. . , 
 
Photogrctph by 1-dmonsto* 
 
 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 
 
LA FOLLETTE S 
 AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
 
 A Personal Narrative of Political 
 Experiences 
 
 BY 
 
 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 
 
 ILLUSTRATED 
 
 MADISON, WIS. 
 
 THE ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE CO. 
 1913 
 

 
 Copyright, 1911, 19l%> by 
 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 
 
 All rights reserved, including that of 
 translation into foreign languages, 
 including the Scandinavian 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction . . ,^<, V . . r ,. . ix 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. Political Beginnings . J . . . 3 
 II. In the House of Representatives . 49 
 
 III. The Reed Congress and the New 
 
 National Issues . . . . . 91 
 
 IV. The Crucial Period of My Public - 
 
 Life 1 >v ...... 135 
 
 V. Six Years Struggle with the Wis 
 consin Bosses . . . . . 176 
 
 VI. My First Term as Governor and 
 
 the Problems I Had to Meet . 225 
 
 VII. How We Passed the Railroad 
 
 Taxation Laws 278 
 
 VIII. Progressive Government Produces 
 Business Prosperity : What Was 
 Accomplished in Wisconsin . 319 
 
 IX. Alone in the Senate: Experiences 
 With Roosevelt; Railroad Rate 
 Regulation 370 
 
 X. Reinforcements: A National Pro 
 gressive Movement .... 427 
 v 
 
 267416 
 
vi CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 XI. Why I Became a Candidate for 
 the Presidency; Taft s Unavail 
 ability; A Complete History of 
 Roosevelt s Course After His 
 Return from Africa; Formation 
 of the Organized Progressive 
 Movement; Pressure for a Real 
 Progressive Candidate . . . 476 
 
 " XII. The True History of the Campaign 
 of 1912 for the Republican 
 Nomination to the Presidency . 530 
 
 XIII. Why I Continued as a Candidate; 
 Roosevelt Never a Progressive; 
 His Record 671 
 
 Appendix: Address of Robert M. La 
 Follette at the Annual Banquet 
 of the Periodical Publishers 
 Association, Philadelphia, Feb 
 ruary 2, 1912, Dealing with the 
 History of the Growth of the 
 Power Represented in Trusts, 
 Consolidated Railroads and 
 Consolidated Banking Interests 
 Controlling Money and Credits, 
 and Suggestions for Meeting 
 Recognized Evils 762 
 
 Index 799 
 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Robert M. LaFollette , . . . Frontispiece 
 
 FACING PAGE 
 
 Birthplace ....... 6 
 
 La Follette Family (from a daguerrotype) . 12 
 La Follette at Nine Years of Age . . .18 
 President John R. Bascom . . . . 28 
 General George E. Bryant . . . .46 
 
 Mrs. Robert M. La Follette, early 90 s . . 66 
 La Follette, when elected to Congress .* . 84 
 Judge Robert G. Siebecker . . v . 140 
 
 Philetus Sawyer . 170 
 
 A. R. Hall . . . . . . .212 
 
 Samuel A. Harper . ... t . . .218 
 
 Mrs. La Follette, a late portrait . . .314 
 Wisconsin s first Railway Commission . . 348 
 Senator Jonathan P. Dolliver .... 434 
 
 Fac-simile page stenographic transcript Senate 
 
 proceedings 478 
 
 Fola, Robert, Philip, and Mary La Follette . 494 
 La Follette Campaigning . . . . . 562 
 The La Follette home, Maple Bluff Farm, 
 
 Madison, Wisconsin . . . .612 
 
 Theodore Roosevelt 684 
 
 William Jennings Bryan ..... 750 
 
 vii 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 IN THE preparation of this narrative I have 
 no literary intent whatsoever. I am not 
 writing for the sake of writing, nor for the 
 mere purpose of relating the events of my politi 
 cal life. I have not yet reached the secluded 
 age when a man writes his life story for the 
 enjoyment the exercise gives him. 
 
 Every line of this autobiography is written 
 for the express purpose of exhibiting the struggle 
 for a more representative government which is 
 going forward in this country, and to cheer on 
 the fighters for that cause. Most of these chap 
 ters were written at Washington between the 
 close of one important Congressional struggle 
 and the opening of another. The final chapters 
 were written after the National Convention and 
 before the presidential election of 1912. Thus 
 the entire narrative may be said to have been 
 written from the field. 
 
 ix 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 We have long rested comfortably in this 
 country upon the assumption that because our 
 form of government was democratic, it was 
 therefore automatically producing democratic 
 results. Now, there is nothing mysteriously 
 potent about the forms and names of demo 
 cratic institutions that should make them self- 
 operative. Tyranny and oppression are just 
 as possible under democratic forms as under 
 any other. ^We are slow to realize that democ 
 racy is a life; and involves continual struggle. 
 It is only as those of every generation who love 
 democracy resist with all their might the en 
 croachments of its enemies that the ideals of 
 representative government can even be nearly 
 approximated. 
 
 The essence of the Progressive movement, as 
 I see it, lies in its purpose to uphold the funda 
 mental principles of representative governfl^it. 
 It expresses the hopes and desires of millions of 
 common men and women who are willing to 
 fight for their ideals, to take defeat if necessary, 
 and still go on fighting. 
 
 Fortunes of birth, temperament and political 
 
INTRODUCTION xi 
 
 environment have thrown me into this struggle, 
 and have made me in some degree a pioneer in the 
 Progressive movement. I am therefore writing 
 my own story in these pages because I believe 
 this to be the best means of mapping out the 
 whole field of conflict and exposing the real 
 character of the enemy. 
 
 I shall give as faithful an account as I know 
 how, of political events in which I have partici 
 pated and I shall characterize the strong men 
 whom I have known, and especially I shall 
 endeavor to present those underlying motives 
 and forces which are often undiscerned in Ameri 
 can politics. 
 
 I believe that most thoughtful readers, per 
 plexed by the conditions which confront the 
 country, will find that they have been meeting 
 in various guises the same problems that I have 
 had to meet, and that their minds have con 
 sequently been traveling along much the same 
 lines as mine, and toward much the same con 
 clusions. I trust this book may be the means 
 of causing many men to think as one and to 
 fight as one. 
 
xii INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is a pleasure to express my grateful appre 
 ciation of the valuable assistance which Mr. 
 Ray Stannard Baker has given me in the revi 
 sion of the manuscript for this work and of the 
 helpful suggestions of Professor John R. Com 
 mons and his verification of the statistical and 
 economic data. 
 
 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE. 
 Washington, D. C., 
 October 1, 1912. 
 
A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF 
 POLITICAL EXPERIENCES 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 FEW young men who entered public life 
 thirty years ago had any wide outlook 
 upon affairs, or any general political 
 ideas. They were drawn into politics just as 
 other men were drawn into the professions or 
 the arts, or into business, because it suited their 
 tastes and ambitions. Often the commonest 
 reasons and the most immediate necessities 
 commanded them, and clear understanding, 
 strong convictions, and deep purposes were de 
 veloped only as they were compelled to face 
 the real problems and meet the real temptations 
 of the public service. 
 
 My own political experiences began in the 
 summer of 1880 when I determined to become a 
 candidate for district attorney of Dane County, 
 Wisconsin, and it resulted almost immediately 
 
4 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 in the first of many struggles with the political 
 boss and the political machine which then con 
 trolled, absolutely, the affairs of the State of 
 Wisconsin. I was twenty-five years old that 
 summer. A year previously, in June 1879, I 
 had been graduated from the University of 
 Wisconsin, and after five months study of the law, 
 part of the time in the office of R. M. Bashford, 
 and part of the time in the university law school, 
 I had been admitted to the bar, in February, 1880. 
 I was as poverty-stricken a young lawyer as 
 ever hung his shingle to the wind. I had no 
 money at all. My single term at the university 
 law school had been rendered possible only 
 through the consideration of the faculty in 
 making an extraordinary exception in my case>; 
 and permitting me to enter without paying 
 the usual matriculation fee. I had no money 
 - but as fine an assortment of obligations and 
 ambitions as any young man ever had. I 
 had my mother and sister to support, as I had 
 supported them partially all through my college 
 course and finally, I had become engaged to 
 be married. 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 5 
 
 To an impecunious young lawyer almost 
 without clients, the district attorneyship of 
 Dane County, paying at that time the munifi 
 cent salary of $800 a year with an allowance of 
 $50 for expenses, seemed like a golden oppor 
 tunity. Though it appeared immeasurably 
 difficult of attainment, I determined to make for 
 it with all my strength. What I wanted was an 
 opportunity to work to practise my profes 
 sion and to make a living. I knew that trial 
 work would appeal to me, and I believed I could 
 try criminal cases successfully. 
 
 I had an old horse which I had used during 
 my university course in riding out to a district 
 school I had taught to aid in paying my way, 
 and borrowing a buggy and harness from Ben 
 Miner, a friend and supporter, I now began 
 driving through the country and talking with 
 the farmers about my candidacy, 
 
 It was harvest time and I remember how I 
 often tied my horse, climbed the fences, and 
 found the farmer and his men in the fields. 
 
 "Ain t you over-young?" was the objection 
 chiefly raised. 
 
C POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 I was small of stature and thin at that time. 
 I weighed only one hundred and twenty pounds 
 and I looked even younger than I really was. 
 Nor was I then in good health, 
 i Throughout my university course I had been 
 compelled to do much outside work. Besides 
 teaching school I had become proprietor of the 
 University Press, then the only college paper, 
 burdening myself with debt in the purchase. 
 It was published bi-monthly, and I not only did 
 the editorial work but made up the forms and 
 hustled for advertisements and subscriptions. 
 Under the strain of all these tasks, added to 
 my regular college work, my health, naturally 
 robust, gave way, and for four or five years I 
 went down under the load at the end of every 
 term of court. A marked physical change came 
 to me later and I have grown stronger and 
 stronger with the years. 
 
 But there were a number of things that helped 
 me in my canvass for the nomination. I was 
 born in Primrose Township, Dane County, only 
 twenty miles from Madison, where my father, 
 a Kentuckian by birth, had been a pioneer 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 7 
 
 settler from Indiana. I knew farm ways and 
 farm life, and many of the people who were not 
 acquainted with me personally knew well from 
 what family I came and that it was an honest 
 family. The people of the county were a mix 
 ture of New Englanders, Norwegians and Ger 
 mans. I had been raised among the Norweg 
 ians and understood the language fairly well, 
 though I could speak it only a little but 
 even that little helped me. 
 
 I also had something of a claim to recognition 
 on my own account. In my last year as a student 
 I had been chosen, after preliminary tests, to 
 represent the university in the state collegiate 
 oratorical contest. I had won the prize at j 
 Beloit with an oration on the character of/ 
 Shakespeare s "lago" and then I had been 
 chosen to represent Wisconsin in the interstate 
 contest at Iowa City, Iowa. This I also won, 
 and when I returned to Madison, university 
 feeling ran to so high a pitch that the students 
 met me at the train and drew the carriage up the 
 hill to the university where I was formally 
 welcomed; and that evening I was given a recep- 
 
8 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 tion in the state-house at which there were 
 speeches by William F. Vilas, the foremost 
 citizen of Wisconsin and afterward United 
 States Senator, by members of the university 
 faculty, and others. All of this, of course, had 
 been reported in the newspapers, especially the 
 Madison newspapers, so that when I went among 
 the farmers, I found that they were able to place 
 me at once. 
 
 Thus, while they considered me too young 
 and inexperienced, I made a good many friends 
 men who began to believe in me then, and 
 have been my warm supporters ever since. 
 
 Another thing helped me substantially in my 
 canvass. Many of the farmers were disgusted 
 with the record of inefficient service in the 
 district attorney s office in the recent past, which 
 had required the employment of extra counsel in 
 trying cases. I promised them with confidence 
 that I would do all the work myself and that 
 there should be no extra fees to meet. 
 
 Up to this point everything had been clear 
 sailing. I was asking the people for an office of 
 public service which they had the full power 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 9 
 
 to give me; but I had not learned the very first 
 principles of the political game as it was then 
 played indeed, as it is still played in a 
 greater part of this country. I knew practically 
 nothing about politics or political organization, 
 never at that time having so much as attended 
 a caucus or convention. 
 
 The Boss of Dane County was Colonel E. W. 
 Keyes, the postmaster of Mamson. He was 
 rarely spoken of as the "Colonel" or "Mr. 
 Keyes," but always then and for many years 
 afterward simply as "the Boss." He had been 
 for a long time the boss of the whole state but 
 stronger men were then coming into the field 
 and he was content to exercise his sway over 
 Dane and neighboring counties. He was a very 
 sharp, brusque, dominating man, energetic in 
 his movements, and not then very young. A 
 Bismarck type of man, he had fine abilities, and 
 if he used the methods of force and of bulldozery 
 toward those who opposed him, he was often 
 generous to those who supported him. And 
 he was big enough to give excellent public serv 
 ice in the office which he held for so many years. 
 
10 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 He was a good representative of old-time poli 
 tics: the politics of force and secret manage 
 ment. He was absolute dictator in his own 
 territory; he could make candidates, and he 
 could unmake political office-holders. He fought 
 me for twenty years. 
 
 I cannot now remember just how long I had 
 been at my canvass before the Boss called 
 me to account. My recollection is that I went 
 in one day to the post-office to get my mail. 
 He had probably directed his clerks to watch 
 for me, and I was told that the postmaster 
 wished to see me. I had known him, of course, 
 when a student in the university; he was one 
 of the men who had spoken at the reception 
 when I returned from the oratorical contest. 
 I went to him therefore with great friendliness; 
 but I found him in quite a different mood. 
 He burst out upon me with the evident purpose 
 of frightening me at once out of all my 
 political ambitions. 
 
 "You are fooling away your time, sir!" he 
 exclaimed roughly. 
 
 He told me I was wasting my money, that I 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 11 
 
 had better go to work, that I had not learned 
 the first lesson in politics. He told me who the 
 next district attorney of Dane County would 
 be and it was not La Follette! 
 
 Boss Keyes did not know it, but opposition 
 of that sort was the best service he could have 
 rendered me. It stirred all the fight I had in 
 me. 
 
 "I intend," I said, "to go on with this can 
 vass; and I intend to be elected district attorney 
 of Dane County." 
 
 I set my face, and as soon, as I left him I began 
 to work more furiously than ever before. I 
 kept asking myself what business Keyes or any 
 other man had to question my right of going 
 out among the voters of Dane County, and 
 saying what I pleased to them. And what had 
 Keyes more than any other voter to do with the 
 disposal of the district attorney ship? 
 
 I remember having had a similar overmas 
 tering sense of jmger and_wrpng and__mjustice 
 in my early days in the university and it led 
 to a rather amusing incident my first ex 
 perience as an Insurgent. Speakers, I recall, 
 
12 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 were to be chosen by the students for some 
 public occasion. At that time college life was 
 dominated by two secret fraternities; they con 
 trolled the student meetings, and directed the 
 elections. Most of the students, of whom I was 
 one, were outsiders, or "scrubs," having little 
 or nothing to say about the conduct of college 
 affairs; and I was one of the greenest of all the 
 "plebs" a boy right from the farm. Well, 
 the fraternities made their slate and put it 
 through. That night I visited every non- 
 fraternity man in the university, and after several 
 days hard work we organized a sort of anti- 
 secret society of some two hundred members. 
 Then we called a new meeting. The whole 
 student body was there, including the fraternity 
 men. We reconsidered the action of the previous 
 meeting and had an honest and open election. 
 
 The same sort of feeling which dominated me 
 in that boyish fight now drove me into ?, more 
 vigorous struggle in Dane County. I traveled 
 by day and by night, I stayed at farm-houses, I 
 interviewed every voter in the county whom I 
 could reach. The Boss was active, too, but he 
 
THE LA FOLLETTE FAMILY 
 
 Taken, in Primrose Township, Wisconsin. Robert, about three years 
 
 old, on his mother s knee; his sister Ellen, now Mrs. Dean Eastman; 
 
 his sister Josephine, now the wife of Judge Robert G. Siebecker; 
 
 and his brother William. 
 

 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 13 
 
 was so secure in his undisputed supremacy and 
 I was so young and inexperienced that he did 
 not take me seriously nor realize until afterward 
 how thoroughly my work was done. He was 
 dependent upon his organization made up of 
 men, most of whom hoped sooner or later to 
 get something from the state or county some 
 little office or job. But I had gone behind all 
 this organization and reached the voters them 
 selves. Whatever success I have attained 
 in politics since then has been attained by 
 these simple and direct means and not other- l " 
 wise. 
 
 There were five candidates at the convention. 
 Quite unexpectedly, between the ballots, a 
 Norwegian named Eli Pederson, a neighbor of 
 ours, who had known and worked for my father 
 and who called me "our boy," made a telling 
 speech in my behalf. I can see him now a 
 big, black-headed, black-eyed man with a 
 powerful frame, standing there in the conven 
 tion. He was a fine type of man, a natural-born 
 leader of his community, and he spoke as one 
 having authority. It was to him, I think, that 
 
14 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 at the crisis I owed my nomination, which came 
 on the fifth ballot. 
 
 This failure of his well-oiled machine as 
 tonished the Boss beyond measure, and my fight 
 for the nomination was nothing as compared 
 with the fight for election. Then, as now, the 
 Boss was quite willing to support the candidate 
 of the opposite party rather than to have his 
 own authority questioned or defied. But the 
 university boys, who were my strong friends 
 and supporters, went out and worked tooth and 
 nail for me all over the county without regard 
 to politics and I was elected by the narrow 
 majority of ninety-three votes. In January, 
 1881, 1 was sworn in as district attorney of Dane 
 \/County. 
 
 As I look back upon it, politics was very 
 different then from now. In these days funda 
 mental issues and policies are being widely and 
 / earnestly discussed, but at that time the coun- 
 / try was in a state of political lethargy. The 
 excitement and fervor which accompanied the 
 war had exhausted itself, reconstruction had 
 been completed, and specie payment resumed. 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 15 
 
 The people had turned their attention almost 
 wholly to business affairs. The West was to 
 be settled, railroads constructed, towns founded, 
 manufacturing industries built up, and money 
 accumulated. In shortajtjway fr time of expan- 
 sjon, and of great materiaj_ prosperity. 
 
 Put the war and the troubled years which 
 followed it had left at- least one important 
 political legacy one of the most powerful and 
 unified party organizations that ever existed, 
 I suppose, anywhere in the world. I mean 
 the Republican party. We may never see its 
 like again in this country. It had fought a 
 desperate war for a great and righteous cause. 
 It had behind it the passionate enthusiasm of a 
 whole generation of men. It was the party of 
 Lincoln and Grant and Sherman. I remember 
 well the character of the ordinary political 
 speeches of those years. Even well down into 
 the eighties they all looked backward to fading 
 glories, they waved the flag of freedom, they 
 abused the South, they stirred the war memories 
 of the old soldiers who were then everywhere 
 dominant in the North. Of this old type of 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 orator I remember to have heard Zach Chandler 
 of Michigan, a great figure in those days a 
 sort of old Roman, of powerful and rugged 
 personality, whose sarcastic flings at the Demo 
 cratic party were accepted as the most persua 
 sive of political argumentation. 
 
 This unreasoning loyalty to party which was 
 a product of the war drew thousands of young 
 men like myself into its ranks with the convic 
 tion that this was the party of patriotism. It "is 
 a notable sign of robust political health in these 
 days that every young man must have his con 
 clusive reasons for voting the Republican or the 
 
 / Democratic ticket; old party names have lost 
 much of their persuasiveness: men must think 
 for themselves and in that fact lies the great 
 hope for the future of the nation. 
 
 ^v Garfield was the first leader to impress me 
 as I think he impressed many men of the 
 younger generation as facing forward in 
 stead of backward. He glorified the party, 
 it is true, but he saw something of the work 
 that needed to be done. I was greatly impressed 
 with Garfield: I heard him at Madison in the 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 17 
 
 summer after I was graduated. He was a very 
 handsome man, of fine presence, dignity and 
 power; splendid diction and a rather lofty 
 eloquence. ^1 do not remember a suggestion of 
 humor. y His address at Madison at that time 
 was a review of the birth and services of the 
 Republican party. I do not recall that he 
 talked about the tariff; he was not a high tariff 
 man, and even in those days urged lower duties 
 and freer trade. I remember he impressed me 
 more as a statesman and less as a politician 
 than any of the men I had heard up to that time. 
 But if the old party and the thrill of the old 
 party slogans were still dominant, the issues 
 of the new generation were beginning to make 
 themselves felt. Already there had been severe 
 local political storms. Sporadic new move 
 ments began forming soon after reconstruction: 
 the great dark problems of corporations and 
 trusts and financial power were appearing on the 
 horizon. As far back as 1872 there had been a 
 Liberal Republican party organized to ask for 
 civil service reform, and later, a Labor party 
 was organized to agitate the problems of capital 
 
y 
 
 18 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 and labor, the control of banks and railroads, 
 and the disposal of public lands. In 1876 the 
 Greenback party came into the field and rose 
 to much prominence on a radical platform. 
 
 In the State of Wisconsin the Progressive 
 ^movement expressed itself in the rise to power 
 of the Patrons of Husbandry. The Grange 
 movement swept four or five middle western 
 states, expressing vigorously the first powerful 
 revolt against the rise of monopolies, the ar 
 rogance of railroads and the waste and robbery 
 of the public lands. Those hard-headed old 
 pioneers from New England and from northern 
 Europe who thought as they plowed, went far 
 toward roughing out the doctrine in regard to 
 railroad control which the country has since 
 adopted. At that time there was no settled 
 policy, no established laws, but their reasoning 
 was as direct and simple as their lives. It was 
 plain to them that the railroad was only another 
 form of highway. They knew that for the 
 purposes of a highway, the public could enter 
 upon and take a part of their farms. If, then, 
 the right of passage through the country came 
 
BOYHOOD PICTURE OF LA FOLLETTE 
 
 Taken at nine years of age, while he was attending district school at 
 Argyle, Wisconsin, a country town forty miles south of Madison. 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 19 
 
 from the people, the people should after 
 ward have the right to control the use of the 
 highway. It was this simple reasoning which was 
 subsequently adopted by legislatures and courts. 
 
 As a boy on the farm in Primrose Township 
 I heard and felt this movement of the Grangers 
 swirling about me; and I felt the indignation 
 which it expressed in such a way that I suppose 
 I have never fully lost the effect of that early 
 impression. It was a time, indeed, of a good 
 deal -of intellectual activity and awakening. 
 Minds long fixed upon the slavery question were 
 turning to new affairs; newspapers grew more 
 numerous and books were cheaper. I remember 
 when I was a boy a dog-eared copy of one of 
 Henry George s early books got into our neigh 
 borhood. It was owned by a blacksmith, named 
 Dixon, a somewhat unusual man a big power 
 ful fellow, who was a good deal of a reader and 
 thinker. He had taken an interest in me and he 
 urged me to read Henry George s book. I knew 
 nothing of public questions, but I read the book. 
 
 In Wisconsin the Granger movement went 
 so far as to cause a political revolution and the 
 
20 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 ^s. 
 
 election in 1874 of a Democratic governor. A 
 just and comprehensive law for regulating the 
 railroads was passed and a strong railroad 
 commission was instituted. It was then, in 
 deed, that the railroads began to dominate 
 politics for the first time in this country. They 
 saw that they must either accept control by 
 the state or contr^PtEVsta^T^TTie^ adopted 
 the latter course; they began right there to 
 corrupt Wisconsin indeed to corrupt all the 
 states of the Middle West. And as usual they 
 were served by the cleverest lawyers and writers 
 
 x 
 
 that money could hire. They asserted that 
 the panic of 1873 was caused by the Granger 
 agitation and that capital was being driven 
 from the state by popular clamor. To these 
 arguments they added open threats and defiance 
 of the law. On April 28, 1874, Alexander 
 Mitchell, President of the Chicago, Milwaukee 
 and St. Paul Railroad Company, wrote a letter 
 to Governor Taylor in which he asserted directly 
 that his company would disregard the state law. 
 These are his words : 
 
 "Being fully conscious that the enforcement 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 of this law will ruin the property of the company 
 and feeling assured of the correctness of the 
 opinions of the eminent counsel who have ex 
 amined the question, the directors feel compelled 
 to disregard the provisions of the law so far as it 
 fixes a tariff of rates for the company until the 
 courts have finally passed upon the question of 
 its validity." 
 
 A more brazen defiance of law could scarcely 
 be conceived. The railroads looked to the 
 courts for final protection, but the law which 
 they thus defied was not only sustained by the 
 Supreme Court of Wisconsin, but by the Su 
 preme Court of the United States. 
 
 But the railroads did not intend to submit to 
 control, courts or no courts, and by fallacious 
 argument, by threats, by bribery, by political 
 manipulation, they were able to force the legis 
 lature to repeal the law which the Supreme 
 Court had sustained. _JBy that assault upon free 
 government in Wisconsin and in other middle 
 western states the reasonable control of cor 
 porations was delayed in this country for many 
 years. 
 
22 / POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 - From that moment in the seventies ex 
 cepting once, and then only for a period of 
 two years when the agricultural and dairy 
 interests defeated the corporations, and elected 
 William D. Hoard governor until my fight 
 was finally successful, Wisconsin was a cor 
 rupted state, governed not by the people but 
 by a group of private and corporate interests. 
 They secured control of the old Republican 
 party organization the party with the splen 
 did history and while its orators outwardly 
 dwelt upon the glories of the past and inspired 
 the people with the fervor of patriotic loyalty, 
 these corporation interests were bribing, boss- 
 ing and thieving within. The machine organi 
 zation of the Democratic party was as sub 
 servient to the railroads and other corporations 
 as the Republican machine, and mastery of 
 legislation was thus rendered complete through 
 all these years. 
 
 I never shall forget the speech I heard the 
 old Chief Justice of Wisconsin, Edward G. 
 Ryan, make to the graduating class at Madison 
 in June 1873, just before I entered the uni- 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 23 
 
 versity. He was one of the most remarkable 
 men who ever served at the Wisconsin bar or 
 filled a judicial chair : an Irishman by birth with 
 a fine legal education. Of an erratic, impulsive 
 and passionate temperament, in his decisions 
 he was as cold and judicial as any judge who 
 ever sat on the Bench. It was he who had writ 
 ten the epoch-making decision sustaining the 
 Granger law which in no small measure laid the 
 foundation for judicial action in this country 
 upon the control of corporations. I remember 
 his bowed figure, his fine, almost feminine fea 
 tures, his wavy auburn hair, and the luminous 
 impressive eyes which glowed as the old man 
 talked there in the Assembly Chamber to the 
 graduating students. His voice shook with 
 emotion and his prophetic words, which I have 
 never forgotten, conveyed powerfully the feel 
 ing of many thoughtful men of that time. I 
 have used them in scores of speeches in my cam 
 paigns. Said he: 
 
 "There is looming up a new and dark power. 
 I cannot dwell upon the signs and shocking 
 omens of its advent. The accumulation of 
 
24 V POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 ^-X 
 
 individual wealth seems to be greater than it 
 
 ever has been since the downfall of the Roman 
 Empire. The enterprises of the country are 
 aggregating vast corporate combinations of 
 unexampled capital, boldly marching, not for 
 economic conquests only, but for political 
 power. For the first time really in our politics 
 money is taking the field as an organized power. 
 . . . Already, here at home, one great cor 
 poration has trifled with the sovereign power, 
 and insulted the state. There is grave fear 
 that it, and its great rival, have confederated 
 to make partition of the state and share it as 
 spoils. . . . The question will arise, and 
 arise in your day, though perhaps not fully 
 in mine, Which shall rule wealth or man; 
 which shall lead money or intellect; who shall 
 fill public stations educated and patriotic 
 free men, or the feudal serfs of corporate capi 
 tal? " 
 
 It was this power, though I did not know it 
 then, nor indeed fully until years later, that 
 spoke through the voice of Boss Keyes when 
 he attempted to deny my right to appear before 
 
I/ 
 
 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 the people of Dane County as a candidate for 
 district attorney. It was this power which 
 held together and directed the county machine, 
 the state machine, the national machine, of both 
 the old parties. Of course, the Boss and the 
 machine had nothing against me personally. 
 All it wanted was the acceptance of its authority 
 and leadership: what it feared and hated was 
 independence and freedom. I could have made 
 terms with Keyes and with the state bosses of 
 Wisconsin at any time during my years of strug 
 gle with them and secured personal advance 
 ment with ease and profit to myself, but I would 
 have had to surrender the principles and aban 
 don the issues for which I was contending, and 
 this I would not do. 
 
 In refusing to acknowledge the authority of 
 Boss Keyes at the outset I was merely express- 
 ing a common and widespread, though largely 
 unconscious, spirit of revolt among the people 
 a movement of the new generation toward 
 more democracy in human relationships No 
 one had thought it out in sharply defined terms, 
 but nearly every one felt it. It grew out of the 
 
26 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 intellectual awakening of which I have already 
 spoken, the very centre and inspirational point 
 of which in Wisconsin was then, and has been 
 ever since, the university at Madison. 
 
 It is difficult, indeed, to overestimate the part 
 
 played in the Wis 
 
 consin revolution. For myself, I owe what I am 
 and what I have done largely to the inspira 
 tion I received while there. It was not so much 
 the actual courses of study which I pursued; it 
 was rather the spirit of the institution a high 
 spirit of earnest endeavor, a spirit of fresh in 
 terest in new things, and beyond all else a sense 
 that somehow the state and the university were 
 intimately related, and that they should be of 
 mutual service. 
 
 The guiding spirit of my time, and the man 
 to whom Wisconsin owes a debt greater than it 
 can ever pay, was its President, John Bascom. 
 
 I never saw Ralph W r aldo Emerson, but I 
 should say that John Bascom was a man of much 
 his type, both in appearance and in character. 
 He was the embodiment of moral force and 
 moral enthusiasm ; and he was in advance of his_ 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 27 
 
 time in feeling the new social forces and in 
 emphasizing the new social responsibilities. 
 His addresses to the students on Sunday after 
 noons, together with his work in the classroom, 
 were among the most important influences in 
 my early life. It was his teaching, iterated and 
 reiterated, of the obligation of both the uni 
 versity and the students to the mother state 
 that may be said to have originated the Wiscon 
 sin idea in education. He was forever telling 
 us what the state was doing for us and urging 
 our return obligation not to use our education 
 wholly for our own selfish benefit, but to re 
 turn some service to the state. That teaching 
 animated and inspired hundreds of students who 
 sat under John Bascom. The present Presi 
 dent of the university, Charles R. Van Hise, 
 a classmate of mine, was one of the men who 
 has nobly handed down the tradition and con 
 tinued the teaching of John Bascom. 
 
 In those days we did not so much get correct 
 political and economic views, for there was then 
 little teaching of sociology or political economy 
 worthy the name, but what we somehow did 
 
28 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 get, and largely from Bascom, was a proper atti- 
 tude toward public affairs. And when all is said, 
 this attitude is more important than any definite 
 views a man may hold. Years afterward, when 
 I was Governor of Wisconsin, John Bascom came 
 to visit us at the executive residence in Madison, 
 and I treasure the words he said to me about 
 my new work: 
 
 "Robert," he said, "you will doubtless make 
 mistakes of judgment as governor, but never 
 mind the political mistakes so long as you make 
 no ethical mistakes." 
 
 John Bascom lived to be eighty -four years 
 old, dying last fall, 1911, at his home at Williams- 
 town, Massachusetts. Up to the last his mind 
 was clear and his interest in the progress of 
 humanity as keen as ever. In his later years 
 he divided his time between his garden and his 
 books a serene and beautiful old age. His 
 occasional letters and his writings were always 
 a source of inspiration to me. 
 
 In all my fights in Wisconsin, the university 
 and the students have always stood firmly be 
 hind me. In a high sense the university has 
 
PRESIDENT JOHN BASCOM 
 
 1 John Bascom s addresses, with his work in the classroom, were among 
 the most important influences in my early life." 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 29 
 
 been the repository of progressive ideas: it has 
 always enjoyed both free thought and free 
 speech. When the test came years ago the 
 university met it boldly where some other 
 institutions faltered or failed. The declaration 
 of freedom was made by the Board of Regents 
 in 1894 when Dr. Richard T. Ely was tried for 
 economic heresy : 
 
 "We cannot for a moment believe that knowl 
 edge has reached its final goal or that the present 
 constitution of society is perfect. ... In 
 all lines of investigation . . ; ; the investi 
 gator should be absolutely free to follow the 
 paths of truth wherever they may lead. What 
 ever may be the limitations which trammel 
 inquiry elsewhere, we believe the great State of 
 Wisconsin should ever encourage that continual 
 and fearless sifting and winnowing by which 
 alone the truth can be found." 
 
 This declaration of freedom was framed by 
 Herbert W. Chynoweth, then a member of the 
 board, now deceased, and it was incorporated 
 as a plank in the last Republican state platform 
 as a pledge of the party to sustain the academic 
 
30 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 freedom of the university. It has also been 
 inscribed on a monument erected by a recent 
 graduating class. 
 
 In no state of the Union are the relationships 
 between the university and the people of the 
 state so intimate and so mutually helpful as in 
 Wisconsin. We believe there that the purpose 
 of the university is to serve the people, and 
 every effort is made through correspondence 
 courses, special courses, housekeepers confer 
 ences, farmers institutes, experimental stations 
 and the like to bring every resident of the state 
 under the broadening and inspiring influence of a 
 faculty of trained men. At the same time the 
 highest standards of education in the arts and 
 in the professions are maintained in the uni 
 versity itself. 
 
 In other ways the influence of the university 
 has been profound. While I was governor, I 
 sought the constant advice and service of the 
 trained men of the institution in meeting the 
 difficult problems which confronted the state. 
 Many times when harassed by the conditions 
 which confronted me, I have called in for con- 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 31 
 
 ference President Van Hise, Dr. Ely, Professor 
 Commons, Dr. Reinsch and others. 
 
 During my terms as governor I did my best 
 to build up and encourage the spirit which John 
 Bascom in his time had expressed, by the appoint 
 ment of strong trustees the sort of men who 
 would understand what the university should 
 do and be. When I became governor the uni 
 versity graduates were not numerically strong 
 on the Board of Regents; when I resigned, the 
 alumni had at least their full representation, 
 and I had also strengthened the board by the 
 appointment of a woman member the first 
 ever appointed in Wisconsin. 
 
 I made it a further policy, in order to bring 
 all the reserves of knowledge and inspiration of 
 the university more fully to the service of the 
 people, to appoint experts from the university 
 wherever possiWe upon the important boards 
 of the state the civil service commission, the 
 railroad commission and so on a relationship 
 which the university has always encouraged and 
 by which the state has greatly profited. Many 
 of the university staff are now in state service, 
 
h POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 and a bureau of investigation and research estab 
 lished as a legislative reference library conducted 
 by Charles McCarthy, a man of marked origi 
 nality and power, has proved of the greatest assist 
 ance to the legislature in furnishing the latest and 
 best thought of the advanced students of gov 
 ernment in this and other countries. He has 
 built up an institution in Wisconsin that is a 
 model which the Federal Government and ulti 
 mately every state in the Union will follow.,/, 
 
 During the last session of the legislature a 
 Saturday lunch club was organized, at which 
 the governor, and some of the state officers and 
 legislators regularly meet the university pro 
 fessors Van Hise, Ross, Reinsch, Commons, 
 Ely, Scott, Meyer, McCarthy and others to 
 discuss the problems of the state. Such meet- 
 " ings as these are a tremendous force in bringing 
 about intelligent democratic government: they 
 are very different from the old-time secret, 
 back-room conferences of bosses which once 
 controlled Wisconsin in the interest of private 
 corporations. It is not, indeed, surprising that 
 Dr. Eliot of Harvard, after an examination of 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 33 
 
 the work done at Madison should have called 
 Wisconsin "the leading State University," for 
 in every possible way it has endeavored to make 
 itself a great democratic institution a place 
 of free thought, free investigation, free speech, 
 and of constant and unremitting service to the 
 people who give it life 
 
 I have endeavored thus to exhibit some of the 
 underlying causes of the progressive spirit in- 
 Wisconsin, and I cannot leave the subject with 
 out speaking of one other influence which im 
 pressed me. 
 
 In the campaign of 1876, Robert G. IngergoJL 
 
 . "* 
 
 came to Madison to speak. I had heard of him 
 for years; when I was a boy on the farm a 
 relative of ours had testified in a case in which 
 Ingersoll had appeared as an attorney and he 
 had told the glowing stories of the plea that 
 Ingersoll had made. Then, in the spring of 
 1876, Ingersoll delivered the Memorial Day ad 
 dress at Indianapolis. It was widely published 
 shortly after it was delivered and it startled 
 and enthralled the whole country. I remember 
 that it was printed on a poster as large as a door 
 
34 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 and hung in the post-office at Madison. I can 
 scarcely convey now, or even understand, the 
 emotional effect the reading of it produced upon 
 me. Oblivious of my surroundings, I read it 
 with tears streaming down my face. It began, 
 I remember: 
 
 " The past rises before me like a dream. Again 
 we are in the great struggle for national life. 
 We hear the sounds of preparation the music of 
 boisterous drums the silver voices of heroic 
 bugles. We see the pale cheeks of women and 
 the flushed faces of men; and in those assem 
 blages we see all the dead whose dust we have 
 covered with flowers." 
 
 I was fairly entranced. He pictured the 
 recruiting of the troops, the husbands and fathers 
 with their families on the last evening, the lover 
 under the trees and the stars; then the beat of 
 drums, the waving flags, the marching away; 
 the wife at the turn of the lane holds her baby 
 aloft in her arms a wave of the hand and he 
 has gone; then you see him again in the heat of 
 the charge. It was wonderful how it seized 
 upon my youthful imagination. 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 35 
 
 When he came to Madison I crowded myself 
 into the assembly chamber to hear him : I would 
 not have missed it for every wordly thing I 
 possessed. And he did not disappoint me. 
 
 A large handsome man of perfect build, with a 
 face as round as a child s and a compelling smile 
 all the arts of the old-time oratory were his 
 in high degree. He was witty, he was droll, 
 he was eloquent: he was as full of sentiment as 
 an old violin. Often, while speaking, he would 
 pause, break into a smile, and the audience, in 
 anticipation of what was to come, would follow 
 him in irresistible peals of laughter. I cannot 
 remember much that he said, but the impression 
 he made upon me was indelible. 
 
 After that I got Ingersoll s books and never 
 afterward lost an opportunity to hear him speak. 
 He was the greatest orator, I think, that I 
 ever heard; and the greatest of his lectures, I 
 have always thought, was the one on Shake 
 speare. 
 
 Ingersoll had a tremendous influence upon me, 
 as indeed he had upon many young men of that 
 time. It was not that he changed my beliefs, 
 
36 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 but that lie liberated my mind. Freedom was 
 what he preached: he wanted the shackles off 
 everywhere. He wanted men to think boldly 
 about all things: he demanded intellectual 
 and moral courage. He wanted men to follow 
 wherever truth might lead them. He was a 
 rare, bold, heroic figure. 
 
 I have departed somewhat from my direct 
 narrative, but it has seemed necessary to show 
 some of the conditions and influences which have 
 resulted in the spread of the Progressive move 
 ment in Wisconsin and elsewhere. 
 
 I was sworn in as district attorney of Dane 
 County in January, 1881 . I was not yet twenty- 
 six, and, besides the defense of a tramp charged 
 with assault with intent to kill, a few collection 
 cases, and two civil cases in the circuit court, 
 I had had little actual trial experience. I never 
 worked harder in my life than I did during the 
 next two years: I worked almost day and 
 night. I liked it, it suited my talents, and from 
 the first I was successful with most of my cases. 
 I kept my word to the farmers literally : although 
 I often had to meet the foremost lawyers in 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 37 
 
 southern Wisconsin men like William F. 
 Vilas no legal assistance was ever employed 
 in my office or to aid in the trial of a case while 
 I was district attorney. I did all the work 
 alone. At the end of two years service, so well 
 satisfied were the people with my administration 
 that the Boss did not even oppose my renomina- 
 tion and I was the only man on the Republican 
 county ticket who was reflected. I ran over 
 ,000 votes ahead of my ticket. 
 
 During my service as district attorney I began 
 to see some further aspects of boss rule and mis- 
 representative government, although I had little 
 idea then what it all meant. It was a common 
 practice for men caught in the criminal net, or 
 the friends of those men, not to go forward 
 honestly and try their cases in the public tri 
 bunal, but repair to the boss and thus bring 
 .underhanded and secret influence to bear in 
 blocking the wheels of justice. And why 
 shouldn t they? The influence of the boss was 
 all-powerful in the election or appointment of 
 sheriffs, police, constables, usually the district 
 attorney, and even judges. With their official 
 
38 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 life in some measure dependent upon the Boss, 
 a mere nod or a request might easily change the 
 whole course of justice; and there are few crim 
 inals who cannot muster some influence with a 
 boss, whose secret of power lies in the personal 
 loyalty of those upon whom he has conferred 
 special benefits. 
 
 I began to feel this pressure in all sorts of 
 cases : they did not attempt to reach me directly, 
 knowing that I had defied the Boss in my elec 
 tion, but it came about in the curious ways in 
 which witnesses faded out of the reach of the 
 sheriff s office, in the disagreement of juries, and 
 the like. I remember one case of adultery in 
 which the parties brought powerful influence to 
 bear, defeating my attempts at prosecution, 
 Finally I was taken sick and had to go to bed. 
 Keyes seized eagerly upon the opportunity and 
 used his influence to compel the dismissal of the 
 case against the defendant. I heard of it, and, 
 although too weak to walk, I had myself rolled 
 in a blanket and driven to the courthouse. I 
 entered my appearance and asserted my official 
 authority against having the case dismissed. 
 
V 
 
 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 39 
 
 There was a good deal of a fight, I remember, 
 and I was threatened with being sent to jail for 
 contempt. But I finally secured a postponement 
 and afterward convicted my man. 
 
 Under such conditions, it may well be imag 
 ined, any man inside the political ring, or a man 
 with great political influence, could escape pun 
 ishment for almost any offense except, perhaps, 
 a capital crime. I early determined that I 
 would make absolutely no distinctions between 
 men in the administration of justice, and I soon 
 had a very severe test, in which I had to meet 
 the influence of the system which then prevailed. 
 Sanderson, chairman of the Republican State 
 Central Committee, came to Madison at the 
 organization of the legislature, got to gambling 
 and drinking and went to bed in a state of 
 intoxication. Feeling some one trying to take 
 his money, he aroused himself enough to make 
 an outcry, and the next morning the story was 
 all over town. It came up to me and in the 
 regular course of my duty I went to the hotel 
 to get Sanderson to make a complaint. He was 
 insulting; told me it was none of my business, 
 
40 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 and that if I knew where my political interests 
 
 lay, I better keep d quiet. I told him 
 
 plainly that we did not permit such things to 
 happen in Madison without prosecution and 
 that I should require him to swear out a warrant. 
 As soon as I left he set the wheels to moving, 
 and before I could get the papers made out a 
 number of friends came to me advising me that 
 it would defeat me for reelection if I made 
 trouble for so important a person. Sanderson 
 got out of Madison by the first train and tried 
 to get out of the state, but I caught him with a 
 subpoena at Milwaukee. I also got the fellow 
 who was charged with taking the money; but 
 the pressure on the witnesses was so great that I 
 could not convict him. \ However, the purpose 
 of the prosecution to make the law supreme 
 in Dane County -- was well served; and instead 
 of injuring my chances for reelection, the case 
 decidedly helped me. 
 
 I do not think, as I look back on my record 
 as district attorney, that I should make as 
 good a prosecutor now as I was then.-^I saw 
 just two things then: the law and the individual 
 
5W 
 
 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 
 
 At the time of his graduation from the University of Wisconsin. 
 

 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 41 
 
 criminal. I believe I broke the record for con 
 victions in Dane County. I worked the sheriff 
 half to death. If there was evidence anywhere 
 to be obtained in my cases I got it, regardless 
 of work or expense. I even sent one sheriff to ^ 
 England. Since then I have come to have a 
 little different, point of view regarding crime. I 
 see that the individual criminal is not always 
 wholly to blame; that many crimes grow directly 
 out of the sins and injustices of society. 
 
 During the four years I served as district L 
 attorney I had practically nothing to do with 
 politics; I made as good a campaign as I knew 
 how for reelection, but I knew nothing and 
 cared nothing for the political organizations 
 of the county and state. I put my whole force 
 into my work as district attorney and thought 
 of nothing else. It was a keen joy to prepare 
 the cases and present them in perfect order 
 before the court. When it became known that 
 a crime had been committed I tried always to be 
 first on the ground myself, interview all the 
 witnesses and see all the surroundings in person. 
 It is facts that settle cases; the law is always the 
 
42 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 same. And this rule applies to things of larger 
 importance than criminal cases. Facts count 
 high everywhere. Whether the matter in hand 
 is railroad legislation or the tariff, it is always 
 a question of digging out the facts upon which 
 to base your case. In no other one thing does 
 a public man more surely indicate his quality 
 than in his ability to master actual conditions 
 and set them forth with clearness. Neither 
 laws, nor opinions, nor even constitutions, will 
 finally convince people: it is only the concrete 
 facts of concrete cases. 
 
 The first and rather surprising suggestion 
 made to me to become a candidate for Congress 
 came about in this way. 
 
 Samuel A. Harper and I were classmates and 
 chums in the university. Some time in his 
 sophomore year, while wrestling, he injured his 
 knee so severely that he had to leave the uni 
 versity. He taught school for a time, then 
 studied law, and in 1884, while I was finishing 
 my last year s service as district attorney, he 
 came to visit me in Madison. He was full of 
 imagination and the spirit of youth; six feet 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 43 
 
 tall, lithe and athletic; eyes bright and black; 
 ha^ir in ringlets. He was a handsome and bril 
 liant fellow a charmer of men. He possessed 
 the most unerring political judgment of any one 
 I have ever known. Dear fellow! Our lives 
 were knit together in a way that rarely comes to 
 men. He became my law partner in 1886, and 
 was my closest friend and most trusted adviser 
 until his death in 1898. 
 
 Sam remained with me for several weeks and 
 we talked as such friends will. One night he 
 said: 
 
 "Bob, why don t you go to Congress? You 
 can go to Congress just as well as not. You 
 have the opportunity of a public career, and 
 you have the stuff in you." 
 
 With inimitable spirit he developed his plan: 
 
 "There are five counties in this district," he 
 said. "The two big counties, Dane and Grant, 
 outnumber all the others in voting population. 
 Now I live in Grant and you live in Dane. I ll 
 carry Grant for you and you carry Dane for 
 yourself. They will control the convention - 
 and you go to Congress." 
 
44 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 Well, we talked it over. It got into my head. 
 It seemed feasible. Neither Sam nor I ever 
 thought of going to the Boss; indeed, I do not 
 think we consulted any one but ourselves until 
 after I decided to run. 
 
 The situation was favorable. In the previous 
 Congressional convention, Geo. C. Hazelton 
 who had served the district three terms, was a 
 candidate for renomination. Boss Keyes, who 
 was also a candidate, withdrew from the con 
 vention and was nominated by his followers in 
 a separate convention. This three-cornered 
 fight resulted in the election of the Democratic 
 candidate, Burr Jones, of Madison, and left 
 much bitterness among the Republicans of the 
 district. Keyes s enmity toward me naturally 
 made the Hazelton supporters friendly to me. 
 It was also important to have a candidate from 
 Dane County, as Jones had made a good record 
 and was likely to run ahead of his ticket. 
 
 Sam and I started out on the campaign as 
 though it were some fine game, and with great 
 enjoyment of the prospect. By this time I was 
 thoroughly well acquainted in Dane County. 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 45 
 
 Besides my service as district attorney I had 
 built up such a good civil-law practice that in 
 the year 1885 I had more civil cases on the 
 calendar than any other lawyer in Madison. 
 All this served to give me an assured place with 
 the people. Well, I conducted my canvass 
 among the farmers very much as I had gone 
 about it four years before. It was the general 
 feeling, I knew, that I had made good as district 
 attorney and I argued that I could and would 
 serve the people just as faithfully as Congress 
 man. I found I had many friends among 
 Democrats as well as among Republicans. 
 
 It was not long before the machine found 
 out what I was doing. The so-called " Madison 
 ring," which controlled that Congressional dis 
 trict, was composed of Keyes, Phil Spooner, a 
 brother of John C. Spooner, Oakley, United 
 States Marshal, and Willet Main, a brother-in- 
 law of John C. Spooner, who was deputy-mar 
 shal. As I was on my way home one day, Phil 
 Spooner stopped me and said: 
 
 "What is this I hear about your running for 
 Congress?" 
 
46 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 I told him my purpose. 
 
 "Do you expect to be nominated?" 
 
 I told him I did. 
 
 "Don t you know," he said, "that there hasn t 
 been a Congressman nominated for fifteen years 
 who hasn t had our support? Why haven t 
 you consulted Keyes and Oakley and me?" 
 
 I said: "I know of no reason why I should 
 consult you. I ve been out in the country con 
 sulting the people, and I m going to consult a 
 good many more." 
 
 "Well, young man," he said, "you can t go 
 to Congress." 
 
 I said: "I think I can; anyhow I m going to 
 try." 
 
 They gave me a hard fight. They hired most 
 of the teams in Madison and covered the country 
 districts. There was no influence they did not 
 use; no wires they did not pull. But I carried 
 the caucuses against them and elected my 
 delegates. The very night that I got the final 
 returns from Dane County I received a telegram 
 from Sam Harper saying that he had carried 
 the last caucuses that settled Grant. That meant 
 
GENERAL GEORGE E. BRYANT 
 
 A gallant soldier, who had commanded a Wisconsin regiment in the 
 
 war. . He was long an intimate friend of General Grant. . . 
 
 A wise man, a good lawyer and judge." 
 
POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 47 
 
 that I had won. Sam had not been out of his 
 buggy for thirty days. 
 
 We never went into the other counties in 
 the district at all, although the university men, 
 who were then, as always, my warm supporters, 
 did what they could for me there. 
 
 I cannot refrain here from speaking of another 
 individual influence which was helpful to me in 
 my campaign. Among the notable men of 
 southern Wisconsin was General George E. 
 Bryant, a gallant soldier who had commanded a 
 Wisconsin regiment in the war and who had 
 been probate judge of Dane County. He was 
 long an intimate friend of General Grant, and 
 one of the 306 delegates who stood out in the 
 national convention for a third term for Grant 
 in the presidency. He came from a fine old 
 New England family, and he was a wise man, a 
 good lawyer and judge. General Bryant had 
 been a Hazelton supporter, and was a potent 
 influence in my behalf among the old soldiers 
 who were then an important element in the 
 electorate. When I was elected governor he 
 became chairman of the State Central Commit- 
 
48 POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 
 
 tee, and he fought with me through all my cam 
 paigns. During his last illness, when he thought 
 he would not see me again, he addressed this 
 brief note to me, which I treasure highly : 
 
 DEAR BOB: Next to my own two boys, I loved you 
 and Sam Harper better than any one else in the world. 
 
 GEN L. 
 
 The convention w T as held at Dodge ville, and, 
 although the old crowd was there in force, I was 
 nominated on the first ballot. They tried to 
 beat me at the polls by throwing support to the 
 Democrats and they had behind them the 
 influence of the railroads but I was elected 
 by 400 votes. 
 
 My second term as district attorney closed 
 on January 1, 1885. I continued my law prac 
 tice until Congress met in the fall of that year. 
 At the time of my election I had never been 
 farther east than Chicago, and when I arrived 
 in Washington I found myself the youngest 
 member of Congress. I was twenty -nine years 
 old. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 HAVING thus been elected to Congress, 
 in November, 1884, I began to realize 
 keenly how ill-prepared I was to 
 meet with intelligence any important national 
 question. My service as district attorney dur 
 ing the preceding four years had absorbed 
 my energies to the exclusion of everything 
 else; in trying to do that work thoroughly 
 well, and to keep my promise to employ no 
 legal assistance in the trial of cases, I found I 
 had little time to devote to political or legisla 
 tive affairs. 
 
 For these reasons I resolved to go to Washing 
 ton in January, 1885. The 49th Congress, to 
 which I had been elected, did not meet until 
 December, but I hoped that by attending the 
 closing session of the 48th Congress, I might learn 
 
50 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 something of the great national questions then 
 under consideration. 
 
 I shall never forget the journey from Madison 
 to Washington. I came by way of Harper s 
 Ferry and I saw the old battlefields and the 
 prison where John Brown had been confined. 
 The first sight of the Capitol stirred me deeply. 
 I recall distinctly how I thought of Jefferson 
 and Hamilton and Webster and Clay and Lin 
 coln, and I had visions of public service which I 
 would hardly dare now to confess. I was very 
 young then, you see. Before breakfast, on my 
 first morning in Washington, I went into Lin 
 coln Park and stood with my hat off before 
 Ball s statue of Lincoln. I know that critics 
 have found fault with it as a work of art, but 
 I cannot forget how it moved me that first morn 
 ing in Washington. There stood Lincoln hold 
 ing in one hand the Proclamation of Emancipa 
 tion, the other extended over the head of a 
 kneeling negro from whose wrists the shackles 
 had just parted! That moment and the day I 
 spent at Mount Vernon were experiences which 
 I shall never forget. 
 
IN THE HOUSE 51 
 
 I attended the sessions of the House as faith 
 fully as though I were a member. I studied the 
 rules, followed every debate, read the Congres 
 sional Record each day. When there was an 
 all-night session I remained all night. It was 
 soon known that I was the youngest member of 
 the House, and this decidedly helped me in 
 getting acquainted. 
 
 Carlisle was then Speaker: he was a striking 
 figure. A near view of his face was disappointing; 
 it was almost colorless and his eye was as dull 
 as lead, but, seen from the floor of the House, 
 his great slow-moving figure and his strong head 
 were indeed striking. He possessed something 
 of the Southern courtesy of manner and there 
 was a peculiar steady quality of the voice that 
 suggested not only a reserve of power but ab 
 solute impersonality in the decision of questions. 
 I have never known his superior as a presiding 
 officer. 
 
 Many other notable figures were then playing 
 their parts upon the national stage. Arthur 
 was in the White House, and Blaine was still a 
 great party leader. In the Senate, where I 
 
52 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 sometimes occupied a seat in the gallery, were 
 Edmunds, Hoar, Sherman, Evarts, Allison and 
 Ingalls. In the House, the leaders were Tom 
 Reed, McKinley, the brilliant Ben Butterworth 
 and Joe Cannon. Cannon had not then earned 
 the title of "uncle"; he was a rough and rugged 
 man of fifty years of age, a hardy off-hand de 
 bater. On the Democratic side were Carlisle, 
 Randall, Mills and Holman of Indiana. Holman 
 was always objecting the watch-dog of the 
 treasury. During the daytime I heard these 
 men discussing the important issues of the time; 
 many of the nights I spent in the Congressional 
 library, eagerly reading political history. I 
 wanted to get hold of fundamental principles 
 and the reasons underlying current issues. I 
 also read many speeches Lincoln and Douglas, 
 and the Elliot debates. 
 
 I remained in Washington until after the 
 inauguration of Cleveland. I saw Cleveland 
 and Arthur sitting side by side in the Senate 
 chamber on March 4th. My first impression 
 of Cleveland was extremely unfavorable. The 
 contrast with Arthur, who was a fine handsome 
 
IN THE HOUSE 53 
 
 figure, was very striking. Cleveland s coarse 
 face, his heavy, inert body, his great shapeless 
 hands, confirmed in my mind the attacks made 
 upon him during the campaign. And he was 
 a Democrat! and I a Republican at a time 
 when party feeling was singularly intense. Later 
 I came to entertain a great respect for Cleveland, 
 to admire the courage and conscientiousness of 
 his character. 
 
 In December I moved to Washington with 
 my family, which then consisted of Mrs. La 
 Follette and our little girl Tola. 
 
 A new Congressman finds himself at once 
 irresistibly drawn into various groups and align 
 ments. No sooner was I on the ground than 
 I began to feel the influence of Senator Philetus 
 Sawyer, then the leader of the Republican party 
 in Wisconsin. Owing to the fact that I had 
 been elected to Congress without the assistance 
 of the organization indeed, in defiance of it 
 I knew next to nothing about the underlying 
 forces which at that time controlled, and in large 
 measure still control, party machinery. A very 
 small coterie of men then dominated the politics 
 
54 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 of Wisconsin and the two great leaders were 
 Senator ^Sawyer and Henry C. Payne, who 
 afterward became a member of Eoosevelt s 
 cabinet. 
 
 Sawyer was a man of striking individuality and 
 of much native force. He was a typical lumber 
 man, equipped with great physical strength 
 and a shrewd, active mind. He had tramped 
 the forests, cruised timber, slept in the snow, 
 built saw mills and by his own efforts had 
 made several million dollars. So unlearned was 
 he that it was jokingly said that he signed 
 his name "P. Sawyer" because he could not 
 spell Philetus. He was nevertheless a man of 
 ability, and a shrewd counselor in the prevailing 
 political methods. He believed in getting all 
 he could for himself and his associates whenever 
 and wherever possible. I always thought that 
 Sawyer s methods did not violate his conscience; 
 he regarded money as properly the chief in 
 fluence in politics. Whenever it was necessary, 
 I believe that he bought men as he bought saw- 
 logs. He assumed that every man in politics 
 w r as serving, first of all, his own personal in- 
 
IN THE HOUSE 55 
 
 terests else why should he be in politics? He 
 believed quite simply that railroad corporations 
 and lumber companies, as benefactors of the 
 country, should be given unlimited grants of 
 public lands, allowed to charge all the traffic 
 could bear, and that anything that interfered 
 with the profits of business was akin to 
 treason. 
 
 I had not been long in Washington before 
 Sawyer invited me to go with him to call on the 
 President. I can remember just how he looked 
 climbing into his carriage a short, thick-set, 
 squatty figure of a man with a big head set on 
 square shoulders and a short neck stubby 
 everywhere. I remember he talked to me in a 
 kindly, fatherly manner very matter-of-fact 
 - looking at me from time to time with a 
 shrewd squint in his eye. He had no humor, 
 but much of what has been called "horse sense." 
 His talk was jerky and illiterate; he never made 
 a speech in his life. 
 
 We called on President Cleveland and on all 
 the cabinet officers. His form of introduction 
 was exactly the same at each place we stopped. 
 
56 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 He was not quite sure, always, of my name; 
 " Toilette" he called me. He would say: 
 
 "This young man we think a great deal of; 
 we think he is going to amount to something. I 
 want you to be fair to him. I d like him to get 
 all that is coming to him in his district. I hope 
 you will treat him right when he has any busi 
 ness in your department." 
 
 As we drove away from our last call, Sawyer 
 asked me if I had in mind any particular com 
 mittee in the House upon which I desired to 
 serve. I told him I had thought it over and I 
 wanted to go on some committee where I could 
 make use of my legal knowledge. I could not 
 hope to be assigned to the great Committee 
 on Judiciary, so I told him that I should like 
 to go on the Committee on Public Lands. 
 I innocently explained that many land grant 
 forfeitures were pending and I should enjoy 
 grappling with the legal questions which they 
 presented. Sawyer looked at me benignly and 
 said: 
 
 "Just leave that to me; don t say another 
 word about it to anybody. I know Carlisle; 
 
IN THE HOUSE 57 
 
 served with him in the House. Just let me take 
 care of that for you." 
 
 I was very grateful, and confided in his 
 promises. But when Carlisle announced the 
 committees I was astonished to find that Ste- 
 phenson now a Senator from Wisconsin - 
 was appointed to the Committee on Public 
 Lands and that I had been assigned to a place 
 on the Committee on Indian Affairs. Sawyer 
 came to me promptly and told me that he could 
 not secure my appointment to Public Lands, but 
 he was sure I would enjoy my work on Indian 
 Affairs. There was a reason for putting me on 
 this committee, and not upon Public Lands, 
 which I did not appreciate until later. I had 
 been quite too frank in expressing an interest 
 in land grant forfeitures. It did not occur to the 
 Senator that I might develop "foolishly senti 
 mental" ideas against robbing Indian reserva 
 tions of the pine timber in which they were very 
 rich. 
 
 I was disappointed, but so eager to get to 
 work at something definite that I went out 
 immediately and invested quite a little money 
 
58 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 in second-hand books on Indians. I also had 
 all the treaties and documents relating to Indians 
 sent to my rooms. It made quite a library. I 
 studied these books diligently, nor was it long 
 before I began to feel a good deal of sympathy 
 with the Indians. Years afterward, when I was 
 on the Committee on Indian Affairs of the 
 Senate, an old Indian chief who had come to 
 Washington to plead for the interests of his 
 people paid me one of the most amusing com 
 pliments I ever received. Quay of Pennsyl 
 vania, though a cold-bloode3*""jfolitician, was 
 one of the best friends the Indians ever had in 
 Congress. Having Indian blood in his veins 
 he invariably opposed legislation which was 
 unjust to the Indians. Well, this old chief came 
 to see me and I helped him all I could. After 
 ward, in trying to give me the highest measure 
 of praise he could bestow, he said: 
 "La Follette him all same Quay." 
 I soon found out why Sawyer had secured my 
 appointment to the Committee on Indian Af 
 fairs. It was the first illuminating glimpse I 
 had of the inside methods of political organiza- 
 
IN THE HOUSE 59 
 
 tion. Wellborn of Texas was then chairman of 
 this committee. He strongly resembled Stephen 
 A. Douglas, was an able man and a real orator. 
 Cleveland appointed him federal judge in Cali 
 fornia where he has made a fine record. He is 
 to-day one of the strong men of the state. We 
 have never lost the touch of friendship since 
 our service together in the House. 
 
 Wellborn appointed me a sub-committee of 
 one to consider a bill introduced by Guenther 
 of Oshkosh to sell the pine timber from the 
 Menominee Indian Reservation in Wisconsin. 
 Guenther represented Sawyer s Congressional 
 district. When I began to study the bill more 
 closely, it seemed to me to offer unlimited op 
 portunities for stealing the timber from the In 
 dians. I concluded to consult J. D. C. Atkins, 
 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, about it. 
 He read the bill through; then he looked at 
 me over his glasses and said: 
 
 "Mr. La Follette, I think this is a little the 
 worst Indian bill I ever saw." 
 
 "Will you write me a letter as Commissioner, 
 saying so?" I asked. 
 
60 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 In due time I got his letter and a few days 
 later Guenther came to me and said: 
 
 "Bob, why don t you report that bill out?" 
 
 I told him it was a bad bill and that I should 
 report it adversely. 
 
 "Oh, don t do that," he said; "I know noth 
 ing about the bill. Sawyer asked me to intro 
 duce it, and he introduced one exactly like it 
 in the Senate. He has passed his bill over there, 
 and he wants me to get the House bill favorably 
 reported and on the calendar by the time his 
 bill comes over." 
 
 When I insisted that I would not report it 
 favorably, that ended it and the bill died in 
 Committee. Sawyer never spoke to me about 
 the affair. 
 
 I was very soon to meet this question of po 
 litical self-seeking in another form. My first 
 speech in Congress was made on April 22, 1886. 
 It was on the so-called "pork-barrel" bill for 
 river and harbor appropriations. I was then, 
 as I am now, heartily in favor of generous 
 expenditures of national funds for waterways 
 and harbors, but the scramble for unwarranted 
 
IN THE HOUSE 61 
 
 appropriations was then and is now not short 
 of scandalous. 
 
 The bill called for $15,000,000, the largest 
 amount at that time ever appropriated. It 
 ignored the recommendations of the government 
 engineers that sixty -three improvements already 
 begun should be completed, and provided for 
 completing only five of these unfinished im 
 provements. This recommendation was ignored 
 in order to use the funds to project over one 
 hundred new improvements started to satisfy 
 the demands of members for some of the "pork." 
 I argued that if the sums necessary to complete 
 unfinished work were used to inaugurate new 
 improvements, then the next Congress would 
 be compelled to set aside still larger appro 
 priations merely to keep pace with the destruc 
 tion resulting from the action of the elements 
 upon the uncompleted improvements. 
 
 I argued that Congressmen should not con 
 tend as rivals for these appropriations, each 
 seeking all he could get as a grab for his district, 
 but that they should regard the river and harbor 
 bill as a great national measure. 
 
62 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 "I believe that the tendency of such legis 
 lation is to debauch the country and dull the 
 moral instincts of the American Congress." 
 
 I went on further to say, "There is but one 
 right course. Not one dollar of this money 
 belongs to any state, any district, any locality. 
 It all belongs to the United States, and what 
 ever is appropriated with any other view is a 
 misappropriation of public funds. I might use 
 a severer term. No man can shirk the respon 
 sibility. ... He cannot say, My con 
 stituents want this money, and I will therefore 
 vote for it, though I do not approve of the 
 measure. The money is neither his nor theirs. 
 So far as this money is concerned, when by his 
 vote he takes it from the treasury, he becomes, 
 in a liberal use of the word, a trustee of the 
 money, and he is bound to expend it for the 
 benefit of national commerce." 
 
 I knew that the bill would pass, as it did, but 
 I felt that I ought at least to express my con 
 victions upon the subject. I did not oppose 
 the bill; I opposed the policy. 
 
 This little speech it does not seem of much 
 
IN THE HOUSE 63 
 
 importance to me now - - was commented on, 
 not only in Wisconsin, but by the press of the 
 country. The New York Tribune, the New 
 York Sun and other papers gave it favorable 
 editorial notice. This helped me in my district 
 and aided in the contest for renomination. 
 
 The opposition of Boss Keyes and the old- 
 time politicians of each of the counties of the 
 district in my first nomination and election, 
 warned me of the enemy I would have to meet 
 in the convention of 1886. If I ever expected 
 to serve more than one term in the House of 
 Representatives, I knew T I had to fight for that 
 privilege. It had seemed to me in the very 
 beginning that a public official should deal 
 directly with the people whom he was to serve. 
 I did not go to Boss Keyes for the office of district 
 attorney. The district attorney was not em 
 ployed by Keyes, but by the people. The office 
 was not his to bestow; it was theirs. It was 
 the same in my first fight for Congress. After 
 I had won the nomination and election, it gave 
 me still greater confidence in the people. But 
 while the district attorney did his work in the 
 
64 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 county where the voters could see how they 
 were being served, Washington was a long way 
 off. How were the people to know about the 
 proceedings of Congress and the work of their 
 Congressman? 
 
 I thought it all over. It was clear to me that 
 the only way to beat boss and ring rule was to 
 keep the people thoroughly informed. Machine 
 control is based upon misrepresentation and 
 ignorance. Democracy is based upon knowl 
 edge. It is of first importance that the people 
 shall know about __jtheir___^vernmnt and the 
 work of their public servants. :< Ye shall know 
 the truth, and the truth shall make you free." 
 This I have always believed vital to self govern 
 ment. 
 
 j Immediately following my election to Con- 
 
 / gress I worked out a complete plan for keeping 
 
 my constituents informed on public issues and 
 
 the record of my services in Congress; it is the 
 
 j system I have used in constantly widening circles 
 
 ever since. 
 
 There were five counties in my district, La 
 Fayette, Grant, Green, Dane, and Iowa. I 
 
 
IN THE HOUSE 65 
 
 secured from the county clerks offices a com 
 plete list of all the voters who had voted in the 
 last election. 
 
 I had the names written on large sheets, one 
 township, sometimes two, to a sheet. Then I 
 sent the sheets to a friend in each county who 
 filled in all the information he could, indicating 
 especially the strong men in each community - 
 those w r ho were leaders of sentiment. To this 
 information I added the results of my own ac 
 quaintance in thefiistrict. This gave me a 
 complete descriptive poll list of my district. 
 
 When some Congressman made a speech on 
 sound money Reed or Carlisle - - 1 would get 
 the necessary number of copies of that speech, 
 and send them to those interested in the money 
 question. When the Oleomargarine bill, the 
 Interstate Commerce bill, and other important 
 legislation was pending, I sent out speeches 
 covering the debates thoroughly. In this way 
 I suppose I sent out hundreds of thousands of 
 speeches, my own and others. 
 
 It is not generally known that Congressional 
 speeches, reprinted from the Record for dis- 
 
66 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 tribution, must be paid for by the Congressman 
 or Senator ordering them at a cost equal to that 
 of any first-class printing establishment. The 
 size of the bills I paid the government printing 
 office for many years was one of the reasons why 
 I found myself so poor when I left Congress. A 
 Congressman in those days received only five 
 thousand dollars a year, and no secretarial or 
 clerk hire whatever unless he chanced to be 
 chairman of a committee. The result was that 
 the bulk of the actual mechanical work of keep 
 ing up all this correspondence and pamphlet 
 eering fell upon Mrs. La Follette and myself. 
 Occasionally we indulged in the extravagance of 
 hiring a stenographer for a few weeks, but as a 
 rule, while I was engaged in my Congressional 
 duties, Mrs. La Toilette worked until the late 
 hours, writing letters, addressing envelopes and 
 sending away stacks of speeches. We do not 
 look upon those days with any self pity. We 
 were both young and vigorous and they were 
 among the happiest and most hopeful years we 
 ever spent. We gave ourselves comparatively 
 few amusements, but those that we did take, we 
 
MRS. LA FOLLETTE IN THE EARLY 90 S 
 
 She was a sane, far-sighted counselor of the little group of Progressives 
 throughout all of the Wisconsin campaigns." 
 
IN THE HOUSE 67 
 
 % 
 
 enjoyed supremely. Our interest in the drama 
 has always been keen, and I remember that 
 whenever Booth and Barrett came to play 
 in Baltimore they never came to Washing 
 ton owing to Booth s aversion to the scene of 
 the tragedy with which his brother was con 
 nected Mrs. La Toilette and I threw dis 
 cretion utterly to the winds, and went over to 
 every evening performance while their engage 
 ment lasted. 
 
 The task of building up and maintaining an 
 intelligent interest in public affairs in my district 
 and afterward in the state, was no easy one. 
 But it was the only way for me, and I am still 
 convinced that it is the best way. Of one thing * 
 I am more and more convinced with the passage 
 of the years and that is, the serious interest 
 of our people in government, and their willing 
 ness to give their thought to subjects which are 
 really vital and upon which facts, not mere 
 opinions, are set forth, even though the presen- { 
 tation may be forbidding. Get and keep a dozen 
 or more of the leading men in a community 
 interested in, and well informed upon any public 
 
68 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 question and you have laid firmly the founda 
 tions of democratic government. 
 
 Never in my political life have I derived bene 
 fit from the two sources of power by which ma- 
 V thine politics chiefly thrives I mean patronage, 
 ;the control of appointments to office, and the use 
 of large sums of money in organization. During 
 my fight in Wisconsin the old machine used its 
 power of dispensing patronage to the utmost 
 against me. When I became governor I ap 
 pointed supporters of the Progressive movement 
 to offices whenever there were appointments to 
 make. These men did all in their power for the 
 success of our campaigns. But sirch service is al 
 ways criticized by the opposition, and discounted 
 by the public because of the self interest of the 
 officials, and does about as much harm as good. 
 As soon as I had the legislature with me in 1905, 
 I secured the passage of the strongest Civil Ser 
 vice law that could be framed, wiping out the 
 whole system of spoils in state offices. To-day 
 there is less patronage-mongering in Wisconsin 
 than in any other state in the Union. As for 
 federal patronage, I have had very little to dis- 
 
IN THE HOUSE , 69 
 
 pense nor have I needed any. When Mr. Taft, 
 soon after he became President, began withhold 
 ing patronage from the Insurgents, with the idea, 
 I suppose, of disciplining them, I stated my own 
 views and the position of the Insurgents editori 
 ally in La Follette s Magazine, as follows : 
 
 "It is w^ell to have this patronage matter 
 understood. The support of the Progressives 
 for progressive legislation will be given without 
 reference to patronage or favors of any sort. 
 That support wilL.b.e_accorded _ on conviction. < 
 And itos_idle for the PresidenlTto presume that 
 he can secure adherence from the Progressive 
 ranks for any policies, or support for any legis 
 lation reactionary in its character for the .sole 
 purpose of party solidarity." 
 
 i^ 
 iLyou are going direct to the people^you-have. 
 
 33.0 need of patronage. Moreover, you hayejio / 
 need of organization in the complicated way in^ / 
 which politics has J^en organized, jnjthe_p,ast, 
 nor of the use of large sums of money. The 
 only organization through which I have attained 
 whatever success it has been my lot to win has 
 consisted of a clerical force to send out literature 
 and speeches, and a manager to arrange speak- 
 
70 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 ing campaigns. The money for the campaigns 
 which I have conducted and there has never 
 been much of it has been supplied, not by 
 business organizations, but by men who were 
 sincerely interested in the cause. 
 
 In general it can be said of all the group known 
 as Insurgents or Progressives that they have won 
 their victories without complicated organi 
 zation, without patronage, often without news 
 paper support and with the use of very little 
 money. Nothing could show more conclusively 
 that they represent a popular feeling so deep 
 that it cannot be influenced by machine methods. 
 - At the end of my first two years in Congress, 
 I was renominated, overcoming all opposition, 
 and carried my district, which had given me only 
 400 plurality in 1884, by more than 3,500; and 
 the third time, in 1888, I was elected by a 
 majority of nearly 3,000. 
 
 As time passed the more familiar I became 
 with the inner affairs of Congress, the more 
 plainly I saw the constant crowding in of private 
 interests, seeking benefits. I soon had another 
 very illuminating experience. 
 
IN THE HOUSE 71 
 
 A voluminous bill was before the Committee 
 on Indian Affairs providing for the opening for 
 settlement of 11,000,000 acres of the Sioux Indian 
 Reservation in Dakota. As it was being read 
 in committee, we came to a provision to ratify 
 an agreement made by the Chicago, Milwaukee 
 and St. Paul and Chicago and Northwestern 
 railroads with the Indians for rights of way 
 through the reservation. My previous study 
 of documents on Indian Affairs here be 
 came useful. I discovered that in addition to 
 the rights of way, one company was given the 
 exclusive right to acquire 715 acres, and the 
 other 828 acres of land, ostensibly for "terminal 
 facilities," and that each road was to have at 
 intervals of every ten miles an additional 160 
 acres of land, presumably for "station privi 
 leges." I stopped the reading at this point. 
 
 "This looks to me like a town site job," I said. 
 "I cannot see why these railroads should have 
 so much more land than is necessary to use 
 directly in connection with their business as 
 
 common carriers." 
 
 I had no sooner uttered these words than the 
 
72 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 member of the committee sitting upon my right 
 nudged me and whispered, "Bob, you don t 
 want to interfere with that provision. Those 
 are your home corporations 9 
 
 But I did interfere and had the paragraphs 
 laid over and we adjourned the session of the 
 committee at twelve o clock to attend the meet 
 ing of the House. I had not been in my seat 
 half an hour when a page announced that 
 Senator Sawyer wanted to see me. I found him 
 waiting for me near the cloakroom. We sat on 
 a settee and talked of general matters for some 
 time. As the Senator rose to go he said, ap 
 parently as an afterthought: 
 
 "Oh, say, La Follette, your committee will 
 have coming up before long the Sioux Indian 
 bill. There is a provision in it for our folks up 
 in Wisconsin, the Northwestern and St. Paul 
 railroads. I wish you d look after it." 
 
 "Senator Sawyer," I said, "we have already 
 reached that provision in the bill, and I am 
 preparing an amendment to it. I don t think 
 it s right." 
 
 "Is that so," said the Senator, in apparent 
 
IN THE HOUSE 73 
 
 surprise. "Come and sit down and let s talk 
 it over. 51 
 
 We argued for an hour, Sawyer presenting 
 every point in favor of granting the railroads the 
 prior right to acquire all the land they wanted. 
 This was the first time Sawyer had directly and 
 personally attempted to influence me in a matter 
 of legislation. I was respectful to him, but could 
 not yield to his view. I told him that I thought 
 it right to permit the railroads to acquire the 
 land necessary for rights of way, yards, tracks, 
 sidings, depots, shops, roundhouses, and indeed, 
 all they needed solely for transportation pur 
 poses, and should favor such a provision. But as 
 framed, the provision plainly allowed them to get 
 prior and exclusive rights to much more land for 
 town site and other speculative uses ; that besides 
 they were not required to build their lines within 
 any definite time, and might hold the land to the 
 exclusion of all others indefinitely, without turn 
 ing a sod or laying a rail; that it was unjust to 
 the Indians and the public, and I could not sup 
 port it. He was not ill tempered, and said he 
 would see me again about it. 
 
74 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 Forty -eight hours later Henry C. Payne ar 
 rived in Washington. He was Secretary of the 
 Republican State Central Committee, political 
 manager of the Wisconsin machine, lobbyist for 
 the St. Paul Railroad and the Beef Trust, and 
 had the backing of the important corporate 
 interests of the state. Obviously he had been 
 summoned to Washington by Sawyer. 
 
 Everybody was taught to believe that Payne 
 had some occult and mysterious power as a 
 political manager, and that when he said a thing 
 would happen in politics or legislation, it always 
 did happen. He was a perfect ideal of that 
 union of private business and politics that car 
 ried on its face apparent devotion to the public 
 interest. A fine head and figure, meditative, 
 introspective eyes, a quiet, clear-cut, convincing 
 way of stating his views, he was certainly the 
 most accomplished railroad lobbyist I ever 
 knew. His intimate friendship and business 
 relation with the Chairman of the Democratic 
 State Central Committee in Wisconsin came to 
 be one of the best-known amenities in the politics 
 of the day in that state. It was said that there 
 
IN THE HOUSE 75 
 
 was a well-worn pathway between the back 
 doors of their private offices. 
 
 Well, Sawyer and Payne came to see me night 
 after night for a week or more. Payne was 
 rather stiff and harsh, but Sawyer was fatherly 
 much like a parent reasoning with a wayward 
 child. 
 
 Nils P. Haugen, Congressman from the tenth 
 district, occupied a seat near me. One day he 
 said: 
 
 "I want to tell you something. I saw Payne 
 last night at the Ebbitt House, and he went for 
 you. He said La Toilette is a crank; if he 
 thinks he can buck a railroad company with 
 5,000 miles of line, he ll find out his mistake. 
 We ll take care of him when the time comes. 
 
 Payne was as good as his word. He fought 
 me ever afterward. 
 
 But I got my amendment through allowing 
 the railroad to acquire the necessary right of 
 way, twenty acres of land for stations, and only 
 such additional land as the Secretary of the 
 Interior should find to be a necessary aid to 
 transportation, prohibiting the use or sale of 
 
J 
 
 76 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 any of said lands for town site or other purposes, 
 and providing that each of said roads should 
 within three years locate, construct, and operate 
 their lines or forfeit the lands so acquired to 
 the government. 
 
 I felt even then, and learned far better after 
 ward, what it meant to oppose my own party 
 organization; but when party leaders work for 
 corporations and railroad control, when they 
 do not represent the people, what other course 
 is open for a man who believes in democratic 
 government? I b^lie^eiLthen, as Lbelieye now, 
 
 hat the only salvation for the Republican 
 party lies in purging itself wholly from, the in- 
 luence of financial interests. It is for this, 
 ndeed, that the group of men called Insurgents 
 lave been fighting and it is this that they 
 
 II contend for to the end. I here maintain 
 vith all the force I possess that it is only as the 
 Republican party adopts the position main- 
 ained to-day by the Progressives that it can 
 ive to serve the country as a party organi 
 zation. 
 
 Two of the incidents which I have related as 
 
IN THE HOUSE 77 
 
 examples showing how private interests sought 
 advantages in Congress involve the Wisconsin 
 organization. But Wisconsin was no whit worse 
 than other states. While Sawyer and Payne 
 were getting things for their "home corpora 
 tions" Quay was getting things for his and 
 Aldrich for his, and Gorman for his corporations. 
 And they all traded back and forth, Sawyer 
 helping Aldrich and Quay in getting what they 
 wanted, and they helping him to get what he 
 wanted. At first I saw only sporadic cases, 
 such as I have mentioned, and it was some time 
 before I learned how thoroughly all these in 
 terests worked together, each serving the other. 
 It was in my second term that I crossed the 
 trail of the national organizations of both parties 
 meddling in legislation for corporate interests. 
 In the session before the presidential campaign 
 of 1888 an effort was made to pass the Nica- 
 raguan Canal bill. Congressman Haugen and 
 I had been active in opposing this bill. One 
 day we received an invitation to visit Senator 
 Sawyer in his committee room at the Senate 
 end of the capitol, and did so. When we arrived 
 
78 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 we found Senator Sawyer and the famous Colonel 
 William W. Dudley alone together. Dudley 
 was Chairman of the executive committee of 
 the National Republican Committee. He was 
 a most genial man personally, a brave soldier 
 of the Civil War, who left a leg at Gettysburg. 
 But he was an old-school politician and 
 practical. It was in the following campaign 
 that the Colonel acquired the title of " Blocks - 
 of-five Dudley," through the publication of a 
 letter to an Indiana follower giving minute 
 instructions as to how voters should be rounded, 
 up, watched by faithful lieutenants and voted 
 in "blocks of five." 
 
 When we entered the room, Sawyer said: 
 "I have called you boys over here to talk with 
 you about the Nicaraguan Canal bill. I hear 
 you are ag in it. Now that bill is all right, and 
 ought to pass. Dudley here knows all about it. 
 Dudley, you tell the boys about it." 
 
 Colonel Dudley argued that it was very es 
 sential that the measure then on the House 
 calendar should pass before the adjournment of 
 the session. Not meeting with any favorable 
 
IN THE HOUSE 79 
 
 response from Haugen and myself, he finally 
 appealed to us in the interests of the Republican 
 party, and stated that if the bill was permitted 
 to pass before the adjournment of Congress, the 
 parties interested in the canal would contribute 
 one hundred thousand dollars to the Republican 
 campaign fund. Having understood that Phil 
 Thompson, a prominent Democrat and an ex- 
 Representative, who had the privilege of the 
 floor, was active in behalf of the same measure, 
 I asked Dudley what the Democrats expected 
 if the bill passed, and he frankly admitted that 
 there would be a similar amount contributed 
 to the Democratic National Committee. I 
 jokingly suggested that if the Democrats were 
 to receive a like contribution, one would offset 
 the other. Dudley replied in the same vein, 
 that Republicans had a lot more sense than 
 Democrats in spending their campaign funds, 
 and then proceeded seriously to explain that a 
 plan was afoot by which the Republicans hoped 
 to carry Delaware; that in Delaware at that 
 time only persons owning real estate could vote, 
 and that it was proposed to use this fund, or a 
 
80 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 part of the fund, to buy a tract of swamp land, 
 and parcel it out among the laboring men so as 
 to qualify them as voters. We stated that it 
 was a matter of principle with us, and that we 
 should not withdraw our opposition to the bill. 
 
 The bill did not pass at that session. It did 
 pass with some amendment in 1889. 
 
 A striking incident which occurred near the 
 
 end of my service in Congress, vividly illustrated 
 
 the relationship between private interests in 
 
 various parts of the country in seeking legislation 
 
 \ for special privilege. 
 
 A Ship Subsidy bill was pending in the House, 
 so sweeping in its provisions, that as one of its 
 opponents somewhat extravagantly said, it 
 would "subsidize every fishing smack in New 
 England waters." It was a flagrant effort on 
 the part of private interests to get into the public 
 treasury. The Democrats were generally op 
 posed to the measure. The Republicans were 
 then in control of the House and generally 
 supported it. I was opposed to it, because it 
 granted a privilege to private interests. There 
 fore I began to canvass among my Republican 
 
IN THE HOUSE 81 
 
 friends to see if I could not persuade enough of 
 them to join in voting with the Democrats to 
 defeat the bill. These first tests of strength 
 came a few days before the close of the session, 
 about two o clock in the morning. Enough 
 Republicans voted with the Democrats to defeat 
 it by a narrow margin of five votes. While the 
 clerk recapitulates the roll call on a close vote, 
 effort is often made to get enough members to 
 change their votes to reverse the result. There 
 was great bustling about by the leading sup 
 porters of the measure, seeking out members 
 who might be induced to change their votes. 
 I saw what was afoot. Myron McCord was a 
 
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ggfrg^g,., Jf Aj/y& 
 
 Republican member of the Wisconsin delegation?*! 
 with whom I had discussed the measure and 
 who had voted against the bill. Suddenly I saw 
 a group of members coming out of the cloak 
 room, urging, almost pushing McCord down the 
 aisle. He called out, "Mr. Speaker Mr. 
 Speaker." Obviously he was about to change 
 his vote. 
 
 There was confusion everywhere the same 
 thing going on in different parts of the House. 
 
82 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 Without at all reckoning the consequences, I 
 jumped from my seat, slipped through the 
 crowd, and seizing McCord by his collar, jerked 
 him suddenly backward. Taken by surprise, un 
 prepared for the pull, he nearly lost his feet, and 
 I kept him going until I had him back in the 
 cloakroom. 
 
 "Tell me, Myron," I said, "what do you 
 mean? Why are you trying to change your 
 vote? You promised to vote against the bill." 
 
 He did not resent what I had done. He was 
 ashamed, and said: 
 
 "Bob, I ve got to change my vote. Sawyer 
 has just sent a page over here and insists on 
 my voting for the bill. I ve got to do it. He 
 has loaned me money; he has a mortgage on 
 everything I possess. And he is on his way 
 over here now. He seems to have a personal 
 interest in the passage of the bill." 
 
 He was much agitated. 
 
 "Myron," I said, "here is your hat and coat. 
 Get off the floor as quickly as you can." 
 
 I went with him out of the door leading from 
 the House floor into the corridor back of the 
 
IN THE HOUSE 83 
 
 Speaker s desk. As I returned and was passing 
 up the centre aisle, whom should I see but 
 Senator Sawyer hurrying down the aisle to 
 meet me. He was white with rage. He came 
 directly at me, and jabbing me in the chest with 
 the ends of his stubby fingers, said (I remember 
 his exact words) : 
 
 "Young man, young man, what are you do 
 ing? You are a bolter. The Republican plat 
 form promises this legislation. You are a bolter, 
 sir; you are a bolter." 
 
 I was furious. I revolted at the whole thing. 
 
 "Senator Sawyer," I said, "you can t tell 
 me how to vote on any question. You ve no 
 business on this floor seeking to influence legis 
 lation. You are violating the rules. You get 
 out of here, or I will call the Speaker s attention 
 to you." 
 
 I turned toward the Speaker s desk. He 
 knew I would do what I said, and left the floor 
 immediately without another word. And the 
 House bill was beaten and a substitute measure 
 passed. 
 
 A day or two later I chanced to meet Sawyer 
 
84 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 in the corridor of the capitol. He stopped me 
 and apologized, saying, "I am sorry for what 
 I said the other night. You were right and I 
 was wrong. You have a perfect right to vote 
 as you please." I met him a number of times 
 after that before finally leaving Washington, 
 and he was as cordial toward me as ever. 
 
 In those days a Congressman was obliged to 
 spend even more time than now in departmental 
 matters, especially pensions, widen are now 
 covered by general laws. At that time the 
 pressure was tremendous and a Congressman 
 with many old soldiers in his district was kept 
 busy examining testimony and untangling their 
 records. During most of my service in Congress 
 I spent from a quarter to a third of my time 
 following up pension cases. This did not relate 
 to private pensions, but to the work of investi 
 gation at the Pension Office, where the methods 
 were not so systematized as now. 
 
 I recall one interesting case. An old man, 
 by the name of Joseph Wood, living in Madison, 
 very poor, had a claim pending for an injury 
 received at Pittsburg Landing. His case had 
 

 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 
 At the age of twenty-nine; taken when he was first elected to Congress. 
 
IN THE HOUSE 85 
 
 been repeatedly rejected because the records 
 of the War Department showed that his regi 
 ment had not arrived at Pittsburg Landing 
 until forty-eight hours after the claimant swore 
 he had been injured. On going through his 
 papers I found the affidavits of his captain and 
 twenty-five other soldiers all swearing to the 
 facts as stated by him. I was sure these twenty- 
 six men had not committed perjury. I went to 
 the War Department, thinking there might have 
 been a clerical error in copying, but the record 
 was just as reported at the Pension Office. 
 
 Finding that the 77th Ohio, in which Wood 
 had served, was brigaded with the army which 
 General Sherman commanded, I wrote to Sher 
 man. He replied, in substance, " See my mem 
 oirs, page so-and-so." The date there agreed 
 with the one given by the claimant. I went 
 back to the War Department and said, " General 
 Sherman knows when the 77th Ohio reached 
 Pittsburg Landing." The records were taken 
 to the Secretary of War. He said they could 
 not be changed even on the authority of General 
 Sherman s memoirs. I seemed up against it, 
 
6 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 when it flashed across my mind that the docu 
 ment looked too new to be the original record. 
 Upon inquiry, I found this was true. The old 
 worn records had been stored away years before. 
 Some one was detailed to examine them, and 
 sure enough, there had been a mistake in 
 copying. General Sherman and my old soldier 
 friend were right. Thirty -six hundred dollars 
 back pension brought comfort to that old man 
 and his wife. 
 
 It seems to me now, as I look back upon those 
 years, that most of the lawmakers and indeed 
 most of the public, looked upon Congress and 
 the government as a means of getting some sort 
 of advantage for themselves or for their home 
 towns or home states. River and harbor im 
 provements without merit, public buildings 
 without limit, raids upon the public lands and 
 forests, subsidies and tariffs, very largely occu 
 pied the attention of Congressmen. Lobbyists 
 for all manner of private interests, especially 
 the railroads, crowded the corridors of the capitol 
 and the Washington hotels and not only argued 
 for favorable legislation, but demanded it. 
 
IN THE HOUSE 87 
 
 Of this period, Bryce in his "American Com 
 monwealth," says: 
 
 "The doors of Congress are besieged by a 
 whole army of commercial and railroad men and 
 their agents to whom, since they have come to 
 form a sort of profession, the name of lobbyists 
 is given. Many Congressmen are personally in 
 terested and lobby for themselves among their 
 colleagues from the vantage ground of their 
 official positions. Thus a vast deal of solicita 
 tion and bargaining goes on. . . . That 
 the capitol and the hotels at Washington are a 
 nest of intrigues and machinations while Con 
 gress is sitting is admitted on all hands; how 
 many of the members are tainted no one can 
 tell." 
 
 The genesis of the private interest idea in 
 our government is perfectly clear. While the 
 country was developing rapidly, with capital > 
 scarce and competition strong, it often seemed ^ 
 that the best way, indeed the only way, to 
 secure the highest public interest was through 
 the encouragement and protection of private 
 interests. To the wisest men of the earlier 
 
88 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 times in this country it seemed important to 
 encourage private interests, for example, in 
 building railroads; hence vast tracts of land 
 were granted to railroad companies. Our forest 
 and other natural resources seemed unlimited, 
 and it was anything for growth and development. 
 For a long time, only in the case of railroads did 
 the public generally begin to draw the line at 
 which the protection of private interests be 
 came the legalized plunder of the public. In the 
 newest and least developed sections of the coun 
 try, as in Alaska, the line is still somewhat 
 obscured. Private interests, fed thus upon pub 
 lic favors, became enormously strong. Later 
 the combination form of organization appeared, 
 and competition began to be wiped out. Trusts 
 came into existence. 
 
 But the private interests, the "infant indus 
 tries," the "struggling railroads," instead of 
 wanting less government help when they grew 
 \ strong, demanded more. It was easier to grow 
 rich by gifts from the government than by 
 efficient service and honest effort. 
 
 At the time I was in Congress, from 1885 to 
 
IN THE HOUSE 89 
 
 1891, the onslaught of these private interests was 
 reaching its height. I did not then fully realize 
 that this was the evidence of a great system of 
 "community of interests," which was rapidly 
 getting control of our political parties, our 
 government, our courts. The issue has since 
 become clear. Whether it shows itself in the 
 tariff, in Alaska, in municipal franchises, in the 
 trusts, in the railroads, or the great banking 
 interests, we know that it is one and the same 
 thing. And there can be no compromise with 
 these interests that seek to control the govern 
 ment. Either they or the people will rule. 
 
 I have endeavored in this chapter to show 
 how, in those days, the consideration of private 
 interests of all sorts overwhelmed Congress. I 
 have showed how, in several instances, and in a 
 limited way, I tried to fight against them - 
 singly. But I do not mean to imply that there 
 was no hopeful, no constructive movement then 
 going forward, or that patriotic men, in both 
 branches of Congress, were not doing their best 
 to stem the tide. Such men as Sherman in the 
 Senate and Reagan in the House were real con- 
 
 ft KT Cat / 
 

 
 IN THE HOUSE 
 
 structive statesmen. While I was in Congress 
 the first efforts were made, through the passage 
 of the Interstate Commerce Law, the Sherman 
 Anti-trust Act and other measures, to reassert 
 the power of popular government and to grapple 
 with these mighty private interests; but of that 
 significant, constructive work I shall speak in 
 the next chapter. 
 
 Even then the two diametrically opposite 
 ideas of government had begun a death grapple 
 for mastery in this country. Shall government 
 be for the benefit of private interests, as the 
 Sawyers of those days, and the Quays, Gormans, 
 and the Aldriches believed? Or shall govern 
 ment be for the benefit of the public interest? 
 This is the simple issue involved in the present 
 conflict in the nation. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE REED CONGRESS AND THE NEW 
 
 NATIONAL ISSUES 
 
 I COME now with great personal interest to 
 an account of what was, with a single excep 
 tion, the most tumultuous and exciting ses 
 sion of Congress in all our history, and one of the 
 most important. It was the so-called "Reed 
 Congress" of 1889 to 1891. 
 
 For the first time in fourteen years since 
 18 75 --the Republican party had come into 
 full control of all the departments of govern 
 ment; but while Harrison had comfortably 
 defeated Cleveland, and Blaine was in the 
 cabinet, the House of Representatives was 
 Republican by so narrow a majority that there 
 was some talk that we might not be able to 
 organize the House and elect a Speaker. 
 
 It developed immediately that McKinley 
 
 91 
 
92 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 and Reed were to be the two chief candidates 
 of the Republicans for the Speakership, and the 
 lines of the contest were soon sharply drawn. 
 I was for Reed; I was for Reed notwithstanding 
 the fact that I felt for McKinley a peculiar 
 admiration and affection. I thought Reed bet 
 ter equipped in temperament and character for 
 the struggle which we all knew must follow. 
 
 McKinley and Reed were not at all alike. 
 McKinley drew men to him by the charm, court 
 liness, and kindliness of his manner; Reed drove 
 and forced men; he scourged them with his irony 
 - stung them with his wit. McKinley was a 
 magnetic speaker; he had a clear, bell-like 
 quality of voice, with a thrill in it. He spoke 
 with dignity, but with freedom of action. The 
 pupils of his eyes would dilate until they were 
 almost black, and his face, naturally without 
 much color, would become almost like marble - 
 a strong face and a noble head. When inter 
 rupted either in a speech or debate, instead of 
 seeking to put his man at a disadvantage, as 
 Reed did, he sought to win him. He never had 
 a harsh word for a harsh word, but rather a 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 93 
 
 kindly appeal: "Come now, let us put the 
 personal element aside and consider the prin 
 ciple involved." 
 
 Reed, on the other hand, impressed one with 
 his power. He was rough and sharp and strong. 
 He was one of the ablest men in either house of 
 Congress next to Sherman, who was a broader 
 statesman, perhaps the ablest. He had a mar 
 velous gift of expression. His sentences were 
 short, crisp, strong, and his diction was perfect* 
 but his voice was harsh and disagreeable, es 
 pecially in its higher notes. As a debater he 
 has rarely been equaled in our public life; he 
 had a caustic wit, was often sarcastic, ironical, 
 sometimes droll. He would metaphorically lay 
 hold of his opponent, shake him for a few minutes 
 like some great mastiff, and then drop him into 
 his seat all crumpled up. And yet, though witty 
 in his dealings with individual members, he 
 never trifled with the business of the House. 
 Some of his passages with Carlisle, when Carlisle 
 was Speaker, were among the best examples of 
 4, close forensic reasoning I have ever heard. Both 
 were as fine parliamentary athletes as were ever 
 
94 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 to be found. I remember vividly a characteris 
 tic passage between them. It was near the end 
 of the session, and three o clock in the morning. 
 An appropriation bill was pending. Some one 
 offered an amendment. If it passed, some 
 advantage would accrue to the Democrats; if 
 it failed, some advantage to the Republicans. 
 A point of order was raised against it and Carlisle 
 overruled the point. Reed was on his feet 
 Reed, three hundred pounds, six feet tall. He 
 was the leader on the Republican side. I re 
 member he had just two gestures; one an im 
 pressive downward movement with his extended 
 index finger, and in the other, during his higher 
 flights, he held one great clenched fist high 
 above his head like some colossus. He was 
 a striking figure. 
 
 "I contend," he said, on the occasion to which 
 I refer, "that the Speaker is wrong." 
 
 Carlisle standing there in the Speaker s place 
 answered, "I shall be glad to hear the gentle 
 man from Maine." 
 
 Reed retorted: "The Speaker is wrong for 
 this reason" and put it in a nutshell. 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 95 
 
 "Ah, but the gentleman from Maine is in 
 error because" and Carlisle stated his con 
 tention without a superfluous word. 
 
 "Yes," answered Reed, "but Mr. Speaker" 
 and for ten or fifteen minutes it was parry and 
 thrust, thrust and parry, Reed pressing Carlisle 
 from position to position until finally the Speaker 
 said: 
 
 "The gentleman from Maine is clearly right. 
 The Speaker is wrong and reverses his ruling." 
 
 It was during the speakership fight, in which 
 the interest of the country was intense, that I 
 first met Theodore Roosevelt. He was at that 
 time Civil Service Commissioner, and was much 
 interested in the success of Reed. I liked him. 
 I thought him an unusually able and energetic 
 man, but I think no one then realized the power 
 of growth that was in him. We were about the 
 same age; we were both interested in Reed s 
 election, and I saw quite a little of him that 
 winter. 
 
 Well, we chose Reed Speaker, and it was not 
 long before the expected clash took place. In 
 previous Congresses and under the old rules 
 
96 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 it was possible for an obstructive minority, by 
 refusing to vote, to prevent the House from 
 accomplishing anything. A change in the rules 
 seemed absolutely necessary if the Republicans 
 were to enact any legislation, and, indeed, that 
 was one of the issues in Reed s election. The 
 initial test, as I recall, came on some minor 
 matter, and I have never, in any legislative 
 body, seen anything like it for intensity of 
 emotion and excitement. 
 
 It was evident beforehand that the Demo 
 crats were preparing, by refusing to vote, to 
 make a point of no quorum and prevent the 
 consideration of the motion which was before 
 the House. Reed with McKinley and other 
 members of the Committee on Rules were in 
 conference in the Speaker s room. The time 
 came for action. Reed returned to the floor 
 of the House. I remember how he loomed up 
 behind the Speaker s desk. His face was set 
 and grim. His eyes were dead black, and be 
 yond those of any man I ever knew his were the 
 eyes of power. 
 
 The motions necessary to close the debate 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 97 
 
 were made; the yeas and nays were demanded; 
 the clerk was ordered to call the roll. 
 
 As we anticipated, the Democrats refused to 
 vote. When the roll was completed a point of 
 no quorum was made. This was the moment 
 of suspense. What would Reed do? WTiat 
 would the Democrats do? A perfect hush fell 
 upon the House; I found myself holding fast 
 to my desk. Reed raised his gavel, and with the 
 mallet end in his hand, deliberately pointed out 
 and called the names of members present and 
 not voting, and directed the clerk to so record 
 them. Then he proclaimed a quorum present, 
 announced the vote, and declared the result. 
 
 Instantly members on the Democratic side 
 were on their feet and rushed down the aisles 
 toward the Speaker. An angry roar went up; 
 there were cries of "Czar," "Tyrant." Im 
 mediately the Republicans pressed forward to the 
 support of the Speaker. The least thing in the 
 world if, for example, some one had by acci 
 dent been thrust against another might have 
 precipitated a conflict of serious consequences. 
 
 As for Reed, he never stirred from his place, 
 
98 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 but stood unmoved and with a look held them, 
 until one by one they dropped back into their 
 places. 
 
 Reed appointed me a member of the Ways 
 and Means Committee, which was then as now 
 the leading committee of the House. Among 
 its members were an unusually talented group 
 of men. On the Republican side were McKinley, 
 the chairman, who afterward became President; 
 McKenna, now a member of the Supreme Court; 
 Burrows of Michigan, who went to the Senate; 
 Dingley of Maine, and Payne of New York, both 
 of whom afterward became leaders of the 
 House; Bayne of Pennsylvania; Gear of Iowa, 
 afterward United States Senator. On the 
 Democratic side were Carlisle of Kentucky, 
 afterward Senator and Secretary of the Treas 
 ury; Flower of New York, who served as governor 
 of his state; Roger Q. Mills of Texas, author of the 
 Mills bill, and afterward United States Senator; 
 Breckenridge of Arkansas, afterward Minister 
 to Russia; and McMillan of Tennessee, after 
 ward governor of his state. 
 
 I was younger than any of the other members. 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 99 
 
 I think my appointment came largely as the 
 result of a speech I made on the tariff in the 
 preceding session. It was during the discussion 
 of the Mills bill. I had taken no part in the 
 debate, although I had been trying hard to pre 
 pare myself on the tariff, studying all the great 
 debates on the subject, going back to Clay and 
 Hamilton. 
 
 Ordinarily, Roger Q. Mills, as the father of 
 the measure, should have closed the debate, but 
 for some reason that task fell to Carlisle, the 
 Speaker. Reed closed for the Republicans. 
 Both speeches were very able efforts and made a 
 profound impression; but both had been pre 
 pared beforehand and each without reference 
 to the other. 
 
 I felt that Carlisle s speech was a dangerous 
 one for the Republicans. It dealt with former 
 tariff legislation, particularly w T ith the effect of 
 the acts of 1846 and 1857. I was sure that 
 Carlisle was not only in error in his statement 
 of historical facts, but misleading in his deduc 
 tions from statistics. 
 
 I believed strongly that Carlisle ought to be 
 
100 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 answered, though I felt that it would be pre 
 sumptuous for a member of my youth and in 
 experience to attempt it. Finally I went to 
 Reed, told him how I felt and urged him to 
 reply to Carlisle. He responded by advising 
 me in a jocular way to answer Carlisle myself. 
 I then went with the same proposition to Mc- 
 Kinley. And McKinley also said to me: 
 
 "Bob, you answer it." 
 
