The 
 
 Diplomatic History 
 
 of the 
 
 Southern Confederacy 
 
THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES 
 ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 
 
 By the liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph. D., of New 
 York City, the Johns Hopkins University has been 
 enabled to provide for three years a series of lectures 
 on Diplomatic History. These courses are given in 
 the Department of History, Politics and Economics 
 and are published under the direction of Professor 
 Herbert B. Adams. 
 
THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON 
 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 
 
 The Diplomatic History of the 
 Southern Confederacy 
 
 Q 
 
 By JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph. D. 
 
 BALTIMORE 
 
 THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS 
 1901 
 
Copyright, 1901 
 THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS 
 
 $t JSorb (gafttmore 
 
 THE FRIEDENWALD COMPANY 
 
 BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A. 
 

 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I. The Confederate Diplomatic Archives n 
 
 II. Confederate Government, Politics and Finances . 25 
 
 III. The Confederate Foreign Policy 66 
 
 IV. Mission of Yancey, Rost and Mann 108 
 
 V. Mission of Mason and Slidell 130 
 
 VI. Expectations of European Intervention .... 145, 
 
 VII. Controversies 169 
 
 \VIII. The Crisis in England 182 
 
 IX. Napoleon and the Projected Confederate Navy . 202 
 
 X. Confederate Operations from Canada 220 
 
 XI. The Last Effort Kenner s Secret Mission . . . 239 
 
 Appendix 277 
 
 9 1.3.1 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This volume is a study of the efforts of the Confed 
 erate authorities, in the face of waning hope and 
 diminishing resources, to secure foreign recognition 
 and support. It considers also the forces which con 
 trolled the European powers and defeated the attempt 
 to divide the American Union, which, if successful, 
 would have changed the current of political and eco 
 nomic evolution. 
 
 It attempts to give a careful and purely historical 
 presentation of the theories, purposes, policies, diplo 
 matic efforts, and difficulties of the Secessionists, as 
 reflected from their official archives and other original 
 records. It traces the inner working of the diplo 
 matic machine during the many variations of the mili 
 tary and political situation, closely observes the atti 
 tude, motives, and policy of the great nations with 
 whom the Confederate agents sought to negotiate, 
 and throws light upon international questions arising 
 between the United States and foreign powers. 
 
 Though other materials have not been neglected, 
 the work is, in a large measure, based upon the Con 
 federate diplomatic correspondence, which is now in 
 manuscript in the United States Treasury Depart 
 ment. For permission to read this correspondence 
 
8 PREFACE 
 
 and to make extracts, I desire to acknowledge the 
 courtesies of Judge Lewis Jordan, Chief of the Mis 
 cellaneous Division of the Treasury Department. 
 For permission to examine several of the duplicates 
 of Mr. Mason s despatches and originals of his in 
 structions, I am grateful to his daughter, Miss Vir 
 ginia Mason. For the narrative of Mr. Kenner, 
 which has been utilized in the preparation of part of 
 Chapter XII, I am under obligations to Brigadier- 
 General J. L. Brent, of Baltimore, and the late Hon. 
 William Wirt Henry, of Richmond. For sugges 
 tions of value in obtaining material, or for informa 
 tion upon particular points, my thanks are due to 
 Mrs. Jefferson Davis and Burton N. Harrison, Esq., 
 of New York; Comtesse Roman, of Paris; Brigadier- 
 General Marcus J. Wright, Brigadier-General F. C. 
 Ainsworth, Dr. J. L. M. Curry, Hon. John Goode, 
 and Theodore J. Pickett, Esq., of Washington, D. C.; 
 Colonel William Preston Johnston, Ernest B. Krutt- 
 schnitt, and Miss Grace King, of New Orleans; Rev. 
 J. William Jones, of Richmond, and others. For 
 careful and valuable service in the correction of the 
 typewritten manuscript and proof-sheets, acknowl 
 edgment is due to Miss Elizabeth R. Daran, Librarian 
 of the Historical Department of the Johns Hopkins 
 University. 
 
 I am especially under deep obligations to Professor 
 Herbert B. Adams, who has directed and encouraged 
 me in this and other fields of research. . 
 
PREFACE 9 
 
 The materials upon which this volume is based 
 were used in the preparation of a paper on Anglo- 
 Confederate Relations, presented before the Ameri 
 can Historical Association, at the New Haven meet 
 ing, December, 1898. My investigations resulted 
 later in a course of lectures which were given upon 
 the Albert Shaw foundation in the Johns Hopkins 
 University. 
 
 JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C, April, 1901. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 
 
 In a small room on the third floor of the Treasury 
 Department, overlooking the Executive Mansion, are 
 the manuscript archives, sometimes designated as the 
 " Pickett Papers," which relate the story of the un 
 successful diplomatic efforts of the Southern Con 
 federacy to secure admission as an independent mem 
 ber in the family of nations, to obtain the means 
 necessary to the establishment of a navy and the 
 maintenance of an army, and to bring about foreign 
 mediation or intervention. 
 
 During the war many valuable despatches were 
 captured while being carried through the blockade, 
 and were afterwards published by United States 
 papers, but the greater part of the Confederate cor 
 respondence, copies of which were in the offices at 
 Richmond, were safely kept until the close of the war, 
 and the Confederate Government exercised vigilance 
 to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Fed 
 eral authorities. For a time in the spring of 1862, 
 locomotives were kept in readiness to remove the 
 treasure and some of the archives. There were prep 
 arations for flight from Richmond for several weeks 
 before the evacuation in the spring of 1865. Papers of 
 the Government were revised and marked for destruc 
 tion, abandonment or preservation. 1 A month before 
 
 Bollard: Life of Jefferson Davis, with a Secret History 
 of the Confederacy, Chapter XXX. J. B. Jones: Diary. 
 
12 iftk CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 
 
 of the archives were sent to 
 Lynchburg and others were packed in boxes to send 
 away later. Mr. Benjamin destroyed the secret ser 
 vice papers on April 2, the day the Confederates set fire 
 to Richmond. In the evening of that day trains 
 steamed from the city with the Confederate treasure 
 and archives, including those of the " State Depart 
 ment." The load dwindled until, in Georgia, it was 
 carried in the saddle-bags of individuals. Some of 
 Mr. Davis s papers accidentally fell into the hands of 
 a young man at Richmond, who distributed them as 
 autographs to his friends. 2 Part of his correspond 
 ence, including letters from disloyal persons in the 
 North, was carried away and was said to be pre 
 served under seal of personal confidence with Mr. 
 Davis. 8 Many other valuable papers were hidden in 
 the vicinity of Richmond. 4 
 
 The United States captured only the refuse of the 
 archives at the Confederate capital, 5 but soon estab 
 lished a bureau of " Rebel Archives," and added other 
 manuscripts from time to time. On the fall of 
 Charleston the Federal army had found a mass of 
 papers relating to many subjects; some treated of 
 the causes and plans of secession, others related to 
 Southern life before and during the war, while still 
 others were merely the letters and diary of a lady 
 belonging to one of the historic families of South 
 Carolina, whose trembling hand notified an ardent 
 and pleading lover that " men and matters change." 
 
 2 Letter of Mrs. Davis to the author, Jan. 13, 1899. 
 8 The volumes of " office copies " of letters written by Mr. 
 Davis, are preserved, and are now in the control of Mrs. 
 Varina J. Davis. 
 4 Pollard: Life of Jefferson Davis, etc., p. 368. Ibid. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 13 
 
 Correspondence and records bearing upon the war 
 were obtained in many other places. When General 
 Joseph Johnston surrendered in 1865, he notified 
 General Schofield at Raleigh that he had in his pos 
 session at Charlotte, North Carolina, certain records 
 and archives of the Confederacy which he was ready 
 to deliver. A United States officer received them 
 and they were sent to Washington. The United 
 States afterwards claimed all the effects of the Con 
 federacy abroad, including money in the hands of 
 agents and vessels-of-war in foreign ports. Some of 
 the Confederate agents at the close of the war de 
 stroyed their papers for fear they might fall into the 
 hands of the Federal Government. 8 Mr. Mason, how 
 ever, carefully preserved his voluminous correspond 
 ence, and while living in Canada guarded against any 
 possibility of its seizure. 
 
 While the important Confederate archives were 
 being removed from Richmond, the diplomatic cor 
 respondence, consisting of the " State Department " 
 archives, except the secret service vouchers, was taken 
 by a Southern man and hidden in a barn in Virginia. 
 After the excitement had somewhat subsided, the 
 papers were removed to Washington in five separate 
 trunks and, in order to guard against seizure by the 
 Government, were deposited in several places for 
 safe keeping. It appears that the custodian of the 
 papers was in reduced circumstances and that sums 
 of money for his current expenses were advanced by 
 Colonel John T. Pickett, who was employed by him 
 as an agent to dispose of the papers/ 
 
 8 Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1872. 
 
 7 Interview with Theodore J. Pickett. It should be stated, 
 however, although Col. Pickett always claimed to be the 
 
14 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 
 
 Picket! was a well-known Southern man, having 
 been United States Consul at Turk s Island and also 
 at Vera Cruz, Mexico, for a number of years. He 
 had also been commissioned by Louis Kossuth as a 
 general in the Hungarian service. Later he had joined 
 the Lopez expedition to Cuba and was in command 
 against the Spanish regulars at the battle of Cardenas. 8 
 He was secretary of the Confederate Peace Commis 
 sion to Washington in 1861, after which he was sent 
 as a commissioner to Mexico, and later served in the 
 Confederate army as chief-of-staff to Gen. John C. 
 Breckinridge. 
 
 Pickett, stating that he had found the archives 
 stored away in Canada and had bought a certain con 
 trol of them, wrote, January 20, 1868, from Toronto, 
 offering them to Seward, who replied that they would 
 have to be brought to Washington and examined be 
 fore purchase. The proposition was declined. When 
 Grant became President the papers were offered to 
 him in person, and he favored their acquisition, but 
 the consideration of the subject was delayed. Pickett 
 also offered them to Southern men of wealth, to pub 
 lishers, and to historical associations, but was unable 
 to dispose of them. Knowing that the archives ex- 
 hibited the fact that Thompson was in Canada with 
 considerable money when the Confederacy fell, Pickett 
 made a long journey to Thompson s home in the sum 
 mer of 1871, but the latter, feeling that his correspond 
 ence had been destroyed by Mr. Benjamin, showed 
 
 agent of a custodian whom he never named, some of his 
 acquaintances suggested that he, himself, was the custodian. 
 8 Many interesting facts relating to Pickett may be found 
 among his private papers now in possession of his son. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 15 
 
 no disposition to buy the documents. 9 During the 
 same summer various persons went to Pickett to in 
 vestigate the papers, and he, acting as attorney for the 
 custodian, offered to sell them to the United States 
 officials, at the same time representing that they were 
 in Canada. He finally exhibited a copy of the in 
 ventory, found with the property, giving indices of 
 the contents of the trunks. The President, in the 
 meantime having issued his amnesty proclamation, 
 and the unknown, needy custodian urging a conclu 
 sion, Pickett entered into negotiations with Cabinet 
 officers and the " Southern Claims " Commissioners. 
 In April, 1872, the United States agents appointed 
 to make the purchase went with Pickett to Canada 
 to examine the contents of the trunks. Pickett, with 
 out the knowledge of the agents, carried the trunks 
 to Canada on the same train, and after crossing the 
 border they were submitted to a two weeks examina 
 tion. 10 He had hoped to obtain $150,000, but accepted 
 half the sum rather than wait longer. The officers 
 reported in favor of the purchase, and the custodian 
 of the papers agreed to deliver them to the Govern 
 ment. 
 
 An appropriation to enable the Secretary of War 
 to examine the Confederate archives was approved 
 May 8, 1872, but it seems that the diplomatic papers 
 were purchased by special act of Congress which was 
 passed a month later. 11 Pickett, having first made 
 copies of the papers for his own use, transferred them 
 to the Government. On July 3, 1872, four yellow 
 trunks were delivered at the White House, where he 
 
 9 The Daily Patriot (Washington), July 19, 1872. 
 
 10 Interview with T. J. Pickett. 
 
 "See Cong. Globe, Part VI, Appendix, 42-2, p. 711. 
 
l6 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 
 
 was handed $75,000, from which he received stipu 
 lated fees and reimbursement for his expenses. 
 Through Mr. Riggs, a Washington banker, a great 
 part of these fees was distributed to needy widows 
 and orphans of Confederate officers, without inform 
 ing them as to the source of the charity. 
 
 The news that the " Pickett Papers " had been pur 
 chased soon became public. Among them the report 
 of Jacob Thompson concerning plans to burn North 
 ern cities and commit other depredations was found 
 and soon afterwards published in the newspapers. A 
 great many articles appeared regarding the delivery 
 of the papers to the United States Government, very 
 exaggerated accounts of the character of the papers 
 and the price received were published, and great in 
 justice was done to Colonel Pickett, whose connec 
 tion with the transaction was that of an agent or attor 
 ney of the custodian. Some said that no good could 
 result from the exhibit of long-buried documents, 
 unless they should be in defense of persons maligned; 
 others, including Sanford Conover, said that the 
 papers would prove to be forgeries, and that Secretary 
 Boutwell had wasted $75,000 on four trunks of ^worth 
 less archives. Some, speaking of them as campaign 
 documents, said that the impending presidential elec 
 tion seemed -to have whetted the appetite of the ad 
 ministration to purchase records which, when sifted, 
 might be found to reflect on Judge Davis, who had 
 just been nominated for the presidency. Several 
 prominent Southern men blamed Pickett for deliver 
 ing the correspondence. Some suggested that it was 
 forged and some that it was stolen. 12 
 
 12 N. Y. Herald, July 24 and 28, 1872. Daily Patriot, July 
 22 and 27, 1872. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 17 
 
 Colonel Pickett, in a published statement of his 
 agency in the sale of the archives, vindicated his ac 
 tion. To those who feared that prominent men might 
 be injured, he stated that Mr. Benjamin had burned 
 the secret service vouchers, and that under any cir 
 cumstances he would not have delivered such papers 
 to the Government. Of those delivered he said that 
 the Thompson report was the only one that gave him 
 any pain, and without the consideration of incapacity 
 and blunders, that it was the only one " discreditable 
 to the three or four men who ran the Confederate 
 machine." He admitted that Thompson, Davis and 
 Benjamin might feel uncomfortable for awhile, but 
 stated that Thompson, to whom he had given an op 
 portunity to buy the papers, could not now complain. 
 As to the Thompson report, Pickett declared that he 
 did not know of its presence among the papers until 
 his attention was drawn to it while making the exam 
 ination in Canada, and that it was then too late to with 
 draw it. He repudiated the policy of attempting to 
 burn the Northern cities. 
 
 Pickett said that the Confederacy yet owed him 
 $50,000, but that, in preserving the documents, he 
 acted only in the interest of his client and of his 
 tory. " What right had I," inquired he, " to destroy 
 the material by which history is written? The per 
 son who spirited the papers away and held them in 
 his possession was getting impatient and swore that 
 he would dispose of them himself. When the papers 
 were sold he received the greater part of the money 
 and took the first train." As to the charge that the 
 documents were stolen, Pickett said that they were 
 rather restored to their rightful owner the heir-at- 
 2 
 
l8 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 
 
 law and residuary legatee of the defunct Confederacy. 
 The Baltimore Sun asked why Pickett had not deliv 
 ered them sooner, if they were the rightful property 
 of the United States! 
 
 Pickett declared that the archives had no present 
 political significance, and insisted that they should be 
 respected as part of American history. He did not 
 see any wrong in placing them in the hands of the 
 Government so that generations to come might know 
 the truth. He did not think that the Confederate 
 Government should be ashamed of its records, and 
 if by chance their publications should injure some 
 individuals it was simply the fate of war. 
 
 Aside from the letters from Confederate agents in 
 Canada, the archives did not contain the material 
 which was expected to make Thompson, Davis, Ben 
 jamin and others uncomfortable, and as a campaign 
 weapon the collection was not such a boomerang as 
 had been expected. 18 After the publication of Thomp 
 son s report, parties in the South and elsewhere offered 
 to sell other Confederate manuscripts. 14 iTckett ^riad a 
 list of books used by the Confederacy and held by 
 parties in Texas which he proposed to furnish for a 
 remuneration. 18 They contained correspondence or 
 lists relating to subscriptions to the cotton loan, 
 transfers of steamers from English firms to the Confed 
 eracy, confiscation of property by the Confederate 
 Government and the exchange of cotton to English 
 
 13 Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1872. Also, the Memphis Appeal. 
 
 14 Baltimore Sun, July 15, 1873. 
 
 15 Pickett also had in his possession the official seal of the 
 Confederacy, but he did not sell it. Electrotype " medals " 
 of it were for awhile on sale by a Washington jeweler. Very 
 few persons know who now has the original seal. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 19 
 
 subjects for rifles. Still other papers were offered by 
 other persons, but the Government had decided to 
 make no further purchases. Later, however, some of 
 those who had first been disposed to censure Pickett s 
 conduct sold important military papers to the Govern 
 ment, thus practically sanctioning his action. 
 
 In June, 1874, Congress passed an act to enable 
 the Secretary of War to begin the publication of 
 Union and Confederate official records. On July I, 
 General Marcus J. Wright was appointed agent of the 
 War Department for collecting Confederate military 
 records. He has obtained the originals or copies of 
 many valuable military and executive papers. Per 
 sons having correspondence have generally shown 
 a disposition to have it published, though the Gov 
 ernment no longer makes purchases. 15 The Naval 
 War Records Office has also gathered much material 
 for publication. 
 
 Time has proven that Boutwell did not pay for waste 
 paper. The names in the indexes of the Pickett 
 papers, together with the indexes of the correspond 
 ence of the Confederate Treasury and other depart 
 ments, have proven of great convenience and value to 
 the Government in defeating the payment of fraudu- 
 lent claims to the amount of many millions of dollars. 
 Hence the transaction has proven a most profitable 
 one from a financial point of view. The indexes are 
 not made according to subjects, but are arranged ac 
 cording to the names of persons, giving their post- 
 office addresses and the subjects of their correspond 
 ence opposite. Thus the records of persons making 
 
 18 Marcus J. Wright in Phila. Weekly Times, April 10, 1880. 
 
2O THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 
 
 claims on the Government can be ascertained in i. 
 short time by referring to the correspondence itself. Ii 
 the index the subjects of letters are given by such 
 short titles as are indicated in the following taker 
 from the index of the " Miscellaneous " papers 
 " Suggestions/ " salt-petre," " loud complaints," " ab 
 straction of State-papers," " vents his spleen on hie 
 captors," " bustling with joy for the Confederacy." 
 
 Outside of the great value which the Pickett ar 
 chives have had in facilitating the investigation o! 
 claims, they have still greater importance as historical 
 
 & material. Embracing the larger part of the diplomatic 
 correspondence of the Confederate Government, the} 
 have a far greater value than any of the collections 
 of military papers or records. Pickett said that the; 
 archives consisted of all the " State Department " cor 
 respondence without the abstraction of a single paper ; 
 but it must be remembered that Mr. Benjamin de-- 
 
 ostroyed papers relating to secret missions 17 and that a 
 few despatches from abroad failed to reach Richmond, 
 although second and third duplicates were started 
 across the Atlantic. Of Slidell s despatches, numbered 
 from i to 76 inclusive (January, 1862, to December 
 13, 1864), only " No. 21 " is missing, but several of 
 Mason s failed to reach Richmond. No letters written 
 by Mason and Slidell to Mr. Benjamin, or by Mr. 
 
 17 Mr. Benjamin seems always to have had a desire not to 
 leave behind him any historical material. He also seemed to 
 have an abhorrence of any ransacking of his private papers 
 and correspondence, and a very short time before his death 
 he destroyed all such manuscripts. Some of his correspond 
 ence of the period before 1861 may be found passim in the 
 archives of the State Department at Washington, but no 
 collection of his private letters is to be found anywhere. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 21 
 
 Benjamin to them, after December, 1864, are to be 
 found in the papers purchased from Pickett. It is 
 quite probable that the strict blockade after January, 
 1865, prevented Benjamin from receiving European 
 correspondence; and his own letters after December 
 30, 1864, were probably laid aside to be copied in the 
 record books later, and were not packed with the other 
 archives at the time when preparations were made to 
 evacuate Richmond. 
 
 The scope of the material included in the Pickett 
 collection may be indicated by the following list: 
 
 1. Instructions and despatches of the commission to 
 Washington, 1861. 
 
 2. Papers relating to the ratification of the ordi 
 nances of secession. 
 
 3. Correspondence relating to Fort Sumter. 
 
 4. Diplomatic despatches of Yancey, Rost, Mann, 
 Mason, Slidell, Lamar, Lynch, Pickett, Preston, 
 Cripps and Ricken, the Confederate representatives 
 in England, Spain, Belgium, France, Russia, Rome 
 and Mexico." 
 
 5. Record books containing the letters of Secre 
 taries Toombs, Hunter and Benjamin to diplomatic, 
 consular and special or confidential agents abroad. 
 
 6. Consular correspondence, including that of 
 Hotze, De Leon, McRae, Quintero, Fitzpatrick, 
 La Sere, Avegeno, Bannon, Capston, Dowling, Labor, 
 Walker, Lee, Helm, Heyleger, Thompson, Clay and 
 Holcombe, representing the Confederacy in London, 
 Paris, Mexico, Ireland, the West Indies and Canada. 
 
 18 The larger part of the diplomatic and consular corre 
 spondence is in " Trunk B." 
 
22 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 
 
 7. Record copies and originals of domestic letters 
 from the State Department, and the originals of mis 
 cellaneous letters to the department. 
 
 8. Applications for appointments to positions, for 
 letters of marque and for passports, and subscription 
 lists for persons to whom passports were issued. 
 
 9. Index to testimony concerning property taken or 
 destroyed, etc. 
 
 10. Newspapers and clippings. 
 
 11. Proclamations, messages, pardons, commis 
 sions, appropriations, constitutions, and acts of Con 
 gress. 
 
 12. Indexes, " Cash Book," ledgers, etc. 
 
 Some of the Confederate agents abroad kept copies 
 of their private correspondence. In some cases this 
 is valuable in supplementing the Richmond archives 
 which have been preserved to us through the thought- 
 fulness of Colonel Pickett. J. M. Mason s complete 
 public and private correspondence, including that 
 with Messrs. Benjamin, Slidell, Mann, and other 
 Confederate officials, is in possession of his daughter, 
 Miss Virginia Mason of Charlottesville, who, after pub 
 lishing a portion of it, contemplates leaving it with 
 the Virginia Historical Society. Among these papers 
 are several official letters not found in the Richmond 
 archives. John Slidell unfortunately destroyed the 
 bulk of his private correspondence during his resi 
 dence in Paris." 
 
 Colonel Ambrose Dudley Mann wrote from mem 
 ory an account of his diplomatic career, leaving the 
 task of editing it to Miss Winnie Davis, but owing to 
 
 " Letter of Comtesse Roman to the author. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 23 
 
 his death the manuscript was never placed in the 
 hands of Miss Davis and has never been published. 20 
 
 The prominent men, who could have spoken from 
 personal experience and intimate acquaintance re 
 garding the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Con 
 federacy, have passed from the stage of action, and 
 have left no record of personal narratives which 
 might have been drawn from their mines of remin 
 iscences. John H. Reagan, of Austin, Texas, the 
 only surviving member of the Confederate Cabinet, 
 has been so busily engaged with public and private 
 cares since the war that he has had " substantially no 
 opportunity to review and perpetuate the memory of 
 past events." He is now over eighty years of age 
 and can no longer trust his memory on important 
 points unless fortified by the records. He probably 
 had no occasion to know much regarding the depart 
 ment of Mr. Benjamin, who knew how to keep his 
 own secrets. 
 
 Mr. L. Q. C. Washington, who was assistant sec 
 retary under Benjamin, and now resides in Wash 
 ington, D. C., is probably the only living man who 
 had opportunity to know the inside motives and plans 
 of Confederate diplomacy. In some cases, he finds 
 himself unable to recall details unless he can refresh 
 his memory by reference to documents. Although 
 he always knew more than anyone else, except Ben 
 jamin, regarding the routine work of the office, on 
 some points he has only a vague recollection. Perhaps 
 there were some diplomatic missions, the details of 
 which were not confided to him. 
 
 20 Letter of Mrs. Davis to the author. 
 
24 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 
 
 Walker Fearn, who was connected with the mis 
 sions of Lamar and of Preston as secretary, and was 
 for some time in close relation with Mason and Slidell 
 in Europe, lived until 1899, but was not inclined to 
 write. 
 
 In a letter of Colonel Pickett, under date of July 
 26, 1872, he alludes to a " forthcoming work " on the 
 " diplomacy of the rebellion," but does not name the 
 person who contemplated the preparation of such a 
 work. J. D. Bullock, an agent of the Confederate 
 navy, in his " Secret Service of the Confederate States 
 in Europe," has given a graphic account of the plans 
 of the Confederacy to secure a navy and of the diffi 
 culties which had to be met. John Bigelow, the 
 United States Consul at Paris and also United States 
 minister at the same place during the Civil War, has 
 treated the same subject in his volume on " France 
 and the Confederate Navy," a work based upon his 
 own observation and upon Mr. Slidell s correspond 
 ence. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND FINANCE 
 
 The Confederacy had a de facto Government, 
 though it was not formally recognized by any power. 
 For over three years it made its home in Richmond, 
 and the vast armies of the United States unsuccess 
 fully beat against its strongholds. It adopted a flag 
 and a seal of its own. 1 More important than flag or 
 seal, (t had an army whose achievements won the ad- 
 miration of the world; )jut it had no navy with whichV 
 to open the blockade and give the Government that 
 probability of permanence which was necessary to k** 
 secure European recognition. 2 
 
 1 Davis loved the old flag, and many favored keeping it; 
 but the Confederate Congress, in February, 1865, in the face 
 of Federal triumph, decided upon a temporary design, and 
 was debating the adoption of a flag for future generations. 
 The seal was not received at Richmond until near the close 
 of the war. In April, 1863, Congress passed a resolution for 
 the seal and the next month Benjamin authorized Mason to 
 have it executed in England. In July, 1864, after many de 
 lays, Mason sent it by Lieutenant Chapman and shipped two 
 boxes containing the iron press necessary for making the 
 impression. [Despatches of Mason, No. 10, July 6, 1864.] 
 The seal reached Richmond in September, but the boxes 
 were lost. [An article on the seal, by J. T. Pickett, appears 
 in the Am. Hist. Record, Vol. Ill, p. 360.] * 
 
 * In some respects the South had the advantage at the 
 beginning of the war. The United States executive had 
 been left unprepared for war, two-thirds of the serviceable 
 steam vessels were in foreign ports, and many high officials 
 were Southern sympathizers. The Secessionists, from their 
 oosition, required a less number of troops than the Union- 
 
26 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 The organization of a central authority for the 
 seceding states began at Montgomery, Alabama, on 
 February 4, 1861. The conservative leaders, like 
 Stephens, were opposed to secession as " a remedy 
 against anticipated aggressions," and many still hoped 
 for something to occur to prevent permanent dissolu 
 tion of the Union and at the same time secure terms 
 favorable to the institution of slavery. Stephens had 
 urged that Democratic failure at the polls furnished 
 the South no reason for breaking the Constitution, but 
 he had not been heeded by those of a more impulsive 
 temperament. Cobb, of Georgia, had advised the 
 state legislature to declare for secession without wait 
 ing " to hear from the cross-roads and the groceries." 
 Toombs, of Georgia, had demanded that he be given 
 the sword. In December a South Carolina conven 
 tion had declared for secession, and asked the other 
 slaveholding states to cooperate and to send dele 
 gates to form a provisional congress. Other state 
 conventions had soon responded to the invitation. 
 
 The Montgomery council of delegates, who had 
 been hastily selected at a time when it was expected 
 that a war resulting from secession could only last a 
 few months, became a provisional congress for one 
 year. Cobb, as the temporary president of the 
 council until the organization of the provisional gov 
 ernment, appointed the committees by which the 
 
 preservation party. The North, however, had the advantage 
 of resources and factories and more business men. These 
 count in war, and made the North firmer than the South had 
 expected. A navy large enough to blockade the Southern 
 ports was soon created. The North had a population of 
 23,000,000, while the South only had 9,000,000, of which 
 3,500,000 were slaves. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 2J 
 
 organization was effected. The constitution for the 
 provisional government was reported by a commit 
 tee including two members from each state, and on 
 February 8 it was accepted by the assembled dele 
 gates. It was practically the same as the Constitu 
 tion of the United States. Two new features were 
 introduced, however, by Mr. Stephens. 8 Congress v 
 was to have no power to appropriate money unless ? 
 requested by the executive or the heads of the depart 
 ments. The clause excluding Cabinet members from 
 Congress was omitted. (Stephens thought it would 
 even be well to choose the Cabinet members from . 
 Congress.) The provisional government was to last 
 one year. Davis and Stephens were elected President 
 and Vice-President respectively, the vote being taken 
 by states. Stephens concurred in Toombs s superior, 
 qualification for the presidency, but political ma 
 neuvering placed it on Davis, who, it seems, did not 
 want it. On February 16, Davis arrived, and at once 
 appointed a Confederate commission to Washington 
 in accordance with a resolution of Congress. He se 
 lected Forsyth of Alabama, Crawford of Georgia, and 
 Roman of Louisiana. He desired peace with the 
 United States. Slavery demanded it, and the South 
 was not ready for war. Stephens was greatly bored 
 by the debates of the new Congress; but it was from 
 the people that he expected trouble, for he saw that 
 it would be necessary for them to exercise great pa 
 tience with the inconveniences of derangements of 
 mails and commerce and the increase of taxes. 
 The permanent constitution was completed March 9. 
 
 Johnston and Browne: Life of Stephens. 
 
28 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 Rhett was chairman of the committee that framed 
 it. He, Toombs and Stephens, proposed most 
 of the variations from the Federal Constitution, 
 which was followed as interpreted by Southerners. 
 The central Government was limited and its hands 
 tied. The constitution began: "We, the People of 
 the Confederate States, each State acting in its sov 
 ereign and independent character, in order to form a 
 Permanent Federal Government," etc. The " general 
 welfare " clause was omitted. Several new provisions 
 and restrictions were added. Congress was author 
 ized to allow heads of departments to appear in the 
 legislative chambers to explain their recommenda 
 tions. 4 Appropriations were proposed by the heads 
 of the departments, except in case of a two-thirds 
 vote of both Houses to the contrary. The President, 
 who was given power to convene and adjourn either 
 House at his will, could approve or disapprove an 
 appropriation bill by sections. Bills appropriating 
 money were to relate to but one subject, and that was 
 to be expressed in the title (against the "rider"). The 
 post-office was to be self-sustaining after 1863. Rev 
 enue was to be obtained by import duties to pay the 
 debts, to provide for the common defense, and for the 
 expenses of the Government, but no bounties nor pro- 
 
 4 The committee favored the clause in the Federal constitu 
 tion which prevented the Cabinet from being chosen from 
 Congress, but this view did not carry. The permission to in 
 troduce heads of executive departments into Congress was 
 practiced under the provisional government, but after Feb 
 ruary, 1862, no steps were taken towards putting it into 
 practice, and Congress uttered stinging criticisms against 
 Davis and his cabinet officers, though it yielded to executive 
 need, and its members thereby became men of little influence 
 and initiative. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 29 
 
 tective duties were to be placed on imports. The Sec 
 retary of the Treasury was required to publish an 
 itemized statement of the receipts and the disburse 
 ments of his office. There were to be no general in 
 ternal improvements to facilitate commerce. Each 
 state was allowed to tax marine commerce in its har 
 bors. In case a harbor was improved by Congress 
 it was necessary to reimburse the Confederate treas 
 ury by taxes on the commerce of that harbor. States 
 could unite to improve a river dividing or flowing 
 through them. States were to be admitted by a two- 
 thirds vote of each House, the vote of the Senate 
 being by states. (Stephens had desired the new con 
 stitution to be framed so as to admit non-slave- 
 holding states in case they should apply.) Congress 
 could pass no bankruptcy act to discharge debts con 
 tracted before such act. Congress could not inter 
 fere with the place or the time of electing senators. 
 The African slave trade was forever prohibited,^ 
 although the Confederate Government had no au-""^ 
 thority to make treaties upon the subject. Congress 
 could prohibit the introduction of slaves from states 
 not members of the Confederacy. It could take no 
 part in amending the constitution. 
 
 The President and Vice-President were to serve for 
 six years and the President was not re-eligible. Pro 
 vision was made against the dogma " to the victors 
 belong the spoils." If the President removed officials 
 of a lower grade than the Cabinet it was necessary 
 for him to report the cause to Congress, and he could 
 make no appointment if rejected by the Senate. 5 
 
 8 In the early part of 1865 a conference of the Virginia mem 
 bers of the Confederate Congress advised Davis to reorganize 
 
30 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 No supreme court was provided, though it was 
 expected to establish one later. Citizens of one state 
 could not bring suit against citizens of another state 
 in trie Federal courts. For constitutional offenses 
 the legislature of a state could not impeach a Federal 
 judge whose duties were confined to that state. The 
 Department of Justice was to be administered under 
 the attorney-general. The states were denied their 
 former privilege of granting franchises to persons not 
 citizens under the general law of naturalization. Pro 
 vision was made to change the constitution. Three 
 states could demand a convention of states to alter 
 or amend it, but Congress could not suggest altera 
 tions. The constitution was ratified by state con 
 ventions. 8 
 
 Davis promptly selected a Cabinet Toombs of 
 Georgia, was appointed Secretary of State; Mem- 
 minger of South Carolina, Secretary of the Treasury; 
 Mallory of Florida, Secretary of the Navy; Reagan 
 
 the cabinet by relieving all the existing members. Davis re 
 fused, but on January 18, Mr. Seddon of Virginia, the Secre 
 tary of War, handed in his letter of resignation. On February 
 I, the President finally acquiesced in Seddon s resignation, 
 but he did not admit the power of Congress to control such 
 a matter (as in England). He stated that the Confederate 
 Cabinet members were not members of Congress, did not 
 originate legislation, and were not admitted to the right of 
 debate. Two weeks later the Virginia delegates stated that 
 their advice to Davis had been confidential and had only been 
 given to prevent a collision; that there were many others in 
 Congress who favored a change in the Cabinet, but that they 
 did not assume the power of Congress to compel a resigna 
 tion of the Cabinet, and had spoken only for public sentiment 
 and safety. [Richmond Dispatch, Feb. 15, 1865.! 
 
 9 On the Confederate Constitution, see articles in the Galaxy 
 for March, 1874, and Frazer s Mag. for Oct., 1862. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 3! 
 
 of Texas, Postmaster-General, while J. P. Benjamin T 
 of Louisiana " full of accomplishments and sophistry, 
 placid and smiling, his brow ever unclouded " was, 
 strangely, not dispatched to European Courts, but 
 made Attorney-General of a government " never des 
 tined to have a judiciary." Toombs was chosen Sec 
 retary of State only after Barnwell of South Carolina, 
 had refused to accept the place. Chafing under red 
 tape and complaining that too many were seeking 
 bomb-proof positions under a timid administration, 
 he soon resigned and was succeeded by R. M. T. 
 Hunter of Virginia. 8 William Lowndes Yancey was 
 offered the chief place in the European Commission, 
 
 7 Judah P. Benjamin was born in 1811 on the British island 
 of St. Croix in the West Indies. His parents had recently 
 sailed from England with the purpose of settling at New 
 Orleans, but at the close of the war of 1812 they located at 
 Wilmington, N. C. Benjamin located at New Orleans in 
 1832 to practice law, and in 1852 and again in 1857 he was 
 chosen to represent Louisiana in the United States Senate, 
 where his resolute face, piercing eyes and clear voice helped 
 him in gaining a reputation as an eloquent speaker. He 
 had great influence with the Buchanan administration much 
 to the discomfort of John Forsyth who was minister to 
 Mexico in 1856-58. During the civil war some spoke of him 
 as " the brains of the Confederacy." 
 
 An English journalist said he was the most cordial Con 
 federate he ever met, though " too fond of the card table 
 where cooler heads squeezed his sponge dry." 
 
 He was at his office early and late and first suggested many 
 of the measures of the Davis administration, some of which 
 evoked severe criticism from the people and Congress. He 
 had for years been on intimate terms with Slidell, who took 
 steps to secure a Confederate navy in France. 
 . On the fall of Richmond, in 1865, he escaped to England 
 after several romantic adventures, and soon began practice 
 at the English bar, where he won distinction. In 1883 he 
 retired from practice, and died in 1884. 
 
 Stovall: Robert Toombs, Chap. XXI. 
 
32 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 and although he did not receive the instructions which 
 he considered necessary to his success, he decided to 
 accept. 8 
 
 --The provisional congress soon passed laws relat 
 ing to the tariff, navigation, the slave trade, the estab 
 lishment of ports, and the issue of money. An act 
 for raising money authorized Mr. Davis to borrow 
 $15,000,000, payable in ten years at 8 per cent, and to 
 S :; impose an export duty on cotton as a means of creat 
 ing a fund for paying the principal and interest of the 
 loan. At a session held by the call of Mr. Davis at 
 Montgomery on April 29, 1861, Congress recognized 
 the existence of war, authorized letters of marque, and 
 passed a bill for the issue of $50,000,000 in bonds, or, 
 in lieu of these bonds, $20,000,000 of treasury notes 
 of small denomination, without interest. 
 
 In June the Government was removed to Richmond 
 for political and military reasons. Davis, expecting 
 to direct the armies, desired to be in Virginia near 
 the seat of war, and Congress decided to follow the 
 executive departing - 10 The battle of Bull Run in 
 July gave the Conft .acy bright views of the future, 
 and Stephens expected a " reign of terror to develop 
 in the North." But there soon arose a strong oppo 
 sition party in the South. Many opposed Davis s 
 - v policy of endeavoring to produce a cotton famine in 
 order to force Europe to recognize his Government." 
 Congress gradually became alienated. As the time 
 approached for the inauguration of the " permanent 
 
 * Du Bose: Life and Times of Yancey. 
 
 10 Confed. " Dip. Cor.". Vol. I. Instr. to Yancey, Rost 
 and Mann, No. 6, May 24, 1861. 
 
 11 Mrs. Davis: Jefferson Davis. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 33 
 
 government," Hunter and Beauregard were men 
 tioned for the presidency, but Davis continued to hold 
 the reins. 
 
 In November, 1861, the people at the polls chose 
 presidential electors, and elected members to serve 
 in the new Congress. In the case of states overrun 
 by the enemy, as Missouri and Arkansas, congress 
 men were elected by a handful of votes in the camps 
 of the army of Virginia. The electors confirmed the 
 provisional choice of Davis and Stephens; and with 
 little ceremony Davis passed from a provisional chief 
 to a president chosen for six years. The permanent 
 government had its birth in a storm on February 
 22. The skies poured incessantly and Capitol Square 
 was black with umbrellas, but there was an im 
 pression that the Confederacy would yet thrive in 
 sunshine. Davis retained his former Cabinet, with 
 the exception of Hunter, who was succeeded by Ben 
 jamin as Secretary of State. He admitted that errors 
 had been made in the war policy, but he had abundant 
 faith in the administration for the,.J[uture. 
 
 After February, 1862, Coir;. ..,..., was composed of 
 two Houses, the representatives being now chosen 
 by the people instead of by conventions, as in 1861." 
 
 12 The last session of the provisional Confederate Congress 
 began in Richmond on Nov. 18, 1861, and ended Feb. 17, 1862. 
 The first session of the first regular Confederate Congress 
 met on Feb. 18. Hunter, of Virginia, was chosen president 
 of the Senate, and Bocock, of Virginia, speaker of the House. 
 The more prominent members were Wm. L. Yancey of Ala., 
 B. H. Hill of Ga., R. M. T. Hunter and Wm. B. Preston of 
 Va., A. H. Garland of Ark., Julian Hartridge of Ga., H. C. 
 Chambers of Miss., W. H. Smith of N. C., Wm. Porcher 
 Miles of S. C, H. S. Foote of Tenn., and C. W. Russell, 
 J. P. Holcombe and John P. Baldwin of Va. Though Foote 
 3 
 
34 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 The members were prevented, by law, from holding 
 military commissions in the army, as many had done 
 in the provisional Congress. Some, like Pollard, said 
 that this was unfortunate and that it resulted in mak 
 ing Congress an inane and incompetent assembly, the 
 best men having a passion for military service. Pol 
 lard declared that the Congress came at last to be a 
 reflection of Mr. Davis, and was composed of un 
 known men or broken-down politicians, " who aban 
 doned the whole government to Davis and a few weak 
 creatures around him," though a few distinguished 
 politicians returned from the battle-field before the 
 close of the war. Stephens, on February 26, 1862, 
 
 urged aggressive measures, a defensive policy of conducting 
 the war was sustained. The Senate recommended the de 
 struction of all cotton and tobacco that could not safely be 
 removed beyond the reach of Federal forces; and the House 
 advised the planters to devote their attention to the produc 
 tion of provisions instead of cotton and tobacco. Authority 
 was given to impress negroes to work on fortifications. At 
 the second session, which began Aug. 18, 1862, Congress 
 extended the conscript law to persons under 45 years of 
 age, and passed a bill to reduce the interest on the funded 
 debt and to authorize the issue of 6 per cent convertible 
 bonds. At the third session, which began Jan. 12, 1863, it 
 passed an act authorizing the impressment of produce neces 
 sary for the use of the army, and discussed a bill for the 
 organization of a Supreme Court, which passed the House 
 (March 18) but died in the judiciary committee of the House, 
 where there was much difference of opinion as to how much 
 power should be conferred upon the court. At the session 
 which began Dec. 7, 1863, a conscript act was passed making 
 persons between the age^ of 18 and 55 subject to military 
 duty. The gravity of the situation induced many to favor 
 resolutions for peace. At the last session, which met Nov. 
 7, 1864, Congress talked more than it worked, but finally 
 adopted the most important of Mr. Davis s recommendations 
 and adjourned sine die. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 35 
 
 wrote that Congress was not such as he could wish 
 it either in the Senate or in the House. In April, he 
 said: " This is a very poor Congress. There are 
 few men of ability in the House only two or three 
 in the Senate." Again, in September, when fretting 
 over military orders and the suspension of the writ 
 of habeas corpus, he said: " We have not the men in 
 Congress to act they have not the knowledge of prin 
 ciples. They are children in politics and statesman 
 ship." ] There were, however, several remarkable 
 men in the Senate,/Yancey of Alabama, and Wigfall 
 of Texas, were the fiercely eloquent orators. Orr 
 of South Carolina, and Hill of Georgia, were also 
 prominent. Barksdale, a friend of Davis, was the 
 leader in the House. 14 
 
 The dispersion of the " fugacious Congress " in 
 
 Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens. 
 14 Hon. John Goode, in response to a query, has named 
 the following persons as the ablest and most active members 
 of the Confederate Congress from 1862 to 1865: 
 
 1. Supporters of the policy of the administration In the 
 House: R. M. T. Hunter of Va., Clement C. Clay of Ala., 
 Benj. H. Hill of Ga., Gustavus Henry of Tenn. In the 
 Senate: J. L. M. Curry of Ala., Garland of Ark., Hartridge 
 of Ga., Conrad of La., Barksdale of Miss., Miles of S. C. 
 
 2. Those holding views in opposition to the policy of the 
 administration In the House: Baldwin of Va., Smith of 
 N. C., Foote of Tenn. In the Senate: Louis T. Wigfall of 
 Texas. 
 
 Hon. J. L. M. Curry names as the most prominent mem 
 bers of the second Congress: Jemison, Walker, Hill, John 
 son, Semmes, Graham, Orr, Barnwell, Wigfall and Hunter. 
 
 Probably not more than ten or twelve members of that 
 Congress lived to see the last year of the nineteenth century. 
 Goode, Curry, Pugh, Breckinridge, Barksdale, Miles, Atkins, 
 Wright, Pryor, Lester, Bell, Bruce and one or two others 
 have been mentioned to the author as late survivors. 
 
36 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 April, 1862, when whispered alarms said that McClel- 
 lan would take Richmond, was a source of much 
 amusement. Members were represented as running 
 to their homes even amidst the contempt of women. 
 Shop-windows were filled with amusing caricatures 
 representing congressmen, with carpetbags, pursued 
 by insects magnified to represent gunboats. News 
 papers stated that some of the stampeders left in canal- 
 boats drawn by three sweet-tempered mules (for fear 
 of accidents on railroads), and that a regiment of 
 women were detailed to march in front of the mules 
 " to clear the tow-path of piratical snakes and bull- 
 frogs." 
 
 Congress had no commodious quarters in which to 
 hold its sessions. The Senate met in a plain, dingy, 
 third-floor chamber. There were no accommoda 
 tions for ladies. The House had better chambers, 
 but the chairs were uncushioned and the benches 
 slashed by knives. There was no legislative decorum. 
 Members were described as sitting with their heels 
 in the air. All important business was conducted in 
 secret session. A synopsis of the ordinary debates 
 appeared only in the newspapers and there was no 
 stenographic report. 17 / In August, 1862, Yancey de 
 sired to check the undemocratic practice of secret ses 
 sions so that the people could see how senators voted 
 on the war plans of the Government. A short time 
 
 15 Richmond Examiner, April 21, 1862. Also, the Rich 
 mond Whig. 
 
 18 E. A. Pollard in the Galaxy, Dec., 1868. For the temper 
 of the women in the war see G. C. Eggleston s " Recollec 
 tions " (N. Y., 1875), Chap. III. 
 
 17 Du Bose: Yancey; The Weekly Register (Lynchburg), 
 Vol. I, Feb. 27, 1864. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 37 
 
 later a committee of the Senate decided that a re 
 porter of the Richmond Enquirer had violated the 
 privileges granted him by the Senate and advised that 
 he be excluded from the bar hereafter. Yancey op 
 posed such action as an infringement of the liberty 
 of the press. Several months before this a report of 
 the judiciary committee of the provisional Govern 
 ment had recommended a law to restrict or restrain 
 the press and speech under certain circumstances, 
 and Wigfall, solemnly rising, simply read the sedition 
 law. On April 13, 1863, Johnson of Arkansas, moved 
 in the Senate that a committee of three be appointed 
 by the chair with leave to sit during vacation, and to 
 investigate and report to the Senate at the next ses 
 sion upon the expediency of providing for regular 
 and perfect reports of the debates of the Senate, and 
 of embracing secret as well as open sessions, and to 
 report the terms for which reporters could be ob 
 tained, and other costs incident to publication. The 
 Senate agreed to the resolution, but the debates were 
 never reported, and were more and more concealed 
 from the public eye. 18 Toward the end of the war, 
 when the people were growing more restless, nearly 
 everything was done in secret session. 19 
 
 There were many animated debates and exciting 
 scenes at Richmond which did not find their way into 
 the newspapers, but which leaked out in whispered 
 conversations. In January, 1863, when the Senate 
 was considering the organization of the judiciary, 
 Yancey and others opposed the conferring of appel- 
 
 18 Richmond Whig, April 14, 1863. 
 
 19 N. Y. Times, March 12, 1865. 
 
38 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 late jurisdiction on the Confederate supreme cour: 
 over the state supreme courts, as had been proposed 
 by the judicial committee of the provisional Congress 
 of which Mr. Hill had been chairman. On February 
 4, Hill, while speaking on the same bill, made SOUK; 
 bitter references concerning Yancey, who replied thar 
 the statements were false. Shortly afterwards, during 
 a lull in business, Senator Hill, after some remark 
 by Yancey, whizzed a tumbler past his head and 
 broke an inkstand over his cheek bone. 20 Yancey, in 
 a long speech of March 14, was severe on Hill for 
 making violent " assaults from the rear." In a nigh: 
 secret session of the summer of 1863, a row occurred 
 in the House between Foote of Tennessee, and Judge 
 Dargan of Alabama, throwing the whole House into 
 a panic. Dargan drew a bowie-knife and advanced 
 toward Foote, to resent some language which Foote 
 had muttered while Dargan was speaking. Several 
 members pinned Dargan to the floor, and Foote 
 changed passion to laughter by striking a melodra 
 matic attitude and saying: " I defy the steel of the 
 assassin." The following December a lady entered 
 the House of Representatives and cowhided Mr. V. 
 of Missouri. 21 The Richmond correspondent of the 
 London Times, in a letter of March 4, 1865, when the 
 struggle seemed nearing the end, said that the con 
 duct and language of legislative assemblies during the 
 war had brought republican institutions into deri 
 sion and disrepute. 22 
 
 Toward the end of the war, Congress became very 
 
 20 DuBose: Yancey, p. 739. 
 
 21 E. A. Pollard in the Galaxy. Dec., 1868. 
 
 22 London Times, March 31, 1865. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 39 
 
 lively in its opposition to Davis, the disposition to 
 oppose him being spurred on by such papers as the 
 Richmond Examiner and the Charleston Mercury. 
 Wigfall returned from the army to speak against him 
 with vehement passion, and the Richmond editors 
 feared to report his bitter, vindictive speeches. There 
 was, in fact, during the last year of the war, serious 
 thought in the South of inaugurating a counter-revo 
 lution against Davis s administration. 
 
 The Confederacy had all the paraphernalia of a con 
 stitutional government, but in reality the executive 
 department wielded powers far beyond those given by 
 the constitution. 23 Laws prepared in the executive 
 offices were sent to a small room where the provisional 
 Congress sat to register them. Later in the war, 
 even Senator Miles of South Carolina, when he pre 
 pared a bill, sent it to the executive department for 
 approval. In the stupendous struggle, inevitable 
 exigencies made the executive will the force of law, 
 and Congress bent to the necessity of subordinating 
 law to the emergencies of war. 
 
 An act of the Confederate Congress in secret ses 
 sion, March I, 1862, proclaimed martial law in Rich 
 mond and vicinity and declared the suspension of the 
 writ of habeas corpus. A passport system placed re 
 strictions upon the free movement of individuals. 
 " Notorious Unionists " and those suspected of Fed 
 eral sympathy were arbitrarily arrested. A military 
 police was established under General Winder of Bal 
 timore, and rowdyism, which had recently shown it- 
 
 23 Du Bose: Yancey; The Richmond Examiner Q. M. 
 Daniels), Feb. 24, 1862. 
 
4O CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 self, disappeared, but the despotic espionage of the 
 Baltimore detective system became a source of much 
 complaint, 24 though it kept watch on the people of 
 Richmond until May, 1864, issuing its " reign of ter 
 ror passports." In April and September, 1862, Con 
 gress passed conscription acts which gave much dis 
 satisfaction." Stephens declared that conscripts would 
 go into battle like a horse starting from home, while 
 volunteers would go like horses returning home. It 
 is said that Davis at first opposed the conscription 
 policy, preferring the voluntary system, but that he 
 yielded to the newspapers and necessity. The Sep 
 tember law caused a quarrel in Georgia between the 
 Secessionists and the Unionists. An exemption law 
 was passed about the same time for the benefit of the 
 overseers of slaves. 20 
 
 Stephens feared that the Confederacy tended toward 
 errors which would lead to its overthrow. In 1862 
 he was disappointed at the President s message and 
 dissatisfied with his appointments. The policy of the 
 Government was against his judgment, and he stated 
 that there was " no energy except such as a turtle 
 with fire on its back." Military orders and the sus 
 pension of the writ of habeas corpus were to him the 
 source of the greatest concern. Though he succeeded 
 in inducing the President to request some of the gen 
 erals to revoke part of their orders, he failed to 
 arouse Congress to opposition. He still clung to the 
 
 24 J. B. Jones: Diary. 
 
 25 For the acts of the Confederate Provisional Government 
 and the first and second Congress, see " Statutes at Large," 
 edited by J. M. Matthews [one volume, 1861-64]. 
 
 28 Du Bose: Yancey. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 view that government by the people was not a failure; 
 but it seemed to him that the people, though living 
 under a constitution, were indifferent, and yielded to 
 usurpations. 27 
 
 Mr. Davis and his administration have been vari 
 ously estimated. Pollard has written pages to give 
 his mistakes, and General Thomas Jordon says of 
 him: "The longer he held power the narrower grew 
 his conceptions, the more imperious his will, until to 
 differ from or cross the orbit of his fancies, or even to 
 run counter to the plans or wishes of his favorites, 
 became a personal affront. . . . He and his minis 
 terial clerks . . . were always anticipating success in 
 a preposterous manner, always displaying little prac 
 tical industry, and quite as little judgment in prepar 
 ing for contingencies." : Mr. Alfriend, on the other 
 hand, has written a volume to praise him. 
 
 Mr. Davis, like all who accept offices in exciting 
 times, probably had to suffer from much censure that 
 was unjust. He was as sensitive to disapprobation 
 as Thomas Jefferson, the man of peace. He grew 
 cold under the criticism of his qualities as a military 
 organizer, and his appointments to civil and military 
 positions, but he seldom changed his opinion or his 
 policy. The pressure of public opinion could not 
 induce him to change his Cabinet or to dismiss Dr. 
 Northrop from the Commissary Bureau. His dis- 
 .position to have his own way, and his attitude toward 
 those who sought to interfere with what seemed to 
 him was a part of his own prerogative, swelled the 
 
 "Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens. 
 28 Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XXXI, p. 610. Oct., 1865. 
 
4 2 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 opposition and made him very unpopular. His im 
 prisonment at the close of the war drew to him the 
 sympathies of the South, but during the closing 
 months of the conflict, when the Confederacy was 
 gasping for breath, he was rapidly losing the influ 
 ence which his magnetic personality had been able 
 to command. Much of the dislike for Davis arose 
 from the fact that he did not meet the people oftener 
 in social intercourse. He was a sufferer from nervous 
 dyspepsia; and with the arduous labors of his office 
 examining as he did into the minutest details he 
 found it necessary to be careful of his diet and to 
 economize his time. Soon after going to Richmond, 
 he resolved to administer the Government instead of 
 giving entertainments, and the people soon said he 
 was hoarding his wealth. 29 Tuesday evening recep 
 tions were begun later in the war, but were discon 
 tinued after a month. Davis received a salary of 
 $25,000 in Confederate money. Richmond had offered 
 to make him a present of his house, but he declined 
 it. 30 Toward the close of the struggle his salary was 
 insufficient to meet the household expenses, though 
 there were very few receptions and levees. In April, 
 1864, it was reported that Davis intended to move 
 the Government to Montgomery, because of the 
 scarcity and high price of supplies. In June, 1864, 
 Congress doubled the salaries of its own members 
 so that they received $5500, and debated a measure 
 for the increase of the President s salary, but took 
 no action upon the latter. 
 
 29 Mrs. Davis: Jefferson Davis. 
 
 30 J. W. Daniel: Life and Reminiscences of Jefferson Davis 
 (by distinguished men of his time). 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 43 
 
 /~ 
 
 The Confederate Government was much embar- 
 rassed by popular opinion, state opposition, and by 
 controversies between officials. At the beginning of 
 the war Union sentiment probably preponderated in 
 several states that seceded. After the Battle of Bull 
 Run the voice of the Unionists was silenced by the 
 shouts of victory, but it was heard again in the train 
 of disaffection and defeat. " Secession from 
 Secessia " was also threatened. In November and 
 December, 1862, when state authorities complained of 
 military usurpations, some of the clerks at Richmond 
 said that patriotism was mainly in the army and 
 among the women, and that the President should 
 change his Cabinet and policy, and cultivate the sup 
 port of the people, else the Confederacy might split 
 into states. It was feared that Lincoln s message 
 for gradual emancipation would find advocates in the 
 South. A letter to Davis said that Louisiana and a 
 large part of Mississippi, if overrun by Federal troops, 
 would submit to the United States. Davis went to 
 Mississippi a few days later to encourage fighting. 
 In June, 1863, while the Federals thundered at the 
 gates, jealousy was growing between the Confederacy 
 and the state authorities and Davis feared conspiracy. 
 In September, defection was spreading in North Caro 
 lina and the United States flag was raised. Davis 
 made a month s tour in the South and it was suspected 
 that he was preparing to take measures for fuller 
 control. In December, collision between the Con 
 federate and Georgia authorities was imminent on 
 the question of " just compensation " for sugar seized 
 by the agents of the commissary. Northrop said 
 that it was necessary to impress food for the soldiers. 
 
44 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 Foote was denouncing both Davis and Northrop, and 
 Senator Orr and others asked for the removal of 
 Northrop, but Davis refused, stating that the Com 
 missary-General was one of the greatest geniuses of 
 the South. 
 
 In January, 1864, the breach was widening between 
 Congress and Davis, but for the sake of the country, 
 Congress, in February, obediently passed the new 
 conscript act and other laws, greatly increasing the 
 power of the executive. 31 It also passed a bill sus 
 pending the writ of habeas corpus for six months, 
 though it refused to pass Judge Campbell s supreme 
 court bill. A revival of the murmurs against Davis 
 followed. Colonel Brown ordered an armed guard 
 to protect him, and it soon became a fixture in front 
 of Mr. Davis s residence. 32 Judge Pearson of North 
 Carolina continued to grant the writ of habeas cor 
 pus. In March Stephens said the purpose of the bill 
 to suppress the writ was to muzzle the North Caro 
 lina press. In April, in a speech against the sus 
 pension of the writ, Stephens said that indepen 
 dence without liberty was of no value to him, and 
 that he would as soon have a Northern as a Southern 
 master. In June, while the Federal guns thundered 
 down the river, there were intermittent " rows " in 
 the Bureau of Conscription, and they continued in 
 
 31 An act approved Feb. 6, 1864, prohibited all exports of 
 cotton, tobacco, etc., except by specific regulations issued 
 by the President, who was thus practically given full power 
 as to the regulation of foreign commerce. In carrying this 
 act into effect, Mr. Davis required that one-half the tonnage 
 of all vessels should be reserved for the use of the Confed 
 erate authorities. 
 
 82 J. B. Jones: Diary. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 45 
 
 September, November and December. The Govern 
 ment was almost in a state of paralysis. In July the 
 murmurs against Davis grew louder. 33 
 
 The feeling against speculators and class exemp 
 tions increased the disaffection against the Gov 
 ernment in the autumn of 1864, and there were 
 signs that the curtain would soon rise on the 
 last act of the drama, and that the disturbed 
 and divided nation would " cease to float upon a 
 sea of blood." Both Seward and McClellan, in the 
 North, were making promises, and in the hour of 
 dulness many reflected on the repose once enjoyed in 
 the Union. Many favored a revolution in the South. 
 Governor Vance of North Carolina showed his teeth, 
 and said that he would not allow the Confederate 
 Government to interfere with his furnishing clothes to 
 his troops. From the attitude of Governors Brown, 
 Toombs, Stephens and others it appeared that Georgia 
 was in danger of making peace with the United States. 
 Davis went South to make speeches. Governor 
 Brown refused to respond to his call for the Georgia 
 militia. He held to states rights and said that Davis 
 must send reinforcements if he demanded the return 
 of the Georgia troops. Notwithstanding Davis s 
 speeches in Georgia and Alabama to reanimate the 
 people, the states seemed determined to control their 
 own men not in the regular army, and the Union party 
 was increasing. There was danger of losing North 
 Carolina. In November J. T. Leach of that state 
 offered submission resolutions in the Confederate Con 
 gress, and two of his colleagues voted for them. A 
 
 33 J. B. Jones: Diary, June I, Sept. 6, Nov. 9 and Dec. 4. 
 
46 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 few days later peace resolutions were offered in tlit 
 North Carolina legislature. General Lee s corre 
 spondence indicated that the conscription officers were 
 not doing their duty that the rich, the slaveholders 
 and the speculators, were buying their way out of ser 
 vice. He complained that rich young men were 
 elected magistrates in order to escape field service. 
 The law exempting large slaveholders was creating 
 an anti-slavery party. In September, a clerk in the 
 War Department said that over 100,000 landed pro 
 prietors, and the majority of the slave-owners, were 
 out of the ranks and that some wanted to keep the 
 horses that had been lent them by the Government, 
 while the poor were thrust into the trenches. Mili 
 tary officers were impressing men into the army, while 
 state governors were granting exemptions. In Oc 
 tober many men with exemptions were being forced 
 into the army some while getting medicine for their 
 sick wives, and many became indifferent as to which 
 side should prevail. 34 New and strong farmer soldiers 
 murmured, and many hoped that the soldiers in both 
 armies would desert and go home, and that the guns 
 would " cease to shoot sine die." Some who once held 
 the idea that " beauty and booty " were the aim of 
 the Northern troops, said that " Beast " Butler was 
 proving himself very generous before Richmond, and 
 they declared that the press had " long misrepre 
 sented the conduct of the enemy and tried to keep 
 animosity alive." They complained that they were 
 put in the trenches as " volunteers " under threat of 
 dismission, while able-bodied men escaped the army 
 
 84 J. B. Jones: Diary. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 47 
 
 and rode through the streets on sleek horses. Clerks 
 supposed that they were exempted from military ser 
 vice by the constitution, but in November, Attorney- 
 General George Davis said that though the constitu 
 tion exempted certain civil officers, the recent im 
 pressment act of Congress must be executed. A few 
 weeks later the clerks favored revolution. 
 
 As the year 1864 drew to a close, Congress was sit 
 ting most of the time in secret session, and while Mr. 
 Davis was suffering from neuralgia or busy with ap 
 pointments, promotions or the details of the adminis 
 tration, a strong party was preparing to transfer 
 the military powers of the executive to General Lee, 
 in order to prevent Georgia from reentering the 
 Union, and to strengthen the confidence of the peo 
 ple. The Federal cannon kept up their monotonous 
 noise, Lee s army was being depleted by desertions, 
 incessant rains made gloom gloomier, and the hungry 
 people complained that they were at the mercy of the 
 quartermasters, commissaries, railroads and the 
 Southern Express Company. Foote, in the House of 
 Representatives on December 17, announced his in 
 tention to withdraw from the Confederate Congress 
 rather than to legislate under a despotism, and said 
 that there was a land of freedom yet left that would 
 receive to its bosom a poor refugee. 35 At the begin 
 ning of the new year the Government, in a volumin 
 ous correspondence, was planning for the arrest of 
 men who should attempt to cross the Potomac. To 
 the south " mountains were looming up everywhere." 
 States were evading the Confederate law and ignoring 
 
 85 Richmond Examiner, Dec. 19, 1864. 
 
48 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 Confederate authorities, while the Confederate Gov 
 ernment was preparing the way for negro enlistment 
 and emancipation. North Carolina was swarming 
 with deserters and Georgia was favorable to the 
 Union. The people desired peace. Mr. Collier, ir 
 the Virginia legislature, on February 25, said that the 
 chief characteristic of the Confederate administration 
 was that it had separated the Government from the 
 people. 3 " Future events were casting their shadows 
 before. 
 
