GIFT OF The Treaty of Washington, Concluded August 9, 1842, by Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton HUGH TAYLOR GORDON UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA The Treaty of Washington, Concluded August 9, 1842, by Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton THE JAMES BRYCE HISTORICAL PRIZE ESSAY FOR 1907 BY HUGH TAYLOR GORDON BERKELEY THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1908 TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE Introduction 1 Part I. The Causes for the Treaty 3 The Boundary Question, its Origin and History 3 Frontier disputes 20 The Question of the Eight of Search 23 The "Creole" and the "Caroline" cases 25 Part II. The Making of the Treaty 27 The Appointment of a Special Mission 29 The Negotiations 33 Eatification and Acceptance 42 Opposition and Criticism 45 Part III. The Effects of the Treaty 53 Immediate and Local Effects 53 Effects on International Eelations: Eight of Search and Ex tradition 56 Appendices 62 Bibliography 82 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, CONCLUDED AUGUST 9, 1842, BY DANIEL WEBSTER AND LORD ASHBURTON. HUGH TAYLOR GORDON. INTRODUCTION. The Treaty of Washington of August 9th, 1842, com monly called the Webster- Ashburton Treaty, was described by Mr. Webster, himself, as * something for the peace of the world." The whole truth of this characterization was not appreciated at the time it was spoken. Webster intended his description of the treaty for its relation to past events, for its results in settling questions which had actually been verging upon war. But the same description is equally true of the far-reaching effects of the treaty in its subse quent relation to international law and the fundamental principles of peace between nations. The treaty stands between two long periods of history, one including the events which led to its negotiation, the other, those which resulted from it. In its relation to both of these periods the treaty is primarily a security of inter national peace. The long history of the Webster- Ashburton treaty be gins with the boundary question originating in the treaty of 1783. Around this question a whole series of compli cated disputes were added during the ten years preceding 174 [2 the negotiation of the treaty in 1842. It was the unsettled boundary which magnified the real importance of the other disputes and brought the relations of the United States and England to the crisis of a compromise settlement by a spe cial mission. During the negotiations, the boundary question was still the strategic point in dispute. Its settlement involved the concurrence of four parties, Maine and Massachusetts be ing added to the two national governments, and although this greatly increased its difficulty, the adjustment of the different claims was finally accomplished. The boundaries being settled, the success of the negotiation was practically assured. But this assurance does not imply that no other questions of importance were settled by the treaty. Two points, the suppression of the slave trade, and extradition, were included in its provisions and both of these held a prominent place in the international relations subsequent to the treaty. The boundary question as a point in interna tional relations was ended by the conclusion of the treaty ; while the suppression of the slave trade and extradition were fairly launched as international questions by the same treaty. It is in this way that the treaty marks the close of one period of historic events and the opening of another period of other events. Its relation to both is that of a security of international comity ; something for the peace of the world." In the writing of this inquiry into the history of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty the attempt has been made to draw upon all available primary sources for the facts of the case. Some difficulty has been encountered in this regard chiefly because of the incompleteness of the Congressional Records on the shelves of the University of California Library for the period between 1833 and 1841, and from an almost total lack of English documents except the Par liamentary Debates and an occasional collection of extracts. The complete private and diplomatic correspondence of 3] 175 Daniel Webster, drawn from several sources, has been val uable in tracing the course of the negotiations of the treaty, while the "Recueil des Arbitrages International^ " De Lapradelle et Politis, furnished a good working basis for the history of the boundary question up to the Arbitration in 1831. In arrangement, the inquiry falls naturally into three main divisions, which correspond with distinct periods in the history of the treaty. The first of these, concerning the history of the questions which led to the treaty of 1842, subdivides into two sections, which deal with the history of the boundary question, and with the complicating disputes which arose over questions of national policy. The second main division shows the culmination of the disputed ques tions in the treaty of 1842, under sections dealing with the negotiations preliminary to the treaty, the making of the treaty, and its ratification and acceptance by both countries. In the final part of the inquiry the results of the treaty are taken up under the sub-headings of immediate and local results, and effects upon international law and the princi ples of peace between nations. I. THE CAUSES FOE THE TEEATY. It is a singular piece of irony that the boundary stip ulations of the treaty of 1783, between the United States and Great Britain, which were proclaimed by their framers for the particular purpose of preventing subsequent dis putes, were the very source and material of the longest series of boundary disputes the United States has ever experi enced. The termination of this much agitated boundary question was not reached until 1842, when Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton compromised for its settlement by a conventional line. To understand the conditions which contributed to its final settlement, it is necessary to trace its history through the fifty-nine years which elapsed from 176 its origin in 1783 to 1842. During this period there were many attempts made to solve the difficulties which arose from the second article of the treaty of 1783, describing the boundaries of the new nation, the United States of America. By Jay s treaty in 1794 and the treaty of Ghent in 1815, portions of the boundary were settled. But the remaining parts, constituting almost the entire land boundaries be tween the United States and Great Britain s North Ameri can provinces, remained disputed in spite of the efforts of commissioners, diplomatists and arbitrators to secure a set tlement. By the second article of the treaty of peace of 1783, the northern and eastern boundaries of the United States are described as follows: And that all disputes which may arise in the future on the subject of the boundaries of the said United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared that the fol lowing are and shall be their boundaries, viz: From the northwest angle of Nova Scotia; viz: that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix River to the Highlands ; along the said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river Saint Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlan tic Ocean, to the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River; thence down along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude ; from thence, by a line due west on said latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraquy; thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie ; thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication between that lake and Lake Hu ron ; thence through the middle of said water communication into Lake Huron ; thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Super- 5] 177 ior; thence through Lake Superior, northward of the Isles Royal and Phelipeaux, to the Long Lake ; thence through the middle of said Long Lake and the water communication be tween it and the Lake of the Woods to the said Lake of the Woods ; thence through the said lake to the most northwest ern point thereof, * * * *. East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid Highlands, which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the River St. Lawrence; comprehending all the islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean ; excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia. J It is admitted that natural boundaries such as rivers, mountain ranges and sea coasts, are the best means of fixing political boundaries where they allow the desired division of territory between two countries, and there is little doubt that this was the aim of the negotiators who laid down the boundaries of the United States in 1783. But at that time the country through which the boundary lay was for the most part wild and unsurveyed. Consequently, instead of the natural objects named in the treaty being accurate and unmistakable definitions of the boundary, they served chief ly to raise a number of questions as to the identity of sig nificant points in the boundary. It is to this fact that the boundary disputes rising out of the treaty of 1783 are due. The first of these was in regard to the St. Croix River. The treaty had identified this river merely as having its mouth in the Bay of Fundy. But it happened that there 1 ( Treaties and conventions between U. S. and other powers since July 4, 1776," p. 376. John H. Haswell, Compiler. 178 [6 were several streams which had been called at one time or another the St. Croix River and three of these emptied into the Bay of Fundy. Adverse claims were set up by the two governments as to which of these was intended. 2 A de tailed history of this particular question is not required for our purpose, since it was settled by the treaty of November 19, 1794, commonly known as Jay s treaty. It is important to note, however, that in deciding this point, not only the territory immediately between the two streams was affected, but the position of the boundary formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix River was there by determined. Under the fifth article of Jay s treaty and an explanatory article of the same, added in 1798, a com mission definitely identified the St. Croix River, giving the longitude and latitude of its mouth and erecting at its source a monument to be maintained by the joint measures of the two governments. 3 This monument was made the starting point of all subsequent attempts to trace the unsettled boundary. Another difference had arisen about the same time that the commissioners were investigating the identity of the St. Croix, prior to the negotiations of 1794, but its settlement was not included in that treaty. 4 It concerned the course of the boundary among the islands in the Bay of Passamr,- quoddy at the mouth of the St. Croix. and the ownership of the large island of Grand Menan in the Bay of Fundy. Upon this point the treaty of 1783 had been very indefinite, merely stating that the line should be drawn due east from the mouth of the St. Croix and should include within the United States all the islands within twenty leagues of the mainland that were not, and had not been, hitherto, under the jurisdiction of the province of Nova Scotia. But Nova 2 Message of the President, Feb. 9, 1790, with correspondence and papers relating to the northeast boundary. American State Papers, Foreign Eelations. Vol. I., pp. 91-99. 3 Treaties and Conventions, J. H. Haswell, pp. 382, 396. 4 American State Papers, F. E., Vol. I., pp. 91, 99. 7] 179 Scotia claimed jurisdiction over all the islands in the Bay of Fundy, which was more than the United States was will ing to concede, especially since the American town of East- port was situated on one of them. Settlement of this ques tion was again deferred by the rejection of the treaty ne gotiated by King and Hawkesbury in 1803, which contained an article denning this portion of the boundary. Before any further negotiation resulted, other events intervened to take the attention of both countries from this quarter. With the return of peace after the war of 1812, another attempt was made to settle the boundary question. Articles four to eight, inclusive, of the Treaty of Ghent, provided for the appointment of commissioners to decide upon the ownership of the islands in the Bay of Fundy, and to sur vey and determine the entire boundary from the source of the St. Croix river to the northwesternmost point of the Lake of the Woods, in conformity with the provisions of the treaty of 1783. 5 The work was divided among four com missions. The first of these, as provided in the fourth ar ticle, was to decide upon the ownership of the islands near the mouth of the St. Croix. Article five allotted to another commission the determination of the boundary from the head of the St. Croix to the intersection of the line of the forty-fifth parallel with the St. Lawrence. Article six pro vided for two more commissioners to run the boundary from the last named point on the St. Lawrence to the outlet of Lake Superior, and having completed that work, the same commissioners were authorized by article seven to continue the line from the outlet of Lake Superior to the northwest point in the Lake of the Woods. It was further stipulated that should the commissioners fail to agree in any case, statements of their points of difference and the grounds for their disagreement should be referred to some friendly Sovereign or State for arbitration. s Treaties and Conventions, J. H. Haswell, p. 399. 180 [8 The commissioners appointed under the fourth article, declared their work successfully completed, and delivered their decision November 24, 1817. They awarded to the United States Moose Island, Dudley Island and Frederick Island. Great Britain received all other islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, also the large island, Grand Menan, in the Bay of Fundy proper. The commissioners of article six accomplished the settle ment of the boundary described in that article, i.e., from the intersection of the line of the forty-fifth parallel with the St. Lawrence to the outlet of Lake Superior. But when they attempted to continue this line westward into and through Lake Superior and the water communications to the Lake of the Woods, they were unable to reach an agreement. Two points of difference w T ere encountered. The first was in regard to which channel should be fol lowed around St. George s Island, or Sugar Island, situated in the water communication between Lake Huron and Lake Superior. The ownership of this island was involved, and as it was of considerable extent and value, neither side would make the concession. The second question was as to the course of the boundary from Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods. The treaty of 1783 had said it should go by way of Long Lake, but the commissioners differed as to the exact location of Long Lake, as intended by the negotiators of the treaty of 1783. The American Commissioners main tained that the most northern route was intended ; going by way of Dog River and Sturgeon Lake to Lac la Pluie, and from there to Lake of the Woods. The English Commis sioners claimed the line should run to the most southwestern point of Lake Superior and from there reach Lac la Pluie by Fond du Lac and the St. Louis River. The two lines agreed from Lac la Pluie to Lake of the Woods. Neither of the commissioners would relinquish his claim, so the whole attempt to fix the boundary from the outlet of Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods came to nothing. 9] 181 The most difficult part of all the boundary fell to the commissioners under the fifth article. This was that por tion lying between the monument at the source of the St. Croix River and the point where the forty-fifth parallel intersects the St. Lawrence at St. Regis. As defined by the treaty of 1783, this part of the boundary was to be deter mined by a line extending due north from the source of the St. Croix to its intersection with the Highlands which formed with that line the northwest angle of Nova Scotia. Furthermore, these Highlands were defined as "those which divide those rivers which empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean." Along their crest the line was to run until the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River was reached; whence it followed the middle of that stream to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude, and from that point extended along the line of the forty-fifth parallel to the St. Lawrence. The treaty of 1783 had, as we have already observed, defined a boundary through an unsurveyed coun try by naming rivers and heights of uncertain location. This was a fault particularly applicable to the Highland frontier just described. The northwest angle of Nova Scotia had never been accurately defined before the treaty of 1783, nor was it known at that time just where a due north line from the source of the St. Croix would strike the Highlands. Consequently when the commissioners of the fifth article of the treaty of Ghent started to run the line from the head of the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence, the first question they encountered was that of determining the point where the due north line strikes the Highlands to form the northwest angle of Nova Scotia. With nothing in the treaty of 1783 which they were trying to interpret to prove this point, they were involved in the territorial history of Massachusetts, Canada, and Nova Scotia, and each decided on a different point to which the north line should be run. 182 [10 The United States commissioner claimed the Highlands named in the treaty were those which the due north line encountered near the source of the Metis, a small tributary of the St. Lawrence, and separated its waters from the headwaters of the Ristagouche and the St. John. The boundary, if it followed the crest of the Highlands from this point, gave to the United States the entire territory drained by the St. John and its tributaries. It also inter cepted the roads of communication between Quebec and Halifax, and brought the United States frontier within a few miles of Montreal and the St. Lawrence. This consid eration was much more important to England than the loss o the territory for its agricultural value. It was not diffi cult to find a valid objection to such an interpretation of the treaty of 1783. The Highlands were first mentioned in the treaty between France and England in 1763, when they were described as those "which divide the rivers which empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Sea. They were similarly described in the Proclamation creating the Province of Quebec in 1763 and in the Quebec act of 1774, 6 but in 1783 instead of "the sea," "the Atlantic Ocean" was named. Otherwise the two descriptions coincided. But in this difference, the English saw more than a difference between controvertible terms. They contended that "the sea" was a general term including all the bays and gulfs along the shore, but when "Atlantic Ocean" was specified, it was clearly intended by the negotiators to express a distinction between the open seacoast and a gulf or bay. Hence any Highlands which divided streams flowing into the Bay of Chaleurs or the Bay of Fundy were not within the meaning of the words of the treaty. This was their ground of objection to the American claim. The English commissioner contended that the due north e Collections of the Maine Historical Society ; 2nd Ser. Vol. VIII, pp. 61, 64. 11] 183 line was never intended to go beyond the St. John River, but should terminate at Mars Hill, situated about midway between the source of the St. Croix and the intersection of the due north line with the St. John. From this point the boundary was run westward along the heights separating the headwaters of the Aroostook and other streams flowing northward into the St. John from the sources of the Pen- nobseot, flowing southward into the Atlantic Ocean. This line struck the Highlands, followed by the American com missioner, at Metamarjette Portage, the two lines concur ring from that point to the northwest source of the Connecticut River. The objections which the American commissioner raised to this line were quite as valid as those raised by the English against the United States claim. Instead of separating the waters of the St. Lawrence from those of the Atlantic, the Highlands claimed by the English divided streams flowing into the St. John from those empty ing into the Atlantic Ocean, which was directly contrary to the words of the treaty. Furthermore, these Highlands were not distinct mountainous ranges like those north of the St. John. Apparently neither side presented a claim which com plied strictly with the words of the treaty of 1783. But both commissioners insisted that their claim was entirely just and in accord with the intentions of the negotiators. There was no alternative but to abandon this attempt to settle the boundary. The commissioners, Thomas Barclay for England and Van Ness for the United States, an nounced their failure to their respective governments, Oc tober 9, 1821. 7 Besides the boundary dispute on the ques tion of the Highlands, two questions of minor importance remained unsettled. In regard to the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut, the American commissioner claimed Indian Stream, supposed to be the most westerly 7 De Lapradelle et Politis, Kecueil des Arbitrages Internation- aux," p. 355. 