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 THE 
 
 LIFE AND SERVICES 
 
 OF 
 
 GEN. GEO. B. McCLELLAN. 
 
 H^ocnmeiit, IVo. 4. 
 
GEORGE BRINTON MCCLELLAN was born 
 in the city of Philadelphia, the birthplace 
 of American Independence and of American 
 Union, on the 3d day of December, 1826. 
 
 His father was a physician, eminent among 
 the eminent, "praised by the praised, - con 
 spicuous by his abilities and his character even 
 in that galaxy of accomplished men by whom 
 the fame of Philadelphia, as the metropolis of 
 physical science and the healing art in Amer 
 ica, was made respectable in Edinburgh and in 
 Paris, in London and in Leyden. No man s 
 ancestry is a matter of indifference when we 
 desire to study his nature and ascertain the true 
 measure of his worth. In monarchical coun 
 tries, where the voice of the people has little 
 or no weight in determining the selection of 
 those who are to administer the government, 
 it matter* little to the masses of mankind 
 whether those by whom they are ruled come 
 of a sound or an unsound stock, of an honest 
 and vigorous, or of a corrupt and weakly race. 
 The will or the whim of a prince makes such 
 inquiries superfluous. Once invested by his 
 sovereign with the insignia of office, the vilest 
 caitiff silences all questions into his origin 
 with the splendors of his rank and the ter 
 rors of his authority. But in a republic 
 which rests for its permanence and its power 
 upon the virtue of. the people and of their 
 public servants, it can never be an insignifi 
 cant recommendation of a public man to that 
 confidence of his fellow-citizens in which alone 
 his hope of distinction and of influence lies, 
 that his fathcs in their ibime were : citizens of 
 credit, men who* knew thelr r ights and main 
 tained thpin, .knew -tbfiir. .duties and "fulfilled 
 them. -". , V 
 
 The ancestors of George Brinton McClel- 
 lan were men of this stamp, coming of 
 that pure and hardy . Scottish blood which 
 has so long been a trouble to tyrants, which 
 has throbbed in the veins of so many 
 sturdy champions of justice and order, and 
 which has been poured out so freely on the 
 most heroic battle-fields of history. Through 
 one of those mysterious affiliations which the 
 Scotch, like all other Celtic tribes, delight to 
 trace out, and hold above all things sacred, a 
 kinsmanship has been established for the 
 American McClellans with that noble old 
 soldier, Sir Colin Campbell, who fought 
 his way honestly up from a shepherd s plaid 
 on the Caledonian moors to a Field Marshal s 
 baton in the army of England, and a baron s 
 coronet among her peers. ^ 
 
 Into these refinements of consanguinity, how 
 ever, it is scarcely worth while to enter Had 
 Colin Campbell lived and died, the just and 
 
 God-fearing man he was, as a shepherd on the 
 banks of Clyde, no man in whose veins his 
 blood ran -would have been the less enno 
 bled by its wholesome life ; and so fur as the 
 antecedents go of George Brinton McClel- 
 lan s birth, it is enough for us to know that 
 he comes of a people renowned the world over 
 for justice, fidelity, valor, and truth. 
 
 As a boy of thirteen, his father sent him 
 into the Freshman Class at the University of 
 Pennsylvania. He pursued the University 
 course, for nearly two years, patiently and suc 
 cessfully ; but, like Washington, he had an 
 " inward longing " for the life of an engineer 
 and a soldier, and, in 1842, a Cadet warrant 
 having been obtained for him, he was removed 
 to the Military Academy at West Point. 
 
 In the congenial atmosphere of the exact 
 studies to which he here found himself called, 
 the young Cadet very s,oon distinguished him 
 self, and rewarded the judicious confidence of 
 his friends. He was graduated, with high 
 honors, in the Class of 1846 ; assigned to 
 duty with a company of the engineers, and 
 ordered, before the close of the year, into active 
 service on the line of the Rio Grande River. 
 The war with Mexico was then fairly begun, 
 and Lieutenant McClellan" reached his post 
 just after the battle of Monterey. 
 
 After some time spend, in active service on 
 the Rio Grande, Lieutenant McClellan was 
 ordered to Tampico in January, 1847, to 
 take part in the concentration of troops then 
 going on for the grand expedition which was 
 preparing, under Gen. Scott, to end the war, and 
 dictate terms of peace in the capital of Mexico. 
 What jealousies and intrigues; and, to use 
 the veteran s own well-known phrase, what a 
 "fire in the rear" attended the organization 
 of this expedition no one familiar with the 
 recent history of the country can need to be 
 reminded. 
 
 The young Lieutenant was thus made a 
 witness, at the very beginning of his career, 
 of the political difficulties and the personal 
 spites which so often confound and hamper 
 the action of the most earnest and devoted 
 military leaders. 
 
 In the beginning of the month of March 
 the assembled army disembarked from its 
 transports to the west of the island of Sacri- 
 ficios, and the memorable siege of Vera Cruz 
 "and San Juan de Ulloa began. 
 
 It is not our purpose minutely -to pursue 
 the fortunes of Lieutenant McClellan through 
 the wonderful campaign of which this siege 
 was the initial chapter. 
 
 Who, indeed, can now find the heart to re 
 write or even to re-peruse the annals of that 
 
3 
 
 campaign in which, as the lamentable history 
 of the last four years too sternly bids us fear, 
 American soldiers of the North and of the 
 South, of the East and of the West, for the 
 last time, marched side by side to death and 
 victory ? 
 
 The Executive Documents of the Thir 
 tieth Congress, in which the story of that 
 glorious campaign lies embalmed and awaits 
 the historian s skilful hand, can be read now 
 without overmastering emotion only by the 
 fanatic or the fool, by him who is indifferent 
 to his country s fate, or by him who rejoices 
 in her ruin. 
 
 To those formal and official pages the course 
 of subsequent events has given the painful in 
 terest of a tragedy. In them we read how, 
 working with an equal zeal to serve one com 
 mon cause, Lieutenants Beauregard and 
 McClellan earned the commendation of their 
 commander in the trenches before Vera 
 Cruz; in them we read how the escort of 
 Captain Robert E. Lee, engaging the skir 
 mishers of Valencia in the Pedregal, opened 
 that stern unswerving march which led the 
 Stars and Stripes, through storm and stress of 
 strife and victory, up to their station of tri 
 umph on the heights of Chapultepec and the 
 towers of the city of Montezuma. Heintzel- 
 rnan and Magruder, Kearney and Pillow, 
 meet us here, marching, manoeuvring, fighting 
 manfully together for the one old flag. One 
 day Lieutenant T. J. Jackson " the horses 
 of his guns nearly all killed or disabled, his 
 drivers and cannoneers cut up" gets one of 
 his pieces from under the direct fire of Cha 
 pultepec, opens upon the enemy, and holds 
 the battle till the Castle is carried. Another 
 day Lieutenant Reno, " in the advance with 
 his mountain howitzers," maintains, against the 
 superior artillery of the enemy, so fierce a fire 
 as saves the bold advance of " Lieutenant 
 Colonel Albert Sidney Johnstone " with his 
 voltigeurs. Now we have "Captain Hooker" 
 riding gallantly down alone to reconnoitre the 
 ground for Lieutenant Colonel Hebert, of 
 Louisiana; anon, "Lieutenant Grant," of 
 the Fourth Infantry, " pushed forward with a 
 party " to aid in securing advantages won by 
 the troops of Tennessee and South Carolina. 
 
 Between these once fraternal names how 
 wide a gulf has since been dug by passion, by 
 madness, and by folly, a gulf which, in the 
 providence of God, nothing surely but reason 
 .and justice can ever bridge again ! 
 
 The peculiar importance of that arm of the 
 service to which, in virtue of his distinction 
 won at the academy, Lieutenant McClellan 
 was attached naturally, gave him a prominence 
 
 M2f 
 
 in the operations of General Scott s advance, 
 to which his years and his rank would not 
 otherwise have entitled him. He won his 
 promotion to the rank of 2d Lieutenant early 
 in the campaign, and received his brevet as 
 1st Lieutenant for gallant and meritorious 
 conduct at the battle of Contrerays, on the 19th 
 of August of the same year. The service of 
 the engineers and the staff officers at Contrerays 
 was of the most arduous kind, testing in the 
 highest degree the coolness, the personal 
 bravery, and the powers of physical endur 
 ance, as well as the professional skill, of those 
 engaged in it. General Valencia s position 
 was infinitely more formidable from the 
 broken, rough, and impracticable character of 
 the country, than from the skill with which 
 that pompous and wordy personage had se 
 lected and entrenched his camp ; and the re- 
 connojssance which determined the route taken 
 by our troops to assault and overwhelm their 
 enemy had to be executed on a moonless 
 night, over rocky and precipitous mule paths, 
 through a region of wild ravines and tangled 
 forests. 
 
 Deserted in disgust by Santa Anna, whose 
 advice he had scorned and whom he hoped, by 
 a decisive victory over the American invaders, 
 to oust from power, Valencia was utterly 
 bewildered by the attack to which this dan 
 gerous night reconnoissance opened the way ; 
 his troops, finding themselves inextricably in 
 volved, were stricken with a panic, and one 
 of the most complete victories of the war re 
 warded the skill of our commanders and the 
 valor of our troops. 
 
 When compared with the scale on which 
 war has since been waged by American ar 
 mies, the battles through which our soldiers 
 fought their way to the city of Mexico may 
 seem, indeed, but petty and insignificant com 
 bats. But the campaign of 1847 was, in truth, 
 a most instructive school for the officers who 
 passed through it. Not less by the mistakes 
 and failures of the enemy than by our own 
 successes were the capable and the thoughtful 
 among those officers taught rightly to estim^-c 
 the tremendous difficulties which attend a war 
 of invasion, and the formidable advantages en 
 joyed by an army acting on the defensive in 
 a country sparsely populated, broken, rugged, 
 and densely wooded ; nor is it easy to imagine 
 the extent of the disasters which must have 
 befallen the cause of the Union had the abso 
 lute conduct in the field of our vast and un 
 disciplined armies been assumed, in the outset 
 of the existing war by the arrogant and inex 
 perienced civilians whose influence has beer, 
 since so. N lamentably felt in the disturbance of 
 
well-considered plans of campaign and the 
 waste of well-organized resources. 
 
 The hard-fought action of Molino del Rey, 
 on the 8th of September, 1847, afforded 
 Lieutenant McClellan an occasion to prove 
 that his rapid promotion in his profession had 
 not disturbed that well-balanced sense of jus 
 tice which is one of the rooted qualities of his 
 nature. 
 
 The conduct of the attack upon the Mex 
 ican positions at Molino del Rey. had been 
 confided, by General Scott, to General Worth. 
 The ostensible object of this attack was the 
 destruction of a cannon-foundry which the 
 Mexicans were believed to have established at 
 that point ; but as General Worth found rea 
 son to anticipate such a resistance as might 
 lead to a general action for the possession of 
 the heights and fortress of Chapultepec, it was 
 of the first importance for him to be thoroughly 
 informed of the true nature of the defences 
 thrown up by Santa Anna at Molino del Rey, 
 and of the true proportions, of the force which 
 the Mexican President would there array 
 against him. 
 
 Two serious reeonnoissances were accordingly 
 ordered by General Worth before the attack 
 was made, and in these reconnoissances Lieu 
 tenant McClellan bore a distinguished part. 
 
 The conflict which followed assumed the 
 character of a battle, the most fiercely- 
 contested battle indeed of the whole war, in 
 which, after hours of desperate onslaught, an 
 aggregate American force about 3,500 strong 
 assailed and drove from their formidable in- 
 trenchments a Mexican army numbering at 
 least 10,000 men, with a loss to the enemy of 
 four pieces of artillery and nearly a thousand 
 prisoners. Lieutenant McClellan was offered 
 the brevet rank of Captain for his share in this 
 victory, but declined to receive it on the 
 ground that he was not fully entitled to it, 
 having been concerned in the preliminary op 
 erations alone, and nob in the actual assault 
 and capture of the enemy s works. 
 
 The maxim, Palmam qui meruit feral, is 
 not often thus rigorously applied to his own 
 case by a young and ambitious man actively 
 engaged in the most exciting of professions ! 
 Within a week, however, the storming of Cha 
 pultepec and the consequent occupation of the 
 Mexican capital gave the magnanimous young 
 . soldier a fresh opportunity of winning, by act 
 ual service and exposure in the stricken field, 
 the rank which he disdained otherwise to wear. 
 He was breveted a Captain for these crowning 
 operations of the campaign on the 14th Sep 
 tember, 1847., 
 
 As Captain McClellan, he remained with 
 
 the army in Mexico till the signing of the 
 treaty of peace with that republic. The ad 
 ministration of a conquered city necessarily 
 afforded to a soldier of his character and train 
 ing many valuable opportunities of observa 
 tion and reflection upon the true relations of 
 the military with the civil authority. The 
 impotence of mere force to maintain or re 
 store a solid tranquillity in the social order is 
 never so apparent to a clear and vigorous mind 
 as when force is clothed with a temporary om 
 nipotence ; the beauty and the majesty of law 
 are never so apparent as when the calm and 
 constant operation of the law is, for a time, 
 suspended in favor of the sword. As the 
 Duke of Wellington learned, during his long 
 military mastery of the Peninsula and his 
 brief practical dictatorship of Paris, that pro 
 found dislike of all unnecessary military in 
 terference with civil affairs which, at a later 
 day, when England was convulsed with civil 
 commotion, made the veteran of a hundred 
 victories the calmest, most forbearing, and 
 most conciliatory of English statesmen, so we 
 may be sure that his experience of conquest 
 and of military rule in Mexico contributed 
 mainly to fix in the mind of Captain Mc 
 Clellan those sound and moderate principles 
 of policy which were afterwards to develop 
 themselves so fully and so firmly in the proc 
 lamations and in the conduct of the victor of 
 West Virginia and the leader of the Peninsu 
 lar campaign. 
 
 In June, 1848, Captain McClellan re 
 turned to the United States, and was almost 
 immediately ordered to the post at West 
 Point, where, for three years, he remained in 
 command of the company of- sappers and 
 miners. 
 
 In June, 1851, he was removed to Fort 
 Delaware to superintend the construction of 
 the works ; and early in the next year he ful 
 filled the common destiny of the officers of the 
 regular army of the Union by joining an ex 
 pedition for tho exploration of the far western 
 territory of the Red River, under the command 
 of Colonel Marcy, whose daughter has since 
 become his wife. 
 
 From the Red River he passed into Texas 
 upon the staff of General Persifer F. Smith, 
 and until March, 1853, was occupied in the 
 survey of the Texan coast. From the sea- 
 breezes of the Gulf and the lowlands of Texas 
 he was suddenly transferred to the neighbor 
 hood of the Rocky Mountains, going to Wash 
 ington Territory in the spiing of 1853, and 
 remaining there until May, 1854, in charge 
 of the western division of the survey for the 
 northern route to the Pacific Ocean. 
 
5 
 
 The vast extent, the magnificent possibil 
 ities, the grand unity in a variety as grand of 
 our national dominion, which are but sounding 
 forms of words on the lips of so many a 
 blatant orator, become simple realities to the 
 intelligent American officer whose routine of 
 duty thus leads him from one extremity to 
 another of the imperial republic ; and the sen 
 timent of continental patriotism, so vague and 
 passionate in the minds of most men, is thus 
 made to him a substantial and controlling im 
 pulse of his nature. 
 