 The breach between Davis and Congress grew 
 wider as the alarm tocsin sounded and the end drev\ 
 nearer. While the Federal artillery thundered at the 
 gates, the politicians quarrelled. Congressional com 
 mittees of five or six would visit Davis in a private 
 way to remonstrate or to ask the removal of Commis 
 sary Northrop, " the pepper-corn doctor from North 
 Carolina," but it was breath wasted. Members of 
 Congress asked the dismissal of members of the Cabi 
 net. On some questions Vice-President Stephens 
 used all his influence against the administration. 87 In 
 March, 1864, he had objected to the act of Congress 
 to suspend the writ of habeas corpus which he heard 
 had for one of its objects the control of the elections 
 and the assemblages in North Carolina and to muzzle 
 certain presses in that state. He declared that the act 
 was unconstitutional, and that the denial of constitu 
 tional liberty could only hasten the departure of states. 
 " I want to see no Maryland this side of the Potomac," 
 said he. 38 In January, 1865, there was a tie vote in 
 
 30 Richmond Sentinel. 
 
 87 Cleveland: A. H. Stephens, p. 761. 
 
 88 H. S. Foote made a speech in favor of repealing the act 
 for suspending the writ of habeas corpus. He was not afraid 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 49 
 
 the Senate on a bill to re-suspend the writ of habeas 
 corpus, and Stephens was on the point of giving his 
 deciding vote in opposition to the bill when he was 
 prevented by a senator who changed his vote to the 
 affirmative. Stephens declared that the senator had 
 no right to change his vote after the result had been 
 announced. But the Senate overruled him. Stephens, 
 considering this as an indignity, told Senator Hunter 
 that he would resign. Hunter urged him not to do 
 so. The next day the Senate succeeded in conciliat 
 ing him by unanimously passing a resolution request 
 ing him to address them in secret session upon the 
 situation of public affairs. The bill to suspend the 
 writ of habeas corpus ultimately failed to pass. 
 
 After long secret debates, in which policy oscillated 
 between " not yet " and " too late," Congress finally 
 passed the bill for negro enlistments and decided to 
 adjourn March 10, 1865. But Mr. Davis requested 
 its members to remain a short time, as further legis 
 lation would be required. There was much anxiety 
 as to the kind of communication that he was prepar 
 ing to lay before Congress. Some supposed that it 
 related to foreign complications. Rumor said that a 
 treaty with France for alliance was about to be con 
 summated. On Sunday, March 12, Davis was clos 
 eted with Benjamin and the Secretary of War nearly 
 all day. 3 " The next day he sent a message to Con 
 gress stating that he considered the measures already 
 passed to be insufficient, and that only by the prompt 
 
 of newspaper criticism of the Government. " Paper bullets 
 are harmless " said he. [The Weekly Register (Lynchburg), 
 May 28, 1864.] 
 39 J. B. Jones: Diary. 
 4 
 
5 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 devotion of the entire resources of men and money 
 in the Confederacy could independence be achieved. 
 He said that Congress had so long debated and de 
 layed his recommendation of the preceding Novem 
 ber as to the enlistment of negroes, etc., that much 
 of their value was now lost. He asked that restric 
 tions on the power to impress supplies be removed 
 on account of the condition of the Confederate 
 finances; he again recommended a diminution of ex 
 empts and the abolition of class exemptions; and he 
 said that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
 was indispensable. 40 Davis and Benjamin were said 
 to be already rejoicing over their triumph over Con 
 gress. But on March 16, the Senate committee 01 
 Congress presented their reply which stated that 
 if the President had urged the necessity of the negro 
 bill legislation might have been quickened but that 
 he had seemed to dissent from the general policy of 
 arming them as soldiers and had not even responded 
 to calls for information by the Senate. The commit 
 tee defiantly declared that all measures recommended 
 by Mr. Davis to promote the efficiency of the army 
 had been adopted " except the entire repeal of class 
 exemptions." (Exemption of overseers between 18 
 and 45 had been repealed.) Mr. Davis was informed 
 that on account of executive abuse of the power of 
 detail Congress had revoked details and limited their 
 power. When the members of the committee waited 
 upon Mr. Davis he fired a parting broadside into 
 them. Congress adjourned sine die, March 18, with 
 out passing Davis s last recommendations, but also 
 
 40 Richmond Dispatch, March 15, 1865. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 51 
 
 without succeeding in ousting Mr. Benjamin from the 
 cabinet. 41 
 
 The Confederacy while embarrassed by political 
 conditions was also handicapped by lack of resources 
 and of communication with the world. The want of 
 skilled labor was a source of weakness. In April, 
 1863, Mallory asked Captain Bullock to send out 
 English mechanics capable of manufacturing Besse 
 mer steel but he met with difficulties in obtaining and 
 sending them. In the South there were no great 
 iron manufacturing establishments for furnishing ma 
 terials for ships and railways. Mason, in 1863, sent 
 a model of a wooden railway which was supposed to 
 have some advantages over the iron roads but the 
 Government appears to have had less confidence in 
 it than did Mr. Mason. 42 Frequently the Government 
 was unable to obtain even reference books in the 
 library at Richmond. 43 Benjamin, anxious to keep 
 posted on the British debates on the blockade, etc., 
 had to wait months for a copy of " Hansard." 
 
 There was no direct communication with Europe, 
 though several plans were proposed before the close 
 of 1862. There were Government vessels most of the 
 time from Nassau and Bermuda to Charleston and 
 Wilmington, but supplies and dispatches were often 
 sent by private blockade runners which charged enor 
 mous freight. Agents carrying despatches were in- 
 
 41 Richmond Dispatch, March 20, 1865. J. B. Jones: Diary. 
 C. A. Evans (Ed.): Confederate Military History (Atlanta, 
 1899), Vol. I, Chap. 24, p. 538, ct seq. 
 
 42 Despatches of Mason, No. 35, April 30, 1863. Ibid., No. 
 13, Paris, Sept. 29, 1864. 
 
 ** Instr. to Mason, No. 27, June 22, 1863. 
 
52 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 structed to destroy them in case they were in danger 
 of capture, but in several instances United States 
 cruisers apprehended correspondence containing im 
 portant plans or damaging statements. 
 
 On July 19, 1862, Mr. Benjamin had for weeks had 
 no opportunity to send Mason instructions with any 
 reasonable hope of his getting them. Mr. Ward, re 
 cently United States minister to China, had just 
 brought Mason s despatches of May 6 and 15, which 
 were the first received since his despatch of February 
 7. Wetler and Ficklin had been entrusted with 
 despatches of a later date than February 7, and 
 they had arrived safely, but found it necessary to 
 throw their despatches overboard." In November, 
 1862, Mason had heard nothing from Benjamin since 
 his letter of the preceding April. In January, 1863, 
 after the capture of Reid Sanders, the Northern 
 papers were full of " intercepted correspondence " 
 of Benjamin and others, berating Russell and charg 
 ing Napoleon s consuls with occult designs to seize 
 Mexico as a colony, detach Texas and recognize it 
 separately. The correspondence also revealed the 
 Confederate plans to obtain money and vessels in 
 Europe. 
 
 The Northern papers were often the only means 
 of obtaining news from Europe. They also seem to 
 have been correctly advised of what happened at 
 
 ** Instr. to Mason No. 6, July 19, 1862. Also, see Instr. to 
 Mason No. 20, April 14, 1863. 
 
 45 Richmond Examiner, Jan. 24, 1863. J. B. Jones: Diary, 
 Jan. 23, 1863. Benjamin advised that no more despatches 
 should be entrusted to Mr. Sanders. Instr. to Mason, No. 
 15, Feb. 7, 1863. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 53 
 
 Richmond. Perhaps in some cases persons with 
 regular passports carried information, but there were 
 other means.* 5 Dr. McClure, an embalmer, was de 
 tected taking live men through the lines in his cof 
 fins. In December, 1864, a " Yankee " mail line was 
 discovered between Federal gunboats and the city 
 with a lady at one end of the line. 
 
 The Confederate Government resorted to all pos 
 sible expedients in financial measures, and its hands 
 sometimes largely controlled Southern resources. 
 By an act of May 16, 1861, and by subsequent laws, 
 Confederate treasury notes, payable six months after 
 the war, were provided. In June, 1861, a bureau of 
 printing and engraving was established and soon be 
 gan " to make money." A loan was provided in 
 April, 1861, and was met by a double subscription. 
 Another of $100,000,000 was provided in August, and 
 still others followed. The Government received 
 loans of cotton from planters who promised to ac 
 cept 8 per cent bonds for a portion of it when sold. 
 This " produce loan " was conceived with the idea 
 that cotton could be made a basis for security. 
 Within a short time the whole amount of the loan 
 was taken. By an order of the Treasury Department 
 no vessel was granted a clearance unless one-half her 
 cargo was shipped on Government account from the 
 accumulated Government stores. The Confederacy 
 also paid for direct purchases from planters " in 8 per 
 
 46 Secret service agents often furnished the U. S. Govern 
 ment with valuable information as to the plans of the Con 
 federates. See an interesting article, by Allan Forman of 
 Baltimore, on " A Bit of Secret History," in the Magazine of 
 American History, Vol. XII, Oct., 1884. 
 
 47 H. D. Capers: Life and Times of C G. Memminger, 
 Richmond, 1893. 
 
54 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 cent bonds. When it was seen that the blockade and 
 war would continue, arrangements were made to use 
 cotton as a basis of a foreign loan negotiated by Er- 
 langer, of Paris. The states in undertaking to sup 
 port their quotas issued paper money and, in some 
 cases, seized supplies for the army, paying for them 
 state certificates of indebtedness. The property oi 
 all alien enemies was sequestered. 
 
 Supplies were impressed by the Confederate Gov 
 ernment where the depreciated currency failed tc 
 command them. In order to secure cotton as a basis 
 on the foreign loan it was sometimes found necessary 
 to enforce a tax in kind. In the early part of 1863 
 there was a bill before the Confederate Senate to 
 regulate the impressment of private property. It 
 was strongly opposed, especially by Yancey who had 
 for several months been making long speeches in 
 Congress protesting against the usurpations of the 
 Government and insisting that the war power was not 
 superior to the civil power. The administrative offi 
 cials called Yancey a professional alarmist, but the 
 Richmond Whig declared that he was the guardian 
 of public liberty. Yancey favored the exercise of 
 stern war powers by Congress and claimed to oppose 
 only extra-constitutional measures. At the close of 
 1863, Commissary Northrop found it necessary to 
 impress food for the army. At the close of 1864 and 
 the beginning of 1865 Mr. Benjamin favored the seiz 
 ure of cotton for the purchase of ships in Europe, 
 and, in a speech of February 9, he said that all per 
 sons having tobacco, corn, meat, and other supplies 
 must give them to the Government. Mr. Collier of 
 the Virginia legislature a few days later protested 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 55 
 
 against Benjamin s declaration that everything the 
 people had belonged to the Government in the hour 
 of its adversity. 
 
 The treasury notes, simple in appearance, uncertain 
 in promise, resting only on the scriptural faith, 
 " the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of 
 things unseen," nevertheless fell but little below par 
 until after the summer of 1861. When the blockade 
 of the Southern ports shut off all communication 
 with Europe they depreciated more and more, and 
 prices in the Confederacy became higher and higher 
 after 1862. Many suffered for the want of food. 
 Davis, speaking from a dray, quelled the threatened 
 bread riot at Richmond, and later advised the 
 people to raise food instead of cotton. Farmers 
 losing confidence in the currency refused to sell grain, 
 stating they had all the currency that they desired. 
 Many suffered in the midst of plenty because they 
 had not the means to purchase. A Richmond lady 
 being told by a merchant the price of flour said: "I 
 have seven children, what shall I do?" "I don t 
 know, madam," replied he, " unless you eat your 
 children." From October, 1863, to March, 1865, 
 flour rose from $70 to $1500 per barrel. In Septem 
 ber, 1863, quinine was $100 per ounce, and calico $10 
 a yard. In July, 1864, a saucer of ice-cream cost $6, 
 a pound of sugar $10, and coffee $i per cup. In 
 August, $33 in Confederate money were worth only 
 $i in gold. In March, 1865, the Government was 
 paying $i in gold for $60 of its currency. In Octo 
 ber, 1864, the physicians charged $30 per visit. The 
 Richmond Dispdtch cost $.50 per copy or $100 per 
 year. Some believed that prices could be regulated 
 
5 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 and that jugglery could save the Confederate cur 
 rency. It was as possible for one to lift himself by 
 his boot straps. The Government could not live al 
 ways on credit. Some believed that a new issue of 
 currency would defeat the schemes of the speculators, 
 but the prices of food would not diminish. The ma 
 jority of the people lived on limited rations. Rats 
 ceased to appear; cats staggered and died. It cost 
 $200 a year to keep a cat. Wives made their petti 
 coats into undershirts for their husbands. Legisla 
 tures threatened to suppress theatrical amusements 
 during the war. In some cases the Government lent 
 horses to the plantation owners. 
 
 The scarcity of food and the depreciation of the 
 currency were not the only causes of the high prices. 48 
 They were often due to the lack of transportation. 
 Crops were abundant but the means of transportation 
 were poor. Railroads were not kept in repair, and, 
 in some cases, there were complaints that the Gov 
 ernment monopolized the roads for military pur 
 poses. In January, 1863, the Governor transmitted 
 to the Virginia legislature a copy of a joint resolu 
 tion of the Alabama legislature protesting against 
 the continued exclusive military control of the rail 
 roads and favoring their being kept open for private 
 business and transportation. Later complaints in 
 Virginia stated that the speculators occupied too 
 much space in the cars. Sometimes there was not 
 sufficient transportation for food for the troops in the 
 field. In February, 1865, Lee s armies suffered for 
 
 48 An article on the " History of Prices in the Confederacy," 
 by J. C. Schwab, appears in the Report of the Am. Hist. 
 Ass n for 1898. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 57 
 
 want of soap, though there was plenty at Charlotte, 
 North Carolina. 
 
 Government regulation of prices and transporta 
 tion was several times the subject of consideration. 
 In 1863 Congress authorized the seizure of food sup 
 ply at rates of payment fixed by state commissioners 
 who were to assess prices every sixty days. 49 In Oc 
 tober of the same year some favored the Government 
 control of prices and transportation in order to break 
 up the speculators and to get the food to places 
 where it was most needed. Some favored martial 
 law as a step toward the equal distribution of food. 
 In May, 1864, the Government was selling meal to 
 private individuals. The following July, it caused an 
 increase in the price of food by fixing a high price 
 upon the goods which it seized. In November follow 
 ing, Senator Sparrows, of Louisiana, offered a reso 
 lution providing that no prices should be higher than 
 those assessed by the army. In January, 1865, Mr. 
 Seddon, the Secretary of War, was requested to im 
 press and distribute the coffee and sugar which was 
 " cornered " when Wilmington was threatened. In 
 some cases there was a state distribution of cloth. 
 
 The depreciation of the currency and the lack of 
 transportation made it very difficult for the Confeder 
 ate armies to get living rations during the last few 
 months of the war. Trenholm, the Secretary of the ? 
 Treasury, tried to mend the currency by purchasing 
 
 49 In September, 1864, the commissioners of prices for 
 N. C., Ga., Ala., Fla., Miss., and Tenn., met at Montgomery, 
 Ala., with a view to securing uniformity of prices (under the 
 impressment law). [Weekly Register (Lynchburg), Oct. 22, 
 1864, pp. 248-50.] 
 
5 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 all the cotton and tobacco, selling it to foreign mer 
 chants and buying treasury notes with the proceeds. 
 In February the preachers offered to take the stump 
 to raise subscriptions. President Davis, marking 
 their proposal "special," sent it to the War Depart 
 ment. " Humbugged to the end," said Jones, a 
 clerk in the department. In that hour the ministers 
 could not stem the ebbing tide of Confederate for 
 tune. On March 22, Congress deemed it hopeless 
 to adopt any plan to reduce the currency. Deprecia 
 tion continued, and the operations of the Federals 
 made it impossible to collect the taxes. 
 
 Until 1863, Fraser, Trenholm and Company were 
 the only European bankers or " depositories " of the 
 Confederate Treasury. They paid the drafts of the 
 Confederate purchasing agents in Europe and the 
 bills drawn by the heads of departments at Richmond. 
 Thus, when Congress made appropriations for build 
 ing naval vessels in Europe, the navy made a requisi 
 tion on the treasury for the amount and received 
 treasury notes which could be converted only by buy 
 ing cotton and shipping through the blockade to 
 Fraser, Trenholm and Company, who placed the 
 proceeds to the Confederate navy. 50 In this way, 
 Mallory, in 1862, placed $1,000,000 to the credit of 
 Captain Bullock, the naval agent in Europe. Soon 
 after that date the Confederate finances were much 
 depressed. On July 4, Bullock stated that the credit 
 of the Navy Department was thus far sound, but he 
 hoped for more money to settle the outstanding con- 
 
 00 Bullock: Secret Service of the Confederate States in 
 Europe, Vol. II, p. 416. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 59 
 
 tracts which amounted to 390,000. Congress ap 
 propriated very much larger sums for the navy, but 
 Mallory wrote in September that the exchange of 
 the country was nearly exhausted and that cotton 
 went out in very small lots. 51 It was found neces 
 sary to resort to other means of finance for it was 
 seen that the blockade and the war would continue. 
 Mallory stated that if the agent of the treasury could 
 dispose of the Confederate bonds even at fifty cents 
 he would do so in order to pay the requisitions 
 in Europe, and he suggested that Bullock himself 
 might possibly be able to get advances by an agree 
 ment to repay with 8 per cent interest in cotton, and 
 that he might agree to have the amount expended 
 at Richmond by the Treasury Department for cot 
 ton, which could be stored and transported to the 
 sea-ports by the treasury regarding it as the prop 
 erty of British creditors. 
 
 In May, Mason had enclosed a letter of Mr. Spence, 
 a Liverpool banker, whom he considered sagacious 
 and friendly, suggesting the importance of a Confed 
 erate financial agency in Europe. Benjamin replied 
 that the subject was considered premature. " It is 
 by no means certain that we shall require a loan in 
 Europe/ " In September, Mason suggested that 
 money might be commanded in England by the use 
 of cotton bonds or obligations for the delivery of 
 cotton at any Confederate port upon the thirty days 
 demand of the holder of the bond, or within three 
 months after peace. 58 In November he wrote again 
 
 61 H. D. Capers: C. G. Memminger. 
 
 82 Instr. to Mason, No. 6, July 19, 1862. 
 
 K Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, No. 16, Sept. 18, 1862. 
 
60 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 enclosing views upon a "cotton bond" mode of fi 
 nance. 5 * Bonds for the delivery to the amount of 
 60,000 had been negotiated through the house of 
 Lindsay. Erlanger, whose son was engaged to Mr. 
 Slidell s daughter, made a proposal to float a Con 
 federate loan of 5,000,000. Mason said that the cot 
 ton bond plan seemed to offer the best scheme of 
 finance, but that political advantages might follow the 
 Paris (Erlanger) plan. 
 
 When Mason wrote, the subject of a loan based on 
 cotton certificates had already been considered. 
 Benjamin wrote Mason, October 28, that the Gov 
 ernment had confided the matter to Mr. Spence as 
 Mason had suggested. Memminger s cotton certifi 
 cates represented cotton stored on the plantation and 
 accepted by the Government. These certificates 
 gave the European purchaser an absolute right to 
 the particular lot of cotton with the privilege of ship 
 ping the same. Spence was also appointed as agent 
 for the sale of $5,000,000 of 8 per cent bonds if he 
 could realize 50 per cent on them and he was direct 
 ed to negotiate for the application of $2,500,000 of 
 coin in the Confederate treasury for supplies by 
 transfer to British owners who could transport it 
 from a Confederate port as British property. 
 
 Mr. Spence received the cotton certificates but it 
 was thought best to withhold them from the market 
 until the result of Erlanger s proposals for a direct 
 loan were known. Later they were withheld for fear 
 they would prejudice the proposed loan which was 
 considered of great political importance. The cer- 
 
 64 Ibid., No. 19, Nov. 4- 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 6l 
 
 tificate money bonds were also received by Spence; 
 but they could not be used at better rates than 50 cents 
 on the dollar, and they too were withheld until after 
 the floating of the Erlanger loan. 
 
 In January, 1863, Benjamin, in informing Mason 
 that the cotton bonds had been forwarded to Spence, 
 said that there was no desire to effect a loan in 
 Europe during the war, and that the Confederacy only 
 wanted moderate sums for the purpose of supplies. 55 
 The Confederate loan based on cotton and nego 
 tiated by Erlanger had, however, been decided on. 
 The cotton was to be delivered at certain ports with 
 in six months after the close of the war or before 
 the end of the war if possible. The agents of Er 
 langer had recently gone to Richmond to offer to 
 float a loan of $25,000,000, but Memminger would 
 agree to make it only $15,000,000. Erlanger took 
 the 7 per cent bonds at 77 per cent, and said that 
 Davis privately favored increasing the loan. Mem 
 minger also seems to have contemplated an exten 
 sion of the amount in case Congress would amend 
 the loan act so as to relieve all doubt as to his au 
 thority to do so; and in January, 1863, he recom 
 mended to the Speaker of the House of Representa 
 tives that the act be so amended that the bonds pro 
 vided for might be used for largely increasing the 
 Confederate specie credit in Europe. 56 
 
 The Confederate loan was placed upon the Euro 
 pean market March 18, 1863, and, Mason rejoicing 
 that it w r as a brilliant success, wrote Benjamin the 
 
 55 Instr. to Mason, No. 12, Jan. 15. 1863. 
 
 56 Capers: Memminger. 
 
62 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 next day that over 5,000,000 were subscribed at 
 once and that it reached a premium of 4^ per cent 
 before night. " Mr. Erlanger worked it with great 
 diligence," said he, " and has conferred with me freely 
 and frankly." In two days and a half the subscrip 
 tion to the loan reached 16,000,000. The premiun 
 fluctuated, being 1^4 to 2 per cent by March 30. Er 
 langer did not expect it to touch par. " I congratu 
 late you," wrote Mason " on the triumphant success 
 of our infant credit; it shows malgre all detraction 
 and calumny that cotton is king at last." 51 On April 
 9, however, Mason wrote that the loan had shown a 
 tendency to fall below par more and more. Erlanger 
 told him that the agents of the United States were 
 trying to discredit the loan by large purchases at low 
 rates and that they might cause the subscribers to 
 
 forfeit the instalment of 15 per cent already paid and 
 abandon future subscriptions. To prevent a panic 
 Erlanger desired the Confederacy to give authority 
 for the purchase of 1,000,000 to bring it back to 
 par. 08 The bears were bringing down the stock and 
 it was necessary to bull the market to keep it up till 
 April 24, when the second intalment on subscriptions 
 was to be paid. 
 
 Mason, by the advice of Slidell and others took the 
 responsibility of authorizing Erlanger and Company 
 to sustain the loan by secret purchases on Confeder 
 ate account and from April 9, to April 24, 1,388,500 
 worth were bought, carrying the price from 4^ per 
 cent discount gradually to about i l / 2 per cent pre- 
 
 67 Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, No. 32. 
 58 Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, Unofficial, April 9, 
 1863. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 63 
 
 mium. Mason acted under the advice and guidance 
 of Mr. Spence, who was attending to the operations 
 in London. 5 " A second effort was made to bull the 
 market till May i. After that, they hoped that with 
 the mass of stock " in certain hands," and with favor 
 able news from the South, the stock would keep at 
 par and enable the government to sell what it had 
 bought. " Our purchase of the stock may yet turn 
 out to be a money-making affair," wrote Mason. 
 
 The loan dropped somewhat when the news arrived 
 that United States ships had run the batteries at 
 Vicksburg. Mason found that the conditions were 
 far different from what he had expected, but he said 
 that the press was confident of news from Fredericks- 
 burg that would " make our loan buoyant." On 
 June 12, he wrote that the loan seemed solidly placed 
 at last. After the news from Gettysburg and Vicks 
 burg, however, it soon fell to 30 per cent discount 
 and Mason saw that the Confederacy could not ex 
 pect another loan, and that the Government should 
 arrange to ship cotton to Nassau and Bermuda by 
 fast steamers running the blockade and under Gov 
 ernment control. 
 
 In May all the Confederate disbursing officers in 
 Europe were in arrears and there was no authority 
 to make the proceeds of the loan available to them. 
 C. J. McRae, who was sent to Europe as special agent 
 of the Treasury Department to regulate the disburse 
 ment of the Erlanger loan and to negotiate the sale 
 of treasury bonds arrived about June i. At first 
 
 59 Ibid., Unofficial, and No. 34, of April 27, 1863. 
 80 Bullock: Vol. II. 
 
64 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 he had no orders to supply Confederate agents in 
 Europe, but later the heads of departments sent 
 drafts on him to meet the wants of purchasing agents 
 and he was authorized to keep the bankers in funds. 
 At the beginning of August he found only 700,000 
 on hand while the Government engagements for the 
 army and navy required much more. 
 
 A short time later, the financial programme in 
 Europe was changed. Both the Navy and Treasury 
 Departments had sent out large amounts of Confed 
 erate bonds to different persons who practically be 
 came competitors of each other in negotiating for 
 their sale. This was unsatisfactory and in Septem 
 ber, 1863, Benjamin drew up a scheme which pro 
 vided for a special fiscal agent with power to deal 
 exclusively with all bonds. All who had been en 
 trusted with the sale of bonds were asked to sur 
 render them to McRae who was to negotiate them 
 and distribute the proceeds among the purchasing 
 agents. 01 Mr. Spence was thus superseded. He had 
 been dissatisfied when Erlanger was selected to effect 
 the Confederate loan. His retention was strongly 
 opposed by the Richmond Examiner. He was well 
 paid for his services but while speaking and writing 
 in favor of the Confederacy he had also promised that 
 it would abolish slavery as soon as it became inde 
 pendent. For this reason Mr. Benjamin afterwards 
 wrote him that he could not officially recognize him 
 as an agent. 
 
 Before the end of 1864, the net proceeds of the 
 Erlanger loan were exhausted, and after the fall of 
 
 61 J. B. Jones: Diary, Sept. 16, 1863. 
 
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 65 
 
 Fort Fisher the small supply of funds from the sale 
 of bonds ceased, the intercourse with the Confeder 
 acy being cut off by one or two shoal bays on the 
 coast of Texas. The financial agents of the Con 
 federacy saw that transmission of supplies must cease 
 and stopped their purchases and shipment. To get 
 money for urgent wants, McRae sold several ships and 
 transferred the funds to the Treasury Department. 
 When the war closed, the Confederate agents abroad 
 had no large sums of money to turn over to the 
 United States. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 James L. Orr, chairman of the Confederate House 
 Committee on Foreign Relations, once said that the 
 Confederacy never had a foreign policy, and never 
 attempted any high diplomacy. Whatever may be 
 thought of this statement, the failure of the Confed 
 eracy was certainly not due to any deficiency in the 
 number of its agents abroad. Jefferson Davis com 
 missioned many diplomatic consular and secret agents 
 to watch every opportunity to negotiate treaties or to 
 press Confederate interests. 1 
 
 An attempt to open diplomatic negotiations with 
 the United States Government in February, i86i, was 
 made with the hope of securing a peaceful disruption 
 of the Union. The leaders of secession were, no 
 doubt, influenced by the belief that there would be a 
 strong Northern sentiment opposed to coercive 
 measures and in favor of the early establishment of 
 trade and diplomatic relations with the South. They 
 favored peaceful secession, and some desired alliance. 
 They proposed to win the good-will of the West by 
 maintaining the free navigation of the Mississippi. 2 
 In March, while some thought it impracticable to go 
 on without further accession of territory, many ex- 
 
 1 Confed. Dip. and Consular Commissions. Pickett Papers, 
 " Trunk C." 
 
 2 Proceedings of the Confederate Congress, Feb. 25, 1861. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 67 
 
 pected the size and strength of the Confederacy to 
 increase rapidly. Stephens hoped and expected that 
 the border states would join, though the South could 
 get along without them until they should decide lo 
 follow. 3 Looking at the distant future, he said that 
 even the states of the Northwest might gravitate to 
 ward the Southern door, which he considered was 
 wide enough to receive them " if they assimilate with 
 us in principle." 
 
 It has been said that if Andrew Jackson had been 
 President during the term before Lincoln s inaugu 
 ration he would have discouraged secession in its in- 
 cipiency and thus prevented the civil war. Buchanan 
 sympathized with the South on the slavery question 
 and took no decided position to prevent preparations 
 for the dissolution of the Union. He did not believe 
 that the states had a constitutional right to secede, 
 but neither did he think the United States Govern 
 ment could constitutionally prevent them. 
 
 The seceding states made several unsuccessful at 
 tempts to obtain recognition at Washington, and to 
 arrange for a peaceful secession. South Carolina* 
 after its resolution to secede sent three commission 
 ers to state its reasons to Buchanan, and to arrange 
 terms of separation, but they were not received. 
 They then prepared a memorial to the Secretary of 
 State but no answer was received. In February, 
 1861, South Carolina sent its Attorney-General to 
 Washington, but he received no official recognition. 
 When the Confederate Provisional Government was 
 established it sent three commissioners 4 to Wash- 
 
 3 Cleveland: A. H. Stephens, p. 723. 
 
 4 Commission to Washington Record Book. (Pickett 
 Papers, " Trunk B," Ncs. 28 and 29.) The three commis- 
 
68 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 ington to arrange a peaceable settlement. The lat 
 ter were instructed to consult upon " matters of in 
 terest to both nations," and were authorized to con 
 clude treaties. They arrived March 5, and one week 
 later, through Judge Campbell, they communicated 
 their mission to Seward, who, after delaying his 
 reply until April 8, refused to receive them. The 
 commissioners believed that the United States would 
 evacuate Fort Sumter. Seward and others in Lin 
 coln s Cabinet seem to have thought that Sumter 
 amounted to little as a strategetical point, and were 
 waiting for an expression of public opinion on the 
 subject. 6 Davis believed that Seward s views would 
 prevail at Washington. But as the war party at the 
 North grew, public opinion opposed the evacuation 
 of Government property, and the hope of peaceable 
 secession was lost. Seward was hoping that by wait 
 ing and making no attempt to precipitate war, the 
 Union element at the South would assert itself. 8 But 
 in this he was mistaken. 
 
 In the history of the mission, which Davis pub 
 lished on April 29, he stated that Seward had induced 
 the commissioners to forbear pressing for an answer 
 and had said that Fort Sumter would be evacuated/ 
 but that in the meanwhile preparations were being 
 made for its defense. Lincoln, however, had ex- 
 
 sioners were M. G. Crawford, John Forsyth and A. B. 
 Roman. Their credentials were dated Feb. 27, 1861. J. T. 
 Pickett was secretary of the commission. 
 
 5 Stovall: Toombs, p. 222, et seq. 
 
 6 Some favored a foreign war as a means of " reunion," 
 but this project was smothered by Lincoln and Sumner. 
 
 T Correspondence relating to Fort Sumter. Confederate 
 Archives (Pickett Papers), " Trunk A," Package No. 35. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 69 
 
 pressed his views in no uncertain tone. In a speech 
 to the Indiana legislature February 12, referring to 
 some of the " lovers of the Union " who resisted co 
 ercion and seemed to " think the Union no regular 
 marriage, but rather a free-love sort of arrangement 
 to be maintained only on passionate attraction," he 
 said it was no coercion or invasion to hold United 
 States forts and collect duties, or even to withhold 
 mails. Abraham of old said to Lot, " Is not the 
 whole land before thee. Separate thyself, I pray 
 thee from me; let there be no strife between me and 
 thee, for we are brethren." But Abraham Lincoln 
 said no such thing to Jefferson Davis. To, settle 
 questions by avoiding them was not so easy as in the 
 days of the patriarchs. 
 
 President Lincoln remained firm in his purpose to 
 defend Sumter, Davis (in opposition to Toombs in a 
 Cabinet meeting) resolved to attack it, and soon " the 
 hornet s nest " was opened by a bloodless conflict in 
 which no one was hurt. On April 12, the newsboys 
 ran through the streets of Richmond shouting " The 
 storming of Fort Sumter." 8 The coup d etat, which 
 some said should have been struck before the inaug 
 uration of Lincoln, had started the dogs of war, and 
 it was too late to dream of peaceable separation. On 
 April 15, there was a strong secession demonstration 
 at Richmond. Fiery speeches were made by Tyler, 
 Wise and others. On April 23, Alexander H. Steph 
 ens met the state convention in a closed door session 
 to arrange a treaty of alliance with the Confederate 
 states." For two days he waited in suspense while 
 
 8 J. B. Jones: Diary. 
 
 "Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens. 
 
70 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 the Virginians debated, but on April 25, the treaty 
 was ratified. The Virginia convention which had 
 > strongly declared against secession at last resolved 
 to secede and join the Confederacy. North Carolina 
 and Tennessee followed, and, for the succeeding four 
 years, the Confederate de facto Government was in 
 dependent of Washington and a civil war disturbed 
 the repose of Europe, as well as of America, until the 
 instruments of battle proved, notwithstanding the 
 prophecies of great statesmen, that secession was in 
 admissible. The devotion and constancy of the 
 South for its principles of government and econom 
 ics in the face of a waning hope and diminishing re 
 sources have, perhaps, no parallel in history, but at 
 the end of the war it accepted the historical situation, 
 and the constitutional interpretation of the majority. 
 
 A commission appointed by Davis in January, 1865, 
 when many were anxious to take some step to end 
 the fraternal contest, was directed to proceed to 
 Washington for an informal conference as to the is 
 sues of the war and terms of peace. Its members 10 
 met Lincoln and Seward at Hampton Roads where a 
 friendly interview occurred, but they failed to agree 
 upon the subject of reunion. Compelled by force of 
 circumstances, however the Confederate authorities 
 finally ceased the contest. 
 
 No agents were sent to Canada until 1864, when 
 it appeared that the British Government, unless in 
 duced by new circumstances or complications, would 
 continue to refuse to favor either recognition, media 
 tion or intervention. Agents were then sent to that 
 
 10 J. A. Campbell, A. H. Stephens, and R. M. T. Hunter. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 7! 
 
 country to encourage the peace party in the North 
 and disaffection in the Northwest, and to make the 
 Canadian border a base for hostile expeditions into 
 United States territory." 
 
 Mexico was a near neighbor whose territory, ever 
 since the purchase of the Mesilla valley in 1853, had 
 been looked upon by many as a field for the future 
 extension of the institution of slavery and its accom 
 panying agricultural system, and very early in 1861 
 the Confederates desired to open friendly relations 
 with the people of that country and take steps to 
 prevent the United States from securing any treaty 
 advantages in that direction. On May 17, Toombs 
 instructed J. T. Pickett as a special agent to sound 
 the Mexican Government on the subject of alliance, 
 to feel the pulse of merchants and ship owners on the 
 subject of privateering, and authorized him to grant 
 commissions of marque and reprisal or to employ 
 agents in Mexico for the same purpose. 12 Looking 
 for arguments which might induce Mexico to form an 
 alliance with the Confederacy, Toombs said: "The 
 institution of domestic slavery in one country, and 
 that of peonage in the other, establishes between 
 them such a similarity of labor as to prevent any ten 
 dency on either side to disregard feelings and inter 
 ests of the other." Mexico was to be informed that 
 in case the Confederate States were to guarantee her 
 against foreign invasion " they could do so more 
 promptly and effectually than any other nation." 
 
 u Jacob Thompson and C. C. Clay were appointed Special 
 Agents to Canada, on April 27, 1864, to carry out instruc 
 tions received orally. 
 
 12 Confed. Dip. Cor., Vol. I, Instr. i. 
 
 13 Confed. Dip. Cor., Vol. I. 
 
72 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Picket! remained in Mexico until December, writing 
 many letters, most of which Toombs failed to receive. 
 On his arrival at Vera Cruz, which he called " the 
 SoutE Carolina of Mexico," he sent to Mata (who 
 had recently been Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs) an unofficial note, looking toward recognition. 
 He also took steps to open negotiations with the 
 Governor of the province, which he suggested might 
 again resolve to resume its sovereignty as it had done 
 in the past. While awaiting the arrival of a " friend," 
 he wrote: " Let the United States Minister [Corwin] 
 fire at random and waste his ammunition, and then I 
 will go to Mexico City." Learning that the United 
 States had probably made overtures for the passage 
 of her troops through Mexico, in order to reach 
 Arizona, he caused the insinuation to be made (to 
 various persons connected with the Government) that 
 the granting of such a privilege would be " a breach 
 of neutrality, attaining the gravity of a casus belli 
 that it would be a step not only hostile to the Confed 
 eracy, but also suicidal to Mexico." At the city of 
 Mexico, he found that the Government was not dis 
 posed to give attention to his communications. Ne 
 gotiations with the United States, however, were " dili 
 gently pressed." Corwin wrote Seward, on July 29, 
 that well-informed Mexicans seemed to be aware that 
 the independence of the Confederacy would be a signal 
 for a war of conquest to establish slavery in each of 
 the states of Mexico. 
 
 Pickett, on learning that the Mexican Congress had 
 acceded to the American request for the privilege to 
 pass troops through Mexican territory, said privately: 
 " If this decree is not annulled, Mexico will lose the 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 73 
 
 state of Tamaulipas in 60 days." He unofficially in 
 formed the Mexican Government that invasion of the 
 northern states of Mexico by Confederate forces would 
 probably result. In October, while threatening re 
 taliation, he proposed to re-cede California and New 
 Mexico in order to secure a treaty of free trade be 
 tween the Confederate States and Mexico. He also 
 gave notification that the Confederacy could not con 
 sent to the sale or hypothecation of the Mexican pub 
 lic lands to any government not in amity with the 
 Confederate Government. On October 29, in a de 
 spatch (No. 12) to Toombs, suggesting that the pro 
 posed treaty of the United States with Mexico prob 
 ably had for its basis the hypothecation of Mexican 
 lands and the establishment of a line of United States 
 military posts through Mexican territory, he said: 
 " Under these circumstances does it not become the 
 policy of the Confederate States to take military pos 
 session of Monterey and declare their purpose of hold 
 ing all of that region until all questions with the 
 United States be brought to an amicable adjustment? 
 Such an occupation, under the direction of wise mili 
 tary and civil chiefs would ensure to us the permanent 
 possession of that beautiful country." Mentioning 
 the information that the privilege granted by Mexico 
 as to the passage of troops would probably not be used 
 by the United States, he said: " I have entered no 
 formal protest against that extremely offensive per 
 mission; for it affords a golden opportunity to the 
 people of the Confederate States of fulfilling speedily 
 a portion of that inevitable destiny which impels them 
 southward." 
 
 On October 30, Pickett received a telegram an- 
 
74 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 nouncing Confederate victories and the safe arrival 
 of Mason and Slidell at Havana, and proceeded to 
 celebrate the occasion by jollification with his friends. 
 Learning that an American " pill vendor," named 
 Bennett, had doubted the authenticity of the news, 
 and had intimated it to be an invention, he went to his 
 place of business, called him a " liar/ slapped him, 
 and inflicted " severe punishment." with his hands and 
 feet. On the following night he was arrested, but was 
 allowed to remain at his hotel. He pleaded his diplo 
 matic character, which the Government refused to 
 recognize. On November 14, he was " thrust into a 
 filthy guard room," to await trial or the payment of an 
 indemnity to Bennett. After his release he wrote: 
 " To preserve my liberty, and perhaps my life, I have 
 had no alternative but to resort to bribery." He was 
 convinced that the Confederacy had few friends in 
 Mexico " at least among the Mexicans themselves 
 of the dominant party." 
 
 In a despatch [from "near Mexico"], on Novem 
 ber 29, Pickett informed Toombs that, having no reply 
 from Mexico, and no further instructions from the 
 Confederacy, he considered his mission virtually 
 ended. As early as the middle of October he had so 
 notified the Mexican Government, stating that the 
 chief reason was the persistent violation of neutrality 
 by Mexico. Commenting upon the internal condition 
 of Mexico, the desire of Conservatives for the restora 
 tion of Spanish rule, and the effects of his own mis 
 sion, he said: "My enterprise has afforded the Gov 
 ernment of the Confederate States an opportunity 
 which may never present itself again. . . . My ap 
 proaches to the Conservatives was with the double 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 75 
 
 hope of making them our friends, and of having my 
 self sent out of the country as a pernicious intriguer, 
 and when first arrested I really supposed that to have 
 been the cause. . . . Mexico has placed herself in the 
 wrong in the eyes of all civilized nations . . . and thus 
 have I cut the Gordian knot of our infant diplomacy 
 in this quarter. If the Confederate States improve the 
 golden opportunity, I will not have suffered in vain. 
 .... Our people must have an outlet on the Pa 
 cific. . . . 
 
 " The part for the Confederate States to play in this 
 crisis is clear to my mind. Our revolution has emas 
 culated the Monroe doctrine in so far as we are con 
 cerned. The Spaniards are now become our natural 
 allies, and jointly with them we may own the Gulf of 
 Mexico and effect a partition of this magnificent coun 
 try. I little thought a few years ago ever to counsel 
 a Spanish alliance, but revolutions bring us into 
 strange company, and I am now prepared to advocate 
 an alliance which may tend to check the expansion of 
 the North." 
 
 Pickett reached Vera Cruz in December, in time to 
 witness its occupation by Spanish forces. He soon 
 returned to the Confederacy by request from Rich 
 mond. 14 After September, 1863, some hoped for rec 
 ognition by Mexico, and Preston/ 5 being appointed 
 envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, on 
 
 14 Confed. Dip. Cor., Mexico. (Pickett Papers, " Trunk 
 B," Record 5; Pickett s Despatches, June 15 (No. i), June 
 17 (No. 2), Oct. 29 (No. 12), Nov. 29 (No. 13) and Dec. 24 
 (No. 14), 1861; also Corwin s Despatches to Seward, July 
 29 (No. 3), Aug. 28 (No. 4), Sept. 7 (No. 5) and Oct. 29 (No. 
 7), 1861. 
 
 15 Walker Fearn was also appointed as secretary. 
 
76 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 January 7, 1864, soon left the Confederacy for Cuba 
 with " secret service " money, but receiving no intima 
 tion that he would be received by Maximilian he never 
 reached the Mexican capital. 10 
 
 At the opening of the civil war the northern prov 
 inces of Mexico were in a state of revolution, and 
 on May 22, Toombs sent J. A. Quintero on a mission 
 to New Leon to inform Governor Vidaurri that the ^ 
 Confederacy wished to maintain friendly relations 
 and to prevent border raids between Mexico ard 
 Texas, but that if the Governor failed to stop tr.e 
 raids the Confederacy would be compelled to punish 
 the invaders and to guard against the recurrence of 
 such disturbing inconveniences. 17 Vidaurri impress 
 ed Quintero with his friendliness, and confidentially 
 proposed a political union of the northern provinces 
 of Mexico with the Confederacy. Quintero, after 
 returning to report the success of his mission was 
 again sent as confidential agent to northeast Mexico 
 (September 3, 1861) to reside at Monterey, with in 
 structions to declare his official character only to the 
 Governor and such others as he might deem prudent. 
 He was authorized to say that Mr. Davis reciprocated 
 Vidaurri s expressions of friendship and good-will 
 for himself and his people, and that he desired to 
 serve mutual interests by intimate social and com 
 mercial relations ; but, although the Confederates felt 
 sympathy for the revolutionists, he believed " it 
 would be imprudent and impolitic in the interests of 
 both parties to take any steps at present in regard 
 to the proposition made by Governor Vidaurri in his 
 
 10 Confed. Dip. Cor., Mexico. Ibid., Package 15. 
 17 Confed. Dip. Cor., Vol. I. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 confidential communication ... in reference to the 
 future political relations of the Confederate States 
 and the northern provinces of Mexico." Quintero 
 was instructed to send statistics concerning that 
 country, to report on the prospects of getting powder, 
 lead and other war supplies through Matamoras, and, 
 in case Mexico had given the United States permis 
 sion to transport troops across her territory for war 
 against the Confederacy, to induce Vidaurri to use 
 his influence to prevent it. On November 4, Quin 
 tero reported that Vidaurri would oppose the pas 
 sage of the United States troops through New 
 Leon." 
 
 Naturally the Confederacy early sent a special 
 agent to the West Indies, where it was desired to 
 obtain a point of vantage for communication with 
 Europe. On July 22, 1861, Toombs instructed C. J. 
 Helm to perform this office, giving him a letter of 
 introduction to the Captain-General of Cuba to whom 
 it was desired that he should present reasons for 
 friendly relations between Cuba and the Confederacy, 
 leaving no efforts untried to remove appfehensions 
 as to Confederate designs to acquire that island. 19 The 
 Confederate authorities, by sparing no pains to in- 
 
 18 Consular Corres., New Leon and Coahuila Quintero 
 (Pickett Papers, " Trunk B," Package 17). Also, Dip. Mex. 
 8 and g J. L. Cripps and Charles Ricken; Misc. Cor. and 
 Records, Mexico; Consular, Matamoras Fitzpatrick; Con 
 sular; Vera Cruz Matamoras, La Sere and Avegno. 
 
 Richard Fitzpatrick was appointed commercial agent at 
 Matamoras on Nov. 15. 1862. Bernard Avegno was ap 
 pointed on Dec. 18, 1862, to act in the same capacity at 
 Vera Cruz. Emile La Sere received credentials on May 30, 
 1864. to perform the same functions at Vera Cruz. 
 
 19 Confed. Dip. Cor., Vol. I. 
 
78 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 form Spain that the South no longer desired Cuba, 
 by urging mutual interests in the institution of slav 
 ery, by suggesting probable aggressive expansive de 
 signs of the United States, and by proposing a de 
 fensive alliance, made strong efforts to secure the 
 friendship of that once powerful people; but Spai:i 
 remained neutral. In Cuba there was considerable 
 local sympathy with the Confederates; and, during 
 the blockade, the Richmond authorities hoped to 
 make the island an entrepot from which to obtain 
 European supplies, and a base for forwarding des 
 patches between the Confederacy and Europe. Sew- 
 ard, while denying any desire for conquest, in 
 formed Spain that the United States could not look 
 with favor upon any policy that would make that 
 island the fulcrum of the lever for overthrowing the 
 Union/ The Confederacy several times tried to se 
 cure recognition by Spain, but was always disap 
 pointed, though it took fresh hope from complica 
 tions. The Confederate steamer, General Rusk, had 
 been used to get Confederate supplies at Havana, 
 and while there, it was supplied with British papers 
 and had its name changed to Blanche. After one suc 
 cessful voyage the vessel sailed for Havana with a 
 cargo of cotton, in the latter part of 1862, but, while 
 off the coast of Cuba in the neutral jurisdiction of 
 Spain, was destroyed by a United States steamer. 
 For this act the United States paid Spain $200,000, 
 
 m James Morton Callahan: Cuba and International Rela 
 tions, Chap, n, passim; 15 Instr. Sp., p. 263, Sevvard to 
 Schurz, No. 2, April 27, 1862. [Also, October 28, 1861]; 
 Confed. " Dip. Cor.", Hunter to Yancey, Rost and Mann, 
 Aug. 24, 1861, and Benjamin to Slidell (No. 16), May 9, 1863. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY /9 
 
 and Benjamin instructed Slidell (March 22, 1863) to 
 urge Spain to pay all of the amount over to the 
 Confederacy, instead of to the individuals who tem 
 porarily had the loan of the vessel, but the Confed 
 eracy did not press its claim. 
 
 Agents in Nassau and the Bermudas, in addition 
 to Helm in Cuba, performed valuable service for 
 the Confederacy during the whole period of the war. 21 
 
 It was to Europe that the Confederate leaders 
 principally looked for sympathy and assistance. 
 Their policy of secession had been greatly influenced 
 by the expectation of foreign aid. Naturally, in pre 
 senting their case to Europe they urged the advan 
 tages of free trade and avoided a discussion of the 
 slavery question. They desired especially to enlist 
 English sympathy. Benjamin, in a letter to the Eng- I s 
 lish consul in New York said that conditions might 
 arise which would even induce Southern states to 
 resume their former allegiance to England. 22 \There ! 
 was a strong belief that in case of war England would 
 not permit the United States to interfere with Eng 
 lish trade through the Southern ports. On January 
 28, Mr. Iverson, of Georgia, in his farewell speech 
 to the United States Senate, referring to the possi 
 bility of a blockade, said : " We can live, if need be, 
 without commerce. But when you shut out our cot- 
 
 21 The name of Heyleger, who acted as agent at Nassau, 
 and obtained concessions favorable to blockade running, 
 does not appear among those whose credentials (from Mr. 
 Davis) are recorded in the " Diplomatic and Consular Com 
 missions " book of the Confederate State Department. Nor 
 man S. Walker was appointed commercial agent at Bermuda 
 on July 7, 1864. 
 
 22 Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. II, pp. 313-14. 
 
8O THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 ton from the looms of Europe we shall see whether 
 other nations will not have something to do on that 
 subject. Cotton is king and it will find means 1.0 
 raise your blockade and disperse your ships." 
 
 The new American tariff gave the Confedera r e 
 leaders further hope of English sympathy, and an 
 opportunity to urge their opposition to the tariff 
 with greater effect. 23 Buchanan, in his message of 
 December, 1858, had recommended a revision of tl e 
 tariff in order to increase the revenue, but the admin 
 istration leader in the House could not get the neces 
 sary two-thirds vote for the proposition. In April, 
 1860, Morrill introduced his tariff bill in the House. 
 Its principal object was stated to be revenue. It 
 passed the House by 105 to 64, but its consideration 
 by the Senate was postponed. On February 20, i86c, 
 however, it passed the Senate with some amendments 
 by a vote of 25 to 14 after the senators from seven 
 seceding states had withdrawn. Some felt that its 
 passage made England much more liable to recognize 
 the Confederacy, and Clingman said that it contributed 
 to the secession of Virginia, North Carolina and Ten 
 nessee. 
 
 On general principles the Democrats of both 
 North and South since 1825 had leaned towards a 
 tariff for revenue only, but since 1832 there had 
 been no signs that the integrity of the Union was 
 endangered by tariff legislation. In the farewell 
 speeches of Southern leaders in Congress there had 
 been scarcely an allusion to the tariff. The burden 
 of the grievances expressed were concerning South- 
 
 23 See Hunter s remarks in the Cong. Globe, Feb. 27, 1861. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 8l 
 
 ern rights as to slavery. Many in the Alabama se 
 cession convention desired to induce the United 
 States to treat with the South as an independent 
 power and as an ally, and they were willing to agree 
 to a tariff equal to that of the United States but al 
 lowing free trade with the United States in order to 
 dispense with frontier custom houses, border 
 troubles and war debts.** 
 
 The Confederate constitution declared in favor of 
 a tariff for revenue only, and the commissioners who 
 were sent to England with instructions (of March 16) 
 to make a treaty practically providing for free trade 
 were told to inform the English Government that 
 dissolution was the result of long and mature delib 
 eration to escape the persistent efforts to compel the 
 South to pay bounties to the North in the shape of 
 high protective tariffs. It was soon discovered that 
 Seward had taken prompt steps to meet their argu 
 ments abroad. The nature of Seward s arguments 
 may be seen in his instructions to Carl Schurz April 
 27, in which he said : " The interest which now 
 raises the flag of disunion has directed the Govern 
 ment since the first murmur of discontent was heard. 
 The United States . . . for forty years has especially 
 accommodated that interest (slavery) and construct 
 ed all defenses required for that section." 
 
 " Rost to Yancey, April 7, 1862. 
 
 * The Confederacy offered to continue all the United States 
 treaties except the clause providing for the maintenance of 
 a naval squadron on the coast of Africa. The Confederate 
 constitution had a clause against the slave trade, but if Eng 
 land had asked for a treaty clause against it. she would have 
 been informed that the constitution gave the Government no 
 power relating to that subject. " It is not wise to impose 
 restraints on the future " said Benjamin in January, 1863. 
 [Instr. to Mason, Nos. 13 and 14, Jan. 15, 1863.] 
 6 
 
82 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 The instructions of the Confederate commission 
 ers did not mention any of the expressed grievances 
 relating to slavery. But later, the agents in Eng 
 land endeavored through the press and otherwise to 
 leave the impression that the North desired the con 
 tinuance of the institution of slavery. This policy 
 was based upon the fact that England and France 
 were opposed to slavery but desired commercial 
 intercourse with the South. Palmerston, in July, 
 1861, said to August Belmont of New York, " We do 
 not like slavery but we want cotton and we dislike 
 very much your Morrill tariff." 
 
 There was a strong party in England led by 
 Bright, Cobden and Forster, who had pronounced 
 sympathies with the United States and would have 
 been glad if they could have informed their constitu 
 encies that the Lincoln administration was fighting 
 for emancipation as well as for the integrity of the 
 Union. But, notwithstanding the fears which had 
 been expressed in the speeches of the Southern lead 
 ers, the Lincoln party proposed only to restrict slav 
 ery in the territories and had no emancipation policy 
 until it came as a military exigency during the war. 
 Lincoln in his inaugural address said: vJ have no 
 purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the 
 institution of slavery in the states where it exists." 
 The Confederate agents in Europe quoted this as a: 
 means of decreasing sympathy with the North. The 
 Confederate arguments were presented to the Brit 
 ish Parliament by Lindsay, Gregory, Roebuck and 
 other members who sympathized with the South. 
 Lindsay, in explaining these positions in July, 1862, 
 said that the cry against slavery in the North was 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 1 
 
 only a political cry else England could sympathize 
 with the North. He declared that taxation without 
 representation was the real cause of the war, stating 
 that the North and West had increased their repre 
 sentation in Congress while the South had fallen be 
 hind and had to pay the protective tariffs. 28 Forster, 
 in reply, stated that slavery was the real cause of 
 the war, and that the tariff had scarcely been men 
 tioned in the elections and during the period of se 
 cession." 7 
 
 Mr. Davis and his followers at first expected to 
 produce a cotton famine which \vould induce Eng 
 land and France to break the blockade and recognize 
 the Confederacy. , Later, they were willing to offer 
 special commercial advantages to secure the same 
 end, and proposed to give Napoleon,a large amount 
 of cotton for the loan of a squadronA They also fav 
 ored French and Spanish designs in America and, in 
 order to obtain a treaty of alliance, intimated their 
 readiness to guarantee the possessions of those pow 
 ers. (They made England and France a base for secret 
 attempts to fit out vessels. They endeavored to dis 
 turb internal affairs and create complications which 
 Iwould serve the interests of the Confederacy. Finally, 
 jin a paroxysm of desperation, they proposed to secure 
 
 emancipation for recognition, and in negotiations with 
 >ndon syndicates agreed to guarantee cotton for 
 
 noney to secure ships to break the blockade. / 
 
 i6 rarnaTDebates, p 511 et seq. July 18, 1862. 
 
 See "Appendix." Also, see F. W. Sargent: England, 
 the United States, and the Confederate States, London, 1864. 
 Also, an article on the changes in tariff legislation since 
 1789, by W. G. Cutler, in Mag. Am. Hist., Vol. XII (1884), 
 P- 519. 
 
84 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 | R. B. Rhett, who had made some study of com 
 merce and revenues, had discussed in the secession 
 convention of South Carolina a policy of commercia 1 
 agreements with the important states of Europe 
 At Montgomery, he was chosen chairman of the 
 committee of foreign relations, and before the inaug 
 uration of Davis had brought in a report author 
 izing the latter to send a commission to Europe to 
 secure recognition and make treaties, offensive and 
 defensive. As a plan of diplomacy he proposed, 
 
 (i) A treaty of commercial alliance involving recipro 
 cal obligations offensive and defensive for twenty 
 years or more, during which the Confederacy would 
 impose no import duty higher than 20 per cent ad 
 valorem, no tonnage except for maintaining harbors 
 and rivers, and would permit European parties to the 
 treaty to enjoy the privileges of the coasting trade 
 free, subject only to the police regulations of the 
 states. (2) A discriminating duty of 10 per cent on 
 all goods of all nations refusing to accept the treaty. 
 (3) The commissioners to have power (as Franklin 
 in 1778) to form alliances with European powers and 
 guarantee their North American possessions. 28 This 
 policy was discussed in Congress in the presence of 
 Toombs, who, as Secretary of State, hoped to be al 
 lowed to give the commissioners instructions based 
 upon this policy of overcoming European feeling 
 against slavery by offering liberal commercial ad 
 vantages, but Davis did not embrace these points 
 in his later conversation with Toombs. The com 
 mission had already been appointed to go to Wash- 
 
 28 Du Bose: Life and Times of Yancey. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 85 
 
 ington; but Toombs, Rhett, and Yancey, expecting 
 nothing from that source to justify a delay in foreign 
 diplomacy, said that the friendship of Europe should; 
 first be secured, and that the policy toward the<l 
 United States should depend upon circumstances. 
 There was a strong feeling, however, in the Confed 
 erate Congress, and especially in Alabama, in favor 
 of giving the first advantages of diplomacy to the 
 United States. Some expected that the desire for 
 cotton would induce the Government at Washing 
 ton to favor a treaty of peace with the Confederacy. 
 Yancey, the champion leader in " firing the South 
 ern heart " at the beginning of the secession move 
 ment, who had been spoken of for the presidency, 
 was asked by Davis to head the commission to Eu 
 rope, and P. A. Rost and Dudley Mann were named 
 as his colleagues. Yancey was born in 1814 and 
 elected to Congress in 1844. He had opposed the 
 Clay compromise of 1850, anticipated the coming 
 conflict, and prepared schemes for secession as early 
 as 1858. In January, 1860, he advocated the seces 
 sion of the Southern members from the Charleston 
 convention, if their demands were denied, and he be 
 came the chief manager in that convention and in 
 laying the program for secession from the Union. 
 P. A. Rost, born in France, 1797, had gone to Louis 
 iana in 1816, served in the Mississippi legislature in 
 1826, and a few years later removed to Louisiana 
 where he became judge in the Supreme Court. 
 Mann, born in 1801, had been sent as United States 
 consul to Bremen in 1842, commissioner to Hun 
 gary in 1849, an d minister to Switzerland in 1850, 
 after which he was appointed Assistant Secretary of 
 State (March 23, 1853). 
 
86 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Yancey found that Davis did not favor the policy 
 of negotiating commercial treaties, but expected to 
 base his diplomacy on the importance of the cotton 
 crop (much of the previous year s crop being still 
 on hand) and the legality of secession. When 
 Yancey informed Rhett of Davis s instructions, 
 Rhett, feeling that the United States had already 
 warned Europe, and that it would be necessary to 
 compensate the latter for the risk of recognition, 
 said: "You have no business in Europe, you carry 
 no argument that Europe cares to hear. My coun 
 sel is ... to stay at home, or to go prepared to 
 conciliate Europe by irresistible proffers of trade. 
 B. C. Yancey, who had recently been in England, anc 
 had " studiously sought information touching the 
 feeling of the Government there toward a probable 
 Southern Confederacy, and, also had applied himself 
 to ascertain the feeling of the laboring classes and 
 their leaders, Cobden and Bright," whom he found 
 would oppose the recognition of a slaveholders 
 Confederacy, advised his brother not to undertake the 
 mission, stating that the English Government, how 
 ever well disposed, could not run counter to the Ex 
 eter Hall anti-slavery influence. 29 
 
 Before the commission sailed, Congress and the 
 executive were urged to adopt a foreign policy simi 
 lar to that by which Franklin, Deane and Lee se 
 cured money and supplies during the American Rev 
 olution, but the commissioners only received power 
 to encourage practical reciprocity to aid them over 
 a crisis. The opposition afterwards complained that 
 
 - u Du Bose: Life and Times of Yancey, pp. 588-89. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 87 
 
 though the ports ,w~ere open for a year, cotton was 
 left on the plantations " while waiting for the United 
 States to fall into bankruptcy." 3 
 
 Yancey, though he failed to receive the instruc 
 tions which he considered necessary to success, ac 
 cepted the mission. The instructions to the commis 
 sion directed them to Inform Europe that secession 
 violated no allegiance, that opposition by the United 
 States was not expected, and that the South, with 
 abundant resources^was able to win, and was willing 
 to accept the treaties between the United States and 
 foreign powers and to make a treaty practically pro 
 viding for free .trade. The commissioners were later 
 authorized to issue commissions to privateers. They 
 sailed March 31, and were in mid-ocean when news 
 arrived from Washington that an armed fleet had 
 been sent to relieve Fort Sumter. A call for troops 
 by Lincoln followed, and Virginia seceded. 
 
 Rhett soon appealed to the Confederate Congress 
 to direct Mr. Davis to instruct the commissioners in 
 favor of a more liberal treaty, granting commercial 
 privileges for a period of twenty years. Perkins, 
 fearing that so long a period would extinguish the 
 infant manufactures of the South, proposed to make 
 it six years, stating that England was compelled to 
 have cotton anyhow. Rhett replied that Europe, for 
 a treaty securing vital relief for the Confederacy, 
 would require a twenty years guarantee, and that 
 
 30 It is said that six iron ships built for the East India 
 trade were, early in the war, offered to the Confederacy by a 
 Liverpool firm for ten million dollars, but that Mallory, 
 knowing the inefficiency of Memminger s department, omitted 
 to communicate this offer to President Davis. [Du Bose: 
 Life and Times of Yancey.] 
 
