GIFT OF 
 
The Treaty of Washington, Concluded 
 
 August 9, 1842, by Daniel Webster 
 
 and Lord Ashburton 
 
 HUGH TAYLOR GORDON 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 The Treaty of Washington, Concluded 
 
 August 9, 1842, by Daniel Webster 
 
 and Lord Ashburton 
 
 THE JAMES BRYCE HISTORICAL PRIZE ESSAY 
 FOR 1907 
 
 BY 
 HUGH TAYLOR GORDON 
 
 BERKELEY 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 1908 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction 1 
 
 Part I. The Causes for the Treaty 3 
 
 The Boundary Question, its Origin and History 3 
 
 Frontier disputes 20 
 
 The Question of the Eight of Search 23 
 
 The "Creole" and the "Caroline" cases 25 
 
 Part II. The Making of the Treaty 27 
 
 The Appointment of a Special Mission 29 
 
 The Negotiations 33 
 
 Eatification and Acceptance 42 
 
 Opposition and Criticism 45 
 
 Part III. The Effects of the Treaty 53 
 
 Immediate and Local Effects 53 
 
 Effects on International Eelations: Eight of Search and Ex 
 tradition 56 
 
 Appendices 62 
 
 Bibliography 82 
 
THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, CONCLUDED 
 
 AUGUST 9, 1842, BY DANIEL WEBSTER 
 
 AND LORD ASHBURTON. 
 
 HUGH TAYLOR GORDON. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The Treaty of Washington of August 9th, 1842, com 
 monly called the Webster- Ashburton Treaty, was described 
 by Mr. Webster, himself, as * something for the peace of the 
 world." The whole truth of this characterization was not 
 appreciated at the time it was spoken. Webster intended 
 his description of the treaty for its relation to past events, 
 for its results in settling questions which had actually been 
 verging upon war. But the same description is equally 
 true of the far-reaching effects of the treaty in its subse 
 quent relation to international law and the fundamental 
 principles of peace between nations. 
 
 The treaty stands between two long periods of history, 
 one including the events which led to its negotiation, the 
 other, those which resulted from it. In its relation to both 
 of these periods the treaty is primarily a security of inter 
 national peace. 
 
 The long history of the Webster- Ashburton treaty be 
 gins with the boundary question originating in the treaty 
 of 1783. Around this question a whole series of compli 
 cated disputes were added during the ten years preceding 
 
174 [2 
 
 the negotiation of the treaty in 1842. It was the unsettled 
 boundary which magnified the real importance of the other 
 disputes and brought the relations of the United States and 
 England to the crisis of a compromise settlement by a spe 
 cial mission. 
 
 During the negotiations, the boundary question was still 
 the strategic point in dispute. Its settlement involved the 
 concurrence of four parties, Maine and Massachusetts be 
 ing added to the two national governments, and although 
 this greatly increased its difficulty, the adjustment of the 
 different claims was finally accomplished. The boundaries 
 being settled, the success of the negotiation was practically 
 assured. But this assurance does not imply that no other 
 questions of importance were settled by the treaty. Two 
 points, the suppression of the slave trade, and extradition, 
 were included in its provisions and both of these held a 
 prominent place in the international relations subsequent to 
 the treaty. The boundary question as a point in interna 
 tional relations was ended by the conclusion of the treaty ; 
 while the suppression of the slave trade and extradition 
 were fairly launched as international questions by the same 
 treaty. It is in this way that the treaty marks the close of 
 one period of historic events and the opening of another 
 period of other events. Its relation to both is that of a 
 security of international comity ; something for the peace 
 of the world." 
 
 In the writing of this inquiry into the history of the 
 Webster-Ashburton Treaty the attempt has been made to 
 draw upon all available primary sources for the facts of the 
 case. Some difficulty has been encountered in this regard 
 chiefly because of the incompleteness of the Congressional 
 Records on the shelves of the University of California 
 Library for the period between 1833 and 1841, and from 
 an almost total lack of English documents except the Par 
 liamentary Debates and an occasional collection of extracts. 
 The complete private and diplomatic correspondence of 
 
3] 175 
 
 Daniel Webster, drawn from several sources, has been val 
 uable in tracing the course of the negotiations of the treaty, 
 while the "Recueil des Arbitrages International^ " De 
 Lapradelle et Politis, furnished a good working basis for 
 the history of the boundary question up to the Arbitration 
 in 1831. 
 
 In arrangement, the inquiry falls naturally into three 
 main divisions, which correspond with distinct periods in the 
 history of the treaty. The first of these, concerning the 
 history of the questions which led to the treaty of 1842, 
 subdivides into two sections, which deal with the history of 
 the boundary question, and with the complicating disputes 
 which arose over questions of national policy. The second 
 main division shows the culmination of the disputed ques 
 tions in the treaty of 1842, under sections dealing with the 
 negotiations preliminary to the treaty, the making of the 
 treaty, and its ratification and acceptance by both countries. 
 In the final part of the inquiry the results of the treaty are 
 taken up under the sub-headings of immediate and local 
 results, and effects upon international law and the princi 
 ples of peace between nations. 
 
 I. THE CAUSES FOE THE TEEATY. 
 
 It is a singular piece of irony that the boundary stip 
 ulations of the treaty of 1783, between the United States 
 and Great Britain, which were proclaimed by their framers 
 for the particular purpose of preventing subsequent dis 
 putes, were the very source and material of the longest series 
 of boundary disputes the United States has ever experi 
 enced. The termination of this much agitated boundary 
 question was not reached until 1842, when Daniel Webster 
 and Lord Ashburton compromised for its settlement by a 
 conventional line. To understand the conditions which 
 contributed to its final settlement, it is necessary to trace 
 its history through the fifty-nine years which elapsed from 
 
176 
 
 its origin in 1783 to 1842. During this period there were 
 many attempts made to solve the difficulties which arose 
 from the second article of the treaty of 1783, describing the 
 boundaries of the new nation, the United States of America. 
 By Jay s treaty in 1794 and the treaty of Ghent in 1815, 
 portions of the boundary were settled. But the remaining 
 parts, constituting almost the entire land boundaries be 
 tween the United States and Great Britain s North Ameri 
 can provinces, remained disputed in spite of the efforts of 
 commissioners, diplomatists and arbitrators to secure a set 
 tlement. 
 
 By the second article of the treaty of peace of 1783, the 
 northern and eastern boundaries of the United States are 
 described as follows: 
 
 And that all disputes which may arise in the future on 
 the subject of the boundaries of the said United States may 
 be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared that the fol 
 lowing are and shall be their boundaries, viz: From the 
 northwest angle of Nova Scotia; viz: that angle which is 
 formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the 
 St. Croix River to the Highlands ; along the said Highlands 
 which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the 
 river Saint Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlan 
 tic Ocean, to the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut 
 River; thence down along the middle of that river to the 
 forty-fifth degree of north latitude ; from thence, by a line 
 due west on said latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois 
 or Cataraquy; thence along the middle of said river into 
 Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes 
 the communication by water between that lake and Lake 
 Erie ; thence along the middle of said communication into 
 Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at 
 the water communication between that lake and Lake Hu 
 ron ; thence through the middle of said water communication 
 into Lake Huron ; thence through the middle of said lake to 
 the water communication between that lake and Lake Super- 
 
5] 177 
 
 ior; thence through Lake Superior, northward of the Isles 
 Royal and Phelipeaux, to the Long Lake ; thence through the 
 middle of said Long Lake and the water communication be 
 tween it and the Lake of the Woods to the said Lake of the 
 Woods ; thence through the said lake to the most northwest 
 ern point thereof, * * * *. East, by a line to be 
 drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its 
 mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source 
 directly north to the aforesaid Highlands, which divide the 
 rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which 
 fall into the River St. Lawrence; comprehending all the 
 islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of 
 the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due 
 east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between 
 Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, 
 shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic 
 Ocean ; excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have 
 been, within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia. J 
 
 It is admitted that natural boundaries such as rivers, 
 mountain ranges and sea coasts, are the best means of fixing 
 political boundaries where they allow the desired division 
 of territory between two countries, and there is little doubt 
 that this was the aim of the negotiators who laid down the 
 boundaries of the United States in 1783. But at that time 
 the country through which the boundary lay was for the 
 most part wild and unsurveyed. Consequently, instead of 
 the natural objects named in the treaty being accurate and 
 unmistakable definitions of the boundary, they served chief 
 ly to raise a number of questions as to the identity of sig 
 nificant points in the boundary. It is to this fact that the 
 boundary disputes rising out of the treaty of 1783 are due. 
 
 The first of these was in regard to the St. Croix River. 
 The treaty had identified this river merely as having its 
 mouth in the Bay of Fundy. But it happened that there 
 
 1 ( Treaties and conventions between U. S. and other powers since 
 July 4, 1776," p. 376. John H. Haswell, Compiler. 
 
178 [6 
 
 were several streams which had been called at one time or 
 another the St. Croix River and three of these emptied into 
 the Bay of Fundy. Adverse claims were set up by the two 
 governments as to which of these was intended. 2 A de 
 tailed history of this particular question is not required for 
 our purpose, since it was settled by the treaty of November 
 19, 1794, commonly known as Jay s treaty. It is important 
 to note, however, that in deciding this point, not only the 
 territory immediately between the two streams was affected, 
 but the position of the boundary formed by a line drawn 
 due north from the source of the St. Croix River was there 
 by determined. Under the fifth article of Jay s treaty and 
 an explanatory article of the same, added in 1798, a com 
 mission definitely identified the St. Croix River, giving the 
 longitude and latitude of its mouth and erecting at its source 
 a monument to be maintained by the joint measures of the 
 two governments. 3 This monument was made the starting 
 point of all subsequent attempts to trace the unsettled 
 boundary. 
 
 Another difference had arisen about the same time that 
 the commissioners were investigating the identity of the St. 
 Croix, prior to the negotiations of 1794, but its settlement 
 was not included in that treaty. 4 It concerned the course 
 of the boundary among the islands in the Bay of Passamr,- 
 quoddy at the mouth of the St. Croix. and the ownership of 
 the large island of Grand Menan in the Bay of Fundy. 
 Upon this point the treaty of 1783 had been very indefinite, 
 merely stating that the line should be drawn due east from 
 the mouth of the St. Croix and should include within the 
 United States all the islands within twenty leagues of the 
 mainland that were not, and had not been, hitherto, under 
 the jurisdiction of the province of Nova Scotia. But Nova 
 
 2 Message of the President, Feb. 9, 1790, with correspondence and 
 papers relating to the northeast boundary. American State Papers, 
 Foreign Eelations. Vol. I., pp. 91-99. 
 
 3 Treaties and Conventions, J. H. Haswell, pp. 382, 396. 
 
 4 American State Papers, F. E., Vol. I., pp. 91, 99. 
 
7] 179 
 
 Scotia claimed jurisdiction over all the islands in the Bay 
 of Fundy, which was more than the United States was will 
 ing to concede, especially since the American town of East- 
 port was situated on one of them. Settlement of this ques 
 tion was again deferred by the rejection of the treaty ne 
 gotiated by King and Hawkesbury in 1803, which contained 
 an article denning this portion of the boundary. Before any 
 further negotiation resulted, other events intervened to take 
 the attention of both countries from this quarter. 
 
 With the return of peace after the war of 1812, another 
 attempt was made to settle the boundary question. Articles 
 four to eight, inclusive, of the Treaty of Ghent, provided 
 for the appointment of commissioners to decide upon the 
 ownership of the islands in the Bay of Fundy, and to sur 
 vey and determine the entire boundary from the source of 
 the St. Croix river to the northwesternmost point of the 
 Lake of the Woods, in conformity with the provisions of the 
 treaty of 1783. 5 The work was divided among four com 
 missions. The first of these, as provided in the fourth ar 
 ticle, was to decide upon the ownership of the islands near 
 the mouth of the St. Croix. Article five allotted to another 
 commission the determination of the boundary from the 
 head of the St. Croix to the intersection of the line of the 
 forty-fifth parallel with the St. Lawrence. Article six pro 
 vided for two more commissioners to run the boundary from 
 the last named point on the St. Lawrence to the outlet of 
 Lake Superior, and having completed that work, the same 
 commissioners were authorized by article seven to continue 
 the line from the outlet of Lake Superior to the northwest 
 point in the Lake of the Woods. It was further stipulated 
 that should the commissioners fail to agree in any case, 
 statements of their points of difference and the grounds 
 for their disagreement should be referred to some friendly 
 Sovereign or State for arbitration. 
 
 s Treaties and Conventions, J. H. Haswell, p. 399. 
 
180 [8 
 
 The commissioners appointed under the fourth article, 
 declared their work successfully completed, and delivered 
 their decision November 24, 1817. They awarded to the 
 United States Moose Island, Dudley Island and Frederick 
 Island. Great Britain received all other islands in the Bay 
 of Passamaquoddy, also the large island, Grand Menan, in 
 the Bay of Fundy proper. 
 
 The commissioners of article six accomplished the settle 
 ment of the boundary described in that article, i.e., from 
 the intersection of the line of the forty-fifth parallel with 
 the St. Lawrence to the outlet of Lake Superior. But 
 when they attempted to continue this line westward into 
 and through Lake Superior and the water communications 
 to the Lake of the Woods, they were unable to reach an 
 agreement. Two points of difference w T ere encountered. 
 The first was in regard to which channel should be fol 
 lowed around St. George s Island, or Sugar Island, situated 
 in the water communication between Lake Huron and Lake 
 Superior. The ownership of this island was involved, and 
 as it was of considerable extent and value, neither side 
 would make the concession. The second question was as to 
 the course of the boundary from Lake Superior to the Lake 
 of the Woods. The treaty of 1783 had said it should go by 
 way of Long Lake, but the commissioners differed as to the 
 exact location of Long Lake, as intended by the negotiators 
 of the treaty of 1783. The American Commissioners main 
 tained that the most northern route was intended ; going by 
 way of Dog River and Sturgeon Lake to Lac la Pluie, and 
 from there to Lake of the Woods. The English Commis 
 sioners claimed the line should run to the most southwestern 
 point of Lake Superior and from there reach Lac la Pluie 
 by Fond du Lac and the St. Louis River. The two lines 
 agreed from Lac la Pluie to Lake of the Woods. Neither 
 of the commissioners would relinquish his claim, so the 
 whole attempt to fix the boundary from the outlet of Lake 
 Superior to the Lake of the Woods came to nothing. 
 
9] 181 
 
 The most difficult part of all the boundary fell to the 
 commissioners under the fifth article. This was that por 
 tion lying between the monument at the source of the St. 
 Croix River and the point where the forty-fifth parallel 
 intersects the St. Lawrence at St. Regis. As defined by the 
 treaty of 1783, this part of the boundary was to be deter 
 mined by a line extending due north from the source of 
 the St. Croix to its intersection with the Highlands which 
 formed with that line the northwest angle of Nova Scotia. 
 Furthermore, these Highlands were defined as "those which 
 divide those rivers which empty themselves into the river 
 St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic 
 Ocean." Along their crest the line was to run until the 
 northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River was 
 reached; whence it followed the middle of that stream to 
 the forty-fifth degree of north latitude, and from that point 
 extended along the line of the forty-fifth parallel to the 
 St. Lawrence. The treaty of 1783 had, as we have already 
 observed, defined a boundary through an unsurveyed coun 
 try by naming rivers and heights of uncertain location. 
 This was a fault particularly applicable to the Highland 
 frontier just described. The northwest angle of Nova 
 Scotia had never been accurately defined before the treaty 
 of 1783, nor was it known at that time just where a due 
 north line from the source of the St. Croix would strike the 
 Highlands. Consequently when the commissioners of the 
 fifth article of the treaty of Ghent started to run the line 
 from the head of the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence, the 
 first question they encountered was that of determining the 
 point where the due north line strikes the Highlands to 
 form the northwest angle of Nova Scotia. With nothing 
 in the treaty of 1783 which they were trying to interpret 
 to prove this point, they were involved in the territorial 
 history of Massachusetts, Canada, and Nova Scotia, and 
 each decided on a different point to which the north line 
 should be run. 
 
182 [10 
 
 The United States commissioner claimed the Highlands 
 named in the treaty were those which the due north line 
 encountered near the source of the Metis, a small tributary 
 of the St. Lawrence, and separated its waters from the 
 headwaters of the Ristagouche and the St. John. The 
 boundary, if it followed the crest of the Highlands from 
 this point, gave to the United States the entire territory 
 drained by the St. John and its tributaries. It also inter 
 cepted the roads of communication between Quebec and 
 Halifax, and brought the United States frontier within a 
 few miles of Montreal and the St. Lawrence. This consid 
 eration was much more important to England than the loss 
 o the territory for its agricultural value. It was not diffi 
 cult to find a valid objection to such an interpretation of 
 the treaty of 1783. The Highlands were first mentioned in 
 the treaty between France and England in 1763, when they 
 were described as those "which divide the rivers which 
 empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those 
 which fall into the Sea. They were similarly described in 
 the Proclamation creating the Province of Quebec in 1763 
 and in the Quebec act of 1774, 6 but in 1783 instead of "the 
 sea," "the Atlantic Ocean" was named. Otherwise the 
 two descriptions coincided. But in this difference, the 
 English saw more than a difference between controvertible 
 terms. They contended that "the sea" was a general term 
 including all the bays and gulfs along the shore, but when 
 "Atlantic Ocean" was specified, it was clearly intended by 
 the negotiators to express a distinction between the open 
 seacoast and a gulf or bay. Hence any Highlands which 
 divided streams flowing into the Bay of Chaleurs or the 
 Bay of Fundy were not within the meaning of the words 
 of the treaty. This was their ground of objection to the 
 American claim. 
 
 The English commissioner contended that the due north 
 
 e Collections of the Maine Historical Society ; 2nd Ser. Vol. VIII, 
 pp. 61, 64. 
 
11] 183 
 
 line was never intended to go beyond the St. John River, 
 but should terminate at Mars Hill, situated about midway 
 between the source of the St. Croix and the intersection of 
 the due north line with the St. John. From this point the 
 boundary was run westward along the heights separating 
 the headwaters of the Aroostook and other streams flowing 
 northward into the St. John from the sources of the Pen- 
 nobseot, flowing southward into the Atlantic Ocean. This 
 line struck the Highlands, followed by the American com 
 missioner, at Metamarjette Portage, the two lines concur 
 ring from that point to the northwest source of the 
 Connecticut River. The objections which the American 
 commissioner raised to this line were quite as valid as those 
 raised by the English against the United States claim. 
 Instead of separating the waters of the St. Lawrence from 
 those of the Atlantic, the Highlands claimed by the English 
 divided streams flowing into the St. John from those empty 
 ing into the Atlantic Ocean, which was directly contrary 
 to the words of the treaty. Furthermore, these Highlands 
 were not distinct mountainous ranges like those north of 
 the St. John. 
 
 Apparently neither side presented a claim which com 
 plied strictly with the words of the treaty of 1783. But 
 both commissioners insisted that their claim was entirely 
 just and in accord with the intentions of the negotiators. 
 There was no alternative but to abandon this attempt to 
 settle the boundary. The commissioners, Thomas Barclay 
 for England and Van Ness for the United States, an 
 nounced their failure to their respective governments, Oc 
 tober 9, 1821. 7 Besides the boundary dispute on the ques 
 tion of the Highlands, two questions of minor importance 
 remained unsettled. In regard to the northwesternmost 
 head of the Connecticut, the American commissioner 
 claimed Indian Stream, supposed to be the most westerly 
 
 7 De Lapradelle et Politis, Kecueil des Arbitrages Internation- 
 aux," p. 355. 
 
184 [12 
 
 of the four confluents forming the sources of the Connec 
 ticut. The English claim was for the western source of 
 Connecticut Lake, a part of the headwaters of the most 
 easterly of the four confluents, which they said was the 
 northwesternmost head of the Connecticut proper. The 
 difference between the two claims here affected the owner 
 ship of a considerable tract of very fertile land lying along 
 these streams. The second of the questions arose from the 
 discovery, by an accurate survey in 1818, that the line of 
 the forty-fifth parallel as it had been generally accepted 
 since the survey of Valentine and Collins, 1764- 67, as the 
 northern boundary of New York and Vermont, was three- 
 quarters of a mile north of the true line of the forty-fifth 
 parallel, where that line intercepted the Connecticut River. 
 The two lines converged as they approached the St. Law 
 rence, including a long, narrow strip of territory across 
 the northern end of New York and Vermont. The English 
 commissioner claimed that the true line should be adopted, 
 while the American held that the old line was well recog 
 nized as the boundary and should be confirmed. An im 
 portant feature of this question was that it affected the 
 ownership of Rouse s Point, a military position command 
 ing the entrance of Lake Champlain, situated between the 
 two lines, and hitherto supposed to belong to the United 
 States. 
 
