IC-NRLF 
 
EX 1 
 
 tmntfoer0it of Chicago 
 
 FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 
 
 CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1815-1830 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 OF THE 
 
 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
 
 BY 
 
 DAVID R. MOORED 
 
 CHICAGO 
 1910 
 
{iffntfctrgftg of Chicago 
 
 FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 
 
 CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1815-1830 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 x 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 OF THE 
 
 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
 
 BY 
 DAVID R. MOORE 
 
 CHICAGO 
 1910 
 
Press of 
 
 JENNINGS & GRAHAM 
 57 Washington St. 
 
 Chicago 
 
To My Wife 
 
 KTHEL HALLAM MOORE 
 this little monograph is affectionately dedicated. 
 
 239328 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Students of Canadian history must ever be thankful for the ex 
 tensive accumulation, careful preservation, and systematic arrange 
 ment, so far as the cataloguing has progressed, of the historical 
 manuscripts in the archive department at Ottawa, Canada. In the 
 Ontario archives much collecting and arranging remains unfinished. 
 I am very much indebted to the directors and librarians in these 
 archives, especially to those in Ottawa where most of my work was 
 done, for their courteous treatment and assistance. I am also very 
 grateful to Professor A. C. McLaughlin and his associates in the 
 history department of the University of Chicago for their patient 
 reading of this monograph and for their helpful suggestions. 
 
 University of Chicago, DAVID R. MOORE. 
 
 December, 1910. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. THE GENERAL CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN 1815. 
 
 British, Canadian, and American grievances existing after the Treaty 
 of Ghent. 
 
 CHAPTER II. THE MICHIGAN FRONTIER IN 1815. 
 
 Tardy surrender of forts ; British traders and British presents re 
 ported to be the reason why the Indians resist the American occupa 
 tion of Green Bay and other posts ; councils at Detroit ; murder of 
 Akochis and other trouble near Detroit ; desertion of soldiers. 
 
 CHAPTER III. NAVAL ARMAMENTS ON THE GREAT LAKES. 
 
 The continued searching of vessels leads to international correspond 
 ence and reduction of the navies. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. THE INDIAN MENACE. 
 
 The Indians in their councils of 1816 threaten war. 
 CHAPTER V. THE CANADIANS RETAIN THE INDIANS GOOD WILL. 
 
 The Indians prefer the British traders and cooperate with them ; 
 failure of the American factory system. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. INDIAN PRESENTS. 
 
 The British continue to send presents to American Indians ; reasons 
 for this ; number of Indians affected ; abuses resulting from the giving 
 of presents; protests. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. APPREHENSION OF AMERICAN AGGRESSION. 
 
 The British fear that the Canadas are still in danger of an Amer 
 ican invasion. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. DREAD OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND INFLUENCES. 
 
 Many British fear that American republican influences may cause 
 the Canadians to forsake their allegiance to England. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. BOUNDARY LINES AND FREE NAVIGATION. 
 
 Disputed boundary from the St. Lawrence River to Lake Superior. 
 United States claim the free navigation of the St. Lawrence. 
 
 CHAPTER X. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Navigation laws more strenuously enforced after 1815; temporary 
 and variable commercial regulations for the Canadas until 1822 ; de 
 mand for freer trade ; abandonment of the old colonial system ; smug 
 gling. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. TRANSPORTATION. 
 
 How Canadian relations with the United States affected the trans 
 portation system and other internal affairs in the Canadas. 
 
 7 
 

Canada and the United .States 1815-1830 
 
 I. 
 
 THE GENERAL CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN 1815. 
 
 The experience derived from the days of the American Revolution 
 must have taught European nations wholesome lessons in the man 
 agement of colonies. Nevertheless, for over half a century after 
 the British lost the United States, England still compelled her Amer 
 ican possessions to endure a slowly dying system of navigation 
 laws and similar irritating and obnoxious restrictions. It was ap 
 parently with the greatest reluctance that the average European 
 statesman could accept the theory that colonies do not exist solely 
 for the benefit of the mother country, that they are not places for 
 mere exploitation, and that local autonomy must be given in due 
 season. 
 
 The Canadas were peculiarly and dangerously situated for the 
 continuance of any antiquated and nonprogressive system. Com 
 mon laws, language, customs, and descent, common commercial 
 and industrial interests, similar local conditions and the lack of any 
 geographical barrier tended to bring the Canadians into very close 
 touch with the people in the United States. The very presence of 
 the youthful, vigorous, enterprising, liberty-loving American Re 
 public was a menace to anything that abridged natural rights." 
 In addition to this, American proclamations issued during the war 
 of 1812 convinced many Englishmen that the American Republic 
 was to be feared not merely from the example that it set, but from 
 the fact that its citizens were ambitiously eager to carry their flag 
 and institutions over all the continent. A few enlightened British 
 statesmen accordingly endeavored to retain the loyalty of their 
 colonists by loosening the shackles which bound colonial trade and 
 commerce and by strenuously opposing any arbitrary imperial 
 domination in local affairs. But until the rebellion of 1837 the 
 prevailing British policy was to maintain the old system, and as 
 far as the Canadas were concerned, prevent the loyal inhabitants 
 there from being exposed to the contaminating influence of the 
 expanding democracy to the south of them. 
 
 The Treaty of Ghent in 1814 was gladly welcomed because it 
 brought about the cessation of active hostilities, and yet it did not 
 usher in a period of perfect peace, harmony and confidence. In 
 
 9 
 
the United States indignation was aroused because practices con 
 tinued which it had been hoped the war would bring to an end. 
 Vessels were again boarded and searched; Indians were corrupted 
 by British presents; life and property along the western frontier 
 were endangered by savages generally believed to be emboldened 
 by British intriguers; the American Northwestern fur trade was 
 almost monopolized by foreigners; and increased difficulty was 
 experienced in persuading the tribes to surrender their lands and 
 make room for the American farmer and merchant. 
 
 The Treaty of Ghent stipulated that the United States should 
 restore to the Indians with whom they had been at war all the 
 possessions, rights and privileges which the Indians had enjoyed 
 or been entitled to in 1811, previous to the outbreak of the war. a 
 These "possessions, rights and privileges" were variously inter 
 preted by the United States, the Indians, and the British. During 
 the negotiations at Ghent the British plenipotentiaries, asserting 
 that the Indians "must in some sort be considered as an independent 
 people," endeavored to create a kind of Indian state in the Old 
 Northwest which would form a barrier between the United States 
 and Canada. b When they failed in this attempt to creat a buffer 
 state they insisted on having the Indians specially mentioned and 
 protected by the contracting parties. The British wanted to provide 
 for the welfare of the tribes who had helped them in the war, but 
 they also had in mind the protection of the Canadas and perhaps 
 were influenced not a little by the desire to have a share in the 
 profits of the fur trade. The result was that the British continued 
 to be very friendly with the Indians residing within the jurisdiction 
 of the United States, and Americans complained that much of the 
 Indian discontent was due to the sympathy and support which 
 Canadian agents extended to the tribes. 
 
 In Canada also there was restlessness. Almost unaided the 
 loyalists had held the enemy at bay for three years. Now they 
 saw their prosperity and progress hampered by ill-advised and un 
 intelligent regulations. They censured the London Colonial office 
 for exploiting the colonies, for placing friends in fat salaried si 
 necures, for maintaining an irresponsible, superimposed, provincial 
 government, for fixing trade and tariff laws to favor English 
 merchants or manufacturers, for hindering American immigrants 
 
 "Am. State Papers, For. Bel., Vol. Ill, p. 745 ff. 
 b lbid., p. 706. 
 
 10 
 
from entering and developing the natural resources of Canada, 
 for sacrificing Canadian interests in commercial conventions and 
 boundary line awards, in short for being either ignorant of or in 
 different to provincial needs and desires. Canadian soldiers de 
 serted, and colonists left Canada for the western states. The 
 English suspected American immigrants and feared American de 
 mocracy. There was danger in the spread of republican principles 
 lest the loyal inhabitants of the British colonies should shake off 
 their allegiance to the mother country in order to enjoy greater 
 political liberty and economic prosperity. British administrative 
 officers were cognizant of dissatisfaction in the Canadas and be 
 lieved that the United States was in part responsible for this. c 
 
 The close of the three years war was therefore followed by a 
 period wherein there arose many a matter relative to the Canadas 
 which was international in scope and which became the subject of 
 discussion and negotiation between the .United States and the United 
 Kingdom. It is with these international events that the following 
 chapters have to deal. ! 
 
 Durham s Report, p. 41. 
 
 11 
 
II. 
 
 THE MICHIGAN FRONTIER IN 1815. 
 
 The first serious engagements of the war had been at or near 
 Detroit and Amherstburg. Here, too, among the frontiersmen so 
 recently withdrawn from the battlefield, and among a savage race 
 who hated the Long Knives for encroaching upon their lands, the 
 ugly demon of discord lingered the longest, ever threatening to 
 bring about a renewal of the strife. The Treaty of Ghent provided 
 for the speedy and mutual surrender of all posts. captured during 
 the war. But the first fort surrendered Fort Niagara was not 
 vacated by the British till May 22nd, 1815, and the delivery of 
 Fort Michillimackinac was delayed until late in the summer. This 
 tardiness on the part of the British was one of the first matters 
 causing trouble. 1 
 
 In the case of Fort Michillimackinac the British Charge d Affaires 
 had requested extra time, a request granted by President Madison 
 because there were no buildings available on the British shores of 
 Northern Lake Huron for the reception of the British garrison. 
 As a matter of fact, however, no haste was made in erecting the 
 buildings ; it had been the habit of the British in America to hold 
 what they already possessed; but Drummond, the commanding 
 officer in Canada, cannot be held entirely responsible for the delay 
 in ordering the departure of McDouall and his garrison from this 
 island. As soon as he heard the terms of the treaty, he gave the 
 American officers to understand that it was his anxious wish 
 "scrupulously to fulfill all the conditions of the treaty" as far as 
 they depended upon him, and, only the "absolute necessity of pre 
 paring a cover" in his own territory for the reception of his 
 Majesty s troops and stores in that quarter would cause him to 
 leave McDouall at Michillimackinac. 2 His sincerity in this is 
 demonstrated by a letter dated a little later in which he informed 
 Bathurst that the American government had issued instructions 
 not to give up the post at Maiden until a simultaneous restitution 
 should be made of the post at Michillimackinac and therefore he 
 had "instantly addressed a letter to Lieutenant Colonel McDouall" 
 
 iDrummond to Bathurst, C. A. Q. 133, p. 5. 
 
 Harvey to Murray, April 6, 1815, C. A. Q. 132, p. 10. 
 
 12 
 
ordering the "immediate removal" of his garrison "apprehensive 
 that delay in the evacuation of that island might afford grounds 
 of complaint on the part of the American nation." 3 At the 
 same time he communicated with Baker, the British minister at 
 Washington, requesting him to "impress the American government 
 with the assurance of his determination to fulfill the conditions of 
 the treaty of peace." 4 For the tardiness in leaving Michigan, 
 Baker, not Drummond, was primarily responsible. He knew what 
 Drummond was as yet unaware of the War Department at Wash 
 ington on April 29, 1815, had directed their military forces to be 
 continued upon the same establishment as they had stood at the 
 close of hostilities, 5 and for this reason he sent instructions to 
 procrastinate until definite reports should come from his home 
 government regarding the delivery of the fort and island. Upon 
 receipt of Baker s letter, Drummond countermanded all previous 
 orders. 6 It is apparent therefore that it was Baker s intervention 
 and a knowledge of the action taken by the American War 
 Department that caused the delay. But British traders and those 
 who wished to retain an influence over the Indians also pleaded 
 for procrastination. 
 
 The Northwest Company urged Drummond not to deliver 
 Michillimackinac until compelled to do so by positive instructions, 
 and at any rate, not to allow American custom houses to be estab 
 lished on the island while the British garrison remained there. 
 They said the Indian trade was "on the point of annihilation unless 
 the stipulation in the Treaty of Ghent to preserve Indian rights" 
 was meant to exclude military posts and custom houses of either 
 nation from the territory then occupied by the tribes 7 . Drummond s 
 reply to this company was that they should make representations 
 to His Majesty s government if they deemed it needful ; but mean 
 while he himself made certain concessions. He told McDouall to 
 allow no custom houses on the island so long as the British remained 
 there and to consult the company in the selection of a new post 8 . 
 This trading company had pleaded hard to get the British to keep 
 the Americans away from their trading centres. They urged that 
 if the British forces were withdrawn from the island, such with- 
 
 3 Drummond to Bathurst, May 20, 1815, C. A. Q. 132, p. 104. 
 
 Ibid. 
 
 5 Ibid. 
 
 Drummond to Bathurst, April 25, 1815, C. A. Q. 132, p. 18. 
 
 7 N. W. Company to Drummond, April 20, C. A. Q. 132, p. 25. 
 
 8 Harvey to Richardson and McGillivray, April 24, 1815, 0. A. jQ. 132, p. 32. 
 
 13 
 
drawal should be on the condition that no force from the United 
 States should occupy it, nor any civil authority of that country be 
 established there, until after the decision of the boundary com 
 missioners had been given 9 . 
 
 It was in the interests of both the military officers and the trading 
 companies to retain the good will of the Indians and it was well 
 known that the Indian warrior and hunter would show the greater 
 respect to the party that would display the greater force. The 
 United States realized this as vividly as did the Canadians. Graham, 
 an American agent, hoped that the evacuation of the western coasts 
 by the British forces would have the effect of inducing the Indians 
 to seek an early and satisfactory termination of all differences with 
 his countrymen 10 . Harrison and other American officers were 
 carefully warned to explain to the Indians why Michillimackinac 
 was not given up, so as to give the British no advantage over the 
 United States in relation to the Indian, and so as to beget a just 
 confidence in the power as well as the resolution of the American 
 government to maintain its rights against every opposition 11 . 
 
 It was impossible, however, for the British to procrastinate very 
 long without overtaxing the patience of the Americans. Moreover, 
 Drummond seems to have desired to live up to the terms of the 
 treaty as far as it lay within his power. On July 18, 1815, Michilli 
 mackinac was handed over to the American officers and one source 
 of trouble was removed. 
 
 The most fruitful and long enduring source of annoyance, never 
 theless, still remained. The British were loath to sever their con 
 nections with the tribes residing within the territorial limits of the 
 United States, and, in spite of American remonstrance and resist 
 ance, British agents still gave presents to the red men. Was it a 
 sense of moral duty or of gratitude for those who had assisted them 
 in the late war that prompted the British to dole out annual presents 
 and extend favors to the children of the forest ? Was it the shrewd 
 ness of the British trader who aimed at extending his business? 
 Or was this policy a precautionary measure on the part of the 
 British imperialist and military officer, who wished to retain an ally 
 for a future service? The British, as we shall see later, claimed 
 that gratitude for services rendered was the reason for any favors 
 shown to the Indians; but whatever may have been the motives, 
 
 N. W. Company to Drummond, April 20, 1815, C. A. Q. 132, p. 25. 
 
 10 Graham to Harrison, July 12, 1815, A. S. P., I. A., II, p. 15. 
 
 "Dallas to Harrison, McArthur, and Graham, June 9, 1815, A. S. P., I. A., II, p. 13. 
 
 14 
 
no sooner had the Treaty of Ghent been announced than Prevost, 
 administrator of affairs in Canada, issued an address which de 
 clared that presents should continue to be given to his dusky allies. 
 He ordered Drummond to select a deputation of regular officers or 
 members of the Indian Department, send them immediately to Bur 
 lington Heights, Saquina Bay, Michillimackinac, Green Bay and 
 Prairie du Chien, call the Indians together at these points, and tell 
 them that the Good Spirit had "moved the heart of their Great 
 Father beyond the Great Lakes to give peace to the nations ;" that 
 peace had been made with the last enemy, and the Indian had not 
 been forgotten ; that according to promises already given these 
 children were to have all the rights possessed by them before the 
 war; this meant that they were to return to their lands, plant their 
 corn, and hunt the deer ; traders would bring them their supplies as 
 formerly, and special care would be taken that the presents should 
 be sent to the frontier posts and should not be diminished ; peace 
 it was hoped would last forever; but if it were broken, it would 
 be by the fault of the Long Knives for the heart of their father was 
 spotless. 12 
 
 Thus Prevost promised peace and presents. Monroe, on the other 
 hand, with much less tact promised peace and posts. Clark, 
 Edwards, and Chouteau were told to make treaties with the Indian 
 tribes, to confine these treaties to the sole objects of peace, but at 
 the same time to avail themselves of the opportunity to inform 
 the Indian tribes that it was intended to establish strong posts very 
 high up the Mississippi, and from the Mississippi to Lake Michigan, 
 and to open trading houses at these posts or other suitable places 
 for their accommodation. 13 The very mention of posts was objec 
 tionable to the Indians. In the United States territory the Indian 
 saw the British only as a trader and friend, never as one taking up 
 his land and encroaching upon his hunting grounds. 
 
 In order to placate the Indians the Washington authorities ordered 
 their agents in the Northwest Territories to explain that the "policy 
 of introducing factories and military stations generally into the 
 Indian territory" was really in the interests of the Indian. The 
 chain of outposts from Chicago along the Illinois to St. Louis was 
 intended not only to guard against encroachments upon the property 
 and people of the United States, but to aid and protect the Indian, 
 
 "Prevost to Bathurst, C. A. Q. 131, p. 75, March 13, 1815. 
 
 "Monroe to Clark, Edwards, and Chouteau, March 11, 1815, A. S. P., I. A., II, p. 6. 
 
 15 
 
to furnish him supplies, to afford him an occasional asylum, to give 
 him an opportunity to claim redress for grievances, or to com 
 municate intelligence of any danger he might apprehend at home 
 or abroad. 14 But neither the President s explanations, nor his 
 presents which he also found it expedient to grant, appeased the 
 tribes. The Indian looked to the British colonies for help and the 
 Canadian authorities were often only too eager to encourage the 
 Indian to do so. 
 
 The Canadians, however, were not the only ones responsible for 
 the Indian trouble. Subordinates in the employ of the American 
 government seem to have been fond of using threats of force 
 rather than employing that "skillful cajolery" which would obtain 
 the same ends with less friction. At Green Bay it was reported 
 by the Indians that American agents had made boisterous threats 
 to seize lands which the Indians claimed to be their own and which 
 they refused to sell. In such resistance as this the Indians knew 
 where to find sympathy. Even Drummond hastened to acquaint 
 
 Bathurst that he was "concerned that there appeared 
 
 a strong indication on the part of the American government to 
 
 violate the existing treaty as far as related to the 
 
 infringement of Indian territories." 15 He had heard of a strong 
 American force having been sent to establish forts at Green Bay. 
 Chicago, Prairie du Chien, and at the Falls of St. Anthony and that 
 the plans to do so were openly reported. Under pretext of calling 
 a numerous council of Indians to make peace, the intention, he said, 
 seemed to be to destroy the tribes who would surrender their lands in 
 these parts ; and Major Morgan, an American officer commanding 
 at Michillimackinac, had frankly admitted to Lieutenant Colonel 
 McDouall that the American forces had "no right to occupy Indian 
 territory or to construct forts upon it which they did not possess 
 before the war, but that still it was determined upon and should 
 be done !" 16 General Brown; Drummond said, was hourly expected 
 with a strong body of men on his way to Michillimackinac to carry 
 out these designs. Certainly the Indians believed that their lands 
 and rights were being unjustly trespassed upon and the Northwest 
 Company supported them in this belief. 17 
 
 "Dallas to Harrison, June 9, 1815, A. S. P., I. A., II, p. 13. 
 
 "Drummond to Bathurst, August 27, 1815, 0. A. Q. 133, p. 82. 
 
 16 Ibid. 
 
 "McGillivray to Harvey, April 17, 1815, G. A. Q. 132, p. 35. 
 
 16 
 
The first serious dispute was at Green Bay ; it was there that the 
 Indians refused to sell their lands. The few white or mixed settlers 
 in that place were exclusively French or British, and we may be 
 sure that these people were not enthusiastic in urging the Indians 
 to comply with American demands. At Prairie du Chien, where 
 another dispute arose, the Northwestern Company vigorously sup 
 ported the Indians. 18 This place had not been occupied by Amer 
 icans before the war and therefore the Company maintained that 
 |the rights of the Indian should be as in 1811. Previous to the war 
 the most advanced post of the United States in this region was 
 Fort Madison on the Mississippi, some four hundred miles south 
 of Prairie du Chien. During the war a stockade had been built at 
 Prairie du Chien and this had fallen into the hands of an American 
 force but had been recaptured by British and Indians. At the 
 close of the war when other forts were given up, no restitution was 
 made of this one on the ground that it was Indian territory not 
 a part of the United States and had not been included in the gen 
 eral surrender of posts. 20 When the Americans, therefore, now 
 attempted to erect a trading post and a military station at Prairie 
 du Chien, the Indians and the Northwest Company objected, de 
 claring that without previous purchase and express permission no 
 one had a right to take possession of the place. Quasi sovereign 
 rights were claimed for the Indians ; and they, resenting the prox 
 imity of soldiers and settlers, appealed to their father across the 
 ocean for protection. Native warriors were thus zealously trying; 
 to block the westward march of the Americans and were encouraged 
 to do so by the foreign traders. 
 
 The President s agents were fully aware of these facts. "The 
 commotion of the Indians about Prairie du Chien and the failure 
 of the Winnebagoes, Menomonies, and the Chippewas to meet the 
 Americans in council," wrote Clark, Edwards, and Chouteau, "is 
 thought by most intelligent white men as well as by most respectable 
 friendly Indians to be the result of the immense presents which 
 the British government have lately distributed to the constant 
 intrigues of British traders who certainly have a greater quantity 
 of merchandise on the Mississippi at present than they have ever 
 had in any former year. They are making the greatest efforts to 
 retain their influence and to engross the whole of the trade." 21 
 
 "McGillivray to Harvey, April 17, 1815, C. A. Q. 132, p. 35. 
 
 ^Kingsford, IX, p. 70. 
 
 "Letter of Clark, Edwards, and Chouteau, Oct. 18, 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 9. 
 
 17 
 
Clark and his two companions also blamed the "contemptible British 
 trader" for the trouble they were having with the Sacs and Foxes. 22 
 Another American Indian agent declared that "every British trader 
 among the Indians is a political partisan, sowing the seeds of 
 distrust and dislike against the government and people of the United 
 States. It was through this description of persons that all the plans 
 of the late Indian war were laid, matured, and brought into opera 
 tion." 23 From Fort Wayne it was reported that even the kindness 
 of the United States had been misinterpreted and that enemies had 
 persuaded many Indians to believe that the United States permitted 
 goods to be sold on credit so that later these land-grabbers might 
 seize the lands in payment for unpaid debts. 25 
 
 In a treaty with several tribes in the fall of 1815 special pains 
 were taken to offset this reported intriguing. Emphasis was laid 
 upon the assertion that the United States were really taking care 
 of the tribes, that British intercourse was entirely a matter of in 
 dulgence, and that it must not be believed for a moment that Great 
 Britain had obtained any special benefits for them. 26 But intriguing 
 did not cease. Eight years later the British traders in the farther 
 West were accused of continuing this same kind of influence. 
 Major O Fallon, a man who, according to the National Intelligencer 
 of St. Louis, enjoyed a "reputation for penetration" and for an 
 "intimate acquaintance with the Indian character," reported that 
 many circumstances had transpired to induce a strong belief that 
 the Hudson Bay Company was then exciting the Indians to drive 
 the Americans from that quarter so as to reap the fruits of Amer 
 ican labor. He had been in hopes, he said, that the British traders 
 had some bounds to their rapacity, but, like the greedy wolf, not 
 yet gorged with flesh, they guarded the bones, they ravaged the 
 fields, and, not satisfied with participating in the Indian trade, they 
 had become alarmed at the individual enterprise of American people, 
 and were exciting the Indians against them. 27 Such evidence shows 
 how bitter was the feeling in the western territories against the 
 intrusive foreigner and how this hostility continued long after the 
 Treaty of Ghent had declared for a return of friendly intercourse. 
 
 K A. s. P., i. A. ii p. 9-10. 
 
 ^Letter of John Johnston, Agent, Piqua, Sept. 6, 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 83. 
 Stickney to Crawford, Oct. 1, 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 85. 
 
 "Treaty, Sept. 8, 1815, with tribes in Ohio. Indiana, and Michigan, A. S. P., I. A. II, 
 
 p. 13. 
 "National Intelligencer, Aug. 10, 1823, O. A. G. 222. 
 
 18 
 
Not only the British trader in general, but the British agents at 
 Amherstburg in particular were constantly exciting the ill will of 
 their neighbors across the river. In the summer of 1815 Harrison, 
 McArthur and Graham, American commissioners, called a council 
 of Indians at Detroit to inform them of the provisions of the Treaty 
 of Ghent and to "concert with them the proper measures for carry 
 ing the same into effect." 28 This meeting was called for August 
 25th, 1815, but the invitation did not produce the desired effect. 
 The Indians did not come. The commissioners were told that the 
 Indians had been detained by the British agents. A request was 
 therefore made to the senior officer at Maiden to take "measures, 
 to give full effect to the 9th article of the Treaty of Ghent," and 
 Major Langham was sent to deliver this request. While in the 
 discharge of this duty Langham felt that he had been rudely re 
 ceived by the Canadian officers and returned in high dudgeon to 
 Harrison. The Americans were now doubly irritated. Their own 
 Indians had been induced to stay away from the council and an 
 officer had been insulted. 
 
 Barracks, temporarily in command at Maiden, and Lieutenant 
 Colonel James, who had been absent when Langham arrived, sent 
 replies to Harrison s note. They declared that the Indians were 
 a free and independent people at liberty to act for themselves and 
 "had considered it a matter of greater importance to attend the 
 Council ordered to assemble in Amberstburg on the 26th instant 
 for the explaining of the articles of the Treaty of Ghent." No 
 inducements, they said, were held out to detain the Indians but it 
 was not surprising if Indians on the left -bank had not crossed over 
 when pains had so recently been taken to prevent any one of them 
 from ever passing over. Barracks was "unable to account for the 
 mysterious conduct" of Langham. 29 
 
 The curtness and general tone of the British replies was suf 
 ficient to make Harrison still more indignant. After calling atten 
 tion to the discourteous reception of his aide, and the hasty reading 
 or misinterpretation of his first note, Harrison wrote James that he 
 had never asked the British to compel the Indians to cross to the 
 Council at Detroit as Barracks had intimated and it was to be 
 regretted that the British had not explained the terms of the treaty 
 
 "Harrison, McArthur, and Graham to the commanding officer at Maldon, Aug. 26, 1815, 
 
 A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 15. 
 ^Barracks to Harrison, Aug. 27, 1815. A. S. P., I. A. II, 15. James to Harrison, 
 
 Aug. 29, 1815, I. A. II, 15. 
 
 19 
 
much earlier and so have prevented, perhaps, Indian depredations, 
 vexatious and injurious to American citizens, and troublesome to 
 the British themselves. Cass, he said, was now trying to prevent 
 these depredations by limiting intercourse with his people but it 
 was never intended to prohibit Indians from crossing the inter 
 national boundary. 31 
 
 Such letters and such actions are typical of the state of affairs 
 in this district all through the year 1815. Even if James did not 
 willfully try to hamper Harrison, undoubtedly he would have been 
 better pleased if the Indians had not gone to the American councils. 
 It looked suspiciously like an effort to exert influence, when he 
 called an Indian meeting on the Canadian side at the very time 
 set by the Americans for their council. If the civil or military 
 authorities in Canada were desirous of maintaining friendly inter 
 course with their American neighbors in the Amherstburg district 
 and all evidence seems to point in favor of such desire then 
 a man less adapted to foster peace and harmony could scarcely 
 have been found than Lieutenant Colonel James, the commanding 
 officer in that district. 
 
 But if James and his subordinates were trying to cater to the 
 red men, it is evident that the American officers had no thought of 
 retreating. Harrison persisted in his efforts to gather the Indians 
 before him, though forced to postpone this meeting from day to 
 day until the council on the other side of the river had been dis 
 solved. At last when his patience had been partly rewarded, he 
 endeavored to make up for lost time by vigorously berating the 
 British and extolling the virtues and bravery of his own country 
 men. He told the prophet and other red men in the assemblies that 
 their late British father had acknowledged his error and had agreed 
 to make peace; that the British had been defeated in the war with 
 the Americans, and in Europe they had not been unassisted in their 
 victorious struggle against Napoleon ; other nations had cooperated 
 with them; that in America the British agents had seduced the 
 chiefs and warriors from their duties to the United States and 
 were now deceiving them ; that their great father at Washington 
 was their only true friend and wanted peace and prosperity and 
 happiness to continue among his children. 32 
 
 "Harrison to James, Aug. 30, 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 15, 16. 
 32 Harrison s Speech, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 20, 25. See p. 18, 19 also. 
 
 20 
 
Harrison was not alone in complaining against British officers 
 during this first year of peace. United States Secretary of State 
 Adams reported to Earl Bathurst of the British Colonial office that 
 a British colonel, Nicholls, "after the conclusion of the peace, 
 actually concluded a pretended treaty of alliance, offensive and 
 defensive against the United States." 33 Bathurst expressed him 
 self in terms of unqualified disapprobation at this pseudo treaty. 
 It had not been, he said, approved of, for no such treaty could be 
 made by Great Britain. In this action of Nicholls there is one of 
 the first instances after the war of a colonial officer s clashing: 
 with the desire of the British government. It must be kept in mind 
 that the actions of the British frontier officers were not always in 
 harmony with the will of the home government; at all events the 
 Colonial Office more than once disclaimed any part in incidents 
 that caused offense to the goverment at Washington. 
 
 In October of this same year serious trouble was threatened from, 
 two other sources. On the morning of October 5, Richardson, 
 surgeon and justice of the peace of the Western District of Upper 
 Canada, a man who apparently bore no love for the Americans, 
 officially reported to James that an "unprovoked and most wanton 
 act of violence," namely the killing of an Indian, had been com 
 mitted the day before by a number of Americans near Grosse 
 Island. Some Indians had gone to the island "to shoot squirrels," 
 when they were approached by the Americans, "damned, told to 
 embark immediately, which they did," and were then fired upon, 
 the shot resulting in the death of one of. their number the next 
 morning. 34 James immediately wrote to Cass, briefly informing 
 him that an Indian had been "murdered under the most aggravated 
 circumstances" by eight or ten Americans, including an officer who 
 was with them at the time the cruel act was perpetrated. Then, in 
 language most untactful, and which Cass was justified in con 
 sidering offensive, he continued: "I need not point out to you 
 
 the line of conduct necessary on this occasion, my 
 
 pointing out to you the custom of savages in the present instance 
 would be needless." 35 Even if the Indian had really been wantonly 
 murdered and if it had occurred within British territory, both of 
 which we may presume James had been led to suppose, such a 
 message was unnecessary and ungentlemanly. Cass replied with 
 
 33 Adams to Castlereagh, March 21, 1816, C. A. Q. 138, p. 215. 
 34 Bichardson to James, Oct. 5, C. A. Q. 319, p. 199. 
 to Cass, Oct. 5, C. A. Q. 319, p. 181. 
 
 21 
 
dignity and firmness: he would make inquiry; if Americans were 
 guilty, American courts of justice would operate with rigid im 
 partiality; a person would be sent over to attend the inquest in 
 order to procure evidence. 36 But he incidentally reminded James 
 that some suggestions he had made in his note were unnecessary. 
 
 At the coroner s inquest, held October 6th, sworn evidence of 
 two of the Indians who were with Akochis, the deceased, showed 
 that some five Kickapoo Indians had been innocently hunting 
 squirrels on the island and were about to embark for Amherstburg 
 when ten American soldiers, one of them apparently an officer, 
 approached and asked the Kickapoos if they were British subjects. 
 When answered in the affirmative, they motioned the Indians to 
 leave the island. This command was immediately obeyed but as 
 soon as they had pushed off their canoe, one of the Americans 
 loaded his gun. The officer spoke to him and endeavored to grasp 
 the gun, but before this could be done, the soldier had fired, 
 wounding Akochis in the back. The coroner s jury declared 
 Akochis to have been murdered " feloniously, willfully, and with 
 malice aforethought by an unknown person supposed to be an 
 American." 37 
 
 It must be noticed that the coroner s jury simply stated that 
 this murder occurred in the waters of the Detroit River, apparently 
 indifferent whether the scene of the shooting was in American or 
 British territory or else willfully concealing the fact that it was on 
 the American side of what was then generally considered to be 
 the dividing line. It must also be noticed that the American 
 soldiers had not been heard in self-defense. The evidence of the 
 savages delivered through an interpreter was all that the jury had 
 upon which to base their verdict of willful murder. 
 
 The next day Cass again wrote to James stating that he had 
 "ascertained with precision the circumstances of the transaction." 
 The Indian, he said, was killed while in the act of presenting his 
 gun to McComb, the officer referred to by James. The event was 
 connected with the predatory system which the Indians had pursued 
 for some time on the Island and which the American soldiers were 
 trying to check. Since the shooting had occurred within the ter 
 ritorial jurisdiction of the United States, a British officer had con 
 sequently no right to require nor ought an American officer to give 
 
 M Cass to James, Oct. 5, C. A. Q. 319, p. 182. 
 
 ^James to Robinson, Oct. 16, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 179. 
 
 22 
 
any explanation upon the subject. 38 Cass then sent an officer, 
 McDougall, to hold a personal interview with James, because, as 
 reported by the latter, "letters are apt to lead to rancour and 
 personal interviews avoid it." 39 Cass, evidently, was unwilling 
 to allow this unfortunate incident to lead to further trouble, but 
 James was not of so peaceful a temperament. 
 
 According to McComb s testimony, and surely his testimony 
 ought to bear at least equal weight with that of a savage, these 
 Indians had been killing his cattle on the island. He ordered the 
 marauders to leave the island and they had just pushed off from 
 the shore when one of them aimed his gun at him. A soldier stand 
 ing by, noticing the danger, quickly drew his gun and shot the 
 Indian. This story is more probably the true one, but both James 
 and the magistrates jumped recklessly at conclusions, impelled by 
 the spirit of vengeance rather than wisdom. Paying no attention 
 to the letter from Cass, James, on October I2th, requested the 
 justices of the peace to "take such steps and measures" as would 
 most likely protect the British subjects as well as those entitled to 
 and claiming that protection. 41 Accordingly on the i8th of October, 
 there was issued, most imprudently on the part of the British officers 
 concerned, a proclamation offering $500 reward if the murderer 
 were secured in some one of His Majesty s jails in Upper Canada. 
 
 Three days later James received a letter from Caldwell, Deputy 
 Superintendent of British-Indian affairs, which caused more trouble. 
 The Prophet had complained to Caldwell that a few days after the 
 death of Akochis, some American had stolen from Stony Island 
 an island near Amherstburg eight horses and a colt belonging to 
 the Kickapoos ; the Indians, Caldwell said, wanted James to demand 
 a return of the horses. 42 James wrote a brief note to Cass enclos 
 ing Caldwell s letter and intimating that he had no doubt that Cass 
 would see to the restitution of the property because, when a similar 
 case had occurred the last summer, the United States officer had 
 been good enough to return the stolen property. 
 