 "Well," I said, a bit nettled, "I will answer 
 it." 
 
 I had a cartload of Congressional Records and 
 reports sent to my home. I put in two or three 
 weeks of the hardest kind of work and prepared 
 a speech about an hour and a quarter long. I 
 knew that under the rules I could get only five 
 minutes, but I hoped to make enough impression 
 in five minutes to secure an extension of time 
 from some other member. I read the speech 
 in advance to just one member of Congress, 
 William E. Fuller of Iowa, who had been my 
 good friend, and he advised me to deliver it. 
 
 I waited my opportunity, and began my 
 answer to Carlisle with the statement, "That 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 101 
 
 the representations and conclusions of the dis 
 tinguished gentleman from Kentucky in refer 
 ence to this most interesting decade (1846-1857) 
 remain unchallenged and unanswered, is my 
 only excuse for calling the attention of the House 
 to the subject now." I did my best to crowd 
 everything I could into the first few minutes, 
 keeping my eyes more or less on Reed, the Re 
 publican leader. He was working at his desk, 
 writing. After I had been speaking for a time 
 he stopped and turned around to listen to me. 
 
 Presently the gavel fell, cutting off my speech. 
 Butterworth and Reed both came to their feet. 
 Butterworth asked that my time be extended so 
 as to enable me to finish my remarks. Reed 
 also interposed I can recall just how he looked 
 saying: 
 
 "Mr. Speaker, I think that courtesy ought to 
 be allowed the gentleman. This speech ought 
 not to be interrupted here." 
 
 Unanimous consent was given, and I con 
 tinued. 
 
 The speech, which was afterward widely cir 
 culated, evidently so impressed the party leaders 
 
102 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 as to assure me a place on the Ways and Means 
 Committee. 
 
 As soon as the committee was organized we 
 began serious work upon the preparation of 
 the measure afterward known as the McKin- 
 ley bill. McKinley apportioned the different 
 schedules to sub -committees for special consider 
 ation. I was assigned to prepare the agri 
 cultural, jute, hemp, flax, and tobacco schedules 
 and was one of three on the metal schedule. 
 Gear, of Iowa, and I made the chief fight to put 
 sugar on the free list. 
 
 For many weeks we held open hearings and 
 scores of men of all classes appeared before us 
 and presented their views. Most of the informa 
 tion we then received, as I now realize, con 
 sisted of the loose statements of interested men. 
 The facts and figures of the manufacturers were 
 accepted as reliable. I think at that time I did 
 not seriously question this unscientific method 
 of securing information as a basis for such im 
 portant legislation as that upon the tariff. 
 
 We relied upon the historical theory of the 
 protective tariff as advocated by the Republican 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 103 
 
 party. Hamilton, Clay, Elaine, and McKinley 
 believed that it made little difference how high 
 the duties were fixed, because free competition 
 betw r een domestic manufacturers within the 
 tariff wall would inevitably force prices down, 
 insuring the lowest charge to the consumer 
 commensurate with paying American wages to 
 American workmen. 
 
 Elaine in his " Twenty Years in Congress" 
 makes domestic competition the cornerstone 
 of protection. He says: 
 
 "Protection . . . does not invite com 
 petition from abroad, but is based on the con 
 trary principle, that competition at home will 
 always prevent monopoly on the part of capital 
 ists, assure good wages to the laboring man and 
 defend the consumers against the evils of ex 
 tortion." 
 
 But the trouble has been that domestic com 
 petition did not prove the strong regulator of 
 commerce that the early protectionists believed 
 it would. Money interests began to form monop 
 olies behind the tariff wall and -both consumers 
 and wage-earners began to suffer from extortion. 
 
104 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 The difference in view on the tariff between 
 the progressive Republicans and the so-called 
 "stand-pat" Republicans lies exactly here. 
 The Progressives have seen this vast revolution 
 in economic conditions and have recognized the 
 need of radical changes in our tariff system, while 
 the stand-pat Republicans, led by Aldrich, 
 Penrose, Lodge, Smoot, and others, have refused 
 to recognize the changed conditions. They 
 believe in keeping the tariff wall as high as 
 possible notwithstanding the growth of extor 
 tionate monopolies. They believe it more im 
 portant to keep up the profits of the combined 
 manufacturers than to keep down the prices to 
 the people. The passage of the Payne- Aldrich 
 tariff bill of 1909, of which I shall have more to 
 say later in the appropriate place, was the most 
 outrageous assault of private interests upon the 
 people recorded in tariff history. 
 
 Progressive Republicans have demanded a 
 Tariff Commission of scientific experts, with 
 power to investigate and discover the actual 
 differences in labor cost between American and 
 foreign products. We do not wish to have the 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 105 
 
 tariff reduced below that difference, but we 
 realize that we cannot accept the statements of 
 interested manufacturers. In my speech in 
 1890 supporting the McKinley bill, I referred 
 to the wide difference in conditions between 
 farmers and wage-earners in America com 
 pared with those in foreign countries. I said: 
 
 "Gentlemen may reason upon any line they 
 choose; they may approach the subject from 
 either side; but, sir, there is no escape from 
 the conclusion that labor is the great issue in 
 volved. The workers in every field of industry 
 in this broad land are the ones vitally interested." 
 
 Where there can be shown to be no difference 
 in labor cost I am for free trade. But the dif 
 ference must be determined by real experts who 
 understand the use and limits of statistics. This 
 was my criticism at the last session of Congress, 
 of the present so-called tariff board appointed 
 by Mr. Taft. This board reported to Congress 
 the average difference on print paper and wood 
 pulp, but I showed that their "average" had 
 no meaning at all. It was made up from many 
 establishments, some of which had old, anti- 
 
106 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 quated machinery which ought long ago to have 
 gone to the scrap heap. In these establishments 
 the labor cost was excessively high, and we do 
 not believe in protecting inefficient management. 
 On the other hand, by digging into their report, 
 I showed from their own statistics that the up- 
 to-date efficient plants in this country were 
 making paper just as cheaply as it can be made 
 in Canada, and for that reason 1 was for free 
 print paper and wood pulp. A tariff board is 
 a poor substitute for the haphazard hearings 
 on the McKinley, Dingley, and Payne-Aldrich 
 bills if the statistical experts do not know how 
 to collect and interpret their statistics. While 
 the present tariff board may gather much valu 
 able information, it has no power of command 
 ing the facts from unwilling manufacturers; it 
 does not meet the requirement that every mem 
 ber shall be specially trained for the service, it 
 is insufficiently supplied with funds, and it 
 reports to the executive rather than the legis 
 lative branch of the government. Its lack of 
 power was well expressed by its capable chair 
 man, Prof. Henry C. Emery, in a speech to the 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 107 
 
 American Association of Woolen and Worsted 
 Manufacturers on December 8, 1910. He said: 
 
 "You must not think I am joking about this 
 thing, but there is a joke about it, and the joke 
 is this: I have no powers whatsoever. The 
 tariff board has no powers. There is really no 
 such thing as a tariff board. The law says that 
 for certain purposes the President may employ 
 such persons as he sees fit. I am one of 
 such persons. That is all." 
 
 The Tariff Commission should be at the 
 service of the houses of Congress instead of the 
 semi-confidential advisers of the President. For 
 it is Congress which is charged with the duty of 
 framing the tariff laws, and there are other 
 things besides mere statistics that Congress must 
 pass upon. Congress must determine whether 
 a given industry shall be protected at all. We 
 ,,do not want to protect tropical products not 
 suited to our climate. We do not want to 
 protect raw material, like lumber and phos 
 phates, where protection merely adds to the exhaus 
 tion of our natural resources. Then, before Con 
 gress decides that a given industry shall be 
 

 108 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 protected, we want to know how much of its 
 claim for protection is due to its own inefficiency. 
 We ought to work toward a condition in which 
 American enterprise, good management, clever 
 and powerful machinery, intelligence and skill 
 of the workers will enable us to have low cost 
 of labor along with high wages to the laborer. 
 
 For this reason we want to know also what 
 are the actual wages and actual standards of 
 living of American labor in the protected in 
 dustries. If men are working twelve hours a 
 day seven days a week, as they are in the steel 
 industry, whereas their competitors in England 
 are working eight hours a day six days a week, 
 then the fact that our labor cost is less than the 
 English labor cost does not necessarily require 
 us to adopt free trade in steel products. Our 
 tariff should be based on what American labor 
 ought to get in order to reach our ideal of living 
 wages suited to American citizenship. In 1890, 
 when we were working on the McKinley bill, 
 the iron and steel workers had the most powerful 
 trade union in the country. There was no 
 question then that they would be able to get 
 

 THE REED CONGRESS 109 
 
 from their employers their fair share of the tariff 
 protection. But their union was broken to pieces 
 afterward by the Homestead strike. The ques 
 tion of how American labor is going to protect 
 itself against the trusts is a serious problem fast 
 looming up ahead of us. Certainly we should 
 not reduce the tariff so low as to shut off their 
 hope of better conditions. If their unions are 
 destroyed we must supplement our tariff legis 
 lation by labor legislation. 
 
 These are some of the facts which a really 
 expert Tariff Commission should furnish to 
 Congress. And I can see, by comparison with 
 our hearings on the McKinley bill, how such a 
 commission would be of incalculable service to 
 \the Ways and Means Committee. 
 
 But to return to my story: As soon as the 
 hearings were completed the committee divided 
 and the Democratic members, led by Carlisle 
 and Mills, discontinued their attendance. In 
 doing this they were following the precedent 
 set by the Republicans in the former Congress, 
 when the Mills bill was being framed by a 
 Democratic majority. In framing the measure 
 
110 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 each sub -committee reported and the bill was 
 then drafted by the Republican members. I 
 remember spending night after night with Mc- 
 Kinley in his rooms in the Ebbitt House going 
 over, comparing, and arranging the paragraphs 
 of each schedule. 
 
 One interesting feature of our deliberations was 
 our various consultations with James G. Blaine. 
 Elaine was a man of extraordinary personality, 
 possessing those peculiarities of temperament 
 and character which made him a great leader 
 of men. I never was an ardent Blaine man. I 
 always shared the Wisconsin admiration for 
 Sherman, and it was a disappointment to me 
 when Blaine was nominated for the Presidency. 
 He was a man who had to be defended; and 
 many Republicans who were not infatuated with 
 him were somewhat afraid of him. 
 
 I remember especially one visit that the 
 Republican members of our committee paid to 
 Blaine in his office as Secretary of State. He 
 was not then in good health; the malady to 
 which he finally succumbed had fastened upon 
 him. His face was chalky white and as he 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 111 
 
 talked I remember he leaned upon his desk. 
 It was suggested by McKinley that he sit down. 
 "No, no," he said, "I can t talk when I sit 
 down." The only thing that did not look like 
 death in his face was his brilliant black eyes. 
 
 Elaine was one of the most effective talkers 
 we have had clear, easy, copious, and with 
 a rare grace of expression. He gave us his 
 views on reciprocity, and before the bill finally 
 became law they were substantially incorpo 
 rated in Section III. At that time Blaine had 
 begun to see clearly the path along which the 
 high protective tariff was driving us, and to 
 realize the necessity of developing our foreign 
 markets. But the sort of reciprocity which he 
 advocated was very different from the reci 
 procity advocated by President Taft and op 
 posed by many of the Republican Progressives 
 in the last session of Congress. 
 
 Nothing surprised me more during that ses 
 sion than the misunderstanding in many minds 
 of the Republican doctrine of reciprocity. It 
 was astonishingly confused with what might be 
 called the Democratic doctrine. The Repub- 
 
112 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 lican doctrine, as expounded by Elaine, is based 
 upon the protection of all American industries 
 that can economically be conducted in this 
 country. It then places a high tariff on articles, 
 such as tropical and semi-tropical products, 
 that cannot be produced in this country except 
 at excessive cost. But this tariff is not for 
 the purpose of protection. It is for the 
 purpose of "trading capital." Its object is 
 to enable the President to make a trade with 
 foreign countries by offering to them a reduction 
 of duties on articles which we do not care to 
 protect, in exchange for the reduction of their 
 duties on articles which we wish to protect but 
 wliich we wish also to export. It is a kind of 
 double protection for American industries 
 protection of the home market against foreigners, 
 and extension of the foreign market for Ameri 
 cans. 
 
 But the Democratic doctrine applied to reci 
 procity is exactly the opposite. It is based 
 upon the free trade theory. It proposes to 
 make "trading capital," not of the industries 
 which we cannot build up economically, but of 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 113 
 
 the industries which we want to protect. In 
 fact, carried to the extreme, as was done by 
 President Taft in his Canadian pact, it sacrificed 
 the farmers, who, with the laborers, are almost 
 the only interests we want to protect, in favor 
 of the trusts, which are the last interests needing 
 protection. It proposed to reduce our tariffs 
 on farm products if the Canadians would reduce , , 
 their tariffs on our trust products. No wonder V 
 the Canadians rejected it! and I believe the 
 Americans would have rejected it if they could 
 have had a similar campaign of education upon 
 it. It would have sacrificed our farmers to 
 Canadian competition, while actually strength 
 ening our trusts by giving them cheaper raw 
 material; and it would have placed the Cana 
 dians at the mercy of our trusts, so that they 
 could not have retained the advantages of their 
 cheap raw material after their own manufac 
 turers were driven out. It was also an attrac 
 tive bait for the American newspapers, which 
 were influenced in its favor by the promises of 
 free print paper and wood pulp. In my speech 
 in the Senate I proclaimed that the suppression 
 

 114 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 by the newspapers of news against reciprocity 
 was a black page in our history. 
 
 The McKinley tariff bill was a momentous 
 measure. It aided in defeating the Republican 
 party in 1892, but, when the reaction came, 
 McKinley s connection with it was largely in 
 strumental in making him President of the 
 United States. 
 
 McKinley believed profoundly that the in 
 terests of the whole country, agricultural as 
 well as manufacturing, were involved in the 
 maintenance of such duties as would insure the 
 protection of all articles which it was economi 
 cally possible for us to produce in this country. 
 That meant patriotism to him. It was a deep 
 conviction, almost a religion, with him. No one 
 who worked with him could doubt it. 
 
 A few months after his . inauguration, I re 
 ceived a telegram from President McKinley and 
 also from Senator Spooner, offering me the 
 position of Comptroller of the Treasury. It 
 came out of a clear sky: I was not a candidate 
 for any position under his administration, and 
 I declined by telegraph. Later I called on him 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 115 
 
 at the White House, explaining why I could 
 not accept. We were then in the midst of the 
 Wisconsin fight, and besides I did not desire 
 an appointive office. We sat on a lounge to 
 gether and talked over our old days in Congress. 
 He told me what his hopes and ambitions were 
 as to extending our trade abroad; that in his 
 selection of appointees in foreign missions and 
 in the consular service he hoped to secure trained 
 business men who were masters in the lines of 
 trade which could be extended in the countries 
 to which they were sent. It was McKinley s 
 greatest ambition, now that the country had 
 reached its highest development under the pro 
 tective system, with an excess of production 
 demanding outlet, to round out his career by 
 gaining for America a supremacy in the markets 
 of the world; and this he hoped to do without 
 weakening the protective system. 
 
 During all the years that I was in Congress 
 the stupendous problems which now confront 
 us, and which will occupy us for a long time 
 to come, had already begun to appear. I mean 
 the problems of the trusts and the railroads: 
 
116 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 in short, the problems of vast financial power 
 in private hands. In those years the govern 
 ment of the United States for the first time began 
 to consider seriously the condition of the com 
 mon man the worker, the farmer. While I 
 was in Congress we passed two measures, which 
 I heartily supported, that were destined to be 
 of incalculable value to the plain people. One 
 of them provided for the organization of a 
 ^national Bureau of Labor, which has since been 
 joined with bureaus concerned with the interests 
 of commerce to form one of the great departments 
 of the government with a representative in the 
 cabinet. The other was the establishment of the 
 
 \/ Department of Agriculture the recognition of 
 the great farming industry of the country. Until 
 that time, while manufacturers had been lav 
 ishly protected and while railroads had received 
 vast grants of land, the wage-earner and the 
 farmer had received little attention and no direct 
 benefits. It is fortunate that this cooperation 
 of the government with wage-earners and 
 
 \J farmers took the form, not of direct financial 
 advantage, but of investigation, publicity, and 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 117 
 
 education, which in their nature are soundly 
 constructive. 
 
 But the great subjects which were dealt with 
 for the first time in those three Congresses were 
 the railroad and trust problems. Real states 
 men like Sherman and Reagan saw that the 
 policy, until then pursued, of serving the public 
 interest by assisting private interests was no 
 longer tenable. Private interests had grown 
 so strong that it was felt that either the govern 
 ment must control them with a strong hand or 
 else they would control the government. 
 
 It would not have availed then, nor will it 
 avail now, merely to pursue the negative method 
 of removing the tariff which has encouraged the 
 growth of trusts and combinations. I believe 
 that the reduction of tariffs will furnish a small 
 measure of relief from the extortion of certain 
 combinations, but it will not cure the evil of 
 monopolies in private hands. Many trusts, 
 such as the Standard Oil Company, the Anthra 
 cite Coal trust, and the whole group of trusts 
 based upon monopoly of patent rights, do not 
 now depend and never have depended for their 
 
118 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 existence or their power upon a protective tariff. 
 Foreign competition will not, therefore, cure 
 the trust evil: indeed, it will encourage the 
 movement, already strongly in evidence, toward 
 the organization of international and world- wide 
 monopolies. 
 
 No, the constructive statesmen of those times 
 saw clearly that there must be positive action 
 of government either to prevent or to control 
 monopolies. Two very significant laws, both 
 of which I supported heartily, were therefore 
 passed in those years. In one of these the 
 A Sherman Anti-trust Act the keynote was 
 prohibition, the effort to prevent combination 
 and to restore competition by drastic laws. In 
 the other, the act establishing the Interstate 
 ^Commerce Commission for the control of rail 
 roads, the keynote was regulation. 
 
 Of all the legislation of those years none 
 interested me so deeply as the measure for the 
 creation of the Interstate Commerce Commis 
 sion, which we passed in 1887. I laid there the 
 foundation of the knowledge which afterward 
 served me well in the fight in Wisconsin, and 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 119 
 
 continued of value after I came back to the 
 Senate nineteen years later when railroad legis 
 lation occupied so much of the time of Con 
 gress. 
 
 I was strongly in favor of the regulation of 
 railroads, and while the bill as proposed did 
 not go as far as I should have liked, I worked 
 for it and voted for it. Of all the speeches I 
 made while a member of Congress, the one on 
 the railroad bill gives me to-day the greatest 
 satisfaction. 
 
 It was a bitter fight. To Reagan of Texas, 
 more than any other one man in the House, 
 belongs the credit for the passage of the act. 
 He was a very able man, a Democrat. He was 
 for a time Postmaster-General of the Confeder 
 acy. Reagan afterward went to the Senate, 
 but because of his public-spirited interest in 
 transportation questions, his desire to see rail 
 road regulation established upon correct prin 
 ciples j he resigned, went home to Texas, and 
 took the chairmanship of the state railroad com 
 mission at a much lower salary. He afterward 
 took a great interest in my fight for railroad 
 
120 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 regulation in Wisconsin. When I was governor 
 I sent him the original draft of our proposed 
 Wisconsin law, and was much aided by his wise 
 criticisms and suggestions. 
 
 Another method of dealing with private in 
 terests also appeared during those sessions of 
 Congress in which I personally was particularly 
 interested. I mean the regulation of industry 
 by internal revenue taxation. The measure at 
 issue was a bill to check the manufacturers of 
 oleomargarine, mostly the great packers of 
 Chicago, who made a bogus product and sold 
 it as butter. It seriously injured the dairy 
 business all over the country. The bill was 
 debated for months in the House. The con 
 stitutional argument in favor of the measure 
 had taken on an apologetic tone. The bill 
 imposed an internal revenue tax on oleomar 
 garine. It could not be defended as a measure 
 to raise revenue, for there was a surplus of 
 revenue in the treasury. When pressed by 
 opponents of the bill to answer whether it was 
 a proper use of the constitutional power to levy 
 a tax when revenue was not needed, advocates 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 121 
 
 of the measure inconsistently and illogically 
 admitted that it was not. In my speech I 
 argued openly that the Constitution authorized 
 the federal government to use the taxing power, 
 that there was no limit to that power for police 
 purposes, and that it could be used not only to 
 raise revenue but frankly and unreservedly to reg 
 ulate or to destroy an evil. I think now as I ^ 
 thought then, that the power of internal revenue 
 taxation, which has never been extensively used/ 
 in this country, save for revenue purposes, will 
 in the future be a valuable means of correcting 
 some of the abuses which have grown out of 
 modern business methods. 
 
 In my preparation of this oleomargarine 
 debate I got track of a letter written by John 
 Quincy Adams to the Speaker of the House of 
 Representatives, in which I understood there 
 was an extended discussion of the very proposi 
 tion on which I wished to take my stand. At 
 that period there were no complete records made 
 of the doings of Congress, and I could not find 
 the letter. I took my problem to Mr. Spofford, 
 then at the head of the Congressional Library, 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 who, after several weeks of search, finally dis 
 covered a copy of the letter in a newspaper of 
 that day. It was a valuable document in its 
 exposition of the views of the framers of the 
 Constitution regarding the taxing powers of 
 the government. It was eagerly accepted as 
 furnishing high authority for the proposed legis 
 lation. In order to make it accessible for future 
 use, I had it printed as an appendix to my 
 speech. 
 
 Efforts in those days to bring about con 
 structive reforms, especially if they struck 
 at concrete evils, met with the bitterest oppo 
 sition, as indeed they do to-day, in the case, for 
 example, of so reasonable and practical a 
 measure as that which provides for a parcels- 
 post. 
 
 One single illustration will show the difficul 
 ties that beset any man in Congress who tries 
 honestly to press a constructive reform against 
 the power of private interests. 
 
 Henry Clay Evans of Tennessee was a friend 
 of mine. He was formerly from Wisconsin, and 
 in the convention in 1896, at St. Louis, I seconded 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 123 
 
 his nomination for the vice-presidency. At that 
 time Vilas of Wisconsin was Postmaster-General 
 in Cleveland s cabinet. One of the first reforms 
 he urged was against the excessive rental charge 
 of railroad companies for postal cars. After a 
 thorough investigation he showed that for the 
 rental which it paid annually the government 
 could actually build outright, equip, and keep 
 in repair all the cars it used and then save 
 $500,000 a year. 
 
 Evans had been appointed to the House Com 
 mittee on Post Offices and Post Roads, and when 
 he got hold of Vilas report it amazed him as 
 it would amaze any one not connected with a 
 railroad company. It seemed to him that he 
 had only to make these facts known in order to 
 have the abuse corrected. He came to me and 
 said very earnestly: 
 
 "I am going to get a provision adopted by 
 the committee to stop this abuse and ^ecure an 
 appropriation sufficient to enable the govern 
 ment to build its own mail cars." 
 
 It seemed the sensible, honest thing to do. I 
 encouraged him and told him that, if he could 
 
124 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 get the matter before the House, I would help 
 him. 
 
 A few weeks later he gave me the result of 
 his effort in committee: 
 
 "I put that thing up to the committee," he 
 said, "with a good plain statement which should 
 have convinced any man, and I couldn t even 
 get a vote in support of the proposition." 
 
 If he had tried to get it upon the floor of the 
 House there would not have been a corporal s 
 guard to sustain him. The railroad lobby out 
 side and the railroad members inside would have 
 prevented any action. 
 
 Seventeen years after w r ard, when I came to 
 the Senate, I looked this matter up and there 
 was the same old abuse. During all those years 
 the government had been paying enough rental 
 every year to the railroads to buy the cars out 
 right. I took up the old Vilas report, interested 
 Victor Murdock of Kansas, then on the House 
 Committee on Post Offices, and attempted to 
 get something done. Murdock encountered 
 the same opposition that defeated Evans years 
 before he could accomplish nothing. But 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 when the Post Office appropriation bill came 
 over to the Senate, I offered an amendment 
 providing for an investigation in order to bring 
 the Vilas data down to date. I believe that 
 legislation should always be preceded by accu 
 rate information. I knew that my proposal was 
 subject to a point of order as an amendment to 
 an appropriation bill, but it was so manifestly 
 right and in the public interest that I hoped the 
 point would not be insisted upon. But no! 
 Penrose raised the point of order and the inves 
 tigation was denied. 
 
 The next year, when Penrose got the Post 
 Office appropriation bill up, I was in a stronger 
 position. For some reason he wanted it passed 
 that day. But I stood in its path with my 
 amendment and the power of unlimited debate. 
 He suggested that if the Senator from Wiscon 
 sin would not press the matter at that time but 
 would offer his amendment later and indepen 
 dently, that he (Penrose) would promise to have 
 it reported back favorably from the committee 
 and help in passing it. I promptly accepted 
 his proposition, but Penrose went away and did 
 
126 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 not return until so near the end of the session 
 that when I went to him he said he could not 
 get his committee together so I lost out again. 
 
 At the next session I began earlier, and got a 
 resolution through the Senate w^hich provided 
 for an investigation by the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission. This investigation has been made 
 and reported and at another session we are 
 going at it again ! 
 
 During those years in the eighties, while I 
 was in Congress, the lines between the Pro 
 gressive and stand-pat elements were already 
 beginning to appear. The alignment of forces 
 was not so clear to me then as it is now, but I 
 knew well enough where the leaders stood. 
 Reed always used his great powers in defending 
 f the existing system. He sneered at those who 
 desired new legislation. He closed one of his 
 speeches with these words: 
 
 "And yet, outside the Patent Office there are 
 no monopolies in this country, and there never 
 can be. Ah, but what is that I see on the far 
 horizon s edge, with tongue of lambent flame 
 and eye of forked fire, serpent-headed and 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 127 
 
 griffin-clawed? Surely it must be the great 
 new chimera Trust. . . . What unrea 
 sonable talk this is. A dozen men fix the 
 prices for sixty million freemen! They can 
 never do it! There is no power on earth that 
 can raise the price of any necessity of life above 
 a just price and keep it there. More than that, 
 if the price is raised and maintained even for 
 a short while, it means ruin for the combination 
 and still lower prices for the consumers." 
 
 Reed had no sympathy with the Interstate 
 Commerce bill, and voted against it. 
 
 I always felt that McKinley represented the 
 newer view. Of course, McKinley was a high 
 protectionist, but on the great new questions 
 as they arose he was generally on the side of 
 the public and against private interests. 
 
 And this the people instinctively sensed. In 
 my own State of Wisconsin, during the campaign 
 for the Republican nomination in 1896, I was 
 strongly for McKinley, but the old machine 
 leaders, Payne, Sawyer, Spooner, Pfister, and 
 Keyes, all worked vigorously for Reed. Reed 
 had Big Business with him; but the sentiment 
 
128 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 in the state was too strong for the bosses. The 
 Wisconsin delegation to the St. Louis conven 
 tion, of which I had been elected as an anti- 
 machine member, was instructed for and stood 
 solid for McKinley. 
 
 I am saying this notwithstanding McKinley s 
 relationships with Mark Hanna. The chief 
 incentive behind Hanna s support of McKinley, 
 I am convinced, was the honest love he felt for 
 his friend. McKinley inspired affection of that 
 sort. And Hanna, having come largely into 
 control of the Republican organization through 
 his genius as a leader and through the enormous 
 expenditure of money, tried to bring all the 
 elements together in harmony. The first and 
 only time I ever met him was at the St. Louis 
 convention. He requested me to come and 
 see him. He was extremely cordial, almost 
 affectionate. I remember he put his arm 
 around me and told me of his relations with 
 McKinley. He told me and this was the 
 object of the meeting that he felt sure that 
 McKinley would like to see Payne on the 
 National Committee from Wisconsin. He under- 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 129 
 
 stood, he said, that I was making a fight on 
 Payne, but hoped that in the interest of harmony 
 I would stand for Payne s selection. I told 
 him very earnestly about our struggle in Wis 
 consin, that a great movement had started there 
 which could not be arrested or diverted, that 
 Payne and his associates stood for the destruc 
 tion of representative government, and that we 
 could make no truce with them. Mr. Hanna s 
 manner changed abruptly, and the interview 
 terminated. 
 
 I know of my own knowledge that McKinley 
 stood against many of the corrupt influences 
 within his own party that he even stood 
 firmly against the demands of his best friend, 
 Hanna. 
 
 McKinley had no sooner been elected than 
 the Wisconsin machine, backed strongly by 
 Hanna, demanded the appointment of Henry 
 C. Payne as Postmaster-General. And I with 
 others brought forward the name of Governor 
 Hoard of Wisconsin as candidate for Secretary 
 of Agriculture. A few weeks before McKinley s 
 inauguration, upon his invitation, I went to 
 
130 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 Canton to see him. When I called about ten 
 o clock he told his secretary that he would not 
 see anybody else before five that afternoon. We 
 drove about town and visited his mother, a 
 beautiful old lady. We had luncheon at his 
 house. We discussed at length the appoint 
 ment of Payne and Hoard to the cabinet. I 
 explained to him what forces Payne represented 
 in Wisconsin, and indeed he had already known 
 Payne s work as a lobbyist in Washington in 
 connection especially with beef trust matters, 
 and I knew he abominated that sort of thing. 
 But he told me that lie believed no other man 
 had ever been so strongly endorsed by promi 
 nent influential politicians in every part of the 
 country as was Payne for that appointment. 
 When it was nearly time for me to go McKinley 
 said: 
 
 "Bob, I may not be able to appoint Hoard, 
 but I will say to you that Henry Payne shall not 
 be a member of my cabinet." 
 
 When I saw McKinley at the White House in 
 the following winter, he told me how the effort 
 to secure Payne s appointment had culminated. 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 131 
 
 He said that Hanna had come to him just before 
 his final decision was made and said: "You may 
 wipe out every obligation that you feel toward 
 me, and I ll ask no further favors of you, if you ll 
 only put Henry Payne in the cabinet." 
 
 McKinley s answer was: "Mark, I would do 
 anything in the world I could for you, but I 
 cannot put a man in my cabinet who is known 
 as a lobbyist." 
 
 And he kept his word. 
 
 McKinley did not fully appreciate the new 
 currents then entering our public life. He was 
 a leader in the old business school of politics 
 which regarded material prosperity as the chief 
 end of all government. But he was a consist 
 ently honest man throughout. To illustrate: 
 
 It was during his administration that exten 
 sive frauds were discovered in the Post Office 
 Department and in the Department of Posts of 
 Cuba. Senator Bristow of Kansas was then 
 the Fourth Assistant Postmaster-General. He is 
 a born investigator, able, original, fearless. 
 McKinley, when he realized the gravity of the 
 frauds, sent for Bristow and told him he had 
 
132 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 selected him to go to Cuba and make a thorough 
 investigation and clean out any corruption that 
 might be found there. 
 
 " I am willing to go, Mr. President," said 
 Bristow, "but before going I want to call your 
 attention to the fact that every appointee in 
 Cuba who has been accused of wrong-doing has 
 been sent there upon the recommendation of 
 members of Congress, Senators, or men influen 
 tial in the Republican party. When it becomes 
 necessary for me to arrest or remove from office 
 any of these men, they will at once complain 
 to their friends in the states and you will be 
 bombarded with complaints as to my conduct. 
 All I ask is that you withhold judgment until 
 you hear my side of the case." 
 
 McKinley said: "Mr. Bristow, I "under 
 stand just how difficult a task I have assigned 
 to you. But go ahead, do what is right, be 
 cautious, but firm, and shield no man who has 
 been guilty of wrong-doing. As to the com 
 plaints, leave them to me; I will take care of 
 them." 
 
 Bristow did go ahead and ran his game to 
 
THE REED CONGRESS 133 
 
 cover, and when Hanna and other Senators and 
 Congressmen protested he told them that the 
 Cuban postal service was infested with a 
 gang of thieves and that he was simply doing 
 his duty and proposed to keep it up. Then 
 they went to the White House and McKinley 
 told them that Bristow was acting on his orders. 
 He stood unwaveringly by Bristow against the 
 persistent importunity of many of his most 
 intimate political advisers. 
 
 I never felt that McKinley had a fair chance. 
 His first term was broken into by the Spanish 
 War. His second was cut off at the very begin 
 ning by assassination. He had no opportunity 
 to develop his carefully wrought-out plans for 
 large trade extension. He had rare tact as a 
 manager of men. Back of his courteous and 
 affable manner was a firmness that never yielded 
 conviction, and while scarcely seeming to force is 
 sues he usually achieved exactly what he sought. 
 
 In the fall of 1890 I was a candidate for a 
 fourth term in Congress. I was so confident 
 of reelection that I spent much time campaign 
 ing in other parts of Wisconsin and in speaking 
 
134 THE REED CONGRESS 
 
 in Iowa and elsewhere. But serious complica 
 tions had arisen in Wisconsin politics: an act 
 known as the Bennett law had been passed by 
 the preceding legislature which the very large 
 Lutheran and Roman Catholic element in the 
 state believed to be a blow at their parochial 
 school systems, and there was a wholesale cut 
 ting of the Republican ticket. Combined with 
 this the machine leaders in Wisconsin came into 
 my district while I was absent speaking for 
 candidates in other parts of the state, and 
 secretly used all their power against me and in 
 favor of the Democratic candidate. The result 
 AVSLS that although I ran seven hundred votes 
 ahead of my ticket, I was defeated. The whole 
 state went heavily Democratic. Every Repub 
 lican Congressman save one lost his seat. 
 
 Thus I was returned to private life and to 
 my law practice; but it was not long before I 
 began the fifteen years struggle with the machine 
 in Wisconsin which finally resulted in its complete 
 overthrow. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD OF MY PUBLIC LITE 
 
 IT WOULD be idle to say that the termina 
 tion of my career as a Congressman in 
 March, 1891, was not a bitter disappoint 
 ment to me. It was. I had not made a great 
 many speeches in the six years of my service, 
 but when I did enter the debates it was with 
 careful preparation; and I think I may fairly 
 say that I had attained to such a position as 
 warranted me in looking forward to a career of 
 some distinction had I been permitted to remain 
 in the House. So the defeat came to me as a 
 severe blow. But I had acquired a very valu 
 able experience in my public service and formed 
 delightful and valuable acquaintances. I had 
 been in contact w r ith the strong men of the coun 
 try, and as a result had, I think, grown in char 
 acter and power. 
 
 135 
 
136 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 I was but thirty-five years of age, and went 
 back with firm resolutions and good cheer to 
 my law practice at Madison, Wisconsin. I was 
 poor, and the expenses attendant upon readjust 
 ment to the new life were matters of conse 
 quence. These matters were discussed from 
 time to time by Mrs. La Toilette and myself. 
 Our little daughter, Fola, very much impressed 
 with frequently hearing these talks, came one 
 day to her mother, and having in mind my 
 recent failure of reelection, said, "Mama, will 
 papa have to be elected before he can practise 
 law and earn some money?" 
 
 I found that my public service, while it had 
 been a serious interruption to my professional 
 life, had extended my reputation materially and 
 tended to draw to me a very substantial client 
 age. Any thought I had of returning to the 
 public service was vague and remote. That I 
 should continue to be interested in public ques 
 tions and in matters political was inevitable. I 
 knew that issues of great importance affecting 
 the lives and homes of all the people of the coun 
 try w r ere coming rapidly forward. I had fol- 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 137 
 
 lowed the great debate in the Senate and House 
 on the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, had taken part 
 in the debate in the House on the Interstate 
 Commerce Law, had seen the manifestations of 
 corporate power in the halls of Congress. I rec 
 ognized, in a way, the evidences of the oncom 
 ing struggle. I had come to understand the 
 power of Sawyer, Payne, and a few other promi 
 nent Republican politicians, closely associated 
 with railroads and other corporate interests in 
 national and state legislation. I was convinced 
 that Payne had not been seriously disappointed 
 with my defeat; that, in fact, wherever he could 
 exert any influence against my political success, 
 without leaving a trail as broad as a highway, he 
 had for some time lost no opportunity of doing 
 so. 
 
 Not so with Sawyer. I had disappointed him 
 again and again in my course upon legislation. 
 But he was a loyal party man and believed in 
 supporting party candidates regardless of per 
 sonal feeling. Furthermore, as I have said be 
 fore, I always believed that Sawyer did not 
 violate his standard of political ethics in his 
 
138 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 course upon legislation. Like many politicians 
 he regarded Congress as a useful agency for the 
 promotion of business enterprises in which he 
 and his friends were identified or interested. If 
 a man did not accept his point of view, he would 
 argue the matter in a blunt, frank, simple w r ay 
 without any display of feeling. The only time I 
 remember to have seen Senator Sawyer manifest 
 the least show of temper was on the floor of the 
 House in connection with the ship subsidy meas 
 ure, which I have already reviewed. While I 
 understood Senator Sawyer, I think rightly, and 
 knew that our standards were not the same and 
 that we would always differ on questions where 
 there was a conflict between corporate and public 
 interests, yet I did not entertain any personal 
 ill will toward him, and I am sure that he then 
 entertained no feeling of personal hostility to 
 me. 
 
 I might, therefore, have gone forward with my 
 law practice quite contentedly had it not been 
 for an event which soon took place and changed 
 my whole life. I shall deal with this event con 
 siderably at length because it was not only all- 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 139 
 
 powerful in its effect upon me personally, but it 
 will reveal to what lengths corrupt politicians 
 are prepared to go. I had, of course, seen that 
 sooner or later a conflict with the old leaders 
 was inevitable; the people were already restive 
 against the private interest view of government, 
 but if it had not been for the incident to which 
 I refer which brought the whole system home 
 to me personally in its ugliest and most revolting 
 form I should not so soon have been forced 
 into the fight. 
 
 One of the political grafts of Wisconsin, an 
 cient and time honored, was the farming out of 
 the public funds to favored banks. Excepting 
 the office of governor, the state treasuryship 
 was more sought after than any other place on 
 the ticket. The reason for this lay in the fact 
 that the state treasurer was able to deposit pub 
 lic moneys in such banks as he chose, upon terms 
 satisfactory to the bankers and profitable to 
 himself. Interest upon this money was regarded 
 as a political perquisite. 
 
 One of the first acts of the Democratic state 
 administration which came in on January 5, 
 
140 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 1891, was to institute suit against all state 
 treasurers of Wisconsin who had occupied that 
 office during the preceding twenty years. The 
 Wisconsin Treasury cases became noted as 
 pioneer cases for the enforcement of the correct 
 principle in the discharge of duty regarding the 
 custody of trust funds. The beginning of these 
 cases produced a profound sensation in the 
 state and attracted much attention throughout 
 the nation. Suits were instituted against for 
 mer Treasurers Henry B. Harshaw, Edward C. 
 McFettridge, Richard Guenther, Ferdinand 
 Kuehn, Henry Betz and their bondsmen. Sen 
 ator Sawyer s wishes had largely controlled in 
 the selection of several of these treasurers, and 
 he was one of the principal bondsmen. Certain 
 of the treasurers had little or no property to 
 satisfy judgments of large amounts. Hence, 
 Sawyer, as the wealthiest of all the bondsmen, 
 stood to lose a large sum of money in the event 
 of the state s recovery. The suits finally re 
 sulted in judgments in favor of the state aggre 
 gating $608,918.23. Of this amount Sawyer was 
 liable for nearly $300,000.00. The estate of 
 
JUDGE ROBERT G. SIEBECKER 
 
 "My brother-in-law and my partner in the firm of La Follette, Sie- 
 becker & Harper." 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 141 
 
 Guido Pfister, a leading business man of Mil 
 waukee, was also liable as bondsman for former 
 Treasurer Kuehn to the extent of something 
 more than one hundred thousand dollars. The 
 liability of this estate marks the advent into 
 Wisconsin state politics of Charles F. Pfister 
 of Milwaukee, one of the principal heirs of the 
 Guido Pfister estate, who will figure hereafter in 
 this narrative. 
 
 The ex-treasurers and their bondsmen em 
 ployed a strong array of excellent counsel, among 
 others S. U. Pinney, afterward Supreme Court 
 Justice, and Joseph V. Quarles, afterward 
 United States Senator. The state retained as 
 counsel to assist Attorney -General O Conner, 
 Col. William F. Vilas, former member of Cleve 
 land s cabinet, afterward United States Senator, 
 and R. M. Bashford, afterward Supreme Court 
 Justice. 
 
 Robert G. Siebecker, now one of the justices 
 of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, was at that 
 time judge of the Circuit Court for Dane County. 
 He had been appointed to that office by Gover 
 nor Hoard in 1889 to fill a vacancy, and a tele- 
 
142 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 gram from Governor Hoard s secretary announ 
 cing Siebecker s selection was my first intimation 
 that he had been considered. I was indeed sur 
 prised, because Siebecker was a Democrat and 
 was appointed by Governor Hoard to succeed 
 Judge Stuart, who was a Republican. I men 
 tion this point in this connection because in so 
 far as the appointment was criticized at all, it 
 was upon the ground that Siebecker was a Demo 
 crat. This fact, and the further fact that he 
 was my brother-in-law and my partner in the 
 firm of La Follette, Siebecker & Harper was also 
 the subject of newspaper comment at the time, 
 and his appointment was ascribed to my 
 known friendly relations with Governor Hoard. 
 I have taken pains to state these facts some 
 what in detail because of their important con 
 nection with the incident which I am about to 
 relate. 
 
 Shortly before these cases were to come on for 
 argument in the Circuit Court, I received a letter 
 from Senator Sawyer, whose home was in Osh- 
 kosh, Wisconsin, of which the following is an 
 exact copy: 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 143 
 
 Dictated. 
 
 Oshkosh$rWisconsin, September 14, 1891. 
 Hon. Robert M. La Follette, Madison, Wisconsin. 
 My dear La Follette: 
 
 I will be in Milwaukee, at the state fair, on 
 Thursday. I have some matters of importance 
 that I would like to consult you about, that 
 escaped my mind yesterday. If convenient 
 can you be in Milwaukee on that day and meet 
 me at the Plankinton House at 11 o clock A.M.? 
 If not on that day, what day would suit your 
 convenience this week? Please answer by tele 
 graph. All you need to say, if you can meet me 
 that day is merely telegraph me "yes." If not 
 simply mention day you can meet me. 
 
 Yours truly, PHILETUS SAWYER. 
 
 The letter was typewritten on a single sheet 
 of paper, letter size. The top part of the sheet 
 had been torn off, down nearly to the date line, 
 leaving only the printed words, " Dictated. Osh- 
 kosh." This fact did not impress me at the 
 time I received the letter but led me to investi 
 gate the matter later and to discover that it was 
 written on the office stationery of ex-Treasurer 
 Harshaw, who afterward came to me with a 
 message from Sawyer. The reference to his 
 having seen me the day before it was written, 
 
144 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 related to our meeting on the 13th of 
 September at Neenah, Wisconsin, on the occa 
 sion of the funeral of former Congressman 
 Charles B. Clark. During the services and after 
 ward, until Mr. Sawyer left to take his train, 
 other people had been constantly with us, so 
 that Sawyer had had no opportunity for any 
 private conversation with me. 
 
 I conferred with my law partner, Sam Harper, 
 after receiving the letter, and believing that the 
 proposed interview concerned political matters, 
 decided to meet Sawyer. I remember that the 
 brief nature of the response which he requested 
 to the letter impressed me as a precaution taken 
 to forestall newspaper interviewers. And I 
 filed a telegram in response, limited to the word 
 "yes" as directed. 
 
 On the 17th of September I went to Milwau 
 kee and met Sawyer at the Plankinton House. 
 The state fair was in progress at that time and 
 the hotel crowded. Sawyer said that he had 
 been unable to secure a room and requested me 
 to go with him to the hotel parlors on the second 
 floor. The parlors were large, and he led me 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 145 
 
 away to a portion of the room remote from the 
 entrance where we sat down. After some 
 preliminary conversation in which he said, "I 
 wanted to talk with you about Siebecker and 
 the treasury matter," he finally came directly to 
 the point and said: 
 
 "These cases are awfully important to us, and 
 we cannot afford to lose them. They cost me a 
 lot of anxiety. I don t want to have to pay 
 
 " naming a large sum of money whether 
 
 one hundred thousand or more, I am not certain. 
 "Now I came down here to see you alone. No 
 one knows I am to meet you here. I don t want 
 to hire you as an attorney in the cases, La Fol- 
 lette, and don t want you to go into court. But 
 here is fifty dollars, I will give you five hundred 
 more or a thousand or five hundred more 
 and a thousand (I was never able to recall ex 
 actly the sums named) when Siebecker decides 
 the cases right." 
 
 I said to him, "Senator Sawyer, you can t 
 know what you are saying to me. If you struck 
 me in the face you could not insult me as you 
 insult me now." 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 said, "Wait hold on!" 
 
 I was then standing up. I said: "No, you 
 don t want to employ me as an attorney. You 
 want to hire me to talk to the Judge about your 
 case off the Bench/ He said, "I did not think 
 you would take a retainer in the case. I did not 
 think you would want to go into the case as an 
 attorney. How much will you take as a re 
 tainer?" 
 
 I answered, "You haven t enough money to 
 employ me as an attorney in your case after 
 what you have said to me." 
 
 "Well, perhaps I don t understand court 
 rules. Anyway, let me pay you for coming 
 down here." 
 
 I said, "Not a dollar, sir," and immediately 
 left the room. 
 
 Nothing else ever came into my life that ex 
 erted such a powerful influence upon me as that 
 affair. It was the turning point, in a way, of 
 my career. Sooner or later I probably would 
 have done what I did in Wisconsin. But it 
 would have been later. It would have been a 
 matter of much slower evolution. But it 
 
 V left 
 
 V:* 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 147 
 
 shocked me into a complete realization of the 
 extremes to which this power that Sawyer rep 
 resented would go to secure the results it was 
 after. But in another way its effect upon me 
 as an individual was most profound. I had 
 always had a pride in my family in my good 
 name. It had been the one thing that my 
 mother had worked into my character. It was 
 the thing that she emphasized when she talked 
 with me about my father, whom I never saw. 
 One who has never been subject to an experience 
 like that cannot realize just w r hat comes over him. 
 There has always been uncertainty in my mind 
 about the money he offered me the amounts. 
 He named different amounts. He was going to 
 give me a sum right then, and more, conditioned 
 upon the case being decided "right." He had 
 his pocketbook in one hand, and a roll of money 
 in the other. For an instant I was dazed, and 
 then the thing surged through me. I felt that 
 liquid not keep my hands off his throat I 
 stood over him, said the things to him that I 
 have related and then left him, blindly. I knew 
 he followed me. I went rapidly downstairs, and 
 
148 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 out of the hotel. The state fair was on, and the 
 hotel lobby crowded with people. I saw r nobody. 
 I got out in the street and walked and walked. 
 
 Six or eight years afterward, when I w r as a 
 candidate for governor, I stopped one day in the 
 little town of Sheboygan Falls. Among those who 
 called on me was former Congressman Brickner. 
 He had been on the Democratic side when I was 
 on the Republican side of the House. He came 
 into the hotel to greet me and while he was sit 
 ting there he brought up the Sawyer affair. The 
 state, of course, had been aflame after the inter 
 view had been published. Sawyer s power over 
 the Republican press of the state was very great, 
 and it was all turned against me. I was de 
 nounced as a liar and assassin of character, try 
 ing to destroy one of the great and good men of 
 the state. Brickner said, "Mr. La Follette, I 
 knew which one of you two told the truth about 
 what took place in the Plankinton Hotel that 
 day. I saw your face when you came down the 
 stairs, with Sawyer following trying to catch up 
 with you. I knew that there had been serious 
 trouble." 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 149 
 
 After the interview with Sawyer at the Plank- 
 inton Hotel that day I disclosed what had tran 
 spired between him and me to a few close per 
 sonal friends and told them I thought it my 
 plain duty to report the matter to the Court. 
 Several of them took strong ground against this 
 course. They pointed out the great power of 
 Senator Sawyer, his corporation and political 
 connections, his control of newspapers; they 
 argued that he would utterly destroy me. I 
 granted all that, but urged that as a member of 
 the bar, an officer of the Court, I could not be 
 silent; that it was my duty to report to Judge 
 Siebecker exactly what had occurred. Confer 
 ences of these friends were held from time to 
 time, they urging their view and I contending 
 that my course, though the harder one, must be 
 followed. 
 
 It was finally agreed that the whole matter be 
 submitted to Judge Romanzo Bunn, the federal 
 judge for the Western District of Wisconsin, 
 whose home was in Madison, and who enjoyed 
 the confidence and esteem of all who knew him. 
 I remember the afternoon when I saw him by 
 
150 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 appointment at his chambers in the federal build 
 ing in Madison. He listened with patience and 
 understanding, his benign face expressing the 
 utmost pain and sympathy. He did not speak 
 until I had finished. Then he said, 
 
 "Robert, have you told Judge Siebecker?" 
 
 "No," I answered. "And on the advice of a 
 few friends I came to tell you about it and to ask 
 your counsel." 
 
 He said, "Well, you must tellMudge Siebecker. 
 You cannot permit him to sit in the case without 
 telling him all about it. I doubt very much 
 whether he will feel that he can try the cases. 
 That is for him to decide but you must tell 
 him." 
 
 I said to him, "Judge Bunn, I have insisted 
 from the first that it was my duty to tell Judge 
 Siebecker, but my friends have strongly urged 
 against that course, because they realize that 
 Sawyer will follow me relentlessly as long as he 
 lives. I understand that well, for this thing 
 has weighed on me every hour since it occurred." 
 
 On the evening of the same day on which I 
 saw Judge Bunn, in the privacy of Judge Sie- 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 151 
 
 becker s home I told him exactly what had 
 taken place. He was very much moved. He 
 decided immediately, of course, that, with the 
 knowledge of Sawyer s attempt to corrupt the 
 Court, he could not sit as judge in the cases. He 
 said that if he caused Sawyer to be cited for con 
 tempt, the facts would necessarily become public 
 with the result that it would prejudice the cases. 
 So far as either of us knew, many of the defend 
 ants probably w r ere ignorant of Sawyer s action. 
 At any rate, it was important that they be given 
 a fair and impartial trial. Before I left him he 
 had determined that he would promptly call 
 together the attorneys on both sides, tell them 
 that he would not hear the cases for reasons 
 which were controlling with him, but that he 
 would call in any other circuit judge in the state 
 upon whom they agreed. Siebecker was then 
 a young man he had been on the Bench two 
 years and was making an excellent record as 
 judge. These cases were certain to be important, 
 and if he rendered a judgment which should 
 ultimately be sustained by the Supreme Court, 
 it would make a record in which any trial court 
 
152 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 could take just pride, and might prove an im 
 portant factor in his judicial career. Indeed, it 
 transpired that Judge A. W. Newman, who was 
 called in to try the cases after Siebecker s with 
 drawal, was elected to fill the first vacancy upon 
 the Supreme Bench of Wisconsin. 
 
 I think it was on Friday that Judge Siebecker 
 informed the attorneys on both sides that he 
 could not try the treasury cases. They were 
 amazed at his announcement, and the news 
 quickly spread. The cases were of such great 
 public interest, involving so many prominent 
 men and such large sums of money, that the 
 keenest speculation and indeed excitement fol 
 lowed Siebecker s withdrawal. 
 
 By the following day, newspaper correspond 
 ents, representing the principal papers of the 
 state and leading dailies of Chicago, were rushed 
 to Madison, keen on the scent for sensational 
 news. Efforts were made to interview Judge 
 Siebecker. And because of my relationship with 
 the judge and my interest in political matters, 
 every possible effort was made to extract some 
 thing from me; but I did not regard it as incum- 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 153 
 
 bent upon me to make any public statement. 
 Unable to ascertain any facts, a lot of newspaper 
 stories were predicated upon guesses some 
 wide of the mark and some shrewdly direct in 
 their shot at the facts. 
 
 On Sunday morning, October 25, 1891, the 
 Chicago Times printed a sensational story with 
 the startling query as to whether there had been 
 an attempt made to "influence" the Court in 
 the Wisconsin Treasury cases, suggesting that if 
 an effort had really been made to influence the 
 Court, causing Siebecker s withdrawal, that the 
 guilty party was known, and stood in the shadow 
 of the penitentiary. Here are the headings from 
 the Chicago Times: 
 
 BRIBERY THEIR GAME 
 
 PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE WISCONSIN STATE TREASURY 
 SUITS ATTEMPT DESPERATE MEANS. 
 
 AN EFFORT MADE TO " INFLUENCE " JUDGE SIEBECKER, OF 
 MADISON, WHO WAS TO TRY THE CASES. 
 
 THE INDIGNANT OFFICIAL NOTIFIES THE LAWYERS THAT 
 HE WILL NOT SIT DURING THE TRIAL. 
 
 HE REFUSES TO AT PRESENT MAKE PUBLIC THE DETAILS 
 OF THE AFFAIR STARTLING DISCLOSURES EXPECTED. 
 
154 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 From what followed I was led to believe that 
 Senator Sawyer had read and been very greatly 
 alarmed by the matter published in the Times. 
 His home was in Oshkosh, where also lived former 
 State Treasurer Harshaw. Sunday evening I was 
 surprised to receive a note from Harshaw 
 brought to me by a bellboy from the Park 
 Hotel, Madison. The note, which was written 
 on the hotel stationery, indicating that Harshaw 
 was then in Madison, requested an interview at 
 my law office on the following morning at eight 
 o clock. I showed it to my law partner, Sam 
 Harper, who happened to be with me at the time. 
 I suggested that Harshaw probably desired to 
 see me regarding the Sawyer matter; that as no 
 witnesses were present when Sawyer made his 
 proposal to me at the Plankinton Hotel in Mil 
 waukee, the time might come when the question 
 of veracity would be raised between us ; that Har 
 shaw s proposed interview with me might result 
 in some disclosure which would show conclusively 
 that Sawyer had endeavored to corrupt the 
 Court; and that I would consent to see Harshaw 
 if he (Harper) would be present at the interview. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 155 
 
 At eight o clock the next morning Harshaw 
 came to my office, accompanied by Joseph V. 
 Quarles, afterward United States Senator, one 
 of the attorneys in the treasury cases. They 
 were shown into my private room. After formal 
 greetings, Mr. Quarles made inquiry about 
 Judge Siebecker and said he wanted to see him. 
 I told him where the Judge could be found and 
 he thereupon withdrew. Harshaw remained. 
 As Quarles left Sam accompanied him to the 
 door of the outer office, leaving Harshaw in the 
 private office with me. 
 
 The moment we were alone Harshaw leaned 
 across the desk, and said quickly: 
 
 "Bob, will you meet Sawyer at the Grand 
 Pacific Hotel in Chicago to-night?" 
 
 I was incensed that he had succeeded in com- ] 
 municating to me privately a message from/ 
 Sawyer, and rising to my feet I said in a tone 
 of voice which immediately brought Sam back 
 into the room. 
 
 "No, I will never meet Sawyer or have any 
 communication with him again as long as I 
 live." 
 
156 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 I was determined that Harper should know 
 exactly what Harshaw had said to me during 
 his absence, and so leaning across the desk, I 
 repeated : 
 
 : You have just asked me if I will meet Saw 
 yer to-night at the Grand Pacific Hotel in Chi 
 cago, and I answer you, no, so long as I live, I will 
 never again meet Sawyer or have any communi 
 cation with him." 
 
 Harshaw put up his hand in protest and said, 
 "Don t, Bob, don t be angry with me. I have 
 always respected you and always shall." 
 
 I then said to Harshaw that it was wrong for 
 him to come to me with any such proposal; that 
 he knew just what Sawyer had attempted at the 
 Plankinton, and that he ought to have known 
 that I would have nothing more to do with 
 Sawyer. Harshaw said, "I do know what Saw 
 yer did; but had I known beforehand what he 
 intended to do when he met you at Milwaukee, it 
 never would have occurred." This ended the 
 interview, and Harshaw left the office. 
 
 From what occurred immediately thereafter 
 it was plain that Sawyer was then in Milwaukee 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 157 
 
 awaiting Harshaw s return, prepared to go on to 
 Chicago provided I consented to meet him at the 
 Grand Pacific; that upon Harshaw s arrival in 
 Milwaukee and his report to Sawyer of the fail 
 ure of his mission, he (Sawyer) then, apprehen 
 sive that the truth might come out, decided that 
 he would forestall any possible statement which 
 I might make. Up to that time no public 
 charge had been made connecting Sawyer with 
 Judge Siebecker s retirement from the treasury 
 cases; but Sawyer knew, and that knowledge 
 impelled him to commit the folly of protesting 
 his innocence in advance of any public charge of 
 guilt. On that same (Monday) evening he per 
 sonally gave to the Sentinel, in Milwaukee, an 
 interview in which he stated that he had "tele 
 graphed" me to meet him at the Plankinton 
 Hotel in Milwaukee; that he had offered me a 
 retainer of five hundred dollars, but no money 
 was paid; that I thought it would not be advis 
 able to take a retainer, as Judge Siebecker was 
 my brother-in-law; that it was the first he knew 
 that Siebecker was my brother-in-law, and that 
 had he known that fact he would not have pro- 
 
158 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 posed to retain me; that if I had put any im 
 proper interpretation upon his conversation 
 with me, I had misunderstood or misconstrued 
 what he said; and that at the time of the con 
 versation I certainly made no such intimation 
 to him. The interview with Senator Sawyer 
 was published Tuesday morning, October 27th, 
 1891. 
 
 The publication of Sawyer s statement wholly 
 misrepresenting the facts made it necessary that 
 I should make public the truth regarding that 
 interview, and in the Milwaukee Sentinel of 
 Wednesday morning, October 28th, in a signed 
 statement, I set forth in detail just what actually 
 did occur between Senator Sawyer and myself. 
 I requested Judge Siebecker s sanction to speak, 
 and received it. I did not point out the weak 
 ness and inconsistency of Sawyer s statement; 
 I did not note the fact that he could not be igno 
 rant of the relation existing between Siebecker 
 and myself, which everybody knew, and which 
 had been the subject of public discussion and 
 comment when Siebecker was appointed circuit 
 judge; I made no mention of the fact that I was 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 159 
 
 constantly practising my profession in Sie- 
 becker s court, and that there could be no im 
 propriety in my accepting a retainer had it been 
 offered upon honorable terms. In that inter 
 view I stated only the naked facts required to 
 make public record of the exact truth. 
 
 I believed I fully realized what this would cost 
 me. Sawyer was the power in Wisconsin 
 politics. He was many times a millionaire. 
 His wish was law his rule unquestioned. His 
 organization extended to every county, town 
 and village. I knew that within twenty -four 
 hours after giving my signed statement to the 
 Milwaukee Sentinel his agents would be actively 
 in communication with newspapers, with po 
 litical committees, with the representatives of 
 prominent business interests throughout the 
 commonwealth . 
 
 Party feeling and party loyalty were still 
 strong, and partook in some measure of the zeal 
 and fervor of the days following the war. My 
 veracity had never been questioned by any man. 
 I was confident that the truth of my statement 
 would be accepted. I did anticipate that men 
 
160 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 who loved the Republican party would resent as 
 an attack upon it a statement which must im 
 peach the honesty and integrity of its leader, 
 and that while members of my party and all 
 men generally would approve of my refusing a 
 bribe, men devoted to the success of the Re 
 publican party would say that I might have 
 suppressed the facts, though Sawyer had falsi 
 fied them; that I might indeed have withheld 
 information from the Court and, for the good of 
 the party, have kept secret all knowledge of the 
 fact that its leader had attempted to corrupt even 
 the courts. This may seem strange in these 
 times of growing independence and keener civic 
 conscience; it was vastly different twenty years 
 ago. 
 
 Prepared as I was to meet criticism, no one 
 could have anticipated the violence with which 
 the storm broke upon me. In my own party 
 there was no newspaper that dared to brook 
 Sawyer s disapproval. Besides a little group of 
 personal friends, there was no one to raise his 
 voice in my defense. Prominent politicians de 
 nounced me. I was shunned and avoided every- 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 161 
 
 where by men who feared or sought the favor of 
 Senator Sawyer and his organization. At every 
 turn the way seemed barred to me. No one can 
 
 ever know what I suffered. As I recall the fear- 
 
 ^- 
 
 f ul depression of those months, I wonder where , / 
 I found strength to endure them. But I went * 
 
 >x 
 
 about my work determined that no one should 
 see in my face or daily habit any sign of what I 
 was going through. But the thing gnawed all 
 the while. I went from my office to my house, 
 from my house to my office, and did my work 
 as it came to me day by day. Fortunately I 
 found clients who wanted the services of a man 
 who could not be tempted by money. They 
 came to me with their cases, and I found plenty 
 to do. But I could not shake off or be indif 
 ferent to the relentless attacks upon my veracity 
 which came in a steady onset from the Repub 
 lican press of the state. Anonymous, threaten 
 ing letters crowded my mail with warnings that 
 if I dared to show my head in politics I would 
 do well to arrange in advance for a lot in the 
 cemetery. I did not know it at the time, nor 
 indeed until after Harper s death, but Mrs. La 
 
162 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 Follette has since told me that there was a long 
 period following the Sawyer affair w T hen Sam 
 was so apprehensive for my personal safety that 
 he scarcely permitted me to be out of his 
 sight. 
 
 But I was resolved that I would not let it 
 break me down. The winter of 1891-92 proved 
 an ordeal. Sam Harper, General Bryant, Charles 
 Van Hise, my classmate, then at the head 
 of the Department of Geology of the Univer 
 sity of Wisconsin, and a few friends stayed 
 by me. These friends and the immediate family 
 knew what I suffered during that time, but on 
 the street, in my office and in the courtroom, I 
 carried myself so that no one should know how 
 keenly I felt it all. I slept very little and there 
 was fear that my health would give way. But 
 it did not. 
 
 Fourteen years afterward, when I first came 
 v to the Senate of the United States, I was placed 
 in a somewhat similar position. I was again 
 alone. When I entered the cloakroom, men 
 turned their backs upon me and conversation 
 ceased. Members left their seats when I be- 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 163 
 
 gan to speak. My amendments to bills were 
 treated with derision and turned down with a 
 lofty wave of the hand. For nearly two years 
 I went through an experience that had seldom 
 failed to bring a fresh, independent member 
 to terms. It was said that I would soon be 
 " eating out of their hands." They did not 
 know the iron that had been driven into me 
 years before. 
 
 During that winter of 1891-92 I spent much 
 time alone, in the private room at my law offices, 
 and in the little study at my home in the long 
 hours of the night. I went back over my politi 
 cal experiences. I thought over many things 
 that had occurred during my service in the 
 House. I began to understand their relation. 
 I had seen the evils singly here and there a 
 manifest wrong, against which I had instinc 
 tively revolted. But I had been subjected to a 
 terrible shock that opened my eyes, and I began 
 to see really for the first time. I find now no 
 bitterness and little resentment left in me 
 against individuals. The men of that time 
 filled their places in a system of things, in some 
 
V 
 
 164 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 measure the outgrowth of the wealth of our re 
 sources and the eagerness of the public for their 
 development. Corporations and individuals al 
 lied with corporations were invited to come in 
 and take what they would, if only the country 
 might be developed, railroads and factories con 
 structed, towns and cities buildedup. Against 
 this organized power it had been my misfortune 
 perhaps my fortune to be thrown by cir 
 cumstances. The experiences of my Congres 
 sional life now came back to me with new mean 
 ing the Ship Subsidy bill, the Oleomargarine 
 bill, the Nicaraguan Canal, the Railroad Rate 
 bill, the Sioux Indian land grant and the Me- 
 nomonie timber steal. 
 
 So out of this awful ordeal came understand 
 ing; and out of understanding came resolution. 
 I determined that the power of this corrupt in 
 fluence, which was undermining and destroying 
 every semblance of representative government 
 in Wisconsin, should be broken. 
 
 I felt that I had few friends; I knew I had no 
 money could command the support of no 
 newspaper. And yet I grew strong in the con- 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 165 
 
 viction that in the end Wisconsin would be 
 made free. 
 
 And in the end it was so. That Sawyer in 
 cident had a tremendous effect on the young 
 men of the state. Three years afterward, in 
 the campaign of 1894, they came into the state 
 convention, standing together and taking defeat 
 like veterans. The ten years fight was on. 
 
 I did not underrate the power of the oppo 
 sition. I had been made to feel its full force. I 
 knew that Sawyer and those with him were 
 allied with the railroads, the big business in 
 terests, the press, the leading politicians of 
 every community. I knew the struggle would 
 be a long one; that I would have to encoun 
 ter defeat again and again. But my resolution 
 never faltered. 
 
 I well understood that I must take time to 
 develop my plan; that the first encounter with 
 the organization in Wisconsin must be one 
 which should compel their respect, even though 
 it resulted in temporary defeat for the reform 
 movement. First of all I must make it manifest 
 that I had not been destroyed as an individual. 
 
166 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 To do this it was necessary to go out and meet 
 men wherever they were gathered together on 
 political occasions. 
 
 The national Republican convention was 
 called to meet in Minneapolis, June 7, 1892. 
 There was no serious contest for the presiden 
 tial nomination. Harrison s administration was 
 generally popular throughout the country. The 
 country was prosperous, and when the country 
 is prosperous a presidential administration is 
 popular. 
 
 Harrison himself was a man of superior ability. 
 On a trip across the country in 1891, he accom 
 plished a remarkable feat. It is generally said 
 of these presidential "swings around the circle" 
 that you get substantially all the man has to say 
 in the first three or four days; after that he re 
 peats his thought in varied form. Harrison s 
 speeches, however, made on this trip to the 
 Pacific coast, were a notable series of daily 
 addresses covering a wide range of important 
 subjects, treated broadly and thoughtfully. 
 They aroused a great deal of enthusiasm and 
 were eagerly read by the public. Reserved, 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 167 
 
 undemonstrative, a bit austere in manner, direct, 
 quick to grasp a proposition and decide on its 
 merits, Harrison was a strong executive, com 
 manding the respect and confidence of all with 
 whom he came in contact. He was conservative 
 but not what we would call to-day reactionary. 
 His state papers were noteworthy for the ability 
 and directness with which he discussed public 
 questions. He stood for integrity in every 
 branch of the government; he strengthened, 
 supported and extended the civil service law; 
 he was not in favor with the spoilsman and the 
 jobster. After his retirement from the Presi 
 dency he delivered many important addresses 
 throughout the country, one of which in par 
 ticular was markedly progressive in thought. 
 This address was made to the Union League 
 Club of Chicago, February 22, 1898, on the 
 "Obligations of Wealth." We were then in the 
 midst of our struggle in Wisconsin, and I found 
 his views as expressed therein of great help to 
 me in the speeches I was making in support of 
 reforms in taxation. 
 
 I made no attempt to be elected as a delegate 
 
168 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 to the convention. But I determined, never 
 theless, to attend as a spectator. Sam Harper 
 went with me. Of course the delegates elected 
 to the convention by the Wisconsin machine 
 were bitterly hostile to me. My trouble with 
 Sawyer had been given wide publicity and was 
 well known to all prominent politicians in that 
 great gathering. I knew that generally they 
 would not judge the matter upon its real merit, 
 but strictly with reference to its effect upon the 
 political situation in Wisconsin. To the extent 
 that it injured Sawyer, the party leader in the 
 state, it lessened the chances of Republican 
 success; and the delegates to a national con 
 vention are looking above all things for imme 
 diate political victory. So, to that extent, I 
 anticipated disapproval even among those who 
 had been my personal friends in public life at 
 Washington. It taxed my resolution severely 
 to meet these former political friends. I found 
 all that I had anticipated in the way of coldness 
 and hostility. One encounter which cut me to 
 the quick will illustrate my meaning : 
 
 I had served for six years in Congress with 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 169 
 
 David B. Henderson of Iowa, afterward Speaker 
 of the House of Representatives, upon terms of 
 personal intimacy. When the roll was called 
 in the 49th Congress for the allotment of seats, 
 mine chanced to fall almost within touch of 
 Henderson, who was already in the seat which he 
 had chosen a sturdy figure he was, square 
 face, fine head, covered with thick iron-gray 
 hair. He turned on me a keen, searching, yet 
 withal a kindly look; our eyes met for a moment, 
 and then putting out his hand, he said, "Well, 
 my boy, I think you ll do." That was the be 
 ginning, and we were always good friends. We 
 represented adjoining districts, the Mississippi 
 River between. He had called me across the 
 state line to speak for him in the campaign of 
 1890 when he feared that he was losing, and had 
 often declared that I was a material help in 
 saving him from defeat in that landslide year. 
 When I met him at Minneapolis he came at me 
 quickly with "What are you fighting Sawyer for, 
 and tearing things all to pieces in Wisconsin?" 
 I told him that if he knew the truth he would not 
 ask me such a question. And then the jostling 
 
170 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 crowd swept between us, and I saw him no more. 
 A few old-time friends, Major McKinley among 
 them, greeted me cordially with a warm hand 
 and an understanding look in the eye, though 
 in the main I was made to feel that they re 
 garded me a political outcast. But it was good 
 training; it was seasoning me for the hard strug 
 gle ahead. 
 
 With Harrison s nomination, the Wisconsin 
 machine selected its candidates for the state 
 campaign. Former Senator Spooner was its 
 candidate for governor. The rank and file of 
 the party had nothing to say Sawyer, Payne 
 and a few others made the plans. 
 
 I was not yet ready to offer opposition, and 
 decided to wait until two years later. But it 
 was obvious that I must insist on keeping my 
 place as a factor in the Republican campaign of 
 that year. 
 
 The defeat of Governor William D. Hoard 
 two years before had seriously divided the party. 
 Hoard s friends felt that he had not been loyally 
 supported by Payne in conducting the state 
 campaign of 1890. In order to mollify Hoard s 
 
PHILETUS SAWYER 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 171 
 
 friends, and they were legion among the farmers 
 of Wisconsin, and to bring about the desired 
 party harmony, Payne withdrew as Chairman 
 of the Republican State Central Committee, and 
 H. C. Thorn, a warm personal friend of Hoard 
 was elected in his place. 
 
 During my four Congressional campaigns I 
 had been called each time by the Chairman of 
 the State Central Committee to speak outside 
 of my district, and over the state. The facts 
 warrant me in saying, I think, that there was a 
 general demand in campaigns for my work as a 
 speaker. But in the campaign of 1892 I was not 
 invited to speak. This, I understood, was by 
 the orders of the machine. 
 
 I had well considered the wisdom of making 
 my fight against the corrupt organization in 
 Wisconsin politics in the Republican party 
 rather than out in the field as an independent. 
 
 y 
 
 I believed in the integrity of the rank and file of * 
 the party. I could see no valid reason why I y 
 should stand apart from the great body of men X 
 with whom I had been affiliated politically since 
 coming to my majority, so long as I was in sub- 
 
172 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 stantial agreement with the ideas about which 
 that party was organized. For these reasons, 
 briefly stated, I had settled it in my own mind 
 that I would fight within the ranks. I did not 
 propose that those nominally in control of the 
 party organization should for any reason black 
 list and put me outside of the party lines. If I 
 chose at any time to leave the party, it would be 
 because my convictions compelled me to do so. 
 But I would not recognize the authority of any 
 man or any set of men to decide my party 
 status. 
 
 After waiting until it became quite apparent 
 that I should not be invited, I wrote to the 
 Chairman of the State Central Committee ten 
 dering my services as a speaker in the campaign. 
 He came to see me at my law office in Madison, 
 and suggested that in view of the feeling exist 
 ing against me on the part of Senator Sawyer 
 and his many friends, it would be inadvisable 
 for me to take part in the campaign. We were 
 personal friends, and discussed the matter 
 frankly. He suggested that Senator Sawyer was 
 an old man, and that if I ever wished to take 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 173 
 
 any part in political matters in Wisconsin, the 
 easier course for me would be to wait until he 
 had passed away. He suggested that the feel 
 ing against me was very intense and that my ap 
 pearance on the platform might be resented 
 with violence. I answered that that would not 
 deter me from entering the campaign; that I 
 proposed to maintain my relations with the 
 party and would not consent to be turned out 
 to pasture to wait for my opponents to die off; 
 that I was opposed to the corrupt machine 
 methods of those in control and intended to 
 stay on the firing line. I furthermore stated 
 that if it was not desired that I should speak 
 under the auspices of the State Central Commit 
 tee, I would make my own announcements and 
 speak under my own auspices ; that I was deeply 
 interested in Harrison s election and wanted to 
 do all in my power for him; and that I was rea 
 sonably confident that I would have as good 
 meetings in numbers and results as any managed 
 by the State Central Committee. Chairman 
 Thorn thereupon decided that if I was going to 
 speak anyway, he preferred that I should speak 
 
174 THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 
 
 under the direction of the State Central Com 
 mittee. 
 
 This I told him would be perfectly agreeable 
 to me, but that I should designate the places 
 where I was to speak. He desired to know what 
 my attitude would be regarding the state ticket. 
 I told him that I should discuss national issues. 
 
 I never held better meetings in any political 
 campaign. I found every town placarded with 
 great posters in flaming red, urging that I be 
 called upon in my meetings to discuss the 
 Sawyer affair. These posters contained a list 
 of questions which it was urged should be put 
 up to me for answer. I had little doubt that 
 they emanated from Democratic sources, and 
 it was their purpose to force that issue into my 
 campaign. 
 
 Strange as it may seem, in no instance through 
 out that campaign was there a single unfriendly 
 interruption from the audience, and never was I 
 given a more respectful and attentive hearing. 
 I was greatly encouraged and firmly convinced 
 that whatever the attitude of the politicians, 
 I still had many friends among the people. 
 
THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 175 / 
 
 In the next campaign, that of 1894, I began 
 my fight on the Wisconsin machine which con 
 tinued for ten years and resulted in the com 
 plete reorganization of the Republican party of 
 the state. Of the details of that fight I shall 
 tell in the following chapters. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 six YEARS STRUGGLE WITH THE WISCONSIN 
 BOSSES 
 
 I HAD firmly determined to begin my fight 
 on the old political machine in Wisconsin 
 in the campaign of 1894. While I had no 
 money and no newspaper support, and while all 
 the leading politicians of the state were bitterly 
 hostile to me, the success of my meetings in the 
 previous campaign of 1892 convinced me that I 
 could get a hearing. 
 
 But it was essential to the success of any such 
 undertaking that some strong man who would 
 appeal to the younger and more independent 
 members of the Republican party should be 
 found to stand as the anti-machine candidate 
 for governor. 
 
 Such a man, I felt, was Congressman Nils P. 
 Haugen. 
 
 176 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 177 
 
 I had known Haugen for many years. He had 
 been a member of the legislature, and railroad 
 commissioner under a weak statute which he 
 administered with marked ability and inde 
 pendence, and having been elected to the 49th 
 Congress, he had served with distinction for 
 nine years. During five years of that time I 
 had been closely associated with him in the 
 House of Representatives. We were agreed in 
 practically all our views upon public questions. 
 I knew him to be fearless, independent, and able. 
 A native of Norway, he was educated in this 
 country, graduating from the Michigan Uni 
 versity Law School in 1874. He was a fine rep 
 resentative of the best Scandinavian type 
 tall, strong, virile, with something of the Vi 
 king quality in his character. 
 
 I considered the matter carefully. Many of 
 the counties of the western half of the state 
 were well settled by sturdy Scandinavian pio 
 neers an independent, liberty -loving people. 
 I knew they felt a certain national pride in 
 Congressman Haugen s prominence and success, 
 and I counted on their giving him very strong 
 
178 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 support. On my part I still had many friends 
 in my old Congressional district, and among 
 men all over the state, who could, I 
 
 knew, be enlisted in any fight upon the machine. 
 Between us, I believed we could carry a good 
 many counties. It seemed to me, therefore, 
 that Haugen was the ideal candidate for the 
 first encounter with the bosses. But would he 
 consider being a candidate? 
 
 The chances w r ere all against winning. His 
 hold upon his district was very strong, and there 
 w r as every reason to believe that he could con 
 tinue in Congress for many years to come. I 
 knew he enjoyed his work in the House, and he 
 had rendered good service to the state and coun 
 try. Ought he to be asked to take the chance? 
 
 But there was the good State of Wisconsin 
 ruled by a handful of men who had destroyed 
 every vestige of democracy in the common 
 wealth. They settled in private conference 
 practically all nominations for important offices, 
 controlled conventions, dictated legislation, and 
 had even sought to lay corrupt hands on the 
 courts of justice. 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 179 
 
 Had I believed that I as a candidate could 
 have led as strong an attack upon this entrenched 
 organization, I should not have asked Haugen 
 or any other man to make that first fight. But 
 I believed then, as I believe now, that however 
 forlorn the hope of immediate achievement, the 
 great final issue at stake demanded that the 
 best and strongest man should meet this call 
 to service as a patriotic duty. 
 
 In November, 1893, I requested Haugen to 
 stop at Madison en route to Washington, and 
 I then pressed him to become a candidate for 
 governor. He raised the objections which I 
 had anticipated. 
 
 You know," he said, in his direct, incisive 
 way, "the forces we will have to meet. They 
 have money; we have none. They have a 
 powerful organization extending into every 
 county in the state. Our support will be scat 
 tered and isolated. They will have the rail 
 roads, the great business interests, and the news 
 papers back of them. How can we hope to 
 win?" 1 
 
 I proposed to Mr. Haugen that he consent to 
 
 
180 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 my writing letters to old university friends over 
 the state, calling upon them to join in sup 
 porting him as a candidate for governor. 
 
 This was agreed to, and I wrote something 
 like 1200 letters, mainly to young men who were 
 neither allied with the Sawyer-Payne machine 
 nor hitherto active in politics. The replies 
 gave me great encouragement, and I asked 
 Mr. Haugen to meet me in Chicago, where w T e 
 spent a day going through the correspondence. 
 Haugen was much gratified; he had no idea 
 that my letters would meet with any such re 
 sponse. 
 
 I recall vividly our final conference. It was 
 at my home in Madison. There were present 
 Mrs. La Follette, whose counsel was always val 
 ued by our little group, General Bryant, Sam 
 Harper, and Herbert W. Chynoweth, a leading 
 attorney, then a member of the Board of Uni 
 versity Regents. After consenting to stand as 
 a candidate, Haugen said: "It is my judgment 
 that we shall lose this fight, and I shall be retired 
 from public life. But there is a chance to win, 
 and in any event, \ve will make a beginning." 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 181 
 
 No sooner was Haugen s candidacy announced 
 than the fight was on. I had no misconception 
 of the task which we had undertaken. I knew 
 full well that we were entering upon a long politi 
 cal warfare. We opened headquarters in my law 
 office, and for many weeks the lights never went 
 out. Candidates for governor were brought 
 forward in other sections of the state - - W. H. 
 Upham in central Wisconsin, Edward Scofield 
 in the northeast, and "Hod ""Taylor, as he was 
 known, from Dane County, in the southern 
 part of the state. These candidates were in 
 perfect accord, and all had the favor of the 
 bosses of Wisconsin. Sooner or later the 
 strength which each could command in the 
 convention would be merged to secure victory 
 for the machine. Sawyer declared that I should 
 never have a seat in a Republican convention 
 in Wisconsin, nor hold political office, as long as 
 he lived. He was friendly to every other candi 
 date, and announced that he had nothing against 
 Haugen, but would oppose him as "La Follette s 
 candidate." 
 
 The fight centred on Dane County, which 
 
182 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 was the heart of my old district. Sawyer s 
 money was everywhere. The opposition con 
 trolled the county organization, and Roger C. 
 Spooner, brother of Senator Spooner, was chair 
 man of the county committee. In order to 
 make it as difficult as possible for us, the machine 
 brought forward no fewer than three candidates 
 on the state ticket from Dane County alone, 
 only one of whom (under the usages of conven 
 tions in distributing the offices geographically) 
 could hope to be nominated. It was "anything 
 to beat Haugen and kill off La Follette." Con 
 sidered as a county fight, it was the hottest I 
 ever saw. 
 
 The bi-partisan character of machine politics 
 v became a prominent feature of the contest. 
 Democratic machine newspapers and politicians 
 joined with Republican machine newspapers and 
 politicians to suppress this first organized revolt. 
 The whole state watched the contest in Dane 
 County. If the machine were successful there, 
 if I were defeated in my own county as a dele 
 gate to the state convention, it meant the 
 breaking down of Haugen s campaign. I sat 
 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 183 
 
 at my desk almost day and night dictating 
 letters to the Republican farmers, among whom 
 I had a very wide personal acquaintance. 
 
 The first caucuses, held in the city of Madison 
 and in two other small cities in the county, 
 registered a complete victory for the machine. 
 We were defeated in every ward. It was a 
 gloomy night in our headquarters. Many 
 were disheartened and felt that it was a fore 
 runner of overwhelming defeat. But it only 
 strengthened my resolution to win, and after a 
 brief talk every man w r ent out from the head 
 quarters w r ith zeal to carry the country foyms 
 of the county, which might still give us a major 
 ity. The struggle from that time on grew fiercer 
 to the end, which came quickly. We fairly 
 swept the country towns, carried the county 
 convention by four to one, and I was elected to 
 head the delegation to the state convention. 
 To give emphasis to the result, the convention 
 adopted strong resolutions declaring for Haugen 
 for governor. The remaining four counties of 
 my former Congressional district were likewise 
 carried in succession, and it was a great satis- 
 
184 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 faction to lead the old district into the conven 
 tion to back Haugen s candidacy. 
 
 We did not fare so well in Haugen s district. 
 The machine brought forward a leading Scan 
 dinavian politician as a candidate for governor, 
 and thus embarrassed the canvass in Haugen s 
 home county, which he lost together with 
 certain other counties of his district. 
 
 The contest for the nomination in the state 
 convention lasted two days. The machine united 
 on W. H. Upham, who was finally nominated. 
 Our forces had passed through such a struggle for 
 election that they were fused together as one man. 
 It was a rigid line-up against the bosses, and while 
 we lost the nomination for governor, their forces 
 so scattered on the remaining nominations that 
 we held the balance of power, and named practi 
 cally every other man on the ticket. The old ma 
 chine was tried to the breaking point, and we came 
 out of that campaign tremendously enthused 
 and stimulated for the work ahead. Sawyer, 
 Payne, and the other big ones had been pressed 
 into strenuous and continuous activity through 
 out the convention to hold their forces in line. 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 185 
 
 Haugen accepted his defeat with fine spirit. 
 Expressing no regrets, he went back to his home 
 in the little town of River Falls, Pierce County, 
 and resumed his law practice. It was not with 
 out a keen pang that I saw him retired from 
 public life, but defeated though we were, the 
 spirit of the campaign of 1894 and the evidence 
 of a growing conviction that held our forces 
 unwaveringly throughout the convention strug 
 gle, gave me strong assurance for the future. 
 We had gone down to our defeat in the first 
 battle, but I never doubted we should rise again 
 to fight, and win final victory over the old 
 machine. And when we did win, one of my ear 
 liest acts as governor was to bring Haugen s 
 great abilities to the service of the state as a 
 member of the tax commission. He has 
 served continuously in that position since, is 
 now its chairman, and has become a leading 
 authority on taxation in the United States. 
 
 I did not at that period put forward a broadly 
 constructive policy. My correspondence of that 
 time shows that appeal was made for support 
 primarily with a view to overthrowing corrupt 
 
186 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 machine control. It was clear to me that the 
 
 y single issue against boss rule would be more 
 
 ^ x immediately effective in securing support in 
 
 the first contest than a program for legislation 
 
 which would necessarily require much more time 
 
 ^forjeducational work. 
 
 As I considered the future, it was clear that it 
 would be necessary to devote six weeks to two 
 months out of each biennial period, and pos 
 sibly each year, in speaking and pamphleteering 
 the state. I therefore withdrew from the firm 
 of La Follette, Harper, Roe & Zimmerman and 
 opened an office by myself. I found it neces 
 sary, owing to the steady growth of my law 
 business, to employ two attorneys most of the 
 time to aid me in briefing and preparing cases 
 for trial. But the new arrangement gave me 
 perfect freedom and independence. While I 
 applied myself industriously to my profession, 
 I set aside a brief period in the autumn of each 
 year, which I devoted to speeches and addresses 
 throughout the state. 
 
 The campaign of 1894 resulted in a sweeping 
 victory for the Republicans. Upham was elected 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 187 
 
 governor and the old Sawyer-Payne-Spooner 
 machine came back to power with restored con 
 fidence. Almost the first thing they did was to 
 tamper with the work of the former Democratic 
 administration in connection with the treasury 
 cases. When the legislature assembled there 
 had already been returned to the state, as a 
 result of the prosecutions of former state 
 treasurers, no less than $427,902.55, and there 
 had been put into judgment the further sum of 
 $181,015.68, making a total of $608,918.23. 
 Other cases were still pending. The bosses at 
 once began developing a plan to relieve the ex- 
 treasurers from the "hardship" of paying their 
 full indebtedness to the state, and, as a feeler, 
 put through legislation releasing one of the 
 treasurers from the payment of a portion of the 
 judgment secured against him, and providing 
 for the discontinuance of all the cases against 
 two of the other ex-treasurers. 
 
 Members of the legislature were fearful of 
 public sentiment and reluctant to pass the 
 measures, but a powerful lobby was organized 
 under the immediate charge of Charles F. 
 
188 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 Pfister of Milwaukee, who had recently appeared 
 as a power in Wisconsin politics. Pfister had 
 inherited several millions from his father, Guido 
 Pfister, who had been a bondsman for one of the 
 state treasurers, against whom a judgment 
 amounting to $106,683.90 had been obtained. 
 Pfister had been associated with Henry C. Payne 
 and Frank G. Bigelow, president of the First 
 National Bank of Milwaukee, in street railway 
 and other municipal enterprises, and had been 
 rapidly promoted to a position of authority in 
 the Wisconsin machine. 
 
 The audacity of this attempt to relieve the 
 ex-treasurers by legislation passed under the 
 whip and spur of a powerful lobby is more ap 
 parent when it is understood that throughout 
 the campaign of 1894 the Democrats warned 
 voters that if a Republican governor and legis 
 lature were elected the ex-treasurers would be 
 "let off." 
 
 And they were let off: obligations aggregating 
 more than a quarter of a million dollars were 
 cancelled, and the bills were signed by Governor 
 Upham. 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 189 
 
 At the approach of the next campaign, that 
 of 1896, Sawyer, Spooner, Payne, and Pfister 
 saw plainly that they would have to meet the 
 resentment of the people upon this issue. It 
 would not do to offer Upham again as a candi 
 date. It is true that he had done their bidding: 
 he had served the bosses, but by that very serv 
 ice he had weakened himself as a candidate. 
 Although he was personally entitled to every 
 consideration at their hands, he had gained no 
 independent strength with the people, and it 
 was easy to cast him aside. 
 
 Strange as it may seem to the reader unac 
 quainted with machine methods, the question of 
 Upham s renomination in 1896 was disposed of 
 in the Planters Hotel, at St. Louis, at the time 
 of the national Republican convention. The 
 bosses did not regard the selection of a candidate 
 for governor as a matter in which the voters of 
 Wisconsin were entitled to have any voice. 
 During a recess in the sessions of the convention, 
 Governor Upham was summoned before an 
 executive session of the Wisconsin bosses, in 
 formed that he would not be given the endorse- 
 
190 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 ment of a renomination, and his successor, 
 Edward Scofield, was chosen. Of course, they 
 expected afterward to go through the formality 
 of calling caucuses and conventions and declare 
 the nomination according to party usage. But 
 it never occurred to these political rulers of the 
 commonwealth that there was anything gro 
 tesque in their disposing of the government of 
 the state as a side issue to a national convention. 
 
 I came back from the national convention 
 in 1896, to which I had been elected as an anti- 
 machine delegate, and conferred with friends 
 to determine on the strongest and soundest 
 man to stand against Sawyer and his political 
 machine. But with the sacrifice of Haugen 
 fresh in mind, no man was willing to go out in the 
 open as the candidate against that great power. 
 
 I was determined that the fight should go on 
 and therefore announced myself as an anti- 
 machine candidate. An address to the inde 
 pendent Republican voters of the state was 
 issued in my behalf by a number of my sup 
 porters, headed by ex-Governor W. D. Hoard, 
 in which they said: 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 191 
 
 "The time is near at hand when the Republican 
 voters must assemble in their respective cau 
 cuses and choose delegates to their assembly 
 conventions where in turn delegates will be 
 chosen to the state convention for the purpose 
 of nominating a candidate for governor. 
 
 "In our opinion it is of the highest importance 
 that a people s man be chosen as such candidate. 
 There was never a time when such a man was 
 more needed for the important office of chief 
 executive of Wisconsin than now. Will the 
 people take their own work in their own hands, 
 or will they allow, as they have too often done, 
 a ring of shrewd bosses to select their candidates 
 for them? The discontent which has prevailed 
 in our party for nearly two years ought to teach 
 us a lesson. It ought to bring every Republican 
 voter to the primary caucuses with a deter 
 mination to discharge his own duty as a true 
 Republican citizen." 
 
 It was an exciting campaign. My candidacy 
 was at first greeted with jeers, but as it progressed, 
 Sawyer, Spooner, Payne, and Pfister soon real 
 ized that their organization was in danger of 
 
192 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 defeat. Against a practically united press, a 
 veteran army of trained politicians, and the 
 lavish expenditure of money, I came down to the 
 convention at Milwaukee on the fifth day of 
 August, 1896, with delegates enough pledged and 
 instructed to nominate me on the first formal 
 ballot. 
 
 There were six candidates for ; governor, of 
 whom Scofield was the leading machine candi 
 date. All had headquarters at the Hotel Pfister. 
 Shortly after ten o clock that night, Captain 
 John T. Rice, the leader of a delegation from one 
 of the Assembly districts in Racine County, 
 informed me that he had been taken aside into 
 a private room and offered seven hundred dollars 
 in money to transfer the seven delegates from 
 his Assembly district to Scofield s support. 
 Between that time and twelve o clock many other 
 delegates reported like personal experiences. 
 One after another these delegates, in the pres 
 ence of Sam Harper, General Bryant, and other 
 friends, made detailed statements of what had 
 transpired with them that night. These men 
 had rejected all offers made to them. How 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 193 
 
 many of my delegates had yielded to the temp 
 tation I did not know. 
 
 Shortly after midnight Charles F. Pfister 
 came to my headquarters and asked to see me 
 alone. 
 
 "La Toilette," he said, "we ve got you 
 skinned. We ve got enough of your delegates 
 away from you to defeat you in the convention 
 to-morrow. Now, we don t want any trouble 
 or any scandal. We don t want to hurt the 
 party. And if you will behave yourself, we will 
 take care of you when the time comes." 
 
 I told Mr. Pfister that I was able to take care 
 of myself and that I would whip their machine 
 to a standstill in the convention the next day. 
 I was not sure but that they had me beaten, 
 but I didn t propose to run up any white flag. 
 Ijiidn^Jiave one. 
 
 When the balloting came on the next day, I 
 was beaten, just as Pfister said. My delegates 
 understood what had defeated them. The work 
 of the bosses had been coarse and rank. When 
 it was over my steadfast supporters came back 
 in a body to the headquarters. Wrought up to 
 
194 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 a high pitch they indignantly demanded that I 
 stand as an independent candidate, as a rebuke 
 to the methods employed to defeat the will of 
 the people. I shall never forget the excited 
 throng, their flushed faces, their bitter disap 
 pointment. One of them, a young fellow it 
 was his first convention -- broke down and 
 sobbed like a child. I stood up and spoke to 
 them: they needed to know that the defeat 
 would not turn me back but drive me on with 
 higher resolve. There came to me those lines 
 o Henley s which had often inspired me, and 
 which I repeated to them: 
 
 "Out of the night that covers me, 
 Black as the pit from pole to pole, 
 I thank whatever gods there be 
 For my unconquerable soul. 
 
 "In the fell clutch of circumstance 
 I have not winced nor cried aloud; 
 Under the bludgeoning of chance, 
 My head is bloody but unbowed. 
 
 "It matters not how strait the gate, 
 How charged with punishment the scroll, 
 I am the master of my fate, 
 I am the captain of my soul." 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 195 
 
 The outraged spirit of the group quickly 
 changed. The mood to destroy, to get quick 
 redress, gave way, and they faced to the front 
 with courage to fight on. I said to them that 
 the men who win final victories are those who 
 are stimulated to better fighting by defeat; that 
 the people had not betrayed us, but that they 
 themselves had been betrayed by those whom 
 they had sent to serve them in that convention; 
 that the wrong was not here, it was there; that 
 it would be weak and cowardly to abandon the 
 rank and file who believed as we believed; that 
 if any one was forced to leave the Republican 
 party it should be the corrupt leaders; that the 
 bosses were not the party; that the fault lay with 
 the system that permitted corrupt agents to be 
 tray their principles; that the evil work of the 
 night before had forced me to do some hard 
 thinking, and that I was going home to find some 
 better way; that we would never compromise, 
 never abandon the fight until we had made gov 
 ernment truly representative of the people. 
 
 That little army went back to their homes 
 and told the true story of that convention. 
 
196 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 At that time, I had never heard of the direct 
 primary. Indeed, there was no direct primary 
 statute in any state, excepting a weak optional 
 law in Kentucky. In order to become familiar 
 with every phase of the caucus and convention 
 system, I briefed all the laws relative to cau 
 cuses and conventions. I had resolved to 
 attack and, if possible, overthrow the whole 
 system in Wisconsin. 
 
 A little later, I accepted an invitation from 
 President Harper of the Chicago University to 
 make an address before the faculty and students 
 of that institution on the 22d of February, 1897. 
 I took as my theme, "The Menace of the Po 
 litical Machine." After portraying the evils of 
 caucuses and conventions, and showing how 
 readily they lend themselves to manipulation, 
 defeating the will of the majority, I outlined a 
 complete system of direct nominations for all 
 county, legislative, and state offices, by both 
 parties upon the same day, under the Australian 
 ballot. So far as I am aware, this was the first 
 presentation of a complete direct nominating 
 system. In that speech, I said in conclusion: 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES m 
 
 "Beginning the work in the state, put aside 
 the caucus and convention. They have been 
 and will continue to be prostituted to the service 
 of corrupt organization. They answer no pur 
 pose further than to give respectable form to 
 political robbery. Abolish the caucus and the 
 convention. Go J)ack to the first principles of 
 democracy; go back to the people. Substitute 
 for both the caucus and the convention a pri- / 
 mary election held under the sanctions of law / 
 which prevail at the general elections where 
 the citizen may cast his vote directly to nomi 
 nate the candidate of the party with which he 
 affiliates and have it canvassed and returned 
 just as he cast it. ... Then every citizen 
 will share equally in the nomination of the can 
 didates of his party and attend primary elec 
 tions as a privilege as well as a duty. It will 
 no longer be necessary to create an artificial 
 interest in the general election to induce voters 
 to attend. Intelligent, well-considered judg 
 ment will be substituted for unthinking enthus 
 iasm, the lamp of reason for the torchlight. The 
 voter will not require to be persuaded that he has 
 
198 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 an interest in the election. He will know that 
 he has. The nominations of the party will not 
 be the result of compromise or impulse, or 
 evil design the e barrel and the machine but 
 the candidates of the majority, honestly and 
 fairly nominated." 
 
 Of this address the Chicago Times Herald said : 
 
 "Mr. La Follette s experience with the ma 
 chine has resulted in some well considered and 
 well matured plans for the abatement of the evils 
 growing out of our loose primary elections. If 
 the eminently wise and practical suggestions 
 as to how the machine may be stripped of its 
 power in our party politics, which Mr. La 
 Toilette elaborated in his address before the 
 students of the University of Chicago, ulti 
 mately find embodiment in state laws, the 
 people will have occasion to feel grateful that 
 men of his calibre have been forced into con 
 flict with machine fighters. . . . Laws 
 based on the lines suggested in Mr. La Follette s 
 admirable address will afford the only practical 
 relief from the despotism of machine politics." 
 
 Immediately after making this address, I pre 
 pared, with the assistance of Sam Harper, a bill 
 incorporating my plan for direct nominations 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 199 
 
 which was introduced in the Legislature of 1897 
 by William T. Lewis, a member from Racine. 
 It was not expected that it would receive favor 
 able consideration, but it was a beginning. I 
 knew that it would take a long educational cam 
 paign to prepare the way for its adoption. I 
 considered, therefore, the best and cheapest 
 means of introducing it into every home in 
 Wisconsin. I had a limited state list which I 
 had used in the campaigns of 1894 and 1896, but 
 pamphleteering through the mails entails con 
 siderable expense. I therefore wrote to the 
 owners of country weeklies of both parties, well 
 distributed over the state, and told them of my 
 address at the Chicago University; that the 
 Chicago papers had considered it of sufficient 
 importance to give it two or three columns of 
 space, and that I believed it would be found 
 interesting to their readers. I offered to furnish 
 the address and the draft of the bill in the form 
 of a supplement without charge, to be folded in, 
 and distributed in the next regular issue of their 
 papers. Something over three hundred news 
 papers agreed to receive it I do not now recall 
 
200 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 a single refusal of my offer and I thus secured 
 the distribution of something like 400,000 copies 
 of my address, press comments on the same, and 
 a copy of the bill. Having some spare space I 
 filled it out with an address by Charles Noble 
 Gregory, now Dean of the Law Department of 
 the George Washington University, on the Eng 
 lish Corrupt Practices Act. One of those old 
 supplements lies before me as I write. I think, 
 in all my campaigning, I never got an equal 
 amount of publicity at less cost. There came a 
 time later when the machine was powerful 
 enough to prevent my publishing a line in most 
 of these papers, and forced me to use pamphlets 
 and letters almost entirely. But of this I shall 
 speak later. 
 
 I had been defeated in the state convention 
 at Milwaukee through fraud and corruption. 
 But I went into the campaign with zest, and 
 spoke in every important city and town in the 
 state, closing the campaign in Milwaukee before 
 an immense audience. Although the para 
 mount issue in the campaign was sound money, 
 yet with McKinley as the candidate for Presi- 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 201 
 
 dent, the recent repeal of the McKinley Tariff 
 Act, and the enactment of the Wilson-Gorman 
 Law, made the tariff as a matter of course also 
 a prominent issue. My personal acquaintance 
 with McKinley and my affection for him made 
 my interest in the campaign one of deep feeling 
 and conviction. Having aided in framing and 
 passing the tariff bill, I had a familiarity with 
 the subject which enabled me to discuss it with 
 freedom and confidence. 
 
 The bosses would have been pleased had I 
 bolted the convention of 1896. The desperate 
 means to which they were driven to control 
 that convention convinced Sawyer and his as 
 sociates of the growing strength of the opposition 
 to the machine, and gave them serious appre 
 hension for the future. It was said that in a 
 conference, when it was over, Sawyer, drawing 
 a long breath, mopped his perspiring face and 
 said: 
 
 "I never want to go through so hard a fight 
 ag in." 
 
 Years afterward, Stephenson, now Senator, 
 who was then with the machine and afterward 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 from 1900 to 1908 a supporter of our movement, 
 told me that in a conference with Sawyer and 
 the others after my defeat, he (Stephenson) said 
 to them: 
 
 "I can t help feelin a good deal of sympathy 
 for Bob La Toilette. We ve got the newspapers, 
 the organization, the railroads, and free passes, 
 and all the money, and he is fightin us all alone. 
 If he d a had money enough to buy a few more 
 postage stamps, he d a beat us sure." 
 - Yes, I think Sawyer, Spooner, Pfister, and 
 Payne would have been glad to see me leave the 
 party and start an independent movement. 
 Many of my close advisers, too, believed that 
 we should break from the Republican organiza 
 tion and try to build up a new reform party in 
 the state. Many Progressives urge this same 
 course to-day. But I do not believe that it lies 
 in the power of any one man or group of men 
 successfully to proclaim the creation of a new 
 i political party, and give it life, and being, and 
 achievement, and perpetuity. New parties are 
 brought forth from time to time, and groups of 
 men have come forward as their heralds, and 
 
J 
 
 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 203 
 
 have been called to leadership and command. 
 But the leaders did not create the party. It 
 was the ripe issue of events. It came out of the 
 womb of time, and no man could hinder or 
 hasten the event. No one can foretell the com 
 ing of the hour. It may be near at hand. It may 
 be otherwise. But if it should come quickly, 
 we may be sure strong leadership will be there ; 
 and some will say that the leaders made 
 the party. But all great movements in society 
 and government, the world over, are the A 
 result of growth. Progress may seem to halt; 
 we may even seem to lose ground, but it is 
 my deep conviction that it is our duty to do,, 
 day by day, with all our might, as best we can 
 for the good of our country the task which lies 
 nearest at hand. The party does not consist of 
 a few leaders or of a controlling political machine. 
 
 It consists of the hundreds of thousands of 
 
 V 
 
 citizens drawn together by a common belief in 
 certain principles. And it seemed to me then 
 that it ought to be in the power of that great 
 body, the overwhelming majority of the party, 
 to smash the machine, to defeat corrupt leaders 
 
204 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 and to drive the officials of every rank who 
 betray the majority out of public life. Con 
 sidered as a state problem, I never have ques- 
 x , tioned the wisdom of our course in remaining 
 within the Republican party. 
 
 And so, in the campaign of 1896, I know that 
 I strengthened our movement when I followed 
 my convictions as well as my judgment, and 
 threw myself as strongly as I could into the cam 
 paign for the election of McKinley as President. 
 
 McKinley carried the state by 103,000; Sco- 
 field by nearly 95,000. 
 
 In the summer of 1897 I concluded to try the 
 experiment of campaigning for reform in an off 
 year. It had occurred to me that one might 
 obtain a better hearing from people of all parties 
 when they were not in the heat and fever of a 
 political campaign. 
 
 On the fourth of July, 1897, I delivered an 
 address at Mineral Point and took as my theme 
 the " Dangers Threatening Representative Gov 
 ernment." I delivered substantially the same 
 address at Fern Dell, on August 23d, at the 
 Waukesha fair, and on September 24th at the 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 205 
 
 State Fair in Milwaukee. These speeches were 
 the subject of much controversy throughout the 
 state. The fact that they were strongly as 
 sailed by the corporation press served only to 
 excite interest in them, and I received many 
 more invitations to speak than it was possible 
 for me to accept. 
 
 One might regard a county fair as a very un 
 suitable place to secure an attentive hearing 
 upon a subject seriously treated, but in all my 
 years of campaigning I think I never made any 
 speeches productive of better results. I found 
 people everywhere open-minded and eager. 
 Almost without exception those in attendance 
 would turn from the amusements and give me 
 their closest and best attention. I found, at 
 every such fair, representatives of almost every 
 township of the county, business men and well- 
 to-do farmers, who took away with them for dis 
 cussion and consideration the matter which I 
 submitted in the address. 
 