 The result of the treaty of Ghent came far short of 
 settling the boundary. The portions allotted to the com 
 missioners under articles four and six had been determined, 
 but the part described by articles five and seven, greater 
 both in extent of boundary and difficulty of settlement, 
 remained in dispute. The provisions in the treaty for 
 arbitration offered no immediate solution of the difficulties, 
 since nothing in the way of a definite set of rules was laid 
 down by which the questions could be fairly presented to 
 an arbiter. 8 Until such necessary rules were agreed upon, 
 
 s De Lapradelle et Politis, Eecueil des Arbitrages Internation- 
 aux," p. 356. 
 
13] 185 
 
 the declaration of the treaty that the questions should be 
 referred to a friendly sovereign were wholly ineffective. 
 
 From 1821 to 1826 there was a lull in the boundary 
 proceedings as far as any national action was concerned. 
 Neither side made a move toward negotiating for settle 
 ment. But in 1826 active interest of the national govern 
 ments was again aroused by the disturbances in the disputed 
 territory, resulting from friction between the local author 
 ities of the two governments. The disputed frontier had 
 been for the most part unoccupied and practically unheeded 
 until about 1825, when pioneer settlers began to take up 
 the land for homesteads and to cut into the resourceful 
 forests of the disputed territory. 9 Then complaints, increas 
 ing in number and urgency, began to be sent to the author 
 ities, both local and national, that encroachments upon the 
 rights of the State were being made by subjects of the other 
 government. Mr. C. R. Vaughan, the British minister at 
 Washington, informed his government in March, 1827, that 
 the American Secretary of State, Mr. Clay, had promised 
 to restrain Maine and Massachusetts from further encroach 
 ments into the disputed territory. 10 The Governor of 
 Maine soon afterwards issued a proclamation in which he 
 forbade the citizens of the State from taking any independ 
 ent action regarding encroachments, but urged them to rely 
 on the authority of the State for the preservation of peace. 
 But in spite of these measures, timber cutting and settling 
 continued in the disputed territory and the complaints 
 against encroachments grew. This fact is well shown by 
 the correspondence between Mr. Vaughan and Sir Howard 
 Douglas, the Governor of New Brunswick, 11 and by the 
 
 American Historical Review. Vol. VII. (1901-02), p. 500. 
 
 10 Vaughan to Canning. March, 1827. American Historical Re 
 view, Vol. VII, p. 500. Maine was separated from Massachusetts and 
 admitted as a State, 1819-20. But much of the unclaimed land in the 
 disputed territory was still held by them under an arrangement of 
 joint ownership. Maine Historical Ass n., Vol. VIII, pp. 135, 196. 
 
 11 American Historical Review, Vol. VII, p. 500. 
 
186 [14 
 
 emphatic resolutions of the Maine Legislature, passed Feb 
 ruary 18, 1828, in which the Governor was requested to use 
 his power to stop new aggressions if they were not pre 
 vented by the national government. 12 The conditions on 
 the frontier clearly demanded that an early attempt be 
 made to settle the question of jurisdiction over the disputed 
 territory. Albert Gallatin was intrusted with the work of 
 negotiating a settlement of the boundary question, and to 
 this end was appointed minister to England and empowered 
 to treat for and sign a convention for the United States 
 with England on this subject. It was hoped by Gallatin 
 that a settlement could be successfully made by direct 
 negotiations w r ith the English ministry, but this hope was 
 doomed to failure. Both parties remained obdurate in their 
 claims based upon divergent interpretations of the treaty 
 of 1783. After several weeks of unsuccessful conferences, 
 Gallatin was obliged to submit to a recourse to arbitration 
 which was taken as the last means of bridging the dif 
 ficulty. 13 
 
 "A convention providing for the arbitration of the dis 
 pute concerning the Northeastern Boundary" was con 
 cluded, September 29, 1827, by the negotiators, Albert Gal 
 latin for the United States, and Charles Grant and Henry 
 Unwin Addington for England. Ratifications were ex 
 changed April 2, 1828, and the convention proclaimed May 
 15, 1828. This convention framed the rules for arbitration 
 which had not been provided by the treaty of Ghent and 
 agreed that the differences which had arisen under the fifth 
 article of that treaty should be submitted to the decision 
 of a friendly Sovereign or State. Each side was allowed 
 to prepare a statement of their claims and a counter state 
 ment to the points offered by the opposing side. Upon 
 these statements and such other necessary topographical 
 
 12 Maine Historical Society, Vol. VIII, p. 270. 
 
 is Gallatin to J. Brown, U. S. Minister at Paris, February 2, 1827. 
 Gallatin a Writings, II, p. 360. 
 
15] 187 
 
 evidence, maps and surveys as the contracting parties mu 
 tually supplied, the arbiter was to decide for the claims of 
 one or the other. His decision, to be given if possible 
 within two years after he consented to act. should be final 
 and binding upon both parties. 
 
 In drawing up their statements, the claims of the com 
 missioners of the fifth article of the treaty of Ghent were 
 reaffirmed in all but one particular. The American claim 
 regarding the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut 
 Kiver was changed from Indian Stream to Hall s Stream, 
 since discovered to be the most westerly of the four con 
 fluents. The statements were full and complete, each side 
 contending to prove that its claim met the intentions of the 
 negotiators of 1783. England s statement was drawn up 
 by the foreign office, while that of the United States was 
 prepared by Albert Gallatin, assisted by Mr. W. P. Preble, 
 a Maine man, then United States Minister at the Hague. 
 
 The arbiter chosen was William I, King of the Nether 
 lands, and his decision was announced January 10, 1831, 14 
 through the United States Minister at the Hague, Mr. 
 Preble. This decision, known as the * Dutch Award, now 
 became the center of interest between the two countries. 
 Upon two of the points submitted, the northwest source of 
 the Connecticut and the line of the forty-fifth parallel, 
 England s claim was upheld, with the special provision that 
 Eouse s point should belong to the United States. But on 
 the question of the Highlands and the northwest angle of 
 Nova Scotia, the arbiter decided that the claim of neither 
 party could be taken as a just and true interpretation of 
 the treaty of 1783. The boundary, he said, could not be 
 determined by its description in that treaty. Hence he 
 recommended a middle line which would give an equitable 
 division of the disputed territory. The due north line from 
 the source of the St. Croix was terminated at the St. John 
 
 i* De Lapradelle et Politis, Recueil des Arbitrages Internation- 
 aux" . 361. 
 
188 [16 
 
 and from there the boundary followed the middle of that 
 stream to the source of the St. Francis, whence the High 
 land boundary was unmistakable. In making this decision 
 the arbiter gave what he considered a fair settlement of 
 the dispute. England gained enough of the disputed ter 
 ritory to insure her communications between the Provinces 
 of New Brunswick and Canada, while the United States 
 retained a strong military frontier along the Highlands, as 
 well as Rouse s Point at the entrance of Lake Champlain. 
 In value of territory, the gains of Great Britain at the 
 source of the Connecticut and along the forty-fifth parallel 
 w r ere counterbalanced by awarding to the United States the 
 fertile valleys of the Aroostook and Allegash, the country 
 north of the St. John being very rugged and of little agri 
 cultural value. 
 
 Mr. Preble sent the award to England, January 12, 
 1831, and with it a "respectful protest against a decision 
 which had exceeded its authority in giving an opinion in 
 stead of a judgment." The grounds for this protest were, 
 that the arbiter had not been authorized by the rules of 
 1827 to mediate between the claims, but to decide abso 
 lutely for one or the other. This had not been done in 
 regard to the northwest angle of Nova Scotia and the High 
 lands. The British ministry, nevertheless, disregarded 
 Preble s protest, which was not made under any instruc 
 tions from his government, and announced that it would 
 accept the award as had been agreed in the convention. 15 
 
 In the United States the award met a strong opposition. 
 Maine in particular strenuously protested its acceptance by 
 the federal government. A joint select committee of its 
 legislature, consisting of four senators and seven repre 
 sentatives, recommended resolutions which were adopted by 
 the state legislature, January 19, 1832, which declared, 
 that it was not within the constitutional power of the fed 
 eral government to cede to a foreign power any portion of 
 
 is Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, Vol. 67, pp. 1171, 1175. 
 
17] 189 
 
 a state s territory without its consent; that the decision 
 was not obligatory on the parties of the arbitration agree 
 ment, and that inasmuch as the adoption of the new line 
 was regarded as a violation of the rights of Maine, a formal 
 protest was made against it. These resolves were communi 
 cated to Congress and the President, and the Representa 
 tives of the State in Congress were instructed to prevent if 
 possible the adoption of the award. The cooperation of 
 Massachusetts was solicited and on February 15 the general 
 court of the legislature of that state passed concurrent reso 
 lutions for the rejection of the award. 
 
 The question was referred to the Senate by the Presi 
 dent on December 7, 1831, and shortly afterwards Eng 
 land s decision to accept the award was officially announced. 
 After a lengthy debate in secret session, the Senate voted 
 in June, 1832, to reject the arbiter s decision, and to re 
 open negotiations with England for determining the boun 
 dary according to the treaty of 1783. 16 The vote was 
 decisive: thirty-five for rejection against eight for accept 
 ance. Maine s absolute stand against the award was the 
 chief cause for the refusal of the federal government to 
 accept it. President Jackson was inclined to accept the 
 arbiter s decision, in which he saw the solution of a long 
 standing and sore difficulty. 17 But the protests of Maine 
 and Massachusetts could not be legally over-ridden, since 
 it is not possible under the constitution to change the boun 
 daries of a state against its will, except by treaty. The 
 refusal of the award by the United States was announced 
 to the British Minister by the Secretary of State, July 31, 
 1832. 
 
 England refused to consider the vote of the Senate as 
 a final rejection of the award, but for three years con 
 tinued to insist on its acceptance by the United States. 
 
 is Congressional Debates, Vol. VIII, Part I, p. 1395. 
 IT Curtis, "Life of Webster," II, p. 139; also N. A. Keview, Vol. 
 LV (1843), p. 461. 
 
190 [18 
 
 Palmerston declared that even though the arbiter s opinion 
 upon the Highlands was purely deliberative, the United 
 States could not rightfully repudiate the other parts of the 
 decision. 18 Sir Charles R. Vaughan also stoutly defended 
 the award. His dispatches to the home government through 
 the year 1833 express his firm belief that the way to settle 
 the boundary question was to induce the United States to 
 accept the award. He also suggested that once this was 
 done, England could, by negotiation and equivalents, re 
 move the American jurisdiction from the territory north of 
 the St. John. 19 Nothing was accomplished, however, to 
 ward a reconsideration of the award by the Senate. Eng 
 land finally gave up the attempt and declared herself no 
 longer bound by her offer to accept the arbiter s decision. 20 
 From 1833 to 1841 the boundary question was juggled 
 back and forth between the two countries in a series of 
 projects and counter-projects in which neither side could 
 agree to the conditions imposed by the other. Soon after 
 the rejection of the award the United States proposed that 
 a joint commission be appointed to survey the line and de 
 termine the Highlands named in 1783. England reluctantly 
 consented to this proposal. A draught of convention was 
 drawn up and sent to the American Secretary of State, 
 through the English Minister, Mr. Fox. But when this 
 reached Washington the United States had decided that set 
 tlement could only be obtained by arbitration, recent dis 
 turbances in Maine having shown the improbability of set 
 tlement by a survey commission. They accordingly re 
 turned a counter proposal, that a commission of six be 
 chosen for the survey and arbitration of the boundary. 
 England accepted the main features of this proposal, but 
 absolutely refused to consent to the added conditions, that 
 
 is De Lapradelle et Politis, "Kecueil des Arbitrages Internation- 
 aux," p. 282. 
 
 19 Vaughan to Viscount Goderich, Feb. 7, 1833. American His 
 torical Eeview, VII, p. 504. 
 
 20 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1175. 
 
19] 191 
 
 Mitchell s Map should be acknowledged by the commission 
 as the authentic map of the country, and that agents of the 
 two governments should accompany the survey commission 
 to furnish explanations on behalf of their respective gov 
 ernments. Her objections were expressed in the preamble of 
 a new draft for a convention, communicated to the Secre 
 tary of State by Mr. Fox, July 28, 1840. 21 The United 
 States reply to this was another counter-project, delivered 
 August 13, 1840. Palmerston said in his letter to Fox, of 
 August 24, 1841, that this "contained so many inadmiss 
 ible propositions" that it could not be accepted. To this 
 he added a belief that no settlement could be hoped for dur 
 ing the Presidency of Mr. Van Buren. 22 
 
 The whole course of the negotiation during this long 
 period of projects and counter-projects accomplished noth 
 ing toward an actual settlement. It did, however, impress 
 upon the two governments the necessity of abandoning their 
 attempts to fix the boundary according to the terms of the 
 treaty of 1783. In his communication to Mr. Forsyth of 
 January 10, 1838, Mr. Fox proposed a conventional line as 
 the only possible settlement of the dispute. 23 Although the 
 United States continued to urge further attempts to trace 
 the line in conformity with the treaty, the opinion was form 
 ing among some of the leading men of the country, of whom 
 Daniel Webster was one, that a conventional line would 
 have to be agreed upon. 
 
 Meanwhile survey commissions had been sent out by 
 each government to collect data and topographical evidence 
 concerning the disputed territory. England sent two com 
 missions, one in 1839 conducted by Colonel Mudge and Mr. 
 Featherstonhaugh, and another in 1840 under Mr. Brough- 
 ton and Mr. Featherstonhaugh, Jr. The reports of these 
 commissions were intended to furnish additional proofs for 
 
 21 Senate Document, No. 274, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 
 
 22 Parliamentary Debates, 3d Series, Vol. 67, p. 1233. 
 
 23 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1229. 
 
192 [20 
 
 England s claim in case another convention was agreed 
 upon. Similarly the United States sent surveyors into the 
 disputed territory in the summers of 1840 and 1841, to 
 verify by their reports the American claim for the High 
 lands north of the St. John. Although the work of these 
 commissions was ex parte, the two governments informed 
 one another of their intention to send surveyors into the 
 territory and even communicated the reports of the com 
 missions, so that a partial step was taken in the direction of 
 mutual action, in spite of their disagreements in making 
 drafts for a convention. 24 
 
 While the foreign secretaries of both governments were 
 exchanging views on framing a convention for settling the 
 question, and surveyors were making maps of the disputed 
 territory, affairs on the boundary were becoming more and 
 more critical. The disputes resulting from an unsettled 
 frontier were taking on a very threatening aspect. It had 
 been agreed by the parties when the question was submitted 
 to arbitration that any attempts on either side to exercise 
 jurisdiction over the disputed territory should be sus 
 pended. But, whether from inability or unwillingness 
 probably the latter, the local authorities did not stop their 
 citizens from coming into contact in the disputed territory. 
 The national governments showed a desire to settle the 
 question peaceably by dividing the disputed territory if 
 necessary, but the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick 
 demanded that their claims be upheld to the full extent. 25 
 
 The disputes on the Maine boundary centered around 
 the settlement of Madawaska, situated on both sides of the 
 St. John at its intersection with the Madawaska River. It 
 was over these settlements that both countries claimed juris 
 diction and consequently a clash of authority resulted. In 
 
 24 Corresp. of Fox and Forsyth, Senate Document No. 274, 29th 
 Cong., 1st Sess. 
 
 25 Resolves of Maine Legislature, March 25, 1837, in "Messages 
 and Papers of the Presidents." J. D. Richardson, Vol. II, pp. 349- 
 357. 
 
21] 193 
 
 1828, John Baker, an American citizen, had been arrested 
 there for warning the inhabitants against the exclusive 
 authority of New Brunswick, and was convicted of seditious 
 conspiracy by an English court, for which he was forced 
 to pay a fine and serve a term of imprisonment, although 
 repeated demands were made by the United States for his 
 release. 20 In 1837 more Americans were arrested for try 
 ing to hold an election in Madawaska under the authority 
 of Penobscot County. Also Greely, a census agent of 
 Maine, was taken into custody by the New Brunswick 
 authorities. These events brought forth a storm of protest 
 in Maine. Her legislature passed resolutions demanding 
 that the State s rights be secured and her citizens protected 
 by the federal government. The prisoners were released, 
 but the feeling of antagonism remained. 27 The movement 
 developed into what was known as the Madawaska War. 
 Although no blood was shed, both sides assumed a threat 
 ening attitude and organized their forces for military occu 
 pation of the disputed territory. General Scott was sent 
 to take charge of the United States forces in the Canadian 
 frontier in the spring of 1838 and it was largely due to his 
 cool direction that open conflict was avoided. He made a 
 proposal which was accepted by the governors of Maine and 
 New Brunswick, whereby it was mutually agreed to let 
 questions of possession and jurisdiction over the disputed 
 territory stand, each government exercising its jurisdiction 
 over a certain portion of the territory but without recog 
 nition of its right to do so by the other side. 28 Such a 
 policy succeeded in pacifying the local factions for a short 
 time. Irresponsible depredations into the timber by law 
 less men were stopped and a vigorous military police was 
 maintained by both governments. How long the question 
 
 26 Speech of Douglas, former Governor of New Brunswick, in Par 
 liamentary Debates, 3rd Ser., Vol. 67, pp. 1270-73. 
 
 27 Kichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. Ill, 
 pp. 358, 368. 
 
 28 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Ser., Vol. 53, p. 1153. 
 
194 [22 
 
 could be thus kept under guard, was questionable. The 
 military agreement of Scott and Harvey was really a tem 
 porary truce, pending the settlement which it was hoped 
 would soon be reached by the national governments. 
 
 The border disturbances were not confined to the fron 
 tiers of Maine, but spread along the entire northern boun 
 dary. Violations of neutrality, not even thought of by the 
 framers of the treaty of Ghent, were actually begun during 
 a Canadian rebellion, 1837- 38. American adventurers, 
 idlers, and worse, helped the insurgents to aggravate the 
 Canadian authorities. Bands of "Patriots" and "Hunters 
 Lodges were established along the frontier for the purpose 
 of assisting the rebels in what they declared to be the cause 
 of right and liberty. Affairs came to a crisis in this quarter 
 with the destruction of the steamer "Caroline," an Amer 
 ican vessel, which was alleged to have been used by the 
 sympathizers to carry supplies and war munitions to Navy 
 Island, where the rebels were located. An English force 
 was sent out on the night of December 29, 1837, to destroy 
 the vessel, but found her moored to the dock on the Amer 
 ican shore, instead of at Navy Island as they had expected. 
 They were not deterred, however, from carrying out their 
 plans, but seized the vessel forcibly and towed her into the 
 current, where she was set afire and allowed to drift over 
 Niagara Falls. At least one American was killed in the 
 affair, and several were more or less injured. The indig 
 nation of the entire country was roused by this outrage. 
 United States territory had been violated by an armed force 
 of a foreign government. This was more than a local dis 
 pute of boundaries. It was unmistakably an invasion of 
 United States territory, a fact which the government as 
 well as the people resented. On the frontier things were 
 in a commotion and there was imminent danger of the 
 people taking summary justice by a resort to arms. The 
 national government took immediate steps to establish 
 order and also to prevent a repetition of such invasions. 
 