 Cass reply to James showed not only impatience but a deter 
 mination not to budge from what he considered the rights of the 
 United States. In no ambiguous terms he told James to attend to 
 his own affairs and cease meddling with matters purely beyond 
 
 Cass to James, Oct. 7, 1815, C. A. jQ. 319, p. 184. 
 ^Letter written by Lt. Col. James, C. A. Q. 319, p. 186. 
 * Richardson to James, Oct. 12, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 204. 
 "Caldwell to James, Oct. 21, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 212. 
 
 23 
 
British jurisdiction. Stony Island, he said, was in the territory of 
 the United States ; the horses had been taken from there, not to 
 Canada, but to Michigan ; consequently, a British officer had no 
 right to interfere; "the jurisdiction of the United States and of 
 Great Britain within their territorial limits was exclusive ;" he would 
 not "acknowledge in principle nor ever admit in practice" the right 
 of any foreign authority to interfere in any arrangement or dis 
 cussions between them and the Indians living within his territory. 
 He was inclined to impute the conduct of Caldwell in interfering 
 either to a "profound ignorance of the relative rights of nations 
 or to a more artful though less pardonable motive, that of preserv 
 ing an influence over the Indians to be used as subsequent events 
 might render expedient." The letter concluded with the statement 
 that the United States courts of justice had made inquiries con 
 cerning the particular case referred to by Caldwell ; one horse 
 belonged to a citizen of Detroit, the others would be returned to 
 the Indians; but this information was given as a personal favor 
 to James, for American officers were under no compulsion to render 
 an account to a foreign power under the circumstances. 43 
 
 Cass fighting spirit was fully aroused. The next day he issued 
 a proclamation to counteract the reward offered by the magistrates 
 of Upper Canada for the apprehension of the murderer of Akochis. 
 He called attention to the fact that the killing had occurred wholly 
 within the jurisdiction of the United States and was a matter, there 
 fore, that concerned the United States alone; and in order that 
 British pretensions so unfounded might be resisted and that attempts 
 so unjustifiable might be repelled; that the people of his territory 
 might not be transported to a foreign country for acts committed 
 in his territory; that the Indians residing within the United States 
 might not be taught to look to the agents of another country for 
 protection and redress which American laws so fully afforded ; and 
 that a foreign influence incompatible with the sovereignty of the 
 United States might not be acquired and exercised over them, he 
 required all persons, citizens of his territory or residing therein, to 
 repel by force all attempts which might be made to apprehend any 
 person on the American side of the dividing line. 44 
 
 It will be noticed that one of the principal things Cass was trying 
 to break up was the foreign influence over the Indians of Mich- 
 
 *Cass to James, Oct. 26, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 214. 
 "Proclamation, Oct. 27, C. A. jQ. 319, p. 306. 
 
 24 
 
igan. 45 If James had been trying to exert undue interference in 
 affairs beyond his jurisdiction, he found himself properly check 
 mated by Cass. In a letter a few days later, however, James 
 defended his interference by taking "the liberty to remind" Cass 
 that the Treaty of Ghent amply provided for the Indians who had 
 lately been in alliance with Great Britain and that even those tribes 
 whose country extended as far as the Mississippi were included 
 in the treaty, and looked to England for a fulfillment of that solemn 
 agreement. 46 Surely James must have recognized that the Treaty 
 of Ghent could never have justified him in all his claims and 
 actions. 
 
 Meanwhile he had reported the whole affair to his superior officer, 
 Major General Sir Frederick Robinson, adding that little friendly 
 intercourse existed between the American and British officers in 
 that district because every time British officers were from curiosity 
 induced to cross to the opposite shore, the visit was attended by 
 some act of insult, whereas American officers on the Canadian shore 
 were treated with the greatest respect. 47 James later reported to 
 Robinson that it was evident that Governor Cass intended to cut 
 off all British communication and traffic with the western Indians 
 and that if this effort succeeded, the Indians would become allies 
 of the United States, and if so, Canada would be lost. It is perfectly 
 plain that James preferred the good will of the Indian to that of the 
 United States. 48 
 
 Drummond, the Governor in Lower Canada, also received infor 
 mation from James concerning the killing of Akochis, and as this 
 was his only source of information, he was persuaded that it was 
 a "wanton murder and an inhuman outrage," and, therefore, he 
 trusted that Gore, Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, would 
 demand the "strongest remonstrance from the American govern 
 ment." 49 Gore, on the other hand, had heard both sides of the 
 question and with a calm, sane judgment and with that conciliatory 
 spirit usually displayed by the central authorities on both sides, he 
 deplored the part played by James, Caldwell and the magistrates 
 
 484 The tenor and object of their [British] measures is to teach the Indians to look 
 to them for protection." Cass in letter to Monroe see A. H. A. Reports, 1888, 
 p. 77. 
 
 *James to Cass, Nov. 1, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 218. 
 
 47 At this very time an American officer at Detroit had just written to Baltimore com 
 mending the great civility with which the military officers and men treated each 
 other on both sides of the animosity which he believed existed between the 
 
 Nil< 
 
 citizens of Michigan and Canada. Niles Reg. IX, p. 188. 
 "James to Robinson, Oct. 16, C. A. Q. 319, p. 179. 
 "Drummond to Gore, Nov. 25, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 177. 
 
 20 
 
of the Western District. To him it was most obvious, from the 
 despositions taken, that the homicide was committed in the territory 
 of the United States. He regretted the fact that the coroner s 
 verdict seemed to have been drawn up with a view to conceal this, 
 and concealment could have been designed only to cover the extraor 
 dinary measure of the proclamation and the reward offered by 
 those magistrates. He blamed James for not adopting a more 
 conciliatory policy and ordered all further discussions to be carried 
 on between His Majesty s minister at Washington and the govern 
 ment of the United States. 50 Luckily for the interests of peace 
 Gore s influence prevailed, and luckily, too, no attempt was made to 
 earn the $500 reward. The "border warfare" arising out of these 
 two particular questions was transferred from Detroit and Am- 
 herstburg to Washington and London. 
 
 4- Meanwhile, however, the press in sections of the United States 
 interested in the West, and unfriendly to Britain, was discussing the 
 action of these Western magistrates. The Pittsburg Mercury 
 called upon Congress to take action. The affairs at Detroit, it said, 
 afforded "evidence of the hostile disposition of the British com 
 manding officer towards the American government and people," 
 and these transactions showed the length to which he was disposed 
 to go and "furnished unequivocal testimony of a desire in the 
 British authorities to cherish and promote among the savages dis 
 positions hostile to the United States to be employed as future 
 events (might) render necessary ; the pompous interference of His 
 Majesty s agents were designed to give the untutored savages 
 exalted ideas of the friendship, the power, and the dignity of the 
 British government and to make that government appear to them 
 as the avenger of their wrongs ; these circumstances connected with 
 the preparations being made by the British government throughout 
 the whole length of the Canadian lines, loudly called for preparations 
 also on the part of the United States." 51 
 
 Sufficient pressure was brought to bear upon Congress to induce 
 John Quincy Adams to enter in the spring of 1816 a formal com 
 plaint against the British military officers in America. He asserted 
 that these officers "labored with an activity as restless and a zeal 
 as ardent as they could have done in the heat of war" to instigate 
 Indians to continued or renewed hostility. The proceedings of 
 
 50 Gore to Baker, Dec. 26, 1815, O. A. Q. 319, p. 174. 
 
 "Pittsburg Mercury, quotation in Niles, IX., p. 241. Dec. 2, 1815. 
 
 26 
 
uu 
 
 ., 
 
 James and of the magistrates in Upper Canada bore such a strong 
 resemblance to those of Colonel Nicholls that he hoped they would 
 receive the same disapproval and disavowal by His Majesty s gov 
 ernment. He trusted also that the British government would issue 
 such orders that no doubt would be left on the minds of American 
 officers that the intention towards the United States was peace. 52 
 
 Adams protest appears to have borne immediate results. Gov 
 ernor Sherbrooke, who came to Canada in July, 1816, at once sent 
 instructions to his subordinates to repress by every means in their 
 power the hostile disposition of the Indians towards the Amer 
 icans, 53 ordered no presents to be sent to the United States Indians 
 and directed the Superintendent of Indian Affairs to adhere strictly 
 to these regulations. 54 Gore also concurred with Sherbrooke ill 
 this policy. 
 
 Meanwhile another source of trouble had caused irritation along 
 the frontier. Sailors were abandoning British vessels on the Great 
 Lakes as well as at the Atlantic ports, and soldiers were deserting 
 from British regiments. Americans were blamed for not only entic 
 ing these deserters but for preventing their recovery. 540 Soon after 
 the peace was proclaimed Drummond tried to recall his runaways 
 by issuing a proclamation pardoning all such who would return 
 to their former regiments before July 7, 1815. 55 But this pardon 
 was not sufficient. More money and better opportunities could be 
 found under the American flag, if not as a soldier, then as citizen. 56 
 
 In the various controversies caused by frequent desertions of 
 British soldiers and sailors neither side was blameless. In one 
 instance several sailors deserted together, and landed about ten 
 miles from Detroit. They were followed by a crew of officers and 
 men who disembarked, examined several houses, and at length 
 seized one man and sent him to the Canadian side. Then they 
 placed sentinels on the American highway, one of whom fired on a 
 citizen. These events angered the people of Detroit, who flew to 
 arms and arrested both the officers and the men. Later it was 
 agreed to release all except one officer who was to be held until 
 the men already sent to Canada should be returned. The officer 
 
 "Adams to Castlereagh, March 21, 1816, C. A. ,Q. 138, p. 215. 
 
 "Sherbrooke to Bathurst, July 15, 1816, C. A. Q. 136, p. 7. 
 
 "Sherbrooke to Bathurst, July 20, 1816, C. A. Q. 137, p. 157. 
 
 B4 a"Not a vessel arrives at New York from this country without her crew being 
 
 immediately seduced into the American service." From a London paper Niles 
 
 Register IX, p. 428, Feb. 1816. 
 "Kingsford, IX, p. 31. 
 "Glenelg to Head, C. A. G., p. 79. 
 
 27 
 
was put in an American fort and James was requested to release 
 his prisoner but refused to do so. The captive-officer was tried in 
 Detroit, fined $400 or $500 and released, though Chief Justice 
 Woodward said he "ought to have been pilloried and imprisoned." 57 
 On another occasion the bandmaster of the 37th regiment went 
 to Detroit to bring back a boy who had deserted, but who afterwards 
 had expressed a willingness to return. As soon as the bandmaster 
 had made known his errand he was surrounded by a mob and 
 escaped only through the friendly intercession of an American 
 officer. 570 At another time it was reported that an orderly sent 
 to Detroit on business was approached by two who had previously 
 deserted and by two American citizens who greeted him with a 
 considerable display of cordiality ; these invited him to a dance where 
 he should have the privilege of dancing with a "major s daughter," 
 and urged him to remain in Detroit wherein he could escape from 
 the tyranny of England. A newspaper was thrust into his hand, 
 containing an article which declared that 10,000 of the oppressed 
 in England were migrating that summer to find freedom in the 
 United States. Every artifice, declared James, was used by certain 
 classes across the river to entice the British soldiers to that side. 57b 
 
 It might be considered not unfair tactics for the United States 
 marshal to encourage desertion during the war. 58 But long after 
 the war James found occasions such as these cited above upon which 
 to complain loudly and grievously against both ordinary citizens 
 and officers in Detroit for not only conniving at desertion but for 
 openly enlisting deserters in their own army. 59 On March 2, 1816, 
 James published a partial list of those who had left his ranks and 
 had been enlisted in the United States army. American deserters, 
 he said, had offered to enter the British service but care had been 
 taken to discourage such desertion and it had been the practice 
 of British commanders to compel these deserters to leave the 
 Canadian frontier within twelve hours. 60 
 
 Bagot called the a^ention of Monroe to this practice of admitting 
 deserters "into corps within sight of the regiments they had so 
 disgracefully abandoned," 61 to which Monroe immediately replied 
 
 07 Niles, IX., p. 104, 187, Sept. 1815. 
 
 ""Letter of Lt. Col. James, C. A. Q. 138, p. 192. 
 
 B7b lbid. 
 
 58 Loring s Memorandum, Jan. 23, 1815, C. A. Q. 131, p. 26. 
 
 B9 James to Robinson, Oct. 16, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 179. 
 
 C. A. Q. 138, p. 275. 
 
 "Bagot to Monroe, May 24, 1816, C. A. Q. 138, p. 277. 
 
 28 
 
that such alleged practices were entirely contrary to the general 
 orders of the war department and ordered investigations. 62 General 
 McComb, writing over three months after James made his com 
 plaints, did not deny the fact that James charges might be well 
 founded. What he did say was that though no recruiting had taken 
 place since the war, substitutes were allowed, and deserters might 
 have crept in by that means ; however, more stringent rules had 
 been passed since his attention was called to this, and "already 
 perfect harmony existed between the officers on both sides of the 
 line." 63 
 
 Subsequent desertion of soldiers nevertheless was destined to 
 interrupt this "perfect harmony." American troops in their turn 
 invaded Canadian soil in search of alleged deserters and the corre 
 spondence of these years reveal how difficult, tedious and expensive 
 it was to trace fugitives who had escaped from one country into 
 the other. In districts sparsely settled and comparatively poorly 
 policed a culprit might easily secrete himself and baffle all pursuers. 
 Vexatious delays and much ill feeling often arose because of the 
 lack of any extradition treaty and such a treaty failed to be agreed 
 upon until more than twenty-five years after the war, largely be 
 cause the British government was reluctant to consider any terms 
 which insisted upon the return of runaway slaves. 64 
 
 b2 Bagot to Castlereagh, C. A. Q. 138, p. 273. 
 
 63 McComb to Monroe, June 20, 1816, C. A. (Q. 138, p. 309. 
 
 "Richmond to Bagot, Aug. 18, 1818, C. A. Q. 149, p. 78, 90. Richmond to Bathurst, 
 Nov. 19, 1818, C. A. Q. 149, p. 131. Letter of E. T. Throop, July 3, 1882, 
 C. A. Q. 223. Vaughan to Dudley, 1828, C. A. Q. 185, p. 208. Clay to Vaughan, 
 Jan. 23, 1828, C. A. Q. 185, p. 211. Dalhousie to Bathurst, Oct. 27, 1821, C. 
 A. Q. 157, p. 388. Van Buren to Vaughan, July 21, 1829, C. A. ,Q. 189, p. 161. 
 Vaughan to Kempt, Aug. 1, 1829, C. A. Q. 189, p. 151. Hillier to Goulburn, Sept. 
 24, 1819, C. A. Q. 326, p. 117. Gleneig to Head, C. A. Q. 83, a demand for the 
 return of the slave. See the draft on the Convention sent by Palmerston to 
 Fox, April 27, 1840, and the letter of Fox to Poulett Thompson, Sept. 10, 1840, 
 C. A. G. 226. 
 
 20 
 
III. 
 
 NAVAL ARMAMENTS ON THE GREAT LAKES. 
 
 The year 1816 was perhaps the most critical in the first decade 
 after the war. The intriguing at the Council, the Indian murder 
 and horse stealing incidents, the advance of American settlers and 
 military posts, the exclusion of British traders by an act of Con 
 gress and the more or less open sympathy and support of the 
 British trader and frontier military officer made the tribes very 
 hostile towards the Long Knives. Before we continue the con 
 troversy over Indian affairs, however, we shall take up another 
 matter which occupied the attention of the British and Americans 
 during the summer of this year. When John Quincy Adams, the 
 American ambassador to England, lodged a complaint in March 
 against certain actions of James and others, he coupled with this 
 note to Castlereagh a proposal to reduce the existing naval arma 
 ments on the Great Lakes, the reductions to be mutual and the 
 degree to which they should be made to be left to the action of 
 His Majesty s government; but the greater the reduction, the more 
 acceptable it would be to the President of the United States and 
 most acceptable of all should it be agreed to maintain on either 
 side during the peace no other force than such as might be nec 
 essary for the collection of revenue. 74 
 
 This was a very timely proposal. For the continuance of peace 
 some such action was necessary because the right of search after 
 the Treaty of Ghent was still claimed and practised by the British. 
 Western American papers grew very much excited over this prac 
 tice. The Pittsburg Mercury of June, 1816, again took up the 
 cudgels and published a series of articles in regard to the arrogant 
 conduct of the British on the waters of Lake Erie. The firm and 
 dignified remonstrance of Governor Cass, it said, had not been 
 sufficient to restrain the practice complained of ; another American 
 vessel had been forcibly entered and searched within the waters 
 of Put-in-Bay, Ohio ; such insolent conduct could not and would not 
 be borne ; the government of the United States must take immediate 
 notice of the subject and order into service a sufficient force to 
 
 74 Adams to Castlereagh, March 23, 1819, C. A. Q. 138, p. 220. 
 
 30 
 
compel respect for the American flag. 75 The Buffalo press ironically 
 and sarcastically declared that the firing on the American schooner, 
 Mink, near Put-in-Bay by his majesty s schooner was "truly British" 
 and "magnanimous ;" and Niles wrote, "The long and short of the 
 matter is this that the insult must and will be atoned for." Niles, 
 too, was very much excited over the reported increase of the 
 British forces in Canada and the establishing of a more "respectable 
 naval force" upon the lakes. Movements of Canadian vessels on 
 Lake Ontario made him suspect that the right of search would 
 there be exercised as it was on Lake Erie and he also found reason 
 to believe that British officers were in most of the seaports of the 
 United States, making maps of them and the places adjacent. 
 "The danger is not over," he wrote. 76 
 
 , During the spring of 1816 complaints and affidavits came officially 
 from Cass to the effect that parties of armed men from the British 
 war vessel Tecumseh on Lake Erie had boarded several vessels 
 belonging to the United States. 77 Baumgardt, the senior British 
 captain, was anxious to prevent controversies. He wrote to Captain 
 Bourchier, commanding on Lake Erie, regretting that the latter 
 had issued orders to search "all vessels passing through the port 
 of Amherstburg" and requested that such action should be dis 
 continued. Later in 1816 another complaint of illegal search gave 
 rise to diplomatic correspondence. Baumgardt admitted that Bour 
 chier had exceeded his power in searching the American vessel 
 and once more he ordered that there should be absolutely no boarding 
 or searching of American vessels. However, it was pointed out 
 that the complaint had not "proceeded from the master or owner 
 of the vessel searched, but from passengers, men of a class ap 
 parently anxious to blow up every trifling occurrence into a flame ;" 
 and, moreover, the United States themselves were committing the 
 same offense; for one of their vessels had followed a British boat 
 from Niagara to search her for deserters. The whole point of this 
 particular incident, Baumgardt said, was the American effort to 
 maintain a claim to Bois Blanc, an island near Amherstburg. If 
 their ships kept to their own territory they would never have been 
 disturbed. 78 
 
 75 Pittsburg Mercury, July 17, 1816, C. A. Q. 138, p. 337. 
 
 76 Niles Register IX., p. 152, Oct. 17, and Oct. 24, 1815, p. 169, Nov. 4, 1815. Niles 
 
 Register XI., p.. 30 and 47, Sept. 7 and 14, 1816. 
 "Baumgardt to Bourchier, Sept. 5, 1815, O. A. Q. 146, p. 13. 
 "Baumgardt to Bagot, C. A. Q. 146, p. 15. 
 
 31 
 
The commanding naval officers in Canada were not eager for 
 strife. The civil authorities had also taken steps to prevent their 
 naval force from meddling with American vessels and this action 
 on the part of Lieutenant Governor Gore preceded Adams proposal 
 to eliminate the armaments on the lakes. Two days before Adams 
 submitted his proposition to the court of Saint James a Canadian 
 naval captain, Owen, asked Gore for "unquestionable authority" to 
 act as magistrate in other words to be empowered to arrest smug 
 glers. 80 Gore replied that the Great Lakes were open to the United 
 States for navigation and the British civil authority was sufficient to 
 support the revenue laws. 81 Owen was ordered to cease searching 
 public vessels, but he significantly told Gore that "if only the col 
 lector of duties had a right to visit vessels on the Lakes, a new 
 feature was thereby given to the naval service." 82 
 
 Adams representation to the British government complaining 
 of improper interference on the part of British naval officers re 
 sulted in Bathurst s sending the most positive instructions to Gore 
 and to his successor, Sherbrooke, to discourage "all proceedings 
 of this nature and to exert their utmost authority and influence to 
 maintain within the limits of their government in all communica 
 tions and intercourse with the American authorities and people, a 
 line of conduct strictly conformable to the relations of amity and 
 friendship so happily existing between the two nations." 83 The 
 friendly disposed Sherbrooke received and communicated these 
 orders and heartily tried to enforce them, "because much inter 
 ference was so much at variance with the intentions of His Majesty s 
 government." 84 It is clear that, if the British navy on the lakes 
 thereafter interfered with American vessels so as to provoke ill 
 feeling, it was neither in accordance with the British wishes nor 
 with the wishes of the Canadian civil authorities. Almost invariably 
 American protests were favorably acted upon by the cabinet in 
 London. 
 
 The agreement of April 28, 1817, to reduce the naval armaments 
 went a long way towards removing further trouble. 85 Henceforth 
 the naval force to be maintained upon the lakes, should be confined 
 to the following vessels on each side; on Lake Ontario to one 
 
 "Owen to Gore, March 21, 1816, O. A. Q. 220, p. 218. 
 "Gore to Owen, May 14, 1816, C. A. Q. 320, p. 212. 
 "Owen to Gore, May 27, 1816, C. A. jQ. 138, p. 91. 
 Bathurst to Gore, Sept. 9, 1816, C. A. G. 58. 
 "Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Nov. 21, 1816, O. A. Q. 137, p. 300. 
 C. A. Q. 146, p. 127. 
 
 32 
 
vessel not exceeding 100 tons burden and armed with one eighteen- 
 pound cannon; on the Upper Lakes to two vessels; and on the 
 waters of Lake Champlain to one vessel of the same kind. It was 
 stipulated that the other armed vessels on the lakes should be forth 
 with dismantled and if either party should be desirous of annulling 
 the stipulation, six months notice to that effect should be given. 86 
 Although the naval armament on both sides was reduced, as 
 indicated above, each nation maintained a limited naval equipment 
 not until fifteen years later did the British seriously discuss the 
 expediency and policy of discontinuing this remaining unnecessary 
 and even baneful establishment. The United States had already 
 set the example which the British admiralty at last wisely followed. 
 The Lords of the Admiralty were prompted to do this from motives 
 quite as potent as that of removing possible friction with the United 
 States. First, there was the expense; the pay and allowance of 
 the officers and men, and of the civil part of the establishment 
 employed on the Lakes, amounted to a sum exceeding eight thou- 
 
 86 The following is an account of the actual force upon the lakes in the spring of 1817; 
 British vessels. Lake Ontario. 
 
 St. Lawrence can carry 110 guns; laid up in ordinary 
 Psyche . . . . " " 50 
 Princess 
 Charlotte 
 
 unfit for service 
 
 Niagara 
 
 Charwell 
 
 Prince Regent " 
 
 Montreal carries 
 
 Star 
 
 Netley Schooner. 
 
 40 
 20 
 14 
 
 60 
 
 unequipped 
 transport only 
 4 unfit for service 
 
 surveyor s boat 
 
 Some row boats, 274 gun ships on the stocks and one transport of 400 tons. 
 
 Lake Erie. 
 
 Tecumseh and New Castle, 4 guns each. 
 Huron and Tank, 1 each, transports chiefly. 
 
 Lake Huron. 
 2 schooners, 1 gun each; transports only. 
 
 Lake Champlain. 
 12 gun boats, 10 of these laid up in ordinary (C. A. Q. 138, p. 366.) 
 
 American vessels. 
 
 Lake Ontario. 
 Brig Jones 18 guns in service 
 
 Schooner, Lady of the Lake 1 
 
 Ship New Orleans, Rate 14 
 
 Chippewa 74 
 
 Superior 44 
 
 Mohawk 32 
 
 General Pike 24 
 
 Madison 18 
 
 Brig Jefferson 18 
 
 Sylph 16 
 
 Oneida 18 
 
 Schooner Raven 
 
 15 barges each one gun, laid up for preservation. 
 
 Lake Erie. 
 
 Schooner Porcupine 1 gun, transport 
 
 Ghent 1 
 
 Ship Detroit, rate 18 
 
 Brig Lawrence 20 
 
 Queen Charlotte 14 
 
 Niagara 18 
 
 33 
 
 revenue service, 
 on stocks 
 
 dismantled 
 
 sunk at Erie 
 
 dismantled at Erie 
 
sand pounds a year, while the quantity of stores kept at Montreal 
 and Kingston ever since the war had been "quite enormous" and 
 the loss from waste and decay had been proportionately great." 87 
 Second, all this expense was unnecessary. True, the people of 
 Canada had looked to the fleet as one means of defense against 
 the United States; but protection had been increased by the con 
 struction of the Rideau Canal and the fortifications at Quebec and 
 Kingston ; the line of forts recommended by the Duke of Wellington 
 had gone far to make Canada impregnable. 88 At any rate it was 
 a vain effort to try to maintain a British naval supremacy on the 
 Great Lakes. 
 
 The British admiralty, however, were afraid a false impression 
 might be created by a sudden withdrawal of the establishment. 
 Hence, it was suggested simply to cease to repair the vessels. 
 Definite steps were not taken towards decisive reductions till October, 
 i834. 89 The Admiralty thereby acted in harmony with the general 
 policy of the reform government of that day, but incidentally they 
 removed an obstacle in the way of friendly intercourse between the 
 Canadas and the United States. A few other British statesmen 
 meanwhile were trying to lessen expense and increase international 
 good will by cancelling or decreasing the gifts to American Indians. 
 A greater number of influential British traders and government 
 igents, however, for various reasons, advised their government to 
 continue the granting of these presents. Such traders and agents 
 were a menace to the westward march of the American settlers. 
 
 Lake Champlain. 
 
 Ship Confiance, rate 32 Laid up at White Hall 
 
 Saratoga 22 " 
 
 Brig Eagle 12 
 
 Linnet 16 
 
 Schooner Ticonderoga 14 
 
 6 galleys, each 2 
 
 0. A. Q. 138, p. 370. 
 * 7 Barrow to Hay, Dec. 3, 1833, C. A. Q. 210, p. 17, and see Hall s Travels in Canada 
 
 and U. S. 1817, p. 100 and 101. 
 8 Ibid. 
 
 9 Barrow to Hay, Oct. 7, 1834, C. A. Q. 218, p. 52, and see Niles Reg. for Dec. 31, 1831, 
 p. 327. 
 
 34 
 
IV. 
 THE INDIAN MENACE. 
 
 While the question of the decreasing of the naval armaments was 
 being discussed in England and in Canada during the year 1816, 
 the discontented tribes of the Northwest formed a confederacy, 
 collected in great numbers about the frontier Canadian posts, and 
 demonstrated by their numbers and their actions that they bitterly 
 resented what they considered American encroachment upon their 
 rights and privileges. An Indian Council met at Amherstburg on 
 June 19, composed of the Hurons, Ottawas, Chippewas, Potta- 
 wotomies, Shawnees, Kickapoos and Munsies. Lieutenant Colonel 
 James and other officers of his garrison were also present. 
 
 The Indians in this council complained that when they had re 
 turned to their old hunting grounds after the ratification of the 
 Treaty of Ghent they had been ordered to depart, with the notice that 
 if they refused, they would be fired upon. It was claimed, they 
 said, that their lands had been sold "from such a latitude to such 
 a latitude." They never sold lands except from some named river or 
 creek to some other river, lake or mountain ; and lately they had 
 sold no land at all to the United States. At Detroit a certain Mr. 
 Godfrey, they declared, had ordered them back into Canada, telling 
 them that the United States was their country no longer. They 
 mourned over losses which they had suffered in order to help the 
 British ; they had not received the prize money for helping to take 
 Detroit, they had lost all, their horses, cattle, plows, houses. They 
 wanted James to lay their complaints before the government at 
 Quebec and insisted that the British keep their promises to recom 
 pense them for losses. 90 
 
 A little earlier in June there met at Drummond Island a tumul 
 tuous assembly, composed chiefly of Sioux. There were some four 
 hundred at first, and at least three times that number were said to 
 be on the way thither. According to McDouall, commanding officer 
 at that post, they were brooding over wrongs, indignant because 
 no assistance had been given them, and consequently hazarding 
 the safety of the garrison. Presents of a little powder and other 
 
 C. A. Q. 206, p. 301; also Kingsford IX., p. 68. 
 
 35 
 
things, he said, failed to give satisfaction to the Indians but angered 
 the Americans; chiefs of the greatest reputation could not divest 
 themselves of the suspicion that the erection of forts in the western 
 territories meant their complete subjugation if not entire destruc 
 tion; and the little Corbeau considered the exclusion of British 
 traders as sealing the ruin of the nations. Little Corbeau referred 
 to an act of Congress approved of by President Madison April 29, 
 1816, whereby none but American citizens was henceforth permitted 
 to trade with Indians resident within the United States. 
 
 McDouall had no doubt that a strong confederacy of all the 
 nations on the Mississippi had been formed for the avowed object 
 of resisting American occupation of the West. The Indians seemed 
 f to be unanimous in an almost unprecedented degree. They came to 
 the councils, McDouall said, full of the idea of receiving British 
 assistance in securing for themselves possession of their land, rights, 
 7and privileges assured to them by the Treaty of Ghent; Americans 
 were blaming the British for fostering a bellicose spirit, whereas 
 Americans themselves were using every art to add to the discontents 
 of the savages, threatening and cajoling them by turns and almost 
 uniformly concluding with the boast that they had driven their 
 English father from among them and would shortly drive him 
 beyond the great Salt Lake. Two months later McDouall informed 
 Sherbrooke that another Indian council had been held. The Indians 
 were more excited than ever. McDouall feared that if they were 
 abandoned by the British now they would become the bitterest of 
 enemies with perilous results to the Canadians but this was just 
 what the Americans desired. In his opinion the late commercial 
 treaty renouncing British rights to the Indian trade was a most 
 lamentable mistake, because materially and morally the natives 
 had been supplied and cared for by these traders. 91 
 
 Such were the sentiments of the British officer in close contact 
 with the Indians and with his American neighbors. Because of his 
 position on the frontier, his recent task of defending his post against 
 attacks, his habit of looking upon the American as an enemy, his 
 contact with the British traders, and possibly his own personal 
 interest in the Indian trade, we may expect him to have held biased 
 opinions ; but it was such men as he who could appreciate the loss 
 
 "McDouall to Military Secretary June 1, 1816, O. A. Q. 137, p. 12 ff. 
 
 McDouall to Mil. Sec., June 17, 1816, O. A. Q. 137, p. 12 ff. 
 McDouall to Mil. Sec., June 19, 1816, C. A. Q. 137. 
 
 McDouall to Mil. Sec., Aug. 7, 1816, C. A. Q. 137, p. 70 ff. 
 
of the good will of the tribes and the consequent danger from 
 a military and from a commercial standpoint. 
 
 The men above the frontier officer, however, especially the home 
 government, remote from the scene where the real action was in 
 progress and representing not only Canadian but imperial interests, 
 looked upon all this excitement in the West in a far different light. 
 While McDouall was thus worried, John Quincy Adams was 
 corresponding with the British government, endeavoring, as we 
 have seen, to preserve peace and good will in the West and calling 
 attention to what had been represented to him as irregularities and 
 injustice on the part of certain British officials. Whether this 
 letter from Washington was the motive or not, the British gov 
 ernment, both at home and in Canada, used redoubled exertions 
 to appease American anger. Sherbrooke instructed McDouall to 
 repress, by every means in his power, the hostile disposition of the 
 Indians towards the United States and informed Bagot, the British 
 minister in Washington, of these instructions. Sherbrooke further 
 instructed McDouall to intimate clearly to the Indians that no 
 presents would be made to any of those residing within the limits 
 of the United States and directed Sir John Johnson, Superintendent- 
 General of Indian Affairs, strictly to adhere to this regulation on 
 all occasions. 95 Bathurst and Gore entirely concurred with Sher 
 brooke in the inexpediency of sending presents to the far distance 
 vSacs or other tribes, and Drummond was instructed by them to 
 govern his conduct accordingly. 98 
 
 Nevertheless, contrary to the policy thus dictated, a "few swords, 
 sashes, and epaulets" were purchased and given as a "mark of the 
 estimate of the zeal and bravery of certain Indian chiefs." Sher 
 brooke, true to his policy, refused to approve of this expenditure 
 with the result that McDouall and McKay who had been responsible 
 for the purchase were allowed to pay the bill out of their own 
 purses. 97 Here again was one of several instances wherein sub 
 ordinate officers tended to endanger the preservation of the peace 
 while the higher authorities were striving to give no offense to the 
 American government. To prevent further trouble McDouall was 
 again commanded not to communicate directly with any of the 
 United States authorities, but all matters in dispute were to be 
 
 ^Sherbrooke to Bathurst, July 15, 1816, C. A. jQ. 136, p. 7. Sept. 20, 1816, C. A. Q. 
 
 "Bathurst to Gore, July 13, 1816, C. A. Q. 58. 
 
 "McDouall to Military Secretary, June 19, 1816, O. A. Q. 138, p. 241. 
 
 37 
 
communicated through Sherbrooke. 8 He was once more urged to 
 discourage the hostile disposition of the Indians and to tell them 
 explicitly that the British government would neither countenance 
 nor assist in any action against the American people, and that com 
 plaints they wished to bring forward would be promptly attended 
 to and peaceful negotiations would be more likely to obtain rea 
 sonable objects than would any act of indiscreet conduct." 
 
 The Westminster government, it is clear, did not at this time 
 encourage the Indian in his hostility to the Americans. In fact, 
 it may fairly be conceded that all through this period, there was 
 an attempt to maintain the good will of the American government 
 even though it should tend to the sacrifice of Canadian or Indian 
 interests. The commercial regulations had cut off the British trade 
 within American limits to the injury of the Upper and Lower 
 Canadian trader. Liverpool, Prime Minister of England, openly 
 declared that he had no intention of assisting his former Indian 
 allies even if they were being abused. The Treaty of Ghent, he 
 said, stipulated for the restoration of the Indians to all the territories 
 and privileges which they enjoyed previous to the war, but he 
 assured them it was never intended to offer any guarantee for the 
 repossession of them. 100 Liverpool s own policy therefore was to 
 do nothing towards helping the Indians regain any coveted hunting 
 grounds. 
 
 While McDouall was much worked up lest war should immediately 
 break out, Sherbrooke was convinced that the temper and conduct 
 of the chiefs indicated no danger unless they were first attacked. 101 
 Bagot, like McDouall on Lake Huron, was less optimistic. He had 
 been in communication with Monroe, had informed that Secretary 
 what steps Sherbrooke and the British government were taking 
 to prevent any disturbance, and had assured him that Great Britain 
 would lend no military assistance to the Indians. Monroe tried to 
 quiet Bagot s apprehensions by telling him that the United States 
 intended to build only one fort, the one at Green Bay, where there 
 had always been a fort, 102 and left the impression that the Indians 
 had no grounds to fear American encroachment. Bagot, however, 
 did not believe this. Notwithstanding the assurance from Monroe 
 
 8 Hall to McDouall, July 4, 1816, C. A. Q. 138, p. 327. 
 *>C. A. Q. 136, p. 222; C. A. Q. 138, p. 328. 
 100 Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Aug. 9, 1816, C. A. Q. 137, p. 68. 
 101 Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Aug. 9, 1816, O. A. Q. 137, p. 68. 
 102 Bagot to Castlereagh, Aug. 21, 1816, C. A. Q. 138, p. 313. 
 
