LIFE AND LETTERS 
 
 OF 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY CABOT LODGE. 
 
 LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY. 
 
 1878. 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1877, by 
 
 HENRY CABOT LODGE, 
 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 CAMBRIDGE : 
 PRESS OF JOHN WILSON AND SON. 
 
TO 
 
 MY MOTHER, 
 
 THIS MEMOIR OF HER GRANDFATHER IS 
 AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED. 
 
 H. C. L. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 A SENTIMENT of respect for the memory of my great 
 grandfather, and a desire to rescue his name if possible 
 from complete oblivion, induced me to undertake the work 
 of which this volume is the result. The difficulties in my 
 way at first seemed insurmountable. Mr. Cabot, shortly 
 before his death, made an almost complete destruction of all 
 ./his letters and papers ; and I had, therefore, no material for 
 a biography in the best sense of the word. Mr. Cabot s 
 correspondents, however, had preserved his letters; and 
 examination led me to believe that they were of consider 
 able historical value. Selections from these letters form 
 the principal part of this volume. Being debarred by the 
 nature of my only materials from writing a suitable biog 
 raphy, and not considering that a history of any period 
 could be properly treated in a work relating exclusively 
 to an individual, I was forced to confine myself to the 
 task of simply editing those letters which seemed to merit 
 publication. With this object, I have prefixed to each 
 chapter a short account of Mr. Cabot s public life, and of 
 such events as happened during the period covered by 
 the letters and alluded to in them. These introductory 
 passages and the notes as well have been written with 
 the sole purpose of rendering the accompanying letters 
 intelligible. 
 
Vi PREFACE. 
 
 Only once have I exceeded the bounds which I pre 
 scribed to myself, and that is in regard to the Hartford 
 Convention. The life of the President of that once fa 
 mous body seemed to me a fit place and a sufficient 
 excuse for tracing its history in some detail, and I was 
 still further encouraged to do this by the abundance of 
 new material offered to me in the Pickering MSS. and 
 by the letters of Governor Strong. I must confess that 
 my single excursion beyond the editorial paling has been 
 a protracted one, but I hope it will not be deemed either 
 unjustifiable or wholly useless. 
 
 I have endeavored throughout to be scrupulously accu 
 rate and fair in all my statements, but I have not sought 
 in treating New England Federalism to write a judicial 
 and impartial history of the country. My object was to 
 present one side, and that the Federalist, in the strong 
 est and clearest light. I wished to give as vivid a picture 
 as I could of the opinions and feelings of those- men among 
 whom Mr. Cabot was prominent. To do this, I have been 
 obliged to trace the actions and policy of the Democratic 
 party and of its famous leader, in order to show how 
 they appeared to the Federalists. To the feelings of the 
 latter toward their opponents, I am conscious that I have 
 done but scant justice, and that they would deem my ver 
 sion of their opinions a feeble reproduction ; but neither 
 sympathy nor intention, however genuine, can now revive 
 on paper in all its force the intense party spirit of seventy- 
 five years ago. Unfortunately, the path of New England 
 Federalism lies over many battlefields beside those fought 
 with its legitimate and natural enemies. Its fiercest strug 
 gles were within its own ranks, and the feuds of 1798- 
 1800 were never wholly at rest except in the grave of the 
 party itself. I have striven to be impartial in dealing with 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 these controversies, and I have wished to award to both 
 sides their fair share of blame or praise. 
 
 I ought to say here a few words in regard to the let 
 ters, and the sources from which some of them have been 
 drawn. Nearly all of those addressed to Hamilton have 
 been printed before in his works, and a large proportion of 
 those to Wolcott have appeared in Gibbs s " Administra 
 tions of Washington and Adams." A small number also of 
 those to Colonel Pickering have appeared in his Life by 
 Mr. Upham. All the others are, with hardly an exception, 
 now published for the first time. I have printed every thing 
 which seemed to me of any historical value ; and I have 
 given the letters exactly as they were written, without any 
 alteration, and without the suppression of any passage, 
 except in the case of a single paragraph too personal in 
 its nature to warrant publication. I ought to add that 
 this omitted paragraph did not occur in a letter written 
 by Mr. Cabot. 
 
 All the letters to or from Colonel Pickering, except 
 those to Governor Strong, are taken from the Pickering 
 papers, now in the possession of the Massachusetts His 
 torical Society ; and those to and from Wolcott, from the 
 Wolcott MSS., in the custody of the Historical Society of 
 Connecticut. The Hamilton and Washington letters are 
 among the national archives, but all the rest are in my 
 possession or in that of other private individuals. 
 
 In the matter of references, I have tried to be as spar 
 ing as possible, and have cited chapter and verse only for 
 literal quotations, or for the support of statements requir 
 ing the fullest proof. For those general facts which can 
 be easily verified by referring to the State Papers or the 
 Annals of Congress, I have not deemed it necessary, in a 
 work of this nature, to give elaborate authorities. 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 I have now only to return thanks for the many 
 kindnesses which I have received. I am especially in 
 debted to my friend, Professor HENRY ADAMS, for many 
 suggestions and for much valuable aid. To HENRY LEE, 
 Esq., I am under many obligations for the most un 
 wearied assistance and for much encouragement, and to 
 Dr. EDWARD STRONG I owe a special debt for the generous 
 kindness with which he placed the correspondence of his 
 grandfather at my disposal. To thank individually the 
 many others who have helped me so readily and in so 
 many ways would unreasonably lengthen an already long 
 preface ; and I must ask them, therefore, to accept my 
 acknowledgments collectively, and to be assured of my 
 sincere gratitude. I trust the result is not wholly unde 
 serving of the interest so kindly shown by many persons 
 in the undertaking ; but I shall, for my own part, be sat 
 isfied if I have made a slight contribution to the history 
 of my country. 
 
 HENRY CABOT LODGE. 
 
 EAST POINT, NAHANT, June, 1877. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 1751-1775. 
 
 The Name and Family of Cabot. Birth of George Cabot. Educa 
 tion. Leaves Harvard College. Enters Merchant Service. Rises 
 to be Captain. Results of this Experience 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 1775-1790. 
 
 Business Relations. Marriage. Town Affairs. Privateering. 
 Committee of Town to consider Constitution. Convention at Con 
 cord. Convention to form State Constitution. Convention to 
 adopt Federal Constitution. Correspondence 11 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 1791-1792. 
 The United States Senate 38 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 1792-1796. 
 The United States Senate 59 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 1796-1798. 
 
 Retreat from Politics. Suggested for the French Commission. Polit 
 ical Services. Correspondence 97 
 
X CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 1798. 
 
 Declines Secretaryship of Navy. Renewed Political Activity. 
 Affair of the Major-Generals. Opinion of Gerry and Marshall. 
 Correspondence 143 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 1799. 
 
 The Second Mission to France. Views of Mr. Cabot. Corre 
 spondence 191 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 1800. 
 
 Dissensions of Federalists. Hamilton s Pamphlet. Presidential 
 
 Election. Correspondence 256 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 1801-1806. 
 
 Private Life. Society. Business. Occupations. Political Mat 
 ters. Correspondence 301 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 1807-1814. 
 
 The British Orders in Council. The French Decrees. The Em 
 bargo. Mr. Cabot takes part in the Elections of 1808. Is chosen 
 a Member of the Council. Death of Ames. Publication of 
 Ames s Works. Mr. Cabot undertakes to edit Ames s Letters. 
 Views as to Charges of " British Faction " and of Design to dissolve 
 the Union. Death of Mr. Cabot s Eldest Son, Charles. Views in 
 regard to War of 1812. Correspondence 364 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 1800-1805. 
 New England Federalism and the Hartford Convention ...... 410 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 * 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 1804-1815. 
 New England Federalism and the Hartford Convention . . . 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 1812-1815. 
 Correspondence relating to the Hartford Convention 627 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 1815-1823. 
 
 Last Years of Mr. Cabot s Life. Withdrawal from Politics. 
 Occupations. Illness and Death. Personal Appearance. 
 Private Character. Political Opinions. Influence in the Com 
 munity. Respect in which he was held. Religious Belief. 
 Conclusion . 564 
 
 POLITICAL WHITINGS 581 
 
 APPENDIX 601 
 
 INDEX or LETTERS 605 
 
 GENERAL INDEX ... .607 
 
THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 1751-1775. 
 
 The Name and Family of Cabot. Birth of George Cabot Education. 
 Leaves Harvard College. Enters Merchant Service. Rises to be 
 Captain. Results of this Experience. 
 
 AMONG the names on the "auncient role," given by 
 Stow, 1 of "the chiefe Noblemen & Gentlemen, which 
 came into England with William the Conqueror," is 
 that of Cabot. What became of this adventurer who fol 
 lowed Duke William is unknown : he is a mere name 
 upon an old parchment; the barren list does not even 
 tell the place whence he came. Modern research, how 
 ever, has traced the numerous branches of the Cabot fam 
 ily back to one stem, which has flourished in the Island of 
 Jersey since a time when the memory of man runneth not 
 to the contrary. It is mere conjecture to connect William s 
 follower with those of like name in the Channel Islands ; 
 but the conjecture has the merit of probability, since 
 Normans had possessed the island long before the memo 
 rable year A.D. 1066. 2 This occurrence on the " auncient 
 
 1 Chronicle of England, John Stow, London, 1632, p. 107. The original 
 title of the role reads, "Cognomina Conquisitorum Anglise cum Domino 
 Gulielmo Duce Normannise et Conquistore Angliae." 
 
 2 The Chabot family of Poitou, afterwards so celebrated in French his 
 tory, is said to have been in Poitou since 1041. The Cabot of the " auncient 
 role " may possibly have been a Poitou Chabot, and one of William s merce 
 naries ; but it is more natural to suppose that he was one of the island race. 
 
 1 
 
2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1751-75. 
 
 role " of the Cabot name is certainly its first historical 
 appearance, and, taken in connection with the remote 
 origin of the Jersey stock, seems to settle the purely 
 Norman extraction of the family. 1 
 
 Many centuries intervened before the world heard of 
 another Cabot. The name first reappears at the time of 
 the great navigators, John and Sebastian. We know the 
 story of the discoveries which made them famous ; but, of 
 the men themselves, hardly more has been preserved than 
 of their namesake who followed Duke William into Eng 
 land. 
 
 To the connection of John and Sebastian with the discov 
 ery of this continent is probably due the claim of descent from 
 them that has been made by American Cabots, but for which 
 there is no sufficient foundation. The only evidence ever 
 adduced in its support has been a chance resemblance in face 
 and feature, an heirloom, 2 or some extremely vague tradi- 
 
 The arms of the Poitou Chabots and the Jersey Cabots are almost identical, 
 and they probably had a common origin. See Hoefer s Biographie Univ., 
 art. Chabot. The Norman Cabots were of Jersey origin. Their arms differed 
 from those of the Jersey Cabots and the Poitou Chabots, being " argent ; three 
 leopards heads sable." But they are, nevertheless, of the same family ; 
 for their arms are found upon the bell of the old church of St. Trinity, in 
 Jersey. See Armorial of Jersey, by J. Bertrand Payne, pp. 23-50. 
 
 1 The following passages illustrate the purity of the Norman race in Jersey. 
 " This identity Jersey preserved almost intact until the commencement of the 
 present century. Laws, habits, and customs have been handed down with 
 astonishing fidelity. The clameur de Haro the legacy of Rollo s stern j ustice, 
 although disregarded and ignored in its first home, is here as potent as ever." 
 " Until comparatively a recent period, little or no alien blood flowed in the 
 veins of the Jersey folk, and in them continued the main features of their 
 nationality ; while persecution and tyranny have so far debased the modern 
 inhabitant of Normandy as to leave in him but few traces of his heroic 
 ancestry. The Jersiais are fully aware of the degeneracy of their conti 
 nental neighbors ; for when one of the lower classes would express the ne 
 plus ultra of contempt for an antagonist, he sums it up in the significant 
 phrase, Tu es Normand. " " Hardy, abstemious, clever, brave, and warlike, 
 the Normans earned for themselves a home on the fair borders of France, 
 where they flourished while all around them was misery and wretchedness. 
 Then it was that Jersey was part and parcel of their domain." Armorial 
 of Jersey, Payne, pp. 11, 12. 
 
 2 The heirloom referred to here is a mourning-ring, over two hundred 
 
1751-75.] THE CABO x FAMILY. 3 
 
 tion ; while careful investigation has never been able to dis 
 cover the necessary links in the pedigree. There is only one 
 bond which can be sustained even by reasonable conjecture. 
 The New England family came from Jersey, where there 
 are two parishes still inhabited almost exclusively by 
 Cabots. There can be little doubt that this was the origi 
 nal home of the race, which in numbers and social arrange 
 ments is not unlike a Scottish clan. Persons of all classes 
 in the community possessed a common name and common 
 origin, but beyond this there was no relationship among 
 them. 1 The name is found also in France, England, Bel 
 gium, and Italy ; and this ubiquity, at first sight, seems 
 to contradict the theory of a single stock. But a sure 
 test exists which proves the derivation of the scattered 
 branches from one source. The coat-of-arins of the Jersey 
 family is perfectly defined and well known. The device is 
 three fishes, 2 or, in the Jersey phrase, " three chabots ; " and, 
 by this charge upon the coat-of-arms, the origin of those 
 who bore the name in other countries can be determined. 
 The fishes are found crossed with the Rohan arms, when one 
 of that great family married a Chabot of Poitou, and one of 
 the most distinguished branches of the same family is that 
 of Rohan-Chabot. 3 They were borne by an Italian Cardi- 
 
 years old, with the name " Sebastian Cabot " engraved upon it. It is now 
 in the possession of the family of the late Mr. C. C. Foster, of Cambridge. 
 
 1 Mr. George E. Waring, in his " Farmer s Vacation," speaks as follows 
 of the Jersey society : " The gentry invariably cultivate their own estates, 
 and indeed one is at a loss to learn where gentry ends and peasantry begins. 
 The best names in the island are borne by the small landholders as well as 
 by the larger, and cousinship links the population into a very compact com 
 munity." (p. 183.) 
 
 2 A charge corresponding with the family name is known to heraldry as 
 " armes parlantes," and is one of the oldest kinds of devices, forming the 
 connecting link between the primitive personal badge and the heraldic bear 
 ings with which we are familiar. (Armorial of Jersey, p. 7.) The arms 
 stamped upon this volume are taken partly from a design made for Mr. 
 Samuel Cabot, of Boston, at the close of the last century, and partly from 
 the " Armorial," and Moule s " Heraldry of Fish." 
 
 8 See Etat Pre sent de la Noblesse Franpaise. Bachelin de Florenne, art, 
 Rohan-Chabot, p. 1601, 4me eU, 1873-1874. 
 
4 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1751-75. 
 
 nal of the last century, and they are still preserved unal 
 tered by the family in America. 1 The Cabots, like their 
 northern ancestors, were a wandering race; and, as the 
 little channel island offered no field for advancement, the 
 more adventurous spirits were driven out into the world 
 to seek their fortune. The nationality even of John Cabot, 
 the discoverer, is still uncertain ; for modern investigation 
 has cast doubt upon the usually accepted story of his 
 Venetian birth. 2 His course of life and personal character 
 istics would lead us to suppose him of the island race ; and 
 this supposition is converted into certainty by the identity 
 of arms and motto, as borne by the French descendants of 
 the discoverer, with those of the Jersey family. 3 To claim 
 descent from him, however, is quite another matter, and de 
 mands much more direct evidence than any yet brought for 
 ward by those who in this country lay claim to the honor. 
 For every Cabot to consider himself a descendant of John 
 Cabot, the discoverer, or of Chabot, the Admiral of France 
 and patron of Jacques Cartier, is very much as if every 
 Cameron claimed descent from Lochiel or every Campbell 
 from the Dukes of Argyll. Such relationship is purely 
 theoretical ; but it is all to which the New England 
 Cabots are fairly entitled, in regard to those distin 
 guished men who have borne the name in other coun 
 tries and in past times. If any further and more positive 
 proof were needed on this point, it is amply supplied by 
 the genealogy of the American family, which has been 
 
 1 See F^tat Present de la Noblesse frar^aise, as above, articles Cabot, 
 Chabot, and Chabot la Tour. 
 
 2 Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, Rawdon Brown, 1202-1509, 743 
 and 753 ; Life of Sebastian Cabot, Mcholls, London, 1869. 
 
 8 Armorial de Languedoc, L. de la Roque, Tome II. 163. The French 
 Cabots trace their descent from Louis, John Cabot s second son. M. de la 
 Roque says Sebastian died without issue, but gives no proof of this asser 
 tion. He also states the Jersey and American Cabots to be of the same 
 family as the navigators. The identity of arms and motto can leave but 
 little doubt on this last point. 
 
1751-75.] THE CABOT FAMILY. 5 
 
 accurately traced, 1 and which the most patient labor has 
 failed to carry beyond the parents of those who first emi 
 grated to Massachusetts. 
 
 With this explanation as to the name and family, the 
 region of conjecture and speculation may be left, and the 
 history of the New England family briefly and surely 
 sketched from the certain testimony of legal records and 
 family papers. Some time in the latter half of the sev 
 enteenth century, Frangois Cabot, of St. Trinity, a large 
 land-owner and wealthy man, 2 married Suzanne Gruchy. 3 
 In 1677, a son of theirs was baptized George in the St. 
 Heliers Church, whose records show that three years later 
 another son received the name of Jean. There was also an 
 older son, whose baptism is not recorded, named Frangois. 
 About 1699, old deeds conveying land at St. Heliers bear 
 witness that the three sons just named sold a large amount of 
 real estate ; and soon afterwards, apparently, they emigrated 
 to Massachusetts. Of Frangois, nothing is known after his 
 arrival in America, except the bare fact that he was a ship 
 owner and merchant in conjunction with his brother George. 
 The latter was rated as a tax-payer in Salem, in 1700 ; and 
 in a conveyance of Jersey land made in the following year 
 is described as a joiner. Soon after his arrival, George 
 Cabot made a good marriage, obtaining the hand of Abigail 
 Marston, of Salem, daughter of Benjamin Marston and 
 Patience Rogers. Mrs. Cabot died in 1709, and her hus 
 band survived her less than a year. Whether George 
 Cabot pursued his trade in his new home is not known ; 
 
 1 For nearly all that follows in regard to the New England family, I am 
 indebted to the kindness of Henry Lee, Esq., by whose careful investiga 
 tions the Cabot genealogy has been fully settled. 
 
 2 Mr. Payne says, in regard to the Cabot family, " The eldest branch of 
 this family, which formerly held much landed property in the parish of 
 St. Trinity, emigrated to America in the person of George Cabot," &c. 
 Armorial of Jersey, p. 50. Mr. Payne connects the Cabots of St. Trinity 
 with both the Chabots of Poitou and the Cabots of Normandy. 
 
 3 Suzanne Gruchy was of the same family as the Marshal Grouchy of 
 Napoleon s time, who did not come up at Waterloo. See Armorial of Jersey, 
 p. 120. 
 
6 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1751-75. 
 
 but old business letters preserve the memory of various 
 mercantile enterprises, in which he was engaged with his 
 brother Frarigois. Mr. Felt, in his " Annals of Salem," l 
 speaks of Benjamin Marston s house as the first brick house 
 built in Salem ; and he says the mason and builder was 
 George Cabot. As I have just stated, George Cabot mar 
 ried Marston s daughter ; but whether he obtained her 
 hand after services rendered to her father as a mason, or 
 whether from superior knowledge he was enabled to direct 
 the construction of his father-in-law s house, and was there 
 fore supposed to be a mason, I am unable to determine. 
 The presumption, however, is strong that the first George 
 Cabot, though a jack-of -all-trades, was master of none ; 
 for neither inherited property, nor skill in the joiner s 
 or mason s crafts, nor ventures at sea, were able to save 
 him from ultimate failure. Whatever his occupation, it 
 is certain that he was unsuccessful, and at his death 
 his estate was found to be insolvent. George Cabot left 
 two children, one daughter, and one son named Mars- 
 ton Cabot. Marston was first cared for by his mother s 
 family, but afterwards was adopted by his paternal uncle, 
 and in 1720 entered Harvard College in the same class 
 with his cousin, John. Despite the apparent generosity of 
 John Cabot to his brother s orphan children, the rela 
 tions between the nephew and uncle do not seem to have 
 been pleasant. While still a boy and about to enter col 
 lege, Marston Cabot, and his uncle Benjamin Marston as 
 well, wrote to his grandmother in Jersey, asking assistance, 
 and deprecating a state of dependence on his uncle John. 2 
 Graduating in 1724, Marston Cabot entered the ministry, 
 and removed to Killingly, Conn., to take charge of a parish. 
 He there married, begot thirteen children, published a few 
 sermons, and before he had completed his fiftieth year died 
 
 1 Annals of Salem, I. 414. Mr. Felt cites no authority in support of 
 this statement, and I have relied solely on his well-known accuracy. 
 
 2 See N. E. Hist, and Gen. Register, XXVII. 294. 
 
1751-75.] THE CABOT FAMILY. 7 
 
 suddenly one Sunday morning in his pulpit. His descend 
 ants still live in Connecticut. 
 
 John Cabot, the youngest of the three emigrant brothers, 
 also came to Salem in 1700 ; and, like his brother George, 
 made a fortunate marriage. His wife, Anna Orne, belonged 
 to one of the prominent Essex families of the earliest Eng 
 lish emigration. In no other respect, however, does the 
 resemblance of John Cabot s career hold with that of his 
 older brother. Unlike George, he prospered greatly in 
 business, became a leading merchant, 1 and built himself a 
 goodly house in Salem. Indeed, we have a right to believe 
 that John Cabot brought a considerable amount of property 
 with him to his new home. Not only the circumstances of 
 his marriage point to this, but Colonel Benjamin Pickman, 2 
 in describing the old houses of Salem, mentions John Cabot s 
 house as dating from the year 1700. The house could 
 hardly have been as old as this ; but Pickman s evidence 
 shows that John Cabot, almost immediately upon his arri 
 val, was rich enough to build what was considered for many 
 years afterwards one of the handsomest of the Salem houses. 
 He was certainly not a needy adventurer in the New World, 
 but followed the example of many of his prosperous coun 
 trymen 3 in emigrating to Salem. He had nine children. 
 The oldest son, John, was admitted to Harvard, as already 
 mentioned, in 1720, together with his cousin Marston, and 
 after graduation studied medicine, and practised success 
 fully as a physician. The youngest son of this numerous 
 
 1 Samuel Gardner, in his Journal, mentions John Cabot s interests in the 
 fisheries (Essex Institute, II. 252) ; and, in a description of some rare coins 
 sold not long since in Salem, it is said this coin was given by an " eminent 
 merchant, John Cabot, of Salem," to his daughter Margaret, on her mar 
 riage with Benjamin Gerrish, afterwards royal Governor of the Bermudas. 
 Essex Institute, V. 31 ; Felt s Annals, first edition, p. 443. 
 
 2 Proceedings of Essex Institute, Pickman s notes, VI. 107. 
 
 8 The Englishes, afterwards distinguished in Salem history, were from 
 Jersey, and settled in Salem as early as 1670. Lefavour was the name of 
 Still another Salem family of Jersey origin. See Essex Institute Proc., 
 I. 158. 
 
8 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1751-75. 
 
 family, who was named Joseph, entered into business, like 
 his father, and was equally prosperous. He remained in 
 Salem, and married Elizabeth Higginson, a direct descend 
 ant in the fifth generation from Francis Higginson, the 
 first minister of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Nine 
 sons and two daughters were the fruits of this marriage. 
 The seventh child and fifth son of Joseph Cabot was George 
 Cabot, the subject of this memoir, born Dec. 16, 1751. 
 Owing to the careless and wanton destruction of family 
 papers, little is now known of George Cabot s early years. 
 His childhood was passed amidst the healthy and sober 
 influences of a well-ordered New England household, and 
 in the pure, invigorating atmosphere of a thriving Purir 
 tan town. His father was a prosperous and upright man, 
 and his mother a woman of strong understanding and 
 firm character. He was educated at the best schools of 
 the day, where he displayed so much proficiency in his 
 studies that in 1766 his father sent him to Harvard Col 
 lege. At that time, the oldest son appears to have been 
 usually the only recipient of the highest education ; and 
 the selection of George was therefore a parental compli 
 ment to his boyish powers. Two years after George entered 
 college, his father died. In his will he provided : 
 
 " That my son George, who now belongs to Harvard Colledge, 
 shall be supported and maintained by and out of my estate, 
 while he shall belong to said Colledge, (i.e.} untill he shall have 
 taken one Degree there ; or untill the time which according to the 
 Common Usage shall or ought to be appointed for giving Degrees 
 to the Class to which he belongs, or is a member of ; the said 
 George continuing to belong to said Colledge and not being 
 expelled." 
 
 Although Joseph Cabot was esteemed a wealthy man, 
 his property, when divided among the widow and nine chil 
 dren, yielded but six hundred pounds to each of the younger 
 ones, a narrow inheritance, even in those days of small 
 
1751-75.J 
 
 EDUCATION. 9 
 
 things. Unwilling to be a charge upon his father s estate, 
 in accordance with the terms of the will, and probably still 
 more unwilling to diminish his already slender patrimony, 
 George left college at the end of his Sophomore year, and, 
 true to the Essex customs, went to seek his fortune at sea. 
 Not yet seventeen years old, he shipped as cabin-boy in a 
 vessel commanded by his brother-in-law, Mr. Joseph Lee. 
 Such a change in his mode of life must have been a sharp 
 one to a young collegian of studious habits : nor was his lot 
 softened by relationship with his captain ; for, if family 
 tradition may be trusted, Mr. Lee gave his young kinsman 
 the full benefit of severe ship s discipline. Cabot, however, 
 was not discouraged, but pursued his profession with such 
 success and determination that, before he reached his 
 majority, he was himself in command of a ship. 
 
 This early experience was not without effect upon his after 
 life. By it he was of course deprived of the full advan 
 tages of that classical education to which his tastes strongly 
 impelled him ; but his early contact with the world devel 
 oped manly qualities and knowledge of men, while the 
 responsibilities of his profession demanded reflection, fore 
 thought, and self-command. Yet, though engaged in active 
 pursuits before most boys now leave school, he never lost 
 his love of books. Always a student, he now made the 
 most of the opportunities afforded by travel, and turned 
 his attention to foreign languages. He acquired a good 
 knowledge of French, and became very proficient in 
 Spanish, accomplishments less common then than now. 
 Voyages to foreign countries were likewise beneficial in 
 increasing his understanding of the politics and interests 
 of other nations, and the knowledge so gained proved sub 
 sequently of great value. A strong fancy for natural sci 
 ences led him to devote much time to them ; and he was 
 also fond of metaphysics ; but his favorite subjects were 
 politics and political econoni}^, which continued to be a 
 constant source of study and amusement from the day he 
 
10 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1751-75. 
 
 went to sea to the day of his death. To practice he added 
 theory : for commerce was to him not only a livelihood, 
 but a study ; arid, in later life, the knowledge of commercial 
 laws and necessities thus acquired gave him a position of 
 authority in regard to all such topics. Among the New 
 Englanders, the men of Boston and Salem, of Marblehead 
 and Newburyport, George Cabot was only one of many 
 whose minds ripened into a peculiar flavor, and grew strong 
 with a robust and masculine vigor, in this school which never 
 failed to leave on its scholars a characteristic stamp of the 
 quarter-deck and a dash of salt water. For this it was 
 well worth while to sacrifice two years of a college life, 
 which in those days was neither highly cultivated nor 
 deeply scientific. Books and independent thinking were 
 always the great pleasures and resources of his life, and as 
 long as he had opportunity for them he was content. Such 
 methods of instruction were not calculated to develop the 
 imagination, but they were eminently fitted to stimulate 
 the growth of those talents most needed in the American 
 Colonies. Mr. Cabot s education had the same defects and 
 the same advantages as that of his contemporaries : it was 
 typical of the mode of thought and manner of life which 
 bred up a class of clear-headed, strong-willed, sensible men, 
 at a time when the sentimentalism, which at a later day 
 flooded the country, would have been ruinous. Such edu 
 cation was essentially practical, but its practicality was of 
 that sort which seeks in past experience a guide for future 
 action. The men of that age, while striking out for them 
 selves a new path in a new country, never fell into the mis 
 take of abandoning practice in favor of theory. They may 
 possibly have leaned too strongly in the other direction, but 
 to look at facts as they were was the lesson which their 
 early life had taught them ; and if from lack of imagination 
 they went too far in their contempt for theory, at least they 
 understood what they meant, and maintained their own 
 cause with a native shrewdness and tenacity which stamp 
 them as men of a peculiar mould. 
 
1776-90.] BUSINESS RELATIONS. MARRIAGE. 11 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 1775-1790. 
 
 Business Relations. Marriage. Town Affairs. Privateering. Com 
 mittee of Town to consider Constitution. Convention at Concord. 
 Convention to form State Constitution. Convention to adopt Federal 
 Constitution. Correspondence. 
 
 MR. CABOT soon abandoned the career of a sea captain 
 for that of a merchant, and was joined in many business 
 adventures with his brother-in-law, Mr. Joseph Lee, with 
 whom, in 1785, he formed a partnership. Mr. Lee and 
 Mr. Cabot were both engaged in the same trade that they 
 had severally pursued when in command of ships. They 
 prospered in their business, and became large ship-owners 
 and merchants. They were established in Beverly, then 
 considered by its inhabitants the great New England sea 
 port of the future. This belief was common to all Essex 
 towns possessing a good harbor; and its gradual extinc 
 tion, as the tide of prosperity flowed steadily towards Bos 
 ton, is very striking. Despite the troubles with England, 
 the Essex commerce had much increased and the little 
 trading towns flattered themselves with the hope that they 
 were on the threshold of a great career. The town and 
 its young merchants during those years throve together; 
 and the partnership afterwards formed between Mr. Lee 
 and Mr. Cabot continued until both removed from Beverly. 
 In 1774, Mr. Cabot was married to his double-first-cousin, 
 Elizabeth Higginson. This union was destined to be both 
 long and happy. Mrs. Cabot possessed unusual mental 
 powers, together with great force of character and strength 
 
12 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 of will ; while at the same time she did not lack the more 
 attractive and more essential qualities of her sex. 1 
 
 Mr. Cabot always took a warm interest in town affairs, 
 and in the town meetings learned, like so many other New 
 
 1 Mr. John Lowell, the well-known lawyer and writer of the early part of 
 this century, in a letter to his cousin, Mr. Stephen Higginson, on the death 
 
 of Mrs. Cabot, speaks of her as follows : 
 
 JULY 17, 1826. 
 
 . . . We have lost, my dear cousin, one of the last of a race, of whom we 
 may justly be proud; and it is no alleviation to our deep, and to us both, 
 sincere regret at the departure of our dear aunt that we have little reason 
 to expect to see her equal in any of our families. It is not the course of 
 the world to estimate justly female merit. The present age is somewhat 
 more correct in this respect ; but still many an accomplished woman, with 
 high and elevated powers, passes off the stage with little notice, while a man 
 of far inferior natural powers, from the adventitious circumstance of his 
 having held offices which a female of great talents would have better sus 
 tained, fills the world for a time with his posthumous praises. I do not 
 quarrel with this state of public feeling, because it was part of the wise 
 system of Providence that the province of the two sexes should be separate. 
 Still, however, that same Providence occasionally permits that some gifted 
 females should appear, who seem by their talents calculated to rule rather 
 than obey. Of this last description was our revered departed friend. She 
 had all the firmness, vigor, resolution, penetration, capacity to form and 
 express her thoughts in a strong, clear, and masculine style, which are 
 found in men of the firmest, boldest, and most elevated temperament and 
 mind. If she had been called like Elizabeth to stations of great power, she 
 would have been like her, prudent, energetic, and commanding. She had 
 none of the advantages of early education afforded so bountifully to the 
 young ladies of the present age; but she surpassed all of them in the acute- 
 ness of her observation, in the knowledge of human nature, and in her 
 powers of expressing and defending the opinions which she had formed. 
 Without systematic knowledge, her mind was filled with information on 
 every topic interesting to us in this world. No doubt she derived great bene 
 fit from the intercourse with one of the most luminous minds of the age, 
 with whom for nearly fifty years she was associated. With these great 
 qualities, for great they were, she had a full share of all the virtues of her 
 sex. Her firmness and resolution were mingled with kindness and tenderness 
 and affection for her own children and all her numerous friends. It is a 
 pleasure to me, and it will be to you, to take this retrospective view of her 
 life and character. To me, it is a deep loss ; for there remains not another 
 mind, in a perfect state, to whom I can look up for sympathy among a 
 departed and departing race, very dear to me. J. LOWELL. 
 
 This is a good portrait of the best type of New England woman in 
 the last century. I owe this letter to the kindness of Miss Anna Cabot 
 Lowell. 
 
1775-90.] 
 
 PRIVATEERING. 13 
 
 Englanders, his first lessons in parliamentary debate and 
 in the art of popular self-government. The only town 
 office ever held by Mr. Cabot was that of fire-ward, in 
 1787 ; but he was ever active in the support of all pro 
 jects that could promote the prosperity of Beverly. In 
 1787, the scheme of the Essex Bridge, to connect the towns 
 of Salem and Beverly, was proposed ; and Mr. Cabot was 
 the first named in the act of incorporation. He was sub 
 sequently director and president of the Bridge Company, 
 and gave much time and attention to the speedy comple 
 tion of what was then regarded as a great undertaking. 
 
 Mr. Cabot s marriage had taken place just as the country 
 was actually involved in war. In the troubles which pre 
 ceded the actual outbreak of hostilities, and throughout 
 the Revolution, Mr. Cabot and all his family and friends 
 warmly espoused the " patriotic " side. When war began, 
 the men of Essex turned naturally to the sea as the ele 
 ment on which they could best serve their country. 
 They were more fortunate in their choice than most of 
 their fellow-citizens ; for privateering, the only naval war 
 fare possible to the colonists, was not only patriotic, but 
 profitable to those engaged. The Essex ships were scat 
 tered in all directions, and preyed upon English com 
 merce with great prejudice to the enemy, and much benefit 
 to themselves and their country. Many of these priva 
 teers were owned by the Cabots and Lees, and had notable 
 success. The "Cicero," one of Mr. Cabot s ships, was 
 commanded by Captain Hugh Hill, a man of great daring 
 and well known at that time. Andrew Cabot s ship 
 " Defiance," also a privateer, was destroyed in the ill- 
 starred Penobscot expedition of 1779. 1 The younger mem- 
 
 1 Curwen, himself an Essex man, in his Journal (p. 234), speaks with a 
 slight touch of loyalist bitterness of the success of his former friends : " The 
 Cabots of Beverly, who, you know, had but five years ago a very moderate 
 share of property, are now said to be by far the most wealthy in New Eng 
 land. Hasket Derby claims the second place on the list." . . . This was in 
 
14 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 bers of the family served their country in other ways. 
 Mr. Cabot s younger brother, Francis, was in Colonel 
 Pickering s regiment on his Rhode Island and New York 
 expedition, and subsequently in Washington s army. 
 
 During these eventful years, Mr. Cabot was often chosen 
 by his fellow-townsmen to represent them in State affairs. 
 In 1778, a Constitution, framed by a committee of the 
 General Court in its capacity as a Convention, was sub 
 mitted to the people. The objections to the instrument 
 were weighty. There was no declaration of rights ; the prin 
 ciple of representation was not a just one ; the powers and 
 duties of the legislature and executive were not properly 
 defined; and the Constitution itself was the work of the 
 General Court, and not of a convention of delegates. 1 On 
 the 22d of May, this Constitution was submitted to the 
 town of Beverly, and rejected by a very large majority 
 of the voters. A committee, consisting of George Cabot, 
 
 1780. Yet even the profitable patriotism of the privateer was not always 
 unattended with sacrifices and misfortunes. Colonel John Trumbull, in his 
 " Reminiscences " (p. 84), says that he took passage at Bilbao for Beverly, 
 in 1781, in the " Cicero," a fine letter-of-marque ship, of twenty guns and one 
 hundred and twenty men, Captain Hill, belonging to the house of Cabot. 
 When Colonel Trumbull joined the ship, she had with her a British Lisbon 
 packet of sixteen guns, which she had just taken as a prize. On his arrival 
 at Beverly, Colonel Trumbull saw lying in the harbor eleven privateers all 
 finer than the " Cicero " in which he had been a passenger, and all belong 
 ing to the Cabots. The following year the same writer speaks of being in 
 Beverly again, and adds that not one of the privateers was to be seen in 
 the harbor. All had been lost, and the Cabots did not have a single letter- 
 of-marque ship afloat. Many of these vessels belonged to John and Andrew 
 Cabot, who, like their brother George, were also Beverly merchants. 
 The translator of Chastellux has a note on the same subject : 
 " The town of Beverly began to flourish greatly towards the conclusion 
 of the war, by the extraordinary spirit of enterprise and great success of 
 the Messrs. Cabot, gentlemen of strong understandings and the most liberal 
 minds, well adapted to the most enlarged commercial undertakings and 
 the business of government. Two of their privateers had the good fortune 
 to capture in the European seas, a few weeks previous to the peace, several 
 West-Indiamen, to the value of at least 100,000 sterling." Chastellux, 
 Travels in North America, translated from the French, London, 1787, II. 
 252, 253. 
 
 1 Barry, Histor} of Massachusetts, 3-175, 176 ; Bradford, II. 158, 159. 
 
1775-90.] TOWN AFFAIKS. 15 
 
 Joseph Willard, 1 and William Bartlett, was then appointed 
 to draft instructions to the town s representative in the 
 General Court, that he might give the precise reasons for the 
 town s dissent. The report submitted by this committee, 
 and adopted by the town, was drawn with considerable 
 ability. Objection was chiefly made on the ground of in 
 equality of representation, and defects in the election of 
 senators. The report concluded in a manner character 
 istic of the New England temper : 
 
 " Good government, we are sensible, is essential to the happi 
 ness of the community ; and this we ardently wish to take place* 
 and shall sincerely endeavor to promote and encourage it. But 
 if any form is offered to us, which we in our consciences think 
 does not tend to the public welfare, but in its consequences is 
 destructive of it, to oppose such form with a decent but manly and 
 zealous freedom and firmness is a duty we owe to ourselves and 
 posterity, and we shall ever esteem ourselves bound to attend to 
 its calls." 
 
 In July, 1779, a State Convention was held at Con 
 cord, to adopt such measures as would tend to appreciate 
 the currency. This was but one of the many visionary 
 attempts to obviate by legislative enactments the sure 
 workings of economic laws. It was then considered possi 
 ble as well as patriotic, by fixing a maximum of prices, to 
 heal the wounds inflicted on the community through war, 
 the ruin of commerce, and disordered finances. Mr. Cabot 
 took a leading part in this Convention, in opposition to the 
 theory that by acts of the legislature men could be forced 
 to sell at reduced rates, and the public be thereby bene 
 fited. The current of popular feeling, however, was too 
 strong to be resisted, and modifications in the report were 
 all that Mr. Cabot obtained. The action of this Conven 
 tion was but an example of many similar ones. States and 
 counties were all engaged in the vain effort to remedy, 
 by law, the inevitable results of war and economic igno- 
 
 1 Afterwards President of Harvard College. 
 
16 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 ranee. Mr. Cabot s course in opposing these generally 
 accepted views merely serves to show the value of his 
 previous studies. In a period when Adam Smith was 
 hardly known, and twenty years before the writings of Say 
 and the Continental school had appeared, to oppose on 
 economic grounds propositions deemed not only wise, but 
 patriotic, shows both independence and liberality of mind. 
 Mr. Cabot was at that time not twenty-nine ; and, although 
 his opposition was fruitless, it was creditable to his courage 
 and judgment. 
 
 In the following summer, August, 1780, Mr. Cabot was 
 elected a delegate by the town of Beverly, to attend the 
 Convention for forming a State Constitution. This Con 
 vention was composed of the best and ablest men in Massa 
 chusetts. Among the members were Samuel and John 
 Adams, John Hancock, John Lowell, Theophilus Parsons, 
 James Sullivan, Levi Lincoln, and Caleb Strong. The 
 Convention, admirably adapted for the work before it, 
 organized on September 1st by the choice of James Bow- 
 doin as President and Samuel Barrett as Secretary. A 
 committee of thirty, twenty-six from the counties and 
 four at large, was appointed to draft a Constitution. 
 The Convention then adjourned to the 28th of October, 
 in order to give the committee time to report, and to allow 
 certain towns, which had not received precepts, to elect 
 delegates. On the reassembling of the Convention, there 
 was much indecisive discussion, followed by an adjourn 
 ment until January, 1781, when the debate was again 
 resumed. The draft of the General Convention was dis 
 cussed clause by clause, and each section was usually 
 entrusted to a sub-committee to redraft and report. The 
 journal of the Convention shows that Mr. Cabot served 
 on several of these sub-committees. 1 The Constitution, as 
 finally submitted, was not, however, adopted without con 
 siderable opposition. The general tendency in the Con- 
 1 Report of the Convention to form a Constitution, Boston, 1780. 
 
1775-90.] THE "ESSEX JUNTO." 17 
 
 vention had been conservative, and the members had made 
 as few innovations as possible. In this they were un 
 doubtedly wise ; but there was a popular party which con 
 sidered that the Constitution had not gone far enough, and 
 had yielded too much to prejudice and tradition. 1 In the 
 ensuing elections, the representatives of the State in Con 
 gress, and some of the more moderate leaders at home, 
 opposed Governor Hancock, the popular candidate, and 
 supported James Bowdoin, who was thought to represent 
 the more conservative elements. It was a vain opposition ; 
 but the contest, though unattended with much virulence, 
 produced a good deal of strong feeling on both sides. Then 
 for the first time may be discerned the uncertain outlines 
 of those divisions which grew steadily during the next few 
 years, took definite shape in the Convention to adopt the 
 Federal Constitution, and finally culminated in two great 
 national parties. It was at this time that Hancock is said 
 to have bestowed on his opponents the title of the " Essex 
 Junto," 2 and this is the first appearance of the name in 
 American politics. Mr. Cabot was so closely connected with 
 the men who are popularly supposed to have formed the 
 " Junto," that it is proper to give some account of that 
 body, which in its day was honored by the invective of Mr. 
 Clay, and by the bitter hostility of both John and John 
 Quincy Adams. The denunciations of these distinguished 
 men, while they leave no doubt as to their respective opin 
 ions, are, nevertheless, vague, and give no clear notion .as to 
 what the object of their invective really was. Judged solelv 
 by the rather uncertain language of its enemies, the 
 " Junto " was a well-defined organization, which for many 
 years exerted a powerful influence on Massachusetts politics 
 and the Federal party. Like most hostile descriptions, 
 this is partly true and partly false ; and I shall try, there- 
 
 1 Barry, 3, 179; Bradford, II. 187; Boston Gazette, March 13, 1780; 
 Austin s Life of Gerry, I. 353. 
 
 2 Memoir of Chief Justice Parsons, p. 48. 
 
 2 
 
18 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 fore, to describe the " Junto," and to decide whether it 
 was really an organized political body, or merely a cant 
 name applied to certain individuals, who usually supported 
 a common policy, and represented a fraction of a large 
 party. The " Junto " was generally supposed to be com 
 posed of such men as Theophilus Parsons, George Cabot, 
 Fisher Ames, Stephen Higginson, the Lowells, Timothy 
 Pickering, &c., and took its name from the county to 
 which most of its reputed members originally belonged. 
 
 The men of Essex were descendants of those who, in the 
 dark days of 1629, followed Endicott into the wilderness. 
 They were of the oldest Puritan stock ; and, after all the 
 modifications of a century and a half, they still retained 
 the marks of their ancestry. The lines were softened, but 
 still distinct ; and the inhabitants of Essex, at the close of 
 the last century, more fully perhaps than those of almost 
 any other New England county, represented the Puritan 
 character both in its strength and its limitations. Strong, 
 honest, in many cases of an almost reckless courage, they 
 were sagacious in civil, and bold in military life. But 
 their intellectual vigor and clear perceptions were in many 
 instances combined with great mental narrowness and 
 rigidity. Then, as always, in the days of Revolution, and 
 in the years when disintegration threatened the country, 
 the men of Puritan descent were foremost. But, when 
 time brought changes and an expansion of ideas, the older 
 generation could not, in Massachusetts, bend sufficiently 
 to the new political forces. They resisted when they 
 could, and, though unconvinced, stoically submitted when 
 resistance was not longer possible. But the services they 
 rendered in trying times may well efface the remembrance 
 of an obstinacy, which proceeded from strength, not from 
 weakness, and by which they were themselves the greatest 
 sufferers. 1 
 
 1 In this description of the " Essex Junto," I have written without espe 
 cial reference to Mr. Cabot, who was of Puritan descent on his mother s 
 side alone. The paragraph is intended to be of general application in 
 regard to the characteristics of the prominent Essex leaders. 
 
1775-90.] THE " ESSEX JUNTO." 19 
 
 Of such material was the " Essex Junto " composed, and 
 such was the nature of most of the leaders. Taken as a 
 whole, they present a striking example of the mixture of 
 sense and prejudice, of liberality and narrowness, of cau 
 tious sagacity and reckless audacity, which has from the 
 beginning marked the New England character. The re 
 puted members of the " Junto " held political power in 
 Massachusetts for more than a quarter of a century, and 
 their successes and failures are a part of the history of the 
 State. The subject is, therefore, of sufficient importance 
 to warrant the introduction here of the only account of the 
 " Essex Junto," by one of its so-called members. This 
 description is from the common-place book or diary of 
 Timothy Pickering ; and the general tone is so character 
 istic of the writer, that, though the incidental political 
 views have no immediate bearing on the present subject, 
 I have ventured to quote the entire passage. On this point, 
 the testimony of Colonel Pickering l and Judge Parsons is 
 of the greatest value ; and it will be seen from their state 
 ment that the theory of an organized body known as the 
 " Junto " has no foundation. 
 
 "THE ESSEX JUNTO." 
 
 " Many persons, in States remote from Massachusetts, seem to 
 have entertained an idea that a number of influential men, origi 
 nally of the county of Essex, had associated and formed an organ 
 ized body, whose object it was to advance a plan of public policy 
 peculiar to themselves, in the administration of the general gov 
 ernment, and particularly in opposition to that administration 
 which, by way of excellence, the actors themselves have chosen to 
 call Republican. And the term Essex Junto has been used, 
 like that of The Hartford Convention, for the purpose of public 
 deception. The innocent the more than innocent, the laudable 
 purpose for which the latter was instituted, I have lately taken 
 occasion briefly to show ; referring any who desired more full and 
 
 1 Colonel Pickering, although absent from Massachusetts in the early 
 days of the " Junto," was afterwards so intimately connected with its reputed 
 members as to be a good witness. 
 
20 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 complete information to the excellent and perfectly satisfactory 
 letters of Mr. Otis. I will now give a brief account of The 
 Essex Junto. 
 
 " Although born in Essex, and residing there during the first two- 
 and-thirty years of my life, and officially well acquainted with the 
 county, I never heard the term Essex Junto ; nor till twenty 
 years -afterwards (in 1797), when the election of John Adams to 
 the office of President of the United States had been ascertained. 
 Having called to see him at his lodgings in Philadelphia (say in 
 January, 1797), he spoke of the issue of the Presidential election, 
 and seemed to be vexed because he had so small a number of votes 
 (only three) over his rival, Thomas Jefferson. This he seemed 
 to think was owing, in part, to some influential men in Massachu 
 setts, who, instead of zealously promoting, were at best but luke 
 warm in regard to his election. There were three in particular, 
 of whom he spoke with warmth, George Cabot, Stephen Hig- 
 ginson, and Theophilus Parsons. All were natives of Essex, and 
 all were my friends. The two former had removed to Boston, and 
 the latter went thither afterwards. 
 
 " These gentlemen, well acquainted with certain peculiarities in 
 Mr. Adams s character, and thinking, doubtless, that the adminis 
 tration of the general government would be at least as safe in 
 the hands of another, were willing, I presume, that his Federal 
 associate in the nomination for President and Vice-President 
 Charles C. Pinckriey, a distinguished citizen of South Carolina 
 should stand at least as high on the electoral list as Mr. Adams 
 himself. It was this indifference, or lukewarmness towards him, 
 as one of the Presidential candidates, that appeared to have excited 
 in Mr. Adams such warmth of resentment, petulantly expressed, 
 as I have in another paper recently mentioned. 
 
 " In one of my conversations with the late Chief Justice Par 
 sons, I asked if he knew the origin of the term Essex Junto. 
 He answered that some time prior to the American Revolution, 
 when Massachusetts was under her charter government, one of the 
 royal governors (all received their appointments from the King 
 of England), having a favorite measure to carry in the Legis 
 lature, was opposed by some able and influential members from 
 the county of Essex, and defeated. The governor, disappointed 
 and irritated, ascribed his defeat to the * Essex Junto. This 
 origin of the name does no discredit to Old Essex. If able and 
 
1775-90.] THE "ESSEX JUNTO." 21 
 
 influential men there and elsewhere in Massachusetts, and in the 
 other States of the Union, had been able to resist and defeat cer 
 tain great measures taken in some of the administrations which 
 succeeded Washington s, they would have been entitled to the last 
 ing gratitude of their country. The men here referred to were 
 those in whom Washington (entertaining the same views and hold 
 ing the same principles in regard to what the public welfare de 
 manded) placed his confidence, while he considered and pronounced 
 the popular leaders of their opponents i the curse of their country. 
 Hence the inference is obvious, that Washington himself and the 
 other eminent Federalists deceased, as well as their Federal sur 
 vivors, would be comprehended in the term Essex Junto. " 
 
 In a letter to George Henry Rose, the British minister 
 to the United States, in 1806, Colonel Pickering has given 
 another description of the "Junto." It tallies exactly 
 with that just quoted, but presents some additional details ; 
 and I therefore insert it : 
 
 " In the National Intelligencer of yesterday, in the remarks 
 on my letter of February 16 to Governor Sullivan, you will see 
 mentioned the Essex Junto, among whom the editor has honored 
 me with a place. This may need explanation to a stranger. 
 
 " Having then been absent many years from my native State, 
 I think the first time I heard the phrase was from the mouth of 
 the late President Adams, just at the moment when he succeeded 
 General Washington in the Presidency. He had understood that 
 the persons comprehended in the term Essex Junto had opposed, at 
 least had not favored, his election [they all knew his pride, his 
 vanity, and his eccentricities], and thereby had committed a deadly 
 sin. Mentioning this to me with some warmth, and in language 
 not very dignified, he pronounced the names of those gentlemen, 
 who were confessedly the principals in that society of friends which 
 he called the * Essex Junto, just as I have written them, George 
 Cabot, Thoph. Parsons, and Steph. Higginson. These gentlemen- 
 now live in Boston, in Suffolk County. Mr. Cabot s character I 
 have already given you. Mr. Higginson is one of the best in 
 formed and most intelligent of our merchants. Aud Mr. Parsons 
 is so eminent a lawyer (and, I might add, a man of universal 
 science) that in New England he is often designated by The 
 Giant of the Law. He is now Chief Justice of Massachusetts, 
 
22 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 and would do honor to either Bench in Westminster Hall. These 
 three gentlemen happened all to have been born in the county of 
 Essex. I esteem it fortunate that the same county gave me birth, 
 and my highest honor to have those gentlemen for my friends." 
 
 From this it appears that the name was originally applied 
 by a royal governor to some of his political opponents; 
 and when first given was still familiar, and of ill-repute 
 in England, 1 although its origin in Massachusetts was far 
 from discreditable. Nevertheless, it was an odious title ; 
 and Hancock meant it to be so, if it is true that he used 
 it against his opponents. Reintroduced at a moment when 
 parties were growing more sharply defined, the old name 
 once revived was not soon abandoned ; and, in the political 
 strife of later times, abuse was lavished upon the " Essex 
 Junto," which would have been almost too strong for 
 the " Cabal " of the Restoration. But to-day this formi 
 dable political engine resolves itself into a cant political 
 term, applied to a certain wing of the Federalist party. 
 
 Shortly after the new Constitution went into operation, 
 Mr. Cabot was chosen a senator from Essex. The Legisla 
 ture of 1782-83 adjourned in the autumn of 1782, until 
 January of the next year. During the time of adjourn 
 ment, a vacancy occurred among the Essex senators ; and 
 Mr. Cabot, having been elected to the position, took his 
 
 1 Although the name had not been used before the days of royal gov 
 ernors, the county of Essex had grasped at political control in Massachu 
 setts at a much earlier period. In 1644, the Essex men turned Winthrop 
 and Dudley out their offices of Federal commissioners, and replaced them 
 with Hathorne and Bradstreet, both of Essex County. By the same com 
 bination, a very formidable attempt was made to dictate the proceedings of 
 the whole government. They aimed to remove the government and the 
 court to their county, and also to obtain four places in the magistracy. Dr. 
 Palfrey says in this connection : " Two hundred years ago, it seems, Essex 
 men were thought to be aspiring to rule the colony, as fifty years ago an 
 Essex Junto was cried out against for its alleged ambition to rule the 
 Commonwealth. A vital local influence has its ebbs and flows, which some 
 times history discloses." (Hist, of New England, II. 157, note.) In the past 
 history of Massachusetts, Essex seems to have ever been the strongest, most 
 ambitious, and most powerful politically of all the counties. 
 
1775-90.] 
 
 THE STATE SENATE. 23 
 
 seat at the opening of the new year. The journals l of the 
 State Senate bear witness to his constant attendance and 
 faithful work ; and this portion of his career is connected 
 with a brief contemporary allusion to his powers as a public 
 speaker. The English translator of Chastellux s " Travels " 
 was in Boston during the winter of 1782-83. He says: 
 " There were then violent debates in the Assembly and the 
 Senate, respecting the duration of the Sabbath. One party 
 were for having it consist of six-and-thirty hours, commenc 
 ing at six o clock on the Saturday evening ; whilst the other 
 insisted on abridging it to eighteen, reckoning from the 
 midnight of Saturday, and finishing at six on the Sunday 
 evening. The former proposition passed the Assembly, where 
 the country interest prevailed ; but was thrown out in the 
 Senate by the predominant interest of the merchants, aided 
 by good sense and the palpable absurdity of such a regula 
 tion in a commercial country abounding with strangers. 
 Mr. Cabot, a very sensible man, and a rich merchant of 
 Beverly, distinguished himself on this occasion by a speech 
 full of eloquence and wit." 2 To the chance presence of a 
 stranger, Mr. Cabot is indebted for the rescue of his speech 
 from oblivion ; and upon his public life at that time 
 the few words of this eye-witness throw a passing gleam of 
 light. The unexpired term for which Mr. Cabot had been 
 chosen lasted only to May, 1783 ; and, although urged 
 to continue in office, he declined a re-election. 
 
 In the recurring political struggles, Mr. Cabot warmly 
 espoused the cause of the party opposed to Hancock, and 
 gave his support to Bowdoin. Not only association, but 
 character and modes of thought, made any thing except a 
 quiet, though vigorous, conservatism impossible to him. At 
 this time (1780-88) there were no political parties, in 
 the strict sense of the term. The war had but just ceased, 
 and society was in a state of solution : old things had passed 
 
 1 See manuscript Journals of Massachusetts Senate for the years 1782, 
 1783, at the State House in Boston. 
 
 2 Chastellux s Travels in North America, translated from the French, 
 London, 1787, II. 383, 384. 
 
24 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 away, but new ones had not yet grown up to take their 
 place. The men who then were masters had all alike been 
 Whigs and patriots. In other words, one party had pre 
 vailed to such an extent that no other existed. But in the 
 opposition to Governor Hancock, as I have said, the germs 
 of the new divisions may be discovered. The political dif 
 ferences for some time developed slowly ; but, during the 
 confusion of the years which succeeded the close of the 
 war, the conservative elements gradually gathered strength. 
 Bowdoin was elected governor in 1784, and held office until 
 the close of the Shays rebellion. His vigorous and manly 
 course in that insurrection destroyed his personal popular 
 ity ; but the party which had supported him gained in 
 force and consistency from the strong reaction against the 
 anarchy of the Confederation. 1 
 
 In 1788, the Massachusetts Convention to consider the 
 adoption of the Constitution met. The Federalists were 
 in a minority ; and the majority opposed to them was for 
 midable and determined. But the "friends of the Con 
 stitution," as they were then called, whose leaders were 
 Rufus King, Ames, Parsons, Cabot, and others of the same 
 stamp, possessed great ability, and had the advantage of 
 definite purpose and cordial co-operation. Their opponents, 
 though without much ability, were strong numerically, and 
 powerfully supported by local prejudices. The appearance 
 of many of Shays s partisans lent bitterness to the conflict ; 
 but, if these insurrectionists added to the numbers and per 
 sistency of the opposition, they in no less degree roused the 
 zeal of the Federalists, thus brought face to face with the 
 recent promoters of rebellion. 2 
 
 Between the contending parties stood two men of high 
 position, great influence, and almost unbounded popularity. 
 John Hancock and Samuel Adams were able to insure 
 success to those who secured their support ; but their opin- 
 
 1 Massachusetts elected delegates in 1786 to attend the Annapolis Con 
 vention, and Mr. Cabot s name was placed at the head of the list. The Con 
 vention dispersed before the Massachusetts delegates had left their State, but 
 Mr. Cabot s selection for this office shows his early prominence among the 
 advocates of a better government. 
 
 2 For the composition of the Anti-Federalist party, see Drake s Mem. of 
 Knox, p. 97. 
 
1775-90.] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1788. 25 
 
 ions were not known. The Federalists, thoroughly appre 
 ciating the situation, devoted all their energies to obtain 
 for the new scheme the adherence of the two Revolutionary 
 leaders, in whose hands victory rested. Hancock was 
 easily dealt with. The Federalist leaders understood their 
 man perfectly, and were adroit enough to reason with 
 and flatter the governor, so successfully that Parsons actu 
 ally persuaded him to preside at the Convention, and to 
 read a speech prepared by Parsons himself. 1 It was by no 
 means so simple a matter to secure Samuel Adams. He 
 was not to be flattered, and he could argue and dispute 
 with the best and ablest of the Federalists. Neverthe 
 less, he, too, had his weak point, and in one way the ardent 
 supporters of the new scheme could apply persuasion. In 
 moments of doubt as to questions of great moment, Samuel 
 Adams, with the true instincts of a popular leader, had 
 always relied on public feeling in Boston for guidance ; and 
 the Federalists now made use of public feeling to turn him 
 to their side. The mechanics of the town favored the Con 
 stitution ; and their leaders called a meeting, whose loudly 
 expressed Federalist sentiments some trusty followers, 
 headed by Paul Revere, promptly conveyed to Adams. 
 The effort was successful, and Adams gave in his support 
 to the new scheme. Other lesser men were also converted, 
 and much effective work was done which does not appear 
 in the records of the proceedings. 
 
 In these unofficial debates, Mr. Cabot s manner, address, 
 and powers of conversation were of especial value and were 
 willingly exerted. Since he had last served in a State con 
 vention, eight years before, the country had passed through 
 all the miseries entailed by the weak and wretched govern 
 ment of the Confederation ; and these misfortunes had con 
 tributed to deepen his belief in the necessity of a stronger 
 and more conservative establishment. During this interval 
 
 1 Life of Samuel Adams, II. 248-276; Life of Gerry, II. eh. ii. See also 
 Memoir of Parsons, p. 70 and ff., for a full account of the Federalist move 
 ments. For the effective flattery used with Hancock, compare Drake s 
 Mem. of Knox, p. 98. 
 
26 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 also, business had taken him much to New York, where he 
 formed the acquaintance of Hamilton and the other Feder 
 alist leaders of that State. 1 This acquaintance, which in the 
 case of Hamilton ripened into a life-long friendship, helped 
 to strengthen Mr. Cabot s already firm convictions ; and, 
 when he was chosen a delegate to the Convention, he gave 
 himself up wholly to the work before him. His personal 
 friends were those who led the Federalists, and nothing 
 contributed more to their success than the concert and 
 unanimity displayed in their counsels. It would be super 
 fluous here to follow in detail the history of the Convention. 
 Mr. Cabot s position has been defined, and his share in the 
 labors outside the Convention has been sufficiently alluded 
 to. To sketch the part he took in the public debates is all, 
 therefore, that remains to be done in this connection. Mr. 
 Cabot spoke seldom, but always forcibly and clearly ; and 
 his arguments, if we may judge by the report, commanded 
 general attention. 
 
 The fourth section of the first article in the Constitution 
 was vigorously opposed. This section, it will be remem 
 bered, provides that "the times, places, and manner of 
 holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be 
 prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof ; but 
 the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such 
 regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators." 
 This appeared to the jealous eyes of the opposition to 
 infringe on the pet New England principle of free repre 
 sentation. At this point, there was a long and vigorous 
 resistance ; and the Federalists were obliged to put forth all 
 their strength in order to dispel the phantom which had 
 been conjured up, of an external power controlling the 
 popular representation. Mr. Cabot, in replying to this 
 attack, began by a few remarks on the biennial election 
 of representatives, saying : 
 
 1 Mr. Cabot met Mr. Jefferson on one of these visits to New York, or 
 perhaps in Boston, in 1784 ; and the latter, then on his way to Europe, bor 
 rowed of Mr. Cabot a Spanish grammar, by the aid of which he mastered that 
 language in the short space of nineteen days. (Diary of J. Q. Adams, I 317.) 
 
1775-90.] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1788. 27 
 
 " We should consider the particular business which that body 
 will frequently be called upon to transact, especially in the way of 
 revenue. We should consider that, on a question of supplies of 
 money to support a war or purchase a treaty, it will be impossi 
 ble for those representatives to judge of the expediency or inex 
 pediency of such supplies, until they shall have had time to become 
 acquainted with the general system of Federal politics, in its con 
 nection or relation to foreign powers ; because upon the situation 
 of those must depend the propriety or impropriety of granting 
 supplies. If to this be added a due attention to the easiest way 
 of raising such supplies, it must appear that biennial elections are 
 as frequent as is consistent with using the power of the represen 
 tatives, for the benefit of their constituents." 
 
 Mr. Cabot then turned to the fourth section, at that 
 moment under debate, and said: 
 
 It gives me no pain to see the anxiety of different gentlemen 
 concerning the paragraph under consideration, as it evidences a 
 conviction in their minds of what I believe to be true, that a 
 free and equal representation is the best, if not the only, foundation 
 upon which a free government can be built, and consequently that 
 the greatest care should be taken in laying it. I am, sir, one of 
 the people : such I shall continue ; and with these feelings I hold 
 that the right of electing persons to represent the people in the 
 federal government is an important and sacred right. The opin 
 ions that have been offered upon the manner in which the exercise 
 of this right is provided for by the fourth section satisfy me that 
 we are all solicitous for the same end, and that we only differ as to 
 the means of attaining it ; and, for my own part, I confess that I 
 prize the fourth section as highly as any in the Constitution, because 
 I consider the democratic branch of the national government, the 
 branch chosen immediately by the people, as intended to be a check 
 on the federal branch, which latter is not an immediate representation 
 of the people of America, and is not chosen by them, but is a rep 
 resentation of the sovereignty of the individual States, and its 
 members delegated by the several State legislatures ; and, if the 
 State legislatures are suffered to regulate conclusively the elections 
 of the democratic branch, they may, by such an interference, first 
 weaken, and at last destroy, that check. They may at first diminish, 
 and finally annihilate, that control of the general government 
 
28 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 which the people ought always to have through their immediate 
 representatives. As one of the people, therefore, I repeat that, in 
 my mind, the fourth section is to be as highly prized as any in the 
 Constitution." 
 
 In the debate on the wide subject of the powers of Con 
 gress, Dr. Willard 
 
 " Entered largely into the field of ancient history, and deduced 
 therefrom arguments to prove that where power had been trusted 
 to men, whether in great or small bodies, they had always abused 
 it, and that thus republics had soon degenerated into aristocracies." 
 
 " Hon. Mr. Gorham (in reply to the gentleman from Uxbridge) 
 exposed the absurdity of conclusions and hypotheses drawn from 
 ancient governments, which bore no relation to the confederacy 
 proposed." 
 
 " Hon. Mr. Cabot went fully into a continuation of the argu 
 ments of the honorable gentleman last up. In a clear and elegant 
 manner, he analyzed the ancient governments mentioned by Dr. 
 Willard, and by comparing them with the proposed system fully 
 demonstrated the superiority of the latter, and in particular the 
 section under debate." 1 
 
 In a further debate on the powers of Congress, Mr. 
 Dench argued, at length, that the powers granted to the 
 central government would dissolve those of the States. To 
 this Mr. Cabot replied by an elaborate argument, and 
 proved to his own and his friends satisfaction, if not to 
 that of Mr. Dench, the utter fallacy of such views. In the 
 debate on the slave-trade, 
 
 " Mr. Cabot asks the gentleman from Sharon whether in his 
 five hundred miles travel he saw five thousand people who live as 
 well as five thousand of the lowest sort here. As to the slave- 
 
 1 Mr. Randal, who followed in the debate, does not appear to have received 
 so favorable an impression of Mr. Cabot s efforts as the reporter Mr. Ran 
 dal began by saying that ancient history had no more to do with the ques 
 tion in hand than to know how our forefathers dug clams ; what he feared 
 was a consolidation of the thirteen States, and an enforcement of Southern 
 customs in New England. History has given a curiously twisted verifica 
 tion of this prediction. The customs of one part of the country have cer 
 tainly been imposed on the other, but not precisely as Mr. Randal feared. 
 For these debates, see History of Massachusetts Convention, 1788. 
 
1775-90.] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1788. 29 
 
 trade, the Southern States have the slave-trade, and are sovereign 
 States. The Constitution is the best way to get rid of it." 1 
 
 Mr. Cabot also spoke on a subsequent occasion, with great 
 fulness, on the proposed mode of raising revenue, of which 
 he was particularly competent to judge, and upon which 
 he apparently enlarged. 2 The complete though narrow 
 victory of the Federalists, after these long debates, was a 
 source of great satisfaction to all who had striven for that 
 result. The prize was a large one. Without the adhesion 
 of Massachusetts, the scheme would have been broken 
 down at the start, and the " more perfect union " would 
 have been impossible. The Federalist leaders in Massachu 
 setts were then the rising young lawyers and business men 
 of the community, and were admirably fitted for the work 
 that lay before them. Most of them had passed through 
 the war of Independence, and had shared its privations in 
 one form or another. But they were not the men who had 
 made the war possible. They belonged essentially to the 
 period of construction, which must always follow that of 
 revolution. King, Ames, Parsons, Cabot, and the rest 
 who made their first party fight in this Convention, were 
 far from believing the Constitution to be perfect, although 
 they worked so hard to secure its adoption. On the con 
 trary, they deemed it highly defective. But it was the 
 best that could be done ; and the Massachusetts Federalists 
 acted from the beginning on the idea that, imperfect as it 
 was, it must be definitely adopted, and that no half-measures 
 would answer. They rightly believed that, if they failed 
 in this struggle, a miserable disintegration and political 
 ruin were sure to follow. Their policy was a sound one ; 
 and they carried their point with great skill and address, but 
 only after an obstinate struggle. The Federalists did not 
 relax their efforts after the actual adoption of the Consti 
 tution, but directed them to securing a fair trial for the 
 experiment. They did not neglect to choose good men to 
 
 1 Parsons s Minutes in " Massachusetts Convention, 1788," p. 304. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 320. 
 
30 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 the Senate and to the Congress, to fulfil the difficult task 
 of organizing the new government and setting it in motion. 
 In the adoption of the Constitution, they had taken only 
 the first step. Their struggles in the State Conventions 
 were as nothing to those of the succeeding twelve years, 
 during which the Federalists were destined to firmly found 
 a nation in the midst of the bitterest opposition. 
 
 In the month of June, 1789, while the first Congress was 
 sitting, and the organization of the government was still in 
 progress, Mr. Cabot took his wife to New York for the ben 
 efit of her health, then far from good. He there passed sev 
 eral weeks, enjoying the society of those friends and political 
 allies to whom he was most attached. Fisher Ames refers 
 to this visit with a pleasure which was probably returned 
 both in anticipation and realization. 1 During the follow 
 ing summer, Washington made his tour through the Eastern 
 States ; and on his way from Boston, along the Essex shore, 
 he stopped at Beverly, and breakfasted with Mr. Cabot. 2 
 To the latter, this visit was the pleasantest, if not the most 
 memorable, incident of that eventful year. 
 
 CABOT TO PARSONS. 
 
 BEVERLY, Feb. 28, 1788. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I feel exceedingly disappointed in having you 
 pass this way without stopping. I had so much relied on seeing 
 you, that I could not believe you had left home, until yesterday 
 I was informed that you had been lately seen in Boston. I was 
 about to inquire more particularly whether it was you or your 
 ghost ; but, recollecting that to determine this required more than 
 
 1 Life and Works of Fisher Ames, I. 46, 52. 
 
 2 I have mentioned this little incident, not merely because of the compli 
 ment to Mr. Cabot thereby conveyed, but also because of the pleasant asso 
 ciations which the anecdote it recalls must always have for me. When a 
 boy, it was my great delight to persuade my grandfather, Mr. Henry Cabot, 
 to tell me how, as a lad of seven, he hid under the side-table in the dining- 
 room of the house at Beverly, in order to get a look at Washington, while 
 he sat at breakfast with his father. The rights of children were not so 
 much respected then as now. 
 
1775-90.] CORRESPONDENCE. 31 
 
 common acuteness of sight and judgment, I waived a question 
 which by confounding my informant might have placed him in a 
 more humiliating point of view than a man is willing to be seen in. 
 However, I am very glad to learn that you are still in any shape 
 on this side the Styx ; for I had begun very strongly to suspect 
 that the old boatman had tumbled you into his scow, and paddled 
 over the stream. As these apprehensions are of a nature that do not 
 readily subside, I beg, before the old kidnapper takes advantage of 
 you, that you would be doing whatever you have not already done 
 toward rearing the Conventional Edifice. The impatience discov 
 ered by the few people I converse with stimulated me to set about 
 collecting such materials as were to be procured in this quarter. 
 These I intended should pass your sole inspection, and only such 
 of them as you should judge would be useful should be offered to 
 the architects. But, having got into the depth of incertitude as to 
 your ubiquity, I forwarded all that I had collected in their rough 
 state to Mr. Minot, 1 with a request that such of them as are not 
 suitable for any part of the building may be used for firewood, 
 which I am sure is much wanted this cold weather. This last 
 reflection is a very consolatory one to me, as I had felt most con 
 cern lest my lumber should not only fail of answering any good 
 purpose, but might be prejudicial by incumbering the work-yard. 
 Whereas, if it arrives at the honor of warming the hands of my 
 patriotic friends, and enables them more freely to execute the 
 commands of their heads, I shall be perfectly satisfied. With this 
 sentiment operating in its full force on my mind, I proceed to make 
 a little addition to what I had sent on before. 
 
 You will not wonder at the free use I make of wooden figures, 
 when you consider how busy I am in preparing timber for the 
 bridge. 2 As to being witty, you know that s so natural to me that 
 it is with difficulty sometimes that I refrain from it. I have at 
 this moment a number of excellent puns ; not puny ones, but good 
 substantial ones, big enough to cover this whole paper, which I 
 could very well entertain you with, but that such Parsons as you 
 would, at the least, tell them to a certain strong man, in conse 
 quence of which I might possibly be pierced through. When you 
 have discovered what may be called the occult meaning of all this, 
 with Dr. Swift s leave I may possibly furnish you with more. 
 
 1 George Richards Minot, the historian of Massachusetts. 
 
 2 The Essex Bridge, between Salem and Beverly. Mr. Cabot, as already 
 stated (p. 13), was President of the Bridge Company. 
 
32 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 The objection to the fourth section of the first article l is stated 
 full as strongly in the paper I sent Mr. Minot, as I remember to 
 have heard or seen it made anywhere ; and the argument that the 
 people of one State have an interest in the elections of every State 
 may, if placed in the most striking light, be a satisfactory answer. 
 But there is (in my mind) ground for an objection to that article 
 which, by going a little further back than the opponents have, may 
 be taken and defended against any thing / have ever thought of 
 that could be brought against it. I mean that the objectors, 
 instead of conceding as they do, by implication at least, that the 
 powers of that article could not be fixed absolutely in the Consti 
 tution, and so reduce the question simply to what body it shall be 
 lodged in ; if, instead of this, they should insist that it might and 
 ought to have been fixed immovably in the Constitution, it will be 
 difficult to answer them. For I cannot see why a rule might not 
 have been made of a kind that should answer that description, and 
 yet accommodate itself to the changes of population, &c., in all the 
 different districts. The best answer to this which occurs to me 
 is " that, as the article now stands, the different States may each 
 enjoy their own favorite mode;" but this answer, if pursued, will 
 very much weaken the strongest argument we have ever used in 
 favor of Congress having the right ultimately instead of the States. 
 Pray think of the strongest objection possible to this article ; and, 
 if you can answer it satisfactorily, it must be of infinite advantage. 
 I come now to the point for which I have thought it necessary to 
 write to you at this time ; and that is, to mention to you the two 
 objections which I am told the people of the country find it the 
 most difficult to get over. The first is that of the fourth section, 
 mentioned in the last page, and which I fear will never be entirely 
 removed. The next is one which seems to me may be pretty fully 
 answered, that of such a consolidation of the States as will dis 
 solve their governments. Under the head of objections to the 
 Senate, will it not be well to show how far the injustice of an equal 
 representation in that body is balanced by the additional security 
 it brings that no measures will ever pass tending in the smallest 
 degree to consolidation, which must be always guarded against by 
 small States ? Small States will outnumber great ones. This 
 argument, well managed, in addition to the dependence of the 
 Federal government for the election of all its branches, and the 
 
 l Section in the Constitution as to regulation of elections to Congress. 
 
1775-90.] CORRESPONDENCE. 33 
 
 express and implied reference to the State governments in various 
 parts of it, will show that the provisions for their existence are 
 interwoven in the Constitution in such a manner as not to be sepa 
 rated without rending it in pieces. I wish you would introduce 
 among the preliminary observations of your address this idea : that 
 the general government, being an institution that is to affect States 
 as well as people, will be obliged to admit into one of its branches 
 that equality which sovereigns independent of each other usually 
 insist on. And there is some fitness in the principle which requires 
 that, as the laws affect States as well as people, the consent of 
 States, as such, as well as of individuals, should be first obtained 
 through their [representatives or legislatures ? l ] ; and as sovereign 
 States cannot be expected to submit to an entire renunciation of 
 claims which have been, in a degree, sanctified by the language of 
 nations, it is a strong motive why the great States should concede 
 something in this particular. 
 Verbum sapienti. 
 
 I am your sincere friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO BENJAMIN GooDHUE. 2 
 
 BEVERLY, March 16, 1790. 
 
 SIR, The managers of our manufactory have desired me to 
 forward you the enclosed petition, with the request that you would 
 present it as soon as a suitable opportunity offers. It was their 
 intention to have accompanied the petition with a letter to you, 
 explaining more fully the facts it contains, and the objects of their 
 wishes ; but Dr. Fisher, to whom this business was assigned, hav 
 ing fallen sick, it remains unperformed. The Doctor wishes you to 
 be informed " that the proprietors have proceeded as far as they 
 have with a full reliance that, if it appeared upon fair experiment 
 to be a practicable and useful manufacture in this country, in our 
 present state, the government would, in some way or another, 
 reimburse them those heavy charges which they have incurred in 
 introducing it ; " " that the managers have, of themselves, acquired 
 that knowledge and experience in the business which now makes 
 it certain that it can be prosecuted with profit to the greatest extent 
 
 1 Doubtful in MS. 
 
 2 Member of Congress for Massachusetts from the Essex district 
 
 3 
 
34 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 by any persons who can have the advantage of our knowledge 
 without much expense ; " and therefore " that we cannot reimburse 
 ourselves the great sums we have expended, let the business suc 
 ceed ever so well among the people at large, who engage in it 
 upon the information we have purchased." You are not ignorant, 
 I believe, that the Worcester people got their machinery made by 
 a man whom we had taught at great expense, and that their card 
 ing engine did not consequently cost an eighth part as much as 
 ours ; they also took away the second spinner we had instructed. 
 This woman, after having destroyed our materials and enjoyed our 
 support in learning to spin, was bribed to desert us as soon as she 
 could be useful to us. The Rhode Island undertakers have, to a 
 degree, treated us in the same manner ; and we have not yet been 
 able to stop this evil which has cost us so much money. We have 
 now about forty people employed, all of whom, except one, are 
 our own country people. Their contracts will expire in succession, 
 and they will diffuse their knowledge and skill through all the 
 States in the Union where manufactories can be carried on. All 
 these things are against us ; but are they not beneficial to the pub 
 lic in proportion as they are prejudicial to us ? We think a fair 
 discussion of our pretensions will show them to be well founded ; 
 and that if there be any case in which good policy or public justice 
 (which is always good policy) will dictate the propriety of govern 
 mental assistance, it is this case. The infinite importance of a 
 manufacture that will clothe us in this cold climate in winter as 
 well as wool, and which is used universally in warm countries, will 
 be acknowledged by all to give it a stronger claim to public pat 
 ronage than any other that has been attempted or proposed. The 
 materials being vegetable, and the productions of various countries, 
 may be considered as illimitable in quantity ; and such as will, in 
 all human probability, be always at a price in this country as low 
 as in any manufacturing country this side the Cape of Good Hope. 
 The intimate connection and reciprocal benefit that naturally sub 
 sist between manufactures and agriculture at this period, between 
 these and commerce and population, and betwixt all of them and a 
 national strength and a productive revenue, will necessarily induce 
 Congress to give the subject a candid examination ; but it will 
 always be necessary in a popular assembly that some few persons 
 should take upon themselves the trouble of thinking for others. 
 For this reason the managers will be obliged to you for such par- 
 
1775-00.] 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 35 
 
 ticular support and personal attention to the business as you shall 
 think it merits. They flatter themselves with the hope that Con 
 gress may, by a lottery, allow them to take a voluntary tax from 
 persons in different parts of the Union to the amount of their extra 
 expense, and thus divide among a greater number the cost of a ben 
 efit that is common to all. Mr. Ames is acquainted with many 
 circumstances which it would be tedious to recite in this letter, but 
 which may be convenient to be possessed of : we wish, therefore, 
 you may have an opportunity of consulting with him previous to 
 the introduction of the petition. You may recollect that we 
 engaged in this undertaking in October, 1787. Whether the 
 Philadelphians had then begun, we are unable to say. We did not 
 know of their doing any thing until the spring following; but, be 
 this as it may, we believe that we are the only persons who, at 
 private expense, have prosecuted the business to any effect. In 
 Philadelphia, it has been supported by an extensive contribution, 
 and by the aid of their State government, and yet it is trifling 
 there compared with it here. You will find that, in all the coun 
 tries of Europe where the benefit of this manufacture is enjoyed, 
 great sums have been expended in introducing it, and that these 
 have been borne by the public. In Ireland, a bounty of five per 
 cent, and large grants of money from Parliament, with loans free 
 of interest ; and in France the government has continually patro 
 nized the undertakers. It will occur to you that the European 
 manufacturer would gladly suppress the efforts we are making, 
 and that a reimbursement of our expenses would be thought a 
 cheap purchase. 
 
 I hope Dr. Fisher will be able to write you by next post, in 
 which you may have much information not in my power to give, 
 as to the progress and state of our business. 
 
 I am, sir, with much respect, your most obedient servant, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO GOODHUE. 
 
 BEVERLY, April 6, 1790. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The last post brought me your obliging letter of 
 the 28th ult., since which some private hands have conveyed to us 
 the disagreeable intelligence of your overthrow in the House, and 
 the trials for the non- assumption of the State debts. I never con- 
 
36 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1775-90. 
 
 sidered the national government as being more than half estab 
 lished by the nominal acceptance of the form. To take from our 
 newspapers the metaphor they have used, it was an arch ; but to me 
 the keystone was wanting. The actual exercise of certain powers 
 to the exclusion of the States will be finishing the work. Till this 
 takes place, I cannot think the country completely safe from the 
 danger of division, and consequently anarchy and wretchedness. 
 
 1 am no holder of public securities of any kind, and never would 
 be interested in any of our funds on any terms ; but I consider the 
 assumption of all our State debt as so essential, that, as an individual, 
 I would rather pay a fourfold interest through the national govern 
 ment than a half per cent through the medium of the State ; because 
 the former may give us protection, the latter cannot. I confess 
 to you, however, that I am still indulging myself that you will 
 succeed in this point, in the present session ; and, if you do, I shall 
 think that the Government has done every thing its most sanguine 
 friends and every honest patriot could have wished. If you fail, 
 there certainly is reason to apprehend a long and hard contest with 
 the State governments for power. 
 
 Since our petition was forwarded to you, the people of Lebanon, 
 in Connecticut, have sent for one of our machine-makers, who, I 
 suppose, will go and assist them in setting up a manufactory there. 
 You know the state of the one in Worcester, and that there is one 
 in Providence, and another in Greenwich. All these have the 
 benefit of the knowledge and information we have purchased. An 
 increased duty on importation of such articles as are manufactured 
 here will undoubtedly be of public benefit by promoting these 
 attempts, and, upon principles of sound policy, I think ought to 
 take place ; but, upon a little reflection, you will perceive it will be 
 little or no relief to us. I am, sir, with much respect, 
 Your friend and obedient servant, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO GOODHUE. 
 
 BEVERLY, May 5, 1790. 
 
 DEAR SIR, An invincible indolence of disposition, derived 
 from nature and confirmed by habit, has prevented my acknowl 
 edgment of the receipt of your favor of the 17th ult. Having set 
 tled it as an irrefragable truth, in my own mind, that the national 
 
1775-90.] 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 37 
 
 government cannot go on without assuming the State debts, I 
 cannot discharge myself of anxiety for the peace of our country 
 until that object is attained. While my pride is gratified to see all 
 New England united in their efforts and wishes to establish this 
 
 ^ 
 
 measure, I am at a loss to account for the conduct of some other 
 men whom I have been accustomed to think well of. I can t recon 
 cile Mr. Madison s present conduct with his former principles. I 
 conclude that his principles now do not guide him, or he has 
 changed them. He was once sensible of the folly of such a divided 
 sovereignty as left the supremacy nowhere ; and he would then 
 have thought that the powers which must be exercised by the 
 States in providing for their own debts are such as belong to a 
 supreme government only, and cannot be safely left to subordi 
 nate ones. While Congress are acting so unworthy of themselves, 
 and of the great trust reposed in them, it is to be apprehended 
 that the anti-Federalists may seize the opportunity of attaching 
 all the State creditors to their cause by providing honestly for 
 them. If they should do this in the State legislatures, the general 
 government would be ruined irrecoverably. The only security 
 that remains seems to be that the members of many of the State 
 governments will not do honestly, even to carry their own points 
 against the national government. Thus we have more to hope 
 from the vices than the virtues of men in some cases. "All 
 Nature s difference keeps all Nature s peace." I hope you will 
 not be wearied out by the perplexities that attend these great ques 
 tions. The welfare of the community certainly depends upon your 
 success. This idea will animate you to persevere, and, if you die, 
 to fall in the last ditch. 
 
 I am, sir, with much respect, your assured friend, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
38 LITE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1791-92, 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 1791-1792. 
 The United States Senate. 
 
 IN the month of June, 1791, Mr. Cabot was chosen, with 
 out opposition, Senator of the United States from Massa 
 chusetts, for the full term, to succeed Tristram Dalton. 
 He at once accepted the office, and in the following autumn 
 took his seat. The other Massachusetts senator at this 
 time was Caleb Strong, with whom Mr. Cabot main 
 tained a life-long friendship. Mr. Cabot s services in the 
 State Convention had made him well and widely known ; 
 and, after his arrival in Philadelphia, he at once took a 
 high position among the Federalist leaders in the national 
 government. He took the oath of office just in time to be 
 placed upon the committee to draft an address in reply 
 to the President s message. But his services then, as well 
 as during his whole senatorial term, were principally ren 
 dered in affairs of commerce and finance. During the ses 
 sion of 1791-92, Mr. Cabot served on the committee on 
 the mint, and on that for establishing a consular system. 
 He was a member of the committee on appropriations, and 
 also chairman of the committee to consider the expediency 
 of legislation, and, if it was thought proper, to report a 
 bill respecting fugitives from justice, and from the service 
 of masters. He also framed and carried through a bill 
 " for the encouragement of the Bank and other cod-fisheries, 
 and for the regulation and government of the fishermen 
 employed therein," and in this connection served as the 
 
1791-92.1 
 
 THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 39 
 
 chairman of the committee on fisheries. In this, as in all 
 subsequent sessions, Mr. Cabot was most assiduous in his 
 attention to all the duties involved in his office. Invariably 
 present when the session opened, he asked for leave of 
 absence but once during his term of service, and then only 
 to go home and tender his resignation. Mr. Cabot had no 
 fondness for public life ; but he had a keen sense of respon 
 sibility both to his country and to himself, and, if he under 
 took to fill an office at all, he gave it his constant care 
 and best attention. How much he felt the then very 
 marked carelessness of senators in regard to their atten 
 dance, and the misfortunes involved by continual absences 
 from their posts, is well illustrated by the letter to Mr. 
 Strong, printed at the end of the next chapter. 
 
 When Mr. Cabot first took his seat in the Senate, parties 
 had begun to crystallize. The Federalists, from being sup 
 porters of the Constitution, had become the supporters of the 
 government. Now, as in the contest for the adoption of 
 the Constitution, they had the advantage of definite objects 
 and settled plans, besides greater ability and a more perfect 
 co-operation than their opponents. As yet the opposition 
 was a loose mass of heterogeneous materials; but in the 
 two first years of the new government they obtained what 
 they most sorely needed, a great leader. Jefferson, after 
 his return from Europe, had carefully surveyed the political 
 field ; and, at the date of Mr. Cabot s election to the Sen 
 ate, had practically come out as chief of the opposition, 
 though he continued to hold the first cabinet office, and was 
 still a nominal supporter of the administration. With a sure 
 hand, he was engaged in welding the different elements of 
 opposition into the consistent and compact form of a party. 
 By the unerring instinct of a popular leader, Jefferson saw at 
 once the Federalists advantage in their cry for better govern 
 ment and strong policy. An antidote was needed, and Jeffer 
 son furnished it. Shrinking from an attack on Washington, 
 who was upheld and defended by the implicit popular faith, 
 
40 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 he struck at the two party leaders, Adams and Hamilton ; 
 and, branding them with the stigma of monarch ism, ral 
 lied his own followers with the democratic shibboleth 
 of fidelity to republican institutions. Party lines were 
 drawn, therefore, with considerable sharpness, during Mr. 
 Cabot s first winter in Philadelphia. The control of 
 both branches of Congress was still in the hands of the 
 Federalists, but their majority in the House had been re 
 duced; and in the Senate, owing to absences and to the 
 uncertain views of some members, the Federalists often 
 carried their point only by the casting vote of the Vice- 
 President. The first party question of this session arose 
 on the apportionment of representatives in accordance 
 with the new census. The small number of represen 
 tatives had been a fruitful topic of complaint with the 
 opposition, and the House passed a bill which adopted 
 thirty thousand, the lowest number allowed by the Consti 
 tution, as the ratio of representation. By this means, the 
 number of the House was raised to one hundred and thir 
 teen, but large fractions in the Northern States were left 
 unrepresented. The Federalists in the Senate, by the Vice- 
 President s casting vote, amended this bill so that the ratio 
 should be thirty-three thousand. A disagreement ensued, 
 and the bill was lost. The House then passed a second 
 bill with the ratio of thirty thousand, but providing for a 
 new census and new distribution before the next Congress. 
 The Federalist senators struck out the provision for the 
 new census and new distribution, and substituted a provision 
 in favor of the unrepresented fractions. This arrangement 
 raised the number of the House to one hundred and twenty, 
 and the bill embodying it was carried ; but Washington ob 
 jected on the score of unconstitutionality, and the measure 
 was lost on reconsideration. A third bill was now intro 
 duced in the House, which conformed with the Senate s 
 amendments to the first bill, by making the ratio thirty- 
 three thousand; and this was agreed to. A letter from 
 
1791-92.] THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 41 
 
 Mr. Cabot to his friend, Theophilus Parsons, reveals the 
 motive of the Federalist policy in this matter. The Fed 
 eralists believed, and justly, that any increase of the rep 
 resentation would be prejudicial to their party. As it was 
 obvious that the representation would have to be enlarged 
 without delay, the exertions of the Federalists were concen 
 trated in an effort to mitigate, as far as possible, the results 
 of such a measure. The ratio of thirty thousand left large 
 unrepresented fractions in the Northern States, the strong 
 hold of Federalism ; whereas the ratio of thirty-three thou 
 sand absorbed the fractions, or left them in the South only, 
 and thus diminished as much as possible the anti-Federalist 
 effects of the necessary increase in representation. Mr. 
 Cabot supported the Federalist policy strongly, which was 
 saved at the most critical moments only by the casting 
 vote of Mr. Adams. 
 
 Mr. Cabot s faith in the government measures rose, doubt 
 less, in no small degree from his relations with their author, 
 Alexander Hamilton, and from his own share in devising 
 them. The Secretary of the Treasury consulted him fre 
 quently in regard to the important questions of revenue, 
 so intimately connected with the interests of commerce and 
 manufactures, subjects on which his judgment was highly 
 esteemed. The financial policy introduced by Hamilton 
 was soon strained to the utmost by having to provide for 
 the increased army which St. Clair s defeat rendered neces 
 sary ; and Mr. Cabot s bill for the encouragement of the 
 fisheries, to which allusion has just been made, formed at 
 this juncture a part of Hamilton s general scheme. The 
 pecuniary value of the fisheries was enhanced by their im 
 portance as a nursery for seamen, an object appealing 
 strongly to the Federalists, whose policy included, among 
 its objects of first necessity, the establishment of a navy. 
 The problem Mr. Cabot undertook to solve by his bill was 
 the preservation and encouragement of the fisheries, without 
 causing thereby, at a time when every dollar was of impor- 
 
42 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 tance, any diminution of the revenue arising from the salt 
 duties. What he did substantially was to encourage the 
 fishing interest by a bounty on the vessels, and replace this 
 bounty to the government by abolishing the drawback on salt. 
 In this way the objects of the bill were effected. 1 In the 
 party struggle which arose on the question of coinage, Mr. 
 Cabot, as a member of the Senate committee on the mint, 
 was especially interested. The bill for the mint originated 
 in the Senate, and provided that on one side of the coin 
 the head of the President, for the time being, should be 
 stamped. This harmless provision caused a most violent 
 debate in the House. Rallying to the cry of monarchy, the 
 Republicans, after a good deal of frothy eloquence, amended 
 the bill by substituting a figure of Liberty for the Presi 
 dent s head, as the device on the coin. To this amendment 
 the Senate, in the end, very wisely agreed, and put a stop 
 to the useless discussion which had been excited. In this 
 session, too, the first indications of the strife engendered by 
 the evil influences of the French Revolution were apparent 
 in the debate as to the phraseology of the answer congratu 
 lating the French government on the adoption of their 
 new constitution. 
 
 Mr. Cabot served on all the committees on claims, and 
 on those appointed to deal with questions relating to the 
 revenue. In those days, before the era of standing com 
 mittees, special ones were appointed to report on every ques 
 tion that arose ; and, as a majority of these questions related 
 to the revenue and to finance, Mr. Cabot was constantly 
 employed. It would therefore be tedious beyond measure to 
 enumerate all the various committees on which he served, and 
 I have contented myself with alluding to the more import 
 ant ones, and with endeavoring to define so far as possible, 
 from the slender information conveyed by barren journals, 
 the position occupied by Mr. Cabot in his party, and the 
 nature of the official services he was called upon to render. 
 
 The session of 1791-92, if compared with those which 
 1 See below, p. 113, letters to Sewall. 
 
1 791-92. j 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 43 
 
 followed, was an extremely peaceable one; but observing 
 men already detected the dark clouds gathering upon the 
 political horizon. 
 
 CABOT TO WASHINGTON. 1 
 
 BEVERLY, January 29, 1791. 
 
 SIR, Mr. William Kirkpatrick, a member of the house of 
 Messieurs Grivegnee & Co., of Malaga, wishes to have the honor 
 of serving the United States in the character of consul for that 
 port. Should it be thought expedient to institute such an office, 
 it may be found that Mr. Kirkpatrick s situation as well as talents 
 and disposition peculiarly enable him to fill it with propriety. 
 Permit me therefore, sir, to request that, when the qualifications 
 of candidates are under your examination, his also may be 
 considered. 
 
 If any apology is necessary for this freedom, I hope it may not 
 be deemed insufficient that, having been led by my profession to 
 make frequent visits to Spain, among other intimacies I formed 
 one with the principals of the commercial establishment to which 
 Mr. Kirkpatrick belongs; that these have desired my testimony 
 on this occasion, and that my experience of their integrity and 
 their friendship to the people of this country constrains me to 
 think well of a gentleman they recommend, and to confide in one 
 for whose faithfulness they are willing to be responsible. 
 I am, with the most profound respect, sir, 
 
 Your most faithful and obedient servant, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 BEVERLY, Sept. 6, 1791. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Being absent from home when your letter of the 
 25th ultimo arrived, it has been out of my power to answer the 
 inquiries it contains until this day s post. 
 
 1 I have inserted this letter simply as an illustration of the conception 
 of the civil service, entertained by senators in 1791, and also as showing the 
 relation to the President which senators thought they held with regard to 
 such appointments. This Mr. Kirkpatrick was, I believe, the father of the 
 Countess Montijo, and consequently grandfather of Eugenie, late Empress 
 of the French. 
 
44 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 Almost four years have expired since a number of gentle 
 men in this place associated for the purpose of establishing a 
 manufactory of cotton goods, of the kinds usually imported from 
 Manchester, for men s wear. The various parts of this complex 
 manufacture are performed by machines, some of which are very 
 intricate, and others delicate. A want of skill in constructing the 
 machinery and of dexterity in using it, added to our want of a 
 general knowledge of the business we had undertaken, have proved 
 the principal impediments to its success. 
 
 Destitute of the necessary information ourselves, we were sub 
 ject to be misled by every pretender to knowledge. A number of 
 Europeans, chiefly Irish, have been successively employed by us ; 
 but as no one of them was master of any branch of the business, 
 and most of them proved deficient in some quality essential to use 
 fulness, one only has remained in our service. 
 
 Satisfied from experience that we must at last depend on the 
 people of the country alone for a solid and permanent establish 
 ment, we have for a long time directed our efforts to their instruc 
 tion, so that, of the forty persons now employed in our workshop, 
 thirty-nine are natives of the vicinity. 
 
 Our machines are : 
 
 1 carding-engine, which with the labor of 1 man, cards 15 Ibs. per 
 
 day, and with the labor of 2 men is capable of carding 30 Ibs. 
 
 per day. 
 
 9 spinning-jennies, of 60 to 84 spindles each. 
 1 doubling and twisting machine, constructed on the principle of 
 
 the jenny. 
 1 slubbing-machine or coarse jenny, to prepare the ropings for 
 
 the finest jennies, whereon they are fitted for doubling and 
 
 twisting. 
 
 1 warping-mill sufficient to perform this part of the work for a 
 very extensive manufactory. 
 
 16 looms with flying-shuttles, 10 of which are sufficient to weave 
 all the yarn our present spinners can finish. 
 
 2 cutting-frames, with knives, guides, &c. 
 
 1 burner and furnace, with apparatus to singe the goods. 
 Apparatus for coloring, drying, &c. 
 
 A summary of our accounts, lately exhibited by the managers, 
 shows our actual expenditures to have been about $14,000, against 
 
1791-92.] CORRESPONDENCE. 45 
 
 which may be placed, buildings, &c., worth as they 
 
 cost $3,000 
 
 Machinery and apparatus now worth 2,000 
 
 Goods and unwrought materials 4,000 
 
 Sunk in waste of materials, extraordinary cost of first 
 machines, in maintaining learners and compensating 
 teachers, &c 5,000 
 
 $14,000 
 
 It should be noticed, however, that the Legislature of Massachu 
 setts having granted aids in land and lottery tickets, that may 
 amount to about $4,000, the net loss to the proprietors may be 
 estimated at only $10,000 actual money, and the interest on their 
 advances for about two years. 
 
 At present, we manufacture at the rate of 8,000 to 10,000 yards 
 per annum, worth in the market on an average three-sixths. These 
 goods cost us three per cent, without adding any thing for the 
 use of that part of the capital which is constituted by buildings, 
 machinery, and apparatus. If the proper allowance for rent and 
 repair of these be added, it would raise the cost of the goods six 
 per cent higher, which is indeed the true cost, and is equal to what 
 they bring in the market. The enclosed specimens numbered 
 1 and 2 show the proficiency we had made two years ago ; and by 
 comparing with these the other specimens on the same paper, 
 which were executed lately, may be readily seen the improvement 
 we have made since that period. 
 
 With respect to our future prospects, they are less discouraging 
 than they have been. We have subdued the greatest difficulties, 
 and we shall not be exposed again to many extravagant 
 charges which heretofore have swallowed up our funds without 
 any reproduction. Many expenses, such as the rent of buildings, 
 wages of the dyer, compensation to managers, and some others, 
 will remain nearly the same, though the scale of business should 
 be greatly increased ; consequently, the proportion chargeable on 
 each yard of goods will be lessened as the whole work extends. 
 Beside, we are not without expectation of placing many parts of 
 the work in private families, where we can avail ourselves of the 
 cheapness of household labor. Our machinery has been bad and 
 dear : it is now perfectly well made and cheap. Our artists have 
 been learning their trades at our expense. Their work is now 
 
46 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 worth more than it costs ; and, as they improve in skill and adroit 
 ness, we expect that they will perform more and better work for 
 the same compensation. 
 
 On a comparison of the prices of labor in this country with 
 those of Great Britain, we perceived that although the wages of 
 common labor is much higher here, yet that of artificers is not. 
 Here the demand for labor is chiefly for agriculture, and the wages 
 seem to be regulated by it. There the mechanic arts afford so much 
 employment that the demand for every species of skill and in 
 genuity is constant and high. 
 
 Hence it happens that we can satisfy our artists with wages very 
 little above the common labor of the country, while those who come 
 from Europe will not work without a much greater price. 
 
 It is on considerations of this kind that our hopes principally 
 rest, and with these ideas we shall proceed to extend our business 
 as fast as we can train the laborers to the proper execution of the 
 work. This, however, must be very slowly, as the heavy losses 
 on ill-wrought goods discourage extension beyond a very limited 
 ratio. 
 
 We have yet had no experience of the cotton of the Southern 
 States ; but it appeared early to be essential to our interest to use 
 cotton of the longest fibre and the best cleaned. That of Cayenne, 
 Surinam, and Demerara, has been preferred, though at a price two 
 or three pence higher than the cotton of the islands. In proportion 
 as our workers are awkward and unskilful is the necessity of fur 
 nishing the best materials. Bad materials would be wasted alto 
 gether. At present, we wish to have the cotton that grows nearest to 
 the equator ; but, when our spinners are more perfect, an inferior 
 kind may perhaps be wrought with advantage. 
 
 With the highest respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, 
 sir, 
 
 Your most obedient and most humble servant, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 OCT. 8, 1791. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have understood that after the peace of 1763, 
 and till the late war, France gave direct assistance to her cod- 
 fishery beside the monopoly of her home and colonial markets ; but, 
 
1791-92.] COKKESPONDENCE. 47 
 
 notwithstanding these encouragements, the supply from her own 
 fishery was so scanty that her prohibitory laws were evaded, and 
 very large supplies of foreign fish were continually smuggled into 
 her colonies, and consumed there at prices forty per cent higher to 
 the planters than English and American fish was worth at the 
 free ports in the neighboring islands. 
 
 Since the peace of 1783, fish of the United States has not 
 been wholly prohibited ; but its admission has been generally con 
 fined to a single port in an island (sometimes very distant from the 
 consumers). The duty demandable on each quintal has been from 
 three to eight livres, arid the amount actually paid from two and a 
 half to three ; while the French fish has enjoyed a free access to 
 every place, and upon landing has been entitled to a very liberal 
 bounty. Yet, under all these disadvantages, the fishery of the 
 United States has successfully rivalled that of France. 
 
 These facts, at first view, seem to indicate such a preponderance 
 of natural advantages in the United States for carrying on the 
 fishery as can hardly be balanced by France ; but it should be 
 noticed that, about five years ago, the French West India markets 
 were surcharged to such a degree that the exporters of fish from 
 the United States suffered great losses upon all they shipped 
 thither, and the fishery exhibited such symptoms of decline in con 
 sequence of it that it may be doubted whether it could possibly 
 have been supported, if that of France had not been interrupted 
 by the commotions at home. It should be observed, too, that the 
 equipments of armed fleets and appearances of war occur so fre 
 quently to the European nations, and especially to France, that no 
 fair experiment can be tried to determine the extent to which their 
 fishery would be carried in a long period of uninterrupted pursuit. 
 These and similar events, however, have great influence upon the 
 fishery of the United States ; but their frequency and effect in 
 future can neither be foreseen nor accurately estimated, and hence 
 it is the more difficult to say " what is the greatest disparity of 
 duties the fish of the United States could bear, and meet the fish 
 of France in the French market ; " but, on the whole, should the 
 government of the United States restore to their cod-fisheries in 
 some direct form the full amount which they pay to its treasury, 
 by the consumption of dutied articles, and should the fisheries of 
 France be left without aid from their government, except, like 
 those of the United States, a bare indemnity from contribution to 
 
48 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 the public revenue, should the markets of the French West Indies 
 be open to the fish of both countries, I think it may be safely relied 
 on that the fish of the United States could be afforded full ten per 
 cent cheaper than that of France, and consequently could bear a 
 duty of ten per cent on its value at the place and time of sale, and 
 yet sustain the competition with French fish selling in the same 
 market duty free. 
 
 I have thus, my dear sir, given you the best opinion I can form 
 at present on the subject of your inquiry. This I have done, not 
 with the expectation of adding to your information, but solely to 
 show my readiness to obey your commands, and to convince you of 
 the esteem and respect with which 
 
 I am very sincerely your assured friend and most obedient 
 servant, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 DEC. 18, 1791. 
 
 DEAR SIR, It is well stated by a gentleman, who has exam 
 ined the subject, that in 1784 the British government, having 
 taken measures for drawing over to their service the whale-fisher 
 men of the United States, the government of France at once saw 
 the danger of suffering her great maritime rival to acquire the 
 advantage of four or five thousand excellent seamen, and with 
 them an art of immense value in marine consideration (as the 
 nursery of sailors), which they possessed almost exclusively. 
 
 France, therefore, did not hesitate to arrest these proceedings 
 by giving informal but strong assurances that, if the whale-fisher 
 men would but for a moment reject the temptations held out by 
 the English, their friends in France would soon procure for them 
 advantages superior to those they were required to refuse. Ac 
 cordingly, liberal bounties in money, accompanied with other 
 allurements, were offered to those persons who would remove 
 from the United States to Dunkirk, and from thence carry on the 
 whale-fishery. 
 
 This measure at first did not have all the effect expected from 
 it ; and, rather than hazard the immigration of the fishermen of 
 the dominions of Britain, it was thought expedient to create in 
 France a market for the produce of the whale-fishery of the 
 United States. This has been of much benefit to us ; but partly 
 
1791-02.1 CORRESPONDENCE. 49 
 
 from the fluctuating policy of France toward us, and partly from 
 the excessive premiums she gives to her own vessels, it is to be 
 feared that her whale-fishery will be eventually established on the 
 ruins of ours. Already this business has extended itself consider 
 ably at Dunkirk, and the enormous profits which have been made 
 by the aid of public bounties cannot fail to draw from the United 
 States many more adventures. 
 
 France is undoubtedly an important market for tobacco, rice, 
 lumber, oil, and occasionally for some other articles ; but the ordi 
 nance of the National Assembly, requiring that after October, 1791, 
 tobacco in American ships should pay 6 livres per quintal, duty, 
 more than in French ships (equal to near double freight), and 
 determining, also, that after that period American-built vessels 
 cannot be sold to the citizens of France, must render our trade to 
 that country in our own bottoms comparatively small. 
 
 In the course of the late war, France opened the ports of her 
 colonies to foreign ships. These very soon engrossed a large share 
 of their trade ; and soon after the peace an arret of the Council of 
 State was passed, restricting the intercourse between those colo 
 nies and strangers. 
 
 The precise intent or effect of this first public regulation after 
 the peace is not within my present recollection, and I have no 
 authority to which I can recur ; but soon after it (in 1784) another 
 arret was published, which established in each of the Windward 
 Islands one port, and in Hispaniola three ports, to which foreign 
 vessels might have free access with fish, lumber, live stock, rice, 
 Indian corn, salted beef (but not pork), vegetables of a certain kind, 
 hides, peltry, pitch, tar, and turpentine, but no other commodities ; 
 the duty on fish to be three livres per quintal, and on fatted beef 
 three livres per barrel, and on all these commodities such local 
 duties as might be imposed in the islands, beside an established 
 one per cent on the value. 
 
 In return, and as payment for these commodities, molasses and 
 rum of the islands, and goods previously imported from France, are 
 the only articles allowed to be brought away. 
 
 Several years after the second arret, a third passed, raising the 
 duty on salted beef to a dollar per barrel, and on fish to a dollar 
 per quintal, and at all times a sum equal to the duty per quintal 
 imposed on foreign fish was given as a bounty on each quintal 
 of fish of the French fisheries. 
 
 4 
 
50 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 Although some important products of the United States are 
 excluded by the arrets, or standing laws, yet the pressing wants of 
 the colonists have occasionally induced a suspension of those laws 
 in relation to particular articles ; but so versatile has been the con 
 duct of the French Government in this part of their administra 
 tion that the people of the United States have sometimes suffered 
 exceedingly, though perhaps oftener profited by these temporary 
 indulgences. Since the commencement of the Revolution in 
 France, and partly in consequence of scarcity there, the colonists 
 have been obliged to take from the United States large supplies of 
 flour, and some other items not usually admitted. 
 
 The importance of the French West India market for the fish 
 of the United States will appear from observing that nearly one 
 half of the whole fish is consumed there : should this advantage be 
 lost, the fishery would be almost, if not quite, ruined. The molas 
 ses received from the French islands is an excellent payment for 
 what they buy of us ; but it may be noted that this article has 
 been raised to its value and consequence as an object of commerce 
 chiefly, if not altogether, by the people of the United States. It 
 was not thought to be worth saving by the French planters until 
 the Anglo-Americans became its purchasers and created a demand 
 for it. At the commencement of the molasses trade with the 
 French, it was bought by the tun, supposed to measure sixty gal 
 lons, and by the hogshead, supposed to contain one hundred. The 
 New England people at that time used to receive upwards of 
 ninety gallons for a tun and one hundred and fifty for a hogshead : 
 so little was it valued by the planters, that they for a long time 
 submitted to this imposition in the measure. 
 
 It has been much complained of that at Cape Francis bonds are 
 required before a vessel is allowed to trade, with such sureties as 
 cannot be had unless the captain pays an extravagant commission 
 on his whole cargo to some merchant of the place, whether he 
 needs any other aid of such merchant or not. What share of this 
 abuse, or whether any, is chargeable to the government, I am 
 unable to say ; or whether it extends to the other parts of Hispan- 
 iola I am uncertain, but I think it does. 
 
 I am not able to discern any essential difference of principle 
 between the French and English colonial systems : both aim at a 
 monopoly of their trade, but neither can effect it perfectly without 
 ruining the colony ; each, therefore, relaxes occasionally in some 
 
1791-92.] CORRESPONDENCE. 51 
 
 points, and constantly in others, according to the necessity of the 
 case. Both nations admit nearly the same commodities, except 
 that France takes fish and refuses flour, while England takes flour 
 and refuses fish. 
 
 England, being more solicitous as well as more able to carry the 
 supplies of her colonies than she is to furnish them, insists only on 
 being the carrier. 
 
 France, being unable to carry the requisite supplies of her colo 
 nies, insists only on furnishing them so far as she can, and permits 
 others to supply whatever of prime necessity she cannot supply 
 herself. 
 
 The English reserve the exclusive right of carrying the commod 
 ities their colonists need from the United States ; but they impose 
 no duty on the importation of the commodities themselves. 
 
 The French allow foreigners to carry certain commodities which 
 their colonies need ; but they impose a duty on the most valuable 
 of those commodities greater than the whole freight or price of 
 carriage is worth. 
 
 The French colonies are, I believe, more extensive than the 
 English ; but, if the French had not from necessity taken some 
 things which they legally prohibit, it may be doubted whether the 
 exports of the United States to the British West Indies would not 
 equal the exports to the French West Indies. 
 
 Some unavoidable business and some unavoidable dissipations 
 have prevented me till this moment from obeying your commands. 
 Upon a review of what I have written, tis some consolation, in 
 seeing how unimportant the information is, that you have lost 
 nothing by the delay. 
 
 I am, &c., GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 STEPHEN HIGGINSON TO CABOT. 
 
 BOSTON, 1792. 
 
 DEAR GEORGE, I received yours, enclosing your observations 
 relative to our trade with the British and French in Europe and 
 in the West Indies ; and I think they are just, showing very clearly 
 the advantages and inconveniences attending both. They are 
 alike attentive in all their regulations to their own interest, or 
 what they conceive to be such ; and, in every instance, discover 
 that to promote their own trade, and to encourage their navigation, 
 is their only object. 
 
52 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 This is the only natural or proper principle by which to arrange 
 their commercial regulations ; and we have no right to expect of 
 either of them any indulgence, which will not lead either directly 
 or remotely to their object. We ought not to ask of either an 
 indulgence which may injure them in one point, without offering 
 them a benefit that will fully balance every probable disadvantage. 
 Commercial arrangements between nations as well as individuals 
 are the subject of fair, open calculation ; and, in forming them, both 
 parties ought to be fully satisfied that the bargain will prove an 
 equal one, before they definitely close it. 
 
 Political advantages, such as guarantee of territory, an alliance 
 offensive and defensive, support in case of invasions, &c., may be 
 given and received in return for particular advantages in commerce, 
 which would otherwise be confessedly unequal. But as we have 
 a full compensation in kind to offer for every commercial privilege 
 we want from others, and can have no possible advantage from 
 blending commerce and politics in any negotiations, I presume that 
 we shall not be misled or drawn aside from the path of safety and 
 interest by any attempts of others to combine and confound 
 objects which ought ever to be separately considered. 
 
 You have stated generally and rightly the advantages we have 
 derived from our intercourse both with the French and British, 
 in Europe and in the West Indies, and have reverted to the prin 
 ciples and objects which seem to have directed them both in their 
 indulgences and restrictions. 
 
 In France, we, in common with other foreigners, have the liberty 
 of freighting from port to port in their dominions ; but this has 
 proved no benefit to us, the freights being low and not very fre 
 quent, nor have our vessels availed themselves of the liberty in 
 many instances. Much, however, may be said of this indulgence, 
 though the British also enjoy it with others. 
 
 Our whale-fishery is no doubt injured by the establishment at 
 Dunkirk ; and it is clearly the intention of France to transfer this 
 business eventually from us to themselves. Their present apparent 
 indulgence to us, as to oil, is clearly to keep our whale-men at 
 home, till they shall have had time to get prepared for their recep 
 tion and employment; and, as they shall be able, they will by 
 degrees certainly draw them over to France. 
 
 To withdraw their present encouragement to our oil would be 
 to hazard a transfer of the fishery from us to the British ; and if 
 
1791-92.] CORRESPONDENCE. 53 
 
 4 
 
 OUT men are once transplanted, and the business get into the hands 
 of Britain, it will be wholly lost both to us and France. 
 
 Such are the views of France, I suppose, in their arrangements 
 as to our oil and whale fishery ; and having secured Mr. Rotch 
 and others, who are best acquainted with it, they can measure the 
 exact degree of support necessary to keep it up here, till they shall 
 be prepared to transfer it to France. 
 
 If we could induce the British to receive our sperm oils, as 
 formerly, which would not much interfere with their Greenland 
 fishery, or if they would take it at three to five pounds duty per 
 ton, we could then extend that branch and support the fishery, and 
 take our chance for a market for the common oil, which now finds 
 a vent in the West Indies and Ireland to a large amount, and will 
 daily increase. 
 
 It is much better for both Britain and France to have that 
 fishery remain with us, than to be transferred to either of them to 
 the injury of the other ; and it seems to me that they may, upon this 
 subject, be played off against each other with advantage. But, unless 
 something be done to give the business a new face, France will, with 
 the advantages she now has, eventually gain it wholly from us. 
 
 As to the cod-fishery, I think that is safe and will succeed with 
 us, hi spite of them all ; and the bill l you sent me will tend very 
 much to secure and extend it. I have shown it to E. Parsons, and 
 some from Gloucester, who think, with me, that it will very much 
 benefit that branch, and contains every security and aid which can 
 be desired. The bounty on tonnage instead of the fish will prevent 
 much fraud, and will save a great expense, in fees to officers, &c., 
 and prove more beneficial both to owners and men. 
 
 I cannot think that an exclusion of our fish from direct importa 
 tion into the French islands would be very alarming. If the con 
 sumption of it in them could be prevented, we should have much 
 to fear ; but that is impossible, for they cannot support their slavery 
 without it. They have no substitute ; and we should supply it as 
 formerly through the neutral islands, with as much benefit to our 
 selves as we now derive from the direct supply. 
 
 Those islands have experienced an immense saving by the admis 
 sion of our exports direct. It is this which has made them thrive 
 so surprisingly, and increase their cultivations and the numbers of 
 their slaves. Those cultivations must be continued. Their slaves 
 
 1 See above, pp. 38, 41. 
 
54 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 must be fed, and with their present habits and ideas as well, at 
 least, as heretofore ; but this can be done only by the use of our 
 fish, which they must have directly and cheap, or through the 
 neutral islands, at an advanced price. 
 
 The French will reluctantly abandon their settlements for the 
 cod-fishery. They must keep up the appearance, at least, of sup 
 porting them ; and if they would admit our fish paying ten per cent 
 duty, and give no bounty on their own, or receive ours free and 
 allow a bounty of ten per cent on theirs, I would ask no better 
 terms. They would be better than we have enjoyed for years, and 
 would enable us to supply exclusively in a short time. The French 
 will, as well as the British, exclude such of our exports as interfere 
 with their own ; and both will be the carriers of all they want, as 
 far as they can be. France cannot interrupt us much as carriers. 
 Britain will be our rivals in many cases. 
 
 France has been versatile in her commercial intercourse with 
 us, being not well versed in the subject of commerce, and from the 
 fluctuating state of her government for several years past. 
 
 Britain has been out of humor, and disposed to gain every advan 
 tage of us, by trying projects, and proving the wisdom and stability 
 of our government. 
 
 But matters are now closing to a point. They have both expe 
 rienced our wisdom, firmness, and resources ; and both must now 
 wish for permanent and equal terms of future intercourse. 
 
 It is our part to see that we have a full equivalent for all we 
 grant, that our bargains with all be equal. Why should either of 
 them be allowed to carry our produce to foreign markets direct, 
 without giving us an equivalent, and what shall that be ? To give 
 us the same liberty in their ports will not do, because the amount 
 they have to export in transient or mere freighting ships bears no 
 proportion to ours, most of their exports being taken off in ships 
 belonging to the importer or exporter, or their connections ; so 
 that transient ships get very little freight in their ports to other 
 ports of Europe, nor have the Americans obtained any such freights 
 worth attending to since their independence. We would have 
 some indulgence in the sale of our exports with them, or the im 
 portation of their exports, to serve as an equivalent, or else be 
 admitted to some special intercourse with their colonies. France 
 will not furnish us with an extensive market for any of the Amer 
 ican exports, save tobacco. Ireland this year has taken near as 
 
1791-92.] COKKESPONDENCE. 55 
 
 many tons of our common whale-oil as France : to the former, our 
 export of it is rapidly increasing ; to the latter, it has lessened. 
 The French markets take no great quantity of rice and ashes ; and 
 their demand for our wheat, flour, &c., will depend, as in England, 
 upon their own crops. Our beef, butter, and pork have not found 
 as yet any sale in France of consequence. 
 
 Their prejudice in favor of the Irish articles and against ours 
 has in part prevented it ; but their demand for those articles in 
 general seems to be very small. 
 
 Upon the whole, I see not that the trade to France is so very 
 important to us. Tobacco, which is the great article they do and 
 will continue to receive from us, they have endeavored to monopo 
 lize the freight of ; and, excepting that and oil, they admit all the 
 American exports in any foreign vessels, as in ours. 
 
 The trade to their colonies is much more important to us ; 
 in this State, however, as little so as any, because we can supply 
 them through the neutral islands, our exports being more essen 
 tially necessary to them than those from the other States. 
 
 It is not easy to settle the comparative importance to those two 
 countries, or to us, of our trade with them and their colonies. 
 Their connection with and the advantage to us is very wide, and 
 arises from different sources. With the French, our best trade is 
 in their colonies ; with the British, in Europe. 
 
 From the former, we want indulgences in the West Indies ; from 
 the latter, in Europe. The most valuable articles wanted in the 
 British islands are from those States who are not anxious about 
 the carrying of them ; and the bulky articles of lumber and stock 
 which they take from this State we could not make much profit 
 upon, having no molasses to take in return, nor any articles that 
 will afford much profit ; but in Europe our trade with the British 
 is vastly important. 
 
 England and Ireland are the greatest markets for our most 
 valuable exports, either for consumption or re-exportation ; and 
 the British have done us the favor of confining the importation of 
 them to their own vessels and ours. 
 
 The articles most wanted in the French islands are drawn 
 chiefly from this State; and they are willing we should be the 
 carriers of them. To us, this trade is very important : it is the 
 great support of our cod-fishery ; and we have for its continuance 
 the security of its being indispensable to them, and the certainty of 
 
56 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 supplying them in our own vessels, directly or indirectly. There 
 is, therefore, no ground for much apprehension of our losing it, 
 nor any reason for our giving up any great points to retain it. 
 
 They may claim some good equivalent, should they indulge the 
 importation of flour arid meat, &c., steadily and without interruption ; 
 but as this would interrupt, if not supplant, their supplies from 
 France, it cannot be expected ; and we ought not to pay much 
 for the liberty of supplying them only when their necessities 
 oblige them to look abroad for food. 
 
 The imposition of duties on our exports in either France or 
 Britain may or may not be injurious to us. If we can rely on the 
 general principle of the consumer s paying them when duties are so 
 high as to discourage the use of the article ; if it be imposed on our 
 exports, but not on those of other foreigners, so as to support a 
 rival ; or if it be imposed to increase the production of the article 
 with success within themselves, in all these cases, the duty will 
 prove injurious to us. But where it is imposed on an article 
 necessary to themselves, in which they cannot be our rivals; 
 when all foreigners pay alike, and the duty be riot so high as to 
 discourage the use of the article, in these cases, I would not 
 pay much for an exemption, unless it be an exclusive one, and 
 where we had a rival. 
 
 I expect there will be much management, and much party spirit 
 exhibited in adjusting our commercial intercourse with Britain and 
 France. But if a fair bargain be the object of the parties, and the 
 negotiators act honestly and are well informed, the business may 
 be settled easily to the benefit and satisfaction of all. The great 
 est difficulties that can arise will be from treaties pre-existing with 
 others, which must be attended to ; and these will make it necessary, 
 in some cases, to extend or restrict beyond what would otherwise 
 be eligible. 
 
 I wish you well through the business. The secretary and others 
 of you will have only right objects in view, and will attend to the 
 subject with candor ; but others again will enter upon it replete 
 with prejudice, and with all the zeal of party men or interested 
 agents. 
 
 We are all well here, and at Beverly ; and, wishing you many 
 Happy New Years, 
 
 I remain yours affectionately, 
 
 STEPHEN HJGGINSON. 
 
1791-92.] CORRESPONDENCE. 57 
 
 P. S. I give you the above ideas just as they were in writing : 
 they will, however, be of the same use to you, as if reduced to 
 system and more clearly conveyed. The imposition you speak of 
 in the Cape is winked at, if not worse, by the government 
 there ; but it exists nowhere except in Hispaniola, and is not 
 bottomed upon any demands at home. 
 
 CABOT TO PARSONS. 
 
 (Confidential.) 
 
 BEVERLY, Oct. 3, 1792. 
 
 DEAR SIR, It has been generally supposed that the increase 
 of representation in the national government will be an increase 
 of opposition, at least so far as relates to the Southern States. It 
 must occasion some anxiety to the friends of the Union that, 
 although Connecticut and Rhode Island will send all good men, 
 and Massachusetts likewise, yet a majority may be found in the 
 new House whose principles will lead them to measures injurious, 
 and perhaps ruinous, to the Federal government. You need not 
 be told that your friend Benson 1 will decline the future service, as 
 will Mr. Lawrence, 2 Mr. William Smith, 8 and Mr. Barnwell. 4 
 But perhaps you- are not yet informed that in Pennsylvania and 
 New York the opponents are well combined, and are incessantly 
 active ; while the friends discover a want of union and a want of 
 energy. I am informed, in a manner that is satisfactory, that a 
 very serious effort will be made to prevent the re-election of Mr. 
 Adams ; that in New York, where the electors are to be appointed 
 by the Legislature, every artifice will be practised to procure the 
 appointment of such persons only as will agree to degrade Mr. 
 Adams ; that Governor Clinton is invited to stand a candidate for 
 the Vice-Presidency, but, if he refuses, the same party in Pennsyl 
 vania and New York are to fix on a new candidate of similar 
 principles, and that he will be supported by the influence of all the 
 Virginian and other malcontents. The ruin of Mr. Adams would 
 
 1 Egbert Benson, of New York, at this time member of Congress, and after 
 wards Judge of New York Supreme Court and United States Circuit Court. 
 
 2 John Lawrence, member of Congress from New York, 1789-93 ; United 
 States Judge of the New York District Court, 1794 ; United States Senator, 
 1796-1800. 
 
 8 William Loughton Smith, of South Carolina. He remained in Congress 
 until 1799, when he was appointed minister to Portugal by John Adams. 
 4 Robert Barnwell, member of Congress from South Carolina, 1791-93. 
 
58 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1791-92. 
 
 be a triumph of the Jacobins, and would be an important step 
 toward that general overthrow of our establishment which is evi 
 dently intended. With these ideas upon his mind, a friend has 
 written by the last post to know of me whether Massachusetts 
 will send all men of right principle and good abilities, and espe 
 cially whether she will send Mr. Parsons, whose assistance will be 
 prodigiously important, and whose talents ought not to be withheld. 
 I only answer as you answered me, " that your family and subsistence 
 could not be abandoned." It is, however, exceedingly to be 
 lamented that you cannot or will not come to our help. 
 
 You will recollect, among the late addresses of Governor Clinton, 
 the name of our old friend Osgood : l he is now and has indeed long 
 been considered as deep in the principles of that party. Is it not 
 probable that he may beat up for troops in this quarter to serve 
 them the next campaign ? My neighbor D. would probably aid his 
 designs. Some attention, therefore, will be necessary to secure the 
 choice of good electors as well as representative. I cannot, with 
 propriety, take any part in these proceedings ; but my concern for 
 the public welfare leads me inevitably to communicate to a few 
 confidential friends such information as I may have of the move 
 ments of the opposition, and as they may be supposed to desire. 
 You have withdrawn yourself from the circle of politics ; but you 
 will often be in contact with those who are within it, and will 
 impress those whom you touch. It cannot but happen, therefore, 
 that you will do much good without great trouble to yourself. 
 I am, with very great respect, 
 
 Your friend and obedient servant, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 1 Samuel Osgood, of Massachusetts. He had been a member of the Con 
 tinental Congress, and had served with distinction in the war for Indepen 
 dence. Had also been first commissioner of the Treasury, 1785-80; and 
 from 1789-91 was postmaster-general of the United States ; afterward, 
 speaker of the New York Assembly. 
 
1792-96.] THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 59 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 1792-1796. 
 The United States Senate. 
 
 BEFOKE Mr. Cabot returned to Philadelphia, in the 
 autumn of 1792, party strife had become much embittered. 
 Jefferson s first attempts against the Federalists had been 
 made in the shape of indirect attacks on them in letters 
 to Washington. Powerful and adroit as Jefferson always 
 was in swaying the minds of men by well-directed appeals 
 to the passions and by covert insinuations, his arts proved 
 vain when applied to the President. The wild though in 
 genious chimeras of " a monarchical faction " and " a cor 
 rupt Treasury squadron," conjured up by Jefferson, were 
 useless before the sound judgment and strong understand 
 ing of Washington. The President refused to withdraw 
 his confidence from men in whom he had every reason to 
 trust, and with whose measures he agreed, in order to be 
 stow it on Jefferson, tricked out for the moment in the 
 novel garb of a defender of the Constitution. Baffled in 
 this attempt, Jefferson turned to a more sympathetic au 
 dience. By his assistance, Philip Freneau established the 
 " National Gazette," intended to be the organ of the oppo 
 sition, and the means of public attacks upon the Federalist 
 policy and upon the characters of its promoters. Although 
 imbued with a just hatred of newspaper conflict, Jefferson 
 was always ready to have some one else use that powerful 
 engine in his behalf. He never shrank from thrusting a 
 friend, whether Madison or Freneau, into the thickest of 
 a fight, from which he himself wisely held aloof. 1 Fren- 
 1 Jefferson to Madison, Jefferson s Works, IV. 121. 
 
60 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 eau s unceasing and bitter attacks on the Treasury and the 
 whole financial system at last roused Hamilton, never the 
 coolest of men, and now enraged beyond endurance, both 
 by the nature of the assault and by the character of its 
 real author. Hamilton made a grievous mistake when he 
 descended into the arena of the press ; for, though he 
 drove Jefferson from the field temporarily, he sullied the 
 dignity of his own high office by the violence of news 
 paper controversy. It was the first step in the course 
 which led the Federalists to the extreme measures that 
 ultimately proved their ruin. The conflict between the 
 hostile leaders assumed a personal tone, which rapidly 
 spread to their friends and parties. Washington strove 
 to allay the storm, but it had gone beyond even his 
 control ; and Jefferson soon announced his fixed determi 
 nation to retire from the cabinet. Other events con 
 spired to deepen the contest. The second Presidential 
 election had just occurred. The great name of Washing 
 ton rendered a struggle for the first place impossible ; but 
 the opposition had rallied on the question of the Vice- 
 Presidency. By better combination than they had hitherto 
 attained, the self-styled " Republicans " succeeded in cast 
 ing fifty votes for George Clinton, against seventy-seven 
 for John Adams. 1 A much more serious affair, in its ulti 
 mate consequences, was the resistance to the whiskey tax. 
 The President s proclamation sufficed to quell the disturb 
 ances in North Carolina; but the turbulent population of 
 the western counties of Pennsylvania were not to be so 
 easily put down. The resistance there had a very ugly 
 
 1 This comparative closeness of Adams s and Clinton s vote is the theme 
 of one of Jefferson s most amusing and ingenious tales. Dec. 26, 1797: 
 " Langdon tells me that, at the second election of President and Vice-Presi- 
 dent of the United States, when there was a considerable vote given to 
 Clinton in opposition to Mr. Adams, he took occasion to remark it in con 
 versation in the Senate Chamber with Mr. Adams, who, gritting his teeth, 
 said : * Damn em, damn em, damn em ! You see that an elective govern 
 ment will not to. " Jefferson s Works, IX. 187. 
 
1702-96.] THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 61 
 
 appearance, and already threatened the insurrection which 
 soon afterwards actually broke out. 
 
 Party feeling, therefore, ran very high when the last ses 
 sion of the Second Congress opened ; and the events which 
 ensued were not calculated to abate it. The comparative 
 mildness of the previous session had disappeared, and was 
 not destined to revive for many years. 
 
 This increase of political animosity was publicly per 
 ceptible only in the House, where the opposition, guided 
 by their master, made a concentrated attack on Hamilton. 
 The first effort against the Federalist leader was a demand 
 for the speedy payment of the debt. Hamilton readily 
 acquiesced. There was nothing he more desired ; and he 
 suggested additional taxes for the purpose. This proposi 
 tion cooled the ardor of the gentlemen who were anxious 
 to fix on Hamilton the charge of saddling the country 
 with an irredeemable debt. They therefore shifted their 
 ground ; and their next attempt was far more bitter to 
 ward their opponent, and more discreditable to themselves. 
 Giles, put forward by Jefferson and Madison, made an attack 
 on Hamilton s personal integrity. The only results of this 
 assault were renewed confidence in Hamilton, and the tem 
 porary obliteration of the wretched tool whom the princi 
 pal contrivers had used. 
 
 Fiercely as the conflict raged in the House, it apparently 
 did not as yet disturb the calmness of the Senate. Mr. 
 Cabot s services in this session did not differ materially 
 from those of the last. He appears on all the committees 
 on claims, and on all appointed to consider questions of 
 revenue and finance. He was again on the committee of the 
 mint, and also on that to regulate the value of foreign coin 
 age. He also reported in this session two bills, one of which 
 was fated to play a most important part in our future his 
 tory. This was the bill to regulate the capture and deliv 
 ery of fugitives from justice. At the time, it passed with 
 out much comment ; but, after many vicissitudes, it was 
 
62 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 destined to reappear, more than half a century later, in the 
 portentous form of the Fugitive Slave Law. Mr. Cabot s 
 other bill was to regulate the registration of fishing ves 
 sels, a measure important to New England interests. 
 
 Washington entered on his second term March 4, 1793 ; 
 and the Senate, after a brief special session, adjourned. 
 The members had hardly reached their homes, when the 
 news of Genet s arrival became generally known. To trace 
 the course of that feather-headed Frenchman in America, 
 to enumerate the insults which he heaped upon our gov 
 ernment, or to depict the troubles in which he involved the 
 administration, is neither pleasant nor in this place neces 
 sary. The foreign influence, so much dreaded by the Fed 
 eralists, had come from a quarter where they had not 
 looked for it, and in a shape they could never have im 
 agined. The result was fatal to them in the end. That 
 party which bent most servilely to foreign influence,, 
 which introduced it the first, and maintained it the long 
 est, was to suffer the least from its own follies. Whereas 
 the Federalists, the corner-stone of whose policy was re 
 sistance to foreign intervention, were driven by the course 
 of their opponents into a reaction so violent that they ri 
 valled the democratic love of France in their own admiration 
 of England. But to Jefferson and his followers belongs the 
 ^ole glory of introducing foreign influences into our politics. 
 Adoration of France produced worship of England ; and 
 both brought a curse upon our politics, and warped public 
 sentiment among men of every shade of belief for the next 
 twenty-five years. With Genet, this wretched business 
 began. The contagion, under the benign influence of the 
 French envoy, spread rapidly ; and the feelings it excited 
 among the Federalist leaders are not, at this day, easy to 
 understand. In the first place, the event which they had 
 always most dreaded was actually upon them. Foreign 
 influence was in their midst, and alien politics supplanted 
 those of native growth. They knew such a state of things 
 
1792-96.] THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 63 
 
 to be morbid and unhealthy. But they soon forgot the 
 broad and fundamental objection to the introduction of 
 French policy, in the hatred and disgust which that policy 
 itself excited. To these men, the friends of order, who 
 had just rescued the country from the anarchy of the 
 Confederation, came the spectre of French democracy. 
 Not the constitutional freedom which they venerated ; not 
 the well-ordered State which they sought to construct ; 
 not the liberty for which they had fought the War of In 
 dependence, none of these principles were supported 
 by France. The French liberty was a totally different 
 thing. France preached license, not freedom ; substi 
 tuted names for realities; and, redressing wrongs by in 
 discriminate massacre, set up a tyranny ten times worse 
 than the one she had thrown down. To the Federalists 
 in America, comprising many of the best political thinkers 
 of that age, the spectacle of French anarchy seemed to 
 betoken, as plainly as the setting sun foretells the approach 
 of night, the coming of French despotism. And it was 
 this sham liberty, beginning in fine words and ending 
 in confusion, shame, and tyranny, which they now saw im 
 ported amongst them. As they watched these delusions 
 spread, and Jacobin clubs rise up, with all the vile para 
 phernalia of liberty-poles and red caps, the Federalists 
 roused to a vigorous and bitter resistance. " Anti-Federal 
 ists," now changed to "Jacobins" and "Anarchists," was 
 retorted to the accusations of monarchy, with right good 
 will. Yet the hands of the Federalists were hampered in 
 dealing with their enemies. The memory of French suc 
 cor during the Revolution was still fresh ; and this re 
 strained the Federalists at a time when the current was 
 setting against them with a force which demanded their 
 most unrestricted efforts. Mr. Cabot was of opinion that 
 the Federalists ought to meet the issue squarely, explain 
 everywhere that a selfish policy of ambition and revenge 
 had prompted French aid in 1778, and that it was no time 
 for a sentimental and baseless gratitude, when the inter- 
 
64 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 ests of property and liberty were threatened. Right or 
 wrong, Mr. Cabot s policy had the merit of frankness ; and 
 circumstances ultimately forced its adoption. But, in jus 
 tice to the apparently violent views of the Federalists, we 
 must try to imagine what our own feelings would have 
 been at the time of the French Revolution, when its hor 
 rors were actually at our doors, and threatening entrance ; 
 when the ambassador of that polite nation preached his 
 crusade in our country, appealed to the populace against 
 the government, and spread his pernicious doctrines far 
 and wide. The prospect opened by a general adoption of 
 such theories was one which has been revolting to intelli 
 gence in every age ; for it involved a temporary return to 
 political and social barbarism. This natural alarm was 
 much increased by the general sense of instability in our 
 young government. Can it be matter for wonder that the 
 Federalists grew more and more savage in their hatred 
 toward the men who made political capital out of Genet 
 and the dangerous doctrines which he promulgated ? 
 
 Artifices and threats were alike vain when applied 
 to the President ; and even now the thought of Genet, 
 baffled and impotent before Washington, whose greatness 
 he professed himself unable to comprehend, causes a feel 
 ing of the keenest satisfaction. The President s final re 
 fusal to hold any further communications with Genet is 
 connected with an anecdote of Mr. Cabot, related by Mr. 
 J. A. Hamilton in his " Reminiscences." When Washing- 
 ington resolved upon the important step of dismissing 
 the French minister, he was most anxious to receive the 
 united support of all friends of the administration. To quote 
 Mr. Cabot s own words, as repeated by Mr. Hamilton : 
 
 " John Adams, the Vice-President, was considered a very un 
 certain man ; and the task was committed to me to take care that 
 he should not go wrong on this occasion. I accordingly called 
 upon Mr. Adams in the morning at an early hour, and after a few 
 incidental remarks said : Mr. Adams, this French minister s con 
 duct seems to me to be most objectionable. 
 
1792-96.] THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 65 
 
 " MR. ADAMS. Objectionable ? It is audacious, sir ! 
 
 " MR. CABOT. I think, if you were President, you would not 
 permit him to perform his office very long ! 
 
 "MR. ADAMS. Not an hour, sir! I would dismiss him im 
 mediately. 
 
 " MR. CABOT. i I wish you would allow me to say to the 
 President that such are your views ! 
 
 " MR. ADAMS. Certainly, sir ! I will say so to the Presi 
 dent myself, when I see him. " 1 
 
 The embarrassment of the Federalists in dealing with 
 the French difficulties was increased by the conduct of 
 England. That country still smarted from the humilia 
 tion inflicted on her by the United States, and allowed her 
 desire for revenge to stand in the way of her best political 
 interests. The true British policy obviously was to concili 
 ate her former colonies by every means in her power. 
 Instead of doing so, with an exquisite stupidity and an 
 arrogance only less brutal than that displayed a few years 
 later, England adopted a course which helped greatly to 
 drive America into the arms of the French terrorists, and 
 to increase the difficulties of the administration. 
 
 In these unfavorable circumstances, the session of 1793- 
 94 opened. Public interest was very keen, and centred 
 upon the Congress at Philadelphia. In his message, Wash 
 ington formulated in a few brief words the Federalist 
 policy of a strong neutrality, saying : " There is a rank 
 due to the United States among nations, which will be 
 withheld, if not absolutely lost, by a reputation of weak 
 ness. If we desire peace, one of the most powerful in 
 struments of our rising prosperity, it must be known 
 that we are at all times ready for war." As long as the 
 United States adhered to this truly national policy, our 
 dignity, neutrality, and self-respect were assured. Its en 
 tire abandonment by Jefferson, a few years later, led to the 
 wretched and degraded condition of our country and our 
 politics during the first years of the present century. 
 
 1 Reminiscences of James A. Hamilton, p. 10. 
 5 
 
66 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 In 1793, the Federalists, though perfectly united in sup 
 port of the administration, and thoroughly devoted to the 
 leaders who guided them so strongly and so well, were in 
 a most difficult situation. The majority in the House was 
 against them, and for success they had to rely solely upon 
 their superior ahility, discipline, and concentration of pur 
 pose. In the Senate, their numerical strength had suffered 
 little or no diminution. The opposition s plan of action 
 was now changed. They dropped the system of personal 
 attack on Hamilton, and made up an issue upon the per 
 fectly false question of supporting the French or British 
 interest. Under the direction of Jefferson, they strove 
 for a commercial policy which should be at once hostile to 
 England and favorable to France; and in this plan they 
 were aided both by popular feeling, and by the ill-advised 
 conduct of Great Britain. 
 
 The most important question in the Senate, at the open 
 ing of the session, was raised by the petition of Conrad 
 Laub and others against Albert Gallatin s election as sen 
 ator from Pennsylvania. Mr. Cabot was second on the 
 committee to whom this petition was referred. Their 
 report was adverse, and the subsequent decision of the 
 Senate coincided with the views of the committee. Mr. 
 Cabot s official services were of the same nature as before. 
 He was chairman of the committees on the regulation 
 of coinage, the remission of duties, and the appropria 
 tions. He was also chairman of several minor committees 
 on claims and light-houses, and of the highly important 
 ones, to which were assigned financial questions, on the pay 
 ment of interest, on the assumption of State debts, and 
 on laying duties on wines. As chairman of the committee 
 on appropriations, and of those concerned with the debt, 
 Mr. Cabot appears to have occupied the position of leader 
 in regard to matters of commerce and finance. 
 
 With the new year, Jefferson retired from office, but by no 
 means from the control of his party, to which he was now 
 
1792-06.] THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 67 
 
 able to give his undivided attention. In pursuance, how 
 ever, of the general hostile policy introduced by the re 
 strictive commercial measures of Virginia, the Federalists, 
 to the great disgust of their opponents, brought forward, 
 and carried through, a bill looking to the foundation of a 
 navy. This was another integral part of the Federalist 
 policy, as laid down by Washington, and abandoned by 
 Jefferson. 
 
 While these matters were in progress came the news of 
 the British orders in council against neutral ships, and of 
 Lord Dorchester s speech to the Western Indians. 1 Public 
 feeling was inflamed, and the Federalists were the first to 
 take the lead in proposing strong and energetic measures. 
 A restriction of the first order in council produced a tem 
 porary lull, of which Washington determined to take ad 
 vantage by sending an extraordinary mission to England. 
 This scheme originated with Hamilton, who sent for Mr. 
 Cabot to advise with him. Mr. Cabot, convinced of the 
 wisdom of the plan, held a conference with his brother 
 senators, Rufus King, Oliver Ellsworth, and Caleb Strong, 
 all of whom fully approved the mission, and agreed that 
 Hamilton was the most proper person to be appointed. 
 Ellsworth was selected to confer with the President, who, 
 after some hesitation, agreed in the necessity of such a 
 step. Although Washington s own wishes favored the 
 choice of Hamilton as the ambassador, he was deterred 
 from carrying them into execution by considerations of the 
 clamor which would be raised against such an appoint 
 ment, and which would endanger the success of a decided 
 peace policy. Hamilton himself readily withdrew his 
 claims, holding that personal desires ought to yield to 
 public considerations. 2 The choice, therefore, fell upon 
 Jay, who was duly nominated and confirmed. 
 
 1 This speech suggested the probability of a speedy rupture between the 
 United States and England. See Hildreth, IV. 482. 
 
 2 Hamilton s History of the Republic, V. 532-35 inclusive. Mr. Hamil- 
 
68 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 The opposition, enraged at the mission, passed resolutions 
 for a suspension of trade, which were killed in the Senate ; 
 the Federalists taking the impregnable ground that war 
 like preparations, and not interferences with trade, were 
 the true method to ensure peace. I have briefly sketched 
 the state of public affairs at this time, in order to show the 
 views of which Mr. Cabot was a consistent supporter ; but 
 we are, fortunately, not left to the letters of friends only 
 for information as to his political opinions and party stand 
 ing. The celebrated " Anas " afford a glimpse of the 
 manner in which he was regarded by Jefferson. As a 
 friend of Hamilton and a stanch Federalist, Mr. Cabot 
 could hardly expect at the hands of the Democratic chief 
 better treatment than that given him in the following 
 
 "Dec. 1, 1793. Beckley tells me he had the following fact 
 from Lear. 1 Langdon, Cabot, and some others of the Senate, 
 standing in a knot before the fire after the Senate adjourned, and 
 growling together about some measure which they had just lost, 
 Ah ! said Cabot, things will never go right until you have a 
 President for life and an hereditary Senate. Langdon told this 
 to Lear, who mentioned it to the President. The President 
 seemed struck with it, and declared he had not supposed there 
 was a man in the United States who could have entertained such 
 an idea." 2 
 
 ton is my only authority for this account of the circumstances connected 
 with the origin of the mission and the selection of Jay. In confirmation of 
 his statement, he refers to minutes of the conference held by Mr. Cabot 
 and the other senators. Where or of what nature those minutes are, 
 I am unable to say; and Mr. Hamilton offers no explanation. As Mr. 
 Hamilton had access to many still unpublished documents, his opportunities 
 of information were unusually good ; but the absence of exact references 
 in his work to any manuscript evidence he may have used renders this ex 
 planation necessary. 
 
 1 Tobias Lear, Washington s private secretary, afterwards strongly sus 
 pected of removing important letters from among Washington s papers, 
 and conveying them to Jefferson. The latter gave him a foreign mission. 
 
 2 Jefferson s Works, IX. 184. To test by the usual standards a story 
 told ^ by a political opponent, embellished many years after, and originally 
 received by that opponent on hearsay and at fourth hand, would be super- 
 
1792-96.] THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 69 
 
 The summer of 1794 was marked by the outbreak 
 of the whiskey rebellion, and the vigorous suppression 
 of that insurrection by Hamilton. This in a large 
 measure, and Wayne s Indian victories in a smaller de 
 gree, were the means of greatly strengthening the hands 
 of the government. Hamilton, after encountering many 
 difficulties, by an energetic display of force proved the 
 ability of the new government to sustain itself ; and Wash 
 ington took advantage of the situation to condemn in his 
 message the Jacobin clubs and societies, which had grown 
 up rankly in servile imitation of their French prototypes. 
 The opposition, though rallying bravely in defence of their 
 beloved " societies," lost heart ; and the concentration and 
 vigorous attack of the Federalists made them give ground 
 in a fashion which caused intense disgust to Jefferson. An 
 account of Mr. Cabot s services during this session would 
 be but a tedious repetition of those rendered in previous 
 years. Claims, loans, the revenue system, and finance 
 formed as usual his principal duties in the Senate. 
 
 At this time, Mr. Cabot made an important change in 
 the circumstances of his private life. He withdrew from 
 all active business, in possession of a reasonable and suffi 
 cient fortune, and at the same time left Beverly to make 
 his home in Brookline, where he had purchased an estate. 
 The fashion of retirement to a country place, or farm, was 
 much more common in those days, when the traditions and 
 customs of England still lingered in the community, than 
 now. Mr. Cabot s house in Brookline is still standing, 
 and but little altered. Like most New England dwell 
 ings, it stood near the road which led from the village ; 
 but the narrow, country lane, winding through the estates 
 of a single possessor, is now replaced by broad streets 
 uniting before the old-fashioned, gabled house, which in 
 
 fluous. The anecdote is at least amusing, no small merit in the eyes of any 
 one familiar with the writings of the time; and the last touch about the 
 President displays the genius of a true artist in historical statements. 
 
70 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 1795 was secluded and solitary. The farm covered the 
 slopes of a hill, and stretched far away over lands now 
 thickly dotted with modern villas. Mr. Cabot intended to 
 devote himself to the care and management of his new 
 domain, to which he gave the name of " Greenhill." 
 Judge Iredell was a guest there in the summer of 1795 ; 
 and he speaks in his letters of the beauty of the place, then 
 dressed in all the glories of June. 1 
 
 Mr. Cabot had hardly returned to Brookline, when he 
 was recalled to Philadelphia to attend the executive session 
 held for the ratification of the Jay treaty. The contents 
 of that famous treaty, its ratification by the Senate, and the 
 action of the President absorbed all the political interests 
 of the ensuing summer. The first feeling, when the pro 
 visions of the treaty were known, was one of indignation ; 
 but sober second thought eventually brought over to its 
 support the great majority of the people, who considered 
 peace cheaply purchased, even at a somewhat heavy price. 
 Mr. Cabot was one of the most uncompromising defenders 
 of the treaty. He took the ground that, defective as it 
 was, we could rationally expect nothing more, in view of 
 our own strength as compared with that of England. If 
 it were admitted that these terms were the best, or nearly 
 the best, possible, the only question then was between them 
 or war ; and Mr. Cabot firmly believed that a ruinous war 
 would at that time have destroyed the Union, and produced 
 irreparable disintegration. In his letters to Rufus King and 
 Oliver Wolcott, he fully sets forth his views ; and it is not 
 necessary, therefore, to dwell further upon them here. 2 
 
 The great event of the next session of Congress that 
 of 1795-96 was the discussion in the House upon the 
 treaty. While this debate lasted, party feeling was at 
 fever-heat. Nothing was possible to the Senate but to await, 
 with what patience they could muster, the issue of the 
 
 1 Life of Iredell, II. 446, 447. 
 
 2 See below, p. 85. 
 
1792-96.J THE UNITED STATES SENATE. 71 
 
 struggle. Jefferson represents that, while the fate of the 
 treaty was in suspense, the Federalists resolved to dissolve 
 the Union, if the House decided adversely to the treaty, 
 and that they announced their intention on the floor of 
 the Senate. Mr. Cabot is mentioned, in the " Anas," as 
 one of the leaders in this movement, and as the person 
 on whom it chiefly devolved to give utterance to this 
 formidable threat. 
 
 " March 1. Mr. Tazewell tells me that, when the appropria 
 tions for the British treaty were on the carpet, and very uncertain 
 in the Lower House, there being at that time a number of bills in 
 the hands of committees of the Senate, none reported, and the 
 Senate idle for want of them, he in his place called on the com 
 mittees to report ; and particularly on Mr. King, who was of most 
 of them. King said that it was true the committees kept back their 
 reports, waiting the event of the question about appropriation ; 
 that, if that was not carried, they considered legislation as at an 
 end ; that they might as well break up, and consider the Union as 
 dissolved. Tazewell expressed his astonishment at these ideas, and 
 called on King to know if he had misapprehended him. King rose 
 again, and repeated the same words. The next day, Cabot took 
 an occasion in debate, and so awkward a one as to show it was a 
 thing agreed to be done, to repeat the same sentiments in stronger 
 terms, and carried further, by declaring a determination on their 
 side to break up and dissolve the government." l 
 
 Tried by the ordinary historical tests, this story may be 
 rejected, in common with the rest of the " Anas," which are 
 never to be safely relied on, unless corroborated by outside 
 evidence. Yet there is in this an element, or rather a sug 
 gestion, of truth more misleading than even absolute inac 
 curacy. The Federalists believed, and made no secret of 
 their belief, that the rejection of the treaty would bring 
 war, and that war at that period meant a dissolution of the 
 Union. From this undisputed fact, Jefferson concludes a 
 plot, and substantiates his conclusion by a skilful detail of 
 
 i Jefferson s Works, IX. 190. 
 
72 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 circumstantial evidence and minute facts. His accusation 
 of a definite scheme, however, finds no support in the pri 
 vate letters of the Federalists. 
 
 Early in this session, it became the duty of the Senate to 
 return thanks, through the President, for a flag presented 
 to the United States by the French Republic. The resolu 
 tion offered referred to the French as " that magnanimous 
 nation," &c. Mr. Cabot moved to strike out those words ; 
 and, after a sharp debate, the motion prevailed. The only 
 addition this year to Mr. Cabot s usual duties on questions 
 of finance, revenue, &c., was his service on the committee 
 on naval armament, a subject in which he took the 
 deepest interest. 
 
 In the latter part of May, 1796, Mr. Cabot returned to 
 Brookline, without waiting for the close of the session, 
 and prepared his resignation, which he shortly after sent 
 to the Legislature. The only hesitation he felt in taking 
 this step was caused by the fear that his successor might 
 not be a man of suitable character. When satisfied on 
 this point, 1 he immediately and with great gladness aban 
 doned public life. The prevailing cause of his early with 
 drawal was a strong distaste for the asperities of politics, 
 becoming every day more personal and bitter. This 
 aversion to the broils and to the daily wear and tear of 
 public life had made his position an irksome one for some 
 time past ; while a life of leisure and quiet, at all times 
 the most congenial to his tastes, by his retirement from 
 business was now open to him. 
 
 I have tried in the preceding paragraphs to depict the 
 political position of Mr. Cabot, his rank in his party, and 
 his services to the country. I much regret that secrecy, and, 
 after that was removed, bad reporting, have deprived me of 
 any material for an account of Mr. Cabot s share in the 
 debates. He was not fond of public speaking, and made no 
 
 1 Mr. Cabot s friend, Benjamin Goodhue, of Salem, was chosen his 
 successor. 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 73 
 
 pretensions to the powers of oratory ; and yet he seems to 
 have been a not ineffective debater. Fisher Ames, a good 
 judge, though possibly a partial friend, says : " Madison, in 
 speaking, never relaxes into pleasantry, and discovers little 
 of that warmth of heart which gives efficacy to George 
 Cabot s reasoning, and to Lowell s." 1 The following letters 
 will show, better than any description of mine, Mr. Cabot s 
 opinions and thoughts upon the public affairs, in which he 
 took an active and not unimportant part : 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The people of Massachusetts entertain the 
 idea that a balance is due to the State more than sufficient to cover 
 her State debt, and some anxiety has been excited in the Legisla 
 ture of that State lest she should finally fail of receiving it. 
 
 After the failure of the assumption bill, I intended to have had 
 five minutes conversation with you on the subject, but that your 
 time seemed to be overcharged with other business. 
 
 I hope you will find leisure and inclination to furnish me soon 
 with your ideas on the interesting subject of commercial policy, 
 and that you will say definitely whether my continuance in the 
 bank is to be desired or not, since it furnishes so copious a topic 
 for complaint. 2 
 
 I called this morning to bid you farewell, but you were absent. 
 
 May God bless you ! G. CABOT. 
 
 EVENING, March 4, 1793. 
 
 CABOT TO RUFUS KING. 
 
 BEVERLY, Aug. 2, 1793. 
 
 DEAR SIR, This morning s post brought me your favor of 
 the 27th of July. I thought a publication of some of the ideas it 
 
 1 Works of Fisher Ames, II. 42. 
 
 2 Mr. Cabot had been appointed President of the Boston Branch of the 
 United States Bank, when that institution was first organized. This natu 
 rally offered a fine opportunity for references to " corrupt Treasury squad 
 rons ; " and Mr. Cabot had no liking for the position of target, if it could be 
 
74 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOPwGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 contained, with others which were naturally excited, might be use 
 ful, and therefore, after giving them a little change of form and 
 arrangement, have set them off for the press. But as they are gone 
 by a subterraneous passage, and under the patronage of another 
 gentleman, it is uncertain whether they will ever appear, or, if 
 they do, in what shape. 
 
 The people in this part of the country have but one wish respect 
 ing the national peace, and that is, that it may be preserved, 
 excepting a few factious men in Boston and a very few in other 
 places. They are well united, too, in the sentiment that the Pres 
 ident is the proper guardian of the public tranquillity, and that the 
 measures he takes to secure it are fit and proper, and ought to be 
 supported. Our commercial and maritime people feel themselves 
 deeply interested to prevent every act that may put our peace at 
 hazard ; but who can restrain opinions ? The cause of truth 
 requires that they should be free, and will, on the whole, profit by 
 this freedom. Unfortunately, the propagators of falsehood are the 
 most industrious, and for the moment the most successful. Indeed, 
 they are most of them stimulated by the strongest personal motives ; 
 while their opponents are actuated chiefly by a love of the public. 
 Who can doubt on which side the victory will be in such a con 
 test ? It has been with surprise, as well as concern, that I have 
 seen the rapid progress of Jacobinical principles since my return 
 from Philadelphia. Until Pacificus * appeared, there were very 
 few persons whose ideas were tolerably just respecting the relation 
 of the United States to France. Indeed, there are not many now 
 who think correctly upon that subject; but for these erroneous 
 sentiments the friends of the government are as blamable as their 
 adversaries. Why have they not always told the truth, at least so 
 much of it as would have enabled the people to understand that 
 France, in the aid she gave to tlfe United States, was actuated by 
 policy, or, to speak out, by ambition ? Why has it been concealed 
 that, from the first moment of her connection with us, she inserted 
 herself into all our councils; that by her influence there she pro 
 cured measures that placed the most precious interests of our 
 
 honorably avoided. His application to be released from the bank duties 
 failed, for he continued to act as President of the Boston Branch until after 
 the close of Mr. Adams s administration. 
 
 1 Hamilton wrote under that name at the time when public feeling against 
 England was strongest, and when Genet was most popular. 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 75 
 
 country at her own mercy ; that she obstructed our commercial 
 views ; that at the treaty of peace she endeavored to depress us ; 
 and, in a word, that she has constantly aimed to keep us low, imbe 
 cile, and dependent, &c. ? But all this declamation is out of time. 
 Although I have lived much at home, yet I have not been wholly 
 inattentive to what was passing these few months, and, previous to 
 the receipt of your letter, had promoted in some degree the meas 
 ures you wish. It will be useful to rouse the sober part of the 
 community, and oblige them to attend to a subject, the discussion 
 of which can no longer be avoided. 
 
 I am always happy to hear from you, and remain, with sincere 
 
 esteem, 
 
 Your friend, &c., G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PARSONS. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, Jan. 8, 1794. 
 