23] 195 
 
 The militia were called into service under the command of 
 General Scott, and a formal complaint was made to the 
 British government. 29 
 
 Under this vigorous management matters became more 
 peaceable in 1839. General Scott did much to end the 
 "Patriot" movement by addressing the rebel sympathizers 
 upon the folly and danger of disturbing the international 
 peace. 30 Proclamations by the President urged similar for 
 bearance upon the citizens of the United States. 31 The 
 favorable aspect of the question is shown in the President s 
 third annual message to congress issued December 2, 1839. 32 
 He says in part : * The extraordinary powers vested in me 
 by the act of Congress for the defense of the country in an 
 emergency, considered so far probable as to require that 
 the Executive should possess ample means to meet it, have 
 not been exerted. * * * Happily, in our pending ques 
 tions with Great Britain, out of which this unusual grant 
 of authority arose, nothing has occurred to require its ex 
 ertion. * * * There is every reason to believe that the 
 disturbances like those which lately agitated the neighbor 
 ing British Provinces will not again prove the sources of 
 border contentions." Prompt and judicious action by the 
 national authorities had dispersed any immediate danger 
 of conflict on the frontier. But the feeling of hostility was 
 only suppressed and not extinguished. The international 
 questions which gave rise to the disturbances, remained 
 unsettled. 
 
 In 1840 and 1841 more difficulties were added to the 
 disputes already pending, which, like the case of the Caro 
 line," involved questions of international law. Foremost 
 
 29 Kichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. Ill, pp. 
 401-404. 
 
 30 Callahan, J. M., The Neutrality of the American Lakes, pp. 
 100-101. 
 
 si U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. XI, pp. 784-785. 
 32 Kichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. Ill, 
 p. 529. 
 
196 [24 
 
 among these was the question of Right of Search or Visit 
 which was revived at this time by the action of British 
 cruisers engaged in suppressing the slave trade on the 
 African Coast. The United States and Great Britain had 
 agreed in the Treaty of Ghent to exercise their best efforts 
 to end the traffic in slaves. To further this object, a treaty 
 was negotiated, but not ratified, during the second admin 
 istration of Mr. Monroe, allowing a mutual right of visit to 
 be exercised by the cruisers of the two governments, to 
 ascertain whether ships suspected of being slavers were act 
 ually so enga ged. Since this time England had entered 
 into treaties with other powers, particularly Portugal, 
 Spain, and France, for the exercise of a right of visit, but 
 with the United States nothing had been agreed upon. 
 Several proposals for such a treaty had been made by Eng 
 land from 1833 to 1838, but not accepted. This question 
 had never been well received in the United States and its 
 significance in the war of 1812 was not yet forgotten. But 
 in the spring of 1840, the commanders of the American and 
 British fleets on the coast of Africa signed an agreement 
 for the mutual right to arrest the merchant vessels of the 
 United States and England and her allies, found to be 
 trading in slaves, and turn them over to their own govern 
 ment s authorities for adjudication. 33 The agreement on 
 the part of the American Commander was unauthorized by 
 his instructions and was promptly disavowed by the home 
 government. But during the interval of its enforcement 
 several American merchant vessels were arrested by British 
 cruisers on slender suspicions of being slavers, causing con 
 siderable loss to their owners from the interruption of the 
 voyage. The complaints received by the national govern 
 ment against such interference with innocent commerce 
 renewed the old opposition to the Right of Search, even 
 though it was now, as England claimed, a mere Right of 
 Visit to ascertain the truth of a vessel s nationality. Eng- 
 ss Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers (1848), pp. 73-76. 
 
25] 197 
 
 land maintained that, treaty or no treaty, her warships 
 were entitled to visit a merchant vessel on the high seas and 
 see the proof of her nationality. It was asserted that this 
 was made necessary by the fact that vessels of various 
 nationality engaging in the slave trade, sought immunity 
 by falsely assuming the flag of the United States. True as 
 this may have been, the United States stuck to the prin 
 ciple, that in time of peace, none but an American warship 
 was entitled to interrupt, or in any way interfere with a 
 merchant vessel flying the American flag. 
 
 England s zeal to abolish slavery raised another question 
 of maritime rights, in which the case of the "Creole" 
 figured most prominently. 34 The "Creole" was an Amer 
 ican vessel whose crew, composed of negro slaves, had mu 
 tinied and forced her captain to sail to the British port of 
 Nassau in the Bermudas. While in that port, the English 
 authorities declared that in accord with the laws of Eng 
 land, which recognized no rights of slavery within English 
 territorial jurisdiction, these slaves on the "Creole" were 
 no longer bound to their masters. Similar action was taken 
 by the port authorities with slaves on board other American 
 vessels driven to the refuge of the English port by stress 
 of weather. The loss of valuable slave property, thus forced 
 upon the American owners, raised a strong protest in the 
 United States, particularly in the South where the question 
 of fugitive slaves was keenly felt. Complaint was made to 
 England and damages asked for the liberated slaves. Eng 
 land however was inclined to refuse the American claim 
 on the mistaken ground that her laws against slavery ex 
 tended to foreign vessels within her ports. 
 
 In the United States the war spirit which had been 
 effectually quieted in 1839, broke out afresh in 1840 over 
 new developments in the "Caroline" episode. Alexander 
 McLeod, a British subject, boasted in New York of having 
 taken part in the destruction of the "Caroline," and that 
 
 34 Scott s Cases on International Law, p. 252. 
 
198 [26 
 
 he had fired the shot which killed the American, Durfree. 
 He was immediately arrested and imprisoned in Lockport, 
 New York, under a charge of murder. 35 The popular cry 
 was that he should be hanged, and in view of the feeling of 
 resentment prevalent on the frontier, there was a reason 
 able prospect that the threat would be executed. 
 
 In England a feeling, no less strong, was created that if 
 McLeod was hanged, war would be declared. The govern 
 ment had assumed the responsibility of the destruction of 
 the "Caroline," and a just indignation was felt that an 
 Englishman should be tried by a foreign court, with a pros 
 pect of being convicted and executed, for acts which were 
 committed under the orders of his government. In this 
 important crisis the United States government was next to 
 helpless. McLeod was held for trial by a New York State 
 court and there was then no authority by which his case 
 could be transferred to the federal courts. The only thing 
 to be done was to assure him a fair trial before the State 
 court and furnish any possible evidence for his defense. 
 England s demands for his immediate release could not be 
 granted. 36 
 
 On the whole, Anglo-American relations at the close of 
 Van Buren s administration were in a very complicated 
 and uncertain state. The boundary question had been dis 
 puted for so many years, in spite of repeated attempts to 
 settle it, that peaceable means were nearly exhausted. The 
 hostile feeling on the frontier had brought the border States 
 to a condition of military preparation very war-like and 
 threatening. 37 Maine had demanded that, unless a settle 
 ment was reached in the negotiations then pending, the 
 federal government should take military possession of the 
 entire disputed territory. 38 The Governor of New Bruns- 
 
 ss Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 53. 
 
 se Senate Document No. 1, 1st Sess., 22nd Cong. 
 
 37 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Ser., Vol. 62, pp. 1238-1241. 
 
 38 House Journal, 26th Congress, 2nd Sess., p. 796. 
 
27] 199 
 
 wick, on the other hand, was instructed to retain possession 
 of the same territory, by military force if necessary. Under 
 the constant stress of popular hostile sentiment the situation 
 of armed neutrality could not be indefinitely maintained. 
 Add to this aggravated boundary question the other ques 
 tions of international relations then in dispute, and we can 
 appreciate the critical complexity of them all. Briefly sum 
 marizing, the unsettled boundary, the violation of American 
 territory in the "Caroline" episode, the trial of Alexander 
 McLeod for acts authorized by his government, the right 
 of English cruisers to "visit" American merchantmen on 
 the high seas, and the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by 
 England s colonial authorities over vessels storm-driven 
 into her ports, were the questions which combined to enforce 
 the negotiations of the treaty of Washington, commonly 
 known as the Webster- Ashburton Treaty. 
 
 II. THE MAKING OF THE TEEATY. 
 
 In the Presidential election of 1840 General Harrison 
 made a sweeping campaign of the country and his party, 
 the Whig, went into office by a great popular victory. In 
 forming his cabinet Harrison was singularly fortunate, in 
 view of the existing state of foreign affairs, to be able to 
 entrust the Department of State to a man of such eminent 
 capabilities as Daniel Webster. To his sound judgment 
 and cool, masterly conduct of the affairs of State is largely 
 due the credit of successfully terminating the complicated 
 series of disputes which had arisen between the United 
 States and England. 
 
 Negotiations for the settlement of the boundary were 
 reopened by England with Webster and the new adminis 
 tration in March, 1841. Instead of continuing from the 
 point where negotiations had stopped in August, 1840, 
 Palmerston now referred back to his first draft for conven 
 tion of which he directed Mr. Fox "to show the new secre 
 tary its reasonableness. Webster, however, suspended any 
 
200 [28 
 
 action until he could become more acquainted with the 
 question and its course of discussion. 39 But before any 
 further action was taken the death of President Harrison 
 after one month in office suspended all negotiations for a 
 time. This unexpected calamity also introduced a new dif 
 ficulty into the work of the administration. Tyler, the 
 vice-president, who succeeded Harrison, disagreed with his 
 party to such an extent that his entire cabinet, with the 
 exception of Webster, resigned, and the popular support 
 he should have received in Congress was withdrawn. Under 
 the spell of this estrangement, it seemed dubious that any 
 treaty which the President might propose would be heartily 
 received in the Senate and ratified. 
 
 During the summer of 1841, Webster intimated to Mr. 
 Fox that he was disposed to settle the boundary difficulties 
 by a conventional line or line by compromise. 40 It is well 
 known that Webster saw little hope in continuing the old 
 negotiations for a joint survey commission with ultimate 
 umpirage. His opinion was thus expressed in the Senate a 
 few years later : Mr. President, it is true that I regarded 
 the case as hopeless, without an entire change in the manner 
 of proceeding." 41 Here was a distinct step toward peace 
 able settlement. It was a move to recover the question from 
 the great tangle of diplomatic proceedure in which it had 
 remained so long and accomplished so little. 
 
 In England more changes were made which bore upon 
 the final settlement of the difficulty. Lord Melbourne s 
 Ministry was succeeded in September, 1841, by that of Sir 
 Kobert Peel, and the management of foreign affairs, hith 
 erto entrusted to Viscount Palmerston, was taken up by 
 Lord Aberdeen, a man much less sharp and antagonistic 
 than his predecessor. The United States Minister to Eng- 
 
 39 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Ser., Vol. 67, p. 1236. 
 
 40 Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 70. 
 
 41 Webster s Speech in the Senate April 1846, in vindication of the 
 Treaty of Washington. Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 239. 
 
29] 201 
 
 land, Mr. Stephenson, who had been a match for Palmers- 
 ton s uncompromising diplomacy, was succeeded by Mr. 
 Edward Everett, eminently conciliatory, and, as an old 
 friend of Webster, in full sympathy with his views. 42 Thus 
 both nations were represented by new administrations. The 
 old petty differences could now be abandoned and a new 
 course of negotiation begun. But before negotiations act 
 ually began, one of the most important difficulties attending 
 the settlement was eliminated. Alexander McLeod was 
 tried at Utica, New York, and by proving an alibi was 
 acquitted in October, 1841. Thus the war cloud which had 
 hung so threateningly over this transaction was dispersed. 43 
 
 It had been decided by Palmerston and Forsyth that 
 negotiations for the settlement of the boundary should be 
 transferred to Washington. This decision was now carried 
 out by Aberdeen in a way both unexpected and effective. 
 On December 26, 1841, he invited Mr. Everett to a confer 
 ence and informed him that the British Ministry would take 
 a decisive step toward a settlement of the questions in dis 
 pute between the two countries by sending a special min 
 ister to Washington with full powers to treat for the settle 
 ment of all pending questions, and named Lord Ashburton 
 as the man selected for the work. 44 The English Ministry 
 had come to the same conclusion as that reached by Webster, 
 that a new manner of proceeding was necessary to accom 
 plish anything toward a settlement. All negotiations upon 
 the questions pending were abandoned in London and 
 turned over to the Special Minister. 
 
 In the United States the news of the Special Mission 
 was welcomed. Webster sent word of his warm approval 
 
 42 Lodge, Daniel Webster, p. 252.. 
 
 43 To prevent such possibilities from arising in the future Webster 
 prepared a bill which was made a statute August 29, 1842, by which 
 such cases involving international questions should be transferred 
 from the State to the Federal Courts. Webster s Works, Vol. VI, p. 
 267. 
 
 44 See Appendix A. (1). 
 
202 [30 
 
 to the English Ministry, and immediately began to prepare 
 the way for the negotiations in America. 45 He was not 
 without a plan in this preparation. In 1839 it had been 
 rumored that the United States would send a similar Spe 
 cial Mission to England, and Webster heard that his name 
 had been suggested to the President by Poinsett, the Secre 
 tary of War. To justify this good opinion of Mr. Poinsett, 
 Webster had drawn up a plan of negotiation by which he 
 thought such a Special Minister should proceed and sent 
 it to the President. Many of the leading features of this 
 plan were later embodied in the negotiation of the Treaty 
 of Washington. 46 Chief among them was to secure the con 
 currence and aid of Maine and Massachusetts in the nego 
 tiation for a conventional line of compromise. It was clear 
 to Webster that without the cooperation of these two States 
 nothing could be done toward bringing the adverse claims 
 to a common understanding. 
 
 Ashburton arrived in the United States April 4, 1842, 
 and on the llth, Webster sent letters to the Governors of 
 Maine and Massachusetts, announcing the arrival and pur 
 pose of the Special Mission and asking their active cooper 
 ation. 47 He was anxious to avoid having the question in 
 volved with the local prejudice which was likely to be found 
 in the State Legislatures, and asked that commissioners be 
 sent to Washington to confer with the National Represen 
 tatives and act for their States in the negotiations. The 
 difficulties of settlement even by this means were great. 
 Both States had declared in favor of a settlement by the 
 treaty of 1783, and Maine still held stubbornly to her claim 
 for the whole disputed territory. But Webster s appeal 
 for a compromise settlement, and for the appointment of 
 commissioners to gain that end was well received. Gov 
 ernor Davis of Massachusetts replied that the commissioners 
 
 45 See Appendix A. (2). 
 
 46 Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 2. 
 
 47 See Appendix A. (3). 
 
31] 203 
 
 would be appointed, and that the people of the State were 
 ready to make reasonable concessions to the convenience or 
 necessity of Great Britain, "but nothing not a rood of 
 barren heath or rock to unfounded claims." 48 In Maine 
 the consent to compromise was not so easily obtained. It 
 was necessary to convene the legislature in special session 
 and overcome local prejudice and political antagonism with 
 an appeal for national patriotism. Webster was in Boston 
 early in May, and sent Jared Sparks, who was thoroughly 
 familiar with the points of strength and weakness in both 
 claims, to influence the Maine legislators for a compromise. 
 In this work he was successful, as reported in his letter to 
 Webster, May 19, 1842. 49 Resolutions were passed on the 
 26th in favor of a conventional line and for the appoint 
 ment of four commissioners, two from each party, to give 
 the State s assent to such terms as seemed reasonable and 
 fair. 50 To Webster this meant a preliminary success in the 
 settlement. He is said to have announced this result to 
 President Tyler with the comment, "The crisis is passed." 
 The Commissioners of both States were well chosen, with 
 out reference to their political connections. Massachusetts 
 was represented by Abbott Lawrence, John Mills, and 
 Charles Allen, and Maine by Edward Kavanagh, Edward 
 Kent, Wm. P. Preble, and John Otis. 
 
 A word as to the negotiators, before entering upon a 
 discussion of their work, is not amiss. Daniel Webster s 
 career as one of the leading statesmen of the United States 
 is too well known to need repetition. But his peculiar 
 position in the administration at this particular time merits 
 our attention and approval. Webster was prominently as 
 sociated with the Whig party, which had declared Tyler to 
 be a traitor to its principles and caused the members of 
 Harrison s cabinet, who had been asked to continue in office 
 
 48 Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 99. 
 
 4 Curtis, Ibid., p. 100. 
 
 so Maine Historical Society, Vol. VIII, p. 310. 
 
204 [32 
 
 under Tyler, to resign, with the single exception of Webster. 
 In the approaching crisis in the international disputes, 
 Webster saw his duty to remain with the new President 
 in the face of severe party criticism and complete the settle 
 ment, which he believed he could accomplish. At the pres 
 ent time, when we can see the important influence of Webs 
 ter in bringing about the final settlement, we are apt to 
 underrate the difficulties he faced in staying at his post. 
 It was no easy thing for him, at that time, before the treaty 
 was made and before the people appreciated the value of 
 the work he was to accomplish, to remain allied to the Pres 
 ident against whom political anger and party excitement 
 were raised to a high pitch. His action in undertaking the 
 work of the negotiation is therefore most commendable, 
 since true patriotism and the cause of peace were his only 
 motives. 51 
 
 Lord Ashburton, also, was well qualified to accomplish 
 a compromise settlement. He was favorably known and 
 respected in the United States through his commercial as 
 sociation with the house of Baring Brothers and by his 
 marriage to an American lady. We have ample evidences 
 of his unselfish motives in accepting the Special Mission, 
 but nothing summarizes them better than his own state 
 ment in a letter to Gallatin of April 12, 1842. 52 He and 
 Gallatin were old friends, ripe in years, and had witnessed 
 this controversy from the beginning. Ashburton says in 
 part : You will probably be surprised at my undertaking 
 this task at my period of life. * * * The truth is that 
 I am tempted by my great anxiety in the cause, and the 
 extreme importance which I have always attached to the 
 maintenance of peace between our countries. The latter 
 circumstance induced my political friends to press this ap 
 pointment upon me, and with much hesitation founded 
 solely on my health and age, I yielded." He professes his 
 
 si Lodge : "Webster," p. 251. 
 
 52 Gallatin s Writings, Vol. II, p. 595. 
 
33] 205 
 
 belief that all political parties in the United States are in 
 clined to secure peace with England on reasonable terms: 
 "I expect and desire no other, and my present character 
 of a diplomatist is so new to me that I know no other course 
 than candor and plain dealing." 
 
 The commissioners arrived in Washington and the nego 
 tiations officially commenced June 13, 1842, with a letter 
 from Ashburton to Webster. 53 In this, he reviewed the 
 course of preceding attempts at settling the question, in 
 which no progress had been made because each party had 
 held uncompromisingly his own claim. The present at 
 tempt, he said, to succeed, must proceed not as a renewal 
 of the controversy, but with a full realization of previous 
 failures. By an interchange of notes of June 17th, a 
 personal conference was arranged for the next day and by 
 Webster s request, Ashburton, a few days later, wrote a 
 statement of his views on the subject of a conventional line. 
 In this statement Ashburton again expressed his desire for 
 frank presentations of their case. England s object, he 
 said, was not a gain of acres of land, so that he was willing 
 to concede all material advantages, which were not essential 
 to England and her subjects. He suggested the St. John 
 as a good boundary from its intersection with the north line 
 from the source of the St. Croix to the Highlands, except 
 for the Madawaska settlement on the south bank. But he 
 could not "in any case abandon the interests of these 
 people," whose history and personal desire bound them to 
 England. 
 
 Webster submitted Ashburton s letter to the Maine com 
 missioners, and their reply was received June 29th. It 
 shows that they were still firm in their belief that the whole 
 of the disputed territory was theirs by right, but that they 
 were willing to make concessions necessary to secure Eng 
 land s line of colonial communication. 54 For this they sug- 
 
 53 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 3rd Sess., p. 4. 
 B * See Map, Appendix D. 
 
206 [34 
 
 gested that the line follow the St. John to a point about 
 three miles above the mouth of the Madawaska, and from 
 there turn northward continuing parallel to that river al 
 most its source, whence it turned westward by a straight 
 line through the head of Lake Pohenagamook to the High 
 lands. Thus the whole valley of the Madawaska, which 
 they said was the real Upper St. John, was allowed for 
 England s road of communications. They declared that if 
 Ashburton s claim for the settlements south of the St. John 
 was sine qua non, they would refuse to negotiate further. 
 