88 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 during this period the Confederacy would have time 
 to recuperate from the sacrifices of the war, which 
 might not end for six years. To those who sug 
 gested that goods could be smuggled into the 
 United States, he said that in case of such an event 
 the manufactures of the United States would be in 
 jured more than those of the Confederacy. He did 
 not think that a currency based on the cotton de 
 posited in the South as good as a treaty that would 
 make a cotton deposit in Europe the basis of a cur 
 rency; and he declared that if the cotton ports be 
 closed, England would engage in attempts to culti 
 vate cotton in India and her other possessions, and 
 would thus be led to discourage trade with the Con 
 federacy. The Perkins amendment carried, but on 
 the motion of Rhett the whole subject was laid on the 
 table. 
 
 Davis expected to get Europe to recognize his 
 Government and receive its ambassadors on grounds 
 of international duty. Memminger, also, feared to 
 sell the cotton on account of possible political ef 
 fects at home, stating that the United States would 
 make the blockade more effective if an attempt 
 should be made to take cotton out of Confederate 
 ports and that there was little probability that 
 Europe would send vessels to get the product even 
 if it should be stored in seaports. He said, that cot 
 ton stored by the Government on the plantations was 
 the best basis for currency and European diplomacy. 
 Soon after this many began to say that it should all 
 be destroyed by the Government, 81 and that notice 
 
 81 J. M. Daniels: Writings in the Richmond Examiner 
 during the Civil War (N. Y., 1868), Feb. 26, 1862. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 89 
 
 should be given to England that no more would be 
 raised until that power was willing to grant recogni 
 tion. The Confederate Government soon placed a 
 tax on cotton production. 
 
 Stephens had been strongly in favor of shipping 
 the cotton to Europe to pay for vessels to injure the 
 United States commerce and to hold at least one 
 Confederate port open while other Confederate ves 
 sels convoyed cotton to Europe where it could be 
 stored more safely than in the United States. He 
 was strongly opposed to the policy of Mr. Davis. 
 Many others preferred the exportation policy, and 
 strongly tried to convince Davis that his " cotton 
 famine policy " was wrong. 82 Some urged him to 
 sell to persons in the United States. Toombs, who 
 had desired the Confederate Government to take the 
 responsibility of rapidly exporting all the cotton to 
 Europe, chafed under red tape, and resigned because 
 he thought the administration was too timid. He 
 said that if he had been president he would have 
 mortgaged every pound of cotton to France and 
 England at a price sufficient to remunerate the plant 
 ers as well as to get the aid of the navies of England 
 and France. 33 It is doubtless true that the shipment 
 of 200,000 bales of cotton to Liverpool during the 
 first year of the war would have strengthened the \ 
 Confederate chances of securing a navy, but there 1 
 were, probably, insurmountable obstacles to this 
 policy. The Government was new and untried, and 
 the sudden blockade of Southern ports had not been 
 expected. Many merchant vessels made haste to 
 load and get away in March, 1861, but Bullock says 
 
 82 Mrs. Davis: Jefferson Davis. "Bullock. 
 
QO THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 there were not enough vessels to carry out the cot 
 ton even if it had been bought. General J. E. Johns 
 ton stating that the blockade was not effective unti 
 the end of the winter of 1862, declared that the Con 
 federate Government could easily have shipped 
 4,000,000 bales to England and received the mone> 
 for it. Memminger pronounced Johnston s views 
 impracticable and visionary, stating that the block 
 ade was instituted in May, 1861, and that it would 
 have required 4000 ships to get the cotton out be 
 fore that time. He said that private enterprise ship 
 ped as much as the Government could have shipped; 
 that the Government had no funds with which to 
 make purchases; that, even if there had been enough 
 treasury notes and bonds for that purpose, it would 
 have been a bad policy to use them to meet the ne 
 cessities of the planters; that the Government could 
 not have secured donations of cotton and did not de 
 sire to seize it; and, with the expectation that the 
 blockade would last for less than a year, the Govern 
 ment had no motive to store cotton as a basis of 
 credit. 8 * 
 
 Stephens, who was never very confident of recog 
 nition by European powers, always said that it was 
 a serious mistake at the beginning of the war to 
 consider cotton as a political instead of a commercial 
 power. 35 He strongly opposed the recommendations 
 which some made to cease cotton culture so and de 
 stroy the stock on hand in order to compel England 
 
 84 H. D. Capers: Memminger. 
 
 85 Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens. 
 
 80 The Confederate House, on March 3, 1862, passed a 
 resolution advising all growers of cotton and tobacco to 
 stop the cultivation of those products. [C. E. Evans (Ed.): 
 Confederate Military History, Vol. I, p. 436.] 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 9! 
 
 to raise the blockade. He had been in favor of the 
 Government paying ten cents a pound for all the 
 cotton that persons were willing to subscribe for 
 eight per cent bonds, and after the harbor system of 
 the South had been closed, Memminger adopted his 
 views as to the constitutionality of the Government 
 purchasing cotton, but Stephens said it was then 
 too late. 
 
 Yancey, Rost and Mann, on reaching Europe, 
 soon saw that the action of France and other powers 
 depended upon the policy of England who, though 
 opposed to slavery, desired commercial intercourse 
 with the South. They were encouraged by the Brit 
 ish neutrality act, recognizing the Confederacy as a 
 neutral, and later by the victory of Bull Run, and 
 hoped that the British Government would take of 
 fense at the harsh protests of Seward (who at that 
 time would have been willing to unite the North 
 and South in a war against England), but independ 
 ence was different from belligerency, and Adams, 
 anxiously keeping his hand on the British pulse 
 and watching every indication of variation, presented 
 all of Seward s protests in courteous language and 
 thus avoided an Anglo-American rupture. By their 
 active operations, the Confederates gave rise to im 
 portant legal and diplomatic questions, and to acrimo 
 nious correspondence between England and the 
 United States, and, at the time of the Trent affair 
 they anticipated complications which would induce 
 the British Government to take a stand favorable to 
 the Confederacy, but their hopes were disappointed. 87 
 
 37 On Aug. 24, 1861, Messrs. Yancey, Rost and Mann were 
 also appointed special commissioners to Spain with full 
 powers. 
 
 
92 $HjCON|.EDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Yancey s commission was embarrassed by lack 
 of funds 38 and secret agents, by Seward s vigorous 
 diplomacy, and by the fact that Europe read the news 
 from Northern papers, but soon after sending Mason 
 and Slidell to Europe the Confederacy decided to 
 spend more money abroad. Agents with secret ser 
 vice money were sent to influence public sympathy. 
 [The Index, a Confederate organ, was established at 
 London, editorials and other articles were prepared 
 for insertion in the prominent English and French 
 newspapers. About the latter part of 1862 Benja 
 min, in writing to De Leon, expressed a desire for 
 him to extend his operations to the press of Austria, 
 Prussia and other parts of central Europe. Henry 
 Hotze, the confidential agent at London, 30 in addi 
 tion to his press duties, also kept Mr. Benjamin in 
 formed on European public opinion, forwarding him 
 the London papers and the principal quarterly re 
 views. 40 Mason and Slidell each received a salary of 
 $12,000 with an allowance of $3000 for contingent 
 expenditures for limited objects. In January, 1864, 
 Mason wrote Benjamin that Slidell and himself both 
 
 88 When Yancey left London on the arrival of Mason he 
 borrowed money for his expenses. His salary had not been 
 remitted. ^&t~Z., 
 
 w Hotze was born in Zurich, Switzerland in 1834. In 1858 
 he was provisionally appointed secretary of the U. S. Le 
 gation at Brussels. In 1859 he became associated with John 
 Forsyth in editing the Mobile Register. In April, 1861, he 
 enlisted in the Confederate army. On Aug. 31, he was ap 
 pointed, by the Confederate war department, to proceed to 
 Europe to purchase supplies of war. On Nov. 14, he was 
 appointed commercial agent at London, where he founded 
 the Index. [The Mobile Register, May u, 1887.] 
 
 40 Instr. to Mason, No. 35, April 18, 1864. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 93 
 
 agreed that there " are objects of expenditure for 
 political ends, occasionally presenting themselves, 
 when it would be well that the commissioners in 
 Europe could have larger discretion." " This char 
 acter o/ expenditure might not generally admit of a 
 regular voucher but must be submitted to the integ 
 rity of the commissioners." On April 18, Benjamin 
 sent him 500 as a secret service fund. 
 
 When Mason and Slidell reached Europe the first 
 of February, 1862, Davis and Hunter were contem 
 plating the possibility that France and England, act 
 ing both from commercial and political motives, 
 would end the blockade by intervention, and, on Feb 
 ruary 8, prepared instructions urging that to prevent 
 the danger of future war or reunion, the area of the 
 Confederacy should be enlarged so as to include the 
 Chesapeake bay, the border states, and New Mexico 
 and Arizona.* 2 _Mason, while unsuccessfully urging 
 the British Government to adopt the policy of recog 
 nizing the Confederacy and breaking the blockade 
 to secure cotton, also directed his efforts to mould 
 public opinion through the press and social channels, 
 and took an active part in arranging for the con 
 struction of Confederate vessels in British ports. 
 Though he always exaggerated the chances of suc 
 cess, public opinion in favor of recognizing the Con 
 federacy was increasing in 1862. The battle of Fred- 
 ericksburg seemed to silence Southern opposition to 
 the Confederate Government, and Gladstone said 
 
 41 Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, No. I, Paris, Jan. 25, 
 1864. 
 
 42 Confed. " Dip. Cor., Great Brit." Hunter to Mason, 
 No. 4, Feb. 8, 1862. 
 
 
 
94 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 that Davis had " created a nation." When the Brit 
 ish Government awaited future developments and re 
 fused to join France in a policy of mediation, the 
 Confederate leaders were disappointed, and pro 
 nounced English neutrality a farce and an irony man 
 aged to the advantage of the United States. 43 The 
 Richmond Enquirer said that the English policy was 
 to let the war continue long enough to destroy the 
 strength of both North and South. 
 
 In November, 1862, Mason having been able " to 
 see and hear nothing from the British Government 
 officially or unofficially," suggested that a termina 
 tion of his mission might preserve the dignity of the 
 Confederate Government; but, in the same letter he 
 stated that his presence in London was really import 
 ant." As early as July, seeing that Russell would 
 neither receive him nor recognize the Confederacy 
 he had given a similar intimation, and, on September 
 26, Benjamin wrote him that Mr. Davis, though de 
 siring him to avoid being placed in the attitude of a 
 \suppliant, thought that he should await contingen 
 cies. In the last week of October, expecting San- 
 jiers to secure the construction of vessels in England, 
 
 "Alfriend: Jefferson Davis, Chap. 14. 
 
 ** Commander Sinclair arrived at London with an order of 
 the Confederate Navy for money to pay for building a ship; 
 but Bullock s funds were needed to meet contracts already 
 made, and, in order to avoid delay, Mason, as an agent of the 
 Confederacy, agreed to an arrangement with Lindsay arid Co. 
 [Despatches of Mason, No. 16, Sept. 18, 1862.] In October, 
 after a murder had occurred on the Swntcr at Gibraltar, 
 Mason authorized Bullock to sell the vessel and endeavored 
 to induce the English authorities to deliver the murderer at 
 some Confederate port. The government at Richmond after 
 wards approved his action in these matters. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 95 
 
 Davis, notwithstanding Russell s scant courtesy, " of 
 fensive arrogance and rude incivility," decided that 
 Mason had better remain waiting for public opinion 
 to force the British Government to change its policy. 
 But, in a speech to the Mississippi legislature in 
 December, after referring to former expectations ofj 
 recognition and intervention by foreign nations, he 
 said " put not your trust in princes . . . this war is 
 ours; we must fight it out ourselves." 4 The proba 
 bility that Russia, like England and France, would 
 postpone the question of recognition until the ques 
 tion of might was made clear, caused Benjamin to 
 hesitate in approaching Alexander II., but on No 
 vember 19 he instructed L. Q. C. Lamar to go to 
 St. Petersburgh and assure the Czar of the Confed 
 erate desire for friendly and commercial intercourse. 46 
 Russia was friendly toward the United States and re 
 fused to receive the Confederate commissioner. 47 
 
 Stephens, considering that France and England 
 while jealous of the growth of the United States were 
 also opposed to slavery, had " never looked to for r 
 eign intervention or recognition," and on September 
 I, 1862, in a letter to R. M. Johnston he said that 
 Davis should recall all commissioners. 48 Others held 
 the same views by the close of the year. In Jan 
 uary, 1863, Foote in the House urged this measure. 
 On January 15, the Richmond Examiner, commenting 
 
 I 
 
 "Alfriend: Jefferson Davis. 
 
 48 Walker Fearn was appointed as secretary. 
 
 47 Despatches from U. S. Legation, Russia: Bayard Taylor 
 to Seward, No. 30, March 3, 1863 (encloses intercepted com 
 munication of Benjamin to L. Q. C. Lamar). Also, 14 Instr. 
 Russia, Seward to C. M. Clay, No. 2, March 31, 1863. 
 
 ** Cleveland: A. H. Stephens, p. 761. 
 
96 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 upon Davis s policy to avoid a conclusion upon this 
 subject, also favored a withdrawal, and said that th<; 
 European powers as soon as they saw the end of 
 the struggle approaching would then have to send 
 ambassadors to Richmond instead of calling up 
 Southern commissioners " now waiting in servants 
 halls and on the back stairs." New York papers ot 
 March 30 published the Mason-Russell correspond 
 ence which had been brought before the public by a 
 resolution of Parliament, and the Richmond Whig of 
 April 6, republishing part of it, berated Russell for 
 his terror of Seward and his " perversion " of the 
 provisions of 1856 to which the Confederacy had 
 been induced to agree. In the Confederate House- 
 on April 6, 1863, Mr. Swan of Tennessee, moved z. 
 suspension of the rules to enable him to introduce 
 a joint resolution suggesting that Congress would 
 approve the removal of Mason from London. 48 The 
 vote stood 39 yeas to 39 nays, but as a two-thirds 
 vote was necessary Swan s motion failed. On April 
 13, the Sentinel abused Congress for differing with 
 the President as to the retention of the diplomatic 
 agents. 80 De Leon wrote Benjamin from Paris on 
 
 48 Richmond Dispatch, April 7, 1863. 
 
 60 On March 16, Mr. Davis sent to the Senate the name of 
 L. Q. C. Lamar as commissioner to Russia. The Senate 
 referred the nomination to the committee of foreign affairs. 
 The committee and the Senate did not think it expedient to 
 send a commissioner to Russia, and on April 13, in secret 
 session, requested Mr. Davis to state his reasons for making 
 such an appointment. Davis replied on April 20, but the 
 Senate adjourned May I without confirming the nomination, 
 and Lamar s commission thereby expired. Davis, while re 
 gretting the action of the Senate, deemed it his duty to yield. 
 [Confed. " Dip. Cor., Russia," Instr. to Lamar, June u, 
 1863, with enclosure of Burton N. Harrison to Benjamin.] 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 97 
 
 June 19, that by reason of the prejudice against 
 slavery no further attempts to get recognition should 
 be made, and renewed suggestions which he had 
 previously made that the commissioners should be 
 recalled from Europe. Slidell, considering De Leon 
 as a spy on his actions and his despatches, soon com 
 plained to Benjamin, 51 and, after some annoyance 
 caused by the interception and publication of objec 
 tionable correspondence, De Leon s agency was s 
 ended. 
 
 The Confederacy had felt inconvenienced and han 
 dicapped by the slowness of communication with 
 Europe, and was anxious to secure a sure and swift 
 transportation of despatches and news. George X. 
 Sanders had early tried to get the privilege to estab 
 lish a line of communication. 52 Benjamin would not 
 engage him in that capacity, but agreed to give him 
 a certain sum for the delivery of despatches from 
 abroad. 83 In October, 1862, Benjamin wrote Mason 
 that Mr. Fearn had arranged a plan for facilitating 
 intercourse, but Sanders continued to act as des 
 patch bearer until the beginning of 1863 when his 
 son Reid Sanders, while attempting to run the block 
 ade from Charleston, allowed important despatches 
 to be seized on his person, and caused Benjamin to 
 advise Mason to risk no more letters through that 
 agency. Despatches and supplies were afterwards 
 sent through L. Heyleger, at Nassau or via Bermuda. 
 In November, 1862, Mr. Lindsay proposed a plan for 
 establishing a direct line of French steamers, with a 
 
 51 Despatches of Slidell to Benjamin, No. 50. 
 
 52 Instr. to Mason, No. 8, Oct. 28, 1862. 
 
 53 Instr. to Mason, Feb. 7, 1863. 
 
 7 
 
98 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 view of diverting the trade of the West, and as far 
 as possible that of the North, through Norfolk and 
 other Confederate ports, but this line was not ex 
 pected to operate before the close of the war. 54 Dav s. 
 and Benjamin replied that the Confederate constitu 
 tion did not allow a grant of postal subsidies as pro 
 posed by Lindsay s plan, but suggested that Vi;*- 
 ginia as a state might grant such a subsidy. 55 About 
 the same time George McHenry made a proposition 
 for the establishment of an Atlantic mail line by Con 
 federate aid, but Davis, on the grounds that the Post 
 Office Department must sustain itself, and that tie 
 terms of transportation might be cheaper later, re 
 fused to accept the proposition. 58 Despatches con 
 tinued to be sent by British vessels via Halifax ard 
 through the Confederate agents at Bermuda ard 
 Nassau. 
 
 In the early part of 1863, Benjamin seeing little 
 hope of action by England and suspecting Napo 
 leon s designs in Texas, Louisiana and Florida, asked 
 Slidell to open communication with Spain by sug 
 gesting the advantage of alliance and offering to join 
 in a disclaimer as to designs on Cuba." President 
 Davis refused to recognize any longer the British * 
 consuls unless they obtained exequaturs from the 
 Confederate Government. 
 lln the middle of 1863 Napoleon with the United 
 
 M Despatches of Mason, Nov. 4, 1862, and March 19, 1863. 
 
 55 Instr. to Mason, No. 12, Jan. 15, 1863. Despatches of 
 Mason, Jan. 16, 1863. 
 
 M Instr. to Mason, No. 19, March 31, 1863. 
 
 87 An attempt was also made to influence public opinion in 
 Ireland. On March 7, 1863, Robert Dowling was appointed 
 as commercial agent at Cork. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 99 
 
 States map before him said he was only waiting for 
 England to act, and the Confederates believed they 
 had two advocates in the British cabinet and ex 
 pected to get others to support a resolution for rec 
 ognition, but it was in vain that they hoped to over 
 come the influence of the British Liberals and of 
 Seward, who with an eye to the future, w r as watch 
 fully making record of every case where he thought 
 the British Government had favored the Confeder 
 ates. When they turned secretly to secure the con 
 struction of vessels in British ports they found Se- 
 ward s consular agents watching the dockyards, and 
 securing evidence by which to emphasize protests 
 to the British Government. 58 In the autumn of 1863 
 Mason withdrew from London to Paris, and soon 
 received duplicate full powers addressed in blank so 
 he could fill them out himself and go to any English 
 capital, 5 " but contingencies not arising to call for his 
 services on the continent he alternated between Paris 
 and London until the close of the w r ar, drawing his sal 
 ary as a commissioner but having no diplomatic du 
 ties to perform. 80 At London, however, he aided 
 certain members of Parliament in attempts to em 
 barrass the Government and force it to recognize the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 58 Bullock, Vol. I. 
 
 69 Instr. to Mason, No. 34, Jan. 25, 1864. 
 
 60 On September 24, 1863, Mann was instructed, by Benja 
 min, to go to the Pope, who had expressed sorrow as to the 
 ruin and devastation of the war, and to assure him hat the 
 Southern people were desirous that the war should cease. 
 [Record i, Instr., p. 21.] On April 4, 1864, Rt. Rev. P. A. 
 Lynch, Bishop of Charleston, was appointed Special Com 
 missioner to the States of the Church, with full powers. 
 
IOO THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 On October 26, 1864, Benjamin published a copy 
 of a despatch, 61 which he prepared for publication in 
 Europe, with the purpose of showing that if the 
 United States continued the war she would be unable 
 to pay her debts abroad, and that the foreigners, in 
 order to escape ruin, ought not to lend her more 
 money. 6 " He also tried to impress Spain, England 
 and France with the statement that their American 
 
 \ possessions would be in danger from the desire of 
 he United States for empire. 
 
 There was considerable English sympathy for the 
 I secession movement, but the condition of parties, the 
 f sentiment against slavery, the active efforts of Eng 
 lish friends of the Union, together with the diplo 
 macy of Seward and Adams, prevented the success 
 of Confederate efforts to secure recognition or inter 
 vention. 
 
 Earl Russell in his " Recollections and Sugges 
 tions " says that the only grave error of his official 
 acts toward America was his neglect to detain the 
 Alabama. The British cabinet, while Napoleon was 
 intriguing and Anglo-American relations were 
 strained, was, as a rule, discreet and fair in its policy 
 ,of neutrality. Benjamin, Mason and Slidell all con- 
 jsidered that Earl Russell was cold, distant and un- 
 i friendly to their cause, and after 1862 their only hope 
 [was for a change of cabinet or complications, but 
 many members of the Lords and Commons were in 
 (frequent conference with Mason and openly express- 
 *ed the desire to embarrass the government and force 
 
 61 Instr. to Mann (circular), Oct. 10, 1864. 
 02 Weekly Register (Lynchburg), Dec. 24, 1864. J- B. Jones: 
 Diary, Oct. 26, 1864. The Index, Jan. 5, 1865. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY IOI 
 
 it to recognize the Confederacy. It has been said y 
 that the dress suit and digestive apparatus of Eng 
 land were hostile to the United States, but that the 
 cerebro-centres, heart and muscle were friendly. 
 
 Napoleon was held back by England and the 
 people. He held many conversations with Slidell and 
 was eagerly planning in the Tuileries to recognize 
 the South and break the blockade, but the capture 
 of New Orleans prevented any step he i^av;- have 
 contemplated without the cooperation of England. 
 He afterwards seemed to favor the constructicji x*f 
 Confederate vessels in French ports ancTit wa s prin 
 cipally the vigilance of Mr. Dayton, the American 
 minister, which prevented these vessels from reaching 
 the sea, but the Confederate agents asserted that the 
 Emperor had wilfully tricked them. 
 
 The Confederacy was disappointed in the power of 
 cotton to secure foreign influence. A report to the 
 Richmond congress in December, i864, 63 said tha 
 England, at the beginning of the war, possessed larg 
 stocks of cotton and cotton goods which the owner 
 sold for exorbitant prices, doing a smaller busines 
 in quantity but a larger one in value and leaving 
 their unemployed operators to be supported by oth 
 ers. Besides, from 1862 there was a steady flow of 
 cotton to both Europe and the Northern states. The 
 report to Congress stated that England had received 
 indirectly from the Confederacy since September, 
 1863, 4000 bales per week; that United States mer 
 chants also had the benefit of exports in Confederate 
 cotton through the trade with Mexico and the West 
 
 63 Geo. McHenry: Cotton Crisis, Dec. 18, 1864. 
 
IO2 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Indies, and had not drawn from Europe; that King 
 Cotton had been captured by United States vessels 
 while running the blockade, and had thus assisted the 
 finances of the United States. In February, 1862, 
 the Richmond Examiner proposed that the Govern 
 ment should burn the cotton to prevent it falling into 
 the hands of citizens of the North. 04 In October, 
 1862, Benjamin, desiring to secure army stores, gave 
 Mr. Dunnock permission to sell cotton on the coast. 
 Randolph,, the Secretary of War, urged the accept 
 ance -of offers by others to trade it for meat and 
 < a > 
 
 bread imports held by the United States. Davis hesi 
 tated, but on November 8, he consented to allow Gov 
 ernor Pettus of Mississippi to trade it for salt at New 
 Orleans which was under the jurisdiction of Butler. 
 In 1863, there were complaints that while the Con 
 federates could not place enough money in Europe 
 to pay for needed supplies, the United States was re 
 ceiving both cotton and information through the 
 blockade runners and the Southern Express Com 
 pany was monopolizing the railroads to deliver cot 
 ton to speculators who sent it into the North. In 
 April, 1863, it was said that importation by British 
 adventurers was contrived by Northern merchants 
 with the sanction of the United States Government 
 and that war supplies were therefore usually cap 
 tured. In March, 1864, J. B. Lamar of Savannah, 
 who had command of five steamers, wrote that he 
 could easily arrange with the Federal commanders 
 
 M Bunch, the British consul at Charleston, wrote Lord 
 Russell on August 15, 1862, that 1,000,000 bales of cotton had 
 been destroyed by the South. By the end of the year very 
 little was taken to the coast. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 103 
 
 to permit them to pass out with cotton by paying 
 one-half for freight. 53 On April 2, General Lee made 
 regulations to prevent cotton from passing to the 
 North unless allowed by the Richmond Government. 
 A month later Memminger favored a proposition of 
 Mr. Bond for the Government to give him a bill of 
 sale of ten thousand bales of cotton in exposed places 
 in the West " to be shipped via New Orleans to 
 Antwerp." In June, one of the commissary officers 
 in the West proposed to the Government to sell cot 
 ton on the Mississippi river for London exchange and 
 indicated that he had large sums to his credit by such 
 transactions. 
 
 George McHenry, in a pamphlet on the approach 
 ing " Cotton Crisis " published at Richmond, in De 
 cember, 1864, said that under the acts of the United 
 States Congress of July 2, by which the Secretary of 
 the Treasury was directed to authorize purchases of 
 products of the Confederate States, the North had 
 been getting cheap cotton, and the South receiving 
 dear bacon; that the trade had been winked at on the 
 part of some of the Confederate authorities; that 
 frauds had been practiced to a shameful degree; and 
 that there had been a constant drain of cotton from 
 Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas. On September 27, 
 1864, the Confederate cotton agent in Mississippi was 
 authorized by the Government at Richmond to sell 
 cotton in exposed situations to United States agents 
 for specie. In October, Beverly Tucker who was in 
 Canada made a contract by authority of the Secretary 
 of War to exchange cotton for bacon pound for 
 
 65 J. B. Jones: Diary. 
 
IO4 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 pound. The Secretary of the Treasury was not 
 pleased with the arrangement. 
 
 In January, 1865, Trenholm, Secretary of ihe 
 Treasury, authorized an agent to go to Augusta to 
 buy all the cotton for the Government, and then sell 
 it for the London exchange to parties who were to 
 be allowed to remove it within the Federal lines or 
 abroad. A month later speculators at Wilmington 
 seemed to want their cotton to fall into United States 
 hands. 
 
 There had been a considerable loss on the cotton 
 exchanged in Europe for supplies. The rate for 
 blockade running was extravagant and the cotton was 
 usually sold at less than the market price. Some 
 said it would have been far better to pay gold for 
 supplies and retain the cotton; others that the Gov 
 ernment should have assumed complete control of all 
 cotton and the regulation of the price. When the 
 Richmond Government saw that the war and the 
 blockade would continue, it arranged to use cotton as 
 the basis of a loan negotiated in Europe by Erlanger," 8 
 but its power to control the cotton was restricted by 
 a large amount in the hands of those who would not 
 sell, and it did not desire to seize the crops of those 
 who refused to receive a depreciated currency in pay 
 ment. The first efforts to ship cotton on Govern 
 ment account met with difficulty and delay. Ships 
 engaged in the blockade trade were owned by private 
 firms who wanted all their space and the ships owned 
 by the Government were wanted for other purposes. 
 On December 29, 1863, Mallory wrote Bullock that 
 
 98 Capers: Memminger. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY IO5 
 
 3100 bales had been shipped from Charleston and 
 Wilmington via Bermuda and Nassau to go to Fraser, 
 Trenholm & Co. Later he said that 1200 bales had 
 been purchased by the State Department and would 
 go forward as rapidly as possible. 67 At the beginning 
 of 1863, Bullock had suggested that the Government 
 should own its packets in order to avoid heavy 
 freights. In September, when Mason saw no pros 
 pect of another European loan, he wrote Benjamin 
 that the Confederacy in order to cheapen goods, 
 strengthen the Confederate credit and prevent the 
 United States from sharing in the profits of running 
 the blockade should take entire control of exporta 
 tion of cotton and the importation of supplies. 68 Bul 
 lock suggested the same to Mallory in October, stat 
 ing that the Confederacy should accumulate in Eu 
 rope a large supply of cotton by which to rule the 
 market and perhaps exert political influence. Again, 
 in November, he urged the building of special ves 
 sels for shipments by the Government. In December 
 Benjamin prepared a project for a " Bureau of Ex 
 port and Import," and early in 1864 he recommended 
 a Government monopoly in the export of cotton and 
 the import of necessary supplies. Congress adopted 
 the measure; and McRae, who had written from Paris 
 urging this plan, during the following summer con 
 tracted with Fraser, Trenholm & Co. for eight steel- 
 clad steamers, six of which reached the Confederate 
 coasts and made one or more trips before the close of 
 the war. Other vessels were begun but not com- 
 
 61 Bullock, Vol. II. 
 
 88 Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, No. 45, Sept. 5, 1863. 
 
IO6 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 jpleted. Notwithstanding the tone of unofficial 
 speeches in England, the British Government refused 
 to allow unarmed ships to escape when they were 
 clearly intended for use by the Confederates. 
 
 One of the principal factors in forcing the Confed 
 eracy to end the war was the lack of supplies which 
 cotton could have purchased if it could have been 
 shipped to Europe. The blockade by sea and by lane 
 was the principal cause of the Confederate failure 
 If the vessels at Liverpool and Bordeaux had beet 
 allowed to go to sea in 1864 the South might hav< 
 opened some of her ports./ George McHenry in hi 
 report on " the approaching 1 cotton crisis " in Decem 
 ber, 1864, said that if the Confederates could hav< 
 withheld their cotton from the outer world the pow 
 ers by that time would have been forced into a polic) 
 of recognition, but that a large share of it had abso 
 lutely been dissipated away; that most of the Con 
 federate legislation had operated to favor a few spec 
 ulators who had neither social nor political influence 
 across the Atlantic, and who, so long as they had con 
 tracts giving them the monopoly of the trade at 700 
 per cent profit did not care to see peace brought 
 about,""/ Mr. McHenry said that the cotton operators 
 in England who were over employed before the war 
 had invested money in the savings banks and had 
 been using it during the period of tinder-employ 
 ment since the war began, but that they had now ex 
 pended all their former earnings, and sold their fur 
 niture, and must soon have work. He held that Eng 
 land was in error in expecting an increased supply 
 
 09 Geo. McHenry: Approaching Cotton Crisis, Dec. 31, 
 1864. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY IO7 
 
 of cotton from countries which had hitherto produced; 
 little, and stated that the stoppage of the Confederate! 
 cotton leak would certainly produce a cotton crisis 
 in England some time during the year 1865 and cause 
 Manchester to force the ministry to recognize the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 frt the beginning of 1865* Mr. Davis and Mr. Ben 
 jamin had resolved not only to offer emancipation 
 f&r recognition or intervention by England and 
 Rrance, but to contract with syndicates at London and 
 Paris ^agreeing to seize cotton and furnish it to them 
 in payment for funds necessary to procure a navy. At 
 tliat time, however, no policy could have secured the 
 success of secession. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 In 1860 the Prince of Wales visited the northern 
 portion of the United States, going as far south as 
 Virginia. He slept at the White House, planted .1 
 tree at the tomb of Washington, and was given a re 
 ception indicating that Anglo-American relations 
 were more cordial than they had been for years. 
 When the storm of the "irrepressible conflict" burst 
 forth in torrents of fury the next year, the sympathy 
 of Queen Victoria, Prince Albert, the Prince of 
 Wales and the majority of the people of England was 
 with the Union cause. Slavery in the South , had 
 been a source of much annoyance to England, and the 
 Northern people hoped that the secession movement 
 would receive no support, but in this they were disap 
 pointed. Many of the aristocracy of England stood 
 for the South. London club life was Southern in its 
 sympathies and prominent English papers endeavored 
 to mould England in favor of the Southern Confed 
 eracy. Prominent statesmen considered that the 
 Union was " shooting the Niagara Falls." Lord 
 Russell spoke of the " late United States." The Earl 
 of Shrewsbury spoke of the trial and failure of democ 
 racy and prophesied the establishment of an aristo 
 cracy in America. In October, 1862, Gladstone said 
 that Jefferson Davis had made an army, a navy and 
 a nation. 
 
MISSION OF YAXCEY, ROST AND MANN (IOC) 
 
 On the day of Mr. Lincoln s inauguration Mr. 
 Gregory, in the House of Commons, gave notice of 
 motion to recognize the independence of the Confed^ 
 erate States; and, soon after, by a public letter, urged 
 this policy as a means of breaking up the slave trade, 
 and as a retaliation against the American tariff. 
 Many of the leaders of the Confederacy already had 
 strong expectations of securing early recognition by 
 both England and France, especially for commercial 
 reasons.JOn March 16, 1861, while Confederate com 
 mission eTs""were at Washington trying to open peace 
 negotiations with Secretary Seward, Mr. Toombs- 
 directed Yancey, Rost and Mann to go to London 
 " as soon as possible " (and then to other European 
 capitals) to press claims for recognition. 1 /The in 
 structions recite that dissolution was tfie result of 
 long and mature deliberation to escape the persistent 
 efforts to compel the agricultural South to pay bourp*j 
 ties to the North in the shape of high protective tar- 
 iff_S4_that secession violated no allegiance or rights; 1 
 that the Washington Government was not in a condi 
 tion to offer opposition; that a large party of Northern 
 people would not favor resistance to secession; that 
 there was no unusual reason to fear war; and that 
 the South had abundant means and determination, 
 jvpuld be joined by the border states, and would win M 
 | Power was given the commissioners to make a treaty 
 ^"practically providing for free trade. A willingness 
 was expressed to continue all the United States trea 
 ties except the clause providing for the maintenance 
 of a naval squadron on the coast of AfricaTi Though 
 
 1 Confed. " Dip. Cor.," Vol. I. 
 
IIO/ MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 / 
 
 the Confederacy had prohibited the slave trade, she 
 could not help the rest of the world to end it. With the 
 South controlling the Gulf coast, and one-half of the 
 Atlantic coast, and with her large exports of cotton 
 and her laisscz faire policy in commerce, it was ex 
 pected that England would be ready to oppose any 
 measure by the United States Government that would 
 interfere with trade. 2 After Sumter fell, Toombs 
 wrote (April 24) to the commissioners stating that 
 war was unavoidable but that unrestricted intercourse 
 with friendly nations was desired, 3 and he soon au 
 thorized them (May 18) to issue commissions for 
 privateers!"! In 1856 the powers of Europe had en - 
 deavorecPto persuade all nations to abandon priva 
 teering, but the United States having no large navy 
 had refused to join such an arrangement. Toombs 
 now stated that the large navy of the United States 
 made it necessary for the Confederacy to adopt this 
 
 2 W. H. Russell, an English journalist, who spent May of 
 1861 in the South, and had a seat on the floor of the legisla 
 tive assembly at Montgomery when it was not in secret 
 session, says in his diary (May 6th) that the press was fan 
 ning the flames, and that Browne, Assistant Secretary of 
 State, had informed him that 400 letters applying for letters 
 of marque and reprisal had been received by the Confederate 
 government. Russell visited the plain office of Mr. Davis, 
 and also that of the cordial Mr. Benjamin, whom he said 
 was " not afraid of anything." Benjamin stated that if 
 England declared privateers to be pirates the Confederacy 
 would consider it as a declaration of war, and meet it. He 
 was certain that if the United States claimed the Confederate 
 ports as United States ports, that the British law officers 
 would advise the British government not to recognize the 
 blockades. W. H. Russell: Diary, North and South. 
 
 3 Confed. " Dip. Cor.", Vol. I, Instr. to Y., R. and M., 
 No. 2. Ibid., No. 5. 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN III 
 
 method of warfare. He had made no allusion to 
 slavery in the first instructions, but he now stated that 
 it was evidently the intention of Lincoln to overthrow 
 domestic instituticns and to sweep away the rights 
 of the minority. The right of each state to judge what 
 are infractions of the constitution, and the remedy for 
 such infractions, was declared. Assurance of the en 
 thusiasm and unanimity of the South was given, and 
 the commissioners were instructed to present to 
 England the prejudicial results of the blockade. At 
 the same time Captain Bullock was sent to secure war 
 vessels in Europe. 
 
 Before the last instructions had been received the 
 three commissioners had reached London, and, on 
 May 3, through the-.good .offices of Mr. Gregory of / A/V V "~ 
 the House of Commons, had obtained J^ormal inter- u *JL** 
 view with Lord Russell. They stated that a new - 
 government in America had been formed without 
 shedding a drop of blood and was prepared to main 
 tain its independence and they emphasized especially 
 the unrestricted commercial advantages which Eng 
 land would obtain by recognition. 4 They said that 
 the tariff was the principal cause of secession, and 
 pointed to the new Morrill tariff as a means of nearly 
 excluding English manufactures from the North. 
 Earl Russell informed the commissioners that the 
 whole matter would be a subject of Cabinet consider 
 ation, but he expressed no opinion. Mr. Rost re 
 ceived more encouragement in Paris, where he had an 
 interview with Count De Morny, a confidential friend 
 of the Emperor Napoleon. The Count said that 
 
 4 Russell to Lord Lyons, May n, 1861. 
 
112 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 France and England had agreed to pursue the same 
 course, and that recognition was a mere matter of 
 time, but that it would be a fatal mistake to urge im- 
 ^mediate action. He stated- that France ; would be 
 ready to receive suggestions from the Confederates 
 unofficially and secretly, and that so long as cotton 
 was for sale both France and England would see that 
 their vessels reached the Confederate ports. In a 
 despatch to Secretary Toombs, the commissioners 
 expressed confidence that neither England nor 
 France were averse to the -disintegration of the 
 United States, but they feared that public opinion 
 against the Confederacy on the question of slavery 
 would embarrass the governments in dealing with the 
 question of recognition. 5 
 
 In April the British Government had concluded not 
 to intrude its counsels unsolicited to avert war. 6 On 
 May 2, Russell referred to the war as a bad one and 
 , said: "For God s sake, let us, if possible, keep out 
 of it." Though war had been declared by neither 
 party, Russell, in reply to Gregory, on May 6, an 
 nounced the decision of the law officers of the Crown 
 that the Southern Confederacy must be treated as a 
 belligerent as Greece had been in 1825, but he antici 
 pated no disagreement with the United States as to 
 the blockade. On the same day he wrote to the 
 British ambassador at Paris inviting the Emperor to 
 cooperate in a joint endeavor to obtain from each of 
 the belligerents certain concessions in favor of neu- 
 
 5 Confed. "Dip. Cor.," Vol. I, p. 105. Despatches of 
 Yancey and Mann, No. I, London, May 21, 1861. 
 8 162 Parl. Debates, Lords, April 29, 1861. 
 7 Sen. Rp. 1160, 54-2. 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 trals. The French minister concurred. 8 British 
 statesmen saw the necessity of warning British sea 
 men that privateering was against the foreign enlist 
 ment act, and on May 13 the government issued a 
 proclamation of neutrality between the United States 
 and " certain states styling themselves the Confeder 
 ate States of America." Earl Russell based his ac 
 tion on the " si?e and population of the seceding 
 states." He soon gave orders to interdict the en 
 trance of all ships of war or privateers with prizes, 
 into any of the British ports. 9 Some believed that 
 Russell felt that recognition of the independence of 
 the Confederacy was only a question of time, and 
 thought that he hurried his proclamation in order 
 to avoid the remonstrance of C. F. Adams, the new 
 American minister who was on his way to London. 
 W. H. Russell, the English journalist who was trav 
 elling in the United States, found people in the North 
 very indignant against England on account of the 
 British policy. 10 They pointed out that the United 
 States had taken no such unfriendly course during the 
 Canadian rebellion. 
 
 The British proclamation of neutrality, practically 
 recognizing the Confederacy as a belligerent, was 
 given at a time when the United States claimed that 
 no state of war existed, and that this action would 
 
 8 In March, 1861, Mercier at Washington seems to have 
 advised France to recognize the Confederacy. In May he 
 advised his government to intervene by raising the blockade. 
 About May 21 he was at Richmond and held prolonged in 
 terviews with Benjamin probably for the purpose of rescuing 
 tobacco which had been purchased by French citizens. 
 
 9 163 Parl. Debates, June 7, 1861. 
 
 10 W. H. Russell: Diary, p. 133. 
 
 8 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 be a means of aiding the secessionists in the estab 
 lishment of their power. Complaints were made tha 
 the British Government had not given the nev\ 
 American administration time to develop its policy o 
 ending the " demoralization " which had been grow 
 ing since the November election. The United State: 
 did not recognize the Confederacy as a belligeren 
 until President Lincoln under the act of Congress o 
 July 13, issued his proclamation of August 16, 1861. I 
 was stated that England knew the Confederacy ha< 
 no navy, and was aware that the United States consid 
 ered secession unconstitutional. Secretary Fish in 
 1869, in referring to the matter, said " the assumed 
 belligerency of the insurgents was a fiction . . . tho 
 anticipation of supposed belligerency to come, but 
 which might never have come if not thus anticipated 
 and encouraged." English writers, on the other 
 hand, said that President Lincoln s proclamation of 
 a blockade to suppress local insurrection practically 
 recognized belligerency, and that it had become nec 
 essary for Great Britain to protect the interests of 
 Her citizens which would be affected by the war. 
 
 A few hours after the British Government issued 
 its proclamation Charles Francis Adams arrived in 
 London to replace Dallas as United States minister, 
 and to oppose decidedly any wavering policy of the 
 British Government which might give the Confeder 
 ates hope of recognition. " You alone will represent 
 your country at London " said Seward in his instruc 
 tions to Adams, " and you will represent the whole of 
 it there. When you are asked to divide that duty 
 with others, diplomatic relations between the Gov 
 ernment of Great Britain and this Government will 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 1 15 
 
 be suspended." Before Adams arrived, Dallas 
 informed Seward of Russell s unofficial interview witr 
 the Confederate agents on May 3. Seward had also 
 learned that England and France had decided to act 
 together. He had not expected such an alliance, and 
 resolved to take no notice of it, but he was determined! 
 to take a decided stand against European interference; 
 in the war. On May 21, in a letter bristling with ref 
 erences to the danger of a war with European na 
 tions, and stating that the United States was ready 
 to meet such a war with confidence and success, he 
 wrote Adams that the United States after long for 
 bearance had a right to adopt a blockade as a means 
 of suppressing insurrection, and that the treatment 
 to be administered to Confederate privateers was a 
 matter for the United States alone to decide. 11 He 
 also stated that even unofficial intercourse with the 
 Confederates was hurtful to the United States and he 
 
 11 This letter had several of its teeth drawn by Lincoln 
 before it was sent. In the original draft Seward said, " We 
 intend to have a clear and simple record of whatever issue 
 may arise between us and Great Britain," but Lincoln struck 
 out this phrase, as well as others. W. H. Russell, in his 
 diary said that the relations of the United States with Eng 
 land probably were considerably affected by Seward s failure 
 in his prophecies as to the early suppression of secession. 
 He said that Seward, becoming more exacting and defiant, 
 and assuming higher ground as the Confederacy gained 
 power, had been " fretful, irritable and acrimonious," but 
 that Sumner was useful in allaying irritation. On July 4, 
 Seward told Mr. Russell that if any European power pro 
 voked a war the United States would not shrink from it, and 
 had nothing to fear from a foreign war, though it should 
 wrap the world in fire. Russell could not but admire his 
 confidence and coolness. It appeared that he, like Benjamin, 
 was " not afraid of anything. 
 
Il6 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 added " You will .... desist from all intercourse 
 whatever, official or unofficial, with the British Gov 
 ernment so long as it shall continue intercourse of 
 either kind with the domestic enemies of this 
 country." On June 14, Adams replied that Russell 
 declared he had " no intention of seeing them again." 
 Seward, by his constant vigilance, embarrassed the 
 Confederate commissioners at every corner. After 
 the passage of the Morrill tariff he expected that the 
 Confederates would ask for recognition as a retalia 
 tion and gave Adams his instructions to thwart the 
 arguments of the Confederates. He said that to seek 
 to destroy the Union as a retaliatory measure would 
 be far more injurious to the United States than the 
 temporary disadvantage of a revenue law could be to 
 England; he intimated that England should not as 
 sume that the Confederacy would offer more liberal 
 terms of trade than the North could offer; he stated 
 that the Confederates might in case of war find them 
 selves tempted to levy import duties, or be forced to 
 discontinue their offer of practically free trade; he 
 urged that most of the imports from Europe to the 
 United States were consumed in the North, and that 
 the Morrill tariff probably would not decrease the 
 amount; he declared that recognition would mean in 
 tervention and war, and that permanent disunion 
 would mean perpetual civil war and Confederate ag 
 gression for expansion, which might be fraught with 
 grave consequences to other nations and to the peace 
 of the world; he reminded England that recognition 
 would be a dangerous precedent to be set by a nation 
 whose bonds to her colonies might be put to a se 
 vere test by future insurrections. 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 1 1/ 
 
 By June the Confederate commissioners found that 
 the general opinion at London was that the North U/f 
 was too strong for the South. 12 Seeing no immediate 
 hope of recognition by England and France they sug 
 gested that communication should be opened with 
 Spain. Gregory had proposed to make a move in 
 the Commons on June 7, looking toward recognition, 
 but he postponed his motion at the request of Earl 
 Russell, who said it was opposed to public interests 
 to raise such a question. The commissioners were 
 hopeful, however, that the Confederacy would win 
 favor by the failure of Seward s pledges to restore 
 the Union in ninety days. In a recent interview with 
 the Confederate commissioners, Earl Russell had 
 seemed to be interested in their narrative of the con 
 duct of the United States toward the Confederate I 
 Peace Commissioners at Washington, but he only said \ 
 that. Great Britain desired to communicate with both 
 the United States and the Confederate States as to 1 
 the Declaration of Paris and the rights of neutrals, \ 
 and that the cabinet would consider all the questions 
 that arose but he could give no promise in regard 
 to recognition. 18 
 
 12 Despatches of Yancey, Rost and Mann, No. 2., June I, 
 1861. 
 
 13 On June 15 Lord Lyons and Mercier in an interview 
 with Seward proposed to read their instructions as to the 
 neutral attitude of their respective governments, and ascer 
 tain the position of the United States as to the Declaration 
 of Paris, but Seward already having been informed of the 
 substance of the instructions, and feeling that foreign powers 
 had no right (by assuming the attitude of a neutral) to decide 
 that the United States was divided into two belligerent par 
 ties, declined to hear them read, and a few days later in 
 structed Dayton at Paris and Adams at London, that the 
 insurrection in the South did not constitute a war. 
 
Il8 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 In 1856 representatives from the different Euro 
 pean governments met at Paris and agreed upon the 
 following declarations: 
 
 "(i) Privateering is and remains abolished. 
 
 "(2) The neutral flag covers enemies goods with 
 the exception of contraband of war. 
 
 "(3) Neutral goods, with the exception of contra 
 band of war are not liable to capture under the ene 
 mies flag. 
 
 "(4) Blockades in order to be binding must be ef 
 fective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient 
 really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." 
 
 At that time the United States, having a small 
 navy as compared to the nations of Europe with 
 whom there was a possibility of a contest in the fu 
 ture, felt that it was inexpedient to agree to a declara 
 tion against privateering unless private property 
 should be exempted from capture by sea. 14 
 
 Having practically recognized the Confederacy as 
 a belligerent, Lord Russell, on May 18, instructed 
 Lord Lyons at Washington to take steps to secure 
 the assent of the officials of the Confederacy to the 
 rules of 1856 in regard to a neutral flag, neutral goods 
 and blockades, and authorized him to confide the ne 
 gotiation to Robert Bunch, the British Consul at 
 Charleston. On July 5, Lord Lyons directed Bunch 
 , ^ to proceed in the negotiations with the Richmond au 
 
 thorities, using caution so as to avoid raising the 
 question of recognition. Mr. Bunch secured Mr,J\V^ 
 H. Trescot as an agent to lay the matter before Mr. 
 ^\ Davls7"and the latter, after a cabinet meeting, obtained 
 
 14 Exec. Docs., 24-3, Vol. I, p. 33- 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 1 19 
 
 the passage by the Confederate Congress of a resolu 
 tion maintaining the right of privateering, but ac 
 ceding to the Declaration of Paris on all other sub 
 jects. This resolution was approved August 13, and 
 England practically agreed not to interfere with pri 
 vateering by the Confederacy. 
 
 As soon as Seward heard of the negotiations with 
 the Confederacy he asked the removal of Bunch, but 
 Lord RusselJ accepted the responsibility of his acts 
 and refused to remove him, whereupon his exequatur 
 was revoked by President Lincoln on the ground that 
 his communication invited the insurgents to exercise 
 power belonging to a sovereign state to become a 
 party to an international agreement which was simi 
 lar to a treaty. The United States was willing to 
 accept the entire declaration of Paris, but England 
 did not desire her to accept the article against pri 
 vateering. 15 
 
 The Confederate commissioners abroad were still 
 watching the popular pulse. By July 15, Rost had 
 held an informal interview with M. Thouvenel the 
 French minister of foreign affairs. He found that 
 while France was ready to join the other powers in 
 an effort for peace it was necessary for her to look 
 [first to her interests in Europe. Yancey had joined 
 Lost in Paris, and he reported that the Emperor had 
 
 10 feeling hostile to the Confederacy but only waited \ 
 [or England. The commissioners were of the opinion 
 lat Spain, Belgium and Denmark were friendly and 
 
 feady to extend recognition as soon as England and 
 France should do so. In a letter complaining of the 
 
 13 J. B. Moore: International Arbitrations, Vol. I, pp. 
 V>4-65. 
 
120 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 neglect of the Confederacy to keep the commissioners 
 well informed as to vessels entering and clearing Con 
 federate ports, and urging the establishment of a se 
 cret line of communication by way of Canada, he said 
 that opinion was becoming reconciled to secession as 
 a fact though it had been opposed to it as a theory. 
 In a letter to Toombs (July 15) the commissioners 
 stated that relations between Mr. Adams and the 
 British Cabinet were neither amicable nor satisfac 
 tory. It was seen that complications might arise to 
 the advantage of the Confederacy. But Adams was 
 successful in breaking off the personal interviews be 
 tween Russell and the commissioners, and this caused 
 a difference of opinion in the commission. Yancey 
 thought that Russell s concession to Adams s de 
 mand was a violation of British neutrality. He said 
 that the cause of the Confederacy could not be ade 
 quately explained in writing, nor the temper of the 
 British Government be discovered, and urged that a 
 firm but moderate protest should be made, but Rost 
 and Mann objected to the protest and the subject was 
 referred to Richmond. 10 
 
 After the Confederate victory at Manassas (Bull 
 Run), in July, the commissioners were encouraged to 
 renew their efforts and to furnish Russell with a long 
 communication giving reasons for immediate recogni 
 tion. R. M. T. Hunter, who had replaced Toombs, 
 informed the commissioners that Union sentiment in 
 the South had been silenced, and that Maryland and 
 Missouri were kept in the Union only by Federal 
 troops. 17 Even in the United States some said that 
 
 16 Du Bose: Yancey. 
 
 L! Confed. " Dip. Cor.," Vol. I. Instr. to Y., R. and M., 
 No. 7, July 29, 1861. 
 
} Y*-t^v 
 
 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 1^12* 
 
 the Union was as dead as the Achean League. 18 Earl 
 Russell in a note of August 7 intimated a desire to -^ 
 have a written explanation of the alleged right of the 
 Confederate States to recognition by England. 
 Yancey and Mann replied on August 8, promising to 
 prepare the document. Rost came from Paris, the 
 document was prepared the next week, and on August 
 14 it was presented, j It reviewed the two previous in 
 terviews, and the instructions of the Confederate 
 Government, and urged that the secession violated 
 no principles of allegiance, but was sustained by the 
 principles of the American Declaration of Independ 
 ence in favor of self-government. 
 
 The commissioners had already expatiated upon 
 the extent, products and population of the Confeder 
 acy, offering arguments to prove that they were not 
 rebels and pirates. They now explained why it was 
 necessary for the agricultural South to resort to pri 
 vateering in order to injure American commerce, 
 stating that the English law of neutrality as to ports 
 favored the United States. They announced that 
 the blockade was ineffective except on the Chesa 
 peake, that Confederate resources were abundant and 
 that reconstruction was impossible. They then pro 
 ceeded to show that anti-slavery sentiment could not 
 remain in sympathy with the North. They were 
 aware of the strength of this sentiment in Europe 
 and of its influence in preventing friendly relation 
 with the Confederacy. They did not undertake to 
 discuss the morality of the institution; but they stated 
 that the authors of the Declaration of Independence 
 
 18 W. H. Russell: Diary, July 23, 1861. 
 
122 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 found the African race in the colonies, in slavery by 
 English law and by the laws of nations, that they left 
 that fact where they found it, and made the declara 
 tion of freedom for the white race only and perpetu 
 ated slavery in the fundamental theory of the gov 
 ernment. As to the wisdom of the fathers, they said 
 that it was not a matter for them to discuss. But 
 they informed Russell that the United States Con 
 gress had declared that the war was prosecuted only 
 to maintain the constitution and to preserve the 
 Union. "It was not from fear of liberation of the 
 slaves," they said, " that secession took place. The 
 new party in power has proposed to guarantee slav 
 ery forever, if the states of the South will but remain 
 in the Union." Some at this time surmised that the 
 United States might change its policy in regard to 
 slavery. The commissioners met this squarely by 
 stating that the abrupt destruction of a labor system 
 which had given bread to 10,000,000 people engaged 
 in manufacturing, and reared so vast a commerce be 
 tween America and Europe, " would be disastrous to 
 the world as well as to the master and the slave." In 
 urging the claims of the Confederacy to recognition 
 as a de facto Government, Texas and South America 
 were mentioned as precedents, and reference was 
 made to the necessity of British commercial rela 
 tions with the South in order to preserve great inter 
 ests in England. As an inducement to break the 
 blockade the commissioners stated that the cotton 
 crop would be delivered at the Southern wharves and 
 ports whenever there was a prospect of the blockade 
 being raised, and not before. An embargo had been 
 laid as an offensive measure against the passage of 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 cotton across the border into the United States, thus 
 making it necessary for Europe to seek it at the ports 
 of the South. 19 The commissioners closed their com 
 munication by saying that they would be surprised if 
 England left the Confederacy to contend alone for 
 interests which \vere as important to the commercial 
 powers of Europe as to herself without giving even 
 friendly countenance, but they said that the citizens 
 of the South would continue their task with vigor 
 and that when peace should be won they would not 
 be responsible for all the bloodshed and for the suf 
 fering of millions in the eastern as well as the western 
 hemisphere. 20 
 
 Going to Paris, the commissioners had an interview 
 with the minister of the marine and colonies, who 
 gave hopeful intimations. They also soon receivec 
 private information that the letter of/ August 14 hac 
 made a good impression on Russell; that there was 
 a strong feeling in the cabinet in favor of recognition 
 and that England had suggested to France to take the 
 nitiative in European recognition. They also learned 
 :hat Louis Napoleon had officially asked England to, 
 cooperate with him in recognizing the Confederacy 
 and breaking the blockade, but that England had re-; 
 used. Cotton had gone up 100 per cent; the facto- 
 ies were running on short time and there was a 
 :>read riot in Paris. But France could not lead in a 
 policy of intervention or interference.! 
 
 3 Raising the blockade by England of course meant war 
 with the United States. In order to open the blockade, 
 Yancey, Rhett and Toombs had desired that the Confederacy 
 should adopt a policy of offering England a practical monop 
 oly of commerce for twenty years, as well as other stipula 
 tions. * See McPherson: Rebellion. 
 
\ 
 
 124 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 ^4 Russell replied on August 24, stating that the Brit- 
 fish Government did not pretend to pronounce judg 
 ment on questions in debate between the United 
 States and her adversaries in North America; that it 
 desired to remain neutral and would perform all tl e 
 duties required of a neutral; that it could not ac 
 knowledge the independence of the Confederacy until 
 arms or some peaceful mode of negotiation should 
 better determine the respective positions of the two 
 belligerents. 1 Yancey soon sent Hunter a letter of 
 resignation. 
 
 On August 24, Hunter instructed the commission 
 ers to hurry to Madrid, to inform Spain that since 
 secession the South no longer desired Cuba; to reprc- 
 ; sent that mutual interests seemed to invite a close and 
 mutual alliance; and to ask for recognition. It was 
 
 1 stated that both Spain and the Confederacy were 
 interested in the same social system, that the growth 
 of Spanish power and resources could never be a 
 cause for Confederate jealousy, but that in case of 
 reunion the non-slave-holding states would also desire 
 to annex the Spanish colonies. It was suggested that 
 Spain would be justified, even at some risk, in assist- 
 
 " ing to build up a great friendly power that would 
 prove so advantageous to her. 22 
 
 A short time after Hunter s instructions were writ- 
 v x ten, an act of the Confederate Congress disunited 
 the European commission, and on September 23, Mr. 
 i Davis appointed Mason and Slidell 23 as commission 
 ers to England and France respectively with instruc- 
 
 21 51 Brit, and Foreign State Papers. 
 
 22 Confed. " Dip. Cor.," Vol. I, p. 120. 
 88 Instr. to Mann, No. n, Sept. 23, 1861. 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 tions to urge that the new " homogeneous " Southern 
 union could serve as no precedent for revolutionary 
 violence, that its existence was of deep commercial 
 and political interest to other nations, and that they 
 should intervene against American intervention and 
 an ineffectual blockade. Of the former commission 
 Mann was sent to Belgium, Rost was expected to go 
 to Spain, and Yancey was asked to remain in Europe 
 until Mason should arrive. Though Mason received 
 his instructions September 23, he did not reach Eu 
 rope until January 29/1862. 
 
 In the meantime the attitude of the European pow- 
 rs toward the blockade was *a disappointment to the 
 Tonfederacy. Russell, having heard of Mercier s 
 .dvice to the French Government, to intervene and 
 orcibly raise the blockade, wrote to Palmerston, on 
 3ctober 17, that there was much good sense in Mer- 
 ier s observations, but that it was not advisable to 
 >reak a blockade merely for the sake of getting cot 
 ton. He intimated that good offices for pacification 
 should first be offered, and that in case they failed, 
 intervention on a large scale might be taken about the 
 end of the year in order to close the war. Palmers- 
 ton was not ready at that time, and such an aggres 
 sive action would have been less popular in England 
 after the American concession in the Trent affair. 
 The English Government knew that the recognition 
 f the tonfederacy would place England in the atti- 
 ude of an ally against the United States, and there 
 ;as no desire to assume such a position. 
 
 Yancey, after a short stay in France, returned to 
 England intending to depart for the Confederate 
 States at an early date. He was still confident of the 
 
126 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 ability of the South to resist the superior numbers and 
 resources of the North. In November, at a dinner of 
 the Fish-monger s Society, he stated that the Souta 
 could live under a blockade. Yancey s return to the 
 Confederacy was delayed by the capture of Maso-i 
 and Slidell on the British steamer Trent. Mr. 
 Hanckel of Charleston, on the arrival of the Trent i i 
 England, delivered to Mr. Yancey and his associates 
 the instructions which had been given Mason an i 
 Slidell. "* Information of the Trent affair reached 
 London November 27, and the press was indignant. 
 Yancey, immediately, while war was menacing, ur 
 gently renewed the attempt to get recognition, anc", 
 in order to show the inefficiency of the blockade, pre 
 sented information (brought by Mr. Hanckel) of a list 
 of over forty vessels which had passed the blockade in 
 safety (up to August 7). 
 
 In the letter to Russell (November 30) the commis 
 sioners, stating that the United States and the Con 
 federacy had both agreed to the Declaration of Paris 
 on the subject of the blockade, urged that the Euro 
 pean powers should enforce it, not only because of the 
 principles of the Declaration, but also from the inter 
 ests affected. They declared that a war shutting up 
 cotton was directed against Europe as well as against 
 the Southland suggested that since transit routes had 
 been made neutral, cotton could be made so. They 
 informed Russell that no blockade would ever sub 
 due the South, but that it should be declared ineffec 
 tive for the interests of mankind as well as for those 
 of the Confederacy. They insisted that real neti- 
 
 U. S. and Confed. Naval Records, Series i, Vol. I, p. 155- 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 127 
 
 trality called for a rigid observance of international 
 law on the subject <^L blockades, and that Europe 
 should not give aid to the United States through 
 considerations of her embarrassed condition. 25 
 
 Russell briefly replied December 7, as follows: 
 " Lord Russell presents his compliments to Mr. 
 Yancey, Mr. Rost and Mr. Mann. He has had the 
 honor to receive their letters and enclosures of the 
 27th and 3Oth of November; but in the present state 
 of affairs he must decline to enter into any official 
 communication with them." 
 
 The Confederate expectations which arose after the 
 Trent affair were gradually dissipated when the 
 course of the United States Government became 
 known. When Slidell reached Paris in February, 
 1862, Rost handed him a " Confidential Memoran 
 dum " dated "London, 31 Jan., 1862," and indicating 
 a correspondence between the British-Cabinet and the 
 maritime powers of Europe concerning the Federal 
 " Stone Fleet," and the blockade, in which the powers 
 alluded to the blockade as ineffectual. 28 But Slidell 
 said that the memorandum was either a hoax played 
 on Rost s credulity, or an invention of his own. 
 Yancey left London upon Mason s arrival, carrying 
 with him Mason s first despatch, which narrated the 
 incidents relating to his eventful journey, and reported 
 that the ministry seemed to " hang fire." Running the 
 blockade at Sabine Pass, Yancey reached New Or 
 leans, where he informed Soule and others that Prince 
 Albert and Queen Victoria were against the seces- 
 
 25 51 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, pp. 254-57. 
 28 Despatches from Mason to Benjamin, No. 25, January 14, 
 1863. 
 
