PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, CONTAINING PROCEEDINGS OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION OF DELEGATES j REPORT OF THE cdMMISSIONERS WHILE AT WASHINGTON J LETTERS FROM MASSACHUSETTS MEMBERS N CONGRESS. LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA J REPORT AND RESO LUTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA STATE. LETTER OF GOVERNOR OF NEW-JERSEY, INCLOSING SUNDRY PAPERS. LETTER OF GOVERNOR O5 NEW-YORK, INCLOSING SUNDRY PAPERS. RELATING TO AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION, ij^. PR9POSED BY MASSACHUSETTS. :- . &F PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF TEE SE5ATR 1815. REPORT, &c. THE Delegates from the Legislatures of the States of Massa chusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode-Island, and from the Counties of Graf ton and Cheshire in the State of New- Hampshire and the county of Windham in the State of Vermont, assembled in Convention, beg leave to report the following result of their conference. THE Convention is deeply impressed with a sense of the ardu ous nature of the commission which they were appointed to exe cute, of devising the means of defence against dangers, and of re lief from oppressions proceeding from the act of their own Go vernment, without violating constitutional principles, or disap pointing the hopes of a suffering and injured people. To pre scribe patience and firmness to those who are already exhausted by distress, is sometimes to drive them to despair, and the pro gress towards reform by the regular road, is irksome to those whose imaginations discern, and whose feelings prompt, to a shorter course. But when abuses, reduced to system and accu mulated through a course of years, have pervaded every depart ment of Government, and spread corruption through every re gion of the State ; when these are clothed with the forms of law, and enforced by an Executive whose will is their source, no summary means of relief can be applied without recourse to di rect and open resistance. This experiment, even when justifia ble, cannot fail to be painful to the good citizen ; and the suc cess of the effort will be no security against the danger of the example. Precedents of resistance to the worst administration, are eagerly seized by those who are naturally hostile to the best. Necessity alone can sanction a resort to this measure ; and it should never be extended in duration or degree beyond the exi gency, until the people, not merely in the fervour of sudden \riteinent, but after full deliberation, are determined to change the Constitu It is a - * irnent r no incon construct ions to . . ;-3es M198484 under colour of its authority, that the time for a change is ai hand. Those who so believe, regard the evils which surround them as intrinsic and incurable defects in the Constitution. They yield to a persuasion, that no change, at any time, or on any occasion, can aggravate the misery of their country. Thi* opinion may ultimately prove to be correct. But as the evi-, dence on which it rests is not yet conclusive, and as measures adopted upon the assumption of its certainty might be irrevoca ble, some general considerations are submitted, in the hope of reconciling all to a course of moderation and firmness, which may save them from the regret incident to sudden decisions, proba bly avert the evil, or at least insure consolation and success in the last resort. The Constitution of the United States, under the auspices of a wise and virtuous Administration, proved itself competent to all ihc objects of national prosperity, comprehended in the views of its framers. No parallel can be found in history, of a ; transition so rapid as that of the United States from the lowest depression <o the highest felicity from the condition of weak and disjointed i-epublicks, to that of a great, united, and prosperous nation. Although this high state of publick happiness has undergone a miserable and afflicting reverse, through the prevalence of a weak and profligate policy, yet the evils and afflictions which have thus been induced upon the country, are not peculiar to any form of Government. The lust and caprice of power, the cor ruption of patronage, the oppression of the weaker interests of the community by the stronger, heavy taxes, wasteful expendi tures, and unjust and ruinous wars, are the natural offspring of bad Administrations, in all ages and countries. It ^vas indeed to be hoped, that the rulers of these States would not make such disastrous haste to involve their infancy in the embarrassments of old and rotten institutions. Yet ail this have they done ; and their conduct calls loudly for their dismission and disgrace. But to attempt upon every abuse of power to change-the Constitu tion, would be to perpetuate the evils of revolution. Again, the experiment of the powers of the Constitution, to regain its vigour, and of the people to recover from their delusions, has been hitherto made under the greatest possible disadvantages arising from the state of the world. The fierce passions which have convulsed the nations of Europe, have passed the Ocean, and finding their way to the bosoms of our citizens, have afforded to Administration the means of perverting publick opinion, in respect to our foreign relations, so as to acquire its aid in the indulgence of their animosities, and the increase of their adhe rents. Further, a reformation of publick opinion, resulting from bought experience, in the Southern Atlantick States, at least, is not to be despaired of. They will have felt, that the Eastern States cannot be made exclusively the victims of a capricious and impassioned policy. They will have seen that the great and essential interests of the people, are common to the Sonth and to the East. They will realize the fatal errours of a system, which seeks revenge for commercial injuries in the sacrifice of commerce, and aggravates by needless wars, to an immeasurable extent, the injuries it professes to redress. They may discard the influence of visionary theorists, and recognize the benefits of a practical policy. Indications of this desirable revolution of opinion, among our brethren in those States, are already mani fested. While a hope remains of its ultimate completion, its progress should not be retarded or stopped, by exciting fears which must check these favourable tendencies, and frustrate the efforts of the wisest and best men in those States, to accelerate this propitious change. Finally, if the Union be destined to dissolution, by reason of the multiplied abuses of bad administrations, it should, if possible, be the work of peaceable times, and deliberate consent. Some new form of confederacy should be substituted among those States, which shall intend to maintain a federal relation to each other. Events may prove that the causes of our calamities are deep and permanent. They may be found to proceed, not merely from the blindness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, or the confusion of the times ; but they may be traced to implacable combinations of individuals, or of States, to monopo lize power and office, and to trample without remorse upon the rights and interests of commercial sections of the Union. When ever it shall appear that these causes are radical and permanent, a separation by equitable arrangement, will be preferable to an alliance by constraint, among nominal friends, but real enemies, inflamed by mutual hatred and jealousies, and inviting by intestine divisions, contempt, and aggression from abroad. But a severance of the Union by one or more States, against the will of the rest, and especially in a time of war, can be justified only by absolute Jiecessity. These are among the principal objections against precipitate measures tending to disunite the States, and when examined in connexion with the farewell address of the Father of his country, they must, it is believed, be deemed conclusive. Under these impressions, the Convention have proceeded to- confer and deliberate upon the alarming state of publick affairs, especially as affecting the interests of the people who have ap pointed them for this purpose, and they are naturally led to a consideration, in the first place, of the dangers and grievances which menace an immediate or speedy pressure, with a view of g means of present relief: in 1he next place, of such as are of a uiore remote and general description, in the hope of attaining future security. Among the subjects of complaint and apprehension, which might be comprised under the former of these propositions, the attention of the Convention has been occupied with the claims and pretensions advanced, and the authority exercised over the militia, by the executive and legislative departments of the Na tional Government. Also, upon the destitution of the means of defence in which the Eastern States are left ; while at the same time they are doomed to heavy requisitions of men and money for national objects. The authority of the National Government over the militia is derived from those clauses in the Constitution which give power to Congress " to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute 1he laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel inva sions" Also, " to provide for organizing, arming and discipli ning the militia, and for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline pre scribed by Congress." Again, < 7 The President shall be Com mander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United Stales. 19 In these specified cases only, lias the National Government any power over the militia ; and it follows conclusively, that for all general and ordinary purposes, this power belongs to the States respectively, and to them alone. It is not only with regret, but with astonishment, the Convention perceive that under colour of an authority conferred with such plain and precise limitations, a power is arrogated by the execu tive government, and in some instances sanctioned by the ttfo Houses of Congress, of control over the militia, which if conce ded, will render nugatory the rightful authority of the individual States over that class of men, and by placing at the disposal of the National Government the lives and services of the great body of the people, enable it at pleasure to destroy their liberties, and erect a military despotism on the ruins. An elaborate examination of the principles assumed for the basis of these extravagant pretensions, of the consequences to which they lead, and of the insurmountable objections to their admission, would transcend the limits of this Report. A few general observations, wi th an exhibition of the character of these pretensions, and a recommendation of a strenuous opposition to them, must not however be omitted. It will not be contended, that by the terms used in the con stitutional compact, the power of the National Government to call out the militia is other than a power expressly limited to three cases. One of these must exist as a condition precedent to the exercise of that power Unless the laws shall be opposed, or an insurrection shall exist, or an invasion shall be made, Con gress, and of consequence the President as their organ, has no more power over the militia than over the armies of a foreign nation. But if the declaration of the President should be admitted to be an unerring test of the existence of these cases, this important power would depend, not upon the truth of the fact, but upon ex ecutive infallibility ; and the limitation of the power would consequently be nothing more than merely nominal, as it might always be eluded. It follows therefore that the decision of the President in this particular cannot be conclusive. It is as much the duty of the State authorities to watch over the rights reserv ed) as of the United States to exercise the powers which are delegated. The arrangement of the. United States into military districts, with a small portion of the regular force, under an officer of high rank of the standing army, with power to call for the militia, as circumstances in his judgment may require ; and to assume the command of them, is not warranted by the Constitution or any law of the United States- It is not denied that Congress may delegate to the President of the United States the power to call forth the militia in the cases which are within their jurisdiction But he has no authority to substitute military prefects through out the Union, to use their own discretion in such instances. To station an officer of the army in a military district without troops corresponding to his rank, for the purpose of taking command of the militia that may be called into service, is a manifest evasion of that provision of the Constitution which expressly reserves to the States the appointment of the officers of the militia ; and the object of detaching such officer cannot be well conceived to be any other, than that of superseding the Governour or other officers of the militia in their right to command. The power of dividing the militia of the States into classes, and obliging such classes to furnish by contract or draft, able bodied men, to serve for one or more years for the defence of the fron tier, is not delegated to Congress. If a claim to draft the militia for one year for such general object be admissible, no limitation can be assigned to it, but the discretion of those who make the law. Thus with a power in Congress to authorise such a draft or conscription, and in the Executive to decide conclusively upon the existence and continuance of the emergency, the whole militia may be converted into a standing army disposable at the will of the President of the United States. The power of compelling the militia and other citizens of (he tlnited States, by a forcible draft or conscription to serve in the regular armies, as proposed in a late official letter of the Secretary of War, is not delegated to Congress by the Constitution, and the exercise of it would be not less dangerous to their liberties, than hostile to the sovereignty of the States. The effort to de duce this power from the right of raising armies, is a flagrant attempt to pervert the sense of the clause in the Constitution which confers that right, and is incompatible with other pro visions in that instrument. The armies of the United States have always been raised by contract, never by conscription, and nothing more can be wanting to a Government, poisessing the power thus claimed, to enable it to usurp the entire control of the militia, in derogation of the authority of the State, and to convert it by impressment into a standing army. It may be here remarked, as a circumstance illustrative of the determination of the Executive to establish an absolute control over all descriptions of citizens, that the right of impressing sea men into the naval service is expressly asserted by the Secre tary of the Navy in a late report Thus a practice, which in a foreign government has been regarded with great abhorrence by the people, finds advocates among those who have been the loud est to condemn it. The law authorizing the enlistment of minors and apprentices into the armies of the United States, without the consent of parents and guardians, is also repugnant to the spirit of the Con stitution. By a construction of the power to raise armies, a