 The negotiations had reached a critical state. The de 
 cision of the boundary rested awkwardly upon a disagree 
 ment between the Maine commissioners and the English 
 Minister, with Webster trying to mediate between them for 
 mutual concessions. At this juncture matters were almost 
 disrupted because of a misunderstanding of the British 
 home government concerning the American claim in the af 
 fair of the Creole. The only demand the United States 
 raised upon the circumstances of this case was that her 
 merchant ships seeking shelter in English ports should not 
 become subject to the local territorial jurisdiction. The 
 English ministry confused the American claim with a de 
 mand for the return of fugitive slaves, which was contrary 
 to England s law against slavery. Webster explained the 
 distinction in his letter to Everett, June 28. 55 In that let 
 ter he intimated that something in Ashburton s recent in 
 structions bore strongly on this point and conspired to make 
 Ashburton think of returning to England without complet 
 ing the work of the Special Mission. The combined urging 
 of Webster and President Tyler succeeded in preventing 
 such a termination of the negotiations at this unfinished 
 point, but it required all of the Secretary s skill and tact 
 to keep this question out of the discussions until the bound 
 ary question was settled. 56 
 
 55 See Appendix C. (1). 
 
 56 < < It is a fact, which Mr. Webster always acknowledged, that 
 President Tyler s address, in persuading Lord Ashburton to remain, 
 was most skillfully and happily used. Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. 
 II, p. 105, note. 
 
35] 207 
 
 To fix a boundary with concessions and equivalents to 
 which both Maine and England would agree, was a perplex 
 ing matter. Maine had refused to consider any part of the 
 territory which she claimed under the treaty of 1783, as an 
 equivalent on the part of England for the concessions of 
 Maine. England could offer equivalents which were just 
 and equitable to the United States, but none which would 
 inure directly to the State of Maine. The strip of territory 
 along the forty-fifth parallel and free navigation of the St. 
 John had been already suggested by Ashburton, but at least 
 one of these in no way benefited Maine. Webster had from 
 the first recognized this difficulty as most important, and 
 considered various ways by which it could be overcome. In 
 a private note to Mr. Everett as early as April 25, 1842, he 
 speculates on possible equivalents to be offered to Maine. 57 
 One of his suggestions was to include within the United 
 States a tract of territory lying between the due north line 
 from the source of the St. Croix and the St. John. This 
 territory he did not think possessed much agricultural value, 
 but would have great weight in the negotiations since it 
 conceded to Maine territory undoubtedly belonging to Eng 
 land. If this proposition was ever submitted by Webster 
 to Ashburton, it was not well received. There is no mention 
 found of it in their written correspondence. The only other 
 equivalent suggested by either Webster or Ashburton, was 
 the privilege of sending timber and produce down the St. 
 John free of any duty not imposed on similar articles grown 
 in New Brunswick. Even this was not considered an actual 
 concession but more as a recognition of a right which Maine 
 had claimed for many years. The first negotiation entered 
 into for the boundary settlement after the rejection of the 
 award, embodied a demand by the United States for free 
 navigation of the St. John. 58 The prospect of coming to 
 amicable agreement was very obscure. It seemed impossi- 
 
 57 Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, Vol. II, p. 120. 
 ss Vaughan to Viscount Goderich. American Historical Eeview, 
 Vol. VII, p. 503. 
 
208 [36 
 
 ble to find terms which would satisfy both Maine and Eng 
 land. 
 
 At this point Webster and Ashburton put aside the for 
 malities of diplomatic correspondence and conducted their 
 negotiations in personal conferences. 59 They attacked the 
 difficulties which confronted them in a spirit similar to that 
 of two business men who enter a private office and discuss 
 an arrangement for their mutual benefit. Ashburton had 
 received the reply of the Maine commissioners of June 29th, 
 with Webster s comments on the propositions it contained, 
 July 8th. He replied July llth, that their proposed line 
 north of the St. John was, "wholly inadmissable, " and 
 reluctantly implied that if it was necessary he would sur 
 render the Madawaska settlements on the south bank of 
 that river. In regard to these settlements, Maine also had 
 taken a somewhat conciliatory tone. Her commissioners 
 had offered to allow the Madawaska settlers to choose for 
 themselves to which government they would adhere, on the 
 condition that in case the territory was given to New Bruns 
 wick, all grants of land hitherto given by Maine should be 
 confirmed. It was apparent that both sides were willing to 
 accept the St. John as the boundary as far as the mouth of 
 the Madawaska, but from there to the Highlands their 
 claims differed decidedly. To bring this disagreement to 
 a compromise basis was the problem which the negotiators 
 proposed to solve in their conferences. The only feasible 
 equivalent offered to Maine and Massachusetts for their con 
 cessions of land, was the free navigation of the St. John and 
 this was not considered by the commissioners as sufficient 
 recompense for their losses. One more means of satisfying 
 the States remained. That was to pay cash for the territory 
 which they were asked to give up. Webster agreed that the 
 United States could do this in a manner more acceptable to 
 the States than if the offer came from England. The set 
 tlement of the boundary and advantages gained in other 
 
 Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 115. 
 
37] 209 
 
 parts of the line were ample justification for this payment 
 by the national government. As it afterwards proved, this 
 was the expedient which severed the deadlock between the 
 adverse claims and brought the boundary question to its 
 final settlement. 
 
 On July 15th, Webster sent to the Maine Commissioners 
 a draft of the terms which he thought would satisfy their 
 own claims and be acceptable to Lord Ashburton. 60 In this 
 he included his offer on the part of the federal government 
 to pay two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in equal 
 moieties to Maine and Massachusetts, besides all expenses 
 incurred by them in protecting the disputed territory and 
 surveying the line. The boundary which he proposed was 
 practically the same as that afterwards accepted into the 
 treaty. It is important to note that this line represented 
 a compromise between the first claim of Lord Ashburton, 
 favoring the main St. John, and the line suggested by the 
 Maine Commissioners on June 29th. 61 The United States 
 gained seven-twelfths of the disputed territory, equal in 
 value to about four-fifths of the whole. In addition to this, 
 the old line of Valentine and Collins was recognized as the 
 boundary along the forty-fifth parallel, thus giving Rouse s 
 Point to the United States, and Hall s stream was accepted 
 as the northwest source of the Connecticut, England there 
 by conceding another tract of valuable territory. Webster 
 urged upon the commissioners the patriotism which should 
 prompt them to secure a settlement of the question by ac 
 cepting these terms. In this way he endeavored to relieve 
 his proposition of any appearances of a pecuniary bargain, 
 and allow Maine to yield her claims without sacrificing her 
 principle. He recognized that the chief benefits of a settle 
 ment on the terms he proposed would inure to the United 
 States and that in fairness, the States of Maine and Massa 
 chusetts deserved a recompense for their cession of claims. 
 
 See Appendix A. (5). 
 See Map, Appendix D. 
 
210 [38 
 
 In this case he appealed to the commissioners to accept his 
 arrangement for paying the states for their claims, not as 
 a "bargain of acres," but as means to secure international 
 peace and promote the welfare of the federal state. 
 
 The fate of Webster s proposition and probably of the 
 whole negotiation, was decided July 22, 1842, when the 
 Maine commissioners finally gave assent to the terms em 
 bodied in Webster s communication of July 15th. 62 The 
 Massachusetts commissioners had expressed their approval 
 two days before, a fact which probably helped to bring 
 Maine to an agreement. In consenting to the terms of 
 fered by Webster, the Commissioners still maintained that 
 they made a sacrifice of extensive territory which they 
 rightfully owned, and for which no adequate compensation 
 was given. It was a surrender, they said, "of a portion of 
 the birth-right of the people of the state, made in favor of 
 the judgment of her sister-states and in a "spirit of attach 
 ment and patriotic devotion of their state to the Union. 63 
 The States asked that certain amendments be made to the 
 terms before they were incorporated into a treaty ; viz., that 
 the privilege of free navigation of the St. John be extended 
 to include farm produce as well as timber ; that the amount 
 of the disputed territory fund, which was the money re 
 ceived by the New Brunswick authorities for the timber 
 cut in the disputed territory, be paid over to the United 
 States for the use of Maine and Massachusetts 64 and that 
 all possessory titles to land previously granted by Maine, 
 Massachusetts and New Brunswick be reciprocally recog 
 nized by both governments. Massachusetts also asked that 
 
 62 Ashburton, in a private note, undated, wrote as follows to Web 
 ster: "1 have had an interview with the gentlemen from Maine and 
 I incline to think they will consent to our line. I explained that I 
 was at the end of my line, and that they must therefore say yes or 
 no." Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 120. 
 
 63 Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, pp. 49, 56. 
 
 64 The disposal of the disputed territory fund carried into ef 
 fect an arrangement entered into some years before regarding timber 
 cut upon the disputed territory. Webster s Diplomatic and Official 
 Papers, pp. 61, 62. 
 
39] 211 
 
 the amount to be paid by the United States be increased to 
 one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for each of the two 
 States. Ashburton accepted the additional terms, and in 
 giving his official approval of them, the settlement of the 
 northeastern boundary was at last assured. 
 
 The negotiators next directed their attention to the set 
 tlement of the boundary described under the seventh article 
 of the Treaty of Ghent and to framing their agreements 
 into the articles of a treaty. But the difficult part of the 
 negotiation had been accomplished. The boundary on the 
 northwest was not complicated with "States claims" or 
 adverse local jurisdictions, nor were the other disputed 
 questions of international relations beyond the reach of a 
 conciliatory adjustment. They had all been touched upon 
 in the conferences between the negotiators so that their final 
 settlement was largely a matter of setting into official form 
 what had already been informally agreed upon. 
 
 The country west of Lake Superior was still wild and 
 uninhabited, except by Indians and pioneer trappers, so 
 that the boundary in that quarter was easily fixed by a 
 compromise line. 65 Ashburton, on July 16th, had proposed 
 that the line should be drawn through Pidgeon River, lo 
 cated about half way between the lines claimed by the com 
 missioners under the seventh article of the Treaty of Ghent, 
 and to this Webster readily assented when he summarized 
 the settlements on all the points of boundary in his com 
 munication of July 27th. 66 Through the water communica 
 tion between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, the boundary 
 was decided in favor of the line claimed by the American 
 commissioner under the Treaty of Ghent, thus ceding to 
 the United States St. George s, or Sugar Island. This, 
 however, was regarded as one of the equivalents offered for 
 the settlement of the northeast boundary. 
 
 es Webster a Correspondence with Mr. Delafield and Mr. Ferguson 
 of July 20th and 25th, 1842, gives the opinion of those gentlemen upon 
 the character of the territory in question. "Webster s Diplomatic 
 and Official Papers," pp. 67, 72. 
 
 ee Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 57. 
 
212 [40 
 
 In the final negotiations upon the international disputes 
 arising out of the suppression of the slave trade, the case of 
 the "Creole," and the "Caroline" episode, a process of 
 selection was employed. These questions were all more or 
 less involved with other disputes between the two countries. 
 In regard to suppression of the slave trade, we have already 
 noticed its connection with the right of search, and the re 
 vival of the old dispute upon this point. With a renewal 
 of that question came the question of impressment, which, 
 though subdued since the war of 1812, had never been def 
 initely settled. The question raised by the case of the 
 "Creole" had been confused in England with the extradi 
 tion of fugitive slaves. In the "Caroline" episode, the 
 complications of the frontier disturbances and a necessity 
 for the suppression of lawless characters were involved. 
 To meet these questions effectively, Webster and Ashburton 
 selected for treaty articles, what they considered the fun 
 damental causes for the disputes, and left the settlement 
 of the particular cases in which these causes had operated 
 to an official correspondence between the negotiators. Thus 
 in the treaty itself but two questions, other than the settle 
 ment of the boundary, were included ; namely, the suppres 
 sion of the slave trade and the extradition of criminals for 
 certain enumerated offenses. In the official correspondence 
 accompanying the treaty, the negotiators dealt with the 
 subject of interference with American ships, storm driven 
 into the ports of the West Indies, with the attack upon and 
 destruction of the "Caroline" and with the subject of im 
 pressment. 
 
 An account of the negotiations upon these questions is 
 necessarily brief. It was chiefly conducted by personal con 
 ferences between the negotiators, of which no minutes or 
 any official record was kept. From Webster s correspond 
 ence, however, some light is thrown upon the way in which 
 the arrangements were conducted. As early as April 26, 
 1842, Webster writes to Mr. Everett in London, that he 
 
41] 213 
 
 has proposed to Lord Ashburton a practical settlement of 
 the right of search difficulty by maintaining for a limited 
 time independent squadrons on the African Coast for the 
 suppression of the slave trade. 67 This arrangement was 
 afterwards spoken of by Ashburton as the "cruising con 
 vention," which he thought was a favorable means to ac 
 complish its object. 68 The question of right of search 
 brought forth a lengthy correspondence between Webster 
 and General Cass, then United States Minister to France, 
 who was much disappointed that an absolute renunciation 
 of the right of search was not secured by the United States. 
 The discussion of the question of the * Creole has already 
 been mentioned as a difficulty in the boundary settlement. 
 The chief point in the adjustment of this question was to 
 make plain the distinction between a remonstrance by the 
 United States against the interference with American ships 
 seeking shelter in British ports and a demand for the return 
 of fugitive slaves. Upon this question Webster wrote to 
 John Davis, April 16, 1842, as follows: "Our position in 
 relation to the Creole has been misrepresented by some 
 and misunderstood by others, but it is defensible and 
 safe." 69 Practically all of the agreements afterwards ex 
 pressed in the correspondence explanatory to the treaty, 
 had been arranged by personal conferences even before the 
 formal settlement of the boundary. From July 29th to 
 August 9th these agreements were given official tone in an 
 interchange of formal diplomatic notes, stating the views 
 held by the respective governments in regard to each of the 
 disputed points. A proper understanding of this corre 
 spondence will be gained in our study of the treaty in its 
 various articles. 70 
 
 The negotiations were brought to their close August 9, 
 1842, in a treaty signed by Lord Ashburton and Daniel 
 
 67 Webster s Private Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 124. 
 es Curtis, Life of Webster, Vol. II, p. 118. 
 69 Webster s Private Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 119. 
 TO See Part III. (2). 
 
214 [42 
 
 Webster, entitled: "A treaty to settle and define the bound 
 aries between the territories of the United States and the 
 possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; 
 For the final suppression of the African slave trade; and 
 for the giving up of criminals, fugitive from justice in cer 
 tain cases." 71 But with the conclusion of the negotiators 
 work, the final settlement of the treaties provisions was but 
 half assured. Not only was its ratification by the proper 
 authorities in the respective governments necessary to its 
 finality and legal enforcement, but laws had to be passed 
 by the two governments to carry certain of its provisions 
 into effect. On the part of England, the article relating 
 to extradition was without binding effect until substantiated 
 by an act of Parliament; 72 while in the United States a 
 bill of appropriation was necessary to carry out the obliga 
 tions of the national government to the States of Maine and 
 Massachusetts according to the terms of the fifth article. 
 
 In England the difficulties of ratification, such as con 
 fronts a treaty in the United States, are eliminated. Rati 
 fication there is a prerogative of the Crown and unless the 
 agreements of the negotiator are radically contrary to the 
 national interests, his engagements are unquestionably 
 sanctioned by his government. 73 So with the Webster- 
 Ashburton Treaty, the only question of ratification was in 
 regard to the action of the United States. England s ac 
 ceptance of it was practically undoubted. 
 
 The President referred the Treaty to the Senate August 
 llth, together with the official correspondence of the ne 
 gotiators upon the questions not included in the articles of 
 the treaty. He sent also a special message of approval, in 
 which he explained at some length the results of the negotia 
 tions and the reasons for their proposed ratification by the 
 
 71 See Appendix B. 
 
 72 See Appendix A. (5) 6. 
 
 TS S. B. Crandall, Treaties, their Making and Enforcement," 
 151. 
 
43] 215 
 
 Senate. 74 Regarding the boundary settlement a recapitula 
 tion was given of the points agreed upon and the difference 
 which had been settled. An important advantage was no 
 ticed in that the main channels of the St. Lawrence, which 
 in certain cases lay entirely within the boundary of one of 
 the countries, were opened to free navigation by the ships 
 of both. The provisions for the suppression of the slave 
 trade were explained with reference to their bearing upon 
 the right of search and the principles which determined 
 American policy in this regard. Similarly the negotiations 
 upon the questions of the "Caroline," the "Creole" and 
 impressment, were interpreted by the President as definitive 
 statements of the ground held by the United States upon 
 these points. 
 
 In the Senate the Treaty was referred, on a motion by 
 Mr. Rives, to the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which 
 he was chairman. The report of this committee favoring 
 the ratification of the treaty was received August 15th and 
 the Senate, in secret session, proceeded to deliberate upon 
 it. 75 It was made the order of the day for the 17th, and the 
 discussion continued through the 19th and 20th. In this 
 debate the chief opponent to the treaty was Senator Benton 
 of Missouri, who made several motions for amendment and 
 alteration of the treaty, all of which were rejected when 
 voted upon. Mr. Rives led the defense of the treaty before 
 the Senate, and finally after defeating the various attempts 
 of the opposition to amend its articles, he submitted, on 
 August 20th, the following resolution : 
 
 "Resolved (two-thirds of the senators present concur 
 ring), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratifica 
 tion of the treaty to settle and define the boundaries between 
 the territories of the United States and the possessions of 
 Her Britannic Majesty in North America ; for the final sup 
 pression of the African slave trade; and for the giving up 
 
 74 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 3d Sess., p. 2. 
 
 7 5 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 3d Session, p. 1. 
 
216 [44 
 
 of criminals fugitive from justice in certain cases." This 
 resolution was carried by the decisive vote of 39 to 9, and 
 ordered to be communicated to the President of the United 
 States. 
 
 The treaty having been also duly ratified by England, 
 the exchange of ratifications took place in London, October 
 13, 1842, between Edward Everett, the United States min 
 ister, and Lord Aberdeen, the English Secretary of Foreign 
 affairs. The President formally announced the treaty in 
 the United States by a proclamation of November 10th. 70 
 
 In the United States the ratification of the treaty by 
 such a decisive vote called forth many expressions of grat 
 ification from prominent men of the country. Foremost 
 among these was Webster himself. On August 21, 1842, he 
 wrote as follows to Mr. Jeremiah Mason : "I cannot forego 
 the pleasure of saying to an old and constant friend, who, 
 I know, takes a personal as well as a public interest in the 
 matter, that the treaty was ratified last evening by a vote 
 of thirty-nine to nine. I did not look for a majority quite 
 so large. I am truly thankful the thing is done." Mr. 
 Mason replied on August 28th that : "In my opinion it is of 
 more importance to the welfare of the country than any 
 thing else that has taken place since the Treaty of Ghent. 7T 
 Chancellor Kent added his commendations to the treaty in 
 the following words: "That act (for the removal of certain 
 cases to federal courts; passed August 27, 1842) and the 
 10th article of the treaty, providing for the surrender of 
 fugitives are momentous and most conspicuous improve 
 ments in our national and diplomatic codes. 78 Even Gal- 
 latin, who had so long championed the claim of the United 
 States for the boundary as described in 1783, sanctioned the 
 settlement reached by the compromise line. He said con 
 cerning it : " The arrangement being founded upon a sup 
 posed equivalent, the principal part of which is of an in- 
 
 76 Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 230. 
 