184 [12 of the four confluents forming the sources of the Connec ticut. The English claim was for the western source of Connecticut Lake, a part of the headwaters of the most easterly of the four confluents, which they said was the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut proper. The difference between the two claims here affected the owner ship of a considerable tract of very fertile land lying along these streams. The second of the questions arose from the discovery, by an accurate survey in 1818, that the line of the forty-fifth parallel as it had been generally accepted since the survey of Valentine and Collins, 1764- 67, as the northern boundary of New York and Vermont, was three- quarters of a mile north of the true line of the forty-fifth parallel, where that line intercepted the Connecticut River. The two lines converged as they approached the St. Law rence, including a long, narrow strip of territory across the northern end of New York and Vermont. The English commissioner claimed that the true line should be adopted, while the American held that the old line was well recog nized as the boundary and should be confirmed. An im portant feature of this question was that it affected the ownership of Rouse s Point, a military position command ing the entrance of Lake Champlain, situated between the two lines, and hitherto supposed to belong to the United States. The result of the treaty of Ghent came far short of settling the boundary. The portions allotted to the com missioners under articles four and six had been determined, but the part described by articles five and seven, greater both in extent of boundary and difficulty of settlement, remained in dispute. The provisions in the treaty for arbitration offered no immediate solution of the difficulties, since nothing in the way of a definite set of rules was laid down by which the questions could be fairly presented to an arbiter. 8 Until such necessary rules were agreed upon, s De Lapradelle et Politis, Eecueil des Arbitrages Internation- aux," p. 356. 13] 185 the declaration of the treaty that the questions should be referred to a friendly sovereign were wholly ineffective. From 1821 to 1826 there was a lull in the boundary proceedings as far as any national action was concerned. Neither side made a move toward negotiating for settle ment. But in 1826 active interest of the national govern ments was again aroused by the disturbances in the disputed territory, resulting from friction between the local author ities of the two governments. The disputed frontier had been for the most part unoccupied and practically unheeded until about 1825, when pioneer settlers began to take up the land for homesteads and to cut into the resourceful forests of the disputed territory. 9 Then complaints, increas ing in number and urgency, began to be sent to the author ities, both local and national, that encroachments upon the rights of the State were being made by subjects of the other government. Mr. C. R. Vaughan, the British minister at Washington, informed his government in March, 1827, that the American Secretary of State, Mr. Clay, had promised to restrain Maine and Massachusetts from further encroach ments into the disputed territory. 10 The Governor of Maine soon afterwards issued a proclamation in which he forbade the citizens of the State from taking any independ ent action regarding encroachments, but urged them to rely on the authority of the State for the preservation of peace. But in spite of these measures, timber cutting and settling continued in the disputed territory and the complaints against encroachments grew. This fact is well shown by the correspondence between Mr. Vaughan and Sir Howard Douglas, the Governor of New Brunswick, 11 and by the American Historical Review. Vol. VII. (1901-02), p. 500. 10 Vaughan to Canning. March, 1827. American Historical Re view, Vol. VII, p. 500. Maine was separated from Massachusetts and admitted as a State, 1819-20. But much of the unclaimed land in the disputed territory was still held by them under an arrangement of joint ownership. Maine Historical Ass n., Vol. VIII, pp. 135, 196. 11 American Historical Review, Vol. VII, p. 500. 186 [14 emphatic resolutions of the Maine Legislature, passed Feb ruary 18, 1828, in which the Governor was requested to use his power to stop new aggressions if they were not pre vented by the national government. 12 The conditions on the frontier clearly demanded that an early attempt be made to settle the question of jurisdiction over the disputed territory. Albert Gallatin was intrusted with the work of negotiating a settlement of the boundary question, and to this end was appointed minister to England and empowered to treat for and sign a convention for the United States with England on this subject. It was hoped by Gallatin that a settlement could be successfully made by direct negotiations w r ith the English ministry, but this hope was doomed to failure. Both parties remained obdurate in their claims based upon divergent interpretations of the treaty of 1783. After several weeks of unsuccessful conferences, Gallatin was obliged to submit to a recourse to arbitration which was taken as the last means of bridging the dif ficulty. 13 "A convention providing for the arbitration of the dis pute concerning the Northeastern Boundary" was con cluded, September 29, 1827, by the negotiators, Albert Gal latin for the United States, and Charles Grant and Henry Unwin Addington for England. Ratifications were ex changed April 2, 1828, and the convention proclaimed May 15, 1828. This convention framed the rules for arbitration which had not been provided by the treaty of Ghent and agreed that the differences which had arisen under the fifth article of that treaty should be submitted to the decision of a friendly Sovereign or State. Each side was allowed to prepare a statement of their claims and a counter state ment to the points offered by the opposing side. Upon these statements and such other necessary topographical 12 Maine Historical Society, Vol. VIII, p. 270. is Gallatin to J. Brown, U. S. Minister at Paris, February 2, 1827. Gallatin a Writings, II, p. 360. 15] 187 evidence, maps and surveys as the contracting parties mu tually supplied, the arbiter was to decide for the claims of one or the other. His decision, to be given if possible within two years after he consented to act. should be final and binding upon both parties. In drawing up their statements, the claims of the com missioners of the fifth article of the treaty of Ghent were reaffirmed in all but one particular. The American claim regarding the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut Kiver was changed from Indian Stream to Hall s Stream, since discovered to be the most westerly of the four con fluents. The statements were full and complete, each side contending to prove that its claim met the intentions of the negotiators of 1783. England s statement was drawn up by the foreign office, while that of the United States was prepared by Albert Gallatin, assisted by Mr. W. P. Preble, a Maine man, then United States Minister at the Hague. The arbiter chosen was William I, King of the Nether lands, and his decision was announced January 10, 1831, 14 through the United States Minister at the Hague, Mr. Preble. This decision, known as the * Dutch Award, now became the center of interest between the two countries. Upon two of the points submitted, the northwest source of the Connecticut and the line of the forty-fifth parallel, England s claim was upheld, with the special provision that Eouse s point should belong to the United States. But on the question of the Highlands and the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, the arbiter decided that the claim of neither party could be taken as a just and true interpretation of the treaty of 1783. The boundary, he said, could not be determined by its description in that treaty. Hence he recommended a middle line which would give an equitable division of the disputed territory. The due north line from the source of the St. Croix was terminated at the St. John i* De Lapradelle et Politis, Recueil des Arbitrages Internation- aux" . 361. 188 [16 and from there the boundary followed the middle of that stream to the source of the St. Francis, whence the High land boundary was unmistakable. In making this decision the arbiter gave what he considered a fair settlement of the dispute. England gained enough of the disputed ter ritory to insure her communications between the Provinces of New Brunswick and Canada, while the United States retained a strong military frontier along the Highlands, as well as Rouse s Point at the entrance of Lake Champlain. In value of territory, the gains of Great Britain at the source of the Connecticut and along the forty-fifth parallel w r ere counterbalanced by awarding to the United States the fertile valleys of the Aroostook and Allegash, the country north of the St. John being very rugged and of little agri cultural value. Mr. Preble sent the award to England, January 12, 1831, and with it a "respectful protest against a decision which had exceeded its authority in giving an opinion in stead of a judgment." The grounds for this protest were, that the arbiter had not been authorized by the rules of 1827 to mediate between the claims, but to decide abso lutely for one or the other. This had not been done in regard to the northwest angle of Nova Scotia and the High lands. The British ministry, nevertheless, disregarded Preble s protest, which was not made under any instruc tions from his government, and announced that it would accept the award as had been agreed in the convention. 15 In the United States the award met a strong opposition. Maine in particular strenuously protested its acceptance by the federal government. A joint select committee of its legislature, consisting of four senators and seven repre sentatives, recommended resolutions which were adopted by the state legislature, January 19, 1832, which declared, that it was not within the constitutional power of the fed eral government to cede to a foreign power any portion of is Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, Vol. 67, pp. 1171, 1175. 17] 189 a state s territory without its consent; that the decision was not obligatory on the parties of the arbitration agree ment, and that inasmuch as the adoption of the new line was regarded as a violation of the rights of Maine, a formal protest was made against it. These resolves were communi cated to Congress and the President, and the Representa tives of the State in Congress were instructed to prevent if possible the adoption of the award. The cooperation of Massachusetts was solicited and on February 15 the general court of the legislature of that state passed concurrent reso lutions for the rejection of the award. The question was referred to the Senate by the Presi dent on December 7, 1831, and shortly afterwards Eng land s decision to accept the award was officially announced. After a lengthy debate in secret session, the Senate voted in June, 1832, to reject the arbiter s decision, and to re open negotiations with England for determining the boun dary according to the treaty of 1783. 16 The vote was decisive: thirty-five for rejection against eight for accept ance. Maine s absolute stand against the award was the chief cause for the refusal of the federal government to accept it. President Jackson was inclined to accept the arbiter s decision, in which he saw the solution of a long standing and sore difficulty. 17 But the protests of Maine and Massachusetts could not be legally over-ridden, since it is not possible under the constitution to change the boun daries of a state against its will, except by treaty. The refusal of the award by the United States was announced to the British Minister by the Secretary of State, July 31, 1832. England refused to consider the vote of the Senate as a final rejection of the award, but for three years con tinued to insist on its acceptance by the United States. is Congressional Debates, Vol. VIII, Part I, p. 1395. IT Curtis, "Life of Webster," II, p. 139; also N. A. Keview, Vol. LV (1843), p. 461. 190 [18 Palmerston declared that even though the arbiter s opinion upon the Highlands was purely deliberative, the United States could not rightfully repudiate the other parts of the decision. 18 Sir Charles R. Vaughan also stoutly defended the award. His dispatches to the home government through the year 1833 express his firm belief that the way to settle the boundary question was to induce the United States to accept the award. He also suggested that once this was done, England could, by negotiation and equivalents, re move the American jurisdiction from the territory north of the St. John. 19 Nothing was accomplished, however, to ward a reconsideration of the award by the Senate. Eng land finally gave up the attempt and declared herself no longer bound by her offer to accept the arbiter s decision. 20 From 1833 to 1841 the boundary question was juggled back and forth between the two countries in a series of projects and counter-projects in which neither side could agree to the conditions imposed by the other. Soon after the rejection of the award the United States proposed that a joint commission be appointed to survey the line and de termine the Highlands named in 1783. England reluctantly consented to this proposal. A draught of convention was drawn up and sent to the American Secretary of State, through the English Minister, Mr. Fox. But when this reached Washington the United States had decided that set tlement could only be obtained by arbitration, recent dis turbances in Maine having shown the improbability of set tlement by a survey commission. They accordingly re turned a counter proposal, that a commission of six be chosen for the survey and arbitration of the boundary. England accepted the main features of this proposal, but absolutely refused to consent to the added conditions, that is De Lapradelle et Politis, "Kecueil des Arbitrages Internation- aux," p. 282. 19 Vaughan to Viscount Goderich, Feb. 7, 1833. American His torical Eeview, VII, p. 504. 20 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1175. 19] 191 Mitchell s Map should be acknowledged by the commission as the authentic map of the country, and that agents of the two governments should accompany the survey commission to furnish explanations on behalf of their respective gov ernments. Her objections were expressed in the preamble of a new draft for a convention, communicated to the Secre tary of State by Mr. Fox, July 28, 1840. 21 The United States reply to this was another counter-project, delivered August 13, 1840. Palmerston said in his letter to Fox, of August 24, 1841, that this "contained so many inadmiss ible propositions" that it could not be accepted. To this he added a belief that no settlement could be hoped for dur ing the Presidency of Mr. Van Buren. 22 The whole course of the negotiation during this long period of projects and counter-projects accomplished noth ing toward an actual settlement. It did, however, impress upon the two governments the necessity of abandoning their attempts to fix the boundary according to the terms of the treaty of 1783. In his communication to Mr. Forsyth of January 10, 1838, Mr. Fox proposed a conventional line as the only possible settlement of the dispute. 23 Although the United States continued to urge further attempts to trace the line in conformity with the treaty, the opinion was form ing among some of the leading men of the country, of whom Daniel Webster was one, that a conventional line would have to be agreed upon. Meanwhile survey commissions had been sent out by each government to collect data and topographical evidence concerning the disputed territory. England sent two com missions, one in 1839 conducted by Colonel Mudge and Mr. Featherstonhaugh, and another in 1840 under Mr. Brough- ton and Mr. Featherstonhaugh, Jr. The reports of these commissions were intended to furnish additional proofs for 21 Senate Document, No. 274, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 Parliamentary Debates, 3d Series, Vol. 67, p. 1233. 23 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1229. 192 [20 England s claim in case another convention was agreed upon. Similarly the United States sent surveyors into the disputed territory in the summers of 1840 and 1841, to verify by their reports the American claim for the High lands north of the St. John. Although the work of these commissions was ex parte, the two governments informed one another of their intention to send surveyors into the territory and even communicated the reports of the com missions, so that a partial step was taken in the direction of mutual action, in spite of their disagreements in making drafts for a convention. 24 While the foreign secretaries of both governments were exchanging views on framing a convention for settling the question, and surveyors were making maps of the disputed territory, affairs on the boundary were becoming more and more critical. The disputes resulting from an unsettled frontier were taking on a very threatening aspect. It had been agreed by the parties when the question was submitted to arbitration that any attempts on either side to exercise jurisdiction over the disputed territory should be sus pended. But, whether from inability or unwillingness probably the latter, the local authorities did not stop their citizens from coming into contact in the disputed territory. The national governments showed a desire to settle the question peaceably by dividing the disputed territory if necessary, but the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick demanded that their claims be upheld to the full extent. 25 The disputes on the Maine boundary centered around the settlement of Madawaska, situated on both sides of the St. John at its intersection with the Madawaska River. It was over these settlements that both countries claimed juris diction and consequently a clash of authority resulted. In 24 Corresp. of Fox and Forsyth, Senate Document No. 274, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 Resolves of Maine Legislature, March 25, 1837, in "Messages and Papers of the Presidents." J. D. Richardson, Vol. II, pp. 349- 357. 21] 193 1828, John Baker, an American citizen, had been arrested there for warning the inhabitants against the exclusive authority of New Brunswick, and was convicted of seditious conspiracy by an English court, for which he was forced to pay a fine and serve a term of imprisonment, although repeated demands were made by the United States for his release. 20 In 1837 more Americans were arrested for try ing to hold an election in Madawaska under the authority of Penobscot County. Also Greely, a census agent of Maine, was taken into custody by the New Brunswick authorities. These events brought forth a storm of protest in Maine. Her legislature passed resolutions demanding that the State s rights be secured and her citizens protected by the federal government. The prisoners were released, but the feeling of antagonism remained. 27 The movement developed into what was known as the Madawaska War. Although no blood was shed, both sides assumed a threat ening attitude and organized their forces for military occu pation of the disputed territory. General Scott was sent to take charge of the United States forces in the Canadian frontier in the spring of 1838 and it was largely due to his cool direction that open conflict was avoided. He made a proposal which was accepted by the governors of Maine and New Brunswick, whereby it was mutually agreed to let questions of possession and jurisdiction over the disputed territory stand, each government exercising its jurisdiction over a certain portion of the territory but without recog nition of its right to do so by the other side. 28 Such a policy succeeded in pacifying the local factions for a short time. Irresponsible depredations into the timber by law less men were stopped and a vigorous military police was maintained by both governments. How long the question 26 Speech of Douglas, former Governor of New Brunswick, in Par liamentary Debates, 3rd Ser., Vol. 67, pp. 1270-73. 27 Kichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. Ill, pp. 358, 368. 28 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Ser., Vol. 53, p. 1153. 194 [22 could be thus kept under guard, was questionable. The military agreement of Scott and Harvey was really a tem porary truce, pending the settlement which it was hoped would soon be reached by the national governments. The border disturbances were not confined to the fron tiers of Maine, but spread along the entire northern boun dary. Violations of neutrality, not even thought of by the framers of the treaty of Ghent, were actually begun during a Canadian rebellion, 1837- 38. American adventurers, idlers, and worse, helped the insurgents to aggravate the Canadian authorities. Bands of "Patriots" and "Hunters Lodges were established along the frontier for the purpose of assisting the rebels in what they declared to be the cause of right and liberty. Affairs came to a crisis in this quarter with the destruction of the steamer "Caroline," an Amer ican vessel, which was alleged to have been used by the sympathizers to carry supplies and war munitions to Navy Island, where the rebels were located. An English force was sent out on the night of December 29, 1837, to destroy the vessel, but found her moored to the dock on the Amer ican shore, instead of at Navy Island as they had expected. They were not deterred, however, from carrying out their plans, but seized the vessel forcibly and towed her into the current, where she was set afire and allowed to drift over Niagara Falls. At least one American was killed in the affair, and several were more or less injured. The indig nation of the entire country was roused by this outrage. United States territory had been violated by an armed force of a foreign government. This was more than a local dis pute of boundaries. It was unmistakably an invasion of United States territory, a fact which the government as well as the people resented. On the frontier things were in a commotion and there was imminent danger of the people taking summary justice by a resort to arms. The national government took immediate steps to establish order and also to prevent a repetition of such invasions. 