 38 
 
he apprehended that the alarms of these Indians were in fact well 
 founded and that the building of forts was only a part of a larger 
 scheme by which it was intended gradually to expel or extirpate 
 the Indian from the soil. 103 As a matter of fact, the United States 
 had already planned to extend a line of forts far north and west 
 into the Indian territory. 104 
 
 During the years immediately following this stormy year of 1816 
 the trouble continued, though it was less violent. Jealous of British 
 influence and rightly so, the Americans were endeavoring to exclude 
 the British entirely from trading with Indians residing within the 
 United States. 105 The Indians, still alarmed at the extension of 
 American posts into the far west, 106 continued to resort to the 
 British posts at Drummond Island, and bitterly complained that the 
 British were neglecting them by not preventing the advance of the 
 Americans. McKay, writing in 1819, still professed to be afraid 
 of the most serious consequences to the garrison at Drummond 
 Island and to the lives of His Majesty s subjects in that part of 
 the country, unless some satisfactory communication were made to 
 the Indians. 107 The Indians to be feared were those warriors who 
 had served the British in 1812 and whose lands are now situated 
 within the United States. 
 
 Meanwhile, Cass failed to prevent Canadian agents from trading 
 and tampering with American Indians, and therefore collected 
 affidavits and other material to lay before the administration in 
 London. Thus, London found itself at one and the same time 
 censured by the American ambassador for stimulating insurrection 
 among American Indians and threatened by these same Indians 
 because the British were not providing a sufficiently vigorous and 
 zealous protection against American usurpation of their rights. 
 
 103 Bagot to Castlereagh, Aug. 12, 1816, C. A. Q. 138, p. 313. 
 104 Monroe to Clark, March 11, 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 6. 
 100 Johnson to McNaughten, March 2, 1817, C. A. Q. 323, p. 193. 
 1M Dalhousie to Bathurst, Nov. 12, 1821, C. A. Q. 156, p. 407. 
 ""McKay to Bathurst, Feb. 15, 1819, C. A. Q. 153, p. 211. 
 
V. 
 
 THE CANADIANS RETAIN THE INDIANS GOOD WILL. 
 
 The British were anxious to retain an influence over the Indians 
 of the Northwest largely because of the lucrative fur trade. 108 As 
 early as 1754 Green Bay, then garrisoned by only one officer, one 
 sergeant and four soldiers, required thirteen canoes to transport its 
 annual supply of goods and the total yearly trade at this post was 
 worth eighteen thousand dollars. 109 The Northwest Company, 
 founded in 1783, maintained four emporiums in the West Detroit, 
 Mackinac, Sault St. Marie, and Grand Portage. At the beginning 
 of the nineteenth century Grand Portage alone sent annually 106,000 
 beaver skins to Montreal, to say nothing of other commodities. 110 
 This extensive trade carried with it a market for British goods 
 and so the manufacturers in England as well as the French Canadian 
 traders were interested in this old Northwest. 
 
 As the Americans pushed their frontier farther North and West, 
 they too became increasingly interested in this trade. A keen 
 rivalry developed between the French Canadians who were already 
 on the ground, and the New York and New England adventurers 
 who claimed jurisdiction over the soil and over the natives. Neither 
 side was conspicuous for any deep or sentimental affection for its 
 competitor. Robert Dickson, a Canadian trader writing in 1814, 
 reveals the fierce spirit of rivalry. He said: "The crisis is not far 
 off when I trust to God that the tyrant [Napoleon] will be humbled 
 and the scoundrel American Democrats will be obliged to go down 
 on their knees to Britain." 111 As early as 1685 New England 
 traders had established posts at Michillimackinac whereupon the 
 French by force and strategy endeavored to drive them out and 
 retain a monopoly of the trade in this region. 112 
 
 108 In a report of the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantation in 1772 the 
 attitude of the English government was stated in these terms: "The great object of 
 colonization upon the continent of North America has been to improve and to extend 
 the commerce and manufacturers of this kingdom * * * It does appear to us 
 that the extension of the fur trade depends entirely upon the Indians being undis 
 turbed in the possession of their hunting grounds. * * * Let the savages enjoy 
 their deserts in quiet ; were they driven from their forests the peltry trade would b 
 decreased." J. H. U. S., Vol. 9, 580. 
 
 109 C. A. Q. 1886, p. OLXII. 
 
 "J. H. TT. S., Vol. IX, p. 581, 595. 
 
 "JJ. H. U. S., Vol. IX, p. 589. 
 
 1]2 J. H. U. S., IX, p. 513, and Sheldon, Early Hist, of Mich., p. 310. 
 
 40 
 
The Indians meanwhile generally preferred to trade with the 
 French or with their successors, the British. 113 With the soil the 
 British seemed also to obtain the good will of the natives. The 
 French in Canada had known how to win the Indians friendship 
 and respect. 114 Under British regime these same Frenchmen, 
 Coureurs des Bois, still mingled with the natives and both French and 
 Indians turned their allegiance to and looked for protection from 
 their British father. Furthermore the British won influence over 
 the Indians by a display of force. In succession the French and the 
 Americans had surrendered to the British at Detroit and Michilli- 
 mackinac and the credulous Indian had become impressed with 
 the might and power of the conquerors. 
 
 The Indians now needed help, or thought they did. This assist 
 ance they sought from the powerful "Redcoats" who instead of 
 trespassing upon the hunting grounds 117 were even extending in 
 vitations for the Indians to enter Canada and take up their abode 
 in those unsettled wilds. On the other hand, immigrants from the 
 Atlantic states were both lawfully and unlawfully pressing into 
 the Indian lands of Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. 118 American- 
 Indian superintendents and agents themselves complained of insuf 
 ficient power to prevent this illegal encroachment. "Persons are 
 found in the Indian territory," wrote Edwards, "hunting, tres 
 passing, trading without license, or engaged in any other unlawful 
 purpose. Many such offenders pass with impunity while these 
 unlawful visits and intrusions have the most unhappy effect upon 
 the Indians who have repeatedly made them the subjects of their 
 bitterest complaints." 119 
 
 Such encroachments made the Indian hate the American. Cal- 
 houn s policy of building military posts in the West in advance of 
 the settlements only increased the discontent because these outposts 
 themselves were considered to be encroachments. Even while the 
 
 118 A. S. P., Indian Affairs, II, 327 ff. 
 114 A. S. P., Indian Affairs, II, p. 70. 
 
 11T Tecumseh s speech to Gen. Proctor at Amherstburg, 1813, reveals a belief 
 among the Indians that the British had promised to help them recover their lands in 
 the Northwest territory. "When the war was declared," said the great Indian 
 captain, "our father stood up and gave us the tomahawk and told us he was now 
 readjr to strike the American, that he wanted our assistance, and that he would 
 certainly get us back our lands which the Americans had taken from us." "Summer 
 before last," said Tecumseh in 1810, "when I came forward with my red brethren 
 and was ready to take up the hatchet in favor of our British father, we were told 
 not to be in a hurry, that he had not yet determined to fight the Americana." School- 
 craft: H. of I. T., Vol. VI, p. 351; p. 358. Copied from official military and naval 
 letters. 
 ""Schoolcraft, H. of I. T., VI, p. XIII. 
 
 " Edwards to Crawford, Nov., 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 63. 
 
 41 
 
Indians ceded lands in councils, there was always an undertone of 
 unwillingness to cede. "The Americans are never satisfied," they 
 declared at one of these councils. 120 Cass and McArthur perceived 
 how displeased the Indians were to give up their lands when, in 
 1818, it was proposed that the Wyandottes, Shawnees, and Senecas 
 should remove west of the Mississippi. The tribes received this 
 proposition with such strong symptoms of disapprobation that it 
 was deemed expedient to postpone the migration. "The time had 
 not yet arrived," Cass wrote, "for them voluntarily to abandon the 
 land of their fathers .... As our settlements surround them, 
 their minds will be better prepared to receive this proposition." 12i 
 Furthermore, the British-Indian department was undoubtedly su 
 perior to that of the Americans. The latter themselves, acknowl 
 edged this. 122 More care and tact was exercised in the manage 
 ment of Indian affairs ; British agents were acquainted with at least 
 one of the native languages and so were not easily imposed upon; 
 a blacksmith was found at every post to make repairs for the 
 Indians ; 123 and when military prowess, or invitations to visit and 
 live in Canada, or ordinary management could no longer prevail 
 upon the Indian, a more lavish outpouring of presents was made 
 to compensate. The liberality of British beneficence formed a 
 marked contrast to the paucity of American gifts. The "United 
 States presents are so small they might as well be discontinued," 
 wrote one American agent. 124 
 
 The Americans, however, were quite as anxious to win the favor 
 of the tribes and were using the same tactics as the British. 125 
 Harrison s speech in the council at Detroit in 1815 was a direct 
 appeal to the known instincts of the Indians. Thousands of dollars 
 worth of medals and presents were ordered to be distributed at St. 
 Louis and other places. 126 When any treaty was signed, or when 
 lands were purchased, the Indians were bribed to accede to the 
 wishes of the land-grabbers but there is no instance recorded as 
 far as I have found, nor any complaint made, that the Americans 
 offered presents to nonresident Indians, the crime that was re 
 peatedly and justly charged against the dispensers of gifts at Maiden 
 
 1>0 Schoolcraft, Vol. VI, p. 383. And see speech by Creek chief in Niles Register 
 for June 20, 1829. 
 
 121 Cass to Calhoun, Sept. 18, 1818, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 177. 
 1K A. S. P., I. A., II, p. 85. 
 
 123 Forsythe to Clark, A. S. P., I. A., II, p. 79. 
 1Z *A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 86. 
 1J5 C. A. |Q. 333, p. 292. 
 1W A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 6. 
 
 42 
 
or Manitoulin. The Americans found too many Indians already. 
 They wanted to expel those they had rather than attract more. 
 
 Despite numerous foreign influences and extraneous impediments 
 the citizens of the United States can blame only themselves for a 
 considerable part of their failure to win the afTections of these 
 western tribes and gather to themselves the profits from the fur 
 trade. Systematic effort to regulate the Indian trade began in 
 1786 when the whole territory occupied by the natives was divided 
 into two districts with a superintendent and deputy over each. Only 
 licensed individuals were allowed to trade and foreigners were 
 not permitted to obtain a license till 1790. In 1816 foreigners 
 were again prohibited unless by special permission of the President 
 and he issued instructions to admit foreigners only as boatmen or 
 interpreters. 
 
 Meanwhile the factory system had been introduced, but until 
 after the war it had not superseded the earlier mode of carrying 
 on the trade by license. In 1796 the President was authorized to 
 establish trading houses and to appoint an agent at each house 
 to carry on, as the act states, "a liberal trade with the Indians." 
 The original capital of $150,000 and an annual allowance of $8,000 
 to pay clerks and agents had been increased until in 1811 it stood 
 at $300,000 and an annual allowance of $i9,25O. 126a By authority 
 of this act of 1796, renewed and revised from time to time, eight 
 or ten factories under government supervision and regulation were 
 established within Indian territory. Such goods as the Indians 
 might require were here kept and exchanged for furs, or whatever 
 surplus produce the natives might have. These storehouses were 
 intended to serve as a check upon the unfairness or rapacity of 
 the licensed trader and ensure to the Indians a sufficient amount of 
 necessary goods at a fair price. 
 
 Just before the war, in 1811, there were in operation ten such 
 factories to supply the needs of the Indians within the limits of 
 the whole country. 127 During the war four of these in the north 
 western districts, namely those at Michillimackinac, Chicago, San- 
 dusky and Fort Wayne, had been broken up by the enemy; but 
 when peace was again assured and the United States garrisons 
 had begun to occupy Green Bay and Prairie du Chien, factories 
 were again established to take the place of those destroyed. In 
 
 128a A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 18 Iff. Report of J. C. Calhoun. 
 137 Mason s Report, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 68. 
 
 43 
 
the fall of 1815 two were set up at Chicago and Green Bay. 128 
 Two more were soon in operation at Prairie du Chien and at a 
 place nine miles above Natchitoches. 129 Once, this machinery for 
 the supply of the Indian needs was again in operation, the govern 
 ment of the United States made an attempt to throw the Indian 
 trade wholly into the hands of these factories. By an act of 1816 
 the British trader was excluded from holding any intercourse with 
 the Indians residing within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
 This act was of course antagonistic to the interests of the North 
 west Company, who immediately complained that the natives were 
 being deprived of their rights and privileges guaranteed by the 
 Treaty of Ghent. 130 
 
 But complaints came not only from the British or even from the 
 Indians; the factories met with harsh criticism from many of the 
 Americans themselves. As early as October, 1815, Governor Clark 
 from St. Louis declared that the "mode of managing Indian affairs 
 
 grew more and more imperfect every day" and the 
 
 "decided policy of England, so recently and clearly developed of 
 using the Indian tribes to vex and harass the frontier settlements 
 in time of peace and as active partisans in time of war, ought to 
 admonish the United States to adopt a more efficient system of 
 regulating the Indian concerns" than had hitherto been in use. By 
 the existing methods, he said, the tribes were not at that time 
 furnished with what they absolutely required. 131 Similar charges 
 were reported later. 
 
 The trouble with the factory system was not that the United 
 States government was trying to make money out of the business. 
 During these years the system was carried on at an annual loss of 
 over $5,ooo. 132 Undeniably the policy of the federal authorities was 
 to maintain peace and to acquire an influence over the tribes which 
 could be obtained only by generous treatment. Prominent Amer 
 icans on the floors of Congress advocated a humane and benev 
 olent policy. The earnest desire of the government was "to draw 
 its savage natives within the pale of civilization." American offi 
 cers on the ground held the same views. The Governor of Mich 
 igan Territory at this time favored cash payments of annuities, 
 
 1J8 MaBon to Crawford, Feb. 9, 1816, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 68. 
 
 1M A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 127. 
 
 130 J. H. U. S., IX, p. 597. Also McGillivray to Harvey, 1815, 0. A. Q. 132, p. 35. 
 
 131 Clark to Crawford, Oct. 1, 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 77. 
 
 ls >Crawford i Report, March 13, 1816, Feb. 4, 1817, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 127. 
 
 44 
 
because it would be "more satisfactory to the Indians." 188 Never 
 theless the Indians were not satisfied with the system introduced 
 into the Northwest. 
 
 Even while the act of 1816, providing for the exclusion of for 
 eign traders was under discussion, Mason pointed out the peculiar 
 difficulties which the legislators were partly creating, partly over 
 coming. 134 He recognized that it would be very questionable 
 whether the amount of supplies heretofore furnished in many parts 
 of the territories by the British traders could, within a short period, 
 be supplied by the American factors. He saw that the "Indian 
 trade required certain associations of local information and habit 
 on the one hand, and of capital and perseverance on the other, 
 which could not be at once matured." If British traders were 
 excluded, not only would the Indians suffer for the want of nec 
 essary supplies but they would lose respect for the American gov 
 ernment. 134 * 1 It is perfectly apparent therefore that the American 
 government had not been left entirely ignorant of the probable 
 effects of this act of 1816. 
 
 As a matter of fact, however, many British traders managed to 
 evade this American law. 135 Statements of such men as Benjamin 
 O Fallon, Indian agent on the Missouri, and Matthew Irwin, United 
 States Factor at Green Bay, leave no doubt as to the great number 
 of British subjects who continued to trade with the American 
 tribes. Writing from Prairie du Chien in 1817, O Fallon told of 
 his extreme "surprise and disappointment in meeting with nu 
 merous British traders equipped with licenses under the authority 
 of the United States government." 138 Irwin at the same time com 
 plained of the number of British subjects licensed by the American 
 Fur Company to trade on the Wisconsin, Upper Mississippi, the 
 Chicago district, and other places. 137 He also pointed out the 
 palpable incongruity of allowing such licenses; the factors were 
 sent to supply the needs of the Indians and yet the Indian agents 
 could adopt measures so as to defeat the plans of the factors. 188 
 The American Fur Company, backed up, it would seem, by the 
 Secretary of War himself, in 1817 freely granted licenses to men 
 
 188 Letter of Cass, Oct. 21, 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 75. 
 
 ^Mason to Crawford, March 1, 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 70. 
 
 ""Ibid. 
 
 188 J. H. IT. S., IX, p. 597. 
 
 18fl A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 358-359. 
 
 137 J. H. U. S., IX, p. 597. 
 
 188 A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 259, 360. 
 
 45 
 
who understood how to serve the Company; whether these were 
 citizens of the country or aliens, the Fur Company doubtless cared 
 little. 139 Unlicensed British traders were also numerous. "In fact," 
 Irwin wrote later, "from the prejudices they, [the British traders,] 
 have excited against American traders, the American trade is con 
 fined to the British traders The Indians are altogether 
 
 ted away by them." 139a The factor at Green Bay also stated that 
 the British had almost completely monopolized the trade in that 
 vicinity. 140 Many other Indian agents confirmed the statement 
 of O Fallon : "the Indians cannot be attached to the factories ; they, 
 have almost abandoned them." 141 "Nine-tenths of the Indian 
 trade," said Crooks, "is not done with the factories, but with private 
 
 traders So small a trade is done at the factories that 
 
 their withdrawal would not be felt." 142 The factory system there 
 fore proved to be a failure. 
 
 Various reasons were assigned for the failure of the factor to 
 gain the favor of the native hunters and trappers. In the first 
 place, he rarely met the Indians except during the process of barter. 
 He did not cultivate intimacy with them and his knowledge of them 
 was proportioned to an intercourse so limited and unsociable. 143 
 The private trader to the contrary became identified with the tribe 
 . which he commonly visited. 
 
 A second fault found with the factor was that he too often sup 
 plied goods not suited to the Indian. 144 The quality of the goods 
 of the factory at Green Bay was reported to be bad, the blankets 
 and woolen goods particularly so. 145 Both Ramsey Crooks, who 
 was acquainted with the factory system as it was conducted at 
 different periods at Bell Fontaine, Fort Madison, Chicago, Michill- 
 imackinac, Fort Osage, Prairie du Chien, Fort Edwards, and Green 
 Bay, and who ought to have been an authority on the question, 146 
 and Governor Edwards, who was quite as closely connected with 
 the system, regretted that the factories goods were inferior and 
 
 39 Ibid. 
 
 39a lbid. 
 
 40 Letter of August 10, 1818, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 359. 
 
 "A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 228-229. 
 
 42 Crooks and Biddle to the Senate, Jan., 1822, A. S. P., I. A. II, 330 327. 
 
 43 Crooks and Biddle to the Senate, Jan., 1822. A. S. P., I. A. II, 330, 327. 
 
 ^Ibid. 
 
 45 Biddle to the Senate, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 326. 
 
 146 Crooks to Senate, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 329, Jan. 23, 1822. "The quality of 
 the Indian goods," he said, "has always been much inferior to the same description of 
 articles furnished by private traders, except, perhaps, during the late war. Gun 
 powder, balls, shot, and the like, are as good at the factories; but the blankets and 
 other drygpods generally have been from twenty-five to fifty per cent inferior to the 
 corresponding articles supplied by individual traders." 
 
 46 
 
admonished the government that its first care should be to obtain 
 goods, particularly the important articles of blankets and cloths, of 
 equal quality to those that were carried into the Indian market by 
 their rivals. This, it was said, "had never heretofore been done in 
 a single instance." 147 No doubt it is true, too, that the more wily 
 private traders taught the Indians to prefer British goods. They 
 told them that all blankets, cloths, ribbons, shawls, jewelry, etc., of 
 common quality were of American manufacture and that the British 
 made only the best ; that only American goods were for sale at the 
 factory and that even if the price were lower, the goods were 
 dearer, and very dear considering the quality. 148 This argument 
 hurt the factories and operated not a little in favor of the British. 14 * 
 That in general, the Indians considered British goods superior to 
 American must be accepted. But we must not suppose that the 
 factories carried poor goods only. Cass, for instance, just before 
 the factory system was abolished, spoke of some of them as 
 being "very satisfactory" and "very well selected." 15 
 
 Another objection to the factories was that in some places, 
 especially at Green Bay, there was no uniformity whatever in 
 prices. 151 In this matter of price and the quality of the goods it 
 was not easy to deceive the Indians. They were not uncritical and 
 not incompetent judges. They recognized that prices varied at 
 both the factory and among private traders and therefore bought 
 from those who treated them best. 152 
 
 The crowning fault with the factors, however, was that they did 
 not employ the credit system. 153 Credits were actually indispensable 
 because the hunting grounds were more distant than formerly. In 
 dians were obliged to go more than three hundred miles from their 
 villages in order to find their game. They did not have furs previous 
 
 " 7 Edwards to Crawford, Nov., 1815, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 65. The following 
 incident emphasizes Edwards views: "A gentleman of our party," said Captain 
 John B. Bell, in 1822, "had with him what is termed by the Indians a Mackinac 
 blanket, which is of a superior quality of blankets and such as are generally furnished 
 by the British traders at Mackinac to the Indians. Several of the Indian party 
 noticed this blanket and each proposed to exchange his blanket, which was of the 
 same description as those supplied by the United States or their traders, offering 
 at the same time something very considerable in addition. * * * On inquiry, I 
 found that the Indians were under the impression that the blankets, arms, vermillion, 
 etc., furnished them at Mackinac, were .of a superior quality to anything received 
 from the American government or procured from its traders." Bell, of Senate Com- 
 m.ittee, to Benton, Jan. 23, 1822, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 329. 
 148 Sibley, Feb. 3, 1818, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 363. 
 ""Ibid. 
 
 1M A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 426. 
 
 ul Biddle, O Fallon, and Bell, 1822, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 326-7. 
 152 Crooks and Biddle, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 331, 327. 
 " Edwards, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 66. 
 
 47 
 
to the hunt to pay for their goods, and could not return on account 
 of the distance, cold, and dangers to get supplies. These supplies 
 therefore had to be advanced to them or carried to their hunting 
 grounds. The custom of advancing goods on credit dated back 
 to the French regime and was also used by the Dutch and New 
 Englanders. 154 The amount of credit granted varied with the 
 reputation of the individual hunter, from $40 or $50 worth to 
 $ 3 oo. 155 
 
 Good goods and courteous treatment drew the Indians to the 
 British rather than to the factories. British traders did their best 
 to extend their credit to any hunter who had a fair reputation 
 because a family who had obtained goods on credit sold all of its 
 furs to those who advanced the goods. 156 Out on the hunting 
 grounds, one hundred or two hundred miles from the summer 
 camp, British traders built their cabins alongside those of the 
 hunters, collected furs in payment for advances already given and 
 granted additional credit to those who were prospering in the 
 chase. Even a lower price at the factory before the hunt offered no 
 inducement for an Indian to buy there. Improvident by nature, he 
 had no capital on hand. Well might he think that the attempt 
 of 1816 to shut out those who extended credit was an attempt to 
 injure the red man and not the Montreal merchant. 157 
 
 The first approach of the American factory had been a disappoint 
 ment to the tribes. British frontier posts had been depots for free 
 gifts to the Indians. When the United States warehouses were 
 carried to the districts approaching Canada the Indians were so 
 firmly of the opinion that the goods deposited there were to be 
 disposed of after the manner of the British that they frequently 
 charged the factors with selling for their own emolument what 
 their great father, the President, had intended as presents. When 
 they found that they were mistaken the "impression became univer 
 sal" that their American father must be very poor indeed since he 
 sent his goods into their country to be sold for skins as a common 
 
 154 J. H. U. S. IX, p. 602. 
 
 155 Schoolcraft in 1831 estimated $48.34 in goods and provisions at cost price was 
 the annual supply of each hunter. This is confirmed by Turner in J. H. U. S. IX, 
 p. 603 (see A. S. P., I. A- II, p. 64; 56). An account from the book of Jacques Polier 
 at Green Bay, in 1823, shows that the Indian Michel bought on credit in the fall, 
 cloth, $16; trap, $1.00; cotton, $3.12J; powder, $1.50; lead, $1.00; bottle of 
 whisky, fifty cents; and other miscellany; making a total of about $25. This was 
 paid for in the spring by muskrat skins, a foxskin, and maple sugar, to the full 
 extent, but the trader usually expected to get at least one hundred per cent profit 
 upon the credit transactions (see J. H. U. S. IX, p. 603). 
 156 Edwards, A. S. P., I. A. II. 64, 66. 
 
 1B7 Edwards, Nov., 1815, and Forsyth, A. S. P., I. A. II, pp. 64, 79. 
 
 48 
 
trader had bought his goods. While England s king by unanimous 
 consent received the appellation of father, the President of the 
 United States was degraded to the level of a common adventurer. 158 
 
 The American trading houses themselves not infrequently played 
 into the hands of the British. The British traders bought goods 
 from the factory at Chicago through an Indian friendly to them, 
 it might be, and then the British traded these goods with the 
 Indians for furs. Thus an enterprising Canadian trader whose 
 stock of English goods had become exhausted might, nevertheless, 
 collect a big load of furs to sell in the Eastern or European 
 markets. 159 
 
 Against such odds the trading post system, backed up though it 
 was by such friendly supporters as Jefferson and Calhoun, could 
 not but fail. Calhoun tried to improve the system by organizing a 
 still bigger trading post business with a complete government 
 monopoly managed by a private company. 160 Benton and the Amer 
 ican Fur Company, however, were bitterly opposed to this plan. 
 They declared the system bad, both as a civilizing and as a Chris 
 tianizing influence. 161 In the first session of the seventeenth Con 
 gress, 1822, it was at last abolished. The trade was then left 
 entirely to private enterprise, but until the Indian moved far beyond 
 the Mississippi the British trader maintained his hold on the old 
 Northwest territories as hitherto, and furs continued to pass down 
 the St. Lawrence. 
 
 ^ B8 Crooks to Senate, Jan. 23, 1822, A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 331. 
 
 159 Ibid. 
 
 180 A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 181, 184. 
 
 161 A. S. P., I. A. II, p. 331, 417. 
 
VI 
 INDIAN PRESENTS. 
 
 Long before 1815 the Indians were accustomed to receive pres 
 ents from those who had any traffic with them. Traders had 
 purely commercial and selfish ends to serve. It was otherwise with 
 the civil and military powers, who in the second, third, and fourth 
 decades of the nineteenth century continued to bestow gifts not 
 only upon the resident Indians, but upon those who lived beyond 
 their borders. They defended their action on the ground of grati 
 tude, of usage, of pledge, of policy, and of necessity. 164 It can 
 scarcely be doubted, however, that the chief motive for continuing 
 to give presents was that the British wanted to retain a dominating 
 influence. 
 
 Almost as soon as the Treaty of Ghent had been signed, Bathurst 
 wrote to Drummond: "You will not fail to make liberal presents 
 to the Indian tribes who have cooperated with us." 165 There was 
 not necessarily anything insidious in this. The Indians then were 
 with or near the British army. It was not a matter of bribing 
 Indians who lived in the United States ; it was merely a partial 
 payment of an honest debt, and as such could not be offensive 
 to the United States. It was not these first gifts but the later ones 
 that caused trouble. When Provost made an announcement of the 
 Treaty to the Indians, he definitely promised that the presents sent 
 to the frontier posts should not be diminished. His military officers 
 at Maiden, Michillimackinac, Drummond, or Manitoulin Islands 
 were chiefly responsible for the extension of this kind of favor 
 and on many occasions it will be observed that it was these military 
 officers in Canada rather than the civil officers and rather than the 
 distant British government who realized the need of maintaining 
 the Indian as an ally. Every action on the part of the Colonial 
 Office was an effort to prevent renewal of war. Compromises in 
 the boundary dispute, disavowal of the deeds of frontier officers, 
 orders to cease sending presents, all bear out the statement. But 
 
 1M Caldwell to Glaus, Dec. 20, 1815, C. A. Q. 320, p. 155. 
 
 When the Indians allowance had been curtailed in the preceding years, the 
 Indians had committed depredations as the Prophet had predicted. 
 
 188 Bathurst to Drummond, Jan. 10, 1815, C. A. Q. 320, p. 57. 
 
 50 
 
certain minor officers often brought the two nations to the verge 
 of serious conflict. 
 
 Not content with supplying presents to the Indians who came 
 to his frontier posts, Drummond in the fall or winter of 1815 and 
 1816, even suggested the advisability of sending some to the Indians 
 residing on the Mississippi. He did not wish, he said, to foment 
 discord between Canada and the United States, for his desire was 
 quite the opposite ; but faithful services should be remembered and 
 promises should be kept. 166 It is difficult to perceive how Drum 
 mond could convince himself that the sending of goods across 
 American territory to Indians residing within American limits would 
 not excite American hostility. Did Drummond really imagine that 
 the Indians might cause trouble as Caldwell reported them to 
 have done before if presents were not forthcoming and that this 
 was a means of preserving peace within American jurisdiction? 
 
 Happily, Drummond s proposal was not acted upon. Gore re 
 ferred the matter to Bathurst but informed Bathurst that according 
 to information from the Indian Department it was not customary 
 to send presents to these Indians even in time of peace, and now, 
 while the United States were so extremely jealous of intercourse 
 with those residing in their territory, there would be great risk of 
 the presents being seized in transit. 167 There is no doubt that 
 Drummond as well as Gore did not want to excite another American 
 conflict, but Drummond saw the necessity of alliance with those 
 who had helped, and might again be called upon to help, his forces. 
 Gore recognized more acutely the delicacy that was necessary in 
 dealing with non-resident tribes. 
 
 In May, 1816, the management of Indian affairs, which had been 
 a department of the civil administration in Canada, was transferred 
 to the military department, and Drummond, therefore, was left more 
 free to carry out his plans. 168 Bathurst, however, favored Gore s 
 prudent policy rather than Drummond s proposal, and accordingly 
 ordered no presents to leave Canada. 169 Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, who 
 landed at Quebec July u, 1816, as Governor of Canada, instructed 
 both McDouall and the superintendent of Indian Affairs to pacify 
 the Indians and clearly to announce to them that no presents should 
 be made to any residing beyond the British jurisdiction. 170 There 
 
 18fl Drummond to Gore, March 2, 1816, C. A. Q. 320, p. 79. 
 187 Gk>re to Bathurst, March 20, 1815, C. A. jQ. 320, p. 73. 
 168 0. A. Q. 320, p. 337. 
 W C. A. Q. 320, p. 58. 
 1TO C. A. Q. 320, p. 136-7. 
 
 51 
 
can scarcely be the shadow of a doubt that the protest of Adams 
 in the spring of this year was partly responsible for these instruc 
 tions. (The Colonial Office was aware of the dangers it was running 
 in further irritating the settlers of the Northwest. 
 
 In spite of these spasmodic efforts of Bathurst and others in 1816, 
 the giving of presents to the visiting Indians was not suspended. 
 Cass, who bore the burden of maintaining order and furthering the 
 prosperity of Michigan, felt the evils of this practice more imme 
 diately than any other American officer. By 1818 he had grown 
 weary of the persistent efforts of certain foreign agents to influence 
 the Indians against his own countrymen. He, therefore, busied 
 himself collecting affidavits and other material so that Calhoun 
 might file in the British Foreign Office a carefully detailed and 
 formal protest. In August, 1819, he told Calhoun that a radical 
 change was necessary in the policy of the United States upon the 
 subject of the relations existing between the agents of the British 
 government and the Indians residing within the United States. 
 He had numerous and grievous charges to make against these 
 agents, but it was very difficult he said, to produce definite proofs 
 because all written communication was excluded and the language 
 was figurative. Large quantities of clothing, arms, amunition and 
 trinkets, were annually distributed to American Indians who were 
 invited to Fort Maiden. On their way to Maiden these Indians 
 stole from and abused American citizens, thus keeping the frontier 
 in a continuous state of alarm. It was impossible to punish the In 
 dians. They escaped rapidly. Lately, he said there had appeared 
 among them a morbid sensibility and restlessness, without any as 
 signed cause, all of which he blamed to the British agents. He feared 
 there was an intention of reviving the plans and policy of Tecumseh 
 and of forming a general confederacy. Just then there was at 
 Maiden a large party of Sacs and Foxes, bitter enemies of the 
 United States, and the greater proportion of the Indians on the 
 eastern side of the Mississippi made annual visits there. To prevent 
 this, he urged the United States government to put an effective 
 stop to the giving of presents. The British had no reason to give 
 them, he maintained, for they had bought no land and owed no 
 annuities ; it was not a debt nor the price of services justly rendered, 
 and to assign any philanthropic motive was perfectly farcical. The 
 obvious motive was to acquire and preserve an influence which 
 might be exerted if future circumstances should render it expedient. 
 
 52 
 
That a foreign power should thus subsidize a people living on the 
 soil of the United States was to Cass most incompatible with the 
 honor of his country and therefore only two courses were open 
 to allay the feverish excitement among the Indians and teach them 
 not to look to the British for counsel and protection. The first 
 was a firm remonstrance to the British government; the second, 
 to prohibit any Indian crossing the river into Canada or from pass 
 ing to the island of Michillimackinac. 172 
 
 Two months later Cass again wrote that he was convinced that 
 at least three thousand Indians had visited Maiden in 1819 and that 
 the quantity of goods exceeded anything hitherto received for the 
 same term either in peace or in war. The recipients of these goods 
 he said, were most influential of the tribes and had come from the 
 far Mississippi. As far as he was concerned he would prohibit 
 the Indians from crossing into Canada and would send out in 
 structions to his troops and to the interpreters to make this order 
 known to the Indians. Under the present conditions he declared, 
 it was vain to elevate the Indian socially or morally and it was 
 equally ineffectual to exclude British traders while the Indians 
 could supply their wants gratuitously from foreign storehouses. 171 
 
 Whitney reported that one old chief, bearing a reputation for 
 veracity, had divulged the secret of a conspiracy that was being 
 hatched. The fiery, unbridled imagination of the chief ; the alarm 
 and anxiety aroused in the minds of Godfrey and of Whitney, 
 sufferers from the Indians, and consequently from those whom 
 they believed to be intriguing with the Indians ; the fourfold repeti 
 tion of the story; these are factors that must be considered. The 
 story might easily have been an exaggeration and its origin is 
 certainly doubtful, but let the story originate where it may, the 
 repetition of this particular "conspiracy" by Cass shows the spirit 
 with which some of the people of Michigan regarded their" neigh 
 bors across the Detroit River and how eagerly they would support 
 Cass in his attempt to exclude foreign influence. 
 
 The conspiracy said to have been told by the chief to Godfrey 
 and by him to Whitney was this: The King of England, in con 
 junction with the Spaniards, the Negroes, and the Indians of the 
 
 172 Cass to Calhoun, Aug. 3, 1819, C. A. Q. 156, p. 33. 
 
 173 Whitney to Cass, C. A. Q. 156, p. 313. Whitney corroborated the statements 
 made by Cass both as to the apparent abundance of the presents in the last year and 
 to the effect these were producing upon those who came to get them. The savageg 
 were being drawn closer and closer to the British, they being much more liberal than 
 the Americans in the distribution of ammupition, etc. 
 