128 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 
 
 sionists, and that English feeling was so strong 
 against .slavery that the Government would hardly 
 dare to give any help that would tend to perpetuate 
 the institutiori.(Tpn March 29, Mr. Davis accepted 
 Yancey s resignation with regretT""] 
 
 Rost, after an interview with trie French minister in 
 Paris in the latter part of January, 27 soon went to his 
 post at Madrid. In March he was informed by 
 Mr. Calderon Collantes that Spain was not ready to 
 take the initiative in Europe in a policy recognizing 
 the Confederacy. 28 There was no encouragement in 
 this mission. While waiting for news Rost wrote to 
 Yancey, on April 7, that there was no hope from Eu 
 rope until the United States should be ready to treat 
 with the Confederacy as an independent power, and 
 he thought it was to the interest of the South to 
 make concessions to secure an alliance with the 
 North. Seeing "that the Confederacy would have a 
 big war debt to pay, he suggested that the South 
 should intimate to the North its willingness to agree 
 to make its tariff equal to that of the North for a lim 
 ited time, dispensing with frontier custom houses and 
 having practically free trade with the United States. 
 He was willing to give the North commercial advan 
 tages in order to avoid frontier troubles, and said that 
 if other nations complained they could be reminded 
 of their course in the Confederacy s hour of need." 9 
 In bad health, and discouragedf~Rost resigned in 
 
 "Despatches of Slidell, No. i, Feb. n, 1862. Rost s inter 
 view of Jan. 31 was in regard to the blockade, and the 
 number of vessels leaving Cuba for Confederate ports. 
 
 28 Despatches of Rost, March 21, 1862. 
 
 29 Rost to Yancey, April 7, 1862. 
 
MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 129 
 
 May and left Madrid with his familyV- jThe following 
 September his health was still wretCTred and he had 
 not changed his views. 30 He said that France waited 
 for England, that England would do nothing so long 
 as she could keep peace a.t home, and that Spain would 
 be the last power to act. 31 
 
 30 Despatches of Rost, Paris, Sept. 13, 1862. 
 
 31 Perry, who represented the United States at Madrid in 
 1861, before the arrival of Carl Schurz, stated that the sym 
 pathies of the Spanish government at the beginning of the 
 war were favorable to the " faction " which seemed to offer 
 some hope of dividing the United States and diminishing 
 her power in the western hemisphere. He said that Preston, 
 of Kentucky, during the latter part of his term as United 
 States minister at Madrid, had endeavored to impress the 
 governing classes with the belief that the aristocratic and 
 chivalrous society was in the South, and that the sans culottes 
 democracy was at the North. Perry stated that the conserva 
 tive classes were at the North, and the filibusters at the 
 South. From speeches of Southern leaders at the outbreak 
 of the Civil War he showed that they contemplated annexa 
 tion of Cuba, San Domingo and Mexico, and that the Union 
 of South and North was the best guarantee to Spain of her 
 own peace in North America. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 
 
 On October 12, 186$, Secretary Hunter received 
 from W. H. Trescot, of Charleston, a telegram of 
 which the following is the substance: " Our friends 
 left here last night at one o clock. Their escape was 
 favored by having a fast steamer with good officers, 
 and by the darkness and rain. The boat will be back 
 in about a week and nothing should be said of it in 
 the meantime." : 
 
 " Our friends " were James Murray Mason and 
 John Slidell, who on September 23 had received their 
 instructions as commissioners to Engffhd and 
 France 7 , respectively. 2 It was felt that the Confeder 
 ate claims for recognition had been recently strength 
 ened, and the commissioners were sent to obtain aid 
 in every way possible. Both had been prominent 
 men in national affairs. 
 
 James Mason was born in Fairfax county, Virginia, 
 in 1798. He was a grandson of George Mason who 
 had been prominent in the Revolution. He graduated 
 from the University of Pennsylvania in 1818, prac 
 ticed law in Virginia, served in the state legislature, 
 and was a member of the state constitutional conven 
 tion of 1829. In 1833 he was elected to the United 
 States House of Representatives. In 1847 he entered 
 
 1 With Despatches of Mason. 
 
 2 Confed. " Dip. Cor.," Vol. I. 
 
MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 13! 
 
 the United States Senate, of which body he remained 
 a member for fourteen years, and for ten years was 
 chairman of the committee on foreign affairs. He 
 was the author of the fugitive slave law of 1850, and 
 was always a strong opponent to anti-slavery agita 
 tion. He had urged secession in Virginia when a 
 majority favored the Union, and took a prominent 
 part in changing the decision of his state. He was 
 a member of the Confederate Congress when ap 
 pointed commissioner. 
 
 John Slidell was born in New York about 1793, 
 graduated at Columbia in 1810, moved to New Or 
 leans in 1819, and began the study of law. After 1828 
 he became prominent in Louisiana politics and in 
 1842 he was elected to Congress where he served one 
 term. In 1845 ne was sent as commissioner to 
 Mexico, but Mexico refused to receive him. In 1853 
 he entered the United States Senate and remained 
 until his state seceded in 1861. He represented the 
 extreme views of the South, and was active on com 
 mittees, though not prominent in debate. In send 
 ing these two commissioners to Europe the Confed 
 eracy hoped soon to receive such support as would 
 enable it to break the blockade. 
 
 The investment of the Southern ports was becoming 
 severe. At the beginning of the war the United States 
 navy undertook to blockade the coast of 1900 miles, 
 capture seaports, acquire control of bays and sounds, 
 assist in opening the Mississippi, destroy Confeder 
 ate cruisers, and protect United States commerce. 
 Most of the steam vessels were abroad when Sumter 
 fell and there was then no cable to call them home, 
 but the resources of the North soon created a large 
 
/^^ A A^*~~ * j 
 
 l^tJ**^*^* /Jf 
 N AND SLIDELL ~*~ x>*~ 
 
 132 MISSION OF MASO 
 
 navy. On April 27, 1861, Lincoln, in order to stop 
 the trade and supplies of the Confederacy, declared a 
 blockade of all the Southern ports, and slowly this 
 became more and more effective. The cotton exports 
 of $202,000,000 in 1860 fell to $42,000,000 in 1861, and 
 to $400,000 in 1862. This was a serious blow to the 
 South, which was dependent on England for supplies. 
 A social and industrial revolution had improved the 
 conditions in the free states, but during the century 
 there had been very little change in the slave states. 
 The flow of European immigrants passed by the South 
 to carry their skill, energy and free labor to the new 
 homes in the Northwest, so that the resources of the 
 slave states remained undeveloped, owing to their 
 peculiar industrial system. The South had no ships, 
 no gun factories and no machine shops. Even medi 
 cines had to be bought in a foreign country. But 
 the English manufacturers and merchants, and four 
 million laborers, depended upon American raw cotton, 
 of which the South in 1860 had raised 4,700,000 bales. 
 Smuggling naturally took place in spite of the block 
 ade, but by means of the increase of Federal vessels, 
 and by sinking the hulks of vessels in the channels 
 leading to Charleston, the investment became so 
 effective that cotton fell to eight cents in South Caro 
 lina and rose to fifty cents in England notwithstand 
 ing the fact that Nassau had become a centre for 
 blockade-runners which carried it out on moonless 
 nights and during storms. The distress of the South 
 increased, for want of manufactured goods, and the 
 people could not thrive under isolation from Europe. 
 
 3 T. E. Taylor: Running the Blockade, pp. 16-32, 44-54. 
 
MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 133 
 
 Would England and France recognize the Confed- 
 leracy and oppose the blockade? 
 
 Mason, with power to make peace, had been 
 directed to " proceed to London with as little delay as 
 possible," in order to state the Confederate position 
 md urge recognition and opposition to the blockade 
 as a means of shortening an unnecessary war and sub 
 serving the interests of England as well as of the 
 Confederacy. He was instructed to say that a dom- 
 nant majority in the United States had violated the 
 original compact which had been made between sec 
 tions with diverse social systems, and that the Gov 
 ernment no longer protected the Southern system; 
 that the South, seeking self-government, had decided 
 to form a new union of more homogeneous materials 
 and interests, but that the old institutions would be 
 retained, the form of government not being changed, 
 and that secession would furnish no precedent for the 
 overthrow of lawful authority by revolutionary vio 
 lence; that the United States had rejected the offers 
 of amicable adjustment by peaceful separation; that, 
 notwithstanding the advantage of organization which 
 the United States had at the beginning of the strug 
 gle, the Confederacy now had a responsible Govern 
 ment, a united people, 200,000 men in the field and 
 bright prospects, while the North was suffering from 
 failures; that the English people had a deep political 
 and commercial interest in the establishment of the 
 Confederacy because the latter would not be a rival, 
 but a customer, of the manufacturing and commercial 
 nations that it would favor free trade, prevent the 
 United States from any longer controlling the cotton 
 supply, and end the former Southern desire to seek 
 
134 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 
 
 protection and balance of power by the annexation 
 of contiguous territory. The instructions stated that 
 the South had resolved to seek protection by separa 
 tion instead of by annexations, and would no longer 
 threaten to disturb the peace of the world, but would 
 be a bond of peace between the nations. 
 
 It was urged that the recognition of the Confederacy 
 would be in accord with the previous policy of Eng 
 land. Lord John Russell, in recent despatches to 
 Lord Cowley on the Italian question, referring to the 
 consistent principles upon which England had acted 
 since 1821 (at Troppau, Laybach, Verona, and in 
 the cases of South America, Greece and Belgium), 
 said: " She uniformly withheld her consent to acts 
 of intervention by force to alter the internal govern 
 ment of other nations; she uniformly gave her coun 
 tenance, and if necessary her aid, to consolidate the 
 de facto governments which arose in Europe or 
 America." The Confederate instructions stated that 
 to withhold recognition would encourage the inter 
 vention of the United States, and invited the applica 
 tion of English principles. Hunter desired England 
 to treat the case of the Confederacy as she had that of 
 Italy, concerning which Russell had recently said: 
 " We, at least, are convinced that an authority restored 
 by force of arms, maintained by force of arms, con 
 stantly opposed by the national wishes, would afford 
 no solid and durable basis for the pacification and wel 
 fare of Italy." Hunter s instructions also insisted that 
 England should enforce the Declaration of Paris upon 
 the question of blockade; that a war shutting up cot 
 ton was directed against manufacturing nations and 
 humanity as well as against the producing nations; 
 
MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 135 
 
 and that cotton should be made neutral, like transit 
 routes, and protected by most of the chances of war. 4 
 
 The strict blockade made it difficult for Mason and 
 Slidell to leave the Confederacy. Going to Charles 
 ton, they awaited a favorable opportunity. They 
 found three United States steamers and a sloop-of- 
 war patrolling the harbor. On October 3 they con 
 templated taking the route through Texas and Mata- 
 moras unless they were otherwise directed. 5 But the 
 next day, before receiving a reply from Hunter, they 
 decided that the route by Mexico would be imprac 
 ticable and unsafe. They found that the Gordon, a 
 good sea boat of 500 tons, could go at any time, and 
 by any route, to Nassau or Havana, and that it could 
 be bought for $62,000, or chartered to either port for 
 $10,000 for the trip, the Government to pay for its 
 value if captured. On October 9, the Gordon was 
 chartered and its name changed to Theodora, and on 
 the night of October 12, Mason, Slidell, with his wife 
 and four children, J. E. Macfarland, and George 
 Eustis 6 and wife, started on their journey to Europe. 
 As they left the harbor, a shower of rain increased the 
 darkness, and they passed within a mile and a half of 
 the nearest United States ship without being captured. 
 When near Nassau they learned that they could not 
 obtain a steamer from that point to St. Thomas, and 
 instead of landing they determined to go to Cuba. 
 
 The Theodora reached Havana October 17, but the 
 
 4 Confed. " Dip. Cor.", Vol. I, pp. 146-60, Hunter to Mason, 
 Sept. 23, 1861. 
 
 5 Despatches of Mason. Telegram, Oct. 3, 1861. 
 
 3 Macfarland and Eustis were the secretaries of Mason and 
 Slidell, respectively. 
 
136 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 
 
 Confederate party disembarked at Cardenas, where 
 they were hospitably treated by a planter until they 
 were ready to go to Havana. At the latter port, the 
 British consul, Mr. Crawford, introduced them to Gen 
 eral Serrano, who received them unofficially. Slidell 
 wrote that they found almost universal sympathy in 
 Cuba. 7 After their departure from Charleston had 
 become known in the Confederacy, there had been an 
 expression of much delight. The Richmond Exam 
 iner of October 29, said that the bold, straightforward 
 manner of Mason at London would wield an influence 
 in England which would enable him to sign a treaty 
 of amity. But Wilkes, stopping at Havana, resolved 
 to prevent both Mason and Slidell from reaching 
 Europe. 
 
 On November 7, the steamer Trent, with the Con- 
 ederate party on board, left Havana for St. Thomas, 
 nd the next day in Bahama channel a second shot, 
 red across her bows from the San Jacinto, caused her 
 stop. Lieutenant Fairfax of the San Jacinto was 
 nt on board with instructions from Wilkes to capture 
 iason, Slidell, their secretaries, their baggage and 
 espatches. Captain Moir of the Trent was indig- 
 ant but courteous. The commissioners refused to 
 eave the vessel peaceably, but they arranged their 
 aggage and, under protest, yielded to arrest. The 
 rent, though its seizure had been contemplated, was 
 allowed to proceed with its excited passengers, some of 
 whom indulged in emphatic words of anger. The 
 San Jacinto reached Fortress Monroe November 15, 
 and sailed by way of New York to Boston, reaching 
 
 7 Despatches of Slidell, No. I, Paris, Feb., 1862. 
 
MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 137 
 
 the latter place on November 24. During the voyage 
 Mason and Slidell were kindly treated, being allowed 
 to occupy Captain Wilkes cabin. They were taken to 
 Fort Warren and given comfortable quarters. 8 In 
 their baggage were fine liquors and cigars, but their 
 despatches had been given to Mr. Hanckel of Charles 
 ton, who, on his arrival in England on the La Plata 
 from St. Thomas, delivered them to Yancey, Rost and 
 Mann. 9 
 
 From Fortress Monroe on November 15, the tele 
 graph informed the American people of the Trent / 
 affair. The people in the North had known of the/ 
 appointment of Mason and Slidell; many also had be 
 come anxious at the news of their departure, and 
 there was a storm of applause at the news of their 
 capture. -Even the Cabinet was elated and Congresfe 
 gave a vote of thanks to Wilkes. Lincoln recognized . 
 that, if England protested, the United States ought to 
 deliver the prisoners, on the ground that their seizure 
 was a violation of the American principles concern 
 ing the rights of neutrals. Jefferson Davis, in a mes 
 sage to the Confederate Congress, said that in the 
 seizure the United States had assumed a right to 
 general jurisdiction over the high seas, and that a 
 claim to seize Confederates in London would have 
 been as well founded. Many felt that the anxiety of 
 the Washington Government to prevent the Confed 
 erate diplomatists from reaching Europe showed a 
 weakness, and that the seizure would endanger rela 
 tions between England and the United States, and 
 
 8 Despatches of Mason (to Hunter), London, Feb. 2, 1862, 
 No. i. 
 
 9 U. S. and C. S. A. Naval Records, Series i, Vol. I, p. 155. 
 
 
138 MISSION OP MASON AND SLIDELL 
 
 strengthen the hands of not uninfluential persons in 
 England who were urging a policy of interference ir 
 the American quarrel. Seward waited to see the 
 course of the English Government, but November 30, 
 he informed Adams that the seizure was not author 
 ized by the Washington Government. 
 .| The report of the seizure reached London Novem-j 
 per 27, and the British press indignantly demanded 
 immediate reparation. The British Government be 
 gan to arrange for the increase of the British nava 
 force in American waters, and in a few days the trans 
 portation of troops to Canada was begun. The Lonj 
 don press declared that Seward desired a pretex 
 for a quarrel with England, but Thurlow Weed, wlu 
 was in London on government business, denied the 
 report through the Times. Even the manufacturing 
 classes represented by Bright, Cobden and Forster, 
 who were friendly to the United States and hoped to 
 see the doom of slavery, were silenced for the moment, 
 but they counselled moderation and were confident 
 that the United States had not authorized the capture. 
 The law officers of the crown advised Lord Russell 
 that an American man-of-war would have a right to 
 board a British mail steamer, open her mail bags, ex 
 amine their contents, and, in case despatches from the 
 enemy were found, carry the vessel to a United States 
 port for adjudication, but that she had no right to 
 seize Mason and Slidell and leave the vessel to con 
 tinue its voyage. 
 
 On November 29, after a Cabinet meeting, Pal- 
 merston submitted to the Queen and Prince Albert 
 the draft of a proposed despatch to Lord Lyons urg 
 ing the duty of Seward to deliver the prisoners and 
 
MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 139 
 
 to offer a suitable apology for the aggression. After 
 its form had been rendered less offensive, Russell sent 
 a copy to Lord Lyons (by Conway Seymour, Novem 
 ber 30), together with a private letter, instructing him 
 to leave Washington if, after a delay of seven days, 
 there should be no compliance with the demand. This 
 ultimatum intimated that a crisis was impending. 
 A messenger delivered it to Lord Lyons on Decem 
 ber 1 8, and its substance was given to Seward in a 
 courteous manner the next day. 
 
 European opinion generally declared the seizure to 
 be a violation of neutral rights; on the other hand, 
 the American press as a rule opposed the surrender 
 of the prisoners and was ready to risk a war. The 
 leaders at Richmond saw the great disadvantage which 
 such a war would bring to the United States, and they 
 hoped that, while breaking the blockade in America 
 and the cotton famine in England, it would result in 
 permanent disunion by establishing Confederate in 
 dependence. 
 
 The newspapers announced friction between Lord 
 Lyons and Seward, 10 and this was followed by the 
 information that Prince Albert, the friend of "he 
 United States, was dead, but the Lincoln Adminis 
 tration was determined to make a friendly adjustment 
 of the difficulty with England. At a Cabinet meeting 
 on Christmas Day, and the day following, it was 
 finally decided that, notwithstanding public opinion, 
 the most expedient course was to surrender the pris 
 oners for diplomatic reasons, skillfully stating this 
 policy to be in accord with the principles for which 
 America had long contended. 11 
 
 1- W. H. Russell: Diary. u Nicolay and Hay. 
 
I4O MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 
 
 International law forbids a neutral to perform any 
 act which will aid the belligerent in conducting hos 
 tilities. Among such acts are the transportation of 
 officers, soldiers, despatches of a military character 
 arms or military stores, and vessels so engaged are 
 liable to be confiscated. Wilkes had a right to search 
 the Trent for such contraband of war. But Mason, 
 Slidell and their secretaries were not contraband 
 goods, and there seems to have been no right to seizj 
 them while they were on board the Trent on the high 
 seas. Diplomatic ministers of recognized states 
 are entitled to special immunities and the protection 
 of other governments, but the government repre 
 sented by Mason and Slidell had no recognition ex 
 cept as a belligerent. The United States, however, 
 could not justify the seizure of the Confederate com 
 missioners on the ground that they were political 
 offenders unless there had been some treaty providing 
 for the extradition of such offenders. If there had 
 been some valid reason for seizing the Trent and 
 taking her into an American port, the commissioners 
 might have been legally arrested while in American 
 waters, but the Trent in carrying Confederate pas 
 sengers had not violated her duty as a neutral ship. 
 
 Though Seward disavowed the act of Captain 
 Wilkes, he carefully added: "If the safety of thej 
 Union required the detention of the captured persons 1 
 it would be the right and duty of this Government to 1 
 detain them. But the effectual check and waning \ 
 proportions of the existing insurrection, as well as \ 
 the comparative unimportance of the captured per 
 sons, . . . happily, forbid me from resorting to this 
 defense." In the later discussions of the principles 
 
MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 14! 
 
 involved, Russell informed Seward that Great Britain 
 could not have submitted to Wilkes act " however 
 flourishing might have been the insurrection in the 
 South, and however important the persons captured 
 might have been." Feeling in the United States was 
 strong against the English attitude at a moment of 
 national embarrassment, but under the lead of Sum- 
 ner, Congress and the people were influenced to sup 
 port the surrender. 
 
 On December 30, Lord Lyons directed Commander 
 Hewett, of the British war vessel Rinaldo, to receive 
 the released prisoners at Provincetown, Massachu 
 setts, and to treat them with the courtesy due to 
 unofficial persons. On January I, 1862, they were 
 received on board and expected to go to England by 
 way of Halifax, but on account of bad weather they 
 turned to the Bermudas from whence they sailed to 
 Southampton. 
 
 The concession of Seward was a sore disappoint 
 ment to the Southern hopes of European complica 
 tion, and, notwithstanding the hopes of Mason, the 
 prospects at London were by no means encouraging. 
 The London Times (January n), recommending that 
 the Commissioners be treated simply as inoffensive 
 visitors to Europe, said: "They are here for their 
 own interests, and . . . rather disappointed perhaps 
 that their detention has not provoked a new war. . . . 
 They must not suppose, because we have gone to the 
 very verge of a great war that they are precious in our 
 eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue 
 two of their own negroes. . . . Let the Commissioners 
 come up quietly to town and have their say with 
 anybody who may have time to listen to them. For 
 
142 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 
 
 our part, we cannot see how anything they may have 
 to tell can turn the scale of British duty and delibera 
 tion." 
 
 When Mason and Slidell landed at Southampton, a 
 series of disastrous reverses to the North, followed b 
 sluggish action, caused many abroad to consider the 
 the North and the South would never be united again. 
 England and France were suffering from lack of co 
 ton, and the South was suffering from a congestion A 
 it. Napoleon was planning to realize the dream >f 
 his predecessors by founding an American empire to 
 perpetuate his dynasty in Europe. The Civil War 
 was his opportunity, and he was anxious to win glo v 
 by playing the role of a mediator in favor of the Sout 
 ,He promptly granted an interview to Slidell, who " i 
 (sisted on the insufficiency of the blockade, and t 
 vandalism of the Stone Fleet. " The current f 
 feeling in France ran strongly against the Nort 
 >lidell had interviews with Napoleon and the Fren 
 Cabinet, who appeared to rejoice at Confederate vie- 
 >ries and regret her defeat. He learned that Napo- 
 >on had asked England to join with him in recog- 
 tizing the South; but that England had leaned to the 
 jide of the United States, and had declined to act. 
 Lussell refused to respond to e Confederate protest 
 igainst " the paper blockade." He afterwards (May 
 >) said that though thousands in England, on account 
 )f the closing of the Southern ports, were obliged to 
 
 Slidell s instructions of Sept. 23, 1861, directed him to 
 seek recognition and commercial intercourse, and -to suggest 
 the importance of opening water communication to the great 
 coal fields of western Virginia, which would be valuable and 
 convenient for the French steam marine. 
 
MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 143 
 
 resort to the poor rates, the British Government had 
 sought to take no advantage of the obvious imper 
 fection of the blockade, and had scrupulously ob 
 served the duties due to a friendly state. 13 Still, there 
 were many in England who, fearing the tendency 
 tpwards democracy, and opposing the Liberals in their 
 desire to Americanize English institutions, did not 
 deplore the disruption of the American Union. One 
 of these, James Spence, had just published a book 
 entitled " The American Union," in which he strongly 
 sympathized with the secession movement, and said 
 that slavery was not its real cause. A writer in Black- 
 wood s Magazine for January, 1862, desired to claim - 
 no ties of relationship with the performers in the 
 " convulsive dance " which was being executed in 
 America, and urged recognition of the Confederacy. 14 
 Mason reached London January 29, and on Feb 
 ruary 2, he wrote Hunter that the ministry seemed 
 " to hang fire," but that there was a prevalent opinion 
 in well-informed circles that a resolution for recogni 
 tion would soon be introduced in the Commons as 
 an amendment to- the Queen s speech. He did not ^ 
 then anticipate that Earl Russell would refuse to re 
 ceive him. A . few days after his arrival. Parliament 
 met. Mr. Gregory, ttio had visited the Southern^, 
 mn 
 
 States, in 1860, found him a place in the Commons to 
 hear the Queen s speech, which disappointed him by 
 saying nothing about the blockade. 15 He wrote that 
 
 "Jefferson Davis: Confederate Government, Vol. II, p. 
 343. 
 
 M Blackwood s Mag., Jan., 1862, p. 118; April, 1862, pp. 
 514-36. 
 
 15 Despatches of Mason, No. 2, Feb. 7, 1862. , 
 
144 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 
 
 " our friends in Parliament " thought best not to at 
 tempt the amendment for recognition, while the Queen 
 was in mourning, and that they proposed first to try 
 opposition to the blockade. On February 7, by ad 
 vice of Gregory, who was " steering " him, Mason ap 
 plied for an interview, and was received unofficiall} 
 at Russell s home. The despatch reporting that in 
 terview never succeeded in getting through the block 
 ade; but subsequent events show that Russell gave no 
 encouragement. 115 Mason said afterward that the min 
 ister s personal sympathy had always been against 
 the Confederates. Mason, eagerly watching for mail 
 that never came, was disappointed because he re 
 ceived no words of encouragement from Richmond, 
 and on May 15 wrote Benjamin that the public mind 
 at London " should be kept assured." 3 
 
 18 On Feb. 17, 1862, Mason submitted to Russell a list of 
 vessels entering and clearing Cuban ports engaged in com 
 merce with Confederate ports. On April i, he supplemented 
 the list, showing there had been 28 vessels for January and 
 February. On Aug. 4, Russell asknowledged the receipt of 
 his information. [55 Brit, and For. State Papers, p. 723.] 
 
 17 Despatches of Mason, No. 10, May 15, 1862. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 Hunter, still hoping that England and France, act 
 ing from commercial and political motives, would en 
 deavor by force of arms to break the blockade and end 
 the war, on February 8, instructed Mason that Mr. 
 Davis would not deprecate intervention, but that he 
 desired that the treaty of peace should enlarge the 
 Southern agricultural area, give the Confederacy pos 
 session of Chesapeake bay by which to concentrate 
 and control the Western commerce, and make it inde 
 pendent of the North. He urged that the Confed 
 eracy should have Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, 
 and all south of those states, together with New 
 Mexico and Arizona, through which the Southerners 
 could have railroad connection with the Pacific. He 
 stated that the South needed North Carolina, Vir 
 ginia, Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland to produce 
 food supplies so that the remaining states could de 
 vote their entire attention to supplying the demand 
 for cotton and sugar. Besides, it was held that if 
 Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri should go to the 
 TTorth, it would end the hope of a balance of power, 
 and lead to war or to a Southern reunion party to se 
 cure peace and trade. It was claimed that, aside from 
 political reasons, it was England s commercial inter 
 est " to enlarge the area from which she draws 
 tribute." * 
 
 1 Instr. to Mason, No. 4, Feb. 8, 1862. Congress also passed 
 a resolution declaring its opposition to any peace which 
 10 
 
146 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 It was not until June 23, that Mason replied. In the 
 meantime the Confederate Government had been born 
 in a storm on February 22; on March 8, the Merri- 
 mac had made an unsuccessful effort to break th<; 
 blockade; defeat and reverses had only resulted in 
 sterner stubbornness, and Benjamin, still confident ot 
 success, declared the Confederacy only needed arm ; 
 and ammunition; on March 5, Congress had resolved 
 never to affiliate with the Northern invaders; 2 Count 
 Mercier, the French minister at Washington, visited 
 1 Richmond on a mysterious errand; 3 missionaries witli 
 jplenty of money were sent abroad to aid and direct 
 public opinion; 4 Benjamin, claiming despatches wer3 
 not contraband of war, was contemplating the organi 
 zation of communication with Europe by French de 
 spatch vessels; Slidell was instructed to offer Napo 
 leon seven million dollars in cotton 5 to indemnify him 
 for the expense of a fleet to relieve the Confederacy 
 and establish communication with Europe; 6 Mason 
 
 should exclude any of the soil of the Confederacy. C. E. 
 Evans (Ed.): Confederate Military History (Atlanta, 1899), 
 Vol. I, p. 436 et seq. 
 
 2 Instr. to Mason, No. i, April 5, 1862. 
 
 8 Despatches of Mason, No. 8, April 2, and No. 10, May 
 15, 1862. J. B. Jones: Diary, May 21, 1862. 
 
 4 Instr. to Mason, No. 3, April 12, 1862. 
 
 8 Ibid. 
 
 8 Benjamin, in a " confidential " letter, on April 12, wrote 
 Slidell that there were certain points on which the interests 
 of England and France were so distinct, if not conflicting, 
 that Napoleon might not be precluded from acting alone on 
 the basis of certain commercial advantages. He stated that, 
 as a rule, Confederate relations should be on the same footing 
 with all nations, leaving commercial relations as free as pos 
 sible, but that while struggling against vastly superior re 
 sources no means to open Southern ports and successfully 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION ( 147 
 
 was asked to say that England by a few words could 
 encourage the Northern peace party to stop the war; 
 /"but the occupation of the Confederate ports and the 
 vigorous blockade by Federal forces gave little hope 
 for any interference. On March 10, Earl Russell had 
 said that separation would probably be a result of the 
 war, but in May, when Lord Lyons embarked for 
 England, it was understood in Richmond that he 
 would " report the rebellion on its last legs." 
 
 Napoleon asserted that he was ready to cooperate 1 
 in declaring the blockade ineffective; but said that 
 Russell had dealt unfairly in sending his previous pro 
 posals to Lord Lyons, who made them known to 
 Seward. 7 Slidell reported that Napoleon, in an inter 
 view with Lindsay (on April n), agreed that the block 
 ade was inefficient, and said that he had__twice ad 
 dressed the British Government through the French 
 \ambassador at London in-regard to taking steps to end 
 it, but had received no definite response. The Em 
 end the war should be neglected. He said that Mr. Davis, as 
 a means of inducing France to abandon her acquiescence in 
 the United States interdict (blockade) on Confederate com 
 merce, would be willing to concede to the French Emperor 
 the right to introduce French products free of duty for a 
 certain period. It was seen that temporary embarrassment 
 of the French finances might deter Napoleon from initiating 
 a policy likely to necessitate naval expeditions. Slidell was 
 instructed that if, after cautious inquiry, it should appear 
 probable that this obstacle might be removed by the grant 
 of a cotton subsidy to defray the expenses of such expedi 
 tions, he might stipulate to deliver 100,000 (or more) five- 
 hundrtd-pound bales of cotton in the Confederacy. It was 
 estimated that France could sell the cotton for 20 cents per 
 pound and that the vessels which sailed to convey the cotton 
 could take cargoes of merchandise and sell them, in the Con 
 federacy, at four times their cost in Europe. 
 7 Despatches of Mason, April 21, 1862. 
 
148 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 peror said that he was still ready to act promptly, i i 
 cooperation with England, by sending a fleet to the 
 mouth of the Mississippi to demand free ingress and 
 egress for merchant vessels, and he authorized Lind 
 say to so inform Lord Cowley and to ascertain whether 
 the latter would recommend such a course to Eng 
 land. 8 Lindsay saw Cowley on Sunday, April 13, and 
 immediately reported to Napoleon that Cowley thought 
 that England was not prepared to act, and that the 
 proper moment for action had passed. Napoleon 
 then requested Lindsay to see Lord Palmerston and 
 Russell, to tell them all that had occurred; to manage 
 to communicate his views to Derby and Disraeli of 
 the opposition; to get the views of Russell; and to 
 return. Lindsay returned on the I7th and met tie 
 Emperor on the i8th. In reply to his note, Russell 
 had informed him that he could receive no communi 
 cation from Napoleon except through the regular 
 diplomatic channel. Disraeli had concurred in the Em 
 peror s views. He had no reason to suspect a secret 
 understanding between Russell and Seward as to 
 England respecting the blockade, but he said that any 
 initiative which France might take would probably 
 be supported by a majority in Parliament and that 
 Russell, in order to avoid a change of ministry, would 
 assent. 9 Napoleon was interested in Disraeli s sug 
 gestion, and thought that the best course was to make! 
 a friendly appeal to the United States to open the ports, 
 at the same time accompanying it with a proper dem 
 onstration of force, ready to act in case the United 
 States should fail to take New Orleans, but he do 
 
 8 Despatches of Slidell, April 14, 1862. 
 
 9 Ibid., April 18, 1862. 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 149 
 
 cided to wait for more news, and asked Lindsay in 
 the meantime to observe secrecy. Perhaps Napoleon 
 meant what he said, but while he was saying it, th< 
 Federal guns opened fire and soon New Orleans fell 
 
 harles Wood of England wrote Slidell denying tha 
 the British Government was unwilling to act ir 
 American affairs. M. Billault, the/ minister sans port 
 folio of the French Government, said that the whol< 
 Cabinet, except Thouvenel, had been in favor of the 
 South, and that if New Orleans had not fallen recog 
 nition could not have been delayed much longer. 
 
 In June, Mason wrote Benjamin that he saw little 
 prospect for " the suggested form of mediation unless 
 the cotton famine should urge the Government to 
 act." ] Seward justified his obstruction of Charleston 
 harbor by saying that the holes of the three thousand 
 miles of coast line could not all be blocked by ships : 
 alone. On May 6, Russell said that though the irreg 
 ularity of the blockade had injured thousands, yet the 
 British Government had never sought to take advan 
 tage of obvious imperfections in order to declare it 
 inoperative. Mason had heard nothing further as to 
 the purpose of Mercier s visit to Richmond and was 
 much disappointed as to the results achieved. Na 
 poleon was still waiting. Russell and Palmerston^ 
 both denied that France had proposed joint mediation,? 
 and said that such a policy would be inopportune. 
 Mason complained that even the recent seizure of 
 British ships on the high seas, between England and 
 Nassau, had not caused the British Government to 
 intervene. Though he found much sympathy for the 
 Confederacy, and suggested that the cotton famine 
 
 10 Despatches of Mason, No. 12, June 23, 1862. 
 
 A 
 
 C^ 
 
I5O EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 might urge the Government to act, he thought it in- 
 expedient even to renew the request for recognition, 
 unless it should be done as a demand of right, to be 
 followed by his retirement to the continent as evidence 
 of Confederate dignity. Caleb Hughes, the Confed 
 erate agent for buying foreign supplies, wrote from 
 London (July 3), that there was much Southern sym 
 pathy in England, but that no one could see how the 
 Government could interfere though in case the 
 South should win against McClellan, and at Charles 
 ton, he did not see how recognition could be deferred. 
 The Richmond authorities had expected that Eng 
 land, in the interests of trade, would favor the Con 
 federacy on the question of blockade, and that British 
 vessels would seek Confederate ports for cotton. In 
 October, 1861, they had prohibited two British ves 
 sels, the Bruce and the Napier, from proceeding out to 
 sea from Wilmington with their cargoes of naval 
 stores, but they offered compensation for the cargoes, 
 and denied that it was their policy to prohibit the ex 
 portation of cotton except to prevent its use by the 
 United States. On July 7, Mason asked Russell for 
 an interview, and for a statement of his attitude upon 
 the rules of blockade, and whether it would be prac 
 ticable to require blockaded ports to be designated. 
 On July 10, Under-Secretary Layard simply acknowl 
 edged the receipt of his letter and made no allusion to 
 his request. Mason wrote home that it was difficult 
 to hold intercourse under such circumstances, and 
 that the British Government would probably use its 
 own pleasure as to abiding by the rules of 1856." 
 
 11 Despatches of Mason, No. 14, July 30, 1862. In 55 Brit, 
 and Foreign State Papers, p. 724 et seq. 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION !$! 
 
 The news of the defeat of the United States army 
 under McClellan, before Richmond, reached London 
 and Paris by July 15, and for several days Confederate 
 efforts were vigorously pushed. Slidell, in an inter 
 view with the Emperor at Vichy, on July 16, ex 
 plained the conditions and resources of the South; 
 proposed to pay him in cotton for vessels to break 
 the blockade; informed him that the United States 
 had negotiated a treaty with Mexico, agreeing to give 
 $11,000,000 to aid Juarez against France; and sug 
 gested that the Emperor now had a chance to secure 
 the Confederacy as a faithful ally in return for recog 
 nition. The Emperor had no objection to Slidell s 
 presenting his demand to Thouvenel for recognition. 
 He said that he had seen the nature of the contest 
 and that separation was a mere matter of time, but 
 that " the difficulty was to find a way to give effect to 
 his sympathies; that he had always desired to pre 
 serve the most friendly relations with England, and 
 that in so grave a question he had not been willing to 
 act without her cooperation; that he had several times 
 intimated his wish to England, but that he had received 
 no favorable response; and, besides, that England had 
 a deeper interest in the question than France, and 
 was wishing for him to draw the chestnuts from the 
 fire for her benefit. He regretted that France had 
 ever respected the blockade, and said that Europe 
 should have recognized the Confederacy in the sum 
 mer of 1 86 1, when Washington was menaced and the 
 Southern ports not yet all closed." 
 
 Lindsay s carefully studied motion for mediation 
 had been dangling before the House of Commons for 
 some time, and even Lord Brougham, who, since the 
 
152 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 days of Jefferson, had been known as the friend of the 
 United States, said that America should listen to the 
 voice of friends and stop the war. Russell and Pal- 
 merston, however, feared that an attempt at mediation 
 would only irritate both of the contestants. On July 
 17, Mason informed Russell that there was no au 
 thority for saying that the Confederacy would be 
 offended by such an attempt. 12 The next day Lindsay, 
 in a long speech in the Commons, reviewed the causes 
 of the war and the " compact " nature of the former 
 Government. He attributed the cause of the struggle 
 not to the opposition against slavery, but to taxation 
 without representation. He stated that emigration 
 had favored the North, decreasing the proportion of 
 Southern representation in Congress without decreas 
 ing the taxes of the property-holders in the South. He 
 said that reunion was hopeless; that many people even 
 in the United States were anxious for England to 
 mediate to relieve the American Government of an 
 embarrassing situation, and that France was ready to 
 join. 13 Others declared that the establishment of the 
 Confederacy would lead to the manumission of the 
 slaves. Whiteside favored secession and the recog 
 nition of a de facto Government, as in the case of 
 Texas. Taylor and others took the opposite view. 
 Taylor said that the war had been postponed for many 
 years by concessions to slavery until that institution 
 now struck at the interests of freedom in the North. 
 He gave warning tliat intervention would lead to a ter 
 rible conflict with the United States. In reply to the 
 statement that the tariff was the cause of the. war, 
 
 12 55 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, p. 728. 
 13 168 Parl. Debates, July 18, 1862. 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 153 
 
 Forster quoted from A. H. Stephens speech that 
 "the South went to war to establish slavery as the 
 corner-stone of a new republic," and drew attention I 
 to the fact that the South Carolina Declaration of In 
 dependence did not mention the tariff. 14 Palmerston 
 said the thirty-years war was a joke compared to the 
 Civil War; but he denied that England would be jus-j 
 tified in assuming the independence of the Confed-Jk^ 
 crates, and said that recognition would lead to direct^ 
 intervention. Lindsay s resolution, therefore, was not 
 pressed to a vote because there was no reasonable 
 assurance of its success. Mason wrote that it was 
 vexatious that the British Government could not 
 be driven to a decided position " in harmony with the 
 public sentiment " of England, and began to hope for 
 a new ministry. He said that Derby could take the 
 helm at any time; but that there were political reasons 
 for not ousting Palmerston while the Queen was in 
 mourning, and while there were fears of her going 
 insane. 
 
 Slidell, after an interview with Napoleon, wroteA 
 Mason that both should ask recognition at the samel 
 time. Slidell presented his letter on July 23. 
 Thouvenel agreed with him that the application to 
 England and France should be simultaneous, though 
 he advised him to wait. On July 24, Mason, cooper 
 ating with Slidell, sent a letter to Russell in which he 1 
 said the Confederate States asked recognition as a I 
 European duty. At the same time, desiring to state 1 
 orally that a failure of England to grant recognition I 
 would operate as an incentive to the United States to 
 
 14 1 68 Parl. Debates, pp. 527-78. 
 
154 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 protract the struggle, he sent a private note asking for 
 an interview. Russell declined the interview because 
 he thought no good could come of it. Mason then 
 supplemented his previous letter by stating that a word 
 of recognition would encourage many in the North to 
 speak openly against the continuation of the war. 
 j On August 2, after a Cabinet meeting, Russell re- 
 (plied that the British Government had never presumed 
 to form a judgment on the question of the right of 
 withdrawal of " certain Confederates," nor upon the 
 previous conduct of the United States. He left such 
 cases to be judged by interpretations of the United 
 States, and not by England. He informed Mason that 
 Secretary Seward affirmed that a large portion of the 
 disaffected population was restored to union and loy 
 alty, and that the Confederacy owed its main strength 
 to the hope of assistance from Europe. He said that 
 in the face of fluctuating events and contradictory 
 allegations, and the uncertainty of Confederate sta 
 bility and permanence, the British Government was 
 " determined to wait," and could only hope for a 
 peaceful termination of a bloody and destructive con 
 test. On August 4, Mason wrote Benjamin " the 
 British Government shuts its eyes to accumulating 
 proof . . . and relies on the open mendacity of Sew 
 ard." He hoped that division in the Cabinet, together 
 with Napoleon s attitude, might drag the Cabinet into 
 a " disgraceful reversal of its decision." 
 
 Lord Campbell in the House of Lords called for 
 Mason s correspondence; but Russell did not think 
 
 18 In Mason s despatch, No. 14, begun July 30, 1862. In 
 55 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, p. 733- 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 155 
 
 it then expedient to submit it, stating that it was un 
 official. Russell also declared that he had no com 
 munication with any foreign power upon the 
 subject of recognition, but that he would favor com 
 munication with the maritime powers if the Govern 
 ment should adopt a new line of policy. Malmsbury 
 suggested that England should act with the other 
 powers, whenever the time should come, upon ques 
 tions of blockade, recognition or mediation, and that 
 Lord Lyons should not be long absent from Wash 
 ington. Russell stated that there had been intimate 
 and unreserved communication, and no difference of 
 opinion, between England and Napoleon, and that 
 in case it became the duty of England to make a com 
 munication upon American affairs it would be very 
 deliberately considered, on account of the feeling in 
 the United States as to the sympathies of Great 
 Britain. 16 
 
 Davis said that Mason s whole correspondence 
 showed that the feeling of the British Government was 
 unfriendly to the Confederacy, and not in harmony 
 with public opinion, and that there might be a change 
 of policy later. Benjamin, on October 28, in a letter 
 which was captured arid published before it reached 
 Mason, contrasted the friendliness of French states 
 men with the " rude incivility of Russell." But not 
 withstanding Mason s difficulty in holding intercourse 
 with the Government, and his failure to obtain recog 
 nition, Benjamin, elated over McClellan s defeat and 
 he military situation, advised him to remain in Eng- 
 
 18 168 Parl. Debates, Lords, Aug. 4, 1862. Also, Despatches 
 of Mason, No. 15, Aug. 5, 1862. [Received by Benjamin on 
 Oct. 25.] 
 
 
156 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 * 
 
 land, where he could disseminate favorable impres 
 sions and where contingencies might arise to make 
 his presence important. 17 Davis, however, agreed 
 that the Confederacy should not be put in the attitude 
 of a supplicant. Mason s house continued to be a 
 resort for Confederate sympathizers. The Index and 
 other papers were used to deny that the United States 
 aimed at emancipation, and Confederate aid associa 
 tions were formed to encourage sympathy with the 
 South. 
 
 In the case of the cruiser Alabama the English Gov 
 ernment apparently had favored the Confederates. The 
 departure of the Florida had caused the United States 
 consul at Liverpool, with a wakeful and agitated mind, 
 to watch for new vessels. In May, 1862, " No. 290," 
 which was building in Laird s dock-yard, was under 
 suspicion. The building went on, however, and the 
 vessel was completed. A young lady christened it 
 Enrica, and its testing trip was satisfactory. 18 As 
 early as July 4, the British Government had promised 
 Adams that the customs officials should keep a strict 
 watch on the vessel. On July 26, Bullock received 
 information from a private but reliable source that it 
 would not be safe to leave the vessel in Liverpool 
 another forty-eight hours, and, as previously agreed 
 with Laird, he arranged for another trial trip out of 
 the harbor, at the same time informing Captain 
 Butcher that the ship would not return. Though the 
 report of the British law officers was not given until 
 July 29, the signs indicated that it was time to get out; 
 
 1T Instr. to Mason, No. 7, Sept. 26, 1862. 
 "Bullock: Vol. I, Chap. 5. 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 157 
 
 for inquiries were becoming very frequent and un 
 comfortable. Bullock claimed that no officer of the 
 British Government ever gave him a hint that would 
 lead him to anticipate the future action of the Gov 
 ernment, but Mason kept him informed of all he heard 
 as to naval affairs, and, though gathered merely from 
 the conversations of those who were accustomed to 
 observe the conduct of the ministers and draw their 
 own conclusions, the information often proved cor 
 rect. Bullock says " it is probable that through pri 
 vate friends Mr. Mason could and did have very fav 
 orable opportunities of learning the general, and in 
 some cases, the specific purposes of the Government." 
 
 On July 29, " No. 290," which was soon to be 
 known as the Alabama, under pretence of taking out a 
 pleasure party, including ladies and gentlemen of the 
 family of John Laird, M. P., left Liverpool in spite of 
 Mr. Adams warnings. After a sail of fourteen miles, 
 the excursionists were transferred to the Hercules for 
 return, and the Alabama sailed away to do service for 
 the Confederacy. In reply to Adams request for ex 
 planation, Russell stated that the delay of England 
 was due to the sickness of the Queen s Advocate, Sir 
 John D. Harding, which " made it necessary to call 
 in other parties, whose opinion had been at last given 
 for the detention of the gunboat, but before the order 
 got down to Liverpool the vessel was gone." The 
 Alabama was commissioned on the high seas, and 
 Seward never ceased to call her a pirate, nor to press 
 England to seize her, though she was flying the Con 
 federate flag. 
 
 After the close of the second campaign in Virginia, |* 
 both Palmerston and Russell contemplated the right I 
 
158 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 or expediency of mediation or intervention. 19 On 
 September 14, Palmerston, in a note to Russell, sug 
 gested the offer of joint " good offices " by England 
 and France. Three days later Russell wrote: The 
 Federal army is driven back to Washington and . . 
 I agree with you that the time is come for offering 
 mediation to the United States with a view to the rec 
 ognition of the independence of the Confederates. . . . 
 In case of failure ... to recognize the Southern 
 States as an independent state." He proposed a meet 
 ing of the Cabinet, and said that if it should determine 
 upon mediation England should propose it first to 
 France, who should cooperate in proposing it to Rus 
 sia and other nations as a measure decided upon by 
 England, and he suggested that the latter should 
 make herself safe in Canada. On September 23, Pal 
 merston replied, pronouncing the plan excellent, and 
 said: " Of course the offer would be made to both 
 the contending parties." He suggested that in case 
 of a defeat of the Federals, which might make them 
 ready for mediation, that " The iron should be struck 
 while it was hot; " but that if the Federals should 
 come out best, England should wait and watch awhile. 
 In October there was an impression in the United 
 States that England would soon grant recognition and 
 follow by mediation or intervention. The English 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer said the South had an 
 army and would soon have a navy. 20 Mallory, at that 
 
 19 Mason wrote: "I look with renewed confidence to the 
 effect on the Emperor." Slidell had not yet received a reply 
 to his note of July 23. [Despatches of Mason, No. 17, Sept. 
 18, 1862.] 
 
 20 Parl. Debates, March 27, 1863. Quoted by Forster. 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 159 
 
 time, had sent Mr. G. N. Sanders to England under 
 contract to construct six iron-clad steamers, to be paid 
 for in cotton. 21 
 
 On October 17, Adams wrote to Secretary Seward 
 that the United States should try to achieve decided 
 success by February to prevent the possibility of rec 
 ognition of the Confederacy by England. The Cab 
 inet meeting, called for October 23, was recalled as 
 unnecessary, but some English statesmen compli 
 mented Davis upon having " made a nation." Lord 
 Donnoughmore and Fitzgerald, both warm friends of j 
 the Confederacy, told Mason that Palmerston would 
 probably not enter into a treaty with the Confederacy 21 
 unless it should agree not to permit the African slave 
 trade; but bankers were proposing schemes to raise 
 Confederate finances in Europe. Lindsay was plan 
 ning for direct intercourse between France and the 
 South at the close of the war, and Mason, watching 
 for the slow arrivals from the South of " calm and dig 
 nified revelations of truth," was gaining hope, though 
 he had received no epistle from Benjamin of a later 
 date than April 14." 
 
 Napoleon was at this time shaking hands with 
 Slidell and listening to proposals to build a Confeder 
 ate navy in French ports; and, a few days later, wher 
 the cotton famine " was looming up," and simultane 
 ous with his expedition of 35,000 reinforcements tc 
 " establish stable government in Mexico," he formally 
 invited England and Russia to intervene in the Amer- 
 
 21 Despatches of Mason, No. 16, Sept. 18, 1862. 
 
 22 Ibid., No. 20, Nov. 6, 1862. 
 
 23 Ibid., " Unofficial," Nov. 4, 1862. 
 
 24 Ibid., No. 20, Nov. 6, 1862. 
 
l6o EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 ican war by offering a six months armistice with the 
 blockade removed. Dayton had heard reports of Na 
 poleon s hostile designs, but he had doubted whether 
 Slidell ever exchanged a word with the Emperor. 
 Lord Cowley at Paris had recently denied that France 
 had made any proposals on the American question, 
 and said that no action was contemplated. 23 Thouvenel 
 expressed surprise, and Mason suggested that the 
 English denial probably referred only to official com 
 munications. Slidell had entire confidence in Na 
 poleon, but stated that English statesmen were full of 
 duplicity and hypocrisy. He spoke to Napoleon 
 concerning the British denial, and the latter, smiling, 
 suggested that in diplomacy nothing existed unless it 
 was formally written. Thouvenel, before his resign 
 nation, told Slidell that the British denial of official 
 knowledge of Napoleon s views was a " mauvaise 
 plaisanterie," for there had been " des pourparlers 
 tres reels " on the subject. Slidell, entertaining little 
 hope from England, on October 27, had an interview 
 with Drouyn de L Huys, to whom he recapitulate 
 the views which he had expressed to Thouvenel in 
 July. He referred to Russell s statement that the pur 
 pose and policy of France on American affairs were 
 the same. He mentioned the conflicting statements 
 as to whether France had communicated Napoleon s 
 views to England, and showed L Huys a letter from 
 a leading member of the British Parliament, insinuat 
 ing that France was playing an unfair game. L Huys 
 said that he had been too recently in office to know 
 what Thouvenel had said or done, and when Slidell 
 
 25 Despatches of Slidell, Oct. 20, 1862. 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION l6l 
 
 tried to show him how divergent were the interests of- 
 France and England on the subject of American affairs 
 he said that there were grave objections to France 
 acting without England. 28 
 
 It appears that the armistice plan originated withj^ 
 Napoleon. On October 22, at St. Cloud, Slidell 
 shook hands w r itjrthe Emperor and asked him to break 
 the blockade, ? The Emperor averred that his sym 
 pathies were with the Confederacy, but that England 
 might embroil him with the United States if he acted 
 alone,, and that he preferred to make a proposition 
 for an armistice of six months with the Southern 
 ports. He stated that the refusal of his plan by the 
 North would give such strong reason for recognition, 
 and perhaps for intervention, that England might be 
 induced to cooperate. Slidell was pleased with the 
 plan, and on November 8, Mason wrote that there was 
 no doubt, but that the proposal had been made 
 officially to Russia and England, and that it was " con 
 fidently asserted that Russia would assent to it." The 
 French note, dated October 10, was read to Russell 
 on November 10. No copy was left, but it was pub 
 lished in the Monitcur. Russell replied on the thir 
 teenth, declining immediate action. 27 Russia kept the 
 promise made through Gortchakoff to Bayard Taylor 
 earlier in the war, and refused. Napoleon now con 
 templated mediation through the French minister at 
 Washington, but seeing that the United States would 
 reject such a suggestion, he proceeded with his plan 
 to attack the Monroe Doctrine in Mexico a policy 
 
 26 Despatches of Slidell, Oct. 28, 1862. 
 
 27 172 Parlc Debates, July 2, 1863. Layard in the House 
 cf Commons. 
 
 II 
 
l62 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 which could conciliate neither England nor Spair. 
 Some in the North would have favored the French 
 tender of mediation. Mr. Cox in the United States 
 House of Representatives, on December 15, said that 
 the recent elections indicated that " the eagle must use 
 the dove." 
 
 The report of the French proposals to England and 
 Russia reached New York on November 25. A few 
 days later, after the news reached Richmond, Benja 
 min decided that it was a favorable time to further 
 encourage England and France to come to the rescue, 
 by insisting on the restoration of pre-blockade condi 
 tions and by taking steps to obtain a monopoly of the 
 trade with the Confederacy. In a letter to Mason " 9 
 on December n, 29 he said that there were indications 
 that Europe would soon recognize the Confederacy 
 and that trade with the South would be brisk. To en 
 courage Europe to take measures to break the block 
 ade, he said that the Confederacy, in the interests of 
 permanent peace, would expect a treaty of free trade 
 with the United States at the end of the war, and that 
 the rush of the Southern people to get commodities 
 might enable the agents of Northern merchants by 
 their cupidity to monopolize Southern products and 
 become the intermediaries in Southern commerce. To 
 prevent this monopoly, he urged that the European 
 
 28 Instr. to Mason, No. n, Dec. u, 1862. 
 
 29 Mason, still looking forward to a cotton famine, on 
 Dec. ii (No. 23) wrote: "We hear little, but I think events 
 are maturing which must lead to some change in the attitude 
 of Europe." The Alabama, in a successful cruise, had taken 
 British property in some instances. When British merchants 
 complained, Russell intimated that they should apply to the 
 Confederate prize courts for redress. 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 163 
 
 governments, looking toward an early renewal of 
 trade, should encourage their citizens to purchase 
 Southern products en depot before the close of the war; 
 to establish West Indian depots of supplies needed 
 by the Confederacy, ready for immediate introduction; 
 and to prepare merchant steamers for sale in Confed 
 erate ports, in order to provide communication with 
 Europe. He urged that the cessation of Southern 
 commerce was not due to the blockade, but to the 
 seizure along the coasts, or on the high seas, of neutral 
 vessels " bound to points where not a blockade vessel 
 was ever stationed," and that, by stopping such seiz 
 ures, rrany neutral vessels, which before had not dared 
 to sail for fear of capture, could transport a large 
 supply of Southern staples upon which the North 
 hoped to get the profits. He said that Europe, by 
 encouraging trade with the Confederacy as a bellig 
 erent, could prevent the seizure of neutral property 
 by the United States, and thereby make it unneces 
 sary to destroy resources at the approach of the Fed 
 eral army. On March 2, Mason sent a copy of these 
 instructions to Russell, and the latter merely thanked 
 him for the information. 
 
 On October 31, Mr. Davis had complained that 
 England, after asking the Confederacy to concur in 
 the adoption of principles of international law regard 
 ing neutrals, had shown herself unfriendly by deviat 
 ing from her own principles, that no blockade was 
 binding unless enforced, and by refusing to reply to 
 requests for explanation. 30 Mason was instructed to 
 protest against the British modification of the Decla- 
 
 30 Confed. "Dip. Cor., Great Brit.", p. 38. Instr. to Mason, 
 No. 9, Oct. 31, 1862. 
 
164 
 
 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 ration of Paris, and on January 3, 1863, he brought 
 the complaint to the attention of Lord Russell. 31 On 
 February 10, in replying to his note, 32 Russell stated 
 that England would practically adhere to the rule of 
 1856, which was aimed against paper blockades, but 
 added that the escape of vessels on dark nights or dur 
 ing adverse winds did not make a blockade ineffectual 
 and that the neutral powers had no excuse for assert 
 ing that the United States had not maintained an 
 effectual blockade. In was in vain 33 that Mason 
 urged (February 18) that the departure of vessels was 
 notorious; that Confederate vessels had raised the 
 blockade of Charleston and Galveston and that the 
 duties collected at Confederate ports on foreign goods 
 were twice as much as before the war. 34 In January, 
 Stephens said that there had been a change of tone in 
 the British press since the preceding summer, when 
 Lord Lyons visited London, and that the latter having 
 never become acquainted with Southern men had 
 probably influenced the change. 35 
 
 In December, many in the Confederacy had de 
 spaired of the intervention by European powers, and 
 only hoped that the Great Power above would inter 
 vene and create an armistice by freezing the Chesa 
 peake. In January the newspapers published the in 
 tercepted correspondence of Benjamin, in which Rus 
 sell was much berated and Napoleon was charged 
 with designs on Mexico and Texas. 36 Lincoln s eman- 
 
 81 Despatches of Mason, No. 24, Jan, 14, 1863. 
 
 82 In 55 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, p. 734. 
 
 33 Despatches of Mason, March 19, 1863. 
 
 34 Ibid., No. 31, March 19, 1863. 
 
 35 Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens. 
 
 36 J. B. Jones: Diary, Jan. 23, 1863. Instr. to Mason, No. 
 15, Feb. 7, 1863. 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 165 
 
 v & 
 
 cipation proclamation was received with favor in Eng-;i) 
 land. After two years of the irrepressible conflict 
 many in the North had changed their early feelings 
 against emancipation. On March 6, 1862, Lincoln 
 had proposed that Congress should provide for re 
 munerating persons in the loyal slave states who would 
 free their slaves. This was based on the idea that 
 there was a strong Union sentiment at the South, and 
 was proposed as a war measure. Slaves had been a 
 great aid to the South by supplying food while the 
 whites fought. After the defeat of Lee at Antietam, 
 Lincoln decided to declare the freedom of all slaves 
 belonging to persons at war with the United States, 
 and when his proclamation was issued it gave no 
 strength to the Confederate sympathizers in England. 
 The North now fought not only for the Union, but 
 also for emancipation; and the English workingmen, Uj 
 notwithstanding the prophecies of the South, and the II 
 dangers of a cotton famine, prayed for the North and 
 the emancipation of slaves. 
 
 On January 17, the French Minister of Marine, ad 
 vised the French admiral off Mexico to protect some 
 vessels belonging to M. Bellot which were returning 
 to Havre laden with cotton, and Bellot suggested to / 
 Mason that this seemed to suggest intervention for 
 getting cotton to Matamoras. 37 Mason was elated 
 over the recent democratic victories in the North, and 
 said that the Commons would respond unanimously 
 if Palmerston would recommend recognition; 88 but 
 he was not hopeful as to any favorable action by the 
 British Government. A few days later he wrote that 
 
 87 Despatches of Mason, No. 28, Jan. 31, 1863. 
 
 88 Ibid., No. 27, Jan. 15, 1863. 
 
l56 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 both the ministry and the opposition agreed that it 
 : was not a favorable time for recognition. Derby 
 stated that recognition without intervention would 
 have no fruits. " With those willingly deaf/ said 
 Mason, " it was vain to argue." ! Mason suggested 
 that the United States might provoke a conflict with 
 England in order to avert an internecine war at home . 
 But, by March, 40 he was provoked that the British 
 Government was determined to do nothing objection 
 able to the United States, and he feared that Na 
 poleon 41 could do nothing owing to his ill-timed 
 Mexican expedition and the complications which re 
 sulted from the outbreak of Poland. Benjamin, read 
 ing the British debates, also saw little hope from that 
 direction, but he " awaited the onset on the Atlantic 
 and the Mississippi with calm confidence." Layard 
 said that the British Government had given orders to 
 keep a strict watch on vessels suspected to be preparing 
 for the Confederacy in English ports. 42 
 
 When Campbell urged that it was the duty of Eng 
 land to recognize the Confederacy and send an am 
 bassador to Richmond, Russell replied 43 that though 
 Napoleon had actually proposed to the United States 
 to negotiate with the Confederacy, no offer of good 
 offices could now end the contest. Though Russell 
 doubted the ultimate success of the United States, 
 he favored British neutrality, leaving the belligerents 
 
 39 Despatches of Mason, No. 30, Feb. 9, 1863. 
 
 40 Ibid., No. 31, March 19, 1863. 
 
 41 The British Government claimed to have no official 
 document from France as to mediation. 
 
 42 169 Parl. Debates, Commons, Feb. 24, 1863. Palmerston 
 in reply to Hopwood. 
 
 43 Parl. Debates, March 23, 1863, PP- 1714-34- 
 
EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 167 
 
 to conclude their own quarrel. In his speech of 
 March 23, he said that England had nothing to be 
 ashamed of in her past intervention that it had al 
 ways been in behalf of the independence, freedom and 
 welfare of a great portion of mankind, and that he 
 would be sorry if it should ever be for any other pur 
 pose, no matter how much English interests were 
 affected. He predicted that if interference should 
 ever be necessary again, it would again be " in the 
 cause of liberty and to promote the freedom of man 
 kind." In concluding his speech, he said: "Depend 
 upon it, my Lords, that if that war is to cease, it is 
 far better it should cease by a conviction on the parts 
 of the North and South that they can never live again 
 happily as one community and one republic, than that 
 the termination of hostilities should be brought about 
 by the advice, the mediation or the interference of 
 any other power." 
 
 Mason saw a double meaning to part of Russell s 
 speech, and suggested that he was not disposed to 
 recognize a state with slavery. He was certain the 
 Confederacy could take no action with England be 
 yond the protest at that time. 45 During the spring 
 and summer Russell remained firm, and said the 
 United States blockade of 2500 miles was as legitimate 
 as the English blockade of 2000 miles was in the war 
 against Napoleon. In June Mason wrote that Russell 
 repudiated the rules of 1856 and that the Confederacy 
 
 ** On May 20, Benjamin wrote Mason that even if the 
 defeats of the United States forces had no effect on Europe, 
 and even in the face of the strong blockade, the Confederates 
 were still determined to secure separation from the United 
 States. 
 