 DEAR SIR, A want of leisure has prevented me from making 
 you the return I had promised for your obliging letter. You must, 
 however, indulge me in the hope that my neglect will not discour 
 age you from a repetition of the favor. 
 
 I sent you by Mr. Amory Genet s correspondence ; but before it 
 reaches you its contents will be less interesting, as you will have 
 previously heard, what is incontestably true, that this fellow has 
 been attempting to raise a large body of troops (to be embodied 
 on the Indian territory) for the purpose of attacking the Spaniards, 
 as he pretends, but possibly to be employed in support of his fac 
 tion and principles within the United States. These particulars 
 may render his letters comparatively insipid. My respects to Mrs. 
 Parsons. 
 
 Your assured friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO SAMUEL PHILLIPS.* 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, 8th March, 1794. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Scarcely a day has passed since I last wrote 
 you without a recollection of the subject of your letter, to which 
 
 1 Samuel Phillips, of Andover, Mass., founder of the Phillips Academy 
 in his native town, and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Mr. 
 Phillips was in active political life for many years, but held only provincial 
 and State offices. 
 
76 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-9& 
 
 no satisfactory reply can be given. But, having already imparted 
 to you the ideas which heretofore have occurred to my mind, I 
 make no scruple of adding now that the prospect of our public 
 affairs becomes daily less favorable. The hazard to which the 
 French faction and its partisans were exposing us has very much 
 diminished in relation to our internal tranquillity ; but the measures 
 they promoted, and the spirit they excited in the course of the last 
 summer among our people, must be supposed to have had great 
 effects upon the temper and disposition of the British government 
 towards this country. And, although our government conducted 
 wonderfully well in preserving the neutrality, yet it is quite cred 
 ible that the hostile sentiments of our citizens to the British nation, 
 propagated with so much zeal and industry and published with so 
 many aggravating circumstances, may have produced a belief in the 
 government of that nation that our influence in the war, open or 
 covered, ivould be exerted in favor of France. To which let it be 
 added, that, in spite of the declared neutrality, the enemies of 
 Britain did equip and arm vessels in our ports, with which, as Mr. 
 Genet says, they captured or destroyed fifty sail of British vessels, 
 and annihilated their trade with the United States. It is therefore 
 at least probable that Great Britain has taken into her account of 
 contingencies a war with the United States. I do not, however, 
 believe that she is willing to make us an open enemy, if she can 
 effect her projects against France and the French colonies without 
 it. But the objects of her pursuit are of such a nature and of such 
 magnitude that she will not hazard the attainment of them from a 
 consideration of our rights, even if she were persuaded we should 
 go to war to vindicate them. I think the language of her conduct 
 is so far intelligible. She plainly says to us, " You shall not hold 
 any intercourse with our enemies which in our judgment may 
 enable them to resist our attacks." In resolving to treat us with 
 such levity, doubtless Great Britain considered our weakness and 
 inability to injure her. She considered, also, that we had already 
 done her some harm, which might justify rigorous measures on her 
 part. But she considered chiefly that our interest and inclination 
 together led us to aid her enemies, and therefore she had nothing 
 very important to fear by incurring our resentment. But with 
 these views I think the minister of Great Britain must have also 
 connected some others not uninteresting. Though we are weak in 
 arms, and they are strong, yet they must feel a reluctance at pro- 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 77 
 
 ducing events which could operate to the derangement of their 
 resources even in a small degree. We are large customers and 
 have running accounts of great extent, and the disturbance of our 
 intercourse must be embarrassing to the merchants and others with 
 whom we deal. A shock to them like fire to a train might run 
 too fast to be stopped and too far to be borne. And an appre 
 hension of this would surely be sufficient to restrain them from all 
 wanton aggression and from all avoidable provocation. On the 
 whole, therefore, among the variety of reasons which I have con 
 jectured as the ground on which our vessels are detained in the 
 West Indies, the most probable is that they think it essential to 
 destroy our intercourse with the French colonies, in order to get 
 the more ready possession of them, and therefore at the commence 
 ment of their operations they have determined to arrest all neutral 
 vessels in that predicament. If this be all that is intended, many 
 questions may be suggested as to what is actually done, and which 
 do not seem exactly to correspond with this idea. So far as I am 
 acquainted with the subject, however, all these may be solved on 
 principles of public policy or private interest. We have as yet 
 very little accurate information, and not enough to enable us to 
 judge whether any thing, and, if any thing, what, ought to be done 
 on our part. Enough, however, is known to create great anxiety 
 and to depress the public credit, and it is on this account I state to 
 you the reflections I make. I think the friends of government 
 will be opposed to war and to whatever may have a tendency to 
 produce it ; but I think it probable they may propose some provi 
 sional arrangements of a defensive kind, and endeavor to obtain by 
 negotiation that redress which could not easily be obtained in any 
 other way. We all perceive that, bad as our condition is, war 
 would make it much worse, and therefore must be avoided. An 
 unarmed nation entering late into a war with those who are well 
 armed, and have been long engaged, suffers out of all measure : this 
 fact has been too well proved to be denied. 
 
 MONDAY, March 10. 
 
 Since Saturday, when I finished the foregoing sheet, we have 
 been informed of the evacuation of Toulon, which event must of 
 itself have some effect in moderating the insolence of Great Brit 
 ain. In its consequences, it may perhaps humiliate all the com 
 bined nations. I believe it to be for the interest and peace of our 
 
78 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 country that they should on all sides suffer deeply, and no one tri 
 umph. On the one hand, the haughtiness of P^nglarid, in case of 
 success, would become intolerable to our maritime commerce ; and, 
 on the other hand, French principles would destroy us as a society. 
 They are more to be dreaded, in a moral view, than a thousand 
 yellow fevers in a physical. It is on this account, in addition to 
 numberless others, that a war is to be deprecated, as it would by 
 giving us a new common interest attach us more closely, and pro 
 duce the greatest possible assimilation with them. I pray Heaven, 
 therefore, that this dreaded evil may be averted from us, as one from 
 which the present generation could not possibly be recovered. The 
 post of this day from the eastward brings us some intelligence of 
 vessels being liberated that were seized by the British ; and, as this 
 corresponds with my prevailing sentiments that they do not mean 
 to plunder us and to make war, I indulge the hope that their sys 
 tem, when fully developed, will turn out to be less hostile than 
 appearances have indicated or rumor pronounced. Should this 
 prove to be the case, the elasticity of the public mind would soon 
 recover its proper tone, and our affairs would brighten. But, while 
 the Europeans are contending in a spirit of desperation, our tran 
 quillity must be precarious, and it would be presumptuous to disre 
 gard the danger. After so long a letter, which you must now be 
 willing to see ended, I wish it were in my power to give you a 
 definitive opinion. But there are not data on which to form it. 
 I therefore have been diffuse in describing the impressions of my 
 mind. Your, &c. GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PARSONS. 1 
 
 ( Confidential. ) 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 12, 1794. 
 
 DEAR SIR, At the close of the late session of Congress, I 
 resolved to free myself from the torments of political anxiety, at 
 least during the present recess. But to attain this desirable respite 
 is no easy thing for any man who sincerely loves his country, who 
 feels any sort of responsibility for its welfare, and who believes 
 that any thing remains to be done to secure or promote it. The 
 public good has always been the victim of private vices. We 
 
 1 When this letter was written, the " whiskey insurrection " was in pro 
 gress ; a circumstance which doubtless invigorated the expression of the 
 writer s sentiments. 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 79 
 
 witness the ready sacrifice which personal ambition makes of equal 
 rights. We see the facility with which a wicked faction has tri 
 umphed over public liberty by assuming popular names. We 
 have seen the expression of the general will of a great society 
 silenced, the legal representatives of the people butchered, and 
 a band of relentless murderers ruling in their stead with rods 
 of iron. Will not this, or something like it, be the wretched fate 
 of our country, if the people can be excited to resist the laws of 
 their own making, and to consider as tyrants those who are ap 
 pointed to execute them ? I know of no security individuals can 
 have for the enjoyment of their equal rights but the force of the 
 laws, these being so many declarations of the general will fairly 
 and constitutionally made. But if this general will is superseded 
 by faction, and its supremacy can be no longer maintained, there 
 is an end of that equality of rights which is the very essence of 
 liberty. 
 
 All governments rest on opinion. Free governments, espe 
 cially, depend on popular opinion for their existence, and on popu 
 lar approbation for their force. If, therefore, just opinions and 
 right sentiments do not prevail in the community, such systems 
 must necessarily perish. Let me ask if such sentiments do prevail 
 at this moment. On the contrary, are they not hostile or distrust 
 ful ? and is not this hostility and distrust chiefly produced by the 
 slanders and falsehoods which the anarchists incessantly inculcate ? 
 I think no honest, well-informed man will answer these questions 
 in the negative. 
 
 It is the belief of many able statesmen that no free government, 
 however perfect its form and virtuous its administration, can with 
 stand the continued assaults of unrefuted calumny. This is al 
 ready verified in some degree in our country, and the fact is so 
 alarming that the real friends of liberty and order can no longer 
 indulge themselves in that repose with which they are lulled by 
 a confidence in the rectitude of their principles. For, while they 
 slumber, the anarchists are up and doing. These ideas, common 
 to the minds of those with whom I generally converse, constrain 
 me to solicit your exertion and co-operation with other good men 
 to counteract the mischievous attempts everywhere making to de 
 stroy the peace, order, and liberty of our country. Truth alone 
 can be used by men of virtue in this contest. But truth will be 
 a sufficient defence, if extensively propagated. It is well known 
 
80 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 that you can give great aid in this honorable work, by timely 
 explanations in conversations, by occasional paragraphs in the 
 newspaper, by republishing from other papers such pieces as are 
 calculated to inform and rectify the public mind, and finally by 
 stimulating other patriots to join in these efforts. Conscious that 
 I am actuated by those motives only which honest minds approve, 
 no apology is necessary for this application to you on a subject so 
 deeply interesting to all, and in relation to which I have always 
 had the satisfaction to find your opinions and mine essentially 
 agree. With great esteem and respect, 
 
 I remain your friend and servant, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO KING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, 25th July, 1795. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Going into town yesterday for the first time since 
 my return, I met your letter of the 13th, and was greatly rejoiced 
 to find that the insanity which is epidemic in this quarter is less 
 prevalent with you. It would be consolatory to believe that among 
 the crew of our political ship the sound would always be sufficient 
 to take care of the sick. But I have not this desirable faith. The 
 readiness and severity with which the treaty has been condemned 
 is a new proof that our government cannot rely for support even 
 upon good men in cases of emergency, for these very generally 
 acquiesced in the censure, without any examination of the subject. 
 It is true that they are now mortified at their indiscretion, and 
 many of them will have the magnanimity to retread their steps ; 
 but pride will probably prevent others from acknowledging they 
 were wrong. A number of gentlemen visited me soon after I 
 arrived here, and were easily satisfied that the ideas circulated re 
 specting the treaty were very incorrect ; but they all united with 
 me in sentiment, that explanations would be fruitless during the 
 ferment, which was extreme and universal. What was then fore 
 seen has been realized. Men s minds had gone too far ; and, when 
 inclined to come back, a little effort has been successful in greatly 
 accelerating the reverberation. With a view to ascertain the state 
 of public opinion and to contribute my mite towards forming it 
 rightly in other parts of the State, I attended the Commencement 
 at Cambridge, and was gratified to perceive that sensible and vir 
 tuous men from other quarters resented the proceedings of Boston ; 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 81 
 
 so that, if I were to judge from the evidence of that day. I should 
 pronounce that the sober sense of Massachusetts approves the 
 treaty. Since that time, a piece entitled " Candid Remarks on the 
 Treaty " has been republished here from some of your papers, the 
 effects of which are highly beneficial. Such a summary defence 
 was well adapted to the moment, but I hope a more elaborate one 
 will be produced at New York, and handed along very soon. Our 
 mercantile men have learned something more of our rights and the 
 rights of the other nations than they knew formerly, but they have 
 yet to learn that the commerce of the United States is not such as 
 would enable us to dictate the terms on which an intercourse is to 
 be held with the nations of Europe. 
 
 Upon examining the East India article, I don t see that our ves 
 sels are prohibited the coasting trade ; and I should imagine they 
 will enjoy it as usual, until an explicit prohibition shall be declared 
 by the British. The more I have examined this article, the better 
 it has appeared ; and most men with whom I converse seem to agree 
 that it is good. I have much more to say, but my potatoes need 
 hoeing and must not be neglected ; so I only add, with respects to 
 Mrs. King, that 
 
 I remain your faithful friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO KING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, July 27, 1795. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Your favor of the 20th did not come to hand until 
 this moment. It was not wholly unexpected that our mob should 
 inflame yours : all society is full of combustible materials, arid a 
 flame once alighted easily produces a general conflagration. It 
 dannot be sufficiently regretted that some of our respectable men 
 jliave on this occasion joined the Jacobins, and very many of them 
 acquiesced in their measures. They now see the pernicious ten 
 dency of their proceedings, and a good portion of them already 
 condemn them. I believe it adds much to their mortification to 
 reflect that they listened to the representations and observations of 
 a man whose want of sense has been thought at Boston a security 
 against his influence. After all, no sufficient apology is offered 
 for the conduct of men who have habitually supported order, and 
 now have arranged themselves with its enemies. Some of them, 
 indeed, say that they were deceived by the accounts brought by 
 
82 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 Mr. Langdon ; l others, by the mutilated abstract published, which 
 totally removed alienage ; and many confess that they condemned 
 the treaty without knowing its merits. You will perhaps hold me 
 responsible for these excesses, but I decline being surety against 
 the folly and nonsense of any man. If I had thought as ill of the 
 citizens of Boston as their conduct respecting the treaty would now 
 justify, or if I had realized that Mr. Langdon could furnish sparks 
 to inflame them, it is possible that a few hours conversation with 
 some of them on the evening of my arrival might have retarded 
 the rapidity of the current, though I don t think it could have 
 changed its course. 
 
 In justice to Dr. Eustis, 2 I ought to mention, as from his friends, 
 that one of his motives for sharing in the agency was that of pre 
 venting greater mischief. This is laudable, and sometimes expe 
 dient ; but the services of our friends, when accompanied by 
 improper concessions to our enemies, are too costly to be profit 
 able. You will see a sharp speech of Dexter s, 3 which does him 
 credit for its spirit and good sense ; but it is introduced by admitting 
 that the treaty is " not so good as he hoped." I shall desire him 
 to point out some of those good things which he had a right to hope 
 for, presuming that his hopes and even desires are regulated by 
 reason. 
 
 I wish you would inform me by return of post whether these pop 
 ular tumults have produced any embarrassment to the President, 
 and whether the treaty, with its accompaniments, is gone ? Our 
 good men here all presume that the President is too firm to be 
 shaken, and therefore have the more willingly indulged themselves 
 in supineness. I think, however, they would rally, and make a 
 reputable effort, if it were believed to be indispensable. In Salem 
 and the other seaports, they are pretty steady ; and in the country 
 as yet I have not heard of the treaty s being anywhere unpopular, 
 and every day furnishes new evidence that the old friends of order 
 are reuniting even at Boston. 
 
 It was observed here that your Jacobins were prudent to en- 
 
 1 I suppose this to refer to John Langdon, afterwards governor of New 
 Hampshire. His desertion of the Federalists rendered him very unpopular 
 with that party. 
 
 2 Dr. William Eustis, afterwards a Democratic Congressman from Mas 
 sachusetts, Governor of the State, and Secretary of War in Mr. Madison s 
 cabinet. 
 
 3 Samuel Dexter, the distinguished lawyer. 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 83 
 
 deavor to knock out Hamilton s brains, 1 to reduce him to an equal 
 ity with themselves ; but I trembled at the first account which was 
 related of that adventure, and offered up an unfeigned prayer for 
 his safety, I mean the silent prayer of an affectionate heart. 
 Mrs. King s order has been transmitted to the manufactory, and in 
 due time she shall hear further. In the interim, believe me truly 
 her and Your faithful friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO KING. 
 
 BROOKLIXE, Aug. 4, 1795. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The uncertainty you mention respecting the 
 ratification of the treaty by the President renews my anxiety for 
 the welfare of our country. Although I have entertained some 
 fears that the business was delayed, yet, as no objections from the 
 President had ever come to my knowledge, my hopes greatly pre 
 ponderated. I shall seize this moment, while the proceeding of the 
 President is unknown, to suggest to the Boston merchants the pro- 
 fpriety of a manly declaration of their sentiments ; but although I 
 [have reason to believe that the treaty is now generally approved 
 iby them, yet so many of them indiscreetly censured it, that it is 
 jdoubtful how far they will incline formally to express their present 
 (^pinions. 
 
 Pride is a powerful enemy in this case, and, combined with the 
 natural reluctance which men feel at combating popular prejudices, 
 may not be easily overcome ; but, be this as it may, you may be 
 fully assured that the most respectable part of our community have 
 become the advocates of the treaty, and are extending the opinion 
 of its propriety every moment. 
 
 I am told that the only article which is now unsatisfactory to 
 any of the Federalists here is the 10th, which shows, I think, that 
 they are hard pressed by their friends. Indeed, it will not surprise 
 me to find the Senate blamed for not accepting the entire instru 
 ment by some men who have lately censured every part, such is 
 
 1 A large public meeting, called by the enemies of the treaty, was held in 
 New York, July 18, 1795. The Federalists, to the disgust of the Democrats, 
 appeared there in force. Hamilton rose to address the meeting, and just as 
 he began was struck on the forehead with a stone. " If," said Hamilton, 
 " you use such knock-down arguments as these, I must retire," and there 
 upon withdrew. The meeting, however, was a failure, and the Federalists 
 were satisfied. 
 
84 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 the versatility of opinion. Although we have neither a Curtius 
 nor a Camillus, 1 yet the explanations given by Gore in the news 
 paper and those circulated by others in private conversation have 
 so well aided the investigations of individuals that the subject is 
 pretty well understood, and its friends increased in a corresponding 
 ratio. I am, however, very glad to see the systematic and able 
 defence setting up in your city, and shall take measures to extend 
 its operation in this quarter. I have too much respect for the 
 character of the President to believe that he can be deterred from 
 his duty by the clamor or menaces of these city mobs, but still I 
 agree with you that their doings should be counteracted by the 
 good people, lest it should be imagined that all are alike infected 
 with the rage of disorganization. 
 
 Your sincere friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO OLIVER WOLCOTT. 
 
 BOSTON, Aug. 13, 1795. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The Chamber of Commerce here has held a meet 
 ing on the subject of the treaty, and with a remarkable unanimity 
 approved it. They also passed a vote reprobating the attempts 
 everywhere made to excite clamor and discontent. The proceed 
 ings are to be transmitted to the President. 
 
 At Salem, the respectable people are all acquiescent ; arid many 
 of them approve, but they think it unadvisable to act. At New- 
 buryport, the principal merchants are also well satisfied ; and some 
 steps have been taken to bring them to express their opinions, but 
 I am not yet informed of the success. 
 
 On the whole, it may be safely pronounced that the sober and 
 discreet part of even our seaports, and still more of our country 
 towns, feel a great anxiety lest the treaty should by any means 
 miscarry. 
 
 1 " Camillus " was the signature under which Hamilton wrote his famous 
 essays in defence of the Jay treaty. King assisted largely in this work, 
 contributing a number of the " Camillus " papers. The introductory essay 
 of the series was signed "Curtius." Jefferson (Works, IV. 121) supposed 
 it to have proceeded from the pen of Hamilton, but was mistaken in his 
 opinion. (See Hamilton s History of the Republic, VI. 280.) It would seem 
 from the expressions in this letter, that King was the author of " Curtius; " 
 but there is no direct evidence of this, and I believe the " Curtius " letters 
 are now generally and correctly attributed to Pelatiah Webster, a well-known 
 writer and pamphleteer of the day. 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 85 
 
 It is with no less chagrin than astonishment that I learn this 
 day the consummation of the business has been delayed by popu 
 lar clamor. If delay should terminate in refusal, we are ruined. 
 The present system will have finished its destiny. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO KING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 14, 1795. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Since my last, I have been at Newburyport, 
 where the merchants are perfectly well united, and have by this 
 time probably made a formal declaration of their opinions. I un 
 derstand that the only point on which they differed was the expe 
 diency of giving to the negotiation personal praise, and this was 
 omitted entirely on the ground of avoiding present irritation. 
 
 The Boston Chamber of Commerce have held a meeting. The 
 number attending was, as usual, about forty. They were of the 
 most reputable class, and with only a single dissentient appro 
 bated the treaty, and reprobated the attempts everywhere made to 
 excite discontent and tumult among the people. Their proceed 
 ings, as well as those of Newburyport, are to be transmitted to the 
 President. At Boston, the members of the Chamber of Com 
 merce who did not attend are to be invited to concur in writing ; 
 and it is expected that three-fourths, including nineteen-twentieths 
 of the real respectability, will concur. 
 
 At Salem, Mr. Derby, Gray, and some others, having consulted, 
 declare it to be their opinion that seven-eighths of their town would 
 vote to leave the business where the Constitution has placed it ; but 
 they think it not best to make any movement, because, they say, 
 as no opposition has been made among them they ought to be con 
 sidered unanimously favorable. 
 
 / After all, where is the boasted advantage of a representation 
 system over the turbulent mobocracy of Athens, if the resort to 
 popular meetings is necessary? Faction, and especially the fac 
 tion of great towns, always the most powerful, will be too strong 
 for our mild and feeble government. 
 
 The newspapers will inform you of the arrival of a vessel from 
 Rochelle yesterday, the captain of which informs me that he fell 
 in with the British fleet of fourteen sail of the line, which had 
 combated fourteen French and captured three. The action was 
 
86 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 off Belle Isle, and the English captain told our informant that the 
 whole French fleet would have been taken, if night had not covered 
 them. Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 24, 1795. 
 
 MY DEAR Sm, In answer to your question, it may be 
 said with confidence that New England will be calm and steady, 
 and that the national government will lose nothing in the present 
 storm, that depends upon her. 
 
 It is, however, a lamentable truth that the first impressions upon 
 good men were so erroneous as to give every encouragement to 
 faction. This delusion was indeed momentary, and, having soon 
 been dissipated by reason and information, has been succeeded by 
 a greater anxiety for the success of the negotiation with Britain 
 than has appeared upon any other occasion since the establishment 
 of the present government. It was in this state of the public 
 mind that the President s letter appeared, and gave universal satis 
 faction to the true friends of order in all parts of our country. 
 Even faction and anarchy have acknowledged the merit of this 
 letter. It is a remarkable proof of the unstability, or rather ver 
 satility, of popular opinion, that some of those men who execrated 
 the twenty senators for advising to a ratification on any terms are 
 already beginning to censure them for having cavilled at the 
 twelfth article, and thus put at hazard such important benefits as 
 the treaty would secure to the country. I am satisfied, if the 
 business should not finally be closed, this sentiment will extend 
 very far ; and even if all the rest of the treaty should take effect, 
 if no new agreement can be made on the subject of the twelfth 
 article, and France should, as she will whenever able, establish her 
 colony monopoly, we shall be condemned for refusing the partial 
 benefit. 
 
 With unfeigned respect and unaffected attachment, I remain 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 The next three letters refer to the visit of Lafayette s 
 son, who had fled to the United States for safety and pro 
 tection. The relations of the United States with France 
 were at that time very delicate, and Lafayette was an out- 
 
1792-96.] COBRESPONDENCE. 87 
 
 cast from his grateful country. Washington hesitated to 
 assist young Lafayette openly, and desired also to sound 
 M. Adet, the French minister, on the matter. At the 
 same time, his deep affection for his old comrade in arms 
 urged him to do every thing for his son. In this dilemma, 
 Washington determined to entrust the care of young La 
 fayette, then at Boston, under the assumed name of Motier, 
 to Mr. Cabot. He wrote to young Lafayette, explaining his 
 own difficult position and the reasons for his leaving such 
 a matter to another s care ; and he also wrote to Mr. Cabot, 
 who replied at once, giving a full account of his interview 
 with Motier, and his tutor, M. Frestel. These two letters 
 have been already published by Mr. Sparks, 1 and explain 
 perfectly Washington s position. For some time after these 
 letters, Washington felt constrained to take no notice of 
 young Lafayette, and to even abstain from writing him. 
 In November, the young Frenchman and his tutor set out 
 for New York. The President at this time, in explanation 
 of his course, wrote to his namesake : 
 
 " I imposed upon Mr. Cabot, a gentleman of character, and one 
 in whose discretion I could place entire confidence, the agreeable 
 office of assuring you, in my name, of my warmest affection and 
 support, and of my determination to stand in the place of a father 
 and friend to you under all- circumstances ; requesting him, at the 
 same time, to make arrangements with M. Frestel for supplying 
 your immediate wants ; and, moreover, that he would add thereto 
 every thing consolatory on my part." 2 
 
 Mr. Cabot relinquished his charge to Hamilton, who, at 
 the request of the President, watched over the young exile 
 until the time arrived when he could with safety enter the 
 President s family. The original embarrassment of Wash 
 ington in this affair had been greatly aggravated by the 
 fact that the arrival of Lafayette s son was not long a se 
 cret. The opposition, not content with offering festivals 
 
 1 Writings of Washington, XI. 64-67. 
 
 2 Ibid., XI. 95. 
 
88 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 to young Lafayette, took advantage of the delicacy and 
 restraint entailed by official position to abuse the Presi 
 dent. In the words of a stanch Federalist of the day, " It 
 was circulated among these devils that the President took 
 no notice of the lad, because he loved the British and hated 
 the French." 1 The letter to Mr. Cabot admirably illus 
 trates the truth of this ingenious calumny deceased so many 
 years ago. 2 
 
 WASHINGTON TO CABOT. 
 
 (Private and Confidential.) 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, 7th Sept., 1795. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The enclosed letters (which, after reading, be so 
 good as to return to me) will be the best apology I can offer for 
 the liberty I am about to take, and for the trouble, if you comply 
 with my request, it must necessarily give. 
 
 To express all the sensibility which has been excited in my 
 breast by the receipt of young Fayette s letter, from the recollec 
 tion of his father s merits, services, and suffering, from my friend 
 ship for him, and from my wishes to become a friend and father to 
 his son, are unnecessary. Let me in a few words declare that I 
 Witt be his friend ; but the manner of becoming so, considering the 
 obnoxious light in which his father is viewed by the French gov 
 ernment, arid my own situation as the executive of the United 
 States, requires more time to consider in all its relations than I can 
 bestow on it at present ; the letters not having been in my hands 
 more than an hour, and I myself on the point of setting out for 
 Virginia to fetch my family back, whom I left there about the 
 first of August. 
 
 The mode which, at the first view, strikes me as the most eligi 
 ble to answer his purposes and save appearances is to administer 
 all the consolation to the young gentleman that he can derive from 
 the most unequivocal assurances of my standing in the place of 
 and becoming to him a father, friend, protector, and supporter. 
 But secondly, for prudential motives, as they may relate to himself. 
 
 1 Life of Jeremiah Smith, by J. H. Morison, p. 98. 
 
 2 See also Washington s correspondence with Hamilton on the same 
 matter. Works of Hamilton, VI. 51-74 ; also Writings of Washington, XI. 
 72, 94, 118. 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 89 
 
 his mother and friends whom he has left behind, and to my official 
 character, it would be best not to make these sentiments public ; 
 of course that it would be ineligible that he should come to the 
 seat of the general government, where all the foreign characters 
 (particularly that of his own nation) are residents, until it is seen 
 what opinions will be excited by his arrival ; especially, too, as I 
 shall be necessarily absent five or six weeks from it, on business, 
 in several places. Third, considering how important it is to avoid 
 idleness and dissipation, to improve his mind, and to give him all 
 the advantages which education can bestow, my opinion and my 
 advice to him is (if he is qualified for admission) that he should 
 enter as a student at the University in Cambridge, although it 
 should be for a short time only. The expense of which, as also of 
 every other means for his support, I will pay, and now do author 
 ize you, my dear sir, to draw upon me accordingly ; and, if it is in 
 any degree necessary or desired, Mr. Frestel, his tutor, should 
 accompany him to the University in that character. Any arrange 
 ments which you shall make for the purpose, and any expense 
 thereby incurred for the same, shall be borne by me in like manner. 
 
 One thing more, and I will conclude : let me pray you, my dear 
 sir, to impress upon young Fayette s mind, and indeed upon that 
 of his tutor s, that the reasons why I do not urge him to come to 
 me have been frankly related, and that their prudence must appre 
 ciate them with caution. My friendship for his father, so far from 
 being diminished, has increased in the ratio of his misfortunes, and 
 my inclination to serve the son will be evidenced by my conduct. 
 
 Reasons which readily will occur to you and cannot easily be 
 explained to him will account for my not acknowledging the receipt 
 of his or Mr. Frestel s letter. 
 
 With sincere esteem and regard, I am, dear sir, 
 
 Your obedient and obliged 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 P. S. You will perceive that Lafayette has taken the name of 
 Motier. Whether it is best he should retain it and aim at perfect 
 concealment or not depends upon a better knowledge of circum 
 stances than I am possessed of ; and therefore I leave this matter 
 to your own judgment, after a consultation with the parties. 
 
90 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 CABOT TO WASHINGTON. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Sept. 16, 1795. 
 
 g IR) The letter which you did me the honor to write on the 
 7th was received last evening, when I immediately waited on the 
 gentlemen who are the subject of it. They were in a state of anx 
 iety respecting a new place of residence where they might live 
 unnoticed. Considerations of the kind which you have mentioned, 
 and some others, render this eligible for the present; but it is 
 found impracticable here. Already Mr. Motier is known to too 
 many persons ; and a public festival announced by the French 
 consul for Monday next, at which all their citizens in this vicinity 
 are expected to attend, occasions serious embarrassment, to which 
 is added that some circumstances of delicacy, relative to the family 
 in which they are placed, make an immediate removal proper. 
 
 It was at this moment of solicitude I arrived to testify to them 
 the benignity of your intentions by expressing those unequivocal 
 assurances of friendship which your goodness had dictated, and 
 which were received with every emotion of the most lively sen 
 sibility. A conversation succeeded, which had for its object a 
 relief from their present perplexity with the least possible devia 
 tion from the path you had proposed. In addition to the motives 
 already explained for removing further than Cambridge, it was 
 urged that the studies now actually pursuing by Mr. Motier are 
 entirely different from those presented in any of our universities, 
 and that your desires will therefore be best accomplished by a con 
 tinuance in his present course under Mr. Frestel. It was admitted, 
 however, that other aids would be requisite in those branches of 
 education which Mr. Frestel does not possess. With a view to 
 these, and to combine with them abstinence from society, it is 
 thought best to seek a position near some principal town, where 
 all the desiderata can be found. No determination was formed ; 
 and we parted, to reflect more on the step to be taken, and to 
 examine if there were any situation in this quarter which would 
 correspond with their wishes ; but to-day, on their visiting me, I 
 found they had concluded it would be best to go to New York in 
 the Friday s stage, where they expect to be accommodated in a 
 country house, which is in the possession of their friend, Mr. La 
 Callombe, and with whom they may remain in retirement until you 
 shall direct otherwise. 
 
1792-96.] CORRESPONDENCE. 91 
 
 The suddenness of their departure will deprive me of an oppor 
 tunity of being essentially useful to them, and of executing your 
 commands, which would be the most grateful occupation of my 
 life. 
 
 I shall give them letters to Colonel Wadsworth 1 and to Colonel 
 Hamilton, the latter of whom will probably know where they 
 may be found after they shall be established. 
 
 I shall speak of Mr. Frestel and a young gentleman whom .he 
 accompanies, leaving ifr with them to make such other disclosures 
 on some occasions as discretion will approve. 
 
 Mr. Frestel has a passport from the Committee of Public Safety, 
 and stands fair with his country ; and it is doubtful whether Mr. 
 Motier would have any occasion to be private, but for the con 
 dition of his friends, he likewise having a passport as a citizen 
 of the United States, under the name of Motier, which is not 
 newly assumed, but is a name which regularly remained to him 
 after the law passed proscribing titles. An unbounded affection 
 cements the tutor and pupil, and renders them inseparable ; and it 
 is impossible to see without delight the exquisite gratification of 
 the former at the elevation of character which the latter has 
 already attained. 
 
 Mr. Frestel repeatedly mentioned that he has some communica 
 tions to make, which may affect those whom you love, but which 
 can hardly be explained without an interview. I promised to in 
 timate his idea, but reminded him that you would be absent for 
 several weeks, and added that possibly before your return he 
 might know your pleasure in this respect. If any pecuniary ac 
 commodations had been necessary, I should have furnished them ; 
 but at present they are supplied. With the highest respect and 
 esteem, I remain, sir, 
 
 Your obedient and faithful servant, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO CHRISTOPHER GORE. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, Jan. 5, 1796. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your reflections on Randolph s publication 2 
 have given much pleasure to me, and to several of my friends to 
 whom they have been communicated. 
 
 1 General James Wadsworth, of Connecticut. 
 
 2 An intercepted despatch of Fauchet, the French minister, had indicated 
 that Edmund Randolph, then Secretary of State, was in his pay. Randolph 
 
92 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 The questions which suggest themselves so naturally to the 
 mind of the reader, and which you have stated, are of some impor 
 tance; but it has become doubtful whether any formal answer 
 should be given to a production which has so disappointed public 
 expectation that it engages no attention either of party or individ 
 uals. The man has found no defenders, and not enmity enough to 
 sink him lower than he has placed himself. 
 
 It may, however, be proper to make it known that Fauchet s 
 letter was kept back by the President from no considerations that 
 were personal, but solely to finish the official papers relative to 
 the ratiiication in the Secretary s office ; after which, a disclosure 
 would have been made to Randolph immediately, but for the indis 
 position of the Attorney- General, 1 whose assistance was very prop 
 erly required at a consultation so deeply affecting the public wel 
 fare. In vain did the messenger go every day to his house, five 
 miles from town, to solicit his attendance. It was impossible. He 
 grew worse, and finally it was apprehended that he would never 
 recover. As soon as the expectation of seeing him was extin 
 guished, it was decided by the President to make the disclosure to 
 Randolph, which was done without permitting any communication 
 to be made by the officers of government to any person whatever ; 
 and it appears at this moment that the first intimation of the busi 
 ness from our government was given by Randolph himself. He 
 probably put the letter immediately into the hands of Dallas 2 and 
 others whose advice he needed. It is true that some whispers 
 were beginning to circulate about this town at the same time, 
 
 thereupon resigned, and published a " Vindication," which was a very lame 
 affair. It is said that Washington, on being asked if he had read the book, 
 replied, " Yes, sir, I have read every line, every letter of it ; and a danm der 
 scoundrel God Almighty never permitted to disgrace humanity ! " Washing 
 ton was aroused by the gross misrepresentations of Randolph. It will be re 
 membered that Randolph afterwards proved to be a public defaulter. For 
 the anecdote of Washington, see Hamilton s History of the Republic, VI. 
 309 ; for Randolph s pecuniary troubles, Administration of Washington and 
 Adams, I. 280. Although Randolph then labored under an irremovable 
 weight of suspicion, from which nearly a century has not relieved him, the 
 whole business is still involved in mystery. We shall probably never know 
 the exact truth in regard to his dealings with the French minister until the 
 French archives have been thoroughly examined, and Fauchet s private corre 
 spondence with his own government brought to light. 
 
 1 William Bradford, of Pennsylvania. 
 
 2 Alexander J. Dallas, of Pennsylvania ; afterwards Secretary of the 
 Treasury under Mr. Madison, 1814-16. 
 
1792-96.] COERESPONDENCE. 93 
 
 which had relation to the subject; but these undoubtedly pro 
 ceeded from the English, who were not under so strong obliga 
 tions to be reserved. 
 
 The hesitation to ratify which was produced in the President s 
 mind after the departure of the senators from this city arose first 
 from the provision order which it was insinuated was bottomed on 
 the treaty. 1 The " certain person" spoken of by Randolph (Ham 
 ilton) was on this occasion consulted by the President, and, as I 
 understand, advised to withhold the exchange of ratifications in Eng 
 land until the order should be revoked or satisfactorily explained, 
 so that no pretence should be had for saying that we acquiesced 
 in a construction so extraordinary of the treaty. This circum 
 stance, which, if known, would refute so much calumny against 
 Hamilton, happened at an unlucky moment for the President. It 
 unsettled his previous resolution, and laid him open to all the arti 
 fices which were then practising by Randolph to deter him from 
 giving the final sanction. You will easily trace the information, 
 which the Jacobins exclusively possessed at this period, of the state 
 of the President s mind ; and you will see the motives they had for 
 so much exertion in exciting tumultuous meetings, and other sedi 
 tious practices. A channel was open, through which every senti 
 ment expressed by the President in confidence could be conveyed 
 to the demagogues of the great towns by every post. 
 
 A review of these ideas, connected with the transactions of the 
 last summer, will furnish the only clew to the executive proceed 
 ings, and will account for the promptitude which seems to have 
 characterized the last act, especially if it be remembered that Ham 
 mond 2 was waiting for the President s determination, which had 
 been long promised. The most dangerous as well as most atro 
 cious part of Randolph s design, however, cannot be fully devel 
 oped without bringing the President into a position in which he 
 
 1 The " provision order " was the order in council authorizing the seizure 
 of all ships conveying provisions which might in any way be used by the 
 French. So extensive a claim was denied by the United States, who held 
 that provisions were contraband only when being conveyed to some port 
 absolutely blockaded or besieged. The British withdrew this claim when 
 the negotiations opened, but Jay was unable to agree to any article on this 
 point. In July, 1795, just after the Senate ha,d ratified the treaty, news 
 came that British cruisers were again enforcing the provision order ; and the 
 Democrats promptly asserted that this new infringement of neutral rights 
 was due to the treaty. 
 
 2 The British minister. 
 
94 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792-96. 
 
 never should be placed. The design of separating the President 
 from the Senate, so ruinous if effected, can only be inferred now 
 from the information which Randolph supplies ; but the officers of 
 the government, who must possess the most ample evidence, have 
 no doubt of the fact. 1 
 
 I send to Mr. Higginson, by this post, a copy of Hamilton s letter 
 on the power of the commissioners, which, to save me the trouble 
 of transcribing, I must request you to call for, if you wish to 
 read it. 
 
 With much esteem and regard, I remain, dear sir, 
 
 Your faithful friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WASHINGTON. 
 
 MARCH 4, 1796. 
 
 Sm, The great importance of selecting persons speedily for 
 the offices created by the British treaty, and the difficulty of finding 
 those who may be in all respects competent to the duties required, 
 have suggested the belief that it might not be unacceptable to the 
 Executive to receive from various parts of the Union the names of 
 candidates who may be thought most suitable. 
 
 Under the impressions of these ideas, I have frequently reviewed 
 the circles in which I have been accustomed to move ; and it ought 
 to be confessed that very few have occurred to my mind whose char 
 acters were wholly free from objections. However, I do not hesi 
 tate to mention Mr. Gore 2 as a gentleman who, in my estimation, 
 unites most of the qualifications requisite for a commissioner in 
 London, and possesses more fitness for that trust than any other 
 person in Massachusetts who can be considered as a candidate. 
 
 I also take the liberty of naming Mr. Parsons as a lawyer 
 whose well-known talents peculiarly fit him for investigating and 
 deciding on the claims of British creditors, and Mr. Learned, of 
 Connecticut, as a gentleman whose probity and good sense qualify 
 him for many offices where public confidence is required. 
 
 With the highest possible respect, I am, sir, 
 
 Your most obedient servant, G. CABOT. 
 
 1 This letter throws a good deal of light on the intrigues by which it was 
 attempted to defeat the treaty. Mr. Cabot was in a position to know accu 
 rately the true state of affairs, and his account brings out very forcibly the 
 part played by Randolph. For the views of Washington and Hamilton, see 
 Hamilton s Works, VI. 12, 16, 19, 25, 33, and 35. 
 
 2 Mr. Gore was subsequently appointed, and acted as commissioner under 
 the treaty. 
 
1792-96.1 CORKESPONDENCE. 95 
 
 CABOT TO CALEB STRONG. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, Thursday, April 27, 1796. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, The question 1 in the House will be 
 taken this day, or at farthest to-morrow ; and all agree that the 
 result will be unfavorable. It is hoped, however, that the majority 
 will not be greater than fifty-two to forty-eight. 
 
 It is distressing to the few of us who remain here that, at so 
 delicate a conjunction, when the Senate will be called to act a 
 part, it is totally uncertain on what side the majority will be found 
 on a question of the most consequential kind. Mr. Vining 2 can 
 not be heard of, and there is no reason to expect him here in any 
 event ; and Mr. Frelinghuysen 8 has this day left us : so that at 
 this moment we should lose the most important questions, if forced 
 to a decision. I have stated these and some further ideas in a let 
 ter to Mr. Paine ; 4 hoping that he would not persist in his deter 
 mination to remain at home, when he knows that it is impossible 
 to transact the business depending in our House without his assist 
 ance. The President and the friends of order in the Legislature 
 are extremely discouraged by the evident weakness of the Senate 
 at a time when all its members will be needed, and their firmness 
 put to the severest trial. I pray you to come on without a moment s 
 delay, as you would wish to save us from defeat, and our country 
 from disgrace and ruin. 
 
 Your faithful friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO STRONG. 
 
 BROOKLIXE, June 6, 1796. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, The letters which several successive 
 mails have brought from you give me much pleasure, not only as 
 they contain interesting information, but much more as they testify 
 a sentiment to which my heart is always alive. 
 
 My letter of resignation is written, and will be delivered to the 
 Legislature in two or three days ; and, as it is understood that you 
 
 1 This refers to the execution of the British treaty. 
 
 2 John Vining, senator from Delaware. 
 
 8 Frederick Frelinghuysen, general in the Revolutionary War, and 
 senator from New Jersey. 
 
 4 Elijah Paine, senator from Connecticut. 
 
96 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1792 96. 
 
 also intend to relinquish Congressional service, I should have been 
 willing to have had your resignation gone before mine. Indeed? 
 I am so habituated to follow or act with you that I should have 
 felt more satisfied (if possible) that I was doing right. You were 
 successful in your intention to make Mrs. Cabot and me laugh 
 heartily, by proposing that I should write you from Congress. Yes, 
 truly, I will repay your fidelity " when I am there, and you are at 
 home" 
 
 Judge Lowell has just mentioned to me that the State of 
 Tennessee is actually admitted into the Union. I charge this to 
 the momentary ill-humor of a disappointed gallant. How mortify 
 ing a reflection is it that the most important concerns of a nation 
 should be conducted by such caprice ! With what exultation may 
 the ministers of monarchical governments expose the secret move 
 ments of our pure republican system, where the public good is sup 
 posed to be the constant spring of action ! 
 
 But, although I shall never be able to entertain you with what 
 is passing among the aristocrats of the great world, I have no 
 reluctance at giving you a faithful narrative of what occurs at 
 Greenhill. Here is no faction nor cabal, although our government 
 is perfectly democratic. The swinish multitude are occasionally 
 noisy ; but a sop from the cook or a pail from the dairy-woman 
 never fails to quiet them. More humane than those of Paris, they 
 are satisfied with milk instead of blood. Accordingly, we go on 
 harmoniously together ; I supplying their table, and they supply 
 ing mine. I wish you were here to partake of one out of twenty- 
 five which my breeders have been good enough to produce this 
 spring. If you have really done with Congress, as I fear is the 
 case, why should you not visit Boston, and make my house your 
 lodging? Be assured nothing would give us greater pleasure, 
 provided you do not attempt to rival me too far in the favor of 
 the ladies here. 
 
 Your unfeigned and affectionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
1796-98.1 
 
 RETREAT FROM POLITICS. 
 
 97 
 
 p$t T L ;p^ 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 1796-1798. 
 
 Retreat from Politics. Suggested for the French Commission. Political 
 Services. Correspondence. 
 
 MR. CABOT wished and intended, when he resigned from 
 the Senate, to lead a perfectly retired life and one of unin 
 terrupted quiet. He thought his abandonment of office 
 would free him entirely from the trials of patience and 
 temper so inseparable from political life, but he was not 
 destined to escape so easily. The four years of Mr. Adams s 
 administration were crowded with important questions, and 
 were marked by those bitter dissensions which ultimately 
 destroyed the Federalist party. However much Mr. Cabot 
 might shut out the world, he could not exclude the strong 
 emotions nor repress the deep interest excited in his mind 
 by the course of French policy and by the dangers menac 
 ing both his party and his country. He was often applied 
 to for advice during this critical period, was frequently 
 consulted by the party leaders, and was finally called 
 upon in such a way that he was forced to render active 
 assistance. Though he refused office, he .could not refuse 
 his friends the aid of his influence and exertions within 
 his own immediate sphere. His correspondence from the 
 time of his resignation to the accession of Jefferson 
 furnishes abundant evidence of much unassuming politi 
 cal activity. True to his first idea of seclusion, he took 
 no part in the canvass which occurred soon after his 
 resignation, and which resulted in the choice of Mr. 
 Adams. His opinions as to the proper course for the 
 
 7 
 
98 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 Federalists, in this instance, were clear and distinct. Mr. 
 Cabot believed that the first object was to defeat at all 
 hazards the election of a Democratic, or, to use his own 
 words, a " French President." This point assured, he con 
 ceived that the next duty of the party was to unite on Mr. 
 Adams as their first choice. In a letter to Wolcott, he says : 
 "I do not hesitate to avow my opinion that the first and 
 highest duty of the electors was to prevent the election of 
 a French President ; and, this being provided for, the next 
 object would have been to secure the election of Mr. Adams. 
 But I will never admit that we ought to take any consider 
 able risk of seeing a French or any foreign President 
 rather than the risk of any one Federal candidate in pref 
 erence to another." 1 Mr. Cabot s preferences were de 
 cidedly in favor of Mr. Adams, in which he differed from 
 Hamilton, whose personal inclinations were all for Pinck- 
 ney ; nor does he seem to have been alarmed in regard 
 to the Vice-Presidency, about which Hamilton was at this 
 time so justly anxious. 2 
 
 1 See below, p. 119. 
 
 2 I have elsewhere (North American Review for July, 1876) discussed 
 Hamilton s position as to the Federalist candidates, and I have there taken 
 
 /The ground that Hamilton s openly expressed preference for Pinckney never 
 led him into an attempt to bring in that gentleman over Mr. Adams. Ham 
 ilton s exertions were directed to having all the electors vote for Adams and 
 Pinckney, because he wished at all hazards to secure both offices. He was 
 perfectly willing to risk the choice of Pinckney to the first place, but to 
 assert that he ever intrigued to bring about such a result seemed to me 
 unwarranted by the authorities. The charge against Hamilton of trying to 
 relegate Mr. Adams to the Vice-Presidency was freely made at the time by 
 Mr Adams s supporters, and was flatly denied by the other wing of the 
 party. The accusation has been repeated by later writers, but seems wholly 
 unsustained on any reasonable construction of the numerous private letters 
 relating to that time and now before the public. This view is confirmed by 
 the letters in this volume. Mr. Cabot was in a position to know of such an 
 intrigue, had it existed. He was in all the Federalist counsels, was the inti 
 mate friend of Hamilton, and yet never alludes to any scheme intended to 
 benefit Pinckney at the expense of Mr. Adams. His silence on such a point 
 is strong proof that the story had no foundation, but what he does say in 
 regard to the election is even more striking and convincing. From Mr. 
 Cabot s description of the probable action of the Massachusetts electoral 
 
 P< 
 u 
 
 re 
 
1796-08.] 
 
 THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 17C6. 99 
 
 "While the Presidential election was in progress and dur 
 ing the ensuing winter, public attention became more and 
 more engrossed by our relations with France. Monroe, 
 substituted for Morris as a conciliatory measure, had in 
 gratiated himself with our " magnanimous allies ; " if not 
 at the expense of his own self-respect, certainly with great 
 detriment to the dignity of the country he represented. 
 This jinwise, if not improper, conduct provoked the censure 
 of Washington, and finally led to Monroe s recall, and to the 
 appointment of General Pinckney in his stead. Mr. Cabot 
 viewed Monroe s course with a steadily increasing aversion, 
 which culminated in the deepest indignation when the news 
 came of the insults offered to Pinckney on his arrival in 
 Paris, and the still more degrading flattery lavished upon 
 the departing Monroe. The subsequent dismissal of our 
 minister with every mark of contempt, and the renewal of 
 extensive depredations on our commerce, rendered war im 
 minent. While affairs were in this unpromising condition, 
 the new President was inaugurated. Mr. Adams, believing 
 fully in the Washingtonian policy of a strong neutrality, 
 desired above every thing to prevent by all honorable means 
 the disaster of a French war, and his attention therefore was 
 at once directed to the scheme of a special embassy. The 
 necessity of such a step Hamilton had foreseen some months 
 before. In a letter dated Jan. 22, 1797, Hamilton pressed 
 this matter on Washington s attention : 1 
 
 " The best form of the thing, in my view, is a commission in 
 cluding three persons, who may be called commissioners pleni 
 potentiary and extraordinary. Two of the three should be Mr. 
 Madison and Mr. Pinckney ; a third may be taken from the north 
 ern States, and I know of none better than Mr. Cabot, who, or 
 any two of whom, may be empowered to act. 
 
 college, it is evident that the only risk anybody there meant to run was that 
 of bringing in Jefferson rather than endanger the choice of Mr. Adams to 
 the first place. All the Massachusetts electors were of course supporters 
 of Mr. Adams. See below, p. 112. 
 i Hamilton s Works, VI. 195. 
 
100 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 " Mr. Madison will have the confidence of the French and of 
 the opposition. Mr. Pinckney will have something of the same 
 advantage in an inferior degree. Mr. Cabot, without being able to 
 prevent their doing what is right, 1 will be a salutary check upon 
 too much Gallicism, and his real commercial knowledge will sup 
 ply their want of it. Besides that, he will enjoy the confidence of 
 all the friends of the administration. His disposition to preserve 
 peace is ardent and unqualified. 
 
 "This plan, too, I think, will consist with all reasonable atten 
 tion to Mr. Pinckney s feelings. 
 
 " Or (which, however, I think less eligible) Mr. Madison and 
 Mr. Pinckney only may be joint commissioners, without a third 
 person. 
 
 " Mr. Cabot, if appointed without being consulted, will, I think, 
 certainly go." 
 
 No action was taken by Washington in this important 
 matter. The approaching end of his term of office, and 
 the short-sighted opposition of Pickering and Wolcott to a 
 peace policy, probably induced him to leave a settlement 
 of this difficult business to his successor. The idea of the 
 commission, however, was ever present to Hamilton s mind, 
 and we find him writing to Sedgwick, Feb. 26, 1797 : 
 
 " Were I Mr. Adams then, I believe I should begin my Presi 
 dency by naming an extraordinary commission to the French 
 republic ; and I think it would consist of three persons, Mr. Madi 
 son, Mr. Pinckney, and Mr. Cabot. I should pursue this course 
 for several reasons : because I would have a man as influential 
 with the French as Mr. Madison, yet I would not trust him alone, 
 lest his Gallicism should work amiss ; because I would not wound 
 Mr. Pinckney, so recently sent in the same spirit ; thirdly, I think 
 Cabot would mix very useful ingredients in the cup." 2 
 
 The morning after the inauguration, Fisher Ames, then 
 about to retire from public life, called upon the new 
 
 1 This I understand to refer to the dangers to be apprehended in a nego 
 tiation, from Mr. Cabot s bitter and, as far as it was in his nature, violent 
 hatred of France, the French, and all their works. The excesses of the 
 French Revolution had deeply prejudiced Mr. Cabot against every thing 
 Gallic. 
 
 2 Hamilton s Works, VI. 209. 
 
1796-98.] FRENCH COMMISSION. 101 
 
 President, and after speaking of the state of our French 
 relations, of the necessity of a commission, and of sending 
 some man who would command the confidence of the 
 Northern States, recommended the appointment of Mr. 
 Cabot. Ames suggested that Mr. Cabot should be sent as 
 one of the three, if a commission was determined on, or 
 alone, if but one was to go. Mr. Adams, after describing 
 this interview, says : 
 
 " I had thought of Mr. Ames himself, as well as Mr. Cabot, 
 Judge Dana, Mr. Gerry, and many others." * "I considered Mr. 
 Ames s candidate, Mr. Cabot, as deliberately as any of the others, 
 and with as favorable and friendly a disposition as any other 
 without exception. But I knew his character and connections 
 were as well known in France, particularly by Talleyrand, as Mr. 
 Gerry s were ; and that there were great objections against the 
 former, and none at all against the latter. It would be therefore 
 inexcusable in me to hazard the success of the mission merely to 
 gratify the passions of a party in America, especially as I knew 
 Mr. Gerry, to say the least, to be full as well qualified by his 
 studies, his experience, and every quality, for the service as the 
 other." 2 
 
 While the President hesitated as to the composition of 
 the embassy, Hamilton was urging the necessity of the 
 measure upon all the leading men of his party. On March 
 22, 1797, he wrote to Pickering : 
 
 ..." I would appoint a commission extraordinary, to con 
 sist of Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison, together with Mr. Cabot 
 and Mr. Pinckney. To be useful, it is important that a man 
 agreeable to the French should go. But neither Madison nor 
 Jefferson ought to go alone. The three will give security. It 
 will natter the French pride. It will engage American confidence, 
 and recommend the people to what shall be eventually necessary." 8 
 
 Again, a few weeks later, he wrote to Wolcott, arguing 
 with great force the wisdom of such a mission as he 
 describes : 
 
 1 Works of John Adams, Letters to the "Boston Patriot," IX. 283. 
 
 2 Ibid., IX. 287. 
 
 8 Hamilton s Works, VI. 214. 
 
102 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 " We ought to do every thing to avoid rupture without unworthy 
 sacrifice, and to keep in view, as a primary object, union at home. 
 No measure can tend more to this than an extraordinary mission. 
 And it is certain, to fulfil these ends proposed, it ought to embrace 
 a character in whom France and the opposition have full credit. 
 What risk can attend sending Madison, if combined, as I propose, 
 with Pinckney and Cabot ? or such a man (two deciding ) ? Depend 
 on it, Pinckney is a man of honor, and loves his country. Cabot 
 we both know." 1 
 
 At the same time, Hamilton wrote to William Smith, 
 and in discussing the proposed commission said : 
 
 "And, to produce the desired effect, it seems to me essential 
 that it shall embrace a distinguished character, agreeable to France 
 and having the confidence of the adverse party. Hence I think 
 of Madison ; but I think of him only as one, because I would not 
 trust him alone. I would unite with him Pinckney and some 
 strong man from the North, Jay, Cabot ; and two of the three 
 should rule. We should then be safe." 
 
 From these extracts, Hamilton s plan, or rather the prin 
 ciples on which it was based, may be readily understood 
 and appreciated. Sharp, strong, and well-defined, this pol 
 icy bore all the characteristic marks of the mind which 
 devised it. The central figure in Hamilton s arrangement 
 of the commission was the " distinguished character " of 
 the opposition. The subordinate parts were to be filled by- 
 two strong Federalists, one from the South, the other from 
 the North ; and they were to be the checks and balances on 
 the movements of their colleague. In this way, dignity, 
 force, and consistency would have been imparted to the 
 embassy from the outset, and not only the geographical 
 but the political exigencies would have been duly provided 
 for. There was one man in the United States pre 
 eminently fitted to play the part of the u distinguished 
 character" of the opposition, and there was only one. 
 
 1 Administrations of Washington and Adams, I. 490; and Works of 
 Hamilton, VI. 230. 
 
1796-98.] FKENCH COMMISSION. 103 
 
 Send any one else in Madison s place, and the difficulties of 
 the situation were enhanced at once a thousand-fold. The 
 two strong Federalists, on the contrary, might have been 
 replaced by a dozen others equally good. Mr. Adams 
 remembered the geographical, but not the political uni 
 ties. The commission sent was composed of Pinckney, 
 Marshall, and Gerry. Pinckney was common to both 
 arrangements. Marshall and Gerry replaced, in Mr. 
 Adams s commission, Cabot and Madison, as suggested by 
 Hamilton. Mr. Adams apparently labored under the idea 
 that he was merely substituting Gerry for Cabot, both 
 being Northern men ; while in reality Marshall took 
 Cabot s place, and Gerry Madison s. This was an all- 
 important difference. To send Marshall instead of Cabot 
 was wise, but to exchange Madison for Gerry was ruinous. 
 The whole merit of the scheme resided in " the distin 
 guished character " of the opposition, by whose presence the 
 country would be united and France appeased, yet whose 
 dangerous tendencies would be controlled by the two sup 
 porters of the administration. Madison was such a character, 
 a man of first-rate intellectual powers, of wisdom and address, 
 while Gerry was neither. Partly from the ill-advised opposi 
 tion 1 of his secretaries, who resisted the appointment of Mad- 
 
 1 See Wolcott to Hamilton, Hamilton s Works, VI. 223. Mr. Adams, 
 in his letters to the " Boston Patriot " (Works, IX. 287), says : " I then called 
 the heads of departments together, and proposed Mr. Gerry. All the five 
 voices unanimously were against him. Such inveterate prejudice shocked 
 me," &c. In deference to the opposition excited, Mr. Adams gave up Mad 
 ison, who was in every respect just the one man for the place, but, stimulated 
 by the same opposition to Gerry, nominated him at once. Wolcott s scheme 
 of joining J. Q. Adams and Ingersoll (Hamilton s Works, VI. 223) to 
 Pinckney was, of course, absurd on its face. Neither the younger Adams 
 at that time, nor Ingersoll at any time, was of sufficient weight and promi 
 nence to be placed on such a mission. Mr. Adams s blunder in saying 
 ail " five " opposed him has been admitted in the complete edition of his 
 works. There were at that time but four cabinet officers. 
 
 The letters of the secretaries differ most materially from Mr. Adams s 
 account of this interview, and McHenry s especially shows how much later 
 animosities and passions had distorted Mr. Adams s views, and made him 
 
104 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 ison only to be saddled with that of Gerry, partly from his 
 own obstinacy, his strange partiality to Gerry, and his notion 
 that he was only putting him in Cabot s place, Mr. Adams 
 blundered into this fatal appointment. Had he but per 
 ceived that Madison was the essential part of the commis 
 sion, all would have gone well. The President yielded to 
 opposition in Madison s case, and disregarded it in that of 
 Gerry. By an opposite course, not only the subsequent 
 troubles with France might have been averted, but the 
 political ruin in which the Federalists were afterwards 
 involved might have been prevented. Mr. Adams took 
 the ground that Gerry justified all his hopes, 1 and brought 
 back the intelligence which ultimately led to peace. No 
 one now would question Gerry s honesty or integrity of pur 
 pose ; but he was a man of slight intellect, dull perceptions, 
 and no great force of will or character. Such a man was 
 strong enough to quarrel with his associates, but not strong 
 enough to baffle Talleyrand, guide the course of the com 
 mission, and bring the negotiation to a successful issue. 
 All this Madison might possibly have done. Gerry, with 
 every appearance of having compromised both himself and 
 his office, merely brought home information such as an indus 
 trious and intelligent valet might have gleaned ; while the 
 objects of the mission were left a hopeless wreck, and the 
 Federalist party plunged in a desperate quarrel among 
 themselves. 
 
 I have dwelt upon this point at some length, because Mr. 
 Cabot s name is so mixed up in the whole affair. He does 
 
 believe in the existence of mysterious and deadly hostility, when nothing 
 of the sort existed. McHenry s account of the transaction is at least 
 perfectly natural, and does not require a strong effort of the imagination 
 from the reader. Either McHenry, a perfectly honorable man, has wilfully 
 and knowingly lied, or the "inveterate prejudice against Gerry/ and the 
 affection for Cabot on the part of the heads of departments, has been 
 greatly exaggerated by Mr. Adams, induced by the memory of later and 
 more bitter struggles to see plots and intrigues in every incident of his 
 administration. 
 
 1 Works of John Adams, IX. 288. 
 
1796-98.] FRENCH COMMISSION. 105 
 
 not himself appear to have known that his name was even 
 suggested by his friends for this important post. He was 
 opposed to the plan of a commission ; for, though appreciat 
 ing the value of peace, and, in the event of war, the necessity 
 of union, he did not believe that any further pacific dealings 
 with France could result in good. In the disputes of which 
 he was to some extent the innocent cause, Mr. Cabot had, 
 therefore, no personal interest whatever; and that Mr. 
 Adams, too, at the time was free from any personal motives, 
 is proved by his offering to Mr. Cabot soon afterwards a 
 seat in his cabinet. Unfortunately, Mr. Adams believed 
 subsequently that his rejection of Mr. Cabot was his " first 
 offence against the sovereign heads of departments." I 
 have been unable to find in Mr. Cabot s correspondence or 
 elsewhere any proof of this assertion. The secretaries were 
 averse to any mission at all, and especially hostile to one 
 which comprised Madison or Gerry. This was the true 
 cause of their opposition at the time to the schemes of both 
 Adams and Hamilton ; and they gave a sullen acquiescence 
 to the measures adopted. If the secretaries had felt ag 
 grieved by the non-appointment of Cabot, it would have 
 appeared in their letters. Is it conceivable that the selec 
 tion of Cabot should have reconciled them to a policy so 
 distasteful that they had opposed Hamilton in regard 
 to it? Though Hamilton s scheme had included Mr. 
 Cabot as an essential part, still Pickering and Wolcott dis 
 liked it none the less. The fact was that Mr. Adams en 
 tirely misconceived the true state of affairs, and his belief 
 that " the rejection of Mr. Cabot was his first offence against 
 the sovereign heads of departments " is not sustained by the 
 evidence. 
 
 In the interval between the arrival of the news of Pinck- 
 ney s dismissal and the assembling of Congress in special 
 session, it became all important to rouse the people to a 
 sense of the aggressions of France, and to prepare the pub 
 lic mind for strong action on the part of the executive. 
 
106 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 Wolcott therefore wrote to Mr. Cabot, setting forth the 
 probable policy of the government, and urging him to use 
 all his influence that a right direction might be given to 
 public opinion. Averse as Mr. Cabot was to political activ 
 ity of all sorts, this was an occasion on which he could not 
 hold back. To rouse the people against France, to bring 
 home to them, if possible, the infamous conduct of their 
 " magnanimous allies," was a duty from which Mr. Cabot 
 had no wish to shrink. He at once addressed a circular 
 letter to several of the leading New England Federalists, 
 in which he described the attitude of France in the late 
 negotiations, and the probable policy of the administration, 
 and urged the greatest efforts to obtain for the govern 
 ment a hearty and general support. He also sent several 
 articles, 1 conceived in the same spirit, to the papers, and 
 lost no opportunity to declare the sentiments by which, at 
 that crisis, all good men ought to be actuated. Just before 
 the opening of Congress, Mr. Cabot addressed a second 
 letter to a few friends in public positions, giving his views 
 on the situation. He therein expressed his hostility to 
 an embassy, and dwelt upon the importance of prompt 
 war measures. He even went so far as to suggest the pos 
 sible necessity of an embargo, a policy to which he was 
 always consistently opposed. But, above every thing, he 
 urged the need of a cordial and united support of the exec 
 utive, to whom he looked for a clear and well-digested plan 
 of action. Even the assurance that Hamilton was anxious for 
 the new embassy could not reconcile Mr. Cabot to the scheme. 
 It was his firm conviction that any more friendly dealings 
 with France would tend only to the revival of the Gallo 
 mania and Jacobinism in the United States. 
 
 " Quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes ; " 
 Laocoon s famous sentence in its widest extent not unfitly 
 represented Mr. Cabot s feeling then and always in regard 
 
 to the French. 
 
 1 See pp. 581-600. 
 
179G-98.J CORRESPONDENCE. 107 
 
 On May 13th, Congress met. The firm and manly tone 
 of the President s message delighted Mr. Cabot, and com 
 manded his fullest support and admiration. His one anx 
 iety was now in regard to the action of the House ; and, 
 with a view to influencing them, he exerted himself to pro 
 cure from the Massachusetts Legislature an expression of 
 opinion favorable to the President s views. Although the 
 Federalist policy proved in a slight degree successful in 
 Congress, the extra session was consumed, for the most part, 
 in hopeless wrangling and futile party strife. 
 
 The American envoys reached Paris in October, 1797 ; 
 and a few weeks later Congress again assembled for the 
 regular session. The President urged, in his message, the 
 necessity of still stronger defensive measures, although refer 
 ring hopefully to the prospects of the French mission. 
 Congress responded but faintly to the vigorous policy of 
 the Executive. Every one was waiting and expectant, for 
 it was universally felt that nothing decisive could be done 
 until the fate of the pending negotiation was settled. The 
 Federalists urged warlike preparations, and the Democrats 
 resisted ; but political interests and speculations were cen 
 tred on the irregular and tardy mails bearing the latest 
 news from Europe. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, June 11, 1796. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The President has determined to make a change 
 in the consulate at Hamburg. Do you know of any respectable 
 American citizen, of a mercantile character, who would be willing 
 to accept the appointment? It has, I take it, been a lucrative 
 place, even by the fees of office ; although these couJd be of little 
 consequence to a merchant of Mr. Parish s 1 great wealth and 
 
 1 Mr. Parish s case was one of the many difficulties which arose during 
 Mr. Monroe s ambassadorship. Parish was an English merchant, who had 
 befriended us during the Revolution. Our consular system, owing to our 
 
103 LIFE AXD LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 extensive dealings. Yet there have been repeated complaints 
 against him for taking exorbitant fees (as seven dollars instead 
 of two for every certificate), which, considering his established 
 reputation and riches, appears unaccountable. Of this, however, 
 an explanation would have been asked, if other causes of a politi 
 cal nature had not influenced the decision. The change will be 
 softened to Mr. Parish, if a worthy American succeeds him ; and 
 in this light I have placed the matter in my letter, advising him of 
 the President s determination. 
 
 Pray inquire among your friends, and favor me with an an 
 swer. . . . 
 
 I am very sincerely yours, T. PICKERING. 
 
 commerce, was extensive ; and in many places it was impossible to have 
 an American citizen in the office of consul. Such was the case at Ham 
 burg ; and Mr. Parish, on account of former good offices, eminent posi 
 tion in the mercantile community, and good reputation, was selected as 
 our representative. As was common then and now, he was also agent for 
 another country, and, as it happened, England. Keports reached Monroe 
 that Mr. Parish, "comparatively with England" (Parish s native country), 
 was unfriendly to America ; that he was " absolutely unfriendly to France 
 and the French Revolution ; " that he was an agent for Great Britain, and 
 that he granted American passports to Englishmen. The three first of 
 these charges were undoubtedly true, and, though objectionable on the 
 score of policy, were not of such a nature as to justify a peremptory dis 
 missal. The last charge as to issuing false passports would, if true, have 
 been a gross violation of morality and of trust. In regard to this, Monroe 
 says, "In justice, however, to this gentleman, I must add that I do not 
 know any instance in which he has betrayed in this respect [passports], and 
 that in others I only apply to him general principles, and bring to your view 
 the complaints of our countrymen." To this recommendation, dated July 6, 
 1795, for the removal of Parish "on general principles/ Colonel Pickering, 
 then acting Secretary of State, replied on November 23d of the same year : 
 " Your suggestions in regard to Mr. Parish, our consul at Hamburg, have 
 led me to remind Mr. Adams of a request formerly made to him, to inquire 
 into his conduct, and report the same to this department. Such I under 
 stand to be the fact, and that no report has yet been received." This was 
 a proper and natural answer to what Monroe himself treated merely as a 
 subject to which he desired to call the attention of the government. Before 
 Monroe received this letter, he had received one from a different quarter. On 
 Dec. 5, 1795, or rather on the 13th Frimaire, in the fourth year of the Repub 
 lic, De la Croix wrote to Monroe, requesting the recall of Parish, as an agent 
 of England and a granter of false passports. When Pickering s letter came 
 therefore, Monroe was prepared to describe it " as advising him that this 
 British subject should not be compelled to yield his post to an American 
 citizen, at my request, supported as it was by such weighty reasons." This 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 109 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, July 8, 1796. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have inquired diligently for a character to sup 
 ply the vacancy at Hamburg, and all my friends unite in the belief 
 that Mr. Samuel Williams, 1 of Salem, is a very suitable man. His 
 reputation for integrity and good sense is thoroughly established ; 
 and I fully believe his appointment would be thought a wise .one 
 by all who know him. He has been for some time past in France, 
 and is now in England, where his brother Timothy supposes he 
 would reside a year or two ; * but, although it cannot be ascer 
 tained here yet, yet he thinks it in the highest degree probable 
 that he would readily accept the trust. 
 
 Yours sincerely and faithfully, G. CABOT. 
 
 * [That is, if not called by any appointment or other occasion to quit 
 England. T. P.] 
 
 ingenious misrepresentation may be passed over in favor of one which 
 immediately succeeds it. Monroe says, " For although the administration 
 (not being able to resist the objections to his continuance) did remove him, 
 yet it was done in a manner so as to show the French government it was 
 not done in compliance with its request." This statement Monroe bases 
 on a letter of Pickering s (dated June 2, 1796) to the French minister, in 
 answer to one complaining of Parish. In this letter, Pickering says 
 that, in consequence of Monroe s complaints, inquiries had been insti 
 tuted in regard to Parish, but were not yet concluded. He then says 
 that Parish had an undoubted right to act as agent for England, and 
 characterizes the issuing of false passports as a crime of the deepest 
 dye. But Pickering adds, there is no proof of this last charge, and 
 then continues : " Desirous, however, of maintaining a course of action as 
 impartial as his principles, the President has for some time contemplated 
 a change in the consulate at Hamburg, and proposes to supply the place of 
 a foreigner by an American citizen." The letter to Mr. Cabot ten days 
 later was the result of this determination. From this letter, and the passage 
 just quoted from Pickering s official note, it is evident that Parish was 
 removed solely and openly on general grounds of policy and from prin 
 ciples of strict neutrality, while Monroe represents the government as con 
 cealing their motives. The confutation of this specimen charge may be 
 drawn entirely from the documents cited by Monroe himself. (View of 
 Conduct of Executive, pp. xlvii, 195, 302, 319, and 368.) It is of importance, 
 as bearing on the general character of Monroe and his French mission. 
 
 1 Mr. Williams was subsequently appointed, and accepted the office. At 
 a later day, Mr. Williams was the largest American banker in London. He 
 was a nephew of Colonel Pickering. 
 
110 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 31, 1796. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I feel much indebted to you for your favor 
 of the 22d, and am rejoiced at the information it contains. Gov 
 ernment cannot long be respected, if it should submit tamely to the 
 abuse of its own servants ; and this sentiment is so natural that a 
 general indignation is felt at the supposed baseness of our minister. 1 
 His disgrace is surely merited, and his recall is highly approved 
 by all those whose opinions I have heard. There are, indeed, some 
 who think the measure has been too long delayed, because they 
 fully believe that the French executive has been invited to bully us 
 for daring to be so independent as to be just to ourselves. It is 
 unfortunate for our country that a fact of this kind, however true, 
 is not very susceptible of proof, since a mere negative conduct in 
 the minister may be perfectly understood, and therefore none but 
 the greatest of all blockheads would be likely to go farther ; and 
 yet it has been frequently said, by Americans coming from France, 
 that the execrations of our government were confined chiefly to 
 that circle of society of which Mr. Monroe was the centre. What 
 ever may be the final destiny of our national system, it cannot be 
 doubted that those who are entrusted with the administration will 
 have the concurrence of every honest citizen in displacing faithless 
 officers and disgracing treacherous ones. The examples which 
 have already occurred I am persuaded have increased the respect 
 of the people, and have discouraged the efforts of faction. It is 
 asked what becomes of Skipwith, 2 the tool of Monroe. I have 
 answered that I know nothing of the disposition of the executive 
 towards him, but that it may be relied upon, or he would be no 
 longer suffered to hold a public trust after he shall have been 
 proved unworthy of it by reasonable testimony, but that those who 
 complain of him ought not to imagine that the executive can 
 know his conduct without being informed, or that it will act with- 
 
 1 Monroe. 
 
 2 Fulwar Skipwith was Monroe s secretary. On the death of Barclay, 
 our consul at Paris, Monroe appointed Skipwith to fill the office temporarily. 
 Skipwith was as ardent a Franco-maniac as Monroe, and the latter s confi 
 dential adviser. See Monroe s Conduct of the Executive, pp. viii, 39, 50, 
 57, 87, 94, &c. 
 
1796-08.] CORRESPONDENCE. Ill 
 
 out a competent knowledge. 1 pray you to make my regards 
 acceptable to Mrs. Pickering, and be assured that I am 
 
 Your faithful friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 11, 1796. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, ... The President s advice 1 is an excellent 
 coronation of an excellent public life. I think it will do as much 
 as an) T thing can toward saving us from the miserable servitude 
 to which our folly and vices seem to destine us. 
 
 Mr. J. B. Cutting 2 tells me that the French successes in Italy 
 will certainly secure the election of Mr. Jefferson. France, he 
 says, must be appeased by our making a president she likes. If 
 the report be true that she has a powerful fleet at Halifax, I 
 imagine Mr. Cutting s opinion will be adopted by many who have 
 always considered (and some of them desired) that our national 
 independence should depend on France. . . . 
 
 Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Nov. 30, 1796. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I am glad to see Mr. Adet s manifesto, 3 which 
 you were so good as to send me. If the devil is in company, it is 
 always best to see his cloven foot. Although I am not sure that 
 our country can escape all the evils which threaten it from without, 
 yet I am persuaded that our chance will be best when we no longer 
 indulge ourselves in the foolish belief of French friendship. The 
 copy you sent me was the only one I heard of by the post, and 
 consequently I cannot state to you the opinions of others ; but 
 my own is clear, that this measure will serve to strengthen our 
 government. 
 
 1 This refers to Washington s Farewell Address. 
 
 2 Dr. J. B. Cutting had been abroad in a semi-official capacity, and appears 
 to have been a busy though unimportant politician. His brother, Nathaniel 
 Cutting, seems to have indulged in the same pursuits. See Gibbs, Adminis 
 trations of Washington and Adams, I. 492 ; and below, pp. 121, 122. 
 
 3 Adet, just before leaving the country, published a species of procla 
 mation in Bache s " Aurora," in which he called upon all Frenchmen resident 
 in America to wear the tri-colored cockade, " the symbol of a liberty the 
 fruit of eight years toils and five years victories." Most of the Democrats, 
 
112 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 No decisive judgment can be yet formed respecting the votes of 
 our electors for a second man. They will, doubtless, give Mr. 
 Adams every vote, and I think a large majority (perhaps all) to 
 Mr. Pinckney. Upon this last point, they will probably be gov 
 erned by the best intelligence which can be had on the day of 
 voting. If they could certainly make Mr. A. President and Mr. P. 
 Vice-president, this would be done ; or, if it should be pretty evi 
 dent that Mr. A. can not be carried, and that Mr. P. may, I should 
 not doubt they would give Mr. P. every vote. At any rate, you 
 may rely that proper attention is paid to the business. 
 
 Yours sincerely, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Feb. 2, 1797. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I can hardly thank you sufficiently for the excel 
 lent treat you have sent me under a cover dated 24th ultimo. 1 I 
 had just dined at Mr. Higginson s when the packet was brought me ; 
 but although it was a snow-storm, and I was obliged to come home, 
 we nevertheless read over the document before we parted. You 
 would certainly have been gratified, could you have witnessed the 
 strong emotions of approbation which were continually excited; 
 and you would have laughed, in concert with us, at many of our 
 recognitions of the old " Lover of Truth." 2 I have perused the 
 piece to-day with as much attention as the time would allow, and 
 I am fully satisfied it must do infinite service to our country. If, 
 however, it should provoke some snarling and barking among the 
 
 unable to resist this touching appeal, joined their French brethren in mount 
 ing the cockade, a fashion which was afterward generally adopted as a 
 badge of party. The Federalists called Adet s address the " Cockade Procla 
 mation." Soon after this, Adet sent notes to the State Department and 
 to the " Aurora," which he seems to have regarded as co-ordinate branches 
 of the government. The proclamation was surpassed by the eloquence 
 of the note. The latter is, unfortunately, too long for insertion; but 
 it avowed that the name of America still excited "sweet emotions" in 
 the French heart. This was consoling, but hardly justified a change of the 
 national policy. Mr. Cabot s reference here is to the note. 
 
 1 The " excellent treat " was Colonel Pickering s despatch of Jan. 16, 
 1797, to Pinckney. In this able paper, Colonel Pickering replied to Adet s 
 charges, and made a clear presentation to the general public of our rela 
 tion with France. 
 
 2 Signature used by Colonel Pickering in his first writings in the Salem 
 newspaper, at the outbreak of the Revolution. 
 
179<>-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 113 
 
 factious curs, I shall riot wonder ; but I trust you will not be dis 
 turbed by their noise. I pray you to accept my unfeigned respect 
 and regard, and believe me ever 
 
 Your sincere and obliged friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO SAMUEL 
 
 BROOKLIXE, Sunday, Feb. 5, 1797. 
 
 DEAR SIR, It would afford me great pleasure, on personal as 
 well as public considerations, to repay you the aid once given me 
 on the subject of the fisheries, when you were a master, and / a 
 servant. 
 
 I have long been sensible that the allowances for salt considera 
 bly exceeded the quantity consumed, and possibly still more ex 
 ceeded the quantity on which a duty had been paid. I think you 
 will find the public books exhibit a view of the accounts previous 
 to 1795 much more unfavorable than the one presented by that 
 year. Being aware of this, I had expected an attack upon the 
 fishery system, and had cast about for the means to repel it ; and I 
 had satisfied myself that a good answer might be given to those 
 who should charge us with unfairness in the data and calculation 
 on which the allowance law was founded. It was the intention of 
 that law to give to the fishery as much in the form of a tonnage 
 allowance as the public would probably have given on the exporta 
 tion of fish, if the drawback 2 had continued, including the charges 
 borne by the public in ascertaining the quantity of Jish exported. 
 To determine what this would be, I offered a statement, showing 
 the number and tonnage of the vessels in several principal places, 
 with the actual quantities of fish taken in those places ; and I 
 offered another, showing the whole quantity of fish exported ; and, 
 by apportioning this to the tonnage employed in taking it, I proved 
 how much the public would pay per ton. 3 These statements are 
 lost, and cannot easily be recovered ; and it would be difficult to 
 avail ourselves of the benefit of their results without a complete 
 recollection of all the component parts. I remember that the cal 
 culation of a season s produce was in some cases made from the 
 
 1 At this time member of Congress, and afterwards judge of the Supreme 
 Court of Massachusetts for many years ; chief justice from 1813-14, the 
 year of his death. 
 
 2 On the salt duties. 
 
 3 See above, pp. 38, 41. 
 
 8 
 
114 LTFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 known produce of a part of one season only, the public record at 
 that time not furnishing more perfect materials. In addition to 
 the information derived from the public offices, I procured from 
 individuals, in various places, estimates of the quantities of salt con 
 sumed on a hundred quintals of fish in each of the different fares, 
 and also the quantity of fish taken in each fare by each vessel, on 
 an average. From all these estimates, formed by different persons 
 in different places, I made a general estimate, as perfect as I was 
 able to make, having due regard to the particular branches of the 
 business, and other local interruptions which must have affected the 
 individuals in their estimates. The allowance by law on the ton 
 nage shows how much salt each vessel must have been supposed to 
 consume ; and although the allowance at the time was not narrow, 
 yet I am convinced it could not have exceeded the actual consump 
 tion to any considerable amount ; and yet, perhaps, it may now 
 appear by the public books that the allowances were extrava 
 gant, and the calculations grossly erroneous. Several circum 
 stances, not foreseen at the time of the passing of the law, have 
 occurred which have produced these appearances. At the time 
 the law passed, and for a considerable period before, salt was 
 cheap, having been sold as low as six shillings eight pence the 
 hogshead by the cargo for fresh salt, and from that upward to 
 ten and twelve shillings for St. Martin s. The price of fish at the 
 same time was ten to fifteen shillings ; thus a quintal of fish was 
 worth more than a hogshead of salt. It cannot be doubted that 
 under such circumstances salt would be used more freely than 
 when it was dearer. I think seven hogsheads of salt for a hundred 
 
 quintals of Isle of fish, ten hogsheads for Bank fish, and 
 
 twenty-two hogsheads for Bay fish, were estimated as the ordinary 
 consumption, the two latter being a little increased in the summer 
 fares. Supposing a vessel to take nine hundred quintals in a sea 
 son, one hundred and fifty were assigned to the spring fare, two 
 hundred and fifty to the fall, and five hundred to the summer fare. 
 The summer fish required more salt, and would sell for the least 
 money. Since the law has been in operation, salt has risen to 
 these prices: that is, twenty shillings for the lowest quality ; and 
 the best has been as high as thirty-six shillings, while fish has not 
 doubled. Supposing the law to have been accurately just in the 
 relations which prices bore to each other when it passed, yet these 
 have so changed since that it may have become otherwise. It is 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 115 
 
 easy to perceive that the vessels might with profit carry on those 
 parts of the fishery where the least salt was consumed, and the 
 fish most valuable per quintal, as the spring and fall fares, particu 
 larly the former ; while the summer fares, and especially those to 
 the Bay of St. Lawrence, could not be made, on account of the 
 great consumption of salt and the low value of that kind of fish. 
 Indeed, the summer fare always consumed the principal part of the 
 salt, not less than fifteen hogsheads per one hundred quintals hav 
 ing been used sometimes in the Bay. This single circumstance 
 might account for the fact, if it is a fact, that the allowance to the 
 fishery greatly exceeds the salt consumed. There are other causes 
 which co-operate, such as instances of vessels fishing only four 
 months instead of the whole season, they being attracted by exor 
 bitant profits to foreign trade. I think it important, however, to 
 suggest that at the commencement of the operation of the fishery 
 law there was on hand an immense supply of salt. All the stores 
 were full, and it might have been bought the year before lower 
 than at any time since our Revolution by fifty per cent. Until all 
 this extraordinary surplus, which was hoarded up for great profits 
 in consequence of duties laying and expected, no proof could be 
 drawn from the public books of more being allowed to the fishery 
 than was consumed in it. That there were fresh hoards is a well- 
 known fact, and may be well credited from the prices, which could 
 only have been depressed so extremely as they were by the super 
 abundance of the article in the market, and this in all the Eastern 
 States. My own stores were filled, and I was solicited in 1790 or 
 1791 to buy at Portsmouth and Newburyport at eight shillings, 
 deliverable in Beverly or Boston ; and I know of no better evi 
 dence of a universally surcharged market. I like your salt-tax, 
 and am in favor of a direct tax also, sufficient to make up all 
 deficiencies. But I am in the midst of company, and cannot add 
 to my letter by this post. To-morrow I will look into my chaos 
 of papers ; and, if any memoranda can be found that may be of 
 use, I will forward them by the succeeding post. 
 
 Yours sincerely, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO SEWALL. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Feb. 6, 1797. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have looked over those of my papers that can 
 be of much use to you. Some of the notes which I had made to 
 
116 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 support the debate in the Senate are enclosed. They are not alto 
 gether intelligible, and in some particulars were applicable only to 
 that debate. The general estimates of which I spoke in my letter 
 of yesterday were put into the hands of different members, and 
 probably were never returned, as I find no copy. I admitted the 
 supporting of one branch of industry permanently by bounties 
 which must be paid by a tax on others was, in general, absurd ; but 
 it might be the duty of government to do it in several cases. It 
 might do it very properly in a case where the business would be 
 permanently profitable to the country after it was fully established ; 
 but where the establishment was obstructed by extraordinary and arti 
 ficial means, practised by rival nations, which, it might be hoped 
 would be relaxed or relinquished after a little while, &c., it 
 must be in some degree the duty of government to afford public 
 aid, if, as in this case, a great multitude of the citizens with a large 
 capital were so engaged as to be dependent on its continuance. 
 Mr. Jefferson, in his report, says : " Fisheries with distant nations 
 would come to nothing, if not supported from their treasuries. The 
 advantages of ours place them on higher ground, such as to 
 relieve the Treasury from giving support, but not to permit it to 
 draw support from them" l Although I argued that the fishery, 
 as a source of pecuniary advantage, might be entitled to some pecu 
 niary aid, yet I confessed it needed only to have a full remittance 
 of the revenue drawn from it ; and this was the principle of the bill, 
 and upon this its defence chiefly rested. But I maintained stren 
 uously that, if more assistance were necessary to keep up the fish 
 eries, there were reasons of policy which ought to reconcile every 
 man in the United States to the measure. I stated the capture of 
 more than two thousand British vessels by the privateers of New 
 England in our war, and the actual arrival of more than twelve 
 hundred in safe ports. This important fact had great weight with 
 those gentlemen who realized it. I think the whole navigation of 
 Great Britain is stated to have been less than seven thousand ves 
 sels in the year 1775, and the New Englanders alone captured 
 nearly one-third of that number before the peace of 1782. Six or 
 seven hundred of them were recaptured by the British. 
 
 Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 1 See Jefferson s Works, VII. 554, 555. 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 117 
 
 WOLCOTT TO CABOT. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, March 27, 1797. 
 
 DEAR SIR, It is now certain that General Pinckney has been 
 refused a reception by the Directory, and that the refusal has been 
 attended with extraordinary circumstances of indignity. In addi 
 tion to the facts detailed in a letter from Paris dated the 7th of 
 January, which are correctly stated, there is one which you ought 
 to know. Mr. La Croix, in a letter to Mr. Monroe, announced it to 
 be the determination of the Directory not to receive another minister 
 plenipotentiary from the United States until the grievances of 
 France shall have been redressed. The grievances of which a 
 redress is to be a preliminary to the reception of a minister are 
 supposed to be those stated by Adet, and to which the government 
 have given an answer by which they must and will abide. The 
 violation of the British treaty, the repeal of laws, and the claim of 
 consular jurisdiction paramount to the courts of our country, are 
 points never to be conceded. 
 
 It is also proper that you should know that Mr. Pinckney was 
 specially instructed, prior to his departure, on every subject of com 
 plaint which then and now exists, and that his letter of credence 
 stated that the President, " sincerely desirous to maintain that 
 good understanding which from the commencement of their alli 
 ance has subsisted between the two nations, arid to efface unfavora 
 ble impressions, banish suspicions, and restore that cordiality which 
 was at once evidence and pledge of a friendly union, had judged 
 it expedient to appoint," &c. In point of rank, General Pinckney 
 was invested with a character equal to that enjoyed by Mr. Jay, 
 and was moreover designated, as has been shown, as the messenger 
 of conciliation. I have stated these facts, because the Jacobins 
 will endeavor to prevent any defensive measures Until an envoy 
 extraordinary can be sent, and the issue of his mission known. 
 Our friends, having been the advocates of negotiation on a former 
 occasion, may be deceived by the specious appearance of a parallel 
 case. 
 
 The truth is, General Pinckney is in fact an envoy extraordinary, 
 special objects being designated in his letters of credence ; and in 
 name he is a minister of equal rank. So far as respects the sub 
 stance or any point of etiquette, France ought therefore to be satis 
 fied. Mr. Pinckney is rejected, because the Directory mean to 
 
118 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 plunder us ; and they will suffer no discussions, to avoid hearing 
 and being disgraced with the manner in which they know we shall 
 utter our complaints. 
 
 It is contrary to the system of France that we should remain 
 neutral. No nation will be permitted to be neutral : we must join 
 France, or defend ourselves against France. The Directory ex 
 pect that the people will not support the government : if they 
 separate on this occasion, our country is undone. 
 
 In my opinion, we must prepare for a serious state of things, 
 one which will continue for a considerable time, and to meet which 
 firmness, decision, and system are indispensable. We must arm 
 for the defence of our commerce when attacked ; we must fortify 
 some or all our ports ; we must equip ships-of-war to serve as 
 convoys ; we must lay a tax ; and we must keep a minister as 
 near the Directory as he shall be suffered, to improve any opportu 
 nity for discussion and amicable adjustment, but never to disgrace 
 our government by retracting any thing which has been done. 
 
 The plan, on the other hand, will be to do nothing, until the 
 issue of an extraordinary mission can be known. In the mean time, 
 our commerce will be ruined, our public credit blasted, despondency, 
 distress, and faction will impair and divide our country, and finally 
 the French faction will obtain an ascendency. 
 
 I do not write this from any knowledge that the measures I 
 mentioned will be adopted by the President. But this I am cer 
 tain, these measures or something better will be recommended by 
 him. He will do what is right. In the mean time, the country 
 ought to be roused, not inflamed. They ought to make up their 
 minds for a serious and persevering exertion. They must consent 
 to sacrifices ; and they must cling to their government, and reject 
 the distinction attempted to be established by the Directory, or 
 they are lost. On the contrary, if they do what is right, I will 
 pledge my head that they will be successful. I rely upon you to 
 be an apostle of truth in Massachusetts. 
 
 Yours truly, OLIVER WOLCOTT, JR. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BEOOKLINE, April 3, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your favor of the 16th ultimo and its accom 
 paniment were received yesterday. Whether the government will 
 
1796-98.] COKKESPONDENCE. 119 
 
 have virtue enough to profit by your labors or not, time alone can 
 show ; but we, the people, are certainly much the wiser, and as one 
 of them I thank you for the instruction. 
 
 I foresaw at an early period that, if the Federalists were faith 
 ful to the country, their conduct would be liable to misinterpreta 
 tion ; and, considering the sort of stuff men are made of, I confess 
 my apprehensions have been very great that some of the best char 
 acters in the nation would be looked upon with jealousy. Although 
 I took no part in the election, I do not hesitate to avow my opinion 
 that the first and highest duty of the electors was to prevent the 
 election of a French President ; and, this being provided for, the 
 next object would have been to secure the election of Mr. Adams. 
 But I will never admit that we ought to take any considerable 
 risk of seeing a French or any foreign President rather than the 
 risk of any one Federal candidate in preference to another. But 
 our misfortune is that, when we profess to set the interest of the 
 public above that of our friends, their pride forbids them to believe, 
 or egotism to forgive it. 
 
 I have not the privilege of a Democrat, and therefore cannot 
 answer your questions for the people. But for myself I can 
 readily say that the United States are manifestly in the right, and 
 therefore cannot confess they are in the wrong. Of consequence, 
 they can neither repeal the acts of their legislature, nor reverse 
 the just judgments of their courts, nor violate their engagements to 
 another nation. But you would know what the people will think. 
 I presume, if the government assumes the tone it ought, that the 
 people will accord with them ; and, if the government does not, I 
 should expect the people will blame them hereafter, when they 
 shall have experienced, in addition to their losses of property, the 
 more irreparable loss of honor. Such is my course of thinking, 
 when, abstracted from the world, I revolve the subject in my 
 mind ; but I ought to add that, whenever I go out of my own house 
 or have guests within it, I am led to distrust my reasonings and 
 conclusions. 
 
 I find myself lost in the errors of the French Revolutionists, who 
 maintain that the people always understand their true interests 
 and will always vindicate them. How this may be in the political 
 millennium I know not ; but, in the present state of society, folly 
 and the vices which are its natural offspring have a power which 
 cannot be overcome. 
 
120 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1706-98. 
 
 After all, we must take the world as it is, and by expecting less 
 expose ourselves to less chagrin. I have long seen that your 
 sensibility was deeply wounded by the want of interest in the 
 affairs of the nation which is discovered in many public men ; but 
 I hope you will not always be a prey to that sort of anxiety ; and, if 
 you cannot arrive at a pure apathy, I hope you will at least moderate 
 your sufferings, for I am sure the consciousness of what you have 
 done ought to satisfy pride as well as principle, and, if there is to 
 be public disgrace, no part of it will attach to you. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, April 7, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, It gives me infinite pleasure to learn from 
 you that our Palirmrus is undaunted at the storm which is gather 
 ing. Popular gales sometimes blow hard, but they don t blow long ; 
 and the man who has the courage to face them will at last out- 
 face them. I hope from my soul that the President will enjoy 
 that immortality which is due to the man who dares do right when 
 all the world does wrong. I believe, however, if he is sternly and 
 strongly right, a great many people will discover that they them 
 selves are so. I readily accept the apostleship you mention, and 
 shall use your discourse as if it were my own. Your letter arrived 
 yesterday afternoon, and already my zeal has produced a letter of 
 two sheets, which will be transcribed as a circular to half a dozen 
 friends. I shall quote no authorities to infidels, and as for the 
 faithful they won t need them. 
 
 I am as ever your affectionate and faithful 
 
 G. CABOT. 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, April 13, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, It has been my intention to communicate to you 
 
 two occurrences of last summer, which seemed to be of consequence 
 
 to be known to those whose opinions must guide our affairs. The 
 
 first is the substance of a conversation * with the Duke de Liancourt, 1 
 
 * / think this conversation ivas in the month of August. G. C. 
 
 1 Frederic Alexandre Francois Due de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, an 
 emigre of 1792, after which time he travelled in the United States. He re 
 turned to Paris in 1799, and published an account of his travels in eight 
 volumes. In his book (English Translation, I. 481) he says: " I met here 
 again, to my great satisfaction, Mr. Cabot, Senator of the United States for 
 Massachusetts. He stands in high estimation among the Americans on 
 account of his well-informed mind and amiable character." 
 
1796-98.1 CORRESPONDENCE. 121 
 
 in which he disclosed to me the determination of the French Direc 
 tory to order the seizure of all vessels that should be found to have 
 on board any article of the product or manufacture of any of the 
 British dominions, and all such products and manufactures to be con 
 demned, wheresoever from, whithersoever bound, and to whomsoever 
 belonging. Whether the vessel was to be condemned or not, he did 
 not clearly express. He assured me of the authenticity of his 
 information, and that the system would be carried into operation 
 " as soon as the Emperor should be broken down" which he said 
 would be in September or October. After a moment s pause, I 
 observed that I did not at all doubt the truth of his information, 
 and that my mind was ready to receive much more. He perceived 
 that my gravity and moderation were affected, and suddenly added, 
 " What ! you think this would be unjust? " " I think," said I, " it 
 would be very impolitic, because it would confirm all those charges 
 of tyranny, injustice, and contempt for the rights of others, &c., 
 &c., which are made against France by the wise and virtuous part 
 of mankind. It would be, in fact, a greater outrage upon neutral 
 nations than was ever committed." " Why," said he, " it may be 
 disagreeable ; but there is no other way of destroying England." 
 I acknowledged to him, in a spirit of irony, that if the English 
 could be destroyed in no other way, that would justify it ; but I 
 added that my own opinion was that such a measure would unite 
 the English to a man, and excite the most desperate spirit in the 
 nation ; that they would cover the sea with their ships, and by the 
 greatness of their exertion would annihilate the remaining navy of 
 their enemies, and would block up for nine months in the year 
 every port of France on the Atlantic. He smiled at my opinions, 
 and said the power of England was at an end. Her resources 
 were exhausted, and she could not add a single ship, nor find the 
 means of supporting her present navy another season. I rejoined 
 that all the civilized world would have cause to mourn, if this should 
 be true ; for they would then be obliged to fight against France, or 
 give up their independence. ^ 
 
 The other occurrence was an unexpected visit from Cutting, 1 who 
 asked me, without much ceremony, " whom we intended to make 
 President." I told him I had nothing to do with it, but the 
 friends of the government would certainly make Mr. Adams, if 
 they could, or, if they could not elect him without a hazard of 
 Jefferson s coming in, they would perhaps make Mr. Pinckney ; 
 
 1 See above, p. 111. For some account of Dr. Cutting, see " Recollections 
 of Samuel Breck," pp. 173. 185. 
 
122 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 for they deemed it essential to the safety of the country to exclude 
 Mr. Jefferson, and, if possible, to choose Mr. Adams. He affected 
 great surprise at these sentiments, and assured me that, if I went 
 into the world instead of remaining in solitude, I should find a total 
 change of sentiments among the Federalists, which had recently 
 taken place ; that, whatever they might think of the tendency of 
 the French Revolution to serve or to injure the cause of freedom, 
 they were all united in their estimate of the French power and of 
 the use that would be made of it ; and that they saw plainly " we 
 must soothe France by making their favorite Jefferson President, 
 
 ^or we must take a war with them" "This language," said I to Mr. 
 Cutting, " is what I should have expected from you and your 
 party ; but, if the alternative is made, I trust there is virtue in the 
 country to make a war against tyrants rather than tamely submit 
 to them as masters." He said he was sorry I thought him a party 
 man, &c., &c., and then asked me if I had seen the paper of the 
 day. I told him no. " Oh," said he, " the contest is nearly over. 
 Buonaparte has cut up all the Austrians, and there will be no 
 
 ^further opposition in Italy." He then, repeating his regret at my 
 tenacity, assured me that Colonel Hamilton had declared to him 
 that Mr. Jefferson must be supported, as the only way of appeasing 
 
 ^.France. I told him Colonel Hamilton s opinion would have 
 weight with me on every such subject, but he was frequently mis 
 represented for party purposes, and nothing short of hearing it 
 from his own mouth would make me believe he was willing to see 
 Mr. Jefferson President. All this respecting Hamilton I am per 
 suaded is false, but the extreme desire discovered by Mr. Cutting 
 to draw from me a sentiment of acquiescence in Mr. Jefferson s 
 election for the sake of pacifying France is unaccountable. I give 
 you the essence of what passed, leaving out many little circum 
 stances which would be tedious to recite. It was my expectation 
 to pass a night with Mr. Adams in November, when I should have 
 related every thing to him ; but my indolence conquers every thing, 
 and I stayed at home, where I have radicated too strongly to be 
 easily removed. 
 
 I shall write you again in a few days, when I may possibly send 
 you a copy of a letter which I have addressed to a few friends con 
 fidentially, assuring them that the government would be firm, and 
 showing the necessity of our exciting the people to support the 
 measures which shall be adopted. 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 123 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 APRIL, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, As I hold myself accountable to those by 
 whom / am sent, I enclose you a copy of one of my epistles, that 
 it may be seen whether the doctrines I teach are sound or not. I 
 also enclose you an answer from one of the gentlemen to whom 
 my circular had been sent, that you may see how men are affected 
 by a little display of political truth. Mr. Watson writes with a 
 running pen. and therefore may express a little more than he 
 would, if required to be precise ; but, in support of his opinion, I 
 may add that Mr. William Gray, Jr., 1 who is one of our most sen 
 sible men and the greatest merchant in this State, assures me that 
 be finds men in every place and situation united in the conviction 
 of the perfidy and wickedness of France towards us, and he has no 
 doubt the people will zealously support every efficient measure 
 which the government shall adopt for our protection and defence. 
 I desired my son to transmit you a copy of my letter to Jeremiah 
 Smith, that you might more perfectly know the ideas I have propa 
 gated ; and for the same purpose I wish you to read a piece I sent 
 to the printer this morning for the next " Centinel," addressed to 
 the " Lovers of our Country," and signed " Fortiter in Re." 2 
 
 Several gentlemen who live in the interior of our State, to whom 
 I have written, have made me no reply ; but I am satisfied that 
 public opinion is in a right course and makes a daily progress, so 
 that the only anxiety among good men now is lest the House of 
 Representatives should be governed by a French faction. I am 
 confirmed in the belief that, if the President speaks with his usual 
 masculine tone of decision upon the dangers of our country and the 
 duties which arise from them, he will be supported by the spirit 
 and feelings of the bulk of the people. All the tools of France 
 and many of their opposers earnestly desire that an envoy may be 
 sent. I think it wrong, but it will take place ; and, if accompanied 
 by vigorous preparations for possible wants, it may do no great 
 harm, especially if the persons sent are not Frenchmen. My own 
 opinion as to the characters suitable is that men should be sought 
 whose principles are unquestionable, their respectability acknowl- 
 edo-ed, and whose detestation of the French tyrants has not been 
 
 C5 
 
 strongly expressed to the public and is not known. 
 
 Your faithful and affectionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 1 William Gray, of Salem, the largest ship-owner and merchant in the 
 United States, and lieutenant-governor of Massachusetts in 1810. 
 
 2 See below, p. 582. 
 
124 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 CIRCULAR LETTER REFERRED TO IN PRECEDING LETTERS. 
 
 (Confidential.) 
 
 APRIL 6, 1797. 
 
 SIR, If, in a free country like ours, the public welfare ordi 
 narily, or indeed ever, depends upon the prevalence of just senti 
 ments among the people, it is of the highest importance that such 
 sentiments should prevail at this time, when our political affairs are 
 fast verging to a great and unavoidable crisis. It is not, however, 
 from any peculiar confidence in my own ideas on this subject that 
 I address them to you, but it is because certain facts, rather than 
 opinions, of which I am possessed, ought to be imparted to those 
 whose influence in the community will contribute greatly to pre 
 serve its interest and its honor. The two great rivals of Europe, 
 whose ambition so often disturbs the repose of other nations, 
 could not fail to view the United States as an object of great inter 
 est to them in all their struggles for power. It is well known 
 that the French, in particular, had determined, from the commence 
 ment of the present war against England, that we should become 
 their associate ; and at some periods they have had great reason to 
 calculate upon the event. Happily, however, all their attempts 
 to involve us by fraud or by force have been hitherto baffled ; but 
 elevated by their unparalleled successes on the land, and irritated 
 by their defeats on the sea, they have long since taken the most 
 outrageous and desperate resolutions against those nations who 
 hold a pacific intercourse with their enemy ; they long ago re 
 solved " that they would destroy the commerce which any neutral 
 people should presume to carry on with any of the dominions of 
 England." This unprecedented measure is now executing, and, 
 if unresisted, will doubtless be followed by others more atrocious. 
 
 General Pinckney went from the United States specially in 
 structed on every subject of dispute which now exists. His creden 
 tial, of which the Directory have a copy, sets forth that the 
 President, " sincerely desirous to maintain that good understanding 
 which from the commencement of their alliance has subsisted be 
 tween the two nations, and to efface unfavorable impressions, 
 banish suspicions, and restore that cordiality which was at once 
 the evidence and pledge of a friendly union, had judged it expe 
 dient to appoint Mr. Pinckney minister plenipotentiary," &c. 
 
 But notwithstanding our minister was thus designated as a 
 
1796-08] CORRESPONDENCE. 125 
 
 special minister of conciliation, and such terms were used as might 
 have soothed their pride, the Directory have refused to receive 
 him, and the refusal has been accompanied with indignities. Some 
 of the facts relative to this business have been detailed in a letter 
 from Paris dated January 7th, which has appeared in our news 
 papers, but perhaps it ought not to be published, that Mr. de la 
 Croix announced to Mr. Monroe the determination of the Direc- 
 torv not to receive another minister plenipotentiary from the United 
 States until the grievances of France shall have been redressed. 
 These grievances are supposed to be those specified by Mr. Adet, 
 and to which our government has already given a complete answer, 
 and by their answer the government must abide. The demands 
 which France makes upon us " to violate a solemn treaty with a 
 powerful nation, to repeal just and necessary laws, and to admit 
 a French consular jurisdiction paramount to our judicial courts," 
 are points that never can be conceded but with the total surrender 
 of independence ; and yet these are to be yielded (if yielded at all) 
 as preliminary to any discussion of the questions in dispute, for we 
 are still to learn what further marks of humiliation would be re 
 quired of us, if we were to submit to these. We know the choice 
 of our President was viewed as an interesting object on which 
 they bestowed all their influence. As this has failed, they are now 
 prepared to embarrass the new administration. They rely, too, on 
 the exertions of a powerful faction to oppose, at all hazards, the 
 system which has prevailed through the period of Washington s 
 administration. But, whatever may be the success of their opera 
 tions within our country, it is on our commerce their policy bears 
 with the most force. Viewing our trade as a material prop to 
 British credit, they aim at the destruction of it, in hopes by that 
 means to weaken the power of England. If by this violence and 
 injustice to neutrals they should make them all their enemies, they 
 would still calculate upon being no great losers, for plunder and 
 contributions would be a valuable consideration to those who have 
 no other revenues ; and if, in the process, a neutral nation becomes 
 disorganized and ruined, it is of course a natural ally to their sys 
 tem, and will directly or indirectly add to their strength. It seems 
 therefore evident that neutral nations, and ours especially, must 
 either submit to ruin or resist it : but if this is the alternative, and 
 we hesitate which to prefer, we are already half undone ; for, if 
 our indignation is not excited by the wounds which innocence and 
 
126 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 honor receive, public liberty must soon be lost, and private rights 
 will speedily follow. In this delicate conjuncture of affairs, it 
 appears to me necessary that the public mind should be informed 
 and prepared as fast as possible for the efforts we may be called 
 to make. The country should be roused without being inflamed, 
 and by a dispassionate attention to the public dangers should be 
 reconciled to additional taxes, and should strengthen the govern 
 ment by additional confidence in the measures it may adopt. What 
 these will be no man can foretell ; but it is not improbable that 
 merchants may be authorized to arm their ships for defence, and 
 that the several frigates which are in forwardness may be equipped 
 as convoys, that our most valuable seaports may be further forti 
 fied, and probably a military force provided to suppress the insur 
 rections of slaves in those places where the French emissaries or 
 others shall excite them. But, as the preservation or attainment 
 of peace is the only end desired, it is likely that a minister may be 
 always in Europe, authorized to seize any moment to secure that 
 best of blessings. But, whatever there may be in these conject 
 ures, it is not to be doubted that the President will be firm, and as 
 far as depends upon him will never concur in degrading the coun 
 try, and still less in relinquishing its independence. On the other 
 hand, the Jacobin plan will be to enfeeble and divide the public 
 sentiment, that nothing may be done ; while, in the mean time, com 
 merce will more and more languish under continued depredations, 
 public credit and private credit may be impaired, and from a gen 
 eral impoverishment distress and despondency must ensue, and, 
 what will be the greatest of all evils, France by the instrumental 
 ity of faction will govern the country at last. These ideas are 
 important, so far as the} T are correct : to me they appear correct, 
 and therefore need no apology for being offered to the friends of 
 the United States. 
 
 With great respect, I am, sir, 
 
 Your most obedient servant, G. CABOT. 
 
 APRIL 10, 1797. 
 
 Since writing the foregoing, I am told there are some good peo 
 ple who think it would be wise to send an envoy extraordinary to 
 France, it having been suggested that the rank of minister pleni 
 potentiary is objected to by the Directory. But I answer that the 
 rank of the two characters is the same, and is so established by all 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 127 
 
 the writers. Beside which, Mr. Pinckney is in fact an envoy 
 extraordinary for special purposes ; and even if it were otherwise, 
 and the rank were different, it would puzzle ingenuity to furnish 
 a reason why they should reject a minister from us of the same 
 grade with the highest they ever sent to us. To this I add that 
 the Directory have not made the objection ; and it must therefore 
 be understood that for the present France has shut the door of 
 negotiation, expecting no doubt that this last step of violence 
 would intimidate our government, and deter them from further 
 defending the rights of our country, or that the people would no 
 longer support their own government. 
 
 I am, &c., GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 MARSTON WATSON * TO CABOT. 
 
 MARBLEHEAD, April 14, 1797. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Your confidential communication, dated the 6th, 
 I received yesterday at Boston. 
 
 No one can be more impressed than I am with the necessity of 
 giving a currency to sentiments of real patriotism, and a loyal dis 
 position to support the government at the present and approaching 
 important period ; and under such persuasion I omit no favorable 
 opportunity, publicly and privately, to express and circulate such 
 opinions and disposition where I have a hope of influence. And 
 I think you have recollection enough of the people of Essex gen 
 erally, and of those of Marblehead particularly, to believe that nine- 
 tenths of them are fully satisfied in all the truths and reasonings 
 that you have suggested relating to our foreign connections, the 
 objects and measures of France, and their ultimate tendency to the 
 interests and politics of this country, unless independently repressed 
 by our government on the firm support of the voice of the whole 
 nation. I cannot be mistaken in this confidence in my townsmen 
 and neighbors, who, with an ardent desire for the preservation of 
 peace and security, are cordially and firmly devoted to aid the gov 
 ernment by any necessary surrender of the lucrative prospects of 
 their commerce, of their capital, or their personal service, when 
 ever the exigencies of the nation shall demand them ; and I am 
 happy in believing that these opinions, favorable to the support of 
 
 1 Mr. Watson was a prominent merchant of Marblehead, and afterwards 
 of Boston. His letter is in reply to that just given. 
 
128 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 our government and national rights, are not peculiar to our vicin 
 ity, but that it is at least very general in New England. From all 
 appearances of the effects of the licentious and ruinous depreda 
 tions of the French on the property of our citizens, and the indig 
 nities to our government on their minds, I cannot but think that 
 your anxiety for the general welfare underestimates the real patri 
 otism of our countrymen generally through the United States ; 
 and if it should at once become a national question whether to 
 abandon our rightful honors or interest, or abandon all commercial 
 and political connections with France, or virtually in any way to 
 surrender to them any portion of our independence, that there 
 would be scarcely a hesitation with three-fourths of the people of 
 all classes, as well those with but little information, who would 
 only be governed by their passions, as those who have better op 
 portunity to understand for themselves. And from effects to trace 
 motives and causes, and consequently, like members of a free na 
 tion, vindicate and support the government to the utmost extremity, 
 I confess I can see the mischievous wishes of the bad men among 
 us with the same concern that you do ; but I have rather more 
 confidence in the insignificance of their power, and that France 
 and all other nations will be soon satisfied of that truth. I know 
 that you are assured of my fullest concurrence with your sentiments 
 and wishes, and that no favorable opportunity will be lost to pro 
 duce any influence favorable to them. 
 
 I am, with esteem, sincerely yours, M. WATSON. 
 
 My acquaintance with Congressional folks is so small that I have 
 never been informed whether the objection to the land-tax origi 
 nated in political motives, or only from the strong hand of economy 
 in the landed interest. But, whatever it was, I think it is to be 
 lamented that it did not prevail. Justice as well as urgent patriot 
 ism certainly demands some more direct contributions from that 
 part of the community ; and I sincerely hope that at the ensuing 
 session Congress will agree to think so. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, April 17, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, Jeremiah Smith, who called on me yes 
 terday, tells me that a difference of sentiment prevails among you 
 great men in and out of the cabinet, respecting the expediency of 
 
1796-98 ] CORRESPONDENCE. 1 29 
 
 a new embassy to France. From the facts which have been stated 
 to me, I do not see how we can possibly find new messengers, with 
 the expectation that they will not be kicked from the door, unless we 
 first appease those to whom the visit is intended, by performing 
 the penance they have prescribed ; and this all agree is impossible 
 for us to do. 
 
 I confess to you I was struck with the formal precision of the 
 words used by the Directory. The literal sense of the declaration 
 would be saved, though they were to receive an embassy from us, 
 if it were other than a minister plenipotentiary. But why this 
 equivocation ? Surely it was to leave the door open for accommo 
 dation, if the actual state of things should render it desirable to 
 them. If they have not acted upon some such principle, the new 
 embassy would be fruitless ; and, if they have, it is unnecessary, 
 because in this latter case they will be guided in their conduct 
 toward us by events in Europe and the circumstances of their own 
 country. 
 
 But I take it for granted the only solid argument in favor of a 
 new embassy is the tendency of it to satisfy popular opinion here, 
 and to unite the country in the measures which must be taken after 
 ill success. I am afraid this argument claims more weight than it 
 truly merits. I conceive that the government has attempted nego 
 tiation already, as far as it can without abasement ; and, if the 
 knowledge of this does not satisfy the country, it is not certain 
 that any thing that can be done will satisfy them. But my fears 
 concerning the effects of a new embassy are that France will 
 strengthen her party by it. She will know our motive to be to put 
 her so clearly in the wrong that her friends here can be no longer 
 her advocates ; but, as she must know this, she can with certainty 
 counteract us, and by a very obvious policy give to her friends 
 new strength. 
 
 She can propose to the new embassy a treaty which shall contain 
 many things which would be extremely popular, accompanied with 
 some requisitions which we could not grant without present dis 
 honor, and ultimately a war with another nation. The commis 
 sioners would reject such a project, if they are honest; but the 
 party in this country would then be able to rally again. France is 
 now grown, and daily growing, more odious to the people; but 
 from a thousand causes this weaning from folly is a difficult work, 
 and I incline to think France would now gladly prevent its being 
 
 9 
 
130 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 perfected. If therefore, according to my ideas, the result of a new 
 embassy may be to supply new means to the French party now 
 exhausted, the danger of this may be a fair offset against the hope 
 of uniting the country in some efficient mode of defence. At the 
 same time I express these as my own opinions, it is impossible that 
 the mass of the people should not (if left to themselves) prefer one 
 more attempt to persuade our French brethren to do justice and be 
 friends. Public attention is pretty well excited in this quarter, 
 and hitherto the public mind has held a right course. I should 
 imagine, by the time Congress meets, we shall be willing to take 
 such burthens as may be reasonable to lay upon us. I think, how 
 ever, much will depend upon the tone of the government : if it is 
 niascul ne, our notes will conform. I hope the President will speak 
 decidedly upon every topic that is connected with the business of 
 the meeting ; and especially, if it is clear that we cannot and 
 ought not attempt farther negotiation, I hope he will say it. Mrs. 
 Cabot tells me the chaise is waiting to carry us to Judge Lowell s, 
 and that I must give her love and close my letter. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO JEREMIAH SMITH. 
 
 [The following letter is the " copy of one addressed to a few friends," 
 referred to in the next letter to Gore. See p. 133.] 
 
 BEOOKLINE, April 17, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, It is easy to say what ought not to be done 
 in certain conjunctures, but difficult to determine what ought. The 
 truth is that we often arrive at a dilemma in which something must 
 be done, and yet that something must appear to be wrong ; for the 
 inconveniences of the course taken, whatever it be, must be consid 
 erable, and will be the most known and the only ones felt. But no 
 considerations of this kind will deter many men, whom I am proud 
 to call friends, from adopting any measures which, in their judg 
 ment, the public good may require. What are these measures, you 
 ask ? I wish I could give a satisfactory reply to the question, but 
 I confess I cannot. There is, however, in my mind no difficulty 
 in deciding that an embargo would be much more injurious to us 
 than all depredations will be, much more injurious to us than 
 to the French ; and, indeed, much more to the other nations who 
 have colonies than to the French. It would be particularly incon 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 131 
 
 venient to the English, who are now fighting for the independence 
 of the neutral nations which remain unconquered by France. This 
 idea is so obvious that I shall expect many zealous advocates for 
 an embargo among those who prefer the interests of France to 
 those of the United States. As & permanent measure or principal 
 measure in any system, I consider an embargo as always prepos 
 terous, being necessarily more distressing to the nation that 
 imposes it than to the nation against which it is intended to 
 operate; but there is an infinitude of cases in which partial, 
 special, or temporary embargoes may be expedient, and there 
 fore at all times of public danger the executive ought to be 
 authorized by law to lay them. In the most probable cases, 
 this power cannot be exercised directly by Congress, without 
 defeating its own designs. I now release you from the embargo, 
 and proceed to express my hopes that the first measures of Con 
 gress will be to provide more revenue. A land-tax, however unpala 
 table at first, will be approved by the people themselves, after they 
 are brought to contemplate a little more soberly the nature and 
 extent of the public dangers. The few frigates which are in for 
 wardness ought to be equipped forthwith, and the merchants should 
 be authorized to defend their vessels, as far as it can be done with 
 out actual war. If no better idea occurs on the point, let convoys 
 accompany them, who shall fulfil the twenty-seventh article of the 
 treaty, which prescribes the conduct of armed vessels of one nation 
 towards the trading vessels of another. In the West India scene, 
 where we suffer greatly from little paltry pirates, this sort of 
 defence would be sufficient generally ; but a minute examination 
 of the rights of nations is requisite, to enable a man to delineate 
 this system fully. Our most valuable and exposed seaports should 
 be better fortified, and a small military corps raised arid established 
 to keep the fortresses. Thus prepared and provided for the worst, 
 I would diplomatically declare that none of these things are to be 
 understood as making a rupture with France ; but that, on the con 
 trary, no offence is authorized against the persons, properties, or 
 rights of the French Republic, or any of its citizens, to whom we 
 are disposed to do justice as we always have done, and with whom 
 we wish to be at peace ; but that the measures are solely defensive, 
 &c. If these measures can be carried, adjourn for three months. 
 
 With respect to a new embassy, it would be disgraceful, and 
 indicate a dread of France, which is already too great; but my 
 
132 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 principal objection to it is that it may be easily made the means of 
 recruiting the exhausted strength of the French party within our 
 country,* and their mischiefs are more to be dreaded than any their 
 masters can perpetrate without. 
 
 Thus, my friend, you see with what readiness I give you my 
 crudest opinions. If they are erroneous, it will be satisfactory that 
 they have no authority, and I no responsibility. But, before I close 
 this letter, let me entreat you to be at Philadelphia on the day 
 mentioned by the President. Probably you will then find a well- 
 digested plan of the executive, which, if not repugnant to your own 
 ideas, you will zealously support. If no system is formed by the 
 executive, or such as shall be formed is not supported, there will be 
 no consistency, and of course no efficiency, in our measures. If I 
 were to fill another sheet, I should probably suggest nothing which 
 has not been familiar to your mind. There can be nothing new in 
 this. It is, however, the best return I can make to your very flat 
 tering letter, and may be regarded as an additional proof of the 
 great esteem with which I am 
 
 Truly your friend, &C. 1 G. CABOT. 
 
 * E.g., by making propositions which would be popular here, and only 
 insisting on one or two points which would involve us in a contest with Great 
 Britain. G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 BROOKLINE, April 17, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I am so much in your debt for letters and 
 other favors that I hardly dare to acknowledge the extent, unless 
 I could be assured you would take the acknowledgment for pay 
 ment, or at least as a compensation for giving time. It is impossi 
 ble that your official duties, 2 with all their perplexities, should so 
 far engross your thoughts as to prevent your notice of the inter 
 esting events which occupy us here ; and I wish it were in my 
 power to satisfy in any degree the desire you must feel to know 
 our measures and their success. My own indolence, which I 
 thought nothing could overcome, has given way to my anxiety for 
 the cause of order and of our country. You may have seen that 
 I was taken as your suppleant in the difficult office of rectifying 
 
 1 This letter has been already printed in Morison s Life of Smith, p. 98. 
 
 2 Mr. Gore was at this time in London, as one of the commissioners 
 under the Jay treaty. 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 133 
 
 public opinion ; l and, if I have been less successful, you will attrib 
 ute it to the proper causes. The enclosed copy of a letter, 2 which 
 I addressed to a few friends, will show you my course of thinking 
 on the subject which is to engage Congress ; and I am riot without 
 hopes that the people will be disposed to support measures of 
 energy, though a little burdensome, when they are brought to see 
 the public dangers in their true light. If the country should be put 
 into a posture of defence, adequate revenues provided, and convoys 
 allowed to enforce and fulfil the twenty-seventh article of the treaty 
 with France, and a diplomatic declaration that all these meas 
 ures are purely defensive, and not to be understood to mean any 
 thing like a rupture, that, on the contrary, no offence is author 
 ized against the persons, properties, or rights of the French Repub 
 lic, or any of its citizens, to all of whom we will for ever render 
 complete justice, and with whom we earnestly wish to remain at 
 peace, I should expect ultimately to see our dignity preserved. 
 But I am very recently informed that a friend of ours at New 
 York, whose opinions are almost always the wisest in the world, 
 thinks that a new embassy is advisable, to consist of Mr. Pinckney, 
 now in Holland, Mr. Madison, and some person from this quarter. 
 I have not heard the reasons for this measure, but imagine the 
 principal one to be its tendency to unite the country in a system of 
 vigorous defence, if it fails. But, having viewed it in all the atti 
 tudes my imagination could place it, I confess my apprehension is 
 very strong that France would seize upon the occasion to renew 
 the exhausted strength of her party in the United States. This 
 she might do by profuse promises, which, as they never would be ful 
 filled, could cost nothing, and by insisting on one or two points, the 
 yielding of which would involve us in new difficulties with another 
 nation. Besides, if France has left open a way to back out, she 
 will use it or not, as events in Europe may determine her. If she 
 is full of power, our humiliating overtures will be fruitless ; and, if 
 she is distressed, they will be unnecessary. In a word, although 
 peace is not to be abandoned by the government so long as it is 
 possible to retain it, yet I believe that the people at this moment 
 are prepared to take a proper tone, if the government will give it. 
 Adet is about to sail for France ; and I understand that he tells his 
 
 1 Mr. Cabot had sent to Mr. Gore a copy of the circular letter given 
 above, p. 124. 
 
 2 This refers to the letter just given, addressed to Jeremiah Smith. 
 
134 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 confidants that there will be no war, but that every thing will be 
 accommodated as soon as he arrives, or his letters reach Paris. 
 Almost all the tools of France have held up the idea that France 
 would not make war upon us, but only plunder our commerce in 
 their own defence and to punish us for having sacrificed their 
 interests in the British treaty ; but I am well persuaded that 
 Adet is greatly disappointed in the effect of their measures upon 
 the country, and, above all, the effects of Pickering s letter. 1 
 
 You know very well that all power has been concentrating in 
 the House of Representatives. It has made great progress, and 
 much must therefore depend upon them ; and they depend upon 
 Gallatin. Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, April 22, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Since I wrote you last, Mr. Swan 2 has 
 returned from New York, where he had been to have a last 
 interview with Adet, who is about sailing for France. Swan has 
 stated to a friend of mine that Adet has no expectation of a war, 
 but relies fully that all misunderstandings will be cleared up 
 immediately upon his arrival in France, or upon the arrival of his 
 letters, if he himself fails. Thus far Mr. Swan, whom you know. 
 
 If Adet does confide his sentiments to Swan, he cannot wish 
 them to remain secret. It is conceivable that Adet may wish to 
 see the influence of his nation recovered by a conciliatory conduct 
 toward the United States ; but it is more probable that he wishes, 
 by exciting this idea here, to prevent all preparatory measures 
 against a different conduct. It has been a striking artifice in the 
 Revolutionists to divide and disarm those they intended to attack, 
 by leading them to expect moderation and justice. But, in every 
 instance of nations and individuals, the credulous have become 
 victims ; and I cannot but fear that we, too, are destined to suffer 
 from this kind of folly. It is hardly within possibility that the 
 House of Representatives should not temporize rather than act 
 
 1 The reply to Adet s charges in the letter to our minister at Paris, 
 already referred to, p. 112. 
 
 2 Colonel James Swan. Born in Scotland, he came in early youth to 
 Boston. He served through the Revolution with distinction, and was a 
 wealthy merchant and writer of some note. The last fifteen years of his 
 life he passed in a debtors prison in Paris. 
 
1796-98.1 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 135 
 
 with decision, unless new events occur before they meet, which 
 shall rouse them by rousing the country. 
 
 I am well persuaded, however, that, if the House should unite 
 with the other branches in measures of suitable vigor, the country 
 will go along with the government, and support it with constancy. 
 I think, too, that firmness and prudence well combined would 
 carry us safe through the crisis, and that France, upon the return 
 of adversity, which will come, will respect us more and treat us 
 better. She now despises us, as she does all who do not resist her ; 
 and she always respects the English above every other people. 
 
 Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 At an early period, you asked of me " what the people 
 would think should be done by the government to ward off the 
 impending evils." I answered then that they would take their 
 opinion from the government, if the government has one. But I 
 ought perhaps to state to you now that the expediency of sending 
 an envoy is more generally admitted than denied. At the same 
 time, I believe it is expected that other measures of preparation 
 will be taken, so that we may be ready for the worst events. I 
 repeat to all my acquaintances my fears that, if an envoy is sent 
 and received, the French will completely re-establish their undue 
 influence in our country. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 12, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Since the receipt of your favor of the 5th, 
 which was handed me last evening, I have revolved the subject of 
 it in my mind as frequently as the time would admit ; and finally 
 I could think of no persons in this State, whose names I would 
 mention for commissioner on the British debts, except Mr. Jackson, 1 
 the supervisor, or my quondam colleague, Mr. Strong. Both 
 these gentlemen deservedly possess the public confidence, and are 
 habituated to those patient investigations which the office may 
 require. My preference would be for Mr. Jackson, because, ceteris 
 paribus, treaty makers should be kept free from the imputations 
 
 i Jonathan Jackson, of Newburyport. He was for many years prominent 
 in Massachusetts politics, and a successful merchant. He was the father of 
 Judge Jackson, of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, of Dr. James Jackson, 
 and of Pa trick Tracy Jackson, the eminent merchant and manufacturer. 
 
136 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 of deriving individual benefit from that public act. In every other 
 point of view, Mr. Strong will doubtless be an unexceptionable 
 character. Whether either of the gentlemen would engage in this 
 service, I am unable to say ; but I will try to ascertain Mr. Jack 
 son s disposition, and inform you by the next post. The union 
 of the four commissioners in the choice of any fifth man would 
 probably strengthen his inclination to accept the office, as it would 
 place him in a situation of great respectability, and where the duty 
 of impartiality would be rendered easier from the peculiar great 
 ness of its obligation. 
 
 I am five miles from the post-office, and therefore can add 
 nothing to these first impressions now ; but, if any thing further 
 occurs, it shall follow by the succeeding post. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 14, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I thought it a fulfilment of your desires to 
 ascertain whether Mr. Jackson would engage as a fifth commis 
 sioner, if he were invited. I therefore communicated to him the 
 substance of your inquiry, and added that I had mentioned his 
 name to my correspondent at Philadelphia, as one that might be 
 compared with others ; but he readily decided that it would be im 
 possible for him to execute the commission, if it should be offered, 
 alleging, among other reasons, that his state of health forbids a 
 journey southward, and that the business of his present office (riot 
 perfectly ordered by his predecessor) would require the careful 
 labor of several months to arrange with propriety. 
 
 I take it for granted that your intention is to form a list of the 
 best names, and from these to select the most suitable character. 
 If, however, it should be thought expedient to take a man in this 
 part of the Union, I think Brother Strong unites excellent quali 
 ties for the office. He is happy in a moderation of manner, which 
 has prevented his firmness of purpose from giving offence, and 
 therefore may conciliate the good opinion of the South, while he 
 highly enjoys that of the North. 
 
 Very respectfully and affectionately, 
 
 I remain your constant friend, 
 
 G. CABOT. 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 137 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 15, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Almost all men seem finally to expect that an 
 envoy extraordinary is to be sent to France ; but no one has 
 attempted to show the propriety of such a step, except that its 
 tendency is to unite the country eventually. I had one conversa 
 tion with Ames upon this subject, in which he supported the 
 measure, chiefly on the ground that without it the government 
 could do nothing, and with it might be brought to prepare for an 
 ultimate efficient defence. After all I have heard and all I have 
 been able to imagine, my mind is still as unsatisfied as at first. I 
 often ask myself what instructions can be given to the new min 
 ister, that will not immediately bring us to issue with France. To 
 say that he shall not enter the Republic, until a recognition is 
 promised, is making a point at the outset, which, while Mr. Pinck- 
 ney remains alone at the door, may be possibly avoided. And yet 
 I can have no idea of an envoy being put on any other terms. 
 Again, is it possible that an acknowledgment can be made on the 
 part of the United States that they have done wrong towards France? 
 If they were disposed to make such an acknowledgment in general 
 terms, it would be impossible to point out the particular case. 
 Even our Jacobins are brought to confess that the United States 
 have done nothing which they had not good right to do ; but they 
 complain that our government did not forbear to do what (though 
 right in itself) must have been known would displease our allies, 
 and so make them quarrel with us, or rather punish us. Again, 
 can we send a minister without instructing him, when received by 
 the French, to ask of them some reparation for all the injuries 
 their agents and servants have done us ? If not to these ends, to 
 what does the mission aim ? France is acting as I have seen a 
 cunning knave in private life, first commit the most insufferable 
 injuries, and then take the high ground of complainant. In such 
 a case, no good can come from an act which will place the injured 
 party in the attitude of entreaty, weakness, and fear. I still wish 
 it were possible for our country to assume a dignified countenance, 
 and, without provoking hostilities, pre pare to repel them. I am 
 well persuaded, if we could do this, all would be well. The hope 
 of seducing us within, or coercing us without, would be extinct ; and 
 France would not then suppose it for her interest to quarrel with 
 
138 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 us. It cannot be denied that the people wish to avoid new taxes, 
 and especially one upon land; but the rapidity with which the 
 people have come to a right way of thinking on French politics 
 leads me to believe that almost any measures the government may 
 take would be approved, and especially if accompanied with an 
 address to the people, explaining the necessity and pointing to the 
 public danger. But, after all, my greatest reliance is that Great 
 Britain will keep the monster at bay, until he destroys himself or 
 becomes less dangerous to others ; and I cannot believe that any 
 vicissitudes in the internal affairs of England will sensibly diminish 
 their naval strength, or divert its application, as long as France 
 remains formidable. England certainly possesses abundant means 
 of every kind to defend herself against France, and as many of the 
 powers on the continent as France can compel to act as auxiliaries. 
 I shall not believe therefore, until I see it, that England will yield 
 in the present contest. Mr. Erskine, Mr. Waddington, and some 
 thousands of others, will try at every period of misfortune to 
 displace the ministers ; but the government, the landed as well as 
 other property of the nation, the weight of character, and essen 
 tially the body of the nation, must and do hate France, and will 
 under all circumstances fight France as long as they can. 
 
 Farewell. G. CABOT. 
 
 TUESDAY, May 16. 
 
 Since writing the preceding, I have received a letter from Mr. 
 King, by which it appears that he considers the late proceedings 
 in England as a fair commencement of a paper-money system. It 
 was evident to us all that, if the stoppage of payment in gold and 
 silver were not merely a thing of a day, and resulting from causes 
 in their nature of short duration, a paper currency must take 
 place; but is any way of managing these unavoidable difficulties 
 less hazardous? 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 22, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I thank you sincerely for the copy of the 
 President s message with its accompaniments from your office, 
 which you were so good as to send me. It is abundantly evident 
 now that the first opinion I formed was a just one, of the benefit 
 which the community would derive from your letter to Mr. Pinck- 
 
1796-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 139 
 
 ney. The French disease will yield to powerful discutients, if to 
 any thing. 
 
 We are all charmed with the speech of the President, and I 
 am persuaded this part of the country will support the policy he 
 indicates. 
 
 Accept my unfeigned regards, and be assured of my highest 
 esteem. G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 31, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, If it were doubtful whether the government 
 could give a tone to the nation, I think the effect of the Presi 
 dent s speech is a proof of its truth. 
 
 All the Federalists, and many others, approve highly the style he 
 has used, and swear to support him. Still, however, we look with 
 anxiety for the address of the House, as it shall finally pass ; for, 
 if the representatives fall off, they will be followed by many of the 
 people. 
 
 Our Legislature assembles this day, and it is expected they will 
 express their coincidence of opinion with the President. With a 
 hope to stimulate them to this proper conduct, I threw into the 
 " Centinel " of this date a piece signed " One of the American Peo 
 ple." J When this is done, I shall hope you will think my apostle- 
 ship may be suspended as no longer necessary, and I hope you will 
 be persuaded that I have faithfully executed the trust. We are 
 told, and I believe it to be true, that our eastern district will send 
 a recruit to the Federal party, by electing Parker instead of 
 Dearborn. 
 
 Brother Ellsworth, a few days since, made us a friendly visit 
 of three or four hours, and gave us a more realizing view of your 
 family than we had enjoyed for a long time. We are to see him 
 again to-morrow evening. He perceives with some triumph that 
 my political faith has been a little strengthened by the manifesta 
 tions of right temper among the people since the publication of the 
 speech. If Congress should be disposed to do all that they ought, 
 I trust they will rescue us from the continued disgrace of starving 
 our public officers ; and, when this happens, I shall hope you will 
 have it in your power to draw every good man you need as an 
 
 1 See below, p. 584. 
 
140 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 auxiliary in your department, and that you will no longer delay to 
 expel a commissioned traitor. 1 Expectation has been alive since 
 the appearance of an infamous letter, as it is called ; but, for my 
 own part, whether the letter was written by the person to whom 
 it is imputed or not, I should always have believed the sentiments 
 are precisely those he maintains. Indeed, the attack he made pub 
 licly upon Adams, in his note to a printer, was no less scandalous. 
 In all these things, I devoutly acknowledge the hand of Provi 
 dence ; and, if I would be persuaded that we deserve these kind inter 
 ferences, I could be as easy as some of our friends. 
 
 G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, June 27, 1797. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have just returned from a circuitous jour 
 ney of four hundred miles, which has occupied seventeen or eigh 
 teen days. Your favor of the 8th I found upon my table at my 
 arrival here. 
 
 In passing up the Merrimac and down the Connecticut, one 
 hundred and fifty miles on each river, I found the people every 
 where maintaining more just sentiments of our political affairs 
 than I had conceived possible after so much pains had been taken 
 to mislead them. 
 
 At Concord, I was in the House of Representatives when the 
 address in answer to Governor Gilman s speech was discussed; and 
 I can assure you I never saw in any assembly so much of the right 
 sort of American spirit. Of one hundred and thirty-one members, 
 there were not more than four or five tainted with Jacobinism ; 
 and although twenty-eight voted against the address, yet most of 
 these acted upon the principle of accommodating the four or five 
 who professed to desire only a little less force in the expression 
 of what all agreed was the public sentiment. In the Upper House 
 there was equal union and spirit; and I am persuaded nineteen- 
 twentieths of these men would have marched, with Governor Gil- 
 man at their head, upon a moment s call, to defend the country and 
 its government against France, as Stark and his followers did 
 to repel the British in 1777. When I came into Vermont, I found 
 
 1 This refers to Tench Coxe, shortly after dismissed by Wolcott for offi 
 cial misconduct. See p. 148. See also Administrations of Washington and 
 Adams, II. 6, 9. 
 
1790-98.] CORRESPONDENCE. 141 
 
 the same temper and spirit ; so that I could not forbear to conclude 
 that the disaffection in Boston and its vicinity is almost all that 
 exists in New England, for I consider the paltry opposition of 
 Portsmouth as only sufficient to blow the fire of patriotism in the 
 rest of the State of New Hampshire. 
 
 I have seen by the newspapers that Ames was nominated for a 
 fifth commissioner. I should have mentioned him with the first 
 men, if I had not considered his ill-health as a total disqualifica 
 tion. I had just visited him, and he appeared too feeble to attend 
 to business of any sort. 
 
 We resist the French successfully in our own country, but they 
 beat us in Europe. If England revolves, our tranquillity must be 
 disturbed ; but I still hope and confide that England in every sup- 
 posable condition will command the ferry, and that interest and 
 pride will always stimulate her to keep the French boats from 
 passing. . . . Your unfeigned friend, 
 
 G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 4, 1797. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I am greatly obliged to you for the pamphlet 
 you sent me, as I felt a strong desire to see the argument which 
 should prove conclusively that the knight would be a knave, if he 
 was not by nature a fool. 1 
 
 I am persuaded this subject stands pretty well in the public 
 view already ; but I am nevertheless convinced that, since the policy 
 of France has dragged our executive into the street, it is best to 
 make the people who are there understand that we are wholly 
 right, and our accusers altogether wrong. 
 
 I hope therefore your letter will be communicated to Congress, 
 that it may be regularly published. 
 
 In a late letter from Mr. Gore, he informs me that the office 
 of consul will soon be vacated by the return of Mr. Johnson to 
 Maryland ; and, as it is of much public importance that the consul 
 ship in such a city as London should be well filled, he expresses a 
 
 J This refers to a letter from Pickering to the Chevalier de Yrujo, the 
 Spanish minister. Yrujo had become unpopular from his libel suits against 
 Cobbett. His intrigues with the Democrats also gave a peculiar zest to this 
 sharp state paper, which Pickering afterwards transmitted to Congress 
 with his official report. See, for full account, Life and Works of Pickering, 
 in. 396-411 inclusive. 
 
142 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1796-98. 
 
 solicitude that among the candidates the best should be selected. 
 His own opinion is decidedly in favor of Mr. Williams, 1 our consul 
 at Hamburg, who he thinks would accept the trust. I have 
 formerly expressed to you my opinion, and that of the commercial 
 men who know him in this quarter ; and I repeat that his sound 
 understanding and well-established character and principles render 
 him in my estimation highly deserving of public confidence. 
 
 I rejoice that at this period of distress in the city of Philadel 
 phia 2 you and your family are so remote from the scene ; and, 
 wherever you may be, I pray for the welfare of you and yours, 
 being, with sincere esteem and affection, 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 1 See above, p. 109, note. 
 
 2 This refers to the yellow fever, which raged with great violence in 
 Philadelphia during the summer of 1797. Despite his precaution, Colonel 
 Pickering lost a child from the disease. 
 
1798.] SECRETARYSHIP OF THE NAVY. 143 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 1798. 
 
 Declines Secretaryship of Navy. Renewed Political Activity. Affair of 
 the Major-Generals. Opinion of Gerry and Marshall. Correspondence. 
 
 THE winter of 17971798 in Philadelphia passed away 
 unmarked, except by the ever-increasing bitterness of party 
 hostility. Meanwhile, the American envoys, in Paris, 
 were subjected to the insults and intrigues of Talleyrand. 
 No definitive tidings came from them until March, when 
 the President sent a message to Congress, announcing that 
 the negotiation had failed, and that the country must arm. 
 The Federalists received the message with exultation ; and, 
 though Jefferson at once pronounced it " insane," the oppo 
 sition was for the moment demoralized. But they soon 
 rallied ; and although so keenly alive to the dignity of the 
 country, so sensitive to British insults, so bellicose even in 
 1794, they were now filled with a generous enthusiasm 
 for peace and moderation. A series of dilatory resolutions 
 were introduced, and in the course of the debate a call was 
 made for papers and despatches. The amiable Giles, by 
 whose exertions the demand was made as sweeping as possi 
 ble, little imagined the result of his request ; for the Presi 
 dent, in reply to the call, sent to Congress the famous 
 X. Y. Z. letters, and in a moment the whole country was 
 aflame. The now famous cry, " Millions for defence, not 
 one cent for tribute," rose on all sides. Opposition faded 
 away, and even Jefferson quailed before the storm. 
 
 By the tone of the President s message, Mr. Cabot was 
 roused to renewed exertions. He again strove by every 
 
144 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 means, by articles in the papers and by personal exhorta 
 tions, to stimulate public feeling ; and he regarded the 
 publication of the X. Y. Z. letters as a most fortunate event 
 for the country. The attitude of France thus disclosed 
 was no surprise to him, and his only feeling was one of 
 profound satisfaction that the true character and feeling 
 of the French should be brought home so forcibly to the 
 American people. 
 
 The strength of the popular indignation enabled the 
 Federalists to make provision for an army and navy, and to 
 establish a separate department for the latter branch of the 
 service. To the new secretaryship thus created, Mr. Cabot 
 was appointed. Mr. Adams said subsequently, in his letters 
 to the " Boston Patriot," " I afterwards nominated Mr. 
 Cabot to be Secretary of the Navy, a station as useful, as 
 important, and as honorable as the other, 1 and for which he 
 was eminently qualified." 2 Mr. Cabot s name was at once 
 sent to the Senate, and confirmed without opposition. The 
 commission was made out, and immediately forwarded 
 to him by Colonel Pickering, together with a private 
 letter warmly urging his acceptance of the post. Mr. 
 Cabot s honest belief in his own unfitness, combined with 
 his dislike of publicity and great natural indolence, led him 
 to refuse an office for which he was well suited and in which 
 he might have rendered important services. The reasons 
 alleged in his letter certainly do not, it must be confessed, 
 justify the refusal of such an appointment at such a time, 
 although for his own comfort and peace of mind, especially 
 in view of after events, it was well that he declined as he 
 did. Fortunately, too, neither the administration nor the 
 country was embarrassed by his refusal, since his successor, 3 
 Mr. Stoddert, proved himself in every respect an able and 
 efficient officer. 
 
 1 That of envoy to France. 
 
 2 Works of John Adams, IX 287. 
 
 3 I say successor, because Mr. Cabot actually held the office for a month ; 
 and his name stands first on the list of secretaries of the navy. 
 
1798.] WAR WITH FRANCE. 145 
 
 By the disclosure of all the secrets of the negotiations, 
 the infamous demands of the French were at last understood 
 throughout the country. Addresses, manifesting a thorough 
 popular appreciation of his vigorous policy, poured in upon 
 the President ; and this phase of public sentiment, as may 
 be seen by his letters to Wolcott, of course afforded to Mr. 
 Cabot the greatest possible gratification. The President re 
 plied to these addresses with the greatest fervor, and pushed 
 with vigor the w r arlike preparations. The most important 
 business was of course the organization of the provisional 
 army ; and to but one man could this duty be entrusted. 
 Washington, summoned from retirement by the universal 
 demand of the people, accepted the new task, on condition 
 that he should not be called into active service until hos 
 tilities fairly began, and that he should be allowed to name 
 the general officers. To these conditions the President 
 assented ; and Washington sent in a list, which gave Hamil 
 ton the first place, Pinckney the second, and Knox the third. 
 In this order, too, the nominations were sent to the Senate, 
 and by them confirmed. Against this arrangement Knox 
 rebelled, demanding the first place ; and Mr. Adams not 
 only listened to his remonstrances, but seemed inclined to 
 yield to his requests. Such a change in the position of the 
 major-generals was wholly indefensible, technically as well 
 as politically, and was also inconsistent in principle with 
 the other appointments which Mr. Adams was then daily 
 making. Even if Hamilton was regarded with indifference 
 by the masses of the party, he was no less the first choice 
 of Washington than of the Federalist leaders throughout 
 the country ; and it should be remembered that those were 
 the days of leaders, and when they were satisfied the rest 
 of the party generally followed them, without much delay. 
 Knox, on the other hand, had no strength in the party, and 
 in abilities was certainly far inferior to Hamilton. To put 
 him at the head of the list, therefore, conduced neither to 
 party unity nor to the good of the public service. Even to 
 
 10 
 
146 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 hint at such a change was a grievous mistake ; and one is 
 at a loss to know why Mr. Adams should have committed it. 
 The only apparent solution is that Mr. Adams s deeply 
 rooted dislike and distrust of Hamilton, inflamed by Knox 
 and stimulated by the opportunity, flared up, and found in 
 this change of rank a dangerous expression. 
 
 Mr. Cabot, of course, shared in the alarm excited among 
 the leading Federalists by this sudden disposition on the 
 President s part. Most anxious for party harmony, he 
 wrote to the President, not only urging Hamilton s claim 
 to the first place, but especially pressing on his atten 
 tion the grave danger of serious party dissensions, if a 
 change were now made. Whether Mr. Adams, despite 
 representations of this sort from all sides, would still have 
 persisted cannot be determined ; but a voice which no 
 American at that day dared to disregard was now heard to 
 demand that the original order of appointments should 
 remain untouched. Mr. Adams yielded to the request of 
 Washington, and the threatened quarrel was averted, but 
 unhappily not forgotten. Mr. Cabot was greatly disturbed 
 by the whole affair, and strove in every way to allay the 
 angry feelings which had been excited. His one thought 
 was for his party and its policy, so greatly endangered by 
 the struggle for rank. 
 
 While this affair was in progress, Gerry returned from 
 France; and his intimacy with the President awakened 
 suspicions that he had a hand in changing the relative posi 
 tions of the major-generals. Gerry was also very justly dis 
 trusted on account of his inexplicable and dubious conduct 
 while in Paris ; so that the Federalists, well aware of the 
 President s strange partiality for him, watched his course 
 with extreme anxiety. Mr. Adams s hasty and unguarded 
 utterances with reference to French affairs were widely 
 circulated ; and these, together with his apparent de 
 sire to screen Gerry and his local separation from his 
 cabinet, were topics which occupied Mr. Cabot s thoughts 
 
1798.] PARTY SPIRIT. JOHN MARSHALL. 147 
 
 and filled his letters during the latter part of this year. 
 . Then, as always, he especially dreaded any conduct which 
 might give to the policy and actions of the administra 
 tion the least appearance of weakness, indecision, or dis 
 sension. 
 
 One other subject, frequently referred to in the letters 
 of 1798, offers a curious example of the rigidity with 
 which party lines were then drawn. Congress had, be 
 fore their adjournment the previous summer, passed the 
 famous alien and sedition laws, which were generally ac 
 cepted by the administration and its supporters as very 
 wholesome measures. One of the wisest and coolest of 
 the Federalists, however, John Marshall, then just on the 
 threshold of his great career, expressed in the " Freeholder " 
 his opposition to these laws. His party friends were dis 
 mayed, and so much feeling was aroused that any de 
 fence of him was very ill received. Ames says : " John 
 Marshall, with all his honors in blossom and bearing fruit, 
 answers some newspaper queries unfavorably to those laws. 
 George Cabot says that Otis, our representative, condemns 
 him ore rotundo, yet, inconsistently enough, sedulously de 
 clares his dislike of those laws. George Cabot vindicates 
 John Marshall, and stoutly asserts his soundness of Federal 
 ism. I deny it." 1 Ames was by no means the sternest of 
 party men ; and yet he was amazed apparently that Mr. 
 Cabot should defend any one convicted of so bad a lapse 
 from grace as Marshall. Indeed, Mr. Cabot himself speaks 
 in a rather deprecating tone, even while he defends Mar 
 shall most stoutly. With all their great virtues and abilities, 
 there was a good deal of dogmatism about the Federalists 
 of tha.t day. 
 
 1 Works of Fisher Amesj II. 246. 
 
148 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, 9th January, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The bare possibility that you may not have 
 received from any other hand Lord Malmesbury s negotiation in 
 duces me to transmit the enclosed paper. 
 
 My letter from England announces the expectation there that 
 the arms of the French Republic are next to be employed in 
 reducing Spain to the form of a province, in expunging Portugal 
 from the catalogue of nations, and in subverting and plundering 
 Hamburg and Denmark. Like the Romans, whom they imitate, 
 war and rapine are necessary to their existence ; and if the modern 
 Carthage does not restrain them, and they remain united, doubtless 
 they will revolutionize the whole civilized world, and we must 
 again fight for our independence, or lose it. If, however, England 
 is not destroyed by internal faction, she will be able to keep the 
 monsters in their den until they devour each other. Accept, my 
 dear sir, my unfeigned wishes for the welfare of you and all 
 yours. G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Jan. 19, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I rejoice to hear that you have finally ex 
 pelled a traitor from the Treasury, who never deserved to have 
 been trusted. 1 The toleration of such a fellow in office after his 
 duplicity was known indicates truly a weakness in the government, 
 and I have never yet believed that this kind of policy was wise. 
 Let the government be just and upright in every thing ; but the 
 higher it holds its head, the more people will look up to it, while, 
 if it abases itself even by the affectation of humility, it will cer 
 tainly be despised and trampled under the feet of barbarous 
 Democrats. 
 
 I have late letters from Europe, which mention the designs 
 of France to plunder Hamburg and invade Denmark, and that 
 Prussia is beginning to ferment with Jacobin leaven, which, if it 
 works powerfully, is to be accompanied by a Jacobin invasion. 
 These projects, with those meditated against Spain and Portugal, 
 are sufficient to occupy the Parisian horde till a new convulsion 
 may call them to their own dens. In the mean time, we are learn- 
 
 1 Tench Coxe again. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 149 
 
 ing something, though slowly, on this interesting subject. I keep 
 my house, but sometimes scribble for the good of others. In the 
 first page of the " Mercury," I appear as " A Sincere Lover of my 
 Country," and am preparing to appear again as a " Political Moni 
 tor." 1 Thus you see I try to help a little in the good cause. 
 
 Yours jideliter, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Feb. 9, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I can t say that I am much grieved at the 
 attack made on you in Bache s paper. 2 " Improbis vituperari 
 laudari est." So that there is as much sweet as bitter in the 
 potion that is served up. Besides, every government has its weak 
 sides, and ours has many: it is but just, therefore, its enemies 
 should attack those points from which they are easily repelled, and 
 I have often been proud to see that the close texture of many of 
 our public characters was impervious. Your friends laugh to see 
 the charge that has been advanced, and think its folly full as great 
 as its indignity. I am much flattered with your enclosure of 27th 
 ult., and assure you that I feel always interested in whatever con 
 cerns you or yours, being, very sincerely, 
 
 Your affectionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, 23d March, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I thank you for the trouble it cost to transmit 
 my letter from Mr. King, and for the few lines with which it was 
 accompanied. Well knowing the incessant labors and ill-requited 
 services of every faithful man in the higher offices of our govern 
 ment, I always feel reluctant to occupy any part of their time. 
 
 Mr. King s letter is short and gloomy ; but he has appeared to 
 me to despond too much heretofore, and therefore I would per 
 suade myself that he now overshades his picture. But, however 
 this may be, I cannot dissemble my apprehensions that a melan 
 choly destiny is allotted to our country, if England yields to 
 France. Undoubtedly, the designs of France to subject to her 
 
 1 See below, pp. 586, 588. 
 
 2 The famous, or, perhaps in view of the attacks on Washington, infa 
 mous, " Aurora." 
 
150 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 own control every nation of the civilized world are, and have 
 been, systematically pursued by every party that has governed. 
 Every thing in France is resolved into force, and she has discov 
 ered the secret of dividing, and of course weakening, every nation 
 whom she wishes to subdue. Indeed, she may be said to have 
 natural allies numerous and powerful in every state ; and, I add, 
 most numerous and most powerful in the freest states, where the 
 mildness of government encourages faction to attempt every thing, 
 because it hopes for every thing. 
 
 Your affectionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, March 26, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have written to you less frequently than 
 might have been expected, because I have felt no disposition to 
 have any thing like an agency in political affairs, and because I 
 have thought it little less than criminal to occupy any part of the 
 time of our public slaves. Indeed, such is my sympathy with 
 many of our public men that it has become extremely painful to 
 think of their tasks. 
 
 I live perfectly recluse, scarcely going beyond the limits of my 
 farm once in a month. I do not pretend, however, to be uninter 
 ested in what passes in the world ; on the contrary, I partake in all 
 the anxieties of those who foresee and tremble at the destiny of 
 our country. But, while I am so selfish as to applaud myself for 
 shunning all responsibility which might belong to official character, 
 I have omitted no opportunity to inculcate just sentiments upon 
 those who bear me prate, or read what I write ; for I have often 
 been tempted to write by the belief that public opinion depended 
 much on the newspapers, and that I could say something that 
 would be useful. It ought to be some compensation to our execu 
 tive officers to know that their administration is universally ap 
 proved and generally admired by the wise and the good. These, 
 as far as I can learn their sentiments, have thought that the Adams 
 administration has done every thing in its power to rescue the 
 country from dishonor and the servitude with which it is threat 
 ened ; but I confess to you there prevails everywhere in this quar 
 ter a despondency that is alarming. The truth is that the spirit of 
 the country has been sinking from the time that the House of Rep- 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 151 
 
 resentatives, in June last, discovered their disposition to submit to 
 the aggressions of France rather than to prepare to repel them. 
 At that moment, if the legislature had been as faithful to their 
 trust as the executive, I have not the smallest doubt the indigna 
 tion of all the States (on this side the Delaware, at least) would 
 have been sufficiently roused, and that France would have seen 
 that there was a point at which her provocations must stop, or she 
 would lose this country. But the people have been taught by the 
 example, and still more explicitly by the language of the House of 
 Representatives, that it is expedient to submit to a foreign domina 
 tion rather than hazard its resentment by declaring we will main 
 tain our rights. We are now so accustomed to this humiliation 
 that it ceases to disquiet us, and for every new disgrace that is 
 thrown upon us we seek for excuses to bear it without impatience. 
 We are ashamed to acknowledge the influence of our fears, and yet 
 we show that they repress every sentiment of honor. Perhaps no 
 misfortune greater than this could happen to our country, as regard 
 ing its independence. The independence of the smallest states has 
 often been secured against the rapacious ambition of the greatest 
 by a desperate resolution to defend themselves in every extremity ; 
 and although it is evident that France meditates the subjugation 
 or destruction of every civilized nation, yet, as she acts always in 
 each case upon calculations of the advantage of success and the 
 disadvantage of failure, I am fully satisfied she would never at 
 tempt to subdue the United States by force, if she were to see us 
 unitedly determined to resist her with vigor. At present, we cer 
 tainly invite rather than discourage her attacks, and I am not sure 
 that the executive can excite in either the legislature or the people 
 a just indignation or a proper sense of the public danger. But 
 this I know : it is the duty of the executive to attempt it, and o 
 every good citizen to co-operate. I hope, therefore, the President 
 will persist in the manly course he has hitherto trod, and that he 
 will tell plainly and forcibly to Congress and the people their dan 
 ger and their duties as they appear to him, and say to them they 
 must not slight the former as an excuse for neglecting the latter. 
 If this will not do all that is wished, it will do the best that can be 
 done ; and, if we are to be lost finally, it will be a consolatory re 
 flection to the executive and its friends that they have done their 
 duty. It would be a greater undertaking for France to conquer 
 us, if we were united, than to conquer Germany and all the south 
 western parts of Europe. Sooner than attempt it, if we were 
 
152 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 united, she would certainly be peaceable on terms that would leave 
 us the government of our own country ; but if we remain divided 
 and imbecile, as seems probable, we must undoubtedly be a colony 
 to France, if England will consent or is obliged to leave the sea. I 
 have long seen that the fate of the civilized world is probably to 
 be decided by the issue of the present contest between France and 
 England ; and I confess I see no reason to doubt that England will 
 triumph at last, if the nation continues tolerably united. Mr. King 
 is gloomy ; but he has constantly been so, and I cannot but think 
 he stands at a point from whence the power of England is never 
 seen with advantage. England is a free country, and the force of 
 faction which proves it free gives it the appearance of division and 
 weakness. The despotism of France admits but one language. 
 But England is undoubtedly able to continue the war for twenty 
 or even a hundred years, if the disease of Jacobinism does not enfee 
 ble her. She may monopolize the commerce, not the navigation, of 
 the two Indies, the United States, and a part of Europe ; she may 
 supply all these, and will supply even France with manufactures, 
 and the consumers will pay the increased cost. If England will 
 persevere, she will save Europe and save us ; but, if she yields, all 
 may be lost. I am sure she can, and I think she will persevere, be 
 cause it becomes more and more manifest that she is contending for 
 existence with a foe that can never be appeased or trusted. If it 
 were possible to work up the French to such a frenzy as to attempt 
 an invasion of England, I think all the friends of virtue and order 
 in the world ought to be willing to trust the event, because there 
 can be no case supposed in which a trial by force would be so much 
 to the disadvantage of France. I have often wished the attempt 
 might be made with half a million of men determined to conquer 
 or perish, as I fully believe they would perish, and with them 
 the physical force and the destructive fame of Jacobinism. But 
 France, always ready to do the wickedest things that can be pro 
 posed, rarely is guilty of weak ones. She will never attempt to 
 invade England without first seeing the British fleet vanquished. 
 Your sincere and affectionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 27th. 
 