applied by our present rulers, not only persons capable of con tracting are liable to be impressed into the army, but those who are under legal disabilities to make contracts, are to be invested with this capacity, in order to enable them to annul at pleasure contracts made in their behalf by legal guardians. Such an interference with the municipal laws and rights of the several States, could never have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. It impairs the salutary control and influence of the parent over his child the master over his servant the guardian over his ward and thus destroys the most important relations in society, so that by the conscription of the father, and the seduction of the son, the power of the Executive over all the effective male population of the United States is made complete. Such are some of the odious features of the novel system pro posed by the rulers of a free country, under the limited powers derived from the Constitution. What portion of them will be embraced in acts finally to be passed, it is yet impossible to de termine. It is, however, sufficiently alarming to perceive, that these projectse manate from the highest authority ; nor should it be forgotten, thai by the plan of the Secretary of War, the clas sification of the militia embraced the principle of direct taxation upon tiie white population only; and that, in the House of lle- presenta ivr-;, a motion to apportion !ho militia among the white po udafion exclusively, which would have been in its operation a direct tax, was strenuously urged and supported. In this whole series of devices and measures for raising men, this Convention discern a total disregard for the Constitution, and a disposition to violate its provisions, demanding from the indi vidual States a firm and decided opposition. An iron despotism can impose no harder servitude upon the citizen, than to force him from his home and his occupation, to wage offensive wars, inrlerlaken to gratify the pride or passions of his mas er. The example of France has recently shewn that a cabal of individuals assuming to act in the name of the people, may transform the great body of citizens into soldiers, and deliver them over into the hands of a single tyrant. No war, not held in just abhor rence by a people, can require the aid of such stratagems to recruit an army. Had the troops already raised, and in great. number* sacrificed upon the frontier of Canada, been employed for the defence of the country, and had the millions which have been squandered with shameless profusion, been appropriated to their payment, to the protection of the coast, and to the naval service, there would have been no occasion for unconstitutional expedients. Even at this late hour, let Government leave to New-England the remnant of her resources, and she is ready and able to defend her territory, and to resign the glories and advan tages of the border war, to those who are determined to persist in its prosecution. That acts of Congress in violation of the Constitution are ab solutely void, is an undeniable position. It does not, however, consist with (he respect and forbearance due from a confederate State towards the General Government, to fly to open resistance upon every infraction of the Constitution. The mode and the energy of ihe opposition should always conform to the nature of the violation, the intention of its authors, the extent of the injury inflicted, the determination manifested to persist in it, and the danger of delay. But in cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions of the Constitution, affecting the sovereignty of a State, and liberties of the people ; it is not only the right but the duty of such a State to interpose its authority for their protection, in the manner best calculated to secure that end. When emergencies occur which are either beyond the reach of the judicial tribunals, or too pressing to admit of the delay inci dent to their forms, States, which have no common umpire, must be their own judges, and execute their own decisions. It will o 10 thus be proper for the several States to await the ultimate dis posal of the obnoxious measures, recommended by the Secretary of War, or pending before Congress, and so to use their power according to the character these measures shall finally assume, as effectually to protect their own sovereignty, and the rights and liberties of their citizens. The next subject which has occupied the attention of the Convention, is the means of defence against the common enemy. This naturally leads to the inquiries, whether any expectation can be reasonably entertained, that adequate provision for the defence of the Eastern States will be made by the National Government ? Whether the several States can, from their own resources, provide for self-defence and fulfil the requisitions which are to be expected for the national Treasury ? and, gene rally, what course of conduct ought to be adopted by those States, in relation to the great object of defence ? Without pausing at present to comment upon the causes of the war, it may be assumed as a truth, officially announced, that to achieve the conquest of Canadian territory, and to hold it as a pledge for peace, is the deliberate purpose of Administration. This enterprise, commenced at a period when Government pos sessed the advantage of selecting the time and occasion for mak ing a sudden descent upon an unprepared enemy, now languishes in the third year of the war. It has been prosecuted with vari ous fortune, and occasional brilliancy of exploit, but without any solid acquisition. The British armies have been recruited by veteran regiments. Their navy commands Ontario. The Ame rican ranks are thinned by the casualties of war. Recruits are discouraged by the unpopular character of the contest, and by the uncertainty of receiving their pay. In the prosecution of this favourite warfare, Administration have left the exposed and vulnerable parts of the country desti tute of all efficient means of defence. The main body of the regular army has been marched to the frontier. The navy has been stripped of a great part of its sailors for the service of the Lakes. Meanwhile the enemy scours the sea-coast, blockades our ports, ascends our bays and rivers, makes actual descents in various and distant places, holds some by force, and threatens all that are assailable with fire and sword. The sea-board of four of the New-England States, following its curvatures, pre sents an extent of more than seven hundred miles, generally oc cupied by a compact population, and accessible by a naval force, exposing a mass of people and property to the devastation of the enemy, which bears a great proportion to the residue of the maritime frontier of the United States. This extensive shore has been exposed to frequent attacks, repeated contributions. 11 and constant alarms. The regular forces detached by the na tional Government for its defence, are mere pretexts for placing o.licers of high rank in command. They are besides confined to a few places, and are too insignificant in number to be includ ed in any computation. These States have thus been left to adopt measures for their own defence. The militia have been constantly kept on the alert, and harassed by garrison duties, and other hardships, while the expenses, of which the National Government decline the reim bursement, threaten to absorb all the resources of the States. The President of the United States has refused to consider the expense of the militia detached by state authority, for the indis pensable defence of the State, as chargeable to the Union, on the ground of a refusal by the Executive of the State, to place them under the command of officers of the regular army. Detachments of militia placed at the disposal of the General Government, have been dismissed either without pay, or with depreciated paper. The prospect of the ensuing campaign is not enlivened by the promise of any alleviation of these grievances. From authen- tick documents, extorted by necessity from those whose incli nation might lead them to conceal the embarrassments of the Government, it is apparent that the treasury is bankrupt, and its credit prostrate. So deplorable is the state of the finances, that those who feel for the honour and safety of the country, would be willing to conceal the melancholy spectacle, if those whose infatuation has produced this state of fiscal concerns, had not found themselves compelled to unveil it to public view. If the war be continued, there appears no room for reliance upon the national government for the supply of those means of defence, which must become indispensable to secure these States from desolation and ruin. Nor is it possible that the States can discharge this sacred duty from their own resources, and continue to sustain the burden of the national taxes. The Administration, after a long perseverance in plans to baffle every effort of commercial enterprise, had fatally succeeded in^ their attempts at the epoch of the war. Commerce, the vital spring of New-England s prosperity, was annihilated. Embargoes, re strictions, and the rapacity of revenue officers, had completed its destruction. The various objects for the employment of productive labour, in the branches of business dependent on commerce, have disappeared. The fisheries have shared its fate. Manufactures, which Government has professed an in tention to favour and to cherish, as an indemnity for the failure of these branches of business, are doomed to struggle in their in fancy with taxes and obstructions, which cannot fail most seri ously to affect their growth. The specie is withdrawn from 12 circulation. The landed interest, the last to feel these burdens, must prepare to become their principal support, as all other sources of revenue must be exhausted. Under these circum stances, taxes, of a description and amount unprecedented in this country, are in a train of imposition, the burden of which must fall with the heaviest pressure upon the states east of the Potowmac. The amount of these taxes for the ensuing year, cannot be estimated at less than five millions of dollars upon the New-England States, and the expenses of the last year for de fence, in Massachusetts alone, approaches to one million of dollars. From these facts, it is almost superfluous to state the irre sistible inference, that these States have no capacity of defray ing the expense requisite for their own protection, and, at the same time, of discharging the demands of the national treasury. The last inquiry, what course of conduct ought to be adopted by the aggrieved States, is in a high degree momentous. When a great and brave people shall feel themselves deserted by their Government, and reduced to the necessity either of submission to a foreign enemy, or of appropriating to their own use those means of defence which are indispensable to self-preservation, they cannot consent to wait passive spectators of approaching rum, which it is in their power to avert, and to resign the last remnant of their industrious earnings, to be dissipated in support of measures destructive of the best interests of the nation. This Convention will not trust themselves to express their conviction of the catastrophe to which such a state of things in evitably tends. Conscious of their high responsibility to God and their country, solicitous for the continuance of the Union, as well as the sovereignty of the States, unwilling to furnish ob stacles to peace resolute never to submit to a foreign enemy, and confiding in the Divine care and protection, they will, until the last hope shall be extinguished, endeavour to avert such conse quences. With this view they suggest an arrangement, which may at, once be consistent with the honour and interest of the National Government, and the security of these States. This it will not be difficult to conclude, if that government should be so dis posed. By the terms of it these States might be allowed to as sume their own defence, by the militia or other troops. A rea sonable portion, also, of the taxes raised in each State might be paid into its treasury, and credited to the United States, but to be appropriated to the defence of such Slate, to be accounted for with the United States. No doubt is entertained, that by such an arrangement, this portion of the country could be de- iended with greater effect, and in a mode more consistent with 13 economy, and the public convenience, than any which has been practised. Should an application for these purposes, made to Congress by Ihe State Legislatures, be attended with success, and should peace upon just terms appear to be unattainable, the people would stand together for the common defence, until a change of Ad ministration, or of disposition in the enemy, should facilitate the occurrence of that auspicious event. It would be inexpedient for this Convention to diminish the hope of a successful issue to such an application, by recommending, upon supposition of a con- trarv event, ulterior proceedings. Nor is it indeed within their province. In a state of things so solemn and trying as may then arise, the Legislatures of the Slates, or Conventions of the whole people, or delegates appointed by them for the express purpose in another Convention, must act as such urgent circum stances may then require. Bui the duty incumbent on this Convention will not have been performed, without exhibiting some general view of such mea sures as they deem essential to secure the nation against a relapse info difficulties and dangers, should they, by the blessing of Providence, escape from their present condition without abso lute ruin. To this end, a concise retrospect of the state of this nation under the advantages of a wise Administration, contrasted with the miserable abyss into which it is plunged by the profliga cy and folly of political theorists, will lead to some practical con clusions. On this subject, it will be recollected, that the imme diate influence of (he Federal Constitution upon its first adop tion, and for twelve succeeding years, upon the prosperity and happiness of the nation, seemed to countenance a belief in the transcendency of its perfection over all other human institutions. In the catalogue of blessings which have fallen to the lot of the most favoured nations, none could be enumerated from which our country was excluded A free Constitution, administered by great and incorruptible statesmen, realized the fondest hopes of liberty and independence The progress of agriculture was stimulated by the certainty of value in the harvest and com merce, after traversing every sea, returned with the riches of every clime. A revenue, secured by a sense of honour, collected without oppression, and paid without murmurs, melted away the national debt ; and the chief concern of the publick creditor arose from its too rapid diminution. The wars and commotions of the European nations, and the interruptions of their commercial intercourse afforded to those, who had not promoted, but who would have rejoiced to alleviate their calamities, a fair and golden opportunity, by enriching themselves to lay a broad foundation for national wealth. Although occasional vexations to com- 14 merce arose from the furious collisions of the powers at war, yet the great and good men of that time conformed