 48 Despatches of Mason, No. 31, March 19, 1863. 
 
l68 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 would have to watch him when the time came to make 
 treaties. 40 In September he wrote again that Russell, 
 with unchanged opinions, was resorting to evasions of 
 the convention of Paris. 47 
 
 In the spring of 1863, Davis and Benjamin hoped 
 that by disclaiming all designs on Cuba, and by agree 
 ing to guarantee the island to Spain, the Government 
 at Madrid could be induced to take the initiative in 
 recognition. They appointed Slidell as special com 
 missioner to Spain, 48 but the latter received no intima 
 tion from Madrid that his presence there would be 
 acceptable and did not go, though he held long con 
 versations with Isturitz, the Spanish ambassador at 
 Paris, who professed sympathy for the Confederates. 49 
 In June Slidell contemplated plans by which Spain 
 could be induced to take the initiative in recognition, 
 and cooperate with France in breaking the blockade. 50 
 Napoleon gave assurance that he concurred in the plan, 
 and it appears that the Spanish Government was 
 sounded upon the subject; but after the news of Gettys 
 burg and Vicksburg, Isturitz informed Slidell that 
 nothing could be effected at Madrid. 
 
 48 Despatches of Mason, No. 40, June 20, 1863. 
 
 47 Ibid., No. 44, Sept. 4, 1863. 
 
 48 Confed. " Dip. Cor., France." Instr. to Slidell, March 
 22 and May g (No. 16), 1863. 
 
 49 Despatches of Slidell, No. 36, May 28, 1863. 
 80 Ibid., No. 38, June 21, 1863. 
 

 CHAPTER VII 
 
 CONTROVERSIES 
 
 During the spring of 1863, the fate of the Confed 
 erate States hung in the balance. Doubt succeeded 
 expectancy. The Confederate bonds were floated in 
 Europe above par on March 28; but, in a few weeks, 
 Mason was unable to keep them propped up even by 
 " bulling " the market. After the publication of cap-") 
 tured Confederate correspondence relating to vessels 
 building in England, Palmerston became very alert in r 
 investigating cases brought to his attention. But 
 Confederate friends in Parliament kept up an agita 
 tion in American affairs. They protested against the 
 American seizure of British vessels near the Confed 
 erate coast; they complained of American prize court 
 proceedings, and brought accusations of American; 
 enlistments in Ireland. 
 
 In the last week of March, 1863, Forster and others 
 in Parliament, complaining that Confederate vessels 
 were building in Liverpool and referring to the neu 
 trality of the United States in the Crimean War, urged 
 the Government to prevent further departures of ves 
 sels like the Alabama. Bright gave warning that thA 
 United States, which had the sympathy of the English 
 workingmen, and was receiving large numbers of f 
 Irish immigrants, might be inclined to remember V . 
 England s unfriendliness. Baring desired Russell toy 
 allay irritation by expressions of anxiety to avoid a 
 
170 CONTROVERSIES 
 
 recurrence of such incidents. Laird, who built the 
 Alabama, replied that the Northern armies were also 
 obtaining war supplies in England, and that he would 
 rather build one hundred Alabama* than laud the 
 institutions of the United States, whose " ubiquitous 
 spies made her boasted liberty an absurdity." The 
 Solicitor-General quoted American decisions and the 
 opinions of Hamilton, Webster and Pierce to show 
 that the United States did not forbid its citizens to 
 sell war supplies, and said that the Government had 
 acted promptly and in good faith to prevent the de 
 parture of the Alabama. As precedents of the Ameri 
 can policy, he alluded to the cases of the Caroline at 
 Niagara, and Walker in Honduras. Palmerston, in 
 closing the debate, said that neutrality was difficult to 
 execute, but that English neutrality, whether warm or 
 cold, was honest, and that the Government was ready 
 to act on evidence. 1 Mason, a few days later, in writ 
 ing Benjamin of the success of the Confederate loan, 
 said that the debate \vas " damaging to Yankee pre 
 tensions as well as to their advocates." 
 
 The seizure of the Alexandra 2 on April 6, by order 
 of the British Government, caused several to make 
 protest in Parliament that the vessel was not building 
 for the Confederacy, and, at the same time, to offer 
 objections to the Federal stone fleet in Charleston 
 harbor, the large emigration of Irish 3 and shipment 
 of arms to the United States, and even to eulogize the 
 
 1 170 Parl. Debates, pp. 33-72 and 90-101. 
 
 2 J. B. Moore: International Arbitrations, Vol. I, p. 586. 
 
 8 Benjamin instructed Mason to inform Earl Russell that 
 there were " extensive enlistments in Ireland of recruits for 
 the armies of the United States." Instr. to Mason, No. 21 
 April 29, 1863. 
 
CONTROVERSIES I/I 
 
 growing success of the Confederacy. Cobden said 
 that the equipment of ships of war was a different 
 question from that of traffic in fire-arms, and that 
 they should be seized in English ports even after their 
 escape from the place of building. Collier thought 
 that armed vessels left United States ports in 1793, 
 and said .that the American Government could not 
 complain of the construction of law in the English 
 courts followed the example of the United States. 4 But 
 he stated that England had no right to refuse to en 
 force the law against the Confederacy. 
 
 Many long, low, greenish-gray blockade-runners 
 were fitted out in the Clyde to engage in the trade 
 between Nassau of the Bahamas and Confederate 
 ports. The United States found it difficult to stop 
 this trade. Nassau merchants complained of the law 
 of the American Congress by which vessels bound 
 from New York to that port were refused a clearance, 
 but the British Government was unable to induce the 
 Federal Government to change its orders. 
 
 As the Federal navy increased along the Atlantic, 
 part of the trade retreated to the Rio Grande and es 
 pecially to Matamoras, \vhich, from 1862, had become 
 a seat of flourishing traffic with both Europe and New 
 York. The United States had captured several neu 
 tral vessels engaged in this commerce, but, later, 
 made the claim that these vessels were not really 
 destined to Matamoras, but that they intended to dis 
 charge their freights into lighters to be conveyed di 
 rectly to Confederate territory. 
 
 When the news arrived at London that Captain 
 
 * 70 Parl. Debates, Commons, April 24, 1863. 
 
172 CONTROVERSIES 
 
 Wilkes of the United States Navy had captured the 
 Peterhoof while she was on her way from London to 
 Matamoras, Mason and his friends cooperated to 
 induce the British Government to take some action. 
 A deputation headed by Mr. Crawford, a London 
 member of Parliament, waited upon Russell and asked 
 him to protest, and it was believed for a while that 
 he would demand her release without reference to a 
 prize court. 5 The Peterhoof was one of the vessels 
 which had been recommended to the protection of the 
 French admiral off the coast of Mexico, and Mr. 
 Mason had sent by Mr. Mohl, who sailed on the ves 
 sel, triplicates of five despatches which Benjamin had 
 never yet received, and which Mohl subsequently 
 found necessary to destroy in order to prevent their 
 capture. 8 The Peterhoof was taken to New York as 
 a prize. Archibald, the British consul, refused to 
 open the packages which had been taken from the 
 sealed mail-bag, and the latter was soon forwarded to 
 its destination, but the vessel was held for the decision 
 of the court. Mj\J$pence at once asked the British 
 Government to relieve his vessels from carrying mail. 
 Although Russell had desired to keep the subject 
 from being discussed in Parliament at that time, Mr. 
 Peacock, in the Commons, precipitated a debate on 
 April 23, by calling for the correspondence. He had 
 understood that Russell had refused to allow certain 
 vessels to carry the mail. He and Mason were both 
 encouraged by the recent publication of a letter of 
 
 B Despatches of Mason, No. 33, March 30, 1863. [This 
 despatch was carried by Hobson of Richmond, who found it 
 necessary to destroy it.] 
 
 Ibid., No. 39, June 12, 1863. 
 
CONTROVERSIES 173 
 
 Adams, who, by the advice of W. H. Aspinwall of 
 New York, J. M. Forbes 7 of Boston and R. J. Walker, 
 had offered protection to a vessel sailing to Mata- 
 moras with ammunition for the Mexican Government 
 to use against France, and Mason now wrote that the 
 British Cabinet might grant recognition and adopt 
 a bolder front as a policy to prevent drifting into war 
 with the United States. 8 
 
 Layard, in reply to Peacock, said that the Govern 
 ment could not furnish the correspondence; that it 
 had not refused to allow vessels to carry mail, but that 
 the owners of the vessels, fearing that Confederate 
 correspondence might be found by a visiting Federal 
 vessel, had asked to be relieved. 9 
 
 Hugh Cairns was surprised that the Government 
 seemed to admit that the United States could take 
 correspondence from an English vessel and place its 
 fate before an American prize court. Malins hoped 
 that England would not allow American dictation to 
 make her so timid that she dare not enforce the obli 
 gation of vessels to carry mail-bags. The Solicitor- 
 General merely referred to Russell s letter of Xovem- 
 
 7 Forbes and Aspinwall had been sent to England by the 
 United States Government with instructions to negotiate pri 
 vately for blocking the progress or changing the destination 
 of the Confederate cruisers then building in English ship 
 yards. They failed to purchase the cruisers, but their repre 
 sentations to prominent Englishmen, who were fearful of 
 provoking a war, had some influence in inducing the British 
 Cabinet to stop the. sailing of the rams and to purchase them 
 for the Government. [Sarah F. Hughes: Letters and Recol 
 lections of John Murray Forbes, 2 Vols, Boston, 1899.] 
 
 8 Despatches of Mason, No. 34, April 27. 1863. " The 
 recent debates in Parliament," said Mason, " have this good 
 effect at least they keep up agitation on American affairs." 
 
 9 170 Parl. Debates 
 
174 CONTROVERSIES 
 
 her 28, 1862, to Lord Lyons, which stated that the 
 right of search must depend upon circumstances. 
 Lord Robert Cecil said that England waited for Pal- 
 merston s decision and expected it at once, but Os- 
 born proposed that it was wise to drop the discussion, 
 and Peacock consented to withdraw his motion. 
 
 Lord Russell wrote Lord Lyons on April 24 that 
 the Matamoras trade was perfectly legitimate, even if 
 part of the goods was afterwards carried to Texas. 
 On the same day, in the House of Lords, he seemed 
 to admit that the United States had a right to require 
 an examination of sealed packages taken from seized 
 ships. He decided that if the English Consul, on 
 opening a mail-bag, should find a letter to the Con 
 federate Secretary of State, he could send it to the 
 prize court unopened. The Earl of Hardwick was 
 pained by this decision, stating that it made the Brit 
 ish Consul a tool of the United States. He desired to 
 see an ." impression made upon the . . . dis-United 
 States " by a fearless stand which he claimed would be 
 the best method of preventing collision. 10 On April 
 27, Russell stated that it was not then desirable to 
 state the opinion of the law officers of the Crown; but 
 he agreed with Seward that the mail-bags of a neutral, 
 if duly certified and authenticated, should not be 
 opened or detained in case of the seizure of a mer 
 chant vessel, but should be forwarded immediately 
 to their destination. At the same time he intimated 
 that the United States was the sole judge of whether 
 a vessel should be captured on suspicion. 11 On April 
 
 10 170 Parl. Debates, Lords, April 24, 1863. 
 
 11 Ibid., April 27, 1863. For correspondence between Great 
 Brit, and the U. S., see Parlia. Papers, " North America, 
 No. 5." 
 
CONTROVERSIES 175 
 
 30 he announced that the Peterhoof would not be re 
 leased, but that her mail-bags had been forwarded. 
 The United States Supreme Court, in the Peterhoof 
 case, decided that the blockade could not be extended 
 to the Mexican half of the Rio Grande; that the trade 
 from London to Matamoras, even with intent to sup 
 ply Texas, was not a violation of the blockade and 
 could not be called unlawful; but that contraband of 
 war on a voyage to a neutral port, with a probable 
 ulterior destination to the Confederacy, were liable 
 to condemnation. 13 
 
 On May 2, Mason wrote Benjamin that the British 
 Government, in its anxiety to prevent collision, seemed 
 etermined to yield everything to the United States. 13 
 le understood that Adams had clandestinely made 
 is peace with Russell, but he still predicted that the 
 ublic would not be satisfied with this settlement of 
 le question. Marquis Clanricarde recommended 
 tat a squadron be sent to the Gulf of Mexico, but he 
 was informed that such an act would mean war. On 
 May 18, in the Lords, while asking for copies of the 
 proceedings in the United States prize court, he in 
 timated that those courts " set aside the whole inter 
 national law of the world." Russell denied his 
 charges and said that the United States judges had 
 always been quoted with respect. In a calm speech, 
 he referred to Clanricarde s speech as a " desultory 
 lecture on international law," and proceeded to show 
 the error of his charges. 14 He stated that it was nat- 
 
 13 A treatment of the Nassau and Matamoras trade, and the 
 Peterhoff case, may be found in Montague Bernard s " Brit 
 ish Neutrality," Chap. 12. 
 
 13 Despatches of Mason, No. 34, April 27 and May 2. 
 
 " 171 Parl. Debates, pp. 1818-32. 
 
176 CONTROVERSIES 
 
 ural for the United States to suspect vessels bound 
 for Nassau; and that while successful English cap 
 tains exulted over running the blockade, those who 
 failed and lost their vessels came to the Foreign Of 
 fice with an air of injured innocence. 
 
 Many Irish were emigrating to the United States, 
 some to join the army. Peel said that the Govern 
 ment had knowledge that United States agents were 
 in Ireland, and Mason, stating that Adams had tor 
 mented the ministry as to Confederate agents until it 
 would be alert to establish counter-charges against 
 United States agents, employed detectives to obtain 
 evidence of enlistments in Ireland, but no clear dis 
 coveries were made. 15 
 
 The Confederate authorities at Richmond, angered 
 by their failure to establish diplomatic relations with 
 England, and, by the evident care which the British 
 Government exercised to prevent giving offense to 
 Seward, refused to recognize the exequaturs of the 
 British consuls in the Southern states. On December 
 19, 1862, Mr. Bunch, the British Consul, complained 
 of the forcible detention of an unnaturalized Irish de 
 serter, and stated that his letters had not been an 
 swered. The Richmond authorities replied in scath 
 ing terms. In the early part of 1863, several members 
 of the Confederate Congress favored recalling the 
 diplomatic agents and notifying the foreign consuls 
 to leave the country. Mr. Davis held that the British 
 consuls, having been appointed under the original 
 compact, of which the Southern states had been mem 
 bers, should be allowed to stay so long as they sought 
 
 15 Despatches of Mason, No. 38, Paris, June 4, 1863. 
 
CONTROVERSIES 177 
 
 not to evade nor deny Confederate authority. But 
 England, while refusing recognition, had authorized 
 Lord Lyons at Washington to exercise authority over 
 the British consuls in the Confederacy, thus ignoring 
 the existence of the Confederate Government, and, in 
 June, Davis ordered that no further communication 
 should be allowed " between consuls of neutral na 
 tions in the Confederate States and the functionaries 
 of those nations in the United States," 16 stating that 
 there was now ample opportunity for correspondence 
 by Confederate fleets and neutral steamers between 
 neutral ports and the South. 
 
 Since February 20, Davis had refused to recognize 
 Moore as consul at Richmond. But the latter con 
 tinued to perform his duties. Two Irishmen, Mo- 
 loney and Farrell, claimed exemption from enroll 
 ment as conscripts on the ground that they were 
 British subjects. Moore, who had been asked by Ben 
 jamin, to show his commission and had not done so, 
 in April presented the two cases of the Irishmen to 
 the Secretary of War who, after ordering an investi 
 gation, found that both men had exercised the right 
 of suffrage and were thus subject to military duty. 
 Moore, incensed by his treatment, on May 5 wrote to 
 J. B. Caldwell of White Sulphur Springs of Virginia, 
 that from 1826 to 1858, he had lived in despotic coun- 
 [ tries where he had met with more official courtesy on 
 complaint of grievances than he had received at the 
 hands of his own blood and kin in the Confederacy. 
 
 In June, Davis also refused to recognize the con 
 sul at Mobile. In the preceding November the Bank 
 of Mobile, as agent for the state of Alabama, informed 
 
 18 Instr. to Mason, No. 24, June 6, 1863. 
 
178 CONTROVERSIES 
 
 Magee, the British Consul, that the state, owing Eng 
 lish citizens interest-coupons for the sum of for:y 
 thousand pounds, payable in London, asked to place 
 coin in the consul s hands for safe transportation at 
 the expense of Alabama. On November 14, Magoe 
 replied that he had asked the British Consul at New 
 Orleans whether the British Rinaldo could be sent ;o 
 take the coin from Mobile to Havana, from whence 
 it could go to London. Later, the British Vesuvius 
 received thirty-one kegs of specie, amounting to $155,- 
 ooo. The American commander of the blockading 
 squadron offered no objection, saying " we cannot 
 examine an English man-of-war; we trust all you do 
 will be right and proper." The specie was received 
 in England and paid to the British subjects. Lord 
 Lyons, as soon as he heard of the intention to trans 
 mit the specie, sent despatches to Mobile forbidding 
 it, but the Vesuvius had already sailed when his de 
 spatches arrived. Magee, having been dismissed, 
 Warner, a member of the House of Commons, in the 
 following May, asked whether he had been incon 
 sistent with British neutrality and whether the United 
 States had suggested his removal. Under-Secretary 
 Layard replied that the permission for the Vesuvius 
 to do private business was in violation of the pledge 
 given to the United States, and that a dismissal was 
 made before receiving the complaint of the American 
 Government. Though he did not know whether the 
 specie was intended for the payment of interest on the 
 Alabama bonds, or for use for purchasing privateers 
 in Europe, he felt that the British Government had 
 taken the right course. 17 
 
 17 170 Parl. Debates, p. 1952, May 19, 1863. 
 
CONTROVERSIES 179 
 
 In May, the Richmond Whig contained an article 
 complaining that Mr. Cridland, who had sometimes 
 acted in place of Moore in Richmond, was accredited 
 as consul to Mobile under the United States Govern 
 ment. The article, suggesting that the appointment 
 might tend to excite the Southern people to "take 
 the liberty of making a remark " before the close of 
 the war, said: "We know that sundry private citi 
 zens of the South, nick-named ministers, are cooling 
 their heels to no earthly purpose in the ante-chambers 
 of St. James and the Tuileries; and this useless refriger 
 ation of the ossa calcis of Messrs. Mason and Slidell 
 has been going on for above a year. Intimations of 
 this have reached the so-called. " On May 18, Mr. 
 Cridland sought an interview with Benjamin, called 
 his attention to the article in the Whig, and denied that 
 he was going to Mobile except as a private citizen to 
 look after certain interests of the British Government. 
 There was no objection to his going unofficially, but, 
 after his arrival, a telegram from Admiral Buchanan 
 stated that he had papers showing him to be acting 
 consul at Mobile by appointment of Lord Lyons. 
 Cridland was at once informed that he would not be 
 permitted to act as consul and a hint was given him 
 that it would be agreeable if he would leave Mobile. 18 
 On June n, Benjamin wrote Mason that he hoped 
 the British Government might be induced to change 
 its whole policy and soon instructed him to bring 
 to its attention all matters relating to consuls. As to 
 the specie sent from Mobile, he said that " according 
 to the principles of the modern public code debts due 
 
 18 Instr. to Mason, No. 25, June n, 1863. 
 
ISO CONTROVERSIES 
 
 by a state are not subject to the operations of the law 
 of war, and that, notwithstanding the recent United 
 States confiscation laws (of August 6, 1861), they were 
 beyond confiscation; that England had always ab 
 horred such breaches of faith, and during the Crimean 
 War had paid to the enemy money that she knew 
 would be used against her; that the recent confiscation 
 laws of the United States had caused the Confederacy 
 to pass (August 30, 1861) a law for the sequestration 
 of the enemy s property, but that it exempted public 
 debts; that the United States, in trying to prevent the 
 remittance of specie, either hoped that she herself 
 would be able to get it by the fortunes of war or de 
 sired to dishonor Alabama. Benjamin held that if 
 Alabama was still a part of the Union the United 
 States had no right to prevent the payment of her 
 debts; and that if she was a member of the Confed 
 eracy, Lord Lyons, by his cooperation with the United 
 States concerning the British consuls in the South, 
 had been unfriendly to the Confederacy. 19 
 
 In July, Russell wrote Mason concerning the cases 
 of both Moore and Cridland, and intimated that the 
 consular agents should have been allowed to remain. 
 Mason informed him that the Confederacy would 
 doubtless be willing to receive agents properly ac 
 credited. 20 
 
 The extradition of one Hester, who committed a 
 murder on board the Confederate privateer Sumter, 
 which had landed in a port under British jurisdiction, 
 became a subject of correspondence between Russell 
 
 19 Instr. to Mason, No. 25, June n, 1863. 
 
 20 Despatches of Mason, No. 44, Sept. 4, 1863. 
 
CONTROVERSIES l8l 
 
 and Mason in June and July. Hester was impris 
 oned by the British authorities, and the London Gov 
 ernment offered to deliver him in the West Indies or 
 in a Confederate port, in case the United States would 
 allow a British vessel to pass the blockade. Seward, 
 or Adams, protested against the delivery of the pris 
 oner through the blockade, and on July 25, Russell 
 informed Mason that the British Government had de 
 cided that he could be detained in custody by the 
 British authorities no longer than might be necessary 
 to dispose of him on the shore at the Bermudas. 
 Mason expressed regret that Russell had not adhered 
 to the original purpose of delivering the prisoner. 21 
 
 21 Despatches of Mason, No. 41, July 10, 1863; No. 42, 
 July 21, 1863; No. 43, Aug. 6, 1863. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 The crisis in England came in the middle of 186.5 
 when Lee was in the heart of the North. Napoleon, 
 shaking hands with Slidell in friendly conferences, 
 consenting to the building of Confederate vessels, 
 denying the English rumors that he was not ready 
 to act, and sitting with the map of the United States 
 unrolled before him, only waited for Lee to take 
 Washington in order that he might grant recogni 
 tion. 1 Roebuck and Lindsay, by a stroke of ama 
 teur diplomacy, in which tliey said that Napoleon had 
 proposed joint mediation to England, made an at 
 tempt through parliament to force the British Gov 
 ernment into cooperation with France. But Palmers- 
 ton opposed double diplomacy, and the govern 
 ment refused " to pull Napoleon s chestnuts from a 
 fire that was too hot for imperial hands." Lindsay, 
 Roebuck, and other friends of the Confederacy, were 
 soon depressed by the news of Lee s retreat, and, 
 Mason received instructions to quit London. 
 
 Notwithstanding the recent publication of Benja 
 min s correspondence suspecting Napoleon of occult 
 designs in Texas, the Emperor in the spring and 
 
 1 Dayton wrote Seward (July 10) that news from the U. S. 
 gave him anxiety; that it was already hard enough to prevent 
 recognition, and if Lee should take Washington he could 
 foresee the probable results. 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 183 
 
 summer of 1863 professed great friendship for the 
 Confederates and showed a disposition to favor them. 
 On April 14, Mocquard, Napoleon s private secre 
 tary and confidential friend, stating that he was di 
 rected by the Emperor, sent Slidell a copy of a des 
 patch from Adams to Dayton concerning a Confed 
 erate cruiser which was expected to enter a French 
 port. 2 It appears that all despatches passed through 
 the French Minister of the Interior, and, if of politi 
 cal interest, were telegraphed to Napoleon so that 
 Slidell did not doubt that the copy was handed to 
 him as early as the original reached Mr. Dayton at 
 the American legation. 
 
 A year before, Napoleon, in a conference with 
 Lindsay and Slidell, said he was ready to act with 
 England, but, as an objection to his initiating official 
 communications with London upon American affairs, 
 he stated that Earl Russell had dealt unfairly in 
 sending his previous proposals (as to the blockade) 
 to Lord Lyons, who made them known to Seward. 8 
 Since that time England had rejected Napoleon s 
 proposal for mediation upon the basis of a six- 
 months armistice, and he did not care to take the 
 initiative in any more proposals. 
 
 In June, 1863, news from the United States, an< 
 the condition of French affairs, again encouraged th< 
 Confederacy to ask for recognition. Roebuck am 
 Lindsay were preparing to insure the success of 
 motion which it was proposed to offer in Parliament 
 on June 30. There were rumors in England that 
 
 2 Despatches of Slidell, April 20, 1863. 
 
 8 Despatches of Mason, July 2, 1863, and No. 8, April 21, 
 1862. 
 
1 84 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 the Emperor thought recognition would be unwise 
 at that time, and Lindsay was anxious to see him 
 before the motion should be offered, for he saw that 
 Palmerston would probably inform Parliament of the 
 rumors of the reports concerning Napoleon s adverse 
 views. On June 13, Lindsay enclosed to Slidell a let 
 ter from Roebuck which referred to Napoleon and 
 the proposed interview as follows: " You know that 
 I am not a great admirer of that great personage, but 
 still I am a politician so is he, and politicians have 
 no personal likes or dislikes that stand in the way of 
 their political ends. I therefore would act as if I had 
 no feeling either friendly or hostile to him he could i 
 do the same as to myself, and therefore I have no \ 
 fear but that he would listen to all I have to offer 
 by way of suggestion and advice .... and good 
 might come of our interview." 4 
 
 On June 18, Slidell obtained an interview with the 
 Emperor who said that without the cooperation of 
 England with her strong navy, recognition, by creat 
 ing a rupture with the United States would jeopard 
 ize French commerce and the success of the Mexi 
 can expedition. He stated that other powers of 
 Europe had no navies, but Slidell suggested that Spain 
 had a fleet, and that a Confederate guaranty of 
 Cuba, and an assurance of French concurrence, 
 might induce her to take the initiative in recognition. 
 Napoleon agreed that France in such a case would 
 act even without England. Speaking of the possi 
 bility of forcing the English cabinet to act or to give 
 \way to a new ministry, and asking an interview for 
 
 * Despatches of Slidell, No. 38, June 21, 1863. 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 185 
 
 Lindsay and Roebuck, Slidell stated that Lord 
 Malmsbury, who was friendly toward the Emperor, 
 would probably be the new English Secretary of 
 Foreign Affairs in case of a change in the govern 
 ment. 5 Napoleon replied that the Tories were very 
 good friends of his when in the minority, but that 
 their tone changed very much when they came into 
 power. He made an appointment, however, to re 
 ceive Roebuck and Lindsay, and gave his permission 
 for Slidell to give an authorized unqualified denial 
 of the correctness of the rumor in England that he 
 thought it unwise to recognize the Confederacy. 
 Slidell in his report to Benjamin stated that Napo 
 leon added : " I think that I can do something bet 
 ter: make a direct proposition to England for joint 
 recognition. This will effectually prevent Lord 
 Palmerston from misrepresenting my position and 
 wishes on the American question. I shall bring the 
 question before the cabinet meeting to-day, and if 
 it should be decided not to make the proposition 
 now, I will let you know in a day or two through 
 Mr. Mocquard, and what to say to Roebuck." 
 
 On June 19, Slidell s friend in the French Foreign 
 Office wrote him that the council had decided to con 
 tradict the reports that France was less favorable 
 to the Confederacy, and also to remind the English 
 Government of previous French propositions. On 
 June 22, Mocquard wrote Slidell that the Emperor 
 requested him to say that L Huys, the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, had written Baron Gros, the French 
 ambassador at London, to sound Russell on the sub- 
 
 8 Despatches of Slidell, No. 38, June 21, 1863. 
 
1 86 
 
 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 ject of recognition, and to say that the French Cabi 
 net was ready to discuss the subject. 6 
 
 On June 20, Mason having received an account oi 
 Slidell s interview with Napoleon sent a note to Lind 
 say and Roebuck, and they went to Paris that night 
 to urge the Emperor to invite England formally, b 
 fore June 30, to join France in recognition, ar 
 that, in case England should refuse to cooperate, 1 
 should act alone, with the assurance that Englai 
 would follow or have a change of ministry. 7 C 
 June 25, Slidell wrote Benjamin that tlu 
 interview with the Emperor at Fontainebleau was 
 highly satisfactory, and that they " were authorized 
 to state in the House of Commons that the Em 
 peror was not only willing but anxious to recognize 
 the Confederate States with the cooperation of Eng 
 land. The Emperor, however, did not promise them 
 that he would make any formal proposition to the 
 British Government. But a few days later, the 
 Paris correspondent of the Times said that Russell 
 had received a communication from France, through 
 Baron Gros, looking toward the conclusion of the 
 war in America. On June 29, Roebuck asked Gros 
 the substance of his communication to Russell on 
 this subject, and Gros replied that he had made no 
 formal communication. The next day, Lord Camp 
 bell, in the House of Lords, asked Russell if he had 
 received such a document or verbal communication." 
 Russell replied that the French ambassador had told 
 him " an hour ago " that he had not even received an 
 order to deliver to him such a communication. 
 
 6 Despatches of Slidell, No. 38, June 21, 1863. 
 
 7 Despatches of Mason, No. 40, June 20, 1863. 
 8 171 Parl. Debates, June 30, 1863. 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 On June 30 Roebuck presented his petition in the 
 Commons, in favor of entering into negotiations 
 with the great powers of Europe with the object of 
 recognizing the Confederate Government. He re 
 viewed the establishment of the colonies in America; 
 the American Revolution, in which he said that 
 France in aiding the colonies had borne a similar 
 relation to them as that which England now bore to 
 the Confederate States; and the opposition of the 
 South to the tariff since 1827. Announcing that 
 secession was now successful, he stated that if the 
 United States had kept growing she would have 
 been the greatest bully in the world; and though he 
 did not favor slavery he was determined to try to 
 prevent the reconstruction of the Union. He said 
 that England by recognition could avoid the misery 
 of the cotton famine; and that, if recognition was de 
 layed, the people would look to the Government as 
 the cause of their misery and sweep the existing 
 Cabinet from its seat. Roebuck, in telling of his 
 interview with Napoleon, accused the Cabinet ,ofi 
 misrepresenting the Emperor s views, of concealing/ 
 his offers, and of disclosing to Mr. Seward the na 
 ture of the Emperor s despatches. He said that Na 
 poleon was stronger than ever in favor of recogni 
 tion, notwithstanding reports to the contrary; that 
 on account of the leakage of previous overtures he 
 could not make a formal application to England; 
 but that he had authorized Lindsay and himself to 
 say to Parliament that he was ready to act w r ith 
 England. 
 
 Roebuck s motion evidently had little chance of suc 
 cess. Robert Montague in discussing the legal 
 
l88 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 aspect of recognition, and historical precedents, fa 
 vored strict neutrality, feeling that England might 
 as well declare war against the United States at once 
 as to adopt the policy of recognition which would 
 certainly lead to war. He stated that the Confed 
 eracy should not be aided to fight its own battles, 
 and that Napoleon should be left to pull his own 
 chestnuts from the fire. Clifford denied that the 
 Confederate States were in rebellion, and prophesied 
 military despotism and failure in the United States, 
 but he also favored neutrality. The Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer 9 did not believe that the restoration 
 of the United States, by force, was obtainable, how 
 ever much those who favored American institutions 
 might dislike to see great visions destroyed; but he 
 did not fear American expansion, nor think that the 
 United States should be divided in order to prevent 
 it from becoming a menace to England. He said 
 that England should suppress passion and treat the 
 matter as one of facts. Though he thought that 
 nineteen-twentieths of the House favored an end of 
 the war, he considered that Roebuck s motion was 
 untimely and inconvenient. Forster, whose father 
 had been killed in a slave state, favored neutrality 
 not only because it was a duty, but because a war 
 with the United States would endanger Canada and 
 commerce, and because he was opposed to any more 
 division and strife in the Anglo-Saxon race. Lord 
 Robert Cecil defended the course of Napoleon and 
 suggested that the fear for Canada would not in 
 fluence England. But Bright had no faith in the 
 
 8 171 Parl. Debates, p. 1807. 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 189 
 
 scheming and land-hungry Emperor of France who, 
 he said, ran the chance of being " far too much rep 
 resented in this House." He considered that Lin 
 coln represented a moral and peaceful party, and 
 warned England not to lift her hand " to aid the 
 most stupendous act of guilt in history." " The 
 more I study this war," said he, " the more I con 
 clude that it is improbable that in the future the 
 United States will be broken into separate republics. 
 Even if separation occur, sympathies will later bring 
 the whole continent under one central government." 
 George Grey could not understand the extraordinary 
 statement of Roebuck as to what Napoleon said 
 about the danger of making proposals >to the Eng 
 lish Government, and he referred to the apparent 
 contradiction between the statements of Roebuck and 
 Baron Gros. 
 
 On July 2, Layard, the Under Secretary of State, 
 answered Roebuck s accusation against the British 
 Foreign Office. 10 He stated that the Emperor s des 
 patch of November 10, 1862, which was the only one 
 to which Napoleon could have made reference, had 
 been published at once in France, and then in other 
 newspapers; and that it had been communicated to 
 Seward by Mercier, the French minister, and not by 
 Lord Lyons. He further said that, since the French 
 communication of the previous November, France, 
 notwithstanding the statements of Roebuck, had not 
 made any overtures to the British Government upon 
 the subject of proposed intervention, mediation or 
 recognition; that Gros of his own accord had stated 
 
 10 172 Parl. Debates, July 2, 1863. 
 
19 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 that he had received no such communication from 
 Paris; and that Earl Cowley at Paris knew of no 
 such communication. Roebuck asked if France had 
 not made a proposal in the spring of 1862. Lay- 
 ard had looked over every despatch and could find 
 none upon that subject. 
 
 Mason, July 2, said that the debates and the lan 
 guage of Gros reduced to a mere shadow the profes 
 sions of Napoleon to Slidell, Lindsay and Roebuck. :l 
 At the same time he saw an article in the Times, 
 from the Paris correspondent, stating that a private 
 letter from Madrid gave the information that the 
 Spanish Government had been sounded upon the 
 question of recognition, with an intimation that if 
 Spain were ready she would have the support of 
 France. He remarked that France seemed to be 
 playing a complicated diplomatic game. Slidell be 
 lieved that the Emperor had kept his promise, and 
 that the fault rested either with the French Foreign 
 Office, Palmerston, or with Russell and Layard. 
 Mason wrote that the Commons were agitated by the 
 entanglements, and that four-fifths of the members 
 were with the Confederacy, but that as parties stood 
 Roebuck s motion would probably be lost; and he 
 anxiously awaited news from General Lee. 12 
 
 The debate on Roebuck s motion was resumed on 
 July 10, when the latest report from Lee s movement 
 in the North was favorable to the Confederacy, in 
 dicating to Mason that Washington and Baltimore 
 might fall, and make it impossible for the ministry 
 to hold out against recognition. 13 Sir James Fergu- 
 
 11 Despatches of Mason, No. 41, July 2, 1863. 
 
 12 Ibid., No, 42, July 10, 1863. la Ibid. 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 19! 
 
 son stated that the Confederacy seemed to be no 
 longer on the defensive, but that the debate should 
 be postponed until the result of the campaign was 
 learned. Though the debate was postponed until 
 July 13, there was a long discussion on July 10. 
 Palmerston said that all knew the wishes of Napo 
 leon now* and, while stating that England was ready 
 to interchange views with France on American 
 affairs, he suggested that Napoleon should know that 
 conversation between himself and two members of 
 Parliament was not a question for discussion in the 
 Commons. He hoped that Roebuck would let the 
 debate drop, claiming that it could not go on without 
 a revival of personal discussions as to what Napo 
 leon had said in private. Lindsay explained that in 
 the previous four years he had held several conver 
 sations with Napoleon upon the subject of naviga 
 tion some of which had occurred since the Civil 
 War and that he had told nothing except when Na 
 poleon gave him permission. He vouched for the 
 truth of what Robeuck had said, but he desired to 
 avoid such discussions in the House. He said that 
 he felt for the Southern people, but others replied 
 that the Confederacy need look for no sympathy 
 from the workingmen of England. O Donoghue 
 declared that disunion would be one of the greatest 
 calamities to the world and protested against the 
 feeling of hostility to American prosperity in which 
 Roebuck s motion had been conceived. 
 
 After a long discussion, much of which related to 
 Napoleon s statements, Layard still declared that 
 he himself had gone through all the papers and that 
 no despatch sent by France to the British Govern- 
 
192 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 ment had ever been sent to the American Govern 
 ment. He also mentioned a previous case where 
 Lindsay had come from Paris as an amateur diplo 
 matist to make communications which he had no au 
 thority to do. Lindsay in reply spoke of his con 
 versation with Napoleon on April n, 1862, stating 
 that Napoleon had asked him to report it to Russell. 
 As to the recent conference, he said that Napoleon 
 was anxious to recognize the Confederacy, had 
 wished to see him, and had authorized the use of any 
 means to notify the Commons of his readiness to acl. 
 He took no offense at what Lord Palmerston had 
 said, but he did not like to be called an " amateur 
 diplomatist " by the Under Secretary. He said that 
 if he was an amateur diplomatist the British Govern 
 ment had made him so by authorizing his talks with 
 Napoleon on the subject of navigation. Palmerston 
 made another speech on July 13, regretting the at 
 tack on the Under Secretary, and stating that it was 
 necessary to receive communications through re 
 sponsible ministers even if the correspondence 
 should be between Napoleon and Victoria. He said 
 that it was not the habit of the British Government 
 to carry on double diplomacy or irregular negotia 
 tions by private individuals. He explained that 
 Lindsay had offered to talk with Napoleon on navi 
 gation; and that the Government, considering him 
 informed upon that subject, had accepted his offer 
 with the best intentions. At the request of Palmers- 
 ton, Roebuck moved to discharge the order for re 
 suming the debate. In doing so he said that there 
 Avere two great dangers to England which the Gov 
 ernment would have to meet: (i) The possibility of 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND IQ3 
 
 reconstructing the Union on a Confederate basis, or, 
 (2) recognition of the Confederacy by France alone. 
 The statement of Lindsay and Roebuck as to Na 
 poleon became a subject of conversation between 
 Dayton and L Huys at Paris, and Dayton wrote 
 Seward : " Take it all in all, it was the most futile 
 and abortive attempt to help on the recognition of 
 the South that men in prominent positions ever 
 made." Both English and French officials declared 
 that there were no such official despatches as those 
 to which Napoleon had referred. L Huys informed 
 Dayton that after the most diligent search he could 
 find no despatch to which Lindsay s statement could 
 possibly apply except the November proposal for 
 an armistice. 14 Perhaps, in his interview with Lind 
 say in 1862, Napoleon may have referred to unoffi 
 cial representations made through the French min 
 ister at London, but Secretary Seward positively 
 stated that Russell had never furnished him any com 
 munication of the Emperor. Seward distrusted Na 
 poleon, but his distrust probably arose from the 
 rumors and reports which found their way into the 
 newspapers. L Huys stated to Dayton that the 
 Emperor had at no time made a proposal to Eng 
 land to acknowledge the South, though Roebuck 
 and Lindsay had pressed him hard to do so and had 
 told him that England was ready and would offer 
 recognition if it were not believed that France would 
 refuse to follow ^that if he would but say the word 
 their proposals in the House of Commons would 
 pass at once; that Napoleon had replied that he had 
 
 14 Dayton to Seward, No. 333, Aug. 5, 1863. 
 13 
 
194 TII E CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 given England no cause to believe that he would not 
 act with her, but that he would not initiate the move 
 ment; that when Roebuck and Lindsay asked him if 
 they might communicate his views, the Emperor had 
 replied that his views were no secret, little dreaming 
 that they would use his words in the Commons. An 
 article in the Monitcur admitted the readiness of the, 
 Emperor to follow England in case the latter be 
 lieved that acknowledgment of the Confederacy 
 would end the war. 15 
 
 Notwithstanding the assurances of L Huys, it 
 jseems that Napoleon may have sent some kind of a 
 despatch through L Huys, asking Gros to sound 
 Palmerston and Russell and to notify them that he 
 was ready to join in recognition if England would 
 make the official proposal. Mocquard in explain 
 ing the subject to Slidell said: "On the next day 
 after the interview of Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay 
 with the Emperor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 telegraphed Baron Gros to inform Lord Palmerston 
 officiously that, should Great Britain be willing to 
 \ecognize the South, the Emperor would be ready to 
 follow her in that way." Either Gros did not get the 
 telegram, or, seeing the feeble support which Roe 
 buck s motion met, he denied receiving any official 
 communication on the subject of recognition as he 
 had a right to do if his despatch was purely confi 
 dential. 
 
 It is possible that if Lee had won, and the draft riots 
 had not failed in the North, and if Vicksburg had 
 not fallen, that England and France might have 
 
 15 Dayton to Seward, No. 329, July 30, 1863. 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 195 
 
 intervened and sent iron-clads to America. Some 
 still hoped for foreign aid and complications, and 
 said that if France and England feared reconstruc 
 tion of the Union, they would manifest their purpose 
 when they heard of the recent Confederate calami 
 ties. Still others, seeing that the United States 
 would continue the war, would have been willing to 
 be included in the new Mexican empire, whose 
 notables were now asking France for an emperor. 16 
 A few favored the abolition of slavery as a means of 
 obtaining recognition. By August, it became evi 
 dent that what nature and man s genius had bound 
 together could not be separated by the storms of a 
 single generation. Peoples might come and pass 
 away but the Mississippi would roll on through a 
 united country. 
 
 Parliament was prorogued July 28, and the expec 
 tations of the Confederate sympathizers were much 
 depressed by the news from America." The Con 
 federate engagements in Europe for an army and 
 navy required large sums, and Confederate affairs in 
 the stock market became more and more doubtful. 
 The loan fell to -70; and Mason, seeing that another 
 could not be expected, advised that the Confederate 
 authorities at Richmond should take control of the 
 shipment of cotton by fast steamers, and avoid the 
 exorbitant rates of the blockade runners. On Au 
 gust 10, in reply to Mason s note of July 16, Russell 
 stated that he saw no reason to change his opinion 
 on the subject of the blockade. 18 Mason reported that 
 
 16 J. B. Jones: Diary. July 31, 1863. 
 
 17 Despatches of Mason, No. 43, Aug. 6, 1863. 
 13 Ibid., No. 44, Sept. 4, 1863. 
 
196 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 England would still resort to evasions of the Decla 
 ration of Paris. Confederate agents had been sent 
 to Ireland to stop Irish emigration to the United 
 States, by assurances of Southern friendship, but 
 Mason doubted whether they could make much im 
 pression. Mason saw, in fact, very few crumbs of 
 comfort; but he wrote Benjamin that if Russia should 
 modify her policy toward Poland so as to remove ap 
 prehension of European war, France, compelled by 
 her interests in Mexico, might take a position of 
 value to the Confederacy. He suggested that the 
 authorities at Richmond should define their pol.cy 
 with the view of endeavoring to obtain France and 
 Mexico as allies against the supposed future designs 
 of the United States. 
 
 After the failure of Mason to obtain recognition, 
 in the summer of 1862, the Southerners had become 
 irritated, and many desired the recall of the diplo 
 matic agents. 19 The withdrawal of Mason was con 
 templated by the Government, but it was decided that 
 his recall would interfere with Slidell s arrangements 
 for the purchase of war materials. The press com 
 plained that, while the Confederacy should have 
 agents abroad, the dignity of the country was com 
 promised by having them sit or kneel at the gate 
 of kings to petition for admission to the family of 
 nations. It was stated that, since European minis 
 ters had spoken so plainly, no one now believed in 
 the delusion of European recognition and that self- 
 respect demanded the withdrawal of the diplomatic 
 agents; that Europe wished to see the war pro- 
 
 18 Instr. to Slidell, Jan. 15, 1863. 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 197 
 
 tracted till both sides should become exhausted, and 
 would interfere only when it was clear that the South 
 could not succeed alone. 20 
 
 In the spring of 1863 England published the cor 
 respondence between Mason and Russell on the le 
 gality of the blockade, and when it reached the Con 
 federacy the immediate withdrawal of Mason was 
 strongly urged. Editorials suggested that he had 
 no position from which to retire, save that of a waiter 
 on the pleasure of the English Government. Others, 
 adopting the policy of Davis, saw no humiliation in 
 allowing him to remain in London " to be ready for 
 any event which might turn up." They remembered 
 that they had received valuable assistance from some 
 of the English people who were " not so cold as 
 Russell." But a strong party in the Confederacy 
 continued to speak of Mason " cooling his heels in 
 the ante-chamber of St. James to no earthly advan- 
 tage. " 
 
 On August 4, Benjamin, seeing by the parliamen 
 tary debates that England would decline overtures 
 for a treaty, wrote Mason that his residence in Lon 
 don was " no longer conducive to the interests nor 
 consistent with the dignity of the Confederacy," and 
 advised his withdrawal. 22 In a private note, however, 
 he asked him to use his discretion if the British 
 Government showed any sign of a change of policy. 
 On September 21, Mason, after consulting Slidell, 
 notified Russell and the newspapers of his reasons 
 for withdrawal. 
 
 20 Richmond Dispatch, March 31, 1863. 
 
 21 Ibid., April 8, 1863. 
 
 " Instr. to Mason, No. 30, Aug. 4, 1863. 
 
198 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 The London papers for which the Confederate 
 press agent (Hotze) wrote editorials to " affect the 
 public mind," commented upon Russell s very marr 
 ed and impolitic partisanship in favor of the United 
 States, stating that he licked the feet of Adams and 
 bit every one else who ventured within the length of 
 his chain while rifles and Irishmen were sent to 
 New York in shiploads with impunity. The Morning 
 Herald (September 23) spoke of the inconvenience 
 which would result from England having no means 
 of communication with the South, and said that 
 Davis had reluctantly reached his determination after 
 enduring much provocation and lack of courtesy 
 from Russell, who, in order to please the indignant 
 American minister, had not even been disposed un 
 officially to converse with Mason as a private citizen, 
 concerning interests of British citizens in the vast 
 territories over which Davis affirmed himself the 
 ruling executive. Alluding to the continental idea 
 that Russell was " a very bear of diplomacy," the 
 Herald suggested that the bear had found his keeper, 
 and inquired: " How 7 much dirt is this nation to eat 
 in order to escape the bugbear of an American war? " 
 It was urged that the Confederacy, with its seat at 
 Richmond unshaken by the hosts from the North, 
 had a right to expect more sympathy than it had re 
 ceived in Europe; and that it was unwise for Russell 
 to grow colder with the waning fortunes of the Con 
 federacy, while Napoleon was growing so friendly 
 that rumor spoke of a possible alliance of France, 
 Mexico and the Confederacy to cut the Gordian knot 
 of the American difficulty. But Russell, remaining 
 unmoved in his policy, replied (September 25) that 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 199 
 
 the reasons for declining Confederate overtures 
 were still in force, and that he regretted that circum 
 stances had prevented the cultivation of Mason s per 
 sonal acquaintance. 
 
 Mason still complaining of Russell s evasions in 
 favor of the North on the question of the blockade, 
 withdrew from London to Paris to await orders from 
 Richmond. 23 He decided that it would be best for 
 him to remain in England or at least in Europe. 
 Accustomed to dealing in futures, he was not yet 
 disheartened. Who could say when there might cease 
 to be a Palmerston and a Russell in the Cabi 
 net. To Jefferson Davis on October 2, he presented 
 his views in substance as follows : " I await orders. 
 We think best for me to stay in Europe. Notwith 
 standing the reluctance of those really our friends in 
 the Commons to vote for Roebuck s motion, ... it 
 resulted from no disaffection to our cause, but was 
 due to the peculiar structure of parties in England 
 just now. Palmerston s personal popularity is the 
 mainstay of his administration, and if his party \vere 
 overthrown it might be returned. The opposition 
 members think that if he were out of the way they 
 could come in with their strength greatly increased 
 and he is now far advanced in years, and subject to 
 sharp attacks of the gout or its incidents. Were 
 there a new administration, or one reconstructed on 
 the loss of its chief, or any event which would dis 
 place Lord Russell, it is thought that the policy of 
 
 23 Despatches of Mason, No. 46, Sept. 25, 1863 (received 
 at Richmond on Oct. 23). On Sept. 25, Russell wrote Mason 
 that the reasons for declining Confederate overtures were 
 still in force. [Despatches of Mason, Oct. 19, 1863.] 
 
200 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 
 
 England in regard to our country would undergo 
 great modification." 
 
 Mr. Davis in his message to Congress strongly 
 criticised the Governments of Europe for refusing 
 to admit the Confederacy into the family of nations. 4 
 Nevertheless, in view of the very disturbed condition 
 of European affairs, the wars which might arise, 
 therefrom, the probable relations of France and 
 Austria in Mexico, and contingencies and unexpected 
 relations in which the Confederate interests could 
 not wait for the delays of uncertain communication, 
 Mason was appointed commissioner to the continent 
 with duplicate full power addressed in blank so they 
 could be used for any capital in Europe. 25 He never 
 had any occasion to use them. Yet he continued to 
 draw his salary of $12,000 per year until the end of 
 the war, conferring alternately with Slidell at Paris, 
 and with Southern sympathizers in the British Parlia 
 ment who were seeking to embarrass the Palmerston 
 ministry. He watched the ebbing tide of the Con 
 federacy s fortunes and hoped against fate until the 
 last. 26 
 
 "The Richmond Examiner (J. M. Daniels), Dec. 10, 1863. 
 Davis was criticised at Richmond for " bad taste " in 
 complaining too much of the foreign powers. [J. B. Jones: 
 Diary, Dec. 9, 1863.] 
 
 24 Instr. to Mason, No. 34, Jan. 25, 1864. The Confederate 
 Senate, on Jan. 18, had confirmed the appointment of both 
 Mason and his secretary. Macfarland s salary was $3600. 
 
 26 The tenacity with which some clung to the hope of 
 foreign recognition and support is surprising. It appears 
 that their ideas as to English sympathy with the cause of 
 the secessionists were very much exaggerated. In April, 
 1864, L. Q. C. Lamar, who had recently returned from his 
 fruitless mission to Russia, in a speech at Macon, Georgia, 
 
THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 2OI 
 
 said England was almost unanimously Southern in its sym 
 pathies, and that the majority in Parliament were sym 
 pathizers with the Confederacy, but that the Cobden-Bright 
 element held the balance of power. He declared that Napo 
 leon, the artful politician, was friendly, but was opposed by 
 his Chamber of Deputies and could do nothing. He con 
 sidered that the Confederacy was favored "by Austria and 
 Spain, and by Italy through the Pope, and might be able to 
 secure as an ally Mexico, under the rule of Maximilian. 
 [The Weekly Register (Lynchburg), April 23, 1864.] 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 NAPOLEON, AND THE PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 While Napoleon was contemplating an American 
 empire around the Gulf, Slidell was planning in 
 France for a Confederate navy, and Mason was com 
 missioned to await contingencies. 1 Some who favored 
 rushing headlong into political combinations for 
 " gigantic increase " urged entangling alliances with 
 France. Henry St. Paul, in a pamphlet published at 
 Mobile (November, 1863) on " Our Home and For 
 eign Policy," stating that France had contemplated 
 and panted for it, proposed making the gulf a Franco- 
 Confederate lake, of which Cuba and the French 
 islands would be the central key, by which the isth 
 mus could also be brought under control. 
 
 Louis Napoleon desired to perpetuate his dynasty 
 by a military revival and a strong foreign policy. 
 Even before the civil war he dreamed of restoring to 
 France her long-lost colonial empire. A professor in 
 the University of Virginia told Benjamin of an hour s 
 conversation which he had with the Emperor in 1859 
 or 1860. He said that the latter drained him by ques 
 tions, and was especially eager to talk of Mexican 
 affairs. The professor had just returned from Cuba, 
 but he found Napoleon apparently better informed 
 than himself concerning the condition of affairs in the 
 gulf. He knew the exact number of guns on Morro 
 
 1 Instr. to Mason, No. 32, Nov. 13, 1863. 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 203 
 
 Castle and how much the United States spent on the 
 Florida fortifications. He seemed to seek in Mexico 
 a compensation for the lost colonies in the West 
 Indies, which he said could not be peaceably recov 
 ered. He stated that France must soon have a pied-a- 
 terre on the Florida coast to protect her gulf com 
 merce. " Nous ne voulons pas d un autre Gibraltar 
 de ce cote-la." He seemed also to revolve in his 
 mind the possibility of getting a foothold in Louisiana. 
 In asking as to the disposition of the French in Texas, 
 the tendency of the German colonists, and the feeling 
 on the Mexican border, he twice said " La Louisiane 
 n est ce pas qu elle est Franchise au fond? . . . Eh 
 bien, il faut reconstruire Tempire la bas." 
 
 At the opening of the civil war Napoleon saw his 
 opportunity, and he was favored by the conditions 
 around the gulf. Spain was ready to introduce her 
 authority in San Domingo; and England and Spain 
 were cooperating with France in contemplated inter 
 vention in Mexico in order to collect claims resulting 
 from the revolutions there. The United States, how 
 ever, would not join the European powers, but soon 
 expressed a readiness to help Mexico in the settle 
 ment of her claims. In the early part of 1862 Eng 
 land, Spain, and France landed troops at Vera Cruz. 
 Mexico soon arranged with England and Spain by 
 negotiations, and they withdrew their forces. Napo 
 leon refused the terms offered, and by invitation of the 
 clerical party declared war against Juarez. He ex 
 pected the Confederacy to be successful, and hoped 
 that thereby the United States would be prevented 
 
 2 Confed " Dip. Cor.", France, Benjamin to Slidell, Feb. 7, 
 1863. 
 
2O4 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 from interfering with his designs. French journalists 
 stated that intervention was rendered necessary by the 
 ambitious views of the United States as to expansion. 
 The American Government was apprehensive that 
 Spain might renew her cooperation with France. 
 Perry at Madrid suggested to the Spanish Govern 
 ment that it was time for her to end her participation 
 in the Mexican affair. Referring to the possible large 
 merchant navy which might traverse the waters be 
 tween Mexico and France, he suggested that the 
 strategical position of the Spanish colonies should 
 make Spain careful. For a while the influence of the 
 United States at Madrid was lessened by the report 
 that Mexico was to pledge territory for a loan from 
 the American Government, but Spain held aloof from 
 Mexican affairs. 
 
 The Confederate officials expressed no disapproval 
 of the policy of either France or Spain in Mexico and 
 San Domingo. They informed Spain that they de 
 sired to see her power grow. Slidell in 1862 told 
 Napoleon that the Confederacy would have no objec 
 tion to his taking the west end of San Domingo. 
 
 The Confederates were much encouraged by Napo 
 leon s attitude. In May, 1861, the Due de Morny, the 
 greatest person in France after the Emperor, informed 
 Rost that the recognition of the South was only a 
 matter of time. France only waited for England. 
 In April, 1862, Napoleon freely stated to Slidell that 
 he was ready to send an Anglo-French fleet to the 
 mouth of the Mississippi to break the blockade, but 
 New Orleans soon fell and postponed the chances of 
 Confederate recognition. In the fall of 1862 Napo 
 leon had been ready to mediate for a six months 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 205 
 
 armistice but England and France had refused to join 
 him. Apparently his friendship grew in the spring 
 and summer of 1863, but Lee was driven from the 
 North and England firmly declared against coopera 
 tion in recognizing the South, and Napoleon soon 
 found it inconvenient to facilitate plans for building 
 a Confederate navy in his ports. Gradually the signs 
 of the times rudely destroyed his vision of a great 
 Latin empire beyond the seas. 
 
 While Napoleon, declaring the necessity of a stable 
 government in Mexico to prevent the United States 
 from controlling the entire gulf, was preparing, in 
 the summer of 1862, an expedition for Vera Cruz, his 
 consuls at Galveston and Richmond were acting in 
 such a manner as to make Benjamin suspicious that 
 the Emperor, in accordance with the traditions of the 
 French policy, had secret and occult designs on some 
 of the Southern states, as well as on Mexico. Under 
 date of August 18, Theron, the French consul in 
 Texas, in a letter to Governor Lubbock, confidentially 
 asked his views as to whether the annexation of Texas 
 to the United States, and its subsequent secession and 
 incorporation with the Confederacy were good politi 
 cal movements, and whether the reestablishment of 
 the republic of Texas would be beneficial. He stated 
 that he was seeking information to guide him in his 
 political correspondence with his government. Lub 
 bock forwarded this letter to Davis ; and shortly after 
 wards Benjamin, in a communication which was cap- - 
 tured and published in the newspapers 3 of the follow 
 ing January, informed Slidell as to the discovery of 
 
 3 Richmond Examiner, Jan. 23, 1863. 
 

 206 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 a political intrigue believed to have been set on foot 
 by the French consul for the purpose of detaching 
 Texas from the Confederacy. Benjamin suggested 
 that it was the intention of Napoleon to hold Mexico 
 as a colony, and to establish Texas as a weaker power 
 between Mexico and the Confederacy so that he might 
 feel secure or that it was his purpose to take Texas 
 under his protection as an independent republic, so 
 that he could get cotton to offset the India supply of 
 England, thus making Texas as subservient to French 
 interests as if it were a French colony. Benjamin 
 asked Slidell to investigate. 
 
 The Richmond Examiner, whose editor was not an 
 admirer of Benjamin, feeling that the publication of 
 this captured despatch would give the Yankees more 
 news than could possibly have been given by any 
 Confederate newspaper, and tend to disgust Napoleon 
 with the Confederate cabinet and, at the same time, 
 ironically feigning to believe that the despatch was a 
 fabrication said that two idle French consuls might 
 have conceived the " silly idea " of sandwiching 
 Texas between two strong governments, but that so 
 stupid a conception could not possibly have attracted 
 the serious attention of even the feeblest secretary of 
 state.* L Huys voluntarily spoke to Dayton concern 
 ing the alleged intrigue, and said that he would 
 severely censure (" pound them "), the French con 
 suls, for assuming to interfere. Seward seems to 
 have attached no importance to Mr. Benjamin s fears, 
 nor to have apprehended any danger from the various 
 rumors as to French designs. He considered that 
 
 4 Richmond Examiner, Jan. 26, 1863. 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 207 
 
 the French element around New Orleans had become 
 entirely Americanized. At the close of 1862, in writ 
 ing to Dayton that the relations between France and 
 Louisiana did not have any political significance in 
 the relations of the two countries, he said that there 
 was no hook in Louisiana upon which French inter 
 vention could grapple. 5 
 
 Notwithstanding the suspicions of Benjamin, Napo- / 
 leon did not appear to take offense. He still professed / 
 to be ready to cooperate with England in any policy 
 affecting the Confederacy, and a few months later 
 he even appeared willing to act with Spain alone if 
 the latter would take the first step. In March, 1862, 
 Spain had not been ready to take the initiative in 
 recognizing the Confederacy. At the close of 1862, 
 when by the mutations of Spanish affairs General 
 Serrano was called to the portfolio of foreign affairs 
 in the O Donnel cabinet, Slidell saw a possibility that 
 Spain might review her decision, and he recommended 
 that the Confederacy should be represented at Madrid. 
 On March 22, 1863, Benjamin appointed Slidell to 
 act as special commissioner to that court; and, on 
 May 9, sent him instructions to assure Spain that the 
 South, since secession, no longer desired Cuba, nor 
 sought to extend its boundaries, but that it foresaw 
 future aggression of the United States for acquisi 
 tions, and was willing to form an alliance with Spain, 
 and to guarantee her possession of Cuba. When 
 Slidell received his instructions Serrano had gone out 
 with the other members of the O Donnel cabinet. 
 
 8 U. S. Dip. Cor., 1863, parts i and 2. pp. 640, 642, 646 and 
 702. Dayton to Seward, Feb. 13, 1863. Seward to Dayton, 
 Dec. 29, 1862, March 2, Sept. 26, 1863. 
 
208 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 Slidell did not go to Madrid, but he held long con 
 versations with Isturitz, the Spanish ambassador at 
 Paris, who stated that the sympathy of himself and his 
 government was with the Confederacy, and that Spain 
 was prepared to act with France and England, but that 
 she could not take the initiative in recognition and 
 risk the results of a war with the United States. 9 
 Slidell suggested that Spain and other powers might 
 unite with France without the cooperation of England, 
 and with apprehension of consequences no more ser 
 ious than " Seward s ebullitions." Isturitz seemed to 
 admit that Spain would be favorably disposed to his 
 suggestion, but he did not commit himself. He wrote 
 Miraflores, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, 
 that Slidell would promptly go to Madrid in case he 
 should receive an intimation that his presence would 
 be acceptable. 7 Napoleon, on June 18, was more fav 
 orably disposed than ever to a general European 
 recognition of the Confederacy; but he feared the 
 large navy of the United States, unless he could re 
 ceive English cooperation. Slidell suggested that 
 Spain had a navy, and that, by a guaranty of Cuba 
 and with assurance that France would concur, she 
 might be induced to act. Napoleon gave the assur 
 ance, Slidell informed Isturitz, the Paris correspond 
 ent informed the London Times, and Benjamin ex 
 pected a treaty; but after the defeat of the Confederacy 
 at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Isturitz stated that 
 nothing could be effected at Madrid. 
 
 The Confederates at this time were calculating upon 
 success in obtaining a navy in French ports. In an 
 
 8 Despatches of Slidell, May 28, 1863. 
 7 Ibid., June 21, 1863. 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 209 
 
 interview of October, 1862, Napoleon had intimated 
 to Slidell that if the Confederacy would arrange to 
 build ships in France, the builders would not be inter 
 rupted, and that by making some plausible plea the 
 vessels would be allowed to leave. The two had just 
 been speaking of a plan of joint mediation for a six 
 months armistice, when Napoleon changed the sub 
 ject by asking why the Confederacy had not created 
 a navy. Slidell said: "If the Emperor would give 
 only some kind of verbal assurance that the police 
 should not watch too closely when we put on the guns j 
 and men, we would gladly avail ourselves of it." The ! 
 Emperor replied: "Why could you not have them: 
 built as if for the Italian Government? I do not think j 
 it would be difficult, but I will consult my ministers." 
 Slidell was further encouraged, in December, by an 
 interview with Mocquard, though in the early part of 
 January the latter said that Napoleon found greater 
 difficulties as to building the ships than he had an 
 ticipated. 8 
 
 On January 7, M. Arman, a deputy of the French 
 legislative body, came to Slidell with a proposition to 
 build steamers, and the latter, feeling that he came at 
 the Emperor s instance, asked him to wait until he 
 learned the action of the Confederacy upon the propo 
 sition of European bankers to float a loan. L Huys, 
 who was consulted as to building the vessels, said that 
 he preferred to close his eyes to the affair until some 
 direct appeal should be made to him, and that Slidell 
 had better communicate with him through his 
 " friend," except when there was something special. 
 