 Postscript. My son has just brought in the President s mes 
 sage, 1 which I fully approve, and hope he will tell the whole story 
 at the first suitable moment. 
 
 1 That in which Mr. Adams announced the results of the French mission. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 153 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, April 21, 1 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have received your several favors to the 
 14th inclusively, with their enclosures ; and I rejoice to find that by 
 the last you were not destitute of hope that the spirit of the coun 
 try might rise in opposition to tyrannical France. 
 
 I took the first moment of going to town to ascertain the fact 
 whether the apathy, which has so long disgraced and so much 
 endangered us, still continued. I found Mr. Higginson with an 
 address in his hand of a good complexion ; and before I left town, 
 which was in a few hours, adequate measures were taken to obtain 
 the most extensive subscriptions, and to invite the co-operation and 
 concurrence of the whole people of the State. 
 
 My expectations are strong that the business will prosper, and 
 that the body of the people will be brought to a good temperament, 
 so that the measures of government will be zealously supported 
 by a majority, and duly acquiesced in by all. I doubt, however, 
 whether the mercury in the popular body will rise sufficiently to 
 press upon the Legislature. I hope, therefore, that Congress will 
 proceed rapidly to establish every thing requisite for our national 
 defence. If more taxes are wanted, let them be laid without fear ; 
 but let great care be taken to show that they are unavoidable, and 
 that we are called to part with a little, as the only possible means 
 of saving the remainder, and with it our liberty and independence. 
 If this could be done in an address from the Legislature, I would 
 answer for its complete success ; but, if this is unattainable, it must 
 come from some other source. We keep our presses going with 
 Harper s 2 excellent speech and pamphlet ; and, if no address from 
 government or any branch is practicable, Harper must devote him 
 self to the work of proving to the people the absolute propriety of 
 what is done. He has the requisite talents and motive, and must 
 work : indeed, if he knew the extent of his fame already ac 
 quired, his ambition would stimulate him to the most laborious 
 
 1 On April 3d, the famous X. Y. Z. letters had been sent to the House. 
 Hence, the more confident the tone of this letter, and the account given of 
 public demonstrations, &c. 
 
 2 Robert Goodloe Harper, of Maryland. The speech here referred to 
 was that made in reply to Giles (see Annals of Congress, 1797-99, II. 
 1341, 1353), in the debate on the Spriggs Resolutions, introduced by the 
 
154 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 undertakings. But any majority that can pass a law must be 
 able to pass an address to explain its expediency, and to prevent 
 the mischievous effects of misrepresentation. I lay great stress on 
 this idea, from a conviction of its utility, if wisely and ably pursued. 
 As the President may be called frequently to answer addresses, I 
 take it for granted he will profit by every such occasion, to convey 
 to the people those truths which they ought to know and those 
 sentiments they ought to feel. Perhaps you have seen that the 
 little town in which I live has petitioned against arming. Our 
 whole number of voters is about sixty-five, and upwards of fifty 
 attended the meeting. Although I am extremely averse to moving 
 in politics, yet my conscience would not permit me to see the gov 
 ernment abandoned. I therefore entered into the debate, which 
 continued several hours ; and finally the vote for petitioning ob 
 tained thirty-five to twenty-three. I have the satisfaction, how 
 ever, to believe that some salutary truths were inculcated, and that 
 many of the petitioners are substantial friends of the government. 
 I think it must be satisfactory to the executive to know that, with 
 all the aberrations of the public mind, it has constantly approved 
 the administration of that branch of government, even while the 
 absurd hope was cherished that France would be conciliated. A 
 few violent Jacobins have alone rejected this opinion ; but the de 
 spatches have silenced them, and convinced many of their followers 
 that they are wrong. 
 
 I am fearful our envoys will remain in France until the de 
 spatches are known there. In that case, they must give up their 
 lives, or contradict their own communications, or, according to the 
 order of the day, pay a deal of money. Should they suffer in any 
 way, they will enjoy the sympathy of every good man in the world ; 
 and their sufferings will serve their country by dispelling a part of 
 the remaining delusions. 
 
 Your affectionate and faithful friend, 
 
 G. CABOT. 
 
 Democrats after the receipt of the message announcing the failure of the 
 French mission. The pamphlet by Harper was entitled " Observations on 
 the Dispute between the United States and France." It was a very able 
 production, and had great celebrity as well as great effect at the time of its 
 publication. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 155 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, May 5, 1798. 
 
 SIR, The President of the United States being desirous of 
 availing the public of your services as Secretary of the Navy of 
 the United States, I have now the honor of enclosing the commis 
 sion, and of expressing the sentiments of respect with which I am, 
 sir, your most obedient servant, TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, May 5, 1798. 
 
 SIR, I cannot transmit your commission, without expressing 
 my individual wishes that you would accept the office of Secretary 
 of the Navy of the United States. I know at the same time that 
 you cannot accept it without making some sacrifices ; but our 
 present situation demands this as a duty from every citizen, and 
 especially from those who are eminently qualified to contribute to 
 the safety and prosperity of our country. In this new office, the 
 President wishes to find not only a person of practical knowledge 
 in maritime affairs, but a statesman ; and how seldom can these 
 two characters be found combined in one person ? In every charac 
 ter, public and private, you know how happy those of us whom you 
 are already acquainted with would be made by your acceptance 
 of the office. The public advantages to be derived from your con 
 ducting the department you can fully estimate, and your friends 
 have anticipated. Although the formation of a navy has been con 
 templated these four years, it is at the present moment only that 
 the establishment may be considered as commencing, and it is of 
 vast importance that the foundation be well laid, that the first 
 institutions and regulations be adjusted in the best manner to its 
 present most efficient use and future prospering. I will suggest 
 but one other consideration. If you decline taking the office, 
 where will your country find a substitute ? There is not one in 
 Philadelphia, and you will readily believe there is no one south 
 ward of it ; and, if you fix your eye on any one at the eastward, 
 will you propose to yourself these questions : " Can he relinquish 
 his private affairs more conveniently than I ? Can he accept the 
 office without making greater sacrifices than I must make ? In a 
 word, is it the duty of any citizen more than mine to perform this 
 indispensable public service ? " 
 
156 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 When President Washington tendered to me the office I now 
 hold, I made objections. (I believe that I have mentioned the 
 circumstances to you.) He urged my acceptance, among other 
 reasons, in the prospect of peace in Europe, and the lessened 
 burthens and embarrassments in executing the office. This, unfor 
 tunately, has proved an unfounded expectation. I have for some 
 time past reflected seriously on the vast importance of employing 
 the best abilities and energies of the country in the management 
 of our public affairs ; and therefore, without difficulty, resolved to 
 make room for another to take my station, which the interests of 
 the country required, or to return to private life, as those who 
 can and have a right to judge should deem most eligible. This is, 
 and will continue to be, my determination. 
 
 With the most earnest solicitude for your public services, and 
 sincere wishes for your individual and domestic happiness, 
 I remain, dear sir, very truly yours, 
 
 TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 11, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR, SIR, By the same mail which brought me your 
 official letter of the 5th, I received a private one to which I feel 
 anxious to make a satisfactory reply. Although it is true that my 
 inclinations, habits, duties, and interests all remarkably concur in 
 confining me to private life, and although in consequence of this I 
 have been continually growing less fit for any public station where 
 great efficiency is required, yet such is my zeal to maintain the 
 political institutions of our country, and thus preserve the country 
 itself, that I should not at this moment hesitate to engage in the 
 office to which I am invited, if I were not perfectly convinced that 
 the service is beyond my strength. 
 
 I have seen, with a painful sympathy, the tasks which our 
 executive officers are called to perform, and have often made the 
 reflection that, if they were not capable of the most intense and 
 persevering application, the public business must suffer. I have 
 seen with pride, however, that the affairs of our executive govern 
 ment have been conducted with a degree of order, intelligence, and 
 steadiness that do great honor to the nation ; but I must be 
 allowed to say that I am incapable of imitating those efforts which 
 in others have been productive of so much good. This is a cir- 
 
1708.] CORRESPONDENCE. 157 
 
 cumstance so important that, in my estimation, it greatly outweighs 
 the advantage of any practical knowledge which a person could be 
 supposed to bring into the office. It is undoubtedly requisite that 
 the officer at the head of the naval department should possess 
 considerable knowledge of maritime affairs ; but this should be 
 elementary as well as practical, including the principles of naval 
 architecture and naval tactics. He should also possess skill suffi 
 cient to arrange systematically the means of equipping, manning, 
 and conducting the naval force with the greatest possible despatch 
 and with the least possible expense ; and, above all, he should 
 possess the inestimable secret of rendering it invincible by any 
 equal force. Thus a knowledge of the human heart will constitute 
 an essential ingredient in the character of this officer, that he may 
 be able to convert every incident to the elevation of the spirit of 
 American seamen. Suffer me to ask how a man who has led a 
 life of indolence for twenty years can be rendered capable of these 
 various exertions ? In the present case, it is physically impossible. 
 Notwithstanding the grateful sensations which are excited by so 
 nattering a testimony of the national confidence, yet I think I do 
 not deceive myself in saying that I had rather not have been 
 thought fit for this office, than be justly chargeable with refusing 
 at this time any essential service which I ought to perform. Let 
 me therefore repeat that, waiving all other objections, it is an 
 insuperable one that my powers are inadequate to the work. To 
 be obliged to offer apologies, however, just when substantial aid 
 is demanded by the government, would of itself have given me 
 great pain, but this is exceedingly increased by the consideration 
 that I must disappoint those to whose friendly sentiments I am 
 always indebted, and whose esteem I cannot part with without the 
 greatest regret. 
 
 In reply to your questions, I would say it is not to be expected 
 that a man will be found possessing the ability to perform, at once, 
 all the duties of an office new and difficult. But I trust men may 
 be found, and it seems to me indispensable that such should be 
 found, who will, by industrious application of genius and talents, 
 soon acquire the requisite qualifications. I well know many 
 of the circumstances respecting your appointment to the depart 
 ment of state, and I feel myself at liberty to insist upon the exam 
 ple to show that a man who has been accustomed to apply his 
 powers properly to a few things becomes capable of every thing. 
 
158 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 The power or habit of intense and persevering application is, in 
 my opinion, one of the most rare and the most valuable of human 
 talents. In great affairs, nothing can be well done without it ; 
 and, with it, men of a certain force of mind and character can do 
 every thing, and do every thing well. A man possessing this 
 faculty is the man now wanted. It is a faculty, however, of which 
 I am remarkably destitute ; and your candor must admit the fact. 
 I urge it in sincerity, as an abundant justification in declining the 
 momentous and difficult trust with which it was proposed I should 
 be honored. Under one cover with this, I enclose an answer to 
 your official letter, which I pray may be considered as decisive and 
 unequivocal. I can never sufficiently express my gratitude for the 
 sentiments of your private letter, and I must ask forgiveness for 
 writing so much concerning myself. Accept my unfeigned wishes 
 for your happiness, and believe me ever 
 
 Your faithful and obliged friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, June 9, 1798. 
 
 MY DE^R SIR, When those who have a right to command 
 our services condescend to solicit them, it is not to be imagined 
 that a refusal, however proper, can be wholly forgiven. I know 
 too much of human nature to deceive myself with the belief that I 
 can escape censure under circumstances where others would incur 
 it. I therefore have made up my account for the frowns of my 
 friends, as evils that must be borne. Still, however, I calculate on 
 a good residuum of esteem and regard with those I love best, and 
 with this I must be content. 1 
 
 I have been impatient to express to you my satisfaction at the 
 great success of the President in awakening the country from the 
 fatal stupor into which it had sunk. We have still some dis 
 affected, seditious people in this quarter : they are few, however, in 
 number, and reside chiefly in the town and vicinity of Boston ; 
 and their influence is extremely diminished. All men whose 
 opinions I know are unbounded in their applause of the manly, 
 just, spirited, and instructive sentiments expressed by the Presi 
 dent, in his answers to the addresses. I am persuaded the good 
 effects of these open declarations cannot be overrated. They have 
 
 1 This refers, of course, to the subject of the two preceding letters, 
 the secretaryship of the navy. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 159 
 
 excited right feelings everywhere, and have silenced clamor. But 
 Caesar s maxim must be observed, and nothing be left undone by 
 the government: the stronger and more decisive measures they 
 take, the more readily will they be supported. I was glad to see 
 the bill for prohibiting intercourse with the dominions of France ; 
 but I should have thought the prohibition should lie on all for 
 eigners as well as citizens and residents. Otherwise, I foresee 
 attempts will be made by our own people to change their bottoms 
 in the neutral islands, and then supply the French ; and I think it 
 is an object of importance to prevent the supply of Guadaloupe 
 and Hispaniola. You have passed the Rubicon : rapid marches are 
 necessary to success, and at least they inspirit your troops. Why 
 should not a bill pass, authorizing the executive to send away the 
 French consuls, &c. ? If you mean to take no measures but such 
 as are purely defensive and fair retaliations, yet this authority 
 should be given. The refusal to receive our ministers would 
 certainly justify our refusal to permit consuls to act, although they 
 admit our consuls ; but, if squeamishness doubts this, we ought to 
 be prepared to send away their consuls, when any exigency in the 
 opinion of the executive shall require it. 
 
 I do not see that the executive is authorized to accept of volun 
 tary naval aid which may be offered. I should have thought it 
 wise to give commissions to such private vessels as the President 
 should approve, and which might be obligated to convoy others. 
 If privateers from the French islands continue numerous, the mer 
 chants may be glad to associate occasionally in forming little arma 
 ments for the protection of their vessels in a single voyage. I 
 think, however, these aids ought not to be resorted to, until the 
 government has done its own duty ; and I hope, before Congress 
 rises, General Smith J will be disposed to increase the number of 
 vessels to be equipped by the public for the protection of com 
 merce. It ought to be remembered that this kind of force will be 
 inestimably precious, if an attempt to invade us should be made. 
 The men who will have been trained in the public sea service will 
 be able to do more than any equal number of any other descrip 
 tion, and they will be in readiness to act. 
 
 It is pretty certain that, if Great Britain yields, we shall have 
 the weight of the whole European world to oppress us. This 
 seems to be understood, and men are momently declaring their 
 belief that we can and shall sustain it all without sinking. Doubt 
 
 1 Samuel Smith, at this time member of Congress from Maryland. 
 
160 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 less, if we were united and determined to die rather than submit, we 
 \ should succeed ; but the cursed foul contagion of French principles 
 ] has infected us, and time is required to restore us to soundness. 
 
 My hope is that France will exert all her powers in an attempt 
 upon England. If she fails, the world will be free. I have the 
 highest confidence in the success of England in such a contest. 
 Her chance would be much better than in a long protracted war of 
 such immense expense, and which gives room for so many contin 
 gencies. But I cannot believe that the French will trust them 
 selves on the sea. With all their victories on land, they are no 
 match for the English on the sea, and I should expect the French 
 to be defeated even with a superiority of naval force of three to 
 two ; nor do I think, if they could land in England, that they 
 would be able to conquer it. I therefore wish the cause of the 
 civilized world to be tried there. I see no other chance so favor 
 able. 
 
 Although you are doubtless better informed than I am, yet it 
 may not be amiss to mention that my letters from London 1 of the 
 9th April state to me confidentially that Pinckney and Marshall 
 are to be turned away, and Gerry kept, if possible. It seems the 
 delay of the envoys has been produced by the extreme fastidious 
 ness of one of the gentlemen. I don t believe, however, he will 
 be such a dupe as to remain after his colleagues shall depart. Per 
 haps the case will not occur, for it is highly probable that the 
 despatches which have been published will arrive in France before 
 any of them can have embarked. A gentleman who left France 
 the last of March tells me that no idea was entertained there that 
 we should offer any resistance. The Gallo-Americans had no 
 doubt we should pay money, and he says they will be all surprised 
 at learning that we dare to refuse the demands of France. 
 
 Will you allow me to suggest the propriety of selecting young 
 men for the lieutenants and sailing-masters in the navy ? Old 
 sailors are incapable of improvement, and young ones may be 
 made whatever you wish. I deem it a misfortune that any but 
 young men should have employments now which will lead to im- 
 portant commands in a few years. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. CABOT. 
 
 1 Besides occasional letters from Mr. Gore, Mr. Cabot also received 
 letters from his younger brother, Mr. Samuel Cabot, then in London, as 
 agent of the American commission under the Jay treaty. 
 
1798.1 COKKESPONDENCE. 161 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 (Confidential,) 
 
 TREXTON, Sept. 20, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, You have seen, and I trust approved, the order in 
 which the names of Hamilton, Pinckney, and Knox were arranged 
 for general officers. Nobody at the seat of government doubted 
 whether they would rank in that way, being that in which they 
 were nominated and approved by the Senate. But you must have 
 noticed that, two or three times in the " Centinel," the idea was 
 suggested that General Knox was the first major-general. At 
 length it has appeared that General Knox demanded the first rank. 
 The first intimation of it to me was in his answer to a letter which 
 I wrote him at the request of the late Captain Mitchell, who wished 
 to be his aide-de-camp. I was astonished at the claim. I knew 
 indeed that Knox was proud and vain and ambitious ; but I 
 thought that as for years he had been the daily witness of Hamilton s 
 vast superiority of talents, and had known how highly they stood 
 in the public estimation, and supposing also that he felt an ardent 
 friendship for Hamilton, I was astonished to find him not hesitat 
 ing, but apparently desirous not to serve under Hamilton. The 
 President s tour to Massachusetts furnished Knox with the lucky 
 opportunity of making and enforcing his claim by the plausibility 
 of his arguments and his adulatory professions of respect, honor, 
 and devotion to the great man. You probably know that Knox 
 is capable of using the deepest flattery ; and flattery has often too 
 much effect on the finest minds, and in the present instance would 
 make the stronger impression as operating against a competitor for 
 whom the President had no liking, if he did not feel for him aver 
 sion. In a letter to the President, marked private, but which is 
 filed in the war office, dated June 26, he 1 thus begins: " I have 
 often intended, in the ardor of my unqualified admiration of the 
 measures of the supreme executives, to express the same respect 
 fully to you. But hitherto I have been restrained from an ap 
 prehension of invading upon your important duties. A crisis, 
 however, is rapidly approaching, which renders it indispensable 
 that the mind of the meanest citizen be known as to the part he 
 intends to act." Having then made some assertions on the nature 
 of the impending war and the most vulnerable points to be guarded, 
 
 1 Knox. 
 11 
 
162 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 he says : " Whoever you should please to appoint as the immediate 
 commanding officer of the provisional army, you will, I am per 
 suaded, contemplate General Washington as the efficient Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. His name would be a host, and the occasion 
 would be worthy of his name. He alone would be able to combine 
 and draw into activity and harmonize all that remains of the late 
 army that could be useful. My .diffidence in uttering these senti 
 ments is inexpressible, and only to be equalled by my respect and 
 attachment to you." 
 
 " After having said so much, I should lose all self-respect, were 
 I not to say that, if there be any sort of service to which my 
 humble abilities should be judged equal, I should faithfully and 
 ardently execute it, believing as I do that the occasion will demand 
 the labors of all the friends of their country to defend its rights 
 and liberties against the all-devouring rapacity of the French 
 rulers." Who that reads these professions of patriotism and 
 humility would imagine that his humility aspired, and would be 
 content only with the rank of second in command, and that his 
 patriotism admitted, at such a crisis, a personage of his conse 
 quence to withdraw from the service of his country ? This imagi 
 nary importance of character, and usefulness to serve in a station 
 which to all who know him must seem abundantly equal to his 
 talents, would hardly be worth a thought, were not the President 
 inclined to favor his pretensions. Knox has appealed to a rule 
 observed in the American war, in which he says it was directed 
 that, of appointments of officers to the same rank on the same day, 
 the priority was to be determined by the rank held prior to the 
 new appointment ; consequently, as he was a major-general and 
 Hamilton only a lieutenant-colonel, the latter must now take the 
 subordinate station. But there can be no such general rule ; at 
 least, none is found in the journals of Congress. The only one to 
 which he can refer is that of Nov. 24, 1778. But that you will 
 see is absolutely confined to the officers appointed in pursuance of 
 the resolves, Sept. 16, 1776, and prior to the 1st of January, 1777. 
 If, however, the old regulations are to govern, and it is upon 
 Knox s representation of their force to the President that the lat 
 ter has said he thinks Knox has a " legal " right to rank before 
 Hamilton, we appeal to a resolve which is directly in point, and 
 general in its nature. This is that of the 4th of January, 1776, 
 in these words : " In all elections of officers by Congress, where 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 163 
 
 more than one are elected on the same day to commands of the 
 same rank, they shall take rank of each other according to their 
 election, and the entry of their names in the minutes, and their com 
 missions shall be numbered to show their priority." This is an 
 obvious rule, perfectly just in principle, and ought to decide the 
 present question, for it was to regulate the relative rank of new 
 officers. And such are Hamilton and Knox, who, prior to their 
 late appointments, were private citizens, without other claims to 
 office or rank than agreeably to their positive and relative talents 
 and merit. If Knox has a legal right to precede Hamilton, then 
 Hand, who was a brigadier in the American war, will precede 
 Pinckney, Hamilton, and Lee, the first having been only a colonel, 
 and the two last lieutenant-colonels ; and then, too, General White 
 must precede Dayton ; and the practice must run through the whole 
 train of old officers who shall be called to serve in the new army. 
 General Washington s opinion appears by the arrangement of their 
 names in the list he gave in his own handwriting to the Secretary 
 of War, who laid it before the President, who had requested Gen 
 eral Washington s opinions on the officers proper to be called into 
 service, in the principal stations. But, besides this, General Wash 
 ington wrote a letter to Hamilton, left it open for the Secretary of 
 War to take a copy, and the latter laid the original before the 
 President. In that letter, General Washington says explicitly to 
 Hamilton : " You will see that as to my old friend. General Knox, 
 whom I love and esteem, I have ranked him below you both, " 
 that is, below both Hamilton and Pinckney, between whom alone 
 there arose any hesitation in General Washington s mind, and that 
 chiefly from local considerations : the high respect borne for 
 General Pinckney in the Southern States ; his great popularity, 
 added to his being really a soldier ; and the probability that the 
 Southern States would be the theatre of war, and where, conse 
 quently, the great popularity of General Pinckney, and the exten 
 sive influence of his connections, would render his services, in an 
 acceptable station, of immense importance. 
 
 I have much more of detail to give you, but fear I shall miss the 
 mail. The object of this letter is to engage you in this matter in 
 such way as you and one or two confidential friends (say Higgin- 
 son and Ames) shall deem most eligible to prevail on the President 
 to acquiesce in the first arrangement, Hamilton, Pinckney, Knox. 
 The affair has been fully and handsomely stated in a private letter 
 
164 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEOBGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 from Mr. Wolcott to the President : the arguments are irrefraga 
 ble, and ought to be irresistible. But the President has committed 
 himself so far, it will be difficult to retreat ; and yet his own honor, 
 reputation, and influence we all think involved in it, and there 
 with the public welfare. Hamilton will not serve, if superseded by 
 Knox. Yet this is a fact which it may not be expedient to com 
 municate to the President, for he personally dislikes Hamilton, and 
 may in this way be willing to get rid of him. For the President 
 does not estimate his abilities as all other public men do : nay, he 
 thinks the public voice prefers Knox, and that the " Five New 
 England States will not submit to the humiliation intended for 
 them, " that is, in placing Hamilton above Knox ! How egregi- 
 ously the President is misinformed ! The mail is ready to close, 
 and I must quit abruptly. Pray contrive some means of prevent 
 ing so serious a mistake as is here presented to your view. If 
 Knox could be persuaded that the voice of the country, even of 
 New England, requires Hamilton to be placed second to General 
 Washington, and that the old rules will not legally apply to the 
 present case, and that, if they do, they are decidedly in favor of 
 Hamilton, perhaps he may be induced to withdraw his claim. 
 This might yet save his own reputation, while it would relieve the 
 President from extreme embarrassment. 
 
 The nature of this communication is delicate, and I commit it to 
 your perfect confidence. 
 
 Very sincerely yours, TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 (Private. ) 
 
 BROOKLINE, Mass., Sept. 27, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Your confidential communication of the 20th was 
 received last evening, and shall be attended to without delay. 
 
 The order of the appointments, being supposed to have estab 
 lished the rank, was very highly approved here by those whose solici 
 tude for the public "welfare is sincere. It soon appeared, however, 
 that another sort of men were active in encouraging the discon 
 tents which Knox might be likely to feel. I think, however, an 
 acquiescence would have soon taken place, if General Lincoln 1 had 
 
 1 General Benjamin Lincoln, distinguished in the war of Independence. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 165 
 
 not countenanced Knox s pretensions in a manner more decided 
 than is usual for him to act in any political affairs. The principal 
 reason for this extraordinary conduct is probably to be found in 
 the peculiar circumstances of General Lincoln, who is an indorser 
 of Knox s notes, which are floating in this quarter to a very great 
 amount. 
 
 My first impression on reading your letter is that I ought to 
 write a letter to the President, stating the course of public opinion 
 here as it has appeared to me. 
 
 If this idea should be pursued, I will transmit you a copy of 
 what I shall write him. 
 
 Mr. Higginson, who is with me, thinks of nothing better at 
 present; and I shall call Ames to co-operate with us either by 
 taking a similar step, or by making a visit for the purpose. 
 I am, dear sir, 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO JOHN ADAMS. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 BROOKLINE, Sept. 29, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, A sincere desire to prevent a possible embarrass 
 ment to the administration of our government, and to see preserved 
 entire that influence by which alone the honor and independence 
 of our nation can be maintained, has induced me to trouble you 
 with my thoughts at this time. 
 
 When the appointments of major-generals were first known, it 
 was readily perceived that the order in which they were made 
 naturally determined their rank ; and it was seen with infinite 
 satisfaction, by the most zealous friends of our country, that the 
 actual arrangement was in the highest degree propitious to the 
 security and welfare of the United States. 
 
 Among the many respectable persons whose opinions were early 
 disclosed to me, there was not one who did not applaud the execu 
 tive for having happily united in the military service the greatest 
 weight of character with the greatest powers of genius and talents, 
 in a manner perfectly adapted to the present exigency and to future 
 contingencies. But this excellent disposition, so much approved by 
 one sort of men, could not please men of another sort, who eagerly 
 seized an opportunity to disturb it by suggesting that Genera] 
 
166 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 Knox would be disgraced, if he served in a station subordinate to 
 Colonel Hamilton. Few men who possess a common portion of 
 vanity or ambition are able to resist an attack of this kind ; and 
 yet I believe that General Knox s own consciousness of the vast 
 superiority of his rival, co-operating with a natural good temper, 
 would have produced his final acquiescence, if he had been left 
 wholly to himself. But he was not : on the contrary, he was 
 stimulated to declare his discontents, which he did pretty soon in 
 whispers among his friends. Even here he might have stopped, if 
 he had been countenanced only by those who reprobate all the 
 measures of the executive ; but he soon found himself supported by 
 General Lincoln in a manner more decisive than is usual for him 
 of late years to support any political opinions. 
 
 The feelings of General Knox are so natural, that, if they do 
 not justify his conduct, they at least explain it ; but I confess all 
 my own reflections leave me at some loss for the motives of Gen 
 eral Lincoln. It was at first insisted on that as General Knox 
 could not, consistently with his honor, serve in a station below 
 Colonel Hamilton, it must be presumed that the appointments 
 were not made in the order they appeared ; but, the fact being 
 ascertained, it was then contended that the priority of order gave 
 no priority of rank in appointments made on the same day. 
 
 This doctrine, I believe, is new, both at the seat of government 
 and here, and it would seem to me, if it were admitted, would have 
 the absurd effect of destroying all claims to priority of rank among 
 persons appointed on the same day, and who had not been officers 
 before. 
 
 I do not recollect ever to have heard it denied until now that 
 the priority in the order of appointments on the same day settled 
 the rank as decisively as a priority of years. 
 
 Such were the ideas which prevailed in the Senate at the time 
 of the naval appointments in 1794, and such they continue ; for I 
 am informed that in the late session the question was started, and 
 the concurrence of the Senate with the nominations of all the 
 major-generals, except that of Colonel Hamilton, would have been 
 postponed for a day to prevent doubts as to his rank ; but that the 
 perfect conviction of his rank being secured by a prior nomination 
 by the President, and a prior concurrence of the Senate, rendered 
 the postponement unnecessary. But it is said there is a rule 
 which governs in this case, and which was established in our 
 Revolutionary war. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 167 
 
 There is, I am told, a resolve which declares that, in elections 
 made on the same day of officers to the same rank, the priority 
 shall be determined by the rank held previous to the elections. 
 This was, I believe, a special provision for a particular description 
 of persons designated by the resolve. There is, however, another 
 resolve which is general, and which provides, according to what 
 seems reasonable, without any positive rule, that in elections on 
 the same day the rank shall follow in the order of the elections ; 
 therefore, if either of these obsolete resolves be applicable, which 
 at best is doubtful, it would seem natural to take the latter, which 
 is general, and was intended for all new officers, as all those must 
 be considered who are private citizens and out of all office at the 
 time of appointment. 
 
 I recollect there were some occasions in which pains were taken 
 to accommodate the pretensions of gentlemen founded on these 
 antiquated titles, but I think they were always treated as mere 
 matters of discretion, and never admitted as rightful claims ; and I 
 am sorry to add that, in my opinion, the attention which has been 
 given them in many instances has been very prejudicial to the 
 public service. 
 
 And I do not see, if the opinions of Generals Lincoln and Knox 
 are correct, why other officers of the former army now employed 
 must not be elevated above Pinckney, Hamilton, and Lee, and thus 
 the whole line of new appointments be deranged and broken up ; 
 an evil which I think the country would deplore as great in the 
 extreme. I would not venture to say what is the opinion of the 
 most enlightened men through New England, concerning the char 
 acter of every individual of the major-generals ; but, on the com 
 parative merits and talents of Hamilton and Knox, I am well 
 persuaded there is a remarkable uniformity of sentiment in favor 
 of the former. It has been intimated to me repeatedly that 
 General Knox s friends cherished a hope that the President would 
 listen to his demands, and might be persuaded to favor them. If 
 there is an expectation of this kind, I have presumed it might be 
 useful to be apprised of it, and I indulge the belief that my motives 
 for offering this notice will be so justly appreciated as to render an 
 apology unnecessary. 
 
 I am, sir. with every sentiment of unfeigned respect and attach 
 ment, Your most obedient and faithful servant, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT, 
 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
168 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 6, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have just written to Mr. Pickering a short 
 letter, in which I have suggested a method by which all embarrass 
 ment resulting from the question of rank may possibly be prevented. 
 General Knox has said that he could acquiesce in the arrangement 
 made, if General Pinckney could. Now, as I am satisfied the 
 arrangement is in all respects proper, I presume Pinckney will not 
 countenance the objection made by Knox ; and therefore, even if 
 Pinckney for other reasons should decline the service, he may so 
 manage as to dissipate the doubts excited by Knox s friends. 
 
 We are all solicitous to see what course Gerry intends to steer, 
 that we may shape our own accordingly. The gross impropriety 
 and folly of his conduct in France makes it difficult for him to act 
 a right part here, even if he is well disposed. He has divided the 
 delegation, as if to show that it represented a divided country ; he 
 has held secret conferences with the French government, to which 
 his colleagues had a right to be privy, and his engagement that 
 they should not was contrary to duty ; he has acted conformably to 
 the French maxim, that there might be an adjustment of differences 
 and an establishment of fraternity with us, by sacrificing our gov 
 ernment and disavowing the principles and policy of its adminis 
 tration. It would seem, therefore, as if he must say now that peace 
 and safety were attainable, if our government had not prevented it 
 by precipitating measures of hostility. 
 
 I hope, however, he will say nothing of this kind ; and it is said 
 his language is approbatory of the administration. A few days 
 more will disclose to us his determination. I wish the Presi 
 dent knew precisely how Gerry is, and will be, viewed by the 
 friends of government ; but your own recollection of what passed 
 at your table l must suggest the delicacy I feel towards him on this 
 
 1 In a letter to his wife, dated June 21, 1795, Mr. Adams says : " I dined 
 yesterday at Mr. Wolcott s, the Secretary of the Treasury, with King, Ells 
 worth, and Cabot, and a few others. The conversation turned upon old 
 times. One of the company expressed such inveteracy against my old 
 friend Gerry that I could not help taking up his vindication. The future 
 election of a governor, in case of an empty chair, excites a jealousy which 
 I have long perceived. These things will always be so. Gerry s merit is 
 inferior to that of no man in Massachusetts, except the present governor, 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 169 
 
 account, you cannot have forgotten the warmth with which I in 
 sisted on his unfitness for all great affairs. The experience which 
 has been had of the justness of my opinion would make a recog 
 nition of it extremely painful. It is unfortunate that Congress did 
 not declare war : the danger of French artifice would then have 
 been less. It is impossible to make the people feel or see distinctly 
 that we have much more to fear from peace than war : that peace 
 cannot be real, and only leaves open a door by which the enemy 
 enters ; and that war would shut him out ; that the French are 
 wolves in sheep s clothing, entreating to be received as friends, that 
 they may be enabled to destroy and devour. But war open and 
 declared would not only deprive our external enemy of his best 
 hopes, but would also extinguish the hopes of internal foes. The 
 rights and duties of every citizen in a state of war would be known 
 and regarded. 
 
 Traitors and sedition-mongers, who are now protected and toler 
 ated, would then be easily restrained or punished. I hope there 
 fore we shall not long persist in pacific war, with one part of our 
 citizens against us and another part neutral. At this moment, it 
 appears to me every thing depends on the approaching elections : 
 if they issue favorably, the hands of the country need be bound no 
 longer ; and, in that case, I think the executive can do every thing. 
 For, if the present Congress at the next session refuses to do any 
 thing which national safety requires, the executive ought to summon 
 the new Congress on the 5th of March, and ought to say that the 
 new elected representative body, just constituted by the people, 
 must be well qualified to declare their will ; and, as from the 
 numerous addresses from every part of the Union the people 
 seem to be strongly impressed with the reality of the dangers of 
 
 according to my ideas and judgment of merit. I wish he was more enlarged, 
 however, and more correct in his views. He never was one of the threads 
 tied into the Essex knot, and was never popular with that set." 
 
 The discussion apparently was sharp ; and " one of the company " Mr. 
 Cabot, as appears from the letter given above remembered it well, and 
 felt a delicacy in speaking again to Mr. Adams on the subject. Mr. Adams 
 stood alone in his admiration for Gerry, and was apparently very sensi 
 tive to any allusions to him. (See Works of Pickering, III. 441.) Mr. 
 Adams attributed the general low opinion of Gerry s talents to the Essex 
 Federalists; and this deepened his feelings on this point, as on every 
 other which concerned the natives of that county. Indeed, the hostility of 
 the " Essex Junto " to Gerry seems to have been his strongest claim upon 
 Mr. Adams s affection and admiration. 
 
170 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 the country, they ought to have the earliest opportunity of taking 
 such measures as they think indispensable to the security of the 
 United States, and which have not appeared so to one branch 
 of the present legislature. A proclamation, well formed on this 
 principle, addressed to the new House, would give them a strong 
 and right impulse, and, I have no doubt, would be strengthened by 
 the spirit of the people. The new Congress, meeting under such 
 impressions, could act with vigor and decision ; and we should no 
 longer doubt whether our representatives were Frenchmen or 
 Americans. Farewell. G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 6, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I sent by the post some days ago the letter I 
 promised you I would write to the President. Mr. Higginson and 
 Mr. Ames approved it ; and I have, by their advice, sent a copy of 
 it, together with yours, to Mr. Goodhue, accompanied with a request 
 that he would make a visit to Quincy, to enforce the ideas of mis 
 chief which we all entertain from any attempt to derange the order 
 of general officers which now is established. When I get my 
 copy back from Mr. Goodhue, it shall be transmitted to you, that 
 you may see precisely what it is. General Knox is now in Maine, 
 but will be at Boston, probably, in a week or ten days. If I can 
 contrive to satisfy him that he must be a loser if he pursues the 
 game which he is playing, I shall certainly do it ; but, at present, I 
 think of no person here who can tell him all he ought to know in 
 a manner that would be well received. Colonel Wadsworth, 1 of 
 Hartford, could manage the business perfectly well, if he were 
 applied to for the purpose by Mr. Wolcott, and could afterwards 
 see Knox. 
 
 Colonel Wadsworth has been in the habits of friendship and 
 intimacy with Knox for many years, and has been accustomed to 
 tell him of his faults with great freedom ; and has, I believe, in 
 some instances really served him by doing it. For my own part, I 
 should never wish to be so employed ; but, in a case where great 
 good might be expected from it, no man ought to decline it. 
 
 A few days since, I gave a little dinner to Mr. Listen s 2 family, 
 
 1 See above, p. 91. 
 
 2 The British minister. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 171 
 
 including Mr. Jeffrey, 1 his host ; and knowing, as I did, that the 
 doctrines of General Knox on the subject of rank had been vehe 
 mently insisted on at Jeffrey s table, by Dr. Eustis, 2 Morton, and 
 others, I purposely introduced the subject, and pronounced my 
 opinion very emphatically, that Knox would be ultimately injured 
 by suffering himself to be pushed forward in the manner he did. I 
 urged that the rank was now legally settled, according to usage as 
 well as reason ; and that, by denying it, the preference of Colonel 
 Hamilton would become so apparent as to injure Knox both in 
 his feelings and reputation. 
 
 In the course of the discussion, an appeal was made to Mr. 
 Liston and Lord Henry Stuart, both of whom declared that, in 
 England, if an officer were once out of commission, from any cause, 
 his old rank would be lost, if he came into service again ; and that 
 he must regularly go through all the grades which any one would, 
 who had never been commissioned. 
 
 The result of our whole conversation was a unanimity of senti 
 ment that our government was right in its arrangement, and that 
 no question could properly be raised concerning the rank. I have 
 been told that Knox latterly said he would serve, if General 
 Pinckney did, and not otherwise. If, therefore, General Pinck- 
 ney should feel no such motives for refusing as operate here, the 
 whole difficulty may be avoided ; for, if Piuckney refuses to serve 
 from any other motive, and will so manage as to demonstrate his 
 own acquiescence in the rank, Knox may be perfectly saved on his 
 own terms. 
 
 Mr. Gerry is at length returned, and, I am told, passed some 
 time yesterday at Quincy. 
 
 I am not well informed yet of the course he steers. The half 
 way men say he condemns the French bitterly, and recommends 
 to our people union and vigor ; and, it is said, he declared to 
 E. Bobbins (the speaker of our House of Representatives) that 
 he highly approved of the spirited measures of our government. 
 
 On the other hand, I am informed credibly that, since he left 
 France, he has maintained strenuously the ridiculous and dan 
 gerous opinion that peace might have been preserved, if our 
 government had not proceeded so far in the measures of hostility. 
 With unfeigned esteem and affection, 
 
 I remain your assured friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 1 Patrick Jeffrey, uncle of Lord Jeffrey. His wife was Mrs. Haley, sister 
 of John Wilkes, who had come to Boston in 1785. 
 
 2 See above, p. 82. 
 
172 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 12, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have the pleasure to enclose you a copy of 
 what I wrote to the President, in obedience to your commands. 
 Although what I have written will do little more than confirm the 
 
 O 
 
 idea of what the public sentiment must be, yet I cannot think 
 more is necessary in this case ; but every day convinces me of the 
 impropriety of the local separation of the President from the 
 heads of departments. I fear that, at this moment, the desire to 
 palliate Mr. Gerry s errors influences the President to speak of 
 all the envoys as having conducted equally well and equally ill. 
 This is not true, and, if persisted in, will justly offend those who 
 have done their duty, and all their friends. I pray you to accept 
 my best regards and invariable esteem. G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 (Confidential.} 
 
 OCT. 16, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Every day brings some new proof of the necessity 
 there is for some person to inform the President of the danger to 
 which he exposes the government and himself, by attempting to 
 vindicate Mr. Gerry at the expense of his colleagues. I have 
 just been canvassing the subject with Mr. Higginson and Mr. 
 Sewall 3 at Boston. We are all aware of the schisms among the 
 friends of government, which may be apprehended ; and we con 
 cluded to urge Otis to make a visit to Quincy, for the purpose of 
 communicating freely to the President what passes abroad on this 
 subject, and how much his frankness exposes him and his friends. 
 Sewall offers to accompany Otis, if required ; but his known dislike 
 of Gerry makes it best that he should not be a principal. You 
 recollect enough of what passed at your own table to perceive 
 that I am disqualified to speak of Mr. Gerry to the President. 
 But, my dear sir, must there not be something more done ? Must 
 it not become a maxim, never to be violated, that the President 
 shall be always accompanied by those whom he has selected to 
 assist him in carrying on the executive government ? If, at any 
 time, he is absent for the benefit of relaxation, let it be adhered to 
 that he does no business, and gives no opinions. If some system 
 1 See above, p. 113. 
 
1798.J 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 173 
 
 like this is not established, there will be no order nor consistency 
 in our affairs. It is a delicate thing to say all this in plain terms ; 
 but it is so fit and proper, indeed so indispensable to the public, 
 and to the ease as well as honor of the President, that you must 
 cause it to be well understood. 
 
 We are grieved to see the Maryland elections turn out so ill. 
 The spirit of French democracy is as active as it is wicked, and 
 thus becomes more than a match for every other sort of spirit. 
 We had been flattering ourselves that in this State we should have 
 no more Jacobin votes after the present Congress ; but Isaac Par 
 ker l will decline, and will be succeeded by Dearborn. 2 Yarnum 8 
 is more likely to be chosen than not, and Freeman 4 may be 
 elected merely because no good Federalist will consent to be a 
 candidate in his district. Gr- C. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 TRENTON, Oct. 20, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have this morning read Colonel Hamilton s 
 letter of the 19th instant to the Secretary of War, in which is the 
 following passage. Having mentioned the arrival of General 
 Pinckney, he says : 
 
 " You will learn with pleasure that he sent me a message by 
 young Rutledge, purporting his entire satisfaction with the mili 
 tary arrangements, and readiness to serve under my command. 
 Communicate this to our friends Pickering and Wolcott, as I am 
 not well enough to write them by this post." 
 
 This, according to an intimation in your letter to me, will settle 
 the matter with Knox. But his conduct has been such in this 
 affair as cannot fail to have displeased his old patron and former 
 friend, General Washington ; and I doubt whether there will exist 
 
 1 Afterwards a judge of the Supreme Court, and chief justice of 
 Massachusetts. 
 
 2 General Henry Dearborn. Afterwards in Mr. Jefferson s cabinet, and 
 prominent in the war of 1812. 
 
 3 Joseph Bradley Varnum, general in the Revolutionary army; for 
 many years a leading Democrat ; member of Congress from Massachusetts, 
 and Speaker of the House in the tenth and eleventh Congresses. 
 
 * I presume this refers to Dr. Nathaniel Freeman, a local politician of some 
 prominence in the Plymouth district, and judge of the Court of Common 
 Pleas. He was never a member of Congress. 
 
174 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 again that perfect cordiality between them, or between Hamilton 
 and Knox. The latter, however, must feel himself so much in the 
 wrong that it may produce a modest demeanor, and restore him to 
 their friendship : it may do him good to have been a little troubled. 
 
 I received this morning a letter from Mr. King, a letter in which 
 is the following passage : " Notwithstanding his pretended deli 
 cacy, Hauteval l by no means denies the agency ascribed to him 
 in soliciting the bribe required by Talleyrand. Colonel Trumbull, 
 who was at Paris soon after the arrival there of the commissioners, 
 has more than once informed me that Hauteval told him that both the 
 douceur and the loan were indispensable, and urged him to employ 
 his influence with the American commissioners to offer the bribe 
 as well as the loan." Delicate [word illegible in MS.~] when de 
 ciphering the despatches, I voluntarily spared his name, because 
 the envoys mentioned it with respect, for secrecy was enjoined 
 only with regard to X. and Y. 
 
 Pray write me from time to time of Gerry s deportment, and 
 contrive to have his derelictions minuted for future use. 
 I am, with sincere affection, 
 
 Yours, T. PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 ( Confidential. ) 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 26, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have received your favor of the 15th, and 
 am happy to find that the business which gave rise to our present 
 correspondence is likely to end so well. General Knox has lately 
 been summoned to Boston by urgent and anxious creditors. He 
 does not now pay his notes, and General Lincoln s property is at 
 tached. How many painful reflections arise from these incidents ? 
 Who does riot see that the manners of our country are daily unfit 
 ting us for a mild elective government ? If our great men must 
 be guarded by sheriffs, those sheriffs must be sufficiently strong to 
 keep them. 
 
 Mr. Gerry is very copious in declarations of loyalty. He says 
 all must unite with the government, and even those who do not 
 approve every measure are, nevertheless, bound to support them. 
 He is also liberal in his condemnation of the French government ; 
 
 1 One of Talleyrand s agents in demanding bribes from the American 
 envoys, better known by the letter Z. in the X. Y. Z. despatches. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 175 
 
 but he still maintains (as he always must) that an adjustment might 
 have been made, &c. Our good people all censure Mr. Marshall 
 for his opinions of the Sedition Act. I have examined what he 
 has said, and have moderated the blame they incur as well as I 
 could. I also desired a young friend to write the vindication you 
 saw in Wednesday s " Centinel." 
 
 The President s answer to the Machias address has attracted 
 some attention, from the disposition it manifests to merge the great 
 errors of a very little man with the little errors (if any can be 
 found) of great and good men. This may become the source of 
 serious disquietude among the friends of government. I have 
 taken some pains to arrest its progress, but with little success hith 
 erto. I hope, however, to cause it to be understood that silence on 
 the comparative merits of the envoys would be proper. 
 
 I think the President will soon discover that Knox is not, and 
 has not been, thought a suitable man for the second commander by 
 the best New England men. Even in Boston, the number is small 
 who hold him very high, and those mostly table friends or expec 
 tants of office. It is openly said he declines, which, if true, you 
 know from the war office. 
 
 Yours, faithfully and affectionately, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 31, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, A great deal of pains has been taken to give a 
 wrong direction to the public sentiment on the subject of the late 
 military appointments, but T think the circumstance of General 
 Pinckney s acceptance of his commission, and his approbation of 
 the arrangement, will have great influence in bringing good men 
 to think rightly, and in silencing the clamors of the factions. I 
 lost no time in communicating the information, and I have the 
 satisfaction to see it producing great good. 
 
 Mr. Gerry is very zealous and unequivocal in his jcommenda- 
 tion of our government as it regards French affairs. In the pres 
 ence of Judge Patterson, 1 Mr. Theophilus Parsons, and Judge 
 Lowell 2 (as the latter himself assures me), he declared his utter 
 
 1 William Patterson, senator from New Jersey, and at this time a judge 
 of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 2 John Lowell, of Newburyport, an eminent lawyer, judge of the United 
 States District Court, 1789-1801 ; and then chief justice of the Circuit Court 
 for Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. 
 
176 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 detestation of the French government, and his approbation of our 
 own, which he thinks has conducted perfectly right ; and he insists 
 warmly that no honest man can withhold his full support of our 
 government, even if its measures were not all perfectly conform 
 able to his opinion of right. He says we have every thing to fear 
 from the wickedness and power of France, unless we are united 
 and act with vigor ; that she will certainly practise every seduc 
 tion to corrupt us, and will assuredly seize the first opportunity to 
 divide and destroy us. If, however, we are united and firm, he 
 thinks us perfectly safe. Such, I am told, is his language, and 
 that he uses it freely. I will endeavor to procure from some one 
 his precise expressions, but you already have their substance. 
 
 Mr. Marshall has given great uneasiness here by his answers to 
 the " Freeholder ; " and Gerry takes advantage of it to enforce the 
 belief that Marshall s politics will not prove sound according to 
 New England ideas, and he is confident " that Marshall will not 
 in Congress act with New England men, whom he holds in great 
 contempt" I do not yet believe this. Mr. Marshall I know has 
 much to learn on the subject of a practicable system of free gov 
 ernment for the United States. I believe, however, he is a man 
 of so much good sense that, with honest principles, he cannot fail 
 to discern and pursue a right course, and therefore that he will 
 eventually prove a great acquisition. 
 
 I mentioned in my last the report of Knox s declining to serve 
 as third major-general : this is now confirmed ; and, as he is seen 
 with Gerry more than usual, it will not be surprising if they join 
 stocks and make a common defence. It can never be sufficiently 
 lamented that these men are authorized to quote the President as 
 on their side. Without this sanction to their respective opinions, 
 they would have found no support among the Federalists ; but 
 even with this advantage I have no doubt that they will be very 
 generally censured. You have already been informed that Knox s 
 paper is discredited with the names of Generals Lincoln and Jack 
 son 1 upon it. It is believed that Knox s notes now extant exceed 
 one hundred thousand dollars, perhaps one hundred and twenty or 
 one hundred and thirty thousand. I am unable to say for what 
 portion of this Lincoln is responsible, but it is thought forty or 
 fifty thousand, which is much more than he can pay. I have so 
 
 1 Henry Jackson, of Boston, distinguished as an officer in the war of 
 Independence. 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 177 
 
 often seen men made desperate by pecuniary wants that I am 
 always grieved to see men of influence reduced on account of what 
 they may do as well as what they may suffer. 
 
 I pray you to accept my unfeigned regards, and believe me 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 ( Confidential.) 
 
 TRENTON, Nov. 6, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have this moment received your letter of the 
 26th ult. I regret the embarrassments of General Knox, and 
 the misfortunes into which they have plunged General Lincoln ; 
 but I have for some time past wished for what is now decided, that 
 General Knox should not enter into the army. He has positively 
 refused to accept the commission of third major-general, which was 
 finally and solely tendered to him. How very different and how 
 excellent the conduct of General Pinckney ! As soon as he learned, 
 on arrival, that some questions and difficulties occurred about the 
 priority of rank among the three first named major-generals, he 
 wrote a note to General Hamilton, explicitly informing him that 
 with great pleasure he should serve under his command. Arid, on 
 his coming to Trenton, General Pinckney told me that he was 
 gratified in the first rank being given to General Hamilton, whose 
 superior genius and military talents deserved it. Nay, further, 
 before he was made acquainted with the whole history of the busi 
 ness, he would have given place to Knox also, if that would have 
 removed all inquietude ! Yet General Pinckney is a man of high 
 sense of honor, of valuable military acquirements, and he has made 
 the military much his study, and is of great influence in the South 
 ern States, on all which might be founded a claim to an elevated 
 rank. But he is truly a patriot and an honest man. 
 
 I took notice of the President s answer to the Machias address, 
 and regretted the passage which involved the three envoys in the 
 same censure. I gave General Marshall information of it, and 
 expressed my opinion that for his and General Pinckney s reputa 
 tion it would be necessary that he should write a history of their 
 mission. He answered that, since he consented to be a candidate 
 for a seat in Congress, such torrents of abuse had been poured 
 upon him he feared his own testimony concerning himself would, 
 
 12 
 
178 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 among his enemies and their followers, fail of meeting clue credit. 
 Added to which, his professional, business was so in arrears in con 
 sequence of his absence, that he really had no time to undertake 
 such a justification. But I suppose you know that the President 
 tendered the commission of Judge of the Supreme Court to Mar 
 shall before it was offered to Bushrod Washington ; and, in his 
 letter to me, the President really pronounced a handsome panegyric 
 on Marshall, and said he was the only one of the three envoys who 
 had conducted unexceptionably. But I was not able to discern a 
 single circumstance in General Pinckney s conduct that was repre 
 hensible. It is true he remained in France three or four months 
 longer than General Marshall ; but it was to rescue his daughter 
 from death, and he has saved her. 
 
 Yesterday I received from the President a letter dated the 26th 
 ult., in which he says : " The enclosed letter to me from Mr. 
 Gerry I received last night, and pray you to have it inserted in 
 a public print. It will satisfy him, and do no harm to any one. 
 It explains some circumstances advantageously." I was surprised 
 at the expression, " and do no harm to any one;" for it gave the 
 lie to me or my informer, in declaring that the " important fact " I 
 had stated on incontrovertible evidence " never existed." The evi 
 dence was General Marshall s letter to me, whose very words I 
 used in stating the fact, and had before sent those words to the 
 President, who showed them to Gerry, when he first manifested 
 his uneasiness at some expressions in my letter to P. Johnston. 
 Upon which, Gerry gave to the President the same explanations 
 which are contained in his letter to the President of the 20th ult., 
 a copy of which I enclose. These explanations, you will see, are 
 contemptible quibbles about immaterial circumstances attending the 
 important facts to be stated and established. My sense of Gerry s 
 letter and conduct, and of the President s prayer " to have the let 
 ter published," you will find in my answer to the President of yes 
 terday, of which also I enclose a copy. I am sorry that want of 
 time absolutely forbids my giving you the long detail of facts on 
 which my accusation against Gerry for duplicity and treachery is 
 founded. There is no question, in my view of them, that they 
 prove his betraying, in his frequent secret conferences with Talley 
 rand, the opinions, propositions, and determinations of his col 
 leagues ; and Talleyrand s propositions to him were under an 
 injunction of secrecy towards them, with which Gerry was sum- 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 179 
 
 ciently abject, base, and treacherous in his joint trust from his 
 country to comply. 
 
 Faithfully and affectionately yours, 
 
 TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 P. S. What you say in vindication of General Marshall s an 
 swers to a " Freeholder " induces me to send you the enclosed 
 extract of my letter to Mr. Goodhue, who, in his letter of October 
 26, expressed his fears that Marshall was not sound at heart. 1 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Nov. 7, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I yesterday met Mr. H. G. Otis and Mr. Ed. 
 Robbins, 2 each of whom separately had conversed freely with Mr. 
 Gerry ; and they both agreed that Mr. Gerry had unequivocally 
 approved the proceedings of our government, and condemned that 
 of France. Mr. Robbins stated to me that he questioned Gerry 
 very closely, and that his answers were satisfactory. He asked in 
 particular whether Mr. Gerry thought the measures of our govern 
 ment toward France were wise and proper, to which Mr. Gerry re 
 plied that they were perfectly so in his opinion, and that their effects 
 upon the French government proved it, for that in proportion as our 
 tone was raised theirs was lowered. 
 
 Mr. Otis intimated to him the state of public opinion concerning 
 him : that the friends of government were not satisfied, and that 
 its enemies had calculated upon finding in him a character round 
 
 1 The passage in Mr. Goodhue s letter referred to here runs as fol 
 lows : 
 
 " We meet with ups and downs in our political prospects, and I confess 
 nothing has given me more surprise and regret than that General Marshall 
 should so far degrade himself as to fan the flame of opposition to govern 
 ment by giving his opinion so decidedly against the Alien and Sedition 
 Bills. What does he mean ? Or have we been mistaking hitherto his true 
 character ? I sometimes have been led to think that none of the Virginia 
 Federalists are little better than half-way Jacobin." (Goodhue to Picker 
 ing, Oct. 26, 1798. The letter is misplaced chronologically, and can be 
 found in Vol. XXVI. of the Pickering MSS.) This extract illustrates very 
 well what I have said above (p. 147) in regard to Mr. Cabot s defence of 
 Marshall on this occasion, and also shows the rigid and unyielding temper 
 of the New England Federalists. 
 
 2 See above, p. 171. 
 
180 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 which they might rally with new spirit. He replied that he was 
 sensible of the predicament in which he stood, but he thought it 
 an ill compliment to his understanding to suppose he could be made 
 subservient to the designs of the opposition. I think, from all I 
 have heard, that there can be no doubt that Gerry professes his 
 entire approbation of our national measures, and recommends to 
 every one to support them ; and that he insists that it is the duty 
 of those who are not satisfied with the administration to support it 
 nevertheless, but that for himself he is satisfied with it. 
 
 He told Mr. Bobbins that the mockery of elections in France 
 was so gross that the most ignorant were not deceived. All the 
 people know that they have less liberty than ever, for they hardly 
 dare to think freely now upon any subject that has any relation to 
 public affairs. He mentioned examples within his own knowledge 
 of persons returned as members of the legislature, who were refused 
 a seat because their principles did not suit the Directory, and eight 
 or ten electors having afterward sent other members of the flexible 
 kind. This is impudently called the choice of the people. The 
 people, however, as Mr. Gerry says, see very plainly that all this 
 is a perfect farce, but dare not say so, lest it be converted to a 
 tragedy. 
 
 I know, my dear friend, that you are not so prone to see objects 
 in a gloomy light as I am ; but I cannot forbear to express to you 
 my apprehensions, which are now greater than ever, that our 
 country is destined to act over the same follies, to practise the same 
 vices, and of consequence to suffer the same miseries which com 
 pose the history of revolutionary France. I trust we shall fall 
 short of them in each particular, but we shall in some considerable 
 ..degree imitate their errors and their sufferings. This is a fate 
 which cannot be wholly averted : it may, however, be procras 
 tinated and mitigated by the exertions of good men ; and these I 
 hope will be never withheld. Our elections here indicate a state 
 of the public mind less satisfactory than was believed. Your old 
 friend, the doughty general, though not elected, has received a 
 support in this district which astonishes the Federalists. But it is 
 more grievous to observe the motives which govern the voters : 
 they vote for the man who would vote against taxes. I recollect 
 to have heard that Dr. Manning, of Ipswich, wishing to recom 
 mend himself to the people, boasted, toward the close of our 
 Revolutionary war, that during the whole contest he had never 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 181 
 
 voted for a tax, although he was in the legislature many years. 
 How long could a just, equal, and free government be maintained 
 by a people who would approve of such a representative ? I have 
 fondly cherished the belief that our countrymen would give a fair 
 chance to the experiment of a just government altogether elective 
 by the people and perfectly free ; but I am ready to say that, as I 
 understand human nature, such a system cannot long be supported 
 by any people whatever. In every government where any thing 
 like justice is respected, there will necessarily be great inequalities 
 of property and condition, and the numbea of the poor will greatly 
 exceed that of the rich. This alone will furnish unprincipled 
 ambition with means to subvert a free state, or compel it to adopt 
 in its own defence principles and provisions which are hostile to 
 popular liberty. Thus, as I reason, whether the government of 
 a free state or the faction which opposes it prevails, popular liberty 
 will find a new restraint at the issue of every conflict. If the gov 
 ernment is successful, the restraint will be legitimate and salutary ; 
 but, if faction triumphs, there will nothing of rational liberty remain. 
 I ought to apologize for drawing you into these painful specula 
 tions, but they absorb my own mind so much that I can write 
 nothing else. 
 
 I beg to be remembered affectionately to Mrs. Pickering, and 
 that you will ever believe me your faithful and much obliged 
 friend. GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 P. S. There has been more appearance of deep and well- 
 digested design on the part of our Jacobins at the late election in 
 this district than I have seen. It seemed as if they had been all 
 instructed individually to be silent on the subject previous to the 
 election, and every man to attend and give his vote. For this 
 latter purpose, I have reason to believe that select persons went 
 through the district and called out every Jacobin vote. I mention 
 this, because, if it happened so in other places, we must not doubt 
 the systematic process. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 TRENTON, Nov. 10, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have just received your favor of the 31st ult. 
 I am glad that Mr. Gerry has been so explicit in respect to the 
 character of the French government. g u ^ now w ju tn j g cons j s t 
 
182 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 with his intimations (and, if I mistake not, they repeatedly occur 
 in his official report since his return home) of that government 
 being sincere in its desires of peace and reconciliation with the 
 United States ? When I can again read his budget, I will correct 
 the mistake, if I now make one. I am satisfied that the true friends 
 of their country need be under no apprehensions concerning Gen 
 eral Marshall s rectitude or steadiness. It is a great misfortune 
 that the President s promptness (I might use another word) of 
 opinion and his strong predilection for Gerry should have given 
 countenance and support to the pretensions and conduct of ftnox 
 and Gerry ; but, in respect to the former, he must certainly be 
 convinced of his error, and, when he reads Marshall s journal (a 
 copy of which I have purposely taken, and the verity of which 
 will be confirmed by General Pinckney), he will be convinced of 
 Gerry s disgraceful pusillanimity, weakness, duplicity, and I think 
 treachery. By my last, enclosing a copy of my letter to the Presi 
 dent, you will see I have announced so much to him. The 
 President s unbiassed opinion of General Marshall I cannot with 
 hold from you. It is given in a letter, dated September 26, when 
 filling- the vacant seat on the bench of the Supreme Court. The 
 only candidates about whom there appeared any competition in 
 the President s mind were Bushrod Washington and General Mar 
 shall. I gave to the President reasons why Marshall would decline 
 the office. The President, in his answer, said he could not blame 
 him if he should decline. Washington was the alternative. Of 
 both, the President wrote me thus : " The name, the connections, 
 the character, the merit and abilities of Mr. Washington, are 
 greatly respected ; but I still think that General Marshall ought 
 to be preferred. Of the three envoys, the conduct of Marshall 
 alone has been entirely satisfactory, and ought to be marked by 
 the most decided approbation of the public. He has raised the 
 American people in their own esteem ; and, if the influence of 
 truth and justice, reason and argument, is not lost in Europe, he 
 has raised the consideration of the United States in that quarter 
 of the world." And be assured, my dear sir, that this opinion of 
 Marshall is correct, in respect to his efficiency in the mission. But 
 I am yet to learn in what General Pinckney is reprehensible. 
 There is not to be found a more honorable man. He does honor 
 to Marshall s eminent qualities of mind and heart. The despatches 
 would have appeared to still greater advantage in style, sentiment, 
 
1798.] CORRESPONDENCE. 183 
 
 and energy, had they been adopted from Marshall s pen ; but for 
 the sake of unanimity, to gain Gerry s signature, Pinckney and 
 Marshall were obliged to let them pass through his alembic, 
 in which you will readily imagine that much of the spirit 
 escaped. I hope Marshall may get into Congress. His general 
 politics are well known, and his integrity is unblemished. He 
 will assuredly act with the intelligent New England men. Gerry 
 has the foolish vanity to imagine that he himself represents the 
 sense and virtue of his immediate countrymen ; and, as it was im 
 possible for Marshall, fatigued with his delays and pertinacity in 
 trifling objections, disgusted with his wrongheadedness, and indig 
 nant at his duplicity, ultimately not to manifest his contempt for 
 him, Gerry has transferred this contempt to his country. 
 I remain, my dear sir, with great truth and esteem, 
 Your faithful friend and servant, 
 
 TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLIXE, Nov. 17, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I lament that your excellent letter of the 5th 
 could not have reached the President before he left home. It is 
 important to himself and to the country that he should think more 
 justly of the merits of his favorite Gerry, or, at least, that he 
 should act as he would, if he did think justly. Your letter can 
 hardly fail of producing this good effect, if he can have time to 
 ruminate a little upon it, and give his good sense and good principles 
 a fair chance to be consulted ; and I sincerely hope this will yet 
 happen before his speech to Congress is prepared, as I have some 
 reason to fear he will repeat the sentiments expressed to the 
 Machias addressers, and perhaps be more pointed. 
 
 When I read Gerry s letter, I could hardly realize that such 
 a tissue of miserable quibbles and wretched cavillings should be 
 thought an advantageous explanation of any thing. Indeed, in my 
 judgment, its publication would injure him as much or more than 
 that which it proposes to answer ; because, while it does not dimin 
 ish the substance of what is implied in yours, it discovers a pitiful 
 disposition to give such importance to the most trifling circum 
 stances. Mr. Wolcott can tell you that in a dispute with the Pres 
 ident at his (Mr. Wolcott s) table, concerning the character of Mr. 
 
184 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 Gerry, I was provoked to be rude ; arid that I pronounced him 
 " totally unfit to conduct any great affairs of himself, and from 
 his captious and jealous temper altogether unqualified to act with 
 others." Such he has always been ; such his late colleagues have 
 found him ; and such, I am persuaded, even the French now think 
 him. 1 Decency would forbid me to revive in the mind of the 
 President a subject of so much mortification as our dispute would 
 prove, after what he knows of the envoyship ; and, on this account, 
 I have not dared to speak to him upon it. But I have been sur 
 prised that so little public disapprobation of Gerry should have 
 been expressed, since he himself has furnished abundant testimony 
 of his own unworthiness, in entering into conferences with Talley 
 rand under a stipulation that his colleagues should not be informed 
 by him of that which he was bound in duty to tell them. This 
 was not merely unfaithfulness, a sort of negative fault, it was 
 positive treachery ; it was co-operating with an insidious enemy in 
 his attempts to divide our country, after he had avowed his expec 
 tation of subduing it by the force of our divisions. After all, such 
 is our feeble condition that it is expedient to be silent, and, if 
 possible, to prevent a public investigation which may make new 
 schisms. On this account I am extremely solicitous that the Pres 
 ident should perceive that a disposition to cover the follies and 
 faults of Gerry, if not repressed, will eventually bring forward 
 Pinckney and Marshall to criminate him ; and that they, with truth 
 and justice on their side, will necessarily be supported by all men 
 of virtue, honor, and ability. 
 
 I lament with you the misfortunes of Knox on his own account, 
 and, I am sorry to add, on that of the public ; for already he 
 begins to intimate, though obscurely, that Hamilton is a man of 
 insatiable ambition and not to be trusted. 
 
 I am always, with high esteem and true affection, 
 
 Your faithful G. CABOT. 
 
 1 The justice of this surmise may be gathered from Talleyrand s decla 
 ration, that " he [Gerry] wanted decision at a moment when he might easily 
 have adjusted every thing, that he was too irresolute, and that the corre 
 spondence between them was a curious monument of advances on his part 
 and evasions on Gerry s." Pinckney s opinion of his colleague was even 
 worse. He wrote " that he had never met with a man so destitute of can 
 dor and so full of deceit." (See Hildreth, V. 261.) Pinckney, no doubt, 
 judged. Gerry harshly; but it is evident that the latter showed his mental 
 incapacity most clearly to all concerned in this business. 
 
1798.1 CORRESPONDENCE. 185 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Nov. 24, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The mail of yesterday brought me your favor 
 of the 10th. I have some fears that, while I have stated to you the 
 opinions which Mr. Gerry has openly avowed, I may have seemed 
 to think him consistent. You need not examine his budget to dis 
 cover whether you have done him justice in making him the advo 
 cate of Directorial sincerity. However absurd it may be, he has 
 assured some of our Jacobin leaders (the "VVinthrops 1 particularly) 
 that the French were sincere in their professions of desiring an 
 honorable peace with us. In all this, every thing will be intelligi 
 ble to those who know Gerry and his conduct in the late mission ; 
 to all others, it must be unintelligible. Gerry can offer no excuse 
 for listening to the proposal of his French friends to remain in 
 France, without urging as a part of it his own belief that a safe 
 and an honorable adjustment might have been made with them. 
 He did not intend to be their tool, but he was their dupe. He is too 
 proud, however, to confess, if he is not too self-conceited to see the 
 latter; and he asserts the former by his unreserved censures of 
 them in every thing, except their disposition of peace towards us. 
 It would be natural to ask how the President could possibly be 
 imposed upon by any explanations which could be made of such 
 gross folly and misconduct. Here it is impossible not to see a 
 strong motive which Gerry would have to applaud the executive 
 administration ; and, without going further, we may account for all 
 that Gerry professes to individuals, while his reserve to the public 
 may be fairly ascribed to his determination to retain the Jacobin 
 suffrages at all events. It has been proposed in private circles to 
 invite him to express formally to the public that approbation of 
 our own government and that condemnation of the French which 
 he has declared to individuals ; but no act of his life that I have 
 known will warrant the expectation of his doing a thing so obvi 
 ously proper, in the opinion of wise and good men, unless it coin 
 cided with some of his paltry selfish purposes. 
 
 I had made the same reflection on Gerry s opinions concerning 
 General Marshall which you have expressed ; and I concur fully 
 with you in the sentiments that his merit is of the first order, and 
 that he is to be cherished as a most precious acquisition to the 
 cause of order, morality, and good government. 
 
 1 Judge James Winthrop, and his brothers John and William. All three 
 were active Democrats. 
 
186 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 Our people have become silent, and satisfied with the distribution 
 of the military trusts. The knowing ones are better pleased than 
 they would have been with an acquiescence by Knox. 
 
 We are rejoicing cordially that Nelson has given a decisive blow 
 to the naval power of the French tyrants in the Mediterranean. 
 If our country could act up to the standard of its executive admin 
 istration, the Gallic crows would soon pick the carcasses of each 
 other. I remain always, with unfeigned affection, 
 
 Your faithful friend, and obliged GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 GORE TO CABOT. 
 
 LONDON, Dec. 8, 1798. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Thinking and hoping, as I do, that no terms will 
 be offered by the French that can induce our government to 
 resume a negotiation on the subject of their depredations, has 
 restrained me from writing my sentiments on the manner of 
 arranging the terms of an article, that should adjust either the 
 objects, or measure of compensation, or the requisite circumstances 
 which should entitle the object to the consideration and decision of 
 those appointed to award the compensation. In the low state of 
 French despotism, the Directory may propose terms ; and, although 
 no one would believe that any would be kept, that were obligatory 
 on them, yet the government may feel it inexpedient to refuse 
 acceding to them. In such an event, great care should be taken, 
 in wording the article, to include all cases, and exclude all doubt 
 as to the objects, both as to quality and time of examination by 
 the board, not with any expectation of deriving satisfaction for 
 the injury, but with the view of more completely and definitely 
 fixing the breach, so as to leave nothing for their supporters or 
 apologists to allege in their behalf, or against the United States. 
 The article under which we act has, by some people, been settled 
 down to the most senseless jumble of words that two men could 
 have thrown together. The description, according to these com 
 mentators, contained no case for the board, where the High Court 
 of Appeals had acted, because it never could be conceived that 
 this government would have subjected the decisions of so high and 
 respectable a tribunal to the revision or examination of another. 
 It did not contain any that had not passed through all the courts ; 
 because it was only in cases where compensation could not be 
 
1708.] CORRESPONDENCE. 187 
 
 obtained in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings that the 
 board was to take cognizance. 
 
 The board could not examine any cases yet pending in the 
 courts, prior to the term allotted for presenting memorials, for the 
 last-mentioned reason ; nor afterward, because it had no authority 
 to receive ; nor at the time of its completion, because the very 
 assertion of the cause yet being undecided in the courts of the 
 Crown showed that there was still wanting proof of a material 
 allegation, viz., that compensation could not be obtained in the 
 ordinary course, which fact, said these gentlemen, only can appear 
 by proof of having resorted to and exhausted all the judicial 
 means, and that these had failed. In my opinion, the words used 
 in the British treaty were adequate to the end ; but if a nation, 
 possessing like this a character for integrity, and desirous of 
 sustaining that character, should, under the existing circumstances, 
 be disposed to cavil, and fritter down to nothing the provisions of 
 a treaty, what are we to expect from another, the reverse of every 
 thing good, wise, or honorable ? We should leave no uncertainty 
 in language, no terms under which their advocates may apologize 
 for their breaches. Beside general and comprehensive terms, it 
 would be well to insert particular descriptions, taking care at the 
 same time not to diminish the force and extent of the former by 
 the insertion of the latter. All conclusions unfavorable to the 
 claimants, which might be drawn from the terms, should by 
 express provision be excluded. 
 
 You may ask why I do not write these remarks to Mr. Pick 
 ering. My answer is, I have no correspondence with him, other 
 than a joint and official one on the subjects of our duties ; and 
 reasons of delicacy forbid such an intrusion in this way. He 
 knows all the objections that have been raised ; and, if his mind 
 should contemplate them on making a similar arrangement, he will 
 not fail to use all necessary cautions. If, in the course of events, 
 a new attempt should be made at negotiation, you can just suggest, 
 if you think proper, some of these things to his recollection. 
 Express provision should also be made that those who execute the 
 commission should be entitled to the immunities of public minis 
 ters. It would give weight to the commission, avoid inconveniences 
 to the individuals, and could never disserve the country who 
 expected benefit from such an arrangement. 
 
 In our present relation to Great Britain, it is more than proba- 
 
188 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 ble we may finish our commission in the course of time. But 
 there is a coldness, phlegm, and delay, among those who think 
 they have an indispensable right and duty to decide before the 
 cause is examined by us, that calls for all the patience of my 
 constitution. When we meet, this will be a fit subject for conver 
 sation, and more fit than for paper. 
 
 I have read, with great satisfaction, Mr. Pickering s letter to 
 the addresses from Prince Edward County. I have read, also, 
 General Marshall s letter, and answers to queries. Gallatin is 
 re-elected, and Lyon a will be. The elections make us tremble for 
 the safety as well as honor of our country. I rejoice sincerely 
 in the final adjustment of the questions between Hamilton, &c. 
 That Knox should be embarrassed in his pecuniary affairs, and 
 General Lincoln involved with him, I do most heartily regret. I 
 was the more pleased to learn that the military etiquette was 
 disposed of, as I foresaw in its progress great parties of new 
 division among those whose unanimity is indispensably necessary 
 to the salvation of our country. 
 
 Since the understanding between Toussaint the Black and the 
 British government, possibly the trade of St. Domingo may be 
 opened to our people. But what the designs of this government 
 are, I cannot tell, probably their monopoly system. However, I 
 think we can easily defeat them, in such a scheme as respects St. 
 Domingo. Buonaparte, having possessed himself of Egypt, will, in 
 a great measure, cut off the Turks from their supplies of rice, 
 coffee, &c., which they formerly received by the way of Alexandria 
 at Constantinople. And it is very probable our vessels might 
 make beneficial voyages to this last-mentioned place. Fish, and 
 the articles of the East Indies, are much wanted there. And 
 foreign shipping is much employed in freighting from Constanti 
 nople to the various ports in the Levant. A Mr. Abbot tells me 
 that, several years ago, a ship came to Constantinople direct from 
 India. The house of which he is a member succeeded in procur 
 ing her admission, on terms of the most favored nation. Should 
 this be an advantageous trade for our merchants, it would be 
 
 1 Matthew Lyon, then a member of Congress from Vermont, and after 
 wards from Kentucky. He was a well-known Democrat in his day, a good 
 deal of a demagogue, a rough and ready debater; and the thrashing he 
 received at the hands of Roger Griswold, on the floor of the House, gave 
 him at the time considerable notoriety. 
 
1708. 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 189 
 
 advisable for our government to adopt measures for placing the 
 commerce on a permanent footing by treaty with the Porte. The 
 present time will probably be as favorable as any future period. 
 We ought, likewise, to secure a free passage into the Black Sea, and 
 this should be settled with the Emperor of Russia. Great Britain 
 would, at least at present, not thwart us in these views. I under 
 stand she says she would promote our views on these subjects. 
 
 There is a report of a battle between Jourdan and the Aus- 
 trians, but it does not come in such a way as to obtain credit. 
 
 Yours truly, C. G. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Dec. 14, 1798. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have been unable to comprehend the motives 
 which influence the Federalists to neglect the infinitely important 
 subject of electing the President and Vice-President. The defect 
 of the constitution in this particular is so obvious, and the incon 
 venience and absurdity of it so much felt, that I should imagine a 
 proposition to amend it could not fail of success. It is certain that 
 in the late election we were in great danger of seeing a French 
 President instead of an American placed in the chair, when a 
 majority of the electors were truly Americans, merely because 
 each elector could not constitutionally determine the character of 
 his own vote. If this article in the Constitution is not amended, 
 we shall be exposed to great embarrassments at the next election, 
 as we were at the last ; and the evil of division and jealousy among 
 men who have the same honest views will be unavoidable. It will 
 be the opinion of many good men, as it was before, that the public 
 safety requires first to exclude the enemies of our country, and 
 then to choose the best of its friends, but not to hazard the success 
 of the former for a preference among the latter. This principle 
 of action will be held sacred by many of the truest patriots ; but 
 it will not always be admitted by others to be any thing more than 
 a good cover for supporting a favorite candidate, or opposing one 
 who ought to be elected. You know that many painful heart 
 burnings have more than once been produced among those whom 
 we esteem, and that very lately (perhaps now) this same business 
 disturbs the harmony of our first councils. 
 
 I have troubled you with this hint, because there is no time 
 
190 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 to be lost. If two-thirds of each House will agree this session to 
 recommend the amendment, the State legislatures may ratify it 
 in good season ; but, if not, I should think every possible exertion 
 should be made in the States to accomplish it with the next Con 
 gress, which I trust will be somewhat better than the present. I 
 am looking impatiently for the President s speech, with some hope 
 that he will say frankly that the safety and independence of the 
 United States are endangered by the personal intercourse between 
 us and our insidious and perfidious enemy ; and that war, by end 
 ing it, would tend to secure us, and make every man s rights and 
 duties plain and clear. There are, in my mind, irresistible reasons 
 for changing the present state of things, even if unqualified war is 
 inexpedient. Why should our merchants be denied the liberty of 
 making reprisals on those who have an authorized right to plunder 
 them ? Our enemies have no commerce, but they often capture 
 the property of every nation which has, and opportunities to recap 
 ture their prizes will sometimes occur, especially as our armed 
 vessels are very numerous, and becoming daily more so. Besides 
 this, encouragement to private armaments would add greatly to 
 our strength and security, by increasing our seamen and training 
 them to the management of armed vessels. On the other hand, 
 there is no possibility of losing any thing. France wars upon us 
 now as much as she is able, and will certainly apply more force, if 
 she can with a prospect of success. Why not preclude her, there 
 fore, by every possible augmentation of our own force ? She will 
 be humble and respectful, and even just toward us, precisely in 
 proportion to her estimate of our power. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. C. 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FKANCE. 191 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 1799. 
 The Second Mission to France. Views of Mr. Cabot. Correspondence. 
 
 THE great event of the year 1799 was the President s 
 renewal of negotiations with France. This change of pol 
 icy, which proved the immediate cause of the downfall of 
 the Federalists party, forms, to the exclusion of all else, the 
 subject of Mr. Cabot s letters during this year. The ap 
 pointment of the new commission was in all ways of the 
 deepest and most far-reaching consequence ; and, since Mr. 
 Cabot was a prominent representative of the opinions held 
 by most of the leading Federalists, a few pages will not, I 
 hope, be wasted in defining briefly, and if possible accurately, 
 his exact position in regard to this famous measure. 
 
 Several important bills introduced early in the session 
 by the committee on defence were still before Congress 
 when the new year opened. Gallatin, then heading the 
 opposition, objected to the passage of these bills until cer 
 tain additional documents, promised by the President and 
 relating to the recent negotiations, were laid before the 
 House. Early in January, 1799, the President sent in the 
 desired papers, comprising Gerry s correspondence with 
 Talleyrand, and certain letters from the consul-general, 
 Skipwith. These were soon followed by an elaborate report 
 from Colonel Pickering on French affairs, drawn with con 
 siderable ability, and reflecting with much sharpness on all 
 that related to Talleyrand, the Directory, and Gerry. 
 Within a few days after this report, the President trans 
 mitted to Congress information of a new French decree, by 
 
192 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 the terms of which, all Americans serving in hostile vessels 
 were, if captured, to be condemned to the treatment of 
 pirates. Thus stimulated, the House passed a retaliation 
 bill in answer to the new decree, renewed the act of non- 
 intercourse with France, and made large appropriations for 
 the navy, while the Senate passed a bill providing for a 
 greatly increased army. The Legislature was engaged upon 
 these vigorous measures, when they and the public generally 
 were startled by the President s nomination of William 
 Vans Murray, resident minister at the Hague, to be min 
 ister plenipotentiary to the French Republic. Public opin 
 ion at that time was much divided on the subject of French 
 affairs. A large section of the Democratic party, including 
 all the worst foreign elements, and led by Jefferson, favored 
 peace with France on any and all terms. They were actu 
 ated by a sentimental adoration of any thing called a repub 
 lic, by the Jacobin spirit then at its height, and many of 
 them by a general love of faction and hatred of order. Most 
 strongly opposed to these extremists were the Federalist 
 leaders, among whom Hamilton was conspicuous. These 
 men saw clearly that peace and a strong neutrality were for 
 the best interests of the country, but they Avere convinced 
 that neither of these objects could be served by further nego 
 tiations with France. They believed that a French peace 
 at that time would be taken merely as an evidence of weak 
 ness, could not be lasting, and would invigorate Jacobinism 
 in the United States. On the other hand, they felt confi 
 dent that a French war would give life to the national sen 
 timent, strengthen the administration, and secure their own 
 party supremacy. Between the partisans who favored peace 
 on any terms and the war Federalists were a portion of the 
 Democratic and the larger part of the Federalist party. 
 This party of the centre composed a majority of the whole 
 nation. They were of that class so varying in numbers, but 
 so inevitably found under every constitutional government 
 at all times and seasons, which is always ready to follow any 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 193 
 
 leader who seems to consult most carefully the immediate 
 interest and dignity of the country. This large floating 
 vote had been driven over to the support of the war Feder 
 alists by the outrageous conduct of France toward the first 
 commission. So great an accession of popular strength had 
 raised the war party to a position of absolute control in the 
 country ; and the nomination of Murray, indicating what 
 seemed a complete change of policy on the part of the ex 
 ecutive, fell upon them in the hour of their success with 
 overwhelming effect. They felt instinctively that the 
 great mass of the people would sympathize with the Presi 
 dent s action, and that they must bow to a public opinion 
 which it would be madness to resist. Exasperated, amazed, 
 bewildered, the war party yielded, and sought merely to 
 palliate what they could not entirely prevent. They suc 
 ceeded in enlarging to three the number of envoys, and 
 with this for the time they were fain to be content. 
 
 Mr. Cabot s letters give a clear picture of the views of 
 the more moderate type of Federalist leader at this period. 
 But, before tracing in outline the contents of these letters, 
 it becomes necessary to define briefly the controversy to 
 which they relate, and the dire results which that contro 
 versy produced. The conflict arose upon a policy, the sound 
 ness of which no one would to-day think of questioning ; yet 
 when it was adopted by Mr. Adams, in 1799, it resulted in 
 the common ruin of President and party. That it should 
 have turned out in this way was owing to many causes, of 
 which some are not readily apparent. Because a portion of 
 the party held erroneous views, and because the President, 
 in opposition to these views, carried through a proper pol 
 icy, is but an unsatisfactory explanation of the consequent 
 defeat of the Federalists. Parties of far less strength have 
 survived greater differences of opinion ; but the causes of 
 defeat in this instance lay deeper, and were inherent not 
 only in the party, but also in the character of the prominent 
 men. There were too many leaders in the Federalist party, 
 
 13 
 
194 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 and all these leaders were unbending and dogmatic in a 
 greater or less degree. Most unfortunately, too, the princi 
 pal supporters of the differing policies held the two highest 
 offices in the administration, and, when opposed, were as de 
 termined and unyielding as any men in the whole country. 
 The outlook was certainly not a hopeful one, if any violent 
 difference of opinion arose in a party so composed and so 
 situated. Fortunately for the historical interests involved, 
 all those principally concerned have left elaborate accounts 
 of what they severally said, did, and thought. The letters 
 to the " Boston Patriot " explain Mr. Adams s position ; 
 Hamilton s famous pamphlet, his letters and those of Pick 
 ering, Wolcott, McHenry, Ames, and Cabot, define the 
 attitude of the war Federalists ; while a letter from Mr. 
 Stoddert, the Secretary of the Navy, represents the opinion 
 of moderate men both in and out of the cabinet. 1 
 
 The first intimation of the contemplated change of policy 
 on the part of the President was given at the opening of 
 the session. Influenced by Gerry s reports, Mr. Adams 
 wished to state in his message that, while the war measures 
 already on foot ought by no means to be abandoned, the 
 door was still to be kept open for negotiation whenever 
 France should evince a proper respect toward the United 
 States. Such sentiments as these were resisted in the cab 
 inet. Pickering, followed by Wolcott and McHenry, stren 
 uously opposed the insertion in the message of any paragraph 
 which even hinted at the possibility of our sending another 
 minister to France. Stoddert and Lee inclined to the same 
 views, but the character of their opposition ivas mild and 
 temperate. The President nevertheless persisted, and from 
 
 1 This important letter was addressed to Mr. Adams at the time of the 
 publication of the "Patriot" letters. Mr. Adams did not publish Mr. Stod- 
 dert s letter, and replied to but one or two of the objections which were 
 offered in it. As I shall have occasion to refer to this letter, and from its 
 intrinsic value, I have printed it in full in this connection, and also one from 
 James McHenry, the Secretary of War ; so that all sides are now before 
 the public. I am indebted to the Pickering manuscripts, in the possession 
 of the Massachusetts Historical Society, for the letters of both Stoddert and 
 McHenry on this important question. 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 195 
 
 the manner in which the message was received it was evi 
 dent that public opinion coincided with the views of Mr. 
 Adams. 
 
 Mr. Cabot s letters during the early part of the year 
 are largely occupied with the subject of the message. He 
 was disappointed at the conciliatory tone therein adopted, 
 and was surprised at what seemed to him indications of 
 hesitation and uncertainty in the President s policy. He 
 also regretted that the tone of Colonel Pickering s report had 
 been moderated, but neither of these incidents in the least 
 prepared his mind for what was to follow. The war Federal 
 ists were so confident of the strength of their position, and 
 believed the success and maintenance of their policy to be 
 so assured, that they had no apprehension of an entire rever 
 sal of all their schemes by any action of the President. 
 They were destined to be quickly undeceived. 
 
 During the winter, Mr. Adams received through Pichon, 
 the French Secretary at the Hague, and thence through 
 Murray, our minister at the same place, assurances of a dis 
 position on the part of the French government to renew 
 negotiations in a proper spirit. Acting on this information, 
 Mr. Adams, without any warning to his cabinet, sent to 
 the Senate the nomination of William Vans Murray to be 
 minister plenipotentiary to the French Republic. No nom 
 ination probably ever produced such a profound sensation. 
 No one understood precisely what it meant, though every 
 body recognized at once its gravity and importance. The 
 blow fell most severely on the dominant Federalists all over 
 the country, and to no one did it cause more bitter disap 
 pointment than to Mr. Cabot. He had been, since Pinck- 
 nev s dismissal, a most consistent opponent of any negotia 
 tions with France until she had learned to treat us with 
 respect ; and no one had so strongly and persistently op 
 posed the first mission. The conduct of Talleyrand and 
 the failure of the first ambassadors seemed to Mr. Cabot to 
 assure the maintenance of a vigorous policy, and the eradi- 
 
196 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 cation of Jacobinism in the United States. He believed 
 that fresh negotiations were not only wrong, but impossible, 
 without great advances from the French. The news of the 
 new nomination therefore filled him with indignation ; for 
 he considered peace with France to mean a revival of French 
 principles in the United States, and the utter loss of any 
 real national independence. There is now no difficulty in 
 perceiving that Mr. Cabot and his wing of the party erred 
 completely in maintaining so unyielding an attitude toward 
 France. But it was not then so easy to decide rightly, 
 and the war policy could be supported by many plausible 
 and some sound arguments ; and this fact, while it palliates 
 the mistakes of the Federal leaders, reflects credit on the 
 power of the President s judgment. The verdict of history 
 must be given in Mr. Adams s favor, so far as the general 
 policy towards France is concerned. Nor is the fact that 
 the nation generally sympathized with* his course any de 
 traction from his merit. Almost all the leaders of his party 
 opposed him. They were all men of ability and determina 
 tion, and they possessed an amount of political weight and 
 actual power that it is now difficult to conceive. In their 
 hands rested the power to ruin the President and destroy 
 the party, and it required as much boldness and tenacity of 
 purpose to resist them as to oppose the wishes of the great 
 est popular majority. There can be no doubt that Mr. 
 Adams acted wisely and patriotically, and that in opposing 
 his party on what might w^ell appear a doubtful question, 
 for the sake of his country, he displayed the highest courage. 
 This is sufficient praise for any statesman, but it is much 
 to be regretted that approbation of Mr. Adams s course 
 must stop here. The manner in which the policy was car 
 ried through was as wholly wrong as the policy itself was 
 wholly right. 
 
 The first and capital mistake was the President s refusal 
 to consult his secretaries. The condemnation of this step 
 may be drawn from Mr. Adams s own account : no other 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 197 
 
 testimony is needed. The letters to the " Boston Patriot " 
 are occupied principally with a very complete defence of the 
 general policy and sources of information leading to Mur 
 ray s nomination, and with violent, ill-timed, and distasteful 
 denunciations of Hamilton ; but they are singularly unsatis 
 factory on the all-important question of not consulting the 
 cabinet. 
 
 The defence made by Mr. Adams, on this point, substan 
 tially is that he knew the secretaries would oppose him 
 openly and secretly, and therefore deemed it useless to con 
 sult them. If this is the only defence, and it seems to be 
 so, it is really no defence at all. In every way, such a 
 step was a fatal and irretrievable blunder. Mr. Adams s 
 courage was undoubted, and of the highest kind ; yet this 
 avoidance of his secretaries gave an air of timidity and 
 evasion to the whole business. An appearance of weakness 
 was thereby communicated to an otherwise impregnable 
 position. Moreover, it infuriated his opponents in the cab 
 inet, estranged many men who might otherwise have been 
 conciliated, and left the moderate members of the party 
 entirely adrift. Stoddert says that, if Mr. Adams had con 
 sulted the cabinet, he would have had a majority in his 
 favor. This seems hardly probable ; but it is certain from 
 such a statement that Mr. Adams would have received the 
 support of at least two of his secretaries. Putting aside 
 the fact that it was the duty of the President to consult his 
 cabinet, it is nevertheless clear that such an omission was 
 a grave political blunder. The opposition which he antici 
 pated was embittered, not avoided, by the refusal to con 
 sult ; and Mr. Adams lost in this way the grand opportunity 
 of starting the measure with a portion of his cabinet pledged 
 to its support. Stoddert and Lee by no means relished the 
 domination of their colleague in the state department, and 
 were quite ready to accept the President s lead. But the 
 tacit rejection of their counsels forced them back into 
 a silent adhesion to Colonel Pickering. In a word, Mr. 
 
198 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 Adams was master of the situation ; and he threw away the 
 advantages of his position, by refusing to meet opposition 
 at the outset. He united -when he should have divided, 
 and he afterwards divided when he should have strained 
 every nerve to conciliate and to unite. 
 
 A partial explanation of the origin of these capital mis 
 takes may be found in the lack of tact, which is so striking 
 in Mr. Adams s character. But even the fact that he 
 could not deal with other men judiciously does not account 
 for his extraordinary mismanagement in this instance. 
 Every thing was in his favor, and yet he contrived to do 
 right only at the heavy expense of party ruin. A com 
 parison of the following letters of McHenry and Stoddert, 
 both moderate men, with those of Mr. Adams to the " Bos 
 ton Patriot, makes all the difficulties of the last Federalist 
 administration perfectly comprehensible. The want of 
 cordiality between the President and his advisers, which 
 existed from the beginning, becomes, from these letters, 
 more apparent than ever ; but the real secret is to be found 
 in the peculiar temperament of Mr. Adams. Not a sus 
 picious man by nature, but frank and open, almost to a 
 fault, if his distrust was once awakened, there were then no 
 bounds to his dark imaginings. He had a fair share of 
 jealousy in his composition, and a large amount of self- 
 confidence ; but the fatal element was the rapid process of 
 mental exaggeration. When this once began, there were 
 no limits ; and he supplemented this imaginative power by 
 an absolute and honest conviction of the truth of the con 
 ceptions he had himself framed. In the affair of the 
 major-generals, he ran sharply against the opposition of 
 Colonel Pickering; and he felt at that time that the 
 influence of the leaders was brought to bear against him. 
 So far, all was natural. This was not the first nor the last 
 time that cabinet officers resisted their superior, or that 
 party leaders had striven to control their chief. But Mr. 
 Adams did not stop here, and endeavor, as a more astute 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 199 
 
 man would have done, to quietly frustrate and disarm his 
 opponents. He resisted stubbornly, and yielded only under 
 pressure ; and then he proceeded to account for his troubles, 
 after his own fashion. We can see in the letters to the 
 " Boston Patriot," with shadows deepened by the lapse of 
 time, the picture which Mr. Adams drew, in his own mind, 
 of his opponents and their arrangements. Jealousy led him 
 to suppose Hamilton his great enemy. Hence Hamilton 
 was the Deus ex machina who guided the cabinet, the 
 " mightier spirit " who moved the political puppets. Ham 
 ilton, thirsting after empire, and seeking to rise upon the 
 ruins of the republic, was the central figure in the back 
 ground. Then came the cabinet, organized in a compact 
 conspiracy against him ; then the Federalist leaders, in the 
 part of assistant conspirators, and the Senate and the press 
 as their adjuncts. Now if this description be compared 
 with HcHenry s and Stoddert s letters, the conspiracy van 
 ishes, the organized cabinet disappears, and we find that 
 one certainly, and probably two, of the secretaries, had no 
 knowledge even of Hamilton s opinion. Instead of Ham 
 ilton as the leader of opposition, it is clear, from all the 
 sources, that Colonel Pickering was far more entitled to 
 that place, and that it was he who aspired to lead the party, 
 and control not only the President, but Hamilton himself. 
 As to Hamilton s dreams of empire, this is not the place for 
 a discussion of them ; but, whoever the dreamer was in this 
 case, the delusions remained delusions, and nothing more. 
 So long as Mr. Adams merely amused himself by construct 
 ing these theories, no harm was done ; but, unluckily, he 
 acted upon them as if they were as well established as the 
 movement of the tides. Thus it was that, on the theory of 
 a conspiracy, he refused to consult his cabinet, and by unit 
 ing his cabinet and the party leaders on a perfectly tenable 
 ground did much to give reality to his own preconceived 
 ideas. There was opposition to Mr. Adams, in the cabinet 
 and in the party, from the time of the affair of the major- 
 
200 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 generals; and it rapidly hardened and consolidated. But 
 neither an organized opposition of the whole cabinet, nor 
 a combined and extended confederation among the leaders 
 to control the executive, seems ever to have existed, except 
 in the mind of Mr. Adams himself. His own vehement 
 temperament, his uncompromising disposition, and his rapid 
 conversion of simple incidents into extensive and portentous 
 combinations were his worst enemies. 
 
 STODDERT TO JOHN ADAMS. 
 
 BLADENSBURG, 12th October, 1809. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Until within a few days, I had only seen detached 
 parts of your letters published in the " Boston Patriot." I have 
 now a pamphlet containing eighteen letters : I presume the first 
 eighteen you sent to the press. I do not know that more have been 
 published. 
 
 It was impossible for me to read these letters, and subscribe to 
 their justice, at least, so far as they respect myself. You have 
 connected me with acts in which I had no concern. You have pro 
 duced an impression that there was not one head of a department 
 under your administration who felt the obligation imposed on him 
 by his official situation to be faithful to your reputation, as well as 
 to the public interest ; and you give too much countenance to an 
 opinion, that the heads of departments, if not themselves the blind 
 partisans of a foreign government, were under the influence the 
 contemptible tools of men who were. 
 
 For myself I say, and I appeal to every part of my conduct for 
 the verity of what I say, that you have done me the highest injus 
 tice ; that never did I forget I was bound by honor to protect your 
 reputation so long as I remained your confidential adviser. Nor 
 am I so nice a casuist as to be able to discern at what period since, 
 the obligation, which I cannot but consider in some degree mutual 
 between a President and a head of a department, ceased. That 
 in no instance did an overweening partiality for any foreign gov 
 ernment make me lose sight for a moment of the honor or the 
 interest of my own. As to General Hamilton, I scarcely knew 
 him ; and perhaps my crime as to him was that, though believing 
 highly of the brilliancy of his talents and of his sincere patriotism 
 
1799.1 SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 201 
 
 and honorable principles, I never entertained an exalted opinion of 
 his discretion or the solidity of his judgment, and always thought 
 it unfortunate for the Federal party, and of course for the coun 
 try, for I believe the views of that party have always been 
 directed to the best interests of the country, that the opinions of 
 this gentleman were deemed so oracular. 
 
 But to come to facts. You say the five heads of departments 
 were unanimously against the appointment of Mr. Gerry, " and 
 you were shocked at such inveterate prejudices ; " in another place, 
 " None but the friends of Hamilton would go down with the heads 
 of departments." It was not until June, 1798, that I had the mis 
 fortune to be called to office. Well may I say " misfortune," for 
 such I have ever since found it. Mr. Gerry, I believe, was ap 
 pointed in 1797 : he had long been in France. Before I was in 
 office, and until I was in office, there were but four heads of depart 
 ments. 
 
 In the nomination of Mr. Murray to France, you say : " You 
 knew the sentiments of all your ministers, and the secret motives 
 that governed them better than they did themselves. You knew, 
 if you had asked their advice, three of them would very laconically 
 protest against the measure : the other two would have been loath 
 to dissent from their brethren, and would more modestly and mildly 
 concur with them. The consequence would be that the whole 
 would be instantly communicated to A, B, C, D, &c., the public 
 and the presses would have it at once, and such a clamor raised as 
 to excite the Senate to put their negative upon the whole plan." 
 Against the justice of this whole charge and every part of it impli 
 cating me, I solemnly protest. Prior to this time, I do not believe 
 I had met in cabinet more than three times, except on the subject 
 of the commission under the British treaty. Once, I recollect, there 
 was a meeting in consequence of the Pennsylvania insurrection, 1 
 on which occasion the departments were not unanimous in advising 
 the course to be pursued. I well remember that the majority was 
 against my opinion, as to the importance proper to be given to the 
 governor of the State in suppressing that insurrection. Oh that 
 you had adopted the opinion of the majority ! This was a matter 
 of no little importance ; but I mention it merely to show that there 
 was not that weak, criminal acquiescence of some of the heads of 
 departments to the opinions of others which you describe. 
 
 But on this particular subject, the nomination of Mr. Murray 
 
 * The Fries rebellion. 
 
202 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 to France: I had never seen, prior to his nomination, his letter 
 to you, the only circumstance which made the measure a proper 
 one. Of course, you could not have known what my opinion would 
 have been with that document before me. One or two days after 
 the nomination, you showed me the letter, and voluntarily entered 
 into some explanation why you had taken the step without consult 
 ing the heads of departments. It is not necessary, nor would my 
 memory enable me, to repeat all that passed on that occasion. You 
 had reason to believe I did not hold myself at liberty to oppose 
 a measure of yours and retain my office ; and I strongly advised 
 you, since the nomination of Mr. Murray was made, to adhere to it, 
 expressing my conviction that the Senate would acquiesce. You 
 were then determined to adhere ; but afterwards, and perhaps 
 more wisely, though I think at the expense of some personal 
 dignity, made a modification of your message. 
 
 Until this time and, indeed, during the whole time I was in 
 office my own department required my whole attention, and I 
 had as little leisure as inclination to attend to the affairs of other 
 departments. Before I entered into office, the only system I ever 
 knew of, as to our foreign relations, had been formed ; and this 
 system was to be found in the laws and in the public acts of the 
 executives. I heard of no intended deviation from it from you, 
 or from any of the heads of departments. It had been determined 
 to resist the aggressions of France, but to leave wide open the 
 door of reconciliation with perfect honor. A majority of a caucus, 
 composed entirely of Federal members of the two Houses, would 
 not agree to a declaration of war ; and the result of the meeting 
 showed too plainly to be mistaken by the President that it was his 
 duty to avail himself of the first fair opportunity that presented 
 for seeking reconciliation, without debasement. The Democratic 
 party was certainly averse to war ; so was the Federal party, if 
 war could be avoided without dishonor. 
 
 In this view of the subject, and to my understanding it is a 
 true one, I cannot conceive how you could have avoided insti 
 tuting a negotiation on the receipt of Mr. Murray s letter ; nor can 
 I perceive on what ground the five heads of departments, or any 
 of them, would have given their advice against the measure, had 
 they been consulted. All might not have agreed in the nomi 
 nation of Mr. Murray, but I am convinced there would have been 
 a majority for his appointment. It was the manner and not the 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 203 
 
 matter of that measure, the holding them up to the world as per 
 sons in whom you could not confide in a thing that might lead to 
 peace with France, that created the dissatisfaction on the part of 
 the heads of departments, and the opposition if there really was 
 opposition through their means. 
 
 To say there was not great dissatisfaction would be uncandid. 
 It was not possible there should not be, if the heads of depart 
 ments possessed the feelings of men fit for exalted stations. I felt 
 it myself, though perhaps having the least right of any to feel it, 
 if from no other cause, from the short time I had been in office, 
 and my little experience as a statesman ; and I deliberated seri 
 ously with myself whether it did not become me at once to resign 
 my office. Not resigning, there was, according to my own notions 
 of right, which will always govern my own conduct, but one proper 
 course for me to pursue : to act always as if the measure of a new 
 negotiation with France had been taken with my advice. 
 
 Some other things I would notice, but I fear I have already 
 exhausted your patience. I must, however, say a word as to the 
 meeting at Trenton, and the letter from the five heads of depart 
 ments. Of the letter, I will only say that I have entirely forgot 
 ten its contents, if it advised a relinquishment of the measure of 
 the mission, or any thing more than a short suspension of it, in 
 consequence of the then uncertain state of France. I wish the 
 letter had been published. When you arrived at Trenton, the 
 causes that had produced the letter had in some degree subsided, 
 and it was less proper to suspend the mission than it had appeared 
 to be a few weeks before ; and, for rny own part, I then thought 
 it most proper the mission should proceed. If I did not say so to 
 you, it was because there was no occasion for it. You came to 
 Trenton seemingly determined. The departments met you to con 
 sider the instructions to the ministers, but never I think to discuss 
 the propriety of sending on the mission ; and I believe you have 
 been mistaken in ascribing to the heads of departments language 
 held with you by General Hamilton and others at Trenton. I 
 pretend not, however, to know the language held by others. 
 I know such language was not held by me. 
 
 Yours, &c. BEN. STODDERT. 
 
204 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 MCHENRY TO PICKERING. 
 
 NEAR BALTIMORE, Feb. 23, 1811. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Your last letter is dated the 13th instant. I 
 return you its enclosures ; viz., Mr. Stoddert s letter to Mr. John 
 Adams, dated the 12th, and Mr. Adams s answer, dated the 30th 
 October, 1809, with Mr. Stoddert s to you, dated 11 February, 
 1811. I hope you will not be displeased at my having taken 
 copies of them. 
 
 I have at length procured Mr. Adams s printed correspondence 
 with the editor of the " Boston Patriot," in eighteen letters. 
 From the cursory reading, I perceive he has fallen into many 
 errors, some important forgetfulness, and not a few striking mis 
 representations, to say nothing of his coarse and unmanly abuse 
 of a deceased statesman. 
 
 How many recollections have these puerile letters awakened ! 
 Still, in his own opinion, the greatest man of the age, I see he 
 will carry with him to the grave his vanity, his weaknesses and fol 
 lies, specimens of which we have so often witnessed, and always 
 endeavored to veil from the public. 
 
 In letter No. 10, Mr. Adams, speaking of the second abortive 
 mission to France, observes : " I mentioned Mr. Dana and Mr. 
 Gerry to the heads of departments, and many leading men in 
 both houses. They all preferred Mr. Dana. But it was evident 
 enough to me that neither Dana nor Gerry was their man. Dana 
 was appointed, and refused. I then called the heads of depart 
 ments together, and proposed Mr. Gerry. All five were unani 
 mously against him. Such inveterate prejudice shocked me. I 
 said nothing, but I was determined I would not be the slave 
 of it." 
 
 This statement wants correctness. Mr. Stoddert, in his letter 
 to Mr. Adams (above mentioned), denies the possibility of his 
 being present, as his appointment of Secretary of the Navy did 
 not take place till some time after. I well remember the meeting, 
 for I have often thought of it since. It was composed of Mr. 
 Wolcott, yourself, Mr. Lee, and myself. Mr. Adams, in a familiar 
 way, said, " Gentlemen, what think you of Mr. Gerry for the mis 
 sion ? " None of the gentlemen offering to speak, I observed : " I 
 have served in the old Congress with Mr. Gerry. If, sir, it was 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 205 
 
 a desirable thing to distract the mission, a fitter person could not, 
 perhaps, be found. It is ten to one against his agreeing with his 
 colleagues." Mr. Wolcott made some remark. Mr. Lee and you 
 were silent. Mr. Adams replied : " Mr. Gerry was an honest and 
 firm man, on whom French arts could have no effect. He had 
 known him long, and knew him well." Nothing more was said 
 on the subject, but I soon discovered that to controvert his wishes 
 was next to incurring his enmity. Mr. Gerry was appointed with 
 Mr. Marshall and General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. 
 
 Justly offended at the treatment these gentlemen met with in 
 France, it drew from him his celebrated declaration to Congress 
 (21 June, 1798), "I will never send another minister to France, 
 without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored 
 as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent 
 nation." 
 
 I shall not pretend to penetrate into all the motives that weighed 
 with Mr. Adams, to retire from the ground of this declaration, and 
 send a third mission to France. He acknowledges he concealed 
 his intention from the heads of departments, and signifies that he 
 w r as equally careful not to intrust it with any member (meaning 
 Federal members) of either branch of Congress. " I knew (Letter 
 XI.) if I called the heads of departments together, and asked their 
 advice, three of them (meaning you, Mr. Wolcott, and myself) 
 would very laconically protest against the measure : the other two 
 would more modestly and mildly concur with them." The conse 
 quence, he adds, would be that the thing would be instantly com 
 municated to members of Congress, and a clamor raised against it 
 in the newspapers, all which would probably have excited the 
 Senate to put their negative on the measure. 
 
 Such are Mr. Adams s reasons for not making confidants, on this 
 occasion, of the heads of departments. Having treated us in this 
 account as well as he did his best friends in Congress, ought we 
 not to thank him, and be satisfied ? 
 
 With respect to the mission itself, he rests its propriety on 
 letters written by Mr. Barlow and Mr. Codman, and twenty others, 
 whose names I have forgotten ; and on Pichon s, transmitted by 
 Mr. Murray, coaxing and wheedling for another experiment, all 
 of which found their way to the President, who did not or would 
 not perceive that the object of the French government in this 
 machinery was to obtain instead of being obliged to send a minis- 
 
206 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 ter, which must have taken place but for his precipitancy in catch 
 ing the bait. That there was an undercurrent in this business, 
 you are not unapprised ; an understanding, I mean, with others, 
 if not with the Federal members of Congress. I shall therefore 
 only observe that Mr. Adams furnishes positive proof that he did 
 not put confidence in these letters or any of them. 
 
 The proof I allude to will be found in his two messages to the 
 Senate. They are, one nominating Mr. Murray, dated Feb. 8, 
 1789, the other joining with Mr. Murray, Judge Ellsworth, and 
 Patrick Henry, dated Feb. 28, 1799. "If the Senate," says 
 the first message, " shall advi-se and consent to this appointment, 
 effectual care shall be taken in his instructions that he shall not 
 go to France without direct and unequivocal assurances from the 
 French government, signifying that he shall be received in charac 
 ter, shall enjoy the privileges attached to his character by the law 
 of nations, and that a minister of equal rank, title, and powers, 
 shall be appointed to treat with him, to discuss and conclude all 
 controversies between the two republics by a new treaty." " It is 
 not intended," says the second message, " that the two former 
 gentlemen will embark for Europe until they shall have received 
 from the executive directory assurances, signified by their secre 
 tary of foreign relations, that they shall be received in char 
 acter," &c. 
 
 The condition here annexed, as a prerequisite to the envoys, 
 going to France, being of the same import in the first as in the 
 second message, it cannot be said to have been inserted at the 
 instance of the heads of departments, or any Federal member of 
 Congress ; for Mr. Adams expressly says (Letter XL) he concealed 
 his intention to send a mission from them all. On his own show 
 ing, therefore, he considered the measure, at the moment of recom 
 mending it to the Senate, as resting on sand and of dubious issue. 
 Had he thought otherwise, he would not have employed his pre 
 cautionary proviso. 
 
 In Letter V., he states that the articles of instruction for this 
 mission were unanimously agreed upon, to his intense satisfaction, 
 and committed to the Secretary of State, who, by the by, had 
 framed them to be reduced into a proper form, and transmitted to 
 him at Quincy, "for revision, correction, or signature, as there 
 might be occasion ; " but that, instead of them, he received a letter 
 signed by all five of the heads of departments, earnestly entreating 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 207 
 
 him to suspend the mission ; that, upon receipt thereof, he instantly 
 determined to go " to Trenton, meet the gentlemen face to face, 
 confer with them coolly on the subject, and convince them, or be 
 convinced by them, if he could." What followed this determina 
 tion ? He arrives at Trenton, ill of the yellow fever, or something, 
 as he says, very like it, which he had caught at Hartford. " 111 as 
 I was, I sent for the heads of departments. Four of them were 
 there. The Attorney- General was gone to Virginia. Many days 
 were employed, sometimes at my own apartments, and sometimes 
 at their offices." Everybody at Trenton, he continues, seemed to 
 be of opinion that the first arrivals from England would bring the 
 news that Louis XVIII. was restored to the throne of France. 
 Suwarrow, at the head of a Russian army, was to have marched 
 from Italy to Paris, on one side, and Prince Charles, through 
 Germany to Paris, on the other; and detachments from both 
 armies to Havre, to receive the king, who was to be brought over 
 by a British fleet, and escorted with flying colors to Versailles. I 
 could scarcely believe my senses, when I heard such reveries. Yet 
 the heads of departments appeared to believe them, and urged 
 them as decisive arguments for suspending the embarkation of our 
 envoys till the spring. In vain did I urge the immense distances 
 the two imperial armies had to march, the great number of towns 
 and cities in the route of both, in positions chosen with great skill, 
 fortified with exquisite art, defended by vast trains of heavy 
 ordnance, garrisoned by numerous troops of soldiers, perfectly 
 disciplined and animated with all the obstinacy and ardor of the 
 Revolutionary spirit. In vain did I allege the military maxim which 
 would certainly govern both Prince Charles and Suwarrow, that 
 is, never to leave a fortified city in the rear of your army in 
 possession of your enemy ; that the siege of one town would con 
 sume the whole season ; that neither the Russians nor Austrians 
 were probably provided with mortars and heavy cannons neces 
 sary for sieges. Nothing would do: Louis XVIII. must be upon 
 the throne of France. Well, suppose he is : what harm will there 
 be in embarking our envoys ? They will congratulate his Majesty ; 
 and if his Majesty cannot receive them under their credentials to 
 the French republic, he will be glad to see them in his kingdom, 
 and assure them of his royal protection till they can write home 
 for fresh commissions, and such shall be ready for them at a min 
 ute s warning. In vain did I urge the entire change of property 
 
208 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 in France, and the necessity the present possessors were under to 
 defend themselves at every sacrifice and risk. 
 
 To this detail, this minuteness of time, place, and argument, Mr. 
 Stoddert in his letter to Mr. Adams (above quoted) replies that 
 not a word of all this passed at those meetings or conferences with 
 the heads of departments. My recollection entirely coincides with 
 Mr. Stoddert s. No discussion of the kind here mentioned hap 
 pened, nor was the question of suspension ever touched on by any 
 head of a department or by Mr. Adams at any of our meetings. 
 The few official meetings we had at Trenton were exclusively em 
 ployed in revising the instructions which had been agreed to in 
 Philadelphia. On any thing relative to the question of suspension, 
 the heads of departments observed a profound silence. We had 
 respectfully offered our opinion, which terminated our duty, and 
 had obtained, as I conceived, his final answer in a letter written 
 after his receipt of ours, directing a draft of the instructions, in 
 which he intimates that the departure of the envoys would be sus 
 pended for some time. Why has Mr. Adams omitted any notice 
 of this fact ? And why has he not favored the public with our 
 joint letter recommending the suspension ? Surely, this was a 
 document important to his argument, and which fairness of repre 
 sentation required to be produced. It ought to exhibit the reasons 
 that operated on those who signed it, and must be considered as 
 the best interpreter of their thoughts. As instructed by my mem 
 ory, it was very short. It could not therefore have contained half 
 the trash put into our mouths by Mr. Adams. He also appears to 
 have forgotten that, before the supplementary envoys sailed from 
 the United States, information was received of a new revolution in 
 the French government. This we had expected ; and this event, 
 had it pleased Mr. Adams to have produced our joint letter, it 
 would have been seen, had the greatest weight in our recommenda 
 tion. Was it possible for the most clear-sighted politician to 
 anticipate that the envoys would be received and respected as such 
 by the new revolutionists ? 
 
 Throughout these letters, Mr. Adams affects to consider a Presi 
 dent of the United States as every thing in government, and the 
 heads of departments little more than mere clerks. I cannot sub 
 scribe to this hypothesis Do not the heads of departments, like 
 him, hold a high and responsible station in government ? In offer 
 ing advice to a President, do they not perform an incumbent duty ? 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 209 
 
 What more did we do ? Less we ought not to have done. Not, 
 therefore, to our recommendations or advice, but to his own way 
 ward disposition, his own wavering and changeable policy, are to 
 be charged the humiliations our country has since experienced, and 
 the ruin of the great Federal temple erected by Washington. 
 
 Mr. Adams talks much of his system of policy respecting foreign 
 nations. His system and ours for some years were the same. 
 Ours was General Washington s. We held with him that we 
 ought never to quit our own to stand upon foreign ground ; under 
 no pretext to weave our destiny with that of any European power ; 
 that our true policy was to avoid permanent alliances with any 
 portion of the foreign world ; to trust to temporary ones for ex 
 traordinary emergencies, and to suitable military establishments, 
 to enable us to act up to and avail ourselves of our maxims. 
 Three of the gentlemen who were heads of departments with Mr. 
 Adams were also heads of departments with General Washington. 
 These gentlemen could never for a moment depart from his 
 maxims ; they were the soul of their system ; they could not tear 
 them from their hearts, and retain their honor and integrity ; they 
 held them to be the only sound ones for their country, the only 
 ones proper for the guidance of our foreign affairs, and in no in 
 stance did they ever advise or countenance a departure from them. 
 I cast back on my accuser all insinuations to the contrary. 
 
 I cannot close this letter, notwithstanding it is already longer than 
 I intended when I sat down to write, without adverting to his entire 
 misconception of the cause of General Hamilton s appearing at 
 Trenton, who he says arrived there a few hours before him, and 
 was brought there to persuade him to countermand the mission. I 
 have, be assured, no reason or ground for supposing that the Gen 
 eral was apprised or had any knowledge of the President s ap 
 proach ; and I know the business that occasioned his coming to 
 Trenton was with my department. If he had any other, I am 
 totally ignorant of it. Being in Trenton, it was proper he should 
 visit Mr. Adams. If the mission became a subject of their con 
 versation, does it follow that it was his errand to argue him out 
 of it ? This, to say no worse of it, is miserable logic. General 
 Hamilton never mentioned to me what passed at his visit, or 
 whether any thing was said respecting the mission. The fact is, 
 to complete his instructions to General Wilkinson, who was to be 
 disposed on the frontiers, it was necessary to consult my depart- 
 
 14 
 
210 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 ment. For this purpose, General Hamilton had my permission to 
 come to Trenton, and I certainly had a right to give it. 
 
 Mr. Adams, for reasons best known to himself, endeavors to 
 represent General Hamilton as a man without fair pretensions to 
 sound judgments or useful talents, a visionary politician consumed 
 by indelicate pleasures and a censurable ambition. Far be it from 
 me to attempt to palliate pleasures, the indulgence in which Mr. 
 Hamilton himself publicly lamented. Has Mr. Adams the mag 
 nanimity to acknowledge his early or his later failings? Is he 
 sure that his own judgment and genius can stand a comparison 
 with Hamilton s, or will leave behind them to posterity as useful 
 results ? Were their respective literary productions to be exam 
 ined in the court of criticism, which, think you, would obtain most 
 suffrages, those wearisome accounts of governments ancient and 
 modern, that cold collection of other men s thoughts, " The Defence 
 of the American Constitutions," or those well-sustained papers 
 in the " Federalist," known to be written by Hamilton ? In 
 his diplomatic correspondence, we meet with nothing beyond the 
 reach of an ordinary mind, arid with follies into which an ordinary 
 mind would never fall. Can aught found in these letters be drawn 
 into competition with Hamilton s reports to Congress on the most 
 important branches of finance and legislation, those prescient 
 measures, without a single exception, such as an enlightened people 
 should have clung to and perpetuated? As to their minds ab 
 stractedly considered, Hamilton s was profound, penetrating, and 
 invariably sound, and his genius of that rare kind which enlight 
 ens the judgment without misleading it ; the mind of Mr. Adams, 
 like the last glimmering of a lamp, feeble, wavering, and unsteady, 
 with occasionally a strong flash of light, his genius little, and that 
 little insufficient to irradiate his judgment. 
 
 This letter has grown to too great a length. I have more to 
 say, but it would be tiresome to extend it further. It might also 
 be useless, for in a few passing years the eighteen letters will 
 perhaps be neither read nor remembered. 
 
 I am, dear sir, now and always, 
 
 Your sincere and affectionate friend, JAMES McHENRY. 
 
 The mischief of Mr. Adams s treatment of his secretaries 
 seems to have impressed Mr. Cabot much more strongly 
 than it did the other party leaders. Colonel Pickering, for 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FKANCE. 211 
 
 example, regarded it apparently as a mere wanton insult ; 
 and he dwelt upon it as a circumstance winch relieved him 
 from all responsibility, and ought therefore, in justice to 
 himself, to be generally known. Mr. Cabot, on the other 
 hand, saw clearly that by it the safety, indeed the very 
 existence, of the party was menaced, and that the evils 
 necessarily resulting from such difficulties would be thereby 
 increased tenfold. 
 
 Indeed, so great was the importance which he attached 
 to this breach between the President and the secretaries, 
 that, after the first access of disappointment on hearing of 
 Murray s nomination, it excluded even the fears awakened 
 by the sudden reversal of his own most cherished policy. 
 In a letter to Colonel Pickering, Mr. Cabot says : 
 
 " I feel more apprehension of mischiefs which are yet to arise 
 from the same cause that produced the nomination of Mr. Murray 
 than from the nomination itself. I perceive that a dangerous divi 
 sion of the supporters of the government may take place," &c. 1 
 
 Again he says, in the same letter : 
 
 " There seems to be no ground for expecting consistency in our 
 administration, while the false and dangerous dogma is maintained 
 that the President is to decide upon great national measures with 
 out first availing himself of the fullest information and judgment 
 of others. No man could be safely trusted that should practise 
 upon this vain idea. The greatest men and the best governments 
 have been those who have known how to profit most by the talents 
 of others." 2 
 
 In a letter to Mr. Gore, he observes : 
 
 " A just sentiment of personal dignity and official independence 
 would be satisfied to act rightly, after having heard all that could 
 be said by those it might consult. The truest greatness is that 
 which knows best how to avail itself of the best talents of others. 
 It is sufficient that a man is superior to menace or entreaty, and 
 that after hearing his counsellors he should feel superior to personal 
 influence, but never to the authority of reason and truth." 3 
 
 i See p. 226. 2 See p. 227. See p. 231. 
 
212 LIFE AND LETTEBS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 From these extracts, it is evident that the event most 
 dreaded by Mr. Cabot was a division in the party so in 
 curable that it could lead only to destruction. From this 
 feeling, he suppressed a series of papers which he had pre 
 pared for publication, because he feared that the strictures 
 on the French policy reflected on the President. He also 
 urged upon his friends the adoption of a similar course. 
 
 In a letter to Colonel Pickering, he says : 
 
 " I have always objected to those newspaper discussions which 
 must necessarily implicate the President, and I think some humili 
 ation ought to be submitted to rather than depart from this salu 
 tary respect ; but I fear the mistaken zeal of personal friends will 
 finally draw out those who think they act upon the broadest prin 
 ciples of the public good." 1 
 
 Mr. Cabot appreciated the " dictatorial " temper of the 
 Federalists, he perceived how dangerous the " rivalry " among 
 the leaders was, and he therefore strove to assuage as far as 
 he could the violence of the feelings which had been gen 
 erated. From such motives as well as on general principles, 
 he strenuously opposed Colonel Pickering s theory, that the 
 Senate ought to interfere with a nomination because it was 
 the precursor of a policy they disliked. On the other side, 
 Mr. Cabot feared the influence of Mr. Adams s harsh speeches 
 directed against all who differed from him in opinion ; and 
 he especially dreaded the course pursued by Mr. Adams s 
 personal partisans. He believed, and rightly, that the 
 truest and best supporters of the President were to be 
 found now, as formerly, among those men who were at 
 the moment opposed to the French mission. In short, Mr. 
 Cabot, bitterly as he disliked the new French policy, wished 
 to heal the wounds that had been inflicted, and to hold the 
 party together, even at the expense of personal sacrifices. 
 He saw in the Federalists the best and wisest defenders of 
 order and good government, and esteemed their political 
 ascendancy too highly to be willing to risk its continuance 
 through a difference of opinion on any single point, 
 i See p. 226. 
 
1799.] SECOND MISSION TO FRANCE. 213 
 
 Such a hope was vain from the characters of the principal 
 men engaged in the contest. To Hamilton has usually been 
 attributed the deadly hostility which finally ruined Mr. 
 Adams and the party ; but Hamilton came upon the scene 
 only at the last moment. A much more reckless enemy 
 than Hamilton had already made the tragic denouement 
 inevitable. Colonel Pickering was at first, and for some 
 time continued to be, the real leader in the opposition to the 
 President. Bold, ambitious, determined, Colonel Pickering 
 had come to believe himself master of the party and 
 of the administration. He awoke suddenly to the con 
 sciousness of defeat and humiliation, and from that moment 
 his one thought was to_de_stro.y the President. By highly 
 abusive letters scattered Mbrojadcast through the land, he 
 endeavored to inflame all the leading Federalists with 
 the same personal resentment toward the President that 
 he himself felt. Unluckily, he found ready listeners ; and, 
 still more unluckily, Mr. Adams greatly assisted the benev 
 olent objects of his secretary. Colonel Pickering s attacks 
 were soon brought to the President s ears, and he retorted 
 by sweeping condemnations of all who opposed him. Both 
 Colonel Pickering and Mr. Adams were, like most of the New 
 England Federalists, given over to the belief that all who 
 differed from them in opinion were little less than criminals 
 and traitors. There was a healthy Puritan spirit about such 
 a condition of mind, but it did not conduce to the pacifica 
 tion of party dissensions: and, with two such combatants 
 fighting, it became difficult to maintain general harmony. 
 Men whom Colonel Pickering s own appeals could not rouse 
 were stung by the accusations of being a " British faction." 
 There was nothing Mr. Cabot more dreaded than the 
 revival of this old and bitter cry; for it was one which 
 aroused the worst passions on all sides, and shut the door 
 on peace. Those upon whom Mr. Adams was said to fix 
 the name were men who had fought through the Revolu 
 tion^ and who had dragged the country out of the sloughs 
 
214 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 of the Confederacy. It had been applied to the same 
 men years before, by Mr. Jefferson ; and the persons 
 then attacked had keenly felt all the bitter injustice of 
 the charge. Loose accusations of treason do immeasurable 
 harm, and no good : they lower party warfare to a mere 
 interchange of abuse ; and in this case, as in all others, they 
 were productive of the greatest disasters. Mr. Cabot clearly 
 foresaw the evils of such venomous attacks, which he attrib 
 uted to Gerry and to the little knot of men of similar 
 capacity, who were at that moment the President s most 
 noisy and violent supporters. Thus it happened that every 
 one added fuel to the already hot fire, and in rousing the 
 bitterest animosities Colonel Pickering proved only too 
 successful. Those whom he could not personally influence 
 were affected by the retorts which his assaults drew from 
 the President. 
 
 Thus, with matters growing steadily worse for the Fed 
 eralists, the spring and summer of 1799 passed aw^ay. The 
 war party put every engine in motion to influence and 
 restrain the President. Through every channel, they sought 
 to dissuade him from his project ; but they merely excited 
 still further a naturally jealous temperament, and effected 
 nothing. No one of them apparently perceived that the 
 policy was too obviously wise to be abandoned, and that all 
 attempts to block proceedings simply made a bad business 
 worse. 1 A temporary suspension of the mission gave a 
 gleam of hope that they might succeed, but at the last 
 moment the President despatched the envoys without a 
 word to any one. It was but a repetition of the old story. 
 Mr. Adams, confident that he was right, persisted in his 
 policy ; and we must admire his constancy, judgment, and 
 
 1 McHenry and Stoddert both claim that, after the policy was decided, 
 the only wish of the cabinet was to suspend the mission. This proves that 
 there was not that organized, united resistance in the cabinet at Trenton 
 which Mr. Adams imagined he perceived ; but I feel convinced that Picker 
 ing, at least, did not until the last moment abandon his efforts to wholly 
 defeat the despatch of the commission, and that he also believed himself 
 master of the whole cabinet. 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 215 
 
 patriotism. But he did the right thing in such a wrong 
 way, he displayed so little address, so little regard for the 
 feelings or opinions of others, that he alienated all and 
 conciliated none. On the other side was Pickering rag 
 ing at the President, and determined to crush him at all 
 hazards. One leader after another was drawn into the 
 fight ; and the Federalist party entered upon the new 
 century with a Presidential election before them, and 
 distracted by the deepest and bitterest animosities. The 
 prospect was not cheering, nor were its sinister auguries 
 belied in the events which followed. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 4, 1799. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I enclose you two pamphlets : one, of Mr. Gerry s 
 communication, to which Skipwith s are annexed ; the other my 
 report upon them, in which I was naturally led to bring into view 
 some things before made public. 
 
 I was mortified that some remarks on Gerry s conduct and 
 opinions were excluded : you will be at no loss to account for this 
 exclusion. The enclosed paper will show you how the report 
 stood when it went from my hands. I was not solicitous, how 
 ever, for retaining any other passages than those noted as I., K., 
 and M., on pages 15, 17, and 19. I proposed a substitute for 
 " 5. Because, &c.," to this effect : " 5. Because Mr. Gerry has 
 expressed his opinion that before the arrival of the despatches 
 of the envoys the minister appeared to him sincere, and anxious 
 to obtain a reconciliation, an opinion which a candid exami 
 nation of those despatches, and of his own correspondence, will 
 show to be erroneous ; " but 1 could not prevail. It was this un 
 founded but dangerous opinion which first induced me to think of 
 making a report. I more than ever regret the exclusions, since 
 you inform me of the " chilling fogs of Gerryism." But. now that 
 his silly budget is before the public, he is fair game for the at 
 tack of every man of discernment who feels his country dishonored 
 by the folly and perverseness of that " make-weight." 
 
 Either you or Mr. Higginson have written me a few weeks 
 since about the President s speech, in that part which relates to 
 
216 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 the sending another ambassador to France. We were anxious that 
 it should have a different form ; we wished it to be peremptory, 
 not to send another ; and we are unanimously of that opinion, 
 but . My only hope now is that despots will have too much 
 pride to give a direct and official assurance that a minister shall be 
 received, &c. ; and on the conditions explicitly mentioned which 
 a negotiation must embrace, but which they will have no desire to 
 concede. But, those fellows are so debased by gains, I am not 
 very sanguine that they will riot stoop to any measure which may 
 authorize the expectation of negotiating, in order to prevent our 
 placing ourselves in a more warlike attitude. We shall not be safe 
 until we assume that posture. A treaty, if considered on terms 
 perfectly agreeable to us, would not give us security, nay, the 
 more satisfactory to us, the more likely to be broken by the " Great 
 Nation," whose government would easily find a pretext. In the 
 summer of 1797, the Portuguese minister had paid his money and 
 concluded a treaty, which was drawn out ready for signature ; but 
 the next morning the Directory required new conditions, and be 
 cause D Arunjo refused to comply, he was ordered to leave France. 
 He went to the Hague, and related the fact to Mr. Murray. 
 
 I must beg you to make my apology to Mr. Higgirison and 
 one is due to you also for several letters which remain unan 
 swered. I really want time. 
 
 Believe me very sincerely yours, T. PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 BROOKLINE, Feb 14, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your favor of the 4th was handed me last 
 evening, and though the pamphlets do not accompany it, yet this 
 was the less to be regretted, because I have read over again and 
 again and again the excellent report of the Secretary of State on 
 French affairs, which you were so kind as to enclose to me on the 
 day of its publication. 
 
 I had suspected that the " Lover of Truth " would be restrained 
 from telling all he knew, and from exciting all our just sentiments 
 by freely expressing his own. I think, however, his task has been 
 well performed, and that he has effectually dispelled the fogs which 
 chilled the upper part of our atmosphere. I think it impossible 
 for any man of common sense to avoid seeing that Gerry is too 
 great a fool to have been employed by a wise government in a 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 217 
 
 business of so much consequence. Moderate men feel themselves 
 compelled to admit that he cannot be acquitted of criminality but 
 at the entire expense of his understanding. But, although public 
 opinion cannot be misled concerning his merits, it is feared that 
 his conduct has already produced essential mischief. It is appre 
 hended that those who have had too strong a desire to vindicate 
 Mr. Gerry have necessarily adopted his inconsistency. How are 
 we to understand the practicability of a safe, pacific system of in 
 tercourse with those whose object is universal domination, and 
 whose means are fraud and perfidy as well as force ? The spirit 
 of our country was once so depressed that every thing was to be 
 feared, but the transactions of the last year had lighted up a hope 
 ful fire which promised a perennial and salutary warmth. From 
 the commencement of our present session of Congress, the ardor 
 of our citizens has been damped to a degree that threatened the 
 return of our former dangers. I hope we are again recovering, 
 but the proper temper of the nation cannot be revived without 
 new and open outrages on the part of France. So dangerous is it 
 to check the spirit of a just indignation, which was given to man 
 to guard him against the insolence and tyranny of his fellows. I 
 regret this falling off the more, because it will sink our reputation 
 abroad ; and reputation is power. The statesmen of Europe will 
 take back a little of the praise they have lately given us : they 
 w r ill say we are still duped by the French. This is the more cruel, 
 as it will be applied where it is undeserved. I think you ought 
 to have nerves of iron ; and I believe you have, or you would be 
 wearied to death with the labors and perplexities of your office, 
 which are created by domestic caprice as well as foreign intrigue 
 and injustice. Mr. Higginson, Judge Dana, 1 and I were lately 
 conversing on these topics, and we agreed that you must be forti 
 fied against every event, and by all means be induced to persevere 
 as well to perfect your own fame as to save the country. 
 
 Yours faithfully and affectionately, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 You make an acknowledgment of some epistolary obligation, 
 which I reject, and once for all absolve you from any claims I 
 may have had, or shall have, except only where I expressly make 
 them, or where you suppose I can render you service. 
 
 1 Francis Dana, judge of the Supreme Court, and afterwards chief jus 
 tice of Massachusetts. 
 
218 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Feb. 15, 1799. 
 
 Mr DEAR SIR, Undoubtedly you have read the speech and 
 answers at the opening of the session of our Legislature. Governor 
 Sumner acts upon the best principles of Federalism. He evidently 
 seconds the policy and views of the national executive, and in this 
 spirit he adopted a style less firm and decisive than his own senti 
 ments. Both branches of the Legislature without concert were im 
 pressed with the idea that the government had not held a language 
 suited to the times, or in unison with the public sentiment ; and in 
 their answers they raise the tone as much as they can with propriety, 
 and guard against the depression of the public pulse. Had the 
 President taken the high ground which was expected, no man 
 would more readily or faithfully support it than Governor Sumner. 
 
 By these proceedings, as well as by the stern and sharp reproof 
 given to the seditious Virginians, you will see that the people here 
 are better than the national government ; and it cannot be suffi 
 ciently regretted that this excellent temper, which was excited by 
 the Federal administration, may subside for want of a proper nutri 
 ment from the same source. It was expected by all good men 
 that the chief magistrate would have aimed principally to show the 
 people the danger of trusting to the appearance of moderation in 
 the tyrants of France, and to have proved that we have much more 
 to fear from arts of this sort than from their arms. If he had 
 reminded us that " the tiger always crouches before he leaps upon 
 his prey," every tongue would have repeated the expression, and 
 every heart responded to the just caution which it teaches. 
 
 I think you will derive pleasure from reading the resolutions of 
 our Legislature in answer to those of Virginia. 1 If they contain 
 some little inaccuracies, they are strong upon the whole, and must 
 tend to support the orthodox party in that State. These resolu 
 tions had only one member negative in the Senate, and one-fifth of 
 the House. Perhaps a greater unanimity is hardly to be desired ; 
 for I am persuaded that a majority of the best men would either 
 
 1 These were the famous nullification resolutions drawn by Madison. 
 The stronger ones from Kentucky, of the same import, were the work of Jef 
 ferson, who, being then Vice-President of the United States, was at the bottom 
 of the whole business. 
 
1700.] CORRESPONDENCE. 219 
 
 be inactive, or act ill, if they had no opposers to stimulate them and 
 to criticise with severity whatever they do. Farewell. 
 
 Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Feb. 21, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, When the French government threatened to 
 ravage our coasts with their cruisers from the West Indies, they 
 believed the hand of our government was so tied up by faction that 
 no resistance could be made ; but, as soon as they saw our inter 
 course and naval armament bills had passed, they were sensible 
 their colonists might be driven to despair, and the colonies finally 
 lost to them. The French have been the wisest as well as wicked 
 est politicians in the world ; they have been remarkable for adapt 
 ing their measures to the character of the people, and above all for 
 profiting by their vices. They consider us as mercenary to excess, 
 and a review of their proceedings would prove that they expected 
 to establish an influence over us by constantly addressing our ava 
 rice. A nation may be so addicted to commerce and the arts of 
 procuring property as to be insensible to every other sentiment. 
 Such a condition would be extremely deplorable, and is only to be 
 avoided by cultivating a love of glory as a balance. All the ex 
 penses of British wars are a thousand times remunerated to that 
 nation by the preservation of their high spirit and character. In 
 stead of a free, gallant, and generous people, as they now are, an 
 uninterrupted peace would in fifty years have sunk them to the 
 level of sordid, defenceless Jews. It is chiefly on the sea, how 
 ever, that the English prowess is tried ; yet this has been sufficient 
 to display virtues and talents, the fame and reward of which are found 
 to be worth more than much money. In our country, the commer 
 cial spirit must predominate ; and there are reasons peculiar to our 
 society why the love of wealth should be a stronger passion than 
 in the societies of the Old World. As this cannot be prevented, it 
 should be consulted and provided for as much as possible in all our 
 political arrangements. It was with a reference to this idea that 
 I expressed formerly a hope that the government would have de 
 clared war in this session, or at any rate would cut off all personal 
 intercourse with the French territories, and especially would author 
 ize the citizens of the United States to make reprisals upon French 
 
220 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 property of every description. Such a measure could have added 
 nothing to our difficulties, but must have been attended with many 
 and great advantages. Avarice would have fought our battles, 
 and would train up innumerable defenders of the country ; and a 
 love of glory and spirit of patriotism would have grown upon the 
 love of gain. But I have feared that, in the awkward and indefi 
 nite state we are now placed, our adventurous spirits will be tempted 
 to seek for the means of gratifying themselves in the evasions of 
 our laws, and administering to the necessities of our enemy. I am 
 recently impressed with these apprehensions more deeply than 
 before, because I see the prices of provisions are rising high in the 
 French islands, and French letters of marque begin to appear in 
 the West Indies, which will be employed in taking our commodities 
 from the Danish islands ; and because the news agent at Guadaloupe 
 has undoubtedly come out to amuse us with some show of modera 
 tion, while he in fact concerts measures with the Gallo- Americans 
 to supply the French colonies. Nothing can be more evident than 
 the permanent substantial benefits which would accrue to the 
 United States from the independence of the West India islands, 
 which may result from our withholding supplies ; but, at any rate, 
 whether this happens or not, our enemy is so extremely vulnerable 
 in that scene, that we must be stupid or worse if we do not make 
 him feel our power. As I have not seen the new intercourse bill, 
 I am uninformed of the power it vests in the President ; but it is 
 little short of betraying the country, if the legislature do not give 
 authority to capture all French property, and all American prop 
 erty employed in French trade. 
 
 The friends of Barney l are still in the great flour cities, and 
 some of them in the government. They were willing to sacrifice 
 the peace of the country in 1794 to their private interests, arid they 
 will now be willing to sacrifice its honor. But it is time to speak 
 plainly upon these subjects ; and it is the duty of those who conduct 
 
 1 Captain, afterwards Commodore, Joshua Barney, of Baltimore. He 
 was a most violent Jacobin and French sympathizer. In 1794, he went with 
 Monroe as bearer of an American flag to France ; and at the reception of 
 the latter he presented his flag, received a French one in exchange, and 
 made a speech on the occasion. For this service, he was given and accepted 
 a commission as captain in the French navy, in which capacity he served 
 for several years. The reference here is to the extensive evasion of the non- 
 intercourse acts by smuggling provisions from Baltimore to the French 
 islands. 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 221 
 
 our national affairs to destroy, if possible, every project for supply 
 ing the dependencies of France. You will please to remember 
 that I have expressly renounced all claim to answers, and therefore 
 I have been less reluctant to write. 
 
 With unfeigned esteem, I remain yours, &c., G. C. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 21, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, You will be shocked, as we all were, by the 
 President s nomination of Mr. Murray minister plenipotentiary to 
 negotiate a treaty with the French republic. I beg you to believe 
 that it is the sole act of the President. Not one officer about him 
 had any knowledge of his design. He has learned that all his 
 friends and the friends of his country are mortified and disgusted, 
 and he is now suffering the pains of purgatory. This would be 
 well enough; but how is the country to be retrieved from the 
 calamitous consequences ? How is its honor thus prostrated in the 
 dust to be recovered ? It has already damned one measure calcu 
 lated to invigorate the spirit and enterprise of our navy. The bill 
 for granting a bounty on every gun taken was yesterday lost in the 
 House, fifty-two to forty-eight. 
 
 The nomination is committed in the Senate to a committee, con 
 sisting of Sedgwick, Stockton, Read, Bingham, and Ross. 1 You 
 would suppose that all these might be depended on in every Federal 
 question except Bingham. Unfortunately, Ross is candidate for 
 governor of Pennsylvania, the election will be made next Octo 
 ber, and lately has become what you Yankees call peoplish. 
 The committee will study to invent some change by which the 
 measure may be rendered less mischievous; but the President s 
 character can never be retrieved. He cannot recover the confi 
 dence of the Federalists. The citizens are astonished, and many 
 would not believe it possible. This reminds me of " Porcupine s " 2 
 
 1 Theodore Sedgwick, senator from Massachusetts, and afterwards judge 
 of the Supreme Court of that State. Richard Stockton, son of the signer of 
 the same name, and senator from New Jersey. Jacob Read, general in the 
 war of Independence, senator from South Carolina, and afterwards United 
 States judge of the District Court of that State. William Bingham and 
 James Ross were the senators from Pennsylvania. 
 
 2 William Cobbett s nom de plume. 
 
222 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 neat but cutting satire of yesterday : it is enclosed. If any thing 
 could gall him more, it is that the serpents of the " Aurora " are 
 daily slavering him with their praise. 
 
 Adieu, my dear friend. Bad as things are, I will not yet 
 despair. 
 
 T. PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Feb. 22, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I sincerely thank you for the kind intentions 
 which are sufficiently manifest, notwithstanding your willingness to 
 disguise them, in your letter of the 12th. 
 
 I am grieved to hear you complain of the weight of duty which 
 I have often feared might become intolerable to you. I pray for 
 your own sake, but still more for the public, that you may neither 
 be disabled nor discouraged. I speak with sincerity of the public, 
 because I see nowhere a man to fill the place. For yourself, the 
 only adequate motive is that honest fame which is the just reward 
 of the greatest and most difficult services. I have sometimes 
 hoped that time, which accommodates us to our burdens, would 
 have reconciled you to yours, and that the sensibility, which wastes 
 human strength like a hectic fever, would become less exquisite ; 
 but, if you are compelled to sacrifice your health or quit your 
 office at last, there can be no doubt of the option you ought to 
 make. In any event, you will doubtless take no step without the 
 utmost deliberation, nor without first ascertaining the position of 
 comfortable ease which you are to take, and which must be 
 always completely in your power to secure. I have a great deal 
 to say on this subject, but you would think I had already said too 
 much, if you did not know the great interest I take in your happi 
 ness. I agree with you fully on the importance of an established 
 right to trade freely with any of the principal islands, but to secure 
 this we must perhaps forbear to supply them until their dependence 
 on the Jacobin parent is entirely destroyed. I should think, too, 
 that the English must be consulted, and that without a perfect 
 concert there would be no safety in the system, for indeed the 
 occurrence is produced by their arms. I have always apprehended 
 that our money-loving people would be apt to supply the French 
 colonies, notwithstanding your prohibitory laws. You ought to go 
 one step further ; and, if you cannot declare war, you ought never- 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 223 
 
 theless to authorize indiscriminate reprisals on French property, 
 and prohibit personal intercourse. It is as singular as it is humil 
 iating that, while the French capture our property ad libitum, 
 and have done it for years, we restrain our citizens from retaliating. 
 It has appeared to me the path of policy is so plain that it cannot 
 be mistaken, and nothing but the foulest traitorism and faction can 
 prevent its being pursued. General reprisals would instantly 
 increase the number, and still more the force, of private vessels of 
 war. Avarice would fight our battles, and would train innumera 
 ble sea soldiers to defend our coasts against invaders, if they ever 
 come, and give us weight and respect among the maritime nations, 
 if they should not. The incidents of active war would every day 
 interest the feelings of the community, and destroy that apathy 
 which has been so dangerous ; and by driving away Frenchmen, 
 and forbidding personal intercourse between the countries, the 
 ducts of corruption would be principally cut off. It is time to say 
 openly what I have said these five years, that the Revolutionary 
 monster that has arisen in France must be destroyed, or it will 
 never cease to destroy others. These opinions, indeed, are exten 
 sively embraced now. 
 
 I repeat that you are not to write to me, unless I expressly 
 request it, or you have commands of your own to give ; but, as I 
 am still called to preach political sermons to occasional auditors, 
 I wish in future you would send me annually the report of the 
 Secretary of the Treasury, which gives a view of the exports and 
 imports. I have not seen one these several years. 
 
 Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 26, 1799. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The President, finding that Mr. Murray would 
 be negatived, or finally impressed with the importance of yielding 
 to the public sentiment (by which I mean the sentiment of the real 
 friends of the country, and supporters of his administration), yes 
 terday morning sent in a new nomination, Chief Justice Ellsworth, 
 Patrick Henry, and Mr. Murray ; the two former not to leave 
 America until they receive assurances from the French government 
 that they will be received. And as this is the amelioration which 
 was desired as the best palliative of the evil of any nomination, 
 
224 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 and for the purpose of treating with France, Ellsworth being 
 here, I presume he was consulted, and consented to the nomination 
 from the necessity of preventing a greater evil. Patrick Henry 
 probably will decline. 
 
 I have received your letter of the 15th. You, Governor Sum- 
 ner, and other men to whom you refer, have seen and lamented the 
 falling off in the President s speech at the opening of this session 
 of Congress. We endeavored to raise its tone respecting France, 
 but were repelled. The nomination of Murray was in the spirit of 
 that part of the speech to which I refer. Perhaps I may find here 
 after an opportunity of giving further information to you on this 
 subject. I am very truly yours, T. PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKETING. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 BROOK LINE, March 7, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I received in course your favors of the 21st 
 and 26th ult., and with the latter a packet of seeds which shall be 
 tried in our soils. 
 
 Indignation, grief, and disgust, in a rotatory succession, are the 
 only sentiments excited by the nomination of Mr. Murray in the 
 breasts of well-informed, decided Federalists. The half-informed 
 and the feeble see no harm in any measure which professes to 
 have peace for its object ; and they will not listen to the painful 
 proofs that a safe peace, which they truly desire, is rendered less 
 attainable by this new evidence of our weakness and this new 
 encouragement to French artifice ; while the temporizers, trimmers, 
 and Federal hypocrites with Jacobin hearts, rejoice in an oppor 
 tunity to throw off the mask, and under sanction of a great name 
 oppose that system of national dignity and defence which they had 
 reluctantly supported because it had become popular. 
 
 The modification which the business has undergone removes the 
 objection of incompetency in the negotiator, but the pernicious 
 consequences of leading the public mind to negotiation instead of 
 resistance are not abated. I have thought it a duty to inculcate 
 the idea that we should have nothing to dread from France, if we 
 could but realize the extent of her designs and the means by which 
 she expected to accomplish them ; and I thought I was serving the 
 government when I insisted that all the affected moderation and 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 225 
 
 crouching of the French was only a trick to soothe our resentments 
 and lull us into a fatal security. The wrecks of European States, 
 who were beguiled from their true course by the false lights which 
 France had hung out, ought to warn us of the danger of following 
 them ; but it would seem as if States cannot profit by the examples 
 of others, nor even by their own experience. It has been fre 
 quently remarked that for several years our distance from Europe 
 had saved us from a participation in its calamities, and had given 
 us opportunity to learn wisdom at their expense ; and it has been 
 observed, with some pride and great joy, that finally our people 
 (a majority) had acquired such just ideas of the national policy as 
 to approve and support it at every expense and every hazard. If 
 this was the case, the blessing is in great jeopardy, if not absolutely 
 lost ; for it is to be feared that a new division of the country is 
 this moment forming, by which the men who have heretofore 
 devised and supported the national measures will be the minority. 
 
 You will see by the paragraphs in the Boston papers that the 
 presses there have been attended to by those who are strongly 
 attached to the President personally, or who approve these half-way 
 measures which lead to whole ruin. Immediately after the first 
 intelligence was received, I penned a paragraph for the next day s 
 " Centinel," expressing doubts of the truth of the intelligence, be 
 cause it was contrary to the avowed policy of the President, and 
 because the assurances said to have been given by France could 
 now deceive no one, as all the world knew the sole design of such 
 professions must be to facilitate their destructive designs, &c. I 
 am not sure the paragraph arrived at the printing-office ; but, if it 
 did, it was rejected. I then wrote a little piece, certainly unex 
 ceptionable in form, showing the manner in which the Greeks were 
 amused by negotiations, till their liberties were destroyed by 
 Philip, &c. But this, which was sent to the " Mercury " office, 
 was refused, although its publication was particularly requested, 
 and although I have formerly written a number of pieces for that 
 paper which they valued so highly as to send me repeated solicita 
 tions for more. JThus you see already the seeds of division vege 
 tate. I have not been in town ; but I know many of the best men 
 feel extreme chagrin, and doubtless would be more open in express 
 ing it, if they did not consult the public welfare more than their 
 own personal gratifications. 
 
 I have always objected to those newspaper discussions which 
 
 15 
 
226 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1799, 
 
 must necessarily implicate the President, and I think some humili 
 ation ought to be submitted to rather than depart from this salu 
 tary respect ; but T fear the mistaken zeal of personal friends will 
 finally draw out those who think they act upon the broadest prin 
 ciples of the public good. 
 
 I rejoice extremely to find Ross acting with firmness. I always 
 esteemed him highly, and I know of few things in life more unpleas 
 ant than being obliged to renounce or abate a favorable opinion of 
 a friend. With unfeigned esteem and affection, 
 
 I remain as ever yours, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, March 18, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Although I have neither faith nor hope 
 myself, yet it is possible we must be all subject to the evils of 
 negotiation with the present regency of France. I fulfil a duty, 
 therefore, in transmitting you Mr. Gore s letter 1 which relates to 
 it. From our newspapers as well as from other sources, you will 
 receive information of the schisms created among Federalists by 
 the unaccountable conduct of the President. I have been once in 
 town ; and I met no man who did not censure the President ex 
 tremely, though they differed much as to the expediency of declar 
 ing it. But I heard of many, and they were such as might be 
 expected to do so, who insisted on the propriety of our justifying 
 what had been done, and of denouncing whomsoever should dare 
 to do otherwise. Personal friends of the President, temporizing 
 men, with real Jacobins who profess Federalism, have been active 
 and zealous ; while the open, avowed Jacobins have been somewhat 
 at a stop, and for a time said but little. Taking a retrospect from 
 the point at which we now stand, I feel more apprehension of 
 mischiefs which are yet to arise from the same cause that produced 
 the nomination of Mr. Murray than from the nomination itself. I 
 perceive that a dangerous division of the supporters of government 
 may take place, by which the men who act on truly public princi 
 ples will be opposed by many who have hitherto followed them, 
 and that these will be necessarily countenanced by the President. 
 Should this happen, the animosity to England, which is still pop 
 ular, will be resorted to ; and we shall be told that the President is 
 
 1 This letter is printed in the previous chapter. See p. 186. 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 227 
 
 calumniated, because he will not yield to a British faction, &c. It 
 seems to me that the late transactions must operate unfavorably on 
 the discussions which are taking place between you and Great 
 Britain, respecting the commission at Philadelphia, and on the busi 
 ness of the commissioners in London. I had an hour s conver 
 sation with Mr. Listen at Boston, which satisfied me that he was 
 disposed to smooth every unavoidable difficulty between the two 
 countries, confiding that our government would, as far as possible, 
 keep the United States out of the fangs of France, and thus at last 
 become independent and free of French influence. I found he was 
 perfectly satisfied with your sentiments and principles, and he de 
 clared to me that he had not a wish to embarrass us with any 
 engagements which you would not approve. Indeed, he said ex 
 pressly to me that he was pleased with General Marshall s opinions 
 published on this subject. 
 
 I ran over several topics with Mr. Liston, in which he professed 
 to agree with me, and especially that we have great common inter 
 ests which ought to keep us friends in spite of all the irritations 
 which from various causes must arise for a time. But I cannot 
 refrain from suggesting to you the utility of impressing him now 
 with the importance of acting conformably to those sentiments, by 
 which he will certainly serve his own country no less than ours. 
 We have so many men who seek for a quarrel with Great Britain, 
 that no ordinary skill can prevent it, unless that nation, laying aside 
 a little of its haughtiness, will faithfully and generously accommo 
 date its policy to the nature and character of our government. Our 
 system must occasionally yield to the errors and prejudices of the 
 people, arid if it were always to be administered by the best men 
 in the world, still it would be less stable than theirs ; and there 
 fore political duty that is, true interest requires that they should 
 be sufficiently flexible to prevent that discord which is constantly 
 aimed at by the bitter enemies of both. Be all this as it may, 
 there seems to be no ground for expecting consistency in our ad 
 ministration, while the false and dangerous dogma is maintained 
 that the President is to decide upon great national measures with 
 out first availing himself of the fullest information and judgment 
 of others. No man could be safely trusted that should practise 
 upon this vain idea. The greatest men and the best governments 
 have been those who have known how to profit most by the talents 
 of others. Henry IV. s greatest glory, in my opinion, consists 
 
228 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 in having known how to appreciate the character of Sully; and 
 the British administration would not have existed for a month, 
 still less to astonish the world by its constancy and its energies, if 
 the king did not steadily pursue the course pointed out by those 
 whose abilities he employs in his council. It is enough that the 
 chief magistrate is superior to all personal influence, whether of 
 menace or entreaty ; that he is superior to the influence of every 
 authority but that of reason well informed. But that dignity and 
 independence should require a man to act in the most important 
 concerns without the aid of counsel from others is the error of 
 vanity which the populace alone ought to indulge. The power of 
 displacing all officers whom the President is expected to consult is 
 su-rely sufficient to preserve his spirit of independence ; and he need 
 not be afraid to examine their investigations, hear their discussions, 
 or consider their results. If their power force a conviction, he 
 ought to yield to it ; if not, he is at liberty to discard it, and to 
 act a part which shall seem to him better. This is my idea of 
 dignity, and this is the way to avoid mistakes. This is the secret 
 of Washington s greatness. I am sensible it is as delicate as it is 
 difficult to make the arrangement I long since intimated, by which 
 it should be understood that the President would habitually hear 
 his servants before he decides upon their tasks, and that when he 
 is absent from them he would refrain from all business. 
 
 Your faithful friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 2, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Soon after the return of the President, I 
 visited him at Quincy, where I was hospitably entertained at 
 dinner with the family. It was the wish of several of my friends 
 that I should discharge the friendly duty of disclosing such facts 
 and sentiments as were known and felt by the best public men 
 here, and which might be useful to him. It was particularly 
 desired that he should be informed of the insincerity of men who, 
 under the mask of patriotism, inflame his jealousy of his best 
 friends and the best friends of the country. But, though I was 
 treated with great cordiality and confidence on many subjects, a 
 studied course kept us distant from those on which I should have 
 spoken freely, if permitted, though with great pain to myself. In 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 229 
 
 a late letter from Mr. Gore, he intimates to me that if the gov 
 ernment should find it necessary to appoint a minister plenipo 
 tentiary for St. Petersburg or Constantinople, or any other court, 
 at the time of his present employment being ended, and he should 
 be thought a suitable person to serve the country in that character, 
 he would undertake it. I have written to Mr. Gore that I should 
 take the liberty to mention his name to you and to Mr. Wolcott, 
 and that I would also communicate his idea to the President, if an 
 opportunity occurred, which I do not suppose probable. I think 
 it unnecessary to speak of Mr. Gore s qualifications or pretensions, 
 all which must be well known to you ; and I think it cannot be 
 unknown to the President that he has applied his talents and 
 devoted his studies to politics almost exclusively these ten years 
 past. You have seen the discussions in our papers under the " En 
 voys," written by Otis, and other paragraphs by other persons 
 concerning the President s nomination of Mr. Murray. I think, 
 however, you may be assured that sensible men very generally 
 condemn that measure, and chiefly differ as to the expediency of 
 expressing their censures publicly. 
 
 With the highest esteem and unabating attachment, I remain 
 
 Your affectionate and faithful friend, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 2, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I fulfil my own inclination as well as promise 
 in mentioning to you that Mr. Gore, one of our commissioners in 
 London, at the expiration of his present service would willingly go 
 to Constantinople or St. Petersburg or any other court, as minister 
 plenipotentiary, if the government should need a person for such 
 an employment and should think him capable of serving them 
 acceptably. Mr. Gore has formed himself for such an office by 
 assiduous study and attention for ten years, and would certainly 
 be well received anywhere, and, I think, could not fail to advance 
 the reasonable views of the government. The Jacobins have 
 lately become more systematical, I think, in their electioneering 
 projects, and have in this part of the country availed themselves 
 greatly of those momentary discontents which naturally follow the 
 promulgation of a new tax. We are taking some pains, however, 
 
230 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 to keep the people steady ; and I hope with a majority these labors 
 will succeed. 
 