 53 
 
South, was to join with the Indians from the Northwest and take 
 from the Americans the lands from which the Indians had been 
 expelled. For the present the dispossessed natives were cautioned 
 to return home to their villages without causing any disturbance 
 and wait in readiness until another talk should be sent to them. 
 Hostilities would probably be begun in the fall or early the next 
 spring. These things were to be confidential among the chiefs 
 and old men. Their young men, therefore, had not been informed 
 of them. Godfrey was convinced by the statements and reputa 
 tion of the chief that the talk had actually been made to these old 
 chiefs and that the simple Indians believed it. At any rate the 
 Indians were unusually insolent this summer. Doors had to be kept 
 locked ; otherwise they would enter a house, and once in, it was 
 impossible to get them out without using violence, a means which 
 was dangerous. 174 
 
 By such documents as these Cass endeavored to prove that the 
 British agents were annually distributing presents with a lavish 
 hand; that the purpose was to acquire an illegitimate influence; 
 that the immediate effects were depredations all along the routes 
 leading to the British distributing points; that the increasing num 
 ber of recipients were becoming more discontented and excited, 
 and were likely to join in a confederacy and rebellion; that the 
 critical condition of the Indians and the danger to the citizens 
 of Michigan called for immediate and decisive action. 175 
 
 This report from Cass reached Downing Street in the spring of 
 1820 and Bathurst, taking up the matter, requested the Canadian 
 officials to make investigations. 176 At the same time he commanded 
 these officials to reduce the distribution of presents and to take 
 every precaution not to give offense to Cass or his people. The 
 commander of the Canadian forces, Dalhousie, in January, 1821, 
 replied that he had investigated the charges made by the United 
 States minister. The acting Superintendent of the Indian Depart 
 ment at the point in question had been interviewed and was perfectly 
 satisfied that the complaints of Cass were utterly unfounded and 
 the circumstances greatly exaggerated. The policy of maintaining 
 a friendly intercourse with the Indians was, in the opinion of 
 Dalhousie, too long established, the harmless commercial inter 
 change of furs for trifling articles of British manufacture of too 
 
 174 Cass s Report, October 9, 1819, C. A. Q. 156, p. 33 ff. 
 175 0ass s Report October 9, 1819, C. A. Q. 156, p. 33 ff. 
 176 Planta to G-oulburn, March 3, 1820, C. A. Q. 156, p. 31. 
 
 54 
 
old a standing and the affection of these wandering tribes towards 
 their great father too deeply engraven in the hearts and on the 
 records of those people to admit of any marked change of conduct 
 towards them. Nevertheless, he would guide himself strictly in 
 the line Bathurst had pointed out; maintain a quiet and friendly 
 relation as far as possible with all parties ; reduce the distribution 
 of Indian presents as far as consistent with the friendly civilities 
 hitherto shown ; and avoid giving any encouragement beyond what 
 that civility had by length of time made necessary. 177 
 
 The protest of Cass had once more an effect but only a half 
 hearted one. Again we see the British foreign office anxious to 
 preserve peace, and the Canadian military officers anxious to retain 
 their old-time ally. The Indian presents were to continue. The 
 Indian tribes would therefore tramp across American territory 
 and commit crimes along the way. Surely the Canadians could 
 not have been blind to the fact that the American settlers suffered 
 by the Canadian presents and if they were not blind they were 
 morally bound to take measures to prevent the mischief. 
 
 A few months later Dalhousie once more assured Bathurst that 
 the presents were "distributed with due propriety" and the Indians 
 were "satisfied." He didn t forget, however, to inform Bathurst 
 on the same occasion that the Americans were continually extend 
 ing forts farther west. Alarm was intensified by this and by the 
 report that of the whole military force of the United States, by 
 far the greater part was concentrated on this northwest frontier. 
 It was reported, too, that the Americans were increasingly anxious 
 to secure the good will of the native tribes. 178 Dalhousie therefore 
 urged the propriety of placing a post at the Falls of St. Mary, 
 the key to Lake Superior, and of strengthening other posts another 
 evidence of the care taken by the Canadian armed forces to keep 
 up the defenses of the frontier, to display power in the presence 
 of the Indians, and, despite the precautionary measures of distant 
 cabinet officers, to keep these Indians on their side. 
 
 The London government, however, continued to interfere in this 
 western problem. The expensiveness of the Indian department, 
 the slow progress in the civilization of the Indian, and the con 
 tinued irritation of the Americans along the frontier called for 
 further inquiry in regard to the possibility and practicability of re- 
 
 " 7 Dalhousie to Bathurst, Jan. 17, 1821, C. A. Q. 157, p. 36. 
 ""Dalhousie to Bathurst, C. A. ft. 157, p. 407. 
 
 55 
 
form. Horton, Under-Secretary of State for the colonies, was 
 anxious to receive a correct account of the number and condition 
 of the Indians, of the annual amount of the presents, for what 
 proportion of this annual distribution the government was bound 
 by contract, whether reductions could not be made without a breach 
 of faith and whether the Indian funds could not be expended in a 
 manner better calculated to foster a higher civilization. 179 
 
 Gore s successor, Lieutenant-Governor Maitland, answered his 
 questions, declaring it not only to be inconsistent with fairness 
 and honesty, but poor policy to reduce this amount. 180 Small 
 reductions had in some instances already been made within the 
 provinces but invariably these had produced pernicious effects. 
 Maitland, like Dalhousie, seemed to forget that while the Indian 
 was favored by British magnanimity, the settler in Michigan was 
 .injured. The governor s disapproval in this case did not prevent 
 a continuance of the agitation for reform. Suggestions were made 
 that the presents should be confined to useful things only and 
 such objects as would encourage the unsettled wanderers to estab 
 lish homes and till the land. 181 
 
 In September, 1828, Sir James Kempt assumed the government 
 of Canada and immediately set to work to solve the problem. He 
 held a consultation with his most experienced officers and stated 
 his policy. He would proceed slowly at first but intended to intro 
 duce radical changes later. He deemed it expedient to divide the 
 Indian department between the two provinces, still keeping both 
 under military control. 182 He would make the Indians more pros 
 perous and cultivated, keep them on friendly terms with the United 
 States but nevertheless attach them more firmly to his Britannic 
 Majesty. His scheme was to commute the annual presents for 
 something more substantial by taking advantage of what he thought 
 to be a growing inclination on the part of the tribes at this time 
 to settle down. He would collect them in considerable numbers 
 and establish villages on Canadian soil ; afford them assistance in 
 building houses, procuring seeds, implements, etc., and commute 
 where practicable all presents for these things. He would provide 
 active, zealous, Wesleyan missionaries from England to counteract 
 the objectionable principles which the Methodist missionaries from 
 
 178 Horton to Maitland, C. A. Q. 333, p. 290. 
 
 180 Maitland to Horton, November 20, 1823, C. A. Q., 333, p. 292. 
 
 181 Hill to Horton, C. A. Q., 167, p. 181. 
 
 1M Kempt to Murray, Feb. 22, 1829, C. A. Q. 187, p. 431. 
 
 56 
 
the United States were supposed to instill into the minds of their 
 Indian converts. 183 Colborne was very much in favor of Kempt s 
 ideas. 
 
 This was not the first time since 1815 that the plan of settlement 
 and a commutation of presents had been suggested as a means 
 for attracting the allegiance and the presence of the Indians from 
 the United States to Canada. Even within a year after the peace, 
 Norton had made a similar proposition. 184 This scheme of Kempt s 
 and of Head, who also supported it was, however, doomed to 
 failure from the very nature of the Indians. These people had 
 no inclination to engage in agriculture and those who did come to 
 Manitoulin at the suggestion of Head found the soil too poor. 
 Many of the tribes who lived in the United States and there re 
 ceived annuities knew that if they moved to Canadian territory 
 they would have to relinquish the presents, and therefore stayed 
 on the other side. 185 
 
 At the very time Head was planning to bring the Indian tribes 
 over to Canadian soil, the American government was formulating 
 and carrying into effect its scheme of settling these tribes as rapidly 
 as possible west of the Mississippi. This in itself might ultimately 
 have closed the question of Canadian presents; for the increased 
 distance and the extra exertion required in traveling would have 
 prevented the Indian from coming so far to receive so paltry an 
 amount of blankets or powder. But not all the northwestern tribes 
 would be induced to leave their old-time hunting grounds, and still 
 the question of presents continued. During Kempt s administra 
 tion Drummond Island was evacuated and the presents which had 
 been distributed from that point were henceforth issued from 
 Penetanguishene. Other points, such as St. Joseph s Island and 
 Manitoulin, in turn laid claim to be the most satisfactory point, 
 that is of being "most convenient for the Indians," which in itself 
 shows how anxious the agents were to cater to the taste and good 
 will of the Indian. 186 
 
 In regard to the number of those whose representatives received 
 presents from Maiden or the northern post, it is difficult to give an 
 accurate estimate. Schoolcraft, from his intimate connection with 
 the Indians, is undoubtedly as reliable an authority as any. At the 
 
 183 Kempt to Murray, June 10, 1829, O. A. Q. p. 98, p. 110. 
 ^Norton to Colborne, Dec. 1, 1815, O. A. jQ. 135, p. 376, 381. 
 186 Schoolcraft, VI, p. 463. 
 18 Kempt to Murray, C. A. )Q. 189, p. 98. 
 
 57 
 
outbreak of the war in 1812 he believed that there were in the 
 Northwest approximately 41,000 distributed as follows: 187 
 
 Warriors. Total. 
 
 Wyandottes of Ohio and Michigan 600 2,500 
 
 Shawnees of Ohio, Michigan and Indiana 120 600 
 
 Senecas of Sandusky 100 500 
 
 Dela wares of Indiana 150 750 
 
 Ottawas of Maunee 80 400 
 
 Ottawas of Michigan 400 2,000 
 
 Saginaws 240 1 ,200 
 
 Pottawatomies of St. Joseph and Lake Huron. . . . 100 500 
 
 Pottawattomies of Chicago and Illinois 400 2,000 
 
 Chippewas of Lake St. Clair and Huron 1,000 5,000 
 
 Chippewas of Lake Superior and the region north 
 to the Lake of the Woods and to the Missis 
 sippi 2,000 10,000 
 
 Menomonies of Green Bay and Fox River 600 3,000 
 
 Winnebagoes of Western Michigan and Wisconsin. 1,000 5,500 
 
 Miamis, Weas and Piankeshaws 900 4,500 
 
 Sioux and other bands from west of the Mississippi 
 
 and visiting and roving Indians at large.... 600 3,000 
 
 8,390 41,400 
 
 In 1829 the report issued by General Porter, American Secretary 
 of War, estimated the Indian population in the Northwest at about 
 52,ooo. 188 
 
 There was, then, a more or less fluctuating and nomadic body 
 of 40,000 or 50,000 Indians within these territories. On account 
 of location or distance many of these were beyond the range and 
 influence of their foreign benefactors. At this time, however, we 
 must remember that the white population west of Ohio was ex 
 tremely sparse. Indiana and Illinois began to fill up with aston 
 ishing rapidity after the war ; but in Michigan there were probably 
 not more than two or three thousand in 1815, the population for 
 another decade grew very slowly, and many of these settlers were 
 French or halfbreeds. The presence therefore of so many wander 
 ing and discontented Indians was a serious menace in the western 
 part of this Northwest Territory. 
 
 1R7 Schoolcraft V., p. 708. 
 188 Sehoolcraft III., p. 591. ( 
 
 58 
 
It is also difficult to state precisely what was the total annual 
 or per capita value of the presents distributed to the nonresidents. 
 The statement of McDouall 189 in 1816 that the "little powder pre 
 sented to them does not please the Indians, but is blazened over 
 the United States as supplying them with the means of war" min 
 imizes the value just as the report of one who had made a tour 
 of the border in 1817 greatly exaggerates the quantity when he 
 stated that from 100,000 to 150,000 were expended annually. 190 
 A little care must be exercised also to notice whether the word 
 "present" in British documents refers to gratuitous gifts or to 
 payment for land cessions for all passed under the name of 
 presents. 191 Moreover, the word "pound" sometimes means pound 
 sterling, sometimes pound currency, a much smaller amount. 
 
 One fact, however, is at once patent, namely, that the goods given 
 to the tribes after the War of 1812-1815 averaged half as much 
 again as the value of those given before the war. During the 
 years 1807-1811 inclusive, the average amount so expended by the 
 government in Canada was about i2,5OO. 192 By 1823 this had been 
 increased to 23,500, 4,500 of which were paid for land cessions and 
 the remainder, 19,000, for free gifts. 193 But these sums, 12,500 
 and 19,000, were expended on presents for the resident as well as 
 the visiting Indians. 
 
 During the first decade, after the war, when the Americans began 
 to feel the pernicious effect of Canadian generosity Cass took 
 pains to obtain an estimate of the value of the presents given to 
 the tribes. His report computes the average value given to man, 
 woman, or child at $10.00 worth of goods. 194 The general tes 
 timony of the Americans consulted by him is that the Indians were 
 "never before supplied so abundantly." 195 Ten dollars was, there 
 fore, considered in 1819 as a larger gift than usual. 
 
 We might be led to suppose that Americans would have a tend 
 ency to exaggerate the amount of these gifts, but Canadian records 
 verify these estimates. In 1828 the presents to visiting Indians 
 averaged about 2 each. 196 Cass, therefore, was probably quite 
 correct in his $10.00 estimate for the decade earlier. Kempt, 
 
 189 McDouall to Military Secretary, June 17, 1816, C. A. Q. 137, p. 15. 
 
 180 C. A. Q. 323, p. 42. 
 
 191 Maitland to Horton, Nov. 20. 1823, C. A. Q. 333, p. 292. 
 
 192 0. A. Q. 314, p. 25 ff. 
 
 193 MaitIand to Horton, Nov. 20, 1823, C. A. jQ. 333, p. 292. 
 
 194 Walker to Cass, 1819, C. A. Q., 156, p. 60. 
 
 165 Knaggs to Cass, C. A. Q., 156, p. 63. 
 
 196 Wilson to Hay, C. A. Q. 375, p. 381. 
 
 59 
 
anxious to modify the prevailing system, made somewhat careful 
 investigations to find out the exact state of affairs. 197 He was 
 informed that for the year 1830 the total value of the presents 
 distributed in Upper Canada, not including 4,426 paid for land 
 cessions, was computed at 21,903, 175. currency. 198 This was the 
 retail or merchant s value. They cost the government of Canada 
 only 13,142, 6s. 3d. currency. The total number of Indians, in 
 cluding those residing within the United States who received these 
 presents, was computed at 17,766. The average value of the 
 presents to each person was, therefore, approximately 253. currency, 
 retail value. If the value of the goods delivered to each visitor 
 was less than that in 1828, we must remember that this was in 
 keeping with Kempt s policy of retrenchment. 
 
 The number of Indians who resided in the United States and 
 who received presents by making visits to Amherstburg or Drum- 
 mond Island was, in 1830, according to Kempt s report, 4,073. Not 
 only had the value of the presents given to each individual decreased 
 during the first two years of Kempt s regime but the number of 
 visiting Indians was also smaller. Wilson stated that 3,500 non 
 residents came to Drummond s Island alone in i828 199 and Cass, 
 whose figures are based upon observation from the American side, 
 declared that in 1818 as many as 3,000 had crossed over to Maiden. 
 Still he admitted that was an unusually large number. 
 
 Routh, of the Canadian Commissariat department, gives us per 
 haps the most definite and reliable estimate of the number and 
 location of the Indians who came to the government storehouses 
 for their annuities. 200 The following is Routh s statement for the 
 year 1833. 
 
 "At Amherstburg: 
 
 VISITING INDIANS. 
 
 Chippewas 1600 residing in Michigan and Ohio. 
 
 Ottawas 900 residing in Michigan. 
 
 Pottawatomies 500 residing in Ohio and Michigan. 
 
 Shawnees 260 residing in Michigan. 
 
 Six Nations 240 residing in Michigan. 
 
 Hurons 250 residing in Michigan. 
 
 197 Kempt to Colborne, 1830, C. A. Q. 204, p. 169 ff. 
 
 198 At that time the Indian Department was limited to 20,000 for presents ex 
 clusive of land payments. 
 
 199 Wilson to Hay, C. A. |Q. 375, t>- 381. Wilson further stated that a great number 
 of these had sold their lands to the United States and were now regularly living further 
 west and hunting largely to the advantage of the American Fur Company. 
 
 20 <>Routh to Stewart, March 7, 1834, C. A. Q. 218, p. 168. 
 
 60 
 
Munsees 40 residing in Michigan. 
 
 Sawkees 210 residing along Lake Superior. 
 
 Total 4,000 
 
 RESIDENT INDIANS. 
 
 Chippewas 1,226 
 
 Total visiting and resident 5> 22 6 
 
 "The number of visiting Indians is not always the same but 
 does not exceed the above. 
 "At Penetanguishene : 
 
 VISITING INDIANS. 
 
 Ottawas and Chippewas, about 3,ooo 
 
 (The first all in United States, the latter chiefly.) 
 RESIDENT INDIANS. 
 
 "At Penetanguishene, about 400 
 
 "At York, resident Indians 2 >596 
 
 "At Kingston, resident Indians 572 
 
 Total 1 1,794 
 
 See notes 199 and 200 on next page. 
 
 From the United States 7,000 
 
 Resident in Upper Canada 4,794 
 
 Nearly three years later, in 1836, Head, the Governor of Upper 
 Canada, made another report. The average number of Indians 
 from the United States, he estimated at 3,270 and the value of the 
 presents annually issued to those Indians 4,000, both figures being 
 about twenty per cent lower than Kempt s estimate for i83O. 201 
 
 All the foregoing figures regarding the number of Indians are 
 necessarily unreliable. The statement of Cass (1819), Wilson 
 (1828), and Routh (1834) would place the total number of vis 
 iting Indians as high as 6,000 or 7,000. Kempt s estimate, in 1830, 
 is about two-thirds of this number and Head s, of 1836, a little 
 more than half. The numbers necessarily would vary from year 
 to year. The total value of the presents as well as the value per 
 capita would also vary. We may be justified, however, in accepting 
 as the average individual s present from twenty-five to forty shill 
 ings currency and from 4,000 to 5,000 as the average total. The 
 reports of Routh, of Cass, and of Schoolcraft show that Maiden, 
 
 to Glenelg, 1836, C. A. Q. 391, p. 214. 
 
 61 
 
rather than Northern Lake Huron, -became the metropolitan center 
 for distribution. 202 
 
 To return to the controversy in Canada as to whether these pres 
 ents should be continued after 1830: Proposals to reduce them 
 were persistently made by the British Foreign Office and were as 
 persistently met by stubborn resistance. Some colonials as well as 
 Englishmen opposed the Canadian policy. As early as 1817 a pro 
 test was made by one who had traveled along the frontier and 
 believed that there were thousands of pounds annually and uselessly 
 expended. The fine cambrics, Irish linens, etc., which were given 
 to the Indians were rarely seen upon them. The Indians made 
 promises to the Americans when coming to Canada that they 
 would return by the same route. Their goods were then exchanged 
 for a little Yankee rum. 203 Vigorous protests against the Canadian 
 policy were submitted from time to time. 
 
 Wilson reported in 1832 that neither Canada nor the visiting 
 Indians were being benefited by the distribution of presents. The 
 Indians visiting Drummond Island and receiving Canadian pres 
 ents straightway crossed the channel, he said, and, following the 
 old custom, exchanged a great part of their presents for liquors. 
 He also observed that several children came to the Canadian post 
 from a missionary school at Michillimackinac. Upon visiting this 
 school he found that the children were being taught principles an 
 tagonistic to the British, and Canadian presents were supporting 
 \ an institution which was disseminating a veneration for the United 
 States and a dislike for monarchy. 204 At Amherstburg he found 
 the service equally objectionable. At Grape Island the Indians 
 were altogether under the management of an American Methodist 
 missionary from Pittsburg. He therefore recommended the grad 
 ual reduction not only of the Indian presents, but of the whole 
 expensive Indian department. Routh, also, in 1834, questioned 
 the expediency of giving presents. The assistance of the Indians, 
 he thought, might be obtained by other means if the occasion de 
 manded it. 205 Colborne, however, desired the continuance of Brit 
 ish generosity and argued that no diminution of the presents should 
 be made because if this were done, the Indians would not take their 
 laborious journey to obtain them. When their active cooperation 
 
 202 Schoolcraft, vol. VI., p. 449. 
 ^December 3, 1817, C. A. Q. 323, p. 342. 
 204 Wilson to Hay, Jan. 5, 1832, C. A. Q. 375, p. 281. 
 ^Routh to Stewart, March 7, 1834, C. A. jQ. 218, p. 
 
 168, ff. 
 62 
 
was necessary the British had cringed before them. It was his 
 opinion that they could not cease to give now without forfeiting 
 their self-respect; they could not so easily get rid of an inconven 
 ient debt. 206 The Northwest Company likewise recommmended the 
 continuance of a liberal supply of presents. 207 
 
 In the meantime a committee of the British Parliament reported 
 that the expensive Indian department must be reduced, if not en 
 tirely abolished. This called forth more arguments from the ad 
 herents of the old system. Stewart of the Colonial Office was 
 again informed in October, 1835, that the time had not yet come 
 when it was either expedient or just to abolish the department, the 
 well worn arguments of pledge, custom, the keeping of faith, etc., 
 being brought into play. 208 
 
 The British Foreign Office nevertheless still kept up its efforts. 
 Early in 1836 Glenelg informed Head that he believed it would 
 be a breach of faith, unjust and impolitic, to withdraw the presents 
 suddenly, but he could not say they should be indefinitely perpet 
 uated. He wanted to know if the free consent of the Indian could 
 not be obtained for the commutation of presents for money or for 
 the immigration of non-residents to Canada. Nothing, however, 
 should be done which would not be for the permanent benefit of 
 the tribes. Consistently with Canadian policy, Head replied to 
 Glenelg that the presents could not be refused. Promises had been 
 invariably made never to desert the Indian. No restrictions had 
 been made in regard to domicile. He did not deny that it might 
 be considered almost an act of hostility for the British government 
 to give presents of guns or powder to a people with whom the 
 United States were then engaged in civil war, but he said that the 
 Americans themselves gave arms to the Indians. In compliance, 
 however, with the desire of the British Foreign Office he hinted 
 to the Indians in a great council at Manitoulin Island that it would 
 be unfair to the Americans to give presents to the Indians living 
 in the United States after three years, but he would continue to give 
 them, if they resided in Canada. This proposal seemed to be re 
 ceived without much disapprobation and Head therefore thought 
 that a declaration to this effect might be formally made to the tribes 
 within a very short time. 209 
 
 ^Colborne to Goderich, Nov. 30, 1832, O. A. Q. 374, p. 911. 
 ^McGillvary (N. W. Co.) to Harvey, April, 1815, C. A. Q. 132, p. 35. 
 **C. A. Q. 224, p. 217. 
 209 Head to Glenelg, Nov. 20, 1836, C. A. Q. 391, p. 216. 
 
 63 
 
In the early part of the year 1836 there had been an intention 
 to discontinue the issue of presents from Amherstburg. The Lieu- 
 tenant-Governor of Canada, however, prevented this. Upon hear 
 ing of this action the Lords of the Treasury ordered an investiga 
 tion. Then two months later they approved of Head s proposal 
 to discontinue the issue to non-resident Indians after three years. 210 
 
 The Mackenzie-Papineau disturbances of 1837 and the hard feel 
 ings engendered against the United States by many Canadians on 
 account of the sympathy and support the conspirators received from 
 Americans had a tendency to prolong the friendly gifts to the 
 Indians. Military officials were in favor of this; but sympathetic 
 and well meaning men like Ryerson, still argued on behalf of the 
 Indian. The services of the Indian during the rebellion of 1837 
 and 1838 demanded additional rewards. 211 Indian presents were 
 therefore ordered in 1839 as usual. 212 By 1840, however, the end 
 was in sight, it being decreed that after a limited period presents 
 should cease to be issued to visitors from the United States. 213 
 
 Thus ended a policy which had for its recommendations as far 
 as the British were concerned the keeping of pledges, the recogni 
 tion of gratitude, the relieving of wants, and chiefly the preserva 
 tion of the allegiance and good will of the Indian ; but a policy 
 which had for evils the maintaining of an expensive institution 
 for the procuring and distribution of the presents, the irritating 
 of American citizens, and the depraving of the Indian. The vis 
 itors were continually made to feel that the United States were 
 not treating them fairly, and that the British were their only true 
 friends. Besides this, they suffered actual material losses on ac 
 count of their long journeys from the Mississippi to the Canadian 
 frontier. These losses were scarcely compensated for by the few 
 dollars worth of goods, a large percentage of which was squan 
 dered in border grogshops. 
 
 210 Spearman to Stephens, Feb. 9, 1837, C. A. Q. 240, p. 211; and see Glenelg to 
 Head Jan. 20, 1837, C. A. &. 78. 
 
 ai O. A. Q. 42 ; The Indians of Caughnawaga valiantly collected at the village, 
 November 4, 1838, against the rebels. Glenelg sent the Queen s thanks and advised 
 rewards. 
 
 2ia Normanby to Oolborne, April 28, 1839, C. A. Q. 42. 
 
 213 Russel to Sydenham, Jan. 30, 1841, C. A. G. 51. 
 
 64 
 
VII. 
 APPREHENSION OF AMERICAN AGGRESSION. 
 
 During the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth cen 
 turies the average English minister or legislator was without doubt 
 woefully ignorant of American people and affairs ; 214 but in the 
 Revolution and the War of 1812 British regiments and British 
 vessels had suffered sufficiently for them to realize, in part at least, 
 the strength and danger of their independent offspring. 215 Coupled 
 with this appreciation of the growing power of the young republic, 
 there was in the United Kingdom and her dependencies a deeply 
 rooted fear that they who had hoisted the Stars and Stripes over 
 the thirteen original colonies and who had carried it across the Al- 
 leghanies and even to the vast regions beyond the Mississippi would 
 not be content until that flag waved over the Canadas and maritime 
 provinces. Long after the close of actual hostilities of 1814 there 
 lingered the suspicion, which had originated before the war and 
 was confirmed by the proclamation of Hull, that the people of the 
 United States were "influenced by a spirit of aggrandizement not 
 necessary to their own security but increasing with the extent of 
 their empire." During the negotiations at Ghent in 1814 the 
 British commissioners gave no undisguised expression of this sus 
 picion. They declared it was "notorious to the whole world that 
 the conquest of Canada and its permanent annexation to the United 
 States was the declared object of the American government." 216 
 The American plenipotentiaries denied this ; but mere denials by 
 treaty makers would scarcely convince a people who had read 
 certain American boasts of 1812. 
 
 214 For the ignorance concerning Canadian affairs see Gourlay s address to the 
 resident land owners of Upper Canada, Feb. 1818, C. A. Q. p. 324, p. 26; Musgrave 
 to Bannister, Oct. 11, 1822, C. A. Q. 334, p. 133; Lord Durham s Report, p. 72. 
 
 215 Hart Davis, British H. of C. April 11, 1815; Hans. vol. 30, p. 501. 
 
 218 "It is notorious to the whole world that the conquest of Canada and its perma 
 nent annexation to the U. S. was the declared object of the American government. 
 * * * That of late years at least the American government has been influenced 
 by a very different policy, by a spirit of aggrandizement not necessary to their own 
 security but increasing with the extent of their empire, has been too clearly mani 
 fested by their progressive occupation of the Indian territories, by the acquisition of 
 Louisiana, by the more recent attempt to wrest by force of arms from a nation in 
 amity the two Floridas, and lastly by the avowed intention of permanently annexing 
 the Canadas to the United States." A. S. P. For. Bel. vol. JII. p. 713, ff. (Brit. 
 Plenipotentiary to Amer.) 
 
 65 
 
In Canada not a few looked upon the Americans as their nat 
 ural enemies and then exaggerated the real danger of a renewal 
 of hostilities. Traders, travelers, soldiers, and politicians were 
 among those who fancied they could see the Americans lying in 
 wait to lay their hands upon Canada. The representatives of the 
 great British trading organization, the Northwest Company, re 
 ferred to the "grasping proclivities" of "such a government and 
 such a people as the Americans." 217 In the spring of 1815 they 
 tried to persuade Drummond to grant no special favors to Amer 
 ican people because there was no instance of an unnecessary con 
 cession being made to the United States that did not engender the 
 demand for greater sacrifice. When Captain Hall of His Majesty s 
 Royal navy was making a tour of the British and American pos 
 sessions in America during 1816, he had apprehensions of another 
 American attack and recommended therefore, the building of a 
 strong fort on the Niagara River near Lake Erie. The proximity 
 of the Canadas and their fertile soil were, he said, "all motives and 
 very legitimate ones, it must be allowed, to stimulate the inhabitants 
 of the United States to such a conquest." Drummond, another 
 army officer holding the highest official position in Canada, felt, 
 even a full year after the war, that his American neighbors were 
 not only unfriendly but bitterly inimical to him. 219 The order from 
 Washington in the spring of 1815 to continue the military strength 
 of the United States as it was at the close of the war and the 
 strengthening of the United States forts in Michigan further 
 alarmed both Drummond and Baker. Even wild rumors found 
 their way to the commander-in-chief in Canada that American sym 
 pathizers were not only designing to help the French to release 
 Bonaparte, but were soon going to attack Canada and wrest it from 
 the British. 220 
 
 This fear of an American attack expressed itself in various 
 forms during the first years after the treaty. Proposals seriously 
 considered were made to transfer the seat of government of Upper 
 
 2 "N. W. Co. to Drummond. April 20, 1815. C. A. )Q. 132, p. 25. 
 
 ^Drummond to Bathurst, May 20, 1816, C. A. Q. 136, p. 222. 
 
 220 A certain Francis Story took the precaution to warn Drummond of a design 
 being formulated among the many French in the United States and among French 
 sympathizers there to attack St. Helena, to release Bonaparte, and also to attack 
 Canada. Addison, acting for Sherbrooke, doubted whether such a scheme had ever 
 been contemplated. There is an indication here, however, of the ease with which 
 such reports of American invasion could be believed in by Canadian people. (Story, 
 to Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 8, 1816, C. A. Q. 137, p. 151.) 
 
 Two years later the Duke of Richmond forwarded a paper from Ross Cuthbert 
 stating his belief that certain French generals with American assistance were going 
 to make an effort to wrest Canada from the British. (Richmond to Bathurst, Aug. 
 11, 1818, C. A. Q. 149, p. 9. 
 
 66 
 
Canada from York to Kingston because this latter town was more 
 securely protected and preferable from a military standpoint. The 
 Beauharnois Canal was opposed because of the danger of American 
 invasions. A line of communication was proposed between Mon 
 treal and Kingston by way of Ottawa and the Rideau River so that 
 the exposed St. Lawrence route would no longer be the only avail 
 able one ; 221 and the Rideau canal was soon under construction and 
 military settlements were planted on its banks because there they 
 would be protected against invasion and would also serve as a 
 check upon the "very bad description of Canadian residents on the 
 banks of the St. Lawrence, most of whom [were] by birth, par 
 entage, and education decided Yankees ; so important were these 
 objects considered that immense sums were expended for their at 
 tainment." 222 Military settlements were advocated by the ministry 
 in England as late as 1839. 223 The loss of the navigable channels 
 at Barnhart s Island, to which reference will be made hereafter, 
 and the colonization of Magdalen Islands, by American subjects 
 were chiefly complained of because of the danger to the protection 
 and defense of Canada. 224 
 
 Another precaution against or preparation for anticipated strife 
 and a most primitive and foolish one was found in Prevost s 
 recommendation to Bathurst that nine townships near Lake Cham- 
 plain, containing 111,000 acres, should remain unsettled because 
 "an unsettled country on the frontier is a better protection than 
 any population that could be placed there." 22r> Acting, it would 
 seem, on Prevost s advice, Bathurst ordered Wilson to allow no 
 settlements there and later, on July i, 1816, gave the same orders 
 to Sherbrooke. No new grants were to be made in these counties, 
 no roads were to be built; even those colonists already settled 
 there were to be induced, if possible, to vacate their homes and 
 the existing roads were to be broken up. This action would, it 
 was thought, "materially contribute to the future security of the 
 province." 226 Such absurd regulations naturally could not be 
 enforced. In 1821 Dalhousie reported that the soil and timber had 
 attracted a considerable population, among whom were felons, 
 escaping from justice, from both Canadian and American courts. 
 
 221 Gore to Bathurst, May, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 108. (Robinson to Bathurst, 
 July, 1815, C. A. jQ. 319, p. 73.) 
 222 0. A. Q. 167, p. 56. 
 223 Russel to Thompson, Sept. 7, 1839. 
 224 C. A. Q. 169, p. 13. 
 
 ^Prevost to Bathurst, March, 1815, C. A. Q. 131, p. 86; 0. A. Q. 137, p. 16. 
 Kingsley, IX. p. 41, and C. A. Q. 157, p. 182. 
 
 67 
 
Precautionary measures were naturally advocated by those who 
 would be the most immediately responsible for the defense of the 
 provinces. Not only were these alert to see that strategic points 
 along the boundary line should be decided by the commissioners 
 in favor of Upper Canada and that garrisons should be kept along 
 the frontier, but, as we have noticed before, they went to a great 
 deal of trouble to retain the good will of the native warriors. For 
 this reason the officers at Michillimackinac before it was evacuated 
 anxiously tried to check and correct the report insidiously circu 
 lated that the stipulations in the Treaty of Ghent were a mere 
 mockery, that Britain had betrayed the natives. 227 
 
 Drummond, early in 1815, called the attention of Bathurst to 
 certain movements in the West which seemed to indicate that the 
 United States appeared to be on the point of violating the treaty 
 as far as it regarded Indian territory. He pointed out the build 
 ing of forts and the apparent intention of exterminating the tribes. 
 Bathurst s reply to such notes of warning were most frequently 
 of the type of that sent to an Indian chief wherein he advised the 
 tribe to take measures to allay domestic animosities and return to 
 their habits of friendly intercourse with the Long Knives. 228 In 
 other ways Bathurst exerted himself to promote peace. Drummond 
 prepared for self-defense, and as a first step ordered the whole of 
 Manitoulin Island to be bought and a military post established on 
 the western point of it to act as a substitute for the former post 
 at Michillimackinac, the key to the land of the western Indians. 229 
 Then presents were distributed to the tribes who made that place 
 a rendezvous. 230 Care continued to be taken that the British out 
 posts in the West should be occupied by a garrison as imposing 
 as could be supplied by the military chest and the available troops. 
 This policy of the successive governors was based on the necessity 
 of preventing the Americans from "establishing their superiority 
 in these distant regions," 231 for it was learned that the Americans 
 were sending out "battalions instead of detachments" and were 
 strengthening their positions from Detroit to Sault Ste. Marie. 
 Such action would tend to win over the hitherto comparatively 
 
 to Goulborn, April and June, 1815, C. A. ,Q. 135, p. 225 ff. 
 
 228 Bathiirst to Chief of Muscogees, Sept., 1815, C. A. Q. 150, p. 70. 
 
 229 Drummond to Gore, Dec. 9, 1815, 0. A. Q. 320, p. 4. 
 
 230 It was found necessary to show the western Indians strong tokens of their 
 great father s satisfaction at their conduct." Drummond to Bathurst, Feb. 13, 1816, 
 C. A. Q. 146, p. 41. 
 