 8 Despatches of Slidell, Jan. II, 1863. 
 14 
 
2io NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 The Minister of Marine officially assured Slidell and 
 Deputy Voruz that the builders of the corvettes " for 
 commercial purposes in the Indian ocean " would be 
 permitted to arm and equip them, and that the vessels 
 would be allowed to go to sea. 9 The Emperor also 
 informed Arman that there would be no difficulty i i 
 arming the steamers. 
 
 By the last of March the success of the Confederate 
 loan seemed to be assured and Mason and Slidell ad 
 vised that the building of vessels should begin. On 
 April 15, Captain Bullock made a contract with J. L. 
 Arman for four clipper corvettes of the Alabama 
 type, to run between Shanghai, Yedo and San Frar- 
 cisco, and built with the contemplation of a sale to the 
 Emperor of China or of Japan. Arman arranged with 
 M. J. Voruz of Nantes for two of the vessels. Bul 
 lock, soon after, received Mallory s note, of May 16, 
 stating that the Confederate Congress by a secret act 
 had appropriated 2,000,000 for building iron-clad 
 ships of war abroad. Expectations at Richmond had 
 become much aroused by the hopes held out by 
 France. In an interview with Napoleon on June 18, 
 Slidell, in thanking him for his sanction of the con 
 tract for building the four corvettes, stated that the 
 Confederacy was also prepared to build several iron 
 clads if he would only give verbal assurance that they 
 would be allowed to proceed to sea. To this request 
 Napoleon replied that if the ships were built it would 
 be necessary to conceal their destination. Slidell 
 urged that it would be no violation of neutrality for 
 the Emperor to give his permission to the Confeder- 
 
 9 Despatches of Slidell, March 4, 1863; Feb. 16 and 18, 1864. 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 211 
 
 acy, and mentioned the precedent of a ship built for 
 the Chilean Government, but the Emperor said there 
 was a distinction. 10 On July 16, Bullock closed an 
 other contract with Arman for two iron-clad vessels. 
 There was no official assurance, as in the case of the 
 corvettes, that the vessels would be allowed to go to 
 sea; and afterwards, when Slidell found that they could 
 not leave except under the apparent ownership of 
 some recognized government, he stated that he did 
 not know of the contract until it was made. 11 
 
 It will be seen from the foregoing statements, as 
 reported by Slidell, that Napoleon only promised that 
 the vessels should be built, and allowed to sail if their 
 real destination could be kept concealed. But the 
 secret of their destination becoming known through 
 no fault of his, in the face of American protest he 
 finally found it inexpedient to favor the Confederacy 
 in its plans to secure a navy. 
 
 On September 10, 1863, a mysterious stranger 
 walked into the office of John Bigelow, the United 
 States consul at Paris, and informed him of Bullock s 
 contract to secure Confederate vessels by having them 
 built for China. The stranger was Peterman, a clerk 
 of M. Voruz, who had abstracted his employer s cor 
 respondence. Bigelow at once informed Seward and 
 Dayton, who brought the matter to the attention of 
 the French Government. 12 Arman claimed that he 
 was no longer dealing with the Confederacy; but, on 
 October 22, L Huys informed Dayton that the Min- 
 
 10 Despatches of Slidell, No. 38, June 21, 1863 (in cipher). 
 Despatches of Mason, No. 40, June 20, 1863. 
 
 11 South. Hist. Ass n Papers, Vol. XIV, p. 454. 
 
 12 Bigelow: France and the Confederate Navy. 
 
212 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 ister of Marine had notified both Voruz and Arman 
 of the withdrawal of the authority which had been 
 obtained for the armament of the four vessels. 13 Some 
 time later, when Dayton placed into the hands of the 
 French authorities full proofs as to the Confederate 
 vessels, L Huys expressed amazement. 
 
 Slidell became uneasy, and on November 6, wrote to 
 Napoleon that the confident assertions of the agents 
 of the United States Government, and certain remarks 
 made at the office of foreign affairs, and of marine, 
 caused him to apprehend that orders might be given 
 to interfere with the completion of the vessels, and 
 he stated his confidence that Napoleon would take 
 necessary steps to prevent such interference. Three 
 days later L Huys asked Slidell to call November 9. 
 He then told him that what passed with the Emperor 
 was confidential, and that France being bound by a 
 declaration of neutrality would not risk a war with 
 the United States. Slidell replied that the vessels 
 were building by an invitation of Napoleon, who had 
 originated the idea, and he invoked an adherence to 
 the promises confidentially given. 
 
 The Minister of Marine (November 19) drew a 
 broad line of distinction between corvettes and iron 
 clads, stating that if the latter be allowed to sail in 
 spite of the remonstrances from Washington and in 
 violation of the declaration of neutrality it would be 
 an overt, act of hostility. He informed Arman that 
 the iron-clads would not be allowed to go to sea ex 
 cept as the property of some non-belligerent govern 
 ment, and Bullock, after consulting Mason and Slidell, 
 
 13 U. S. Dip. Cor., 1863, Vol. II. 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 213 
 
 determined to sell them. Bullock also desired to dis 
 pose of the corvettes, which he said were built only to 
 act in conjunction with the iron-clads in raising the 
 blockade. Slidell, however, suggesting that a few 
 months might change affairs, was in favor of using the 
 corvettes as cruisers like the Alabama. " I know the 
 Emperor s feelings are as friendly as ever," said he, 
 " and the new ministry in England may enable him 
 to indulge them. The chapter of accidents is always 
 in the long run fruitful of great and unexpected re 
 sults. Perhaps it may be better to go on and com 
 plete the ships." Davis and Mallory agreed that it 
 was best to complete the vessels and take chances. 
 
 A short time later, Slidell s hopes received a fresh 
 shock. The steam sloop Rappahannock, pierced for 
 four guns and purchased by Confederate agents in 
 Great Britain, left November 25, without armament 
 or war equipments, and by permission entered the 
 French port of Calais for repair, to adjust her engines, 
 and to complete preparations for her voyage to the 
 Confederacy. Napoleon wrote Persigny that he had 
 given orders that she might leave the French port, 
 but that the American minister must not know it. A 
 few days later, however, by an order which Benjamin 
 called unfriendly, the French Government prevented 
 the vessel from proceeding to sea with more than 
 thirty-five officers and men. This being insufficient 
 to manage the vessel she was detained at Calais. 1 * 
 
 Slidell soon had fresh evidence that the turn of 
 events in America and Europe, and the policy of Eng 
 land, were forcing Napoleon to endeavor to conciliate 
 
 14 Rp. of Mallory, Sec y of the Confed. Navy, Richmond, 
 Nov. 5, 1864. 
 
214 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 the United States. James Williams, a confidentia 
 agent, had spent two weeks at Miramar in frequent 
 communication with Maximilian, and wrote Davis tha* 
 the latter was disposed to enter into an alliance will 
 the Confederacy. Slidell was told by his friend in the 
 foreign office that Maximilian would recognize the 
 South, but when the latter, while at Paris, did noi. 
 receive him, he wrote that the whole policy of the 
 Emperor had changed. Mercier was on a visit to 
 Paris, and Mason suggested that perhaps Lincolr 
 had sent a message to the Emperor offering to recog 
 nize the Mexican Government if France would noi. 
 recognize the Confederacy. 15 
 
 Arrangements for extricating vessels in Englanc 
 also met with serious interference. The British Gov 
 ernment had detained several steam rams upon com 
 plaints that they were building for the Confederacy, 
 and Earl Russell soon found occasion to warn Mr. 
 Davis that British neutrality must be respected. In 
 December, 1863, Seward sent Russell a copy of what 
 purported to be an annual report of Mallory of the 
 Confederate navy. 19 It alluded to Confederate vessels 
 building in England, and to contemplated Confederate 
 operations in Canada. Seward stated that " The re 
 cognition of the insurgents without navy, ports, 
 courts, or coasts, as a belligerent, was deemed by 
 
 18 Despatches of Mason, March 16, 1864. Despatches of 
 Slidell, Dec. 3, 1863, Mar. 16, 1864, and May 2, 1864. 
 
 10 U. S. Dip. Cor. Instr. No. 789, Seward to Adams, Dec. 
 20, 1863. As to the spurious character of the Mallory report, 
 see Adams to Seward, Nos. 574 and 579; Seward to Adams, 
 Nos. 824 and 883; Adams to Seward, Nos. 596 and 640; and 
 Seward to Dayton, Feb. 25, 1864. Also, Despatches of 
 Mason. 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 215 
 
 them ... as an invitation to use the British ports," 
 and he urged that for the British Government to tol 
 erate the Confederate agents while they were carrying 
 on their avowedly hostile purposes against the United 
 States could not be called neutrality. 
 
 In March, 1864, Lord Russell asked Lord Lyons 
 to convey to Davis in a spirit of neutrality and impar 
 tiality a protest against the efforts of the agents of the 
 " so-called " Confederate States to build or purchase 
 war vessels in British dominions for use against the 
 United States stating that they gave the United 
 States just cause for serious complaint, even if the 
 vessels were armed out of port. 17 He further stated 
 that even if it should be difficult to prove in a court 
 of law that the parties procuring the building of these 
 vessels were Confederate agents, nevertheless it was 
 so undersood everywhere, and the British were satis 
 fied that Davis would not deny it. 18 There were no 
 regular diplomatic or consular agents near Richmond, 
 and Lord Lyons (April i) by permission of the United 
 States Government sent Russell s protest to Rich 
 mond by special messenger. Davis replied (April 6) 
 through Burton N. Harrison, his private secretary, 
 protesting against the term " so-called," stating that 
 the British plea of neutrality was clearly contradicted 
 by British action in favor of the United States, and 
 refusing to notice Russell s argument upon a ques 
 tion which was still before the highest courts of Eng 
 land. 19 
 
 17 Despatches of Mason, March 16, 1864. 
 
 18 Despatches of Adams to Seward, No. 596, Feb. 12, 1864. 
 Enclosure. 
 
 "Frank Moore: The Rebellion Record (N. Y., 1861-65, 
 8 Vols), Vol. VIII, p. 513, et seq. Mrs. Davis: Jefferson 
 Davis, Vol. II, Chap. 48- 
 
216 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 A few days later Benjamin instructed Mason that 
 he could use his own discretion about going to Lon 
 don, in case he thought his presence would be useful 
 there. 20 Mason had already been going to Londo i 
 to help " keep the public mind awake," to combat the 
 anti-slavery sentiments of his friends, to organize 
 Southern societies, and to communicate to Lori 
 Robert Cecil information which he might use in com 
 bating the Government. 21 He was feeling the pulse of 
 the opposition and of public opinion, but he could 
 expect nothing from the British Government unless 
 Grant should be driven from before the gates of Rich 
 mond. 22 
 
 At the beginning of 1864 the vigilance and pro 
 tests of the United States officials in France had 
 caused the French Government to notify the builders 
 that vessels for the Confederacy must not leave, and 
 Arman saw that his only opportunity was to make a 
 fictitious sale and have the vessels delivered to the 
 Confederacy on the ocean. Bullock, feeling that he 
 had been deceived, refused to agree to Arman s plan. 
 Maury returned to the Confederacy (February) to 
 report the failure to get out vessels from either France 
 or England. It was a painful disappointment." 
 Mason wrote that there was no excuse for the defeat 
 in France where the Confederate agents had a right 
 
 20 Instr. to Mason, April 18, 1864. 
 
 21 Despatches of Mason, No. i, Paris, Jan. 25; No. 2, Paris, 
 Feb. 8; No. 3, London, Feb. 18; No. 4, London, Feb. 18; 
 No. 5, March n, 1863. 
 
 22 On June 22, 1864 (Instr. to Mason, No. 36), Benjamin 
 wrote that the British action regarding the Tuscaloosa was 
 an " outrage." 
 
 23 Despatches of Mason, No. 3, London, Feb. 18, 1864. 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 217 
 
 to expect better results. 2 * A month later he said that 
 there was no more hope from France than from 
 Austria, notwithstanding Napoleon s mysterious pol 
 icy and his " fairest professions sedulously made." 
 Again in July he wrote: " We have been duped by 
 that power and worse." Bullock stated that in future 
 it would be necessary to be very cautious in dealing 
 with France. Perhaps Napoleon had expected Con 
 federate victory, or contemplated an alliance which 
 would give him an opportunity to allow the vessels to 
 go, but he finally found it necessary to discountenance 
 any arrangement which would offend the United 
 States. Bullock had finally agreed to the fictitious 
 sale of the corvette tn a Denmark banker, to be deliv- 
 ered to the Confederacy on the sea, but Arman sold 
 Ifiem outright, claiming- that he did so by the order 
 of Napoleon. The two Bordeaux corvettes and the 
 ram were sold to Prussia! The builder at Nantes 
 declared that he would deliver the other two corvettes 
 at sea but Slidell was not confident. On June 2, in / 
 a letter stating that ex-Senator Gwin with a recom 
 mendation from Napoleon was on his way to colonize 
 Sonora with persons of Southern birth and proclivi 
 ties, Slidell advised that no further attempt be made 
 at that time to fit out a navy in Europe but he said 
 that the Confederacy ivould need a navy at the close of 
 the war. Napoleon still studied the United States 
 map, but he ceased to see Slidell, except occasionally 
 at the races. 
 
 Of the prospective navy only one vessel was ever I 
 
 u Despatches of Mason, No. 5, March 16, 1864. Ibid., No. 
 7, Paris, April 12, 1864. Ibid., No. 11 July 8, 1864. 
 25 Despatches of Slidell, June 2, 1864. 
 
218 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 
 
 delivered to the Confederates. About the last of 
 January, 1865, the ram JStoerkodder, which Arrran 
 pretended to have sold to Denmark, sailed from Bor 
 deaux. She changed her name to Olindc on_Jhe 
 FrenetLcoast, discharged her Danish crew, and taking 
 on arms, sailed to Spain as the Stonezvall. France 
 declined to meddle with the vessel after it reached 
 Spain. Commodore Craven, of the United States 
 navy, arrived to prevent its escape but he mysteriously 
 failed. The Stonewall escaped to Nassau and fina ly 
 reached Havana, where it was sold for $16,000, though 
 the captain-general was willing to make the contract 
 read $100,000. The war had then ended and it was 
 too late to attempt to break the blockade. Bigelow 
 afterwards instituted suit against Arman for money 
 received from Confederate agents, but the claim was 
 rejected. 
 
 The failure to get out vessels in France was a blow 
 from an unexpected quarter. 20 It disappointed both 
 Davis and Benjamin who seem already to have hal 
 grave doubts of the good faith of Napoleon. Davis 
 while walking through the capitol square with some 
 Richmond ladies said: " We have no friends abroad." 1 
 Benjamin ceasing to put his faith in foreign powers 
 and expressing expectation of an early victory without 
 them said (April 18): "It has been, perhaps, fortu 
 nate for us, notwithstanding the awful price paid in 
 blood . . . that European powers have remained so 
 inconceivably blind to their own interests in this 
 trouble. The end is seen to be approaching and we 
 . . . shall have no favor to reciprocate, but many 
 
 20 Instr. to Mason, April 16, 1864. 
 
 27 J. B. Jones: Diary, March 21, 1864. 
 
NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 219 
 
 wrongs to forget some, perhaps, for which to ask 
 for redress." In September, 1864, Benjamin fur 
 nished Slidell with a long catalogue of acts of the 
 French Government in France, in the Confederacy 
 and on the Mexican border which he said had been 
 injurious to the Confederate States. 28 He stated that 
 England had scarcely disguised her hostility, but that 
 the Emperor had obscured his under profuse pro 
 fessions of friendship. He decided, however, to defer 
 complaints against the French Government until a 
 more favorable season. There w % ere rumors of pros 
 pective French aid until the visions of both the Con 
 federacy and Napoleon vanished in the fall of Rich 
 mond. But there was no longer a cordial feeling 
 toward the Emperor, and Davis, while travelling 
 through Europe after the war, refused to call upon 
 him. 29 
 
 28 Instr. to Slidell, Sept. 20, 1864. 
 
 29 J. W. Daniel: Jefferson Davis, p. 45. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 The plans in the British Parliament had failed; the 
 British war vessels kept a close watch at the mouth 
 of the Mersey to prevent the escape of Confederate 
 vessels; Spain would not act; and France, owing to 
 the vigilance of the United States officials, had he- 
 come more careful than had been anticipated, leaving 
 doubt as to whether a Confederate navy would be 
 allowed to sail even if it were secretly built in European 
 ports. The decrease of Confederate opportunities in 
 Europe, together with the desire to embarrass the 
 United States Government, and to create national 
 complications, caused the Confederates to turn to 
 Canada as a base of operations. 
 
 The Richmond authorities in making their plans 
 placed much reliance upon the disaffection (against 
 the Lincoln administration) which existed in portions 
 of the North, and which found expression in the or 
 ganization of the Knights of the Golden Circle and 
 the Sons of Liberty. Some even expected a counter 
 revolution. The West, at the beginning of the war, 
 had been much excited as to the Confederate policy 
 on the waters of the Mississippi. On February 25, 
 1861, the Confederate Congress had passed an act for 
 free navigation of that river. In January, 1863, Foote, 
 in the Confederate Congress, offered a resolution 
 tempting the Northwest to make peace. A few days 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 221 
 
 later he stated that if Indiana and Illinois should 
 recede from the war and aid the Confederacy he 
 would be willing to furnish them an army for protec 
 tion against Lincoln. A month later it was stated in 
 Richmond that a gentleman from the Northwest de 
 clared that Ohio, Kentucky and Illinois would secede 
 and form a new confederacy, or join the South. 
 Though this was not reliable, the people began to dis 
 cuss whether Virginia would be willing to take back 
 her " erring children of the Northwest/ and whether 
 the cotton states would oppose such an accession. 1 
 In March, it was suggested that conscription in the 
 North might cause a new civil war that would result 
 in giving aid and comfort to the Confederacy. In 
 the following June, Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio, 
 whom Lincoln had banished to the Confederacy for 
 an intemperate speech in Mount Vernon, Ohio, was 
 in Richmond, and told Ould that, if the Confederacy 
 could only hold out for the year, the peace party of 
 the North would sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of 
 existence. In September, J. C. Jones asked Davis 
 for permission to run the blockade to confer with 
 Secretary Bates of Lincoln s Cabinet on terms of peace 
 by assuring the United States that none of the North 
 western states would be admitted to the Southern 
 Confederacy. 2 In February, 1864, one of Morgan s 
 secret agents, who had spent several months in the 
 North, doubted whether Lincoln would be able to re 
 cruit the army by a draft, and stated that there was 
 a perfect organization all over the North for a revolu- 
 
 *J. B. Jones: Diary, Jan. 24 and 27, Feb. 14, March 3, 
 June 22. 1863. 
 2 Ibid., Sept. 10, 1863. 
 
222 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 tion, and for the expulsion or death of the aboli 
 tionists. 8 
 
 As early as February, 1863, Mr. Mallory had favored 
 an expedition against Johnson s Island for the pur 
 pose of releasing Confederate prisoners. Davis and 
 other members of the Cabinet, fearing complications 
 with England, opposed the expedition, but it was 
 finally arranged. The plans, however, miscarried. 
 In November, 1863, Lord Monck, Governor-Genen.l 
 of Canada, telegraphed Lord Lyons at Washington 
 that there was a rumor of a Confederate plot to capture 
 steamers on Lake Erie, release Confederate prisoners, 
 and then to invade the United States by an attac c 
 upon Buffalo. On the night of November n, Lyons 
 notified Seward, and a close watch being kept along 
 the frontier by both Canada and the United States, the 
 Confederates made no attempt to execute the plot. 
 Lieutenant Minor soon returned from Canada and 
 stated that his contemplated expedition had failed on 
 account of the gratuitous action of Lord Lyons.* 
 
 Notwithstanding the close watch kept by Lord 
 Monck, the United States Government in 1864 ex 
 pressed much anxiety concerning the large number 
 of Confederates in Canada and the suspicious-looking 
 vessels in Canadian waters. Seward had been pro 
 testing vigorously against the British policy, and there 
 was a widespread belief in the United States that the 
 Confederates received assistance which the British 
 
 3 J. B. Jones: Diary, Feb. 22, 1864. 
 
 4 Lieut. Minor s letter of Feb. 2, 1864. In Naval War 
 Records, Series i, Vol. II, No. 36, House Docs., Vol. XLI, 
 54-1, 1895-96. 
 
 J. M. Callahan: The Neutrality of the American Lakes 
 and Anglo-American Relations, pp. 145-46. 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 223 
 
 Government could have prevented. With the rise of 
 controversies, the Confederates contemplated the con 
 tingency of an Anglo-American war which would 
 embarrass the United States and aid the cause of 
 secession. In April, 1864, Seward said: "We must 
 finish the Civil War soon or we shall get into a war 
 with England." Two months later he declared that 
 British sympathy was clearly with the South. 
 
 In February, 1864, the Confederates expected to 
 gain some advantage from the Chesapeake affair. On 
 December 5, 1863, J. C. Braine and H. A. Parr, with 
 twelve equipped men, boarded the United States 
 steamer Chesapeake, leaving New York for Portland. 
 They pretended that they were passengers for Port 
 land. On December 8, while on the high seas, they 
 captured the vessel, after a brief struggle, made pris 
 oners of those on board, and sailed to the bay of 
 Fundy. Near St. Johns, New Brunswick, the pas 
 sengers, and most of the crew, were released, and 
 Captain Parker took command. While the Chesapeake 
 was receiving coal from a British vessel in Sambro 
 harbor, Nova Scotia, the United States gunboat, Ella 
 and Annie, entered the harbor and seized her; but, 
 after reaching the sea, orders were received from a 
 Federal officer to deliver her to the British authorities 
 at Halifax. The United States Government re 
 quested that the men engaged in capturing the Chesa 
 peake on the high seas should be delivered to the 
 United States. Davis and Benjamin decided to as 
 sume responsibility for the seizure of the Chesapeake, 
 stating that the original conception of the plan was 
 probably by Captain John Parker, alias Locke, a Brit 
 ish subject, who had enlisted as a Confederate priva- 
 
224 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 teer, and whose vessel had become unseaworthy. They 
 stated that Braine and Parr were Confederate citizens 
 ; and that they had intended to take the Chesapeake 
 through the blockade at Wilmington. 5 
 
 On February 15, Benjamin instructed Hon. J. P. 
 Holcombe to go to Nova Scotia to defend the men 
 and to claim the vessel. In case the authorities re 
 fused to give him an official interview, he was to re 
 monstrate firmly and inform them that the Confed 
 eracy would hold England responsible. He received 
 $3000 salary, and $5000 for expenses in carrying out 
 his instructions. He was also given $25,000 to se 
 cure passage to Bermuda for Confederate prisoners 
 who had escaped to Canada. 6 Holcombe s instruc 
 tions asked him to insist upon the following points: 
 (i) That citizens of the Confederacy had a right, dur 
 ing the war, to make captures even without a com 
 mission, and that while engaged in such enterprises 
 they were neither pirates nor murderers. (2) That 
 the Chesapeake, while in a neutral harbor, was beyond 
 the reach of legal recapture, and that voluntary rendi 
 tion of the vessel gave the United States no right to 
 retain it. (3) That the Richmond admiralty court, 
 and not those of a neutral power, had jurisdiction in 
 determining whether the Chesapeake was a good prize 
 of war. (4) That this particular case was not affected 
 by the English prohibition against privateers carrying 
 prizes to English ports, as the vessel went to the Eng 
 lish port only to get fuel. (5) That England had rec 
 ognized the Confederates as belligerents. (6) That if 
 the British authorities had delivered the vessel to the 
 North, they must reimburse the Confederates 
 
 6 Instr. of Benjamin to Holcombe, No. I, Feb. 15, 1864. 
 8 Instr. to Holcombe, No. 2, Feb. 24, 1864. 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 225 
 
 Holcombe found Confederate sympathizers in 
 Canada; but, in April, the Confederate Government, 
 acknowledging that it had been led into error, dis 
 claimed the seizure of the Chesapeake. 1 
 
 In April, 1864, just before Grant began his advance 
 to Richmond, the Confederacy had recognized its 
 perilous condition. Many, both North and South, 
 were weary of war. The Confederate Congress, be 
 lieving that an organization in the North and West 
 would aid the South, secretly appropriated a million 
 dollars to be used by Confederate agents. 8 In March, 
 
 Mrs. , of Maryland, whose son was in a Federal 
 
 prison, had already received secret service money, and 
 had gone to Canada on some enterprise in which she 
 expected aid from Catholic priests and nuns. 9 On 
 April 27, Jefferson Davis sent Jacob Thompson and 
 C. C. Clay as special agents to Canada to carry out 
 instructions 10 received orally, by which that country 
 was to be made the base for striking the United States 
 in the back. 11 Thompson, on April 28, received bills 
 of exchange for $900,000. 
 
 A subsequent report of Thompson to Benjamin (from 
 
 7 Instr. to Holcombe, April 20, 1864. 
 
 8 See N. Y. Herald, July 28, 1872. 
 
 *J. B. Jones: Diary, March 22, 1864. 
 
 10 Their credentials are in Confed. " Diplomatic and Con 
 sular Commissions." On April 30, Benjamin wrote Slidell: 
 " We have sent Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, and Clement 
 C. Clay of Alabama, to Canada on secret service in the hope 
 of aiding the disruption between the Eastern and Western 
 States in the approaching election at the North. It is sup 
 posed that much good can be done by the purchase of some 
 of the principal presses, especially in the Northwest." [Con- 
 fed. " Dip. Cor., France."] 
 
 u Benjamin to Thompson, April 28, 1864. 
 t-5 
 
226 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 Toronto, December 3, 1864) indicates the nature of his 
 mission. By conferences with disaffected men, some of 
 whom hoped that without war the South would soon 
 consent to reconstruction, Thompson encouraged tae 
 organization of an insurrection in the North; he ad 
 vised with Colonel Martin in regard to burning New 
 York City, and with Captain C. H. Cole, who made a 
 tour of the lakes, studying forts, channels and peo 
 ple preparatory to plans for the release of Confed 
 erate prisoners and the inauguration of operations in 
 which the prisoners were expected to assist; he aided 
 a plot undertaken by J. Y. Beall for the capture of lake 
 steamers. By Benjamin s instructions, he urged t;ie 
 people of the North to convert their paper into geld 
 and withdraw it from the market. John Porterfield of 
 Nashville was sent to New York with $100,000 to use 
 in purchasing and exporting gold. 12 
 
 On July 9, Thompson wrote Benjamin from Wind 
 sor: " We have sixty escaped prisoners who are 
 ready for any enterprise." He said that nothing could 
 be done in the Eastern States, but suggested that the 
 Confederate movements to Kentucky and Missouri 
 would facilitate a movement in the West, where there 
 was much discontent against the Lincoln Govern 
 ment. In a letter sent by Captain Hines, he stated 
 that " the work " would probably not begin before the 
 middle of August and that much caution would be 
 necessary. About the same time there were rumors 
 from Canada that the Confederate agents had ma 
 chines in Canada which were to be mounted on lake 
 vessels and shipped to destroy Northern cities. 
 
 13 Report of Thompson to Benjamin, Toronto, Dec. 3, 1864. 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 227 
 
 The coming presidential election in the United 
 States was at this time an absorbing question and the 
 Confederates were reckoning upon some chapter of 
 possible accidents to defeat Lincoln. Some in the 
 North, like Wendell Phillips, the stormy petrel of 
 political troubles, thought Lincoln \vas going too 
 slowly in his policy. Others who opposed military 
 arrests and the suspension of the habeas corpus, said 
 that he was going too fast and that recent reverses 
 justified efforts to obtain peace. Some had opposed 
 the war policy from the beginning. But the nearly 
 universal desire of the Union party was to renominate 
 Lincoln and to support the campaigns of Grant be 
 fore Richmond and Sherman before Atlanta. The 
 Baltimore Convention which met June 7, declared in 
 favor of maintaining the integrity of the Union, of 
 ratifying an amendment for emancipation, of con 
 structing a railway to the Pacific, of paying the public 
 debt and of re-electing Lincoln. It opposed any com 
 promise with secession. 
 
 Many of the opposition had charged Lincoln with 
 refusing to negotiate for peace on reasonable terms. 
 A. H. Stephens, who desired peace, had been stopped 
 before he reached Fortress Monroe on his way to 
 Washington, and had not been permitted to come 
 within the Union lines because he had refused to state 
 the object of his visit. 13 In July, 1863, Colonel 
 Jacques, a Methodist clergyman, serving in Rosen- 
 cranz s army, returned from an unofficial visit to Rich- 
 
 13 President Davis to Gov. Vance, Jan. 8, 1864. On Dec. 
 30, 1863, Vance had urged efforts to secure peace. [Weekly 
 Register (Lynchburg), June 4. 1864.] See also Stephens 
 "War Between the States," Vol. IT, pp. 557-80; ^and Nicolay 
 and Hay s " Abraham Lincoln," Vol. VII, pp. 369-74. 
 
228 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 mond and reported that he had proposals for peace. 
 He said that prominent men in the South were willing 
 to give up slavery, but that they would not take the 
 initiative in a movement for peace. On June 14, 1864, 
 Davis issued a manifesto stating that the Confederacy 
 was willing to negotiate on points which required c.d- 
 justment and that it desired the United States to cease 
 the war against secession. He stated that if the 
 United States would withdraw its armies, the war 
 would be at an end. On July 8, Col. J. T. Jacques, in 
 company with J. R. Gilmore, a novelist (Edmund 
 Kirke), made an " unofficial visit " to Richmond, 
 where Davis listened (July 17) to their plans of ad 
 justment to decide, by majority vote, whether there 
 should be union without slavery or disunion with it. 
 Davis pronounced their plan impracticable, said that 
 the Confederate States seceded to get rid of the rule of 
 the majority, and would not consider proposals for 
 peace except on the basis of independence. 14 
 
 About the same time another peace comedy 15 was 
 being enacted on the Canadian boundary. After a 
 recent conference at Niagara Falls between Thomp 
 son, Clay and several prominent citizens of the United 
 States, the Confederate agents decided to open a cor 
 respondence looking toward negotiations for peace. 
 Holcombe in the following November wrote Ben 
 jamin that it was intended that the correspondence 
 snould have effect in rendering probable the defeat of 
 Lincoln at the polls. 10 Clay and Holcombe opened 
 
 14 Nicolay and Hay, Vol. IX, p. 212. Benjamin to Mason, 
 Aug. 25, 1864. Register (Lynchburg), Aug. 27, Sept. 24, 1864. 
 Gilmore, Recollections of Lincoln; Atlantic Mo., Vol. 59. 
 
 13 The Index (London), Aug. 4 and 6, 1864. 
 
 10 Despatches of Holcombe (Richmond), Nov. 16, 1864. 
 Also, N. Y. Herald, July 31, 1872. 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 22() 
 
 communication with Greeley, and G. N. Sanders ex 
 pressed his willingness to go to Washington on a 
 peace mission. 17 In the early part of July, Greeley 
 wrote Lincoln that Colonel Jewett was at Niagara in 
 communication with Confederates who had power to 
 make negotiations for peace. Lincoln had no faith in 
 Jewett s story, but replied July 9: "If you can find 
 any person, anywhere, professing to have any propo 
 sition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, em 
 bracing the restoration of the Union and the aban 
 donment of slavery . . . say to him he may come 
 to me with you." A few days later he again wrote: 
 " I am disappointed you have not reached here with 
 those commissioners ... I not only intend a sincere 
 effort for peace, but I intend you shall be a personal 
 witness that it is made." On July 20, Major John 
 Hay, Lincoln s private secretary, arrived at Niagara 
 with the following note: 
 
 " Executive Mansion, Washington, July 18, 1864. 
 To Whom it may concern: 
 
 Any proposition which embraces the restoration of 
 peace, the integrity of the Union, and the abandon 
 ment of slavery, and which comes by and with an 
 authority that can control the armies now at war 
 against the United States will be received and be con 
 sidered by the Executive Government of the United 
 States, and will be met with liberal terms on other sub 
 stantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers 
 thereof shall have safe conduct both ways. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 
 "The Weekly Register (Lynchburg), Aug. 6, 1864, p. 214. 
 
230 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 It was discovered that the Confederates at Niagara 
 with whom Greeley opened peace negotiations had no 
 authority from the Confederate Government. 18 They 
 were endeavoring to have Lincoln take the initiative 
 in the peace negotiations and to recognize the official 
 status of the Confederate Government. Lincoln con 
 sidered that the Niagara Confederates were cooperat 
 ing to aid the anti-administration movement by cre 
 ating an impression that he was opposed to peace ex 
 cept on the basis of immediate emancipation. Cn 
 August 24, Lincoln wrote a letter with the intention 
 of sending Henry J. Raymond to propose peace with 
 out mention of slavery, but events soon occurred 10 
 weaken the extreme peace men and the letter was 
 never used. 19 
 
 Thompson and Clay, by confidential conferences 
 with men from the Northwest, had declared the readi 
 ness of the Confederacy to seize Illinois, Indiana and 
 Ohio. Peace meetings were inaugurated at Peoria 
 and other places, but the fire soon diminished and the 
 nerves of the leaders began to relax. 20 The return of 
 Vallandigham in June encouraged the opposition to 
 attempt to defeat Lincoln by the ballot-box. The 
 half-formed project of an insurrection was given up 
 with the hope of success at the polls. The leaders of 
 the anti-administration party had called a national 
 convention on July 4; but after the Baltimore Conven 
 tion, hoping to receive advantage from some new 
 chapter of accidents, they agreed to postpone the meet 
 ing to a more inconspicuous date. Thompson, in his 
 
 18 Instr. to Mason, Aug. 25, 1864. 
 
 19 Nicolay and Hay. 
 
 20 Thompson to Benjamin, Toronto, Dec. 3, 1864. 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 231 
 
 report to Benjamin, said this postponement inter 
 rupted the calculations for a general uprising in the 
 North. The Democratic convention finally met at 
 Chicago, August 29, the day which had been set for 
 a counter-revolution, and nominated McClellan for 
 president. It was a time of depression and gloom. 
 The terrible fighting in the Wilderness, the horrible 
 slaughter at Cold Harbor, the Confederate raid into 
 Maryland had shocked and depressed the country. 
 Early, defiant, stormed up the Shenandoah; Sherman 
 was delayed at Kenesaw; Chase, tired of providing the 
 funds while others controlled the expenditures, had 
 resigned from the Cabinet, and seemed to see the 
 mirage of the presidency; the Wade-Davis manifesto 
 had been issued in August and the Democrats, attack 
 ing the administration and hoping to change the Gov 
 ernment, pronounced the war a failure. Mason, also 
 from London, wrote: " I do not see how the war can 
 be carried on when . . . people have no stomachs for 
 the fight." a 
 
 The Confederates had recently received fresh proof 
 that Europe would not take any action, and Mason 
 saw nothing to do but await events, hoping that the 
 presidential election and the anti-war feeling in the 
 United States, together with the distress in England, 
 would favor the South. In the last week in May, 
 Lindsay had had a conversation with Palmerston to 
 endeavor to conciliate the British Government s sup 
 port on a resolution for joint mediation in the Amer 
 ican war. He wrote Mason that Palmerston favored 
 his resolution, but thought it best to wait. At the 
 
 21 Despatches of Mason, No. 13, Paris, Sept. 29, 1864. 
 
232 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 suggestion of Lindsay, Palmerston said he would 
 be willing to see Mason and hear his views if he were 
 in London. 22 Mason did not feel at liberty to ap 
 proach the British Government without some intima 
 tion of its disposition to enter into official relation; 
 but, urged by Lindsay, he went to London, expecting 
 to see Palmerston in case he should be invited. He 
 found that only the news of a great victory against 
 Grant before Richmond would give any hope that the 
 ministry would support Lindsay s resolution. 23 Rus 
 sell remarked that Adams still spoke confidently. On 
 July 8, however, Mason, in a note to Benjamin, stal 
 ing that new Confederate successes might cause Eng 
 lish public opinion to compel the Government to ac :, 
 said: " Palmerston has sent me a note that he de 
 sires to see me." : Benjamin had already (July 12), 
 in a note advising occasional conferences with Lind 
 say, favored the proposed interview and instructed 
 Lindsay to meet Palmerston s advances with courte 
 ous but lofty bearing." 23 
 
 On July 14, Palmerston received Mason and Lind 
 say in a friendly manner at his home. He asked 
 Mason his opinion of the nature and probable length 
 of the war; the probable results of the presidential 
 election upon it; whether the United States would be 
 as much opposed to intervention as formerly, and 
 what prospects the South had. Mason, in his reply, 
 stated that the North was strongly against a continua 
 tion of the war and indicated that the United States 
 
 22 Despatches from Mason, No. 8, Paris, June i, 1864. 
 
 23 Ibid., No. 9, London, June 9, 1864. 
 "Ibid., No. n, July 8, 1864. 
 
 25 Instr. to Mason, No. 37, July 12, 1864. 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 233 
 
 would be forced to cease hostilities and make peace. 
 He did not doubt the final success of the Confederacy. 
 Though he did not urge recognition, he suggested that 
 recognition alone by any European power would stop 
 the war. Palmerston, though friendly, did not define 
 his policy for the future. 26 Lindsay, unable to con 
 ciliate the ministry, abandoned his resolution. 27 On 
 July 25, Palmerston, in reply to Lindsay in the House 
 of Commons, said that the Government lamented the 
 sacrifice of life and property in America and the dis 
 tress in England, but in the existing state of affairs 
 there would be no advantage in entering into concert 
 with European powers to propose mediation. 18 Mason 
 soon returned to Paris, from whence he wrote," a few 
 weeks later, that he might .be able to do some good at 
 Frankfort by efforts to prevent emigration to the 
 United States and aid a catastrophe to United States 
 securities. Palmerston had stated that recognition 
 would be of no value unless England should intervene 
 by raising the blockade, but Benjamin said that rec 
 ognition from whatever quarter would end the war 
 and that nothing else would. He insisted the Confed 
 eracy did not seek intervention, but he expected noth 
 ing from England except a " policy dictated by the 
 United States." As Benjamin was writing, Davis 
 was on a tour through Mississippi, Alabama and 
 Georgia endeavoring to dispel increasing disaffection 
 
 28 Despatches of Mason. July. 1864. Duplicate copy in 
 Mason s MS. Record Book. Ibid., No. 14, Nov. 10. 
 
 27 Ibid., No. 12, Aug. 4, 1864. 
 
 M 176 Parl. Debates. Also, Despatches of Mason, No. 12, 
 London, Aug. 4, 1864. 
 
 *" Despatches of Mason, No. 14, Nov. 10, 1864, 
 
234 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 for the Confederacy. But Benjamin wrote : " There 
 is no reason for despondency." : 
 
 From the moment of the Chicago convention, the 
 stars in their courses seemed to fight against both the 
 Confederacy and the Chicago platform. During a 
 flow of rhetoric and the march of torchlight proces 
 sions, following the nominations, Hood was preparing 
 to evacuate Atlanta. The Union success at Mobile 
 knocked the second plank out of the platform. 
 McClellan seemed to see the poison of death in the 
 platform and his letter of acceptance he practicallv 
 repudiated part of it and disappointed the Confed 
 erates in their expectation of an early end of the at 
 tempts to preserve the Union. In September, Na 
 poleon shook hands with .Slidell at the races, and 
 agreed with him that McClellan s letter was disap 
 pointing. Slidell said the war would probably con 
 tinue till a revolution broke out in the North. As 
 the campaign proceeded, the thunder of great guns 
 announced new Union victories. Peace did not ap 
 pear so far distant, but it was the peace of reunion. 
 
 The crisis on the lakes came September 19, 1864, 
 when the steamer Philo Parsons, running between De 
 troit and Sandusky, was captured by Confederates 
 who had boarded her as passengers. The Confederate 
 flag was unfurled and the vessel started on her way to 
 Sandusky to capture the armed steamer Michigan, but 
 the design failed and the Parsons was taken back to 
 
 30 Instr. to Mason, Sept. 2, 1864. The Confederate Con 
 gress prepared a manifesto (July) which Mason, Slidell and 
 Mann, in November, decided to engross and present to the 
 principal European powers. [Despatches of Mason, No. 14, 
 Nov. 10, 1864.] 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 235 
 
 the Detroit river and left at Sandwich in a sinking 
 condition. 31 Air. Seward had just prepared a state 
 ment of the Parsons affair for the British Govern 
 ment when the news arrived at Washington that 
 twenty-five desperate men had plundered St. Albans, 
 Vermont, and escaped on stolen horses into Canada. 82 
 Excitement in the United States followed. It was 
 felt that Canada was responsible for her Confederate 
 guests, and that their bad conduct might endanger 
 the peace with Canada. This feeling w r as not mollified 
 by the declaration of Lieutenant Bennett H. Young, 
 commander of the St. Albans raiders, that he went to 
 Canada as a commissioned officer in the provisional 
 army of the Confederate States M and that he had vio 
 lated no law of Canada. False reports continued 
 to alarm the people and to add to the excitement 
 which naturally existed upon the eve of a great presi 
 dential election. On Sunday, October 30, church 
 
 81 Thompson to Benjamin, Dec. 3, 1864. 
 
 "Seward to Adams (19 Instr., Great Brit.), No. 1136, Oct. 
 24, 1864. 
 
 33 The St. Albans raiders were afterwards tried in the 
 Canadian courts. Mason, learning that Lieutenant Young 
 had acted under orders of war, took steps to appeal his case 
 to the courts of England in case it should be necessary. 
 [Despatches of Mason, No. 15, Dec. 16, 1864.] In Decem 
 ber Sanders wrote from Montreal to Richmond asking for 
 copies of orders showing that the Vermont raid was author 
 ized by the Confederate Secretary of War. [J. B. Jones: 
 Diary, Dec. 15, 1864,] It appears that Thompson had no 
 knowledge that the raid was contemplated, but Sanders in 
 his testimony before the court at Montreal stated that Young 
 acted under the instructions of Clay. Davis issued a procla 
 mation assuming Confederate responsibility for Young s raid 
 [N. Y. Times, Jan. i, 1865], and Seddon, the Confederate 
 Secretary of War, said that the raid was authorized by in 
 structions of June 16, 1864. [N. Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1865.] 
 
236 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 services at Detroit were disturbed over the report 
 from Toronto that one hundred Confederates had 
 left that place for the purpose of raiding Detroit. The 
 State Department at Washington received information 
 that there was a conspiracy to fire all the principal 
 cities in the North on election day, and, on that day, 
 General Butler and General J. R. Hawley, as a pre 
 cautionary measure, were placed upon lake steamers 
 ready for service at any point in case Confederate 
 sympathizers should attempt to execute any of the 
 reported plots. But no Confederate attempts were 
 made. 
 
 After the people had so strongly supported Lin 
 coln at the polls, the Confederacy saw its approach 
 ing doom unless the United States should become 
 involved in foreign difficulties. The Sons of Liberty 
 had been demoralized by the election. Thompson, 
 holding letters from prominent Northern men, and 
 with much money still unused, was not anxious to 
 continue his operations from Canada. " The bane 
 and curse of carrying out anything in this country," 
 said he, " is the surveillance under which we act. 
 Detectives stand at every corner." 3 Holcombe, how 
 ever, advised further encouragement of disaffection 
 in the North. In a letter to Benjamin dated at Rich 
 mond, November 16, he said: "The Northwest is 
 not . . . ready for a revolution. But it is fermenting 
 with the passions out of which revolutions have been 
 
 84 Report of Thompson to Benjamin, Toronto, Dec. 3, 
 1864. [Received by Benjamin on Feb. 13, 1865.] Published 
 in the N. Y. Herald of July 25, 1872, and in Naval War 
 Records, i, Vol. Ill, No. 379, p. 714. [House Doc., Vol. 
 LXXIII, 54-1.] 
 
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 237 
 
 created. In Illinois, Indiana ... a majority are 
 hostile to the present administration ... it would be 
 a fatal mistake, in my opinion, to abandon all effort to 
 separate this section from the United States because 
 no results have as yet been achieved commensurate 
 with our expectations. . . . We should employ money 
 and talent without stint to give this brooding resent 
 ment the proportions of anarchy and civil strife. Let 
 us preserve our communication with our friends in 
 the North, . . . introduce arms . . . gradually and 
 cautiously . . . subsidize leading presses. . . . With 
 arms, leaders and an opportunity, we could strike a 
 deadly blow." ! Benjamin did not recall Thompson 
 until March 2, i865. 36 
 
 Confederate operations from Canada caused excited 
 debates in the United States Congress in December, 
 and for a while affairs seemed to be drifting toward an 
 Anglo-American war. The English Parliament be 
 came alarmed at the proceedings in the American Con 
 gress, but Palmerston, seeking to avoid angry debate 
 /(February n), said: "We cannot deny that things 
 did take place of which the United States were justly 
 entitled to complain." The London Times became 
 friendlier in its tone toward the United States, and 
 said that the Confederacy was seeking to involve Eng 
 land in the war. The Richmond Dispatch, in reply, 
 said that England, seeking her own prosperity, was 
 responsible for the anti-slavery feeling in the North, 
 for secession, and " for the present calamities of this 
 continent," but that her precarious hold on Canada 
 was indicative of the coming day of retribution when 
 
 35 Holcombe to Benjamin, Richmond, Nov. 16, 1864. 
 
 36 See N. Y. Herald, July 24, 1872. 
 
238 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 
 
 that province would be " tied like a tinpail to the tai 
 of New England." 87 
 
 On February 13, Russell informed Mason, Slidel: 
 and Mann by a note, that the Confederates, by not 
 respecting the British neutrality, were attempting to 
 involve England in a war in which she had declared 
 her intentions to take no part. Referring to the seiz 
 ure of the Philo Parsons, the plan to capture the Mich 
 igan, and the raid into Vermont, he stated that the 
 " so-called Confederate States," by assuming respon 
 sibility for such acts and claiming them to be bellig 
 erent operations, showed " a gross disregard of her 
 Majesty s character as a neutral power, and the de 
 sire to involve her Majesty in hostilities with a coter 
 minous power with which Great Britain is at peace." 
 In conclusion, he said: " I trust you will feel your 
 selves authorized to promise that such practice shall 
 cease, and shall be entirely abandoned for the 
 future." 8S 
 
 87 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 14 and 18, and Feb. 24, 1865. 
 
 88 MS. at U. S. Dept. of State: Vol. 88 Despatches, Great 
 Brit. Enclosure in Russell to Adams, Feb. 15, and in Adams 
 to Seward, Feb. 16, 1865. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S SECRET MISSION. 
 
 Near the close of 1864 two Confederate officials at 
 Richmond apprehensive of an approaching crisis 
 were closeted in deep deliberation. One of them 
 had been suffering for days with neuralgia, and once 
 there had been rumors over the city that he was 
 dead; but, still bearing evidences of recent illness, 
 he had returned to his laborious work of reading let 
 ters of complaint, examining monotonous detail, and 
 deciding on applications for positions. The other 
 was the picture of robust health though in his face, 
 over which there usually played a pleasant smile, 
 could now be seen the worry of those troubled times. 
 Both had been hearing the old dull sullen sounds of 
 bombs down the river for weeks and months, and 
 now they were informed that Lee s army was be 
 coming depleted by desertions; that the nitre and 
 mining companies were ceasing operations; that 
 Hood was defeated; that Sherman had seized Savan 
 nah; and that persons in high places were aiding 
 Federals to obtain information. They saw the people 
 feeding upon poor supplies and condemning the 
 speculators. The croakers were made gloomier by 
 dismal rain and fogs. Some of the states refused to 
 obey the Richmond authorities and were threatening 
 to make peace with the United States, or to estab- 
 
240 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 lish a counter revolution. 1 The soldiers and clerks 
 were complaining that rich property holders were 
 exempt from military service. Military officers and 
 disaffected congressmen were quarrelling with the 
 administration. Lee s shelterless men were shive:;- 
 ing over feeble fires before Richmond, and pulling 
 the trigger with frozen fingers; and Lee himself was 
 despondent. 
 
 In all attempts to secure European recognition or 
 aid by offer of commercial advantages or alliance, or 
 by international complications, the Confederacy had 
 failed; and, in its plans to raise a navy in French 
 ports, it had been duped by Napoleon. 2 Notwitl - 
 
 1 Governor Brown of Georgia refused to obey the Coi - 
 federate authorities. The conditions in North Carolina were 
 such that Governor Z. B. Vance urged Davis (Dec. 30, 1863) 
 to send envoys to Washington to endeavor to bring the war 
 to an end. Davis in his reply expressed the fear that some of 
 the people of North Carolina would inaugurate a movement 
 to give aid and comfort to the Union, and that there would 
 be a civil war in that State. He hoped that Vance, by not 
 too long delaying action for conciliating men suspected of 
 disloyalty to the Confederacy, would make it unnecessary to 
 use " physical force to suppress treason." [South. Hist. 
 Society Papers, Vol. XIV, p. 412. Jefferson Davis to Z. B. 
 Vance, Jan. 8, 1864.] 
 
 2 Davis in his message of November said that the policy 
 of European nations in refusing recognition discriminated 
 unfairly in favor of the United States, and that it was chari 
 table to say that they were indifferent. Referring to the 
 impossibility of peace without independence he said: "The 
 common judgment of history will be unable to absolve the 
 neutral nations of Europe from a share in the moral respon 
 sibility for the myriads of human lives unnecessarily sacri 
 ficed." On November 25, Earl Russell in a communication 
 acknowledging a joint note of Slidell, Mason and Mann, 
 which had as an inclosure the manifesto of the Confederate 
 Congress lamented the " protracted nature of the struggle 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 24! 
 
 standing the immense war debt which had been piling 
 up, the United States had the confidence of for 
 eign powers, and they feared to oppose her while the 
 Confederacy was being crushed, and while the 
 clauses of Lincoln s message contained the Monroe 
 doctrine coiled up for a spring. Very few now as 
 serted the political power of cotton stored in Con- 
 between the Northern and Southern States of the formerly 
 United States of North America," and said that Great 
 Britain since 1783 had remained connected by friendly rela 
 tions with both the Northern and Southern States, and that 
 her policy was strict neutrality. [Despatches of Mason, No. 
 15, Dec. 16, 1864.] Some thought that there was a relaxa 
 tion in Russell s tone, but Mason attached no importance 
 to the reply. In December some hoped that complications 
 might arise over the seizure of the Confederate cruiser 
 Florida in Brazilian waters [Mason to Benjamin, Nov. 10, 
 1864], and some still looked across the Atlantic to see aid 
 brought from the East in ships, but Europe spoke not. 
 The editor of the Richmond Examiner said that a Confed 
 erate commission to Brazil might do more service than the 
 Erlanger loan would ever be able to do. He stated that if 
 Brazil should demand redress and the United States should 
 laugh at her that nothing would be more natural than a 
 Confederate-Brazilian alliance which might also include Mex 
 ico and " erect a barrier against the encroachments of the 
 Hoosier." [Richmond Examiner, Dec. 8, 1864.] Some pro 
 posed to enter into colonial or other subordinate relations 
 with European nations. The Sentinel counselled the Con 
 federate States to resume their places as the colonies of 
 England, France and Spain like prodigal sons, or like 
 young birds that had broken their shells too soon. This 
 would have been a recantation of the Declaration of Inde 
 pendence in order to escape defeat in a nearly lost cause. 
 [J. B. Jones: Diary, Dec. 15, 1864.] The same paper shortly 
 afterwards advised that in order to secure recognition or ; 
 intervention and the good opinion of mankind that the 
 Confederacy should inform Europe of its readiness to abolish 
 slavery. The Examiner (Dec. 30, 1864) preferred to put 
 military affairs in a really responsible hand, give him carte 
 blanche and carte noire and let Europe alone. 
 16 
 
242 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 federate warehouses, or doubted that the crisis in the 
 English " cotton famine " was over. 8 It was the 
 darkest period in the Confederacy, and Presic ent 
 Davis and Secretary Benjamin, seeing a com 
 ing cataclysm in which the Confederacy m ; ght 
 be swept to its doom, began to feel convinced lhat 
 intervention by European powers was the only hope 
 and they resolved to play their last card by sacri 
 ficing slavery, as a war exigency, for success against 
 the United States. 
 
 It had often been suggested that Europe was prej 
 udiced against the Confederacy chiefly on account 
 of the question of slavery. Mason so interpreted 
 one of Earl Russell s speeches in the House of 
 
 8 George McHenry, in a paper on " The Approaching 
 Cotton Crisis " (Dec. 31) endeavored to prove that, act- 
 withstanding the general belief on both sides of the Atlantic, 
 the cotton famine was not over, and the calamity was still in 
 store. On January 5, 1865, the Committee of Ways and 
 Means (F. S. Lyon, Chairman) passed a resolution asking 
 McHenry to furnish such information as he had in his 
 possession relating to " cotton products, cotton trade, and 
 its importance to the commerce of the world." McHenry 
 replied January 8. His belief in 1861 had been that cotton 
 was not then king, and now, although he found himself 
 almost alone, he asserted its political power if the Confed 
 erate authorities would take the proper steps. He stated 
 that a supply of good cotton would, after the lapse of a 
 few months, be of vital importance to England, and endeav 
 ored to show that 90 per cent of all the cotton yarns and 
 goods manufactured in England were from southern cotton, 
 the China and Indian cotton being of a damaged or inferior 
 quality. He said that the time was at hand when the British 
 cotton manufacturers would not remain quiet if they were 
 deprived of the raw material to make the fabrics for which 
 there was a demand that unless the mills obtained a full 
 supply of American cotton there would be a revolution in 
 the British isles. He considered it a mistake to attribute 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 243 
 
 Lords (March 23, 1863), in which, while urging the 
 present duty of England to stand still, he had stated 
 that if interference should be necessary in the future 
 it would be " in the cause of liberty and to promote 
 the freedom of mankind." Mason saw a double 
 meaning in these words and intimated that Russell 
 was not disposed to recognize a state with slavery. 
 Even the most ardent friends of the Confederacy 
 were opposed to its system of labor. In November, 
 1862, while Mason was taking dinner with Lord 
 Donnoughmore, a warm Confederate sympathizer, 
 the latter informed him that Palmerston would 
 doubtless not enter into any treaty with the Con 
 federacy unless it should agree not to permit the 
 African slave trade. Mason was surprised, and still 
 
 the previous distress in the English manufacturing districts 
 to a cotton famine. He stated that there were large stocks 
 of cotton and cotton goods in England when the war began 
 enough for three years and that these goods had been sold 
 at from two to five times the regular prices, and that the 
 supply from the Confederacy had never been fully shut off. 
 He believed that the cotton crisis had been staved off only 
 by the steady arrivals of 4000 bales of American cotton per 
 week, together with that which had been received in the 
 United States. It was to this that he attributed the fact that 
 the neutral powers had been passive viewers of the American 
 conflict. He declared that the American slavery question 
 had not in any degree influenced the course of the rulers of 
 England that they knew that cotton could not be cultivated 
 by free negro labor and that they would not oppose the 
 South in obtaining necessary help even from Africa. Ac 
 cording to his view, England would already have been pre 
 pared to offer recognition if the export of cotton from the 
 Confederacy had been prohibited a year before. He ex 
 pected the famine sometime during 1865, and said, " If recog 
 nition or mediation could only be brought about in time to 
 permit of a good cotton planting in 1865, the finances of the 
 South would soon be righted. 
 
244 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 
 
 more so when Fitzgerald, another member of Par 
 liament, coincided. The Confederate constitution 
 forbade the opening of the slave trade, but Benjamin 
 stated that the Confederacy could not make a treaty 
 on the subject. 4 He informed Mason that after all 
 it was not wise to impose restraints on men for the 
 future, and requested him, in case England should in 
 sist on this subject, to refer the matter back to Rich 
 mond. 5 In June, 1863, De Leon wrote Benjamin 
 that the prejudice against slavery was so great that 
 the Confederate reasons and arguments were power 
 less. 6 M. de Lesseps said that France could not 
 acknowledge the Confederacy without some promise 
 of emancipation. De Leon recommended that the 
 Richmond Government should withdraw the commis 
 sioners from Europe, stand on its dignity and en 
 lighten public opinion. In January, 1864, Mann in 
 formed Benjamin that the Southern Independence 
 association was against " our cherished institution " 
 and had desired kindly to show him that recognition 
 must lead to the gradual abolition of slavery. 7 Ma 
 son at the same time wrote that he found it " but 
 vain to combat their sentiment " though, still ex 
 pecting to convert them, he told them that the film 
 would fall from their eyes in time. 8 Mr. Spence, who 
 wrote a book and many articles in favor of the 
 South, lost a prominent position under the Confed 
 erate Government because his published opinions 
 
 4 Instr. to Mason, No. 14, Feb. 6, 1863. 
 
 6 Ibid., No. 13 (and circular), Jan. 15, 1863. 
 
 6 De Leon to Benjamin, June 19, 1863. 
 
 7 Mann to Benjamin, London, Jan. 24, 1864. 
 
 8 Despatches of Mason, No. I, Paris, Jan. 25, 1864. [Re 
 ceived at Richmond on April 19.] 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER*S MISSION 245 
 
 were unfavorable to the Confederate institution of 
 slavery. 
 
 Many prominent men in the Confederacy had 
 favored the abolition of slavery. Others had pro 
 posed drafting slaves into the army. In 1862 John 
 T. Pickett favored emancipation. After the defeat 
 at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in 1863, E. S. Dargon, 
 a member of Congress said that he would agree to 
 abolish slavery in order to obtain intervention. 9 In 
 August of the same year B. H. Micon of Florida 
 proposed that slaves be drafted into the army to fight 
 for their masters. Benjamin in his reply stated the 
 following difficulties: (i) Slaves as property would 
 cost the Confederacy $2000 each. (2) If the Govern 
 ment should hire them they would cost $30 per 
 month, and only $11 per month were paid for white 
 men. (3) The banding together of negro men might 
 be an unsafe experiment, giving facilities for deser 
 tion. (4) The males were needed in the mines, on 
 fortifications, and in other fields of labor. 10 The sub 
 ject was frequently discussed at that time. Lee, in 
 the fall of 1864, recommended the employment of 
 negroes as soldiers, and a few months later he stated 
 to the Senate committee that slaves should have their 
 liberty if put in the field to fight. 11 In the early part 
 of the war Davis refused to respond to the intima 
 tions that England or France might recognize the 
 Confederacy without slavery. The constitution gave 
 him no power to treat with foreign nations on the 
 
 * J. B. Jones: Diary, July 31, 1863. 
 
 10 Confed. " Domestic Letters/ Aug. 18, 1863. 
 
 11 H. A. White: R. E. Lee and the Southern Confederacy, 
 N. Y., 1897. 
 
246 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 subject of slavery. At last, however, he was per 
 suaded to favor gradual emancipation, and reluc 
 tantly he recommended the arming of the slaves. 12 
 In November, 1864, after Davis s recommendation, 
 the Confederate Congress began a several months 
 debate upon the proposition for arming and emanci 
 pating a part of the slaves. 13 Some declared it was 
 Benjamin s idea for foreign effect, and the press at 
 first strongly opposed it." Howell Cobb thought it 
 would be better to " concede the demands of England 
 and France for the emancipation of the slaves and to 
 enlist them afterwards." In December and January 
 some of the newspapers counselled the Government 
 to propose to Europe that the Confederacy should 
 abolish slavery in order to obtain recognition ani 
 ships to break the blockade, but the majority of the 
 leaders did not favor such a course. 
 ) In the fall of 1864 Benjamin realized even more 
 fully than Davis that desperate measures and new 
 forces were necessary to secure Confederate success. 
 He informed Davis that future negotiations with 
 Europe must be on the basis of emancipation and the 
 Government seizure of cotton to purchase ships by 
 , which to break the blockade. Davis hesitated to act 
 I in a matter so clearly extra-constitutional, stating 
 that the Confederate constitution was his supreme 
 court of law. But Benjamin justified his proposi 
 tion as a war measure; he believed that by emancipa- 
 
 12 J. W. Daniels: Jefferson Davis, p. 59. 
 
 18 Seward s Diary, Nov. 21 and Dec. 17, 1864. Richmond 
 Observer, Dec., 1864. Seward to Adams, No. 1193, Dec. 17, 
 1864, and No. 1298, March 13, 1865. [Instr. Great Brit., 
 Vols. XIX and XX.] 
 
 14 J. B. Jones: Diary, Nov. 8, 1864. 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 247 
 
 tion, and a promise to ship cotton, the recognition 
 of France and perhaps of England might be ob 
 tained; he urged that the only way to get ships and 
 money was by cotton, the only unexhausted resource 
 of the Confederate Government and the people. 
 Mr. Davis was influenced or controlled by few men, 
 but he had entire confidence in Mr. Benjamin. After 
 careful deliberation, without appealing to Congress, 
 and independent of that body, he finally agreed to 
 accept the last and only hope of an almost expiring 
 Confederacy, trusting that if successful the plan 
 would gradually receive the support of Congress and 
 the states. 
 
 In determining what agencies to use in order to 
 carry out this new policy, Benjamin proposed the 
 selection of some one man of sound judgment who 
 \vould be ready and able to meet contingencies as they 
 might arise. For several reasons it was not consid 
 ered expedient to work through Mason and Slidell 
 alone. It was seen that they might not be enthusiastic 
 with the new policy, and that it would be better to send 
 some one from Richmond pledged to the new 
 scheme, and with power to act independently of diplo 
 matic agents, or even to dismiss them if necessary. 
 The blockade was very stringent and communication 
 was very hazardous. Speedy action was necessary. 
 There was no time to refer questions back to Rich 
 mond. Benjamin opposed sending more than one 
 prominent man on account of the danger of pub 
 licity, and of jars and quarrels. 
 