 On a late visit to Quincy, I was treated with cordial hospitality 
 and with some confidence ; but I was studiously (as I thought) pre 
 vented from speaking on those topics which so much engage public 
 attention. I performed a duty in attempting it, and saved myself 
 great pain in being defeated. General Knox tells the President 
 he has many good men about him, men of wise heads and honest 
 hearts, but they are of a sort that will raise insurrection, if some 
 of them be not dismissed. He only named Tench Francis, but it 
 is easy to fill up his list. I wish he would name all himself, and 
 describe their faults. Doubtless the public would highly commend 
 much of that conduct he condemns. 
 
 Your affectionate and faithful friend, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 MAY 2, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, If acknowledgments of debt would dis 
 charge obligation, I should write a long letter of acknowledgments. 
 The particular subject of your letter of the 26th of January had 
 often occurred to me, and some friends with whom I converse 
 about you. We had presumed the employment would be agreeable, 
 and we knew the honor of it was merited. If my wishes had 
 power, you would be gratified. I shall write to Mr. Woleott and 
 Mr. Pickering 1 concerning it ; and, if I can directly or indirectly 
 communicate it to the President in a manner likely to promote your 
 views, I shall certainly do it. 
 
 I rejoice that the President s speech was so much approved by 
 the good people on your side the water, but they certainly praise 
 it at the expense of our country. The spirit of that speech was 
 elevated than the spirit of reflecting men through the nation, 
 and its effect has been to depress them : if, however, this had been 
 all, it would have been tolerable ; but it is to be lamented that the 
 affected moderation of that speech was to supply by authority what 
 was wanted in argument, to silence the offensive remonstrants 
 against Gerryism, to open a way for soothing Jacobin spirits, to 
 provide for something like a support against the dictatorial temper 
 
 1 This promise was fulfilled in the two preceding letters. 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 281 
 
 of high-minded Federalists, and to show that he could conduct the 
 affairs of the nation without advisers, &c. Nothing can be more 
 unfortunate for him and for the country than this course of think 
 ing, as weak and false as it is vain and dangerous. A just senti 
 ment of personal dignity and official independence would be satis 
 fied to act rightly, after having heard all that could be said by those 
 it might consult. The truest greatness is that which knows best 
 how to avail itself of the best talents of others. It is sufficient 
 that a man is superior to menace or entreaty, and that after hear 
 ing his counsellors he should feel superior to personal influence, 
 but never to the authority of reason and truth. How many do 
 wrong that they may differ from those whose opinions they wish to 
 be thought not to respect ! 
 
 I do not suspect that the President has in the smallest degree 
 abated his detestation of French revolutionism. Nor do I doubt 
 that the country pretty well understands its nature and its danger 
 ous tendency toward us ; but, as in other free states, the spirit of 
 faction predominates over every thing. Rivalry among the Fed 
 eralists generates opposition to those distinguished characters who 
 might render us most service. Disappointed men oppose and 
 calumniate them openly ; and all the desperate adventurers who 
 are uneasy with their present condition know that the poor we 
 have always with us, and that these, with many of the ignorant, 
 are easily formed into a revolutionary corps in every country. 
 The jealousy of the rich is a passion in the poor, which can always 
 be appealed to with success on every question, and instead of an 
 answer to every argument. Time and experience will prove the 
 fallacy of every theory of government which admits universal 
 suffrage as a right, but our people will not be wise enough to 
 apply a remedy voluntarily. Like other evils, therefore, it must 
 be left to produce its own cure. So I preach, instead of replying 
 directly to your inquiries about Congress, &c. 
 
 I have often wished you here to write books, because they would 
 do much service in palliating and protracting evils which cannot 
 be wholly averted. We all work a little ; but your patience, per 
 severance, and mellifluence are extremely wanted. 
 
 May Heaven bless you. G. C. 
 
232 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 JUNE 9, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, I have by a former conveyance informed 
 you that I had written to Mr. Pickering and Mr. Wolcott concern 
 ing a future destination, arid I have no doubt they will promote your 
 wishes, because they will in so doing serve the public. It is prob 
 able, however, that their influence will be much less than it ought 
 to be, as they are suspected of enjoying more consideration in the 
 community than consists with the respect claimed by another. 
 
 It has been a part of the cant of Democratic writers to ascribe 
 to kings exclusively an undue love of praise, and to subjects the 
 disgrace of giving it, however unmerited. Few kings I believe 
 could be named, who swallowed grosser flattery than our Governor 
 Hancock daily required and received from servile citizens. You 
 recollect how entirely men of dignity and worth were excluded 
 from his confidence, because they could not yield the adulation he 
 desired. It must be unhappy for our country if ever a man of such 
 character should be raised to the head of the Union. 
 
 I have received your favor of the 9th of March, with a copy of 
 one of the 27th of February, the original of which has not come 
 to hand. I am impatient to see the manuscript of which it speaks, 
 not doubting it will be useful to the public, and at any rate to a 
 part of that public. Be assured, if it reaches me, I will observe 
 your directions, and pursue a course which shall best fulfil your 
 wishes. 
 
 Notwithstanding your reasoning upon the nominations for Peters 
 burg and the Porte, 1 I have no suspicion that there exists a dis 
 position toward you particularly unfriendly. If I did, I would 
 disclose it frankly. I shall, however, be able to ascertain the 
 precise circumstances of those nominations in a month or two, and 
 if there be any thing in them of importance you shall be informed. 
 
 It has often occurred to me that you and Mr. King would blame 
 me much for the scanty information I give you of what passes on 
 this side of the water, and especially that I should omit to explain 
 why the United States remain in such an absurd state in relation 
 
 1 Mr. King, minister to England, had heen appointed to negotiate a treaty 
 with Russia through the Russian minister at London. Mr. Smith, our minister 
 at Lisbon, had been appointed to negotiate with the Porte. Thus Mr. Gore 
 failed to obtain either of the employments for which he had expressed a 
 desire. 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 233 
 
 to France. But the truth is that I have been discouraged from 
 attempting to explain a course of conduct which, after it was com 
 menced, has been guided by accident and caprice. If there was a 
 system in the heads of the advisers, as I presume there was, it never 
 has been fully adopted by the principal, or has been relaxed from 
 jealousy. You know all that I do of the character of the agents, 
 and you can easily conceive of the inconsistencies which they might 
 produce. A jealousy of Pickering and Wolcott, and a resentment 
 against all censurers of Gerry, have greatly diminished their influence ; 
 while men of another cast are naturally taken into favor, and their 
 suggestions listened to. The old jealousy of Hamilton is revived 
 with tenfold force ; and even the raising an army, so essential to the 
 protection of the government and country, is frowned upon by the 
 President, because it may display Hamilton s greatness : so that 
 we are not to be saved, lest the man most conspicuous in saving us 
 should be called saviour. So I read our politics, but it is chiefly 
 without book. 
 
 We are lamenting the death of Sumner, 1 whose loss is irrepar 
 able. Ames is one of the council to Lieutenant- Governor Gill, 
 but whether he will be listened to I don t know. 
 
 Farewell. Yours, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, July 8, 1799. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I transmit herewith a copy of Mr. Lowell s ora 
 tion, which gave great pleasure to the auditory on Thursday. The 
 President was particularly gratified with it, and declared his appro 
 bation of every sentiment except those which were complimentary 
 to himself. I have been often told that you intended to make a 
 visit to your natale solum in the course of this summer, but am 
 now informed that you have relinquished the design. This, if true, 
 will greatly disappoint very many here, and especially your affec 
 tionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Sept. 5, 1799. 
 
 Mr DEAR SIR, The letter directed to Mr. Lowell was de 
 livered to him : he has long thought properly on the subject of 
 government, and knows how to estimate the men who support our 
 own. 
 
 1 Hon. Increase Sumner, at that time Governor of Massachusetts. 
 
234 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 It has been thought incredible that the United States should at 
 this period renew their negotiations with France: it is not seen 
 that any good can come of it, but much trouble may come, which 
 might otherwise be avoided. It is mere fastidiousness to say we 
 will negotiate because we have a right ; it is Quixotism to suppose 
 that we must exercise this right to prove that we possess it, or to 
 prevent our forbearance from being imputed to fear. When our 
 rights are questioned, they must be maintained at every hazard ; 
 but neither prudence nor honor requires us to provoke attacks. 
 
 A negotiation with France will necessarily excite the jealousy, if 
 not the resentment, of the coalesced powers, who will say that they 
 are fighting for us as well as themselves, and that the security and 
 tranquillity we enjoy are the fruit of their efforts and the price of 
 their blood ; that it is a dishonorable traffic on our part, and but 
 for their energies would soon appear to be unsafe ; and, finally, 
 that the disposition of the common enemy to treat with us at all 
 arises wholly from the distress into which they have driven him, 
 and that the end he proposes by it is a recruit of means to annoy 
 them. If any ideas of this sort are entertained by the coalesced 
 powers, they will feel exasperated at our conduct, and will lead us 
 to dread their successes as much as we have dreaded those of 
 France ; for power, we well know, always engenders haughtiness, 
 insolence, and injustice. It appears to me we have already as 
 much misunderstanding with some of them as can be either borne 
 or explained with good humor ; and it is not easy to discover how 
 we are to avoid downright quarrels, after new sources of irritation 
 shall be opened. 
 
 There are very few men of information or reflection in this 
 quarter who do not feel alarmed. Our preachers and orators 
 almost universally have expressed a joy at the separation from 
 France, and a confident hope that we should keep aloof from her 
 influence, poisons, and. plagues ; and I certainly do not know one 
 in twenty among the Federalists who thinks there is any apology 
 for attempting to renew the intercourse in any shape. 
 
 A few men try to console themselves with the confidence they 
 place in Mr. Ellsworth ; but the evil is negotiation. If the disas 
 ters of the campaign are not mitigated by some successes to the 
 arms of France, she will probably grant us every thing in promises ; 
 and the more she grants in this way, the more we shall be embar 
 rassed by the measure, and finally gain nothing. But France will 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 235 
 
 gain a great deal. She will involve us in difficulties, and perhaps 
 war with her enemies, and in that case will recover all her in 
 fluence here ; but without war she will gain a free access, which 
 she now wants. You know my obstinate opinions upon the nature 
 of French republicanism : it is a modification of the vilest and 
 wickedest ambition the world has ever seen. I believe a small 
 portion of numbers in France can be found who would not be 
 glad to see the present system annihilated, and the old regime 
 restored, or some sort of monarchy. I have no doubt such a 
 change will take place sooner or later. If military events accel 
 erate it, the new government in France will feel no partiality 
 toward those who have officiously and unnecessarily attached them 
 selves to the bloody usurpers, as the present regents will be called. 
 This view of the subject makes the negotiation, at least, of doubtful 
 policy, as regards the French nation. You see I cannot refrain 
 from perplexing myself with affairs which are committed to better 
 hands. But I will not tease you with all my conjectures or appre 
 hensions. I pray Heaven to bless you, and, as our clergy express 
 it, to preserve to you the spirit of your station. 
 
 Your affectionate and faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 TRENTON, Sept. 13, 1799. 
 
 DEAR SIR, This morning I received your favor of the 5th. 
 Mr. Higginson had before written me on the same subject ; and, 
 for such information as I can give, I pray you to read my answer 
 of yesterday to him, after which I wish the letter may be burnt. 
 
 In that answer, I have said that but for recent events, intending 
 chiefly those in France, the attempt to divert the President from 
 the negotiation could not have been made. After the first nom 
 ination of Mr. Murray, instead of rejecting the project absolutely, 
 the supporters of government thought no remedy, or rather pallia 
 tive, was practicable but the nominating of three commissioners in 
 the place of one. The principle was, as I understood, that the 
 Federalists had from the beginning declared that the Senate had 
 no right to judge of a measure of the kind, but only of the men 
 proposed to execute it. This principle, having been from the for 
 mation of the government advanced and advocated by the Federal 
 ists, could not, on the occasion of Murray s nomination, be departed 
 
236 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 from without inconsistency. I have never deliberated on this 
 point, but taken it up as I found it. I wish, however, that the 
 stand had now been made. I wish the project of negotiating with 
 France, such as she then was, had been peremptorily rejected, if 
 a vote of rejection could have been obtained, of which there was 
 at least some doubt ; the weak and timid Federalists manifesting 
 a deposition to join the antis for the sake of peace. The nomi 
 nation of ambassadors and other foreign ministers seems to me 
 different from the nomination of judges and other officers. Of the 
 latter, the duty and the extent of their powers are prescribed by 
 the known laws of the land, and therefore nothing remains for 
 the Senate to judge of but the fitness or unfitness of the candidates 
 for the offices to which they are nominated by the President. But, 
 in foreign affairs, the Senate have a right of judging whether any 
 and what special relations shall be formed with other sovereigns 
 and states, the power of making treaties being vested in them in 
 concurrence with the President. 
 
 And why not the initiative as well as the concluding power? 
 "Why not of deciding beforehand whether any connection should 
 be formed, as afterwards whether the proposed terms and condi 
 tions of the connection are salutary or hostile to the interests of 
 the United States ? Why should the perfect right and freedom of 
 judging in the Senate be controlled by an independent act of the 
 President ? Did not the Constitution intend to vest in the Senate 
 the like independent power to reject treaties formed by the Presi 
 dent, as to reject bills formed by the House of Representatives ? 
 In the latter case, have not the Senate a perfect right to reject as 
 well because a bill is founded in an erroneous principle as for 
 defective or improvident provisions in the enacting clauses ? But 
 is not the Senate foreclosed from judging of the principle of a 
 treaty, by previously assenting to the nomination of ministers to 
 negotiate it ? And if afterwards they reject one, when the articles 
 are adapted to the subjects treated on, will it not expose the coun 
 try to the reproach of bad faith ? 
 
 I remember to have read in the records of my office a report 
 made to President Washington, in 1792, by Mr. Jefferson, of cer 
 tain terms to be proposed in a treaty with Spain, and a submission 
 of it to the Senate for their previous opinion and advice; and their 
 opinion and advice were given. 
 
 As I have never before considered this subject, my reasoning 
 
1790.] CORRESPONDENCE. 237 
 
 may be very wild and inconclusive. I must presume it is so, since 
 the principle has been so long since discussed and settled by men 
 from whom I place myself at a humble distance. But, if their 
 construction is the only one of which the constitution will admit, it 
 is time it was changed. From what I have heard of the Presi 
 dent s opinion on this subject, I perceive that such a previous inter 
 position of the Senate with their advice and opinion would be 
 deemed as unwarrantable and unholy as it was for an unanointed 
 priest to touch the Jewish ark. 
 
 I have this week sent to the President a draught of instructions 
 to the envoys, as settled here with my colleagues. Pursuant to the 
 President s orders, I at the same time sent the press copy of them 
 to Mr. Ellsworth. This excellent man, when here in August, saw 
 no alternative but that he must go. The subsequent changes in 
 Europe, and especially in France, I think must change his ideas. 
 I wish you would write him upon it, and propose his attempting to 
 dissuade the President from the pursuit. I also will write him. 
 There is nothing in politics he more detests than this mission, and 
 nothing in nature he more dreads than the voyage across the 
 wide Atlantic. Governor Davie 1 is evidently pleased with the 
 business ; but his letter to me was prior to the late arrivals from 
 Europe. Is there no man near the President, whose opinion he 
 will respect, believing it to be given sincerely for his honor and 
 glory, as well as for his country s good ? 
 
 My chief clerk has found the report of Mr. Jefferson, before 
 mentioned; and I enclose the resolve which the Senate passed upon 
 it the 16th of March, 1792. I feel myself obliged by all your 
 communications, and pray you to continue them, being as sincerely 
 as respectfully yours, TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Sept. 22, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, As soon as I was made to believe that the 
 new envoys were actually going to France, I sat down and penned 
 the observations contained in the enclosed six numbers. My 
 motive was solely to present to the President a view of the subject 
 in the light in which it appeared to almost every man whose opin 
 ion he respected three years ago. 
 
 I did not however feel satisfied that it would not drag him before 
 the public eye, by the discussions which it would excite. I there- 
 1 Of North Carolina. 
 
238 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 fore did not publish. When you have run them over, and, if you 
 please, shewn them to our friend Mr. Wolcott, you may enclose 
 them to me in a blank cover. 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 I have this moment received your favor of the 13th, which I 
 will answer by the next post. 
 
 A plain and perspicuous statement has been attempted of the 
 few leading ideas which occur on the report of the day, that a new 
 cargo of envoys is speedily to be shipped for France. Upon 
 review of what is written, I confess there does not appear to me 
 any sufficient motive for the publication, but, on the contrary, it 
 may produce an unnecessary irritation. If any thing could be 
 done at this hour, it must be by an able display of the subject, in a 
 private letter to Ellsworth, which might engage him to expostulate 
 strongly with the President, and refuse to go. 
 
 [ Memo, of passages from some papers of George Cabot, of Sept. 
 
 22, 1799.] 
 
 Having described the character of the French govern 
 ment, he says : 
 
 " With such a power, there ought to be no truce, and there can 
 be no peace but at the expense of national honor and national 
 safety. A peace with such a power is a bridge for an enemy to 
 advance upon into the country he means to destroy." 
 
 " While France is governed by men, or principles such as have 
 governed her for several years, we have only the option to be her 
 enemies or her * slaves. " 
 
 " The despatches of our envoys disclosed our dangers, and put 
 an end to those delusions which had almost consummated our ruin." 
 " The people were then made sensible that in vain we had drunk 
 of the cup of humiliation to its very dregs. They saw the fatal 
 error of Switzerland and other States, and were convinced that, 
 under Providence, they must trust to their arms at last for the 
 security of their most precious interests. * These interests, the 
 President has lately assured us, are still held in jeopardy by the 
 hostile designs and insidious arts of a foreign nation, France. 
 It is now a problem how a treaty can be made with France, which 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 239 
 
 will not be beneficial to her, and injurious, or at lest fruitless, to 
 the United States." 
 
 " From the nature and constitution of the revolutionary system, 
 France is, and must continue, irreconcilably hostile to every inde 
 pendent State. If she stoops, she stoops only to conquer. She 
 must aim at controlling by art and intrigue those whom her arms 
 do not reach." 
 
 " France at this moment will grant us in promises whatever 
 we should be likely to demand ; yet, as she acknowledges no obli 
 gation but that of physical force, it is evident that whatever we 
 concede must be in effect gratuitous. Should we give only the 
 ordinary privileges of hospitality to her incendiaries, we should 
 again see some part of our country on fire, if the present order 
 of things in France is maintained. But if that order is annihi 
 lated, as it probably will be in the hands of Frenchmen, it may 
 happen that the new government will not regard as friends those 
 who have officiously and unnecessarily associated with their bloody 
 tyrant usurpers, as the revolutionists may then be styled." 
 
 With respect to " the interests and feelings of the other great 
 powers at war, it is true that, while we respect the rights of other 
 nations, we are not accountable to them for the discretion with 
 which we exercise our own. But we cannot be insensible that 
 actions in themselves strictly lawful are often highly inexpedient. 
 In the use of the clearest rights and in the preservation of unsul 
 lied honor, prudence guides the individual, and policy must guide 
 the nation. In a contest like the present, where every thing is at 
 stake, the sensibility of the combatants will be lively, their jeal 
 ousy quick, and resentment strong. The coalesced powers feel 
 ivhat no one can deny that they are fighting the battles of every 
 independent people as well as their own. It cannot be expected, 
 therefore, that they would see the friendly overtures of any coun 
 try, to the common enemy, without great emotions. It would be 
 a new thing under the sun, if such a transaction should not en 
 gender distrust and give birth to every hostile sentiment." 
 
 [When the French legislature passed the law prohibiting the 
 neutral powers to carry on any commerce with England, or, 
 which was the same thing, declaring the produce and manufac 
 tures of the British good prize in neutral vessels, although the 
 property of neutrals, and vessels and cargoes subject to confisca 
 tion, I thought that this outrage upon the rights of all nations 
 
240 LIFE AND LETTERS OP GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 would have justified Great Britain in counteracting it by prohibit 
 ing the neutral nations to have any commerce with France, and 
 enforcing the prohibition by the capture and confiscation of all 
 vessels attempting to carry it on. T. P.] 
 
 " Seventy millions of dollars, in a late letter addressed to the 
 citizens of the United States, citizen Barlow l tells us have been 
 taken from us by the French. Probably citizen Barlow exagger 
 ates the account ; but, however this may be, he hardly attempts to 
 palliate the atrocity of this immense robbery, although he is the tool 
 of the Directory ; and yet to this moment we have not dared to 
 make reprisals on French property ! The restraining our captures 
 to the armed vessels of France is a humiliation of our country 
 which has been too long protracted already ; and its continuance 
 after Congress shall meet will be without excuse, unless we are in 
 fact courting those whom we really detest, and whose friendship 
 every good man dreads." 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Sept, 23, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I very early turned my attention to the 
 power of the Senate in the appointment of officers. I do not 
 recollect that I ever thought the terms of the Constitution would be 
 better satisfied with the use of that power in the limited manner 
 contended for by the Federalists than by the extent contended for 
 by their opponents ; but I never doubted that the limitation of the 
 Federalists was absolutely necessary to prevent the executive power 
 from passing into the hands of a cabcd. Under this conviction, 
 I easily adopted the idea that the power of the Senate was in no 
 sense initiative or even active, but negative and censorial, and was 
 never to be exercised but in cases where the persons proposed for 
 office were unfit. I have always rejected the idea of non-concur 
 rence with a nomination merely because the nominee was less 
 suitable for the office than thousands of others : he must be posi 
 tively unfit for the office, and the public duty not likely to be per 
 formed by him, to justify in my mind the non-concurrence. It has 
 always appeared to me that a departure from this principle would 
 soon wrest from the President altogether the essence of the nomi 
 nating power, which is the power of selecting officers ; and I am 
 fully persuaded that the disposal of offices is of all things the 
 
 1 Joel Barlow, afterwards minister to France during Mr. Madison s ad 
 ministration. 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 241 
 
 most dangerous to a body of men. The motives to provide for the 
 friends of each other, and to feed their dependants, are so power 
 ful, that they will always be yielded to by men who do not stand 
 individually responsible to public opinion. I am persuaded that 
 any body of men as numerous as the Senate, possessing such a 
 power, however pure they may have been originally, will be cor 
 rupted by it, and will corrupt others. With respect to the power 
 of the Senate in making treaties, I believe in matters of such 
 great moment it was well to provide that their sanction should be 
 given to treaties before they could have the force of laws, or be 
 binding on the nation. It is a check upon the President that may 
 be always salutary by way of prevention of abuses, and is a quiet 
 and effectual remedy in the last resorts ; but the same sort of ob 
 jections as are made to their sharing actually with the President 
 the power of appointment to office apply to their sharing in the 
 actual management of foreign relations. If the Senate of the 
 United States should be admitted to possess the right to determine 
 a priori what foreign connections should be sought or shunned, I 
 should fear that they would soon exhibit the humiliating spec 
 tacle of caps and hats, which so long and so naturally appeared in 
 Sweden. 1 I confess to you my opinion that republican govern 
 ments have never yet had a fair experiment in the world, chiefly 
 because they have never constituted the supreme executive, at the 
 same time single and independent, of competent force and sufficient 
 duration. If a free government is a government of laws, constitu 
 tionally enacted, there ought always to exist a power to execute 
 those laws ; otherwise it is a faction governs instead of the laws. 
 The presidential authority of the United States will dwindle to 
 nothing, if the policy of the Senate should so far change that they 
 assume to themselves, and deny to the President, all the power the 
 
 1 By the great limitations imposed on the royal power after the death 
 of Charles XII., the Diet became all-powerful. Consisting of four orders, 
 nobles, burghers, clergy, and peasants, the Diet was always turbulent, and 
 soon grew to be corrupt. The " Hats " were those who wished to invigorate 
 the royal power, which the " Caps " sought to still further diminish. The 
 " Caps " were in the pay of Russia, and the " Hats " soon sold themselves to 
 France. These miserable intrigues and turbulent dissensions were at their 
 height during the reign of Adolphus Frederick (1751-1771). The son and 
 successor of Frederic, Gustavus III., rebelled against this odious legislative 
 tyranny, accompanied by foreign interference. By a well-executed coup 
 d tftat, he overthrew the power of the Diet, and converted the most limited 
 monarchy in Europe into one of the most absolute. 
 
 16 
 
242 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 words of the Constitution will allow. I am sensible there are evils 
 both ways, and the caprice which has been discovered to govern 
 some most important determinations leads one to lay less stress on 
 the advantage of individual responsibility than abstract reasonings 
 promise ; still, however, it is, in my opinion, the best part of our 
 Federal theory. I certainly do not mean to flatter when I attribute 
 to this principle, operating through the medium of the executive 
 departments, every thing excellent which has been done by the 
 government. 
 
 I well remember the business of the Spanish treaty, and I think 
 I was one of the committee to whom the reference was made. A 
 number of commercial points were examined, and the Senate agreed 
 that they would ratify, &c. This was abundant caution on the 
 part of the President, and was not supposed to be a measure which 
 the Senate could with any propriety have moved in, unless required 
 by the President. 
 
 The arguments you have used are better than those I heard 
 in the Senate on that side of the question. They are sufficient to 
 warrant, perhaps, the construction they advocate, if that construction 
 would in fact be propitious to the best administration of the gov 
 ernment. You see I give you my unstudied sentiments with a 
 frankness which would need apology, if separated from other senti 
 ments which I indulge with pride and pleasure. Mr. T. Williams 
 has just received a pamphlet containing Sir William Scott s opinion 
 and decision on the ships captured under the Swedish convoy. I 
 was allowed only twenty minutes to run it over, but I saw enough 
 to make me insist it should be sent to you, unless it immediately 
 goes through the press. 
 
 I remain your faithful friend, and much obliged 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 P. S. I had written to Mr. Ellsworth through the medium of 
 Governor Trumbull, and received his answer before your sugges 
 tion. I rejoiced to find he thinks precisely as we do on the general 
 merits. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 TRENTON, Sept. 29, 1799. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have just received your favor of the 23d. With 
 respect to the appointment to office by a body of men, I have for a 
 long series of years entertained the same opinion which you express ; 
 
1799.1 CORRESPONDENCE. 243 
 
 and yet there are exceptions which produce no mischief, as in 
 Connecticut, where even the judges are annually appointed by the 
 legislative body. But such are the excellent habits of the people 
 of that small State that the executive as well as judicial offices are 
 in fact held during good behavior. The ideas I expressed on the 
 treaty-making power were those of the moment, arising as I wrote. 
 They concerned a question which, having been settled before I came 
 into the administration, I had never heard discussed, and which, for 
 want of an occasion, had never exercised my own reflections ; and, 
 pressed by the existing evil, my thoughts reached after an imme 
 diate, I should rather say direct, remedy. It is doubtless best 
 that the initiative power in making treaties should rest with the 
 President ; and, as foreign powers know that the validity of his 
 stipulations depends on the sanction of the Senate, they will accord 
 ingly make their calculations. The secrecy necessary in negotiat 
 ing would be impracticable, if the Senate were to partake in the 
 first stages thereof; and this, when writing you before, struck me 
 so forcibly, that I conceived the Senate should be previously con 
 sulted only on the single question, Shall any treaty be formed 
 with such a foreign power? 
 
 ( Confidential. ) 
 
 With your letter, I received this morning one from Mr. Ellsworth, 
 dated the 26th, in which he quotes from a letter he had just re 
 ceived from the President the following words : " The convulsions 
 in France, the change of the Directory, and the prognostics of a 
 greater change, will certainly induce me to postpone, for a longer 
 or shorter time, the mission to France." These are the very rea 
 sons (to be sure, very obvious ones) which, with the assent of my 
 colleagues, I had stated to the President as motives for suspending 
 the mission in a letter the receipt of which he has acknowledged, 
 but without expressing himself so strongly as in the above passage 
 to Mr. Ellsworth. I have indeed supposed that, not having conde 
 scended to consult us in the origin of this humiliating business, we 
 should not be the first to be made acquainted with a suspension 
 or abandonment of it : it would savor of concession. Before this 
 reaches you, another promising circumstance will be known to you, 
 his departure from Quincy for Trenton, where he will meet 
 Messrs. Ellsworth and Davie and the heads of departments prior 
 to a final determination. It has therefore happened well, probably, 
 
244 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 that the publication of " Cato " l was omitted. You will find the 
 six numbers enclosed. Mr. Wolcott has read them. 
 
 I am most truly yours, TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 I have received from Mr. King Sir William Scott s opinion and 
 decision on the Swedish convoy. The instructions to our armed 
 vessels conform to the doctrine he lays down. Have you got Bar 
 low s late letter, addressed to the citizens of the United States, in 
 which he tells us that " seventy millions of dollars have been taken 
 from us by the French " ? I have not seen it. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 16, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I ought immediately on receipt of your favor 
 of the 2d to have made the acknowledgment ; but I procrastinated 
 it, upon the idea that I should accompany it with a few remarks on 
 the observations you had made on British finances, and the effects 
 which might ultimately be felt here in case of their derangement. 
 
 I am forcibly struck with the importance of your opinions, and 
 see in them a new motive to regret the unfortunate measures of 
 our executive. I think, however, that the resources of Great Brit 
 ain have always been underrated. An industrious, enterprising, 
 and ingenious nation, possessing almost exclusively and securely 
 the navigation and trading stock of three-quarters of the globe, and 
 a large portion of the skill, machinery, and capital of its manufac 
 tures, and all the advantages of these well protected to the individ 
 ual proprietors by a liberal, just, and stable government, offer a 
 mass of productive power, the fruits of which can hardly be cal 
 culated. 
 
 I saw plainly at the moment bank-notes were not exchangeable 
 for gold and silver at the option of the holder, that these metals 
 were no longer the measure of value. I have been astonished to 
 see the paper supported ; and I do not expect to see this support 
 continue, unless the paper shall in fact be exchangeable at the 
 pleasure of the holder. Gold and silver must inevitably disappear 
 soon after the depreciation of paper appears ; but, all this being 
 perfectly understood, it is presumable that those who guide the 
 affairs of the nation will either return and adhere rigidly to the 
 
 1 The signature under which Mr. Cabot wrote the series of papers not 
 published at the time, but given above, pp. 238-240. 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 245 
 
 metals, or introduce a paper system which shall accommodate their 
 necessities, and finally relieve the nation from some part of its bur 
 den. But, in either course, the society ought not to be disorganized ; 
 and, constituted as they are and abounding in means, I should think 
 motives could not be wanting to preserve the order of the state 
 while the operation is performing. If, however, it be true that the 
 passions of the nation must be occupied in a foreign war to prevent 
 their employment at home, such a war must be with the great 
 powers of Europe, or it will not be sufficiently interesting. Indeed, 
 every war into which France or England enters may be expected 
 to engage them both as adversaries ; and this great rivalry seems 
 to me to furnish a strong motive with each of them to avoid push 
 ing us to hostility. I cannot deny that what you suggest as a 
 means of preserving their artists and manufacturing capitals will be 
 likely to occur to the British cabinet, and will be so strong a temp 
 tation to break with us, that, if aided by other motives, it may 
 prevail. I do believe, however, it would be a short-sighted policy 
 which sacrifices permanent objects to temporary ones. In saying 
 this, I assume for fact that our own policy will be prudent and con 
 ciliatory toward them. This country for half a century to come 
 may be immensely valuable to Great Britain as a consuming cus 
 tomer, and this connection would be at least as beneficial to us as 
 to them. Nothing but violence can interrupt this salutary inter 
 course. Violence long continued, however, often repeated or 
 extremely aggravated, may destroy it. Instead of laws like those 
 proposed by Madison, Great Britain ought to be made to see that 
 we will not sacrifice our interests to our passions, still less to the 
 passions of France. She ought to be satisfied that we are not 
 the dupes of her rival, and that we never will quarrel with her or 
 embarrass the commercial intercourse with her while she regulates 
 her own conduct toward us by the rules of acknowledged justice. 
 If these impressions could be made, not by verbal profession merely, 
 but by uniform public policy, I think no wise administration of 
 that country would desire to quarrel with us, and no one that did 
 not defy the censures of the British people would dare to do it. 
 
 You see by these impotent endeavors to disprove the dangers 
 you apprehend that I am alarmed at them. It is to be feared that 
 we shall be plunged into a sea of troubles before we are prepared. 
 If the strange and disastrous course taken last winter is to be pur 
 sued, or indeed is not to be openly and unequivocally abandoned, 
 
246 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 a war with Great Britain is hardly avoidable. Under the delusive 
 pretence of impartial and independent sentiments, I expect soon to 
 see an address to the latent animosities of our people against the 
 English. A man who loses the approbation of the wise and good 
 can hardly forbear to appeal to their adversaries, who will be glad 
 to succor him. 
 
 If it be not practicable to persuade such a one that he may yet 
 easily secure the permanent support of his first friends, if he will 
 be steady to his own first principles, our affairs are hopeless. 
 Every thing will be rendered odious that is truly valuable, our 
 army, public credit, &c., will be sacrificed to popularity, and at last 
 opposition to French principles will be treated as a predilection for 
 whatever is British. You see how I run, and will justly say I 
 ought to stop. Farewell. 
 
 G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 OCT. 16, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, It has given inexpressible pleasure to all the 
 thinking men from New York to Portsmouth to see that the 
 embassy to France is suspended. Mr. Ellsworth communicated 
 this agreeable intelligence as soon as he received it, and it travelled 
 with the rapidity of good news. Still, however, it is seen that 
 much more is to be done to retrieve our lost character : we cannot 
 recover the high ground on which we stood twelve months ago. 
 The truth is, we had then more reputation than real character : I 
 fear now we have less. I am almost ashamed to use a term which 
 has been so frequently applied as to seem absurd, yet I cannot 
 refrain from saying that we are arrived at a great crisis in our 
 affairs. We are certainly in danger of involving the country in a 
 war, in which the losses by commerce and internal expenses will 
 not be the greatest evils: our strongest passions will be vented 
 upon each other. I am expecting to see the popular animosity to 
 the English resorted to, as a means of recruiting personal influence. 
 It will not surprise me to see the importance of impartial an.d 
 independent sentiments insisted on, while the true design of the 
 preacher will be to captivate the public feelings by abstract ideas, 
 which, though just and proper in themselves, are often rendered 
 pernicious by the manner in which they are applied. Every man 
 of honor and dignity recognizes the worth of elevated sentiments, 
 every lover of the country feels a glow of patriotism at the expres- 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 247 
 
 sion of manly spirit toward those whose haughtiness wounds our 
 just pride, and whose insolence and power seem to insult our weak 
 ness. To these add a formidable party, ready to catch at whatever 
 can be used to foment our hatred to the English, and mitigate our 
 resentments toward France. In a word, it appears to me all our 
 prudence, if we were free to exercise it, would not be more than 
 enough to keep peace. Doubtless you have received informal 
 accounts of the general reprobation in Europe of the nominations 
 to France. It is not confined to England, but is heard on the bor 
 ders of the Mediterranean as well as the Baltic and North Sea : 
 such, at least, is the information of all my visitors from Boston. Is 
 it not possible to make the President see this business in its true 
 light ? Will he not acknowledge that we ought upon principle, 
 and at any rate upon policy, to conciliate the good-will of the 
 coalesced powers ? These powers are become victorious, and for a 
 little while may be too formidable to be trifled with. Does not 
 our own interest require that all suspicions should be removed, 
 concerning our disposition toward the parties at war ? Is it not 
 possible to satisfy the President that those of whom he is jealous 
 have no views but public, and that they will cordially support him 
 and his administration upon the principles he has always avowed, 
 and with few exceptions generally practised? It appears too 
 evident that, if the President persists in the course he has taken 
 a few steps further, he must break all terms with his best friends, 
 his only real friends, who are in fact the genuine friends of the gov 
 ernment and the country. I confess I don t know the man, but 
 perhaps you do, who might by a full and free conversation recon 
 cile him to his ministers, and, what is more difficult, reconcile him 
 to himself. It is worth the trial before the meeting of Congress. 
 It may afterwards be too late. I looked to Ellsworth, 1 but he 
 says he can do no more. Where is Judge Patterson ? He has 
 the right sort of sense and spirit. 
 
 I know of only one copy of Barlow s address, which was the one 
 I had read. Measures are taken to procure it for you, but I don t 
 know yet the success. If it can be obtained, it shall be transmitted. 
 
 With unfeigned respect, esteem, and attachment, 
 
 I remain ever yours, G. C. 
 
 1 Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut, so frequently referred to in these 
 letters, is, of course, well known as chief justice of the United States and 
 envoy to France. He served as senator from Connecticut during Mr. 
 Cabot s term of office, and they were always warm friends. 
 
248 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 (Private and confidential.) 
 
 TRENTON, Oct. 22, 1799. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The die is cast: the envoys go to France, or 
 rather to Europe, to see if they can enter France. 
 
 When the President wrote Mr. Ellsworth, from Quincy, that he 
 should delay the mission for a longer or a shorter time, we im 
 agined he would not finally decide the great question to send or 
 not to send without asking some opinions. But we have mis 
 taken. Nobody was consulted : he had deliberated fully on the subject, 
 and his determination was unchangeable. Thus decided, it would 
 have been indecorous to have asked advice. If you were deputed 
 on this mission, you would little imagine that you were going on a 
 party of pleasure; yet the President suggests that it will be " enter 
 taining " as well as " instructive " to the envoys, and, u whether it 
 succeed or riot, useful to their country." 
 
 I thought of your idea, that, in the last resort, Mr. Ellsworth 
 should refuse. But what would have been the alternative ? Prob 
 ably the appointment of Madison or Burr. 
 
 This measure will unquestionably change the whole administra 
 tion, if it should not eventually occasion the subversion of the 
 government. A change of the administration from one set of 
 Federal hands to another would be of little moment, but it will 
 riot be such a change. Jefferson will be President, Gallatin Secre 
 tary of the Treasury, Madison Secretary of State, and two other 
 like political characters be placed at the head of the other depart 
 ments. 
 
 There is but one way in which these evils can be prevented, it is 
 the only way in which the mischiefs of this French mission can be 
 repaired, the only atonement which the President can make to his 
 country for this fatal error, his announcing publicly, at the close 
 of the next session of Congress, that he will retire. Then the Fed 
 eralists, uniting in one man for his successor, might yet save the 
 country from ruin. 
 
 The envoys embark forthwith at Newport, in the United States 
 frigate. 
 
 Mr. Murray has given many details of the French affairs. He 
 thinks the Republic will not last six months. The President says 
 it will last seven years, and desires his opinion may be remem- 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 249 
 
 bered. 1 Whatever is unfavorable to this prediction is doubted or 
 disbelieved. The account we have had of the battle of Novi and 
 the death of Joubert was a stock-jobbing story ! 2 I have not time 
 to add, but that I am ever most truly yours, 
 
 T. PICKERING. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 TRENTON, Oct. 24, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your letter of the 16th has just come to 
 hand. I have already written you that the great question of the 
 mission to France has been finally decided by the President alone. 
 Patterson is in Georgia; but an angel from heaven would have 
 produced no change. In most matters, we are consulted, and our 
 ideas often adopted ; but on this all-important question, from first 
 to last, we have been absolutely excluded. Some conversation took 
 place last Thursday with the envoys, who dined with the President 
 (after the point had been previously decided), when many strange 
 ideas were broached. I heard Judge Ellsworth recite a part, but had 
 not patience to hear the remainder, and went away. It was at 
 Wblcott s the same evening. I have desired him to commit it to 
 writing, which he has promised to do. 
 
 I am sincerely yours, TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 31, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The two letters I received from Trenton yes 
 terday deprived me of last night s sleep. My gloomy imagination 
 is too apt to persuade me that the worst which can happen will 
 happen, or rather that measures of a tendency manifestly evil will 
 produce the evil to which they tend. Thus, from the moment the 
 nomination of ministers to France was made known to me, I saw 
 an unavoidable division of the Federalists, and apprehended the 
 triumph of Jacobinism in the United States ; and I foresaw dis 
 tinctly a foreign war, ruinous and disgraceful, which by prudent 
 
 1 This prediction is correct in regard to the conquests of the allies ; but, 
 within less than a month from this time, Bonaparte was proclaimed first 
 consul, and the French republic ceased to exist in aught but name. 
 
 2 Joubert was defeated at Novi, by Suwarrow, with great loss, Aug. 15, 
 1799. Joubert himself and ten thousand Frenchmen, including many dis 
 tinguished officers, were slain. 
 
250 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 measures might be honorably avoided. 1 These things are undoubt 
 edly to be dreaded, as the consequences of the absurd and unad 
 vised project of courting the revolutionary sect, and appearing to 
 connect ourselves with them at a moment when their power is so 
 fallen as to leave us without the plea of necessity, and when it is 
 highly probable they are about to expiate the crimes they have 
 committed against rational liberty and the wretchedness they have 
 inflicted upon millions of innocent people. The annunciation by 
 the President of his resolution to decline being a candidate at the 
 next election would be indeed the most effectual reparation and 
 atonement that could be made for the fatal error ; but this is not to 
 be expected, and I should sooner expect a resignation, which would 
 punish those 2 who have dared to prefer the interest of the body of 
 the country to that of its head. I have flattered myself that the 
 great Washington would again come upon the stage, if the occa 
 sion should be made to appear worthy of his reappearance. 3 
 
 The prediction of years duration to the revolutionary sect in 
 France may be true, but it is highly improbable. Frenchmen will 
 themselves annihilate the remaining powers in France, if the 
 coalesced powers act with discretion and in concert. If they liber 
 ate the conquered nations and leave France to herself, a king will 
 be established before the expiration of 1800. It will probably be 
 the case, at any rate ; but such a prediction as that of the seven 
 years favors the policy so generally reprobated by other wise men. 
 Similar to this is the opinion of J. Q. Adams, in a letter from 
 Berlin, 19th of April, to a friend in London. He approved of the 
 nomination ; he thought the campaign there favorable to France, 
 although every one else thought otherwise. My messenger waits, 
 and only allows me to add that I am always 
 
 Your faithful and affectionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 Nov. 1, 1799. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have not been able to find a copy of Joel Bar 
 low s address, but I am told that the one which had been formerly 
 lent me is in Philadelphia. Whether it is in the hands of the 
 
 1 All these events ultimately came to pass, though the consequences 
 were not in all respects as dreadful as the writer anticipated. 
 
 2 By causing Mr. Jefferson, then Vice-President, to succeed at once to 
 the first office. 
 
 8 Compare Sparks s Life of G. Morris, III. 123. 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 251 
 
 President or his secretary, or of some other person, could not 
 be ascertained. I think it probably, however, to be with the 
 President. My young friends are still looking out for another 
 copy for you. It is, on the whole, a very contemptible perform 
 ance ; yet there may be some good use of it in proving the con 
 nection between our patriots and the Directory, which appears by 
 the letter to the latter from Barlow and Skipwith. 
 
 Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 WOLCOTT TO CABOT. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 4, 1799. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I agree with you that the resources of Great 
 Britain, derived from superior skill, ingenuity, and industry, pro 
 tected by a stable government, have rarely or never been properly 
 appreciated. Amidst the passions and turbulence of the times, the 
 finances have been administered with firmness and intelligence, 
 which have rarely been imparted to statesmen. Some evils have 
 been foreseen and avoided, others have been mitigated, and in 
 every conjunction the government has manifested an exact knowl 
 edge of its real situation. 
 
 But after paying the respect which is due to the foresight and 
 energy of the British administration, and after admitting (as I ex 
 plicitly do) that the government was right in prosecuting the war 
 at every hazard, I cannot but think that the success of the financial 
 system of Great Britain has been in a great measure owing to the 
 misfortunes of other nations, and that an immediate peace would 
 greatly endanger the government. Great as the profits of the 
 nation really are, they must be admitted to be insufficient to fur 
 nish thirty millions annually to the government in loans, besides 
 twenty-five millions of revenue, and all in addition to the immense 
 capital required for new establishments in the four quarters of the 
 globe. The true cause of the existing credit of the government, in 
 my opinion, is that Great Britain has so far the exclusive com 
 mand of several great objects of commerce that she can for a time 
 prescribe for the commercial world an artificial measure of value. 
 The precious metals could not be commanded in sufficient quantities 
 to answer the purposes of interior circulation and to balance all 
 her public and commercial negotiations with foreign countries. 
 
252 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 She has therefore declared paper to be money , and gold and silver 
 to be merchandise. Her immense commerce enables her to com 
 mand the gold and silver necessary for foreign intercourse, and 
 the quantity of paper is so regulated by the administration and by 
 governmental operations of finance as not greatly to exceed the 
 demand. The price of labor, of manufactures, in short of every 
 thing, is however gradually rising, and the system must fail when 
 ever any considerable foreign nation can successfully compete with 
 Great Britain in manufactures or in the supply of the tropical 
 climates, which constitute the basis of her commerce and revenue. 
 
 Events may happen which may disconcert the plans of the 
 British government. I believe, however, that their calculations 
 are formed for a long continuance of the war ; that a speedy 
 restoration of any settled system in France is not expected ; and 
 that there exists but little confidence in the sincerity of the Aus 
 trian government. By continuing the war, the fine edge of Jacob 
 inism will be worn smooth, the enthusiasm of the new sectaries 
 will be abated. As the danger diminishes, Great Britain will 
 diminish her resistance. In the mean time, that island will be 
 made the entrepot of the world, and the national debt be disposed 
 of in the best manner which circumstances will permit. When 
 peace is made, I presume it is intended that Great Britain shall be 
 at least as little embarrassed with debt as her neighbors. 
 
 I am sensible that the reasoning on which my opinion is founded, 
 and which does not presume any intentional fraud, would be deemed 
 abstruse, if fully detailed. Perhaps it is unfounded. I know that 
 a war would be illy relished by the merchants and manufacturers 
 of Great Britain, and the same may be said with truth of the 
 merchants and ship-owners of the United States. It is on this 
 circumstance I found my argument of the ill policy of the late 
 measures of our government. We might have secured the influ 
 ence of these men in our favor, and thus preserved peace, and have 
 attracted much of the capital and commerce of Great Britain to 
 our country. There are, however, ill-concealed prejudices existing 
 in both countries ; and my apprehension is that the passions of 
 certain descriptions of persons in Great Britain and the United 
 States will be employed to aid the deliberate calculations of the 
 British cabinet. If our envoys arrive when the governments of 
 Europe are prepared to negotiate for a general peace, the mission 
 will by accident become a proper and safe measure. / do not 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 253 
 
 expect a general peace ; and, if the war continues, I believe experi 
 ence will show that a great mistake has been committed. I cannot 
 believe that either the British government or their merchants will 
 consider it for their interest to permit us to prosecute a free com 
 merce with France ; and if, after a treaty shall be made, our trade 
 shall be interdicted, the United States will commence or retaliate 
 hostilities. 
 
 But it has been decreed that the negotiation shall be prosecuted, 
 and we must submit. The President directed the instructions to 
 be prepared, and his orders were obeyed. Expectations were in a 
 certain way encouraged, that the persons who were compelled to 
 participate in this business would be permitted to explain their 
 sentiments ; but, as soon as the papers were completed, the envoys 
 were directed to proceed immediately. The President, having 
 formed his own judgment upon the measure, did not think it right 
 to consult opinions which he foreknew could not shake his purpose. 
 Thus are the United States governed as Jupiter is represented 
 to have governed Olympus : without regarding the opinions of 
 friends or enemies, all are summoned to hear, reverence, and obey 
 the unchangeable fiat. It must for some time remain a question 
 whether the master or his servants are in an error. 
 
 Although without desponding I deprecate this measure in respect 
 to our foreign relations, yet the effects upon our domestic interests 
 appear to me incapable of mitigation. It is certain that the Fed 
 eral party will be paralyzed, nor do I perceive how the present 
 system of measures can be maintained. The people will not 
 support the army ; the navy will not be increased ; neither taxes 
 nor loans will be permitted beyond what may be necessary to dis 
 charge existing engagements ; the President will gain no new 
 supporters ; his former friends will be in disgrace with the public ; 
 and the administration of John Adams, so much extolled, will end 
 by a transfer of the powers of the government to the rival party. 
 I am, dear sir, Your friend and obedient servant, O. W. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Nov. 14, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have read your excellent letter of the 4th, 
 in which you have added to the stock of ideas occasioned by your 
 former observations on British affairs. My mind has been occu 
 pied with some other subjects, or this would have absorbed it. 
 
254 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1799. 
 
 Whether all the consequences you apprehend should be experienced 
 or not, I shall always be satisfied your reasonings are just, as they 
 are profound. I still think, however, that means will be found to 
 manage that great debt, and bring it to a bearable weight without 
 greatly disordering the state. 
 
 I had yesterday some conversation with Mr. Senator Dexter, 
 and was much pleased to find his good sense prevailing over all 
 sorts of nonsense on the subject of the late occurrence. 
 
 Your obliged, &c., G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Dec. 16, 1799. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The intimations contained in the speech are 
 of the sort which I feared, but not so plain as I expected. The 
 partisans of Jacobinism rejoice to see that the principles of this 
 sect are no longer denounced, and triumphantly ask "if it is not 
 evident now that the charges of their enemies are calumnious?" 
 " Great pains had been taken," they say, " to misrepresent them to 
 the people, and to make it believed that the French revolutionary 
 system was a war against real liberty and legitimate property in 
 every country, and that the owners of property everywhere ought 
 therefore to discountenance it." " But," it is asked, " if this were 
 true, would the head of our nation be seen negotiating with 
 France ? " " Would they treat with the Directory, if it were true 
 that the Directory were supposed capable of such vile conduct as 
 is ascribed to them?" "At any rate," they say, "the President 
 discards the jealousy of French designs, which had begun to take 
 hold of our citizens," &c., &c. But if the silence observed toward 
 French principles is in itself so grateful, it is no less so to find 
 some general expressions of uneasiness which may be explained by 
 the well-known feelings toward another nation which are always 
 popular. To these sources of pleasure the Jacobins add the hope 
 of getting rid of the army, and the influence of some great men 
 connected with it, so that the pure principles of democracy may be 
 no longer restrained, but have a free course, as in France, &c., 
 &c., &c. 
 
 How often has it happened that we have derived from our 
 blunders greater benefits than from what we should have called the 
 wisest policy ? There is a reason for this, which in many cases it 
 
1799.] CORRESPONDENCE. 255 
 
 is easy to discern. The republic is not to be despaired of. If we 
 are to have an inundation of Democratic evils, we shall have better 
 dikes afterwards ; if we are only threatened, we shall strengthen 
 those we already have. While I cannot but feel the greatest con 
 cern for the events which are soon to happen, I confide in the 
 ultimate good destiny of our country ; and I feel extremely anxious 
 that those who now labor to administer its affairs properly should 
 then enjoy the superior satisfaction of having striven against every 
 error, and persevered in fulfilling duties the more difficult from 
 being left unsupported. Sure I am at this moment that the merit 
 of those men whose services are now rendered under circumstances 
 of great discouragement is distinctly seen and justly valued by the 
 wisest and best citizens. Suffer me, therefore, to hope that the 
 helm of state will not be abandoned by those who watch while they 
 cannot guide it. It is often remarked that the situation is difficult 
 as well as delicate into which the auxiliaries of our Federal head 
 are brought; but it always is maintained that their honor and 
 dignity will be best supported by a steady, inflexible adherence to 
 official duties. 
 
 I don t know why I trouble you with ideas of this sort, unless 
 it is that I partake of the fear sometimes expressed, " that the 
 patience of our secretaries will be exhausted." It ought not to 
 be supposed possible, and therefore I pay them no compliment 
 in admitting the influence for a moment. 
 
 Your obliged and faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
256 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 1800. 
 
 Dissensions of Federalists. Hamilton s Pamphlet. Presidential Election. 
 Correspondence. 
 
 MISFORTUNES accumulated about the dominant party, 
 as the last year of the century closed. When Congress 
 assembled, though the Federalists had for the first time a 
 large working majority, it was seen that the great secret 
 of their former success had been lost. Perfect harmony 
 was at an end. The moderate Southern men, under the 
 lead of Marshall, approved the French mission ; but the 
 extreme wing of the party dissented wholly from the peace 
 policy of the President, and as the necessary result all 
 consistent action was paralyzed. Jefferson perceived with 
 exultation that their majority availed his opponents noth 
 ing. This early display of the bad effects of internal 
 quarrels was by no means the smallest evil which at that 
 time befell the Federalists. Their differences were greatly 
 aggravated by Tench Coxe s perfidious publication of a 
 letter written to him by Mr. Adams, in 1792. The latter, 
 with the hasty suspicion that was always too common with 
 him, had there hinted in plain terms that the Pinckneys 
 of South Carolina were British sympathizers. The publi 
 cation of the letter at this time helped to inflame Mr. 
 Adams s opponents. It convinced them that Mr. Adams 
 purposed and had long planned their ruin, by rousing 
 against them the latent popular hatred of any one who 
 dared to speak well of England. From its nature as well 
 as from its falseness, this charge was one of the prime causes 
 in the dissolution of the party ; and every thing that tended 
 
1800.] DISSENSIONS OF FEDERALISTS. 257 
 
 to show Mr. Adams to be its author embittered the resist 
 ance of the ultra-Federalists. 
 
 But the event which removed the last chance of peace 
 was the death of Washington. In the midst of their feuds 
 and anxieties, with political overthrow staring them in the 
 face, the Federalist leaders had begun to look despairingly 
 to Washington as the only man who could maintain the 
 party and govern the country. They were not without 
 hopes even that the great Virginian might be induced to 
 again emerge from retirement and assume the Presidency. 
 But now all this was ended by death, and even the vague 
 hope afforded by the possibility of Washington s reappear 
 ance was taken from them. 
 
 From Mr. Cabot s earliest letters in this year, it is clear 
 that there were symptoms of a desire on the part of the 
 extreme Federalists, and of the President as well, to accept 
 the situation with a better temper, and, if possible, to heal the 
 wounds already inflicted on the party. Every thing, however, 
 was against such a solution. Not only had personal hostilities 
 gone too far to be allayed, but the element of secrecy added 
 much to all the difficulties of the situation. The great 
 mass of the party, though differing among themselves 
 perhaps as to the expediency of the second mission, were 
 sincerely united in wishing party harmony. Through igno 
 rance, they were prevented from forwarding the object of 
 their wishes by any general and decisive manifestation of 
 opinion. Every one knew that grave dissensions existed 
 among the leaders; but very few persons understood 
 exactly what those differences were, or how far they had 
 gone, nor did any of the immediate parties to the quarrel 
 desire to make their controversies public. Mr. Adams had 
 no wish to drive the hostile chiefs into open rebellion ; and 
 the leaders, conscious of their own weakness in the party, 
 were most unwilling to appeal to that tribunal for redress. 
 But the fire burnt all the more hotly, because smothered 
 in this unnatural manner. Moreover, the leaders of the 
 
 17 
 
258 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 party, though opposed to Mr. Adams, were by no means 
 united in their own plans. Pickering and Wolcott wished 
 the overthrow of Mr. Adams, at any and all risks ; while 
 the others, more prudent and less exasperated by personal 
 encounters, saw the impossibility of such a step. The 
 result was that in a secret caucus of the Federal members 
 of Congress, held at Philadelphia, it was voted to support 
 Adams and Pinckney for the offices of President and Vice- 
 President. Yet owing to the differences among themselves, 
 which crippled every movement of the Federalists, it was 
 not decided whether Mr. Adams or Mr. Pinckney was to 
 be considered the party choice for the first office. From the 
 nature of the existing electoral law, the simple determina 
 tion to vote for two candidates equally without distinctly 
 settling the distribution of the two offices left the door open 
 for indefinite intrigue. Hence the omission to indicate 
 beyond question the party choice afforded an almost irre 
 sistible inducement to the enemies of the President to 
 quietly try to bring Pinckney in over him ; while, to the 
 partisans of Mr. Adams, the possibility of such an event 
 was an incentive to throw away a sufficient number of 
 votes to insure the relegation of Pinckney to the second 
 place. Thus, while one side was tempted to gratify their 
 personal hatred, at the expense of party faith and honor, 
 the other was ready to risk a total defeat rather than ex 
 pose their favorite candidate to the loss of the first office. 
 
 The action of one or two of the more prominent leaders 
 contributed to widen still further the already existing 
 breach, and to foster the intrigues for which the uncertain 
 action of the caucus gave abundant opportunity. The first 
 overt act was committed by Mr. Adams. By the results 
 of the Federal caucus and the disastrous termination of 
 the New York elections, the President must have perceived 
 that his fate in the coming campaign would depend solely 
 upon the action of the Southern Federalists. He there 
 fore determined, now that it could make matters no worse, 
 
1800.] DISSENSIONS OF FEDERALISTS. 259 
 
 to rid himself of his opponents in the cabinet, and, in 
 pursuance of the object, requested, and at once received, 
 McHenry s resignation. On the refusal of Pickering to 
 follow McHenry s example, Mr. Adams dismissed him 
 from the Secretaryship of State. The only criticism that 
 can be made on this action of the President s is that he 
 should have dismissed Pickering, McHenry, and Wolcott 
 as well, at least a year sooner than he actually did. There 
 is no necessity to seek for good and sufficient reasons for 
 these cabinet changes. The secretaries had consistently 
 opposed Mr. Adams in his recent measures ; and, whether 
 those measures were wise or not, this of itself is full 
 justification for their dismissal. No man can carry on 
 an administration properly, unless his cabinet is in sub 
 stantial agreement with him. Such had long ceased to 
 be the case with Mr. Adams ; and that he hesitated so 
 long to exercise an undoubted right, and to perform what 
 was in fact a duty, can only be attributed to his unwilling 
 ness to force a party quarrel. Had he changed his secreta 
 ries sooner, the trouble sure to result from such a step might 
 possibly have been in a measure overcome before the party 
 became involved in another electoral contest. Inasmuch as 
 Mr. Adams s removal of the secretaries can be defended on 
 the broadest and soundest political principles, it is to be 
 regretted that it has been thought necessary to bring sweep 
 ing charges of intrigue and bad faith against them and all 
 their friends. Intrigue and bad faith are harsh words, and 
 demand great care and exact definition on the part of those 
 who use them. There is unfortunately in this instance 
 ground for such accusations ; but they have been exagger 
 ated, and have not been applied with sufficient precision. 
 
 To say that cabinet officers are guilty of intrigue and of 
 bad faith, because they discuss the government policy in 
 letters to confidential friends, seems wholly unreasonable. 
 That leaders of a party in office should, under the seal of 
 secrecy, reveal the policy of the administration to a few 
 
260 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 other leaders out of office, seems so unquestioned a right that, 
 to borrow a legal phrase, history may be said to take judi 
 cial cognizance of it. We may even go farther, and say 
 that cabinet officers have an undoubted right, if differing 
 from the supreme executive as to the expediency of a 
 measure, to make an effort to alter his course by bringing 
 to his notice the views of his most prominent supporters, 
 as well as the general party sentiment. This was done, 
 and to judge by the correspondence was all that was done, 
 in the affair of the major-generals ; l yet Mr. Adams made 
 a charge of intrigue, which has since been renewed against 
 all concerned in that affair. The case is very different, 
 however, where cabinet officers, opposed in opinion to their 
 official chief, use the opportunities of their confidential 
 relations to destroy or injure him. Pickering took advan 
 tage of his position in attacking Mr. Adams, and both he 
 and Wolcott furnished Hamilton with material obtained in 
 their official capacity for use in further attacks. 2 Such a 
 course deserves the stigma of bad faith, and Pickering and 
 Wolcott are open to all the censure which must attach to 
 it. But, be all this as it may, there can be no doubt that 
 Mr. Adams was fully justified in ejecting his secretaries, 
 nor that their dismissal was a most disastrous opening to the 
 ensuing campaign. Colonel Pickering now lost all restraint, 
 and wrote to every Federalist leader letters abounding in 
 the most virulent invective against the President. The 
 latter retorted ; and accusations of being a " damned fac 
 tion," an " Essex Junto," and " a British faction," were 
 again loudly repeated against all Mr. Adams s opponents. 
 
 Mr. Cabot had received the news of Pickering s dismissal 
 with unfeigned indignation ; for he saw in this step, as he 
 
 1 Colonel Pickering, as appears from letters in the Pickering MSS., had 
 a more definite plan, and desired more combination in regard to the ap 
 pointment of Hamilton. But he seems to have stood alone ; and with this 
 exception I am satisfied of the correctness of the statement in the text. 
 
 2 See Pickering to Hamilton, Hamilton s Works, VI. 443; Wolcott to 
 Hamilton, Ibid., 447 ; Hamilton to Wolcott, Ibid., 449. Authorities can be 
 multiplied, but these serve as illustrations. 
 
1800.] DISSENSIONS OF FEDERA LISTS. 261 
 
 believed, the complete abandonment by Mr. Adams of all 
 the best principles of the Federalist party. Besides the fact 
 that Colonel Pickering was his warm personal friend, Mr. 
 Cabot was still further aroused by the cry of " British fac 
 tion," raised by the President and his supporters. He 
 knew that the sympathy which he and many of his friends 
 felt for Great Britain in her struggle with France, and 
 their desire that the United States, so far as they co-operated 
 with any foreign power, should aid England, were dictated 
 by reason and by motives of the soundest policy. With 
 even more keenness and with the greatest justice, he felt 
 outraged by the illiberal demagogue cry of a " British fac 
 tion." Rightly or wrongly, he attributed the authorship 
 of this charge to the President, and to such partisans as 
 
 Gerry ; and he deeply resented it. Mr. Cabot was far more 
 unwilling than most of his contemporaries to embroil him 
 self in personal quarrels i\ but he felt it to be inconsistent 
 with his own self-respect to make any advances toward a 
 renewal of his former friendly intercourse with Mr. Adams, 
 on the latter s return to Quinc}^ in the spring of 1800. 
 Thus did the animosity of Colonel Pickering, and the con 
 sequent violence exhibited by Mr. Adams, serve to complete 
 the alienation of the more temperate men among the extreme 
 Federalists, men like Mr. Cabot, who were in the begin 
 ning truly desirous of making much personal sacrifice, that 
 party harmony might be secured. 
 
 The absorbing question during the summer of 1800 was, 
 of course, the impending election. Mr. Cabot believed 
 that there were only two courses possible, either the open 
 rejection of Mr. Adams, or a fair and equal support of 
 Adams and Pinckney. The action of the caucus at Phila 
 delphia, and the popular favor with which Mr. Adams 
 was generally regarded, had made the first of these alter 
 natives impossible ; and Mr. Cabot therefore felt that it 
 only remained to adopt the second in perfect good faith. 
 He considered it essential, either for success or honorable 
 
262 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 defeat, that unquestioned fairness in the maintenance of 
 the pledge to cast an equal vote for Adams and Pinckney 
 should be observed, and that a spirit of mutual conces 
 sion should be manifested by the contending factions. 
 But matters had gone too far for such moderate counsels. 
 The charge of belonging to a " British faction " had worked 
 Hamilton beyond the point of dislike toward Mr. Adams, 
 into a condition of such rage that passion seems to have 
 completely mastered his political judgment. His first step 
 was to transmit to Mr. Adams a letter requesting an ex 
 planation of the charge of belonging to a " British faction," 
 directed against himself, and authorized, as he understood, 
 by the President himself. If the latter could have an 
 swered this letter by a denial of the authorship of this 
 charge, it is clear he should have done so. If he could not, 
 then the silence which he observed was perhaps the wisest 
 course under the circumstances. This much is certain, 
 that this refusal to reply was not calculated to mend mat 
 ters ; and Hamilton resolved forthwith to make a public 
 attack on the President. From such a proceeding Mr. 
 Cabot strove most earnestly to dissuade him. He repre 
 sented to him the absurdity of supporting in one breath 
 for the highest office in the land a man whom in the next 
 he attacked most bitterly. Though conceding the possible 
 necessity of defending themselves against the cry of " Brit 
 ish faction," Mr. Cabot urged upon Hamilton the great 
 dangers from the imputation of foul play which would be 
 involved in a public onslaught on their candidate. Keenly 
 alive to the reflections to which such a step would expose 
 Hamilton himself, Mr. Cabot even went so far as to say 
 that, if Hamilton must publish, he had better do it anony 
 mously. But all was in vain. Hamilton published his 
 attack on Mr. Adams, and, in so doing, signed the death- 
 warrant of his party. Every thing had tended in but 
 one direction since the departure of the French mission ; 
 but Hamilton s pamphlet was the last act in this melancholy 
 
1800.] HAMILTON S PAMPHLET. 263 
 
 political drama. Whatever chance of success the Federal 
 ists may have had before, nothing was now possible but 
 defeat. All confidence was destroyed, all belief in the 
 validity of party pledges and party faith vanished, and the 
 Federalists were left to the contemplation of what their 
 own hands had wrought. Mr. Cabot was too experienced 
 a political observer, and too little of an optimist, not 
 to perceive clearly the unmistakable presages of disaster. 
 From his letters during the summer, it is evident that he 
 was hoping against hope, and that he had prepared his own 
 mind, and was striving to prepare his friends for the coming 
 defeat. But, however much philosophy he may have dis 
 played in contemplating the probable future, his patience 
 was entirely overcome when he received Hamilton s pam 
 phlet. That this ill-timed and ill-advised attack should 
 have been made at all was bad enough, but that it should 
 be such a lame assault was too much to be borne. Not 
 only was the self-stultification of supporting and attacking 
 the same person as complete as he had foreseen, but the 
 attack itself seemed to him an utter failure. Thoroughly 
 disheartened and disappointed, Mr. Cabot wrote Hamilton 
 a letter in which, with manly frankness, but with entire 
 courtesy, he expressed his opinion of this performance. 
 To the credit of both men, it may be said that this honest 
 and severe criticism produced no change or diminution in 
 their friendship. 
 
 In due course, the election was held ; and the Federalists 
 were compelled to endure the defeat which their own 
 blunders and high temper had made inevitable. To every 
 one who admires the Federalist party, as all intelligent 
 and fair-minded men must ; to every one who recalls the 
 courage, the ability, the sagacity with which the founda 
 tions of American nationality were laid; to all who rev 
 erence the party that counted Washington, Hamilton, 
 Marshall, and Adams among its leaders, the story of that 
 great party s downfall must be melancholy in the extreme. 
 
264 LITE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 Led by the greatest men in American history, officered 
 with a greater amount of ability than was ever displayed 
 by all other political parties in America, the Federalists, 
 by their own strong and uncurbed wills, by their own 
 errors and their own passions, brought upon themselves a 
 premature defeat, which neither the address of Jefferson, 
 the wisdom of Madison, nor all the popular majorities of 
 Democracy had been able to compass ; 
 
 " And when they fell, they fell like Lucifer, never to hope again." 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Jan. 13, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have not seen our friend Ames since he 
 received the letter of which you speak. It is impossible you should 
 be free from great perplexities ; but why should you not cultivate a 
 
 little stoicism, and not be wretched because and 1 
 
 are about you ? 
 
 Whatever shall be done or attempted that tends to dishonor us, 
 I am sure will not be imputed to you. It will be seen that you 
 lament more than others that a system steady, dignified, and con 
 sistent is too elevated for the low and selfish views we entertain, 
 and requires more force and vigor than our feeble, disjointed ma 
 chinery possesses. You can only propose what is fit : you must 
 execute what is prescribed, and leave the rest to Heaven. 
 
 Your faithful G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 BROOKLINE, Jan. 16, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Mr. Ames passed last evening with me : he 
 is to pronounce the eulogy of Washington before our State Legisla 
 ture three weeks hence. I hope he will weave into it as much as 
 possible of his own politics: they are such as Washington ap 
 proved, and I hardly know what greater praise can be given hini 
 than a display of this fact. 
 
 I have viewed and reviewed, again and again, the picture you 
 
 1 Left blank in manuscript. 
 
1800.J 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 265 
 
 have drawn. I wished to discover that you had thrown over it an 
 air of gloom darker than the truth, but I believe it is a verisimili 
 tude in every particular. 
 
 From the moment the mission to France was announced, it was 
 to be foreseen that the President would part wider and wider from 
 every active, firm friend of the anti-Jacobin policy, which had been 
 with infinite difficulty just established. It was to be foreseen that, 
 a direct attack of external enemies being no longer dreaded, no 
 sufficient reason could be offered to the people for subjecting them 
 to the burden of armies and taxes, always odious when first im 
 posed, and only submitted to from a conviction of indispensable 
 necessity so plain and obvious that no one can dispute its existence. 
 Every sagacious man, however, must discover that, while the ap 
 pearance of danger has diminished, its reality has increased, and 
 thus we are thrown back into a state of peril and embarrassment 
 similar to that we were in several years ago. The difficulty then 
 was to make the people sensible of the nature and extent of the 
 dangers to which the country was exposed, and to arouse a suffi 
 cient indignation to repel it. When they were almost persuaded, 
 a measure was adopted which contradicted all that had been taught, 
 and repressed the rising spirit. Should the mission now fail and 
 France be insolent, it will be in vain to address the people s resent 
 ments upon a subject on which their passions have already evapo 
 rated. But, be all this as it may, it is not the less incumbent on 
 the government to provide for the public safety by all the means 
 in their power. Whatever may be the obstacles to an army, they 
 ought to be overcome : the whole world is becoming military ; and, 
 if we are wholly otherwise, we shall be as sheep among wolves. 
 Indeed, we shall have wolves enough within our own fold, if we 
 cannot keep up our guards. 
 
 I have more than once been informed that Mr. Pitt has expressed 
 in the British cabinet his willingness to make peace, but has been 
 overruled. I have accounted to myself for this circumstance, so 
 extraordinary in a man of his inflexibility, by supposing that he 
 alone felt the extreme difficulty of providing the means to support 
 the war. If the similarity of situations can be supposed to have 
 biassed your opinions, I should not wonder; for, notwithstanding 
 our boasted resources actually existing, such is the machinery by 
 which they are to be drawn forth, that an American financier has 
 not greatly an advantage over the British. The acquiescence in the 
 
266 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 direct tax is such as I hope will encourage the Federalists to make 
 it permanent. But why should not some of the import duties be 
 greatly increased ? Half a dollar upon every fifty-six pounds of salt 
 would be an excellent tax. The article is bulky and imported: 
 evasion is therefore difficult. It is of universal use, and therefore 
 the tax would be productive. Though not perfectly equal, it is as 
 much so, probably, as any tax can be ; and, if it be punctually and 
 perpetually paid, the inequality will be almost annihilated by the 
 incessant operation of well-known principles. I see no objection to 
 doubling the duties on tea, and raising them considerably on coffee 
 and sugar. There is certainly no reason why these and many 
 articles should not be taxed as high as they will bear without 
 encouraging smuggling. This is a limit very important to be 
 known. I am not enough in the world to know what passes 
 openly, still less clandestinely ; but I have always entertained 
 great fears on this point. So far as I have known the opinions 
 which have prevailed, smuggling appears to have been deemed in 
 famous. Whatever has been practised must therefore have been 
 hidden from the citizens as well as the revenue officers, and very 
 few men, probably, have been hardy enough to hazard the dis 
 grace ; but we have had a tide of commercial prosperity constantly 
 flowing : this must turn, and the auri sacra fames will then subdue 
 many scruples. The selection of taxes is a choice among difficul 
 ties ; and it abundantly appears, I think, that indirect taxes, as they 
 are called, are the most tolerable, and therefore these must be car 
 ried as high as they can be collected. Doubtless new and addi 
 tional guards will become requisite ; but, as it becomes more and 
 more understood that all smuggling is paid for by the fair trader, 
 I think a pretty vigorous system may be established. From the 
 money-loving character of our people as well as from the nature of 
 our government, I have always thought the revenues are to be 
 principally secured by the force of pecuniary penalties. If these 
 can be so contrived that they cannot be avoided, but shall be always 
 dreaded by those who offend, I think the offenders will be few and 
 the revenue safe. My object would be to have penalties certain 
 rather than excessive, and subject to no limitation of time or place 
 which should bar full proof. 
 
 Your view of continental Europe is more unfavorable and much 
 more profound than my imagination had formed. Doubtless the 
 selfishness of the German Emperor is a bar to the exertions of 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 267 
 
 the conquered States. A glorious opportunity has been lost to 
 destroy the power of Jacobinism. So much depends on opinion, 
 that the success of the campaign in Italy would have armed half 
 of Europe against France and half of France against the usurp 
 ers, if the coalition had acted fairly, on principles entirely just and 
 had supported faithfully their first enterprises. Suwarrow had 
 consumed his army by employing them in the service he had to 
 perform ; he was exhausted, though always victorious ; and as he 
 approached France, where was the main body of his enemies, he 
 was almost alone. But will not the adversity which closes the 
 campaign operate to unite more closely and effectually the three 
 great powers ? 
 
 I confess to you nothing can exceed my chagrin at seeing a cam 
 paign, which promised every thing to my hopes, produce so little. 
 Still, however, it has produced something of value : it has proved 
 to the terrified people of various countries that their oppressors 
 are not immortal, and that whoever opposes them with courage will 
 defeat them. It has shown France incapable of such great efforts 
 as she made for several successive years, when she easily sent forth 
 eight or ten hundred thousand soldiers to plunder and destroy those 
 who refused to be her willing slaves. She has this year manifested 
 great anxiety for the safety of her revolutionary system, and has 
 been unable to command five hundred thousand for her own defence. 
 The recall of several great leaders from Egypt indicates an aban 
 donment of all hope of any success in that quarter, and probably 
 was in part occasioned by a want of the name and talents of some 
 of them and the support of their united partisans. 
 
 I do not, therefore, yet despair of reaping next year the golden 
 harvest I vainly expected at this time. The success in Hollai.d 
 may tempt the French once more to expose their fleet. They 
 have strong inducements ; and, if they yield to them, England will 
 probably be reinvigorated by another naval victory. 
 
 G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 JAN. 21, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Long before this will reach you, Mr. Payne l 
 will have arrived, and informed you of the state of things here. 
 They have grown something worse since he departed. The tide of 
 
 1 Mr. Gore s brother-in-law. 
 
268 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 wealth which had flowed so long has considerably ebbed, and the 
 effect of this change has become visible in every thing. Property 
 has fallen in price ; real estates, especially, are not worth so much 
 by twenty per cent as three months ago. Our politics have de 
 clined as much as our commercial wealth. The most sensible Fed 
 eralists are generally silent. They would offend, if they spoke 
 freely what they think. With all their circumspection, they are 
 denounced however as oligarchical, as aiming at a dictatorship over 
 the executive. Your old friend Otis is said to be worshipping at 
 the Presidential shrine ; and there are those who charge him with 
 sinister views, those who think that he would even go into the 
 department of state, if the intractability of the present incumbent 
 should provoke his dismissal, &c. But you must reject these 
 slanders. 
 
 The present House of Representatives in Congress is composed 
 of a greater number of Federalists than any former one, but they 
 are uncemented, and will do less than their predecessors to promote 
 the common weal. You may see by their answer to the speech 
 how they are embarrassed. In order to satisfy Mr. Marshall and 
 the Southern Federalists, it was necessary to appear satisfied with 
 the mission ; and in order to please others, perhaps all the true 
 Federalists, it was necessary to withhold all praise of the measure. 
 Hence an awkward circumlocutory phraseology resulted, which, 
 while it seemed to approve, does not really approve the step. 
 
 In the mean time, the honest but uninformed part of the commu 
 nity is perplexed and confounded. At one time, they are told that 
 France is so enfeebled that she can no longer inspire fear, and that 
 she will make peace on such terms as the coalesced powers may 
 choose to offer her. Again, they are told that peace is impractica 
 ble, and that the allies, grown insolent from success, are greatly to 
 be feared, and that prudence requires every opposition to be made 
 to them to preserve the balance of power. But at this moment it 
 is discovered that the coalition is at an end and triumphant, and 
 that France, instead of being provoked, should be amused and con 
 ciliated. Thus our speculations vary, and every arrival discloses to 
 us a new reason for the mission to France. 
 
 Unhappily, the Federalists of the North do not agree with those 
 of the South. The former have pretty generally expressed an 
 open disapprobation, while the latter have as openly vindicated the 
 mission to France. The antis of Virginia maintain that the Presi- 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 269 
 
 dent has been compelled by the force of public opinion to attempt 
 a negotiation which he means should fail, from the improper char 
 acter of the persons he employed and the inadmissible terms he 
 has probably demanded. They confess, however, he has done well 
 in a partial yielding to the popular voice, and they trust to the 
 magnanimity of France to do the rest. France knows, they say, 
 the depressed condition of the true republicans in the United States 
 under the present administration, and will therefore accommodate 
 her behavior to the present exigency, and thus keep open the door 
 for a complete restoration of friendship by-and-by, if it cannot be 
 effected now. On the other hand, the Southern Federalists have 
 been driven to defend the mission as wise, sincere, arid well-timed, 
 and say, if it fail, all men must admit it a full proof of the moder 
 ation of our government and the injustice and hostile designs of 
 France. 
 
 You see General Marshall leads in Congress. He doubtless has 
 great talents and I believe great virtues ; but I fear he is not yet a 
 politician, 1 and has much to learn on the subject of practicable 
 theories of free government. 
 
 It is long since I have heard from you. Doubtless you have 
 great disasters to relate, but I indulge the hope that the misfor 
 tunes which have closed the campaign will produce a more effectual 
 combination and greater exertions the next season. Such one 
 would suppose to be the tendency. Austria must now see that a 
 selfish policy has ruined every thing at the same time that enough 
 has been done to prove to all parties that France can be thor 
 oughly beaten, if the allies do their best. I have written Mr. King 
 something like what is written here, yesterday, which will go by a 
 different ship. 
 
 I beg you to believe me always your unfeigned friend, 2 
 
 G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Feb. 28, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR Sm, I presume you have learned that the King of 
 Denmark has joined the coalition, and that a treaty is negotiating 
 
 1 "We must remember that politican had a somewhat different sense in 
 1800 from that which it now bears. By " politician," Mr. Cabot meant one 
 versed in public policy and the practical arts of state-craft and government. 
 
 2 This letter gives a painfully exact description of the difficulties and 
 distractions by which, thanks to their own dissensions, the Federalists were 
 at this time beset. 
 
270 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 at Stockholm with a view to engage Sweden. It is determined, if 
 this can be accomplished by England and Russia, to treat other 
 powers who shall trade with France as accomplices. 
 
 Talleyrand was taken under the consular patronage upon the 
 belief that the envoys from the United States were on their pas 
 sage to France. It is hoped in England that Suwarrow will be 
 largely reinforced, and with the addition of a German division will 
 act on the Rhine, and that Austria will act separately. Doubtless, 
 if the Emperor of Germany is so disposed, the allies may carry 
 all before them ; but our past experience does not authorize us 
 to expect the sincerity and good faith which the interest of all 
 requires. 
 
 I remain your much obliged and affectionate friend, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 MARCH 27, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I owe you a thousand letters which I shall 
 never pay ; and, if a bankrupt law should pass for this species of 
 debtors, I resolve to take advantage of it, and defraud you of your 
 dues. A few days ago we received the constitution of Buonaparte 
 & Co. for the year 1800. It would be a waste of time to examine 
 the merits of any thing so transient and so useless as a French 
 constitution. Its design is doubtless to amuse the nation while 
 their masters fleece them. But I am delighted with Lord Gren- 
 ville s note to the infamous Jesuitical Talleyrand. 1 It breathes a 
 noble disdain which every man of English blood ought to feel. 
 You must allow me still to admire this nation, who have, except 
 oursefaes, the best people and the best government in the world. 
 Without as much urbanity as they ought to have, they have more 
 good principles and better habits than others. They have as much 
 
 1 As soon as Napoleon had seized upon the supreme power, he made over 
 tures of peace to England. Lord Grenville declined these overtures, on the 
 ground that England waged a purely defensive war in behalf of herself and 
 her allies, and for the security of " property, personal liberty, social order, 
 and religious freedom." As long as the system of attacking the very exist 
 ence of civil society was adhered to by France, Lord Grenville said England 
 would never make peace. He did not consider that the advent of Napoleon 
 and his usurpation of power gave any sufficient pledge in itself for the aban 
 donment of the revolutionary system. This bold and determined note of 
 Lord Grenville is given in full in Alison s History of Europe, IV. 94, 95. 
 See also Thiers, Histoire du Consulat, 52, 64. 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 271 
 
 liberty as they can manage, and more than any other people of 
 Europe can immediately bear, while their government is as just as 
 any and more energetic. 1 
 
 You will have learned by the newspapers that Truxtun has lately 
 acquired great honor in pursuing, attacking, and beating an enemy 
 which he must have known to be his superior in force. 2 Our 
 little navy has, on the whole, done great service ; our commerce is 
 immense, and it is pretty well protected. 
 
 I can give you no information of domestic politics, for I have 
 scarcely known of any thing passing beyond the limits of my own 
 farm these several weeks. Strong and Gerry are the gubernatorial 
 candidates : the first would doubtless be a great acquisition, and 
 the second an injury to the cause of good government ; but you are 
 not to conclude that the former will of a certainty be elected. It 
 is highly probable, but the advantage of Presidential favor is in 
 favor of the latter. 8 Delicacy or a mistaken policy prevented 
 a public discussion of the conduct of Mr. Gerry: in consequence, 
 he is less censured than he deserves to be among the small Feder 
 alists. 
 
 Notwithstanding the despondency you sometimes feel, it seems 
 to me that there is good ground to expect that England will persist 
 in her hostility to Jacobinism until the force of the sect is destroyed. 
 
 Yours truly, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO "WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 26, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, While I feel the highest indignation at the 
 unmerited treatment of Mr. Pickering, I feel no less regret at the 
 necessity he supposes it has created for him to go again into 
 
 1 For views like these, Mr. Cabot and men who felt as he did were 
 termed a " British faction." To-day they appear sensible and proper enough ; 
 but they were then regarded with sentiments of horror, and those who held 
 such opinions were denounced by the Democrats as monarchists at heart, 
 and enemies of the republic. 
 
 - Truxtun s defeat of the French frigate "L Insurgente." This was the 
 first of the exploits of our navy, as Truxtun was the first of our naval heroes. 
 He had the misfortune, however, to be a Federalist ; and Jefferson seized the 
 first opportunity to rid the naval service and the country of him and his 
 obnoxious politics. 
 
 8 The election resulted in the choice of Strong by a majority of about 
 twenty-five hundred. The opposition, however, showed much more strength 
 than was generally anticipated. 
 
272 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 the wilderness. Mr. Pickering s friends and family connections 
 are greatly distressed at the idea of his undertaking new settle 
 ments at his time of life, and with a large family ; and they have 
 deputed Mr. Timothy Williams, nephew of Mr. Pickering, to go 
 to Philadelphia, and dissuade him, if possible, from executing his 
 project. I have desired Mr. Williams, who is a sensible and re 
 spectable man, to call on you for such advice and information as 
 he may need. You can probably inform him whether Mr. Picker 
 ing would be likely to find employment sufficiently lucrative in the 
 banks, insurance companies, or any other great corporation at 
 Philadelphia. I recollect some years ago, when Mr. Hamilton was 
 Secretary of the Treasury, you were often spoken of as a suitable 
 president for the bank of the United States ; and at that time I 
 have no doubt, if you had chosen the office, you would have had it 
 with a handsome salary. If any thing similar is attainable now, I 
 think you must know it; and I should imagine Mr. Pickering s 
 claims would be admitted by every good man. 
 
 Excuse my troubling you on this occasion, which interests every 
 friend to virtue, to justice, or the government. 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BROOKLINE, May 26, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Mr. Williams, knowing the interest I take in 
 whatever concerns you, has put into my hands the letter in which 
 you speak of the President s conduct toward you, and your intended 
 migration. Every honest mind will feel indignant at such unmer 
 ited treatment, wherever it is known. But permit me to ask whether 
 it is absolutely necessary that you subject yourself again to all the 
 hardships and sufferings which are inseparable from a new settle 
 ment in the wilderness ? I don t rely much upon the gratitude of 
 society, and therefore should not expect your just claims to avail ; 
 but I cannot be persuaded that your well-known talents and quali 
 ties would remain long unemployed and unsought for in Philadel 
 phia. I have conversed with Judge Dana and some other friends 
 on this topic, and all agree that you ought not to withdraw from 
 the world until a fair experiment shall prove it to be necessary. 
 This it is believed will never happen. If nothing better occurs, 
 why should you not convert your lands into money, and once more 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 273 
 
 try your fortune in trade ? I have no doubt that, as a commission 
 merchant, you would find more encouragement than formerly, and 
 it would soon bring forward the talents of some of your sons. At 
 any rate, I think you ought not to encounter the labors and self- 
 denials of the frontiers until one year s trial of what can be done 
 on the sea-board. Wherever you may be, and whatever you finally 
 decide to undertake, you will have my ardent prayers for your 
 happiness, and that of all about you, in which sentiment Mrs. 
 Cabot most cordially unites. 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 HAMILTON TO CABOT. 1 
 
 HEADQUARTERS, Oxford, June 11, 1800. 
 
 SIR, It is just reported to me that, among the means of paying 
 the troops which have been transmitted to this place, there is a 
 treasury draft on the collector at Portsmouth for five thousand 
 dollars. Without this sum, the troops cannot be put in possession 
 of their dues ; and a recourse to the collector would be attended 
 with considerable delay. It would therefore be necessary to keep 
 an entire regiment here for some time, and thus an expense of some 
 importance would be incurred by the public. Under this view 
 of the subject, I trust you will deem it expedient to advance the 
 money and take the draft on the collector of Portsmouth. In 
 doing so, you will particularly oblige the army, and render a ser 
 vice to the government. The consideration of the loan you can 
 arrange hereafter with the Treasury Department. 
 
 With consideration, &c., A. HAMILTON. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, June 14, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, I have more than once spoken of your 
 situation in the government to men whom you already esteem, 
 and to others whom you would esteem, if you knew them. They 
 all agree that you fulfil a high but difficult duty in remaining at 
 
 1 This letter was an official one, addressed to Mr. Cabot in his capacity 
 of President of the Office of Discount and Deposit of the United States Bank 
 Boston. Mr. Cabot had accepted this post at the time of Hamilton s secre 
 taryship. See p. 7? 
 
 18 
 
274 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 your post, while the public good so strongly demands it. Whatever 
 may be your apprehensions, I hope you will see the issue of the 
 presidential election before you decide on any new course of life. 
 It is not easy to answer satisfactorily the question, " how far the 
 influential men in Massachusetts will go in attempting to save the 
 declining cause ? " You may, however, rely upon it that the most 
 influential men think as you do upon the nature of our difficulties, 
 and the remedy for them. It is one of the evils incidental to pop 
 ular systems, that the best friends of government feel themselves 
 obliged to conceal the defects and magnify the good qualities of 
 those who administer public affairs. A reputation and degree of 
 personal power is by this means acquired, which may be used for 
 wrong purposes, and cannot be suddenly counteracted. A perfect 
 silence has been observed in Massachusetts until very lately on the 
 caprices, ill-humor, selfishness, and extreme vanity of a man who 
 with these faults and weaknesses possesses some good qualities, 
 great talents for unpolitical speculation, and has rendered some 
 important services. Many good men had the fear, as you know, 
 that Mr. Adams would make wild steerage, if placed at the helm, 
 notwithstanding he had written well on the subject of political 
 navigation ; but those men suppressed their opinions, and co-oper 
 ated with others in giving praise as often as they could, and thus 
 contributed to strengthen the public sentiment in his favor. Thus 
 his fame is in some sort interwoven with the web of the national 
 government. Local ideas also concur to unite them in the minds of 
 the people here, so that every attempt to separate them is ill re 
 ceived. I think, however, that, if electors were now to be appointed, 
 they would vote unanimously for Adams and Pinckney. Our Legis 
 lature have taken this business into their own hands ; and, although 
 they do not wish to see Mr. Adams discarded, I am satisfied they 
 would not hazard the mischief of having Mr. Jefferson elected by 
 wasting a single Federal vote. Every moment brings me new proof 
 that the opinion extends itself of the propriety of uniting all oar 
 votes with the Federalists of other States, as the only measure by 
 which the government can be preserved. Having thus given you 
 my own single opinion, I ought to suggest my apprehension that 
 great pains will be taken in the course of the summer to rouse the 
 passions and prejudices of our people in various ways, and bring 
 them to bear upon the Legislature in such a manner as to deter 
 them from pursuing their own measures on principles which ought 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 275 
 
 to govern. Events abroad, too, may be of a kind to be convertible 
 to the same purposes. All these and other contingencies are deduc 
 tions from present estimates which you will naturally make. On 
 the whole, I trust the good sense of New England will see its in 
 terest, and will not sacrifice it to the views of any individual. 
 
 Yours faithfully and affectionately, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 1 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, June 16, 1800. 
 
 DEAR SIR, While McKean s election was pending, it was 
 given out that, if he should be chosen governor of Pennsylvania, 
 the insurgents would be pardoned, and many other good things done 
 for the patriots and true republicans. 2 McKean was with the 
 President shortly before the pardons issued, and I am assured 
 spent many hours with him the preceding afternoon. The Jacobins, 
 far from giving the President any credit for his " clemency," ascribe 
 the pardons (and justly) to political views. I have been told that 
 Fries manifested his "penitence" by reviling the government as 
 soon as he was set at liberty. 
 
 A day or two before the President set off for the city of Wash 
 ington, a gentleman in conversation with him mentioned the dis 
 mission of one Jacob Mayer, consul of the United States at Cape 
 Francois, whom he (the gentleman) had supposed a deserving man. 
 " Why [said the President], he slandered Colonel Pickering, and 
 had the audacity to charge him with being concerned in the f Kings 
 ton s cargo ; and therefore I removed him ! " And yet I was told 
 (since my removal from office) that in his private companies I was 
 the constant theme of the President s abuse during the whole of 
 the last winter ! 
 
 1 The copy of this letter in the Pickering MSS. only professes to give 
 extracts from the original, but I think every thing essential is preserved. 
 
 2 This refers to Fries, the most prominent leader in the Northampton 
 insurrection, who was found guilty, and sentenced to death. President 
 Adams pardoned him, and his action was attributed by his enemies to polit 
 ical motives. However much the advisability of pardoning Fries, when con 
 demned on two trials for treason, may be questioned, no one can doubt 
 that the motives of Mr. Adams were of the purest and most honorable kind. 
 That a political significance should have been attached to this act of exec 
 utive clemency was from the circumstances of the times unfortunate and 
 unjust, but still inevitable. 
 
276 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 You will doubtless, have seen Mr. Goodhue, and heard him recite 
 in substance the conversation between the President and him on 
 May 9, the day preceding the President s notice to me to resign. 
 Mr. Goodhue omitted some things. I recollect he told me next 
 morning that, among other accusations against the " damned fac 
 tion," the President said, " And you crammed Hamilton down my 
 throat." 
 
 In the dialogue between the President and Mr. McHenry, you 
 will see an evidence of what Wolcott and I have more than once 
 said to each other, that the President is destitute of sincerity ; you 
 will see that while he has so many times been pronouncing, in strong 
 language, Washington s praise, his heart was strong with envy at 
 the mention of his name. In the same dialogue, he pronounced a 
 panegyric upon Jefferson, and, comparing him with Hamilton, he 
 said : " Mr. Jefferson is an infinitely better man, a wiser one I am 
 sure ; and, if President, will act wisely. I know it, and would 
 sooner be Vice-President under him, or even minister resident at 
 the Hague, than be indebted to such a being as Hamilton for the 
 Presidency." 
 
 Yet, a short time before my removal, in conversing with the 
 President, I mentioned Mr. Jefferson s letter to Sir John Sinclair, 
 describing the mould-board, of which I sent you a model, and 
 repeated the substance of Mr. Jefferson s political observations 
 with which he concluded the letter. Upon which I remarked 
 that I supposed Mr. Jefferson to be a very learned man, "but 
 certainly he is a very visionary man." The President answered, 
 " Why, yes, he has a certain kind of learning in philosophy, &c., 
 but very little of that which is necessary for a statesman." 
 
 That he would readily serve as Yice-President under Mr. Jeffer 
 son, I assured Mr. Wolcott two months ago ; and I believe that 
 his coalition with Mr. Jefferson (of which I entertain no doubt) 
 has taken place with the view of securing that station, seeing 
 he despaired of being chosen President ; and probably Jefferson 
 and his friends flattered him with hopes of a lift from their party. 
 
 In the course of my correspondence with General Washington 
 in 1798, in which I informed him of the President s hatred of 
 Hamilton, and stated the necessity of his (General Washington s) 
 direct interposition to prevent Hamilton s degradation and Knox s 
 elevation, I used this expression : " I respect the President for 
 many great and excellent qualities ; but I cannot respect his errors, 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 277 
 
 his prejudices, or his passions." I have regretted that my opinion 
 then expressed should have unavoidably changed ; that subse 
 quently I had reason to retract it, and to deny him the useful 
 qualities of an ordinary statesman. I had then no conception that 
 vanity, ambition, and avarice could so blunt the moral sense of a 
 man, who had so long sustained a fair reputation, as to render him 
 capable of base, dishonorable, and dishonest conduct in the admin 
 istration of public affairs. Instead of resentment for his treat 
 ment of me, I lament, for the sake of human nature and civil 
 society, the degeneracy of such a man ; a man grown gray in the 
 public service, and who, with all his foibles, was esteemed the con 
 stant, firm patriot and upright man. The measure he took to color, 
 at least to his own mind, the pardon of the three insurgents, which 
 I have described in my letter to Mr. Gore, is such an outrage on 
 decency, propriety, justice, and sound policy as stamps the man 
 with indelible disgrace, and demonstrates his unfitness for any 
 public trust. 
 
 When I spoke of the consul Mayer, I intended to have informed 
 you that on authentic documents I stated to the President, in a 
 formal report, the baseness, falsehood, and infamy of the man, 
 and the necessity of his immediate removal from the consulship. 
 He had slandered Doctor Stevens, the consul-general for St. 
 Domingo, and embarrassed him in the exercise of his functions; 
 he had openly and repeatedly declared that "Wolcott and I were 
 concerned in the ship " Kingston s " cargo, and insinuated that the 
 President also had been dabbling. For these reasons, the fellow 
 was dismissed, and not (as the President was willing to make the 
 gentleman before referred to believe) " for slandering Colonel 
 Pickering, as honest a man as lived." Pardon these last six 
 words, as they seemed necessary in this history of Presidential 
 proceedings. 
 
 This report concerning Mayer I finished and sent to the Presi 
 dent in the short interval between the transmission of my answer, 
 in which I refused to resign, and the receipt of his reply, declaring 
 my discharge from my office. And the case was so clear that, with 
 my report, I sent the recommendations I had received of two can 
 didates (there were no more) to succeed Mayer. The candidate I 
 wished to have appointed was Henry Hammond (brother of Abijah 
 Hammond, of New York), who was then at the Cape, and had 
 been recommended by Dr. Stevens himself. The other candidate, 
 
278 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 I believe, was a worthy man and very competent to the office ; but, 
 unfortunately for him, among his recommendations was one from 
 General Hamilton, which was enough to defeat his wishes. 
 
 Referring to the uncertainty of the issue of the next election of 
 President, whether Mr. Adams or Mr. Jefferson would be chosen, 
 I thus expressed myself in a letter of 7 March last to my son John 
 in London : " I am prepared for either event, determined to act 
 independently whether in or out of office. My only solicitude is 
 for my children, that I may have it conveniently in my power to 
 give them educations suited to their capacities and dispositions, &c. 
 For the rest, though ashamed to beg, I am willing and able to dig ; 
 and, if it were convenient to gratify my own inclinations, I would 
 return to the calling of my ancestors, and become a tiller of the 
 ground. When the occasion occurs, I shall do it without reluc 
 tance." 
 
 JUNE 17, 1800. 
 
 P. S. Mr. McHenry thinks it ineligible to have the dialogue 
 communicated by copies, though he would have no objection to a 
 confidential reading by gentlemen meriting confidence, &c. 
 
 WOLCOTT TO CABOT. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, June 18, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, On my return from Connecticut two days 
 since, I received your letter of May 26, when I had the pleasure 
 of being introduced to Mr. Williams by Colonel Pickering. I 
 have conversed with him on the subject of his private affairs, and 
 have tendered him my services. He remains of opinion that it is 
 best for him to attempt a settlement upon his new lands. You 
 may, I believe, rest assured that this determination has been 
 formed with deliberation, and that his mind is not in the least 
 depressed by the cruel treatment he has received. 
 
 I wrote a letter to Mr. Ames from Hartford, which I desired 
 him to show to you. Whatever may be thought of my sentiments, 
 I think it right to communicate them to my friends. It is proba 
 ble the same opinions will be more generally entertained than 
 avowed ; but, if General Pinckney is not elected, all good men 
 will find cause to regret the present inaction of the Federal party. 
 It is at least in their power to defend their principles, and to 
 assume a position in which, if defeated, they may avoid dishonor. 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 279 
 
 It is with grief and humiliation, but at the same time with per 
 fect confidence, that I declare that no administration of the govern 
 ment of President Adams could be successful. His prejudices are 
 too violent, and his resentments of men of influence are too keen 
 to render it possible that he should please either party ; and we 
 all know that he does not possess and cannot command the tal 
 ents, fortitude, and constancy necessary to the formation of a new 
 party. 
 
 The facts upon which these opinions are founded are not gener 
 ally known to the Federalists, although they are well understood 
 by our adversaries ; and this circumstance constitutes our principal 
 danger. There is nothing said in defence of the government 
 which is understood by the people. The newspapers, on our side, 
 are filled with toasts and nonsensical paragraphs, attributing wis 
 dom and firmness to the President ; while, at the same time, all 
 confidence is destroyed by the skilful attacks of a vindictive and 
 intelligent opposition. 
 
 I am no advocate for rash measures, and know that public opin 
 ion cannot be suddenly changed ; but it is clear to my mind that 
 we shall never find ourselves in the straight road of Federalism 
 while Mr. Adams is President. If, however, sensible men think 
 otherwise, he will be supported ; for I shall certainly admit that 
 a change ought not to be attempted, except upon the clearest 
 evidence. 
 
 The beginning of the next week I shall proceed to Washington, 
 where I will endeavor to do as much good and as little mischief as 
 possible. It would, however, be an affectation of insensibility to 
 pretend that I do not expect to suffer much unhappiness, knowing, 
 as I well do, that the whole vengeance of the party will be exerted 
 against the Treasury department, and that the views of certain indi 
 viduals, whom I do not yet consider as Jacobins, will be promoted 
 by destroying my character, if possible. The engines for effecting 
 these purposes are prepared, and the operations have commenced. 
 Some of the clerks in the offices either of the auditor, comptroller, 
 or register, will continue to furnish extracts from the files and 
 records, which will be published and misrepresented in Duane s 
 paper. Unjust as the accusations will be, both in respect to my 
 self and the other officers of the department, they will make a 
 considerable impression, and I shall be held accountable for frauds 
 which I could not prevent, and for errors which others have com 
 mitted. 
 
280 LITE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 I must state one instance in point : Mr. Dayton, 1 as Speaker, 
 called for thirty-three thousand dollars at the close of the session 
 in July, 1798. The money was advanced on his written appli 
 cation, for the compensation of the House of Representatives. 
 It was impossible for me to know that the whole sum was not 
 wanted ; and I ought certainly to presume, as I did presume, that 
 any balance which might remain unexpended would be instantly 
 refunded. Mr. Dayton, however, on various pretexts, neglected 
 to settle his accounts till last winter, when it was discovered that a 
 balance of more than eighteen thousand dollars had been retained 
 by him since July, 1798. 
 
 The day I was informed of it I called on Mr. Dayton, and 
 represented the nature and tendency of his conduct. I afterwards 
 wrote him a private letter, and during the session recovered the 
 money for the public. The accounts have, by some means not 
 to be discovered, been copied for Duane, and published in the 
 " Aurora," with most insolent accusations of my conduct. As 
 Dayton cannot be defended, his breach of trust will attach suspi 
 cion to the officers of the treasury, and to every man who has an 
 account open with the public, and of course the sums accounted 
 for will be plausibly represented as sums which have been embez 
 zled. Part of Colonel Pickering s accounts are unsettled, and he 
 has been attacked in the most indecent manner, although I am cer 
 tain that not a cent of money has been applied improperly. This, 
 indeed, appears from his accounts, which have lately been rendered 
 for settlement. OLIVER WOLCOTT. 
 
 N. B. What think you of the answer 2 to the Alexandria 
 dinner-makers ? Ought not the last war with Great Britain to be 
 considered as having been terminated by the treaty of peace ? 
 
 O. W. 
 
 1 Jonathan Dayton, of New Jersey, member of Congress and afterwards 
 senator from that State. He was Speaker of the House from 1795-99. He 
 was arrested for complicity in Burr s treason, but the prosecution against 
 him was dropped. 
 
 2 This refers to a reply to an address from Alexandria, in which Mr. 
 Adams alluded to the revolution, to the outrages by the English, and to 
 his own and the people s spirit of resistance. (See Works of John Adams, 
 IX. 238.) Wolcott evidently looked on the address as but another appeal 
 to the latent hatred of the English, and as directed though not in so many 
 words against his wing of the party. 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 281 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, July 20, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Mr. Ames put into my hands the letter you 
 wrote from Hartford ; and I have since received your favor of the 
 28th June, from Philadelphia. Let me repeat to you now the 
 wish which is daily expressed by your friends here, that you will 
 not quit the Treasury while a just sense of character will permit 
 you to remain. Doubtless, a man may act independently in office 
 as well as out ; and he can only be made responsible for his own 
 individual opinions and those acts which he approves. If you 
 were out of office, you would not wholly avoid the anxiety which 
 you now feel for the national welfare and the dignity of the gov 
 ernment ; and, although you would escape some mortifications, I 
 doubt, on the whole, whether you would then allow them so much 
 weight as you do now. It is and must be the fate of every man 
 of sensibility to suffer in the public service in proportion to his 
 usefulness. If the cause of the present chagrin were removed, 
 I apprehend no less would proceed from other causes inherent in 
 our system. I lament that, for the sake of the public and for your 
 own sake, you were not born under Saturn instead of Mercury, 
 and that your nativity was not in Germany, where a good stock of 
 phlegm would have been nourished in your constitution ; but these 
 things cannot be altered, and it only remains to accommodate to 
 them. The public feeling is opposed to the censure of Mr. Adams 
 in this quarter. Some good men are very reluctant to admit his 
 unfitness for his office, because to admit it is to admit the necessity 
 of a change, which involves the idea of disorder, discord, and tur 
 bulence, which they desire to avoid. It is impossible, however, 
 that Mr. Adams should govern as a Federal man, and this must be 
 seen presently by all sagacious men who attend to political affairs. 
 It is evident Mr. Adams calculates upon engaging the force of the 
 passions and prejudices of the populace on his side, and with this 
 reinforcement to overcome or beat down his Federal opponents. 
 He has lately toasted men whom he has hated or despised these 
 fifteen years ; and I am told he talks of his late friends as men 
 either afraid of the English, for which they ought to be treated as 
 cowards, or devoted to the English, for which they ought to be 
 branded as infamous. But, for himself, he sees no evil to be ap 
 prehended from a war with England, and is ready to meet it. I 
 
282 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 do not think it much proof of the courage or philosophy of a man 
 to be indifferent to the danger and sufferings of others, especially 
 if he may be likely to profit by them himself. I readily conceive 
 that Mr. Adams, by rousing the spirit of animosity against the 
 English, which only sleeps in the bosoms of our people, may secure 
 his re-election, and a double portion of power with it. This sus 
 picion is so natural, that it will be felt by many men who know 
 how much we have to lose and how little to gain by a war with 
 England. Great efforts are making to persuade our people that 
 they ought to throw away votes at the election, lest Mr. Pinckney 
 should be made President ; but no satisfactory opinion can yet 
 be formed of what Massachusetts will do. If it could be made to 
 appear that the election of General Pinckney would secure our 
 internal tranquillity, our Legislature would, I think, appoint electors 
 who would contribute all in their power to the attainment of that 
 object ; but it is seen that, if Mr. Pinckney is chosen, he will 
 enjoy but little support from those who are now devoted to Mr. 
 Adams. Perhaps he will be opposed by them, and doubtless he 
 will be opposed by the Jacobins. There are even men among the 
 Federalists who prefer Jefferson to a Federal rival of Mr. Adams, 
 and there are some certainly who would prefer Mr. Jefferson to 
 Adams. The motives of these various parties are too obvious to 
 need explaining. There seems to me to be only one sufficient 
 reason for the good men to exert themselves in favor of Mr. 
 Pinckney in preference to both the others ; and that is, in case of 
 success, they will then be again where such men must always wish 
 to be, arranged with their chief on the side of the Constitution 
 and the laws. 
 
 I have not yet waited on the President, and I think I shall not. 
 When a man in his station attempts to render odious those who 
 differ from him by imputations which he cannot possibly believe, 
 he certainly discharges them from all obligation of extraordinary 
 respect. At present, therefore, I feel at liberty to stay at home, 
 though perhaps I am not bound to. 
 
 With unfeigned esteem and respect, I remain 
 
 Your faithful friend, G. CABOT. 
 
1800.1 COEEESPONDENCE 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 10, 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your letter of the 1st did not reach me until 
 last evening. The enclosure shall be transmitted to-morrow or the 
 day following, by some trusty person who will attend the levee, 
 if one can be found who will engage to deliver it ; otherwise, I 
 may perhaps send it in the regular package which goes from the 
 post-office. 
 
 This method would be better than to send a servant, who might 
 be obliged to deliver it to another servant. 1 
 
 There is no reason to doubt the first course will be pursued, and 
 I shall not delay to inform you of the delivery as soon as it is 
 ascertained. 
 
 Although I cannot but feel unhappy at the gloomy prospect of 
 our public affairs, yet I do not feel my usual degree of solicitude 
 for the issue of the election. There is something like a balance of 
 advantages and disadvantages in the success of either of the three 
 candidates. 
 
 Mr. Adams will doubtless continue to sacrifice the independent 
 Federalists so long as he finds victims who will be acceptable to 
 those whose favor he courts. 
 
 He will also hazard a war with Great Britain, which he evi 
 dently thinks would be no injury to him; but, if he has justly 
 forfeited the confidence of the country, he has not yet actually 
 lost it in this quarter, and the men who adhere to him while they 
 zealously sustain him are also a restraint upon him, and for some 
 time at least may prevent his worst measures, and until they have 
 given him up will not cordially support another. 
 
 Jefferson s election would tend to reunite the Federal party ; 
 and if it is evidently effected by the Jacobin force unaided by any 
 Other, or, if aided at all, by the adherents of Mr. Adams, the 
 reunion of our old friends would be complete. 
 
 Should Mr. Pinckney be elected, he would be opposed by Mr. 
 Adams and his warm adherents, and would be heartily supported 
 by those only who are now detached from Mr. Adams. This state 
 of things would be unpropitious to Mr. Pinckney s administration. 
 
 1 The enclosure here referred to was Hamilton s first letter, inquiring 
 whether Mr. Adams had accused him of belonging to a " British faction." 
 See Hamilton s Works, VI. 449. 
 
284 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 There is, however, one unanswerable reason for wishing Mr. 
 Pinckney to succeed, and that is that the best, and, indeed, all the 
 truly good men would find themselves in their proper places, ar 
 ranged under the banners of the Constitution and laws, on the side 
 of the national chief. 
 
 The question has been asked, whether, if the Federalists cannot 
 carry their first points, they would not do well to turn the election 
 from Jefferson to Burr. They conceive Burr to be less likely to 
 look to France for support than Jefferson, provided he could be 
 supported at home. They consider Burr as actuated by ordinary 
 ambition, Jefferson by that and the pride of the Jacobinic philoso 
 phy. The former may be satisfied by power and property, the 
 latter must see the roots of our society pulled up and a new course 
 of cultivation substituted. 
 
 Certainly it would have been fortunate for the United States if 
 the second candidate on the Jacobin side had been one who might 
 be safely trusted. 
 
 No great progress has been made in convincing people of the pro 
 priety of voting for Pinckney with all our strength ; yet I believe 
 if it shall appear clearly that Adams will fail, and that Pinckney 
 may be elected, our Legislature will act properly, especially if there 
 is no just imputation of unfairness against Mr. Pinckney s friends. 
 
 I am told New Hampshire will vote for Adams and Pinckney, 
 but that Rhode Island will sooner give some votes for Jefferson 
 than all for Pinckney. 
 
 I am, with increasing esteem and attachment, 
 
 Your faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 21, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, An exposition of the reasons which influence 
 many men of unquestionable patriotism and loyalty to withhold 
 from Mr. Adams the confidence he once enjoyed may be useful, 
 by satisfying the intelligent and candid part of the public that those 
 men act, as they have ever done, on genuine national principles. 
 The reasons are strong, and require only to be placed in a clear 
 light ; but this must be done with infinite care and circumspection, 
 that neither anger nor jealousy may be excited. It must be done 
 in a manner that shall clear up the doubts which now exist, of the 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 285 
 
 sincerity and consistency of the party who promote the union of 
 votes for Adams and Pinckney. It is perceived by Mr. Adams s 
 personal friends that, while the party profess a zealous desire to 
 unite all the Federal votes for Adams and Pinckney, there are 
 many, or at least some, individuals among those who compose it, 
 whose wishes are known to be that the election may issue in favor 
 of Mr. Pinckney, and therefore it is inferred such persons will not 
 act and do not aim as they profess. To this charge it is generally 
 answered, "that without a union of all the Federalists neither Mr. 
 Adams nor Mr. Pinckney can probably be chosen, but that with 
 such a union one may probably be President and the other Vice- 
 President, and, considering all the circumstances of the case, the 
 chance and the preponderance of wishes are in favor of Mr. Adams; " 
 " that although there may be many, and doubtless are some, indi 
 viduals who would think it by no means propitious to the national 
 welfare that Mr. Adams should be re-elected, yet they yield to the 
 superior consideration of union, by which alone Jefferson can be 
 kept out and Adams or Pinckney put into the office ; and there 
 fore these men act and will act fairly toward Mr. Adams, giving 
 him all their support, upon the just expectation of a similar support 
 to Mr. Pinckney from those who prefer Mr. Adams ; " " that the 
 plan formed at Philadelphia to support both was a compromise, 
 which contemplated Mr. Adams as President, but liable, however, 
 to be superseded by Pinckney from the nature of the election ; " 
 and " that good faith would and ought to be observed as the only 
 means of success and as the only ground of content after success." 
 Such is the tenor of our language to the public : we think it true, 
 and we shall be greatly embarrassed if, at this late period, after 
 our sentiments are extensively known, there should be a new or 
 different ground taken. You must allow me, therefore, to insist 
 that, whatever display is made of Mr. Adams s misconduct, it must 
 be continually recollected that he may be again chosen by us, and that 
 we are pledged to give him the full chance of the united vote con 
 certed at Philadelphia. 
 
 So that whatever is said against him must be explicitly avowed 
 to be the complaint of those of us who have yielded individual 
 opinions to the general opinion of the party as a matter of expe 
 diency, and not the language of the party. And it ought to be 
 admitted that the party, from various considerations, rather prefer 
 the election of Mr. Adams to Mr. Pinckney. 
 
286 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 I understand, through a friend, that the Carolinians adhere to 
 these ideas as they were digested and agreed to at Philadelphia. 
 
 Mr. Harper writes from Baltimore, the llth inst., "that our 
 friends may now count with some certainty, and very great cer 
 tainty, on a unanimous vote for Adams and Pinckney in Mary 
 land." Although I think some good may be derived from an 
 exhibition of Mr. Adams s misconduct, yet I am well persuaded 
 that you may do better than to put your name to it. 
 
 This might give it an interest with men who need no such inter 
 est ; but it will be converted to a new proof that you are a dan 
 gerous man. Ames and I agree that you will give the enemy an 
 advantage to which he has no claim. 
 
 In every situation, believe me obediently and faithfully yours, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 23, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have shown to several of our wisest and 
 best men a copy of what I wrote you on the 25th inst. 
 
 They all concur in the sentiments it contains : still, it is probably 
 fit, and it may be indispensable, to expose Mr. Adams fully to the 
 public. The countenance and authority given by him and his 
 friends to the vile calumnies against us may strengthen their 
 credit so much as to render them irrefutable without such an 
 exposition. 
 
 / don t think, however, we can discard Mr. Adams as a candidate, 
 at this late period, without total derangement and defeat in this 
 quarter. 
 
 It is true there is an apparent absurdity in supporting a man 
 whom we know to be unworthy of trust. It is a dilemma, however, 
 into which we are brought by the proceedings at Philadelphia, and 
 which we could not shun. Or perhaps it is a natural result of the 
 mode of election, and could not have been avoided ; but, be this as 
 it may, we have considered as an agreed point among the Federal 
 ists that Adams and Pinckney are to be voted for together, and we 
 accordingly have urged with great confidence that this is the inten 
 tion of the Federal party generally, and that it is acquiesced in by 
 most of those who are supposed to influence them. I think, there 
 fore, you cannot omit to make a clear and explicit reference to 
 this known state of things in whatever you may publish, and possi- 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 287 
 
 bly as a consequence of it to ground the publication chiefly on the 
 necessity of it, to exculpate those whom it vindicates from the 
 abominable charges, insinuations, and unmerited denunciations of 
 Mr. Adams and some of his personal friends. Indeed, I see no 
 impropriety in regretting that a compromise has been made which 
 must be observed at every hazard, it being too manifest that Mr. 
 Adams has relinquished the system he was chosen by the Federal 
 ists to support, and that he has become hostile, and will necessarily 
 become more and more hostile, to the firm advocates of that system 
 and all who adhere to it. 
 
 I think, however, it must be shown that the opposition to Mr. 
 Adams is founded upon broad public principle. For myself, I often 
 declare that the mission to France, though impolitic, unjustifiable, 
 dangerous, and inconsistent ; the expulsion of able, upright, and faith 
 ful officers, 1 though a ruinous precedent ; the pardon of Fries, though 
 a sacrifice of the safety as well as dignity of the State ; that many 
 other transactions of inferior magnitude, though shamefully wrong, 
 yet that all these would not of themselves induce me to oppose the 
 President s re-election, if I did not view them as evidence, explained 
 and confirmed by other evidence, that he has abandoned the system 
 he was chosen to maintain, and that he is likely to introduce its 
 opposite with all its pernicious consequences as fast as he can, and 
 as far as his influence will go. 
 
 If this idea is correct, as it appears to me, it cannot be too 
 strongly impressed on the sound part of the public. 
 
 A long letter, full of good sense and instructing information, is 
 just received from Mr. Wolcott. He thinks an examination of 
 President Adams s administration has been so long delayed that 
 it can only now be made to grow out of the unjust accusations of 
 his present friends. This excellent letter has been read and 
 admired by several persons whose judgment you respect, but whose 
 opinions remain perfectly fixed that we cannot now change the 
 arrangement : we are not strong enough to break up, and new 
 form in the face of our enemy. 
 
 I have sent to Mr. Wolcott a copy of mine to you of the 25th, 
 which will explain to him sufficiently our situation. Mr. Gordon 
 tells me that Xew Hampshire s electors will all vote for Adams and 
 Pinckney certainly, except one, of whom the same is probable, but 
 not certain. 
 
 1 [Since Mr. Pickering was expelled, the President has said of him to a 
 gentleman, " as honest a man as ever lived." G. C. ] See above, p. 277. 
 
288 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 The persons for electors are supposed to be predestinated by the 
 Legislature. 
 
 Colonel Burr is to be at Providence to-day. He probably may 
 expect that, as Governor Fenner will vote for Jefferson, he may 
 also be induced to vote for him. As he is a very sanguine man, 
 he may expect even more. Yours faithfully, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 23, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have read with great attention your letter of 
 the llth. Mr. Chief Justice Dana and Mr. Parsons have also 
 given it a reading. As you probably see our newspapers, you 
 must perceive that we have taken our course as we understood it 
 to have been settled by our friends at Philadelphia. The enclosed 
 copy of my letter to General Hamilton will explain to you the 
 difficulties we apprehend from a disclosure of Mr. Adams s defects, 
 unless accompanied with suitable acknowledgments that he is to be 
 supported as one of the candidates, notwithstanding those defects. 
 This apparent absurdity is only to be reconciled by the truth of the 
 case arid the necessity of mutual concession. T am, and have long 
 been, as fully convinced as you are that Mr. Adams ought to have 
 been abandoned by the Federal party, whom he had in fact sacri 
 ficed ; but it seems a majority were not brought to this opinion in 
 season, and the present half-way system was the consequence. I 
 wish every Federalist, who can understand it, might read your 
 excellent letter ; and I wish to see a full but calm discussion of all 
 the grounds of discontent with Mr. Adams, in a pamphlet or news 
 paper. But still I do not see how it will be practicable to discard 
 Mr. Adams as a candidate, at this period, without confounding us 
 in this quarter, and consequently exposing the whole party to a 
 defeat. Besides, if Jefferson is to come in, is it not very important 
 that he shall not have come in by any division among the Federal 
 ists ? I fear we are too weak at best to face our enemy ; but at 
 any rate we are not strong enough to break up, and new form on 
 the field of battle. 
 
 I have often contemplated the various issues of the election, and 
 I see in each a considerable approximation of balance of advantage 
 and disadvantage. General Pinckney is the only one from whom 
 I should expect pure, honest, steady efforts to save the State. On 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 289 
 
 his side, the wise and good would be in their proper place ; and, if 
 they fail of doing all the good they wish, yet they could neither be 
 destroyed nor disgraced. But it is too obvious that Mr. Adams 
 and many with him will oppose the Pinckney administration, and 
 very many more support it coldly. 
 
 A comment upon your letter would make a great book, and, if 
 worthy of the text, would be invaluable. I shall for ever regret 
 that the ideas it contains have not been communicated to every man 
 of sense and honesty. 
 
 With sincere esteem and attachment, I remain as ever, 
 
 Yours faithfully, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, September, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, At the desire of Mr. Gore, from whom it has 
 just arrived, I enclose you a letter to Colonel Pickering, with a 
 request that you will transmit it to him. You will see by our 
 newspapers that .the negotiation at Paris is broken off, and I think 
 you will soon see such of its details as may tend to influence the 
 Presidential election. The article fron\ Paris is certainly intended 
 for that purpose. The French say they will not treat with us, 
 unless we put them on the same footing as the English ; but, in the 
 twenty -fifth article of Mr. Jay s treaty, we have stipulated that we 
 will make no new treaty which shall give to a nation at war with 
 England the advantage of our ports to shelter privateers, prizes, &c. 
 Previous to the treaty of Mr. Jay, and afterward until the annul 
 ment of the French treaty, France had the same advantages over 
 the English which she now complains the English have over her. 
 Yet this did not prevent an equitable and amicable treaty being 
 made by Mr. Jay. When we supposed ourselves in danger from 
 the power and hostility of England, as in 1778, we reciprocated 
 with France certain exclusive stipulations relative to maritime 
 rights, which we then thought suited our condition. In 1794, we 
 reciprocated with England similar stipulations, and which by the 
 violations of France, in the face of our treaty with her, gives an 
 efficacy to the stipulation, which it could never have had in relation 
 to France. If this is inconvenient or injurious to France, it is her 
 own fault. For we saved to her all the rights she enjoyed by 
 treaty ; and she wantonly, wickedly, and insolently violated that 
 
 19 
 
290 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 
 same treaty by which she held them. If I were not too indolent, 
 
 I would throw two or three of these ideas into the papers. 
 
 A gentleman, who saw Mr. Ellsworth the end of June, informs 
 me that he expressed an opinion that it was best he and his col 
 leagues should be where they were ; that Austria probably would 
 make peace, and England perhaps would not continue the war 
 after the summer campaign ends ; that if all others should adjust 
 their differences, arid ours remain unsettled, we might find it diffi 
 cult to obtain terms that were just and reasonable. These senti 
 ments are natural, but are they sound ? What safety can be 
 derived to us from a piece of parchment, if Buonaparte is able and 
 disposed to disturb us ? Does not our danger increase with his 
 preponderance of power, and is not that preponderance increased 
 by the extinction of our enmity? Is there any safety for any 
 nation against the power and ambition of France, but in a power 
 and disposition to resist them of themselves, or in concert with 
 others ? I think there is not ; and I still hope that England thinks 
 so, and will therefore revive the spirit of King William and Queen 
 Anne s times, and make neither peace nor truce with France until 
 her power is reduced. 
 
 I should be most happy to see you here, although I should 
 expect to hear you denounced as an intriguer, if you were to visit 
 us at this time. I am told, however, that to Mr. Parsons the 
 President denies that he ever called us " British faction, or any of 
 the hard names of which he has been accused." He does not 
 recollect these intemperances, and thinks himself greatly misunder 
 stood or misrepresented ; he does not recollect to have used the 
 expressions mentioned by Mr. Goodhue, and never spoke of the 
 Essex Junto in the opprobrious terms charged against him. It 
 seems, on the whole, he was disposed to moderation, and to be 
 reconciled to those few who have omitted to visit him, if they 
 wished to be reconciled. Yours faithfully, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 SEPT. 30, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, I have looked into citizen Barras s vale 
 dictory address to citizen Monroe as published here, and find the 
 words to be as I had supposed : " We restore in you a representative 
 to America." In the publication you quote, the word " send " 
 changes the signification entirely. 
 
1800.] 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 291 
 
 I wish it were possible to give a satisfactory opinion upon the 
 Presidential election, but the probability fluctuates weekly. For 
 some time past, Jefferson s chance was much the best ; but within a 
 few days we have been informed that the Federalists in South Car 
 olina hope to prevail in the united vote for Adams and Pinckney. 
 If this proves well founded, it gives Mr. Adams the only chance he 
 could have. If, however, the new Pennsylvania Legislature can 
 be managed by McKean and Dallas, Jefferson will still prevail. 
 Against this, we are assured by the Pennsylvania Federalists that 
 a majority in their Senate will immovably adhere to the district 
 election, in which case the final issue must be considered as now 
 wholly uncertain. 1 I could give you many details and conjectures 
 on this subject, but they would not enable you to form a satisfac 
 tory judgment, and therefore I spare you the trouble of reading 
 them. I think, however, such is the activity of parties, and they 
 are now so distinct, that we shall soon be able to give a statement 
 of the votes that may be expected. 
 
 Mr. Wolcott thinks Mr. Marshall accepted the secretaryship 2 
 from good motives, and with a view of preserving union, and that 
 he and Dexter, 3 by accepting, have rendered the nation great ser 
 vice ; for, if they had refused, we should have had Heaven alone 
 knows whom ! He thinks, however, as all must, that under the 
 present chief they will be disappointed in their hopes, and that if 
 Jefferson is President they will probably resign. 
 
 I am alarmed at the talk of peace which is heard at your table 
 and Mr. King s. There can be no security, and therefore should be 
 no peace. England may be undone by a peace while the power of 
 France is so predominant. There is no good, but every evil, to 
 England to be dreaded from a peace ; and certainly there is no 
 necessity for it. Will any man pretend that England has not the 
 means of opposing the universal empire of France now with as 
 much effect as at the beginning of the century ? I have lately been 
 reviewing the events of that period, and cannot but be struck with 
 the immense superiority of advantage which the British govern 
 ment and nation now enjoy compared with it. If Great Britain 
 perseveres, she cannot fail of a triumph over her rival, and will 
 
 1 The Pennsylvania Senate did hold out, and the House finally compro 
 mised for seven Federal and eight opposition electors. In South Carolina, 
 the Federalists were beaten, the opposition obtaining all the eight votes. 
 
 2 Of state. 
 
 8 Appointed Secretary of War to succeed McIIenry. 
 
292 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 ultimately be reimbursed her expense as well as enjoy the glory of 
 redeeming Europe. The power and influence which she acquires 
 by her exertions are as solid as the gold she expends, and, if they 
 are used wisely and without abuse, will make her as great as a 
 nation can be, perhaps, indeed, too great. 
 
 I concede to you that your estimate of Buonaparte s talents was 
 the most correct. Since his return from Egypt, he has risen in my 
 esteem by his conduct and success, though both have been favored 
 by circumstances. 
 
 " The damned British faction " is now smaller in numbers than 
 it has been for several years. Ames and I, with half a dozen others 
 of your friends, still adhere with unshaken constancy to those sen 
 timents of true patriotism (as we think) which have drawn upon 
 us this extraordinary denunciation. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 OCT. 11, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, I wrote to you and Mr. King each a short 
 letter, which my son copied, and which copies are under this cover. 
 
 We are in statu quo as regards the election, though I think the 
 sentiments favorable to a united vote for Adams and Pinckney 
 have extended themselves considerably. While you and my good 
 friend, Mr. King, lament the asperity of parties here, you will nat 
 urally recollect that your distance from the fire enables you to keep 
 more cool than those who are in the midst of it. Jacobinism is 
 declining in Europe, because the master of the workshop has now 
 an interest to maintain, at least within doors, the principles, and 
 observe the maxims of all regular establishments. Still, a little of 
 this mischief abroad may be promoted. Excessive democracy, which 
 is a sort of natural Jacobinism, threatens the United States with 
 great trouble ; and most men who reflect much and see far think 
 we cannot avert it. Some efforts, however, will be made to con 
 solidate and invigorate New England. An " anti-Jacobin " news 
 paper is, among other things, to be printed, and filled with the 
 productions of our best men. It is at least hoped by this measure 
 to unite, and to keep united, the Federalists, to correct their dan 
 gerous errors, and to prepare them for evils which cannot be 
 shunned. You will not expect much from this undertaking, yet 
 you will think it proper to be pursued. It seems to be considered 
 
1800-1 CORRESPONDENCE. 293 
 
 by the most sensible men, in some of the Southern and Middle 
 States, that there is no hope for our government but what rests 
 upon New England ; and the most knowing ones think that a very 
 slender dependence. In New York, we are told there is a total 
 despondence ; in New Jersey, the parties are balanced ; but, in 
 Pennsylvania, Jacobinism triumphs. 
 
 With all these melancholy appearances, you will not fail to remem 
 ber what has often happened, that we derive the means of escape 
 from evil very often from the terror it excites. 
 
 Yours affectionately, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Saturday, Oct. 11, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your letter of the 2d did not reach me until 
 last evening, it having been accidentally detained at the stage-house 
 in this village several days. 
 
 The President is on the point of departure for the seat of govern 
 ment, so that no opportunity of conveyance by a private gentleman 
 could be found. I have therefore sent your letter by a sure hand 
 to the post-office, whence it undoubtedly goes, in the President s 
 regular package of letters, to Quincy this day. 1 I have chosen 
 this method as more sure of reaching his own hand than if I had 
 sent it by a servant, who would have been obliged to deliver it, 
 perhaps, to another servant, instead of to the President or his 
 secretary. 
 
 1 The letter referred to was a second, addressed by Hamilton to Adams 
 on the charge of " a British faction," and is as follows : 
 
 NEW YOBK, Oct. 1, 1800. 
 
 SIR, The time which has elapsed since my letter of the 1st August 
 was delivered to you precludes the further expectation of an answer. 
 
 From this silence, I will draw no inference ; nor will I presume to judge 
 of the fitness of silence on such an occasion, on the part of the chief magis 
 trate of a republic towards a citizen, who without a stain has discharged so 
 many important public trusts. 
 
 But thus much I will affirm, that, by whomsoever a charge of the kind 
 mentioned in my former letter may at any time have been made or insin 
 uated against me, it is a base, wicked, and cruel calumny, destitute even of 
 a plausible pretext to excuse the folly or the depravity which must have 
 dictated it. 
 
 With due respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
 
 ALEXANDER HAMILTON. 
 
 See Works of Hamilton, VI. 470, 471. 
 
294 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 Our people, after all their scolding, seem now to admit more 
 generally that Massachusetts ought fairly to vote for Adams and 
 Pinckney ; but you know that we can only give conjectures until 
 the meeting of our Legislature. Although I am not " an influential 
 man" and wish I was not thought to be, I expect at least one, and, 
 if printed, several copies of your justificatory letter. 
 
 Dr. Dwight 1 is here stirring us up to oppose the demon of 
 Jacobinism. A new paper, to be entitled the " New England 
 An ti- jacobin," is to be published at Boston, and circulated as 
 extensively as passible, especially through New England. The 
 labors of many good men are expected in its support, and yours 
 among the rest. Some good may reasonably be expected from it 
 in the dissemination of useful truths, in correcting some of the 
 dangerous errors embraced by the Federalists, in uniting and keep 
 ing them united, and in some measure preparing them for the evils 
 they cannot shun. But the object is too vague and the means too 
 inconstant to satisfy all our anxieties. 
 
 The President has been endeavoring to be calm and discreet, 
 and has discovered a desire to be visited by the individuals of the 
 " damned faction " whom he has formerly proscribed. 
 
 Yours affectionately and faithfully, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Oct. 5, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, A letter from Mr. Gore, dated August 21, 
 informs me that the Americans who daily arrive in London from 
 Paris are generally, if not universally, of opinion that nothing will 
 be effected by our envoys. These itinerants seem to think, too, 
 that we are in the wrong, not because we have humbled ourselves 
 before the " Great Nation," but because our humility is limited by 
 the instructions which ought to have permitted the acceptance of 
 such terms as France would prescribe. 
 
 I have already intimated to you my fears that the high and well- 
 tempered mind of our excellent friend Ellsworth has been shaken, 
 perhaps by sickness in part, but in part also by the events which 
 he has witnessed, and by others which he apprehended, and all 
 aggravated by the acts and management of a set of people at Paris 
 
 1 Dr. Timothy Dwight, President of Yale College. 
 
1800.] CORRESPONDENCE. 295 
 
 employed for the purpose, as the Kosciuskos, Barlows, 1 &c. For 
 my own part, I rejoice exceedingly that Mr. Jay s treaty contains a 
 bar to such conventions as the French insist on. On this point, I 
 published yesterday in the Centinel, as " One of the American 
 People" a few ideas which occurred on reading the Paris article ; 2 
 and I have sent to the same press, for Wednesday s paper, some 
 further remarks on the impudence as well as the insidiousness of 
 all the dogmas and doctrines of the French respecting the commer 
 cial rights of neutrals, all which I consider are maintained by them 
 with the sole view of engaging the neutrals to become pledged to 
 support a system by which France can have her own commerce 
 covered, or neutrals be brought to fight for her. You know I am 
 too indolent to illustrate and enforce these ideas as they merit, 
 but the hints will be useful to abler and more active men. Great 
 pains are taken by Dr. Morse 3 and some others to effect a recon 
 ciliation, as it is called, between the President and those who dis 
 approve his politics ; but, though well meant, the attempt is absurd. 
 We believe the President s course leads to the division, disgrace, 
 and rum of the Federal cause. He denounces us for entertaining 
 these sentiments. No personal good-humor can alter the fact. I 
 am one of the few who prefer remaining under Presidential frowns 
 and displeasure rather than, by visiting him or any other act, indi 
 cate to the public that I have renounced opinions which are com 
 pletely established, or that I can abandon men in public life whose 
 conduct and character, I think, ought to endear them to every friend 
 of order, virtue, and public liberty. Although I still think the en 
 gagement to support Mr. Adams with Mr. Pinckney, and which 
 perhaps was unavoidably made, ought to be sacredly respected, yet 
 I am strongly inclined to believe, in our untoward situation, we 
 should do as well with Jefferson for President, and Mr. Pinckney 
 Vice-President, as with any thing that we can now expect. Such 
 an issue to the election, if fairly produced, is the only one that will 
 keep the Federal party together, and in a state to act with renewed 
 vigor when circumstances shall require it. 
 
 Yours faithfully and affectionately, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 1 Joel Barlow, of Connecticut, famous for his good Democratic principles 
 and his bad poetry. See above, p. 240. 
 
 2 See p. 597. 
 
 3 Dr. Jedidiah Morse, of Connecticut, better known by his geographical 
 works and his religious labors than by politics, with which, however, he 
 seems to have busied himself to a considerable extent. 
 
296 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 WOLCOTT TO CABOT. 
 
 (Private.) 
 
 WASHINGTON, Nov. 16, 1800. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I received your favor of October 5 a few days since, 
 after my return from a visit to Connecticut. We know nothing 
 more of the result of the mission to France than what appears in 
 the papers. A treaty has unquestionably been signed, although 
 our previous information justified a confident belief that nothing 
 would be done. I fear there are grounds for the apprehensions 
 you suggest ; and I shall be happy if the embarrassments, which 
 the mission to France has already occasioned, are not increased by 
 its future consequences. Let us not however anticipate difficulties, 
 but prepare to meet them. 
 
 After due reflection, I have considered it to be my duty to retire 
 from office. I have accordingly written a respectful letter to the 
 President, offering my resignation at the close of the ensuing month, 
 to which I have received an obliging answer. I reflect with satis 
 faction that the business of the Treasury department has not suf 
 fered in my hands, that the revenue of the present greatly exceeds 
 that of any former year, and that loans can be obtained, if neces 
 sary. It would be affectation to pretend that my resignation has 
 not been attended with a conflict of emotions. I can however 
 declare that none of them have been of a nature to produce self- 
 crimination ; and I presume to hope that my future conduct will 
 evince a zealous attachment to the interests of my country and its 
 government, and sincere gratitude to those who have honored me 
 with their confidence, friendship, and support. I am, dear sir, 
 with esteem and friendship, 
 
 Your obedient servant, O. W. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 (Private and confidential.) 
 
 Nov. 27, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, Although I had long contemplated the 
 possible event of your retirement from office, yet my mind was not 
 quite prepared for it when your letter of the 16th arrived. I have 
 revolved it the greatest part of the last night, which I found impos 
 sible to pass in sleep ; and I still can view the subject only as grief 
 
1800.] COERESPONDENCE. 297 
 
 or indignation presents it. A government which cannot tolerate 
 the virtues which have been exhibited in ours cannot long enjoy 
 the confidence of the wise and good ; it cannot long be preserved 
 pure, and will soon be thought to be not worth preserving. I know 
 not how this event will operate upon the minds and feelings of 
 others; but I can hardly doubt, if pride and prejudice had not 
 made this State so blind to Mr. Adams, they would have wished to 
 withhold their votes at this late period. In Connecticut, they are 
 differently circumstanced and may dare to act according to the 
 dictates of genuine public principles. 
 
 You must indulge my wishes to know your future destiny, so far 
 at least as it is foreseen by yourself. I am anxious to learn what 
 course you have prescribed yourself, that I may direct the prayers 
 of my heart in conformity. 
 
 If what the newspapers represent with great appearance of truth 
 be correct, I should think the affairs of our country are in the 
 worst possible situation in regard to foreign nations. We nourish 
 all the substantial differences between us and the two leading 
 European powers, and we wantonly throw away the means which 
 their rivalry affords us to remove those differences. 
 
 I remain ever yours, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 Nor. 28, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, Who is it possible to find for your suc 
 cessor in office ? I have sought in vain for a character competent 
 to its duties, and who would undertake them. Indeed, there are but 
 few, very few, who could perform them. Mr. Steele l will be 
 offended, if he is neglected ; but a man ought to have more than 
 common merits, coming from such a quarter, to secure public con 
 fidence. I will thank you, if a leisure moment recurs, to inform 
 me, when the arrangement is made, what it is. 
 
 Writing 2 to General Hamilton, I have taken the liberty to 
 inform him that some of his respectable friends censure him for 
 displaying too much egotism and vanity in his book. I know how 
 difficult it is for a man to be told of his faults without offence ; but 
 
 1 I suppose this to refer to John Steele of North Carolina, and at this 
 time First Comptroller of the Treasury. 
 
 2 This refers to the next letter. 
 
298 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 I was encouraged to do what I thought a necessary service by the 
 belief that he cannot possibly mistake my motive or doubt either 
 my affection or esteem. If I have materially diminished his friend 
 ship, it will be a new spur to my cynical feelings, which already 
 exceed those of Diogenes. 
 
 Since the success of the friends of Mr. Pinckney in our State 
 Legislature, it has been thought by some that, if your policy had 
 been pursued and Mr. Adams renounced absolutely by the Feder 
 alists, it would have been in our power to have carried Pinckney 
 and Ellsworth or Jay. I am not of this opinion ; but I think the 
 issue may now be as unfavorable to the permanent interest of the 
 Federal cause as it would have been in any issue of the other 
 course. But the truth is local causes support Mr. Adams here too 
 strongly ; and in the Middle States, where he ought to have been 
 first openly opposed, the Federalists were too weak for the opera 
 tion. In Pennsylvania, nothing would have been hazarded, because 
 all was previously lost ; but in Delaware, and especially in Jersey, 
 the attempt, by dividing the Federalists, would have defeated them 
 altogether. I do not therefore see how the thing could have been 
 well managed very differently. Your resignation gives great pain 
 to the few persons whom I have made acquainted with it, and will 
 doubtless excite general uneasiness among the sober people and 
 those who have much property. 
 
 Accept my unfeigned regards. G. CABOT. 
 
 I have sent a copy of Judge Washington s paragraph to Rhode 
 Island, and shall put the letter you sent into the hands of our 
 electors. 
 
 CABOT TO HAMILTON. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Nov. 29, 1800. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, It is too late to use the letter you enclosed 
 me in Vermont, and here it is unnecessary. 
 
 I am satisfied the votes in this State and New Hampshire will 
 be all for Adams and Pinckney. You will have seen with some 
 pleasure that our Legislature have conducted in the manner which 
 was predicted by our friend, Mr. Lowell, Jr. 1 To his efforts, in 
 deed, much of the success may be attributed. 
 
 1 John Lowell, son of Judge Lowell mentioned above, p. 175. He was 
 distinguished as a lawyer, and was one of the ablest of the politic-al writers 
 of his day. He was Mr. Cabot s nephew, and a warm personal friend as 
 well. 
 
1800.] COEEESPONDENCE. 299 
 
 Some fears are entertained lest the electors in Rhode Island, 
 though decidedly Federal, will not all vote for Pinckney. To 
 avoid such a misfortune, Ames has written earnest expostulations, 
 which will be communicated to the electors, or some of the influ 
 ential ones ; and Mr. Mason, 1 who will be at Providence on Mon 
 day, carries with him a copy of a letter just received by me from 
 Mr. Wolcott, containing a paragraph from Judge Washington, 
 extremely well calculated to induce a fair and equal vote for 
 Pinckney in New England. 
 
 Admitting that your friends are " dismayed " by your letter con 
 cerning Mr. Adams, it is nevertheless possible you may be right 
 in publishing it. I am of opinion that no publication of the kind 
 would have been well received at this time in any part of the 
 United States ; and this opinion is manifestly supported by the 
 
 fact: 
 
 " Truths would you teach, or save a sinking land, 
 All fear, none aid you, and few understand." 
 
 So said the man who had more good sense than commonly falls to 
 the lot of a poet. 2 
 
 I don t think the case exactly parallel, yet I cannot omit to 
 remind you of " Burke s Reflections," which were reprobated 
 almost universally when they first appeared. Even those who 
 approved the sentiments thought the avowal of them imprudent 
 and the publication of them untimely. 
 
 I wish some one who is more in the world than I am, and who 
 feels, if possible, as much interest in every thing that affects you as 
 I feel, would furnish you with correct information of all the opin 
 ions which are expressed by sensible men, and especially by your 
 friends. 
 
 While I cannot conceal that some of these would be unpleasant 
 to hear, I am persuaded that most of them are explicable, on the 
 principles of human nature, and do not in the smallest degree incul 
 pate the writer. Men are easily made angry with the messenger 
 of ill news, and they who love their ease listen with great impa 
 tience to those who tell them they must no longer indulge it. Some 
 who felt great dislike to Mr. Adams are disappointed that you have 
 treated him with so much moderation. They opened your book 
 with the expectation of seeing Mr. Adams convicted of designs to 
 
 1 Jonathan Mason, of Boston, senator from Massachusetts 1800-3, and 
 afterwards member of Congress from 1817-20. 
 
 2 Pope, Essay on Man. 
 
300 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 involve the country in war with Great Britain, that he might thus 
 secure to himself the support of those numerous but mistaken 
 people, whose animosity to Britain is ardent and inveterate ; they 
 expected you would describe in just but glowing colors his perni 
 cious jealousy of Washington s superior merits and fame, and the 
 intolerance of such a spirit toward all men who enjoy a great 
 degree of public confidence ; they expected you would have ana 
 lyzed him so effectually as to prove that he is, and must be, but 
 little attached to the support of public credit and the rights of 
 property, and that his ideas respecting commerce, and the use it 
 may be put to in our foreign politics, are more unsound than even 
 Jefferson s or Madison s : in a word, that war with England, 
 privateering, and paper money, with all their baneful appendages 
 and consequences, are viewed by him, not as evils to be deprecated, 
 but resources to be preferred to that stable condition aimed at by 
 the Washington system, which he hates, and which he has been 
 constrained by circumstances to support. 
 
 Yet the men who looked for all this acknowledge it would 
 have been highly impolitic and injudicious, if you had executed it. 
 
 There are others, but they are not numerous, who think you 
 have done too much already in the crimination of Mr. Adams. 
 
 All agree that the execution is masterly, but I am bound to tell 
 you that you are accused by respectable men of egotism ; and some 
 very worthy and sensible men say you have exhibited the same 
 vanity in your book which you charge as a dangerous quality and 
 great weakness in Mr. Adams. 
 
 I should have left it to your enemies to tell you of the censures 
 of your friends, if I was not persuaded that you cannot possibly 
 mistake my motives or doubt of the sincerity of my affection or 
 the greatness of my esteem. 
 
 Yours faithfully, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
1801-6-1 PRIVATE LIFE. 301 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 1801-1806. 
 
 Private Life. Society. Business. Occupations. Political Matters. 
 Correspondence. 
 
 AFTER the downfall of his party, Mr. Cabot withdrew 
 more completely even than before from the field of politics. 
 At no time was he a good correspondent ; but, after the 
 beginning of the century, his indolent habits in this respect 
 became more confirmed, and his letters steadily diminished 
 in number. The realization of his melancholy forebodings 
 as to the political fate of the country, and the disgust 
 excited by the internal dissensions and consequent ruin of 
 the Federalist party, were the principal causes of the in 
 crease in Mr. Cabot s innate aversion to publicity and to 
 public affairs. Other events, too, of a more private char 
 acter contributed, as years went on, to the same result. 
 
 His life at this time, though quiet and secluded, was both a 
 contented and happy one. Although fond of the country, he 
 did not enjoy the drudgery of farming, and relieved himself of 
 it bv a judicious lease of his estate to a tenant. His house 
 hold was a small one, and its affairs were regulated with a 
 wise simplicity and necessary economy. He still held the 
 office of President of the Boston Branch of the United States 
 Bank, and this necessitated occasional visits to Boston ; but, 
 except in this way, he saw little of society. His old party 
 friends from other States were sometimes in Boston, and 
 then he had the pleasure of entertaining them at his house. 
 Now and again, one would come to Brookline for several 
 days ; but the only person whom Mr. Cabot saw regularly 
 or frequently was Fisher Ames, with whom he constantly 
 
30^ LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 interchanged visits, and whose society was always one of 
 his chiefest and most valued pleasures. But Mr. Cabot s 
 principal resources were found in his library. Books were 
 to him unfailing and ever welcome friends, and from them 
 he derived at this time his greatest satisfaction. A life of 
 such perfect retirement and leisure suited well with his 
 disposition. His natural indolence, his disinclination to 
 mix much with other men, his dislike of the jarrings of the 
 outer world, his studious tastes and reflective temperament 
 were all gratified by a condition which he himself terms 
 that of " a complete recluse." But man lives not to him 
 self alone, and domestic duties required a change in his 
 mode of life, which put an end to this secluded and peace 
 ful existence. In these days of rapid transit, the distance 
 of five miles from a large city seems trifling in the extreme, 
 and it is difficult to conceive that at the beginning of 
 the century residence in Bropkline not only meant entire 
 seclusion, but also involved separation from those members 
 of the family who were compelled to live in Boston. Mr. 
 Cabot s eldest son, Charles, had, like his father, entered 
 upon the career of a sea captain and merchant ; and long 
 voyages to the East Indies permitted but rare and distant 
 visits to his home. This separation from their eldest son 
 caused Mr. and Mrs. Cabot to cling even more closely to 
 their other children. Henry, the second, and Edward, the 
 third son, were respectively at this time in a law office 
 and counting-house in Boston ; and so long as their father re 
 mained in Brookline, therefore, they were unable to be with 
 him except on Sunday. To this almost constant separation 
 Mr. Cabot was most unwilling to submit ; and he did not, 
 moreover, think it right that his only daughter, then just 
 entering upon womanhood, should for six months in the 
 year be entirely cut off from all society. From these 
 motives, though with great reluctance, he sold his farm in 
 Brookline, and early in the year 1803 removed to Boston, 
 where he passed the rest of his life. At this time, also, 
 
1801-6.] 
 
 DEATH OF HAMILTON. 303 
 
 the firm of Lee & Cabot, formed in the early days at 
 Beverly, but which had long since ceased to carry on 
 any active business, was finally dissolved. The year of his 
 removal to Boston closed sadly for Mr. Cabot, darkened by 
 sorrow for the death of his youngest son, Edward ; and, be 
 fore six months more had elapsed, he was called upon to bear 
 a large private share in the profound public grief excited 
 by the tragic and untimely death of Hamilton. Not only 
 did this event cause the keenest sorrow to Mr. Cabot as the 
 loss of an intimate and valued personal friend to whom he 
 was warmly attached, but it removed the last hope which 
 he had ventured to cherish for his party and its future 
 success. Under the guidance of Hamilton, in changed cir 
 cumstances and as the advocates of a new policj^, the Fed 
 eralists might have again succeeded to power, or at least 
 might have remained a powerful and dreaded opposition. 
 But the loss of their great leader was irreparable, and no one 
 was left in the smallest degree capable of wisely directing 
 the party, and at the same time maintaining a strong ascend 
 ancy over its members. Hamilton, at his death, left his 
 family in very straitened circumstances; and Mr. Cabot 
 devoted himself at once to relieve them and ameliorate their 
 condition. Several years before, Colonel Pickering, on his 
 dismissal from office, had resolved to go again into the 
 wilderness, and support himself and his family by cultivat 
 ing the lands which he there possessed. This scheme 
 alarmed his friends ; and, as Colonel Pickering would receive 
 no direct assistance, they raised sufficient money to buy 
 his wild lands at a generous price, and thus enabled him to 
 live in Massachusetts, and to enter once more into public 
 life. Mr. Cabot was a large subscriber to the fund for the 
 purchase of Colonel Pickering s land, and was one of those 
 most interested and most active in the whole affair. He and 
 his associates, however, were none of them men who could 
 do any thing with the territory they had bought, and indeed 
 it seems never to have occurred to them that the land 
 
304 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 was any thing more than an excuse to assure a competency 
 to Colonel Pickering. That they regarded their purchase 
 solely as a gift, as a means of retaining their friend amongst 
 them, and as a tribute which that friend eminently de 
 served, is evident from the fashion in which the subscribers 
 neglected their newly acquired property. No attempt was 
 made to improve, set off, or sell the lands ; nor were the 
 final deeds even passed between the associates and Colonel 
 Pickering. 1 But now the death of Hamilton, and the press 
 ing needs of his family, suggested a use to which this 
 extensive property might be applied. The ensuing corre 
 spondence 2 explains itself, and the kindness to which it 
 bears witness, connected as it is with a previous act of like 
 generosity, reflects credit and honor upon all concerned, 
 while at the same time it illustrates the fidelity and practical 
 value of undemonstrative New England friendship. 
 
 [Subscription for the Benefit of General Hamilton s Family, ,] 
 
 Having in remembrance the exalted worth and pre-eminent ser 
 vices of the late General Hamilton, his extraordinary and truly 
 patriotic exertions, which contributed so much to save our country 
 from the greatest impending calamities ; his able, disinterested, 
 and successful efforts to inculcate the wisdom, justice, and advan 
 tage of all those maxims of jurisprudence which render sacred the 
 rights of property and which are inseparable from true liberty, 
 and especially recollecting that the devotion of his time and talents 
 to these public interests has operated to deprive his family of a 
 common share of those pecuniary advantages which his labors, if 
 applied to them, would have easily made abundant: we, there- 
 
 1 Life of Pickering, IV. 28, 35-41. 
 
 2 These documents have already been partially printed in Mr. Upham s 
 Life of Pickering ; but from Mr. Cabot s connection with the affair, as well 
 as from the nature of the transaction and the light it throws on the sincere 
 attachment felt by the leading Federalists for Hamilton, I have no hesita 
 tion in giving them again, and without abbreviation. 
 
1801-6.] PROVISION FOR HAMILTON S FAMILY. 305 
 
 fore, whose names are subscribed, to testify in some degree our 
 sense of departed excellence, and our gratitude for benefits con 
 ferred on our country, do engage that we will pay into the hands 
 of the Honorable George Cabot, Thomas Davis, and Theodore 
 Lyman, Esqs., the sums of money set against our respective 
 names, to be by them applied to the benefit of the children or 
 family of General Hamilton in any manner they shall judge proper. 
 And whereas we whose names follow are proprietors of certain 
 parcels of land in Pennsylvania, which we purchased in 1801 of 
 Timothy Pickering, Esq., in shares of $100 each, which lands are 
 not yet divided or formally conveyed, we do hereby authorize and 
 request the said Timothy Pickering, Esq., to convey by a quit 
 claim deed to such person or persons as shall be named to him for 
 that purpose, by the afore-mentioned George Cabot, Thomas Davis, 
 and Theodore Lyman, Esqs., or any two of them, so many of our 
 shares in said lands as we have set against our respective names. 1 
 
 Some time after this scheme had been set on foot, Mr. 
 King arrived from New York, and, anxious to engage the 
 New England Federalists in the plan adopted by the New 
 York friends of Hamilton, addressed the following letter to 
 Mr. Cabot : - 
 
 KING TO CABOT. 
 
 WALTHAM, Oct. 10, 1804. 
 
 DEAR SIR, According to a schedule of General Hamilton s 
 estate, drawn up by himself a few days before his death, it appears 
 that his property consists altogether of new lands situate in the 
 western part of New York, and of a house nine miles from the 
 city. The new lands cost fifty -five thousand dollars, and the coun 
 try house and grounds about twenty-five thousand. The General s 
 debts amount to fifty-five thousand dollars ; and, as the estate is 
 unproductive and the debts bear an interest, it is the opinion of 
 judicious persons that, with the most prudent management, the 
 estate will be but barely sufficient to pay the debts. Mrs. Hamil 
 ton is a daughter of General Schuyler, who has a family of eight 
 or nine children. The General is supposed to have a good real 
 
 1 Then follows a list of all the subscribers, with one exception, to the 
 Pickering fund for the amounts severally subscribed in 1801. This list is 
 given in the Life of Pickering, IV. 28. 
 
 20 
 
306 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 estate, but not much personal property ; so that little expectation 
 can be entertained of any considerable amount from this quarter, 
 either for the maintenance of General Hamilton s family, or for the 
 education and advancement of his children. To the sorrow that 
 every virtuous mind has felt for the death of this distinguished 
 patriot, it is painful to add the reflection that his young and help 
 less family must depend for their support, not upon the earnings 
 of their father, for he served the public, but upon the contributions 
 of a few individuals who admired his unequalled worth. The sub 
 scription for this purpose at New York amounted to upwards of 
 nineteen thousand dollars when I last heard from thence (which 
 was before my journey to the eastward), and it was expected that 
 a considerable addition would be made to this sum. 
 With the most affectionate regard, I am, dear sir, 
 
 Your faithful and obedient servant, RUFUS KING-. 
 
 TRUSTEES LETTER TO COLONEL PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Nov. 16, 1804. 
 
 SIR, The design which was formed to transfer to the heirs 
 of General Hamilton the lands purchased of you in 1801 is now 
 accomplished, so far as depended on the acts of those purchasers. 
 By the enclosed papers, it will appear that the actual conveyance 
 of the land, either to the executors of General Hamilton s will, or 
 to any other persons, as well as the time and manner of making 
 such conveyance, remains to be definitively regulated and arranged 
 by and between those gentlemen and you. Whenever this is com 
 pleted, we shall cancel and deliver to you the written covenants you 
 entered into, which are now in our possession. 
 
 It is understood that you have paid for taxes, surveying, &c., 
 one or two hundred dollars, which ought to be reimbursed with 
 out delay. We wish, therefore, you would be so good as to inform 
 us of the amount, that we may immediately provide for its dis 
 charge. 
 
 With the highest respect and esteem, we are, dear sir, 
 
 Your assured friends and servants, 
 
 GEO. CABOT. 
 THOS. DAVIS. 
 THEO. LYMAN. 
 
1801-6.] PROVISION FOR HAMILTON S FAMILY. 307 
 
 TRUSTEES TO EXECUTORS OF HAMILTON S WILL. 
 
 BOSTON, Nov. 26, 1804. 
 
 GENTLEMEN, "We enclose you a copy of an original paper 
 which is committed to us by the gentlemen whose signatures it 
 bears. Its objects as well as motives are sufficiently explained; 
 but in relation to what yet remains to be done, to fulfil the pre 
 cise intentions of the subscribers, it may be proper to observe : 
 1st, that the purchasers of the Pennsylvania lands having in view 
 the accommodation of Colonel Pickering more than any pecuniary 
 advantage to themselves, it is to be considered as a condition of the 
 present transfer, that his interest and convenience should be con 
 sulted in the future disposal of the property no less than that of 
 the new proprietors ; 2d, Colonel Pickering retained for himself 
 eighty-eight shares, which is something more than a fourth part of 
 the whole property, and it was expected he would superintend it 
 altogether ; accordingly he alone has paid to it the attention it has 
 received, and for this care he would at some subsequent period 
 have been compensated, by a commission on the sales or some 
 other equivalent emolument ; and, lastly, it may be remarked that 
 the conveyance of the lands by Colonel Pickering is to be in deeds 
 of quitclaim only, and not with warranties. This provision has 
 not proceeded from any distrust of the titles by which Colonel 
 Pickering holds, but from the original determination of the sub 
 scribers to liberate an estimable friend from all responsibility for 
 title, if from any cause it should in whole or in part be ever found 
 defective. These observations we have deemed essential to a just 
 understanding of the views of those whom we have the honor to 
 represent ; but, for whatever may assist you in judging of the value 
 of the property or its proper management in future, we must refer 
 you to Colonel Pickering, who we are assured will readily im 
 part to you all the information he possesses. As we are intrusted 
 with the nomination of the persons to whom the property shall be 
 conveyed, we cannot hesitate to name the executors of General 
 Hamilton s will, leaving it with them to name others, if they think 
 it expedient, and also to arrange with Colonel Pickering the time 
 and circumstances of making the conveyance. 
 