23] 195 The militia were called into service under the command of General Scott, and a formal complaint was made to the British government. 29 Under this vigorous management matters became more peaceable in 1839. General Scott did much to end the "Patriot" movement by addressing the rebel sympathizers upon the folly and danger of disturbing the international peace. 30 Proclamations by the President urged similar for bearance upon the citizens of the United States. 31 The favorable aspect of the question is shown in the President s third annual message to congress issued December 2, 1839. 32 He says in part : * The extraordinary powers vested in me by the act of Congress for the defense of the country in an emergency, considered so far probable as to require that the Executive should possess ample means to meet it, have not been exerted. * * * Happily, in our pending ques tions with Great Britain, out of which this unusual grant of authority arose, nothing has occurred to require its ex ertion. * * * There is every reason to believe that the disturbances like those which lately agitated the neighbor ing British Provinces will not again prove the sources of border contentions." Prompt and judicious action by the national authorities had dispersed any immediate danger of conflict on the frontier. But the feeling of hostility was only suppressed and not extinguished. The international questions which gave rise to the disturbances, remained unsettled. In 1840 and 1841 more difficulties were added to the disputes already pending, which, like the case of the Caro line," involved questions of international law. Foremost 29 Kichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. Ill, pp. 401-404. 30 Callahan, J. M., The Neutrality of the American Lakes, pp. 100-101. si U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. XI, pp. 784-785. 32 Kichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. Ill, p. 529. 196 [24 among these was the question of Right of Search or Visit which was revived at this time by the action of British cruisers engaged in suppressing the slave trade on the African Coast. The United States and Great Britain had agreed in the Treaty of Ghent to exercise their best efforts to end the traffic in slaves. To further this object, a treaty was negotiated, but not ratified, during the second admin istration of Mr. Monroe, allowing a mutual right of visit to be exercised by the cruisers of the two governments, to ascertain whether ships suspected of being slavers were act ually so enga ged. Since this time England had entered into treaties with other powers, particularly Portugal, Spain, and France, for the exercise of a right of visit, but with the United States nothing had been agreed upon. Several proposals for such a treaty had been made by Eng land from 1833 to 1838, but not accepted. This question had never been well received in the United States and its significance in the war of 1812 was not yet forgotten. But in the spring of 1840, the commanders of the American and British fleets on the coast of Africa signed an agreement for the mutual right to arrest the merchant vessels of the United States and England and her allies, found to be trading in slaves, and turn them over to their own govern ment s authorities for adjudication. 33 The agreement on the part of the American Commander was unauthorized by his instructions and was promptly disavowed by the home government. But during the interval of its enforcement several American merchant vessels were arrested by British cruisers on slender suspicions of being slavers, causing con siderable loss to their owners from the interruption of the voyage. The complaints received by the national govern ment against such interference with innocent commerce renewed the old opposition to the Right of Search, even though it was now, as England claimed, a mere Right of Visit to ascertain the truth of a vessel s nationality. Eng- ss Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers (1848), pp. 73-76. 25] 197 land maintained that, treaty or no treaty, her warships were entitled to visit a merchant vessel on the high seas and see the proof of her nationality. It was asserted that this was made necessary by the fact that vessels of various nationality engaging in the slave trade, sought immunity by falsely assuming the flag of the United States. True as this may have been, the United States stuck to the prin ciple, that in time of peace, none but an American warship was entitled to interrupt, or in any way interfere with a merchant vessel flying the American flag. England s zeal to abolish slavery raised another question of maritime rights, in which the case of the "Creole" figured most prominently. 34 The "Creole" was an Amer ican vessel whose crew, composed of negro slaves, had mu tinied and forced her captain to sail to the British port of Nassau in the Bermudas. While in that port, the English authorities declared that in accord with the laws of Eng land, which recognized no rights of slavery within English territorial jurisdiction, these slaves on the "Creole" were no longer bound to their masters. Similar action was taken by the port authorities with slaves on board other American vessels driven to the refuge of the English port by stress of weather. The loss of valuable slave property, thus forced upon the American owners, raised a strong protest in the United States, particularly in the South where the question of fugitive slaves was keenly felt. Complaint was made to England and damages asked for the liberated slaves. Eng land however was inclined to refuse the American claim on the mistaken ground that her laws against slavery ex tended to foreign vessels within her ports. In the United States the war spirit which had been effectually quieted in 1839, broke out afresh in 1840 over new developments in the "Caroline" episode. Alexander McLeod, a British subject, boasted in New York of having taken part in the destruction of the "Caroline," and that 34 Scott s Cases on International Law, p. 252. 198 [26 he had fired the shot which killed the American, Durfree. He was immediately arrested and imprisoned in Lockport, New York, under a charge of murder. 35 The popular cry was that he should be hanged, and in view of the feeling of resentment prevalent on the frontier, there was a reason able prospect that the threat would be executed. In England a feeling, no less strong, was created that if McLeod was hanged, war would be declared. The govern ment had assumed the responsibility of the destruction of the "Caroline," and a just indignation was felt that an Englishman should be tried by a foreign court, with a pros pect of being convicted and executed, for acts which were committed under the orders of his government. In this important crisis the United States government was next to helpless. McLeod was held for trial by a New York State court and there was then no authority by which his case could be transferred to the federal courts. The only thing to be done was to assure him a fair trial before the State court and furnish any possible evidence for his defense. England s demands for his immediate release could not be granted. 36 On the whole, Anglo-American relations at the close of Van Buren s administration were in a very complicated and uncertain state. The boundary question had been dis puted for so many years, in spite of repeated attempts to settle it, that peaceable means were nearly exhausted. The hostile feeling on the frontier had brought the border States to a condition of military preparation very war-like and threatening. 37 Maine had demanded that, unless a settle ment was reached in the negotiations then pending, the federal government should take military possession of the entire disputed territory. 38 The Governor of New Bruns- ss Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 53. se Senate Document No. 1, 1st Sess., 22nd Cong. 37 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Ser., Vol. 62, pp. 1238-1241. 38 House Journal, 26th Congress, 2nd Sess., p. 796. 27] 199 wick, on the other hand, was instructed to retain possession of the same territory, by military force if necessary. Under the constant stress of popular hostile sentiment the situation of armed neutrality could not be indefinitely maintained. Add to this aggravated boundary question the other ques tions of international relations then in dispute, and we can appreciate the critical complexity of them all. Briefly sum marizing, the unsettled boundary, the violation of American territory in the "Caroline" episode, the trial of Alexander McLeod for acts authorized by his government, the right of English cruisers to "visit" American merchantmen on the high seas, and the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by England s colonial authorities over vessels storm-driven into her ports, were the questions which combined to enforce the negotiations of the treaty of Washington, commonly known as the Webster- Ashburton Treaty. II. THE MAKING OF THE TEEATY. In the Presidential election of 1840 General Harrison made a sweeping campaign of the country and his party, the Whig, went into office by a great popular victory. In forming his cabinet Harrison was singularly fortunate, in view of the existing state of foreign affairs, to be able to entrust the Department of State to a man of such eminent capabilities as Daniel Webster. To his sound judgment and cool, masterly conduct of the affairs of State is largely due the credit of successfully terminating the complicated series of disputes which had arisen between the United States and England. Negotiations for the settlement of the boundary were reopened by England with Webster and the new adminis tration in March, 1841. Instead of continuing from the point where negotiations had stopped in August, 1840, Palmerston now referred back to his first draft for conven tion of which he directed Mr. Fox "to show the new secre tary its reasonableness. Webster, however, suspended any 200 [28 action until he could become more acquainted with the question and its course of discussion. 39 But before any further action was taken the death of President Harrison after one month in office suspended all negotiations for a time. This unexpected calamity also introduced a new dif ficulty into the work of the administration. Tyler, the vice-president, who succeeded Harrison, disagreed with his party to such an extent that his entire cabinet, with the exception of Webster, resigned, and the popular support he should have received in Congress was withdrawn. Under the spell of this estrangement, it seemed dubious that any treaty which the President might propose would be heartily received in the Senate and ratified. During the summer of 1841, Webster intimated to Mr. Fox that he was disposed to settle the boundary difficulties by a conventional line or line by compromise. 40 It is well known that Webster saw little hope in continuing the old negotiations for a joint survey commission with ultimate umpirage. His opinion was thus expressed in the Senate a few years later : Mr. President, it is true that I regarded the case as hopeless, without an entire change in the manner of proceeding." 41 Here was a distinct step toward peace able settlement. It was a move to recover the question from the great tangle of diplomatic proceedure in which it had remained so long and accomplished so little. In England more changes were made which bore upon the final settlement of the difficulty. Lord Melbourne s Ministry was succeeded in September, 1841, by that of Sir Kobert Peel, and the management of foreign affairs, hith erto entrusted to Viscount Palmerston, was taken up by Lord Aberdeen, a man much less sharp and antagonistic than his predecessor. The United States Minister to Eng- 39 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Ser., Vol. 67, p. 1236. 40 Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 70. 41 Webster s Speech in the Senate April 1846, in vindication of the Treaty of Washington. Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 239. 29] 201 land, Mr. Stephenson, who had been a match for Palmers- ton s uncompromising diplomacy, was succeeded by Mr. Edward Everett, eminently conciliatory, and, as an old friend of Webster, in full sympathy with his views. 42 Thus both nations were represented by new administrations. The old petty differences could now be abandoned and a new course of negotiation begun. But before negotiations act ually began, one of the most important difficulties attending the settlement was eliminated. Alexander McLeod was tried at Utica, New York, and by proving an alibi was acquitted in October, 1841. Thus the war cloud which had hung so threateningly over this transaction was dispersed. 43 It had been decided by Palmerston and Forsyth that negotiations for the settlement of the boundary should be transferred to Washington. This decision was now carried out by Aberdeen in a way both unexpected and effective. On December 26, 1841, he invited Mr. Everett to a confer ence and informed him that the British Ministry would take a decisive step toward a settlement of the questions in dis pute between the two countries by sending a special min ister to Washington with full powers to treat for the settle ment of all pending questions, and named Lord Ashburton as the man selected for the work. 44 The English Ministry had come to the same conclusion as that reached by Webster, that a new manner of proceeding was necessary to accom plish anything toward a settlement. All negotiations upon the questions pending were abandoned in London and turned over to the Special Minister. In the United States the news of the Special Mission was welcomed. Webster sent word of his warm approval 42 Lodge, Daniel Webster, p. 252.. 43 To prevent such possibilities from arising in the future Webster prepared a bill which was made a statute August 29, 1842, by which such cases involving international questions should be transferred from the State to the Federal Courts. Webster s Works, Vol. VI, p. 267. 44 See Appendix A. (1). 202 [30 to the English Ministry, and immediately began to prepare the way for the negotiations in America. 45 He was not without a plan in this preparation. In 1839 it had been rumored that the United States would send a similar Spe cial Mission to England, and Webster heard that his name had been suggested to the President by Poinsett, the Secre tary of War. To justify this good opinion of Mr. Poinsett, Webster had drawn up a plan of negotiation by which he thought such a Special Minister should proceed and sent it to the President. Many of the leading features of this plan were later embodied in the negotiation of the Treaty of Washington. 46 Chief among them was to secure the con currence and aid of Maine and Massachusetts in the nego tiation for a conventional line of compromise. It was clear to Webster that without the cooperation of these two States nothing could be done toward bringing the adverse claims to a common understanding. Ashburton arrived in the United States April 4, 1842, and on the llth, Webster sent letters to the Governors of Maine and Massachusetts, announcing the arrival and pur pose of the Special Mission and asking their active cooper ation. 47 He was anxious to avoid having the question in volved with the local prejudice which was likely to be found in the State Legislatures, and asked that commissioners be sent to Washington to confer with the National Represen tatives and act for their States in the negotiations. The difficulties of settlement even by this means were great. Both States had declared in favor of a settlement by the treaty of 1783, and Maine still held stubbornly to her claim for the whole disputed territory. But Webster s appeal for a compromise settlement, and for the appointment of commissioners to gain that end was well received. Gov ernor Davis of Massachusetts replied that the commissioners 45 See Appendix A. (2). 46 Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 2. 47 See Appendix A. (3). 31] 203 would be appointed, and that the people of the State were ready to make reasonable concessions to the convenience or necessity of Great Britain, "but nothing not a rood of barren heath or rock to unfounded claims." 48 In Maine the consent to compromise was not so easily obtained. It was necessary to convene the legislature in special session and overcome local prejudice and political antagonism with an appeal for national patriotism. Webster was in Boston early in May, and sent Jared Sparks, who was thoroughly familiar with the points of strength and weakness in both claims, to influence the Maine legislators for a compromise. In this work he was successful, as reported in his letter to Webster, May 19, 1842. 49 Resolutions were passed on the 26th in favor of a conventional line and for the appoint ment of four commissioners, two from each party, to give the State s assent to such terms as seemed reasonable and fair. 50 To Webster this meant a preliminary success in the settlement. He is said to have announced this result to President Tyler with the comment, "The crisis is passed." The Commissioners of both States were well chosen, with out reference to their political connections. Massachusetts was represented by Abbott Lawrence, John Mills, and Charles Allen, and Maine by Edward Kavanagh, Edward Kent, Wm. P. Preble, and John Otis. A word as to the negotiators, before entering upon a discussion of their work, is not amiss. Daniel Webster s career as one of the leading statesmen of the United States is too well known to need repetition. But his peculiar position in the administration at this particular time merits our attention and approval. Webster was prominently as sociated with the Whig party, which had declared Tyler to be a traitor to its principles and caused the members of Harrison s cabinet, who had been asked to continue in office 48 Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 99. 4 Curtis, Ibid., p. 100. so Maine Historical Society, Vol. VIII, p. 310. 204 [32 under Tyler, to resign, with the single exception of Webster. In the approaching crisis in the international disputes, Webster saw his duty to remain with the new President in the face of severe party criticism and complete the settle ment, which he believed he could accomplish. At the pres ent time, when we can see the important influence of Webs ter in bringing about the final settlement, we are apt to underrate the difficulties he faced in staying at his post. It was no easy thing for him, at that time, before the treaty was made and before the people appreciated the value of the work he was to accomplish, to remain allied to the Pres ident against whom political anger and party excitement were raised to a high pitch. His action in undertaking the work of the negotiation is therefore most commendable, since true patriotism and the cause of peace were his only motives. 51 Lord Ashburton, also, was well qualified to accomplish a compromise settlement. He was favorably known and respected in the United States through his commercial as sociation with the house of Baring Brothers and by his marriage to an American lady. We have ample evidences of his unselfish motives in accepting the Special Mission, but nothing summarizes them better than his own state ment in a letter to Gallatin of April 12, 1842. 52 He and Gallatin were old friends, ripe in years, and had witnessed this controversy from the beginning. Ashburton says in part : You will probably be surprised at my undertaking this task at my period of life. * * * The truth is that I am tempted by my great anxiety in the cause, and the extreme importance which I have always attached to the maintenance of peace between our countries. The latter circumstance induced my political friends to press this ap pointment upon me, and with much hesitation founded solely on my health and age, I yielded." He professes his si Lodge : "Webster," p. 251. 52 Gallatin s Writings, Vol. II, p. 595. 33] 205 belief that all political parties in the United States are in clined to secure peace with England on reasonable terms: "I expect and desire no other, and my present character of a diplomatist is so new to me that I know no other course than candor and plain dealing." The commissioners arrived in Washington and the nego tiations officially commenced June 13, 1842, with a letter from Ashburton to Webster. 53 In this, he reviewed the course of preceding attempts at settling the question, in which no progress had been made because each party had held uncompromisingly his own claim. The present at tempt, he said, to succeed, must proceed not as a renewal of the controversy, but with a full realization of previous failures. By an interchange of notes of June 17th, a personal conference was arranged for the next day and by Webster s request, Ashburton, a few days later, wrote a statement of his views on the subject of a conventional line. In this statement Ashburton again expressed his desire for frank presentations of their case. England s object, he said, was not a gain of acres of land, so that he was willing to concede all material advantages, which were not essential to England and her subjects. He suggested the St. John as a good boundary from its intersection with the north line from the source of the St. Croix to the Highlands, except for the Madawaska settlement on the south bank. But he could not "in any case abandon the interests of these people," whose history and personal desire bound them to England. Webster submitted Ashburton s letter to the Maine com missioners, and their reply was received June 29th. It shows that they were still firm in their belief that the whole of the disputed territory was theirs by right, but that they were willing to make concessions necessary to secure Eng land s line of colonial communication. 54 For this they sug- 53 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 3rd Sess., p. 4. B * See Map, Appendix D. 206 [34 gested that the line follow the St. John to a point about three miles above the mouth of the Madawaska, and from there turn northward continuing parallel to that river al most its source, whence it turned westward by a straight line through the head of Lake Pohenagamook to the High lands. Thus the whole valley of the Madawaska, which they said was the real Upper St. John, was allowed for England s road of communications. They declared that if Ashburton s claim for the settlements south of the St. John was sine qua non, they would refuse to negotiate further. The negotiations had reached a critical state. The de cision of the boundary rested awkwardly upon a disagree ment between the Maine commissioners and the English Minister, with Webster trying to mediate between them for mutual concessions. At this juncture matters were almost disrupted because of a misunderstanding of the British home government concerning the American claim in the af fair of the Creole. The only demand the United States raised upon the circumstances of this case was that her merchant ships seeking shelter in English ports should not become subject to the local territorial jurisdiction. The English ministry confused the American claim with a de mand for the return of fugitive slaves, which was contrary to England s law against slavery. Webster explained the distinction in his letter to Everett, June 28. 55 In that let ter he intimated that something in Ashburton s recent in structions bore strongly on this point and conspired to make Ashburton think of returning to England without complet ing the work of the Special Mission. The combined urging of Webster and President Tyler succeeded in preventing such a termination of the negotiations at this unfinished point, but it required all of the Secretary s skill and tact to keep this question out of the discussions until the bound ary question was settled. 56 55 See Appendix C. (1). 56 < < It is a fact, which Mr. Webster always acknowledged, that President Tyler s address, in persuading Lord Ashburton to remain, was most skillfully and happily used. Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 105, note. 35] 207 To fix a boundary with concessions and equivalents to which both Maine and England would agree, was a perplex ing matter. Maine had refused to consider any part of the territory which she claimed under the treaty of 1783, as an equivalent on the part of England for the concessions of Maine. England could offer equivalents which were just and equitable to the United States, but none which would inure directly to the State of Maine. The strip of territory along the forty-fifth parallel and free navigation of the St. John had been already suggested by Ashburton, but at least one of these in no way benefited Maine. Webster had from the first recognized this difficulty as most important, and considered various ways by which it could be overcome. In a private note to Mr. Everett as early as April 25, 1842, he speculates on possible equivalents to be offered to Maine. 57 One of his suggestions was to include within the United States a tract of territory lying between the due north line from the source of the St. Croix and the St. John. This territory he did not think possessed much agricultural value, but would have great weight in the negotiations since it conceded to Maine territory undoubtedly belonging to Eng land. If this proposition was ever submitted by Webster to Ashburton, it was not well received. There is no mention found of it in their written correspondence. The only other equivalent suggested by either Webster or Ashburton, was the privilege of sending timber and produce down the St. John free of any duty not imposed on similar articles grown in New Brunswick. Even this was not considered an actual concession but more as a recognition of a right which Maine had claimed for many years. The first negotiation entered into for the boundary settlement after the rejection of the award, embodied a demand by the United States for free navigation of the St. John. 58 The prospect of coming to amicable agreement was very obscure. It seemed impossi- 57 Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, Vol. II, p. 120. ss Vaughan to Viscount Goderich. American Historical Eeview, Vol. VII, p. 503. 208 [36 ble to find terms which would satisfy both Maine and Eng land. At this point Webster and Ashburton put aside the for malities of diplomatic correspondence and conducted their negotiations in personal conferences. 59 They attacked the difficulties which confronted them in a spirit similar to that of two business men who enter a private office and discuss an arrangement for their mutual benefit. Ashburton had received the reply of the Maine commissioners of June 29th, with Webster s comments on the propositions it contained, July 8th. He replied July llth, that their proposed line north of the St. John was, "wholly inadmissable, " and reluctantly implied that if it was necessary he would sur render the Madawaska settlements on the south bank of that river. In regard to these settlements, Maine also had taken a somewhat conciliatory tone. Her commissioners had offered to allow the Madawaska settlers to choose for themselves to which government they would adhere, on the condition that in case the territory was given to New Bruns wick, all grants of land hitherto given by Maine should be confirmed. It was apparent that both sides were willing to accept the St. John as the boundary as far as the mouth of the Madawaska, but from there to the Highlands their claims differed decidedly. To bring this disagreement to a compromise basis was the problem which the negotiators proposed to solve in their conferences. The only feasible equivalent offered to Maine and Massachusetts for their con cessions of land, was the free navigation of the St. John and this was not considered by the commissioners as sufficient recompense for their losses. One more means of satisfying the States remained. That was to pay cash for the territory which they were asked to give up. Webster agreed that the United States could do this in a manner more acceptable to the States than if the offer came from England. The set tlement of the boundary and advantages gained in other Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 115. 37] 209 parts of the line were ample justification for this payment by the national government. As it afterwards proved, this was the expedient which severed the deadlock between the adverse claims and brought the boundary question to its final settlement. On July 15th, Webster sent to the Maine Commissioners a draft of the terms which he thought would satisfy their own claims and be acceptable to Lord Ashburton. 60 In this he included his offer on the part of the federal government to pay two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in equal moieties to Maine and Massachusetts, besides all expenses incurred by them in protecting the disputed territory and surveying the line. The boundary which he proposed was practically the same as that afterwards accepted into the treaty. It is important to note that this line represented a compromise between the first claim of Lord Ashburton, favoring the main St. John, and the line suggested by the Maine Commissioners on June 29th. 61 The United States gained seven-twelfths of the disputed territory, equal in value to about four-fifths of the whole. In addition to this, the old line of Valentine and Collins was recognized as the boundary along the forty-fifth parallel, thus giving Rouse s Point to the United States, and Hall s stream was accepted as the northwest source of the Connecticut, England there by conceding another tract of valuable territory. Webster urged upon the commissioners the patriotism which should prompt them to secure a settlement of the question by ac cepting these terms. In this way he endeavored to relieve his proposition of any appearances of a pecuniary bargain, and allow Maine to yield her claims without sacrificing her principle. He recognized that the chief benefits of a settle ment on the terms he proposed would inure to the United States and that in fairness, the States of Maine and Massa chusetts deserved a recompense for their cession of claims. See Appendix A. (5). See Map, Appendix D. 210 [38 In this case he appealed to the commissioners to accept his arrangement for paying the states for their claims, not as a "bargain of acres," but as means to secure international peace and promote the welfare of the federal state. The fate of Webster s proposition and probably of the whole negotiation, was decided July 22, 1842, when the Maine commissioners finally gave assent to the terms em bodied in Webster s communication of July 15th. 62 The Massachusetts commissioners had expressed their approval two days before, a fact which probably helped to bring Maine to an agreement. In consenting to the terms of fered by Webster, the Commissioners still maintained that they made a sacrifice of extensive territory which they rightfully owned, and for which no adequate compensation was given. It was a surrender, they said, "of a portion of the birth-right of the people of the state, made in favor of the judgment of her sister-states and in a "spirit of attach ment and patriotic devotion of their state to the Union. 63 The States asked that certain amendments be made to the terms before they were incorporated into a treaty ; viz., that the privilege of free navigation of the St. John be extended to include farm produce as well as timber ; that the amount of the disputed territory fund, which was the money re ceived by the New Brunswick authorities for the timber cut in the disputed territory, be paid over to the United States for the use of Maine and Massachusetts 64 and that all possessory titles to land previously granted by Maine, Massachusetts and New Brunswick be reciprocally recog nized by both governments. Massachusetts also asked that 62 Ashburton, in a private note, undated, wrote as follows to Web ster: "1 have had an interview with the gentlemen from Maine and I incline to think they will consent to our line. I explained that I was at the end of my line, and that they must therefore say yes or no." Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 120. 63 Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, pp. 49, 56. 64 The disposal of the disputed territory fund carried into ef fect an arrangement entered into some years before regarding timber cut upon the disputed territory. Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, pp. 61, 62. 39] 211 the amount to be paid by the United States be increased to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for each of the two States. Ashburton accepted the additional terms, and in giving his official approval of them, the settlement of the northeastern boundary was at last assured. The negotiators next directed their attention to the set tlement of the boundary described under the seventh article of the Treaty of Ghent and to framing their agreements into the articles of a treaty. But the difficult part of the negotiation had been accomplished. The boundary on the northwest was not complicated with "States claims" or adverse local jurisdictions, nor were the other disputed questions of international relations beyond the reach of a conciliatory adjustment. They had all been touched upon in the conferences between the negotiators so that their final settlement was largely a matter of setting into official form what had already been informally agreed upon. The country west of Lake Superior was still wild and uninhabited, except by Indians and pioneer trappers, so that the boundary in that quarter was easily fixed by a compromise line. 65 Ashburton, on July 16th, had proposed that the line should be drawn through Pidgeon River, lo cated about half way between the lines claimed by the com missioners under the seventh article of the Treaty of Ghent, and to this Webster readily assented when he summarized the settlements on all the points of boundary in his com munication of July 27th. 66 Through the water communica tion between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, the boundary was decided in favor of the line claimed by the American commissioner under the Treaty of Ghent, thus ceding to the United States St. George s, or Sugar Island. This, however, was regarded as one of the equivalents offered for the settlement of the northeast boundary. es Webster a Correspondence with Mr. Delafield and Mr. Ferguson of July 20th and 25th, 1842, gives the opinion of those gentlemen upon the character of the territory in question. "Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers," pp. 67, 72. ee Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 57. 212 [40 In the final negotiations upon the international disputes arising out of the suppression of the slave trade, the case of the "Creole," and the "Caroline" episode, a process of selection was employed. These questions were all more or less involved with other disputes between the two countries. In regard to suppression of the slave trade, we have already noticed its connection with the right of search, and the re vival of the old dispute upon this point. With a renewal of that question came the question of impressment, which, though subdued since the war of 1812, had never been def initely settled. The question raised by the case of the "Creole" had been confused in England with the extradi tion of fugitive slaves. In the "Caroline" episode, the complications of the frontier disturbances and a necessity for the suppression of lawless characters were involved. To meet these questions effectively, Webster and Ashburton selected for treaty articles, what they considered the fun damental causes for the disputes, and left the settlement of the particular cases in which these causes had operated to an official correspondence between the negotiators. Thus in the treaty itself but two questions, other than the settle ment of the boundary, were included ; namely, the suppres sion of the slave trade and the extradition of criminals for certain enumerated offenses. In the official correspondence accompanying the treaty, the negotiators dealt with the subject of interference with American ships, storm driven into the ports of the West Indies, with the attack upon and destruction of the "Caroline" and with the subject of im pressment. An account of the negotiations upon these questions is necessarily brief. It was chiefly conducted by personal con ferences between the negotiators, of which no minutes or any official record was kept. From Webster s correspond ence, however, some light is thrown upon the way in which the arrangements were conducted. As early as April 26, 1842, Webster writes to Mr. Everett in London, that he 41] 213 has proposed to Lord Ashburton a practical settlement of the right of search difficulty by maintaining for a limited time independent squadrons on the African Coast for the suppression of the slave trade. 67 This arrangement was afterwards spoken of by Ashburton as the "cruising con vention," which he thought was a favorable means to ac complish its object. 68 The question of right of search brought forth a lengthy correspondence between Webster and General Cass, then United States Minister to France, who was much disappointed that an absolute renunciation of the right of search was not secured by the United States. The discussion of the question of the * Creole has already been mentioned as a difficulty in the boundary settlement. The chief point in the adjustment of this question was to make plain the distinction between a remonstrance by the United States against the interference with American ships seeking shelter in British ports and a demand for the return of fugitive slaves. Upon this question Webster wrote to John Davis, April 16, 1842, as follows: "Our position in relation to the Creole has been misrepresented by some and misunderstood by others, but it is defensible and safe." 69 Practically all of the agreements afterwards ex pressed in the correspondence explanatory to the treaty, had been arranged by personal conferences even before the formal settlement of the boundary. From July 29th to August 9th these agreements were given official tone in an interchange of formal diplomatic notes, stating the views held by the respective governments in regard to each of the disputed points. A proper understanding of this corre spondence will be gained in our study of the treaty in its various articles. 70 The negotiations were brought to their close August 9, 1842, in a treaty signed by Lord Ashburton and Daniel 67 Webster s Private Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 124. es Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 118. 69 Webster s Private Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 119. TO See Part III. (2). 214 [42 Webster, entitled: "A treaty to settle and define the bound aries between the territories of the United States and the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; For the final suppression of the African slave trade; and for the giving up of criminals, fugitive from justice in cer tain cases." 71 But with the conclusion of the negotiators work, the final settlement of the treaties provisions was but half assured. Not only was its ratification by the proper authorities in the respective governments necessary to its finality and legal enforcement, but laws had to be passed by the two governments to carry certain of its provisions into effect. On the part of England, the article relating to extradition was without binding effect until substantiated by an act of Parliament; 72 while in the United States a bill of appropriation was necessary to carry out the obliga tions of the national government to the States of Maine and Massachusetts according to the terms of the fifth article. In England the difficulties of ratification, such as con fronts a treaty in the United States, are eliminated. Rati fication there is a prerogative of the Crown and unless the agreements of the negotiator are radically contrary to the national interests, his engagements are unquestionably sanctioned by his government. 73 So with the Webster- Ashburton Treaty, the only question of ratification was in regard to the action of the United States. England s ac ceptance of it was practically undoubted. The President referred the Treaty to the Senate August llth, together with the official correspondence of the ne gotiators upon the questions not included in the articles of the treaty. He sent also a special message of approval, in which he explained at some length the results of the negotia tions and the reasons for their proposed ratification by the 71 See Appendix B. 72 See Appendix A. (5) 6. TS S. B. Crandall, Treaties, their Making and Enforcement," 151. 43] 215 Senate. 74 Regarding the boundary settlement a recapitula tion was given of the points agreed upon and the difference which had been settled. An important advantage was no ticed in that the main channels of the St. Lawrence, which in certain cases lay entirely within the boundary of one of the countries, were opened to free navigation by the ships of both. The provisions for the suppression of the slave trade were explained with reference to their bearing upon the right of search and the principles which determined American policy in this regard. Similarly the negotiations upon the questions of the "Caroline," the "Creole" and impressment, were interpreted by the President as definitive statements of the ground held by the United States upon these points. In the Senate the Treaty was referred, on a motion by Mr. Rives, to the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which he was chairman. The report of this committee favoring the ratification of the treaty was received August 15th and the Senate, in secret session, proceeded to deliberate upon it. 75 It was made the order of the day for the 17th, and the discussion continued through the 19th and 20th. In this debate the chief opponent to the treaty was Senator Benton of Missouri, who made several motions for amendment and alteration of the treaty, all of which were rejected when voted upon. Mr. Rives led the defense of the treaty before the Senate, and finally after defeating the various attempts of the opposition to amend its articles, he submitted, on August 20th, the following resolution : "Resolved (two-thirds of the senators present concur ring), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratifica tion of the treaty to settle and define the boundaries between the territories of the United States and the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America ; for the final sup pression of the African slave trade; and for the giving up 74 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 3d Sess., p. 2. 7 5 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 3d Session, p. 1. 216 [44 of criminals fugitive from justice in certain cases." This resolution was carried by the decisive vote of 39 to 9, and ordered to be communicated to the President of the United States. The treaty having been also duly ratified by England, the exchange of ratifications took place in London, October 13, 1842, between Edward Everett, the United States min ister, and Lord Aberdeen, the English Secretary of Foreign affairs. The President formally announced the treaty in the United States by a proclamation of November 10th. 70 In the United States the ratification of the treaty by such a decisive vote called forth many expressions of grat ification from prominent men of the country. Foremost among these was Webster himself. On August 21, 1842, he wrote as follows to Mr. Jeremiah Mason : "I cannot forego the pleasure of saying to an old and constant friend, who, I know, takes a personal as well as a public interest in the matter, that the treaty was ratified last evening by a vote of thirty-nine to nine. I did not look for a majority quite so large. I am truly thankful the thing is done." Mr. Mason replied on August 28th that : "In my opinion it is of more importance to the welfare of the country than any thing else that has taken place since the Treaty of Ghent. 7T Chancellor Kent added his commendations to the treaty in the following words: "That act (for the removal of certain cases to federal courts; passed August 27, 1842) and the 10th article of the treaty, providing for the surrender of fugitives are momentous and most conspicuous improve ments in our national and diplomatic codes. 78 Even Gal- latin, who had so long championed the claim of the United States for the boundary as described in 1783, sanctioned the settlement reached by the compromise line. He said con cerning it : " The arrangement being founded upon a sup posed equivalent, the principal part of which is of an in- 76 Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 230. 77 Webster s Private Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 146, 148. 78 Ibid., p. 160. 45] 217 definite value, may be accepted without wounding the honor of the country. And since the acquiescence of Maine, the party most interested, removes the great obstacle to an ac commodation, I would think it not only unwise in the pres ent situation of the country, but quite unjustifiable to run the risks incident to the failure of the pending negotia tions." 79 It has been pointed out by some writers that the ratifica tion of the treaty by a three-fourths vote of the Senate, hostile in politics to the President, signified greater success on the part of Webster. This conclusion, however, is apt to be misleading and to cause the supposition that President Tyler was not actively interested in the success of the ne gotiation. As a matter of fact, he deserves a large share of the credit, instead of the scant justice he has received from the historians of that period. 80 Webster expressed his warm regard for Tyler s solicitude in the success of the negotiation in the following note of August 24, 1842: "I shall never speak of this negotiation, my dear sir, which I believe is destined to make some figure in the history of the country, without doing you justice. Your steady support and confidence, your anxious and intelligent attention to what was in progress, your exceedingly obliging and pleas ant intercourse both with the British minister and the com missioners of the States, have given every facility to my agency in this important transaction." 81 Although ratified and proclaimed, the treaty was yet a target for vigorous attacks from three quarters. It was still hoped by its opponents to nullify the treaty by pre venting the laws necessary for its enforcement from being enacted. In the United States Senate, and in Parliament, long debates took place upon the treaty of Washington dur ing first months of 1843. An unexpected opposition came 7Gallatin to Thomas Ritchie, August 2, 1842. Gallatin s Writ ings, Vol. II. so Foster, J. W., "A Century of American Diplomacy," p. 283. si Webster s Private Correspondence," Vol. II, p. 147. 218 [46 from France. Lewis Cass, the United States minister at Paris, bitterly resented that his efforts in Europe to pre vent an adoption of the right of search were not more substantially upheld by the provisions of the Webster-Ash- burton Treaty. Webster successfully upheld the action of the government in the ensuing correspondence which con tinued after Cass had resigned his post on account of his feelings against the treaty. 82 The political opponents found an excellent opportunity to attack the treaty in the discussion raised by a circum stance of its ratification. This was the notorious question of "The Maps." 83 When the negotiations were just begin ning, Jared Sparks, who was gathering data in the French archives for a revision of his work, "The Diplomatic Cor respondence of the American Revolution," discovered a let ter written by Franklin to Count de Vergermes, in which he referred to a certain map which he had sent, marked with a " strong red line" to show the boundaries of the United States as settled in the preliminary draft of the treaty of 1783. On further search he discovered a map, answering accurately the description given by Franklin, on which the line marked for the boundary coincided with that claimed by England. 84 Mr. Sparks immediately sent a copy of this map to Webster with an explanatory letter concerning it. Nothing more was heard of this letter or of its contents un til after the treaty was signed by the negotiators. Then, while the Senate was debating the ratification of the treaty, Webster gave a copy of Sparks letter and the map to Mr. Rives, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and it was published in Mr. Rives speech. As soon as the treaty was ratified and the fact became known that Webster had withheld the information conveyed by Sparks 82 Webster a Diplomatic and Official Papers, pp. 170-221. 83 A full and complete account of the Maps is given in < North American Keview," 1843, Vol. LVI, pp. 468-477. 84 Jared Sparks to Buchanan, February 11, 1843. Curtis: "Life of Buchanan, Vol. I, p. 505. 47] 219 letter while the treaty was being negotiated, a stir of ex citement was raised. Webster was charged with having taken an unfair advantage of the British negotiator in withholding evidence bearing upon the question, which he was duty bound to make known. This charge of dis honorable conduct on the part of the Secretary of State was enforced by the fact that Sparks letter had been used to secure the ratification of the treaty by the Senate. 85 This feeling was strongest in England, but was also entertained by some people in the United States. A fair judgment of the case, however, shows that Web ster s conduct in regard to the Sparks map was not such as his opponents declared. 86 Rives speech upon the Sparks documents did not imply that they in any way affected the validity of either claim, but," he said, "they could not fail in event of another reference, to give increased confi dence and emphasis to the pretensions of Great Britain, and exert a corresponding influence upon the mind of the ar biter." There is little doubt, in view of the conflicting probabilities to be drawn from the number of maps relat ing to the boundary, that if the discoveries of Mr. Sparks had been made known at the time they were communicated to Webster, the only result would have been the addition of endless perplexities and a possible disruption of the ne gotiation. 87 But in the midst of popular interest and possi- 85 A private letter of Webster to Everett, July 14, 1842, shows that Webster did take precautions to keep the map question quiet. He says to Everett : l * * * forbear to press the search for maps in England or elsewhere. Our strength is on the letter of the treaty." Curtis: "Life of Webster," Vol. II, p. 103. se "Defense of Webster," E. Everett, in "Orations and Speech es," Vol. IV, p. 213. 87 Webster and Ashburton both expressed their satisfaction with the results accomplished by keeping the map question out of the ne gotiations. Webster, before the New York Historical Society, April 15, 1843, said: "I must confess that I did not think it a very urgent duty to go to Lord Ashburton and tell him that I had found a bit of doubtful evidence in Paris out of which he might perhaps make some thing to prejudice our claims." Webster s Works, Vol. II, p. 149. Ashburton wrote to Webster that, "he was by no means disposed to disturb its (the map question s) sleep." See Appendix C. (3). 220 [48 ble antagonism, raised by the map question, the discussion of the treaty was renewed in the Senate and Parliament. The debates which ensued brought forth the severest kind of criticism both for the treaty and its negotiators, but re sulted finally in a complete vindication of both. In the Senate a discussion was brought about by a dispatch of Mr. Everett received February 23rd, in which a reference was made to the right of search and to the state ment made by Sir Robert Peel, that Lord Aberdeen s dis cussion of it in a dispatch to Everett, December 20, 1841, had not been answered by the United States. It had been asserted in England that the claims which Aberdeen laid down in his dispatch of December 20th, to the right of search, or, as explained by Aberdeen, "The right to ascer tain the truth of a vessel s nationality," had never been denied in the United States and were in fact undeniable. 88 The real reason why Aberdeen s dispatch had not been an swered was that negotiations had been transferred to the Special Mission before Everett framed a reply. The sub ject having been brought before the Senate in such a man ner, Mr. Benton made a long speech upon the different in terpretations put upon the treaty in the two countries, and argued that for just such indefmiteness none of the real questions between the countries had been settled by the re cent negotiations. 89 He was answered by Mr. Archer, who declared that the misunderstandings were more apparent than real. He (Archer) said that although England had not actually given up the right of visit, yet the treaty had removed the cause for its immediate exercise and was there for a solution of the question. The opposition to the treaty in the United States was not confined to the right of search. Mr. Benton criticized all of its provisions and added that one of the greatest faults ss Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 68, pp. 615, 621. 89 Benton : < Thirty Years View in the IT. S. Senate, Vol. II, pp. 421, 451. 49] 221 was that it did not settle all the questions it was supposed to include. One of these was the question of Oregon, which was beginning to attract settlers to such an extent that it was felt that the arrangement for its joint occupation by the two countries should be terminated. 90 In Parliament the treaty was brought up for discussion by a resolution of Lord Palmerston calling for the corre spondence of the recent negotiation and the instructions of the ministry to the British envoy to be laid before the House of Commons. In his subsequent speech upon the motion he made a detailed and searching criticism of the treaty, its negotiation, and England s representative in the negotia tions. 91 He reviewed the history of the boundary question from its beginning in 1783, to the negotiations of Lord Ash- burton; then proceeded to attack those negotiations upon all the points connected with them. He considered the choice of Lord Ashburton as negotiator a great mistake and one which was clearly demonstrated in the weakness and lack of skill shown in the negotiations. The concessions of territory to the United States he considered for the most part as absolute losses to England for which no compen sating equivalents were gained. The 8th and 9th articles of the treaty were not a fulfillment of the promise of the governments in the Treaty of Ghent "to use their best en deavors," to end slavery, since efficient policing of the sea against slave traders was only possible by a mutual right of search. In regard to the "Creole," Palmerston held that 90 In regard to the Oregon question and its connection with the treaty of Washington, a mistaken belief has been circulated that Marcus Whitman, the missionary, by a heroic trip across the continent to tell the national authorities of Oregon s value, saved that territory from being traded to England for a cod fishery, in the Webster- Ashburton negotiation. This story has been conclusively proved to be an entire fabrication, but many notable writers were taken in by it, among others being Von Hoist, who says in his Constitutional His tory of the United States," Vol. Ill, pp. 51, 52, "How much truth is in the story can probably never be authentically determined. The proofs of the story s lack of foundation are found in Edw. G. Bourne s, "Essays in Historical Criticism." i Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, pp. 1162, 1216. 222 [50 Ashburton gave too much countenance to the doctrines of Webster, in promising that instructions should be sent to the colonial governors to prevent such officious interferences in the future. The extradition article alone escaped the general condemnation of Lord Palmerston. This he be lieved to be a sound principle of international relations which would be properly enforced by the two governments for their mutual benefit. But on the whole, Palmerston regarded the treaty as no definite assurance of future peace. Its agreements were either already bad or more capable of misconstruction than of satisfactory enforcement. This long arraignment by Palmerston, which occupied more than three hours in its delivery, was concluded with a hope that the forebodings which had been expressed would prove wrong. Sir Robert Peel replied to Palmerston s attack with an able defense of the entire course of the government in the recent negotiations. He emphasized the fact that some thing had at last been accomplished. The Special Mission and Ashburton s "undiplomatic and unskillful" negotia tions had settled questions which Palmerston, with formal diplomacy, had tried for ten years to determine, without success. The misconstructions put upon the treaty by its opponents were not founded upon any actual misunder standing between the governments regarding the under lying principles it embodied. Neither side had sacrificed any principle which it had held, nor suffered any material losses in territory. The failure to negotiate upon the Or egon question was attributed to the danger of complete fail ure if too many difficulties were added to those already de manding settlement. The charge of misconduct on the part of the negotiators recently raised by the map question was erroneous. Even if Webster had produced the Sparks map which he was not bound to do nothing would have been proved by it. The British government had recently dis covered a map, which belonged to the King, George III., 51] 223 and on which the boundary, stated to be the line "as de scribed by Mr. Oswald," the British negotiator in 1783, was shown as claimed by the United States. It was clear that the maps proved nothing toward one claim or the oth er. Peel concluded that the fact that no one dared to move any open censure or blame of Ashburton, was proof of the universal satisfaction with his conduct. The debates in the House of Commons, besides the two speeches already mentioned, included others by Mr. Macaul- ay and Sir Charles Napier in opposition, and Sir H. Doug las and Mr. Disraeli in support of the treaty. On March 23rd, when the question was again called up, it having been adjourned the day before by a call of order for lack of a quorum, Mr. Hume gave notice of the following resolution : "That the House, looking to the long protracted nego tiations between the government of this country and that of the United States of North America as to the settlement of the northeastern boundary, and taking into consideration the state of our foreign relations in October, 1841, is of the opinion that the treaty of Washington is alike honorable and advantageous to each of the high contracting parties, and that the thanks of the House are due to the ministers who advised, as well as to the Rt. Hon. Lord Ashburton, who negotiated and concluded that treaty. 2 This resolution of thanks was passed in the House of Commons on May 2nd by a large majority. Meanwhile the House of Lords had debated a similar motion, made by Lord Brougham, and accepted it, April 7th. 93 The result of the debates in Parliament bore out the be lief of Ashburton, that the opposition to the treaty lay chiefly among political enemies of the ministry. 94 It also foreshadowed the ultimate success of the treaty, in that it showed a disposition in Parliament to carry out its provi sions. 92 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1317. 93 IUd., Vol. 68, pp. 632, 818. 94 See Appendix C. (2). 224 [52 Lord Ashburton replied to an inquiry in the House of Lords, February 9, 1843, concerning the 10th article of the treaty, that he had written to Webster of the necessity of an act of Parliament to confirm that article in England. 95 A bill for this purpose was introduced by Ashburton in June, 1843, and finally passed August 22nd. In the debate upon it, there was still an inclination on the part of some of the members to confuse the extradition article with an attempt by the United States to recover fugitive slaves. This mis take was rectified by Lord Aberdeen, who disclaimed any possibility of such an interpretation of the article ever being enforced. 96 In the United States the bill for carrying into effect the Treaty of Washington was passed in the House of Repre sentatives, February 28, 1843, by a vote of 137 to 40. The Senate adopted it March 2nd, without division, upon the report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, of which Mr. Archer was the chairman. The final work of putting the treaty into force was com pleted by the joint survey commission, appointed under the sixth article. The report of this Commission was received January 28, 1847. 97 It showed that the line was success fully marked and surveyed from the source of the St. Croix to the intersection of the forty-fifth parallel with the St. Lawrence, three hundred men having been occupied for eighteen months to complete the work. Perfect harmony prevailed between the commissioners and nothing was en countered throughout the work to cause any difference be tween them regarding the determination of the line. With the adoption of the report of the Joint Commission of the s See Appendix A. (5) 6. 9G Shortly before leaving America, at the conclusion of the Treaty, Ashburton had assured a delegation of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society that care would be taken that the provision of the 10th article should not prejudice the cause of anti-slavery. Niles Eegister, Vol. 63, p. 53. 97 Senate Executive Documents, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 71, Vol. VIII, p. 3. 53] 225 Boundary the last step was taken in the negotiation of the Treaty of Washington of 1842. III. THE EFFECTS OF THE TREATY. Having seen the causes which led to the negotiation of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, and the way in which that treaty was drawn up and incorporated into the laws of the two countries, the final chapter of its history is concerned with a retrospective view of its effects. What has been the effect of this treaty upon the political and legal relations of the countries with which it is directly connected, and what has been its effect and significance in the relations of na tions generally ? These are the questions to be answered by our final review of its history. The treaty of Washington of 1842 included twelve ar ticles, in which three questions, exclusive of explanatory and ratification provisions, are included. In articles I. to VII inclusive, the settlement of the boundary between the United States and England s North American Provinces is provided for. The eighth and ninth articles are concerned with the suppression of the slave trade, and the tenth with the extradition of criminals, fugitive from justice, for seven enumerated offenses. In addition to these questions cer tain others are included in the official diplomatic corre spondence, whose close connection with the causes and ne gotiation of the treaty give them a partial relation to its historic effects, although they are not a part of its provi sions. Primarily, however, the treaty deals with but three subjects as just enumerated. The question of the boundary settlement has little or no bearing upon international relations except as between the United States and Great Britain. But between these two nations its importance is two-fold. In the first place, be cause of its termination of the disorders and conflicts of jurisdiction on the frontier, which prevented the adminis tration of justice and threatened the peace of the two na- 226 [54 tions; and secondly, for the military and commercial sig nificance of the new boundary. The relation of the boundary question to the interna tional peace of the United States and England has been noticed as one of the leading causes of the negotiation of the Webster-Ashburton treaty. 98 It was the one question which had hung over the two countries in constant dispute since 1783. Other questions had remained unsettled as long as had the boundary, such as the right of search, but none had been so continually agitated or so long in actual suspense. The very length of time during which this ques tion had remained unsettled had made it a sore point of difference between the two countries. But since the settle ment of the frontier had started disorders and friction be tween the local authorities, a very practical danger was em bodied in the unsettled boundary question. Under these circumstances it had become the factor which embittered all disputes arising between the two governments. Its settle ment therefor was of great importance to them both. The line of the boundary as laid down in the Webster- Ashburton Treaty, articles I and II secured a settlement which was satisfactory and definite. It was satisfactory to neither side from the standpoint of their respective claims, but as the termination of an aggravated and dan gerous dispute it was a compromise which secured to both parties the essential features of their contentions, and thus allowed a peaceable adjustment of their relations. Articles IV, V, VI, and X of the treaty dealt with the adjustment of territorial jurisdiction to conform to the new boundary and provided for a peaceable administration of law on the frontier. They were all carried into effect without diffi culty, thus definitely terminating the frontier disputes which had become almost a frontier war. The commercial and military significance of the new boundary were important points of discussion in both coun- 98 See Part I. (1). 55] 227 tries during the debates upon the treaty. Its military im portance was particularly emphasized and for good reason. The feelings between the two nations at that time were not yet firmly established on a peace basis and more considera tion was given to the possibilities of another war than at the present day. Rouse s Point and the Highland frontier, therefore, were important questions in the boundary settle ment. The advantages which resulted seem to have been about equally divided. Rouse s Point was returned to the United States and the Highland frontier, from the source of the St. Francis to Metjarmette, went to Great Britain. Each country gained a point which was more conducive to its own welfare than to the others detriment. Rouse s Point in commanding the entrance to Lake Champlain was much more important as a strategic point of defense for the United States than it would be for Canada. Similarly the Highland frontier was more essential for the defense of Canada than for the United States, since it bordered close ly on the St. Lawrence, the highway of England s colonial communications. The military possibilities of the boundary, however, have never been tested and there is no longer the old hostile feeling between the two countries to cause much anxiety in that regard. But the commercial possibilities of the boundary settlement have been actually realized. The free navigation of the St. John as provided in the 3rd article proved to be an important concession to the lumber interests in Maine" as well as to promote a general good feeling in the commercial intercourse between the countries. In ar ticle VII a correction, for commercial advantages, was made in the boundary settled under the Treaty of Ghent. The original description of the boundaries said that the line along the St. Lawrence should be "through the middle of as Under the 4th article of the treaty of June 5th, 1854, it was agreed that no export duty should be charged on American timber floated down the St. John, and shipped from New Brunswick. Trea ties and Conventions," p. 452. 228 [56 that river, and it had been determined so by the commis sioners of the Treaty of Ghent. It was found, however, that the navigable channel of the river was not always the middle of the stream and that in several cases, mentioned in article VII of the Treaty of Washington, the only safe ship channel was within the territory of one of the nations. Provision was made therefore for the free navigation of such channels by the ships of both countries. 100 It is sometimes said that the questions of right of search and impressment were settled by the treaty of Washington of 1842. This is not true in any strict sense of the word. In fact, the only thing which was accomplished by this treaty, at all connected with the right of search, was a re moval of the immediate occasion for its exercise. The question of right of search had been brought up in con nection with the suppression of the slave trade, and since the provisions for independent squadrons eliminated the necessity of a right of search in accomplishing that pur pose, 101 it was considered that the question was practically settled. As Palmerston said, the provision for a sufficient naval force by the United States to stop American ships from engaging in the slave trade, "was practically equiv alent to the acknowledgment of a power which we did not abandon in words, but it would be understood we should not attempt to exercise." 102 The principle of right of search was not touched by this treaty which operated mere ly as a suspension of the questions and not as an actual set tlement. 100 in international law, river boundaries are interpreted to be the middle of the main channel, or "thread of the stream/ unless other wise stipulated by treaty. "Wm. Butteruth, et al. v. The St. Louis Bridge Co." (123 Illinois 535) Scott s "Cases in International Law," p. 121. The Treaty of Washington avoided the mistake of stipulating "middle of the stream." By it, the boundary along the St. John is described as the "middle of the channel." The final opening of the entire river St. Lawrence for free navigation by the ships of both countries was not accomplished until 1871. Taylor: "International Public Law," p. 286. 101 See Appendix B, The Treaty, Art. VIII. 102 Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, Vol. Ill, p. 63. 57] 229 The right of impressment is one which England has never abandoned in any official declaration. Its practical abandonment, however, has caused it to be considered as set tled. Its only connection with the treaty of Washington, 1842, is entirely secondary. It was believed in 1841 that the demand of England for the right of search might be associated, as it was before the war of 1812, with the right to take seamen from American merchant ships, on the ground that they were deserters. This led Webster to address correspondence to Lord Ashburton, setting forth the reasons for the United States opposition to impress ment, and the stand they would take against it all future time. 103 Ashburton s reply agreed with Webster s views and gave assurance that there would never arise another occasion for its exercise. But Ashburton did not feel em powered to negotiate any treaty stipulations upon this ques tion. It has remained undenied by England except by the semi-official renunciation of Lord Ashburton. But the effects of the provisions for independent squad- drons to patrol the African Coast were felt in Europe as well as in the United States. England had advocated a mutual right of search as a necessary measure in suppres sing the slave trade, and by her efforts a treaty for this purpose had been negotiated by five of the European na tions. England, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia were the parties to this Quintuple Treaty. It was ratified by all except France, who was still debating the ratification when Webster and Ashburton began the negotiation of the treaty of Washington. The United States had not been asked to become a party to the Quintuple Treaty, but it was under stood that this request would be made as soon as the orig inal contracting parties should ratify it. 104 Vigorous pro tests against the right of search and the adoption of the Quintuple Treaty were made in Europe by Mr. Wheaton, 103 Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 95. 104 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1205. 230 [58 the United States Minister to Prussia, and by General Cass, the Minister at Paris. The efforts of these men were main ly responsible for the rejection of the treaty by France, 105 and when the treaty of 1842 was announced the Quintuple treaty was definitely abandoned. Its opponents pointed to the eighth article of the Webster-Ashburton treaty as the real solution of the difficulty. 106 In securing even the temporary elimination of the ques tion of right of search from the disputes between the two countries, Webster and Ashburton achieved success to a certain degree. In the critical state of the international relations at that time, a practical settlement of this old question by removing the temporary cause for its agitation, was a wise and effective measure. But the fact of its being only a postponement, and not a settlement of the principle involved, is well borne out by the subsequent history of the right of search and its significance in the United States at a later date. 107 In striking at the causes rather than at the effects of the disputes between the two countries, Webster and Ash- burton were particularly successful in their selection of the subject of extradition of criminals, fugitive from justice, for the tenth article of the treaty. John Bassett Moore has well expressed the good effects of extradition laws in gen eral, as follows : "No innovation in the practice of nations has ever more completely discredited the woeful predictions of its adversaries than that of surrendering fugitives from 105 Lawrence, Introduction to Wheaton 7 s International Law, p. 120. Also Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, pp. 170, 221. ice Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1266. 107 l Apart from the case of piracy, executions of revenue laws, and proper cause for self-defense, the right of visit in time of peace may be said to have ended in 1858, when England abandoned it, after a strong protest by the United States Senate, caused England sta tioning cruisers near the island of Cuba to stop slave trading." Taylor, International Public Law, p. 239 and 310, note. Also Philli- more, International Law, Vol. Ill, p. 543. In 1862 the United States concluded a treaty with England for the mutual exercise of the right of search, within certain limits, by public vessels of the two countries duly authorized for the work. l Treaties and Conventions, p. 454. 59] 231 justice." 108 In 1842, international laws of extradition were yet an innovation, almost untried before the adoption of the Webster- Ashburton treaty. The only previous attempt to pass extradition laws in the United States was in Jay s treaty of 1794, which provided in its 27th article for the extradition of criminals fugitive from justice in cases of murder or forgery. Nothing ever came of this attempt, however, and it expired by limitation, 1808. 109 Since then the governments had extradited criminals in some cases as an act of comity, but no effective rule of extradition was adopted. The necessity for such a regulation was forced upon the attention of the two governments in 1834, when the following reply was sent by Mr. Forsyth to a request for the surrender of Andrew Cawlin, charged with murder in England: I have the honor, by his (the President s) directions to reply, that in absence of any conventional agreement between the United States and Great Britain for the delivery of persons charged with heinous offenses, the authority of the executive of the United States to exercise a right of such important effect upon the personal security, is more than questionable, and hence the case to which you refer is without any remedy in the competency of this government to apply." 110 The opinions, both of attorney- generals and courts, decided that in absence of treaty stip ulations the executive authority in the United States was not authorized to extradite a person for offenses committed in a foreign country. This gave unbounded opportunity for criminals to operate between the United States and Canada with little fear of being punished. A considerable share of the border disturbances finally resulting in the "Caroline" affair was due to these law beaters, who in fested the boundary. The tenth article of the Webster- 108 Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy, p. 253. loo Lawrence, Introduction to Wheaton s International Law, p. cxiii. Cf. Moore, American Diplomacy, p. 252. no Moore, J. B., Treatise on Extradition and Inter-State Kendition, p. 31. 232 [60 Ashburton Treaty was intended to put a stop to such law lessness on the border and to promote the general cause of justice by providing for extradition upon seven offenses. 111 This article was well received by some of the opponents of the treaty, but vigorously attacked by others, particu larly in England where it was confused with the mistaken idea that the Creole claims applied to the extradition of fugitive slaves. The distinction between the two was made clear in Aberdeen s speech upon the bill for carrying the article into effect. 112 In the Senate, Benton said, "Though fair on its face, it is difficult of execution." He feared that with its large number of numerated offenses, it would be misused to secure the punishment of innocent persons and political offenders. 113 In the House, Mr. Levy, of Florida, made a motion and speech in March, 1844, for the abandonment of the extradition article on the ground that England was not executing her part of the agreement in refusing to extradite seven negroes, who had committed a murder and escaped to Nassau. Nothing resulted from this motion. In spite of the "woeful predictions of its adversaries," the extradition article proved its effectiveness in securing order on the frontier. The results of its enforcement were highly commended by Mr. Woodbridge, a former governor of Michigan, who spoke during Webster s defense of the Treaty of Washington, before the Senate, April, 1846, 11 * as follows: "I have now only to add my entire and un qualified conviction, that no act of the legislative or treaty- making power, that I have ever known, has ever been more successful in its operation than this article of the treaty; nor could any provision have been attended by more happy consequences upon the peace and safety of society in that remote frontier." 115 in See Appendix B. 112 See Part II. (3). us Benton, Thirty Years View in the IT. S. Senate, p. 444. 114 Webster s Works, Vol. V, p. 78. us Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 295. 61] 233 In the history of extradition the treaty of Washington holds an important position. Although it was not the initial step in the development of the process of extradition in modern times, its inception in 1842 gave great strength to that movement and to the underlying conception of legality in International Relations. 116 In its relation to the history of extradition, we can see the treaty in its most characteristic feature as a result of modern American diplo macy. Its practicality, its legal foundation, and its direct aim at the causes of the difficulty which it sought to remedy, stamp it as a truly modern and well built monument in the history of arbitration and international peace. Moore, American Diplomacy, p. 252. 234 [62 APPENDICES. APPENDIX A. Extracts from the diplomatic correspondence relating to the negotiation of the Webster- Ashburton Treaty. APPENDIX B. The treaty concluded at Washington, August 9, 1842, by Lord Ashburton and Daniel Webster, verbatim. APPENDIX C. Extracts from Webster s Private Correspondence. APPENDIX D. A map showing the various lines between the United States and the British Provinces. APPENDIX A. Extracts from the diplomatic correspondence relating to the ne gotiation of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. (1) Edward Everett to Webster, London, December 31, 1841. (2) Webster to Everett, Washington, January 29, 1842. (3) Webster to Governor Fairfield, Washington, April 11, 1842. (4) Webster to the Maine Commissioners, Washington, July 15, 1842. (5) Lord Ashburton to Webster, Washington, August 9, 1842. (1) EDWARD EVERETT TO WEBSTER. London, December, 31, 1841. "At a late hour on the evening of the 26th, I received a note from the Earl of Aberdeen, requesting an interview for the follow ing day, when I met him at the Foreign Office, agreeably to the appointment. After one or two general remarks upon the difficulty of bringing about an adjustment of the points of controversy be tween the governments, by a continuance of the discussions hither to carried on, he said that her majesty s government had deter mined to take a decisive step toward that end, by sending a special minister to the United States, with a full power to make a final settlement of all matters in dispute. * * * This step was de termined on from a sincere and earnest desire to bring the matter so long in controversy to an amicable settlement; and if, as he did 63] 235 not doubt, the same disposition existed at Washington, he thought this step afforded the most favorable, and, indeed, the only means of carrying it into effect. In the choice of the individual for the mission, Lord Aberdeen added, that he had been mainly influenced by a desire to select a person who would be peculiarly acceptable in the United States, as well as eminently qualified for the trust, and that he persuaded himself he had found one who, in both re spects, was all that could be wished. He then named Lord Ash- burton, who had consented to undertake the mission. Although this communication was, of course, wholly unexpected to me, I felt no hesitation in expressing the great satisfaction with which I received it. I assured Lord Aberdeen that the President had nothing more at heart than an honorable adjustment of the matters in discussion between the two countries; that I was per suaded a more acceptable selection of a person for the important mission proposed could not have been made; and that I anticipated the happiest results from this overture. Lord Aberdeen rejoined that it was more than an overture; that Lord Ashburton would go with full powers to make a definite ar rangement on every point in discussion between the two countries. He was aware of the difficulty of some of them, particularly what had incorrectly been called the right of search, which he deemed the most difficult of all; but he was willing to confide this and all other matters in controversy to Lord Ashburton s discretion. He added, that they should have been quite willing to come to a gen eral arrangement here, but they supposed I had not full powers for such a purpose. This measure being determined on, Lord Aberdeen said he pre sumed it would be hardly worth while for us to continue the cor respondence here on matters in dispute between the governments. Pie, of course, was quite willing to consider and reply to any state ment I might think proper to make on any subject; but, pending the negotiations that might take place at Washington, he supposed no benefit could result from a simultaneous discussion here." (2) WEBSTER TO EVERETT. Washington, January 29, 1841. "Your dispatch of the 31st of December announces the import ant intelligence of an intention of dispatching a special minister from England to the United States, with full powers to settle every matter in dispute between the two governments; and the 236 [64 President directs me to say, that he regards this proceeding as originating in an entirely amicable spirit, and that it will be met, on his part, with perfectly corresponding sentiments. The high character of Lord Ashburton is well known to this government; and it is not doubted that he will enter on the duties assigned to him, not only with the advantages of much knowledge and experi ence in public affairs, but with a true desire to signalize his mis sion by assisting to place the peace of the two countries on a per manent basis. He will be received with the respect due to his own character, the character of the government which sends him, and the high importance, to both countries, of the subjects intrusted to his negotiation. The President approves your conduct in not pursuing in Eng land the discussion of questions which are now to become the sub jects of negotiation here." (3) WEBSTER TO GOVERNOR FAIRFIELD. Washington, April 11, 1842. Department of State, Washington, April 11, 1842. "Your excellency is aware that, previous to March, 1841, a negotiation had been going on for some time between the Secretary of State of the United States, under the direction of the President, and the British minister accredited to this government, having for its object the creation of a joint commission for settling the con troversy respecting the northeastern boundary of the United States, with a provision for an ultimate reference to arbitrators, to be ap pointed by some one of the sovereigns of Europe, in case an ar bitration should become necessary. On the leading features of a convention for this purpose the two governments had become agreed; but on several matters of detail the parties differed, and appear to have been interchanging their respective views and opin ions, projects, and counter-projects, without coming to any final arrangement, down to August, 1840. Various causes, not now necessary to be explained, arrested the progress of the negotiation at that time, and no considerable advance has since been made in it. It seems to have been understood on both sides that, one arbi tration having failed, it was the duty of the two parties to proceed to institute another, according to the spirit of the treaty of Ghent and other treaties; and the President has felt it to be his duty, un less some new course should be proposed, to cause the negotiation to be resumed, and pressed to its conclusion. But I have now to inform your excellency that Lord Ashburton, a minister plenipo tentiary and special, has arrived at the seat of the government of 65] 237 the United States, charged with full powers from his sovereign to negotiate and settle the different matters in discussion between the two governments. I have further to state to you, that he has offi cially announced to this department that, in regard to the bound ary question, he has authority to treat for a conventional line, or line by agreement, on such terms and conditions, and with such mutual considerations and equivalents, as may be thought just and equitable, and that he is ready to enter upon a negotiation for such conventional line so soon as this government shall say it is author ized and ready, on its part, to commence such negotiation. Under these circumstances, the President has felt it to be his duty to call the serious attention of the governments of Maine and Massachusetts to the subject, and to submit to those governments the propriety of their co-operation, to a certain extent, and in a certain form, in an endeavor to terminate a controversy already of so long duration, and which seems very likely to be still con siderably further protracted before the desired end of a final ad justment shall be attained, unless a shorter course of arriving at that end be adopted, than such as has heretofore been pursued, and as the two governments are still pursuing. Yet, without the concurrence of the two states whose rights are more immediately concerned, both having an interest in the soil, and one of them in the jurisdiction and government, the duty of this government will be to adopt no new course, but, in compliance with treaty stipulations, and in furtherance of what has already been done, to hasten the pending negotiations as fast as possible, in the course hitherto adopted. But the President thinks it a highly desirable object to prevent the delays necessarily incident to any settlement of the question by these means. Such delays are great and unavoidable. It has been found that an exploration and examination of the several lines constitute a work of three years. The existing commission for making such exploration, under the authority of the United States, has been occupied two summers, and a very considerable portion of the work remains still to be done. If a joint commission should be appointed, and should go through the same work, and the com missioners should disagree, as is very possible, and an arbitration on that account become indispensable, the arbitrators might find it necessary to make an exploration and survey themselves, or cause the same to be done by others, of their own appointment. If to these causes, operating to postpone the final decision, be added the time necessary to appoint arbitrators, and for their preparation to leave Europe for the service, the various retarding incidents al- 238 [66 ways attending such operation, seven or eight years constitute, perhaps, the shortest period within which we can look for a final result. In the meantime, great expenses have been incurred, and further expenses cannot be avoided. It is well known that the con troversy has brought heavy charges upon Maine herself, to the re muneration or proper settlement of which she can not be expected to be indifferent. The exploration by the government of the Unit ed States has already cost a hundred thousand dollars, and the charge of another summer s work is in prospect. These facts may be sufficient to enable us to form a probable estimate of the whole expense likely to be incurred before the controversy can b"e settled by arbitration; and our experience admonishes us that even an other arbitration might possibly fail. The opinion of this government upon the justice and validity of the American claim has been expressed at so many times, and in so many forms, that a repetition of that opinion is not necessary. But the subject is a subject in dispute. The government has agreed to make it matter of reference and arbitration; and it must fulfill that agreement, unless another mode for settling the contro versy should be resorted to, with the hope of producing a speedier decision. The President proposes, then, that the governments of Maine and Massachusetts should severally appoint a commissioner or commissioners, empowered to confer with the authorities of this government upon a conventional line, or line by agreement, with its terms, conditions, considerations, and equivalents; with an un derstanding that no such line will be agreed upon without the as sent of such commissioners. This mode of proceeding, or some other which shall express as sent beforehand, seems indispensable, if any negotiation for a con ventional line is to be attempted; since, if happily a treaty should be the result of the negotiation, it can only be submitted to the Senate of the United States for ratification. It is a subject of deep and sincere regret to the President that the British plenipotentiary did not arrive in the country and make known his powers in time to have made this communication before the annual session of the Legislature of the two states had been brought to a close. He perceives and laments the inconvenience which may be experienced from reassembling those legislatures. But the British mission is a special one; it does not supersede the resident mission of the British government at Washington, and its stay in the United States is not expected to be long. In addition to these considerations, it is to be suggested that more than four months of the session of Congress have already passed, and it is 67] 239 highly desirable, if any treaty for a conventional line should be agreed on, that it should be concluded before the session shall ter minate, not only because of the necessity of the ratification of the Senate, but also because it is not impossible that measures may be thought advisable, or become important, which can only be ac complished by the authority of both Houses. These considerations, in addition to the importance of the sub ject, and a firm conviction in the mind of the .President that the interests of both countries, as well as the interests of the two states more immediately concerned, require a prompt effort to bring this dispute to an end, constrain him to express an earnest hope that your excellency will convene the Legislature of Maine, and submit the subject to its grave and candid deliberations. I am, etc., DANIEL WEBSTER. His Excellency John Fairfield, Governor of Maine. (4) WEBSTER TO THE MAINE COMMISSIONERS. Washington, July 15, 1842. Department of State, Washington, July 15, 1842. "Gentlemen, You have had an opportunity of reading Lord Ashburton s note to me of the llth of July. Since that date I have had full and frequent conferences with him respecting the eastern boundary, and believe I understand what is practicable to be done on that subject, so far as he is concerned. In these con ferences he has made no positive or binding proposition, thinking, perhaps, it would be more desirable, under present circumstances, that such proposition should proceed from the side of the United States. I have reason to believe, however, that he would agree to a line of boundary between the United States and the British provinces of Canada and New Brunswick, such as is described in a paper accompanying this (marked B), and identified by my sig nature. ***** The territory in dispute between the two countries contains 12,027 square miles, equal to 7,697,280 acres. By the line described in the accompanying paper, there will be assigned to the United States 7015 square miles, equal to 4,489,600 acres; and to England 5012 square miles, equal to 3,207,680 acres. By the award of the King of the Netherlands, there was as signed to the United States 7907 square miles, 5,061,120 acres; to England 4119 square miles, 2,636,160 acres. The territory proposed to be relinquished to England south of the line of the King of the Netherlands is, as you will see, the mountain range from the upper part of the St. Francis Eiver to 240 [68 the meeting of the two contested lines of boundary, at the Metjar- mette Portage, in the highlands, near the source of the St. John. This mountain tract contains 893 square miles, equal to 571,520 acres. It is supposed to be of no value for cultivation or settle ment. On this point you will see herewith a letter from Captain Talcott, who has been occupied two summers in exploring tke line of the highlands, and is intimately acquainted with the territory. The line leaves to the United States, between the base of the hills and the left bank of the St. John, and lying upon the river, a ter ritory of 657,280 acres, embracing, without doubt, all the valuable land south of the St. Francis and west of the St. John. Of the general division of the territory, it is believed it may be safely said, that while the portion remaining with the United States is, in quantity, seven-twelfths, in value it is at least four-fifths of the whole. If this line should be agreed to on the part of the United States, I suppose that the British minister would, as an equivalent, stip ulate, first, for the use of the Elver St. John, for the conveyance of the timber growing on any of its branches, to tide-water, free from all discriminating tolls, impositions, or inabilities of any kind, the timber enjoying all the privileges of British colonial timber. All opinions concur that this privilege of navigation must greatly enhance the value of the territory and the timber growing thereon, and prove exceedingly useful to the people of Maine. Second: That House s Point, in Lake Champlain, and the lands heretofore supposed to be within the limits of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, but which a correct ascertainment of the 45th parallel of latitude shows to be in Canada, should be surrendered to the United States. It is probable, also, that the disputed line of boundary in Lake Superior might be so adjusted as to leave a disputed island within the United States. These cessions on the part of England would enure partly to the benefit of the states of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, but principally to the United States. The consideration on the part of England, for making them, would be the manner agreed upon for adjusting the eastern boundary. The price of the cession, therefore, whatever it might be, would in fairness belong to the two states interested in the manner of that adjustment. Under the influence of these considerations, I am authorized to say, that if the commissioners of the two states assent to the line as described in the accompanying paper, the United States will 69] 241 undertake to pay to these states the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, to be divided between them in equal moieties; and also to undertake for the settlement and payment of the ex penses incurred by those states for the maintenance of the civil posse, and also for a survey which it was found necessary to make. The line suggested, with the compensations and equivalents which have been stated, is now submitted for your consideration. That it is all which might have been hoped for, looking to the strength of the American claim, can hardly be said. But, as the settlement of a controversy of such duration is a matter of high importance, as equivalents of undoubted value are offered, as longer postponement and delay would lead to further inconven ience, and to the incurring of further expenses, and as no better occasion, or, perhaps, any other occasion, for settling the boundary by agreement, and on the principle of equivalents, is ever likely to present itself, the government of the United States hopes that the commissioners of the two states will find it to be consistent with their duty to assent to the line proposed, and to the terms and conditions attending the proposition." * * * * (5) LORD ASHBURTON TO WEBSTER. Washington, August 9, 1842. a. Sir, It appears desirable that some explanation between us should be recorded by correspondence respecting the fifth article of the treaty signed by us this day for the settlement of bound aries between Great Britain and the United States. By that article of the treaty it is stipulated that certain pay ments shall be made by the government of the United States to the states of Maine and Massachusetts. It has, of course, been understood that my negotiations have been with the government of the United States, and the introduction of terms of agreement between the general government and the states would have been irregular and inadmissible, if it had not been deemed expedient to bring the whole of these transactions within the purview of the treaty. There may not be wanting analogous cases to justify this proceeding; but it seems proper that I should have confirmed by you that my government incurs no responsibility for these engage ments, of the precise nature and object of which I am unin formed, nor have I considered it necessary to make inquiry con cerning them." ***** 242 [70 "By the 3d article of the convention which I have this day signed with you, there is an agreement for the reciprocal delivery, in certain cases, of criminals fugitive from justice; but it becomes necessary that I should apprise you that this article can have no legal effect within the dominions of Great Britain until confirmed by act of Parliament. It is possible that Parliament may not be in session before the exchange of the ratifications of the conven tion, but its sanction shall be asked at the earliest possible period, and no doubt can be entertained that it will be given. In Her Majesty s territories in Canada, where cases for acting under this convention are likely to be of more frequent occurrence, the gov ernor general has sufficient power, under the authority of local legislation, and the convention will there be acted upon so soon as its ratification shall be known; but it becomes my duty to in form you of the short delay which may possibly intervene in giv ing full effect to it where the confirmation by Parliament becomes necessary for its execution. * * * APPENDIX B. The treaty concluded at Washington, August 9, 1842, by Lord Ashburton and Daniel Webster, verbatim^ 1 Whereas, certain portions of the line of boundary between the United States of America and the British dominions in North America, described in the second article of the Treaty of Peace of 1783, have not yet been ascertained and determined, notwith standing the repeated attempts which have been heretofore made for that purpose; and whereas it is now thought to be for the interest of both parties, that, avoiding further discussion of their respective rights, arising in this respect under the said treaty, they should agree on a conventional line in said portions of the said boundary, such as may be convenient to both parties, with such equivalents and compensations as are deemed just and reasonable; and whereas, by the treaty concluded at Ghent, on the 24th day of December, 1814, between the United States and his Britannic majesty, an article was agreed to and inserted, of the following tenor, viz.: Article 10. Whereas the traffic in slaves is irrecon cilable with the principles of humanity and justice; and whereas both his majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed 117 Treaties and Conventions, J. H. Haswell, pp. 432-438; also House Ex ecutive Documents, 27th Cong., 3rd Sess., No. 2, pp. 25-30. 71] 243 that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object; and whereas, notwithstand ing the laws which have at various times been passed by the two governments, and the efforts made to suppress it, that criminal traffic is still prosecuted and carried on; and whereas, the United States of America and her majesty, the Queen of the United King dom of Great Britain and Ireland are determined that, so far as may be in their power, it shall be effectually abolished; and where as, it is found expedient for the better administration of justice and the prevention of crime within the territories and jurisdiction of the two parties respectively, that persons committing the crimes hereinafter enumerated, and being fugitives from justice, should, under certain circumstances, be reciprocally delivered up: The United States of America and her Britannic Majesty, having re solved to treat on these several subjects, have for that purpose appointed their respective Plenipotentiaries to negotiate and con clude a treaty; that is to say: The President of the United States has, on his part, furnished with full powers Daniel Webster, Secretary of State of the United States; and Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has, on her part, appointed the Eight Honorable Alexander Lord Ashburton, a peer of the said United Kingdom, a member of Her Majesty s most honorable privy counsel, and Her Majesty s minister plenipotentiary on a special mission to the United States; Who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective full powers, have agreed to and signed the following articles: ARTICLE I. It is hereby agreed and declared that the line of boundary shall be as follows: Beginning at the monument at the source of the Kiver St. Croix, as designated and agreed to by the commissioners under the fifth article of the treaty of 1794, between the govern ments of the United States and Great Britain; thence north, fol lowing the exploring line run and marked by the surveyors of the two governments in the years 1817 and 1818, under the fifth article of the Treaty of Ghent, to its intersection with the Kiver St. John, and to the middle of the channel thereof; thence, up the middle of the main channel of the said Kiver St. John to the mouth of the River St. Francis; thence up the middle of the channel of the said Kiver St. Francis, and of the lakes through which it flows, to the outlet of the Lake Pohenagamook; thence, southwesterly, in a straight line, to a point on the northwest branch of the River St. 244 [72 John, which point shall be ten miles distant from the main branch of the St. John, in a straight line, and in the nearest direction; but if the said point shall be found to be less than seven miles from the nearest point of the summit, or crest, of the Highlands that divide those rivers which empty themselves into the Eiver St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Eiver St. John, then the said point shall be made to recede down the said northwest branch of the Eiver St. John, to a point seven miles in a straight line from the said summit or crest; thence in a straight line, in a course about south, eight degrees west, to the point where the parallel of latitude of 46 degrees 25 minutes north intersects the southwest branch of the St. John s; thence, southerly, by the said branch, to the source thereof in the Highlands, at the Metjarmette Port age; thence down along the said Highlands which divide the waters which empty themselves into the Eiver St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the head of Hall s Stream; thence down the middle of said stream, till the line thus run inter sects the old line of boundary surveyed and marked by Valentine and Collins previously to the year 1774, as the 45th degree of north latitude, and which has been known and understood to be the line of actual division between the States of New York and Vermont on one side, and the British province of Canada on the other; and from said point of intersection, west, along the said dividing-line, as heretofore known and understood, to the Iroquois or St. Law rence Eiver. ARTICLE II. It is moreover agreed, that from the place where the joint com missioners terminated their labors under the sixth article of the Treaty of Ghent, to wit, at a point in the Neebish Channel, near Muddy Lake, the line shall run into and along the ship-channel between St. Joseph s and St. Tammany Islands, to the division of the channel at or near the head of St. Joseph s Island; thence, turning eastwardly and northwardly, around the lower end of St. George s or Sugar Island, and following the middle of the channel which divides St. George s from St. Joseph s Island; thence up the east Neebish Channel, nearest to St. George s Island, through the middle of Lake George; thence, west of Jonas s Island, into St. Mary s Eiver, to a point in the middle of that river, about one mile above St. George s or Sugar Island, so as to appropriate and assign the said island to the United States; thence, adopting the line traced on the maps by the commissioners, through the Eiver St. Mary and Lake Superior, to a point north of He Eoyale, in 73] 245 said lake, one hundred yards to the north and east of He Chapeu, which last-mentioned island lies near the northeastern point of He Eoyale, where the line marked by the commissioners terminates; and from the last-mentioned point, southwesterly, through the mid dle of the sound between He Eoyale and the northwestern main land, to the mouth of Pigeon Eiver, and up the said river to and through the north and south Fowl Lakes to the lakes of the height of land between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods; thence along the water communication to Lake Saisaginaga, and through that Lake; thence to and through Cypress Lake, Lac du Bois Blanc, Lac la Croix, Little Vermillion Lake, and Lake Namecan, and through the several smaller lakes, straits, or streams connect ing the lakes here mentioned, to that point in Lac la Pluie, or Eainy Lake, at the Chaudiere Falls, from which the commissioners traced the line to the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods; thence along the said line to the said most northwestern point, being in latitude 49 degrees, 23 minutes, 55 seconds north, and in longitude 95 degrees, 14 minutes, 38 seconds west from the observatory at Greenwich; thence, according to existing treaties, due south, to its intersection with the 49th parallel of north lati tude, and along that parallel to the Eocky Mountains; it being understood that all the water communications, and all the usual portages along the line from Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods and also Grand Portage, from the shore of Lake Superior to the Pigeon Elver, as now actually used, shall be free and open to the use of the citizens and subjects of both countries. ARTICLE III. In order to promote the interests and encourage the industry of all the inhabitants of the countries watered by the Eiver St. John and its tributaries, whether living within the State of Maine or the province of New Brunswick, it is agreed that where, by the provisions of the present treaty, the Eiver St. John is de clared to be the line of boundary, the navigation of the said river shall be free and open to both parties and shall in no way be obstructed by either; that all the produce of the forest in logs, lumber, timber, boards, staves, or shingles, or of agriculture, not being manufactured, grown on any of those parts of the State of Maine watered by the Elver St. John, or by its tributaries, of which fact reasonable evidence shall, if required, be produced, shall have free access into and through the said river and its said tributaries, having their source within the State of Maine, to and from the sea-port at the mouth of the said Eiver St. John s, and to and round the falls of the said river, either by boats, rafts, or other 246 [74 conveyance; that when within the province of New Brunswick, the said produce shall be dealt with as if it were the produce of the said province; that in like manner, the inhabitants of the terri tory of the Upper St. John, determined by this treaty to belong to her Britannic majesty, shall have free access to and through the river for their produce, in those parts where the said river runs wholly through the State of Maine: Provided always, that this agreement shall give no right to either party to interfere with any regulations not inconsistent with the terms of this treaty which the governments, respectively, of Maine or of New Bruns wick may make respecting the navigation of the said river, where both banks thereof shall belong to the same party. ARTICLE IV. All grants of land heretofore made by either party, within the limits of the territory which by this treaty falls within the do minions of the other party, shall be held valid, ratified, and con firmed to the persons in possession under such grants, to the same extent as if such territory had by this treaty fallen within the dominions of the party by whom such grants were made: and all equitable possessory claims, arising from a possession and improve ment of any lot or parcel of land by the person actually in pos session, or by those under whom such person claims, for more than six years before the date of this treaty, shall, in like manner, be deemed valid, and be confirmed and quieted by a release to the person entitled thereto, of the title to such lot or parcel of land, so described as best to include the improvements made thereon; and in all other respects the two contracting parties agree to deal upon the most liberal principles of equity with the settlers actual ly dwelling upon the territory falling to them, respectively, which has heretofore been in dispute between them. ARTICLE V. Whereas, in the course of the controversy respecting the dis puted territory on the northeastern boundary, some moneys have been received by the authorities of Her Britannic Majesty s prov ince of New Brunswick, with the intention of preventing depreda tions on the forests of the said territory, which moneys were to be carried to a fund, called the "disputed territory fund," the pro ceeds whereof, it was agreed, should be hereafter paid over to the parties interested, in the proportions to be determined by a final settlement of boundaries: it is hereby agreed that a correct ac count of all receipts and payments on the said fund shall be de- 75] 247 livered to the Government of the United States, within six months after the ratification of this treaty; and the proportion of the amount due thereon to the States of Maine and Massachusetts, and any bonds or securities appertaining thereto, shall be paid and delivered over to the Government of the United States; and the Government of the United States agrees to receive for the use of and pay over to, the States of Maine and Massachusetts, their respective portions of said fund; and further, to pay and satisfy said states, respectively, for all claims for expenses incurred by them in protecting the said heretofore disputed territory, and mak ing a survey thereof in 1838; the Government of the United States agreeing with the States of Maine and Massachusetts to pay them the further sum of three hundred thousand dollars, in equal moieties, on account of their assent to the line of boundary described in this treaty, and in consideration of the conditions and equivalents re ceived therefor, from the government of Her Britannic Majesty. ARTICLE VI. It is furthermore understood and agreed, that for the purpose of running and tracing those parts of the line between the source of the St. Croix and the St. Lawrence Eiver, which will require to be run and ascertained, and for marking the residue of said line by proper monuments on the land, two commissioners shall be ap pointed, one by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and one by Her Bri tannic Majesty; and the said commissioners shall meet at Bangor, in the State of Maine, on the first day of May next, or as soon thereafter as may be, and shall proceed to mark the line above described, from the source of the St. Croix to the Eiver St. John; and shall trace on proper maps the dividing line along said river and along the River St. Francis to the outlet of the Lake Pohe- nagamook; and from the outlet of the said lake they shall ascer tain, fix, and mark, by proper and durable monuments on the land, the line described in the first article of this treaty; and the said commissioners shall make to each of their respective Governments a joint report or declaration, under their hands and seals, desig nating such line of boundary, and shall accompany such report er declaration with maps certified by them to be true maps of the new boundary. ARTICLE VII. It is further agreed that the channels in the Elver St. Law rence on both sides of the Long Sault Islands and of Barnhart Island, the channels in the Eiver Detroit, on both sides of the 248 [76 Island Bois Blanc, and between that island and both the American and Canadian shores, and all the several channels and passages between the various islands lying near the junction of the Eiver St. Glair with the lake of that name, shall be equally free and open to the ships, vessels, and boats of both parties. ARTICLE VIII. The parties mutually stipulate that each shall prepare, equip, and maintain in service, on the coast of Africa, a sufficient and adequate squadron or naval force of vessels of suitable numbers and descriptions, to carry in all not less than eighty guns, to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws, rights, and obliga tions of each of the two countries, for the suppression of the slave trade, the said squadrons to be independent of each other, but the two Governments stipulating, nevertheless, to give such orders to the officers commanding their respective forces, as shall enable them most effectually to act in concert and cooperation, upon mutual consultation, as exigencies may arise, for the attainment of the true object of this article; copies of all such orders to be com municated by each government to the other, respectively. ARTICLE IX. Whereas, notwithstanding all efforts which may be made on the coast of Africa for suppressing the slave trade, the facilities for carrying on that traffic and avoiding the vigilance of cruisers, by the fraudulent use of flags and other means, are so great, and the temptations for pursuing it, while a market can be found for slaves, so strong, as that the desired result may be long delayed, unless all markets be shut against the purchase of African negroes, the parties to this treaty agree that they will unite in all becoming representations and remonstrances with any and all Powers within whose dominions such markets are allowed to exist, and that they will urge upon all such Powers the propriety and duty of closing such markets effectually, at once and forever. ARTICLE X. It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic Majesty shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, or their Ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forg ery, or the utterance of forged papers, committed within the juris diction of either, shall seek an asylum or shall be found within the 77] 249 territories of the other: Provided, that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had there been committed; and the respective judges and other magistrates of the two governments shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other mag istrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify the same to the proper executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requi sition and receives the fugitive. ARTICLE XI. The eighth article of this treaty shall be in force for five years from the date of the exchange of ratifications, and afterward until one or the other party shall signify a wish to terminate it. The tenth article shall continue in force until one or the other of the parties shall signify its wish to terminate it, and no longer. ARTICLE XII. The present treaty shall be duly ratified, and the mutual ex change shall take place in London, within six months from the date hereof, or earlier, if possible. In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty, and have hereunto affixed our seals. Done in duplicate at Washington, the ninth day of August, anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and forty-two. DANL. WEBSTER (Seal). ASHBURTON (Seal). APPENDIX C. EXTRACTS FROM WEBSTER S PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE. (1) Webster to Edward Everett, Washington, June 28, 1842. (2) Lord Ashburton to Webster, The Grange, January 2, 1843, (3) Lord Ashburton to Webster, London, April 28, 1844. 250 [78 (1) WEBSTER TO EDWARD EVERETT, WASHINGTON, JUNE 28, 1842. Our movement for the last ten days, if any has been made, has been rather backward. The boundary business is by no means in a highly promising state so many difficulties arise, not only between us and England, but between us and the commissioners, and the commissioners of the two States themselves and other questions are still less so. I know nothing of Lord Ashburton s recent instructions, but he appears to me, certainly, to be under restraints not heretofore apparently felt by him. What increases the embarrassment and renders a failure more probable, is his great unwillingness to stay longer in the country. The President has desired a personal interview with him, which has been had, and the President has pressed upon him in the strongest manner the necessity of staying till every effort to effect the great object of his mission shall have been exhausted. The President feels, what all must feel, that if the mission should return, rebus infectis, the relations of the two countries will be more than ever embarrassed. "I think we have much reason to regret, if not some right to complain, that, in regard to the delicate questions growing out of such cases as that of the Creole, we have been strangely mis understood. The Lords took up the subject of the Creole, appar ently with no accurate knowledge of what had been done or said by us, and argued and decided questions which we had never raised or thought of raising, and that misapprehension seems to have run through all subsequent considerations of the subject. We did not make any demand for fugitive slaves; no such thing; we well know that when slaves get on British ground, they are free. Nor have we ever asked England to enter into any stipulation by treaty which should interfere with this general principle of English law. Nor do we, in the absence of treaty provisions, demand the sur render of fugitives from justice. You quote Lord Aberdeen as saying, You do not yourselves give up mutineers to be punished. Certainly we do not, nor do we surrender other offenders, unless in virtue of special stipulations by treaty. But we think a proper convention for the extradition of offenders charged with high crimes would tend greatly to prevent the commission of such crimes, and to preserve peace and harmony between the two coun tries. Such a provision would have nothing in it peculiarly ad vantageous to the United States. Its benefits would be equal and alike to both parties. All along the inland frontier the necessity for some mutual regulation of this kind is severely felt, and cases calling for such regulations are also constantly arising on the high- But at any rate we wish to be distinctly understood, and I repeat, 79] 251 therefore, that we do not demand the restitution of fugitive slaves; that, without treaty stipulations to that effect, we do not demand, and shall not demand, the surrender of criminals fleeing from justice. But all this is quite remote from what we firmly hold to be our rights, according to the laws and usages of nations in such cases as that of the Creole. That is to say (that in cases of ves sels carried into British ports by violence or stress of weather, we insist that there shall be no interference from the land, with the relation or personal condition of those on board, according to the laws of their own country; that vessels under such circumstances shall enjoy the common laws of hospitality, subjected to no force, entitled to have their immediate wants and necessities relieved, and to pursue their voyage without molestation). * * * "A general feeling prevails in this country at the present moment, no doubt, both North and South, that all questions will be amicably settled through the agency of Lord Ashburton s mis sion. His lordship s frank and candid manner, his great intelli gence and practical ability, and the apparent justness and moder ation of his views and principles, have conspired to conduct the public mind to this conclusion, and that public mind desires that result, and the country is preparing itself for the state of things which will naturally follow it. But if the negotiation fail, if unexpected obstacles be interposed, if what has been considered quite reasonable and moderate be not attained, if the boundary question to put into another endless series of surveys, explorations, arbitrations, and umpirages, if we are left only to understand that our coasting trade through the Bahama Channel can not otherwise enjoy ordinary safety than as we put it under convoy, a mission, the institution of which was hailed as a bright harbinger of the restoration of perfect amity and harmony between the two coun tries, and in the conduct of which I am sure the best disposition has prevailed, will only have terminated in leaving things much worse than it found them. I hardly see how this bad result is to be prevented, unless we can succeed in beseeching Lord Ashburton to delay his return another month, in the hope that the cloud on his brow may be dissipated by the next communication from home. "I have marked this letter private, as it is in answer to a private letter of yours; but the substance and effect of it ought, perhaps, be made known to Lord Aberdeen; notwithstanding that his lordship may receive communications from Lord Ashburton, covering similar accounts of the sentiments entertained here, and the state of things existing. "I am, dear sir, always faithfully yours, "T>. WEBSTER." 252 [80 (2) LORD ASHBURTON TO WEBSTER, THE GRANGE, JANUARY 2, 1843. * "But early next month we are again all to meet in the great Babylon, where the conflict of parties in our Congress is to begin. I should probably not appear if it were not to look after my dear character when the critics open their attack upon what they call the "Ashburton Capitulation." I am not afraid of them, and though I have not your power of destroying an ad versary, I have one advantage over you, that I have a right to be heard. In speaking of critics, however, I should, in fairness, state that they are nearly, if not exclusively, reduced to one, an ex- Secretary of State, who is laboring hard in his vocation of a fault finding leader of opposition, sharpened a little by the apprehension that his powers of diplomacy are questioned by the result. Mr. Everett, who has been passing a few days here with his family, will have told you that the public opinion of this country is de cidedly satisfied. I have assurances to this effect from people of all parties. Few, if any, of the Whigs will support the author of the angry articles of The Morning Chronicle, and I suspect that when it comes to the point his capitulation will be more mani fest than mine. The truth is, that the desire of all here is peace, and more especially with your country. Nobody of common sense cares much about the precise position of Lake Pohenagamook. The important thing is that we have shaken hands cordially, and I should be very sorry to be supposed to have ever been anxious to make a sharp bargain. The real merit of the settlement is that it will not stand this description. On the other side, what we may, I believe, really boast of, my dear sir, is that we have done a work of peace which to the extent of our power, we must endeavor to prevent folly or malevolence from spoiling. This was the whole of my aim in crossing the Atlantic, though I see my friend Mr. Ingersoll persists that I want to be an earl or a marquis, with a true republican appreciation of such vanities. (3) LORD ASHBURTON TO WEBSTER, LONDON, APRIL 28, 1844. "On this side of the water the several debatable subjects con nected with our treaty are settling down very satisfactorily in the public mind. The battle of the maps, the question whether con cessions were made on either side, and by whom, with respect to search or visit, and the admirable reproofs administered by you to the officious interference of Mr. . The discussion of all these questions, now pretty nearly exhausted, leave the universal impression that the treaty was a good and wise measure, and good 81] 253 and wise because it was fair; so much so that the critics are at a loss to determine which of us had the advantage in the scramble for the swamps on the St. John s, a dilemma in which it was your wish, as I am sure it was mine, to leave them. The map question now fortunately only interests historians, such as Mr. Sparks and Mr. Bancroft. I am by no means disposed to disturb its sleep, or that either party should find, or think they had found, anything conclusive, so as to interfere with the conviction that there existed that real shade of doubt or perplexity which could alone be satis factorily settled by compromise. If we are ever fated to meet again, which I indulge the hope may yet be the case, I should have some curiosity to know how you unravel this, to me, inextricable puzzle; at present I will only say, what I know you will believe, that the discoveries here are quite recent, and were wholly un known to me when I was at Washington. Not but that I agree entirely with you, that it would have been no duty of mine to damage the cause of my client, yet at the same time I perhaps went further in protestations of ignorance than I otherwise should have done. Palmerston has in Parliament been the only real ad versary of the treaty, and it seems felt that he is not a disinter ested one. His move will probably bring upon me the unusual honor of the complimentary acknowledgment of my services. That in the Lords is already passed with only three dissentient voices. In the Commons, the motion is expected to come on next week. The ministers have taken no part in this volunteer proceeding. I send you herewith Brougham s speech, which is, I am told, good; but you will be surprised when I add that I have not yet read it. The extradition article of the treaty makes some stir with our anti-slavery people. I have seen some of their deputations, and I hope to have satisfied them; but we shall hear of them, though with no bad consequences, when the bill passes for giving effect to this article. The apprehension is that some cases of robbery will be got up to claim fugitive slaves. This will certainly require caution with the magistrates in Canada, but I am not fearful of the result; but should the abuse prove excessive, the remedy is in the power to correct the article. We have now in our new governor- general a very judicious, discreet, and liberal man, upon whose practical good sense full reliance may be placed. " APPENDIX D. A map showing the various lines between the United States and the British provinces. 254 [82 BIBLIOGRAPHY. PRIMARY SOURCES. American State Papers. Foreign Affairs, Vols. Ill, IV. Military Affairs, Vol. VII. Attorney Generals of the United States, Official Opinions of, Vol. VI. Congressional Globe. 26th Congress, 1st Session. 27th Congress, 3rd Session. 29th Congress, 1st Session. Cralle, E. K. "Works of J. C. Calhoun." 6 vols. New York, 1851-1870, Vol. IV. Compilation of the Treaties in Force. Prepared under Resolution of the Senate, February 11, 1904. Washington, 1904. Congressional Documents. Statutes at Large, Vols. V, VII. Executive Documents. 26th Congress, 2nd Session. Vol. III. Executive Journals of the Senate. Haswell, J. H. (Compiler). "Treaties and Conventions Between the United States and Other Powers." 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