 77 Webster s Private Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 146, 148. 
 
 78 Ibid., p. 160. 
 
45] 217 
 
 definite value, may be accepted without wounding the honor 
 of the country. And since the acquiescence of Maine, the 
 party most interested, removes the great obstacle to an ac 
 commodation, I would think it not only unwise in the pres 
 ent situation of the country, but quite unjustifiable to run 
 the risks incident to the failure of the pending negotia 
 tions." 79 
 
 It has been pointed out by some writers that the ratifica 
 tion of the treaty by a three-fourths vote of the Senate, 
 hostile in politics to the President, signified greater success 
 on the part of Webster. This conclusion, however, is apt 
 to be misleading and to cause the supposition that President 
 Tyler was not actively interested in the success of the ne 
 gotiation. As a matter of fact, he deserves a large share 
 of the credit, instead of the scant justice he has received 
 from the historians of that period. 80 Webster expressed 
 his warm regard for Tyler s solicitude in the success of the 
 negotiation in the following note of August 24, 1842: "I 
 shall never speak of this negotiation, my dear sir, which I 
 believe is destined to make some figure in the history of the 
 country, without doing you justice. Your steady support 
 and confidence, your anxious and intelligent attention to 
 what was in progress, your exceedingly obliging and pleas 
 ant intercourse both with the British minister and the com 
 missioners of the States, have given every facility to my 
 agency in this important transaction." 81 
 
 Although ratified and proclaimed, the treaty was yet a 
 target for vigorous attacks from three quarters. It was 
 still hoped by its opponents to nullify the treaty by pre 
 venting the laws necessary for its enforcement from being 
 enacted. In the United States Senate, and in Parliament, 
 long debates took place upon the treaty of Washington dur 
 ing first months of 1843. An unexpected opposition came 
 
 7Gallatin to Thomas Ritchie, August 2, 1842. Gallatin s Writ 
 ings, Vol. II. 
 
 so Foster, J. W., "A Century of American Diplomacy," p. 283. 
 si Webster s Private Correspondence," Vol. II, p. 147. 
 
218 [46 
 
 from France. Lewis Cass, the United States minister at 
 Paris, bitterly resented that his efforts in Europe to pre 
 vent an adoption of the right of search were not more 
 substantially upheld by the provisions of the Webster-Ash- 
 burton Treaty. Webster successfully upheld the action of 
 the government in the ensuing correspondence which con 
 tinued after Cass had resigned his post on account of his 
 feelings against the treaty. 82 
 
 The political opponents found an excellent opportunity 
 to attack the treaty in the discussion raised by a circum 
 stance of its ratification. This was the notorious question 
 of "The Maps." 83 When the negotiations were just begin 
 ning, Jared Sparks, who was gathering data in the French 
 archives for a revision of his work, "The Diplomatic Cor 
 respondence of the American Revolution," discovered a let 
 ter written by Franklin to Count de Vergermes, in which he 
 referred to a certain map which he had sent, marked with a 
 " strong red line" to show the boundaries of the United 
 States as settled in the preliminary draft of the treaty of 
 1783. On further search he discovered a map, answering 
 accurately the description given by Franklin, on which the 
 line marked for the boundary coincided with that claimed 
 by England. 84 Mr. Sparks immediately sent a copy of this 
 map to Webster with an explanatory letter concerning it. 
 Nothing more was heard of this letter or of its contents un 
 til after the treaty was signed by the negotiators. Then, 
 while the Senate was debating the ratification of the treaty, 
 Webster gave a copy of Sparks letter and the map to Mr. 
 Rives, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
 and it was published in Mr. Rives speech. As soon as 
 the treaty was ratified and the fact became known that 
 Webster had withheld the information conveyed by Sparks 
 
 82 Webster a Diplomatic and Official Papers, pp. 170-221. 
 
 83 A full and complete account of the Maps is given in < North 
 American Keview," 1843, Vol. LVI, pp. 468-477. 
 
 84 Jared Sparks to Buchanan, February 11, 1843. Curtis: "Life 
 of Buchanan, Vol. I, p. 505. 
 
47] 219 
 
 letter while the treaty was being negotiated, a stir of ex 
 citement was raised. Webster was charged with having 
 taken an unfair advantage of the British negotiator in 
 withholding evidence bearing upon the question, which 
 he was duty bound to make known. This charge of dis 
 honorable conduct on the part of the Secretary of State 
 was enforced by the fact that Sparks letter had been used 
 to secure the ratification of the treaty by the Senate. 85 This 
 feeling was strongest in England, but was also entertained 
 by some people in the United States. 
 
 A fair judgment of the case, however, shows that Web 
 ster s conduct in regard to the Sparks map was not such as 
 his opponents declared. 86 Rives speech upon the Sparks 
 documents did not imply that they in any way affected the 
 validity of either claim, but," he said, "they could not 
 fail in event of another reference, to give increased confi 
 dence and emphasis to the pretensions of Great Britain, and 
 exert a corresponding influence upon the mind of the ar 
 biter." There is little doubt, in view of the conflicting 
 probabilities to be drawn from the number of maps relat 
 ing to the boundary, that if the discoveries of Mr. Sparks 
 had been made known at the time they were communicated 
 to Webster, the only result would have been the addition 
 of endless perplexities and a possible disruption of the ne 
 gotiation. 87 But in the midst of popular interest and possi- 
 
 85 A private letter of Webster to Everett, July 14, 1842, shows 
 that Webster did take precautions to keep the map question quiet. 
 He says to Everett : l * * * forbear to press the search for maps 
 in England or elsewhere. Our strength is on the letter of the treaty." 
 Curtis: "Life of Webster," Vol. II, p. 103. 
 
 se "Defense of Webster," E. Everett, in "Orations and Speech 
 es," Vol. IV, p. 213. 
 
 87 Webster and Ashburton both expressed their satisfaction with 
 the results accomplished by keeping the map question out of the ne 
 gotiations. Webster, before the New York Historical Society, April 
 15, 1843, said: "I must confess that I did not think it a very urgent 
 duty to go to Lord Ashburton and tell him that I had found a bit of 
 doubtful evidence in Paris out of which he might perhaps make some 
 thing to prejudice our claims." Webster s Works, Vol. II, p. 149. 
 Ashburton wrote to Webster that, "he was by no means disposed to 
 disturb its (the map question s) sleep." See Appendix C. (3). 
 
220 [48 
 
 ble antagonism, raised by the map question, the discussion 
 of the treaty was renewed in the Senate and Parliament. 
 The debates which ensued brought forth the severest kind 
 of criticism both for the treaty and its negotiators, but re 
 sulted finally in a complete vindication of both. 
 
 In the Senate a discussion was brought about by a 
 dispatch of Mr. Everett received February 23rd, in which 
 a reference was made to the right of search and to the state 
 ment made by Sir Robert Peel, that Lord Aberdeen s dis 
 cussion of it in a dispatch to Everett, December 20, 1841, 
 had not been answered by the United States. It had been 
 asserted in England that the claims which Aberdeen laid 
 down in his dispatch of December 20th, to the right of 
 search, or, as explained by Aberdeen, "The right to ascer 
 tain the truth of a vessel s nationality," had never been 
 denied in the United States and were in fact undeniable. 88 
 The real reason why Aberdeen s dispatch had not been an 
 swered was that negotiations had been transferred to the 
 Special Mission before Everett framed a reply. The sub 
 ject having been brought before the Senate in such a man 
 ner, Mr. Benton made a long speech upon the different in 
 terpretations put upon the treaty in the two countries, and 
 argued that for just such indefmiteness none of the real 
 questions between the countries had been settled by the re 
 cent negotiations. 89 He was answered by Mr. Archer, who 
 declared that the misunderstandings were more apparent 
 than real. He (Archer) said that although England had 
 not actually given up the right of visit, yet the treaty had 
 removed the cause for its immediate exercise and was there 
 for a solution of the question. 
 
 The opposition to the treaty in the United States was 
 not confined to the right of search. Mr. Benton criticized 
 all of its provisions and added that one of the greatest faults 
 
 ss Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 68, pp. 615, 621. 
 89 Benton : < Thirty Years View in the IT. S. Senate, Vol. II, pp. 
 421, 451. 
 
49] 221 
 
 was that it did not settle all the questions it was supposed 
 to include. One of these was the question of Oregon, which 
 was beginning to attract settlers to such an extent that it 
 was felt that the arrangement for its joint occupation by 
 the two countries should be terminated. 90 
 
 In Parliament the treaty was brought up for discussion 
 by a resolution of Lord Palmerston calling for the corre 
 spondence of the recent negotiation and the instructions of 
 the ministry to the British envoy to be laid before the House 
 of Commons. In his subsequent speech upon the motion he 
 made a detailed and searching criticism of the treaty, its 
 negotiation, and England s representative in the negotia 
 tions. 91 He reviewed the history of the boundary question 
 from its beginning in 1783, to the negotiations of Lord Ash- 
 burton; then proceeded to attack those negotiations upon 
 all the points connected with them. He considered the 
 choice of Lord Ashburton as negotiator a great mistake and 
 one which was clearly demonstrated in the weakness and 
 lack of skill shown in the negotiations. The concessions of 
 territory to the United States he considered for the most 
 part as absolute losses to England for which no compen 
 sating equivalents were gained. The 8th and 9th articles 
 of the treaty were not a fulfillment of the promise of the 
 governments in the Treaty of Ghent "to use their best en 
 deavors," to end slavery, since efficient policing of the sea 
 against slave traders was only possible by a mutual right of 
 search. In regard to the "Creole," Palmerston held that 
 
 90 In regard to the Oregon question and its connection with the 
 treaty of Washington, a mistaken belief has been circulated that 
 Marcus Whitman, the missionary, by a heroic trip across the continent 
 to tell the national authorities of Oregon s value, saved that territory 
 from being traded to England for a cod fishery, in the Webster- 
 Ashburton negotiation. This story has been conclusively proved to be 
 an entire fabrication, but many notable writers were taken in by it, 
 among others being Von Hoist, who says in his Constitutional His 
 tory of the United States," Vol. Ill, pp. 51, 52, "How much truth 
 is in the story can probably never be authentically determined. The 
 proofs of the story s lack of foundation are found in Edw. G. 
 Bourne s, "Essays in Historical Criticism." 
 
 i Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, pp. 1162, 1216. 
 
222 [50 
 
 Ashburton gave too much countenance to the doctrines of 
 Webster, in promising that instructions should be sent to the 
 colonial governors to prevent such officious interferences 
 in the future. The extradition article alone escaped the 
 general condemnation of Lord Palmerston. This he be 
 lieved to be a sound principle of international relations 
 which would be properly enforced by the two governments 
 for their mutual benefit. But on the whole, Palmerston 
 regarded the treaty as no definite assurance of future peace. 
 Its agreements were either already bad or more capable of 
 misconstruction than of satisfactory enforcement. This 
 long arraignment by Palmerston, which occupied more than 
 three hours in its delivery, was concluded with a hope that 
 the forebodings which had been expressed would prove 
 wrong. 
 
 Sir Robert Peel replied to Palmerston s attack with an 
 able defense of the entire course of the government in the 
 recent negotiations. He emphasized the fact that some 
 thing had at last been accomplished. The Special Mission 
 and Ashburton s "undiplomatic and unskillful" negotia 
 tions had settled questions which Palmerston, with formal 
 diplomacy, had tried for ten years to determine, without 
 success. The misconstructions put upon the treaty by its 
 opponents were not founded upon any actual misunder 
 standing between the governments regarding the under 
 lying principles it embodied. Neither side had sacrificed 
 any principle which it had held, nor suffered any material 
 losses in territory. The failure to negotiate upon the Or 
 egon question was attributed to the danger of complete fail 
 ure if too many difficulties were added to those already de 
 manding settlement. The charge of misconduct on the part 
 of the negotiators recently raised by the map question was 
 erroneous. Even if Webster had produced the Sparks map 
 which he was not bound to do nothing would have been 
 proved by it. The British government had recently dis 
 covered a map, which belonged to the King, George III., 
 
51] 223 
 
 and on which the boundary, stated to be the line "as de 
 scribed by Mr. Oswald," the British negotiator in 1783, 
 was shown as claimed by the United States. It was clear 
 that the maps proved nothing toward one claim or the oth 
 er. Peel concluded that the fact that no one dared to move 
 any open censure or blame of Ashburton, was proof of the 
 universal satisfaction with his conduct. 
 
 The debates in the House of Commons, besides the two 
 speeches already mentioned, included others by Mr. Macaul- 
 ay and Sir Charles Napier in opposition, and Sir H. Doug 
 las and Mr. Disraeli in support of the treaty. On March 
 23rd, when the question was again called up, it having been 
 adjourned the day before by a call of order for lack of a 
 quorum, Mr. Hume gave notice of the following resolution : 
 
 "That the House, looking to the long protracted nego 
 tiations between the government of this country and that 
 of the United States of North America as to the settlement 
 of the northeastern boundary, and taking into consideration 
 the state of our foreign relations in October, 1841, is of the 
 opinion that the treaty of Washington is alike honorable 
 and advantageous to each of the high contracting parties, 
 and that the thanks of the House are due to the ministers 
 who advised, as well as to the Rt. Hon. Lord Ashburton, who 
 negotiated and concluded that treaty. 2 
 
 This resolution of thanks was passed in the House of 
 Commons on May 2nd by a large majority. Meanwhile the 
 House of Lords had debated a similar motion, made by 
 Lord Brougham, and accepted it, April 7th. 93 
 
 The result of the debates in Parliament bore out the be 
 lief of Ashburton, that the opposition to the treaty lay 
 chiefly among political enemies of the ministry. 94 It also 
 foreshadowed the ultimate success of the treaty, in that it 
 showed a disposition in Parliament to carry out its provi 
 sions. 
 
 92 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1317. 
 
 93 IUd., Vol. 68, pp. 632, 818. 
 
 94 See Appendix C. (2). 
 
224 [52 
 
 Lord Ashburton replied to an inquiry in the House of 
 Lords, February 9, 1843, concerning the 10th article of the 
 treaty, that he had written to Webster of the necessity of an 
 act of Parliament to confirm that article in England. 95 A 
 bill for this purpose was introduced by Ashburton in June, 
 1843, and finally passed August 22nd. In the debate upon 
 it, there was still an inclination on the part of some of the 
 members to confuse the extradition article with an attempt 
 by the United States to recover fugitive slaves. This mis 
 take was rectified by Lord Aberdeen, who disclaimed any 
 possibility of such an interpretation of the article ever being 
 enforced. 96 
 
 In the United States the bill for carrying into effect the 
 Treaty of Washington was passed in the House of Repre 
 sentatives, February 28, 1843, by a vote of 137 to 40. The 
 Senate adopted it March 2nd, without division, upon the 
 report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, of which Mr. 
 Archer was the chairman. 
 
 The final work of putting the treaty into force was com 
 pleted by the joint survey commission, appointed under the 
 sixth article. The report of this Commission was received 
 January 28, 1847. 97 It showed that the line was success 
 fully marked and surveyed from the source of the St. Croix 
 to the intersection of the forty-fifth parallel with the St. 
 Lawrence, three hundred men having been occupied for 
 eighteen months to complete the work. Perfect harmony 
 prevailed between the commissioners and nothing was en 
 countered throughout the work to cause any difference be 
 tween them regarding the determination of the line. With 
 the adoption of the report of the Joint Commission of the 
 
 s See Appendix A. (5) 6. 
 
 9G Shortly before leaving America, at the conclusion of the Treaty, 
 Ashburton had assured a delegation of the American and Foreign 
 Anti-Slavery Society that care would be taken that the provision of 
 the 10th article should not prejudice the cause of anti-slavery. Niles 
 Eegister, Vol. 63, p. 53. 
 
 97 Senate Executive Documents, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 71, 
 Vol. VIII, p. 3. 
 
53] 225 
 
 Boundary the last step was taken in the negotiation of the 
 Treaty of Washington of 1842. 
 
 III. THE EFFECTS OF THE TREATY. 
 
 Having seen the causes which led to the negotiation of 
 the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, and the way in which that 
 treaty was drawn up and incorporated into the laws of the 
 two countries, the final chapter of its history is concerned 
 with a retrospective view of its effects. What has been the 
 effect of this treaty upon the political and legal relations of 
 the countries with which it is directly connected, and what 
 has been its effect and significance in the relations of na 
 tions generally ? These are the questions to be answered by 
 our final review of its history. 
 
 The treaty of Washington of 1842 included twelve ar 
 ticles, in which three questions, exclusive of explanatory 
 and ratification provisions, are included. In articles I. to 
 VII inclusive, the settlement of the boundary between the 
 United States and England s North American Provinces is 
 provided for. The eighth and ninth articles are concerned 
 with the suppression of the slave trade, and the tenth with 
 the extradition of criminals, fugitive from justice, for seven 
 enumerated offenses. In addition to these questions cer 
 tain others are included in the official diplomatic corre 
 spondence, whose close connection with the causes and ne 
 gotiation of the treaty give them a partial relation to its 
 historic effects, although they are not a part of its provi 
 sions. Primarily, however, the treaty deals with but three 
 subjects as just enumerated. 
 
 The question of the boundary settlement has little or no 
 bearing upon international relations except as between the 
 United States and Great Britain. But between these two 
 nations its importance is two-fold. In the first place, be 
 cause of its termination of the disorders and conflicts of 
 jurisdiction on the frontier, which prevented the adminis 
 tration of justice and threatened the peace of the two na- 
 
226 [54 
 
 tions; and secondly, for the military and commercial sig 
 nificance of the new boundary. 
 
 The relation of the boundary question to the interna 
 tional peace of the United States and England has been 
 noticed as one of the leading causes of the negotiation of 
 the Webster-Ashburton treaty. 98 It was the one question 
 which had hung over the two countries in constant dispute 
 since 1783. Other questions had remained unsettled as 
 long as had the boundary, such as the right of search, but 
 none had been so continually agitated or so long in actual 
 suspense. The very length of time during which this ques 
 tion had remained unsettled had made it a sore point of 
 difference between the two countries. But since the settle 
 ment of the frontier had started disorders and friction be 
 tween the local authorities, a very practical danger was em 
 bodied in the unsettled boundary question. Under these 
 circumstances it had become the factor which embittered all 
 disputes arising between the two governments. Its settle 
 ment therefor was of great importance to them both. 
 
 The line of the boundary as laid down in the Webster- 
 Ashburton Treaty, articles I and II secured a settlement 
 which was satisfactory and definite. It was satisfactory 
 to neither side from the standpoint of their respective 
 claims, but as the termination of an aggravated and dan 
 gerous dispute it was a compromise which secured to both 
 parties the essential features of their contentions, and thus 
 allowed a peaceable adjustment of their relations. Articles 
 IV, V, VI, and X of the treaty dealt with the adjustment 
 of territorial jurisdiction to conform to the new boundary 
 and provided for a peaceable administration of law on the 
 frontier. They were all carried into effect without diffi 
 culty, thus definitely terminating the frontier disputes 
 which had become almost a frontier war. 
 
 The commercial and military significance of the new 
 boundary were important points of discussion in both coun- 
 
 98 See Part I. (1). 
 
55] 227 
 
 tries during the debates upon the treaty. Its military im 
 portance was particularly emphasized and for good reason. 
 The feelings between the two nations at that time were not 
 yet firmly established on a peace basis and more considera 
 tion was given to the possibilities of another war than at 
 the present day. Rouse s Point and the Highland frontier, 
 therefore, were important questions in the boundary settle 
 ment. The advantages which resulted seem to have been 
 about equally divided. Rouse s Point was returned to the 
 United States and the Highland frontier, from the source of 
 the St. Francis to Metjarmette, went to Great Britain. Each 
 country gained a point which was more conducive to its own 
 welfare than to the others detriment. Rouse s Point in 
 commanding the entrance to Lake Champlain was much 
 more important as a strategic point of defense for the 
 United States than it would be for Canada. Similarly the 
 Highland frontier was more essential for the defense of 
 Canada than for the United States, since it bordered close 
 ly on the St. Lawrence, the highway of England s colonial 
 communications. 
 
 The military possibilities of the boundary, however, have 
 never been tested and there is no longer the old hostile 
 feeling between the two countries to cause much anxiety 
 in that regard. But the commercial possibilities of the 
 boundary settlement have been actually realized. The free 
 navigation of the St. John as provided in the 3rd article 
 proved to be an important concession to the lumber interests 
 in Maine" as well as to promote a general good feeling in 
 the commercial intercourse between the countries. In ar 
 ticle VII a correction, for commercial advantages, was 
 made in the boundary settled under the Treaty of Ghent. 
 The original description of the boundaries said that the line 
 along the St. Lawrence should be "through the middle of 
 
 as Under the 4th article of the treaty of June 5th, 1854, it was 
 agreed that no export duty should be charged on American timber 
 floated down the St. John, and shipped from New Brunswick. Trea 
 ties and Conventions," p. 452. 
 