 Every occurrence that forces the mind back to the epoch of Gen 
 eral Hamilton s death revives the most poignant sorrow. The 
 deep-felt grief of wise and good men everywhere testifies their 
 
308 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 sense of an irreparable loss to the public, while the strong sympa 
 thies which are awakened for those who were by nature attached 
 to him are a just tribute to his private virtues. If it were possible 
 to express our own regrets, they would show how dear he was to 
 us. We are, gentlemen, with the greatest respect, 
 Your most humble servants, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 THOS. DAVIS. 
 
 THEO. LYMAN. 
 
 JOHN B. CHURCH, NICHOLAS FISH, NATHANIEL PENDLETON, Esqs., Execu 
 tors of the last will and testament of Alexander Hamilton (deceased). 
 
 EXECUTORS TO TRUSTEES. 
 
 NEW YORK, Nov. 29, 1804. 
 
 GENTLEMEN, We received the letter you did us the honor to 
 write, of the 26th inst., with a copy of a deed authorizing a con 
 veyance of certain valuable lands to trustees, for the benefit of the 
 heirs of General Hamilton, and a copy of a letter from you to 
 Colonel Pickering, as to the manner of effecting it. 
 
 This act of munificence towards the family of a man so dear 
 to his country and his friends, from persons of such well-known 
 worth as those whom you represent, will be regarded as a testi 
 mony equally strong and honorable of his merit ; and their liberality 
 and the manner of it are no less delicate than the motives are noble 
 and disinterested. 
 
 We receive with the greatest respect the honor you have done 
 us personally, by naming us the trustees of your benefaction. 
 Having been long and closely united with General Hamilton by 
 the ties of an intimate friendship, and feeling it to be no less our 
 duty than our wish to render to his family any services that may 
 be in our power, we cannot decline any trouble a trust created for 
 so interesting a purpose may give us. We therefore accept it, 
 and we hope we need not add our assurance that it shall be per 
 formed with fidelity. ? 
 
 We take the liberty to suggest that in any deed that may be 
 executed by Colonel Pickering, for the lands in question, pursuant 
 to your directions, our wish is that the precise objects of the trust 
 may be designated, and that the powers intended to be given to 
 the trustees for the disposition or improvement of the fund may be 
 as definite as the nature of the subject will permit. 
 
1801-6.] PKOYISION FOR HAMILTON S FAMILY. 309 
 
 We have the honor to be, gentlemen, with esteem and considera 
 
 tion, your obedient, humble servants, 
 
 J. B. CHURCH. 
 NICHOLAS FISH. 
 NATHANIEL PENDLETON. 
 
 Hon. GEORGE CABOT, THOMAS DAVIS, THEODORE LYMAN. 
 
 TRUSTEES TO EXECUTORS. 
 
 BOSTON, 1st January, 1805. 
 
 GENTLEMEN, We were honored with your letter of 29th 
 November, which we ought to have acknowledged before this late 
 day. 
 
 The gentlemen whom we represent desire that their contribu 
 tions may be as subservient as possible to the use and convenience 
 of General Hamilton s children and family. With a view to this, 
 it was proposed to convey the property to the trustees, free from 
 all conditions which might embarrass its disposal or the application 
 of its proceeds, if it should be sold. But, if a more definite appro 
 priation is thought necessary, we request that the conveyance may 
 be to John B. Church, Nicholas Fish, and Nathaniel Pendleton, 
 the survivors or survivor of them, and the heirs of the survivor, 
 upon this special trust and confidence : to sell the same or any part 
 thereof, and to apply the proceeds thereof to the use of the chil 
 dren of General Hamilton, at the discretion of the said trustees, 
 the survivors or survivor of them, and the heirs of the survivor; 
 but, until such sale shall be so made, the lands to be holden for the 
 use of General Hamilton s children as joint-tenants in fee-simple, 
 provided that Colonel Pickering may sell and dispose of the same 
 lands, or any part thereof, at the direction and request of the said 
 trustees, the survivors or survivor of them, or the heirs of the sur 
 vivor, instead of the conveyance first aforesaid, and pay over the 
 proceeds of such sale, by him so made, to the said trustees, the 
 survivors or survivor of them, or the heirs of the survivor, &c., to 
 be received upon the same trusts as the moneys which may be 
 received by the said trustees upon sales by them made, if any are 
 above directed. 
 
 If this form of words should be thought either inconvenient or 
 inadequate, we shall be ready to adopt any other more eligible, 
 which you shall have the goodness to recommend. And we take 
 
310 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 the liberty of suggesting to ^ou the expediency of seeing Colonel 
 Pickering as he passes through your city, on his return from 
 Washington, that the business may be definitively arranged as far 
 as is practicable. 
 
 We are, gentlemen, with the highest respect, your most obedient 
 
 servants, 
 
 G. CABOT. 
 T. DAVIS. 
 T. LYMAN. 
 
 To JOHN J3. CHURCH, NICHOLAS FISH, NATHANIEL PENDLETON, Esq., 
 New York. 
 
 The tranquillity of Mr. Cabot s life was but little dis 
 turbed by political events during the years covered by the 
 letters in this chapter ; and his participation in affairs of 
 public interest was, with scarcely an exception, limited to 
 the letters and conversations on political topics, in which 
 every reflecting man was at that period wont to indulge. 
 The utter defeat of the Federalists, although anticipated, 
 still caused deep regret to Mr. Cabot, because it appeared to 
 preclude the possibility of the strong constitutional govern 
 ment he had hoped to see established. Yet he regarded 
 this change as the inevitable result of natural causes, at 
 which it was useless to repine. He had no sympathy with 
 the intrigues by which his party in Washington sought to 
 gratify their hatred of Jefferson, by the elevation of Burr ; * 
 
 1 Mr. Randall says in his Life of Jefferson (II. 583), "Cabot had previ 
 ously written to Hamilton, favoring the idea of preferring Burr." This 
 assertion Mr. Randall supports by reference to a letter from Hamilton to 
 Wolcott (Hamilton s Works, VI. 487). The first paragraph of the letter 
 referred to reads as follows : " Your last letter, my dear sir, has given me 
 great pain ; not only because it informed me that the opinion in favor of 
 Mr. Burr was increasing among the Federalists, but because it also told me 
 that Mr. was one of its partisans. I have a letter from this gentle 
 man, in which he expresses decidedly his preference for Mr. Jefferson " The 
 rest of the letter from which this is quoted refers solely to Burr s character. 
 I made an application to the state department in Washington for a copy of 
 this letter, that I might determine whether Mr. Cabot s name was the one 
 which filled the blank in the printed form. A copy of the letter was refused 
 me, without any reason being stated ; but Mr. Hunter, the second assistant 
 
1801-6.] FEDERALIST POLICY, 1801-6. 311 
 
 but at the same time Mr. Cabot, like most of his political 
 associates, seriously misunderstood Jefferson s character, 
 and attributed to him a reckless determination to carry 
 out in practice all that he believed as theory. In one of 
 his letters, indeed, he speaks of Mr. Jefferson as conser 
 vative in temperament, but this is evidently an expres 
 sion caused by deference to the opinion of others ; for the 
 profound distrust and dislike with which he really regarded 
 the new President are very apparent throughout his corre 
 spondence. Mr. Cabot, however, found some ground for 
 consolation and hope in the appointment of Mr. Madison 
 and Mr. Gallatin, whom he considered reasonable, intelli 
 gent, and conservative men, according to their kind, and 
 opposed to the most visionary and mischievous theories of 
 their chief. In regard to the future course of his own 
 party, Mr. Cabot s views were at first quite different from 
 those adopted and acted upon by the official leaders. Be 
 lieving that the principles of pure democracy had com 
 pletely triumphed, he thought that the utmost now to be 
 expected was to modify and soften the effects of those prin 
 ciples, and he perceived but one way in which this could 
 be brought about : as he constantly says in his letters, 
 " Things must grow worse before they are better." He 
 felt that the Democratic doctrines were sure to be speedily 
 pushed to dangerous extremes, that by the inevitable reac 
 tion which would then ensue divisions would arise among 
 the Jacobins, that a conservative force would be generated 
 
 Secretary of State, in conveying this refusal, said, " You may, however, 
 be informed that the name of George Cabot is not the one that, in the copy 
 of Hamilton s letter here, fills the blank in the printed copy." It therefore 
 appears that Mr. Randall filled this blank by conjecture, and then founded 
 on it an accusation against Mr. Cabot Nor was this all : in the same vol 
 ume of Hamilton s Works (p. 454) is a letter from Mr. Cabot (given above, 
 p. 284), in which he speaks of the opinions of some Federalists favorable to 
 Burr, but adds that he is not a man who can be trusted. Mr. Eandall has 
 therefore not only made his accusation on the authority of a letter in which 
 Mr. Cabot s name was not even mentioned, but he did this in the face of Mr. 
 Cabot s own adverse opinion printed in the same volume. 
 
312 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 in their ranks, and that the moderate men would part com 
 pany with the violent partisans. To unite at the moment of 
 this division with the more conservative among their present 
 opponents seemed to Mr. Cabot to offer to the Federalists 
 the only possible chance for future success. But, in order to 
 take such an advantage of the enemies dissensions, he felt 
 that the Federalists ought to concentrate and consolidate 
 their forces, and prevent at all hazards any further feuds 
 within the party ; that they ought to refrain from unmeas 
 ured attacks, and above all that they ought to beware of 
 cultivating deep and bitter animosities with the men who 
 might one day be their allies. It is eas} T now to point out 
 the wrong premise on which this reasoning was based. 
 Jefferson was the last man to run into any thing so unpop 
 ular as the vices of the French proletariat. But though 
 Mr. Cabot misjudged Jefferson, in supposing him bold and 
 reckless, and capable of precipitating a ruinous division in 
 his party, yet a split was sure to come sooner or later ; 
 and there can be little doubt that such a division between 
 the moderate and extreme Democrats was the only way in 
 which the Federalists could obtain the very limited measure 
 of success henceforth possible to them. They could never 
 have returned to the power they held in the days of Wash 
 ington and Adams ; but they might have shared the admin 
 istration with conservative Democrats, and modified the evils 
 which Jefferson, now leading and now pushed by his extreme 
 partisans, brought upon the country. In any event, however, 
 the firm, temperate, and dignified policy which, after their 
 defeat, Mr. Cabot wished his party to adopt, would have 
 been by far the best and wisest. Unfortunately, the actual 
 leaders thought differently; and, in the miserable years 
 which followed Jefferson s first term, any thing resembling 
 moderation was flung away by both sides, and by all public 
 men. The result was a series of blunders, failures, egre 
 gious mistakes, and savage quarrels, which can be palliated 
 only by the extreme and perhaps insurmountable difficulties 
 
1801-6.] THE DEMOCRATIC POLICY. 313 
 
 of the political situation. It was the only period of our 
 history when we filled the perhaps useful, but certainly 
 disagreeable position of foot-ball for the two great nations 
 of Europe. As a consequence of our humiliating situation, 
 and of the difficulties incident to an honorable or even 
 possible extrication, the policy of individuals and of parties 
 presents but little for proud contemplation . No matter what 
 our political sympathies may be, the first fifteen years of 
 this century offer nothing of a political nature that is not 
 in some degree mortifying and painful. 
 
 The removals from office for political reasons, and the 
 Democratic attacks on the judiciary, during Jefferson s first 
 term, greatly alarmed Mr. Cabot, and met with his severest 
 reprobation. He sympathized also with his party in their 
 oppposition to the acquisition of Louisiana, a measure which 
 he considered unconstitutional, as well as politically danger 
 ous. But, much as he feared and disliked the policy of Jef-/ 
 ferson s administration, he was by no means prepared to takel 
 part in the scheme for a separation of the Union, which was \ 
 urged upon him by his friend, Colonel Pickering. In \ 
 reply to the latter s letter on this subject, he took the ground 
 that the plan was not only impracticable and unwise, but 
 that, if carried out, it would not accomplish the desired re 
 sults. In a letter to Mr. King, Mr. Cabot, commenting upon 
 Colonel Pickering s suggestions, says that he is strongly of 
 opinion that the proposed separation is not justified by 
 the political mismanagement of the dominant party. He 
 believed that the Union was of too great value to be 
 endangered, merely on account of a bad and perhaps 
 temporary policy. In these opinions as to a separation of 
 the States, Mr. Cabot was in full accord with Hamilton, 
 King, and most of the other leading Federalists, whose 
 quiet opposition sufficed to extinguish completely this 
 plan, which had emanated entirely from those members 
 of the party who were at that time senators or members^ojx 
 Congress. The close of the year 1805 was marked by the 
 
314 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 only occasion on which Mr. Cabot took any active part in 
 public matters. This happened in connection with the 
 first symptoms of the coining troubles with England. Un 
 der the modification of the rule of 1756, as recognized 
 hitherto by the British orders in council, neutrals might 
 trade to and from the colonies of belligerents, and also to 
 and from the mother countries, but not between the two. 
 By a slight extension of the voyage, therefore, the rule 
 could be evaded, and the produce of the colonies of bellig 
 erents be carried to their respective mother countries. 
 The Americans, quick to perceive their opportunity, soon 
 made a practice of loading their vessels with colonial pro 
 duce, touching at some American port, and then sailing at 
 once for Europe. While the desperate struggle in \vhich 
 England- and France were engaged lasted, the result of this 
 proceeding on the part of our merchants was that nearly all 
 the great carrying trade fell into American hands. The 
 English, indignant both at the immunity enjoyed by French 
 commerce thus carried on by neutrals, and at the loss of their 
 own, seized some of the American vessels engaged in this 
 trade ; and the British admiralty courts adjudged them 
 good prize, on the ground that the neutral flag was in many, 
 if not in most cases, a mere fraud to protect belligerent 
 property. The news of these seizures, or rather of the con 
 sequent decisions, aroused the anger of all Americans, but 
 especially of those inhabiting the seaport towns. In all 
 the great commercial centres, indignation meetings were 
 held, and bulky memorials drafted and sent to Congress. 
 One of these was a meeting of the merchants of Boston, 
 to remonstrate to Congress against the British doctrines. 
 A committee, of whom Mr. Cabot was one, was appointed ; 
 and they reported a memorial drawn by Mr. Lloyd, 1 
 which was adopted and forwarded to Washington. 2 
 Mr. Cabot felt himself constrained to accept a place on 
 
 1 James Lloyd, afterwards senator from Massachusetts. 
 
 2 For this memorial, see Annals of Congress, 1806-7, p. 890 ; New Eng 
 land Palladium for Jan. 31, 1806 ; or Waite s State Papers, V. 367. 
 
1801-0.] ADMIRALTY DECISIONS. 315 
 
 this committee, as one of Boston s leading merchants ; but, 
 while he was not convinced that the decisions of the courts 
 were incorrect, he also feared that the excitement attend 
 ant on all popular movements might result in measures and 
 demonstrations which he himself could not but deem ex 
 treme and mischievous. Thus it was that he consented 
 with the greatest reluctance to take a leading part in the 
 meeting ; for he was especially averse to the barest appear 
 ance of professing opinions which he did not really hold, 
 or of acceding, from deference to the popular wish, to meas 
 ures which he had always conscientiously opposed. Fisher 
 Ames, writing at this time to Colonel Pickering, says : 
 
 " I have just returned from Boston, where I find the merchants 
 have had a meeting on Mr. Fitzsimmons s letter, and appointed a 
 committee of seven. Our friend Cabot is much, too much, morti 
 fied that he is one of them. He hates hypocrisy, and respects 
 principles ; and he dreads lest the popular feeling should impel the 
 committee to deny what he believes to be true, or to ask for what 
 he knows to be mischievous. I confess I have rather approved the 
 meetings of merchants. ... I expect more good than evil from 
 their interposition, especially if such men as Cabot will consent to 
 appear among them. I hope they will be prevailed on soon or 
 late to depute such men as James Lloyd and Thomas H. Perkins 
 to the government, as their committee, who could not fail to impose 
 respect on the Sam. Smiths 1 among you." 2 
 
 Colonel Pickering, in a letter to Mr. Lowell many years 
 later, says : 
 
 " Much against his will, and contrary to his own better judgment, 
 he [Mr. Cabot] was placed at the head of the committee which, in 
 1806, subscribed and sent to Washington the remonstrances drawn 
 by Lloyd against the British doctrine concerning neutral trade. 
 He signed it (he afterwards told me), officially, as one of the mer 
 chants (or town s) committee." 3 
 
 These admiralty decisions were but the beginning of the 
 end. The peace and prosperity of Jefferson s first term, 
 
 1 Mr. Smith was a senator from Maryland, and brother of Robert Smith, 
 Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 2 Works of Ames, I. 342. 8 See p. 542. 
 
316 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 engendered by the twelve previous years of wise and strong 
 administrations, now came rudely to a close ; and our gov 
 ernment embarked on that crazy policy which, after years 
 of contumely abroad and factious opposition at home, re 
 sulted in the unnecessary and fruitless war of 1812. To 
 Jefferson s embargo policy, the first step on the downward 
 path, Mr. Cabot was, of course, most deeply opposed. On 
 this subject, his wide commercial experience gave him 
 peculiar fitness to judge ; and he had always been a con 
 sistent enemy to embargoes, and indeed to any doctrine 
 which favored much interference with trade. In 1794, he 
 opposed and voted against such a measure when introduced 
 in the Senate ; and a few years later, in writing to his 
 friends, at the time of the French difficulties, he expressed 
 his strong objections to an embargo, except when laid under 
 the strictest limitations and in compliance with the severest 
 necessity. In the present instance, he regarded Jefferson s 
 restrictive policy with all his old hostility to such measures ; 
 and his convictions were still more strengthened by the 
 circumstances of the time, which rendered an embargo, of 
 peculiar danger. Mr. Cabot, like most of the Federalists, 
 believed that Jefferson, for selfish ends and to promote the 
 interests of France, sought to drive the United States into 
 a war with Great Britain. Whether this view of the 
 President s motives was right or wrong, the fact that an 
 English war was imminent could not escape the attention 
 of any reflecting man. An embargo, therefore, was not 
 only a mistake, but a piece of criminal folly ; for, while it 
 drew down war with one hand, it destroyed with the other our 
 best and indeed our only means of fighting. It ran directly 
 counter to the most cherished doctrine of the Federalists, 
 the preservation of a strong neutrality; and, what was 
 far worse, it also was in direct opposition to all the dictates 
 of common prudence and common sense. We were actu 
 ally on the verge of a conflict with the greatest maritime 
 power in the world; and yet, not content with this and 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 317 
 
 with the prior destruction of our navy, the Jeffersonian policy 
 seemed to aim at nothing less than the annihilation of our 
 mercantile marine, from which alone it was possible to 
 obtain seamen to navigate our public ships and fight our 
 national battles. Mr. Cabot, on this ground alone, very 
 rightly believed that the embargo was the most fatal meas 
 ure that could be taken. But he also opposed the whole 
 policy on economic principles, which are set forth at length 
 in his letters. I shall attempt, therefore, no summary of 
 his opinions on these questions, but leave him to speak for 
 himself through the medium of his correspondence. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 APRIL 10, 1801. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, I received last evening your letter of the 
 20th of February, containing important information of affairs 
 on your side the water and some valuable speculation upon their 
 tendencies. I shall inquire of persons learned in the law ; and, if I 
 find that our bankrupt act will relieve insolvent epistolary debtors, 
 I shall avail myself of its provisions. If otherwise, I shall make the 
 best composition I can with my creditors ; and, as you and Mr. King 
 are the principal ones, I hope and entreat you to be liberal. You 
 will naturally consider that idle men find no time to do any thing. 
 This truth, hidden from vulgar eyes, will be the first before yours 
 and his. 
 
 Although I do not rate very highly the talents of an English 
 cabinet for diplomatic management, and although I have always 
 thought they studied the prejudices and accommodated themselves 
 to the humors of others less than their interest required, yet I do 
 not think they could by any course of conduct have prevented the 
 hostile disposition of the continental nations as it now appears ; in 
 some the effect of folly, in others of rivalry, and some of terror. 
 I am glad you think England, if quiet and orderly at home, will 
 succeed against the confederacy. Heaven alone foresees the issue ; 
 but, judging by such lights as I enjoy, I should say there is a moral 
 certainty that England will triumph over all her external enemies, if 
 
318 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 her own subjects are true and loyal, as their interest plainly requires, 
 as well as their duty, that they should be. 
 
 I have good reason to believe that our new President is deter 
 mined to keep clear of the war. Happy will it be for our country, 
 if he can maintain this determination against his own pre-existing 
 prejudices and the incessant assaults of his party. 
 
 The " Gazette of the United States " and the " Palladium " will 
 show you what the good men think on this subject, especially the 
 " Palladium." 
 
 While Mr. Jefferson pronounces our government the strongest 
 in the world, some others of our wise men affirm its best days are 
 past ; and I believe the sentiment is extensive, that we are doomed 
 to suffer all the evils of an excessive democracy through the United 
 States. Our elections grow worse, and the Maratists and Robes- 
 pierrians everywhere raise their heads. What should you have 
 thought two or three years ago if you had been told that a very 
 large and powerful party was formed in Connecticut, who have 
 deliberated and probably decided to elect Pierrepont Edwards, 1 
 instead of Trumbull, 2 their governor ? You may believe this now. 
 Probably they will not succeed in their first essay ; but, if they 
 should, this fact, in addition to others of a similar nature which are 
 already recorded in our annals, must put an end to all argument 
 among sensible and fair men on the practicability of honest popular 
 governments. Having been always in heart, soul, and mind, attached 
 to the principles of our governments, and enthusiastic in my desires 
 and hopes that we should support them arid be blessed by them, 
 I have been for some years suffering the pain of disappointment at 
 their successive failures which experiment has produced. There is 
 no security for a good government without some popular mixture 
 in it ; but there will be neither justice nor stability in any system, 
 
 1 Pierrepont Edwards, son of Jonathan Edwards. Though an advocate 
 for the adoption of the Constitution, he became a prominent Democratic 
 leader, and was the principal founder of the so-called " Toleration " party 
 in Connecticut. Hildreth says he was " the maternal uncle of Burr, whom 
 he resembled as well in accomplishments and address as in profligacy of 
 private character, at least in whatever related to women." History of the 
 United States, V. 631, 533. 
 
 2 Jonathan Trumbull the younger son of the celebrated Revolutionary 
 governor. Like his father, he held for many years a leading position in 
 Connecticut politics, and was governor of the State, from 1798-1809 the 
 year of his death. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 319 
 
 if some material parts of it are not independent of popular control. 
 Authority, as well as sentiment and interest, must combine to make 
 a government a blessing to any people. 
 
 Yours truly, G. C. 
 
 WOLCOTT TO CABOT. 
 
 LITCHFIELD, July 27, 1801. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, After a long silence, during which I have 
 been neither inactive nor forgetful of my friends, I think it right 
 to inform you where I am, and how circumstanced, and to propose 
 a renewal of our correspondence. I am at length planted on my 
 native hill, in a pleasant little town where there are several agree 
 able families and some of the leading Democrats of Connecticut. 
 Kirby, our new supervisor, is my near neighbor. We of course ex 
 perience good and evil ; friendship, envy, and slander, in short, 
 most of the pleasures and plagues incident to a village life. 
 
 It was my expectation to have visited Boston this summer, in 
 company with Mrs. Wolcott. This pleasure must be postponed to 
 the next season, in consequence of her late indisposition, and the 
 necessity I am under of superintending some repairs to render our 
 situation convenient during the ensuing winter. 
 
 I have written this detail of my domestic situation, to furnish 
 an excuse for requesting information respecting yours. The best 
 substitute for the pleasure of yours and Mrs. Cabot s society will 
 be such a description as you can give of your situation, sentiments, 
 and feelings. 
 
 Mr. Jefferson, contrary to my hopes, and in some degree to my 
 expectation, appears to have commenced a vindictive attack upon 
 the Federalists of New England ; and, if I understand his intention, 
 "he is determined to distinguish his administration by subverting the 
 systems and destroying the characters of those who supported or 
 aided his predecessors. The attempt, if made, will not succeed. The 
 best mode of repelling this assault, however, ought to be well 
 considered. Will you be so good as to inform me what impression 
 the President s conduct has made on the minds of the common 
 people, on Mr. Adams and his friends, and whether the gentlemen 
 of information have adopted any system of defence ? In short, I 
 wish to know briefly the political situation of Massachusetts. It is 
 highly probable that we have a serious task to perform. We ought 
 
320 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 not to hasten the crisis ; but, when it arrives, I hope we shall be 
 prepared to act in concert and with effect. 
 
 I remain as ever your assured friend and obedient servant, 
 
 0. W. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 3, 1801. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I was much gratified with your letter of the 
 27th July, which, having been sent to Brook/ze/c? by mistake of the 
 postmaster, did not reach me until yesterday morning. While I 
 feel the strongest solicitude that your circumstances should be in 
 all respects propitious to happiness, I pray chiefly that it may 
 not be dependent on them. Every village, as well as every city, 
 which contains men, will have democrats and demagogues, the 
 latter of whom must live by practising upon the weaknesses and 
 administering to the vices of the former. While you have about 
 you some whose society you can enjoy, there will be others whose 
 interest and whose pleasure it must be to mar your enjoyment. 
 
 I am not able to inform you of the impression which is made 
 upon our common people by Mr. Jefferson s revolutionary move 
 ments, nor do I know with any certainty how they are treated by 
 Mr. Adams. I live out of the world, and have but little commu 
 nication with it, and that little through the medium of our own sect 
 exclusively. If instead of a fact I might offer an opinion, it would 
 be that our common people are not yet sensibly affected by any 
 thing done or threatened by Mr. Jefferson. 
 
 I should think, however, Mr. Adams must feel great indignation : 
 first, because his own principles and conduct are impudently con 
 demned ; and, second, because I learn that those Federalists who 
 adhered to his (Mr. Adams s) greatest errors are full of resentment 
 against Mr. Jefferson. 
 
 I can speak of that class of men which I more particularly es 
 teem, and whose politics I deem correct, with less doubt. They 
 are surprised at the weakness, and provoked extremely at the per 
 nicious principles avowed by Mr. Jefferson in his answer to the 
 New Haven remonstrants. 1 It is, however, a general opinion 
 
 1 President Adams had appointed Elizur Goodrich, a member of Congress, 
 to the collectorship of New Haven. Goodrich was in every way a compe 
 tent man and good officer, but his appointment had been made after Jeffer 
 son s election was known. All nominations of this sort, Jefferson, who was 
 
1801 -0.] CORRESPONDENCE. 3*21 
 
 among these men that no system of defence can yet be adopted, 
 although it is difficult to refrain from making the most censorious 
 observations themselves, and impossible to prevent them from being 
 made by others, and inculcated in the newspapers ; yet it is a com 
 mon sentiment that considerable time must elapse, and much be 
 borne and suffered, before the pressure of existing evils arid the 
 apprehension of others and greater ones to come will so operate as 
 to give a chance of success to the Federal cause. The language"] 
 of some of the Federal newspapers is perhaps a little too violent I 
 at this time, though the sentiments are just. Strictures will be-*- 
 continually made on the conduct of the administration, and perhaps 
 they are as useful as they are unavoidable. Errors, vices, and 
 crimes must be pointed out, but it should be done in a manner that 
 will not exasperate those whom it is expected to convince. No 
 effectual remedy can be applied to our affairs until its necessity is 
 strongly and extensively felt, and a sense of common danger shall 
 unite more closely the real friends of the country. Mr. Dexter, 
 who has a tem^Drary residence in my neighborhood, took family 
 dinner with me yesterday. He still Wames us for not supporting 
 and adhering to Mr. Adams, notwithstanding we were deserted, 
 betrayed, and denounced. We agreed, however, in reprobating Mr. 
 Jefferson as more weak and more wicked than we had thought him. 
 
 O 
 
 Mr. Dexter is satisfied that the present administration is diligently 
 employed in ransacking the public offices in search for faults, and 
 documents to prove them. He thinks, too, there must unavoidably 
 be found among the infinitude of transactions many which to the 
 public eye may be made to appear improper, though at the time 
 
 then cautiously introducing the procedure since become infamous as the 
 " spoils system," chose to treat as nullities. Goodrich was removed, and a 
 man named Bishop appointed. The merchants of New Haven remonstrated 
 against the change. Bishop held several state offices already, and was 
 nearly eighty years of age. To meet their objections and to justify remov 
 ing Goodrich, Jefferson, after pointing out that Bishop was considered com 
 petent to hold other offices, forcibly replied that Franklin, at the same period 
 of life, was "an ornament to human nature." This was conclusive. See 
 Randall s Life of Jefferson, II. 660; Works of Jefferson, IV. 402. The real 
 explanation, perhaps, of the appointment of Bishop, a man so old that he 
 could not see to write his name, is to be found in the fact that his son, a 
 briefless lawyer, was a prominent young Democrat, who had recently 
 delivered two orations in praise of his party principles. The second of 
 these productions was devoted to an elaborate parallel between Jefferson 
 and Jesus Christ. 
 
 21 
 
322 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 they were right, and that they will be able by the use of such 
 means, and perhaps some real misconducts of some former officers, 
 to inflame the public mind to a great degree against honest and 
 faithful men. I do not believe that the sensible and well-disposed 
 part of the community will be the dupes of these abominable arts ; 
 but I can easily conceive that the bulk of the people should be de 
 ceived. Our elections, as well as other incidents, prove that we 
 are grown and growing worse in this State. Our best men think 
 more justly than ever on the subject of government, but their 
 influence over public opinion is less than usual. The belief is daily 
 extending that our affairs must necessarily grow much worse before 
 they can grow much better. I confess myself to entertain this 
 belief, though I admit that the efforts of good men may very much 
 mitigate the evils, by assisting the public mind to comprehend the 
 nature and true tendencies of all that passes under its eye. We 
 are destined in this country, as in all the free states who have gone 
 before us, to sacrifice the essence of liberty to the spirit of democ 
 racy. We are now and have always been more democratic in our 
 opinions and temper than the form of our government. The ten 
 dency of the latter has been to balance, to regulate, and to correct 
 the former ; but its force, from the nature of its structure, was in 
 sufficient. It is in effect already overcome. Our government is in 
 the hands of its enemies, and it is placed there because they are its 
 enemies. It is intrusted to them, because it is believed that they 
 would not use its powers for those purposes for which the govern 
 ment was professedly constituted. A candidate for Congress 
 recommends himself to a majority of the voters by inducing or 
 allowing them to believe that he would sacrifice the permanent 
 interests of the nation to the passions and prejudices of the populace 
 rather than restrain those passions or resist those prejudices. I 
 will not at this time give an opinion of what might be done in a 
 society like that of New England, and especially the State of Con 
 necticut ; but as a general observation, verified by experience and 
 explicable on known principles of human nature, it may be said 
 that democracy tends always to place power in the worst men s 
 hands. The most desperate and audacious men are the most likely 
 to govern. If, by any fortunate concurrence of circumstances, good 
 men are employed at first, the tendency is every day stronger to 
 raise bad men to their places, and from bad to worse, until the 
 excess of the evil brings the remedy. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 323 
 
 I had heard by accident, some days ago, that you and Mrs. Wol- 
 coit contemplated a visit here. I at first disbelieved it, because I 
 had hoped that a visit here would be a visit to my house, where I 
 should be happy to see you quartered. We are in a very pleasant 
 village, five miles from the centre of Boston, sufficiently retired, 
 yet within visiting distance of several agreeable neighbors, besides 
 the accessibility of town friends. My family consists of Mrs. Cabot 
 and my only daughter (a girl of sixteen) and myself. My eldest 
 son. Charles, is at the Isle of France, beyond the Cape of Good 
 Hope ; my second son, Henry, a lad of eighteen, is in a law office 
 at Boston ; and my youngest son, Edward, a lad of seventeen, is in 
 an accompting house. These two last visit us on Saturday evening 
 every week, and pass the Sabbath. We all enjoy good health, and 
 have no more of the "plagues " of life than we ought to have on 
 every principle. My farm is very good as well as pleasant, and my 
 love of ease is more gratified than is salutary. I am not rich, yet 
 my income is as great as my expenses, and my expenses as great as 
 my desires. Mrs. Cabot is in better health than when you knew 
 her. We visit very little, yet we are not long solitary. A single 
 man and three females form our list of domestics, the former of 
 whom drives us round the country every fine day. The labor of 
 my farm is performed altogether by a tenant, to whom I give spe 
 cific benefits, that he may have no control over the management ; 
 and the benefits are liberal, that he may be happy, and tied to me 
 by his interest. When I have no living company, I call upon the 
 dead, who are always ready to come from my library and entertain 
 me. Among the friends who contribute greatly to my happiness, 
 Mr. Ames is almost the only one with whom you are acquainted, 
 but you can easily conceive how precious he is. Our intimacy, and 
 1 believe our mutual attachment and confidence, have continually 
 increased. He lives seven miles from me, and sometimes takes my 
 house in his way to or from Boston ; and I often go to Dedham to 
 see him. We never meet without talking of you, and expressing 
 our desires to see you. I shall indulge this hope till it is realized. 
 You know so well that Mrs. C. and I wish to see you and Mrs. 
 Wolcott as our guests, that, when you come to this part of the 
 country, you will certainly make our house your home. 
 
 Yours affectionately and faithfully, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
324 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 MARCH 27, 1802. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Nothing could give me more pleasure than the 
 intelligence by your letter of the llth of January. Our friend 
 has his reward for all his patient, persevering attention and able 
 management, and his reward is the approbation of the wise and 
 good. There is none better ; and I trust with these he will be con 
 tent, so far as relates to externals. 1 
 
 If I were not already vain in the belief that I had successfully 
 broached and preached a new and salutary doctrine, I should be 
 made so by what you have communicated to me on the subject of 
 my arguments on the rights of neutral traders. If, however, I 
 could have thought they would be used as auxiliaries to an author 
 who proposes a regular and full display of the errors which prevail 
 on this subject, I should have suggested to you and Mr. King an 
 idea which occurred to me of the difference between the United 
 States and the northern powers of Europe ; which is, that the lat 
 ter have an immediate interest in avoiding search, as they could 
 then supply the vanquished belligerent with naval stores and other 
 articles acknowledged to be contraband. To those nations, say, 
 Denmark, Sweden, and Holland, this would be more lucrative 
 than the other branches of trade which, upon the existing system, 
 they partake of in war. But to us and other nations the advantage 
 of trading for belligerents, with our own capital, as allowed by the 
 law of nations, infinitely outweighs every possible profit from the 
 other source. The causes of this difference, as local position, &c., 
 will readily occur to you. 
 
 I had a great treat from Ellsworth, who gave me in detail much 
 information which I desired. I should enjoy many hours with you 
 in hearing the condition of France described, but I cannot reproach 
 you for refraining from such an endless subject on paper. 
 
 At the distance you are, it is possible you may think the Federal 
 ists have been too ardent ; but I am persuaded they have retarded 
 the revolution which is begun. It is a fact that Jefferson would 
 have displaced officers until he had excited a general fever among 
 the people ; but he was restrained by some of his counsellors, who 
 were evidently alarmed at the public indignation which they saw 
 
 1 The loss of Mr. Gore s letter renders it impossible to determine who the 
 person here alluded to was, but I suppose it to have been Mr. King. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 325 
 
 rising. They had resolved (as Mason informs me) to remonstrate 
 or expostulate in writing, if he did not desist. I am not informed 
 who these counsellors were, but concluded they could be no other 
 than Madison and Gallatin, the latter of whom must foresee a 
 tota! failure of revenue, if faithful officers are displaced and worth 
 less demagogues put into their places. 
 
 I rejoice exceedingly that after so tedious a delay you are likely 
 to put a finishing hand to the business of your commission in a 
 manner that will satisfy you and give so much pleasure to good 
 men. You will be entitled to all their gratitude, and will receive it. 
 
 I should fill my paper, but a visitor obliges me to say no more 
 than that I am 
 
 Your sincere and affectionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 WOLCOTT TO CABOT. 
 
 LITCHFIELD, Aug. 28, 1802. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, At the close of the week after I left you, I had 
 the pleasure of arriving here and finding my family well. Nothing 
 happened differently from what I could have wished, except not 
 having an opportunity to converse a few hours with our friend 
 Ames, who had been called to Boston on business the day we 
 parted. 
 
 I often think of the felicity of your situation ; and you will 
 believe me, when I assure you that the reflection affords me the 
 highest pleasure. In the vicinity of one of our most wealthy and 
 polished towns, surrounded with those friends whose society you 
 prefer, with a mind disposed to review the events which have 
 passed and in a situation which affords you early information of 
 those which are passing, you at once realize the great objects of 
 human pursuit. May you long live to enjoy them, and, if possible, 
 may they be increased. 
 
 The newspapers mention that the Moors have declared war 
 against the United States, and that Mr. Jefferson is, according to 
 his system of pacific warfare, sending out presents to preserve peace 
 and frigates to maintain war. It is the sole object of the adminis 
 tration to acquire popularity. The Magi of Virginia imagine that 
 it would be unpopular either to make war or pay tribute, and to 
 avoid censure they do both. Will it not be well to inquire how this 
 double-faced system is to be reconciled with economy ? 
 
326 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 When you write, will you inform me whether either of the col 
 lectors in Essex county are supposed to have been removed on the 
 ground of official neglects. I presume, from my knowledge of the 
 men, that nothing of the kind is pretended. What are the charac 
 ters of Mr. Lee and Mr. Warren ? Mr. Lyman I know. I shall 
 want this information for future use. 
 
 I remain as ever your friend, OLIVER WOLCOTT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Sept. 8, 1802. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, As soon as we learned that you had missed 
 Ames, we regretted exceedingly that we had permitted you to leave 
 us until the following morning. 1 am glad, however, that your 
 tour has been finished with the happy sight of your family all 
 well. 
 
 I think it probable that the collector of Marblehead (Mr. Gerry) 
 has been removed for keeping back the public money. He is said 
 to be deficient four or five thousand dollars ; and I am informed 
 his brother Elbridge has written a letter from Cambridge to the 
 merchants in Marblehead, proposing that they should advance by sub 
 scription a sufficient sum to balance his brother s account with the 
 Treasury, and intimating that, if this was not done, he (Elbridge) 
 could obtain for him a new appointment.* The precise facts will 
 probably soon find their way to the press. It is worth remember 
 ing that Mr. S. R. Gerry was appointed by Washington, in compli 
 ance with Democratic solicitation chiefly, if not solely. I recollect 
 well that the rival candidate, Colonel Joshua Orne, was zealously 
 supported and strongly recommended by the Federalists. Mr. 
 Warren, who is appointed to the place of Gerry, is said to decline: 
 he thinks himself well entitled to a greater reward for his services 
 and the claims he inherits from both father and mother. The 
 family, I believe, consider themselves as the most efficient anti- 
 Federalists. Mr. Hiller has been always esteemed a good officer 
 and an honest man. His office is not taken from him for any fault 
 in his character or conduct ; but Colonel Lee wanted it extremely, 
 and the government wanted Colonel Lee s support, which, how 
 ever, is not powerful, for he is not a man of much political influ 
 ence or information. He was an officer of good reputation in the 
 
 * [Query. Is not Elbridge surety for Samuel Eussell Gerry ? G. C.] 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 327 
 
 army, which he left in 1 778, 1 believe. He has been an industri 
 ous man and good citizen since, always friendly to order, and would 
 not have been arranged on the Jacobin side but for the temptation 
 of a good office. His property was exhausted, and his family very 
 large. I understand he has visited the Federal city since the reign 
 of Democracy commenced, and that when he returned it was re 
 ported by his children that he would be appointed to the office of 
 Mr. Hiller. 1 Mr. Tyng was unquestionably a valuable acquisition 
 to the government, and has been so considered at the Treasury 
 long since the new administration begun its career. He is without 
 fault as an officer, and in the highest estimation for probity, good 
 sense, and dignity. As a man, all parties at Newburyport lament 
 his removal. Your sincere friend, 
 
 G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLIXE, Oct. 21, 1802. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I cannot but approve the intention of your 
 judicial corps to unite in a memorial or remonstrance to Congress. 2 
 They will doubtless prepare the most forcible argument the subject 
 admits, and this will be the less difficult to perform because of the 
 ample discussion it has already received. There are two ideas 
 which ought to be urged with perspicuity, to justify completely, in 
 the minds of the community, this proceeding of the judges. One is 
 that the Constitution, having rendered judicial commissions irrevo 
 cable, except for misbehavior, evidently contemplated a resistance 
 on the part of the judges to all attempts to remove them for any 
 other cause ; and therefore, second, if the judges should silently 
 acquiesce, they would be said by one part of the community to have 
 tamely surrendered a public trust, and by the other their silence 
 would be construed into an acknowledgment that their removal was 
 
 1 Collector of Salem. 
 
 2 This refers to the repeal of the Judiciary Act, and the number of 
 judges thereby deprived of office. This is not the place to enter into a dis 
 cussion as to the expediency of the measure at this particular time ; but it 
 may be said that nothing is better settled than the right of the Legislature to 
 legislate out of existence a judicial body. Not many years ago, this was 
 done in Massachusetts as the only method of reforming and reconstituting 
 the bench of what is now the Superior Court. Nevertheless, it is a danger 
 ous expedient, and one justifiable only in the last resort. 
 
LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 constitutional. It seems to me these ideas may be so stated as to 
 make the interference of the judges a manifest duty. Our news 
 paper account of the appointment of Stephen Cross to the collector- 
 ship was erroneous. I was shocked at reading that this man,* who 
 was early displaced by Washington for misconduct, should be 
 again placed in the same office. But it turns out to be Ralph 
 Cross who is commissioned, a man much below Stephen in repu 
 tation ; indeed, his truth or integrity would be very little trusted in 
 the part of the country where he lives. He once held an office 
 under Mr. Collector Tyng, but was discovered to connive at 
 smuggling or practising deceit in the weight or measure of dutied 
 goods ; and for this unfaithfulness in his office was displaced by 
 Mr. Tyng. I shall not be surprised if appointments of this sort 
 should be followed by deficiencies of revenue. The Democrats 
 will be favored or allowed to smuggle ; and, should this be per 
 ceived by the Federalists, they will not submit to a ruinous par 
 tiality. Yours affectionately, G. CABOT. 
 
 * [Stephen Cross was collector prior to Wigglesworth. G. C.] 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Dec. 20, 1802. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, I have never reflected on the situation 
 and duty of the judges of the Supreme Court, in relation to the 
 outrage committed by Congress on the Constitution. Presuming, 
 however, that your opinion is correct in this, as I am accustomed 
 to think it in every thing connected with our affairs, it shows how 
 little dependence there is, even on good men, to support our sys 
 tem of policy and government. The aberration of Mr. Adams, 
 in 1798 or 1799, shows the same thing; and his strange answer to 
 the address of his friends, lately, shows it in a still stronger light. 1 
 It is no very extraordinary interpretation of his disclaimer of 
 measures not specified, that they are those which his opponents dis 
 like ; while the " some" and "other" measures, for which indirect 
 apologies are offered, imply that much has been wrong. It is 
 apparent, too, that this wrong is to be attributed to men who gave 
 to him and his administration the most efficient support. 
 
 1 I take this to refer to the answer to an address from the inhabitants of 
 Quincy, in 1802. See Works of John Adams, I. 602. The address is given 
 in John Adams s Works, but not the answer. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 329 
 
 I have a great curiosity to see the manner in which Congress 
 will treat the representation of your corps. 1 The quotation you 
 furnish pleases me, because it presents to public view a motive 
 which ought to govern, and which every man who has a head or 
 heart ought to approve. 
 
 You will be a little surprised when you learn that I am about 
 to exchange the scene which you justly admire for a town life ; 
 but it is determined that I go to Boston as soon as accommodations 
 can be provided there and my place here disposed of. I shall 
 always be as recluse as I can be ; but I have not thought it right 
 to shut up a daughter six months in every year in the country, 
 and I cannot afford to hold my farm, if I live in town. My other 
 children, too (my three sons), will be weaned from me, and I from 
 them, more than is reconcilable to my natural disposition, if I do 
 not live where they can see me without great sacrifices of time 
 and business. But, wherever I may be and however circumstanced, 
 I beg to be remembered among your affectionate friends, and to 
 be allowed the hope of hearing from you often and seeing you 
 again. Yours faithfully, G. CABOT. 
 
 WOLCOTT TO CABOT. 
 
 LITCHFIELD, Feb. 7, 1803. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, I thank you sincerely for your favor of 
 December 20th. The change of residence which you meditate 
 will, I hope and believe, as much increase your happiness as it 
 must be productive of advantage to your children ; and, in this 
 view, the motives of your resolution are certainly proper, and will 
 be applauded by all your acquaintance. 
 
 The enclosed paper will inform you that I have determined on a 
 removal to New York immediately. My family will remain in the 
 country till next autumn. To this change of situation I am im 
 pelled by a kind of necessity. I have been contented here ; but 
 my property is not sufficient to employ my time, or to furnish the 
 means of educating and providing for my family as I wish. This 
 State furnishes no employments in which I can engage, except 
 those of a public nature, and with those I have been satiated. 
 
 The tern\s on which I have concluded to enter upon a new 
 career of active business are beneficial and as safe as possible ; and 
 
 1 Wolcott was appointed judge of the second circuit by President 
 Adams. 
 
330 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 the gentlemen associated with me are all men of ample fortunes 
 and respectability. Where prior engagements and connections do 
 not interfere, I hope to experience the patronage and encourage 
 ment of my acquaintance. Upon my friends, and upon you in 
 particular, I wish to impose the tax of recommending me to busi 
 ness, on suitable occasions, in such terms as propriety and justice 
 will permit. 
 
 I amused myself, a few weeks ago, in some observations upon 
 the relative circumstances of different sections of the United States, 
 the result of which I sent to Mr. Ames, as a sort of reply to an 
 interesting letter which I received from him. This letter he will 
 show you. It becomes more and more evident that a crisis is 
 impending. It is most probable that we shall soon be engaged in 
 a war. The idea is rapidly diffusing among Democrats that the 
 present administration is incompetent ; but, though Jefferson & Co. 
 are going down, no desirable substitute yet appears to be coming 
 up. The State of New York, in the councils of which we are 
 much interested, appears to me to be divided into State parties, by 
 which national politics are but little regarded. Governor Clinton 
 is the only man living who can preserve the least appearance of 
 union among the factions into which the present majority is divided. 
 Mr. Burr has a considerable popular influence with the secondary 
 classes of society in the city of New York ; but, in the State, no 
 party can rally under his name. His friends are numerous, and 
 consist of active, subtle, vigilant spirits, who are able to " perplex 
 maturest councils," and who place no confidence in the present 
 system of our country. These men are not Federalists, and 
 neither expect nor wish the Federalists to regain power or influ 
 ence. Against a common foe, they are however occasionally 
 united with the Federalists, and are thus able to neutralize many 
 of the measures of the Clintonians. 
 
 I am, dear sir, your affectionate friend, 
 
 OLIVER WOLCOTT. 
 
 CABOT TO KING. 
 
 BOSTON, July 1, 1803. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, We hear from New York that Mr. King 
 is arrived, and confirms our accounts of war. The first gives me 
 an unmingled pleasure, the last excites a mixed sentiment of joy 
 and anxiety. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 331 
 
 I have constantly believed that the struggle between France 
 and England must continue, until the power of the former is effect 
 ually abridged, or the latter falls. You can judge best of the 
 issue ; but, after every allowance for the immense advantages of 
 force on the side of France, with all continental Europe at her 
 disposal, and the wishes of all the fools and knaves throughout the 
 universe on her side, I entertain great hopes and confidence in the 
 final success of England. She has means and motives sufficient, 
 which, I trust, will not be unavailing for want of talents to employ 
 them. 
 
 A letter from Paris of the 13th May states that, previous to the 
 departure of Lord Whitworth, a despatch from Russia had been 
 received, which announced the consent of Alexander to guarantee 
 Malta according to the terms of the treaty of Amiens, and that 
 Marcott dissuaded Lord Whitworth as much as he could from 
 leaving Paris. This intelligence comes from Cassenove, an intimate 
 of Talleyrand, and therefore may be true. Cassenove also speaks 
 of Prussia as very closely connected with France. If all this is 
 so, England exhibits the most interesting spectacle which my im 
 agination can conceive. 
 
 The cession of Louisiana is an excellent thing for France. It is 
 like selling us a ship after she is surrounded by a British fleet. It 
 puts into safe keeping what she could not keep herself ; for Eng 
 land would take Louisiana in the first moment of war, without 
 the loss of a man. France would neither settle it nor protect it : 
 she is therefore rid of an incumbrance that wounded her pride, 
 receives money, and regains the friendship of our populace. I 
 pray you to make my best regards acceptable to Mrs. King. I 
 think you too wise to seek public honors ; and I hope you are too 
 patriotic to shun them, if they seek you. 
 
 Your faithful and affectionate friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 P. S. An expression which I well remember in a letter from 
 you. after your visit to Paris, leads me to expect the pleasure of 
 seeing you here. I know nothing of the objections which may 
 exist to your executing such an intention ; and I can assure you 
 it would give infinite pleasure to a great many people here, and 
 especially to me. 
 
332 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 CABOT TO KING. 
 
 BOSTON, July 9, 1803. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I received from you, at the beginning of this 
 week, the declaration of the British government and their corre 
 spondence with France ; and I take great pleasure in observing that 
 so much dignity and firmness as well as moderation have been dis 
 played by the British ministry. Had I known the secrets, how 
 ever, I should have trembled lest Malta should have been given up, 
 which would have been of more consequence than all the other con 
 quests of Great Britain and twenty sail of the line beside. Malta is 
 the spot intended by Providence for Great Britain, to enable her to 
 cover Egypt, the Levant and Adriatic, to watch Toulon and over 
 awe the whole Mediterranean. Nothing should tempt Great Britain 
 to yield it to France, while France remains so formidable. 
 
 You give me no conjectures on the manner in which the rupture 
 will be treated by the opposition. Should they in the true spirit 
 of faction clamor against the war, and pretend that the peace might 
 have been maintained with honor and safety, it will be a difficult 
 task for ministers to carry on the war with that spirit and energy 
 which its dangers demand. But should the opposition (contrary 
 to natural expectation) admit the necessity of the war and of a 
 continued exertion, till the power of France is in some way 
 abridged, I should not doubt of a successful issue. The English 
 possess means enough ; but, to use them, they must resort to unpala 
 table measures, and these can hardly be exerted against a powerful 
 opposition. 
 
 / Our Jacobins here already indulge their French feelings. 
 They allow that the success of England, at least in defending her- 
 ( self, is necessary to keep France from troubling us ; yet, such is 
 \ their profligacy and their hatred, that they rather would risk the 
 j liberty of our country than see the English beat the French. 
 
 I hear very seldom lately from our friend Hamilton, whom you 
 know I love excessively. When you see him, I pray you tender 
 him my affectionate regards, and believe me ever, with sincere 
 attachment, 
 
 Your faithful GEORGE CABOT. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 333 
 
 CABOT TO GORE. 
 
 BOSTOX, Nov. 15, 1803. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, All our attention is again engrossed by the 
 struggle on your side the ocean, which must termimtte, at last, in 
 the establishment of universal empire or the reduction of France 
 to its ancient limits. I am still a believer that the latter will be 
 the issue, and that the Bourbons will resume the government of 
 that turbulent nation. It is said that we talk more of the invasion 
 than you do, which is very possible. My own opinion has been 
 invariable that it would be happy for England, and for the whole 
 world, that this desperate attempt should be seriously made ; but 
 I have never for a moment thought it would be made, and it is not 
 difficult to conceive of sufficient reasons for all the menaces and 
 preparations, nor the various modes in which they may eventuate 
 without a serious attempt to conquer England and overthrow its 
 government. 
 / We proceed here democratically and quietly, all the noisy 
 
 /having their mouths stopped by loaves and fishes, or in immediate 
 
 . expectation of them. 
 
 Your faithful and affectionate friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Dec. 10, 1803. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I had just finished the reading of your speech 
 on the Louisiana bill, when your letter of the 28th was put into 
 my hand. I am greatly pleased with both ; and although I have 
 other objections to the treaty than those you have urged, yet I am 
 sensible yours are more indisputable and much the most proper to 
 be offered in a public debate. In a word, I think the title to this 
 great province was to be tried in the great court-martial now 
 sitting in Europe. If France can maintain her predominancy, she 
 will through Spain do what she pleases ; and if she is beaten, as I 
 think she will be, her cession is not worth the money, for she 
 could never in that case have settled it or disturbed our navigation. 
 Li am not suprised, though I am mortified, to see your colleague 1 
 assisting to accommodate the Constitution to the views of the party 
 
 1 John Quincy Adams. He and Pickering were at this time senators from 
 Massachusetts. 
 
334 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 in power, when it is so obvious that the influence of our part of 
 the Union must be diminished by the acquisition of more weight at 
 the other extremity. I think, however, a paper constitution too 
 feeble a barrier to obstruct a triumphant majority in their course, 
 and_I^ should expect to see any alteration which they require to be 
 made.] 
 
 I do not think you overrate my indolence, which you civilly call 
 "tranquillity;" but I beg you to understand that I am not "dis 
 turbed " by reading the longest letters my industrious friends may 
 have the goodness at any time to write. I love to hear, to read, 
 and to think (if not deeply), and I love to converse, but I confess 
 I am too lazy to write as much as my friends would have good 
 rights to require ; and on this account, as well as some others, I 
 am always likely to be so great a delinquent that I must prove an 
 unworthy correspondent to any sensible, punctual man. There is 
 some account in this day s " Centinel " of Mr. Adams s motion, &c. 
 I know not from whence it comes. 
 
 Our newspapers will give you all the foreign news, say from 
 England, late in October. You will please to remember that I 
 have uniformly discredited the serious invasion of England. I 
 learn nothing which ought to change my opinion, but my wishes 
 are stronger than ever that I may be wrong. A serious attempt 
 would be fatal to Buonaparte, and would probably change the face 
 of all the rest of Europe for the better. I know there are many 
 military men who entertain different views, but in this case the 
 issue will not, or at least certainly ought not to, depend on a battle 
 or the skilfulness of a general. The defence of P]ngland may be 
 made certain, and no Marlborough among them. Divisions of one 
 to twenty thousand men will be conducted by as brave officers as 
 any in the world, and new ones will be formed faster than old 
 ones destroyed. If it were to happen, therefore, contrary to all 
 human expectations, that the whole French force, say two or three 
 hundred thousand men, were to land, I have not the smallest doubt 
 they would be finally exterminated. But I do not yet find that 
 any force is prepared capable of beating the English flotillas and 
 small craft with which they abound. Putting the navy of both 
 countries out of the question, so far as from frigates upward, and I 
 think there is no naval force on the French coast capable of fight 
 ing their way to the English shore. Ireland may possibly be 
 attacked by twenty thousand men, which in a peculiarly favorable 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 335 
 
 moment may escape from Brest and other ports in men-of-war ; 
 but, though this would be troublesome, it would not be fatal, and 
 should not pass as a thing worthy the mountain s labor. 
 
 Your kinsman, Mr. S. Williams, I understand, gives his opinion 
 on the 23d of October, that Spain will be drawn into the war. I 
 fear it, but hope it will be avoided. 
 
 Your faithful and affectionate friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Jan. 4, 1804. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I know that the mind which does not find 
 consolation in its own reflections cannot derive it from any foreign 
 source. Even the sympathy of a friend, while it soothes, may 
 cause the wound inflicted by death to bleed afresh. I learn that 
 you have lost a son, amiable and of great promise. For his 
 parents sake, and for society, I lament it. It reminds me of my 
 own bereavements, and renews my tears. Twice it has pleased 
 God to lay heavily his hand upon me, and to take away the objects 
 of my tender affection and of my best hopes. The lapse of seven 
 and of ten years has not removed my affliction. Ordinary deaths, 
 indeed, pass by as common things. It is the like affliction of a 
 friend which excites my grief anew. Accept the tribute of a tear 
 for yours. 
 
 But we do not grieve as those who have no hope. We look 
 forward to a brighter and a happier world, where sorrow shall 
 cease, " and where all tears shall be wiped away from our eyes." 
 How blest are they who entertain such hopes ! How wretched 
 those (like numbers round me here) whose views extend not be 
 yond the grave, and whose best refuge is annihilation ! In the 
 midst of my painful recollections, I sometimes check myself, and 
 ask, is it for my children, or for myself, that my tears start 
 afresh ? I have found my grief too selfish. I looked to them for 
 comfort and joy in my advancing years : they were indeed " very 
 pleasant to me." But "they have been taken from the evil to 
 come." The events of every day serve to abate the desire of life, 
 to point our attention to a life to come, and to check all other 
 anxieties than to pursue the means of obtaining it, determined, 
 however, to wait "all the days of our appointed time, till our 
 change come ; " in the mean while bearing with Christian fortitude 
 
386 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 the afflictions inseparable from humanity, aiming to fulfil every 
 duty, enjoying the good which Providence bestows, and antici 
 pating the never-ending happiness which is the object of the faith 
 and of the hope of every virtuous and pious soul. 
 
 To your excellent wife as well as to you I address these senti 
 ments, and to both express my sincere attachment and esteem. 
 
 Adieu. TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Jan. 10, 1804. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The loss of a son, 1 whom I loved too well to 
 part with, has so absorbed my thoughts that, had I been as faithful 
 in my correspondence as I am in my feelings of friendship, I could 
 not until this moment have acknowledged several favors which 
 I have received from you. 
 
 jThe papers you have sent, and especially the masterly speech 
 of Mr. Tracy, display the subject of the Presidential election much 
 more amply than had been done before ; and, if party principles 
 were not stronger than State jealousies, the small States would 
 assuredly resist the innovation. I am told that your colleague 
 vindicates the part he early took by referring to the former opin 
 ion and instruction of Massachusetts ; but surely, if it were even 
 admitted that in the abstract the amendment were better than the 
 Constitution, we would not be so far the " dupes of our own 
 virtues "as to subserve the pernicious designs of our opponents. 
 This we should certainly do by agreeing to change the constitu 
 tional mode of election in the manner proposed and at this junc 
 ture of time. I confess I was once desirous of a change of the 
 kind now contemplated, believing it an indispensable means of 
 preserving the government in good hands, and the country from 
 the fangs of France ; but we failed. Our opponents now wish the 
 same thing for purposes they approve, but which we think dishon 
 orable and ruinous. Shall we be so weak as to promote in this 
 manner the views and perpetuate the power of those in whom we 
 cannot confide ? I am sure they will lessen their respect for us, if 
 we do7\ Your constant and affectionate friend, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 i See p. 303. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 337 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Jan. 14, 1804. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The generous sympathy and just sentiments 
 of consolation expressed in your letter to Mrs. Cabot and me, and 
 which friendship alone could inspire, affect us most sensibly ; and, 
 while for a moment they revive the keenness of our sorrows, they 
 tend permanently to blunt their edge. We have lost a child 
 deservedly dear to us, but in the midst of our sufferings we do not 
 forget that he who seemed to live only for the happiness of others 
 may have died to be happy himself. Mrs. Cabot begs that with 
 mine you will accept the assurance of her grateful and sincere 
 esteem and attachment. 
 
 Your ever faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Jan. 29, 1804. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, A friend of mine in Pennsylvania, 1 in answer 
 ing a letter, lately asked me, " Is not a great deal of our chagrin 
 founded on personal dislikes, the pride of opinion, and the morti 
 fication of disappointment?" I replied, or to speak correctly, 
 I prepared the following reply. But when I had finished, perceiv 
 ing the sentiments too strong for the latitude of Pennsylvania, 
 and perhaps for the nerves of my friend, I changed the form, 
 and now address them to you. 
 
 To those questions, perhaps to a certain degree, an affirmative 
 answer may be given. I have more than once asked myself, for 
 what are we struggling? Our lands yield their increase, our 
 commerce flourishes, we are building houses, " are marrying and 
 given in marriage," yet we are dissatisfied : not because we envy 
 the men in office, to most of us a private life is most desirable. 
 The Federalists are dissatisfied, because they see the public morals 
 debased by the corrupt and corrupting system of our rulers. Men 
 are tempted to become apostates, not to Federalism merely, but 
 to virtue and to religion and to good government. Apostasy and 
 original depravity are the qualifications for official honors and 
 emoluments, while men of sterling worth are displaced and held 
 up to popular contempt and scorn. And shall we sit still, until 
 1 Judge Peters. 
 22 
 
338 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 this system shall universally triumph ? until even in the Eastern 
 States the principles of genuine Federalism shall be overwhelmed ? 
 Mr. Jefferson s plan of destruction has been gradually advancing. 
 If at once he had removed from office all the Federalists, and given 
 to the people such substitutes as we generally see, even his fol 
 lowers (I mean the mass) would have been shocked. He is still 
 making progress in the same course ; and he has the credit of being 
 the real source of all the innovations which threaten the subver 
 sion of the Constitution, and the prostration of every barrier erected 
 by it for the protection of the best, and therefore to him the most 
 obnoxious, part of the community. His instruments manifest tem 
 pers so malignant, so inexorable, as convince observing Federalists 
 that the mild manners and habits of our countrymen are the only 
 security against their extreme vengeance. How long we shall 
 enjoy even this security, God only knows. And must we with 
 folded hands wait the result, or timely think of other protection ? 
 This is a delicate subject. The principles of our Revolution point 
 to the remedy, a separation. That this can be accomplished, 
 and without spilling one drop of blood, I have little doubt. One 
 thing I know, that the rapid progress of innovation, of corruption, 
 of oppression, forces the idea upon many a reflecting mind. Indeed, 
 we are not uneasy because " unplaced." I But we look with dread 
 on the ultimate issue, an issue not remote, unless some new and 
 extraordinary obstacle be opposed, and that speedily ; for paper 
 constitutions are become as clay in the hands of the potter. The 
 people of the East cannot reconcile their habits, views, and inter 
 ests with those of the South and West. The latter are beginning 
 to rule with a rod of iron. When not convenient to violate the 
 Constitution, it must be altered ; and it will be made to assume 
 any shape as an instrument to crush the Federalists. The inde 
 pendence of the judges is now directly assailed, and the majority 
 are either so blind or so well trained that it will most undoubtedly 
 be destroyed. Independently of specific charges, as ground of 
 impeachment, John Randolph, I am informed, avows this doctrine : 
 that the clause in the Constitution granting to the judges their 
 offices during good behavior was intended merely to guard them 
 against executive removals, and not at all to restrain the two Houses 
 of Congress, on whose representation the President ought to re 
 move them ! We should really be safer without any constitution, 
 for then oppressive acts might excite public attention ; but while 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 339 
 
 the popular tyrants shelter themselves under the forms or the 
 name of the Constitution, tortured and interpreted to suit their 
 views, the people will not be alarmed. 
 
 By the Philadelphia papers, T see that the Supreme Court judges 
 of Pennsylvania are to be hurled from their seats on the pretence 
 that, in punishing one Thomas Passmore for a contempt, they acted 
 illegally and tyrannically. I presume that Shippen, Yates, and 
 Smith are to be removed by the Governor, on the representation 
 of the Legislature. And when such grounds are taken, in the 
 national and State Legislatures, to destroy the rights of the judges, 
 whose rights can be safe ? Why destroy them, unless as the pre 
 lude to the destruction of every influential Federalist, and of every 
 man of considerable property, who is not of the reigning sect ? 
 New judges, of characters and tempers suited to the object, will be 
 the selected ministers of vengeance. I am not willing to be sacri 
 ficed by such popular tyrants. My life is not worth much, but, if 
 it must be offered up, let it rather be in the hope of obtaining a 
 more stable government, under which my children, at least, may 
 enjoy freedom with security. Some Connecticut gentlemen (and 
 they are all well informed and discreet) assure me that, if the lead 
 ing Democrats in that State were to get the upper hand (which 
 would be followed by a radical change in their unwritten constitu 
 tion), they should not think themselves safe, either in person or 
 property, and would therefore immediately quit the State. I do 
 not believe in the practicability of a long-continued union. A 
 Northern confederacy would unite congenial characters, and present 
 a fairer prospect of public happiness ; while the Southern States, 
 having a similarity of habits, might be left " to manage their own 
 affairs in their own way." If a separation were to take place, our 
 mutual wants would render a friendly and commercial intercourse 
 inevitable. The Southern States would require the naval protec 
 tion of the Northern Union, and the products of the former would 
 be important to the navigation and commerce of the latter. I be 
 lieve, indeed, that, if a Northern confederacy were forming, our 
 Southern brethren would be seriously alarmed, and probably aban 
 don their virulent measures. But I greatly doubt whether prudence 
 should suffer the connection to continue much longer. They are 
 so devoted to their chief, and he is so necessary to accomplish their 
 plans of misrule and oppression, that as they have projected an 
 alteration of the Constitution to secure his next election, with a con- 
 
340 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 tinned preponderance of their party, so it would not surprise me, 
 were they, soon after his next election, to choose him President for 
 life. I am assured that some of his blind worshippers in South 
 Carolina have started the idea. 
 
 But when and how is a separation to be effected ? If, as many 
 think, Federalism (by which I mean the solid principles of govern 
 ment applied to a federate republic, principles which are founded 
 in justice, in sound morals, and religion, and whose object is the 
 security of life, liberty, and property against popular delusion, injus 
 tice, and tyranny), if, I say, Federalism is crumbling away in New 
 England, there is no time to be lost, lest it should be overwhelmed, 
 and become unable to attempt its own relief. Its last refuge is 
 New England, and immediate exertion, perhaps, its only hope. It 
 must begin in Massachusetts. The proposition would be welcomed 
 in Connecticut; and could we doubt of New Hampshire? But 
 New York must be associated ; and how is her concurrence to be 
 obtained ? She must be made the centre of the confederacy. Ver 
 mont and New Jersey would follow of course, and Rhode Island of 
 necessity. Who can be consulted, and who will take the lead? 
 The Legislatures of Massachusetts and Connecticut meet in May, 
 and of New Hampshire in the same month or in June. The sub 
 ject has engaged the contemplation of many. The Connecticut 
 gentlemen have seriously meditated upon it. We suppose the 
 British provinces in Canada and Nova Scotia, at no remote period, 
 perhaps without delay, and with the assent of Great Britain, may 
 become members of the Northern league. Certainly that govern 
 ment can feel only disgust at our present rulers. She will be 
 pleased to see them crestfallen. She will not regret the proposed 
 division of empire. If with their own consent she relinquishes her 
 provinces, she will be rid of the charge of maintaining them, while 
 she will derive from them, as she does from us, all the commercial 
 returns which her merchants now receive. A liberal treaty of 
 amity and commerce will form a bond of union between Great 
 Britain and the Northern confederacy highly useful to both. 
 
 Are these ideas visionary or impracticable ? Do they not merit 
 consideration ? If they do, let me know, in such way as you deem 
 expedient, what you think. Tracy 1 has written to several of his 
 most distinguished friends in Connecticut, and may soon receive 
 
 1 Uriah Tracy, senator from Connecticut. 
 
1801-6.] x CORRESPONDENCE. 341 
 
 their answers. R. Griswold, 1 examining the finances, has found 
 that the States above mentioned, to be embraced by the Northern 
 confederacy, now pay as much (or more) of the public revenues as 
 would discharge their share of the public debts due those States and 
 abroad, leaving out the millions given for Louisiana. 
 
 Perhaps a crisis may occur to mark the moment for decisive 
 measures. Perhaps the violation of the Constitution in the arbi 
 trary removal of the judges may hasten such a crisis. The signal, 
 a bold but safe step by members of Congress. 
 
 I am, &c., T. PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 FEB. 14, 1804. 
 
 JViY DEAR SIR, I have read with great interest your letter of 
 the 3d. 2 The subject is as important as it is delicate, and has often 
 occupied my thoughts. All the evils you describe and many more 
 are to be apprehended ; but I greatly fear that a separation would 
 be no remedy, because the source of them is in the political theories 
 of our country and in ourselves. A separation at some period not 
 very remote may probably take place. The first impression of it 
 is even now favorably received by many ; but I cannot flatter my 
 self with the expectation of essential good to proceed from it, while 
 we retain maxims and principles which all experience, and, I may 
 add, reason too, pronounce to be impracticable and absurd. Even 
 in New England, where there is among the body of the people 
 more wisdom and virtue than in any other part of the United 
 States, we are full of errors, which no reasoning could eradicate, if, 
 there were a Lycurgus in every village. We are democratic alto 
 gether, and I hold democracy in its natural operation to be the gov 
 ernment of the worst._\ If democracy has not produced among us 
 all the mischief to which it necessarily tends, the causes are not 
 difficult to be traced, and I am not without hopes that the same or 
 other causes may still operate to retard and mitigate those evils 
 which cannot be wholly averted ; but it is, in my mind, expecting 
 too much of mankind to suppose that they will cease to act from 
 impulse- and habitually act from reflection. It is the ordinary duty 
 
 * Roger Griswold, member of Congress from Connecticut, a leading Fed 
 eralist, and afterwards governor of his native State. 
 
 2 " Probably Jan. 29, in rough draft, which was sent Feb. 3." This is the 
 explanation of Mr. Octavius Pickering, in a manuscript note appended to 
 this letter. 
 
342 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 of every just government to restrain men from doing what their 
 vicious inclinations impel them to do, and coerce them to the per 
 formance of duties to which they are disinclined. Hence, in popu 
 lar governments, men are driven from office for performing their 
 duty, and others put in their places who violate theirs. The people 
 will not knowingly employ men nor voluntarily support a govern 
 ment whose acts contravene their favorite purposes, which are 
 often those of their worst passions ; and it is not unusual to see 
 men of tolerably good characters urgent to choose for rulers those 
 whom they know to be the worst, because, though they do not 
 approve of profligacy and immorality, yet they will not on this 
 account sacrifice sinister objects of their own. While I hold that 
 a government altogether popular is in effect a government of the 
 populace, I maintain that no government can be relied on that has 
 not a material portion of the democratic mixture in its composition. 
 The great and hitherto insurmountable difficulty has been to estab 
 lish and maintain the empire of principles against the assaults of 
 popular passions. This can only be done by such an organization 
 as supplies somewhere vital powers which the popular fury cannot 
 extinguish. The independent judiciary was the best feature in 
 our national system, but it is abolishing ; and it may be asked who 
 shall prevent the people from destroying their own institutions. 
 You would hope that in New England we should be all alive to 
 guard this sacred principle, but it is not so ; and I doubt whether it 
 is possible by any alarm of this kind to excite a zeal among the 
 people. We look with apathy on things of this sort. 
 
 At the same time that I do not desire a separation at this mo 
 ment, I add that it is not practicable without the intervention of 
 some cause which should be very generally felt and distinctly 
 understood as chargeable to the misconduct of our Southern mas 
 ters : such, for example, as a war with Great Britain, manifestly 
 provoked by our rulers. But they will not hazard a war, though 
 they will wantonly excite much animosity. Without some single 
 event of this kind to rouse us, I am of opinion we must bear the 
 evils which the delusion of democracy is bringing upon us, until 
 men of all parties in our country can be brought to acknowledge 
 them and unite in the application of a remedy. Should this con 
 viction be general in New England, I think something might be 
 done, in spite of all opposition from the South ; but, until it is gen 
 eral, a great Jacobin party here, supported by the nation and its 
 
1801-6.1 CORRESPONDENCE. 343 
 
 government, would be likely to triumph. If, as is probable, we do 
 not find ourselves strong enough now to act with success the part 
 proposed, I am sensible of the dangers you point out, and see no 
 way of escaping them. We shall go the way of all governments 
 wholly popular, from bad to worse, until the evils, no longer toler 
 able, shall generate their own remedies. 
 
 There was a time when I believed that New England might get 
 along very well with a system of government which had proved in 
 other times and places inadequate to the purposes of social order, 
 but I can truly say I have despaired of our success these ten 
 years. The prosperity of these States, and the apparent soundness 
 of their politics, may seem to confute this opinion ; but, like the 
 successful tide of experiment through the United States, much is 
 to be attributed to the incalculable advantages derived from a 
 neutral station in a world of war. And, in regard to our present 
 politics, let me observe that there is no energy in the Federal 
 party, and there could be none manifested without great hazard 
 of losing the state government. Some of our best men in high 
 stations are kept in office, because they forbear to exert any influ 
 ence, and not because they possess right principles. They are 
 permitted to have power, if they will not use it. It is happy for 
 us that we have a governor 1 whose consummate prudence con 
 ciliates opponents without detaching friends, but he will cease to be 
 popular the moment he dares to act with vigor. It must be nearly 
 the same in New Hampshire and Connecticut. This latter State 
 has given the best example of a self-governed people that the world 
 has ever seen ; but its system is nearly run out, and I doubt, if 
 every honest man in the State were united, whether they could long 
 prevent their opponents from getting the government. Let a solid 
 peace take place in Europe, and the strength of their government 
 would soon appear too feeble to enforce justice. I shall not be 
 surprised to see Connecticut as remarkable for disseminating 
 anarchical doctrines as it has been for a contrary character. It 
 is to be feared that the superior information of the Connecticut 
 people, while it gives them more power to produce political effects, 
 will not give them better dispositions than others. Indeed, their 
 education increases their wants more than their means of supplying 
 them ; and such people will of necessity become ungovernable when 
 the acquisition of property is difficult. I doubt not some of our 
 
 1 Caleb Strong. 
 
844 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 friends from that State view this subject in the light now pre 
 sented, but they are very reluctant to admit it. The fears they dis 
 cover may, however, be considered as unequivocal evidence of their 
 private opinion. If no man in New England could vote for legis 
 lators who was not possessed in his own right of two thousand dol 
 lars value in land, we could do something better ; but neither this 
 nor other material improvements can be made by a fair consent of 
 the people. I incline to the opinion that the essential alterations 
 which may in future be made to amend our forms of government 
 will be the consequences only of great suffering or the immediate 
 effects of violence. If we should be made to feel a very great 
 calamity from the abuse of power by the national administration, 
 we might do almost any thing ; but it would be idle to talk to the 
 deaf, to warn the people of distant evils. By this time, you will 
 suppose I am willing to do nothing but submit to fate. I would 
 not be so understood. I am convinced we cannot do what is 
 wished ; but we can do much, if we work with nature (or the course 
 of things), and not against her. A separation is now impracticable, 
 because we do not feel the necessity or utility of it. The same 
 separation then will be unavoidable, when our loyalty to the Union 
 is generally perceived to be the instrument of debasement and im 
 poverishment. If it is prematurely attempted, those few only will 
 promote it who discern what is hidden from the multitude ; and to 
 those may be addressed, 
 
 " Truths would you teach, or save a sinking land, 
 All fear, none aid you, and few understand." 
 
 I have said that a separation now is not desirable, because we 
 should not remedy the evil, but should bring it home and aggra 
 vate it by cherishing and giving new sanctions to the causes which 
 produce it. But, if a separation should by and by be produced 
 by sufferings, I think it might be accompanied by important amelio 
 rations of our theories. 
 
 You have doubtless seen the portraits of some of the New York 
 patriots, which are said to be good likenesses. Some observations 
 on the subject which appeared in the " Centinel " may be thought 
 worth reading. 
 
 You see how unstudied I give you my thoughts. With equal 
 unaffectedness, believe me 
 
 Always your friend, G. C. 1 
 
 1 The letter which should have followed this was accidentally omitted, 
 and will be found in the Appendix, No. I. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 345 
 
 CABOT TO KING. 
 
 BOSTON, March 17, 1804. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, In reply to your inquiry respecting the opin 
 ions of our Legislature on the subject of Louisiana, I can only 
 speculate. The session is ended, and no one attempted to discover 
 what was thought or what might be done. We add thousands to 
 our possessions, but have long since discarded the idea of security. 
 The many do not think at all, and the few think only to despond. 
 Indeed, most men are compelled to admit that our evils must be 
 borne until their intolerability generate their cure. Most of those 
 which we fear must therefore happen before a remedy can be pre 
 scribed. An experiment has been suggested by some of our friends, 
 to which I object that it is impracticable, and, if practicable, would 
 be ineffectual. The thing proposed is obvious and natural, but it 
 would now be thought too bold, and would be fatal to its advocates 
 as public men ; yet the time may soon come when it will be demanded 
 by the people of the North and East, and then it will unavoidably 
 take place. I am not satisfied that the thing itself is to be desired. 
 My habitual opinions have been always strongly against it; and 
 I do not see, in the present mismanagement, motives for changing 
 my opinion. It is doubtless true that we are not so perfectly mad 
 in New England as the people in some other States, especially 
 those of the South ; but here we are altogether Democratic in our 
 principles, and those principles of necessity place power in the 
 worst hands. If the favorable aspect of our State politics seems 
 to contradict my opinion, I confess that those principles have not 
 yet produced all the mischief to which they tend; but, at the same 
 time, I insist that our appearance is deceptive, being better than 
 the reality, and the reality better than can be well maintained. 
 You see good men in high office here, contrary to the natural oper 
 ation of Democratic election; but those men hold their powers 
 upon the sole condition that they will not use them, and the moment 
 they shall dare to exercise them with vigor they will cease to be 
 popular, and of course cease to fill the high offices they now hold. 
 There is an unusual apathy among the Federalists here. They 
 have lost more of their vivacity than of their numbers. I fear 
 they lose some of these. Our national administration may destroy 
 judiciaries and constitutions, and make new ones without exciting 
 much sensibility ; but, if they had involved us by their folly and 
 
346 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 baseness in a war with Great Britain, I believe New England 
 might be roused to do any thing which her leading men should 
 recommend. Some distinct general cause of evil like this, and 
 fairly imputable to the wickedness or ignorance of those who govern, 
 would be fatal to their power or to the union of the States. We are 
 loyal to the national government, and can bear every species of 
 public dishonor ; but, the moment our loyalty appears to be made 
 the instrument of our impoverishment, we shall be disposed to act 
 with effect in defence of all that is dear to us. In the moral as in 
 the natural world, we must in all operations consult the tendency 
 of general laws. It is vain to attempt sailing against wind and 
 tide : we ought to have the influence of one in our favor to make 
 considerable progress, and of both to make the greatest. The 
 longer I live, the more I think on the nature of man and of society, 
 the more I am convinced of the absurdity of expecting ever to see 
 a self -governed people, as we understand the terms. Men will act 
 from the impulse of their passions. These lead them to seek 
 power, property, &c., by means incompatible with order and justice. 
 Government to enforce these is called to counteract and coerce 
 those who (on our principles) have the control of the government. 
 We love virtue and virtuous men; but we respect power only, and 
 the powerful. If we choose a man to office, we displace him for 
 doing the duties of it when these thwart our sinister views, and 
 then it happens that good men are often found co-operating in the 
 election of the bad, and to the exclusion of those whom as men 
 they truly esteem. It is folly to expect mankind will act other 
 wise; and, therefore, although the people must have a great share 
 in every good government, yet that share should not be so great as 
 to destroy it at pleasure, or by the word of their mouth to impede 
 its just offices. Viewing the subject in this light, I contemplate 
 with pleasure the prosperous course of our affairs for many years 
 past, and feel neither surprise nor disappointment at the change 
 which is commenced. The first part has been better than we had 
 any right to expect ; and without derogating from the transcendent 
 worth of men, who did every thing that time and circumstances 
 would allow, I must attribute the success of their public measures 
 in a great degree to favorable accidents, which, though external, 
 have acted with great force on our internal affairs. We are now 
 going on according to the course of nature, and shall follow those 
 who have gone before us from bad to worse, till suffering, or the 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 347 
 
 fear of suffering generally and deeply felt, stimulates us to do better. 
 Indeed, I expect no essential improvements in our systems but 
 from suffering, from fear, or from force. I think no material change 
 can be made except by those whom we call Jacobins. Good men 
 would not, if they had opportunity, establish any system of suffi 
 cient force to protect itself. The violent and unprincipled are 
 more likely to make a government independent of popular consent 
 than their betters. I beg you, however, not to infer that, because 
 I think we cannot do things impossible, I would not attempt 
 every possible good, or that I do not think any great good can be 
 accomplished. So far would that be from the truth, that I firmly 
 believe we owe much of what we enjoy, and of what we hope 
 for, to the influence of the Federal party. We are a minority, 
 and unable to conquer the vast body which keeps the field ; but we 
 are so powerful that he is compelled to confine his movements to 
 a narrow compass, lest he should give us an advantage over him. 
 We have, therefore, the most commanding motives to preserve to 
 our party all the weight we can, by adhering to the principles on 
 which it is formed, and keep it well combined and well informed, 
 prepared to think and act alike on every important occasion. In 
 this way, we prevent some mischief entirely, and mitigate what we 
 cannot wholly avert, and shall be able to soften every catastrophe 
 in the political drama which must happen, and turn them to the 
 best account. 
 
 I have lately received a long letter from our excellent friend 
 Gore. He speaks of invasion as more likely than he used to think 
 to be attempted. I wish I may be mistaken in the belief I con 
 stantly entertain, that it would never be undertaken. It would be 
 happy for us and the world to have the attempt seriously made 
 upon the largest scale; but I cannot for a moment be persuaded 
 that Buonaparte will play so desperate a game. A hundred to one, 
 he would not get over the Channel with fifty thousand men, and 
 a hundred to one (in jny opinion) that with one hundred thousand 
 he would be destroyed. No: he may make little expeditions to 
 burn a dock-yard, conquer Guernsey and Jersey, and land twenty 
 thousand men in Ireland; but his force, when collected, will be 
 chiefly useful to overawe Denmark, Prussia, &c., and perhaps to 
 conquer them. It will be useful to influence the policy of every 
 continental power, and, if necessary, to fight them ; but he will not 
 embark this host of soldiers to be drowned, taken, or shot, and give 
 
348 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 to England the greatest triumph she ever had, and which she can 
 never obtain, if he does not give her this kind of opportunity. You 
 would give very great pleasure to many whom you esteem, if you 
 were to execute what you intimate. To me, it would of all things be 
 the most gratifying to review those familiar interviews, which have 
 been among the most satisfactory hours of my life. 
 
 I should rejoice to see Burr win the race in your State, but 
 I cannot approve of aid being given him by any of the leading 
 Federalists. 
 
 When you next meet Hamilton, Benson, and Wolcott, give my 
 affectionate regards to each of them. 
 
 Your faithful and affectionate friend, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO JOHN LOWELL. 
 
 BOSTON, July 18, 1804. 
 
 MY DEAR COUSIN, I have received from you two very grate 
 ful letters, without having made you any return for either. I am 
 not satisfied with myself by any excuse for this delay, knowing, as 
 I do, how valuable every communication is from domestic friends 
 to a man in remote countries. Your aunt and I have felt very 
 sensibly the generous sympathy you expressed when we were de 
 pressed by affliction; and, I assure you, it alleviated our trouble 
 to learn that you were recovering health and spirits. I trust you 
 will fully renovate your former vigor by the journey you are to 
 make. 
 
 Harry Lee is charged with newspapers of the day, which will 
 announce and explain to you the public misfortune experienced 
 here by the untimely death of Hamilton. You know how well his 
 friends loved him, and all esteemed him. You can therefore judge 
 of the general sensibility at his death. I have always thought his 
 virtues surpassed those of other men almost as much as his talents. 
 His errors, unfortunately for the country, were conspicuous, and 
 diminished his influence, which otherwise would have been irre 
 sistible, and was always directed to the noblest purposes. All re 
 flecting men seem now to be sensible that he was our hope in the 
 isis to which our affairs necessarily drive us. France has finished 
 e first and principal piece of her drama, and it remains only to 
 see who will come out as manager, when all appear in their own 
 dresses. You judge rightly of the course of things here, because 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 349 
 
 such as you describe must be the course of all democracies. A 
 democracy is in terms a solecism, as we understand it in the United 
 States. It is absurd to expect any people will voluntarily and 
 knowingly support men or systems which compel them to do what 
 they wish to avoid, and restrain them from doing what they desire 
 to do. Men may deliberately engage to give such support; but 
 they will certainly violate those engagements as long as man is 
 what he has always been, impelled to action by his passions. But, 
 although we must deteriorate, I hope the condition and character 
 of our country will render the process more tolerable than it com 
 monly is. 
 
 I pray you to make our sincere regards acceptable to Mrs. Lowell, 
 and believe me always 
 
 Your affectionate and faithful friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Nov. 30, 1804. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I am indebted to you for three letters which 
 are constantly reproaching me for my delays to acknowledge them. 
 I trust much to your knowledge of my indolent habits, which are 
 an overmatch for my sense of many duties, and render my best 
 intentions often inert. 
 
 I can truly say I feel more chagrin by sympathy with our friends 
 at Washington than I felt direct at the issue of our election. I 
 confess I did not yet expect it, but I was one of the many who con 
 demned the experiment at the time it was proposed ; but it was the 
 project of good Federalists, chiefly from the western parts of the 
 State. They believed the measure l to be essentially necessary to 
 maintain the popularity of the Federal cause. There could not 
 have been a weaker opinion formed. It is to be remarked, how 
 ever, that this transaction has not made us bad, but has shown too 
 plainly how bad we are. It has also shown to our opponents how 
 strong they are ; and when it is considered that the opinion of 
 power, and still more the knowledge of its being possessed by a 
 party, tends much to its increase, I think it must be allowed that 
 our opponents are stronger in fact than before this trial. 
 
 1 Previous to the election of 1804, the Legislature of Massachusetts, in 
 which the Federalists were predominant, voted to give the choice of electors 
 to the districts instead of retaining it in their own hands. The result was the 
 choice of Jeffersonian electors. 
 
350 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 Many good judges are still of opinion that our elections will not 
 be injured in the spring. Nothing can be more uncertain, yet I 
 think it highly probable that Governor Strong will be re-elected ; 
 and probably a majority may be elected of Federal senators, but a 
 majority of Democratic representatives is expected by most men. 
 
 I thank you for the paper you enclosed, and shall be always 
 gratified to see the only arms we have left used to punish wicked 
 rulers. The time will come, however, when this avenue to public 
 opinion will be shut against the truth. I have grieved for my 
 country till I am convinced of the futility of grief. I consider 
 what I see as the order of nature, and that it is vain to attempt to 
 change it. We may mitigate, but we can no more avert these 
 evils than the cold of winter. 
 
 I am truly and respectfully ever yours, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Dec. 24, 1806. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I perceive Congress have suspended their 
 ridiculous law 1 against trade with England. By suspending in 
 stead of repealing the act, it is hoped to hide our folly ; but this is 
 impossible. Every man conversant with the subject must be con 
 vinced that the system of commercial hostility, if fairly tried, would 
 be infinitely more injurious to us than to England, if it did not 
 produce war ; and that it certainly tends so strongly to war that, 
 if persisted in, it would produce it, if other causes in which we have 
 an interest as well as they did not overrule. I think the affected 
 moderation of the British government at this alarming crisis is 
 to be applauded as much as our egregious and absurd vaporing is 
 to be condemned. 
 
 Yours faithfully always, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Feb. 10, 1806. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Although I have been fully sensible myself of 
 my delinquency, yet I hoped you would not be ; and at any rate, if 
 it occurred to you, that you would forgive it, as you have always 
 done, and as I must rely you always will, upon the recollection of 
 
 4 
 
 1 This was the Non-importation Act, passed after the admiralty decisions, 
 and suspended on account of the Monroe and Pinkney negotiation. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 351 
 
 the inveteracy of my bad habits and the belief that the languor and 
 coldness of my hand shall never reach my heart. 
 
 It is impossible so to detach one s self from public affairs as to 
 be uninterested in any measures proposed to guard our country 
 against the evils that assail it. It is not for us, however, to indicate 
 the course to be pursued, and perhaps it will be useful to our op 
 ponents to be made to feel their responsibility. By this time, they 
 see how vain it would be to wrap ourselves up in the fancied secu 
 rity which local separation affords against the arms of the European 
 combatants. We cannot exempt ourselves from the effects of their 
 wars any more than an individual can from the internal commotion 
 of the society of which he is a member. 
 
 I have read cursorily the "Baltimore Memorial," 1 the great 
 book 2 attributed to Mr. Madison, and many other papers, all tend 
 ing to prove how much we shall lose by the operation of the Brit 
 ish principle, " how unsupported it is by precedent, how inconsistent 
 and wavering Great Britain herself has been in maintaining it, &c., 
 &c., with some little argument to show its unreasonableness in the 
 abstract." These writings coincide with many honest, preconceived 
 opinions, with many prejudices, with our animosity toward Eng 
 land, with our pride and vanity, and, above all, with our avarice. 
 
 Yet afeiv men still say it is impossible to prove the right of a 
 neutral state to interfere and protect by purchase the spoils which 
 one belligerent has won from the other ; but, however this may be, 
 it would be worse than useless to say it openly. Possibly, the man 
 would be insulted, who should attempt to show it in any public 
 assembly. Certainly, these papers are to be considered as the 
 argument on one side only, and as advocates the writers are not 
 bound to do otherwise. It must be allowed, I think, that they are 
 the fruits of the laborious researches of many able men, and ought 
 therefore to be supposed to contain the strength and ingenuity of 
 this side of the question. Yet surely there is much that has no 
 close affinity to the question. There is, too, some sophistry in some 
 of the argument, and some false assumption of fact. It is an extra 
 ordinary assumption that our trade would be annihilated or nearly 
 
 1 A memorial of the merchants of Baltimore against the British doctrine. 
 See Annals of Congress for 1806-7, p. 824. 
 
 2 This refers to Madison s " Memoir, containing an examination of the 
 British doctrine which subjects to capture a neutral trade not open in time 
 of peace." This pamphlet was in answer to " War in Disguise," an exposi 
 tion of the arguments on the other side. 
 
352 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-0. 
 
 so, if confined in war to the kind and places of trade accustomed 
 in peace. Even with large deductions for blockades and contra 
 band, the total of our trade would commonly be much enlarged and 
 its profits doubled by a war between France, Holland, and England. 
 It is certainly a fallacious argument, too, that because Great Britain 
 opens to us her monopolies, therefore she is bound to permit us 
 to accept the invitation of her enemy. Every belligerent permits 
 neutrals to bring to itself supplies of military and naval stores. 
 Does it follow that it must permit them to be carried to an enemy ? 
 But yet this argument is used triumphantly. 
 
 Laying aside, however, a question not easily settled, I cannot but 
 remark to you that I every day hear the magnanimous policy of 
 wise nations invoked to save what remains of the unconquered 
 world. Prussia is execrated as being equally foolish and wicked : 
 her fate is said to depend on that of Austria, yet she acquiesces in 
 her subjugation. Now are we not also disposed to do all the harm 
 we can to those whose safety is necessary for our independence? 
 We are ready to risk every thing for a little longer enjoyment of 
 the spoils which are won by the blood of the hated English, and, 
 while we ought to think of the safety of the empire, we refer every 
 thing to the pence table. I am persuaded we are to be taught in 
 this business as well as governed by events over which we have no 
 control, and therefore indulge very little of that anxiety which 
 once would have disturbed me. So commending you, my country, 
 and all that is dear to me, to a kind Providence, 
 
 I remain your sincere and affectionate friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Feb. 17, 1806. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have lately read your gloomy letter to 
 Ames, and his desponding answer. It was a melancholy pleasure 
 to me, yet it was a pleasure. Would to Heaven all the men whom 
 I esteem thought as correctly ! With the single exception of the 
 degree of facility with which a French army could conquer Eng 
 land, I subscribe to all your sentiments. Upon that point, too, I 
 confess myself unsatisfied with the British government. They cer 
 tainly ought to organize a military force at least a hundred thousand 
 strong, in addition to their present regular army ; which force 
 should be subject, in every particular, to the law and discipline of 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 353 
 
 the regular army, except in their time of service. I am not at all 
 surprised to hear that Mr. Adams is among the advocates for the 
 absurd, childish, and truly ridiculous scheme of non-importation, 
 or non-intercourse. I have often heard the father express his full 
 belief that, by one or two short laws in that spirit, we could with 
 ease and certainty ruin the naval power of Great Britain. Great 
 philosophers and men of distinguished talents will be often found 
 the most zealous defenders of the most monstrous follies, a good 
 lesson for human pride ! 
 
 There are many men who think, and think justly, that Great 
 Britain has acted wrongly in the manner of enforcing her claims 
 as a belligerent, and that she ought in justice to restore the prop 
 erty of all those where fair voyages were shaped according to those 
 rules of evidence and principles she herself had sanctioned. But 
 there are many sensible men who think she might with propriety 
 in this great crisis proscribe all intercourse with her enemy by sea. 
 Whatever may be her motive, she is in the greatest extremity 
 defending the independence of the civilized world ; and the neces 
 sity of the case would justify her in saying to neutrals, If you will 
 not help us in the battle, you shall not hinder its success under a 
 cover of neutral pretensions. 
 
 I take it for granted that every man sees that the projects of 
 Wright, Gregg, Smith, & Co., would, if carried into effect, probably 
 issue in war. Now it is manifest that no considerable party is 
 willing to take that consequence ; and the government, so far is it 
 from contemplating war that it is unwilling to disburse a dollar in 
 preparation. It will go to no expense for any thing but scare 
 crows. Perhaps this is best. 
 
 But what a change of appearances in Europe do we see by the 
 late arrival from Liverpool at New York; and this moment a 
 gentleman whispers to me that another vessel in twenty-eight days 
 is arrived at the same place, from whence we may hear important 
 news to-night. A great defeat, or the death of an emperor or 
 two, may make us forget our disputes and almost our losses. 
 
 Yours semper et fideliter, G. C. 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
354 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 MARCH 29, 1806. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, You are a hard-hearted man to compel me to 
 think, which is a bad employment, and to write my thoughts, which 
 is a worse. 
 
 All our projectors of systems for coercing Great Britain to 
 abandon or materially change her commercial policy have appeared 
 to me to lay down false premises, and many of them to reason 
 absurdly, if those premises were admitted to be true. It is assumed 
 by most of them that our commerce with Great Britain is of more 
 benefit to her than to us, that consequently its interruption would 
 injure her the most. It is expected that the fear of that injury, or 
 the suffering it would cause, would drive her from her purposes, 
 while we should not be moved. It is argued that a country is 
 benefited by a particular branch of foreign trade in the ratio of its 
 exports, or in the ratio of the excess of those exports above the 
 imports in the same trade. It is maintained that a country which 
 sells provisions (the staff of life) and raw materials for the use of 
 manufacturers possesses such a decided advantage over one that 
 sells manufactures only as enables the former to dictate the terms and 
 conditions on which the trade of the two countries shall be carried 
 on. It is contended not only that navigation, or the carrying part, 
 is the most profitable part of commerce, but that this latter will 
 flourish in proportion as the former is confined to the people of 
 our own country. They suppose the navigation laws of Great 
 Britain favorable to direct pecuniary profit, and on this account 
 supported with so much rigor. They seem to think that our trade 
 with those nations to whom we sell much and of whom we buy 
 little is best deserving encouragement, and that the trade with those 
 from whom we buy almost all we want should be discouraged. 
 They suppose, also, that wherever we supply the British wants, no 
 other source is to be found, if ours is stopped. I write with a 
 galloping pen, and could continue as long as my breath would 
 hold without enumerating the data and postulata of these men, all 
 of which are untrue, and in many instances the inverse propositions 
 can be proved. We sell to Great Britain annually one-half of all 
 the surplus of our domestic produce. If this produce were manu 
 factures, they would probably, in case of prohibition, find some 
 other market : they would not immediately perish. A little varia- 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 355 
 
 tion of the labor and skill that wrought them would produce some 
 thing else of equal value adapted to the taste of domestic or new 
 foreign customers, or, in spite of prohibitory laws, would find those 
 who had been accustomed to them. It was triumphantly declared 
 by Mr. Madison and his adherents that, by refusing to buy British 
 manufactures, we could bring distress on a million or millions of 
 people in Great Britain, and that their discontents would drive the 
 ministry from their places. It was at the same time urged with 
 equal confidence that our commercial power was irresistible, because 
 we held their bread in our hands, which we had only to shut and 
 they would starve. This I understood to apply to Europe as well 
 as the West India islands. Now it is undoubtedly true that a sud 
 den stoppage of the West India supply would be an inconvenience, 
 and would produce considerable suffering ; but this must be a stop 
 page of all supplies to that quarter, or Great Britain would certainly 
 have a share of it, either by capture or peaceably by purchasing it 
 at the other islands. It should be remarked here that no great 
 mass of population in any country is dependent for its principal 
 subsistence on imported food. Nature is kind in this, as a thousand 
 other cases, to set bounds to the power of political projectors. The 
 West India island settlements are more dependent than any other ; 
 yet, if they once are compelled to raise their own bread by our 
 prohibitions, we should never cease to lament arid condemn the 
 folly that produced them. It is within my own recollection when 
 the islands were chiefly fed by the corn of Europe. France never 
 permitted a barrel of flour to be carried to her colonies from any 
 foreign country until the revolution shook her laws. The little 
 she took from us was smuggled ; she even supplied the Spaniards 
 with the flour in Cadiz which they transported to the Havana. 
 More recently, the Havana market has been supplied with wheat 
 from the Spanish settlements on the main, which is a very fertile 
 country. Every one knows that maize and other bread can be 
 raised in the islands plentifully, and would be, if the profit on sugar, 
 &c., was not greater than on raising bread. Make bread dear in 
 the West Indies, or make it very uncertain, and they will no 
 longer look to you for supplies. In regard to Europe, all the 
 provisions she takes from the United States in a year would hardly 
 amount to five days subsistence. One shower of rain too much or 
 too little on their crops makes a greater difference. The grain of 
 all kinds consumed in Europe in each year cannot be less than 
 
356 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 seven or eight, and in some years nine, hundred millions of bushels. 
 Notwithstanding many embarrassments on the corn trade, it is 
 necessarily distributed with tolerable equality. Now, what a very 
 trifling difference can it make, whether we send them ten millions 
 more or not. The only difference to them is a present convenient 
 supply in those few places, accessible by sea, where the scarcity 
 is pointed out by a high price. But, although the difference to 
 them is trifling, yet to us it would be a serious loss to have no 
 vent for a surplus of ten millions of dollars value. Russia and 
 Poland in the north, Sicily and the people of Africa in the south, 
 have been the principal venders of grain, especially wheat. I am 
 persuaded, if to all that is exported from those countries you add 
 all that we export, the total would be less than five per cent (I 
 might say three per cent) of the consumption of Europe. I think, 
 therefore, we could not starve any nation in JZurope, nor feed them 
 if they were starving. With respect to raw materials, they are 
 more certainly needed than food. I believe, however, we hold 
 nothing of this description of great value but what may be acquired 
 elsewhere, or admits of some substitute that can be acquired. The 
 improvements in chemistry and natural history go hand in hand in 
 multiplying uses of natural substances, and supplying those sub 
 stances. If ashes become scarce, barilla will be cultivated. 
 
 We now sell cotton to the English to the amount of six millions 
 of dollars, and this article, if uninterrupted, may increase to twelve 
 millions in ten years more, as it has at the same rate the last ten 
 years ; but, if you choose to interrupt it, Great Britain has it in 
 her power to obtain ample supplies, partly from Dutch Guiana and 
 her own islands, and indefinitely from the East Indies. If the 
 carriage be dear, it will employ her seamen ; and this gain of power 
 always satisfies her for a little loss of money. And this leads me 
 to remark that her navigation laws, including her fishery bounties, 
 are, as now understood, bottomed on the principles of national 
 defence as depending on naval strength, and not on the principles 
 of pecuniary profit. Great Britain often pays direct bounties to a 
 greater amount than the whole profit on the fisheries. She also 
 pays indirectly a tax on her internal industry to encourage naviga 
 tion. All exclusions of foreign freight operate to raise or keep up 
 the freightage of her own ships, but in this she calculates that she 
 maintains her maritime force in the cheapest manner. Being an 
 island, her safety demands she should be always strong at sea ; 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 357 
 
 and, by contributing in various ways to the support of numerous 
 seamen in time of peace, she has them always prepared to fight for 
 her in war. They may be considered as a naval militia, who 
 chiefly subsist themselves in peace ; and the deficiency is supplied by 
 the nation, who converts them to a regular military marine in war. 
 How far this sort of policy is demanded by the condition and 
 circumstances of the United States I will not now inquire ; but 
 that we ought constantly to keep up a respectable naval force, and 
 be well prepared at all times to enlarge it without delay, no man 
 can doubt who considers what sort of a world we live in, how 
 prone nations, as well as individuals, are to violate each other s 
 rights, and how vain it is to expect to be spared upon any other 
 ground than that you are not to be attacked with impunity. I 
 observe among the exports to Great Britain three millions value 
 of tobacco. This article may be raised in many countries as ad 
 vantageously as in the United States ; but its superior fitness for a 
 heavy tax to most other articles has almost everywhere in Europe 
 subjected it to the sole purpose of revenue. It has been therefore 
 imported by sea, and its culture forbidden. Portugal and Spain 
 import from their own colonies vast quantities of an excellent 
 quality, and the former re-exports to a considerable amount the 
 Brazil tobacco. It would be perfectly easy to make the Portu 
 guese and Spaniards our successful competitors in the production 
 of this article. It would be extraordinary if there were to be found 
 among the articles of our commerce any one thing indispensable to 
 Great Britain, and not to be procured elsewhere ; but it would not be 
 extraordinary, in our juvenile state, if there are many things indis 
 pensable to us which we have exclusively received from her. I 
 read and hear with amazement men insisting that Great Britain 
 would be a greater sufferer than the United States by an interdic 
 tion of trade, and that in an experiment on self-denying ordinances 
 she would be the first to yield. Our public documents show that 
 of all our surplus she annually buys half, and of all our foreign 
 supplies she furnishes two-thirds of what we consume. Is it, then, 
 possible any man should doubt that our affairs would be extremely 
 deranged, both private and public ? It is not. 
 
 But, although this commerce bears so great a proportion to the 
 whole commerce of our country, it bears a small proportion to 
 the whole commerce of Great Britain. All that she buys from us 
 is less than one-sixth of her imports, and all that she sells to us 
 
358 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 less than a fifth of her exports. This view of the subject shows 
 that the injury or inconvenience would be at times as great to the 
 United States as to Great Britain. I have no doubt, if the experi 
 ment is tried, it will prove so ; and that, instead of the button- 
 makers rising in England to expel the ministers, we should see 
 the people of the United States clamoring against the folly of 
 their rulers, and demanding a change of measures. 1 
 
 It is singular that men who expect to distress the British by 
 refusing to buy of them should not perceive that we must also 
 suffer by their refusing to buy of us. I conceive, however, that 
 the idea is totally false (as we apply it) that the seller is most 
 benefited. If our trade with Great Britain were abolished, it 
 would soon be manifest that our solicitude to buy the forbidden 
 goods would be much greater than theirs to sell them ; and that, 
 while their prices at home would scarcely vary at all, the articles 
 when brought here would be doubled in price. On the other 
 hand, many of the articles we should wish to sell would fall here 
 so much below their common level in price as to compensate men 
 for sending them at great risk by circuitous routes to the British 
 market, there to be sold at little more than the ordinary rate. 
 
 In our trade with Spain and the south of Europe, we sell much 
 more than we buy. There is a loss often by the ships returning 
 dead freighted. There is also a loss on the balance of this trade, 
 which must be received in money or bills which are ordinarily of a 
 correspondent value. Thus, when money cannot be extracted 
 from Spain without a loss of five per cent (which was commonly 
 the case formerly), there will be a loss of about five per cent on 
 bills. The same has held true, when the loss on money was 
 twelve or fourteen per cent. Yet, as this trade is one on which we 
 sell more than we buy, and receive the balance in money, it is 
 conceived by many to be the most useful, as far as its amount goes, 
 of any we carry on. In Russia, we sell little or nothing, and buy 
 to a great amount. We go there dead freighted, and pay all in 
 cash or rather in bills on London, better to us than money, having 
 cost us a considerable premium in Spain or elsewhere ; yet who, 
 among those that think no trade so important to the buyer as to 
 the seller, will dare to deny that the trade with Russia since 1783 
 has been for its amount the most useful trade to the country ? 
 
 The hemp, iron, and duck brought from Russia have been to 
 our fisheries and navigation like seed to a crop. Had it so hap- 
 
 1 This prophecy was literally fulfilled when the embargo was laid. 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 359 
 
 pened that the trade of Spain and Russia were united, the time 
 and expenses of a middle passage and other losses would have been 
 avoided. That is, it would have been better if, as in our trade 
 with England, we could have sold and bought at the same places. 
 
 ] have now given you a general idea of iny manner of thinking, 
 but have not answered your question. 
 
 I do not perceive any considerable effect that will be produced 
 by Smith s bill, if it should become a law. It aims to open the 
 British ports for articles not of the United States in American bot 
 toms ; and it enacts, if this is not admitted by the British, that 
 their bottoms shall not bring to us articles not of their own product 
 or manufacture. I take it for granted Great Britain will not 
 permanently admit us to import into her dominions in our bottoms 
 any articles not of our own growth or product. According to the 
 bill, therefore, we shall refuse to her the privilege she now enjoys 
 of importing into the United States articles other than those of her 
 own growth, product, and manufacture. The effect of the bill is 
 therefore to be measured by the amount of all the articles not of 
 her own product which are brought into the United States in 
 British bottoms. Without recurring to documents, I should think 
 that in war this amount is very trifling indeed, and in peace not 
 very large. If I am correct in this, the only effect of any impor 
 tance to be expected is to irritate Great Britain by manifesting a 
 spirit of hatred and animosity, and by attempting to intimidate her 
 with the dread of a new enemy, when in truth she has no such 
 enemy to fear ; for I am satisfied a war with that nation would be 
 soon too unpopular for the administration to maintain it, or main 
 tain their places. Every nation has an equal right to regulate its 
 own commerce, and we undoubtedly have as good a right to pass a 
 navigation law as Great Britain. Such a measure, therefore, con 
 sidered in the abstract, is no ground of offence. But, notwithstand 
 ing our right is clear to do this, it cannot be concealed that for 
 more than ten years the party now in power have discovered a 
 desire to do all the harm possible to Great Britain, without provok 
 ing her to war. Jefferson, Madison, Livingston, Monroe, Arm 
 strong, and many others, have published their hostile wishes. 
 Such a measure as the one proposed at this time would indicate 
 more of the inclination to hurt Great Britain than to help our 
 selves. Should it produce on her part any kind of resentment, 
 we should be bound in honor to retaliate ; and a series of crimina- 
 
360 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 tions and recriminations would tend strongly to an eventual inter 
 diction of commercial intercourse, and thus cut asunder the tie 
 which binds us together in peace. It cannot escape the notice of 
 British statesmen that we acquiesce without a murmur in regula 
 tions of other nations, which we complain of when enforced by 
 Great Britain. The colony monopoly of Spain, Portugal, and 
 France, may be adduced as examples. The two first of these 
 nations maintain in peace an unqualified exclusion of our trade ; 
 and France, though she admitted our vessels and thus favored our 
 navigation, yet the conditions of their trade were, on the whole, 
 as unfavorable to our national interest as those of Great Britain. 
 France refused flour, and took fish ; but she took the fish under a 
 duty of thirty per cent, which she applied to the encouragement of 
 her own fishermen. She permitted us to take molasses, salt, and 
 French manufactures only in return ; but all this was allowed in 
 our own vessels. The British refused fish, but took flour, and 
 allowed almost every article in return except cotton, and on the 
 same terms as if carried to other British colonies ; but it must all 
 be carried in British ships. Considering commerce and navigation 
 as one interest, and as subservient to the producing interest of the 
 nation, it is evident that, if our clamors against Great Britain were 
 justifiable, they should have been equally loud against France. 
 But I have never been convinced they were just towards either. 
 The right of the Europeans to monopolize respectively their col 
 ony trade is established, and it must be left to their own discretion 
 how far to relax it. We are so situated as to trade with them 
 in a manner reciprocally beneficial, and I should not despair 
 of obtaining by negotiations a reasonable portion of it in the 
 course of a few years. But I do not believe in our competency to 
 extort it from France or Great Britain. I deem it unfortunate 
 that questions of this kind should be started at this time, when it 
 must be obvious that any settlement we could make would be liable 
 to be broken up by the great events of the war. It is also morti 
 fying to see this country so ardently contesting with Great Britain 
 these little points, at the moment she is fighting for us as absolutely 
 as for herself, and when it is to be feared, if she fails, her master 
 will be ours. 
 
 You see I think it inexpedient to pass this law or any of the 
 foolish resolutions about non-importations and non-intercourse, or 
 other non-sense. If Great Britain cannot keep her ground, we 
 
1801-6.] CORRESPONDENCE. 361 
 
 must treat with France as mistress of the world; and, if Great 
 Britain does maintain her standing, I think much will depend on 
 the temper of Russia in regard to the policy of Great Britain 
 toward neutrals. The lofty tone of Great Britain was well sup 
 ported at Copenhagen, in 1800 ; but she availed herself of the first 
 moment to dissolve that formidable confederacy which had been 
 formed in the North. About that time (as I think) Mr. King s 
 spirited note induced the government to temporize, though reluc 
 tantly. The peace with Russia soon after was made by a sacrifice 
 of the colonial principle, as it is called. Lord Grenville denounced 
 that part of the Russian treaty ; and the new ministers obtained 
 from Russia an explanatory article, restoring back a part of what 
 Lord St. Helens had yielded. Lord Grenville is now in place, 
 and his principles would forbid us to hope for concessions toward 
 neutrals. Mr. Fox, a seditious demagogue out of office, may be 
 high-toned in ; but this is uncertain. Mr. Erskine from his known 
 character may be expected to favor moderate measures toward 
 neutrals, and not the less so toward the United States from hold 
 ing large sums in our funds. On the whole, the new ministry is 
 so made up that they may adopt vigorous measures toward neutrals, 
 if Russia will join ; but I think they will temporize, unless that 
 takes place ; and I should think it highly proper for our govern 
 ment to know the true state of things between those two powers, 
 before any great measure is executed. 
 
 I hope Mr. Lloyd will write to Mr. Quincy by to-morrow s 
 post. Yours truly, and I may now say obediently, 
 
 G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 MARCH 31, 1806. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I sent you by this day s mail four sheets, 
 which, if your patience were not inexhaustible, you would never 
 wade through. I am tempted to try it a little further by adding 
 another, though I hardly think I shall have supplied one material 
 fact or thought which you did not possess before. It is not a point 
 settled in my mind how far the navigation of the United States 
 will be favored by the laws and steady policy of the country, if it 
 should ever have a system worthy of that name. Nothing has yet 
 occurred to bring principles, opinions, and party influences to a 
 proper test. It has indeed been believed, and the belief propa- 
 
362 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-6. 
 
 gated by the lt New York Evening Post," that our imposition of 
 forty-four cents on foreign tonnage, and an augmentation of duties 
 on goods imported in foreign bottoms, have occasioned that im 
 mense increase of American shipping which has taken place since 
 1791. Now, I am of opinion that this monstrous increase of navi 
 gation and trade may be attributed to the wars of Europe ; and 
 this is so easily proved, that it is needless to state the facts or the 
 argument. 
 
 In a time of peace, I am sensible the foreign extra duties would 
 be sensibly felt ; and, until such a time, we can hardly conjecture 
 what measures, if any, will be adopted to counteract them by those 
 nations who will then feel their effects. Should foreign nations, 
 however, retaliate in any manner that embarrasses commerce and 
 depresses the value of our native productions, I should apprehend 
 great discontents among the landholders and cultivators. We are 
 accustomed to consider the interest of navigation and the interest 
 of merchants as the interest of commerce. But is this correct ? Is 
 it not true that the tide of commerce would swell the highest, if 
 all the world were perfectly free to contribute to the stream, and 
 that the fullest, freest, and fairest competition in commerce would 
 give to our producers the highest prices and supply them at the 
 lowest ? But, while this would best suit the planter, it would 
 certainly lessen the profits of our ship-owners and our merchants. 
 These are theoretical truths, not to be despised, and not to be 
 too implicitly trusted. Practical men know that, in a country of 
 such ardent commercial enterprise as the United States, many arti 
 cles have a value which would be worthless among an indolent or 
 even a phlegmatic people. Our merchants seek continually new 
 markets for whatever our country can produce. This gives an 
 impulse, and often a direction, to industry more advantageous than 
 it could otherwise receive. Hence I infer that the landed interest 
 of our country would be well compensated for any apparent partial 
 sacrifices in support of the commercial and navigating interests. If 
 these latter decline and languish, the demand for our productions 
 for foreign markets would be less in amount and less constant, and 
 our producers would feel the loss. Should the force of these argu 
 ments be admitted, it still remains doubtful how far the principle 
 ought to operate to exclude foreign competitors. It is not to be 
 imagined that we can engross our whole trade with other nations. 
 If all parties are equally strenuous and equally persevering, we 
 
1801-6.] 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 363 
 
 might conclude that one-half, or nearly that proportion, might 
 finally remain to each. For whatever claim of right is set up by 
 one party may be set up by the other with equal reason. Admit 
 ting, however, that from the peculiar circumstances of some nations, 
 and the character of others, we could monopolize the trade between 
 this and other countries, there is, I think, one argument against 
 it, which the agricultural States may urge with plausibility. They 
 may say that a war, if it should happen, would be doubly distress 
 ing by cutting off at once all demand for their exports ; whereas, 
 if foreigners were employed to carry a part, the evil would be les 
 sened in that proportion. I have never had much confidence in 
 the success of our plans to help commerce by prohibitory laws. I 
 believe we could secure more by negotiation than in any other 
 way, and only resorting to prohibitory laws in the last resort in 
 cases of some magnitude, and of manifest unreasonableness in the 
 other parts. 
 
 Yours, G. C. 
 
364 LIFE AND LETTE11S OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 1807-1814. 
 
 The British Orders in Council. The French Decrees. The Embargo. 
 Mr. Cabot takes part in the Elections of 1808. Is chosen a Member of 
 the Council. Death of Ames. Publication of Ames s Works. Mr. 
 Cabot undertakes to edit Ames s Letters. Views as to Charges of " British 
 Faction " and of Design to dissolve the Union. Death of Mr. Cabot s 
 Eldest Son, Charles. Views in regard to War of 1812. Correspondence. 
 
 AFTER the decisions of the British Admiralty Courts, 
 difficulties rapidly thickened round the United States. 
 The retaliatory non-importation act, discussed at length in 
 the letters just given, served only as a useless irritant, and 
 effected nothing. An effort to negotiate with England, how 
 ever, accompanied and made a part of this ill-advised meas 
 ure ; and William Pinkney was sent to London as joint 
 commissioner with Mr. Monroe. The news that their nego 
 tiation was proceeding successfully induced Congress, in 
 the autumn of 1806, to agree to a suspension of the non 
 importation act. But these promising appearances were 
 soon clouded. The battle of Trafalgar left England supreme 
 upon the ocean, and Bonaparte was compelled to fight 
 his one unconquered foe with other than naval forces. 
 Then it was that, flushed with victories and master of 
 continental Europe, he issued from the field of Jena the 
 famous Berlin decree, by which all commerce and inter 
 course with Great Britain were interdicted to the whole 
 world. England was not slow to retaliate by orders in 
 council of similar nature. From the attitude of France, it 
 seemed to Mr. Cabot impossible to longer preserve the sem 
 blance even of neutrality, and the policy he now desired to 
 see adopted was one of definite alliance with England. By 
 such a course, our commerce, where we alone were vulner- 
 
1807-14.1 FOREIGN POLICY. 365 
 
 able, would have been protected ; and, aloof from the attacks 
 of Bonaparte s armies, we might by an attitude of open 
 hostility have wrung from France a secure and lasting 
 peace. When the European conflict was at an end, we 
 should have been in a position to treat, at least, as advan 
 tageously with England as at a moment when her one 
 thought was to crush at all hazards the power of France. 
 By such a policy, too, we should have made ourselves a 
 valuable ally to one party, an undesirable enemy to the 
 other, and our friendship would have become an object 
 which both the great powers would have sought either to 
 acquire or retain. On such grounds as these, Mr. Cabot 
 favored an alliance with Great Britain ; and such a course, 
 whatever its abstract merits, would have been at least well 
 denned, strong, and intelligible. With such feelings as to 
 the general policy proper to be pursued, Mr. Cabot very 
 strongly desired the ratification of the treaty negotiated by 
 Monroe and Pinkney, and hoped that in this way an escape 
 from the most pressing dangers would be secured. Not only 
 were these hopes in regard to the treaty destined to disap 
 pointment, but the disgraceful affair of the " Chesapeake " 
 seemed to render vain any expectation of peace. Mr. Cabot 
 still thought, however, that, if Great Britain offered suitable 
 reparation for the attack on the " Chesapeake," it was our 
 duty to accept the reparation and renew the negotiations. 
 He therefore deprecated all attempts to inflame further an 
 already strongly excited public feeling, for he believed that 
 unbridled anger and indignation tended to make peace with 
 England impossible, and to encourage the administration 
 in wild and mistaken measures. His fears were not un 
 founded. A proclamation ordering British men-of-war to 
 leave our coasts, a demand for reparation so linked with 
 the old grievance of impressment as to make even dis 
 cussion difficult, and the famous embargo, these were 
 the measures by which Jefferson hoped to overawe the 
 great powers of Europe, and to carry our young nation 
 safely through the greatest of external dangers. 
 
366 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 So weak and wrong was the embargo policy that it at 
 once gave new life to the almost defunct Federalist party. 
 It fell so heavily upon New England, that Mr. Cabot 
 wrote to Pickering, favoring war even as less deadly in its 
 effects on our commercial prosperity and national well- 
 being than the embargo. So strong, however, was the 
 righteous public indignation at the insult offered to our 
 flag by England, that the disposition was very general to 
 accept any and every means of retaliation, even if it took 
 the form of commercial restrictions. But the prominent 
 Federalists in Massachusetts rallied at once against the 
 embargo, and the newspapers teemed with their attacks 
 upon the policy of the administration. These essays, written 
 with great vigor by some of the ablest Federalist leaders, 
 were not without effect, but other causes contributed much 
 more to produce a change of public sentiment. The mis 
 managed negotiations had broken down, there was no indica 
 tion that the embargo was merely temporary, as had been at 
 first supposed, and the new year (1808) brought the alarm, 
 ing tidings of a royal proclamation ordering a more strenuous 
 enforcement of the right of search for British deserters. This 
 was followed by an insolent letter from Mr. Canning, declin 
 ing to renew negotiations on the old basis, after what he con 
 sidered the wayward and uncertain course of our administra 
 tion. Mr. Cabot still believed that sufficient reparation had 
 been offered by England for the " Chesapeake " affair, 1 and 
 that the refusal of our government to accept that reparation, 
 and to then proceed to treat fairly and honestly, was a ruin 
 ous and dangerous policy. Still more did he oppose Jeffer 
 son s plan of consultation with the Senate as to the foreign 
 policy, a method of procedure which he had always con 
 sistently resisted. He dreaded a war more than any thing 
 else, not from a fear of the evils which all wars bring, but 
 because he felt that war with England meant submission 
 to France ; and he was convinced that both Jefferson and 
 
 1 As Mr. Madison afterwards accepted this reparation from Mr. Foster, 
 in 1811, it may be supposed that he and his cabinet, also, thought it sufficient. 
 
1807-14.] THE EMBARGO. 367 
 
 Madison purposely avoided an honorable peace with the 
 former, not only from a belief that their popularity was 
 best sustained in this way, but also from a desire to serve 
 and maintain the interests of the latter. 
 
 In the mean time, the opposition to the embargo in 
 creased rapidly in New England. The annihilation of the 
 shipping interest threw multitudes of men out of work, and 
 the people turned to the opponents of the administration 
 measures for guidance. Colonel Pickering threw himself 
 eagerly into the conflict, and addressed a letter to Governor 
 Sullivan, setting forth with considerable ability and great 
 vigor the grounds of the Federalist opposition. To insure 
 publication, Colonel Pickering transmitted a copy to Mr. 
 Cabot ; and, on the refusal of Sullivan to communicate the 
 letter to the Legislature, Mr. Cabot sent the copy in his 
 possession to the printers, and superintended its publica 
 tion. This pamphlet was widely read, and produced a 
 great sensation ; and Colonel Pickering, then the most 
 prominent Federalist in public life, assumed as far as 
 possible the conduct of the party. Mr. Cabot was most 
 anxious in regard to the line of policy which should at this 
 time be adopted. What he especially feared was the revival 
 of the old cry of " British faction ; " and, understanding 
 Colonel Pickering s extreme views, he dreaded lest such 
 a course should be taken as to justify, in appearance 
 at least, this fatal accusation. He therefore wrote to 
 Colonel Pickering with perfect frankness, urging him 
 most strongly to avoid every thing either in speech or 
 action which could justify their enemies in calling them a 
 " British faction." Mr. Cabot saw clearly that hostility to 
 the embargo and the other administration measures was at 
 this time likely to awaken the latent suspicion of friendship 
 to England. He felt now, as keenly as in 1799, the injus 
 tice of the charge ; for he himself regarded England only as 
 our best bulwark against France, and he believed this to be 
 the sentiment of his party. But, in the critical state of our 
 
368 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 affairs, he foresaw that any rash or heated advocacy of what 
 were then unpopular views would present an appearance 
 of sympathy with Great Britain, not as the foe of France, 
 but as our own ancient and inveterate enemy. In all 
 this miserable turmoil of foreign politics, Mr. Cabot s 
 greatest anxiety was always for the independence, honor, 
 and welfare of his country. The policy which he sup 
 ported he believed to be the one best adapted to serve 
 the nation ; but he knew that any word or deed which 
 could fairly call forth the odious accusation of being a 
 foreign faction would be fatal to his party, its policy and 
 its adherents. Conscious of his own innocence in regard to 
 any subservience to foreign interests, he was well aware that 
 the slightest false step might lead to all the dangers which 
 a charge of that nature could produce ; and for this reason he 
 was most earnest in his warnings to Colonel Pickering, as 
 to the line of policy that should be pursued. As far as he 
 was able, he restrained his friend, who, always ready for the 
 fray, and now flushed with battle and with the success of 
 his first assault, seemed ready to become an avowed par 
 tisan of England. Very fortunately, he intrusted to Mr. 
 Cabot s care and discretion a variety of letters and essays 
 with which he proposed to continue his warfare against 
 Democrats generally, and against those in particular who 
 resided in Massachusetts. But Colonel Pickering s exertions 
 were in this instance in some measure frustrated ; for Mr. 
 Cabot quietly suppressed, or, in his own words, " laid in his 
 bureau," several diatribes which his friend launched from 
 Washington on the heads of their foes in New England. 1 
 
 The great public excitement caused by the operation of 
 the embargo, and the consequent renewal of political activ 
 ity on the part of the Federalists, drew Mr. Cabot from the 
 life of retirement and leisure to which he was so much 
 
 1 Among others which never saw the light is a long letter for publica 
 tion, addressed to Mr. Cabot at a later period, revealing the " baseness " of 
 Madison in his negotiations with the British ambassador. 
 
1807-14.] MEMBER OF COUNCIL. 869 
 
 attached. He not only lent the assistance of his pen and of 
 his advice to his party, but he even consented to the use of 
 his name as a candidate for office. The tide of opposition, 
 however, had not yet begun to run with sufficient force 
 to give victory to the Federalists in the State elections of 
 1808. Sullivan was re-elected governor; but Mr. Cabot, 
 though his party suffered defeat, was individually successful, 
 being chosen a member of the governor s council. 1 Averse 
 as he was to all forms of public service, this position must 
 have been peculiarly irksome as well as repugnant to his 
 retiring and indolent disposition ; but the records of the 
 council show that he was as faithful in the performance of 
 the duties entailed by this comparatively small office as of 
 those which fell to his lot when a senator of the United 
 States. There is no break in the evidence of his constant 
 attendance at all the meetings of the council, or of his 
 attention to all the various matters of business, great and 
 small, with which he was called upon to deal. The usual 
 labors of the council were moreover, in the years 1808-9, 
 increased by the death of Governor Sullivan before the 
 expiration of his official term. Mr. Cabot served but for 
 one year ; and he doubtless took advantage of the rising 
 fortunes of his party to free himself from what he consid 
 ered a sacrifice of his own comfort and convenience, and 
 which he made only from an unwillingness to refuse aid to 
 his friends at a critical period. 
 
 Soon after his election as councillor, Mr. Cabot met with 
 a severe loss in the death of Fisher Ames, his most intimate 
 and trusted personal friend. It affected him deeply, and 
 made his distaste for politics keener, if possible, than be 
 fore. He had long expected this misfortune. The failing 
 health of his friend had given but too ample and certain 
 
 1 The governor s council were at that period chosen by the Legislature, 
 where the Federalists were in a majority. It is to the credit of all con 
 cerned that Governor Sullivan was able to say that he had less contro 
 versy with his Federalist councillors than with those of the preceding years, 
 who were of his own party. See Amory s Life of Sullivan, II. 307. 
 
 24 
 
370 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 warning of the approaching end, yet the shock was none 
 the less haiyi to bear when it came. By the death of Mr. 
 Ames, ties of the closest friendship and affection, and habits 
 of the most cherished and constant intercourse, were broken. 
 There was no one, outside of his immediate family, whose 
 loss would have been so severe a blow, or the deprivation 
 of whose society would have been so sorely felt. 
 
 To Mr. Cabot s care were intrusted all Mr. Ames s papers 
 and letters; and under his superintendence a volume of 
 political essays and speeches, for which he wrote the pref 
 ace, was prepared, and issued from the press. To Mr. 
 Cabot also was confided the task of assorting and preparing 
 for publication a selection of his friend s private letters, 
 but this work seems never to have been carried further than 
 the collection and arrangement of the correspondence. 
 
 While still a member of the council, oppressed with 
 sorrow for the death of his friend, and burdened with the 
 sad duties it entailed, Mr. Cabot was also compelled to 
 take some share in the party struggle, now additionally 
 embittered by the approaching Presidential election. He 
 was consulted in regard to the proposed plan of a union 
 with the Clintonians ; but, from the brief note on this sub 
 ject, 1 his opinions as to the advisability of such a step can 
 not be accurately determined. During the progress of the 
 campaign, the cry was raised, and justified in some measure by 
 the unguarded language of extreme men, that the Federal 
 ists aimed at a dissolution of the Union. Mr. Cabot, be 
 lieving, as in 1804, that such a step was unnecessary as well 
 as useless and impracticable, and conceiving the accusation 
 to be wholly unfounded, urged on Colonel Pickering the 
 necessity of a clear and prompt public denial by the leaders 
 of any intentions to bring about a separation. His advice 
 on this point was, it would seem, unheeded ; and no effort 
 appears to have been made to refute the charge. His 
 opinions as to separatist schemes, at this time, appear very 
 clearly in a letter which he wrote to Colonel Pickering in 
 1 See below, p. 397. 
 
1807-14.] VIEWS AS TO ADMINISTRATION POLICY. 371 
 
 the spring of 1809. Colonel Pickering apparently desired 
 either the town or the State to accept a proposition from a 
 French engineer to fortify the port of Boston. Mr. Cabot 
 replied that such a notion would not be tolerated, and 
 suggested to Colonel Pickering that to fortify the ports 
 was the duty of the national government, which therefore 
 was the proper quarter for such an application. 
 
 In all these questions, Mr. Cabot was guided by the views 
 which he took of the general policy of the administration. 
 He considered the embargo to be in the interests of France ; 
 and he deemed the threats of war as intended only to main 
 tain the embargo, for he utterly discredited the idea that 
 the administration had any serious intention of fighting. 
 He also felt that the dread of war was universal and strong 
 among the people, and that it was therefore the manifest 
 policy of the Federalists to confine their attacks to the 
 embargo, and force the administration into a position where 
 the latter would be compelled to make peace. To such a 
 policy any violent action or threats of separation would of 
 course have been fatal. 
 
 After the period of political excitement in 1808 and 
 1809, and the success of the Federalists in forcing a repeal 
 of the embargo, Mr. Cabot s letters almost entirely cease. 
 Other causes than the temporary advantage of his party 
 produced this cessation of correspondence. Mr. Cabot had 
 hardly recovered from the sorrow caused by the death of 
 his friend Fisher Ames, when he was called upon to bear 
 the severest trial he ever had to endure. Early in 1811, 
 his eldest son Charles, an able and successful man, died of 
 consumption at Havana, in the thirty-first year of his age. 
 So heavy a blow to his hopes and affections caused Mr. 
 Cabot to withdraw completely from all outside and public 
 affairs, and, although in time he recovered from the loss, he 
 never again resumed his correspondence, nor, with one ex 
 ception, took any active part in politics. Always inclined 
 to take a dark view of the political future and to regard 
 
372 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 passing events with a gentle cynicism, this severe domestic 
 affliction seems to have confirmed him in his desire for 
 perfect retirement and privacy, and to have strengthened 
 the natural despondency of his disposition. 
 
 The war of 1812 he regarded as an unmixed misfortune. 
 He speaks of it at the outset as unjust and wicked, and 
 announces his determination to refrain from aiding, in any 
 way, its prosecution. But, with the single exception of the 
 one expressing these sentiments, there are no letters or 
 papers left which give any clew to his political opinions, 
 until the period of the Hartford Convention, in 1814. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Feb. 14, 1807. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I think precisely as you do of Mr. Ames s 
 " Alarming Prospect " and some other of his late writings. They 
 should now be free from party feelings. I have told him so, and 
 he has profited a little by it. You and some others of my friends 
 have given me credit for an agency in these writings ; but I have 
 no other merit than that of thinking in almost every particular 
 exactly as the writer does. 
 
 In the midst of the gloom which the destroying power of France 
 has produced on the minds of reflecting men, I find there are some 
 who cherish a hope that the late decree * of Buonaparte may be so 
 executed as to drive us from the fatal ground on which alone we are 
 willing to remain. They think, too, the British treaty 2 favors the 
 same expectation. I see distinctly the tendency of both measures, 
 but I confess my apprehensions that we are to be purified only as 
 by fire. I felt solemnly affected by the quotation you made in the 
 close of your letter, and would gladly partake of the consolation 
 you suggest, a consolation which I honestly believe in your own 
 heart is at its proper home. I speak this without flattery. 
 
 Although Great Britain is depressed and in danger of being dis 
 couraged, yet I am perfectly satisfied that, if she were supported 
 
 1 The Berlin decree of Nov. 21, 1806. See above, p. 364. 
 
 2 That negotiated by Pinkney and Monroe. See above, p. 365. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 373 
 
 by this country, feeble and parsimonious as we are, nothing need 
 be feared from France, with all continental Europe at her dis 
 posal. Great Britain and the United States could keep the sea in 
 defiance of all their power ; and such parts of the commercial inter 
 course as should be kept up by force, by stealth, by connivance, or 
 by consent, would be enjoyed necessarily by the two nations, be 
 sides which they would possess almost exclusively the maritime 
 commerce of the other three-quarters of the world and their own 
 with each other. To do this, they must act in earnest, as those 
 who struggle for life ; but, if they would act in such a manner, I 
 have no doubt their empire of the sea would be complete, and that 
 the means of sustaining it might be in part derived from the enemy. 
 Both ships and men would probably be procured by victories more 
 than sufficient to repair the waste. The people of all the northern 
 nations, when captured, might be used, and so might some few of 
 the southern. But I am persuaded we prefer the risk of French 
 domination to the efforts which would be required to resist it. 
 
 Yours truly, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 APRIL 14, 1807. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The enclosed paper derives a peculiar impor 
 tance from the condition of Europe and our relations to it. Nothing 
 can be clearer to my mind than the expediency of a ratification, as 
 favorable to our political safety and commercial advantage ; yet a 
 consideration of the circumstances of those who guide our affairs 
 forbids every sanguine hope that they will do what would be best. I 
 think prudence requires a concealment of what we know on this 
 subject, at least until we have had time to deliberate. My own 
 opinion is that the influential Democrats in the different States 
 ought, if possible, to be excited to urge the ratification. I am in 
 formed that our ridiculous non-importation law operated unfavor 
 ably on the negotiation, 1 and that, if we should vapor about its 
 effects, the gasconade will probably be resented. If you should 
 communicate to Mr. Thorndike the information 2 enclosed, let him 
 be enjoined to secrecy. Yours always, G. C. 
 
 1 This was correct. The British ministers objected to negotiating with 
 the non-importation act still in force, because it would produce the appear 
 ance of treating under coercion. Monroe and Pinknev had great difficulty 
 in overcoming this objection. 
 
 2 I am at a loss to know the nature of the information here referred to. 
 No other letter exists which throws any light on the subject of this one. 
 
374 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Dec. 31, 1807. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, In spite of my indolence, I sit down to write 
 you a short letter, because you command it and have rights which 
 I cannot dispute. Most of us are as much surprised as you are at 
 Mr. Jefferson s hardihood. I believe, however, he still does not 
 mean to go to war, although every step he takes leads to it. I 
 rely a little on this opinion from recollecting how much popularity 
 he has gained by his professions of peace and parsimony, but much 
 more from the consideration that the effects of a British war will 
 probably be so distressing as to render odious those who unneces 
 sarily produce it ; and certainly, if Mr. Rose 1 acts his part prop 
 erly, he will put us in the wrong, if we refuse to be conciliated. 
 If he is commissioned, as I suppose he must be, to disavow as an 
 unauthorized act the attack on the " Chesapeake," notwithstanding 
 the previous provocation and subsequent hostility of the United 
 States, and to offer reparation for the balance of wrong which is 
 fairly due (and it would not be much), I should think a rejection 
 of his overtures would be too dangerous for Mr. Jefferson. If, 
 however, I am wrong in this conjecture, it is completely within the 
 power of the British government to beat us at our own game. 
 They who exclusively possess the empire of the sea must be con 
 sulted by us whenever we go there (to sea) again ; and if we 
 abstain a few months without foreign war to employ our men, our 
 minds, and our passions, the people will run mad. Already the 
 evils of the embargo begin to be felt, and threats of violence are 
 whispered. No man can doubt that all our commercial cities will 
 experience that degree of suffering which must destroy order and 
 subordination. Some thousands (including women and children) 
 of persons in this town will be without subsistence in a few days, 
 because there is no employment for them. If the government cuts 
 off all the business we are pursuing, they ought to provide a substitute 
 without delay. The embargo brings greater immediate distress on 
 us than war, though the latter would finally bring ruin. This 
 abominable measure is adopted by Mr. Jefferson, as I think, to 
 avoid a dilemma into which the French were pushing him. The 
 French decree, accompanied with verbal declarations, being made 
 known to him, he perceived he must either warn the people of our 
 
 1 The British minister. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 375 
 
 dangers, or by concealing them be convicted of wilful and criminal 
 neglect of duty, by which immense losses were incurred. He 
 escaped from this situation by the embargo, which renders notice 
 less necessary, and hides from the country what, if disclosed, would 
 have excited resistance to France, and favored accommodation with 
 England. I have given you my speculation, and wish you to say 
 to Mr. Quincy l and Mr. Livermore 2 that I acknowledge myself 
 greatly indebted to them for their letters, but am unable to pay. 
 
 Yours always in truth, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Jan. 20, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I am oppressed by the debts with which you 
 have loaded me, and can never get free. Before this reaches you, 
 our governor s 3 speech will show you that no great good is to come 
 from him ; for, although he dares not praise the embargo, yet he 
 has taken from some of Jefferson s parasites the hint to attack the 
 Boston writers. The truth is those writers are not to be answered, 
 and therefore must be silenced by threats or popular clamor ; but 
 the attempt evidently fails. A few weak and credulous people may 
 be duped by the ridiculous stories of our writings having an influence 
 on the British government ; but men of sense know better. We 
 saw our country inflamed by false statements, and have corrected 
 them by proving the exact truth. We read much false reasoning 
 concerning national rights, and we exposed it. Our country was 
 urged to take up arms upon an exaggerated view of our power to 
 injure the proposed enemy, and we have shown the folly and 
 extravagance of the expectation of success. 
 
 The answer of the House, I think, will please you, as it now 
 stands ; but it would have satisfied you better, if it had remained as 
 it at first passed, without the words " royal proclamation." The 
 answer of the Senate is waiting for some Democratic members who 
 are absent. I fear it will be bad ; but, if it should, there will be 
 some very able harangues from Otis and Gore, which will be ser 
 viceable to the Democratic members of the House, many of whom 
 
 1 Josiah Quincy, then member of Congress from Massachusetts. 
 
 2 Edward St. Loe Livermore, member of Congress from Essex County, 
 Massachusetts, from 1806-12. 
 
 8 James Sullivan. 
 
376 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 will attend. It is hoped the discussion will deter the House from 
 attempting to address Jefferson ; but, on the whole, we incline to 
 think the pressure of the embargo will be more operative in dis- 
 affecting the people from war than any thing that can be said or 
 done. If you have seen all our newspapers, you see how much 
 Mr. Lowell has done ; and you must be gratified to see how well 
 supported by authorities, by the practice of nations, and by sound 
 reason, the Boston opinions have been. I trust you will approve 
 the forbearance to animadvert on the strange and unaccountable 
 conduct of some who are intrusted with our greater interests. It 
 would be very easy, but it is not expedient, to point out extreme 
 absurdity. Our people are not tumultuous yet ; but there is no 
 doubt that discontent has already seized a large portion, and will 
 extend to all the people, against the embargo. I can truly say I 
 do not know a man of any party who openly vindicates it, though 
 there may be some apologists who would palliate and excuse it. 
 In sixty or ninety days, we shall be in a very unhappy state, if it 
 continues. Yours ever in truth, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 JAN. 28, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, At the moment I was expressing to you my 
 hopes that "bhe_ popular discontent with the embargo would deter 
 our General Court from approving it, a motion to approve was 
 under consideration. It has been twice postponed, but will proba 
 bly pass to-day. The truth is no man likes the embargo, and 
 nineteen in twenty detest it ; yet party hatred is stronger, and will 
 dictate the declaration of what you will read in the newspaper 
 after another post. "We are told of a secret session of the Senate 
 of the United States, which to me augurs no good. In such a 
 body, I should expect a swaggering spirit which disdains prudence, 
 when called to declare what reparation is sufficient to heal a wound 
 which has been exaggerated so much as that we have received. 
 I fear Mr. Jefferson is employing you to do worse than he would 
 dare to do alone. Although there is a precedent in Washington s 
 administration, which I well remember, yet it is and always was 
 contrary to my opinion to consult the Senate before the negotia 
 tion with a foreign state. I have often speculated on the possible 
 demands and compliances of the parties in the present case, but 
 with little satisfaction. I see no insuperable obstacle to an engage- 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 377 
 
 ment of Mr. Rose that the two Americans l shall be restored, 011 
 the principle of the British proclamation, which fairly implies that 
 native citizens may be required and are bound to return. He may 
 engage that Berkeley shall be recalled and not serve on this sta 
 tion, or he may engage that his conduct shall be inquired into by 
 a competent court. But he cannot engage that he shall be pun 
 ished, for no court of any just nation would punish in such a case. 
 He may, however, be recalled, and disqualified from serving in 
 these seas, as a minister is recalled from a particular court to which 
 he is obnoxious, on account of the very acts which fidelity to his 
 own State have required. In relation to us, this may be a conces 
 sion, while the officer may be consistently remunerated by his own 
 country with new offices and honors. But, at any rate, considering 
 the mission of Mr. Rose on such an errand is itself the essential 
 reparation, which consists in acknowledgment more than any thing 
 else, I hope the Hotspurs will not plunge us into a war with 
 Great Britain, which would destroy every thing good in our coun 
 try, institutions, property, and men, and almost hope itself. 
 IjVTr. Joseph Story, 2 of Salem, goes to Washington as solicitor for 
 the Georgia claimants. Though he is a man whom the Democrats 
 support, I have seldom if ever met with one of sounder mind on 
 the principal points of national policy. He is well worthy the 
 civil attention of the most respectable Federalists ; and -I wish you 
 to be so good as to say so to our friend Mr. Quincy, and such other 
 gentlemen as you think will be likely to pay him some attention."") 
 Yours faithfully, though lazily, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 FEB. 10, 1808. 
 
 Mr DEAR SIR, You see with pain that our Legislature have 
 conducted worse than was expected. Undoubtedly, the votes were 
 given reluctantly, for the people in general are known to disprove 
 the embargo ; and, although no violences are immediately appre 
 hended, yet no man believes we can bear the measure long with 
 tranquillity. The truth is, a little more time is required to show 
 effects and produce turbulences. I have long since despaired of 
 accommodation with Great Britain, and for some days have appre 
 hended that even the reparation offered for the supposed wrong, 
 
 1 The two American seamen taken from the " Chesapeake." 
 
 2 Afterwards associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
378 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 in the affair of the " Chesapeake," would be refused on some pretence 
 or another. There are reasons enough for these opinions in the 
 minds of all attentive observers of the character and past conduct 
 of Jefferson and Madison. Admitting that they see the danger to 
 which we are exposed from the power of France, and our helpless 
 ness in case of the fall of England, yet they see an indissoluble 
 connection between their party power here and their foreign poli 
 tics. I really feel ashamed when I recollect how much you do to 
 inform and gratify me on whatever is interesting, while I am 
 almost too lazy to express in words my sense of it. 
 
 Yours affectionately always, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 FEB. 17, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, ... I have for some time despaired of our 
 public affairs, yet the slightest ground serves to build a new hope 
 upon. Your mentioning the opinions of two leading Democrats, 
 at a moment when we hear by way of New York, a day or two 
 later, that Mr. Jefferson declared his expectation of a settlement 
 with Mr. Rose, revives a LITTLE my exhausted expectations. If 
 the negotiation continues to this day, you must have the French 
 decree l of December 17, which I should think would cause many 
 men to blush, if not to change their conduct. 
 
 Yours sincerely, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 FEB. 24, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, We are more tranquil here than it was ex 
 pected we shauld be under the embargo ; but the constant hope 
 
 1 On the llth of November, 1808, England had issued orders in council, 
 retaliating the Berlin decree. By these orders, all neutral trade with France 
 was forbidden except through Great Britain. No imports or exports were 
 to be made to or from the ports of France or of her allies, except with a 
 British license ; and neutral vessels, which had sailed before the publication 
 of these orders, were to be ordered by British cruisers into English ports. 
 Possession of French " certificates of origin " was held a sufficient ground for 
 capture. Bonaparte replied to this by publishing, December 17. the Milan 
 decree referred to in the letter. By this decree, that of Berlin was extended 
 and strengthened. All vessels were pronounced " denationalized " and 
 " forfeited," which should submit to British search, or to any tax, duty, or 
 license from England. All vessels, also, were forfeited, which should at 
 tempt to trade to or from any of the ports of Great Britain or her allies. 
 Spain and Holland followed Bonaparte s lead with hasty servility, and at 
 once issued similar decrees. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 379 
 
 that it will not continue long, and the real difficulties which would 
 attend several branches of trade if our ports were open, silence 
 complaint. It is evident, too, that, with all the clamors for ven 
 geance and war upon the English, the community are very happy 
 to hear of any thing that seems to promise peace. The policy of 
 the government appears to be pretty well understood in some par 
 ticulars. They do not wish for a war with France, at any rate. 
 They are not willing to make war on the English, which they fear 
 the people would disapprove. They will avoid, as far as possible 
 without rupture, fair accommodation of differences. 
 
 Yours truly always, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 THURSDAY, March 3, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, By the mail due on Tuesday, I received 
 yesterday morning three letters from you, consisting of a copy of 
 your excellent communication to the governor, a single sheet dated 
 the 20th, and a single page of the 21st of February to me. A 
 packet franked by you, and superscribed to Governor Sullivan, was 
 at the same time in the post-office ; but nothing has been yet heard 
 of it in the Legislature, and it is doubtful whether it will be with 
 held or sent with some accompanying observations to counteract 
 its effect. I fear our malady is too inveterate to be cured ; but it 
 is impossible your letter should be read throughout New England, 
 without producing great benefit. Indeed, if it could be read in the 
 House of Representatives here by one who would do justice to the 
 composition, it would for a moment electrify the members. It is 
 decided to wait as long as decorum requires for a communication 
 through the medium of the Legislature, after which the press will 
 give it to the people in a pamphlet. Among the many valuable 
 truths you have stated with perspicuity and force, I was glad to see 
 the position that our trade would be greater now, if the embargo 
 were removed, than we should have in profound peace, when every 
 nation monopolizes its own according to the ancient usage. After 
 a little more time shall have brought home to individuals the evils 
 of the embargo, there will be but little diversity of opinion about 
 their reality and weight. 
 
 Yours truly always, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
380 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 MARCH 9, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, This day will issue from the press a copy of 
 your letter to the governor, which he dared not to communicate. 
 Five thousand copies will be struck in a pamphlet form, and it 
 will be reprinted in the newspapers. Probably, you will receive a 
 pamphlet with this letter. This excellent address is well calcu 
 lated to rouse us from our apathy ; and, if we were fit for any thing 
 but slavery, all New England might be brought to act with effect. 
 
 Mr. Williams sent you a newspaper writing of Ames s, which 
 would naturally lead you to think he must be better. The fact is 
 otherwise. Mr. Gore, who saw him a few days since, reports very 
 unfavorably of him ; and this opinion is confirmed by others. 
 
 Improbis viluperari laudari est. You will doubtless have a 
 little of this praise. I trust you will neither be vain nor angry. 
 
 I am ever, with sincere esteem and regard, 
 
 Yours truly, G. C. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 (Confidential.) 
 
 WASHINGTON, March 10, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Last evening I received a letter from Gov 
 ernor Sullivan, dated the 3d, of which I now enclose you a copy, 
 together with a copy of my answer, forwarded in this day s mail. 
 This evening T expect a letter from you relative to my long letter 
 of February 16 to the governor, of which I sent a copy to you 
 on the 21st. Your answer will direct me how to steer my course. 
 If I do not get a letter from you this evening, then I contemplate 
 sending you a packet to-morrow, containing the original of my long 
 letter to Sullivan, to be laid before the Legislature, if in session, 
 and provided you shall not have already published it from the 
 copy. I am, &c. T. P. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 (Confidential.) 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, March 11, 1808. 
 
 DEAR SIR, On the 21st of February, I forwarded to you a 
 copy of my long letter of the 16th to Governor Sullivan. If to 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 381 
 
 know the truth in our public affairs (as far as it was discover 
 able) were an object deserving attention, I had a right to expect 
 he would communicate my letter to the Legislature. He has re 
 fused to do it, as you will see by the enclosed, as well as by my 
 letter to you of yesterday. Knowing the force of party policy, I 
 was in some measure prepared for such a result, though I had not 
 contemplated a return of my letter, much less a rude return. As 
 it was my intention and the earnest wish of my Massachusetts 
 friends here to have the letter, in one way or another, communi 
 cated to the people as well as to the Legislature, I sent you the 
 copy, leaving it to your " discretion " to give or not to give it pub 
 licity, as you and the friends you should consult should think best 
 for the public good. Seeing the course the affair has taken, it 
 may be fortunate if my letter to the governor shall have remained 
 in your pocket. For then the original, now addressed to the 
 President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, under cover 
 to Mr. Otis, may be communicated to the two Houses, if in ses 
 sion. But should they have adjourned, or if the copy has not been 
 published, then the publication of the whole correspondence may 
 be advantageously made. The order of publication would be: 1st, 
 my letter dated the to Mr. Otis ; 2d, my letter dated the to 
 the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House ; 3d, Gov 
 ernor Sullivan s letter to me, of the 3d instant ; 4th, my answer of 
 the 9th ; lastly, my long letter to the governor, of February 16. 
 
 If my letter of February 16 shall have been already published, 
 then the original now again forwarded cannot be presented to the 
 two Houses. At least, it would seem to me indecorous. 
 
 In this case, Hillhouse suggests the following course : That my 
 letter to Mr. Otis, and the one to the President and Speaker of 
 the two Houses, should have BLANKS left for the day of their date ; 
 then if the Legislature have adjourned, or if not, then as soon as 
 they do adjourn, those blanks should be filled with a date about 
 seven or eight days prior to their adjournment, or the usual num 
 ber of days that a letter is in passing from Washington to Boston ; 
 then, that the whole correspondence should be published in the 
 order I have before suggested ; the prior publication of the long 
 letter being understood to have been made from a copy sent to a 
 friend. If you should think proper to adopt this course of pro 
 ceedings (and I commit it wholly to your own bosom}, then, at the 
 proper time, after inserting the suitable dates in the letters to Otis 
 
382 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 and to the President and Speaker, you can seal and present the 
 packet to Mr. Otis. But perhaps a simpler mode may be better. 
 If the letter of February 16 shall have been published already, 
 then, without troubling Mr. Otis or the President and Speaker 
 of the two Houses (if found yet in session), it may be useful to 
 publish the governor s letter to me of the 3d instant, and my 
 answer. But something seems necessary to rouse the people from 
 the lethargy which appears to have seized the public mind. I am 
 sorry, my dear sir, to impose on you so much trouble. I am con 
 strained to do it from the impression we feel here that the pro 
 posed publication may be useful. But you who are on the spot 
 can better decide the question, and therefore I beg leave again to 
 commit the whole affair to your discretion. Yet, if any doubt 
 arise on the expediency of publishing, may not the consideration 
 that the governor and his friends may misrepresent the affair, not 
 only prejudicially to me, but to the Federal cause, which is the 
 cause of our country, demand its publication ? 
 
 Need I assure YOU that I have no personal wishes about this 
 business ? I trust not. Let the question be decided solely and 
 absolutely as the public good shall appear to require. 
 
 I am, &c. T. P. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, March 12, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your letter of the 2d confirms all my opinions 
 of the bad state of public affairs, and prepares us to hear in a short 
 time of the departure of Mr. Rose. It would be a great gratifica 
 tion to see this gentleman in this part of the country, but perhaps 
 his departure will have a salutary influence. When it is once 
 decided that the object of his mission is unattainable, it will natu 
 rally augment our fears of actual war. 
 
 In the event of Mr. Rose s failure, it becomes a most interesting 
 inquiry, what steps Great Britain will take, and what course 
 pursue in relation to us. On this we daily speculate with infinite 
 anxiety, yet we always arrive at the conclusion that she will take 
 no new steps, adopt no new measures that are offensive, but leave 
 us to the effects of our own policy. 
 
 In the tremendous contest in which Great Britain is engaged, 
 she has the strongest motives for rescuing or preserving from the 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 
 
 grasp of France every state that can be saved. This her policy is 
 as obviously wise as it is invariable. Our country, ill organized as 
 it appears, with all its ports, people, and resources, would be a pow 
 erful auxiliary to France ; but to England, as an ally, it might be 
 inestimable. Great Britain and the United States, united in a 
 common cause of defence, would be an overmatch for all the pow 
 ers on the globe, separated as we are from the strongest of them, 
 arid complete mistress as Great Britain already is of the ocean. 
 We could command in every sea, direct and diet-ate the course of 
 maritime commerce everywhere, and make it nourish and maintain 
 the protecting power. This would make us both safe against the 
 master of continental Europe, until his immense force shall break 
 or be dissipated by a new state of things. The aid we could give 
 in various ways to England, and the steady support to commerce 
 and manufactures we should necessarily yield, would render the 
 two countries, if allied for defence, invincible and almost invulner 
 able. We are not indeed authorized to expect soon to see this 
 desirable consummation ; but, when we see how strongly it is dic 
 tated by a sense of safety as well as interest, it ought not to be 
 despaired of. But if at present our jealousies, prejudices, or even 
 worse causes, prevent us from acting on the most correct princi 
 ples ; if we will not help those whose success involves our own 
 safety, it is of infinite importance that we be kept from joining the 
 common enemy. If Great Britain should indulge her resentments 
 in acts of avowed hostility, the first blow would destroy all hope, 
 and almost all possibility of our escape from the hands of France. 
 They (France) would of course monopolize all our means in war 
 and our commerce in a subsequent peace, if this blessing can revisit 
 us while the two rival powers of the world remain. Great Britain 
 necessarily considers the nature of our government, and the com 
 position and condition of our population. Regarding these, as she 
 certainly must desire to do, in all her measures, I am persuaded 
 she will think it wise not only to forbear to strike, but will refrain 
 from injuring or irritating us as far as her honor and substantial 
 interest will permit. Our sufferings by a war would be of no ser 
 vice to England, but would rivet us more strongly, closely, and 
 lastingly to her deadly foe. 
 
 Knowing that we shall not make war and believing that Great 
 Britain will not force it upon us, I apprehend she will execute 
 fairly the system she has lately promulgated, leaving our govern- 
 
384 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 ment in the ridiculous attitude they have chosen, until a better sense 
 of our true interest shall induce them, or the force of public opinion 
 compel them, to change it. But, further than this, I should imagine 
 Great Britain would deem it proper to unfold to the eyes of the 
 two nations all such parts of the history of the controversy as 
 would be consistent with decorum to disclose. She would detail 
 the evidence of her constant readiness to remove all just ground 
 of complaint. She would exhibit a fair defence of her maritime 
 rights and pretensions, and show from the perilous state of the 
 world the necessity of her adherence to them. The claim to search 
 for her sailors on board merchant vessels should be justified on 
 principle, and its actual practice vindicated by the pressure of her 
 own wants of her own men. The allegation that it infringes the 
 rights of neutrals, and is an indignity to their sovereignty, should be 
 repelled by a reference to the search for enemy, persons as well 
 as property, which is admitted ; and at the same time the infor 
 mal arrangements which have been offered on this point should be 
 demonstrated to be all that safety and honor permit to be offered, 
 and to be such as ought to have been accepted. The shifts and 
 evasions by which our administration have eluded an accommoda 
 tion should be exposed, and the real inability of the United States 
 to bear the privations and self-denials they have voluntarily and 
 systematically become subject to, as the chosen means of coercing 
 Great Britain ; and the superior advantages Great Britain pos 
 sesses for that sort of contest, if she would resort to it, might be 
 proved. The conduct of the American government might also be 
 placed in a light that would justify hostile measures ; but it should 
 be insisted on that Great Britain has no vindictive feelings towards 
 the United States to gratify, and that she will not be wanting in 
 any reasonable measures to keep from them the miseries and per 
 haps ruin which a war with her might entail upon them. It 
 might be intimated that the late proceedings of the American gov 
 ernment appear so entirely without any adequate motives, and so 
 contrary to the true and obvious interests of the country, that it is 
 impossible not to suspect them of being produced by that fear and 
 influence of France which has overwhelmed the cabinets of other 
 states, where independence is now no more. It might be declared 
 that, if all the sacrifices of wealth, comfort, and conveniences which 
 we are voluntarily making are to be continued until Great Britain 
 yield her just rights, they will not speedily terminate, since those 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 885 
 
 will necessarily be supported with her life ; and on this the lan 
 guage of deliberate firmness should be employed, to dispel the 
 delusions that may exist. Finally, it should be stated that, while 
 an honorable accommodation is offered, with sincere wishes that a 
 just regard to the mutual welfare of both countries may prevent 
 a rupture, the pacific disposition and amicable intentions must not 
 be misconstrued, and the partiality of the American government to 
 her enemy must be kept within bounds. 
 