 ^Dalhousie to Bathurst, June, 1826, C. A. Q. 176, p. 424, and Kempt to Murray, 
 Dec. 22, 1828, C. A. Q. 183, p. 319. 
 
 68 
 
stable allies and make military operations against the Upper Prov 
 ince less likely to succeed. The friendship of the Indian must be 
 maintained not only for the enriching of the merchant and trader 
 but for the strengthening of the power of the military commanders. 
 
 While some of the British were trying to attract or retain the 
 Indians, Lieutenant-Governor Gore and others were equally as anx 
 ious to keep out the great number of Americans who began to 
 enter Upper Canada as soon as war ceased. Settlers were wanted 
 but it was feared that American settlers might be treacherous. 
 Lieutenant-Governor Gore urged Bathurst not to abandon the re 
 straint put upon immigration to the Canadas from the United States 
 for if free immigration were allowed the loyal population would 
 be reduced to defend themselves from the disloyal and the "next 
 declaration of hostilities" by America would "be received by ac 
 clamation." 232 It is also reported in Canada that the Americans 
 themselves entertained not the slightest doubt as to the Canadas 
 "becoming an appendage of the union." 233 Lieutenant-Governor 
 Maitland in 1818 shared the apprehensions of his predecessor Gore, 
 when told that of the eighty schooners employed in navigating Lake 
 Erie and capable of carrying, in the event of war, either one or two 
 guns of the larger caliber, not more than ten belonged to or were 
 navigated by subjects of His Majesty. 234 In 1822 another Gov 
 ernor, Sherbrooke, after noting the intermarriages, intercourse and 
 immigration, doubted very much whether reliance could be placed 
 on a continuance of the state of peace. 235 
 
 It was not alone military officers or legislators in Canada who 
 discussed the probability of a future conflict. Merchants and busi 
 ness men interested in their own and the colonies prosperity made 
 reference to it in memorials for trade regulation. Perhaps some 
 of these utterances may have been made for purely political or 
 business ends, but nevertheless it would have been folly for shrewd 
 business men to try to make capital out of a specter which was 
 believed to have vanished from the earth. A memorial of the 
 merchants and citizens of Quebec and Montreal in 1818 suggested 
 the likelihood of further trouble when they stated that it would 
 
 232 Gore to Bathurst, April 7, 1817, C. A. jQ. 322, p. 129. 
 
 233 Dr. Mountain, Bishop of Quebec, after a trip through Upper Canada, related 
 that in his travels he met a U. S. Colonel who spoke without disguise as to the view 
 of his countrymen upon the Canadas and who entertained not the slightest doubt as 
 to their becoming an appendage of the Union. Kingsley IX. p. 249. 
 
 ^Maitland to Bathurst, Dec. 8, 1818, C. A. Q. 324, p. 180. 
 
 ^Sherbrooke to Bathurst, March 14, 1822, C. A. Q. 332, p. 114. 
 
be better to give United States citizens an interest adverse to war, 
 namely, an interest in trade by way of Lower Canadian ports and 
 waterways. 236 
 
 The mutual agreement of both nations to abolish the fleets on 
 the Great Lakes and the readiness shown to settle quietly the nu 
 merous disputes of 1815 and 1816 along the western frontier must 
 certainly have diminished, but did not entirely dispel, the fear that 
 peace was merely temporary, and that the United States would not 
 rest contented until they had made another effort to annex Canada. 
 In the spring of 1817 a western officer furnished Bathurst with a 
 minute description of the topography of the provinces and of the 
 inadequate state of the existing militia system in Canada because 
 it was believed that the United States ruling bodies were actuated 
 by a desire for conquest or usurpation. The American population, 
 it was feared, stood ready armed, the sale of Canadian lands would 
 pay the expenses of the campaign, and the conquest would enable 
 the United States to disband its northern army. 237 A London paper 
 commenting upon the recent dismantling of the warships upon the 
 Great Lakes declared that though the Americans had reduced their 
 naval force, the exertions with which that energetic nation was 
 cutting roads in the direction of those waters, felling timber and 
 preparing it as knees, bends, etc., for vessels of war were circum 
 stances which should excite some attention. 238 
 
 At almost the same time a prominent Canadian warned Bath 
 urst that a discontented and mixed multitude from all nations, 
 recent immigrants to the United States, were combining with the 
 French and other discontented characters already there and were 
 anxiously awaiting the return of war. It was a well-known fact, 
 he said, that those points of punctilio, namely, the right of search 
 etc., were as keenly insisted upon by naval commanders and as 
 strenuously opposed by the Americans as at any time previous to 
 the war, and apart from the exception of a few engaged in com 
 merce who were kept from venting their sentiments from motives 
 of interest, there did not exist a single inhabitant of the United 
 States who did not cherish a hostile principle towards the British 
 Isles. Excessive pride and an ardent spirt of independence, it was 
 stated, made them view the power of Britain with a jealous eye; 
 
 ^ Memorial, 1818, 0. A. Q. 149, p. 142. 
 
 237 E. McDonnell to Bathurst, April, 1817, O. A. Q. 147, p. 375. 
 ^Quotation from London paper in Niles Register for Nov. 1, 1817. Niles Regis 
 ter, Vol. XIII. p. 156. 
 
 70 
 
the strength and resources of the United States were greater than 
 was usually represented; their population and revenues were in 
 creasing and their advantages in building ships for the navy and 
 training men for the army were much greater than those afforded 
 the Canadians. 239 
 
 To some on the American side of the dividing line a future clash 
 of arms was likewise considered not an utter improbability. The 
 reasons for the declaration of war in 1812 had been largely re 
 moved when the Napoleonic wars had ceased, but the Treaty of 
 Ghent was silent on the principles fought for. The right of search 
 was held in theory and still practically applied on Lake Erie during 
 the first two years after the war. Pittsburg, Buffalo, and Phila 
 delphia papers cried out in horror and demanded that American 
 rights be protected there even if force were necessary to do so. 240 
 British intriguing with the Indians kept green the memory of the 
 intrigues with Tecumseh and the Prophet, which were generally 
 believed to have been in progress for years prior to Madison s 
 war message. The instability of the Indian and the plotting and 
 scheming of the traders made an Indian rising possible at almost 
 any moment, and the bitter spirit manifested along the Michigan 
 frontier was certainly no guarantee for permanent harmony. It is 
 true the American nation as a whole had sincerely welcomed the 
 conclusion of hostilities. They didn t need more territory. Thou 
 sands of square miles of their own western possessions were yet 
 unexplored. But their love of independence and resentment of any 
 kind of foreign dictation, much less foreign abuse or insult, would 
 not let them be imposed upon. This spirit was well exhibited by 
 the one who was nearest to the zone of trouble. Cass had suffered 
 the most from meddlesome interference by a power which had 
 no right to hamper him in his projects, and in the summer of 1817, 
 when he purchased land from the Indians to complete the union 
 of Ohio and Michigan, we find that he did it chiefly for military 
 purposes. "Lake Erie," he said, "may once more become the the 
 ater of desperate exertion and skill." 241 
 
 It was not only on the American continent, and before the smoke 
 of battle had hardly blown away, that we hear of the probability 
 of a renewal of the conflict ; but through the twenties and on the 
 floors of the British Parliament we hear the same topic under 
 
 239 A. J. Christie to Bathurst, July, 1817, C. A. Q. 147, p. 116 ff. 
 
 240 Niles Register, Vol. 13, p. 156. 
 
 241 Cass and MacArthur to Graham, Sept. 29, 1817, A. S. P., I. A. II. p. 137. 
 
 71 
 
discussion. In 1820 Marryat in the House of Commons pleaded for 
 better trade regulations in order to establish in the Canadian prov 
 inces "a numerous flourishing and well-affected population, able 
 and willing to serve as an effective barrier against the future am 
 bition of the United States." 242 Four years later Bright advocated 
 the encouragement of the Upper Canadian colony for the very 
 same reasons. 243 The announcement of the Monroe Doctrine must 
 have tended to confirm the opinions of some who were afflicted 
 with the idea that the United States wanted to exclude the British 
 altogether. During these years members of Parliament like Baring 
 and Stanley frankly declared that the time was not far distant when 
 the Canadas would no longer be British possessions, 244 and such 
 debate led Huchinson in May, 1828, to deliver a strong plea for 
 the continuance of British control over these provinces and there 
 fore for the strengthening of British influence and power there. 245 
 In the following July, Sir Robert Peel alluding to Baring s speech 
 spoke thus: "[Mr. Baring] himself said, Don t disregard the Amer 
 icans ; they are not inattentive to military science ; they are training 
 up their youths to arms ; if that were true was it not wise in time 
 of peace to make preparation for an effectual defense? " He then 
 supported Harding s motion that 30,000 be granted for military 
 works at Kingston, U. C, and Halifax, N. S., and begged the 
 House to consider what would be the effect if the Canadas were 
 not well defended. He deplored the fact that some members had 
 suggested these colonies be abandoned or allowed to become free 
 and independent states. What chance was there, he asked, that 
 these colonies could remain free and independent with a powerful 
 neighbor like the United States at their side ? 246 Quebec news 
 papers would have supported Harding s motion for just then the 
 Quebec Gazette believed the United States would not dislike an 
 opportunity to distinguish themselves in war. 247 
 
 Shortly after this an "ancient peer of England," who had been 
 early acquainted with Jefferson and who professed to be a close 
 student of American affairs, openly declared that "Rufus King and 
 Mr. Canning had agreed perfectly" with him that in "succession 
 
 242 Marryat s Speech, June 5, 1820, Hansard II series, Vol. I. p. 854. 
 
 243 Bright s Speech, Mar. 12, 1824, Hansard II series, Vol. X. p. 959. 
 
 244 Baring s Speech, May 15, 1825, Hansard II series, Vol. XII. p. 1036; also his 
 speech, Mar. 2, 1829, Hansard II series. Stanley s speech, May 2, 1828, Hansard 
 II series, vol. 19, p. 339. 
 
 ^Huskisson s Speech in H. of C., May 2, 1828, Hansard and also see Christie, 
 Vol. III. p. 174, 175. 
 
 ^Peel s Speech July 7, 1828, in "Peel s Speeches," Vol. I. p. 665. 
 
 247 Quotation from Quebec Gazette in Niles Register, June 20, 1829. 
 
 72 
 
the objects of American ambition were the Mexican province of 
 Texas, the island of Cuba, and the Canadas." They were deter 
 mined to possess them and considered the end would justify the 
 means. 247a During the thirties, too, people along the frontier in 
 sisted that troops stationed there should not be removed lest raids 
 be made from across the border, and Lord Durham advocated the 
 removal of a "barren and injurious sovereignty" which but tempted 
 the "chances of foreign aggression by keeping continually exposed 
 to a powerful and ambitious neighbor a distant dependency in 
 which an invader would find no resistance. " 247b 
 
 From 1815 to the outbreak of the rebellion in 1837 the fear of 
 raids or of a more generally organized effort on the part of the 
 United States to capture the northern part of the continent was 
 repeatedly expressed. Even men of the greatest prominence and 
 responsibility informed the Colonial Office of the fear of renewed 
 attempts to disturb the peace. May we not see here one reason 
 why the Canadians and the Colonial Office were so tardy in break 
 ing with the Indians residing in Michigan or further west, and 
 must we not read other actions of British authorities in the light 
 not only of an aggrandizing spirit of the British, of an insidious 
 effort to render insecure the western territories of the United 
 States, but of an effort to be prepared to meet the aggrandizing 
 spirit of ambitious and powerful rivals for the northern land and 
 trade ? 
 
 Nevertheless with both central governments and the vast ma 
 jority of both peoples sincerely anxious for peace, it was easy for 
 sacrifices to be made on both sides to maintain it. Great Britain 
 was especially reluctant to encourage discord, so exhausted was 
 she by the two decades of war through which she had just passed, 
 so enormous was her national debt, and so much was she interested 
 in the settlement of European affairs and of Spanish difficulties in 
 Central and Southern America. Members of Parliament questioned 
 whether Canada was worth the expense involved in its maintenance 
 and whether it would not be to the real advantage of England to 
 
 to a minister, June 3, 1830, C. A. Q. 196, p. 481. 
 II series, Vol. 19, p. 339. 
 
 247b Colborne to Glenelg, Nov. 20, 1835, C. A. Q. 387, p. 311, C. A. Q. 244, p. 90; 
 Durham s Report, Introd. p. XIII. 
 
 73 
 
give it up entirely. 2470 The prudent American diplomat, Rush, mean 
 while cleverly worked his way into the good graces of the courtiers 
 at St. James and softened the bitterness which Englishmen had held 
 against their disobedient offspring. Despite these things, however, 
 the apprehension that the ambition of the United States would 
 lead to further trouble could not easily be brushed aside. 
 
 247c Marsh in H. of C., Nov. 28, 1814, asks for imports and exports of Canada to 
 see if it is "consistent with prudence * * * to continue the country at war." 
 
 Also Sir I. Coffin, H. of C. Mar. 13, 1822: * * * "It would have been 
 a good thing if Canada had been sunk to the bottom of the sea * * * it costs 
 500,000 pounds per annum * * * the sooner the Governor were called home 
 and the sooner the assembly and colony were suffered to go, he should be sorry to 
 say, au diable, the better." (Hansard.) 
 
 Also Bell s Weekly Messenger (Niles Register, 14, p. 14, Feb. 21, 1818): "It 
 always has been our opinion and we know it personally to be that of one of our 
 greatest statesmen this country ever produced that Halifax, Canada, etc., are not 
 worth what they actually cost England and that the true point of wisdom would be to 
 make the best bargain we could for them to the United States." 
 
 74 
 
VIII. 
 
 DREAD OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND INFLU 
 ENCES. 
 
 If there was a lingering apprehension that sooner or later another 
 attempt would be made to annex Canada there was also the fear 
 that American influence might cause the still loyal colonies them 
 selves to take the initiative and break off from the mother country. 
 Commercial intercourse, immigration, intermarriage, the holding 
 of Canadian land by American citizens, the spread of American 
 newspapers, magazines, and books, the increasing number of Amer 
 ican missionaries and teachers in the province by all such means 
 it was feared that the principles of American democracy were being 
 disseminated while monarchial institutions were censured. It was 
 feared that American public men were being eulogized and British 
 depreciated, that Canadians were being taught to feel the weight of 
 civil and ecclesiastical tyranny, and that Canada was thus in danger 
 of being slowly but surely separated from the mother country. 
 
 The Upper province especially was intimately bound up with the 
 states to the south and east. Much of its imports came from these 
 states ; many of its citizens came either from or through them ; 
 mail frequently came through the states ; the money in circulation 
 was almost entirely of Spanish or American pieces, though English 
 and French coins were met with occasionally 2488 - ; American laws 
 suppressing bank notes were felt severely in Quebec; ideas and 
 opinions held on one side were reechoed on the other arguments 
 made by Mackenzie against chartered banks, for example, were 
 identical with those of the Jacksonian party 248b for those who had 
 grown up under liberal institutions or had become familiar with 
 them through contact, demanded similar ones in their new homes. 2480 
 A similar environment gave rise to similar desires. The emigrant 
 direct from Europe breathed the air of freedom and often became 
 very rapidly "Americanized." This natural evolution was too often 
 traced to influences brought to bear upon him by his cousins south 
 
 8 Gosford to Glenelg, Dec. 21, 1836, C. A. Q. 229, p. 863. 
 ^Hamilton petition, Aug. 29, 1833, C. A. Q. 378, p. 317. 
 
 248c See speech of Sir James Macintosh, Brit. H. of C., May 2, 1828, Hansard 
 II series, Vol. 19, p. 331. 
 
 75 
 
and east of the Great Lakes. 248d Sherbrooke very much doubted 
 whether the provinces could long withstand the loose demoraliz 
 ing principles introduced" and he "could not avoid remarking * * 
 that in many instances a stronger bias prevailed in Upper Canada 
 in favor of the American than the British form of government/ 2486 
 
 On account of the danger of American contamination many ad 
 vocated the need of more stringent qualifications for membership in 
 the House of Assembly of Upper Canada because recent immigrants 
 from the United States possessing Republican sympathies and strong 
 feelings in favor of their native country, might, from the advan 
 tages of wealth, acquire influence sufficient to secure their elections 
 to that body. 249 Not only was there an unreadiness to permit these 
 immigrants to be eligible for administrative or legislative office, 
 but obstacles were even placed in the way of American citizens 
 / from settling in Canada at all. 250 
 
 From the lands subject to Talbot s superintendence, the subjects 
 of the United States were absolutely excluded. 251 Beyond the limits 
 of Talbot s reservation there were no legal means of keeping Amer 
 ican citizens from coming in and taking up land, if they so desired. 
 The British Colonial Office and the War Department would have 
 preferred to see Upper Canada fill up with British emigrants 
 but this did not deter others. In the fall of 1815 Gore was loath 
 to report to Bathurst that numbers from the United States were 
 pouring into the provinces and that there was "no legal power in 
 the governor to restrain the evil." A provincial statute, however, 
 authorized the dismissal from the province, upon very slight grounds, 
 
 l, Travels in Canada and United States, 1816 and 1817, p. 154. 
 A lurking hostility to republicanism has been too frequently suffered to color 
 our views of the conduct of America." (Fidler, Observations on Professions, etc., 
 in U. S. and Can. p. 159.) 
 
 "The malus animus (towards the British) * * * is in fact the food on 
 which the great and I am sorry to say the predominant party in the country (U. S.) 
 is nourished. 1 Quotation from letter of Bagot to Lord Binning dated Washington, 
 May 6, 1816, found in "George Canning and His Friends," Vol. II, p. 22. 
 see Bagot to Sneyd, Letters of June 12, 19, 1816. Vol. II, p. 22. 
 
 Letters and Dispatches of Lord Castlereagh III series, Vol. Ill, p. 437. 
 
 Mackenzie s Objections, Mar. 14, 1833, C. A. Q. 378, p. 370. 
 
 248e But when I consider the vicinity of the latter province (Upper Canada) to 
 the United States, the population continually flowing in from thence, the constant 
 communication and intermarriages between the families on both sides of the line, 
 the number of Americans who purchased the best of the lands as soon as they are 
 cleared, and every description of property worth having, and when I look to the 
 loose, demoralizing principles introduced by these people, I very much doubt whether 
 reliance can be placed on the continuance of this tractable disposition * * * Cir 
 cumstances have materially changed since the separation of the two provinces and I 
 could not avoid remarking, when I was in Upper Canada, that in many instances a 
 stronger bias prevailed in favor of the American than the British form of govern 
 ment " Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Mar. 14, 1822, C. A. <Q. 332, p. 114. 
 
 249 Bouchette to Bathurst, Jan. 6, 1823, C. A. Q. 167, p. 244. 
 
 ^Bathurst to Drummond, Jan. 10, 1815, O. A. Q. 57. 
 
 ^Halton to Talbot, Oct. 7, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 147. Talbot had a large reser 
 vation on Lake Erie. 
 
 76 
 
of all such as had not been resident six months or had not taken 
 the oath of allegiance, and therefore Gore sought advice from his 
 Executive Council how best "to give the utmost efficacy to this stat 
 ute," ordered his magistrates to report the names and destination 
 of all aliens coming from the United States or elsewhere, and di 
 rected that the oath of allegiance should not be administered to any 
 person without a special order. 252 The British immigration agent 
 in New York, not sharing the same antipathy to American settlers, 
 tried to persuade Gore to allow some of these to take up their resi 
 dence in Upper Canada. Nevertheless the Lieutenant Governor 
 with the greatest eagerness tried to carry out Bathurst s policy of 
 settling the province with British emigrants only. 253 
 
 It must be noticed that during his administration Gore exerted 
 himself in this direction to a greater extent than he was legally 
 warranted in doing. The popular assembly was more liberal than 
 he, but the majority of this parliament, he declared, was composed 
 of influential land speculators desirous of promoting their own 
 rather than imperial interests. In April, 1817, this assembly re 
 solved that the admission of settlers from the United States should 
 be unrestricted and that all orders to the contrary should be 
 rescinded. Rather than allow any measure so objectionable to 
 him to be carried through, Gore prorogued his legislature and 
 immediately informed Bathurst of his motives for so doing. 254 The 
 deadlock between the governor and his legislative assembly seems 
 to show that whatever the motives might be, basely selfish or purely 
 honorable, the majority of the parliament, at least, neither resented 
 nor feared the American immigration but would have gladly wel 
 comed it. 
 
 When the matter was called to the attention of Bathurst this 
 minister supported neither Gore nor the assembly. 255 Gore was 
 mistaken he declared, because American citizens, arriving in the 
 province, %ere entitled to have the oath of allegiance and the oath 
 of their intention to reside and settle administered to them; the 
 governor had no discretion to refuse this; but the assembly were 
 in error in supposing that the taking of such an oath could of 
 
 2B2 Gore to Bathurst, Oct. 17, 1815, C. A. Q. 319, p. 120. 
 
 0, 
 
 to Buchanan, July 31, 1816, C. A. ,Q. 320, p. 319. 
 
 ^"The interruption of the flowing migration from the United States was par 
 ticularly offensive to certain land speculators, the principal of these was William 
 Dickson, who, I regret to say, is a member of the Legislative Council and a commis 
 sioner to administer the oath of allegiance was the first and only one reported to me 
 who disobeyed my instructions, that is, to administer the oath of allegiance without 
 license from the governor." Gore to Bathurst, April 7, 1817, C. A. &. 322, p. 129. 
 
 K5 Bathurst to Smith, Nov. 13, 1817, C. A. Q. p. 58. 
 
 77 
 
itself qualify an American citizen to hold land in the province. A 
 previous continued residence of seven years was the indispensable 
 condition of being entitled to hold lands and it was His Royal 
 Highness wish that this law should be enforced. Those persons 
 who, since the war, had violated this law should be dispossessed. 
 Drummond, the administrator at Quebec, bore the same sentiments 
 as Gore, and strongly recommended his Parliament to revive im 
 mediately the old regulations respecting aliens, for he feared "dis 
 contented adventurers and mischievous agitators from the continent 
 of Europe, who had recently migrated to the neighboring states." 255a 
 Drummond s successor charged the strong republican sentiment 
 of his Parliament to the American education of many of its 
 leaders. 25515 
 
 In spite, however, of prejudice of governors and irritating in 
 structions, hundreds of citizens of the United States continued 
 to come in and take possession of the land. 256 Not until 1825 did an 
 order come from the Colonial Office to remove from settlers 
 already in Upper Canada the obstacles in the way of their complete 
 citizenship in that province. 257 But restrictions were still left on 
 prospective immigrants from the United States and this led to a 
 clash between the Assembly in Upper Canada, who favored the 
 abolition of all restrictions, and Bathurst, who would not go so 
 far. An address was sent from the Assembly to England animad 
 verting upon the losses sustained through this action of the colonial 
 department. In the absence of commercial and manufacturing 
 capital, land was the chief basis of public credit and further popula 
 tion was necessary in order that the land might be occupied and 
 made productive. " Many United States citizens had come in 
 and were among the most useful and loyal subjects and many 
 thousands of families would have entered during the last few 
 years if they had not been discouraged. 258 Bathurst s reply to 
 this address was quite unsatisfactory to the Upper Canadians; but 
 Kempt, who shortly after this came out as Governor, saw the 
 expediency of procuring more favorable legislation in favor of the 
 foreigners, and he was particularly anxious that the Americans, 
 
 ^"Drummond s Address to Parl, Jan. 26, 1816, Christie II, p. 252. 
 255b See Kingsford, IX, p. 176. 
 
 ^Sherbrooke to Bathurst, C. A. Q. 163, p. 186 and letter by an English farmer 
 settled in Upper Canada, 1820, Provincial Archives. 
 
 a7 Bathurst to Maitland, July 22, 1815, C. A. Q., p. 67. 
 ^Address from Commons, Jan. 16, 1826, C. A. Q., p. 18. 
 
 78 
 
settled in Lower Canada, should have as much relief as had been 
 granted to those in the Upper Province. 259 
 
 So long as it was the desire and policy to maintain special 
 privileges for any ecclesiastical organization or to bolster up an 
 autocratic irresponsible government, the British governors in the 
 provinces and the Colonial Office, which sent them out, were 
 perfectly justified in trying to cut off or restrict American immigra 
 tion and American influence. Property and prominent political 
 positions were falling rapidly into the possession of these immi 
 grants and so rapidly was this process carried on that the assertion 
 was made that if purchases by the people of the United States 
 should continue as they had done, Americans would in a short 
 time, without treaty or conquest, become the owners of Canada. 260 
 The people in the provinces did not regard them as foreigners and 
 thus their influence and the proximity of the United States made 
 it hazardous to maintain invidious distinctions in favor of any 
 particular class or denomination. 
 
 The desire for greater local autonomy increased and as late as 
 1838 Lord Durham reported that undoubtedly there were many 
 who wished to assimilate the institutions of the province rather to 
 those of the United States than to those of the mother country, and 
 that a few persons, chiefly of American origin, had entertained 
 those designs from the outset. The extensive internal improvements 
 of the Republic, producing marvelous growth both in wealth and 
 in population, were enviously marked, Durham declared, by the 
 discontented provincials. 2COa The political, social, and religious con 
 troversies which dated from the beginning of Dalhousie s adminis 
 tration up to that of Sydenham s plainly proved how strong a factor 
 this American influence was and how much unconcealed sympathy 
 and proffered support the agitators received, if not from the legis 
 lative or executive body within the United States, from many of 
 the people who voted into office those governing bodies. En 
 lightened statesmen, such as Durham, saw how to direct the spirit 
 of this mixed Canadian population. His predecessors had clung 
 to the old colonial policy of suppression, of domination, and vainly 
 sought to crush out everything tainted with republicanism. 
 
 Ke C. A. Q., 193, p. 120. 
 
 260 Sherbrooke to Bathurst, 1822, C. A. Q. 163, p. 186; Bigg to Stanley, 1833. 0. 
 A. Q. 379, p. 188; Gould to Glenelg, 1835, C. A. Q. 224, p. 470. 
 
 ^"Durham s Report, p. 108 and p. 113. 
 
 79 
 
Immigration from the United States was thus impeded, but mis- 
 government of the provinces and a misgovernment that native 
 Englishmen like Bennet and Hume vigorously condemned on the 
 floors of the British Parliament 26015 not only tended to exclude 
 Americans, but was largely responsible for the fact that many of the 
 newcomers at Quebec passed through the fertile unoccupied Upper 
 Province and took up lands in what is now Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, 
 or even in the farther west. That twenty or twenty-five per cent 
 of all immigrants by way of the St. Lawrence river did this, is 
 perhaps a conservative estimate ; and before the rebellion of 1837 
 many who had already settled in the Canadas sold their homesteads 
 and removed across the border. 2600 
 
 These immigrants who were forsaking Canada and the discon 
 tented who remained were, for the first few years after the war, 
 confined solely to the English speaking element ; but later the French 
 also became dissatisfied. During the war and for some years aft 
 erwards, the British could count on a hearty support from these 
 people in the Lower Province. In 1814 citizens of Quebec memo 
 rialized the Prince Regent to retain Prevost as Governor. 261 But 
 
 280b Bennet s Speech, March 12, 1824, Hansard II series, Vol. 10, p. 958; Hume s 
 Speech, March 15, 1825, Hansard II series, Vol. 12, p. 1035. 
 
 2GOc Hume, Apr. 15, 1825, said that he was "creditably informed that eighteen 
 out of every twenty emigrants that went to Upper Canada passed on to the United 
 States." Hansard II Series, Vol. 12, p. 1360. Astle to Gregory, June 30, 1823, 
 C. A. ,Q. 167, p. 228. Maitland to Gore, Feb. 6, 1838, C. A. Q. 244, p. 90. 
 
 "I have observed myself and I find from information that many American fami 
 lies settled in this part of the country are leaving it. Buchanan, Chief Emigration 
 Agent, Quebec, Statistics for 1834 and 1836. (C. A. Q. 217, p. 680 and 229, p. 877 
 resp.) 
 
 1834 Distribution of immigrants, Quebec: 
 
 To Dower Canada 4,090 
 
 To Upper Canada 22,210 
 
 Died 800 
 
 Returned to Gt, Brit 350 
 
 To United States 3,485 
 
 Total 30,485 
 
 1836 Distribution of immigrants, Quebec: 
 
 To Lower Canada 9,600 
 
 To Upper Canada 13,000 
 
 Died 145 
 
 To United States 4,973 
 
 Total 27,728 
 
 281 Memoir of Citizens of Quebec to Prince Regent, Nov. 1814, C. A. (Q. 135, p. 37. 
 
 "Ce pays une fois perdu, ils n ont plus de patrie ou ils puissent tpurner les 
 yeux; un Anglois a encore sa patrie. Si le Canada passe sous la domination des of 
 Etats-unis, leur population sera submergee par celle des Etats-unis, et ils deviendront 
 nuls, sans aucune influence dans leur governement; incapables de se proteger, de pro- 
 teger leur religion" * * * ending with the declaration that the British govern 
 ment caused no such dangers to be feared. 
 
 Hall (Travels in Canada and United States, 1816 and 1817, p. 94) says: "The 
 Canadians (i. e., Lower Canadians) bear a< considerable antipathy to the Americans 
 whom they dominate Sacres Bastonnais." 
 
 Sherbrooke to Bathurst, May 14, 1822, C. A. Q. 332, p. 14, says that he is con 
 vinced that the Catholics in Lower Canada feel a deep-rooted antipathy to the Govern 
 ment in the United States and have no dread equal to that of one day falling under 
 its dominion. He feels that whatever may be the fate of the Upper Province, Amer 
 icans would never be able to establish themselves in Lower Canada. 
 
 80 
 
by 1839, so completely had the forces brought to bear upon these 
 people reversed the situation that, according to Dunham s acute 
 observation, "an invading American army might rely on the co 
 operation of almost the entire French population of Lower 
 Canada. 261a 
 
 Some persons high in official positions would gladly welcome the 
 American negro 262 but there were more who would as gladly erect 
 a Chinese wall against American missionaries and teachers. Meth 
 odist ministers in particular met with no cordial reception from 
 those who basked in the gubernatorial rays. 263 The average settler 
 undoubtedly welcomed them with open arms, but the high church 
 men and the absolute monarchists fancied that they saw these 
 teachers and ministers disseminating dangerous republican doc 
 trines. 264 Maitland was among those who did not welcome the 
 foreign missionaries. In 1819 he extolled the loyalty of the mem 
 bers of the Church of England during the war and made a plea 
 for thirty or forty more clergymen from his church, chiefly because 
 many Canadians were joining the Methodists, whose preachers 
 came mostly from the United States. 265 A little later he regretted 
 the decision of the Washington Congress whereby the London 
 Wesleyan Methodists had been prevailed upon to withdraw their 
 missionaries, thus leaving the field open to American Methodist 
 preachers only. He had just as little faith in the loyalty of Amer 
 ican preachers as he had in the loyalty of American teachers. 2 
 
 In May, 1827, Strachan congratulated the Church of England 
 upon the considerable progress being made by it in Upper Canada, 
 the more especially because teachers of the different denominations, 
 with a few named exceptions, were all from the United States from 
 which they brought sentiments of hostility to the established gov 
 ernment and church. 267 During the same summer Dr. Weld peti 
 tioned for forty more clergymen from England, the need being 
 more urgent he said, since Methodists in the United States were 
 establishing themselves in the province of Upper Canada with 
 
 261a Durham s Report, p. 40. 
 
 282 Certain American negroes had petitioned for permission to establish a settle 
 ment in Upper Canada. Gould sympathized with the petitioners, because they were 
 being oppressed by their very "liberal brothers, the professors of liberality, the 
 Yankees." Letter to William Allen, July 20, 1830, C. A. Q. 196, p. 187. 
 
 See also, Knill to Glenelg, Nov. 19, 1835, C. A. Q. 388, p. 416. 
 
 263 Methodist ministers in 1816 were charged with raising an insurrection in the 
 West Indies. See Hansard II Series Vol. 34, p. 1216. 
 
 264 Minutes of British Wesleyan Methodists at Montreal, May, 1827, C. A. Q. 344, 
 p. 332. 
 
 ^Maitland to Bathurst, June 4, 1819, C. A. ,Q. 325, p. 222. 
 
 ^Maitland to Bathurst, Jan. 4, 1821, C. A. Q. 321, p. 2. 
 
 26T Strachan to Morton, May 16, 1827, C. A. Q. 325, p. 342. 
 
 81 
 
increasing rapidity. 268 A little later Colborne complained that these 
 Methodists had become a political body that they might strengthen 
 their influence against the established church. Four or five news 
 papers allied with them, he said, were spreading anti-British feeling 
 and attempting to undermine the patriotism of the people. 269 Col- 
 borne was no more solicitious for the welfare of the white race 
 than Kempt was for the red. He believed that among the most 
 effectual means of ameliorating the condition of the Indians would 
 be the providing of active, zealous, Wesleyan missionaries from 
 England to counteract the antipathy to the established church and 
 other objectionable principles which the missionaries from the 
 United States were supposed to instill into the minds of their Indian 
 converts. 270 
 
 A charge of another kind was made against these missionaries. 
 A petition from the bishop and clergymen of Quebec, men inter 
 ested in the pecuniary as well as the spiritual welfare of the denom 
 ination, stated that the most active efforts put forward to secure 
 the sale of clergy reserves for educational and internal improve 
 ments were made by Methodists, most of whom were ordained in 
 the United States and had no ecclesiastical connection with the 
 Methodist conference in England. 271 Another Episcopal clergyman 
 in Upper Canada about the same year (1832) wrote that "most of 
 f the Methodist ministers in Canada are from the States and 
 have a double object: they ostensibly minister in sacred offices 
 but secretly and effectively disseminate principles destructive of 
 the present order of affairs. They are concerting schemes for 
 the establishment of republican institutions and plans of govern 
 ment." 272 A short time after this complainant added his grievances, 
 the Lords of the Treasury in England refused to admit free of 
 duty books and tracts from the United States for the benefit of 
 their Bible, Sunday School, and Tract societies, because these books 
 and tracts were represented as being politically dangerous. 273 
 
 This persistent and potent resistance to the Methodist ministry 
 continually led its champions to deny the charges, and the vigorous 
 denial of disloyalty serves only to show how much opposition there 
 was to this so-called American influence. By addresses of attach- 
 
 M8 Dr. Weld to Horton, May 16, 1827, C. A. Q. 325, p. 342. 
 Colborne to Hay, March 13, 1829, C. A. Q. 351, p. 85. 
 ""Kempt to Murray, May 16, 1829, C. A. Q. 188, p. 345. 
 ^Petition, December, 1831, C. A. jQ. 200, p. 291. 
 272 Rev. I. Fidler, "Observations, etc.," p. 124. 
 273 Spearman to Stephen, April 7, 1837, C. A. Q. 240, p. 236. 
 
 82 
 
ment to the British Crown and mother country 274 and through the 
 press and on the platform, such men as Ryerson hurled back the 
 violent onsets of their adversaries. This leader of the denomination 
 boldly rebuked the Lieutenant Governor himself, declaring that 
 the majority of the Methodist preachers were British born subjects, 
 that they had no dislike for the Church of England and were inno 
 cent of secular interference. He complained that the Lieutenant 
 Governor s remarks "must produce the impression in an unin 
 formed mind that the Methodist clergy as a body was a company 
 of ignorant, political demagogues, alike divested of religious prin 
 ciple and public character." 275 Hume in Parliament likewise 
 stoutly maintained that Dr. Strachan had grossly misrepresented 
 these missionaries in Upper Canada and produced statistics to dem 
 onstrate that far the larger percentage of the Methodist and Bap 
 tist preachers in Canada were born and educated in British do 
 minions. 276 
 
 Though Hume and Ryerson and others might deny the charges 
 of their adversaries, one must now see, as the Lieutenant Governors 
 and the established church then saw, that the Methodists really 
 were a force representing and advocating "American principles," 
 and if this Americanizing of Upper Canada was baneful as the 
 Governor and established church believed it to be, then the Meth 
 odists ought to have been condemned. Ryerson undoubtedly, how 
 ever, had the sympathy and generous support of an extensive group 
 and voiced their sentiments in saying that there was no general 
 wish expressed in the province for the return of British Wesleyan 
 missionaries, that only some political newspapers were clamoring 
 for this, that nine-tenths of the European population in Upper 
 Canada were decidedly favorable to the principles of civil and reli 
 gious liberty as advocated in a memorial from the Methodist con 
 ference, and that at least one quarter of the people of the Upper 
 Province preferred the ministrations of the Methodist clergy. 277 
 His references to the provisions made by the constitution of six 
 teen of the United States for the diffusion of virtue, wisdom, and 
 knowledge among the humblest classes of the people shows his 
 familiarity with the affairs of the United States. The entire de 
 fense of Ryerson only tended to show the growth of the so-called 
 
 ^Address from Methodist Conference, 1834, 0. A. Q. 382, p. 451. W. M. S. to 
 Goulbourn July 3, 1821, C. A. Q. 330, p. 99. 
 
 " Hume s Speech, May 2, 1828, Hansard II series, Vol. 19, p. 341. 
 277 See note 274. 
 
 83 
 
American tendencies and theories and the need of greater precau 
 tion if the rulers of Upper Canada were to preserve their old-time 
 supremacy over the government and religion of the new province. 
 
 Teachers from the United States were no less undesirable. An 
 extremely strong plea for protection against peril from this source 
 came from the Reverend Alexander Macdonell, Vicar-General of 
 the Catholics in Upper Canada, in the beginning of 1817. He 
 suggested that clergymen and teachers of the Gaelic language and 
 Catholic faith should be sent out to instruct the Highlanders in 
 the Upper Province so that "thus assured by the double barrier 
 of their language and religion, they might for a long time stand 
 proof against the contagious politics of their democratical neigh 
 bors." He lamented that boarding schools for young ladies in 
 both the Canadas were kept principally by American women, and 
 that every book of instruction put into the hands of their pupils 
 by these schoolmistresses was of American manufacture, artfully 
 tinctured with the principles of democratic government and holding 
 up American worthies as perfect patterns of every moral excel 
 lence while British public and private characters were represented 
 in the most odious terms. With more warmth than pure justice, 
 Macdonell condemned the crafty arts of these active agents. To 
 demonstrate the extent of the territory over which their teachings 
 prevailed, he reported that, with the exception of the eight district 
 schools, which were taught principally by clergymen of the estab 
 lished church, the education of the youth of both sexes in Upper 
 Canada was exclusively entrusted to American teachers. 278 
 
 It seems to have (been true that most of the teachers and text 
 books in Upper Canada, as well as a majority of the ministers of 
 the gospel, came from the neighboring states. A few years later 
 Maitland took occasion to refer to the preponderance of alien 
 teachers and repeated almost the same language used by Mac 
 donell. He wished that instructors could be brought in from 
 some central school "to the exclusion not only of American mas 
 ters but of their republican apparatus of grammars and lesson books, 
 all of which were studiously composed with a view of instilling 
 principles into the pupil s mind unfriendly to the existing form 
 of government." 279 More than a year later he was still insisting 
 on the enlargement of the school at York for this same purpose, 
 
 ^Macdonell to Bathurst, Jan. 10, 1817, C. A. Q. 323, p. 177. 
 278 Maitland to Bathurst, Jan. 4, 1821, C. A. Q. 229, p. 2. 
 
 84 
 
and Durham relates that those in Lower Canada who wished higher 
 education sought it in American colleges. 280 Undoubtedly seeds 
 of discontent were scattered by these foreign teachers and to a 
 governor of the old school the need of action was urgent. Malcon 
 tents were finding sympathy, instruction, and inspiration from their 
 ambitious neighbors, and it was easy for them to contrast the re 
 tarded development of the Canadas with the progress, freedom, 
 and popularly elected governing boards of New York, Pennsylvania, 
 and Ohio. 281 
 
 One of the favorite methods of airing grievances and attacking 
 men and institutions with impunity was found in making use of the 
 United States printing presses. In the conservative and best Amer-- 
 ican newspapers, the administrators of Canada might often find 
 matter not complimentary to their system of government, but there 
 were some radical papers especially objectionable. 2810 Five years 
 before the war of 1812 broke out, there began to be published by 
 Wilcox, the Upper Canada Guardian or Freeman s Journal. This 
 paper, professing to be a Canadian publication, was printed and 
 published in the United States, sustained, it was currently reported, 
 by funds gathered in New York, and circulating widely in Can 
 ada. 282 That its aim was to stir up discontent in the British col 
 onies and excite hostilities is evident from the first edition of this 
 paper. The editor referring to the Chesapeake affair, wrote therein : 
 "We are all confused by the appearance of hostilities between the 
 two countries and the honest part of us say that if the United States 
 pocket the indignity now offered them, they can no longer style 
 themselves a nation." 283 
 
 To cite but one other glaring instance of the use of the American 
 press, it is necessary to refer only to L Ami du Peuple, a paper 
 published at Plattsburg in 1827 and then with generous prodigality 
 scattered through Canadian parishes. 284 The unlearned and credu 
 lous inhabitants were told that the administration in Canada was 
 forging chains to bind them; their liberties, their rights, their po 
 litical existence were in danger of public destruction; kings are 
 great and powerful only because their subjects bow their knees 
 before them ; now was the time to rise up and shake off the yoke 
 
 290 Durham s Report, p. 94. 
 
 281 See Gourlay s Address to resident landholders, Feb. 1818, C. A. (Q. 324, p. 26 
 and letter to Bathurst, Dec. 3, 1817, C. A. Q., 323, p. 42. 
 
 ^"See, for example, Niles Register, Feb. 11, 1832, p. 437. 
 
 ^Kingsley, Vol. VIII. p. 94ff; C. A. Q. 312, p. 237; 331 C. A. Q. 311, p. 53. 
 
 ox to Cozens, C. A. Q. p. 329, 361. 
 
 Kingsford IX, p. 355, note. 
 
of tyranny. It is readily perceived that men like Nelson, Lount, 
 Papineau, and Buncombe, who ultimately headed the rebellion of 
 1837, found it to their advantage to see that the United States 
 papers were supplied with sensational gossip. American sympathy 
 and support, apparent if not real, would aid their cause in Canada 
 and perhaps raise up for them adherents for an armed force, if 
 such should be required. Credible arguments and revolutionary 
 teachings could be circulated while the editor and publisher re 
 mained safely ensconced within a foreign territory and entirely 
 immune from libel. 
 
 While radical papers were circulating in the Lower Province, 
 and while constitutional committees 285 were forming there an 
 ominous similarity to the action adopted by the revolting colonies 
 of 1776 the local as well as the foreign press was taken advantage 
 of by the opposition party in the Upper Province. Lieutenant 
 Governor Colborne was alarmed. In his opinion rebellion was 
 fostered by radical newspapers subscribed for chiefly by settlers 
 who had lived formerly in the United States but encouraged by 
 such prominent leaders as Ryerson, "who would have no objection 
 in seeing a more democratic form of government established." 288 
 
 The alarm felt by Colborne and other governors of Canada may 
 have been vastly increased by the knowledge that not only was 
 there an organized opposition within their own jurisdiction but 
 across the border there was also an organized body working against 
 their administration. A certain group professing to be British 
 royalists and calling themselves the Adelaide Association held meet 
 ings in Philadelphia to prepare an impeachment against Colborne 
 for not granting them the privilege of settling in Seymour Town 
 ship. The chairman of this Association, when demanding redress 
 from Sir Robert Peel made a significant statement which would 
 tend to confirm the worst fears of such men as Maitland and Col 
 borne. Emphasizing the virtue of himself and his friends in order 
 further to appeal to the British minister, he said that the royalists 
 in the United States were the only men who had so long refuted 
 the base calumnies disseminated through the United States which 
 were replete with the most vindictive vituperations against the 
 laws and constitution of Great Britain. 287 
 
 ^Aylmer to Hay, Dec. 11, 1834, C. A. Q. 217, p. 578. 
 288 Colborne to Hay, May and July, 1832, C. A. jQ. 374, p. 601 and 801. 
 to Colonial Secretary, Oct. 3, 1835, C. iA. Q. 318, p. 210. 
 
 86 
 
As opposed to the apprehensions of Colborne and others we must 
 place the confidence of Talbot who, though American immigrants 
 had been shut out from his reservation, had a better opinion of 
 the loyalty and peaceful disposition of these foreign settlers. "The 
 disaffected are but few," he wrote, "considering all the noise that 
 has been made." Certainly the few who joined the outbreak in 
 1837 and the patient endurance for so many years of an almost 
 unendurable system argues well for the law abiding nature of the 
 mingled American and English residents of Upper Canada before 
 the days of Durham and Sydenham. However, Canadian affairs 
 had become so critical during the later twenties and thirties that 
 members in the British House of Commons also feared that unless 
 more attention was paid to Canada these colonies would revolt 
 and throw themselves into the arms of their neighbors. It was 
 suggested, therefore, that they should be made a more integral 
 part of the British Empire for if they were not more closely united 
 to the mother country, republican principles would get such a firm 
 foothold that all the colonies would be lost, one after the other. 288 
 
 ^Pinsent to Murray, May 24, 1829, 0. A. Q. 192, p. 514. 
 
 81 
 
IX 
 BOUNDARY LINES AND FREE NAVIGATION. 
 
 In conformity with a provision in. the Treaty of Ghent, commis 
 sioners were appointed to define the boundaries westward from the 
 point where the forty-fifth parallel of latitude met the St. Lawrence 
 river. The boundary line must run through the Great Lakes and 
 connecting rivers up as far as the head of Lake Superior, and the 
 possibilities for serious disputes lay only in connection with those 
 islands or channels which were of special military or commercial 
 advantage. Barclay and Porter were the commissioners respectively 
 for Great Britain and the United States. In June, 1822, they met 
 in Utica and came to an agreement on the boundary line between 
 the point on the St. Lawrence river from which they began and 
 the Neebish Islands in Lake Huron. In this Utica convention the 
 commissioners were unanimous and therefore according to the 
 terms of the Treaty of Ghent their decision must be final. 
 
 As soon as the terms of this convention were made known, how 
 ever, a storm of protest was directed against Barclay. The mu 
 nicipalities and legislature of Upper Canada were especially irri 
 tated because he had awarded Barnhart s Island to the United 
 States. This remarkably fertile island of over two thousand acres 
 lay in the St. Lawrence river near Cornwall. That town was 
 among the first to draw up a memorial requesting reasons why 
 Barnhart s and the Long Sault Islands had not been assigned to 
 Canada ; the main channel, it was stated, was not on the Canadian 
 side and the interests and defense of Canada demanded control of 
 them. 291 Maitland, the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, 
 took up the matter and requested Robert Barrie, the acting naval 
 commissioner, to give him a detailed statement of the facts con 
 cerning the boundary dispute in the St. Lawrence river. In the 
 fall of 1823 Barrie submitted the results of his investigations. As 
 far as Barnhart s Island was concerned, and that was the real bone 
 of contention, this report was a stinging criticism of Barclay. Ac 
 cording to" Barrie the award seemed to stand upon no reasonable 
 basis. The nearest distance from it to the Canadian shore was 
 
 I81 C. A. Q. 167, p. 97. 
 
 88 
 
one hundred and twenty-four yards in high water and not more 
 than one hundred yards in low water. The nearest distance to 
 the American shore was two hundred and seventy yards, which 
 would be reduced by not more than fifteen or twenty yards in low 
 water. The island was therefore at least one hundred and forty- 
 six yards farther from the American shore than from the Cana 
 dian. The American channel was deep, rapid, and safe ; the Cana 
 dian, shallow, rocky, dangerous, and in some places absolutely 
 fordable. Every winter there was a clear and easy passage over 
 the ice to Canada, but to the American side the ice could not be 
 crossed except on rare occasions and under great danger. Both 
 in winter and in summer the possessors of this island held an im 
 mense military advantage. 292 
 
 The Council and Assembly of Upper Canada during the follow 
 ing winter discussed the matter and in January, 1824, presented a 
 joint address to Maitland to be forwarded to the king. They, too, 
 professed to be unable to understand upon what grounds they 
 should have to relinquish all the navigable channels. 293 An addi 
 tional weight was just then lent to the boundary dispute because 
 of the President s recent message to Congress claiming the free 
 navigation of the St. Lawrence. The Upper Canadian Legislature 
 therefore urged the king to reconsider the St. Lawrence river boun 
 dary and to refuse to grant the demand for free navigation. If 
 free navigation were allowed it would be most ruinous to the Brit 
 ish interests, they said, it would endanger connection with His 
 Majesty s empire, injure commerce and revenues to an incalculable 
 extent, and facilitate illicit introduction of foreign merchandise. 294 
 The Barnhart boundary question had by this time become quite 
 serious 295 and Maitland himself strongly supported the sentiments 
 of the address and earnestly desired Bathurst to give the represen 
 tations from his legislature his most serious consideration. 296 
 
 Although the boundary question and the demand for free navi 
 gation were two entirely distinct matters, the members of the Brit 
 ish Foreign Office, as well as Maitland s legislature, spoke of them 
 in the same breath. Wilmot Horton, commenting on Barclay s ac 
 tions and explanations and basing his conclusions chiefly on Barrie s 
 
 292 Barrie to Maitland, Oct. 25, 1823, C. A. )Q. 335, p. 199. 
 
 M3 C. A. Q. 335, p. 193. 
 
 2M C. A. Q. 335, p. 193. 
 
 " Not only "some Canadians" expressed apprehensions but the "Legislature of 
 Upper Canada and every intelligent man of either province expressed the greatest 
 surprise and concern" at the Barnhart boundary award. C. A. Q. 343, p. 530. 
 
 29<J C. A. Q. 335, p. 185. 
 
 89 
 
report, urged the necessity of Lord Dalhousie s examining whether 
 everything possible had been done affecting this question and in 
 the same paragraph pressed for the best legal opinion upon the 
 assumed right of the Americans for free navigation to the ocean. 297 
 
 Protests against the award reached such formidable proportions 
 that Barclay felt it incumbent upon himself to explain his reasons 
 for acting as he had done and accordingly prepared and submitted 
 an elaborate defense. 298 He said that in order to determine the 
 boundary the commissioners at the outset drew up a set of general 
 rules by which they should be -governed. According to these rules 
 the boundary line was to be the "middle line inter ripas ;" islands 
 intersected by the middle line were to be divided as equally as pos 
 sible between the two nations but wherever an island was inter 
 sected by such middle line into two unequal parts, the nation on 
 whose side the larger portion lay was entitled to the election to 
 retain the whole or to exchange its portion for an equivalent else 
 where, at the consent of the other party. 299 These rules we shall 
 see were not strictly adhered to, especially at the two disputed 
 points, Bois Blanc and Barnhart s Island, for in both these places 
 Barclay speaks of the channel, rather than the middle line, as being 
 the real determining factor. 
 
 From the beginning Barclay had preferred the middle line to 
 that of the channel. 300 A channel, he recognized, would have been 
 better and more proper in one respect : it would have unequivocally 
 established a free navigation but the variety of channels in places 
 was a serious objection. A marine survey would have been neces 
 sary to determine where the channel lay. The mutability of chan 
 nels would be a cause for future trouble. The chief objection, 
 however, was that the principal channel lay close to the north or 
 Canadian shore throughout almost the whole length of the lake 
 and river system. There were only two exceptions of consequence : 
 one was at Barnhart Island, the other was in Lake St. Clair. Bar 
 clay therefore decided not to favor the adoption of the channel 
 line unless ordered to do so by his government. This order was 
 not given. 
 
 According to Barclay, Lord Bathurst was partly responsible for 
 the award. Previous to the Utica convention Bathurst sent what 
 
 29T C. A. Q. 167, p. 132. 
 
 2fiS Bathurst to Maitland, July 28, 1825. 
 
 ^Barclay to Canning, Feb. 27, 1826, C. A. jQ. 177, p. 20. 
 
 300 Barclay to Canning, June 14, 1823, C. A. Q. 167, p. 98. 
 
 90 
 
he believed to be a very important letter from Goulbourn to Barclay, 
 saying that he thought that the recommendations and advice con 
 tained in this letter ought to be followed unless, after due examina 
 tion and a perfect conviction in the justice of their claim, it should 
 turn out that the United States were entitled to some of the terri 
 tory therein assigned to Canada. In this letter Goulbourn warned 
 the commissioners not to surrender Bois Blanc nor Navy and Grand 
 Islands in the Niagara River, as these by the Treaty of 1783 were 
 distinctly British. Attention was also called to the importance of 
 retaining Bass Island in Lake Erie and the best channel between 
 Lake Erie and Detroit, namely, that between Sandusky and Cun 
 ningham Islands. Barclay received another set of instructions 
 from Castlereagh, which requested him to carry into effect as far 
 as possible certain objects recommended by Commodore Owen. 
 Among these were that he should, for military reasons, secure 
 Picquet Island in the St. Lawrence, Navy Island, and Bois Blanc ; 
 but if Navy Island were secured, Grand Island need not be re 
 quired. 301 
 
 In defense of his part in the Utica Convention Barclay therefore 
 presented these instructions saying that he had followed them as 
 closely as possible, had obtained most of the essentially strategic 
 points, and had received more than his due share of landed terri 
 tory. He had received Navy Island but had surrendered Grand 
 Island, Niagara, for both positive and negative reasons. In regard 
 to Bass Island both by channel line and by line equally distant 
 inter ripas it belonged to the United States. Then, as if to divert 
 attention from Barnhart Island, Barclay referred to his having 
 obtained Grand Island lying off Kingston, one intersected by the 
 middle line but unmentioned by Owen, a very large one containing 
 some 31,283 acres, and very important because of its proximity to 
 the Kingston dockyards. Thompson, the British surveyor, who by 
 the way seems to have been a good friend of the British commissioner 
 though a rather unreliable surveyor as far as his knowledge of 
 the channels on either side of Barnhart s Island was concerned, 
 eulogized Barclay for his success in getting this island. "No one 
 looked for it," he wrote to Barclay, "at least for more than part 
 of it. It was far more than Barrie expected and gentlemen of 
 the navy and army and merchants give you praise." 303 Barclay 
 pleaded also that of the islands intersected by the middle line, 
 
 301 Barclay to Canning, C. A. Q. 177, p. 20, ff. 
 MS Ibid. 
 
 91 
 
42,029 acres fell upon the American side and only 31,054 fell upon 
 the Canadian side. Nevertheless, of the total 73,083 acres, Canada 
 had received 34,500 acres or 3,446 acres more than her legitimate 
 share. 
 
 Barclay also emphasized the importance of possessing Bois Blanc. 
 He said, "In addition to the sentiments of Sir E. Owen, to general 
 opinion and to my own observation, through Mr. Hale, His Maj 
 esty s agent to the commission, I had learned in what estimation 
 Earl Dalhousie held this island. It was considered the most im 
 portant on the whole line." 30 * In obtaining Bois Blanc for Canada 
 Barclay certainly won the control of the main channel at this point, 
 but the "middle line" principle would also have given him this 
 island. 
 
 It is rather curious to see how the general rules were set aside 
 or shifted from "middle line" to "main channel." When Barnhart s 
 Island or Bois Blanc was under consideration the main channel 
 seemed to be the determining factor, yet we are told the rules were 
 to follow the middle line. In order to obtain Bois Blanc Barclay 
 said that it became "absolutely necessary to forsake the rule of a 
 channel line in order to preserve His Majesty s interests." Barclay 
 mentions channel line here perhaps because he allowed the channel 
 line as well as the middle line to be forsaken at Barnhart s, but he 
 says the Americans "had lost so many valuable islands by having 
 abandoned the channel line that they would not allow another loss 
 to occur to them * * * by the occasional adoption of it." 305 
 The British commissioners argument of the "occasional adoption" 
 of the channel line in reference to Barnhart s seems to be purely 
 specious. He might better have come out boldly and stated that he 
 was dealing with a shrewd bargainer and that the decision was 
 purely the result of higgling in the market. The Americans it 
 seems were more anxious for the control of the channels and par 
 ticularly of the more important one in the St. Lawrence than they 
 were for the mere possession of one half of the intersected islands. 
 Barclay further defended his action in regard to Barnhart s Island 
 by referring to Mr. Hale, Mr. Ogilvie and others in good standing 
 who approved of the decision ; secondly, by showing that Canada 
 already had more than its share of the acreage of islands cut by 
 the "middle line;" thirdly, by trying to prove from impressions 
 derived from his surveyor, Mr. Thompson, that neither the channel 
 
 304 Ibid. 
 
 92 
 
on the Canadian side nor the channel on the American side was 
 entirely satisfactory ; that a canal would be necessary and that this 
 canal could be built more easily on the Canadian side. The advan 
 tages in the channel, natural and artificial, seemed to be balanced. 
 His fourth and most weighty argument was that there was no 
 need to be alarmed. The United States Commissioner nor no other 
 person, he said, had ever given the least suggestion of any intended 
 obstruction to the free navigation of the St. Lawrence and Mr. 
 Porter had even desired to insert a declaration that their decision 
 had been made on that express understanding. 306 The British Com 
 missioner could thus find no serious objections in the surrender 
 of the island. He insinuated that the leaders among those who 
 had now complained were a group of smugglers who lived on the 
 islands and who feared American justice, should the islands fall 
 into the possession of the Americans. 
 
 In defending himself Barclay also mentioned a letter from Lord 
 Londonderry received less than a month before the Utica conven 
 tion. 308 This letter reveals the fact that, after all, the ceding of 
 Barnhart s Island was a concession to the Americans based on no 
 principle except this that it was necessary in order to prevent fur 
 ther vexatious delay in arriving at a settlement of the boundary 
 up to Lake Huron. Barclay himself ultimately admitted this. Had 
 he made the appropriation of Barnhart s and the Long Sault Islands 
 to His Majesty a sine qua non, a deadlock between the commission 
 ers, would have ensued and the friendly power to which reports 
 must have been referred would either have decided the respective 
 
 ^Barclay would not allow this to be inserted because he thought he had no author 
 ity to do so but he told Porter that he considered both parties entitled, by the law of na 
 tions, to the free navigation of all the waters through which the line had passed. To 
 support this theory he made reference to the treaty concluded at London in 1802 by 
 Lord Hawkesbury and Bufus King, representing Great Britain and the United States 
 respectively, which, he stated, "manifests the opinion that the fact of a channel s 
 being bound on both sides by land of one nation is not incompatible with the free 
 navigation thereof by another nation. 1 Barclay is here referring to the boundary 
 line through the St. Croix River. Campo Bello Island was given to the British but 
 the main channel ran between it and the British side of the river. He says that the 
 ministers do not add that there shall be free navigation to and from Campo Bellp Island. 
 That is left unnoticed as a necessary attendant resulting from the territorial right 
 and secured by the law of nations as positively as the right of ingress, egress, and 
 regress, through intervening possessions appertains to the proprietor of an estate 
 under the common law of England." p. 118. 
 
 e letter from Lord Londonderry received May 28, 1822, reads as follows: 
 "Nor is it easy for us to understand upon what equitable principle the American 
 Commissioner, after allowing upon every other point the equi-distant admeasurement 
 of the central line from main shore to main shore can now make up his mind wholly 
 to break off from that principle with respect to these three islands. His Lordship s 
 dispatch concluded with the instructions to immediately conclude the boundary as it 
 had been provisionally agreed upon by the commissioners, on condition that the 
 American commissioner should yield all claims of Bois Blanc upon receiving renun 
 ciation of His Majesty s claim to the other three islands mentioned in His Lordship s 
 letter." C. A. Q. 177, p. 20 ff. 
 
 93 
 
rights as they at present stand, he thought, or would have given 
 Bois Blanc, Lake St. Clair, or Grand Island, Niagara River, in 
 recompense. 309 
 
 In regard to Bois Blanc it is true that the United States had 
 been very anxious to obtain it. In 1817 a British admiral had 
 stated that one of the main objects of the American clamor was 
 to maintain a claim to it. Close beside Bois Blanc there are three 
 other islands, namely, Sugar, Fox, and Stony, which are clearly 
 within British limits on the middle line principle but which were 
 awarded to the United States apparently without any serious strug- 
 gle. 
 
 Although the controversy over Barnhart s Island had waxed 
 warm, Bathurst refused to break the Treaty of Ghent by reconsid 
 ering the matter and so the boundaries remained fixed up to the 
 headwaters of Lake Huron. Here the boundary commissioners 
 failed to agree upon the ownership of the Neebish Islands. Barclay 
 insisted that two of the Islands including the main channel should 
 go to the British and the third island to the United States, and 
 refused to yield his point unless direct orders came from his home 
 government. 310 As one looks at the official maps, one cannot won 
 der at Barclay s stand upon this question. It is surprisingly strange 
 that "that most incompetent diplomatist," 311 Lord Ashburton, 
 twenty years later should have submitted to the American demands. 
 Such sacrifice was not necessary on Ashburton s part. Barclay 
 had already shown more generosity than business ability and per 
 haps in no case more than in this very neighborhood, when he 
 allowed the boundary line to pass to the north and east of Drum- 
 mond Island. This island had always been regarded hitherto as 
 indisputably British territory. 312 The British garrisons at the close 
 of the war were withdrawn there, remained there and no objections 
 had come from the American government that they were still upon 
 United States territory. The old "Detour" to the west and south 
 of this island had always hitherto been considered the boundary 
 line. Nevertheless, before the Utica Convention Barclay had de 
 cided to give up this island for the sake of peaceful settlement. 
 
 When Barclay and Porter disagreed upon the question of the 
 Neebish Islands nothing further was then done in regard to the 
 
 808 Barclay to Canning, Feb. 27, 1826, C. A. Q. 177, p. 20 ft*. 
 810 Barclay to Canning, Feb. 27, 1826, C. A. Q. 177, p. 19. 
 811 Kingsford, vol. IX., p. 272. 
 
 sia Drummond to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1815, C. A. jQ. 133, 81. 
 
 94 
 
boundary farther west than this point. From Lake Superior west 
 ward the only British then greatly interested in the boundary line 
 were the members of the trading companies. These feared lest a 
 foreign power should get possession of the portages and other 
 means of communication whereby their merchandise passed from 
 the west to the east. The Hudson Bay Company, therefore, ap 
 pealed to the British Foreign Office to have their interests re 
 spected. 313 But during all these years that Barclay or others were 
 working upon the boundary settlement, the British Foreign Office, 
 the British Parliament, and the British press seemed to have been 
 almost ignorant of or indifferent to the importance of the whole 
 matter. Yet they appointed commissioners to deal with a people, 
 alert "full of the tradesmanlike principle and singularly bargaining 
 and pertinacious." 314 In the United States the boundary question 
 was mentioned prominently by the President in his speech, the Con 
 vention of Arbitration was laid before Congress, confidence was 
 expressed in the justice and evidence of their case, and the subject 
 much boasted and advocated by their press. 315 British silence and 
 apparent indifference certainly did not tend to advance British in 
 terests. In vain, did Howard Douglas or Charles Vaughan or the 
 Hudson Bay Company and others try to arouse the lethargic For 
 eign Office. 316 The British can blame only themselves if British 
 statesmen sometimes found it "mortifying to find that Great Britain 
 (had) been somewhat outwitted." 317 
 
 The demand for the free navigation of the St. Lawrence, although 
 discussed by Barclay and Porter in the Utica convention became 
 conspicuous for the first time during the early summer of 1823. 
 In his December message to Congress Monroe expressed the hope 
 that "the just claim of the citizens of the United States would be 
 satisfactorily arranged." The concessions already made to Porter 
 by the British Boundary Commissioner doubtless prompted Rush, 
 Adams, and Monroe to seek for further concessions. Northwest 
 ern produce wanted an outlet to the sea. The acts of the British 
 Parliament of June 24 and Aug. 5, 1822, had stimulated discussion 
 within the United States. By giving the Colonial government in 
 Canada discretionary power to except any of the Canadian ports 
 from those to which American vessels were made admissible it 
 
 813 C. A. Q. 169, 202 and 39 ff. 
 
 314 Vaughan to Hay, Jan. 25, 1830, C. A. Q. 195A, p. 297. 
 
 315 Douglas to Hay, May 16, 1830, C. A. Q. 195A, p. 112. 
 
 31 Vaughan to Hay, Jan. 25, 1830, C. A. Q. 195A, p. 297. 
 
 317 Ibid. 
 
 95 
 
followed that the enjoyment of the navigation of the St. Lawrence 
 River was rendered contingent upon British permission. This the 
 citizens of the United States would not recognize. Certain regu 
 lations regarding timber had already practically prohibited free 
 navigation to the United States vessels. 318 
 
 When the news of the American demand had reached the Leg 
 islative Council of Lower Canada most dire apprehensions were 
 aroused. They knew that if the war of 1814 had been continued 
 the enemy had intended to interrupt the water communication to 
 Lower Canada. 319 To comply now with the American claims might 
 facilitate such an action in the contingency of future struggles. 
 In their extreme anxiety for the welfare of the people whom they 
 represented, the Legislative Council of Lower Canada formulated 
 an address in which for petty, spiteful reasons the Legislative 
 Assembly did not join to be sent to Governor Dalhousie. This 
 address declared that such a claim was contrary to the Established 
 and recognized law of nations and expressed the hope that innova 
 tions upon those laws by so ambitious a neighbor would not be 
 allowed. If allowed, the effect would be to weaken the intimate 
 connection and dependence upon the parent state; it would tend 
 to systematize contraband trade and the evasions of laws and be 
 pernicious in other respects. The Legislative Council also hoped 
 that Great Britain would take this occasion to secure by negotia 
 tion the reciprocal right or exercise of navigation during peace of 
 the several channels of the St. Lawrence south of 45 degrees, no 
 matter in whatsoever territory this channel might happen to be. 320 
 Dalhousie heartily agreed with the sentiments expressed in this 
 memorial and earnestly recommended it to the consideration of the 
 Colonial Office. 321 
 
 While these and other residents in Canada might thus impotently 
 express opinions, the power to act lay with those in London and 
 between this city and Washington diplomatic correspondence began 
 which, strangely enough, contrary to the British custom of making 
 concessions rather than of standing firm, did not follow the course 
 Monroe had hoped it would. Rush tried at first to get an agree 
 ment concluded between Great Britain and the United States for 
 
 318 Rush to Adams, August 12, 1824, C. A. Q., 185, p. 50, if. 
 319 Robinson to Bathurst, July 29, 1815, C. A. jQ. 185, p. 50 ff. 
 320 Address from Legislative Council of Lower Canada, February 7, 1824, C. A. Q. 
 166, 26. 
 
 321 March 10, 1824, C. A. Q. 168, 70. 
 
 96 
 
the free navigation of the river, subject to such fair tolls as might 
 be mutually agreed upon, together with the privilege of stopping 
 at certain points along the river if desirable. These privileges Rush 
 urged as a right. To support his demand Rush argued the analogy 
 of the Mississippi River which the British had freely navigated 
 and where they used New Orleans as a stopping place although as 
 a matter of fact they had no treaty right to do so. He thought 
 that his claim was well established by the law of nations, for up 
 to this time it had been tacitly conceded. Using the arguments of 
 Adams, he declared that the exclusive right of jurisdiction over a 
 river originates in the social contract and is a right of sovereignty.! 
 The right of navigating the river is a right of nature, preceding it 
 in point of time, which the sovereign right of one nation cannot 
 annihilate since it belongs to the people of another. He declared 
 that the practice had been substantially recognized by all the parties 
 to the European Alliance and particularly by Great Britain at the 
 negotiation of the Vienna Congress treaties which declared the 
 navigation of the Rhine, the Neckar, the Main, the Moselle, the 
 Meese, and the Scheldt, free to all nations. 322 Another argument 
 used by Rush was that United States colonists had helped Great 
 Britain to win the St. Lawrence and therefore they had a strong 
 natural right of free use. The United States on its part would, 
 as a matter of right, grant British subjects the privilege of navi 
 gating the Columbia River if it were navigable in British territory. 
 However well disposed the British statesmen were to treat the 
 question as one of mutual convenience, they wouldn t consider it 
 at all as a question of right. The St. Lawrence River ran for 600 
 miles entirely through British territory. The American claim of 
 right, they maintained, precluded all considerations of good neigh 
 borhood and mutual accommodations. They quoted Vattel and 
 Grotius in regard to the natural right or law of nature theory to 
 disprove the American argument. If the United States meant to 
 insist on such demands, that country must be prepared to apply 
 by reciprocity the same principle to its own rivers. This, the Brit 
 ish argued, would mean that Great Britain might navigate even 
 the Mississippi River since there was only a short portage by land 
 between British possessions and the headwaters of that river. The 
 same general principle would admit British vessels to ascend all 
 the navigable rivers of the United States and would lead to extraor- 
 
 322 Rush to Adams, August 12, 1824, C. A. Q. p. 50 ff and 
 
 97 
 
dinary and unheard-of demands; it would allow foreigners into 
 the bosom of every country. Referring to the treaties of Paris 
 in 1814, and Vienna, 1815, the British plenipotentiaries said that 
 neither in the general nor in the special stipulations relating to the 
 free navigation of rivers was there anything to countenance the 
 principle of a natural independent right as asserted by Mr. Rush. 
 The Rhine only was thrown open to general navigation by the 
 Paris treaty, and here it was natural for France, in giving up terri 
 tory on the banks of the river to stipulate for a reserve of navigation. 
 In case of the Vienna treaty the powers engaged to regulate by 
 common consent and closed saying that no change should be made 
 except with the consent of all the powers bordering on the same 
 river. The powers, therefore, recognized what was due to sov 
 ereignty and what was due to voluntary compact. They challenged 
 the American government to present a single instance in which 
 the liberty claimed by the United States was exercised explicitly 
 as a natural independent right. In the case of the Mississippi River, 
 France in 1763 gave up the exclusive navigation of it and the 
 fact of stipulating for free navigation would lead irresistibly to 
 the very reverse of what was maintained by Mr. Rush. The agree 
 ment later between Spain and the United States for the navigation 
 of the river would support the same argument. Great Britain was 
 ready to meet the claims of justice or even friendship but colonial 
 policy, commercial and national interests precluded such a prepos 
 terous demand. 323 
 
 While Great Britain did stand firm during the negotiations of 
 1824 to 1827 the merchants of Quebec as late as 1833 had so little 
 confidence in the stability of the British plenipotentiaries that they 
 again transmitted memorials pleading that the concessions asked 
 for in 1824 be not granted to the American seamen. 324 
 
 323 British paper on the navigation of the St. Lawrence, 24th Protocol C. A. Q. 
 
 185, p. 164. 
 