 The opposition criticised the fair committees 
 severely for setting apart a day for the appear 
 ance of a "demagogue and disturber" upon 
 
206 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 their grounds, but so long as the supporters and 
 patrons of the association over the county were 
 satisfied, the protests of the machine availed 
 nothing. I was made, however, to feel their 
 displeasure and resentment on various occasions. 
 On the fair grounds at Oshkosh, which was the 
 home of Senator Sawyer, a determined effort 
 was made to stop my address. I was speaking 
 from a farm wagon which had been drawn on to 
 the race track between the pavilion and the 
 judge s stand. I had scarcely gotten under way 
 with my address when the bell in the judge s 
 stand gave the usual signal for starting the horse 
 races. Dozens of uniformed boys distributed 
 through the audience began shouting, "Score 
 cards for sale; score cards for sale." This was 
 followed by the appearance of half a dozen or 
 more horses coming on to the track a quarter 
 of a mile away, and headed directly down upon 
 the audience, forcing those standing upon the 
 track to stampede to places of safety. I saw 
 that I must act quickly or lose the day, and 
 I directed that the wagon in which I was stand 
 ing be drawn upon the track. Then, turning to 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 207 
 
 the judge s stand, I announced thatJE was there 
 on the invitation of the association to deliver an 
 address, and that I should not budge from my 
 place until I had finished and, if again inter 
 rupted, my address would occupy the balance of 
 the afternoon to the exclusion of any other per 
 formance on that race track. I think not fewer 
 than five thousand people stood up and cheered 
 their approval, and I was not again interrupted. 
 
 In the fall of 1897 a few of the friends promi 
 nently associated with me in carrying forward 
 our campaign, bought a country weekly then 
 published at Madison, called Old Dane. Being 
 busy men, it was necessary for us to select an edi 
 tor for this paper, and the choice was an easy one. 
 
 From the very beginning of our contest we 
 had not only the support of practically all uni 
 versity men throughout the state, but of sub 
 stantially all of the students of the university 
 old enough to be interested. The spirit of 
 democracy pervaded university life, and a 
 strong body of these fine, clean, brainy fellows 
 really able men have been conspicuous in 
 all the Progressive fights of Wisconsin from that 
 
208 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 day to this. They are the Progressive leaders 
 in their communities throughout the common 
 wealth, and are filling the first positions in our 
 state Assemblymen, Senators, the Governor s 
 office. They are to be found upon the commis 
 sions, in journalism, in the professions not 
 even excepting the pulpit all earnestly striv 
 ing for civic righteousness. \ One of the ablest 
 and most active of these students was a boyish- 
 looking, tow-headed Norwegian now Con 
 gressman John M. Nelson one of the stanches t 
 supporters of the Progressive movement. He 
 came from a farm in the town of Burke, a few 
 miles out of Madison. He had taken rank as a 
 student and a debater in the university society 
 work, and was one of the many students who 
 early came to my office to volunteer his services 
 in the Haugen campaign, and likewise in the 
 campaign of 1896. He accepted the position 
 of editor of Old Dane, the name of which we 
 changed to The State. As we now had a medium 
 through which to maintain from week to week a 
 campaign of education, the time seemed at hand 
 to propose a constructive program. A new 
 
209 
 
 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 heading for the paper was designed, which set 
 forth the following platform: 
 
 \/ 
 
 Protection for the products of the factory 
 and the farm. 
 
 Sound money, a dollar s \vorth of dollar. 
 
 Reciprocity in trade. 
 
 Adequate revenues for state and nation. 
 
 Equal and just taxation of all the property of 
 each individual and every corporation trans 
 acting business within the state. 
 
 Abolish caucuses and conventions. Nomi 
 nate candidates by Australian ballot at a pri 
 mary election. 
 
 Enact and enforce laws to punish bribery in 
 every form by the lobby in the legislature and 
 wherever it assails the integrity of the public 
 service. 
 
 Prohibit the acceptance by public officials of 
 railroad passes, sleeping-car passes, express, 
 telegraph, and telephone franks. 
 
 Enact and enforce laws making character 
 and competency the requisite for service in our 
 penal and charitable institutions. 
 
210 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 Enact and enforce laws that will prohibit 
 corrupt practices in campaigns and elections. 
 
 An economical administration of public af 
 fairs, reducing expenditures to a business basis. 
 
 J 
 
 From the beginning the circulation of the 
 paper rapidly extended, and soon we had readers 
 in every part of the state. It began to exert a 
 strong influence upon public sentiment. 
 
 The bosses were alarmed. Here was a pub 
 lication carrying the truth week by week into 
 every community. Its policy could not be 
 affected in any way neither money, adver 
 tising, nor offices would divert it from its course. 
 Something must be done. So they sought to 
 have the post-office department at Washing 
 ton deny the paper the second-class mail privi- , 
 lege. I knew that the affair had been instigated 
 by Keyes and the bosses, and I wrote the de 
 partment, inviting the most searching inspec 
 tion, but stating what I knew to be the purpose 
 back of the attack. Inspectors from Washing 
 ton took possession of our books, and made a 
 thorough investigation. I do not know what 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 they reported, but no order came from the post- 
 office department denying us the second-class 
 privilege. 
 
 In the meantime we were not only actively 
 at work with our political propaganda and our 
 efforts to overturn the machine, but we were 
 also advancing constructive measures of various 
 sorts as rapidly as we could get them to the 
 attention of the people. 
 
 ^xQne of these reforms was our effort fo secure 
 the passage of a law preventing railroad com 
 panies from giving free passes to political leaders 
 and public officials. I will relate the details of 
 the fight to secure an anti-pass law quite fully 
 here because it shows vividly the conditions we 
 had to meet. 
 
 The pass abuse had grown to extraordinary 
 proportions in Wisconsin, and the power to give 
 passes, franks on telegraph and telephone lines, 
 free passage on Pullman cars, and free transpor 
 tation by express companies had become a great 
 asset of the machine politicians. These in 
 sidious privileges went far toward corrupting 
 the politics of the state. 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 I had early to meet the problem of passes in 
 my own case. In 1884, as soon as I was elected 
 to Congress, several railroads sent me passes 
 over their lines. Although there was then little 
 or no agitation of the subject, I talked the whole 
 matter over with Sam Harper and Judge Sie- 
 becker, my law partners, and we agreed that I 
 must keep myself absolutely free from any 
 obligations; I never used railroad passes while 
 I was a member of Congress, nor at any other 
 time while I held a public office. 
 
 In 1890 I first met A. R. Hall, to whom, more 
 than any other man, belongs the credit for the 
 enactment of the strong statute finally passed, 
 after nine years struggle, prohibiting state 
 officials from accepting, using, or procuring 
 passes or franks. Hall was one of the pioneers 
 of the Wisconsin movement. I never knew a 
 better man. Plain, modest, without guile, 
 patient, lovable, tender-hearted, his whole life 
 was so simple, so unselfish, so humble that he 
 was sometimes underrated. He feared nothing 
 except to do wrong. He made his way indif 
 ferent to abuse and misrepresentation. He did 
 
ASSEMBLYMAN A. R. HALL 
 
 "Plain, modest, without guile, patient, lovable, tender-hearted, his 
 whole life was so simple, so unselfish, so humble, that he was some 
 times underrated." 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 213 
 
 not serve the hour. He was not afraid to break 
 new ground. Fundamental principles appealed 
 to his understanding. He was a man of strong 
 convictions, courageous in defeat, fair in victory. 
 
 Hall came to me in the spring of 1891, when 
 I returned from Congress to resume my law 
 practice. The legislature was then in session. 
 We conferred on pending measures, and from 
 that time on we worked together. He was one of 
 our leading supporters in the Haugen campaign, 
 and headed the delegation from his county. 
 
 His bill for the abolition of passes and franks 
 was beaten in the session of 1891, and again in 
 1893. At the Haugen convention, Hall offered 
 a resolution to commit the party against the 
 pass evil, but the machine has a system which 
 takes care of all "crank" resolutions. As soon 
 as a convention is organized, a motion is adopted 
 providing that all resolutions shall be referred, 
 without being read or debated, to the Commit 
 tee on Resolutions, thereafter to be appointed. 
 Hall s resolution went to the committee, but 
 was never heard from after. 
 
 But this did not stop Hall. He was ready 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 with his anti-pass bill when the legislature of 
 1895 convened. To aid in creating public sen 
 timent against the use of railway passes by 
 members of the legislature and other officials, 
 he and I prepared resolutions which were printed 
 and placed in the hands of reliable men in prac 
 tically every township of the state. These 
 resolutions were offered on town-meeting day, 
 April, 1895, and generally adopted throughout 
 the state. 
 
 During the legislative session of 1895 Hall 
 made a speech for his bill with the usual result. 
 A few members notably James O. David 
 son, afterward governor, and William O Niel, 
 afterward a senator, supported him. In the 
 meantime, I was aiding as best I could on the 
 platform to organize public sentiment in sup 
 port of the anti-pass amendment. And public 
 opinion soon began to respond. Members of 
 the legislature found themselves confronted 
 with criticism of their positions on this legisla 
 tion. But the free pass and the telegraph and 
 telephone frank were valuable assets for the 
 machine, and it was a hard fight. 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 215 
 
 In the convention of 1896 Hall was again 
 ready with his anti-pass resolution. It was 
 chloroformed as usual by the Committee on 
 Resolutions, but afterward on the floor of the 
 convention, when vigilance was somewhat re 
 laxed, Hall seized the opportunity and again 
 offered his anti-pass resolution, and promptly 
 moved its adoption. It was a dangerous situa 
 tion for the machine. It is one thing to smother 
 a resolution in committee; it is quite another 
 thing to vote it down in open convention. The 
 vote was taken, and to the consternation of the 
 bosses, it was passed with cheers. 
 
 But it was a barren victory so far as actual 
 results were concerned. The legislature of 
 1897 ignored the action of the convention and 
 again defeated Hall s anti-pass bill. More 
 than this, the bosses and their henchmen de 
 nounced it. They said that it had been sprung 
 on the convention; that it had not been con 
 sidered by the platform committee; that the 
 convention that passed it was nothing more than 
 a mob ; that it was not a part of the platform and 
 binding on nobody. This all helped. It pro- 
 
216 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 voked discussion and controversy everywhere, 
 and that is all that is required to advance any 
 proposition that is sound and right. The public 
 was now thoroughly aroused, and the defeat of 
 the anti-pass bill in the legislature of 1897 
 called down upon those responsible for it the 
 sharpest criticism. Then a discovery was made 
 which did more to enable us to destroy the pass 
 bribery system than anything which had there 
 tofore occurred. 
 
 H. M. Tusler, the Madison agent of the United 
 States Express Company, who was a strong 
 sympathizer with our reform movement, as are 
 so many employees of corporations, let it be 
 known that Governor Scofield had shipped from 
 his home in Oconto, in the northern part of the 
 state, to Madison, the capital, in the southern 
 part of the state, free on express frank No. 2169, 
 the following: 
 
 January 7, 1897; 2 boxes, 2 barrels. 
 
 January 8, 1897; 3 barrels, 1 box. 
 
 January 9, 1897; 2 boxes, 200 pounds. 
 
 January 11, 1897; 2 barrels, 2 boxes, 1,000 
 pounds. 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 217 
 
 January 13, 1897; 1 cow (crated). 
 
 January 14, 1897; 1 box, 50 pounds; 1 box, 
 26 pounds. 
 
 February 2, 1897; 1 package. 
 
 February 26, 1897; a package. 
 
 March 26, 1897; 1 sewing machine. 
 
 March 26, 1897; 1 buggy pole. 
 
 August 26, 1897; 1 barrel potatoes (small). 
 
 These facts were published in The State. 
 It was no answer to say that this was not in 
 violation of law. It raised a storm of mingled 
 ridicule and resentment. Scofield s cow became 
 famous, her picture appeared in the newspapers/, 
 and she came to be known in every home in the 
 state. 
 
 Finally, in the session of 1899, Hall s bill was 
 forced through the legislature, and it at once 
 cut off one of the strong props of the boss system 
 in Wisconsin. In the death of Mr. Hall in 1905 
 the state lost a true patriot. 
 
 I come now to the campaign of 1898. We had 
 been beaten twice already in 1894 and 1896 
 and there were those who thought it unwise 
 to fight the renomination of Scofield in 1898. 
 
218 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 Scofield had been subservient to the bosses 
 in all things throughout his administration. 
 His influence had been exerted in the legislature 
 to aid in defeating compliance with the anti- 
 pass resolution adopted by the convention 
 which nominated him. He had vetoed two 
 bills taxing express companies and sleeping- 
 car companies doing business within the state, 
 upon a technicality. Only three votes were 
 lacking in the Senate to pass these bills over his 
 veto. But the precedent of a second term, 
 usually accorded an executive, gave him a 
 certain advantage. Many of my friends were 
 apprehensive that if I were defeated again it 
 would destroy all possibility of my leadership 
 thereafter, and they urged that a negative 
 campaign be made in the form of a protest 
 against Scofield s renomination, but that we 
 put forward no candidate of our own. I con 
 tended that defeat could not destroy any man 
 whose candidacy was based upon important 
 principles; that vital issues were never destroyed 
 by defeat; and that any failure upon our part 
 to oppose the machine would disintegrate our 
 
SAMUEL A. HARPER 
 "No other man has ever been so completely a part of my own life." 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 219 
 
 forces, and greatly delay the overthrow of the 
 bosses. I offered my support to any recognized 
 Progressive who would lead the fight as a can 
 didate for governor, but insisted with all the 
 force I could command that the fight must be 
 continued unceasingly. There being no other 
 candidate willing to undertake the campaign, I 
 announced my candidacy. 
 
 During this campaign of 1898 I felt deeply 
 the loss of my oldest and best friend and sup 
 porter. March 12, 1898, 1 delivered an address 
 on the Direct Primary at the University of 
 Michigan at Ann Arbor. Upon my return, I 
 was shocked to find my law partner, Samuel A. 
 Harper, desperately ill with pneumonia. I 
 never left him, day or night, till the end came. 
 No man has ever been so completely a part of 
 my own life. 
 
 The three weeks campaign for the choice of 
 candidates in 1898 was one of the fiercest ever 
 conducted in the state. Gilbert E. Roe, my 
 former law partner, now a member of the New 
 York bar, rendered excellent service in that 
 campaign. He was a member of the Com- 
 
220 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 mittee on Resolutions in the convention and 
 led the fight in committee, securing the adoption 
 of many of the strongest planks of our progres 
 sive platform. /When the convention met I 
 should have been nominated on the first ballot, 
 except for the use of money with delegates 
 exactly as in the convention of 1896. Senator 
 Stephenson, then a Scofield supporter and a 
 power in the old organization, stated many 
 times to my friends that the total amount of 
 money required to handle delegates the night 
 before the ballotting began was $8,300. I was 
 again defeated. 
 
 But we had not fought wholly in vain: we 
 had so stirred the state upon progressive issues 
 that our opponents did not dare risk the rejection 
 of the platform which we presented, and, except 
 in one or two particulars, it was adopted sub 
 stantially as we drafted it. 
 
 It demanded immediate enactment of such 
 laws as would compel all corporations engaged 
 in business to contribute their just and equal 
 share toward the burden of taxation. 
 
 It prohibited the giving and receiving of 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 passes and franks, and demanded that it be 
 made a penal offence, both as to the giver and 
 receiver. 
 
 It admitted the defects in the caucus and con- 
 vention system, and favored direct primary legis 
 lation to secure to every citizen the freest expres 
 sion of his choice in the selection of candidates. 
 
 It admitted the existence of the lobby to con 
 trol legislation in the interests of corporations, 
 and promised laws to abolish the same. 
 
 In the following legislature, of 1899, none of 
 the pledges of the platform of 1898, aside from 
 the anti-pass law, was redeemed. An effort 
 was made to pass a bill for the more equitable 
 taxation of the railroads, but it was resisted by 
 a strong railroad lobby and finally defeated by 
 substituting a bill for the creation of a commis 
 sion to investigate the subject. Every forward 
 step was resisted. 
 
 A pretense of compliance with the platform 
 promise of direct primaries was made by passing 
 a law which really strengthened and entrenched 
 the caucus and convention system. The bosses 
 
222 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 thus sought to fortify their position for the 
 future. 
 
 We had now lost out in three campaigns 
 1894, 1896, 1898. But we had tested the 
 machine to the limit of its strength, and we were 
 prepared to go forward with the fight more 
 vigorously than ever before. We had an irre 
 sistible platform of principles to appeal to the 
 democratic spirit of the people, and I never 
 doubted that, when once the people understood, 
 they would drive the bosses from control and 
 reclaim their government. 
 
 I had then, and have had ever since, absolute 
 confidence in the people. The question was 
 often asked, "How do you expect to make Wis 
 consin a pioneer progressive state, with its 
 foreign-born, foreign-bred, slow-moving popula 
 tion?" True, a majority of the people of Wis 
 consin are of foreign birth and foreign parent 
 age. But it is a rare and exceptional people. 
 The spirit of liberty stirring throughout Europe 
 in the late forties and early fifties gave us the 
 best of Germany, Scandinavia, Poland, Ireland. 
 It gave us Carl Schurz and his followers; gave 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 
 us political refugees who were patriots and 
 hardy peasants, seeking free government as well 
 as homes. An organization known as the Ger 
 man Idealists even flooded Germany with liter 
 ature urging the founding of a free German 
 state in Wisconsin. In every city and hamlet in 
 the commonwealth are still living the last of 
 these pioneers. And as a heritage to their chil 
 dren they are leaving the story of the oppression 
 which forced them to abandon their native 
 lands and intensified their devotion to self- 
 government. Combined with the Puritan Yan 
 kee of New England, these sturdy immigrants 
 have produced a courageous, progressive race 
 of men in wiiom the spirit of democracy domi 
 nates. 
 
 Our problem was further simplified owing to 
 the predominance of the agricultural population 
 and the absence of great congested centres, 
 which are always the stronghold of machine 
 control through a corrupt combination of big 
 business with municipal graft. During the long 
 winter months the farmer finds time for reading 
 and thinking, but the men in the industries must 
 
224 STRUGGLE WITH THE BOSSES 
 give their energies more exclusively to their 
 employment and have less leisure for study and 
 reflection, excepting where through organization 
 Jthey are securing shorter hours and better op 
 portunities. To the character of the people of 
 Wisconsin I attribute the progress which we 
 were able to make against machine control. 
 
 We entered upon the campaign of 1900, there 
 fore, in which we were destined to be finally 
 victorious, with great enthusiasm. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 MY FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR AND THE PROBLEMS 
 I HAD TO MEET 
 
 THE psychology of a certain type of 
 machine politician is a most interesting 
 study. It is characteristic of him to 
 win if possible, but to appear to win in any event. 
 He has a quick, almost prophetic eye for the 
 loaded wagon. He has one rule: beat the op 
 position man, but if he cannot be beaten, support 
 him. Claim credit for his victory, and at all 
 hazards, keep in with the successful candidate. 
 He believes that if he cannot get what he wants 
 for himself by opposing a candidate, he may 
 possibly succeed in getting what he wants by 
 supporting him. 
 
 We had been beaten by the bosses in three suc 
 cessive campaigns in Wisconsin; but when we 
 entered the campaign of 1900, the cumulative 
 
 225 
 
226 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 effect of our previous work began to be strongly 
 apparent. I announced my candidacy for gov 
 ernor on May 15th. Several candidates were at 
 once brought out by the machine in various 
 parts of the state to carry their own and nearby 
 counties with a view to combining their strength 
 and defeating me in the convention. I had 
 therefore to make a hot fight against each of 
 these candidates in his own stronghold. County 
 after county was carried, and the evidences of 
 victory soon began to be overwhelming. 
 
 It was then that a number of politicians who 
 had been opposed to our cause, among them 
 Congressman Babcock, his friend, Emanuel 
 Phillipp, and Isaac Stephenson, now United 
 States Senator, joined our ranks for such time 
 as suited their purposes. 
 
 Isaac Stephenson is a man eighty-two years 
 of age. Up to 1900 he had always cooperated 
 with the old Wisconsin machine. Like Sawyer, 
 he was a typical pioneer lumberman, who had 
 acquired great wealth which he was willing to 
 use liberally in political activities. He had 
 never enjoyed any educational advantages, but 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 227 
 
 had read a good deal, and remembered with 
 remarkable accuracy all the details of his active 
 life. He served six years in the House of Rep 
 resentatives, and after he retired at the end of 
 the 50th Congress his political associates 
 gave him frequent assurance that his desire to 
 become United States Senator should be grati 
 fied in good time. 
 
 When the legislature of 1899 came to elect a 
 United States Senator, Stephenson felt that the 
 hour had come when the oft-repeated promise 
 should be made good. He knew that a word 
 from Sawyer and Spooner would settle the 
 matter, but that word was not spoken. It may 
 be that they had never intended to make 
 Stephenson Senator. It is certain that there 
 were others on the waiting list who wanted the 
 Senatorship and who also expected Sawyer and 
 Spooner to help them. One of these was Con 
 gressman Babcock, a machine politician with 
 close political connections with big business. 
 
 Now, as a matter of fact, Sawyer and Spooner 
 did not want either Stephenson or Babcock for 
 Senator. The man they really wanted was Henry 
 
228 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 C. Payne, but his reputation as a lobbyist and 
 boss politician was such that they did not dare 
 propose him openly. They supported Joseph V. 
 Quarles as a "holding candidate." No oppor 
 tunity offering for Payne they finally elected 
 Quarles Senator. This left Stephenson and Bab- 
 cock in an unpleasant frame of mind, and both in 
 less than two years came to me with propositions 
 to support the Progressive movement, which by 
 that time began to look like a winning cause. 
 
 I remember distinctly the incident which pre 
 ceded Babcock s alignment with us. Colonel 
 Henry Casson, then Sergeant-at-Arms of the 
 House of Representatives at Washington, and 
 an old friend of Babcock, came to me in Jan 
 uary, 1900. 
 
 He said: "I come to you with a message 
 from Babcock. He asks nothing from you. But 
 he is angry with the old crowd, because they did 
 not treat him fairly in the senatorial contest. 
 He has such a hold upon his district that he 
 feels he can remain in Congress without asking 
 the favor of any outside support. But he wants 
 to fight in your ranks as a private." 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 229 
 
 "Well," I replied, "you know what I am 
 fighting for in this state. You know that I am 
 standing for certain issues, and am welcoming 
 all the help that I can get." 
 
 Another machine man who also apparently 
 enlisted in the reform movement in that cam 
 paign was Emanuel L. Phillipp, of Milwaukee, 
 a close friend of Babcock. Phillipp was born 
 of Swiss parentage, with Italian ancestry. Big, 
 heavy, swarthy, adroit, self-possessed, deter 
 mined, but mild and conciliatory in manner, 
 Phillipp was an out-and-out corporation man. 
 But in the campaign of 1900, he with others of 
 his type professed to have reached the conclusion 
 that there were abuses to reform and that the 
 railroads and other interests recognized this to 
 be so. They were apprehensive that I was 
 hostile to railroad corporations and would, if 
 governor, seek to embarrass them in every 
 conceivable way. Mr. Babcock and Mr. Phil 
 lipp assured me that they did not share in this 
 opinion regarding my position; and that they 
 very much wished my true position might be 
 made known. They suggested that Mr. Marvin 
 
230 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 Hughitt, President of the Chicago and North 
 western Railroad Company, would like to have 
 from me directly a personal statement of my 
 purposes. I replied that I knew of no reason 
 why I should shrink from stating my convictions 
 upon any question of public interest. When I 
 informed A. R. Hall of the proposal he opposed 
 my seeing Mr. Hughitt on the ground that it was 
 the purpose of these gentlemen to draw me into 
 an interview, then cause the matter to be made 
 public for the purpose of arousing popular 
 prejudice. I suggested that if the President of 
 the Wisconsin Dairymen s Association, or the 
 representative of any other business interest, 
 requested a conference for the purpose of as 
 certaining my position upon legislation which 
 might affect their interests, I would agree to 
 such an interview as a matter of course. To 
 refuse to submit my opinions under such cir 
 cumstances would tend to justify the belief that 
 I had some ulterior design. 
 
 When the subject, therefore, was next brought 
 up I agreed to meet Mr. Hughitt provided ex- 
 Governor Hoard might be present. 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 231 
 
 At the appointed time, Governor Hoard, 
 Mr. Hughitt, Mr. Babcock and I met in the 
 offices of Mr. Hughitt in Chicago. Mr. Hugh 
 itt began by telling us how he started in life 
 as a telegraph messenger boy, and took up most 
 of the time reviewing his career. It appeared 
 that this much desired interview was to begin 
 and end with a recital of Mr. Hughitt s early 
 struggles from poverty to affluence and power. 
 But Babcock knew what the interview was for, 
 and presently suggested that Mr. La Follette 
 was reasonably certain to be elected governor 
 of Wisconsin and that Mr. Hughitt might be 
 interested to know his attitude toward railroad 
 corporations. Mr. Hughitt promptly replied 
 that he had no doubt that Mr. La Follette would 
 be perfectly fair in his treatment of their im 
 portant interests in Wisconsin. It seemed my 
 time now to speak, and I said: 
 
 "Mr. Hughitt, I believe I shall be elected 
 governor and I can state in a very few words 
 my position upon the pressing question of rail 
 road taxation. I shall, if elected, recommend, 
 and, if given the opportunity, shall approve 
 
232 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 a bill taxing railroad companies upon the value 
 of their property, just as other taxpayers of 
 Wisconsin are assessed and taxed upon their 
 property." 
 
 Mr. Hughitt answered, with a wave of the 
 hand, which dismissed the subject, "That is 
 perfectly satisfactory to the Northwestern," 
 and that ended the interview. As I came away 
 I was somewhat at a loss to know just what was 
 the real significance of the meeting, but Mr. 
 Bab cock seemed to attach a good deal of im 
 portance to it and said, "Well, Hughitt will 
 feel better now that he has seen you. You 
 ought to call on him whenever you are in Chi 
 cago. He will always be glad to see you." 
 
 I have never met President Hughitt since. 
 I thought then and still think that Mr. Hughitt 
 had been informed that my election as governor 
 could not be headed off; that Babcock and 
 Phillipp were supporting me and proposed to 
 maintain such friendly relations as would give 
 them a footing, if possible, and influence with 
 the administration whenever critical situations 
 arose affecting railroad interests. 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 233 
 
 Although these old machine leaders thus came 
 to the support of the party ticket in 1900, it is 
 questionable whether on the whole their alliance 
 was not more harmful than helpful to me with 
 the public. Their support not only gave us no 
 additional delegates, but it put us off our guard 
 in campaigning for a really progressive legisla 
 ture as we learned later to our cost. 
 
 I had another supporter with railroad affil 
 iations in this campaign, but his support was 
 genuine. This was Thomas H. Gill, General 
 Attorney for the Wisconsin Central Railway 
 Company. We were old-time friends, and he 
 had supported my candidacy for governor in 
 1896 and 1898, asserting his claim to the free 
 exercise of his political rights when questioned 
 about his action by the company. 
 
 One evening in May, 1900, just before I made 
 formal announcement of my candidacy, we were 
 in Gill s rooms in Milwaukee, discussing the 
 political situation in the state, when he said, 
 "Bob, the president (meaning the president of 
 the railway company with which he was con 
 nected) called me in to-day to inquire definitely 
 
234 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 as to your views on railroad taxation, and I 
 defined your position as I understand it." 
 "Just how did you state it, Tom? " I asked. He 
 gave me the substance of his conversation with 
 the president and inquired, "Was I not right?" 
 "Well," I said, "you were partially right." I 
 then stated to him as clearly as I could the 
 legislation which I thought ought to be enacted 
 as to the taxation of railroad property in fairness 
 to the people of the state, and the subject was 
 dropped for the evening. 
 
 But later that night, thinking it over, I decided 
 it would be better to .put my position in writing 
 as a precaution against any possible future 
 misunderstanding. Early next morning I drafted 
 my letter to Tom and delivered it to him 
 personally that same day, saying to him, "There, 
 Tom, you are at liberty to show that to any 
 railroad official, or to publish it if you want 
 to. That is where I stand now, and where I 
 shall stand after I am governor, if I should be 
 nominated and elected." He took the letter, 
 saying laughingly, "That s all right," although 
 he did not think it necessary. 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 235 
 
 When the railroad taxation bill came up in 
 the legislature, rumors began to be heard about 
 the railroads having an agreement in writing 
 with me on that subject, which would be made 
 public sooner or later to my great embarrass 
 ment. Some of my friends came to me, very 
 much disturbed over the story, but my only 
 answer was, "You invite any one who asserts 
 that there is such a statement signed by me to 
 publish it." 
 
 The letter had quite a career. It bobbed up 
 at intervals for four years. I could have given 
 it to the press at any time, but I chose to hold 
 it in reserve, preferring to publish it at a time 
 when I could use it most effectively as an ex 
 ample of our opponents perversion of the truth. 
 In October, 1904, in my last campaign for Gover 
 nor, when the opposition again revived the story 
 of my "written agreement with the railroads," I 
 gave this famous letter to the public.. Here it is: 
 
 MADISON, WLS., May 12, 1900. 
 DEAR TOM: 
 
 You have been my personal and political 
 friend for twenty years. Should I become a 
 
236 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 candidate for the nomination for governor, I 
 want your continued support, if you can con 
 sistently accord it to me. But you are the 
 attorney for the Wisconsin Central R.R. Co., 
 and I am not willing that you should be placed 
 in any position where you could be subjected to 
 any criticism or embarrassment with your em 
 ployers on my account. For this reason I desire 
 to state to you in so far as I am able my position 
 in relation to the question of railway taxation, 
 which has now become one of public interest, 
 and is very likely to so continue until rightly 
 settled. This I can do in a very few words. 
 
 Railroad corporations should pay neither 
 more nor less than a justly proportionate share 
 of taxes with the other taxable property of the 
 state. If I were in a position to pass officially 
 upon a bill to change existing law, it would be 
 my first care to know whether the rate therein 
 proposed was just in proportion to the property 
 of other corporations and individuals as then 
 taxed, or as therein proposed to be taxed. The 
 determination of that question would be con 
 trolling. If such rate was less than the justly 
 proportionate share which should be borne by 
 the railroads, then I should favor increasing it 
 to make it justly proportionate. If the pro 
 posed rate was more than the justly propor 
 tionate share, in comparison with the property 
 of other corporations, and of individuals taxed 
 under the law, then I should favor decreasing 
 it to make it justly proportionate. 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 237" 
 
 In other words, I would favor equal and 
 exact justice to each individual and to every 
 interest, yielding neither to clamor on the one \J 
 hand, nor being swerved from the straight 
 course by any interest on the other. This 
 position, I am sure, is the only one which 
 could commend itself to you, and cannot be 
 criticised by any legitimate business honestly 
 
 managed. . , 
 
 bincerely yours, 
 
 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE. 
 
 Success, for a new movement, often presents 
 quite as serious problems as defeat. Not only 
 had we to deal with that part of the old machine 
 element which now offered to support us with 
 protestations of confidence, but we had also 
 to hold back and keep together the enthusiasts 
 in our own ranks. 
 
 As soon as my nomination in 1900 was a 
 foregone conclusion and I began to think of 
 what our convention platform should be and 
 what we should try to do in our first legisla 
 ture these problems within our own ranks began 
 to concern me. For example, one of the strong 
 est and ablest men among us was A. R. Hall, 
 who had been so persistent in his efforts to 
 
238 FIRST TERM Ao v vERNOR 
 
 obtain anti-pass legislation. He was now mak 
 ing a dogged fight for a railroad commission to 
 regulate rates. Each session he would introduce 
 a bill, make a speech upon it if possible, and see 
 it go down to defeat. He did not expect to 
 pass a bill, indeed his bill was not such a measure 
 as I should have been willing to make a fight for 
 as a law covering that subject. But it served 
 a good purpose in keeping the matter before the 
 legislature. 
 
 Now, I was as keen for railway regulation in 
 Wisconsin as any one could well be. I had been 
 deeply interested in the problem as a boy when 
 it was the leading state issue in the Granger 
 period, and had become a real student of the 
 subject as a member of the House of Represen 
 tatives in 1886 and 1887. It had an important 
 place in my plans for a comprehensive state 
 program. But as a matter of tactics, I did not 
 consider it wise to bring it forward for immediate 
 and serious consideration. In our campaigns 
 J we had emphasized two issues chiefly: direct 
 grimaries and EajLroad^t axartkm . We had found 
 it important to keep the field of discussion nar- 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 239 
 
 rowed to the subjects which could be ad 
 equately treated in a single address. We had 
 tried to make the people masters of these two 
 issues, and, as events proved, we had succeeded. 
 If we now attacked the larger problem of rail 
 road regulation, as Hall urged us to do, we should 
 have too many issues to present clearly and 
 thoroughly to the people in one campaign and 
 would arouse the doubly bitter opposition of the 
 railroads. The railroads had begun to see that 
 some reform in taxation was inevitable, and 
 w r hile they would certainly resist to the end, 
 they believed, secretly, that they could pass on 
 any increase in their taxes to the public by in 
 creasing their rates. We might, therefore, get 
 a taxation law, but if we proposed also to push 
 railroad regulation at that time and assert the 
 pow r er of the state to fix rates, the railroads 
 would call to their support all the throng of 
 shippers who were then receiving rebates, and 
 would probably defeat all our railroad measures. 
 If we centred on railroad taxation alone, of 
 course we should have with us, quietly if not 
 openly, all the big shippers and manufacturers 
 

 240 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 who knew perfectly well that railroad taxes 
 should be increased and that such increases 
 would tend to reduce the proportion which they 
 had to pay. 
 
 I therefore took time from the campaign and 
 arranged a meeting with Hall at Haugen s home 
 in River Falls. I presented the case strongly 
 to him, urging him not to offer his resolution 
 calling for railroad regulation at the convention. 
 I did not want the convention to go on record 
 against a thing we were all in favor of. We 
 were the best of friends, Hall and I. He was 
 a constant visitor in our home and every member 
 of the family loved him. But he was very in 
 sistent about pushing his measure in season and 
 out; he wanted to make a record, and he thought 
 that the fight should be unremitting. Finally, 
 however, he promised to withhold his resolu 
 tion, and I believe we made better progress in 
 the long run by building our structure of reform 
 step by step. I have always felt that the polit 
 ical reformer, like the engineer or the architect, 
 must know that his foundations are right. To 
 build the superstructure in advance of that is 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 241 
 
 likely to be disastrous to the whole thing. He 
 must not put the roof on before he gets the under 
 pinning in. And the underpinning is education 
 of the people. 
 
 In the convention which followed, in August, 
 1900, I was unanimously nominated for gover 
 nor, and in November the state gave me the 
 largest majority ever given up to that time to a 
 gubernatorial candidate. On January 7, 1901, 
 I took the oath of office. 
 
 Up to the time that the legislature met on 
 January 9th, I felt that we should be able to go 
 forward steadily with the reforms for which the 
 people of the state had declared. I even felt 
 that the machine politicians who came to me 
 offering their support were really convinced that 
 the reforms we demanded were inevitable and 
 that they would no longer oppose them. I 
 was yet to learn the length to which the corpora 
 tions and the machine politicians who repre 
 sented them would go in their efforts to defeat 
 our measures. They now carried out openly 
 their plans for stealing the legislature. 
 
 When the legislature met there was a general 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 gathering of the machine leaders at the capital. 
 They attended my inauguration and there was 
 no manifestation of hostile purposes. But 
 forty-eight hours afterward the mask was [off. 
 The newspapers on the morning of January 9th 
 contained the startling announcement that the 
 "Stalwart" Republicans (as the machine ele 
 ment of the party now for the first time called 
 themselves) were in control of the senate and 
 that they proposed to fight the administration 
 measures. This was the first intimation we 
 had that the old leaders were secretly planning 
 to defeat the legislation pledged in the platform. 
 It was a great shock to us. I found it hard to 
 believe that men elected upon issues so clearly 
 presented would have the hardihood to turn 
 about so quickly. 
 
 Our friends were in undisputed control of the 
 lower house of the legislature, the assembly, 
 and after a hasty conference we decided to pay 
 no attention to the sinister reports regarding 
 the senate, hoping that they might not be true. 
 
 All the governors before me, so far as I know, 
 had sent in their messages to the legislature to 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 243 
 
 be mumbled over by a reading clerk. I knew 
 that I could make a very much stronger impres 
 sion with my recommendations if I could present 
 my message in person to the legislature in joint 
 session. I felt that it would invest the whole 
 matter with a new seriousness and dignity that 
 would not only affect the legislators themselves, 
 but react upon the public mind. This I did: 
 and in consequence awakened a wide interest 
 in my recommendations throughout the state. 
 
 The predominant notes in the message were 
 direct primaries and railroad taxation one 
 political and one economic reform. 
 
 The railroads at that time paid taxes in the 
 form of a license fee upon their gross earnings. 
 The report of the Tax Commission showed that 
 while real property in Wisconsin paid 1.19 per 
 cent, of its market value in taxes, the railroads 
 paid only .53 per cent, of their market value 
 (based on the average value of stocks and bonds) 
 or less than one half the rate paid by farmers, 
 manufacturers, home owners and others. Upon 
 this showing we contended that the railroads 
 were not bearing their fair share of the burdens 
 
244 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 of the state. The Tax Commission suggested 
 two measures of reform. One of their bills 
 provided for a simple increase in the license tax, 
 the other provided for a physical valuation of 
 the railroads and a wholly new system of tax 
 ation upon an ad valorem basis, measures which 
 I had earnestly advocated in my campaign 
 speeches, and recommended in my message. I 
 regarded this latter as the more scientific method 
 of taxation. The Commission stated that while 
 they had so framed the bills as to err on the side 
 of injustice to the people rather than to the 
 railroads, the passage of either of them would 
 mean an increase of taxes paid by railroads and 
 other public service corporations of more than 
 three quarters of a million dollars annually. 
 
 No sooner had the taxation and direct pri 
 mary bills been introduced than the lobby 
 gathered in Madison in full force. Lobbyists 
 had been there before, but never in such numbers 
 or with such an organization. I never saw any 
 thing like it. The railroads, threatened with 
 the taxation bills, and the bosses, threatened by 
 the direct primary, evidently regarded it as the 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 245 
 
 death struggle. Not only were the regular 
 lobbyists in attendance but they made a practice 
 during the entire winter of bringing in delegations 
 of more or less influential men from all parts of 
 the state, some of whom often remained two or 
 three weeks and brought every sort of pressure 
 to bear on the members of the legislature. The 
 whole fight was centred upon me personally. 
 They thought that if they could crush me, that 
 would stop the movement. How little they 
 understood! Even if they had succeeded in 
 eliminating me, the movement, which is funda 
 mental, would still have swept on ! They sought 
 to build up in the minds of the people the fear 
 that the executive was controlling the legislative 
 branch of the government. They deliberately 
 organized a campaign of abuse and misrepresen 
 tation. Their stories were minutely detailed 
 and spread about among the hotels and on rail 
 road trains. They said that I Had completely 
 lost my head. They endeavored to give me a 
 reputation for discourtesy and browbeating; 
 stories were told of my shameless treatment of 
 members, of my backing them up against the 
 
246 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 wall of the executive office, shaking my fist in 
 their faces and warning them if they did not 
 pass our bills I would use all my power to crush 
 them. In so far as anything was said in dis 
 paragement of the administration members of 
 the legislature it was that they were sycophants 
 who took their orders every morning from the 
 executive office. The newspapers, controlled 
 by the machine interests, began to print these 
 abusive statements and sent them broadcast. 
 At first we took no notice of their campaign of 
 misrepresentation, but it grew and grew until 
 it got on the nerves of all of us. It came to 
 be a common thing to have one after another 
 of my friends drop in and say: "Governor, is it 
 
 true that you have had a row with ? Is it 
 
 true that you ordered out of the executive 
 
 office?" 
 
 It seems incredible, as I look back upon it 
 now, that it could be humanly possible to create 
 such an atmosphere of distrust. We felt that 
 we were fighting something in the dark all the 
 while; there was nothing we could get hold of. 
 
 In spite of it all, however, we drove straight 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 247 
 
 ahead. After the bills prepared by the Tax 
 Commission were in, the primary election bill 
 was drafted and redrafted and introduced by 
 E. Ray Stevens of Madison, one of the ablest 
 men ever in public life in Wisconsin, and now 
 a judge of the circuit court of the state. The 
 committee having it in charge at once began a 
 series of open meetings, and the lobby brought 
 to Madison people from every part of the state 
 to attend the hearings and to protest. Ex 
 tended speeches were made against it, and 
 these were promptly printed and sent broad 
 cast. The most preposterous arguments were 
 advanced. They argued that the proposed 
 law was unconstitutional because it interfered 
 with the "right of the people to assemble!" 
 They tried to rouse the country people b t s 
 arguing that it favored the cities; they said 
 that city people could get out more readily 
 to primaries than country people. It did 
 not seem to occur to them that practically 
 every argument they made against the direct 
 primary applied far more strongly to the old 
 caucus and convention svstem. 
 
248 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 But we fought as vigorously as they, and 
 presently it began to appear that we might get 
 some of our measures through. It evidently 
 made an impression on the lobby. One night, 
 after the legislature had been in session about 
 two months, Emanuel Phillipp came to my office. 
 He moved his chair up close to mine. 
 
 "Now, look here," he said, "you want to pass 
 the primary election bill, don t you? I will 
 help you put it through." 
 
 "Phillipp," I said, "there is no use in you and 
 me trying to mislead each other. I understand 
 and you understand that the senate is organized 
 against both the direct primary and taxation 
 bills. You know that better than I do." 
 
 "Well," he said, "now look here. This rail- 
 t)ad taxation matter wouldn t you be willing 
 co let that go if you could get your primary bill 
 through? What good will it do you, anyhow, 
 to increase railroad taxation? We can meet 
 that all right just by raising rates or by changing 
 a classification here and there. No one will know 
 it and we can take back every cent of increased 
 taxes in rates from the people." 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 249 
 
 "Phillipp," I said, "you have just driven in 
 and clinched the argument for regulating your 
 rates. And that is the next thing we are going 
 to do. No," I said, " these pledges are straight 
 promises." 
 
 "But," he argued, "if you can get this pri 
 mary election bill through you will have done a 
 great thing. And I will pass it for you, if you 
 will let up on railroad taxation." 
 
 "Just how will you pass it?" I asked. 
 
 "How will I pass it?" he repeated. "How 
 will I pass it? Why, I ll take those fellows over 
 to a room in the Park Hotel, close the door and 
 stand them up .against the wall. And I ll say 
 to them, You vote for the primary election 
 bill! And they ll vote for it, because I own 
 them, they re mine!" And this was Phillipp s 
 last interview with me. 
 
 Still other and even more desperate measures 
 were resorted to as the fight advanced. I have 
 already spoken of the manner in which the 
 machine had secured control of most of the 
 newspapers of the state, but there was still one 
 great independent newspaper in Milwaukee 
 
250 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 the Sentinel. It had been controlled and edited 
 by Horace Rublee, one of that older group of 
 independent journalists which included such 
 men as Joseph Medill, Charles A. Dana, Horace 
 Greeley and Henry J. Raymond. Rublee was 
 temperamentally cold and dispassionate, but 
 endowed with a keen intellect and the highest 
 sense of honor. He treated everything from 
 the heights. He never hesitated to assail cor 
 ruption wherever it existed, even in the Repub 
 lican party. After Horace Rublee s death, the 
 Sentinel continued to be a thorn in the flesh of 
 the bosses. It attacked Payne and Pfister so 
 sharply for the way in which they were running 
 the politics of Milwaukee, that they finally 
 brought libel suits against it for hundreds of 
 thousands of dollars. The managers of the 
 paper stood their ground and served notice that 
 they would answer and prove their charges. 
 Then suddenly the people of Milwaukee learned 
 that the Sentinel had been sold for an immense 
 sum to Pfister. 
 
 Thus the bosses gained control of the chief 
 organ of public opinion in our greatest city: 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 251 
 
 the people were left with no large English-speak 
 ing Republican daily to fight for their cause 
 The long series of abuses that arose under a cf" 
 government controlled by political rings in b( er 
 parties for the benefit of ringsters that, in rn 
 view, has led to the .Socialist ^prising in Mil 
 waukee. 
 
 Hardly had the news of the transfer of the 
 Sentinel been made public than I was afforded 
 strong evidence of its intentions for the future. 
 Mr. Warren, who had been editor of the Chicago 
 Inter-Ocean when it was the organ of Charles 
 T. Yerkes of franchise fame, was appointed 
 editor of the Sentinel. And one of the first 
 things he did was to come to Madison and call 
 on me at the executive office. 
 
 "Governor La Follette," he said, "I suppose 
 you are aware of the fact that Mr. Pfister is now 
 the owner of the Milwaukee Sentinel" 
 
 I told him I had heard such a report. 
 
 "I suppose you know," he said, "the power 
 of the Sentinel in state politics. I have come 
 to see you by Mr. Pfister s direction, to say to 
 you that the paper prefers to support your 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 administration and will do so provided you 
 Ll iange your attitude on the subject of primary 
 im ?tions and railroad taxation. If the Sentinel 
 me poses your administration, you will be de- 
 G-ated and retired to private life. You are a 
 young- ir?n. Yrj are popular with the people. 
 With the support of the Sentinel you can have a 
 successful career." 
 
 He then went on to argue that the people were 
 not fit to make their own nominations, which led 
 to a considerable discussion of the direct pri 
 mary. "If you will let up," he said finally, 
 "the legislature will be taken care of." 
 
 "Mr. Warren," I said, "I have campaigned 
 this state for direct nominations and equal 
 taxation for several years. The convention 
 which nominated me adopted a platform specifi 
 cally promising that these measures should be 
 enacted into law. These were the two main 
 issues upon which I was elected governor, and 
 I propose to go on fighting for them." 
 
 "Well," he said, "if that is your answer, the 
 Sentinel will begin skinning you to-morrow." 
 
 I replied, "You may be able to prevent the 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 253 
 
 passage of this legislation, and you may defeat 
 me, but I will use all the power that the people 
 have given me to fulfill every pledge in the plat 
 form. And you may carry that to Mr. Pfister 
 as my answer." 
 
 Mr. Warren bowed himself out of the office, 
 and the war on us began from that moment. 
 
 The" Milwaukee Sentinel had been a sort of 
 political bible in the state. It went into every 
 corner of Wisconsin. The character which 
 Rublee had given to it made it the final authority 
 with thousands of readers. 
 
 From that moment it became the organ of 
 the opposition. It supported every form of 
 privilege. The result has been that the party 
 which it championed has lost control of Mil 
 waukee, the boss who owned it and the bosses it 
 so ardently supported have been wholly retired 
 from power in Wisconsin, and the corporations 
 back of those bosses have been firmly reined in 
 by the laws of the state. 
 
 But for the time being the change in the 
 Sentinel made our fight bitterly hard. It 
 strengthened the opposition. For a long time 
 
254 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 I paid no attention to its misrepresentations and 
 personal attacks. But finally, about 1904, I 
 began holding a copy of it up to my audiences, 
 telling them just what it stood for and appealing 
 to the people of Wisconsin to drive it out of 
 their homes; saying that the people ought only 
 to support those papers that served the public; 
 that the papers that were organs of corporations 
 should depend upon the corporations for their 
 support. And that is what the people of the 
 country ought to do to-day. They ought to 
 support the newspapers and magazines that 
 > are serving their interests. There must always 
 be muckrakers as long as there are muckmakers, 
 and the public owes it to itself to support those 
 publications that stand for the public interest. 
 It does not make any difference what good news 
 service the organs of the corporations offer, 
 turn them out; teach them that they can t prey 
 upon the public and at the same time appeal to 
 the public for support. 
 
 Following the change of front in the Sentinel, 
 the lobby became more active. Clubs were 
 formed in Madison where members of the legis- 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 255 
 
 lature could be drawn together in a social way 
 and cleverly led into intimate associations with 
 the corporation men who swarmed the capital. 
 In one of the principal hotels a regular poker 
 game was maintained where members who could 
 not be reached in any other way, could win, 
 very easily, quite large sums of money. In that 
 way bribes were disguised. It was, at that 
 time, against the law to use free transportation 
 in Wisconsin; it was against the law to furnish 
 it; it was against the law to procure it for any 
 body else. And yet, all through that session 
 of the legislature, members were receiving trans 
 portation in the form of mileage books on the 
 state roads for themselves and for their friends. 
 It was notorious that lewd women were an 
 accessory to the lobby organization. Members 
 who could not be reached in any other way were 
 advised that they could receive good positions 
 with railroad corporations after the legislative 
 session was over. Even Congressman Lenroot, 
 then fast rising to the leadership of the assembly, 
 was offered one, which, of course, he did not 
 take. 
 
256 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 When we continued to make progress in spite 
 of all this opposition the lobby made another 
 move against us. It brought to bear all the 
 great influence of the federal office-holders who 
 were especially disturbed over the possible 
 effect of a direct primary upon their control of 
 the state. United States District Attorney 
 Wheeler, an appointee of Spooner, and the 
 United States District Attorney of the Eastern 
 District, an appointee of Quarles, were much on 
 the ground; so were United States Marshal 
 Monahan and Collector of Internal Revenue 
 Fink. 
 
 Finally, before the vote on the direct primary 
 was taken in the senate, Senator Spooner, who 
 rarely came to Wisconsin while Congress was 
 in session, appeared in Madison. He was there 
 only a few days, but he was visited by members 
 of the senate, and we felt his influence strongly 
 against us. 
 
 All the efforts of the lobby, combined with the 
 opposition of the newspapers and the federal 
 office-holders, was not without its effect upon 
 our forces. Every moment from the time the 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 257 
 
 senate convened down to the final vote on the 
 railroad taxation bills they were weakening us, 
 wearing us down, getting some men one way, 
 some another, until finally before the close of the 
 session they had not only the senate but a 
 majority of the Republicans in the assembly. 
 It was a pathetic and tragic thing to see honest 
 men falling before these insidious forces. For 
 many of them it meant plain ruin from which 
 they never afterward recovered. 
 
 In order to make very clear the methods em 
 ployed I shall here relate in detail the stories 
 of several of the cases which came directly under 
 my own observation. I shall withhold the real 
 names of the Senators and Assemblymen con 
 cerned, because many of them were the victims 
 of forces and temptations far greater than they 
 could resist. If I could also give the names of 
 the men really responsible for the corruption, 
 bribery! jand debauchery the men higher up, 
 the men behind the lobbyists I would do it 
 without hesitation. 
 
 How did the lobby get them? Various ways. 
 There was Senator A. He was a poor fellow 
 
258 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 from a northern district; a lawyer without much 
 practice rather a weak fellow. I can t re 
 member just on what bill it was, but they got 
 him. When he returned to his district after the 
 session he built an expensive home, to the amaze 
 ment of all his friends, and then came down to 
 Washington to a federal position. 
 
 We depended on Senator B. He made a 
 statement that he could be relied upon to sup 
 port the direct primary bill. We figured him 
 on our list until about the time that Spooner 
 visited Madison and he got away. Senator 
 C. was another man we had counted upon as one 
 of the old reliables in the movement. He was 
 an Irishman and a good talker and debater. 
 They finally got him, too. I remember he came 
 to me one night and said: 
 
 "Well, I don t know but what I m going to 
 disappoint you in my vote on the direct primary 
 bill." 
 
 I could not at first think of a word to say it 
 was a staggering blow. 
 
 "Why, C.," I said finally, "if you were to go 
 .over to the other side on these measures, it 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 259 
 
 would seem to me like the end of everything. 
 You couldn t do a thing like that. You have 
 been one of the pillars of the movement." 
 
 I don t believe I tried to reason with him. It 
 simply was not a case for argument. There 
 was only one side to it, for he himself had been 
 one of our ablest speakers on the stump in favor 
 of the direct primary. 
 
 Well, he voted against us, and it is signifi 
 cant that a few months after the legislature 
 adjourned he was appointed to a federal office 
 and is, I believe, still in the service. 
 
 Another instance was that of Assemblyman 
 D., who had been for some time quite an active 
 supporter of the reform movement. He was a 
 small business man and came to the legislature 
 from a county in which I was personally very 
 strong. When the committees were being formed, 
 he was counted so much the friend of our 
 measures that he was placed upon one of the 
 most important committees. 
 
 He stood with us in the vote on direct pri 
 maries, but some little time after that Assembly 
 man E., who was one of our leaders in the 
 
260 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 assembly, came into my office one morning. E. 
 was a fine young fellow, and regarded as thor 
 oughly reliable. He was often in the executive 
 office and I trusted him absolutely. Upon the 
 occasion to which I refer he said : 
 
 "Governor, I have changed my boarding 
 place" he had been boarding with some 
 private family, I think "I have moved over to 
 the Park Hotel." 
 
 The Park Hotel was the principal hotel in 
 Madison, and the headquarters of all the lobby 
 ists. I was somewhat surprised and asked him 
 why he had moved. 
 
 "Well," he said, "I propose to be where I 
 can watch the game that these lobbyists are 
 playing. I am satisfied that they are working 
 on some of our weak members, and I am going 
 right into their camp to see what they are 
 doing." 
 
 Not long after that he came to me and said: 
 
 "How much do you know about D.? I 
 notice him about the Park Hotel a great deal 
 talking with lobbyists. There s something about 
 it that I don t like." 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 261 
 
 Finally in one of his talks about D. he said: 
 "You want to look out for D., they ve got him; 
 you will find him going back on railroad tax 
 ation." 
 
 I was disturbed about it. We were up pretty 
 close, as I remember it, to final committee 
 action on the bill. I therefore telephoned to 
 one of the leading bankers in the town in which 
 D. lived and asked him to come to Madison. 
 This banker had been a university chum of mine 
 a man of the highest standing, and a constant 
 and loyal supporter of the Progressive move 
 ment. He came to Madison and brought with 
 him a prominent merchant of the town, but 
 before they could reach D. the vote had been 
 taken, and the result was so close that it was 
 found that D. had cast the decisive vote against 
 the bill. The banker and his friends took D. 
 into a room in the capitol, and had a very 
 earnest talk with him. They told him he would 
 never be able to make the people believe that 
 he didn t have the money of the railroads in his 
 pocket for his betrayal of our cause. He never 
 got back to the legislature. 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 A few days later when this same bill was 
 before the assembly we were to have another 
 and a still worse shock. I have said that we 
 trusted E. implicitly. He was one of the most 
 enthusiastic men we had, and being a high- 
 spirited, energetic young fellow, he was of great 
 assistance in our fights. Whenever we gathered 
 a little group of the members in the executive 
 office to talk over any critical situation in the 
 legislature, E. was always with us. He was an 
 active young manufacturer. He often talked 
 with us about his business. I think he had 
 some special machine which enabled him to 
 make his product more cheaply than other 
 manufacturers. 
 
 One day E. Ray Stevens came into my office 
 and said, "Governor, I wish you would send up 
 and ask E. to come down here. I don t just 
 like the way he talks." 
 
 "Why," I said, "Ray, there can t be anything 
 wrong with E." 
 
 Then I began to think that he had not been 
 in to see me for three or four days. "Well," I 
 said, "I will send up." 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR -263 
 
 IVhen he came through the door he did not 
 meet me with his characteristic frankness. But 
 I greeted him exactly as usual and said, "E., 
 I want to have a little talk with you." 
 
 I moved my chair right up to his, placed my 
 hands on his knees and looked him in the eye a 
 moment before I spoke. Then I asked, "E., 
 what s the matter?" 
 
 The tears started in his eyes and the response 
 came at once. 
 
 "Governor, I can t help it. I ve got to vote 
 against the railroad taxation bill." After a mo 
 ment he added, "I haven t slept any for two 
 or three nights. I have walked the floor. I have 
 thought of resigning and going home." 
 
 "Tell me all about it, E.," I said. 
 
 "Well," he replied, "you know that all I have 
 in the world I have put into that factory of 
 mine. I have told you about how proud I was 
 of the thing. Now," he said, "this railroad 
 lobby tells me that if I vote for that railroad 
 taxation bill they will ruin me in business. They 
 can take away everything I ve got. They have 
 threatened to give my competitors advantages 
 
264 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 over me in railroad rates that will offset any 
 advantages I have with my new machinery. 
 Now, I can t beggar my family. I have a wife 
 and babies." 
 
 I said, "E., you can t do this wrong. You 
 can t violate your conscience." I talked to him 
 quite a bit. He got up and walked the floor. 
 He said he would always be for our measures, 
 but he could not risk being driven to the wall. 
 And then he left the office. 
 
 A few minutes before the roll call on the bill, 
 E., who sat next to Lenroot, turned to him and 
 said, "Lenroot, in five minutes I am going to 
 violate my oath of office." Lenroot was shocked 
 and said, "What do you mean?" He replied: 
 "It is a question between my honor and my 
 bread and butter, and I propose to vote for my 
 bread and butter." And he voted against the 
 bill. 
 
 Assemblyman F. was nominated by a con 
 vention that was overwhelmingly for the direct 
 primary. It adopted a platform specifically 
 pledging the nominee to support the direct 
 primary bill, and F., the candidate, formally 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 265 
 
 accepted and agreed faithfully to carry out the 
 instructions of the convention. 
 
 During the all-night session in the assembly 
 on the primary bill, F. was called from the floor 
 into the clerk s room by a member of the senate 
 who offered him five hundred dollars to vote 
 against the bill. F. told the lobbyist that he 
 would not dare to go back to his constituents if 
 he voted against that bill, as he had solemnly 
 promised them when nominated to vote for it. 
 F. said he would like to do anything the Senator 
 wanted him to and he would like the five hun 
 dred, but he did not dare to violate his pledge. 
 After more of this talk they left the clerk s room. 
 The room was not lighted. 
 
 At the time there was lying on a lounge in 
 that room Assemblyman G., who was ill and 
 had been brought from a sick room to attend 
 upon this important session. He recognized 
 F. s voice and also the name of the Senator, 
 which F. repeatedly used during the negotia 
 tions. Assemblyman G. reported the whole 
 matter to Lenroot, who informed me. We 
 agreed that here was a case that we could take 
 
266 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 into the court if G. would swear to the facts as 
 reported to Lenroot. It was hoped that a suc 
 cessful prosecution might check the bribers in 
 their raid on our legislation. 
 
 I sent for G. In Lenroot s presence he re 
 peated the conversation between F. and the 
 senator, just as he had given it to Lenroot. I 
 then called F. to the executive chamber. He 
 admitted the conversation as detailed by G., 
 but was slow about confirming G. as to the name 
 of the Senator which he had used again and 
 again in discussing the five-hundred-dollar pro 
 posal while in the clerk s room. 
 
 Another interview was arranged, at which 
 time he promised to tell everything. Before 
 that interview the lobby did such effective work 
 with both F. and G. that their memories utterly 
 failed them as to every important detail of the 
 whole event, and without these two witnesses 
 there was no case. 
 
 Such was the opposition we had to meet on 
 all of our measures, the lobby standing together 
 as one man against both the taxation and the 
 direct primary bills. 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 267 
 
 It was about the middle of March, after in 
 conceivable delays, before the Direct Primary 
 bill could be finally gotten up in the assembly 
 for consideration, and it was then bitterly op 
 posed. 
 
 When the debate was finally exhausted there 
 was an all-night session so managed in a par 
 liamentary way as to prevent a vote being taken. 
 In the meantime lobbyists were calling members 
 of the assembly outside of the chamber, liquor 
 was brought into the capitol, and into the com 
 mittee rooms. Members were made drunk and 
 brought back in such a condition of intoxication 
 that they had to be supported to their seats. 
 And yet, in spite of all this, we retained the sup 
 port of enough members to pass the bill. 
 
 When it reached the senate, though the mem 
 bers were hostile to it, they dared not kill it 
 outright. The sentiment in the state, they knew, 
 was too strong. Accordingly, they pursued the 
 usual indirect means of accomplishing the same 
 end by passing a substitute measure called 
 the Hagemeister bill, which defeated the real 
 purpose of the reform. 
 
v/ 
 
 268 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 This substitute was indeed supported by some 
 of our friends who were affected by the argument 
 that it was a good thing to make a start, that 
 "half a loaf is better than no bread"; that it was 
 necessary at any hazard to "get something on 
 the statute books." 
 
 But in legislation no bread is often better 
 ,than half a loaf. I believe it is usually better to 
 be beaten and come right back at the next session 
 and make a fight for a thoroughgoing law than 
 to have written on the books a weak and in 
 definite statute. The gentlemen who opposed 
 us were ingenious. Under the Hagemeister sub 
 stitute they proposed to try out the direct 
 primary principle with respect to county offices 
 alone. Now, they knew well enough that 
 county elections scarcely touch the real problem 
 of party caucuses, conventions and legislation; 
 that they involve little besides personal strife 
 for small local offices. They expected by the 
 application of such a law to discredit the direct 
 primary by bringing out a miserably small vote 
 with a big expense charged up against it. They 
 knew that it would take several years to try out 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 269 
 
 the experiment and that by that time the Pro 
 gressive group, unable to prove the excellence of 
 their policies, would have merited the distrust 
 of the people. 
 
 I had thought all this out years before. All 
 through our earlier contests we could have 
 obtained some mild or harmless compromises 
 and concessions. But I was clear that we should 
 not stand for anything that did not strike at the 
 root of the whole boss system. So I promptly 
 vetoed the Hagemeister bill and took the severe 
 lashing of the same newspapers which had all 
 along been fighting the direct primary. 
 
 My attitude in this case, and in several other 
 similar matters, has given me the reputation of 
 being radical and extreme. And if this is radi 
 calism then indeed I am a radical; but I call it 
 common sense. It is simply the clear compre 
 hension of the principle involved, and the clear 
 conception of the utter destruction of that prin 
 ciple if only a part of it is applied. I have 
 always believed that anything that was worth 
 fighting for involved a principle, and I insist on 
 going far enough to establish that principle and to 
 
V 
 
 270 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 give it a fair trial. I believe in going forward a 
 step at a time, but it must be a full step. When I 
 went into the primary fight, and afterward into 
 the railroad fight and it has been my settled 
 policy ever since I marked off a certain area 
 in which I would not compromise, within which 
 compromise would have done more harm to 
 progress than waiting and figliting would have 
 done. 
 
 The Socialists, for example, assert that the 
 regulation of railroads, for which I have always 
 stood firmly, will not work that it is a com 
 promise, and that we cannot escape govern 
 mental ownership. But I say that regulation 
 is in itself a complete step, involving a definite 
 and clear policy or principle. I think it will 
 work, and I know it ought to be thoroughly tested. 
 If it proves the correct solution of the problem, 
 we have no farther to go; if it does not, we can 
 take the next full step with confidence that we 
 have behind us that great body of the people 
 who can only be convinced by events. Diffi 
 culties leading to social explosions are caused 
 not by too lengthy or hasty strides of progress 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 271 
 
 but by holding back and preventing the people 
 from taking the next full step forward when they 
 are ready for it. 
 
 So I vetoed the Hagemeister bill, and decided 
 to go again before the people with the whole 
 issue. I knew the people of Wisconsin thor 
 oughly. I knew from close contact with them 
 what they were thinking, what they believed. 
 I knew also that I was advocating a sound prin 
 ciple which no amount of abuse or misrepresen 
 tation could finally defeat. I felt sure they would 
 support me as indeed they did when the time 
 came, and most loyally. 
 
 After the direct primary matter was disposed 
 of, the railroad taxation bills took foremost 
 place in the legislature. By this time the lobby 
 ists had reached a good many of our men and 
 we began to fear that we could not even control 
 the assembly. They held back the taxation 
 bills and were evidently trying to smother them. 
 I waited patiently and hopefully for the legis 
 lature to act. Weeks went by. Hearings were 
 strung out. It was perfectly plain that it was 
 their plan to beat the bills by delay. Every 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 hour, in the meantime, the corroding influence 
 of the lobby was at work. Business connections, 
 social diversions, the poker room, entertain 
 ments, of every kind, decent and otherwise, 
 were employed, and all I could do, as I sat there 
 day by day watching the precious time go by, 
 was to communicate with the legislature in one 
 of two ways by message, or by personal appeal 
 to the members to redeem the promises that we 
 had made to the people as a basis for our election. 
 The one way was provided for in the consti 
 tution, the other was not. But I could not be 
 stopped from making appeals to those members; 
 I could not. It was very well known that I was 
 the only man in the capitol who could crowd 
 that legislature to do its duty. That is why 
 they attacked me chiefly. As the editor of the 
 Sentinel said to me: "If only you will take 
 your hands off, we can take care of the legis 
 lature." They argued thus to me: ;i You have 
 sent in a strong message, you have made good so 
 far as you are concerned, and the people will 
 understand. Now quit, quit, and you can have 
 anything you want." 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 273 
 
 But I could not see the corruption going on 
 all around me, I could not see honest measures 
 promised to the people beaten by wholesale 
 bribery without doing the utmost I could to 
 prevent it. About that time the legislature 
 passed and sent up to me a bill taxing the dogs 
 owned in the state. The humorous absurdity of 
 such a measure at once struck me the attempt 
 to raise a few hundred dollars in taxes upon dogs 
 owned by a class of people already overbur 
 dened with taxes, while the corporations of the 
 state were paying hundreds of thousands of 
 dollars less than their just share! I therefore 
 made it the occasion of a message to the legis 
 lature in which I vetoed the dog tax bill and in 
 the course of which I endeavored to outline the 
 true principles of taxation. I also held up to 
 view, as I had done in my veto of the Hage- 
 meister bill, the exact conditions in the senate, 
 showing how the lobby had corrupted the rep 
 resentatives of the people. Both of these mes 
 sages struck home and stung, as I intended they 
 should, and both attracted so much attention 
 throughout the state that the legislature was 
 
274 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 forced to a consideration of the bills. After a 
 brief fight, however, both of the railroad taxa 
 tion bills were defeated. 
 
 Thus the session of 1901 closed without our 
 having accomplished any of the important 
 things that we had set out to do. More than 
 this, it had enabled the lobby and the bosses, 
 now more strongly organized than ever, to win 
 over some of our leaders. They even secured 
 a manifesto signed by more than half of the 
 Republican members of both branches of the 
 legislature criticising me sharply for what they 
 claimed to be my encroachment upon the con 
 stitutional rights of the legislative branch of the 
 state government, and organized themselves 
 into a league to fight the Progressive movement. 
 
 I freely admit that as governor I used all the 
 power and prestige of the office to secure the 
 legislation that had been promised to the people. 
 I arraigned the legislature as derelict of duty. 
 No normal condition would w r arrant any exec 
 utive, state or federal, in calling the legislative 
 department so sharply to account as I did in the 
 veto of the Hagemeister bill and in the veto of 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 275 
 
 the dog tax bill, but in this case the situation 
 was not normal; after a series of campaigns the 
 Republican party, the party in control of the 
 government of Wisconsin, had pledged in the 
 platform of 1898 a reform of the nominating 
 system, and of the unequal and unjust tax laws, 
 and the legislature elected on that platform had 
 defeated the will of the people and denied them 
 the legislation for which a majority of them had 
 declared. 
 
 Again in 1900 the same pledges had been 
 made. The people in the election had by more 
 than one hundred thousand majority voted 
 that such legislation be enacted, and again the 
 legislature had defied the will of the electorate. 
 It was plainly the end of representative govern 
 ment in Wisconsin. It was the rule of a minor 
 ity through trickery, bribery and corruption. 
 It was a state of revolt. The situation called 
 for extraordinary, aggressive and strong action 
 on the part not only of the executive but of 
 every man who cared to see democracy main 
 tained. The abuse of power was not on the 
 part of the executive. It was on the part of the 
 
 : 
 
276 FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 
 
 legislature. The legislators were the ones who 
 were abusing their power. The executive was 
 obeying the mandate of the people. 
 
 I understood perfectly well not only that the 
 position which I was taking would raise an issue 
 with the legislature, but that it would be made 
 the basis of a bitter attack upon me. But I 
 was content to go to the people with my mes 
 sages, and place my record side by side with the 
 record of the legislature, and let it be fully 
 discussed and talked out with plenty of time 
 for the people to consider whether I had taken 
 a course menacing to a republican form of 
 government, or whether this legislature was 
 undermining and destroying every semblance 
 of representative government. So, when this 
 manifesto was promulgated, I accepted the 
 issue. I caused many thousands of copies of 
 the messages which were criticised to be printed 
 and sent broadcast over the state. 
 
 If this had been all, therefore, I might have 
 looked upon the situation more hopefully. But 
 the strain under which I had worked for six 
 months, the high pressure, the long hours, the 
 
FIRST TERM AS GOVERNOR 277 
 
 anxiety I suppose I worked more than 
 eighteen hours a day steadily had so impaired 
 my health that as soon as the legislature ad 
 journed, I broke down completely, and for 
 practically a year afterward I was ill, part of 
 the time dangerously. This also was made the 
 occasion for unremitting attack. They published 
 stories that I was losing my mind, that I had 
 softening of the brain anything to discredit 
 me with the people of the state. But there was 
 never a moment that I was not determined that 
 if I lived I would fight it out with them again. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 HOW WE PASSED THE RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 A THE opening of the legislature of 1903, 
 I felt that the time had arrived to 
 advance vigorously with the railroad 
 regulation issue. There were good reasons for 
 doing this. We had the support of the public. 
 We had discussed the subject pretty thoroughly 
 in the preceding campaign, so that the people 
 were prepared to back us up strongly in our 
 plans. It had been a difficult campaign, but 
 it was indeed illuminating. And that was for 
 tunate, for it was tremendously important at 
 that particular time to have the issue clearly 
 understood and the voters united upon it. As 
 I have already related, the Progressives had 
 suffered defeat in the legislature of 1901. All 
 the important measures they had urged at that 
 session failed of passage. Besides that, I was 
 
 278 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 279 
 
 seriously broken in health for many months. 
 Even a year later, when it became necessary for 
 me to make a campaign for renomination as 
 governor, I was so ill that I could not make a 
 single speech. The old machine seized upon this 
 situation to conduct a campaign of unexampled 
 vigor. Organized in what was called the Elev 
 enth Story League, because they occupied the 
 entire eleventh story of a Milwaukee office build 
 ing, they spent money without stint. They 
 canvassed the entire state, they purchased the 
 editorial opinions of upward of two hundred 
 Republican newspapers, they issued many pam 
 phlets attacking our movement, their speakers 
 were untiring. But in spite of the furious cam 
 paign made against me, I was renominated. 
 This result was brought about chiefly, I think, 
 by the publication of a "Voter s Handbook" 
 of one hundred and forty-four pages in which 
 we set forth the truth about our work, about 
 our plans for railroad taxation and direct pri 
 maries, and told specifically by what corrupt 
 methods the Progressives had been defeated in 
 the legislature of 1901. We printed 125,000 
 
280 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 copies of this book and placed it in the hands 
 of influential men in every part of the state. 
 
 I had not yet regained my strength when I 
 began my speaking campaign in Milwaukee, 
 September 30, 1902, but I improved steadily 
 and spoke every day to the end of the campaign. 
 
 Mayor Rose of Milwaukee, the Democrat 
 who ran against me, had the support of the 
 Republican machine; nevertheless I was easily 
 reflected by some 50,000 plurality. 
 / In the course of our campaign we had not only 
 advocated our railroad taxation bills but we 
 had also endeavored to show the people con 
 clusively how futile it was to stop short with 
 laws increasing railroad taxes when the railroads 
 could easily turn around and take back every 
 cent of that increase by raising their rates. But 
 the chief reason for advancing strongly with this 
 issue was a tactical one. I hoped to make such 
 a hot fight for regulation that before the session 
 was over the railroad lobby would be most happy 
 to let our taxation bills go through, if thereby 
 they could prevent the enactment of a law cre 
 ating a commission to regulate them. 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 When the legislature of 1903 met we were 
 overjoyed to find that the Progressives were 
 strong enough to organize both houses, though 
 our majority in the senate was very slight. 
 Irvine L. Lenroot, now a member of Congress 
 from Wisconsin, was elected Speaker of the 
 Assembly. Although Lenroot, who is of Swed 
 ish parentage, born in Wisconsin, was only 
 thirty years old, and had served but one term 
 previously in the legislature, he made an 
 enviable record. A ready debater, with a 
 special gift as a lawmaker, he forged rapidly 
 ahead to leadership in the legislature, and im 
 pressed his strong personality upon the most 
 important statutes of Wisconsin enacted from 
 1901 to 1905. He is now winning added dis 
 tinction as a constructive legislator in the House 
 of Representatives. 
 
 For years the railroads had been under serious 
 attack in political campaigns. A. R. Hall had 
 long been diligently hammering away on the 
 subject, and had produced a general impression 
 that conditions were wrong, without any con 
 crete proof of his contentions. Hence it had 
 
282 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 been possible for the railroads by the production 
 of a few made-to-order statistics to confuse and 
 unsettle the public mind. 
 
 I aimed, therefore, in my message, not to 
 make a general attack upon the railroads, but 
 rather to set forth the exact conditions regard 
 ing railroad rates and services. I presented 
 fifteen different statistical tables, carefully pre 
 pared, demonstrating the excessive transporta 
 tion charges imposed by the railroads upon the 
 people of the state. I compared our railroad- 
 made rates with the state-made rates of the 
 neighboring commonwealths of Illinois and 
 Iowa, applying the comparisons to 151 well- 
 known railroad towns in Wisconsin, Illinois 
 and Iowa, the names of which I gave, together 
 with the specific rates. I showed that these 
 151 towns were paying on an average 39.9 per 
 cent, more for their transportation charges than 
 towns located at similar distances from markets 
 in Illinois and Iowa. In this way I got down to 
 the vitals of the subject and laid it all before 
 the people so clearly that no one could get away 
 from it. It went straight home to every farmer 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 283 
 
 and shipper in the state. Here was a farmer 
 making shipments, for example, from Baraboo to 
 Milwaukee. I showed that he was paying 59.77 
 per cent, more freight upon certain products 
 than the farmer of Iowa paid for shipping the 
 same products exactly the same distance to 
 market. 
 
 Abusing an individual, calling him a hare 
 brained theorist, a visionary, a demagogue, an 
 unsafe radical, w r ould not answer these tables 
 and the deductions which I made from them. 
 It was for this reason that the message made 
 such a strong impression throughout the state. 
 However bitterly a newspaper might oppose 
 me, yet my proof of the discrimination in freight 
 rates against the very locality in which it was 
 published simply could not be answered or 
 disregarded. 
 
 Immediately the railroads sent their leading 
 lawyers to Madison to meet my charges. One 
 of them published a brief in which he took up 
 table by table the figures I had presented and 
 tried to make some explanation or defence. But 
 he could not budge them; they were unanswer- 
 
284 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 able. Nor could my message be assailed as 
 intemperate; it was as dispassionate as a census 
 report. 
 
 One of their statements gave me a further 
 opening. It was charged that in making my 
 comparisons I had unfairly selected stations 
 where exceptional conditions existed, and that 
 I had done this to prove my case, the implication 
 being that elsewhere in the state the rates were 
 not discriminatory. 
 
 I decided, therefore, to get out a special mes 
 sage that should once and for all set the whole 
 matter at rest. With the help of Halford Erick- 
 son, chief of our bureau of statistics, whom I 
 later appointed a member of the railroad com 
 mission, and a corps of clerks, we listed every 
 station on the Northwestern and the St. Paul 
 railroads, the two principal roads of the state, 
 and secured the rates for shipping every sort 
 of merchandise and commodity between those 
 stations and the markets. Then we got corre 
 sponding rates and distances in Iowa and Illi 
 nois and printed them, with the names of the 
 stations, side bv side with those of Wisconsin. 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 285 
 
 Having in hand this voluminous material, I 
 worked night after night at the executive resi 
 dence until I wrote a message of 178 printed 
 pages, to which was added many supporting 
 supplementary tables. I sent in this message 
 to the legislature on April 28, 1903, and it 
 furnished a final and unanswerable demonstra 
 tion that we were paying from 20 per cent, to 
 69 per cent, higher freight rates in Wisconsin 
 than they were paying for exactly the same 
 service in Iowa or Illinois. I presented it on 
 the day before the hearings on the bill were 
 to open, for I was certain that on that day there 
 would be assembled in Madison, at the behest 
 of the railroads, all the big shippers of Wis 
 consin. And they actually came by the car 
 load, filled all the hotels, thronged the capitol 
 and surrounded the members of the legislature. 
 They argued, protested, threatened, but they 
 could not controvert my facts. 
 
 On the receipt of the message the railroad 
 lobby engineered a plan to break the effect of it 
 by organizing an indignation movement among 
 these big shippers. The meeting, which was 
 
286 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 held in the state senate, was a cut-and-dried 
 affair at which resolutions were adopted de 
 nouncing my message, particularly and espe 
 cially denying the statements in it that some 
 of the shippers who appeared to oppose the 
 legislation were in receipt of special favors or 
 rebates from the railroads. The greatest ex 
 citement prevailed in and about the capitol 
 and all over the state. In fact, I was content 
 to bide my time regarding the action of the 
 shippers. I could not at that moment produce 
 the legal evidence that they were receiving 
 rebates, but I was absolutely sure it existed, and 
 I shall tell later how we secured it. 
 
 I knew also that the statement in my message 
 that some of these shippers had been coerced by 
 the railroad companies into appearing before 
 the legislature was perfectly true. I had 
 received calls from some of the smaller manufac 
 turers and merchants who told me confidentially 
 that they were there ostensibly to fight the legis 
 lation, but wanted me to know, privately, that 
 they were in favor of it, that they were afraid 
 if they did not come when they were summoned 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 287 
 
 by the railroads they would be punished by 
 increases in their rates, delays in furnishing cars, 
 and in many other ways. 
 
 The regulation bill did not pass at that session, 
 nor did we expect it to pass. But the contest ac 
 complished the purposes we had chiefly in mind. 
 It stirred the people of the state as they had 
 never been stirred before, and laid the founda 
 tions for an irresistible campaign in 1904. It 
 also gave the lobby so much to do as we had 
 anticipated that it could not spend any time 
 in resisting our measures for railroad taxation. 
 It also forced some members of the legislature 
 who were really opposed to us, and who intended 
 to vote against the regulation bill, to vote with 
 us on the taxation bill as a bid for the favor 
 of the people of their districts. 
 
 So, at last, after all these years of struggle, 
 we wrote our railroad tax legislation into the 
 statutes of Wisconsin. As an immediate result, 
 railroad taxes were increased more than $600,000 
 annually. When I came into the governor s 
 office, on January 1, 1901, the state was in 
 debt $330,000 and had only $4,125 in the general 
 
288 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 fund. But so great were the receipts from our 
 new corporation taxes, and from certain other 
 sources, that in four years time, on January 1, 
 1905, we had paid off all our indebtedness and 
 had in the general fund of the treasury $407,506. 
 We had so much on hand, indeed, that we found 
 it unnecessary to raise any taxes for the suc 
 ceeding two years. 
 
 Indeed, we so reorganized and equalized our 
 whole system of taxation that the state to-day 
 is on a sounder, more businesslike foundation 
 than ever before. We brought in so much 
 property hitherto not taxed or unequally taxed 
 that, while the expenses of the state have greatly 
 increased, still the burden of taxation on the 
 people has actually decreased. While corpora 
 tions in 1900 paid taxes of $2,059,139 a year, 
 in 1910 they paid $4,221,504 a year, or more 
 than double. Wisconsin to-day leads all the 
 states of the union in the proportion of its taxes 
 collected from corporations. It derives 70 per 
 cent, of its total state taxes from that source, 
 while the next nearest state, Ohio, derives 52 
 per cent, 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 289 
 
 In 1903 we passed an inheritance tax law 
 which yielded us $26,403 in the following year 
 and has increased steadily since. 
 
 In 1905 I recommended a graduated income 
 tax which has since been adopted by the state. 
 It is the most comprehensive income tax system 
 yet adopted in this country. Those who receive 
 incomes of over $500 must make a return to the 
 tax assessor. The tax at 1 per cent, begins on 
 incomes above $800 in the case of unmarried 
 people and above $1,200 in the case of married 
 persons, increasing one half of 1 per cent, or 
 thereabout for each additional $1,000, until 
 $12,000 is reached, when the tax becomes 5| 
 per cent. On incomes above $12,000 a year the 
 tax is 6 per cent. 
 
 All of these new sources of income have 
 enabled us to increase greatly the service of the 
 state to the people without noticeably increasing 
 the burden upon the people. Especially have 
 we built up our educational system. In 1900 the 
 state was expending $550,000 a year on its uni 
 versity; in 1910 it appropriated over $1,700,000, 
 and there has been a similar increase for 
 
290 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 our normal and graded schools and charitable 
 institutions. Under the constitution the state 
 debt is limited to $100,000, so that we must 
 practically pay as we go. Recently we have 
 been building a state capitol to cost $6,000,000, 
 at the rate of $700,000 to $1,000,000 a year 
 from current funds. 
 
 After the railroad taxation bills were out of 
 the way in the legislature of 1903 a law was 
 passed, upon my recommendation, providing 
 for the appointment of a corps of expert ac 
 countants to investigate the books of the rail 
 road companies doing business in Wisconsin 
 with a view to ascertaining whether they were 
 honestly and fully reporting their gross earnings 
 upon Wisconsin business. The railroads had 
 always been left practically free to assess them 
 selves; that is, they transmitted annually to the 
 state treasurer the reports of gross earnings 
 on which they paid a license fee of 4 per cent, 
 in lieu of all taxes, and no one connected with the 
 state knew whether these reports were accurate 
 or not. I was confident, also, and so stated, that 
 such an examination of the companies books 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 291 
 
 would finally settle the facts as to whether the 
 railroads of Wisconsin were or were not paying 
 rebates to the big shippers. And, as I have 
 said, I wanted the legal evidence. As no one 
 could make an argument against such an in 
 vestigation, we got the law. 
 
 Expert accountants were immediately em 
 ployed and presented themselves at the main 
 offices of the railroads in Chicago. The railroad 
 officials did not exactly refuse them admittance, 
 but asked them to come again. In this way 
 they succeeded in securing some weeks of delay; 
 for what purpose or for what preparation we 
 were never able to learn. But in course of time 
 the Wisconsin accountants were admitted to 
 their offices, and made a thorough investigation, 
 resulting in the discovery that rebates had been 
 given to the amount of something like $1,100,000 
 during the preceding period of six years. In 
 short, we found that in reporting gross earnings 
 the railroads had left out all account of these 
 secret rebates and we therefore demanded the 
 payment of taxes upon them. The railroads 
 carried the cases to the supreme court, but the 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 state was finally victorious and we recovered 
 over $400,000 in back taxes from the railroads 
 in this one case. 
 
 The investigation also showed clearly that 
 many of the big manufacturers and shippers of 
 Wisconsin had long been receiving very large 
 sums in rebates in violation of the Interstate 
 Commerce act. I recall that one firm received 
 as much as $40,000 in rebates in one year, and 
 this firm had been particularly active among the 
 lobbyists. Another firm received $60,000 a 
 year; others, various sums, large and small. 
 The violence, indeed, of the opposition on the 
 part of the shippers and the fury of their denun 
 ciation of the governor for intimating that re 
 bating was practised in Wisconsin could be 
 pretty well gauged by the amounts they were 
 proven to have received. 
 
 We had now passed one of the two great 
 measures so long struggled for the railroad 
 taxation bill. The other, that providing for 
 direct primaries, seemed almost within reach. 
 
 I prepared that part of my message which 
 dealt with direct nominations of candidates for 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 293 
 
 office as though on trial for my life. I felt that 
 the legislature simply must be made to see its 
 duty and that we must pass the direct primary 
 at that session. . I feared that if it failed again, 
 after six years of agitation, we might begin to 
 lose ground with the public. There comes a 
 time when public interest cannot be sustained 
 in further discussion of a subject no matter how 1 
 important. The people will give an adminis 
 tration their support two or three times and 
 then they begin to expect results. 
 
 The primary bill as introduced easily passed 
 the assembly, and after a long and hard fight 
 we finally got it through the senate by accept 
 ing a provision submitting the act on a referen 
 dum to the voters of the state in the election of 
 1904. The machine senators let it go through 
 with this provision because, first, it left the 
 caucus and convention system in force for nearly 
 two years longer. They felt that they would 
 thus have another chance to secure our defeat 
 and get control of the state. It also gave them 
 a chance to defeat the measure, if they could, at 
 the polls. They believed, I am confident, that 
 
294 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 the people themselves would fail to adopt it; 
 they still thought that it had back of it only 
 "agitators" and "demagogues." It was neces 
 sarily a lengthy measure, with some forty or 
 more sections, and they figured that to present 
 the details of a complex bill was a task too great 
 for us in a campaign involving other important 
 issues. Under the referendum as now adopted 
 in many states publication of such measures is 
 provided for at public expense, months in ad 
 vance of the election, and there is wide dis 
 tribution of literature on the subject. But there 
 was no such provision in Wisconsin at that time 
 and they relied on the difficulties and expense 
 we would have in reaching all the voters, and on 
 their own ability to checkmate us. 
 
 But, as usual, the bosses were mistaken in 
 their estimate of the intelligence of the people. 
 When the time came the Democratic party as 
 \vell as the Republican party declared for it, 
 and although a desperate fight was made upon 
 the measure at the polls, nevertheless it carried 
 in the election of 1904 by a majority of over 
 50,000. 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 295 
 
 Except for one omission I think it is the most 
 perfect law for the nomination of candidates by 
 direct vote ever enacted. It failed to make 
 provision for the second choice, which permits 
 voters to indicate on the ballot not only their 
 first choice of candidates for each office, but a 
 second choice as well, thereby positively as 
 suring a nomination by the group of the party 
 which is actually in the majority. 
 
 We struggled for a second choice amendment 
 to our Wisconsin primary law for nearly seven 
 years, and finally obtained it in the session of 
 the legislature of last year (1911). I can trace 
 most of the political misfortunes we have in 
 Wisconsin since the adoption of the primary law 
 to this omission. The machine system of poli 
 tics requires nt> second choice, because Ithe 
 boss determines who shall be candidates and X 
 prevents rivals from dividing up the machine 
 vote. But it is an essential part of the Progres-1 
 sive belief that there shall be no boss system; no\ 
 one to give and no one required to take orders;/ / 
 the field is open to everybody, and so there are) 
 always men to divide up the Progressive vote, 
 
296 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 while the machine vote is solid. Thus the 
 I machine can win out even when the Progressives 
 are in the vast majority. 
 
 This happened in the primary election for 
 United States Senator in Wisconsin in 1908. 
 There were two Progressives in the field against 
 Stephenson, both very strong men McGovern, 
 now governor, and State Senator Hatton and 
 they split the Progressive vote between them. 
 Stephenson thus slipped in between and received 
 a plurality of the votes. 
 
 It was this omission of the second choice 
 provision, with the opening it gave for a man like 
 Stephenson to spend a large sum of money to 
 secure his nomination (his recorded expenditure 
 was $107,000), that has furnished the chief cause 
 of complaint against the Wisconsin primary 
 system. People do not stop to think that under 
 the old caucus and convention system the 
 amounts spent in an election were often many 
 times as great and no account was made of 
 them. A second choice provision, such as we 
 now have in Wisconsin, ought to be the law of 
 every state which has a direct primary. 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 297 
 
 We needed one thing more in connection with 
 the primary law, and that was a stringent Cor 
 rupt Practices Act to prevent the corrupt use 
 of money in primaries and in elections. W T e 
 tried hard to get such a law in 1903. W r e failed 
 at that time, but Wisconsin now has an admir 
 able measure which will make it impossible for 
 any candidate to spend money as Mr. Stephen- 
 son did in 1908. 
 
 One other measure of great importance also 
 came up strongly in the session of 1903. It grew 
 directly out of our miserable experience with 
 the lobby, and was designed to abolish these 
 corrupt influences which had for decades con 
 trolled legislation in Wisconsin. We began 
 fighting for such legislation as early as 1897, and 
 I urged it in messages to three different legis 
 latures, but it was not until 1905 that our anti- 
 lobby law was finally enacted. The Wisconsin 
 statute requires all lobbyists or represent 
 atives, employed and paid for their services, 
 to register themselves in the office of the 
 secretary of state, specifying the character 
 of their employment, and by whom employed. 
 
298 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 The statute prohibits such lobby agents or 
 counsel from having any private communication 
 with members of the legislature upon any 
 subject of legislation. The lobby is given the 
 widest opportunity to present publicly to legis 
 lative committees, or to either branch of the 
 legislature, any oral argument; or to present to 
 legislative committees or to individual members 
 of the legislature written or printed arguments 
 in favor of or opposed to any proposed legis 
 lation; provided, however, that copies of such 
 written or printed arguments shall be first filed 
 in the office of the secretary of state. This 
 law rests upon the principle that legislation is 
 public business and that the public has a right 
 to know what arguments are presented to mem 
 bers of the legislature to induce them to enact 
 or defeat legislation, so that any citizen or body 
 of citizens shall have opportunity, if they desire, 
 to answer such arguments. 
 
 Since I came to the United States Senate I 
 have steadfastly maintained the same position. 
 Again and again I have protested against secret 
 hearings before Congressional committees upon 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 the public business. I have protested against 
 the business of Congress being taken into a 
 secret party caucus and there disposed of by / 
 party rule; I have asserted and maintained at all 
 times my right as a public servant to discuss in 
 open Senate, and everywhere publicly, all legis- | 
 lative proceedings, whether originating in the 
 executive sessions of committees or behind 
 closed doors of caucus conferences. When the 
 Tariff bill on wool and woolens was in con 
 ference between the two houses last summer, I 
 was determined as a member of that conference 
 that its sessions should be held, if possible, with 
 open doors. I waited upon Senator Bailey, a 
 member of the committee, and told him that I 
 proposed to announce that I should freely dis 
 cuss on the floor of the Senate any action taken 
 by the committee, and that if support could be 
 had I should move to make the sessions of 
 the committee open and public. Indeed, both 
 Senator Bailey and myself had taken the same 
 position when an attempt had previously been 
 made to hold secret sessions of the Committee 
 on Finance so that Secretary Knox might give 
 
300 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 in private his testimony on the Reciprocity bill. 
 At that time I moved that a stenographer be 
 present and that all questions and answers be 
 taken down and made of record, and declared 
 that I would not be bound by any action of the 
 committee against making use of the testimony 
 of Secretary Knox if I felt it to be my duty in 
 discussing the Reciprocity bill on the floor of 
 the Senate. I was assured by Senator Bailey 
 that he was heartily in favor of that course. 
 When, later, the committee on conference on 
 the Tariff bill on wool and woolens met in the 
 rooms of the Finance Committee, Senator 
 Bailey moved that the sessions of the conference 
 committee be held with open doors. Objection 
 was made, but finally, on a roll call, Bailey s 
 motion carried, the doors were opened, and the 
 representatives of the newspapers were admitted. 
 For the first time in the history of Congress a 
 conference committee transacted its important 
 business under the eye of the public, with re 
 porters in attendance. 
 
 It is to be hoped that this precedent will be 
 followed by all the regular committees and con- 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 301 
 
 ference committees of Congress in dealing with 
 every subject of legislation. The propriety of 
 considering treaties and matters affecting foreign 
 relations in executive session is conceded, al 
 though there are unquestionably cases where 
 public interest would demand open sessions and 
 full publicity even when treaties with foreign 
 nations are under consideration. A case in 
 point is the Honduran Treaty, now pending, in 
 which it is proposed that this government shall 
 become surety for and guarantee loans aggrega 
 ting millions of dollars made to the Honduran 
 Government by American capitalists. 
 
 Evil and corruption thrive best in the dark. 
 Many, if not most, of the acts of legislative dis 
 honesty which have made scandalous the pro 
 ceedings of Congress and state legislatures 
 could never have reached the first stage had 
 they not been conceived and practically con 
 summated in secret conferences, secret caucuses, 
 secret sessions of committees, and then carried 
 through the legislative body with little or no 
 discussion. I hope to see the rules of the Senate 
 and House of Representatives so changed as to 
 
302 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 require, in plain terms, every legislative com 
 mittee to make and keep for public inspection 
 a record of every act of the committee. 
 
 In a great body like the Congress of the 
 United States nearly all legislation is controlled 
 by committees. The sanction of a committee 
 goes a long way. The life of a Congressman, a 
 Senator, is a busy one; he is worked early and 
 late, and in some measure he must depend for 
 the details of legislation upon the committees 
 appointed for the purpose of perfecting the 
 legislation. And as the business of the country 
 grows and the subjects of legislation multiply, 
 so committee action upon bills becomes more 
 and more important. We spend a vast sum of 
 money to print a Congressional Record in order 
 that the public may be made acquainted with 
 the conduct of their business, and then we trans 
 act the important part of the business behind 
 the locked doors of a committee room. The 
 public believes that the Congressional Record 
 tells the complete story, when it is in reality 
 only the final chapter. 
 
 The whole tendency of democracy, indeed, is 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 303 
 
 toward more openness, more publicity. In the 
 early days of this government not only were the 
 committee meetings secret, but during the first 
 tw r o or three administrations even the sessions 
 of the Senate itself were held behind closed doors. 
 Discussing this subject in the Senate in con 
 nection with the Lorimer case, I quoted these 
 stirring words of Charles Sumner, delivered on 
 the floor of the Senate over forty years ago : 
 
 "Something has been said about Senatorial 
 caucuses. Now, I shall make no revelation, but 
 I shall repeat what for ten years I have said in 
 this Chamber as often as occasion allowed. A 
 Senatorial caucus is simply a convenience. It 
 is in no respect an obligation on anybody. To 
 hold that it is, is infinitely absurd and uncon 
 stitutional. We are all under the obligation of 
 an oath, as Senators, obliged to transact the 
 public business under the Constitution of the 
 United States. We have no right to desert this 
 Chamber and go into a secret conclave, and there 
 dispose of the public business. . . . The 
 Senatorial caucus is secret; it is confidential, if 
 you please; it has no reporters present; it is not 
 
304 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 in the light of day. Why, sir, to take the public 
 business from this Chamber and carry it into 
 such a caucus is a defiance of reason and of the 
 best principles of government." 
 
 I came out of the legislative session of 1903 
 in good health, and spent that summer and fall 
 chiefly upon the lyceum and chautauqua plat 
 forms. 
 
 The chautauqua is truly an educational force 
 in the life of the country. It is organized widely 
 among the towns and smaller cities in nearly all 
 of the northern and western states. It is 
 strongly supported by the well-to-do farmers. 
 The people who patronize the chautauquas 
 will not only listen to, but also they demand, the 
 serious discussion of public questions. I called 
 my address "Representative Government," but 
 it was never the same. I spoke extemporane 
 ously, and in connection with my addresses 
 related my experience in Wisconsin. It was the 
 struggle between democracy and privilege which 
 I tried to place on view, and I illustrated it 
 directly from the most recent events in my own 
 state. In that way it always had a live, fresh 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 305 
 
 interest. W r henever I spoke in Wisconsin I never 
 accepted any payment, not even expenses, and 
 elsewhere, if the address was free to the public, 
 I would not accept pay. In this way I have 
 made a thousand or more chautauqua and 
 lyceum addresses, and have pretty well covered 
 all the states of the union except New England 
 and the Old South. I believe these addresses 
 were the most practically effective work I have 
 done, in a national way, for the Progressive 
 movement, though it cannot well be separated / 
 from my work as a public official. For it is my 
 work as a public official that has made my work 
 on the platform count. If I had simply dis 
 cussed principles and their relation to the pro 
 ceedings of Congress and state legislatures in a 
 theoretical way, I could not have given those 
 addresses the living, vital interest which it was 
 possible to give them where I had been a part 
 of the official proceedings which I presented to 
 my audiences. 
 
 Our Progressive cause in Wisconsin has always 
 been supported by what is more technically 
 called the labor vote. Many years ago, in 
 
306 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 Wisconsin, it was customary, shortly before 
 election, for the bosses to distribute four or five 
 thousand dollars among certain of the old-time 
 labor leaders, who were expected thereafter to 
 deliver the labor vote to the Republican ticket. 
 I have heard it said many times back in those 
 years: "Oh, never mind about the labor vote; 
 Payne w T ill take care of that." 
 
 When we began our fight on the bosses they 
 resorted to their usual methods of influencing the 
 labor leaders. The railroads and the big ship 
 pers also tried actively to vote their employees 
 against me, but after we had begun to be suc 
 cessful, after the wage-earners had begun to see 
 what our movement meant, we got more and 
 more of their support. This was noticeable in 
 the campaign of 1902. In our great crucial 
 campaign of 1904, of which I shall speak in 
 the next chapter, this effort to influence the labor 
 vote reached its height. It was the final struggle. 
 Congressman Babcock personally called upon 
 large employers of labor and urged them either 
 to prevent their men going to the caucuses 
 to vote for La Follette or else to devise means 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 307 
 
 of controlling the caucuses. In a number of 
 cases railroad men were notified to be at the 
 roundhouse or shop at a given time when the 
 superintendent would arrive in a special car 
 to address them. The talk was something like 
 this: "It is to our interest and therefore to 
 yours that this man La Follette be defeated for 
 nomination. Your bread and butter depends 
 on your standing by the railroads at the cau 
 cuses." And when the caucuses were held, 
 division superintendents and other officials often 
 stood at the entrances to the voting places and 
 handed specially prepared ballots to the railroad 
 employees as they came up to vote. 
 
 But in spite of all these efforts I always felt, 
 in fact knew, that I had the sympathy of these 
 employees. Several times in the campaign 
 which followed this desperate attempt to control 
 the caucuses have I had a conductor, as he \vas 
 taking my ticket, lean down and whisper: 
 
 "It s all right, Governor; they had us where 
 we were obliged to take orders in the caucus, but 
 they can t watch us in the election. The Aus 
 tralian ballot will give us a chance." 
 
308 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 And in many cases they would say nothing, 
 but grip my hand hard. 
 
 I have always had respect for the man who 
 labors with his hands. My own life began that 
 way. Manual labor, industry, the doing of a 
 good day s work, was the thing that gave a 
 man standing and credit in the country neigh 
 borhood where I grew up. We all worked hard 
 at home, and the best people I ever knew 
 worked with their hands. I have always had 
 a feeling of kinship for the fellow who carries 
 the load the man on the under side. I un 
 derstand the man who works, and I think he 
 has always understood me. In the campaign 
 of 1904 I used, often, the verses of a poem of 
 Whittier s called "The Poor Voter on Election 
 Day:" 
 
 The proudest now is but my peer, 
 
 The highest not more high; 
 To-day, of all the weary year, 
 
 A king of men am I. 
 To-day, alike are great and small, 
 
 The nameless and the known; 
 My palace is the people s hall, 
 
 The ballot-box my throne! 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 309 
 
 In some cases where the labor vote was very 
 heavy the employers allowed La Follette dele 
 gates to be elected and afterward gave them the 
 alternative of losing their jobs or violating their 
 political faith. In Eau Claire County we met 
 with an example of this sort. We had there a 
 very strong supporter who came to us and told 
 us exactly his situation. He said he had been 
 threatened with loss of his job if he voted for me 
 in the convention, and while it would be a great 
 hardship for him to lose his position he could 
 not reconcile himself to obey their orders. W 7 e 
 found that we could spare his vote and save his 
 job, so he voted against us with our full under 
 standing of the reason. 
 
 As soon as I became governor we began press 
 ing for new labor legislation which should place 
 Wisconsin on a level with the most progressive 
 state or nation; and it can be truthfully said, 
 since the passage last year of a law creating an 
 Industrial Commission, that Wisconsin now 
 easily leads the states of the union in its body 
 of labor legislation. Child labor has been 
 reduced and the children kept in the schools. 
 
310 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 Excessive hours for women workers have been 
 abolished. The doctrine of comparative neg 
 ligence has been adopted for railways, and the 
 long hours of trainmen have been done away 
 with. The most carefully drawn of all work 
 men s compensation laws has been adopted, 
 and the employers of the state have organized, 
 under a new insurance law, an employer s 
 mutual insurance association, similar to those 
 which in Germany have greatly reduced ac 
 cidents and compensated the workmen. Many 
 other laws have been added and old ones 
 strengthened, and finally our new Industrial 
 Commission, modeled after the Railroad Com 
 mission, has been placed in charge of all the 
 labor laws, with full power to enforce the laws 
 and protect the life, health, safety and welfare of 
 employees. This commission has employed 
 one of the leading experts of the United States 
 to cooperate with employers in devising ways 
 and means of safety and sanitation. 
 
 The commission consists of three members, 
 appointed by Governor Me Govern: Charles 
 Crownhart, a very able lawyer and devoted to 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 311 
 
 public service; Dr. John R. Commons, the 
 great constructive economist and a leading 
 authority on labor legislation, and Joseph D. 
 Beck, who had served the state most efficiently 
 as Commissioner of Labor and Industrial Sta 
 tistics. The Industrial Commission is a new 
 departure of the first importance the first 
 of its kind in the country. By this measure 
 the state assumes to control and regulate the 
 most difficult questions of sanitation, safety, 
 health and moral well-being which affect the 
 workers of the state. It is one of the most 
 important innovations we have made, one 
 charged with the greatest possibilities for im 
 proving the lives of working men and women, 
 and one which should be watched and studied 
 by every one who is interested in forward 
 movements. 
 
 In all of my campaigns in Wisconsin I had 
 been much impressed with the fact that women 
 were as keenly interested as men in the ques 
 tions of railroad taxation, reasonable transporta 
 tion charges, direct primaries, and indeed in the 
 whole Progressive program. They compre- 
 
312 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 bended its relation to home life and all domestic 
 problems. They understood what it meant for 
 the railroads to escape paying a million dollars 
 of justly due taxes every year. They knew 
 that the educational system of the state must 
 be supported; that every dollar lost to the 
 educational, charitable, and other institutions 
 of the state through tax evasions by railroad 
 and other corporations must be borne by added 
 taxes upon the homes and farms. They un 
 derstood that freight rates were a part of the 
 purchase price of everything necessary to their 
 daily lives; that when they bought food and 
 fuel and clothing they paid the freight. As a 
 result my political meetings were generally as 
 largely attended by women as by men, and these 
 questions were brought directly into the home 
 for study and consideration. It has always been 
 inherent with me to recognize this co-equal 
 interest of women. My widowed mother was a 
 woman of wise judgment; my sisters were my 
 best friends and advisers; and in all the work 
 of my public life my wife has been my constant 
 companion. 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 313 
 
 Mrs. La Follette and I were classmates at the 
 University of Wisconsin, and naturally we had 
 common interests. The first year of our mar 
 ried life, in order to strengthen myself in the law, 
 I was re-reading Kent and Blackstone at home 
 evenings, and she joined me. This led later to 
 her taking the law course as an intellectual pur 
 suit. She never intended to practise. She was 
 the first woman graduated from the Wisconsin 
 University Law School. 
 
 On one occasion when my firm was over 
 whelmed with work at the circuit, and the time 
 was about to expire within which our brief 
 should be served in a supreme court case, it 
 having been stipulated that the case should be 
 submitted without argument, I proposed to Mrs. 
 La Follette that she prepare the brief. It was 
 a case which broke new ground, and her brief 
 won with the Supreme Court. 
 
 About a year afterward Chief Justice Lyon, 
 in the presence of a group of lawyers, compli 
 mented me on the brief which my firm had filed 
 in that case, saying, "It is one of the best briefs 
 submitted to the court in years, and in writing 
 
314 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 the opinion I quoted liberally from it because 
 it was so admirably reasoned and so clearly 
 stated." I said, "Mr. Chief Justice, you make 
 me very proud. That brief was written by an 
 unknown but very able member of our bar - 
 altogether the brainiest member of my family. 
 Mrs. La Toilette wrote that brief, from start 
 to finish." 
 
 Although Mrs. La Follette never made any 
 further practical use of her law, this training 
 brought her into closer sympathy and compan 
 ionship with me in my professional work, and in 
 my political career she has been my wisest and 
 best counsellor. That this is no partial judg 
 ment, the Progressive leaders of Wisconsin who 
 welcomed her to our conferences would bear 
 witness. Her grasp of the great problems, 
 sociological and economic, is unsurpassed by 
 any of the strong men who have been associated 
 with me in my work. 
 
 It has always seemed to me that women should 
 play a larger part than they do in the greater 
 housekeeping of the state. One of the factors 
 in the improvement of conditions in Wisconsin 
 
Copyright, by Harris & Ewing 
 
 MRS. ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 
 
 (A late portrait) 
 "She has been my wisest and best counselor." 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 315 
 
 has been the selection of able women for posi 
 tions in the state service, particularly upon 
 those boards having to do with the welfare of 
 women. by/; 
 
 In my first message to the legislature, after 
 I became governor, I recommended the ap 
 pointment of a woman as factory inspector, and 
 also that women should serve on the Boards of 
 University and Normal School Regents, and on 
 the very important Board of Control, which has 
 charge of all the charitable, penal and reforma 
 tory institutions of the state. 
 
 At first, even in our own camp, there was 
 some opposition to the appointment of women 
 in the state service a survival of the old 
 political belief that "the boys ought to have 
 the places" and especially the places that 
 carried good salaries but that feeling has 
 disappeared before the evidences of the high 
 character of the services which these women 
 have rendered. 
 
 Mrs. La Follette and other interested women 
 exercised a helpful influence in securing the legis 
 lation and in making the appointments. 
 
316 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 Dr. Almah J. Frisby, a practising physician 
 of Milwaukee, was made a member of the Board 
 of University Regents. She was graduated from 
 the university in 1878, and is a woman of excep 
 tionally strong character and high ability. She 
 remained on the Board until I appointed her to a 
 place on the State Board of Control of Chari 
 table and Penal Institutions, where she has since 
 served with great usefulness. 
 
 To succeed Doctor Frisby on the Board of 
 Regents I selected Kate Sabin Stevens, a sister 
 of Ellen Sabin, President of Downer College, 
 Milwaukee, and wife of Judge E. Ray Stevens. 
 She was a graduate of the university, had been 
 Superintendent of Schools of Dane County, 
 and was especially qualified as a representative 
 woman for the place. 
 
 As State Inspector of Factories, Miss Ida M. 
 Jackson, now wife of Professor Charles T. Bur 
 gess of the University of Wisconsin, was chosen, 
 a bright young woman, who through her 
 newspaper experience had become interested in 
 social questions, and was well prepared for the 
 service. 
 
RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 317 
 
 Mrs. Theodora Youmans, of Waukesha, was 
 placed on the Board of Normal School Regents, 
 a position she has held continuously since. Mrs. 
 Charles M. Morris, of Berlin, was appointed a 
 member of the Wisconsin Free Library Commis 
 sion. Mrs. Youmans and Mrs. Morris were two 
 out of five members selected on the Board of 
 World s Fair Commissioners. They are women 
 of tact and broad understanding, and unusually 
 fitted for public work, each having served as 
 President of the State Federation of Women s 
 Clubs, in which they have been, since its organi 
 zation, recognized leaders. 
 
 I believe not only in using the peculiar exec 
 utive abilities of women in the state service, 
 but I cannot remember a time when I did not 
 believe in woman suffrage. The great economic V 
 and industrial questions of to-day affect women 
 as directly as they do men. And the interests 
 of men and women are not antagonistic one to 
 the other, but mutual and coordinate. Co- 
 suffrage, like co-education, will react not to the 
 special advantage of either men or women, but 
 will result in a more enlightened, better balanced 
 
318 RAILROAD TAXATION LAWS 
 
 citizenship, and in a truer democracy. I am 
 glad to say that the legislature of Wisconsin 
 passed, at its last session, a suffrage law which 
 will be submitted on referendum next November 
 to the voters of the state. I shall support it 
 and campaign for it. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT PRODUCES BUSINESS 
 PROSPERITY: WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN WIS 
 CONSIN 
 
 REFORMERS often stop fighting before 
 the battle is really won : before the new 
 territory is completely occupied. I felt 
 that the campaign of 1904 was the very crux of 
 our whole movement. We had passed our rail 
 road taxation and direct primary measures in 
 1903; but the railroad taxation law would be a 
 barren victory until it was supplemented by a 
 commission to control railroad rates; and the 
 direct nomination of candidates would fail un 
 less we carried the election and secured the 
 adoption of the primary bill at the referendum 
 that fall. Without the direct primary law it 
 would be an easy matter for the old machine to 
 regain control of the legislature and not only 
 
 319 
 
320 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 prevent further progressive legislation, but undo 
 part, if not all, of tke work already accomplished. 
 
 I felt absolutely sure that another term, with 
 another legislature, would securely ground and 
 bulwark self-government in Wisconsin. I knew 
 that the opposition understood this too, and 
 that they would make the most desperate fight 
 in that campaign that they had ever made. I 
 began, therefore, delivering speeches both in 
 side and outside the state as early as December, 
 1903 nearly a year before the election. As 
 for the old machine, Congressman Joseph W. 
 Babcock early came forward as commander-in- 
 chief. He criticised the methods adopted by 
 Phillipp, Pfister and others in the campaign of 
 1902 as being too open and noisy. He came 
 right to Madison, rented some rooms and began 
 what he called a "gumshoe campaign." Men 
 were sent quietly about the state, arrangements 
 \vere made for controlling the employees of the 
 railroads and the big industries, and the federal 
 office-holders were marshaled for duty. 
 
 Upon our part the campaign of 1904 was the 
 most comprehensive of the whole series. We 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 321 
 
 went straight to the people with the same facts 
 - the same dry statistics which we had 
 used so effectively upon the legislature in 1903. 
 We prepared ten different pamphlets and dis 
 tributed over 1,600,000 separate pieces of mail. 
 Some of these pamphlets contained comparative 
 tables showing transportation rates upon all the 
 principal products shipped to market from every 
 county seat in the state. It placed side by side 
 with these items the cost of shipping the same 
 products an equal distance from stations in 
 Illinois and Iowa. In that way it was brought 
 home to every citizen in every county just what 
 he was sacrificing in dollars and cents as the 
 result of the negligence of his representatives 
 in affording him the same protection which his 
 neighbors in Iowa and Illinois had secured many 
 years before. Even in those two states the 
 railroads had controlled the commissions for a 
 long period and the rates had not been lowered 
 in many years, though the volume of traffic 
 had enormously increased and railway profits 
 had more than kept pace with the big tonnage. 
 In this connection I want to credit the Bureau 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 of Labor and Industrial Statistics, Mr. Erickson 
 particularly, as its head, and his assistant, Walter 
 Drew, with the aid rendered in constructing 
 these rate sheets. It was Mr. Erickson s mas 
 tery of this subject which suggested to my mind 
 his fitness as a member of the Wisconsin Railway 
 Commission when it was later established and 
 upon which he has served with distinction. 
 
 Two or three w r eeks before the close of the 
 nominating campaign we were surprised by an 
 entirely new tack taken by the old leaders. Word 
 came that in many counties second sets of Re 
 publican delegates were being elected under such 
 circumstances that it could have but one mean 
 ing that the opposition was laying the founda 
 tion either for stealing the state convention or 
 else bolting it and placing a third ticket in the 
 field. They were desperate: they knew that it 
 was their last chance to win the state under the 
 old system, that the approaching convention 
 would probably be the last ever held in the 
 state for the nomination of candidates, as in 
 deed it proved to be. 
 
 When the time arrived for the convention to 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 323 
 
 meet, at Madison, they brought in a veritable 
 army of men. All their leaders were there: 
 Babcock, Pfister, Phillipp, Spooner and Quarles. 
 We realized that we were facing a crisis; that 
 all we had been struggling for in Wisconsin might 
 be lost if we permitted these men by force or by 
 confusion to cast doubt upon the action of the 
 convention. 
 
 The convention was called to meet in the 
 university gymnasium, the largest auditorium 
 in Madison. We felt it necessary to protect the 
 doorkeepers from being rushed and swept aside 
 by a crowd of men not entitled to seats as dele 
 gates. So during the night before we had con 
 structed at the delegates entrance a barbed wire 
 passage which w r ould admit of the delegates 
 entering only in single file. Stationed along the 
 line of this fence we had twelve or fifteen of the 
 old university football men fine, clean, up 
 right fellows who were physically able to 
 meet any emergency. Among them were Arne 
 Lerum, "Norsky" Larson, "Bill" Hazzard, and 
 Fred Kull. The machine crowd formed in a 
 body on the capitol square, a mile from the 
 
324 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 university, and marched down in large numbers, 
 prepared to take possession of the convention 
 hall. They had printed "fake" badges and 
 delegates tickets exactly duplicating those is 
 sued by the State Central Committee to all 
 regularly elected delegates -- theirs as well as 
 ours. It was only by placing initials on the 
 genuine badges and tickets at a late hour that 
 our men stationed at the gymnasium entrance 
 were able to distinguish the genuine from the 
 spurious. When this army appeared at the 
 gymnasium they discovered that provision had 
 been made against a rush and that they had to 
 enter in single file. Whenever a man presented 
 a counterfeit credential he was promptly set 
 outside of the wire fence. All these men, how 
 ever, came in later with the spectators at the 
 front entrance and found seats in that portion 
 of the hall which had been separated by roping 
 off from the portion occupied by delegates; and 
 along that roping they found another sturdy 
 lot of "Norsky" Larsons. So well was all this 
 preliminary work arranged that the convention 
 organized regularly and in the best of order. 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 325 
 
 The critical moment came when Mr. Rosen- 
 berry, a machine member of the State Central 
 Committee, arose to make his minority report 
 regarding the election contests. The state 
 committee, which was composed partly of our 
 men and partly of their men, had tried out all of 
 these contests before the convention met and 
 they had unanimously seated enough of our 
 delegates to give Progressives a comfortable 
 majority of the convention. After the meeting 
 of the committee and before the convention was 
 called to order the machine leaders evidently 
 planned to repudiate the report of the state 
 committee, to ignore the roll of delegates en 
 titled to seats for the preliminary organization 
 of the convention in accord with all precedent, 
 and to seat their " delegates, " which the com 
 mittee had unanimously rejected, and thus get 
 control of the convention which they knew 
 would probably result in a row. 
 
 As I say, Rosenberry came forward to make 
 a speech. It had leaked out that the conclusion 
 of his speech was to be the signal for action ; that 
 Rosenberry would then be on the platform, in a 
 
326 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 good position to seize the gavel, and take pos 
 session of the chair, with the fellows down on 
 the floor all primed to have him declared elected 
 chairman. They were simply going to gavel 
 it through, no matter how much protest there 
 might be. The convention was crowded, but 
 we reserved three or four seats close to the front 
 of the platform and near the speaker s chair, 
 where we planted some more "Ncrsky" Larsons 
 and "Bill" Hazzards. The result of all this 
 precaution was that they dared make no move, 
 and the convention went forward in the most 
 orderly way. Not an unparliamentary thing 
 was done. They voted upon the contests and 
 even upon the nominations, and of course were 
 beaten. 
 
 After the convention adjourned that day the 
 machine men were so desperate that they im 
 mediately organized a bolt and called a conven 
 tion at the Madison Opera House, which, we 
 learned afterward, they had rented weeks before 
 the caucuses and county conventions were held 
 upon which they based their contests, no doubt 
 with just this contingency in mind. Addresses 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 327 
 
 were made by Spooner, Quarles, Babcock, and 
 others, and they nominated a full state ticket 
 of their own. It was the last stand! 
 
 They then proceeded to carry the validity of 
 the regular convention into the supreme court, 
 which supported us at every point, and left 
 so little for the bolters to stand upon that the 
 candidate for governor they had nominated at 
 their convention withdrew his name from their 
 ticket and much of their following deserted them. 
 Indeed, their leaders soon began advising ma 
 chine men everywhere to vote the Democratic 
 ticket as the only way of beating me. In the 
 election the bolters candidate received only 
 12,000 votes. 
 
 One other bitter contest was to grow out of 
 these conventions. It being a presidential 
 year, we elected four delegates-at-large to the 
 national convention Senator Stout, Isaac 
 Stephenson, W. D. Connor, and myself. The 
 bolters convention also elected four delegates, 
 John C. Spooner, J. V. Quarles, J. W. Babcock, 
 and Emil Baensch. We therefore made ready 
 to meet the contest in the convention. Ex- 
 
328 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 haustive briefs were prepared by Gilbert E. 
 Roe and H. W. Chyno weth ; but when we reached 
 Chicago and the case came before the National 
 Committee, they not only would not look at our 
 briefs, but they paid no serious attention to the 
 oral arguments. Of course with Payne of Wis 
 consin serving as chairman of the National 
 Committee, and Spooner and Babcock strongly 
 influential with the "federal crowd," there was 
 small chance for us, no matter what our claims 
 might be. 
 
 The hearing before the committee was a 
 grotesque farce. Payne made a pretense of 
 fairness by withdrawing as presiding officer and 
 called United States Senator Scott of West 
 Virginia to the chair. While the arguments 
 were being made, the members of the committee 
 strolled about the room or chatted with each 
 other in their seats. The few who gave atten 
 tion interrupted our counsel so constantly with 
 questions manifestly designed to prevent them 
 from submitting a succinct and intelligible state 
 ment of the case, that neither had an oppor 
 tunity to finish his argument in the time allotted. 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 329 
 
 As soon as that time had expired, without even 
 looking at the documents which had been pre 
 sented, including the printed briefs, the verified 
 statement of the case, the printed case and the 
 affidavits, the committee refused to permit us 
 to be seated as delegates in the convention. 
 
 There still remained for us the privilege of 
 submitting our case to the Committee on 
 Credentials, appointed by the convention after 
 it was organized. Such a committee is made 
 up of one representative from each state. 
 Spooner, Babcock, Payne and their associates 
 on the National Committee and in the United 
 States Senate and House of Representatives 
 promptly set at work with the various delega 
 tions to secure right men from each delegation 
 for the Committee on Credentials. I have been 
 told since by men who were in that national 
 convention that they were approached and 
 urged to see to it that the committeeman on 
 credentials from their delegation was warned 
 that under no circumstances should this Wis 
 consin movement be allowed to spread; that La 
 Follette was a dangerous man, and that unless 
 
330 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 lie could be stopped right there, he would ulti 
 mately break up the Republican party in the na 
 tion as he had broken it up in Wisconsin. Under 
 these circumstances we decided not to submit 
 our case to the Committee on Credentials, but 
 instead to file with the committee a statement 
 setting forth the reasons for our decision. I 
 drafted such a statement; the four of us signed 
 it, filed it with the committee and went back 
 to Wisconsin to take up the campaign for the fall 
 election. 
 
 In anticipation of the kind of campaign which 
 I had determined to conduct that year I had 
 secured the incorporation in the state platform 
 of a declaration which read as follows: 
 
 "We believe that platform pledges are sacred 
 obligations binding upon every member of the 
 party; that the candidates of the party become 
 its trusted agents to execute in good faith its 
 promises to the voters; that the acceptance of 
 any candidate of any office to the duties of 
 which platform promises may relate imposes 
 upon the candidate the obligation to the party 
 and to the voter to aid in redeeming every 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 331 
 
 pledge in letter and spirit; that to receive the 
 vote of the citizen as the candidate of the party 
 which has promised the legislation and then to 
 oppose such legislation, or to connive at its 
 defeat, is a fraud upon the voter and deprives 
 him of his right of suffrage as effectually as 
 though he were disfranchised by law. 
 
 "That the platform pledges of both parties 
 have been openly and flagrantly violated in 
 Wisconsin must be regarded as the political 
 history of the last six years. Legislation prom 
 ised by the accredited delegates of the Repub 
 lican party has been defeated session after 
 session by the members of the party chosen from 
 its ranks to represent it in the legislature. 
 Sometimes these men have secured the votes 
 of constituents by silent acquiescence in the 
 promises of the platform; sometimes by open 
 declarations to support the legislation pledged 
 by the party; in either case, as trustees of the 
 honor of the party and the rights of the voter 
 and taxpayer, they are guilty of having betrayed 
 their trust. No party can retain and no party 
 deserves to retain the confidence and support 
 
332 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 of the citizen if it knowingly entraps him to vote 
 for candidates who repudiate its pledged obliga 
 tion. The regular party organization can there 
 fore regard as the candidates of the Republican 
 party for state and legislative offices only such 
 men as are pledged to its support, and whose rec 
 ord and good faith are above question. . . ." 
 
 I took that as authoritative support for the 
 plea that only such men should be regarded as 
 Republicans as pledged themselves to support 
 the principles and declarations of the platform 
 and whose record assured fulfilment of the 
 pledge. And in my speech of acceptance I em 
 phasized that. 
 
 In all my campaigning, covering a period of 
 twenty years, it had been a rigid rule with me 
 never to engage in personal controversy. I 
 assailed abuses, attacked bad practices with all 
 the power I could command, and though the 
 newspaper files of that day will record the fact 
 that I was subjected to every form of abuse and 
 misrepresentation, I had not been diverted from 
 my course. I saw clearly that if I gave heed to 
 personal attack and retaliated in kind that the 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 333 
 
 principles would be lost sight of and the contest 
 degenerate into one of mere abuse and recrim 
 ination. But after my legislative experiences 
 of 1901 I had seen many men returned to the 
 legislature of 1903 who had made conspicuously 
 bad records and yet were able so to confuse the 
 issues that they could and did secure their re 
 election. It was plain to me that the people 
 needed to be educated on men as well as meas 
 ures. I therefore formulated my plan so to 
 conduct the discussion with respect to men that 
 it would be impersonal in its character and would 
 go directly to the record of the representative 
 and deal with concrete facts. It seemed to me 
 logical and unanswerable that the people were 
 entitled to know exactly how they were repre 
 sented, and that no man had a right to complain 
 if his constituents were fully informed as to his 
 record on every bill of public interest. 
 
 I am free to confess that it had been my great 
 ambition to be governor of Wisconsin, not just 
 to be governor (for that seemed to me in itself 
 but an empty honor), but to be in reality the 
 chief executive of the state; to be a strong factor 
 
334 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 in securing legislation that should build into 
 the life of the people a new order of things laws 
 that should be a recognition of human rights, 
 ux" that should make safe the vital principles of 
 representative government. To aid in achiev 
 ing such results was the realization of my high 
 est ambition. I had gone through two sessions 
 of the legislature, through three hard campaigns 
 prior to that time ; I had given to the work some 
 of the best years of my life, and here I was at 
 the end of my second term as governor with 
 almost nothing of a lasting nature accomplished. 
 I was determined, therefore, to make this a 
 campaign that should result in the election of a 
 legislature that would finally execute the will 
 of the people. It was an unheard of thing for 
 the governor of the state to "interfere" in the 
 nomination of candidates for the legislature; 
 but I knew perfectly well that those members of 
 the legislature who had served the political 
 machine instead of their constituents would, 
 many of them, seek renomination and reelection 
 to the legislature, when they would again re 
 pudiate their party pledges. And so, with the 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 335 
 
 calling of the caucuses, I went out into senate 
 and assembly districts, announced public meet 
 ings and executed the new policy upon which I 
 had resolved. I did not engage in personalities ; 
 I did not attack individuals as such, but I took 
 the journals of the two houses of the legislature 
 on to the public platform, and presented fairly 
 and clearly the character of the different meas 
 ures of public importance, and then read from 
 the journal the record vote of the candidate 
 seeking reelection upon those measures. I 
 selected districts in which those men who had 
 wronged the public were seeking renomination, 
 and almost without exception in those districts 
 where I held meetings I secured the defeat of 
 the candidates who sought renomination. 
 
 It was not possible for one man to cover, dur 
 ing the caucus period, all of the seventy -two 
 counties of the state, but I did as well as I could; 
 and in those senatorial and assembly districts 
 which I was unable to reach and in which Re 
 publican candidates secured renomination whose 
 records would have defeated them if they had 
 been properly placed before their constituents, 
 
336 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 I now resolved to make the contest against them 
 at the election, although they were nominally 
 members of my own party. Wlierever I found 
 a Democratic nominee for the assembly or sen 
 ate whose standing was such as to warrant con 
 fidence in his pledges, and who was willing to 
 come into my meetings and give assurance of his 
 support of the measures for the public good 
 embodied in the Republican platform, I be 
 sought the voters of such legislative districts to 
 support him and defeat the Republican nominee 
 who had betrayed them in the preceding legis 
 latures. I utterly ignored the campaign for 
 my own election. In nearly one half of the 
 counties of the state I never held a single meet 
 ing in that campaign. But I picked out those 
 legislative districts that were the battleground 
 for the accomplishment of legislation and I cam 
 paigned those as they had never been campaigned 
 before. I spoke forty -eight days in succession, 
 never missing one single day, excepting Sundays, 
 I averaged eight and one quarter hours a day 
 on the platform. We had two automobiles, so 
 that if one broke down or got out of order in any 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 337 
 
 way I could transfer to the other. I began 
 speaking about nine o clock in the morning. I 
 would go into a county and speak at every little 
 hamlet or crossroads, talking to small groups 
 of men during the day, often from the automo 
 bile, and sometimes in a store. Then we would 
 have a meeting in the evening, probably at the 
 county seat, where I always had a large audi 
 ence, finishing my work about eleven o clock 
 at night. Some of those night meetings were 
 enormous; when I closed the campaign at Mil 
 waukee I spoke to about 10,000 people for four 
 hours. 
 
 I took only one meal a day at the table dur 
 ing those forty -eight days. My noon luncheon 
 consisted of a bottle of good rich milk and two 
 slices of the crust of bread buttered, and some 
 times a little well-cured cheese shaved off and 
 put in between. For my supper I duplicated 
 my luncheon. I got the bread and milk at the 
 farmhouses along the road, and ate it on the 
 way. It was a real whirlwind campaign, and I 
 came out of it weighing only two pounds less 
 than when I went in. The opposition tried 
 
338 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 for a time to follow me and catch my crowds, 
 but *they were soon worn out, and their recep 
 tion, just after I had furnished my audiences 
 with the ammunition for asking concrete ques 
 tions, was discouraging, so that they soon de 
 sisted. 
 
 I discussed chiefly freight rates. I would 
 tell them how much it cost them to ship a car 
 load of hogs from that town to Chicago, and 
 how much it would cost an Iowa farmer to ship 
 a carload of hogs from his town the same distance 
 to market. And then I would tell them that 
 we were trying to create in Wisconsin a railroad 
 commission to which appeal could be made, 
 instead of to a railroad official, for fair freight 
 rates and adequate service. Then I would take 
 the record of the last legislature on that ques 
 tion. I would say: "Now, I think you are 
 entitled to know how your representative voted 
 on this question. I am going to make no per 
 sonal attack upon any individual, but he is 
 \j your servant, and the servant of all the people 
 of this state. His vote counts not only against 
 your interests, but against the interests of the 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 339 
 
 district in which I live as well, and I am here 
 to-day to lay before you his record, and let you 
 then decide whether that is the sort of service 
 you want. There is no politics in this thing; it 
 does not matter whether you get this legislation 
 upon the vote of a Republican or a Democrat." 
 Then I w r ould tell them that I had interviewed 
 the candidate on the Democratic side, and found 
 him to be a man of integrity, that I had re 
 ceived from him assurance that he would support 
 the important legislation pledged in the Repub 
 lican platform, and submitted to them whether 
 the promise of this man was not better than the 
 performance of the man who had betrayed them 
 in the preceding session. 
 
 And I cleaned up the legislature. That was 
 the origin of the "roll call" which I have since 
 used with such effectiveness. It is simply a 
 form of publicity, of letting the light in on dark 
 records. I have developed a department called 
 "The Roll Call" in La toilette s Magazine 
 which has presented accurately the records of 
 many Senators and Congressmen, and has been 
 instrumental, I am positive, in putting more 
 
340 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 than one bad Congressman and Senator out of 
 business. In my chautauqua work also I have 
 found the roll call a most potent instrument for 
 political regeneration. 
 
 I was elected by about 50,000, and the direct 
 primary law, for which we had campaigned 
 vigorously, carried by about the same majority. 
 We also elected a safe majority of both houses 
 of the legislature. 
 
 Now, it is never safe to be satisfied with vic 
 tory at an election. The real test comes later, 
 when the bills incorporating new principles are 
 written. It is one thing to talk of general prop 
 ositions on the stump: it is quite another thing 
 to perform the careful, cautious, thoughtful 
 task of reducing those propositions into closely 
 worded legal provisions which will afterward 
 serve the public interest and stand the scrutiny 
 of the courts. The trouble comes when the 
 powerful opposition appears to cease, when the 
 skilful corporation lawyer comes to you and 
 says: 
 
 "You shall have no further opposition. All 
 we ask is that the measure be fair and reason- 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 341 
 
 able. We have had large practical experience, 
 and we can make a few suggestions really for 
 the good of the legislation." 
 
 He then presents changes which seem very 
 plausible, but in which may lurk the weaknesses 
 and uncertainties that will afterward lead the 
 court to break down the statute by construction. 
 It is then that sincere friends of reform may be 
 misled, because they have not the expert knowl 
 edge to meet the situation. At the outset of 
 the legislature of 1905, therefore, we took the 
 greatest pains in drawing our railroad bill. We 
 got together leading members of the legislature 
 and discussed the first draft exhaustively: Sena 
 tors Hatton, Sanborn, Martin, Frear, Morris, and 
 Assemblymen Lenroot, Braddock, Ekern, Dahl 
 and others. Senator Hatton was especially 
 helpful not only in framing the bill but in man 
 aging it in committee. Then I had copies of 
 the bill retyped, with wide margins, and sent 
 them to disinterested experts throughout the 
 country men like Commissioner Prouty, ex- 
 Governor Larrabee of Iowa, Judge Reagan and 
 Judge Cowan of Texas, A. B. Stickney, President 
 
NJ 
 342 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 of the Great Western Railroad, and many others. 
 We took all the notes and criticisms of these 
 men and went over our bill again before it was 
 finally introduced. 
 
 It was a very strong regulatory bill. It 
 provided for a commission with power not only 
 to fix rates but to control service and to make a 
 complete physical valuation of all the railroad 
 property in the state. It was more sweeping 
 than any legislation enacted by any state up 
 to that time; and there is still, I believe, no law 
 which compares with it and none, certainly, 
 more successfully enforced both to the advan 
 tage of the railroads and to that of the people - 
 as I shall show later. 
 
 Of course, the railroad representatives op 
 posed the bill at every step. The hearings con 
 tinued for many weeks, and the strain was at 
 times serious. 
 
 While we were in the stress of the fight I was 
 called one evening from the dinner table to 
 answer the telephone. Some one said : 
 
 "Hello, Governor! how are you getting on 
 with your legislation?" 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 343 
 
 I answered instantly, for I recognized his 
 voice: "Colonel Bryan, where are you?" 
 
 He told me that he was to speak in Milwaukee 
 that night, and the next day at Oshkosh. I said: 
 
 "Colonel, come this way. Some of the best 
 provisions of our railroad bill are in danger. 
 Come this way and help us." 
 
 He was in doubt about being able to do so 
 without interfering with his engagement at 
 Oshkosh, but the next morning a telegram from 
 him was delivered to me at the breakfast table. 
 It said, "I am just taking the train for Madison; 
 will arrive at 10.45." 
 
 I went down to the capitol early and called 
 into the executive office several leading members 
 of the legislature, both Republicans and Demo 
 crats. I informed them Colonel Bryan would 
 be in Madison that day a couple- of hours be 
 tween trains, and suggested that the legislature 
 adopt a resolution inviting him to address them 
 in joint session at about eleven o clock. This 
 suggestion met with the favor of the men whom 
 I had called in, and they secured the passage of 
 the resolution. 
 
344 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 I met Colonel Bryan at the train. He was in 
 fine spirits, keenly alive to the situation and 
 deeply interested in a non-partisan way in our 
 achieving the very best results we could in that 
 important session. The galleries of the assem 
 bly chamber were crowded with citizens, and 
 all the members of the legislature were present 
 on the floor. I presented Colonel Bryan, and 
 he made one of the finest speeches I ever listened 
 to. He was witty and eloquent; he appealed to 
 the patriotism of the legislature without re 
 gard to party, especially urging the Democratic 
 members to support our measure. He said he 
 w^as not afraid of Republicans stealing Demo 
 cratic thunder; that he would be willing to leave 
 all the good Democratic propositions that had 
 ever been advanced out on the porch over night 
 if only the Republicans would steal them and 
 enact them into law. 
 
 I had Bryan s speech taken down by a stenog 
 rapher and circulated it widely in Democratic 
 districts, thus starting a back fire on the Demo 
 cratic legislators who were doubtful. The re 
 sult justified the effort. It aided us materially, 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 345 
 
 and when the bill came up for the final vote 
 it was passed unanimously. 
 
 I have always felt grateful to Colonel Bryan 
 for this broadminded and patriotic action. 
 It showed that his interest in principles was 
 truly uppermost. I first met Bryan near the 
 close of the last session of the 49th Con 
 gress. I had been defeated and was going out; 
 he had just been elected and was coming in. 
 He was then a tall, slender, handsome fellow 
 who looked like a young divine. Since then I 
 have met him very often, and have come to 
 feel a strong personal attachment for him. He 
 helped us often during our long fight in Wiscon 
 sin when the Democratic machine as well as 
 the Republican machine was opposing the things 
 we stood for. He helped us in The Commoner 
 with his support of our campaign for direct 
 primaries. I have brought audiences to their 
 feet by quoting Bryan or by reading from The 
 Commoner his words approving our measures. 
 
 In the campaign of 1902 efforts were made to 
 get him to come into Wisconsin to speak in 
 behalf of the Democratic ticket. I knew 7 that 
 
346 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 he did not come. I did not know why until 
 the next summer, when I went to Lincoln, Ne 
 braska, to speak at the Epworth League State 
 Assembly. I was resting in my room in the 
 afternoon when there came a knock at my door 
 and Bryan entered. I had not seen him for 
 years. During our conversation he told me 
 that he could not hear me speak that evening 
 as he wanted to, because he had a convention 
 on his hands. "But," he said, "I am tremen 
 dously interested in what you are doing in Wis 
 consin and I want to see you succeed. It is 
 more important in its example to the country 
 than any triumph of the Democratic party in 
 that state. I want to see you get a state pri 
 mary. I want to see you carry out your taxation 
 propositions. I want to see you win out in 
 your contest with the corporations." And he 
 went on, "I have been supporting your cause 
 in The Commoner, and as long as you are ad 
 vocating the things you are now advocating, I 
 shall continue to support you. In the last 
 campaign the Democrats tried very hard to get 
 me to come into the state to speak, but I would 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 347 
 
 not do it because I did not want to aid in solid 
 ifying the Democratic party against your work 
 there. I wanted you to have all the Democratic 
 support you could get to take the place of the 
 corporation Republicans who were attacking 
 
 you." 
 
 There was a strong minority in the Demo 
 cratic party, all through our contests, which 
 favored direct primaries, railroad and other 
 corporate taxation, the regulation of railway 
 rates and services, and practically every reform 
 measure incorporated in the Republican state 
 platform. And though this element of the 
 party was not strong enough under the caucus 
 and convention system to control their state 
 conventions and frame the platforms, they were 
 independent and patriotic enough to use their 
 influence and their votes in favor of the prin 
 ciples in which they believed. Many thousands 
 of Democrats in Wisconsin voted for Repub 
 lican members of the legislature known to stand 
 for the enactment of these principles into law, 
 and gave me active support in my campaigns 
 and election. 
 
348 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 I have met Bryan often in recent years. We 
 have talked from the same platforms and been 
 in the same lyceum and chautauqua courses 
 season after season. I consider him a great 
 moral teacher and believe that he has exerted 
 a powerful influence for good upon the political 
 thought and standards of his time. 
 
 As soon as the legislature passed our regu 
 lation law I appointed the three commissioners. 
 I had contended all along for an appointive 
 rather than an elective commission. I felt that 
 the state should have the best experts in the 
 country in these positions, whether residents of 
 Wisconsin or not, for much would depend upon 
 the way in which our new law was administered. 
 They would have to match wits with the highly 
 skilled, highly paid agents of the railroads, and 
 they would have to make their work pass the 
 critical consideration of the courts. Now, the 
 men best equipped by study and experience for 
 such work might, if the commission were elec 
 tive, prove very poor campaigners. If pitted 
 against brilliant talkers or good "mixers" they 
 might stand no show at all. The submission 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 349 
 
 also of a large number of candidates to the voter 
 to be selected at a time when his mind is occu 
 pied with the consideration of questions under 
 discussion, as well as candidates, tends still 
 further to lessen the chances of the selection of 
 the best man for particular service. For these 
 reasons I have always strongly advocated the 
 appointive method for filling all places requiring 
 the services of trained experts. 
 
 I tried to persuade Commissioner Prouty of 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission to come 
 to Wisconsin, organize our commission, and take 
 the chairmanship, but failing in that, I turned 
 at once to the head of the transportation depart 
 ment of the University of Wisconsin, B. H. 
 Meyer. A native of Wisconsin and a graduate 
 of the university, Professor Meyer had made 
 himself an authority upon railroad affairs in the 
 country. He served upon our commission with 
 great distinction, resigning in January of last 
 year (1911) to accept a position upon the Inter 
 state Commerce Commission at Washington. 
 As another commissioner I appointed John 
 Barnes, a Democrat, one of the foremost lawyers 
 
350 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 of the state, who sacrificed much in taking the 
 place at the salary we paid. He has since been 
 elected to the Supreme Court of the State. The 
 third member was Halford Erickson, who had 
 rendered invaluable service as Commissioner 
 of Industrial and Labor Statistics. He had 
 practical knowledge of railroading and has stead 
 ily grown in power until to-day he has no superior 
 as a railroad authority on any state commission 
 in the country. 
 
 The commission proceeded with wisdom. 
 Though under great pressure at first, it refused 
 to consider complaints until it had laid a broad 
 foundation of scientific knowledge. Expert 
 engineers and contractors were employed and 
 many months were spent in making a physical 
 valuation of all railroad property in the state. 
 This is the logical first step if you are going to 
 fix rates. It then became necessary to deter 
 mine the actual cost of maintenance and 
 operation a very difficult matter in our case - 
 because the railroads of Wisconsin are parts of 
 great systems. 
 
 When all this immense work was done, the 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 351 
 
 commission had the wisdom and foresight to 
 submit its findings to the railroad officials, who 
 went over them and approved them. This 
 prevented disputes in the future upon funda 
 mental facts. 
 
 Having all this data, the commissioners began 
 to entertain complaints, and to fix rates upon a 
 basis which they knew positively was fair to 
 the public and fair to the railroads. They so 
 reduced transportation charges as to effect a 
 saving of over $2,000,000 per year to the people 
 of the state, and they have only made a begin 
 ning. Generally the rates of public utility cor 
 porations have been reduced, but in some cases 
 the investigation showed that the rates were too 
 low already and the commission raised them. 
 The result is that individuals may be found in 
 communities where rates have been increased 
 or have not been promptly or radically reduced 
 who declare that the Railroad Commission has 
 not met expectations by "going after" the cor 
 porations. 
 
 All through our fight for railroad control the 
 lobbyists and the railroad newspapers made the 
 

 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 most mournful prophecies of disaster: they 
 predicted that capital would fly from the state, 
 that new construction would stop, that equip 
 ment would deteriorate, and so on and so on. 
 What are the facts? 
 
 The object of our legislation was not to 
 "smash" corporations, but to drive them out 
 of politics, and then to treat them exactly the 
 same as other people are treated. Equality 
 under the law was our guiding star. It is the 
 special discriminations and unjust rates that are 
 being corrected; the privileges, unfair ad 
 vantages, and political corruption that have 
 been abolished. Where these do not exist the 
 object has been to foster and encourage business 
 activity. Consequently, no state in the union 
 to-day offers better security for the savings of 
 its people than Wisconsin. The honest investor, 
 or business man, or farmer, or laborer, who 
 simply wants equal opportunity with others and 
 security for what he honestly earns, is protected 
 and encouraged by the laws. The mere specu 
 lator, or monopolist, or promoter, who wants 
 to take advantage of others under protection of 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 353 
 
 law, is held down or driven out. The result is 
 that instead of falling behind, the state has 
 actually gone forward more rapidly than the 
 rest of the country. This may be shown by 
 incontrovertible facts and figures in practically 
 every direction where there has been progressive 
 legislation affecting business. 
 
 The Railroad Commission keeps accurate 
 account of all the business of every railroad and 
 public utility in the state. It has jurisdiction 
 over property whose total value amounts to 
 $450,000,000. The books are kept exactly as 
 the commission orders them to be kept. These 
 accounts show that while during the first five 
 years of its existence the commission reduced 
 rates by more than $2,000,000 a year, the net 
 earnings of the railroads of Wisconsin increased 
 relatively just a little more than the net earn 
 ings for all railways in the United States. The 
 increase in Wisconsin was 18.45 per cent., and 
 in the United States it was 18.41 per cent. 
 
 How did this come about? Simply from the 
 fact that the decrease in rates for freight and 
 passengers was followed by an enormous in- 
 
354 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 crease in the amount of freight and number of 
 passengers carried. So it happened that, not 
 withstanding the reduction in rates, there was an 
 actual increase of nearly 20 per cent, in the rev 
 enue, while the increase of revenue of all the rail 
 roads in the United States was only 16 per cent. 
 
 This remarkable increase took place notwith 
 standing the fact that, mainly on account of the 
 greatly improved service which the commission 
 required the railroads to perform, the expense 
 of railroad operation in Wisconsin increased 33 
 per cent, more than the average rate of increase 
 in the entire United States. 
 
 Much of what the railroads lost in the reduc 
 tion of open rates that everybody shares they 
 recovered by being compelled to abolish free 
 passes and secret cut rates that went only to 
 insiders and grafters. The special examiners 
 whom I appointed in 1903 uncovered $5,992- 
 731.58 as Wisconsin s share of rebates paid by 
 twelve roads during the six years 1898 to 1903. 
 By stopping rebates alone the railroads have 
 gained at least $1,000,000 a year toward off 
 setting $2,000,000 they lost by reduction of rates. 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 355 
 
 They must also have gained largely by the stop 
 page of political contributions and expenses. 
 The railroads to-day are gaining far more by 
 treating everybody on an equality than they 
 could have gained if their old methods of politics 
 and secret favoritism had continued. 
 
 It is not claimed that railroads are both mak 
 ing and keeping more money in Wisconsin than 
 they did before the progressive legislation began. 
 Indeed, they are making more but keeping a 
 smaller proportion of it. They are now paying 
 taxes the same as other people on exactly what 
 their property is worth. This they began to do in 
 1904. Under the old system of unequal tax 
 ation, in 1903, when the railroads practically 
 assessed themselves, they paid taxes in the state 
 amounting to $1,711,900. Under the new sys 
 tem, in 1910, when the State Tax Commission 
 assessed them exactly like farms and other 
 property, they paid $3,142,886. This was an 
 increase of 83 per cent, in the amount of their 
 taxes. But during the years 1903 to 1909 the 
 taxes of all railroads in the United States in 
 creased only 41 per cent. That is, railroad taxa- 
 
356 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 tion in Wisconsin has been increased by the 
 progressive legislation in six years nearly twice 
 as much as the increase for all of the United 
 States. If this increase in taxation is a hardship 
 on the railroads, it is simply because equal taxa 
 tion is always a hardship on those who had not 
 been formerly paying their equal share of taxes. 
 
 Nor did progressive legislation stop new con 
 struction: During the years 1903 to 1909 the 
 railroads invested in new construction in Wis 
 consin an amount estimated by the Railroad 
 Commission at $39,000,000, an increase of 15 
 per cent, over 1903. This is not a fictitious 
 increase in capitalization. It is actual cash paid 
 out for new road and equipment. A cash invest 
 ment by railroads of $6,500,000 a year for six 
 years of progressive legislation refutes their 
 prophecies of disaster. 
 
 Other public utilities besides railroads were 
 not brought under the control of the Railroad 
 Commission until 1907, and it was not until 
 1909 that the commission was able to get their 
 accounts into such shape as to be reliable. But, 
 for the year 1910, compared with 1909, notwith- 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 357 
 
 standing reductions in rates and improvements 
 in service, the water utilities increased their 
 net earnings 7.1 per cent., the telephone utilities 
 7.1 per cent., gas utilities 7.4 per cent., and 
 electric utilities 25 per cent. These utilities 
 have even exceeded the railroads in the rate at 
 which they have made cash investments for new 
 construction. While the increase in railroad 
 construction has averaged 2j per cent, a year 
 for six years, the water utilities in 1910 increased 
 their new construction of property .5 per cent, 
 over what it had been in 1909; the telephone 
 utilities 5.4 per cent., gas utilities 1.6 per cent., 
 and electric utilities 35.5 per cent. For the 
 year 1911 compared with 1910 the water utili 
 ties increased their net earnings 4.3 per cent., 
 the telephone utilities 15.9 per cent., gas utili 
 ties 5.7 per cent., and electric utilities 24.2 per 
 cent. The water utilities in 1911 increased their 
 property by new construction 4 per cent, over 
 that of 1910; the telephone utilities 5. 7 per cent, 
 gas utilities 6.1 per cent., and electric utilities, 
 22.1 per cent. 
 
 Wisconsin is certainly not driving capital out 
 
358 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 of the state when the electrical business in the 
 single year 1910, after two years of regulation 
 by the state, made bonafide new investments 35 
 per cent, greater than it had done in 1909. All 
 of this has been accomplished notwithstanding 
 the fact that the Railroad Commission has 
 reduced the rates charged by public utilities 
 $250,000 a year, and has required improvements 
 in the quality of service amounting to $125,000 
 a year a total saving to the consumers of gas, 
 water, and electricity of $375,000 a year. 
 
 A single example will show how these dif 
 ferent results have been brought about. In 
 April, 1910, after two years of careful investi 
 gation, the Railroad Commission, after improv 
 ing the quality of service, reduced the maximum 
 price of electricity in the city of Madison from 
 16 cents to 14 cents per kilo watt -hour, and 
 adjusted the other rates on a lower basis. The 
 result was that the sales of electricity increased 
 16 per cent., the net earnings increased 24 per 
 cent., the company increased its investment 12 
 per cent., and the saving to consumers, compar 
 ing old rates with new rates, was $18,308 a year. 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 359 
 
 At the end of another fifteen months, in July, 
 1911, after such an increase in profits following 
 the reduction in rates, the company accepted 
 without protest another reduction to 12 cents. 
 No additional investigation was necessary, be 
 cause the books of the company had been kept in 
 the way prescribed by the commission so as to 
 show every item of expense, income, and invest 
 ment. Supervision by the state commission 
 has thus proven of great benefit to the private 
 corporation itself. 
 
 How has it been possible that both the people 
 of Wisconsin and the investors in public utilities 
 have been so greatly benefited by this regula- * 
 tion? Simply because the regulation is scientific. \ 
 The Railroad Commission has found out through 
 its engineers, accountants, and statisticians what 
 it actually costs to build and operate the road 
 and utilities. Watered stock and balloon bonds 
 get no consideration. On the other hand, since 
 the commission knows the costs, it knows ex 
 actly the point below which rates cannot be 
 reduced. It even raises rates when they are 
 below the cost, including reasonable profit. 
 
360 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 The people are benefited because they are 
 not now paying profits on inflated capital. The 
 investors are benefited because the commission 
 has all the facts needed to prevent a reduction 
 of rates below a fair profit on their true value. 
 So honestly, capably, and scientifically has the 
 work of our commission been done that the 
 railroads and other utility corporations have 
 accepted their reductions without any contest 
 at all. Our law makes it perfectly easy for the 
 railroads to seek redress in the courts if they 
 feel wronged in any way. Yet it is significant 
 that there has never been an appeal taken in 
 any railroad rate case decided by the Railroad 
 Commission. The corporations know that the 
 Railroad Commission has all the data for making 
 rates that they (the railroads) have, and that it 
 can go into court and show that it is making 
 rates not by guess, not by estimate, but by the 
 most careful calculation based upon definite in 
 formation. Thus while the railroad companies 
 do not enjoy having their rates cut down, they 
 are not over-eager to advertise the Wisconsin 
 system of rate making. When the other states 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 361 
 
 of the country and the federal government make 
 rates as we do in Wisconsin, the shippers of the 
 country will be saved millions of dollars every 
 year in excessive transportation charges. 
 
 In Wisconsin we regulate services as well 
 as rates. When the services of a railroad are 
 not satisfactory to the public, complaint can 
 be made to the Railroad Commission. Under 
 our law that complaint does not need to be a 
 formal legal document, but a simple statement 
 of grievance by letter or postal card. In 1906 
 I rode over the branch of the Chicago, Mil 
 waukee and St. Paul road which runs from Madi 
 son to Prairie du Chien. The train was not so 
 very crowded when I got on two or three sta 
 tions east of Prairie du Chien, but it kept filling 
 up and pretty soon I found myself standing in 
 the aisle. I kept being crowded back and back 
 until when I got to Madison I was sitting on the 
 tail end of the train, and I was thoroughly 
 angry. I had a canvass made of the regular 
 patrons of the train who were aboard, to find out 
 how the service that morning compared with 
 the average service. I found it was the usual 
 
362 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 thing, and I wrote at once on the back of an 
 envelope which I took from my pocket some 
 thing like this: 
 
 "Mr. Commissioner: I call your attention 
 to the bad service on the Prairie du Chien divi 
 sion of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul 
 road. It is not adequately equipped either 
 with cars or trains. Passenger train so-and-so 
 crowded to the platforms. I think the matter 
 should be investigated by your commission." 
 
 I think inside of ten days there was a new 
 train running on that road. The travelling men 
 called it the "Bob" train in honor of me, but I 
 am sure that no more attention was paid to my 
 K complaint than would have been paid to one 
 from any other source. 
 
 The complaint is taken up by the commission 
 in an informal way. A representative of the 
 railroad and the party making complaint are then 
 brought together, quite informally. I should 
 say hundreds of cases of that sort are disposed of 
 and adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties 
 to one case requiring a formal presentation and 
 the employment of counsel. This system makes 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 363 
 
 it cheaper for the railroads, cheaper for the 
 people, and it is a speedy way to get justice in a 
 lot of little things. Most people deal with rail 
 roads in a large way only a few times in their 
 lives. But they are brought into intimate 
 contact with the railroad on little freight ship 
 ments, or with relation to crossings and depots 
 - small annoyances which often cause more 
 bitterness than large matters. As the result of 
 the easy and just settlement of such difficulties 
 I think to-day there is a better feeling in the 
 state toward the railroads and railroad men than 
 ever before in our history. 
 
 In other ways our progressive legislation has 
 materially benefited all the people of the state. 
 For example, beginning in 1903, I secured in 
 every water-power franchise the insertion of a 
 provision that the rates charged should be 
 regulated by arbitration. Since that time the 
 water powers of the state serving as public 
 utilities have been placed under the control 
 of the Railroad Commission, and a great cor 
 poration, supervised by the Railroad Commis 
 sion, with its profits limited to 6 per cent, on 
 
364 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 actual cost, has been created and has improved 
 the headwaters of the Wisconsin River in order 
 to secure a steady flow through the year. Sev 
 eral enormous power dams have been con 
 structed, and through these means the state 
 has gone far toward utilizing its 1,000,000 avail 
 able horsepower, while protecting the state 
 against water-power monopoly. 
 
 Wisconsin began in 1905 to build up a state 
 forest reserve on the headwaters of its principal 
 rivers. It now ranks next to New York and 
 Pennsylvania in its areas of forests belonging 
 to the state, and has adopted a permanent policy 
 of adding annually to the reserve. 
 
 Wisconsin has also taken hold of the insur 
 ance problem with vigor. The special session 
 of the legislature which I called in 1905 pro 
 vided for a committee to investigate insurance 
 corporations. This was about the time of the 
 Hughes investigation in New York, and the 
 committee appointed pursuant to that legis 
 lation rendered a very signal service to our 
 state. As a member of that committee H. L. 
 Ekern, who was then Speaker of the Assembly 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 365 
 
 - a legislator of real creative power de 
 veloped a very remarkable aptitude for the 
 insurance problem. It was most extraordinary. 
 Ekern is a Norwegian, a university graduate, a 
 lawyer. In the legislature of 1907 he appeared 
 before the committee having charge of the 
 insurance legislation, and there demonstrated 
 his ability to more than hold his own against 
 the ablest actuaries and lawyers representing the 
 largest insurance companies in the United States. 
 In 1910 he was elected Insurance Commis 
 sioner of the state and in the legislature of 1911 
 he brought about a complete recodification of 
 our insurance laws. He has indeed practically 
 laid the basis for a system of state insurance - 
 the first, I think, in the United States. 
 
 The public service of the state has been 
 democratized by a civil service law opening it . 
 to men and women on an equal footing inde 
 pendent of everything excepting qualification 
 and fitness for office. I think the passing of this 
 law was the only case of the kind where the 
 employees then holding office were not blanketed 
 into the service, but were required to take the 
 
366 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 regular competitive examinations in order to 
 retain their jobs. The law has worked to the 
 great advantage of the service and to the general 
 improvement of political standards. There is 
 no longer any political pull in Wisconsin. 
 
 I give here, also, some further facts to show 
 that Wisconsin, instead of being retarded by 
 progressive legislation, is advancing more rap 
 idly than the country taken as a whole. 
 
 Since 1904, when we recodified our whole 
 system for the examination of state banks, 
 there has not been a single failure among the 
 573 state banks in Wisconsin, with $27,000,000 
 of capital, surplus and undivided profits. The 
 only bank failures in the state have been those 
 of three national banks through embezzlement. 
 
 During the years 1903 to 1911 the capital, 
 surplus and undivided profits of all state and 
 national banks in Wisconsin increased 72 per 
 cent., whereas for the United States they in 
 creased only 48 per cent. Individual deposits 
 for the same years in Wisconsin banks increased 
 82 per cent., while in the United States as a 
 whole they increased but 74 per cent. 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 367 
 
 The clearing-house exchanges for Milwaukee 
 increased 117.5 per cent, from 1900 to 1910, 
 whereas for the United States the increase was 
 106 per cent. Milwaukee s increase w r as greater 
 than Chicago s. 
 
 Judged by commercial failures, Wisconsin 
 has prospered better in proportion than the 
 country. The total liabilities in commercial 
 failures for the entire United States in the four 
 years 1906 to 1909 increased 33 per cent, over 
 the total amount for the preceding four years 
 1902 to 1905. But the liabilities in Wisconsin 
 for the same years fell off 5.3 per cent. In other 
 words, comparing the four years that followed 
 the progressive victory of 1905 with the four 
 years that preceded it, the business failures in 
 Wisconsin fell off one twentieth, but for the 
 whole United States they increased one third. 
 
 These are a few of the conclusive proofs that 
 progressive legislation in Wisconsin has not 
 been destructive, as its enemies predicted. 
 Instead of driving capital out of the state it 
 has attracted capital more than other states. 
 It has made investments safe for all, instead of 
 
368 PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 speculative for a few. It has been conserv 
 ative and constructive as well as progressive. 
 Only one of the progressive laws a law passed 
 in 1911, declaring flowing w^ater public property 
 - has been overturned by the supreme court 
 of the state, and not one has been carried into 
 the federal courts. 
 
 No account of the long and successful struggle 
 in Wisconsin would be fair and complete that 
 did not record the splendid services of the men 
 who led the fight for progressive principles. 
 I regret that I cannot here give to each the 
 individual recognition that is merited. That 
 must wait for a more detailed history of the 
 Wisconsin movement. It was a day-and-night 
 service with them; they left their offices and 
 business interests and devoted years to the great 
 constructive work which has made Wisconsin 
 the safest guide in dealing with the political, 
 economic and social problems of our time. 
 
 This closes the account of my services in 
 Wisconsin a time full of struggle, and yet a 
 time that I like to look back upon. It has been 
 a fight supremely worth making, and I want it 
 
PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT 369 
 
 to be judged, as it will be ultimately, by results 
 actually attained. If it can be shown that Wis 
 consin is a happier and better state to live in, 
 that its institutions are more democratic, that 
 the opportunities of all its people are more equal, 
 that social justice more nearly prevails, that 
 human life is safer and sweeter then I shall 
 rest content in the feeling that the Progressive 
 movement has been successful. And I believe 
 all these things can really be shown, and that 
 there is no reason now why the movement should 
 not expand until it covers the entire nation. 
 While much has been accomplished, there is 
 still a world of problems yet to be solved; we 
 have just begun; there is hard fighting, and a 
 chance for the highest patriotism, still ahead 
 of us. The fundamental problem as to which 
 shall rule, men or property, is still unsettled; 
 it will require the highest qualities of heroism, 
 the profoundest devotion to duty in this and in 
 the coming . generation, to reconstruct our in 
 stitutions to meet the requirements of a new 
 age. May such brave and true leaders de 
 velop that the people will not be led astray. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 ALONE IN THE SENATE: EXPERIENCES WITH 
 ROOSEVELT I RAILROAD RATE LEGISLATION 
 
 I WAS elected to the United States Senate on 
 January 25, 1905, four weeks after the leg 
 islature met. At first I was very doubtful 
 whether I ought to resign the governorship and 
 go to Washington. Much work still remained 
 to be done in Wisconsin, and I felt that I could 
 not accept until all the pledges which we 
 had made to the people were redeemed in letter 
 and spirit. 
 
 For this reason I determined not to resign as 
 governor until the legislation we had under 
 way was not only passed but actually in opera 
 tion. WTiile I recognized that the work of 
 democracy is never finished, I resolved for my 
 self that I would net leave Wisconsin until our 
 legislation had been enacted and its efficiency 
 
 370 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 371 
 
 proven. In the following spring we tested our 
 new direct primary law at the polls, and we 
 tried out the railroad taxation law before the 
 circuit court. 
 
 Having thus discovered the weaknesses in 
 our program of legislation, I called a special 
 session of the legislature to meet in December, 
 1905, in order to correct the defects and fully to 
 complete our work. When the session ad 
 journed, eleven months after my election to the 
 Senate, I resigned as governor of Wisconsin 
 and prepared to go on to Washington. 
 
 In making this final decision I was not a little 
 influenced by the urgent letters and interviews 
 with people of prominence outside of Wiscon 
 sin. During that summer I lectured in some 
 twenty -five different states and I never went 
 anywhere that leading Progressives did not 
 urge me to go to Washington and carry forward 
 the fight on the wider national platform. I 
 remember meeting Colonel Bryan once or twice 
 during the summer. 
 
 "La Follette," he said, "I hear you are not 
 going to the Senate. I do hope that is not true. 
 
372 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 You must go and make the fight there in the 
 public interest." 
 
 I found not a little amusement in the treat 
 ment by the press of the country of my decision 
 to accept the senatorship. Most of the impor 
 tant papers prophesied an early suppression of 
 all my reform notions. It was suggested that 
 a few months in the Senate refrigerator, to which 
 I would be promptly consigned, would consider 
 ably cool my ardor and give me time for reflec 
 tion and the adoption of saner, more rational 
 views of business and government. I remember 
 one of the cartoons of the time pictured my ap 
 proach to the Senate end of the Capitol ap 
 parently all unconscious of the fact that every 
 window was open and that the Senate leaders 
 were leaning halfway out, each holding aloft a 
 mallet with which to extend a senatorial wel 
 come. 
 
 On the evening of January 3, 1906, Mrs. La 
 Toilette and I arrived in Washington. Senator 
 Chandler of New Hampshire, who had been most 
 friendly, came to the Raleigh Hotel to call upon 
 us, and I learned from him the proper methods 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 373 
 
 of procedure in presenting my credentials. I 
 had anticipated some departure from precedents 
 owing to the fact that the senior Senator from 
 Wisconsin, John C. Spooner, and I had long been 
 upon opposite sides in the Wisconsin fight, and 
 while it had not been personal in its character, 
 the struggle had resulted in a very wide division. 
 I did not know how he might feel about con 
 forming to the usual custom of the Senate in 
 presenting my credentials. 
 
 The next day at twelve o clock I went to call 
 on the Vice-President, Mr. Fairbanks, in his 
 official capacity as President of the Senate; and 
 upon returning to the floor of the Senate, Sen 
 ator Spooner met me and introduced me to a 
 number of the Senators who were coming in to 
 take their places. There were some dozen or 
 fifteen men in the Senate whom I knew as 
 members of the House Burrows, Hopkins, 
 Rayner, and others. Spooner invited me to sit 
 next to him. Mrs. La Follette and other friends- 
 were in the gallery. After the divine blessing 
 had been invoked Senator Spooner arose and 
 presented my credentials. The Senator offered 
 
374 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 his arm, I took it, and we marched down to the 
 Vice-President s desk, where the oath of office 
 was administered. I was then escorted to my 
 desk in what was called the Cherokee Strip a 
 group of seats on the Democratic side of the 
 house which was then occupied by Republicans, 
 there being at that time 61 Republicans in the 
 Senate and only 31 Democrats. Thus it came 
 about that at 12.30 o clock on the 4th day of 
 January, 1906, I found myself occupying a seat 
 on the outskirts of the Democratic side of the 
 Senate as a member of the 59th Congress. 
 
 After my election to the Senate I had received 
 the usual form letter from Senator Hale, chair 
 man of the Committee on Committees, asking 
 me to state my preference as to committee 
 assignments. In my reply I expressed but 
 one preference the Committee on Interstate 
 Commerce. I suggested that my interest in 
 the subject of transportation, to which I had 
 given some years of study and investigation, 
 led me to believe that I could render better 
 service upon that committee than upon any 
 other. I had never received any response to that 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 375 
 
 letter, and I was naturally interested to know 
 what my assignments were. I need scarcely 
 say that I was not appointed to the Committee 
 on Interstate Commerce. Of all my assign 
 ments the Committee on Indian Affairs was 
 altogether the best; though I should not over 
 look the bestowal upon me of a chairmanship 
 which carried with it a committee room, a clerk, 
 and a messenger. The title of this committee 
 impressed me considerably. It was the "Com 
 mittee to Investigate the Condition of the 
 Potomac River Front. (Select.) " I had im 
 mediate visions of cleaning up the whole Poto 
 mac River front until I found that in all its 
 history the committee had never had a bill 
 referred to it for consideration, and had never 
 held a meeting. My committee room was 
 reached by going down into the sub-cellar of the 
 capitol, along a dark winding passage lighted 
 by dim skylights which leaked badly, to a room 
 carved out of the terrace on the west side of 
 the Capitol. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to emphasize the very 
 great importance of committee appointments 
 
376 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 in the Senate. They are the gateways of legis 
 lation. A powerful committee in secret session 
 has almost autocratic power in deciding what 
 laws shall or shall not be passed: and it is in the 
 committees that the great financial interests of 
 the country have found their securest entrench 
 ment. Of first importance is the great Finance 
 Committee, which has charge of all bills affect 
 ing the tariff, currency and banking. Other 
 very powerful committees are Interstate Com 
 merce, with its control of bills relating to rail 
 roads, trusts and combinations, and the Com 
 mittees on Rules, on Appropriations, on Foreign 
 Relations, and on the Judiciary. 
 
 I decided to make the best of my committee 
 appointments. I knew, of course, what they 
 thought when they placed me on at least three 
 of them: Claims, Indian Affairs and Pensions 
 
 - "We will give the gentleman so much routine 
 work to do that he will not trouble us at all" 
 
 - for these committees, more than almost any 
 others, are occupied by a multiplicity of un 
 important legislation. But while I resolved 
 to do my duty, I determined not to permit my 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 377 
 
 attention to be diverted from the really great 
 and important questions of the day. Upon one 
 of the committees, indeed, that of Indian Affairs, 
 I found immediately most congenial service. My 
 interest in the Indians, awakened during my 
 service in the House of Representatives fifteen 
 years before, had always been active. 
 
 The most important bill under consideration 
 by that committee was the bill for the settle 
 ment of the affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes 
 in the Indian Territory, one of the most im 
 portant provisions of which related to the 
 segregated coal lands of the Choctaw and 
 Chickasaw Indians. The bill, as passed by the 
 House, provided for a continuation and exten 
 sion of the policy of leasing the coal lands to 
 private mining companies. The Senate com 
 mittee proposed to amend this provision of the 
 House bill and provide for the sale of the lands. 
 It was a new question for me, but I went to see 
 the Secretary of the Interior and got his views 
 upon the subject. I then called upon the 
 Director of the Geological Survey, and learned 
 that bituminous coal of a very superior quality 
 
378 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 had been located upon 413,000 acres of this land. 
 I also discovered that leases covering about 
 112,000 acres in area, while taken in the name of 
 private coal-mining companies, were really con 
 trolled by the railroads of the territory. I found 
 that there was little or no competition in prices, 
 and that the transportation rates for shipments 
 from the mines to the consumers were enor 
 mously high. 
 
 I therefore opposed in committee the sale of 
 these coal lands. Being voted down on that 
 proposition, I proposed such amendments as 
 seemed to me to better the measure, such, for 
 instance, as limiting the amount of coal land 
 which could be acquired by any one company; 
 providing for a condition in the deeds making 
 the lands revert to the United States in trust 
 for the Indians when the land went to any rail 
 road corporation or the officers or directors of 
 any railroad corporation. 
 
 I was, of course, voted down overwhelmingly 
 in the committee on all of these propositions; 
 indeed, as I now remember it, my own was the 
 only vote which I was able to get for any of 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 379 
 
 them. I reserved the right to oppose the com 
 mittee as to these provisions in any and all 
 respects when the bill should be brought up on 
 the floor of the Senate. The committee smiled 
 a broad smile. I was regarded at that time, I 
 am sure, by every man upon that committee as 
 a crank, a disturber of peace and prosperity. I 
 knew what was back of that smile. The mem 
 bers of the committee were thinking what the 
 Senate would do to me when I attempted to 
 oppose the action of the committee in selling 
 these coal lands. 
 
 Well, when the bill came before the Senate, I 
 offered amendments which led to a two days 
 discussion. Though they were voted down, the 
 whole subject was so effectively aired in the 
 newspapers as a scheme of the railroads and 
 other special interests connected with them to 
 get hold of the Indian coal lands, that the plan 
 to sell the coal had to be abandoned. 
 
 But from that day to this the railroads and 
 other important interests have never ceased their 
 efforts to get control of these valuable deposits. 
 
 At every session of Congress, from that ses- 
 
380 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 sion of 1906 down to the last day of the extra 
 session of 1911, the protection of the interests of 
 the Indians and of the public generally in that 
 coal field has required constant vigilance. Many 
 lobbies have been organized; measures have 
 been introduced in one form and another at 
 every session independent bills, riders on ap 
 propriation bills, jokers in conference reports 
 have concealed in some form an attempt to 
 exploit these coal lands and the people depend 
 ent upon them for fuel supply. 
 
 This first fight in the Senate proved to be an 
 important one. It was the beginning of the 
 battle for conservation of coal lands belonging 
 to the people. I am not aware that President 
 Roosevelt had ever, prior to this time, given 
 expression to any views in regard to a policy 
 upon this subject, but as an evidence of the 
 quickness with which his mind grasps an impor 
 tant subject, I mention my first call upon him 
 after the debate in the Senate. I do not now 
 remember the purpose of my visit; I do remem 
 ber his greeting: 
 
 "Senator La Follette, by Jove! you struck a 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 381 
 
 mighty good lead on that coal matter in Indian 
 Territory. I think that is a very important 
 subject." 
 
 And I said to him: "Yes, Mr. President, its 
 importance will develop. I am going to work 
 out a bill providing that the government shall 
 take over that coal and save it from being ex 
 ploited by monopoly control." 
 
 " Bully ! It is a bully good thing ! " 
 
 "Mr. President," I said, "I think it would 
 also be a good thing applied to all the coal fields 
 of the government, and I want to come and talk 
 to you about that when you haven t so many in 
 waiting to see you." 
 
 He said, "I would be very much interested. 
 I wish you would come." 
 
 I did go to have a talk with him and I found 
 him not only open-minded upon the subject, 
 but ready to assent to the importance of some 
 action in that direction. I then suggested to 
 him the withdrawal from sale and entry of all 
 coal, asphalt, and oil lands by executive order, 
 but he at once raised the question of the power 
 of the President to act without Congressional 
 
382 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 authority. I argued that the President had 
 such authority, but he said that he would get 
 Attorney-General Moody s opinion on it. When 
 I saw him afterward he said that Moody s 
 opinion left the matter still in doubt. I then 
 told him that I would introduce a joint resolu 
 tion in the Senate clothing him with power to 
 withdraw the public lands from entry. 
 
 Accordingly, on the 20th of June, I offered 
 such a joint resolution authorizing the President 
 " to withdraw from entry and sale all public lands 
 known to be underlaid with coal, lignite, or oil 
 and all such lands which, in the judgment of the 
 Director of the Geological Survey, contain depos 
 its of coal, lignite, or oil, and that all such lands 
 be withheld from entry or sale until such time 
 as Congress shall determine otherwise." 
 
 I was not able, however, to secure action on 
 the resolution in the Senate. 
 
 I next saw President Roosevelt on the 30th 
 of June a few hours prior to the adjournment 
 of Congress. He was then in the President s 
 room at the capitol. I told him it had been 
 impossible to get action upon the joint resolu- 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 383 
 
 tion authorizing him to withdraw the coal lands 
 from sale and entry, at the same time saying 
 that I did not think that such action was neces 
 sary on the part of Congress. 
 
 "Well," he said in his characteristic and 
 energetic way, "Moody thinks there is some 
 doubt about it, but I ll resolve that doubt in 
 favor of the public, and after Congress adjourns 
 I ll withdraw all government lands known to 
 contain coal deposits." 
 
 I told him I believed that such action on his 
 part would have the backing of all the people 
 of the country, and that I proposed to give such 
 time as I could during the summer to a study 
 of the subject with a view to introducing a com 
 prehensive bill not only dealing with the coal 
 lands belonging to the Indians but* with all the 
 coal lands belonging to the general government. 
 
 He said, "Good. You go ahead, get your bill 
 ready, and I will make it the leading subject in 
 my message to Congress in December. Come 
 and see me as soon as you return." 
 
 Not long after Congress adjourned, while on 
 the road in the middle west filling lecture en- 
 
384 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 gagements, I saw a Washington dispatch an 
 nouncing the withdrawal by the President of 
 many millions of acres of government coal lands, 
 and that afternoon, in an address on the dangers 
 threatening representative government, I told 
 the story of the coal lands and of the President s 
 keen interest in the whole subject. 
 
 On my return to Washington in December, 
 1906, I called promptly upon the President. 
 Almost his first words were : 
 
 "Senator La Follette, I have got it in the mes 
 sage!" 
 
 I told him I had made a first draft of my bill, 
 but that I needed some further assistance in 
 perfecting it. Upon my request he gave me a 
 card to Attorney-General Moody, and one of the 
 best men in the Department of Justice was 
 assigned to help me. Many weeks were spent 
 in mastering all the literature and legislation 
 upon this question in Great Britain, Germany 
 and New Zealand, and we then prepared a broad 
 conservation measure. In view of the fact that 
 the bill was in a large degree the work of the 
 able assistant assigned by the Attorney- General 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 385 
 
 I may be pardoned for saying that it is the one 
 bill that has been put before Congress that deals 
 with the whole subject in a comprehensive way. 
 
 Its essential provisions are that all coal lands 
 shall be reserved by the general government and 
 shall not be sold, but shall be operated under 
 license. By the passage of such a measure the 
 government would forever control its coal 
 reserves. 
 
 Before I introduced the bill, however, I called 
 at the executive office and went over it sec 
 tion by section with the President. At 
 every important point Mr. Roosevelt would 
 smite the table and declare his approval with 
 an emphatic: 
 
 "Admirable, admirable! that does the busi 
 ness!" 
 
 When we had finished with the bill, he said : 
 
 "How soon will you introduce it?" 
 
 "To-morrow," I answered. 
 
 He said, "You may announce, if you desire, 
 that it is an administration measure." 
 
 I was delighted, and expressed my apprecia 
 tion that this important measure could 
 
I/ 
 
 386 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 have the active support of the administration. 
 I introduced the bill, and gave to the press a 
 brief statement of its provisions. Within three 
 days I was surprised to receive a note from the 
 President advising me that he had conferred 
 with friends about the coal bill which I had 
 introduced, and found that it would be impos 
 sible to get support for any such measure; that 
 its provisions were regarded as too drastic, and 
 that in order to get "something through" it 
 would be necessary to agree upon a less com 
 prehensive plan. He said it had been suggested 
 to him that Senator Nelson had introduced a 
 bill shortly before which would be acceptable 
 to everybody. The joint resolution which I had 
 introduced on the 20th of June, 1906, with its 
 preamble reciting the conditions that existed, 
 followed by the President s withdrawal of the 
 coal lands, had served as a warning that action 
 in some form, thoroughgoing or otherwise, was , 
 likely to be undertaken, and Senator Nelson 
 of Minnesota had on the 3rd day of Janu 
 ary, 1907, introduced a bill upon the subject. 
 I replied to President Roosevelt s note by 
 
AL@NE IN THE SENATE 387 
 
 letter, as I wished to place before him a care 
 ful analysis of the Nelson bill to the end that 
 he might see that legislation of that char 
 acter would be not only not worth while, but 
 would, if enacted, serve only to bring govern 
 ment control and leasing into actual disrepute, 
 and end, as do all compromises with principle, 
 in defeating the very object in view. In my 
 letter to the President I assured him that no 
 pride of authorship would impel me to insist upon 
 my bill; that in order to secure legislation upon 
 this important subject I stood ready to support 
 any bill, provided it embodied the principles 
 essential to make this new legislation really 
 effective. In reply, the President did not at 
 tempt to answer the objections which I presented 
 to the Nelson bill, but said substantially that if 
 those who were supporting the new policy were 
 not willing to agree upon " something which could 
 be passed," he would wash his hands of the whole 
 matter and would cancel his withdrawal of the 
 lands and open them again to sale and entry. 
 
 I state the facts here just as they transpired, 
 because they illustrate the difference in methods 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 v/ 
 
 which sometimes rendered it impossible for 
 President Roosevelt and myself to cooperate 
 on important legislation. He acted upon the 
 
 maxim that half a loaf is better than no bread. 
 
 r 
 
 1 I believe that half a loaf is fatal whenever it is 
 accepted at the sacrifice of the basic principle 
 sought to be attained. Half a loaf, as a rule, 
 dulls the appetite, and destroys the keenness of 
 interest in attaining the full loaf. A halfway 
 measure never fairly tests the principle and may 
 utterly discredit it. It is certain to weaken, 
 disappoint, and dissipate public interest. Con 
 cession and compromise are almost always ne 
 cessary in legislation, but they call for the most 
 thorough and complete mastery of the principles 
 involved, in order to fix the limit beyond which 
 
 \not one hair s breadth can be yielded. 
 
 Roosevelt is the keenest and ablest living 
 interpreter of what I would call the superficial 
 public sentiment of a given time and he is 
 spontaneous in his response to it; but he does 
 not distinguish between that which is a mere 
 surface indication of a sentiment and the 
 building up by a long process of education of a 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 389 
 
 public opiit on which is as deep-rooted as life. 
 Had Roosevelt, for example, when he came to 
 consider railroad rate regulation, estimated cor 
 rectly the value of the public opinion that had 
 been created upon that subject through a space 
 of nine years, he would have known to a cer 
 tainty that it lay in his power to secure legis 
 lation which should effectually control the great 
 transportation companies of the country. But 
 either through a desire to get immediate results, 
 or through a misunderstanding of the really 
 profound depth of that public sentiment, he 
 chose to get what little he could then, rather 
 than to take a temporary defeat and go on 
 fighting at the succeeding session of Con 
 gress for legislation that would be fundamentally 
 sound. 
 
 To get back to the coal matter: I knew 
 instinctively what had taken place immediately 
 after the introduction of my bill. Representa 
 tives of the railroads and of the corporations 
 both inside and outside of Congress had prob 
 ably swarmed to the White House, denounced 
 the bill, denounced me, and told the President 
 
390 ALONE IN THE SENATE, 
 
 that the plan I had offered was socialistic and 
 that the committee would not tolerate it. 
 
 Well, after the President decided he could not 
 support the bill which I had introduced it had 
 no chance of passing the Committee on Public 
 Lands. And no other measure proposed received 
 the support of the people of the country who 
 were in favor of genuine conservation. That 
 ended, for the time being, any chance of legis 
 lation on that subject. But I have presented 
 the same bill at every session of Congress since 
 1907 and it is now before the Committee on 
 Public Lands. I am very hopeful that public 
 sentiment and the changes that are gradually 
 taking place in the personnel of the committee 
 will soon make it possible to secure favorable 
 action. I am glad to see, indeed, that the Secre 
 tary of the Interior has used this bill as well as 
 that which I introduced to provide for the con 
 trol of the Indian coal land of Oklahoma as a 
 basis for his plan for the control of coal and 
 other mineral resources in Alaska. 
 
 The simple scheme of dominating the com 
 mittees in the Senate and the House, as exempli- 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 391 
 
 fied in the case of these coal land bills, is the 
 familiar procedure of those private interests 
 both inside and outside of Congress which seek 
 to direct national legislation. Any attempt 
 to bring about progressive reforms is met by 
 this entrenched opposition. For example, the 
 Committee on Naval Affairs will be found com 
 posed almost entirely of members representing 
 states or districts within which have been built 
 up, often wrongfully, great land naval estab 
 lishments, harbors, docks and the like. I ven 
 ture to say that an expert, unbiased naval board 
 so chosen as to represent the highest authority 
 of our country on all matters pertaining to our 
 navy would close many if not most of the prin 
 cipal naval yards and docks and never permit 
 the expenditure of another dollar upon them. 
 Every experienced naval officer will tell you that 
 owing to channel and currents every large battle 
 ship docks at Portsmouth at the risk of serious 
 injury or total loss, and yet Hale of Maine and 
 Gallinger of New Hampshire were for years 
 important members of the Committee on Naval 
 Affairs, and Portsmouth was maintained. The 
 
392 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 same is in a measure true of the Mare Island 
 yard at San Francisco, but Senator Perkins of 
 California is now chairman of the Committee 
 on Naval Affairs. Every principle of naval 
 warfare requires that this government should 
 have one of its most important stations at 
 Guantanamo, Cuba. But we have no Senator 
 from Guantanamo, and so we have no harbor 
 there. 
 
 Now, I had grown tired of sitting in the Senate 
 and seeing appropriation bills carrying hundreds 
 of millions of dollars brought in, not reasonably 
 early in the session, but held back, held back, 
 until near its close. Such delay served two pur 
 poses: The appropriation bill having the right 
 of way under the rules could be used to kill off 
 any measure that the interests did not want 
 passed. Furthermore, it could be urged that 
 there was no time for full debate. One after 
 noon, therefore, when Mr. Hale arose and 
 presented the Naval Appropriation bill, stating 
 that he hoped the first reading of the bill would 
 be dispensed with, I said that I had had no 
 opportunity to see what was in the bill; that I 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 393 
 
 thought the time had come when the Senate 
 should stop such proceedings; that my remarks 
 were not intended as an affront to the committee, 
 but that each of us had his personal responsi 
 bility to his state and to the country, and that 
 the organization of the Senate contemplated 
 that legislation should not be enacted by the 
 fifteen or seventeen men who constituted the 
 committee, about whose selection the Senate 
 itself had had very little to say. At once Mr. 
 Hale started in to rebuke me. I told him that I 
 was not accountable to him for the course that I 
 was taking; that I stood ready to assume all 
 the responsibility for any loss of time to the 
 country on this important legislation; that ap 
 propriation bills, it seemed to me, should be 
 reported early enough so that members of the 
 Senate could have a few days at least in which 
 to investigate them, and I asked that he defer 
 pressing the bill for a day or two. But Hale 
 made no response and the clerk started in to 
 read the bill. 
 
 I had not studied the Naval Appropriation 
 bill at all, but I began to send for docu- 
 
394 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 ments, which were piled up on my desk, and I 
 determined to speak on the bill until adjourn 
 ment for the day and thus gain time to study it. 
 Hale saw that I was quite determined to prevent 
 the passage of the bill that afternoon and so he 
 rose and said that he wanted to be reasonable 
 about these things, and the bill went over finally 
 until the following Monday. 
 
 I went home that night and immediately 
 began getting telephone calls from naval officers 
 here in Washington, who said they were grati 
 fied to see that there was to be some discussion 
 of the bill; that there were many things about 
 it that were bad; that we were making expendi 
 tures wastefully; that they had pride in the 
 navy and that they wanted to see a navy built 
 up for the ocean, and not for the land. I 
 answered that I would be glad to have them 
 meet me and certain of my associates who would 
 be selected with the greatest care, and who 
 would protect them absolutely. Then I called 
 in Cummins, Borah and Dixon. I called Dixon 
 because he had come to me after my tilt with 
 Hale and expressed sympathy with the course 
 
V 7 
 ALONE IN THE SENATE 395 
 
 I had taken. This was the first gathering of 
 
 the group of sOj : callejJProgressi vga-in the Senate 
 for concerted action on legislation. We spent 
 the entire Sunday on it, assisted by a number 
 of naval officers, and threshed out the whole bill. 
 When we had determined on the items in the 
 bill that should be opposed, we shared them 
 among us and each one went to work. 
 
 In the course of the debate on the Naval 
 Appropriation bill which followed, the Senate 
 bosses for the first time were vigorously attacked 
 for the way they made up the committees. I 
 contended that members from states where ap 
 propriations were to be expended ought not to 
 be on committees which controlled those ex 
 penditures. I said that no one would think of 
 permitting a jury to sit in any case where that 
 jury was directly or indirectly interested in the 
 result of the verdict. And that it was against 
 human nature that the men on the committee 
 would not give preference to the yards and docks 
 in their own states ; that they were unfit to weigh 
 the claims of a harbor in another state. Of 
 course, it was taken by my associates as theoret- 
 
396 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 ical preaching and sneered at, but it had its 
 effect just the same. We did not, indeed, get 
 any change in that particular bill, for they had 
 a big majority and passed it in spite of us, but 
 at the close of the debate I offered a resolution 
 as fundamentally important in principle as the 
 resolution that I offered for the reservation of the 
 coal lands, with reference to naval appropria 
 tions in the future. That resolution provided 
 that the President should appoint a board of 
 naval experts to investigate all of the naval 
 harbors, yards and drydocks in the United States, 
 and report to the next Congress whether appro 
 priations were being made in the best interests 
 of the service, and whether appropriations for 
 the future ought to be continued for these 
 various purposes. They voted me down, but a 
 few weeks after this, Roosevelt, just before he 
 went out of office, appointed just such a board, 
 which has since made a valuable report. 
 
 I made a fight for time to investigate all im 
 portant appropriation bills during that session, 
 and since then immediate consideration is rarely 
 asked upon the report of an appropriation bill. 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 397 
 
 There is indeed a great field for reform, not 
 only in the method of selecting the members of 
 the various committees of the Senate, but in the 
 principle that should control. I do not believe 
 that any committee charged with the respon 
 sibility of the expenditure of hundreds of mil 
 lions of dollars of the public moneys should be 
 composed of Senators or members of the House 
 representing states within which such expen 
 ditures are made. Frye, I remember, picked 
 me up in that debate, and asked me if I would 
 apply that same rule to the Committee on Com 
 merce, of which he was chairman. I answered, 
 "By all means." I contended that the final ex 
 penditure should be made with a single purpose 
 in mind, and that was the public interest, their 
 general good, and that could only be made by 
 men who had no political interest to serve. It is 
 a common thing for members and Senators to 
 urge, as one of the arguments in making their 
 personal and semi-confidential appeal to their 
 friends upon the various committees, that the 
 expenditure of so many hundreds of thousands 
 of dollars in their districts or their states would 
 
398 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 materially help them in their coming election. 
 Every man who has ever served in either branch 
 of Congress has heard it over and over again. 
 It is not an exceptional thing for a man to sup 
 port his claims for reelection on the size of the 
 appropriations he has secured. Senator Warren 
 of Wyoming, within a year, in a speech made to 
 his constituents, compared the amount he and 
 his colleague had obtained in the way of appro 
 priations for Wyoming with what other Senators 
 had been able to get for some of the most im 
 portant states in our union and boasted of it 
 as a meritorious achievement. 
 
 The most important thing of all is to send 
 honest men to Washington men in this time 
 of stress who want to serve the public, and no 
 body else. The abler these men are, the better, 
 but above all the people should see to it that 
 / their representatives are honest not merely 
 \money honest, but intellectually honest. 
 
 If they have the highest standards of in- 
 j tegrity and the highest ideals of service, all 
 our problems, however complex, will be easily 
 solved. 
 
 I 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 399 
 
 Jethro was a wise counsellor when he said to 
 Moses, "Thou shalt provide out of all the 
 people, able men such as fear God, men of truth, 
 hating covetousness." 
 
 1 have said before in the course of this narra 
 tive that the legislation in which I took the 
 greatest interest as a member of the House of 
 Representatives was the enactment of the 
 Interstate Commerce Act. And when I came 
 to the Senate, nineteen years later, I found the 
 same subject as the most important legislation 
 pending. The Hepburn bill, amending the 
 Interstate Commerce Act, had passed the House 
 and was before the Senate. 
 
 There followed months of debate one of 
 the most important debates of recent years - 
 through which I sat waiting for some one to raise 
 what seemed to me to be the real issues the 
 real questions as we had met them in our years 
 of struggle with the railroad problem in Wis 
 consin. 
 
 Now, there are just three principal purposes 
 in the governmental regulation of railroad rates : 
 The first, to prevent unjust and extortionate 
 
400 
 
 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 rates from being imposed upon the country; 
 
 Ithe second, to prevent discriminations between 
 shippers, or localities, or commodities; the 
 third, to enforce and regulate an adequate ser 
 vice. 
 
 The primary purpose in the enactment of the 
 Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 I recall 
 clearly the arguments and hearings was to 
 prevent the imposition of unreasonable and 
 unjust rates. It was passed in response to a 
 demand of the public which had been growing 
 in volume ever since the days of Granger legis 
 lation. 
 
 In saying this I do not wish to belittle the 
 abuses arising from discriminations of which 
 rebates furnish one example. They have been 
 most serious in their consequences : but the early 
 advocates of railroad regulation saw clearly that 
 the subject of deepest importance was not dis 
 criminations but unreasonable rates. 
 
 One school of advocates of railway reg 
 ulation has adopted as its platform the pre 
 vention of discrimination, because it is the least 
 difficult of the two branches of the subject to 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 401 
 
 deal with. It provokes the least opposition 
 from the railroads, and it is always backed by 
 powerful organizations of shippers. Again and 
 again President Roosevelt laid it down in his 
 messages and public addresses that there was 
 very little complaint that rates were unreason 
 able, but that there was much complaint against 
 discriminations. And that statement was true. 
 It was true for this reason. The shippers can 
 easily organize and can make themselves heard 
 and felt. The thing in which the shipper is 
 vitally interested is that his competitor shall not 
 have a better rate or better facilities than he has. 
 But he is not concerned as to whether that rate 
 is high or low, because he does not pay the rate, 
 excepting in the first instance. He always 
 charges the rate in as a part of the cost to the 
 consumer, who is the real freight payer the 
 country over. 
 
 Now, the consumer who is primarily interested 
 in unreasonable rates has little or no opportunity 
 to be heard. Nor has he the means of knowing, 
 when he buys his coal, his supplies, his food, 
 his lumber, his hardware, how much of the price 
 
402 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 he has to pay is due to excessive freight charges. 
 He realizes that year by year it costs more for 
 everything he must buy, but he is not able to 
 put his finger upon the particular amount of that 
 excessive cost which is due to freight charges 
 made in the shipment of raw material to the 
 factory, in the shipment of the partially finished 
 product to some other factory, and in the further 
 shipment of the finished product to the wholesaler 
 or jobber, and in the final shipment to the re 
 tailer, from whom he buys it. He cannot or 
 ganize and come before a legislative committee 
 and make himself heard. Furthermore, Con 
 gress has taken care that no body of men, no 
 commission created anywhere, should have either 
 the authority or the instrumentalities through 
 which it could ascertain what was really a rea 
 sonable freight rate. 
 
 It is true that the Interstate Commerce Com 
 mission has assumed from time to time to say 
 that rates were reasonable or unreasonable, 
 but it has based its decisions, in that regard, 
 merely upon comparisons of one rate with 
 another, both of which may be wholly unreason- 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 403 
 
 able. It has never had, and has not now, 
 any real standard of judgment. 
 
 For ten years after its organization in 1887 
 the Commission did assume the right to fix 
 rates; then in 1897 came a crushing decision 
 of the Supreme Court which robbed it of this 
 power and, indeed, left it worse than helpless. 
 During the next nine years, down to 1906, when 
 the Hepburn bill to which I have referred was 
 introduced, the committees were so organized 
 in both Senate and House and so dominated by 
 railroad and other corporation interests that it 
 was impossible to get any real reform measure 
 reported out. 
 
 During all the years from 1897 to 1906 the 
 commission, which was a very able one, kept 
 calling the attention of Congress and the country 
 to its utter helplessness and urging legislation. 
 Year after year it repeated its pleas, it ap 
 peared before committees, it showed how 
 the railroads were rapidly combining in enor 
 mous monopolies. It showed in 1905 that 
 unwarranted increases in transportation rates 
 amounting to more than $100,000,000 a year 
 
404 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 had been levied upon the people since the com 
 mission lost its power in 1897 - - but Congress 
 would not move. 
 
 All this time, however, the clamor of both the 
 shippers and the public had been increasing in 
 volume and intensity. In 1903 Congress passed 
 the Elkins law which dealt with rebates and 
 discriminations for the railroads by that time 
 had grown weary of paying rebates, and were 
 not unfavorable to having the practice for 
 bidden. But nothing was done for the people 
 - the consumers who were still suffering from 
 unreasonable rates. 
 
 By 1906 the situation had become so un 
 bearable and centres of production through 
 out the country had suffered to such an extent 
 that there arose a great outcry of protest. 
 Organized bodies of men were sent to Washing 
 ton to appear before the committees and attempt 
 to arouse them to a sense of their responsibility 
 to the public, and finally the railroads, realizing 
 that something must be done to quiet the public 
 clamor, loosened their hold sufficiently to permit 
 a bill to be reported out from the Committee 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 405 
 
 on Interstate Commerce of the House of Rep 
 resentatives, known as the Hepburn bill. It 
 passed the House and came to the Senate, and 
 there it fell into the hands of the Senate Com 
 mittee on Interstate Commerce, a majority of 
 which was absolutely opposed to any legislation 
 restoring any power to the Interstate Com 
 merce Commission. 
 
 Finally, however, through an alliance of Dol- 
 liver and Clapp with the Democrats, the bill was 
 reported out, and the debate began. But in 
 credible as it may seem, it is nevertheless true 
 that the bill did not include in its terms the 
 recommendations which the Interstate Com 
 merce Commission had urged as necessary to 
 make it a workable statute the amendments 
 which, through these years, it had been plead 
 ing with Congress to enact into law. It never 
 touched the^he&rt of th&matter, namely, whether ^ 
 the commission should be given the power to 
 determine what was a reasonable rate, and to 
 enforce its decisions. 
 
 For months I sat through these debates, as I 
 say, waiting for some one to raise the real ques- 
 
406 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 tion. I had studied the bill with great care. 
 There was just one portion of it which was 
 important and did really improve the law, and 
 that was the amendment empowering the Inter 
 state Commerce Commission to require all rail 
 roads engaged in interstate commerce to adopt 
 a uniform system of bookkeeping, and author 
 izing the commission through its examiners and 
 accountants to examine the books and accounts 
 of railroad companies at all times. The value of 
 that provision could not be overestimated. But 
 that was about all there was of a vital character 
 to the act of 1906. 
 
 I was very loath to see the bill pass in its 
 imperfect form, but I was a new man in the 
 Senate, without influence with the members of 
 that body. I felt strongly that if President 
 Roosevelt rightly estimated the strength of the 
 public sentiment in favor of effective legislation, 
 and would exert his influence upon the Senate, 
 that legislation which would really count could 
 be secured. I believed I knew exactly what was 
 required to meet the necessities of the situation, 
 but I did not feel that I could thrust my views 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 407 
 
 upon the President. I had known him for 
 fifteen years, but I was conscious that he had 
 been warned that I was dangerous and extreme 
 in my views, and I was in no position to offer 
 him any suggestions unsolicited. 
 
 Lincoln Steffens was in Washington during 
 that winter. On one occasion he asked me why 
 I did not go to see the President and warn him 
 of the defects in the bill. 
 
 "I have been seeing the President," he said, 
 4 and I am going to suggest to him that you 
 have gone all over this question in Wisconsin, 
 that you have been at it for years up there, and 
 it will do no harm for him to have a talk with 
 you about it." 
 
 This he did, with the result that I received an 
 invitation to go to the White House and see the 
 President one Sunday evening at ten o clock. 
 It was at a time when newspaper reporters were 
 not about, and there was no one to take note of 
 the fact or publish to the country that the 
 President was conferring with so dangerous a 
 person.. He was alone, and after chatting with 
 me a few moments, he said: "Senator La Fol- 
 
408 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 lette, I sent fqr you to come and talk with me 
 about the rate bill." 
 
 Then he proceeded to say that the most need 
 ful thing to be done in the way of changes in the 
 la w was to strengthen it, so that the injustice 
 done to a great many shippers by discriminations 
 would be made impossible. 
 
 "Discrimination is important," I said, "and 
 should not be tolerated. Every man who deals 
 with a common carrier has a right to treatment 
 
 
 
 on an equal footing with every other shipper of 
 the same product. But the question, Mr. Presi 
 dent, is very much bigger than that. To begin 
 w r ith, the first and the vital thing in which the 
 great body of the people of this country are 
 interested is in having transportation charges 
 reasonable." 
 
 Then I took up and discussed with him the 
 changes that ought to be made in the bill. I sat 
 with him until twelve o clock that night, and I 
 did not outstay my welcome either. I found 
 him a very good listener and I had the feeling 
 that I had made some impression upon him. 
 In the course of my talk he stopped me to say, 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 409 
 
 "But you can t get any such bill as that through 
 this Congress." 
 
 My answer was, "That is not the first con 
 sideration, Mr. President. 
 
 "But," he said, "I want to get something 
 through." 
 
 And I remember very clearly saying to him, 
 "Mr. President, you pass such a bill as is pend 
 ing in the Senate, and a successor in your place 
 Will have to tear it to pieces and build it all over . 
 again. The record that your administration 
 leaves on this legislation will count for a world 
 more in your history, and in the history of the 
 country, if you will try to get what is right even 
 though you fail, than if you take what you can 
 get, knowing that it does not reach the vitals of 
 this question." I said: "If you will send a 
 special message to Congress right now, while this 
 bill is pending, pointing out the things needful 
 to be done, you may not get it through this 
 session, but you have got an organized senti 
 ment that has been building up for nine years; 
 and if you lay down clearly, so the public can 
 understand just what ought to be done, and this 
 
410 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 Congress fails to act, in the next Congress you 
 will have the people back of you more strongly 
 than ever. If you went to the end of your service 
 as President, reiterating in your messages every 
 time you dealt with the subject the true lines 
 upon which this legislation should be written 
 and the public interest protected, you will have 
 left in your messages a monument compared 
 with which such a statute as this would be 
 trivial." 
 
 But however the President may have been 
 impressed by what I said, and I am quite sure 
 he was impressed, no message came from him on 
 the subject of strengthening the bill funda 
 mentally. So I marked out my own course and 
 made up my mind that I would put before the 
 Senate and the country the defects in the bill 
 and would offer the necessary amendments to 
 make it an effective statute. I had no expec 
 tation of being able to secure the adoption of any 
 amendments unless I could get the support of 
 the administration for them, but I knew that a 
 beginning must be made to build up public 
 opinion for another try at the law a few years 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 411 
 
 later. I spent several weeks preparing my ar 
 gument and beginning on April 19, 1906, 1 spoke 
 for about two hours and a half, the same length 
 of time on the 20th, and the same on the 21st. 
 I reviewed the history of the whole subject. 
 The printed speeches (published together) num 
 bered 148 pages. 
 
 I had not been sneaking more than ten min 
 utes before I found myself without any Republi 
 can colleagues to listen to me, aside from the 
 presiding officer, and the Senator from New 
 Jersey, Mr. Kean, who seemed to have been left 
 on guard. I understood perfectly well that I 
 was being rebuked. It was not altogether be 
 cause I was a new man in the Senate, but I had 
 no sympathy, no fellowship, no welcome from 
 Republican members of the Senate when I en 
 tered. I knew that I was familiar with my 
 subject. I had studied it for several years. In 
 Wisconsin it had been the one subject, above 
 all others, which had been discussed, investi 
 gated, and legislated upon. I knew that things 
 had been done there in a fundamental way, and 
 that I had been a part of the doing, and I felt 
 
412 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 that my experience should be of some value to 
 the country. So I could not help saying: 
 
 "Mr. President, I pause in my remarks to say 
 this. I cannot be wholly indifferent to the 
 fact that Senators by their absence at this time 
 indicate their want of interest in what I may 
 have to say upon this subject. The public is 
 interested. Unless this important subject is 
 rightly settled, seats now temporarily vacant 
 may be permanently vacated by those who have 
 the right to occupy them at this time." 
 
 It was said very quietly, but it elicited general 
 applause in the galleries, which immediately 
 brought Senator Kean to his feet to demand 
 that the rule of the Senate be enforced and the 
 galleries cleared. The presiding officer there 
 upon admonished the occupants of the galleries 
 that upon a recurrence of what had transpired 
 the galleries would be cleared. 
 
 What occurred in the Senate gallery found 
 its way into the cloak rooms and committee 
 rooms, whence the Senators had retired, and 
 before long they began drifting back into the 
 Senate, and it is fair to say that throughout 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 413 
 
 the remainder of my speech I had exceptional 
 attention. 
 
 Senator Dolliver was a member of the com 
 mittee that had framed this bill, and when I 
 began to attack what was called the Hepburn- 
 Dolliver bill, naturally he felt compelled to 
 defend it. He had been for six or seven years 
 a member of the Committee on Interstate Com 
 merce and he did not seem to understand what 
 I was talking about when I suggested the radical 
 defect in the bill that it was not possible for 
 the commission to make and enforce reasonable 
 rates, even if this bill passed. He thought my 
 statement preposterous. Then he proceeded 
 to point out that section so and so of the bill 
 declared every unreasonable rate to be unlawful; 
 and then almost in the next sentence it stated 
 that the commission should have authority to 
 enforce reasonable rates. He seemed to think 
 that this was all that was necessary, and I do 
 not believe that Dolliver or any other man in the 
 Senate at that time had ever seriously considered 
 the idea of determining the value of the property, 
 the cost of maintenance and the cost of opera- 
 
414 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 tion as a necessary basis for fixing the reason 
 ableness of rates. The thing seemed to break 
 upon the Senate as a startling idea, and yet most 
 of them as business men would never have 
 thought of fixing a price on a commodity or for 
 a service without knowing definitely what that 
 service cost. True, the commission had rec 
 ommended and urged a valuation of the rail 
 roads in its reports, but it had never been 
 aired on the floor of the Senate. 
 
 I pointed out to Senator Dolliver in the course 
 of the debate that there were no means by which 
 the commission could ascertain what was a 
 reasonable rate; that under the law of 1887, 
 as proposed to be amended by the pending bill, 
 it would be possible for the commission to 
 determine whether rates were relatively reason 
 able, but not that they were reasonable per se; 
 that one rate could be compared with another, 
 but that the commission had no means of deter 
 mining whether either rate so compared was it 
 self a reasonable rate. And then I proceeded 
 to lay down the basis for determining reason 
 able rates, and we had a running debate for 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 415 
 
 about an hour, when Dolliver, who had come 
 down until he stood squarely in front of my 
 desk, said: 
 
 "Mr. President, I am disposed to sympathize 
 with the views of the Senator from Wisconsin: 
 I believe that the bill ought to be amended." 
 
 And he was one of five other Senators be 
 sides myself on the Republican side who voted 
 for the amendment to authorize the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission to ascertain the value 
 of the railroad property of the country. And 
 from that time on Senator Dolliver, as long as 
 he lived, stood with me whenever the question 
 of valuation was raised. 
 
 Dolliver was honest-minded, and w r hen his 
 intellect pointed the way, that way Dolliver 
 went always. I shall have more to say of him 
 later in this narrative. 
 
 I do not think the "stand-patters" of the 
 Senate understood what I was talking about 
 when I discussed the Hepburn-Dolliver bill. 
 They did not follow me closely enough to under 
 stand. But on the Democratic side of the 
 Senate chamber I had excellent attention, and 
 
416 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 before I finished I had a goodly number on the 
 other side. 
 
 When the time came to offer amendments I 
 carefully canvassed the Democratic side of the 
 house, and secured the pledges of enough Sen 
 ators to enable me to get a roll call on the amend 
 ments as I offered them. I made no personal 
 appeal to any Senator to vote for any amend 
 ment. All that I asked was that they give me 
 an opportunity to put the Senate on record. 
 And I found the Democrats very ready to do 
 that. 
 
 In offering each amendment I made perhaps a 
 five or ten minute statement, and then demanded 
 the yeas and nays. On the amendment for the 
 valuation of railways engaged in interstate 
 commerce I demonstrated conclusively the over 
 capitalization of the railroads of the country. 
 I argued that if the same system were applied 
 which we were then applying in Wisconsin - 
 that is, the true value of the property ascer 
 tained together with the cost of maintaining the 
 property and the cost of operating the property, 
 and the rates so adjusted as to make a fair re- 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 417 
 
 turn to the railroads upon the actual investment 
 made by ;fche roads and not upon capitalization 
 that it would be working a saving in transporta 
 tion charges of something more than $400,000,- 
 000 to the people of this country every twelve 
 months. In support of that amendment I used 
 the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commis 
 sion, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, and the demonstration made in 
 Wisconsin. And yet, when the roll was called, my 
 amendment was beaten 40 to 27, the only Re 
 publicans voting for it being Burkett, Dolliver, 
 Elkins, Gamble, La Toilette, Warner. 
 
 There were nine amendments in all. Eight 
 of them had the endorsement of the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission, an unprejudiced body. 
 Each had reason and justice back of it. No 
 argument could be made against any one of 
 them, and no argument ever was made on the 
 floor against their merits either at that time or 
 
 (since. There was nothing to be said on the 
 other side. 
 
 Coming home on the street car one day, I 
 wondered how far they would go. And I took 
 
418 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 a tab out of my pocket and outlined an amend 
 ment to the effect that any federal judge should 
 be disqualified from hearing, trying or determin 
 ing any case for the regulation of railway rates 
 against any road in which he was a stockholder, 
 or whose bonds he owned, or upon which he used 
 free passes. And that amendment was lost 
 40 to 27. There were only three Republicans 
 who thought that a federal judge ought not to 
 own stock in a road and then hear, try and deter 
 mine a case involving its interests ! 
 
 Formerly, record votes on delicate questions 
 were always avoided in the Senate, if possible; 
 but I had a purpose in thus committing the 
 Senators on these phases of railroad control. I 
 wanted to show exactly where they stood and 
 why. 
 
 During the summer which followed I made a 
 speaking tour that covered nearly all the states 
 from New York to California, and everywhere I 
 went I used these roll-call records of the Senate. 
 I made twenty-one speeches in which I showed 
 the record of Dry den of New Jersey, and I have 
 no doubt that the proof which these roll calls 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 419 
 
 furnished of the true attitude of Senators served 
 to retire not a few of them. There were twenty- 
 four "stand-pat" members of the Senate at that 
 time (1906) wlio are not there to-day. 
 
 At the beginning of the next session (1907) I 
 determined to press forward with constructive 
 railroad legislation and I introduced a bill 
 providing for a comprehensive valuation of the 
 railroads as a basis for establishing just and 
 reasonable rates. I submitted the bill before 
 its introduction to the Interstate Commerce 
 Comissioners and had the benefit of their advice 
 and suggestions. 
 
 After introducing it in the Senate I tried for 
 weeks to get a hearing upon it before the com 
 mittee, but was wiiolly unable to do so. 
 
 I introduced the bill again at the beginning of 
 the next session of Congress in March, 1909, and 
 I have kept it before the Senate committee ever 
 since. I believe absolutely that it is the only 
 basis of a just settlement of the problem. I 
 know how well the plan is being worked out in 
 Wisconsin, and I am certain sooner or later that 
 the national government must adopt it. 
 
420 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 To illustrate the futility of the Hepburn law 
 as passed, it is worth noting that the railroads 
 began almost immediately to raise their rates, 
 and they accompanied these raises by a system 
 atic and costly campaign of publicity to make 
 the public believe that the advances were 
 necessary. But in spite of this, during the years 
 1907, 1908 and 1909 a number of large meetings 
 were held at which shippers, manufacturers 
 and producers protested against the raises. 
 
 And in 1910, the next railroad legislation which 
 really got before Congress was the so-called 
 Commerce Court bill, though the establishment 
 of a Commerce Court was only one of its provi 
 sions. That bill as it came from Attorney- 
 General Wickersham with the approval of 
 President Taft was, in all the history of railroad 
 legislation, the rankest, boldest betrayal of public 
 interest ever proposed in any legislative 
 body. If it had been passed as introduced it 
 would have lost to the people all the ground that 
 had been gained in the long struggle with the 
 railroad corporations. The bill as it was origi 
 nally presented practically took all the power 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 421 
 
 away from the Interstate Commerce Commis 
 sion, deprived it of the right of employing 
 counsel to defend its own orders and trans 
 ferred all that authority to the Attorney- Gen 
 eral s office. It bestowed upon the railroads 
 much larger rights in contesting before the 
 courts the orders of the commission than they 
 had ever had before, and cut out, root and 
 branch, the right formerly enjoyed by outside 
 interested parties and communities of appearing 
 and paying their own attorneys to aid in sus 
 taining the orders of the commission. 
 
 In short, it threw the determination of rail 
 road questions back into the hands of the 
 Attorney- General and the courts. 
 
 Before the Progressives in the Senate began 
 an attack upon this bill I made a speech review 
 ing the acts of the present Attorney-General, 
 Mr. Wickersham, in the very important- matter 
 of the New Haven Railroad cases. The dis 
 missal of these suits, which had been brought 
 before Mr. Roosevelt left the White House, was 
 almost the first act of surrender to the interests 
 on the part of the Taft administration. 
 
422 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 In my speech I showed the strength of the 
 government s case against the New Haven 
 merger, yet the first act of the Taft adminis 
 tration, through the Attorney- General, was to 
 hand over all that great section of New England 
 to the New Haven Railroad, which had acquired 
 control not only of all means of transportation 
 by rail, but had bankrupted or bought in prac 
 tically all of the steamship and trolley lines, so 
 that to-day you cannot ship a pound of any 
 thing from Massachusetts excepting on the 
 terms imposed by a single corporation. That 
 whole speech was specifically aimed against that 
 provision of the law which gave the Attorney- 
 General exclusive power in connection with the 
 prosecution of cases. It was aimed to sound a 
 warning in the ears of the Senate when we came 
 to consider the question of clothing the Depart 
 ment of Justice with the sole power of saying 
 the final word with reference to litigation be 
 tween the people and the railroads. And I 
 think my speech had much to do in preventing 
 the adoption of this provision of the law. 
 
 The first speech that I made on the Commerce 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 423 
 
 Court bill was on April 12, 1910, on the New 
 Haven merger. I made the other speeches on 
 the bill April 29, May 25 and 26, May 31, and 
 June 3. On May 31 I offered my amendment 
 for the valuation of railroads as a part of this 
 bill, and made an argument upon it. My amend 
 ment was defeated by a vote of 33 to 29; 11 of the 
 29 were Republican; the 33 who opposed it were 
 all Republicans. 
 
 The reception of my speeches by the Senate 
 in 1910 on the railroad question was markedly 
 in contrast with the reception given in 1906. 
 
 In the fight made on the President s railroad 
 bill Senators Clapp and Cummins, who were 
 members of the committee, took very active 
 part. Senator Cummins, particularly during 
 the earlier weeks of the contest, was almost 
 constantly in the debate. The entire Progres 
 sive group carried the great burden of the con 
 test against the administration bill, and so 
 strong and so effective was their attack, and so 
 reasonable their arguments, that the adminis 
 tration Senators on the floor were compelled to 
 abandon entire sections of the bill to avoid the 
 
424 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 humiliation of being overwhelmingly voted down 
 in the Senate. 
 
 Several sections of the bill were put forward 
 in the beginning under the guise of reforming 
 abuses in watering and overcapitalizing rail 
 road properties. These sections, under the mask 
 of preventing overcapitalization, were in fact 
 designed to legalize every dollar of the railroad 
 capitalization of the country, and under cover of 
 ingeniously worded phraseology would have 
 made possible unlimited railroad stock- jobbing 
 for all future time. 
 
 Mr. Taft, in an interview published in the 
 Outlook December 2, 1911, takes to himself credit 
 for the railroad legislation as it finally passed. 
 As a matter of fact, the fangs in this bill as orig 
 inally introduced were, with the exception of the 
 Commerce Court provisions, all drawn by the 
 fight of the Progressives. We could not, how 
 ever, prevent the establishment of a Commerce 
 Court, which is in a position to destroy, and 
 is now actually destroying, the work of the 
 most progressive Interstate Commerce Com 
 mission the country has ever had. It is scarcely 
 
ALONE IN THE SENATE 425 
 
 possible to speak of the course of the administra 
 tion upon this legislation in temperate language. 
 I wish in this place to refer briefly and I must 
 do it more briefly than the matter deserves 
 to another fight I made in which I had to meet 
 the railroad interests as they had entrenched 
 themselves in the Interstate Commerce Commit 
 tee. The Railroad Brotherhoods of Engineers, 
 Firemen and Trainmen, a remarkably intelligent 
 body of men, had long maintained a very 
 efficient and faithful legislative representative, 
 Mr. Hugh Fuller, here at the national capital, 
 but they had found it impossible even to get a 
 record vote on important measures in which 
 they were interested. No bill in their interests 
 relating to hours of service or liability of the 
 employer for negligence was permitted to get 
 out of the committee. I took up the matter of 
 an Employers Liability law and attempted in 
 1906 to have it adopted as an amendment 
 the Interstate Commerce Act. Failing in this, 
 by an unexpected move I got a bill before the 
 Senate where I could force a record vote. Now, 
 no Senator wanted to put himself wrong with 
 
426 ALONE IN THE SENATE 
 
 the railway employees, and so after fencing for 
 delay I finally got it passed without a roll call. 
 This law, having been held unconstitutional by 
 the supreme court (by a vote of five to four), I 
 introduced another Employers Liability bill in 
 the next session, and had it referred to the Com 
 mittee on Education and Labor (of which Dolliver 
 was chairman) instead of to the Committee on 
 Interstate Commerce. The bill was reported 
 out by Dolliver, was passed and is now the law. 
 I also secured the passage in 1907, after much 
 opposition and filibustering, of a law to limit 
 the hours of continuous service of railroad em 
 ployees. This law has been of great use in 
 preventing those accidents which formerly arose 
 from the continuous employment of men for 
 twenty-four or even thirty-six hours without 
 sleep or rest. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 REINFORCEMENTS: A NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE 
 MOVEMENT 
 
 WHAT is undoubtedly the most signifi 
 cant development of recent years in 
 the Congress of the United States, 
 especially in the Senate, has been the growth 
 of the so-called Progressive group reflecting 
 a similar change in political view upon the part 
 of the people of the country. 
 
 When I entered the Senate I was alone. 
 Dolliver, Clapp, and Beveridge, all of whom were 
 afterward active Progressives, had been mem 
 bers of the Senate for some time and were still 
 recognized as regular, though Dolliver had 
 shown some symptoms of revolt. I have al 
 ready described the first occasion upon which 
 the few Republican Senators who were willing to 
 oppose the reactionary bosses were brought to- 
 
 427 
 
428 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 gether upon the Naval Appropriation bill in 
 January, 1909. Later, after we got into the 
 tariff fight in 1909, we began to know who could 
 be dependeifupon, and our meetings were fre 
 quent. Dolliver, Beveridge, and Clapp were 
 here when I came; Dixon and Bourne en 
 tered March 4, 1907; Borah, March, 1908; Cum- 
 I mins, November, 1908; and Bristow, March, 
 1909. This was the group which generally 
 worked together. 
 
 I cannot let this occasion pass without some 
 special reference to Dolliver, who, in the last 
 year of his service in the Senate, became a great 
 power for good. 
 
 Dolliver was i wonderfully gifted man. His 
 command of language and facility of expression 
 equaled that of any man I ever knew. He had 
 imagination, humor, alertness. He could com 
 mand all of his powers instantly. This was 
 something of a misfortune to Dolliver, because 
 it tempted him often to depend upon this won 
 derful readiness of power instead of engaging 
 in the drudgery which is necessary to enable 
 any man to master first the principles and then 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 429 
 
 the details of a complex problem. He entered 
 public life very young and everything came to 
 him easily. He did not have to encounter 
 opposition in his own district. He did not 
 have to fight for anything in his own state. 
 He was taken up by the leaders here in the House 
 and afterward in the Senate. He was always 
 in demand as a speaker at banquets, always 
 flattered and applauded, and he drifted along 
 with the old crowd. So, when I came to the 
 Senate Dolliver was one of the men put forward 
 to answer any criticism that I might offer against 
 things as they existed. Even after the debate 
 on the railroad bill, to which I referred in 
 the last chapter, Dolliver was lecturing in the 
 same field that I was covering. I had been out 
 through Iowa before I came to the Senate, and 
 I had reviewed the struggle that was then on in 
 Congress to amend the Interstate Commerce 
 Act. I spoke in Dolliver s town and I spoke 
 in Hepburn s town, and they came in for my 
 criticism against the committees for holding up 
 legislation. Senator Dolliver was piqued and 
 prepared a speech for the chautauqua platform 
 
430 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 designed to answer my criticism, though he never 
 mentioned my name. So, when I came to the 
 Senate, although we had been good friends in the 
 House, and though he greeted me cordially, I 
 felt that he was more than a little against me. 
 
 In 1908 I was the one Republican in the 
 Senate who made a fight on the Emergency 
 Currency bill. Dolliver came back a day or 
 two before the vote was to be taken. And he 
 was staged for an eloquent fifteen or twenty 
 minute talk aimed directly at me. He did not 
 mention my name, of course, but it was intended 
 as a rebuke to me. 
 
 I used to say to Mrs. La- Follette, "Dolliver 
 sometime or other will come to himself," and 
 so I never would be drawn into any controversy 
 with him which would lead to a breach in our 
 friendly personal relations. 
 
 As we were coming into the new session, in 
 1909, and the tariff bill was coming up, I thought 
 a great deal about Dolliver. One day I went 
 over to his seat and said, "Senator, I want you 
 to come down to my committee room. I want 
 to talk with you." 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 431 
 
 He said, "Sit down and talk here." 
 
 "No," I said, "I want a serious talk with you. 
 We will both get angry before we get through, 
 but we will stay until we get it over with." 
 
 "What is it all about, Bob?" he asked. 
 
 "I want to make you see that you ought to 
 break away from Aldrich," and I pointed to 
 the other fellows sitting all about him. "These 
 fellows are not serving the public; they are be 
 traying the public and you are following them. 
 Your place is at the head of a movement here in 
 the Senate and in the country for the public 
 interest." 
 
 He said, "Bob, your liver is all out of order; 
 you re jaundiced. You see things awry: cheer 
 up." 
 
 So he laughed and turned me off with a joke, 
 and I did not get any serious talk with him until 
 March, after the committees were selected. 
 Allison was dead and Cummins had succeeded 
 him. Dolliver surrendered his place on the 
 Committee on Interstate Commerce so that 
 Cummins could have a good committee as 
 signment. According to Senate usage two 
 
432 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 Senators representing the same state and 
 belonging to the same political party cannot 
 serve on the same committee. Dolliver had 
 gone to the boss of the Senate, Mr. Aldrich, 
 and said, "Will you put Cummins on that 
 committee if I resign?" 
 
 "Why, if you want it, I will," said Aldrich. 
 
 Having resigned from that committee to 
 make way for Cummins, he applied for appoint 
 ment to the vacancy created by Allison s death 
 on the Committee on Finance. Dolliver had a 
 right to expect that his friends, Aldrich and the 
 rest, would put him on. But after getting his 
 resignation from the Committee on Interstate 
 Commerce, Dolliver was not only denied a place 
 on the Committee on Finance, upon which he 
 had set his heart, but Cummins himself came 
 within a hair s breadth of losing the appoint 
 ment to the Committee on Interstate Com 
 merce. 
 
 Meeting Dolliver in the corridor one day after 
 the appointments were announced, I said to 
 him, "Jonathan, are you pretty nearly ready to 
 have that conference with me?" 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 433 
 
 He answered, "Yes, I am coming over to see 
 you." 
 
 "Well," I said, "come now." 
 
 And he went with me to my committee room. 
 We spent several hours together. Dolliver 
 reviewed all of his associations with these 
 masters of legislation in the House and in the 
 Senate. He went back to the treatment which 
 he had received on the Committee on Interstate 
 Commerce when Aldrich took his railroad bill 
 away from him by a combination of votes in 
 the committee and placed him in the humiliat 
 ing situation of having to see his bill reported 
 by a Democratic member of the committee. He 
 told me then of the difficulty with which he 
 held himself in restraint from making an out 
 break against Aldrich and the system, but that 
 he had yielded to the counsel of his old col 
 league, Senator Allison. But he said that he 
 had told Allison that he could not stand it 
 much longer; that he was going to break away 
 and declare his independence of the system in 
 the Senate which was manipulating legislation 
 for the benefit of great interests. And Alii- 
 
\ 
 
 434 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 son, whom he loved like a father, had said to 
 him: 
 
 " Jonathan, don t do it; don t do it now: wait 
 until I am gone. I know it is wrong. It has 
 grown up here gradually in the last quarter of a 
 century. I have gone along with it. These 
 men are my associates. I have only a little 
 while left, and I haven t the strength to break 
 away. It has got to come. It is a cancer; it s 
 got to be cut out. But wait until I am gone, 
 and then go into this new movement where you 
 belong." 
 
 Dolliver said to me, "From this time on I am 
 going to be independent. I am going to serve 
 my conscience. I have been lecturing, I have 
 , saved my dollars and put them into a farm up 
 there in Iowa. I am going to judgment in the 
 next twenty years, and I am going so I can look 
 my Maker in the face. I do not have to stay 
 in public life. I can take my books, my wife, 
 and my children, and if I am dismissed from the 
 service for following my conviction I will go 
 out to my farm, and stay there until the call 
 
 comes." 
 
Copyright, 1908, by Harris 
 JONATHAN P. DOLLIVER 
 
 Ewing 
 
 "Dolliver never came to the fulness of his strength until this great 
 political revolution took place within him." 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 435 
 
 After that I don t know how many times 
 Dolliver, when our little group would be con 
 ferring, would turn toward me and say, "Bob 
 has been taking the gaff all these years, and isn t 
 going to take it alone any longer." 
 
 Dolliver never came to the fulness of his 
 strength until this great political revolution 
 took place within him. And then it awaked 
 the sleeping giant and he became a student of 
 the details of the tariff; he dug it out by the 
 roots. 
 
 Dolliver had a very remarkable memory. 
 He often told me about how he had trained 
 it.^ His father had insisted upon his com 
 mitting all of his Latin themes and whole 
 books of the Bible to memory. He could write 
 out a speech and deliver it almost literally as 
 it was written. 
 
 He was attacked by the stand-patters of Iowa 
 when he became a Progressive, and he was not 
 credited even by Progressives with that sincerity 
 of conviction which he was in every way entitled 
 to. Many of those in the Progressive ranks 
 who had suffered under his keen witticisms 
 
436 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 could not believe that Dolliver had changed 
 from conviction. But I know that he did. A 
 close study of his record will show how, even 
 while Allison still lived, he was constantly 
 straining at the bonds which kept him in the 
 ranks on that side. He and Clapp came to 
 gether. They were very dear friends often 
 ^together in a social way. They understood and 
 appreciated each other. They were not at all 
 alike, but they had a very strong affection for 
 each other. 
 
 It was the fight on the Payne-Aldrich tariff 
 bill which brought us all together. The ad 
 ministration of Roosevelt had come to an end 
 on March 4, 1909, with nothing to its credit 
 in the way of tariff revision. That thorny 
 problem fell to the unfortunate Mr. Taft. 
 
 Now, Mr. Taft, fully appreciating the public 
 clamor for tariff changes, and knowing that he 
 could not be elected unless he took a strong 
 stand, interpreted the platform pledge with 
 respect to tariff revision in a speech at Mil 
 waukee on September 24, 1908, as follows: 
 
 "I can say that our party is pledged to a 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 437 
 
 genuine revision, and as temporary head of that 
 party and President of the United States, if it 
 be successful in November, I expect to use all 
 the influence I have by calling immediately 
 a special session and by recommendations to 
 Congress to secure a genuine and honest re 
 
 vision. 
 
 He also promised a "substantial revision down 
 ward" 
 
 As soon as he was inaugurated President Taft 
 called an extraordinary session of Congress to 
 meet on March 15, 1909 and the work of the 
 tariff revision began. 
 
 Immediately, as will be remembered, the 
 struggle began for control of the organization 
 of both houses. In the House an attempt made 
 to defeat Cannon, whom Taft had in the cam 
 paign called "An old man of the Sea," was 
 frustrated through the influence of no other 
 person than Mr. Taft himself -- and to the dis 
 may of every one. And in the Senate, in spite 
 of opposition, the old control, with Aldrich as 
 its leader, organized all the committees. 
 
 We had expected that Taft s first state paper 
 
438 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 to the extra session which he had called would 
 be a vigorous demand for downward revision 
 of the tariff. The Senate and House were 
 crowded. The attention was keen everywhere. 
 The clerk began to read. At the end of two 
 minutes he stopped. There was a hush, an 
 expectation that he would resume. But he 
 laid aside the paper. A look of amazement was 
 on every face. The one thing emphasized in 
 the President s message was -the importance of 
 disposing of the tariff as early as possible in 
 order that business might not be long disturbed 
 by uncertainties regarding customs tariffs. Not 
 a word about honest revision or revision down 
 ward ! 
 
 But the Progressives did hot then lose hope 
 in the President. We believed that he would 
 still carry out his promises. We had all sup 
 ported him heartily in his campaign. I had 
 been the candidate of the state of Wisconsin for 
 the Presidency at the convention which nom 
 inated Taft, and while I had no expectation of 
 being nominated, I did hope that we should have 
 some influence in molding the platform. When 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 439 
 
 Taft was nominated, I immediately sent him 
 the following telegram: 
 
 "Ron. WILLIAM H. TAFT, 
 
 "Washington, D. C. 
 
 "While the platform is disappointing in some 
 fundamental provisions and omissions, and I 
 shall claim the right to say so, I congratulate 
 you most sincerely, and in the faith that you are 
 more nearly in accord with the great body of 
 Republican voters than the platform, I shall do 
 all in my power to insure your election." 
 
 When the tariff bill passed the House, there 
 fore, after being bitterly opposed by the House 
 insurgents as the thoroughly bad measure that 
 it W as, I felt at liberty to call upon the President 
 and talk with him about it. I still had hope 
 that he w r ould keep faith with the people. He 
 agreed with me, on that occasion, that the bill 
 as it passed the House was not a compliance 
 with platform pledges, and he said distinctly 
 that unless it were thoroughly overhauled he 
 would veto it. I suggested to the President 
 that it was plainly his duty now to transmit a 
 message to Congress making it clear that the 
 
440 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 House bill was in violation of the pledges of the 
 party and against the public interests. 
 
 "Well," he said, "I don t much believe in a 
 President s interfering with the legislative de 
 partment while it is doing its work. They have 
 their responsibility and I have mine. And if 
 they send that bill to me, and it isn t a better 
 bill than it is now, I will veto it." 
 
 I suggested that if he remained silent he 
 would never find himself able, after the record 
 was made up, to turn about and fall upon Con 
 gress with a veto. His answer came quick and 
 strong. 
 
 You and your associates in the Senate go 
 ahead, criticise the bill, amend it, cut down the 
 duties go after it hard. I will keep track of 
 your amendments. I will read every word of 
 the speeches you make, and when they lay that 
 bill down before me, unless it complies with the 
 platform, I will veto it." 
 
 And he brought his fist down on the desk with 
 a thump to emphasize the firmness of his pur 
 pose. 
 
 "Very well," I said, "Mr. President, but I 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 441 
 
 predict that when it passes the Senate it will be 
 a far worse measure than it is now." 
 
 "Well," he retorted, "I will show you." 
 Aldrich kept the bill in possession of his 
 committee for forty-eight hours. The corridors 
 about his committee rooms were crowded with 
 the representatives of the big protected interests. 
 Some were admitted from time to time for brief 
 conferences. When Aldrich reported the bill 
 he made a brief oral statement devoted solely to 
 an estimate of the revenues which would be pro 
 duced under the proposed duties. No written re 
 port accompanied the bill, and no explanation, 
 \vritten or oral, was placed before the Senate, 
 offering any reason for the six hundred increases 
 over the rates fixed in the House bill. Thereupon, 
 Aldrich demanded immediate consideration of 
 the bill, which contained three hundred pages, 
 and of which most of the Senators had no knowl 
 edge whatever. He was preparing, as usual, 
 to drive roughshod over all opposition. 
 
 I was not altogether unprepared for this action 
 on the Senator s part, and, taking the floor, I 
 protested against the present consideration of 
 
442 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 the bill. I made it plain that never before in 
 our history had the Senate Committee on 
 Finance failed to submit with a tariff bill an 
 extended printed report setting forth the argu 
 ments for every change of duty. Furthermore, 
 I proved from the record that it had been the 
 invariable custom of the Senate committee to 
 place the tariff bill and the accompanying report 
 upon the desks of Senators, with a notice that 
 the bill would be taken up some two to six weeks 
 later, giving Senators full opportunity to fa 
 miliarize themselves with the proposed changes. 
 
 No answer was made to my speech. It was 
 manifestly the purpose of Senator Aldrich to 
 allow Senators no chance to prepare in advance 
 to resist the sort of tariff legislation which the 
 Payne- Aldrich bill provided. And in further 
 ance of this plan, as the consideration of the bill 
 advanced, he secured the adoption of an order 
 that the Senate should meet, until further order, 
 at 10 o clock in the morning, and that the ses 
 sions should continue without recess or adjourn 
 ment until 11 o clock at night. The reason 
 which he advanced for this was that the business 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 443 
 
 interests were suffering because of the uncertain 
 ties regarding the tariff; but the effect of this 
 order was to force those Senators who were 
 conscientiously investigating schedules either 
 to abandon all of their efforts or to take the 
 course pursued by our little group. I person 
 ally know that it was the practice of a number 
 of Progressives, as it was my practice, to leave 
 the Senate at the close of the session at 11 o clock 
 and, reaching home at midnight, to work well 
 into the small hours of the morning over the 
 provisions certain to be reached on the suc 
 ceeding day, then snatch a brief rest and be 
 ready for the session at ten o clock in the morn 
 ing. This work continued week after week all 
 through the hot months of a sultry Washington 
 summer. It was taxing to the last degree, and 
 reduced the vitality of the hardiest members 
 of the group. I shall always believe that the 
 exactions of that session were the primary cause 
 of Dolliver s death a year later. 
 
 Two of the members of the group, Senator 
 Dolliver and myself, had been members of the 
 Ways and Means Committee of the House of 
 
444 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 Representatives and had taken part in framing 
 the tariff bills in other sessions. Senator Dol- 
 liver performed a prodigious amount of labor, 
 particularly upon the cotton schedule, followed 
 by one of the most "brilliant speeches of his 
 entire public career. Senator Bristow devoted 
 much time to the lead and sugar Schedules; 
 Senator Cummins nihde special preparation 
 upon .the metal schedule, glass, and other im 
 portant products of general consumption. He 
 was in the debate day by day, rendering most 
 excellent public service. I endeavored to ac 
 quire as complete a knowledge as possible of the 
 cotton schedule, the woolen schedule and impor 
 tant items in several other schedules of the bill, 
 which I presented as thoroughly as I could. 
 
 The feature of the work done by the insur 
 gents upon the bill is characteristic of the Pro 
 gressive attitude toward all matters of public 
 \ interest and that is service to the public as 
 against special interests^ It is incumbent upon 
 the reformer who seeks to establish a new order 
 to come equipped with complete mastery of all 
 the information upon which the established order 
 
V 
 REINFORCEMENTS 445 
 
 is based. And it is for this reason that the 
 thoroughgoing, uncompromising, Progressive 
 movement is essentially a safe one for the public 
 and for all legitimate business. 
 
 It soon became apparent as we got into the 
 thickest of the fight that the lines were set and 
 the combinations effected to advance instead 
 of reduce tariff duties. Reductions here and 
 there in no way beneficial to the consuming 
 public were made with a view to offsetting in the 
 general average advances upon many of the 
 necessaries of life, which already enjoyed an 
 excessive protection under the Dingley law. 
 
 The bi-partisan character of the tariff issue 
 also soon developed. In any case where the 
 Progressive attack menaced the duty on any 
 product, Aldrich as a rule summoned to his 
 support a sufficient number of reactionary Demo 
 crats to prevent breaking his lines. 
 
 Mr. Aldrich soon discovered that with all his 
 experience in piloting tariff bills through Con 
 gress he was in no wise equipped to meet the 
 opposition of the Progressives. And after a 
 few encounters, when either of the three or four 
 
446 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 men in the Progressive group took the floor to 
 attack some schedule, Aldrich would beat a 
 hasty retreat from the floor of the Senate to 
 escape the mortification certain to follow such 
 encounters. In all of his long leadership in the 
 Senate on all questions, tariff or otherwise, it 
 had been sufficient for Mr. Aldrich to say, "It 
 is so," or "It is not so," or "It is necessary," or 
 "It is not necessary" -but a new day had 
 dawned. The insurgents stood in the pathway 
 of Mr. Aldrich s program of legislation with 
 searching interrogatories demanding reasons for 
 all things. The Senate boss was thrown into 
 confusion. He had been accustomed to issue 
 orders not furnish reasons. 
 
 The consideration of the tariff bill had pro 
 ceeded but a little way when it became certain 
 that no important changes could be effected. 
 But that did not deter the Progressives. De 
 feated again and again, they returned to the 
 attack. It was a splendid exhibition of the true 
 spirit of moral reform. Defeat was a matter of 
 no consequence to them. 
 
 The great service rendered by the Progressives 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 447 
 
 in the extra tariff session was a clean-cut, 
 straightaway, undeviating fight for principle. 
 The extra tariff session did more to give the 
 Progressive movement a clear definition in the 
 public mind than any one thing that has trans 
 pired in Congress. 
 
 There were ten Republicans, not all of whom 
 could be classed as Progressives, who voted 
 against the bill on its first passage through the 
 Senate: Beveridgfc; BristoW^Brown,^ Burkett, 
 Clapp, Crawford, Cummins, Dolliver, Nelson 
 and myself. The bill then went to conference. 
 
 While most of the Progressives were disap 
 pointed in the President s attitude, they still 
 hoped that he might do something. During 
 the debate, in appealing to the Republican side 
 of the Senate to make good the pledges of the 
 Republican platform, I had quoted President 
 Taft in Milwaukee, in Des Moines, in Kansas 
 City, interpreting the pledge of that platform 
 to mean downward revision. Other Progres 
 sives made reference to these speeches for the 
 same reason. We felt that there could be no 
 gainsaying his position. 
 
448 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 While the bill was in conference I took the 
 occasion to go to my home in Wisconsin, and 
 called at the W T hite House to pay my respects 
 before leaving. The President said: 
 
 " Come and sit down. I want to talk with you 
 about the tariff. What am I to do with this bill? " 
 
 I said, "Mr. President, you ought to veto it. 
 You remember you said you would unless it was 
 a better bill than when it passed the House. 
 Instead of being a better bill, it is much worse. 
 Hundreds of increases have been made in the 
 Senate." 
 
 "Well," he said, "suppose I find that I can t 
 do that. What changes ought I to insist upon 
 in conference?" 
 
 I could not help remembering what the Presi 
 dent had said previously about his being opposed 
 to executive interference with the legislative 
 department of government. But the country 
 was all wrought up and the President had throw r n 
 his scruples to the winds. Picking up a pencil 
 and pad of paper, he said, 
 
 "Tell me what things ought to be reduced 
 in duty." 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 449 
 
 He wrote as I talked until he had filled the 
 page of the tablet. Then, laying it down, he 
 said, 
 
 "Will you write me a letter stating suc 
 cinctly the things that you think ought to be 
 done?" 
 
 I had made my preparations to go home, but 
 I waited over, and the following day I sent to 
 the White House a somewhat lengthy typewrit 
 ten document giving my views. I started out 
 by saying that I thought he ought to veto 
 the bill, but that if he decided not to veto it, 
 it ought to be changed in certain particulars 
 which I outlined. I got a note from him a day 
 or two after I reached home thanking me for 
 that letter. 
 
 At the end of ten days the conferees reached 
 an agreement and reported to the two houses. 
 The final test came on the adoption of the con 
 ference report, the effect of which would be to 
 send the bill to the President. The bill was not 
 so changed in conference as to materially alter 
 its character. Mr. Taft had failed to get his 
 stand-pat friends who conducted the conference 
 
450 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 to make changes that really amounted to any 
 thing. It was still a violation of the platform 
 pledges; it still broke faith with the people. 
 There w r ere indeed slight modifications in duties 
 on lumber, and three or four other articles, and 
 upon these slight changes the administration 
 based its hope of securing the support of some 
 of the Senators and Representatives who had 
 voted against the bill before it went to confer 
 ence. There was a basis for this hope. After 
 making a record in the House or the Senate 
 against the bill to present to his constituents 
 a member was in a position to say that he had 
 done his best to improve the bill and that he 
 now chose to vote with his party for a protec 
 tive measure, though it were too radically pro 
 tective, rather than vote with the Democrats 
 against the bill reported by the conference 
 committee. 
 
 Again it became a question in our little group 
 as to how many would stand against the con 
 ference report and complete a record of con 
 sistent opposition to a bill that represented the 
 consummation of privilege more reprehensible 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 451 
 
 than had ever before found a place upon the 
 statutes of the country. 
 
 I recall distinctly the efforts put forth to 
 break our lines. Insurgents were irrvited to the 
 White House to meet the President, and others 
 saw him from time to time. Among these 
 were Dolliver, Cummins and Beveridge. I re 
 call Dolliver s comment: 
 
 "Bob," he said, "I was invited up to the 
 White House to a tariff breakfast." And then 
 he paused and looked at me with a twinkle in 
 his eye and added, "The muskmelon he served 
 was not very good." 
 
 I knew that Dolliver had not changed. 
 Neither Bristow, Clapp, nor I was invited to 
 sample the President s breakfast melons. We 
 were regarded as hopelessly lost to the admin 
 istration. 
 
 The conference report was agreed upon dur 
 ing the night, and the stand-pat papers an 
 nounced that the changes made a great "moral 
 victory" for President Taft. This was to open 
 the door for the "near" insurgents to come 
 back to the party and vote for the conference 
 
452 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 report. One not experienced in the life of the 
 national capital can hardly conceive the tensity 
 of the situation. Party loyalty is still a fetish 
 in Congress: The air of the Senate chamber and 
 cloak-rooms was charged with partisan feeling. 
 It fairly crackled. 
 
 But in spite of all this pressure, our little 
 group held together wonderfully, and at the 
 final vote the following Republicans cast their 
 ballots against the bill: Beveridge, Bristow, 
 Clapp, Cummins, Dolliver and myself. Sena 
 tor Nelson, who cannot be classed "as a Progres 
 sive, also voted against the bill. 
 
 All during the struggle over the Payne-Aldrich 
 bill partisan power and partisan methods were 
 used in all their forms to force the Progressives 
 into line upon a measure which they knew to be 
 bad. The insurgent members of the House, 
 for example, were made apprehensive about 
 their patronage. A great many of their post- 
 office appointments were delayed and a little 
 later the appointments growing out of the taking 
 of the new census became a critical matter. 
 
 One night nearly all of the Wisconsin delega- 
 
HEINFORCEMENTS 453 
 
 tion came up to my residence. They were very 
 much wrought up. They had discovered that 
 the administration was discriminating against 
 the Progressive members in Wisconsin and in 
 favor of Senator Stephenson, who was voting 
 regularly with Aldrich. Senator Stephenson 
 had said to them that the President was going 
 to allow Mr. E. A. Edmonds to name the super 
 visors of census in all the districts of Wisconsin. 
 Edmonds was chairman of the State Central 
 Committee of Wisconsin and the man who had 
 managed Stephenson s campaign when he spent 
 $107,000 in the primary election. They said 
 they came to me because I was chairman of 
 the Committee on Census of the Senate, and 
 they thought that I might ascertain if Mr. 
 Taft was going to turn over all the patronage 
 of the state to the "stand-patters." I told 
 them that such an action as this was 
 directly contrary to what he had said to me 
 when discussing the civil service features of 
 the census bill; that I had seen him about 
 strengthening those sections of the bill and 
 he had then assured me that the census 
 
454 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 bureau was not to be made a political 
 machine. I told the delegation that if it would 
 be any satisfaction to them I would bring the 
 matter to the President s attention. So I saw 
 the President and told him just what had been 
 reported. He looked out of the window and 
 said, "It s a lie; not a word of truth in it." 
 
 "Well," I said, "may I say to them, Mr. 
 President, that they can file their recommenda 
 tions with the expectation that they will be 
 treated as other Republican Congressmen are 
 treated?" 
 
 "Well," he said, "I can t take this matter up 
 until after the tariff bill is passed." 
 
 Then I knew that this patronage matter was 
 being held as a club over the Progressives. 
 
 When the tariff bill was passed, Mr. Lenroot, 
 Mr. Nelson and Mr. Gary, Wisconsin Republican 
 members, all voted against it. When they filed 
 their recommendations before leaving Washing 
 ton for supervisors in their respective districts 
 they were promptly turned down and stand 
 patters recommended by Stephenson and Ed 
 monds appointed in their places. There was 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 455 
 
 one Democratic district in Wisconsin where 
 no recommendation had been made. Doctor 
 Durand said he would be glad to have me make 
 a recommendation for that district. The man 
 I suggested was promptly turned down, and 
 the man appointed by the President was rec 
 ommended by Mr. Edmonds arid Senator 
 Stephenson. 
 
 Now these appointments were made during 
 the recess, and their nominations all had to 
 come through the Senate Committee on Census, 
 of which I was chairman. When the committee 
 met I stated exactly what the President had 
 I done with respect to supervisors of census in 
 \ Wisconsin. Hale, Carter, and a number of mem 
 bers of the committee said: 
 
 ;< You report against the confirmation of those 
 Wisconsin supervisors, and every member of 
 this committee and the whole Senate will stand 
 with you. Not one of them will be confirmed." 
 
 But I saw plainly enough that I was going 
 to have some differences with the administra 
 tion upon important legislative matters and so 
 I resolved to report these nominations for con- 
 
456 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 firmation, determined that my differences with 
 the administration, if any, should be upon mat 
 ters of principle and not be obscured by squab 
 bles over patronage. 
 
 I wish to refer here in passing to another 
 experience I had, as chairman of the Census 
 Committee, with the President. On one of my 
 visits to the White House while the census bill 
 was pending I called the President s attention 
 to a section of the bill that provided for taking 
 the valuation of the manufacturing plants of 
 the country. I said, "Mr. President, I have 
 been a member of the Senate for three or four 
 years. I have been trying to secure considera 
 tion of an amendment to the Interstate Com 
 merce Act authorizing the commission to make 
 a valuation of the railroads of the country. But 
 as the committees are organized in the Senate 
 and in the House we can t get a bill out of the 
 committee. Now there is an opportunity here 
 to put a provision into the census bill employing 
 engineers of the army and other experts under 
 the direction of the Department of Commerce 
 and Labor to make a physical valuation of the 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 457 
 
 railroads, and I am very strongly tempted to 
 use all the power and influence I have as chair 
 man of that committee to get some action upon 
 this important subject." 
 
 "Senator La Follette," he said, "I am afraid 
 that will delay consideration of the bill. If you 
 will not do that, I will recommend valuation 
 strongly in my message next fall; I will put the 
 whole influence of the administration behind 
 your proposition." 
 
 I said, "Very well, Mr. President. I will act 
 on your suggestion, and with the support of the 
 administration next fall we will have a good 
 show of getting some action." 
 
 He did not recommend the legislation in his 
 message. Instead, he put in a statement that 
 no legislation of the sort was necessary; that 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission should 
 proceed under the law just as it was. And that 
 was the end of the valuation of railroad property 
 under the Taft administration. 
 
 It was acts such as these, together with his 
 attitude upon the tariff question, his failure to 
 support the plain pledges of the party, his inter- 
 
458 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 ference in behalf of Cannon, his use of patron 
 age to discipline members, his alignment with 
 Aldrich and the stand-patters of the party, 
 and his whole course in the Ballinger affair, 
 which absolutely alienated the Progressive 
 group. 
 
 One of the most important measures which 
 has come before the Senate since I became a 
 member is the Aldrich Emergency Currency 
 bill, afterward known as the Aldrich-Vreeland 
 Currency bill. In some ways no bill ever in 
 troduced in Congress was more significant of 
 the control of legislation by great financial 
 interests. This bill proposed an issue of $500,- 
 000,000 of additional notes to national banking 
 associations, such issue to be based upon state 
 bonds, municipal bonds, and as reported by the 
 committee and advocated by Senator Aldrich, 
 railroad bonds as well. The country had just 
 gone through the panic of 1907 and banks and 
 business had been made to feel the pinch. There 
 was a plausible reason to urge, and, indeed, con 
 sidering the character of our currency system 
 and the imperfection of our banking laws, a 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 459 
 
 sound reason, for making provision against a 
 sudden withdrawal of the money necessary for 
 the daily exchanges of business, whether such 
 contraction was due to the fear resulting from a 
 panic inaugurated for speculative purposes or 
 otherwise. For even a managed panic may be 
 come unmanageable, and in any event legitimate 
 commercial enterprises are certain to suffer. 
 
 But there were reasons back of the emergency 
 features of this bill more important vastly to 
 the interests than those prominently urged. It 
 was inevitable that the years of stock-watering 
 and promotion, the inflation of railway securi 
 ties, industrial securities, mining, traction, gas 
 and electricity, should bring its harvest of 
 financial distress and reaction. It was in 
 evitable that the crime of overcapitalization 
 should meet its punishment. There was urgent 
 demand that these securities should be restored 
 to public confidence. The emergency currency 
 measure offered the opportunity, and for the 
 first time in history it was proposed that rail 
 road bonds should be wrought into our monetary 
 system as a basis for currency issue. 
 
460 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 To secure the acceptance of railroad bonds as 
 a basis for even an emergency currency would 
 accomplish two vitally important things for 
 the special interests: First, it would restore 
 confidence in such railroad securities, stocks as 
 well as bonds; second, it would avert an im 
 pending danger to such securities, which had 
 been seriously menaced by a proposal to ascer 
 tain the true value of the properties of the rail 
 roads, against which stocks and bonds had been 
 issued without limit. 
 
 When I entered the Senate in 1906, as before 
 stated, I had proposed as an amendment to the 
 Hepburn rate bill a provision authorizing and 
 directing the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 to make such valuation as a basis for establish 
 ing reasonable rates. The Senate had voted down 
 my proposed amendment. 
 
 For two years I had awaited an opportunity 
 to offer my amendment providing for valuation 
 to any measure pending before the Senate to 
 which it would be germane. Apparently it had 
 never occurred to the committee reporting the 
 currency bill that my valuation measure, which 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 461 
 
 had been bottled up in the Committee on Inter 
 state Commerce, would be germane as an 
 amendment to the railroad bond provision in the 
 currency bill. 
 
 This opportunity now presented itself in 
 connection with the Emergency Currency bill. 
 I promptly offered an amendment providing 
 that the Secretary of the Treasury should be 
 authorized to accept railroad bonds as security 
 for the emergency currency issue only after the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission had ascertained 
 the value of the physical properties of the railroads, 
 upon which the bonds in question constituted a 
 first mortgage; and provided further that no 
 such railroad bonds should be accepted unless 
 the value of the property of the railroad com 
 pany were found to be ample security for such 
 bonds. 
 
 The offering of the amendment produced a 
 flutter of excitement. Disgust and consterna 
 tion were plainly manifest. For two years 
 they had been able to deny me a vote in the 
 Senate on the valuation of railway property 
 and the reactionary Senators had learned to 
 
462 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 fear being placed on record with roll calls. And 
 here I was rudely thrusting this troublesome 
 proposition upon them in violation of all the 
 regulations governing " senatorial courtesy." 
 
 I had announced that on March 17th I would 
 address the Senate on the pending bill, and in 
 that connection would oppose the railroad bonds 
 provision. Thirty minutes before I was to be 
 gin my argument on that day Senator Aldrich 
 arose and informed the Senate that he was 
 directed by the Committee on Finance to with 
 draw from the bill all that portion of it relating 
 to railway bonds ! 
 
 But if it was Mr. Aldrich s purpose to avoid 
 a discussion of his plan to make railroad bonds 
 a security for currency issue he failed. For in 
 opening my argument I referred to the announce 
 ment of Senator Aldrich, and predicted that at 
 some later stage in the course of the legislation 
 that same provision would again make its ap 
 pearance in the bill. Therefore I covered in 
 my argument the railroad bonds provision and 
 discussed it thoroughly. I presented facts to 
 show that 75 per cent, of the railroad bonds 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 463 
 
 which would be affected by the provision were 
 held by banks in New England and eastern 
 states, and only 25 per cent, distributed through 
 out the west, middle west, and south. With 
 its highly organized banking system the entire 
 holdings would be at the command of the big 
 group banks. In the course of my argument I 
 was also able to demonstrate that the legislation 
 would operate to place the money trust in a 
 position to control for their own advantage any 
 issue of emergency currency. 
 
 When government bonds were made the 
 basis for national bank issues, it was avowedly 
 for the purpose of enhancing their market value. 
 It had that effect. It would have a like effect 
 upon railroad, municipal and other bonds. It 
 would be difficult to conceive of a better way 
 to boom the market for railroad bonds than to 
 put behind them the mandate of the law com 
 pelling national banks to go into the market and 
 bid for them. Could anything be conceived by 
 the ingenuity of man that would more quickly 
 enhance the price of railroad bonds held by a 
 limited number of speculative banks and by a 
 
464 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 few capitalists, or better promote certain great 
 related interests? 
 
 In the course of my speech on the Emergency 
 Currency bill I showed clearly how the industrial 
 and banking interests are closely controlled by a 
 small group of financiers. I asserted that fewer 
 than one hundred men control the great business 
 interests of the country. 
 
 The following day the great newspapers of the 
 country, with very rare exceptions, denied my 
 statements and denounced me as a demagogue. 
 The Review of Reviews editorially characterized 
 my utterances as sensational and much to be 
 regretted. 
 
 A few days later I replied to my critics and 
 out of the Directories of Directors and other 
 record data proved my assertions, and demon 
 strated that in fact less than a dozen men control 
 the business of the country indeed, that 
 Standard Oil and Morgan are the real business 
 kings of America. 
 
 In a way the public had understood that the 
 railroads had consolidated and even that the 
 great manufacturing corporations of the country 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 465 
 
 had combined to control production and prices. 
 But I think I may say that never before March, 
 1908, had the facts been brought together in any 
 discussion in Congress. I then demonstrated 
 through an analysis of the directorates of Big 
 Business that the railroads, telegraph, shipping, 
 street car and interurban lines, cable, telephone, 
 express, mining, iron, coal, oil, gas, electric light, 
 manufacturing, steel, agricultural implements, 
 machinery of all kinds, cotton, woolens, tobacco, 
 sugar, and the food products are completely 
 controlled and mainly owned by a small group 
 of men. 
 
 I was very much interested and not a little 
 gratified a few weeks ago to have the statements 
 I made in 1908, as applied to the control of capital 
 and credit, corroborated by the president of one 
 of the largest banks in the United States - 
 George M. Reynolds of the Continental and 
 Commercial Bank of Chicago. On the 13th day 
 of December, 1911, he was one of the speakers 
 at the somewhat exclusive banquet held under 
 the auspices of the National Business League of 
 America. I might add parenthetically that this 
 
466 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 National Business League of America is an 
 organization that is behind the Aldrich cur 
 rency scheme and this meeting was held in Chi 
 cago primarily to advance the Aldrich scheme, 
 which is now being pressed upon the attention 
 of Senators and members of the House. 
 
 It was a company of bankers, a financial 
 family gathering, as it were. Mr. Reynolds 
 said: 
 
 "I believe the money power now lies in the 
 hands of a dozen men. I plead guilty to being 
 one, in the last analysis, of those men." 
 
 I quote this from page 296 of the official 
 report of the " Proceedings of the National Busi 
 ness Congress." A limited number of the vol 
 umes giving these proceedings were issued, 
 but, since Mr. Reynolds overfrank statement 
 has been quoted publicly, I am informed that 
 the reports have been called in and consigned to 
 deposit vaults. There are a few, however, in 
 the hands of individuals who will endeavor to 
 keep alive the confessions of Mr. Reynolds, 
 speaking as one of the twelve. 
 
 The withdrawal of the railroad bond provision 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 467 
 
 by Mr. Aldrich before I began my speech on the 
 currency bill prevented, as he intended it should, 
 any plan on my part to force the consideration 
 of railroad valuation, and on March 27, 1908, 
 by a vote of 42 to 16 the bill passed the Senate. 
 The only Republicans who voted against it were 
 Borah, Bourne, Brown, and La Follette. 
 
 In the House the Vreeland bill was sub 
 stituted for the Aldrich bill and the whole matter 
 was finally thrown into conference. At an early 
 meeting the conference committee announced 
 that an agreement between the two houses was 
 utterly impossible and that therefore no bill 
 could be passed. 
 
 I did not place as great reliance as others upon 
 the statement issued. I could not believe that 
 the interests would permit the session to close 
 without another effort to carry out their plans, 
 but Congress and the country generally accepted 
 the statement with expressions of general satis 
 faction that the whole matter should go over to 
 a later period, when something of substantial 
 merit might be secured. 
 
 For many weeks not a word was heard from 
 t 
 
468 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 this committee on conference, and then suddenly 
 on May 27th, three days before adjournment, 
 this measure of vital importance was thrust upon 
 the consideration of Congress in the form of a 
 conference report, which might be debated 
 but could not be amended in any respect. Upon 
 examining the measure it was clearly apparent 
 that the bill was in no respect better than the 
 bill which had passed the Senate, and in many 
 particulars it was infinitely worse. 
 
 As I had predicted, the railroad bonds pro 
 vision had been restored to the bill, but buried 
 under an obscure phrase. The bill also con 
 tained an infamous provision which permitted 
 the use of bonds as security for currency at less 
 than par value. 
 
 I determined to resist its passage with all my 
 strength. I felt assured that with the assistance 
 of three or four other Senators I could protract 
 the discussion until the rankly objectionable 
 features of the measure would elicit such a 
 protest from independent bankers and business 
 men of the country as would compel Congress 
 radically to amend or to defeat it. I sought for 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 469 
 
 help* among the few recently elected Republican 
 Senators, but found them timid about joining 
 me in the undertaking. I then resolved to make 
 the best opposition I could to the measure and 
 extend the debate in the hope that some Demo 
 cratic Senator or Senators might later come to 
 my assistance. 
 
 Before the conference report was called up 
 for action in the Senate I was assured by 
 Senators Gore and Stone that one or the other 
 of them would take the floor when I concluded, 
 Stone saying that he would speak for five or 
 six hours against the bill and Gore agreeing to 
 follow Stone for at least two hours. The con 
 ference report having been called up shortly 
 before 12 o clock on the 29th of May, I very 
 soon thereafter obtained the floor and began my 
 discussion of its most objectionable provisions, 
 which I continued for the balance of the after 
 noon, throughout the night and until 7 o clock on 
 the morning of the 30th of May, having spoken 
 nineteen hours without surrendering the floor. 
 
 It was not expected that I would be able to 
 hold the floor for more than a few hours at most, 
 
470 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 but as the afternoon wore away, and I con 
 tinued speaking past the usual adjourning time, 
 there were manifestations of some uneasiness 
 on the part of the chairman of the Finance 
 Committee and his more immediate supporters. 
 
 The newspaper dispatches carried the infor 
 mation to the country that a fight was on against 
 the Emergency Currency conference report, 
 and by midnight telegrams began to come to 
 Senators from independent bankers, and business 
 men asking them to support me in my opposi 
 tion to the measure. 
 
 But bills had been held back by the Senate 
 managers of legislation to serve as guards to this 
 conference report. One of these measures was 
 the great public buildings "pork barrel" bill car 
 rying appropriations in which many Senators felt 
 deeply interested. Senators who would natur 
 ally be in sympathy with my fight were warned 
 that if they aided me the public buildings bill 
 would be permitted to fail at that session. 
 
 Another measure used as a club to beat off 
 the aid of a number of Southern Senators who 
 were strongly opposed to the Emergency Cur- 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 471 
 
 rency bill was a measure, then pending, to cut 
 down the number of representatives in the House 
 from the southern states. 
 
 But I got on fairly well with my single-handed 
 opposition. The interest was very great. Scores 
 of representatives came over from the House, 
 and the galleries were crowded. 
 
 When I first took the floor Aldrich, Hale, and 
 the other managers of Senate business were 
 inclined to chaff me, but, after I had been speak 
 ing for some time, they grew impatient. I 
 noticed that they had their heads together and 
 before long it was whispered to me by a friendly 
 Senator that I would have to be on my guard if 
 I kept the floor, as they proposed to get me to 
 yield to some interruption, and then have the 
 presiding officer recognize the interrupting Sen 
 ator as having the floor in his own right, thus 
 compelling me if I desired to go on again to 
 secure a fresh recognition from the Chair, which 
 would be held to be my second recognition upon 
 the same question upon the same legislative day. 
 As Mr. Aldrich intended to keep the Senate in 
 continuous session until the conference report 
 
472 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 was adopted, the legislative day might continue 
 indefinitely. I would then be placed in a posi 
 tion where, when I yielded the floor to procure 
 rest and refreshment, I could not be recognized, 
 as this would be in violation of one of the stand 
 ing rules of the Senate. The rule in question 
 provides that no Senator shall speak more than 
 twice upon any one question in debate upon the 
 same day. This rule is never enforced, but it 
 was proposed to enforce it against me. 
 
 Senator Hale addressed the Chair as follows: 
 
 "Mr. President - 
 
 "The Vice-President. Does the Senator from 
 Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Maine? 
 
 "Mr. La Toilette. I yield to the Senator 
 from Maine. 
 
 "Mr. Hale. I do not ask the Senator to yield. 
 The Senator yielded the floor, and I secured the 
 recognition of the Vice-President." 
 
 This was not in accordance with the fact. 
 Senator Hale had not secured recognition of the 
 Vice-President which entitled him to the floor 
 in his own right. 
 
 I was surprised on the following morning to 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 473 
 
 find that the Congressional Record as printed 
 changed the form of the Vice-President s rec 
 ognition. As it appeared in the Record the 
 next morning it was as follows: 
 
 " Mr. Hale. Mr. President 
 
 "The Vice-President. The Senator from 
 Maine." 
 
 Thus it was made to appear from the Record 
 that the Senator from Maine was recognized as 
 having the right to the floor, and not as having 
 the floor yielded to him by me. On procuring 
 the official shorthand report of the proceedings, 
 I found it had been "doctored," and I caused a 
 photograph to be made for future use. Thus 
 the foundation was laid by altering the Record 
 to have me barred from the floor when I yielded 
 it again. 
 
 Having held the floor for nineteen hours, I 
 surrendered to Senator Stone of Missouri, who 
 had come to my assistance. He was relieved 
 after occupying the floor for six or seven hoursSx 
 by Senator Gore, who spoke for two hours. It 
 was the understanding that Senator Stone would 
 follow Senator Gore for an hour, at which time 
 
474 REINFORCEMENTS 
 
 I would again take the floor. We intended to 
 continue the "filibuster" until the leaders should 
 give in. 
 
 I was in my committee room arranging 
 material for use when I was hurriedly summoned 
 to the Senate floor with the information that 
 the debate had been closed. The roll call was 
 in progress when I reached the floor, and it was 
 therefore impossible for me to attempt to secure 
 recognition and continue the fight. It seems 
 that Senator Stone was not in the chamber when 
 the blind Senator Gore, supposing that Stone 
 was present according to previous arrangement, 
 yielded. There being no one at hand to ask 
 recognition in opposition to the conference 
 report, the call of the roll began at once, and 
 the fight was over. The conference report 
 was adopted by a vote of 43 to 22. The debate 
 had at least exposed the character of the con 
 ference report and the methods employed by 
 the masters of legislation for enforcing it upon 
 the country. It added another chapter to the 
 record of the subserviency of Congress to special 
 interests. 
 
REINFORCEMENTS 475 
 
 It is my settled belief that this great power 
 over government legislation can only be over 
 thrown by resisting at every step, seizing upon 
 every important occasion which offers oppor 
 tunity to uncover the methods of the system. 
 It matters little whether the particular question 
 at issue is the tariff, the railroads, or the cur 
 rency. The fight is the same. It is not a ques 
 tion of party politics. The great issue strikes 
 down to the very foundation of our free insti 
 tutions. It is against the system built up by 
 privilege, which has taken possession of govern 
 ment and legislation, that we must make un 
 ceasing warfare. 
 
 It was in this Emergency Currency bill that 
 Aldrich laid the foundation for the upbuilding 
 of his scheme, which is now backed by powerful 
 financial and business interests to secure stronger 
 control upon the capital and credit of our coun 
 try. This has now crystallized in the so-called 
 Aldrich currency plan, a measure which the 
 interests will take the first available opportunity 
 to force upon Congress. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 WHY I BECAME A CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESI 
 DENCY TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY - A COMPLETE 
 HISTORY OF ROOSEVELT S COURSE AFTER HIS 
 RETURN FROM AFRICA FORMATION OF THE 
 ORGANIZED PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT PRES 
 SURE FOR A REAL PROGRESSIVE CANDIDATE 
 
 BY THE close of the extra session con 
 vened on the fifteenth of March, 1909, 
 President Taft s course upon the tariff 
 legislation had raised, in the mind of every real 
 Progressive, doubts as to his availability as a 
 candidate to succeed himself. In his campaign 
 for election he had interpreted the platform 
 as a pledge for tariff revision downward. 
 Five months after he was inaugurated he 
 signed a bill that revised the tariff upward. 
 And the tariff protected trust beneficiaries, 
 availing themselves of their increased 
 
 476 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 477 
 
 rates, promptly advanced prices to the con 
 sumer. 
 
 The President started on a tour across the 
 country in September, 1909. At the outset in 
 an address at Boston he lauded Aldrich as the 
 greatest statesman of his time. Then followed 
 his Winona speech in which he declared the 
 Payne-Aldrich Bill to be the best tariff bill ever 
 enacted, and in effect challenged the Progres 
 sives in Congress who had voted against 
 the measure, and the progressive judgment of 
 the country, which had already condemned it. 
 
 During the succeeding sessions of Congress 
 President Taft s sponsorship for the adminis 
 tration railroad bill, with its commerce court, 
 its repeal of the anti-trust act in its applica 
 tion to railroads, and its legalizing of all watered 
 railroad capitalization; his course regarding 
 Ballinger and the Cunningham claims, and the 
 subterfuges resorted to by his administration in 
 defence of Ballinger; his attempt to foist upon 
 the country a sham reciprocity measure; his com 
 plete surrender to the legislative reactionary pro 
 gram of Aldrich and Cannon and the discredited 
 
478 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 representatives of special interests who had so 
 long managed congressional legislation, rendered 
 it utterly impossible for the Progressive Republi 
 cans of the country to support him for reelection. 
 Former President Roosevelt, after the expira 
 tion of his term of office, absented himself from 
 the country for a period of about fifteen months. 
 It was during this interval that the Progressive 
 movement made its greatest progress nationally. 
 The reason for this is obvious. Taft s openly 
 reactionary course on legislation during the first 
 two sessions of Congress following his inaugura 
 tion welded together the Progressive strength of 
 the country, and sharpened and clearly defined 
 the issues. While Roosevelt was President, his 
 public utterances through state papers, ad 
 dresses, and the press were highly colored with 
 rhetorical radicalism. His administrative poli 
 cies as set forth in his recommendations to 
 Congress were vigorously and picturesquely 
 presented, but characterized by an absence of 
 definite economic conception. One trait was 
 always pronounced. His most savage assault 
 upon special interests was invariably offset with 
 
* ^ 
 
 * ^ 
 
 X 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 479 
 
 an equally drastic attack upon those who were 
 seeking to reform abuses. These were indis 
 criminately classed as demagogues and dan 
 gerous persons. In this way he sought to win 
 approval, both from the radicals and the 
 conservatives. This cannonading, first in one 
 direction and then in another, filled the air with 
 noise and smoke, which confused and obscured 
 the line of action, but, when the battle cloud 
 drifted by and quiet was restored, it was always 
 a matter of surprise that so little had really been 
 accomplished. Roosevelt is deserving of credit 
 for his appeals made from time to time for 
 higher ethical standards, social decency, and 
 civic honesty. He discussed these matters 
 strikingly and with vigor, investing every utter 
 ance with his unique personality. He would 
 seize upon some ancient and accepted precept 
 as, "Honesty is the best policy" and treat it 
 with a spirit and energy and in a manner that 
 made him seem almost the original discoverer 
 of the truth. He often confessed, however, a 
 distaste for and lack of interest in economic 
 problems, and his want of definite conception 
 
480 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 always invited to compromise, retarding or 
 defeating real progress. 
 
 It was not strange, therefore, that he approved 
 the Hepburn Rate Bill, and claimed it as an 
 achievement for his administration. For nine 
 years the public had demanded relief from Con 
 gress that would restore to the Interstate Com 
 merce Commission some measure of the power 
 of which it had been deprived by a Supreme 
 Court decision in 1897. And, finally, the Hep 
 burn Bill was enacted as a pretended compliance 
 with that public demand. Except for section 
 twenty, which authorized the Commission to 
 enforce upon the railroads a uniform system of 
 bookkeeping, the bill omitted every provision 
 which the Commission had for nine years urged 
 upon Congress as necessary to make the Inter 
 state Commerce Law a workable statute for the 
 protection of the public interest. 
 
 Nor was it strange that he approved the 
 Emergency Currency Law which was but 
 another ragged patch upon our makeshift mone 
 tary system, placed there through the powerful 
 influence of the speculative banking interests 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 481 
 
 and commended it as a "wholesome progres 
 sive law." 
 
 It was for these reasons that, after a service 
 of seven and one half years as President of the 
 United States, he left no great constructive 
 statute as an enduring record of his service. 
 To the credit of his administration may justly 
 be placed, however, in large measure the more 
 recent progress of the conservation movement. 
 But conservation did not originate with thev/ 
 Roosevelt administration. The Forestry Bureau 
 in the Department of Agriculture was estab 
 lished as a result of a memorial presented by 
 the American Association for the Advancement 
 of Science in 1873, reinforced by another memo 
 rial of the Association in 1890. The first 
 national forest reservation was established in 
 1891. This was the beginning of conservation, 
 which was further promoted by a more elabo 
 rate treatment of the subject by the National 
 Academy of Sciences in 1897. Through the 
 publication of a volume entitled "Lands of 
 the Arid West," by Major J. W. Powell, 
 Director of the Geological Survey, and as 
 
482 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 a result of the foresight and influence of 
 Director Powell, an irrigation division of the 
 United States Geological Survey was estab 
 lished in 1888, and authority conferred upon 
 the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw from 
 private entry reservoir sites and areas of land 
 necessary for irrigation purposes. From this 
 time on the growth of conservation as a govern 
 mental policy was commensurate to its great 
 importance to the public. In response to the 
 steadily growing demands, numerous withdraw 
 als of public lands from private sale or entry, for 
 the protection of forests, fuel supply, irrigation, 
 and waterpowers, were made during the Roose 
 velt administration. In this department of the 
 public service Roosevelt made a distinctly pro 
 gressive record, due in large degree to the 
 zeal and activity of Chief Forester Pinchot. 
 The enthusiasm of the Chief Forester which led 
 him to include within forest reserves extended 
 areas of purely agricultural lands, thus retarding 
 agricultural development in some of the western 
 states, naturally caused bitterness and hostility 
 to the whole movement on the part of many peo- 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 483 
 
 pie in those states whose prosperity depended 
 chiefly upon the development of their agricul 
 tural lands, This resulted in building up the 
 only well-grounded opposition to conservation 
 progress. While injustice was done in many 
 cases, the administration of the forestry service 
 has been one of incalculable benefit to the public 
 as a whole. 
 
 But the fact remains that the Roosevelt admin 
 istration came to a close on the fourth of March, 
 1909, without leaving to its credit a definite 
 Progressive national movement with a clearly de 
 fined body of issues. There was the comprehen 
 sive and well recognized Progressive movement 
 in Wisconsin. A good beginning had been made 
 in a number of other states, and for three years I 
 I had labored in the Senate, making some gain 
 against a solid opposition, but wholly unable to 
 rely on the administration of President Roosevelt 
 for support or cooperation. 
 
 On the twenty-fourth of March, 1909, Roose 
 velt sailed for Africa. He was absent from the 
 country until June, 1910. In that period, undc 
 the administration of President Taft, the Pro- 
 
484 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 gressive Republican movement made greater 
 headway than during the entire Roosevelt 
 administration. This was largely due to the 
 fact that Taft s course was more direct, Roose 
 velt s devious. Openly denouncing trusts and 
 combinations, Roosevelt made concessions and 
 compromises which tremendously strengthened 
 these special interests. Thus he smeared the 
 issue, but caught the imagination of the younger 
 men of the country by his dash and mock heroics. 
 Taft cooperated with Cannon and Aldrich on 
 legislation. Roosevelt cooperated with Aldrich 
 and Cannon on legislation. Neither President 
 took issue with the reactionary bosses of the 
 Senate upon any legislation of national impor 
 tance. Taft s talk was generally in line with 
 his legislative policy. Roosevelt s talk was gen 
 erally at right-angles to his legislative policy. 
 Taft s messages were the more directly reaction 
 ary; Roosevelt s the more "progressive." But 
 adhering to his conception of a "square deal," his 
 strongest declarations in the public interest were 
 invariably offset with something comforting for 
 Privilege; every phrase denouncing "bad" trusts 
 
J 
 
 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 485 
 
 was deftly balanced with praise for "good" 
 trusts. 
 
 So uncertain were the Progressive leaders in 
 the Senate and House as to the position which 
 Roosevelt would take upon progressive issues 
 after his return from Africa that it was almost 
 daily a matter of discussion among them. 
 Would he ally himself with Taft or would he 
 stand with the Progressive movement, which 
 had by that time become a concrete and well 
 understood political entity? Indeed, so uncer 
 tain were even his close personal friends, some 
 of whom had fallen out with the administration, 
 that they were anxious to get his ear first as he 
 turned his face homeward, in order to forestall, 
 if possible, any announcement from him favor 
 able to the Taft administration. To that end 
 Gifford Pinchot, who had been removed by 
 Taft from his position of Chief Forester - 
 and had become an active Progressive as 
 early as December 31, 1909, had written an 
 extended letter to Roosevelt which would 
 meet him at the African border, and give his 
 mind the right slant on the political situation. 
 
 I 
 
486 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 Pinchot followed his letter abroad, to supple 
 ment it with verbal explanation and personal 
 persuasion. A throng of American newspaper 
 correspondents crossed the ocean to get some 
 word from Roosevelt which could be cabled back 
 to enlighten the people on the momentous ques 
 tion as to whether Roosevelt, when he finally 
 landed in America, would ally himself with the 
 Progressives or with the Taft administration. 
 Their diligence and ingenuity were rewarded 
 with no syllable to indicate his course. He 
 landed in New York, June 18th, and for weeks 
 the daily press teemed with questioning and 
 speculation. But still the American public 
 was left in ignorance as to the future action of 
 the former President. At the capital of the 
 nation and throughout the country the line 
 of battle had been drawn, and there was no 
 faltering on either side. Every citizen pos 
 sessed of any conviction, had taken his stand 
 long before, and the contest was on in every 
 state. 
 
 The extra session of 1909 on the tariff had 
 been followed by the regular session of 1909-10, 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 487 
 
 in which the Progressives had torn to pieces the 
 administration railroad bill, and written the 
 measure almost entirely anew, on the floor of the 
 Senate. The tariff session had rent asunder the 
 Republican party. Quarter was neither sought 
 nor given between the progressive and stand- 
 pat forces. The session of 1910, preceding 
 the congressional elections, had intensi 
 fied the differences, widened the breach; 
 and still the former President had noth 
 ing to say. He had been received with 
 great acclaim in the old world, and like 
 wise upon his arrival in New York. It was a 
 time in the life of the Progressive move 
 ment when his support would have been a 
 tremendous gain. 
 
 Upon the twenty-seventh of June, 1910, on 
 invitation which came to me through Gilson 
 Gardner, close personal friend of Roosevelt, 
 and Washington correspondent of the Scripps 
 papers, I visited him at Oyster Bay. A colored 
 attendant showed me into the library, and in 
 formed me that the Colonel would see me pres 
 ently. He soon made his appearance, wearing 
 
488 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 linen knickerbockers, and after a cordial greeting 
 said that he had just come in from pitching hay, 
 confirming his statement by removing a rather 
 liberal quantity of timothy from his person. He 
 asked me about the work of Congress and the 
 new administration, and I told him definitely 
 of the tariff and railroad legislation, and of the 
 great advance which the Progressive movement 
 had really made. I asked some direct questions, 
 both regarding issues and President Taft, but 
 excepting as to one matter he was very guarded 
 in his statements. 
 
 Speaking of the initiative and referendum, 
 he said he had arrived at no settled con 
 viction; but upon the recall his mind was 
 definitely made up, at least in so far as it related 
 to the recall of judges. He said: "I arn not 
 sure whether the recall should be applied to 
 public officials generally, but I have been so 
 disappointed in many of the judges commissioned 
 during my administration, that it is perfectly 
 clear to me that the recall should be established 
 and enforced as to judges, and particularly, 
 federal judges appointed for life." I received 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 489 
 
 the statement with some expression of surprise, 
 suggesting as my viewpoint that if the recall 
 were applied to the judiciary, the percentage of 
 petitioners demanding recall should be fixed at a 
 much higher rate than was commonly accepted 
 as proper basis for recall of legislative and other 
 public officials. He replied that he had given 
 no particular thought to the details, biif that 
 he had a settled and fixed opinion as to the 
 importance of applying the principle to the fed 
 eral judiciary. At the close of the interview 
 I left with him some speeches bearing upon the 
 tariff and railroad bills which he said he would 
 read with care. I told him very explicitly 
 of Taft s course upon the tariff, of his 
 Winona speech, in which he declared the 
 Payne-Aldrich Bill the best bill ever enacted 
 by a Republican Congress. His only com 
 ment upon Taft was that "sometimes a 
 man makes a very good lieutenant but a 
 poor captain." 
 
 I was not a little surprised to find, less than 
 three months later, a Roosevelt editorial in the 
 Outlook, under date of September 17, 1910, in 
 

 490 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 which he commented upon the Payne-Aldrich 
 Tariff Law as follows : 
 
 "I think that the present tariff is better than 
 le last, and considerably better than the one 
 before the last." 
 
 Neither the foregoing statement, nor anything 
 akin to it, however, was made in Roosevelt s 
 speeches upon his tour in the months of August 
 and early September in the west, where public 
 sentiment was very pronouncedly against the 
 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Law. The Outlook edi 
 torial above quoted was a portion of a more ex 
 tended reference to the tariff in the speech which 
 he had prepared for his trip through the west. 
 Obviously he left a copy of his tariff views with 
 the Outlook before leaving for his western tour. 
 The reason why the portion quoted above and 
 published as a Roosevelt editorial was not deliv 
 ered as a part of any of his addresses on the tariff 
 in the west was due to the fact that one of the 
 Progressive Senators who rode with him on his 
 special train during part of the trip, and to 
 whom he submitted the speech which he pro- 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 491 
 
 posed to deliver, directed his attention to 
 the fact that the utterance was almost identical 
 with that made a year before by Taft at Winona, 
 which had called down upon the President the 
 fiercest sort of denunciation. But this did not 
 at all embarrass ex-President Roosevelt. He 
 promptly adjusted himself to western ideas 
 upon the tariff, by cutting out of his speeches 
 in Iowa, Kansas, and other western states the 
 approval of the Aldrich bill which had been 
 written in when the speeches were prepared 
 for delivery. Thus he made the right impres 
 sion upon the west for the time being. But it 
 was a distinct shock to his admirers beyond 
 the Mississippi a little later when Roosevelt 
 joined with the New York standpatters in the 
 Republican State Convention in praising the 
 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill and President Taft s 
 administration. In this convention, which met 
 at Saratoga, Roosevelt had such absolute con 
 trol that he was able to elect himself chairman, 
 make the keynote speech, and nominate his per 
 sonal friend Stimson for Governor. He agreed 
 to, voted for, and throughout the campaign 
 
492 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 supported the New York State platform, con 
 taining the following: 
 
 The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Law reduced the 
 average rate of all duties 11 per cent. By 
 increasing the duties on some luxuries and articles 
 not of ordinary use, making, however, no in 
 creases on any common food product, it turned 
 a national deficit into a surplus." 
 
 The New York platform also contained this 
 further declaration: 
 
 "We enthusiastically endorse the progressive 
 and statesmanlike leadership of William Howard 
 Taft, and declare our pride in the achievements 
 of his first eighteen months as President of the 
 United States. Each succeeding month since 
 his inauguration has confirmed the nation in its 
 high estimate of his greatness of character, in 
 tellectual ability, sturdy common sense, extra 
 ordinary patience and perseverance, broad and 
 statesmanlike comprehension of public questions, 
 and unfaltering and unswerving adherence to 
 duty." 
 
 Roosevelt s course in the Saratoga convention 
 was a staggering blow to Progressive Repub 
 licans throughout the middle and western states, 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 493 
 
 where press and people alike condemned him. 
 He led the campaign for Stimson and the New 
 York platform in the election of 1910 mak 
 ing it his own fight and was overwhelmingly 
 defeated. 
 
 For many months little was heard from him. 
 It was plain that the Progressive movement 
 could not be tied up with the Taft admin 
 istration by anybody. The Progressives in the 
 Senate and House of Representatives held 
 steadily to their course. They could not be 
 coerced by the administration, through the use 
 of patronage, into supporting measures not in 
 the public interest. Every day strengthened 
 their cause before the people. Every question 
 with which they dealt placed Progressive issues 
 more clearly and definitely before the public, 
 as the most fundamentally important political 
 movement in a generation of time. 
 
 As we drew on toward the close of 1910 word 
 was frequently brought to the Progressive leaders 
 in Washington by some of Roosevelt s close per 
 sonal friends that he had been chastened by his 
 recent experience and enlightened by a better 
 
494 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 understanding of public opinion; that he was 
 becoming more progressive and would eventu 
 ally be found in the ranks of those who were, day 
 by day, giving that movement its distinct place 
 in political history. 
 
 For nearly a year the formation of a national 
 league to promote progressive legislation in the 
 different states had been under discussion among 
 a few of the Progressive Senators and Members 
 of the House of Representatives. And during 
 the holiday recess in the last days of December, 
 1910, I drafted a Declaration of Principles and 
 form of constitution for the organization of such 
 a league, and submitted the same to Senators 
 Bourne and Bristow. With some modifications 
 suggested by the Senators in our conference, 
 the declaration and constitution were prepared 
 for signatures and copies mailed to Senators and 
 Members who had returned to their homes for the 
 recess, and to leading Progressives in different 
 states. The organization was effected at a meet 
 ing held at my residence, 1864 Wyoming Avenue, 
 Washington, D. C., on the twenty -first day of 
 January, 1911. Jonathan Bourne was elected 
 
I 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 495 
 
 President; Frederic C. Howe, Secretary; Charles 
 R. Crane, Treasurer. Following is the Declara 
 tion of Principles adopted: 
 
 We, the undersigned, associate ourselves to 
 gether as The National Progressive Republican 
 League. 
 
 The object of the League is the promotion 
 of popular government and progressive legisla 
 tion. 
 
 Popular government in America has been 
 thwarted and progressive legislation strangled 
 by the special interests, which control caucuses, 
 delegates, conventions, and party organizations; 
 and, through this control of the machinery of 
 government, dictate nominations and platforms, 
 elect administrations, legislatures, representa 
 tives in Congress, United States Senators, and 
 control cabinet officers. 
 
 Under existing conditions legislation in the 
 public interest has been baffled and defeated. 
 This is evidenced by the long struggle to secure 
 laws but partially effective for the control of 
 railway rates and services, the revision of the 
 tariff in the interest of the producer and con 
 sumer, statutes dealing with trusts and combina 
 tions, based on sound economic principles, as 
 applied to modern industrial and commercial 
 conditions; wise, comprehensive and impartial 
 reconstruction of banking and monetary laws, 
 the conservation of coal, oil, gas, timber, water- 
 
496 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 powers, and other natural resources belonging 
 to the people, and for the enactment of all legis 
 lation solely for the common good. 
 
 Just in proportion as popular government has, 
 in certain states superseded the delegate con 
 vention system, and the people have assumed 
 control of the machinery of government, has 
 government become responsive to the popular 
 will, and progressive legislation been secured. 
 
 The Progressive Republican League believes 
 that popular government is fundamental to all 
 other questions. To this end it advocates: 
 
 (1) The election of United States Senators 
 by direct vote of the people. 
 
 (2) Direct primaries for the nomination of 
 elective officials. 
 
 (3) The direct election of delegates to national 
 conventions with opportunity for the voter to 
 express his choice for President and Vice-Presi- 
 dent. 
 
 (4) Amendment to state constitutions pro 
 viding for the Initiative, Referendum and Recall. 
 
 (5) A thoroughgoing corrupt practices act. 
 
 Roosevelt was invited to become a member of 
 the National Progressive Republican League, 
 founded upon this simple declaration of elemen 
 tary principles, but he had not become enough of 
 a Progressive at that time to be willing to iden 
 tify himself with the organization, and therefore 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 497 
 
 declined. He was urged to join the League for 
 several reasons. The name of a former President 
 would give strength to the organization. It 
 would help, sooner or later, to place him in open 
 opposition to the Taft administration. It would 
 commit him to a clear-cut and definite position 
 upon the five propositions embodied in the 
 Declaration of Principles. This would be very 
 important, as it is his political habit so to state 
 and qualify his positions that you are never 
 quite sure of him. 
 
 I think it is fair to say that the activities 
 of this League resulted in the enactment of 
 the presidential preference laws in the several 
 states during the legislative sessions of 1912. 
 Oregon had already adopted its statute. Wiscon 
 sin, five years before, had enacted a law under 
 which the delegates to the National Republican 
 Convention of 1908 were elected by direct vote of 
 the people. This law was supplemented by the 
 legislature of 1912 providing fora direct vote on 
 presidential and vice-presidential candidates. 
 North Dakota, Nebraska, California, New 
 Jersey, Illinois, and Massachusetts enacted simi- 
 
498 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 lar statutes, and in South Dakota steps were 
 taken to elect delegates by direct vote under 
 an existing primary law, though the provision 
 authorizing such election of delegates had not 
 previously been invoked. The League, under 
 the direction of its president, Senator Bourne, 
 did, and is continuing to do, effective work in 
 advancing the principles to promote which it 
 was organized. 
 
 That the Progressive Republicans should pre 
 sent a candidate for nomination for the presi 
 dency in opposition to Mr. Taft had long been 
 considered by the leaders of that element of the 
 party, and with the beginning of the new year 
 (1911) many conferences were held on that 
 subject. These gatherings were attended not 
 only by Progressive members of the Senate and 
 House, but also by representative Progressives 
 who visited Washington from time to time. The 
 interest of the Progressive cause was the control 
 ling thought in all of those deliberations. None 
 of the men whose availability as candidates was 
 discussed manifested any eagerness to under 
 take the contest, though all were agreed that 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 499 
 
 Progressive Republicans were in duty bound to 
 oppose the renomination of President Taft. Not 
 only because of the division which had arisen 
 in the Republican party upon principle was it 
 conceded that his nomination must be opposed, 
 but because whatever the outcome, the integrity 
 and perpetuity of the Progressive movement 
 demanded that it should present for the support 
 of Progressive Republicans throughout the coun 
 try a candidate who represented its principles. 
 
 It was well understood that owing to the 
 peculiar conditions existing in the south, which 
 made it certain that the administration through 
 patronage could control the selection of prac 
 tically all delegates from that section of the 
 country, Mr. Taft had a very great advantage 
 at the outset. Even in the northern states 
 the federal machine is a powerful factor in 
 the election of delegates, though the can 
 didate may be personally weak, or even obnox 
 ious, and the power of the President s steam roller 
 had been demonstrated so thoroughly in the 
 previous convention that every one familiar with 
 that campaign accepted it as a tremendous force 
 
500 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 to be reckoned with. Taft had almost no in 
 dividual strength or following in 1908. But 
 President Roosevelt put his personality behind 
 an army of federal officials and nominated him 
 against all opposition. I was in a position at 
 that time to know definitely the public senti 
 ment of the west and middle western states. 
 For many years I had addressed great audiences 
 throughout those states, beginning while I was 
 governor of Wisconsin and continuing the work 
 after I came to the Senate in the recesses be 
 tween sessions of Congress. I had received 
 much encouragement, particularly from that 
 portion of the country, in support of my own 
 candidacy for the Republican nomination 
 months prior to the meeting of the convention 
 in 1908. But political sentiment, however 
 strong, unsupported by organization and the 
 finances with which to meet the necessary 
 expenses of a campaign, cannot withstand the 
 assault of a compact, well -disciplined, well- 
 managed federal machine, directed by one 
 trained in the arts of modern political cam 
 paigning. 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 501 
 
 Incredible as it may seem, it is nevertheless a 
 fact in political history, that Roosevelt planned 
 and consummated Taft s succession to the presi 
 dency. The campaign of 1912 witnessed the 
 publication by Roosevelt of a letter written to 
 him by President Taft shortly after his inaugu 
 ration which contained this startling acknowl 
 edgment : 
 
 "I can never forget that the power I now exer 
 cise was voluntarily transferred from you to me, 
 and that I am under obligation to you to see 
 that your judgment in selecting me as your suc 
 cessor and bringing about the succession shall 
 be vindicated according to the standards which 
 you and I in conversation have always formu 
 lated." 
 
 When this was given to the public by the 
 former President, in a speech at Worcester, 
 Mass., April 26, 1912, it was with the naive 
 comment: "It is a bad trait to bite the hand 
 that feeds you." 
 
 The admission of the beneficiary of this crime 
 against democracy, with the comment of the 
 man who planned and executed it, should have 
 
502 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 taken both Taft and Roosevelt out of the 1912 
 campaign. The presidency is the people s office. 
 That it was passed as one might transfer the 
 title to a house and lot makes a mockery of every 
 principle upon which constitutional govern 
 ment is founded. 
 
 \ 
 
 But, to resume my narrative: With a single 
 exception those who professed any interest in 
 the Progressive cause regarded it as an impera 
 tive duty to oppose the renomination of Taft 
 with a pronounced and thoroughgoing Progres 
 sive candidate. Boosevelt was the exception. 
 He was opposed to bringing out a Progressive 
 candidate. Before the close of the session in 
 March, 1911, he had caused it to be made known 
 to the Progressives in Washington, through a 
 number of his close personal friends who sus 
 tained intimate relations with them, that while 
 he was at last hostile to Taft, he was not in favor 
 of opposing his renomination. Among those who 
 saw him oftert in New York, and constituted the 
 medium of communication with Progressives in 
 Washington, were Gifford Pinchot, E. A. Van 
 Valkenberg,^ manager of the Philadelphia North 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 503 
 
 American, and Gilson Gardner. They espe 
 cially were the bearers of frequent messages, 
 and the accepted spokesmen of Roosevelt in 
 published interviews regarding Taft s adminis 
 tration. Through these men we were informed 
 that while Roosevelt was at this time, in the 
 winter of 1911, against Taft, that he (Roosevelt) 
 did not want to see any Progressive candidate put 
 in the field against him; that he was confident 
 of two things : first, that Taft could not be beaten 
 for nomination; and second, 1912 would be a Dem 
 ocratic year and no Republican, either Progres 
 sive or reactionary, could be elected President; 
 that, therefore, he would prefer to see Taft 
 renominated without opposition, and beaten at 
 the polls. None of these men who reported 
 Roosevelt s position at that time agreed fully 
 with him. Pinchot from the first was insistent 
 that a fight should be made against Taft s nomi 
 nation; that it could not be made without a Pro 
 gressive candidate, and that the future of the 
 Progressive movement demanded that such a 
 contest be waged. In the event of failure Pin 
 chot then, and afterward, urged that he would 
 
504 TAFTS UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 like to see such candidate lead a third party fight 
 upon Taft, should the latter secure the . nomi 
 nation. 
 
 Many conferences were held. Indeed, scarcely 
 a day passed when the subject was not informally 
 discussed between the Progressive Senators and 
 Members of the House, as they met from time 
 to time. The third session of the 61st Congress 
 closed on the fourth of March, 1911, without any 
 definite conclusion being reached, although it 
 was pretty generally understood that we must 
 take some formal action soon. 
 
 The President convened Congress in extra 
 session on the fifteenth of April, 1911, for the con 
 sideration of the so-called "Reciprocity" agree 
 ment with Canada, which had been defeated in 
 the closing days of the previous session. The Pro 
 gressives in both houses of Congress quite gener 
 ally opposed the pact with Canada, upon the 
 ground that it was not a fairly reciprocal agree 
 ment that it discriminated against the agri 
 cultural interests of this country and in favor of 
 the already over-protected trusts and combina 
 tions. Gifford Pinchot and also his brother 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 505 
 
 Amos Pinchot, who had joined in some of the 
 conferences before referred to, and, likewise, Van 
 Valkenberg, were very much exercised over what 
 they termed the political mistake of the Progres 
 sives in opposing the Canadian Pact. While I do 
 not now recall that either of those men quoted 
 Roosevelt as being in accord with them on this 
 legislation, he was nevertheless strongly in favor 
 of the Canadian Pact, as will appear later in this 
 narrative. 
 
 As the session advanced, the strength of the 
 Progressive position on reciprocity developed 
 markedly. Though the press of the country, 
 which derived a special advantage from the 
 proposed agreement, denounced all opposition 
 to the President s program, the agricultural 
 interests were so solidly arrayed against it that 
 Roosevelt and his friends ceased to advocate the 
 President s policy for this legislation. Later, as 
 I shall show, when it became politically expe 
 dient, Roosevelt took a positive stand against 
 reciprocity. 
 
 Early in the spring of 1911 Roosevelt prepared 
 for another tour of the country. This trip was 
 
506 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 arranged pursuant to invitations which he had 
 received during the preceding months to deliver 
 addresses in several states. It offered an ex 
 cellent opportunity to try out public sentiment 
 to determine whether time had in some measure 
 restored him to the popular favor, which he had 
 sacrificed as a result of his course in the Sara 
 toga Convention and the crushing defeat of 
 his candidate in the New York election. 
 
 Up to this time there had been no change 
 in his opinion regarding opposition to Taft s 
 renomination, as the Progressives in Washington 
 were advised from time to time through those 
 friends of his who kept us informed. He \vas 
 deadly hostile to Taft, but still felt that he 
 could not be beaten in the convention, and 
 that he should be allowed to take the nomina 
 tion without contest and then be given a 
 beating at the polls. But so far as reported to 
 our group in Washington, the idea of a Progres 
 sive candidate for the presidency, even if de 
 feated in the convention, as a means of holding 
 together an advance Progressive movement, 
 seemed to have no place in his political thinking. 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 507 
 
 His mind was dwelling upon immediate political 
 victory or defeat. In all that we heard from 
 Roosevelt, through these near friends of his, 
 the continued upbuilding of the Progressive 
 movement for the restoration of representative 
 government was not a subject which he was 
 considering at all. 
 
 While this was the attitude of Roosevelt 
 toward a Progressive candidacy, I cannot too 
 strongly emphasize the fact that the Progressives 
 in Washington, indeed all over the country, 
 were of one mind that there should be a Pro 
 gressive candidate. My own mail, and that, 
 I think, of other Progressive Senators and 
 Representatives, was filled with urgent appeals 
 from Progressives, east as well as west, that some 
 action be taken at once to place a candidate in 
 the field. Wliile able men in nearly every state 
 in the north were active in promoting Progres 
 sive principles they seemed to look to the group 
 in Washington to take the initiative. Scarcely 
 a day passed when I did not receive calls from 
 strong men identified with the Progressive move 
 ment, who came to Washington on other mis- 
 
508 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 sions, but made it a part of their business to 
 press this matter for early action. Editors and 
 publishers of progressive magazines and papers 
 were heard from directly and indirectly, insist 
 ing that there should be no further delay in 
 taking formal action to the end that Progres 
 sive Republicans should be given an oppor 
 tunity to support some one who could be 
 recognized and supported as representing the 
 Progressive movement. Among those urging 
 action none were more aggressive and per 
 sistent ihan the Pinchots, James R. Garfield, 
 formerly a member of Roosevelt s cabinet, Van 
 Valkenberg, and Gardner. The peculiarly close 
 relation of these men to Roosevelt and their 
 active cooperation was a source of special encour 
 agement to the Progressive group in Washington. 
 The question of Roosevelt s attitude toward such 
 a candidacy was, of course, a matter of much 
 concern, and the possibility of his coming into 
 the field himself as a candidate was often raised 
 in our interviews with these men, both in casual 
 meetings and in our more or less formal confer 
 ences. At this time the invariable answer to 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 509 
 
 any question touching this subject was that he 
 did not believe there should be a candidate at 
 all; and as to himself, it was not to be thought 
 of. On one occasion, I remember, it was stated 
 by Gardner that the Colonel, referring to the 
 1910 election in New York as a Roosevelt defeat, 
 said that he would be literally eaten up if he 
 were to become a candidate, and that he could 
 not consider such a thing. 
 
 Roosevelt s speaking tour of the country 
 beginning in March, 1911, lasted more than six 
 weeks. He came back quite another man. There 
 was no mistaking the fact that the New York 
 gubernatorial campaign of 1910 had left him 
 in a sorry plight politically. This was the 
 construction which he himself put upon the 
 situation. But this 1911 trip restored his self- 
 confidence in a marked degree. 
 
 In the light of subsequent events, there can 
 be little doubt that when Roosevelt left the 
 White House he had 1916 firmly in his mind. 
 He was more than half piqued at that time 
 because his suggestions as to appointments had 
 been ignored by his successor. He returned 
 
510 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 from Africa to find that many changes had taken 
 place; the Progressive movement he found far 
 in advance of him; he neither understood it, 
 nor was he in sympathy with its manifest 
 purposes, in so far as he comprehended them, 
 e deliberated for a time as to whether he 
 ould stand with the administration, support 
 ing Taft for renomination, or seek to identify 
 himself with the Progressives or straddle. 
 He straddled. It left him awkwardly stranded 
 in the election of 1910. He halted to take 
 account of stock. Events were rapidly trans 
 piring. It was evident that the Taft adminis 
 tration was losing ground day by day. While 
 Taft made some effort at reconciliation, he 
 was. not willing wholly to subordinate himself 
 to his former chief. Nothing less would have 
 satisfied Roosevelt. Besides, every month made 
 it clear that the Taft administration was becom 
 ing more and more impossible. The congres 
 sional elections of 1910 forecast disaster for 
 the Republican party in 1912. Roosevelt was 
 still looking to 1916, and as the political situation 
 developed in the following year, in his political 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 511 
 
 philosophy, which is always personal, Taft s 
 renomination and defeat in 1912 fitted admir 
 ably into his plan. 
 
 Then came this tour in the Spring of 1911. 
 It fired his blood. There were the old-time 
 crowds, the music, the cheers. He began to 
 think of 1912 for himself. It was four years 
 better than 1916; and four years counts in the life 
 of a man turned fifty -three ; a world of things may 
 happen in four years. But every one saw the 
 uncertainties of 1912. Roosevelt clearly saw 
 them. He could take no chance. He could not 
 afford to become a candidate against Taft and 
 fail. Why not put forth another man, and feel 
 out the Taft strength? If it became apparent 
 that Taft could not be beaten for the nomina 
 tion, a contest would nevertheless weaken him 
 and make his defeat in the election the more 
 certain. If it became clear that Taft could 
 be beaten in the convention and furthermore 
 that he (Roosevelt) could win in the election 
 against a Democrat, his restored confidence, 
 resulting from the tour of 1911, made him 
 reasonably certain that he could displace the 
 
512 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 candidate put out against Taft, stampede the 
 convention, and secure the nomination for him 
 self. Now, let us see how this Roosevelt psy 
 chosis fits the facts as they have transpired. 
 
 Shortly after Roosevelt s return from his 
 tour of 1911 Gilson Gardner paid him another 
 visit. I do not know whether this was at Roose 
 velt s solicitation, or whether he went over on his 
 own motion, as he often did. But be that as it 
 may, he came back the bearer of a most impor 
 tant message. Roosevelt, he said, had entirely 
 changed his mind regarding a Progressive candi 
 date against Taft; he now believed that the 
 Progressives should put forward a candidate, 
 that / should be that candidate, and that I should 
 get into the fight at once; that I stood before 
 the country in a different relation to the Pro 
 gressive movement than any other man; that 
 I had done the pioneer work; that upon his re 
 turn from the west he had visited Madison, 
 while the Wisconsin legislature was still in 
 session; that he had been very much surprised 
 at the thoroughly scientific character of the 
 work under way in that state, and the funda- 
 
TAFTS UNAVAILABILITY 513 
 
 mentally sound body of laws which had been 
 enacted under my administration as governor; 
 that the Progressive movement in Wisconsin had 
 reached a stage of practical demonstration of its 
 wisdom and thorough soundness. He said that 
 he was still inclined to believe that Taft could 
 not be beaten; that he (Roosevelt) could not 
 openly oppose him as a candidate because he 
 had made him President; that he could not, for 
 the same reason, openly advocate my candidacy 
 against Taft; but that he would, if I became a 
 candidate, commend my work from time to time 
 in the Outlook and help along in that way; that 
 while visiting the legislature in Madison he 
 had spoken there and strongly endorsed my 
 work; that he did it, having in mind the possible 
 announcement of my candidacy, with the idea 
 that it would be useful and helpful as an ex 
 pression of approval. He said further that if 
 Taft could not be beaten for the nomination, 
 as he was still inclined to believe, I could never 
 theless stand as a candidate, and if defeated in 
 the convention, I would not be weakened before 
 the country. 
 
514 TAFTS UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 This same statement was made by Gardner 
 many times to me and to my friends in Wash 
 ington and elsewhere. 
 
 Secretary of War Stimson visited Roosevelt 
 in January, 1912, and upon his return to Wash 
 ington reported to his college friends, Gifford 
 Pinchot and Congressman William Kent, that 
 Roosevelt was not really opposed to Taft s 
 renomination, and that he (Roosevelt) had said 
 he regarded Taft as the most available man for 
 the Republican nomination. Gardner, when 
 he heard Stimson s statement reported at our 
 headquarters, became quite resentful against 
 Roosevelt, and said to me in the presence of 
 Houser, my campaign manager, and others that 
 he would make a signed statement setting forth 
 the fact that he had brought Roosevelt s mes 
 sage to me urging me to be the candidate and to 
 declare my candidacy at once. Subsequently, 
 when it became certain that Roosevelt would be a 
 candidate, I requested Houser to ask Gardner for 
 this statement. He then refused to make it, 
 unless Houser promised it would not be used 
 against Roosevelt. And as Houser could not 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 515 
 
 make such a promise, Gardner declined to furnish 
 the statement. 
 
 During the North Dakota campaign, in reply 
 to a letter published by Gifford Pinchot and 
 sent broadcast throughout the state, Houser 
 gave to the press a statement reviewing the 
 history of my candidacy, including Roosevelt s 
 connection with it, and his message delivered to 
 me through Gardner. To meet this, Gardner 
 came out with a denial of the truth of Houser s 
 statement. Gardner s denial promptly called 
 forth an interview from George S. Loftus, Presi 
 dent of the Minnesota Progressive League, which 
 is contained in the following dispatch .printed 
 in the New York Tribune: 
 
 URGED LA FOLLETTE TO RUN 
 
 "Minneapolis, March 17. An answer to the 
 letter of Gilson Gardner, in which it was said 
 that any statement that Colonel Roosevelt had 
 urged Senator La Follette to become a candidate 
 was untrue, was issued here last night by George 
 Loft us, President of the Minnesota Progressive 
 League. It is as follows : 
 
 "The statement made by Walter L. Houser 
 relating to the message that Gilson Gardner 
 
516 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 carried from Colonel Roosevelt to Senator La 
 Follette is correct, according to a statement 
 made by Mr. Gardner himself to a number of 
 Progressives at a luncheon which they tendered 
 Mr. Gardner at the Odin Club on October 9, 
 1911. 
 
 "Mr. Gardner stated further that the Colonel 
 advised him that he would not be a candidate, 
 and under no circumstances would he accept the 
 nomination if tendered to him. That state 
 ment somewhat surprised a number present, 
 and they questioned him again concerning it. 
 He repeated his statement and said that when 
 the time came we would find the Colonel lined 
 up with La Follette against Taft." 
 
 On the thirtieth of April a conference of 
 Progressives was held in Senator Bourne s com 
 mittee room in the capitol, attended by sev 
 eral Senators and Representatives Senators 
 Cummins, Clapp, Bourne, Gronna, Poindexter; 
 Representatives Lenroot, Hubbard, Norris ; 
 Professor Merriam, Senator Clyde Jones, and 
 Walter S. Rogers, of Chicago, the latter repre 
 senting Charles R. Crane; Gilson Gardner; Angus 
 McSween, representing Mr. Van Valkenberg of 
 the Philadelphia North American, and a number 
 of others whom I do not now recall. Professor 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 517 
 
 Merriam, Senator Jones, and Mr. Rogers, lead 
 ing Progressives of Illinois, had come on to 
 Washington to urge that action be taken to 
 bring out a Progressive candidate for the presi 
 dency; that such action would greatly aid the 
 Progressive movement in Illinois. Merriam had 
 been the Progressive candidate for Mayor of 
 Chicago, had made a brilliant campaign? a,n<^ <* 
 splendid run. Senator Jones, the Progressive 
 leader in the Illinois State Senate, was then a 
 candidate for the nomination for governor. 
 Practically all who were present took part in 
 the discussion. There was unanimity of senti 
 ment that the Progressives must unite upon 
 one of the Progressive leaders as a candidate. 
 Though some one suggested the favorite son 
 plan, putting forth several Progressive candi 
 dates, no one seriously regarded such plan as 
 feasible. 
 
 Senator Cummins, whose name had been 
 widely mentioned in the press as a possible can 
 didate, took prominent part in the discussion. 
 He said: 
 
 "There is but one man who should be con- 
 
518 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 sidered as the Progressive candidate, and that 
 is Senator La Follette." 
 
 When asked as to his own candidacy, he em 
 phatically replied, "I shall not be a candidate; 
 it is out of the question." 
 
 He added that he felt he ought to say regard 
 ing Iowa that there would be a sharp contest 
 between the standpatters and the Progressives, 
 and that no Progressive candidate, himself or 
 any ether, could carry the state solidly; he had 
 no doubt he said that a number of districts 
 could be carried for Senator La Follette, and 
 added, " If he consents to make the fight, I will 
 do everything in my power in Iowa to elect 
 as many delegates as possible to support him 
 in the convention." 
 
 I said at that time, what I said in all of our 
 conferences, and to leading Progressives who 
 wrote me from various parts of the country, or 
 called on me in Washington that the Progres 
 sives of the country could not support President 
 Taft for renomination, nor could they, without 
 stultification, remain silent and permit him to be 
 nominated; that we must put forward a candi- 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 519 
 
 date, whether that candidate win or lose; that 
 Taft, with the power of southern patronage, 
 would certainly secure the southern delegates 
 to start with, which would give him a long 
 lead; that I was confident, however, he would 
 be found to have little strength west of the 
 Alleghenies; that to stand as the candidate 
 meant the sacrifice of much time and strength, 
 with the chance in favor of a defeat in the 
 convention; that I was willing to support any 
 thoroughgoing Progressive; that I was willing to 
 make the fight as the candidate if the Progres 
 sives agreed that I ought to do so, provided men 
 could be found to contribute the money required 
 to meet the necessary expenses a sufficient sum 
 to make it certain that the campaign could be 
 carried forward, headquarters maintained, litera 
 ture printed and distributed, a force of clerks and 
 stenographers employed to take care of corre 
 spondence ; without this assurance, I said it were 
 better not to undertake it at all. I think every 
 man present stated it as his opinion that I 
 should become the candidate. Gardner told of 
 his interview with Roosevelt. McSween pre- 
 
520 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 sented the views of Van Valkenberg, giving his 
 (Van Valkenberg s) reasons why I should be 
 come the Progressive candidate: Wisconsin, he 
 said, had carried the Progressive movement to 
 the point of demonstration; my work there and 
 in the Senate, in itself, should settle the question 
 as to my candidacy. 
 
 In the minds of those who were present at 
 this conference the whole matter was regarded 
 as settled, subject to our being able to secure 
 such contributions as would make the campaign 
 possible. 
 
 I have given what took place in this confer 
 ence somewhat in detail, because it is typical 
 of many others that were held before and after, 
 attended by some of those who were present 
 on this occasion, and by other Senators and 
 Representatives who likewise urged me to stand 
 as the candidate. Among other Senators and 
 Representatives who tendered support to my 
 candidacy were: Bristow of Kansas, Works of 
 California, Crawford of South Dakota, Murdock 
 of Kansas, Lindbergh of Minnesota, Helgeson of 
 North Dakota, Haugen of Iowa, Kent of Cali- 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 fornia, Nelson, Morse, and Gary of Wisconsin. 
 Senator Borah of Idaho stated that there were 
 complications in his state which he thought he 
 could best take care of by making no open 
 declaration at the time, but gave assurance that 
 the delegation from his state could be depended 
 upon for support in the convention. 
 
 The foregoing recital can give but an imperfect 
 idea of the activity and zeal of many of the gen 
 tlemen above named in pressing for the opening 
 of the campaign. Hardly a day passed that I 
 was not urged to give the final word. But I was 
 resolved that I would not consent to be a candi 
 date until we had assurance of such financial sup 
 port as would enable us to conduct a campaign 
 worthy of the movement. Also I withheld 
 consent for another reason a personal one. 
 For twenty years I had given the very heart 
 out of my life to the restoration of representative 
 government in Wisconsin, and thereafter to 
 carrying the work over into the national field. 
 It had been single-handed work in the beginning 
 of the Wisconsin struggle, and I likewise found 
 myself alone in the national contest when I came 
 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 to the United States Senate. I would not over 
 estimate or magnify my own importance in that 
 work, nor was I willing to under-estimate it. It 
 had become my life work, and I felt that I had 
 achieved results of a character too important 
 and substantial to lend myself to any cam 
 paign plans which might permit me to be made 
 a mere pawn in the national game. I may 
 be thought to have taken myself too seriously, 
 but, I must set down here the truth, subject to 
 whatever judgment may be passed upon it. In 
 other words, I estimated my own worth to the 
 Progressive cause too highly to consent to being 
 used as a candidate for a time, and then, to 
 serve some ulterior purpose, conveniently broken 
 4 and cast upon the political scrap heap, my ability 
 to serve the Progressive cause seriously damaged, 
 and possibly the movement itself diverted and 
 subordinated to mere personal ambition. I 
 would have been unwilling to see the movement, 
 after it was committed to the support of any 
 thoroughgoing Progressive, shifted for political 
 expediency to another candidate, either in the 
 convention or in the campaign leading up to it. 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 523 
 
 In every contest situations may arise, or be 
 created, inviting to a compromise on candidate 
 or principle. The temptation to yield is strong. 
 Yet in my whole course I have always insisted on 
 driving straight ahead. To do otherwise not only 
 weakens the cause for which you are contending 
 but destroys confidence in your constancy of pur 
 pose. 
 
 For these reasons before beginning a national 
 campaign for the Progressive cause I was impelled 
 to exercise every reasonable precaution against 
 miscarriage and disaster. I could foresee the pos 
 sibility, as the campaign progressed, and Taft s 
 real weakness developed, as I personally believed 
 it would, that either Cummins or Roosevelt, or 
 perhaps both, might then be tempted to thrust in, 
 thus dividing the Progressive strength and de 
 feating the real progress which a clean-cut, un 
 compromising campaign, even though a losing 
 one, would insure for Progressive principles. But 
 Senator Cummins sword had already been passed, 
 and his position affirmed by his repeated as 
 surances made to others, as well as to myself. 
 Indeed, in the last interview I had with him. 
 
524 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 at the close of the reciprocity session, he said 
 to me: 
 
 "I want to say to you, Bob, before going 
 home, that I think it impossible to carry 
 the state of Iowa for you solidly; but we can 
 carry a number of districts and give you ten or 
 a dozen delegates. And I have come to say that 
 you can depend upon my doing everything in 
 my power to secure you the largest possible 
 number of votes in Iowa." 
 
 I answered: "That is all that any one can 
 ask, Albert. I am certain if you will give me 
 your best support, that I shall have a good repre 
 sentation out of the Iowa delegation to the 
 National Convention." 
 
 As to Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot said again 
 and again: "Roosevelt will not be a candidate. 
 He has said repeatedly that he could not be a 
 candidate against Taft. And from many talks 
 with him I am as certain as I live that he will be 
 found actively and openly supporting your can 
 didacy before the campaign ends. It will be 
 impossible for him to take any other course." 
 
 Mr. Van Valkenberg, in one of his last con- 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 525 
 
 ferences with me in Washington, told of an 
 extended interview with Roosevelt which repre 
 sented his position as one of strong encourage 
 ment to my candidacy. Roosevelt had read to 
 him an article which he had prepared on Wiscon 
 sin for publication in the Outlook. It was subse 
 quently published on the twenty-seventh of May, 
 1911. Van Valkenberg stated that Roosevelt 
 was growing more and more hostile to Taft and 
 that he would never under any circumstances 
 support his nomination; that while he did not 
 feel that he could go farther in the Outlook 
 than to speak in commendatory terms of my 
 work and its sound and rational character, 
 that nevertheless he would certainly, in a per 
 sonal way, with political friends who called 
 upon him from all parts of the country, say 
 the right word, which would prove immensely 
 helpful. It is just to Van Valkenberg to say 
 that he was always careful to give it as his 
 own opinion that Taft could not be beaten, but 
 no one was more insistent than he that the Progres 
 sive fight should be made against Taft, and that 
 I was the one man in the country to make it. 
 