 Among the wise and good of every nation, Great Britain has 
 many friends. It cannot be otherwise. But, strictly speaking, 
 there is no British party here. Yet such a term is affixed as an 
 opprobrium to the names of many of the best of our citizens. 
 Great care ought to be taken therefore, at all times, to furnish no 
 materials for this villanous method of destroying the influence of 
 good men. 1 A nation that has exhibited to the world so much of 
 every thing to admire and esteem, so much of all that ennobles 
 human society, and above all that singularly felicitous combination 
 of liberty and law, that justice which has made her enviably 
 great, such a nation, if known to inhabit another planet, would 
 be interesting to every man who heard of their existence and 
 character. 
 
 I think, my dear sir, something like the ideas I have expressed 
 will occur to British statesmen ; and that, after Mr. Rose s return, 
 some official communication of them through parliament, or some 
 other channel, will be made. I hope they will be displayed with 
 the skill and ability with which they easily can treat such subjects, 
 if they should think it necessary. The temper should be mild, the 
 manner conciliatory, while the purpose may be jirrn, and avowed to 
 be so. Such a manifesto would produce good effects on both sides 
 of the Atlantic. Here it would promote the inclination for peace 
 and good understanding. In the mean time, whatever may be the 
 views of a few particular and ever public men, our people will 
 not be driven into a war with Great Britain, if she, by moderation, 
 justice, and prudence, furnishes no pretence, no new means of 
 inflaming the popular passions against her. I repeat then that, in 
 my opinion, Great Britain will do all she consistently can to avoid 
 war, because the advantage of it would be trifling to her, if any at 
 all, and the evils would be great to both countries. To her, they 
 would be lasting ; to us, intolerable and probably irreparable. If 
 
 1 All italics here and elsewhere are in the original manuscripts. 
 25 
 
386 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 our government wants the wisdom or the virtue to shun this terri 
 ble mischief, it is incumbent on Great Britain to practise both. 
 This is her interest, though in a much lower degree than ours. It 
 would defeat the designs of France, and could keep this country in 
 a solvable state for happier days, which may come soon, and proba 
 bly will come before the end of the present conflict. The incon 
 venience of our present measures is slight and temporary to Great 
 Britain, and in part believed by some a substantial good ; and, if 
 let alone, would be discontinued by us from choice. 
 
 You see, my dear sir, with what freedom I give you my thoughts, 
 without much order or method. They are, however, the result of 
 much reflection, and agree with those of my best friends, whose 
 hearts like my own are warm with the love of our country and 
 oppressed with anxiety for its fate. With unfeigned regard and 
 respect, I remain your affectionate friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, March 15, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I wrote you a tedious letter on the 12th, con 
 taining a rough sketch of my opinions of the course of conduct 
 towards this country which Great Britain would be likely to pur 
 sue. I expressed those opinions with confidence, because it seemed 
 to me such a course is so obviously wise. I am sensible, however, 
 there are many difficulties in the way, and that our government 
 may even make more still. Yet the true policy of the British ad- 
 ministration will be to foil every attempt to provoke them to put 
 this country into the hands of France. It will not be easy for 
 British pride to brook our foolish insolence in non-importation 
 laws, or other prohibitions, restrictive or discriminative, between 
 them and other nations, which are intended to injure them ; yet it 
 is completely in their power to retaliate (or perhaps only threaten 
 to retaliate) every measure of that sort in a manner unexception 
 able and yet efficacious. Our angry passions are subsiding, our 
 fears are serious of rupture, and our irresistible passion for com 
 merce will be listened to. Indeed, it ought to be ; for no country 
 in the world, perhaps, would suffer more from its abolition. 
 
 When you see Governor Sullivan s letter in the newspaper, you 
 will feel more of contempt than any other passion. Some of your 
 friends here think you will answer him with some severity. I think 
 
1807-U.] CORRESPONDENCE. 387 
 
 the perfect correctness of making the communication through him, 
 the only topic ; and on this not much need be said, because no man 
 doubts it. The inference that he has grossly violated his duty is 
 sufficiently obvious, not to need being much insisted on. 
 
 Yours truly, G. C. 
 
 P. S. Your letter is read with avidity, and gives great satisfac 
 tion. Fifty thousand persons in New England will have read it 
 before this month expires. 1 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 WASHINGTON, March 16, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, This evening I received your letter of 
 the 9th, and, in a blank cover, a correct copy of my letter to Gov 
 ernor Sullivan, in a neatly printed pamphlet. With your approba 
 tion, and the approbation of others whom I respect, esteem, and 
 love, I could be well content, and would cheerfully dispense with 
 the other kind of praise you mention ; but you rightly judge, it 
 will make me " neither vain nor angry " improbis vituperari, you 
 will recollect I had anticipated. And here you will allow me to 
 repeat what is often present to my mind, having heard it quoted, 
 times without number, by my father, " Woe unto you when all 
 men shall speak well of you." It is added, " for so did their 
 fathers to the false prophets." Truth, then (and our own experi 
 ence gives confirmation), is the very subject of evil-speaking. 
 
 1 This letter and the preceding one were sent by Colonel Pickering to 
 Mr. Rose, the British minister, together with the following letter from 
 Colonel Pickering himself : 
 
 PICKERING TO GEORGE HENRY ROSE. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, March 22, 1808. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Last evening I gave you a letter from George Cabot, Esq., 
 of Boston, one of my early friends, and one of the best of men, and as en- 
 lightened as he is good. Ten or twelve years ago, he was a senator in Con 
 gress from Massachusetts. But though eminently well informed in political 
 and commercial subjects, yet always averse to public life, he retired to 
 resume the quiet enjoyment of the pleasures of his domestic circle and of a 
 select society of friends, and of the studious leisure of a contemplative mind. 
 You will read his letter again and with fresh interest, and I pray you to con 
 sider it as the result, on its subject, of whatever there is of political wisdom 
 and real patriotism in Massachusetts ; for the best and most enlightened 
 men in that State are his friends and associates. 
 
 On my return to my lodgings, I found another letter from Mr. Cabot, which 
 came by the last evening s mail, and as it is on the same subject I send it to 
 you for the same purpose as the former. 
 
388 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 To-morrow or next day, you will receive my letters of the 10th 
 and llth, with several enclosures; among which, my friends here 
 think the governor s letter of the 3d and my answer of the 9th 
 may be published with some effect. 
 
 For a few days, I have heard nothing of the negotiation. 1 I can 
 only say that Mr. Rose is still here. 
 
 For some time past, I have feared that I should never see Mr. 
 Ames again. Your letter confirms my fears. " Quis desideriis sit 
 pudor aut modus tarn cari capitis." 
 
 The morning after I received his admirable " newspaper writ 
 ing" which you mention, I was going to send it to Mr. Rose, when 
 I found Mr. Stedman was doing it. Mr. Rose appears to be a 
 very amiable man, so amiable and so candid that, on so short an 
 acquaintance, I cannot think of him but as a friend. Some time 
 ago I wrote to you, expressing my ideas of the true policy of the 
 British government to be observed toward the United States, wish 
 ing to have them confirmed by yours. Mr. King s I have received. 
 He says, " I entirely agree in your opinion concerning the immense 
 importance to England as well as to America that the relations of 
 peace between them should be cherished and preserved," &c. I 
 have enclosed his letter to Mr. Rose, for I had told Mr. King it 
 was for that purpose I wanted his opinion. It was chiefly that he 
 might in person learn on this subject, and on the common interests 
 of the two countries, the sentiments of our wisest statesmen and 
 best citizens, that I have more than once advised and urged Mr. 
 Rose to travel hence as far as Boston, if the circumstances of his 
 mission should render it possible. His own dispositions are all we 
 could wish, and I have no doubt of his transmitting his impres 
 sions to his government. 
 
 MARCH 17. 
 
 I have just given Mr. Ames s communication to a member 
 of the House, to hand to the editor of the Washington " Feder 
 alist," and to urge him to print it. It is time that the silly notions 
 of those who direct and mouth and vote our national measures 
 should be attacked and subverted. Even the herd (who, as Tracy 
 used to say, have begun to walk on their hind legs) may understand 
 (if they read) the most material parts. 
 
 Always truly yours, T. PICKERING. 
 
 1 This refers to Mr. Hose s fruitless negotiation with Jefferson. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 389 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, March 18, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Last evening and this morning I received your 
 three packets relating to the Snllivanian controversy. 1 I regret 
 extremely that you could not know what was done here, which 
 would have saved much of your labor. But it was impossible you 
 should suspect the governor s fatuity to be so great as to publish 
 his own truly ridiculous letter. After this, I should not be sur 
 prised to see him publish your answer on Monday next in the 
 " Chronicle." I shall wait until that day is past before 1 decide 
 on the publication from the copy you have sent me. There will 
 be some of our own party who will not approve it, but they are 
 very few. The mass of them admire it, and I am satisfied it has 
 a good effect on both parties, and will help us more than any publi 
 cation we have had. 
 
 Our Legislature having risen and the publication having been 
 made, it will not be necessary to call on Mr. Otis. I was a few 
 days since at Dedham. Our friend is very low in health, so that I 
 shall not be surprised if he sinks entirely in a few months. My 
 hope that he will not rests on the remembrance that he rose last 
 year from a similar depression. He spoke of you with very great 
 approbation and friendship ; admires your letter, and thinks much 
 good will come out of it. Sincerely yours, G. C. 
 
 Since my long letter to you of the 12th, we have had short 
 arrivals from England here ; and I am much struck, indeed 
 much gratified, to see the coincidence of the opinions of the British 
 administration with those I had expressed as likely to be enter 
 tained by them. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 MARCH 20, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Yours of the 13th is this moment received, 
 and gives me much pleasure ; for the general complexion of it is 
 pleasing, although no positive good is specified. 
 
 You will in turn be gratified to know that you are read with 
 advantage through all New England. Some favorable changes in 
 the elections of our town officers in various places have taken place, 
 
 1 See Pickering s letter of March 11, to which this is an answer, given 
 above, p. 380. 
 
390 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 and some hope is indulged that our State elections may be such as 
 to give to the wise and good a power of deciding what Presidential 
 candidate shall have the votes of Massachusetts. On this head, how 
 ever, it is best for us to say as little and do as much as we can. 
 If Mr. Hose is not gone, he will doubtless observe these changes, 
 which may have a great effect on our foreign policy : indeed, " muta 
 bility " is inscribed on whatever pertains to our government. 
 
 I do not know that it is necessary to remind you that in these 
 evil days we must be circumspect in all that we say, and still more 
 in what we write, concerning our relations to foreign powers. The 
 most patriotic and honorable intentions would be perverted by un 
 principled men, and their authors persecuted, if they were known. 
 What I wrote you is precisely what I maintain often in conversa 
 tion ; yet, in the shape you have it, I would rather it should not be 
 seen. 
 
 I have not yet decided to publish your reply to the governor. 
 One or two friends desire it much, and another with myself thinks 
 it doubtful, and at any rate it may be delayed a few days. When 
 things go well, all experiments are to be avoided. I shall observe 
 your direction, " to forget you and think of the public." 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 APRIL 2, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your answer to Sullivan has been very gen 
 erally approved in a high degree, and stimulated anew the public 
 inclination to read the public letter. 
 
 In spite of all my vis inertice, I am forced to work much more 
 than I like. You draw and others drive me into the vortex of 
 politics, which I wish to shun. You can hardly imagine how active 
 we are to secure the election, of which sanguine hopes are now 
 entertained by most of the good men. 
 
 I am a little surprised at the comprehensiveness of Jefferson s 
 declaration in his message concerning the communication of our 
 affairs with France. If there is nothing really alarming or insolent 
 in the official correspondence, whence does he learn that France 
 menaced us with captures, confiscation, &c., which I am persuaded 
 he knows ? Did Dr. Bullers, an ^accredited messenger, bring it ? 
 
 Mr. Hillhouse s letter will be a valuable auxiliary to yours, and 
 care will be taken to place it before the public as soon as possible 
 after it comes to hand. Yours truly, G. C. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 391 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 APRIL 5, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Our newspapers of this date will damp your 
 hopes of our election. We are all disappointed. I received your 
 letter of the 27th ult., with two copies enclosed of other letters, all 
 which gave me great pleasure ; and I am satisfied with the use 
 made of mine. 1 Although our people now begin to suffer very 
 much from the embargo, yet it appears that other feelings are 
 stronger, and other passions govern them. The individual wishes 
 things to go better, but he prefers to govern others rather than 
 be ruled by them. When shall we understand fully the nature of 
 democratic theories? When shall we be satisfied that a govern 
 ment altogether popular in form tends irresistibly to place in power 
 the levellers of public authority, order, and law ? The people will 
 not permit their own passions, their own favorite objects, to be 
 made to give place to the general good. The small voice of reason 
 will be generally drowned in the clamors of vice and folly. But I 
 have no right to vent my discontents to one who from situation 
 must see and feel more than enough of these mortifying truths. 
 With sincere regard and esteem, I am 
 
 Always yours, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 APRIL 9, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I received your letters of the 28th and 30th, 
 and the printed papers under other covers. Our election of gov 
 ernor will be Democratic, but the majority will be very small ; 
 and we still expect the Cumberland senators will one of them be 
 Federal, and perhaps both. In this case, our condition will be 
 better than last year. Whoever views the democratic theory, in 
 the true light, will perceive that the natural downward course of 
 our affairs is for the moment obstructed, or changed by accidental 
 causes. I think observing men will be sensible that, if our election 
 had been held two months ago, the Federalists would have been 
 outvoted by many thousands. But though party feelings in a 
 large part of the community must prevail over all others, yet 
 many men are alarmed at the shameful and dangerous conduct of 
 
 1 They had been sent to Mr. Rose, as stated above, in note, p. 387. 
 
392 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 the national administration toward foreign powers ; and this uneas 
 iness is the principal cause of the great Federal vote. Your col 
 league, 1 however, thinks us all in the wrong, and has written a long 
 letter to persuade the people so. It is now in the press, and will 
 appear on Monday or Tuesday, when I will send you a copy. I 
 am told its chief .object is to controvert the sentiments contained 
 in your letter. I think, however, events are daily unfolding which 
 will prove that the policy of peace and good understanding with 
 England as a security against France is truly wise. 
 
 Yours sincerely, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 APRIL 11, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I received yesterday your two letters of the 
 2d, and a copy of that of Champagny. 2 This having already 
 appeared in the newspaper, I regretted your labor in transcribing 
 it. Upon reading Madison and Rose, I was surprised that the 
 latter had not made a better use of the argument he evidently 
 possessed. 
 
 By the mail of this day, I have sent you, under a blank cover, 
 J. Q. Adams s letter. 3 There is a good deal of presumption in it, 
 and a good deal of slang ; but, on the whole, considering how apt 
 he is to be violent, I did not find him more so than I had expected. 
 I don t see how it can be known that Buonaparte has not declared 
 he will have no neutrals. His conduct, his decrees, arid Cham- 
 pagny s letter, certainly give credibility to the opinions of those 
 who believe that he has declared so. The paucity of cases in which 
 
 1 John Quincy Adams. 
 
 2 I take this to refer to a letter from Champagny, the French minister of 
 foreign relations, to our minister at Paris, General Armstrong. This letter, 
 together with one from Erskine, the British minister, to Madison, was trans 
 mitted to Congress by the President, April 2, 1808. Erskine s was a simple 
 defence of the British policy towards neutrals. Champagny s was an insult 
 ing command that we should at once go to war with England ; and the 
 information was added that, in the emperor s opinion, war already existed 
 between Great Britain and the United States. Acting on this view, Cham 
 pagny said our vessels were to be sequestered until it was seen whether we 
 engaged in war with England, as was our manifest duty. See Waite s State 
 Papers, VI. 209. 
 
 8 This was a " Letter to the Hon. Harrison Gray Otis, on the Present State 
 of our National Affairs ; with Remarks upon Mr. Pickering s Letter to the 
 Governor of the Commonwealth." 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 
 
 the European nations have taken their men is surely no argument 
 against the fact of their maintaining such right by asserting it as 
 often as there is opportunity. But I am not going to comment on 
 what I have scarcely read, and from which I turned with disgust. 
 I think, however, that all the answers should be written with per 
 fect temperance and moderation, that men may not forget the 
 reality of our safety from France depends on Great Britain s being 
 able to defend herself. G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 APRIL 15, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I do not know whether I have acknowledged 
 all your letters in the order they were received. Last evening, 
 a couple of packets with printed enclosures came to hand. Our 
 newspapers begin to attack the letter of your colleague, and will 
 probably persist until all its falsities and fallacies as well as weak 
 ness shall be fully exposed. 
 
 In the case of Ratford, 1 insinuated to be still alive in Pennsyl 
 vania, we see a renewal of the wretched attempt to persuade the 
 country that Bobbins 2 was a native of Danbury. I have been 
 asked how you would escape from the charge of inconsistency, in 
 having concurred in the resolution on which the non-importation 
 law was bottomed, and now arguing against measures naturally 
 following it, while Great Britain persists in the same conduct. 
 My answer is that, whatever may have been your motives for that 
 concurrence, you are completely justified in your present views of 
 the policy which now ought to be pursued from the general aspect 
 of our foreign relations. But I say distinctly that Great Britain, 
 in the treaty just now rejected, has done her part toward settling 
 amicably and reasonably the principal question, that of the colo- 
 
 1 Ratford, alias Wilson, was one of the men taken from the " Chesa 
 peake." He was proved on trial to be a British deserter from the " Halifax " 
 man-of-war, and was hung at Halifax, in Nova Scotia. 
 
 2 Robbins was the assumed name of Thomas Nash, a leader in the mutiny 
 on board the British ship " Hermione," in 1797. Nash escaped to this coun 
 try, and the British government applied to have him given up. Nash set 
 up as a defence that his name was Jonathan Robbins, and that he was a 
 native of Danbury, Connecticut. This defence broke down. He was given 
 up, and was hanged at Halifax. The cry was raised that President Adams 
 had surrendered an American citizen, and that the proof of Nash s Irish 
 origin and British citizenship was manufactured for the occasion, by our 
 government. 
 
394 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 nidi trade; and that, she having given this ample proof of her 
 equitable disposition on that point, a measure which might pos 
 sibly have been once thought expedient to employ against her 
 would now be highly improper. I have been reading Baring s 
 pamphlet, published February 7th at London. 1 It is the best per 
 formance on the subject of our disputes with Great Britain, and 
 shows him to be a very well-informed man. Allowance is to be 
 made, however, for anti-ministerialism. I have made a few notes 
 in the margin, which indicate my objections, and shall send the 
 work to you by post. Yours truly, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 APRIL 20, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I received last evening your favor of the 
 12th. As you must be much occupied until the close of the ses 
 sion, I indulge a hope that, with all your incredible industry, you 
 will not finish your letter to Sullivan. My reason is that you 
 will probably think it necessary to take some notice of the violent 
 invective of your colleague, and perhaps it may be done as well in 
 your address to Sullivan as in any way. I think so much of this, 
 that, if it comes to hand, I shall be tempted to lay it under an 
 " embargo " till I hear from or see you. A cutting criticism on 
 Adams s letter as a literary performance will appear in the " Pal 
 ladium," I am told, on Friday, which shall be transmitted. Many 
 answers to parts of the letter are issuing from the press, and 
 I have reason to believe one or two pamphlets will be written. I 
 cannot go through the labor of expressing my opinions on Mr. 
 Hillhouse s motion ; but will the strong man let a weaker bend 
 him? Yours Jideliter, G. C. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 CITY OP WASHINGTON, April 22, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I am myself frightened, and you will be 
 alarmed, at the length of my third letter to Governor Sullivan. 
 
 1 "On the British Orders in Council." The author was Alexander Bar 
 ing, son of Sir Francis Baring, and afterwards Lord Ashburton. He had 
 resided many years in this country, and had married a daughter of William 
 Bingham, United States senator from Pennsylvania. Mr. Baring was at 
 this time a Whig in politics, and, of course, an opponent of the Tory 
 administration. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 395 
 
 Forty-three pages ! I have examined and re-examined in order 
 to discover what more I can dash out, but am now at my ne plus 
 ultra. What can be done with it? Is the public mind satiated 
 with addresses ? Will even my friends not have patience to read 
 it? Driven to a vindication never before contemplated, I am 
 strongly impressed with the importance of laying it before the 
 public. In regard to Sullivan, ought this just call to scourge him 
 to be let slip? What will be the reflections of himself and his 
 partisans, to the chief of whom he will certainly communicate his 
 letter of March 18, and what their reports among their underlings, 
 if I remain wholly silent on the monstrous charges that letter 
 contains ? Ought this opportunity of clearly convicting him of 
 deliberate falsehood to be neglected ? 
 
 Perhaps you may think some variations proper or expedient. 
 Such can without difficulty be made (seeing the letter is to go 
 directly to the printer) in my absence. Congress will doubtless 
 rise the 25th, but it will probably be as late as the 8th or 10th of 
 May before I reach Boston. To postpone its publication till that 
 time would seem to me to lessen its effect. Even now I fear the 
 delay which has taken place may be rather unfavorable. As to 
 alterations, " what you d have it, make it." I think they cannot 
 be numerous, and consequently not occasion you a great deal of 
 trouble ; while I regret that my communications have given you 
 so much. 
 
 A bill has passed both Houses, vesting the President with power 
 to suspend the embargo laws, in the event of peace, or a suspen 
 sion of hostilities in Europe, or of such changes in the orders and 
 decrees of the belligerents respecting neutrals as in the President s 
 opinion will render it safe to renew our foreign commerce. And 
 he may suspend the embargo in whole or in part. I had objected 
 to the words, as opening a door for dangerous partialities. My 
 colleague, by way of reply, as it seemed, and notwithstanding all 
 his anathemas against the British (and he never lets slip an oppor 
 tunity to vent his hatred at them), said, "If the British orders 
 should be repealed, I would remove the embargo as to England in 
 the teeth of Buonaparte." He continued, " But if France repeal 
 her decrees, and Britain leave hers in force, I am not prepared to 
 say I would remove the embargo in respect to France." What a 
 strange man ! But with all this ostensible independence, and im 
 partiality towards the two great belligerents, I do not recollect to 
 
396 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 have ever heard from his mouth one reproachful expression of the 
 French or their master. When, pretty early in the session, Mon 
 roe s negotiations with Canning about the " Chesapeake " were read 
 in the Senate (confidentially), he said to Mr. Goodrich, "There is 
 now no cause of war with England." Perhaps no one longer 
 extended his charity towards Mr. Adams than I, but I have in this 
 session given him up. Bayard lately said to me, " He is com 
 pletely sold." I do not know, among my Federal friends, one who 
 thinks otherwise. 
 
 APRIL 23. 
 
 My letter. Its first object, in order, is the exposure of Sulli 
 van ; but its most important object is the vindication of my char 
 acter. The latter, perhaps, should be exclusive of all electioneering 
 views. Take both into consideration, and decide on the most 
 auspicious time for its publication. You will allow me to submit 
 it to your correct judgment. 
 
 When I say " its most important object is the vindication of my 
 character," I do not mean as it respects my individual self, but in 
 respect to every public consideration connected with that vindication, 
 not excluding, however, the immediate interests of my family and 
 friends in having the fairness of that character maintained. Is it 
 not of some importance to have the letter published immediately, 
 on account of the part which touches my colleague ? For I cun- 
 not write one syllable in reply to this to Mr. Otis, until I return 
 home. For myself, I declare to you that, if all his learning an 
 ample store and all his talents could by one act of volition be 
 transferred to me, and I must take with them the single sentiment 
 he uttered on the passing of the first embargo law, all would in my 
 estimation be lighter than a feather. That degrading sentiment 
 would haunt me like a ghost, and never let me rest. I should be 
 ashamed to meet the face of any man who knew me. The publi 
 cation of that sentiment should refute every thing in his letter 
 which depends on opinion arid compunction, every thing short of 
 incontrovertible facts. 1 
 
 I enclose a copy of Sullivan s, of March 18th. 
 
 I am, my dear sir, 
 
 Your greatly obliged friend, T. PICKERING. 
 
 1 The sentiment here referred to was contained in Mr. Adams s speech 
 on the first embargo law : " I would not deliberate, I would act," &c. See 
 p. 425. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 397 
 
 CABOT TO EGBERT BENSON. 
 
 BOSTON, Aug. 2, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, It is proposed to get up a book to commemo 
 rate the worth of our excellent friend, Ames. It will be a single 
 volume, and it will be grateful to his friends to see a- large sub 
 scription of the wise and good. We are not willing that any thing 
 like solicitation should be used, yet it may be proper for you and 
 Mr. Wolcott to suggest to a few opulent friends the expediency of 
 taking a couple of copies each. A number of gentlemen here have 
 taken two and three, and a few have taken five. Will you say to 
 Mr. Wolcott what I have written, and, after assuring him of all 
 my regard, accept the remainder yourself ? 
 
 Yours truly, G. CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Aug. 10, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have seen Mr. Barton s letter, 1 addressed to 
 you. There is a correspondence between some gentlemen here 
 and others at Philadelphia on the subject of it ; and on Monday 
 next a conference will be held at New York by gentlemen from 
 various quarters, with a view to examine the means and decide the 
 manner of applying them to the great question of the Presidency. 
 The gentlemen from this place are Mr. Otis, Mr. Gore, and Mr. 
 Lloyd. To the first I have shown Mr. Barton s letter, but I 
 believe that all he writes is also known from others. 
 
 Yours truly always, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 OCT. 5, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I enclose a list of the vessels which have been 
 " permitted " to sail from this port since the embargo laws passed. 
 I have not heard that any of them were captured, though it is 
 possible that some one or two may have been ; and my inquiry, 
 which is very limited, may not have ascertained it. You will 
 
 1 This letter is preserved among the Pickering MSS. in the possession of 
 the Massachusetts Historical Society. It sets forth a plan for forming a 
 junction with Clintonians against Madison, which was to be proposed at a 
 meeting of Federalists about to be held in Pennsylvania. 
 
LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14 
 
 doubtless be told that five out of six which sailed for France from 
 some of our ports have been captured and condemned, though in 
 ballast. It should be recollected, however, they were obnoxious to 
 the orders of council by attempting to enter the prohibited coun 
 tries after notice, and no man supposed vessels going to such coun 
 tries would not be liable. The English have chosen to take the 
 lex talionis for a justification of those orders ; but, in fact, the 
 ports interdicted were in general so closely and constantly invested 
 by a naval force as to give them all the rights of a blockade, and 
 the capture of five in six of the vessels proves it. The demands of 
 underwriters for insurance against British capture would show how 
 effectual their blockades are known to be by men who are the best 
 judges. Your sincere and faithful friend, G. CABOT. 
 
 Since the within writing, I have seen from several quarters 
 letters expressing apprehensions that a disunion of the States is 
 meditated by the Federalists. Some Federalists have been made 
 to believe there was foundation for these insinuations, and the 
 Democrats at the Southward are using this story to deter men 
 from acting with the Federalists. I think, therefore, it will be 
 well to pass some very decided resolution on the importance of 
 maintaining the Union inviolate under every trial, &c. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Nov. 11, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, On the other side, you will find a memo 
 randum l of the state of our maritime insurance at three principal 
 offices. It may not be accurate in every little particular, but is 
 sufficiently so for all purposes of general reasoning. The result 
 you will find to be perfectly coincident with the ideas of the Feder 
 alists. It appears that the actual losses are so small, that, if the 
 undetermined risks issue in the same ratio of loss as those which 
 have ended, the profit of the insurers will be very handsome. 
 
 But what avails it that our opinions are correct, and those of 
 our opponents absurd ? Will they adopt ours ? I think not. 
 With the folly, prejudice, and vice of the country on their side, 
 they can do infinite mischief, and entail upon us irremediable evils, 
 and I believe they will. Yours truly always, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 1 Note by Mr. Octavius Pickering. [The following facts are given in 
 T. P. s speech of Nov. 30, 1807. 0. P.] 
 
1807-14.1 CORRESPONDENCE. 399 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 Nov. 23, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, After seeing Mr. Canning s masterly letter l 
 I do not wonder at the rage of the friends of our administration. 
 They who are disgraced must feel resentment. Nothing has morti 
 fied me so much in all our political discussions as to see the facility 
 with which good men have been duped so as to lend their aid to 
 their destroyers. Too many of our merchants have thoughtlessly 
 countenanced opinions and measures which are wrong, and thus 
 have enabled the government to pursue a system which, without 
 such aid, they must have abandoned. It is, however, some satis 
 faction to observe the amelioration of public opinion here. It is a 
 fact that the declaration of our Legislature against the Presidenc s 
 continuing his proclamation was supported by more hearts than 
 voices ; and I cherish the belief that New England will steadily 
 oppos.e as unjust and unnecessary a war with Great Britain. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BOSTON, Nov. 27.. 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Mr. Olney informs me of the safe arrival of 
 the engravings, and promises to send them forward by a suitable 
 conveyance. I owe you an acknowledgment of two letters con 
 cerning your care of this business, 2 and must trouble you still 
 further when the next parcels come to New York. In all this, 
 however, I know full well that I give you pleasure. 
 
 As you well remember the course of my opinions on the destiny 
 of our country, you will not be surprised to learn from me now 
 that I consider the government of vice and folly as inevitable until 
 the evils they bring shall, by their excess, necessarily bring reme 
 dies. But, however all these things may be, believe me always, 
 with unfeigned affection and esteem, 
 
 Your friend, and obliged GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 1 In reply to Pinkney s proposing a repeal of the orders in council on 
 condition of the repeal of the embargo, see Hildreth, VI. 90-92; also 
 Waite s State Papers, VI. 288. 
 
 2 The publication of Ames s Works. 
 
400 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 WASHINGTON, Dec. 1, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have received your letter of the 23d ult. 
 The administration and their friends are indeed enraged at the 
 mortifying situation in which Mr. Canning s letter has placed them. 
 Anderson, 1 of the Senate (whose person, I believe, you must re 
 member), in a petulant but silly speech he made at me to-day, had 
 the folly to say, among other things, that Canning was acting the 
 part of Genet, and that he believed his letter was intended to be 
 an appeal from our government to the people ! If I had not an 
 swered his remarks instanter, I should not have infringed the sacred 
 rule, "Let not the sun go down upon thy wrath," his insignifi 
 cance screening him from one s indignation, though he is not 
 below contempt ; so I thought a few gentle stripes might not be 
 misapplied. On Canning s letter, I had only to observe that it 
 was not, nor ever would be, published by him. It was presented 
 to the American people by their own government. 
 
 The supporters of the administration are sick of the embargo, 
 but the ground taken cannot at once be relinquished. An instant 
 repeal would wound their pride ; but, conscious of their own base 
 ness, their pride would give way, if their false character for supe 
 rior wisdom and patriotism would not fall with it. 
 
 But they cannot save themselves from perdition. One corner of 
 the curtain which concealed the insincerity, the duplicity, the false 
 hood of the executive, has been lifted up. It will be raised still 
 higher, and all their deformity be exposed. They must sink. 
 Their partisans will make every possible effort to support them, 
 knowing that they fall with their two leaders. Madison must 
 necessarily be privy to all the impostures practised by the Presi 
 dent ; and, partaking in the fraud, he must participate in its punish 
 ment. The detection comes too late to defeat his election. But 
 assuredly the corrected public sentiment will control his measures ; 
 and he may even derive some credit for administering the govern 
 ment properly, though against his will. 
 
 Mr. Giles is to make a speech to-morrow on the resolution for 
 repealing the embargo, after which, perhaps, the question may 
 be taken ; and though he himself is staggered, and others tremble, 
 
 1 Joseph Anderson, senator from Tennessee. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 401 
 
 they will doubtless, at this time, reject it. Perhaps this may be 
 requisite, more effectually to dissolve the spell which has distracted 
 the public mind. 
 
 Faithfully and affectionately yours, T. P. 
 
 The followers of Jefferson are sufficiently angry with me, and 
 yet (though not aware of it) pay me no small compliment. At 
 the head of all the publications on this side of the water, which 
 induced the British government not to revoke the orders of council, 
 Anderson placed my letter to Sullivan. And a member of the 
 House, of vastly more consequence than Anderson, Burwell, x 
 told Quincy, just at the opening of the session, that but for my let 
 ter the orders would have been revoked ! Really, these gentlemen 
 go far beyond you, and in effect call in question your penetration. 
 You saw only that I had done you the honor of making you one 
 of Governor Sullivan s councillors : they have discovered that I 
 direct the councils of the British Empire ! 
 
 I am, &c., T. P. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Dec. 15, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, . ... It is plain to me that the governing 
 party, after ten years perseverance in vindicating the abominable 
 conduct of France and criminating the venial conduct of England, 
 are compelled to abandon the defence of the former. But, in doing 
 this, they seize the advantage offered by the corrupt state of public 
 opinion, of placing those two nations on the same ground as ag 
 gressors. This opinion, while it shall continue, must blast every 
 effort that can be used toward the establishment of a just policy. 
 I know the tide of prejudice is overwhelming you in Congress, and 
 therefore you can do but little for the safety of the nation ; yet 
 that little is precious. I have no desire to see any of my friends 
 there attempt to display those great truths which are indispensable 
 for the people to know until the people are better prepared to 
 receive them ; but the newspapers may be used with great effect 
 until you stop them by law. An examination of the despatches 
 appears in the " Centinel," and is reprinted in the " Repertory," 
 which I think will lay open fairly the scandalous duplicity of our 
 
 1 William A. Burwell, member from Virginia from 1806-21. 
 26 
 
402 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 government (to use no worse terms), by which we are subject to 
 evils, which, if continued, will burst the bands of society, unless, 
 indeed, Mr. Gallatin means to get rid of the embargo by showing 
 the difficulty of maintaining it. I should infer from his letter, and 
 the general course of our internal affairs, it was intended seriously 
 to arouse the dominant party against the minority, and thus to 
 crush them as a political party, under the pretence of executing 
 the law. My present purpose of writing, however, is not to specu 
 late on the dangerous views of the administration, but to ask of 
 you to read * the Analysis," l and, if you think it useful, to procure 
 its republication in suitable places. You will find the work more 
 and more interesting as it advances. 
 
 Yours truly always, G. C. 
 
 DEC. 15, 1808. P. M. 
 
 I had written the enclosed at the council chamber, but was too 
 late for the mail this morning. Since my letter, I have received 
 your EXCELLENT SPEECH. 2 On the topics it treats, you have taken 
 precisely the course I wished. Your modesty may prevent you 
 from doing with it all the good of which it is capable, but sure I 
 am you ought to transmit to sensible good men in various quarters 
 a copy. Here, we shall give it circulation in the newspaper or 
 a pamphlet. I say, then, of you and Lloyd and Hillhouse, you 
 deserve well of your country. So fare you well. G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Dec. 18, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, .... I was rejoiced to see your colleague s 8 
 observation on the futile argument so often urged about starving 
 England by our withholding supplies of grain, when she brews 
 into beer more than we ever sell to her, and almost as much as we 
 can spare to the whole world. This truth displaces a dangerous 
 error, from which we have suffered much. I only regret that it is 
 not possible to dispel other errors still more dangerous. I regret 
 that so many causes have concurred to establish opinions in our 
 country which I think absolutely false, and which, while they prevail, 
 
 1 By John Lowell. 
 
 2 On the embargo, delivered November 30 and December 1. 
 Mr. Lloyd. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 403 
 
 are insuperable obstacles to a just and wise national policy. Even 
 good men seem to think it a great point gained that the friends of 
 the administration place the conduct of the two belligerents towards 
 us on the same ground of injustice. Now, if it be true that, with 
 few exceptions and those always fairly healed, Great Britain has 
 habitually treated us with due respect, and that France has gen 
 erally, and especially the last ten years, violated every obligation 
 toward us, and held us in perfect contempt, how can we take a 
 right position toward those two powers, with the present corrupt 
 state of public opinion ? We must think more justly before we 
 can act so ; and, if we are incapable of this, we must suffer, and 
 shall suffer bitterly. 
 
 Yours truly always, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO WOLCOTT. 
 
 BOSTON, Dec. 28, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I perceive with you that, bad as the times 
 are, they are to become worse. I add with the most painful 
 regret that, in my opinion, the evils which we suffer, and those 
 which we justly fear, are the natural offspring of our vices, vanity, 
 and folly as a people. I cannot admit that we have an election 
 between the two great belligerents which we shall treat as an 
 enemy. God forbid it! But I pray you not to imagine that, 
 because I entertain these sentiments and think them defensible 
 against the general opinion of the country, I indulge any expecta 
 tions of seeing them prevail. I have no such hope. My mind has 
 for many years been completely settled that the fate of our coun 
 try is inevitable, and all that good men can possibly do is only to 
 mitigate in some degree or defer calamities which no human virtue 
 and skill can avert. I am indeed mortified that my friends some 
 times compel me to take a nominal part in public agency, but I 
 weakly yield to personal solicitation what I should deny to other 
 motives. Forgive me, if these intimations of my political despond 
 ency disgust you, assured that I am always sincerely, 
 
 With high esteem and regard, your friend and servant, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
404 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 CITY OP WASHINGTON, Jan. 11, 1809. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Yesterday I received in a pamphlet the able analy 
 sis of the late correspondence between our administration and Great 
 Britain and France. Some of its numbers I had not before seen. 
 They now appear with a preface, in which is this passage : " The 
 public mind, excited in the highest degree by real distress and 
 more dreadful prospects, has sought in secondary causes the source 
 of our public calamities. The arrestation of our commerce, the 
 total annihilation of external as well as internal trade, are effects, 
 not causes. They are the instruments employed to scourge and 
 afflict us. But the secret and hidden causes of the infliction of this 
 punishment are to be sought elsewhere. Remove our commercial 
 restraints and our evils are not cured : our malady will only become 
 the more inveterate. Measures will succeed so much more disastrous 
 as to make us look back to our present sufferings and to hail them as 
 blessings." I understand the writer to mean that a removal of the 
 embargo will involve us in a war with Great Britain. This is the 
 precise sentiment which our administration wish to have impressed 
 on the minds of the people of the United States. Let this impres 
 sion be made, and the embargo will be in effect what it is in form, 
 permanent. Now, my dear sir, be assured that this alternative, 
 an indefinite continuance of the embargo or war with Great Brit 
 ain, is a pernicious error. At a distance from the seat of gov 
 ernment, indeed, the conduct of the administration, the war speeches 
 of its devoted adherents, and the irritations intended to be excited 
 by the newspapers, alike devoted, certainly tend to produce such an 
 impression. But I beg you to be persuaded that, whatever may 
 be the faith of the mass of these devotees who are not let into the 
 secrets of the cabinet, the administration will not make war on 
 Great Britain. The threatening language daily heard is not en 
 titled even to the rank of gasconade or bullying, because the admin 
 istration know full well that all such gasconade and bullying have 
 been and will be viewed by Great Britain with utter contempt. 
 But such language is well enough adapted to impose on the citizens 
 of the United States, by terrifying them with the evils of a war with 
 Great Britain, to induce them quietly and patiently to submit to the 
 evils of the embargo. You may say (and I know not how to contradict 
 you) that old prejudices and attachments to France, which, 
 
1807-14.1 CORRESPONDENCE. 405 
 
 through all affected disguises, are still visible in those who have 
 brought us into our present disastrous situation, and their never- 
 dying hatred of England, prompt them to such a war. But, while the 
 people of the United States would manfully encounter every evil 
 incident to a necessary war, the administration are not satisfied that 
 the same people, even duped as they long have been by a thousand 
 artifices, will be persuaded that war with Great Britain is at this 
 time unavoidable. The administration surely make some calcula 
 tion of the expenses of such a war, and know that it could not be 
 carried on without new taxes, which would hazard or render cer 
 tain their own overthrow, and make way for successors of a differ 
 ent character. They know that, in the actual state of the world, 
 our commerce during a war with Great Britain would be compar 
 atively trifling, and the ordinary revenues not equal to the present 
 necessary expenses of government ; and they know that, without 
 adequate funds pledged for the regular payment of the interest and 
 the eventual discharge of the principal of new debts to the vast 
 amount which must be incurred to maintain a war with Great 
 Britain, money could not be borrowed. They know, or ought to 
 know, that the conquest of Canada and Nova Scotia would cost 
 more than they would be worth, and that the conquest of the 
 latter would be impracticable without a naval force far surpassing 
 that we now possess. They know that these conquests, if effected 
 by the expenditure of many millions of dollars, and at the expense 
 of many thousand lives of valuable citizens, could not be maintained 
 without a vast annual expense to support the armies which must 
 be stationed in those regions for their defence. Finally, they 
 know and rely upon it, my dear sir, that, if they think at all, they 
 deeply ponder this that, if Canada and Nova Scotia were added 
 to the United States, they would add just so much to the popula 
 tion and strength of the northern section of the Union, the power 
 of which, of all things, our present rulers would endeavor to prevent. 
 Make what use you think proper of this letter. This is not a 
 time to shrink from any responsibility in which the public safety is 
 involved. 
 
 I am, &c., T. P. 
 
406 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 JAN. 18, 1809. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Your favor of the llth is this moment re 
 ceived. I presume you know that Mr. Lowell is the writer of the 
 " Analysis," as well as of many other excellent publications here. 
 We do not, however, differ from you materially in the views you 
 take of the policy of the administration. It is not believed by us 
 that they intend a war with Great Britain, but that, by menacing 
 us with that calamity, they expect to terrify us into acquiescence 
 with their oppressive embargo and its concomitants. We do be 
 lieve, however, that the administration have only to elect between 
 their own disgrace or the ruin of their country. They would dread 
 the consequences of a British war, which you have described, and 
 therefore they do not contemplate declaring it ; but they have taken 
 a course which leads to it, if they persist. They know the embargo 
 will not be borne much longer, and they must be prepared with a 
 substitute of a character coincident with their general policy. This 
 policy requires a non-intercourse, with such provisions as, in effect, 
 will be hostile, unjustifiably hostile, to Great Britain, and she will 
 necessarily retaliate. The present obnoxious measure being re 
 moved, the nominal relief would be popular ; and yet we should in 
 fact have no trade, and should only be permitted to go upon the 
 ocean to provoke British captures, which our laws will justify her 
 in making, but which will be universally odious in our country. 
 Whether this would be called war or not, its pernicious effects on 
 us would be the same. Our government ought to raise the em 
 bargo, and leave commerce free ; but this they know would offend 
 France, and therefore they refuse to do it. For the same reason, 
 they will adopt no substitute for the embargo that is not as favor 
 able to the wishes of France as the embargo itself ; and there are 
 so many foolish expedients, that would be popular and yet ruinous, 
 that we do truly fear some of them will be adopted. Such is the 
 explanation of the sentiment in the " Analysis." 
 
 With my best regards and respects to your colleague 1 and to the 
 " Old Sachem " 2 of the Connecticut tribe, I remain always 
 
 Your faithful G. C. 
 
 1 James Lloyd, the successor of J. Q. Adams. 
 
 2 James Hillhouse. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 407 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 JAN. 19, 1809. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, In a short letter yesterday, I explained in 
 some degree the apparent difference between our friends at Wash 
 ington and ourselves here. We think precisely alike of the policy 
 of the government, their views, intentions, and tricks ; but we think 
 a little differently of the consequences that may be produced. We 
 have therefore thought it wise to alarm our people here with a 
 just dread of those consequences, which are too likely to be realized. 
 We believe it has been useful to direct the public attention to the 
 danger of a British war, that they may the more strongly and 
 steadily resist every substitute for the embargo which shall be cal 
 culated to involve us in such a war. We think, too, these discus 
 sions operate favorably on all the best part of our community, by 
 compelling them to see that we have no cause of war with that 
 nation, and that, in fact, the want of any color of pretext to enter 
 into such a quarrel is now the most embarrassing circumstance to 
 the administration. We are sensible, at the same time, that in 
 other sections of the country our ideas give more effect to the vile 
 artifices the administration are practising. 
 
 Yours faithfully, G. C. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, May 9, 1809. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have received your letter of the 1st instant, 
 on the subject of Mr. Du Buc s proposition. Although I have no 
 authority to answer for the town of Boston, and certainly none to 
 answer for the State, yet I am satisfied that, in the present posture 
 of our affairs, neither the one nor the other of these communities 
 would enter into a serious engagement for the fortification of the 
 port. Indeed, every one knows that the national government is 
 intrusted with the care of our national defence, and to that alone 
 ought an application to be made. 
 
 I hope you will pardon my delay, when I inform you that I 
 waited for an opportunity to see a paper which was laid before the 
 council last June on military affairs, by the late governor. 
 
 I am, with unfeigned regard, always yours, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
408 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1807-14. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 MARCH 28, 1810. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, A packet franked by Mr. Quincy and a letter 
 covered to Colonel May were received the day before yesterday. 
 The reasoning on the subject of Jackson s * dismissal is so forcible 
 and perspicuous that it could not have failed to satisfy honest 
 doubts. But the truth is, we are past the period of argument on 
 that topic by about three weeks. Men will scarcely read a para 
 graph which professes to prove the fallacy or falsehood of the gov 
 ernment s pretensions concerning Jackson. This point occupies so 
 much of the letter, and is so interwoven with other parts of it, that 
 I do not hesitate to use the authority with which I am vested to 
 deposit it in my bureau until further order. 
 
 With the sincerest regard and esteem, I am ever truly yours, 
 
 GEORGE CABOT. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 JUNE 11, 1813. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, It is absolutely impossible for me to perform 
 the task prescribed in your letter. I have long since expelled from 
 my mind as much as possible every thought on the subject you 
 require me to consider. I perceive there is so much weight in the 
 reasons you suggest for a repeal of the non-intercourse law that it 
 may be expected to take place. The replenishing the treasury by 
 the double duties, and the supplies of some indispensable articles 
 to the enemy, are stronger motives for a repeal than any which 
 now exist for the continuance of that laV. If, however, the double 
 duties are faithfully collected (which I doubt), the Eastern and 
 commercial people will be most grievously oppressed ; for the con 
 sumption of imported articles by these is out of all proportion 
 greater than by the cultivators of the South and West. I hear 
 many persons express a hope that the repeal will not be agreed to, 
 unless the double duties are abolished ; and others hope it will be 
 resisted altogether, because they are not willing to raise money by 
 any means to support an unrighteous war. For my own part, I 
 grow more indifferent to any of these measures, believing fully 
 that, since our nation is so wicked and unjust as to enter upon this 
 
 1 Francis James Jackson, British minister at Washington. 
 
1807-14.] CORRESPONDENCE. 409 
 
 war, if it suffers, its sufferings will be salutary. I, therefore, shall 
 obey the laws constitutionally made, but shall conscientiously 
 refrain from every voluntary aid to the war, in thought, word, and 
 deed. With sincere regard and the highest esteem and respect, I 
 am always 
 
 Your assured friend, GEORGE CABOT. 
 
410 LIFE AND LETTERS J&& GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 1800-1805. 
 New England Federalism and the Hartford Convention. 
 
 I PROPOSE in the following chapters to give some ac 
 count of the Hartford Convention, of which Mr. Cabot had 
 the honor to be chosen President. His acceptance of this 
 office was the most momentous action of his life, and I 
 shall therefore endeavor to define with exactness the opin 
 ions and intentions which led him to take this step. To 
 do this properly, it becomes necessary not only to relate 
 the history of the Convention itself, but to trace the course 
 of political events which produced such a measure. This, 
 if performed with fulness, would be to write the history of 
 New England Federalism during the first decade and a half 
 of the present century ; and a biography offers neither 
 place nor occasion for so extended a work. By a careful 
 exclusion of all irrelevant matter, a brief sketch of New 
 England Federalism and its results may, I think, be pre 
 sented, and no point essential to a correct understanding of 
 the subject be left untouched. I shall aim to show not merely 
 what the Federalists did, but also what their opinions were ; 
 and, to do this successfully, I shall be obliged to trace, as 
 concisely as possible, the general policy of the administra 
 tion during this period. 
 
 Mr. Hildreth and Dr. Von Hoist have alone attempted 
 to treat the Hartford Convention and its antecedents his 
 torically : all other writers on the subject have been im 
 bued with a spirit of bitter partisanship. I cannot claim 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 411 
 
 impartiality, nor is it my intention to offer arguments either 
 for or against the Hartford Convention and its members. 
 I shall simply state the facts of the case, and leave the 
 work of deciding the merits of the question to the future 
 historian. I shall in this connection present some facts 
 which are wholly new and drawn from material never 
 before published, and these new facts will of necessity be 
 interwoven with many already familiar. 
 
 In enumerating the sources on which we may rely for evi 
 dence in regard to the history of the Convention and of the 
 New England Federalists, it is to be much regretted that 
 we cannot count testimony of the best and highest kind. 
 There is no evidence by a disinterested contemporary. 
 Partisan witnesses abound, however ; and we are especially 
 fortunate in respect to the opinions of opponents. 
 
 We have in great fulness the views of the most extreme 
 hostility as well as those of more temperate opposition. 
 But we are not compelled to trust to the frothy denuncia 
 tions of the Democratic press for a statement of the case 
 against the New England Federalists. The indictment has 
 been drawn up by one of their former associates with far 
 greater force and elaboration than any member of the 
 Democratic party was capable of exhibiting. In his sec 
 ond reply to the thirteen Boston gentlemen, in 1829, Mr. 
 John Quincy Adams has formulated an accusation against 
 the New England Federalists, pre-eminent both in extent 
 and in force. 1 With all the bitterness of confirmed enmity, 
 and sharpened by the peculiar animosity due to the family 
 nature of the quarrel, Mr. Adams s fierce polemic has con- 
 
 1 This second reply, here referred to, was never published. The repub- 
 lication, in 1828, of the accusations made by Mr. Adams in 1808, drew forth 
 from some quondam Boston Federalists a request for evidence, which Mr. 
 Adams in a long answer declined to give. The thirteen demandants then 
 issued an appeal to the public. These three documents were published. 
 Mr. Adams then prepared this second reply, but did not give it to the world. 
 Through the kindness of Professor Henry Adams, I have been allowed to 
 use this valuable paper. 
 
412 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 centrated in one pamphlet all that can be charged against 
 the Federalists. If worse things can be said about them, I 
 have failed to find them ; nor do I believe that they exist. 
 Mr. Adams, in common with Colonel Pickering, the chief 
 enemy of his early years, believed conscientiously that no 
 one who differed from him in opinion could be governed in 
 any action of life by aught except the vilest and basest 
 motives. Join such conviction as this to a power of vitu 
 peration unequalled except in rare instances even in New 
 England, and we have an accuser who would leave nothing 
 unsaid, and who would not seek to soften any thing that he 
 could say. So well provided with an opponent s views, we 
 are equally fortunate in the other direction. Not only from 
 Mr. Cabot s own letters, but in the fullest measure from 
 the Pickering papers, from those of Governor Strong, and 
 from the deprecating defences of Mr. Harrison Gray Otis, 
 are we enabled to gather the views of the New England 
 Federalists of all shades of opinion. Thus it is possible \o 
 know both the best and the worst that can be alleged for 
 or against the Federal leaders. The future may, and very 
 probably will, bring some new materials to light; but it 
 does not seem probable that any thing can be presented to 
 essentially modify or alter the evidence contained in the 
 papers now printed. 1 
 
 The principal points in Mr. Adams s accusations may be 
 resolved into seven heads, which I will enumerate here for 
 the sake of convenience. Mr. Adams charges : 
 
 I. That there was a plot among certain Federalist leaders 
 to dissolve the Union in 1804. 
 
 II. That this plot was never abandoned, but was re 
 newed in 1808 and in 1814. 
 
 1 This may appear a bold assertion, but it rests upon a conviction of its 
 truth derived from a long and careful study of the Pickering Papers. What 
 ever schemes of separation were fomented in New England, Colonel Picker 
 ing was the foremost in them. He surpassed all his associates in reckless 
 and daring opposition, and that which he did not know and share in regard 
 to New England Federalism cannot, I think, be vitally essential to its his 
 tory. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 413 
 
 III. That a dissolution of the Union was, as such, the 
 object and wish of certain Federalist leaders. 
 
 IV. That these leaders were in communication with 
 Great Britain in 1807-8, and subsequently. 
 
 V. That these leaders were a small band of adroit con 
 spirators, residing in Boston, who deceived and misled the 
 people, had no real popular support, represented nobody 
 but themselves, and sought only their own advancement 
 and the gratification of their own ambition. 
 
 VI. That the Hartford Convention was the culmination 
 of this conspiracy, and was intended as the preliminary step 
 to the attainment of the object of the conspirators, a disso 
 lution of the Union. 
 
 VII. That the Hartford Convention was unconstitutional 
 and treasonable, and was the only instance up to that time 
 of State resistance to the general government, and wholly 
 abnormal, hideous, and wicked. 1 
 
 Before proceeding with a detailed discussion of these 
 points, it seems proper to say a few words as to the origin 
 and principles of the Federalist party, and also to trace their 
 history after their fall from power in 1801 until the first 
 scheme of separation in 1804. The popular notion in re 
 gard to Federalism is that to which the name naturally 
 gives rise. By Federalists are commonly understood those 
 men who advocated a union of the States and an efficient 
 Federal government. This conception is true, but is at the 
 same time so limited that it may fairly be called superficial. 
 The name arose from the first object which the friends 
 of the Constitution strove to achieve ; but this object, the 
 more perfect union, and even the Constitution itself, were 
 but means to ends of vastly more importance. The ends 
 which the Federalists sought formed the great principles 
 on which the party was founded, and it can be justly said 
 
 1 I have endeavored to sum up fairly the essential accusations made by 
 Mr. Adams. I feel confident that I have not exaggerated them, and I trust 
 I have not weakened them. 
 
414 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 that no nobler or better ends were ever striven for by any 
 political party or by any statesmen. The first and para 
 mount object of the Federalists was to build up a nation 
 and to create a national sentiment. For this they sought 
 a more perfect union. Their next object was to give the 
 nation they had called into existence not only a govern 
 ment, but a strong government. To do this, they had not 
 only to devise a model, to draw a constitution, to organize a 
 legislature, executive, and judiciary, but they had to equip 
 the government thus formed with all those adjuncts without 
 which no government can long exist under the conditions 
 of modern civilization. The Federalists had to provide for 
 the debt, devise a financial and foreign policy, organize an 
 army, fortify the ports, found a navy, impose and collect 
 taxes, and put in operation an extensive revenue system. 
 We of the English race whose creed is that governments 
 and great political systems grow and develop slowly, are 
 the results of climate, soil, race, tradition, and the exigen 
 cies of time and place, who wholly disavow the theory that 
 perfect governments spring in a night from the heated 
 brains of Frenchmen or Spaniards can best appreciate the 
 task with which our ancestors grappled. But even we must 
 stand amazed, if we pause to consider the social and physi 
 cal circumstances under which this great experiment was 
 made. Thirteen distinct communities, scattered along a 
 vast extent of coast, with no ties to bind them but race, 
 language, and geographical isolation, were to be welded 
 into a compact, harmonious nation. Most of these commu 
 nities were dispersed over great territories, were agricul 
 tural, and were destitute of the commercial and moneyed 
 interests which demand so peremptorily a firm and stable 
 government. Moreover, these communities had always re 
 alized in large measure the blessings of little or no govern 
 ment. They were essentially self-governing, and depended 
 solely on their own good sense to maintain peace, order, and 
 justice. Against the mother country, the colonies had risen 
 
1800-5.] THE HABTFOKD CONVENTION. 415 
 
 in defence of the rights of Englishmen ; and after long years 
 of struggle, after bitter intestine broils, they had shaken off 
 the parental yoke. The contest had strengthened the inde 
 pendence and self-reliance of the colonists ; but it had also 
 fostered their distrust of all government, and had rudely 
 shaken even the weak local fabrics. What followed could 
 have been readily foreseen. The ill-contrived central gov 
 ernment of the Confederation went rapidly to pieces. With 
 no intrinsic strength, it could not resist the popular distrust, 
 jealousy, and contempt. Independence became turbulence ; 
 liberty, license ; and freedom, anarchy. A revulsion fol 
 lowed, and the Constitution was the result. Amidst natural 
 disadvantages, increased a thousand-fold by the miserable 
 years of the Confederation, Americans sought to build up a 
 nation. Upon a people lately convulsed by civil war, upon 
 a people who had lost their old political habits and tra 
 ditions without finding new ones in their stead, it was nec 
 essary to impose a government, and to create a national 
 sentiment. This the Federalists did, and they need no other 
 eulogy. With no undue national pride, we can justly say 
 that the adoption and support of the Constitution offer an 
 example of the political genius of the Anglo-Saxon race to 
 which history cannot furnish a parallel. 
 
 The political party to whose exertions these great results 
 were due was the Federal party. They were the party of 
 order, of good government, and of conservatism. Against 
 them was ranged a majority of their fellow-citizens. But 
 this majority was wild, anarchical, disunited. The only 
 common ground on which they could meet was that of sim 
 ple opposition. The only name they had was anti-Federal 
 ists. They had neither leaders, discipline, objects, nor even 
 a party cry. Before the definite aims and concentrated 
 ability of the Federalists, they fled in helpless disorder, like 
 an unarmed mob before advancing soldiers. But, though 
 dispersed, the anti-Federalists were still in a numerical ma 
 jority. They needed a leader, organization, and opportu- 
 
416 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 nity, and they soon found all three. Thomas Jefferson 
 arrived in New York, not only to enter into Washington s 
 cabinet, and lend the aid of his great talents to the suc 
 cess of the new scheme, but soon also to put himself at the 
 head of the large though demoralized opposition to the ad 
 ministration he had sworn to support. Filled with the wild 
 democratic theories which his susceptible nature had readily 
 imbibed in France, Jefferson soon infused them into the 
 minds of most of his followers. Instead of a vague dislike 
 to any and all government, he substituted a sharp and fac 
 tious opposition to each and every measure proposed by the 
 friends of the Constitution. To that Constitution he had 
 been strongly opposed, 1 and he endeavored to instil a like 
 distrust into the minds of his followers. Failing in this, 
 with his ready insight into popular wishes, and with his 
 instinctive appreciation of the latent political forces, he 
 changed his position to the more tenable ground of a strict 
 and limited construction. He found the opposition an inert 
 mass, and as far as possible he informed it with his own 
 spirit, the spirit of the French democrat. He found it with 
 out objects or principles, and he gave it both. He built up 
 a party creed sentence by sentence, as the Federalists ad 
 vanced from one measure to another. To bind the States 
 and to strengthen the national sentiment, to make the coun 
 try respected and prosperous, the genius of Hamilton de 
 vised and carried through the financial policy. Jefferson 
 met it by the cry of corruption, monarchy, and repudiation. 
 He denounced the national bank as an engine of despotism. 
 He sneered at the forms with which Washington strove 
 to hedge the dignity of his position. When Washington 
 formulated the two great principles of Federalism, a strong 
 neutrality supported by a sufficient navy, Jefferson, im 
 bued with an insane love of France, led his party into the 
 defence of that nation, and forced our politics to turn on 
 those of Europe. Appreciating the strength of the latent 
 * Jefferson s Works, III. pp. 315-318, 324, 325. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 417 
 
 hostility to England, lie roused it to frenzy, and strove to 
 divide the nation into a French and English party. From 
 the same motives, he resisted and opposed Jay s treaty ; and, 
 when he found himself unable to stay the national indigna 
 tion against the French, he grasped the terrible weapon of 
 States rights, and sought to coerce the national government 
 by the doctrine of nullification, by threats of secession, and 
 by the imminence of civil war. 1 
 
 The Federalists had come forward as the champions of 
 order, as the upholders of law, as the defenders of constitu 
 tional liberty, and of the rights of property. When they 
 found themselves confronted not by the constitutional 
 opposition which was to have been anticipated, but by 
 what seemed a Gallicized resistance to every thing that 
 was not license, they grew more and more convinced of the 
 imperative need of a strong and energetic government. 
 The extreme ground taken by Jefferson drove the Federal 
 ists to believe more and more firmly in the necessity of 
 stringent measures, and in the baneful character of every 
 thing approaching democracy. Yet the vigor and success 
 of their policy never gave them the support of a majority 
 of the people, except at the moment of enthusiasm awak 
 ened by the French outrages. Still, they maintained them 
 selves by sheer weight of ability, and for twelve years 
 frustrated the attacks of the opposition. With all his 
 marvellous political skill, with all his unequalled adroitness 
 in the management of men, Jefferson succeeded in drawing 
 over to his views but one man of real ability. Madison 
 left the Federalists ; but their ranks remained otherwise 
 intact, and the Democratic majority seemed vain before 
 the united efforts of a party led and officered by nearly 
 all the distinguished men of the nation. But the Fed 
 eralist party carried within itself the seeds of destruction. 
 
 1 If this seems overdrawn, let any one who is of that opinion read the 
 Kentucky resolutions of 1798, drafted by Jefferson himself, the Virginia reso 
 lutions of tlie same date, which he instigated, and call to mind the fact that 
 Virginian troops were ready in arms to seize in 1801, as they did in 1861, 
 the arsenals of the United States. 
 
 27 
 
418 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 To continue successfully the political tour deforce by which 
 they had obtained their power and established their meas 
 ures, a perfect harmony was requisite. In a party which 
 found its strength almost solely in the numbers and abili 
 ties of its many leaders, union and co-operation rested on 
 most unstable foundations. After the withdrawal of Wash 
 ington, bitter feuds broke out, and the Federalist party fell, 
 never to rise again. Then was seen the unsubstantial 
 nature of the popular support which had been given to 
 them. In the country, generally, their numbers melted 
 away with a startling rapidity, and even in New England 
 their power began to wane. The reasons for this are not 
 far to seek. The Federalists were not in sympathy with 
 the political forces at work in the country ; whereas Jef 
 ferson knew these forces by instinct, and directed his 
 course in conformity to them, as surely as the mariner 
 follows the compass. Under no circumstances could the 
 Federalist tenure of power have been much prolonged, yet 
 in the short time allotted to them they had done much. 
 This is neither the place nor the opportunity to rehearse 
 their achievements, nor is it necessary. A party which, in 
 opposition to the popular passions, called a nation into 
 being, and which erected around our constitutional liberties 
 the barriers that kept out the flood of ignorant democracy, 
 then threatening to engulf us, does not need to have their 
 exploits catalogued here. The Federalists could not do as 
 they wished, and prevent our government becoming purely 
 democratic and popular ; but they did succeed in modify 
 ing democracy, and in rendering it both acceptable and 
 successful. Yet they necessarily left much undone. They 
 had initiated the policy of strong and real neutrality, pro 
 tected by an efficient navy ; but they had not habituated 
 the people to it, nor had the glories of Truxtun s victories 
 been sufficient to make men realize that the sea was the 
 field on which our power could be best maintained and 
 asserted. The foreign policy and the navy were, therefore, 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 419 
 
 the two points on which Jefferson s attacks could and did 
 succeed ; and they form the key to nearly all the history 
 of the next twelve years. 
 
 To understand and do justice to the unmixed feeling of 
 dread with which the Federalists regarded Jefferson, we 
 must understand not only the peculiar and strong nature 
 of New England Federalism, but also the circumstances 
 of the times, and the character of Jefferson himself, as it 
 appeared by his words and deeds. In New England, Fed 
 eralism had always found its chief support ; and there alone, 
 after the downfall of the party, did it retain any real vital 
 ity. This was due, of course, partly to the stubborn and 
 unyielding character of the New England people, but 
 chiefly to the circumstances of their daily lives, to their 
 education, their occupations, and their traditions. The 
 population of New England was of the purest English stock, 
 unmixed with any foreign element. Dependent wholly on 
 their own exertions, the New Englanders were not burdened 
 with the curse of slavery. Settled in towns, and not scat 
 tered over a wide extent of territory, their interests and 
 habits were homogeneous and of long standing. The aver 
 age standard of wealth and education was remarkably high ; 
 and they were, moreover, essentially a trading and commer 
 cial community. Their social fabric was perfectly crys 
 tallized and firm, and their moneyed interests were large, 
 extended, and sensitive. They were naturally, therefore, 
 the friends of order, stability, and strength in the govern 
 ment, and of political conservatism. To the party which 
 represented these principles, they were sure to give an 
 obstinate and unyielding adherence. 
 
 All these opinions had been invigorated and confirmed 
 in the minds of the Federalist leaders, by the spectacle pre 
 sented to them in Europe. Beholding, as we now do, the 
 excesses and results of the French Revolution through the 
 long vista of eighty years, we cannot easily appreciate 
 the almost wild alarm with which its principles were re- 
 
420 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 garded at the time by the majority of intelligent men in 
 New England. It is a simple matter for us to estimate the 
 dangers, meaning, and importance of that awful convulsion. 
 Secure in our established national wealth and strength, 
 brought up from our cradles to believe in the Monroe doc 
 trine as the only possible foreign policy for the United 
 States, we smile readily at what seem to us the almost mad 
 fears excited by the French among the New England Fed 
 eralists. But, if we can for a moment perform that most 
 difficult of all feats, carry ourselves back in imagination, 
 and stand in the places of our ancestors, we shall no longer 
 look upon their apprehensions as ill-founded. They had a 
 commerce of enormous value and great extent, scattered 
 over the face of the globe, and at the mercy of the Euro 
 pean nations. They had but just freed themselves from 
 England, their nation was still in infancy, and its very 
 existence seemed to depend upon the actions of Europe. 
 Foreign politics had a vital importance then, of which we 
 can now have no conception. And what was the lesson, 
 what the spectacle, that these same foreign politics pre 
 sented? They had seen one of the great nations of the 
 world torn to pieces by the frenzies of a Parisian mob. 
 They had. beheld universal license, atheism, communism, 
 preached by the ephemeral leaders whom these mobs had 
 set up. They had seen every thing which they considered 
 dear and valuable in life trampled in the dust by the 
 French rulers, and this destruction exultingly proclaimed. 
 This was not all. Possibly their fears would not have been 
 justified by this alone; but when they saw the pillage, 
 carnage, and riot of mobs converted into sacred principles, 
 and a crusade in their behalf inaugurated and supported by 
 a whole nation, they shrank from the promoters of such 
 deeds with undisguised horror. The Federalists were the 
 champions of " not rash equality, but equal rights." 
 
 ..." They wished men to be free : " 
 " As much from mobs as kings, from you as me." 
 
1800-5.J THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 421 
 
 The liberty for which they had fought the Revolution, 
 and founded the government, was the sober, intelligent, 
 fearless liberty of our English ancestors. But they hated 
 the licentious despotism of a French rabble, even when 
 dressed out in the deceitful mask of " liberty, equality, 
 fraternity." Under the influence of these specious names, 
 they had seen the nations of Europe become, in turn, the 
 allies, the dupes, and the victims of French Republicanism. 
 They had no wish to follow in the same path. Let it not 
 be supposed that these men dreaded the arms of France. 
 They longed to meet her in battle, and prove their native 
 supremacy to any thing of Gallic origin. What they didi 
 fear was the subtle infusion of the poison of French prin 
 ciples with all its baneful concomitants, and concluding, at 
 last, in abject dependence on the "great republic." We 
 may call such feelings and beliefs madness or folly now ; 
 but, when we do so, we should recall the great men of other 
 lands, who shared in the opinions of the New England Fed 
 eralists. Edmund Burke was neither knave nor fool, nor 
 the sycophantic Tory which Democrats delighted to paint ; 
 yet what Federalist ever equalled or even approached Burke 
 in savage and unmeasured denunciation of France and the 
 French Revolution? William Pitt was neither a coward 
 nor a driveller ; but he regarded the principles of the 
 French Revolution with unmixed horror, and, in obedience 
 to a public sentiment which he could not resist, waged a 
 long and doubtful war against them. George Canning was 
 neither dull nor timid ; yet he founded the " Anti-Jacobin," 
 to arrest the spread of French doctrines, and to their suppres 
 sion devoted all his ability. The list might be indefinitely 
 lengthened, but to no good purpose. French principles, as 
 then preached and practised, were regarded with deadly 
 aversion by a large majority of able men everywhere ; and 
 the New England Federalists, whether rightly or wrongly it 
 boots not now to inquire, formed no exception to the rule. 
 
 Actuated by such feelings, it becomes easy to com- 
 
422 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 prehend their bitter political hostility to those who not 
 only brought French principles into vogue, but strove, and 
 with some measure of success, to found a party upon them. 
 Chief among the apostles of the new belief was Thomas 
 Jefferson. He had opposed the Constitution, and denounced 
 it as too energetic ; he had raised the hollow, canting cry of 
 " monarchists ; " he had defended Shays s rebellion as hon 
 orable and patriotic ; he wished " the tree of liberty to be 
 watered with the blood of patriots every twenty years ; " he 
 desired a rebellion to recur, with regularity, at the same 
 epochs ; l he had been the advocate of repudiation, and the 
 consistent enemy of the army, the navy, and the treasury ; 
 he favored rotation in office ; he was a foe to strict neutral 
 ity, and an ally of France ; and now, under what circum 
 stances it mattered not, he was chosen President of the 
 United States. Perhaps he intended to carry out no one 
 of his views, but he avowed the contrary. Nor is it neces 
 sary to say that these were the real views of Jefferson ; but 
 they were his declared opinions, and in this character had 
 he chosen to appear. Can we therefore blame the Feder 
 alists for regarding him as the enemy of all respectable 
 government, and his accession to power as the precursor of 
 a revolution destined ultimately to reduce the United States 
 to the condition of France ? 
 
 One thing is certain : the success of Jefferson was a revo 
 lution. To the timid character of the leader and, above all, 
 to the good sense of the American people, it is due that 
 this revolution was a peaceable one. The natural political 
 forces which the Federalists had curbed, but which they 
 had tried in vain to crush, were now in the ascendant, and 
 for good or ill our future history was to move on different 
 lines from those which had at first been drawn. The cooler 
 heads in the Federalist party understood the importance 
 and meaning of the change : they knew that it was revolu 
 tion; and, while they believed it to be inevitable, their just 
 1 See note above, p. 416. 
 
1800-5] THE HARTFOKD CONVENTION. 423 
 
 anxiety was very great. Nor were the first steps of the 
 new President of such a nature as to allay their fears. 
 
 In the midst of the anxiety and excitement produced by 
 the wretched and prolonged intrigue to substitute Burr for 
 Jefferson, some of the Federalist leaders in Washington 
 sought to make terms with the latter, in order to secure from 
 him guarantees that certain fundamental principles should 
 be observed. Strange as it may sound to us, one of the 
 dangers most dreaded by the Federalists was that the acces 
 sion of Jefferson would be accompanied by a complete re 
 organization of the civil service in the interest of partisans 
 of the new administration ; and there can be little doubt that 
 on this point Jefferson gave satisfactory assurances to the 
 Federalist leaders in Washington, through the medium of 
 Senator Smith of Maryland. 1 The other points on which 
 the Federalists were alarmed were the public debt, com 
 merce, and the navy, which they considered as of vital im 
 portance, but to which Jefferson s hostility was notorious and 
 avowed. On these questions, likewise, Jefferson s pledges 
 were satisfactory. How far he violated them will gradually 
 appear as we proceed ; but that they were given is undoubted, 
 and, although in itself a matter of no great moment, illus 
 trates the fears of the Federalists, and the extremities to 
 which they believed Jefferson would go. Reference is not 
 made to it here for the sake of charging Jefferson with bad 
 faith subsequently, although such pledges as were given, 
 even if conveyed in a roundabout way, w r ere sufficiently 
 precise, and were looked upon by the parties as binding. 
 
 1 See Hildreth, II. 407 ; Diary of John Quincy Adams, containing direct 
 testimony of Bayard, 1. 428. Davis s Life of Burr, pp. 102-107, contains a full 
 account of this transaction, together with the sworn depositions of Bayard 
 and Smith that the negotiation had occurred, and that Jefferson had acceded 
 to the conditions proposed by the Federalists. That Jefferson made and 
 violated these pledges is now matter of history, although in the " Anas " he 
 denied the existence of any negotiations or pledges of this character. In the 
 same account, Jefferson with his wonted adroitness accuses Bayard of nego 
 tiating for Burr with Democratic members, a statement which called forth 
 the publication of the conclusive testimony of Bayard and Smith given in 
 the Life of Burr. 
 
424 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 The Federalists seem to have put confidence in them. Yet 
 Jefferson was the most changeable of men ; and to expect 
 him to maintain pledges such as these, or to accuse him 
 of bad faith in violating them, would be little better than 
 charging a man with bad faith for changing his coat. But 
 we gain some notion of the feelings the honest, if mis 
 taken feelings with which the Federalists regarded Jeffer 
 son, by the pledges they exacted from him. They are just 
 such conditions as men would exact from one whom they 
 deemed the enemy of property, of society, and of vested 
 rights. They are the pledges that would be demanded by 
 men who feared a social and political convulsion, which was 
 precisely what the Federalists did fear. If any one doubt 
 the reasonableness of their terror, let them trace Jefferson s 
 previous course, let them ponder the opinions he had avowed, 
 and consider the views he had expressed, and the objects at 
 which he professed to aim. A word may be fitly said here in 
 regard to the injustice so often charged against the Feder 
 alists for concentrating all their hatred upon Jefferson. 
 We only need to read the history of the party which 
 he ruled, to find the explanation and justification of this 
 bitter personal animosity. Jefferson, while at the head of 
 his party, was the party. He had found it demoralized, dis 
 organized, without aims and without principles. He had 
 breathed into it the breath of life, he had. given it objects 
 and principles, and he had led it to victory ; but he had 
 gathered no leaders into its ranks. Except his immediate 
 successor and his financier, both of whom he kept ever by 
 him, Jefferson allowed no rivals near the throne. By the 
 most consummate management, by unequalled tact, by an 
 unsurpassed power of dealing with men, by these arts, and 
 by these alone, Jefferson established a supremacy to which 
 our history cannot furnish a parallel. Such parliamentary 
 ability as there was in his party, his crushing despotism drove 
 into revolt; but the ringleader 1 found no followers. Like 
 the Etruscan king, Jefferson cut off the heads of all the tall 
 1 John Randolph. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 425 
 
 poppies, and so devoid of leaders was the compact and devoted 
 majority in Congress, that they could not repel the assaults 
 of the handful of Federalists and of their former ally, John 
 Randolph. So great was the extremity at one time, that 
 Jefferson urged Nicholas to return to Congress, and lead the 
 party. 1 The despotism was an iron one ; and even John 
 Quincy Adams, when he came beneath its sway, found him 
 self helpless. Strong, bold, aggressive beyond even the 
 measure of the sternest New England character, Mr. Adams, 
 when he supported Jefferson, was compelled to support him 
 without asking any reasons, and was obliged to advance the 
 measures of the chief measures which involved the fate 
 of the country without knowing why or wherefore they 
 were framed. 2 The supple Virginian, who made no speeches 
 and wrote no pamphlets, wielded an unquestioned power as 
 relentlessly as an autocrat of the Russias. He recognized no 
 master but popularity, and a great party bent before him in 
 blind subserviency, while he not only strained the Constitu 
 tion to the utmost, but, if need were, overstepped its limits. 3 
 With all the political power in the country centred thus in 
 
 1 Jefferson to Nicholas, V. 4, 48. 
 
 2 Diary of John Quincy Adams, p. 497. See also his remarks on the em 
 bargo bill, as given by Colonel Pickering in his letter to Governor Sullivan. 
 I have found among the Pickering MSS. the following memorandum : 
 
 "Mem. at Boston, May 11, 1808. I was informed, that Mr. Adams said 
 my last letter (April 22d) to Sullivan did not exactly recite his words in 
 Senate, the day the embargo bill passed. I reminded Mr. Cabot that, soon 
 after the law passed, I wrote the words. The next day (May 12th) he fur 
 nished me with the following extract. My letter to him is dated January 8. 
 To save you the trouble of recurring to the letter [I suppose one I might 
 have written to T. Williams], I repeat, what I shall never forget, the ex 
 pressions used. The President has recommended the measure on his high 
 responsibility. I would not consider, I would not deliberate, but act. Doubt 
 less, the President has further information to authorize the measure ! " In 
 the appendix to the letter to H. G. Otis, ed. 1824, Mr. Adams denies the truth 
 of Colonel Pickering s insinuation, that he wished to resolve the legislature 
 into a mere exponent of the executive will ; but he admits that the report 
 of his words was substantially correct. Whatever Mr. Adams s intention, 
 the fact therefore remains that he had to bend beneath Jefferson s sway 
 when he supported his measures. 
 
 3 Jefferson himself considered the acquisition of Louisiana unconstitu 
 tional. See IV. of his Works, 500, 501, 504-507. 
 
426 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 one man, it is hardly surprising that the Federalists held 
 that man responsible for all the acts of his party, and poured 
 upon his devoted head all the vials of their wrath. If it be 
 also remembered that the Federalists sincerely believed Jef 
 ferson to be in reality, as he was in seeming, the embodiment 
 of French democracy, the advocate and promoter of princi 
 ples which menaced with destruction all the rights and 
 customs which alone made life to them worth having, their 
 feelings may be easily conceived. The Federalists hated 
 Jefferson with no common political hatred, but rather with 
 the vindictiveness of men toward a deadly foe who, as they 
 firmly believed, sought the ruin of all they most prized 
 and cherished. Eight or wrong, such were the honest feel 
 ings of the New England Federalists toward Jefferson. 
 How far his deeds conduced to an abatement of such 
 opinions, a brief statement of events during his admin 
 istration, as they appeared to his contemporaries, will 
 readily show. 
 
 Jefferson came into power at a moment singularly for 
 tunate for himself. We were at peace with all the world, 
 while at home all the unpopular measures of organizing the 
 government had been carried through by the Federalists. 
 They had laid the taxes which now filled the Treasury ; and, 
 under their wise management, the debt had been provided 
 for, and the revenues had grown to large proportions. Jef 
 ferson s inaugural address was intended to be conciliatory 
 in tone, and was certainly adroit ; but, except when he 
 adopted the Federal policy, there was nothing definite about 
 its loosely worded sentences. It was the first of our public 
 documents where Talleyrand s use of language was adopted, 
 and where the real meaning of the author was hidden under 
 a cloud of words. From this address dates the pernicious 
 practice among our public men of using platitudes to con 
 ceal meaning or a lack of meaning, as the case may be. 
 " A policy of wise frugality," unaccompanied by any defi 
 nite suggestion, was the principal topic of the inaugural. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 427 
 
 The reasons for this vagueness are obvious. Jefferson had 
 no definite policy to offer. His pole-star was popular sup 
 port, his guiding principles were French theories of govern 
 ment. The cabinet, however, promised better than the 
 address. Madison and Gallatin were by far the ablest men 
 among the Democrats, and they filled the highest places. 
 They were neither visionaries nor theorists, and their ap 
 pointment was productive of confidence. The rest of the 
 cabinet simply showed the lack of ability in the party. 
 The South had no one capable of administering depart 
 ments, and Jefferson filled up the places with the best 
 Northern men he could get. 1 
 
 But, though Jefferson was now weighted and in some 
 measure sobered by the responsibilities of office, he had 
 no intention of abandoning his favorite theories without 
 a trial. The hungry party sent up a cry for " spoils," and 
 Jefferson at once set about gratifying them, although he 
 did not fail to display his wonted circumspection. First 
 came removals in a number of selected cases, which were not 
 considered to come within his covenant with the Federalists. 
 Then the district attorneys and marshals were changed. 
 Then Jefferson claimed that all appointments made by 
 Mr. Adams after the election had taken place were ipso 
 facto void. Persons so appointed Jefferson stigmatized 
 comprehensively as " midnight appointees," and proceeded 
 to dismiss them, and fill their places with his own support 
 ers. These steps called forth much vigorous opposition; 
 but, in the message addressed to Congress in the autumn 
 of 1801, measures far more dangerous, and more in accord 
 ance with Jefferson s peculiar views, were broached. Re 
 trenchment was advised, and effected at once in the army 
 and fortifications. The naturalization laws were modified 
 to a mere nullity, and the gates were opened to the flood 
 of emigration which brought fresh supporters to the ad- 
 
 1 Levi Lincoln and Henry Dearborn of Massachusetts, and Robert Smith 
 of Maryland. 
 
428 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 ministration in ever increasing numbers. Far worse than 
 this was the repeal of the judiciary act, recommended by 
 the President and carried out by Congress ; supplemented 
 by a wholesale attack on any and all judiciary systems by 
 Giles and Randolph of Virginia, the President s faithful 
 and provident followers. 
 
 But it was one of the cardinal points of Federalist policy 
 which suffered most. Our policy of neutrality found all 
 its strength in the gradual construction and preservation 
 of an efficient navy. Suggested by Washington, the foun 
 dation and support of our naval power had been the chief 
 glory of Mr. Adams s administration. 
 
 A report by Mr. Stoddert, dated Jan. 12, 1801, 1 gives a 
 clear idea not only of the state of the navy at that time, 
 but of the Federal policy in regard to it. We find that, 
 inasmuch as the danger of a French war had subsided, the 
 secretary advised the sale of all vessels in the service 
 except thirteen frigates. Materials had been already col 
 lected sufficient to build six seventy-fours, and the sites 
 for as many navy-yards had been purchased. After ad 
 vising the continued collection of materials, the report 
 proceeds, 
 
 " When the United States own twelve ships of seventy -four guns, 
 and double the number of strong frigates, and it is known that 
 they possess the means of increasing them with facility, confidence 
 may be indulged that we may then avoid those wars in which we 
 have no interest, without submitting to be plundered. An annual 
 sum of $117,387 (over and above the appropriation for the six 
 seventy-four gun-ships already authorized) for the purchase of 
 timber to be laid up in docks for seventy-four gun-ships and frig 
 ates, and the adoption of efficient arrangements to secure the 
 manufacture of copper, the culture of hemp, and the manufacture 
 of canvas, would in a few years raise us to this desirable state of 
 security." 
 
 An estimate was also submitted, which placed the an- 
 1 American State Papers, Navy Department. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 429 
 
 nual expense of maintaining the present force, thirteen 
 frigates, six in service, seven laid up, at $643,000. 
 
 Such was the wise and far-sighted scheme of Washing 
 ton and Adams. Before Jefferson s policy of a " wise fru 
 gality," it fell helpless, and the Tripolitan war alone saved 
 our navy from utter extinction. A constant adhesion to 
 this economical management left us, when the war of 1812 
 broke out, with five frigates in service, seven brigs and two 
 ships ; and to this little navy almost all the glory of that 
 otherwise disastrous war was due. But, in the prosperity of 
 his first term, Jefferson thought only of his theories ; and the 
 " Chinese policy " had to be carried out. In his first mes 
 sage, he w r as able to announce that the marine corps had 
 already been disbanded, that the sites for navy-yards were 
 abandoned, and that all naval preparations had ceased. A 
 prompt reduction of appropriations by Congress completed 
 this triumph of " a wise frugality." 
 
 Although he thus withdrew her protection, Jefferson 
 could not injure commerce directly ; and in the hands of 
 Gallatin, who pursued the Hamiltonian policy, the finances 
 were safe. But, with characteristic adroitness, Jefferson, 
 while he repealed stamp duties and excises, and removed 
 the tax on spirits, refused to meet the just obligations of 
 the country to the claimants under the French indemnity. 
 All these measures, in appearance the first cautious steps 
 towards a revolution in our system, were passed in Con 
 gress by a brute vote ; and calls for information by the 
 opposition were voted down in silence. 
 
 In April, Jefferson could write to Kosciusko, and detail a 
 long catalogue of accomplished changes. He was able to 
 say: 
 
 " The session of the first Congress convened since Republicanism 
 has recovered its ascendancy, is now drawing to a close. They 
 will pretty completely fulfil all the desires of the people. They 
 have reduced the army and navy to what is barely necessary. 
 They are disarming executive patronage and preponderance, by 
 
430 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 putting down one-half the offices of the United States, which are no 
 longer necessary. These economies have enabled them to suppress 
 all internal taxes, and still to make such provision for the pay 
 ment of their public debt as to discharge that in eighteen years. 
 They have lopped off a parasite limb planted by their predecessors 
 on their judiciary body for party purposes ; they are opening the 
 doors of hospitality to fugitives from the oppressions of other 
 countries ; and we have suppressed all those public forms and 
 ceremonies which tended to familiarize the public eye to the har 
 bingers of another form of government." * 
 
 The last clause refers to Jefferson s watchful care for the 
 symbolic as well as the essential. He had not listened in 
 vain to the French doctrine which substitutes names for 
 things, which regards as one prime object of revolution the 
 right to alter the names of Parisian streets, and to scrawl new 
 mottoes on the walls of houses. There was, fortunately, in 
 our country no need to do more than discard the few simple, 
 dignified forms which Washington had adopted as befitting 
 his office. For the imposing speech to Congress, the delivery 
 of a written message, to which no answer was expected, was 
 substituted. But these changes did not suffice ; and Jef 
 ferson, the high-bred, aristocratic Virginian, therefore laid 
 aside all decency and courtesy in order to prove his Repub 
 licanism. To insult the representative of tyranny, and to 
 show his own hatred of that odious crime against humanity, 
 the President of the United States, dressed like a pawn 
 broker s clerk, so far lowered himself and his office as to 
 receive the minister of England in a manner which a cow 
 boy would have blushed to adopt. 2 Thus all parts of Repub 
 licanism as conceived by Jefferson were preserved. Such 
 changes may have been wise, the policy that dictated them 
 may have been just, but it must be allowed that they nat 
 urally tended to confirm the fears and suspicions of the 
 Federalists. They had believed the President to be a 
 
 1 Works of Jefferson, IV. 430. 
 
 2 See Quincy s Life of Josiah Quincy, 92, 93. 
 
1800-5.] THE HAKTFORD CONVENTION. 431 
 
 leveller and revolutionist; and he seemed to them to be 
 acting up to his character, when judged by his own 
 utterances and behavior, and by the measures of an 
 obedient Congress. Nor were they encouraged by the in 
 auguration of the new system of -electioneering. Gallatin s 
 report, in May, 1802, was the first of those miserable 
 documents, which, emanating from a great department of 
 the government, served only as a cover for partisan 
 attack. To this open assault by the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, Wolcott replied for the Federalists with great 
 force and effect. 1 
 
 Meantime, removals from office went on slowly but 
 steadily : and the Federal newspapers and public meetings 
 began to attack the President on this point with bitterness 
 and persistence. 2 Though Jefferson had carried resistance 
 to the alien and sedition laws to the very verge of secession, 
 he was too absolute a party chief to permit newspaper 
 assaults which he deemed injurious, or in cases where he 
 could reach the offender. The notorious Callender, con 
 victed under the alien and sedition law, had just emerged 
 from prison. His faithful, if somewhat dirty services 
 seemed to entitle him to a reward ; but Jefferson refused 
 him office, and gave him only fifty dollars. Callender 
 thereupon accused Jefferson of assisting him in the prepa 
 ration and publication of the "Prospect before us," the 
 scandalous pamphlet whose authorship had caused Callender 
 to languish so many months in a " Federal dungeon." Jef 
 ferson denied the charge in print, 3 and promised to publish 
 all the correspondence between himself and Callender, 
 although characteristically enough he soon after said that 
 he could not find the letters. Callender, however, was 
 more careful of his papers: he not only found all Jef- 
 
 1 " Address as to the Faithful Expenditures of Money drawn from the 
 Treasury," by Oliver Wolcott, 1802. 
 
 2 See above, p. 320. 
 
 8 Jefferson s Works, IV. 444-446. 
 
432 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 ferson s letters, but lie immediately printed them. It then 
 appeared that Jefferson not only had furnished money and 
 information, and revised the proofs for the seditious libel, 
 " The Prospect before us," 1 but that he had afterwards 
 been betrayed into an unguarded denial of this action. 
 Callender, his revenge still unsated, then proceeded to nar 
 rate a series of disagreeable and scandalous little incidents 
 connected with Jefferson s early amours. The same hound 
 that had yelped at the heels of Hamilton was now baying 
 at his own, and Jefferson seems to have been as irritated 
 and displeased as was his great rival. Strong measures 
 were necessary. George Hay, the district attorney of Vir 
 ginia, therefore arrested Callender, and strove to treat him 
 as McKean had treated Cobbett, seeking to put him in 
 prison until he should give sufficient security that he would 
 publish no more libels. Public opinion in a community 
 which had lately been on the brink of civil war, because 
 of the alien and sedition acts, was hardly ripe for this pro 
 ceeding against Callender ; and Hay was obliged to desist. 
 Jefferson s ingenuity is well illustrated by the fact that, 
 while the Federalists had been obliged to pass stringent 
 laws in their efforts to punish libels, he was able to go 
 quite as far in the same direction without passing any laws. 
 What the law failed to do, however, a just, and, in Jeffer 
 son s eyes, a most merciful Providence did in silencing 
 Callender, and removing him by drowning from the scene 
 of his labors. He left, however, a rich legacy of scandal, 
 which the opposition press turned to account. Just at 
 this time, also, appeared the letter which Jefferson had 
 written to Thomas Paine, inviting him to this country, and 
 offering him a passage in a vessel of the United States. 2 
 Paine was then regarded by most decent persons as the 
 libeller of Washington, the active enemy of Christianity, 
 
 1 These letters, &c., were printed by Callender, in the " Richmond Re 
 corder." See Hildreth, V. 453-455. 
 
 2 Jefferson s Works, IV. 370. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 433 
 
 and the foe of social order and the rights of property. To 
 honor him in the name of the United States seemed to 
 many, therefore, a startling and even monstrous prop 
 osition. 
 
 I have alluded to these two incidents of Callender and 
 Paine, simply to show not only by his policy, but by his 
 various public acts, the light in which Jefferson must natu 
 rally have appeared to his opponents. In judging of the 
 position and actions of the Federalists, it is important to 
 know how they regarded the head and single embodiment 
 of the Democratic party. And to judge justly that or any 
 other past time, or to weigh fairly the motives and actions 
 of individuals or parties, we must remember that they did 
 not have the strong illuminating side-lights by which pos 
 terity can form an exact opinion. I do not mean to justify 
 or defend all the opinions of the Federalists in regard to 
 Jefferson ; but I do wish to describe their opinions, to prove 
 that they were honest ones, and to enumerate the facts on 
 which these opinions were based. 
 
 Towards the close of the year 1802 came the first breath 
 from Europe of the storm which was destined to end in 
 confusion the Presidential career now in such prosperous 
 operation. News arrived that Bonaparte proposed to 
 take possession of the Mississippi. The young life and 
 commerce of the South-Avest were threatened with extinc 
 tion, and great commotion and alarm ensued. Louisiana, 
 therefore, was one of the subjects of the message, which 
 also gave an outline of the new naval policy intended to 
 replace that of the Federalists. This was simply to build 
 a dry dock at Washington, where vessels were to be laid 
 up and roofed over, so that the sun might not warp and 
 crack them ; and the scheme was supplemented by the 
 first suggestions of the gun-boat plan. The chief interest 
 of the session, however, was the Louisiana matter. The 
 Federalists at once demanded information, which was re 
 fused ; and then offered a resolution, asserting the right of 
 
 28 
 
434 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 the people to the Mississippi, which was voted down. The 
 only real or ostensible reason for this stifling process was 
 the President s wish. While matters were in this state, 
 the ferment and commotion continued in the Western 
 States, on account of the Spanish obstruction of navigation, 
 and the refusal of a place of deposit. Mr. Ross, therefore, 
 brought forward a series of resolutions in the Senate, by 
 which the President was authorized to seize New Orleans 
 as a place of deposit in accordance with the treaty, and to 
 raise fifty thousand men for carrying this resolution into 
 effect. This was the Federalist policy, clear, sharp, deci 
 sive ; but there were two fatal objections : it might lead to 
 war, and, more awful still, it might lead to war with France. 
 So the Federal plan was voted down, and the whole matter 
 intrusted to the discretion of the President ; while, in pur 
 suance of the " wise frugality " policy, two millions were 
 voted for the private intercourse fund. Scarcely had Jeffer 
 son s policy been adopted by Congress, when news came 
 that Monroe and Livingston had purchased Louisiana for 
 fifteen million dollars. Jefferson and his party acceded at 
 once to the treaty. All the magnificent territory, which 
 was thus obtained, was at that time terra incognita. Jeffer 
 son only knew that he had bought peace and the mouth of 
 the Mississippi, and in his eyes these were worth any price. 
 In such an opinion, and in his policy on this particular 
 point, Jefferson was unquestionably right; but, in carry 
 ing out his policy, he violated the Constitution with an 
 indifference which would have been striking in any 
 one, but which, coming from a strict constructionist, 
 was absolutely appalling. We do not need to go further 
 than Jefferson s own letters, to find the most convincing 
 arguments against the constitutionality of the Louisiana 
 purchase. 1 Some faint show of a desire to amend the 
 Constitution was the most that ever came, however, from 
 the President s very correct opinions. Thus, the first exam- 
 1 See above, p. 426. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 435 
 
 pie was given of both the will and desire to violate the 
 Constitution, if the popular feeling would sustain the execu 
 tive and the legislature in so doing ; and in this fact lies 
 the pernicious and crying evil of the Louisiana purchase. 
 It was the first lesson which taught Americans that a 
 numerical majority was superior to the Constitution, was 
 a safe protection against it when violated, and that, when 
 policy proved the necessity of change, it was easier to break 
 than to legally and regularly amend the provisions of our 
 charter. The Federalist opposition on the ground of un 
 constitutionally was strong, and their position impreg 
 nable ; but their resistance to the general policy was 
 both factious and unwise. The people fully appreciated 
 the immense advantage gained by the control of the Mis 
 sissippi, and they asked to know no more. 
 
 The acquisition of Louisiana was regarded by the New 
 England Federalists at the seat of government, and by 
 extreme men of that party everywhere, with far different 
 feelings from those which governed the rest of the people. 
 The leaders in Congress saw clearly that this measure 
 sealed their doom, that their political power would now 
 be finally destroyed, and the principles of Democracy 
 wholly prevail. They saw in Louisiana the question of 
 life or death. They believed that these new and fertile 
 regions would draw away all the population of the North 
 ern and Eastern States, and would leave themselves beg 
 gars and outcasts. They were fully aware that the popular 
 will throughout the length and breadth of the country was 
 arrayed against them, and they knew of but one method 
 of relief, a dissolution of the Union. In a speech in 
 October, 1803, Griswold of Connecticut sounded the key 
 note, when he said that the acquisition of Louisiana threat 
 ened a subversion of the Union ; and, as they saw the fatal 
 measure closing in upon them, the Federalists in Washing 
 ton, stimulated by constant and embittering opposition, 
 turned from threats to definite plans of separation. They 
 
436 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 N/ 
 
 did not fear the measure of acquiring Louisiana pe^r se, but 
 the supremacy of Democracy, which was its meaning to 
 them. They saw in it the assurance of a perpetuation of 
 Jefferson s power and of his maxims, and with their opin 
 ions of both the man and his principles, they could not but 
 regard their indefinite ascendancy with unmixed horror. 
 Two other measures coincided with that involving Louisiana 
 to spur them on to the last resort of American opposition. 
 The amendment to the Constitution, providing for the sepa 
 rate election of President and Vice-President, was on the 
 point of adoption. The Federalists had years before sup 
 ported this same amendment as a security for their own 
 tenure of power, and they rightly believed that it was now 
 urged with a like purpose by their enemies. This, too, 
 afforded fresh support to the hated supremacy of Democ 
 racy, and was a new stimulus to their spirit of desperate 
 resistance. Far worse than this, in their eyes, was the at 
 tack on the judiciary, headed by Giles and Randolph. In 
 the midst of the separatist schemes of the Federalists came 
 that outrage on decency and justice, the trial and condem 
 nation of Judge Pickering, quickly followed by the resolve 
 ordering the impeachment of Judge Chase. The prime 
 movers in this affair made no secret of their opinions that 
 the judiciary ought to be a political body removable at will ; 
 and these impeachments were, as they openly avowed, but 
 the preliminaries to a general onslaught upon the bench. 1 
 Beneath the mouthings of Giles and the diatribes of Ran 
 dolph, we can now detect something else, which was not then 
 perceived, the feline hostility of Jefferson, aiming at the 
 overthrow of John Marshall. Such a scheme as this might 
 well have driven to desperation less heated and less deter 
 mined men than the New England Federalists of that day. 
 To them it seemed nothing less than the destruction of the 
 last bulwark which sheltered their lives, their liberty, and 
 their property from the tyranny of a mob. 
 
 Such was the condition of mind and such the circum- 
 1 See above, p. 338 ; also Diary of John Quincy Adams, I. 322. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 437 
 
 stances and the exciting causes at the period of the sepa 
 ratist scheme of 1803-4. It only remains to define the 
 exact nature of. the plan, to show who were interested in it, 
 and to determine how far it progressed, in order to meet 
 John Quincy Adams s first point, as stated at the beginning 
 of this chapter. Much light has already been thrown upon 
 this subject by the " Life of Plumer," and by Hamilton s 
 " History of the Republic of the United States ; " but the 
 letters which follow, drawn principally from the Pickering 
 MSS., leave but little to be added. The letters of Gris- 
 wold, Tracy, and Hillhouse, would undoubtedly throw addi 
 tional light on the subject ; but, though our knowledge on 
 this point may in future be amplified, I doubt if any essen 
 tial change in it can be produced. 
 
 From the letters already printed and from those about to 
 be given, it becomes evident that the scheme originated 
 and was worked out wholly in Washington, by the Federal 
 ist members of Congress. Their aim was the establishment 
 of a Northern Confederacy, to include the New England 
 States and New York, and perhaps Pennsylvania. Colonel 
 Pickering seems to have anticipated the ultimate addition 
 of Canada, but I cannot find that this view was entertained 
 by any one else. The theory was that a movement of this 
 sort must come from the States interested through the 
 medium of their Legislatures. This was the whole plan ; 
 and the only definite step actually proposed was a meet 
 ing of leading Federalists, among them Hamilton, to be 
 held in Boston in the autumn of 1804. This meeting was 
 to be for consultation ; but the whole business had come 
 to an end long before the period set for their assemblage, 
 and, if any thing further had been needed, the death of 
 Hamilton, which deprived them of their great leader, was 
 a sufficient obstacle. But disapprobation had effectually 
 checked even purposes of mere consultation. The only 
 action taken was by the Federalists in Congress writing to 
 their leading party friends in the different States, asking 
 
488 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 their advice and urging them to push the scheme. Those 
 principally concerned in originating the plan appear to 
 have been Roger Griswold and Uriah Tracy of Connect 
 icut, Colonel Pickering of Massachusetts, and William 
 Pluiner of New Hampshire. Hillhouse and the other 
 Federalists in Congress sympathized and shared in the 
 plan in a greater or less degree. Griswold s views and 
 Plumer s have already appeared, and Colonel Pickering s 
 are printed here in full. 
 
 Colonel Pickering addressed his letters on the subject 
 to the principal Massachusetts Federalists, King, Ames, 
 Cabot, and Parsons among the number. The application 
 was wholly unsuccessful. The party leaders at home had 
 no faith in the scheme, and believed it neither necessary 
 nor advisable. Hamilton was bitterly opposed to it. In 
 his celebrated letter to Sedgwick, written just before his 
 death, he says : 
 
 " I will here express but one sentiment : which is, that dismem 
 berment of our empire will be a clear sacrifice of great positive 
 advantages, without any counterbalancing good ; administering no 
 relief to our real disease, which is democracy ; the poison of which 
 by a subdivision will only be the more concentred in each part, and 
 consequently the more virulent." l 
 
 These views find an echo in the letters of Mr. Cabot, 
 already given. 2 To Colonel Pickering he says : 
 
 " All the evils you describe and many more are to be apprehended ; 
 but I greatly fear that a separation would be no remedy, because 
 the source of them is in the political theories of our country and 
 in ourselves. A separation at some period not very remote may 
 probably take place. . . . We are democratic altogether, and I hold 
 democracy in its natural operation to be a government of the 
 worst." 
 
 To King Mr. Cabot wrote : 
 
 " I am not satisfied that the thing itself is to be desired. My 
 habitual opinions have been always strongly against it, and I do 
 
 l Hamilton s Works, VI. 568. See above, pp. 341, 345. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 439 
 
 not see in the present mismanagement motives for changing my 
 opinion." 
 
 Hamilton and Cabot considered the whole scheme im 
 practicable and not justified by necessity; and they regarded 
 it in the then state of public affairs, as they had always 
 before deemed it, an evil in itself. In these views, Ames, 
 Parsons, and King concurred. Similar opinions, if not 
 quite so pronounced, were also entertained by Mr. Higgin- 
 son and Mr. Lyman, to whom Colonel Pickering had also 
 written. From New Hampshire, Mr. Plumer received 
 letters which agree entirely in opinion with those of the 
 Massachusetts and New York Federalists. Mr. Adams s 
 own opinion is expressed in a letter to Plumer, whom he 
 was not disposed to visit with the same indiscriminate 
 censure which he displayed towards the citizens of his 
 native State. Mr. Plumer s subsequent conversion had 
 unquestionably much to do with this unusual mildness. 
 Dec. 31, 1828, Mr. Adams wrote to Mr. Plumer :- 
 
 " There were moments of weariness and disgust in my own mind 
 at the errors and vices of Mr. Jefferson s administration, when I 
 almost despaired of the Union myself. That it affected you to the 
 extent at one time of contemplating with favor the substitution of 
 another and more compassable system of confederation, can be no 
 disparagement to your understanding or your heart." 1 
 
 Thus it will be seen that even Mr. Adams himself, when 
 not borne away by a torrent of .personal hatred, could re 
 gard with calmness the schemes for a dissolution of the 
 Union, and deem such schemes no disparagement to either 
 the heads or hearts of their projectors. In Connecticut 
 alone did the plan seem to find any support, and even there 
 it was very slight. I give below the only favorable letter 
 I have been able to find printed or imprinted. In short, 
 the reception of the scheme concocted in Washington was 
 crushed by the leaders of the party elsewhere, and the whole 
 project came to nothing. The men who nipped this plan in 
 the bud were some of them those whom Mr. John Quincy 
 i Life of William Plumer, p. 304. 
 
440 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 Adams impliedly points out as its principal aiders and 
 abettors. 1 
 
 Bat one word remains to be said before coming to the 
 original documents. The tone in which the men of that 
 day discussed the question of a dissolution of the Union is 
 one that may well startle the present generation, which has 
 passed through a great civil war in behalf of the Union, and 
 has learned to consider the mere mention of separation as 
 the blackest treason. The men who were prominent in 
 1804 regarded a separation of the States with no such feel 
 ing. It was a simple impossibility that they should do so. 
 They had most of them arrived at manhood before Union 
 was even thought of. They had passed through the period 
 of dissolution under the Confederacy. They had formed 
 our present Union from pure motives of policy, and they 
 regarded separation in exactly the same way. The indi 
 viduality and separate existence of the States were quite as 
 familiar to them as the conception of union, and the senti 
 ment of nationality at that time was still in its infancy. 
 They had looked upon the Union, when it was formed, as 
 an experiment ; and they continued to so regard it. They 
 looked upon it as an arrangement which might or might not 
 succeed, but whose maintenance was a mere question of pol 
 icy. Nor was this feeling confined to any section nor to any 
 party. It had less strength in New England than elsewhere, 
 and this is what gives to the separatist movements in New 
 England a peculiar importance and significance. But the 
 separatist feeling was universal, and broke forth at various 
 
 1 It is but fair to say that Mr. Adams nowhere names the individuals 
 whom he accused of participation in this scheme. But the whole tenor 
 of his pamphlet points irresistibly to certain men, including Mr. Cabot ; and 
 on this I have based the statement in the text. As I think I have shown 
 who were concerned in the plan, and who opposed and defeated it, Mr. 
 Adams s implication, whether justly or unjustly interpreted by me, is of no 
 material importance to the facts of the case. But, if I have not misunder 
 stood his implication, it shows the wholesale and indiscriminate suspicion 
 with which he included all alike, and the need of caution in accepting his 
 conclusions generally, based as they were on insufficient material and dic 
 tated by the bitterest spirit of personal and political hostility. 
 
1800-5.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 441 
 
 periods before 1804 in all parts of the country. The mi 
 nority in national affairs, if they felt themselves oppressed, 
 turned instinctively to the governments to which they had 
 always been accustomed to look for protection and support. 
 Thus all parties and all leaders during the first twenty-five 
 years of our government, when defeated and as they believed 
 oppressed, looked natural^ to their States as their protec 
 tors, and were ready to take the ground that the experiment 
 had failed, and that it would be wise to try something dif 
 ferent. Schemes of separation therefore were treated and 
 discussed as any extreme, but nevertheless perfectly conceiv 
 able question of mere policy would be. The hard, matter-of- 
 fact way, in which men seventy-five years ago argued about 
 the advantages and disadvantages of a dissolution of the 
 Union, was as natural and proper as it is for us to consider 
 that question no longer an open one. To condemn them 
 for the tone of their discussions on this matter would be as 
 wholly unjust and unreasonable as it always is to brand 
 individuals for the general opinions of any past age and 
 society. The only rule here as in any similar case is not 
 to try men by an abstract standard or by the ideas of pos 
 terity, until they have first been judged according to the 
 standards and the ideas of the age in which they lived. 
 
 PICKERING TO JUDGE PETERS. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Dec. 24, 1803. 
 
 MY DEAR FRIEND, Although the end of all our Revolutionary 
 labors and expectations is disappointment, and our fond hopes oi 
 Republican happiness are vanity, and the real patriots of 76 
 are overwhelmed by the modern pretenders to that character, I 
 will not yet despair. I will rather anticipate a new confederacy, 
 exempt from the corrupt and corrupting influence and oppression 
 of the aristocratic Democrats of the South. There will be (and 
 our children at farthest will see it) a separation. The white and 
 black population will mark the boundary. 1 The British provinces, 
 
 1 This prophecy came uncomfortably near verification. 
 
442 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 even with the assent of Britain, will become members of the 
 Northern confederacy. A continued tyranny of the present ruling 
 sect will precipitate that event. The patience of good citizens is 
 now nearly exhausted. By open violations and pretended amend 
 ments, they are shattering our political bark, which with a few 
 more similar repairs must founder. Efforts, however, and laud 
 able ones, are, and will continue to be made to keep the timbers 
 together. The most distinguished you will find in the speech of 
 Mr. Tracy, which I enclose. He has exhibited the excellency of 
 the Constitution as it now prescribes the mode of electing the 
 President and Vice-President, and pointed out the pernicious ten 
 dency of the proposed amendment. John Taylor, 1 the Goliath of 
 the party, on this question attempted to support the amendment ; 
 but the ground was untenable, and his speech can, do neither him 
 nor the cause any honor. I* ". 
 
 TAPPING REEVE TO URIAH TRACY. 2 
 
 [Extract of a letter from a gentleman of distinction in Connecticut to his 
 friend in the city of Washington, dated Feb. 7, 1804.] 3 
 
 " I have omitted answering your letter until this time, that I 
 might learn, if possible, the sentiments of others upon the subject 
 of your letter. I shall continue to pursue the subject with all the 
 industry I am capable of exercising, and will write to you again by 
 the mail next week. The court is now sitting at Litchfield, 4 and I 
 shall have further opportunities of learning the sentiments of influ 
 ential people. I can now say that there never has been such an 
 alarm excited in the minds of informed people as at the present 
 moment. It seems to be a very general opinion that some method 
 must be fallen upon to preserve ourselves from that ruin with which 
 
 i Colonel John Taylor, United States Senator from Virginia. He was 
 the mover of the nullification resolutions of 1708-1799, in the Virginia 
 House of Delegates. At this period, he was an ardent Unionist, and would 
 have shrunk with abhorrence from the sentiments expressed in this letter. 
 " Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur." 
 
 * This letter is indorsed by Colonel Pickering " T. R. to U. T.," and Mr. 
 Octavius Pickering conjectures with indubitable correctness that the ini 
 tials stand for the names which I have placed at the head of this extract. 
 Tapping Reeve was a distinguished lawyer and judge in Connecticut. His 
 wife was a sister of Aaron Burr, who knew of this scheme, and proposed, 
 if it seemed profitable, to take part in it. See Life of Plumer, and Hamil 
 ton s History of the Republic ; Davis s Life of Burr. 
 
 3 This is Colonel Pickering s own head-note to the extract. 
 
 * Litchfield was the home of Tapping Reeve. 
 
1800-5.] CORRESPONDENCE. 443 
 
 we are threatened. We are waiting with great anxiety to learn in 
 what manner the amendment will be treated by Massachusetts. I 
 have seen many of our friends ; and all that T have seen, and most 
 that I have heard from, believe that we must separate, and that 
 this is the most favorable moment. The difficulty is, how is this 
 to be accomplished ? I have heard of only three gentlemen, as 
 yet, who appear undecided upon this subject. Among these is 
 
 . Pie is sufficiently alarmed, but afraid that the country is 
 
 not prepared. I believe that some proper step must be taken 
 
 before there will be that preparedness that he wishes. Mr. , 
 
 I believe, retains a great degree of apathy. The other gen 
 tleman s opinion is, I believe, governed in some measure by Mr. 
 
 - 1 But a settled determination that this must be done has 
 
 taken fast hold of some minds, where you would expect more 
 timidity. It seems to be the opinion of those with whom I have 
 conversed that two things must be done with a view to accom 
 plish the desired object, one by you gentlemen of Congress, and 
 the other by the Legislatures of the States. We believe, in the 
 present state of alarm and anxiety among Federalists, that if you 
 gentlemen at Congress will come out with a bold address to your 
 constituents, taking a view of what has been done under the pres 
 ent administration, with glowing comments on the ruinous tenden 
 cies of the measures, and if this should be done before the sitting 
 of our Legislature, or rather the election of the members thereof, 
 that this will produce all that preparedness that is wanted. I 
 know that it will animate the body of the people beyond any other 
 possible method, and give a death-wound to the progress of Democ 
 racy in this part of the country. That this ought to be followed 
 up by the Legislatures by such declarations as may have the 
 strongest tendency to secure the object aimed at. In what manner 
 this separation is to be accomplished is to me wholly in the dark, 
 unless the amendment is adopted by three-fourths of the Legisla 
 tures, and rejected by Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connect 
 icut, upon the last ground taken by Delaware. 2 In such case, I 
 can see a foundation laid." 
 
 1 These blanks are all in the original. 
 
 2 Note by Colonel Pickering. " That the amendment * had not constitu 
 tionally passed the two Houses of Congress ; that is, by two-thirds of the 
 entire number composing the respective Houses " 
 
 * This amendment had evidently from Colonel Pickering s speeches and letters 
 been intended as the ground on which those who planned the separation wished 
 
444 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 PICKERING TO THEODORE 
 
 CITY OP WASHINGTON, Feb. 11, 1804. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The conduct of our rulers reminds me of your 
 early predictions, coeval I believe with Mr. Jefferson s inaugural 
 speech. The public debt, indeed, is not annihilated; but in all 
 other things they have, I suspect, surpassed your apprehensions. 
 The removals from office have been gradual, not to shock the public 
 mind. When the sensations produced by the political death of one 
 distinguished Federalist are blunted, another victim is led to the 
 altar ; with the same view, removals and appointments are no 
 longer made public. The changes which take place are but very 
 partially known, that is, only by the neighbors of the individuals 
 respectively, while the community at large is kept in ignorance of 
 the accumulated evil. The violation of the Constitution, though 
 not commenced, yet most remarkable in overthrowing the judi 
 ciary, is becoming habitual. The judges of the Supreme Court 
 are all Federalists. They stand in the way of the ruling power. 
 Its satellites also wish to occupy their places. The judges, there 
 fore, are, if possible, to be removed. Their judicial opinions, if at 
 all questionable, though mere errors of judgment, are interpreted 
 into crimes, and to be grounds of impeachment. And, if these 
 should fail, they are to be removed by the President, on the 
 representations of the two Houses of Congress. At least, this is 
 the doctrine of John Randolph, the leader of Democracy in the 
 House of Representatives. 2 He says that the provision in the 
 Constitution, that the judges should hold their offices during good 
 behavior, was intended to guard them against the executive alone, 
 and not by any means to control the power of Congress, on whose 
 representation against the judges the President should remove 
 them. Such a removal of some would, or at least ought to, occa 
 sion the resignation of all the rest. For as upright men, feeling 
 for their own dignity and rights, how could they consent to hold 
 their offices at the will and pleasure of such rulers ? 
 
 1 Mr Lyman was connected by marriage with Colonel Pickering, his wife 
 having been the latter s favorite niece, Miss Lydia Williams. 
 
 2 In confirmation of this, see authorities cited above, p. 436. 
 
 to make their issue. Shortly before these letters sounding the leaders at home, Colonel 
 Pickering had despatched to all parts of the country letters inveighing against this 
 amendment, together with copies of the speeches which had been made in oppo 
 sition to it in Congress. 
 
1800-5.] CORRESPONDENCE. 445 
 
 The removal of good men from office, and the appointment of 
 some of the worst in their places, have a pernicious effect on the 
 public morals. Depravity is the surest road to preferment, while 
 virtue and integrity are objects of virulent persecution. Hence, 
 the open apostasy of many, before of decent character, but without 
 stability to resist temptation. The removal of the present judges, 
 and the appointment of unprincipled successors, will complete the 
 catastrophe. The men of stern, inflexible virtue, who dare expose 
 arid resist the public corruption, will be the first victims ; and the 
 best portion of the community, already humbled, will be trodden 
 under foot. 
 
 And must we submit to these evils ? Is there no remedy ? Is 
 there not yet remaining in New England virtue and spirit enough, 
 if a suitable occasion offer, to resist the torrent ? The most intel 
 ligent of the Federalists here have been reflecting on this subject 
 with the deepest concern. Massachusetts, as the most powerful, 
 they say, should take the lead. At the word from her, Connecticut 
 would instantly join. There can be no doubt of New Hampshire. 
 Rhode Island would follow, of necessity. There would probably 
 be no great difficulty in bringing in Vermont. But New York 
 should also concur ; and, as she might be made the centre of the 
 Northern Union, it can hardly be supposed that she would refuse 
 her assent. New Jersey would assuredly become an associate ; 
 and it is to be wished that Pennsylvania, at least east of the Sus- 
 quehannah, might be induced to come into the confederacy. At 
 no distant period, the British Provinces on the north and north 
 east would probably become a part of the Northern Union. I 
 think Great Britain would not object ; for she would continue to 
 derive from them, when become States, all the commercial advan 
 tages they would yield if continued her provinces, without the 
 expense of governing and defending them. 
 
 While thus contemplating the only means of maintaining our 
 ancient institutions in morals and religion and our equal rights, we 
 wish no ill to the Southern States, and those naturally connected 
 with them. The public debts might be equitably apportioned 
 between the new confederacies, and a separation somewhere about 
 the line above suggested would divide the different characters of 
 the existing Union. The manners of the eastern portion of the 
 States would be sufficiently congenial to form a union, and their 
 interests are alike intimately connected with agriculture and com- 
 
446 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 merce. A friendly and commercial intercourse would be main 
 tained with the States in the southern confederacy, as at present. 
 Thus all the advantages which have been for a few years depend 
 ing on the general Union would be continued to its respective por 
 tions, without the jealousies and enmities which now afflict both, 
 and which peculiarly embitter the condition of that of the North. 
 It is not unusual for two friends, when disagreeing about the mode 
 of conducting a common concern, to separate, and manage each in 
 his own way his separate interest, and thereby preserve a useful 
 friendship, which without such separation would infallibly be 
 destroyed. 
 
 If even the New England States alone were agreed in the first 
 instance, would there be any difficulty in making frank and open 
 proposition for a separation, on the principles above suggested ? 
 
 The Northern States have nothing to countervail the power and 
 influence arising from the negro representation, nor will they ever 
 receive an equivalent. This alone is an adequate ground to de 
 mand a separation. The only practical equivalent is a direct tax, 
 which will not be resorted to until all other means are exhausted ; 
 and in the mean time we suffer all the mischiefs which flow from an 
 unequal representation. 
 
 Several distinguished men are turning the attention of their 
 Eastern friends to the consideration of this subject ; and it being 
 of the highest importance, and requiring the most serious reflec 
 tions, I have thought it right to present it to you. 
 
 With the greatest regard and esteem, I am, &c. T. P. 
 
 THEODORE LYMAN TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Feb. 29, 1804. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have carefully and with much solicitude perused 
 the communications received in your letter. There are few among 
 my acquaintance with whom I could on that subject freely con 
 verse ; there may be more ready than I am aware of, and that are 
 kept back under an impression that they are more singular in their 
 opinion than they really are. Patient waiting with prudent man 
 agement, by giving opportunity, when it occurs, of expressing 
 sentiments, seems to be the only means to ascertain the opinion of 
 gentlemen whose prudence, discretion, and good judgment are to be 
 relied on. Many judicious and discerning men must see that one 
 
1800-5.] CORRESPONDENCE. 447 
 
 encroachment after another on the fundamental principles of the 
 Constitution lessens its solidity. Clearly perceiving the danger, 
 they may yet feel at a loss how to counteract a system of proceed 
 ing which they are sure will ultimately destroy it, without endan 
 gering the peace and safety of their country. There is, besides, a 
 large class of valuable men, whose business takes up the principal 
 part of their attention, and who scarcely ever cast their eye toward 
 the political horizon of their country ; and they of course do not 
 perceive the cloud that is gathering around it. Being themselves 
 honest and true lovers of good government, they are ready to be 
 lieve, if not at least to hope, that all are like unto themselves. 
 These good people cannot be made to look up until the cloud shall 
 have so much thickened that their prospects are darkened, and to 
 feel their security is in danger. That such is the state of things 
 may be to be regretted ; but, if the picture is truly drawn, must 
 not the remedy that is to be applied be in conformity thereto ? 
 
 How the project of an adjustment, 1 as has been suggested, would 
 suit the dominant party, is problematical. Men seldom are content 
 to stop at any stage of power ; and, possessing it so completely as 
 they now do, is it reasonable to suppose that any proposition 
 founded on reason, and that would in its tendency promote the 
 united interest of the whole nation, is it natural, or can it scarcely 
 be hoped, that it would be well received ? 
 
 You know full well my sentiments, and will believe me ready at 
 all times, in any way that is in my power, to do those things which 
 in their tendency shall promote the interest of my country. 
 Faithfully yours, 
 
 PICKERING TO KING. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, 
 
 DEAR SIR, I am disgusted with the men who^QV 
 with their measures. At some manifestations of their 
 I am shocked. The cowardly wretch at their head, 
 a Parisian revolutionary monster, prating about humanity, would 
 feel an infernal pleasure in the utter destruction of his opponents. 
 We have too long witnessed his general turpitude, his cruel re 
 movals of faithful officers, and the substitution of corruption and 
 looseness for integrity and worth. We have now before the Senate 
 
 1 This refers to the taxation of slaves on the ground of representation. 
 
448 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 a nomination of Merriweather Jones, of Richmond, editor of the 
 " Examiner," a paper devoted to Jefferson and Jacobinism ; and 
 he is now to be rewarded. Mr. Hopkins, commissioner of loans, 
 a man of property and integrity, is to give room for this Jones. 
 The commissioner may have at once thirty thousand dollars in his 
 hands to pay the public creditors in Virginia. He is required by 
 law to give bonds only in a sum from live to ten thousand dollars ; 
 and Jones s character is so notoriously bad that we have satisfac 
 tory evidence he could not now get credit at any store in Rich 
 mond for a suit of clothes ! Yet I am far from thinking, if this 
 evidence should be laid before the Senate, that his nomination 
 will be negatived ! I am therefore ready to say, " Come out from 
 among them, and be ye separate." Corruption is the object and 
 instrument of the chief, and the tendency of his administration, for 
 the purpose of maintaining himself in power and the accomplish 
 ment of his infidel and visionary schemes. The corrupt portion of 
 the people are the agents of his misrule. Corruption is the recom 
 mendation to office, and many of some pretensions to character, but 
 too feeble to resist temptation, become apostates. Virtue and worth 
 are his enemies, and therefore he would overwhelm them. The 
 collision of Democrats in your State promises some amendment: 
 the administration of your government cannot well be worse. 
 
 The Federalists here in general anxiously desire the election of 
 Mr. Burr to the chair of New York, for they despair of a present 
 ascendancy of the Federal party. Mr. Burr alone, we think, can 
 break your Democratic phalanx ; and we anticipate much good 
 from his success. Were New York detached (as under his admin 
 istration it would be) from the Virginian influence, the whole 
 Union would be benefited. Jefferson would then be forced to 
 observe some caution and forbearance in his measures. And, if a 
 separation should be deemed proper, the five New England States, 
 New York, and New Jersey would naturally be united. Among 
 those seven States there is a sufficient congeniality of char 
 acter to authorize the expectation of practicable harmony and a 
 permanent union, New York the centre. Without a separation, 
 can those States ever rid themselves of negro Presidents and 
 negro Congresses, and regain their just weight in the political 
 balance ? At this moment, the slaves of the Middle and Southern 
 States have fifteen representatives in Congress, and they will 
 appoint that number of electors of the next President and Vice- 
 
1800-5.] CORRESPONDENCE. 449 
 
 President; and the number of slaves is continually increasing. 
 You notice this evil. But will the slave States ever renounce the 
 advantage? As population is in fact no rule of taxation, the negro 
 representation ought to be given up. If refused, it would be a 
 strong ground for separation, though perhaps an earlier occasion 
 may present to declare it. How many Indian wars, excited by the 
 avidity of the Western and Southern States for Indian lands, shall 
 we have to encounter, and who will pay the millions to support 
 them ? The Atlantic States. Yet the first moment we ourselves 
 need assistance, and call on the Western States for taxes, they will 
 declare off, or at any rate refuse to obey the call. Kentucky 
 effectually resisted the collection of the excise; and of the thirty- 
 seven thousand dollars direct tax assessed upon her so many years 
 ago, she has paid only four thousand dollars, and probably will 
 never pay the residue. In the mean time, we are maintaining 
 their representatives in Congress for governing us, who surely can 
 much better govern ourselves. Whenever the Western States de 
 tach themselves, they will take Louisiana with them. In thirty 
 years, the white population on the Western waters will equal that 
 of the thirteen States when they declared themselves independent 
 of Great Britain. On the census of 1790, Kentucky was entitled 
 to two representatives; under that of 1800, she has six. 
 
 I do not know one reflecting Nov- Anglian who is not anxious 
 for the GREAT EVENT at which I have glanced. They fear, they 
 dread the effects of the corruption so rapidly extending ; and that, 
 if a decisive step be long delayed, it will be in vain to attempt it. 
 If there be no improper delay, we have not any doubt but that the 
 great measure may be taken, without the smallest hazard to private 
 property or the public funds, the revenues of the Northern States 
 being equal to their portion of the public debt, leaving that for 
 Louisiana on those who incurred it. 
 
 Believe me ever faithfully yours, T. P. 
 
 The facility with which we have seen an essential change in the 
 Constitution proposed and generally adopted will perhaps remove 
 your scruples about proposing what you intimate respecting negro 
 representation. But I begin to doubt whether that or any other 
 change we could propose, with a chance of adoption, would be worth 
 the breath, paper, and ink which would be expended in the acqui 
 sition. 
 
 29 
 
450 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5 
 
 KING TO PICKERING. 
 
 NEAV YORK, March 9, 1804. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have duly received, and beg you to accept my 
 acknowledgments for, your letters of the 3d and 4th instant. The 
 views which they disclose ought to fix the attention of the real 
 friends of liberty on this quarter of the Union, and the more so 
 as things seem to be fast advancing to a crisis. To save the post, 
 I can do little more than acknowledge the receipt of your letters. 
 By the mail of to-morrow or Monday, I will send you a copy of 
 my despatch to the Secretary of State respecting the effort I made 
 to conclude a convention concerning seamen. 1 . . . 
 
 RUFUS KING. 
 
 PICKERING TO THEODORE LYMAN. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, March 14, 1804. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have received your letter of the 29th ult. Con 
 sidering your connection with a certain cousin of yours, I thought 
 it possible that you might deem it proper to start the idea to him. 
 I had written to G. Cabot on the same subject. He had commu 
 nicated my letter to Theophilus Parsons, S. Higginson, and Mr. 
 Ames : they think the measure premature, while they deplore the 
 existing evils and our future prospects. The idea suggested for your 
 consideration is certainly extending, in Connecticut especially ; and 
 it begins to be entertained in New York. The character and pro 
 ceedings of the virulent Clintonians in that State, with the declining 
 of Chancellor Lansing to be the candidate for governor, will vastly 
 aid Mr. Burr s pretensions, and from the intelligence we have 
 here we expect that Mr. Burr will be elected. This will break 
 the Democratic phalanx of that State, and prepare the way for the 
 contemplated event. Mr. Burr s administration will be more liberal 
 than that of the Clintonian or of the general government. 
 
 As for the Constitution, tis mere paper, to be folded into any 
 shape to suit the views of the dominant party. Little regard is 
 had in deciding political questions to it or to justice ; and a great 
 part of the public measures have a bearing on politics, being cal 
 culated to depress the Federalists and to increase the power and 
 
 1 The letter goes on from this point, despite the haste necessary to save 
 the post, for three closely written pages, on the subject of our foreign policy 
 and impressment. 
 
1800-5.] CORRESPONDENCE. 451 
 
 influence of their opponents. We have this day, upon an ex 
 parte hearing, and against the testimonies of many respectable 
 men of the insanity of Judge Pickering, district judge of New 
 Hampshire, adjudged him guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, 
 and sentenced him to be removed from office. Justice should 
 have presided at this trial, but was not admitted ; nor will she 
 again find a place in the court of impeachment. The demon 
 of party governed the decision. All who condemned were Jeffer- 
 sonians, and all who pronounced the accused not guilty were 
 Federalists. Some members retired, without giving any vote. 
 I am told that the " Aurora " has published that Mr. Harper 
 was heard in defence of Judge Pickering, but tis false. He 
 was permitted to read a petition from Judge Pickering s son, 
 setting forth his father s insanity and utter inability of body to 
 appear in person to read his depositions, to prove the suggestions 
 in the petition, and to enforce the prayer of it that the cause might 
 be postponed. But Mr. Harper explicitly stated that he did not 
 appear for Judge Pickering, but merely as his son s friend, and 
 the friend of the court, to present and support the suggestions in 
 his son s petition. 
 
 I am this moment informed that the House of Representatives 
 have resolved to impeach Judge Chase. You may conclude he 
 will be condemned. If a considerable majority of the House were 
 to impeach any man in the United States, he would by the Senate 
 be found guilty ; because there could be no doubt that these meas 
 ures originate with the administration, are made questions of party, 
 and therefore at all events to be carried into effect according to 
 the wishes of the prime mover. There will, to be sure, be some 
 stretching of conscience. If several of the senators were left to de 
 cide the questions individually, their consciences would give way ; 
 but, when a number of consciences are joined together, they will bear 
 much rough usage without being rent. Judge Chase will not be 
 brought to his trial this session, for we hope to adjourn in two 
 weeks. Disgusted and shocked with the proceedings of the ruling 
 sect, I long to get away from such scenes of political profligacy and 
 injustice. I have just now heard mentioned the means used to 
 obtain the assent of Rhode Island to the alteration of the Constitu 
 tion relative to the choice of President and Vice-President. The 
 profligate rulers of that profligate State, it is said (and I believe 
 truly), agreed to adopt the amendment, provided the Federal 
 
452 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 officers in the State, especially the collectors of the customs, were 
 removed, and that Jefferson promised to remove them. This, how 
 ever, will not be done until Congress rises. He is fond of remov 
 ing and appointing in the recess. The outrage becomes an old 
 story before it is necessary to nominate the same men to the 
 Senate. 
 
 Under such a man, and with the means he possesses and can 
 command, corruption will continue to make rapid progress, all 
 power will be thrown into the hands of his party in all the States, 
 and the Federalists will curse the day which detached them from 
 the milder government of the mother country. 
 
 Such is the fate which awaits us, and we shall live to see it ; 
 yes, the next Presidential term will not elapse before what is now 
 anticipated will be verified. One or two Marats or Robespierres in 
 each branch of the Legislature, with half a dozen hardened wretches 
 ready to co-operate, a greater number of half-moderates, another 
 portion of gaping expectants of office, another of the ignorant 
 and undiscerning, with the many timid characters, will constitute a 
 large majority, up to any measure which the revenge, the malice, 
 the ambition, or rapacity of the leaders shall propose. It will be 
 enough to render every such measure popular to declare its object 
 to be to crush aristocracy and monarchy, and to secure liberty and 
 Republicanism. 
 
 And are our good citizens so devoted to their private pursuits that 
 they will not allow themselves time to look up and see the gathering 
 cloud? Will nothing rouse them but its thunder, or strike their 
 eyes save the lightning bursting from its bosom ? 
 
 I am, indeed, sick at heart to see of our Revolutionary toils, 
 dangers, and sufferings, such a result, and in the short space of 
 twenty years ! " A virtuous and enlightened people ! " The ear is 
 wounded by prostitution of those epithets. And is our case really 
 hopeless ? I have little to lose, except life, and that, verging to 
 threescore years, is not worth much ; yet I would fain die in 
 peace, or, if that be denied, perish in the hope of leaving it an 
 inheritance to my children, under a free government, established on 
 surer foundations than that which only fifteen years ago we em 
 braced with so much ardor. The experienced errors of the latter 
 might, one would hope, be remedied under a Northern con 
 federacy. Are stability, justice, and tranquillity incompatible with 
 Republicanism ? 
 
1800-5.] CORRESPONDENCE. 453 
 
 You have mistaken, or I did not clearly express my meaning 
 with regard to an adjustment. That must be a subsequent meas 
 ure. If the States I mentioned were united, the rest would not 
 dare to lift a finger against them. After the confederacy of the 
 former should be fixed, the terms of intercourse with the others 
 and the distribution of existing burdens would be agreed on. 
 
 I remain, my dear sir, very truly yours, T. P. 
 
 STEPHEN HIGGINSON TO PICKERING. 
 
 MARCH 17, 1804. 
 i 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have seen your letters to Mr. Cabot and Mr. 
 Lyman on the question of separation, which is a very delicate and 
 important one, considered in the abstract. We all agree there can 
 be no doubt of its being desirable ; but of the expediency of 
 attempting it, or discussing it now at this moment, we all very 
 much doubt. It is dangerous to continue under the Virginia 
 system ; but how to extricate ourselves at present we see not, and, 
 if we remain long together, we shall be bound with so many liga 
 tures it will require great efforts to get extricated, and, in the 
 present state of the public mind, even here no attempt can be 
 excited. It would indeed be very unpopular to suggest the idea of 
 its being either expedient or necessary. It is impossible to alarm, 
 much less to convince, a large portion of the Federal party here of 
 their danger. A small part only of those called Federal, and who 
 in common cases usually go with us, are sound in their opinions, 
 and willing to look into their real situation. Many even of our 
 own party have as much yet to unlearn as to learn. They have 
 yet much of the Democratic taint about them ; and, with this non 
 sense in their brains and the influence of a former great man * and 
 his friends, who will seize every occasion to keep up a division 
 in the Federal party here, we should be put into the background, 
 were we to make that question the subject of free conversation. 
 As, in the present state of things, it would be imprudent even to 
 discuss the question, we must wait the effects of still greater out 
 rage and insult from those in power before we prepare for the only 
 measure which can save the New England States from the snares 
 of Virginia. 
 
 Democracy is rising, and will increase in this State. Our elec- 
 1 Ex-President John Adams. 
 
454 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800-5. 
 
 tions may this year give us a majority in both houses, and Governor 
 Strong; but, without some favorable events, the Democrats will 
 succeed another year, and we shall be revolutionized, and the other 
 States will follow. Such is my view of our situation : it is the 
 natural effects of existing causes, which will produce the change I 
 contemplate, and I see no means in our power to control their 
 operation. But as we may at times check, perhaps modify and 
 often mitigate, by a vigilant and steady opposition, the effects of 
 revolutionary measures, and give ourselves the chance of the 
 chapter of accidents for a longer period of time, I am for remaining 
 at our posts, ready to seize every favorable event and to keep the 
 robin alive as long as we can. 
 
 Wishing as much success and happiness as can attend you, I am 
 very truly yours, &c., S. HIGGINSON. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 455 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 1804-1815. 
 New England Federalism and the Hartford Convention. 
 
 THE settlement of the Louisiana question concluded the 
 most important political transaction of 1804. In the spring 
 of that year, Mr. Jefferson overcame his scruples l in regard 
 to a re-election, and accepted the nomination of. his party 
 caucus for a second term. 
 
 The same year was made memorable also by the closing 
 scenes in the life of the President s great opponent. Just 
 before the renomination of the former, Hamilton, not less 
 illustrious at the bar than at the head of the Treasury, had 
 fixed the attention of the country by his celebrated defence 
 of the liberty of the press in the Croswell case. A few 
 short months, and all these talents, all this genius, were 
 hurried to a premature grave by the hand of Aaron Burr. 
 The news of the terrible tragedy enacted that quiet sum 
 mer morning, on the beautiful banks of the Hudson, spread 
 fast and far. The whole country, forgetting for an instant 
 party hatred, mourned the untimely death of one of her 
 greatest men ; while the Federalists were for the moment 
 crushed by the unexpected blow. In Hamilton, they lost 
 their greatest leader, the only man who had the power and 
 the will to form them to new issues, and lead them again to 
 success. By his death, Federalism received a check from 
 which it never recovered, except in New England ; and only 
 unforeseen events renewed its strength there. Colonel Pick 
 ering s letters, at the opening of the next session, show plainly 
 1 Jefferson s Works, II. 330, 331 ; III. 15. 
 
456 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1801-15. 
 
 that the material prosperity of the country during Jeffer 
 son s first term, the death of Hamilton, and the ill-judged 
 resistance of the Federalists to the purchase of Louisiana, 
 had done their work. When Massachusetts sent Demo 
 cratic electors to vote for Jefferson, the end was near at 
 hand, the Democratic tide was almost at its height ; and the 
 dissolution and re-formation of parties could not have been 
 far distant. Colonel Pickering writes sadly of the decay 
 of party spirit, and the absence of party feeling in Con 
 gress. Had it not been for Europe and Jefferson s foreign 
 policy, the era of good feeling, the break-up of the old 
 parties and the development of new ones, would have come 
 in 1805 instead of in 1815. But it was destined to be 
 otherwise ; and the country at that very moment was on 
 the verge of the most bitter and, in some respects, the sor 
 riest political strife which our annals have to show. 
 
 The first signs of trouble were visible at the opening of 
 the session of 1804-5. The renewal of war in Europe 
 had brought with it a revival of impressments from our 
 vessels ; and the country was rudely awakened from its 
 tranquillity to a sense that storms were brewing, and that 
 " wise frugality " had left a maritime people not only with 
 out a navy, but destitute even of cannon or fortifications 
 with which to guard their far-reaching sea-board and de 
 fenceless towns. The President, however, was fully pre 
 pared for the emergency. A further curtailment of the 
 navy appropriation was of course obviously proper ; but the 
 protection of the coast had to be provided for, and the lack 
 of fortifications supplied. With these last objects, appro 
 priations were made for building twenty-five gun-boats, 
 which were to be housed, and put in the water only when 
 the stress of war was actually upon us ; and a sufficient num 
 ber of cannon mounted on wheels were to be in readiness to 
 meet an attack at any point, and thus supply the need of 
 permanent forts. By this simple device, expensive and 
 immovable fortifications at all the ports would be avoided ; 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFOKD CONVENTION. 457 
 
 while travelling fortifications would always be on hand to 
 be trundled from one harbor to another, in order to meet 
 the enemy wherever he appeared. In this way, money was 
 saved ; and at the same time the country and the flag were 
 protected. 
 
 The chief interest of the session, however, centred in a 
 domestic question, the impeachment and trial of Judge 
 Chase. Here the Federalists gained a decisive victory, and 
 one whose importance it is now difficult to appreciate. By 
 their efforts, Judge Chase was acquitted, the judiciary was 
 saved, and its independence protected. At this time, too, 
 the split, which had been anticipated by the Federalists, 
 between the radical and conservative elements of the Demo 
 cratic party, began to show itself. There can be no doubt 
 that there were many men with just wit enough to be fas 
 cinated by Jefferson s theories, but wholly devoid of his 
 tact, prudence, and address, whose designs fell little short 
 of a complete revolution in our government. This faction 
 suffered a severe defeat by the acquittal of Chase, and 
 were suppressed and broken down by Jefferson, but still 
 they were not idle elsewhere. Pierrepont Edwards s Demo 
 cratic convention in Connecticut, and the furious partisan 
 attempts to alter the Constitution of Pennsylvania, showed 
 the existence and activity of a very dangerous and extreme 
 party. Had not other events intervened, our politics might 
 have turned at this point into channels very different from 
 those actually taken. 
 
 The famous English admiralty decisions 1 were known 
 here early in 1805, and produced a storm of indignation in 
 all our commercial cities whose interests were most nearly 
 affected. Not only were we in trouble with England, but 
 our difficulties with Spain began to assume a threatening 
 appearance. Once more the President proved himself equal 
 to the occasion. At the opening of Congress in the autumn, 
 more gun-boats were advised in the message ; and money 
 was required for secret objects. Jefferson wished to have 
 1 See above, p. 314 
 
458 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 the Mediterranean fund, formerly used to buy off pirates, put 
 into his hands, and no questions asked as to the purpose to 
 which it was applied. A resolution in conformity with this 
 plan was accordingly introduced in the House by one of the 
 President s adherents. Information was demanded by the 
 opposition as to the use for which this money was intended, 
 but the " secret wishes " of the President was the only reply 
 vouchsafed. In a spasm of self-respect, the House, while 
 they voted the appropriation with their usual obedience, 
 refused to raise it under cover of duties for the Mediterra 
 nean fund, although subsequently, by a trick which it is 
 unnecessary to explain here, Jefferson succeeded in carry 
 ing his point, and in getting possession of the money in the 
 form of the fund. His object was the very simple one of 
 paying France to keep Spain in check. 1 He had already 
 exhibited his tenderness to those nations by refusing our 
 merchants permission to arm and protect themselves against 
 the piratical cruisers in the West India islands ; but his re 
 gard for the Latin races was still more severely tested, at this 
 time, by the insults which the Spanish minister Yrujo heaped 
 upon us. Not even the actual invasion of our territory by 
 Spaniards seemed to Jefferson cause for prompt resistance. 
 But while planning to subdue some hostile nations by the 
 gentle arts of purchase, and by turning to their assailants the 
 still unsmitten cheek for further blows, our government, in 
 other directions, was both sensitive and even aggressive, and 
 at once retaliated the English admiralty decisions by the 
 non-importation act, the first of that dismal series of commer 
 cial restrictions for which we were indebted to another of 
 Jefferson s many theories. The Federalists opposed this 
 whole policy, on the ground that the trade affected by the 
 British decisions was not a legitimate trade, but the growth 
 of the European troubles ; and they contended that non 
 importation was a measure which could lead only to war, 
 
 1 See Annals of Congress, 1805, 1806, pp. 94(3-994, Debate on Spanish 
 Affairs. Compare Jefferson, Works, IV. 587, and V. 27, 164, 181. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 459 
 
 and to a war in defence of an illegal trade. Jefferson, 
 however, was not neglectful of other weapons. One hun 
 dred and fifty thousand dollars was voted in order to for 
 tify all our harbors, and two hundred and fifty thousand 
 dollars for building more gun-boats. Nothing was done 
 for the army, but the navy was attended to. No appro 
 priation was made to repair some of the frigates which had 
 been laid up ; but they were sold, and thus turned to good 
 account. The frames, too, of certain ships of the line were 
 utilized by being cut up for the gun-boats. At the same 
 time, the numbers of the seamen were limited, so that only 
 enough were provided to man three frigates. The strong 
 position acquired by these measures may be appreciated 
 by the action of our government in the Peirce affair. 
 Peirce, the captain of an American vessel, was killed near 
 New York Harbor by a cannon-shot from a British cruiser ; 
 and, although Jefferson had just aimed a blow by the non 
 importation act at the commercial supremacy of Great 
 Britain, he was both unwilling and unable to retaliate, or 
 even to display any indignation for the death of Peirce. 
 The only notice taken of the affair was to send a copy of 
 the act, providing for our naval peace establishment, to the 
 New York council, who had called upon the national govern 
 ment for defence, and to publish a proclamation ordering 
 the offending cruiser to leave our waters. Thus, by these 
 missives, a sense of our ability to enforce the demands 
 of the proclamation was conveyed both to us and to the 
 English. No evidence remains to show whether the British 
 cruiser departed after this pitiable display of weakness on 
 the part of our government. 
 
 Scarcely had the President succeeded in securing the 
 Mediterranean fund, when it became known that Talley 
 rand threatened Avar, unless we abandoned our commerce 
 with Hayti. This menace, conveyed through the medium 
 of Turreau, the French minister, produced the desired effect : 
 and an act of Congress, in conformity with the desires of 
 
460 LFFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15, 
 
 the President, forbade the obnoxious trade. The adminis 
 tration was ready to quarrel with the greatest maritime 
 power in the world, the only one that could do us essential 
 injury, because certain doubtful commercial rights had 
 been infringed ; while another branch of trade was readily 
 prohibited in deference to the threats of France. The 
 contrast between the policies pursued towards the two bel 
 ligerents is, in this instance, sufficiently striking. 
 
 Difficulties, indeed, thickened rapidly about the Presi 
 dent s path, as our affairs drifted off into the stormy sea 
 of European politics. Before tracing their confused and 
 intricate course, it will be of advantage to pause for a mo 
 ment, in order to consider the relative positions of political 
 parties and the principles by which each professed to be 
 actuated. The foreign policy of the Federalists had been 
 one of their greatest merits, and was simply that of a strong 
 neutrality, now become traditional as the " Monroe doc 
 trine." Jefferson s theory was to keep peace, at all hazards; 
 to involve the country in no foreign connections, and yet 
 at the same time, with marvellous inconsistency, to aid 
 France and injure England to the utmost extent. To 
 depress the latter and exalt the former, without engaging 
 in actual war, were the sum and substance of Jefferson s 
 tactics. When this was first attempted, at the period of 
 the Genet difficulties, the immediate result was the baneful 
 division of our people into a French party and an English 
 party, instead of into two American parties. The wisdom 
 of Washington and the clear judgment of Adams steered 
 us through these first troubles, and the position of a strong 
 neutrality was preserved. During Jefferson s first term, 
 foreign politics did not disturb us ; but they came again into 
 prominence in 1805. In the interval, great changes had 
 been wrought in Europe. France no longer fought under 
 even the hollow pretence of republicanism, but solely to 
 advance the hungry ambition of one man. England, in the 
 words of John Randolph, was doing battle for the liberties 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 461 
 
 of mankind, and for the maintenance of civilized society, 
 which was the opinion entertained by the Federalists. 
 That this view was in general correct, few persons at 
 this day would care to deny ; but Jefferson, unluckily, 
 thought differently. 
 
 Mr. John Quincy Adams in the pamphlet so often 
 referred to here takes the ground that Jefferson had 
 no partiality for Napoleon. This may be perfectly true. 
 He may, perhaps, have had no love for Bonaparte, individ 
 ually; but he nevertheless shaped his course in conformity 
 with his old theory of supporting France against England. 
 His admiration for the French and his hatred of England 
 were, moreover, powerfully aided by his abject fear of the 
 power of the modern Csesar. The practical reasons for his 
 policy are easily discerned. Jefferson relied on the popular 
 feeling against England as a principal support to his politi 
 cal supremacy, and his d priori theories coincided fully with 
 what he knew to be for his own interests. The destruction 
 of the navy had deprived our neutrality of any strength it 
 might have possessed ; and Jefferson now destroyed neutral 
 ity itself, by putting the country as far as he could, without 
 actually engaging in war, upon the side of Bonaparte. One 
 immediate result was to drive his opponents into an ex 
 treme support of Great Britain. The Federalists had seen 
 their naval policy overthrown, and now they beheld the 
 country with all its vast and defenceless commerce launched 
 upon a series of measures which must in the end lead to 
 war. Jefferson was unquestionably sincere in his desire for 
 peace at all risks, and the Federalists understood this fact 
 perfectly ; but they nevertheless believed that his meas 
 ures made the preservation of peace ultimately impossible. 
 Strongly attached as they were to the commercial inter 
 ests, they dreaded war with any power, but they utterly ab 
 horred the thought of a conflict with the one nation which 
 seemed to them the champion of the liberties of mankind 
 and the independence of neutral nations. They feared a 
 
462 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 necessary and a just war as little as any one ; but they 
 were bitterly opposed to a policy that supported the in 
 terests of a gigantic despotism, and furthered schemes of 
 Corsican brigandage, in which nations were the victims, 
 and myriads of soldiers the robbers. There is no need of 
 supposing, with Colonel Pickering, that Jefferson was the 
 minion and hireling of Bonaparte. This was the exagger 
 ated charge of a heated and bitter partisan. But nothing 
 can be clearer than that Jefferson steadfastly pursued his 
 policy of adhering to the French and attacking the English 
 interests. Great Britain, it is true, treated us disgracefully ; 
 and in all our relations with her we exhibited a strange 
 mixture of proud sensitiveness and impotent resistance. 
 Whereas the outrages of France, who behaved with still 
 greater brutality, and heaped insults upon us with generous 
 profusion, were quietly discussed, and then hidden and 
 shuffled over with a tameness that is even now very trying 
 to contemplate. If the Federalist admiration and support 
 of England were extreme and unwarrantable, they are at 
 least better than the hushed and stealthy subserviency to 
 France displayed by their opponents. Both sides of the 
 picture are dark, neither can give aught but pain to an 
 American, but the blame must fall chiefly on those who 
 wielded the powers of government. Those men, and those 
 alone, were responsible, who, not content with destroying 
 our only weapon, the navy, crippled our resources by a suc 
 cession of measures which nearly drove a large and populous 
 section of the country into open revolt, and who, having 
 made war the only possible result, then refused to fight, and 
 left us to be kicked about at the mercy of the two great 
 European powers. The two parties were in this way ar 
 rayed against each other on the question of supporting 
 French or English interests, while they never ceased to 
 proclaim in the loudest possible manner that they had no 
 intention of supporting either. The issues arising from 
 such a condition of affairs were so confused and so falsified 
 
1804-15]. THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 463 
 
 that even now it is no easy matter to determine what any 
 one really wanted, while, as if to make confusion worse con 
 founded, the administration persisted in a policy that was 
 no policy, but only a vague jumble of theories. 
 
 Alarmed by the dangerous aspect of our foreign relations, 
 Jefferson determined to make, in appearance at least, a 
 genuine effort for a stable peace with Great Britain. With 
 this purpose, he despatched Mr. Pinkney to England early 
 in the autumn of 1806, and joined him as special commis 
 sioner with Mr. Monroe to conclude a treaty. Many pre 
 vious attempts to settle the vexed question of impressment 
 had been made, and had thus far proved fruitless. The 
 subject, although not mentioned in the Jay treaty, had 
 been discussed by the negotiators ; and John Marshall, at 
 the close of the last century, had urged the necessity of a 
 settlement upon the attention of the British ministry. Mr. 
 King, then minister to England, soon after renewed the 
 negotiation, and would have succeeded in obtaining a settle 
 ment, had it not been for the determination of the British 
 ministry, at the last moment, to retain the right of search in 
 the narrow seas. The inadmissibility of such a claim forced 
 Mr. King to break off the negotiation. During the summer 
 previous to Mr. Pinkney s departure, Mr. Madison had urged 
 upon Mr. Merry, the British minister, the propriety of a neu 
 tral flag, protecting against seizure and impressment ; and 
 Mr. Monroe, then in London, had been instructed to press the 
 same doctrine, and to protest against the recent admiralty 
 decisions. When Mr. Pinkney was joined with Mr. Mon 
 roe, in order to give weight to the commission and to hasten 
 the conclusion of a treaty, circumstances were peculiarly 
 favorable to a successful issue. The short-lived ministry 
 of Charles Fox and u all the talents," who regarded us with 
 much more kindness, and were disposed to treat us with 
 greater justice than were their Tory predecessors, was then 
 in power. Fox himself was then laboring under the malady so 
 soon to prove fatal, and Lords Auckland and Howick were 
 
464 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 therefore appointed to treat with the American commission 
 ers. The first question was, of course, that of impressment. 
 Monroe and Pinkney contended that this was merely a 
 municipal right, while the English commissioners held that 
 it was a prerogative of the crown, a universal legal right, 
 the protection of their navy, and finally and conclusively 
 that no ministers would dare to renounce it. Lords Auck 
 land and Howick declared, however, that though the min 
 istry dared not at that moment abandon this right by a 
 formal treaty, yet that special instructions should be given 
 to avoid molesting any American-born citizens, and that in 
 case of such injury the speediest redress should be given. 
 These pledges were reduced to writing, both parties reserv 
 ing all their rights in the matter for future negotiation. 
 The American commissioners were also given to under 
 stand, and did in fact believe, that impressment would not 
 be attempted except where deserters from the British navy 
 were known to be on board an American vessel ; and they 
 felt convinced that this was a practical, if not a formal, set 
 tlement of the question. It was at any rate the greatest 
 concession ever made by England on this point, and Mon 
 roe and Pinkney, satisfied that the practice of impress 
 ment would be silently abandoned, determined to accept 
 the British note, and to proceed with the negotiations, al 
 though in so doing they violated their instructions. After 
 the removal of this obstacle, a treaty was soon concluded, 
 which did not differ essentially from that of Mr. Jay. On 
 the question of the carrying trade, whose invasion had been 
 the cause of the present difficulties, the rights claimed by 
 the United States were practically admitted. Just as this 
 treaty was about to be signed, news of the Berlin decree 
 arrived. The British commissioners did not on this account 
 withhold their signatures from the treaty, but merely en 
 tered a protest, reserving the right of retaliation, if the 
 decree were enforced against neutrals. Soon after, England 
 did in fact retaliate, by proclaiming a blockade of the 
 French coast from Brest to the mouth of the Elbs. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 465 
 
 In the mean time, Congress met; and the President, 
 in consideration of the promising aspect of the English 
 negotiation, successfully recommended a suspension of the 
 non-importation act. Preparations for war were not re 
 laxed. An increase of the army was defeated ; but the mu 
 nificent sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars was 
 voted for fortifications, and the President obtained a like 
 amount for his favorite gun-boats, though the latter appro 
 priation was stricken out afterwards by an unfeeling Senate. 
 At the same time, five hundred additional seamen were voted 
 for the navy. These were the principal government meas 
 ures, when a negotiation of doubtful result was pending 
 with England on questions involving peace or war ; and 
 when Napoleon had flung in our face an imperious prohibi 
 tion of our commerce. Other troubles were not wanting. 
 Yrujo, who had publicly insulted our government, and been 
 dismissed in consequence, had been sent back by Bona 
 parte s influence. The President s Spanish negotiations 
 were looking very black, while at the same time Turreau 
 was dragooning our unfortunate administration in regard 
 to a French claim. But these were trifling matters in our 
 relations with France, compared with what followed. The 
 battle of Trafalgar had annihilated the strength of Napoleon 
 at sea, and forced him to resort to other methods for the 
 destruction of England. Master of continental Europe, he 
 issued from the field of Jena the famous Berlin decree, by 
 which Great Britain was declared in a state of blockade 
 and all commerce with her was forbidden, and by which the 
 greater proportion of American shipping was threatened 
 with seizure and confiscation. When the news was received, 
 at the beginning of the year, insurance rose ruinously, and 
 commerce almost ceased. Armstrong, our minister at Paris, 
 wrote that the French government did not intend to disturb 
 our commerce ; but his correspondence with the French min 
 ister, when laid before Congress, was not entirely reassur 
 ing on this point. Our measures of defence under these 
 
 30 
 
466 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15 
 
 circumstances have already been alluded to, but the tone of 
 the debates at this time is not without interest. The sen 
 timents expressed by members of that party, which Mr. 
 Adams, disgusted by the lack of patriotism among the 
 Federalists, soon after felt obliged to join, are quite instruc 
 tive. One gentleman, opposing appropriations for forts 
 and ships, said that in case of a war we could abandon 
 our harbors and sea-coast, and all retire to the interior. 
 Another patriot, one Smilie, of Pennsylvania, whose 
 sensitive nature would have shrunk from the black trea 
 sons of Federalist New England, as depicted by Mr. 
 Adams, now proclaimed the doctrine that rather than vote 
 money for a fleet he would leave the country undefended. 
 The iron of a " wise frugality " had certainly entered 
 very deeply into these men s souls. The fact was, that 
 the whole Democratic party was completely demoralized. 
 Without leaders, devoted to French principles, hating 
 Great Britain, afraid of war, detesting commerce and 
 New England, the dominant majority presented a sorry 
 sight. They do not seem to have known what they 
 wanted, or even what they did not want. They were re 
 solved to obey Jefferson, and they knew this must be right ; 
 yet they could not help perceiving that the country was drift 
 ing into a dreaded and, worst of all, into an expensive war. 
 Their last resource, at this trying moment, was to cut down 
 appropriations and pursue, as long as possible, the precepts 
 of economy. Now it was that Jefferson wrote despairingly 
 to Nicholas, begging him to come to Washington and take 
 command of their " well-disposed," but sadly inefficient 
 forces. 1 
 
 With affairs in this wretched state, the country alarmed 
 and the ruling party demoralized, the treaty arrived from 
 England. It was a better treaty than Jay s treaty of 1795, 
 it was a far better treaty than that of 1815. If it was 
 right to make and ratify those treaties, it was far more 
 surely right to make and ratify this one. No mention of 
 i See above, p. 425. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 467 
 
 impressment was made in Jay s treaty ; and at the treaty 
 of 1815 we failed even to press our objection to it, 
 though for that, and that alone, we had just fought a long 
 and well-nigh ruinous war. In 1806, large concessions, 
 and the only ones ever granted, were made to us on the 
 subject of impressment, and all our rights in the matter 
 were reserved for further negotiation. The posture of 
 affairs abroad was far graver and more threatening in 1806 
 than in 1795, and quite as much so as in 1815. In 1806, 
 we were wholly unprepared for war ; while in 1795 we 
 were united, and in 1815 flushed with some success in 
 fighting. If it was beneath the national dignity to accept 
 any thing short of a formal stipulation in 1806, then it was 
 baseness in Washington to accept less in 1795, and simple 
 treachery and cowardice in Madison to abandon our rights 
 in 1815. The treaties of 1795 and 1815 were eminently 
 wise and proper measures : one saved us from war, the 
 other arrested it. The treaty of 1806 was a better treaty, 
 was more demanded by circumstances than either of the 
 other two, and was a more clearly judicious measure. The 
 difference in the cases is the difference in the several 
 individuals to whom the guidance of the country was at 
 the moment intrusted. In the one case, it was Washington, 
 wise, dignified, and calm ; in the other, it was Madison, 
 prudent, sagacious, and badly frightened ; in the third, it 
 was Jefferson, crafty, selfish, and a French doctrinaire. 
 Washington and Madison ratified their treaties, Jefferson 
 rejected his. Without a word to the Senate, or to any one 
 but Madison, the treaty of 1806 was thrown aside ; and the 
 "war of 1812, with all the miserable years which preceded 
 it, was made inevitable. The history of the time presents 
 no single valid reason for Jefferson s secret rejection of the 
 treaty. To the character and principles of the man, we 
 must alone look for explanation. It was the old story : a 
 hatred of England and a love of France, a policy of covertly 
 injuring one and aiding the other, and a firm belief that 
 
468 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 a constantly manifested detestation of England was the 
 best way to popular support. His views and objects at 
 this time are summed up in his remark to Dr. Logan, an 
 intimate friend, and then a senator from Pennsylvania : 
 " To tell you the truth, doctor, I do not wish to have any 
 treaty with them." To quote Logan s awn words : " An 
 impression was made on my mind that Mr. Jefferson did 
 not at that time wish a treaty of peace and commerce with 
 England. I perfectly recollect he terminated a conversa 
 tion on this subject, by observing that before a treaty could 
 be ratified with Great Britain she might no longer exist 
 as an independent nation. I am of opinion Mr. Jefferson 
 declined making a treaty with England, not from his hatred 
 to that country, but from his fear of the overwhelming 
 power of Bonaparte." 1 For the gratification of theory, 
 and of mingled emotions of hatred, affection, and fear, 
 and for the preservation of popularity, Jefferson rejected 
 the treaty, and in so doing involved his country in priva 
 tions, disgraces, and finally in an abortive and nearly ruin 
 ous war. 2 
 
 The Federalists were bitterly disappointed by the loss 
 of the treaty, not simply because they represented the 
 great commercial interests so wantonly exposed to destruc 
 tion, but because they believed that the rejection of the 
 treaty would sooner or later end, not only in war with 
 England, whom they regarded as the champion of constitu 
 tional liberty, but also in a subservient and dependent 
 alliance with France, or, in other words, with Bonaparte, 
 
 1 Pickering MSS. 
 
 2 See Monroe s letters in State Papers, as to the treaty and its rejection. 
 The reason given by Jefferson for this course was that we could never, 
 consistently with our national honor, recognize by treaty the principle of 
 impressment. To which it may be replied that no mention of impressment 
 was made in the treaty, and in the informal notes on the subject all rights 
 were expressly reserved, and the way for future negotiations explicitly left 
 open. Thus, Jefferson s reason, if sincere, was shallow and unfounded, so 
 shallow and so obviously unfounded that it is evident it was adopted merely 
 as a blind, and was not the true ground for the rejection. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 469 
 
 whom they believed to be establishing a universal despotism. 
 Their hatred of Jefferson could not become under any 
 circumstances more intense, but it could and did become 
 more active. 
 