228 [56 
 
 that river, and it had been determined so by the commis 
 sioners of the Treaty of Ghent. It was found, however, 
 that the navigable channel of the river was not always the 
 middle of the stream and that in several cases, mentioned 
 in article VII of the Treaty of Washington, the only safe 
 ship channel was within the territory of one of the nations. 
 Provision was made therefore for the free navigation of 
 such channels by the ships of both countries. 100 
 
 It is sometimes said that the questions of right of search 
 and impressment were settled by the treaty of Washington 
 of 1842. This is not true in any strict sense of the word. 
 In fact, the only thing which was accomplished by this 
 treaty, at all connected with the right of search, was a re 
 moval of the immediate occasion for its exercise. The 
 question of right of search had been brought up in con 
 nection with the suppression of the slave trade, and since 
 the provisions for independent squadrons eliminated the 
 necessity of a right of search in accomplishing that pur 
 pose, 101 it was considered that the question was practically 
 settled. As Palmerston said, the provision for a sufficient 
 naval force by the United States to stop American ships 
 from engaging in the slave trade, "was practically equiv 
 alent to the acknowledgment of a power which we did not 
 abandon in words, but it would be understood we should 
 not attempt to exercise." 102 The principle of right of 
 search was not touched by this treaty which operated mere 
 ly as a suspension of the questions and not as an actual set 
 tlement. 
 
 100 in international law, river boundaries are interpreted to be the 
 middle of the main channel, or "thread of the stream/ unless other 
 wise stipulated by treaty. "Wm. Butteruth, et al. v. The St. Louis 
 Bridge Co." (123 Illinois 535) Scott s "Cases in International 
 Law," p. 121. The Treaty of Washington avoided the mistake of 
 stipulating "middle of the stream." By it, the boundary along the 
 St. John is described as the "middle of the channel." The final 
 opening of the entire river St. Lawrence for free navigation by the 
 ships of both countries was not accomplished until 1871. Taylor: 
 "International Public Law," p. 286. 
 
 101 See Appendix B, The Treaty, Art. VIII. 
 
 102 Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, Vol. Ill, p. 63. 
 
57] 229 
 
 The right of impressment is one which England has 
 never abandoned in any official declaration. Its practical 
 abandonment, however, has caused it to be considered as set 
 tled. Its only connection with the treaty of Washington, 
 1842, is entirely secondary. It was believed in 1841 that 
 the demand of England for the right of search might be 
 associated, as it was before the war of 1812, with the right 
 to take seamen from American merchant ships, on the 
 ground that they were deserters. This led Webster to 
 address correspondence to Lord Ashburton, setting forth 
 the reasons for the United States opposition to impress 
 ment, and the stand they would take against it all future 
 time. 103 Ashburton s reply agreed with Webster s views 
 and gave assurance that there would never arise another 
 occasion for its exercise. But Ashburton did not feel em 
 powered to negotiate any treaty stipulations upon this ques 
 tion. It has remained undenied by England except by the 
 semi-official renunciation of Lord Ashburton. 
 
 But the effects of the provisions for independent squad- 
 drons to patrol the African Coast were felt in Europe as 
 well as in the United States. England had advocated a 
 mutual right of search as a necessary measure in suppres 
 sing the slave trade, and by her efforts a treaty for this 
 purpose had been negotiated by five of the European na 
 tions. England, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia were 
 the parties to this Quintuple Treaty. It was ratified by all 
 except France, who was still debating the ratification when 
 Webster and Ashburton began the negotiation of the treaty 
 of Washington. The United States had not been asked to 
 become a party to the Quintuple Treaty, but it was under 
 stood that this request would be made as soon as the orig 
 inal contracting parties should ratify it. 104 Vigorous pro 
 tests against the right of search and the adoption of the 
 Quintuple Treaty were made in Europe by Mr. Wheaton, 
 
 103 Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 95. 
 
 104 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1205. 
 
230 [58 
 
 the United States Minister to Prussia, and by General Cass, 
 the Minister at Paris. The efforts of these men were main 
 ly responsible for the rejection of the treaty by France, 105 
 and when the treaty of 1842 was announced the Quintuple 
 treaty was definitely abandoned. Its opponents pointed to 
 the eighth article of the Webster-Ashburton treaty as the 
 real solution of the difficulty. 106 
 
 In securing even the temporary elimination of the ques 
 tion of right of search from the disputes between the two 
 countries, Webster and Ashburton achieved success to a 
 certain degree. In the critical state of the international 
 relations at that time, a practical settlement of this old 
 question by removing the temporary cause for its agitation, 
 was a wise and effective measure. But the fact of its being 
 only a postponement, and not a settlement of the principle 
 involved, is well borne out by the subsequent history of 
 the right of search and its significance in the United States 
 at a later date. 107 
 
 In striking at the causes rather than at the effects of 
 the disputes between the two countries, Webster and Ash- 
 burton were particularly successful in their selection of the 
 subject of extradition of criminals, fugitive from justice, 
 for the tenth article of the treaty. John Bassett Moore has 
 well expressed the good effects of extradition laws in gen 
 eral, as follows : "No innovation in the practice of nations 
 has ever more completely discredited the woeful predictions 
 of its adversaries than that of surrendering fugitives from 
 
 105 Lawrence, Introduction to Wheaton 7 s International Law, p. 120. 
 Also Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, pp. 170, 221. 
 
 ice Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 67, p. 1266. 
 
 107 l Apart from the case of piracy, executions of revenue laws, 
 and proper cause for self-defense, the right of visit in time of peace 
 may be said to have ended in 1858, when England abandoned it, after 
 a strong protest by the United States Senate, caused England sta 
 tioning cruisers near the island of Cuba to stop slave trading." 
 Taylor, International Public Law, p. 239 and 310, note. Also Philli- 
 more, International Law, Vol. Ill, p. 543. In 1862 the United States 
 concluded a treaty with England for the mutual exercise of the right 
 of search, within certain limits, by public vessels of the two countries 
 duly authorized for the work. l Treaties and Conventions, p. 454. 
 
59] 231 
 
 justice." 108 In 1842, international laws of extradition were 
 yet an innovation, almost untried before the adoption of the 
 Webster- Ashburton treaty. The only previous attempt to 
 pass extradition laws in the United States was in Jay s 
 treaty of 1794, which provided in its 27th article for the 
 extradition of criminals fugitive from justice in cases of 
 murder or forgery. Nothing ever came of this attempt, 
 however, and it expired by limitation, 1808. 109 Since then 
 the governments had extradited criminals in some cases as 
 an act of comity, but no effective rule of extradition was 
 adopted. The necessity for such a regulation was forced 
 upon the attention of the two governments in 1834, when 
 the following reply was sent by Mr. Forsyth to a request 
 for the surrender of Andrew Cawlin, charged with murder 
 in England: I have the honor, by his (the President s) 
 directions to reply, that in absence of any conventional 
 agreement between the United States and Great Britain for 
 the delivery of persons charged with heinous offenses, the 
 authority of the executive of the United States to exercise 
 a right of such important effect upon the personal security, 
 is more than questionable, and hence the case to which you 
 refer is without any remedy in the competency of this 
 government to apply." 110 The opinions, both of attorney- 
 generals and courts, decided that in absence of treaty stip 
 ulations the executive authority in the United States was 
 not authorized to extradite a person for offenses committed 
 in a foreign country. This gave unbounded opportunity 
 for criminals to operate between the United States and 
 Canada with little fear of being punished. A considerable 
 share of the border disturbances finally resulting in the 
 "Caroline" affair was due to these law beaters, who in 
 fested the boundary. The tenth article of the Webster- 
 
 108 Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy, p. 253. 
 
 loo Lawrence, Introduction to Wheaton s International Law, p. 
 cxiii. Cf. Moore, American Diplomacy, p. 252. 
 
 no Moore, J. B., Treatise on Extradition and Inter-State Kendition, 
 p. 31. 
 
232 [60 
 
 Ashburton Treaty was intended to put a stop to such law 
 lessness on the border and to promote the general cause of 
 justice by providing for extradition upon seven offenses. 111 
 
 This article was well received by some of the opponents 
 of the treaty, but vigorously attacked by others, particu 
 larly in England where it was confused with the mistaken 
 idea that the Creole claims applied to the extradition of 
 fugitive slaves. The distinction between the two was made 
 clear in Aberdeen s speech upon the bill for carrying the 
 article into effect. 112 In the Senate, Benton said, "Though 
 fair on its face, it is difficult of execution." He feared 
 that with its large number of numerated offenses, it would 
 be misused to secure the punishment of innocent persons 
 and political offenders. 113 In the House, Mr. Levy, of 
 Florida, made a motion and speech in March, 1844, for the 
 abandonment of the extradition article on the ground that 
 England was not executing her part of the agreement in 
 refusing to extradite seven negroes, who had committed a 
 murder and escaped to Nassau. Nothing resulted from this 
 motion. 
 
 In spite of the "woeful predictions of its adversaries," 
 the extradition article proved its effectiveness in securing 
 order on the frontier. The results of its enforcement were 
 highly commended by Mr. Woodbridge, a former governor 
 of Michigan, who spoke during Webster s defense of the 
 Treaty of Washington, before the Senate, April, 1846, 11 * 
 as follows: "I have now only to add my entire and un 
 qualified conviction, that no act of the legislative or treaty- 
 making power, that I have ever known, has ever been more 
 successful in its operation than this article of the treaty; 
 nor could any provision have been attended by more happy 
 consequences upon the peace and safety of society in that 
 remote frontier." 115 
 
 in See Appendix B. 
 
 112 See Part II. (3). 
 
 us Benton, Thirty Years View in the IT. S. Senate, p. 444. 
 
 114 Webster s Works, Vol. V, p. 78. 
 
 us Webster s Diplomatic and Official Papers, p. 295. 
 
61] 233 
 
 In the history of extradition the treaty of Washington 
 holds an important position. Although it was not the 
 initial step in the development of the process of extradition 
 in modern times, its inception in 1842 gave great strength 
 to that movement and to the underlying conception of 
 legality in International Relations. 116 In its relation to the 
 history of extradition, we can see the treaty in its most 
 characteristic feature as a result of modern American diplo 
 macy. Its practicality, its legal foundation, and its direct 
 aim at the causes of the difficulty which it sought to remedy, 
 stamp it as a truly modern and well built monument in the 
 history of arbitration and international peace. 
 
 Moore, American Diplomacy, p. 252. 
 
234 [62 
 
 APPENDICES. 
 
 APPENDIX A. Extracts from the diplomatic correspondence relating 
 to the negotiation of the Webster- Ashburton Treaty. 
 
 APPENDIX B. The treaty concluded at Washington, August 9, 1842, 
 by Lord Ashburton and Daniel Webster, verbatim. 
 
 APPENDIX C. Extracts from Webster s Private Correspondence. 
 
 APPENDIX D. A map showing the various lines between the United 
 States and the British Provinces. 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 Extracts from the diplomatic correspondence relating to the ne 
 gotiation of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. 
 
 (1) Edward Everett to Webster, London, December 31, 1841. 
 
 (2) Webster to Everett, Washington, January 29, 1842. 
 
 (3) Webster to Governor Fairfield, Washington, April 11, 
 
 1842. 
 
 (4) Webster to the Maine Commissioners, Washington, July 
 
 15, 1842. 
 
 (5) Lord Ashburton to Webster, Washington, August 9, 1842. 
 
 (1) EDWARD EVERETT TO WEBSTER. 
 London, December, 31, 1841. 
 
 "At a late hour on the evening of the 26th, I received a note 
 from the Earl of Aberdeen, requesting an interview for the follow 
 ing day, when I met him at the Foreign Office, agreeably to the 
 appointment. After one or two general remarks upon the difficulty 
 of bringing about an adjustment of the points of controversy be 
 tween the governments, by a continuance of the discussions hither 
 to carried on, he said that her majesty s government had deter 
 mined to take a decisive step toward that end, by sending a special 
 minister to the United States, with a full power to make a final 
 settlement of all matters in dispute. * * * This step was de 
 termined on from a sincere and earnest desire to bring the matter 
 so long in controversy to an amicable settlement; and if, as he did 
 
63] 235 
 
 not doubt, the same disposition existed at Washington, he thought 
 this step afforded the most favorable, and, indeed, the only means 
 of carrying it into effect. In the choice of the individual for the 
 mission, Lord Aberdeen added, that he had been mainly influenced 
 by a desire to select a person who would be peculiarly acceptable 
 in the United States, as well as eminently qualified for the trust, 
 and that he persuaded himself he had found one who, in both re 
 spects, was all that could be wished. He then named Lord Ash- 
 burton, who had consented to undertake the mission. 
 
 Although this communication was, of course, wholly unexpected 
 to me, I felt no hesitation in expressing the great satisfaction with 
 which I received it. I assured Lord Aberdeen that the President 
 had nothing more at heart than an honorable adjustment of the 
 matters in discussion between the two countries; that I was per 
 suaded a more acceptable selection of a person for the important 
 mission proposed could not have been made; and that I anticipated 
 the happiest results from this overture. 
 
 Lord Aberdeen rejoined that it was more than an overture; that 
 Lord Ashburton would go with full powers to make a definite ar 
 rangement on every point in discussion between the two countries. 
 He was aware of the difficulty of some of them, particularly what 
 had incorrectly been called the right of search, which he deemed 
 the most difficult of all; but he was willing to confide this and all 
 other matters in controversy to Lord Ashburton s discretion. He 
 added, that they should have been quite willing to come to a gen 
 eral arrangement here, but they supposed I had not full powers for 
 such a purpose. 
 
 This measure being determined on, Lord Aberdeen said he pre 
 sumed it would be hardly worth while for us to continue the cor 
 respondence here on matters in dispute between the governments. 
 Pie, of course, was quite willing to consider and reply to any state 
 ment I might think proper to make on any subject; but, pending 
 the negotiations that might take place at Washington, he supposed 
 no benefit could result from a simultaneous discussion here." 
 
 (2) WEBSTER TO EVERETT. 
 Washington, January 29, 1841. 
 
 "Your dispatch of the 31st of December announces the import 
 ant intelligence of an intention of dispatching a special minister 
 from England to the United States, with full powers to settle 
 every matter in dispute between the two governments; and the 
 
236 [64 
 
 President directs me to say, that he regards this proceeding as 
 originating in an entirely amicable spirit, and that it will be met, 
 on his part, with perfectly corresponding sentiments. The high 
 character of Lord Ashburton is well known to this government; 
 and it is not doubted that he will enter on the duties assigned to 
 him, not only with the advantages of much knowledge and experi 
 ence in public affairs, but with a true desire to signalize his mis 
 sion by assisting to place the peace of the two countries on a per 
 manent basis. He will be received with the respect due to his own 
 character, the character of the government which sends him, and 
 the high importance, to both countries, of the subjects intrusted 
 to his negotiation. 
 
 The President approves your conduct in not pursuing in Eng 
 land the discussion of questions which are now to become the sub 
 jects of negotiation here." 
 
 (3) WEBSTER TO GOVERNOR FAIRFIELD. 
 
 Washington, April 11, 1842. 
 Department of State, Washington, April 11, 1842. 
 
 "Your excellency is aware that, previous to March, 1841, a 
 negotiation had been going on for some time between the Secretary 
 of State of the United States, under the direction of the President, 
 and the British minister accredited to this government, having for 
 its object the creation of a joint commission for settling the con 
 troversy respecting the northeastern boundary of the United States, 
 with a provision for an ultimate reference to arbitrators, to be ap 
 pointed by some one of the sovereigns of Europe, in case an ar 
 bitration should become necessary. On the leading features of a 
 convention for this purpose the two governments had become 
 agreed; but on several matters of detail the parties differed, and 
 appear to have been interchanging their respective views and opin 
 ions, projects, and counter-projects, without coming to any final 
 arrangement, down to August, 1840. Various causes, not now 
 necessary to be explained, arrested the progress of the negotiation 
 at that time, and no considerable advance has since been made in it. 
 
 It seems to have been understood on both sides that, one arbi 
 tration having failed, it was the duty of the two parties to proceed 
 to institute another, according to the spirit of the treaty of Ghent 
 and other treaties; and the President has felt it to be his duty, un 
 less some new course should be proposed, to cause the negotiation 
 to be resumed, and pressed to its conclusion. But I have now to 
 inform your excellency that Lord Ashburton, a minister plenipo 
 tentiary and special, has arrived at the seat of the government of 
 
65] 237 
 
 the United States, charged with full powers from his sovereign to 
 negotiate and settle the different matters in discussion between the 
 two governments. I have further to state to you, that he has offi 
 cially announced to this department that, in regard to the bound 
 ary question, he has authority to treat for a conventional line, or 
 line by agreement, on such terms and conditions, and with such 
 mutual considerations and equivalents, as may be thought just and 
 equitable, and that he is ready to enter upon a negotiation for such 
 conventional line so soon as this government shall say it is author 
 ized and ready, on its part, to commence such negotiation. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the President has felt it to be his 
 duty to call the serious attention of the governments of Maine and 
 Massachusetts to the subject, and to submit to those governments 
 the propriety of their co-operation, to a certain extent, and in a 
 certain form, in an endeavor to terminate a controversy already 
 of so long duration, and which seems very likely to be still con 
 siderably further protracted before the desired end of a final ad 
 justment shall be attained, unless a shorter course of arriving at 
 that end be adopted, than such as has heretofore been pursued, 
 and as the two governments are still pursuing. 
 
 Yet, without the concurrence of the two states whose rights are 
 more immediately concerned, both having an interest in the soil, 
 and one of them in the jurisdiction and government, the duty of 
 this government will be to adopt no new course, but, in compliance 
 with treaty stipulations, and in furtherance of what has already 
 been done, to hasten the pending negotiations as fast as possible, 
 in the course hitherto adopted. 
 
 But the President thinks it a highly desirable object to prevent 
 the delays necessarily incident to any settlement of the question 
 by these means. Such delays are great and unavoidable. It has 
 been found that an exploration and examination of the several lines 
 constitute a work of three years. The existing commission for 
 making such exploration, under the authority of the United States, 
 has been occupied two summers, and a very considerable portion 
 of the work remains still to be done. If a joint commission should 
 be appointed, and should go through the same work, and the com 
 missioners should disagree, as is very possible, and an arbitration 
 on that account become indispensable, the arbitrators might find it 
 necessary to make an exploration and survey themselves, or cause 
 the same to be done by others, of their own appointment. If to 
 these causes, operating to postpone the final decision, be added the 
 time necessary to appoint arbitrators, and for their preparation to 
 leave Europe for the service, the various retarding incidents al- 
 
238 [66 
 
 ways attending such operation, seven or eight years constitute, 
 perhaps, the shortest period within which we can look for a final 
 result. In the meantime, great expenses have been incurred, and 
 further expenses cannot be avoided. It is well known that the con 
 troversy has brought heavy charges upon Maine herself, to the re 
 muneration or proper settlement of which she can not be expected 
 to be indifferent. The exploration by the government of the Unit 
 ed States has already cost a hundred thousand dollars, and the 
 charge of another summer s work is in prospect. These facts may 
 be sufficient to enable us to form a probable estimate of the whole 
 expense likely to be incurred before the controversy can b"e settled 
 by arbitration; and our experience admonishes us that even an 
 other arbitration might possibly fail. 
 
 The opinion of this government upon the justice and validity of 
 the American claim has been expressed at so many times, and in 
 so many forms, that a repetition of that opinion is not necessary. 
 But the subject is a subject in dispute. The government has 
 agreed to make it matter of reference and arbitration; and it must 
 fulfill that agreement, unless another mode for settling the contro 
 versy should be resorted to, with the hope of producing a speedier 
 decision. The President proposes, then, that the governments of 
 Maine and Massachusetts should severally appoint a commissioner 
 or commissioners, empowered to confer with the authorities of this 
 government upon a conventional line, or line by agreement, with 
 its terms, conditions, considerations, and equivalents; with an un 
 derstanding that no such line will be agreed upon without the as 
 sent of such commissioners. 
 