to the force of circumstances which they could not control, and preserved their country in security from the tempests, which overwhelmed the old world, and threw the wreck of their fortunes on these shores. Respect abroad, prosperity at home, wise laws made by honoured legislators, and prompt obedience yielded by a con tented people, had silenced the enemies of republican institu tions. The arts flourished the sciences were cultivated the comforts and conveniences of life were universally diffused and nothing remained for succeeding administrations, but to reap the advantages, and cherish the resources, flowing from the policy of their predecessors. But no sooner was a new administration established in the hands of the party opposed to the Washington policy, than a fixed determination was perceived and avowed of changing a sys tem which had already produced these substantial fruits. The consequences of this change, for a few years after its commence ment, were not sufficient to counteract the prodigious impulse towards prosperity, which had been given to the nation. But a steady perseverance in the new plajis of administration at length developed their weakness and deformity, but not until a majority of the people had been deceived by flattery, and inflamed by passion, into blindness to their defects. Under the withering influence of this new system, the declension of the nation has been uniform and rapid. The richest advantages for securing the great objects of the Constitution have been wantonly rejected. While Europe reposes from the convulsions that had shaken down her ancient institutions, she beholds with amazement this remote country, once so happy and so envied, involved in a ru inous war, and excluded from intercourse with the rest of the world. To investigate and explain the means whereby this fatal re verse has been effected, would require a voluminous discussion. Nothing more can be attempted in thjs Report, than a general allusion to the principal outlines of the policy which has pro duced this vicissitude. Among these may be enumerated First. A deliberate and extensive system for effecting a combination among certain States, by exciting local jealousies and ambition, so as to secure to popular leaders in one section of the Union, the control of publick affairs, in perpetual succession. To which primary object most other characteristicks of the sys tem may be reconciled. Secondly. The political intolerance displayed and avowed, in excluding from, office men of unexceptionable merit, for want of adherence to the executive creed. 15 Thirdly. The infraction of the judiciary authority and rights, by depriving judges of their offices in violation of the Constitution. Fourthly. The abolition of existing Taxes, requisite to pre pare the Country for (hose changes to which nations are always exposed, with a view to Ihe acquisition of popular favour. Fifthly. The influence of patronage in the distribution of offices, which in these s(ates has been almost invariably made among men the least entitled to such distinction, and who have sold themselves as ready instruments for distracting publick opinion, and encouraging administration to hold in contempt the wishes and remonstrances of a people thus apparently divided. Sixthly. The admission of new States into the Union, form ed at pleasure in the western region, has destroyed the balance of power which existed among the original States, and deeply affected their interest. Seventhly. The easy admission of naturalized foreigners to places of trust, honour or profit, operating as an inducement to the malcontent subjects of the old world to r.ome to these States, in quest of executive patronage, and to repay it by an abject devotion to executive measures. Eighthly. Hostility to Great-Britain, and partiality to the late government of France, adopted as coincident with popular prejudice, and subservient to the main object, party power. Connected with these must be ranked erroneous and distorted estimates of the power and resources of those nations, of the pro bable results of their controversies, and of our political relations to them respectively. Lastly and principally. A visionary and superficial theory in regard to commerce, accompanied by a real hatred but a feign ed regard to its interests, and a ruinous perseverance in efforts to render it an instrument of coercion and war. But it is not conceivable that the obliquity of any administra tion could, in so short a period, have so nearly consummated the work of national ruin, unless favoured by defects in the Constitution. To enumerate all the improvements of which that instrument is susceptible, and to propose such amendments as might render it in all respects perfect, would be a task, which this Convention has not thought proper to assume. They have confined their attention to such as experience has demonstrated to be essential, and even among these, some are considered entitled to a more serious attention than others. They are suggested without any intentional disrespect to other States, and are meant to be such as all shall find an interest in promoting. Their object is to strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate, the Union of the by removing the grounds of existing jealousies, and pro- 16 viding for a fair and equal representation, and a limitation of pow ers which have been misused. The first amendment proposed, relates to the apportionment of Representatives among the slave-holding States. This can not be claimed as aright. * Those States are entitled to the slave representation, by a constitutional compact. It is therefore merely a subject of agreement, which should be conducted upon principles of mutual interest and accommodation, and upon which no sensibility on either side should be permitted to exist. It has proved unjust and unequal in its operation. Had this effect been foreseen, the privilege would probably not have been de manded ; certainly not conceded. Its tendency in future will be adverse to that harmony and mutual confidence, which are more conducive to the happiness and prosperity of every con federated State, than a mere preponderance of power, the prolifick source of jealousies and controversy, can be to any one of them. The time may therefore arrive, when a sense of magnanimity and justice will reconcile those States to acquiesce in a revision of this article, especially as a fair equivalent would result to them in the apportionment of taxes. The next amendment relates to the admission of new States into the union. This amendment is deemed to be highly important, and in fact indispensable. In proposing it, it is not intended to recog nise the right of Congress to admit new States without the origi nal limits of the United States, nor is any idea entertained of disturbing the tranquillity of any Slate already admitted into the union. The object is merely to restrain the constitutional power of Congress in admitting new States. At the adoption of the Constitution, a certain balance of power among the original par ties was considered to exist, and there was at that time, and yet is among those parties, a strong affinity between their great and general interests. By the admission of these States, that balance has been materially affected, and unless the practice be modi fied, must ultimately be destroyed. The Southern States will first avail themselves of their new confederates to govern the East, and finally the Western States multiplied in number, and augmented in population, will control the interests of the whole. Thus for the sake of present power, the Southern States will be common sufferers with the East, in the loss of permanent advan tages. None of the old States can find an interest in creating prematurely an overwhelming Western influence, which may hereafter discern (as it has heretofore) benefits to be derived to them by wars and commercial restrictions. The next amendment* proposed by the convention, relate to the powers of Congress, in relation to Embargo and the interdic tion of commerce ir Whatever theories upon the subject of commerce have hith erto divided the opinions of statesmen, experience has at last shewn, that it is a vital interest in the United States, and that its success is essential to the encouragement of agriculture and man ufactures, and to the wealth, finances, defence, and liberty of the nation. Its welfare can never interfere with the other great in terests of the State, but must promote and uphold them. Still, those who are immediately concerned in the prosecution of com merce, will of necessity be always a minority of the nation. They are, however, best qualified to manage and direct its course by the advantages of experience, and the sense of inte rest. But they are entirely unable to protect themselves against the sudden and injudicious decisions of bare majorities, and the mistaken or oppressive projects of those who are not actively concerned in its pursuits. Of consequence, this interest is al ways exposed to be harassed, interrupted, and entirely destroy ed, upon pretence of securing other interests. Had the mer chants of this nation been permitted, by their own government, to pursue an innocent and lawful commerce, how different would have been the state of the treasury and of publick credit ! How shortsighted and miserable is the policy which has annihilated this order of men, and doomed their ships to rot in the docks, their capital to waste unemployed, and their affections to be alienated from the Government which was formed to protect them ! What security for an ample and unfailing revenue can ever be had, comparable to that which once was realized in the good faith, punctuality, and sense of honour, which attached the mercantile class to the interests of the Government ? Without commerce, where can be found the aliment for a navy ; and without a navy, what is to constitute the defence, and ornament, and glory of this nation ? No union can be durably cemented, in which every great interest does not find itself reasonably secured against the encroachment and combinations of other interests. When, therefore, the past system of embargoes and commercial restrictions shall have been reviewed when the fluctuation and inconsistency of publick measures, betraying a want of information as well as Reeling in the majority, shall have been considered, the reasonableness of some restrictions upon the power of a bare majority to repeat these oppressions, will appear to be obvious. The next amendment proposes to restrict the power of making offensive war. In the consideration of this amendment, it is not necessary to inquire into the justice of the present war. But one sentiment now exists in relation to its expediency, and regret for its declaration is nearly universal. No indemnity can ever be attained for this terrible calamity, and its only palliation must bo found in obstacles to its future recurrence. Rarelv can the 3 state of this country call for or justify offensive war. The ge nius of our institutions is unfavourable to its successful prosecu tion ; the felicity of our situation exempts us from its necessity. j In this case, as in the former, those more immediately expo sed to its fatal effects are a minority of the nation. The com mercial towns, 1he shores of our seas and rivers, contain the pop ulation, whose vital interests are most vulnerable by a foreign enemy. Agriculture, indeed, must feel at last, but this appeal to its sensibility comes too late. Again, the immense population which has swarmed into the West, remote from immediate dan ger, and which is constantly augmenting, will not be averse from the occasional disturbances of the Atlantick Slates. Thus inte rest may not unfrequently combine with passion and intrigue, to plunge the nation into needless wars, and compel it to become a military, rather than a happy and flourishing people. These considerations, which it would be easy to augment, call loudly for the limitation proposed in the amendment. Another amendment, subordinate in importance, but still in a high degree expedient, relates to the exclusion of foreigners, hereafter arriving in the United States, from the capacity of hold ing offices of trust, honour or profit. That the stock of population already in these States, is amply sufficient to render this nation in due time sufficiently great and powerful, is not a controvertible question Nor will it be seri ously pretended, that the national deficiency in wisdom, arts, science, arms or virtue, needs to be replenished from foreign countries. Still, it is agreed, that a liberal policy should offer the rights of hospitality, and the choice of settlement, to those who are disposed to visit the country. But why admit to a par ticipation in the government aliens who were no parties to the compact who are ignorant of the nature of our institutions, and have no stake in the welfare of the country, but what is recent and transitory? It is surely a privilege sufficient, to admit them after due probation to become citizens, for all but political pur poses. To extend it beyond these limits, is to encourage for eigners to come to these states as candidates for preferment. The. Convention forbear to express their opinion upon the inauspi cious effects which have already resulted to the honour and peace of this nation, from this misplaced and indiscriminate lib erality. The last amendment respects the limitation of the office of President to a single constitutional term, and his eligibility from the same State two terms in succession. Upon this topick it is superfluous to dilate. The love of power is a principle in the human heart, which too often impels o the use of all practicable means to prolong its duration. The 19 office of President has charms and attractions which operate as powerful incentives to this passion. The first and most natural exertion of a vast patronage is directed towards Ihe security of a new election. The interest of the country, the welfare of the people, even honest fame and respect for the opinion of poster ity, are secondary considerations. All the engines of intrigue, all the means of corruption, are likely to be employed for this object. A President, whose political career is limited to a single election, may find no other interest than will be promoted by making it glorious to himself, and beneficial to his country. But the hope of re-election is prolifick of temptations, under w T hich these magnanimous motives are deprived of their principal force. The repeated election of the President of the United States from any one State, affords inducements and means for intrigue, which tend to create an undue local influence, and to establish the dom ination of particular States. The justice, therefore, of securing to every State a fair and equal chance for the election of this officer from its own citizens, is apparent, and this object will be essentially promoted by preventing an election from the same State twice in succession. Such is the general view which this Convention has thought proper to submit, of the situation of these States, of their dan gers and their duties. Most of the subjects which it embraces have separately received an ample and luminous investigation, by the great and able assertors of the rights of their Country, in the National Legislature ; and nothing more could be attempted