 The rejection of the Monroe and Pinkney treaty was 
 the turning point in the history of those troubled times, 
 and it offers a good opportunity to compare once more the 
 policy of the contending parties. On the one side was 
 Jefferson, at the head of a great majority, in complete pos 
 session of all departments of the government. The policy 
 of the leader and of the party was to aid France without 
 going to war with England, and to bend every thing to 
 continuing their own popular support, by exciting hatred of 
 Great Britain and by sacrificing every interest to a false 
 economy. Acting on such principles, the dominant party 
 had stripped us of our navy, our army, and our forts, in 
 short, of every means of defence. From the same motives, 
 they had, while tamely submitting to the French aggres 
 sions, resisted violently those of England, and by the 
 rejection of the treaty had exposed our vast and unpro 
 tected commerce to the dangers of an unavoidable war 
 with the one great maritime power of the world. On the 
 other side were the Federalists, numerically weak, but re 
 spectable by their wealth, their abilities, and their char 
 acter. They wished to arm the nation, to equip the navy, 
 to make peace and perhaps an alliance with England, and, 
 if necessary, declare war with France. In this way, they 
 would have protected both our dignity and our commercial 
 interests ; and, whatever the faults of such a policy, it had 
 at least the merits of decision and intelligibility. The 
 Federalist plan was never tried; but the other, if it can 
 be called a plan, was tried to the bitter end. If the 
 history of the next nine years justified its adoption, there 
 is nothing more to be said ; but as the policies appeared in 
 bold contrast, in 1806, there would seem to be little room 
 for hesitation in deciding which was the more dignified, 
 the more reasonable, and the more manly of the two. 
 
470 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 We can see now that the rejection of the treaty made 
 war ultimately inevitable ; but such was not Jefferson s 
 view, and he determined to renew the negotiations forth 
 with. Matters were very soon still further complicated by 
 the British outrage upon the " Chesapeake." This insult was 
 received with general indignation, and every feeling was 
 for the moment swallowed up in the sense of national dis 
 honor. Mr. Adams, in describing the action of the Feder 
 alists, says that George Cabot, John Lowell, and Tlieophilus 
 Parsons took no part in the indignation meetings that 
 were held in Boston. While this shows the extreme bitter 
 ness of party spirit, it also shows that these were men who 
 would not at any time, or under any circumstances, pledge 
 their support to an administration which they held respon 
 sible for all our trouble, and for the disgrace to which we 
 had been subjected. They did not believe that the national 
 honor or dignity could be preserved while the Jeffersonian 
 system was in force, and they were not willing to belie 
 their opinions even to save their popularity. 
 
 Jefferson managed the " Chesapeake " affair with that curi 
 ous mixture of defiance, springing from his hatred of Eng 
 land, and of feebleness derived from his determination not 
 to fight in any event. He at once published a proclama 
 tion, ordering British men-of-war to leave our waters, 
 and at the same time demanded satisfaction from the 
 British government, coupling the demand with the old 
 question of impressment. When the attempt to reopen 
 negotiations was thus made, affairs had changed in Eng 
 land most unfavorably to our interests. The administra 
 tion of " all the talents " was no more, and Tories reigned 
 in their stead. Mr. Canning roughly refused to con 
 sider the questions of satisfaction for the " Chesapeake " 
 and impressment, when thus united; but a minister, Mr. 
 Rose, was at once sent to America to offer sufficient repara 
 tion. 1 He declined, however, to treat until Jefferson s pro- 
 
 1 The Federalists thought the reparation offered sufficient at the time ; but 
 they would not, as sympathizing with England, be considered trustworthy. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 471 
 
 clamation was withdrawn, and his mission ultimately came 
 to nothing. In the mean time, Great Britain issued a 
 proclamation calling in all British seamen, and directing 
 the officers of the navy to seize and impress such seamen, 
 wherever found. Against this, Mr. Monroe, before his de 
 parture, protested strongly ; and Mr. Canning thereupon 
 sent a final reply to the American commissioners. He 
 refused to renew negotiations on the basis of a treaty which 
 had been signed and then rejected, but was willing to 
 open new negotiations ; and so the hopes of peace in that 
 quarter ended for the present. The policy of the adminis 
 tration irritated England and displayed our weakness, and 
 by this happy combination exposed us to all the brutal arro 
 gance and sarcasm that Mr. Canning chose to indulge in. 
 
 In the message with which he met Congress in the au 
 tumn of 1807, Jefferson explained his views. He said it was 
 proper to exclude offending vessels from our harbors by pro 
 clamations, but he added that it was obviously wrong to keep 
 up a force sufficient to compel obedience. The British 
 infringement of the neutral coasting trade in Europe was 
 enlarged upon with great warmth. As to the other bellig 
 erent, the President was less communicative, although the 
 French seizures and captures of our vessels had gone on 
 steadily and with rapid increase. Jefferson also announced 
 that Spain had promulgated a similar decree, and he ex 
 pressed to Congress a natural curiosity to know whether 
 the Spanish would follow the example of their French 
 masters, and prey upon our commerce. Still, the situa 
 tion was grave enough to suggest the advisability of 
 measures of defence. A million and a half was accord 
 ingly proposed in Congress for the gun-boats, and thus 
 one hundred and eighty-eight of them were to be pro 
 vided. Seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars was 
 proposed for fortifications. The Federalists wished this 
 
 Since Mr. Madison, five years later, accepted the very same kind and 
 amount of reparation for the " Chesapeake," I feel authorized in calling it 
 " sufficient." 
 
473 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 last appropriation doubled, but were refused, because the 
 money was not merely to repair permanent, but to sup 
 ply movable forts or cannon, by which any other kind of 
 coast defence would be superseded. The proposition to 
 enlarge and strengthen, or rather to build, a navy, was 
 promptly voted down, and the gun-boat scheme was substi 
 tuted for it. Indeed, one argument made at the time to 
 such a scheme seems conclusive. Were we to build a 
 navy, it was urged, the British would at once seize it, as 
 they did the Danish fleet ; and we should then have had all 
 our trouble and expense for nothing. 1 
 
 While these measures were under discussion, news came 
 of the English proclamation recalling all British seamen and 
 of the extension of the Berlin decree. Information also 
 arrived that the Berlin decree had been interpreted so as to 
 cover American vessels, and that the doctrine had been 
 carried out by the condemnation of the " Horizon." Papers 
 relating to these matters were laid before Congress, and 
 certain other papers which had come to the President, but 
 which were not then published, were also sent in. The un 
 published documents formed the correspondence between 
 Armstrong and Champagny, in which the former had asked 
 for explanations in regard to the extended construction of 
 the Berlin decree, and the latter had replied by avowing 
 that the one object of the decrees was to unite the world 
 against Great Britain, the enemy of the Emperor. Rumors 
 were also afloat of the intended publication of new and more 
 stringent orders in council. 
 
 The time seemed to have arrived when Jefferson s guid 
 ing theory of no wars and no treaties with anybody at any 
 time must break down. War or alliance with one of the 
 two great belligerents certainly appeared unavoidable. But 
 Jefferson was master of the situation. He extricated one 
 theory from its difficulties by resorting to another. Instead 
 of fighting or negotiating with either of our enemies, he 
 pursued the simpler and more peaceable plan of bringing 
 
 1 Annals of Congress for 1807-8, pp. 1072-1074, and 1090. 
 
1804-15.] THE HAKTFOKD CONVENTION. 473 
 
 the great combatants in Europe to their knees by a series 
 of restrictions on our own commerce. On the night of 
 December 22d, the embargo law was forced through 
 by an obsequious majority, acting in obedience to the 
 nod of their chief, and the interests of a large body of 
 the people were silently sacrificed. The Federalists, em 
 bittered by this defeat, accused the President of acting 
 in obedience to French commands: they stigmatized him 
 as the hireling of Bonaparte. We can now readily believe 
 that Jefferson was guided in this matter solely by a pre 
 conceived theory as to the best kind of stern and digni 
 fied foreign policy, but it must be admitted that the 
 Federalists had good reasons for their charges of French 
 influence. The worst feature of the measure was the Presi 
 dent s concealment of the fact that the embargo might be 
 permanent, while he permitted the country to suppose it 
 only temporary. The embargo, moreover, though directed 
 against both belligerents, really injured England alone, 1 and 
 was a pure benefit to France. Yet this measure, so clearly 
 advantageous to France and hostile to England, was passed 
 when we had just received tidings of fresh aggressions from 
 the former, as well as from the latter. This was certainly 
 strong prima facie evidence of French influence; and the 
 Federalist convictions on that point became, if possible, 
 deeper and stronger than ever. 
 
 The absolute futility of such measures as the embargo 
 has been long since demonstrated, and no civilized nation 
 to-day would seek the possible injury of its enemies by its 
 own certain impoverishment. But this general principle was 
 by no means thoroughly established in 1807, when naviga 
 tion acts still flourished, and when the memory of the Revo 
 lutionary non-intercourse was fresh among the people of the 
 United States. Yet, tried merely by the canons of common 
 sense, the embargo, under the circumstances of that time, was 
 as obviously bad as it is now in the light of the principles of 
 political economy. By the embargo, about one-sixth of the 
 1 Jefferson to Rodney, Works of Jefferson, V. 275. 
 
474 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 English commerce was cut off, while the whole of ours was 
 destroyed. To begin with, therefore, the exchange was an 
 unequal one. But the theory of the embargo was wholly 
 false, for it assumed that a great and powerful nation, mis 
 tress of the ocean, flushed with the triumphs of Nelson, 
 struggling as she believed for very existence, would, by a 
 partial injury to material interests and to a fraction of her 
 mercantile population, be constrained to make concessions 
 to an unarmed republic acting apparently in the interests 
 of her most deadly enemy. Moreover, English statesmen 
 perceived readily enough that our loss must eventually be 
 their gain, and that our voluntary abandonment of an im 
 mense carrying trade would leave them without a rival. 
 Almost any one but Jefferson would have appreciated the 
 hard facts of the case, and would have yielded to them ; but 
 preconceived and rooted theories are fatal to statesmanship 
 as well as to the dictates of reason. Unfortunately, the 
 theorist in this instance was the possessor of a large and 
 powerful party organization, devoid both of theories and 
 sense, and only wise enough to blindly follow their leader. 
 The embargo policy also strained the Constitution to the 
 utmost, but this was a trifle in the eyes of a party accus 
 tomed to violate its provisions. 
 
 The measure had one effect, however, which was not 
 foreseen at the moment. It breathed renewed life into the 
 expiring Federalist party, and served to render them once 
 more a united and formidable opposition, although its first 
 result was the open defection of one of their most promi 
 nent leaders. Mr. John Quincy Adams seized upon this 
 occasion to leave his party, and declare his faith in the pur 
 poses of the President. Filled with the spirit of nationality, 
 stung to the quick by the sense of national injuries, and by 
 nature combative and aggressive, Mr. Adams, with charac 
 teristic independence and disregard for consequences, rushed 
 to the support of what he supposed to be the first effort of 
 determined and warlike resistance. Posterity can under- 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFOKD CONVENTION. 475 
 
 stand his motives, and respect his courage and his objects; 
 but they can also see how fatally he blundered both in oc 
 casion and time. Devoted to national principles, Mr. Adams 
 became the advocate of a measure wholly sectional in its 
 practical operation, and calculated more than any other to 
 kindle into a fierce flame the slumbering embers of separa 
 tion. To avenge national dishonor, he supported a measure 
 degrading in itself, ruinous in its results, and which sub 
 jected us to outrages that made all previous ones seem 
 gentle in comparison. He deserted a party in which, he 
 held the place of leader, and whose movements he might 
 have influenced, to enter into one which moved at the touch 
 of a single man. Disgusted with the partisan spirit of the 
 Federalists, he supported Jefferson, who deceived him as 
 to the nature of the embargo, who exacted a blind and 
 unquestioning obedience, and whose measures he was com 
 pelled to urge without even inquiry for their reasons. 1 He 
 broke finally with Pickering, Ames, Cabot, Otis, and all the 
 New England Federalists; and he parted for a time from 
 King, Marshall, Morris, and all the leading Federalists else 
 where. In their stead, he substituted Mr. Giles and others 
 of the same stripe. With Giles, indeed, he entered into a 
 mutually affectionate and laudatory correspondence; and 
 this, be it remembered, was the same gentleman wfiom in 
 later years Mr. Adams described as " of a character black 
 with private infamy, . . . rising to power on the ruins of 
 honor and virtue." 2 And all these sacrifices were made in 
 behalf of a measure at once feeble, destructive, and dan 
 gerous. The results of Mr. Adams s course were certainly 
 very different from the motives. 
 
 Mr. Adams s change of party was of course received with 
 the deepest indignation in New England, where the old tri 
 angular fight was at once renewed with fresh bitterness. 
 No one knew better than Mr. Adams the men with whom 
 he had to deal ; for he was of them, if not with them. They 
 held the power in Massachusetts, they regarded him as an 
 1 See above, p. 425. 2 j. Q. Adams s Diary, VII. 369. 
 
476 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOBGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 apostate, and politically speaking they cut his throat with 
 out the slightest compunction. He would have performed 
 the same friendly office for them, if he could ; he would not 
 have shown mercy, he could have expected none, and it is 
 but fair to say that, if he did, he was soon undeceived. In 
 the political warfare then raging, no quarter was given, least 
 of all to one esteemed a deserter. Mr. Adams, in his pam 
 phlet, attempts a defence of the embargo, which amounted 
 merely to saying that our ships were saved by it from certain 
 capture. In other words, to sacrifice all our shipping and 
 all our commerce, to throw our whole sea-faring and ship 
 building population out of employment, and to awaken 
 hatred and distrust of the national government, was wiser 
 than to risk the loss at the hands of England and France 
 of a portion of our vessels, and to rouse thereby a general 
 spirit of national resistance. If the embargo is defensible 
 on such grounds, it is useless to argue about it. 
 
 I have anticipated the course of events, in order to 
 describe Mr. Adams s revolt from the Federalists, which 
 formed an important feature in their history, and which 
 gave to Mr. Adams himself the unquestioned position of 
 their strongest accuser and opponent. 
 
 The embargo was received by New England in sullen 
 silence. The people looked upon it as merely temporary, 
 a first step to armed resistance ; and they accepted it as the 
 forerunner of a necessary, if unpleasant, solution of their 
 difficulties. The arrival soon after of the new orders in 
 council and of the Milan decree seemed to justify the 
 adoption of any measure, no matter how stringent and 
 unpalatable. Both parties engaged actively in the agree 
 able task of accusing each other of foreign sympathies ; 
 and the Federalists no longer made any secret of their 
 belief, that we ought to side with England or at least ought 
 to make war on France. Jefferson s party had apparently 
 come round entirely to Bonaparte s view, that there ought 
 not to be any neutral commerce ; and an unfortunate Feder- 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 477 
 
 alist, who spoke in Congress of alliance with England, was 
 promptly denounced as a traitor. The insolent spirit and 
 arrogant policy manifested in Champagny s letter, which 
 ordered us to go to war with Great Britain under penalty 
 of losing all our vessels, gave additional reasons for believ 
 ing in the dangerous and degrading nature of French predi 
 lections. All this received confirmation from the failure of 
 Mr. Rose s negotiation, through the seeming reluctance of 
 the administration to do any thing that might result in a 
 lasting peace with Great Britain. Yet with the gulf ever 
 widening between us and England, with fresh insults from 
 France, and with the prospect of a maritime war staring us 
 in the face, the navy was still neglected. The naval policy 
 of the administration cannot be too much insisted on ; for, 
 had a different course been pursued in this respect, we 
 should have been in a position to assert our rights and 
 maintain our neutrality, or, if need were, to fight success- 
 fully. 
 
 The opportunity offered to the Federalists by the em 
 bargo was not long neglected. Colonel Pickering made it 
 the object of bitter attack in a letter addressed to Governor 
 Sullivan. To this assault, Mr. Adams replied ; and the paper 
 controversy was waged with great vigor, while public feeling 
 rose steadily in hostility to the measure. Another effect of 
 the new policy was soon felt in the treatment we received 
 abroad. Both belligerents seized on this opportunity to 
 harass us without mercy ; but the French were especially 
 severe, and indeed rather ungrateful, for they alone had 
 benefited by our restrictive measures. The Bayonne decree 
 struck a fresh blow at the rights of neutrals ; and, while 
 France undertook to enforce the embargo by seizing our 
 ships, Great Britain connived at our trade, and aided our 
 merchants to evade the law. Both infringements of our 
 sovereignty were made the subject of bitter though helpless 
 complaint. 
 
 Having shown Europe the danger of arousing us to a 
 
478 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 policy of commercial restrictions, Jefferson now sought to 
 make terms by offering a cessation of the embargo. If 
 Great Britain would withdraw her orders, the embargo 
 would be repealed, as far as she was concerned. If France 
 would withdraw her decrees, the embargo would be repealed 
 as to the French ; and it was hinted that, if England did not 
 then revoke the orders in council, we would go to war with 
 that power in the interests and as the ally of France. This 
 gave an opportunity for fresh insults from both nations. 
 Mr. Canning replied to Mr. Pinkney s inquiries that, while 
 cherishing no sentiment of hostility towards the United 
 States, England was far from desirous of appearing to depre 
 cate the embargo, which she conceived to be wholly in the 
 French interest. France contented herself with a simple 
 refusal to treat on the subject at all ; and with good reason, 
 for the embargo satisfied her completely. Armstrong wrote 
 from Paris " that we had overrated our means of coercion ; " 
 and poor Pinkney, who had been made the butt of Canning s 
 sarcasm, sent to Mr. Madison despatches brimming over 
 with helpless rage and mortification. That the embargo 
 had utterly failed of the great results expected abroad was 
 now clear to every one except the father of the measure. 
 
 At home, matters were still worse. The people of the 
 commercial States, who had endured the embargo while 
 they supposed it merely temporary and initiative, passed 
 rapidly from a state of sullen submission to one of active 
 and violent anger, as it gradually dawned upon them that 
 the ruin of their commerce was intended to be a permanent 
 policy. The Federalists, in full accord with the rising 
 public sentiment, strained every nerve to rouse and invigo 
 rate the opposition to the measure. In Boston, even the 
 Republicans remonstrated by a memorial to the President. 
 A storm was fast gathering, which threatened to overthrow 
 the political fabric of the Democracy. 
 
 But Jefferson was as blind as ever. Even his marvellous 
 political tact seems at this juncture to have failed him, so 
 
1804-15.] THE HAETFOED CONVENTION. 479 
 
 spell-bound was lie by the delusions of his theory ; and when 
 Congress met he sent them a message filled with praises 
 of the embargo as the safeguard of our commerce. But, 
 though Jefferson was blind, his timid followers began to 
 lose heart, and to dimly appreciate that there was some 
 thing in the economy of nature more imperative than the 
 wishes of the President. But they did not yet dare to 
 revolt from their master; and they voted the resolutions 
 of the committee on foreign relations, embodying the views 
 of the administration, and possessing at least the merit of 
 simplicity. They merely declared that we had done noth 
 ing to justify the injurious conduct of France and England, 
 and therefore that the embargo was a good and wise policy, 
 and ought to be maintained in its entirety. A sharp debate 
 followed ; but even proof of a request from English mer 
 chants to their own government to enforce the embargo pro 
 duced no effect, and the motion for repeal was defeated. 
 
 This was almost the last Jeffersonian victory in 1808 ; 
 and we may fitly pause here, and consider the accusation of 
 Mr. Adams which relates to the conduct of the Federalists 
 during this exciting period. The second, third, and fourth 
 of Mr. Adams s charges, as stated at the beginning of the 
 last chapter, were that the plot of 1804 for a dissolution 
 of the Union was never abandoned, but was renewed in 
 1807 and 1808 ; that the Federalist leaders aimed at a dis 
 solution of the Union, because a dissolution was intrinsi 
 cally good ; and that these same leaders \vere in communi 
 cation with Great Britain. The two first propositions can 
 be answered together, the last will demand a separate 
 discussion. 
 
 What Mr. Adams understood by the word " abandon " I 
 do not know, but all mention of the plot of 1804 ceases with 
 that year. Moreover, there is no evidence whatever of any 
 plot or plan of separation of any kind in 1807 and 1808. 
 As Mr. Adams asserts the existence of a plot at that time, 
 the burden of proof is with him to support his affirmative ; 
 
480 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 but he offers no evidence except his own letters, and a state 
 ment that he had heard of the existence of such a plot. 
 That he heard a great many loud and violent denunci 
 ations of the government, and fervent wishes for separation 
 expressed with equal violence and loudness, is undoubted. 
 He had bat to look in the papers to read them, or go upon 
 the street to hear them, or talk with his new party allies to 
 have them enlarged and described. But angry political talk 
 is not a plot, nor are newspaper articles a plan, nor the 
 assertions of enemies a scheme. I have sought with the 
 aid of much material, to which Mr. Adams had no access, 
 to substantiate his statement ; and I have sought in vain. 
 There is not a shred of evidence that there was any plot 
 outside of the busy brain of Colonel Pickering, if it existed 
 at that time even there. Talk of secession there was in 
 great abundance, and even resolutions by towns, and sug 
 gestions by individuals that it would be well to take active 
 measures ; but there was no plot, no combination, no defi 
 nite proposal even on the part of the leaders. This is 
 the fair deduction from Mr. Adams s own evidence; this 
 is the united testimony of all the letters of the day ; and 
 this, in the utter absence of all rebutting evidence, must be 
 considered as the exact truth. 
 
 We cannot wonder, however, that Mr. Adams, con 
 vinced of the existence of a scheme of dissolution in 1804, 
 should have firmly believed in its revival in 1807-8. 
 The signs of the times certainly authorized such a belief. 
 The air was full of threats and demands for separation, 
 produced as might have been expected, and as was always 
 the case, by real or fancied injuries inflicted upon the 
 minority by the dominant party; and, in this instance, 
 the injuries were only too real. The letters in this volume 
 are alone sufficient to carry conviction of the sufferings, the 
 miseries of the Eastern States. The embargo had fallen 
 like a withering curse upon New England. Under its 
 desolating blight, her ships rotted at their wharves, her 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 481 
 
 business stagnated, her industries were paralyzed, and her 
 laboring population was thrown out of work. Ruin con 
 fronted her merchants, poverty and starvation stared her 
 working men in the face. Yet they were expected to 
 tamely endure all this wretchedness, because a Virginian 
 planter said that in this way commerce was defended, and 
 the national dignity protected. In vain did the- men of 
 New England beg to have arms, to be allowed even the 
 privilege of arming themselves. In vain did they urge that, 
 if commerce were left free, they would defend it, and would 
 see to it that the national honor did not suffer. They were 
 told that this would lead to war, and they were not to be 
 permitted to even shed their own blood. Men still remem 
 bered the day when Massachusetts had, single-handed, re 
 sisted England ; they had never known their State to fail 
 them ; they were proud of their traditions ; and they 
 turned, as every American then did in the hour of trouble, 
 to their State for the relief which the general government 
 could not or would not give. Not only did men cry out 
 against the government of Jefferson, but they made no 
 secret of their desire for separation from a union which 
 seemed ruinous. Far worse than this were the immediate 
 dangers which lurked behind the distress of the lower 
 orders. The wisest men justly feared lest there should be 
 tumults and insurrections. 
 
 In such a condition of affairs, the hour had surely come 
 for those men whose sole object was to dissolve the Union. 
 The Federalist leaders were skilful politicians, and by a 
 little management might readily have brought their ten 
 derly cherished plans, as imputed to them by Mr. Adams, 
 to fulfilment. In the midst of popular tumult, the plan of 
 secession would have found ready adherence. Yet these 
 very men deprecated and dreaded tumult. They strained 
 every nerve to bring about in a legitimate manner the 
 repeal of the embargo, the very measure that was surest to 
 cause a dissolution of the Union, if persisted in. They 
 
 31 
 
482 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 encouraged every form of legal opposition ; and their most 
 distinguished lawyer argued in court against it, while the 
 juries refused to convict under it, and their writers and 
 speakers strenuously denounced it. In other words, the 
 men who aimed at a dissolution of the Union sought to 
 overthrow the very measure by which dissolution was 
 hastened. Had they really wished a separation, they would 
 not have opposed the measure constitutionally, but by open 
 resistance. The path was an easy and a sure one, for one 
 violence would have led to another. But the Federalists 
 did not seek a dissolution of the Union for its own sake. 
 They were not even prepared, in 1808, to use it as a threat 
 in order to force those alterations which they deemed essen 
 tial to the preservation of union. On the contrary, they 
 were content to seek the desired changes by the regular 
 and recognized methods of the Constitution. They did all 
 in their power to render abortive the strongest incentive to 
 dissolution ; and so anxious were some of them to succeed 
 in their opposition to the embargo, that Mr. Cabot urged 
 upon the Federal convention the necessity of disclaiming 
 all sympathy with schemes of separation, in order that they 
 might obtain the confidence of the whole country. 1 Surely 
 no men, bent on bringing about secession, would have 
 sought, as a preliminary measure, to strengthen mutual con 
 fidence among the different States. Sectional animosity 
 would have been the one thing they would have wished to 
 cultivate. Mr. Adams believed Colonel Pickering s letter 
 to Sullivan to be the preconcerted signal for the commence 
 ment of a separatist movement ; whereas the correspondence 
 with Mr. Cabot on this subject shows that no idea of this 
 sort existed, but that, on the contrary, the letter was chiefly 
 directed against the embargo, and to break down the 
 Republican party in Massachusetts. Moreover, Mr. Cabot 
 strove to suppress further pamphlets as prejudicial to party 
 success in the general government, rather than to stimulate 
 i See above, p. 398. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 483 
 
 the controversy. In support of the second and third of 
 Mr. Adams s charges, therefore, there is no proof beyond 
 his own assertion ; and he may well have been misled in 
 making them by the circumstances of the time. All the 
 evidence points exactly the other way ; and, although it can 
 hardly ever be said that a negative in a matter of this sort 
 has been proved, it may be safely asserted that, in the face 
 of the opposing testimony, Mr. Adams s unsupported alle 
 gation falls to the ground. The New England Federalists, 
 in 1807-8, did not form any plan or combination for a 
 dissolution of the Union, but, on the contrary, took steps 
 which led to the opposite result. They behaved, moreover, 
 in the very way in which men who aimed at a dissolution 
 would not have behaved. There was, no doubt, much talk, 
 both in public and private, about secession and a New Eng 
 land convention, 1 as well as much vigorous denunciation of 
 the general government. This was known before, and this 
 is all that the hitherto unpublished correspondence of their 
 most prominent leaders reveals. Mr. Cabot s correspond 
 ence at this time with Colonel Pickering, with whom he was 
 on the most confidential terms, discloses their views with the 
 greatest freedom ; and it has been given here with perfect 
 fulness. No trace is to be found of a plan of separation like 
 that of 1804, and the rest of the Pickering correspondence is 
 equally barren. There may have been plots of that kind, of 
 which not only Colonel Pickering and Mr. Cabot, but all 
 Colonel Pickering s correspondents, were wholly unaware. 
 But this is a violent inference ; and I doubt if even Mr. 
 Adams would have ventured to say that a secession scheme 
 existed in New England, from all knowledge of which both 
 Colonel Pickering and Mr. Cabot were excluded. I am 
 unable to carry further a refutation of Mr. Adams s second 
 and third propositions, because I am offering negative proof 
 which cannot in its nature be final. But, until direct 
 affirmative proof of some sort is brought forward, I think 
 
 1 See Colonel Pickering s first letter to Sullivan. Also Otis to Quincy, 
 below, p. 492. 
 
484 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 it must be admitted that there was no Federalist scheme 
 of secession in 18078, and that the leaders did not then 
 or at any previous time desire a dissolution, as in itself 
 a good and advantageous event. 
 
 The fourth charge made against the Federalists by Mr. 
 Adams of treasonable communication with Great Britain 
 is much graver than the two preceding ones. Fortunately, 
 it is more specific and more easily met. Mr. Adams has sup 
 ported this accusation by what he seems to consider good tes 
 timony. I had expected from the language of Mr. Adams s 
 pamphlet to find evidence of the strongest and most damning 
 kind, which would render the charge at least highly probable ; 
 and I confess to great surprise when I found myself confronted 
 by the familiar form of John Henry, and by nothing else. The 
 statutes both of England and of Massachusetts require, in 
 order to convict of treason, two witnesses ; and here there is 
 but one, unsworn and testifying nothing. By the letters of 
 a spy who sneaked into the houses of gentlemen and saw 
 nothing, of an informer who had no information to give, of a 
 creature who sold his own baseness and ignorance for a sum of 
 money, Mr. Adams seeks to establish a charge of treason and 
 of communication with a foreign government against men 
 of honorable lives and high reputation. The mere mention 
 of Henry s character ought to be enough to impeach his 
 testimony, were it ever so direct. But only the most in 
 genious twisting can give even a color of meaning to his 
 vague statements, while the rebutting evidence is overwhelm 
 ing. The Federalists never sought to deny Henry s charges. 
 They treated them as too contemptibly ridiculous to deserve 
 notice. A few words suffice to tell the whole story. John 
 Henry was an English adventurer, who had married an 
 American lady of good social position. Being without em 
 ployment, he suggested to the governor-general of Canada 
 that he should be employed to gather in the United States 
 information which might be of advantage to English in 
 terests. He was therefore commissioned by Sir James 
 Craig, the governor of Canada, to carry out this meritorious 
 
J804-15.] THE HARTFOKD CONVENTION. 485 
 
 plan. He went to Boston, where, thanks to his marriage 
 and his letters of introduction, he was admitted to the best 
 houses. 1 At the dinner-tables in Boston, he probably heard 
 a good deal of loose talk about separation, as well as strong 
 expressions of sympathy with Great Britain. The infor 
 mation he obtained amounted merely to this : that in his 
 opinion, if war were declared against England, there would 
 probably be a congress of the Eastern States and a dissolu 
 tion of the Union. If this were to happen, Henry thought 
 that a treaty with Great Britain would follow, but what con 
 nection would come with that country, he said, " no person 
 was prepared to describe." This was all he learned, abso 
 lutely all, the unknown results of a contingency. He had 
 but to read the papers or talk with the gentlemen at whose 
 houses he dined, to get the information on which he based 
 such an opinion. He offered nothing but an opinion, a 
 mere conjecture as to what might happen in certain events. 
 He did not even say that such things would happen, but 
 merely that such was his opinion, if war were declared, 
 which he did not think probable. In his first letter from 
 Boston, he says he has not discovered himself to any one, 
 but that he is able to judge of the proper time for mention 
 ing an alliance with Great Britain ; and there is no trace 
 in subsequent letters that he ever changed in this respect. 
 The only possible inference is that he never did discover 
 himself, and there is not a vestige of proof which would 
 lead to an opposite conclusion. The utmost that he says 
 in regard to the opinions of the Federalists is that the men 
 of talents and property preferred separation to war with 
 Great Britain and alliance with France. That this had 
 been the view of many leading Federalists for a number of 
 years is now well known. Their one absorbing fear was 
 that the independence of the country would be sacrificed, 
 and that under the specious name of alliance they would 
 fall beneath the dominion of Bonaparte, and go to war 
 1 See Quincy s Life of Josiah Quincy, p. 250. 
 
486 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 with Great Britain as the nations of Europe had already 
 been compelled to do. Henry, then, did not disclose him 
 self to any one, judging by his own letters alone. Nor did 
 he mention the name of a single individual as authority 
 even for the views which he attributed to the Federalists, 
 or for the opinion which he himself had formed. The com 
 mittee on foreign relations, after maturely considering the 
 awful nature of the letters for which Mr. Madison paid fifty 
 thousand dollars, came to the conclusion that there was 
 nothing to be done ; that the letters contained no specific 
 charges and no names, and that they implicated nobody. 
 The committee also examined Count Crillon, a friend and 
 companion of Henry, and extracted nothing from him but 
 a repetition of Henry s own story. In short, there was 
 nothing to tell. Henry told all he could ; for there were 
 no motives for concealment except a sense of honor, which 
 it would be a gross absurdity to impute to a spy. If Henry 
 had names to sell, we may be sure that they would have had 
 their price, and that he would have sold them. The only 
 person in Massachusetts connected by name with Henry was 
 Governor Gerry, who gave him a letter of introduction to the 
 President. From the evidence, therefore, of Mr. Adams s 
 only witness in support of his charge, it appears that 
 Henry never disclosed himself as an agent of the British 
 government to any one, that he could tell nothing that was 
 not known before, and that he did not name or even in 
 directly implicate a single individual. The British govern 
 ment disowned him, and refused him money ; and the new 
 governor of Canada would do nothing for him. This, be it 
 remembered, was before he discovered himself. Never an 
 accredited agent of England, he was angered at the cold 
 ness with which he was treated. But Henry was an acute 
 observer of American politics ; and he knew that the mere 
 fact of his having acted as a British spy in New England 
 would be a valuable political cry to the administration. 
 He therefore sold himself to Mr. Madison, who paid an 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 487 
 
 enormous sum, with the very simple object of exciting 
 anew the popular hatred of England. This was an old 
 party trick ; and perhaps we can hardly wonder that Mr. 
 Madison should have again employed it, and have cared 
 little, if by his actions he should succeed in fixing an odious 
 stigma upon his opponents and upon the States in which 
 they lived, although he roused thereby sectional hatreds at 
 a moment when war was impending and Union all impor 
 tant. In fact, Henry makes a sorry witness in the cold, 
 clear light of the present day; and his testimony, in itself 
 of no importance, shows absolutely nothing that cannot be 
 better known without it. 
 
 We are now in a position to consider external evidence, 
 though it is merely cumulative in its nature ; for Henry is 
 his own all-sufficient refutation. The Federalists knew him 
 when he was in Boston : he went to their houses, and mixed 
 freely with them. There is, however, no mention of his 
 name, as far as I am aware, in any of the Federalist corre 
 spondence before Mr. Madison s disclosures in 1811. The 
 Pickering letters published and unpublished, the Quincy 
 letters, the letters of Mr. Cabot, all are silent before that 
 date as to the existence of such a person as Henry. His 
 visit was evidently not deemed of importance by any of 
 those whom he met in Boston. Even when he made his 
 disclosures, the Federalists gave the matter but little at 
 tention, and treated it as a mere device of the enemy. I 
 cannot close this brief account of the Henry episode more 
 fitly than with the words of one of the very few men who 
 in that period of bitter political feeling kept his temper, 
 his judgment, and his power of cool observation unim 
 paired. Judge Peters writes to Colonel Pickering, on 
 March 18, 1812:- 
 
 " I have read the mighty communications by the President of 
 Henry s espionage. I think it a most pitiful electioneering ma 
 noeuvre, and I am ashamed of my old friend s 1 push for popularity. 
 
 1 Mr. Madison. 
 
488 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 Nevertheless, it will have no small effect among those on whom it 
 is intended to operate. Some of our politicians wonder at the folly 
 of publishing by authority libels on the Democrats. 1 But every 
 thing said by Henry will be attributed to British enmity and hatred 
 of the only true and immaculate patriots. This will keep up re 
 sentment, and drive the wavering into the old phalanx embodied 
 against the English and Anglo-Federalists. All sufferings by anti- 
 commercial measures will be forgot for the moment, and the frenzy 
 will have its effect before reason, among those who have any, can 
 resume its seat. I think the price of his trash for any good pur 
 pose would be high at forty-eight dollars. Whether as the news 
 papers allege forty -eight thousand have been paid, I cannot pretend 
 to know or believe." 
 
 " If the old humor produced among you suggested serious deter 
 mination to separate from the Union, your good sense would have 
 deterred you from trusting yourselves in the hands of such a 
 plenipotentiary ." 
 
 The letter from which I have made these extracts goes 
 on to speak of Henry s attempt at negotiation as at once 
 foolish and impracticable, and with this judicial summing 
 up of the whole affair we may be content to leave the 
 subject. 
 
 Henry s mission took place in 1809 and his disclosures in 
 1812, so that in dealing with the case I have been obliged 
 to anticipate the order of events. But before leaving Mr. 
 Adams s charge of British influence, the evidence of which 
 I have tried to consider, it seems not inappropriate to still 
 further refute his accusations, by citing in their own words 
 the opinions of the Federalists on the political situation in 
 18078. I have already endeavored to describe their con 
 victions that the embargo was a wicked and dangerous 
 measure, that England was fighting for the liberties of man 
 kind, and that war with her was the greatest of all possible 
 evils, entailing, as they believed it must, an alliance with 
 France and a servile submission to Bonaparte. They sym- 
 
 1 The greater part of the Henry letters consisted of keen and well- 
 directed criticisms on the party and the policy of the Democrats. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 489 
 
 pathized far too strongly with England ; but the bane 
 of foreign politics had fallen upon the whole country, and 
 they were far from being the most conspicuous examples 
 of the evil effects of outside influences. The New Eng 
 land Federalists preferred a separation to an English war ; 
 but in their hatred of the embargo, and in their sympathy 
 for England, they were in full accord with their party 
 friends elsewhere. If opinions of this last sort were treason 
 able, as was freely said at the time, there can be no doubt of 
 their guilt. Colonel Pickering s and Mr. Cabot s views have 
 already been given in full ; and the next, therefore, which I 
 shall quote will be those of John Marshall, for his sympathy 
 with England differed but little from that felt by those 
 men whom Mr. Adams stigmatized as Tories and a British 
 faction. 
 
 MARSHALL TO PICKERING. 
 
 RICHMOND, Dec. 19, 1808. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I thank you very sincerely for the excellent 
 speeches 1 lately delivered in the Senate, which you have been so 
 obliging as to transmit me. If sound argument and correct reason 
 ing could save our country, it would be saved. Nothing can be 
 more completely demonstrated than the inemcacy of the embargo, 
 yet that demonstration seems to be of no avail. I fear most seri 
 ously that the same spirit which so tenaciously maintains this 
 measure will impel us to a war with the only power which protects 
 any part of the civilized world from the despotism of that tyrant 
 with whom we shall then be arranged. 
 
 You have shown that the principle commonly called the rule of 
 1756 is of much earlier date, and, I fear, have also shown to what 
 motives the embargo is to be traced. 
 
 But I abstain from remarks on this question. With great and 
 sincere esteem, I am, dear sir, 
 
 Your obedient J. MARSHALL. 
 
 Mr, Stoddert, John Adams s Secretary of the Navy, writes 
 on Dec. 6, 1809: 
 
 1 On the embargo. 
 
490 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 " I see by Mr. Giles s inflammatory resolutions that there are 
 men who mean to second the views disclosed by the cabinet to 
 bring on a war with England, which can only end in open and 
 acknowledged submission to the rule of France." 
 
 " I am not now singular in the hope that you will now save it 
 from a war that would be more fatal than a civil war." 
 
 Dec. 19, 1808, James Ross, of Pennsylvania, writes : 
 
 " Such is the condition of the Old World that, unless we reso 
 lutely and speedily change our national habits and character, unless 
 we assume a military instead of a negotiating, temporizing pol 
 icy, we are undone. To be safe from wanton insult and attack, we 
 must be armed on the ocean and on the land. ... I have consid 
 ered the embargo as a trick, a mere nickname, devised by the Pres 
 ident to conceal the real design and object of the cabinet, which 
 was in effect to comply with the demands of Bonaparte, and to shut 
 our ports against English commerce on this side of the Atlantic, 
 while he compelled all Europe to do the same." 
 
 John Jay says, in thanking Pickering for copies of the 
 latter s speeches : 
 
 " On reading your speech, I observe sentiments which manifest 
 your esteem and demand my acknowledgments. It is desirable that 
 no errors be permitted to prevail either in present or future rela 
 tive to the inducements and objects of the embargo, or relative to 
 the consequences resulting from it. A full, fair, and able exposi 
 tion of the origin and progress of our national embarrassments 
 would be useful." 
 
 Charles Carroll of Carrollton, who survived all the other 
 signers of the Declaration of Independence, says (Dec. 31, 
 1808) : - 
 
 "The antipathy of this man [Jefferson] to England, and his 
 predilection for France, passions of which his successor strongly 
 partakes, will, I fear, ruin our country." 
 
 Mr. Carroll attributed the embargo to the dictates of 
 Bonaparte, who in his opinion aimed at nothing short of 
 universal dominion. His letter continues : 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFOKD CONVENTION. 491 
 
 " I have no predilection for England nor antipathy to France ; 
 but the former I wish success in the present war, because that suc 
 cess will establish the liberties of Europe and the independence of 
 our own country, now in jeopardy." 
 
 Rufus King writes to Colonel Pickering, Jan. 15, 
 1809:- 
 
 " I beg of you to thank Mr. Hillhouse, in my behalf, for his use 
 ful and constitutional speech in opposition to Mr. Giles s oppressive 
 and tyrannical bill to enforce the embargo. These measures may 
 be borne for a time, but they cannot be of long duration. You will 
 have seen the proceedings of a numerous meeting in this city." 
 
 Mr. King thoroughly sympathized with England in the 
 midst of the struggle which, as he says elsewhere, u was 
 changing the face of the world." 
 
 The public declarations of the Federalists were no less 
 explicit, not only in their opposition to the embargo, but in 
 their firm adherence to the naval policy and neutrality of 
 Washington. Mr. Quincy, in an eloquent speech (Novem 
 ber, 1808), after declaring the embargo to be a practical 
 submission to both belligerents, said : 
 
 " But to my eye the path of our duty is as distinct as the milky 
 way, all studded with living sapphires and glowing with cumu 
 lating light. It is the path of active preparation, of dignified en 
 ergy. It is the path of 1776. It consists not in abandoning our 
 rights, but in supporting them, as they exist, and where they exist, 
 on the ocean as well as on the land. It consists in taking the 
 nature of things as the measure of the rights of your citizens, 
 not the orders and decrees of imperious foreigners. Give what 
 protection you can. Take no counsel of fear. Your strength 
 will increase with the trial, and prove greater than you are now 
 aware." 
 
 About the same time, Mr. Lloyd had said in the 
 Senate : 
 
 " Remove the embargo, authorize the merchants to arm their 
 vessels, put the nation in a state of defence, and assert your well- 
 established and indisputable rights, or perish in the contest." 
 
492 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 An earnest letter from Mr. H. G. Otis to Mr. Quincy, upon 
 the speech from which I have quoted, shows how thoroughly 
 in sympathy the latter was with the leaders at home. The 
 suggestion, in the same letter, of a convention " to provide 
 some mode of relief [from the embargo] that may not be 
 inconsistent with the union of these States" is indicative not 
 only of the misery which the system of maritime restric 
 tions had already brought, but shows exactly how far Mr. 
 Adams s " plot " had proceeded. Harassed and nearly 
 ruined by the embargo, threatened by riot and domestic 
 insurrection, the Federalists discussed extreme measures. 
 This letter of Mr. Otis goes further than any other at this 
 time ; but there is very little plot about it, and certainly 
 nothing like combination. 
 
 In the same year (1808), the Legislature of Massachu 
 setts passed resolutions, in which they avowed themselves 
 ready to bear every privation of war, although believing a 
 peace policy to be the true one, and begged earnestly 
 for an efficient navy. This is not the language of timid 
 ity, of fanatical lovers of peace, nor of Tory sympathizers. 
 If such opposition as this frustrated Mr. Jefferson s long 
 ing for a sterner and more warlike policy, he must have 
 labored under a sad misapprehension as to his opponents 
 real wishes. 
 
 Extracts might be multiplied from the writings of the 
 New England Federalists, expressing views identical with 
 those just quoted. But the latter are sufficient to give 
 an exact and truthful picture of Federalist opinion at this 
 time, and to enable us to compare it with the policy of the 
 administration which they resisted and opposed. Such a 
 comparison would be the surest and most complete vindica 
 tion of the Federalists that could be devised. It would 
 justify the motto proposed for their convention in Penn 
 sylvania, " Union, peace, and no foreign alliance." l 
 
 The new year (1809) opened with the passage of the 
 1 Letter from Abraham Shepherd, in Pickering MSS. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 493 
 
 enforcing act, a measure capable of leading to the greatest 
 tyranny, oppression, and fraud. To the suffering people of 
 New England, it was the last straw. We read of a town 
 meeting in Boston demanding that the Legislature should 
 resist the enforcing act ; and we cannot but recall another 
 meeting of the same town fifty years before, when, under 
 the guidance of Samuel Adams, the representatives were 
 instructed to resist the first attempt to tax America. Lin 
 coln, upon whom the office of governor devolved at Sulli 
 van s death, deprecated in his speech at the opening of the 
 session the hostility of New England to the new measures, 
 and also the threats of secession now growing louder and 
 louder. A committee, headed by Mr. Gore, brought in a 
 report which took advanced Federalist ground against the 
 French and the embargo and in favor of England. The 
 committee said: 
 
 " Let Congress repeal the embargo, annul the convention with 
 France, forbid all commercial intercourse with the French domin 
 ions, arm our public and private ships, and unfurl the republican 
 banner against the imperial standard." 
 
 The answers of both Houses to the governor were in a 
 similar strain. Any idea of a dissolution of the Union was 
 disclaimed, but it was intimated very distinctly that the 
 embargo and its adjuncts were not laws. Both Houses de 
 nounced the enforcing act, as in many respects " oppressive, 
 unconstitutional, and not legally binding ; " but they advised 
 peaceable and legal resistance. At the same time, they 
 passed a bill prohibiting the search of dwelling-houses 
 authorized by the enforcing act, just as a former Massachu 
 setts assembly had passed a bill to limit the operation of 
 writs of assistance. The ships hung their flags at half-mast 
 when the commandant at the fort received orders to allow 
 none of them to leave the harbor, and the Legislature re 
 sisted the use of the militia by Lincoln to enforce the 
 obnoxious laws. Fresh threats were heard from the town, 
 
494 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [180^15. 
 
 and the voice of Randolph recalled to Jefferson the fate of 
 Lord North. Now, too, did Mr. Adams, by letter and by 
 word of mouth, warn his new allies against the evil designs 
 of his friends and fellow-citizens. Exaggerated and dis 
 torted by suspicion as this warning was, it came none too 
 soon. The spirit of resistance was rising fast in New Eng 
 land ; and, had it once broken loose, no man could have 
 tamed it. Behind the legal and stubborn opposition of the 
 Legislature lurked possibilities of secession and civil war, 
 and they were each moment coming nearer and growing 
 more distinct. The people of Massachusetts had in former 
 times thrown Andros into prison and risen against Hutch- 
 inson for oppression but little heavier than that from which 
 they now suffered. They would have been unworthy of 
 their race, and contemptible as men, had they not been 
 ready to fight when they honestly believed themselves 
 intolerably wronged. They intended to exhaust every 
 form of legal opposition ; and, if that did not avail, they 
 were ready to draw the sword. This was the spirit which, 
 rightly or wrongly directed, has always made the English 
 race respected and respectable; and this was the spirit 
 which was abroad in New England, in 1809. Moreover, 
 the contagion was spreading. Other States were passing 
 out of the control of the Democracy. All men save one 
 saw that not only political change, but the ruin of the 
 country was imminent, if the embargo policy should be 
 persisted in. But, although the President would not aban 
 don his theory, the dread of sure destruction now proved 
 stronger with the faithful majority than the word of their 
 master The Northern Republicans, influenced by the great 
 abilities of Story, that "pseudo-Republican," as Jefferson 
 in the bitterness of his heart afterwards called him, 
 gave ground ; their Southern allies were demoralized ; the 
 Federalists pressed the assault, the great majority gave 
 way in all directions, the embargo was repealed, and Jeffer 
 son defeated. He mourned over this as a fatal measure, 
 
1804-15.] THE HAKTFOKD CONVENTION. 495 
 
 yet lie was not without compensating successes. The navy 
 appropriation was very small, and the army bill was de 
 feated. At least, the country was so completely unarmed 
 that, even if the removal of the embargo were to lead to 
 war, but little fighting could be done ; for there were no 
 weapons. The closing days of Jefferson s administration 
 present a wretched spectacle. The party had broken from 
 their leader s cherished policy, and neither he nor they had 
 any other to suggest. A frantic objection to doing any 
 thing that by any possibility could lead to war was the one 
 distinct notion among the Democrats ; and so, after much 
 heated and futile wrangling, Congress finally passed Mr. 
 Madison s feeble non-intercourse bill, ingeniously contrived 
 to be perfectly ineffective and yet thoroughly irritating. 
 With this measure, Jefferson s second term came to an end. 
 Mr. Madison succeeded to a terrible task. His prede 
 cessor had so hopelessly entangled every thing that it is 
 doubtful if a Cromwell or a Richelieu could ever have 
 unravelled the knots, but that Mr. Madison was wholly 
 unable to do so is perfectly clear. The last hours of Jeffer 
 son s official life had been clouded with defeat ; yet, could 
 he have shaken off his delusions, he might have resumed 
 his former sway. For Mr. Madison, on the other hand, 
 to assert and maintain the leadership of his disorganized 
 party was an impossibility. The magic touch, the delicate 
 management, the light, firm hand, had departed with Jef 
 ferson ; and the Democratic party dragged their new chief 
 helplessly at the wheels of his own chariot. In dealing with 
 these new conditions, the Federalists made a great, a capital 
 mistake. They assumed that Mr. Madison had succeeded 
 not only to all the insignia, but to all the real power, and 
 to all the principles of his illustrious predecessor ; and they 
 threw all responsibility upon him for every party measure, 
 as they had formerly done upon Jefferson. Nothing could 
 have been more erroneous or more unjust than such a course, 
 and it was of evil consequence to those who adhered to it. 
 
496 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. . [1804-15. 
 
 Mr. Madison was in truth a Federalist at heart and by tem 
 perament, and he was ever a moderate, wise, and concilia 
 tory man. He now found himself at the head of a broken 
 and disorganized party, with a powerful and increasing op 
 position to his policy among his followers. Had the Fed 
 eralists but taken advantage of his difficulties in the proper 
 way, they might have obtained a controlling position, and, 
 with the help of conservative Democrats, have beaten off the 
 war party, now rising into prominence. They were unluck 
 ily too much blinded by the fierce party spirit of the times 
 to see plainly their opportunity, yet in the first months of 
 the new administration it seemed quite probable that they 
 and Mr. Madison might come together for mutual support. 
 This deceitful hope was excited by the Erskine negotiation. 
 Mr. Erskine was a sincere friend to this country, and most 
 desirous to heal the differences existing with England. He 
 presented certain conditions demanded by Mr. Canning as 
 essential preliminaries to a negotiation ; and our government 
 accepted these conditions, but with such limitations that 
 Erskine was obliged to overstep his instructions, in order 
 to go on with the treaty. This he did, however ; and the 
 preliminary arrangement was signed, and sent to England. 
 Canning, with the short-sighted and brutal arrogance of 
 which he was at times capable, took advantage of Erskine s 
 violation of his instructions, and refused a ratification to 
 what had been done. Such impolitic action on the part 
 of England set every thing adrift again. The non-inter 
 course act was renewed ; and the Federalists, who had come 
 round toward the support of Mr. Madison, at the news of 
 the successful negotiations now rushed again into bitter 
 opposition. Again they called Mr. Madison the disciple of 
 Jefferson, the admirer of France, the man who would not 
 make peace with England on any terms. Here, too, they 
 blundered politically, and were unjust to their opponent. 
 Mr. Madison s policy was, in conception at least, a wise 
 and intelligent one. He wished, if possible, to make peace 
 
1804-15.] THE HAUTFOKD CONVENTION. 497 
 
 with England ; but lie was determined that, if the negotia 
 tions broke down, the blame of failure should rest upon 
 England alone. Had he behaved in a perfectly straight 
 forward way, this plan would have been successful ; but, 
 while he neither accepted nor refused the conditions pro 
 posed by Erskine, he drew the British minister on to make 
 concessions clearly unwarranted by the instructions. This 
 slight tinge of duplicity gave ground to his enemies to 
 say that Erskine had been disingenuously treated, and that 
 peace was not really desired. So the bitter antagonism 
 flamed up more fiercely than ever ; and the failure of Er- 
 skine s successor, Jackson, and his quarrels with the admin 
 istration, gave fresh reasons for suspicion and distrust. Mr. 
 Madison was meantime pressed by difficulties on the other 
 side. Turreau, the French minister, addressed to our gov 
 ernment a letter, warning us to desist from the Erskine 
 negotiation, and so dictatorial and insulting in its language 
 that it rouses a keen feeling of shame and indignation even 
 now. Mr. Madison swallowed the affront with the best 
 grace he could, and said but little as to the French outrages 
 and seizures of vessels, which were now renewed in great 
 abundance. Silence also was preserved as to C adore s infa 
 mous letter to Armstrong, commanding us to go to war with 
 England under pain of the Emperor s displeasure. The 
 President s tameness under the abuse of France showed 
 him to be still hampered by the maxims of Jefferson, and 
 destroyed the faint belief of the Federalists in his freedom 
 from French influence. Mr. Madison was himself to blame 
 for all this, and his feeble conduct under French aggressions 
 laid him fairly open to the really undeserved imputation of 
 being a French sympathizer. That the impression of his ser 
 vility towards Bonaparte was generally diffused among even 
 temperate men by his conduct appears from a letter of John 
 Marshall to Mr. Quincy. The Chief Justice says : 
 
 " I had supposed the late letter to Mr. Armstrong, and the late 
 seizure of aii American vessel, simply because she was an Ameri- 
 
 32 
 
498 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 can, added to previous burnings, ransoms, and confiscations, would 
 have exhausted to the dregs our cup of servility and degradation ; 
 but these measures appear to make no impression on those to whom 
 the United States confide their destinies. To what point are we 
 verging ? " 1 
 
 When Congress came together, although Mr. Madison 
 was fully supported in his treatment of Mr. Jackson, dis 
 organization was very apparent in the ranks of the old 
 Jeffersonian phalanx. The restrictive commercial policy 
 no longer found eager support, and even the Federalist doc 
 trine of free commerce met with more acceptance, while 
 Mr. Gallatin s navigation act was ultimately defeated. 
 
 From this time until the actual declaration of war, our 
 unhappy President and his administration plunged from 
 one difficulty into another, and every fresh effort to extri 
 cate the country only served to sink it deeper. A breach 
 in the English cabinet, and the favorable disposition of Lord 
 Wellesley, afforded a momentary gleam of hope and an op 
 portunity to renew negotiation. But even this distant pros 
 pect of relief was darkened by the increased number and 
 insolence of the French seizures and by the publication of 
 the Rambouillet decree, which seemed to achieve the im 
 possible by inflicting fresh injury on our already shattered 
 neutral rights. Although Mr. Pinkney s negotiation with 
 the new cabinet failed, yet the opening of our ports led to 
 a revival of trade at which England connived, and a better 
 state of feeling was generally apparent. The French gov 
 ernment were alarmed, fearing that their hold upon the 
 United States was loosening; and they therefore ingen 
 iously took measures to entrap us into an open conflict 
 with Great Britain. Bonaparte offered to withdraw his 
 decrees, on condition that we should insist on England s 
 withdrawal of the orders in council. He had not in reality, 
 we may be sure, the slightest intention of revoking his 
 decrees, but merely wished to induce us to make proposals 
 
 1 See Quincy s Life of Josiah Quincy, p. 204. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 499 
 
 to England when we had no security that our offers would 
 be made good. He desired to make us a go-between, to 
 force us into the position of bargaining in the French inter 
 est, and then, by a simple refusal to carry out the promises 
 he authorized us to offer, to make England reject our over 
 tures, and to leave us embroiled in a hopeless quarrel with 
 his one opponent. The ruse was only too successful. Mr. 
 Madison, entirely deceived by the lies of the French Em 
 peror, blundered head-first into the snare, and found himself 
 engaged with a third party in a quarrel about French inter 
 ests. At the news of the French propositions, the Federal 
 ists took strong ground against them, urging that only the 
 wildest folly would consent to risk our British trade for the 
 sake of French privileges, which, even if really given, were 
 well-nigh worthless. All opposition, however, was vain. 
 Mr. Madison persisted in his attempt to coerce England by 
 means of the French decrees, which he assisted by a procla 
 mation reviving the non-importation act in all its old sever 
 ity and injustice. When Randolph proposed the repeal of 
 the act, he was told that it was a pledge to France. Yet, 
 at the very time that we were thus sacrificing our interests to 
 those of Bonaparte, our vessels were still seized by his ships, 
 and condemned in his courts ; and Serrurier, the new French 
 minister, did not bring to Washington even an offer of in 
 demnity for all the injuries of our faithless ally. Even such 
 grossly outrageous conduct on the part of France could not 
 undeceive Mr. Madison. By way of showing confidence in 
 the French, new and stricter clauses were added to the non 
 importation act ; and Robert Smith was forced from the 
 cabinet, not merely because he was incompetent, as Mr. 
 Madison very rightly asserted, but also because he failed to 
 comprehend the policy, and would insist that the Emperor 
 never meant to recall the decrees. 1 While Mr. Madison 
 was thus exhibiting, in appearance at least, fresh proofs of 
 
 1 See Smith s Address to the People of the United States, 1811 ; also 
 Address, with Pickering s Review, 1812 ; and Answer to Address, &c., 1812. 
 
500 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 faith in France, the English, who had no confidence in 
 French promises, refused to trust to them, even when 
 offered by us. The result, of course, was the failure of 
 the negotiation and the return of Pinkney. He was soon 
 followed by the new British envoy, Mr. Augustus Foster, 
 the prospects of whose mission were not brightened by the 
 affair of the " President " and the " Little Belt." Mr. Mad 
 ison, however, accepted the reparation offered by Foster 
 for the " Chesapeake " affair, which was identical in terms 
 with that scornfully rejected by Jefferson four years pre 
 viously. Nevertheless, the negotiation did not proceed. 
 To Foster s request, that on the revocation of the British 
 orders we should peremptorily demand the withdrawal of 
 the French decrees, Mr. Madison replied that we could 
 not dictate to France. This was no doubt perfectly true, 
 but we had made no difficulty when the French requested 
 a similar attempt on our part at dictation to England. 
 
 But however perilous our foreign relations, a more cer 
 tain sign of coming conflict was to be found in the rise to 
 influence and power of the new war party. The members 
 of this new faction were principally drawn from the great 
 Democratic majority, but they were men of very different 
 stuff from those who had followed so long at the heels of 
 Mr. Jefferson. Their principal support came from the 
 rude population of the interior and backwoods settlements. 
 Their leaders were, for the most part, young, rough, un 
 trained, and impetuous. They brought with them all that 
 wonderful power of blatant self-glorification, which for so 
 many years after made our nation ridiculous, and which is 
 only just now passing into well-deserved contempt. They 
 were at first about as fit to deal with delicate questions 
 of foreign or domestic policy as an Ashantee savage with 
 a chronometer watch, or a Patagonian Indian with a micro 
 scope. But they represented a new phase and a real force 
 in our politics, and they represented them truly. Their 
 coming signified that the old regime was over, that our poli- 
 
1804-15.] THE HAKTFORD CONVENTION. 501 
 
 tics and our politicians were henceforth to be as demo 
 cratic as our principles. They were the sign that we were 
 really democratic altogether, and they represented a new 
 departure in all the departments and in the character of 
 public life. In 1811, they appeared to the members of the 
 old parties violent, strange, and abnormal, for their coming 
 marked an era in our history : they absorbed the vital prin 
 ciples of both their predecessors, and they fastened them 
 finally and surely on our body politic. These new men were 
 thoroughly imbued with the national spirit, with a sense of 
 national honor ; - and they were ready to fight, as the only 
 method they understood for vindicating their dignity. They 
 were the first to fully represent the work of nationality 
 which the union of twenty-five years had silently effected ; 
 and they were the first men free enough from tradition to 
 offer some definite plan, instead of the never-ending juggling 
 of Jefferson and the timid hesitation of Madison. The forces 
 which brought the war party into sudden prominence were 
 natural as well as powerful, although it is unfortunate that 
 their representatives were absolutely ignorant of state-craft, 
 and manifested their wishes and exercised their power with 
 roughness and brutality. One thing was clear to them : if 
 foreign nations did not treat the United States better, then 
 the United States must fight. Unluckily, their next definite 
 idea was that the only proper country to fight was England. 
 It is true that they were ready to attack anybody ; but they 
 had been brought up under the Jeffersonian auspices, and 
 they had a general notion that Americans could neither 
 hate nor fight any one but an Englishman. Not content 
 with this limited idea as to the range of selection among 
 their opponents, they blundered into another utter miscon 
 ception. Their genuine readiness for war would of itself 
 have obtained for them all they desired, but they had deter 
 mined not only to fight England, but also to fight at all 
 events and under any conditions. 
 
 By this headlong impetuosity, although still but a 
 
502 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 faction, they dragged the rest of their party with them. 
 The committee on foreign relations brought in a report 
 favoring war. The new zealots talked loudly about con 
 quering Canada, and averred that the Canadian population 
 would fraternize with them after the French fashion. 
 Warlike preparations were urged. But still they were 
 under the old spell ; and, while they called for forty-five 
 millions for an army to prosecute their schemes of invasion, 
 they would only give to the navy a pitiful three hundred 
 thousand dollars. Bitterly as the Federalists hated the war 
 which was fast coming upon the country, they roused to a 
 last struggle in behalf of the navy. They had never yielded 
 their conviction that this was the one branch of the service 
 on which we ought to rely ; and they now made a last 
 desperate effort to get money, that we might not enter into 
 war with the mistress of the seas unprovided with ships and 
 seamen. Lloyd of Massachusetts pleaded earnestly for our 
 navy, in a speech of great force and eloquence. He said, 
 
 after combating the war policy : 
 
 i 
 
 " If, however, the nation is determined to fight, to make any 
 impression on England we must have a navy. Give us thirty swift- 
 sailing, well-appointed frigates Give us this little fleet. 
 
 Place your navy department under an able and spirited adminis 
 tration, cashier every officer who strikes his flag, and you will 
 soon have a good account of your navy. This may be thought a 
 hard tenure of service ; but, hard or easy, I will engage in five 
 weeks, yes, in five days, to officer this little fleet from New England 
 alone." 
 
 This was the last despairing cry of the Federalists, but 
 it fell upon deaf ears. We were to fight for seamen s 
 rights, but seamen were to take no part ; we were to con 
 test the dominion of the seas, but only by an invasion of 
 Canada. 
 
 Mr. Madison s position was most pitiable. Sincerely 
 anxious for peace, distressed beyond measure at the prospect 
 of war, he had not the courage to hold out against his own 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 503 
 
 party, or to make one more desperate effort to save the 
 country from a ruinous conflict. He tried to remain a 
 passive spectator, but even this the war faction would not 
 permit. He must be their leader, he must sound the trumpet 
 of defiance ; the war must be " Mr. Madison s war." The 
 war faction had, fortunately for themselves, one irresistible 
 argument. The election was at hand, they had a candidate 
 ready to accept their nomination, and Mr. Madison was 
 obliged to decide between adopting a policy he abhorred and 
 the loss of the Presidency. 1 He chose the former, although 
 it was a heavy price to pay for official preferment. He did 
 not possess that strong moral courage which carried John 
 Adams through the trial of 1798. Mr. Adams lost the 
 Presidency, shattered his party, and saved the country from 
 war. Mr. Madison saved his office and his party, and 
 precipitated the country into the war of 1812. 
 
 The first step, by way of uniting the nation and rousing 
 its spirit, was of course to lay a new embargo ; and soon 
 after, on June 18th, war was formally declared. England 
 made a last, unavailing effort for peace : she also allowed 
 our vessels six weeks to leave her ports, and the obnoxious 
 orders in council were soon after withdrawn. We went to 
 war nominally on account of the orders in council, and of 
 the English claim to the right of impressment. The revo 
 cation of the orders left the impressment question the sole 
 cause for fighting. It cannot be too often insisted on, there 
 fore, in judging the war and the war party, that we fough 
 solely in defence of seamen s rights, and that those rights 
 were not mentioned by the treaty of Ghent. 
 
 1 Mr. Madison s course was very obscure. He favored peace strongly 
 until just at the close of 1811. See Writings of Madison, II. 523. He then 
 shifted his ground. It was freely charged and as freely denied that, just 
 before the nominating caucus, Clay and a delegation of the war party waited 
 on the President, and obtained his promise to declare war. An opposition 
 candidate in the person of Clinton, and perhaps Monroe, was certainly 
 ready ; and the inference is irresistible that Madison yielded from a fear of 
 losing the Presidency, a view which I have never seen successfully con 
 troverted. See Hildreth, VI. 289, 298. 
 
504 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 I do not intend to trace the events of the war. It was a 
 long succession of disasters on land and victories at sea. 
 The grand schemes of conquering and fraternizing in Canada 
 broke down in utter disgrace, redeemed only by the exploits 
 of the little Federalist navy. Instead of wresting prov 
 inces from England, our disorganized and ill-led troops were 
 thrown back on our frontier by the arms of provincial 
 soldiery. Instead of invasion, the war became one of des 
 perate defence ; and we were compelled to see our capital 
 ruthlessly pillaged and destroyed. The ships that France 
 was to furnish never came. Disasters gathered around 
 Bonaparte ; and England, freed from her great foe, showed 
 no desire to make peace with a people who had ever mani 
 fested, as she thought, the most unnatural French sympathies. 
 All the hopes of Mr. Madison vanished as France sank, and 
 we were left alone to cope with England. The loud boast 
 ings of the war Democrats only served to show, by their 
 utter non-fulfilment, the ignorance and incompetence of the 
 men who had hurried us totally unprepared into a struggle 
 which might have been avoided. Such a war, as it pro 
 gressed, was not calculated to weaken or diminish the peace 
 party. 
 
 The Federalists in Congress, in 1812, published an 
 address to their constituents, denouncing the declaration of 
 war as wicked and unjustifiable; and their sentiments were 
 largely shared by the people of New England. This feel 
 ing of hostility increased and deepened as the war went on, 
 and was manifested, from the beginning, in the troubles 
 between the Eastern States and the general government. 
 The quiet but determined resistance of the State govern 
 ments, on every point where they could interpose a legal 
 obstacle, caused the administration to treat them with 
 marked disfavor ; and demands which were readily acceded 
 to in the case of turbulent Democratic States were rudely 
 refused to Massachusetts and Connecticut. No attempt at 
 conciliation was made, and the breach between the Federal- 
 
1804-16.] THE HAETFORD CONVENTION. 505 
 
 ist States and the Democratic administration widened daily. 
 The merits of their quarrels can be more fitly discussed 
 when the report of the Hartford Convention is reached, and 
 we may therefore proceed at once to consider the history 
 and composition of that body. 
 
 When the Legislature of Massachusetts met in 1814, the 
 condition of affairs, both State and national, was gloomy in 
 the extreme. But their own condition was the first thought 
 in the minds of the Massachusetts representatives. The 
 war had gone from bad to worse."|~The little navy which 
 had done so much had disappeareS. Our flag no longer 
 waved over a single national vessel. The ravages of the 
 British on our coasts, culminating in the destruction of 
 Washington, were relieved only by an occasional stubborn 
 and successful defence of some isolated point. One British 
 expedition was on its way to New Orleans, while another 
 was preparing to attack the coast of New England, whose 
 shores, by the withdrawal of the national troops, were left 
 utterly defenceless. The national treasury was bankrupt ; 
 specie payments had ceased ; and the administration was 
 urging upon Congress the adoption of measures of a dan 
 gerous and oppressive character, in order to recruit our army 
 and navy. The negotiations, at the last accounts, were most 
 unpromising; and a conviction of the insincerity of the 
 administration made men believe that all efforts for peace 
 would be fruitless. The Federalists were determined, 
 therefore, to do two things. They were resolved to protect 
 their own shores, which the administration either could 
 not or would not defend from foreign invasion ; and they 
 were equally resolved that they would compel the general 
 government to make peace. With these objects in view, 
 they determined to call a convention of the New England 
 States, in order 
 
 " To devise, if practicable, means of security and defence which 
 may be consistent with the preservation of their resources from 
 total ruin, and adapted to their local situation, mutual relations, and 
 
506 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 habits, and not repugnant to their obligations as members of the 
 Union." 1 
 
 Connecticut and Rhode Island responded to this invita 
 tion, and appointed delegates whose instructions conformed 
 to the terms of the Massachusetts circular. The Conven 
 tion assembled at Hartford, Dec. 15, 1814. There were 
 present twelve delegates from Massachusetts, seven from 
 Connecticut, four from Rhode Island, and subsequently 
 two from New Hampshire and one from Vermont, the three 
 last representing local conventions. 
 
 ~ This was the body which, according to Mr. Adams, was a 
 band of adroit conspirators, residing in Boston, who misled 
 and deceived the people, had no real popular support, rep 
 resented nobody but themselves, and sought only their own 
 advancement and the gratification of their own ambition. 
 Let us see how nearly the Convention corresponded in 
 character and in fact with this description. 
 
 Among the members of the Convention were men who 
 had been distinguished in the Senate of the United States, 
 and who had also proved the confidence reposed in them by 
 their neighbors by the State offices which many of them had 
 held. Among them were eminent judges, able lawyers, and 
 wealthy merchants. They were all men of mature age and 
 wide experience. Many of them had served the country 
 during the administrations of Washington and Adams, while 
 all were of high social position, and had much at stake in 
 the well-being of the country. Honored by public trusts, 
 they were all respected by the communities in which they 
 lived for their private lives and characters. The Hartford 
 Convention was eminently a conservative, honorable, re 
 spectable, and experienced body, when tried by the charac 
 ters of its members ; and this is certainly not the material 
 from which conspirators and revolutionists are usually 
 made. 
 
 The leaders of the Convention undoubtedly came from 
 
 1 The italics are my own. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 507 
 
 the metropolis of New England, but the members repre 
 sented all sections in their several States. If this body did 
 not fairly represent a portion of the people of New Eng 
 land, for the sake of the latter, it is to be much regretted. 
 But such was not the case, for they represented a majority of 
 the people of their respective States ; and to say that under 
 our system a convention of this sort could meet, if disap 
 proved by the people at large, is of itself a gross absurd 
 ity. The assertion arises from the natural inconsistency 
 which leads an opponent not only to savagely attack his 
 enemy, but to insist that that enemy is of no importance, 
 and one to whose actions the world is wholly indifferent. 
 The assailant in such cases rarely perceives that the sever 
 ity of the attack is of itself proof of the magnitude of the 
 object assailed. But the exact position of the Convention 
 in this respect can be shown in a moment by an analy 
 sis of the popular vote for governor at the preceding elec 
 tions. In the year 1812, Governor Strong, the Federalist 
 candidate, was chosen by a slender majority of 1,370 votes. 
 The next year Strong s majority was 13,974 ; and in 1814, 
 although the Democratic candidate was the distinguished 
 Federalist, Samuel Dexter, Strong received a majority of 
 10,421. The resolution ordering the Convention passed 
 the House in the Massachusetts Legislature by a vote of 
 260 to 90, and the delegates were afterwards chosen by the 
 Houses in convention by a vote of 226 to 67. l In Connecti 
 cut, of course, the Federalist and Convention majority was 
 much larger. In the face of these simple figures, the charge 
 Hhat the Hartford Convention represented nobody drops to 
 the ground. They represented their respective States and 
 a large majority of the people in those States, and their 
 actions were the actions of the States and of the people of 
 
 1 The total vote only represents about half the members of the Legisla 
 ture. If all had been present, there is no reason to suppose that the rela 
 tions between the votes of the majority and minority would have been 
 altered. The Federal majority was very large. 
 
503 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 the States. Mr. Adarns was particularly excited on this 
 point, because Mr. Otis had claimed that the Convention 
 represented all the virtue and intelligence of New England. 
 Such a claim is manifestly absurd in behalf of any political 
 party. But it has led Mr. Adams into a glowing account 
 of the size and virtue of the Republican minority in Mas 
 sachusetts in 1814, and also into an eloquent defence of 
 minority rights. Such rights need defence. But, if the 
 Federalists dragged their States and large numbers of their 
 reluctant fellow-citizens into the Hartford Convention by 
 means of a numerical majority, how did Mr. Madison in 
 volve the country in war, bankruptcy, and danger of disso 
 lution, if not by a tyrannical majority. If the voice of the 
 majority was the voice of God at Washington, why by par 
 ity of reasoning was it not the divine command in Massa 
 chusetts ? In the one case, Mr. Adams represents that the 
 Federalists behaved with high-handed and flagrant disre 
 gard of the rights of the minority ; while, in the other, 
 the minority not only had no rights, but their opinions 
 in favor of peace were gross treachery to their country. 
 There would seem to be a rule here which does not work 
 both ways ; and I introduce this instance, in order to show 
 the arbitrary laws of criticism by which it has been cus 
 tomary to try the Hartford Convention. 
 
 Having considered whom the Hartford Convention rep 
 resented, we can now discuss its objects and intentions. 
 These according to Mr. Adams were to gratify the ambition 
 of certain leaders by carrying through the never-abandoned 
 plan of a dissolution of the Union. Mr. Adams sustains 
 his view by a long and ingenious interpretation of the re 
 port. I shall content myself here with stating the essential 
 points in the report, and by giving all the external evidence 
 I have been able to collect as to the objects and intentions 
 of the Convention and its members. But first a word may 
 be said as to the journal of the Convention. Mr. Adams 
 intimates, and it has been freely charged elsewhere, that this 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 509 
 
 journal was not a full account of the proceedings it pro 
 fessed to record. The testimony on this point is direct and 
 simple. When the document was deposited in the Secre 
 tary s office in Boston, it was accompanied by a certificate 
 as follows : 
 
 I, George Cabot, late President of the Convention assembled 
 at Hartford on the fifteenth day of December, 1814, do hereby 
 certify that the foregoing is the original and only journal of the 
 proceedings of that Convention ; and that the twenty-seven written 
 pages which compose it, and the printed report, comprise a faith 
 ful and complete record of all the motions, resolutions, votes, and 
 proceedings of that Convention. And I do further certify that this 
 journal has been constantly in my exclusive custody, from the time 
 of the adjournment of the Convention to the delivery of it into the 
 office of the Secretary of this Commonwealth. 
 
 (Signed) GEORGE CABOT. 1 
 
 BOSTON, Nov. 16, 1819. 
 
 In 1831, Roger Minot Sherman testified in a libel case, 
 of course under oath, that, 
 
 " There was not, to the best of his recollection, a single motion, 
 resolution, or subject of debate, but what appears in the journal." 
 
 And he said further, 
 
 " I believe I know their proceedings perfectly, and that every 
 measure, done or proposed, has been published to the world." 2 
 
 The third witness is Theodore Dwight, the Secretary of 
 the Convention, the only person, not a member, who was 
 present during the debates ; and he says : 
 
 "In the most positive and unhesitating manner, and with all 
 the solemnity which the nature of the case requires, that the Jour 
 nal and the Report of the Convention contain a full, complete, and 
 specific account of all the motions, votes, and proceedings of the 
 Convention" 
 
 1 See Dwight s History of the Hartford Convention, p. 398. 
 
 2 See Goodrich s Recollections of a Lifetime, II. 26-28, where Mr. Sher- 
 man s testimony is given in full ; also, ibid., pp. 19-24, for the testimony of 
 Noah Webster on this point, and for the letters of Joseph Lyman as to the 
 preliminary county convention at Northampton, Mass. 
 
510 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15- 
 
 And he adds : 
 
 " That no proposition was made in the Convention to divide the 
 Union, to organize the New England States into a separate govern 
 ment, or to form an alliance with Great Britain, or any other for 
 eign power. On the contrary, every motion that was made, every 
 resolution that was offered, and every measure that was adopted, 
 was, in principle and in terms, strictly confined within the limits of 
 the instructions from the several legislatures by whom the delegates 
 were appointed." 1 
 
 The letters of Mr. H. G. Otis on the Hartford Conven 
 tion substantiate this testimony. 2 The names of the per 
 sons who offered motions are not given, nor are the debates 
 reported in the journal. No journal of parliamentary pro 
 ceedings, strictly speaking, ever contains debates ; and the 
 full reporting of the present day was then almost unknown. 
 The omission of the names of those offering motions is per 
 fectly trivial. Rumor had it that Mr. Otis made the first 
 motion for a committee, after they had organized, by choosing 
 Mr. Cabot as President, and Mr. Dwight as Secretary. But 
 there is nothing to be gained by knowing that Mr. Otis 
 offered one motion, or Mr. Dane another. And when the 
 names of all those who served on committees, and drew the 
 reports which guided the Convention, are given, it is still 
 more preposterous to call the omission of the authors of 
 motions " suppression." There can be no suppression of 
 knowledge, useless in itself, and rendered still more value 
 less by the publication of all matters of real importance. 
 The journal must be accepted on the testimony of three 
 men of unquestioned integrity to be a full and complete 
 record of proceedings. 3 From the loss of the debates, we 
 
 1 See History of Hartford Convention, p. 405. 
 
 2 See Otis s Letters in Defence of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1824 ; 
 and Letters by one of the Convention, Washington, 1820. 
 
 8 The journal deposited in the State archives by Mr. Cabot is now in 
 the possession of the Hon. Charles Francis Adams. It was, I believe, pre 
 sented to Mr. John Quincy Adams by Governor Eustis. A patriotic Demo 
 cratic House expunged the Hartford Convention resolutions from the journals 
 of their predecessors, and cast out the report from among their archives. One 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 511 
 
 are unable to sift out individual opinions ; but we can hold 
 each and every member responsible for the utterances of 
 the whole, and an analysis of the report will give us the 
 
 official declaration of the views of the Convention. 
 
 \s 
 
 The report begins as follows : 
 
 " The Convention is deeply impressed with a sense of the ardu 
 ous nature of the commission which they were appointed to exe 
 cute, of devising the means of defence against dangers, and of relief 
 from oppressions proceeding from the acts of their own government, 
 without violating constitutional principles, or disappointing the 
 hopes of a suffering and injured people. To prescribe patience 
 and firmness to those who are already exhausted by distress is 
 sometimes to drive them to despair, and the progress towards re 
 form by the regular road is irksome to those whose imaginations 
 discern and whose feelings prompt to a shorter course. . . . 
 
 " It is a truth not to be concealed that a sentiment prevails to 
 no inconsiderable extent, that administration have given such con 
 structions to that instrument [the Constitution], and practised so 
 many abuses under color-of its authority, that the time for a change 
 is at hand. Those who so believe regard the evils which surround 
 them as intrinsic and incurable defects in the Constitution. They 
 yield to a persuasion that no change at any time, or on any occa 
 sion, can aggravate the misery of their country. This opinion may 
 ultimately prove to be correct ; but as the evidence on which it 
 rests is not yet conclusive, and as measures adopted upon the as 
 sumption of its certainty might be irrevocable, some general con 
 siderations are submitted, in the hope of reconciling all to a course 
 of moderation and firmness which may save them from the regret 
 incident to sudden decisions, probably avert the evil, or at least 
 insure consolation and success in the last resort." 
 
 The prosperity of the country under Washington and 
 Adams is then described in the report as a proof of the 
 
 is irresistibly reminded of the revenge of Charles Stuart, when he hung the 
 skeletons of Cromwell, Ireton, and Bradshaw in chains, affixed their heads 
 to Temple Bar, and flung the bones of Robert Blake upon a dung-heap. The 
 different degree of ferocity in the two cases corresponds with the difference 
 in time ; but all such incidents alike reveal in a deplorable fashion the petti- 
 ness and impotence of party malice. 
 
512 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 intrinsic worth of the Constitution, while the evils which 
 followed after the first administrations are forcibly repre 
 sented. The paragraph concludes: 
 
 " But to attempt upon every abuse of power to change the Con 
 stitution would be to perpetuate the evils of revolution." 
 
 The power of recovery, the vigor of constitutional prin 
 ciples, and the growing change in public opinion are 
 pointed out as arguments against extreme measures, and 
 this portion of the report then concludes as follows : 
 
 " Finally, if the Union be destined to dissolution by reason of 
 the multiplied abuses of bad administrations, it should, if possible, 
 be the work of peaceable times and deliberate consent. Some new 
 form of confederacy should be substituted among those States 
 which shall intend to maintain a federal relation to each other. 
 Events may prove that the causes of our calamities are deep and 
 permanent. They may be found to proceed, not merely from the 
 blindness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, or 
 the confusion of the times ; but they may be traced to implacable 
 combinations of individuals or of States to monopolize power and 
 office, and to trample without remorse upon the rights and interests 
 of commercial sections of the Union. Whenever it shall appear 
 that these causes are radical and permanent, a separation by equi 
 table arrangement will be preferable to an alliance by constraint 
 among nominal friends, but real enemies, inflamed by mutual 
 hatred and jealousy, and inviting by intestine divisions contempt 
 and aggression from abroad. But a severance of the Union by 
 one or more States, against the will of the rest, and especially in 
 time of war, can be justified only by absolute necessity. These 
 are among the principal objections against precipitate measures 
 tending to disunite the States ; and, when examined in connection 
 with the farewell address of the Father of his Country, they must, 
 it is believed, be deemed conclusive." 
 
 The report then took up those subjects which in the 
 opinion of the Convention were most pressing, and required 
 the most immediate remedies. These were the authority 
 claimed by the administration and Congress over the mili 
 tia, and the defenceless condition of the Eastern States. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 513 
 
 Under the first head, they began by an examination of the 
 claim of the President to be the sole judge as to the exi 
 gency of calling out the militia. 1 In order to understand 
 this question, it will be necessary to trace briefly the diffi 
 culties which had arisen during the war between Massa 
 chusetts and Connecticut and the general government. 
 
 Governor Strong had declined to obey the first call for 
 militia in 1812, and had rested his refusal on two grounds : 
 that he, as governor of the State, was judge of the exigency, 
 and not the President ; and that the States had the right to 
 officer their militia, a right invaded in his opinion by the 
 general government. Governor Griswold refused the Con 
 necticut militia only on the latter ground. Governor 
 Strong referred both points to the Supreme Court of Mas 
 sachusetts ; and the opinion given and signed by Parsons, 
 Parker, and Sewall confirmed his action. 1 The Legislature 
 and the popular voice concurred with the judges ; and the 
 Convention now took the same ground in their report. 
 That this was a blunder, politically, is obvious enough ; 
 but a grave legal error was also involved in these opinions. 
 No argument is required to show that, if every governor 
 were sole judge as to the exigency for troops, anarchy 
 would exist whenever there was war, foreign or domestic, 
 and that the central power would be helpless. If such 
 an interpretation were acted on, one of the main objects 
 of the Constitution, " to provide for the common defence," 
 would be frustrated. To give the general government the 
 exclusive power of declaring war, and at the same time to 
 take away the means of carrying on such war, is an abso 
 lute contradiction in terms. Unfortunately, the question 
 did not come before the Supreme Court of the United 
 States until 1827, when it was decided that the President 
 was the sole judge of the exigency for calling out the 
 militia. 2 If a United States court had so decided in 1812, 
 
 1 8 Mass. Reports, Appendix. 
 
 2 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton, 19. 
 
 33 
 
514 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 there can be little doubt that New England would have 
 submitted, as she did to the embargo decision in 1808. 1 
 We may fairly acquit the governor, the Convention, the 
 Legislature, and the people of any illegal action, supported 
 as they were by the highest legal authority of the State ; 
 but we cannot so easily acquit the judges. Three able law 
 yers could hardly take so strange a view of so very simple 
 a constitutional question without undue partisanship. 
 
 On the second point, as to officering the militia, the 
 court and the governor were correct. The Constitution 
 expressly reserves this right to the States ; and the admin 
 istration had, in attempting to place State militia under 
 the command of subordinate officers of the regular army, 
 unquestionably violated its provisions. This view is that of 
 Mr, Justice Johnson and Mr. Justice Story, who confirmed 
 the opinion of the Massachusetts judges, by saying that the 
 right to officer their own militia was one of the checks on 
 the general government reserved by the States. 2 
 
 The report of the Convention, after dealing with these 
 two principal questions, proceeds with a brief consideration 
 of certain others of a similar nature. These were the 
 classification of the militia, the forcible drafting of militia 
 as such into the regular army, and the enlistment of minors. 
 The two first were recommendations of the Secretary of 
 War, the third had become law. The Convention, after 
 elaborate examination, concluded that all three measures 
 were unconstitutional. 
 
 While the Convention were clearly wrong on the first two 
 points, they were probably in the right as to the third ; but 
 none of them are of sufficient importance to require discus 
 sion now, since they do not illustrate the views of the 
 Convention on the vital question of the rights of States. 
 
 The report of the Secretary of the Navy, which advised 
 impressment, was next touched upon, and the inconsistency 
 
 1 Story on the Const, 1st ed., III. 162 ; and United States v. Brig William, 
 2 Hall s Law Journal, 256. 
 
 2 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheaton, 1. 
 
1804-15.] THE HAKTFORD CONVENTION". 515 
 
 involved in supporting such a war by such means was 
 pointed out. The unconstitutionality of all these acts was 
 then reviewed in general terms ; and the duty of the States 
 to protest against them, as unconstitutional and void, was 
 declared. 
 
 The next subject was the common defence, declared to 
 be the principal object of the Convention. The conduct 
 of the war was first reviewed. All the disasters we had en 
 dured were set forth ; and the defenceless condition of New 
 England, impoverished as she was by the embargo, was 
 strongly described. The report argued that New England 
 could not pay taxes for a defence which was not given her, 
 nor pay two sets of taxes, national and State, both for de 
 fence and equally heavy. As a solution of this difficulty, 
 the Convention proposed that 
 
 " These States be allowed to assume their own defence by the 
 militia or other troops. A reasonable portion, also, of the taxes 
 raised in each State, might be paid into its treasury, and credited to 
 the United States, but to be appropriated to the defence of such 
 State, to be accounted for with the United States." 
 
 The remainder of the report was devoted to a comparison 
 between the state of the nation under the first two admin 
 istrations and under the last two, leading up to an argu 
 ment in support of certain amendments to the Constitution. 
 
 The first three of the resolutions adopted recommend 
 to the Legislatures of the States represented in the Conven 
 tion that they should take proper measures to protect the 
 people against the unconstitutional action of the adminis 
 tration in regard to the militia, that they should endeavor 
 to make the financial arrangement proposed by the Conven 
 tion with the general government, and that they should 
 provide for the common defence. 
 
 The fourth resolution recommends the Legislatures to 
 urge upon the general government seven amendments to 
 the Constitution : 1. To do away with slave representa 
 tion ; 2. That no new State should be admitted without 
 
516 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 a two-thirds vote ; 3 and 4. That Congress should not be 
 allowed to lay an embargo for more than sixty days, and 
 that, to interdict commerce, a two-thirds vote should be re 
 quired ; l 5. That a two-thirds vote should be required to 
 declare war ; 6. That no person, except a native-born 
 citizen, should be eligible for any office ; 7. That the Presi 
 dent should be eligible for only one term. There is no 
 need to discuss the merits, or the reasonableness of the 
 amendments here suggested. The first has been settled, 
 others have ceased to have either interest or importance, 
 while one at least is still agitated. The very fact that the 
 Convention suggested them showed clearly enough that 
 they still respected and adhered to the Constitution ; and 
 it was their obvious right, as it is that of all citizens of the 
 United States, to offer any amendments they may see fit to 
 that famous instrument. 
 
 Mr. Adams, with great diligence and ingenuity, has 
 looked between the lines of this report to find proof not 
 only of the treasonable intentions of the authors, but also 
 of their duplicity in expressing their views. To me this 
 seems labor misspent. The men who went to Hartford 
 had the courage of their opinions as entirely as Mr. Adams, 
 and they expressed themselves with moderation, but with 
 plainness. He who runs may read in the report, not only 
 the objects of the Convention, but the reasons for its assem 
 blage. A majority of the people in the States represented 
 at Hartford knew themselves to be defenceless against the 
 attacks of a wanton enemy ; they attributed their suffer 
 ings past and present to a hostile administration, bent on their 
 political effacement ; and they believed the war to be both 
 unjustifiable and wicked. Under these circumstances, they 
 determined to take measures for self-preservation ; and they 
 were resolved to force the administration to make peace. 
 The separatist feeling was very strong at that moment in 
 
 1 The two-thirds vote to interdict commerce was one of the burning ques 
 tions in the Constitutional Convention where it was stubbornly supported by 
 the South. " Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis." 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 517 
 
 New England, and the extremists urged violent measures. 
 Indeed a dissolution was openly desired by the radical wing 
 of the party, and demands for a separate peace had appeared 
 in the newspapers. In this state of affairs, the Federalists 
 determined to call the Convention at Hartford. Mr. Adams 
 says their real object was the dissolution of the Union, 
 and that this was the first step in that direction. Mr. 
 Otis, on the other hand, claims that the object of the Con 
 vention was the preservation of the Union. There is truth 
 in both statements, wholly incompatible as they may ap 
 pear. The most distinguished of foreign writers upon our 
 history has remarked on the strange mental confusion 
 which has always existed in this country among those who 
 at any time discussed or advocated schemes of secession. 
 The same authority has also pointed out that though Amer 
 icans have always been extremely quick to invoke the rights 
 of States in opposition to the general government, though 
 they were always ready to go to the very edge of dissolution, 
 they were very slow and cautious in committing any overt 
 act. 1 These observations apply with singular aptness to 
 the Hartford Convention. That Convention was the expo 
 nent and result of a strong separatist feeling. The bare 
 fact of its existence proved the strength of the separatist 
 forces at work in the community. Yet the men who went 
 to Hartford used these separatist forces to maintain the 
 Union. In short, they said plainly to the general govern 
 ment, " unless you alter your present policy, a dissolution of 
 the Union will ensue." They intended to coerce the admin 
 istration by threatening them with separation. If their 
 threat was attended to, the Union would be saved ; if not, 
 it is mere conjecture whether the Federalists would have 
 pushed matters to extremity. They were determined men, 
 and much in earnest; and the worst might have been 
 feared. Fortunately, events made all such threats and 
 their fulfilment alike unnecessary. Yet the policy of the 
 
 1 Yon Hoist, Constitutional History of the United States, pp. 64, 65, 77. 
 
518 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 Convention was one of delay ; and they might and probably 
 would, if there had been occasion, have protracted still 
 further any thing like open resistance. One of their chief 
 objects was to control and restrain the more violent mem 
 bers of their own party. For while the threat of separation 
 is clearly expressed in the report, and the existence of the 
 separatist feeling is recognized in plain terms, the wish for 
 an immediate movement in that direction is deprecated and 
 rejected. This plain and obvious meaning of the report is 
 borne out by other testimony, which serves to show that 
 one, if not the principal, object of the Convention was to 
 prevent violent measures. The wiser Federalists had to 
 choose between controlling and directing the movement 
 themselves, or allowing the extreme partisans to precipitate 
 a dissolution of the Union and possible civil war. With 
 great good sense, they adopted the former alternative, and 
 thus saved the country from two imminent dangers. 
 Mr. Edmund Quincy says in his Life of his father : 
 
 " The Legislature were very careful to choose men of known 
 moderation of views and tried discretion of conduct. It was for 
 this reason my father believed and said that he was passed by on 
 that occasion. The prudent Federalists, when called upon to face 
 this emergency, were afraid of his impetuous temperament and 
 fiery earnestness. They dreaded lest he might express too well 
 the spirit of those whose urgency extorted the Convention. 
 
 " He [Mr. Quincy] always spoke of the Hartford Convention as 
 a tub to the whale, as a dilatory measure to amuse the malcontents, 
 and keep them quiet under inaction, until events might make 
 action unnecessary." l 
 
 To appreciate the full force of this rejection, it must be 
 recollected that Mr. Quincy was one of the most prominent 
 men in the party, the last great and eloquent leader of the 
 Federalists in Congress. 
 
 The same object is mentioned by Mr. Otis, in his letters 
 on the Convention. 2 
 
 1 Quincy s Life of Josiah Quincy, p. 357, et seq. 2 See above, p. 510. 
 
1804-15.J THE HAKTFOKD CONVENTION. 519 
 
 From the letters of Mr. Lowell and Colonel Pickering, 
 given in the next chapter, especially from those descriptive 
 of the members of the Convention, it will be perceived that 
 they disapproved the selection of delegates. Both these 
 gentlemen held extreme views, and they considered the 
 delegates too moderate and conservative in character to act 
 with sufficient vigor. They mistrusted their readiness to 
 take any decisive steps. This is especially noticeable in 
 the expressions they use concerning Mr. Cabot, the recog 
 nized head of the Convention. Despite their friendship and 
 admiration for him personally, they regarded him as too 
 prudent and too despondent a man for this emergency. 
 Mr. Lowell says, " I have been unable to discover what 
 Mr. Cabot s views are." Mr. Cabot s opinions were un 
 changed. He believed now, as in 1804, that, while a dis 
 solution might and ultimately probably would take place, 
 and be perhaps accompanied with important advantages, that 
 schemes for that object were both useless and impracticable. 
 With the greatest reluctance, and only from a high sense of 
 responsibility toward his party and his State, did he accept 
 the position at the head of the Massachusetts delegation. 
 An anecdote preserves the evidence of Mr. Cabot s prin 
 cipal object in going to Hartford. He was accompanied 
 from his house to the Hartford stage-coach by the late Dr. 
 James Jackson, of Boston, at that time of course a young 
 man. Dr. Jackson inquired what they intended to do 
 at Hartford ; to which Mr. Cabot replied, " We are going to 
 keep you young hot-heads from getting into mischief." 1 If 
 any further proof is needed to show that the Hartford 
 Convention was not intended to dissolve the Union, let it 
 be remembered that the instructions of the Legislatures 
 expressly forbade the delegates to do any thing repugnant 
 to the relations of the States to the Union. 
 
 One other object was prominent among those of the Con 
 vention, to defend themselves from invasion. For this 
 they made provision, by advising the Legislatures to ask 
 
 1 This was the object also of Mr. Dane, as appears, by the letter from 
 Hon. R. C. Winthrop, given in the Appendix, No. II. 
 
520 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 permission from the general government to devote the taxes 
 to their own defence. This deference is hardly consistent 
 with an immediate desire to dissolve the Union or to make a 
 separate peace. The same request had been granted to other 
 States, and it was therefore both natural and proper. If we 
 add to this the evidence of the secretary, that " no proposition 
 was made in the Convention to divide the Union, to organize 
 the New England States into a separate government, or to 
 form an alliance with Great Britain or any other foreign 
 power," we may fairly conclude that the objects and inten 
 tions of the Convention were what its reports, its members, 
 and its secretary declared them to be, and not what Mr. 
 Adams or the Democratic party chose to think they were. 
 
 But two points remain to be considered, the unconsti- 
 tutionality of the Convention and its unexampled character. 
 The Hartford Convention adopted and favored the doctrine 
 of Jefferson and Madison, that the States had a right to nul 
 lify laws of the United States which were in their opinion 
 unconstitutional. We must remember that this question 
 was then an open one, although it struck at the very existence 
 of the central government. Nullification was, of course, the 
 most effective weapon with which the States could make 
 1 a constitutional resistance to the general government; and 
 it was therefore generally adopted, not only by the Hart 
 ford Convention, but by all the Southern States at different 
 times. There can now be no question of the unconstitu 
 tionally of the nullification doctrine ; but it was not settled 
 in 1814, nor for many years after. But the great point 
 against the Hartford Convention has always been that it 
 consisted of representatives from several States ; and this, 
 it has been argued, was in itself a direct violation of an 
 express provision of the Constitution. In dealing with this 
 question, we should not forget that some of New England s 
 most distinguished lawyers were not only concerned in get 
 ting up the Convention, but also served in it as delegates. 
 These men were as well versed in the Constitution as any 
 
1804-15.] THE HAETFOKD CONVENTION. 521 
 
 men of their time, and it is not to be hastily supposed that 
 they would have unnecessarily violated an express constitu 
 tional provision. The clause in question says that no State 
 shall enter into any " agreement or compact " with any 
 other State, without the consent of the United States. The 
 whole question turns upon the two words in quotation 
 marks. If, by the Hartford Convention, certain States en 
 tered into an " agreement or compact," they violated the 
 Constitution in so doing. But they did nothing of the 
 kind. The delegates were appointed to " confer with each 
 other, and devise means for their common defence." They 
 were to pave the way for a possible future " agreement or 
 compact," but they were to make none themselves. The 
 States are not forbidden to confer and offer recommenda 
 tions to their several Legislatures, and this has been done 
 in several instances by commissioners. Moreover, there 
 must be some binding force in order to make an agreement 
 or compact, and here there was none. No State was in 
 any way bound by any thing said or done at Hartford ; and 
 this, of itself, shows the non-existence of any " agreement or 
 compact." The authority intrusted to the President to call 
 the Convention together again could not alter the character 
 of the body as at first appointed. They had power merely 
 to recommend to their several Legislatures, who might 
 accept or reject their recommendations as they pleased. 
 The States were at full liberty to confer. This was all 
 that was done at Hartford, and the Convention was therefore 
 strictly within the letter of the Constitution. 
 
 The imputation that New England stood alone in her 
 action is easily disproved. The Constitution had not been 
 in force three years, when Virginian congressmen threat 
 ened disunion on the floor of the House ; and, a few years 
 later, the whiskey insurrection, although not a State mat 
 ter, gave a very practical illustration of the devotion 
 to the Union in Pennsylvania. In 1799, Jefferson and 
 Madison drew up the famous Virginia and Kentucky reso- 
 
522 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 lutions, which embodied for the first time the doctrine of 
 nullification ; and Virginian troops were a little later held 
 in readiness to seize the arsenals of the United States. 
 But the period of the war of 1812 was particularly prolific 
 in instances of the separatist feeling; and the demands 
 which at that time came from Democratic States were com 
 plied with and forgotten, while the resistance of the minority 
 was long and bitterly remembered. 
 
 In 1812, Georgia was dissatisfied with the President s 
 decision against the seizure of East Florida. Despite ex 
 press orders from Washington, Governor Mitchell not only 
 refused to withdraw the State troops from Florida, but sent 
 another expedition. The Georgia Legislature soon after 
 resolved that, whether Congress authorized it or not, the 
 possession of Florida was essential to their safety, and they 
 passed an act to raise a State army, which thereupon 
 invaded the peninsula. The Constitution says that no 
 State shall " engage in war, unless actually invaded ; " and 
 yet Georgia carried on a war of conquest, in the teeth of a 
 direct prohibition from the general government. There is 
 certainly an element of the separatist feeling and of States 
 rights about such conduct as this. 
 
 Virginia, in 1813, passed an act for a State army. They 
 repealed this act only on a promise from the war depart 
 ment that a regiment of regulars should be stationed at 
 Norfolk, and that all Virginian troops heretofore called out 
 for local defence should be paid by the United States, not 
 withstanding a rule adopted at Washington, and enfo ced 
 in other States, to pay no militia not called for by the 
 general government. Placed side by side with this, the 
 plan proposed at Hartford for the defence of New England 
 does not look abnormally hideous. Maryland refused at 
 the same time to pay for the defence of Baltimore. 
 
 In 1812, a public meeting was held in the city of New 
 York. The chairman was Colonel Fish. The committee 
 who framed the resolutions were John Jay, Rufus King, 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 523 
 
 Gouverneur Morris, Richard Harrison, Egbert Benson, 
 Matthew Clarkson, and Richard Varick. After stating 
 the war to " be unwise, declared under unfavorable circum 
 stances, and that the consequences to which it leads are 
 alarming, that it is alliance with the French Emperor, and 
 that they have no confidence in the men who declared war," 
 the resolution demands : 
 
 " That representatives be chosen in the several counties, dis 
 creet men, friends of peace. These representatives can correspond 
 or confer with each other, and co-operate with the friends of peace 
 in our sister States in devising arid pursuing such constitutional 
 measures as may secure our independence and preserve our Union, 
 both of which are endangered by the present war." 
 
 These men, too, must be set down as traitors with those 
 who went to Hartford. Indeed, the arch traitor Morris 
 considered the Hartford Convention a tame affair. 1 
 
 In 1813, Vermont refused to call out her militia in obe 
 dience to a call from the general government ; and, at the 
 very moment of the Hartford Convention, Pennsylvania 
 was making provision for a State army. The instances of 
 outbreaks of the separatist feeling since 1814 are too fresh 
 in every one s mind to need recital here. 
 
 All this amounts merely to saying that the principle of 
 separatism was common to all the States in the Union. 
 The gravity and danger of the Hartford Convention were 
 due to the time and place of its assemblage. That such a con 
 vention should be held in New England, the very stronghold 
 of the sentiments of Union and nationality, shows not only 
 the extent of the evils from which the people thought they 
 suffered, but also proves how deep-rooted, how vigorous, 
 and how universal the principle of separatism was in the 
 United States. The great practical danger was in the cir 
 cumstances of the time ; for the government was bankrupt, 
 without men, arms, or money ; and a general disorganization 
 in the national fabric was only too apparent. One British 
 1 Life of Gouverneur Morris, by Sparks, III. 326. 
 
524 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 expedition had landed at New Orleans, another was on the 
 northern frontier, and threatened the severance of New 
 England from the rest of the country. We realize now 
 but faintly that the nation stood upon the brink of ruin, 
 a ruin which the Hartford Convention might have easily 
 precipitated. But the prudence and moderation of the 
 Federalists at that moment saved the country from great 
 perils which even the unexpected peace might have come 
 too late to avert. 
 
 ^f The Federalists generally, all the more sensible ones cer 
 tainly, were satisfied with the work of the Convention. The 
 general government, soon after the Convention adjourned, 
 passed a law which permitted the use of State troops, as 
 desired by New England and urged by the report of the Con 
 vention, and not many days after came the welcome tidings 
 of peace. The war party no longer insisted on an acknowl 
 edgment of those rights for which alone they had fought, 
 and for which they had shed so much blood and squan 
 dered so much treasure. If we judge it only by immediate 
 results, the war must be pronounced a total failure, and the 
 peace was considered then, and for many years after, a most 
 wretched one ; 1 but the war party was only too glad to make 
 peace on any terms. The events of the war and the terms 
 of peace fully justified the Federalists, who had denounced it 
 throughout as wicked, unjustifiable, and unnecessary ; and, 
 if one looks only at the immediate history and results of the 
 struggle, their assertions cannot be gainsaid. But we, to-day, 
 can see that the Federalists were wrong, though no man 
 then could know it. The war of 1812 was worth all it 
 cost, simply because it was a war. Had we never gained 
 
 3 Mr. John Quincy Adams, who was not likely to be too severe on the 
 treaty, said of it : " O the voracious maw and the bloated visage of national 
 vanity ! If it were true that we had vanquished or humbled Britannia, 
 it would be base to exult over her ; but, when it is so notorious that the 
 issue of our late war with her was at best a drawn game, there is nothing 
 but the most egregious national vanity that can turn it into a triumph." 
 Diary, IV. 33. 
 
1804-15.] THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 525 
 
 a victory, the mere fact of proving to the world that we 
 could and would fight as a nation would have been suffi 
 cient. But the war of 1812 did more than establish our 
 nationality in the eyes of foreigners : it taught England 
 that there was one people who could meet and conquer her 
 at sea, and it taught us to love and cherish our navy. 
 For these reasons, no American, though the war of 181*2 
 was fruitful in misery and disaster, and was almost in the 
 end our ruin, would wish to have its record effaced from 
 our annals. 
 
 1 No persons hailed peace with such joy as the Federalists, 
 and at its arrival all their bitter opposition faded away. 
 They disappeared as a party from our history, and the 
 Hartford Convention marks the last point in their career. 
 They disappeared because they no longer had a reason for 
 existence. The war party adopted all the doctrines for 
 which the Federalists had striven, and which became the 
 principles of our government. This new school of Feder 
 alist-Democrats supported and maintained the army, the 
 navy, the funds, the national bank, the protective policy, 
 the liberal construction of the Constitution, every thing 
 in short which Hamilton cherished and Jefferson loathed. 
 The Federalists had no longer an excuse for living as a 
 political party, and they were soon merged in the ranks of 
 their old opponents and new allies J But, while the party 
 perished, the principles on which it was founded survived, 
 and we have to-day a Democratic government managed on 
 Federalist principles. Jefferson governs by the rules and 
 maxims of Hamilton. The Hartford Convention, marking 
 as it does the extinction of one of the great original parties, 
 stands at the threshold of a new era, and gains in this way 
 a dramatic interest and significance. 
 
 I do not propose to enter into either a defence or a eulogy 
 of the last of the Federalists who gathered at Hartford in 
 1814. They require neither at my hands. I have sought 
 to trace their policy, unveil their motives, and reveal their 
 true objects. If I have done this, I am satisfied. An ex- 
 
526 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1804-15. 
 
 position of their history and all their papers, public and 
 private, are before the world ; and on these posterity and 
 future historians will pass judgment. But this I will say, 
 that I honor and respect those Federalists who, believing 
 as they did, shrank not from what they considered their 
 duty to their State, to their party, and to themselves. 
 
 The men of the Hartford Convention strove honestly to 
 do their duty as seemed best in their eyes, and they need 
 not fear the verdict of posterity. 
 
 With the incidents of an awful civil war still fresh in 
 our memories, we naturally turn from aught that savors 
 of the separatist spirit, and State rights have long been 
 esteemed words of evil omen. But let us not therefore 
 forget that State rights are the great safeguards of our liber 
 ties. Let us remember, when we judge the Hartford Con 
 vention, that resistance to oppression has been the peculiar 
 glory of the English race. Let us recall the history of 
 Massachusetts. Her stubborn spirit, though slow to anger, 
 has never failed in the hour of trial. Who would wish it 
 extinguished because it has not always been directed with 
 perfect wisdom, and who would wish to believe that it is 
 less vigorous to resist wrong now than at any period of her 
 history? But a few short years ago, our greatest poet 
 said, on the occasion of another war, which New England 
 believed to be wicked and unjustifiable: 
 
 " Ef I d my way, I bed ruther 
 
 We should go to work and part, 
 They take one way, we take t other : 
 
 Guess it wouldn t break my heart. 
 Man bed ought to put asunder 
 
 Them that God has noways jined ; 
 An I shouldn t gretly wonder 
 
 Ef there s thousands o* my mind." 
 
 The old spirit breathes in these lines. And it is well 
 that it should not die among us ; for, while it is our duty 
 to crush sectionalism in every form, it is no less our duty 
 to guard the great Anglo-Saxon principle of local self- 
 government. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 527 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 1812-1815. 
 Correspondence relating to the Hartford Convention. 
 
 THE letters included in this chapter are from hitherto 
 unpublished manuscripts, and are taken from the Picker 
 ing MSS. and from the correspondence of Governor 
 Strong. Some of them, notably the first, do not relate 
 directly either to the Hartford Convention or its objects ; 
 but, as illustrations of the opinions held during the war of 
 1812 by some of the most distinguished Federalists, they 
 have appeared to me of sufficient historical value to merit 
 publication. The most interesting letters are unquestion 
 ably those of Colonel Pickering and Mr. John Lowell. 
 From those written by the former, we get a clear idea of 
 the views entertained by the most extreme of the Federal 
 ist leaders. Colonel Pickering s theory in 1804, and subse 
 quently down to 1814, was to separate from the Union, and 
 then, by the injury thus inflicted upon the Southern States, 
 to force them to re-form the Union on terms dictated by 
 New England. The " Northern Confederacy " seems to 
 have been intended as the last resort, in case this plan of 
 coercion failed. Behind the dissolution of the Union, so 
 zealously urged by Colonel Pickering, therefore, was a much 
 more extended plan, to restore to New England and to the 
 principles of the Federalist party their ancient political 
 supremacy. In judging this plan, we must remember that 
 the almost indefinite extension to the westward was then but 
 little thought of. In the absence of railroads and telegraphs, 
 there were no apparent means of uniting firmly more than 
 
528 LITE AND LETTERS OF GEOUGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 a very limited number of States, while mere difficulty of 
 communication made an extended area seem an impossibility 
 for one government. Few men at the beginning of this 
 century looked beyond the Alleghanies, and the extension 
 made at the South-west was regarded by the Federalists as 
 in itself a total destruction of the old balance of power. 
 Such were the premises from which Colonel Pickering rea 
 soned, nor was the possible execution of his plan by any 
 means so chimerical in 1814 as it appears in 1877. One 
 British expedition, although repulsed, still threatened our 
 Northern frontier, while another had arrived at New Or 
 leans. That England would obtain the control of our Avest- 
 ern territory, as Lord Castlereagh at first demanded from our 
 commissioners at Ghent, seemed by no means improbable. 
 The war had drained the national resources, and the Union 
 appeared on the verge of dissolution. Disorganization had 
 indeed begun, and even the most Democratic States were 
 making independent movements of defence. In such a 
 condition of things, the withdrawal of New England would 
 have brought the whole fabric down in ruins ; and she could 
 then have either dictated her own terms in a new Union, or 
 could have formed a Northern Confederacy in which she 
 would have been supreme. Fortunately, Colonel Pickering 
 was not supported by most of the Federalist leaders. We 
 have seen by former letters the lukewarmness with which 
 his plan was received in 1804 ; and in 1814 he appears to 
 have found only two prominent men, Mr. Lowell and Mr. 
 Gouverneur Morris, who fully sympathized with him. The 
 other leaders were too prudent and too moderate to plunge 
 into desperate measures. Yet it is easy to see what a tre 
 mendous political revolution they might have wrought. 
 Colonel Pickering expressed perfect satisfaction with the 
 results of the Convention ; but we can reconcile this with 
 his previous letters only on the theory that he trusted to 
 events to force the moderate leaders up to his position, and 
 bided his time. He had certainly urged much more deci- 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 529 
 
 sive measures as the duty of the Convention than any that 
 were afterwards adopted at Hartford. It is also very strik 
 ing that both Colonel Pickering and Mr. Lowell, dissatisfied 
 as they were with the moderation of the party leaders in Mas 
 sachusetts, distinctly disclaim any wish for a separation for 
 its own sake. Could they have the Union governed as they 
 believed it ought to be, they had no wish for a separation ; 
 and, much as they felt themselves injured, they desired sep 
 aration only as a means of coercion to re-form the old Union 
 or to make a new one on better principles. Certainly, if we 
 may trust to their own letters, no one held more advanced 
 views than Mr. Lowell and Colonel Pickering, yet they ex 
 pressly say they do not regard a dissolution as good in itself. 
 This finally disposes of Mr. Adams s imputation that the 
 Massachusetts leaders sought disunion for its own sake, and 
 solely to gratify their own selfish and personal ambition. 
 
 The letters from Mr. Gore to Governor Strong, which 
 form the last of this series, are of interest in showing the 
 satisfaction given to the Federalists generally by the report 
 of the Hartford Convention, and that the opinions of that 
 body accurately reflected the sentiments of the majority of 
 the party. 
 
 MARSHALL TO PICKERING. 
 
 RICHMOND, Dec. 11, 1812. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Your letter transmitting the documents in rela 
 tion to the French decree of April, 1812, did not reach this place 
 till I had left it on an annual tour to the mountains, and were not 
 received till October last. I thank you very sincerely for this 
 flattering attention. My sentiments on the report l concur pre 
 cisely with yours. It contains a labored apology for France, but 
 none for ourselves. It furnishes no reason for our tame, unmur 
 muring acquiescence under the double insult of withholding this 
 paper from us, and declaring in our face that it had been put in 
 our possession. The report is silent on another subject of still 
 deeper interest. It leaves unnoticed the fact that the Berlin and 
 
 1 War Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 
 34 
 
530 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 Milan decrees were certainly not repealed by the insidious decree 
 of April, since it had never been communicated to the French 
 courts or cruisers, and since their cruisers had at a period subse 
 quent to the pretended date of that decree received orders to con 
 tinue to execute the offensive decrees on American vessels. The 
 report manifests no sensibility at the disgraceful circumstances, 
 which tend strongly to prove that this paper was fabricated to 
 satisfy the importunities of Mr. Barlow, and was antedated to suit 
 French purposes ; nor at the contempt manifested for the feelings 
 of Americans and their government by not deigning so to antedate 
 it as to save the credit of our administration, by giving some plausi 
 bility to their assertion that the repeal had taken place on the 1st 
 of November. But this is a subject with which I dare not trust 
 myself. 
 
 I look with anxious solicitude, with mingled hope and fear, to 
 the great events which are taking place in the north of Germany. 
 It appears probable that a great battle will be fought on or near 
 the Elbe, and never had the world more at stake than will proba 
 bly depend on that battle. Your opinions had led me to hope 
 that there was some prospect of a particular peace for ourselves. 
 My own judgment, could I trust it, would tell me that peace or war 
 will be determined by the events in Europe. 
 
 With much respect and esteem, I am, dear sir, your obedient 
 
 J. MARSHALL. 
 
 PICKERING TO SAMUEL PuTNAM. 1 
 
 FEB. 4, 1814. 
 
 If a step of this kind 2 should be adopted, one more should be 
 taken : send forth a solemn and earnest address to your constitu 
 ents, in plain but forcible language, which all can understand and 
 feel, stating concisely all the great evils wantonly brought on them 
 by the acts of the national government, and for no possible cause 
 but to co-operate with Europe s execrable tyrant, the ruler of France. 
 Recite your demands on Congress for relief ; but tell the people 
 that while, with a sincere and strong desire to maintain the union 
 of the States, you have made one more application to that body for 
 a redress of grievances, past experience too lamentably shows how 
 
 1 Senator in the Massachusetts Legislature. 
 
 2 The passage of certain resolutions addressed to Congress against the 
 continuance of the war, and in favor of the right of self-defence. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 531 
 
 small is the hope of relief ; that therefore they must prepare their 
 minds, and hold themselves in readiness to " right themselves," and 
 remove from them that accumulated load of oppression which is no 
 longer to be endured. 
 
 Declarations of this sort by Massachusetts, especially if con 
 curred in by the other New England States, would settle the busi 
 ness at once. But though made now by Massachusetts alone, you 
 surely may rely on the co-operation of New Hampshire, Rhode 
 Island, and Connecticut, and I doubt not of Vermont and New 
 York. With the executives and legislatures of most and the repre 
 sentatives of all of them, you can freely communicate. 
 
 Ought there not to be a proposal of a convention of delegates 
 from those six States? Recollect the times that are past, when 
 circular letters were first sent from the House of Representatives 
 of Massachusetts, the cradle of American liberty, whence ensued 
 our organized opposition to meditated oppression, the harbinger of 
 tyranny, but which, as compared with the actual tyranny of our 
 own government, would now appear insignificant. 
 
 In describing in your address to the people (for I presume you 
 will not rise without one) the oppressions above referred to, and 
 especially the calamities of this profligate war, will there be any 
 impropriety nay, does not the actual state of things loudly call 
 for it? after showing concisely how the war is unnecessary and 
 unjust, and how impossible by its continuance for any length of 
 time whatever to obtain a relinquishment on the part of Great 
 Britain of the right of impressing her own seamen from neutral 
 merchant ships, for which absolutely hopeless object alone the war 
 is yet maintained, after concisely showing all this, ought you 
 not to caution all the citizens of Massachusetts not to yield by per 
 sonal services or by money any voluntary aid in carrying on the 
 war, which, being criminal in its origin and continuance and ruin 
 ous in its consequences, all those who voluntarily contribute to its 
 support will be involved in its guilt ; and then solemnly denounce 
 all who shall render such voluntary assistance as enemies of their 
 country ? I have more to say, but must do it in another letter. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 T. PICKERING. 
 
532 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 PICKERING TO SAMUEL PUTNAM. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Feb. 7, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Not looking to Massachusetts at this time for any 
 other than preparatory measures of minds and means to vindicate 
 the rights of the commercial and navigating States, the intimations 
 in my letter of the 4th went not beyond those objects, and I pre 
 sume they are even within the limits of moderation. I shall 
 expect your answer informing me of the degree on the political 
 thermometer to which the temper of men entitled to take the lead 
 has risen : I mean as to practicable measures, which must depend 
 on the support of the people. The people, however, are always 
 best pleased with bold, decisive measures. And, if you wait for 
 additional oppression, the danger of tame submission will be in 
 creased. It is the gradual introduction of tyranny that puts in 
 jeopardy the liberties of a free people. 
 
 Not to trouble you with further observations, let me conclude 
 with the hope and confidence that the tones of Massachusetts will 
 be strong and imposing; and that she will prepare to execute 
 boldly and firmly the measures which a just and reasonable redress 
 of her wrongs authorize and urge her to take, and in which the 
 ardent wishes and blessings of all the good and patriotic citizens of 
 the United States will attend you. And let me once more assure 
 you that to New England, especially to Massachusetts, its head, 
 all such men anxiously look for redemption. Let then her glory 
 as well as her own and the general safety animate her in the honor 
 able attempt, which, well conducted, cannot fail of success. 
 
 I am, &c., T. PICKERING. 
 
 SAMUEL PUTNAM TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Feb. 11, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The Senate have just passed the enclosed resolu 
 tions upon the petition of the town of Falmouth for protection, 
 the last of which (the best measure that we have adopted this ses 
 sion) occasioned great excitement on the part of the minority. I 
 have received your two late favors. It is the settled determination 
 not to petition Congress again. 
 
 The select committee from each county have agreed to certain 
 resolutions expressive of the rights of Massachusetts and of the 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION COEEESPONDENCE. 533 
 
 oppressions of the general government, recommending the passing 
 of sundry laws : one, to protect the persons and property of our 
 citizens from illegal seizures, made without warrant, issued upon 
 complaint on oath ; another, inflicting suitable penalties upon all 
 who shall obstruct any persons going from port to port in the State, 
 after giving or offering to give bond to the collector not to go to 
 any foreign port, &c., this to be in force after the 10th of June 
 next, unless Congress shall before repeal the embargo, or so modify 
 it as that it shall cease to violate the rights of Massachusetts ; and a 
 resolve that the people shall instruct their representatives, at the 
 next session of the General Court, as to the expediency of appoint 
 ing delegates to meet the delegates who may be appointed by other 
 States in convention, for the purpose of securing their commercial 
 and other rights. These projects have been received with great 
 unanimity. 
 
 They may undergo some modification, but I apprehend will in 
 substance pass the Legislature. An address to the people will also 
 be made, but whether by the Legislature or by the Federalists is 
 not yet decided. 
 
 You will be surprised to learn that Mr. Dane, 1 of Beverly, of 
 his own accord lately told me that he had learned from long expe 
 rience that (to use his own words) "it will not do to trust the 
 Boston lead." I will give you a particular account when we meet, 
 which will prove that Dane is as good a prophet as historian. 
 In haste, I am affectionately yours, 
 
 SAMUEL PUTNAM. 
 
 SAMUEL PUTNAM TO PICKERING. 
 
 BOSTON, Feb. 22, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, The enclosed has passed the Legislature this day ; 
 and, notwithstanding it falls short of the wishes of a vast number 
 of our friends, there will (I trust) be no want of union and firm 
 ness in our future measures. 
 
 I remain affectionately yours, 
 
 SAMUEL PUTNAM. 
 
 1 Nathan Dane, the distinguished lawyer, reputed author of the Ordi 
 nance of 1787, founder of the Dane professorship in the Harvard Law School 
 at Cambridge, and one of the delegates to the Hartford Convention. 
 
534 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1812-15, 
 
 Resolves on the Petition of the Town of Falmouth. 
 
 1. Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor be and hereby is 
 authorized to furnish the town of Falmouth, in the county of Barn- 
 stable, or any other town which in his opinion may be in danger of 
 invasion, with such guns and ammunition as in his discretion may 
 be thought proper. 
 
 2. Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor be and hereby is 
 authorized to accept the services of any military corps, or of individ 
 uals as volunteers, and cause the same to be organized in such 
 mode as he may deem proper, to be held in readiness for the special 
 defence and safety of this Commonwealth. 
 
 CHANCELLOR KENT TO PICKERING. 
 
 ALBANY, April 26, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, My brother who arrived here yesterday delivered 
 me your speech on the loan bill, which you were so obliging as to 
 enclose to me. I had seen it before, and permit me to say that I 
 do and have long held the doctrines contained in your speech, and 
 which I think you have most clearly illustrated. I have differed 
 from most of my Federal friends here ; for I always was of opinion 
 that the orders in council of November, 1807, were, under the then 
 existing circumstances of Europe, justifiable on principles of public 
 law. They resulted from necessary self-defence, and as against 
 the extraordinary determination of France were a just weapon of 
 retaliation and resistance. The speeches of Mr. Percival and Mr. 
 Canning in Parliament, on this point, I always believed to be solid. 
 But peace be to their manes. You have more undeniably, than 
 any writer I have seen, expressed the baseness of the motive and 
 the hypocrisy of the manner of our first embargo, and the restric 
 tive laws that followed it. But, here also, peace be to its manes ; 
 and as the storm has gone over, and something like a serene sky 
 smiles again, I look forward to better times, and to the hope that 
 the profligate administration of the Jeffersonian dynasty is perma 
 nently checked. 
 
 Be assured, sir, that I feel the utmost respect for your public 
 and private character, and the best wishes for your happiness. 
 
 Sincerely yours, JAMES KENT. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 535 
 
 EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF PICKERING TO PUTNAM. 
 
 OCTOBER, 1814. 
 
 As abandoned by the general government, except for taxing 
 us, we must defend ourselves, so we ought to seize and hold fast 
 the revenues indispensable to maintain the force necessary for our 
 protection against the foreign enemy, and the still greater evil in 
 prospect, domestic tyranny. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM LETTER OF PICKERING TO JOHN LOWELL. 
 
 OCTOBER, 1814. 
 
 I hope the character of the report to our State Legislature, signed 
 H. G. Otis, will be maintained. A convention of the New Eng 
 land States two years ago (which I then confidently expected) 
 would have superseded the one now contemplated, and have saved 
 thousands of lives and millions of money, by putting at that time 
 an end to the war. But timidity in the garb of prudence defeated 
 that salutary proposal. Faithfully yours, T. P. 
 
 PICKERING TO GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Oct. 29, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, To-day I had the pleasure of receiving your letter 
 of the 17th. I was gratified to find my own sentiments corre 
 sponding with yours. " Union " is the talisman of the dominant 
 party ; and many Federalists, enchanted by the magic sound, are 
 alarmed at every appearance of opposition to the measures of the 
 faction, lest it should endanger the " Union." I have never enter 
 tained such fears. On the contrary, in adverting to the ruinous 
 system of our government for many years past, I have said : " Let 
 the ship run aground. The shock will throw the present pilots 
 overboard, and then competent navigators will get her once more 
 afloat, and conduct her safely into port." I have even gone so far 
 as to say that a separation of the Northern section of States would 
 be ultimately advantageous, because it would be temporary, and 
 because in the interval the just rights of the States would be 
 recovered and secured ; that the Southern States would earnestly 
 seek a reunion, when the rights of both would be defined and 
 established on a more equal and therefore more durable basis. 
 
536 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 At a late consultation among Federalists, the great question was 
 agitated, " What part shall we take when the system of taxation 
 shall be brought before us ? " In general (I do not know but 
 universally, as to those who spoke}, it seemed to be concluded that, 
 as the nature of the war was now changed from offensive to 
 defensive, we could not withhold our assent. At the same time, it 
 was admitted that the present rulers were incompetent to carry on 
 the war, and that the money raised by means of a system of heavy 
 taxation would, like the millions already obtained, be profusely 
 wasted. But, in assenting to the taxes, all agreed that it would be 
 proper to protest against the administration, and declare it incom 
 petent to maintain the war or to make peace ! I dissented from 
 this doctrine, and avowed my opinion that our assent to the system 
 of taxation should be given only on the condition that the admin 
 istration should be changed, so that Federalists should control the 
 public measures, and apply the public funds to support them. I 
 presume I shall not be left alone. I trust a number of Eastern 
 members, at least of my colleagues, will agree with me, unless on 
 better advice we should think it expedient to adopt the plan of our 
 other Federal brethren. This day Eppes l called up the resolu 
 tions of the Committee of Ways and Means ; and Mr. Oakley 2 
 (who is a man of talents) took the ground above mentioned, of 
 advocating the system of severe taxation, and protesting against 
 the competency of the men into whose hands the public revenues 
 would be thrown. The reproaches which on this plan are neces 
 sarily cast on the administration and its abettors in the two Houses 
 will render these more bitter, and urge them, from pride and resent 
 ment, to pursue their course with increased obstinacy. 
 
 As you suppose, some men " are on stilts as to British arrogance 
 and audacity, in proposing terms of peace to which we cannot listen 
 without disgrace." I confess they did not disturb me. For some 
 of them (on which our commissioners had no instructions) I was in 
 a degree prepared. In conversation with my friends at home, we 
 had concluded that Great Britain would exclude us from those very 
 fisheries, which she now says she will not again yield to us without 
 an equivalent, but not attempt to deny us the cod-fisheries in the 
 
 1 John Eppes, member of Congress from Virginia, and son-in-law of 
 Jefferson. 
 
 2 Thomas Jackson Oakley, member of Congress from New York, after 
 wards judge and chief justice of the Superior Court of New York. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION COKEESPONDENCE. 537 
 
 open sea, that is, on the Banks of Newfoundland. What equi 
 valent was contemplated by the British Government seemed to me 
 very obvious. They want a direct road from Halifax to Quebec. 
 This will cross the province of Maine, belonging to Massachusetts, 
 to which State those fisheries are almost exclusively interesting. 
 Massachusetts may exchange the north-east corner of Maine for 
 the privilege of participating in the British fisheries. 
 
 As to the lakes, I said more than a year ago that it would be a 
 most desirable thing if Great Britain and the United States could 
 agree to have neither armed vessels on the lakes nor any fortifica 
 tions on their borders, but that Great Britain could not so agree, 
 because in Canada she was weak, and we were strong and daily 
 increasing in strength, which would enable us to invade and overrun 
 her dominions there before she could prepare to defend them. 
 But this proposition of hers is not a sine qua non. In its present 
 form, I have an entire repugnance to it. She would doubtless 
 agree either to stipulate that neither power should keep any naval 
 force on the lakes, each fortifying on the land as it pleased, or 
 to say nothing about it, when both would be in the situation ex 
 isting prior to the war. 
 
 As to the Indian boundary, I soothed some of my friends by ask 
 ing them what Great Britain demanded, answering that she required 
 no cession of territory to herself (in this proposition), nor to the 
 Indians ; for the latter, being proprietors of the soil, Great Britain 
 demanded in their behalf that we should relinquish our right of 
 pre-emption, which was really all the right we could set up. I 
 added that, the British demand out of the question, good policy 
 should dictate to us the same measure, to prevent further en 
 croachments on the Indians (and consequently a renewal of hos 
 tilities), the dispersion of our citizens over vast and indefensible 
 regions, when we had yet so many millions of acres of good lands 
 without inhabitants. 
 
 To effect a peace, our rulers must be changed, and men less 
 proud and less haters of Great Britain be employed as negotiators. 
 Faithfully yours, T. PICKERING. 
 
 GOUVERNEUR MORRIS TO PlCKERING. 
 
 MORRISANIA, Nov. 1, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, I have received yours of the 21st of October, and 
 now see that we are to be taxed beyond our means, and subjected 
 
538 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 to military conscription. These measures are devised and pursued 
 by the gentle spirits who for more than twenty years have lavished 
 on Britain the bitterest vulgarity of Billingsgate, because she im 
 pressed her seamen fbr self-defence, and have shed a torrent of 
 crocodile tears over the poor of that country, crushed, as they pre 
 tend, by oppressive taxes to gratify royal ambition. Nevertheless, 
 this waste of men and money, neither of which can be squeezed out 
 of our extenuated States, is proposed for the conquest of Canada. 
 And thus after swearing and forswearing backward and forward 
 till their fondest adherents were grown giddy, and after publishing 
 their willingness to abandon every former pretext, the administra 
 tion boldly avow that, although we are so simple as to call this a 
 war of defence, it is still on their part a war of conquest. 
 
 What will the Federal gentlemen now say, who, to excuse their 
 support of this administration, assumed that their unprovoked, un 
 wise, unjust war of aggression had, all at once, become defensive. 
 I admire and applaud the proud consistency of our adversaries, 
 who say to these over-quondam friends : " We disdain your prof 
 fered support. You shall not participate in power, neither shall 
 your quibble serve your turn. We wage no defensive war, but 
 mean to conquer Canada. Vote for that or vote against us, we 
 care not which." 
 
 And now, my good friend, be, I pray you, so kind as to tell the 
 pliant patriots who become converts to Mr. Monroe s scheme, 
 frankly communicated to enemies as to friends, of marching into 
 Canada by way of inducing the British forces on our coast to meet 
 us there, that, the St. Lawrence being no longer navigable, this 
 sublime diversion cannot take effect before the month of May. 
 But perhaps the Secretary, as facetious as he is sagacious, meant 
 this diversion merely as a pleasantry to divert himself and his col 
 leagues at the eagerness with which Federal gudgeons will, in the 
 lack of bait, swallow a bare hook. 
 
 Doubts are, I find, entertained whether Massachusetts is in earn 
 est, and whether she will be supported by the New England family. 
 But surely these outrageous measures must rouse their patriot 
 sentiment to cast off the load of oppression. 
 
 Yours truly, Gouv. MORRIS. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION COBRESPONDENCE. 539 
 
 
 PICKERING TO JOHN LOWELL. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Nov. 7, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, You may recollect that, in my letter to Governor 
 Sullivan (April 16, 1808), I said with earnestness "that it was 
 essential to the public safety that the blind confidence in our rulers 
 should cease, that the State Legislatures should know the facts and 
 reasons on which important general laws were founded, arid espe 
 cially that those States whose farms were on the ocean, and whose 
 harvests were gathered in every sea, should immediately and seri 
 ously consider how to preserve them ; " adding that " nothing but 
 the sense of the commercial States, clearly and practically expressed, 
 would save them from ruin." The House of Representatives of 
 Massachusetts was at that time Federal (and was not the Senate 
 also Federal ? ) ; and, with the spirit which ought to have been 
 exerted, the evils of Jefferson s unlimited embargo might have 
 been shortened, and probably a free commerce (instead of the mis 
 erable and mischievous non-intercourse and other restrictions) 
 restored, especially if Connecticut had been invited to co-operate. 
 Obsta principiis was the motto of the movers and leaders of our 
 Revolution, before long before the obstinacy and pride of the 
 British government rendered that Revolution unavoidable. The 
 praises of the sages and heroes of that Revolution are in the mouths 
 of all our political coxcombs ; yet every man who now exhibits one 
 spark of their spirit is denounced as the friend of Britain and the 
 enemy of his own country, while other Federalists, alike sensible of 
 the wanton oppression and tyranny of our rulers, have shrunk from 
 every proposition that contained one particle of boldness. 
 
 When the war had been declared, the House of Representatives 
 of Massachusetts, again Federal, addressed their constituents to 
 rouse them to that degree of opposition to our rulers which their 
 interests and safety required within the pale of the Constitution, 
 recommending meetings of towns and county conventions. There 
 was a convention in Essex, in July, 1812. We thought it neces 
 sary to have a State Convention, and chose delegates to attend it. 
 This measure was defeated at " The Headquarters of Good Prin 
 ciples." I did not yet despair of our country ; for, on conversing 
 afterwards with Chief Justice Parsons, he told me the House would 
 .take up the business at the ensuing winter session. This arrived, 
 and nothing was done. In 1813, the House of Representatives of 
 
540 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 Massachusetts addressed a long remonstrance to Congress, with 
 just spirit enough in it to make it the jest of the majority. Massa 
 chusetts had now become an object of contempt. The majority 
 men, and their partisans abroad, concluded that Massachusetts had 
 neither talents nor fortitude to plan and to execute any efficient 
 measure to control or to check their destroying projects. Hence I 
 almost dreaded to hear of any movements in Massachusetts, lest, 
 like all former ones, it should end in smoke, and sink the State still 
 deeper in disgrace. My hopes are now revived, and this day 
 strengthened, on seeing the names of the Connecticut delegates. I 
 know them all, save Sherman, who is the son or nephew of the 
 famous Roger Sherman, and, I am told, a clever man. For a good 
 while past, when intelligent and spirited Federalists of the Middle 
 States (particularly of Maryland and Virginia) have said to me, 
 " We look to New England, and especially to Massachusetts, for 
 salvation," I have been ready to hang my head, I have been 
 mortified in the extreme, because I could say nothing to encourage 
 their hopes and confidence. 
 
 I am inclined to think there was a time, in the early period of 
 the war, when the sentiments of a New England Convention 
 (which might have been strengthened by a delegation from New 
 York, by the authority of their Federal House of Representatives), 
 boldly and firmly expressed, might have put an end to it, while 
 Britain was solicitous to make peace, without the offer of any hard 
 or unpleasant terms. 
 
 I hope in God that the delegates of Massachusetts (a decided 
 majority, at least) may now prove their readiness to act as well as 
 to speak. I consider the destiny of New England, and, in the 
 result, of the United States, to be placed in the hands of the pro 
 posed Convention. While any symptoms of faint-heartedness will 
 ruin all, the wise sentiments and efficient plans the Convention will 
 be able to express and devise, and the dignified firmness with which 
 they shall be enforced, forbidding every suspicion that they will not 
 be verified in act, will insure the wished-for success. The forlorn 
 condition of the general government, and the destitute and helpless 
 situation of the States south of the Potomac, will render your vic 
 tory easy and complete. That victory will be used not to destroy, 
 but to recover and confirm the Union of the States on more equal, 
 solid, and durable bases. 
 
 The enclosed extracts of letters from Virginia will enable you to 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 541 
 
 estimate the real power of that State, which, by a few of her bad 
 citizens, has led us all to the brink of ruin. The senator in the 
 State Legislature of Virginia is an old Revolutionary officer, with 
 whom I am acquainted, and a decided Federalist. The other letter- 
 writer I do not know personally ; a brother of his, a Federalist, I 
 know very well. They are of one of the wealthy families of Vir 
 ginia. 
 
 The House of Representatives have wasted a number of days out 
 the bill for enabling the President to accept the service of corps of 
 volunteers ; and to-day one of its Kentucky friends, observing that 
 in its present altered form it was inconsistent and would be ineffi 
 cient, moved to have it lie on the table, adopted. While under dis 
 cussion to-day, a Georgia war man (a warm blade, named Barnett *), 
 who seemed to place no great confidence in the volunteer bill, said 
 the people had pronounced the war right, and they must be com 
 pelled to come out and face it. " We [said the member] have fed 
 this nation too long with soft corn, sir : we have been afraid of our 
 popularity, sir." Very truly and respectfully yours, 
 
 TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 PICKERING TO LOWELL. 
 
 (Confidential.) 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Nov. 7, 1814. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I observe that Mr. Cabot is at the head of the 
 list of the Massachusetts delegates for the Convention at Hartford, 
 and I am glad to see him there. His information is extensive, 
 his experience and observation invaluable. I do not know who has 
 more political sagacity, a sounder judgment, or more dignity of 
 character with unspotted integrity, and perhaps no man s advice 
 would go further to save a nation that was in his view solvable. 
 But does he not despair of the Commonwealth ? He considers the 
 evil the radical evil to be inherent in the government itself, 
 in democracy, and therefore incurable. Will he, then, think 
 any plan which the wisdom of the convention may devise worth 
 an effort of his mind ? Yes, it will be answered, or he would not 
 have consented to take a seat in it. But was he not pressed into 
 this situation, reluctantly consenting to take it ? Much against his 
 will, and contrary to his own better judgment, he was placed at the 
 
 i William Barnett, member from Georgia, 1812-1815. 
 
542 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 head of the committee which, in 1806, subscribed and sent to Wash 
 ington the remonstrance drawn by Lloyd against the British doc 
 trine concerning neutral trade. He signed it (he afterwards told 
 me) officially, as one of the merchants (or town s) committee. 
 
 He once said to me (perhaps twelve or eighteen months ago), 
 " Why can t you and I let the world ruin itself its own way ? " 
 These were his words : they sunk deep into my mind, and I confess 
 to you that they never occur to my thoughts unaccompanied with 
 regret. In this wicked world, it is the duty of every good man, 
 though he cannot restore it to innocence, to strive to prevent its 
 growing worse. This has been your course. As Paul among the 
 Christian apostles, you among the political teachers may say, " I 
 have labored more abundantly than they all." 
 
 Most sincerely, adieu. T. PICKERING. 
 
 PICKERING TO LOWELL. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Nov. 28, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Although I have lately troubled you with several 
 letters, I trust you will excuse one more. 
 
 As my thoughts cannot fail of being much occupied with the 
 deplorable condition of our country, the cause of its calamities, the 
 means of deliverance, and the practicable guard against their 
 return, subjects of the greatest importance, but of the greatest 
 difficulty, and which necessarily turn my eyes toward the Hartford 
 Convention, as the best hope of our best men, so I consider it the 
 duty of reflecting minds to contribute whatever occurs that may 
 with any probability merit the attention of that body. While, 
 therefore, I offer my mite, I am highly gratified that this great 
 subject now employs your pen. 
 
 Like you, I have uniformly disclaimed every idea of a separa 
 tion of the States, while the liberty and safety of the parts can be 
 maintained in a union of the whole. At the same time, I have 
 considered that there may be evils more to be deprecated than a 
 separation. 1 
 
 1 Colonel Pickering elsewhere says (p. 535) that he even went so far as to 
 speak of separation as ultimately advantageous. Here he refers to it as an 
 evil. Colonel Pickering was not a man to deceive himself with phrases, and 
 then write them to John Lowell. Such statements go far to disprove Mr. 
 Adams s charge that the Federalists desired a dissolution of the Union, as in 
 itself a good and advantageous thing. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 543 
 
 An intelligent member from Kentucky lately remarked to me 
 that a connection of New England with the States on the Missis 
 sippi and its waters would be more advantageous to the former 
 than the Southern Atlantic States, because the latter will have con 
 siderable navigation of their own, while their products will be less 
 abundant than those of the Western States, which must for ever 
 remain destitute of ships and seamen. He mentioned their flour, 
 tobacco, flax, hemp, and cotton, already vast in amount, and rapidly 
 increasing. For some time past, I had contemplated alike this sub 
 ject in this point of view, although formerly I, with many others, 
 felt disposed to let the Western States go off, leaving the " good old 
 thirteen States" (as John Randolph called them) to themselves, and, 
 so left, it is natural to suppose they would be more firmly united ; 
 for the Southern States, conscious of their separate impotence, 
 would cling to the strength of the North. 
 
 After deciding on the means of defence * and relief from present 
 calamities, I presume the Convention will consider how we may 
 best guard against their future recurrence, by amending the Con 
 stitution. It may be necessary, 
 
 1. To abolish negro representation. 
 
 2. To prohibit the durable interruption of commerce under any 
 pretence, nor at all without the concurrence of nine of the Atlantic 
 States. 
 
 3. To render the President ineligible a second time. 
 
 4. To prohibit the election of a second President from the same 
 State in immediate succession to the first. 
 
 5. To restore the original mode of electing the President and 
 Vice-President ; to prevent the election of a fool for the latter. 
 
 6. To make some new provision for appointing to offices, civil 
 and military. Ever since Jefferson came to the chair of state, the 
 public offices have been instruments of bribery, more extensive and 
 more influential than the treasury of England in the hands of her 
 ministers. This system of Jefferson and Madison has more than 
 all other causes corrupted the morals of the people. 
 
 7. To render naturalization more difficult, and absolutely to 
 exclude from office and from the national legislature all who are 
 not natives. 
 
 1 All these propositions of Colonel Pickering were considered by the Con 
 vention, except Nos. 6, 10, and 11, and the last clause in No. 5, " to prevent 
 the election of a fool as Vice-President." 
 
544 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 8. To limit the number of representatives, which, whatever shall 
 be the future population of these States, shall never be exceeded. 
 
 9. To require the vote of two-thirds or three-fourths of each 
 House of Congress to a declaration of war. 
 
 10. As a further check to the waging of wars of ambition, of 
 pride, of hatred, or of any other evil passion, to prohibit the borrow 
 ing of money by means of any discount or bonus, or at any rate 
 of interest higher than the average rate of interest in the three 
 States which, in the year next preceding the declaration, shall have 
 contributed the largest sums to the regular public revenues. If 
 the country at any time is not in a condition to engage in a war 
 without usurious loans, it will amount to a proof that war ought not 
 to be made. If war be commenced against the United States, and 
 for causes so flagrantly unjust as that the government cannot 
 prevent it, then, as the attack will rouse the whole nation, neither 
 men nor money can be withheld in its defence. 
 
 11. What can be done with the country west of the Mississippi? 
 If, as it becomes peopled, new States are to be founded, the old 
 Atlantic States will become insignificant. To avoid this evil, shall 
 the States west of the Mississippi form a separate confederacy ? 
 
 12. It has more than once occurred to me that the first power 
 granted to Congress, in the present Constitution, has not been 
 accurately understood. 
 
 " The Congress shall have power 
 
 " To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." I ask, 
 for what purposes, and answer in the words of the Constitution : 
 " to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and gen 
 eral welfare of the United States." The words which follow prove 
 this to be the correct construction ; " but all duties, imposts, and 
 excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." As I 
 have often heard this passage quoted, the laying and collecting 
 taxes, &c., has been taken for one power, and " to pay the debts, 
 and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the 
 United States," as a separate and distinct power, and that of pro 
 viding for the general welfare as an independent and universal 
 power, where not expressly limited in other parts of the Constitu 
 tion as a power to be exercised in all things affecting the general 
 welfare, without any reference to the expenditure of the " taxes, 
 duties, imposts, and excises." 
 
 Such are the ideas which have now occurred to me; and, as 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 545 
 
 possibly you may think some of them proper to be embraced in 
 your inquiry, "What the Convention can do, and ought to do," 
 &c., I have taken the liberty thus to communicate them for your 
 consideration. 
 
 A friend of mine from Albany has just put into my hands a 
 letter, which, he says, is written by a worthy and judicious man of 
 that city. It is dated the 23d instant. The writer says : " We 
 have given up all hope of any better times from any thing in the 
 power or disposition of the general government, and have turned 
 our eyes to the East, from whence we hope to see the sun of lib 
 erty arise once more, to cheer our hearts and bless our country. 
 Democracy is sinking here daily, even in their own estimation. 
 And, should the Eastern States move on unitedly in the GREAT 
 WORK, I believe I may say, without the spirit of prophecy, this 
 State will wheel in almost one solid column in support of their 
 measures." 
 
 " The pressure in this place for cash is greater than has ever 
 been known. STATE BANK sick cannot take any food. J. T. 
 [John Tayler, the lieutenant-governor, a zealous Madisonian] is 
 as pliable as any man, fears his loan to government is gone. 
 Spencer 1 is much alarmed, and even B. Knower speaks evil of the 
 administration ; and some of our Demos, admit the principle, when 
 alone, that the Eastern States have the right of proceeding to 
 protect themselves. " 
 
 Multitudes in Vermont are making money by the war. And, 
 considering the small preponderance of Federalists in that State, 
 I have thought it prudent in them to suspend a co-operation until 
 the proceedings of the Convention should be known, when Ver 
 mont can without difficulty form a junction. 
 
 I am, &c., T. PICKERING. 
 
 LOWELL TO PICKERING. 
 
 (Confidential) 
 
 BOSTON, Dec. 3, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, You wrote me on the 7th of November a confi 
 dential letter on the subject of the Convention at Hartford, to which 
 I have failed to reply, owing to my engagements. My feelings on 
 that subject, I perceive, are very similar to yours ; how far our 
 
 1 Ambrose Spencer, the distinguished lawyer and judge, and afterwards 
 chief justice of the New York Supreme Court. 
 
 35 
 
 % 
 
546 LIFE AND LETTEKS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 projects would agree I cannot say. I gave great offence during 
 the sitting of our Legislature by openly opposing the calling a 
 convention. I was attacked with great asperity by some of my 
 best friends, and among the rest by my friend B. Pickman, Jr., 1 at 
 the governor s, who threw in a hint or two also against me. 
 
 But when I explained my reasons, which were that I was con 
 vinced that the Convention would not go far enough, and that the 
 first measure ought to be to recommend to the States to pass laws 
 to prevent our resources in men and money from being withdrawn, 
 they all started, and said I was going farther than anybody. 
 
 I was always convinced, and am now, that the Convention will do 
 little ; that they will be ridiculed by one party, and loudly censured 
 by the other. I admit that it is a very responsible situation and 
 one of great difficulty ; but they ought not to have accepted it, 
 unless they felt, each one for himself, that he was ready for great 
 and decided measures, although he might not have made up his 
 opinion as to what they would be. 
 
 I say no man should have accepted such an office, if he expected 
 it was to end in mere argument or remonstrance. 
 
 We have had enough of these from Mr. Gore s admirable report, 
 in 1809, to Mr. Otis s excellent preamble to the resolutions ap 
 pointing this Convention. "Words are exhausted. We have said 
 more than was said by all the public bodies in the United States 
 prior to the Declaration of Independence. 
 
 I was opposed sincerely and most zealously to the Convention, 
 because I found no one man among its advocates prepared to act. 
 When you ask any of them what the Convention will do, you will 
 find it is expected they will talk : talk of amendments, talk of 
 militia, talk of defence, talk of being paid out of the national taxes 
 what we advance, but nothing more. 2 I was not anxious for any 
 decisive measures at present. I deprecate as one of the greatest of 
 evils a separation of the States. 8 I thought, arid think now, that 
 the people en masse will act in six or twelve months more. I think 
 the remedy then will be more effectual, and will produce more 
 lasting good effects. 
 
 But I was wholly opposed to a premature and feeble effort. 
 
 1 Benjamin Pickman, of Salem, a member of the Hartford Convention. 
 
 2 Compare pp. 616-520. 
 8 Compare pp. 529, 542. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 547 
 
 Nothing sinks the character of a people, or diminishes the force and 
 influence of a party, so much as suppressed efforts, vain and futile 
 exertions. 
 
 For measures of wisdom and prudence, to be considered and 
 adopted in common times of tranquillity, perhaps the choice could 
 not have fallen on more suitable persons than those selected from 
 our State. 
 
 Whatever they propose will be received with great respect by 
 the people ; and the boldest measures would be considered prudent, 
 if suggested by them. 
 
 But they are not calculated for bold measures. Mr. Cabot is 
 undoubtedly the wisest man in our State, or among the very wisest. 
 He has the best stored mind of any man I ever saw, except Hamil 
 ton. He is a very practical man, well acquainted with every thing 
 which concerns the best interests of a nation ; but Mr. Cabot has 
 been always a desponding man as to our public affairs, and their 
 downward course has confirmed his opinions. He hardly thinks the 
 temporary preservation of the State worth the effort, and he is most 
 reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the duty of a delegate. 
 He has no confidence in the possibility of awakening the people. 
 He will not, therefore, be in favor of any measures which will dis 
 turb our sleep. So at least I fear, for I cannot find out from him 
 what his opinions are. 
 
 Mr. Otis is naturally timid, and frequently wavering, to-day 
 bold, and to-morrow like a hare trembling at every breeze. It 
 would seem by his language that he is prepared for the very bold 
 est measures, but he receives anonymous letters every day or two 
 threatening him with bodily harm. It seems the other party sus 
 pect his firmness. He is sincere in wishing thorough measures, 
 but a thousand fears restrain him. 
 
 Bigelow 1 is really bold on the present question, has a just con 
 fidence in the power of Massachusetts, sneers as he ought to do 
 (and as I am sure I do) at all the threats of vengeance of the other 
 States ; and. if he was well supported, I have no doubt that meas 
 ures of dignity and real relief would be adopted. 
 
 Prescott 2 is a firm man, but extremely prudent, and so modest 
 
 1 Timothy Bigelow, Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representa 
 tives. 
 
 2 William Prescott, son of Colonel Prescott, of Bunker Hill celebrity, 
 and father of the historian, W. H. Prescott. He was a distinguished lawyer, 
 and judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Suffolk. 
 
548 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 that he will too readily yield his own opinions to the counsels of 
 others whom he respects. I think he will give his aid to measures 
 calculated to procure solid redress. 
 
 Mr. Dane l you know. He is a man of great firmness, approach 
 ing to obstinacy, singular, impracticable, and of course it must be 
 uncertain what course he will take. Honestly, however, inclined. 
 
 Mr. Wilde, 2 of Kennebec, is a very able man, but one of very 
 great caution and prudence. He lives among a people naturally 
 bad and violent, and I should fear that his counsels may be influ 
 enced by that circumstance. 
 
 These are the men who will have the greatest influence in our 
 delegation. 
 
 It is to be regretted that we had not chosen two or three such 
 persons as Daniel Sargent, William Sullivan, and Colonel Thorn- 
 dike. I do not know that we have among the delegates a single 
 bold and ardent man. I know it will be said that such men are 
 not the fittest for counsel. That is perhaps true in common times ; 
 but in times of great trouble they are often the most proper, and, 
 indeed, the only ones fit to direct and manage affairs. 
 
 I should fear that the Connecticut delegation, though extremely 
 respectable, was much of the same character. 
 
 If it is thought expedient that nothing decisive should be done, 
 then it is to be regretted that so respectable a convention was 
 called, because it tends to degrade and disgrace the members and 
 the people who sent them. 
 
 But, if effectual measures were in contemplation, it is in my 
 judgment to be regretted that some few more active and resolute 
 men were not elected. 
 
 There does not seem to be any difference in opinion as to the 
 extremely hazardous situation in which we are placed, nor as to 
 the incapacity and injustice of our rulers, nor as to their having 
 deserted us, and in effect abdicated the government, nor does there 
 seem to be any hope of redress in a usual course. It is admitted, 
 also, that pecuniary ruin is inevitable, and that there is a certainty 
 of national disgrace, and some danger of attempts against our civil 
 liberties. Yet people seem to have a dread of any effectual meas 
 ures for relief. 
 
 1 Nathan Dane. See note above, p. 533. 
 
 2 Samuel Sumner Wilde. He was for thirty-five years a judge of the 
 Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and one of the greatest ornaments of that 
 bench. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION COKRESPONDENCE. 549 
 
 They tell you how divided we are, and how strong the party of 
 government in other States. They pretend to fear a civil war, if 
 we assert our rights. 
 
 My reply is, the state to which you are advancing in consequence 
 of the measures of government will inevitably produce all the 
 evils you dread of civil commotion and separation, besides the 
 others of absolute pecuniary ruin and national disgrace ; and, as to 
 measures of relief, the people are ten times more likely to join you, 
 if the measures you propose are practical, and bring them instant 
 and perfect relief, than if you adopt circuitous political schemes to 
 procure a distant and precarious one. 
 
 Hence a proposal to relieve them from taxes which go to sup 
 port distant States, and to carry on a wicked and useless invasion, 
 will be received with delight by men of all parties ; and a truce or 
 separate peace would be the most popular measure which could be 
 devised. 
 
 If you have, then, settled in your consciences that the government 
 cannot have a right to tax you, or force you to defend yourselves, 
 when they have wickedly, purposely left you defenceless, what 
 should prevent you from saving yourselves from destruction ? 
 