 3 *March 29, 1833, C. A. Q. 311, p. 365. 
 
 98 
 
X. 
 
 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Although many things of greater or less importance tended to 
 militate against the permanence of the peace agreed to in 1614, 
 there was at least one band of union that in itself went a long way 
 towards fostering the continuance of peaceful relations. The peo 
 ple of both the northern states and the provinces of Canada were 
 knit together commercially. The absence of railroads and canals, 
 a similar absence of good country roads, and the consequent ex 
 pense of overland transportation induced the states bordering on 
 Canada to export freely their grain, timber, pot and pearl ashes, 
 cattle, and horses, via the only natural outlets, Lake Ontario, Lake 
 Champlain, and the St. Lawrence River. 330 
 
 American trade was directed towards the Canadas during the 
 years of Jefferson s embargo and routes then opened by smugglers 
 were not closed when the embargo was lifted. In fact all through 
 and after the war American trade still flowed northward in in 
 creasing quantities. 331 There was the greater incentive to take 
 advantage of the northern route because English goods came into 
 Canada almost entirely free from duty and could be purchased 
 much more cheaply on the St. Lawrence than at the mouth of the 
 Hudson. 
 
 The eighty thousand settlers in Upper Canada in 1815, and the 
 two hundred thousand in Lower Canada found it as advantageous 
 to trade with the United States as the Americans did to trade 
 with or through the Canadas. The United States could more 
 cheaply and more readily than England supply the Canadians with 
 many of the necessities and simple luxuries for home and farm 
 horses, cattle, tea, tobacco, and such things. As a British colony, 
 
 33 McMaster III, p. 464. 
 
 331 McMaster III, p. 460 ff. By 1812 the produce of Vermont as far south as 
 Middlebury and of every county of Northern New York from Essex and Clinton on 
 Lake Champlain to Niagara was gathered at Montreal and iQuebec. The Gazettes of 
 Albany contained many advertisements of rates of transportation. A barrel of flour 
 could be carried from Ogdensbury to Montreal for 88 cents; from Buffalo for $1.50. 
 Even during the war the illicit trade flourished briskly. "In fact, my lord," wrote 
 Prevost to Bathurst, "two-thirds of the army in Canada are at this moment eating 
 beef provided by American contractors drawn principally from the states of Vermont 
 and New York." Prevost to Bathurst, August 27, 1814. "Like herds of buffaloes," 
 said Izard, "they pressed through the forests making paths for themselves. Were it 
 not for these supplies the British forces in Canada would soon be suffering from famine 
 or their government be subject to enormous expense for their maintenance." Izard 
 to Armstrong, July 31, 1814, McMaster IV. p. 66. And see Niles Reg. Vol. 9, p. 43. 
 
however, the Canadas must have their trade relations defined and 
 dictated by the wisdom or interests of the British Colonial Office. 
 When peace was proclaimed commercial intercourse between the 
 United States and Great Britain was reestablished as it had existed 
 previous to the war although both Americans and Canadians were 
 anxious for a freer intercourse. 
 
 Thus it was that immediately after the Peace the United States 
 sent representatives to England to obtain further commercial privi 
 leges. The convention of July 3, 1815, was the result of these 
 negotiations. By this American ships were allowed to carry articles, 
 the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, into 
 any of the European territories of his Britannic Majesty, subject 
 to no higher duty than was demanded from British ships carrying 
 like articles, and reciprocal terms were granted to British ships 
 entering United States ports. The United States were also granted 
 privileges of direct trade with British possessions in the East Indies 
 and India, but it was distinctly stated that the intercourse between 
 the United States and British possessions of the West Indies and 
 on the continent of North America should not be affected by any 
 of the provisions of that convention. 
 
 In respect to Canada and the West Indies therefore, the old 
 colonial system remained in full force. British colonies in the West 
 had been discriminated against to foster, as it was hoped, British 
 manufacturing, British shipping, and an imperial merchant-marine 
 for the supply of recruits for the British navy. This discrimina 
 tion against Canada was due to the influence of the British mer 
 chant. A month before this convention, a committee of merchants 
 interviewed Bathurst trying to prevent any commercial treaty. 
 They expressed the opinion that the safest policy was to leave 
 trade with the United States to local regulations. From the mer 
 chants standpoint this was desirable, perhaps, because British mer 
 chants had a predominating influence in the provincial legislatures. 
 If a treaty were entered into the merchants insisted that United 
 States vessels should be prohibited from the ports of British North 
 America. 332 This they claimed would be the only means of pre 
 venting the introduction of tea or Chinese manufactures and East 
 Indian goods as well as foreign European wares into His Majesty s 
 colonies, to the great injury of the trade and manufactures of Eng 
 land. 
 
 332 C. A. Q. 156, p. 172; 162, p. 258; 170, p. 710; 134, p. 394. 
 
 100 
 
The convention of July 3, 1815, seems to have been framed ac 
 cording to the wishes of these merchants, though Huskisson at 
 this very time in the British Parliament pointed out the need of 
 more liberal treatment of the colonies. He noticed how the "long 
 established custom of entire and rigid exclusion of * * * col 
 onies from all commercial intercourse except with the mother 
 country" was already breaking down in Portugal and Spain and 
 their colonies were benefiting thereby. "I am prepared," said he, 
 "to open the commerce of all colonies to all friendly states." 333 
 Baring, Bright, Burdett and others also stood for a more liberal 
 policy but the colonies were not yet to obtain the legislation best 
 adapted for their progress. 
 
 While the mother country was making regulations for the trade 
 of her Canadian and other colonies, the Canadians themselves were 
 making commercial rules with only a partial regard for imperial 
 politics. These colonists had little scruples against breaking up 
 the time-honored colonial system. By an act of the Lower Cana 
 dian Parliament the Canadian governor and his executive council 
 were given complete control of trade by land and inland navigation 
 until the local parliament should reassemble. Therefore, on May 
 29, 1815, Drummond, by proclamation, established temporary inter 
 course between Lower Canada and the United States, specified 
 the tariff and other conditions under which the trade was to be 
 conducted, and declared St. John on the Richelieu and Coteau dn 
 Lac on the St. Lawrence and such other places as should be an 
 nounced later the sole ports of entry. 334 Ocean navigation, of 
 course, continued to be closed against American vessels but inland 
 trade was now practically unhampered except for the small tariff 
 duties. 
 
 When news of this proclamation reached England the committee 
 of the Council for Trade by way of experiment sanctioned the 
 arrangements made by Drummond. The relations of Canada with 
 the United States were becoming so important that the committee 
 thought it best to cooperate with the secretary of state and the 
 colonial legislature in forming such permanent arrangements as 
 might seem best suited for carrying on the intercourse and pro 
 moting the highest interests of the Canadas. 335 
 
 333 Huskisson, Speech on Colonial Policy, March 21, 1815, Hansard II Series 
 Vol. 12, p. 1099. 
 
 334 C. A. Q. 132, p 154 and 191. 
 
 336 Chetwynd to Goulbourne, Nov., 1815, C. A. Q. 134, 93. 
 
 101 
 
Drummond s temporary arrangements were due to expire April, 
 1816, and as no permanent regulations had been made he again 
 submitted the matter to his executive council in March, 1816. As 
 a result a new proclamation was issued stating that "original laws" 
 were to be enforced. These laws, as announced by Drummond, 
 were that certain enumerated articles might be imported from the 
 United States through the ports of Coteau du Lac, Chateauguay 
 and St. John ; the enumerated articles included timber and its 
 products planks, hoops, shingles, clapboards, tar, turpentine, etc. 
 ; pot and pearl ashes, seeds and grains, domestic animals, butter, 
 cheese, fresh fish, and "whatsoever is the growth of the United 
 States ;" gold and silver coin or bullion, and wampum. Rum, spirits, 
 copper coin, and all other goods, wares, and merchandise not enu 
 merated, that is, practically all manufactured goods and all goods, 
 the growth or produce of any country other than the United States 
 could not enter Canada by way of land or inland navigation. 337 
 
 Just previous to this proclamation, Drummond had received a 
 report from a committee of his executive council stating that ac 
 cording to the laws which had been suspended in 1815, no goods 
 could be imported or exported by American subjects or aliens of 
 any description, and all imports by water must be made in British 
 ships. Drummond apparently did not care to exclude Americans 
 from participating in the trade, for he did not call attention to 
 Uhis in his proclamation. He did, however, incorporate within 
 his proclamation a very significant suggestion of the committee of 
 his executive council. The committee had said, "Inasmuch as it 
 
 appears that flour, Indian meal, pork, and beef, fresh 
 
 and salted, are not allowed to be imported from the United States 
 and consequently are prohibited, the committee, after due delibera 
 tion, humbly submit the following considerations ; that it being a 
 matter of public notoriety that the government of the American 
 states are using every possible endeavor to divert the exportation 
 of the produce of those parts of the said states bordering upon the 
 Canadas from their natural outlet by the waters of the St. Lawrence 
 
 and to turn the transport thereof to the Atlantic ports 
 
 the committee recommends Drummond because of harm 
 
 this would do to British shipping and because of distress that would 
 come to people in Quebec from failure of the harvest this year, 
 to give private instructions to the respective collectors at the ports 
 
 337 C. A. &. 136, p. 127. 
 
 102 
 
to admit duty free any of the articles of flour, etc., so prohibited 
 as aforesaid." 338 Drummond accordingly announced that the reg 
 ular legal duties would be levied on all imports except those via 
 Upper Canada and except on salted beef and pork, salt fish, fish 
 oil, flour, wheat, peas, furs, and skins. These instructions were 
 sent privately to collectors of customs. 
 
 This remission of duties was a policy purely of expediency and 
 discretion and not only without the sanction of imperial authority 
 but in direct opposition to existing imperial statutes. Bathurst 
 objected to Drummond s proclamation in this respect, and when 
 Sherbrooke replaced Drummond during the summer of 1816, the 
 private instructions to the provincial collectors were recalled. How 
 ever, a discretionary power was still left in the hands of the 
 Governor and when informed of the scarcity of flour in the prov 
 ince and the prospects of a bad harvest, Sherbrooke issued another 
 proclamation authorizing the importation from the United States 
 during the period of six months of grain, flour, live stock, and 
 provisions of every kind free of duty. 839 
 
 Meanwhile the demand for freer trade and for permanent reg 
 ulations with the United States became more persistent. United 
 States importers were afraid to send in flour lest it be seized, 340 
 and consequently a shortage in flour still continued. Attempts were . 
 made to persuade the local governor and council to take action. It 
 was asserted that free intercourse between Canada and the United 
 States would not only help Canadians but would aid Newfoundland 
 and the West Indies, for their merchants could then buy goods 
 more cheaply in a Quebec market. The inhabitants of Montreal 
 resorting to the customary petition pointed out that ever since 1796 
 the ordinance prohibiting the importation of the articles referred 
 to above had been successively suspended and beneficially to the 
 province and parent states ; the province often needed American 
 produce ; Americans therefore sent this produce to Montreal and 
 received British manufactures in exchange ; these American goods 
 re-exported supplied the West Indian markets and gave employment 
 to British shipping. 341 
 
 A bill was accordingly framed by the Lower Canadian Parliament (/ 
 and submitted to Sherbrooke. It repealed all acts and ordinances 
 
 3S8 Report of Executive Council to Di^mmond, March 26, 1816, C. A. Q. 136, p. 139. 
 339 Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Sept., 1815, C. A. Q. 137, p. 169. 
 340 C. A. Q. 147, p. 93. 
 8 "C. A. Q. 144, p. 21 ff. 
 
 103 
 
affecting the American trade and substituted a general enactment 
 admitting all the products formerly admitted and in addition flour, 
 meal, flaxseed, hempseed, pork and beef, fresh or salted, undressed 
 hides, and skins, cheese, fruit, gold and silver. 342 Sherbrooke re 
 served this bill for the royal assent because, by the dispatch of 
 July, 1816, Bathurst had forbidden him to sanction any change in 
 trade regulations. But Sherbrooke had his own personal objec 
 tion. 343 The bill proposed to disestablish the border custom houses. 
 This, he thought, would lead to an increase in the smuggling trade. 
 Then, although he admitted that the natural outlet for the enu 
 merated products was by way of the St. Lawrence, he questioned 
 whether such freedom would not retard the agricultural advance 
 ment of the province and, by teaching the people to look abroad 
 for supplies, render them more liable than ever, especially during 
 a period of unfavorable relations with the states to those agricultural 
 distresses from which they had already suffered severely. The 
 imperial committee for trade, upon receipt of this bill, acknowledged 
 themselves to be in favor of freer intercourse but agreed with 
 Sherbrooke that this bill should not be accepted. 344 
 
 When a new governor came out in 1818 the merchants of Quebec 
 and Montreal and others interested in the prosperity of the province 
 presented a memorial to the new governor, Richmond, who for 
 warded it to Bathurst. This memorial gives us a good resume of 
 the feelings and wants of the Canadian merchants in 1818. It stated 
 that subsequent to the Treaty of 1794 the inland trade between the 
 Canadas and the United States had been placed on a footing of 
 nearly perfect freedom ; that this freedom had subsequently been 
 restricted by prohibiting the importation of East Indian and Euro 
 pean goods by way of the United States; that in 1816 an old act 
 had been enforced totally inapplicable to present conditions; that 
 Canadians no longer enjoyed dispensations by order of the Gov- 
 ernor-in-council as formerly; that since the Treaty of Ghent the 
 succession of fluctuating and contradictory measures had been very 
 detrimental to commerce; that there was urgent need for general 
 and permanent regulations ; and that now since the expiration of 
 the convention of 1815 admitted a change, permanent regulations 
 should be established and these ought to permit the utmost freedom 
 in importing by land or inland navigation all articles of the raw 
 
 342 C. A. Q. 144, p. 21 ff. and eee C. A. Q. 132, p. 154. 
 343 Sherbrooke to Bathurst May 20, 1817, C. A. jQ. 144, p. 21. 
 344 Lack to Goulbourn, C. A. Q. 146, p. 73. 
 
 104 
 
produce of the United States or goods in the first stage of man 
 ufacture. Such regulations, it was said, would tend equally to the 
 encouragement of the trade of the province, the employment of 
 British ships, and the advancement of the manufacturing and com 
 mercial interests of the empire at large. 
 
 The memorialists were here appealing to the selfish interests of 
 the English merchants, manufacturers and seamen in order to break 
 down the old colonial system of navigation laws and other restric 
 tions. But they ushered in other arguments to bolster up their 
 plea. It was impossible, they said, to prevent the American trade 
 in any case and as for political objections there were fewer 
 now than formerly because the States were becoming thickly 
 populated and it was well to give this big population an interest 
 adverse to war in other words to give them an interest in a trade 
 which would be cut off as soon as hostilities should begin. 345 
 
 While the merchants of Quebec were thus expressing their dis 
 pleasure with the existing system, their American kinsmen were 
 likewise regretting that since the Peace of Ghent, Great Britain 
 had been trying to enforce the colonial system with unusual vigor. 
 A report in Congress declared that the United States had been dis 
 criminated against, that American vessels and property were ex 
 cluded from colonies where other vessels were at times admitted, 
 and that as far as Canada was concerned it was believed that the 
 greater portion of the apparent Canadian exports of bread stuffs 
 and even of lumber was really American products and yet all must 
 be carried by British vessels. 346 Neither Canada nor the United 
 States was satisfied with the system, nevertheless on April 20, 1818, \ ) ^ 
 the convention of 1815 was simply renewed for ten years longer 
 and direct sea trade between Quebec and the United States was 
 still prohibited. 347 
 
 Richmond, the Governor of Canada, at this time was sincerely 
 in earnest in trying to arrange a satisfactory settlement of the 
 vexatious trade question, but he was uncompromisingly a British 
 imperialist and little inclined to give local authorities much real 
 power. He wanted the imperial Parliament to enact such legisla 
 tion as would provide for a fixed revenue to support the Canadian 
 civil list without the need of annual applications to the provincial 
 
 S45 Petition from Merchants C. A. Q. 149, p. 142. 
 
 ^Annals of Congress, H. of B., Feb. 9, 1818. Report of Com. on For. Relations and 
 Niles Reg. Apr. 11, 1818, No. 14, p. 113. 
 
 347 Hansard II Series Vol. 39, p. 996, and C. A. Q. 152, p. 310 ff. 
 
 105 
 
legislature. By a permanent trade and tariff law such revenue 
 could be received and the pressing demands for the revision of 
 the laws regulating American intercourse could be accomplished. 
 He feared, too, that the jealousy and caprice of both the Upper and 
 Lower Canadians and the successively enacted temporary statutes 
 or administrative proclamations founded on the ephemeral needs 
 of the moment would tend to unsettle and destroy what might 
 legitimately be a most lucrative and growing source of revenue. 
 For these reasons he transmitted for the approval of the Colonial 
 Office a copy of a bill framed in his legislature at Quebec, and 
 drawn largely in accordance with his own conceptions of what 
 would be best. One of its main objects was the confining of the 
 entire trade of the Great Lake regions of North America to British 
 bottoms. 348 
 
 Nearly five years had already elapsed since the close of the war 
 and lower Canada had had only a series of shifting and temporary 
 regulations. It had not enjoyed any direct sea communication 
 with the United States. By land considerable liberty had been al 
 lowed and much more illegally taken. Discontent prevailed; pop 
 ulation was increasing comparatively slowly ; the demand for better 
 commercial arrangements increased. 
 
 Turning to Upper Canada we shall find that meanwhile this 
 province has had somewhat freer communication with the United 
 States, and has lived a commercial life almost entirely separate and 
 independent from that of its sister colony. 349 One feature of the 
 commercial activity of this upper province was the traffic with In 
 dians residing within the United States. Though Congress in 1816 
 had passed an act forbidding anyone but an American to trade with 
 the Indians, the act appears to have interfered very little with the 
 transportation of goods by Canadian adventurers. The Indians 
 still clung to the British, and the trading posts at Amherstburg 
 or farther west still received large consignments of furs taken 
 from Michigan, Wisconsin, or the Mississippi Valley. 350 
 
 3 < 8 Richmond to Bathurst, July 31, 1819, C. A. Q. 152, p. 313, 315. 
 
 349 Legislature Journal Upper Canada, Mar. 12, 1816, p. 106. Ontario archives. 
 
 350 Sherbrooke to Gore, Dec. 31, 1816, C. A. Q. 322, p. 120, and Gore to Bathurst, 
 Feb. 3, 1817, C. A. Q. 322, p. 117, p. 172. 
 
 The Indians in the eastern part of the province also figured slightly in com 
 mercial affairs. Complaints came in that American citizens were monopolizing the 
 Salmon fisheries on the Humber and Credit Rivers and dispensing ardent spirits 
 to the Indians. Lieutenant-Governor Gore who had stilled the tumult at Amherstburg 
 that had been caused by the Indian murder played the same role in this case. 
 Sherbrooke had suggested that the American be excluded from these rivers but 
 Gore replied that the Salmon fisheries were sufficrently protected from abuse and 
 any further laws might appear invidious. He then resorted to the more pacific ex 
 pedient of removing the Indians. 
 
 106 
 
In regard to general intercourse between Upper Canada and the 
 United States the provincial legislature of Upper Canada had 
 since 1801 to a considerable extent assumed and exercised the 
 right of levying duties on imports and making other regulations. 
 These laws do not appear to have been disallowed in England but 
 rather to have been acted upon without question. 351 The restric 
 tions in matters of trade and tariff imposed upon all provincial 
 legislatures by the act of 1791 seem to have been entirely overlooked. 
 The British Lords of Trade were either poorly informed or little 
 interested in the details of the commercial intercourse. 352 The 
 Upper Canadians, either from inattention to the provisions of the 
 navigation laws or from a convenient conviction that they did not 
 apply to the inland navigation of the waters separating the Upper 
 Province from the United States, so little regarded these navigation 
 laws that vessels owned and manned by subjects of the United 
 States were permitted without the least interruption to import and 
 export goods and even to engage in the carrying trade from port 
 to port along the Canadian shores in the same manner as the purely 
 British vessels. 353 Of the eighty schooners employed in navigating 
 Lake Erie not more than ten belonged to or were navigated by sub 
 jects of His Majesty. 354 So habituated were the Upper Canadians to 
 the practice and so well did it harmonize with the needs and desires of 
 the colonists, many of whom had been fellow countrymen of the 
 transgressors, that when in 1816 and 1817 one or two of these 
 American vessels were seized for violating the British navigation 
 laws there was not only objection to the seizures but a general sur 
 prise that such seizure could legally have been made. 
 
 As in Lower Canada it had been customary for the legislature 
 to delegate to the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council its real or as 
 sumed power of regulating trade, so in Upper Canada in the spring 
 of 1816, on the failure of the legislature to act, Gore took advan 
 tage of a similar privilege and issued an order-in-council establish 
 ing trade regulations and fixing a schedule of duties for the year 
 
 ^Attorney-General Robinson s opinion, Nov., 1818, C. A. |Q. 324, p. 194, nnd 
 Maitland to Bathurst, O. A. Q. 324, p. 180. 
 W2 C. A. Q. 321, p. 229. 
 3 C. A. Q. 321, p. 229 ff. 
 ""Maitland to Bathurst, C. A. Q. 324, p. 180. 
 
 107 
 
ending April, iSi?. 336 It must be noticed that according to the 
 schedule of 1816 not only raw materials and natural products of 
 the United States, but some manufactures were also admitted, the 
 duty ranging from about twenty-two to thirty-five per cent. The 
 things the settler needed for food or for planting and working 
 his soil were admitted free of duty and included beef and pork. 
 Furs of all kinds were admitted free so as to foster the Indian 
 trade. Extra charges were put upon goods brought in by Amer 
 ican vessels but American shipping was not prohibited. 356 
 
 Meanwhile a petition from Kingston merchants revealed the 
 attitude of a certain clique who by appealing to the instinct of 
 patriotism, fear, fairness to Lower Canada, and by repeating spe 
 cious economic doctrines, endeavored to induce the legislators at 
 York to favor their interests rather than the welfare of the set 
 tler. 357 These petitioners regretted that the carrying trade in Upper 
 Canada was done by United States vessels, that Lake Ontario was 
 : becoming a nursery for American seamen, that American goods 
 which would have to pay duty in Lower Canada, were admitted 
 into Upper Canada duty free, that by such laws and laxness con 
 traband trade was increasing, that through the influx of American 
 
 ^Schedule of . duties under the order-in-council, Apr. 18, 1816: 
 
 Ad Val. Specific 
 Per Cent 
 
 Anchors 22 
 
 Locks and hinges 22 
 
 Beer, etc., in casks, per gal. 6d. 
 
 Beer, in bottles Is. 
 
 Books 35 
 
 Carriage 35 
 
 Cards, playing Is. 6d. 
 
 Cards, wool or cotton 5s. 3d. 
 
 Candles, tallow 2 l-2d. 
 
 Candles, wax 7 l-2d. 
 
 Canes, etc 35 
 
 Cotton goods 25 
 
 Wool and Manu 35 
 
 Cordage, per Ib 3 l-2d. 
 
 Clothing 35 
 
 Fish, dried per quintal. . . . 5s. 
 
 Fish, mackerel, bbl 6s. 
 
 Furs, undressed free 
 
 Glass 30 
 
 Ad Val. Specific 
 Per Cent 
 
 5d. 
 
 4d. 
 
 7s. 6d. 
 
 7s. 6d. 
 
 Glue, Ib 
 
 Gunpowder, Ib 
 
 Hemp, cwt 
 
 Iron 
 
 Lead 22 
 
 Malt, bu Is. 
 
 Nails, pd 2 l-2d. 
 
 Salt, bu Is. 
 
 Paper 35 
 
 Steel, cwt 10s. 
 
 Spirits, from molasses 3s. 9d. 
 
 Spirits, distilled from grain, 
 
 per gal 2^. 1-2 d. to 3s. 94. 
 
 Shoes Is. 3d. 
 
 Tobacco, unmanu 4d. 
 
 Tobacco, manu 7d. 
 
 Wearing apparel and per 
 sonal baggage free 
 
 All other goods and manufactures of the growth and produce of the United States 
 in America not otherwise enumerated, 30 per cent, except wheat, barley, rye, oats, 
 peas, beans, pot and pearl ashes, staves, oak and pine timber, beef, pork, live cattle, 
 cheese, butter, and all other provisions, which may be permitted free. 
 
 Twelve per cent upon the above duties to be paid on such articles as are im 
 ported in foreign vessels and every ship, boat, or vessel exceeding 5 tons burden 
 belonging to subjects of the United States entering any port or harbor of the 
 province should pay a duty of 12s. 6d. per ton. C. A. Q. 324, p. 202. 
 
 S56 Journal L. A. U. C., Feb. 8, 1816, Ontario Archives, p. 10. The substance 
 
 of Gore s proclamations of 1816 had been suggested by a special message from 
 
 the Prince of Ghent and Colonial Office. Gore informed the Assembly of the 
 message on Feb. 9, 1816. 
 
 "Journal L. A. U. C., Mar. 12, 1816, Ontario Archives, p. 106. 
 
 108 
 
goods for sale specie was being drained from Upper Canada, and, 
 therefore, the petitioners recommended that the carrying trade be 
 done by British boats only. 
 
 In the spring session of 1818 the Upper Canadian House of 
 Assembly tried to revise the existing laws and accordingly framed 
 a bill which was rejected by the Legislative Council. The bitter 
 hostility between the two houses all through these years tended 
 to prevent legislation of any kind and over this particular bill such 
 disputation arose that no further progress could be made and so 
 the administrator, Smith, prorogued Parliament with nothing ac 
 complished. The popular assembly wanted freer trade with their 
 neighbors. The legislative council, looking beyond local interests, 
 meekly following British instructions, or observing British interests, 
 conceived that British shipping would not be sufficiently protected. 
 In the fall of 1818, however, sufficient harmony existed between 
 the warring elements to allow a bill to be agreed upon by both 
 houses. 358 The governor, Maitland, signed the bill but neverthe 
 less had scruples as to whether he was acting within his constitu 
 tional limits. No particular trade instructions had been communi 
 cated to him by the home government and nothing had previously 
 occurred during his administration to call the navigation laws and 
 their application to Upper Canada particularly into discussion and 
 so he was not fully aware of the delicacy of the question involved. 
 His attorney-general informed him that provincial acts had repeat 
 edly exceeded the authority of the legislature, that the present 
 one was no exception, and because provincial acts had been acqui 
 esced in since 1801, custom had partly compensated for non- validity. 
 
 This opinion of Attorney-general Robinson clearly shows how 
 little the Parliament of Upper Canada understood what was its 
 constitutional power. With characteristic frontier freedom 
 and with the natural instinct to feel that he is best served who 
 serves himself, they did not wait for instructions but ministered 
 to their own needs and doubtless never questioned whether this 
 was legal or illegal. It seemed necessary and that was a sufficient 
 warrant. Maitland, however, stood between these pioneers and 
 the all-controlling power across the ocean. He was extremely 
 anxious that no question should later arise concerning constitution 
 ality and therefore immediately communicated to Bathurst his 
 
 358 Journal of L. A. U. C., Nov. 27, 1818, Ontario Archives; Maitland to Bathurst, 
 Dec. 8, 1818, C. A. ,Q. 324, p. 180. 
 
 109 
 
doubts in respect to the tonnage clauses and the effect of the navi 
 gation laws in general upon the inland navigation of America, so 
 that if he had erred His Majesty s dissent could be announced by 
 proclamation before the next spring. Thus a similar haphazard 
 system or lack of system prevailed in Upper as in Lower Canada, 
 during these first years after the war. 
 
 In the absence of definite treaty regulations the trade of Upper 
 and Lower Canada was dependent as much upon acts of Congress 
 as upon the acts of the Canadian British governments. The United 
 States had not yet adopted the high protective tariff system. A 
 comparatively low duty was levied on imports for revenue purposes 
 only and many foreign goods were admitted duty free. The fur 
 trade was profitable and so while Canadians were forbidden to 
 trade with American Indians, Canadian furs, and peltry were among 
 the goods admitted free of duty. Before the opening of the Erie 
 Canal the people of the Northern States, anxious for an outlet 
 for their produce, desired freer commercial intercourse with the 
 Canadas. When this was not granted by the British government, 
 Congress in 1818 intimated to Great Britain that unless certain 
 concessions were made, the United States would close its ports 
 against British vessels arriving from any colony of Great Britain 
 closed against vessels owned by citizens of the United States, and 
 would prohibit the exportation in British vessels to all such col 
 onies of any article the growth, produce, or manufacture of the 
 United States. Even British vessels taking on board productions 
 of the United States in United States ports would be obliged to 
 give bond not to land them in a British colony from which vessels 
 of the United States were excluded. These provisions would be 
 injurious to St. John, New Brunswick, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
 rather than to Quebec, for Quebec as yet did not enjoy the liberties 
 of these two places. 362 Two years later Congress did definitely 
 close the ports of the United States against every British vessel 
 coming from Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, New 
 foundland or the West Indies, and British vessels must give bond 
 not to land United States goods in any of the prohibited places. 
 
 Undoubtedly influenced by movements in the United States and 
 by newspaper articles, by petitions and by discontent in the Can 
 adas the tardy Colonial office began, during the early twenties, to 
 
 3 " 2 United States Statutes at Large, Chapter LXX, Apr. 18, 1818. 
 
 110 
 
consider more carefully the Canadian trade problem. 362 * Bathurst 
 prepared a sketch of a bill for the regulation of the Canadian 
 commerce and sent it to Governor Dalhousie for consideration. 368 
 This proposed bill, though more liberal than the previous statutes, 
 kept distinct the sea navigation from the inland trade and con 
 tinued in the British Parliament the sole power of regulating both. 
 Certain enumerated goods either for home consumption or for 
 exportation were to be admitted duty free, others, subject to duty, 
 some entirely prohibited, but in general, these were the same as 
 those already existing in Lower Canada. There was a proviso 
 that by proclamation the governor, if he deemed it expedient, might 
 exclude flour except for exportation. All goods the growth 
 or manufacture of the United States which might be admitted 
 into England might also be admitted into Canada free of duty 
 provided that these goods were exported in British ships to any 
 place other than the King s colonial dominions. 864 
 
 While this bill was being discussed the British merchants, manu 
 facturers, and shippers were not standing idle, for they were anx 
 ious to retain or increase their present profits unfettered by foreign 
 or colonial competitors. More than one-half the Canadian imports 
 continued to be British manufactures. 365 The population of Upper 
 and Lower Canada was now between four and five hundred thou 
 sand and was increasing at the rate of five per cent per year. The 
 trade, therefore, made it worth while to bring influence to bear 
 upon Parliament or upon the Colonial Office in particular. The 
 British agriculturists were no less active than the merchants. It 
 was to satisfy them that no colonial corn had been admitted into 
 England for consumption unless the average price of British wheat 
 exceeded 675. per quarter. Hence, all that had arrived in England 
 after October 20, 1818, had laid unsold in English warehouses. 
 Colonial grain was thus rendered almost valueless. Then in 1821 
 and 1822 the colonists were in dire distress, burdened with a double 
 monopoly bound to buy from the British only and forced to sell 
 their surplus in British markets under most disadvantageous terms. 
 
 362a "It may seem strange, incredible, that the bounty of nature, the finest 
 navigable river in the world should be rendered useless as an outlet to the sea 
 
 but whoever will consider by what law trade is naturally regulated the 
 
 course which we have supposed the trade of the Canadas will take under the 
 permanency of the existing legislative regulations of Great Britain is neither fanci 
 ful nor far distant." From the Quebec Gazette, Aug. 30, in Niles Register for 
 Oct. 13, 1821 an editorial on the opening of the Erie Canal. 
 
 "O. A. Q. 157, p. 129. 
 
 *C. A. Q. 157, p. 129. 
 
 to Wortley, May 28, 1819, C. A. Q. 153, p. 470. 
 Ill 
 
MIL 
 
 Despite the distress of these years some British merchants still pe 
 titioned Goulbourn that no alteration be made in the duties, so as 
 tip give advantages to foreigners greater than those already pos 
 sessed. Other merchants waited upon Bathurst with a similar 
 petition. 3ae The Canadians, on the contrary, demanded the right 
 either to make their own regulations entirely or have the liberty 
 to purchase at least all heavy goods in the United States. 367 By 
 addresses to the imperial parliament and by petitions, powerful pleas 
 were made for better terms. The hard times and distress, especially 
 severe in Lower Canada, were traced to the lack of market from 
 produce, and the restrictions upon importations. 368 
 
 Although the Canadian felt himself oppressed, he was not so 
 generous as to favor proposals to open to American shippers and 
 merchants the ports of a sister colony, the West Indies. He ob 
 jected because Canada supplied these islands with grain and re 
 ceived rum, sugar, etc., in return. The heavy crops of 1822 gave 
 promise that Canada alone could supply all the needs of the West 
 Indies if rid of competitors. 369 The practical exclusion of colonial 
 grain from England compelled the farmers to demand some exter 
 nal market, even if another colony should suffer. 
 
 Fortunately, there were in England itself persistent advocates 
 for Canadian rights. One has only to read the debates of the 
 House of Commons of February, 1821, or March, 1822, to perceive 
 that the Canadian colony was not forgotten. Mr. Marryat, on the 
 floor of the House impassionately and forcefully described how 
 the colonist was bound by Britain in trade ; how he must draw all 
 his supplies from Great Britain ; how everything about him and 
 belonging to him was British ; his woolens, linens, and leather, the 
 ax with which he felled his timber, the grate with which he cooked 
 his food, the plates, the dishes, knives and forks, mugs and glasses 
 with which he ate his food, were British ; his surplus means were 
 spent in British manufactures and produce and this expenditure 
 gave life and animation to British industry. 370 It was again this 
 same man who a year later called the attention of the Commons 
 to the fact that the levying of a duty on Canadian timber and 
 the lowering of a duty on timber from the Baltic had so reduced 
 
 366 Petition June 19, 1820, C. A. Q. 156, p. 172; Feb. 25, 1822, C. A. (Q. 162, p. 
 ; Feb. 12, 1824, C. A. Q. 170 p. 710. 
 367 March 30, 1822, C. A. Q. 163, p. 485. 
 36S C. A. Q. 162, p. 259. 
 369 C. A. Q. 163, p. 522. 
 370 Marryat s speech, Feb. 9, 1821, Hansard II, Series 4, p. 549. 
 
 112 
 
the price of colonial timber that it would not pay the expenses of 
 cutting and transportation. He pointed out how the revenue in 
 Lower Canada had fallen from twenty to thirty per cent in one 
 year and this was due to British imposition. 371 Others in the same 
 debate came to Marryat s support. Ellice noted the decline in the 
 prosperity of the Canadas, especially since 1822. Ricardo argued 
 that Canadians ought not to be forced to buy in British markets. 
 Sir J. Mackintosh declared that "the House was bound to consult 
 the feelings of the people of Canada." 371 * These men at length pre 
 vailed over Brougham, 372 who favored the duty on Canadian timber, 
 and Bennet, 373 who thought that the English agriculturists had 
 already been sufficiently injured by American grain smuggled into 
 the Canadas and reexported as Canadian grain. Revised regulations 
 were prepared and received the royal assent on June 20, i822. 374 
 By this bill Quebec, for the first time, was opened to direct trade 
 
 between United States and Canada. Either British or American 
 
 m 
 
 vessels were permitted to carry enumerated articles which included 
 grains, domestic animals, flour, and tobacco, but manufactured 
 goods were almost entirely excluded. In the levying of duties there 
 was a curious recognition and incorporation of Canadian statutes. 
 Imperial duties were assigned but if there were a colonial duty on 
 the same article, then the imperial duty should be paid, provided 
 the colonial duty were less ; if not, the colonial duty would be paid. 
 Ocean navigation was now partially freed from shackles and this 
 new liberty diminished the occasion for special privileges and legal 
 dispensations as well as for the very illicit intercourse by which 
 Canadians had hitherto evaded restrictions and exchanged goods 
 with their neighbors to the south. 375 
 
 Influenced by the British legislation of June, 1822, Congress sus 
 pended the acts of April 18, 1818, and May 15, 1820, as far as 
 Quebec was concerned. By this suspension any British vessel was 
 permitted to come directly from that port bringing any article of the 
 growth, produce, or manufacture of that colony except specie and 
 bullion as long as these same goods might be exported from that 
 part on equal terms in vessels of the United States. 376 The President, 
 however, until assured that tonnage duties had entirely ceased in 
 
 371 Hansard s Debates, Mar. 13, 1822, series 2, vol. 6, p. 1073. 
 
 371 aSir J. Mackintosh in H. of C., July 18, 1822. (Hansard.) 
 
 S72 Hansard, for Mar. 13, 1822. 
 
 373 Ibid. 
 
 s74 Act II, George IV, p. 44, 45. 
 
 375 Robinson s speech, Apr. 1, 1822, Hansard, series 2, vol. 6, p. 1414. 
 
 S76 Statute United States, March 1, 1823. 
 
 113 
 
Quebec, ordered that there be continued the discrimination against 
 British shippers of the one dollar tonnage and the ten per cent extra 
 duty. In retaliation a British order-in-council was issued charging 
 the same tonnage and extra duty on American vessels and goods 
 entering Quebec and other British ports. 377 Thus, these extra 
 charges, continued on both sides. In the spring of 1824 Congress 
 passed a new tariff law making a general and considerable augmenta 
 tion in the import duties. This affected the British at home much more 
 than it could affect the North American colonies and in the fol 
 lowing year the imperial Parliament revised its tariff laws and, 
 recognizing that the "law of customs (had) become intricate by 
 reason of the great number of acts relating thereto" repealed all 
 existing acts and issued new and detailed regulations for the trade 
 of the British possessions abroad. 378 
 
 By this British act of July, 1825, Quebec, Halifax, and other 
 enumerated ports in British North America and the West Indies 
 were declared "Free Ports," that is, to these the ships of foreign 
 nations might bring the produce of their own country and carry 
 back the produce of the British possession on condition that British 
 vessels were guaranteed the same favors in the colonies of these 
 foreign countries; or if any foreign nation not in possession of 
 colonies desired to trade with colonies of Great Britain it might 
 obtain this privilege by a special order-in-council from His Britan 
 nic Majesty. In other words, the direct trade of Canada and the 
 West Indies was thrown open to the United States provided tht 
 United States placed Great Britain among the most favored nations. 
 a list of articles which no foreign vessel might carry into 
 
 
 British possessions in America we find gunpowder, arms, ammu 
 nitions or utensils of war, tea, which had previously been prohibited, 
 and beef and pork, which had previously been admitted into the 
 Canadas through special orders of the governors. A duty of from 
 seven to ten per cent ad valorem was levied on live stock and a host 
 of other imports, one shilling per bushel upon wheat, thirty per 
 cent ad valorem upon leather and linen manufactures, twenty per 
 cent upon soap, sugar, and tobacco, and fifteen per cent upon goods 
 not otherwise enumerated, which would include, as far as the Can 
 adas were concerned, the clothing, implements and tools of the col 
 onists. While Quebec was the only authorized seaport for the 
 
 377 British State Papers, 1822 23, Vol. X, p. 781. 
 378 An Act of VI George IV, Chap. 114. 
 
 114 
 
Canadas, inland trade with the United States was permitted subject 
 to the same duties and other regulations as for goods brought in 
 at Quebec. One of the new features of the act was the establishing 
 of bonded warehouses where imported goods might be housed tem 
 porarily free of duty until either sold or reexported. 
 
 When introducing this bill Earl Bathurst tried to convince the 
 Lords that this proposed act was a "complete abandonment of what 
 had hitherto been regarded as the English Colonial System * * * 
 (that) it could no longer be said that Britain placed her colonies 
 in a worse situation with respect to trade than the United States 
 * (that) the colonies would now enjoy not only the same 
 advantages as the United States, but colonial vessels would be en 
 titled to all the advantages of British ships * * * (that) in 
 all former measures for regulating the colonial trade prohibi 
 tion formed the rule, admission the exception, but now admission 
 was the rule, prohibition the exception." 37821 
 
 This speech is interesting from the fact that the spokesman of 
 the Colonial Office is here frankly and officially announcing the 
 passing of the old Colonial System. The liberal views of Hus- 
 kisson, Marryat, Baring, Bright and others were apparently be 
 coming embodied in legislation. Complete liberty, however, in trade 
 and navigation was as yet by no means obtained and not a year had 
 elapsed until the House of Commons heard Baring declare that "it 
 was not possible to preserve them (the North American Colonies) 
 but by giving them all the advantages of a free trade * * * 
 Since the American war these colonies felt their own power and 
 knew their own interest and it was not possible to retain them by 
 violence or subject their trade to unnecessary restraints." 379 
 
 What goods could be legally imported or exported, what goods 
 should be free from duty, and what should be the rates charged 
 on the unfree goods, whether goods could be carried in British or 
 American bottoms, and what should be the ports of entry ever 
 changing regulations in these matters by provincial, British, or 
 American government had annoyed and even yet continued to 
 annoy and inconvenience the Colonists. To cite but a few cases of 
 this. During the year 1823 merchants acting in good faith im 
 ported in American bottoms pot and pearl ashes, etc., which were 
 
 378a Earl Bathurst in H. of L., June 14, 1825, Hansard, series 2, vol. 13, p. 1132. 
 
 379 Baring s Speech, May 13, 1826, Hansard II series, Vol. XV, p. 1190; Huskis- 
 son s Speech, Feb. 14, 1826, Hansard II series, Vol. XIV, p. 361; Ibid, May 12, 1826, 
 Hansard II series, Vol. XV, p. 1144. 
 
 115 
 
allowed to pass through the customs houses at Coteau du Lac, but 
 were seized at Montreal. The case was referred to Governor 
 Dalhousie who, appreciating the merchants position, released the 
 goods on account of the uncertainty of the law, and requested the 
 home government to take steps to prevent repetitions of this sort. 380 
 A little later merchants of Montreal made vigorous complaints be 
 cause, through lack of definite information, duties were being 
 levied by Canadian custom house officers on goods admitted free 
 by imperial acts. 381 An imperial order, decreeing that the remun 
 eration for custom house officers should be by definite salary and 
 not by fees, tended to remove trouble of this kind arising from 
 unscrupulous officials who endeavored to collect all the duty pos 
 sible so as to swell their own private purses. 382 Montreal mer 
 chants, however, still felt themselves unprotected from the meddle 
 some legislator, and customs officer, and even after the act of July, 
 1825, prayed the imperial government that no further alterations 
 be made in the trade relations until time and experience should 
 prove the effects of existing laws. 383 
 
 In the United States a similar sentiment prevailed. President 
 Monroe realized the baneful results of temporary and unstable 
 regulations. In his message at the opening of the second session 
 of his last Congress he said that it appeared from long experience 
 that no satisfactory arrangement for commercial intercourse with 
 the British possessions in America could be maintained by legis 
 lative acts while each party pursued its own course. His propo 
 sition was to regulate commerce by treaty. 
 
 However desirable it might be that the stream should run in a 
 less tortuous and tumultuous course, the fates had decreed other 
 wise. No treaty was signed. Instead, an order-in-council of July 
 27, 1826 declared that the United States had not fulfilled certain 
 conditions required for the continuance of the act of July, 1825, and 
 therefore, the British ports of South America, West Indies, Ber 
 muda, and Newfoundland were to be closed to the United States. 384 
 To meet this new turn of events the Senate of the United States 
 attempted to father a bill abolishing discriminating duties against 
 goods imported in British vessels from Lower Canada and other 
 British American colonies if the British would recall this order-in- 
 
 38 Dalhousie to Bathurst, Feb. 27, 1824, C. A. Q. 168, 37. 
 
 881 Kempt to Murray, Oct. 26, 1828, C. A. Q. 183, 82, and 86. 
 
 382 Bathurst to Maitland June 7, 1826, C. A. Q. 62. 
 
 383 C. A. Q. 176, p. 2. 
 
 ^American State Papers, vol. XIII, p. 366. 
 
 116 
 
council and agree not to levy any discriminating duties on goods 
 imported by American vessels into British ports; but the House 
 of Representatives threw out the bill, and President Adams by 
 proclamation prohibited all trade and intercourse authorized by the 
 American act of 1823 between the United States and the British 
 ports in South America, West Indies, Bermudas, Bahamas, and 
 Newfoundland. 585 This state of affairs continued until Jackson s 
 proclamation of October 5, 1830, which reestablished the inter 
 course. The closing of the West Indian ports to the United States 
 trade had been beneficial to the Canadas and these provinces were 
 loath to hear that trade would be reopened. 386 They had sent 
 their surplus produce to the West Indies and the general carrying 
 trade had been increased for American produce of the lake region 
 found its way into Canada en route to England rather than to the 
 West Indies where otherwise it would have gone. 
 
 The formal convention of July, 1815, renewed in 1818, was again 
 renewed in 1827, this time indefinitely or at least until either party 
 should give twelve months notice that they wished it to be annulled. 
 The renewal of this convention practically meant nothing except 
 the continuance of the existing status; but in April, 1831, the 
 Imperial Parliament passed an act favorable to the British ship 
 ping interests, favorable to the American states and territories ad 
 jacent to the Great Lakes, favorable to some infant manufacturing 
 industries in Canada but unwelcomed by many Canadian farmers. 
 
 By this act, grain, flour, beef, pork, wood and lumber were hence 
 forth permitted to enter the Canadas duty free; and these same 
 commodities were permitted to enter the British West Indies and 
 South America duty free if imported from any other British pos 
 session in North America. 386a By the custom house construction 
 of this act, American grain and flour imported into the Canadas 
 might be reexported duty free to the West Indies and South Amer 
 ica but if reexported to England it would be subject to all the 
 previous duties and restrictions. American wheat, however, might 
 be imported into Canada and there ground into flour and this flour 
 reexported on the same terms as colonial flour. The practical re 
 sults of this act were that Canadian wheat was bought up and 
 
 385 Senate Proceedings, Feb. 28, 1827, and U. S. Stat. at large, 1827, App. I, 
 p. 796. 
 
 386 C. A. Q. 354, p. 70 Niles censures the American administration for the con 
 ditions under which the W. I. ports were opened to American ships. He says Cana 
 dians paid a lower duty and nearly monopolized the U. S. trade even after 1830. 
 Niles Reg. Apr. 9, 1831, page 90. 
 
 38C Statutes at Large, 1, William IV, Cap. XXIV. 
 
 117 
 
shipped to England. Then American wheat was imported to sup 
 ply the Canadian home market and the West Indies. After this 
 had been sufficed American imported wheat was manufactured into 
 flour and re-exported upon the same terms as Canadian flour. The 
 Canadian flour manufacturers, the West India planters, the Colonial 
 and British shipowners, and every class within England except 
 the landed proprietors were all recipients of benefits from this 
 act; 386b but the York Colonial Advocate declared that Canadian 
 farmers were being sacrificed, and New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio 
 and Michigan enriched. 3860 These states were fully aware of what 
 this act meant for them. The great natural outlet for the West was 
 now more freely opened and although the Erie Canal offered facili 
 ties for transportation to New York, nevertheless a more staple 
 market and higher prices were offered in Montreal and conse 
 quently a large part of the produce of the Northwestern States 
 passed into Canada. 3863 
 
 The general course of trade during the early thirties was com 
 paratively smooth, yet petitions continued to be sent to governors 
 and to Parliament, and disputes of one kind or another were not 
 infrequent ; controversy, for instance, arose over the circumstance 
 that tonnage duties continued to be levied on American vessels, 
 entering British ports on Lake Champlain, in spite of the fact that 
 the order-in-council of July, 1826, had been superseded by another 
 order of November 5, 1833, abolishing the tonnage duty of 45. 3d. and 
 extra duty of 10 per cent ad valorem, the United States having 
 agreed to abolish duties on British shipping. The affair was settled 
 by the Canadians explaining that the charge in Lower Canada by 
 the customs house officer there was only a mere trifle to help pay for 
 the expenses of the post, and it had been established by a local 
 provincial act. Nevertheless, it was discontinued at the expiration 
 of the provincial act in i834. 38r In Upper Canada similar troubles 
 arose over the coasting trade until Colborne sent definite instructions 
 to the local collectors in 1833 to cease collecting any charges ex 
 cept such as were enacted from Canadian or British boats in Ameri- 
 
 386h Montrea i Herald quotation in Niles Register, July 2, 1831, p. 310; Montreal 
 Gazette quotation of Nov. 8, 1831, in Niles Register, for Nov. 26, 1831, p. 238. 
 
 386c York Colonial Advocate (quotation in Niles Register July, 1831). Americans 
 it was claimed would grow wheat and manufacture flour cheaper than the Canadians, 
 and the York paper saw how this American grain and flour would now compete in 
 the English and West Indies markets against the Canadians. 
 
 388d Buffalo Advertiser (quotation in Niles Register July, 1831). Cleveland Ad 
 vertiser (quotation in Niles Register, Oct. 29, 1831, p. 165. Niles Register Sept. 7, 
 1833, p. 24). 
 
 3S7 C. A. G. 223. 
 
 118 
 
can harbors. 388 In addition to the complaints in which the United 
 States were specially interested, a great deal of discontent was 
 voiced in Upper Canada. Because tobacco could be grown near 
 Amherstburg the people of that town sent in their little petition to 
 persuade parliament not to diminish the import duty on this ques 
 tionable luxury. 389 
 
 Reports from the Upper Canada Assembly, however, reveal to us 
 the fact that the regulations of 1825 to 1830 had proven to be by no 
 means satisfactory. The first report on trade and commerce of 
 Upper Canada by a select committee in 1835 sums up the long-stand 
 ing grievances of the period. The report is really the work of the 
 more radical members, Wilson, MacKenzie, Shaver, McMicking, 
 and Durand, but it is nevertheless significant. It states the cause 
 of distress in Upper Canada to be due to the restrictions laid on the 
 trade of the colony and compares the disadvantages under which th0 
 land owners and merchants labor as compared with the same classes 
 on the opposite frontier. It regrets that laws for the regulation of 
 trade are dictated or enacted by the Parliament of the United 
 Kingdom and changed and varied without consulting the province, 
 that some articles of general utility were either prohibited or could 
 be imported only in British ships or from a British port and all 
 this was for the advantage of capitalists residing in Europe. 389a 
 
 388 c. A. G. 223. 
 
 3S9 Petition Dec. 21, 1832, C. A. Q. p. 36. 
 
 389a Report on Trade and Commerce of Upper Canada, Legislative Assembly of 
 Upper Canada, 1835, Appendix C. A. 
 
 The duties levied on products of the U. S. to date from Mar. 4, 1835: 
 
 Horses per head 50s By a later amendment duties were 
 
 Mules 40 levied on leather from Is 3d up to 5s 
 
 Cattle 1 and 2 yrs 3 per Ib. And the duty on salt was re- 
 Cows 2 and 4 yrs 15 duced from 6d to 3d per bu. 
 
 Oxen 20 
 
 Hogs 10 
 
 Fresh pork, cwt 5 
 
 Fresh beef, cwt 3s 9d Journal of Legislative Assembly of 
 
 Salt pork, cwt 5 Upper Canada for March 14, 1833, On- 
 Salt beef, cwt 3s 9d tario Archives. 
 
 Hams, bacon 10 
 
 Butter and cheese 10 
 
 Lard and tallow 5s 
 
 Wheat, bu Is 3d 
 
 Rye, corn, bu Is 
 
 Sheep, head Is 3d 
 
 Mutton, cwt. 2s 
 
 Pease, bu Is 
 
 Barley 9d 
 
 Oats 6d 
 
 Potatoes 6d 
 
 Buckwheat 6d 
 
 Apples, bu 6d 
 
 Hay, ton 10s 388b Journal of House of Assembly of 
 
 Flour, cwt 2s 6d Upper Canada, 1821, Reports No. 6, 9, 10. 
 
 Rye flour, cwt 2s Journal for 1834, Ontario archives. 
 
 BuHr wheat flour 2s Journal H. of A., U. C. Nov. 27, 
 
 Indian meal ._ 2s 1818, May 7, 1819; July 12, 1819, etc., 
 
 Eeer, bbl ." 5s in Ontario Archives for earlier discon- 
 
 Cider, bbl 2s 6d tent. 
 
 119 
 
The revenue arising from duty on goods imported from the United 
 States for 1834, the year immediately preceding that in which this 
 report was brought, was ^3,236. 75. 9?4d. amount collected 
 during the year 1820. These figures not only show the rapid 
 growth of the trade but reveal the importance of the matter to the 
 legislative assembly. 389b 
 
 With an ever-increasing population in both provinces and in the 
 neighboring states, with American settlers continuing to move from 
 the United States, and with the better facilities for trade, new roads, 
 new waterways, and reciprocity with regard to the shipping and 
 coasting trade, it was only natural that there should be a growth in 
 the volume and variety of goods exchanged. The settlers in Upper 
 Canada, and it was here that the population grew the faster, brought 
 with them some household and farm supplies from their native 
 country ; but for some time after settling they could not supply 
 themselves from their own homesteads with articles that later that 
 same farm would yield in abundance. When a bill was before the 
 Upper Canadian Legislature in 1835 to lay a comparatively high 
 duty on horses, cattle, hogs, sheep, mill machinery and other things, 
 many people in the province were opposed because these things 
 could not be produced in quantities at all adequate to the demand. 
 The supply for these lay in the United States, 390 and the opponents 
 of the bill wanted to procure that supply as cheaply as possible. 
 It is rather interesting to find that timber which from the earliest 
 colonial times had been imported from New York and New Eng 
 land states into Canada by thousands of feet en route to the British 
 market, now by 1835 began to move from Canada to New York 391 in 
 payment for American goods imported into Canada. 
 
 While the legitimate trade since 1815 was struggling against 
 navigation laws, temporary, confusing, and sometimes conflicting 
 enactments, and uncertain information in regard to the interpreta 
 tion or significance of imperial or provincial decrees, a brisk and 
 flourishing underground traffic had developed unhampered, even 
 fostered by legislation on both sides of the line. We must remember 
 that the East India Company held exclusive privileges. The colonies 
 had no legal means of getting the produce from the Orient except 
 by way of Great Britain and Great Britain itself was supplied by 
 this company. By the convention of 1815 the United States were 
 
 890 0. A. Q. 385, p. 33, p. 263. 
 ^C. A. Q. 155, p. 389. 
 
 120 
 
granted privileges of direct trade with British dominions in the East 
 Indies and in India under the most favored European nation clause. 
 This meant that as far as the United States were concerned the 
 East India Company s monopoly was broken, but as far as the 
 Canada s were concerned, it still held. Because this monopoly did 
 hold and because of the necessity of unloading and reloading in 
 England, and because of the circuitous voyage, Oriental goods were 
 much higher priced in Quebec than in New York; consequently 
 smuggling of Asiatic goods into Canada increased. The long line of 
 poorly protected frontier made it possible and easy to smuggle any 
 kind of goods, but the professional smuggler, however, dealt chiefly 
 in those commodities which were easily transported and would yield 
 him great returns for the risk taken. One of the chief of these 
 commodities was tea and in this the smuggling trade became so 
 systematic and so injurious to the revenues of the Canadian prov 
 inces that in 1824 the Quebec Legislature tried to take effective 
 means to prevent it. 392 The council and assembly sent a joint ad 
 dress to England respecting the illicit trade in goods from China 
 and India and suggested methods of supplying the inhabitants by 
 arrangements with the East India Company or by direct importa 
 tion. 393 
 
 A letter written by Weltden, who traveled in America in 1823, 
 and who professed neither to be engaged nor personally interested 
 in any mercantile pursuit, is very illuminating on the actual state 
 of the smuggling trade. During the first quarter of the last century, 
 he had noticed the extraordinary progress of American shipping and 
 commerce in Europe and Asia and when he came to St. Johns, 
 New Brunswick, and traveled up the St. Croix River, he discovered 
 that a part of this rapid development was due to the fact that Ameri 
 cans were carriers for not only their own people but for the British 
 colonists also. Under cover of impenetrable fogs, they supplied the 
 maritime provinces with more than half of the Asiatic goods con 
 sumed. He passed up through the partly constructed Erie Canal 
 and found that thousands of chests of tea were conveyed by this 
 route to Rochester and the Niagara River. Buffalo had "risen like 
 another Phoenix from its ashes" and its prosperity was due to its 
 advantageous position as a distributing point. But Weltden be 
 lieved that a great share of its wealth came from its illicit trade with 
 
 "C. A. Q. 170, p. 678. 
 
 393 Dalhousie to Bathurst, Feb. 27, 1824, C. A. Q. 168, p. 33. 
 
 121 
 
the Upper Canadians and that a similar condition of affairs ex 
 isted at Rochester, N. Y., and on Lake Champlain. He also estimated 
 the amount of tea smuggled to be twice as great as the amount 
 legitimately imported. 394 The statistics for the port of Quebec cer 
 tainly seem to bear out this statement for, though population had 
 been annually increasing, and the people were drinkers of tea 
 rather than of coffee, the importations at Quebec, the only port 
 where tea could legally enter, had rapidly declined after 1815. The 
 statistics for the customs house at Quebec may not be absolutely 
 accurate but they sufficiently demonstrate the general truth of Welt- 
 den s letter. The amount of coffee imported declined even more 
 rapidly than that of tea because during the war tea could not be 
 obtained from the United States as it had been before, and so coffee 
 was substituted in part. After the war, coffee was no longer pur 
 chased in such large quantities. 395 
 
 When we know the profits that were obtained by smuggling tea, 
 we can more easily credit Weltden s statements as to the amount 
 smuggled. Tea imported in New York at fifty cents a pound sold 
 in Canada for $1.25; that imported at twelve cents per pound re 
 tailed at from twenty-six to twenty-eight cents. 396 By an American 
 law the merchant who imported tea and exported it within eighteen 
 months paid only two and one-half per cent of the duty regularly 
 charged. It paid the American merchant to foster smuggling. 
 
 To check this loss of revenue, Great Britain ordered the East 
 India Company to send tea direct from China to Quebec and land 
 the tea there at reduced prices. Though this lessened the contra 
 band trade it by no means stopped it. 397 By a United States statute, 
 all tea imported in American vessels, direct from China was to be 
 imported duty free after March, i823- 398 This did not help to de 
 crease the Canadian smuggling. Three years later Upper Cana 
 dians were still petitioning the King to protect them against smug 
 glers, but the committees on trade in the British council would 
 
 8M Weltden to Horten, April 11, 1824, C. A. Q. 170, p. 677. 
 
 3fln lmportations at port of Quebec : 
 
 Tea-lbs. Coffee-lbs. 396 C. A. Q. 170, p. 678. 
 
 1814 487,371 168,972 
 
 1815 314,450 269,663 397 Petition from Chamber of Com- 
 
 1816 218,969 335,441 merce, St. John s, Jan. 31, 1833, C. A. Q. 
 
 1817 254,248 35,995 210, p. 280. 
 
 1818 348,008 50,779 
 
 1819 280,497 43,091 398 Ibid. 
 
 1820 167,067 55,378 
 
 1821 160,865 73,173 
 
 1822 134,379 94,929 
 
 April 11, 1829, C. A. |Q. 170, p. 678. 
 
 122 
 
hearken to none of the proposed plans of the colonists. 399 And so 
 a considerable portion of the tea consumed in Canada continued 
 to be carried by American merchantmen. 
 
 Other commodities as well as tea were also smuggled into Canada 
 in great quantities. Petitions were sent to the Legislature pray 
 ing for a reduction of duty on whisky, and other spirits to 3d. per 
 gallon in the hope that a reduction would induce the importers 
 to enter these liquors through the lawful channels. Lower rates 
 when collected would yield a larger revenue than the higher rates 
 under existing conditions. Carleton Island was reported to be the ren 
 dezvous for an organized band of smugglers. A great quantity of 
 tobacco was confiscated here. 400 Customs house officers, however 
 vigilant, were but inadequately prepared to cope with the organized 
 smugglers of these early years. 401 
 
 C. A. G. 79. 
 
 400 Adams complaint that an American citizen had had tobacco confiscated. C. A. Q. 
 162, p. 21. 
 
 40i See proposals made by customs collectors, at Pictou, Sydney, Boston, 1835, 
 and letter of Vaughan to Aberdeen, Oct. 29, 1828, complaining of smuggling, C. A. jQ. 
 354, p. 162. C. A. Q. p. 185, p. 260. 0. A. jQ. 170, p. 263. 
 
 123 
 
XL 
 TRANSPORTATION. 
 
 The growing tendency in the United States after the war to 
 devote more attention to all kinds of internal improvements and 
 especially that part of this tendency which sought to develop better 
 communication between the western states and the seaboard cities 
 was accompanied by a corresponding movement in the Canadian 
 provinces. The war of 1812 had revealed to Canadians as well as 
 to Americans what a military advantage better means of transporta 
 tion would be ; and the construction and location of the early trans 
 portation system of Upper Canada were to a considerable extent 
 due to an effort to find better means for moving men and supplies 
 than had been offered during the war. It is true that some short 
 canals had already been built along the course of the St. Lawrence. 
 A canal at Coteau du Lac had been opened in 1780, preceding by 
 five years the excavation for the first American canal. In 1782 
 and 1783 two other canals, the Cascades and Split Rock, still further 
 removed impediments to navigation between Montreal and Kingston. 
 It was not until the war period and after it, however, that the really 
 significant undertakings were seriously considered. 
 
 The first great overland route constructed in Upper Canada was 
 the York Road or Dundas Street. Military exigencies had shown 
 the need of such a highway to connect York with both the extreme 
 southwest and the military stations of Kingston and farther east. 
 The roadbed was cautiously constructed inland from the exposed 
 waterfront so that an enemy might not so readily interfere with 
 traffic upon it. But the Canadians needed more than the York 
 road and the canals already built along the St. Lawrence if they 
 were to cope successfully against American arms in any future 
 contest, or if they were to stand any chance in the competition for 
 the western carrying trade. In providing facilities for both war 
 and trade the projected Erie Canal would turn the scales immeasur 
 ably in favor of the Americans. The immigrant in southern and 
 western Upper Canada, when bound commercially to a foreign pow 
 er, might soon pay complete homage and allegiance to that country 
 instead of to Britain. Thus, it was that the legislators and parlia 
 ments in Canada and England were induced to vote the necessary 
 
 124 
 
charters and grants for new roadways in Canada, and to place them 
 where they did not merely offer better provisions for the welfare 
 of the immigrants already settled and to induce more to come, but 
 to hold those they had true to their allegiance, and protect the upper 
 province against American aggression. 
 
 This statement holds in the case of the great York road and may 
 be further verified by considering each of the Canadian canals in 
 turn. While the Erie Canal was as yet a reality only in the fertile 
 fancies of some New York promoters, the Lower Canadian Parlia 
 ment in 1817 drew up a bill for fostering the St. Lawrence trade. 
 This bill urged the consideration of improvements in the navigation 
 of that river largely because such improvements would counteract 
 the effects of the projected New York Canal. The Upper Canada 
 Legislature, anticipating by a year the efforts of the lower province, 
 discussed a bill to make surveys for the Welland Canal and, al 
 though an act of incorporation was not granted until 1824 and 
 navigation was not opened until six years later, a letter from Cos- 
 grave in 1819 reveals the tone of the efforts made to persuade those 
 in power to make the necessary grants. 405 After calling attention 
 to the fact that this canal would facilitate an export trade that al 
 ready employed 5,000 seamen and amounted to 1,500,000 pounds 
 sterling annually, he hoped that the British government would by 
 its zeal and decision outstrip the United States government, that 
 it would thus bring to Montreal the exports and imports of the 
 states bordering on Lakes Erie, Huron and Michigan and that the 
 West Indies might continue to be supplied from Canadian ports as 
 they then were. So much for the commercial advantages of such 
 a waterway. But Cosgrave seems to have realized that he must 
 offer arguments that would appeal to those who wished to strengthen 
 the military defenses, and, therefore, he said that the Welland Canal 
 would attract a population along the frontier "ready to oppose any 
 unjust usurpation of British rights when the period arrives that 
 these nations may be unhappily involved in war/ and it "would 
 make these states (Ohio, Indiana, etc.) look up to us (British) as 
 protectors, and in case of another war might cause them to separate 
 from the Federal Government and join England." 406 
 
 Again the Rideau Canal, though not commenced until 1826, was 
 advocated a decade before that as a military necessity. Its advo- 
 
 405 Wm. Cosgrave to Goulbourn, Jan. 18, 1819, C. A. Q. 153, p. 81. 
 Sherbrooke to Bathurst, May 20, 1817, C. A. Q. 144, p. 21. 
 Kingford. Kist. of Can. X. 245. 
 ^Cosgrave to Goulbourn, C. A. Q. 153, p. 81. 
 
 125 
 
cates declared that it would establish communication between Kings 
 ton and Quebec free from the dangers of navigating a river flanked 
 by American artillery ; it would make possible and prosperous a 
 military settlement along its route, and it was "safer to get popula 
 tion consolidated than scattered ;" a colony of loyal British soldier- 
 settlers would "improve the disposition of the people ;" and "to ex 
 pel as much as possible the American manners from the Canadian 
 side of the St. Lawrence (might thereafter) be of vital importance 
 to the provinces." 407 The government was urged to make grants 
 
 because "in the event of a war the sum advanced would 
 
 be almost immediately saved." 408 Bathurst approved of the scheme 
 for the canals and military settlements. 
 
 A few years later, in the early thirties, efforts were made to open 
 a waterway between the head waters of the Ottawa and Lake Huron, 
 and arguments similar to these quoted above were prominently put 
 forth. The Americans, it was asserted, were fortunate in being 
 able to combine almost immediate commercial advantages with ad 
 ditional facilities for war-like operations on the northern frontier; 
 the Rideau Canal had become necessary to restore the equilibrium of 
 attack and defense, but it was also a stimulus to trade and settle 
 ment ; the proposed canal would be likewise commercially profitable, 
 for the rapidly increasing population of Michigan and the Northwest 
 Territories would undoubtedly avail themselves of this route to the 
 Atlantic, and in a political point of view this channel would increase 
 the interest of the Northwestern Americans in continuing on friendly 
 footing with the British Empire ; it would attract British settlers 
 to the west ; and in war an English population on Lake Huron would 
 materially add to British resources. 409 
 
 While canals and highways were thus promoted in some sections, 
 in others roads were absolutely prohibited and in pursuit of the 
 same policy. In the eastern townships it was deemed desirable to 
 admit no settlements, a "state of nature" being considered a better 
 defense than even a military settlement. Consequently no system 
 of transportation was adopted and even the roads which did exist 
 were not repaired. Here was an effort to suppress the natural 
 growth of one part of Lower Canada in order to protect the rest. 
 All attempts to keep these townships in a state of nature proved, 
 
 Cockburn, Lt. Col. and Dep. Qr. Mast. Gen., report Nov. 26, 1818, C. A. Q. 
 152, p. 9; and letters C. A. Q. 167 B. p. 56. 
 
 ^Reports on Ottawa Canals, C. A. Q. 161, p. 318. Also see Diary of Nicholas 
 Garry, Boy. Soc. of Can. II Ser. vol. VI. p. 95. 
 
 W9 Shirreff to Howick, Sept. 29, 1832, C. A. jQ. 375 p. 361. 
 
 126 
 
however, to be very futile; but we are not concerned with that. 
 The motive on the part of the British in prohibiting roads here was 
 to strengthen the military defenses of their colonies and this same 
 motive was apparently stronger than any other in prompting the 
 legislators to vote supplies for the construction of the other roads 
 and canals. Behind all this was the prevailing opinion that the 
 Americans were simply awaiting their opportunity to annex the 
 Canadian colonies. British pride could not suffer such a shock as 
 the loss of additional North American colonies. Moreover, British 
 capitalists, merchants, and seamen had pecuniary reasons for re 
 sisting any further surrender of provinces. 
 
 For altogether too long a period the Colonial Office in London 
 and its representatives in the Canadas suffered from the infection of 
 old-world ideas ; a colony was supposed to be a direct and immediate 
 benefit to the mother country. Therefore, in regard to the Canadas. 
 trade and revenue laws were made in England and framed to suit 
 English interests ; a superabundance of highly paid officials sent 
 from England drew their coveted salaries from the Colonial treas 
 ury; 410 a privileged clergy was alloted one-seventh of the crown 
 lands ; too much local autonomy was undesirable lest the colonists 
 should find the means to revolt against foreign dictation and op 
 pression ; contamination from democratic doctrines must be avoided 
 and therefore immigration from democratic states must be care 
 fully supervised ; missionaries, teachers, books, and newspapers 
 emanating from such a source were dangerous. The existence of 
 a great Republic as a near neighbor was in itself a source of danger 
 and the more especially when another old-world idea still held 
 sway, namely that one of the functions of a nation was to pounce 
 upon its unprotected neighbor. Would not the American eagle 
 await its time for a favorable opportunity to swoop down upon its 
 prey in the northlands? The tardiness in surrendering forts, the 
 unwillingness to admit American citizens, the efforts, legitimate and 
 illegitimate to retain the good will of the Indians, disputes over 
 strategic points along the boundary, futile attempts to prevent the 
 dissemination of so-called American principles, the policy in regard 
 to the placing of internal improvements all these things were con 
 sidered matters of self-defense against American aggression. 
 
 We have noticed that immediately after the close of the war in 
 
 410 Hume in H. of O. Mar. 12, 1824, Hansard II Series Vol. 10 p. 855. 
 
 Ibid Mar. 15, 1825, Hansard II Series Vol. 12 p. 1035. 
 
 Bennett in H. of C. Mar. 12, 1824, Hansard II Series Vol. 10 p. 958. 
 
 127 
 
1814 the old colonial restrictive system the navigation laws were 
 enforced more rigidly than formerly. We have also noticed that 
 the British a few years later found it prudent to adopt a more liberal 
 policy ; the old navigation laws were so unsatisfactory that they 
 must perforce give way to something more modern ; nevertheless 
 the authorities across the ocean were slow to introduce any radical 
 improvements. Even up to the coming of Lord Durham the internal 
 administration of the Canadas and the regulation of affairs directly 
 or indirectly pertaining to the United States reflect not so much 
 ignorance of, or indifference to, the needs of the Canadas, as a more 
 or less systematic pursuit of an antiquated and pernicious colonial 
 policy. 
 
 128 
 
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 131 
 
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