 This mode of proceeding, or some other which shall express as 
 sent beforehand, seems indispensable, if any negotiation for a con 
 ventional line is to be attempted; since, if happily a treaty should 
 be the result of the negotiation, it can only be submitted to the 
 Senate of the United States for ratification. 
 
 It is a subject of deep and sincere regret to the President that 
 the British plenipotentiary did not arrive in the country and make 
 known his powers in time to have made this communication before 
 the annual session of the Legislature of the two states had been 
 brought to a close. He perceives and laments the inconvenience 
 which may be experienced from reassembling those legislatures. 
 But the British mission is a special one; it does not supersede the 
 resident mission of the British government at Washington, and its 
 stay in the United States is not expected to be long. In addition 
 to these considerations, it is to be suggested that more than four 
 months of the session of Congress have already passed, and it is 
 
67] 239 
 
 highly desirable, if any treaty for a conventional line should be 
 agreed on, that it should be concluded before the session shall ter 
 minate, not only because of the necessity of the ratification of the 
 Senate, but also because it is not impossible that measures may 
 be thought advisable, or become important, which can only be ac 
 complished by the authority of both Houses. 
 
 These considerations, in addition to the importance of the sub 
 ject, and a firm conviction in the mind of the .President that the 
 interests of both countries, as well as the interests of the two 
 states more immediately concerned, require a prompt effort to 
 bring this dispute to an end, constrain him to express an earnest 
 hope that your excellency will convene the Legislature of Maine, 
 and submit the subject to its grave and candid deliberations. I 
 am, etc., DANIEL WEBSTER. 
 
 His Excellency John Fairfield, Governor of Maine. 
 
 (4) WEBSTER TO THE MAINE COMMISSIONERS. 
 
 Washington, July 15, 1842. 
 Department of State, Washington, July 15, 1842. 
 
 "Gentlemen, You have had an opportunity of reading Lord 
 Ashburton s note to me of the llth of July. Since that date I 
 have had full and frequent conferences with him respecting the 
 eastern boundary, and believe I understand what is practicable to 
 be done on that subject, so far as he is concerned. In these con 
 ferences he has made no positive or binding proposition, thinking, 
 perhaps, it would be more desirable, under present circumstances, 
 that such proposition should proceed from the side of the United 
 States. I have reason to believe, however, that he would agree 
 to a line of boundary between the United States and the British 
 provinces of Canada and New Brunswick, such as is described in 
 a paper accompanying this (marked B), and identified by my sig 
 nature. ***** 
 
 The territory in dispute between the two countries contains 
 12,027 square miles, equal to 7,697,280 acres. 
 
 By the line described in the accompanying paper, there will be 
 assigned to the United States 7015 square miles, equal to 4,489,600 
 acres; and to England 5012 square miles, equal to 3,207,680 acres. 
 
 By the award of the King of the Netherlands, there was as 
 signed to the United States 7907 square miles, 5,061,120 acres; to 
 England 4119 square miles, 2,636,160 acres. 
 
 The territory proposed to be relinquished to England south of 
 the line of the King of the Netherlands is, as you will see, the 
 mountain range from the upper part of the St. Francis Eiver to 
 
240 [68 
 
 the meeting of the two contested lines of boundary, at the Metjar- 
 mette Portage, in the highlands, near the source of the St. John. 
 This mountain tract contains 893 square miles, equal to 571,520 
 acres. It is supposed to be of no value for cultivation or settle 
 ment. On this point you will see herewith a letter from Captain 
 Talcott, who has been occupied two summers in exploring tke line 
 of the highlands, and is intimately acquainted with the territory. 
 The line leaves to the United States, between the base of the hills 
 and the left bank of the St. John, and lying upon the river, a ter 
 ritory of 657,280 acres, embracing, without doubt, all the valuable 
 land south of the St. Francis and west of the St. John. Of the 
 general division of the territory, it is believed it may be safely 
 said, that while the portion remaining with the United States is, 
 in quantity, seven-twelfths, in value it is at least four-fifths of the 
 whole. 
 
 If this line should be agreed to on the part of the United States, 
 I suppose that the British minister would, as an equivalent, stip 
 ulate, first, for the use of the Elver St. John, for the conveyance 
 of the timber growing on any of its branches, to tide-water, free 
 from all discriminating tolls, impositions, or inabilities of any kind, 
 the timber enjoying all the privileges of British colonial timber. 
 All opinions concur that this privilege of navigation must greatly 
 enhance the value of the territory and the timber growing thereon, 
 and prove exceedingly useful to the people of Maine. Second: 
 That House s Point, in Lake Champlain, and the lands heretofore 
 supposed to be within the limits of New Hampshire, Vermont, and 
 New York, but which a correct ascertainment of the 45th parallel 
 of latitude shows to be in Canada, should be surrendered to the 
 United States. 
 
 It is probable, also, that the disputed line of boundary in Lake 
 Superior might be so adjusted as to leave a disputed island within 
 the United States. 
 
 These cessions on the part of England would enure partly to 
 the benefit of the states of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New 
 York, but principally to the United States. The consideration on 
 the part of England, for making them, would be the manner agreed 
 upon for adjusting the eastern boundary. The price of the cession, 
 therefore, whatever it might be, would in fairness belong to the 
 two states interested in the manner of that adjustment. 
 
 Under the influence of these considerations, I am authorized to 
 say, that if the commissioners of the two states assent to the line 
 as described in the accompanying paper, the United States will 
 
69] 241 
 
 undertake to pay to these states the sum of two hundred and fifty 
 thousand dollars, to be divided between them in equal moieties; 
 and also to undertake for the settlement and payment of the ex 
 penses incurred by those states for the maintenance of the civil 
 posse, and also for a survey which it was found necessary to make. 
 The line suggested, with the compensations and equivalents 
 which have been stated, is now submitted for your consideration. 
 That it is all which might have been hoped for, looking to the 
 strength of the American claim, can hardly be said. But, as the 
 settlement of a controversy of such duration is a matter of high 
 importance, as equivalents of undoubted value are offered, as 
 longer postponement and delay would lead to further inconven 
 ience, and to the incurring of further expenses, and as no better 
 occasion, or, perhaps, any other occasion, for settling the boundary 
 by agreement, and on the principle of equivalents, is ever likely 
 to present itself, the government of the United States hopes that 
 the commissioners of the two states will find it to be consistent 
 with their duty to assent to the line proposed, and to the terms 
 and conditions attending the proposition." * * * * 
 
 (5) LORD ASHBURTON TO WEBSTER. 
 
 Washington, August 9, 1842. 
 
 a. 
 
 Sir, It appears desirable that some explanation between us 
 should be recorded by correspondence respecting the fifth article 
 of the treaty signed by us this day for the settlement of bound 
 aries between Great Britain and the United States. 
 
 By that article of the treaty it is stipulated that certain pay 
 ments shall be made by the government of the United States to 
 the states of Maine and Massachusetts. It has, of course, been 
 understood that my negotiations have been with the government 
 of the United States, and the introduction of terms of agreement 
 between the general government and the states would have been 
 irregular and inadmissible, if it had not been deemed expedient 
 to bring the whole of these transactions within the purview of the 
 treaty. There may not be wanting analogous cases to justify this 
 proceeding; but it seems proper that I should have confirmed by 
 you that my government incurs no responsibility for these engage 
 ments, of the precise nature and object of which I am unin 
 formed, nor have I considered it necessary to make inquiry con 
 cerning them." ***** 
 
242 [70 
 
 "By the 3d article of the convention which I have this day 
 signed with you, there is an agreement for the reciprocal delivery, 
 in certain cases, of criminals fugitive from justice; but it becomes 
 necessary that I should apprise you that this article can have no 
 legal effect within the dominions of Great Britain until confirmed 
 by act of Parliament. It is possible that Parliament may not be 
 in session before the exchange of the ratifications of the conven 
 tion, but its sanction shall be asked at the earliest possible period, 
 and no doubt can be entertained that it will be given. In Her 
 Majesty s territories in Canada, where cases for acting under this 
 convention are likely to be of more frequent occurrence, the gov 
 ernor general has sufficient power, under the authority of local 
 legislation, and the convention will there be acted upon so soon 
 as its ratification shall be known; but it becomes my duty to in 
 form you of the short delay which may possibly intervene in giv 
 ing full effect to it where the confirmation by Parliament becomes 
 necessary for its execution. * * * 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 The treaty concluded at Washington, August 9, 1842, by Lord 
 Ashburton and Daniel Webster, verbatim^ 
 
 1 Whereas, certain portions of the line of boundary between the 
 United States of America and the British dominions in North 
 America, described in the second article of the Treaty of Peace 
 of 1783, have not yet been ascertained and determined, notwith 
 standing the repeated attempts which have been heretofore made 
 for that purpose; and whereas it is now thought to be for the 
 interest of both parties, that, avoiding further discussion of their 
 respective rights, arising in this respect under the said treaty, they 
 should agree on a conventional line in said portions of the said 
 boundary, such as may be convenient to both parties, with such 
 equivalents and compensations as are deemed just and reasonable; 
 and whereas, by the treaty concluded at Ghent, on the 24th day 
 of December, 1814, between the United States and his Britannic 
 majesty, an article was agreed to and inserted, of the following 
 tenor, viz.: Article 10. Whereas the traffic in slaves is irrecon 
 cilable with the principles of humanity and justice; and whereas 
 both his majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing 
 their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed 
 
 117 Treaties and Conventions, J. H. Haswell, pp. 432-438; also House Ex 
 ecutive Documents, 27th Cong., 3rd Sess., No. 2, pp. 25-30. 
 
71] 243 
 
 that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors 
 to accomplish so desirable an object; and whereas, notwithstand 
 ing the laws which have at various times been passed by the two 
 governments, and the efforts made to suppress it, that criminal 
 traffic is still prosecuted and carried on; and whereas, the United 
 States of America and her majesty, the Queen of the United King 
 dom of Great Britain and Ireland are determined that, so far as 
 may be in their power, it shall be effectually abolished; and where 
 as, it is found expedient for the better administration of justice 
 and the prevention of crime within the territories and jurisdiction 
 of the two parties respectively, that persons committing the crimes 
 hereinafter enumerated, and being fugitives from justice, should, 
 under certain circumstances, be reciprocally delivered up: The 
 United States of America and her Britannic Majesty, having re 
 solved to treat on these several subjects, have for that purpose 
 appointed their respective Plenipotentiaries to negotiate and con 
 clude a treaty; that is to say: 
 
 The President of the United States has, on his part, furnished 
 with full powers Daniel Webster, Secretary of State of the United 
 States; and Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
 Great Britain and Ireland has, on her part, appointed the Eight 
 Honorable Alexander Lord Ashburton, a peer of the said United 
 Kingdom, a member of Her Majesty s most honorable privy counsel, 
 and Her Majesty s minister plenipotentiary on a special mission to 
 the United States; 
 
 Who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective full 
 powers, have agreed to and signed the following articles: 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 It is hereby agreed and declared that the line of boundary shall 
 be as follows: Beginning at the monument at the source of the 
 Kiver St. Croix, as designated and agreed to by the commissioners 
 under the fifth article of the treaty of 1794, between the govern 
 ments of the United States and Great Britain; thence north, fol 
 lowing the exploring line run and marked by the surveyors of the 
 two governments in the years 1817 and 1818, under the fifth article 
 of the Treaty of Ghent, to its intersection with the Kiver St. John, 
 and to the middle of the channel thereof; thence, up the middle of 
 the main channel of the said Kiver St. John to the mouth of the 
 River St. Francis; thence up the middle of the channel of the said 
 Kiver St. Francis, and of the lakes through which it flows, to the 
 outlet of the Lake Pohenagamook; thence, southwesterly, in a 
 straight line, to a point on the northwest branch of the River St. 
 
244 [72 
 
 John, which point shall be ten miles distant from the main branch 
 of the St. John, in a straight line, and in the nearest direction; but 
 if the said point shall be found to be less than seven miles from 
 the nearest point of the summit, or crest, of the Highlands that 
 divide those rivers which empty themselves into the Eiver St. 
 Lawrence from those which fall into the Eiver St. John, then the 
 said point shall be made to recede down the said northwest branch 
 of the Eiver St. John, to a point seven miles in a straight line 
 from the said summit or crest; thence in a straight line, in a course 
 about south, eight degrees west, to the point where the parallel of 
 latitude of 46 degrees 25 minutes north intersects the southwest 
 branch of the St. John s; thence, southerly, by the said branch, 
 to the source thereof in the Highlands, at the Metjarmette Port 
 age; thence down along the said Highlands which divide the waters 
 which empty themselves into the Eiver St. Lawrence from those 
 which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the head of Hall s Stream; 
 thence down the middle of said stream, till the line thus run inter 
 sects the old line of boundary surveyed and marked by Valentine 
 and Collins previously to the year 1774, as the 45th degree of north 
 latitude, and which has been known and understood to be the line 
 of actual division between the States of New York and Vermont 
 on one side, and the British province of Canada on the other; and 
 from said point of intersection, west, along the said dividing-line, 
 as heretofore known and understood, to the Iroquois or St. Law 
 rence Eiver. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 It is moreover agreed, that from the place where the joint com 
 missioners terminated their labors under the sixth article of the 
 Treaty of Ghent, to wit, at a point in the Neebish Channel, near 
 Muddy Lake, the line shall run into and along the ship-channel 
 between St. Joseph s and St. Tammany Islands, to the division of 
 the channel at or near the head of St. Joseph s Island; thence, 
 turning eastwardly and northwardly, around the lower end of St. 
 George s or Sugar Island, and following the middle of the channel 
 which divides St. George s from St. Joseph s Island; thence up the 
 east Neebish Channel, nearest to St. George s Island, through the 
 middle of Lake George; thence, west of Jonas s Island, into St. 
 Mary s Eiver, to a point in the middle of that river, about one 
 mile above St. George s or Sugar Island, so as to appropriate and 
 assign the said island to the United States; thence, adopting the 
 line traced on the maps by the commissioners, through the Eiver 
 St. Mary and Lake Superior, to a point north of He Eoyale, in 
 
73] 245 
 
 said lake, one hundred yards to the north and east of He Chapeu, 
 which last-mentioned island lies near the northeastern point of He 
 Eoyale, where the line marked by the commissioners terminates; 
 and from the last-mentioned point, southwesterly, through the mid 
 dle of the sound between He Eoyale and the northwestern main 
 land, to the mouth of Pigeon Eiver, and up the said river to and 
 through the north and south Fowl Lakes to the lakes of the height 
 of land between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods; thence 
 along the water communication to Lake Saisaginaga, and through 
 that Lake; thence to and through Cypress Lake, Lac du Bois 
 Blanc, Lac la Croix, Little Vermillion Lake, and Lake Namecan, 
 and through the several smaller lakes, straits, or streams connect 
 ing the lakes here mentioned, to that point in Lac la Pluie, or 
 Eainy Lake, at the Chaudiere Falls, from which the commissioners 
 traced the line to the most northwestern point of the Lake of the 
 Woods; thence along the said line to the said most northwestern 
 point, being in latitude 49 degrees, 23 minutes, 55 seconds north, 
 and in longitude 95 degrees, 14 minutes, 38 seconds west from the 
 observatory at Greenwich; thence, according to existing treaties, 
 due south, to its intersection with the 49th parallel of north lati 
 tude, and along that parallel to the Eocky Mountains; it being 
 understood that all the water communications, and all the usual 
 portages along the line from Lake Superior to the Lake of the 
 Woods and also Grand Portage, from the shore of Lake Superior 
 to the Pigeon Elver, as now actually used, shall be free and open 
 to the use of the citizens and subjects of both countries. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 In order to promote the interests and encourage the industry 
 of all the inhabitants of the countries watered by the Eiver St. 
 John and its tributaries, whether living within the State of Maine 
 or the province of New Brunswick, it is agreed that where, by 
 the provisions of the present treaty, the Eiver St. John is de 
 clared to be the line of boundary, the navigation of the said river 
 shall be free and open to both parties and shall in no way be 
 obstructed by either; that all the produce of the forest in logs, 
 lumber, timber, boards, staves, or shingles, or of agriculture, not 
 being manufactured, grown on any of those parts of the State of 
 Maine watered by the Elver St. John, or by its tributaries, of 
 which fact reasonable evidence shall, if required, be produced, 
 shall have free access into and through the said river and its said 
 tributaries, having their source within the State of Maine, to and 
 from the sea-port at the mouth of the said Eiver St. John s, and to 
 and round the falls of the said river, either by boats, rafts, or other 
 
246 [74 
 
 conveyance; that when within the province of New Brunswick, the 
 said produce shall be dealt with as if it were the produce of the 
 said province; that in like manner, the inhabitants of the terri 
 tory of the Upper St. John, determined by this treaty to belong 
 to her Britannic majesty, shall have free access to and through the 
 river for their produce, in those parts where the said river runs 
 wholly through the State of Maine: Provided always, that this 
 agreement shall give no right to either party to interfere with 
 any regulations not inconsistent with the terms of this treaty 
 which the governments, respectively, of Maine or of New Bruns 
 wick may make respecting the navigation of the said river, where 
 both banks thereof shall belong to the same party. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 All grants of land heretofore made by either party, within the 
 limits of the territory which by this treaty falls within the do 
 minions of the other party, shall be held valid, ratified, and con 
 firmed to the persons in possession under such grants, to the same 
 extent as if such territory had by this treaty fallen within the 
 dominions of the party by whom such grants were made: and all 
 equitable possessory claims, arising from a possession and improve 
 ment of any lot or parcel of land by the person actually in pos 
 session, or by those under whom such person claims, for more than 
 six years before the date of this treaty, shall, in like manner, be 
 deemed valid, and be confirmed and quieted by a release to the 
 person entitled thereto, of the title to such lot or parcel of land, 
 so described as best to include the improvements made thereon; 
 and in all other respects the two contracting parties agree to deal 
 upon the most liberal principles of equity with the settlers actual 
 ly dwelling upon the territory falling to them, respectively, which 
 has heretofore been in dispute between them. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 Whereas, in the course of the controversy respecting the dis 
 puted territory on the northeastern boundary, some moneys have 
 been received by the authorities of Her Britannic Majesty s prov 
 ince of New Brunswick, with the intention of preventing depreda 
 tions on the forests of the said territory, which moneys were to be 
 carried to a fund, called the "disputed territory fund," the pro 
 ceeds whereof, it was agreed, should be hereafter paid over to the 
 parties interested, in the proportions to be determined by a final 
 settlement of boundaries: it is hereby agreed that a correct ac 
 count of all receipts and payments on the said fund shall be de- 
 
75] 247 
 
 livered to the Government of the United States, within six months 
 after the ratification of this treaty; and the proportion of the 
 amount due thereon to the States of Maine and Massachusetts, 
 and any bonds or securities appertaining thereto, shall be paid and 
 delivered over to the Government of the United States; and the 
 Government of the United States agrees to receive for the use of 
 and pay over to, the States of Maine and Massachusetts, their 
 respective portions of said fund; and further, to pay and satisfy 
 said states, respectively, for all claims for expenses incurred by 
 them in protecting the said heretofore disputed territory, and mak 
 ing a survey thereof in 1838; the Government of the United States 
 agreeing with the States of Maine and Massachusetts to pay them 
 the further sum of three hundred thousand dollars, in equal moieties, 
 on account of their assent to the line of boundary described in this 
 treaty, and in consideration of the conditions and equivalents re 
 ceived therefor, from the government of Her Britannic Majesty. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 It is furthermore understood and agreed, that for the purpose of 
 running and tracing those parts of the line between the source of 
 the St. Croix and the St. Lawrence Eiver, which will require to be 
 run and ascertained, and for marking the residue of said line by 
 proper monuments on the land, two commissioners shall be ap 
 pointed, one by the President of the United States, by and with 
 the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and one by Her Bri 
 tannic Majesty; and the said commissioners shall meet at Bangor, 
 in the State of Maine, on the first day of May next, or as soon 
 thereafter as may be, and shall proceed to mark the line above 
 described, from the source of the St. Croix to the Eiver St. John; 
 and shall trace on proper maps the dividing line along said river 
 and along the River St. Francis to the outlet of the Lake Pohe- 
 nagamook; and from the outlet of the said lake they shall ascer 
 tain, fix, and mark, by proper and durable monuments on the land, 
 the line described in the first article of this treaty; and the said 
 commissioners shall make to each of their respective Governments 
 a joint report or declaration, under their hands and seals, desig 
 nating such line of boundary, and shall accompany such report er 
 declaration with maps certified by them to be true maps of the new 
 boundary. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 It is further agreed that the channels in the Elver St. Law 
 rence on both sides of the Long Sault Islands and of Barnhart 
 Island, the channels in the Eiver Detroit, on both sides of the 
 
248 [76 
 
 Island Bois Blanc, and between that island and both the American 
 and Canadian shores, and all the several channels and passages 
 between the various islands lying near the junction of the Eiver 
 St. Glair with the lake of that name, shall be equally free and open 
 to the ships, vessels, and boats of both parties. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 The parties mutually stipulate that each shall prepare, equip, 
 and maintain in service, on the coast of Africa, a sufficient and 
 adequate squadron or naval force of vessels of suitable numbers 
 and descriptions, to carry in all not less than eighty guns, to 
 enforce, separately and respectively, the laws, rights, and obliga 
 tions of each of the two countries, for the suppression of the slave 
 trade, the said squadrons to be independent of each other, but the 
 two Governments stipulating, nevertheless, to give such orders to 
 the officers commanding their respective forces, as shall enable 
 them most effectually to act in concert and cooperation, upon 
 mutual consultation, as exigencies may arise, for the attainment of 
 the true object of this article; copies of all such orders to be com 
 municated by each government to the other, respectively. 
 