 It is answered, the wrath of the Southern States, and the danger 
 of your own minority. 
 
 As to the first, it is too ludicrous to require an answer. Under 
 the best circumstances, it would be a pretty arduous undertaking 
 for all the Southern States to attempt the conquest of New Eng 
 land, but, reduced as they now are to indigence, it would be more 
 than Quixotic. 
 
 As to our own minority, there is nothing which will ever unite 
 them to the majority so readily as laws to prevent the collection of 
 the proposed United States taxes, and the levy of troops, and the 
 declaration of neutrality. 
 
 What a satire it is that the moment the British take possession 
 of any part of our country, and relieve it from the yoke of its own 
 government, its inhabitants are happy and grow rich ! Its lands 
 rise in value, every species of property is enhanced in price, and 
 the people deprecate the prospect of being relieved by their own 
 government. Yet such is the fact, in the two lower counties of 
 this State. 
 
 Let no man fear the discontents of our own people. They will 
 hail such events as blessings. 
 
550 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 But the permanent advantages of such measures will be greater 
 than their immediate effects. 
 
 It is admitted by all persons that we must have some radical 
 amendment of the Constitution as to slave representation, laws 
 regulating trade, declaring war, &c. Can this ever be effected 
 by CONVENTIONS, by General Conventions ? No : we shall be 
 outvoted. But if you once take a stand, and say, " We go no 
 longer on with you, unless you agree to these stipulations," you 
 will SUCCEED. You must. 
 
 I would have it a treaty, not a constitution. The latter is mere 
 paper, violated at pleasure by interested or ambitious men. But, 
 when a treaty is broken, you know your remedy. 
 
 I would have the Northern States demand of the Southern States 
 certain stipulations as parts of the compact, which should be duly 
 signed by commissioners and ratified by the States respectively. 
 
 These, sir, are my loose ideas on this subject ; but I have little, 
 I may say no, hope that any thing will be done except, 
 
 1. An address to the people of the United States, as a general 
 expose of our grievances ; 
 
 2. Proposals for amending the Constitution by general conven 
 tion ; 
 
 3. That Congress should be invited to permit us to pay our own 
 expenses of defence out of the national tax. 
 
 This I believe is the project. I judge it only from the coldness 
 with which my ideas are received, and some hints occasionally 
 dropped. 
 
 Yours respectfully and sincerely, J. LOWELL. 
 
 MORRIS TO PICKERING. 
 
 DECEMBER 22, 1814. 
 
 I care nothing now about your actings and doings. Your 
 decree of conscriptions and your levy of contributions are alike 
 indifferent to one whose eyes are fixed on a Star in the East, 
 which he believes to be the dayspring of freedom and glory. The 
 traitors and madmen assembled at Hartford will, I believe, if not 
 too tame and timid, be hailed hereafter as the patriots and sages of 
 their day and generation. May the blessing of God be upon them, 
 to inspire their counsels and prosper their resolutions. 
 
 Believe me always and truly yours, Gouv. MORRIS. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 551 
 
 PICKERING TO HILLHOUSE. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Dec. 16, 1814. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I am now sitting alone in our old chamber in 
 the " Six Buildings," from which we attacked the embargo, while 
 you are in council with the wise men of the East. I do not con 
 sider the New England Convention as consulting for those States 
 alone, but for the Federalists generally throughout the United 
 States. In other words, I consider the interests of the great body 
 (certainly the most valuable portion) of the people of the United 
 States as resting on the result of your proceedings. I am sure 
 there is no lack of wisdom : it would not be an easy matter to 
 assemble an equal number of other citizens, where equal wisdom 
 could be found. But a full knowledge of the evils demanding 
 remedies, and a forcible representation of them, will make no im 
 pression on the hardened sinners upon whose heads those evils must 
 be laid. I deprecate every thing which shall simply be put on paper. 
 We have too long contented ourselves with memorials and remon 
 strances : they procure for us nought but contempt. And contempt 
 from wretches in power, who are themselves so contemptible, is 
 sufficiently provoking. When I look round me, and see vice and 
 presumptuous ignorance triumphing over wisdom and virtue, 
 triumphing in cases involving the character and great interests of 
 the country, and putting our liberties in jeopardy, it is impossible 
 to repress my indignant feelings. If the Convention leave us in 
 this miserable situation, we may despair of the Commonwealth. 
 Strong measures alone will procure relief. Their strength and 
 boldness will render them efficient. From sound Federalists in 
 this portion of the Union, I have for years heard only this declara 
 tion, " We look to New England for salvation." 
 
 I wished, my good friend, for an earlier interposition of New 
 England to stay the hands of destroyers. Obsta principiis was 
 the governing maxim, when we resisted incipient oppression by the 
 mother country, an oppression rather in prospect than in action. 
 But for the last several years we have been submitting to one act 
 of tyranny after another, until the people, familiarized to oppres 
 sion, have their spirits depressed and humbled to a degree which, 
 if longer borne, will render the cause of our country hopeless. It 
 is necessary for the Convention to take those firm and decided 
 steps which will rouse the people from the spell which, through an 
 
552 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 unfounded fear of breaking the Union, the boldness and impu 
 dence of political mountebanks have imposed upon them. You have 
 nothing to apprehend from the most imbecile of all governments, 
 and certainly nothing from individual States. Those which 
 eagerly approved the war are exhausted. Virginia cannot protect 
 herself. Her militia have been called forth the past summer and 
 autumn, and are thoroughly disgusted. Their rulers seem to have 
 paid less attention to them than to their slaves. I have read a 
 letter, dated at Richmond the 2d of November, from a senator in 
 their State Legislature to his son-in-law in Congress, in which he 
 says, " We have an army of militia, chiefly from twelve to ten 
 miles below, who are generally very sickly, dying, and suffering 
 for almost every military and camp accommodation." A very 
 v orthy and intelligent Virginian member of Congress, who has had 
 a son (a lieutenant) with the militia at Norfolk, informs me that 
 of the militia of that State, which has been called to the defence of 
 Norfolk, between three and four thousand have perished. A letter 
 from my friend, the Adjutant- General l of Massachusetts, recently 
 received, informs me that of the three thousand six hundred militia 
 called out by Governor Strong for the protection of Boston, and who 
 were in service about two months, three only died, and one of the 
 three from an injury received at home. I have read another letter, 
 dated October 3 1 . to the same member of Congress, from a respect 
 able Virginia gentleman, who had then just been in the lower 
 parts of the northern neck in Virginia, which had been visited by 
 the British. He says : 
 
 " You, believe me, can have no idea of the losses, sufferings, 
 and dreadful distresses with which the inhabitants of it are encir 
 cled. The idea of the war s continuing fills them with complete 
 horror. For they say, and truly, that the lakes, frontiers, fish 
 eries, &c., are phantoms to them, when brought into competition 
 with their exposed and ruined situation. In short, a more misera 
 ble, ill-fated, poor set of men never lived. I am confident, if some 
 prompt and efficient measures are not adopted by Congress (for 
 it seems the Virginia Legislature will not do any thing) for their 
 relief, they will take care of themselves by entering into the best 
 terms they can with the enemy." 
 
 " I admire greatly, indeed, the resolute conduct of Massachusetts 
 and her sister States of the East. They have the firmness and 
 the virtue, I am persuaded, to wield their counsels in such a manner 
 
 1 General John Brooks. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 553 
 
 as to compel the obdurate President and his execrable followers to 
 abandon their foolish measures of conquest, and to withdraw our 
 armies into the Union for the protection of the country." 
 
 The writer subjoined to his letter what follows : " Your old 
 acquaintance, Colonel John Taylor, 1 of Caroline, is out of all kind 
 of patience with Madison and his party. He declares that the 
 government is positively mad, and that the British will another 
 summer get this whole lower country : this he said yesterday." 
 
 It seems to be the opinion (certainly the fearful apprehension) 
 of Western men that New Orleans will be taken by the British. 
 If well conducted, the expedition can hardly fail. If it succeeds, 
 it will be with a view to hold it ; and hold it they will, against 
 the whole force of the Western States, such is the nature of the 
 ground on the Isle of Orleans. For about thirty miles above 
 the city, the strip of land is but a mile wide, between the Missis 
 sippi and impassable swamps. This fact has been stated to me by 
 Mr. Brown, one of the senators from Louisiana. I asked him the 
 question, whether, if once in possession of Orleans City, the 
 British could be expelled ? He answered, " It would be extremely 
 difficult to dislodge them." I am confident it will be impracticable. 
 It will be easy to erect an impassable barrier from the river to the 
 swamp. And their armed vessels and boats on the river would 
 render the post unassailable by water. On the other side of the 
 city, the creek (bayou St. John) connected with Lake Pontchar- 
 train approaches within four or five miles. But this also, accord 
 ing to my information, will give no room for an enemy to land, 
 being so easily defended. And it is for this reason concluded that 
 the British will make their attempt by ascending the Mississippi. 
 
 From the moment the British possess New Orleans, the Union 
 is severed. They will not intermeddle with the governments of 
 the Western States : these will be told to manage their own affairs 
 in their own way. New Orleans will be the market for all their 
 productions, which will be transported in British ships to every 
 country in the world where there is a demand for them. Their 
 tobacco will find a market in Europe. Their cotton will all be 
 wanted in the British manufactories, and their hemp for their 
 ships. Their flour, when they shall have improved their mills, and 
 their beef and pork when they shall have learned better to cure and 
 pack them, will go wherever men want food. What now constitutes 
 
 1 See above, p. 442. 
 
554 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15 
 
 the State of Louisiana will be changed to a province, with a legiti 
 mate annexation of West Florida by cession from Spain. The 
 bulk of the inhabitants, bred under monarchies, will not dislike the 
 change ; while the whole population, French, Spaniards, and 
 Americans, finding themselves in the possession of self-government 
 to every useful purpose, under a provincial Legislature, with a 
 British governor (who, from the immense importance of the 
 charge, will be one of their ablest men), will be quite as well 
 satisfied (I am sure they will have reason to be so) as with the 
 creature first imposed on them by Jefferson, and since continued 
 by the votes of the busy electioneering portion of the people, who 
 are not seldom their own worst enemies. 
 
 The Western people will have no choice ; and, after a little 
 experience, they will not be displeased with their new situation. 
 Their products will probably find more extensive markets than 
 they would as members of our Union. When peace takes place, 
 should the cottons of Carolina and Georgia interfere with theirs in 
 the British markets, a small extra duty may be imposed on the 
 former. The incalculable advantages Great Britain will derive 
 from the acquisition of Orleans will induce her to cherish the 
 good-will of the Western people. This, indeed, will require no 
 more than a reasonable attention to their interests, and this again 
 will best promote those of Great Britain. 
 
 Thus will Great Britain be virtually possessed of immensely 
 rich provinces, increasing in population more rapidly than ever, 
 without the trouble and expense of governing and defending 
 them. 
 
 This severance will of course annihilate the war debt. The 
 Western States will also take to themselves all the public lands ; 
 while they will excuse themselves from paying any part of the 
 debt of our Revolution, for which those lands were pledged. Their 
 annual sales will yield a revenue equal to the maintenance of all 
 their State governments. 
 
 Such are my speculations, arising out of the present state of 
 things. And, should the British succeed at New Orleans, I shall 
 consider the views I have here exhibited as pro facto realized. In 
 one or two years, if the whole were left to the choice of the 
 Western people, prompted by the most powerful interests, they 
 would adopt them, while at the instant they must yield to neces 
 sity. And, as in their whole intercourse with those who at present 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 555 
 
 are enemies, they will hear and read the English language only, 
 they will soon forget that they had not always been one nation. 
 
 One more remark : should the severance above mentioned take 
 place, from that moment the necessity of union among the Atlantic 
 States will strike every man who thinks, as forcibly as during our 
 Revolution ; and the feebleness of the States south of the Potomac 
 will urge them to cling to those of the North, as the Connecticut 
 vine to the tree which supports it. The terms of a new compact 
 will be adapted to this new state of things. 
 
 I am, &c., T. PICKERING. 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Dec. 31, 1814. 
 
 DEAR SIR, It is a good while since I troubled you with a 
 letter, because your own reflections run before mine, even when I 
 fall into the same track. I now write to communicate some short 
 extracts from a letter of the 22d instant from Gouverneur Morris, in 
 answer to one from me of the loth. These extracts exhibit the 
 high expectations formed by him of the result of the deliberations 
 of the Hartford Convention. He is not singular in his expecta 
 tions, accompanied with some apprehensions that the result will 
 not rise to the existing emergency and impending prospects. 
 
 I stated to Mr. Morris that John Francis Mercer 1 (who, I 
 believe, was in Congress in Philadelphia while you were a member 
 of the Senate) said, in a letter which I had read, that the clause in 
 the Constitution giving power to Congress " to borrow money," ran 
 originally, " To borrow money and emit bills of credit ; " and was 
 struck out on the motion of Mr. Morris, after a full discussion, 
 the question being carried " almost by acclamation." Mr. Morris 
 does not recollect it, but says a proposition to issue paper money 
 must have met with all the opposition he could make, because 
 leading to a violation of contracts. I had remarked in my letter 
 that treasury notes were paper money, or bills of credit. He says : 
 It is too late to examine the nature of treasury notes. Their 
 race is run. Your new bank is a new folly. Your taxes will not 
 sustain your system. Paper money will issue, and plunge you 
 still deeper in distress. All the schemes hitherto proposed are 
 
 1 Mr. Mercer was member of Congress from Maryland, in 1792-1794, 
 and afterwards governor of the State. 
 
556 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 inefficient. Do not ask me why, for I will not discuss a subject 
 which is no longer of importance. When the North and the East 
 cast off the old form, if the new one they put on be good, they 
 shall not suffer on the score of finance." 
 
 " I care nothing now about your actings and doings. Your de 
 cree of conscriptions and your levy of contributions are alike in 
 different to one whose eyes are fixed on a Star in the East, which 
 he believes to be the dayspring of freedom and glory. The 
 traitors and madmen assembled at Hartford will, I believe, if not 
 too tame and timid, be hailed hereafter as the patriots and sages 
 of their day and generation. May the blessing of God be upon 
 them, to inspire their counsels and prosper their resolutions." 
 
 In adverting to the discussions at Ghent, Mr. Morris says, 
 " I thought the enemy s first overture should have been seized." 
 So I thought, and so wrote to Governor Strong and Mr. Lowell, 
 as soon as I had read the first despatches, and was happy to find 
 a perfect agreement in our opinions. It is now too late. The uti 
 possidetis (with some modifications) will be the basis of the final 
 negotiations. If the British take New Orleans, they will hold it, 
 and thus command the productions and commerce of a country 
 worth ten Canadas. It is possible they may then relinquish the 
 country east of Penobscot River. On the subject of the British 
 capturing New Orleans and its consequences, I wrote on the 16th 
 of the month to my friend Hillhouse. I do not know that he has 
 received it. 
 
 The majority in the House were determined to pass the bank- 
 bill (fifty millions capital) yesterday, and were reluctantly induced 
 to adjourn after the death of the Virginia senator, Brent, had 
 been omciallly announced. The Virginia representatives them 
 selves (with one or two exceptions) voted against adjourning, 
 the pretence, with the majority, because the official message was 
 delivered by the Senate s Secretary, verbally; and the majority 
 had again called up the bill, when a letter from the senatorial 
 committee of arrangement for the funeral, brought up and handed 
 to the Speaker by a member of the House (who suspected foul 
 management, and therefore went for it), being read, they could re 
 sist no longer, and adjourned. On Monday a decision will doubt 
 less take place. In the mean time, an attempt will be made for a 
 compromise, of a bank with twenty-five millions capital, on proper 
 banking principles ; but, as this could not supply the government 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION COKKESPONDENCE. 557 
 
 with thirty millions of dollars on loan, the compromise will proba 
 bly not take place. 
 
 I am, dear sir, faithfully yours, T. PICKERING. 
 
 PICKERING TO STRONG. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Jan. 9, 1815. 
 
 DEAR SIR, . . . Another subject of the first magnitude 
 claims attention, the British expedition to New Orleans. I ex 
 pect they will take it ; and, if they take it, they will hold it. It 
 will constitute the main article of the rule of pacification, uti 
 possidetis. A severance of the Union will inevitably follow. The 
 train of consequences, as I have a good while since stated them to 
 my friends in conversation, I will take the liberty of presenting to 
 your view, in the course of one or two days. 
 
 I have the honor to be very respectfully, dear sir, 
 
 Your obedient servant, TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 PICKERING TO STRONG. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Jan. 10, 1815. 
 
 DEAR SIR, In a short letter of yesterday, I mentioned my in 
 tention of presenting to you the view I had taken of the British 
 expedition to New Orleans, and its consequences. 
 
 Although rumor announced New Orleans as the object of the 
 British armaments preparing in England and Ireland, I had not 
 turned my thoughts that way, until I read Admiral Cochrane s 
 letter of the 17th of September to the Lords Commissioners of the 
 Admiralty, giving an account of the expedition against Baltimore. 
 He says, " the approaching equinoctial new moon rendering it un 
 safe to proceed immediately out of the Chesapeake with the 
 combined expedition, to act upon the plans which had been con 
 certed previous to the departure of the " Iphigenia," &c., he and 
 General Ross resolved to employ the interval " in making a de 
 monstration upon the city of Baltimore, which might be converted 
 into a real attack," &c. No object of magnitude for a great and 
 " combined expedition out of the Chesapeake " occurring, except 
 New Orleans, I concluded that to be its destination. Instantly, the 
 powerful inducements to undertake it, on the part of Great Britain, 
 and the consequences to the United States, rushed into my mind. 
 
558 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 The collected force, compared with the means of defence, gave a 
 moral certainty of success. The place captured will be held. So 
 costly an armament is not designed to gain a pledge for a peace. 
 Permanent dominion is in view. Last summer I entertained the 
 opinion that Great Britain, without indulging a spirit of resentment 
 and revenge, would look forward to her lasting interests (which I 
 considered as involved in a renewal and continuance of a free and 
 extensive commercial intercourse with the United States), and make 
 peace ; only maintaining, in their full extent, her maritime rights. 
 But now these rights are not contested by the United States. The 
 return of peace will of course restore commerce, the exchange of 
 commodities commensurate with our wants ; and, by the conquest 
 of New Orleans, Great Britain, without losing her commerce with 
 the Atlantic States, will engross the commerce of the Western 
 States and Territories, increasing and multiplying so long as vacant 
 lands remain. One objection occurred to this immense project : 
 that, as the European nations were endeavoring to adjust a balance 
 of power, the acquisition of the Western World by Great Britain 
 might give umbrage to her neighbors, especially to the maritime 
 powers. But a moment s reflection obviated this objection. Great 
 Britain will be wise enough to limit her actual, formal dominion 
 to the State of Louisiana, which she will convert into a province, 
 holding the Isle of Orleans and the portion of the State westward 
 of the Mississippi by right of conquest, and the portion eastward 
 of the river (West Florida) by cession from Spain. The States 
 and Territories above the State of Louisiana she will leave to 
 govern themselves. She will have no interest to intermeddle in 
 their internal affairs : she wants nothing of them but their produc 
 tions ; and these she can command, without making one effort or 
 even issuing one order, for that purpose. She need only tell them : 
 " New Orleans is your market. I want your tobacco for the Euro 
 pean consumption, your hemp for my ships, your cotton for my 
 manufactories ; your flour, beef, and pork for my own colonies 
 (where they would be admitted in vessels of the United States, 
 only in cases of scarcity), and for all other colonies and countries 
 where men want food. You are now independent in your govern 
 ments : continue so. I have no interest or desire to interfere. 
 With British manufactures and all foreign articles of merchandise, 
 I will supply you at the first hand, and unburthened with the enor 
 mous duties and imposts laid upon them in the Atlantic States : 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 5o9 
 
 what imposts shall be charged will be comparatively small. Speak 
 ing the same language, you will find the same facility of intercourse 
 at New Orleans, as if the same had continued a part of the United 
 States. Besides, the Americans now there, and all others from 
 your countries or from the Atlantic States who choose to remain or 
 to resort there, will enjoy equal advantages with British subjects." 
 Under such circumstances, why should the Western people hesi 
 tate a moment ? Their interests would compel their acquiescence, 
 and soon, very soon, their inclinations would concur with their 
 interests. Perhaps they would form a new confederacy. But 
 confederated or severally independent, being in possession of the 
 vacant public lands, they can appropriate them to their own uses 
 exclusively. If they admit the Atlantic States to any participa 
 tion, it will be well ; but our right to it would not be enforced. 
 Those lands annually sold will defray all the expenses of their 
 several governments, and exempt the people from taxes. They 
 may also throw off the public debt, and thus rid themselves of the 
 oppressive taxes, which its payment would require. With all 
 these advantages, migration from the Atlantic States will continue, 
 and with large increase. With this severance of the Union, I 
 expect, indeed, the war debt will be annihilated. This will not 
 grieve me. The debt of the Revolution I view in a different light : 
 it was the price of the independence of the thirteen Atlantic States. 
 These will remain united, or reunite and provide for that debt. I 
 also conclude that, in the event of the separation of the Western 
 States, those on the Atlantic will be more closely united than ever, 
 and by a new compact, to obviate the evils which experience has 
 shown may be introduced under that now existing. 
 
 I am, dear sir, most respectfully yours, 
 
 TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 GoRE 1 TO STRONG. 
 
 WASHINGTON CITY Jan. 14, 1815. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The bill for State troops 2 has passed the 
 House with an amendment to the only section interesting to us, 
 said not to be important. 
 
 1 At this time Senator from Massachusetts. 
 
 2 This was the measure which the Hartford Convention demanded as 
 necessary to the defence of the New England States. 
 
560 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 The result of the Hartford Convention is here, and affords satis 
 faction to most, if not to all, to some, because they see not the 
 point nor consequence of the recommendation as relates to taxes. 
 
 The gentlemen had a difficult task, which, according to my poor 
 judgment, they have executed with wisdom and discretion. 
 
 With great respect, I remain, my dear sir, 
 
 Your faithful friend and obedient servant, C. GORE. 
 
 GORE TO STRONG. 
 
 JAN. 17, 1816. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I received your favor from North Hampton, 
 and, in common with all good men, rejoice that you allow me to 
 indulge the hope you will continue where you are during the war ; 
 indeed, I consider your term of enlistment to be for and during 
 the war. If peace ever arrive in our day, I shall consider some of 
 our evils removed, and all will be changed. 
 
 I wish I could perceive the smallest chance of doing good here. 
 We can only look for a change of miseries. What will follow 
 these, now endured, it is not easy to conjecture. 
 
 I remain, dear sir, your faithful friend, C. GORE. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF DR. LOGAN TO PICKERING. 
 
 JAN. 19,1815. 
 
 I have with pleasure perused the proceedings of the Hartford 
 Convention. The prudence and magnanimity of that body does 
 the greatest credit to its patriotic spirit, and may afford a rallying 
 point to our distracted country. It appears nothing of wisdom can 
 be expected from our public councils at Washington. 
 
 GORE TO STRONG. 
 
 GEORGETOWN, Jan. 22, 1815. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The Congress have passed the bank bill, as 
 it last came from the House of Representatives. There is some 
 question whether the President will sign the act. This doubt 
 arises from its not containing a clause authorizing the issue of 
 notes, which the corporation shall be under no obligation to meet 
 with specie. 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 561 
 
 Mr. Dallas has proposed to raise five millions of dollars more 
 for the current year. Three millions of this to be on income. 
 This is a direct tax, and, if assessed, must be apportioned on the 
 States, according to the Constitution. He proposes a tax of one 
 dollar per barrel on flour, in the hands of the miller. He proposes 
 a further stamp duty: viz., on all bonds, mortgages, conveyances of 
 every kind, policies of insurance, bottomry bonds, &c. ; on wills 
 and testaments, inventories of the estates of deceased persons, dis 
 tributions and successions, that is to say, legacies and devises, 
 property by descent, &c. Mortified with the failure of his scheme 
 of a bank, he may have done this with the view of pressing Con 
 gress to emit bills of credit, or to pass some bill supplemental to 
 the act instituting a bank, authorizing that institution to issue 
 their notes, and loan to government a large sum in bills, which the 
 corporation shall not be obliged to redeem with specie. 
 
 These appear to me the spasms of a dying government. From 
 New Orleans we have nothing further than what the newspapers 
 afford. Our last accounts from that place are only to the morning 
 of the 24th of December. 
 
 The bill authorizing the raising of State troops by the States, 
 and at the expense of the United States, according to the plan 
 sent you some time since, has passed both Houses. Thus one part 
 of the recommendation of the Hartford Convention seems to be 
 adopted. The other, that to authorize the States to receive the 
 taxes, will probably be more difficult to be attained. The accession 
 to this seems not to accord with Mr. Monroe s intimation in your 
 letter, or rather in his letter to you. Indeed, if they have fears of 
 the State governments, one can hardly account for this govern 
 ment s authorizing the States to raise and keep in pay at the ex 
 pense of the United States troops which may be used for purposes 
 hostile to or not conformable with the views of the paymaster. 
 
 I remain, my dear sir, very truly your faithful friend and obe 
 dient servant, C. GORE. 
 
 PICKERING TO LOWELL. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Jan. 23, 1815. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I have had the pleasure to receive your letter 
 of the 16th inst. I regret that I did not acknowledge the receipt of 
 your very interesting confidential letter of December 3d, and thus 
 have prevented the anxiety which the omission has occasioned. It 
 
 36 
 
562 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1812-15. 
 
 seemed that I might have communicated some parts of it to partic 
 ular friends ; but it has so happened that I remain the sole deposi 
 tary of its contents, and now no motive occurs to me for divulging 
 any of your sentiments. 
 
 I believe that some of my very cautious friends and acquaintances 
 think me too ardent in whatever pursuits of a public nature my 
 attention becomes engaged, and hence it may have been supposed 
 that I was not quite satisfied with the doings of the Convention. 
 The fact, however, is otherwise ; and, as you have been pleased to 
 ask my opinion, I will express it with my habitual frankness. 
 
 I think the report of the Convention bears the high character 
 of wisdom, firmness, and dignity. They have explicitly pronounced 
 sentence of condemnation upon a miserable administration, and, 
 stamped as it is with the authority of a body of men so eminently 
 distinguished, that judgment cannot fail of making a just impres 
 sion where it is needed. They have made a declaration of prin 
 ciples the landmarks by which Legislatures and the people may 
 direct their course. And they have, in terms that none can mis 
 take, and which our rulers, whatever for a time they may effect, 
 will not venture to disregard, manifested a determination to apply 
 those principles in corresponding measures, when the future con 
 duct or neglects of the government shall require their application. 
 
 In their proposed amendments of the Constitution, I have the 
 satisfaction to find that all, save that which regards the admission 
 of new States into the Union, were among those which I took the 
 liberty to intimate to you in my letter of the 28th of November. 
 One which I had deemed of vital importance is omitted, that re 
 specting the appointment of public officers. I was aware of its 
 intrinsic difficulties ; while the observation of fourteen years had 
 convinced me that it was the great instrument of corruption, and 
 more than all other means had confirmed and extended the power 
 arid influence of the executive. Probably the Convention thought 
 that the limitation of the President s power by a single election, 
 both as to the person and the State from which he should be taken, 
 would furnish an adequate check. Or it might be among the num 
 ber of further amendments alluded to as expedient, but under the 
 circumstances mentioned less urgent than the others, and there 
 fore not explicitly stated. 
 
 With regard to the admission of new States into the Union, 
 events with which the present moment is teeming may take away 
 
1812-15.] THE CONVENTION CORRESPONDENCE. 563 
 
 the subject itself. If the British succeed in their expedition against 
 New Orleans, and, if they have tolerable leaders, I see no reason 
 to doubt of their success, I shall consider the Union as severed. 
 This consequence I deem inevitable. I do not expect to see a 
 single representative in the next Congress from the Western States. 
 Those States, with the Territories, will be under the necessity of 
 being at peace with the British ; and they will make a virtue of 
 necessity, and this necessity they will soon find to have materially 
 promoted their interests. All the public lands west of the Alle- 
 ghany Mountains will go with them. Migrations thither from all 
 the Eastern States have been constant during the war, and its con 
 tinuance will increase them. But, without entering farther on this 
 subject, permit me to refer you to a late letter from me to Gov 
 ernor Strong, in which I have sketched the great and, in my view, 
 certain consequences of the capture of Orleans. Indeed, I wish 
 you to read it. Yours, &c., &c., TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF HILLHOUSE TO PICKERING. 
 
 FEB. 7, 1815. 
 
 I was much gratified to find that the doings of the Convention 
 met general approbation, and more especially of a friend whose 
 judgment and opinion I hold in such high estimation. 
 
 GORE TO STRONG. 
 
 WASHINGTON CITY, Feb. 18, 1815. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, The newspapers will inform you, before this 
 reaches Boston, that the treaty of peace was ratified yesterday. 
 
 If there be any papers which show the number of inhabitants 
 on Moose Island, which I cannot but consider is gone from the 
 United States and from Massachusetts, I will thank you, if you will 
 direct them to be sent to me. 
 
 The treaty must be deemed disgraceful to the government who 
 made the war and the peace, and will be so adjudged by all, after 
 the first effusions of joy at relief have subsided. 
 
 The bill herewith enclosed has passed the Senate unanimously, 
 and I hope may be found to afford us some compensation for our 
 expenses. 
 
 With great respect and affectionate regard, 
 
 I remain, my dear sir, your faithful servant, C. GORE. 
 
564 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1815-23. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 1815-1823. 
 
 Last Years of Mr. Cabot s Life. Withdrawal from Politics. Occupations. 
 Illness and Death. Personal Appearance. Private Character. 
 Political Opinions. Influence in the Community. Respect in which he 
 was held. Religious Belief. Conclusion. 
 
 THE Hartford Convention was the occasion of Mr. 
 Cabot s last appearance in any public capacity. His life 
 of leisure and retirement, which, despite his efforts, had 
 been occasionally interrupted by the disturbing politics of 
 the day up to 1815, flowed on after that time in unbroken 
 quiet. Even his correspondence ceased. Almost all his old 
 friends had now like himself retired from public life, many 
 of his former associates were dead, and nothing remained to 
 spur his indolence in regard to letter-writing to even an occa 
 sional burst of activity. One letter only remains of a date 
 subsequent to that of the Hartford Convention, addressed 
 to his friend Colonel Pickering, before the latter s term as 
 a member of Congress expired. Colonel Pickering wrote 
 to ask Mr. Cabot s opinion on a question of political econ 
 omy, and the reply seems incidentally to embody the result 
 of the latter s experience and thought on the great sub 
 jects of free trade and protection. The question is still an 
 open one ; and Mr. Cabot s views have, therefore, not only 
 an historical, but to some extent a practical, value. Hamil- 
 tonian as he had always been in his political feelings, it will 
 be seen that Mr. Cabot was, nevertheless, convinced of the 
 soundness of free-trade doctrines, and assented to but a 
 very moderate use of protection, and then only in excep 
 tional cases. 
 
1815-23.] OPINIONS ON THE TARIFF. 565 
 
 PICKERING TO CABOT. 
 
 CITY OF WASHINGTON, Dec. 14, 1815. 
 
 DEAR SIR, Some petitions have already been presented to 
 the House of Representatives, and more are expected, the object 
 of which is to obtain a repeal of the laws imposing duties on some 
 of our manufactures, and the enactment of other laws to impose 
 or increase duties on certain manufactures imported from foreign 
 countries, or absolutely to prohibit their introduction into the 
 United States ; of the latter, particularly to interdict the importa 
 tion of all cotton goods (nankeens excepted), the production of 
 countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, and to augment the 
 duty on those of coarse texture imported from other parts of 
 the world. 
 
 This whole subject will come under consideration in the Commit 
 tee of Ways and Means ; and the chairman of that committee (Mr. 
 Lowndes, of South Carolina) has spoken to me, desiring to obtain 
 information particularly as to the probable effects of such prohibi 
 tion in relation to cotton goods on the navigation of the United 
 States. He had understood that, besides silver, various articles 
 entering into our commerce with the East Indies were carried 
 thither by our own merchant vessels, and exchanged for their cot 
 tons. Now, if the prohibition of these cottons would materially 
 affect our shipping and seamen, this would constitute a serious 
 objection to a compliance with the manufacturer s petitions. For 
 it seems to be desired that our navigation should by all proper 
 means be encouraged and increased. 
 
 I told Mr. Lowndes 1 that for myself I possessed very little 
 knowledge on the subject, but I could obtain information from the 
 best sources. He wished me to do it. And this is the object of 
 the present letter. The subject is important, and especially inter 
 esting to Massachusetts. I must therefore pray you to commit to 
 writing your views of it, and in such form as I may be allowed 
 to communicate the same to Mr. Lowndes. The information from 
 you will be peculiarly valuable ; for, besides having a perfect 
 knowledge of the subject, you are not personally engaged in com 
 merce, and are therefore exempt from that insensible bias which 
 not infrequently warps the opinions of upright men, who have a 
 material interest at stake. 
 
 1 Member of Congress from South Carolina. 
 
566 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1815-23. 
 
 It would seem manifestly proper to abolish the duties on our 
 own manufactures generally, those on distilled spirits and snuff 
 and perhaps on refined sugar excepted. But the natural conse 
 quence of prohibiting the importation of cottons (nankeens ex 
 cepted) from the East Indies, and those of coarse texture from 
 Europe, would be the deterioration of our own cotton fabrics, while 
 their prices might be double those of East India and coarse texture 
 cottons. Besides, many of the cotton factories were established 
 (particularly in Rhode Island) prior to the imposition of the double 
 duties, and yet they flourished. How, then, are they to be ruined, 
 unless the prohibitions and additional duties prayed for be enacted ? 
 I recollect to have heard (I do not know how truly stated) that 
 one of the principals in the Providence cotton factories had several 
 years ago risen, from small beginnings, to a property of upwards 
 of a hundred thousand pounds. 
 
 If the duties actually imposed on foreign cotton goods, or on any 
 other imported manufactures, will not enable our own manufactories 
 to continue their operations with a reasonable profit, ought addi 
 tional duties to be laid to burden the whole community for their 
 support? Where in any of our manufactories imported articles 
 now charged with duties are necessary to their operations, such 
 duties might be abolished, in cases when the abolition was requi 
 site to afford the manufacturer a reasonable profit. In all other 
 cases, if they cannot support themselves, it would prove that they 
 have been prematurely and imprudently undertaken. 
 
 Have the goodness to favor me with an early answer. 
 
 Very sincerely and respectfully yours, T. PICKERING. 
 
 CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 DEC. 20, 1815. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I should feel unhappy, if I did not believe you 
 will forgive me when I reply to your letters of the 14th and loth, 
 that I cannot execute the task you prescribed. If indeed I attempted 
 it, I could do little more than elucidate the leading ideas you have 
 already suggested. It is admitted that a government may wisely 
 assist the maintenance of some branches of industry indispensable 
 to national defence ; and it is conceivable that the public interest 
 might dictate a grant of public aid in the introduction of a manu 
 facture of peculiar difficulty, where its establishment would certainly 
 be of lasting benefit to the community, but where the undertaking 
 
1815-23.] OPINIONS ON THE TAKIFF. 567 
 
 might be too perilous for private enterprise. It is not to be ex 
 pected, however, that our people would long acquiesce in any system 
 which should take money from their pockets to sustain a particular 
 class, unless the service of these was palpably essential to some 
 general interest of primary importance. It becomes every day 
 better understood that manufactures which require permanent aid 
 for their support are not consistent with good economy. They 
 must retard the progress of wealth and diminish the proportion of 
 comfort to the laborer. To sell dear and buy cheap is obviously for 
 our interest : the widest market and freest competition secure these 
 in the best manner. 
 
 Although the manufacturers of cotton goods ask for a prohibi 
 tion of similar articles from India, and a high duty on those from 
 Europe, yet I should think they would be well satisfied with a high 
 duty on all imported, especially as they might rely on the continu 
 ance of duties which would be profitable to the treasury. On the 
 other hand, a prohibition would disaffect ship-owners as well as 
 consumers. Our trade beyond the GREAT CAPES is very great, 
 and is daily increasing. About one hundred vessels (beside the 
 whalemen) are supposed to have gone from the United States, 
 and others are preparing. In twenty-six vessels from Salem, one 
 million three hundred thousand dollars in specie have been ex 
 ported, averaging fifty thousand dollars to a vessel. In the same 
 ratio, one hundred vessels would have carried five millions in silver 
 from the United States since the peace. It is well known that in 
 this trade we export but little value beside silver, and therefore the 
 return cargo alone must yield the profit. A few of the vessels to 
 Calcutta have carried miscellaneous cargoes from hence, and others 
 take wines from Madeira and Teneriffe, while some take their dol 
 lars at Lisbon and Cadiz. But why should not dollars be as free 
 for exportation as any imported articles ? If no other currency 
 than specie or its representative, which is the same thing in effect, 
 is admitted in our country, there will be always enough for this 
 purpose remain here. The necessity of retaining it for domestic 
 uses will retain enough for those uses, and will regulate its impor 
 tation and exportation as it now does coffee and sugar. The coin 
 of each country is dependent for its value on the fact that the met 
 als of which it is composed are the money of the world. In other 
 words, the money of each place has its value supported by its 
 uniform price as merchandise (bullion) in all places. 
 
568 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1815-23. 
 
 You will be surprised perhaps that the India traders and those 
 round Cape Horn should not average more than fifty thousand 
 dollars ; but you will recollect that the North-west ships carry no 
 silver, and ten or fifteen of these are included in the estimate of 
 one hundred. The Calcutta and Canton ships are the only ones 
 that carry out large amounts of silver : some of these carry two or 
 three hundred thousand dollars, but the other Indiamen have sel 
 dom more than fifty thousand. The pepper ships at Sumatra find 
 thirty, forty, or fifty thousand dollars amply sufficient to load them. 
 There are many in this trade, some of which having sailed from 
 hence last spring are at this moment vending their pepper in the 
 Mediterranean, where we have sometimes procured dollars again 
 for a succeeding voyage to India, or brought them home. Thus 
 you see how circuitously our commerce winds about, supplying 
 every want and taking away every surplus our eagle-eyed mer 
 chants can discover on the globe. I pray that Congress may leave 
 it as free as possible. I have now filled two pages to testify anew 
 the sincere respect and regard of 
 
 Your unfeigned friend, G. C. 
 
 Mr. Cabot s occupations during the last years of his life 
 were of the same nature as those which had engaged him 
 ever since his retirement from the Senate of the United 
 States. As president of the Boston Marine Insurance Com 
 pany, he had enough business to take him every day to the 
 resorts of merchants, among whom he had many friends, 
 and whose pursuits had once been his own. This occupied 
 his morning. The rest of the day was devoted to reading 
 and study and to intercourse with his friends. His house 
 was rarely without visitors in the evening, for he was a man 
 whose society was much sought and highly esteemed. His 
 last years were not clouded by any domestic grief. His 
 only daughter Elizabeth still remained at home ; his wife 
 was spared to him ; and his son Henry, now married, lived 
 near him. His son s marriage brought him grandchildren, 
 to the eldest of whom, a little girl, he was most fondly 
 attached. In this happy way the years glided by. They 
 yielded to Mr. Cabot every thing that he most valued : 
 
1815-23 | ILLNESS AND DEATH. 569 
 
 sufficient occupation, the quiet of his library, opportunity 
 for reflection and thought, the constant presence of those 
 dearest to him, the society of friends, and the honor and 
 respect of the community in which he dwelt. 
 
 In 1821, Mr. Cabot was first attacked by the malady 
 which afterwards proved fatal. His disease was the stone, 
 from which the suffering was at times extreme ; but he 
 bore with perfect fortitude and without a murmur all the 
 acute physical anguish to which he was subjected. His 
 illness lasted for nearly two years ; and on April 18, 1823, 
 he died, meeting death with the same calmness and com 
 posure that he had exhibited in all the trials of life. 
 
 The letters which form the larger part of this volume 
 have given, I trust, a clear idea both of Mr. Cabot s mental 
 powers and of his cast of mind and thought; while the 
 friendships which he formed and retained, the public offices 
 he was called upon to fill, and the respect with which he 
 was regarded by the community in which he lived, are the 
 best test of the estimation of his abilities and character 
 held by his contemporaries. Yet I am unwilling to close 
 this final chapter without an attempt at least to give from 
 the scanty materials at my command some better picture of 
 Mr. Cabot than political letters alone can furnish. 
 
 For personal appearance, I am compelled to rely on 
 verbal description ; since Mr. Cabot after he reached matu 
 rity could never be persuaded to sit for his portrait. He 
 had an almost morbid aversion to any thing that seemed to 
 partake of vanity or publicity ; and he seems to have thought 
 that in his own case, though not in that of his friends, a 
 portrait was open to both these objections. In person, Mr. 
 Cabot was tall, measuring more than six feet, and was large 
 and powerfully built. He was considered handsome, and 
 his contemporaries speak of his expression as one of great 
 dignity and repose. He had a low, musical voice, but one 
 of great power and very attractive, it is said, to those who 
 listened. His manners were gentle and courteous to one 
 
570 LIFE AND LETTEES OF GEORGE CABOT. [1815-23 
 
 and all. I am indebted to Miss Quincy, the oldest daugh 
 ter of the late President Quincy, one of Mr. Cabot s most 
 valued friends, for a description of his personal appearance 
 in the last years of his life. Miss Quincy s family occupied 
 a pew next to Mr. Cabot s, and she saw him therefore every 
 Sunday for many years. She has told me that he made a 
 great impression on her mind at this time ; and she describes 
 him as a tall and very handsome man, though at that time 
 of course well advanced in years. He was still, however, 
 perfectly erect and noticeable in appearance. He wore his 
 hair without powder, but drawn back and tied in a queue 
 in the fashion of his younger days. He dressed generally 
 in black, and never abandoned the even then bygone fashion 
 of knee-breeches and silk stockings. Mr. Goodrich in his 
 "Recollections" has given a description of Mr. Cabot as 
 he appeared at the time of the Hartford Convention. 1 He 
 says : 
 
 " The most imposing man among them [the members of the 
 Hartford Convention] was George Cabot, the president. He was 
 over six feet in height, broad-shouldered, and of a manly step. 
 His hair was white, for he was past sixty, his eye blue, his 
 complexion slightly florid. He seemed to me like Washington, 
 as if the great man, as painted by Stuart, had walked out of the 
 canvas, and lived and breathed among us. He was, in fact, Wash- 
 ingtonian in his whole air and bearing, as was proper for one who 
 was Washington s friend, and who had drunk deep at the same 
 fountain that of the Revolution of the spirit of truth, honor, 
 and patriotism. In aspect and appearance, he was strikingly dig 
 nified; and such was the effect of his presence that in a crowded 
 room, and amid other men of mark, when you once became con 
 scious he was there, you could hardly forget it. You seemed 
 always to see him, as the traveller in Switzerland sees Mont 
 Blanc towering above other mountains around him wherever he 
 may be. And yet he was easy and gracious in his manners, his 
 countenance wearing a calm but radiant cheerfulness, especially 
 
 1 "Recollections of a Lifetime," by S. G. Goodrich (Peter Parley), II. 
 36. Mr. Goodrich s description relieves me from any fear that I have been 
 partial in my own. See also the description from Sullivan s " Familiar Let 
 ters," given in the Appendix, No. III. 
 
1815-23.1 CONVERSATIONAL POWERS. 571 
 
 when he spoke. He was celebrated for his conversational powers ; 
 and I often remarked that, when he began to converse, all eyes and 
 ears turned toward him, as if eager to catch the music of his voice 
 and the light of his mind." 
 
 Mr. Cabot s conversational powers, of which Mr. Good 
 rich speaks in so laudatory a fashion, must have been not 
 a little remarkable ; for they appear to have deeply im 
 pressed, even from his earliest years, all with whom he 
 came in contact. Despite great natural advantages, Mr. 
 Cabot was never an orator, and always was averse to speak 
 ing in public. When he did speak, it was with simplicity and 
 clearness ; but the eloquence which he possessed was reserved 
 for conversation. To his friends, he poured forth the re 
 sults of patient thought and study in well-chosen language, 
 enhanced by the charms of a graceful manner and a fine 
 voice. There was much conversation in those days, and 
 a man w r ho excelled in it exercised no small power over 
 his circle. But conversation requires exactness of thought 
 and learning, and affords no opportunity to hide ignorance 
 under oratorical flourishes or vague and glittering similes. 
 It is therefore in some respects a more difficult art than ora 
 tory, and requires a certain solidity which success in the latter 
 does not necessarily imply. Thackeray has said, " We no 
 longer travel : we arrive." And speed, which has so much 
 injured travel, has also infected every department of modern 
 life. We may not unfairly say, " We no longer converse : we 
 talk." This does not mean necessarily that thought has 
 deteriorated, or that " talk " is less good than " conversa 
 tion ; " but the interchange of ideas, the discussion implied 
 by the latter, has lost much of its deliberation and its 
 gravity in the former. The conversation of seventy-five 
 years ago, though both wise and witty, was often a more 
 serious affair, and was tried by a higher standard than we 
 now perhaps realize. Mr. James Hamilton has preserved in 
 his Reminiscences an anecdote which illustrates what our 
 ancestors meant by after-dinner conversation, though that 
 
572 LIFE AND LETTEBS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1815-23. 
 
 particular species certainly was never professedly on 
 weighty subjects. Mr. Hamilton says: 
 
 " This [a story of Gouverneur Morris] reminds me of what 
 George Cabot told me when I was staying at his house in Boston: 
 I never give dinners ; but Morris came to Boston, and having 
 known him well in the good old times I felt it due to him to make 
 up a party for him. I invited Fisher Ames to meet him, with 
 Harrison Gray Otis and others of that stamp. After the cloth 
 was removed, I introduced as a subject of conversation, " How long 
 can Great Britain sustain her load of debt ? " I briefly expressed 
 my own views. All waited to hear Morris, who with great force 
 and knowledge of the subject presented his. When he had fin 
 ished, there was a pause : we drank, and all eyes were turned to 
 Ames, who was admitted to be our best talker. As you know, he 
 was then in feeble health ; and he began in his low, melodious tone, 
 with evident weakness, to express his views, which differed widely 
 from those of Morris. He was thoroughly acquainted with the 
 subject, which, by the way, was very frequently discussed at that 
 time, and talked in his best vein with singular clearness and elo 
 quence. Morris was all attention. I watched him closely. The 
 first clear indication on his countenance of what was passing in his 
 mind was, " He talks well." The next, " He talks as well as I 
 do." And at last, as Ames warmed with his subject, " He talks 
 better than I do." 
 
 " Cabot I remember well. He was one of the best talkers of the 
 day, and one of the most intelligent, upright, amiable, and excellent 
 of men." 1 
 
 The persiflage and repartee of the present day were not 
 then looked upon as the chief merit of conversation, and 
 to be a recognized leader in that art required more than a 
 lively and vivacious wit alone could furnish. Mr. Cabot 
 was not only noted in social converse, but his extensive in 
 formation on questions of government and political economy, 
 together with a varied experience of the world, made him 
 the trusted adviser of many men in public life as well as 
 of those who took counsel with him on their private affairs. 
 Mr. Webster says : 
 
 1 Reminiscences of J. A. Hamilton, pp. 12, 13. 
 
1815-23.] TBAITS OF CHARACTER. 573 
 
 " To these endeavors to maintain a sound currency, I owe the 
 acquaintance and friendship of the late Mr. Cabot, who was kind 
 enough to think me entitled to his regard." 1 
 
 Many letters whose publication would have only encum 
 bered these pages show the reliance which was placed in 
 him as to all matters demanding foresight and judgment. 
 
 Nor were such appeals ever made in vain. Mr. Cabot s 
 kindness and urbanity are mentioned by all who knew him ; 
 and he was moreover charitable and benevolent to every 
 body who required assistance of any kind. No one who 
 has read the preceding letters can fail to have perceived 
 the over-sensitive modesty, the retiring and even indolent 
 disposition, which withdrew Mr. Cabot at an early period 
 from active political life. To these traits of character is 
 due the almost complete destruction of his extensive and 
 valuable correspondence, a loss bitterly to be regretted by 
 his descendants at least. Yet one of his old party allies 
 considered him dangerously ambitious. In the recently pub 
 lished Life of Mr. George Ticknor, the following amusing 
 anecdote is related. When the Hartford Convention was 
 sitting, Mr. Ticknor went to Quincy to receive some letters 
 of introduction from John Adams. 
 
 " Soon after I was seated in Mr. Adams s parlor," to quote his 
 own words, u where there was no one but himself and Mrs. Adams, 
 who was knitting, he began to talk of the condition of the 
 country, with great earnestness. I said not a word ; Mrs. Adams 
 was equally silent. But Mr. Adams, who was a man of strong and 
 prompt passions, went on more and more vehemently. He was 
 dressed in a single-breasted, dark green coat, buttoned tightly by 
 very large, white metal buttons over his somewhat rotund person. 
 As he grew more and more excited in his discourse, he impatiently 
 endeavored to thrust his hand into the breast of his coat. The 
 buttons did not yield readily ; at last he forced his hand, saying as 
 he did so, in a very loud voice and most excited manner, Thank 
 God, thank God ! George Cabot s close-buttoned ambition has 
 broke out at last : he wants to be President of New England, sir ! " 
 
 1 Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, I. 26. 
 
574 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1815-23. 
 
 Mr. Adams s suspicions of Mr. Cabot s deep-rooted and 
 carefully hidden ambition were, however, of much earlier 
 date. Writing to his wife, in 1797, soon after Mr. Cabot s 
 retirement from the Senate, he says : 
 
 "Mr. Madison is to retire. It seems the mode of becoming 
 great is to retire. Madison, I suppose, after a retirement of a few 
 years, is to be President or Vice-President. Mr. Cabot, I suppose, 
 after aggrandizing his character in the shade a few years, is to be 
 some great thing too ; and Mr. Ames, &c., &c. It is marvellous 
 how political plants grow in the shade. Continued daylight and 
 sunshine show our faults and record them. Our persons, voices, 
 clothes, gait, air, sentiments, &c., all become familiar to every eye 
 and ear and understanding ; and they diminish in proportion, upon 
 the same principle that no man is a hero to his wife or valet-de- 
 chambre. These gentlemen are in the right to run away and hide. 
 Tell Mr. Cabot so, if you see him. His countrymen will soon 
 believe him to be a giant in a cave, and will go in a body and dig 
 him out. I wish, but don t tell Cabot so, that they would dig up 
 GERRY ! " l 
 
 There was but little love lost, it is to be feared, between 
 Mr. Adams and Mr. Cabot. Their friendly intercourse 
 ceased at the time of the Hamiltonian controversy; but 
 they always maintained an attitude of silent and dignified 
 hostility, and Mr. Adams had previously shown his respect 
 for Mr. Cabot s character and talents by appointing him to 
 a seat in his cabinet. 
 
 Of Mr. Cabot s political views, the letters in this volume 
 are the best index. A patriot in the Revolution, he was 
 one of the most ardent and useful advocates of the Consti 
 tution. He was consulted by both Washington and Ham 
 ilton on questions of policy ; and the latter relied greatly, 
 in all his financial measures, on the knowledge and expe 
 rience of Mr. Cabot. Reflection and temperament combined 
 to make him the friend of strong government ; and his own 
 share in the early Federal measures caused him to cherish 
 their policy, which was intended to lead to the form of 
 
 1 Letters of John Adams to his Wife, II. 240. 
 
1815-23.J POLITICAL OPINIONS. 575 
 
 government that he esteemed the best. Like Hamilton, he 
 desired a government possessing both vigor and energy ; 
 and, though he believed an infusion of democracy essential, 
 he thought a governing class likewise essential to the high 
 est success. Bitterly opposed to all the doctrines of the 
 French Revolution, his natural aversion to a pure democ 
 racy was thereby greatly increased. In the election of Jef 
 ferson he believed, and rightly, that the ascendancy of pure 
 democratic theories was assured; and as he was convinced 
 that this evil was radical, and not to be overcome by resist 
 ance, he felt that it must be left to work out its destiny with 
 such modifications as were possible. These opinions made 
 him lukewarm toward the aspirations of his more active 
 friends, and reluctant to join in many of their schemes. He 
 was naturally despondent ; and he sincerely believed that no 
 pure democracy could be long successful, or could sufficiently 
 protect the rights of property and of the individual. He 
 was disposed always to philosophize ; and, as he felt sure he 
 could not check the political forces whose action he dreaded, 
 he was inclined, to use his own expression to Colonel Pick 
 ering, " to let the world ruin itself in its own way." I 
 need hardly say that this apparent indifference arose from 
 no want of definite or settled opinions. Beneath all the 
 graciousness and repose of manner, there were the stiff 
 convictions and the fixed principles which have ever marked 
 the Puritan character. But Mr. Cabot s was a more liberal 
 disposition than that of many of his New England country 
 men ; and his natural courtesy, coupled with his indolent 
 temperament, kept him free from the bitter public contro 
 versies in which so many of his more ardent friends engaged. 
 Not that Mr. Cabot feared a necessary conflict, but he 
 desired no needless ones. Being in a quarrel, he bore it 
 that the opposed might beware of him. Two instances 
 occur among his letters, which illustrate this. His 
 youngest brother had been very shamelessly and unjustly 
 accused of unfair dealing in a business transaction. Mr. 
 Cabot s advice, when applied to, was simple. " Go to your 
 
576 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1815-23. 
 
 accuser," said he ; " obtain either a reiteration or a with 
 drawal of his charges : if he gives the latter, well and 
 good ; if the former, your course is plain." In the other case, 
 Mr. Cabot was drawn into a controversy, which he did all in 
 his power to avoid, with a third person by the determined 
 aggressiveness of his friend Colonel Pickering. The ques 
 tion, unluckily, was one of veracity. Mr. Cabot published 
 a brief note in the paper, and his opponent was silenced. 
 
 Mr. Cabot s great influence in the community is always 
 referred to by his contemporaries. One instance shows 
 the respect in which his character and judgment were held, 
 even outside the bounds of his own State. A dispute in 
 volving a large amount arose between an insurer and a 
 New York insurance company. The case was referred to 
 Mr. Cabot, and I cannot learn that his decision was ever 
 appealed from. But his influence in his own immediate 
 circle was almost unbounded, At the time of his death, he 
 was spoken of as " the Nestor, the wise, cool, considerate 
 counsellor of most of the intelligent statesmen on the Fed 
 eral side." 1 Nor was this less true apparently in matters 
 of a more private nature. I am indebted to the Hon. 
 George Bancroft for an anecdote which not only indicates 
 the weight attached to Mr. Cabot s opinions, but is also 
 illustrative of the power exercised by the leading men of the 
 community at that time. Deference to recognized leaders 
 may well be of interest in these days, when our most 
 respectable journals glory in the fact that, though the 
 wisest and best men leave a political party, no one follows 
 them, and the party is not affected. Mr. Bancroft s story, 
 however, is as follows : When he was a young man, and 
 had just graduated from college, he was anxious to go to 
 Germany, in order to finish his studies. A sojourn in 
 Europe was then rare, and no light matter to be hastily 
 decided. Mr. Bancroft s father took the question into care 
 ful consideration ; and his first step was to seek Mr. Cabot, 
 and ask his advice. Mr. Cabot approved the plan, and 
 i Daily Advertiser, April 24, 1823. 
 
1815-23.] PEKSONAL INFLUENCE. 577 
 
 urged his friend to send his son abroad. Then Mr. Ban 
 croft himself went to Quincy, and consulted John Adams. 
 This adviser was equally decided (there was no Greek 
 vagueness about the New England oracles), but his opinion 
 was the direct contrary of Mr. Cabot s. " You had better 
 stay at home," said Mr. Adams : " an American education 
 is good enough for an American." The future historian 
 was sent abroad to the University of Gottingen, and possi 
 bly some of the accomplishments which have graced his 
 career may be attributed to Mr. Cabot s advice. But the 
 story is of real value in illustrating a state of society which 
 has now departed. It shows an intellectual domination 
 exercised by a few leading men, which is utterly foreign 
 to the present day. We may have done well to free our 
 selves from the control of individual opinion, but let us not 
 too easily forget that a people without leaders is by no 
 means a subject for rejoicing. 
 
 In the opening chapter, I have sketched those studies to 
 which Mr. Cabot chiefly devoted himself. His commercial 
 pursuits led him to a close investigation of all subjects 
 connected with political economy ; and he was considered, 
 in his day, an authority in such matters. Politics and 
 questions of government occupied him constantly, and 
 afforded food for his thoughts both in reading and writing. 
 He was versed in French and Spanish, and a fair Latin 
 scholar, while metaphysics and the natural sciences always 
 had for him great attractions. But he did not neglect 
 lighter literature. Works upon the subjects I have men 
 tioned composed the larger part of his small and well-selected 
 library, but the English classics were also well represented. 
 A complete edition of Swift, by its well-worn calf bind 
 ing, attests the owner s fondness for that master of style 
 and satire ; while a once handsome copy of Fielding, " the 
 prose Homer of England," bears indelible marks of con 
 stant reading. To a man devoted to such varied pursuits, 
 the leisure of private life and the quiet of a library offered, 
 of course, irresistible charms. 
 
 37 
 
578 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1815-23. 
 
 Bred in the Congregational Church of New England, 
 Mr. Cabot was always a constant attendant upon religious 
 services, and a firm supporter of the ecclesiastical institutions. 
 But in these matters also he was liberal in his opinions, and 
 in later life joined the Unitarian sect. He brought to relig 
 ious matters the same spirit of conscientious investigation 
 and careful thought that he did to all other questions ; and, 
 although a sincerely religious man in feeling, he was unable 
 to satisfy his scepticism as to the divine revelation of Chris 
 tianity. His letters to his friend and pastor, Dr. Kirkland, 
 show how deeply he was concerned about these questions, as 
 well as the admiration which he had for Christianity as a 
 moral system. But he was never able to remove the doubts, of 
 which he made no concealment, as to its supernatural origin. 
 
 Wise and patriotic in public affairs, respected by his 
 friends, and beloved by his family, of high honor and 
 unspotted integrity, Mr. Cabot left a memory which must 
 ever be venerated by his descendants. I trust that I am 
 not presumptuous when I express the hope that his life and 
 character may be cherished among those which are held in 
 honorable recollection by Massachusetts. 
 
 I cannot close this volume more fitly than with the 
 words of New England s great orator: "And the mention 
 of the father of my friend 1 brings to my mind the memory 
 of his great colleague, the early associate of Hamilton and 
 of Ames, trusted and beloved by Washington, consulted on 
 all occasions connected with the administration of the 
 finances, the establishment of the treasury department, the 
 imposition of the first rates of duty, and with every thing 
 that belonged to the commercial system of the United 
 States, George Cabot, of Massachusetts." 2 
 
 1 Mr. Goodhue. 
 
 2 Speech of Daniel Webster at the dinner of the New England Society 
 of New York, on the Landing at Plymouth, 1843, Webster s Works, II. 205. 
 
POLITICAL WRITINGS. 
 
NOTE. The following selections have been made from the many arti 
 cles contributed by Mr. Cabot to the newspapers of the day. No small part 
 of the influence exerted by the Federalists came from their constant use of 
 the public prints as vehicles to inform and sway the public mind. A few 
 examples serve as well as a complete collection to illustrate Mr. Cabot s 
 style and mode (*f thought and expression ; and I have not therefore thought 
 it necessary to give a greater number of his political writings than could be 
 certainly known and obtained with ease from references in his letters. 
 
POLITICAL WRITINGS. 
 
 From the Columbian Centinel, April 15, 1797. 
 
 MR. RUSSELL, Notwithstanding there are among us some 
 who from various motives would acquiesce in our subjection to 
 France, yet the number so devoted to that nation must be small ; 
 and the support they find from those who do not yet see their 
 dangerous designs must daily diminish. 
 
 The American people know that their individual rights and 
 liberties are so connected with the independence of the nation, 
 that the loss of the latter must soon be followed by that of the 
 former. It was on the broad and solid basis of this truth that our 
 whole Revolution rested, and as long as the force of the sentiment 
 is felt, and not much longer, shall we be truly free. It is in the 
 American mind therefore we are to look for the security of our 
 freedom. This is well known to the French, and hence it is that 
 they persisted so long in attempting to corrupt, debauch, and cajole 
 us before they resorted to violence and outrage ; and hence it is 
 that their instruments here, faithful to their masters, have labored 
 incessantly to prove that their most wicked and atrocious acts are 
 all justifiable. 
 
 Every one must know that France and England, whose rivalry 
 is perpetually involving them in wars, would each desire to have 
 an influence over our country which should render us subservient 
 to its purposes ; but their attempts to establish this influence, 
 whether by fraud or by force, must be repelled at every hazard. 
 And they always may be repelled with certainty, if we are faithful 
 to ourselves. Our own means are sufficient for this, situated as 
 we are, three thousand miles from the scene of their power ; but, in 
 addition to our own strength, we may always rely that either of 
 them will co-operate with us against the other, whenever we need 
 
582 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1797. 
 
 it, not however from friendship to us, BUT ON THE SURE PRIN 
 CIPLE OF THEIR OWN SAFETY OR INTEREST. 
 
 It is painful to see the endeavors of some men to persuade the 
 people that the power of France is irresistible, and that she will 
 make us feel her power, if we do not submit to her insolent de 
 mands. I trust, however, that the spirit of our country will not 
 be so dismayed as to bend to a foreign master, especially in the 
 present instance, where we already suffer almost as much injury 
 as is in the power of the French to inflict. For, great as their 
 power is, it is confined to the European territory, and is chiefly 
 supported by plunder ; and, if we consider the immense sums 
 swindled from the Americans under the mask of friendship, it may 
 be doubted whether we should have lost more by professed war 
 than we have lost in a perfidious peace. 
 
 But notwithstanding the immense depredations France commits 
 on our property, and the insults she offers to our government, 
 she has no disposition to declare war. On the contrary, it is well 
 known that she has been encouraged to proceed thus far by the 
 hope of intimidating us ; and there is good reason to believe that 
 she will cease to injure us at that point where she finds us determined 
 to repel. When she perceives that our government will not betray 
 the country, nor the people destroy their own government, she will 
 desist from hostilities and swear she is our friend. 
 
 A FREE AMERICAN. 
 
 From the Columbian Centinel, May 3, 1797. 
 
 POLITICAL THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT CRISIS. 
 
 Addressed to those who truly love our Country: 
 
 There are those who imagine that France would receive an 
 envoy extraordinary, although she refuses to receive a minister 
 plenipotentiary from the United States ; and there are many who 
 believe she would cordially receive Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison 
 in any diplomatic character. If either of these opinions is correct, 
 it must be because the conduct of the United States would in that 
 case discover a willingness to pass under the Gallic yoke, and 
 because the Directory must so understand it. The Directory knows 
 full well that four years practice of sedition and conspiracy by 
 Genet and his followers, and the immense robberies and plunder- 
 ings of our merchants by the agents of France, aggravated by the 
 
1797.] POLITICAL WHITINGS. 583 
 
 contemptuous treatment of the American nation, in the person of 
 Mr. Pinckney, constitute a mass of outrages and insult such as no 
 people would long submit to, who mean to maintain their rights, their 
 interests, or their honor. The Directory knows full well that the 
 hypocrisy which for a moment concealed the wicked designs of 
 France will no longer answer that purpose. The imposture is 
 fully detected in every country ; and every individual not blinded 
 by party passions now sees that the principal object aimed at by 
 France, from the commencement of the Republic, has been and 
 still is to establish a permanent dominion over other nations. But 
 in this project of universal national tyranny she can never succeed, 
 while England remains mistress of the ocean. " England must be 
 destroyed then," say the French, that the ambition of France may 
 have its full scope. But how is the destruction of England to be 
 achieved ? Not by force, for she conquers all her enemies upon 
 the sea ; not by intrigues with her subjects, for rebels and traitors 
 are made there with difficulty, although in other countries, called 
 free, French emissaries and French gold have done wonders. It 
 is then only by ruining the commerce of the whole world, which 
 indirectly sustains British credit, the only prop of their power, that 
 England can be thrown down. Such is the opinion of France, 
 and, though extremely futile, is one of the reasons why she assails 
 the commerce of the neutral nations. I call this opinion futile, 
 because experience has proved that nations may become formida 
 ble and destructive to others, as well as more miserable among 
 themselves, after the dissolution of order and public credit than 
 they were before. 
 
 England under the tyranny of Cromwell was the terror of her 
 neighbors, as France, now inexpressibly wretched and enslaved, is 
 the scourge or dread of all the civilized world. 
 
 But it will be asked, must we make war upon France ? I an 
 swer, No. War might be just, but is not expedient : it is a great 
 calamity, and should always be avoided, except when necessary 
 to prevent a greater evil than itself. The evil with which we are 
 threatened, it is true, is of this kind, but probably may be guarded 
 against without war. France intends to subject us to her govern 
 ment, if she can ; but her measures will always depend upon her 
 calculations of success. She began with an attempt to seduce us ; 
 but, the arts of seduction having failed, she changed her caresses 
 and flatteries into reproaches and threats, and, finding these in- 
 
584 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1797. 
 
 effectual, she is now endeavoring to intimidate us by acts of hostil 
 ity, declaring at the same time that these acts are not to be under 
 stood as amounting to a " rupture" which she wishes to avoid ; that 
 is to say, she wishes to try the experiment of seduction, menaces, 
 and force upon our country without avowing war, and, if neither of 
 those, nor all of them combined, will make us yield our indepen 
 dence, she will then see that she has been deceived by those profli 
 gate men whose information she has trusted, and will swear in 
 future to be our sincere friend. 
 
 Such is the view of our affairs to the eyes of enlightened men, 
 arid from it may be learned the plain course which ought to be 
 taken. Effectual provision should be made for the protection and 
 defence of our country and the people s rights. Nothing offensive 
 toward the French Republic should be authorized by our govern 
 ment; but it should be made manifest by our preparations for 
 events that we know the designs of France, and have a keen sense 
 of the injuries she has already done us, and that having at all times 
 performed toward her every act which reason, justice, the remem 
 brance of former friendship, and the love of peace can demand of 
 
 US, WE CANNOT DO MORE, AND WILL NEVER CONSENT TO BE 
 
 GOVERNED BY A FOREIGN NATION. This spirit of independence, 
 supported by the perfect rectitude of our cause, if exhibited by the 
 National Legislature, will animate the breast of every lover of true 
 liberty within the United States, and will dissipate those clouds 
 which have so long darkened our political sky. France will then 
 abandon an enterprise which promises her no advantage, for she 
 will then see that we are not intimidated ; and she must know that, 
 
 WHILE UNITED AT HOME, WE CAN NEVER BE CONQUERED. 
 
 FORTITER IN RE. 
 
 From the Columbian Centinel, May 31, 1797. 
 
 [The Independence of the United States was first declared on 
 the 4th of July, 1776. Who could have imagined that in 1797 our 
 rights as a Sovereign State would be denied by France ? History 
 will record the fact that France has been willing to see us inde 
 pendent of Britain, but not independent of herself. ~\ 
 
 MR. RUSSELL, There is no candid man who, after a fair 
 examination of the documents 1 which are published, can doubt 
 
 1 The documents referred to are those which accompanied the President s 
 message on May 13, 1797, and which gave an account of the failure of 
 
1707.] POLITICAL WRITINGS. 585 
 
 that the conduct of our government towards all the nations at war 
 has been just and impartial as far as was in its power; and that 
 whatever partialities have unavoidably existed have been all in 
 favor of France. But, notwithstanding this truth is demonstrated, 
 yet the atrocious designs of France against the United States can 
 no longer be denied even by party men ; for she already executes 
 them wherever her power extends, and in her national acts mani 
 fests openly the disposition, too long concealed, to make us a de 
 pendent people. It is not enough that she robs us of millions of 
 our hard-earned property, to feed the spirit of rapine which sup 
 ports her tyranny. It is not enough that she swears to annihilate 
 our commerce, and the commerce of all the world, in order that 
 she may impoverish a rival ; but, in addition to these unparalleled 
 outrages upon the rights of men and of nations, she avows the nefari 
 ous policy of separating the people of the United States from the 
 free and just government which they themselves have instituted. It 
 is thus she would ally us more nearly to herself by introducing 
 into our happy country that spirit of licentiousness which has pro 
 duced, as its natural offspring, every species of crime, cruelty, per 
 fidy, and injustice among the French, and WHICH I FEAR WILL 
 
 ULTIMATELY ESTABLISH AN IRON THRONE ON THE SEPULCHRE 
 OF LIBERTY. 
 
 But it will be asked, " "What can encourage France to such a 
 bold attempt as the disorganization and subjugation of our country, 
 after she herself had witnessed our persevering efforts for inde 
 pendence ? " To this question, every well-informed man will 
 readily answer, " It is because France has been led to believe that 
 she has a party in the United States to support her pretensions 
 more powerful than Britain had in 1775." Such undoubtedly is 
 the calculation of the French Directory ; and it is not to be 
 expected that they will relinquish their enterprises until they are 
 convinced that this calculation is grossly erroneous, and that the 
 American people will defend their rights against the usurpation of 
 all foreign masters. Whether even this conviction will discourage 
 France in the midst of her victories must be doubtful in the mind 
 of every man who knows the nature of her designs and the insati- 
 ableness of those passions from which they proceed. But, be this 
 as it may, at this interesting moment, when a foreign nation is 
 
 Pinckney s first negotiation, and of the insults to which he had been sub 
 jected. 
 
586 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 actually taking hostile steps upon the presumption that we are a 
 divided people, is it not a sacred duty to unite, and is it not the 
 dictate of wisdom to show that we are united ? Every lover of 
 his country will agree that it is, and will rejoice that the approach 
 ing session of our State Legislature affords an early opportunity 
 of joining their voice with that of the President and Congress of 
 the United States, to proclaim to the world that we have been 
 misrepresented or misunderstood ; " that we are not a degraded 
 people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of in 
 feriority, fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign influence, 
 and regardless of national honor, character, and interest," but that 
 we know our rights and will maintain them, our duties and will 
 fulfil them, and that, while we scrupulously perform towards 
 others every thing that justice requires from us, we can never 
 abandon the rightful claim of justice from them. 
 
 ONE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. 
 
 From the Massachusetts Mercury, Jan. 12, 1798. 
 
 MESSRS. YOUNG AND MINNS, The truly independent spirit 
 of your paper encourages the hope that you will afford a place in 
 the " Mercury " for the following observations of one who thinks 
 himself " A SINCERE LOVER OF HIS COUNTRY." 
 
 Portugal is threatened with the Jacobin yoke,* Spain trembles 
 at the foresight of a similar destiny. Should these events happen, 
 the two nations will become the natural allies of the Great Horde, 
 and their spoils may subsist them for another year. 
 
 Belgium has been gleaned, and can yield nothing more until the 
 return of industry shall prepare a new crop. Holland, drained of 
 one hundred millions in money, its commerce annihilated and fleet 
 vanquished, offers nothing but a dejected people, emaciated by hun 
 ger and desperate from suffering, who wish for death as a refuge 
 from their misery. Austria, though compelled to accept a respite 
 on hard terms, is yet too strong to be plundered and too wise to 
 be duped. 
 
 Italy is probably appropriated to Buonaparte, and nothing can 
 
 [* Spain may be considered as subject to France, since the treaty made 
 by the Prince of Peace ; but, to pass under the Jacobin yoke, its govern 
 ment must be subverted, and a set of cut-throats and desperadoes must 
 reign without control.] G. C. 
 
1798.] POLITICAL WRITINGS. 587 
 
 be drawn from it without his consent. Buonaparte is an Italian, 
 and a large portion of his troops are also Italians. It is too soon 
 yet for the development of all his designs ; but, as he has shown much 
 more genius and talents than any other actor on the Revolutionary 
 scene, it is presumable that he will achieve the object of his ambi 
 tion, if he is not impeded by the dagger or bowl from the hand of 
 a rival. It is contrary to all fair reasoning to expect that the 
 superiority of this Italian can be forgiven by the French Jacobins. 
 
 In France, it is well known that a very large majority of the 
 people wish for monarchy ; but four hundred thousand soldiers, 
 deeply interested in their own despotism, carrying terror on the 
 bayonet point, and two hundred thousand spies employed by the 
 tyrants, silence every tongue. The people everywhere are disarmed, 
 and therefore must continue in the same wretched slavery until the 
 discord or destruction of their masters shall open the way for their 
 escape. It is not necessary to believe that Hoche was poisoned, 
 in order to account for the honors done to his manes. Hoche had not 
 the talents of Cassar or Cromwell, and the Directory might as well 
 fear several others as him ; but the public spectacle exhibited at 
 Hoche s funeral was a homage to the army, which it was proper 
 and politic for the State to pay, when the government became in 
 fact wholly military. . 
 
 England is again menaced with an army of French sans-culottes, 
 professedly to subvert the British Constitution, and to establish in 
 its stead the power of a banditti of ruffians ; but how this army is 
 to be transported across the channel is a secret which the projectors 
 are too prudent to disclose. It is believed that the navies of 
 France, and the nations she has subjugated, if all assembled, would 
 not now be a match for the British tleet ; and yet this fleet must be 
 completely overcome before an invasion can be successful. Per 
 haps it may appear hereafter that the stinging mortification at 
 De Winter s defeat, and the necessity of perpetually agitating the 
 minds of the troops, have given birth to this gasconade. But, 
 however this may be, England has nothing to fear from the under 
 taking ; while the threat must open the purses of Englishmen of 
 every party, must facilitate the operations of the minister, and 
 must give additional force and stability to the government. 
 
 The commissioners of conciliation from the United States sent 
 to France to accommodate differences, it is said, will return re 
 infecta. This is credible ; for those who have done to others the 
 
588 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 most atrocious injuries are generally implacable. This disappoint 
 ment of our desires, however, can be none to the expectations of 
 well-informed men, and will create no new uneasiness in the breast 
 of those who equally dread and detest foreign influence of every 
 kind. To such men, it will occur as an obvious truth that, what 
 ever may be the disposition of the present government of France, 
 her final conduct toward the United States will depend upon our 
 apparent weakness or strength, and her own actual condition and 
 power at the end of her conflict with England. It has been shown 
 to the American people by authentic proofs that from the first 
 moment of our intercourse with France she intended absolutely to 
 govern the counsels and direct the measures and force of our nation, 
 so as to render us completely dependent on her. It has been seen 
 and sorely felt that this intention has been pursued with redoubled 
 efforts since the establishment of the Republic. Every art of seduc 
 tion has been used, and sedition has been frequently excited, till 
 at last we are the witnesses of avowed hostility everywhere exer 
 cised against our unoffending merchants, while in the bosom of our 
 country venal presses and a faction in government distract public 
 opinion and enfeeble the spirit of national defence. But although 
 the ultimate measures of France toward us will depend on their 
 future condition, yet the success under Providence will wholly 
 depend on ourselves. Five millions of people, just to all the 
 world, and determined to be free, if united, are not likely to be 
 attacked, and surely they can never be conquered. 
 
 From the Massachusetts Mercury, Jan. 16, 1798. 
 
 POLITICAL MONITOR. No. I. 
 
 Experience and observation every day teach us to believe that 
 those men who are outrageously patriotic in their professions are 
 generally actuated by some criminal selfishness, and would sacrifice 
 the public welfare to their own avarice or ambition. 
 
 The same truth is inculcated by the writers of ancient history, 
 who inform us that in old times the demagogues were zealous ad 
 vocates for the most popular forms of government, because under 
 such forms they could easily exercise all the powers of the State with" 
 out any responsibilities. 
 
 In Athens, the most democratic of the Grecian republics, DEMOS- 
 
1798.] POLITICAL WRITINGS. 589 
 
 THENES and PHOCION were the only leaders who refused the gold 
 of PHILIP. Those two men were such as are now called Aristo 
 crats : they were lovers of liberty and the best friends of the peo 
 ple, but they hated their vices and would not flatter them, while all 
 the demagogues without exception were the pensioners of a foreign 
 nation which was then taking measures to enslave their country. 
 
 In Rome, it is well known that the tribunes and other democratic 
 leaders were so scandalously venal as to induce one who bribed 
 them to say " that Rome would sell herself whenever a purchaser 
 should appear" 
 
 The minister of the French republic has officially informed his 
 government that in the United States he has found " PATRIOTS 
 whose consciences already have their prices, and that the proof of 
 this will remain for ever in the archives of France" This grievous 
 charge is not to be denied, nor that the seductive power of French 
 gold has been equally pernicious among every people who have 
 been weak enough to think them their friends. But, while Mr. 
 Fauchet s letter makes us blush for our country, it ought always to 
 be recollected who are the men he calls patriots. 
 
 It were devoutly to be wished that France would disclose to us 
 the names of all, as she has occasionally of some, of our citizens 
 whose assistance she relies on to establish her power over us. Such 
 a disclosure would be very precious in the eye of every indepen 
 dent American, who reads too plainly in the miseries of the Hol 
 landers the cruel destiny which France had prepared for the people 
 of the United States, and which it is well known nothing but a want 
 of power prevented her from inflicting years ago. 
 
 From ike Massachusetts Mercury, Jan. 19, 1798. 
 
 MESSRS. YOUNG AND MINNS, If it is essential to the preser 
 vation of our rights that Just sentiments should prevail on subjects 
 that relate to liberty, a faint outline of Jacobinism may be profita 
 bly sketched to excite reflection. 
 
 POLITICAL MONITOR. No. II. 
 
 "Whatever diversity of opinion may have once existed concerning 
 the real principle of the French Revolution, it has long since been 
 demonstrated to be that same lust of domination and plunder which 
 has so often scourged the human race in every period of its history. 
 
590 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 These turbulent passions, rendered formidable by a union with 
 talents, were chiefly concentrated in a body of men who, from 
 the place of their meeting, were called Jacobins, and from them 
 the system of their operations has been justly termed Jacobinism. 
 Among the first members of this famous society, there were a few 
 who felt some little restraint of religion, morality, or honor, and 
 some whose property seemed to give them an interest in the public 
 welfare ; but all these were forcibly swept away, that the society 
 might be enabled to act with perfect freedom, and with what was 
 then called republican energy. But, however desperate those men 
 were who remained, they and their successors have displayed great 
 abilities, and have steadily pursued the same daring designs. As 
 they possessed neither power nor property, their inordinate desires 
 made them the determined enemies of all who possessed either. 
 They saw the nation embarrassed by the errors and vices of a bad 
 government ; but, instead of co-operating with those good citizens 
 who aimed at liberty and order, they boldly resolved to take ad 
 vantage of the public distress, and raise themselves to greatness on 
 the ruins of their country. From the first moment of their acting 
 in public affairs, they have invariably aspired to establish their own 
 absolute power over France, and the absolute power of France over 
 other nations. In the first of these designs, their success is com 
 plete. After the solemn mockery of three constitutions and twelve 
 revolutions, which pretended to have liberty for their object, but 
 which in fact have been only the changes of tyranny, the people 
 of France see that every epoch in their affairs makes a new rivet 
 added to their own chains, till at length, sunk with their weight, 
 they are all ready to abandon the hope of relief. While this dread 
 ful despotism has thus established itself over all France, it has been 
 no less occupied in seeking connections, alliances, and dominions 
 in other countries. The conductors of the Revolution knew that 
 in every society, however well governed, there were many discon 
 tented spirits of their own class, who would rise at their call and 
 whose services they could always command. Men of lost charac 
 ter and broken fortune, disappointed seekers of office, rapacious 
 men, idle profligates and desperadoes of all descriptions, were the 
 natural members of their body ; and to these may be added the 
 disciples which are made among the unwary poor, who are seduced 
 by the fallacious promise of plenty without labor ; and finally many 
 credulous citizens, whose honest, but uninformed zeal for public 
 happiness makes them the easy dupes of those who promise it. 
 
1798.] POLITICAL WHITINGS. 591 
 
 To excite, combine, and organize these various descriptions of 
 persons in every country, and to give them activity in opposition 
 to its government, has been and still continues to be the unremit 
 ting endeavor of Jacobinism ; and this new species of mischief, 
 which its wickedness has devised, is more dangerous to all civilized 
 society, and more destructive than all its poison, daggers, guillo 
 tines, and bayonets. Successful Jacobinism is the consummation 
 of vice and tyranny, and therefore to be viewed as the greatest 
 possible political evil ; and it is justly to be feared, because it is 
 propagated by eloquence and sophistry, and is exhibited in the 
 garb of virtue and of liberty, whose sacred names it profanely 
 usurps. It enjoys, too, the aid of the purse and the sword of the 
 French Republic. In a word, Jacobinism is what the committee 
 of the French Convention emphatically pronounced it : "A con 
 cert of means to establish (everywhere) the empire of death, of 
 terror, and of crime." l 
 
 From the Massachusetts Mercury, Jan. 26, 1798. 
 
 POLITICAL MONITOR. No. III. 
 
 Strictures on FaucheCs Pamphlet. 
 
 Mr. Fauchet renews against the United States the groundless 
 charges of violation or inexecution of the treaties which bind us 
 to France. For the particular facts, he refers his readers to the 
 letter of MR. PICKERING to MR. PINCKNEY, which has been 
 justly considered by all fair reasoners as a complete refutation of 
 all those charges. It would seem indeed that MR. FAUCHET 
 himself is not quite satisfied with the solidity of the claims and 
 complaints heretofore made by France, for he now reminds us of 
 our guarantee of the French possessions in America, which, he 
 says, we are bound to fulfil. This demand his predecessor, GENET, 
 with all his eagerness to embarrass the government, never thought 
 it prudent to press ; doubtless from a conviction that the unten- 
 ableness of the claim would weaken his party and strengthen that 
 of the government. They knew that France was the aggressor in 
 every sense, and had voluntarily declared war against England; 
 and that therefore our treaty, which is purely defensive, did not 
 
 1 [See report of committee of eleven who framed the last French Con 
 stitution.] G. C. 
 
592 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 oblige us to take a part. This idea, simple and obvious, is suffi 
 cient to explain to reasonable men why France has been so quiet 
 on this point, while she has been so violent on others that were 
 frivolous. MR. FAUCHET regrets extremely that the Revolution 
 ary government has acknowledged the insincerity and perfidy of 
 monarchical France toward the United States. It is probable that 
 the inconvenience of this exposure has since been felt by all those 
 who have been endeavoring to cajole us. To recover the confi 
 dence of the American people, thus lost, he insists that, in the 
 treaty of 1778, France displayed an improvidence for herself or 
 an excessive good-will for us. Nothing could be more unseasonable 
 than this stale pretension, set up now, four years after its falsehood 
 has been proved by the best possible testimony. All the world 
 may see the declarations made by the Revolutionary government, 
 while in possession of the evidence ; and which were in substance 
 that the interference of the old Court, and the aid they gave us, 
 resulted wholly from motives base, perfidious, and treacherous, and 
 that they were uniformly hostile to the prosperity of the United 
 States. But, while Mr. Fauchet laments the indiscretion of those 
 tell-tales who have disclosed the secret views of his nation, he is 
 not wholly free from the same imputation. He exemplifies, in his 
 own conduct, the true French maxim which he lays down, " that 
 neither government nor individuals regulate their measures agree 
 ably to the outward forms of correspondence." This contra 
 diction of the actions of the French to what they profess has 
 perplexed many good people in America. We have often been 
 charmed with what they were saying, till seized with horror at 
 what they were doing. This minister came to the United States 
 professedly to erase the impressions and repair the injuries which 
 we felt from GENET ; but it is believed the same atrocious designs 
 were still pursued, only with a little more secrecy. With great 
 affectation of respect for our violated rights, Mr. Fauchet publicly 
 recalled the commissions which Genet had given to American 
 traitors ; but he designed to use the instruments of sedition which 
 were prepared. And, if the coffers had not been emptied, there can 
 be no doubt we should have seen an armed force in the bosom of 
 our country, supported by France, to overawe our government ; but 
 the million of dollars brought over by Genet, and the proceeds of 
 the East India ships, were gone. All disappeared on FAUCHET S 
 arrival ; so that with truth he might say to RANDOLPH and 
 
1798.] POLITICAL WRITINGS. 593 
 
 others that he could not comply with their demands for money. 
 He could only command a few dollars to be distributed among 
 journalists, whose services were necessary, and could be had at a 
 very low rate. 
 
 From the Massachusetts Mercury, Jan. 30, 1798. 
 
 POLITICAL MONITOR. No. IV. 
 Strictures on Fauchefs Pamphlet. 
 
 In order to understand the policy of France, as it relates to 
 maritime affairs, it is necessary always to keep in our eye the 
 object at which she aims. This object undoubtedly is the destruc 
 tion of the naval power of England, for it is England alone that 
 prevents France from establishing the same absolute empire on the 
 sea which she now exercises over many nations by land. The 
 effect of such an accumulation of power in any nation, upon the 
 rights and independence of others, need not be described ; and 
 God grant that it may never be known ! 
 
 Mr. Fauchet, after noticing the maxim of the law of nations, 
 by which enemy property in neutral bottoms is liable to seizure, 
 proceeds to observe that the interest of neutrals, and of those 
 belligerents who were too weak to protect their own commerce, 
 equally suffered by this principle ; and therefore these two de 
 scriptions of powers have usually engaged in their treaties to respect 
 each other s flag, so far as to let the property of an enemy pass 
 unmolested when sailing under it. This treaty privilege he denom 
 inates " modern neutrality." France, he tells us, has defended 
 this new principle with more warmth than any other power ; and 
 he cites one example where she has made it the means of pushing 
 a neutral nation into a war. We are well acquainted with this 
 fact, and perhaps contributed something toward its occurrence, with 
 a view to our own benefit ; but we all see and lament that, in its 
 consequences, it has enfeebled the nation to whom it happened, 
 and finally has made them slaves of France. 
 
 Mr. Fauchet s disclosure of the motives for such active zeal 
 among the French to enforce the new doctrine cannot fail to be 
 instructive to the people of the United States ; and, if duly con 
 sidered, must prove to us incontestably that our own benefit makes 
 no part of its design. 
 
594 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 However desirable it may be to see it admitted as a part of the 
 law of nations " that free bottoms shall make free goods," it is to 
 be feared that those nations, single or combined, against whom the 
 principle would operate, will always resist its establishment, and, 
 even if a number of powers should unite to support it, that there 
 could be no safe reliance on the permanency of such an union. 
 This idea is justified by the history of the armed neutrality and the 
 constitution of man and of society. Mr. Fauchet, however, affirms 
 boldly " that France has faithfully maintained their modern neutral 
 ity ;" but it remains for Mr. Fauchet or his partisans to reconcile 
 this declaration with the truth. For he must know, as all the 
 world has seen, that in contempt of this principle, and in contempt 
 of all treaty obligations, France, in May, 1793, did pass a law 
 authorizing the seizure of all neutral vessels with enemy property on 
 board* and that her cruisers have at all times captured all such 
 vessels and many others, and have often accompanied these acts 
 with circumstances of extreme cruelty and flagrant abuse. 
 
 In a subsequent paragraph, Mr. Fauchet still further explains 
 the use France proposes to make of her agreements with particular 
 States respecting enemy property in neutral ships. At the time of 
 making these stipulations, they necessarily are considered by each 
 party with a sole reference to their own interest, and, when made, 
 their obligation cannot by any construction be extended to their 
 respective intercourse with others. Let it be shown, then, that in 
 our treaty with France we have engaged that the principle of 
 " free bottoms making free goods " should be admitted into our sub 
 sequent treaties with England or other powers. No man will be 
 hardy enough to contend that our treaty with France contains any 
 such stipulations : on the contrary, it will appear, upon reading it, 
 that both parties were left perfectly free, each to consult its own 
 interest. Yet, because we have presumed to use this freedom in 
 a manner which our interest required, France insolently talks of 
 punishing us as if we were her colonists. She tells us plainly 
 that she plunders us, because we have not done something by the 
 use of which she could have forced us into a war with England, as 
 she did the Hollanders in 1780. 
 
 It would be incredible that, at a time when the French have 
 nothing effectual to oppose to the growing superiority of the British 
 naval forces, they should be so impolitic as to avow to us their im 
 perious and unjust designs ; but a solution of this problem is to be 
 
1708 -] POLITICAL WRITINGS. 595 
 
 found in the wicked ^-representations which France has received 
 of the character of the government and people of the United 
 States. It is certain that the French have heen taught to believe 
 that the United States were so blindly devoted to their cause that 
 they might rely upon our acquiescence to every measure they 
 should adopt, as fully as if we were their subjects, and that, if the 
 judicial government should incline to oppose them, the spirit of 
 the people would bear down upon the government. This infamous 
 libel against our country has been too much countenanced by the 
 temper of a considerable party in the Federal House of Represen 
 tatives, and the feeble means of the Legislature. 
 
 If instead of exhibiting a submissive spirit, which invites insult 
 and encourages injury, the Legislature had unitedly discovered 
 those elevated and patriotic sentiments which the President ex 
 pressed in his speech in June last, we should probably have heard 
 of no new outrages or indignities from France, and some of the 
 present embarrassments would have been alleviated. We pray 
 that the errors of the past time may suffice, and that in future 
 party spirit may yield to the public good. We hope for measures 
 always just, butfrm, free from insolence, but free also from ser 
 vility. Such measures will be always acceptable to men who truly 
 love their country, and who mean to defend it against all the 
 assaults of tyranny. 
 
 From the Massachusetts Mercury, Feb. 2, 1798. 
 
 POLITICAL MONITOR. No. V. 
 
 Strictures on Fauchet s Pamphlet concluded. 
 
 The complete refutation which Mr. PICKERING has given to all 
 the calumnies against our government openly propagated by the 
 French seems to render superfluous any further argument on the 
 subject ; but, as the partisans of France have hitherto justified all 
 her outrages, it may be useful to remark that Mr. FAUCHET, the 
 Minister of the Decemvirs, admits that the conduct of GENET and 
 the French consuls was culpable. He admits, too, the folly and 
 ignorance of the Directory in decreeing that French cruisers 
 should treat neutrals as these suffer others to treat them. Doubt 
 less, he is aware of the sentence which impartiality must pronounce 
 on this act. He perceives that it was intended to let loose all the 
 
596 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOEGE CABOT. [1798. 
 
 robbers and pirates that were in the dominions of France, to 
 plunder the unarmed commerce of friendly nations. He admits 
 also that this wanton injustice is succeeded by a subsequent decree, 
 as explained by MERLIN, now a member of the Directory, and 
 which he says must be prejudicial to the French cause, &c. In 
 all this there is nothing new, and yet the confession is very pre 
 cious, because it comes from a great offender, and authorizes us to 
 expect that, if ever justice revives in France, these unprovoked 
 aggressions will be condemned by the nation. 
 
 C5?5 * 
 
 Having made these acknowledgments, Mr. Fauchet then asks 
 whether France has not been eager to redress our grievances when 
 we have made them known ? It is true that the Robespierrian 
 party, having destroyed their rivals, the Brissotins, did, at the re 
 quest of the United States, displace GENET, who was a creature of 
 that party, but it should be remembered they sent a successor. He 
 asks also if the committee of public safety of the second and 
 third year did not respect our neutrality? To this it may be 
 safely answered that in NO YEAR of the Republic has France re 
 spected our neutrality. It is presumed that Mr. Fauchet cannot 
 adduce one example in which a French cruiser meeting with enemy 
 property in an American ship has complied with the treaty of 
 1778. If there have, been any such cases, they are very few, and 
 must be lost in comparison with the fifteen or twenty millions of 
 dollars which have been ravished from our honest industry. The 
 next question of Mr. Fauchet, alluding to the intercourse between 
 the Directory and their avowed friend Monroe, is a cruel insult to 
 those whose interests were depending. Unhappily for the United 
 States, this man always mistook the interest of France for the inter 
 est of his own country, as he does Jacobin tyranny for rational 
 liberty. Educated by JEFFERSON, he believes that the abomi 
 nable system kept up in France in the name of Republicanism 
 ought to be naturalized and cherished -an the United States, and 
 that we, with the wretched slaves- of France, ought to be one 
 people. 
 
 Having criminated the conduct of the UNITED STATES, Mr. 
 Fauchet undertakes to account for our apostasy by saying that, 
 after the exile of FAYETTE and the murder of the king, the Rev 
 olution was viewed with a less favorable eye by WASHINGTON, 
 and that all those persons whose reputation and services might 
 give them influence with him had joined and encouraged his 
 
1800.] POLITICAL WRITINGS. 597 
 
 hostile disposition. From this general description, however, he 
 excepted JEFFERSON, the MOULTRIES, LIVINGSTONS, CLINTON, 
 and SAMUEL ADAMS. It is not proper absolutely to deny the 
 truth of this explanation, since it is not wholly unfounded. It is 
 well known that the first news of a proposed reform in the French 
 government was heard in every country with pleasure and delight 
 by all good men ; but it is also known that long before the murder 
 of the king every statesman in Europe and America saw, and every 
 honest one deplored, that the liberty and happiness of the French 
 people were to be sacrificed to the lawless ambition of their Jacobin 
 leaders. This sentiment was every day confirmed by new events, 
 and, having become common to the upright and enlightened every 
 where, would have soon prevailed among all classes of people, 
 if there had not been in every community some men who were 
 interested to counteract it. Whether the men named by Mr. 
 Fauchet were of this description, the country will judge. And let 
 them also judge whether WASHINGTON, who supports and is sup 
 ported by the wise and good, ought not to have abandoned those 
 who were engaged in the universal destruction of liberty and 
 order. 
 
 From the Columbian Centinel, Oct. 4, 1800. 
 
 MR. RUSSELL, Those who are accustomed to observe the 
 course of diplomatic affairs, and the " skill " practised by the French 
 in their intercourse with other nations, will not be surprised at the 
 elaborate and insidious article on the subject of our envoys, which 
 is taken from a Paris paper. 
 
 Those who recollect the fulminations of Mr. Adet at the period 
 of our last Presidential election, when terror was the order of the 
 day, will not wonder at the sweet expressions of respect toward our 
 envoys, now the system of terror is suspended and the old system of 
 intrigue resumed. 
 
 But this same paper, which would encourage us to believe that 
 the differences between the two countries will be soon removed, 
 tells us pretty plainly that France will insist upon the same pro 
 vision respecting ships-of-war, privateers, and prizes as is contained 
 in Mr. Jay s treaty, although it is supposed that no such provision 
 can be made on our part without a violation of our faith. But I 
 would inquire upon what ground France will support this extraor 
 dinary demand. She will not say to the American people, whom 
 
698 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEOKGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 she often addresses, " You had no right to make this stipulation." 
 This has never been said, I believe, even to the populace. Will she 
 say, " This stipulation impaired the right of France as secured by 
 former treaties " ? This cannot be said with truth. For the same 
 article in Mr. Jay s treaty which contains the stipulation expressly 
 provides that it shall not operate contrary to former existing treaties. 
 Will she allege that the United States first broke the treaty of 
 1778, which secured to France the stipulation which she now 
 wishes to make ? Every page of the Revolutionary history must 
 confute this ; and her legislative records will prove that she author 
 ized the violation of that treaty from May, 1793, so that our own 
 law of July 7, 1798, is little else than a declaration of the effects 
 flowing from the violations of France. Will the French govern 
 ment say that a sense of propriety or justice to their citizens for 
 bids them to make a treaty with us which does not put them on 
 the same footing with the English ? If this were correct, all 
 treaties should be alike ; whereas it is sufficient that they are fair, 
 equal, and reciprocal between the parties, or such as they shall 
 esteem so. Have the French chosen to forget that previous to 
 the treaty of Mr. Jay, and afterward until the annulment of the 
 French treaty was declared by Congress, England was in the same 
 predicament in relation to the point in question that France is 
 now? And yet England was ready to make an equitable and 
 amicable adjustment of all differences, without complaining of this 
 stipulation existing between us and France. 
 
 It will be seen by all who are not wilfully blind that the con 
 duct of the United States has been perfectly natural, honest, and 
 fair in the whole of this proceeding, and that the complaint of 
 France is without any good reason. In 1778, when we appre 
 hended danger from the power and the hostile disposition of Eng 
 land, we reciprocated with France, among other things, a certain 
 exclusive stipulation relative to maritime rights, which was thought 
 suitable to the interests and views of both the parties. In 1794, 
 we stipulated in a similar manner with England, but provided 
 against the operation of it toward those who had prior rights 
 secured by treaty. France chose, however, to break the treaty by 
 which she held this prior right, and of consequence her right 
 ceased. If this is inconvenient or injurious, she must blame her 
 own conduct, and not that of the United States. Doubtless, the 
 consequence was foreseen ; but it was vainly believed in France 
 
1800.] POLITICAL WHITINGS. 599 
 
 that they could reap the double advantage of keeping us bound 
 and being free themselves, and whatever should be wanting of 
 justice should be amply made up by intrigue or by force. 
 
 ONE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. 
 
 From the Columbian Centinel, Oct. 11, 1800. 
 
 MR. RUSSELL, Among the judicious comments with which 
 you accompanied the publication of the Paris article respecting our 
 envoys, I was rejoiced to see that you considered the proposition 
 relative to neutral bottoms as a mere "lullaby." It is, indeed, 
 unfortunate that, on a subject of such moment to the United States, 
 so much has been at different times addressed to our passions and 
 so little to our understanding, and that our enemies still cherish 
 the belief that we will sacrifice our most substantial interests to 
 our vanity, pride, or mistaken avarice. 
 
 The vexation and oppression which the commerce of neutrals is 
 liable to suffer from belligerent nations will never be essentially 
 mitigated until adequate means are mutually agreed on to satisfy 
 the latter that the property of their enemies is not covered. This 
 can only be done by particular stipulations between nation and 
 nation. Although it may be difficult by convention to secure to 
 belligerents and neutrals the full and free exercise of all the rights 
 they respectively claim, yet, if there is a sincere disposition in the 
 parties, all may be secured that are important, and that can be 
 reasonably insisted on. But when will this salutary arrangement 
 take place, if the neutrals themselves do not promote it, but enter 
 into the absurd projects of one of the war parties against the other? 
 A moment s reflection would satisfy any unprejudiced mind that 
 France, while inferior to England in maritime force, will never 
 be reconciled to any system respecting neutrals which cannot be 
 made a shield for her own commerce in a time of war with that 
 power. While, on the contrary, every system convertible to such 
 a purpose will certainly be opposed by England, or by any pre 
 dominant maritime power, since to every such power this system 
 might, and sometimes would, be more injurious than the arms of 
 the neutral in open war. It is time to put an end to the delusions 
 which have already beguiled us to the very edge of a dangerous 
 precipice. It is a proof of the contempt which the French feel for 
 
600 LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT. [1800. 
 
 those whom they address that they repeat these stale tricks, and 
 still expect to be believed when they profess respect for the rights 
 of nations, for they know and are proud of the distinction. Since 
 the period when imperial Rome lorded it over enslaved nations, 
 no people so insultingly, outrageously, and cruelly tyrannized over 
 others as the French. They admit no rights but those of the 
 sword. It is too plain, therefore, to be mistaken by any but the 
 wilfully blind that all the doctrines and dogmas of the French 
 relative to free bottoms, &c., are vile artifices practised on the 
 neutrals, to engage them against a nation whom, if they could con 
 quer or destroy, they could then hope for the consummation of 
 their wishes in the conquest of the rest of the world. 
 
 ONE OP THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 i. 
 
 The following letter was accidentally omitted in its proper place. 
 See above, p. 344. 
 
 GEORGE CABOT TO PICKERING. 
 
 [Indorsed : Received March 7, 1804.] 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, Our friend Ames, whose ill health has kept him 
 from town through the winter, made an effort to visit my family just 
 as I closed my letter of the 14th. I put it into his hands, having pre 
 viously enclosed him the one I had received from you. He read yours 
 with pleasure, and a mingled emotion of anger which it was impossible 
 wholly to repress. His feelings were such as your sentiments have 
 justly inspired in the few persons to whom I have communicated them, 
 say Mr. Parsons and Mr. Higginson ; but the second thoughts of all of 
 us are such as you would collect from the desultory letter I wrote as 
 mine. Yours, &c. G. C. 
 
 II. 
 
 The following letter was in response to an inquiry in regard to 
 Mr. Dane s objects in serving as a delegate to the Hartford Con 
 vention. See above, p. 519. 
 
 BROOKLINE, Aug. 23, 1878. 
 
 DEAR MR. LODGE, . . . My remembrance is substantially this : 
 My father, from having been always before an old Governor Bow- 
 doin Federalist, sympathized strongly with the Democratic support of 
 the war of 1812, and went with Mr. Dexter and Wm. Gray and the 
 other seceders from the Federal policy. He was an intimate friend of 
 Nathan Dane, and had business relations with him, I believe, in con 
 nection with the old Plymouth Land Company. Mr. Dane was accus 
 tomed to call and see him, when he came up from Beverly. He did so 
 call on his way to attend the Hartford Convention, and said at once to 
 my father: " Well, Mr. Winthrop, you are surprised, I doubt not, that 
 
602 APPENDIX. 
 
 I am going to their Convention." " Yes," said my father ; " I am sur 
 prised, and I greatly regret it." "Do not be alarmed," said Mr. Dane; 
 " somebody must go to prevent mischief. I go in that spirit and for 
 that purpose only, and I hope to bring you word on my return that 
 every thing has gone off safely." 
 
 On Mr. Dane s return he called on my father, agreeably to his prom 
 ise, to communicate to him the results of the Convention. He brought 
 with him, as I understood it, a printed report of their doings, which 
 he gave to my father, saying: u You will see by this that no mischief 
 has been accomplished, but if certain persons could have had their own 
 way, and carried the measures which they proposed, I know not where 
 we should have been. I rejoice that I went to Hartford, and helped 
 to avert danger." 
 
 My father gave me this account somewhere about the time of Nathan 
 Dane s death, in 1835. . . . 
 
 Yours truly, ROBT. C. WINTHROP. 
 
 III. 
 
 The following extract is from a long description of Mr. Cabot 
 in Sullivan s " Familiar Letters" (p. 373). See above, p. 570. 
 
 " Mr. Cabot was a tall man, well formed, of courteous and elegant 
 manners, and refined aspect; his complexion light, his eyes blue, his 
 mode of speaking in colloquial intercourse serious and earnest, but 
 not vehement. The dress of his thoughts was clear, strong, and appro 
 priate, and every sentence apparently incapable of amendment." 
 
 In a note to this description Mr. Sullivan, who knew Mr. Cabot 
 well, and was himself a member of the Hartford Convention, 
 
 says, 
 
 " It is well remembered to have been one of Mr. Cabot s opinions, 
 that this country must, sooner or later, submit (as in ancient repub 
 lics) to the termination of freedom, through popular delusion. He 
 thought the natural action of this spirit was most terrible in small 
 communities ; and that the prolonged safety of this country would be 
 found in the diffusion of its inhabitants over a wide surface. He was, 
 therefore, for continuing the unity of the American people, and avoid 
 ing the evils of party-feeling, when limited to narrow spaces, and to 
 small numbers." 
 
INDEXES. 
 
INDEX OF LETTERS. 
 
 c. 
 
 CABOT, GEORGE, to John Adams, 
 165. 
 
 Cabot, George, to E. Benson, 397. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Benjamin Good- 
 hue, 33, 35, 36. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Christopher Gore, 
 91, 132, 230, 232, 267, 270, 290, 
 292, 317, 324, 333. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Alexander Hamil 
 ton, 43, 46, 48, 73, 283, 284, 293, 
 298. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Rufus King, 73, 
 80, 81, 83, 85, 330, 332, 345. 
 
 Cabot, George, to John Lowell, 348. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Theophilus Par 
 sons, 30, 57, 75, 78. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Samuel Phillips, 
 75. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Timothy Picker 
 ing, 109, 110, 112, 138, 141, 148, 
 149, 156, 164, 170, 172, 173, 175, 
 179, 183, 185, 189, 216, 218, 219, 
 224, 226, 228, 233, 237, 240, 246, 
 249, 250, 272, 333, 336, 337, 341, 
 349, 350, 352, 354, 361, 372, 373, 
 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 
 381, 386, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 
 394, 397, 398, 399, 401, 402, 406, 
 407, 408, 566. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Samuel Sewall, 
 113, 115. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Jeremiah Smith, 
 130. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Caleb Strong, 95, 
 96. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Washington, 43, 
 90, 94. 
 
 Cabot, George, to Oliver Wolcott, 
 84, 86, 111, 118, 120, 123, 128, 134, 
 135, 137, 139, 140, 148, 150, 153, 
 
 158, 168, 172, 222, 229, 244, 253, 
 
 254, 264, 269, 271, 273, 281, 288, 
 
 289, 294, 296, 297, 320, 326, 327, 
 328, 399, 403. 
 
 G. 
 
 Gore, C., to G. Cabot, 186. 
 Gore, C., to Caleb Strong, 559, 560, 
 563. 
 
 H. 
 
 Hamilton, A., to G. Cabot, 273. 
 Higginson, Stephen, to G. Cabot, 
 
 51. 
 Higginson, Stephen, to T. Pickering, 
 
 453. 
 Hillhouse, James, to T. Pickering, 
 
 563. 
 
 K. 
 
 Kent, James, to T. Pickering, 534. 
 King, R., to G. Cabot, 305. 
 King, R., to T. Pickering, 450. 
 
 L. 
 
 Logan, George, to T. Pickering, 
 
 660. 
 
 Lowell, J., to T. Pickering, 645. 
 Lyman, T., to T. Pickering, 446. 
 
 M. 
 
 Marshall, John, to T. Pickering, 489, 
 629. 
 
606 
 
 INDEX OF LETTERS. 
 
 Mcllenry, James, to T. Pickering, 
 204. 
 
 Morris, Gouverneur, to T. Picker 
 ing, 537, 550. 
 
 P. 
 
 Pickering, T., to George Cabot, 107, 
 155, 161, 173, 177, 181, 215, 221, 
 223, 235, 242, 248, 249, 275, 335, 
 337, 380, 387, 394, 400, 404, 555, 
 565. 
 
 Pickering, T., to James Hillhouse, 
 551. 
 
 Pickering, T., to S. Higginson, 441. 
 
 Pickering, T., to Rufus King, 447. 
 
 Pickering, T., to John Lowell, 535, 
 539, 541, 542, 561. 
 
 Pickering, T., to Theodore Lyman, 
 444, 450. 
 
 Pickering, T., to Gouverneur Mor 
 ris, 535. 
 
 Pickering, T., to Samuel Putnam, 
 
 530, 532, 535. 
 
 Pickering, T., to Caleb Strong, 557. 
 Putnam to T. Pickering, 532, 533. 
 
 R. 
 
 Reeve, Tapping, to Uriah Tracy, 
 442. 
 
 S. 
 
 Stoddert, Benj., to John Adams, 
 200. 
 
 w. 
 
 Washington to G. Cabot, 88. 
 Watson, Marston, to G. Cabot, 127. 
 Wolcott, Oliver, to G. Cabot, 117, 
 251, 278, 296, 319, 325, 329. 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 A. 
 
 AMES, FISHER, 30, 35. Opinion of 
 Mr. Cabot s public speaking, 73. 
 Suggests Mr. Cabot as commis 
 sioner to France, 101. Opinion 
 of John Marshall, 147, 170. 
 Member of Governor s Council, 
 233. Eulogy of Washington, 264. 
 Friendship with Mr. Cabot, 301, 
 323. Approves indignation meet 
 ings, 315. Death of, 309. Works 
 of, 370, 397, 399. Last efforts of, 
 388, 399. Opinion of separatist 
 schemes of 1804, 439. Conversa 
 tional powers, 572. 
 
 Adams, John, opinion of Essex 
 Junto, 20,21. Casting vote when 
 Vice-President, 40, 41. Efforts in 
 1792 against re-election of, 57. 
 Anecdote of, at second election for 
 Vice-Presidency, 60. Mr. Cabot s 
 interview with, as to dismissal of 
 Genet, 64, 65. Inauguration as 
 President ; desire for strong neu 
 trality and embassy to France, 99. 
 Composition of embassy, 101. De 
 fects in commission as appointed, 
 103, 104. Account of appoint 
 ment of commission, 103, 104, 
 105. Tone of message 1798, 107. 
 Favors warlike policy 1798, 143. 
 Appoints Mr. Cabot Secretary of 
 Navy, 144. Accepts Washington s 
 list of major-generals ; changes 
 the order, 145. Yields to request 
 of Washington ; defends Gerry, 
 146, 178. Account of Mr. Cabot s 
 hostility to Gerry, 168, 169. Re 
 news negotiations with France 
 1799, 191. Nominates Murray, 
 192, 195. Peace policy, 194. 
 
 Soundness of his peace policy, 
 
 196. Mistakes in carrying it out, 
 
 197. Character of, 198. Account 
 of opposition in the cabinet, 199, 
 200. Accuses his opponents of 
 being a British faction, 213. Jeal 
 ousy of Hamilton, Pickering, and 
 Wolcott, and love of Gerry, 233. 
 Suspends departure of French 
 commission, 246, 247. Despatches 
 commission, 248, 249. His ad 
 ministration, 253. Dismisses 
 Pickering and McHenry, 259. 
 Open quarrel with Pickering, 260. 
 Necessity of supporting in 1800, 
 274. Feelings toward Demo 
 crats, 320. Answer to Quincy 
 Address, 328. Influence of, 453. 
 Ambition of G. Cabot, 573, 574. 
 
 Adams, J. Q., 103, 250. Supports 
 Louisiana purchase, 333, 334. 
 Letter to H. G. Otis, 392, 393, 394. 
 Opinions in regard to France and 
 England, 395, 396. Pamphlet and 
 accusations against Federalist 
 leaders, 411-413. Compelled to 
 submit to Jefferson on leaving 
 Federalist party, 425. Opinion 
 of separatist scheme of 1804, 439. 
 Leaves Federalist party, 474, 475. 
 His defence of the embargo, 476. 
 Charge of separatist scheme in 
 1807 and 1808, 479, 480. Founda 
 tion for this charge, 483. Ac 
 cuses the Federalists of being in 
 communication with England, 484. 
 Charges against the Hartford Con 
 vention, 508. Interpretation of 
 report of Convention, 516. 
 
 Adams, Samuel, position in Con 
 vention of 1788, 24, 25. 
 
 Adet, " proclamation and note," 
 
608 
 
 GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 Ill, 112. Opinions as to proba 
 bility of war in 1797, 134. 
 
 Anderson, Joseph, senator from 
 Tennessee : Attacks Pickering, 
 400. 
 
 Armstrong, John : Thinks France 
 will not enforce decrees, 465. 
 Suppressed correspondence with 
 Champagny, 472. Cadore s letter 
 to, 497. 
 
 Assumption of State debts, 36, 37. 
 Balance due Massachusetts, 73. 
 
 B. 
 
 BANCROFT, GEORGE, anecdote of 
 Mr. Cabot, 576. 
 
 Baring, Alexander, pamphlet by, 
 394, and note. 
 
 Barlow, Joel, 240. His relations 
 with Frencli Directory, 257 ; note 
 on, 295, 530. 
 
 Barnett, Win., 541 and note. 
 
 Barney, Joshua, note on, 220. 
 
 Barnwell, Robert, 57 and note. 
 
 Barton, William, Plan for uniting 
 with Clintonians in 1808, 397. 
 
 Benson, Egbert, 67 and note. 
 
 Berkeley, Admiral, recall of, 377. 
 
 Bigelow, Timothy, character of, 547. 
 
 Bingham, Wm., 221. 
 
 Bowdoin, James, conservative can 
 didate in 1780, 17. Governor, 
 23, 24. 
 
 Bonaparte, issues Berlin decree, 
 864, 465. Issues Milan decree, 
 378. Issues Bayonne decree, 477. 
 
 Bradford, William, Attorney-Gen 
 eral, 92. 
 
 Brent, Richard : Death of, 556. 
 
 Brooks, John, 552. 
 
 Bullers, Dr., 390. 
 
 Burr, Aaron, Mr. Cabot s opinion 
 of, 284. Influence in New York, 
 330. Should not be supported by 
 Federalists for governor, 348. 
 Runs for governor, 448, 450. 
 
 Burwell, W. A,, 401. 
 
 c. 
 
 CABOT, CHARLES, career as mer 
 chant, 302, 323. Death of, 371. 
 
 Cabot, Edward, business, 302, 323. 
 Death of, 303, 335, 336, 337. 
 
 Cabot, Henry, anecdote of Wash 
 ington, 30. Enters a lawyer s of 
 fice, 302, 323. 
 
 Cabot, George, birth, 8. Education, 
 8. Goes to sea ; results of this 
 experience, 9, 10. Becomes a 
 merchant; marriage, 11. Town 
 affairs ; Essex Bridge ; part in 
 the Revolution; privateering, 13. 
 Town report on Constitution of 
 1778, 14, 15. Delegate to Conven 
 tion to fix prices, 15. Delegate to 
 Convention to form a State Con 
 stitution, 16. Member of " Essex 
 Junto," 17. State senator, 22. 
 Speech on Sunday law ; declines 
 a re-election, 23. Delegate to Con 
 vention to consider the Federal 
 Constitution, 24. His part in that 
 Convention, 25-30. Journey to 
 New York; receives Washington 
 at Beverly, 30. Opinions on clause 
 in Constitution regulating elec 
 tions, and on consolidation of 
 States, 32. Opinions on Beverly 
 cotton factory, 32, 33. On as 
 sumption of State debts, 36, 37. 
 Elected senator of the United 
 States, 88. His services on" com 
 mittees, 38, 39. Opinion as to 
 increased representation, 40. Bill 
 to encourage the fisheries, 41. 
 Committee on claims and revenue, 
 42. Services in session of 1792 
 -93, 61. Introduces bills to re 
 claim fugitives from justice, and 
 for registration of fishing vessels, 
 62. Opinion as to dealing with 
 cry of gratitude to France, 63. 
 Interview with John Adams as to 
 dismissal of Genet, 64, 65. On 
 committee on Gallatin s case ; 
 other services, 66. Confers with 
 King, Ellsworth, and Strong as to 
 English mission in 1794, 67. Jef 
 ferson says he favors a President 
 for life, &c., 68. Services in 1794 
 -95 ; withdraws from busi 
 ness, and removes to Brookline, 
 69. His house and farm ; 
 opinions on the Jay treaty, 70. 
 Jefferson says Mr. Cabot an 
 nounced plan to dissolve Union in 
 1795, 71. Moves to strike out 
 " magnanimous nation " from res 
 olution of thanks to France, 72. 
 Services in 1795-96 ; resig 
 nation from the Senate, 72. His 
 manner in debate ; President of 
 
GENERAL IXDEX. 
 
 609 
 
 Boston Branch of United States 
 Bank, 73. Takes charge of the 
 son of Lafayette, 86, 91. Motives 
 in resigning from Senate, 95, 96. 
 Retirement from politics ; takes 
 no part in campaign of 179697 ; 
 His opinions as to duties of elec 
 tors at this time ; favors Mr. 
 Adams, 98. Proposed by Hamil 
 ton and Ames for first French 
 commission, 99, 102. Political ac 
 tivity in 1797 ; opposition to 
 French mission, 106. Sympathy 
 with President s message, 1798, 
 107. Recommends S. Williams 
 for Hamburg consulship, 109. 
 Opinion of Monroe, 110. Opin 
 ion of farewell address, 111. 
 Urged by Wolcott to support 
 administration, 118. Newspaper 
 writings in support of administra 
 tion, 123. Circular letter to Fed 
 eralists, urging them to support 
 administration, 124-127. Opin 
 ions in regard to French relations, 
 128-130. Writes letter to leading 
 Federalists, urging strong meas 
 ures, 130-132. Opinions as to 
 an embargo, 131. Opposition to 
 French mission, 133, 134, 137, 138. 
 Approves President s policy, 139, 
 140. Recommends S. Williams 
 for consul at London, 142. Re 
 newed political exertions, 1798; 
 declines secretaryship of navy, 
 144. Opinion on affair of major- 
 generals ; letter to Mr. Adams 
 against changing the order, 146, 
 165. Defence of Marshall, 147, 
 175, 176. Opinions of French, 
 and of our policy in regard to 
 them, 150-152. Heasons for de 
 clining secretaryship of navy, 156- 
 
 158. Opinions as to naval policy, 
 
 159. Opinion on affair of major- 
 generals, 164< 168, 170, 171. 
 Feelings toward Gerry, and opin 
 ion of his character, 168, 169, 183- 
 185. Opinions as to electoral law, 
 189, 190. Favors war with 
 France, 190. Opposition to peace 
 policy, and nomination of Mur 
 ray, 195. Dread of party divi 
 sions arising from nomination of 
 Murray, 210, 211. Objects to 
 newspaper discussions of the 
 President, and to interference of 
 Senate, 212. Feelings in regard 
 to charge of British faction, 213, 
 
 214. Opposition to Murray s 
 nomination, 224, 225. Opinions 
 of John Adams s not consulting 
 cabinet, 227, 228, 230, 231. Din 
 ner and interview with John 
 Adams, 228, 230. Writes but 
 does not publish six papers re 
 flecting on peace policy, 237, 240. 
 Opinions of British finances, 244- 
 246. Fears of results of French 
 commission, 249, 250. Indigna 
 tion at dismissal of Pickering, 
 260, 272. And at cry of British 
 faction, 261. Opinion as to course 
 of party in ensuing election, 261, 
 283, 284. Hamilton s pamphlet, 
 262, 263. Opinions as to Presi 
 dent s French policy, 265. As to 
 taxation, 266. Opinions of Brit 
 ish government, 270, 271. Sup 
 ports John Adams, but prefers 
 Pinckney as President, 281, 282, 
 285, 286. Advice to Hamilton as 
 to his pamphlet, 285-287. Ob 
 jections to Hamilton s pamphlet, 
 288, 289. Refuses to visit Mr. 
 Adams, 295. Opinion on Wol- 
 cott s resignation, 296, 297. Crit 
 icism of Hamilton s pamphlet, 
 299, 300. Retired life after 1801, 
 301, 302, 323. Removal to Bos 
 ton, 302, 329. Dissolves partner 
 ship with Jos. Lee ; death 
 of his son Edward ; death 
 of Hamilton, 303. Subscribes to 
 fund for Colonel Pickering, and 
 to that for benefit of Hamilton s 
 family, 303, 304. Trustee of 
 Hamilton fund, and disposition 
 of the same, 304-310. Opposed 
 to intrigues in behalf of Burr, 310. 
 Opinion of Jefferson, of Madison, 
 and Gallatin, 311. Of true pol 
 icy for Federalists, 311, 312. 
 Opinions of Jefferson s removals 
 from office ; of attack of judi 
 ciary ; opposes scheme of separa- 
 tion in 1804, 313, 341, 347. Takes 
 part in indignation meeting on 
 admiralty decisions, 314. Reluc 
 tance to do this, 315. Opposition 
 to embargo policy, 316, 317. 
 Opinion of Hamilton, 348. Fa 
 vors alliance with England, 364, 
 365, 372, 373. Considers repara 
 tion offered for " Chesapeake " 
 sufficient, 365, 366. Opposition 
 to embargo, 366. Dread and in 
 dignation at accusation of Brit- 
 
610 
 
 GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 ish faction," 367, 368, 385. Polit 
 ical activity; elected to gover 
 nor s council, 369. Grief for 
 Ames s death, 369, 370. Takes 
 charge of Ames s papers, 370. 
 Opposition to schemes of separa 
 tion, 370, 371. Opinions on pol 
 icy of administration, 371. Grief 
 for death of his son Charles, 371. 
 Complete retirement ; opinions of 
 war of 1812, 372, 408. Chosen 
 President of Hartford Convention, 
 410, 510. Kef uses to take part in 
 " Chesapeake " indignation meet 
 ings, 470. Certificate as to journal 
 of Hartford Convention, 509. His 
 objects in attending Hartford 
 Convention, 519. Retirement 
 after 1815, 564. Opinions on 
 protection and free trade, 566- 
 568. Occupations and family 
 during last years of his life, 568. 
 Illness and death, 569. Personal 
 appearance, 569, 570. His con 
 versational powers, 571. Modest 
 and retiring disposition, 573. Po 
 litical opinions, 574, 575. Aver 
 sion to quarrels, 575, 576. Influ 
 ence in Boston, 576, 577. Literary 
 tastes and occupations, 577. Re 
 ligious views, 578. Political 
 writings, 581-600. 
 
 Cabot, George, Mrs., character of, 
 12. 
 
 Cabot, name and family of, 1-7. 
 Services in Revolution, 13, 14. 
 
 Cabot, Samuel, agent under Jay 
 treaty, 160. 
 
 Callender, J. T , his quarrel with 
 Jefferson, 431, 432. 
 
 " Camillus," 84 and note. 
 
 Canning, George, letter to Pinkney 
 in 1808, 399, 400. Arrogance of, 
 471. 
 
 Carroll, Charles, political opinions in 
 1808, 490. 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord, demands cession 
 of Western Territory, 528. 
 
 Champagny, letter ordering United 
 States to go to war, 392. 
 
 Chase, Samuel, impeachment of, 436, 
 451, 457. 
 
 " Chesapeake," affair of the, 365, 374, 
 377, 378, 470. Reparation for, ac 
 cepted, 500. 
 
 Church, John B., executor of Ham 
 ilton s will, 308, 309, 310. 
 
 Civil service, influence of senators 
 in regard to appointments to, 43. 
 
 Clay, Henry, 17. 
 
 Clinton, George, candidate for Vice- 
 Presidency in 1792, 57. Close vote 
 in 1792, 60. Influence in New 
 York, 330. 
 
 Coin, device on, 42. 
 
 Conventions : at Concord to fix prices, 
 
 15. To frame State Constitution, 
 
 16. To adopt the Constitution, 
 24, 30. 
 
 Council, British, orders in, 93, 364. 
 
 Co-xe, Tench, official misconduct of, 
 140, 148. Publication of Mr. Ad 
 ams s letter, 256. 
 
 Crillon, Count, 486. 
 
 Cross, Stephen and Ralph, charac 
 ters of, 328. 
 
 " Curtius," author of, 84, note. 
 
 Cutting, J. B., note on, 111. Inter 
 view with Mr. Cabot, 122. 
 
 D. 
 
 DALLAS, A. J., 92 and note. His 
 financial measures, 561. 
 
 Dalton, Tristam, succeeded by Mr. 
 Cabot in U. S. Senate, 38. 
 
 Dana, Francis, suggested for French 
 commission, .101, 217, note. 
 
 Dane, Nathan, 533 and note. Char 
 acter of, 548. 
 
 D Arunjo, account of French cor 
 ruption, 216. 
 
 Davie, Thomas, 237. 
 
 Davis, Thomas, trustee of Hamilton 
 fund, 304, 310. 
 
 Dayton, Jonathan, 280, note. 
 
 Dearborn, Henry, 173, note, 427. 
 
 Democrats, policy in 1793, 66. Opin 
 ions of French commission, 254. 
 Support France and oppose Eng 
 land, 401, 402. Demoralization of, 
 466. 
 
 Derby, H., 13, 85. 
 
 Dexter, Samuel, 82 and note, 254. 
 Secretary of War, 291. Opinion 
 of Adams and Jefferson, 321. 
 Democratic candidate for gov 
 ernor, 507. 
 
 Dorchester, Lord, speech to West 
 ern Indians, 67. 
 
 Du Buc, Mr., proposition to fortify 
 Boston, 407. 
 
 D wight, Theodore, testimony as to 
 journal of Convention, 509. Sec 
 retary of Convention, 510. 
 
 Dwight, Timothy, Dr., 294, note. 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 611 
 
 E. 
 
 EDWARDS, PIERREPONT, 318, note, 
 457. 
 
 Electoral law, 189, 190, 336. 
 
 Ellsworth, Oliver, 67. Commission 
 er to France, 223, 234. Opinion 
 of French negotiations, 237, 238, 
 242, 243, 247, note. Visits Mr. 
 Cabot, 324. 
 
 Embargo, opinions of Mr. Cabot as 
 to, in 1797, 131. Effect on New 
 England, 367, 368, 376, 379, 397 
 398. Futility of, 473, 474. Effect 
 on Federalist party, 474. How 
 first received in New England, 476. 
 Effect on New England, 480, 481. 
 Repeal of, 494. 
 
 England, her course in 1793, her 
 blunders, 65. Mission to in 1794, 
 67. Relations with in 1794, 76, 
 78. Admiralty decisions, 314, 457. 
 Diplomacy of, 317. Negotiations 
 with France in 1803, 331, 332, 333. 
 Proposed invasion of, 334, 347, 352. 
 True policy of toward United 
 States, 382-386. Treats United 
 States better than France, 403. 
 Demands of in 1814, 537. 
 
 Eppes, John, 536, and note. 
 
 Erskine, Mr., his negotiation, 496 
 497. 
 
 Essex Bridge, 13, 31. 
 
 Essex Junto, account of, 17-22. 
 
 Eustis, Dr. William, 82 and note, 171. 
 
 F. 
 
 FAUCHET, his intrigue with Ran 
 dolph, 91, 94. Strictures on his 
 pamphlet, 591, 597. 
 
 Federalists, difficult position as a 
 minority in 1793, 66. Carry a 
 bill for foundation of navy, 1794, 
 67. Plot to dissolve Union in 
 1795, 71. Strength of party spirit 
 among, 147. Composition of, and 
 feeling in regard to Murray s 
 nomination, 193, 194. Condition 
 of in 1799, 214, 215. Dissensions 
 of, 256-263. Defeat of, 263, 264. 
 Difficulties of, 268, 269. Forced 
 to support Mr. Adams, 298. True 
 policy of, 321. Defeat in Massa 
 chusetts in 1808, 391. Origin and 
 true meaning of name of, 413. 
 Achievements and difficulties of, 
 
 414, 415. Always in minority, 
 
 415, 417. Secret of their suc 
 cess and failure, 417, 418. Their 
 achievements, 418. Federalism in 
 New England, 419. Their opinion 
 of the French Revolution, 420, 421. 
 Reasons for their hatred of Jeffer 
 son, 422. For concentrating it on 
 him, 424. Their naval policy, 428, 
 429. Policy in regard to Louisi 
 ana, 434. Opinions as to West 
 India trade, 458, 459. Foreign 
 policy of in 1805, 460, 461, 462. 
 Policy in 1806, 4(59. Policy after 
 rejection of treaty, 472. Attack 
 the embargo, 477, 478. Real ob 
 jects of in 1807-8, 481, 482. 
 Had no knowledge of Henry, 487. 
 Political opinions of in 1808, 488- 
 494. Opposition to the war, 504. 
 Satisfaction with results of Hart 
 ford Convention, 52-4, 563. De 
 light at peace ; adoption of their 
 principles in government, 525. 
 Their part in system of taxation 
 in 1814, 5m 
 
 Fish, Nicholas, executor of Hamil 
 ton s will, 308, 309, 310. 
 Fisheries, bill to encourage, 38, 41. 
 Mr. Cabot chairman of commit 
 tee on, 39. Letter on to Hamilton, 
 46-48. Letter from S. Higginson 
 on, 51. Letters to Sewall on, 113- 
 116. 
 
 Foster, Augustus, his negotiation, 
 500. 
 
 France, politics of and feelings of 
 Federalists toward, 62, 63, 64. 
 Relations with in 1793, 74. Rela 
 tions with in 1794, 76, 78. Diffi 
 culties with in 1797, 117. Condi 
 tion of in 1799, 267. Negotiations 
 with in 1800, 289, 21X). Power and 
 objects of, and dangers from, 581- 
 588. Intrigues in United States, 
 588, 589. Jacobinism in, 589-591. 
 Deceitful policy of, 597-600. 
 
 Francis, Tench, 230. 
 
 Freeman, Nathaniel, 173, note. 
 
 Frelinghuysen, Fred., 95. 
 
 Freneau, Philip, edits " National 
 Gazette," 59. 
 
 Frestel, Mr., tutor to young Lafay 
 ette, 86-91. 
 
 Fries, pardon of, 275. 
 
 Fugitives from justice, bill for re 
 claiming, 62. 
 
012 
 
 GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 G. 
 
 GALLATIN, ALBERT, contested elec 
 tion of to Senate, 66, 188. Financial 
 policy, 429. Report attacking the 
 Federalists, 431. 
 
 Genet, his arrival in America, 62. 
 His enrolling troops, 75. 
 
 Georgia, separatism in, 522. 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge, urged by Mr. Ad- 
 anis for the French commission, 
 101. Character of, 104. Defended 
 by Mr. Adams, 146. Mr. Cabot s 
 opinion of, 168, 169. Attitude of, 
 after return from France, 168, 171, 
 172, 174, 175, 176, 179, 180. Can 
 didate for governor, 271. Con 
 duct in regard to his brother, S. R. 
 Gerry, the collector, 326. Con 
 nection with John Henry, 486. 
 
 Ghent, treaty of, 563. 
 
 Giles, William B., attack on Hamil 
 ton, 61. Demand for papers in 
 French negotiations, 143. Op 
 poses repeal of embargo, 400. 
 Attacks the judiciary, 428, 436, 
 490, 491. J. Q. Adams s friend 
 ship with and opinion of, 475. 
 
 Gill, Moses, 233. 
 
 Goodhue, Benjamin, M. C., 33. Suc 
 ceeds Mr. Cabot in Senate, 72, 170. 
 Opinion of Marshall, 179. 
 
 Gore, Christopher, writings in news 
 papers, 84. Recommended by Mr. 
 Cabot for commissioner under Jay 
 treaty, 94. Commissioner to Lon 
 don, 132. Opinions as to treating 
 with France, 186. As to treaty 
 with England, 187. Recommended 
 by Mr. Cabot for minister to St. 
 Petersburg, 229. Member of Fed 
 eralist Convention in 1808, 397. 
 Heads committee against embargo, 
 44)3. 
 
 Gray, William, 85, note, 123. 
 
 Grenville, Lord, note to Talleyrand, 
 270. 
 
 Griswold, Roger, thrashes M. Lyon, 
 188, 341 and note. Threatens 
 separation, 435. Share in sepa 
 ratist scheme of 1804, 438. Re 
 sists call for militia in 1812, 513. 
 
 H. 
 
 HAMILTON, ALEXANDER, friendship 
 for Mr. Cabot, 25, 26. Assisted by 
 
 Mr. Cabot in financial measures, 41. 
 Replies to " National Gazette," 60. 
 Attacks on, in Congress, 1792- 
 93, 61. Proposes and is pro 
 posed for English mission in 1794, 
 67. Subdues whiskey rebellion, 
 69. Stoned at public meeting on 
 Jay treaty, 83. Care of young 
 Lafayette, 87, 91. Opinion as to 
 ratification of Jay treaty, 93. 
 Course during Presidential cam 
 paign of 1796, 98. Scheme for 
 French commission, 99, 102. Af 
 fair of major-generals, 145, 146 
 Would not serve, if superseded by 
 Knox, 164. Attack on Mr. Adams, 
 262, 263. Death of, and effect 
 on Federal party, 303, 455. Pro 
 vision for family of, 304, 310. 
 Opinion of separatist scheme in 
 1804, 313. Action in regard to 
 separatist scheme of 1804, 437, 
 438. 
 
 Hammond, Mr., British minister, 93. 
 
 Hancock, John, opposition to, in 
 1780, 17, 23, 24. Position at time 
 of Convention of 1788, 24, 25. 
 Love of flattery, 232. 
 
 Harper, Robert Goodloe, note on, 
 153, 286. Conduct in Pickering 
 impeachment, 451. 
 
 Hartford Convention, has not been 
 treated historically, 410. Sources 
 of information for history of, 411, 
 412. Appointed, 505. Terms of 
 appointment ; characters of mem 
 bers, 506. Supported by majority 
 of people, 507, 508. Journal of, 
 509, 510. Report of analyzed, 511- 
 516. Real objects of, 518, 519. 
 Adopts doctrine of nullifica 
 tion, 520. Unconstitutionality of, 
 521. 
 
 Hauteval, Mons., agent of Talley 
 rand, 174. 
 
 Henry, John, character and history 
 of, 484-488. 
 
 Henry, Patrick, commissioner to 
 France, 223. 
 
 Higginson, Stephen, 21, 22, 153, 170, 
 172, 217. Opinion of separatist 
 scheme of 1804, 439, 453. 
 
 Hill, Hugh, Captain, 13. 
 
 Hillhouse, James, letter of, 390. 
 "Old Sachem," 406. Share in 
 separatist scheme of 1804, 438. 
 
 Hiller, Mr., replaced by Colonel 
 Lee as collector of Salem, 327. 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 613 
 
 I. 
 
 IMPRESSMENT, negotiations in re 
 gard to, 463. British note on in 
 1806, 464. 
 
 Ingersoll, Jared, 103. 
 
 Iredell, James, visits " Greenhill," 
 Mr. Cabot s home, 70. 
 
 J. 
 
 JACKSON, FRANCIS JAMES, dismissal 
 of, 408. 
 
 Jackson, Henry, note on, 176. 
 
 Jackson, James, Dr., anecdote of 
 Mr. Cabot, 519. 
 
 Jackson, Jonathan, note on, 135. 
 Recommended by Mr. Cabot as 
 commissioner on British debts, 
 135. But declines, 136. 
 
 Jacobin clubs, 69. 
 
 Jay, John, nominated for English 
 mission, 67. Proposed by Hamil 
 ton for French commission, 102. 
 Political opinions in 1808, 490. 
 
 Jay treaty, debate on in House, 70. 
 Opinion in Massachusetts on, 80, 
 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86. Danger of 
 defeat in House, and action of 
 Senate, 95. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, anecdote of his 
 learning Spanish, 26, note. As 
 sumes leadership of anti-Federal 
 ists, 39, 40. First efforts against 
 the Federalists. 59. Establishes 
 " National Gazette," 59, 60. Retires 
 from office, but not from control 
 of party, 66, 67. Opinion of Mr. 
 Cabot, 68. Accuses Federalists of 
 plot to dissolve Union in 1795, 71. 
 Proposed by Hamilton for French 
 commission, 101. Foreign policy 
 and embargo, 316, 317. Restrained 
 by Madison and Gallatin from 
 pushing his theories, 324, 325. His 
 policy to the Moors, 326. His 
 policy in 1807, 374. Does not in 
 tend or wish war, 404, 405. Re 
 turns from Europe, enters cabinet 
 and forms Democratic party, 416. 
 Rouses hostility to England; un- 
 abl# to overcome Federalists, 417. 
 His avowed principles and the na 
 ture of his success, 422. His pledges 
 to the Federalists, 423, 424. Con 
 trol of his party, 424, 425, 426. 
 Fortunate moment of his acces 
 sion, 426. His first measures, 426, 
 
 427 His cabinet, 427. Attack 
 on^civil service and the judiciary, 
 427. 428. Ruin of the navy, 
 429. Changes effected by ; treat 
 ment of Mr. Merry, 430. His 
 quarrel with Callender, 431, 432. 
 Invitation to Paine, 432. Naval 
 and giuiboat policy, 433. The 
 Louisiana policy, 433, 434. Con 
 siders acquisition of Louisiana 
 unconstitutional, 434, 435. Ac 
 cepts renomination, 455. Gunboat 
 and fortification policy, 456, 457, 
 459, 465. Obtains Mediterranean 
 fund ; his objects, 458. Conduct in 
 the Peirce affair, 459. Forbids trade 
 with Hayti, 460. Foreign policy, 
 4(30, 461, 462. Reasons for reject 
 ing treaty in 1806, 468. Position 
 of in 1806, 469. Management of 
 " Chesapeake " affair, 470. Policy 
 after rejection of treaty, 471. 
 Lays the embargo, 473. Grief at 
 repeal of embargo, 494. Close of 
 his administration, 495. 
 
 Jeffrey, Patrick, 171, note. 
 
 Jones, Merriweather, 448. 
 
 Judiciary, reform of, in 1802, 327, 
 329. Attack on, 338, 339, 428, 436. 
 
 K. 
 
 KENT, JAMES, opinions as to orders 
 in council and embargo, 534. 
 
 King, Rufus, 67. Plan to dissolve 
 the Union in 1795, 71. Gloomy 
 view of foreign affairs, 149. Ne 
 gotiations with Russia, 232. Ef 
 forts in behalf of Hamilton s 
 family, 305, 306. Opinion of 
 separatist scheme in 1804, 314, 
 439, 450. Ability of, 324. Politi 
 cal opinions in 1808, 491. 
 
 Knower, B., 545. 
 
 Knox, Henry, conduct in affair of 
 major-generals, 145, 146, 161, 164, 
 173, 174. Bankruptcy of, 174, 
 176, 177, 184, 188. Declines to 
 serve as major-general, 176, 177, 
 186. Influence with John Adams, 
 230. 
 
 L. 
 
 LAFAYETTE, G. M. de, visit to this 
 country in 1795 ; Washington s 
 reception of him, 87. Confided to 
 care of Mr. Cabot, 87, 91. 
 
614 
 
 GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 Langdon, John, 60, 82 and note. 
 
 Lawrence, John, 57 and note. 
 
 Lear, Tobias, note on, 68. 
 
 Learned, Mr., of Connecticut, 94. 
 
 Lee, Charles, opposition to peace 
 policy, 194. Position in the cab 
 inet, 197. 
 
 Lee, Joseph, captain of ship on 
 George Cabot s first voyage, 9. 
 Business relations with George 
 Cabot, 11. Dissolution of partner 
 ship with Mr. Cabot, 303. 
 
 Lincoln, Benjamin, note on, 164. 
 Indorser of Knox s notes, 165, 174, 
 176, 177, 188. 
 
 Lincoln, Levi, 427. Supports em 
 bargo, 493. 
 
 Listen, Mr., 171, 227. 
 
 Livermore, Edward St. Loe, 375. 
 
 Lloyd, James, draws memorial 
 against admiralty decisions, 314. 
 Member of Federalist Convention 
 in 1808, 397. Speech on embargo, 
 402. Political opinions in 1808, 
 491. Demands a navy, 502. 
 
 Logan, George, opinion of Hartford 
 Convention, 560. 
 
 Louisiana, purchase of, 331, 333, 433, 
 
 434. Effect on the Federalists, 
 
 435, 436. 
 
 Lowell, John, Judge, 73, 96. ^ote 
 on, 175. 
 
 Lowell, John, character of Mrs. 
 George Cabot, 12. Fourth of July 
 oration, 233. Note on, 298. Ex 
 ertions in 1808, 376. His " Analy 
 sis," 402, 404. Refuses to take 
 part in " Chesapeake " indignation 
 meeting, 470. Objects of Hartford 
 Convention, 519. Supports ex 
 treme views of Mr. Pickering, 
 528, 529. Description of Hartford 
 Convention and its members, 545- 
 
 549. Character of Mr. Cabot, 
 547. Duties of Hartford Conven 
 tion, 549. 
 
 Lvman, Theodore, trustee of Hamil 
 ton fund, 304, 310. Opinion of 
 separatist scheme of 1804, 439, 446. 
 Note on, 444. 
 
 Lyon, Matthew, note on, 188. 
 
 M. 
 
 MADISOX, JAMES, change of party, 
 37, 59. Proposed by Hamilton 
 for first French commission, 99- 
 
 102. Only distinguished man who 
 left Federalists, 417. Objects in 
 buying up Henry, 487. Difficul 
 ties of, at his accession, 495. Con 
 duct in Erskine negotiation, 496, 
 497. Supported in treatment of 
 Jacks;on, 498. Enters into nego 
 tiation with England on behalf of 
 France, 498, 499. Declares war, 
 503. 
 
 Major generals, affair of the, 145, 
 146, 161, 164. 
 
 Manning, Dr., 180. [33, 34, 43. 
 
 Manufactures, account of Beverly, 
 
 Marshall, John, appointed on French 
 commission, 103. Opposition to 
 alien and sedition laws, 147, 175, 
 176. Attacks on, 177. Proposed 
 for judge of Supreme Court, 178. 
 His conduct in France, 178. 
 Leader in Congress, 268. Secre 
 tary of State, 291. Political opin 
 ions in 1808, 489. Opinion of 
 Madison s French policy, 529. 
 
 Maryland, separatism in. 522. 
 
 Mason, Jonathan, 299 and note. 
 
 Massachusetts, resolutions of Legis 
 lature, 1799, 218. District choice 
 of electors, 349. Supports em 
 bargo, 375, 376. Resolves of Leg 
 islature in 1808, 492 Action of, 
 in 1809, 493, 494. Opinion as to 
 French policy, 497, 498. Action 
 in 1814, 505. Opinions of, in 1814, 
 532, 533. 
 
 McHenry, James, account of ap 
 pointment of French commission, 
 104. Resists peace policy, 194. 
 Account of cabinet difficulties with 
 John Adams, 204-210. 
 
 Mercer, John Francis, 555. 
 
 Minot, George R., 31, 33 and note. 
 
 Monroe, James minister to France, 
 his recall, 99. Conduct in Parish s 
 case, 107-109. Conduct in France, 
 110. Protests against impress 
 ment, 471. 
 
 Morris, Gouverneur, minister to 
 France, 99. Supports extreme 
 views of Pickering, 528. Political 
 opinions in 1814, 538. Hopes of 
 Hartford Convention. 550, 555, 
 556. Anecdote of, 572. 
 
 Morse, Jedidiah, 295. 
 
 Motier, name assumed by young 
 Lafayette, 86-91. 
 
 Murray, Wm. Vans, nomination as 
 .minister to France, 192, 195, 221, 
 223, 224. 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 615 
 
 N. 
 
 NAVY, foundation of, 144. 
 Neutrals, rights and trade of, 324, 
 
 350, 351, 352, 353-363, 393. 
 New England, feeling in against 
 
 France in 1797, 140, 141. Efforts 
 
 to consolidate Federalist party in, 
 
 292, 293, 294. 
 New Haven collectorship, 320, 321 
 
 and note. 
 New Orleans, probable capture by 
 
 British and results, 553, 554, 557, 
 
 558, 559. 
 New York, separatism in, 522, 523. 
 
 Feeling in, in 1814, 545. 
 Novi, battle of, 249. 
 
 o. 
 
 OAKLEY, T. J., 536 and note. 
 
 Osgood, Samuel, 58, note. 
 
 Otis, Harrison Gray, opinion of alien 
 and sedition laws, 147, 172, 179. 
 Author of the "Envoys," 229. Sup 
 port of Mr. Adams, 268. Member 
 of Federalist Convention in 1808, 
 307. Political opinions in 1808, 
 492. Objects of Hartford Con 
 vention, 518. Character of, 547. 
 
 P. 
 
 "PACIFICUS," 74. 
 
 Paine, Elijah, 95. 
 
 Paine, Thomas, 432, 433. 
 
 Parish, Mr., consul at Hamburg, 
 Monroe s hostility, removal of, 107, 
 108, 109. 
 
 Parsons, Theophilus, his account 
 of and connection with Essex 
 Junto, 20-22 His part in Con 
 vention to adopt Constitution, 25. 
 Urged to enter Congress, 58. 
 Recommended by Mr. Cabot as 
 commissioner under the Jay treaty, 
 94. Opinion of separatist scheme 
 of 1804, 439. Refuses to take 
 part in " Chesapeake " indigna 
 tion meeting, 470. Decision as 
 to calling out militia, 513. 
 
 Parker, Isaac, note on, 173. Deci 
 sion as to calling out militia, 513. 
 
 Parties, their position in 1791-92, 
 39, 40. Their relations to France 
 and foreign influence, 62, 64. 
 Attitude of during debate on Jay 
 treaty, 71. State of, in regard to 
 Murray s nomination, 192, 193. 
 
 Patterson, William, note on, 175, 
 247. 
 
 Payne, William, 267. 
 
 Pendleton Nathaniel, executor of 
 Hamilton s will, 308, 309, 310. 
 
 Pennsylvania, separatism in, 521. 
 
 Peters, Richard, opinion of John 
 Henry, 487, 488. 
 
 Phillips, Samuel, 75, note. 
 
 Pickering, Judge, impeachment of, 
 436, 451. 
 
 Pickering, Timothy, account of Es 
 sex Junto, 19-22. Opposition to 
 peace policy in 1797, 100. Asks 
 Mr. Cabot s advice as to Hamburg 
 consulship, 107-109. Reply to 
 Adet, 112. Reply to Yrujo, 141. 
 Urges Mr. Cabot to accept secre 
 taryship of navy, 144, 155, 156. 
 Attacks of the " Aurora " on, 149. 
 Account of affair of _ major- 
 generals, 16~1, 164. Opinion of 
 Gerry V-condnet,- 178, 182, 183. 
 Report- on French affairs, 191. 
 Resists peace policy, 194. Leader 
 in opposition to Mr. Adams, 191. 
 Attacks on Mr. Adams, 213, 
 275, 278. Opinion of President s 
 message, 216. Subscription for, 
 304, 305. Plan of separation in 
 1804, 337. Attacks embargo, 367, 
 368. Wishes to have Boston for 
 tified, 371, 407. Letters to Sulli 
 van, 379-382, 388-390, 394-396, 
 477. Views as to J. Q. Adams s 
 change of party, 396. Attacked 
 for his letters in Congress, 400,- 
 401. Share in separatist scheme - 
 in 1804, 437, 438. Laments decay . 
 of party spirit in 1804, 456. Ob 
 jects of Hartford Convention, 519. 
 Theories in regard to separation, 
 and grounds for them, 527, 528. 
 Extreme views of, 528. Did not 
 wish separation for its own sake, 
 629. Urges Legislature of Massa 
 chusetts to issue an address, 530. 
 Urges strong measures on Massa 
 chusetts, 532, 535. Opinions as 
 to policy of Massachusetts, 539. 
 Opinions as to Hartford Conven 
 tion, 540, 541. Character of Mr. 
 Cabot, 541, 542. Opinion as to 
 what the Convention ought to do, 
 541, 545, 551. Satisfaction with 
 report of Convention, 561-563. 
 
 Pickman, B., 546 and note. 
 
 Pinckney, C. C., candidate for Vice- 
 President in 1796, 98. Minister 
 
616 
 
 GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 to France, 99. Urged by Hamil 
 ton for first French commission, 
 99, 102. Ministerial rank of, 117, 
 118. Affair of major-generals, 
 145, 146. Readiness to serve un 
 der Hamilton, 173, 177. Opinion of 
 Gerry, 184. 
 
 Pinkney, William, sent to England, 
 864. Negotiation with Canning, 
 478. Negotiation with Lord Wel 
 les ley, 408. 
 
 Plumer, William, share in separatist 
 scheme of 1804, 438. 
 
 " Porcupine, Peter," attack on John 
 Adams, 221. 
 
 Prescott, William, character of, 547. 
 
 Privateering in the Revolution, 18. 
 
 Putnam, Samuel, 530 and note. 
 
 Q. 
 
 QUTNCY, JOSTAH, 375. Political opin 
 ions in 1808, 491. Objects of Hart 
 ford Convention, 518. 
 
 R. 
 
 RANDALL, H. S., unfounded accusa 
 tion against Mr. Cabot, 310, note. 
 
 Randolph, Edmund, his intrigue 
 with Fauchet, 91, 94. 
 
 Randolph, John, revolt from Jeffer 
 son, 424. Attacks the Judiciary, 
 428, 43(5, 444. Recalls to Jeffer 
 son the fate of Lord North, 494. 
 Proposes repeal of non-importa 
 tion act, 499. 
 
 Katford, Win., British deserter taken 
 from " Chesapeake," 393. 
 
 Read, Jacob, 221. 
 
 Reeve, Tapping, 442 and note. 
 
 Representation, speeches on, 26, 27, 
 28. Ratio of, 40. Letter to Par 
 sons on increase of, 57. 
 
 Revere, Paul, 22. 
 
 Bobbins, E., 171, 179. 
 
 Robbins, Jonathan, case of, 393. 
 
 Rochefoucauld, Liancourt, Due de la, 
 interview with Mr. Cabot, 121. 
 
 Rose, George Henry. 21. Negotia 
 tion of, 374, 376, 378. Departure 
 and failure of his mission, 382. 
 Mr. Cabot s letter sent to, 387. 
 Character of, 388, 470. 
 
 Ross, James, 221, 226. Political 
 opinions in 1808, 490. 
 
 S. 
 
 SAINT DOMINGO, trade with, 188, 
 189. 
 
 Sargent, Daniel, 548. 
 
 Sedgwick, Theodore, 221. 
 
 Senate, absences from, in early 
 years, 39, 40, 95. Powers of, 235, 
 237, 241-243. President should 
 not consult, 376. 
 
 Serrurier, offers no indemnity, 499. 
 
 Sewall, Samuel, 113 and note, 172. 
 Decision as to calling out militia, 
 513. 
 
 Shepherd, Abraham, proposes motto 
 for Federal Convention, 1809, 492. 
 
 Skipwith, Fulwar, 110 and note. 
 
 Smilie, John, 466. 
 
 Smith, Jeremiah, opinion of calum 
 nies against Washington, 88. 
 
 Smith, Robert, leaves cabinet and 
 opposes French policy, 499. 
 
 Smith, Samuel, 159, 801 and notes. 
 
 Smith, William L., 57 and note. 
 Negotiations with the Porte, 232. 
 
 Spencer, Ambrose, 575 and note. 
 
 State troops, bill for, 559, 561. 
 
 St. Clair, 41. 
 
 Steele, John, 297 and note. 
 
 Stockton, Richard, 221. 
 
 Stoddert, Benjamin, succeeds Mr. 
 Cabot as Secretary of the Navy, 
 128, 130, 144. Opposition to 
 peace policy, 194. Position in 
 the cabinet, 197. Account of 
 cabinet troubles, 200-203. Report 
 on navy, 428. Political opinions 
 in 1808, 490. 
 
 Story, Joseph, 377 and note. Oppo 
 sition to embargo, 494. 
 
 Strong, Caleb, friendship with Mr. 
 Cabot, 88, 67. Recommended for 
 English commissioner, 135, 136, 
 343. Resists call for militia, 513. 
 Urged to remain in office during 
 war, 560. 
 
 Sullivan, James, relations with 
 council ; death, 369, 375. Reply 
 to Pickering, 386. 
 
 Sullivan, William, 548. 
 
 Sumner, Increase, Federalist princi 
 ples of, 218. Death, 233. 
 
 Swan, James, 134 and note. 
 
 T. 
 
 TALLEYRAND, knowledge of Mr. 
 Cabot, 101. Attempts to bribe 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 61T 
 
 American commissioners, 174. 
 
 Opinion of Gerry, 184. Protected 
 
 by Bonaparte, 270. Threatens 
 
 war, 459. 
 
 Tayler, John, 545. 
 Taylor, John, 442 and note, 553. 
 Tazewell, William, his account of 
 
 Federalist plot in 1795, 71. 
 Tennessee, admission to Union, 96. 
 Thorndike, Israel, 548. 
 Ticknor, George, anecdote of Mr. 
 
 Adams as to Mr. Cabot, 573. 
 Tracy, Uriah, supports separatist 
 
 scheme in 1804, 340, 438. 
 Treaty of 1806, 373, 464. Compared 
 
 with those of 1795 and 1815, 467. 
 Trumbull, John, 14, 174. 
 Trumbull, Jonathan, 318 and note. 
 Truxtun, Thomas, naval victories, 
 
 271. 
 
 Turreau, Mons., 459, 465. 
 Tyng, D., character of, 327. 
 
 u. 
 
 UNITED STATES, condition and dan 
 gers of, in 1794, 78, 80. Feeling 
 towards France in 1797, 119, 120. 
 Advantages to, from war with 
 France, 219, 220, 222, 223. Evils 
 resulting to, from negotiations 
 with France, 234, 235. Feeling 
 towards England, 252, 253. Plan 
 to dissolve in 1804, 314, 337, 344, 
 437, 440. Democracy in, 349. 
 Relations with France and England 
 compared, 406, 407. Opinions in 
 regard to separation in 1804, 440, 
 441. Correspondence relating to 
 separation of, 441, 454. Separa 
 tism in, 523. Dangerous condi 
 tion of, in 1814, 523, 524. 
 
 V. 
 
 VARNUM, JOSEPH B., note on, 173. 
 Vermont, separatism in, 523. 
 Vining, John, 95. 
 Virginia, separatist movements in 
 
 1792 and 1799, 521; 1813, 522. 
 
 Condition of, during war of 1812, 
 
 552. 
 
 w. 
 
 WADSWORTH, JAMES, 91, 170. 
 War of 1812, 408, 409. Objects of, 
 
 503. Course of, 504. Its failure, 
 
 524. Its real value, 525. 
 
 War party, origin, character, and 
 policy of, 500-502. Compels Mr. 
 Madison to declare war, 503. 
 Eagerness to make peace, 524. 
 
 Washington, George, breakfasts 
 with Mr. Cabot at Beverly, 30. 
 His treatment of Genet, 64. His 
 policy of strong neutrality, 65. 
 His course in regard to young 
 Lafayette, 86-91. Democratic 
 calumnies against, on this account, 
 88. His opinion of Edmund Ran 
 dolph, 92. Censure of Monroe, 
 99. His list of major-generals, 
 145. Insists on retaining original 
 order, 146. Opinions as to affair 
 of major-generals, 163, 164. 
 Hopes of the Federalists as to 
 third term, 250. Death of, and 
 effect on Federalist party, 257. 
 
 Watson, Marston, note on, 127. 
 
 Wayne, Anthony, his Indian victo 
 ries in 1794, 69. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, forms Mr. Cabot s 
 acquaintance, 573. 
 
 Whiskey insurrection, 60, 69. 
 
 Wilde, S. S., character of, 548. 
 
 Willard, Joseph, member of Beverly 
 committee to report against Con 
 stitution of 1778, 15. 
 
 Williams, Samuel, note on, 109. 
 Recommended for consul at Lon 
 don, 142. Opinions on war, 335. 
 
 Winthrops, the: Jacobin leaders, 
 185. 
 
 Wolcott, Oliver, opposition to peace 
 policy in 1797, 100. Scheme for 
 French commission, 103. Resists 
 peace policy, 194. Opinion of 
 British finances, 251. 252. Opin 
 ion of Mr. Adams, 279. Resigns 
 from the treasury, 296. Private 
 life of; opinion of Jefferson, 319. 
 Removal to New York, 329, 330. 
 Replies to Gallatin s report at 
 tacking Federalists, 431. 
 
 X. 
 
 X. Y. Z. letters, publication of, and 
 feeling created thereby, 143, 153. 
 
 Y. 
 
 YRUJO, Chevalier de, conduct in 
 America, 141. Return to America, 
 465. 
 
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