on this occasion, than a digest of general principles, and of re commendations, suited to the present state of publick affairs. The peculiar difficulty and delicacy of performing, even this undertaking, will be appreciated by all who think seriously upon the crisis. Negociations for Peace are at this hour supposed to be pending, the issue of which must be deeply interesting to all. No measures should be adopted, which might unfavourably affect that issue ; none which should embarrass the Administration, if their professed desire for peace is sincere ; and none, which on supposition of their insincerity, should afford them pretexts for prolonging the war, or relieving themselves from the responsi bility of a dishonourable peace. It is also devoutly to be wished, that an occasion may be afforded to all friends of the country, of all parties, and in all places, to pause and consider the awful state, to which pernicious counsels, and blind passions, have brought this people. The number of those who perceive, and who are ready to retrace errours, must, it is believed, be yet sufficient to redeem the nation. It is necessary to rally and unite them by the assurance, that no hostility to the Constitution is meditated, and to obtain their aid, in placing it under guardians, who alone can save it 20 from destruction. Should this fortunate change be effected, the hope of happiness and honour may once more dispel the sur rounding gloom. Our nation may yet be great, our union dura ble. But should this prospect be utterly hopeless, the time will not have been lost, which shall have ripened a general sentiment of the necessity of more mighty efforts to rescue from ruin, at least some portion of our beloved Country. THEREFORE RESOLVED- THAT it be and hereby is recommended to the Legisla tures of the several States represented in this Convention, to adopt all such measures as may be necessary effectually to pro tect the citizens of said States from the operation and effects of all acts which have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United States, which shall contain provisions, subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, not authorized by the Constitution of the United States. Resolved, That it be and hereby is recommended to the said Legislatures, to authorize an immediate and earnest application to be made to the Government of the United States, requesting their consent to some arrangement, whereby the said States may, separately or in concert, be empowered to assume upon themselves the defence of their territory against the enemy ; and a reasonable portion of the t^xes, collected within said States, may be paid into the respective treasuries thereof, arid appropri ated to the payment of the balance due said States, and to the future defence of the same. The amount so paid into the said treasuries to be credited, and the disbursements made as afore said to be charged to the United States. Resolved, That it be, and it hereby is, recommended to the Legislatures of the aforesaid States, to pass -laws (where it has not already been done) authorizing the Governours or Com manders in Chief of their militia to make detachments from the same, or to form voluntary corps, as shall be most convenient and conformable to their Constitutions, and to cause the same to be well armed, equipped and disciplined, and held in readiness for service ; and upon the request of the Governour of eiiher of the other States, to employ the whole of such detachment or corps, as well as the regular forces of the State, or such part thereof as may be required and can be spared consistently with the safety of the State, in assisting the State, making such re quest to repel any invasion thereof which shall be made or atr tempted by the publick enemy. 21 Resolved, That the following amendment* of the Constitution of the United States, be recommended to the States represent ed as aforesaid, to be proposed by them for adoption by the State Legislatures, and, in such cases as may be deemed expe dient, by a Convention chosen by the people of each Slate. And it is further recommended, that the said States shall persevere in their efforts to obtain such amendments, until the same shall be effected. First. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportion ed among the several States which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers of free persons, in cluding those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other persons. Second. No new State shall be admitted into the union by Congress in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, without the concurrence of two thirds of both Houses. Third. Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States, in the ports or harbours thereof, for more than sixty days. Fourth. Congress shall not have power, without the concur rence of two thirds of both Houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation or the dependencies thereof. Fifth. Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the concur rence of two thirds of both Houses, except such acts of hostility- be in defence of the territories of the United States when actu ally invaded. Sixth. No person who shall hereafter be naturalized, shall be eligible as a member of the Senate or House of Representa tives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil office under the authority of the United States. Seventh. The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time ; nor shall the President be elected from the same State two terms in succession. Resolved, That if the application of these States to the go vernment of the United States, recommended in aforegoing Re solution, should be unsuccessful, and peace should not be con cluded, and the defence of these States should be neglected, as it has been since the commencement of the war, it will in the opinion of this Convention be expedient for the Legislatures of the several States to appoint Delegates to another Convention, to meet at Boston, in the State of Massachusetts, on the third Thursday of June next, with such powers and instructions as flie exigency of a crisis so momentous may require. Resolved, That the Hon. George Cabot, the Hon. Chauncey Goodrich, and the Hon. Daniel Lyman, or any two of them, be authorized to call another meeting of this Convention, to be hoi- den in Boston, at any time before new Delegates shall be chosen, as recommended in the above Resolution, if in their judgment the situation of the Country shall urgently require it. HARTFORD, January 4th, 1815. GEORGE CABOT, NATHAN DANK, WILLIAM PRESCOTT, HARRISON G. OTIS, TIMOTHY BIGELOW, JOSHUA THOMAS, SAMUEL S. WILDE, JOSEPH LYMAN, STEPHEN LONGFELLOW, JR. DANIEL WALDO, HODIJAH BAYLIES, GEORGE BUSS, CHAUNCEY GOODRICH, JAMES HILLHOUSE, JOHN TREADWELL, ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, NATHANIEL SMITH, CALVIN GODDARD, ROGER M. SHERMAN. DANIEL LYMAN, SAMUEL WARD, EDWARD MANTON, BENJAMIN HAZARD, BENJAMIN WEST, MILLS OLCOTT, WILLIAM HALL, JR. STATEMENTS, PREPARED AND PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, HELD AT HARTFORD, DECEA1BER 15, 181 -1, AND PR1NTKD MY THEIR ORDER SCHEDULE (A,) Shewing the ascertained expenses of the war, prior to July 1, 1814. Military Department, or land forces, from January 1, to Sept. 30, 1812, including about six months of peace, and three months of war, in that year, $7,464,814 80 From Sept. 30, 1812, to Sept. 30, 1813, 18,484,750 49 From Sept. 30, 1813, to Dec. 31, 1813, 5,887,747 00 From Jan. 1, to July 1, 1814, - 11,210,238 00 Ascertained expenses of the Land forces from > <, n <7 c<- n < m Jan. 1, 1812, to July 1, 1814, \* Navy Department, from Jan. 1, to Sept. 30, 1812, about six months of peace, and three months of war, the sum of $2,638,612 95 From Sept. 30, 1812, to Sept. > 6 ? 30, 1813, $ 0,4^0,70 From Sept. 30, to Dec. 31, 1813, 1,248,145 10 From Jan. 1, to July 1, 1814, 4,012,899 90 14,320,365 15 Ascertained war expenses to July 1, 1814, $57,367,915 44 to which must be added, large sums not ascertained, and, also disbursements made by individual States, these must he more than - - 3,000,000 00 $60,367,915 44 Note. The Military and Naval expenses of the United States from January 1, 1812, to June 18, 1812, when war was declared, are in cluded in the above Account, and were, partly on account of the peace establishment, and, in part, preparations for war. So that this enor- rnous expenditure was incurred in the Military and Naval depart ments alone, in two years of small w:.rfi-r*. aw in six: months th.-a receded it-. SCHEDULE (B,) Shewing the receipts at the Treasury of the United States from January!, 1812, to July 1, 1814, including about 6 months of peace, and about two years of war, to wit From Jan. 1, to Oct. 1, 1812, from the proceedsof the customs, the sales of land, &c. being three fourths of the revenue year, $8,201,210 18 The balance in the Treasury charged this account, 3,947,818 36 On the 11 million loan under the act of March H 1812, 5,847,212 50 $17,906,241 04 Receipts from Oct. 1, 1812, to Oct. 1, 1813, to wit From the proceeds of the customs, $12,596,491 55 Sales of land, - 830,671 53 Other items of revenue, 140,879 35 13,568,042 43 On account of the 11 million loan, $4,337,487 50 On the 16 million loan, act Feb. 8, 1813, - - 14,488,125 00 Treasury Notes issued on the act of June 30, 1812, 4,898,300 00 Do. do. act Feb. 25, 1813, - 253,000 00 23,976,912 50 Receipts from Oct. 1, 1813, to Jan. 1, 1814, to wit From the customs and sales of lands, &c. $3,678,565 00 On the 16 million loan, - 1,511,87500 On the seven and half million loan, 3,907,335 00 Treasury notes, 3,778,700 00 12,876,475 00 Receipts from Jan. 1, to July 1, 1814, to wit From the proceeds of the customs, 4,182,088 25 Sales of publick lands, 540,065 68 Internal duties and direct tax, 2,189,272 40 Postage and incidental receipts, 166,744 00 $7,078,170 33 On the 7 1-2 million loan, act Aug. 2, 1813, - $3,592,665 On 10 million loan (part of the 25 millions) 6,087,011 Carried forward. $0.f>79.076 $7.078,170 33 $68,417,670 97 25 Brought up, 9,679,676 $7,078,170 33 $68,417,670 97 Treasury notes on act Feb. 25, 1813, $1,070,000 Do. on act March 24, 1814, 1,302,100 -2,462,100-12,141,776 00-19,219,946 33 87,637,617 30 Deduct cash in the treasury, July 1, 1814, 4,722,059 32 Deduct payments made at the trea- $82,914,957 98 sury in the s.ime period from Jan. 1, 1812, to July 1, 1814, to wit The civil list, Indian department, &c. $4,697,872 32 Interest and principal of the publick debt, 21,101,417 72-25,799,290,04 Left for war purposes in this period, $57,1 15,667,94 Note. Thus while the war cost above 60 millions of dollars, and the land forces 46 millions of the sum, there was but a small British army employed against the United States, and in this period, disgrace generally attended the American arms by land. SCHEDULE (C,) Shewing the great increase of the revenues of the United States, from the adoption of (he Constitution to the adoption of the restric tive system ; and while commerce continued free, and the great diminution of these revenues since that system was resorted to they were us follow, as by Treasury statements. Prior to 1792, $4,418,913 1803, 11,064,067 In 1792, 3,661,932 1804, 11,828,307 1703, 4,714,423 1805, 13,560,663 1794, 5,128,432 1806, 15,559,931 1795, 5,954,534 1807, 16,398,019 1796, 7,137,529 1808, 17,060,661 1797, 8,403,560 1809, 7,773,473 1798, 7,820,575 1810, 9,384,214 1799, 7,475,773 1811, 14,423,529 1800, 10,777,709 9 months of 1812, 6,927,706 1 801 12 R/tfi "i^O 1 OV/ 1 } 1802, 1 .^jO^IU^c/OV/ 13,668,223 $215,988,703 Note As bonds were given for the duties, and they usually become payable the next year the duties payable in any year, were, gene rally, collected on the importations of the preceding year, as the $17,060,661 received in 1808 were the duties on the great importa tions of 1807, a few small sums escepted. Note, (dso All these revenues arose from commerce, except $16,262,651. It will he observed that all the sources of revenue exclusive of im post and tonnage duties, did not, on an average, amount to quite one million of dollars a year ; so that the impost and tonnage duties, the 4 26 four years preceding the long embargo, amounted to about fifty-eight millions of dollars, or to $14,500,000 a year. And if there had been no embargoes or restrictions on commerce these would have increased, at least not decreased till the war was commenced. That commenced four years and a half after the embargo was laid. It will be seen that all the revenues amounted, in four years, before the embargo, to $62,579,274, and deducting for other sources of revenue, one million a year, there will remain $58,579,274 received from imposts and tonnage duties: whereas in the three years and nine months after the embargo was laid, all the revenues, as above, amounted only to $38,508,922, or at the rate of $40,817,990 in four years ; but in these four years were included, not only the ordinary million a year, but the two million direct tax of 1798, and the new internal duties of those four years, whence was collected at least two millions and a half; hence deduct $6,500,000 from $40,817,990 leaves, received from im post and tonnage duties $34,317,990, $24,261,284 less than was received in the four years preceding the embargo; that is, above six millions a year, or above twenty-seven millions for the four years and a half, the restrictive system existed before the war; hence this sum was clearly lost by this system See Schedule F. Note, also The said $16,262,651 was received thus, from in ternal revenue, $6,460,003; direct tax, $1,757,240; sales of land, $6,161,283 02; postage of letters, &c. $667,343; miscellaneous, $1,216,775. Therefore, it is clear, that if there had been no restrictive system or war, the old debt of the United States, would have been, before this time, paid, or nearly paid. SCHEDULE (D,) Shewing the state of the army of the United States previous to July 1, 1814. It was thus effectives 27,010; aggregate 31,539; sta tioned as follows : In the first Military District, at Boston, Portsmouth, Portland and Eastport, aggregate number 2 Military District at New-London, &c. 3 do. at New-York, 4 do. at Fort Miflflin, &c. 5 do. at Baltimore, Norfolk, 6 do. North and South Carolina and Georgia, 7 do. at New-Orleans, Mobile, &c. Stationed on the sea board, 10,659 8 Military District at Detroit, Sandwich, &c. 2,472 9 do. division of the right, 11,795 at Buffaloe, Sacket s harbour, &c. 6,613 18,408 on the Canada line, 20,880 total 31,539 27 Recruits enlisted from January 27, 1814, to September 30, 1814, as by the return of the Inspector General were 13,898: to wit in February 1814, 980 March April May June July August Sept Note An army of 31,539, early in the year 1814, was, no doubt, a much larger army than the United States kept up the two first years of the war; and if properly employed, 31,000 regular troops were cer tainly adequate to oppose any force Great Britain, in those years, employed against the United States 31,000 men, according to the estimates of the War and Treasury Departments, should not have cost more than 12 millions a year, or 24 millions in the two years; whereas the land forces did cost 46 millions and more, in the wasteful manner in which the war was conducted. Note, also When it is considered the United States had on the 1st of July, 1814, a regular army of 31,539, and enlisted in 8 months, from February 1, to October 1, 1814, 13,898 men, for what possible p -etence can the national government have recourse to conscription, and measures destructive of the liberties of the people, to fill the ranks of the army ? The course of enlistments amply proves, that if the army be well paid and supported, and according to contracts, there can be no occasion to resort to such violent measures. Note, also Of the 10,659 regular troops on the sea board, only 1,369 were stationed in New-England. SCHEDULE (E.) Though the operations of the war in 1 781 and 1 782 were great, espe cially in the Southern States, yet it cost America far less than fifteen millions a year, as will appear t>y the publick documents. In 1782 Con gress made an estimate for an army of 25,000 men. This estimate, which proved to be correct, was a little over eight millions of dollars. The individual States expenses will be found not to have exceeded four millions a year, and Navy expenses were trifling. In 1 781 the expenses were about three millions more than in 1782. Prices were about the same then as now. The following is an abstract of the expenditures of the United States from the adoption of the Constitution, to Oct. 1, 1812, taken from Trea sury Reports : Prior to In 1792, 1792, 1793, 1794, 1795, 1796, 1797, 1798, 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, $1,718,129 1803, 1,766,677 1804, 1,707,848 1805, 3,500,348 1806, 4,350,596 1807, 2,531,930 1808, 2,833,590 1809, 4,623,223 1810, 6,480,1 66 1811, 7,411,369 9 months of 181 2, 4,981,669 3,737,079 4,062,824 4,052,858 6,357,234 6,080,209 4,984,572 6,504,338 7,414,672 5,311,082 5,592,604 11,760,292 $ 107,763,309 A r ote....These expenditures. do not include the interest and principal of the publick debt. Never after the peace of 1783, till 1812, did the expenditures of the United States amount to seven millions and a half in any year. In 1781 Cornwallis was taken, and it is ascertained that over 26,000 British troops were sent into the four Southern States in less than two years in 1780 and 1781. The United States were obliged to keep up large forces in the Middle and Northern States ; and the militia drafts were often made in those two years. During the long period from March 4, 1789, to Oct. 1, 1812, the whole Military expenditures of the United States were hut $44,066,745 65 including Indian wars, war with France, and with the Barbary powers, the Pennsylvania insurrection, and several millions expended in the present war before October, 1812. Much IPSS than two millions of dollars a year. And the Navy expen ditures during the same long period were but $29,889,660 78. About one million and a quarter a year. Further, An examination of the publick documents will shew, that the eight-years-war of the revolution did not cost more than 205,000,000 of specif dollars. More than half that sum was expended in the three first years, when paper money was abundant, and the American and British armies most numerous ; a period in which we withstood the forces of the enemy alone, in a manner so honourable to our arms. SCHEDULE (F.) This Schedule brings into one view the great loss of revenue occa sioned by the Restrictive System, and the enormous waste of publick monies in the two first years of this war; the particulars whereof are stated in the preceding Schedules. 1. 27 millions of dollars, at least, were lost by reason of restrictions on commerce, for four years and a half before the war was declared or commenced, as in scheduleC, $27,000,000 2. War expenses, as stated in schedule A, to the amount of $60,367,915, at least, were incurred in this war before July 1, 1814; whereas, on any scale of expenses of any wars, ever carried on in this country heretofore, the war expenses from January 1812, to July 1, 1814, ought not to have exceeded 27 millions, if indeed they could equal that sum. There then was clearly a wasteful and improvident 29 Amount brought forward, 27,000,000 expenditure of publick monies, in the war and navy depart ments, in this short period, of more than 33 millions of dol lars, ........ * - 33,000,000 Revenue and public monies lost by foolish restrictions,- and in a profligate management of the war, $60,000,000 Schedule E, also, shews how moderate our military expenses were prior to the present war. this large sum been saved, as it might have been, with perfect ease by a wise and economical administration, the credit of the United States, at this moitient, would have been unimpaired, and the very heavy direct and internal taxes now laid on the people to supply the place of this sum, so lost and wasted, might have been avoided. In fact, examine the expenditures of all former wars in this country, the force brought against it in the two first years of this war, and every cause of necessary expenditure, and it will appear, that not so much as 27 millions ought to have been expended in the military and naval de partments in the period in question. SCHEDULE (G,) Shewing the amounts of the several Internal Duties, distinctly, that have accrued for the two first quarters of the year 1814. Ascer tained to have been received in each State and Territory of the United States, viz. IS .nit:.- oi States and Territories. Licenses for Stills and Boilers. Carnages. Licenses for Retailers. Duties on Sales at Auction. Refined Sugar. Stamps. New-Hamp 4817 S*: U155 08 15154 351 29 544 05 Massachusetts. 61217 86 33160 78 79220 12285 05 120 on 14281 18 Vermont, 19710 52 2532 18 12271 7 96 13 35 Rhode- Island, 16265 23 2842 88 15702 6039 23 5329 80 Connecticut, 42878 36 13092 61 28556 79 48 1-2 7388 37 New-York, 154484 67 21687 23 156492 8872 69 1-2 51935 06 New-Jersey, 18429 5r 16253 92 27163 2823 86 3350 49 Pennsylvania, 271780 25707 08 1-2 113852 10871 61 4550 45 Delaware, 1447 50 5118 18 7477 116 25 2701 56 Maryland, 36736 37 16965 97 1-2 42300 5344 111-4 20300 823-4 Virginia, 148442 91 28836 91 46691 2018 20 21378 031-2 North-Caro. 44780 20 13594 293-4 20644 444 141-4 5212 413-4 Georgia, 11076 68 6532 12 1-4 11931 1003 17 2145 76 Sotith-Caro. 32215 67 15024 72 20343 923 52 10,. 10 16 Ohio, 84708 5P 456 24 15200 3246 87 1-2 Kentucky, 56082 IP 2634 69 1-2 13684 160 08 1-2 4185 38 Tennessee, 46855 97 661 11 7612 946 05 Louisiana, 5485 08 840 81 7079 1878 30 26 25 7119 86 Illinois Ter. 490 44 62 835 5 60 Michigan 54 1135 28 93 21 24 Indiana 1263 73 4 1396 Missouri 2027 38 75 1340 45 45 Missisippi 1562 07 303 3305 91 82 652 76 Dis. ofColum. 2044 91 9505 154 32 10159 56 1062758 9!> ^14639 73 1-2 663887 53494 03 146 34 217304 28 1-2 GROSS TOTAL $2,212,290 38. SCHEDULE (H.) This shews the great increase of the commerce of the United States, under federal administrations when it was free. Also its great diminu tion under embargoes, restrictions and war. 2. The comparative ex ports of the several States from time to time. 3. The kind of exports, as articles domestick or foreign, as productions of the forest, of agricul ture, of the sea, &c. 1. The exports of the United States every fifth year, to wit 1791 1796 1801 1806 1811 $17,571,551 45 67,064.097 00 93,020,513 00 103,787,000 00 61,317,833 00 Exports of the United States four years next preceding the long embargo, viz. 1804 $77,701,597 1805 95,566,021 1806, as above, 103,787,000 1807 108,343,558 $385,398,176 iVofc....Thus the exports, when commerce was free, increased near ly 6 fold in 15 years, and under restrictions diminished about one half as stated below. Exports of the United States four years under restrictions, and one year in war, viz. 1808 Domestick Arts $8,417,000 Foreign do. 12,997,414 1809 Domestick do. 28,841,000 Foreign do. 20,797,531 1810 Domes. & For. 67,895,597 1811 do. do. 61,317,833 1813 Domestick Arts 25,008,152 Foreign do. 2,847,845 $228,122,372 The comparative exports of each State, from time to time, viz. year 1791 year 1799 year 1806 year 1813 New-Hampshire, $ 142,858 $ 360,089 $ 795,260 Dom. Arts. $ 29,996 Massachusetts, 2,445,975 11,421,591 21,199,243 do. 1,807,923 Vermont, 20,480 193,775 do. Rhode-Island, 470,131 1,055,273 2,091,835 do. 236,802 Connecticut, 710,340 1,143,818 1,715,858 do. 974,303 New-York, 2,5 IB, 197 18,719,527 21,762,845 do. 8,185,494 New-Jersey, 27,957 9,722 33,867 do. 10,260 Pennsylvania, 2,931,624 12,431,967 17,574,502 do. 3,577,117 Delaware, 119,840 297,065 500,106 do. 133,432 Maryland, 2,193,355 16,299,609 14,580,905 do. 3,787,865 Virginia, 3,131,227 6,292,986 5,055,396 do. 1,819,722 North-Carolina, 524,548 485,921 789,605 do. 797,318 South-Carolina, 1,866,021 8,729,015 9,743,782 do. 2,968,484 Ceorgia, 491,472 1,396,768 no return. do. 1,004,595 Ohio, 62,318 do. Territories of the U. S. 4,100,583 do. Georgetown, Alexandria, 254.353? 991,793 S do. 1,387,498 Michigan, 221,260 do. New-Orleans, 3,887,323 do. 1,045,153 31 3. The kind of exports from the United States, as articles do- mestick or foreign; productions of the forest, agriculture, of the sea, &c. Prod, of the forest, of the sea, of agriculture, of manufact. Miscellaneous, Foreign articles, Year 1804 4,600,000 3,420,000 30,890,000 2,100,000 430,000 Year 1805 5,201,000 2,884,000 31,552,000 2,525,000 155,000 Year 1806 4,801,000 3,116,000 32,375,000 2,707,000 445,000 Year 1807 5,476,000 2,804,009 37,832,000 2,120,000 468,000 41,440,000 36,231,597 42,377,000 53,179,021 43,504,000 60,283,000 48,700,000 59,643,578 77,071,597 95,556,021 1 103,787,0001108,343,578 This statement shews, that about three fourths of the domestick exports of the United States are the produce of agriculture, and fer four years prior to the embargo, exceeded on an average 33 millions a year. It will readily be seen what great losses there must have been in regard to these articles, when the regular exportation of them has been capri ciously interrupted for 7 years past, by embargoes, restrictions and war, the same as to the produce of the forest, and, that of the sea ; the latter amounting, on an average, for four years next before the em bargo, to above 3 millions of dollars a year, has been by restrictions and war, wholly destroyed And the shipping employed formerly, in acquiring these productions of the sea, is nearly rotten at the wharves, and the seamen engagetl in this branch of business, very important, in a publick view, are scattered and gone. The domestick articles in the four years next before the restrictive system, were 50 millions more than the same articles exported in the four years under it, and before the war. NOTE. Page 8. Extract from Report of the Secretary of the Navy, dated November 15, 1814. There is another branch of the service which appears to me to merit the serious deliberation of the legislature, with regard to the establishment of some regular system, by which the voluntary enlistments for the navy may derive occasional reinforcement from the services of those seamen, who, pursuing theirown private occupations, are exempt, by their itine rant habits, from publick service of any kind. In my view there would be nothing incompatible with the free spirit of our institutions, or with the rights of individuals, if registers, with a particular descriptive re cord, were kept in the several districts, of all the seamen belonging to the United States, and provision made by law for classing and calling into the publick service, in succession, for reasonable stated periods, such portions or classes, as the publick service might require, and if any individual, so called, should be absent at the time, the next in sue cession should perform the tour of duty of the absentee, who should, on his return, be liable to serve his original tour, and his substitute be exempt from his succeeding regular tour of duty. NOTE. It appears from the following extract from a speech of Mr. Madison, in the Debates of the Virginia Convention, that he had a prophetick view of circumstances which would induce a majority of States to SUP PORT VIRGINIA against the carrying States. See also the speeches of Mr. Nicholas in that Convention, and the essays in the Federalist, written by Mr. Madison. Extract from debates in Virginia Convention, Richmond Ed. p. 224. I will not sit down till I make one more observation on what fell from my honourable friend. He says, that the true difference between the statec lies in this circumstance that some are carrying states, and others productive, and that the operation of the new government will be, that there will be a plurality of the former to combine against the interest of the latter, and that consequently it will be dangerous to put it in their power to do so. I would join with him in sentiment, if this were the case. Were this within the bounds of probability, I should be equally alarmed, but I think that those States which are contradistinguished as carrying states, from the non-importing states, will be but few. I suppose the southern states will be considered by all, as under the latter description. Some other states have been mentioned by an honourable member on the same side, which are not considered as carrying states. New-Jersey and Connecticut can by no means be enumerated among the carrying states. They receive their supplies through New-York. Here then is a plurality of non- importing states. I could add another if necessary. Delaware, though situated upon the water, is upon the list of non-carrying states. I might s.-iy that a great part of New-Hampshire is so. I believe a ma jority of the people of that State receive their supplies from Massachu setts, Rhode-Island, and Connecticut. Might I not add all those states which will be admitted hereafter into the union ? These will he non- carry ins; states, and will support Virginia in case the carrying states n ill attempt to combine against the rest. DOCUMENTS. Report of Commissioners to his Excellency the Governor. THE Undersigned, appointed by his Excellency the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Council, Commissioners, to proceed to the seat of the National Govern* ment, for the purposes expressed in a Kesolve of the Legisla ture of the 27th day of January now last past, beg leave res pectfully to report, That in virtue of the said Resolve, and of the instructions, given under it by his Excellency, they proceeded to the seat of the National Government, in the most expeditious manner for the purpose of attempting to accomplish the objects of their mission. On the day of their arrival at Washington, a report of the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain was extensively propagated and credited, and on the next day the news assumed a shape of probability, which in the opinion of the undersigned, and of the senators and delegates from this Commonwealth in Congress, with whom they were instructed to consult, rendered it proper to suspend any application to the government of the United States, and wait for a confirmation of this welcome intelligence. The cer tainty of this event being soon placed beyond all possible doubt, by the actual arrival of a messenger with the treaty at Washing ton, justified a still further delay; and the final ratification of the treaty by government, having most happily superseded the necessity of any such arrangements, tor the defence of this Com monwealth, as were proposed in the said resolve, it was judged proper by tlievUndersigned, to abstain altogether from reques ting an audience in their public capacity, or exhibiting their credentials to any persons. The undersigned conceiving that an effort (o oftain a repay ment of monies advanced by the Commonwealth for the nation al defence, was within the scope of their Commission and in structions, had intended to have brought that subject into full view in a conference with the Heads of the proper Departments ; But at this moment, a bill, whose provisions fully embraced this object, had passed the Senate, unanimously, or nearly so, and it was believed that fl< view? of this Commonwealth would 3 34 be more effectually promoted by endeavors to facilitate the pas sing of that bill through the House, than by soliciting the exe cutive Government, which might justly have hesitated to act upon a subject, which Congress thus appeared to consider as belonging to their province. The undersigned therefore re mained at the seat of government no longer than was necessary to communicate to their friends in Congress such information as they possessed in relation to the claims or the Commonwealth, conceiving that this concern could not possibly be left in better hands than their Members ot Congress, from whom they exper ienced the most cordial and zealous assistance. The bill how ever did not pass the House of Representatives. All which is submitted. H. G. OTIS, T. H. PERKINS, AY. SULLIVAN. BOSTON, Mar 13, 1815. In SENATE, June 3, 1815. Read and sent down, JOHN PHILLIPS, President. City of Washington, March 3, 1815. SIR, YOUR letter of the 13th ultimo, inclosing a Re solution of the Legislature of Massachusetts, requesting the Se nators and Representatives of the Commonwealth in Congress, to cause certain arricles, thereto subjoined, to be proposed as amendment* to the Constitution, of the United States, arrived at so late a period of the session as to preclude all hope of their being discussed, we therefore united in opinion that it was ex- 3$ pectient, in presenting them, to ask merely that they might lie on the speaker s table. This has Ueen done, and so they have been received by the House. We have the honor to be, very respectfully, Sir, Your obedient servants, T. PICKERING, LABAN WHEATON, WM. ELY, C. KING, ABTEMAS WARD, WM. BAYLIES ABIJAH BIGELOW, WM. REED, GfcOKGE B ADBURY, JOHN REED, JOHN W. HTJLBERT, ^NATHANIEL RUGGLES, ELIJAH BRIGHAM. QjF We have signed this letter in the House, and the other Members from Massachusetts happen to be absent at the closing of it. His Excellency Governor STRONG. In SENATE, JuneS, 1815. Read and sent down, JOHN PHILLIPS^ President CIRCULAR. Harrisburg, 15th March, 1815, IN conformity with a resolution by the Legislature of Peonsjlvania, 1 have the honor to transmit to you the result from a submission (o that Assembly of certain propositions by the Legislatures of Connecticut and Massachusetts, for amend ing the Constitution of the United States, with a request that it be laid before the Legislature of the State over which you preside, With high regard, I am, Sir, Your obedient Servant, SIMON SNYDER. His Excellency the Governor of the State of Massachusetts. In SENATE, June 3, 1815. Read and sent down, JOHN PHILLIPS, President. The Committee to whom were referred two Communications from the Governors of Connecticut and Massachusetts, in closing certain Amendments to the Constitution of the (Jni ted States : REPORT, THAT they have given to the proposed amendments, the mature consideration to which they are entitled, no less from their intrinsic importance, than from the great national crisis in which they were originally projected. As the amend ments, moreover, embrace several very essential alterations in the political charter of the union, and as the committee will be obliged to offer a reluctant dissent to all of them, it will not be superfluous to explain somewhat in detail the reasons of their decision In the propriety of this course they acquiesce with less reluctance, since whatever may be thought of the conduct of this statedn thus re-examining the foundations of the public liberty, she may at least claim the privilege of giving an im partial opinion on them. The amendments, as far as they ef fect, local interests, relate chiefly to the slave representation, the creation of new states, the restraints on commerce, and the 37. restriction by geographical boundaries, of the choice of the president. Pennsylvania has scarcely any slaves, she is at once agricultural as well as commercial, her relative import ance can be but little affected by the addition of new stairs, and during the whole history of her connexion with *he union, con tent with fulfilling all her duties to it, she has neither claimed nor courted the elevation of any of her citizens to the chief ma gistracy. She may therefore confidently appeal to her history and her situation to vindicate her from the suspicion of yield ing up her judgment to the influence of interested motives The first amendment is in these words : * Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several slates which may be included within this union according totheir res pective number of free persons, including those bound to ser vice for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other persons " The object of this amendment is to exclude from the list of inhabitants conferring the right ot representation three fifths of the slaves within the union. It cannot be concealed that this subject is surrounded by difficulties, and originally presented important obstacles to the union. It was contended then, as it is still asserted, that this unhappy race of beings, degraded alike by intellect and condition, could not be considered above the animals which laboured by their side that they were not admitted by their owners to any share of political power in the states where they resided ;._that they coulii not therefore with propriety be intruded into any participation of power, with freemen that in short they should be regarded as property, not as persons. It was then answered, as it may still be argu ed, that the states not burdened with this species of inhabi tants, the states which had always professed to regard slaves as men whose bondage was oppression, should not be the first to degrade them to the rank of mere cattle that the general prin ciple of the confederation was, to apportion representatives a- mong the states according to inhabitants that if the southern states chose to give their slaves the privilege of voting, or pla ced thc;ii on the footing of bound servants, they would be en titled to representation according to their full nuinoers ; and that the refusal to their slaves of that privilege was, like the qualification of property required in some other states, a mere municipal regulation with which the union had no concern. This reasoning satisfied the Cramers of the constitution. They thought wisely, that slaves were to be considered partly as pro perty, and partly as persons ; and that it would be unjust to condemn their owners to taxation on their, account, without 38 some indemnity. They therefore compromised the conflicting opinions. They agreed to consider the slaves as men, but as men whose value the loss of freedom had depreciated, and ming ling the hopes of power with the chances of taxation, they de cided, that three fifths only of these unfortunate beings should enter into the computation of representatives Nearly thirty years have elapsed since this arrangement re ceived the sanction of the statesmen of that day. It is now pro posed to change it. The great object jof inquiry therefore should be, whether in the progress of time, this compact which then seemed fair and equal has disappointed the hopes or viola, ted the rights, or wounded the interest of one of the parties. Now it does not appear that either the slaves or the slave re presentation has increased in a proportion unexpected or op pressive The black population now does not bear a greater proportion to the white than it did in 1790, on the contrary the number of slaves, and of course the power they confer, is actu ally decreasing in proportion to the whites. In 1790 the slaves were 697,697 out of 3,929,326, more than a fifth of the whole population; in 1810 they were 1,191,364 out of 7,239,903, not quite a sixth ; and the decrease must soon be greater at the importation of slaves which was allowed during eighteen years ot this period is now prohibited Among the slave holding states themselves, the progress of the black and white population has been steady and equal. The census of 1790 gave to the states of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, (including Kentucky) (North Carolina, South Caroli na, and Georgia, 653,910 slaves out of 1,916,481 inhabitants, being 45,000 more than a third. The census of 1800, gave to the same states and Tennessee, (then first enumerated se parately) 853,801 slaves out of 2,613.057 inhabitants, 41,000 less than a third. The census of 18 1 0, gave to the same states, including Orleans, 1,138,290 out of 3,395,684, 19000 more than a third. It would not seem therefore that the slaves have increased either as respects the union at large, or the white po pulation of the slave holding states themselves, with so dispro portionate a rapidity as to derange the balance of power estab lished by the Constitution. This may be seen by comparing the relative strength of the representation caused by the slaves. The 697,697 slaves of 1790 furnished according to the ratio of one representative to 33,000 of three fifths of them twelve repre sentatives out of one hundred and six, the whole number of members of congress. The 896,849 of 1800, bv the same ra tio furnished 16 out of 142 and the 1,138.265 (the number of represented slaves now) at the rate of 35^000 to a rcpre- 39 sentative, furnishes 19 out of 182, which proves a gradual decline in the comparitive representation of slaves. The slave holding states have moreover advanced even their white popu lation, in a greater ratio than many of the states of the \orth. During the 20 years from 1790 to 1810, Massachusetts had not added one fourth to her populat ion, Rhode Island notoneeighth, Connecticut not one tenth, whilst during the same period the white population of Maryland has increased as rapidly as that of Massachusetts, the population of Virginia, North Carolina, and i^outli Carolina, more rapidly, Georgia has nearly trebled her white population, Kentucky has increased hers five fold, and that of Tennessee has augmented even within ten years to more than double. From these facts it would appear that the slave representation does not seem likely to grow into dispropor- tioned magnitude, nor has any influence or power been annex ed to it greater than must have been originally contemplated. In examining, however, the question of the comparitive influ ence of the states, it should not be dissembled that the power communicated by the slaverepresentation is in a very great de gree counterbalanced in favor of the states, to whom that repre sentation is most offensive, by other advantages from a differ ent source. The efficient power of any state in the union, does not depend on the number of its representatives in one branch of congress : it is compounded of the number of those represen tatives, and the number of its senators ; nor can any true esti mate of the relative importance of the states be formed if this prominent consideration be overlooked. The Senate is in fact the principal depository of the national power. An integral branch of the legislature, none of the most ordinary acts of go vernment can be performed without its consent ; the high court of impeachment, itexercises the authority of a supreme judicial tribunal. The treaty making power is there, .no officer can be appointed without its consent, and so far are these privileges from being merely nominal, that we have seen that body reject the nominations of the president^ refuse to ratify articles of a foreign treaty, and deny its assent to laws recommended by the president, and passed by the other branch of the legislature The best test of power therefore is in the Senate, and it is th;*re that the complaining States actually enjoy an ample indemni ty for all the inequalities in their representation. The commit tee reluctantly advert to a topic of so much delicacy, but since they have been tempted into the discussion by the complaints of other States, they cannot disguise their conviction, that the true sufferers in the confederacy, those who alone have cause to 40 lament the disproportion between their strength and (heir pow er, are the large middle states. The theory ot state sovereignty has assigned to each an equal power in the Senate; but in practical legislation the exercise of that power is in the highest degree unequal. The State of Connecticut, of Vermont, or of New Hampshire, for instance, docs not possess one third of the population of New York or Pennsylvania, yet they have each a voice in the Senate equal to that of these States. For every inhabitant of Rhode Island there are more than ten in Pennsylvania, and more than twelve in New York, yet in all that concerns the commerce, the agri culture, the whole destinies of New York and Pennsylvania, the 76000 people of Rhode Island have an equal voice with the 959,000 of New York, or the 810,000 of Pennsylvania. New York and Pennsylvania contain about 300,000 inhabitants, more than all the five States east of the North river, yet those States h?xve no less than 10 voices in the Senate, while New- York and Pennsylvania have together only four. Compared with the slave holding states this disparity, though less striking is sufficiently obvious. Virginia has a white population equal to that of Connecticut, Rhode Island and Newhampshire, vet her two voices in the Senate are overpowered by those of six se nators from those States The five Southern States, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia contain 132*000 white inhabitants more than the five northern States of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Newllampshire,and Vermont, besides nearly one million of black inhabitants ; yet their power in the Senate is the same. Thus if the 392,000 slaves of Virginia give her six representatives more than Con necticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire, that is six voices more out of 182, those three States have in the Senate four more voices than an equal white population in Virginia, that is four more voices out of thirty six. Where they lose a thirtieth therefore in one house, they gain a ninth in the more important branch of the legislature. So too, the live States east of the North river, containing little more than a fifth of the whole in habitants of the Union, ant! riot a fourth of the white inhabi tants has a power in the Senate actually greatei than one fourth. The northern states have besides another counterpoise for the disproportionate advancement of their neighbours. The oilier slates are in a very considerable degree indebted for the increase of people to the constant emigrations from New England, and in their new stations, the intelligence and activity of these emi grants, ensure them a rapid promotion to places of power, to which they cannot fail to carry ir filial attachment and regard 41 for the interests of their parent state. Thus, it is understood that in the last Congress nine out of seventeen of the representa tives of New- York were natives of Connecticut ; in the present Congress also nine of the representatives of New York are na tives of Connecticut, aud a great number of the members of Congress from the middle and western states are emigrants from the northern, whose early associations will give them a natural and honorable respect for the land of their nativity. From these considerations^ the committee conclude, that if any change in the fundamental principle of representation be desirable, it should be a complete one, such a one as would place the real power of the government on the basis of its white population, and render the number not merely of Representa tives but of Senators proportioned to the free white inhabitants within the Union. Any alteration less than this, would be on ly partial in its operation, and would vary the terms of the ori ginal compact without carrying into full and fair operation the new principle introduced into it. The corrmuttee, therefore, dissent from the proposed amendment. The next amendment is in these words : " No new state shall be admitted into the Union by congress, in virtue of the power granted by the constitution, without the concurrence of two, thirds of both houses." The erection of new states seems to have been contemplated at every period of our Union. In the constitution of 1778, Canada was invited to accede to the confederation, and in the existing constitution of 1787, it is declared that u new states shall be admitted into the Union" without any qualification ex cept the previous consent of the parties, where the new were created within the limits of old states. Several states of that description have since been erected, but the principal object on which the constitutional provision has now to operate is the vacant territory within the limits of the United States, whicli by the existing laws are entitled to admission on certain speci fied terms. The right as well as the justice of varying those terms are equally doubtful. First as to the right. By the or dinance of 1787, it is conceded to the inhabitants N. \V . of the Ohio that not less than three nor more than five states shall be erected within their limits, and that, whenever any one of those states had 60,000 free inhabitants, they should be admitted in to the Union on the same footing as the original states. It wa* moreover stipulated, that u as far as it can be consistent willi the general interest of the confederacy, such admission shall be allowed when there may be a less number of free inhabitants in the state than 60,000." This agreement is introduced by the 6 42 following emphatic declaration, "It is hereby ordained and declared by the authority aforesaid, that the following articles shall be considered as articles of compact, between the original states and the people and states in the said territory, and for ever remain unalterable except by common consent." With regard to the stales thus designated it is no longer in the power of Congress to prescribe new terms of admission To other parts of the vacant territory of the United States, the same ob stacle of binding stipulation may not apply, but the general principle of allowing to the new states a share of power cor respondent to their growing wealth and population seems fair and reasonable. New states can be hereafter formed only of American territory and American population, of land already in our possession, or to be hereafter acquired, and of people e- rnigrants from other parts of the Union Is it then wise to close against those who have retiied to the wilderness, and through whose exertions the cultivation, the wealth, and the power of the whole nation is incalculably augmented? Is it wise to deny them, as they emerge from poverty to opulence, n share in governing the fruits of their own industry ? Is it just to deny to an American citizen his birth light of political pow er, because he removes from the eastern to the western section of the Union ? Or, is it not at once a more liberal and judicious policy to suffer their political importance to expand, as their territory ripens in population and improvement ? The progress of our history has not taught u> to apprehend danger from this source. Since the adoption of the constitu tion five new states have been admitted into the Union, one in the north, V r eriuont, one in the south, Louisiana, three in the west, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee. The first has since her admission increased more rapidly than any of the northern slates, and is now the third in rank of the live. Kentucky is more populous in whites than any northern state except Mas sachusetts, or any southern state, except Virginia, Tennessee And Ohio have equal population with the greater part of the southern and northern states, and will no doubt at the next cen sus exceed nearly all of them. Louisiana trom its recent oc- cupationby the United States, has a population about equal to Rhode-Island, or Delaware, but its progress is much more ra pid, and we may safely calculate that in a few years its popu lation will equal that of the greater part of the slates in the U- nioii. From this review, it appears that no particular section of country has been a gainer by the admission of new states be yond their fair claims by population, and that the privilege of forming them has been accorded indiscriminately to all in pro* 43 portion as their powers have been developed. The committee therefore cannot recommend the adoption of this amendment. By the next amendment it is proposed, that" Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States in the ports or harbours thereof for more than sixty days." The committee can see little in the principle of this proposal to recommend it, and they foresee in practice very serious in- conveniencies from it. In most oilier nations an embargo is principally used as a temporary detention to conceal or to fa cilitate the departure of some expedition ; but in addition to these causes, our peculiar situation gives to such a measure a character of defensive war. as well as of offensive hostility. An embargo may here be imposed as a preliminary to war, for the purpose of retaining at home resources which might fall into the hands of adversaries, and of warning our citizens to seek shelter from impending hostilities. This country too stands in a relation to the world which no other nation occupies. The United States is a great granary from which many other coun tries are supplied, and some have been occasionally fed. To withhold for a time those necessary supplies from a nation com mitting aggressions against us, is a measure of fair, obvious and effectual hostility, by which the offending nation may be re claimed to a just course of conduct. Such a measure should therefore be left, with the other incidents of war, to the discre tion of Congress. But it is obvious that the efficacy of au em bargo may depend on its duration. Approaching hostilities may not be averted or determined in sixty days. Within six ty days a refusal to furnish supplies may be productive of no inconvenience to an enemy. If it be said the embargo may be renewed, why the necessity of any limitation of time, since the same power which can renew a limited, may repeal an unqua r lifted embargo when circumstances require it. But during the long recess of Congress it would be impracticable to renew an embargo every 60 days. The more judicious plan seems to be to trust the power where it now is ; and this the more willingly as our recent experience will have furnished the means of ascer taining the nature and the value of that species of restriction. The fourth amendment states, that " Congress shall not have power, without the concurrence of two thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the UnitedStatcs and any foreign nation, or the dependencies thereof." The power of regulating intercourse with foreign nations, is so inherent and inseparable an incident of the sovereignty of the Union, that it cannot be taken from it without impairing 44 ils most important functions. A majority of Congress have now, and would have even after the adoption of this amend ment, the right of" regulating commerce with foreign nations, they have a right by enormous duties on foreign merchan dize, by imposition on foreign ships, by the various devices of commercial legislation, to establish a virtual interdict between us and foreign nations. It is not perceived therefore, that any thing would be gained by requiring two thirds to do nominally what a majority may do actually, and even the little thus gain- ed from the sovereignty of the Union would be not only with out use, but actually injurious, by weakening some of the most essential and valuable powers of a well organized government. The next proposal is, that " Congress shall not make or de- elare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign na tion, without the concurrence of two thirds of both houses of Congress, except such acts of hostility be in defence of the ter ritories of the United States when actually invaded." To the adoption of this amendment insuperable objections present themselves. In the first place, its tendency like that of (he two preceding amendments, is t? enfeeble the national government. Now there is no principle of our political system which the experience of our own as well as of other nations has more emphatically recommended than this, that the mainten ance of the general government in the full exercise of its consti tutional powers, is vital to the freedom and the greatness of this nation. The federal constitution was established amidst the collisions of conflicting sovereignties, its powers were con ceded reluctantly and warily by the jealousy of surrounding states, whose prophetic suspicion saw in it the embryo of usur pation and tyranny. None of these anticipations have been lealized. The dangers to public liberty are, it is conceived, much greater from the states themselves, than from the Union, and our whole political course is a standing admonition to the American statesman to protect at all times and at all hazards, the national government, from the jealousy of discontented slates, and the fatal influence of sectional and local preponder ance. At such a season as this, therefore, it seems unwise to strip the government of the union of its highest prerogatives, to trammel it with restrictions, and to expose it to partial and lo cal influences ; for Secondly, it is impossible to regard the amendment in any other light than as subjecting the majority of the nation to the dominion of a very small minority. The basis of our whole government is, that the clear ascertained voice of the majority must be obeyed a perfectly fair and just principle. The on- 45 ly cases in which the constitution has varied from that princi ple, are the requisition of two-thirds of both houses to counter balance the negative of the President the requisition of two thirds of the Senate to ratify treaties, where, as one branch of the legislature has no voice, a greater number of the other should sanction what is to become a law of the land and the requisition of two thirds of the Senators in impeachments, a pro vision like the unanimity of a jury on the side of mercy. But it is wholly repugnant to our institutions, that an ordinary act of legislation, like a declaration of war, or the restriction of in tercourse with foreign nations should depend not on the will of a majority, but in tact of a minority. Such an arrangement would leave the whole nation completely at the mercy of a small minority, representing perhaps the least populous part of the Uuion. Suppose, for instance, such a measure recommended by the President, and passed by two thirds of the House of Re presentatives. On the floor of the Senate, if the members from Rhode-Island, Vermont, New Hampshire, Delaware, Georgia ajid Louisiana combined, the law would be defeated ; that is, the representatives of a white population of 766,786 souls, a population less than that of New-York alone, or Pennsylvania alone, would have the power of controling the whole Union ; the representatives of 910,959 souls would govern the fate of 7,239,903 ;~ *about one seventh part of the Union would thus be made completely masters of the whole. In the next place, the restriction proposed could not be made to accord with the general powers enjoved at present by the majority of Congress. The President and the majority in Con gress are charged with the general defence ; they regulate com merce, they have the superintendance of foreign affairs, they have the means of raising funds and armies ; they have the power, therefore, of controling all the preliminary negociations and measures which lead to war; yet, before the commencement of hostilities they would be obliged to submit to the will of the minority. The distinction moreover, suggested by the amend ment, would be wholly fallacious in practice. Offensive hos tilities are often the best means of defence, and that surely would be a most impolitic arrangement, which would curb the spirit and fetter the strength of the nation, which might condemn it to witness the grossest insults and injuries, which would render it the inactive spectator of hostilities against us on the ocean, and the total annihilation of foreign commerce, until the enemy would relieve us from the thraldom of a small minority, by an actual invasion of our soil. The unanimity of a Polish diet would be more unreasonable, but it would scarcely be less in. convenient. The danger against which the amendment profes ses to guard, is that of a small majority involving the nation in war. Such a conjuncture may possibly arise, but it is a fail- incident to the many advantages of our form of government, and the majority perceiving its weakness should proceed with greater caution. In other countries the single voice of the so vereign may put to hazard the peace of the nation. Our secu rity k, that no war can be commenced unless the executive, and a majority both of the representatives and senators concur in its propriety. To require more than that majority, is inevi tably to make the will of the greater part of the nation submis sive to that of the smaller. The committee cannot recommend the adoption of such a principle. The sixth amendment is, u That no person who shall be hereafter naturalized, shall be eligible as a member of th Sen ate or House of Representatives of the United States, nor be ca pable of holding any civil office under the authority of the Uni ted States." It is unquestionably true that the rapid progress of our na tive population has rendered the introduction of foreigners an object of very secondary concern, and that without arrogance \ve may be suffered to think that competent persons can be found among our native citizens to fill all the offices of government. Yet it may be fairly questioned whether the total exclusion pro posed, is generous to others, or wise to ourselves. The revolu tions of Europe ma}? hereafter drive as they have already driven, many an honorable and distinguished exile to the shelter of our hospitality. The distance which separates him from his native country, is some guarantee that he has not chosen his new resi dence from any motive of levity, but from deliberate choice ; and when he has abjured his allegiance to that country, when his fortunes and family arc fixed among us, when he has closed all the avenues to his return, when a long probation has evin ced his attachment to our institutions ; why should his mind continue still in exile, and why should the natural and honor able ambition for political distinction be extinguished for ever in 4i is breast ? why too should we deprive ourselves of the choice of such a man, whose European experience may be use ful, if the deliberate voice of the community is in his favor ? Other nations do not indulge in so jealous an exclusion. There is scarcely a nation in Europe which docs not habitually employ the talents of strangers, where ever they can be most useful. Even England the most fastidious of all the nations of Eu rope with regard to strangers, naturalization is in many re spects more easy -than in Hie United States- Many of the re- 47 strictions on aliens may be at once removed by act of Parlia ment, or by the mere wish of the crown ; and we can readily call to our recollection, even within the present reign, several otticersof high rank, both civil and military, employed in im portant and confidential stations by the government of that country In the United States moreover we enjoy a greater se curity than any other nations, from the deliberation with which the choice of our country must be made the probationary term of residence, and the certainty that no foreigner can rise to power but by the voluntary suffrage of the community. The number of foreigners now in office does not threaten any incon venience and even that number will no doubt rapidly diminish. Out of 182 representatives in Congress there are, it is believed, not more than four who were born out of the limits of the Uni ted States, and in the Senate not one member. In one respect too the operation of the amendment would be injurious by pre venting the employment of American consuls, natives of the countries in which they reside a practice almost universal a- mong commercial nations. The natural and prudent precau tions against foreign influence will therefore probably be satis fied by requiring a long noviciate to wean a stranger from for eign modes of thinking, and insure his attachment to our insti tutions, and after that ordeal is past, leaving him a fair compe tition with native talents for political advancement ; a compe tition in which the natural bias in favor pf our own country men will insure them at least an equal chance of success. The committee, therefore, recommend a dissent from the proposed amendment. The seventh amendment is, that " The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time, aor shall the President be elected from the same state two terms in succession." The first part of this amendment, the provisipn against the re-election of the President, is strongly recommended by its tendency to insure the more complete independence of that of ficer. Jt is supposed that after reaching the highest elevation to which his country could raise him, a President of the Uni ted States, with nothing to fear from the ambition of rival poli ticians, nor to hope from popular favor, haying no partizans to reward for the pasi or to gain for the future, would exercise with more freedom and firmness the functions of his magistracy. This high independence of character is so admirable a part of a statesman s character that to secure it we might be tempted to overlook the many inconvejiiencies which necessarily accom pany the proposed amendment ; the instability and vacilla- 48 tion for instance which such frequent changes give to the ad ministration ; the denial to the nation of the future services of a President who has proved himself eminently qualified for his office, and the destruction of one great inducement to good con duct in an officer, the hope of being rewarded by future confi dence for past services. The amendment is however defective in two respects. Its chief object is to shield the independence of the President by preventing- future intrigues for power. It should therefore proscribe the ex-president not merely from the chief magistra cy but from all other offices. The samo President who would submit to the dominion of others to secure a re-election would be equally subservient for the vice-presidency, or he might become the partizan of that candidate for the next presidency who \vould secure him a retreat in some subordinate station The exclusion from office to be effectual must be general. The a- mendment errs in another respect. One of the great features ot the executive should be permanency, and stability. It repre* sents the nation, it is immediately charged with its foreign, concerns, it therefore should present both at home and abroad, something systematic in its conduct and permanent in its char acter. Frequent changes give it a fatal cast of irresolution and inconstancy. The short period for which the President is cho sen exposes the administration to that error, but his re-eligibil ity (if his conduct be approved) furnishes the means of correct ing it. If therefore it should be deemed proper to deny the right of re-election, the President should be chosen originally for a longer term, since it would be an injurious anomaly in our system, that the tenure of the judiciary should be without any limitation of time, that of the Senate six years, with an indefi nite right of re-election while the executive alone, that branch of the government where system, permanency, and experience can alone secure a wise administration ; that the executive alone should be condemned to more frequent changes than any other part of the government. With regard to the second branch of the amendment, it is not perceived that any advantage could be gained by circum scribing the public choice within any geographical bounda ries. As the formation of the constitution, when the states were less acquainted with each other, and more jealous, both of the general government and of themselves, than they now are, it was a natural precaution against the accumulation of power, either in the United States, or any particular state, that the two high est officers of the government should not be from the same state. That restriction still exists. But our experience since has not 49 proved the utility of selecting officers of any kind, with refer ence merely to their places of residence, and all those arrange ments which indicate that we are citizens of a state, rather than citizens of the United States, are not now to be encouraged. It seems wiser to leave the choice of the nation perfectly unre strained and to suffer the discernment of the country to select its best citizens, without regarding the section of the Union where they may happen to reside. The committee, therefore, conclude this examination by sub mitting to the consideration of the Senate, the following reso lutions : Whereas, the Legislatures of Connecticut and Massachusetts have proposed the following amendments to the Constitution of the United States i First Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective number of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and exclu ding Indians not t#xed and all other persons. Second No new state shall be admitted into the Union by Congress in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, without the concurrence of two thirds of both houses. Third Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the United States in the ports or harbors thereof, for more than sixty days. Fourth Congress shall not have power without the concur rence of twolhiids of both houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation, or the dependencies thereof. ftfth Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation without the concur rence of two thirds of both houses, except such acts of hostili ty be in defence of the territories of the United States, when ac tually invaded. Sixth s o person, who shall hereafter be naturalized, shall be eligible as a member of the Senate or House of Representa tives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil of fice under the authority of the United States. Seventh The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time ; nor shall the President be elected from the same state two terms in succession. Resolved^ by the Senate and House of liepiesentatires of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met, That it is inexpedient to concur in the said amendments. Resolved^ That the Governor be requested to transmit a copy 7 50 of the foregoing preamble and resolution to each of the Sena tors and Representatives of this state in Congress, and to the Executive of each State in the Union, with a request that the same be laid before the Legislature thereof. PENNSYLVANIA, ss. SECRETARY S OFFICE, Harrisburgh, March 15^, 1815. A true Copy of the Original, JAMES TRIMBLE, Deputy Sec y* STATE OF NEW-JERSEY. HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY, 12th, 1815. RESOLVED by the General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey ) That the sev^n several propositions of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in the words follow ing, viz. " First Representatives and direct taxes shall be appor tioned among the several States which may be included within this Union* according to their respective numbers of free per sons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other persons. Second No new State shall be admitted into the Union by Congress, in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, without the concurrence of two thirds of both houses. Third Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States, in the ports or harbors thereof, for more than sixty days. Fourth Congress shall not have power without the concur rence of two thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation, or the dependencies thereof. fifth Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the con currence of two thirds of both houses, except such acts of hos- 51 tility be in defence of the territories of the United States when actually invaded. Sixth No person who shall hereafter be naturalized, shall be eligible as a member of the Senate or House of Representa tives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil of fice under the authority of the United States. Seventh The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time ; nor shall the President be elected from the same State two terms in succession," Be and the same are hereby rejected ; and that his Excellen cy thj Governor be requested to communicate information thereof to the Executives of the several States and of the Gen eral Government. HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, FEBRUARY 17, 1815. This Resolution having been three times read and compared in this House, Resolved, That this House agree thereto. By order of the House, SAMUEL PENNINGTON, Speaker. COUNCIL CHAMBER, FEBRUARY 18, 1815. This Resolution having been read and considered in Council, Resolved, That this House agree thereto. By order of Council, WILLIAM KENNEDY, Vice President. Trenton, February 20, 1815. SIR, I HAVE the honor to communicate to your Ex cellency the decision of the Legislature of the State of New- Jersey on the foregoing seven articles proposed by the Legisla ture of the State of Connecticut as amendments to the Consti- 52 (niion of tbe United States, and beg leave to request your Ex cellency to lay the same before (he Legislature of your State. I have the honor to be, With great respect, Your very humble Servant, WILLIAM S. PENNINGTON. To His Excellency CALEB STRONG, Esq. 7 Governor of Massachusetts. 3 P. S. The Legislature of this State rose on the 13th inst. ; your Communi cation of the 13th was not received until the 19th, of consequence it cannot be laid before the Legislature until the next session of that body. In SEN ATE, June 3, 1815. Read and sent down, JOHN PHILLIPS, President. Albany^ May 4M, 1815. Sm, I AM directed by the Senate and Assembly of the State of New- York, to transmit to you the annexed resolution, rejecting the amendments of the Constitution of the United Stales, proposed by the States of Massachusetts and Connecti cut ; and have the honor to be, Sir, With great respect, Your obedient Servant, DANIEL D. TOMPKINS. His Excellency the Governor of the State of Massachusetts. 53 STATE OF NEW-YORK. IW ASSEMBLY, APRIL llth, 1815. f RESOLVED, That the seven several propositions of a- mendmentto the Constitution of the United States, in the words following, to wit : " birst Representatives and direct taxes shall be appor tioned among the several States which may be included with in this Union, according to their respective numbers of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other persons. Second No new State shall be admitted into the Union, by Congress, in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, without the concurrence of two thirds of both houses. Third Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States in the ports and harbors theieof, for more than sixty days. fourth Congress shall not have power, without the concur rence of two thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation, or the dependencies thereof. Fifth Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the con currence of two thirds of both houses, except such acts of hos tility be in defence of the territories of the United States when actually invaded. Sixth No person who shall hereafter be naturalized, shall be eligible as a member of the Senate or House of Representa tives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil of fice under the authority of the United States. Seventh The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time ; nor shall the President be elected from the same state two terms in succession." Be and the same are hereby rejected ; and that his Excellen cy the Governor be requested to transmit copies of this resolu tion to the Executives of the several States. AY.vo Tfrf, That the Honorable the Senate be requested tocon- eur with this House in the foregoing resolution. By order of the Assembly, AARON CLARK, Clerk. 54 ITS SENATE, ATHIL 17, 1815. Resolved, That the Senate do concur with the Honorable the Assembly in their preceding resolution. By order of the Senate, JOHN F. BACON, Clerk. In SENATE, June 3, 1815. Read and sent down, JOHN PHILLIPS, President. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. IK SENATE, JUNE 13th, 1815. ORDERED, That one thousand copies of the following described documents be published in a pamphlet, viz. : Report of theProceedingsofthe Hartford Convention ; Report of the Hon. Harrison Gray Otis, Thomas H. Perkins and William Sullivan, Esquires, relative to a mission to the Government of the United States, dated the 15th of May last ; Letter of the Hon. Timothy Pickering and others, Representatives from this Commonwealth in the Congress of the United States, dated March 3, 1815 ; Report and Resolutions of the State of Penn sylvania ; Letter of Governor Pennington, of New- Jersey, dated February 20, 1815, and papers accompanying ; Letter of Governor Torapkins, of New- York, with the papers accom panying ; which accompanied his Excellency the Governor s speech. Attest, S. F. McCLEARY, Clerk. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. 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