526 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 With these assurances I decided to become a 
 candidate. It was some time before contribu 
 tions were assured which warranted the formal 
 opening of a campaign. Finally such assurances 
 of financial support were given by Charles R. 
 Crane, William Kent, Gifford and Amos Pin- 
 chot, and Alfred L. Baker as warranted the 
 opening of headquarters and the inauguration 
 of the campaign for my nomination as the Pro 
 gressive candidate. 
 
 Before taking this final step I took the pre 
 caution, however, to say to those who became 
 contributors to my campaign, and particularly 
 to Gifford Pinchot, because of his close friend 
 ship for Roosevelt, that it must be under 
 stood, if I became a candidate, I should remain 
 a candidate until I was nominated or defeated 
 in the convention. Indeed, I had been careful 
 to have this well understood by all of my sup 
 porters in the Senate and House of Repre 
 sentatives, and all others who had offered me 
 their support. I said to them again and again 
 that I would make the best fight I could, under 
 standing, as everybody did, that the chances 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 527 
 
 were in favor of Taft s renomination, as at that 
 time they appeared to be; but that it would be 
 unfair to me, and more than that, seriously harm 
 ful to the Progressive movement, to put me or 
 any other candidate into the field, to feel out 
 the strength of the opposition, become a target 
 for the enemy s fire, and then be cast aside for 
 some one who had been watching from behind 
 the breastworks for favorable opportunity. 
 
 There were many conferences and much dis 
 cussion as to whether there should be a formal 
 announcement of my candidacy. At one time a 
 call was drafted, and signed, by a number of my 
 supporters as a basis for presenting the matter 
 to the public. To my surprise Senator Cum 
 mins declined to sign such a call. This raised 
 again the question in my mind as to whether it 
 did not indicate some mental reservation re 
 garding the pledge which he had given to support 
 me, and renewed my concern that later he might 
 enter the field as a candidate himself, in the 
 event that my campaign should demonstrate 
 that Taft was very much weaker in the northern 
 states than was commonlv believed at that time. 
 
528 TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 
 
 But Bourne and others, who had many personal 
 interviews with Cummins on this subject, gave 
 me every assurance that such was not the case, 
 and that Cummins would, under no circum 
 stances, become a candidate; that his reluctance 
 to sign a call for me was solely because he did not 
 regard that as the best form of introducing my 
 candidacy to the public. The publication of 
 any call not signed by Senator Cummins would, 
 however, at once have led the opposition press 
 to charge that I did not have the united support 
 of prominent Progressives. And for that reason 
 the call was not published. 
 
 I could not wholly dismiss from my mind an 
 apprehension regarding both Roosevelt and 
 Cummins. From time to time it would intrude 
 itself into my reflections. I was confident that 
 both were eager for the presidency. I knew 
 that either of them would be more acceptable 
 to the reactionaries than I, because both, judged 
 by their public records, would compromise and 
 make terms with the opposition. And I con 
 ceived it possible, notwithstanding Taft s great 
 advantage through patronage and the federal 
 
TAFT S UNAVAILABILITY 529 
 
 machine, that a strong campaign would show 
 him hopelessly weak as a candidate through 
 out all of the northern states, excepting New 
 England, and that a break might be made even 
 in New England. And to a few of my most in 
 timate friends I said from the beginning that I 
 would not be leading a wholly forlorn hope. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE TRUE HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 FOR THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION TO THE 
 PRESIDENCY 
 
 SETTING aside all doubts, and accepting 
 the promises of support from the Pro 
 gressives at face value, I entered upon 
 the campaign for the nomination with vigor 
 and determination. I secured the services of 
 Walter L. Houser, former Secretary of State of 
 Wisconsin, as campaign manager. Headquar 
 ters were established in Washington, and he took 
 charge, with a clerical force. The campaign 
 was diligently prosecuted, beginning in July, 
 1911. We sent out thousands of letters into the 
 northern states, especially the states west of the 
 Ohio River. My candidacy was treated with 
 derision by supporters of the Taf t administration, 
 and the great body of the metropolitan press. 
 But in less than three months it had taken on 
 
 530 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 531 
 
 proportions which compelled recognition. The 
 correspondence became so heavy, and the de 
 mand for literature and campaign speakers 
 so urgent, that it was soon necessary to 
 double the working force at headquarters, and 
 extend plans for organization by states through 
 out the country, excepting in the south, in New 
 York, and in a part of New England. Even 
 in the extreme east it would have been possible 
 to have made much headway had our means 
 permitted. Indeed, we found the whole country 
 ready to break away from the reactionary control 
 of politics and government. Many times I had 
 said to my associates that the people were much 
 in advance of the Progressives in Washington, 
 and overwhelming proof of this came to us from 
 every side. Strong Progressive organizations 
 w r ere soon perfected in numerous states, and we 
 were greatly strengthened and encouraged. 
 
 By October the campaign had attained such 
 proportions that it seemed desirable and neces 
 sary to bring together the leading Progres 
 sives of the country for a better understanding 
 as to local conditions in carrying forward the 
 
532 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 work in a national way. Pursuant to a call 
 issued by Chairman Houser, three hundred lead 
 ing Progressives representing thirty states assem 
 bled in Chicago on the sixteenth of October, 1911. 
 It was a remarkably impressive gathering and 
 continued in session for three days perfecting an 
 organization. Many addresses were made, and 
 throughout all of its deliberations there pre 
 vailed a spirit of the deepest fervor and patriotism. 
 Resolutions were adopted declaratory of Progres 
 sive principles and endorsing my candidacy in the 
 strongest terms, from which I quote the folio wing: 
 
 "The record of Senator La Follette in state 
 and nation makes him the logical candidate for 
 President of the United States. His experience, 
 his character, his courage, his record in con 
 structive legislation and administrative ability 
 meet the requirements for leadership such as 
 present conditions demand. This conference 
 endorses him as a candidate for the Republican 
 nomination for President and urges that in all 
 states organizations be formed to promote his 
 nomination. " 
 
 In that great conference, from first to last, 
 there was but one discordant note. It was 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 533 
 
 sounded by James R. Garfield. He came to the 
 meeting direct from New York, where he had 
 been closeted with Roosevelt. He was careful 
 to say that he spoke only for himself, but he was 
 singularly persistent in opposing any endorse 
 ment of my candidacy. He did his work chiefly 
 with the Committee on Resolutions, but finding 
 himself quite alone and his efforts futile, he 
 withdrew further opposition. A few days later 
 I received a letter from him in which he urged 
 that the action of the conference be not inter 
 preted as an endorsement of my candidacy. 
 Garfield s course was rendered the more signifi 
 cant by the appearance of an editorial in the 
 Outlook (October 28, 1911), in which the un 
 qualified endorsement of the Chicago confer 
 ence is referred to as follows: 
 
 "This endorsement is to be regarded as a 
 recommendation rather than a committal of the 
 movement to any one man." 
 
 Garfield s action in connection with the 
 Chicago conference revived my distrust regard 
 ing Roosevelt, as it did that of Mr. Houser and 
 
534 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 other of my intimate friends who attended the 
 Chicago meeting, and knew of Garfield s efforts 
 with the Committee on Resolutions to block the 
 endorsement of my candidacy. 
 
 Just prior to the Chicago conference, Gardner 
 had visited a number of the middle western 
 states, through which President Taft was then 
 filling a series of speaking engagements. This 
 trip was made by Gardner, representing the 
 syndicate of papers for which he was the Wash 
 ington correspondent, and was primarily for the 
 purpose of forming a judgment with respect 
 to Taft s strength as a candidate and the 
 strength of my opposing candidacy. He re 
 turned to Washington and advised me that in 
 his opinion Taft had little or no real following 
 west of the Mississippi River, and he said: "I 
 have come definitely to the conclusion that you 
 now have a fair chance to win the nomination 
 in the convention." He gave it as his opinion 
 that the Progressives from the Pacific coast and 
 middle western states were certain to send three 
 hundred to three hundred and fifty delegates 
 to the National Convention. He announced 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 535 
 
 that he was going over to New York to acquaint 
 Roosevelt with the situation as he saw it, and 
 urge him to a more active and more open support 
 of my candidacy. 
 
 Upon his return Gardner came to see me. I 
 saw at once that his interview had given him 
 some new impressions of Roosevelt s attitude 
 toward my candidacy. Apparently it had sud 
 denly dawned upon Roosevelt that Taft could 
 be beaten. Indeed, Gardner reported that 
 when he told Roosevelt that there would be 
 three hundred and fifty Progressive delegates 
 opposed to Taft s renomination, elected west of 
 the Mississippi, Roosevelt at once declared that 
 Taft could not be nominated in the face of that 
 opposition; that even if with the southern dele 
 gates there were votes enough to force his re- 
 nomination, no federal machine would dare to 
 name him in the face of so much opposition. 
 Moreover, the Chicago conference had very 
 greatly impressed Roosevelt with the Progres 
 sive support that was coming to me. In report 
 ing his interview to me, Gardner said: 
 
 "Roosevelt is not only surprised at the devel- 
 
536 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 opment of your candidacy, but he is disappointed 
 as well." And then explaining, he said further: 
 "Roosevelt wants to be President again, but 
 you know it has heretofore been his judgment 
 that Taft could not be beaten. However, he 
 now believes that he will be beaten. This 
 change of opinion is not due alone to my report 
 of the conditions in the west, but others have 
 seen him; and then this Chicago conference has 
 been very informing to him. He begins to see 
 that this Progressive movement is a whole lot 
 bigger than he has ever believed it to be. Now 
 you are developing such strength that being 
 nominated in 1912 becomes a possibility. And 
 even if you should fail of the nomination, your 
 leadership of the Progressive movement would 
 become so established that you would be in the 
 way in 1916." 
 
 Gardner was plainly impressed by the change 
 in Roosevelt. While more the Colonel s friend 
 than mine, he often said that in his opinion 
 Roosevelt could not be elected if nominated; 
 that he had repeatedly urged this view upon 
 Roosevelt, and, furthermore, that notwithstand- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 537 
 
 ing his great personal attachment for Roosevelt, 
 he knew his weakness, his tendency to compro 
 mise, and he believed that "more progress would 
 be made in four years under a La Follette ad 
 ministration than in ten years under a Roose 
 velt administration." 
 
 Gardner had found Roosevelt up on the bit. 
 Others had been ahead of him in reporting the 
 decline of the Taft strength and the astonishing 
 progress of my candidacy. Dan Hanna of Ohio, 
 son of the late Mark Hanna, and Nat Wright, his 
 editor of the Cleveland Leader, had visited Roose 
 velt just ahead of Gardner, and had urged that 
 it was time for him to "cut the string" and turn 
 his candidacy loose. Roosevelt had received 
 also a report in writing from O Laughlin, cor 
 respondent for the Chicago Tribune, who had 
 been with Taft on his "swing around the 
 circle," and he reported Taft a "dead one," and 
 urged upon Roosevelt that it was time for him 
 to get in. "Still," Gardner said, "he will not do 
 it. He cannot come out as a candidate against 
 Taft. He knows it. He has said so himself 
 again and again." 
 
538 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 While there was this flaming up of Roose 
 velt s inner desire, he did not "cut the string." 
 But manifestly he loosened it, giving his friends 
 an opportunity to start here and there an "insist 
 ent demand" that he should be the candidate of 
 the Progressives. Thus, following the visit of 
 Hanna and Wright to Roosevelt, the Cleveland 
 Leader, and the Toledo Blade, another Hanna 
 paper, became more pronounced in advocacy of 
 Roosevelt as a candidate. 
 
 This stirring of Roosevelt sentiment was 
 cleverly directed. There w T as not enough of it to 
 require any outward change of attitude on the 
 part of Roosevelt himself, but just sufficient in 
 Ohio and elsewhere to indicate an apparent out 
 cropping of a powerful underground Roosevelt 
 sentiment in certain localities. This would 
 serve to check or confuse the Progressive support 
 for me resulting from the action of the Chicago 
 conference, and still leave Roosevelt in the choice 
 position where he could let the contest go on, 
 deciding later what course it would be advan 
 tageous for him to take. It had exactly the 
 desired effect upon my campaign and we began 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 539 
 
 to receive complaints from Progressive leaders in \ 
 Ohio and various other states that division was 
 being created in the Progressive ranks by Roose- / 
 velt s friends who were giving out that my can 
 didacy was really in Roosevelt s interest and 
 that at the right time he would be brought out as 
 the real candidate. This situation was seized 
 upon by papers favorable to the Taft adminis 
 tration, and extensively circulated. In some 
 cases it was represented as a disagreement in the 
 Progressive ranks. In some cases it was an 
 nounced that the Progressives supporting my 
 candidacy were being hoodwinked, and that 
 delegates elected for me would be delivered to 
 Roosevelt in the convention. Altogether it be 
 came a very serious hindrance to the progress 
 of our canvass. 
 
 Houser complained daily that his work was 
 being delayed and at many important points 
 brought to a standstill. Our most earnest work 
 ers, men who were supporting my campaign 
 upon the record of achievement in Wisconsin, the 
 work done in the Senate, and in short my whole 
 course as a Progressive; men who would not have 
 
540 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 enlisted in a campaign for Roosevelt, and who, 
 further than this, were unwilling to play a double 
 part, urged that some definite statement be 
 issued clearing the whole matter up. Of course, 
 the confusion and trouble could have been easily 
 disposed of by a few plain words from Roosevelt. 
 Gardner and Pinchot, with whom we talked the 
 matter over, insisted again and again that 
 Roosevelt did not intend to be a candidate, but 
 ( that he was unwilling to make any statement 
 \to that effect. They said he had, while Presi 
 dent, announced that he would not again be a 
 candidate, and that advantage had been taken 
 of this by his opponents to embarrass him in 
 so many ways and to such an extent that he 
 had declared that he would never again make 
 such a statement. This obviously was no answer, 
 and seemed to be an evasion of the point in issue. 
 There was no way in which Roosevelt as a private 
 citizen could be embarrassed by a statement that 
 he would not under any circumstances be a can 
 didate for the Republican nomination for the 
 Presidency in 1912 unless he intended to be a 
 candidate. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 541 
 
 It was at this time and in this connec 
 tion that I found myself beginning to be 
 uncertain as to Pinchot and Gardner. Among 
 all of my supporters none had been more in 
 sistent upon my becoming a candidate, nor 
 stronger in their assurances that Roosevelt was 
 acting in perfect good faith. But we were con 
 fronted with a serious situation in the campaign. 
 Whatever Roosevelt s real position, he was 
 certainly taking exactly the course to embarrass 
 and weaken my candidacy, and injure the whole 
 Progressive movement. It was no satisfaction 
 to our correspondents, whose inquiries multiplied 
 every day, to say that we had repeated assur 
 ances from Roosevelt through his closest friends 
 that he would not be a candidate against 
 Taft. The reply invariably came back, 
 "Roosevelt should be willing to say this plainly 
 to the public over his own signature. We can 
 make no progress with La Follette s candi 
 dacy so long as we are constantly confronted 
 with the statement, Are you certain that 
 he will continue as a candidate, or, if we 
 support delegates for La Follette, will they be 
 
542 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 turned over to Roosevelt later? This we 
 must know." 
 
 While we were in this baffling and distracting 
 situation, Houser proposed that a letter be writ 
 ten Roosevelt which would compel him in his 
 answer to say definitely whether he would under 
 any circumstances be a candidate. Houser con 
 tended that there still was sufficient uncertainty 
 as to Progressive success to deter Roosevelt 
 from coming out as an open candidate, even if 
 he were tendered the united Progressive sup 
 port, and that a letter could be so framed as to 
 force him to a public declaration, which would 
 take him out of the way, and leave me a clear 
 field. I answered that I could not write a letter 
 to Mr. Roosevelt or consent that one be written 
 which might in any way bind me to support 
 him if he decided to become a candidate; that 
 I felt that I could not bring myself to support 
 Roosevelt as the Progressive candidate, but that 
 it could do no harm to call a conference to be 
 attended by the Pinchots, Gardner, and other 
 supporters to discuss the matter; and, indeed, 
 that some good might result in securing an 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 191* 549 
 
 expression from certain of these men upon the 
 subject. 
 
 Such a conference was held at the Pinchot 
 residence, in Washington, which resulted in 
 two or three tentative drafts of letters being 
 made. But after it finally became apparent 
 that any letter requesting him, in the inter 
 ests of the Progressive movement, to publicly 
 announce that he would not be a candidate, 
 must carry with it a give and take proposal 
 which might contingently pledge me to his sup 
 port if he should become a candidate, I put an 
 end to the whole matter, repeating in substance 
 what I had said whenever there had been any 
 serious discussion of Roosevelt as a Progressive 
 candidate for the presidency: that I had always 
 ef edited him with having rendered an important 
 
 ( public service in what he had said and written on \f 
 social and political evils, but when it came to 
 doing the thing necessary to be done, he had 
 
 kfaited^utteily: that the time for preaching 
 generalities had gone by and the time to do the 
 big constructive work had come; that Roosevelt 
 had never shown anv constructive abilitv: that 
 
544 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 he had no settled convictions upon the economics 
 of the Progressive movement, and therefore 
 would certainly compromise it whenever he 
 thought it expedient; that this would defeat 
 real progress; that because of this quality of 
 mind and this element in his character the Pro 
 gressive movement had made more progress when 
 he was out of the country than in all the seven 
 years he was President ; that I was certain he was 
 wrong on the question of the valuation of railway 
 property; that he attached no importance or 
 very little importance to valuation as the cor 
 rect basis for regulating railway rates and had de 
 clared that he did not believe there was any water 
 in the stocks and bonds of the great railway sys 
 tems; that if he were President again I feared he 
 would confirm or bring about the confirmation of 
 the thousands of millions of fictitious capitali 
 zation of the public service corporations and the 
 industrial combinations of the country, fastening 
 forever upon the American people the burden of 
 the present high prices ; and that if I were brought 
 face to face with the question for final decision, 
 I was not prepared to say that I would accept 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 545 
 
 him as a Progressive candidate, or could even 
 support him if he were nominated. 
 
 This conference was not in vain. It served to 
 strengthen my doubts as to certain of my sup 
 porters. On the evening of the same day I re 
 ceived a visit from Gifford Pinchot, who called 
 to inform me that, following the conference, he, 
 Gardner, and Medill McCormick had conferred 
 together, and that he desired to notify me that 
 there must be no break with Roosevelt; that 
 should one come, he and the other two had de 
 cided that they would go with Roosevelt. I said 
 to Pinchot: 
 
 "You know that Roosevelt favored my being 
 a candidate; you know that he sent Gilson 
 Gardner to me to urge me to be a candidate. 
 Now all appearances indicate that he is encour 
 aging the use of his name. As soon as my 
 candidacy began to take on proportions that 
 looked like success there was what seemed to me 
 to be unmistakable evidence of his doing every 
 thing in his power to block it, excepting to come 
 out openly against me. Such a course cannot 
 fail to divide the Progressive strength and seri- 
 
546 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 ously injure, if not destroy for the time being, 
 the whole Progressive movement." 
 
 Pinchot reiterated the statements which he 
 had made before that Roosevelt was not and 
 would not be a candidate; that he (Pinchot) was 
 still absolutely certain that if nothing were done 
 to oppose Roosevelt he would ultimately sup 
 port me openly ; that I had no right to question 
 his motives or his good faith. I asked him if, 
 knowing as he did, the relations between Roose 
 velt and Garfield, he thought Garfield would be 
 found taking a decided position regarding this 
 campaign or any candidate that was not in ac 
 cord with Roosevelt s wishes. He frankly ad 
 mitted that he would not expect Garfield to take 
 any important action in this campaign against 
 Roosevelt s judgment. I then reminded him that 
 Garfield had gone from a conference with Roose 
 velt directly to the Progressive meeting in Chi 
 cago, and there, standing practically alone, had 
 opposed as vigorously as he could in the execu 
 tive session of the Committee on Resolutions any 
 endorsement of my candidacy. And I asked him 
 if he did not regard that as a plain indication of 
 
THE CAMPAING OF 1912 547 
 
 Roosevelt s position. He was forced to admit 
 that it had that appearance, and with some spirit 
 added : 
 
 "But suppose you are right about it, and 
 Roosevelt comes out as a candidate, what can 
 you do? You must know that he has this thing 
 in his own hands and can do whatever he likes." 
 
 I said : "I grant you that he can come into this 
 campaign as a candidate if he chooses to do so. 
 There is no way to prevent that. The fact that 
 he has encouraged my candidacy will not, I am 
 sure, deter him if he thinks at any time the oppor 
 tunity is favorable. But let me serve notice on 
 you now, that if he does so, you and he may 
 understand that he will be confronted with his / 
 record, which is not that of a Progressive. I said, 
 "I know Roosevelt s strength, and I know his 
 weakness. He has never been subjected to criti 
 cism by men of position in his own party. His 
 whole course on the tariff during the seven years 
 he was President proves him to have been as 
 much a standpatter as Aldrich or Cannon. Now, 
 I am not seeking any break with Roosevelt. I 
 have no doubt he could take a large Progressive 
 
548 THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 following with him because he is accepted by 
 many people unacquainted with the details of 
 his record, as a Progressive. He is probably in a 
 position to divide the Progressives and destroy 
 all chance of success in this campaign. But I 
 say now, that if he undertakes such a course, he 
 will surely fail. I know your strong friendship 
 for Roosevelt, and I appreciate the support you 
 have given me. I sincerely hope you are not 
 mistaken when you say that Roosevelt has no 
 intention of becoming a candidate and that he 
 will, as you say, ultimately openly and actively 
 support me for the nomination. Surely you must 
 see, and he must see, that the public is warranted 
 in inferring from his present course that he is con 
 templating an announcement of his candidacy, 
 and that introduces confusion and uncertainty 
 into our campaign which is very harmful. But 
 there is no other way for me than to go on making 
 the best fight I can for the nomination." With 
 my last statement Pinchot apparently agreed and 
 we talked for some time further on the details of 
 our campaign. 
 
 A short time prior to this, on the seventh of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 549 
 
 December, Pinchot had made a speech before 
 the Chicago Press Club, from which I quote the 
 following: 
 
 "If Colonel Roosevelt had not made his recent 
 statement, and I am in a position to know that 
 he means what he says, he might have been the 
 candidate. I do not assert that La Follette is 
 yet sure of the nomination, but now that cir 
 cumstances have made Mr. Taft s renomination 
 either impossible or extremely improbable, the 
 attention of the country is turning swiftly and 
 eagerly to Bob La Follette of Wisconsin." 
 
 Just what occurred between Pinchot and 
 Roosevelt after this speech was delivered in 
 Chicago on the seventh, and before it was 
 repeated in Boston on the sixteenth of Decem 
 ber in Tremont Temple, upon the occasion of 
 the forming of a Progressive organization for 
 Massachusetts, I, of course, have no means of 
 knowing. That Pinchot saw Roosevelt during 
 this interval is certain. It was significant that 
 in delivering the Chicago Press Club speech at 
 the Boston meeting Pinchot omitted from the 
 paragraph above quoted the statement regarding 
 Roosevelt s not being a candidate. 
 
550 THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 Except for this omission he gave the speech 
 as delivered in Chicago. This circumstance is 
 open to the inference that Roosevelt no longer 
 wanted Pinchot emphasizing this statement by 
 repetition. 
 
 It is also certain that Pinchot saw Roosevelt 
 after calling on me that evening following the 
 conference at Pinchot s house, when we had the 
 very plain talk just detailed concerning Roose 
 velt s candidacy and my purpose, which I be 
 lieve was communicated to Roosevelt. Within 
 forty-eight hours thereafter there came a press 
 ing invitation over the long distance telephone 
 for Houser and Lenroot to meet Roosevelt with 
 Gardner and Gifford Pinchot at the residence of 
 Amos Pinchot in New York, on Sunday, Decem 
 ber 17th. It is clear that Roosevelt was still 
 desirous of keeping the soft pedal on his candi 
 dacy, the time not yet having arrived when 
 it would serve his purpose to break in. I 
 declined to permit Houser to go (suggesting 
 that Kent go instead) for the same reason 
 that I had declined to permit either Pinchot 
 or Gardner to arrange any meetings between 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 551 
 
 Roosevelt and myself, which they often sought 
 to bring about. I was unwilling that there 
 should be established any beaten pathway 
 between my headquarters and Mr. Roose 
 velt s offices in New York, upon which at 
 any time might be predicated a relation 
 ship committing me to Roosevelt s brand of 
 Progressivism. 
 
 The substance of Roosevelt s statement to 
 these men, as reported to me by Lenroot, Kent, 
 and Gardner immediately upon their return to 
 Washington, was as follows: Roosevelt said he 
 was not a candidate, but he should never again 
 declare that he would not be a candidate; that 
 he did not think he ought to make such an an 
 nouncement anyway, because if it were found in 
 the convention that I could not beat Taft, it 
 might be necessary for him to permit his 
 name to be presented to the convention; that 
 even then he could not do so, if upon the whole 
 situation it appeared that he might be beaten 
 in the election; that he could not afford to be 
 beaten in the election, as it would spoil his place 
 in history, but that a defeat would not injure 
 
552 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 me; that I should go ahead with the campaign, 
 and if I could be nominated, all right; that if it 
 were found in the convention that I could not 
 make it, then he might come in; but that "under 
 no circumstances ought we to permit the wires 
 to be crossed" or any division or contention 
 come between our friends in the campaign. The 
 North Dakota primary, which was to occur on 
 the nineteenth of March, was then brought to 
 his attention by Lenroot, who pointed out the 
 danger of his (Roosevelt s) name being placed 
 on the ballot there, either by friends, without 
 his consent, or by Taft s supporters, for the 
 purpose of dividing the Progressive vote, thus 
 enabling the reactionaries to carry the state, 
 unless he would (as he could under the law) 
 forbid the use of his name. To this suggestion 
 of Lenroot s he replied that he had not thought 
 of that; but that if such unwarranted action 
 were taken by his friends, or enemies, division 
 could be averted by an understanding that 
 delegates elected fcfr me might be for him for 
 second choice, in the event that his name had 
 to be brought forward in the convention to pre- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 553 
 
 vent Taft s nomination, and it appeared he could 
 win in the election. 
 
 Gardner expressed great satisfaction at the re 
 sult of the interview, contending that Roosevelt 
 was acting in perfect good faith; that he was not 
 a candidate and did not intend to be a can 
 didate. Kent agreed that they would be justi 
 fied in reaching that conclusion if Roosevelt s 
 word could be relied on; but thought that not 
 withstanding his repeated assurances he might 
 be expected to break in at any time and attempt 
 to carry off the nomination; that he certainly 
 would do so if he thought he could get away with 
 it and win in the election against a Democrat. 
 After Kent and Gardner had gone, Lenroot 
 gave it as his opinion that, notwithstanding all 
 Roosevelt had said, he was at that very moment 
 a candidate, but that he would never come out 
 in the open until he had secured such pledges 
 of support as would insure his nomination and 
 also felt sure that he could win in the election. ; 
 
 Arrangements had been made for me to begin 
 a speaking campaign extending through the 
 states of Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, the latter 
 
554 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 part of December and the first of January. 
 My campaign had now been under way for many 
 months. Hundreds of thousands of letters had 
 been written and great quantities of documents 
 and speeches distributed. We had set aside 
 from our campaign fund a sufficient sum to print 
 several thousand copies of a document review 
 ing my public record as a member of the House 
 of Representatives for six years, and governor 
 of Wisconsin for three terms, giving a brief 
 analysis of the progressive laws enacted and the 
 effect of the administration of those laws upon 
 the public service and other corporations of the 
 state, and also covering my six years of service 
 in the Senate. The manuscript for this docu 
 ment had been prepared with care, since it was 
 to be the one given the largest general distribu 
 tion, and turned over to the publicity depart 
 ment in our headquarters to be printed. I had 
 been closely occupied with my official duties 
 and the writing of my autobiography, and could 
 only occasionally look in on the headquarters. 
 Shortly before leaving for Ohio to begin my cam 
 paign, I asked for some printed copies of this 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 555 
 
 record, and was surprised to find that it had not 
 . yet been printed. As Houser was also leaving 
 for Ohio, at my request Congressman John M. 
 Nelson of Wisconsin consented to spend such 
 time at the headquarters as could be spared 
 from his work in the House, and his attention 
 was called to the importance of printing and dis 
 tributing this pamphlet containing my record. 
 
 Some months before this Medill McCormick, 
 with whom I had had no previous acquaintance, 
 calling at my residence to see me, had tendered 
 his services to aid in the .campaign. He referred 
 to his former connection with the Chicago Trib 
 une, and his wide acquaintance with newspaper 
 publishers throughout the country, all of which 
 he mentioned as fitting him to aid in promoting 
 the campaign. He said if his services were 
 acceptable he wanted me to give him a letter 
 to Mr. Houser with directions that he be pro 
 vided with office space at the headquarters for 
 the work which he proposed to do. He stated 
 that he had no active business engagements, as 
 he had been recuperating his health for a con- 
 siderable period of time, and was therefore 
 
556 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 absolutely free to lend a hand. He saw Mr. 
 Houser and soon came to have general charge of 
 matters connected with printing and publicity at 
 the headquarters. 
 
 After I had left to fill my Ohio engagements, 
 Congressman Nelson found that the printing of 
 the manuscript covering my public record was 
 not under way. In the course of a conference 
 relating to other matters, McCormick incident 
 ally placed in Nelson s hands a copy of what 
 Nelson supposed was the approved manuscript. 
 It developed, however, that a manuscript written 
 by McCormick himself had been substituted for 
 the original. Upon reading the document which 
 he proposed to have printed, the significance of 
 the exchange was at once apparent to Nelson, 
 who went directly to McCormick, and with some 
 warmth inquired why a eulogy of Roosevelt 
 was to be sent out ostensibly in the interest of 
 La Follette s candidacy from our headquarters, 
 and stated very positively that it would never 
 be done with his consent in my absence. 
 McCormick took possession of the manuscript 
 and subsequently directed the clerk to have it 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 557 
 
 put in type, telling him to offer the printer a 
 bonus of two hundred dollars for rushing the 
 printing of the document. After taking this 
 extraordinary course to secure the immediate 
 printing of his manuscript, McCormick left for 
 Chicago, in order to be on the ground in Illinois 
 some time in advance of my entering that state 
 to fill the speaking engagements for which I had 
 been scheduled. From Chicago he wired Nelson, 
 again urging that the printing of his manuscript 
 be rushed. Obviously the deep cut which the 
 expenditure for printing this document would 
 make in our limited campaign fund was taken 
 into account, and it was assumed that when once 
 printed, although objectionable, the chances were 
 that it would be sent out instead of the docu 
 ment originally prepared, as we could not afford 
 to print both. 
 
 McCormick s manuscript was cleverly writ 
 ten. It highly commended my work and my 
 candidacy, but contained flattering references to 
 Roosevelt so framed that, if it had been sent 
 out from my headquarters, it would have com 
 mitted me to him as a thoroughgoing Progres- 
 
558 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 sive in the event that he later came out as a 
 candidate. The loyalty of the clerk, however, 
 saved the situation. He carried the manuscript 
 to Nelson, and informed him of the offer which 
 he (the clerk) was authorized to make to the 
 printer in McCormick s behalf. It is to be 
 remembered that at this time Houser and 
 I were both absent and, except for Nelson, 
 McCormick was the one man in authority 
 at my headquarters. Nelson submitted the 
 McCormick manuscript to Mrs. La Follette 
 and Professor Commons, who chanced to be a 
 guest of ours in Washington at the time. They 
 promptly decided that it should not, under any 
 circumstances, be issued, and proceeded at 
 once to have printed the manuscript which 
 had been originally prepared. 
 
 Something like a month before I began my 
 speaking campaign in Ohio a Progressive organi 
 zation had been formed in that state of which 
 Judge Wanamaker of Akron was elected chair 
 man, and John D. Fackler of Cleveland sec 
 retary. At the time of the formation of this 
 Progressive organization it had been proposed to 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 559 
 
 adopt resolutions declaring for my candidacy. 
 But it was suggested to Houser, who was pres 
 ent, that it would be more effective to offer 
 such a resolution at a state- wide conference 
 which it was proposed should be held in 
 Columbus on the first of January following the 
 tour through the state which I was expected 
 to make during the last days of December. 
 Houser reported this to me on his return to 
 Washington. I asked him if it were not possible 
 that work was being done for Roosevelt by Wan- 
 amaker and others who had devised this 
 course, and whether the postponement was not 
 for the purpose of enabling them to develop 
 enough Roosevelt sentiment at the Ohio state 
 conference to defeat a resolution endorsing my 
 candidacy. He assured me that there was not 
 the slightest ground for any such suspicion; that 
 Wanamaker was very friendly to my candidacy, 
 though it was true that he had been at one time 
 a strong Roosevelt man. 
 
 My first meeting in Ohio was at Youngstown 
 in the afternoon of December 27th. Shortly 
 before going to the opera house, where I was 
 
560 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 to speak, Judge Wanamaker, accompanied by 
 Mr. Fackler, called on me at my rooms in the 
 hotel. I had previously been warned to be 
 somewhat on my guard as to Wanamaker. He 
 had called to suggest, he said, that in the course 
 of my speech it would be a fine thing if I would 
 mention the names of former Presidents Gar- 
 field, McKinley, and Roosevelt, as it always 
 had a good effect upon an audience and tended 
 to promote enthusiasm to refer to the old-time 
 Republican leaders of the party. I told him 
 that I was not much given to talking about 
 individuals; that I purposed to discuss the 
 present-day evils oppressing the people and the 
 Progressive remedies which we proposed to meet 
 existing conditions. After some further talk I 
 was escorted to the opera house. Newspaper 
 correspondents representing the press associa 
 tions and many of the. leading papers of the 
 country were present. Indeed, I was accom 
 panied throughout this campaign tour by a large 
 corps of newspaper men, who reported very fully 
 all of my meetings. I never had a more enthu 
 siastic reception nor a more responsive audience, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 561 
 
 but I afterward learned that cards had been dis 
 tributed to those entering on which was printed 
 in black-faced type, "We are for Roosevelt." 
 I do not know whether there was any connec 
 tion between this circumstance and Judge 
 Wanamaker s suggestion that I mention the 
 name of Roosevelt in the course of my speech, 
 but I strongly suspect that had I done so an 
 attempt would have followed to turn the meet 
 ing into a Roosevelt demonstration which would 
 have been reported over the country, giving out 
 the impression that the first meeting of my cam 
 paign had developed an overwhelming senti 
 ment for Roosevelt as the Progressive candidate. 
 The meetings in Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, 
 were really remarkable. I think I may say 
 that never in the heat of a campaign was greater 
 enthusiasm witnessed, and still the primaries 
 were months off. Roosevelt and his friends 
 were surprised and alarmed. When they could 
 neither ignore nor disparage, they were at some 
 pains to restrain the public from committing 
 the error of becoming too enthusiastic about the 
 candidate. 
 
562 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 The Outlook of January 13, 1912, after com 
 menting upon the size of my audiences, added, 
 with exquisite refinement of analysis: 
 
 Whether the crowds that have gathered to 
 hear him have been impelled by enthusiasm for 
 the man, belief in the principles he advocates, 
 or a desire to protest against present political 
 conditions, it would be hard to say; probably all 
 three in varying proportions." 
 
 In judging of Roosevelt s conduct, it is quite 
 important to know whether he entered the field 
 because my candidacy was failing, or because it 
 was succeeding. That is the test of the man s 
 sincerity and reliability of character as involved 
 in this affair, and of the ultimate effect, for good 
 or ill, of his manifest determination to take con 
 trol of the Progressive movement. It therefore 
 becomes an essential part of the history of this 
 whole matter to study step by step the progress 
 or failure of my campaign and candidacy. 
 
 The first practical test came with the Chicago 
 conference of October 16th. The second and 
 more important test came with my first speaking 
 campaign through these three states. I have 
 
.s. 
 
 = 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 563 
 
 said that I never witnessed a deeper and more 
 intense public interest, with all the outward 
 manifestations of enthusiasm and devotion, than 
 on this tour through Ohio, Michigan and Illinois. 
 But I do not rest that statement alone on my 
 own impressions. The brief excerpts herewith 
 added, taken from extended press comments by 
 papers, with one or two exceptions, unfriendly 
 to my candidacy and the Progressive movement, 
 are typical of what the newspapers reported, and 
 are submitted solely that the reader may judge 
 of the matter for himself. 
 
 Of the Youngstown meeting, the Philadelphia 
 North American said: 
 
 "It was an impressive opening, and one which 
 has filled his admirers in Ohio with enthusiasm." 
 
 The Cincinnati Enquirer made this comment 
 on the Cleveland meeting: 
 
 44 At Gray s Armory, which was packed to the 
 doors half an hour before the Senator s arrival, 
 a band burst forth with the national anthem 
 when La Follette appeared. For several min 
 utes Senator La Follette was deterred from 
 speaking by the cheers of the crowd." 
 
564 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 Of the Cleveland meeting the Philadelphia 
 North American said: 
 
 "Senator La Follette got a reception here to 
 night so genuinely enthusiastic, so demonstra 
 tive of tremendous public interest in the man 
 and the Progressive movement, as to astonish his 
 friends and arouse alarm among the reactionary 
 Republicans. The Cleveland newspapers de 
 clared to-day that nothing like this was ever 
 known in Cleveland before." 
 
 The same paper said of the Toledo meeting: 
 
 "The hall in which Senator La Follette spoke 
 here to-night was so crowded before the Senator 
 arrived that the police took charge and locked 
 the doors. Two thousand and more persons 
 were turned away. It was the most enthusiastic 
 audience the Senator had addressed, and cheered 
 him frequently." 
 
 The Cincinnati Enquirer gave this as a part of 
 its report of the Toledo speech: 
 
 " If any one had gained the impression that 
 Republican State Chairman Walter F. Brown s 
 Progressive organization had robbed the visit of 
 Senator Robert M. La Follette of any of its en 
 thusiasm, it was dispelled to-night when the 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 565 
 
 doughty Wisconsin fighter stepped upon the 
 platform in Memorial Hall. 
 
 4 The cheering of more than three thousand 
 men and women greeted him, and this demon 
 stration lasted for five minutes. There were 
 more than two thousand outside the hall who 
 failed to get admittance. They stood around 
 for half an hour in the cold in efforts to make 
 their way indoors." 
 
 Referring to the Dayton meeting, the Phila 
 delphia North American said: 
 
 "Senator La Follette closed the most re 
 markable day he has spent in Ohio with a meet 
 ing here to-night attended by five thousand 
 persons. At North Baltimore to-day the Sena 
 tor got a reception which astonished him. The 
 .actual number of men present exceeded many 
 times the voting population of North Baltimore 
 and must have pretty well exhausted the rural 
 strength of both sections for miles around. 
 Nothing like this North Baltimore meeting was 
 ever known in that section of Ohio in any politi 
 cal campaign." 
 
 Of this same meeting the Cincinnati Enquirer 
 said : 
 
 "Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin 
 talked to an audience here to-night that com- 
 
566 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 fortably filled the Memorial Hall, the largest 
 auditorium in the city. His sentiments were 
 loudly cheered and his climaxes evoked tremen 
 dous applause. 
 
 "Upon his entrance upon the stage he was 
 given such an ovation as clearly showed his 
 immense audience heartily in sympathy with the 
 principles he is representing. " 
 
 My last meeting in Ohio, at Cincinnati on 
 Saturday night, December 30th, was referred to 
 by the Philadelphia North American as follows: 
 
 "Senator La Follette was given to-night, in 
 Cincinnati, President Taft s home town, the 
 most enthusiastic reception accorded him since 
 he entered the state of Ohio. As he proceeded 
 with his speech the enthusiasm increased, and 
 his telling points were greeted with cheers." 
 
 In Michigan I addressed meetings January 1st, 
 2nd and 3rd at Flint, Bay City, Saginaw, Grand 
 Rapids, and Kalamazoo. 
 
 The following from the Detroit Free Press 
 are typical of the notices given my meetings in 
 Michigan : 
 
 "Flint, Mich., January 1. Senator Robert 
 M. La Follette opened the New Year and his 
 

 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 567 
 
 campaign in Michigan simultaneously to-day 
 with a meeting in the auditorium of the Masonic 
 Temple. He was greeted by an audience of 
 about 1,200 persons, which included a consid 
 erable number of farmers from the surrounding 
 country. The Senator was accorded a hearty 
 reception." 
 
 "Bay City, Mich., January 1. Senator Rob 
 ert M. La Follette addressed three thousand 
 people in the armory here this afternoon. The 
 audience was enthusiastic and appreciative." 
 
 Beginning with a meeting on the evening of 
 January 3rd, in Orchestra Hall, Chicago, from 
 which more than three thousand people were 
 turned away, I continued on through the state, 
 concluding a series of seventeen speeches in 
 Illinois at East St. Louis on the evening of 
 January 5th. 
 
 Respecting the Chicago meeting, I quote from 
 the Philadelphia North American: 
 
 6 The public interest in Senator La Follette 
 and the hold he obtained upon his audience here 
 are causing the same amazement to the news 
 papers and politicians that marked his entry into 
 Ohio. Both the newspapers and the politicians 
 
568 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 have been sneering at the La Follette movement 
 and at Senator La Follette in particular. There 
 was plenty of progressive sentiment in the state, 
 they have admitted, but they have been em 
 phatically declaring that it was not La Follette 
 sentiment, and if it were to assume the form 
 of hostility to Taft and the Republican adminis 
 tration it would be found to be Roosevelt senti 
 ment. La Follette s trip to-day and his meeting 
 in Chicago last night have demonstrated that the 
 voters are intensely interested in the Wisconsin 
 Senator and that they believe in him and in his 
 doctrines. The comment in Chicago was that 
 the audience which greeted and cheered Senator 
 La Follette was more like the great mass meeting 
 held against the Allan bill than any political 
 gathering which the city has known since that 
 time. " 
 
 And this from the Chicago Inter-Ocean: 
 
 The meeting last night was the largest and 
 surely the most enthusiastic political gathering 
 ever held in Orchestra Hall. Every seat in the 
 hall was occupied before eight o clock. 
 
 "Senator La Follette had a friendly audience 
 to talk to. They frequently interrupted him 
 with applause. When he rose to speak he was 
 cheered for five minutes. He talked two hours 
 and a half and the audience seemed willing to 
 remain indefinitely." 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 569 
 
 The principal meetings in Illinois were held in 
 the following cities: 
 
 Chicago, Joliet, Morris, Ottawa, Streator, La 
 Salle, Spring Valley, Peoria, Bloomington, De- 
 catur, Springfield, East St. Louis, and Danville. 
 
 The Chicago Tribune said this of the Peoria 
 meeting : 
 
 44 Illinois political jackpotters were castigated 
 without mercy to-day by Senator Robert M. La 
 Toilette in a speech at Ottawa, 111. , the home of Lee 
 O Neil Brown, as well as in speeches at other cities. 
 
 "The Senator completed the first leg of the 
 stiff course mapped out for him in Illinois 
 with an address here to-night before five thou 
 sand persons. " 
 
 And this of the Joliet meeting : 
 
 . "The demonstration to-night, as 
 viewed by expert politicians in the second city 
 in the state, was a record breaker for enthusiasm 
 and cordiality. " 
 
 The following from the Philadelphia North 
 American is characteristic of the general press 
 comment : 
 
 "At Bloomington, Springfield, Decatur, and 
 
570 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 finally here at East St. Louis he was greeted 
 by crowds that packed every available space in 
 the buildings in which he spoke. It was a 
 typical La Follette welcome in every town where 
 he stopped. The men who came to hear him 
 were earnest Progressives, and his utterances 
 pleading for a return to popular rule were en 
 thusiastically applauded. " 
 
 And this from the Chicago Tribune: 
 
 "Senator La Follette was tremendously 
 pleased with his reception in Illinois to-day. 
 He let it be known that he feels he has been 
 received most kindly, and far in excess of the 
 most optimistic predictions of his friends when 
 the Illinois invasion was first planned." 
 
 "There were big crowds at every point 
 he touched -- Bloomington, Clinton, Decatur, 
 Springfield, Carlinville, Staunton, Edwardsville, 
 and to-night (at East St. Louis) an audience 
 which tested the popularity of Senator La 
 Follette in the face of allegations from local 
 Progressive managers that the regular organiza 
 tion, which is particularly strong here, had made 
 efforts to throw cold water on the meeting. " 
 
 I spoke once in Indiana, at Terre Haute, on 
 my way back to Washington. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 571 
 
 It was the most remarkable series of mid 
 winter meetings ever held. The weather was 
 bitterly cold ; yet there were immense audiences 
 everywhere for both the day and night speeches, 
 and I never found people more responsive or 
 more deeply and earnestly interested. 
 
 My tour of these states was really a triumph. 
 And it destroyed the effect of the jack-in-the-box 
 statements emanating from New York regarding 
 Roosevelt s purposes, which had produced so 
 much confusion in the field work that was being 
 carried on from the headquarters. 
 
 Realizing the importance of taking advan 
 tage of the strong current which had set in for 
 my candidacy following the meetings in Ohio, 
 Michigan, and Illinois, I should have extended 
 my tour into Minnesota, the Dakotas, Iowa, 
 Nebraska, and Kansas before returning to 
 Washington, excepting for the fact that it was 
 necessary to return to Washington on account of 
 some matters pending in the Senate, and to fill 
 engagements in New York, Pennsylvania, and 
 New Jersey which had been made some time 
 before. 
 
572 THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 I had been back in Washington but a few days 
 when it became apparent that there was a marked 
 change of policy on the part of Roosevelt and 
 his friends. Systematic and organized efforts of 
 a more clearly definite character were being 
 vigorously put forth to check and set back the 
 rising tide of sentiment in my favor. The 
 Progressives of the country were taking my 
 candidacy too seriously! 
 
 At the very time when my meetings were 
 overtaxing the largest auditoriums that could be 
 secured, Roosevelt wrote a letter to Governor 
 Hiram Johnson, of California, who had been 
 strongly committed to my candidacy, in \vhich 
 1 he stated in substance that it was necessary 
 I should be set aside, and suggested that he 
 (Johnson) would make an admirable candidate 
 for Vice-President. The Vice-Presidential bait 
 was dangled before the eyes of the governor 
 on a separate and detached sheet of paper in 
 the form of an unsigned postscript. John 
 son afterward visited Roosevelt in New York, 
 and became one of the group who finally suc 
 ceeded in cornering the coy and diffident 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 573 
 
 candidate and wringing from him a "reluctant 
 
 consent. 
 
 Dispatches began to appear in the papers here 
 and there quite systematically, and from signifi 
 cant sources, asserting that Roosevelt would be 
 a candidate, I quote from one dated at Pough- 
 keepsie, N. Y., published in the Philadelphia 
 North American, January 1, 1912. 
 
 "That Theodore Roosevelt will be a candi 
 date for President again if the call comes strong 
 enough for him to respond is the statement 
 made to-day by John Burroughs, the author- 
 naturalist in an interview published in the 
 Poughkeepsie Courier. Much significance is 
 attached to this prediction on account of Mr. 
 Burroughs intimacy with Mr. Roosevelt." 
 
 On January 1, 1912, I opened my campaign 
 in Michigan. On the same day the much talked 
 of Ohio state conference was held at Columbus. 
 It had been announced several weeks before. 
 Ninety -two of the leading Progressives of the 
 state were present. In this meeting, for the first 
 time and in an open and formal way, the friends 
 of Roosevelt disclosed their real purpose. Wai- 
 
574 THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 ter F. Brown, reactionary boss and chairman of 
 the Republican State Central Committee, was 
 present, working actively in support of Roose 
 velt, and to prevent any endorsement of my can 
 didacy by the Ohio conference. Brow T n is to 
 Ohio politics exactly what Platt, Quay, Henry 
 C. Payne, and men of that type were to the 
 political affairs of their time. The morning of 
 the conference he spent much time with Pinchot 
 and Fackler. 
 
 It had been accepted that a formal endorse 
 ment of my candidacy would be adopted in this 
 meeting. But a small minority, led by Pinchot, 
 Garfield, Wanamaker, and Brown, appealed to 
 those in attendance not to adopt a resolution 
 making formal declaration for any candidate for 
 President, urging that the friends of Roosevelt 
 should not be antagonized. Pinchot especially 
 gave assurance that they would later all be 
 found supporting my candidacy. He stated 
 further that he knew from his repeated con 
 ferences with Roosevelt that he was not a candi 
 date, and expressed the strongest belief that 
 Roosevelt himself would be found before long 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 575 
 
 openly supporting me. My friends attending 
 upon that conference, who were eager to endorse 
 me, outnumbered the friends of Roosevelt eight 
 to one. But yielding to Pinchot, and the appeal 
 for harmony, the following resolution was finally 
 agreed to: 
 
 "We are opposed to the renomination of 
 President Taft. We hereby declare it to be the 
 determined purpose of the Ohio Progressive 
 Republican League to work in harmony and 
 unison to nominate a Progressive Republican for 
 President, recognizing as fellow Progressives all 
 who hold the principles for which we stand, 
 whether they be for the presidential nomi 
 nation of Robert M. La Follette or Theodore 
 Roosevelt, or any other Progressive Repub 
 lican. 
 
 "We assert the essential unity of the Pro 
 gressive movement throughout the entire state 
 and nation. 
 
 "We favor the election of delegates who will 
 favor the nomination of a candidate who will 
 fully represent the Progressive principles." 
 
 Speaking for these resolutions, Pinchot said: 
 
 "I believe most intensely that it would be 
 foolish not to crystallize the Roosevelt senti- 
 
570 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 ment and the Progressive sentiment of all other 
 men, whatever candidates they may prefer, so 
 that we can elect delegates to the Chicago 
 convention who will vote for the Progressive 
 candidate, which we know will be Mr. La Fol- 
 lette." 
 
 The convention then voted 81 to 11 in favor of 
 a resolution as a " personal expression " of the 
 delegates, naming me as "the living embodi 
 ment of the principles of the Progressive move 
 ment and the logical candidate to carry them to 
 successful fruition." 
 
 January 5th, Garfield made a hurried 
 trip to New York, and had an interview 
 with Roosevelt at a private club. He was in 
 a position to report on the great stirring that 
 Ohio had just been given, and the clever work 
 done by himself, Pinchot, Wanamaker, and 
 Walter Brown, the machine boss, in averting an 
 affirmative endorsement of my candidacy by 
 the Ohio conference at Columbus three days 
 before. 
 
 Pinchot, immediately after the Ohio con 
 ference, went to Battle Creek, Mich., for a 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 577 
 
 brief rest, and on January 3rd the newspapers 
 generally published the following: 
 
 "Gifford Pinchot, in an interview given out 
 here to-day, denied that he had made any state 
 ments in speeches or interviews, that Theodore 
 Roosevelt had told him that he would not accept 
 the presidential nomination if it were tendered. 
 I know nothing of Mr. Roosevelt s affairs, 
 either as to whether he would accept the nomi 
 nation, or whether he believes he could be 
 elected." 
 
 Just one month before, he had said in his 
 speech to the Chicago Press club: 
 
 "If Colonel Roosevelt had not made his recent 
 statement, and I am in a position to know that 
 he means what he says, he might have been the 
 candidate." 
 
 And only two days before he had said in his 
 speech before the Ohio conference that he was 
 advocating the plan which he contended would 
 secure the election of "delegates to the Chicago 
 convention who will vote for the Progressive 
 candidate which we knoiv will be Mr. La Fol- 
 lette." 
 
578 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 But Progressive sentiment was crystallizing 
 about my candidacy so rapidly that the near 
 friends of Roosevelt who had been professing 
 loyalty to me, while at heart for him, were being- 
 forced by developments more and more to dis 
 close their real design. And we were fast ap 
 proaching a time when Roosevelt himself would 
 have to show his hand. 
 
 On the nineteenth of January Mr. Homer 
 Mann, chairman of the Fifth District Congres 
 sional Committee, called a meeting of party 
 workers together in Kansas City, to whom he 
 said: 
 
 "Some time ago I wrote to Mr. Roosevelt 
 telling him that it was impossible to carry the 
 state unless he again assumed the leadership of 
 the party. I got a reply. I am not at liberty to 
 give the answ r er now, but it suffices to say that 
 this meeting was called." 
 
 I had spoken many times in Kansas. Some 
 three years before Bristow became a candidate 
 for the United States Senate I had urged my audi 
 ences to elect him to succeed Senator Long, and 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 579 
 
 in my meetings throughout the state had re 
 viewed Long s senatorial record. Finally, when 
 Bristow did become a candidate, I had gone to 
 Kansas on the urgent call of William Allen White 
 to speak for Bristow. I had every reason to be 
 lieve that White, who is very strong in Kansas, 
 was supporting my candidacy. 
 
 On the ninth of January a letter was received at 
 our headquarters in Washington from Rodney 
 A. Elward of Castleton, Kan., an old Wiscon 
 sin University friend and supporter of mine, and 
 at present one of the regents of the Kahsas State 
 University. In this letter, Elward said: 
 
 "I received a letter from William Allen WTiite 
 this morning saying he is for La Follette." 
 
 This letter of White s must have been written 
 a day or two before and about the time I 
 had concluded my tour of Ohio, Michigan, and 
 Illinois. 
 
 I was amazed to see it followed on the tenth 
 of January by an editorial in White s paper, the 
 Emporia Gazette, concluding an appeal to Pro 
 gressives to organize for Roosevelt, with the 
 words, "Roosevelt or bust!" 
 
580 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 What came to White in that brief interval to 
 change his attitude, I do not know. 
 
 The day after the publication of Mr. White s 
 "Roosevelt or bust" editorial, Frank A. Mun- 
 sey, owner of several newspapers and periodi 
 cals, very much interested in the United States 
 Steel Corporation, and one of Roosevelt s 
 financial backers and intimates, published in 
 large type a double column signed editorial on 
 the front page of his papers, of which the follow 
 ing is the concluding paragraph: 
 
 "Situated as he is, my guess is that Mr. 
 Roosevelt is quite content to let political matters 
 shape themselves up as they will. If no call 
 comes to him to lead the fight, he will keep right 
 on having a good time with his work, as he is 
 now doing. But if the call does come, he will 
 buckle on his armor and go to it with all his 
 old-time impetuosity and energy." 
 
 In view of Mr. Munsey s relations with Mr. 
 Roosevelt, and the financial backing which he 
 furnished to promote Roosevelt s campaign, it 
 will hardly be questioned that the publication of 
 this editorial was inspired. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 581 
 
 Two days later the story that a campaign for 
 Roosevelt was being quietly financed by George 
 W. Perkins of the Steel Trust, and that Ormsby 
 McHarg had been sent into the southern states 
 to "see" the right parties, was printed as coming 
 from Indianapolis, and widely copied in New 
 York, Washington, and other papers. It pro 
 duced a great sensation. When the newspaper 
 reporters saw Roosevelt at the Outlook office 
 to interrogate him on the subject, they experi 
 enced considerable difficulty. The session was 
 very brief, and was reported by one of them as 
 follows : 
 
 "Mr. Roosevelt s jaws snapped shut as he 
 listened, and when they opened it was to say, 
 I will not discuss pipe dreams from Indian 
 apolis or anywhere else. There are depths of 
 tomfoolery that I can t notice. 
 
 But the financing of Roosevelt s campaign by 
 Morgan s friend Perkins was a subject of too 
 great public interest to be disposed of as " tom 
 foolery." And the watchful newspaper corre 
 spondents were soon able to report that private 
 meetings and conferences were being held be- 
 
582 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 tween Perkins and Roosevelt. The support of 
 Morgan s man, Perkins, recalled to the public 
 mind Roosevelt s great service to the Steel Trust 
 in permitting it to swallow up its principal rival, 
 the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, and, con 
 sequently, the demand for something definite as 
 to Perkins financial backing of Roosevelt s can 
 didacy became so insistent that it could not be 
 silenced by brushing it aside as a "pipe dream." 
 Some one had to speak, and the speaking part was 
 assigned to Perkins, who issued a " frank state 
 ment" announcing that he was supporting Roose 
 velt because "they looked at public questions in 
 the same way . When taken red handed the very 
 boldness of an open admission is the best and 
 only recourse. Before many weeks all reserve as 
 to Perkins, Munsey, and the Steel Trust was 
 thrown aside, and later men most prominently 
 connected with the Harvester Trust were likewise 
 openly supporting the Roosevelt candidacy 
 That Wall Street interests generally were in ac 
 cord was soon well understood among those 
 who noted the kindly references to Roose 
 velt and the difference in expression when- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 583 
 
 ever his name was mentioned around the Stock 
 Exchange. 
 
 While the whole plan in the light of subse 
 quent events became perfectly plain, so cleverly 
 was it all managed, so rapidly were the scenes 
 shifted, so swiftly did the unauthorized an 
 nouncements and the qualified denials follow one 
 upon the other, that doubt and confusion pre 
 vailed everywhere, outside of the little circle of 
 which Roosevelt was the centre. One day it would 
 seem certain that my candidacy had already been 
 betrayed by the friends of Roosevelt who were 
 in my own organization; the next day I would be 
 assured that he would announce his refusal to be 
 a candidate; that there would be no division in 
 the Progressive ranks and that his supporters 
 would be my supporters. But events were 
 driving ahead rapidly. With each day the 
 double play became more difficult. 
 
 Finally, on the 14th of January, we were sur 
 prised at our headquarters to receive a visit from 
 John D.Fackler, our campaign manager for Ohio, 
 who said he came with a proposition from Walter 
 Brown and Dan Hanna for a w r orking combina- 
 
584 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 tion of La Follette and Roosevelt forces. They 
 proposed that the campaign be carried on in 
 Ohio with La Follette as the candidate, but that 
 in each congressional district one Roosevelt dele 
 gate should be placed upon the ballot with one 
 La Follette delegate. Roosevelt was not to be 
 known as an open and avowed candidate. The 
 inducement was held out that they would fur 
 nish all the money for the campaign in Ohio, but 
 they stipulated that the La Follette Progressive 
 literature which had been supplied from Wash 
 ington, and was then on hand at our Ohio head 
 quarters in considerable quantity, should be 
 destroyed, and no more sent out into the state. 
 Fackler was told that I would enter into no 
 deal or combination with the men who stood for 
 the very things in politics to which I was op 
 posed, and that I would consent to no arrange 
 ment which involved either coupling Roosevelt s 
 candidacy with mine, or conducting a campaign 
 in which Roosevelt delegates should be put on a 
 ticket under cover of my candidacy. Fackler 
 professed to agree with the position which I took, 
 but he said in the course of the conversation that 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 585 
 
 it had been very strongly intimated to him if the 
 Brown-Hanna-Roosevelt scheme could be car 
 ried out he (Fackler) could have the nomination 
 to Congress from that district. He protested 
 that he had no desire to go to Congress and that 
 such an offer, if squarely made, would have no 
 influence with him. He said several times that 
 when he reached his office on Monday morning 
 he would find these men there with their check 
 or the money ready. Fackler returned to Ohio 
 with directions to say to Brown and Hanna 
 that their offer was rejected; that we should 
 continue to make a straight-out fight for Pro 
 gressive principles and for my candidacy, and 
 that we would enter into no combination of any 
 character whatsoever. 
 
 A few days later Fackler, accompanied by 
 Walter Brown, visited Roosevelt at the Out 
 look office in New York. He returned to Ohio 
 by way of Washington, calling upon Houser 
 at the headquarters, where he gave positive 
 assurance of his continued loyalty, explaining 
 his visit by saying that he had gone to see 
 Roosevelt at the suggestion of Brown, but that 
 
586 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 the conference was confidential, and that he was 
 not at liberty to state what Roosevelt had said 
 to him. Fackler subsequently went over to the 
 support of Roosevelt, taking with him as much 
 of my organization as he could influence. He 
 was given the support of the Roosevelt organiza 
 tion as a candidate for the congressional nomi 
 nation in the Cleveland district, but was defeated 
 in the primary. 
 
 We now began to have serious differences with 
 Gifford Pinchot. He insisted that the Brown- 
 Hanna combination should be made, and that 
 the La Follette organization in Ohio should put a 
 Roosevelt delegate on the ticket in each con 
 gressional district. My answer was that my 
 candidacy should not be made a shield and cover 
 for Roosevelt; that if he was to be a candidate, 
 he should come out in the open; that I would 
 never consent to be a stalking horse for Roose 
 velt or any other man; that for many years I had 
 fought a clean, straight fight for definite Progres 
 sive principles; that I had been urged by Pro 
 gressives to stand as the presidential candidate 
 for that reason; that I would not compromise 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 587 
 
 these principles or permit my name to be used in 
 any way to secure delegates for any other candi 
 date; that he (Pinchot) understood all this before 
 he contributed in support of my campaign, and 
 that as I had repeatedly asserted, this would be 
 my position through to the end. 
 
 I was now to be reminded that "nothing 
 weighs lighter than a promise." On the twentieth 
 of January Cummins announced his candidacy 
 for the presidential nomination. It was little 
 more than eight months since the conference of 
 Progressives in Senator Bourne s committee 
 room, on the thirtieth of April, when Cummins 
 had said, "I shall not be a candidate. It is out 
 of the question." To Houser, in explaining his 
 action in coming out as a candidate, Cummins 
 stated that it was his purpose to hold Iowa 
 from going to Taft. Houser protested and 
 urged him to keep his promise. But he issued 
 his announcement. In the end he was only 
 able to get ten of the twenty-six delegates from 
 the state of Iowa to the national convention. 
 Judged by his estimates of what I would be able 
 to do in that state and from the correspondence 
 
588 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 at our headquarters, I could scarcely have done 
 worse. 
 
 I had been announced to speak in Carnegie 
 Hall on the twenty-second of January. A few 
 days before this meeting Pinchot proposed that 
 on the occasion of my visit to New York a 
 luncheon should be arranged at Amos Pinchot s 
 house, where Roosevelt and I should meet. As I 
 had now become convinced that Roosevelt was an 
 active, though not an open, candidate, and was 
 only waiting to create a situation which would 
 seem to compel his candidacy, I would not con 
 sent to be drawn into any situation which would 
 lead the public to believe that there was a com 
 bination between us, or which could thereafter be 
 interpreted to mean that I accepted Roosevelt as 
 representing real Progressive principles. For 
 some days New York dispatches had appeared 
 in Roosevelt s interest, reiterating the statement 
 that (to quote from one of them) " there will be 
 absolutely no rivalry between Senator La Fol- 
 lette and Theodore Roosevelt in case the latter 
 should become a candidate. . . . On the 
 other hand, it is becoming apparent that should 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 589 
 
 Roosevelt decide that he will not accept the 
 nomination under any circumstances, then the 
 real Roosevelt strength will undoubtedly go to 
 Senator La Follette." 
 
 The time had not quite arrived openly to 
 desert me. My campaign work and that of our 
 headquarters was effective in arousing and 
 organizing Progressive sentiment, and it was 
 still a part of the Roosevelt plan to wear down 
 my strength and entice away my active sup 
 porters, one after another, so that when the right 
 time came for a final stroke my situation would 
 be such that I would either go in and help pro 
 mote the Roosevelt campaign or strike my 
 colors and retire from the field. When Fackler 
 was given his specific instructions, directing 
 that the Ohio campaign must have no connec 
 tion whatever with those who were supporting 
 any other candidate, the same instructions in 
 effect were sent to my headquarters in Chicago. 
 Medill McCormick was now spending most of 
 his time in and about the Chicago headquarters. 
 
 I had already seen enough to make me wholly 
 distrustful of McCormick s loyalty, and was 
 
590 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 apprehensive that he was doing everything in 
 his power to undermine and weaken my organi 
 zation. I was therefore determined to take such 
 steps as would force the Roosevelt men in my 
 camp to show their hands. I was resolved to 
 seek no quarrel, but I would . have no more 
 double work going on in my headquarters. 
 This had the effect of forcing the Roosevelt men 
 in our organization to make their stand, and 
 about January 18th Pinchot, acting upon his 
 own motion, called a conference of those who 
 had contributed to support my campaign, and 
 such others as he saw fit to invite, to meet 
 at the Washington headquarters. There were 
 present at that meeting Gifford and Amos 
 Pinchot, Congressman Kent, Walter S. Rogers 
 (secretary to Charles R. Crane), who were the 
 principal contributors; Houser, Congressman 
 Lenroot, my private secretary, John J. Han- 
 nan, and^as I now remember it, Gilson Gard 
 ner. Medill McCormick was there. McCor- 
 mick came on from Chicago, I presume, 
 on Gifford Pinchot . s invitation. I declined to 
 participate in the conference so long as McCor- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 591 
 
 mick was present and he later withdrew. Francis 
 J. Heney happened to be in Washington at this 
 time. He was then one of my warmest sup 
 porters and strongly opposed to Roosevelt s 
 becoming a candidate. After I learned that 
 Finchot had called the conference I requested 
 Heney to attend and he did so. 
 
 Gifford Pinchot was insistent that the cam 
 paign should be conducted according to the 
 scheme suggested by Walter Brown and Dan 
 Hanna, continuing the campaign for me as the 
 Progressive candidate, but putting Roosevelt 
 delegates on the ticket with the La Follette 
 delegates in Ohio and elsewhere. 
 
 In this conference Heney vigorously opposed 
 Gifford Pinchot s plan. He pointed out the 
 rank injustice of the course Roosevelt was pur 
 suing, and emphasized, as did others, the un 
 certainty of Roosevelt s position on Progressive 
 prmcTples. He argued that it was altogether 
 too late for Roosevelt to come into the cam 
 paign; that months before he had personally 
 interviewed Roosevelt on the subject of his 
 candidacy; that Roosevelt had said that he was 
 
592 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 not a candidate; that Heney had replied to 
 Roosevelt that it was not enough for him to say 
 that he was riot a candidate; that the Progres 
 sives of California and other states had a right 
 to know whether he \vould under any circum 
 stances become a candidate, and that thereupon 
 Roosevelt had said most emphatically and 
 positively that he would not under any cir 
 cumstances become a candidate. Gifford Pin- 
 chot reiterated his oft-repeated statement that 
 Roosevelt was not and would not be a candi 
 date, but contended that we could elect some 
 delegates) by putting Roosevelt men on the 
 
 /tickets, and thus get some votes which otherwise 
 4. might not be cast for us. Lenroot expressed 
 the opinion that as a matter of political expe 
 diency such a course would be advantageous. 
 Houser said that while he had been favorably 
 inclined toward the plan as a matter of political 
 tactics, still he did not think we could stand 
 
 / for any combination with the representatives 
 
 , of the Steel Trust, who were evidently behind 
 
 \Roosevelt. 
 
 As I was firmly against this course Pinchot 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 593 
 
 was voted down. Amos Pinchot strongly sup 
 ported my position throughout the conference, 
 and at its conclusion pointedly remarked to his 
 brother: 
 
 "Gifford, I think you will sleep better to-^ 
 night now that it is settled that we are not to 
 be tied up with representatives of machine / 
 politics and the Steel Trust." 
 
 Amos Pinchot said to me just before going 
 into the conference in excusing his brother s 
 insistence that I should consent to the combi 
 nation : 
 
 "I agree with you perfectly that there must be 
 no combination with Roosevelt. I have no 
 doubt whatever about his having been an active 
 candidate all along, but I am sure Gifford is 
 honest in the position he is taking. Roosevelt 
 has always been able to pull the wool over his 
 eyes." 
 
 Gifford Pinchot apparently acquiesced in the 
 decision of the conference, and I was gratified 
 to believe that the whole matter was definitely 
 and finally settled. 
 
 A few days later, on the twenty-second of Jan- 
 
594 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 uary, I went to New York to fill an engagement 
 at Carnegie Hall. Gifford Pinchot presided at 
 the meeting, which was an exceptional success. 
 A representative audience filled the great hall, 
 and when I arrived I found the streets packed 
 for blocks by people unable to gain admission. 
 I was obliged to address a large overflow meeting 
 before entering the hall. Of this meeting the 
 New York Times said: 
 
 "It was the Wisconsin candidate s first ap 
 pearance in New York and the reception ac 
 corded him he himself said was as great as any 
 he ever received in his home state. Carnegie 
 Hall never held a bigger nor a more enthusiastic 
 audience." 
 
 The Sun said: 
 
 "Carnegie Hall was packed at eight o clock, 
 and the reserves of two police stations were 
 called out to take care of the crowds that were 
 jammed into Seventh Avenue north and south 
 of the hall." 
 
 Roosevelt did not attend my meeting. He 
 was, as I was informed, at a dinner given in his 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 595 
 
 honor on that evening by one of the Progressive 
 clubs of the city. Several members of this club 
 called on me later to express regret that this 
 dinner could not have been given at some other 
 time, and to say that it would have been so 
 arranged but that no other date was acceptable 
 to Roosevelt. 
 
 Though my New York friends were jubilant 
 over my campaign opening there and the prog 
 ress made in other states, I found them very 
 fearful that Roosevelt was determined to " break 
 in," as they expressed it. 
 
 There was still no open declaration from him, 
 but it was understood that leading Progressives 
 were being summoned to confer with him and 
 give out newspaper interviews of the " pressing 
 demands" in their respective states that he 
 should become a candidate. 
 
 Upon my return to Washington I was sur 
 prised to find that Gifford Pinchot had called 
 still another conference of the same men to 
 meet at our headquarters. The date which 
 he fixed for this conference was January 29th, 
 and he had been urgent that Mr. Crane 
 
596 THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 should be present. I learned that he had seen 
 Roosevelt just before my New York meet 
 ing. I felt that this conference would be the 
 last which Pinchot would attend if he failed in 
 his plan, and I understood why he was so deter 
 mined that Crane should be present. The two 
 Pinchots and Kent had each furnished a con 
 tribution of $10,000, all of which had been con 
 tributed months before, and which had been 
 substantially expended by this time. Crane 
 was contributing $5,000 a month, and had 
 agreed to continue his payments monthly until 
 the time of the meeting of the National Con 
 vention in Chicago. If Crane could be drawn to 
 the support of Pinchot s position, it was Pin- 
 chot s reasoning, as I believe, that I would be 
 compelled to masquerade as the candidate 
 behind whom Roosevelt s campaign could be 
 prosecuted, without his being forced to announce 
 his candidacy until the convention should 
 meet, when it would be sprung, the convention 
 stampeded, and the nomination "forced" upon 
 him. 
 
 This final conference met pursuant to Pin- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OP 1912 597 
 
 chot s call at my Washington headquarters on 
 Monday afternoon, January 29th. There were 
 present Gifford and Amos Pinchot, Charles R. 
 Crane, and his secretary, Walter S. Rogers, 
 the manager of our Chicago headquarters; 
 Professor Charles E. Merriam, Louis D. Bran- 
 deis, William Kent, Congressman Lenroot, Gil- 
 son Gardner, Angus McSween, the Washington 
 correspondent of the Philadelphia North Ameri 
 can, Houser and Hannan. Medill McCormick 
 was again brought into this conference from 
 Chicago, uninvited, unless by Pinchot. Their 
 discussion consumed the afternoon, and was 
 marked by plainness of speech all around. It 
 was evident from the beginning that the Roose 
 velt element represented in the group had come 
 prepared to force the issue. It was manifest to 
 them that my candidacy could no longer serve 
 the Roosevelt interest, and they submitted an 
 alternative in writing which I quote: 
 
 (1) That La Follette shall withdraw in favor 
 of Roosevelt, with reservations as to differences 
 of opinion, and continue to stump. 
 
 (2) That La Follette shall withdraw, but 
 
598 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 not in favor of anybody, and continue to stump, 
 leaving the individuals of the group to take 
 what course they choose. 
 
 In order to insure the fullest and freest dis 
 cussion, I did not myself enter the room where 
 the conference was being held until they had 
 about exhausted the subject under consideration. 
 Moreover, I had been resolved upon my course 
 from the beginning, and even if I stood alone 
 I knew I must go straight ahead. When they 
 had threshed the whole matter out among 
 themselves I was invited to come in. It 
 was then about five o clock. I had just been 
 called to the telephone by a representative of 
 the Associated Press, who informed me that a 
 Chicago paper was running a story that after 
 noon stating in effect that Medill McCormick, 
 Crane, Pinchot, and others were holding a con 
 ference that day at the Washington headquar 
 ters, and that a statement would be issued as a 
 result of the conference announcing my with 
 drawal. It would appear that information 
 must have been furnished to the Chicago paper 
 regarding the conference before McCormick left 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 599 
 
 Chicago. I immediately called Houser out of 
 the conference, and caused to be issued by him 
 the following statement: 
 
 Washington, D. C., January 29, 1912.- 
 Once for all I want to settle* the rumors in cir 
 culation that Senator La Follette contemplates 
 withdrawing as a presidential candidate. Sena 
 tor La Follette never has been and is not now a 
 quitter. When he entered the contest for the 
 nomination he assured those who induced him to 
 become a candidate that he would go through to 
 the end, and that is his determination. He will 
 be there until the gavel falls in the convention 
 announcing the nominee. Senator La Follette 
 is making this campaign to promote the princi 
 ples in a national way for which he has stood and 
 fought in his own state and in the United States 
 Senate. He will make a campaign in every 
 state to elect delegates pledged to those princi 
 ples, and to his candidacy as the Republican 
 nominee for President, first, last, and all the time. 
 "(Signed) WALTER L. HOUSER." 
 
 Before giving out this statement, I called Mr. 
 Crane, Professor Merriam, and Mr. Rogers out 
 of the conference, and informed them of the 
 Chicago story which I believed had been given 
 out by McCormick before leaving Chicago; that 
 
600 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 the Associated Press had called for confirmation 
 or denial, and that I had prepared the only 
 statement which I could consent to have issued 
 on the subject. I knew from what Houser had 
 reported as to the proceedings in the conference 
 that the Pinchots, Gardner, and possibly some 
 others, had already decided to desert, and I sub 
 mitted this statement to Mr. Crane. I had never 
 for one moment believed that he would abandon 
 me. He is a man of few words, but with great 
 constancy of purpose. He had been in the 
 conference with the Pinchots for hours, and sub 
 ject to as strong an appeal as it was possible for 
 them to make, and I watched his face with keen 
 interest as he read the statement. There was 
 no change of expression. He returned it to 
 Houser, saying very quietly: 
 
 "I think that statement is all right." 
 So I knew that I would at least have one strong 
 supporter to the end. With Crane, Merriam, and 
 Rogers I then joined the conference. Pinchot at 
 once entered upon a review of what he had said 
 to the conference regarding my candidacy and 
 that of Roosevelt. In order to bring the discus - 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 601 
 
 sion directly to the point, I called up the alter 
 native statement which Houser informed me 
 had been under discussion, regarding my with-; 
 drawal in favor of Roosevelt. I told them that 
 I had but one answer to make; that I had never 
 played that kind of politics and never would ; that 
 I did not recognize Roosevelt as standing for 
 Progressive principles; that I had resisted from 
 the time of its proposal every effort on the part 
 of Pinchot and others to make me serve as a stalk 
 ing horse for Roosevelt s candidacy; that I had 
 not sought the support of Pinchot or any one else, 
 and had not made myself the Progressive candi 
 date; that they had joined in urging me to stand; 
 that I had made a clean fight for principle which 
 had tremendously strengthened the Progressive 
 movement all over the country, but now, when 
 there seemed to be some prospect of success, it 
 was proposed to turn everything over to Roose 
 velt; that if this were done the campaign would 
 be converted into a contest to nominate Roose 
 velt rather than advance a cause; principles 
 would be compromised or wholly ignored, and 
 the Progressive movement suffer untold injury; 
 
602 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 that Pinchot had pledged his support to me as 
 long as I continued a candidate; that I could 
 not prevent his withdrawal of that support, but 
 that I would say nothing which he could con 
 strue to be a consent or release from his obli 
 gation to continue his support. The Pinchots, 
 Gardner, and McCormick then withdrew, but 
 Crane, Merriam, Rogers, Kent, Lenroot, and 
 all of the others assured me that they would go 
 through with me to the end. It was a great relief 
 to have it settled and over with. For weeks the 
 strain had been severe. The Pinchots, however, 
 still hesitated to make any statement respecting 
 the course which they proposed to take. 
 
 A few days later (February 2nd) I attended the 
 annual banquet of the Periodical Publishers 
 Association at Philadelphia, an engagement 
 which had been made some weeks before. In 
 my speech I dealt with the centralized control 
 over the nation s affairs, and concluded with the 
 statement that this control by great special 
 interests extended even to the newspapers and 
 was rapidly reaching out for the magazines. 
 This occasion offered the opportunity to say 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 603 
 
 things which seemed to me supremely important. 
 I understood perfectly that it must subject me to 
 criticism but felt that that ought not to deter me. 
 I spoke as the publisher of a magazine to pub 
 lishers. I was speaking to men who knew, many 
 of them from bitter experience, the powerful 
 influence which the modern business system 
 exerts directly and indirectly over the publisher 
 through the centralized control of great national 
 advertising a gencies. The representatives of the 
 largest publishing companies present understood 
 the subtle working out of plans by which these 
 immense advertising agencies have become the 
 publicity agents of great business interests, the 
 placing of whose national advertising they con 
 trol; and that the placing or withholding of 
 advertising by these agencies with a given publi 
 cation, determines whether that publication shall 
 fail or succeed. It lies in the power of these 
 agencies to serve their clients by giving their 
 advertisements to publications which are well 
 behaved toward the great interests and to starve 
 out those publications which freely criticise 
 privileged business; or, in other words, to make 
 
604 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 the stand-pat publication prosper and the Pro 
 gressive publication fail. 
 
 I print here exactly what I said upon this 
 subject: 
 
 "I have sketched the growth and power of the 
 great interests that to-day control our property 
 and our governments. I have shown how 
 subtle and elusive, yet relentless, they are. 
 Rising up against them is the confused voice of 
 the people. Their heart is true but their eyes 
 do not yet see all the intricate sources of power. 
 Who shall show them? There are only two 
 agencies that in any way can reach the whole 
 people. These are the press and the platform. 
 But the platform in no way compares with the 
 press in its power of continuous repeated in 
 struction. 
 
 "One would think that in a democracy like 
 ours, seeking for instruction, able to read and 
 understand, the press would be their eager and 
 willing instructors such was the press of 
 Horace Greeley, Henry Raymond, Charles A. 
 Dana, Joseph Medill, and Horace Rublee. 
 
 "But what do we find has occurred in the past 
 Few years since the money power has gained 
 control of our industry and government? It 
 controls the newspaper press. The people know 
 this. Their confidence is weakened and de 
 stroyed. No longer are the editorial columns of 
 newspapers a potent force in educating public 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 605 
 
 opinion. The newspapers, of course, are still 
 patronized for news. But even as to news, the 
 public is fast coming to understand that where - 
 ever news items bear in any way upon the con 
 trol of government by business, the news is 
 colored; so confidence in the newspaper as a 
 newspaper is being undermined. 
 
 " Cultured and able men are still to be found 
 upon the editorial staffs of all great dailies, but 
 the public understands them to be hired men 
 who no longer express honest judgments and 
 sincere conviction, who write what they are told 
 to write, and whose judgments are salaried. 
 
 "To the subserviency of the press to special 
 interests in no small degree is due the power and 
 influence and prosperity of the weekly and 
 monthly magazines. A decade ago young men 
 trained in journalism came to see this control of 
 the newspapers of the country. They saw also 
 an unoccupied field. And they went out and 
 built up great periodicals and magazines. They 
 were free. 
 
 "Their pages were open to publicists and 
 scholars; and liberty and justice and equal 
 rights found a free press beyond the reach of 
 the corrupt influence of consolidated business 
 and machine politics. We entered upon a 
 new era. 
 
 :< The periodical, reduced in price, attractive 
 and artistic in dress, strode like a young giant 
 into the arena of public service. Filled with this 
 spirit, quickened with human interest, it assailed 
 
606 THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 social and political- evils in high places and low. 
 It found the power of the public service corpo 
 ration and the evil influences of money in the 
 municipal government of every large city. It 
 found franchises worth millions of dollars se 
 cured by bribery; police in partnership with 
 thieves and crooks and prostitutes. It found 
 juries fixed and an established business plying 
 its trade between litigants and the back door of 
 blinking justice. 
 
 "It found Philadelphia giving away fran 
 chises, franchises not supposedly or estimated 
 to be worth $2,500,000, but for which she had 
 been openly offered and had refused $2,500,000. 
 Milwaukee they found giving away street car 
 franchises worth $8,000,000 against the protests 
 of her indignant citizens. It found Chicago 
 robbed in tax-payments of immense value by 
 corporate owners of property through fraud and 
 forgery on a gigantic scale; it found the aldermen 
 of St. Louis organized to boodle the city with a 
 criminal compact, on file in the dark corner of a 
 safety deposit vault. 
 
 "The free and independent periodical turned 
 its searchlight on state legislatures, and made 
 plain as the sun at noonday the absolute control 
 of the corrupt lobby. It opened the closed 
 doors of the secret caucus, the secret committee, 
 the secret conference, behind which United 
 States Senators and Members of Congress be 
 trayed the public interest into the hands of the 
 railroads, the trusts, the tariff mongers, and the 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 607 
 
 centralized banking power of the country. It 
 revealed the same influences back of judicial 
 and other appointments. It took the public 
 through the great steel plants and into the homes 
 of the men who toil twelve hours a day and seven 
 days in the week. And the public heard their 
 cry of despair. It turned its camera on to the 
 mills and shops where little children are robbed 
 of every chance of life that nourishes vigorous 
 bodies and sound minds, and the pinched faces 
 and dwarfed figures told their pathetic story on 
 its clean white pages. 
 
 "The control of the newspaper press is not the 
 simple and expensive one of ownership and 
 investment. There is here and there a kept 
 sheet owned by a man of great wealth to further 
 his own interests. But the papers of this class 
 are few. The control comes through that com 
 munity of interests, that interdependence of 
 investments and credits which ties the publisher 
 up to the banks, the advertisers and the special 
 interests. 
 
 "We may expect this same kind of control, 
 sooner or later, to reach out for the magazines. 
 But more than this. I warn you of a subtle 
 new peril, the centralization of advertising that 
 will in time seek to gag you. What has occurred 
 on a small scale in almost every city in the 
 country will extend to the national scale, and 
 will ere long close in on the magazines. No men 
 ever faced graver responsibilities. No men have 
 ever been called to a more unselfish, patriotic 
 
608 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 service. I believe that when the final test comes 
 you will not be found wanting; you will not 
 desert and leave the people to depend upon the 
 public platform alone, but you will hold aloft the 
 lamp of Truth, lighting the way for the preser 
 vation of representative government and the 
 liberty of the American people." 
 
 But I entirely underestimated the character 
 and extent of the criticism which I called down 
 upon myself. I was a candidate and the inter 
 ests did not overlook their opportunity. Sensa 
 tional accounts of this speech and its reception 
 were published throughout the country, and at the 
 same time equally sensational and false reports 
 were spread concerning my physical condition. 
 
 It is true that I was not feeling as fit as usual. 
 As on one or two previous occasions I had over 
 taxed my strength. But each time a very brief 
 rest sufficed to restore me to full vigor; as it did 
 in this instance. I attended this gathering with 
 some reluctance, knowing that to speak there 
 would make demands upon me which, at that 
 time, I could ill afford. I had just returned 
 from a speaking trip, part of which was made 
 under most trying circumstances, and all of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 609 
 
 which taxed my reserve. Besides, I was seri 
 ously troubled at the evidences I had discovered 
 at headquarters of the studied undermining of 
 my candidacy by some of my supporters. 
 Added to this, the doctors had decided that our 
 little daughter must undergo an operation, the 
 seriousness of which could not be foretold, on 
 the morning following the Publishers banquet. 
 For every reason I felt that I ought not to go, 
 but was reluctant to break my engagement. I 
 went, arriving after the dinner. It was very 
 late when I began to speak. I was not at my 
 best and did not at once get hold of my audience. 
 It was, I do not doubt, entirely my own fault 
 but I determined to make them hear me to the 
 end. In my effort to do so I talked too long 
 without realizing it. I went home, really ill 
 from exhaustion, but was at the hospital early 
 next morning when my daughter went under the 
 surgeon s knife. After that, with a short rest, I 
 was able to go on with my work as usual, and 
 into the campaign in North Dakota, disproving 
 the stories circulated, not only at that time but 
 since, as to my having broken down. I went 
 
610 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 through a campaign carrying me from coast to 
 coast, making nearly two hundred speeches, 
 and have not lost a moment s time since. I 
 mention this incident, not because it is impor 
 tant of itself, but for the reason that it was given 
 a bearing upon the campaign by those who were 
 quick to use it as a cover under which they felt 
 they could plausibly make their switch to Roose 
 velt. The men who had already abandoned my 
 candidacy, because I could not stand as a shield 
 for another, or agree to any deals or combina 
 tions that would confuse the issue or mislead the 
 people, seized upon what they were pleased to call 
 my " shattered health" as an excuse for their action. 
 Following the session of the Wisconsin legisla 
 ture of 1901, 1 was made the object of a somewhat 
 similar attack for the purpose of demoralizing 
 my support. Combined with the incessant work 
 accompanying the legislative session came the 
 abandonment of the fight by men in whose zeal 
 and devotion I had found courage and inspira 
 tion, and finally the defeat of the legislation I 
 had hoped to see enacted. In 1901, however, 
 as a result of the strain, my health was actually 
 
V 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 611 
 
 impaired; but the nature of my illness was 
 at that time likewise maliciously misrepresented, 
 because my unfitness was the thing most de 
 sired by those who were opposed to the Progres 
 sive movement, and particularly to my part in it. 
 
 Again and again the friends who were sup 
 porting my candidacy had heard my interpre 
 tation of the fight; and they appreciated the 
 spirit in which I had consented to make it. I 
 had not gone into it for the purpose of beating 
 Taft as an individual. I had not gone into it as a 
 political game to be played according to the rule 
 of expediency. I had campaigned only for sup- ) 
 porters willing to make the fight for principlefv 
 ready to win, or to lose, if need be, in the inter 
 est of a cause. My whole public life had been 
 given to a struggle in which countless battles 
 were necessarily lost in the course of the warfare, 
 so a temporary defeat meant less to me, perhaps, 
 than to men unseasoned in strife. 
 
 As before stated, the Pinchots and Gilson 
 Gardner definitely withdrew from my support 
 at the conference held at my headquarters in 
 Washington, January 29th, but apparently found 
 
612 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 some embarrassment in announcing the fact. 
 The critical attitude of the press following the 
 Publishers banquet of February 2nd opened the 
 way. It furnished a pretext for the desertion 
 which it was now plain to be seen had been under 
 consideration for a long time. They waited for 
 two weeks after the final conference in which 
 they definitely withdrew their support, before 
 making any public announcement. Then there 
 was published in the Philadelphia North Amer 
 ican the following, giving the condition of my 
 health as the reason for the action taken: 
 
 LA FOLLETTE DROPPED BY PINCHOT FOR 
 PRESIDENCY 
 
 Senator s Condition Makes His Candidacy Impos 
 sible Declares Pinchot Roosevelt Boom in 
 Minnesota 
 
 JERSEY CITY, New Jersey, 
 
 February 10, 1912. 
 Hugh T. H albert, St. Paul, Minnesota: 
 
 In my judgment La Follette s condition makes further 
 serious candidacy impossible. GIFFORD PINCHOT. 
 
 The above is the wording of a telegram read 
 last night at a meeting of the Board of Directors 
 of the Minnesota Republican League called to 
 
.3 
 
 w 1 
 
 II 
 
 a s 
 
 H i 
 
 s 
 
 H -2 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 613 
 
 consider the probable withdrawal of Senator La 
 Follette as a candidate for the Republican nomi 
 nation for President. Mr. Halbert, a member 
 of the Board, made a speech insisting that La 
 Follette was out of the running, and that the 
 league should turn its support to Roosevelt. 
 The committee, however, refused to take this 
 course, and adopted resolutions pledging unani 
 mous support to La Follette. Mr. Halbert then 
 resigned from the Board. He has for seven years 
 been President of the Saint Paul Roosevelt Club. 
 
 On the eighteenth of February Pinchot pub 
 lished a formal statement announcing that he had 
 withdrawn his support from me and would there 
 after advocate Roosevelt s nomination, this time 
 setting up the claim that my candidacy had only 
 been a sort of temporary convenience. I quote 
 from this statement the following : 
 
 "Senator La Follette s candidacy was under 
 taken for two clear and specific purposes : first to 
 hold the Progressives together as an effective 
 fighting force, and second, to prevent the renom- 
 ination of a reactionary Republican for the presi 
 dency." 
 
 If this statement were true, then the cam 
 paign which we had been making for months to 
 
614 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 induce support of my candidacy was plainly a 
 fraud upon those who were led to believe that 
 I was a candidate in good faith. 
 
 In this connection it is interesting to refer to 
 the Call for me to become a candidate, which 
 was signed by a number of Progressive Repub 
 lican Senators and Congressmen, but which was 
 not published because, as before stated, Cummins 
 did not sign it, giving as his reason for with 
 holding his signature that he did not think it 
 the best way to inaugurate my candidacy. 
 Pinchot wrote in part and approved in its 
 entirety that document, from which, passing 
 over a review of my public services, I quote 
 the following: 
 
 "This seems to us a very splendid record, a 
 record of patient, fearless and effective public 
 service, achieved in the face of almost insur 
 mountable difficulty and opposition. 
 
 "To guide the Progressive movement, a chief 
 executive is required whose life has been devoted 
 to the task of freeing our political institutions 
 from the control of organized wealth, who under 
 stands the problem which is before the country, 
 who has proved by what he has done that he 
 is able to deal with it, and who will use the power 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 615 
 
 of his great office in the interests of the people. 
 The people are progressive and it is necessary, 
 just, and right that their chief magistrate should 
 be progressive also. If the republican voters 
 of the country could make their wishes effec 
 tive at this time, we believe that your record 
 as citizen, governor, representative and senator, 
 your unswerving fidelity to principle and your 
 long, fearless, and successful leadership would 
 cause them to choose you as their next presi 
 dential nominee. We therefore earnestly urge 
 you to permit your name to be presented as a 
 candidate for the Republican nomination for 
 President of the United States." 
 
 It would seem that at this time, when I was 
 being urged to become a candidate, and by none 
 more strongly than Pinchot, it was with a view 
 of nominating and electing me President, rather 
 than drafting me into a temporary service as a 
 sort of political " minute man" to hold the field 
 until a favorable opportunity should present 
 itself for bringing out the real candidate. 
 
 Pinchot s announcement of his support of 
 Roosevelt, in view of their intimate relations, 
 was everywhere accepted as the immediate fore 
 runner of a declaration of candidacy by Roose 
 velt himself 
 
616 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 The time had come for them to act openly. 
 Roosevelt organizations made their appearance 
 here and there with all of the evidences of 
 pre-arrangement. Then came the speech by 
 Roosevelt before the Constitutional Convention 
 at Columbus, Ohio. This speech was accepted 
 as a statement of his " principles." It dealt in 
 his characteristic way with many issues which 
 had been raised by Progressives. It sounded 
 progressive enough to satisfy men of that 
 belief, who did not weigh carefully qualifying 
 phraseology, and at the same time was not defi 
 nitely progressive enough to alarm big business. 
 He favored the Initiative and Referendum with 
 "proper restrictions." He favored the Recall 
 "with such restrictions as will make it available 
 only when there is a widespread and genuine 
 public feeling among a majority of the voters." 
 The Recall, as applied to judges, he declared to 
 be a question of "expediency merely" which 
 each community has a right to try for itself in 
 "whatever shape it pleases." As to labor legis 
 lation he suggested that "no restrictions be 
 placed on legislative powers that will prevent 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 617 
 
 the enactment of laws under which your people 
 can promote the general welfare, the common 
 good." His discussion of trust regulation was 
 equally indefinite, declaring that the mere size 
 of business is no offence, and that any corpo 
 ration, big or little, which has gained its posi 
 tion by unfair methods, and by interference with 
 the rights of others which has "raised prices or 
 limited output in improper fashion" should be 
 broken up. As to other national issues, includ 
 ing the tariff, he said, "I stand to-day exactly 
 where I stood in 1910." 
 
 As to where he stood in 1910, it will be remem 
 bered that, in a signed editorial in the Outlook 
 under date of September 17th, of that year, 
 
 speaking of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Law, Roose^ 
 
 \\ 
 
 velt said: "I believe that the present tariff is 
 better than the last, and considerably better 
 than the one before the last." This was equiv 
 alent to saying what Taft said at Winona and 
 shows Roosevelt, on the tariff, to be just the same 
 sort of a Progressive and just the same sort of 
 a Standpatter as Taft, as indeed does Presi 
 dent Roosevelt s entire record of seven years. 
 
618 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 While this speech was undergoing preparation, 
 some of my former supporters who were now 
 openly for Roosevelt evidenced anxiety lest the 
 address would not be definitely Progressive, and 
 informed friends in Washington that they were 
 keeping in close touch with the Colonel for the 
 purpose of stiffening him up on his Progressive 
 declarations. It was reported that when the 
 completed address was read to one of them and 
 he was asked for his opinion, he answered with 
 the single word "punk." 
 
 Few men of our time have Roosevelt s appre 
 ciation of the importance of keeping the public 
 guessing in order to stimulate political interest. 
 Although the Columbus speech could not, of 
 course, carry any statement as to his candidacy, 
 Roosevelt gave to the occasion just the right 
 turn by tossing off to the newspaper reporters 
 afterward the observation, "My hat is in the 
 ring." This meant that he was a candidate. 
 But it was followed at once with the serious 
 statement that he was still considering what an 
 swer he should make to the half dozen governors 
 whom he had informally invited to formally 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 619 
 
 invite him to become a candidate for the Repub 
 lican nomination for the presidency. This an 
 swer, it was given out, he would make later. But 
 all things must have an end. 
 
 Finally, upon the twenty-sixth of February, 
 Roosevelt made a formal statement in which he 
 said he would accept the nomination for Presi 
 dent if tendered him by the Republican presiden 
 tial convention. At last the public had definite 
 word. Men no longer guessed or made wagers 
 that he would or would not. It was settled. 
 And now, to the surprise and disappointment of 
 Roosevelt enthusiasts, the interest of the general 
 public began to abate. The speculative element 
 which prompts men to stake fortunes on the 
 turn of the market was eliminated, and the pub 
 lic settled down to a serious consideration of the 
 real meaning and significance of Roosevelt s 
 candidacy. His friends had predicted that his 
 statement "would fire the country"; that "it 
 would only be necessary for him to consent to be 
 a candidate." He had thought so too. "I will 
 accept the nomination for President if it is 
 tendered to me," he wrote to the governors, 
 
620 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 But after the press had made its formal com 
 ment on his announcement, interest began to 
 drag perceptibly. His friends in Washington 
 became very anxious about it. Roosevelt him 
 self soon realized that he had misjudged the 
 situation; that the call for him again to serve 
 the public was not so urgent as he had supposed; 
 that he must drop the receptive role which he 
 had assumed and go out and create a demand 
 for his candidacy. He decided to try a trip to 
 Boston and did so. But it proved disappoint 
 ing. In short, his Boston speech and reception 
 were admitted by his friends to be a frost. He 
 came back very much discouraged. After this 
 failure he understood that when he went out 
 again he must "make a killing." His next pub 
 lic appearance must be an unqualified success, or 
 it might set the tide running the wrong way. 
 
 The primary election in North Dakota was 
 near at hand. It was the first presidential pref 
 erence test. He must carry that state by a 
 good majority for its effect upon the country. 
 North Dakota, by the rules that govern in all 
 contests, should be his. It was the state in 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 which he had spent his cowboy days, and the 
 whole section west of the Missouri River was 
 still called the cow country. Every effort was 
 put forth by the brother of Governor Bass of 
 New Hampshire, who was in charge of Roose 
 velt s campaign, to stir the state pride for the 
 Colonel as a North Dakota pioneer. A day or 
 two before the election Roosevelt sent a long 
 telegram into North Dakota pleading with the 
 voters for their support. His managers spared no 
 efforts to win the state for Roosevelt. A large 
 force of clerks and stenographers was employed at 
 their headquarters, and a campaign attended 
 with a very lavish expenditure of money was 
 prosecuted for weeks. It would scarcely be 
 an exaggeration to say that through their head 
 quarters they spent more money in one day than 
 the entire campaign in North Dakota cost my 
 supporters. 
 
 An interesting feature of Roosevelt s cam 
 paign in North Dakota, and one illustrating his 
 peculiar political methods, was his change of 
 front on the reciprocity issue. North Dakota, 
 as a grain-growing state, was strongly opposed 
 
622 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 to Taft s Canadian agreement, and the feeling 
 of resentment against him was so intense that 
 he scarcely figured in the campaign at all. 
 Roosevelt was as strongly in favor of the Cana 
 dian Pact as Taft, and through editorials in 
 the Outlook and public addresses he had 
 given vigorous support to Taft s Cana 
 dian policy and specifically endorsed the 
 agreement. After Roosevelt became an an 
 nounced candidate, our headquarters at 
 Washington made an investigation of his 
 record upon this subject. Taft had trans 
 mitted the Canadian agreement to Congress 
 by special message January 26, 1911. In 
 a signed editorial on January 28th, in which he 
 commended reciprocity with Canada, Roosevelt 
 said : 
 
 "Our tariff policy with Canada can well 
 afford to stand by itself, not only because of our 
 close relationship to the great Dominion to the 
 north of us, but because of the substantial iden 
 tity of conditions on each side of the line divid 
 ing us, so that as regards Canada I should be 
 glad to see the most complete measure of reci 
 procity to which Canada will consent." 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 623 
 
 And again, on February 25, 1911, the Outlook 
 said, editorially: 
 
 "Canadian reciprocity was commended last 
 week in notable speeches both from President 
 Taft and ex-President Roosevelt." 
 
 In a speech made at Grand Rapids, Mich., 
 February llth, Roosevelt said: - 
 
 "I welcome the proposed reciprocity treaty 
 (with Canada) as making a signal advance in 
 bringing about the closest and most friendly 
 relations between the two countries." 
 
 TW T O days later, in a speech before the Re 
 publican Club at the hotel Waldorf, New York 
 City, Roosevelt declared: 
 
 "I want to say how glad I am to hear of the 
 way in which the club, the members of the club 
 here to-night, responded to the two appeals 
 made to them to "uphold the hands of President 
 Taft (terrific applause) both in his effort to 
 secure reciprocity with Canada, and in his 
 effort to secure the fortification of the Panama 
 Canal (applause). ... I hail the reciproc 
 ity agreement, because it represents an effort to 
 bring about a closer, a more intimate and 
 
624 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 friendly relationship of mutual advantage on 
 equal terms between Canada and the United 
 States." 
 
 As soon as Roosevelt s endorsement of reci 
 procity, as shown by his speeches and editorials, 
 was printed in the North Dakota papers, he 
 reversed his position through a letter furnished 
 to the publisher of a Minneapolis agricultural 
 journal having a North Dakota circulation, 
 and came out flatly against the Canadian agree 
 ment. 
 
 Nothing could more clearly expose Roosevelt s 
 shiftiness in politics than his course on Canadian 
 reciprocity. When proposed by Taft and ex 
 ploited by the newspapers, who were the special 
 beneficiaries under the plan, it appeared to be 
 a very popular issue. And Roosevelt, as the 
 above quotations show, originally advocated it. 
 It was defeated at the close of the 61st Congress, 
 and again in the extra session called by Taft at 
 the beginning of the 62d Congress. The ex 
 tended debate upon it exposed it as a sham, and 
 by the time the North Dakota primary was at 
 hand, it was no longer a popular issue. Hence, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 625 
 
 Roosevelt faced the other way and repudiated 
 his former endorsement. 
 
 In his campaign, as the candidate of the 
 Roosevelt party, he spoke on the fifth of Sep 
 tember, 1912, to the farmers of Minnesota, on 
 the state fair grounds at Saint Paul. His audi 
 ence was 90 per cent, hostile to Canadian 
 reciprocity. So Roosevelt, never missing the 
 popular side, had this to say of Canadian reci 
 procity to the Minnesota farmers : 
 
 "At first many of us, myself among the num 
 ber, thought reciprocity might be a good thing. 
 But we took it for granted that the bill would be 
 drawn right. Later we found it was a jug- 
 handle proposition, with the farmers paying the 
 freight." 
 
 That is to say, Roosevelt had advocated 
 Canadian reciprocity at the outset because he 
 took it for granted the bill would be drawn right, 
 from which he would have it inferred that he 
 advocated Canadian reciprocity before he under 
 stood the nature of the Canadian agreement, and 
 the bill drawn in compliance with the agree 
 ment. Now, what are the facts? 
 
626 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 In the recent contest between Taft and 
 Roosevelt for the Republican nomination, the 
 fact that Roosevelt changed his position 
 on Canadian reciprocity, when he found it 
 unpopular, led Taft to make a very remark 
 able disclosure. In a speech delivered at 
 Boston, on April 25, 1912, President Taft 
 said: 
 
 "Mr. Roosevelt now seeks to take advantage 
 of the supposed feeling among the farmers of the 
 country against the reciprocity agreement with 
 Canada, which I made and induced Congress to 
 adopt, but which Canada finally rejected. I 
 would not object to this as a legitimate argu 
 ment in a political controversy against me and in 
 his favor, if the fact were not that I consulted 
 him ten days before I made the agreement, and 
 explained to him, in full, its probable terms, 
 stated the arguments pro and con, especially 
 the effect of it on agricultural products, and 
 asked him to confer with his colleagues of the 
 Outlook as to its wisdom and public benefit, 
 and let me know his and their judgment. He 
 replied approving the agreement in the most 
 enthusiastic terms and complimenting me 
 for having brought it forward. I submit 
 below our correspondence on the subject of 
 reciprocity: 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 627 
 
 " (Confidential) 
 : THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 " January 10, 1911. 
 
 6 My dear Theodore: 
 
 " The probability is that we shall reach an 
 agreement with our Canadian friends by which 
 all natural products cereals, lumber, dairy 
 products, fruits, meats, and cattle shall enter 
 both countries free, and that we shall get a 
 revision not as heavy a one as I would like, 
 but a substantial one, and equivalent certainly 
 to the French reciprocity treaty and probably 
 more on manufactures. 
 
 Here follows about half a column of further 
 quotation from Taft s letter, giving the argu 
 ments pro and con on the subject. The letter 
 concludes as follows: 
 
 " I shall be glad to hear from you as soon as 
 you conveniently can write on this subject, be 
 cause the matter is just at hand and it is quite 
 likely that within ten days we shall reach an 
 agreement. 
 
 " Sincerely yours, 
 
 " WILLIAM H. TAFT. " 
 
628 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 To this letter Roosevelt replied as follows: 
 
 YORK, January 12, 1911. 
 " Dear Mr. President: 
 
 " I at once took your letter and went over it 
 with the Outlook editors. ... It seems to 
 me that what you propose to do with Canada is 
 admirable from every standpoint. I firmly 
 believe in free trade with Canada for both 
 economic and political reasons. As you say, 
 labor cost is substantially the same in the two 
 countries, so that you are amply justified by the 
 platform. Whether Canada will accept such 
 reciprocity I do not know, but it is greatly to 
 your credit to make the effort. It may damage 
 the Republican party for a while, but it will 
 surely benefit the party in the end, especially if 
 you tackle wool, cotton, etc., as you propose. 
 " Ever yours, 
 
 " THEODORE ROOSEVELT." 
 
 Taft s letter to Roosevelt explicitly stated the 
 essentials of the agreement as made, and incor 
 porated in the bill which became a law. His 
 letter informed Roosevelt that cereals, lumber, 
 dairy products, fruits, meats, and cattle were to 
 be made 1 free, and in exchange for that, Canada 
 reduced the duties on manufactured products. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 629 
 
 So Roosevelt had specific information that all 
 these agricultural products were to be admitted 
 from Canada free of duty, and declared it to be 
 "admirable from every standpoint." Now, he 
 says, he thought reciprocity might be a good 
 thing but "took it for granted the bill would be 
 drawn right." Roosevelt ought to have told 
 the Minnesota farmers how he would draw a bill 
 which would be "right," as to their interests so 
 long as it admitted free of duty agricultural 
 products, as he knew from Taft s letter this 
 agreement proposed to do. Now, we know that 
 Roosevelt was fully advised, before the agree 
 ment was made, of everything to which the 
 farmer objects in the agreement as made, and 
 the bill drawn in conformity with it. Pos 
 sessing this information, he approved it in the 
 strongest terms in his letter to Taft, January 12th. 
 After this identical agreement had been entered 
 into, and after the President had transmitted it 
 to Congress, and after the bill based on the 
 agreement had been introduced in Congress, he 
 wrote editorials and made speeches for it. He 
 understood then quite as well as he does now 
 
630 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 that it was a "jug-handle proposition with the 
 farmer paying the freight." 
 
 The above quotations from the Outlook and 
 from Roosevelt s speeches were incorporated in 
 a typewritten statement prepared at our head 
 quarters for publication in the North Dakota 
 papers. The following morning an incident 
 occurred which furnishes a side light on the 
 difficulties under which my campaign was con 
 ducted. We were surprised to learn that this 
 typewritten statement had been clandestinely 
 sent from our headquarters to the office of Gilson 
 Gardner, who had more than a month before 
 severed all relations with my campaign, and be 
 come an open supporter of Roosevelt. It was 
 at once suspected that an employe in our head 
 quarters, who had access to the material that 
 we were sending out, had transmitted this 
 statement of Roosevelt s position on the Cana 
 dian pact to Gardner s office. When questioned 
 he vigorously denied having done so. Antici 
 pating that he might try to warn his confeder 
 ate in Gardner s office, a watch was set over the 
 telephone connections. A few minutes later, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 631 
 
 indeed, as soon as he could reach a tele 
 phone in the office, where he supposed he could 
 talk without being overheard, he called up 
 Kirby, Gardner s confidential stenographer, and 
 directed Kirby to destroy the envelope in 
 which the typewritten record had been en 
 closed. 
 
 This affair would be scarcely worth mention 
 ing except as it tends to show the difficulties 
 under which I was compelled to prosecute my 
 campaign. It was a most critical time when 
 everything counted. The North Dakota con 
 test was engaging the attention of the whole 
 country. Everything bearing upon the Roose 
 velt candidacy there was of the keenest interest. 
 
 The employe whose name I withhold, be 
 cause it would appear that he was simply 
 the tool of others, was appointed to a po 
 sition of some responsibility months before, 
 upon the endorsement of Kirby, who stood in 
 such relation to Gardner that his endorsement 
 was accepted by the headquarters. Of this 
 fact I had not known personally. F. M. Kirby 
 is the same Kirby who was private stenographer 
 
632 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 to Secretary of the Interior Ballinger, and who 
 created a great sensation in the Ballinger- 
 Pinchot investigation, by appearing before the 
 committee and giving testimony against Bal 
 linger and in the interest of Pinchot, concerning 
 matters of which he claimed personal knowledge 
 on account of his confidential relations with 
 Secretary Ballinger. Kirby was thereafter em 
 ployed by Gardner, who offered me his services 
 from time to time as a stenographer while 
 Gardner was, as I believed, supporting my 
 candidacy. I did not accept his tender of the 
 services of Kirby and it is needless to say that 
 the employe in our headquarters appointed 
 upon Kirby s recommendation was dismissed 
 as soon as it became known that he had sent 
 the Roosevelt reciprocity document to Gard 
 ner s office. 
 
 Roosevelt was urged by his supporters to 
 take the stump in North Dakota, and it was 
 given out to the press in New York that he 
 might do so. But the reports which he was 
 receiving from North Dakota were not encour 
 aging. He appeared to vacillate between the de- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 633 
 
 sire to take a hand and the fear that if he did so 
 and lost the state the hurtful effect upon his 
 campaign would be very much accentuated. 
 He therefore took the more prudent course of 
 sending some of his closest adherents and most 
 effective campaigners instead. Pinchot, Gar- 
 field, and others appeared upon the platform in 
 North Dakota in the interest of his candidacy. 
 Pinchot found himself at once confronted with 
 a demand for an explanation of his shift to 
 Roosevelt. In his speeches he assigned as the 
 sole reason for his action that I had become 
 disabled, and that in consequence it became 
 necessary for the Progressive Republicans 
 to have a candidate who could carry on the 
 campaign actively and personally. The hol- 
 lowness of this pretext was promptly ex 
 posed when I appeared in the campaign in 
 North Dakota in such excellent trim as to 
 be able to make from ten to fifteen speeches 
 a day. At the end of four days of this 
 sort of campaigning, I left North Dakota the 
 night before the election, confident of the re 
 sult. 
 

 
 
 34 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 The vote on the nineteenth of March in the 
 North Dakota presidential primary election - 
 the first presidential preference election ever 
 held astounded the country. Roosevelt was 
 overwhelmingly beaten. I had carried the state 
 by more than ten thousand, while Taft s total 
 vote was but little more than eighteen hundred. 
 Taft s small vote in North Dakota, due, in part 
 at least, to the resentment felt by the farmers 
 on account of his stand upon the Canadian pact, 
 nevertheless disclosed his great personal weak 
 ness as a vote getter. 
 
 The North Dakota result thoroughly alarmed 
 the special interests, who were backing Roosevelt 
 in order to capture or to divide and checkmate 
 the Progressive movement. It is a cardinal prin 
 ciple with the interests to so manipulate national 
 politics, if possible, as to bring about the nomi 
 nation of satisfactory presidential candidates by 
 both political parties. Either Taft or Roosevelt 
 would be quite to their liking, but North Dakota 
 disclosed to them an amazing situation. If the 
 middle western states were to vote as North 
 Dakota, then there was the gravest danger 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 635 
 
 that a real Progressive might be nominated 
 by the Republicans at Chicago. If Roosevelt 
 could not break down my strength, and Taft 
 were to prove so weak as not to be counted in 
 the contest throughout that section of the 
 country, then it was obvious that I would 
 enter the convention with enough votes either 
 to be nominated or to force the nomina 
 tion of some pronounced Progressive candi 
 date. 
 
 The North Dakota result called for heroic 
 treatment. So confident had been the supporters 
 of Roosevelt that he would sweep the country, 
 that they regarded a fund of three hundred thou 
 sand dollars as quite sufficient to carry his cam 
 paign through from start to finish, and shortly 
 after his announcement boasted that this amount 
 had already been provided. But the recession 
 of interest and enthusiasm coming shortly after 
 he became a candidate and followed by the 
 North Dakota landslide against him swept aside 
 all previous hopes and calculations. Some 
 thing had to be done, and done quickly. Some 
 thing was done. Just what and by whom the 
 
636 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 public may eventually know. But this much 
 may be said now. If Perkins (United States 
 Steel) contributed to Roosevelt s campaign, it 
 must have been because Roosevelt s treatment 
 of trusts in the past was, and his promised 
 treatment of trusts in the future is, so very satis 
 factory to Perkins that he willingly put money 
 into the campaign as an investment. Roose 
 velt s position upon trusts must have likewise 
 appealed very strongly to others whose interests 
 were akin to those of Perkins. For shortly after 
 the North Dakota primary Munsey, one of the 
 prominent owners of United States Steel stocks, 
 and Dan Hanna, also heavily interested, and 
 others with kindred interests, became directly 
 and indirectly the largest contributors to Roose 
 velt s campaign. Contributions from men with 
 these connections would account, in part, for the 
 character of campaign which Roosevelt carried 
 on for months, the lavish expenditures of 
 which were proof overwhelming of unlimited 
 sources of supply. Headquarters were estab 
 lished east and west, north and south, and an 
 army of men employed and put in the field. 
 Special trains, private cars, literary bureaus, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 637 
 
 newspapers, documents, special dailies the 
 whole conduct of the campaign itself was proof 
 overwhelming that big finance was behind 
 Roosevelt. 
 
 My resources were very limited, and it was 
 decided best to confine my speaking campaign 
 to those states having statutes providing for a 
 popular preferential vote for presidential can 
 didates. As Nebraska, Oregon, and California 
 were the first states, under these statutes, to 
 hold elections, I planned to campaign them next 
 after the North Dakota election. 
 
 After I had been announced to speak in 
 Nebraska, an extra session of the legislature 
 was unexpectedly called by Governor Deneen of 
 Illinois. Pursuant to this call the legislature 
 of Illinois passed a presidential preference pri 
 mary law. While my supporters were inclined 
 to advise against placing my name upon the 
 Illinois ballot so long as I could not personally 
 campaign the state (my engagements in Nebraska 
 rendered it impossible for me to make a speak 
 ing campaign in Illinois), yet, feeling that real 
 Progressives, who believed in the principles 
 
638 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 which my candidacy represented, should have 
 an opportunity wherever there was a presidential 
 preference law, to record their convictions, I 
 requested my friends to take the necessary 
 steps to place my name on the ballot. This 
 they did. I should have had no expectation 
 of carrying Illinois even had my engagements 
 or my finances admitted of making a cam 
 paign in that state, because I did not con 
 sider Illinois Progressive. In support of this 
 opinion there stands the undisputed fact that 
 her congressional delegation in the United States 
 Senate and House of Representatives is ultra- 
 reactionary, and the record of her state legis 
 lature likewise. The adoption of a presidential 
 preference primary was no more proof that 
 Illinois is a Progressive state than a like legis 
 lative enactment by the state of Massachu 
 setts about the same time would be accepted 
 as proof that Massachusetts is a Progressive 
 state. 
 
 My name was placed upon the ballot in 
 Illinois in accordance with my wishes, but there 
 was little else that could be done, as I have 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 639 
 
 before stated. I received some forty-five thou 
 sand votes. Roosevelt, with a very large outlay 
 of money, carried the state overwhelmingly. He 
 made a special train canvass. Three Roosevelt 
 headquarters were maintained in Chicago, and 
 bureaus throughout the state. On primary 
 day the polling places swarmed with work 
 ers, and carriages and automobiles scoured 
 the cities and towns and rural districts for 
 votes. His support was not Progressive. This 
 fact is attested by the action of the Illinois 
 state convention, which voted down the 
 Initiative, the Referendum, the Recall, 
 votes for women, and substantially every 
 distinctly Progressive issue which was pre 
 sented. 
 
 The following week, with the prestige of 
 Illinois, the same sort of a campaign was made 
 in Pennsylvania, with practically the same 
 results. Roosevelt s success in these two stand- 
 pat states stamped his candidacy with its 
 true character. No real Progressive could have 
 secured anything like such a vote as did Roose 
 velt in those states. It had, however, the out- 
 
640 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 ward seeming of success the sort of success 
 that intoxicates the crowd. 
 
 There is a time in every campaign when the 
 tide sets in a given direction. It then seems 
 quite impossible to arrest attention long enough 
 to distinguish between the real and the counter 
 feit. In the 80 s, when Indiana and Ohio held 
 state elections in October, the national com 
 mittees of both parties, counting on the effect 
 of a winning in those two states upon the 
 November elections to follow, put forth every 
 effort, summoned their ablest campaigners and 
 spent money without limit to carry the state 
 elections. 
 
 Illinois and Pennsylvania were both ultra- 
 reactionary, one the centre of Steel Trust 
 power, and the bulwark of high protection; the 
 other the home of the Harvester Trust, the Beef 
 Trust, and many of the greatest business com 
 binations of the country. In both states Taft s 
 campaign was conducted by a discredited polit 
 ical state machine, rankly offensive to the people. 
 The Steel Trust and other special interests sup 
 ported Roosevelt because through him they 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 641 
 
 could divide the Progressives and defeat the 
 nomination of any real Progressive candidate. 
 And, if it resulted in Roosevelt s nomination and 
 election, they remembered that whatever he had 
 said about them, in all the time he was President, 
 he never did anything to hurt them. He was 
 just enough of a reactionary to retain the favor 
 of a large body of the reactionary element, and 
 just enough of a Progressive to attract unsea 
 soned Progressives who wanted to beat Taft, 
 regardless of the means employed to carry their 
 states against him. Progressives of this type 
 wanted to "win"; not a real Progressive victory 
 just a victory. And they did win precisely 
 that kind of a victory in those two states. And 
 thus, having won in Illinois and Pennsylvania, 
 Roosevelt carried several really Progressive 
 states in the elections that followed. 
 
 The result in Illinois and Pennsylvania made 
 no difference with my plans. I had known 
 defeat before, and had been trained to meet it 
 with strengthened resolution to press on, build 
 ing up a real Progressive support, so fixed in con 
 victions as to be utterly indifferent to reverses. 
 
642 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 The momentum of a victorious army is hard to 
 resist, but an army disciplined by defeat, that 
 will still fight on, is invincible. 
 
 No campaign for principle is ever in vain. 
 And I felt an abiding faith that the work 
 which I was doing in the presidential primary 
 states would be lasting in its effects. A splen 
 did body of men and women were deeply inter 
 ested. In each of the states the foundation 
 for a permanent Progressive organization was 
 laid, with leaders of real power in charge. 
 
 My campaign in California was exceptional in 
 many respects. Governor Hiram Johnson had 
 gone over to Roosevelt, taking with him his 
 strong state machine and the La Toilette League 
 of several thousand members organized some 
 months before. When I reached the state, a 
 little more than two weeks before the primary, 
 it seemed that it would be impossible to make a 
 campaign at all. But Rudolph Spreckels, who 
 had carried through the San Francisco graft 
 prosecution, came forward with splendid spirit, 
 and not only paid all the expenses of the Cali 
 fornia campaign, but although suffering from 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 643 
 
 recent illness, he personally gave his time and 
 strength and ability to its management. 
 
 And likewise in varying degree did a number 
 of loyal friends attest their devotion to the cause 
 - state campaign managers Harry N. Tucker, 
 North Dakota; R. O. Richards, South Dakota; 
 Frank A. Harrison, Nebraska; Thomas Mc- 
 Cusker, Oregon; Walter W. Pollock, Ohio; 
 James E. Pope, New Jersey; Elizabeth G. Evans, 
 Massachusetts, besides many others in those 
 states all of whom gave freely of their time 
 and means in the contest. 
 
 So, in the face of desertion and defeat, I 
 fought on, contesting in every direct primary 
 state until election day in the last state to hold 
 a primary election. I lost Nebraska, Oregon, 
 California, three districts which I campaigned 
 in Ohio, New Jersey, and South Dakota. I had 
 carried Wisconsin with twenty-six delegates and 
 North Dakota with ten, which gave me thirty- 
 six delegates to the National Convention a 
 very effective fighting force as it finally proved. 
 
 Roosevelt s willingness to "accept" merged 
 into a desire to receive, and then into a deter- 
 
644 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 mination to pursue the Republican presidential 
 nomination, which he did in person to the very 
 doors of the convention. Progressive principles 
 were lost sight of in his campaign. For definite 
 issues and purpose there was substituted a stand 
 ard of personal loyalty to him. Until he came 
 into the open as a candidate, five months before 
 the convention, there had been a strong and 
 rapidly growing Progressive movement within 
 the Republican party. It was based upon 
 clearly defined principles. It stood forth as the 
 representative of modern political thought on 
 fundamental democracy. It had assumed na 
 tional proportions. It was united. Into this 
 movement, when it gave promise of national 
 success, Roosevelt projected his ambition to be 
 President a third time. 
 
 When the campaign was finished both Taft 
 and Roosevelt claimed a majority of the dele 
 gates elected to the convention. I felt confident 
 that neither had a majority, and believed that 
 if the contests were settled with anything like 
 fairness, it would leave them with their strength 
 so nearly even that the twenty-six delegates 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 645 
 
 from Wisconsin and the ten from North Dakota 
 instructed for me would constitute the balance 
 of power in the convention. I knew that I could 
 depend upon the steadfastness of these thirty- 
 six and felt confident that they would be in a 
 position to force the adoption of a strong Pro 
 gressive platform and the nomination of a 
 thoroughgoing Progressive candidate. Roose 
 velt and Taft had conducted a campaign so bit 
 terly personal that the nomination of either 
 could not, I believed, commend itself to the 
 wisdom of a majority of the convention. Fur 
 thermore, the conditions which had aroused 
 public resentment and indignation the control 
 of government by the railroads, the trusts, the 
 money power had come upon the country 
 mainly in the last dozen years under the admin 
 istrations of Roosevelt and Taft. In view of the 
 whole situation, I urged those representing me 
 in that convention to stand to the last against 
 the nomination of either Taft or Roosevelt. 
 
 The Republican National Convention of 1912 
 met in Chicago June 18th and lasted until the 
 22nd. For about a week before the convention 
 
646 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 the Republican National Committee had been 
 in session, hearing and deciding contests, in 
 order to prepare the preliminary roll of delegates 
 of those entitled to participate in the temporary 
 organization of the convention. According to 
 custom, the credentials committee, consisting of 
 one member from each state, chosen by the sev 
 eral state delegations the choice being ratified 
 by the convention went into session shortly 
 after the convention met, and passed upon the 
 results arrived at by the National Committee. 
 Knowing that he did not have a majority 
 of the delegates honestly elected to the conven 
 tion, Roosevelt made a loud outcry against 
 the fraud which he professed to believe the 
 National Committee intended to perpetrate in 
 passing upon contests to be brought before it. 
 This served the double purpose of diverting 
 attention from his own fraudulent contests and 
 discredited the decisions of the National Com 
 mittee in advance of its action. While the 
 National Committee was engaged in hearing 
 and deciding the contests, Roosevelt and his 
 followers vigorously denounced at every stage 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 647 
 
 the seating of Taft delegates as "robbery" and 
 "theft." Their protest was quite as violent 
 when the committee decided justly against 
 Roosevelt as when it decided unjustly against 
 him. Before the National Committee had 
 completed its hearing of contests, preliminary to 
 perfecting the temporary roll of delegates, it 
 was apparent that the Taft people would con 
 trol the convention for temporary organization. 
 Prior to the time when Roosevelt became an 
 avowed candidate, the men who were to consti 
 tute my delegation from Wisconsin had been 
 selected, and at his request Governor F. E. 
 McGovern had been named as one of the dele 
 gates at large and placed at the head of the 
 ticket. The men so selected were all supposed 
 to be my friends and strongly in favor of my 
 nomination. They were elected in the presi 
 dential primary by nearly one hundred thousand 
 majority. Some days before the Chicago con 
 vention I learned that McGovern and Henry 
 Cochems, another delegate and a close friend of 
 McGovern, had had an interview with Roose 
 velt in his private car on the twenty-seventh 
 
648 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 of March (1912) in the city of Milwaukee, as he 
 was passing through the state on his return from 
 campaigning in Minnesota. I did not know 
 just what this interview signified until a few 
 days before the meeting of the convention, 
 when the word reached me from friends in 
 Wisconsin that McGovern would be Roose 
 velt s candidate for temporary chairman of the 
 convention. As soon as I learned of this I 
 sent my private secretary, John J. Hannan, to 
 McGovern, directing him to say that I should 
 regard his standing as Roosevelt s candidate for 
 temporary chairman as most inimical to my 
 candidacy; that the placing of McGovern^s 
 name before the convention as Roosevelt s can 
 didate for temporary chairman and his elec 
 tion by Roosevelt delegates would at once be 
 accepted by the convention and the country as 
 evidence of an alliance with Roosevelt; that I 
 desired that my candidacy be kept entirely free 
 from any deal or bargain or combination with 
 any other candidate; that the effect of such a 
 proceeding would at once array every delegate 
 in the convention opposed to Roosevelt (and 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 649 
 
 many real Progressives were opposed to him) 
 against me ; that if Wisconsin and North Dakota 
 held the balance of power between the Taft and 
 Roosevelt delegates, this would be equivalent to 
 surrendering that position of vantage, and in the 
 end would operate to carry my delegates to the 
 support of Roosevelt and secure his nomination; 
 that as my delegates were for the nomination 
 of neither Taft nor Roosevelt, they should take 
 no action which would strengthen either Taft 
 or Roosevelt. 
 
 Hannan found McGovern determined to be the 
 Roosevelt candidate for temporary chairman. 
 He declared that he had his speech all prepared; 
 that it was the greatest opportunity of his life, 
 and although strongly urged by Hannan to hold 
 off from any such combination with Roosevelt, 
 he refused absolutely to yield. 
 
 It now became plain that it was a part of the 
 Roosevelt plan to form a secret alliance with 
 McGovern, tempt him with the Chairmanship 
 of the Convention, secure the support of the 
 Wisconsin and North Dakota delegations, and 
 with Cummins Iowa strength added to the 
 
650 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 Roosevelt strength, elect him chairman; that 
 McGovern, as chairman, should rule out as 
 fraudulent, and not entitled to participate in 
 the temporary organization, a sufficient number 
 of the Taft delegates seated by the National 
 Committee, to give Roosevelt a majority of the 
 convention, and then once in control they would 
 be able to steam-roll Roosevelt s nomination. 
 
 A pretence was made that McGovern s can 
 didacy was in my interest, and would, in some 
 mysterious way, have aided in my nomination. 
 But this valuable service in my behalf was con 
 ceived and carried along toward consummation 
 without consultation with or indeed without an 
 intimation to me, and kept carefully under cover 
 until the Chicago convention was right at hand 
 and then attempted to be forced through 
 over my earnest protest. It must always stand 
 upon the record as a betrayal, not merely of my 
 candidacy, but of the Progressive principles 
 which the Wisconsin voters instructed these 
 men to represent with fidelity. 
 
 McGovern stated in an interview in explana 
 tion of his persistency in being a candidate for 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 651 
 
 temporary chairman, given out to Wisconsin 
 papers after his return to the state from the 
 convention, that if he had been elected tem 
 porary chairman he would have ruled that the 
 seventy-two delegates contested by Roosevelt 
 should have been stricken from the roll and 
 denied the right to participate in the temporary 
 organization. He put together some figures 
 attempting to show that, if the deal had not 
 been repudiated from the platform in my be 
 half by Houser, he (McGovern) would have 
 been elected temporary chairman. The absurd 
 ity of this claim is obvious to any one who, even 
 remotely, followed the proceedings of the con 
 vention. The fact that all the anti-Taft votes 
 combined were not sufficient to control became 
 apparent on the first test of strength in the con 
 vention. This was the "seating" of contested 
 delegates for the temporary organization. And 
 in this proceeding all the Roosevelt forces par 
 ticipated and were outvoted. These delegates 
 safely seated, the Taft forces were strong enough 
 to dominate every subsequent roll call, including 
 that upon the temporary chairmanship. There 
 
652 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 is no way of juggling figures to prove that after 
 the seating of these delegates McGovern could 
 have been elected temporary chairman, even 
 were he given the votes of all my delegates. But 
 that is relatively unimportant. Even had it 
 been possible for such a combination to elect Mc 
 Govern, I could not have consented to it. Such 
 a course would have been a repudiation of my 
 whole career and of my pledges to the people 
 to enter into no deals or combinations. What 
 is significant is McGovern s admission that if he 
 had been elected temporary chairman he would 
 have "gaveled" the seventy -two delegates con 
 tested by Roosevelt out of their seats. In other 
 words, he confesses that he would have done 
 even more unjustifiable "steam-rolling" as chair 
 man in Roosevelt s interest than he says was 
 done by the convention in Taft s interest. Such 
 a decision as this, had it been rendered, would 
 have violated the precedents of every national 
 convention ever held, and arbitrarily and wrong 
 fully have nominated Roosevelt as the Repub 
 lican candidate. 
 
 Upon the arrival of the Wisconsin delegates 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 653 
 
 at Chicago prior to the meeting of the con 
 vention, a caucus of the delegates was held to 
 consider McGovern s candidacy for temporary 
 chairman. The caucus decided by a vote of 
 15 to 11 not to present McGovern s name to 
 the convention as a candidate. In violation of 
 this action by the delegation and to their great 
 amazement, Henry Cochems nevertheless did 
 nominate McGovern for temporary chairman. 
 Immediately Roosevelt followers in the conven 
 tion, without regard to the alphabetical order 
 of the states, were on their feet seconding the 
 nomination of McGovern. That there was a 
 perfect understanding with the Roosevelt forces 
 now became evident. 
 
 The placing of McGovern in nomination 
 caused a stir throughout the convention hall. 
 Many interpreted it as evidence of a combination 
 between the Roosevelt and La Follette forces. 
 No answer was forthcoming until after the 
 seconding speeches had been made. And then 
 Walter L. Houser, my campaign manager, who 
 was a delegate at large, in a forceful, earnest 
 speech, informed the convention that the action 
 
654 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 of Cochems and the others who seconded 
 McGovern s nomination, whose speeches had 
 adroitly carried the impression that I sanctioned 
 the nomination of McGovern, totally misrep 
 resented my attitude; that my candidacy was 
 uncompromising and unwavering, and would 
 remain to the end free from combinations of 
 any sort. 
 
 In an editorial printed generally in the 
 Scripps papers, Herbert Quick says of this inci 
 dent of the convention: 
 
 ;< The one sharp shock of unexpectedness, 
 the dramatic thrill which lifts the spectators 
 to erect grip on the arms of their seats, was 
 furnished the first day of the convention by 
 the La Follette clash in the Wisconsin dele 
 gation. . . . 
 
 "The Roosevelt people wanted to get the tem 
 porary chairman. The fight was so close that 
 nobody could tell how it would end. Borah 
 of Idaho was the Roosevelt candidate. But 
 the politics of the situation pointed unerringly 
 to McGovern of Wisconsin. For the La Follette 
 votes in Wisconsin and North Dakota, number 
 ing 36, were bitterly needed. It was plain 
 that with ordinary men and ordinary convention 
 standards, these 36 votes could be secured by 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 655 
 
 the honor to this little group of giving one of 
 their number the temporary chairmanship. 
 
 "They offered the glittering prize to McGov- 
 ern. The delegation, under the general in 
 structions to avoid deals, dickers, and affiliations 
 refused it. It decided that it would not present 
 the name of Governor McGovern. But Henry 
 Cochems, a personal chum of the governor, 
 with the governor s consent, and acting as an 
 individual, presented his name in a ringing 
 speech. 
 
 "The Roosevelt leaders Hadley, Glasscock, 
 Heney, Johnson, and others seconded the 
 nomination. To the convention it looked as 
 though the Roosevelt people had annexed the 
 La Follette strength on this vote, and probably 
 on everything save the formal votes for Pres 
 ident. 
 
 "And then the lightning flashed! Walter L. 
 Houser, La Follette s manager, took the plat 
 form, and in a speech thrilling with passion, laid 
 the La Follette cards face up on the convention 
 table. 
 
 " This nomination is not with Senator La 
 Follette s consent, he shouted. We make no 
 deals with Roosevelt. We make no trades with 
 Taft. Not even this great honor to our gov 
 ernor and an honored member of our delegation 
 can bribe Wisconsin s representatives. Let no 
 man think that La Follette has traded with 
 any one. We make no trades. . . . I m 
 going to wire La Follette to-night, said an 
 
656 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 Indiana Roosevelt leader, that he reaps more 
 glory out of this than any other man gets in 
 the day s doings. It tells in a single dramatic 
 moment what he has been trying to tell the 
 country for a year that he is playing the game 
 without deals, without bargains, and with sole 
 reference to accomplishing results which he 
 believes to be necessary to the welfare of the 
 country. If this episode had been staged by 
 a skilful dramatist for the express purpose of 
 doing this very thing, it could not have been 
 more splendidly done. It put Wisconsin in the 
 spotlight. But the real significance of the 
 incident is its value in giving the world a flash 
 light picture of the La Follette way of doing 
 things. 
 
 "The incident made a lot of Roosevelt men 
 fiercely angry. They asserted that La Follette 
 was trying to wreak his wrath on Roosevelt 
 and to aid Taft. But the country will know 
 better. And the Roosevelt men themselves, 
 most of them, know better. The picture thrown 
 on the screen of the fateful first day of the 
 fateful Republican convention of 1912 will stay 
 in the nation s mind. 
 
 "It shows an indomitable figure erect, un 
 bending, swayed by no wind of expediency, 
 moved by no temporary advantage, playing 
 the long game, building influence and opinion 
 rather than winning victories, making no deals 
 or trades, taking defeat gamely, and when met 
 by a facer coming back for more punishment, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 657 
 
 until his foe finally goes down beaten by an 
 adversary who does not know how to quit." 
 
 After the final vote for President on Saturday, 
 June 22d, Roosevelt and his followers held a 
 meeting in Orchestra Hall, where, in a speech 
 to the delegates, he bade them return to their 
 constituencies, to test the sentiment of the 
 people, and meet again at a later time to 
 determine as to the advisability of creating a 
 new party a Roosevelt party a party, the 
 sole excuse for the formation of which was 
 based upon the contention that delegates in the 
 Republican Convention were stolen from one 
 candidate and given to another. "Thou shalt 
 not steal," was made the keynote of the Roose 
 velt bolting convention. "Thou shalt not steal 
 from me" would have been more in keeping 
 as a Roosevelt slogan. The importance of 
 principles, of issues, was wholly lost sight of. 
 The methods resorted to by the National Com 
 mittee, it may be said in passing, however 
 wrongful, were not unique. In 1908, when they 
 were necessary to steam-roll the nomination 
 of Mr. Roosevelt s successor, Mr. Taft, we 
 
658 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 heard no word of protest. But, as was aptly 
 suggested by Mr. Post in The Public, whether 
 one is on top of or under the steam-roller influ 
 ences somewhat one s point of view. 
 
 Throughout the convention, the delegates who 
 were elected to support and who did support 
 me steadfastly to the end, labored for the 
 adoption of a Progressive platform. In this 
 they had no cooperation from the Roosevelt 
 forces. This incident is characteristic: When 
 the Progressive platform was presented to the 
 convention, by Walter C. Owen, the La Follette 
 member of the Committee on Resolutions, in 
 order to obtain a roll call on its adoption, it 
 was necessary under the rules to have a second 
 by two states. La Follette delegates went in 
 every direction, begging for another state to 
 join with Wisconsin and North Dakota in order 
 to get a vote merely a vote and every re 
 quest was met with a flat refusal. Thus through 
 the cooperation of Roosevelt and Taft forces, a 
 .record vote upon a definitely Progressive plat 
 form of principles was rendered impossible. 
 
 The importance of the charge made by Mr, 
 

 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 659 
 
 Roosevelt that the nomination was stolen from 
 him, led La Follettes Weekly Magazine to engage 
 Mr. Gilbert E.Roe, of New York City, to analyze 
 the evidence and all the proceedings bearing 
 upon the seating of delegates whose title was in 
 dispute. He obtained from the National Com 
 mittee and the Committee on Credentials all of 
 the evidence presented in every contest to the 
 two committees, and the shorthand notes of the 
 proceedings of both committees. He made an 
 exhaustive study of each one of the contested 
 cases. I submit herewith the results of his 
 work. 
 
 There were 1078 delegates to the convention. 
 Five hundred and forty constituted a majority, 
 and was the minimum number of votes necessary 
 to secure the nomination of any candidate. The 
 final vote for President was as follows: Taft, 
 561; Roosevelt, 107; La Follette, 41; Cummins, 
 17; Hughes, 2; Absent, 6; not voting, 344. 
 (Five of my 41 votes were cast by the South 
 Dakota delegation.) 
 
 Upon the adoption of the majority report 
 of the Committee on Credentials by the con- 
 
660 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 vention, Roosevelt in a statement presented by 
 Henry J. Allen of Kansas, said: "I do not 
 release any delegate from his honorable obliga 
 tion to vote for me if he votes at all, but under 
 the actual conditions, I hope that he will not 
 vote at all." So, in view of this request Mr. 
 Roe, in his analysis, places Roosevelt s actual 
 strength in the convention at 107 plus 344, 
 or 451. In order, however, that there can be 
 no possible question as to the maximum number 
 of Roosevelt votes in the convention, he assumes 
 that the six absent delegates would have voted 
 for Roosevelt, had they been present; that the 
 two who voted for Hughes and the seven from 
 Idaho who voted with the Iowa delegates for 
 Cummins, might also at some time during the 
 proceedings have cast their votes for Roosevelt. 
 This would add 15 more votes to the possible 
 Roosevelt strength, making a total of 466 votes 
 as the maximum which he could have received 
 under any circumstances. The difference be 
 tween 466 and 540 is 74. Seventy-four addi 
 tional votes, therefore, must have been obtained 
 from some source in order to have made Roose- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 661 
 
 velt s nomination in the convention even a 
 possibility. 
 
 Mr. Roe then proceeds to analyze the evidence 
 upon which the charge of theft is made. A 
 table which he presents shows the whole number 
 of contests to be 105, the number of seats 
 involved being 248. The actual number of 
 delegates involved was considerably larger than 
 this, as there were sometimes three sets of 
 contesting delegates, and in several instances 
 the same faction of the party had contesting 
 delegates. From the official report it appears 
 that there were 164 Taft delegates seated either 
 by the unanimous vote of the National Com 
 mittee, or by a viva voce vote when the contest 
 was not regarded by the Roosevelt members of 
 the National Committee as sufficiently serious 
 to require a roll call. To be exact, 26 Taft 
 delegates were seated by a viva voce vote, 
 announced as unanimous and not questioned; 
 36 were seated by unanimous vote on roll call; 
 contests were withdrawn by 14 Roosevelt con 
 testing delegates after the cases were called, 
 and in the case of 88 delegates, they were seated 
 
662 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 by a viva voce vote without any request for a 
 roll call. Roosevelt was awarded 19 of the 
 contested delegates. 
 
 Deducting from the 248 delegates (the total 
 number in contest) the 19 Roosevelt delegates 
 seated, leaves 229; and deducting the 164 Taft 
 delegates above mentioned, leaves 65, as the 
 only delegates concerning whom there was a 
 substantial contest. The correctness of these 
 figures, Mr. Roe goes on to state, is strikingly 
 verified by the action of the Roosevelt members 
 of the National Committee. Thirteen of those 
 members presented a minority report to the 
 National Committee, in which they set out that 
 the Taft delegates seated from certain states 
 and districts (which Mr. Roe tabulates in his 
 analysis) were improperly seated, and that the 
 Roosevelt delegates contesting these seats, 
 should be placed on the temporary roll, While 
 this table represents that 72 delegates had been 
 seriously contested by the Roosevelt people, 
 the sheet containing the original pencil memo 
 randa which, in some way, became attached to 
 the report, shows that the original number of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 663 
 
 delegates marked for contest was 66. Enough 
 were afterward added to bring the total up 
 to 72. 
 
 On June 19th, Governor Hadley, the leader of 
 the Roosevelt forces, submitted the following 
 motion to the National Convention: 
 
 "I move as a substitute for the motion 
 offered by the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
 Watson, that the list of delegates, or temporary 
 roll of this convention, be amended by striking 
 therefrom the names of the delegates upon 
 List No. 1, which I hand to the secretary, and 
 that there be substituted in lieu thereof the 
 names upon List No. 2, which I hand to the 
 secretary, and that the temporary roll, when 
 thus amended, become the roll of the con 
 vention." 
 
 This motion proposed to substitute the 
 Roosevelt delegates for the Taft delegates in 
 the case of the 72 delegates covered by the 
 minority report of the Roosevelt members of 
 the National Committee. The convention re 
 fused to adopt the Hadley resolution, and it is 
 this action which the Roosevelt adherents assert 
 made it fraudulent. Since it was in the seating, 
 
664 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 therefore, of the 72 delegates above mentioned 
 that the Roosevelt followers charge fraud, Mr. 
 Roe reasons that it is not necessary to consider 
 any other contests than the ones involving the 
 seats of the 72 delegates. 
 
 After painstaking study of the record evidence 
 he concludes that there was no basis for the 
 claim that a majority of the delegates honestly 
 elected to the National Convention were for 
 Roosevelt; that even if the entire 72 covered 
 by the Hadley Resolution had been given to 
 Roosevelt, he would not have had enough to 
 nominate him; that these 72, after careful 
 investigation of the merits of the contests, and 
 for reasons which he sets forth clearly and in 
 detail, must be reduced by 23, leaving 49 
 delegates to the National Convention as the 
 maximum number given to Taf t by the National 
 Committee which could, on the evidence, fairly 
 have been given to Roosevelt. Mr. Roe does 
 not assert conclusively that these 49 should 
 have been counted as Roosevelt delegates, but 
 that some justification could be found in the evi 
 dence for so doing. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 665 
 
 Adding to these 49 the 466 which represented 
 the maximum of Roosevelt s strength in the 
 convention, as made up, gives Roosevelt 515. 
 These figures can fairly be reduced. They cannot, 
 with the least show of fairness, be increased. 
 And they show that Roosevelt never had any 
 thing like a majority of the honestly elected 
 delegates to the convention. They also show, 
 when the temper of the delegates pledged to the 
 other candidates is considered, that Roosevelt s 
 nomination was impossible, even if every dele 
 gate to whom he had any shadow of claim, or 
 who could be regarded as doubtful, be counted 
 for him. The charge of theft against the 
 National Committee for seating Taft dele 
 gates where Roosevelt delegates should have 
 been seated, came with bad grace from those 
 who made it. At the worst, the National 
 Committee seated less than 50 Taft delegates 
 on insufficient evidence. Those in charge of 
 the Roosevelt campaign tried to seat more 
 than 150 Roosevelt delegates without any evi 
 dence at all. But aside from all this, 
 knowingly false claims put forward by the 
 
666 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 Roosevelt managers to more than 150 delegates 
 for weeks prior to the convention, were made, as 
 they were forced to admit while the contests were 
 on trial, with the deliberate purpose of deceiving 
 the Republicans of the country into the belief 
 that Roosevelt s nomination was assured, and 
 that therefore it was better to give him sup 
 port, hoping that he would prove to be a halfway 
 Progressive, rather than to support a real Pro 
 gressive candidate, whom the voter personally 
 preferred, but had been led to believe could 
 not be nominated. 
 
 Judson C. Welliver is chief political writer on 
 the Washington Times, a paper owned by 
 Munsey, who was one of the principal contribu 
 tors to Roosevelt s campaign and prominent as 
 one of his managers. In an article of Mr. Wei- 
 liver s in the Times of June 9, 1912, is found this 
 startling admission. [The italics are mine]: 
 
 "The Taft people knew their weakness, and 
 were scared about the situation. They adopted 
 the plan of holding conventions in the South 
 early, because there they had the machinery 
 and could rush matters through with the strong 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 667 
 
 arm procedure and stow away a fine bunch 
 of delegates, while the Roosevelt movement 
 was still unorganized; indeed before Roosevelt 
 could be announced. 
 
 "This they did, and on the day when Roose 
 velt formally announced that he was a candidate, 
 something over a hundred delegates had actually 
 been selected. When Senator Dixon (Roosevelt s 
 manager) took charge of the campaign, a 
 tabulated showing of delegates selected to 
 date would have looked hopelessly one-sided. 
 Moreover, a number of southern states had 
 called their conventions for early dates, and 
 there was no chance to develop the real 
 Roosevelt strength in the great northern states 
 till later. 
 
 "For psychological effect, as a move in prac 
 tical politics, it was necessary for the Roosevelt 
 people to start contests on these early Taft 
 selections, in order that a tabulation of delegate 
 strength could be put out that would show 
 Roosevelt holding a good hand in the game. 
 A table showing Taft, 150; Roosevelt, 19; 
 contested, none, would not be very much 
 calculated to inspire confidence. Whereas, one 
 showing Taft, 23; Roosevelt, 19; contested, 
 127, looked very different. 
 
 That is the whole story of the larger number 
 of southern contests that were started early 
 in the game. It was never expected that they 
 would be taken very seriously; they served a 
 useful purpose, and now the National Commit- 
 
668 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 tee is deciding them in favor of Taft; in most 
 cases without any real division." 
 
 Beyond any question it is true that during 
 the last few weeks preceding the convention 
 many delegates were elected for Roosevelt 
 because of the false claims put forth by his 
 managers that he had a large lead in the contest 
 - claims which they well knew to be false to 
 the number of at least 150 delegates represented 
 by "fake" contests. 
 
 / The true psychology of the Roosevelt pro 
 ceedings at Chicago became perfectly plain. 
 He was there to force his own nomination or 
 to smash the convention. He was not there 
 to preserve the integrity of the Republican 
 Party, and make it an instrument for the 
 promotion of Progressive principles and the 
 restoration of government to the people. Other 
 wise, he would have directed his managers to 
 contest every inch of the ground for a Progressive 
 platform before the Committee on Resolutions 
 and in the open convention. If he had evidence 
 to prove that Taft could not be honestly and 
 fairly nominated, why did he not direct his 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 669 
 
 lieutenants to present that evidence to the 
 National Committee, and then to the convention 
 and the country, so clearly that the convention 
 would not have dared to nominate Taft and 
 that Taft could not, in honor, have accepted 
 the nomination if made? 
 
 The reason is obvious. An analysis of the 
 testimony shows that neither Taft nor Roose 
 velt had a majority of honestly or regularly 
 elected delegates. This the managers upon 
 both sides well understood. Each candidate 
 was trying to seat a sufficient number of fraudu 
 lently credentialed delegates, added to those 
 regularly chosen to support him, to secure control 
 of the convention and steam-roll the nomina 
 tion. It was a proceeding with which each was 
 acquainted and which each had sanctioned in 
 prior conventions. This explains the extraordi 
 nary conduct of Roosevelt. He could not enter 
 upon such an analysis of the evidence as would 
 prove Taft s regularly elected delegates in the 
 minority, without inevitably subjecting his own 
 spuriously credentialed delegates to an examin 
 ation so critical as to expose the falsity of his 
 
670 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912 
 
 own contention that he had an honestly elected 
 majority of the delegates. He therefore delib 
 erately chose to claim everything, to cry fraud, 
 to bully the National Committee and Conven 
 tion, and sought to create a condition which 
 would make impossible a calm investigation of 
 cases upon merit, and to carry the convention 
 by storm. He filled the public ear with sound 
 and fury. He ruthlessly sacrificed everything 
 to the one idea of his being the one candidate. 
 He gagged his followers in the convention, with 
 out putting on record any facts upon which the 
 public could base a definite, intelligent judg 
 ment regarding the validity of Taft s nomi 
 nation. He submitted no suggestion as to a 
 platform of Progressive principles. He clam 
 ored loudly for purging the convention roll 
 of "tainted" delegates without purging his own 
 candidacy of his tainted contests, and his 
 tainted trust support. He offered no reason 
 for a third party, except his own overmastering 
 craving for a third term. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 WHY I CONTINUED AS A CANDIDATE ROOSE 
 VELT NEVER A PROGRESSIVE HIS RECORD 
 
 WHEN the men who had supported my 
 candidacy dropped away from me, one 
 by one, and turned to Roosevelt, as 
 "a winner," I weighed, and impersonally too, 
 I think, every phase of the situation. I had 
 gone into the campaign as a candidate, believing 
 that I had been so identified with the Progressive 
 movement that my candidacy was one with it. 
 It is needless to say that having become a 
 candidate, I wanted to win. I should not be 
 frank if I did not admit this to be true. Yet 
 plainly, at any time during the campaign, 
 it would have been my duty to stand aside and 
 support the candidacy of another if, by so 
 doing, I could advance the Progressive cause. 
 It was claimed that Roosevelt had a greater 
 numerical following throughout the country 
 
 671 
 
672 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 than any other Republican. But that, in itself, 
 was not enough. It is one thing to have a 
 candidate of great popular strength. It is 
 another thing to have a candidate sincerely 
 \devoted to the fundamental principles of the 
 I cause he is supposed to represent. As I have 
 before stated I could never consent to play a 
 double game with the public; I could not pre 
 tend to be a candidate, when in fact I was only a 
 dummy for the real candidate, concerning whose 
 candidacy the people were to be kept in the 
 dark. To withdraw in favor of Roosevelt was 
 A quite as impossible, because to surrender the 
 J field to him would be to surrender the move 
 ment to him. 
 
 I have said many times in this narrative, and 
 I had said many times as early as the campaign 
 of 1908, that while giving Roosevelt full credit 
 for all of his preachments for higher ethical 
 standards in our political and social life, what 
 was sorely needed in this critical hour was a 
 real constructive leader with a clear conception 
 of the economic problems of the time. I had 
 tested Roosevelt s public record by the peculiar 
 
i. 
 
 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 abilities which manifestly existing conditions 
 demanded, and he had not measured up. 
 Roosevelt at the close of his administration 
 realized himself that in arousing the public 
 conscience to higher civic standards, he had 
 rendered the service for which he was most 
 fitted, and admitted frankly his distaste for 
 the plodding and investigation necessary to a 
 solution of great economic questions. This, 
 indeed, prefaced his appeal for Taft, for whose 
 constructive work Roosevelt believed he had 
 made the ground ready. 
 
 In a speech which I delivered at Racine, Wis., 
 in the campaign of 1908, I said: 
 
 "President Roosevelt has crystallized public 
 sentiment, and elevated civic standards. He 
 will live in the history of his time, a unique 
 figure. He will not live in history as the 
 author of any great, lasting constructive legis 
 lation. He knows his office and his field better 
 than some of his most enthusiastic supporters. 
 He knows that if his name is given to enduring 
 fame, it will be because he has touched the con 
 science of the foremost nation in the world, lifted 
 its people on to heights, and made them ready 
 for the greatest work that any nation ever did." 
 
674 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 In that same speech I commented upon the 
 dangerous precedent which Roosevelt s action, 
 in choosing his successor, tended to establish. 
 I said it was a " wrong thing, a dangerous thing 
 for the President to use the power and all the 
 force of his administration to select his suc 
 cessor." 
 
 Repeated experiences with Roosevelt had 
 convinced me that in critical situations his 
 action was often in direct opposition to his 
 utterances; that one could reckon on his doing, 
 not the logical consistent thing to carry out a 
 definite policy, but the expedient thing, the 
 thing that achieves temporary success. These 
 elements in his character were matters of 
 constant disappointment as they revealed them 
 selves to me. 
 
 In weighing the course which it was my duty 
 to take when Roosevelt became an open and 
 aggressive candidate, claiming the leadership of 
 the Republican Progressive movement, I re 
 viewed the record of his official life. He had 
 given utterance to many strong Progressive 
 declarations. Taken by themselves, they would 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 675 
 
 persuade the most ardent Progressive. At 
 times this side of the man had led me to be hope r 
 ful that he might support our movement, and 
 with his prestige as a former President, if he 
 would but hold fast, give us greatly added 
 strength. But to commit the Progressive cause 
 to his control, to stake all on his remaining 
 steadfast, to "follow, follow, follow, wherever he 
 would lead " quoting the refrain of those so- 
 called Progressives who did follow him unques- 
 tioningly the thought of doing this always 
 compelled me, whenever this momentous question 
 came up in a serious way, and before taking 
 the final step, to go back along the course over 
 which this man had come, and see whether he 
 had left a straight or a crooked trail. 
 
 Important events blazed that trail, and 
 established its general course and direction. 
 More than that which was the vital thing now 
 they pointed the way he would certainly go 
 in the future. There was his record on the coal 
 land bill; his sponsorship for the Hepburn bill, 
 which was in fact little more than a sham; his 
 shiftiness on the valuation of railroad property as 
 
676 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 a basis for rate regulation; his aversion to the 
 Anti-Trust Law, and his combination and trust 
 policy which, despite his verbal assaults on 
 trusts, steadily strengthened and encouraged 
 the growth of monopoly; his strong support of 
 the Aldrich-Cannon Standpat tariff program; 
 his critical attitude toward Standard Oil coupled 
 with his confidential relations with Morgan, 
 Perkins, Frick, Harriman, and those associated 
 with them, in the interlocking directorates, 
 controlling the Big Business of the country ; and 
 his uniform policy of opposition to the Progres 
 sive movement in Wisconsin and other states. 
 Each of these, by itself, would shatter for the 
 time being confidence in Roosevelt s integrity 
 of purpose. But it would be followed by 
 such vigorous and apparently sincere denunci 
 ation of the evils of privilege, as to make 
 one again believe in and trust him. When, 
 however, I reviewed them in their relation 
 one with another, in this great crisis in the 
 life of the Progressive movement, I could 
 not conscientiously accept him as a leader 
 of the Progressive movement, and there was 
 
^S A CANDIDATE 677 
 
 no alternative for me but to continue as a 
 candidate. 
 
 Roosevelt s attitude with reference to the coal 
 land legislation in 1906, detailed in a previous 
 chapter, is strikingly characteristic. He had 
 encouraged me to believe that he would put 
 back of this important legislation all the power 
 of his administration. That encouragement led 
 me in every speech I made during the recess, 
 and I made many, to tell the story of the coal 
 lands, the corrective legislation proposed, and 
 of President Roosevelt s enthusiastic support. 
 Upon my return to Washington at the beginning 
 of the next session I found that, as promised, 
 he had in his message recommended the legis 
 lation. After weeks of study and preparation, 
 with the assistance of the Attorney General s 
 department, a broad conservation measure was 
 evolved which, when presented to Roosevelt, 
 received his emphatic approval. But within 
 three days he had receded from his position. 
 Because railroad and special interest Senators 
 bitterly opposed the bill, as they were certain to 
 do, and because they denounced me and my 
 
678 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 plan as socialistic, the President withdrew his 
 support. 
 
 He followed the same course with the Hep 
 burn bill. When this measure was pending in 
 1906, after the country had anxiously waited for 
 years for legislation to strengthen the Interstate 
 Commerce Law, in conferring with Roosevelt, as 
 I did upon his invitation, I argued the futility of 
 passing the pending bill, which I had carefully 
 studied, and pointed out wherein it failed to 
 touch the basic question the question which 
 the country had patiently waited to have solved. 
 He had not only tremendous public sentiment 
 back of him in this legislation but the urgent 
 appeal, year after year, of the Interstate Com 
 merce Commission for such amendments to the 
 law as would empower it effectively to deal with 
 this all-important question. But, because he 
 was not sincerely for a thoroughgoing measure, 
 he accepted and gave to the country, as some 
 thing real, a law which withheld from the com 
 mission all authority to correct transporta 
 tion abuses, all means of determining and 
 enforcing just and reasonable rates, a meas- 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 679 
 
 ure which, in every respect, was fundamentally 
 inadequate. 
 
 Subsequent developments have more than 
 justified my criticisms of the Hepburn bill in 
 1906. Under the Hepburn law, railroad rates 
 steadily increased. Hundreds of millions of 
 dollars have been wrongfully taken from the 
 American people, because Congress and the 
 President failed to give to the Interstate Com 
 merce Commission power to protect the public 
 interest. 
 
 One radical defect in the Hepburn bill (and 
 the Interstate Commerce Law is still defective 
 in this regard) was its omission to provide for 
 determining the true value of railroad property 
 as a basis for rate making. Failing to secure the 
 adoption of the valuation amendment which I 
 offered in the Senate, in recording my vote on 
 the passage of the bill I warned the Senate 
 and the country that the measure was fatally 
 defective; that the bill added nothing to the 
 existing law which would enable the commission 
 to determine and enforce reasonable rates; that 
 the country would be sorely disappointed when 
 
680 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 it understood how little had been achieved after 
 a nine years struggle to cure the vital defects 
 which the decision of the Supreme Court had 
 made apparent. My frank statement that I 
 could not laud a measure which I felt was, in 
 large degree, a sham, I had reason to know dis 
 pleased Roosevelt, for the Hepburn bill was an 
 administration measure and went to the coun 
 try as a great achievement. 
 
 Early in the next session, while filling an en 
 gagement in New York, in January, 1907, a long 
 distance telephone message from William Loeb, 
 Secretary to President Roosevelt, requested me, 
 immediately upon my return to Washington, 
 to call at the White House upon an important 
 matter. The President greeted me cordially 
 when I called. He began his conversation by 
 saying that he had been angered with me for 
 the attacks I had made upon the Hepburn bill, 
 which at the time he thought were unnecessary 
 and unjustifiable; that he had, however, been 
 looking into my criticisms, and the amendments 
 I had offered; that he was now convinced 
 I was right, and that my amendments were 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 681 
 
 important and essential to the bill, particularly 
 the valuation amendment; that he had become 
 satisfied that valuation was necessary to any 
 reasonable regulation of railway rates. He had 
 determined, he said, to take this matter up 
 and push it, and had sent for me to request 
 me to prepare for him the best statement I 
 could, presenting in terse form the importance of 
 valuation. Such statement he proposed to use 
 as the basis of a letter to the Interstate Com 
 merce Commission on the subject of valuation. 
 He said he would give this letter to the press, and 
 would do all he could to awaken public interest 
 in the subject; that he would follow it up in 
 some addresses he intended to make after the 
 adjournment, and when Congress met in Decem 
 ber he would urge that the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission be authorized to ascertain the value 
 of the railroad property of the country. He 
 assured me he would make my bill for rail 
 way valuation, then pending, an administration 
 measure, and do everything in his power to put 
 it through. I prepared with care the statement 
 he had requested, adding to it some suggestions 
 
682 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 for improvement of the administrative features 
 of the existing law, and placed it in his hands. 
 
 Shortly thereafter I received several calls 
 from newspaper correspondents who came to 
 make inquiry of me as to Rossevelt s taking up 
 the subject of railroad valuation with the Inter 
 state Commerce Commission, and his intention 
 of giving it a prominent place in the administra 
 tion program of legislation at the next session. 
 The accuracy of their information led me to 
 believe that it had come from White House 
 sources, but I did not feel at liberty to admit 
 any knowledge of what the President proposed 
 to do. Leading newspapers the next day set 
 forth in considerable detail the purpose of the 
 President to address the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission upon the subject of valuation, to 
 present the matter in speeches during the sum 
 mer, and urgently to Congress in a message at 
 the next session. 
 
 Again I experienced great gratification in the 
 belief that Roosevelt really intended to do what 
 he had told me he would do. And I felt perfectly 
 sure that with the power of his administration 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 683 
 
 back of it, the valuation bill would go through, 
 establishing at last the vital principle of jscien- * 
 tific rate-making. 
 
 But I waited in vain for the appearance of 
 his open letter to the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission, or for some further word. If he 
 wrote such a letter to the commission, I never 
 heard of it. The next expression from him upon 
 the subject of railway valuation was on the 
 occasion of the unveiling of the Lawton statue, 
 at Indianapolis, May 30, 1907. In this address 
 he took the position that, except as to some of 
 the small lines, the railroads of the country 
 generally were not overcapitalized at all, and 
 that railway valuation was not the essential 
 basis for ascertaining and enforcing reasonable 
 rates. 
 
 I reviewed also Roosevelt s course upon trusts 
 and combinations. The American people believe 
 private monopoly intolerable. Within the last 
 dozen years trusts and combinations have been 
 organized in nearly every branch of industry. 
 Competition has been ruthlessly crushed, extor 
 tionate prices have been exacted from consumers, 
 
684 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 independent business development has been 
 arrested, invention stifled, and the door of oppor 
 tunity has been closed, except to large aggre 
 gations of capital. The public has not, as a 
 rule, received any of the resultant economies and 
 benefits of combination which have been so 
 abundantly promised. But ordinarily the com 
 binations have demonstrated that the hand of 
 monopoly is deadening, and that business may 
 as easily become too large to be efficient, as 
 remain too small. And as related to govern 
 ment, it is everywhere recognized that trusts 
 and combinations are to-day the gravest danger 
 menacing our free institutions. 
 
 Since Lincoln s time no man was ever offered 
 such an opportunity to strike an effective blow 
 for his country as was presented to Roosevelt 
 when he became President. Compared with 
 the conditions seven and one half years later, 
 the trusts and combinations at the beginning of 
 his term were but a handful. Limited in num 
 ber, they stood unsupported, each by itself. 
 They had not yet been fused and welded to 
 gether with the Morgan system of interlocking 
 
Copyright by Harris 6* Ewing 
 
 "Since Lincoln s time, no man was ever offered such an opportunity to 
 
 strike an effective blow for his country as was presented to Roosevelt 
 
 when he became President." 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 685 
 
 directorates. All told, there were but one 
 hundred and forty-nine. This was the most 
 critical time in the whole history of trust for 
 mation. It was as though the country were 
 menaced by a fatal plague as though it had 
 gained a dangerous footing here and there in 
 the most populous districts, where its deadly 
 ravages were beginning to create distress and 
 consternation. It was a case for strict quaran 
 tine and extermination; a period when such 
 treatment would not affect the whole community 
 but when those responsible for the conditions 
 could be reached without hardship or suffering 
 to the innocent. 
 
 The Sherman Anti-Trust Law, in existence 
 at that time, declared combinations to suppress 
 competition and create or attempt to create 
 monopoly to be criminal. 
 
 In plain terms this law provided that: 
 
 "Every contract, combination in the form 
 of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint 
 of trade or commerce among the several states, 
 or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be 
 illegal." 
 
686 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 The law provided further that " every person" 
 making "any such contract" or engaging in 
 "any such combination or conspiracy," and 
 "every person who shall monopolize or attempt 
 to monopolize, or combine, or conspire with any 
 other person to monopolize any part of the trade 
 or commerce among the several states," shall 
 be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject 
 on conviction to be "punished by a fine not 
 exceeding five thousand dollars or by imprison 
 ment not exceeding one year." 
 
 As said by Judge Stewart, of Vermont, in clos 
 ing the debate in the House of Representatives, 
 when the law was enacted in 1890: 
 
 "The provisions of this trust bill are just as 
 broad, sweeping, and explicit as the English 
 language can make them to express the power 
 of Congress on this subject under the Constitu 
 tion of the United States." 
 
 The enactment of this law placed in the 
 hands of the Executive the strongest, most 
 perfect weapon which the ingenuity of man 
 could forge for the protection of the people of 
 this country against the power and sordid greed 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 687 
 
 of monopoly. And its vigorous and sincere 
 enforcement at the time Theodore Roosevelt 
 entered upon his first term of office as President 
 would have crushed and destroyed the com 
 paratively few trusts which were then in exis 
 tence. 
 
 How did President Roosevelt treat conspira 
 cies against the free markets of our country 
 which the law prohibited as criminal combina 
 tions? Not as the law treated them. The law 
 clearly defined them, and imposed upon the 
 Executive Department of the government the 
 obligation to make an end of them. Instead, in 
 his messages and public addresses, one finds the 
 new President setting himself up as superior 
 to the law. He began by confusing the public 
 mind. He assumed that there was no adequate 
 legislation dealing with the subject of combina 
 tions, and attempts on the part of any person or 
 corporation to monopolize trade. In his first 
 message to Congress, he stated it as his judg 
 ment that "combination and concentration 
 should be, not prohibited, but supervised, and 
 within reasonable limits controlled." 
 
688 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 The law, in plain terms, prohibited even 
 "every attempt to monopolize," and declared 
 "every contract, combination in the form of 
 trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of 
 trade," to be illegal. It said nothing about 
 supervising or controlling these combinations 
 "within reasonable limits." At that time it 
 would have been a simple matter to execute the 
 law. This it was the President s sworn duty 
 to do. Instead of enforcing obedience to the 
 statute, Roosevelt in his first message warned 
 the country that "the mechanism of modern 
 business is so delicate that extreme care must 
 be taken not to interfere with it in a spirit of 
 rashness or ignorance. "Much of the legislation 
 directed at the trusts," he asserted, " would 
 have been exceedingly mischievous had it not 
 also been entirely ineffective." While admit 
 ting the existence of "great industrial com 
 binations," he made no appeal to the public to 
 sustain the law and evinced no disposition to en 
 force that great statute which the statesmanship 
 of Sherman, Edmunds, Hoar, Turpie, Taylor, 
 Culberson, Stewart, and the ablest men of their 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 689 
 
 time had given us to meet these very changes. 
 Instead he twisted and turned and wound about 
 with words, blurring and smearing the dis 
 cussion and vaguely suggesting the need of 
 "publicity" and the probable necessity of a 
 "constitutional amendment," finally and em 
 phatically warning Congress and the country 
 against "ignorant and reckless agitators," and 
 pleading throughout for "calm and sober self- 
 restraint." 
 
 In an address delivered at Providence on the 
 twenty-third of August, 1902, less than a year 
 after he became President, referring to the 
 "great corporations which we have grown to 
 speak of rather loosely as trusts, " he says: 
 
 "Now, the conditions are complicated, and 
 we find it hard to frame national legislation 
 which shall be adequate; while as a matter of 
 practical experience it has been shown that the 
 states either cannot or will not exercise a suffi 
 cient control to meet the needs of the case." 
 
 And again: 
 
 "I believe that the nation must assume this 
 power of control by legislation; if necessary by 
 
690 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 constitutional amendment. . . . The trust 
 nowadays is a large state corporation which 
 generally does business in other states, often 
 with a tendency toward monopoly. Such a trust 
 is an artificial creature, not wholly responsible 
 to or controllable by any legislation, either by 
 state or nation, and not subject to the jurisdic 
 tion of any one court." 
 
 The very case he puts comes within the specific 
 terms of the Sherman Act, as quoted above: 
 
 "Section 2. Every person (corporation) who 
 shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize 
 . .. ?v any part of the trade or commerce 
 among the several states, shall be deemed 
 guilty," etc. 
 
 And then, ignoring the strong statute which 
 he ought to have enforced, and after arguing 
 further the need of conferring additional power 
 upon the national government, he says: 
 
 "When it has been given full power, then 
 this full power can be used to control any evil 
 influence." 
 
 That is, the power which the government 
 already had, but which he was contending had 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 691 
 
 yet to be provided, when supplied, should not 
 be used to destroy the trusts, but "to control 
 any evil influence." He argues further that 
 the government must be very careful not to con 
 trol too harshly, lest the trust be injured. 
 In the very next sentence he says: 
 
 "When the power has been granted, it would 
 be most unwise to exercise it too much - - to 
 begin by too stringent legislation." 
 
 Throughout this and later addresses runs the 
 constant admonition that these trusts are great 
 public benefactors, great national assets. We 
 are reminded that we are prospering, and warned 
 against attacks made upon wealth, "not merely 
 individual, but corporate." He says: 
 
 "If, in a spirit of sullen envy, they (the peo 
 ple) insist upon pulling down those who have 
 profited most in the years of fatness, they will 
 bury themselves in the crash of the common 
 disaster." 
 
 And again: 
 
 "The great captain of industry, the man of 
 wealth, who alone or in combination with his 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 fellows, drives through our great business enter 
 prises, is a factor, without whom the civiliza 
 tion that we see round about ils here (he was 
 speaking in Senator Aldrich s home city) could 
 not have been built up. Good, not harm, 
 normally comes from the upbuilding of such 
 wealth." 
 
 Is it to be marvelled at that the trusts were 
 encouraged to multiply their organizations, and 
 flood the land with watered securities? 
 
 In an address delivered at Boston on the 
 twenty -fifth of August, 1902, he reiterated 
 his claim that it was still a mooted question 
 whether the federal government had any power 
 to deal with the trust question. He said: 
 
 "Now one of the great troubles I am in 
 clined to think much the greatest trouble in 
 any immediate handling of the question of the 
 trusts comes from our system of government. 
 Under this system it is difficult to say where the 
 power is lodged to deal with these evils." 
 
 The same misleading assertions run through 
 the whole address. Note this: 
 
 "Now, if we can get adequate control by the 
 nation of these great corporations, then we 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 693 
 
 can pass legislation which will give us the power 
 of regulation and supervision over them. If 
 the nation had that power, mind you, I should 
 advocate as strenuously as I knew how, that 
 the power should be exercised with extreme 
 caution and self-restraint. 
 
 Five years later he exercised the power to enforce 
 the Sherman Law with "extreme caution and self- 
 restraint " when he permitted Morgan, Gary and 
 Perkins for the Steel Trust to absorb its principal 
 rival, the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company. 
 
 At Wheeling, W. Va., September 6, 1902, 
 again he impressed upon his hearers the thought 
 that there was no sufficient remedy for the 
 trust evil, and that they must still suffer the 
 growth and spread of combinations, until further 
 legislation could be enacted; that perhaps they 
 must await the slow process of constitutional 
 amendment. He said: 
 
 "But, gentlemen, I firmly believe that in 
 the end power must be given to the national 
 government to exercise in full supervision and 
 regulation of these great enterprises and if 
 necessary, a constitutional amendment must be 
 resorted to for this purpose." 
 
694 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 This doctrine when firmly planted in the 
 public mind would excuse and justify shilly 
 shallying with the trusts throughout his whole 
 term of service. 
 
 After his election in 1904, he becomes some 
 what more definite. He is more pronounced in 
 his commendation of the great corporations, 
 their benefits to business and society. He 
 rejoices in "the marvellous prosperity we are 
 enjoying" and shows a growing appreciation of 
 the valuable services of the Morgans and the 
 McCormicks, "the industrial leaders of the 
 nation." 
 
 In his message, December, 1904, he found it 
 expedient to remind Congress that: 
 
 "Great corporations are necessary and only 
 men of great and singular mental power can 
 ?^ manage such corporations successfully, and such 
 men must have great rewards." 
 
 And again he says: 
 
 "If the less fortunate man is moved by envy 
 of his more fortunate brother to strike at the 
 conditions under which they have both, though 
 unequally, prospered, the result will assuredly 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 695 
 
 be that while damage may come to the one 
 struck at, it will visit with an even heavier load 
 the one who strikes the blow." 
 
 Let it be remembered that this was the same 
 President who later ordered his attorney gen 
 eral not to file a suit against the Harvester 
 Trust until he received "further instructions." 
 
 Congress required no restraining influence 
 from the White House to hold it in leash against 
 the combinations which were fast throttling 
 competition. For years it had been the bul 
 wark of privilege for the special interests. But 
 running through all of his utterances as Presi 
 dent, we find him warning Congress to hold 
 itself in check, lest it go too far. 
 
 Not only was the Cannon-controlled House 
 and the Aldrich-controlled Senate admonished 
 not to take his very general recommendations 
 "to assert the sovereignty of the national 
 government by affirmative action" too seriously, 
 but they were cautioned to beware of the 
 agitator and the demagogue: 
 
 "To try to deal with them (the corporations) 
 in an intemperate, destructive, or demagogic 
 
696 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 spirit would, in all probability, mean that 
 nothing whatever would be accomplished, and, 
 with absolute certainty that if anything were 
 accomplished, it would be of a harmful nature." 
 
 It is little less than grotesque to find the 
 President solicitous lest the veterans of privilege, 
 the seasoned bosses of Congress, be swept off 
 their feet by an " intemperate, destructive or 
 demagogic spirit." 
 
 Throughout his second administration, having 
 declared that he would not accept a third term, 
 year by year Roosevelt showed his real opposi 
 tion to the Sherman Anti -Trust Law. It became 
 plain that his failure to vigorously enforce the 
 statute against the competition-destroying trusts 
 was because he was opposed to the law. He 
 boldly asserted that "this is an age of combina 
 tion"; that it was "unfortunate that national 
 laws " on corporations "have sought to prohibit 
 what could not be effectively prohibited." 
 
 True enough, combinations "could not be 
 effectively prohibited" if a President was deter 
 mined that they should not be prohibited at all. 
 
 By 1907 he apparently believed that the 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 697 
 
 Sherman Law with which he had played 
 fast and loose for six years was sufficiently 
 discredited with the public to make its open 
 denunciation timely. And he flatly tells Con 
 gress that: 
 
 "It is profoundly immoral to put or keep 
 on the statute books a law, nominally in the 
 interest of public morality, that really puts a 
 premium on public immorality, by undertaking 
 to forbid honest men from doing what must 
 be done under jnodern business conditions, so 
 that the law itself provides that its own infrac 
 tion must be the condition precedent upon 
 business success." 
 
 Here is a frank declaration from Roosevelt 
 that it was immoral to put the Sherman Law 
 on the statute books that it is immoral to 
 keep it there. Why immoral? Because he 
 says, "it undertakes to forbid honest men from 
 doing what must be done under modern business 
 conditions." 
 
 What does the law forbid? It forbids com 
 binations organized to suppress competition and 
 create or attempt to create monopoly. That 
 is exactly what it does and all it does. It is that 
 
698 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 sort of business that Roosevelt characterized 
 as the business which "honest men" must do 
 under modern business conditions. That is the 
 contention of the Steel Trust, the Beef Trust, 
 the Elevator Trust. It is the trust argument 
 for the trust method. It is the only rule under 
 which the trust can do business, and the "mod 
 ern business" method under which no one but 
 the trust can do business. 
 
 Is it strange that with a President uttering 
 such doctrines in his messages the law was made 
 a dead letter and unlawful trusts and combina 
 tions suppressing competition and increasing 
 prices upon the consumer flourished under his 
 administration ? 
 
 Could United States district attorneys, who 
 wanted to continue in office, or federal judges 
 who might be willing to accept promotion at 
 the hands of this President, be expected to 
 respect or seek to uphold this law when that 
 President would say in a message to Congress 
 that: 
 
 "It is a public evil to have on the statute 
 books a law incapable of full enforcement, 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 699 
 
 because both judges and juries realize that its 
 full enforcement would destroy the business of 
 the country." 
 
 Thus it was that Roosevelt put the Sherman 
 Anti-Trust Law under the ban of executive 
 disapproval. It was the only federal statute for 
 the protection of the public against these 
 plundering combinations. His denunciation of 
 the law was an executive sanction to violate the I 
 law. It opened the floodgates for trust organi-J 
 zation, and upon Theodore Roosevelt, more 
 than any other man, must rest the responsibility 
 for the gravest problem which ever menaced 
 the industrial freedom of the American people. 
 
 He prosecuted on an average six cases a year 
 against a carefully selected list of these combina 
 tions. He went just far enough to give color 
 to the claim that he was upholding the law, 
 but not far enough seriously to injure those 
 prosecuted or deter in the slightest degree the 
 hundreds that were organizing every month 
 throughout his entire administration. 
 
 A study of the more important of these cases 
 against combinations under the Sherman Act> 
 
700 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 shows that the actions were so brought that the 
 government would, at best, win only a nominal 
 victory; and that the decree of the court would 
 be so limited by the allegation of the complaint 
 as to leave the defendant combination in a posi 
 tion, under its existing form or by an easy shift, 
 to continue its wrongdoing. 
 
 As stated above, when Roosevelt became 
 President there were 149 combinations and 
 trusts, including railways, the entire 149 having 
 a total stock and bond issue of only $3,784,000,- 
 000. When he left the White House there were 
 10,020 of these monster plants in combination, 
 including, with the combined railroads,, a total 
 capitalization amounting to the enormous sum 
 of $31,672,000,000 more than 70 per cent, of 
 which was water. The power of these combina 
 tions was so extensive and so completely did 
 they suppress competition, that they were able 
 to advance prices on transportation, and on 
 the products of the mines and factories to enable 
 them to pay dividends on this fictitious and 
 fraudulent over-capitalization. 
 
 The organization of these combinations in 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 701 
 
 transportation, mining, manufacturing, the con 
 trol of markets and also of money and credit, 
 was largely consummated during the seven years 
 that Roosevelt was President, and in direct viola 
 tion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Under the 
 terms of that law those engaging in unlawful 
 conspiracies were subject to punishment by 
 both fine and imprisonment. Moreover, under 
 its provisions, every such combination could 
 have been enjoined, and a violation of the in- 
 junctive order would have been punishable by 
 imprisonment for contempt. As a rule criminal 
 statutes simply define the offence and prescribe 
 the punishment. But the author of this law, 
 anticipating the powerful influence which such 
 aggregations of wealth might exert to suppress 
 prosecutions, embodied in the statute, in specific 
 terms, a provision making it the duty of the 
 Executive Department to enforce the law. If 
 President Roosevelt, at the beginning of his 
 administration, when there were but 149 trusts 
 and combinations, had used all the power of 
 this great government to enforce the anti 
 trust law; if he had summoned to Washington 
 
702 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 every United States district attorney and had 
 called in the Attorney General and his assistants 
 and had said to them: "There are 149 combi 
 nations already organized to suppress competi 
 tion and control the markets; if this law is ever 
 to be enforced, vigorous thoroughgoing action 
 on the part of the government must be no longer 
 delayed; these organizations have been formed 
 in violation of the federal statute; that statute 
 makes it the duty of the United States district 
 attorneys acting under the Attorney General 
 to destroy these criminal conspiracies against 
 the people; it is your duty to enforce this law; 
 it is my duty as President to see that you do 
 enforce it; unless you begin and prosecute 
 criminal actions against every one of these 
 unlawful conspiracies, I will revoke your com 
 missions, and appoint an Attorney General and 
 United States district attorneys who will enforce 
 the law." 
 
 Had the President of the United States at 
 that time, I say, taken this strong stand, there 
 would not have been a criminal conspiracy 
 violating this statute in existence at the end of 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 703 
 
 ninety days. It would have saved the people 
 of this country the payment of hundreds of 
 millions of dollars wrongfully taken from them 
 year after year in excessive transportation rates 
 and in extortionate prices which they have had 
 to pay for the necessaries of life. Had this been 
 done before these combined monopolies acquired 
 such absolute mastery, the people would not now 
 be confronted with this momentous question - 
 are these trusts and combinations stronger than 
 the government itself? Can the people free 
 themselves from this mighty power? Can the 
 unjust burden of fraudulent capitalization be 
 lifted from them? 
 
 The trusts and combinations, the railroads, 
 the steel trust, the coal trust, all are scheming 
 to secure some action by the government which 
 will legalize their proceedings and sanction their 
 fictitious capitalization. The situation is crit 
 ical. It may be expected from the attitude of 
 the Supreme Court as shown by the decisions 
 in the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases that any 
 act on the part of the executive or legislative 
 branch of government giving countenance to a 
 
704 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 trust or combination will be construed as an 
 approval of the thousands of millions of watered 
 stocks and bonds issued, and will fasten upon the 
 people for all time the speculative capitalization 
 of our public service and business corporations. 
 Roosevelt contends that there is no over 
 capitalization in the great railroad corporations 
 of the country. And as to other overcapitalized 
 combinations he contends when once they have 
 issued their fictitious capitalization and sold 
 their stocks and bonds to speculators, ever 
 ready to take chances on investments promising 
 enormous returns, regardless of the actual invest 
 ment underlying these fictitious securities, they 
 shall nevertheless be protected, and the people 
 forever compelled to pay extortionate prices in 
 order to furnish a return to such investors upon 
 these watered stocks and bonds. That this is 
 exactly his position is made clear from the fol 
 lowing quotation from his special message to 
 Congress on January 31, 1908: 
 
 "When once inflated capitalization has gone 
 upon the market and has become fixed in value, 
 its existence must be recognized. . . . The 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 705 
 
 usual result of such inflation is, therefore, to 
 impose upon the public an unnecessary but 
 everlasting tax." 
 
 The fact that the "inflated capitalization has 
 gone upon the market," the fact that a corpora 
 tion issues watered stocks and that those who 
 trade upon an innocent public buy the watered 
 stocks which can be made to pay large profits 
 only by maintaining an unlawful control of the 
 markets and exacting wrongful prices from the 
 people, according to Roosevelt s theory, gives 
 to these spurious securities "a fixed value" 
 which must be recognized, and that "such 
 inflation" is therefore an "everlasting tax." 
 It is Roosevelt s position that while he is very 
 sorry, nevertheless nothing can be done to 
 relieve the people from the "everlasting tax" 
 due to the billions of dollars of watered stocks 
 which have been wrongfully issued. The inno 
 cent public must groan under the burden of 
 paying prices high enough to make a profit to 
 the holders of such stocks upon a grossly in 
 flated capitalization. 
 
 It will be the impartial verdict of history that 
 
706 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 the executive could have saved the people from 
 the appalling conditions which confront us to 
 day, if all the power of this great government 
 had been put forth to enforce the Anti-Trust Law. 
 Five or six prosecutions a year, dragging along 
 in the courts at a snail s pace were little more 
 than notice to these business kings that they 
 might proceed to set up their authority against 
 the government and extend their dominion over 
 trade and transportation; that there was no real 
 danger of the law being so enforced as to do 
 much more than to affect the political situation 
 from time to time. 
 
 I could not forget in my review of Roosevelt s 
 record that while President he was a reactionary 
 on tariff revision. His constant criticism of the 
 Anti-Trust Law greatly encouraged trust growth 
 and trust activity, which was still further 
 stimulated by his course upon the tariff. Two 
 opportunities presented themselves to him to 
 relieve the people from trust oppression: one, 
 the enforcement of the Sherman Act; the other, 
 a radical reduction of the Dingley tariff duties. 
 
 I have already made it plain that from the 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 707 
 
 first he was opposed to enforcing the Anti-Trust 
 Law. Let us see how he behaved regarding the 
 tariff. 
 
 The Dingley law was enacted in 1897, with 
 the avowed purpose of excluding, in so far as 
 possible, foreign manufacturers from the Ameri 
 can market. With free competition between 
 American manufacturers, prices would have 
 been reduced to the lowest point that could be 
 fixed, still leaving to the American workman 
 fair protection. But with foreign competition 
 excluded by the high tariff wall, and domestic 
 competition destroyed by the formation of com- y 
 binations made possible under Roosevelt s treat 
 ment of trusts, prices rapidly advanced and 
 very early in Roosevelt s administration the 
 people feeling the burden, and no relief coming 
 to them through the rigid enforcement of the 
 Sherman law, began petitioning for tariff 
 revision. They had begun to understand that 
 if the tariff rates were lowered, foreign competi 
 tion would reduce the high prices fixed by the 
 trusts and combinations formed by our manu 
 facturers behind the tariff wall. They were 
 
708 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 quick to see that there was one direct, simple 
 way to reduce the high cost of living and curtail 
 the power of monopoly. And year after year 
 they pled for tariff revision. 
 
 Roosevelt was afraid of the tariff issue. 
 He had turned sharp corners on the tariff 
 question from the day he entered public life. 
 He was a member of the Free Trade Club of 
 New York from 1881 until after Elaine s nomi 
 nation upon a strong protective platform in 
 1884. He was opposed to Elaine. He was 
 opposed to a protective tariff. But following 
 his natural bent to do the expedient thing, he 
 resigned as a member of the Free Trade Club 
 after Elaine s nomination, and became an ardent 
 advocate of Elaine s election, a Elaine protec 
 tionist, a Elaine supporter. In his letter of resig 
 nation to the New York Free Trade Club, he said : 
 
 "It is impossible to combine the functions of 
 a guerilla chief with those of a colonel in the 
 regular army." 
 
 So, he decided to drop his convictions, and be 
 a regular colonel. 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 709 
 
 As the pressure for tariff revision grew stronger 
 and stronger, Roosevelt s first impulse was to 
 do the popular thing, and yield to the demand for 
 tariff revision. In one of his regular messages 
 to Congress, he inserted a paragraph announcing 
 that later in the session he would send to Con 
 gress a special message on tariff revision. 
 
 The President s regular messages are pre 
 pared long enough before their transmission to 
 Congress to admit of advance copies being sent 
 out by mail to the leading papers of the coun 
 try, to the end that they may be placed in type, 
 ready to be printed on the day of their delivery. 
 These advance copies are marked "Confiden 
 tial." They are released for publication on the 
 day they are read in Congress. 
 
 After this message was given to the press and 
 before it was released for printing, all news 
 papers receiving it were notified by wire to strike 
 out the paragraph promising a special message 
 on tariff revision. Whether the interests op 
 posed to tariff reduction learned through reac 
 tionary papers of this proposed special message 
 on tariff revision and bore down upon Roosevelt 
 
710 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 to withdraw the paragraph can only be inferred, 
 but that something happened to persuade Roose 
 velt to face about on tariff revision is certain, 
 for the paragraph promising revision disappeared 
 from the message before it was transmitted to 
 Congress and printed in the newspapers of the 
 country. It was another instance of the many 
 which mark Roosevelt s public career, when, con 
 fronted with the alternative of serving the 
 people or privilege, he found it more expedient 
 to serve privilege. 
 
 In his first message to Congress, Roosevelt 
 began by discouraging a general revision of the 
 tariff. He said: 
 
 "Nothing could be more unwise than to dis 
 turb the business interests of the country by 
 any general tariff change at this time." 
 
 But the prices were going higher and higher 
 and the people continued to clamor for relief. 
 It was during this period that the strife was so 
 great between the trusts holding on to the high 
 tariff and the people demanding tariff reduc 
 tion, that the term "standpatter" was coined to 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 711 
 
 describe those who would not yield to the demand 
 for tariff revision downward. And Roosevelt, 
 like Cannon in the House of Representatives 
 and Aldrich in the Senate, stood pat against the 
 public demand. 
 
 He admonished the public of the dangers 
 of tariff revision, and defended the standpat 
 policy of Congress, in an address at Minneapolis, 
 Minn., April 7, 1903, saying: 
 
 :< The tariff affects trusts only as it affects all 
 other interests. It makes all these interests, 
 large or small, profitable; and its benefits can 
 be taken from the large only under the penalty 
 of taking them from the small also." 
 
 It is true that legislation upon the tariff or any 
 other subject must come first from Congress 
 before the President is required to approve or 
 veto a measure. But it is also true that the 
 Constitution authorizes the President to recom 
 mend legislation to Congress. He may also 
 call an extra session for the consideration of 
 any legislation important enough to warrant it. 
 In all the world there is no position of power 
 comparable to that of the exalted office of Presi- 
 
712 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 dent of the United States, and a message from 
 him, setting forth the reasons why the public 
 interest requires legislation upon any subjects 
 for which there is pressing need, if ignored by 
 Congress, at once puts that body upon the de 
 fensive before the people. Did President Roose 
 velt in all the years of his administration, when 
 these tariff and trust made prices were wrong 
 fully taking hundreds of millions of dollars from 
 the consumers, send a ringing message to Con 
 gress recommending tariff revision downward? 
 Did he issue a proclamation calling an extra 
 session for tariff revision, thereby putting the 
 subject up to Congress in a way to compel ac 
 tion? He did neither. 
 
 He knew, as all men knew, that the combina 
 tions between manufacturers for the control of 
 prices, made tariff revision imperative. Further 
 more, he well understood that the Dingley rates 
 when enacted were so high as to be practically 
 prohibitory on nearly all of the necessaries of 
 life; that since the enactment of the Dingley 
 law, through invention, the use of electricity 
 and the adoption of modern methods, the cost of 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 713 
 
 producing the manufactured products had been \ 
 revolutionized; that the cost to the consumer j 
 could have been enormously reduced, still leav- 
 ing the manufacturer a larger profit than for 
 merly, and for that reason alone duties should 
 have been correspondingly lowered. 
 
 He could not altogether ignore the subject. 
 It was too pressing for that. But in his mes 
 sages he was most guarded in his occasional 
 brief references to the tariff, and you will search 
 the record in vain for any clear, strong declara 
 tion favoring a prompt tariff revision to lift 
 the unjust burdens from the people. He gave 
 Cannon and Aldrich the very support they 
 needed to maintain their standpat position, and 
 touched the subject now and then with a deft 
 ness that enabled him to escape, for the time, 
 being classed as a standpatter himself. 
 
 That he not only was a standpatter, backing 
 and cooperating with standpat leaders in legis 
 lation, but gave the great weight of presidential 
 influence to perpetuate their reactionary rule, 
 as late as the middle of his second term, is 
 proven out of his own mouth. 
 
714 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 In 1906, when Cannon was at the height of his 
 domination of legislation in the House of Rep 
 resentatives, appointing all the committees, 
 controlling with iron hand all the proceedings, 
 blocking tariff legislation, juggling with labor 
 legislation and with the bill for the publicity 
 of campaign expenses, palming off on the public 
 the Hepburn Railway Rate Bill, with its bushel 
 of chaff and only a grain or two of wheat, Roose 
 velt on the eighteenth day of August, 1906, wrote 
 from Oyster Bay to Honorable James E. Watson, 
 Member of Congress the same Watson who 
 was floor manager for the Taft organization in 
 the Chicago convention of 1912 to be used 
 as a campaign appeal for votes, a letter from 
 which I quote the following: 
 
 "With Mr. Cannon as Speaker, the House has 
 accomplished a literally phenomenal amount of 
 work. It has shown a courage, good sense, and 
 patriotism, such that it would be a real and 
 serious misfortune for the country to fail to 
 recognize. To change the leadership and or 
 ganization of the House at this time means to 
 bring confusion upon those who have been suc 
 cessfully engaged in the steady working out of a 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 715 
 
 great and comprehensive scheme for the better 
 ment of social, industrial, and civic conditions. 
 Such a change would substitute a purposeless 
 and violent and hurtful oscillation between the 
 positions of the extreme radical and the extreme 
 reactionary, for the present orderly progress 
 along the lines of a carefully thought out policy. 
 It is not too much to say that the cour 
 age of Congress within the last few years, and 
 the hearty agreement between the executive and 
 legislative departments of the nation, in con 
 ducting the needed action each within its own 
 sphere, have resulted with the nation for the 
 first time definitely entering upon the career of 
 proper performance of duty in these matters." 
 
 Finally, as he drew on toward the close of 
 his second term, the cumulative effect of years of 
 outcry for a reduction of tariff duties had brought 
 about a situation so tense and critical that Roose 
 velt felt compelled to deal more at length with the 
 subject, and to indicate that the pub lie might hope 
 for tariff revision in the course of time. In his 
 message of December 2, 1907, he said: 
 
 "It is probably well that every dozen years 
 or so the tariff laws should be carefully scru 
 tinized, so as to see that no excessive or improper 
 benefits are conferred thereby." 
 
716 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 But however much it might cost the consumer 
 every day, Roosevelt did not propose to disturb 
 his pleasant relations with the big manufactur 
 ing trusts. So he made it very plain that Con 
 gress ought not to undertake tariff revision under 
 his administration saying that it was a bad 
 time to revise the tariff on the eve of a presi 
 dential election. He had skilfully "staved it 
 off" through all of the years since he became 
 President, and he now had a "good excuse" to 
 offer for its further postponement for the re 
 maining thirteen months of his term. To this 
 end, he added: 
 
 "The subject cannot with wisdom be dealt 
 with in the year preceding a presidential elec 
 tion, because as a matter of fact experience has 
 conclusively shown that at such a time it is 
 impossible to get men to treat it from the stand 
 point of the public good. In my judgment the 
 wise time to deal with the matter is immediately 
 after such election." 
 
 And then, when the session of 1907 and 08 
 was so far advanced that no tariff revision could 
 possibly be undertaken, he transmitted a special 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 717 
 
 message to Congress on the tariff, in which he 
 said: 
 
 "The time has come when we should prepare 
 for a revision of the tariff." 
 
 The time had not come to revise, but only to 
 "prepare" to revise the tariff. 
 
 It was inevitable that tariff revision involving 
 tariff reductions such as were vital, especially 
 if it was to result in any relief to the consumer, 
 would incur the hostility of the powerful trusts 
 and combinations. And so, as in all the great 
 emergencies in Roosevelt s public life, we find 
 him carefully steering the middle course. He 
 was determined not to incur the animosity of 
 the standpatters by urging thorough tariff re 
 vision; yet he said just enough in its favor at 
 just the right time to leave with the people the 
 impression that he had not wholly ignored their 
 interests. 
 
 Nothing better illustrates the Roosevelt 
 method of dealing with public questions than 
 his course upon the tariff while he was President. 
 
 No review of Roosevelt s tariff record is com- 
 
718 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 plete which does not include his editorial com 
 ment on the Payne-Aldrich Law in the Outlook 
 of September 17, 1910, quoted in an earlier 
 chapter, in which he said: 
 
 "I think that the present tariff is better than 
 the last, and considerably better than the one 
 before the last." 
 
 To which must be added his declaration in 
 the New York State platform in 1910 which 
 strongly approved the Payne-Aldrich law, and 
 "enthusiastically endorsed the progressive and 
 statesmanlike leadership of William Howard 
 Taft." 
 
 One could not consider Roosevelt as the 
 proposed leader of the Progressive Republican 
 cause without remembering his relations with 
 Morgan, Gary, Frick, Perkins, Harriman, Hill, 
 Gould, Morton and others the very men who 
 were building up the greatest railroad and trust 
 combinations of the country. In such a crisis, 
 men calling themselves Progressives might ig 
 nore the damaging evidence of this connection, 
 but I could not contemplate Roosevelt as the 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 719 
 
 Progressive Republican standard bearer in the 
 face of these disclosures. Who could doubt the 
 meaning of this letter to E. H. Harrriman? 
 
 "WHITE HOUSE, 
 
 "WASHINGTON, October 14, 1904. 
 "My DEAR MR. HARRIMAN: 
 
 "A suggestion has come to me in a roundabout 
 way that you do not think it wise to come to see 
 me in these closing days of the campaign, but 
 that you are reluctant to refuse, inasmuch as I 
 have asked you. 
 
 "Now, my dear sir, you and I are practical 
 men and you are on the ground and know con 
 ditions better than I do. If you think there is 
 any danger of your visit to me causing trouble, 
 or if you think there is nothing special I should 
 be informed about, or no matter in which I 
 could give any aid, why, of course, give up the 
 visit for the time being; and then, a few weeks 
 hence, before I write my message, I shall get 
 you to come down to discuss certain government 
 matters not connected with the campaign. 
 
 "With great regard, sincerely yours, 
 
 "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." 
 
 Roosevelt made the claim that this letter was 
 written not with a view of soliciting Harriman s 
 aid for himself, but to secure Harriman s finan- 
 
720 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 cial assistance to save the New York Republican 
 state ticket in the election of 1904. On that 
 point he is overwhelmed by the letter which Har- 
 riman wrote on January 2, 1906, to Mr. Sidney 
 Webster of New York, more than a year after 
 ward. 
 
 From this letter it appears that the New York 
 State ticket was not only in danger, but that the 
 state was "doubtful as to Roosevelt himself"; 
 that Roosevelt invited Harriman to come to 
 Washington "to confer on the political condi 
 tions in New York State"; that Roosevelt told 
 Harriman that "the campaign could not be suc 
 cessfully carried on without sufficient money," 
 and asked him if he "would help them raise the 
 necessary funds, as the National Committee 
 under the control of Chairman Cortelyou had 
 utterly failed of obtaining them, and there was a 
 large amount due from them (the National 
 Committee) to the New York State committee." 
 Harriman explained to Roosevelt that the dif 
 ficulty in New York was mainly "caused by the 
 up-state leaders being unwilling to support 
 Depew for re-election to the United States 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 721 
 
 Senate; that if he (Depew) could be taken care 
 of in some other way, matters could be adjusted, 
 and the different contending elements in the 
 party brought into close alliance again." Roose 
 velt and Harriman talked over what could be 
 done for Depew, and finally Roosevelt agreed 
 that "if found necessary" he "would appoint 
 him Ambassador to Paris." 
 
 Harriman says in his letter to Webster: 
 
 "With full belief that he, the President, would 
 keep this agreement, I came back to New York, 
 sent for Treasurer Bliss (of the National Com 
 mittee) who told me I was their last hope and 
 that they had exhausted every other resource. 
 In his presence I called up an intimate friend of 
 Senator Depew, told him that it was necessary 
 in order to carry New York State that $200,000 
 should be raised at once and that if he would 
 help, I would subscribe $50,000. After a few 
 words over the telephone, the gentleman said 
 he would let me know, which he did probably 
 in three or four hours with the result that the 
 whole amount, including my subscription had 
 been raised. The checks were given to Secretary 
 Bliss who took them to Chairman Cortelyou. 
 If there were any among them of life insurance 
 companies or any other like organizations, of 
 course Cortelyou must have informed the Presi- 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 dent. . :. ; ; This amount enabled the New 
 York State committee to continue to work with 
 the result that at least 50,000 votes were turned 
 in the city of New York alone, making a differ 
 ence of 100,000 votes in the general result. 
 
 "Sometime in November 1904, on my way 
 from Virginia to New York, I stopped and had 
 a short talk with the President. He then told 
 me that he did not think it necessary to appoint 
 Depew as Ambassador to Paris, as agreed, in 
 fact favored him for the Senate. . . ." 
 
 It appears from Harriman s letter that Roose 
 velt preferred to have Depew in the United 
 States Senate rather than appoint him as Am 
 bassador to France. Depew w r as at that time a 
 director in seventy-four of the combinations 
 controlling the business of the country. For 
 forty years he had been the representative of 
 special interests. He was approaching the close 
 of his first term in the Senate. During that 
 time the record of his votes shows him to be 
 arrayed on every question in favor of special 
 privilege as against the public interest. And in 
 the face of this record, Roosevelt "favored him 
 for the Senate." 
 
 This correspondence placed Roosevelt in the 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 723 
 
 position of a solicitor of funds from Harriman 
 and others, representing powerful interests, 
 which became so dominant during Roosevelt s 
 administration, and it is clear that he sought 
 these funds, not only in aid of the state ticket but 
 because, as Harriman says, the state "was 
 doubtful as to Roosevelt himself"; and besides 
 the National Committee was in debt to the New 
 York State Central Committee. Harriman 
 raised this large fund of $200,000, contributing 
 besides $50,000 himself. 
 
 But this is not all. Roosevelt s letter of 
 October 14th to Harriman is very significant in 
 many ways. He says: "If you think there is 
 any danger of your visit to me causing trouble, 
 or if you think there is nothing special I should 
 be informed about, or no matter in which I could 
 give any aid, why, of course, give up the visit 
 for the time being." What was there between 
 these two men that led Candidate Roosevelt to 
 think there might be something " special/ which 
 Harriman should inform him about? What 
 "matter" was there in which he (Roosevelt) 
 might "give any aid"? And why did he want 
 
724 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 to see "a few weeks hence, before I write my 
 message," this great master of the highways of 
 commerce, who was also a potential force in the 
 consolidation of the great banking interests for 
 the control of money and credits then under way, 
 and one of the twenty -three directors of the 
 Standard Oil bank, which through various con 
 nections then represented more than three hun 
 dred and fifty banks, trust companies, railroads, 
 and industrial corporations with an aggregate 
 capitalization of more than $12,000,000,000? 
 
 In this connection I remembered that two 
 important suits brought by the Government 
 against the Central Pacific Railroad Company 
 et al., and the Southern Pacific Railroad Com 
 pany, et al., and pending when Harriman made 
 his $250,000 contribution were thereafter dis 
 missed in the early part of the year 1905 fol 
 lowing Roosevelt s election. Joseph H. Call 
 of California was the special counsel employed 
 to prosecute these cases. Mr. Roosevelt s 
 Attorney-General ordered them dismissed, not 
 through Mr. Call, the special counsel, or upon 
 his advice. Roosevelt s Attorney-General did 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 725 
 
 not appoint Call as special counsel to commence 
 the suit to dissolve the so-called Harriman mer 
 ger of these two and other lines. This suit was 
 based upon an investigation and report of the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission No. 943 en 
 titled, "In the Matter of Consolidations and 
 Combinations of Carriers," etc. In this report 
 the Commission states that these two lines, the 
 Central Pacific Railroad and the Southern Pacific 
 Railroad, were competing parallel lines across 
 the continent, and had been consolidated to 
 gether and operated through a holding com 
 pany called the Southern Pacific Company. 
 This suit was decided against the Government 
 by the Judges of the United States Circuit 
 Court, Eighth Circuit, June 25, 1911. An in 
 spection of this reported case will show that 
 for some mysterious reason the Government 
 did not join as defendants these two wrong 
 doers the Southern Pacific Railroad Company 
 and the Central Pacific Railroad Company. 
 And moreover, strange as it may seem, the bill 
 did not charge or allege that a combination to 
 monopolize commerce or restrain trade had been 
 
726 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 formed between those two great competing lines; 
 but, on the contrary, the bill admitted that 
 these two lines had been combined in the 
 Southern Pacific Company, the holding corpo 
 ration, and started out with that fact. The 
 result was that no decree could be entered dis 
 solving the combination, as it was not com 
 plained of, and because the parties were not 
 before the court a judgment was entered against 
 the Government. That case is now pending 
 upon appeal in the United States Supreme Court; 
 but whatever the outcome, it cannot result in 
 separating these two great lines, because that 
 relief is not sought by the bill. 
 
 In this suit brought by the Government, under 
 the Roosevelt administration, against Harriman 
 lines, why did his Attorney-General fail to make 
 the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and the 
 Central Pacific Railroad Company parties de 
 fendant in that action? Without charging that 
 the contributions made and secured by Mr. Har 
 riman, amounting to $250,000, were for the ex 
 press purpose of securing a dismissal of the pend 
 ing suits against the Southern Pacific and the 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 727 
 
 entering of what would appear to be a collusive 
 judgment against the Government in favor of the 
 combination, it would seem that Roosevelt or 
 some one for him ought to explain this whole 
 matter in connection with the contributions. 
 
 The proceedings in this case are strikingly 
 analogous to another brought by President 
 Roosevelt s direction on the twenty-eighth of 
 May, 1908, entitled, "The United States of 
 America, Complainant, vs. New York, New 
 Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, Boston 
 & Maine Railroad Company, and the Providence 
 Securities Company, Defendants." 
 
 The petition in this case was filed in the Cir 
 cuit Court of the United States for the District 
 of Massachusetts, and alleged an unlawful com 
 bination in restraint of trade, in violation of the 
 Sherman Anti -Trust Law. This case is famil 
 iarly known as the New Haven Merger case. 
 The basis of the Government s action was the 
 acquisition by the New Haven, of the Boston & 
 Maine steam railroad, and various New Eng 
 land trolley lines engaged for the most part in 
 conducting intra-state transportation, but which 
 
728 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 were so connected with one another as to consti 
 tute interstate lines, engaged in interstate trade 
 or commerce. 
 
 The weakness of the Government s case was 
 the difficulty which it would encounter in prov 
 ing that the trolley lines were engaged in inter 
 state trade to such an extent as to constitute 
 lines in competition with the New Haven in 
 interstate traffic. Not only had the New 
 Haven acquired the railroad and trolley lines 
 described in the petition, but practically every 
 steamship line engaged in interstate commerce, 
 competing against the New Haven s combined 
 steam and trolley lines, between New England 
 and New York. If the complaint had covered 
 the acquisition of the steamship lines by the 
 New Haven Company, through which it sup 
 pressed the water competition with its railroad 
 lines, the Government s case would have been 
 absolutely perfect. 
 
 Before this action was begun all New England 
 was in ferment over the consolidation, and 
 United States District Attorney French for the 
 District of Massachusetts, assisted by Louis D. 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 729 
 
 Brandeis, conducted an investigation which, 
 after conferences between the District Attorney, 
 Mr. Brandeis, President Roosevelt, and the 
 Department of Justice, resulted in the com 
 mencement of the action. 
 
 It was made plain to the President and his 
 Attorney-General that the acquisition of the 
 steamship lines by the New Haven constituted 
 a substantial foundation for the action; that 
 while the action might be maintained, if the 
 petition charged only the combination of the 
 railroad and trolley lines, the Government could 
 prove a perfectly plain violation of the Anti- 
 Trust Law if the proper allegations were incor 
 porated in the bill covering the merger of the 
 steamship lines as well. 
 
 Before the petition was signed and filed, 
 Morgan s representative, President Mellen of 
 the New Haven, who brought about the whole 
 combination, called upon President Roosevelt, 
 and persuaded him to have omitted from the bill 
 of complaint all reference to the acquisition of 
 the steamship lines. 
 
 Roosevelt s compliance with Mellen s request 
 
730 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 in this regard greatly weakened the case, mak 
 ing it much easier for Attorney-General Wicker- 
 sham to dismiss the Government s action, which 
 he did within three months after Roosevelt 
 retired, leaving all New England at the mercy 
 of this monster transportation monopoly. This 
 juggling with the Sherman Act resulted in traffic 
 conditions so desperately bad that the Inter 
 state Commerce Commission on its own motion 
 is, at the time of this writing, conducting an 
 investigation which discloses an intolerable situ 
 ation. 
 
 While this obliging concession made by Roose 
 velt to Morgan s man Mellen took away the 
 strongest prop sustaining the Government s 
 case, nevertheless if Attorney-General Wicker- 
 sham, in the performance of his plain duty, had 
 amended the Government s petition by proper 
 allegations setting out the facts regarding the 
 steamship lines, and zealously prosecuted in 
 stead of dismissing the merger case, he could 
 have fully protected the public interest. But 
 the fact remains that President Roosevelt, 
 through his concessions to President Mellen, 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 731 
 
 opened the way for Wickersham to permit the 
 New Haven merger to escape the penalties of 
 the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. 
 
 The Northern Securities case against the 
 Morgan-Hill railroad combination, seems to 
 have pointed the way. This case was brought 
 under the Sherman Law, by Roosevelt s orders 
 in 1902. As his record shows, he was not 
 especially fond of this law, and later openly 
 denounced it, saying its "enforcement would 
 destroy the business of the country." The pub 
 lic was demanding the prosecution of the rail 
 road and other combinations, and some show of 
 compliance with the public demand must be 
 made! 
 
 In the Northern Securities case the Govern 
 ment "won," but some way, the victory seemed 
 to be barren of results. The railroad combina 
 tion survived. The poor old Sherman Law was 
 of course "responsible." But let us see why: 
 In this case it was charged that the Northern 
 Pacific and Great Northern railroads, two 
 parallel continental lines, had combined with 
 the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad 
 
732 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 to destroy competition and to create a monopoly 
 in transportation. The Government s attorneys 
 in preparing the decree strangely omitted to 
 provide for the dissolution of the combination 
 and conspiracy between the competing and 
 parallel lines; and likewise omitted from the 
 decree the provision that those competing lines 
 be required thereafter to operate indepen 
 dently each through its own board of directors 
 and officers. 
 
 The effect of this abortive decree was to leave 
 the combination in full force and operation 
 through a holding company or trust agreement. 
 This defeated the very purpose for which the 
 action was brought and left the Government 
 nothing. Furthermore, the decision entered 
 in that case operated to increase the capital 
 stock of the monopoly one hundred million 
 dollars as a burden upon transporation. That 
 monopoly still exists, with Roosevelt s friend 
 Perkins as one of the directors. 
 
 In an earlier chapter I have suggested the 
 opposition encountered throughout my admin 
 istration as governor, to the enactment of the 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 733 
 
 direct primary, the railroad, and all other Pro 
 gressive legislation. In considering Roosevelt 
 as the candidate, and a suitable representative 
 of Progressive principles, I could not fail to 
 remember how he had thrown the weight of 
 presidential influence on the side of that opposi 
 tion throughout our long struggle in Wisconsin. 
 And it was long and bitter. One little word of 
 encouragement, publicly spoken by President 
 Roosevelt, one act of friendly recognition, how 
 ever slight, would have been as new wine to our 
 battered forces fighting in the gray dawn of this 
 Progressive movement. 
 
 But instead, President Roosevelt was then a 
 scoffer, ever ready with expressions of contempt 
 and warning, to be borne back to Wisconsin 
 and planted where they would be most hurtful. 
 And then came the full weight of the admin 
 istration s appointing power, as a backing to 
 the Standpat-Stalwart reactionary enemy we 
 were fighting, which Roosevelt reinforced with 
 an army of federal officeholders. The repre 
 sentatives of the railroads and combined 
 corporations were very strong, but the sup- 
 
734 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 port of the Roosevelt administration, meant 
 many more defeats for us and added many 
 a heart-breaking year to our long continued 
 contest. 
 
 Henry C. Payne was to Wisconsin what Mark 
 Hanna with whom he was intimately asso 
 ciated was to the country. Mark Hanna, 
 representing Big Business, wanted Payne in 
 McKinley s cabinet. I protested. McKinley 
 refused, saying as stated in an earlier chapter, 
 that he would not appoint a man in his cabinet 
 who was known to be a lobbyist. But imme 
 diately after MX <: , v - death, Roosevelt ap 
 pointed Payne Postmaster-General, placing 
 this adroit manipulator at the head of a 
 force of four thousand postmasters who 
 would take his orders and do his bidding in 
 the Wisconsin fight. In the appointment of 
 Payne, Roosevelt dealt the Progressive cause a 
 body blow. 
 
 Joseph W. Babcock, for many years a member 
 of Congress from the Third Wisconsin Dis 
 trict, was Chairman of the Congressional 
 Campaign Committee. It was his office to 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 735 
 
 "fry the fat" out of the manufacturers, brew 
 ers, railroads, and other special interests, 
 with which to aid in carrying on the cam 
 paigns, and thereafter, with Cannon and tw r o 
 or three other members of the inner circle, 
 it was Babcock s business to see to it that 
 no legislation detrimental to special inter 
 ests should be permitted to go through the 
 House. 
 
 Babcock s district was one of the most 
 progressive in Wisconsin. It had a normal 
 majority of eight to ten thousand. The Pro 
 gressives in his district, *T 1 t to overthrow 
 him. But with money and offices, the one 
 supplied by the business interests which he 
 served, and the other by the Roosevelt ad 
 ministration, with which he was a favorite, 
 he managed to hold fast to the control of 
 his district. Babcock was not only obnox 
 ious to the Progressive Republicans of his 
 district, but to those of the entire state as 
 well. He took charge of the Standpat cam 
 paign against my nomination in 1904. De 
 feated by the Progressive Republicans in that 
 
736 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 campaign, Babcock was one of the Standpat 
 leaders who bolted, organized a rump con 
 vention, placed a reactionary state ticket 
 in the field, and had himself, Spooner, 
 and two other reactionaries "elected" as 
 delegates to the Republican National Con 
 vention, which nominated Roosevelt in 1904. 
 These "delegates" contested the right of the 
 four regularly elected delegates-at-large of 
 which I was one to seats in that conven 
 tion; and without any color of right we were 
 thrown out and they were seated by the Na 
 tional Committee. The Supreme Court of Wis 
 consin subsequently decided that our convention 
 was the regular Republican Convention. 
 
 Babcock s record as a Standpat corporation- 
 serving Congressman was notorious. He was 
 opposed to everything which the Progressive 
 Republican administration in Wisconsin repre 
 sented, and he fought my renomination and that 
 of every member of our Progressive legislative 
 ticket in 1902. Following this campaign Roose 
 velt commended Babcock s campaign methods 
 and expressed gratification that they had been 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 737 
 
 able to work so harmoniously, in the following 
 personal letter: 
 
 "WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 "November 6, 1902. 
 "Personal. 
 "My DEAR BABCOCK: 
 
 "I feel that you and your colleagues, Mr. 
 Overstreet, Mr. Hull (both Standpatters), and 
 the others, are entitled to the hearty thanks of 
 every good Republican. I wish to express my 
 appreciation of all that you have done, my de 
 light at the way we have been able to work to 
 gether, and my astonishment at the accuracy of 
 your forecasts. ,, 
 
 "Faithfully yours, 
 
 "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." 
 
 In 1904 the Progressive Republicans of Bab- 
 cock s district vigorously contested his renom- 
 ination, but were unsuccessful. Babcock in 
 this campaign for renomination made effective 
 use of this letter, for which he must have had 
 Roosevelt s special permission, as it was a per 
 sonal letter from the President, and would not 
 otherwise have been given publicity. It was 
 printed in Wisconsin papers under the heading 
 "Endorsed by Roosevelt." He was nominated, 
 
738 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 and elected by the scant majority of 326 in a 
 district which he had carried two years before 
 by over eight thousand. TW T O years later Roose 
 velt s "influence" did not save him. 
 
 The foregoing is given as first hand evidence 
 that Babcock was the kind of Congressman that 
 Roosevelt wanted in control of legislation in the 
 House of Representatives while he was President. 
 
 In 1904 Roosevelt wrote a characteristic letter 
 to Chairman Cortelyou of the Republican Na 
 tional Committee, which he has since quoted as 
 evidence that he "took sides " with the Wisconsin 
 Progressives in that campaign. The letter in 
 part ran as follows: 
 
 "I think Babcock and his people should be 
 told that, especially in view of the decision of 
 the Supreme Court, there must not be any kind 
 of favoritism shown by us toward the Stal 
 warts. Under the decision of the Supreme 
 Court any weakening of the La Follette ticket 
 is a weakening of the national ticket." 
 
 Nineteen hundred and four was a presidential 
 year, and Roosevelt was a candidate himself. 
 "Any weakening of the La Follette ticket is a 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 739 
 
 weakening of the national ticket," he warns 
 Cortelyou. This letter was in the nature of a 
 reversal of orders to meet the changed condi 
 tions. We were no longer in the minority, 
 fighting the fight for principle; we were in the 
 majority, and the decision of the Supreme Court 
 had established our status. 
 
 Speaker Cannon agreed entirely with Roose 
 velt s estimate of Babcock s worth. In a letter 
 written in 1903 to Calvert Spensley, Mineral 
 Point, Wis., and published in connection with 
 Roosevelt s as above quoted, Cannon gives it 
 as his judgment that "his (Babcock s) continu 
 ance in public life is a matter of concern, not 
 only to his own district and state, but to the 
 whole country." To this he adds: ;< You will 
 notice from the organization of the House, the 
 responsibility having been placed upon myself 
 to make the committees, that Mr. Babcock suc 
 ceeds himself as a member of the Committee on 
 Ways and Means and as Chairman of the Com 
 mittee on the District of Columbia." 
 
 This surely was a tribute to Babcock s "reli 
 ability"! 
 
740 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 As further evidence of Roosevelt s aggres 
 sive hostility to the Progressive cause in Wis 
 consin, let the record tell the story : The holder 
 of every important federal office in the state was 
 a persistent lobbyist in close attendance upon 
 the legislature, session after session, using the 
 power and influence of his position under Roose 
 velt to defeat every Progressive measure. They 
 were bitter in their opposition to direct pri 
 maries, to the regulation of railway rates and 
 services, to railway taxation, to the reduction of 
 passenger rates, to the prohibition of rebating, 
 to a corrupt practices act, to pure food legis 
 lation in short, to the entire Progressive 
 program. Members of the legislature pledged 
 to support these measures, betrayed their con 
 stituents and were rewarded with lucrative 
 appointments by President Roosevelt in the 
 Treasury Department, the Interior Depart 
 ment, and the foreign service. Federal judge- 
 ships were bestowed upon Reactionaries 
 and Standpatters. Owners of newspapers 
 supporting the Progressive state adminis 
 tration faced about, became hostile, and 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 741 
 
 promptly received important appointments 
 abroad. 
 
 The opposition of the Roosevelt administra 
 tion to our Progressive movement in Wisconsin 
 was four years old. We had achieved success 
 despite it, and success can afford to forget. 
 I recalled it at this time only in reviewing 
 Roosevelt s official acts to determine the sound 
 ness and sincerity of his late professions as a 
 Progressive Republican. 
 
 And at a later date, in 1910, in my campaign 
 for reelection to the United States Senate when, 
 as George W. Perkins afterward admitted to 
 Charles R. Crane, "Wall Street was drained 
 dry" to secure my defeat, Roosevelt, to quote 
 horn- The Public, "skilfully managed to speak in 
 Wisconsin just after the primaries instead of 
 just before." It was the day following the 
 primaries. I had been nominated by more than 
 one hundred thousand majority. All the Pro 
 gressives of Wisconsin were rejoicing, and mes 
 sages of congratulation were coming from Pro 
 gressives of every state. Roosevelt spoke in 
 Milwaukee, and of this speech The Public says 
 
742 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 further: "And when he did speak in Wisconsin 
 after La Follette carried the primaries, why was 
 he so eloquently silent about La Follette?" 
 
 Furthermore, it is a fact in political history 
 that Progressive success in every Republican 
 \J state was secured despite the opposition of the 
 Roosevelt administration, during the seven 
 years that he was President. And during that 
 same period, Progressive Republican Senators 
 and Progressive Republican members of the 
 House of Representatives, as candidates to 
 succeed Standpatters, fought their way to the 
 American Congress against the active influence 
 of Roosevelt, put forth to retain reactionaries in 
 the public service, sometimes by verbal message, 
 sometimes by open letter. 
 
 I recite these facts only "as a part of the history 
 of the Progressive struggle, and the real attitude 
 of Roosevelt to it, and this too, but a few years 
 ago. Like the flash of a searchlight, they 
 reveal the true relation of his administration 
 to the most hardened types of interest-serving 
 reactionaries. Also they help us to understand 
 why, with outward manifestations of Progres- 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 743 
 
 sivism, he did so little for the Progressive move 
 ment nationally, and so much directly and so 
 much more indirectly for the great combinations 
 of capital during the years that he was President. 
 
 Even those who urged Roosevelt s candidacy 
 as the expedient thing, were forced to admit that 
 he was not really Progressive; that he shifted 
 his ground; qualified his positions; compro 
 mised important issues; that nobody knew from 
 his record that he would be found to-morrow 
 where he stood to-day. But they justified their 
 course by reasoning that the Progressive move 
 ment had become so powerful that, if elected, 
 public opinion would compel Roosevelt to be 
 Progressive. 
 
 My repeated experiences with him, while he 
 was President had, from time to time, been very 
 trying. Furthermore, his determination to be 
 a candidate for the presidency and to be the 
 Progressive Republican candidate had now, for 
 the first time, forced upon me the necessity of 
 making a thorough study of his record upon 
 the issues that were undermining Democracy, 
 the issues which had made the Progressive 
 
744 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 movement necessary to the preservation of rep 
 resentative government. 
 
 I had many times emphasized the good things 
 in Roosevelt s record. On several occasions, 
 when he professed a determination to aid in 
 some fundamentally important Progressive leg 
 islation, as for example, the valuation of rail 
 roads, I was much impressed, and led to believe 
 that after all he could be relied on, and to feel 
 that if this man with his forcefulness and popu 
 lar following were once thoroughly enlisted, no 
 one could be more serviceable to the Progressive 
 movement. At such times I gave free expres 
 sion to my feeling, and then he would disappoint 
 me by doing the expedient thing, yielding the 
 principle or shifting completely to the opposition. 
 
 It was one thing, however, to refer generously 
 to the best side of Roosevelt s administration; 
 it was quite another thing to consider Roose 
 velt as the Progressive candidate for the presi 
 dency for a third term, with all that it would 
 mean to the Progressive cause which, when once 
 committed to him, would become responsible 
 for, and bound by everything he said or did. 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 745 
 
 Into this man s hands it was proposed to commit 
 the future of a movement with great national 
 promise, at a critical period in its life that would 
 - as that leadership was loyal to principle or 
 served expediency establish it as a lasting 
 power for good, or render it merely a transitory 
 and time-serving thing of the hour. 
 
 Passing the consideration of the sincerity of 
 his convictions, upon his record alone I could 
 not, in good conscience, accept him as a Progres 
 sive candidate for the Republican presidential 
 nomination. His record gave no assurance of 
 profound conviction, or that he was equipped 
 with patience, determination, and experience to 
 deal with great social and economic problems 
 constructively in the public interest. 
 
 And lastly, his course in connection with my 
 own candidacy had destroyed my faith in his 
 integrity of character in any matter conflicting 
 with his self-interest. 
 
 It was plain to be seen, when Roosevelt 
 rushed into the contest, that he would divide 
 the Progressives and destroy all chance of Pro 
 gressive control of the Republican convention, 
 
746 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 as he finally did. But believing that his control 
 of any Progressive movement, independent or 
 otherwise, would be fatal to it, and with supreme 
 confidence that the leadership of the Republican 
 party would ultimately become Progressive as 
 the great body of its rank and file, I determined 
 to fight on for the preservation of the Progres 
 sive movement within the Republican party. 
 The reasons for so doing seemed to me to be 
 very strong. 
 
 What is known as the Progressive movement 
 had originated within the Republican party, the 
 rank and file of which is not now and never has 
 been subservient to privilege in any form. 
 
 While special interests had been increasing 
 their hold upon the administrative side of gov 
 ernment at Washington, Progressive Repub 
 licans in many staunch Republican states had 
 wrested the control from these interests, and en 
 acted statutes restoring representative govern 
 ment to the people of those states. The reforms 
 wrought out in Wisconsin, Minnesota, North 
 and South Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, 
 Washington, Oregon, and California were se- 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 747 
 
 cured under Republican leadership and through 
 Republican legislation. 
 
 This was a most encouraging situation. But 
 it was not all. In practically every state, ex 
 cept in the South, where there is no real Repub 
 lican organization, the most of the Republican 
 voters were struggling to overcome reaction 
 ary control. This takes time, because a well- 
 organized political machine is able to maintain 
 its rule for a considerable period after an over 
 whelming majority of the voters of the party 
 are in open revolt against it. But the Progres 
 sive element in the Republican party had, in 
 four years, made such strides toward mastery, j 
 that it is not too much to say that the national 
 convention of 1912 would have been a genuinely 
 Progressive convention, except for the fact that 
 Roosevelt forced his way into the campaign,! \ 
 divided and demoralized the Progressive forces, 
 swept aside the consideration of issues involving 
 Progressive principles, and converted the contest 
 with Taft into a campaign so bitterly personal 
 that by the time of the Chicago convention the 
 passions aroused upon both sides subordinated 
 
748 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 everything to a fierce scramble to seat delegates 
 by hook or crook, and secure the nomination. 
 It should not be forgotten that the differences that 
 split the Republican party in two were not based 
 on a platform of principles, but upon the ques 
 tion as to which one of two men should secure the 
 nomination. Fraud and bribery were charged 
 upon both sides. Tempers were at white heat. 
 Threats of personal violence were common. In 
 vestigation was baffled. There was no chance 
 for argument. The truth was discounted. Lies 
 were as good as facts. The Roosevelt men 
 charged that the Taft men were stealing the con 
 vention. The Taft men charged the Roosevelt 
 men with trying to steal the convention. 
 
 And upon this mad squabble for office between 
 Taft and Roosevelt under whose administrations 
 the Republican party had made the trust, tariff, 
 and special interest records for which it was most 
 criticised, Roosevelt proposed to destroy a sound 
 and vital Progressive movement which had al 
 ready gone far to nationalize itself within a great 
 and powerful organization. 
 
 Roosevelt s views respecting the establish- 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 749 
 
 merit of a third party, a little more than a 
 year before, were disclosed on the occasion 
 of his visit to Madison in the spring of 1911. 
 On his way from the executive residence, where 
 he had been entertained, to the assembly cham 
 ber, where he was to speak, he said to Gover 
 nor McGovern, Lieutenant-Governor Morris, 
 and Speaker Ingram: 
 
 "By the way, I wish I could have a chance 
 to talk with you boys about some matters in 
 which I am deeply interested. I am afraid La 
 Follette will start a new party. I do not want 
 to see that happen. I am disappointed with 
 Taft. But I do not want to see La Follette 
 start a new party and create division. You 
 fellows here are in a position to reach him. I 
 wish you would see him and do all you can to 
 prevent his taking that course." 
 
 In 1911 Roosevelt thought it would be a 
 great calamity to divide the Republican party. 
 It was a good party then. The only thing 
 that made it so bad as to deserve being riven 
 asunder was that it would not nominate him 
 for a third term in 
 

 750 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 Even though a political convention, through 
 passion, intrigue, or corruption, should fail to 
 represent the will of the millions who constitute 
 a political party, with inspiring traditions and 
 Progressive achievement in many states, and 
 real Progressive promise nationally, it seemed 
 very clear to me that such failure should not be 
 permitted to destroy that party. 
 
 A political party is not made to order. It is 
 the slow development of powerful forces working 
 in our social life. Sound ideas seize upon the 
 human mind. Opinions ripen into fixed con 
 victions. Masses of men are drawn together 
 by common belief and organized about clearly 
 defined principles. From time to time this 
 organized body expresses its purpose and names 
 candidates to represent its principles. The 
 millions cannot be assembled. Until direct 
 nominations and the rigid control of campaign 
 expenditures shall prevail they must seek to 
 express their will through the imperfect agencies 
 of congressional, state, and national conventions. 
 These agencies are not the party. They are 
 temporarily delegated to represent the millions 
 
Copyright, by Harris 6* Ewing 
 
 "Encouraged by Bryan s support of Progressive principles, many Demo 
 crats in Wisconsin and other states abandoned their party on state issues 
 and supported the Republican Progressive program." 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 751 
 
 who constitute the party. If recreant to their 
 trust the party may suffer the temporary defeat 
 of its purposes. But what abject folly to seek 
 upon such a basis to destroy a great political 
 party seven millions strong, with a clear Pro 
 gressive majority in its ranks, within which 
 there has been builded up a Progressive move 
 ment that promises to make the Republican 
 party the instrument through which government 
 shall be completely restored to the people. 
 
 I would in no degree disparage the good 
 work of Progressive Democrats. Encouraged 
 by Bryan s support of Progressive principles, 
 many Democrats in Wisconsin and other states 
 abandoned their party on state issues and sup 
 ported the Republican Progressive program.^ 
 And it was Bryan s superb leadership and cour 
 age at Baltimore which nominated a candidate 
 for the presidency who had made a progressive 
 record as governor of New Jersey. 
 
 In no partisan spirit, therefore, I have con 
 tended that the Progressive movement began 
 within the Republican party. It rapidly ad 
 vanced its control, shaping policies of state 
 
752 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 administrations, and stamping its impress upon 
 national legislation as a distinctly Progressive 
 Republican movement. And upon that fact in 
 recent political history I appealed to Progressive 
 Republicans everywhere to maintain their organ 
 ization within the Republican party. To main 
 tain such organization, blind allegiance to every 
 party nomination and to every party declara 
 tion is never essential. 
 
 The situation in Congress was supremely 
 important. Democrats had been in the majority 
 in the House of Representatives. That control 
 had been partisan rather than progressive. The 
 leaders in the House and the Democratic 
 majority on the principal committees had not 
 marked out a progressive course. Going just 
 far enough to placate those content to accept 
 form instead of substance, they had never gone 
 far enough to endanger special interest control 
 in legislation. 
 
 The crisis in the Republican party, with 
 greater reason than at any time since 1892, 
 had aroused hope of Democratic success nation 
 ally. In view of the present control of the 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 753 
 
 House and the attitude of the strong Democratic 
 leaders of the Senate, Democratic victory car 
 ried with it small assurance of progressive gains 
 in legislation. Interest control in Congress may 
 change its party label and still be powerful in de 
 termining the character of the legislation enacted. 
 
 It was time for Progressive Republicans to act 
 with the greatest deliberation. 
 
 The course pursued by Roosevelt and Taft 
 in the campaign and at the Chicago convention 
 destroyed all hope of a Progressive Republican 
 victory in the presidential contest for 1912. But 
 there remained a most important service to be 
 rendered by the strong Progressive element in 
 the Republican party. In a large number of 
 Republican states there had been enacted defin 
 itely related Progressive statutes based on 
 scientific research which had reconstructed state 
 government, vitalizing it with human interest. 
 There were legislatures to elect, to carry forward 
 this and other creative work. There were Pro 
 gressive Republican governors and state officers 
 to elect, to administer and safeguard these 
 statutes and lead the way along advancing lines. 
 
754 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 In Congress the Progressive Republicans in 
 the Senate and House had furnished the only 
 consistent Progressive program of legislation. 
 The bills offered and pressed for action had 
 shown real constructive statesmanship. This 
 splendid body of fighting Progressive Republi 
 cans forced Aldrichism and Cannonism to the 
 last ditch, exposed the iniquities of the Tariff 
 bill of 1909, tore to pieces the pernicious Railroad 
 bill of 1910, recasting it into a measure in the 
 public interest, and, acting in unison, gave Pro^ 
 gressive Republican -principles a distinct charac 
 ter of commanding importance throughout the 
 country. 
 
 After the disaster in 1912 to the Progressive 
 Republican campaign, occasioned by the deter 
 mination of Roosevelt to be nominated for a 
 third term, or destroy all chance of making the 
 Republican party nationally ["Progressive, the 
 restoration of the Progressive group in the 
 Senate, as shown by its action on the wool bill 
 and other tariff measures in the closing days 
 of the Second Session of the Sixty -second Con 
 gress, attested the validity of its principles. It 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 755 
 
 required only the occasion and the issue to 
 demonstrate the fundamental integrity of the 
 Progressive movement within the Republican 
 party. 
 
 It was my contention that this great construc 
 tive work, in state and national government, the 
 result of years of patient and intelligent effort 
 within the Republican party, should not be im 
 perilled; that the election of Progressive Repub 
 lican governors, legislators, Congressmen, and < 
 United States Senators should not be jeopard 
 ized to make a new party for Roosevelt, who in 
 no sense represented the high ideals of those who 
 made the Republican party Progressive, in many 
 states against his opposition, and who nation 
 alized Progressive policies in his absence from 
 the country. 
 
 With Roosevelt and his party, it was solely a 
 question of personal ascendency and control. 
 This was shown by the course taken in various 
 states where true Progressive Republicans were 
 candidates for Congress and for the United 
 States Senate. Unless they followed him and his 
 party, Roosevelt threatened every Progressive 
 
756 AS A CANDlDAiU 
 
 Republican United States Senator and Congress 
 man with defeat, by bringing out candidates 
 against them in their districts and states. Like 
 wise, he promised no opposition to the Deneens. 
 the Cannons, and the strongest Standpat 
 types in the Republican party, if they would 
 only declare for him, instead of Taft. To 
 win personally, for the hour, was all in all to 
 Roosevelt. 
 
 On him and those who made this war upon 
 Republican Progressive achievement and Repub 
 lican Progressive candidates rests a grave re 
 sponsibility. 
 
 It was clear to me that the highest obligation 
 of real Progressive Republicans in every state 
 was to maintain their organization and continue 
 o fight within the lines of the Republican 
 party for Progressive principles, policies, and 
 candidates. I felt that no aid or encouragement 
 should be given to a third party plan to divide 
 the Progressive vote and destroy the Progressive 
 Republican movement; that no break should be 
 permitted in the Progressive ranks which would 
 endanger the election of any true Progressive 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 757 
 
 Republican anywhere; that every effort should 
 be put forth to increase the number of 
 thorough-going Progressive Republicans in 
 the United States Senate and the House of 
 Representatives; that the election of a strong 
 body of Progressive Republicans in both branches 
 of Congress might enable them to hold the 
 balance of power in legislation; that that balance 
 would serve as a check upon any President, if 
 reactionary, and if Progressive, would aid him 
 to wring from reactionary opposition in both 
 houses, legislation to protect public interest. 
 
 There was every reason for conserving the 
 Progressive Republican organization. 
 
 Years before in Wisconsin we had precisely 
 the same condition the Republican party, with 
 the mass of its membership ready for Progres 
 sive legislation, and a leadership bound to the 
 service of special interests. We forced the re 
 tirement of the reactionary leaders, and made 
 the Republican party the best possible instru 
 ment for achieving representative government. 
 
 I believed we could do nationally with the 
 Republican party what we did with it in Wis- 
 
758 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 consin. I still believe so. Within a few years, 
 such progress has been made in this direction as 
 to justify that belief. It is my conviction that 
 this will sooner bring government back to the 
 
 ) people than will be done through the medium 
 
 i of a new and untried party organization. This 
 was most emphatically true when that new 
 party had for its leader the man, under whose 
 administrations, the Republican party made 
 much of the record for which it is most severely 
 condemned. 
 
 For these reasons I shall remain in the Repub- 
 2 lican party at jthis time. I shall continue to 
 denounce its representatives when they betray 
 public interest. I shall refuse to be bound by its 
 action whenever it fails in its duty to the country, 
 and I shall do all in my power to restore it to 
 the high place in the service and confidence and 
 affection of the American people, which it held 
 when it was the party of Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 , If it shall fail to become thoroughly Progressive 
 , I as a national party, I shall then stand ready 
 
 \to take such further action as shall seem to 
 serve best the interests of the country. 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 759 
 
 Through the pages of this autobiography, I 
 have dealt with certain governmental problems, 
 state and national, upon which, during the past 
 twenty-five years, I have studied and reflected. 
 I have touched on these issues only as they were 
 related to my experience, it having been no part 
 of my plan to treat them exhaustively. But 
 my own story could not have been complete 
 without a discussion incidentally, of certain 
 questions of public concern which, from early 
 manhood, have been a part of my daily thinking. 
 With maturer years, the fundamental principles 
 of democracy involved have worked themselves 
 profoundly into my convictions, and the 
 struggle could not have been sustained, year after 
 year, often in the face of disappointment and 
 defeat, had I felt less deeply the eternal justice 
 of the end sought to be attained. 
 
 I have never assumed to say that I had worked 
 out to the last conclusion the solution of all 
 these complex problems. But years of plodding 
 investigation convinced me of the economic 
 soundness of my basis, from which I have 
 been content to take the next forward step - 
 
760 AS A CANDIDATE 
 
 always sure of my ground, and sure of my 
 direction. 
 
 With the changing phases of a twenty-five- 
 year contest I have been more and more im 
 pressed with the deep underlying singleness of 
 the issue. It is not railroad regulation. It 
 is not the tariff, or conservation, or the currency. 
 It is not the trusts. These and other questions 
 are but manifestations of one great struggle. 
 The supreme issue, involving all the others, is 
 the encroachment of the powerful few upon the 
 rights of the many. This mighty power has come 
 between the people and their government. Can 
 we free ourselves from this control? Can repre 
 sentative government be restored? Shall we, 
 with statesmanship and constructive legislation, 
 meet these problems, or shall we pass them on, 
 with all the possibilities of conflict and chaos, 
 to future generations? 
 
 There never was a higher call to greater 
 service than in this protracted fight for social 
 justice. I believe, with increasing depth of con 
 viction, that we will, in our day, meet our re 
 sponsibility with fearlessness and faith; that 
 
AS A CANDIDATE 761 
 
 we will reclaim and preserve for our children, 
 not only the form but the spirit of our free in 
 stitutions. And in our children must we rest 
 our hope for the ultimate democracy. 
 
NOTE: The most important question now 
 before the American people is that of the com 
 bined capital represented in trusts, in consoli 
 dated railroads, and in the consolidated banking 
 interests, controlling money and credit. I ap 
 pend herewith an address dealing with the history 
 of the growth of this power and some suggestions 
 for meeting its recognized evils: 
 
 SPEECH OF 
 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 
 
 Delivered at the 
 
 ANNUAL BANQUET OF THE PERIODICAL 
 PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION 
 
 Philadelphia, February 2, 1912. 
 
 Mr. Toastmaster, President Curtis, and Gentle 
 men of the Periodical Publishers Association ^^ 
 
 The great issue before the American people 
 to-day is the control of their own government. 
 In the midst of political struggle, it is not easy 
 to see the historical relations of the present Pro 
 gressive movement. But it represents a con- 
 
 762 
 
APPENDIX 763 
 
 flict as old as the history of man the fight to 
 maintain human liberty, the rights of all the 
 people. 
 
 A mighty power has been builded up in this 
 country in recent years, so strong, yet so insidious 
 and far-reaching in its influence, that men are 
 gravely inquiring whether its iron grip on govern 
 ment and business can ever be broken. Again 
 and again it has proved strong enough to nomi 
 nate the candidates of both political parties. 
 It rules in the organization of legislative bodies, 
 state and national, and of the committees which 
 frame legislation. Its influence is felt in cabi 
 nets and in the policies of administrations, and 
 is clearly seen in the appointment of prosecuting 
 officers and the selection of. judges upon the 
 Bench. 
 
 In business it has crippled or destroyed com 
 petition. It has stifled individual initiative. 
 It has fixed limitations in the field of production. 
 It makes prices and imposes its burdens upon 
 the consuming public at will. 
 
 In transportation, after a prolonged struggle 
 for government control, it is, with only slight 
 check upon its great power, still master of the 
 highways of commerce. 
 
 In finance its power is unlimited. In large 
 affairs it gives or withholds credit, and from 
 time to time contracts or inflates the volume of 
 the money required for the transaction of the 
 business of the country, regardless of everything 
 excepting its own profits. 
 
764 APPENDIX 
 
 It has acquired vast areas of the public do 
 main, and is rapidly monopolizing the natural 
 resources timber, iron, coal, oil. 
 
 And this THING has grown up in a country 
 where, under the Constitution and the law, the 
 citizen is sovereign! 
 
 The related events which led to this cen 
 tralized control are essential to a clear under 
 standing of the real danger the magnitude of 
 this danger now menacing the very existence of 
 every independent concern remaining in the 
 field of business enterprise. 
 
 The First Period The Individual and the 
 Partnership. - - For nearly a century after Jef- 
 j ferson declared for a government of "equal 
 rights for all, and special privileges for none," 
 the business of the country was conducted by 
 individuals and partnerships. During this first 
 period business methods were simple, its pro 
 portions modest, and there was little call for 
 larger capital than could be readily furnished by 
 the individual or, in the most extreme cases, a 
 partnership of fair size. 
 
 From the beginning, when men bartered their 
 
 products in exchange, down through all the ages, 
 
 the business of the world had been conducted 
 
 i under the natural laws of trade demand, 
 
 \ supply, competition. Like all natural laws, 
 
 they were fair and impartial; they favored 
 
 neither the producer nor the consumer. They 
 
 had ruled the market and made the prices when 
 
 the individual and the partnership conducted 
 
APPENDIX 765 
 
 substantially all commercial enterprises during 
 the first period of our business life. 
 
 But as the country developed, as the popu 
 lation poured over the Alleghenies, occupied 
 the Mississippi Valley, pushed on to the Rocky 
 Mountains and down the western slope to Cali 
 fornia, discovering the boundless wealth of our 
 natural resources - - the fields and forests, the 
 mountains of iron and coal and precious metals, 
 there was a pressing call on every hand for larger 
 capital beyond the power of any individual or 
 any partnership to supply. We had outgrown 
 the simple methods; there was a demand for a 
 new business device strong enough to unlock the 
 treasure house of the new world. 
 
 The Second Period --The Private Corporation. 
 
 - The modern corporation was invented to meet 
 that demand, and general statutes for incorpora 
 tion were soon upon the statute books of every 
 state. Their adoption marked the beginning of 
 the second period of our business life. It was 
 the best machine ever invented for the purpose; 
 simple in organization, effective in operation. 
 
 A hundred, a thousand, any number of men 
 could associate their capital, and employing the 
 representative principle upon which our country 
 was based, vote for and elect a president, a 
 general manager, a board of directors, a body of 
 men, no larger than an ordinary partnership, 
 and clothe them with power to conduct the busi 
 ness to the success of which the aggregate capi 
 tal was contributed. 
 
766 APPENDIX 
 
 Men no longer stood baffled by the magni 
 tude of any undertaking, but promptly enlisted 
 an army of contributors, large or small, massed 
 together the required capital and under the direc 
 tion of the officers and directors of the corpora 
 tion, a small executive body, seized upon these 
 waiting opportunities, and this second period 
 marked a material development, surpassing 
 anything in the world s history. It was not the 
 era of greatest individual fortune building, but 
 it was the period of greatest general prosperity. 
 And why? 
 
 The natural laws of trade demand, supply 
 p and competition still ruled the market and 
 made the prices in the second period of our busi 
 ness life. The private corporation, in a large 
 measure, supplanted the individual, and the 
 partnership in mining, manufacturing and large 
 commercial enterprises, but each corporation 
 competed with every other in the same line of 
 business. Production was larger, development 
 more rpaid, but, under the free play of com 
 petition, the resulting prosperity was fairly 
 distributed between the producer and the 
 consumer, the seller and the buyer, because 
 profits and prices were reasonable. 
 
 Big capital behind the private corporations 
 drove business at a pace and upon a scale never 
 before witnessed. Competition was at once the 
 spur to the highest efficiency and the check 
 against waste and abuse of power. 
 
 In this period of our industrial and commer- 
 
APPENDIX 767 
 
 cial progress, America amazed and alarmed our 
 business rivals of the old world. We were soon 
 foremost among the nations of the earth in 
 agriculture, in mines and mining, in manufactures 
 and in commerce as well. 
 
 The American market became the greatest 
 thing in all the material world. Its control 
 became the one thing coveted. 
 
 The Third Period The Combination of Cor 
 porations. The evil hour was come upon us. 
 Daring, unscrupulous men plotted in violation of 
 the common law, the criminal statutes and 
 against public right to become masters of that 
 market and take what toll they pleased. To 
 do this thing it was necessary to set aside, 
 abrogate, nullify the natural laws of trade that 
 had ruled in business for centuries. Production 
 was to be limited, competition stifled and prices 
 arbitrarily fixed by selfish decree. And thus 
 we entered upon the third period of our business 
 and commercial life the period of a combina 
 tion of the corporations under a single control 
 in each line of business. It was not an evolu 
 tion; it was a revolution. 
 
 And yet certain economists set it down in the 
 literature of the day that the Supreme Ruler of 
 the universe reserved in His great plan a divinely 
 appointed place and time for a Rockefeller, a 
 Morgan, a Carnegie, a Baer, to evolve this new 
 law, which should enable them to appropriate 
 the wealth of the country and Mexicanize its 
 business and its people. 
 
768 APPENDIX 
 
 The combination became supreme in each 
 important line, controlling the markets for the 
 raw material and the finished product, largely 
 dictating the price of everything we sell and the 
 price of everything we buy - - beef, sugar, 
 woolens, cottons, coal, oil, copper, zinc, iron, steel, 
 agricultural implements, hardware, gas, elec 
 tric light, food supplies. 
 
 Monopoly acquired dominion everywhere. 
 
 It brought with it the inevitable results of 
 monopoly extortionate prices, inferior prod 
 ucts. We soon found shoddy in everything 
 we wear, and adulteration in everything we eat. 
 
 Did these masters of business stop there? 
 By no means! " Increase of appetite had grown 
 by what it fed on." The floodgates of fictitious 
 capitalization were thrown wide open. These 
 organizations of combinations overcapitalized 
 for a double purpose. The issue of bonds and 
 stocks in excess of investment covered up the 
 exaction of their immense profits, and likewise 
 offered an unlimited field for promotion and 
 speculation. 
 
 The establishment of this third period was the 
 beginning of rapidly advancing prices, increasing 
 the cost of living upon people of average earning 
 power until the burden is greater than they can 
 bear. 
 
 The Fourth Period -- The Combination of 
 Combinations. - - The strife for more money, 
 more power more power, more money 
 swept everything before it. 
 
APPENDIX 769 
 
 It remained only to bring together into a com 
 munity of interest or ownership the great com 
 binations which controlled, each in its own field 
 in short, to combine these combinations. 
 
 One needs but to study the directory of direc 
 tories of the great business concerns of the 
 country to determine the extent to which this 
 combination of combinations has been success 
 fully accomplished, thus carrying us over into 
 the fourth period of our industrial and com 
 mercial life - the period of complete industrial 
 and commercial servitude in which we now 
 unhappily find ourselves. And this supreme 
 control of the business of the country is the 
 triumph of men who have at every step defied 
 public opinion, the common law and criminal 
 statutes. 
 
 This condition is intolerable. It is hostile 
 to every principle of democracy. If maintained 
 it is the end of democracy. We may preserve 
 the form of our representative government and 
 lose the soul, the spirit of our free institutions. 
 
 John Sherman, the broadest, clearest vis- 
 ioned statesman of his time, saw this danger 
 away in. advance and wisely sought to fortify 
 the government to meet and destroy it. 
 
 Of this mighty power he said : 
 
 "It is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form 
 of government. If anything is wrong, this is w T rong. If 
 we will not endure a king as a political power, we should 
 not endure a king over the production, transportation, and 
 sale of any of the necessities of life. If we would not sub- 
 

 770 APPENDIX 
 
 mit to an emperor, we should not submit to an autocrat 
 of trade with power to prevent competition and to fix the 
 price of any commodity. * * * The remedy should be 
 swift and sure." 
 
 Sherman well understood that this govern 
 ment could not exist as a free government with 
 any man or group of men invested with the 
 kingly prerogative over the production, trans 
 portation, and sale of any of the necessaries of 
 life. No free people in history very long main 
 tained their political freedom after having once 
 surrendered their industrial and commercial 
 freedom. 
 
 The Sherman law placed in the hands of the 
 executive department of this government the 
 most perfect weapon which the ingenuity of 
 man could forge for the protection of the people 
 against the power of monopoly. 
 
 It will be the impartial verdict of history that 
 the executive department of government could 
 have saved the people from the appalling condi 
 tions which confront us to-day, if all the power of 
 this great government had been put forth to 
 enforce the anti-trust law. Two or three score 
 of prosecutions dragging along in the courts at a 
 snail s pace, from administration to adminis 
 tration, was little more than notice to these 
 business kings that they might proceed to set 
 up their authority against the government and 
 extend their dominion over trade and trans 
 portation; that there was no real dapger of the 
 law being so enforced as to do muchlmore than 
 
APPENDIX 771 
 
 to affect the political situation from time to 
 time. 
 
 That this was accepted as the government s 
 position by the interests can now be made very 
 plain. 
 
 The organization of combinations began 
 quite actively early in 1898. The high tariff 
 rates of the Dingley law encouraged combina 
 tion and aided in its ultimate purpose. 
 ! Between January 1, 1898, and January 1,1900, 
 149 trusts were formed to suppress competition 
 | and control prices. These combinations were 
 /capitalized for $3,784,000,000. The next four 
 / years were years of enormous trust growth. 
 
 From January 1, 1900, to January 1, 1904, 
 k taking account of only the more important trusts, 
 \ 8,664 great plants were combined, with a total 
 L-capitalization of $20,379,162,511. 
 
 Prices were mounting higher and higher. The 
 people were crying aloud in protest, but protest 
 and denunciation caused no fear on the part of 
 the trust makers, so long as the government was 
 actually prosecuting less than an average of 
 seven cases a year. 
 
 (i Mark what followed: From January 1, 1904, 
 /to January 1, 1908, trust consolidation made 
 
 (mighty strides, and the total capitalization 
 reached the astounding sum of $31,672,160,754. 
 In these four years the capitalization increased 
 <inpre than 55 per cent. 
 
 The Centralization of Railroad Control. In 
 the meantime what were the powers doing in 
 
772 APPENDIX 
 
 the great field of transportation? A swift back 
 ward glance reveals the fact that the same sys 
 tem of consolidation, centralized control and 
 suppressed competition had been forced through 
 in violation of law and public right. 
 
 The vital interests of organized society in 
 commerce and the public nature of transporta 
 tion impose upon government the duty to estab 
 lish and maintain control over common carriers. 
 
 To discharge this obligation the government 
 must exact from the common carrier: 
 
 (1) Reasonable rates, (2) impartial rates, 
 (3) adequate and impartial services. 
 
 The public is interested in adequate and im 
 partial services. The shipper is especially in 
 terested in equal and impartial rates. The 
 consumer is especially interested in reasonable 
 rates. 
 
 For forty years after railroads were estab 
 lished there was no attempt to invoke govern 
 mental control. The public depended solely 
 upon competition between railroads for the 
 protection of public interests. 
 
 Finally it learned the elementary lesson that 
 the railroad is a natural monopoly; that there 
 i can be no competition excepting at common 
 points, and that at common points the railroads 
 were destroying all competition by pooling 
 agreements. 
 
 Then came the demand in 1870 for govern 
 mental control in order to secure reasonable 
 rates. It originated in the upper Mississippi 
 
APPENDIX 773 
 
 Valley in Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and 
 Illinois, for a control of rates within the state. 
 
 It spread east and west and became a 
 national movement for controlling interstate 
 commerce. 
 
 The supreme courts of the middle western 
 states sustained the state legislation. The 
 Supreme Court of the United States sustained 
 the state courts, and the power of the state 
 and federal governments to control and fix rea 
 sonable transportation rates, each in its own 
 sphere, was adjudicated as a public right thirty- 
 eight years ago. 
 
 For a generation of time since those decisions 
 the people have struggled to secure an interstate 
 commerce law which would establish and enforce 
 reasonable rates. That was the relief which the 
 consumer, the great body of the people, demanded 
 reasonable rates. 
 
 The shippers have no interest in reasonable 
 rates. They do not pay the freight. The con 
 sumer pays the freight. But the shipper is at 
 a disadvantage in supplying his trade unless he 
 has rates relatively equal to those given to other 
 shippers engaged in the same business. 
 
 Shippers could easily present concrete cases 
 of injustice. They could readily organize and 
 appear before committees and make their repre 
 sentatives feel their power. 
 
 Not so with the consumer, who, in the end, pays 
 all the freight, as a part of the purchase price of 
 everything he buys. He cannot identify the 
 
774 APPENDIX 
 
 freight charge, because it is a part of the price 
 he pays when he purchases supplies. However 
 small the item, in the aggregate it is important 
 to him. He cannot maintain a lobby. If his 
 United States Senators and his Congressmen do 
 not represent him, he is helpless. 
 
 What is the net result of thirty-eight years 
 struggle with the railroads? Congress enacted 
 the interstate commerce law of 1887; the Elkins 
 law of 1903; the Hepburn law of 1906; and the 
 recent law of 1910. 
 
 Out of all this legislation the shippers have 
 been able to secure a partial enforcement of their 
 contention for an equalization of rates. 
 
 The consumers have lost in their long fight 
 for reasonable rates. 
 
 After all these years it is not to-day within 
 the power of the interstate commerce commis 
 sion to take the first step to ascertain a reason 
 able rate. There is a vast difference between 
 equal rates and reasonable rates. 
 
 The consumers are no nearer to securing 
 reasonable rates than they were thirty-eight 
 years ago. 
 
 Ninety million people are to-day paying 
 annually to the railroads $2,500,000,000 for 
 transportation a sum greater than the total 
 cost of maintaining the federal government, 
 the state governments, the county governments, 
 and all the municipal governments of the entire 
 country. 
 / The power of the railroads over Congress 
 
APPENDIX 775 
 
 has been well-nigh supreme. That their in 
 fluence was strong enough to defeat legislation 
 is emphatically asserted by a prominent United 
 States Senator, the writer of a letter which I 
 quote: 
 
 "UNITED STATES SENATE, 
 "WASHINGTON, D. C., Feb. 9, 1903. 
 "DEAR SIR: 
 
 " Yours of the 19th ult. came duly to hand. It has hap 
 pened as I feared: The interstate commerce committee 
 will not report the measure giving power to the interstate 
 commerce commission to fix rates. It is expecting too 
 much from human nature that Senators whose every asso 
 ciation is with the great railroad corporations, and whose 
 political lives largely depend upon them, should in good 
 faith approve a measure that would to an extent make the 
 railroads a servant of the people, and to be subject to the 
 decision of the commission when a question of rates is 
 raised. The Senate committee is by a decided majority 
 men who bear these relations to the railroads. I hope 
 that some time in the future the committee will be so con 
 stituted that legislation of the character mentioned will 
 issue from it, but I am afraid you and I will be many years 
 older when that occurs. Yours truly, 
 
 The control of transportation was achieved 
 through combination. Less than twenty years 
 ago the railroads, overriding the law, secretly 
 combined to suppress every trace of competition 
 and to advance rates. 
 
 By 1897, 922 railroad corporations, with 250 
 allied railroads, having altogether 178,307 miles 
 of road, constituting 95 per cent, of the vital 
 
776 APPENDIX 
 
 railway mileage of the country, were organized 
 into six systems, known as the Vanderbilt, 
 Pennsylvania, Morgan-Hill, Gould-Rockefeller, 
 Moore-Leeds and Harriman-Kuhn-Loeb groups 
 and their allies. 
 
 Since that time further concentration and 
 control has increased the mileage of these groups 
 to more than 200,000 miles of road. These 
 groups are controlled by eight men, and, as 
 stated by John Moody, in 1904, "the superior 
 dominating influence of Mr. Rockefeller and 
 Mr. Morgan is felt in a greater or less degree in 
 all of the groups." 
 
 But an even greater danger was in waiting, 
 - the control of capital and credit, the very life 
 of all business. 
 
 The Centralized Control of Banking, Capital, 
 and Credits. The country is only just beginning 
 to understand how completely great banking 
 institutions in the principal money centres have 
 become bound up with the control of industrial 
 institutions, the railroads and franchise com 
 binations. 
 
 That there was a tendency on the part of 
 great banking associations to merge and com 
 bine could not be overlooked. But while finan 
 cial and economic writers had directed public 
 attention to the fact, and had even pointed out 
 the opportunity and temptation for the use of 
 this augmented power, in connection with the 
 promotion of the speculative side of business 
 organization, they were slow to believe that 
 
APPENDIX 777 
 
 banking institutions could be so prostituted. 
 Certain critical observers had, however, as long 
 as five or six years ago, suggested the dangerous 
 tendencies in this direction. 
 
 Thus early an English economist, writing in 
 LittelVs Living Age, said : 
 
 "The recent extreme stringency of money in New York 
 would probably never have arisen if the banks, instead of 
 preparing for the autumn demands, had not locked up 
 their funds in the financiering of Wall Street. That the 
 banks are, to a large extent, under the domination of the 
 big financiers is well known, and the recent insurance 
 investigations have shown how, under such domination, 
 private interests may be made to prevail over those of the 
 public." 
 
 Addressing the Minnesota Bankers Associa 
 tion at Lake Minnetonka about this time, 
 Thomas F. Woodlock, formerly editor of the 
 Wall Street Journal, author of "The Anatomy of 
 Railroad Reports," and now a member of the 
 New York Exchange, sounded this note of 
 warning : 
 
 "The one thing that stands out most prominent, in my 
 judgment, with reference to Wall Street banking, is the 
 danger of the concentration of banking powers in the 
 hands of a few great speculative interests. We have 
 clearly defined tendencies in Wall Street, the ultimate 
 effect of which is likely to be the creation of two or three 
 powerful groups of banks. There is, for example, the so- 
 called * Standard Oil group of banks headed by the Na 
 tional City; there is the so-called Morgan Life Insurance 
 group, with the National Bank of Commerce and the 
 First National Bank at its head. These two groups con- 
 
778 APPENDIX 
 
 tain many of the most powerful banks in New York City, 
 and together account for a very large proportion of the 
 total volume of credit at the disposal of the public. * * * 
 The connection between the management of the banks in 
 New York City and the great financial and speculative 
 interests is very close, and if we ever have serious banking 
 trouble it will come from this fact." 
 
 In an article on the "Concentration of Bank 
 ing Interests in the United States" (written in 
 1905), Charles J. Bullock, formerly professor of 
 economics, Williams College, now at Harvard, 
 said : 
 
 "Unlike the central banks of other countries, our largest 
 institutions are closely connected with various industrial 
 interests, so that they do not occupy an independent posi 
 tion. Their policy is not controlled with sole regard for 
 the general welfare of our banking system; but they have 
 been drawn into vast enterprises, into promotion or reor 
 ganization, often of a speculative character, and have dis 
 played less, not more, than ordinary conservatism. The 
 National City Bank stood sponsor for the Amalgamated 
 Copper Company, and the First National Bank has lent 
 its aid to the various undertakings with which Mr. Morgan 
 has been identified." 
 
 Under the title "Perils of the Money Trust," 
 the Wall Street Journal (1903) editorially pointed 
 out these dangers in the following language : 
 
 "What is taking place is a concentration of banking 
 that is not merely a normal growth, but concentration 
 that comes from combination, consolidation and other 
 methods employed to secure monopolistic power. Not 
 only this, but this concentration has not been along the 
 lines of commercial banking. The great banks of con- 
 
APPENDIX 779 
 
 centration are in close alliance with financial interests 
 intimately connected with promotion of immense enter 
 prises, many of them being largely speculative. The bank 
 credits of the country are being rapidly concentrated in 
 the hands of a few bankers who are more interested in 
 banking on its financial (watered stock) side than in bank 
 ing on its commercial side. 
 
 "Such concentration as this is dangerous in a political 
 sense. The people have already been greatly disturbed 
 by the concentration that has taken place in the industrial 
 world. * * * But concentration in the industrial 
 world is a far less menacing condition than concentration 
 in banking. The men or set of men who control the 
 credits of the country control the country. 
 
 "And if this concentration continues at the rapid rate 
 with which it has progressed in the past ten years there 
 will surely come a time when the people, alarmed at the 
 growth, will rise up in some vigorous measure to assert 
 their power. Such an uprising would involve the most 
 serious consequences and would likely be carried to the 
 most unreasonable limits. There can be no doubt that 
 further concentration of banking power in New York 
 is the end in view of some of our leading bankers. They 
 believe that there will be a further reduction in the num 
 ber of banks and a further increase in the power of the big 
 banks. That is one reason why this banking concentra 
 tion needs to be studied and its consequences carefully 
 weighed. 
 
 "But there is still another reason why this development 
 in modern banking is open to criticism. It is largely a 
 departure from commercial banking. It is turning the 
 power over bank credits into financial (stock promotion) 
 channels. So long as the country is prosperous no imme 
 diate danger may be apprehended from such a development 
 as that. * * * But it is always the unexpected that 
 happens, and our panics are commonly ushered in by 
 some unforeseen calamity and it is a fair inquiry to make 
 whether banking conducted on a "department-store" 
 
780 APPENDIX 
 
 principle, with credits concentrated in a few great institu 
 tions, and with these institutions having large interests 
 in financial and speculative enterprises, would be in a po 
 sition in such a moment of unexpected calamity to do more 
 than to protect the financial and speculative interests 
 with which it is allied. In such a contingency what pro 
 tection would be left for the great commercial interests of 
 the country?" 
 
 The plain truth is that legitimate commercial 
 banking is being eaten up by speculative bank 
 ing. The greatest banks of the financial centre 
 of the country have ceased to be agents of com 
 merce arid have become primarily agencies of 
 promotion and speculation. By merging the 
 largest banks, trust companies, and insurance 
 companies masses of capital have been brought 
 under one management, to be employed not as 
 the servant of commerce, but as its master; not 
 to supply legitimate business and to facilitate 
 exchange, but to subordinate the commercial 
 demands of the country upon the banks to call 
 loans in Wall Street and to finance industrial 
 organizations, always speculative, and often 
 unlawful in character. Trained men, who a 
 dozen years ago stood first among the bankers of 
 the world as heads of the greatest banks of New 
 York City, are, in the main, either displaced or 
 do the bidding of men who are not bankers, but 
 masters of organization. 
 
 The banks which were then managed by 
 bankers as independent commercial institutions 
 are now owned in groups by a few men, whose 
 
APPENDIX 781 
 
 principal interests are in railroads, traction, 
 telegraph, cable, shipping, iron and steel, copper, 
 coal, oil, gas, insurance, etc. 
 
 This subversion of banking by alliance with 
 promotion and stock speculation is easily traced. 
 
 There was every inducement for those who 
 controlled transportation and a few great basic 
 industries to achieve control of money in the 
 financial centre of the country. 
 
 The centralization of the banking power in 
 New York City would not only open the way for 
 financing the reorganization and consolidation of 
 industrial enterprises and of public utilities 
 throughout the country, but would place those 
 in authority where they could control the mar 
 kets on stocks and bonds almost at will. 
 
 With this enormous concentration of business 
 it is possible to create, artificially, periods of 
 prosperity and periods of panic. Prices can be 
 lowered or advanced at the will of the "Sys 
 tem." When the farmer must move his crops a 
 scarcity of money may be created and prices 
 lowered. When the crop passes into the con 
 trol of the speculator the artificial stringency 
 may be relieved and prices advanced, and the 
 illegitimate profit raked off the agricultural 
 industry may be pocketed in Wall Street. 
 
 If an effort is made to compel any one of these 
 great "Interests" to obey the law, it is easy for 
 them to enter into a conspiracy to destroy who 
 ever may be responsible for the undertaking. 
 
 The bare names of the directors of two great 
 
782 APPENDIX 
 
 bank groups the Standard Oil group and the 
 Morgan group given in connection with their 
 other business associations is all the evidence 
 that need be offered of the absolute community 
 of interest between banks, railroads, and all the 
 great industries. 
 
 There are twenty-three directors of the Na 
 tional City Bank (Standard Oil). There are 
 forty directors of the National Bank of Com 
 merce (Morgan). Examination of these direc 
 torates shows that the two groups are being knit 
 together in business associations, suggesting 
 their ultimate unification. 
 
 Subject to personal differences which may arise 
 between powerful individuals of these different 
 groups, resulting in occasional collision, they 
 are practically a monopoly, and as far as the 
 public is concerned, practically one group. The 
 business partner of the head of the Morgan group 
 is found on the directorate of the chief financial 
 institution which heads the Standard Oil group. 
 And one of the leading directors of the National 
 City Bank (Standard Oil) is a member of the 
 board of directors of the principal financial in 
 stitution in the Morgan group. The directors 
 of the leading organizations comprising the two 
 principal groups are bound together in mutual 
 interest as shareholders in the various transpor 
 tation franchise, and industrial concerns which 
 have been financed by one or the other of the 
 group in recent years. 
 
 Fourteen of the directors of the National City 
 
APPENDIX 783 
 
 Bank are at the head of fourteen great combina 
 tions representing 38 per cent, of the capitaliza 
 tion of all the industrial trusts of the country. 
 
 The railroad lines represented on the board 
 of this one bank cover the country like a network. 
 Chief among them are the Lackawanna, the 
 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, the Union 
 Pacific, the Alton, the Missouri Pacific, the 
 Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul, the Chicago 
 and Northwestern, the Rock Island, the Denver 
 and Rio Grande, the Mexican National, the 
 Baltimore and Ohio, the Northern Pacific, the 
 New York Central, the Texas and Pacific, the 
 Erie, the New York, New Haven and Hartford, 
 the Delaware and Hudson, the Illinois Central, 
 the Manhattan Elevated of New York City, and 
 the rapid-transit lines of Brooklyn. These 
 same twenty-three directors, through their vari 
 ous connections, represent more than 350 other 
 banks, trust companies, railroads, and industrial 
 corporations, with an aggregate capitalization 
 of more than twelve thousand million dollars. 
 
 That is a part only of what is behind the direc 
 torate of the National City Bank of New York, 
 the head of only one of these groups. 
 
 The twenty-three directors of the National 
 City Bank, the head of the Standard Oil group, 
 and the directors of the National Bank of Com- 
 nerce, forty in number, hold 1,007 directorships 
 on the great transportation, industrial, and com 
 mercial institutions of this country. 
 
 The ability of these group banks of New York 
 
784 APPENDIX 
 
 through their connected interests to engage in 
 underwriting, to finance promotion schemes, 
 where the profits resulting from overcapitaliza 
 tion represent hundreds of millions of dollars, 
 places them beyond let or hindrance from com 
 petitors elsewhere in the country. Their ability 
 to take advantage of conditions in Wall Street, 
 even if they did not create these conditions, forc 
 ing interest rates on call loans as high as 150 
 per cent. , would enable them to command, almost 
 at will, the capital of the country for these specu 
 lative purposes. 
 
 But one result could follow. Floating the 
 stocks and bonds in overcapitalized transpor 
 tation, traction, mining and industrial organi 
 zations does not create wealth, but it does 
 absorb capital. Through the agency of these 
 great groups hundreds of millions of dollars of 
 the wealth of the country have been tied up. 
 Other hundreds of millions have been drawn 
 upon to supply these great speculating groups 
 in their steadily increasing Wall Street business. 
 
 I would not unjustly decry Wall Street or " 
 ignore the necessity of a great central market 
 to provide capital for the large business under 
 takings of this country. I recognize the rights 
 of capital and the service which capital can ren 
 der to a great producing nation such as ours. But 
 this government guarantees equality of oppor 
 tunity for all men, and it likewise guarantees 
 equality of opportunity for all capital. And cor 
 porations and combinations of corporations, 
 
APPENDIX 785 
 
 with their centralized banking and extending 
 branch connections from state to state, are not 
 entitled to special favors in legislation. 
 
 The whole course of banking and currency 
 legislation has steadily favored the great bank 
 ing institutions, especially those having com 
 munity of interest with the industrial and 
 transportation companies of the country. 
 
 The committees of Congress controlling this 
 legislation are chargeable with this neglect of 
 public interest. Since the enactment of the 
 National Banking Law, with each recurring 
 Congress the Comptroller of the Currency has 
 recommended legislation needful for the better 
 protection of the depositors and the commercial 
 interests generally, as against the speculative 
 interests of Wall Street. These recommenda 
 tions have been uniformly ignored. In proof 
 of this, I cite an extract from a public statement 
 of Deputy Comptroller of the Currency Kane, 
 issued March 31, 1908, as follows: 
 
 "While numerous have been the recommendations of 
 the eleven comptrollers who have presided over the affairs 
 of the Currency Bureau since its establishment, which, 
 in the judgment of each, would have increased the security 
 of the depositors and creditors of the banks, practically 
 none has been enacted into law or has received the serious 
 consideration of the legislative branch of the government. 
 No one has had better opportunities to observe from an 
 impartial and disinterested standpoint the practical 
 operations of the banking laws and to note their weak 
 features in regard to the security of creditors than the 
 respective Comptrollers of the Currency. Notwith- 
 
786 APPENDIX 
 
 standing the many recommendations made by the several 
 comptrollers, there has been practically no amendment of 
 the law since the passage of the original bank act of Feb 
 ruary 25, 1863, which can be said to have had for its 
 object the particular welfare of the depositor. 
 
 " Of the fifty -four acts amendatory of the original enact 
 ment which have been adopted since that date, practically 
 all have been in the interest of greater latitude or privileges 
 to the banks. 
 
 "The responsibility should rest where it properly belongs 
 upon the law and the lawmakers, and not upon the 
 administrative officials." 
 
 This is but the barest outline of the upbuilding 
 of the power which now controls. 
 
 Is there a way out? Let us consider. 
 
 By its decisions in the Standard Oil and 
 Tobacco cases the Supreme Court has all at once 
 created itself into a legislature, an interstate 
 commerce commission and a supreme court, 
 combined in one. 
 
 The " rule of reason" gives it legislative power, 
 the power to determine according to its own 
 opinion that some restraints of trade are lawful 
 and other restraints unlawful. The power to 
 carry out the dissolution and reorganization of 
 the trusts and to work out the details is exactly 
 the power that a legislature turns over to a com 
 mission. Punishment for contempt is the court s 
 substitute for the criminal penalty that the legis 
 lature attaches to the violation of its statutes. 
 
 The supreme court has amended the anti- 
 
APPENDIX 787 
 
 trust act in exactly the way that Congress 
 repeatedly refused to amend it, and has usurped 
 both legislative and executive power in doing it. 
 Whether we wish it or not, Congress is now com 
 pelled to create an interstate trade commission 
 to control the trusts, or else leave the control to 
 the federal courts, acting as a commission. 
 
 Such a commission should not fix prices. 
 Price regulation assumes that we are dealing 
 with a necessary monopoly, as in the case of 
 railroads and public utilities. But the commer 
 cial monopolies are based on unfair and dis 
 criminatory practices and special privileges. 
 These can be abolished in several ways. 
 
 Amend the Sherman law by enacting specific 
 prohibitions against well-known practices that 
 constitute unreasonable restraints of trade. 
 One of these is the brutal method of the Stand 
 ard Oil Company of cutting prices in any place 
 where there is a competitor in order to kill him 
 off, while keeping up prices in other places. 
 Another is the club wielded by the tobacco 
 trust, which put the jobbers in a position where, 
 unless they refrained from buying of a com 
 petitor, they could not get from the trust the 
 brands which were indispensable to the success 
 ful conduct of their business. These and several 
 other obviously unreasonable restraints of trade 
 are definitely prohibited in the bill which I have 
 introduced in the Senate. 
 
 The bill also places the burden of proof on the 
 trust to show that any restraint of trade which 
 
788 APPENDIX 
 
 it practises is reasonable -- that is, that it bene 
 fits the community. 
 
 It also provides that when the court has once 
 entered its final decree and declared a trust 
 illegal, any person who has suffered damages, 
 may come in under that decree and simply 
 petition that his damages be paid without prov 
 ing anything except the amount of the damages. 
 If this had been law when the Standard Oil 
 and Tobacco decisions were rendered, those 
 decisions would have meant something more 
 than mere victories on paper. 
 
 In addition to these amendments to the anti 
 trust law, there is need of a commission to stand 
 between the people and the courts in order to 
 investigate the facts and to prohibit all unrea 
 sonable restraints not specifically described in the 
 law. This commission should have full power 
 to ascertain the actual cost of reproduction, or 
 physical value of the property; the reasonable 
 value that the intangible property, such as good 
 will, would have under conditions of fair com 
 petition, and to distinguish this from the illegal 
 values that have been built up in violation of 
 law. It should ascertain the values that de 
 pend on patents, monopoly of natural resources 
 and all other forms of special privilege; the 
 amount of property that has been paid for out 
 of illegal profits taken from the public, distin 
 guished from the property paid for out of legiti 
 mate profits and true investment. It should 
 in this way ascertain the true cost of production 
 
 , 
 
APPENDIX 789 
 
 and whether the prices charged are yielding extor 
 tionate profits or only the reasonable profits 
 that competitors could earn. These are the 
 facts that the people must know before they will 
 consent to any legislation that treats illegal 
 values as though they were legal. 
 
 With these facts ascertained and made prima 
 facie evidence in court, these illegal values can 
 not be permanently fastened on the American 
 people. It will take time to pull down this false 
 structure of illegal capitalization of the trusts, 
 but it is now the greatest menace to prosperity. 
 
 If these laws are adopted, then every business 
 man, as well as the courts, will know definitely 
 what is meant by the "rule of reason." Legiti 
 mate business will have its course laid out clear 
 and certain before it, and every investor will 
 know precisely what the law allows and what it 
 prohibits. 
 
 The trust problem has become so interwoven 
 in our legal and industrial system that no single 
 measure or group of measures can reach all of it. 
 It must be picked off at every point where it 
 shows its head. 
 
 Every combination of a manufacturing busi 
 ness with the control of transportation, includ 
 ing pipe lines, should be prohibited, in order 
 that competitors may have equal facilities for 
 reaching markets. 
 
 The control of limited sources of raw material, 
 like coal, iron ore, or timber, by a manufacturing 
 corporation, should be broken up and these 
 
790 APPENDIX 
 
 resources should be opened to all manufacturers 
 on equal terms. 
 
 It is claimed on all sides that competition has 
 failed. I deny it. Fair competition has not 
 failed. It has been suppressed. When com 
 petitors are shut out from markets by discrimi 
 nation, and denied either transportation, raw 
 material or credit on equal terms, we do not 
 have competition. We have the modern form 
 of highway robbery. The great problem of 
 legislation before us is first for the people to 
 resume control of their government, and then to 
 protect themselves against those who are throt 
 tling competition by the aid of government. 
 
 I do not say that competition does not have 
 its evils. Labor organizations are the strug 
 gling protest against cut-throat competition. 
 The anti-trust law was not intended or under 
 stood to apply to them. They should be 
 exempt from its operation. 
 
 The tariff should be brought down to the dif 
 ference in labor cost of the more efficient plants 
 and the foreign competitor, and where there is 
 no difference the tariff should be removed. 
 Where the protective tariff is retained its advan 
 tages must be passed along to labor, for whose 
 benefit the manufacturer contends it is necessary. 
 
 The patent laws should be so amended that 
 the owners of patents will be compelled to de 
 velop them fully or permit their use on equal 
 terms by others. 
 
 More vital and menacing than any other 
 
APPENDIX 791 
 
 power that supports trusts is the control of 
 credit through the control of the people s savings 
 and deposits. When the Emergency Currency 
 Bill was before Congress in 1908, Senator Aid- 
 rich slipped into the conference report certain 
 provisions which he had withdrawn in the 
 Senate, and withdrew provision s which he had 
 first included. He eliminated protection against 
 promotion schemes, excluded penalties for false 
 reporting, dropped provisions for safeguarding 
 reserves, inserted provisions for accepting rail 
 road bonds as security. Now he comes with 
 another plausible measure to remedy the ad 
 mitted evils of our inelastic banking system. 
 
 When we realize that the control of credit and 
 banking is the greatest power that the trusts 
 possess to keep out competitors, we may well 
 question their sincerity in offering a patriotic 
 measure to dispossess themselves of that power. 
 It is the people s money that is expected to give 
 security to this plan and the people must and 
 
 The proposed Aldrich Currency plan is the 
 product of a commission composed of men who 
 are or have been members of the committees 
 of the two houses of Congress, which have con 
 trolled all legislation relating to currency and 
 banking. With such a record it behooves the 
 public to examine with the utmost care any plan 
 which they recommend, however plausible it 
 may appear upon its face. A critical study of 
 the scheme of this commission will convince 
 
792 APPENDIX 
 
 any student of government finance, that under 
 the guise of providing elasticity to our currency 
 system, it is in reality an adroit means of further 
 concentration and control of the money and 
 credits of the United States under a fifty-year 
 franchise, augmenting the power of those who 
 already dominate the banking and insurance 
 resources of the country. 
 
 Our National Banking Law is a patchwork of 
 legislation. It should be thoroughly revised. 
 And all authorities agree that a comprehensive 
 plan for an emergency currency is vitally im 
 portant. When the basic principle of such a 
 plan is once determined, when it is settled that 
 government controlled banks are to be, in fact, 
 controlled by the government in the public 
 interest, the details can easily be worked out. 
 
 An emergency currency circulation should be 
 backed by proper reserves, issued only against 
 commercial paper that represents actual and 
 legitimate business transactions. No plan 
 should be adopted which admits of control by 
 banking interests which, under existing condi 
 tions, means, in the end, control by the great 
 speculative banking groups. 
 Am all our plans for progressive legislation, 
 it must not be forgotten that we are only just 
 beginning to get control of the railroads. The 
 present law is an improvement, but the Inter 
 state Commerce Commission requires to be 
 greatly strengthened. It should have a much 
 larger appropriation, enabling it to prosecute 
 
APPENDIX 793 
 
 investigations in all parts of the country. It 
 should make physical valuations of the rail 
 roads, eliminating watered stock, monopoly 
 values and the unwarranted inflation of railway 
 terminals to conceal monopoly values. And 
 the Commerce Court should be abolished as a 
 mere subterfuge interposed to handicap the 
 commission. 
 
 As a first necessary step for the regulation of 
 interstate commerce, we must ascertain the 
 reasonable value of the physical property of 
 railroads, justly inventoried, upon a sound 
 economic basis, distinguishing actual values 
 from monopoly values derived from violations of 
 law, and must make such discriminating values 
 the base line for determining rates. The coun 
 try should know how much of the eighteen bil 
 lions of capitalization was contributed by those 
 who own the railroads, and how much by the 
 people themselves. We should also provide 
 for the extension of the powers and the adminis 
 trative control of the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission. 
 
 A word to the Magazines. I have sketched the 
 growth and power of the great interests that to 
 day control our property and our governments. 
 I have shown how subtle and elusive, yet relent 
 less, they are. Rising up against them is the 
 confused voice of the people. Their heart is 
 true but their eyes do not yet see all the intri 
 cate sources of power. Who shall show them? 
 There are only two agencies that in any way can 
 
794 APPENDIX 
 
 reach the whole people. These are the press 
 and the platform. But the platform in no way 
 compares with the press in its power of continu 
 ous repeated instruction. 
 
 One would think that in a democracy like 
 ours, people seeking the truth, able to read and 
 understand, would find the press their eager and 
 willing instructors. Such was the press of 
 Horace Greeley, Henry Raymond, Charles A. 
 Dana, Joseph Medill, and Horace Rublee. 
 
 But what do we find has occurred in the past 
 few years since the money power has gained con 
 trol of our industry and government? It con 
 trols the newspaper press. The people know 
 this. Their confidence is weakened and de 
 stroyed. No longer are the editorial columns of 
 newspapers a potent force in educating public 
 opinion. The newspapers, of course, are still 
 patronized for news. But even as to news, the 
 public is fast coming to understand that wherever 
 news items bear in any way upon the control of 
 government by business, the news is colored; 
 so confidence in the newspaper as a newspaper 
 is being undermined. 
 
 Cultured and able men are still to be found 
 upon the editorial staffs of all great dailies, but 
 the public understands them to be hired men 
 who no longer express honest judgments and 
 sincere conviction, who write what they are 
 told to write, and whose judgments are salaried. 
 
 To the subserviency of the press to special 
 interests in no small degree is due the power arid 
 
APPENDIX 795 
 
 influence and prosperity of the weekly and 
 monthly magazines. A decade ago young men 
 trained in journalism came to see this control 
 of the newspapers of the country. They saw 
 also an unoccupied field. And they went out 
 and built up great periodicals and magazines. 
 They were free. 
 
 Their pages were open to publicists and schol 
 ars and liberty, and justice and equal rights 
 found a free press beyond the reach of the cor 
 rupt influence of consolidated business and 
 machine politics. We entered upon a new era. 
 
 The periodical, reduced in price, attractive 
 and artistic in dress, strode like a young giant 
 into the arena of public service. Filled with 
 this spirit, quickened with human interest, it 
 assailed social and political evils in high places 
 and low. It found the power of the public ser 
 vice corporation and the evil influences of money 
 in the municipal government of every large city. 
 It found franchises worth millions of dollars 
 secured by bribery; police in partnership with 
 thieves and crooks and prostitutes. It found 
 juries "fixed" and an established business ply 
 ing its trade between litigants and the back 
 door of blinking justice. 
 
 It found Philadelphia giving away franchises, 
 franchises not supposedly or estimated to be 
 worth $2,500,000, but for which she had been 
 openly offered and refused $2,500,000. Mil 
 waukee they found giving away street -car 
 franchises worth $8,000,000 against the protests 
 
796 APPENDIX 
 
 of her indignant citizens. It found Chicago 
 robbed in tax-payments of immense value by 
 corporate owners of property through fraud and 
 forgery on a gigantic scale; it found the alder 
 men of St. Louis, organized to boodle the city 
 with a criminal compact, on file in the dark cor 
 ner of a safety deposit vault. 
 
 The free and independent periodical turned 
 her searchlight on state legislatures, and made 
 plain as the sun at noonday the absolute control 
 of the corrupt lobby. She opened the closed 
 doors of the secret caucus, the secret committee, 
 the secret conference, behind which United 
 States Senators and Members of Congress be 
 trayed the public interest into the hands of rail 
 roads, the trusts, the tariff mongers, and the 
 centralized banking power of the country. She 
 revealed the same influences back of judicial 
 and other appointments. She took the public 
 through the great steel plants and into the homes 
 of the men who toil twelve hours a day and seven 
 days in the week. And the public heard their 
 cry of despair. She turned her camera into 
 the mills and shops where little children are 
 robbed of every chance of life that nourishes vig 
 orous bodies and sound minds, and the pinched 
 faces and dwarfed figures told their pathetic 
 story on her clean white pages. 
 
 The control of the newspaper press is not the 
 
 simple and expensive one of ownership and in- 
 
 | vestment. There is here and there a "kept 
 
 \^sheet" owned by a man of great wealth to further 
 
APPENDIX 797 
 
 his own interests. But the papers of this class 
 are few. The control comes through that com 
 munity of interests, that interdependence of 
 investments and credits which ties the publisher 
 up to the banks, the advertisers and the special 
 interests. 
 
 We may expect this same kind of control, 
 sooner or later, to reach out for the magazines. 
 But more than this: I warn you of a subtle 
 new peril, the centralization of advertising, that 
 will in time seek to gag you. What has oc 
 curred on the small scale in almost every city in the 
 country will extend to the national scale, and 
 will ere long close in on the magazines. No 
 men ever faced graver responsibilities. None 
 have ever been called to a more unselfish, pa- J 
 triotic service. I believe that when the final ( 
 test comes, you will not be found wanting; you I 
 will not desert and leave the people to depend \ 
 upon the public platform alone, but you will / . 
 hold aloft the lamp of Truth, lighting the way for I Jf 
 the preservation of representative government/ \; 
 and the liberty of the American people. j 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adams, J. Q., 121 
 
 Agriculture, Department of, 116 
 
 Aldrich, Nelson, B., 77, 104, 
 
 431-3, 441-2, 445-6, 453, 458, 
 
 462, 466-7, 471, 475, 477, 484, 
 
 547, 692, 695, 711, 713 
 Aldrich-Vreeland Currency Bill, 
 
 458-75 
 
 Allen, Henry, J., 660 
 Allison, William B., 52, 431, 
 
 433-4 
 American Association of Woolen 
 
 and Worsted Manufacturers, 
 
 107 
 
 Anti-Pass Law, 211-15 
 Appropriation Bills in Senate, 
 
 392-3, 396 
 
 Arthur, Chester A., 51-2 
 Atkins, J. D. C., 59 
 
 Babcock, 226-32, 306, 320, 323, 
 
 327-29, 734-39 
 Baensch, Emil, 327 
 Baker, Alfred, 526 
 Bailey, Joseph W., 299, 300 
 Ballinger, Richard A., 458, 477, 
 
 632 
 
 Banks, Wisconsin State, 366 
 Barnes, John, 349-50 
 Bascom, John, 26-8, 31 
 Bashford, R. M., 4, 141 
 Bass, J. F., 621 
 Bayne, Thomas M., 98 
 Beck, Joseph, 311 
 Beef Trust, The, 74, 640, 698 
 Bennett Law, 134 
 Betz, Henry, 140 
 Beveridge, Albert J., 427-8, 447, 
 
 451-2 
 
 Bigelow, Frank, 188 
 
 Elaine, James G., 51, 91, 103, 110, 
 
 111, 112, 708 
 Bliss, Cornelius N., 721 
 Borah, William, 394, 428, 467, 
 
 521 
 Bourne, Jonathan, 428, 467, 
 
 494, 498, 516, 528, 587 
 Braddock, W. S., 341 
 Brandeis, Louis, D., 597, 729 
 Breckenridge, Clifton R., 98 
 Brickner, G. H., 148 
 Bristow, Joseph L., 131-3, 428, 
 
 444, 447, 451-2, 494, 520, 578-9 
 Brown, Norris, 447, 467 
 Brown, Walter, 574, 576, 583, 
 
 585-6, 591 
 Bryant, George E., 47-8, 162, 180, 
 
 192 
 
 Bryan, William J., 343-8, 371, 751 
 Bryce, James, 87 
 Bunn, Romanzo, 149-50 
 Burgess, Charles T., 316 
 Bureau of Labor, 116 
 Burkett, Elmer J., 417, 447 
 Burrows, Julius C., 98, 373 
 Butterworth, Benjamin, 52, 101 
 
 Call, Joseph H., 724-5 
 Campaign of 1904, 319-40 
 Cannon, Joseph G., 52, 437, 458, 
 
 477, 484, 547, 695, 711, 713, 
 
 714, 735, 739 
 Cary, W. J., 454, 521 
 Carlisle, John G., 51-2, 56-7, 65, 
 
 93-5, 98-100, 109 
 Carnegie Hall, 588, 594 
 Carter, Thomas H., 455 
 Casson, Henry, 228 
 
 799 
 
800 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Caucus Senatorial, 299, 301, 303 
 Central Pacific Ry. Co., 725-6 
 Chandler, William E., 372 
 Chandler, Zachary, 16 
 Chautauqua, The, 304-5, 340, 346, 
 
 348, 418 
 Cherokee Strip in U. S. Senate, 
 
 374 
 Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 
 
 71-2, 284 
 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
 
 Ry. Co., 71-4, 284 
 Chynoweth, Herbert W., 29, 180, 
 
 328 
 
 Civil Service Law, 365 
 Clapp, Moses, 405, 423, 427-8, 
 
 436, 447, 451-2, 516 
 Clay, Henry C., 103 
 Clark, Charles B., 144 
 Cleveland, Grover, 52-3, 55, 91 
 Coal Trust, 117 
 Cochems, Henry, 647, 653-5 
 Committees of Congress, 302-3, 
 
 375-6, 397 
 Commons, John R., 31-2, 311, 
 
 558 
 
 Commoner, The, 345-6 
 Commerce Court, The, Bill, 420, 
 
 423-4 
 Conference Committees, Publicity 
 
 urged, 299-301 
 Connor, W. D., 327 
 Conservation, 380-90, 481-2 
 Convention of 1904, 322-7 
 Corrupt Practices Act, 297 
 Cortelyou, George B., 720-1, 
 
 738-9 
 
 Cowan, S. H., 341 
 Crane, Charles R., 495, 516, 526, 
 
 590, 595, 602, 741 
 Crawford, Coe I., 447, 520 
 Crownhart, Charles, 310 
 Culberson, David B., 688 
 Cummins, A. B., 394, 423, 428, 
 
 431-2, 444, 447, 451-2, 516-8, 
 
 523-4, 527-8, 587, 614, 648, 
 
 659, 660 
 Cunningham Claims, 477 
 
 Dahl, A. H., 341 
 Dana, Charles A., 250, 604 
 Davison, H. P., 636 
 Davidson, James O., 214 
 Democracy, 25-6, 64-9, 178, 195. 
 
 204-7, 222, 275-6, 302-4, 317 
 Deneen, Charles S., 637 
 Department of Agriculture, 116 
 Depew, Chauncey, 720-2 
 Dingley Law, The, 106, 450, 707, 
 
 712 
 
 Dingley, Nelson, 98 
 Dixon, Charles, 19 
 Dixon, Joseph M., 394, 428, 667 
 Dolliver, Jonathan P., 405, 413, 
 
 415, 417, 426, 427-36, 443, 447, 
 
 451-2 
 
 Drew, Walter, 322 
 Dryden, John F., 418 
 Dudley, William W., 78-9 
 Durand, E. Dana, 455 
 
 Edmunds, G. F., 52, 688 
 Edmunds, E. A., 453-4, 560 
 Ekern, H. L., 341, 364-5 
 Eleventh Story League, 279 
 Elevator Trust, The, 698 
 Eliot, Charles, 32 
 Elkins Law, 404 
 Elward, Rodney, A., 579 
 Ely, Richard T., 29-32 
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 26 
 Emery, Henry C., 106-7 
 Emergency Currency Bill, 430, 
 
 458-75, 480 
 
 Employers Liability Bill, 425-6 
 Erickson, Halford, 284, 322, 350 
 Evans, Henry Clay, 122-4 
 Evans, Elizabeth G., 643 
 Evarts, William M., 52 
 
 Fackler, John D., 558, 560, 574, 
 
 583-6, 589 
 
 Fairbanks, Charles W., 373 
 Fink, Henry, 256 
 Flower, Roswell P., 98 
 Forest Reserve of Wisconsin, 364 
 Frear, James A., 341 
 
INDEX 
 
 801 
 
 French, Asa P., 728 
 Prick, Henry, 676, 718 
 Frisby, Almah J., 316 
 Frye, William P., 397 
 Fuller, William E., 100 
 Fuller, Hugh, 425 
 
 Gallinger, Jacob H., 391 
 
 Gamble, Robert J., 417 
 
 Gardner, Gilson, 487, 503, 508-9, 
 
 512-16, 519, 534-7, 540-2, 545, 
 
 550-3, 590, 597, 600, 602, 611, 
 
 630-2 
 Garfield, James R., 508, 533-4, 
 
 546, 574, 576, 633 
 Garfield, James A., 16-17, 560 
 Gary, E. H., 636, 693, 718 
 Gear, John H., 98, 102 
 George, Henry, 19 
 Gill, Thomas, 233-7 
 Glasscock, W. E., 655 
 Gore, Thomas P., 469, 473-4 
 Gorman, A. P., 77 
 Gould, George Jay, 718 
 Grangers, The, 18-20, 23, 238, 
 
 400 
 
 Greeley, Horace, 250, 604 
 Greenback Party, 18 
 Gregory, Charles Noble, 200 
 Gronna, A. J., 516 
 Guenther, Richard, 59-60, 140 
 
 Hadley, Herbert S., 655, 663-4 
 Hagemeister Bill, 267-9, 271, 273, 
 
 274 
 
 Halbert, Hugh T., 613 
 Hale, Eugene, 374, 391-4, 455, 
 
 471-3 
 Hall, A. R., 212-15, 217, 230, 237- 
 
 240, 281 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, 103 
 Hanna, Mark, 128-9, 131, 133, 
 
 537, 734 
 Hanna, Daniel, 537-8, 583, 585-6, 
 
 591 
 
 Hannan, John J., 590, 597, 
 . 648-9 
 
 Harper, Samuel A., 42-4, 46-7, 
 
 142, 144, 154-6, 161-2, 168, 
 
 180, 192, 198, 212, 219 
 Harper, William R., 196 
 Harrison, Frank A., 643 
 Harrison, Benjamin, 91, 166-7, 
 
 170, 173 
 
 Harriman, E. H., 676, 718-26 
 Harshaw, Henry B., 140, 143, 
 
 154-7 
 Harvester Trust, The, 582, 640, 
 
 695 
 
 Hatten, William, 296, 341 
 Haugen, Nils P., 75, 77-9, 
 
 176-85, 190, 208, 213, 240 
 Haugen, G. N., 520 
 Hazel ton, George C., 44 
 Hazzard, William, 323 
 Helgesen, Henry T., 520 
 Henderson, David B., 169 
 Heney, Francis J., 591-2, 655 
 Henley, W. E., 194 
 Hepburn Bill, The, 399, 405-20, 
 
 460, 480, 678-80, 714 
 Hill, James, 718 
 Hoar, George F., 52, 688 
 Hoard, William D., 22, 129-30, 
 
 141-2, 170, 190, 230-1 
 Holman, W. S., 52 
 Homestead Strike, 109 
 Hopkins, A. J., 373 
 Honduran Treaty, 301 
 Hours of Railway Service, 426 
 Houser, \Valter, 514-15, 530, 532-3, 
 
 539, 542, 550, 555-6, 558-9, 
 
 585, 587, 590, 592, 597-601, 651 
 
 653, 655 
 
 Howe, Frederic C., 485 
 Hubbard, E. H., 516 
 Hughes, Charles, 364, 659-60 
 Hughitt, Marvin, 230-2 
 Hull, J. A. T., 737 
 
 Income Tax, 289 
 Indian Affairs, 71-3, 376-8, 383 
 Industrial Commission of Wiscon 
 sin, 309-11 
 Ingalls, John J., 52 
 
802 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Ingersoll, Robert G., 33-6 
 Ingram, Charles, 749 
 Inheritance Tax, 289 
 Insurance Legislation, 364-5 
 Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 
 118, 126, 402-3, 456, 480, 725 
 Interstate Commerce Act, 90, 
 
 118, 127, 399, 400, 456 
 Internal Revenue Taxation, 120-1 
 
 Jackson, Ida M., 316 
 Johnson, Hiram, 572, 642, 655 
 Jones, Burr W., 44 
 Jones, Clyde, 516-17 
 
 Kean, John, 411-12 
 
 Kent, William, 514, 520, 526, 
 
 550-1, 553, 590, 596-7, 602 
 Keyes, E. W., 9-11, 24-5, 38, 
 
 44-6, 63, 127, 210 
 Kirby, F. M., 631-2 
 Kuehn, Ferdinand, 140-1 
 Kull, Fred, 323 
 Knox, P. C., 299-300 
 
 La Follette, Robert Marion 
 
 In the University, 4, 6-8, 11-12, 
 
 26 
 
 Early Life, 6 
 Campaign for district attorney, 
 
 3-5, 8-14 
 District attorney of Dane 
 
 County, 14, 36-42, 48, 63 
 Early influences, 19, 22-7, 33-6, 
 
 43, 49-50, 52, 67, 71, 99 
 
 Campaigns for Congress, 42-8, 
 70 
 
 In Congress from 1885-1891 
 
 First visit to Washington, 
 
 49-56 
 
 The Tariff, 99-102 
 Committee on Ways and 
 
 Means, 102 
 Indian lands, 57-60 
 River and Harbors bill, 60-3 
 
 The Railroads, 71-6 
 
 The Nicaraguan Canal bill, 
 
 78-80 
 
 The Ship Subsidy bill, 80-3 
 Oleomargarine bill, 120-2 
 Reports to constituents, 63-7 
 
 Struggle with the Bosses in 
 Wisconsin, 1891 to 1900 
 
 The Machine, 160-2, 165, 
 
 170-5 
 
 The Sawyer affair, 138-65 
 The campaigns of 1894, 1896, 
 
 and 1898, 176-224 
 The Campaign of 1900, 225- 
 
 41 
 Offered the Comptrollership 
 
 of the Treasury, 114-5 
 
 As Governor of Wisconsin from 
 1901 to 1905 
 
 Primary election law, 243-9, 
 
 256, 292-7 
 Railroad regulation, 271-4, 
 
 282-7, 290-2, 341-5, 348-63 
 Railroad taxation, 243-68 
 Anti-lobby law, 297-8 
 Regulation of state banks, 
 
 366-7 
 
 Inheritance tax law, 289 
 Income tax law, 289 
 Conservation measures, 363-4 
 Insurance laws, 364-5 
 Civil Service law, 365-6 
 Policy as to women in public 
 
 service, 315-8 
 Campaign of 1904, 320-40 
 
 Chautauqua Addresses, 304-5, 
 418 
 
 In the Senate 
 
 Election, 162-3, 370, 373-4, 
 
 411-12 
 The Navy Yards, 391-6 
 
INDEX 
 
 Regulation of railroad com 
 panies, 406-24 
 
 Physical Valuation of rail 
 ways, 456-7, 460-2 
 
 Employers Liability bill, 425 
 
 Indian lands, 377-9 
 
 Coal lands, 377, 383, 386-7, 
 389-90 
 
 Emergency Currency bill, 
 458-75 
 
 Tariff Revision, 441-2 
 
 The Secret Caucus, Control 
 of legislation by, 298, 304 
 
 The Use of the Roll Call, 
 416-18 
 
 Organizing the Progressives 
 against the Aldrich Ma 
 chine, 427-8, 436 
 
 The Progressive League, 
 494-7 
 
 Campaign for the Presidency 
 
 Preliminary canvass, 500, 
 516-20, 536-1 
 
 The Chicago Conference, 
 532-4 
 
 Opening the Campaign, 553- 
 5, 558-71, 588, 594, 599, 
 602-10, 620-1, 632-5, 762 
 
 Duplicity of Roosevelt, 511- 
 12, 515-16, 537-40, 546, 
 551-2, 556-7, 562, 572-3, 
 574-6, 580, 597-8, 612-14, 
 616, 619 
 
 The National Convention of 
 1912, 644, 653-59 
 
 Meetings with Roosevelt 
 On legislation concerning coal 
 
 lands, 380, 382 
 On Hepburn Railroad Rate 
 
 Bill, 407-10 
 
 On Railway valuation, 680-3 
 
 At Oyster Bay on Initiative, 
 
 Referendum, and Recall, 
 
 Railroad rate legislation, 
 
 Tariff, and the growth of 
 
 the Progressive movement 
 487-9 
 
 Staying in the Republican 
 Party, 171-13, 201-3 
 
 La Follette, Mrs., 4, 53, 66-7, 136, 
 162, 180, 313-15, 372-3, 430, 
 558 
 
 La Follette, Fola, 53, 136 
 
 Labor Vote and Legislation, 305-1 1 
 Larrabee, William, 341 
 Larsen "Norsky," 323 
 Lenroot, Irvine, 255, 264-6, 281, 
 
 341, 454, 516, 550-3, 590, 592, 
 
 597, 602 
 
 Lerum, Arne, 323 
 Lewis, William T., 199 
 Liberal Republican Party, 17 
 Lindbergh, C. A., 520 
 Lobby, Law Against, 297-8 
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 104 
 Loeb, William, 680 
 Loftus, George S., 515 
 Long, Chester I., 578-9 
 Lyon, W. P., 313-4 
 
 Madison Ring, The, 45 
 Main, Willett S., 45 
 Mann, Homer, 578 
 Martin, Harry C., 341 
 McCarthy, Charles, 32 ,^_ 
 McCord, Myron, 81-2 ^ 
 McCormick, Medill, 545, 555-58, 
 
 589-90, 597-9, 602 
 McCusker, Thomas, 643 
 McFetridge, Edward C., 140 
 McGovern, Francis, 296, 310, 
 
 647-55, 749 
 McHarg, Ormsby, 581 
 McKenna, Joseph, 98 
 McKinley, William, 52, 91-2, 96, 
 
 98, 100, 102-3, 110-11, 114-15, 
 
 127-33, 170, 200-1, 204, 560, 
 
 734 
 
804 
 
 INDEX 
 
 McKinley Bill, The, 102, 106, 
 
 108-10, 114, 201 
 McMillan, Benton, 98 
 McSween, Angus, 516, 519, 597 
 Medill, Joseph, 250, 604 
 Mellen, Charles S., 729-30 
 Merriam, Charles E., 516-17, 597- 
 
 602 
 
 Meyer, B. H., 32, 349 
 Mills, Roger Q., 52, 59, 98-9, 109 
 Miner, Ben, 5 
 Mitchell, Alexander, 20-1 
 Monahan, James G., 256 
 Moody, W. H., 382-4 
 Morgan, J. P., 581-2, 636, 676, 
 
 693, 718, 729-30 
 Morris, Thomas, 341, 749 
 Morris, Charles Mrs., 317 
 Morse, Elmer A., 521 
 Morton, Paul, 718 
 Munsey, Frank A., 580, 582, 666 
 Murdock, Victor, 124, 520 
 National Progressive Republican 
 
 League, The, 494-7 
 National Republican Convention 
 
 of 1892, 166 
 National Republican Convention 
 
 of 1904, 327-30 
 National Republican Convention 
 
 of 1912, 645, 747 
 National Business League of 
 
 America, 465-6 
 Naval Stations, 391-96, 433 
 Nelson, John M., 208, 454, 521, 
 
 555-8 
 
 Nelson, Knute, 386, 447, 452 
 Nelson Bill, The, 387 
 New Haven Merger Case, 421-2, 
 
 727-31 
 
 Newman, A. W., 152 
 Nicaragua Canal Bill, 77-80 
 Norris, George W., 516 
 Northern Securities Case, 731-2 
 
 Oakley, Frank, 45-6 
 O Connor, James, 141 
 Old Dane, The, 208 
 O Laughlin, J. C., 537 
 
 O Neill, William, 214 
 Overstreet, Jesse, 737 
 Owen, Walter, 658 
 
 Patronage, Official, 68-9 
 Patrons of Husbandry, 18 
 Payne, Henry C., 54, 74-5, 77, 
 
 127-31, 137, 170-1, 188-9, 
 
 191, 202, 228, 250, 328-9, 574, 
 
 734 
 
 Payne, Sereno E., 98 
 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill, 104, 
 
 106, 436, 441-52, 477, 489-92, 
 
 617, 718 
 
 Pederson, Eli, 13 
 Penrose, Boies, 104, 125 
 Perkins, G. C., 392 
 Perkins, George W., 581-2, 636, 
 
 676, 393, 718, 732, 741 
 Pfister, Charles, 127, 141, 187, 
 
 189, 191, 193, 202, 250-3, 320, 
 
 323 
 Phillipp, Emanuel, 226, 229, 232, 
 
 248-9, 320, 323 
 Physicial Valuation of Railways, 
 
 416, 419, 423, 426, 456-7, 
 
 460-2, 681-2 
 Pinchot, Amos, 505, 508, 526, 542, 
 
 550, 588, 590, 593, 596-602, 611 
 Pinchot, Gifford, 482, 485-6, 
 
 502-4, 508, 514-15, 524, 526, 
 
 540-50, 574-7, 586-602, 611- 
 
 615, 632-3 
 Pinney, S. U., 141 
 Platt, T. C., 574 
 Poindexter, Miles, 516 
 Pollock, Walter W., 643 
 Pope, James E., 643 
 Post, Louis, 658 
 Post Office Department Frauds, 
 
 131 
 
 Potter Law, 23 
 Powell, J. W 7 ., 481-2 
 Primary Nominations, 196-8, 267, 
 
 292-7, 219, 247-8 
 Progressive Group in the U. S. 
 
 Senate, 39>, 417, 423, 427, 447, 
 
 452 "^ 
 
INDEX 
 
 805 
 
 Progressive Republican League, 
 
 The, 494-7 
 Progressive League of Minnesota, 
 
 515 
 Progressive Movement, The, 18, 
 
 70, 104-5, 126, 445, 483-4, 614, 
 
 746 
 
 Progressive Party, The, 757-8 
 Protection, The Doctrine of, 
 
 103-6, 111-13 
 Prouty, C. A., 341, 349 
 
 Quarles, Joseph, V., 141, 155, 
 
 228, 256, 323, 327 
 Quay, Matthew, 58, 77, 574 
 Quick, Herbert, 654 
 
 Railway Regulation, 20-3, 118-19, 
 
 Jjftg-fll, 341-63, 399-425 
 Railroad Commission of Wiscon 
 sin, 350-63 
 Railroad Taxation in Wisconsin, 
 
 243-4, 248, 287, 292, 355 
 Railroad Rebates, 286, 291-2, 354 
 Railroad Lobby, 244-5, 248, 254- 
 
 66, 272, 285 
 
 Railroad Brotherhood, The, 425 
 Randall, Samuel, 52 
 Raymond, Henry J., 250, 604 
 Rayner, Isidor, 373 
 Reagan, John H., 89, 117, 119-20, 
 
 341 
 
 Reciprocity, 111-13, 504-5, 622-30 
 Reed, Thomas B., 52, 65, 91-101 
 
 126-7 
 
 Reinsch, Paul, 31-2 
 Republican National Convention 
 
 of 1912, 645 
 Republican Party, The, in 1880, 
 
 15 
 
 Reynolds, George M., 465-6 
 Rice, John T., 192 
 Richards, R. O., 643 
 Roe, Gilbert E., 219, 328, 659-62 
 
 664 
 Rogers, Walter S., 516-17, 590, 
 
 597-602 
 Roll Call, The, 339, 416-18 
 
 Roosevelt, Theodore: 
 
 His General Policy, 95, 478-81 
 
 484, 673-4, 744-5 
 Favors the Trusts, 484, 582, 617 
 
 683-704 
 
 His Policy as to the Railroad 
 Companies, 401, 407-10, 480 
 678-82, 704 
 Supported by W all St., 582 
 
 718-32 
 His Relation to the Steel Trust, 
 
 582 
 His Policy as to Conservation, 
 
 380-90, 481-3, 677 
 Has no Tariff Policy, 490-2 
 
 617, 706-18 
 As to the Canadian Pact, 505 
 
 621-30 
 On the Initiative, Referendum, 
 
 and Recall, 488-9, 616 
 Opposed the Progressive Move 
 ment in Wisconsin, 733-42 
 His Policy as to the General 
 Progressive Movement, 485-6 
 496-7, 510, 639-40 
 Betrayal of La Follette, 511- 2, 
 515-6, 534, 540, 546, 551-2, 
 556-7, 562, 572-3, 574-6, 
 580, 597-8, 612-14, 616, 619 
 Duplicity as to his own can 
 didacy, 502-3, 505-6, 508-9, 
 511-12, 515-16, 528, 534, 537, 
 540, 546, 551-2, 562, 572-3, 
 574-6, 580, 592, 597-8, 612- 
 14, 616, 618, 619 
 The National Republican Con 
 vention of 1912, 644-6, 653- 
 7, 659-70 
 
 Rose, David, 280 
 Rosen berry, M. B., 325 
 Ross, Edward A., 32 
 Rublee, Horace, 250, 253, 604 
 Ryan, Edward, 22-4 
 
 Sabin, Ellen, 316 
 Sanborn, A. W., 341 
 Sanderson, Edward, 39-40 
 
806 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Saturday Lunch Club, 32 
 Sawyer, Philetus, 53-60, 72-5, 
 
 77-8 82-4, 127, 137-8, 140, 
 
 142-51, 154-61, 165, 168-70, 
 
 172, 181, 184, 189, 190, 201-2, 
 
 227 
 
 Schurz, Carl, 222 
 Scofield, Edward, 181, 190, 192, 
 
 216-18, 220 
 Scott, N. B., 328 
 Scott, W. A., 32 
 Sentinel, The, 157-9, 250-4, 272 
 Sherman, John, 52, 89, 93, 110, 
 
 117, 688 
 
 Sherman Law, The, 90, 118, 685- 
 * 706, 727, 730-1 
 Ship Subsidy Bill, 80-1 
 Siebecker, Robert G., 141-2, 145, 
 
 149-53, 155, 157-8, 212 
 Smoot, Reed, 104 
 Socialists, The, 270 
 Southern Pacific Railway Com 
 pany, 725-6 
 Spensley, Calvert, 739 
 Spofford, Ainsworth R., 121 
 Spooner, John, 45, 114, 127, 170, 
 
 182, 189, 191, 202, 227, 256, 
 
 323, 327-9, 373, 736 
 Spooner, Roger, 182 
 Spooner, Phil, 45 
 Spreckels, Rudolph, 642 
 Stalwarts, The, 242, 274 
 Standard Oil Company, 117, 464, 
 
 676 
 Standpatters, The, 104, 126, 415, 
 
 419, 453, 458, 518, 735 
 State, The, 208-10, 217 
 Steel Trust, The, 581-2, 592, 636, 
 
 640, 693, 698 
 Steffens, Lincoln, 407 
 Stephenson, Isaac, 57, 201-2, 220, 
 
 226-8, 296-7, 327, 453-5 
 Stevens, E. Ray, 247, 262, 316 
 Stevens, Kate Sabin, 316 
 Stickney, A. B., 341 
 Stimson, H. L., 491, 493, 514 
 Stone, W. J., 469, 473-4 
 Stout, James H., 327 
 
 Stewart, J. W., 686, 688 
 Stuart, Alva, 142 
 Suffrage Law, 318 
 Sumner, Charles, 303 
 
 Taft, William Howard 
 
 His Nomination in 1908, 500-1 
 
 His Policy as to the Tariff, 105, 
 436-40, 448-9, 451-8, 476-8 
 
 His Canadian Pact, 504-5, 622 
 3, 626-8, 634 
 
 Alliance with Aldrich and Can 
 non, 437, 484 
 
 His Policy as to Conservation, 
 458, 477 
 
 His Policy as to the Railroad 
 Companies, 420-4, 456-7 
 
 Opposes the Progressives, 69 
 
 The National Republican Con 
 vention of 1912, 644-5, 659-70 
 
 Tariff Commission, 104-09 
 
 Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 
 243-4, 355 
 
 Taxes on Wisconsin Corporations, 
 288 
 
 Taylor, Ezra B., 688 
 
 Taylor, Horace A., 181 
 
 Taylor, Governor, 20 
 
 Tennessee Coal and Iron Com 
 pany, 582, 693 
 
 Thorn, H. C., 171, 173 
 
 Thompson, Phil, 79 
 
 Treasury Cases, 140, 153 
 
 Tucker, Harry N., 643 
 
 Turpie, David, 688 
 
 Tussler, H. M., 216 
 
 Union League Club of Chicago, 
 
 167 
 
 University of Wisconsin, 26-33 
 Upham, W. H., 181, 184, 186, 
 
 188-9 
 
 Van Hise, Charles R., 27, 31-2, 
 
 162 
 Van Valkenberg, E. A., 502, 505, 
 
 508, 516, 520, 524-5 
 
INDEX 807 
 
 Vilas, William F., 8, 37, 123-4, Welliver, Judson C., 666 
 
 141 Wheeler, William G., 256 
 
 Voter s Handbook, 279 White, William Allen, 579-80 
 
 Vreeland Bill, 467 Whittier, John G., 308 
 
 Wickersham, G. W., 420-1, 730-1 
 
 Wall Street, 582, 741 Wilson-Gorman Law, 201 
 
 Wanamaker, R. M., 558-61, 574. Wisconsin "Machine," The, 178, 
 
 576 182, 187, 189, 191, 226 
 
 Warren, F.E., 398 Women and Public Service, 311- 
 Warren, Lansing, 251-3 18 
 
 Warner, William, 417 Wood, Joseph, 84-6 
 
 Water-Power Legislation, 363-4 Works, John D., 520 
 
 Watson, James E., 663, 714 Wright, Nathaniel, 537-8 
 Webster, Sidney, 720-1 
 
 Wellborn, Olin, 59 Youmans, Theodora W., 317 
 

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