 The new plans were domestic dynamite, and it was 
 considered necessary to guard against exposure until 
 after a diplomatic triumph had secured a navy. This 
 
248 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER*S MISSION 
 
 was expected to reconcile the people to the means 
 used to achieve the end. At the same time it was 
 desired to send an agent who had a commanding in 
 fluence in Congress one who would prove a link 
 between that body and the executive authorities. 
 Such a man was Duncan F. Kenner of Louisiana, the 
 intimate friend of Benjamin. He was an able man 
 of conservative views, a wealthy sugar planter, rep 
 resenting personally and by his family connections 
 one of the largest slaveholdings in the South, and he 
 was chairman of the committee of ways and means 
 in the House of Representatives. He had been edu 
 cated in Europe and spoke French. He was asked 
 by Mr. Benjamin to go to Europe with general in 
 structions giving him not only full powers as a com 
 missioner to make treaties and bind the Confederate 
 States to the emancipation of slaves, but also with 
 separate instructions to negotiate for the sale of cot 
 ton. These instructions were based upon the prin 
 ciple that the Confederacy was a de facto Govern 
 ment, and could take extra-constitutional power if 
 necessary to its preservation. Mr. Kenner had be 
 fore proposed to offer a motion in Congress author 
 izing a commission to be sent to Europe to promise 
 emancipation for recognition, but had surrendered his 
 determination at the advice of Davis, who did not yet 
 approve his proposal, and begged him not to make 
 the move at that juncture. He now hesitated to ac 
 cept powers given neither by Congress nor by the 
 constitution. 
 
 But Kenner finally yielded to Mr. Benjamin s rep 
 resentation that it was necessary to ignore the con 
 stitution in order to save the Confederacy. He still 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER*S MISSION 
 
 objected to the form of his credentials, stating that 
 his instructions should be more specific as to the 
 plans of emancipation, but Benjamin prevailed. The 
 power given to Mr. Kenner to sell cotton was not dip 
 lomatic, nor was it necessarily intended to be a mat 
 ter of discussion with the European Governments, 
 but only with capitalists. The instructions relating 
 to this power were entirely separate and distinct 
 from his credentials as a high commissioner, and 
 were much fuller. They gave him power to sell all 
 the cotton in the Confederacy if necessary, to receive 
 the price thereof, and to invest in vessels and war 
 material. It was not expected that any contract to 
 sell cotton to the capitalists would be completed until 
 after the success of diplomatic negotiations w T ith 
 either England or France, when it was expected that 
 France at any rate would wink at the fitting out of 
 a navy in her ports. 13 
 
 In a letter addressed to Slidell on December 29, 
 Benjamin stated that the Confederacy in a four 
 years courageous struggle for self-government had 
 really been fighting the battles of England and 
 France; that if the war had been against the United 
 States alone it would have long since ceased, but 
 that in calculating the length of the war the Con 
 federacy had not expected Europe to aid the United 
 States by the abandonment of the rights of neutrals, 
 by closing ports to Confederate prizes, by the seiz- 
 . ure of vessels intended for the Confederacy, and by 
 indifference to an unequal fight; that, notwithstand 
 ing miscalculations and the afflictions caused by the 
 
 15 From notes of an interview with Gen. J. L. Brent in 
 1898, and from correspondence with him in 1899. 
 
250 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 
 
 blockade and devastation, the Confederates were de 
 termined never to reunite with the North. At the 
 same time Benjamin mentioned Seward s " One war 
 at a time " policy, and warned Europe against future 
 Northern aggression. Then he approached the mari 
 question were there no terms upon which recogni 
 tion could be obtained? "Will Europe never recog 
 nize us till the United States consent?" If so, he 
 said that it might be necessary to deliberate upon 
 the terms that could be secured from the Federals. 
 But he urged if Europe had objections to recogni 
 tion not already made known that she should give 
 the Confederacy a chance to meet them or if it were 
 her purpose to exact terms or conditions before rec 
 ognition, a frank exposition of that purpose was due 
 to humanity " for," said Benjamin, " it may enable 
 us to save many lives by consenting to such terms in 
 advance of another year s campaign." On Decem 
 ber 30 a copy of this despatch was addressed to 
 Mason with a statement that it would be handed to 
 him by Hon. Duncan F. Kenner, whose verbal com 
 munication upon the subject embraced in the des 
 patch should be accepted as reliable, and " as ema 
 nating from the department under the instructions of 
 the President." 
 
 Kenner was delayed, probably by the increased 
 blockade at Wilmington, and Mason was told that he 
 need not wait his arrival before taking steps toward 
 sounding the European Governments. " Confer 
 with Slidell " continued the instructions, " as to 
 measures best adapted to elicit some decisive re 
 sponse from France and England as to their inten 
 tions concerning the war after having freely con- 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 251 
 
 versed with Kenner and obtained the information he 
 will convey." 5 
 
 It was intended that Kenner s mission should for 
 the time be kept secret. In such a crisis it is not 
 likely that Benjamin gave out any information except 
 so far as it could not be avoided. On December 29, 
 the Senate, in secret session, among other things 
 asked the President for information as to the 
 finances, the condition of foreign relations and as to 
 whether any aid from abroad was expected or had 
 been sought or proposed. No reply was ever sent 
 to the Senate. The Richmond newspapers, at the 
 beginning of 1865 however, indicate that public opin 
 ion was being prepared for the new policy. The 
 Enquirer said that the absence of a Confederate decla 
 ration of the causes of secession, and of the war, 
 had enabled the United States to say that slavery 
 was the corner-stone; that the thirty years violent 
 anti-slavery discussion in the United States had led 
 anti-slavery Europe " to think our war is to perpetu 
 ate slavery; and that an avowal that slavery would 
 not be permitted to prejudice the question of recog 
 nition might not be too late, and might induce recog 
 nition or intervention." The Enquirer followed the 
 Sentinel in agreeing to urge upon its readers a policy 
 of emancipation, if it should be necessary as a means 
 of securing recognition and a guarantee of inde 
 pendence by England and France." The Sentinel, 
 
 19 Instr. to Mason, No. 39, Dec. 30, 1864. 
 
 17 An editorial from the Richmond Sentinel concluded with 
 this paragraph: " If France and England will enter into a 
 treaty with these Confederate States, recognizing our nation 
 ality and guaranteeing our independence upon the abolition 
 of slavery in all these states, rather than continue the war 
 
252 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 which was often quoted as an " official " organ, 
 stated that such a proposition ought to be made to 
 England and France. It despondently spoke of the 
 recent reverses " as having done much to prepare 
 the minds of the people for the most extreme sacri 
 fices. It said: "Any sacrifice of opinion and sacri 
 fice of property, any surrender of prejudice, if neces 
 sary to the defeat of our enemy, is now the watch 
 word." It favored exhausting every resource, and 
 throwing overboard all the cargo if necessary, to 
 keep afloat the storm-tossed ship of the Confederacy. 
 " Let the Government determine what it needs and 
 what it can use," said the editor, " and if it be our 
 land . . . our negroes ... it shall have them .... 
 Our constitution . . . may not provide for all the 
 exigencies of war; questions may arise .... when 
 our best welfare will require of our rulers the exer 
 cise of a bold responsibility (as in the purchase of 
 Louisiana) .... Statesmen have sometimes to 
 throw themselves upon the intelligence of their 
 countrymen and seek their advantage by irregular 
 means." 1 
 
 On January 25, after having had General Lee at 
 
 his house for tea the day before, Mr. Lyons, 
 
 informed Mr. J. B. Jones that as a last resort he was in 
 
 we should be prepared to urge the measure upon our readers. 
 We believe such a proposition would be favorably received 
 and acted upon by those nations and it ought to be made to 
 them." Some in the North declared this to be from the 
 pen of Davis, and Seward ordered copies of it to be sent to 
 foreign leaders. [Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 7, 1865.] 
 
 18 This despondent tone is also seen in the Whig of Jan. 2, 
 1865. 
 
 19 Richmond Sentinel, Jan. 2, 1865. 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 253 
 
 favor of sending out a commission to Europe for aid, 
 on the basis of emancipation, etc. He stated that to 
 use negroes as soldiers in the war would mean eman 
 cipation, and he thought that Lee always had been an 
 emancipationist. George D. Prentiss, of the Louis 
 ville Journal, in the early part of January returned 
 from a month s visit to Richmond and informed the 
 Kentuckians in the United States Congress that the 
 Confederate Congress had conclusively resolved to 
 free and arm the slaves that 200,000 of them would 
 soon be equipped to fight under promise of liberty 
 and a proprietary interest in the soil. 20 
 
 In January before Kenner sailed for Europe there 
 was much discussion in favor of peace negotiations, 
 and several preliminary unofficial interviews finally 
 resulted in the Hampton Roads conference. Gov 
 ernor Vance of North Carolina, in December, 1863, 
 had urged Davis to communicate with Washington 
 with a view of ending the war. Davis replied that 
 he had already made three such attempts, and that 
 it was Lincoln s policy to grant pardons to the Con 
 federates only after they had emancipated their slaves 
 and sworn allegiance to the United States. Mr. 
 Blair, without any official authority, went from 
 Washington to Richmond, in January, 1865, and urged 
 Davis to take steps looking toward a cessation of 
 hostilities. He stated that Lincoln would receive 
 Confederate commissioners, and that he did not 
 sympathize with the radicals in Congress. He ex 
 pressed a hope that the pride of the South would 
 
 20 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 13, 1865. Quotes from North 
 ern papers of Jan. 10. 
 
254 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 
 
 suffer no shock and the Southern 21 territory would 
 be extended even to the isthmus of Darien. He pro 
 posed: (i) The gradual abolition of slavery by the 
 State legislatures, (2) The Confederate States to re 
 turn to the Union with their old rights; (3) The ir- 
 corporation of the Confederate army with the United 
 States army in case of a foreign war; (4) The past to 
 be forgotten. 22 He suggested to Davis that slavery 
 was doomed even if reunion should be prevented 
 by foreign intervention, and said that rather tha:i 
 continue the war to make themselves dependencies 
 of European potentates, after having abandoned 
 
 "Jefferson Davis: Confederate Government, Vol. II, pp. 
 612-15. 
 
 22 The Richmond Enquirer about this time stated that the 
 Confederacy if it yielded would join the North in applying 
 the Monroe doctrine from Behring s Straits to the Isthmus 
 of Darien. There was much talk of the Monroe doctrine in 
 both Confederate and United States papers. [The Index, 
 Feb. 9, 1865.] Later the Confederacy desired to remove the 
 impression that it was the first to propose a peace based 
 upon foreign aggression as a means of sustaining the Monroe 
 doctrine. The Index of March 16 quotes from the Owl a 
 paragraph which doubtless relates to Mr. Kenner s official 
 instructions on the subject of Blair s mission. The para 
 graph is as follows: "A gentleman of the highest position 
 and character, and a member of the Confederate Congress 
 has just arrived in England, having left the South as late 
 as the end of January. Enjoying as he does the entire con 
 fidence of President Davis, he received prior to his departure 
 the account of Mr. Blair s mission from Mr. Benjamin, the 
 Secretary of State at Richmond, who used these words: 
 The object of the mission was to assure President Davis 
 that commissioners would be received at Washington to 
 open negotiations on the following basis: (i) All questions 
 in dispute to be left undecided, and considered as open 
 questions. (2) An armistice to be granted, and a league 
 offensive and defensive to be made to drive the French out 
 of Mexico. " 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 25$ 
 
 slavery to escape the embrace of the United States, 
 it would be better for the Confederates to send a 
 Southern army to restore the rights of Mexico. He 
 even suggested that Davis might realize previous 
 Southern dreams, and complete the work of Jeffer 
 son, by modelling the Mexican states so as to adapt 
 them to the Union, and by extending the United 
 States to the Isthmus. 23 Blair left Richmond on 
 January- 16, on a flag-of-truce boat, and Singleton, a 
 peace democrat from Illinois returned to Richmond 
 on the same boat on some unauthorized mission. 
 
 Mr. McMullin in a recent resolution 24 in the Con 
 federate Congress had proposed a selection of peace 
 commissioners, and about the time that Blair reached 
 Richmond there were rumors that the resolution had 
 been passed, and that Orr, Gilmore, Stephens, and 
 twelve others had been selected to meet at Grant s 
 headquarters. 25 On January 14 the Sentinel, alluding 
 to a rumor that Mr. Atkins of Tennessee had intro 
 duced a resolution before Congress in secret session 
 to open irregular intercourse through commissioners 
 with Lincoln, pronounced it treachery and disloy 
 alty. 2 * The article was evidently intended as a criti 
 cism of the committee on foreign affairs. The edi 
 tor of the Sentinel was public and private printer of 
 the House, and many considered that his paper was 
 the organ of the administration. Several members 
 of Congress were offended by the evident intention 
 
 23 Rhodes, Vol. III. 
 
 24 On Dec. 16, 1864. Several other peace resolutions were 
 offered on the same day. Printed copies may be seen at the 
 Library of Congress at Washington. 
 
 25 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 16, 1865. 
 29 Ibid., Jan. 18, 1865. 
 
256 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 
 
 of the article in regard to appointing peace commis 
 sioners. On January 17, Lester of Georgia moved 
 to suspend the rules in order to allow him to intro 
 duce a resolution stating that the imputations of the 
 article were false. The vote stood 32 to 26, but a 
 two-thirds vote was required, and thus the motion 
 failed. Atkins was willing to have his resolution 
 considered in public, instead of in secret session, and 
 intimated that he was willing to assault the adminis 
 tration if necessary. He considered that the Sentinel 
 spoke for the administration. W. R. Smith of Ala 
 bama, a member of the committee of foreign affairs 
 was offended because the House refused to allow 
 Lester s resolution. He ceased to attend sessions 
 and prepared to return home, stating that he favored 
 honest efforts to end the carnival of blood; that he 
 believed that this policy was sustained by a volume 
 of Southern sentiment, and that it could not be in 
 timidated by the Sentinel nor " the power behind the 
 throne of the Sentinel." 
 
 Lincoln (January 18) informed Blair on the return 
 of the latter from Richmond, that he was ready to 
 receive any agent informally sent with a view of se 
 curing peace to " our one common country." But 
 he said nothing of a joint invasion of Mexico. Blair 
 returned to Richmond a second time (January 21) 
 to inform Davis of his interview with Lincoln. Many 
 in the South were urging peace negotiations, and a 
 few days later Davis decided to appoint Stephens, 
 Hunter and Campbell as peace commissioners. Ben 
 jamin, with Lincoln s note to Blair before him, in 
 his instructions to the commissioners proposed 
 
 " Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 21, 1865. 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 257 
 
 to say simply that they were empowered to confer 
 " upon the subject to which it relates," but Davis 
 (January 28) changed the instructions so that they 
 authorized a conference " upon the issues of the war 
 and for the purpose of securing peace to the two 
 countries." The commissioners expected to go to 
 Washington, but Seward decided to meet them at 
 Fortress Monroe. Lincoln arrived later, and the 
 Hampton Roads informal conference was held on 
 the River Queen, on February 3, between Seward 
 and Lincoln and the Confederate Commissioners/* 
 Stephens thought that an arrangement for the in 
 vasion of Mexico would be a rational and proper 
 enterprise, 29 but Lincoln informed him that what 
 ever Blair said as to occupying themselves with con 
 tinental questions until the anger of the contestants 
 should cool " was of his own accord and not by au 
 thority " from Lincoln; that the restoration of the 
 Union was a sine qua non, and that there could be no 
 armistice until this question was settled. The Con 
 federate commissioners could not agree to accept 
 the terms of peace, and after a long informal talk 
 which ended by shaking hands Stephens, Hunter 
 and Campbell returned to Richmond and reported 
 the failure of negotiations. 30 
 
 ~ s South. Hist. Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 212-14. Benjamin to 
 Davis, May 17, 1877. 
 
 19 John A. Campbell: Reminiscences and documents re 
 lating to the Civil War during the year 1865. Baltimore, 
 1887. Stephens had no hope of European intervention. 
 While going down the river to Hampton Roads he told 
 Campbell that European intervention was only a dream of 
 Benjamin s. 
 
 30 Perhaps Mr. Davis expected different terms than those 
 offered at Hampton Roads. H. S. Foote, who had recently 
 17 
 
258 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 It was an opportune time to hold an indignation 
 meeting to reanimate the people, and cautiously pre 
 pare them for the contemplated new policy. Such 
 a meeting was held on February 9, on Capitol Square 
 at Richmond. Hunter presided and made a speech 
 picturing the future expansion of the Confederacy 
 
 resigned his place in the Confederate Congress, said that 
 the mission of Stephens, Hunter and Campbell was only a 
 ruse of Davis and a forced concession to the peace men of 
 the South. [N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1865.] Seward, in a 
 very confidential note to Adams on March I, enclosed tl e 
 contents of a cipher of February 13, from a Confedera e 
 emissary in Canada to Jefferson Davis, concerning tie 
 attempt of Thompson and Clay to get terms of assistance 
 and recognition from England and France. Seward believed 
 that it would throw some light upon the " late rebel pro 
 posals to the United States for a conference." [20 Instr., 
 Great Brit., p. 75.] The Richmond Dispatch of March 3r, 
 quoted a Washington letter of March 23d to the New York 
 Tribune, stating that Clay had recently returned from an 
 unsuccessful mission to England. The records do not appear 
 to indicate any such mission of Clay. A Confederate cor 
 respondent of the London limes, had written from New 
 York in January that there was an unexpected theatrical 
 change in favor of the South which would make it possible 
 for Davis to secure independence. The Times suggested 
 that the clue to this startling mystery was to be found in 
 the report that the Emperor of Mexico had conveyed in 
 trust to Napoleon the province of Sonora to be held and 
 administered by a French viceroy in liquidation of the claims 
 of France upon the Mexican government; that it was as 
 sumed in the North that this could not occur without the 
 recognition of the Confederacy by France, and that such 
 recognition would be followed by England and other powers. 
 The Times further stated that these presumptions were 
 strengthened by the anticipations entertained of a Confed 
 erate emancipation policy. [N. Y. Times, March i, 1865.] 
 By February 9, there was a report at London that ex- 
 Senator Gwin, of California, who was a good adventurous 
 leader of the Southern men in California, had been appointed 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 259 
 
 into the countries bordering on the South. 31 But he 
 was evidently not in harmony with the recent aboli 
 tion movement, and probably knew nothing of Ken- 
 ner s mission to Europe. He said that it was no 
 comfort to contemplate the terms offered by the 
 United States Government that 3,000,000 negroes 
 would be let loose to wander about as the lazzaroni 
 of the land, and that Congress would be constantly 
 interfering between the whites and the blacks. He 
 considered that under the existing system the slaves 
 were provided for and were happy, but that under a 
 system of emancipation they must perish. " In the 
 fierce competition for food between white and negro," 
 said he, " the latter will be blasted like human life 
 before the burning Sirocco and vanish like mist be 
 fore the sun." 
 
 The other speeches were in harmony with Benja 
 min s recent instructions for negotiations in Europe. 
 Senator Henry of Tennessee said that he would not 
 hesitate to give the negro his freedom and to em 
 ploy him in the army, and he urged the people to 
 deposit with the Government their gold, cotton and 
 tobacco. Benjamin, after having " worked night 
 after night under infamous Richmond gas-light " 
 studying , data and problems, announced that it was 
 
 viceroy of Sonora. It appears that before Maximilian went 
 to Mexico, Gwin had laid before him plans for rendering 
 the mineral riches of Sonora available for the Mexican 
 Empire. [The Index, Feb. 9, 1865.] In France it was stated 
 that his views were ultra French and that he would carefully 
 look after French interests. Gwin returned to France on 
 March 2. Many Southerners like Foote had contemplated 
 emigration to Sonora. 
 31 Richmond Dispatch, Feb. 10, 1865. 
 
26O THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 
 
 necessary for all the means (cotton, tobacco, bacon, 
 etc.), and men to be given to the Government and 
 the army. He favored emancipating the negroes and 
 placing them in the army, though he admitted i; 
 could only be done by the states. He said: " We 
 want means. Are they in the country? If so, thcv 
 belong to the country and not to the man who 
 chances to hold them now. ... I would take even- 
 cotton bale in the land . . . and make it the basis of 
 means without which we cannot go on. ... I am 
 going to open my whole heart to you. . . . Let us 
 say to every negro who wishes to go into the ranks 
 on the condition of being made free: Go and fight, 
 you are free. >: This speech from the Secretary o 
 State of the Confederacy caused considerable ex 
 citement among slaveholders who had no desire to 
 lose their slaves. 33 Oukl, in January, had stated that 
 rather than adopt the administration policy of free 
 ing and arming the slaves many in Virginia would 
 seek reconstruction. Wigfall of Texas, Graham of 
 North Carolina, Orr and Miles of South Carolina, 
 were among those who strongly opposed the policy 
 in Congress. 
 
 About January 12, Kenner with full powers and 
 letters of credit had gone to Wilmington which he 
 found strongly invested. 33 After the fall of Fort 
 Fisher on January 17, General Bragg suggested that 
 he should sail from Charleston but he decided that 
 he could reach Europe at least a month earlier by 
 way of New York. Returning to Richmond he stated 
 
 32 J. B. Jones: Diary, Feb. 9, 1865. 
 
 B3 War Records, Series i, Part 2, Vol. XLVI, p. 1089. 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 26l 
 
 his plan to Benjamin and Davis who at first opposed 
 it on the ground that it was excessively perilous to 
 a man whose prominence, and especially whose inter- 
 terests in horse-racing before the war had made him 
 well known in the North, and that his capture would 
 be almost certain. The Confederacy had secret ser 
 vice communication across the Potomac, and two of 
 its officers were detailed to assist Kenner, one to 
 carry his papers and deliver them to him in New 
 York, the other to accompany him as far as Baltimore. 
 The companion was not acquainted with Mr. Kenner, 
 and was only informed that he was a Confederate 
 agent who was trying to get to Canada in order to 
 assist the Confederates who had been arrested for 
 operations on the lakes. Reaching the Potomac they 
 found it full of ice and dangerous to cross. The 
 boatmen hesitated to try the river. They remained 
 a few days at the home of a woman to whom they 
 promised to bring some needles and cloth as they re 
 turned. They finally crossed in the night and pro 
 ceeded on horseback to a place where they could 
 safely take a train. They passed the house of Mrs. 
 Surratt who had recently moved to Washington; 
 they spent a night in the woods, and another at the 
 house of a Confederate sympathizer; and after hav 
 ing passed near Washington they boarded the Balti 
 more and Ohio train, occupying seats far apart, and 
 were soon in Baltimore. Mr. Kenner, after obtain 
 ing a suit of clothes which gave him the appearance 
 of a Pennsylvania farmer, took leave of his com 
 panion and boarded the train for New York. Ar 
 riving at his destination early the next morning, he 
 drove to a Ne\v York hotel \vhose proprietor he 
 
262 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER*S MISSION 
 
 had frequently entertained at his Louisiana home. 
 Taking a room on the upper floor he sent for the 
 proprietor and informed him that he was going to 
 London with a commercial enterprise in view. 
 Through his friend he obtained a ticket to Europe, 
 and also a trunk that had just come off a European 
 voyage and was covered with foreign advertisements 
 of hotels. His presence in New York was kept quiet 
 until his departure. 34 On the steamer he escaped 
 the attention of Government officials and was soon 
 en route for England. 35 
 
 Coming events cast their shadows before. By the 
 time Kenner reached Europe the new policy of the 
 Confederacy was already anticipated at London and 
 Paris. Perhaps a copy of Benjamin s instructions of 
 
 34 Memoranda by the late Wm. Wirt Henry of Richmond, 
 March 24, 1899, regarding a narrative which he and the Hon. 
 J. L. M. Curry heard Mr. Kenner give at the White Sulphur 
 Springs, W. Va., several years alter the close of the Civil 
 War. 
 
 35 One finds in the Richmond papers no reference to 
 Kenner s departure, but J. B. Jones says in his diary, under 
 date of January 23d, that there were rumors that a commis 
 sioner (Louisianian) sailed that day to England to make 
 overtures to that government. In the Richmond Examiner, 
 February 3d, we find the following: " On the whole, we 
 believe the Confederacy has given up the idea of making 
 a present of itself to England, France and Spain, and that 
 however willing we might be to give up slavery as the price 
 of independence, there is no more talk of offering that as a 
 bribe to some foreign power in order to induce it to do for 
 us what we should confess we are unable to do for our 
 selves." [Also, in London Times of Feb. 20.] Another 
 Richmond paper of February 6th stated that neither the 
 United States nor Europe desired the abolition of slavery 
 and that no rational being in the Confederacy had seriously 
 entertained the suggestion of emancipation for recognition. 
 It seems evident that the editors of these papers knew noth 
 ing of the pending negotiations. Did they? 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 263 
 
 December 29-30 to Slidell and Mason had preceded 
 Kenner. A letter from Paris, dated January 31, 
 stated that there was little doubt that a proposition 
 had been ccmmunicated to England and France with 
 in the preceding month (and in a manner to leave no 
 doubt of its official character), which suggested that 
 in return for recognition the Confederates were pre 
 pared to abolish slavery, or for practical assistance 
 they were ready to offer " physical concrete advan 
 tages." The letter suspected from appearances that 
 the proposition would not be accepted. In the Inde- 
 pcndance Bclgc, a few days before February i, a Paris 
 correspondent stated that he had seen a letter from 
 a member of the Confederate Congress, stating that 
 President Davis intended at an early day to invite 
 Congress to abolish slavery, and that Mason and 
 Slidell had since informed him that if England and 
 France had decided to acknowledge the Confederacy 
 it could only be after the abolition of slavery. He 
 also said that immediately on the adoption of the 
 emancipation measure instructions and probably dep 
 uties would be sent to Europe, in order to facilitate 
 the mission of Mason and Slidell. Another corre 
 spondent at Paris wrote to the Index in February, 
 stating that he knew " from a good source " that 
 neither Slidell nor Mason had communicated to Rich 
 mond any views as to slavery hindering the recogni 
 tion of the Confederacy; nevertheless, he was con 
 vinced that the abolition of slavery would gain the 
 favorable opinion of the liberal party, especially in 
 France, and that, as a result, Confederate " political 
 rights would be speedily acknowledged." ! 
 
 88 The Index., Feb. 2, 1865. About the middle of January, 
 the London Times stated that a Confederate offer to abandon 
 
264 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 The Index a,nd other periodicals published a state 
 ment that after March 4, Lincoln could only be recog 
 nized as the President of the states which took part in 
 the election of the preceding November. 37 The Indcv 
 of February 16 said that England and France both 
 admitted that after March 4, the government of tl e 
 United States could not be regarded as the dc facto cr 
 de jure of the South. " We are not prepared to say," 
 it continued, "whether England and France will there 
 fore recognize the South on that day. . . . There an 1 , 
 however, some indications that recognition is contem 
 plated, at least by one of these governments . . . 
 Whether or not recognition shall be postponed, under 
 all circumstances a re-union or conquest of the Sout i 
 is to be prevented by recognition, and if necessary 
 by intervention." This proved to be only a contribu 
 tion to a volume of unfulfilled prophecies. 
 
 Kenner, 38 arriving at London in the latter part of 
 February, found that Mason was in Paris. He there 
 upon hastened thither to present his instructions and 
 hold a conference with Mason and Slidell. When the} 
 
 slavery could not secure the recognition of Europe, because 
 recognition was withheld for many other reasons. It was 
 also seen that the abolition of slavery could not propitiate 
 Spain. [Richmond Sentinel, Feb. 3.] The Times of Feb 
 ruary 13 said: "The assumption that the failure of Eng 
 land to recognize the Confederacy is due to the abhorrence 
 of slavery is based on ignorance of the real opinions o) 
 Englishmen as to the abstract principles of public policy." 
 [The Richmond Dispatch, March 4.] 
 
 37 N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1865. London Times, Jan. 23. 
 
 88 Kenner may possibly have arrived by the middle of Feb 
 ruary, for the eccentric Owl, whose articles attracted atten 
 tion from its alleged special sources of information, had 
 resumed publication on February 15, and stated that it was 
 " enabled from special sources " to give the Blair proposals. 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNEKS MISSION 265 
 
 came together, Mr. Kenner, seeing that Mr. W. W. 
 Corcoran was in the room, said: " I was directed to 
 show my instructions to Mr. Mason and Air. Slidell 
 and to no one else." But the latter gentlemen in 
 formed him that he could safely proceed in the pres 
 ence of Corcoran as he was their confidential adviser. 
 The instructions, which were in cipher, were then 
 translated by a clerk of Slidell. Both Mason and 
 Slidell were greatly astonished. Mason at first was 
 disinclined to cooperate in obeying the instructions, 
 but he yielded upon finding that he must assist or 
 be suspended. 89 
 
 Kenner afterwards said that through Slidell he ob 
 tained an interview with the French Minister of For 
 eign Affairs, who asked to defer his reply for two 
 weeks. Mr. Slidell learned, however, that the Em 
 peror was still ready to offer recognition if England 
 would do so. A Confederate " diplomatic council," 
 which had been in session for several days at the 
 Grand Hotel at Paris, adjourned on March 2. Mann 
 and Buchanan had gone over from Brussels to join 
 Mason, Slidell and their secretaries. Members of the 
 council boasted that there would be a peace between 
 the United States and the Confederacy before May i. 40 
 The Index stated that negotiations which were going 
 on between European governments would " give quite 
 a turn to affairs in America." A Paris letter of March 
 2, in the London Telegraph, said: "Mr. Kenner, a 
 distinguished Confederate, has just arrived and brings 
 
 sa From memoranda of Kenner s narrative, by Wm. Wirt 
 Henry. 
 
 40 N. Y. Times, March 20. Richmond Dispatch, March 25, 
 1865. 
 
266 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER*S MISSION 
 
 what the Southerners evidently consider good news." 4 
 Mr. Mason and Mr. Kenner returned to London on 
 March 3, to sound the Prime Minister. Mr. Kenner 
 obtained no interview with Palmerston, though he 
 afterwards stated that Mason asked for one. Whi^e 
 waiting two weeks for a definite answer from France, 
 he opened negotiations with the bankers for the sale 
 of cotton. A syndicate of capitalists offered to invest 
 $15,000,000, and Kenner was encouraged to expect 
 $30,000,000, but his plans in this direction depended 
 upon recognition. 
 
 On March 14, Mason had an interview with Pal 
 merston, in which he mentioned the substance of 
 Benjamin s instructions of December 30. He also 
 gave the substance of later instructions which Kenner 
 had received after leaving Richmond. He denied that 
 an aggressive alliance had been first proposed by the 
 Confederate commissioners at Hampton Roads. He 
 stated that Blair had proposed that an armistice be 
 granted, and that the Union and Confederate armies 
 be united to drive the French out of Mexico, leaving 
 internal questions in dispute to be decided later. 
 While endeavoring to leave the impression that the 
 United States was planning aggression against neigh 
 boring possessions, Mason informed Palmerston that 
 the Confederacy had made an offer to France to 
 guarantee the French West Indies in return for alli 
 ance. He frequently and studiously reverted to the 
 suggestion of emancipation in a way that Palmerston 
 could not have misunderstood, but he " made no dis 
 tinct proposal in terms of the private note borne by 
 
 41 Richmond Dispatch, March 24, 1865. 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 267 
 
 Mr. Kenner." He said that the Confederacy might 
 be induced to agree to terms which it would not have 
 accepted under more favorable circumstances. He 
 did not use the word " slavery," but Palmerston could 
 not have had any doubt as to his meaning upon the 
 subject of emancipation of the slaves. Desiring that 
 Palmerston should at the close of the interview have 
 an impression that the Confederate chances were not 
 as hopeless as they seemed, Mason informed him that 
 the change in the Confederate military policy, by 
 which the coast-line was abandoned, encouraged the 
 people by making it possible to concentrate forces in 
 the interior. 
 
 Palmerston in reply to Mason stated that England 
 had no reason back of those already given against 
 recognition, and that those reasons still held. He said 
 that while England might have taken exception to the 
 blockade during the first year of the war, it would not 
 have been a good policy in view of possible wars 
 which England might have in the future in which she 
 might be placed in a position similar to the United 
 States upon the question of the blockade. 42 On Sun 
 day, March 26, Mason had a conversation with Lord 
 Donnoughmore also, in which Mr. Kenner s mission, 
 so far as it related to emancipation, was plainly dis 
 cussed. Lord Donnoughmore said that it was too 
 late to secure recognition by the abolition of slavery. 
 
 Across the Atlantic, at Richmond, on Sunday, two 
 days before Mason s interview with Palmerston, the 
 two leaders of the Confederacy again sat closeted in 
 an all-day interview. The bill for arming and eman- 
 
 42 Despatches of Mason, March 14. 1865. [From a dupli 
 cate, in the possession of Miss Virginia Mason.] 
 
26& THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 cipating 200,000 negroes had at last, after months of 
 consideration, passed the Senate, Mr. Hunter havii g 
 finally decided to vote for it, and in order to be a law it 
 lacked only the President s signature. But both Davis 
 and Benjamin saw that more than the negro bill won id 
 be required to save the Confederacy. Congress had in 
 tended to adjourn on March 10, but Davis had askt d 
 it to remain a few days. Many supposed that a trea y 
 of alliance with France was expected. There were 
 rumors that France had offered to intervene if the 
 Confederacy would cede Louisiana and oppose the 
 Monroe doctrine." But Mr. Davis had evidently re 
 ceived no dispatches from France. On March 13, 
 the day following the Sunday interview, Mr. Davis 
 sent to Congress a secret message, making no refer 
 ence to foreign relations, but stating that Congress 
 had so long debated and delayed his November recom 
 mendation as to the negro bill, etc., that much of the 
 value was now lost. 44 He asked for additional legis 
 lation increasing the power of the executive. It was 
 observed that day that Benjamin s old smile had re- 
 turned, and it was interpreted to mean a new triumph 
 over Congress, but it was only temporary. Congress 
 on March 16, in a dissentient and defensive reply, said 
 that the executive had not urged the immediate neces 
 sity of the negro bill, that he had even seemed to 
 dissent from the policy of arming the negroes, thrit 
 
 43 Richmond Dispatch, March 13, 1865. 
 
 44 Lee wrote to the War Department March 10, "The 
 situation is full of peril and difficulty and requires prompt 
 action. If my situation is not greatly improved I can neither 
 hold my lines before Richmond, neither can I remove with 
 my army from there." This was sent to Congress with 
 Davis secret message. [Campbell s Reminiscences.] 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER ? S MISSION 269 
 
 he had failed to reply to requests for information as 
 to the condition of affairs, and had left Congress to 
 determine its policy of necessity by consulting the 
 opinion of General Lee. 45 
 
 When the committee waited upon Davis the latter 
 in a vigorous broadside declared that the causes of 
 defeat could not be laid at the door of the executive; 
 but Congress, still refusing to pass his recommenda 
 tion, adjourned on Match 18, sine die, after issuing a 
 five-column address advising the Confederacy not to 
 pause or commit suicide. " The shades of our de 
 parted heroes hover over us and beckon us on," it 
 said, "... The enemy is far spent. . . . Let us stand 
 firm." " 
 
 When Congress issued its advice, and dispersed, 
 there was little chance of holding out much longer 
 against Grant s campaign of shot and shell. For 
 nearly two weeks the packing and boxing of govern 
 ment archives had been going on quietly. Even far 
 ther South there was little chance to prolong the 
 struggle. When Columbia, South Carolina, fell, in 
 February, and the lady employees of the " paper 
 money bureau " returned to Richmond, many wept in 
 real despair. News was scarce, but it was almost 
 all news of defeat. The Richmond newspapers 
 thought that the Northern Menelaus was too persist 
 ent in running after the wayward Southern Helen to 
 induce her to return to political wedlock after she had 
 so long trifled with marital relations. 47 But there were 
 now many who were not opposed to returning to the 
 
 45 Richmond Dispatch, March 20. 
 
 46 Ibid., March 31, 1865. 
 
 47 Ibid., March 10, 1865. 
 
270 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 old " political wedlock." " Street-corner generals " 
 were merely dissatisfied with the plans of the West 
 Pointers in the field, but many others contemplated 
 reconstruction or a counter revolution. 48 Hon. H. S. 
 Foote of Tennessee, who, from the banks of the 
 majestic Potomac, on December 24, had proposed :o 
 resign his place in the Richmond Congress, 49 wrote ;o 
 Seward on January 30, concerning the " strong Union 
 feeling of the majority in the South/ 50 and on Feb 
 ruary 6, before sailing for Europe, he suggested as a 
 political measure that Lincoln should issue a proc 
 lamation of amnesty to the people of the South. Foote 
 said that he had never favored secession. In March, he 
 published a pamphlet in London advising his friends 
 to return to the Union, and he proceeded to do the 
 same himself. 31 In estimating Foote s statements, it 
 is necessary to bear in mind that he was one of the 
 boldest members of the Confederate Congress in his 
 opposition to the Davis administration. But Mr. 
 Foote s declaration was based upon what he had seen 
 and heard, and the voice for peace and reunion as 
 serted itself more and more. In the Virginia House 
 of Delegates, on March 9, when it was proposed to 
 reconsider a bill to confer conventional powers on the 
 General Assembly, Speaker Sheffey made strong op- 
 
 48 On March 5, Campbell, in a note to Breckinridge, re 
 ferring to the large number of desertions and advising an 
 investigation of the Confederate resources, said: " Georgia 
 is in a state of what may be properly called insurrection 
 against the Confederate authorities." 
 
 49 N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1865. 
 
 50 N. Y. Tribune, March 17. 
 
 Bl Richmond Dispatch, March 24, 1865. N. Y. Tribune, 
 March 17, 1865. H. S. Foote: War of the Rebellion (N. Y., 
 1866). 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 2/1 
 
 position, saying that a convention contemplated sever 
 ance from the Confederacy and consideration of re 
 construction. 32 He said: "If other states fly madly 
 from their sphere to blaze awhile, then die out in eter 
 nal night forever, let them fly; but let Virginia be 
 one of the calm fixed stars, veiled sometimes in cloud 
 and tempests, but indestructible as the firmament 
 from which it shines. . . . The ship of state is upon 
 the rapids, and ... if we are to sink, let us sink 
 where we stand." Of the members of the Confed 
 erate Congress who were reported to be Unionists, 
 there were nine from Virginia, ten from North Caro 
 lina, two from South Carolina, nine from Georgia, six 
 from Alabama, and four from Mississippi. 
 
 After the closing of navigation at Wilmington the 
 The London Times had altered its tone. Lord Rus 
 sell s conferences with Mr. Adams were friendlier. 53 
 On February 13, Russell had notified Mason, Slidell 
 and Mann of complaints that Confederate agents did 
 not respect British neutrality that they sought to in 
 volve Great Britain in foreign complications by at 
 tempting to procure war armaments in British waters. 
 He stated that to buy vessels in one place and prepare 
 
 52 Richmond Dispatch, March 10. 1865. 
 
 53 A London correspondent said that the Emperor of 
 France might urge the recognition of the Southern Confed 
 eracy, but that England would not be shaken by the daily 
 letters of the Paris correspondent to the London papers 
 that England had turned Quaker, Palmerston was too gouty, 
 and Earl Russell and the Queen desired peace with the 
 United States. " You may cover the lakes with gun-boats," 
 said he to the New York Times, " and England will give 
 the St. Lawrence for a summer outlet for the western pro 
 ducts. If you take Canada she will throw in New Bruns 
 wick/ [N. Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1865.] 
 
272 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 
 
 them for war in another was manifestly offensive to 
 the British Crown; and that the Confederate instruc 
 tions for cruisers set aside some of the most settkd 
 principles of international law, and broke the English 
 laws of neutrality. 54 This communication, besides bo- 
 ing delivered to the three commissioners, was sent 
 through Seward by way of General Grant s lines; aid 
 General Lee, receiving it under a flag of truce, fcr- 
 warded it to Benjamin at Richmond. 55 
 
 When Russell s note came to Benjamin (March i/.), 
 his career as a diplomatist had about run its course. 
 For several weeks he had seen very little diplomatic 
 correspondence except what he read in Northern 
 
 54 Inclosure in Russell to Adams, Feb. 15, 1865. The Ssa 
 King, built in the river Clyde, Scotland, left London October 
 7, 1864, ostensibly for Bombay, but she was quietly purchased 
 by Confederate agents and a few days later at Madeira was 
 transformed into the Shenandoah, the crew and armament 
 going from Liverpool on the Laurel which ostensibly sailed 
 for Nassau. During the next year the Shenandoah circum 
 navigated the globe, cruising much of the time until the 
 end of the war against the American whalers in the Arctic 
 and Okhotsk seas, and finally returned to the Mersey, where 
 on November 5, 1865, Commander Waddell asked Earl 
 Russell that his men be released and that his vessel revert 
 to the United States. [C. E. Hunt: Cruise of the Shenan 
 doah; J. T. Mason: The Last of the Confederate Cruisers 
 (Century, Aug., 1898).] 
 
 55 When the note was first issued in London the Index 
 bitterly referred to Seward s indecency and stated that 
 though he danced a " can-can, he would not allow England 
 to lift her petticoat one inch to escape the dust, and that 
 England, while hiding her own ankles, shut her eyes to the 
 scantiness of the Federal petticoat." The Richmond Dis 
 patch announced that England had been " brought to play 
 second fiddle in the concert of nations," and philosophically 
 stated that the " greatest bullies are always first to succumb 
 when real danger presents itself." [London Index, Feb. 16, 
 1865.] 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 273 
 
 newspapers, and his principal work had been to grant 
 passports. He returned Russell s letter to General 
 Lee (March 21), diplomatically declining to receive 
 through the Federals a communication from a neutral, 
 and expressing doubt as to its authenticity. General 
 Lee suggested that the expression of doubt be 
 omitted. 66 On March 25, Benjamin forwarded to 
 Mason the correspondence relating to the transmis 
 sion of Russell s note through Grant and Lee, and 
 stated that he only had time to say that it was returned 
 to Grant s lines. 87 
 
 All hope of recognition by England was now gone, 
 but rumors of French alliance or assistance floated 
 in Richmond until the end. The officials took no 
 pains to put the press in possession of authentic infor 
 mation, or to correct false reports. 58 On April i, the 
 people were " fooled " by a report that a treaty had 
 been signed with Maximilian. The next day the 
 Union army broke the lines, and eight trains started 
 south with the archives and executive baggage of a 
 now hopeless Confederacy, 59 which had for four long 
 years stubbornly but unsuccessfully fought and, to the 
 last, struggled for recognition as a nation. A few still 
 expected to continue the war. On May I, Mason 
 
 06 J. B. Jones: Diary, March 14 and 21, 1865. 
 
 57 Instr. to Mason, No. 40. No copy appears on the 
 records kept at Richmond, but the original, written on very 
 thin paper, is among the papers left by Mr. Mason. 
 
 58 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 30, 1865. 
 
 59 Stephen R. Mallory, of Mr. Davis cabinet, wrote an 
 interesting account of the removal from Richmond which 
 has just been published by his daughter under the caption: 
 " The Last Days of the Confederacy." [McClure s Mag., 
 Dec., 1900, and January, 1901.] 
 
 18 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 
 
 nrote Benjamin: " It is the almost universal opinion 
 in Europe that the war is at an end, but I apprehend 
 no such event." He expected the Confederacy to ta <e 
 a new stand farther South, and to prolong the fight 
 until the North should be forced to come to terms on 
 account of internal dissension. 00 But, fortunately for 
 both North and South, the war had ended. 
 
 Notwithstanding the prediction of statesmen tl at 
 the Union was dead, the Mississippi still flowed un- 
 vexed to the sea, with its springs and its mouth be th 
 in the control of one people. Not one Confederate 
 was executed for participating in the long political 
 disturbance. Aside from Benjamin and a few otl er 
 leaders who preferred to live in foreign lands, the 
 brave sons of the South took the oath of allegiai ce 
 and faced the problems of reconstruction. Kennor, 
 going to the United States Legation at Paris, accepted 
 the provisions of the President s amnesty proclama 
 tion, and returned to his native state to recover pos 
 session of his estates. 01 Soldiers returned to fields of 
 productive labor to build up what had been destroyed 
 by the cruel fate of war. Emancipation, though not 
 contemplated as a purpose at the beginning of the 
 war, came as a result of it. But the prophecies that 
 territorial aggrandizement would follow reunion re 
 mained unfulfilled. The lapse of years, and mutual in- 
 f . 
 
 terests and sympathies, have tended to heal the wounds 
 
 of war and the irritations of reconstruction, and to-day 
 an undivided nation looks upon England not with the 
 
 jealousies and suspicions of former days, but as a 
 / 
 
 v 
 
 00 Despatches of Mason, No. 21, May i, 1865. 
 
 61 Mr. Kenner died in July, 1887. 
 
THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 275 
 
 friendly power, and even as a possible ally in case of 
 national danger. Friendly association, the study of 
 industrial conditions, better railway connections, 
 stronger economic interests and higher education have 
 been clearing away misunderstandings. The Con-^ 
 federate armies fought gallantly, but now the veterans 
 of the South are as much a part of the nation as are the^ 
 veterans of the North or of the West. 
 
 NOTE. There may have been other official " mis 
 sions " of which there is no official record owing to 
 their secret nature. There were also " missions " of 
 self-appointed agents who had errands abroad, and 
 saw fit to surround themselves with mystery. In 
 some cases, persons who visited Europe to publish 
 books, or pamphlets, to influence public opinion, prob 
 ably went with the aid and encouragement of the Con 
 federate authorities at Richmond. 
 
 Near the close of the war there were rumors re 
 garding various "missions" and of possible or expected 
 alliances. There were ttiose who, in order to win 
 in the war of secession, would have made great sacri 
 fices which would not have been offered at the begin 
 ning of the struggle. Their policy was dictated by the 
 feeling that dreads the chagrin of defeat. Though 
 they probably could not have induced Mr. Davis to 
 accept their policy, some of them, in order to obtain 
 foreign aid, would have made promises which they 
 never expected to fulfill. They would have promised 
 France and England to set the negroes free; but at 
 the same time they hoped for international conditions 
 that would have enabled the Confederacy to ignore 
 its agreements without fear of being forced to keep 
 
276 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER s MISSION 
 
 them. The policy of Mr. Davis was based on higher 
 grounds. A prominent Confederate has recently said: 
 " If he had been less honest, we might have succeeded 
 in our efforts." 
 
 An editorial in the Washington Post of March 14, 
 1901, states the belief that Prince Polignac, who cc-m- 
 .. manded a brigade under General Kirby E. Smith, 
 was sent to Europe [early in -1865] on a ver y delicate 
 mission, accompanied by Major John C. Moncure. 
 "Gossip had it [at Shreveport, La.] that Polig lac 
 went authorized from Richmond to offer Louis Na 
 poleon all that part of the original Louisiana Purchase 
 \ then included in or claimed by the Southern Confed- 
 \eracy, the consideration being that France would 
 send an army to aid Jefferson Davis and othenvise 
 cooperate in the establishment of his Government in 
 the rest of the Southern States." The editor says he 
 heard of the mission from Moncure himself, when the 
 latter returned from Europe. 
 
 That such a mission was authorized by Mr. Davis, 
 is emphatically denied by Burton N. Harrison, Esq., 
 who was the private secretary of the Confederate 
 President; and also by General John H. Reagan, the 
 only surviving member of the Confederate cabinet. 02 
 Polignac himself has cabled a denial (on April 2, 1901). 
 
 62 See also letters from Col. James Morris Morgan and others 
 in the Washington Post of March 18 and 25, 1901. The dip 
 lomatic archives contain no record of this mission. The 
 records for the early part of 1865 were destroyed or lost. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 CAUSES OF SECESSION. 
 
 The statements of the real causes of secession, and of the 
 beginning of the Civil War, are to be found, not in the 
 archives of Confederate diplomacy, but by following the 
 course of events immediately preceding the war, and by 
 examining the contemporary speeches and writings of the 
 secession leaders. 
 
 The assertion that the tariff was a cause of the secession 
 movement was evidently a ruse diplomatique, intended for 
 effect upon foreign powers that favored free trade. The 
 subject of the tariff was scarcely mentioned in the discussions 
 of Southern statesmen. Toombs, it is true, on November 13, 
 1861, while excitedly demanding hasty action, without the 
 formality of State conventions to ascertain the will of the 
 people, characterized the Union as a curse which by tariffs, 
 navigation laws , and otherwise, had legislated against the 
 South. But Stephens, in a reply, on the following day, 
 opposing secession and advising calmness and deliberation 
 in meeting the crisis, said he could not agree with Toombs. 
 He declared that the South had prospered under the Ameri 
 can system of government and had been protected and aided 
 in many ways by its provisions. Among other things, he 
 said: the Southern presidents had not opposed the early 
 fishing bounties of New England; the tariff had ceased to 
 distract public councils; the navigation laws had been begun 
 under a Southern president, and no subsequent president 
 had ever recommended their repeal; South Carolina, and 
 also Toombs, had voted for the existing tariff, which was 
 just as low as the South had asked. 
 
 The declaration adopted by the South Carolina Conven 
 tion, in December, 1861, said nothing of the tariff as a cause 
 
278 APPENDIX 
 
 of secession. Maxey Gregg suggested that it should be 
 mentioned; but Keitt replied that all of the South Carolinian 
 senators and congressmen had voted for the recent tariff, and 
 that no tariff since that, ot 1832 had caused any desire for 
 secession. The address of the convention to the slaveholding 
 states (prepared by R. B. Rhett), however, had mentioned 
 the tariff, and unequal distribution of appropriations, among 
 other causes of grievance, and had made vague charges about 
 the consolidation of the North and the reduction of tie 
 South. Stephens, who was not favorably impressed by tl e 
 address, said these charges were not well-founded and aro.-e 
 from peevishness rather than from reason. Concerning tl e 
 tariff, he suggested that " perhaps the less said about it tl e 
 better," stating that the South though in a minority ruid 
 controlled the administration for sixty out of seventy-t\\ o 
 years, and had made the tariff and the government what tluy 
 were. 
 
 The principal sources of contention were connected with 
 the institution of slavery, which was seeking extension into 
 new territory even into territory which had not yet been 
 acquired. 
 
 Questions relating to slavery had been most prominent 
 after Folk s nomination to the presidency. Stephens, during 
 the M^qcan^war, fearing the rock which Jefferson had pre 
 dicted would endanger the Ship of State, favored a policy 
 which would tend to avoid slavery discussions. The natural 
 tendency of slavery interests to seek expansion led to at- 
 temjjts-to^annex Cuba, and ajlsij^LjLJ3t)tain control pf_othcr 
 countries southward Mexico and Central 
 
 ^ 
 
 chance to acquire new slave territory faded away after the 
 passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill and the decision in the 
 Dred Scott case. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Buch 
 anan Administration, the Kansas struggle terminated in favor 
 of free soil, 1 and plans to acquire Cuba and part of Mexico 
 failed. 
 
 1 Stephens did not attribute the result entirely to the eternal 
 vigilance of the Northern leaders and to the developing sentiment 
 
APPENDIX 279 
 
 In April, 1860, the Democratic party split at the Charleston 
 convention. Both factions agreed that personal liberty laws 
 were unconstitutional, that Cuba should be acquired, and 
 that the Pacific railway should be built. The Southern 
 leaders, however, feeling the moral reproach under which 
 they were living, complained that the admission by men from 
 the North that slavery was a wrong, but a wrong for which 
 they were not to blame, had been the cause of the discord, 
 and intimated that the Northern Democrats must pronounce 
 the institution a necessary good. 2 Senator Pugh of Ohio 
 replied: " Gentlemen of the South, we will not do it." Other 
 sources of disagreement arose. Gaulden of Georgia asked 
 that the ruthless restrictions which cut off the supply of 
 slaves from foreign lands should be taken off. Some said 
 that slavery by the intention of the constitution should be 
 encouraged and protected by the Federal government, thus 
 deserting the argument of non-intervention as held by pre 
 vious statesmen. The Dred Scott decision has been charac 
 terized as the rock upon which the party went to pieces. 
 The Southern minority desired the platform to declare in 
 favor of the doctrine of the Dred Scott decision permitting 
 the Supreme Court to settle the question of the rights of 
 property in states or territories. The Western and Northern 
 majority rejected this plan, though they were willing to deny 
 
 against slavery. On March 11, 1858, he wrote that the Lecompton 
 constitution would be defeated on account of several Southern 
 members being too drunk to get to the House. " If we are to 
 separate," said he, sadly, " what is to become of us in the hands 
 of such representatives." In the early part of 1860 Stephens 
 expected to retire from politics, and to a friend who asked him 
 why, he said: " When I am on one of the two trains coming in 
 opposite directions on a single track, both engines at high speed, 
 and both engineers drunk, I get off at the first station." 
 
 2 George Fitzhugh, five or six years before, had written a book, 
 " Sociology for the South," which justified slavery not only from 
 expediency but from right stating that it was the happiest form 
 of socialism, the true relief for pauperism, and better than the 
 latescz faire labor policy for the protection of the poor laborer in 
 his struggle for existence. [Also, see De Bow, July, 1855.] 
 
280 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 the power of Congress or the territorial legislatures to abol 
 ish slavery in the territories. Thereupon, the minority 
 seceded from the convention, leaving the majority to ad 
 journ. In June, the majority nominated Stephen A. Douglas 
 and Herschel V. Johnson. The minority named John C. 
 Breckenridge and Joseph Lane. On May Qth, the Consti 
 tutional Union party had nominated John Bell and Edward 
 Everett. On May 16, the Republicans had met at Chicago 
 and nominated Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin upon 
 the platform repudiating the Dred Scott decision, opposing 
 the extension of slavery into the territories, but denying any 
 sympathy with interference with slavery in the states, and 
 declaring in favor of the Pacific railway and the homestead 
 law. 
 
 The Democratic tangle at Charleston gave the rapidly 
 growing Republican party such an advantage that a majority 
 of the Lincoln electors were chosen on November 6. The 
 South Carolina legislature chose electors on that day and 
 remained in session to learn the result of the election, and 
 then, being encouraged by the governor to expect aid from 
 other states, provided for the purchase of arms and called a 
 state convention to determine upon secession. A shower of 
 expressions on the subject of secession followed. 3 
 
 Some urged a declaration of dissolution by state legisla 
 tures instead of by conventions. Cobb of Georgia advised 
 the legislature of that state to declare for secession without 
 waiting " to hear from the crossroads and groceries." 
 Toombs, fearing that a convention, if called by the state 
 authorities, " would vote for abolition rule," said to the 
 
 3 Col. R. B. Ithett of Charleston received a letter from Thomas 
 J. Butler of Mobile, Alabama, dated November 14, saying: " I 
 break down every barrier in order to effect the great object I have 
 had for over thirty years the fli^mimn oik^he states and the 
 security of slavery. If 1 betray unusual feeling~Trffll~ "zeal you 
 must attribute it in a degree to a somewhat impulsive tempera 
 ment, but more to the severe schooling I have had in the lessons 
 of Mr. Calhoun and your illustrious father." 
 
APPENDIX 28l 
 
 Georgia legislature: " Give me the sword, for, if you do 
 not give it to me, as God lives, I will take it myself." It was 
 in vain that Stephens urged the Southern leaders not to yield 
 to temptation as did their first parents who " reopened their 
 eyes only to discover their own nakedness." * 
 
 No advice from a conservative could stay the action of the 
 South Carolina convention. In December it seceded, issued 
 a declaration of independence, and adopted an address to 
 the people of the slaveholding states. The declaration, pre- 
 
 4 Stephens urged that the South should not break the constitu 
 tion because she failed iu the election, but that she should wait 
 until the North broke it. He called attention to the fact that the 
 House of Representatives and the Senate were largely Demo 
 cratic, thus tying Lincoln s hands and leaving him no opportunity 
 to do any thing unconstitutional. He saw no reason why the South 
 should take the last step, so long as there was a chance that the 
 Northern and Western legislatures would recede from their hostil 
 ity towards the fugitive slave laws. 
 
 On November 24, Stephens wrote his brother that he had no 
 doubt that redress might be obtained if it was sought in the 
 proper spirit and with an honest purpose, but he feared that such 
 was not the object of the agitators. " We are, I fear," said he, 
 " in the hands of those who are bent upon dissolution at all 
 hazards. Nothing will satisfy them but to get out of the Union. 
 . . . The evil genius of civil discord seems to be rampant." 
 Again, on November 30, while Insisting that the popular will should 
 be as fairly represented as possible, he said, " The truth is our 
 leaders do not wish any redress . . . are disunionists per se . . 
 and . . they will carry the state." [Johnston and Browne: Life 
 of A. H. Stephens.] 
 
 There were others who threw their weight on the brakes to stop 
 the accelerating movement of the car of secession. One of these 
 was J. A. Campbell, who, although he had emancipated his slaves 
 while a member of the United States Supreme Court, exerted great 
 influence in the government at Richmond during the entire period 
 of the war. On November 26, he protested against secession on 
 the ground that all classes tend towards the same standard of 
 intelligence and submit eventually to the same rule of opinion 
 stating that the South could gain nothing and that the election 
 of Lincoln was not a sufficient cause for revolt. [Du Bose: Life 
 and Times of William Lowndes Yancey, p. 689.] 
 
282 APPENDIX 
 
 pared by Memminger and adopted December 24, declared 
 the right of a state to govern itself or to abolish govern 
 ments, advocated the compact theory of government, said the 
 Northern states had disobeyed the compact, complained that 
 the ends of 1787 had been defeated and that a sectional party 
 was now in power, endangering the institution of slavery. 
 The address recited that, notwithstanding the prosperity of 
 the United States, discontent had been caused by taxation 
 without representation, by unequal distribution of appro 
 priations, by Northern evasion of the compromises, by abro 
 gation of the limitations of the constitution, and by the atti 
 tude of the majority toward the minority. It spoke of the 
 constitution as only an experiment begun when there was no 
 tariff and no negro fanaticism; it did not seek reform but 
 desired only to be let alone. It preferred a system of slavery 
 " where capital and labor are identified in interests " to a 
 system of industry where capital and labor are in conflict/ 
 
 Stephens was not favorably impressed by the address of 
 the convention. He said that it hardly deigned to specify 
 grievances and that it almost entirely ignored the slavery 
 question barely glancing at the personal liberty acts which 
 were the real cause of complaint. 
 
 Events were now hurrying rapidly to a catastrophe. " The 
 times are fearfully distempered," said Stephens, " We are 
 on the high road to ruin." But when his state seceded a 
 few days later, he resolved to " go down with a fragment of 
 the wreck." 
 
 American public opinion had not yet decided in favor of 
 coercion, but expected compromise. Horace Greeley, in the 
 
 5 McPherson: Political History of the Itebellion. 
 
 In a loiter to Lincoln, Stephens said that previous presidents, 
 Washington and Jefferson, had had antislavery opinions, and thai 
 in his judgment " the people of the South did not fear that the 
 Republican administration would attempt to interfere directly or 
 immediately with slavery in the states, but that their discontent 
 and apprehension was created by the fear of results of fanaticism 
 like that of John Brown." 
 
APPENDIX 283 
 
 Tribune of November 9, favored letting the seceding states 
 go rather than holding them by bayonets. Many in the 
 North and in the border states desired compromise, and 
 various plans were proposed. Thurlow Weed, in his Albany 
 Evening Journal t proposed a law for the payment of rescued 
 slaves by counties and the extension of the Missouri com 
 promise to the Pacific. George P. Curtis believed that 
 Massachusetts would repeal her personal liberty law, and the 
 House of Representatives, on December 17, by a vote of 153 
 to 14 recommended a repeal of these laws as far as they 
 were in conflict with the constitution, but Senator Iverson 
 said that the immediate repeal of all these laws could not 
 stop the progress of the " revolution." Davis and Toombs 
 complained that the North refused to recognize slaves as 
 property in the territories. Southerners were sensitive to the 
 Northern sentiment that slavery was out of harmony with 
 the moral progress of the age. Crittenden of Kentucky, 
 December 18, introduced into the Senate a plan of com 
 promise favoring an amendment to the constitution, extend 
 ing the Missouri compromise line of division to all territory 
 of the United States so long as it should remain as territory, 
 and providing that when states should be organized in such 
 territory, either north or south of the line of 36 30 , they 
 should be admitted free or slave as their constitution might 
 provide. Congress was to have no power to shut slavery 
 from the territories; slaves were to be protected as property 
 by all the departments of the territorial government; Con 
 gress was never to have the power to interfere with slavery 
 in the states where the laws permitted that institution not 
 even in places within those states where Congress had ex 
 clusive jurisdiction^ and payment for rescued slaves was to 
 be made by the United States government. Such was the 
 Crittenden plan to which the Republicans could not agree, 
 and no agreement could be reached on other plans before the 
 issue came. 
 
 On December 18, 1860, Senator Powell of Kentucky offered 
 
284 APPENDIX 
 
 a resolution for the selection of a committee of thirteen to 
 consider the grievances of the slaveholding states. The 
 Senate adopted it and the Vice-President appointed Powell, 
 Crittenden, Hunter, Toombs and Davis with the Northern 
 Democrats, Douglas, Bigelow and Rice, and the Republi 
 cans Seward, Collamer, Doolittle and Grimes. Before they 
 met, South Carolina had seceded. On December 22, Crit 
 tenden presented his plan to the committee. Article i relat 
 ing to territories was the most important. It was opposed 
 by all the Republicans and by Toombs and Davis. The 
 Republicans also opposed the other articles. They probably 
 feared Southern filibustering to get Mexico, Cuba and Cen 
 tral America. Nevertheless there was considerable opinion 
 in the North in favor of the Crittenden amendment. The 
 Northern Democrats and Hunter, Powell and Crittenden 
 would have accepted the compromise but Seward, on De 
 cember 26, wrote Lincoln that, even with the restoration of 
 the 36 30 line, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana 
 would secede. As a congressional law, instead of a consti 
 tutional amendment, Lincoln would have accepted all the 
 compromise except article i. He believed that the agitation 
 could be stopped for a time by the provision to extend the 
 36 30 line, but would probably be renewed by Southern 
 attempts to seize and annex Mexico. He believed that com 
 promise could only postpone, but thought that the fugitive 
 slave law ought not to be resisted in the North. 
 
 The Republicans offered a plan of compromise. On De 
 cember 24 Seward proposed to the committee of thirteen: 
 (i) That there should be a constitutional amendment that 
 the constitution should never be amended so as to authorize 
 Congress to interfere with slavery in the state. (2) That the 
 fugitive slave law should be amended so as to grant jury 
 trial to the fugitive. (3) That Congress should recommend 
 the repeal of the personal liberty acts that were unconstitu 
 tional. Two days later he also proposed that Congress 
 should pass no law for the punishment of persons engaged in 
 
APPENDIX 285 
 
 the armed invasion of any state from another. Grimes of 
 Iowa was \villing to admit Kansas under the Wyandotte 
 constitution, and to admit the rest of the western terri 
 tories as two states divided by the line of 36 30 with pro 
 visions for their future sub-division when the population 
 should be sufficient. This would have made New Mexico 
 a pro-slavery pocket borough though physical laws, even in 
 the face of congressional laws to the contrary, would, per 
 haps, have prevented slavery from thriving there. Of the 
 above Republican proposals only the first one was carried. 
 
 After considering other propositions, the committee of 
 thirteen reported to Congress that they could not agree on 
 a plan of adjustment. Crittenden then proposed (January 
 3, 1861) in the Senate, that his compromise plan should be 
 submitted to the people. Douglas favored it, but the ques 
 tion never came to a vote in the Senate. 
 
 Clingman of North Carolina said that he was astonished 
 that the North hesitated to accept the Crittenden plan; that 
 it gave that section the larger amount of present territory 
 and left undisturbed the right to a vote as to the acquisition 
 of further territory toward the South. Lincoln, however, 
 was opposed to surrendering his principles in order to please 
 those beaten at the elections, whom he feared would next ask 
 for Cuba as a condition for remaining in the Union. He 
 stated that the constitution was the same as before the 
 election, and that there never was a more shallow pretext 
 for extorting a compromise. " There is in my judgment," 
 said he, " but one compromise which would really settle the 
 slavery question, and that would be a prohibition against 
 acquiring any more territory." In a letter to Seward on 
 February i, 1861, he said, " I am for no compromise which 
 permits extension of slavery to soil now owned by the nation, 
 or allows any trick by which the nation is to acquire terri 
 tory and allow some local authority to spread slavery over 
 it." 7 
 
 7 Nicolay and Hay : Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, Vol. I. 
 
286 APPENDIX 
 
 On February 4, while the Southern leaders were making 
 their farewell speeches in Congress, and while delegates from 
 six cotton states were convening at Montgomery, Alabama, 
 to form a Southern confederacy, a peace convention in which 
 21 states were represented, met at Washington in response 
 to a proposal (January 19) from Virginia, whose legislative 
 deprecated disunion. The seceding states were not repre 
 sented. Virginia desired to save the Union and was willing 
 to accept the Crittenden compromise as a constitution il 
 amendment. The subject of future expansion 8 was a promi 
 nent feature of the debates and many of the speeches ga\e 
 the intimation that the South was contemplating national 
 suicide because there was no constitutional amendment re 
 garding future acquisitions of territory. Some Southern 
 delegates, like Reid of North Carolina, were looking foi- 
 ward to the glory of future expansion. Some of the Northern 
 delegates spoke of the evils of expansion, and desired re 
 strictions on future acquisitions. Loomis of Pennsylvania, 
 declaring that new acquisitions would only bring new 
 troubles, said: " We want no more territory north or south." 
 Others, however, were opposed to restrictions for the future 
 on the ground that they were unnecessary and might prove 
 troublesome. Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, told the South 
 ern delegates that there was no reason for discussing con 
 tingencies which might never happen that they had enough 
 territory for the next two hundred years, and that, before they 
 should need more land possibly even the North would want 
 Cuba and Mexico for trade advantages. In discussing a 
 resolution based on the Crittenden plan, Reverdy Johnson of 
 Maryland, who thought we had sufficient territory and hoped 
 that we would not separate on account of territory we did 
 not have and did not need, desired to insert the word 
 
 8 On the influence of the South on expansion, see C. E. Evans 
 (Ed.): Confederate Military History, Vol. I, pp. 59-2-16, [\V. R. 
 Garrett: The Si nth as a factor in the territorial expansion of the 
 United States.] 
 
APPENDIX 287 
 
 " present " before " territory " in article I, stating that a 
 constitutional amendment should not go forth to the world 
 indicating that the United States proposed to acquire new 
 territory in any way. The word " present " was inserted. 
 Afterwards Summer offered an amendment that no territory 
 should be acquired except by discovery or for naval depots 
 and transit routes, without the concurrence of the majority 
 of the senators from each section. The motion was carried, 
 but the proposition failed in the final vote upon the report of 
 the convention. 9 On February 27, the convention, voting by 
 states, recommended to Congress a constitutional amend 
 ment which was less favorable to the South than the Critten- 
 den plan but was not satisfactory to the radicals or the 
 Republicans. It advocated the extension of the Missouri 
 compromise line to the Pacific, the establishment, by Con 
 gress, of slavery south of that line, and compensation by the 
 United States for fugitive slaves rescued after arrest. A 
 committee of Congress joined in favoring the compromise, 
 but it was too late. On March 4, Crittenden offered the 
 report to the Senate and it received only seven ayes, among 
 whom were Crittenden, Douglas and two Republicans. The 
 radical republicans had been opposed to the peace conven 
 tion. The House by 113 to 80 and the Senate by 20 to 19 
 refused to submit the Crittenden compromise to the people, 
 but Congress by a two-thirds vote of each House recom 
 mended a constitutional amendment providing that no future 
 amendment should ever give Congress power to interfere 
 with the domestic institutions of the states. This satisfied 
 many in Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee. Nelson 
 of Tennessee said it would remove the only ground of appre 
 hension to the slave states. But it could not stop secession. 
 Public sentiment changed with the course of events. Virginia 
 
 9 L. E. Chittenden: Report of the Debates and Proceedings of 
 the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention for proposing 
 amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Feb., 1861. 
 N. Y., 1864. 
 
288 APPENDIX 
 
 was at first strongly opposed to disunion, but she was aho 
 opposed to coercion in case conciliation failed to bring back 
 seceded states. 
 
 A statement of the causes of secession may be found in 
 the farewell speeches of Southern congressmen delivered in 
 January and February and also in the proceedings of the 
 seceding conventions. The predominant tone was that the 
 states seceded because they believed the election of Linco n 
 meant a blow to the institution of slavery. Toombs, on 
 January 7, in the Senate, said that the South made fi-e 
 demands to cure grievances and prevent secession: (i) Equil 
 right to go to the territories. (2) The same protection for 
 slaves as for other property leaving each state to prote :t 
 or prohibit slavery. (3) The delivery of persons committing 
 crimes against slave property and fleeing to other state?. 
 (4) The surrender of fugitive slaves. (5) The passage 1 y 
 Congress of laws for the punishment of those aiding or 
 abetting invasion or insurrection in any state. 10 The Missis 
 sippi convention said: " Our position is thoroughly identified 
 with the institution of slavery . . . There was no choice 
 left us but submission to the mandates of abolition or a dis 
 solution of the Union." " Your votes," said Jefferson Davis, 
 " refuse to recognize our domestic institution which pre 
 existed the formation of the Union, our property which was 
 guaranteed by the constitution." 1 In his farewell speech to 
 the Senate, January 21, Mr. .Davis said: " Mississippi 
 secedes because she hears the theory that all men are created 
 free and equal made the basis of an attack upon her social 
 institutions." 
 
 Mr. Slidell, February 4, in presenting to the Senate an 
 ordinance to dissolve the compact between Louisiana and 
 the United States, stated that the mere election of Lincoln 
 was not the cause of secession, but that it indicated that 
 outside of New Jersey there was a solid North against 
 
 lu P. A. Stovall. Life of Robt. Toombs. 
 "Alfriend: Jefferson Davis, pp. 225-30. 
 
APPENDIX 289 
 
 Southern institutions, and he declared that the inauguration 
 of Lincoln with Southern assent would mean slave outbreaks. 
 He spoke of the advantages which the South would have in 
 forming a new nation, and said there was no reason to fear 
 coercion. He was willing to adhere to the old constitution 
 and treaties, pay a portion of the national debt, and leave 
 the navigation of the Mississippi free to the inhabitants of 
 its valley; and he expected foreign nations to acknowledge 
 the de facto Southern government and to insist upon com 
 munication with Southern ports. 12 
 
 Mr. Benjamin, in his "farewell" of February 5, said: 
 " Of all the causes which justify the action of the Southern 
 states I know none of greater gravity and more alarming 
 magnitude than that now developed of the denial of the 
 right of secession." He declared that the purchase of Louis 
 iana by the United States did not bind the white men of 
 the state by ties that could not be severed. Clingman held 
 that after an honest effort to defeat Lincoln the South was 
 not responsible for his election and was justified in seceding. 
 
 The foregoing speeches indicate the presence of a general 
 belief among Southern leaders that the perpetuation of the 
 institution of slavery, or of Southern rigfits~crmnected with 
 slavery, were endangered by the election of Lincoln. It must 
 be remembered, however, that, until the Southerners with 
 drew, the Republicans were still the smaller party in both 
 Houses, and that the President had no power to abolish 
 slavery except as a war measure. But the secessionists were 
 correct in their conviction that the Northern moral sense 
 against slavery pointed toward the ultimate doom of the 
 institution, and they made the election of Lincoln a pretext 
 for secession. Did secession and the war then result from 
 the desire to perpettfaTe^slavery? TrThis speech~at Savannah 
 on March I, 1861, Stephens stated that race servitude was 
 the real cornerstone upon which the Confederacy was based. 
 But, years after the close of the war, when the people, drawn 
 
 18 Cong. Globe, Feb. 4. 1861. 
 19 
 
290 APPENDIX 
 
 together by mutual interests, were again being fused into a 
 durable nationality, Jefferson Davis said: "To whatever 
 extent the question of slavery may have served as an occa 
 sion, it was far from being a cause of the war." 
 
 Davis held that slavery was only an incident in a group 
 of causes than the South did not secede on account of tl e 
 Northern attitude toward slavery, but rather from the fear 
 of what a_sgctional party might do when 7mce"Tn power. 13 
 
 In the farewell spisecFTes one sees no reference to niary 
 causes which had contributed to embitter feeling on tie 
 subject of slavery: the lack of communication, the economic, 
 educational, social and political differences which arose fro n 
 different systems of labor, and the influence of climate arc! 
 soil in producing them. The Southern states being agricul 
 tural communities, were led to the general introduction of 
 slavery, and this in turn kept them agricultural while tLe 
 North was developing into a country of diversified interes:s 
 and of denser population than the South. The North hr.d 
 outgrown the economic conditions of 1776, and material in 
 terests had been changed by the growth of manufacturing and 
 commercial towns in the North and West. Helper, in h s 
 pamphlet of 1859, on the Impending Crisis, said that if 
 slavery could be abolished manufacturing might become an 
 industry in the South; and that the social position of the 
 non-slaveholding whites, consisting of about two-thirds of 
 the voters, would soon compare with the mechanics and 
 farmers of the North. 
 
 With the conditions of soil and climate which made slavery 
 more profitable in the South and secured greater immigra 
 tion to the North; with the differences in institutions which 
 resulted from slavery; with railroads of different gauge and 
 inconvenient connections; sometimes in an atmosphere of 
 misunderstanding where neighbor was ignorant of neighbor, 
 and where some of the opposing politicians learned nothing 
 and forgot nothing-v-compromise failed, passions controlled, 
 
 13 ,T. Davis: Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. 1SS1. 
 
APPENDIX 291 
 
 the spirit of secession spread, and war was precipitated. 
 Southern leaders, feeling that the social and industrial system 
 of the South was insecure, preferred tcfappeal toTiTe pre- 
 natioirafr" pTJrrdpte^ ot~CoTrreditioH- - an d tO~~fep u diate the 
 idga~bt nationality?*""" 
 
 The secession- movement had continued under the man 
 agement of the political leaders aid on February 4, 1861, 
 delegates met at Montgomery to organize a government. 
 Conservatives like Stephens were still opposed to secession 
 as a "remedy against anticipated aggressions." Stephens 
 finally decided to accept a place in the provisional govern 
 ment, though he wrote that when he considered the " ambi 
 tious . . . men at the head of the movement, who neces 
 sarily control [led] at least for the present" he had appre 
 hension and mistrust for the future. Some who joined the 
 movement hoped for something to occur to prevent perma 
 nent dissolution, and expected to obtain better terms for 
 slavery by a temporary withdrawal from the Union; others 
 dreamed of a peaceful dissolution, for many in the North 
 were opposed to coercion. There was a strong Southern 
 opposition to secession, especially in Georgia, Virginia, 
 North Carolina and Louisiana. Yet the movement did not 
 lack the substantial support of the majority of the people 
 after it was once begun, though in Georgia especially there 
 was at first a majority of the white people who opposed it. 
 It was only by impassioned persuasion, or by argument of 
 temporary expediency, that the leaders in some parts ob 
 tained popular support for their project. Perhaps the United 
 States constitution could never have been carried in 1788 
 if its ratification had been voted upon by the whole people 
 at the polls, and it has been said that secession would have 
 failed if it had depended upon the popular vote. 
 
 14 Papers rel. to the ratification of the ordinances of secession. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Acquisition, territorial; demanded by 
 slavery, 278, 285; and the Critten- 
 den compromise plan, 283, 284; 
 discussed in " peace conference " 
 of 1861, 286; attempt to limit, 287. 
 
 Adams, C. F. ; U. S. Minister to Lon 
 don, 114; possibility of recognition 
 seen by, 159. 
 
 Aggressions, anticipated. [See " Se 
 cession " and " United States."] 
 
 Alabama, The; built at Liverpool, 156; 
 escape and commission on high 
 seas, 157. 
 
 Alexandra, The ; seizure of, 170. 
 
 Alliance; proposed with Spain, 75, 78, 
 98, 207; proposed with Mexico, 71; 
 proposed with northern provinces 
 of Mexico, 76; proposed with 
 France, 83, 151, 202, 266; proposed 
 with European powers, 84; ex 
 pected between England and 
 France, 115; advocated with the 
 U. S., 128, 257; suggested with 
 France and Mexico, 196, 198; sug 
 gested with Maximilian, 201, 213; 
 suggested with Brazil and Mexico, 
 241; rumor of with Maximilian, 
 273. 
 
 Anglo-American relations, 108, 115, 
 120, 188, 222, 237, 271, 274. 
 
 Archives. [See " Correspondence " 
 and " Pickett Papers."] 
 
 Armistice, proposed plan of, 159. 
 
 Aspinwall, W. H., 173. 
 
 Barksdale, of Miss., 35. 
 
 Barnwell, of South Carolina, 31. 
 
 Beall, J. Y., 226. 
 
 Belgium, diplomatic mission to, 125. 
 
 Belligerency, recognition by England, 
 112; views of Fish on, 114; views 
 of Seward, 214. 
 
 Benjamin, Judah P. ; papers destroyed 
 by, 12, 20; secretiveness, 23; 
 sketch, 31; complains against the 
 British policy, 94, 95, 155, 233; 
 suspicions as to French designs, 
 98, 205, 206; arguments to Europe 
 [see "Europe"]; and bureau of 
 export and import, 105; contrasts 
 French friendliness with the " rude 
 incivility" of Earl Russell, 155; 
 urges that England and France 
 should break the blockade to se 
 cure monopoly of Southern trade, 
 162; on cooperation of Lord Lyons 
 with the U. S. as to consuls in 
 the South, 180; complains of Euro 
 pean powers, 218, 249; accuses 
 Napoleon of duplicity, 219; covert 
 threat of future war against 
 France, 219; hopes against fate, 
 234; instructions to Kenner, 248; 
 warns Europe against future ag 
 gression by the North, 250; 
 " dreams " of European interven 
 tion, 257; advocates emancipation, 
 and seizure of cotton, etc., 260; 
 Sunday talk with Davis, 267; dip 
 lomatically declines to receive 
 Russell s note, 273; on cause of 
 secession, 289. 
 
 Bigelow, John (U. S. Minister at 
 Paris); "France and the Confed 
 erate Navy," 24. 
 
 Blair, mission of, 253-254, 256, 266. 
 
 Blanche, The, 78. 
 
 Blockade, 106, 115, 121, 122, 126, 131, 
 144; attitude of England to, 125, 
 127, 267; attitude of France to, 
 125, 147; and the cotton policy, 
 122, 126, 132; Confederate repre 
 sentations as to, 126, 144, 163; 
 
294 
 
 INDEX 
 
 severity of on South, 132, 147, 163, 
 247, 260; inefficiency of, urged by 
 Mason, 144, 164 (also admitted by 
 Napoleon, 147); irregularities, Rus 
 sell s fairness as to, 149, 167; 
 Confederate expectation for Eng 
 land to favor the South as to, 150. 
 
 Blockade running, 104, 132, 169, 171; 
 government control of recom 
 mended, 105, 195. 
 
 Border States; necessity of to the ex 
 istence of the Confederacy, 145. 
 
 Brazil, 241. 
 
 Bread riot, threatened, 55. 
 
 Brent, Gen. J. L., 249. 
 
 Bright, John; opposed to disunion in 
 the U. S., 189. 
 
 British consuls in the South; exe 
 quaturs finally revoked by Davis, 
 176; authority exercised over by 
 Lord Lyons, 177; complain of for 
 cible conscription of Irish, 17(5, 
 177; Magee of Mobile recalled, 178; 
 case of Cridland at Mobile, 179. 
 
 British Government, The; Benjamin 
 complains of policy of, 94, 95, 155, 
 233; attempts to embarrass, 100; 
 objections to recognition of the 
 Confederacy, 125; attitude toward 
 blockade, 125, 127, 267; and con 
 flicting views as to cooperation 
 with France, 160; orders of as to 
 Confederate operations, 166, 169, 
 170, 272; futile attempt to force 
 recognition by, 186 et seq. ; de 
 tention of Confederate vessels by, 
 214; and Napoleon s supposed pro 
 posals for joint recognition, 185; 
 Roebuck s, charges against (as to 
 Napoleon s offers), 187; suspected 
 secret understanding between Sew- 
 ard and, 147, 148, 187; fears that 
 recognition would lead to war 
 with U. S., 188; leaves Napoleon 
 to pull his own chestnuts, 188; de 
 nials as to Napoleon s overtures, 
 189, 191; protests of Seward against 
 policy of, 222; its policy dictated 
 by the U. S., 233; " Index " com 
 plains as to England playing 
 " second fiddle," 272. [See 
 " Lyons," " Russell," " Palmers- 
 ton " and " Great Britain."] 
 
 British vessels; captured by U. S., 
 171. 
 
 Bullock, J. D. ; "Secret Service" of, 
 24, 58, 59; views of on Confedeiate 
 policy, 105; sent to Europe, 111; 
 and the Alabama, 156; contn cts 
 for vessels in French ports, MO, 
 211 ; complains of French dec ;it, 
 216. 
 
 Bunch (British consul) ; negotiati )ns 
 through, 118; Seward requests re 
 moval of, 119; exequatur of re 
 voked by Davis, 176. 
 
 Butler, Thos. J., 280. 
 
 Cabinet; and congress, 28, 30, 48; 
 first, 30; second, 33. [See " Con 
 federate Government" and." Da 
 vis."] 
 
 Campbell, Judge J. A., 44, 68, 156, 
 257, 281. 
 
 Canada; and Anglo-American rela 
 tions, 188, 237, 271; Confedeiate 
 operations from, 214, 220 et s<q., 
 236; Confederate missions to, 224; 
 225. 
 
 Chapman, Lieut., 25. 
 
 Chesapeake, The affair of the, 223; 
 and Holcombe s mission to Canada, 
 224. 
 
 Clay, C. C. ; special mission to Can 
 ada, 241. 
 
 Cobb, of Georgia, 26, 280. 
 
 Collier, of Va., 48, 54. 
 
 Colonial subjection to Europe sug 
 gested, 241. 
 
 Colonies, of Europe in North America; 
 Confederate policy of guaranty of, 
 84, 168, 207, 266. 
 
 Commerce; proposed advantages to 
 Europe, 84, 86, 87; Confederate 
 policy (laiswz faire) as to, 110, 
 133, 146; advantages offered 
 France, 142, 147; monopoly of Con 
 federate trade, England encour 
 aged to prepare for, 162. [See 
 " Cotton."] 
 
 Communication with Europe, etc.; 
 difficulties of, 51, 52, 55, 97, 304, 
 135, 173, 178, 247, 260; plans for 
 facilitating, 97, 146, 159. 
 
INDEX 
 
 295 
 
 Compromise; plans of (in 1860-61), 283 
 et seq. ; and territorial expansion, 
 285. 
 
 Confederacy, The; seal of, 18, 25; 
 diplomatic and consular agents of 
 (list), 21; government of, 25-65 
 (survivors, 23, 24), [see " Con 
 federate Government"]; flag of, 
 25; provisional government of, 26, 
 32; permanent government of [see 
 " Confederate Permanent Govern 
 ment"]; missions of [see "Dip 
 lomatic missions"]; provisional 
 congress of, 26 (laws, 32); finances 
 of, 32, 53 et seq. ; constitution of, 
 28 et seq. (ignored, 242, 252); 
 permanent congress of [see " Con 
 gress"]; proposed supreme court 
 of, 30, 34, 38; opposition party in, 
 32, 47 [see " Secession," and 
 " Embarrassments and Difficul- 
 culties " under " Confederate 
 Government"]; defensive policy 
 of, 34; prospects of a counter 
 revolution in, 39, 47 [see " Seces 
 sion from Secessia "]; loans of, 53, 
 60, 63, 104, 195, 209 (the bears 
 and the bulls, 62, 63); expansion 
 policy of [see " Expansion pol 
 icy"]; and the Pacific, 75, 145, 
 272; foreign operations of closely 
 watched, 99; diplomacy of (fac 
 tors causing failure), 99, 100, 240; 
 commercial policy of, 110, 133, 
 142, 146, 147, 162; cotton policy 
 and the blockade, 122, 126, 132, 
 134, 243, 246; representations as 
 to blockade, 126, 144, 163; sever 
 ity of the blockade on, 132, 147, 
 163, 247, 260; disadvantages of 
 132, 146; distress of, 132, 225, 239, 
 268, 269; importance of border 
 states to, 145; aid associations in 
 England, 156; friends in the Brit 
 ish parliament (agitation by), 169; 
 suggested union with the Mexican 
 empire, 195; approval of European 
 intervention in Mexico, 204; opera 
 tions of from Canada, 214, 220 et 
 seq.; hope of Lincoln s defeat at 
 
 the polls, 227, 228; projects for 
 insurrection in the North, 230; 
 effect of victories of, 231; defeats 
 of, 234, 239, 260; attempts to in 
 volve England in war with the 
 U. S., 237, 238, 271; last card of, 
 239 et seq.; colonial subjection to 
 Europe suggested, 241. [Also, see 
 "Foreign policjV "Recognition," 
 " Confederate Government," " Eu 
 rope," " France," " Great Brit 
 ain," " Mexico."] 
 Confederate Government, 25-65. 
 Confederate Government, the provis 
 ional; organization of, 26, 291; 
 removal of to Richmond, 32; finan 
 cial measures of, 32. 
 Confederate Government, the perma 
 nent; a " machine of the few," 
 17; survivors, 23, 34; birth, 33; 
 policy of to regulate production, 
 34, 89, 90; collision of with state 
 authorities, 43, 45, 47; impress 
 ment of food by, 43; prohibition 
 of exports, 44; disaffection against, 
 46, 47, 233, 239, 270; embarrass 
 ments and difficulties of, 42 et 
 seq., 48, 51, 56, 102, 106, 233 
 [also, see " Communication."]; 
 financial measures of, 53; argu 
 ments to secure European recogni 
 tion, 87 [see " Europe," " Great 
 Britain," and "France"]; and 
 U. S. treaties with foreign pow 
 ers, 87, 109; encourages defection 
 in the U. S., 220 et seq.; expecta 
 tion of revolution in North, 221; 
 expectation of international com 
 plications, 223, 271; last effort of, 
 239 et seq. ; secrecy and rumors, 
 273. [See " Confederacy," and 
 " Congress."] 
 
 Congress, provisional, 26; laws of, 32. 
 Congress, permanent, 33; survivors, 34; 
 prominent members, 33, 35; acts 
 of, 34, 44; character of, 34, 35; 
 financial measures of, 34; and the 
 executive, 34, 35, 39, 44, 45, 48, 
 49, 50, 96, 256, 268; flight of, 36; 
 quarters of, 36; secret sessions of, 
 
2 9 6 
 
 INDEX 
 
 36; proposed report of debates of, 
 37; stormy scenes in, 37-38; ap 
 propriation for more vessels, 210; 
 dissentient reply to Davis last 
 message, 268; address to the peo 
 ple, 269; " Unionist " members of, 
 271. 
 
 Conscription; laws, 34, 40; opposed by 
 Stephens, 40; bureau of (" rows " 
 in), 44, 46. 
 
 Controversies, 169 et seq. 
 Corcoran, W. W., 265. 
 
 Correspondence; private, 22; preserva 
 tion of, 14; purchase of, 15, 19; 
 capture of, 52, 97, 164; publication 
 of, 96, 164; destroyed, 172. [See 
 " Diplomatic correspondence."] 
 
 Cotton; export of urged, 63, 89, 90; 
 " Cotton is King," 80; Europe 
 and, 80, 123, 132, 142, 243; destruc 
 tion of advocated, 88, 102; aban 
 donment of culture recommended, 
 89 (opposed by Stephens, 90); 
 policy as to, 89, 90, 122, 126, 132, 
 134, 243 (obstacles to export pol 
 icy, 89) ; commercial value urged, 
 89, 90, 105; political value urged, 
 101, 242 (disappointment as to, 
 101, 242) ; government seizure of 
 (policy of), 107, 246, 249; indirect 
 export of, 101, 107, 165; trade in 
 with Federals, 102, 103; govern 
 ment monopoly and shipment of, 
 104, 105 (urged by Mason, 195); 
 proposed neutrality of, 126, 135; 
 and. the blockade, 134, 142; policy 
 of prohibiting export of (urged), 
 150; expectation of a " cotton 
 famine," 159 (" cotton famine pol 
 icy," 243). 
 
 Cotton bonds, 53. 
 
 Cotton loans, 59, 61. 
 
 Crawford, M. G., of Georgia, 27, 67. 
 
 Crittenden plan of compromise, to 
 prevent secession, 283, 287. 
 
 Cuba; policy of the Confederacy to 
 wards, 77, 98, 124, 168, 184, 202, 
 207; Seward s warning as to, 78; 
 Mason and Slidell in, 136; policy 
 of the South towards before seces 
 sion, 278. 
 
 Currency; depreciation of, 57; cl)se 
 
 of paper money bureau, 269. 
 Curry, J. L. M., 35. 
 Dargan, of Ala., 38. 
 Davis, George (Attorney-General), 47. 
 Davis, Jefferson; election, 27; cotion 
 famine policy, 32, 88, 89; increas 
 ing powers of, 39, 44, 47, ,iOj 
 estimates of his character, 41- 
 sources of embarrassment and un 
 popularity, 42 et seq., 239; list 
 message of, 48, 50, 268; foreign 
 policy of, 86, 88; complains of ihe 
 British Government, 155, 163, 25; 
 revokes exequaturs of British con 
 suls, 176; criticises European Gov 
 ernments for refusing recognition, 
 200, 240; opinion as to major ty 
 rule, 228; laborious work of, 2;;9; 
 and the " last card," 246, 263; on 
 cause of secession, 288. [See 
 " Confederate Government " and 
 " Congress."] 
 
 Davis, Judge, 16. 
 
 Davis, Mrs. Varina J., 12. 
 
 Davis, Miss Winnie, 22. 
 
 Declaration of Paris (of 1856), 111, 
 118, 126, 134; U. S. willing to 
 accept, 119; Confederate protects 
 against British modification as to 
 blockade, 164, 196; Russell s inter 
 pretation of rule as to blockade, 
 164, 168. 
 
 De Leon, recommends recall of Con 
 federate commissioners from Eu 
 rope, 97. 
 
 Democratic convention at Charleston, 
 279. 
 
 Democratic convention at Chicago 
 (1864), 231, 234. 
 
 De Morny, Count; views of, 111-112. 
 
 Desertions, 48, 239. 
 
 Despatch agents, 97. 
 
 Dictator, military; favored, 241. 
 
 Diplomacy, Confederate; factors caus 
 ing failure of, 99, 100, 240. 
 
 Diplomatic agents; list of, 25; recall 
 of, favored, 95, 176, 196; Sewaid 
 warns Europe not to hold inter 
 course with, 115. [See " Diploma 
 tic missions."] 
 
INDEX 
 
 297 
 
 Diplomatic correspondence ; preserva 
 tion by Pickett, 14; purchase of, 
 15, 19. 
 
 " Diplomatic council," a, 265. 
 
 Diplomatic missions; (embarrassments 
 and difficulties of, 92, 94, 120); to 
 Washington, 27, 67, 70, 117; to 
 Canada, 70, 224, 225; to Mexico, 
 71, 75 (New Leon), 76; to the 
 West Indies, 77; to Europe (Yan- 
 cey, Rost and Mann), 91, (Mason 
 and Slidell) 130, (Mason) 200; to 
 Russia, 95 (recalled, 96); to the 
 Pope, 99; to England, 109 et seq., 
 239, 258; to France, 123; to Spain, 
 124, 125, 168; to Belgium, 125; to 
 Hampton Roads conference, 257. 
 
 Dowling, Robt., 98. 
 
 Dred Scott decision, 279. 
 
 Dunnock, Mr., 102. 
 
 Emancipation; offered for recognition, 
 
 83, 266; Lincoln s proclamation, 
 effect in England, 165; favored as 
 a means of securing recognition, 
 195, 241, 242, 251; the "last 
 card," 239 et seq., 242, 246; prepa 
 ration of Southern public opinion 
 for, 251, 258, 260; opposition to, 
 260; secrecy of negotiations as to, 
 262; anticipated in London, 262. 
 
 Emigration to U. S. ; from Ireland, 
 168; from Frankfort, 233. 
 
 England, crisis in, 182 et seq. [See 
 " Great Britain " and " British 
 Government."] 
 
 Enlistments in Ireland, 168. 
 
 Erlanger loan, 54, 60, 61, 62. 241. 
 
 Europe; Confederate financial agents 
 in, 59, 63; change of financial 
 program in, 64; Confederate ex 
 pectations as to, 79, 91, 109, 117, 
 204, 249; and tariff policy, 79, 80, 
 
 81, 82; opposition to slavery, 79, 
 
 82, 84, 86, 97, 121, 242, 244, 263; 
 and Confederate cotton, 80, 123, 
 132, 142, 243; Confederate argu 
 ments to, 81, 93, 100, 109, 111, 
 121, 125, 126, 133, 162, 267; pro 
 posed commercial advantages to, 
 
 84, 86, 87 [see "Commerce"]; 
 Confederate operations in, 93 
 
 (closely watched, 99); no hope 
 from, 128, 218, 231, 257, 264; 
 urged to break the blockade to 
 get cotton, 134 (and to establish 
 West India depots of supply, 163); 
 accused of desiring the ruin of 
 both North and South, 197; de 
 crease of Confederate opportuni 
 ties in, 220; Davis complains 
 against the indifference of, 240; 
 suggestion of colonial subjection 
 to, 241; warned against future 
 Northern aggression, 250. [See 
 " Recognition."] 
 
 Executive, absorption of power by, 17, 
 247 et seq., 268. [See " Davis," 
 " Confederate Government " and 
 " Congress."] 
 
 Exemption laws, 40, 46, 50. 
 
 Exemptions, complaints against, 240. 
 
 Expansion policy; Confederate, 66, 71, 
 73, 75, 78, 93, 124, 129, 134, 145, 
 207, 221, 257, 258; discussions in 
 the peace convention of 1861, 286; 
 influence of the South on, 286. 
 
 Export and import, bureau of, 105. 
 
 Extradition, 180-181. 
 
 Fearn, Walker, 24, 76, 97. 
 
 Ficklin, 52. 
 
 Financial agents in Europe, 59, 63. 
 
 Financial measures, 32, 53 et seq., 58, 
 59. 
 
 Financial program in Europe, change 
 in, 64. 
 
 Florida, The, 156, 241. 
 
 Foote, H. S., 47, 95; urges recall of 
 commissioners, 95; on motion of 
 Hampton Roads conference, 258; 
 on strong Union feeling in the 
 South, 270. 
 
 Forbes, J. M., 173. 
 
 Foreign policy, 66-107; of Yancey, 
 Rhett and Toombs, 84, 87, 89, 123; 
 of Davis, 86, 88; of Stephens, 89 
 (cotton exportation), 90, 91; of 
 Johnston, 90; Henry St. Paul s 
 pamphlet on, 202. [See " Confed 
 erate Government," " Davis," 
 " Benjamin," " Mason," " Sli 
 dell," " Recognition," etc.] 
 
2<>8 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Forsyth, John, 27, 31, 67. 
 
 France; rumors of alliance with, 49, 
 273; attitude toward blockade, 125, 
 147; attitude toward secession, 142, 
 149; policy dependent upon that 
 of Great Britain, 148, 161, 204; 
 proposes joint mediation, 159.; 
 playing a complicated diplomatic 
 game, 190, 212 Rumors of prospec^ 
 tive aid by, 219, 268, 273; sug 
 gested alliance with, 196; Benja 
 min suspicious as to the designs 
 of, 98, 205, 206; Bullock complains 
 of deceit of, 216; covert threats of 
 future war against, 219. [See 
 " Alliance," " Napoleon," " L - 
 Huys," " Europe " and " Great 
 Britain."] 
 
 Goode, John, 35. 
 
 Government. [See " Confederate Gov 
 ernment."] 
 
 Great Britain; Confederate sympathiz 
 ers in, 82, 100, 108, 150, 198, 201; 
 neutrality of, 94, 113, 170, 188, 
 205, 215; policy of Government of, 
 94, 106 [see " British Govern 
 ment"]; Confederate complaints 
 against, 96 [see " Davis," " Ben 
 jamin," "Mason"]; opposition to 
 slavery, 97, 128, 167, 187; consuls 
 of in Confederate States, 98; influ 
 ence of Liberals in, 99, 169, 201; 
 effect of Seward s watch on, 99; 
 effect of war on cotton operators 
 in, 106, 143, 159; sympathy for 
 Union cause, 108; Mason s instruc 
 tions as minister to, 133. [See 
 " British Government."] 
 
 Gregg, Maxey, 278. 
 
 Guaranty of N. Am. colonies of Euro 
 pean powers, 84, 168, 207, 266. 
 
 Gwin, ex-Senator, and Napoleon s 
 scheme for colonizing Sonora, 217, 
 258. 
 
 Hanckle, Mr., of Charleston, 126. 
 
 Hampton Roads conference, 253, 257. 
 
 Harrison, Burton N., 97, 215, 275. 
 
 Helm, C. J., 77. 
 
 Henry, Senator, speech on emancipa 
 tion policy, 259. 
 
 Henry, Wm. Wirt, memoranda of, 262. 
 
 Hester, extradition of; correspondence 
 between Russell and Mason as to, 
 180-181. 
 
 Heyleger, L., 79, 97. 
 
 Holcombe, J. P.; mission to Can; da, 
 224; and Niagara Falls pt ace 
 comedy, 228; advises further en 
 couragement of disruption and 
 anarchy in the North, 236. 
 
 " Hoosier," encroachments of .he, 
 241. 
 
 Hotze, Henry, 92, 198. 
 
 Hughes, Caleb, 150. 
 
 Hunter, R. M. T. ; in cabinet, 31, 120; 
 attitude toward Cuba and Sp lin, 
 124; instructions to Mason and 
 Slidell, 133-134; policy as to Eu 
 ropean intervention, 145; sp< ech 
 favoring expansion and oppo >ing 
 emancipation, 258-259. 
 " Impressment of supplies, 43, 54. 
 
 Index, The, 92, 156, 272. 
 
 Indexes to diplomatic corresponde ice, 
 19. 
 
 Internal complications, Confederate 
 hope for, 241. 
 
 Intervention; sought of Europe, 125; 
 British policy as to, 134, 167; ex 
 pectation of, 145 et seq., 195; 
 expediency of, contemplated by 
 Palmerston and Russell, 158; de 
 pendent on military situation, 158, 
 194-195; plan of joint European 
 action, proposed by Napoleon, 159, 
 161 (Russell s reply, 161); of Eu 
 rope in Mexico, 203; opposition 
 of U. S. to, 232; the only hope, 
 242; " dream of," 257; rumors of 
 by France, 268, 273. [See " Rec 
 ognition."] 
 
 Ireland; emigration to U. S. from, 
 176; Confederate agents sent to, 
 196. 
 
 Irish, complaints of in South, 176, 
 177. 
 
 Isturitz, 208. 
 
 Jacques, Col., peace mission of, 227- 
 228. 
 
 Johnson, of Ark., 37. 
 
INDEX 
 
 299 
 
 Johnson s Island, plans for an expedi 
 tion against, 222, 226. 
 
 Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., 13; views 
 of on foreign policy, 90. 
 
 Kenner, Duncan F., secret mission of, 
 239 et seq., 248, 251; goes to Eu 
 rope via New York, 260-261; ar 
 rival in Europe, 264, 265; confer 
 ence with Mason, etc., 265; in 
 terview with L Huys, 265; Mason s 
 interview with Palmerston regard 
 ing, 266; negotiations with bank 
 ers for the sale of cotton, 266; 
 return to U. S., 274. 
 
 Lake Erie, Confederate plans for opera 
 tions on, 222, 226, 234. 
 
 Lamar; J. B., 102; L. Q. C., 95, 200. 
 
 Leach, J. T., 45. 
 
 Lee, General Robert E., 46, 103. 
 
 L Huys, 160, 193; denies that Napoleon 
 proposed recognition, 193; as to 
 French designs in Texas, 206; and 
 the Confederate navy, 209, 211, 
 212. [See " France."] 
 
 Lincoln and slavery, 43, 82, 111, 285; 
 election to presidency, 280. 
 
 Lindsay, Mr., M. P.; plan to control 
 Confederate and Western com 
 merce, 98; " amateur diplomacy " 
 of, with Napoleon, 147, 148, 182, 
 186, 192; motion in Parliament for 
 mediation,- 152; statement of 
 causes of secession, 152; and Roe 
 buck interview with Napoleon, 
 186; attempt to conciliate Pal 
 merston to favor joint mediation, 
 231; abandons resolution for medi 
 ation, 233. 
 
 Louisiana, rumors of French designs 
 to obtain, 268, 275. 
 
 Lubbock, Gov., 205. 
 
 Lyons, James, 252. 
 
 Lyons, Lord, 117, 118, 147, 164; co 
 operation with U. S. as to consuls 
 in the South, 177, 179, 180; coop 
 eration with the U. S. to frustrate 
 Confederate plans in Canada, 222. 
 
 Lynch, P. A., mission to States of 
 the Church, 99. 
 
 Mallory, Confederate Secretary of 
 Navy, 30, 58, 59, 104, 273. 
 
 Mann, A. Dudley; manuscript memoirs 
 of, 22; sent to Europe, 85; sent to 
 the Pope, 99; mission to Belgium, 
 
 . 125. 
 
 Mason, J. M. ; papers of, 22 ; and the 
 Confederate loan in Europe, 62- 
 63; salary as commissioner to Eu 
 rope, 92; operations and argu 
 ments in England, 93, 94, 99, 216; 
 failure to obtain official recogni 
 tion by Russell, 94, 144; recall 
 from England urged, 96; with 
 drawal to continent, 99; recom 
 mends government control of 
 blockade-running, 105, 195; sketch 
 of, 130; sent to England, 125; in 
 structions as minister to England, 
 133; unofficial reception, 144, 232; 
 suggests that a " cotton famine " 
 may force the British Government 
 to grant recognition, etc., 149; 
 complains of the British Govern 
 ment, 149, 150, 153, 154, 166, 167, 
 169; call for correspondence of (in 
 the Commons), 154; dissemination 
 of " impressions " by, 156, 267; 
 awaiting contingencies, 156; hopes 
 against fate, 159, 196, 199, 200, 
 267, 274; elated over Democratic 
 victories in the North, 165; in 
 structed to quit London, 189, 197; 
 remains in Europe awaiting con 
 tingencies, 196, 197; withdrawal 
 from Europe is strongly urged, 
 197; sees possible hope, if Pal 
 merston should die, 199; commis 
 sioner to the continent with full 
 power, 200; difficulties in combat 
 ing anti-slavery sentiment in Eng 
 land, 216; hopes for success of the 
 anti-Lincoln party at the North, 
 231, 232; plans to embarrass the 
 U. S., 233; hopes to convert Eng 
 land to slavery views, 244; and the 
 mission of Kenner, 265; gives im 
 pressions that U. S. has aggres 
 sive designs, 266. 
 
300 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Mason and Slidell; mission of, 130-144; 
 departure from Charleston, 135; at 
 Havana, 136; capture of, by Wilkes, 
 136; reception by Europe, 141. 
 
 Mason, Miss Virginia, 22. 
 
 McHenry, George; views on the cotton 
 question, 103, 106, 242. 
 
 McRae, C. J., 63, 64, 105. 
 
 Martial law, 39. 
 
 Matamoras trade, 165, 171, 174; not a 
 violation of the blockade, 175. 
 
 Maximilian, 201, 213, 273. 
 
 McClure, Dr., 53. 
 
 Mediation; proposed by Lindsay, 152, 
 231. [See " Intervention."] 
 
 Memminger; Secretary of Treasury, 30, 
 61, 103; views of on foreign pol 
 icy, 88, 90, 103. 
 
 Mercier; views, 113, 117; mysterious 
 errand to Richmond, 146, 149; and 
 Napoleon s proposition, 189; visit 
 to Paris, 214. 
 
 Mexico; proposed alliance with, 71; 
 friendliness toward U. S., 72; sus 
 picious of Confederate policy, 72; 
 Pickett s policy towards, 73, 74; 
 Spanish invasion of, 75; northern 
 provinces of, 76; and Texas (bor 
 der raids), 76; suggested union 
 with, 76; European intervention 
 in, 203; and the U. S., 204; Na 
 poleon s expedition to, 205; and 
 Blair s proposal, 253, 256, 266; in 
 vasion of favored by Stephens, 257 
 [see " Alliance "]; policy of South 
 towards before secession, 278. 
 
 Michigan, The; plan to capture, 234. 
 
 Miles, of S. C., 39. 
 
 Military defeats and reverses of tire 
 Confederacy, 146, 149, 168, 182, 
 194, 195, 208, 252. 
 
 Mississippi, navigation of the, 66, 220, 
 289. 
 
 Mocquard, M., 185, 194. 
 
 Monroe doctrine; Confederate attitude 
 toward, 75, 79, 83, 98, 84, 196, 204, 
 217, 254, 257, 266; Napoleon s plan 
 to attack the, 161, 268, 275; 
 " coiled up " in Lincoln s mes 
 sage, 241. 
 
 Morgan, Col. James Morris, 275. 
 
 Morny, Due de, 204. 
 
 Napoleon, Louis; attitude of, 99, 101, 
 123, 142, 151, 161, 213; dreams of 
 empire, 142,_202, ,205; rcceptioi to 
 Slidell, 142"; ready" to act v ith 
 England to break the block; de, 
 147, 151; suggests plan of inter 
 vention, 148; and proposals to 
 build a Confederate navy in 
 French ports, 159, 209; " in di )lo- 
 macy nothing exists unless it is 
 written," 160; avers sympathy 
 with Confederacy, 161, 183; con 
 templated mediation through Mer 
 cier, 161; plan to attack the i on- 
 roe doctrine in Mexico, 161, :!03; 
 charged with designs on Mexico, 
 Texas, etc., 164, 203, 205-206; em 
 barrassed by Mexican expedition 
 and outbreak in Poland, 66; 
 complains of unfair treatment by 
 Russell, 183 (leakage of overtures) , 
 187; unwilling to take initiative in 
 further proposals, 183, 194, ::08; 
 action of dependent on Bri ish 
 policy, 184; supposed proposal.- of 
 (for recognition), 185; denials as 
 to overtures of, 189; proposes joint 
 recognition, 185, 194; willing to 
 grant recognition, in cooperation 
 with Great Britain, 186, 207, "265; 
 distrusted by Seward, 193; Confed 
 eracy encouraged by, 204, 210; de 
 signs in Louisiana, 268 (Seward s 
 views of, 206); willing to cooper 
 ate with Spain in granting recog 
 nition, 208; promise of as to Con 
 federate navy, 211, 212; and the 
 Bappahannock, 213; policy of, 
 changed by international and po 
 litical events, 213, 214, 217; the 
 Confederacy " duped " by, 217, 
 240; " duplicity " of, 219; and 
 Sonora (and the Confederate 
 emancipation policy), 258. [See 
 " France."] 
 
 Nassau trade, 171. 
 
 Navy, Confederate attempts to obtain; 
 and the cotton policy, 89, 90; in 
 England, 105, 214, 215; from 
 France in exchange for cotton, 146 
 
INDEX 
 
 301 
 
 (subsidy), 147; the Alabama, 156; 
 the Florida 156; G. N. Sanders 
 sent to England, 159; plans to 
 build in French ports (101), 159, 
 202 et seq., 209; the Alexandra 
 170; plans interrupted by Forbes 
 and Aspinwall, 173; plans frus 
 trated by U. S., 211, 216; the 
 Bappahannock, 213 ; disappoint 
 ment in, 216; the Stonewall, 218; 
 bold seizure of the Chesapeake, 223: 
 capture of the Philo Parsons, 234 ; 
 proposed seizure of cotton to pur 
 chase a navy, 246; the Shenandoah, 
 272. 
 
 Neutrality; of Mexico, 72; of Great 
 Britain, 94, 100, 112, 113, 117, 124, 
 125, 170, 188, 205, 215 [see " Brit 
 ish Government" and "Russell"]; 
 of France, 100. [See " France " 
 and " Napoleon."] 
 
 New Leon (and the northern provinces 
 of Mexico) ; relations with the Con 
 federacy, 76. 
 
 Niagara Falls, peace comedy at, 228. 
 
 Northrop, Dr., 41, 43, 48, 54. 
 
 Northwest, the; Confederate expecta 
 tions as to, 67, 221; Confederate 
 plans for encouraging insurrection 
 and defection in, 225, 230, 237. 
 
 Opposition party in the South, 32, 47. 
 [See " Secession from Secessia."] 
 
 Orr, Senator, 44, 66. 
 
 Owl, The, 264. 
 
 Pacific, the; and Confederate policy, 
 75, 145, 272. 
 
 Palmerston, Lord, 125, 153, 169, 170; 
 opposed to double diplomacy, 182, 
 191, 192; popularity of, 199; 
 sounded by Lindsay, 231-232; in 
 formal interview with Mason, 232, 
 2C6; refusal to favor joint media 
 tion, 233; seeks to avoid angry 
 debate against the U. S., 237. 
 
 Parliament, the British; Confederate 
 friends in, 144, 152, 169, 174, 182, 
 190; policy of intervention dis 
 cussed in, 152; American seizure 
 of the Peterhoof discussed in, 173; 
 policy cf recognition discussed in, 
 
 187-188; U. S. friends in, 189, 191; 
 alarmed at proceedings in the 
 American Congress, 237. [See 
 " Great Britain."] 
 
 Peace; Confederate expectation of, 66, 
 265; favored by a party at North, 
 71, 227, 230; proposals as to, 221, 
 228, 229; missions, 227, 228, 253, 
 255, 257; resolutions, 255, 256; and 
 reunion sentiment in the South, 
 270. 
 
 Peace conference at Washington (1861), 
 286. 
 
 Pearson, Judge, of N. C., 44. 
 
 Personal liberty laws, 279, 283, 284 
 (the real cause of Southern com 
 plaint, 282). 
 
 Peterhoof. The; capture of, 171; case 
 before prize court, 171; case dis 
 cussed in Parliament, 173. 
 
 Peterman; Confederate-French secrets 
 divulged by, 211. 
 
 Pettus, Gov., 102. 
 
 Philo Parsons, The; capture of, 234. 
 
 Pickett, J. T.; preserver of Confed 
 erate papers, 14; blamed for sell 
 ing diplomatic correspondence, 16; 
 secretary of a commission to Wash 
 ington, 68; mission to Mexico, 71- 
 76; policy toward Mexico, 73, 74. 
 
 "Pickett Papers"; character of, 16, 
 19; historical value of, 17, 18, 20; 
 indexes to, 19; scope of, 21. 
 
 Policy, defensive, 34. [Also, see 
 " Foreign policy."] 
 
 Polignac, Prince, 275. 
 
 Politicians, Roebuck on, 184. 
 
 Pope, missions to the, 99. 
 
 Press agents, 92. 
 
 Prices, 55. 
 
 Privateering, 110, 118, 119, 121. 
 
 Prophecies, unfulfilled, 264. 
 
 Quintero, J. A., 76. 
 
 Rappahannock, The, 213. 
 
 Reagan, J. H., 23, 30, 275. 
 
 Recognition; sought in Mexico, 72; 
 sought in England, 111, 121, 153; 
 various plans to secure, 83; offer 
 of emancipation for, 107; proposed 
 in the British Parliament, 109, 
 
302 
 
 INDEX 
 
 187; contemplated by Napoleon, 
 etc., 112; British objections to, 
 125, 264, 267; urged by Yancey 
 (after Trent affair), 126; urged as 
 in accord with previous British 
 policy, 134; possibility of, seen by 
 Adams, 159; dependent on Con 
 federate victories, 182, 190, 194, 
 204, 208, 213, 216, 232; conflicting 
 reports as to Napoleon s proposi 
 tion regarding, 186, 193, 194; a 
 delusion, 196, 264; mentioned as 
 the only means of ending the war, 
 233; rumors of (and emancipation), 
 263, 264; refusal by Great Britain 
 on grounds of general policy, 264, 
 267; emancipation offered for (too 
 late), 267. 
 
 Revolution, threatened within the 
 Confederacy, 39, 47. 
 
 Rhett, R. B., 28, 280; foreign policy 
 of, 84, 87; on causes of secession, 
 278. 
 
 Richmond; removal of the Confederate 
 Government to, 32; Mercier s mys 
 terious errand to, 146; indignation 
 meeting at, 258; removal of ar 
 chives from, 273. [See " Confed 
 erate Government " and " Con 
 gress."] 
 
 Roebuck; on politicians, 184; opposes 
 reconstruction of U. S., 187. 
 
 Roman, A. B., of Louisiana, 27, 67. 
 
 Rost, P. A.; sent to Europe, 85; at 
 Paris, 111, 112, 127; sent to Spain, 
 128; advocates alliance with the 
 North, 128 
 
 Russell, Lord John; Confederate com 
 plaints against, 96, 100; error in 
 the case of the Alabama, 100;. 
 fairness of, 100, 149, 154, 155, 156, 
 166, 174, 175; attempts to embar 
 rass, 100; neutral policy of, 112, 
 117, 124, 125; refuses to hold offi 
 cial communication with Confed 
 erate commissioners, 127; refuses 
 to respond to Confederate protests 
 against the "paper blockade," 142, 
 149, 195; receives Mason unoffici 
 ally, 144; personal sympathies 
 
 of against the Confederacy, 114; 
 and Napoleon s proposals, 147; re 
 fuses to resort to " double diplo 
 macy " of Lindsay, 148; a secret 
 understanding suspected between 
 Seward and, 147, 148; reply of to 
 Mason s request for recognition of 
 the Confederacy, 154; berated by 
 Benjamin, 155, 164; favored n m- 
 trality, 166; diplomacy of, ridi 
 culed by a London paper, 1 )8; 
 firmly declines to recognize he 
 Confederacy, 198; warns Davis fiat 
 Confederate neutrality must be re 
 spected, 215, 271; Benjamin dii lo- 
 matically refuses to receive n >te 
 of (warning), 273. [See " British 
 Government."] 
 
 Russell, W. H., 110, 113, 115. 
 
 Russia, friendship of for U. S., 95, 161. 
 
 Salaries, 42. 
 
 Sanders, Geo. N., 97; proposal to go to 
 Washington on a peace mission, 22 ). 
 
 Search, right of, 174. 
 
 Secession, 26, 280, 282; opposition to in 
 South, 26, 40, 43, 45, 68, 120, 1-35, 
 270, 281, 291; haste in, opposed 
 by Stephens, 26, 281; from " Se- 
 cessia," contemplated, 39, 43, 45, 
 239, 270; of Virginia, 70; influ 
 enced by expectation of foreign 
 aid, 79, 289; cause of, 82, S3, 333 
 (as stated to Europe), 143, l.">2, 
 277-91, (as given in " farewell " 
 speeches in U. S. congress, 288); 
 attitude of England and France to, 
 112, 143 [see " France " and 
 "Great Britain"]; pronounced 
 successful by Roebuck, 187; natu 
 ral obstacles to the success > f, 
 195, 274; declared to be a result of 
 British policy, 237; resulted in 
 emancipation, 274; compromise 
 plans proposed (in 1860-61) to pre 
 vent, 283-284; and coercion, 2^7, 
 289, 291; due to " anticipated ag 
 gression " of North, 289, 290, 2<>l; 
 election of Lincoln a pretext for, 
 289; from desire to perpetuate 
 slavery, 289; economic causes "f, 
 290. 
 
INDEX 
 
 303 
 
 Secret service, 92, 93. 
 
 Seddon, Secretary, 57. 
 
 Seward, W. H. ; and Fort Sumter, 68; 
 firmness and vigilance of, 99, 114, 
 115, 116, 117, 272; arguments of 
 against secessionists, 116; -warning 
 of, against recognition of the 
 South, 116; asks removal of Con 
 sul Bunch, 119; views on the Trent 
 affair, 140; and Russell, 147-148; 
 views on belligerency, 214; control 
 of the British Government by, 
 272; protest of against British pol 
 icy, 222; England playing " second 
 fiddle " to, 272; compromise plan 
 of to prevent secession, 284. [See 
 " United States."] 
 
 Shenandoah, The, 272. 
 
 Sinclair, Commander, 94. 
 
 Slavery; and Mexico, 71; and Europe, 
 79; and Lincoln s policy, 82, 111; 
 the real cause of the war, 83, 278; 
 European opposition to, 84, 86, 
 122, 128 [see "Great Britain"]; 
 Yancey, Rost and Mann, on, 122; 
 " necessary evil " or " necessary 
 good," 279; justification of, 279, 
 282; an anachronism, 283; Lin 
 coln s opposition to extension of, 
 285. 
 
 Slaves; impressment of, 34 (advocated), 
 245; enlistment of, recommended, 
 49, 245, 253, 259; bill for emanci 
 pation and arming, 268; com 
 plaint that Northern States refused 
 to recognize slaves as property in 
 the territories, 283, 288; fugitive 
 (laws as to), 284, 288. 
 
 Slave trade, 29, 32, 81, 109, 110, 224; 
 and treaties, 87, 109; British oppo 
 sition to, 159; opposition to re 
 strictions on, 279. 
 
 Slidell, John; private correspondence 
 of, destroyed, 22; salary as com 
 missioner to Europe, 92; complaint 
 against De Leon, 97; sent to 
 Europe, 125, 130; sketch, 131; in 
 sists on insufficiency of the " Stone 
 Fleet," 142; offers Napoleon a 
 cotton subsidy to break blockade, 
 
 151; views on duplicity of Eng 
 lish statesmen, 160; appointed 
 special commissioner to Spain, 168, 
 207; confidence of in Napoleon, 
 190, 212, 213; encouraged by Na 
 poleon to build a navy in French 
 ports, 209; views as to corvettes 
 building in France, 213; disap 
 pointment of, 216-217; on causes 
 of secession, 288. [See " France " 
 and " Napoleon."] 
 
 Sonora; French plans to colonize, 217, 
 259; contemplated Confederate 
 emigration to, 259. 
 
 South, cause of secession of, 277-291. 
 
 Spain; and Mexico, 75, 204; suggested 
 alliance with, 75, 78, 98, 124, 207; 
 missions to, 124, 125, 168; attitude 
 toward the Confederacy, 129, 168, 
 208; proposed guaranty of Cuba 
 for recognition by, 184, 207; 
 sounded on recognition, 190. 
 
 Sparrows, Senator, of La., 57. 
 
 Speculators, 45, 56, 57, 102, 106, 239. 
 
 Spence, of Liverpool, 51, 60, 61, 63, 
 143, S44. 
 
 States, collision of with the Confed 
 erate Government, 43, 45, 47. [See 
 " embarrassments and difficulties " 
 under "Confederate Government."] 
 
 Stephens, Alexander H. ; opposed to 
 hasty secession, 26, 277, 281; his 
 opinion of the congress, 35; dis 
 satisfied with administration pol 
 icy, 40, 44, 48; favors recall of all 
 European commissioners, 95; desire 
 of for peace, 227; favors invasion 
 of Mexico, 257; on cause of South 
 ern discontent, 277, 278. 
 
 Stonewall, The, 218. 
 
 St. Paul, Henry, pamphlet of on " Our 
 Home and Foreign Policy," 202. 
 
 Subsidies, requested for steamer lines, 
 98. 
 
 Sumptuary laws, 34, 44, 56, 89, 90. 
 
 Sumter, Fort, 69. 
 
 Swan, of Tenn., 96. 
 
 Supreme court, proposed, 30, 34. 38. 
 
 Tariff, 32, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 109, 111. 
 116, 128, 164 (at Confederat- 
 
34 
 
 INDEX 
 
 ports), 277 et seq. ; not a cause of 
 secession, 277, 278. 
 
 Taxes, 29, 54; on cotton production, 
 89; difficulty of collecting, 58. 
 
 Texas; and Mexico, 76; French designs 
 as to, 98, 164, 203, 205-206. 
 
 Thompson, Jacob; agent to Canada, 
 14, 17, 18, 225; and proposition to 
 burn Northern cities, 226; confer 
 ences with the peace Democrats 
 of the North, 230. 
 
 Thouvenei, 149, 151, 160. 
 
 Toombs, Robert, 26, 31, 71, 77, 84, 89, 
 109, 277, 280, 288. 
 
 Transportation, insufficient 56, 57, 102. 
 [Also, see " Communication."] 
 
 Treasury notes, 55. 
 
 Trenholm, Secretary, 57, 58, 104. 
 
 Trent affair, 126 r 136; rise of Confed 
 erate expectations after, 127, 137, 
 138; effect of news of in England, 
 138; friendly adjustment of, 139; 
 and international law, 140. 
 
 Trescot, W. H., 118, 130. 
 
 Tucker, Beverly, 103. 
 
 United States, The; " anticipated ag 
 gressions " of, 26, 282, 287, 288, 
 289, 290, 291; and Mexico, 71, 204, 
 256; Confederacy willing to ac 
 cept most existing treaties be 
 tween foreign powers and, 87, 
 109, 289; friendship of Russia for, 
 95,161; British sympathy for, 108; 
 and the Declaration of Paris, 119; 
 alliance with advocated, 128, 257; 
 and the Trent affair, 139; emigra 
 tion to, from Ireland, 169, 176; 
 capture of British vessels by, 171; 
 British fear of war with, 188; 
 Bright s opposition to disunion in, 
 189; friends of in British parlia 
 ment, 189, 191; Confederate en 
 
 couragement of defection End 
 anarchy in, 220 et seq., 225, 256; 
 Confederate expectation of re so 
 lution in, 221; plans to burn 
 cities in, 226; Confederacy j nd 
 peace Democrats of, 230; opposi 
 tion of to intervention, 232; men 
 tioned as dictating British policy, 
 233; Palmerston and, 237; accused 
 of having aggressive designs, 241, 
 250, 266. [See " Seward."] 
 
 Vallandigham, C. L., 221, 230. 
 
 Vance, Gov., 45, 227; urges peace, 
 240, 253. 
 
 Vessels, Confederate; the Blanche, 78; 
 the Alabama, 156; the Alexandra, 
 170; the JRappahannock, 213; he 
 Stonewall, 218; the Shenandoift, 
 272. [See " Navy ".] 
 
 Victoria, Queen, 1C8, 127, 138. 
 
 Vidaurri, Gen., 77. 
 
 Walker, N. S., 79. 
 
 Walker, R. J., 173. 
 
 Washington, L. Q. C., 23. 
 
 West Indies, Confederate agents in, 
 77, 79. 
 
 Wetler, Mr., 52. 
 
 Wigfall, of Texas, 35, 39. 
 
 Wilkes, Captain, 136, 137, 140. 
 
 Williams, John, 214. 
 
 Winder, Gen., of Baltimore, 39. 
 
 Wright, Gen. Marcus J., 19. 
 
 Writ of habeas corpus; suspended, 39 
 (opposition of Stephens to suspen 
 sion, 44, 48). 
 
 Yancey, B. C., 86. 
 
 Yancey, W. L., 31, 36, 54, 85; mission 
 of to Europe, 87, 108 (arguments, 
 111), complaints, 120; resignation, 
 124; views on the blockade, 126; 
 return of to the South, 127. 
 
 Young, Lieut. Bennett H., 235. 
 
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 FEB 15 1963 
 
 ^g 29-65-8 
 
 ") rr 
 
 5 19743 
 
 DEPT, 
 
 LD 21A-50m-ll, 62 
 (D3279slO)476B 
 
 General Library 
 
 University of California 
 
 Berkeley 
 
I 
 
 202 J3 
 
 r