 ARTICLE IX. 
 
 Whereas, notwithstanding all efforts which may be made on 
 the coast of Africa for suppressing the slave trade, the facilities 
 for carrying on that traffic and avoiding the vigilance of cruisers, 
 by the fraudulent use of flags and other means, are so great, and 
 the temptations for pursuing it, while a market can be found for 
 slaves, so strong, as that the desired result may be long delayed, 
 unless all markets be shut against the purchase of African negroes, 
 the parties to this treaty agree that they will unite in all becoming 
 representations and remonstrances with any and all Powers within 
 whose dominions such markets are allowed to exist, and that they 
 will urge upon all such Powers the propriety and duty of closing 
 such markets effectually, at once and forever. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic Majesty 
 shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, or their Ministers, officers, 
 or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons 
 who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with 
 intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forg 
 ery, or the utterance of forged papers, committed within the juris 
 diction of either, shall seek an asylum or shall be found within the 
 
77] 249 
 
 territories of the other: Provided, that this shall only be done upon 
 such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place 
 where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would 
 justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime 
 or offense had there been committed; and the respective judges 
 and other magistrates of the two governments shall have power, 
 jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to 
 issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so 
 charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other mag 
 istrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality 
 may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence 
 be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of 
 the examining judge or magistrate to certify the same to the proper 
 executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender of 
 such fugitive. The expense of such apprehension and delivery 
 shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requi 
 sition and receives the fugitive. 
 
 ARTICLE XI. 
 
 The eighth article of this treaty shall be in force for five years 
 from the date of the exchange of ratifications, and afterward until 
 one or the other party shall signify a wish to terminate it. The 
 tenth article shall continue in force until one or the other of the 
 parties shall signify its wish to terminate it, and no longer. 
 
 ARTICLE XII. 
 
 The present treaty shall be duly ratified, and the mutual ex 
 change shall take place in London, within six months from the date 
 hereof, or earlier, if possible. 
 
 In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have 
 signed this treaty, and have hereunto affixed our seals. 
 
 Done in duplicate at Washington, the ninth day of August, 
 anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and forty-two. 
 
 DANL. WEBSTER (Seal). 
 ASHBURTON (Seal). 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM WEBSTER S PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE. 
 
 (1) Webster to Edward Everett, Washington, June 28, 1842. 
 
 (2) Lord Ashburton to Webster, The Grange, January 2, 1843, 
 
 (3) Lord Ashburton to Webster, London, April 28, 1844. 
 
250 [78 
 
 (1) WEBSTER TO EDWARD EVERETT, WASHINGTON, JUNE 28, 1842. 
 
 Our movement for the last ten days, if any has been made, 
 has been rather backward. The boundary business is by no means 
 in a highly promising state so many difficulties arise, not only 
 between us and England, but between us and the commissioners, 
 and the commissioners of the two States themselves and other 
 questions are still less so. I know nothing of Lord Ashburton s 
 recent instructions, but he appears to me, certainly, to be under 
 restraints not heretofore apparently felt by him. What increases 
 the embarrassment and renders a failure more probable, is his 
 great unwillingness to stay longer in the country. The President 
 has desired a personal interview with him, which has been had, and 
 the President has pressed upon him in the strongest manner the 
 necessity of staying till every effort to effect the great object of 
 his mission shall have been exhausted. The President feels, what 
 all must feel, that if the mission should return, rebus infectis, the 
 relations of the two countries will be more than ever embarrassed. 
 
 "I think we have much reason to regret, if not some right to 
 complain, that, in regard to the delicate questions growing out of 
 such cases as that of the Creole, we have been strangely mis 
 understood. The Lords took up the subject of the Creole, appar 
 ently with no accurate knowledge of what had been done or said 
 by us, and argued and decided questions which we had never raised 
 or thought of raising, and that misapprehension seems to have run 
 through all subsequent considerations of the subject. We did not 
 make any demand for fugitive slaves; no such thing; we well 
 know that when slaves get on British ground, they are free. Nor 
 have we ever asked England to enter into any stipulation by treaty 
 which should interfere with this general principle of English law. 
 Nor do we, in the absence of treaty provisions, demand the sur 
 render of fugitives from justice. You quote Lord Aberdeen as 
 saying, You do not yourselves give up mutineers to be punished. 
 Certainly we do not, nor do we surrender other offenders, unless in 
 virtue of special stipulations by treaty. But we think a proper 
 convention for the extradition of offenders charged with high 
 crimes would tend greatly to prevent the commission of such 
 crimes, and to preserve peace and harmony between the two coun 
 tries. Such a provision would have nothing in it peculiarly ad 
 vantageous to the United States. Its benefits would be equal and 
 alike to both parties. All along the inland frontier the necessity 
 for some mutual regulation of this kind is severely felt, and cases 
 calling for such regulations are also constantly arising on the high- 
 
 But at any rate we wish to be distinctly understood, and I repeat, 
 
79] 251 
 
 therefore, that we do not demand the restitution of fugitive slaves; 
 that, without treaty stipulations to that effect, we do not demand, 
 and shall not demand, the surrender of criminals fleeing from 
 justice. But all this is quite remote from what we firmly hold to 
 be our rights, according to the laws and usages of nations in such 
 cases as that of the Creole. That is to say (that in cases of ves 
 sels carried into British ports by violence or stress of weather, we 
 insist that there shall be no interference from the land, with the 
 relation or personal condition of those on board, according to the 
 laws of their own country; that vessels under such circumstances 
 shall enjoy the common laws of hospitality, subjected to no force, 
 entitled to have their immediate wants and necessities relieved, 
 and to pursue their voyage without molestation). * * * 
 
 "A general feeling prevails in this country at the present 
 moment, no doubt, both North and South, that all questions will 
 be amicably settled through the agency of Lord Ashburton s mis 
 sion. His lordship s frank and candid manner, his great intelli 
 gence and practical ability, and the apparent justness and moder 
 ation of his views and principles, have conspired to conduct the 
 public mind to this conclusion, and that public mind desires that 
 result, and the country is preparing itself for the state of things 
 which will naturally follow it. But if the negotiation fail, if 
 unexpected obstacles be interposed, if what has been considered 
 quite reasonable and moderate be not attained, if the boundary 
 question to put into another endless series of surveys, explorations, 
 arbitrations, and umpirages, if we are left only to understand that 
 our coasting trade through the Bahama Channel can not otherwise 
 enjoy ordinary safety than as we put it under convoy, a mission, 
 the institution of which was hailed as a bright harbinger of the 
 restoration of perfect amity and harmony between the two coun 
 tries, and in the conduct of which I am sure the best disposition 
 has prevailed, will only have terminated in leaving things much 
 worse than it found them. I hardly see how this bad result is to 
 be prevented, unless we can succeed in beseeching Lord Ashburton 
 to delay his return another month, in the hope that the cloud on 
 his brow may be dissipated by the next communication from home. 
 
 "I have marked this letter private, as it is in answer to a 
 private letter of yours; but the substance and effect of it ought, 
 perhaps, be made known to Lord Aberdeen; notwithstanding that 
 his lordship may receive communications from Lord Ashburton, 
 covering similar accounts of the sentiments entertained here, and 
 the state of things existing. 
 
 "I am, dear sir, always faithfully yours, 
 
 "T>. WEBSTER." 
 
252 [80 
 
 (2) LORD ASHBURTON TO WEBSTER, THE GRANGE, JANUARY 2, 1843. 
 
 * "But early next month we are again all to meet in 
 the great Babylon, where the conflict of parties in our Congress is 
 to begin. I should probably not appear if it were not to look 
 after my dear character when the critics open their attack upon 
 what they call the "Ashburton Capitulation." I am not afraid 
 of them, and though I have not your power of destroying an ad 
 versary, I have one advantage over you, that I have a right to be 
 heard. In speaking of critics, however, I should, in fairness, state 
 that they are nearly, if not exclusively, reduced to one, an ex- 
 Secretary of State, who is laboring hard in his vocation of a fault 
 finding leader of opposition, sharpened a little by the apprehension 
 that his powers of diplomacy are questioned by the result. Mr. 
 Everett, who has been passing a few days here with his family, 
 will have told you that the public opinion of this country is de 
 cidedly satisfied. I have assurances to this effect from people of 
 all parties. Few, if any, of the Whigs will support the author of 
 the angry articles of The Morning Chronicle, and I suspect that 
 when it comes to the point his capitulation will be more mani 
 fest than mine. The truth is, that the desire of all here is peace, 
 and more especially with your country. Nobody of common sense 
 cares much about the precise position of Lake Pohenagamook. 
 The important thing is that we have shaken hands cordially, and 
 I should be very sorry to be supposed to have ever been anxious to 
 make a sharp bargain. The real merit of the settlement is that 
 it will not stand this description. On the other side, what we may, 
 I believe, really boast of, my dear sir, is that we have done a 
 work of peace which to the extent of our power, we must endeavor 
 to prevent folly or malevolence from spoiling. This was the whole 
 of my aim in crossing the Atlantic, though I see my friend Mr. 
 Ingersoll persists that I want to be an earl or a marquis, with a 
 true republican appreciation of such vanities. 
 
 (3) LORD ASHBURTON TO WEBSTER, LONDON, APRIL 28, 1844. 
 
 "On this side of the water the several debatable subjects con 
 nected with our treaty are settling down very satisfactorily in the 
 public mind. The battle of the maps, the question whether con 
 cessions were made on either side, and by whom, with respect to 
 search or visit, and the admirable reproofs administered by you 
 
 to the officious interference of Mr. . The discussion of all 
 
 these questions, now pretty nearly exhausted, leave the universal 
 impression that the treaty was a good and wise measure, and good 
 
81] 253 
 
 and wise because it was fair; so much so that the critics are at a 
 loss to determine which of us had the advantage in the scramble 
 for the swamps on the St. John s, a dilemma in which it was your 
 wish, as I am sure it was mine, to leave them. The map question 
 now fortunately only interests historians, such as Mr. Sparks and 
 Mr. Bancroft. I am by no means disposed to disturb its sleep, 
 or that either party should find, or think they had found, anything 
 conclusive, so as to interfere with the conviction that there existed 
 that real shade of doubt or perplexity which could alone be satis 
 factorily settled by compromise. If we are ever fated to meet 
 again, which I indulge the hope may yet be the case, I should have 
 some curiosity to know how you unravel this, to me, inextricable 
 puzzle; at present I will only say, what I know you will believe, 
 that the discoveries here are quite recent, and were wholly un 
 known to me when I was at Washington. Not but that I agree 
 entirely with you, that it would have been no duty of mine to 
 damage the cause of my client, yet at the same time I perhaps 
 went further in protestations of ignorance than I otherwise should 
 have done. Palmerston has in Parliament been the only real ad 
 versary of the treaty, and it seems felt that he is not a disinter 
 ested one. His move will probably bring upon me the unusual 
 honor of the complimentary acknowledgment of my services. That 
 in the Lords is already passed with only three dissentient voices. 
 In the Commons, the motion is expected to come on next week. 
 The ministers have taken no part in this volunteer proceeding. I 
 send you herewith Brougham s speech, which is, I am told, good; 
 but you will be surprised when I add that I have not yet read it. 
 The extradition article of the treaty makes some stir with our 
 anti-slavery people. I have seen some of their deputations, and 
 I hope to have satisfied them; but we shall hear of them, though 
 with no bad consequences, when the bill passes for giving effect 
 to this article. The apprehension is that some cases of robbery 
 will be got up to claim fugitive slaves. This will certainly require 
 caution with the magistrates in Canada, but I am not fearful of 
 the result; but should the abuse prove excessive, the remedy is in 
 the power to correct the article. We have now in our new governor- 
 general a very judicious, discreet, and liberal man, upon whose 
 practical good sense full reliance may be placed. " 
 
 APPENDIX D. 
 
 A map showing the various lines between the United States and 
 the British provinces. 
 
254 [82 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 PRIMARY SOURCES. 
 
 American State Papers. Foreign Affairs, Vols. Ill, IV. 
 
 Military Affairs, Vol. VII. 
 Attorney Generals of the United States, Official Opinions of, Vol. 
 
 VI. 
 Congressional Globe. 
 
 26th Congress, 1st Session. 
 
 27th Congress, 3rd Session. 
 
 29th Congress, 1st Session. 
 
 Cralle, E. K. 
 
 "Works of J. C. Calhoun." 6 vols. New York, 1851-1870, Vol. 
 
 IV. 
 Compilation of the Treaties in Force. Prepared under Resolution 
 
 of the Senate, February 11, 1904. Washington, 1904. 
 Congressional Documents. Statutes at Large, Vols. V, VII. 
 Executive Documents. 
 
 26th Congress, 2nd Session. Vol. III. 
 Executive Journals of the Senate. 
 Haswell, J. H. (Compiler). 
 
 "Treaties and Conventions Between the United States and 
 Other Powers." (Senate Executive Documents, 48th Con 
 gress, 2nd Session. Vol. I, Part 2.) 
 House Documents. 
 
 27th Congress, 3rd Session. 
 House Executive Documents. 
 26th Congress, 1st Session. 
 27th Congress, 3rd Session. 
 
 Hansard, T. C. 
 
 Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series. Vols. 46, 49, 53, 55, 56, 63, 
 
 66, 67, 68. 
 Hertslet, Lewis, and others. 
 
 "A Complete Collection of Treaties and Conventions." 22 vols. 
 London, 1840-1905. Vols. VI, VII. 
 
 Kent, James. 
 
 "Commentaries on American Law." 2nd Ed. New York, 1832. 
 4 vols. Vol. I. 
 
83] 255 
 
 Maine Historical Society, Collection of Portland, 1889-1900. 
 
 Vols. VII-VIII. The Farnham Papers, comp. by M. F. Farnham. 
 
 Macdonald, William. 
 
 "Select Documents Illustrative of the History of the United 
 States." New York, 1898. 
 
 Mies Eegister. 
 
 Baltimore, 1839-1848. LXIV-LXVI. 
 
 New York Historical Society, Proceedings of. New York. 
 
 Phillimore, Eobert. 
 
 1 Commentaries upon International Law. 3rd Ed. London, 
 1879- 89. 4 vols. 
 
 Richardson, J. D. 
 
 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President s, 
 1789-1899." Washington, 1903. Vols. Ill, V, VI. 
 
 Senate Documents. 
 
 20th Congress, 1st Session. 
 25th Congress, 2nd Session. 
 26th Congress, 1st Session. 
 
 2nd Session. 
 27th Congress, 2nd Session.. 
 
 3rd Session. 
 
 29th Congress, 1st Session. 
 44th Congress, 1st Session. 
 
 Scribner s Statistical Atlas. 
 
 Hewes, F., and Gannett, H. Compiled 1883. 
 Scott, J. B. (editor). 
 
 1 Cases on International Law. St. Paul, 1906. 
 Taylor, H. 
 
 "International Public Law." Chicago, 1901. 
 Webster, F. 
 
 1 Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster. 2 vols. Boston, 
 
 1875. 
 Webster, Daniel. 
 
 "Diplomatic and Official Papers while Secretary of State." 
 
 New York, 1848. 
 "Works" (with a memoir by Edward Everett). 
 
 Boston, 1851. 6 vols. Vols. V, VI. 
 Wheaton, H. 
 
 "Elements of International Law." 6th Ed. W. B. Lawrence 
 (editor). Boston, 1855. 
 
256 [84 
 
 SECONDARY SOURCES. 
 
 American Antiquarian Society, Proceedings of. Vols. II and IV. 
 Worchester, Mass., 1898. 
 
 American Historical Society, Eeports of 1900, 1901, 1902, 1906. 
 American Historical Review. Vol. VII. New York, 1901- 02. 
 
 Benton, F. H. 
 
 "Thirty Years View in the United States Senate." 2 vols. 
 New York, 1856. 
 
 Bulwer, H. L. 
 
 "Life of H. J. Temple, Viscount Palmerston." London, 1870- 
 
 1874. 
 Butler, C. H. 
 
 "Treaty Making Power." 2 vols. New York, 1902. 
 
 Bourne, E. W. 
 
 Essays in Historical Criticism. New York and London, 1901. 
 
 Crandall, S. B. 
 
 "Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement." New York, 1904. 
 
 Curtis, G. T. 
 
 "The Life of Daniel Webster." 2 vols. New York, 1872. 
 "The Life of James Buchanan." 2 vols. New York, 1883. 
 
 Callahan, J. M. 
 
 "The Neutrality of the American Lakes." Baltimore, 1898. 
 "Last Forty Years of Canada." Vol. X. 
 
 De Lapradelle & Politis. 
 
 "Eecueil des Arbitrages Internationaux. " Vol. I, 1798-1855. 
 Paris, 1905. 
 
 Everett, E. 
 
 "Orations and Speeches." Boston, 1885. Vol. IV. 
 
 Foster, W. E. 
 
 "Eeferences to Presidential Administrations." New York, 1885. 
 
 Foster, J. W. 
 
 "A Century of American Diplomacy." Boston, 1902. 
 Gannett, H. 
 
 "Boundaries of the United States." Washington, 1885. 
 Gallatin, A. 
 
 "Works," edited by H. Allen. Philadelphia, 1879. 
 
 Hart, A. B. 
 
 "The Foundations of American Diplomacy." London, 1901. 
 
85] 257 
 
 Lodge, H. C. 
 
 "Daniel Webster. " Boston, 1884. 
 
 Moore, J. B. 
 
 "American Diplomacy/ New York and London, 1905. 
 "International Arbitration." Boston, 1896. 
 "Treatise on Extradition." 2 vols. Boston, 1891. 
 
 "North American Review" (1843). Vol. 56. 
 
 Schouler, E. 
 
 "American Diplomacy." New York, 1886. 
 
 Tyler, L. G. 
 
 "Letters and Times of Tyler." Richmond, 1884- 96. 3 vols. 
 Vol. II. 
 
 von Hoist, Dr. H. 
 
 "Constitutional and Political History of the United States." 
 8 vols. Tr. by J. J. Lalor et al. Chicago, 1887- 92. 
 
 "Westminster Eeview." Vol. XXXIX. 
 
THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS 
 
 WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN 
 THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY 
 WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH 
 DAY AND TO $1.OO ON THE SEVENTH DAY 
 OVERDUE. 
 
 MAR 26 1132 
 
 22 1937 
 
 LD 21-100m-7, 33 
 
286 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY