**r ,- 
 
 REVIEW 
 
 OF 
 
 T. L. M C KENNEY S NARRATIVE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 CAUSES WHICH, IN 1814, LED TO 
 
 GENERAL ARMSTRONG S 
 
 RESIGNATION OF THE WAR OFFICE. 
 
 BY 
 
 KOSCIUSZKO ARMSTRONG. 
 \\ 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 
 R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 112 FULTON STREET 
 
 1846. 
 
W3/I7 
 

 REVIEW OF T. L. M C KENNEY S NARRATIVE, &c. 
 
 MY attention has lately been called to a work published by 
 Thomas L. McKenney, which, though chiefly devoted to a de 
 fence of his official conduct as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 
 contains, dove-tailed among its chapters, one of political remi 
 niscence, evidently intended as an attack on the late General Arm 
 strong. 
 
 Having been for some time engaged in arranging the General s 
 correspondence, and preparing a sketch of his life, with a view to 
 publication, my first determination was, to leave Mr. McKenney s 
 misrepresentations uncorrected, until such time as my work 
 should be ready for the press. Circumstances, however, beyond 
 my control will, probably, delay its appearance for some months ; 
 and I have thought it well in the meanwhile, to give to the offensive 
 chapter, the notice it deserves. The following extract from Mr. 
 McKenney s book will place the subject at once before the reader. 
 
 "During- the late war with Great Britain, or the greater part of it, as is 
 known to everybody, Mr. Monroe was Secretary of State, and General Arm 
 strong 1 , Secretary of War; it is known also that soon after the capture of 
 Washington and the conflagration of its Capitol, General Armstrong was su 
 perseded in the office of Secretary of War by Mr. Monroe. It was soon 
 whispered that this change had been produced by the undermining agency of 
 Mr. Monroe. Whence the rumor came, or by whom it was originated, no one 
 knew, but it remained a source of deep disquiet to harass Mr. Monroe to the 
 hour of his death." 
 
 How far the Secretary of State was implicated in the intrigue 
 so successfully employed to produce his colleague s resignation 
 of the War office, cannot now be ascertained. He was sus 
 pected of being " art and part " in this dirty business, on the well 
 established principle, that he who profits by the crime is most 
 likely to be the criminal ; and the death bed scene so graphically 
 sketched by his friend and follower, shows, that Mr. Monroe 
 knew that he labored under such suspicion, and felt disquieted by 
 it to his last hour. Is it not extraordinary, that a mere "rumor," 
 as McKenney characterizes the charge, should have so impressed 
 the mind of the Ex-President, that fifteen years after the event 
 that gave it birth, it continued to be a source of secret, corroding 
 thought ? One more disposed than I am to form uncharitable 
 conclusions, might see in this continued apprehension, strong evi 
 dence of the working of a conscience ill at ease. 
 
4 
 
 My business, however, is not with the dead Monroe, but the 
 living McKcnncy, who, under pretence of salving over the 
 reputation of his maker and master, has thought proper to lend 
 the weight of his evidence (such as it is) to the old calumny, that 
 General Armstrong s neglect of duty led to the capture of Wash 
 ington. Before I proceed to comment on the testimony, it may 
 not be amiss to say a few words of the witness. He was the 
 leading member of the famous, or infamous Georgetown-mob 
 Committee, who waited on the President in 1814 to demand 
 General Armstrong s removal from office. He stands therefore 
 before the public in a doubtful position, denying the existence 
 of a plot of which he was himself one of the most active and 
 unscrupulous agents, and offering his own naked assertion as 
 proof of his innocence, and of that of him who was suspected, 
 (perhaps erroneously) of being his employer. Mr. McKenney 
 seems not yet to understand, that the man who thus comes for 
 ward as a witness in his own cause, should either possess a charac 
 ter for truth, placing him above the suspicion of corrupt motives, 
 or else, is bound to furnish such additional evidence derived from 
 other sources, as may make his story credible. Not even this 
 gentleman s vanity can lead him to believe that he stands in the 
 first named category, and it shall be my business to show, how 
 impossible it is for him to fulfil the conditions, required by the 
 last. 
 
 Knowing the value of scenic effect, Mr. McKenney enters on 
 his subject with dramatic skill. The reader is brought to the 
 bedside of the age-worn Ex-President, whose thin features, 
 emaciated form and church-yard cough sufficiently indicate, that 
 he is about passing from time to eternity. With a voice weak 
 ened by emotion or disease, he alludes to the existing suspicion, 
 that he had been instrumental in producing " General Arm 
 strong s separation from the War Department" solemnly pro 
 tests his innocence, and beseeches his friend and follower to nar 
 rate the circumstances of the case. Thus abjured, the pious 
 Thomas begins : 
 
 " My intercourse was frequent with General Armstrong, beginning with the 
 arrival of the British forces in the Chesapeake. It was made my duty to re 
 port to him the arrival of troops, and their wants in equipments, &c. He ap 
 peared to me to doubt the intentions of the enemy to invade the Capitol ; and 
 under the influence of this belief, in which I have no doubt he was sincere, I 
 found some difficulty in procuring the necessary arms, &c., for troops as they 
 came in." 
 
 The narrator shared, I believe, in the danger and glory of this 
 brilliant campaign, as volunteer aid of General Smith, of the 
 Georgetown militia. He does not tell us how it became his 
 peculiar duty to report the arrival of troops, or to procure arms 
 
for men not belonging to the brigade to which he was attached. 
 I arn therefore at liberty to suppose, that as officers of the regular 
 army were on the spot whose business it really was to attend to 
 the wants of the soldiery, Mr. McKermey s applications, if he 
 made any, were regarded at the War office as the impudent in 
 terference of a meddler who trespassed beyond the line of his 
 duty. Taking this view of the subject, it is not surprising, that 
 he found some difficulty in procuring arms, &c. But how was 
 it, that when the Committee of Investigation were in session, not 
 a syllable was heard from him of these difficulties ? How hap 
 pened it that a fact bearing materially on the subject of inquiry, 
 should have been carefully concealed when its revelation was so 
 important ? How came it, that at a moment when the crimina 
 tion and condemnation of General Armstrong by a Committee of 
 Congress, were events which, if purchaseable, the Government 
 would have bought at almost any price, this willing witness, 
 should not have been forthcoming? These questions admit 
 but of two answers : either the alleged difficulties could not 
 justly be attributed to the Secretary of War, or were of a nature 
 so frivolous, as to take from them all importance. I proceed to 
 the next paragraph. 
 
 "After Commodore Barney had been forced to blow up his flotilla in the Pa>- 
 tuxent, and our troops being at the Battalion Old Fields, and I had come in as 
 a vidette, having rode along th? enemy s flanks for over a rnile, and picking up 
 on my return to camp two British deserters whom I brought in with me, I 
 found on horseback in our camp. President Madison, General Armstrong, and 
 two or three persons, to whom in presence of the commanding General, I 
 stated the position of the enemy and what appeared to be their numbers, and 
 gave it as my opinion that they would be at our encampment before daylight 
 next morning. To which General Armstrong replied. " They can have no 
 such intention. They are foraging, I suppose, and if an attack Is meditated by 
 them upon any place, it is Annapolis." 
 
 The reader will observe, that the above story has some of the 
 characteristics of truth ; it is told with minuteness, and with the 
 confidence of a narrator apparently having no cause to distrust 
 the accuracy of his recollection. The object is, doubtless, to 
 show that as late as the 23d of August, the day preceding the 
 battle of Bladensburg, General Armstrong had no faith in the 
 meditated attack on Washington, but believed, that Annapolis 
 was the object of the British invasion, if, indeed, that invasion had 
 any object at all* As no witness of this pretended conversa- 
 
 * I might point to the absurdity of this opinion, as in itself conclusive, that 
 neither General Armstrong nor any other man could have expressed it. 
 Mr. McKenney s zeal or malignity outran his discretion ; acting on the 
 parasitical principle that, " who peppers the highest is surest to please," 
 and discovering with the unerring instinct of toadyism, the hopes and wishes of 
 his sick patron, he made General Armstrong not only express an utter disbelief of 
 the enemy s intention of moving upon Washington, but a doubt whether the Bri 
 tish invasion had any object whatever. 
 
tion, other than the narrator is now in existence, Mr. McKenney 
 may have thought himself secure against the risk of detection : 
 it will be for me to show his mistake, and make the dead speak 
 to his shame and confusion. 
 
 I am willing to admit, that in the early stage of the campaign 
 when the British force was so placed as equally to menace three 
 points Baltimore, Annapolis, and Washington ; and when its 
 movements were not yet sufficiently decided to indicate a prefer 
 ence for one of the three, General Armstrong was of opinion, 
 that the most important and most vulnerable of these would pro 
 bably be selected by the enemy. But. even as early as the 19th 
 of August, the Secretary of War s belief appears to have been 
 modified, since in a letter of that date he advises the Com 
 mander-in-chief " if the enemy s movements indicate an at 
 tack on Washington, to push forward his cavalry without delay, 
 remove cattle, horses," &c. Again : on the 22d of August, he 
 counselled him verbally and by letter, " to throw a corps on the 
 enemy s flank, and by such demonstration, prevent his advance 
 towards Washington."* On the night of this day he reached the 
 camp at Battalion Old Fields in company with the President, and 
 now it is that I will produce the evidence which I intend to op 
 pose to that of Mr. McKenney ; the reader will easily deter 
 mine which is most worthy of credit. I must premise that, 
 since the parties to this pretended conversation are all dead, 
 but one, it is not possible for me to find any testimony 
 directly contradicting that which he offers. The most which 
 can be done or required, is to furnish a chain of evidence suffi 
 ciently strong to support the inference, that the witness has mis 
 represented what passed, and that the opinions which he as 
 sumes to have heard, are such as could not have been expressed. 
 
 It has been seen, that on the 22d of August, General Armstrong 
 believed in the possibility of an attack on Washington, since the 
 written advice which he then offered to Winder was calculated 
 to meet such an emergency. That early on the morning of the 
 23d his opinion was unchanged, is shown by Colonel Allan 
 McClane, who states in his account of the occurrences of the 
 campaign, that the Secretary of War, at the council held at the 
 
 * Report of Committee of Investigation, pp. 116, 126. Again, on the 19th of 
 August, General Armstrong thus gave his opinion in a note to the President on the 
 question whether the flotilla should be blown up without fighting:. " It may be asked, 
 what will be the effect of destroying the flotilla without a contest ? Will it not 
 invite to further aggression, Jl soldier s objects enlarge and multiply with his 
 good fortune. _ Under this view of the subject my opinion is, that unless Barnev s 
 position be decidedly indefensible, it ought to he held, and to Barney alone should 
 be left the question of its tenability." The reply was, that Barney had his orders, 
 and these orders of President Madison were for the immediate destruction of the 
 flotilla ! Had Barney been left to defend the position, as he wished to do and 
 could have done, who can believe that Ross would have ventured further ? 
 
President s quarters in camp, recommended to General Winder 
 the occupation of the Capitol, and adjacent buildings, as offering 
 the best means of defence for the city.* And lastly, that on the 
 afternoon of the same day the War-minister s opinion remained 
 what it had been in th? morning, is proved by the direct evi 
 dence of a witness now living, Mr. Jacob Barker, who, after 
 describing the disorder and confusion of Winder s army at Bat 
 talion Old Fields, speaks in the following words : " The Presi 
 dent and Secretary returned to Washington convinced, that if 
 the enemy marched on the city, they would have an easy con 
 quest. / was that evening present, and heard General Armstrong 
 make this statement to George W. Campbell, then Secretary of 
 the Treasury, and to William Jones, Secretary of the Navy. 
 These high functionaries replied to the Secretary " Why do 
 you not take command of the army yourself, and defend the 
 city ?" His answer was, " I have no right to do so my duties 
 are, by law, confined to my chamber."f I believe the foregoing 
 testimony is sufficiently full, on the subject of the opinions held by 
 General Armstrong, relative to the object of the British move 
 ment, to shut out, I will not say the probability only, but the 
 possibility of his having made the assertion ascribed to him by 
 Mr. McKenney : yet, this is not all. I am enabled to offer to the 
 reader the following strong presumptive proof of the falsity of 
 our authors statement, derived from a letter of the Secretary 
 of the Navy to Commodore Rodgers, and from General Winder s 
 narrative. 
 
 The letter, evidently written to give effect to a resolution 
 adopted in the Camp Council, is dated " Battalion Old Fields, 8 
 o clock, August 23d," and contains the following passage : " I 
 have now to direct, that with the utmost possible celerity, you 
 will move on with the seamen and marines under your command 
 to Bladensburg, and endeavor to have as early communication as 
 possible with General Winder." " The President and Heads of 
 Departments are now in this camp. The enemy were last night 
 at Upper Marl borough, from which it is probable they will ad 
 vance to-day towards Bladensburg." Now, is it at all credible, 
 that General Armstrong, having at 8 o clock in the morning, made 
 part of a Council who thought the enemy s movements so mena- 
 
 * Notices of the War, Appendix, p. 235. 
 
 t Letter to the editor of Commercial Advertiser, May, 1843. For a confirma 
 tion of the material facts in Mr. Barker s statement, see G. W. Campbell s letter 
 to the Committee of Investigation, p. 7. If the Secretary had felt any disposition 
 to transcend his authority, and give orders instead of advice, he would have been 
 effectually precluded from doing so, by the operation of a rule, served on him by 
 the President on the 13th of August, expressly forbidding him from " issuing any 
 military order, having for its object the movement of troops, without Mr. Madi~ 
 son s sanction." 
 
cing to Washington, as to require the hurried march ofRodgers s 
 seamen, should, at 10 o clock (the hour of the review of troops), 
 have ventured the positive assertion in the presence of the Presi 
 dent, Commanding General and Naval Secretary, that " if the 
 enemy had any object of attack, it was Annapolis?" Thus con 
 demning, as worse than useless, the measures he had concurred 
 in but two hours before ! 
 
 Again : If McKenney s story be true, how shall we account 
 for the fact, that General Winder, in his minute narrative of the 
 events preceding the affair of Bladensburg, should say nothing 
 of the consultation held in the saddle, to which the President and 
 Secretary of War are alleged to have been parties ? He con 
 firms McClane s statement as far as relates to the early visit 
 which he paid to Mr. Madison and the War-Minister for the pur 
 poses of report and counsel ; he speaks of two prisoners " taken 
 in a dexterous way by Captain Herbert," the result of whose ex 
 amination led him to believe, that the British army would make 
 no movement that day from Marlborough ; he mentions a variety 
 of conflicting reports by men who saw or pretended to have seen 
 the enemy, but not a word of McKenney s reconnoitring ex 
 ploits, or of the deserters he brought in. It is a fact, too, abun 
 dantly shown by the same official narrative, that General Winder, 
 at this time, leant to the opinion that Annapolis might be the 
 enemy s object ;* yet, though sufficiently diffuse in stating the 
 reasons of this creed, he makes no allusion to the similar belief, 
 asserted to have been avowed in his presence, by the Secretary 
 of War, an omission the more extraordinary, as this belief, had 
 it found utterance, would have been, in some measure, a justifi 
 cation of Winder s. The conclusion is obvious, the Commanding 
 General makes no mention of the Secretary s opinion, respecting 
 the danger of an attack on Annapolis, because that opinion was 
 never given. 
 
 " While engaged in the duty of throwing up batteries on the shore of the 
 Potomac, at the foot of Wind Mill Hill, General Armstrong, of whom we had 
 heard nothing after the evening of the interview at the Old Fields, rode on the 
 ground. The impression had become universal that, as Secretary of War, he 
 had neglected to prepare the necessary defences ; and that owing to this 
 neglect the capital had been desecrated, and the glory of our arms tarnished. 
 
 * See Report of the Committee of Investigation, p. 156, Winder s Narrative. The 
 General thought that Annapolis might be chosen as an object of attack because it 
 presented to the enemy a fine port, comfortable quarters, stores and store-houses, 
 and might with little difficulty be made almost impregnable to a land attack. These 
 were good substantial reasons at one period of the campaign, but when the enemy 
 had passed Marlborough, there was no longer much cause to believe, that he 
 would strike at Annapolis. 
 
9 
 
 Indeed, many went further, openly and loudly. Charles Carrol, of Bellevue, 
 the moment General Armstrong rode upon the ground, met him and denounced 
 him openly and vehemently, as the cause of all the disasters that had befallen 
 the city, when, with one impulse, the officers said to General Smith There, 
 sir, are our swords; we will not employ them if General Armstrong is to 
 command us, in his capacity of Secretary of War; but we will obey the orders 
 of any other member of the Cabinet. At the same moment the men at the 
 batteries threw down their spades, avowing a like resolve. 
 
 "General Smith called me to him, saying, * You see the state of things; I 
 have just ordered Major Williams to report it to the President, that under the 
 orders of any other member of the Cabinet, what can be done will be done. 
 We rode off in haste, and overtook President Madison, Richard Rush (I be 
 lieve), and a third person on F street, in Washington, on horseback the 
 Government having been again organized at Washington. The message de 
 livered to President Madison was in accordance with the above to the letter, 
 the last sentence But under any other member of the Cabinet, the most cheer 
 ful duty will be rendered. The answer by the President was, Say to General 
 Smith, the contingency (namely that of any future orders being given by Gene 
 ral Armstrong) shall not happen.. " 
 
 Imagination and memory are so blended in our author, that it 
 is impossible to say where the operations of the one cease, or of 
 the other begin. It is not easy, at this late date, to ascertain 
 whether or no General Armstrong ever was at Wind Mill Hill, as 
 Mr. McKenney asserts ; but, in default of positive testimony, 
 there is enough of moral evidence to show, that the tale of Car 
 rol s open denunciation is a miserable fiction. In no contempo 
 rary record, and I have searched many, have I found any allusion 
 to this event. Now, let the reader for a moment look back to the 
 circumstances of the times, to the violence of the press, and the 
 rancor of party spirit, and ask himself how it could happen, that 
 General Armstrong s personal and political enemies, so nume 
 rous and active, should not have found a subject of loud exultation 
 in this story of Carrol s unrebuked insolence? Wilkinson, too, 
 who will certainly not be suspected of a disposition to favor the 
 War-minister, or hide any circumstance tending to his discredit, 
 was then living at Washington, in habits of close intimacy with 
 Carrol the frequent companion of his board and bottle ; yet, his 
 Memoirs (otherwise so calumnious) are silent on this head, and 
 indeed, so far from attributing to General Armstrong any dispo 
 sition to submit patiently to affronts, he represents, him with equal 
 injustice, as the terror of Metropolitan politicians.* But before I 
 offer any further commentary on Mr. McKenney s statement, it 
 is necessary to make known a few facts to the reader, by the light 
 of which he may more easily discover the hidden source of that 
 "impulse" which led the chivalry of Georgetown to cast away 
 their innocent swords, on Wind Mill Hill. 
 
 * " I am indeed shocked when I take a retrospect of the evidence of the terror 
 in which that minister kept more than one great man at Washington." Wilkin 
 son s Memoirs, vol.i., p. 762. 
 
 2 
 
10 
 
 After the defeat of the American army, the President designat 
 ed Fredericktown as the temporary seat of the Cabinet, and 
 thither the Secretaries of the Treasury and of War went, in full 
 faith, that Mr. Madison and their colleagues would follow. The 
 President, however, changed his mind and repaired, after Ross s 
 retreat, to Washington, where General Armstrong did not join 
 him until the 29th of August. The three days that elapsed pre 
 vious to his return, were employed by the Georgetown militia, (as 
 Mr. McKenney informs us), in marching and counter-marching on 
 the Baltimore road, and throwing up batteries, which appear to 
 have been erected on the wise and well approved principle of 
 " shutting the stable door after the horse had been stolen." But, 
 though these military mummeries furnished employment to the 
 mass, there were a select few who turned the three days of the 
 Secretary s absence, to a more personal account. A committee, 
 purporting to represent the citizens of the district, was chosen to 
 wait on the President, and demand General Armstrong s removal 
 from office. The select men were Messrs. Hanson, Bowie, and 
 McKenney ; the first a Federal editor, whom the spirit of party 
 rancor moved to this action, and the two last, warm, personal 
 friends of Mr. Monroe, whose motives may be as easily under 
 stood.* When their names were announced, the President de 
 clined communicating with more than one of these unwelcome 
 visitors, and designated Mr. McKenney as the least obnoxious of 
 the three. With him he was closeted for upwards of an hour, 
 and what passed between them is known only by report. That 
 at this time, more was required than the President would give is 
 certain ; and McKenney carried back to his coadjutors the news 
 only of a doubtful success. Even this step had been gained w r ith 
 so much of difficulty, that it was feared the President might, on 
 further reflection, return to a sense of what was due to himself 
 and his minister, particularly if that minister (whose arrival was 
 hourly expected) was allowed time for his defence. 
 
 The Committee thereupon determined to " strike whilst the iron 
 was red," and to assist the civil movement by the more dangerous 
 threat of military revolt. This, at once and clearly accounts for 
 the farce got up upon Wind Mill Hill. Mr. McKenney returned 
 to Washington, no longer the representative of peaceful, pudding- 
 headed burghers, but the emissary of that valorous corps whose 
 rapid movements had been so conspicuous on the field of Bladens- 
 burg, and a new cause of alarm was thus presented to the tremu 
 lous mind of the worthy Madison. 
 
 It was to be expected, that a temper never noted for its firm- 
 
 * This account is founded on information contained in the letters of a resident of 
 Washington, who had the means of reaching the truth, whatever care was em 
 ployed to hide it. It is, besides, in strict conformity with the public impressions 
 of that day. 
 
11 
 
 ness, should yield to this double pressure ; yet, it seems that the 
 Committee, fearful of losing all by asking too much, had now 
 limited their demands, and instructed their agent to require only 
 the curtailment of the Secretary s authority so far as the District 
 of Columbia was concerned. Mr. Madison eagerly availed him 
 self of this middle course; and, without adverting to the fact, 
 that if the charges brought against General Armstrong were 
 true, he deserved instant dismission, and if false, had as clearly 
 a right to a firm, unshaken support, he gave to Mr. McKenney, 
 the assurance required. 
 
 The reader can now easily understand, why our author in re 
 lating, for the benefit of his dying patron, and the guidance of 
 future historians, this tale of other times, should have carefully 
 omitted all allusion to the Georgetown Committee, to the secret 
 closet and more secret conversation, to the mental struggles of 
 the President, and the mischievous activity of General Arm 
 strong s enemies. These things, but too distinctly indicated, that 
 a plot existed ; and it became necessary to sink them out of sight, 
 and represent the whole business as springing out of a sudden fit 
 of patriotic indignation, caused by General Armstrong s appear 
 ance on Wind Mill Hill ! Who could, from McKenney s narra 
 tive, suppose, that he was in this matter anything more than the 
 innocent bearer of General Smith s message ? Who coulfj. dis 
 cover in his plausible story, the fact, that for three days he had 
 been laboriously engaged in defaming a man who was not pre 
 sent to defend himself? Yet, however cunningly the fable be 
 devised, one fact escapes him which may serve to guide us 
 to a right conclusion, with respect to the leading motive of all 
 this dirty villainy, it is, the message so pregnant with mean 
 ing, of which Mr. McKenney was the bearer : " Under any 
 other member of the Cabinet, a cheerful and ready obedience 
 will be rendered." What was this but an intimation to the Presi 
 dent, that Colonel Monroe was expected to succeed to the vacant 
 place ? For neither Campbell, nor Jones, nor Rush, could have 
 any pretensions to fill it. It was virtually telling Mr. Madison, 
 " It would not suit our purpose, were you to seek a successor to 
 General Armstrong out of your own Cabinet ; Mr. Monroe is 
 the man for whose interests we have labored." 
 
 Political intrigues are seldom to be proved by direct evidence ; 
 it is by combining circumstances, trifling when taken alone, but 
 quick with conviction when brought together, that weakness 
 becomes strength, and darkness light. It is sufficient to show 
 the existence of an end, means and agents. How was it in this 
 case ? A competitor for political power had appeared, whom it 
 was necessary to jostle out of Mr. Monroe s way : this was the 
 end. Calumnies, founded on the capture of Washington, and in 
 tended to deceive the people, whilst other influences were em 
 ployed to incite the President such were the means ; and as for 
 
]2 
 
 the agents, it is but necessary to read the names of Smith, Carrol, 
 Mason, Graham, Bowie and McKenney, to be fully convinced of 
 their ready subserviency to the interests of what was termed in 
 that day, the Virginia Dynasty. 
 
 " We learned, and I remember we confided in the source whence we derived 
 our information, that President Madison suggested to General Armstrong, in 
 view of the state of things as narrated, whether it might not be proper for him 
 to suspend his functions as War-minister over the District of Columbia, but to 
 exercise them elsewhere. To which the General was said to have answered, 
 he would be Secretary of War over the whole, or none. Mr. Madison re 
 ceiving this as an inadmissible alternative, told him so, when General Arm 
 strong ceased to be Secretary of War." 
 
 The above paragraph contains (with one exception) a suffi 
 ciently fair account of what passed between General Armstrong 
 and Mr. Madison. The source of McKenney s information, 
 (though he does not say it) was, the President Hmself, and I 
 acknowledge this the more readily, as it will justify me in offer 
 ing what may be new to the present generation of readers, the 
 Secretary s letter to the public on the subject of his resignation. 
 This simple, manly address for a time produced its intended 
 effect ;* neither the President, nor any of his friends, ventured to 
 controvert a single fact stated in it. But the calumnies it ex 
 pose^, continued to be spoken in whispers, and no effort was left 
 untried by official pimps and parasites, to turn the stream of pub 
 lic opinion into a channel unfavorable to the War-minister. The 
 contest between an individual and a government was too un 
 equal to be long maintained, particularly when that individual, not 
 being a party man, could not claim a party support ; yet, there 
 were a select few whose homage and respect followed General 
 Armstrong in retirement, and among them men whose names 
 rank highest in the military annals of America.] Those who 
 
 * Extract of a letter from Governor Desha, of Kentucky, to General Armstrong, 
 dated Washington, September 26th, 1814. " Clamor ran high against you here, 
 but from the effect produced by a letter you addressed to the editors of the Balti 
 more Patriot, together with the opinion of a number of members freely expressed 
 respecting your qualifications, conduct in office, &c., it has been mersurably 
 silenced. Indeed, I have heard members who have not been heretofore well dis 
 posed towards you, expres-s a wish that you were still at he hea i of the War De 
 partment. They speak freely of your capacity and conduct while in office. They 
 say thrt your energy was invaluable in a Cabinet wh ;re indecision and a disposi 
 tion for temporising have been the order of the day." 
 
 f The General was no collector of testimonials ; what he left among his papers 
 of this character, was given unsought, and perhaps, not estimated by him at its 
 proper value. I select a few of these favorable expressions of opinion merely to 
 show, that the assertion in the text is not made without good reason. 
 
 Extracts from letters of Major General Brown to his brother Major Brown 
 " Canandaijjua, March 28th, 1814. Armstrong is a great man, who with a single 
 eye to the public good has pursued the honor and interests of the army." The 
 same to the same "Fort Erie, September 13th, 1814. It is reported that Sec 
 retary Armstrong is removed; if this be so, it is a great misfortune. Rely upon 
 it, he is the only military man in the Cabinet." The same, to General Armstrong. 
 
13 
 
 were most capable of estimating the value of his services, were 
 best disposed to do him justice. With this brief preface, I pass 
 to the letter itself. 
 
 " It may be due to myself, and is certainly due to others, that 
 the reasons under which I retired from the direction of the Wai- 
 Department, at a juncture so critical as the present, should be 
 fully and promptly made known to the public. These reasons 
 will be found in the following brief exposition of facts. 
 
 On the evening of the 29th ultimo, the President called at my 
 lodgings and stated, that a case of much delicacy had occurred ; 
 that a high degree of excitement had been raised among the 
 militia of Georgetown and the city ; that he was himself an ob 
 ject of their suspicions and menaces ; that an officer of that corps 
 had given him notice, that they would no longer obey any order 
 coming through me as Secretary of War, and that in the 
 urgency of the case it might be proper, so far to yield to the im 
 pulse, as to permit some other person to exercise my functions in 
 relation to the defence of Washington. 
 
 " To this statement and proposition I answered substantially, 
 that I was aware of the excitement to which he alluded ; that I 
 knew its source, and had marked its progress ; that it was not a 
 moment to examine its more occult causes, objects, and agents ; 
 
 --" It is a source of great gratification for me to know that my conduct is by you 
 approved. Popular applause is very well it is not to be despised, nor too strongly 
 coveted, but the approbation of the select few, who have the means and the 
 ability to judge, has higher claims ; and I should be dead to all honorable feeling 
 did I not proudly estimate such praise as you can bestow. December 20th, 1814." 
 
 Col. Richard M. Johnson to General Armstrong. " January 19th, 1816, Wash 
 ington. I look back with interest to the time when you composed a part of the 
 Cabinet. I recollect with pleasure the decisive character of your measures from 
 which so much good resulted. It must at all times give consolation to reflect, that 
 we have done our duty in the mo-^t difficult and trying periods. For my part, I 
 have always regretted your separation from us, and the unfortunate occurrences 
 which produced it " 
 
 General Macomb in a letter of the 19th of January, 1826, forwarding certain 
 public documents, says : " It affords me great pleasure to have an opportunity of 
 addressing you, and of assuring you that my attachment to your person and esteem 
 for your character have not been diminished by the distance in space and time 
 which have separated us. I shall be ever ready to testify to the efficiency of your 
 administration in the War Department, as laying the foundation of many of the 
 most valuable attributes now possessed by the army. The present condition 
 of the army, which has been the result of labor and of time, is highly creditable 
 to those who have taken a part in rendering the establishment what it is, and a 
 review of the several administrations under whose guidance it has been trained, 
 would be an interesting and valuable exhibit to the nation at large. 
 
 " I have been led to these remarks by a chain of associations of thought referring 
 to our military connection, and the more I reflect on the part you took, the more I 
 feel inclined to assure you of the homage of my highest consideration and esteem." 
 
 To these names, I might add those of nearly all the distinguished men of the 
 army of 1812-13, and 14. And the reader will remark, that these flattering words 
 were not employed to propitiate the successful candidate for political power ; but 
 were voluntary expressions of regard for one who, in retirement, could no longer 
 confer, or withhold benefits. 
 
14 
 
 that it ostensibly rested on charges known to himself to be false ; 
 that it was not for me to determine how far the supposed urgency 
 of the case made it proper for him to yield to an impulse so vile 
 and profligate so injurious to truth and so destructive of order, 
 but that for myself there was no choice ; that I would never sur 
 render a part of my legitimate authority for the preservation of 
 the rest ; that I must exercise it wholly or not at all ; that I came 
 into office with objects exclusively public, but that to accommo 
 date myself or my conduct to the humors of a village mob, stimu 
 lated by faction and led by folly, was not the way to promote 
 these, and that, if his decision was taken in conformity to the 
 suggestions he had made, I entreated him to accept my resigna 
 tion. This he declined doing. It was an extent he was pleased 
 to say, to which he meant not to go ; that he knew the excitement 
 was limited as well with regard to time as to place ; that he was 
 now and had always been, fully sensible of the general zeal, dili 
 gence, and talent, which I had put into the discharge of my duty, 
 and that it would give him pleasure, were I to take time to con 
 sider, the proposition he had made. I renewed the assurance of 
 my great personal respect, and my readiness to conform to his 
 wishes on all proper occasions. I remarked, that whatever zeal, 
 talent and knowledge I possessed, had been employed freely but 
 firmly, and according to my best views of the public good," and 
 that as long as they were left to be so exerted, they were at the 
 service of my country but that the moment they were required 
 to bow to military usurpation, or political faction, there should be 
 an immediate end of their public exercise. We now parted, 
 with an understanding that 1 should leave Washington the fol 
 lowing morning.* 
 
 * That Mr. Madison looked forward to the time, when they should again form 
 part of the same administration, is shown, by the following extracts from two let 
 ters, written by General Parker, Chief Clerk of the War Department, the evidence 
 contained in which is confirmed by the subsequent testimony of Mr. Jacob Barker. 
 The first letter is dated, September 4th, 1814, three days afterGeneral Armstrong 
 had left Washington, and before the appearance of his address. It contained these 
 words: "The President has expressed himself highly favorable towards you. I 
 expect you back in October." The second bears date, " May 20th, 1833 Your 
 leaving Washington in August, 1814, and subsequent withdrawal from the War 
 Department, has, I believe, changed our whole history from that time. Your 
 movement has nowhere that I have seen been fully explained or accounted for. 
 You spoke to me the evening before you left only of making a visit to Baltimore,, 
 and the next day, Mr. Madison stated to me, that it had been deemed advisable to 
 allow your temporary absence, that we should go on with the War Department 
 as before, and that you would probably return before the meeting of Congress, and 
 resume your duties as Secretary of War." 
 
 From the above it is apparent, that the President had awakened to a sense of 
 the great weakness he had betrayed in listening to the suggestions of a miserable 
 faction, and would, had shame permitted it, have retraced his steps. At the time 
 of General Armstrong s interview with him, he was not aware of the fact that the 
 President had that very morning committed himself by a promise to the George 
 town Committee. This he learned in Baltimore, and immediately determined to 
 resign. Mr. Barker says : I joined him at Baltimore, and assured him from 
 
15 
 
 " It has been since stated to me as a fact (to which I give the 
 most reluctant credit) that, in the morning of the 29th, and be 
 fore my arrival in the city, a Committee of the inhabitants of 
 Georgetown, of whom Alexander C. Hanson, the reputed editor 
 of the Federal Republican, was one, had waited on the Presi 
 dent by deputation, and obtained from him a promise, that I 
 should no longer direct the military defences of the District. On 
 this fact, comments are unnecessary. 
 
 "I now proceed to exhibit, and to answer the charges raised 
 against me, and which form the ground-work of that excitement 
 to which the President thought it prudent to sacrifice his au 
 thority in declining to support mine. 
 
 " 1st. That I gave orders for the retreat of the army in the ac- 
 jon of the 24th instant, and under circumstances not making 
 -.etreat either necessary or proper, 
 
 " This charge has not for its support the shadow of truth, and I 
 appeal to the President himself, whether I did not, by his request, 
 take a position which rendered it impossible for me to have given 
 such order. From this position, I pointed out to him the disorder 
 tnd retreat of the first line, soon after the action began.* 
 
 " 2d. That in despite of the remonstrances of General Winder, 
 Tdid, by the interposition of my authority, prevent him from de 
 fending the Capitol. 
 
 " This charge contains in it a total perversion of the truth. 
 vVhen the head of the retiring column reached the Capitol it was 
 naked for a moment. General Winder took this occasion to 
 state to Colonel Monroe and myself, that he was not in a condi 
 tion to maintain another combat, and that his force was broken 
 down by fatigue and dispersion. Under this representation, 
 Colonel Monroe proposed, that he should occupy the heights in 
 the rear of Georgetown, and in this opinion, I united. f 
 
 the President, that he expected him back as Chief of the War Department in two 
 or three weeks, and would assuredly support him therein. General Armstrong s 
 reply was My determination is taken here are my [written] reasons they 
 will appear in print, if a newspaper can be found free enough to publish them. " 
 Jacob Barker s letter to the editor of the Commercial Advertiser, May 20th, 1843. 
 
 * The truth of this assertion is proved by Mr. Monroe s letter to the Investigat 
 ing Committee, from which I make the following extract: "After some pause, 
 the President remarked to the Secretary of War and myself, that it would be proper 
 for us to retire to the rear, leaving the military movement to military men, 
 which we did." P. 69 of the Report of the Committee. 
 
 f That General Winder made no remonstrance, and did not wish to defend the 
 Capitol is proved, by the following extract from his Narrative [p. 168, Report of 
 Committee]. "In a few moments, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
 War joined me; besides that, they had been witnesses to the dispersion of the 
 troops, and the exhaustion of those just halted by me, I stated the diminution of 
 my force, and the extent of the positions which rendered it impossible for me to 
 place the force 1 then had in such a position, as to prevent the enemy from taking 
 me on the flank as well as the front, and that no reasonable hope could be enter^ 
 tained, that we had any troops who could be relied on to make a resistance as des 
 perate as necessary, in an isolated building, which could not be supported by a suf- 
 
16 
 
 " 3d. That I had withdrawn the covering party from the rear 
 of Fort Washington, arid had ordered the fort to be blown up 
 and all obstruction to the passage of the Potomac abandoned, 
 without firing a gun. 
 
 " This charge is utterly void of truth. The covering party was 
 withdrawn by an order from General Winder, and Captain Dy 
 son s official report shows, that the orders under which he acted 
 were derived from the same source though no doubt mistaken, 
 or misrepresented.* 
 
 " 4th. That by my orders the Navy Yard was burned. 
 
 * This, like its predecessors, is a positive falsehood. I sent an 
 aide to apprise Commodore Tinge y that the army was retiring, 
 and would no longer be able to cover his establishment. He 
 was thus left to follow the suggestions of his own mind, or to 
 obey those of the Head of the Navy Department.f 
 
 " 5th and lastly, that means had not been taken to collect a 
 force sufficient for the occasion. Under this head, as the subject 
 will probably become one of legislative inquiry, I shall at pre 
 sent make but two remarks : 
 
 " 1st. That no means within reach of the Government had 
 been omitted or withheld; that a separate military district em 
 bracing the seat of Government had been created ; that an offi 
 cer of high rank and character had been called to take charge 
 of it ; that to him was given authority to call for supplies and a 
 militia force of fifteen thousand men, to which might be added 
 the 36th regiment of the line, a battalion of the 38th, detachments 
 of the 12th, of the artillery and dragoons, and the flotilla crews 
 and Marine corps under Commodore Barney, making a total of 
 sixteen thousand three hundred men. General Winder s official 
 report shows, how much of this force was actually assembled, 
 and the causes why a greater part of it had not been brought 
 
 ficiency of troops from without." Mr. Monroe s agency in the retreat from Wash 
 ington is proved by the following extract from his letter : " We both advised the 
 General to rally and form [the army] on the heights above Georgetown, believing, 
 as I did, that much would be hazarded by an attempt near the Capitol." 
 
 * That the covering force was withdrawn by an order from General Winder, is 
 proved by the following extract from the letter of Brigadier Young : " General 
 Winder despatched the trooper back w r ith verbal orders for my brigade to cross the 
 Potomac, and form a junction with his army in Montgomery County, Maryland. 
 1 accordingly crossed the troops over to Alexandria, on the night of the 24th of 
 August." That the fort was blown up under a mistaken view of General Winder s 
 order, is shown by his own Narrative, p. 174 of the Report of the Committee. " I 
 sent by Major Kite, directions to the commanding officer at Fort Washington, in 
 the event of his being taken in the rear by the enemy, to blow up the fort, and 
 retire across the river." 
 
 f The facts stated above are proved by the following extract of a letter from. 
 Commodore Tingey to the Secretary of the Navy : " After receiving your orders 
 of the 24th, directing the public shipping, stores, &c., at this establishment to be 
 destroyed in case of the success of the enemy over our army, no time was lost in 
 making the necessary arrangements for firing the whole, &c. About 4 P.M., I re 
 ceived a message by an officer, from the Secretary of War, with information that 
 he could protect me no longer." P. 277, Report of the Committee. 
 
17 
 
 
 
 together causes, altogether extraneous, and beyond the control 
 of the National Government.* 
 
 " 2d. From what is now known of the enemy s force, of the 
 Joss he sustained in the enterprise, and of the precipitancy of his 
 retreat, it is obvious that if all the troops assembled at Bladens- 
 burg had been faithful to themselves, their number was fully compe 
 tent to have beaten the enemy, and to have saved the Capitol."t 
 
 I know with what reluctance the generality of readers turn 
 from the text, to examine notes ; yet, 1 cannot but beseech those 
 who feel an interest in the truth of history, not to pass, unatten- 
 tively, the extracts I have made from public documents. A 
 close examination of these will show, that every assertion set 
 forth in the above nervous production was proved true by subse 
 quent evidence before the Investigating Committee. But, let us 
 return to the subject under review. 
 
 " This," said Mr. Monroe, " is all that I want. It exonerates me from the 
 charge of having undermined General Armstrong by any agency of mine. So 
 far as the facts were made known to me at the time, you state them correctly ; 
 and the rest I have had from other sources since, and they corroborate what you 
 say." I promised to write out the narrative as requested, and did so. Mr. Mon 
 roe died a few days after this interview, and with him the demand fora forth 
 coming of the facts." 
 
 With more of success than Macbeth s Apothecary, Doctor Mc- 
 Kenney seems to have discovered the art of " ministering to a 
 
 * Provedby the following quotation from the Report of the Investigating Com 
 mittee, pp. 37 8. " On the 2d of July, the tenth military district was consti 
 tuted, and the command given to General Winder. On the 4th, the requisition 
 upon the States for 93,500 men was made. On the 14th, the Governors of Penn 
 sylvania and Virginia acknowledged the receipt of the requisition, and promised 
 promptitude. About the 10th, the Governor of Maryland was served with a requi 
 sition, and took measures to designate a corps of six thousand men the whole 
 quota from that State. On the 12th, General Winder was authorized, in case of 
 menaced or actual invasion, to call into service the whole quota of Maryland. 
 On the 17th, the General was farther authorized to call into actual service not loss 
 than two nor more than three thousand of the drafts assigned to his command, to 
 form a permanent force, to be stationed in some central position between Baltimore 
 and the City of Washington. On the same day, he was authorized to call on the 
 State of Pennsylvania for five thousand, on Virginia for two thousand, on the mi 
 litia of the District of Columbia for two thousand, together with the six thousand 
 from Maryland, making an aggregate force of fifteen thousand drafted militia ; 
 three thousand of which, authorized to be called in actual service (the residue in 
 case of actual or menaced invasion), besides the regular troops estimated at one 
 thousand, making sixteen thousand, independent of marines and flotilla men. 
 This was the measure of defence contemplated for military district No. 10, and the 
 measures taken by the War Department up to the 11 th of July in execution of 
 it" Five weeks before the enemy s attack on Washington, General Armstrong 
 had fulfilled his duty. 
 
 f The force actually assembled by Gen. Winder, amounted to upwards of six 
 thousand fiv r e hundred men of all arras, and twenty pieces of artillery. It was 
 attacked and routed in twenty minutes by the advance guard of the British army, 
 consisting of fifteen hundred men. The severity of the engagement may be esti 
 mated by the greatness. of the American loss, ten killed, and thirty wounded ! 
 
 3 
 
, . 
 
 mind diseased." The dose prescribed by him, with such signal 
 effect, consisted of one grain of truth, mixed with ninety-nine of 
 fiction, and, unlike medicines in general, appears to have been 
 equally well suited to the disorder, and the palate of the patient. 
 Yet, I may be permitted to ask, how it happened, that President 
 Monroe should have suffered the moral cancer gnawing at his 
 vitals for so many years, when this convenient friend was ever 
 at hand to administer a cheap and effectual remedy ? Had the 
 brightness of Mr. McKenneys memory suffered a temporary 
 eclipse ? Were the facts which now fall so glibly from his pen, 
 lost for a time amid the maze of Indian accounts and disburse 
 ments ? Or, am I to believe, what I confess seems to me most 
 probable, that when he represents his friend and patron as suffer 
 ing for years from the dread of posthumous condemnation, he 
 paints with a brush too thick, and a coloring too high ? There 
 is also something equivocal in the expression of Mr. Monroe s 
 satisfaction. " This," he says, " is all that I want. It exonerates 
 me from the charge of having undermined General Armstrong, 
 by any agency of mine" Had he said, " by any agency of 
 others," notwithstanding the solemnity of the occasion, McKen- 
 ney must have laughed in his face. 
 
 But why publish this defence, since the contingency has not 
 happened, on which the Ex-President founded his request for its 
 appearance ? Like Mr. Monroe, General Armstrong has done 
 with this world, and his latest and best work is not disfigured by 
 any allusion to personal wrongs, which he despised too much to 
 feel very deeply. The foregoing question admits but of one 
 reply : though the injured party could forget and forgive, his 
 enemies (of whom our author is one) have more memory and 
 less charity. Not contented with temporary success, they seek, 
 as far as practicable, to mislead future inquiry, and stamp their 
 falsehoods on the record of the past. There is also in Mr. Mc- 
 Kenney an affectation of candor, which, if possible, renders his 
 conduct more reprehensible. This is, especially evinced in the 
 last paragraph of the chapter, which has been the subject of 
 notice. It is as follows : 
 
 " The charge of traitor, which was lavishly employed against General Arm 
 strong, I never believed. His whole fault lay in a total absence of faith in the 
 intention of the British to attack Washington. And, indeed, the act struck 
 every military mind then as it does now, as one of the most unexampled teme 
 rity. An incursion, such as was made into a country densely peopled, without 
 artillery or cavalry, exposing both flank and rear to the capacity of such a city 
 as Baltimore, was one of that kind of onsets which secures success only by the 
 general apathy arising out of the belief that nothing so desperate would be at 
 tempted." 
 
 Without being as sceptical as the renowned Walter, the 
 Doubter, Mr. Thomas L. McKenney may well avow his disbe- 
 
19 
 
 | 
 
 lief of a charge so false and foolish, as to have found credence 
 and circulation only among the dregs of a militia carnp. Trea 
 son ! why, the foul suspicion was never breathed in any circle of 
 honest men ; and the admission that he heard it, is a damning 
 proof of the filthiness of his associations at that period. As for 
 the " total want of faith" ascribed by Mr. McKenney, to General 
 Armstrong, I have already shown to the satisfaction of every 
 unprejudiced mind, that it consisted only in a reasonable, well- 
 founded doubt as to the intentions of the enemy ; and this, too, 
 at a time when nothing short of omniscience itself could have 
 sufficed to determine what those intentions were, or rather, what 
 they would be, for they shifted (as is proved by British authori 
 ties) with every incident of the march.* Again : It will not es 
 cape the reader s observation, that with a logic as defective as 
 his memory, Mr. McKenney. in this closing paragraph, imputes 
 to General Armstrong, the serious fault of sharing in an opinion 
 which it seems was held by the whole community ; since, accord 
 ing to our author, the success of the British attack on Washing 
 ton was occasioned, " solely by the general apathy, arising out ot 
 a belief that nothing so desperate would be attempted." 
 
 Is it not a fair inference, that if -general apathy" was alone 
 to blame for this capital misfortune, General Armstrong was 
 treated with much injustice ? And to what, after all, amounts 
 this charge against him of incredulity with regard to the enemy s 
 intentions ? Granting it to be true, in its fullest extent, it is 
 without force, unless it be shown that this " want of faith" was 
 productive of other and greater wants? So self-evident is this 
 proposition, that the censurers of the War minister have, from that 
 day to this, made "neglected preparation" the burthen of their 
 song : yet on this head I stand armed with the decision of seven 
 gentlemen, distinguished alike for character and talent, who, after 
 a long and laborious investigation, in which they sought and in 
 vited whatever evidence could be procured, came to the unani 
 mous conclusion, that the President s plan of defence was put in 
 full execution as far as the Secretary of War could execute it, 
 five weeks before the enemy s attack, f 
 
 * " We remained during the night at Nottingham, nor were we as usual early in 
 motion in the morning, and hesitation had taken place as to the course to be pur 
 sued, whether to follow the gun-boats, or return to the shipping." Campaign at 
 Washington, p. 117. Again : " The truth is, the capture of Washington was 
 not the original end of the expedition. To destroy the flotilla was the sole ob 
 ject of the debarkation ; and but for the instigations of Admiral Cockburn, who 
 accompanied the army, the Capital of America would have escaped our visitation." 
 P. 152. 
 
 f The members of the Committee of Investigation were Johnson of Kentucky, 
 Lowndes of South Carolina, Stockton of New Jersey, Miller of New York, Golds* 
 borough of Maryland, Barbour of Virginia, and Pickens of North Carolina /our 
 Federalists and three Republicans. 
 
20 
 
 t 
 
 As respects the management of the troops in the field, Gene 
 ral Armstrong neither had, nor could have anything to do with 
 it. On the 13th of August he had been served by the President, 
 with the following rule : " No order shall be issued by the Secre 
 tary of War to any officer commanding a district, relative to 
 military movements, without previously receiving the Executive 
 sanction." Understanding this as an intimation that General 
 Winder should be left free and unshackled, to form and execute 
 his own plans on his own responsibility, the War-Minister 
 limited his interference to mere advice, given only when re 
 quested by the General. What that advice w r as has alreaSy been 
 shown, and little doubt can now exist, that if it had been 
 adopted, it would probably have saved the city from capture, or 
 at all events, have surrounded its fall by such circumstances of 
 glorious resistance, as would have made the loss of their capital 
 an event to be spoken of by Americans, without a blush.* 
 
 But some curious inquirer may ask ; If publi ; opinion, mis 
 led by faction and falsehood, has hitherto condemned the inno 
 cent, can you furnish the means of rectifying the mistake by 
 pointing out the guilty ? A full answer to this question would 
 necessarily require much time and labor and research : suffice it 
 to say, that when Mr. McKenney spoke of the ** public apathy," 
 he but stated one of the leading causes of the disaster. " I re 
 ported to the General," says McClane, " that the people between 
 the rivers had not appeared disposed to fight ; it was common to 
 see before the houses a pole with a white cloth attached, as a sig 
 nal of submission"^ Certain it is, that with such materials as 
 that portion of the country afforded, the formation of an efficient 
 army was no easy task ; nor is it to be wondered at, that many of 
 Winder s battalions, when set in opposition to a small but 
 well-disciplined corps, should have suffered " the love of life to 
 prevail, over the love of country and of honor." 
 
 * The advice offered by General Armstrong to General Winder and the Presi 
 dent may be thus recapitulated : 
 
 1st. Harass the enemy on his march by front and flank attacks. 
 
 2d. Let Barney defend his flotilla against the enemy s boats, if the position he 
 has taken is susceptible of defence. 
 
 3d. Fight your decisive battle, not in the open field, but in and about the Capi 
 tol, where your militia will have tl e benefit of cover. 
 
 f McClane Papers, His. Soc. N. Y. 
 

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