 But Captain McClellan s love and rever 
 ence of American nationality were to be in 
 tensified by a wider and even more impres 
 sive experience. In March, 1855, he was pro 
 moted to a full captaincy in the 1st Cavalry,and, 
 with Major Delatield and Major Mordecai/was 
 ordered to proceed to Europe, there to study 
 the operations of the great war then raging 
 between the Western Allies and the Russian 
 Empire. War on a scale which had become 
 traditional in our time war waged upon the 
 principles of the Napoleonic era, but with all 
 the appliances of modern progress was 
 now to pass under his inspection. 
 
 When Captain McClellan and his compan 
 ions reached the Crimea, in the early part of 
 the summer of 1855, the most trying period 
 of the great Allied invasion had already been 
 overpassed. The battle of the Alma had 
 been fought and won, Sebastopol had been 
 invested so far as its investment was practica 
 ble, victory had been snatched by the troops 
 of France and England from the very jaws of 
 ruin on the heights of Inkermann. But the 
 spectacle, which now met the eyes of the 
 American commissioners, was far more in 
 structive than any shock of battle could have 
 been. 
 
 In the course of his investigations into the 
 organization and establishment of the Allied 
 forces before the Russian stronghold, Captain 
 McClellan learned to estimate aright the tre 
 mendous hazards which, even in modern times, 
 "and with all the advantages given by a com 
 plete command alike of the sea and of all the 
 " sinews of war," attend what may be prop 
 erly called, as Mr. Kinglake has called it, 
 a colossal " adventure of invasion." 
 
 A brief extract from this author s bitter, 
 but brilliant, history of the " Invasion of the 
 Crimea" will show the precise nature of 
 the great military lesson set before the Amer 
 ican observers, and will enable the reader to 
 otimate for himself the grave and manifold 
 bearings of that lesson upon the vast enter 
 prise which it was written in the book of des 
 tiny that but a few years afterwards the most 
 
 conspicuous of these observers should be called 
 to undertake : 
 
 4 There were now upon the coast of the 
 Crimea some 37,000 French and Turks, 1 with 
 sixty-eight pieces of artillery, all under the 
 orders of Marshal St. Arnaud ; and we saw 
 that 27,000 English, including a full thou 
 sand of cavalry, and together with sixty guns, 
 had been landed by Lord Raglan. Alto 
 gether, then, the allies numbered (33,000 inert 
 and 128 guns. These forces, partly by means 
 of the draught animals at their command, and 
 partly by the aid of the soldier hhrself, could 
 carry by land the ammunition necessary for 
 perhaps two battles, and the means of sub 
 sistence for three days. Their provisions be 
 yond those limits were to be replenished from 
 the ships. It was intended, therefore, that 
 the fleets should follow the march of the ar 
 mies, and that the invaders, without attempt 
 ing to dart upon the inland route which con 
 nected the enemy with St. Petersburg, should 
 move straight upon the north side of Sebasto 
 pol by following the line of the coast. 
 
 " The whole body of the Allied armies was 
 to operate as a * movable column. 2 
 
 " Between an armed body engaged in regu 
 lar operations, and that description of force 
 which the French cidi a movable column, 
 the difference is broad ; and there is need to 
 mark it, because the way in which- regular 
 operations are conducted is not even similar 
 to that in which a * movable column is 
 wielded. It is, of course, from the history of 
 continental wars that the principle of regular 
 operations in the field is best deduced. A 
 prince intending to invade his neighbor s ter 
 ritory takes care to have near his own frontier, 
 or in states already under his control, not only 
 the army with which he intends to begin the 
 invasion, but also that sustained gathering of 
 fresh troops, and that vast accumulation of 
 stores, arms, and munitions which will suffice, 
 as he hopes, to feed the war. The territory 
 on which these resources are spread is called 
 the base of operations. 3 When the invad 
 ing general has set out from this his strategic 
 home to achieve the object he has in view, the 
 neck of country by which he keeps up his 
 communications with the base is called the 
 line of operations ; and the maintenance 
 
 1 30,204 Frenchmen and 7000 Turks, according to the 
 French accounts. Lord Kaplan, I believe, thought that 
 the French force was less, and put it at ^7,600. 
 
 2 I make this endeavor to elucidate the true character 
 of the operation for the purpose of causing the reader 
 to understand the kind of hazard which was involved 
 in the march along the coast, and also in order to lay 
 the ground for explaining (in a future volume) the 
 causes which afterwards brought upon the army cruel 
 Bufferings and privations. 
 
 " This is generally, but not invariably, the same line 
 as the one by which he has advanced. 
 
6 
 
 of this line of operations is the one object 
 which must never be absent from his mind. 
 The farther he goes, the more he needs to 
 keep up an incessant communication with his 
 base ; and yet, since the line is lengthen 
 ing as he advances, it is constantly becoming 
 more and more liable to be cut. Such a dis 
 aster as that he looks upon as nearly equal to 
 ruin, and there is hardly anything that he will 
 refuse to sacrifice for the defence of the dusty 
 or mud-deep cart-roads, which give him his 
 means of living and fighting. 
 
 " On the other hand, the commander of a 
 movable column begins his campaign by 
 wilfully placing himself in those very circum 
 stances which would bring ruin upon an army 
 carrying on regular operations. He does not 
 profess nor attempt to hold fast any line of 
 operations connecting him with his resources. 
 He says to his enemy, Surround me if you 
 will ; gather upon my front ; hover round me 
 on flank and rear. Do not affront me too 
 closely, unless you want to see something of 
 my cavalry and my horse-artillery ; but, keep 
 ing at a courteous distance, you may freely 
 occupy the whole country through which I 
 pass. I care nothing for the roads by which 
 I have come. What I need whilst my task is 
 doing, I carry along with me. I have an en 
 terprise in hand. That achieved, I shall 
 march toward the resources which my coun 
 trymen have prepared for me. Those re 
 sources I will reach or else perish. If an 
 army engaged in regular operations were 
 likened to an engine drawing its supplies by 
 means of long pipes from a river, the princi 
 ple of the movable column would be well 
 enough tokened by that skinful of water 
 which, curried on the back of a camel, is the 
 life of men passing a desert. 
 
 " Each of the two systems has its advan 
 tages and its drawbacks. The advantages en 
 joyed by an army undertaking regular oper 
 ations are : the lasting character of its 
 power, and its comparative security against 
 great disasters. The general conducting an 
 army in regular .operations is constantly re 
 plenishing his strength by drawing from his 
 4 base fresh troops and supplies to compen 
 sate the havoc which time and the enemy, or 
 even time alone, will always be working in 
 his army ; and if he meets with a check, he 
 retires upon a line already occupied by por 
 tions of his force, already strewed with his 
 magazines. He retires, in short, upon a road 
 prepared for his reception, and the farther he 
 retreats, the nearer he is to his great resources. 
 The drawbacks attending this system are the 
 
 great quantity of means of land transports 
 required for keeping up the communication, 
 and the eternal necessity of having to be ready 
 with a sufficient force to defend every mile of 
 the line of operations against the enter 
 prises of the enemy. 
 
 The advantages of the movable column 
 are : that its means of land transport may 
 be comparatively small, may, in fact, be 
 proportioned to the limited duration of the 
 service which it undertakes ; and that, not 
 being clogged with the duty of maintaining a 
 line of operations, it has, in truth, nothing 
 to defend except itself. But grave drawbacks 
 limit the power of a movable column. In 
 the first place, it .is an instrument fitted only 
 for temporary use, because, during the service 
 in which it is engaged, it has no resources to 
 rely upon, except what it carries along with it. 
 Another drawback is the hazard it .incurs, not 
 of mere defeat, but of total extermination ; 
 for it is a force which has left no dominion in 
 its wake, and if it falls back, it falls into the 
 midst of enemies having hold of the country 
 around, and emboldened by seeing it retreat. 
 
 " Then, also, a movable column, even 
 though it be never defeated in any pitched 
 battle, is liable to be brought to ruin bybaing 
 well harassed ; and very inferior, troops, or 
 even armed peasants, if they have spirit and 
 enterprise, may put it in peril ; for, having the 
 command of the country all round it, they can 
 easily prepare their measures for vexing the 
 column by day and by night. Again, the 
 movable column can not send its sick and 
 wounded to the rear. It must either abandon 
 the sufferers, or else find means of carrying 
 them wherever it marches, and this, of 
 course, is a task which is rendered more 
 and more difficult by every succeeding com 
 bat. Again, if the * movable column is 
 brought to frequent halts by the necessity of 
 self-defence, there is danger that the operation 
 in which it is engaged will last to a time be 
 yond the narrow limit of the supplies which 
 it is able to carry along with it. 
 
 In Algeria the French had brought the 
 system of using small movable columns to 
 a high state of perfection ; and there one 
 might soe a force complete in all arms, cany- 
 ing with it the bread and the cartridges, and 
 driving betwixt its battalions the little herd of 
 cattle, which would enable it to live and to 
 fight ; one might see it bidding farewell for 
 perhaps several weeks to all its communica 
 tions, and boldly venturing into the midst of 
 a wilderness alive with angry foes ; but the 
 Arabs and Kabyles, though not without some 
 of the warlike virtues, were, upon the whole, 
 
too unintelligent and too feeble to be able to 
 put the system of the * movable column to 
 a test sufficing to prove that the contrivance 
 would hold good in Europe. 
 
 "Upon the whole, it may be acknowledged 
 that, for operating in a country where the 
 enemy is looked upon as at all formidable, the 
 emplovment of a movable column is a 
 measure which will be likely to win more 
 favor from those who love an adventure than 
 from those who are acquainted with the art 
 of war. 
 
 But whichever of the two methods be 
 chosen, it is of great moment to choose deci 
 sively, taking care that the operations are car 
 ried on in a way consistent with the principle 
 of the system on which they proceed. A 
 general conducting regular operations must 
 be wary, circumspect, and resolutely patient. 
 The leader of a movable column must be 
 swift, and, even for very safety s sake, -he 
 jmay have to be venturesome, for what would 
 be rashness in another may in him be rigid 
 prudence. The two systems are so opposite, 
 that to confuse the two, or to import into the 
 practice of one of them the practice applica 
 ble to the other, is to run into grave troubles 
 and dangers. Yet this is what the Allies did. 
 When the English Government committed to 
 this enterprise a large proportion of their 
 small, brilliant army, and appointed to the 
 command of it a general mature in years and 
 schooled by his long subordination to Wel 
 lington, they acted as though they meant that 
 the army should engage with all due pru 
 dence in regular operations. When they 
 ordered that this force should make a descent 
 upon the Crimea without intending to prepare 
 for it a base of operations at the landing- 
 place, they caused it to act as a movable 
 column. It will be seen hereafter that from 
 this ambiguity of purpose, or rather from this 
 dimness of sight, the events of the campaign 
 took their shape. 
 
 "Again, it is right to see how far it be pos 
 sible to change with the same force from one 
 of the two systems to the other. Upon this, 
 it can be said that an army engaged in regu 
 lar operations may well enough be able to 
 furnish forth a movable column; but to 
 hope that a movable column will be able to 
 gather to itself all at once the lasting strength 
 of an army prepared for regular operations is 
 to hope for what cannot be. It is true, as 
 we shall see hereafter, that by dint of great 
 effort, and the full command of the sea, the 
 two mighty nations of the West were able in 
 time to convert the remains of their movable 
 column into an army fitted for regular opera 
 
 tions, but we shall have to remember that be 
 fore the one system could bo effectually re 
 placed by the- other, the soldiery underwent 
 cruel sufferings." 
 
 All that it was the rare privilege of Capt. 
 McClellan to see and learn of the relations 
 between politics and the military art, and of 
 the practical operations of war conducted 
 upon the grandest scale during his visit to Se- 
 bastopol might however, let us here observe, 
 have produced but an imperfect and inade 
 quate effect upon hi mind, had not his own pre 
 vious and priceless, though comparatively lim 
 ited experience in Mexico prepared him intel 
 ligently to receive it, and fitted him to deduce 
 from it the most solid instruction and the 
 most durable convictions. 
 
 The immediate fruit of his sojourn in Eu 
 rope, at this time, was an elaborate and ex 
 haustive " Report upon the Constitution of the 
 Greater European Armies," which was pub 
 lished under the authority of Congress in the 
 early part of the year 1857, and which bears 
 irrefragable witness to the pains and zeal with 
 which the young officer had devoted himself 
 to mastering the minutest details, as well as 
 the broadest principles of military organiza 
 tion. 
 
 But of inSnitely greater pith and moment 
 to himself and to his country were the larger 
 and deeper results of this military tour upon 
 his mental constitution and his habits of 
 thought. 
 
 The officers of the Regular Army of the 
 United States, although most carefully trained 
 in the principles of mathematical science and 
 of the military art during the four years of 
 their academic course, have enjoyed for the 
 most part, in later life, but few and limited 
 opportunities of military experience. With 
 the exception of the Mexican war, the lives of 
 most of them now living had been passed, when 
 the great rebellion broke upon us, in a routine 
 of post and garrison duty alternating between 
 the peaceful seaboard of the Atlantic and the 
 frontier forts of the far West. A harassing 
 but contemptible warfare with the roving In 
 dian tribes of the trans-Mississippi educated 
 them to practical skill in the handling of small 
 detachments, but could do nothing, of course, 
 towards familiarizing them with the spirit and 
 the necessities of war on a grand scale. Many 
 of them, inspired with a genuine zeal and love 
 for their profession, were at great pains to 
 master all that text-books could teach upon 
 this subject ; but as the most scientific and 
 thoughtful of military authorities, Baron Jo- 
 mini, has well observed, War, practical 
 war, is not an affair of mathematical dem- 
 
8 
 
 ons (ration, it is a passionate drama," 
 and no study of military literature, how 
 ever judicious and faithful, can teach in 
 years so much available military truth as a 
 soldier like McClellan must imbibe from a 
 few weeks of actual living contact with the 
 realities of war as he came upon and mingled 
 with them in the Crimea. 
 
 After the publication of his Report of the 
 Armies of Europe, in January, 1857, Capt. 
 McClellan resigned his commission in the 
 army and went into civil life. 
 
 He was appointed Chief Engineer of the 
 Illinois Central Railroad, and upon the com 
 pletion of that great enterprise was elected 
 Vice-President of the company, which post 
 he continued to fill, residing at Chicago, 
 until the month of August, 1860, when, hav 
 ing been chosen President of the Eastern Di 
 vision of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, 
 he removed to Cincinnati. 
 
 He was busily engaged in the duties of 
 this office, an office which with his previous 
 experience as a "railroad man" in Illinois, 
 naturally introduced him to a wide and ac 
 curate familiarity with the people and the 
 resources of the Central West, as well as to 
 a practical acquaintance with the details of 
 the modern system of transportation by steam, 
 when, in April, 1861, he was suddenly sum 
 moned from the pursuits of peace by the roar 
 of the cannon fired at Sumter and the crash 
 of impending civil war. 
 
 Governor Dennison, of Ohio, in response 
 to the first call of the President of the United 
 States for volunteers to aid in the suppression 
 of the rebellion and in maintaining the su 
 premacy of the Constitution, appointed Geo. 
 Brinton McClellan Major-General, to com 
 mand the contingent of the State, being thir 
 teen regiments of infantry. This commission 
 was offered and accepted on the 23d of 
 April, 1861. 
 
 There was no difficulty in filling the ranks 
 of these regiments. Throughout the great 
 State of Ohio, as throughout the entire North 
 and West, the call of the President for seventy- 
 five thousand volunteers, to be enlisted for a 
 service of three months, was answered by such 
 a general uprising of the people as, in the 
 words of General McClellan himself, made it 
 " a struggle as to who should be received, 
 and not as to who should avoid the call." 
 
 Throughout the long political conflict which 
 had preceded the assertion by force of arms 
 at Fort Sunvter of the right of secession, the 
 free States had been greatly divided in opinion 
 concerning the issues so hotly debated between 
 numbers of their own citizens on the one side, 
 
 and the citizens of the slaveholding States on 
 the other. 
 
 While the sentiment of hostility to slavery, 
 as an institution discreditable to the republic, 
 and in itself both criminal and dangerous, 
 had greatly grown in fire and in force through 
 out the North during the thirty years which 
 followed the emancipation of the slaves in the 
 West Indian colonies of Great Britain, and 
 while this sentiment had in some places made 
 itself, and in others had been manipulated 
 into becoming a powerful engine of partizan 
 action, an overwhelming majority of the peo 
 ple of the North and the West still firmly ad 
 hered to the conviction that the Constitution 
 in no wise authorized any interference on the 
 part either of the non-slaveholding States, or 
 of their citizens, or of the Federal Govern 
 ment, with the institution of slavery in the 
 States. It was the dominant feeling of hon 
 orable and enlightened men, that it would be 
 dishonest and disgraceful for an anti-slavery 
 North* to take advantage of a power conferred 
 upon its numerical majority solely in virtue of 
 the Union and the Constitution, to accom 
 plish purposes, no matter how laudable they 
 might be in the eyes of philanthropists and 
 philosophers, which, had they been avowed 
 when the original compacts between the States 
 were framed, would have made the Union it 
 self impossible, and put a final stop to the 
 formation of the Constitution. 
 
 It was plainly and painfully true, indeed, 
 that the leaders of the political party by which 
 Mr. Lincoln- had been lifted into power 
 neither shared this feeling nor were disposed to 
 respect it in their policy. But so long as the 
 refusal of many of the Southern States to 
 submit to the authority of the newly-elected 
 President was expressed in the form of polit 
 ical action alone, the great majority of the 
 Northern people were indisposed to draw the 
 sword against those whom they regarded as 
 their fellow-citizens, and whom they believed 
 to be governed by an honest, even if a mis 
 taken fear that their rights, their property, and 
 their liberties were really in peril. 
 
 It was well known throughout the North 
 that the "right of secession" was not more 
 generally accepted, as inherent in the Consti 
 tution of the Union, at the South than it was 
 at the North. 
 
 Before the formation of the Union, indeed, 
 a disposition had been manifested by the East 
 ern States, upon the invitation of the Legis 
 lature of Massachusetts, to separate them 
 selves in respect to many of the most im 
 portant elements of the public weal from 
 the rest of the country, by forming a conven- 
 
9 
 
 reg- 
 
 tion with the State of New York for 
 ulating matters of common concern." This 
 was in April, 1783 ; and, a debate arising 
 upon the subject in the Congress of the Con 
 federation, Mr. Bland, of Virginia, had de 
 nounced such projects as tending directly to 
 break up the Union, and to form what he de 
 scribed as "young Congresses." Alexander 
 Hamilton s proposition that the Federal Gov 
 ernment should assume the debts of the 
 States, gave occasion, soon after the adoption 
 of the Constitution, to a similar, though a more 
 formidable manifestation. That proposition 
 was supported by the Northern and opposed 
 by the Southern States with so much acrimony 
 on either side, that when the proposition was 
 finally rejected, Congress adjourned from day 
 to day without transacting any business, and 
 the members from the Eastern States openly 
 threatened the secession of those States from 
 the Union, and the formation of an Eastern 
 Confederacy. A compromise was finally ef 
 fected by the concession to the South of the 
 site for the National Capital, on the banks of 
 the Potomac, in return for the reconsideration 
 by the South of the vote which had defeated 
 the " Assumption Bill" Under the Presi 
 dency of the elder Adams, hi 1788, a new 
 menace of separation came upon the country, 
 and this time from the South, the States of 
 Virginia and Kentucky passing resolutions in 
 opposition to the policy of Mr. Adams, which 
 clearly indicated by their tone, if not by their 
 express phraseology, a determination to break 
 asunder, in a certain contingency, the bonds 
 which united the Confederacy. 
 
 The annexation of Louisiana, under Mr. 
 Adams s successor, changed the whole sweep 
 and scope of the future of the Republic ; and 
 again in the East the old propositions for the 
 establishment of an Eastern Confederacy were 
 revived, and discussed by men of the highest 
 standing and in the most serious temper. 
 
 President John Adams, in December, 
 1828, gave Mr. Harrison Gray Otis and oth- 
 ers, of Boston, the following account of this 
 matter : 
 
 " This design had been formed in the win 
 ter of 18034, immediately after and as a 
 consequence of the acquisition of Louisiana. 
 . . . The plan was so far matured that the 
 proposal had been made to an individual (this 
 was Alexander Hamilton) to permit himself, 
 at the proper time, to be placed at the head 
 of the military movements, which it was fore 
 seen would be necessary for carrying it into 
 execution." In a subsequent letter to Gov 
 ernor Plumer, of New Hampshire, an avowed 
 
 Disunionist, President Adams states that 
 "three projects of boundary " for the New 
 England Confederacy had been prepared. 
 These were: "1. If possible, the Potomac. 
 2. The Susquebanna. 3. The Hudson 
 River." Of the truth of these statements 
 Governor Plumer himself was well aware. 
 He had written to New Hampshire from his 
 seat in Congress, on the 19th of January, 
 1804, " What do you wish your Senators and 
 Representatives to do here? We have no 
 part in Jefferson and no inheritance in Vir 
 ginia. Shall we return to our own homes, 
 sit under our own vines and fig-trees, and be 
 separated from the slaveholders? " 
 
 The admission of Louisiana as a State into 
 the Unipn, seven years -later, led to a section 
 al debate in Congress, in the course of which 
 the Hon. Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, de 
 clared (Jan. 14, 1811) that the admission 
 of Louisiana would * free the States from 
 their moral obligations, and, as it will be the 
 right of all, so it will be the duty of some to 
 prepare for separation, amicably if they can, 
 violently if they must." 
 
 Without pursuing the subsequent history of 
 *this theoretical right of secession through 
 the successive collisions of sectional interests 
 and sectional passions, which again and again 
 elicited the assertion of it, now from States 
 of the South and now from States of the 
 North, during the period which intervened be 
 tween the admission of Louisiana and the first 
 formal attempt of an American State to act 
 upon the right in December, 1861, it must 
 be evident to all reflecting minds that an im 
 petuous and passionate determination to meet 
 this attempt at once by the " last argument 
 of kings" would have implied, on the part 
 of the people of the Northern States, not 
 only a discreditable ignorance of the prece 
 dents of American history, but a lamentable 
 incapacity of appreciating the importance of 
 time and argument in calming the efferves 
 cence of popular excitement, and dissipating 
 the delusions which so often seize upon the 
 mind of a whole community. No such im 
 petuous and passionate determination we have 
 said was, however, manifested by the people 
 of the North. The secession of one after an 
 other of the States of the South Atlantic and 
 the Gulf was received by the people at large 
 with a kind of incredulous amazement, which 
 was gradually giving place to a widespread 
 conviction that the whole matter must event 
 ually be referred for settlement to such a 
 convention of the States as had already 
 twice rescued the Republic from the danger of 
 
10 
 
 disintegration, when the commencement of act 
 ual hostilities in Charleston harbor, and the 
 call of the President for troops to repel an as 
 sault made upon the national forces and to 
 avenge an insult offered to the national flag, put 
 an entirely new face upon the state of things. 
 
 The most powerful of the Southern States 
 were still, at this time, standing out against 
 the movement of secession. The feeling was 
 almost universal at the North that the attack 
 upon Fort Sumter could not possibly be sus 
 tained by the deliberate judgment of these un- 
 secedcd Southern States. The existence of 
 State Rights, it was felt, necessarily implied 
 the existence of State Duties ; and when the 
 President appealed to the nation for seventy- 
 five thousand troops to maintain the na 
 tional authority, the people of the North and 
 West took up arms, not for the purpose of 
 annihilating the rights even of the seceded 
 States, but for the purpose of compelling those 
 States to fulfil their duties. 
 
 Had it then been understood that the force 
 called into the field was but the advance 
 guard of an army of millions of men, to be 
 employed for an indefinite term of years, not 
 merely in enforcing the authority of the Con 
 stitution and repressing a violent assault upon 
 the established order of things, but in coerc 
 ing the popular will throughout one half of 
 the territory of the Republic, and in over 
 whelming the domestic institutions of thirteen 
 States of the Federal Union, it cannot be 
 doubted, by any candid man, that the popular 
 voice of the North would have called a per 
 emptory " halt! " and that the whole course 
 of subsequent events would have been mate 
 rially changed. 
 
 There are not wanting injudicious and in 
 considerate friends of the Union, particularly 
 upon the other side of the Atlantic, who de 
 light to represent the " uprising of the 
 North " as the initial movement of a magnifi 
 cent moral crusade destined, in the provi 
 dence of God, to deliver America from the 
 sin and the shame of slavery. 
 
 Such representations give an indecently 
 Jesuitical cast to the designs of provi 
 dence," do grave injustice to the spirit, the 
 character, and the intelligence of the North 
 ern people, and might almost seem to be 
 made in the direct interest of that originally 
 small and fanatical party of Disunion at the 
 South, which, by insisting upon the imminence 
 of such a crusade, and lashing therewith the 
 fears and doubts and passions of the body 
 of the Southern people into frenzy, precipita 
 ted the movement of secession, and enlisted 
 whole commonwealths in the service of their 
 
 own designs. And no one thing assuredly 
 will bear more heavily upon the administra 
 tion of Mr. Lincoln, at the bar of history, 
 than the fact that the most conspicuous ad 
 visers of the Pxesident, in the outset of this 
 great struggle, were men who, both by their 
 antecedent and their subsequent course in 
 politics, have given color to such representa 
 tions. 
 
 Nowhere is that blind and fanatical passion 
 which would precipitate one whole community, 
 or section of a community of human beings 
 against another, upon a mission of moral 
 chastisement and correction, so odious and un 
 pardonable as in the high places of authority. 
 " The whole modern mind," it has been ad 
 mirably said, "is in the sovereignty of rea 
 son, the rational organization of society by re 
 flection ; " and of those who are charged with 
 the duty of administering the affairs of a 
 great nation in modern times, it is above all 
 required that they should be capable of reflec 
 tion and governed by reason. 
 
 Reason shows us that in the long course of 
 ages past there is no one movement of a whole 
 community which can bo wholly condemned 
 or wholly approved ; reason convinces us, 
 therefore, that the future will judge ourselves 
 as we judge the past, and will no more par 
 take our passions than we partake those of the 
 past. Absent as it would seem to have been 
 where most its presence was required, in the 
 inner councils of the Administration, this 
 wholesome faculty of reason was not lacking 
 to the people in general. 
 
 Among the volunteers who thronged the 
 front of war at the Presidential summons in 
 April, 1861, there may have been, and doubt 
 less were men who were governed solely by 
 their passions ; who thought only of chastising 
 southern insolence ; of abolishing southern 
 slavery, and of settling by force the future re 
 lations of the States. But the vast majority 
 of these volunteers were men of a very differ 
 ent stamp, men who could discriminate be 
 tween wrongs to be redressed and rights to bo 
 respected. 
 
 Of these was the young major-general called 
 to the command of the contingent of Ohio. 
 His first duty obviously was the organization 
 of the force put under his orders ; and to this 
 duty he addressed himself immediately with 
 all the energy of his character. Believing 
 that the army of the Union had a single and 
 definite work to do, he perceived the supreme 
 importance of putting the army into such a 
 condition as should make the doing of that 
 work the certain immediate consequence of 
 the attempt to do it. 
 
11 
 
 The Western States, as General McClellan 
 at once found upon commencing his labors, 
 were ** totally unprepared for the impending 
 struggle." The Government of the Union 
 wfes entirely unable to assist the States in the 
 organization and equipment of the troops which 
 it had called upon them to furnish. Lieuten 
 ant-General Scott, commanding-in-chief the 
 whole army, at once recognized the dangerous 
 condition of affairs, recommended the appoint 
 ment -of General McClellan to the rank of 
 Major-General in the Army of the United 
 States, and uniting the three great States of 
 Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana into one " Depart 
 ment of the Ohio," confided this department to 
 his care. General McClellan instantly called 
 the governors of these States into council 
 with himself, and laid before them the true 
 state of matters in the West. All that could 
 possibly be done, with the earnest cooperation 
 of these State authorities, was done, and the. 
 work of preparing their contingents for the 
 field was pushed forward as rapidly as the cir 
 cumstances of a population, quite unused to 
 war and not yet in the least aware of the ex 
 tent of the conflict upon which it was enter 
 ing, would permit. 
 
 -While busily engaged in this exhausting 
 and harassing duty, General McClellan found 
 time to scan, with the practised and untroubled 
 eye of a skilful soldier, the whole field over 
 which the clouds of war were swiftly rolling 
 up. 
 
 The President s proclamation had produced 
 not only in the seceded States, but throughout 
 the South, an effect wholly at variance with 
 the general expectations of the Northern peo 
 ple, if not with the intimate hopes and pur 
 poses of those who were most busy and influ 
 ential in the Presidential councils. Instead 
 of intimidating the seceded States, it had in 
 tensified their rage against the Government 
 and the Union ; instead of rallying the unse- 
 cedcd States of the South to the support of 
 order and the castigation of insults offered to 
 the flag, it had been made the instrument of 
 driving the great States of Tennessee, North 
 Carolina, and Virginia themselves into seces 
 sion, and had excited a most formidable fer 
 ment of public feeling in Kentucky and Mis 
 souri. 
 
 Within a month from the date of that proc 
 lamation it had become evident to experienced 
 military men that an extensive collision be 
 tween the troops and people of the States act 
 ually armed and arming at the South, and 
 the hastily-organized and imperfectly-equipped 
 though brave and enthusiastic volunteers of 
 the ,North, might more than probably result 
 
 in such a practical humiliation of the Govern 
 ment as must give an enormous impulse to 
 the now gigantic movement of rebellion. 
 
 General Scott, at Washington, urged this 
 consideration upon the Government with all 
 the weight of his large experience and all the 
 earnestness of his already historical patriot 
 ism. General McClellan, from his position 
 upon the Ohio, reinforced the representations 
 of the General-in-Chief, pressed most strongly 
 for the utmost possible activity in arming and 
 equipping the Western contingents, recom 
 mending the largest possible increase of the 
 whole force to be employed, and proposed 
 such a flank movement up the valley of south 
 western Virginia upon Kichmond as would 
 insure the possession of Tennessee to the 
 Union, guarantee the tranquillity of Ken 
 tucky, and, above all, secure decisive results to 
 the great military operations preparing in the 
 East against Virginia. 
 
 But in the temper, at once frivolous and 
 fanatical, which then prevailed at Washington, 
 the counsels of military experience were un 
 heard or unheeded. 
 
 It was natural enough, perhaps, that the 
 people of the North in general should have 
 been insensible to the gravity of the events 
 now before them. The great majority of the 
 Northern people having neither desired nor 
 labored for the disruption of the Union, could 
 not possibly bring themselves to believe that 
 the Union was really in danger of disruption. 
 They looked upon the South as maddened and 
 misguided, and fully expected that a brief 
 campaign resulting in the overthrow of the 
 extemporized "government" at Eichmond 
 and in tjie dispersion of the extemporized army 
 of the rebellion, would be followed by the im 
 mediate return of the States to their alle 
 giance, and to such a general revision of the 
 political sins and follies of both sections as 
 should insure their deserts to the fanatics and 
 disorganizes of both. 
 
 With the smaller, but for the moment, un 
 fortunately, influential party at the North, 
 which really preferred the disunion of the 
 States to the permanence of a constitution 
 which recognized and protected the right of 
 the Southern States to regulate their own do 
 mestic institutions, it was an article of faith 
 that the South was incapable of a vigorous 
 effort at independence. It was said of old 
 that " a fool is never completely a fool until 
 he knows Latin; " and it may be said, with 
 equal truth, that a fanatic is never completely 
 a fanatic till he has taken to statistics. Study 
 ing the South in the tables of the census, the 
 political Abolitionists of the North had satis- 
 
12 
 
 fied themselves, and were ready to crucify all 
 the rest of the world into believing, that the 
 South was bankrupt as to its finances, and 
 emasculated as to its population ; that it ex 
 isted as a social fact, indeed, simply by virtue 
 of its connection with the North, and must 
 tumble hopelessly to pieces at the moment 
 when it should attempt to stand alone. 
 
 Controlled by the spirit of those who thus 
 believed, the Administration listened impa 
 tiently to such counsels as those of General 
 Scott and General McClellan. To question, 
 indeed, the certainty of an immediate collapse 
 of the rebellion upon the first advance of the 
 National forces was considered by the more 
 enthusiastic supporters of the Administration 
 in Congress and in the press at the outset of the 
 war, as proof positive of a secret sympathy 
 with secession. And there can be no doubt 
 that much of the strange personal animosity 
 with which General McClellan has been 
 assailed by this class of persons, must be at 
 tributed to the intolerable vindication by sub 
 sequent events of the estimates which he orig 
 inally made of the strength of the South, and 
 of the force which would be needed to make a 
 prompt and profitable demonstration of the 
 national power. There is nothing which most 
 men arc so slow to forgive in those with whom 
 they quarrel as the crime of being proved to 
 be in the right. 
 
 " On the 21st of May," says General Mc 
 Clellan, " the total number of small arms in 
 the State of Ohio was twenty-five thousand 
 one hundred and seventy-nine, of which twen 
 ty-two thousand and seventyfive were smooth- 
 Lores, mostly very inferior specimens of the 
 altered flint-locks. Infantry equipments were 
 still more difficult to obtain." 
 
 With this miserable provision for the ar 
 mament of the Ohio contingent to be made the 
 best of, improved and increased only by per 
 sonal unremitting efforts ; and with the 
 knowledge that no force equal to the vast en 
 terprise before the country had yet been sum 
 moned by tjie President into the field, Gen 
 eral McClellan did not hesitate to plan and to 
 urge upon the Government such comprehen 
 sive and decisive schemes of action as we have 
 already alluded to. 
 
 But these schenies of action were schemes 
 of policy, as well of war. The young general 
 of the Ohio troops, whose life had been passed 
 in the study of the art of war, had less faith 
 in the virtue of mere brute force to bring 
 American citizens to reason, than many a new- 
 fledged captain who had just left his law- 
 books and his red tape to don the harness of 
 battle." 
 
 The following passage will show how anx 
 iously at this time General McClellan sought 
 to combine a wise abstinence from military in 
 terference, where such interference was not 
 absolutely essential to the main tenance of the 
 national authority, with large conceptions of 
 the work to be done by the army and with 
 adequate preparation for doing it : 
 
 " During the month of May the political 
 aspect of affairs in Kentucky and Western 
 Virginia was uncertain and threatening. In 
 the latter a convention had been called to as 
 semble at Wheeling, on the 13th of May, to 
 decide upon the question of separation from 
 the eastern portion of the State, while the 
 election upon the question of ratifying the 
 Richmond ordinance of secession from the 
 United States, was fixed for the 23d of the 
 same month. Excitement ran high, and hon 
 est men differed widely as to the policy that 
 .should bo pursued by the military authorities 
 of the general government. 
 
 " I received a multitude of letters from a 
 large number of sincere Union men who en 
 tertained widely divergent views as to the 
 measures adequate to the emergency. Many 
 urged, as early as the beginning of May, that 
 troops should immediately be sent into Vir 
 ginia, to encourage the Union men and pre 
 vent the secessionists from gaining a foothold. 
 At least an equal number insisted, with equal 
 force, that the arrival of troops from other 
 States would merely arouse State pride, throw 
 many wavering men into the rebel ranks, and 
 at once kindle the flames of civil war. 
 
 In Kentucky the struggle was much more 
 bitter than in Western Virginia. The State 
 government, the arms, and the military or 
 ganization, were to a great extent in the hands 
 of men who favored the secession of the State ; 
 but so able and determined was the course of 
 the Union leaders, and so marked did the ma 
 jority of the people soon become in their sup 
 port, that the secessionist leaders were com 
 pelled to content themselves with the avowal 
 of the position of neutrality, while awaiting 
 the results of the elections to be held on the 
 26th June for congressmen, and on the 4th 
 August for members of the legislature. 
 
 "The policy of the leaders of the Union 
 party was, To remain in the Union without 
 a revolution, under all the forms of law, and 
 by their own action. The words of Garret 
 Davis were, We will remain in the Union by 
 voting if we can, by fighting if we must, and 
 if we cannot hold our own, we will call on 
 the general government to aid us. 
 
 "It was the desire of these true and able 
 men that no extraneous elements of excite- 
 
13 
 
 ment should be introduced in the State until 
 the elections were over ; they felt sure of car 
 rying these elections if left to themselves. I 
 fully coincided with them in their expectations 
 and opinions, and, so far as was in my power, 
 lent them every assistance in carrying out 
 their views, among which were the organiza 
 tion of Home Guards and the distribution of 
 arms to Union men. In Missouri, hostilities 
 had already broken out, and it was evident 
 that that State was destined to become the 
 seat of serious fighting ; nor was it then sup 
 posed that our tenure of St. Louis was en 
 tirely secure. 
 
 "Collections of Southern troops at Mem 
 phis and Union City threatened Columbus, 
 ly., and Cairo, and made it necessary to 
 keep a vigilant watch in that direction. It 
 should also be remembered that in the early 
 part of May the National Capital was by no 
 means secure, and it was not at that time an 
 improbable contingency that Western regi 
 ments might yet be needed to protect or re 
 gain Washington. As bearing upon this point, 
 it may be stated that in a letter addressed to 
 the Gencral-in-chief on the 21st May, I in 
 formed him that from the information in my 
 possession the indications were that the dispo 
 sable troops in the regular Confederate ser 
 vice, from Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, 
 and Louisiana had gone to the cast, via Lynch- 
 burg ; leaving in Tennessee the State militia, 
 who were badly armed and under no disci 
 pline. On the 26th April, when my com 
 mand was confined to the limits of the State 
 of Ohio, I submitted to the General-in-chief 
 certain suggestions, the substance of which 
 was : That, for the purposes of defence, Cairo 
 should be occupied by two battalions, strongly 
 intrenched, and provided with heavy guns and 
 a gun-boat to control the river ; that some eight 
 battalions should be stationed at Sandoval in 
 Illinois to observe St. Louis, sustain the gar 
 rison of Cairo, and, if necessary, reinforce 
 Cincinnati ; that a few companies should ob 
 serve the lower Wabash ; that some four 
 thousand men should be posted at Seymour 
 in Indiana to observe Louisville, and be ready 
 to support either Cincinnati or Cairo ; that 
 there should be five thousand men at or near 
 Cincinnati, and two battalions at Chillicothe, 
 Ohio. With the troops disposable for active 
 operations, it was proposed to move up the 
 valley of the Great Kanawha upon Richmond ; 
 this movement to be made with the greatest 
 promptness, that it might not fail to relieve 
 Washington, or to insure the destruction of 
 the enemy in eastern Virginia, if aided by a 
 prompt advance on the eastern line of opera 
 
 tions. Should Kentucky assume a hostile 
 attitude, it was recommended to cross the Ohio 
 with eighty thousand men, and move straight 
 on Nashville, acting thence in concert with a 
 vigorous defensive on the eastern line. It 
 was strongly urged that everything possible 
 should be done to hasten the equipment and 
 armament of the Western troops, as the nation 
 would be entirely deprived of their powerful 
 aid until this should be accomplished. 
 
 "It was not until the 13th May that the 
 order, forming the Department of the Ohio 
 and assigning* ine to the command, was re 
 ceived. In the mean time, as much excite 
 ment existed at Cincinnati, which city was 
 regarded as a tempting object to the enemy in 
 the uncertain condition of Kentucky, I took 
 steps to concentrate the greater part of the 
 Ohio troops at Camp Dennison, on the Little 
 Miami Railroad, seventeen miles from Cincin 
 nati ; a favorable position for instruction, and 
 presenting peculiar facilities for movement in 
 any direction. As .soon as the new depart 
 ment was placed under my command I took 
 steps for the immediate erection of heavy bat 
 teries at Cairo. In- the letter of May 21st, 
 already referred to, after giving the informa 
 tion obtained in regard to the position of the 
 enemy on the Mississippi River, it was stated 
 that I was convinced of the necessity of hav 
 ing, without a day s delay, a few efficient gun 
 boats to operate from Cairo as a base ; that if 
 they were rendered shot-proof, they would en 
 able us at least to annoy seriously the rebel 
 camps on the Mississippi, and interfere with 
 their river communications their main de 
 pendence ; that I requested authority to make" 
 the necessary expenditures to procure gun 
 boats, and that I regarded them as an indis 
 pensable element in any system of operations, 
 whether offensive or defensive. In the same 
 letter .the necessity for light batteries was 
 strongly set forth." 
 
 While General McClellan was thus reflect 
 ing and acting at the West, members of the 
 cabinet in Washington were expressing to 
 foreigners their " willingness to let the South 
 have its way and go in peace," and radical 
 journalists, ostensibly of the same party with 
 these statesmen, were clamoring for the coer 
 cion of Kentucky into " active loyalty." All 
 was chaotic, indefinite, passionate, and extrav 
 agant in the language, the policy, and the 
 purposes of the Administration. 
 
 The Southern Government had been auda 
 ciously removed from Montgomery to Rich 
 mond, with an open threat uttered by the 
 Southern Secretary of War, that the " Con 
 federate flag" should soon wave in triumph 
 
14 
 
 over Washington city. Mr. Davis, availing 
 himself of his past military experience, had 
 secured the early organization of his army by 
 inducing the " Confederate Congress " to pass 
 a law enlisting all volunteers for the period of 
 the war ; and although many dissensions ex 
 isted at Richmond and in the Southern camp, 
 of which a calm and thoughtful mind at the 
 head of the affairs, of the Union might have 
 taken signal advantage, the military prepa 
 rations of the South were going on with a gen- 
 era<l consistency of purpose and harmony of 
 action unknown upon our side o f the Potomac. 
 General Scott, forgetting his many infirmi 
 ties, labored resolutely to perfect the arrange 
 ments necessary to put an army into the field 
 with any fair prospect of success ; but he was 
 daily insulted by the self-constituted captains 
 of the nation in the columns of the Adminis 
 tration press, and he soon found that he could 
 not safely count upon that quiet and vigorous 
 support from the Administration itself, without 
 which all his efforts must .necessarily be vain. 
 He could find but little time to bestow upon 
 the state of matters west of the Alleghanies ; 
 and General McClellan was, accordingly, left 
 very much to himself. The responsibility thus 
 thrown upon him was very great and solemn ; 
 but he did not shrink from the burden. 
 
 Having made up his mind towards the end 
 of May that the State troops of Virginia, then 
 acting independently of the Confederate forces, 
 and commanded by General Robert Lee, were 
 bent upon invading Western Virginia, reduc 
 ing the Union sentiment of that section, and 
 destroying as far as possible the communica 
 tions between Washington and the Central 
 West, General McClellan, though he had un 
 der his orders at that time no more than nine 
 available regiments of infantry, resolved to 
 advance into and occupy Western Virginia. 
 
 General McClellan felt that this was a se 
 rious and momentous step to take. His mind 
 was too deeply imbued with the spirit of the 
 patriots who labored together at the building 
 up of our national edifice, to rogard the inva 
 sion of one American commonwealth by the 
 armed citizens of another as a light or indif 
 ferent thing. He recognized his obligation to 
 make a full explanation of the feelings and 
 purposes with which such a step was taken to 
 the people of the invaded State, and to im 
 press upon the troops under his command in 
 the clearest manner the strict limitations of the 
 painful duty which they -were about to perform. 
 And he accordingly issued to the inhab 
 itants of Western Virginia, and to the soldiers 
 of the Department the following proclamation 
 and address : 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 . yif>. iM 701?] 5 iv<j o-icr wrofrvVttfl 
 
 HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, 
 May 26, 1861. 
 
 To the Union Men of Western Virginia : 
 
 VIRGINIANS ! The general government 
 has long enough endured the machinations of 
 a few factious rebels in your midst. Arawd 
 traitors have in vain endeavored to deter you 
 from expressing your loyalty at the polls. 
 Having failed in this infamous attempt to de 
 prive you of the exercise of your dearest 
 rights, they now seek to inaugurate a reign of 
 terror, and thus force you to yield to their 
 schemes, and submit to the yoke of the traitor 
 ous conspiracy, dignified by the name of the 
 Southern Confederacy. They are destroying 
 the property of citizens of your State, and 
 ruining your magnificent railways. The general 
 government has heretofore carefully abstained 
 from sending troops across the Ohio, or even 
 from posting them along its banks, although fre 
 quently urged to do so by many of your prom 
 inent citizens. It determined to await the 
 result of the late election, desirous that no one 
 might be able to say that the slightest effort- 
 had been made from this side to influence the 
 free expression of your opinions, although the 
 many agencies brought to bear upon you by 
 the rebels were well l^iown. You have now 
 shown, under the most adverse circumstances, 
 that the great mass of the people of Western 
 Virginia are true and loyal to that bsneficent 
 government under which we and our fathers 
 have lived so long. As soon as the result of 
 the election was known, the traitors com 
 menced their work of destruction. The gen- 
 el-al government cannot close its ears to the 
 demand you have made for assistance. I have 
 ordered troops to cross the Ohio River. They 
 come as your friends and brothers, as en 
 emies only to the armed rebels who are preying 
 upon you. Your homes, your families, and 
 your property are safe under our protection. 
 All your rights shall be religiously respected, 
 notwithstanding all that has been said by the 
 traitors to induce you to believe that our ad- 
 "-. vent among you will be signalized by interfer 
 ence with your slaves. Understand one thing 
 clearly. Not only will we abstain from all 
 such interference, but we will on the contrary, 
 with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insur 
 rection on their part. Now, that we are in 
 your midst, I call upon you to fly to arms and 
 support the general government. Sever the 
 connection that binds you to traitors ; proclaim 
 to the world that the faith and loyalty, so long 
 boasted by the Old Dominion, are still pre- 
 
15 
 
 served in Western Virginia, and that you re 
 main true to the stars and stripes. 
 
 GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, 
 Major-General U. S. A., Comd g Dep t. 
 
 
 ADDRESS. 
 
 HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, 
 
 CINCINNATI, May 26, 1861. 
 
 SOLDIERS ! You are ordered to cross the 
 frontier, and enter upon the soil of Virginia. 
 Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, 
 to protect the- majesty of the law, and to res 
 cue our brethren from the grasp of armed 
 traitcrs. You are to act in concert with Vir 
 ginia troops, and to support their advance. I 
 place under the safeguard of your honor the 
 persons and property of the Virginians. I 
 know that you will respect their feelings and 
 all their rights. 
 
 Preserve the strictest discipline ; remem 
 ber that each one of you holds in his keeping 
 the honor of Ohio and the Union. If you 
 are called upon to overcome armed opposition, 
 I know that your courage is equal to the task ; 
 but remember, that your only foes are the 
 armed traitors, and show mercy even to 
 them when they are in your power, for many 
 of them are misguided. When, under your 
 protection, the loyal men of Western Virginia 
 have been enabled to organize and arm, they 
 can protect themselves, and you can then return 
 to your homes, with the proud satisfaction of 
 having saved a gallant people from destruc 
 tion. 
 
 GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, 
 
 Major-General U. S. A., Comd g. 
 
 Left entirely to himself, as we have seen 
 that he was in the conduct as well as in the 
 conception of this campaign upon which he 
 , had now entered, General McClellan could 
 , have no reason to suppose that the Adminis- 
 , tration desired or intended to wage war 
 ; against the seceded States otherwise, than as 
 refractory members of the national community. 
 He knew for himself what limits the Consti 
 tution had plainly put upon the interference 
 of the Federal authority with the internal af 
 fairs of the States, and in his Proclamation 
 and Address he wisely reiterated, with all the 
 solemnity of a man whose words were so 
 soon to be tested by his acts, the language 
 used by President Lincoln in his Inaugural 
 Address, delivered less than three months 
 before : 
 
 " I declare that I have no purpose, direct 
 ly or indirectly, to interfere with the institu 
 tion of slavery in the States where it exists. , 
 I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and 
 have no inclination to do so. . . . The 
 right of each State to order and control its 
 own domestic institutions according to its 
 own judgment exclusively, is essential to the 
 balance of power on which the perfection and 
 endurance of our political fabric depend." 
 
 Little could the young general have 
 dreamed that, ere two years had passed over 
 his head, the author of this Inaugural Ad 
 dress would tacitly suffer it to be imputed to 
 him as a crime that he had thus honestly in 
 terpreted these solemn professions of loyalty 
 to the letter of the Constitution and to the 
 spirit of the Union. 
 
 General McClellan soon found that his 
 military instincts had guided him aright, and 
 that he had not entered Western Virginia a 
 day too soon. The enemy were gathering in 
 the mountains of that noble and picturesque 
 country, and having already occupied two 
 strong positions at Laurel Hill and Rich 
 Mountain under an able commander, General 
 Garnett , of Virginia, were preparing them 
 selves to take the offensive. 
 
 From Washington, General McClellan, al 
 though he regularly forwarded intelligence of 
 his movements, acts, and operations, received 
 no orders or instructions whatever. He knew 
 nothing of the campaign in the East save that 
 Richmond was its object, and he had no rea 
 son to suppose that the slightest attention 
 had been bestowed upon his repeated sugges 
 tions for the invasion and occupation of 
 Eastern Tennessee, a movement which, had it 
 been made at the time when he wished it, 
 must almost irresistibly have been crowned 
 with success; the Confederate army, such 
 as it tiien was, being concentrated in Virginia 
 and Tennessee, the latter State full of ill-sup 
 pressed Union feeling. How much in time, in 
 expense, and in the inestimable waste of pre 
 cious blood would have been saved to us, had 
 those to whom these suggestions were thus 
 early and thus clearly made, had ears to hear 
 or hearts to understand ! 
 
 By the end of June the columns of Gen 
 eral McOiellan were in such a position as to 
 promise a speedy and decisive engagement 
 with the troops of General Garnett. Once 
 more the young commander thought it right 
 to preface the actual shod: of war with a frank 
 appeal to his army. On the 25th of June, 
 1801, he issued, from his head-quarters at 
 Grafton, in Virginia, the following ad 
 dress : 
 
16 
 
 " To THE SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OP THE 
 WEST: 
 
 " You are here to support the goverment 
 of your country and to protect the lives and 
 liberties of your brethren, threatened by a 
 rebellious and traitorous foe. No higher and 
 nobler duty could devolve upon you, and I 
 expect you to bring to its performance the 
 highest and noblest qualities of soldiers 
 discipline, courage, and mercy. I call upon 
 the officers of every grade to enforce the 
 strictest discipline, and I know that those of 
 all grades, privates and officers, will display 
 in battle cool, heroic courage, and will know 
 how to show mercy to a disarmed enemy. 
 
 " Bear in mind that you are in the country 
 of friends, not of enemies ; that you are here 
 to protect, not to destroy. Take nothing, 
 destroy nothing, unless you are ordered to do 
 so by your general officers. Remember that 
 [ have pledged my word to the people of 
 Western Virginia, that their rights in person 
 and property shall be respected. I ask every 
 one of you to make good this promise in its 
 broadest sense. We come here to save, not 
 to upturn. I do not appeal to the /ear of 
 punishment, but to your appreciation* of the 
 sacredness of the cause" in which we are en 
 gaged. Carry with you into battle the con 
 viction that you are right, and that God is on 
 your side. 
 
 Your enemies have violated every moral 
 law neither God nor man can sustain them. 
 They have without cause rebelled against a 
 mild and paternal government; they have 
 seized upon public and private property; 
 they have outraged the persons of Northern 
 men merely because they came from the 
 North, and of Southern Union men merely 
 because, they loved the Union; they have 
 placed themselves beneath contempt, unless 
 they can retrieve some honor on the field of 
 battle. You will pursue a different course. 
 You will be honest, brave, and merciful ; 
 you will respect the right of private opinion ; 
 you will punish no man for opinion s sake. 
 Show to the world that you differ from our 
 enemies in the points of honor, honesty, and 
 respect for private opinion, and that we in- 
 augurate no reign of terror where we go. 
 
 "Soldiers! I have heard that there was 
 danger here. I have come to place myself 
 at your head and to share it with you. I fear 
 now but one thing that you will not find 
 foemen worthy of your steel. I know that I 
 can rely upon you. 
 
 "GEO. B. McCEELT,AN, 
 
 Major-General ComcTg" 
 
 This address was issued at Grafton, 
 where, hampered at every turn by the want 
 of competent staff officers, General McClel- 
 lan^was rapidly organizing his new and inex 
 perienced troops into a movable column, for 
 service in a country singularly broken and 
 difficult against an enemy familiar with all 
 the intricacies and defiles of its vast forests 
 and its almost trackless mountain ranges. 
 This work was accomplished with a rapidity 
 and a success which enabled General McClel- 
 lan to assail the enemy in their formidable 
 positions before the arrival of the heavy 
 reinforcements which General Garnett was 
 expecting from Richmond. 
 
 The Mexican experience of the young 
 commander now came into play. . Rich 
 Mountain, near the foot of which Colonel 
 Pegram, of Garnett s command, had roughly 
 but strongly entrenched himself, was turned 
 by the manoeuvre which had given General 
 Scott the victory of Cerro Gordo. Under 
 the command of Brigadier-General Rose- 
 crans, a force, of about two thousand men, 
 chiefly troops of Ohio and Indiana, and all 
 of them perfectly new to battle, passed in a 
 heavy rain through the dense forests, climbed 
 a steep and difficult mountain, and forming 
 gallantly upon the crest of the ascent, stormed 
 and carried the works of the enemy at that 
 point. In the mean time General McClellan 
 had got the rest of his troops in position to 
 attack the position of Pegram in the front. 
 But General Rosecrans, after carrying the 
 enemy s works on the mountain, failed to 
 complete his part of the programme, and 
 move upon Pegram from the rear. This 
 misfortune disconcerted the plan of the com 
 manding general, and gave the enemy the 
 opportunity of which he availed himself, 
 during the night, of evacuating his works 
 and endeavoring to join the main body of 
 General Garnett s force. General Rose 
 crans did not succeed in communicating with 
 General McClellan until nearly noon of the 
 next day, but such was the skilful dispo 
 sition which the latter had made of his army 
 that the greater part of the fugitives from 
 Rich Mountain were ultimately forced to 
 surrender themselves prisoners of war. 
 
 Garnett, on learning the fate of the battle 
 at Rich Mountain, at once began his retreat 
 from his own position of Laurel Hill. He 
 was promptly pursued, and in an action 
 between his own rear-guard and the advance 
 of one of General McClellan s divisions under 
 General Morris, at Carrick s Ford, fell, while 
 gallantly striving to rally his troops. He was 
 the first officer of conspicuous rank and 
 
17 
 
 merit who perished in actual conflict in this 
 great war. 
 
 General Hill, with about twenty-five hun 
 dred men, came up with the remnants of 
 General Garnett s army on the 14ih of July, 
 Virce days after the battle of Rich Mountain, 
 et a point beyond the Red House, on the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, but for some 
 yet unexplained cause, into which no inves 
 tigation was ever ordered, the great events 
 or Bull Run and Manassas Plains sweeping 
 the matter swiftly into oblivion, failed to 
 attack them. 
 
 Notwithstanding these short-eomings of 
 liis subordinates, however, General McClel- 
 
 lan s 
 
 successes 
 
 in Western Virginia were 
 
 both brilliant and substantial. They cheered 
 the whole country with their evidences of 
 the work that might be expected from our 
 volunteers when organized and led by a 
 commander worthy of his post. They 
 cleared Northwestern Virginia of the Con 
 federate troops, and the population of that 
 region having been satisfied by the procla 
 mations and by the conduct of the -victorious 
 general that their rights would really be pro- 
 tec t%d and their institutions respected under 
 the flag of the Union, Northwestern Vir 
 ginia at once. became, and has ever since 
 remained, a staunch and loyal supporter of 
 the Union cause. 
 
 Receiving no orders from the East, and 
 having satisfied himself that no danger was 
 left to threaten Patterson, at Winchester, from 
 the quarter which he had just so thoroughly 
 cleaved of enemies, General McClellan 
 turned his attention at once to Southwestr 
 ern Virginia, where General Cox was strug 
 gling against a superior force in the Kan- 
 awlia Valley. He resolved to repair thither 
 in person. 
 
 His preparations were rapidly, making, 
 his troops in motion, and General Cox 
 informed of his general intentions, when the 
 whole aspect of affairs was suddenly changed. 
 On the 21st of July the army of the Union 
 hurled on the enemy at Manassas Plains by 
 the clamor of the radical press and poli 
 ticians, was utterly and disastrously defeated. 
 On the 22d the Administration tele 
 graphed to General McClellan, summoning 
 him at once to the defence of the country 
 and the protection of the government. 
 
 Before leaving Western Virginia in obedi 
 ence to the summons of the Government, for 
 Washington, General McClellan released on 
 parole the prisoners taken by him from Gen 
 eral Garnett s command. This measure pro 
 duced the happiest effects for the cause of 
 
 the Union, in that part of the country 
 Taken in connection with the calm and con 
 ciliatory tone of the Federal General s procla 
 mations, it served to confound the passionate 
 representations of the Southern press in 
 respect to the purposes of the Federal inva 
 sion ; arid many months afterwards the Rich 
 mond papers bitterly complained of the " de 
 moralizing " influence exerted upon the Con 
 federate forces and upon the popular senti 
 ment in Western Virginia, by the clemency 
 and forbearance which had marked these first 
 victories of the Union army. 
 
 It was of the first importance to the suc 
 cess of the revolutionary movement at the 
 South that the worst impressions of the 
 Northern temper, and of the purposes of the 
 Administration elevated to power by an 
 exclusively Northern majority, which had 
 been propagated throughout the Southern 
 States during the contest which preceded the 
 Presidential election of 1860, should be 
 confirmed and reinforced by the conduct of the 
 armies of the Union, and by the tone of 
 the Government. This General McClellan 
 perfectly well understood. He saw that the 
 battle for the Union was neither to be fought 
 nor to be won in the field alone, but that 
 military victories which might be decisive in 
 the cnse of a foreign war, would be little 
 more profitable than defeats, in the case of 
 a civil war, unless they were made the oppor 
 tunity of such appeals to the better reason 
 of the defeated party, as an honest devotion 
 to the avowed object of the war must dictate 
 to every sincere and patriotic rnind. It was 
 above all things ess ontiul,. he held, that 
 nothing should be done either to countenance 
 the idea that the war was to be waged for 
 the abolition of slavery, or to justify the 
 notion that the Northern people were actu 
 ated by a spirit of vengeful hostility towards 
 their alienated fellow-citizens of the South. 
 
 Such had been the condition of the 
 Southern States under the Union, such theii 
 prosperity, and go great the general wcltire 
 of their people, that it was impossible for 
 any well-informed and intelligent mind to 
 believe that anything less than a wide-sprea.l 
 conviction of danger immediately imminent 
 over their peace and happiness, could have 
 driven the inhabitants of those States into 
 acquiescing in the violent rupture of the 
 ties which bound them to their confederates 
 of the North and West. The whole past 
 history of the world unfortunately proves 
 that a conviction need by no means be rea 
 sonable or well-founded, in order to drive 
 
whole communities into taking the most 
 aerious measures. 
 
 In our own country, and in the year 1832, 
 Henry Clay had not hesitated to declare in 
 his place in the Senate of the United States, 
 while urging the claims of that protective 
 tariff which was styled the "American sys 
 tem," "let New "England and the West, 
 and tli a Middle States all feel that they 
 arc tho victims of a mistaken policy, and 
 let those vast portions of our common 
 country despair of any favorable change, 
 and then, indeed, might we tremble for the 
 continuance and safety of this Union." 
 If a statesman so cordially and intensely 
 patriotic as the "Sage of Ashland," could 
 thus recognize the power which might reside 
 in a wide-spread popular feeling in respect 
 to a point of economical interest mainly, to 
 break up the bonds of the Union, it was 
 surely imperative upon all those whose duty 
 called them to deal with an actual disruption 
 of the Union under the influence of a wide 
 spread popular fe3ling, in respect to a point 
 of vital social, as well as economical impor 
 tance, that they should bear that feeling in 
 mind in all their measures, and devote them 
 selves sedulously to allaying and dissipating 
 its force by all proper and possible means. 
 
 Thus, at least, Major-General McClellan 
 construed the obligations of his position as 
 a commander of the forces charged to main 
 tain the authority of the Federal laws. That 
 this construction of his obligations was as 
 politic as it was honest and manly, and his 
 conduct in obedience to this construction 
 of his obligations, as wise as it was honorable, 
 * would seem to be abundantly established 
 by the simple fact that out of all the region 
 embraced within the scope of the movement 
 of secession, the territory of West Virginia 
 alone can, even now, be truly said to have 
 been restored to its allegiance to the Union, 
 it may well be questioned whether the 
 measure by which that territory has since 
 been severed from the State of Virginia, 
 uiiJ erected into a separate sovereignty was 
 any more politic than constitutional ; but of 
 West Virginia alone in the South, can it 
 be with accuracy affirmed, that its inhabitants, 
 as a body, have been reclaimed to the sup 
 port of the Federal authority ; nor can there 
 be any doubt in the minds of candid men 
 that this result -was brought about by that 
 brief but brilliant campaign of July, 1861, 
 in which General McClellan, at once un 
 assisted and unhampered by any communica 
 tions with the administration at Washington, 
 was wise and fortunate enough to bo r.ble to 
 
 " superadd to the exercise of force the policy 
 of conciliation," in dealing with this section 
 of the "Old Dominion." 
 
 On the 27th of July, 1861, General Mc 
 Clellan assumed the command in the city of 
 Washington, of the " Division of the Poto 
 mac." 
 
 Six days before, the greater part of the 
 troops comprising this division had suffered 
 an overwhelming defeat from the army of the 
 rebellion on the plains of Manassas. The 
 moral effects of this defeat had been as 
 portentous as the popular confidence of vic 
 tory by which the army of the Union was 
 driven into the field had been absolute and 
 unquestioning. 
 
 The cabinet of Mr. Lincoln contained no 
 one man possessed of the slightest military 
 experience. The President .indeed, in his 
 earty youth, had made a brief campaign 
 against the Indians of the Northwest in tho 
 capacity of a captain of militia, but the 
 experience he had gained in this campaign 
 was not of a nature greatly to serve him in 
 the administration of a great civil war to be 
 waged against the whole force of elevea 
 proud and powerful American States. *By 
 a singular fatality, too, neither he nor any 
 one of his ministers had ever enjoyed any 
 opportunities of familiarity even with tho 
 civil administration of the federal power. In 
 the earlier times of the republic a certain 
 education in one or another department of 
 the cabinet was regarded almost as a con 
 dition precedent to the elevation of any man 
 to the Presidency ; but Mr. Lincoln bad 
 passed at once from the practice of the law 
 in the interior of a great Western State, 
 and from the " caucuses " of an opposition 
 party into the first administrative office of 
 the land. Nor had one of the Secretaries 
 whom he called around him ever filled a 
 position of any importance in the administra 
 tion of federal affdrs. 
 
 From this condition of things at Washing!- i 
 it resulted that the Government was equal j 
 unskilled to control and to direct the popular 
 enthusiasm. When the President and his 
 advisers saw themselves surrounded in tho 
 capital by a force of armed men vastly 
 larger than had ever before been arrayed 
 under the flag of the Union they believed 
 themselves to be looking upon an army ready 
 for and equal to any enterprise, however 
 arduous. It was in vain that Lieutenant- 
 General Scott urged upon them the utter 
 worthlessness for all purposes of invasion 
 of such a force, unorganized, undisciplined, 
 imperfectly equipped, and still more impor- 
 
19 
 
 fbetly officered as it was. The partisan 
 journals of tho Administration daily clamored 
 for the advance of the "irresistible host," 
 which by the sheer force of its numbers, its 
 enthusiasm, and its holy cause, was destined, 
 as they said and shouted, to sweep secession 
 Into the Gulf of Mexico like chaff before the 
 wind. All this appeared eminently reason 
 able to the general masses of the public hap 
 pily unfamiliar with the realities of war, and 
 dazzled by the patriotic arithmetic of the 
 press. For years, too, it had been the custom 
 , of the Anti-Slavery leaders, orators, and 
 writers, to represent the Southern States as 
 etiolated and emaciated by the fatal influences 
 of slavery. Upon the strength of economi 
 cal and statistical returns, dating back beyond 
 the census of 1850, the population and the 
 wealth of the South had been steadily and 
 systematically underrated. While the South 
 had, in truth, been growing rapidly stronger 
 and richer during the period of thirteen years 
 which had elapsed since the great gold dis 
 coveries in California and Australia, coinciding 
 in point of time with the first development of 
 the modern free-trade policy of England, 
 had began to treble and quadruple the world s 
 demand for the great Southern staples, it was 
 a belief almost universal throughout the North 
 that the resources of the South had, during all 
 this period, been wasting away and decaying. 
 
 Unbounded, therefore, were the expecta 
 tions of victory which everywhere throughout 
 the North, from Maine to Minnesota, had 
 attended the " advanced guard of the grand 
 army of the Union," when it passed at mid 
 night across the Long Bridge at Washington, 
 and invaded the " sacred soil of Virginia." 
 
 Over the story of the fatal day on which 
 these expectations came so cruelly to naught, 
 amid the thunders of the rebel artillery, it is 
 not necessary for us now to linger. But it 
 is important for us to bear clearly in mind 
 the real condition of the army which General 
 McClellan was called from his victories to 
 command, at the time when i{; passed under 
 his hands. 
 
 The strength of the army of General Mc 
 Dowell, defeated by the Confederates under 
 Beauregard and Johnston, on the 21st July, 
 is estimated by well-informed officers, as for 
 example by Brigadier-General Barnard, at 
 about 30,000 men. In artillery it was 
 miserably deficient, having, says an experi 
 enced eye-witness, " not more than five com 
 plete batteries, or six batteries including 
 scratch guns, and these of different calibre, 
 badly horsed, miserably equipped, and pro 
 vided "with the worst set of gunners and 
 
 drivers wh*ch I, wiio have seen the Turkish 
 field-guns, ever beheld." It had no cavalry 
 of any value, save a few regulars from the 
 frontiers; no carriages for reserve ammuni 
 tion ; no adequate transportation service ; no 
 organized commissariat; and, above all, 
 scarcely any staff-officers at all. So pitiably 
 deficient was the army in this vital element 
 of efficiency, that General McDowell himself 
 was seen by Mr. Russell in Washington, 
 looking after the arrival of some guns which 
 he expected ; and in the hottest and most 
 important moments of the action on the 21st 
 July, Colonel Burnside, then in command of- 
 a brigade, was forced to carry his own orders, 
 having no aide-de-camp at his command ! 
 The troops had never been paraded or 
 put through their evolutions by brigades; 
 the line and company officers were, for the 
 most part, totally inexperienced; and the 
 great bulk of the troops were men enlisted 
 for but three months, that being the limit set 
 to the possible resistance of the South, by 
 the heads of the Administration. Such was 
 the evil influence exerted upon the temper of 
 the troops by the tone of the Government in 
 regard to the war, that the movement of Gen 
 eral Patterson on the Upper Potomac, to pre 
 vent Johnston, at Winchester, from forming 
 a junction with Beauregard at Manassas, was 
 paralyzed by the point blank refusal of 
 his troops to serve even for ten days beyond 
 the expiration of their term of enlistment; 
 while it is well known that certain Pennsyl 
 vania regiments were met on the day of the 
 critical battle of the 21st, absolutely march 
 ing off the field, to the sound of the cannon, 
 "because their time had expired." * 
 
 And it was an army in this condition 
 which the Administration and its friends in 
 Congress, pliant to the impatient pressure of 
 the ignorant public, literally compelled Gen 
 eral Scott to launch against the enemy. 
 
 Who can properly describe the condition 
 of this army when it had hurried and hud 
 dled itself back into Washington, beaten, 
 broken up, "demoralized," and despairing? 
 Had the Southern army been composed of 
 veteran, disciplined troops, or had the South 
 ern leaders bean equal to the crisis of the 
 tremendous revolution which they had begun, 
 there can be little question that. the army of 
 the Union, notwithstanding the brief and 
 creditable stand made by the reserve at Cen- 
 treville, might have been speedily dispersed, 
 and the cities of Washington and Baltimore 
 captured by the victorious Confederates. 
 
 " If they had immediately advanced on 
 Washington," says General Barnard, in his 
 
20 
 
 sketch of the battle of Bull Run, " and im 
 mediately crossed tho Potomac, and seized 
 Baltimore (and they could command any 
 number of troops, flushed with success, while 
 all our three months men were leaving us, 
 and we had to organize a new army), they 
 would have placed the Government in a situ 
 ation from which it could with difficulty have 
 extricated itself." 
 
 The work which Major-General McClellan 
 found himself called upon to do when he 
 reached Washington, cannot be more com 
 pletely set before the mind of the reader than 
 it is in these words of an officer by no means 
 friendly to him, and upon whose systemat 
 ically prepared evidence the Congressional 
 Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of 
 the War -lay great stress, as vindicating the 
 subsequent course of the Administration to 
 wards the man on whom it had called in the 
 extremity of the nation, for counsel and for 
 safety. 
 
 General McClellan was indeed charged 
 with the " organization of a new army," and 
 this army was to be organized in the face of 
 a success on the part of the enemy, which 
 was sure to enable them to " command any 
 number of men," and to put their active 
 forces in the field on a footing of the highest 
 efficiency, under an act of the rebel Congress 
 which had sagaciously secured the enlistment 
 of all troops for " three years or during the 
 war," and under the administration of a 
 President whose past experience as a gradu 
 ate of West Point, as a soldier in Mexico, 
 and as Secretary of War of the United States, 
 had given him everything in the way of mili 
 tary knowledge and administrative skill, 
 which the President of the Union lacked. 
 
 The first thing to be done obviously was, 
 to provide for the safety of Washington. 
 While ignorance and inexperience were noi 
 sily insisting all over the North upon the ne 
 cessity of an immediate levy en masse of the 
 Northern people, and upon the feasibility of 
 " sweeping the rebellion into the Gulf" by 
 a kind of Peter the Hermit s crusade, all 
 intelligent soldiers at Washington saw that 
 the immediate conditions of the problem had 
 been profoundly modified by the disaster of 
 July 2 Vst. It was known to them that the 
 advance of the Confederates upon the Capital 
 was restrained by political influences and 
 considerations, which might at any moment 
 be overruled in favor of the obvious military 
 feasibility and advantages of such a step. 
 The maxim of Napoleon that " all capitals 
 should be fortified," had a peculiar and per 
 emptory application to the case of Washing 
 
 ton ; and however eager the country might 
 be for a campaign in the field, and for the 
 " crushing of t*he rebellion," General McClel 
 lan had the military sense to see and the 
 moral courage to insist that months of inces 
 sant labor must pass away before we could 
 possibly hope to resume active host : lities with 
 any rational prospect of success, and that un 
 less we gave precedence over all other consid 
 erations to the proper fortification of Washing 
 ton, no amount of patriotic enthusiasm, of 
 senatorial thunder, or of popular sacrifices 
 would save us from the most dangerous blow 
 which could possibly be struck at our domes- 
 .tic organization and at our consideration 
 abroad. 
 
 But General McClellan was also perfectly 
 calm and self-possessed in his estimate of the 
 measures necessary to be taken to secure this 
 object. It was not difficult for him to inocu 
 late the President and the Cabinet with a 
 decent concern for the safety of the Capital 
 in which it was their duty personally to re 
 side. But it was much more difficult for him to 
 impress upon them a due sense of the propor 
 tion which ought to be borne by the measures 
 immediately taken for the security of Wash 
 ington to the general plans of campaign 
 for the suppression of the rebellion. Napo 
 leon has laid it down that a force of 50,000 
 men, with 3,000 artillerists, should suffice for 
 the defence of a properly fortified capital 
 against the attack of an army of 300,000 men ; 
 being about in the proportion of about one 
 defender to six assailants. Assuming it to 
 be altogether improbable that the Confeder 
 ates would be able to attack the Federal city 
 with an army of more than 100,000 men. 
 General McClellan set down the numbers of 
 the force necessary for the defence of Wash 
 ington after its fortifications should have 
 been completed, at 20,000 men, being in 
 the proportion of one defender to five assail 
 ants. This estimate; though based on the 
 soundest military principles, excited great 
 uneasiness at the time when it was made in 
 the minds of many eminent persons condemned 
 by their station in life to inhabit Washington ; 
 and the influence of this uneasiness may be 
 traced throughout all the subsequent relation? 
 of General McClellan with the Federal au 
 thorities. 
 
 General Barnard, in his capacity of chief 
 engineer of the defences of Washington, 
 bears the fullest testimony in his report to 
 the promptitude and energy with which Gen 
 eral McClellan, on his assumption of the com 
 mand in July, 1861, set about developing 
 and completing the fortifications of the Capi- 
 
21 
 
 tal. Of the condition of these fortifications, 
 and of the army at that moment, General 
 McClellan himself thus speaks : 
 
 " When I assumed command in Washing 
 ton on the 27th of July, 1861, the number 
 of troops in and around the city was about 
 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 
 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field- 
 batteries of thirty pieces. 
 
 " On the Virginia bank of the Potomac 
 the brigade organization of General McDowell 
 still existed, and the troops were stationed at 
 and in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and 
 Fort Albany, at Fort Runyon, Roach s Mills, 
 Colo s Mill, and in the vicinity of Fort Ells 
 worth, with a detachment at the Theological 
 Seminary. 
 
 " There were no troops south of Hunting 
 Creek, and many of the regiments were en 
 camped on the low grounds bordering the 
 Potomac, seldom in the best positions for 
 defence, and entirely inadequate in numbers 
 and condition to defend the long line from 
 Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. 
 
 "On the Maryland side of the river, upon 
 the heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, 
 two regiments were stationed, whose com 
 manders were independent of each other. 
 
 " There were no troops on the important 
 Tenallytowa road, or on the roads entering the 
 city from the south. 
 
 " The camps were located without regard to 
 purposes of defence 1 or instruction ; the roads 
 were not picketed,, and there was no attempt 
 ab an organization into brigades. 
 
 "In no quarter were the dispositions for 
 defence such as to offer a vigorous resistance 
 to a respectable body of the enemy either in 
 the positions and numbers of the troops, or 
 the number and character of the defensive 
 works. Earthworks in the nature of tetes- 
 de-pont looked upon the approaches to the 
 Georgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long 
 Bridge, and Alexandria by the Little River 
 Turnpike, and some simple defensive arrange 
 ments were made at the Chain Bridge. With 
 the latter exception, not a single defensive 
 work had been commenced on the Maryland 
 side. 
 
 " There wd,s nothing to prevent the enemy 
 shelling the city from heights, within easy 
 range, which could be occupied by a hostile 
 column almost without resistance. Many, 
 soldiers had deserted, and the streets of 
 Washington were crowded with straggling offi 
 cers and men, absent from their stations with 
 out authority, whose behavior indicated the 
 general want of discipline and organization." 
 
 The task of educing order and safety from 
 
 this chaos of perils was, indeed, as a foreign 
 observer styles it, one of Herculean magni 
 tude." But this task, gieat as it was, was but 
 a part of the duty imposed upon the young 
 commander of the Potomac army. Al 
 though Lieutenant-General Scott still retained 
 the command of the armies of the Union, the 
 President applied to General McClellan, al 
 most immediately upon his arrival in Wash 
 ington, to draw up a memorandum of a gener 
 al programme of operations by land and sea, 
 to cover the whole field of conflict. This 
 memorandum was handed by General Mc 
 Clellan to the President on the 4th of August, 
 1 861 - 1 When it is remembered that this paper 
 was written amid the diversified excitements 
 of that fortnight of passion and fear, which 
 followed upon the defeat at Bull Run ; that 
 it was written by a young commander, sud 
 denly invested with the highest rank in the 
 army, from which he had retired but three 
 years before as a modest subaltern, and hailed 
 as a hero of the Napoleonic order by the uni 
 versal voice of press and people, in a country 
 to which his very name had, six months before, 
 been scarcely known ; and that it was written 
 for the eye of a President who looked upon 
 the civil war as an evanescent absurdity, 
 which must, sooner or later disappear before 
 the blast of the political trumpet, it is diffi 
 cult to speak too highly of the modesty of 
 tone, the sagacity of political insight, the just 
 and patriotic temper, and the far-reaching 
 military forecast which mark it. 
 
 One quality of General McClellan s nature 
 shines conspicuously throughout this remark 
 able document : a quality admirable in itself, 
 but which will appear still more admirable to 
 the future student of our times when he shall 
 contrast it with the spirit which colored and 
 controlled the utterances and the policy of the 
 leading partizans of the Administration when 
 this paper was laid before the President. 
 There is nothing here of those vehement and 
 vulgar fuhninations against " rebels and trai 
 tors," which weak and silly or malignant and 
 designing men were then everywhere impos 
 ing upon the public sense, as evidences of 
 loyalty and love of country. The general 
 who lays before the President such a compre 
 hensive and vigorous plan for the employment 
 of the military forces of the nation, that all 
 our subsequent successes have been achieved 
 by acting in harmony with its conceptions, and 
 
 1 It is a striking illustration of the spirit in which 
 General McClellan is attacked by the organs of the 
 Administration, that this obedience to the suggestion 
 is charged upon him by Mr. Lincoln s authorized biog 
 rapher as a proof of his " ambition and presumption ! " 
 H, J. Raymond s Life of Lincoln, p. 2~1. 
 
our most lamentable subsequent reverses in 
 curred by departing from their scope and tenor, 
 exhibits throughout his formidable pro 
 gramme the most anxious desire for the miti 
 gation of the horrors of war to all his coun 
 trymen, -whether arrayed for or against the 
 cause of their country refuses utterly to 
 look upon the angry and misguided popula 
 tions of the South, otherwise than as citi 
 zens to be coerced into obedience to laws as 
 truly designed for their own welfare as for 
 that of their fellow-citizens from whom they 
 have wrenched themselves away, and earnestly 
 pleads for such a complete preparation of the 
 national arms to strike, as shall make a single 
 blow decisive, and terminate the war in one 
 thorough and victorious campaign : and this 
 not merely because a long war involves a fear 
 ful waste of human life and happiness and 
 wealth ; but because a long war must inevi 
 tably bequeath to future ages a fearful legacy 
 of passion and vengeance and mutual hate. 
 
 As has been excellently said, by one who 
 had himself passed through the terrors of a 
 great revolution and the fiery furnace of a 
 civil war : " The most frightful feature of a 
 civil war is not the blood which flows on every 
 side, or the dead who strew the streets and 
 roads, or the shattered walls of onqe happy 
 homes it is the passions which ferment in 
 men s souls. Nothing is so terrible as the 
 mutual hatred of those who were born to love 
 one another. Tho sombre legend which be 
 gins the story of the world the legend of 
 Cain and Abel seems to hover over these 
 fratricidal conflicts, and to stamp them with a 
 seal of infernal rage. In ordinary war men 
 hate each other like enemies : in civil war they 
 hate each other like brothers." 
 
 It is told of one of the noblest of the 
 French Republicans of our own tune, Jean 
 Reynaud, that on the third day of that hide 
 ous battle of Paris, kno,wn as the " days of 
 June, 1848," he was on his way to the Na 
 tional Assembly, when his attention was 
 arrested by a terrible scene in the Place de la 
 Concorde. The fiercest fighting of the day 
 was just over. It was about four o clock in 
 the afternoon ; a workman in his blouse, un 
 armed and inoffensive, was traversing the 
 place, then occupied by a battalion of the Na 
 tional Guards from one of the provinces. At 
 the * sight of the blouse the rural soldiery 
 cried out, " An insurgent ! an insurgent ! " 
 and rushed upon the unfortunate man, bayonet 
 in hand. Their officers vainly sought to re 
 strain them. The wretched workman took 
 to flight, and was distancing his pursuers, 
 when some cuirassiers stationed near by, see 
 
 ing him run at full speed, made up their 
 minds that he had escaped from some cap 
 tured barricade, and dashed directly athwart 
 his path. In a moment the helpless fugitive 
 was surrounded ; sabres gleamed above him, 
 bayonets were thrust at him ; his blood had 
 already begun to flow, when suddenly, at the 
 risk of his own life, a citizen forced his way 
 through the excited throng, seized the un 
 happy workman, arid, with the quickness of 
 thought, threw over him the tri-colored scarf 
 of a Representative of the French people. 
 
 At the sight of this scarf, the emblem not 
 of a party nor of a passion, but of France 
 herself, of the nation and of the people, 
 the lifted weapons were dropped, and the 
 destined victim was safe. 
 
 In the mind of General McClellan the 
 banner of the Union was meant, like the tri 
 color of Jean Reynand, to speak to all classes 
 and sections of his countrymen, in the 
 midst of their passion, in the moment of bat 
 tle, of victory, or of vengeance, not of 
 classes nor of sections, but of the republic, 
 of the nation, of liberty protected by law, 
 and of force consecrated by justice. 
 
 Read in the light of its author s spirit and 
 with the eloquent commentary of subsequent 
 events, how instructive a contribution is thia 
 memorandum to the right understanding of 
 that " history " which Mr. Lincoln and his 
 administration have for now four years been 
 " making," and suffering to be made, for this 
 people. 
 
 "MEMOBANDTTM. 
 
 " The object of the present war differs from 
 those in which nations are usually engaged, 
 mainly in this : That the purpose of ordi 
 nary war is to conquer a peace, and make a 
 treaty on advantageous terms. In this con 
 test ic has become necessary to crush a popu 
 lation sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and 
 warlike to constitute a nation. . We have, not 
 only to defeat their armed and organized 
 forces in the field, but to display such an 
 overwhelming strength as will convince all 
 our antagonists, especially those of the gov 
 erning aristocratic class, of the utter impossi 
 bility of resistance. Our late reverses make 
 this course imperative. Had we been suc 
 cessful in the recent battle (Manassas), it ia 
 possible that we might have been spared the 
 labor and expense of a great effort :; now we 
 have no alternative. Their success will ena 
 ble the political leaders of the rebels to con 
 vince the mass of their people that we are 
 inferior to them in force and courage, and to 
 
23 
 
 command all their resources. The contest 
 began with a class ; now it is with a people, 
 our military success can alone restore the for 
 mer issue. 
 
 "By thoroughly defeating their armies, tak 
 ing their strong places, and pursuing a rig- j 
 idly protective policy as to private property 
 and unarmed persons, and a lenient course 
 as to private soldiers, we may well hopo for 
 ;- permanent restoration of a peaceful Union. 
 l>ut, in the first instance, the authority of the 
 Government must be supported by overwhelm 
 ing physical force. 
 
 ** Our foreign relations and financial credit 
 also imperatively demand that the military 
 action of the Government should be prompt 
 and irresistible. 
 
 " The rebels have chosen Virginia as their 
 battle-field, and it seems proper for us to make 
 the first great struggle there. But while 
 thus directing our main efforts, it is necessary 
 to diminish the resistance there offered us, by 
 movements on other points, both by land and 
 water 
 
 " Without entering at present into details, I 
 would advise that a strong movement be made 
 on the Mississippi, and that the rebels be 
 driven out of Missouri. 
 
 " As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that 
 Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would 
 advise a movement through that State into 
 Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assist 
 ing the Union men of that region, and of 
 seizing the railroads leading from Memphis 
 to the cast. 
 
 " The possession of those roads by us, in 
 connection with the movement on. the Missis 
 sippi, would go far towards determining the 
 evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. In the 
 mean time, all the passes into Western Virgin 
 ia, from the east, should be securaly guarded, 
 but I would advise no movement from that 
 quarter towards Richmond, unless the politi 
 cal condition of Kentucky renders it impos 
 sible or inexpedient for us to make the move 
 ment upon Eastern Tennessee, through that 
 State. Every effort should, however, be 
 made to organize, equip, and arm as many 
 troops as possible in Western Virginia, in 
 order to render the Ohio and Indiana regi 
 ments available for other operations. At as 
 early a day as practicable it would be well to 
 protect and re-open the Baltimore and Ohio 
 Railroad. 
 
 " Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be oc 
 cupied by garrisons sufficient to retain them 
 incur possession. -The importance of Har 
 per s Ferry and the line of the Pctomac in 
 the direction of Leesburg will be very mate 
 
 rially diminished so soon as our force in this 
 vicinity becomes organized, strong, and effi 
 cient, because no capable general will cross 
 the river, north of this city, when we have a 
 strong army Here, ready to cut off his retreat. 
 
 " To revert to the West, it is probable that 
 no very large additions to the troops now in 
 Missouri, will be necessary to secure that 
 State. 
 
 " I presume that the force required for the 
 movement down the Mississippi will be deter 
 mined by its commander and tli3 President. 
 If Kentucky assumes the right position, not j 
 more than 20,000 troops will be needed, to- j 
 gether with those that can be raised in that 
 State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the 
 latter region and its railroads, as well as ulti- 
 mately to occupy Nashville. 
 
 " The Western Virginia troops, with not 
 more than 5,000 to 10,000 from Ohio and 
 Indiana, should, under, proper management, 
 suffice for its protection. When we have re 
 organized our main army here, 10,000 men 
 ought to be enough to protect the Baltimore 
 and Ohio Railroad and the Potomac. Five 
 thousand will garrison Baltimore, 3,000 Fort 
 Monroe, and* not more than 20,000 will be 
 necessary, at the utmost, for the defence of 
 Washington. 
 
 " For the main army of operations, I urge 
 the following composition : 
 
 250 regiments of Infantry, say . 225,000 men 
 
 100 Field Batteries, 600 guns " . . 15,000 " 
 
 28 regiments Cavalry .... 25.500 " 
 
 5 " Engineer troops . 7,500 <v 
 
 Total, 
 
 273,000 
 
 " The force must be supplied with the ne 
 cessary engineer and pontoon trains, and with 
 transportation for everything save tents. Its 
 general line of operations should be so directed 
 that water transportation can be availed of, 
 from point to point, by means of the ocean 
 and the rivers emptying into it. An essential 
 feature of the plan of operations will be the 
 employment of a strong naval force, to pro 
 tect the movements of a fleet of transports in 
 tended to convey a considerable body of troops 
 from point to point of the enemy s sea-coast, 
 thus, either creating diversions, and rendering 
 it necessary to detach largely from their main 
 body, in order to protect such of their cities 
 as may be threatened, or else landing ana 
 forming establishments on their coast at any 
 favorable places that opportunity might offer. 
 This naval force should also cooperate with 
 the main army, in its efforts to seize the im 
 portant sea-board towns of the rebels. 
 
 1 It cannot be ignored that the construction 
 
of railroads has introduced a new and very 
 important clement into war, by the great facil 
 ities thus given for concentrating at particu 
 lar positions, large masses of troops from re 
 mote sections, and by creating new strategic 
 points and lines of operation. It is intended 
 to overcome this difficulty by the partial oper 
 ations suggested, and such other, as the par 
 ticular case may require. "We must endeavor 
 to seize places on the railways, in the rear of 
 the enemy s points of concentration, and we 
 must threaten their sea-board cities, in order 
 that each -State may be forced, by the neces 
 sity of its own defence, to diminish its contin 
 gent to the Confederate army. 
 
 The proposed movement down the Missis 
 sippi will produce important results in tl*is 
 connection. That advance, and the progress 
 of the main army at the East, will materially 
 assist each other by diminishing the resistance 
 to be encountered by each. The tendency of 
 the Mississippi movement upon all questions 
 connected with cotton, is too well understood 
 by the President and Cabinet, to need any il 
 lustration from me. There is another indepen 
 dent movement which has often been suggest 
 ed, and which has always reconimended itself 
 to my judgment. I refer to a movement from 
 Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian 
 Territory upon lied River and Western Tex 
 as, for the purpose of protecting and develop 
 ing the latent Union and free-state sentiment, 
 well known to predominate in Western Texas, 
 and which, like a similar sentiment in West 
 ern Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately or 
 ganize that section into a free State. How far 
 it will be possible to support this movement 
 by an advance through New Mexico from 
 California, is a matter which I have not suffi- 
 cently examined to be able to express a de 
 cided opinion. If at all practicable, it is emi 
 nently, desirable, as bringing into play the 
 resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific 
 States, as well as identifying them with our 
 cause, and cementing the bond of Union be 
 tween them and the general government. 
 
 " If i$ is not departing too far from my prov 
 ince, I will venture to suggest the policy of 
 an intimate alliance and cordial understanding 
 with Mexico ; their sympathies and interests 
 are with us ; their antipathies exclusively 
 against our enemies and their institutions. I 
 think it would not be difficult to obtain from 
 the Mexican government the right to use, at 
 least during the present contest, the road from 
 Guyamas to New Mexico. This concession 
 would very materially reduce the obstacles of 
 the column moving from the Pacific. A sim 
 ilar permission to use their territory for the pas 
 
 sage of troops between the Panueo and the 
 Rio Grande, would enable us to throw a col 
 umn of troops, by a good road from Tampico, 
 or some of the small harbors north of it, upon 
 and across the Rio Grande, without risk, and 
 scarcely firing a shot. To what extent, if any, 
 it would be desirable to take into service and 
 employ Mexican soldiers, is a question en 
 tirely political, on which I do not venture to 
 offer an opinion. 
 
 " The force I have recommended is large, 
 the expense is great. It is possible that a 
 smaller force might accomplish the object in 
 view ; but I understand it to be the purpose 
 of this great nation to reestablish the power 
 of its government, and to restore peace to ita 
 citizens in the shortest possible time. The 
 question to be decided is smply this : shall wo 
 crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate the 
 war in one campaign, or shall we leave it for 
 a legacy to our descendants ? 
 
 " When the extent of the possible line of 
 operations is considered, the force asked for 
 the main army under my command cannot bo 
 regarded as unduly large. Every mile wo 
 advance carries us farther from our base of 
 operations, and renders detachments neces 
 sary to cover our communications, while tho 
 enemy, will be constantly concentrating as he 
 falls back. I propose, with the force which I 
 have requested, not only to drive the enemy 
 out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to 
 occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, 
 Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans ; in 
 other words, to move into the heart of tho 
 enemy s country, and crush out the rebellion 
 in its very heart. 
 
 " By seizing and repairing the railroads as 
 we advance, the difficulties of transportation 
 will be materially diminished. It is, perhaps, 
 unnecessary to state, that, in addition to tho 
 forces named in this memorandum, strong re 
 serves should be formed, ready to supply any 
 losses that may occur. 
 
 "In conclusion, I would submit that the 
 exigences of the treasury may be lessened by 
 making only partial payments to our troops, 
 when in the enemy s country, and by giving 
 the obligations of tho United States for such 
 supplies as may there .be obtained. 
 
 "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
 
 " jMajor-General" 
 
 WJiile the organization of the Army of the 
 Potomac was going on, to use the words of the 
 Prince do Joinville, a most competent and 
 candid witness of the mighty enterprise, " with 
 a rapidity and a success which are extraordi 
 nary, when we think that the whole thing had 
 
25 
 
 to be accomplished without any assistance 
 from the past j : the whole fabric of the West 
 ern armies had also to bo constructed. The 
 Western States, though abounding in men and 
 in patriotic fervor, were still more destitute of 
 all the materials of war than the Eastern ; and, 
 although General McClellan was not formally 
 invested with the rank of commander-in-chief 
 until the month of November, he performed 
 the greater part of the then inconceivably oner 
 ous duties of that office almost from the first 
 moment of his taking command in Washing 
 ton. His suggestions were not always adopted, 
 his plans were subjected to revision and mod 
 ification at the hands of the President, and of 
 all. those whom the President chose to take 
 into his military confidence. But the solid 
 work of organization, the creation, we may 
 truly say, of the commissariat service, the 
 transportation service, the ordnance service, 
 the artillery reserves, the engineer corps, the 
 pontoon corps, the telegraph corps, the topo 
 graphical brigade, the coast reserves, the hos 
 pital corps of such armies as no American had 
 ever dreamed he should live to see assembled 
 on American soil, all this was put upon the 
 shoulders of fc!ie young general. And to do this 
 work it was, that through good report and evil 
 report while inquisitive senators frowned and 
 fretted at his reticence, and arrogant journalists 
 denounced his imbecile inactivity, lie labored 
 incessantly through the long months of tho 
 autumn. A "Herculean task," truly, and 
 a Herculean task of such a nature, too, that 
 the popular eye, greedy of whatsoever is glitter 
 ing, sudden, and electrical, is slow to rest 
 with just approval and true appreciation upon 
 him who achieves it. 
 
 Whatever measures seemed really likely to 
 accelerate the moment when the troops of the 
 Union could onco more take the field with 
 . olid force enough to overcome the vast increase 
 ( momentum given to the rebellion by the 
 weak and ill-advised measures which brought 
 about the defeat of July 21, received a cor- 
 di^J support from General McClellan, no mat- 
 tor from what quarter they came to him. 
 
 Thus he urged upon the Secretary of War 
 an appeal to the States for a draft such as the 
 Constitution had empowered the State authori 
 ties to make in case of need, and had the ap 
 peal been wisely heeded and answered, it is 
 more than probable that such a law as the 
 Conscription Act, passed by the Congress of 
 1863, would never have been so much as 
 heard of among us. 
 
 Again, in September, 1801, the President 
 and the Secretaries of War and of State be 
 came convinced that a project existed in 
 
 Maryland for forcing an act of secession upon 
 the legislature of that State, then about to 
 meet at the city of Frederick. The evidences 
 of such a project were collected under the 
 authority of Mr. Cameron, the Secretary of 
 War, and Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State ; 
 and having been laid by them before the 
 President, it was judged expedient to order 
 the arrest of certain members of the legisla 
 ture more particularly implicated in the 
 alleged conspiracy. 
 
 On the eleventh of September, Mr. Came 
 ron sent the following letter to Major-General 
 Banks, commanding our forces in Maryland : 
 
 GENERAL : The passage of any act of 
 secession by the Legislature of Maryland must 
 be prevented. If necessary, all, or any part 
 of the members must be arrested. Exercise 
 your own judgmsnt as to the time and man 
 ner, but do the work effectively. 
 " Very respectfully, 
 
 " Your obedient servant, 
 
 " SIMON CAMEUON, 
 " Secretary of War" 
 
 On the same day Goaeral McClellan was 
 called into council with the President, the Sec 
 retaries, and General Scott, upon the subject ; 
 and it having been asserted to him by the 
 highest functionaries in tho land that Mary 
 land was really about to be thrown into the 
 tide of secession, his judgment, as a military 
 man, as to what should bo done, was necessa 
 rily prompt and clear. To permit even a possi 
 bility of the secession of Mary land in the rear 
 of Washington, at the base of the whole army, 
 and of all the operations then planning, was 
 not for a moment to be thought of. The 
 duty of ascertaining the reality of the danger 
 rested not upon General McClellan, but upon 
 his informants, the heads of the Government. 
 The duty of preventing the danger asserted 
 by them to be real, rested upon him, and it 
 was done, promptly and vigorously done. 
 
 Circumstances have since come to light 
 which make it very doubtful whether any such 
 project as that denounced to General Mc 
 Clellan was really entertained at the time by 
 the persons charged with being concerned in 
 it. But the crisis at which General Mc 
 Clellan was called upon to act, forbade all 
 hesitation on his p.-irt. He rejnforced the 
 order sent by Mr. -Secretary Camera* to Gen 
 eral Banks, with a letter from himself to that 
 officer. The arrests were made, and the 
 prisoners, mostly gentlemen of character, in 
 telligence, and high standing, were properly 
 turned over to the control of the Secretary of 
 State. Under the orders of this functionary 
 
26 
 
 and against the protest of the military officer^, 
 who upon the suggestion and at the request 
 of tho Federal authorities, had acted in the 
 matter, these gentlemen were removed from 
 their own State to Fort Warren, in Boston 
 Harbor, were treated with great indignity and 
 indecency, and their guilt being assumed as 
 unquestionable, were detained in a close and 
 cruel confinement long after all danger from 
 any possible evil influence of theirs in Mary 
 land had passed away ; no such opportunity 
 being conceded to them of establishing their 
 innocence as would have been granted to the 
 meanest soldier accused of a violation of his 
 military duty. 
 
 On the 1st of November, 18G1, General 
 McClellan was called to relieve General Scott 
 of the gcneial command of the armies of the 
 Union. 
 
 This high distinction was conferred and this 
 grave responsibility imposed upon General 
 McClellan by the President, after three months 
 of constant intercourse with him in the dis 
 charge of his duties as Commander of the- 
 Potomac army, and in consultation upon tha 
 affairs of the Union. It was a step which It 
 would be doing the President great injustice 
 to suppose lightly taken; and in taking it 
 the President certainly assumed a substantial 
 moral obligation to do all that might in him 
 lie to make easier the task of the man upon 
 whom he had deliberately imposed the onerous 
 responsibility of the command of the armies 
 of the Republic. History will one day pass 
 her final verdict upon the character of the 
 way in which that obligation was fulfilled by 
 Mr. Lincoln. It will be enough for us to 
 show what that way was. 
 
 The disastrous affair which had occurred at 
 Ball s Bluff but a few days before President 
 Lincoln conferred the supreme command of 
 the forces upon General McClollan, ought to 
 have warned the President of the danger of 
 interference with the well-considered plans of 
 a commander in the field. 
 
 In the beginning of the month of October, 
 General McClellan had found reason to believe 
 that the enemy were preparing to evacuate 
 thoir positions at and about Manassas Plains. 
 Watching the whole field of operations with 
 an instructed and intelligent eye, he had not 
 failed to perceive that the victory of July 
 21st, while it had given a certain spirit and 
 prestige to tho army of tho Confederates, 
 actually in service, had indisposed the Southern 
 people in general to making any particular 
 efforts to increase their army, or to strengthen 
 the hands of their government. They had 
 been trapped by the successes of that day 
 
 into a condition of careless self-confidence, 
 which must prove eminently advantageous 
 to the cause of the Union if the renewal of 
 active hostilities could be postponed until the 
 Army of the Union should be strong enough 
 to take the offensive at one and the same time 
 against all the great -points of Southern resist 
 ance. Little had been done towards ade 
 quately fortifying the Southern seaports. 
 New Orleans, the most important city of the 
 South, was almost literally defenceless, and 
 the whole Confederate army in Kentucky and 
 Tennessee scarcely amounted to the strength 
 of a single army corps. This being the 
 general condition of affairs at the South, the 
 Confederate Government perceived that it 
 was absolutely necessary to the defence of 
 their capital Richmond that the army 
 under General Johnstone, at Manassas, should 
 be kept prepared to fall back upon and cover 
 that city, at the first intimation of a probable 
 Federal movement for its capture by the way 
 of the lower Rappahannock or the James 
 and York Rivers. The value of the position 
 at Manassas, as a base for offensive operations 
 against Washington, had passed away during 
 the inaction which was enforced upon General 
 Beauregard immediately after his victory of 
 July. The Southern army at Manassas had 
 suffered ao much from disease, arid from a 
 defective organization, during the months of 
 August and September, that it was in no con 
 dition, in the beginning of October, either to 
 assume the offensive or even to join battle 
 with a superior force advancing from Washing 
 ton. In the very improbable contingency 
 that General McClellan should suffer himself 
 to be hurried by non-military influences into 
 making the lamentable blunder of such an 
 advance, General Johnstone had accordingly 
 prepared himself to retreat at once towards 
 his true base at Richmond. 
 
 Nothing of this was commonly understood 
 at the North, where the continued presence 
 of Johnstone at Manassas was perpetually de 
 nounced as an insult, a menace, and a peril 
 to Washington avid to the Union ; and Presi 
 dent Lincoln was incessantly besieged with 
 entreaties, more or less imperious, to command 
 a direct movement upon the enemy. 
 
 On the 19th of October, General McClellan, 
 clearly conceiving the true state of the case, 
 ordered General McCall to cover a grand 
 reconnaissance in force to be made the next 
 day from Drainsville. This reconnoissancu 
 was successfully made ; and on the- next day, 
 October 20th, General Stone, occupying 
 Poolesville in Maryland, was ordered to make 
 a feint of crossinc; the Potomac in order to 
 
27 
 
 feel the enemy at Lee*burg in Virginia, which 
 General McOlellan bolieved them to be, as 
 they in fact wore, abandoning. This feint was 
 made. But in making it General Stone em 
 ployed an officer whose direct personal relations 
 with the President, and whose official rank as 
 a Senator of the United States seem to have 
 misled him into adventuring further than it 
 was expected or intended he should go ; and 
 the events of the next day, Oct. 21st, con 
 verted the simple reconnoissance of Edward s 
 Ferry into the disastrous battle of Ball s 
 ^ Rluff, a battle fought, certainly, without the 
 knowledge or the orders of the commanding 
 general, fought where there was no direct mili 
 tary purpose to be gained even by a victory ; 
 and fought with so little skill and judgment 
 that it resulted in the complete and humiliat 
 ing defeat of our troops by a body of the 
 enemy largely inferior in point of numbers 
 and of artillery. 
 
 All that could possibly have been won by 
 successful issue of this unhappy movement 
 would have been a stimulation of the public 
 appetite for ** brilliant and exciting intelli 
 gence," and a powerful reinforcement of the 
 already formidable Aulic Council of military 
 citizens by whom the Government was sur 
 rounded and the commanding general beset. 
 Its failure confirmed the exulting confidence 
 of the Southern troops in their own invincibil 
 ity, and cast another shade of gloom over the 
 bravery -which the defeat of Bull Run had 
 already clouded. 
 
 Good might, however, have come out of 
 this evil, had the President learned from it 
 the absolute necessity of trusting the control 
 of the armies implicitly to their nominal com 
 mander, and of abstaining himself, and caus 
 ing others to abstain, from ignorant and im 
 patient interference with operations which 
 imperatively demanded time for their ripening, 
 and unity of authority for their successful 
 execution. 
 
 Immediately after taking command of the 
 armies of the Union, General McClellan 
 addressed letters of instruction to Generals 
 Halleek, Buell, Sherman, and Butler, com 
 manding respectively the departments of Mis 
 souri and Ohio, and the expeditions of the 
 SouthjAtlantic a d the Gulf. In these letters 
 the whole field of operations before the army is 
 surveyed with masterly judgment, and the 
 special part to be taken in those operations by 
 each commander, sketched out for him with 
 clearness and with precision, and, as subse 
 quent events have proved, with an almost 
 marvellous sagacity. The restoration of pub 
 lic confidence in Missouri by a thorough 
 
 reform in the military administration of that 
 State, and the chastisement of corruption, the 
 conciliation .of the weil-4 wpo.- .-oil population 
 of Kentucky by a " religious respect for the 
 rights of all ; " the prompt and decisive occu 
 pation of Knoxville and East Tennessee,, cut 
 ting off all communication bet ween Virginia 
 and the Mississippi; the reduction of Fort 
 Pulaski in the Savannah River, and the or 
 ganization of a formidable attack upon Charles 
 ton. These were the principal measures 
 which General McClellan proposed to himself 
 as the constituent parts of his grand cam 
 paign for the reduction of the seceded States 
 to their allegiance to the Union. 
 
 Had these measures been carried into 
 effect simultaneously in the spring of 1862, 
 under the untrammelled supervision of a sin 
 gle military mind, and with forces adequate 
 as well in point of preparation as in point of 
 numbers, to the work, it is difficult to resist 
 the conviction that they mu^t have resulted in 
 the complete prostration of the organized 
 force of the Confederate States. As we shall 
 shortly see, such was the condition of the 
 Confederate armies at the time when General 
 McClellan was maturing his plan?, that the 
 hastily prepared and somewhat hurriedly 
 executed movements which were made in the 
 West, under the direct authority of President 
 Lincoln, in February and March, sufficed to 
 make an impression upim the front of Con 
 federate resistance in that quarter, which, had 
 it been accompanied by an equal impact upon 
 the eastern and south em bulwarks of the then 
 loosely-jointed Confederate system, could hard 
 ly have failed to determine a speedy issue of 
 the war. Won as they were, these isolated 
 and premature triumphs in the Wc&t simply 
 aroused the Confederates to a full sense of 
 their danger. The great scheme of the war 
 was broken up by them, and the nation expi 
 ated, in more than a year of desperate and 
 costly efforts to master the Mississippi and 
 open a way into Eastern Tennessee, the im 
 patience which refused to recognize the infinity 
 advantages of the delay which perfects concen 
 tration, over the desultory and incoherent 
 energy which spends itself in ill-combined 
 and in spasmodic efforts. * 
 
 The period during which General MeClel- 
 lan really held command of the armies of the 
 Union, and was really in a position to enable 
 him to plan and prepare a campaign propor 
 tionate to the area of the war, extended over 
 but a little more than two months. He was 
 called to fill the post vacated by Lieut. -Gen 
 eral Scott in November, 1861. Incessantly 
 occupied with the details of the organization 
 
28 
 
 of the main army, which was to be directly 
 commanded by himself, General McClellan 
 was, at the same time, burdened with the 
 duty of supervising all the military prepara 
 tions of the Union, and of elaborating the 
 vast plan of campaign already sketched. 
 
 It is not surprising that, while sparing- 
 neither body nor brain in this collossal task, 
 the young Commander-in-Chief should have 
 overtaxed even his vigorous constitution. 
 Towards the middle of December he con 
 tracted a serious illness, which, for a short 
 time, conn tied him to his head-quarters at 
 Washington. 
 
 During this time the political pressure upon 
 the President, for an advance of the armies, 
 became daily more and more vehement. The 
 Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, left the Cab 
 inet, and was succeeded by Mr. Stanton, who, 
 while he professed the warmest regard for the 
 young General in command of the armies, 
 gave his most strenuous efforts in support of 
 the external clamor which was driving the 
 President towards a practical nullification of 
 his influence arid his authority. 
 
 Before General McClellan had fully recov 
 ered his health, and without any consultation 
 whatever had with him, the President finally, 
 on the 27th of January, 1862, succumbed to 
 these demoralizing forces, and assumed him 
 self the command of the national forces. 
 
 On that day he issued, from the Executive 
 Mansion, the following War Order : 
 
 Ordered, That the twenty-second day of 
 February, ^ 1862, be the day for a general 
 movement *of the land and naval forces of the 
 United States against the insurgent forces. 
 That especially the army at and about For 
 tress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the 
 Army of "Western Virginia, the army near 
 Mumfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flo 
 tilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of 
 Mexico, be ready to move on that day. 
 
 " That all other forces, both land and naval, 
 with their respective commanders, obey ex 
 isting orders for the time, and be ready to 
 obey additional orders when duly given. 
 
 "That the heads of departments, and espec 
 ially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, 
 with all their subordinates, and the General- 
 in-Chief, with all other commanders and sub 
 ordinatcs of land and naval forces, will sev 
 erally be held to their strict and full responsi 
 bilities for prompt execution of this order. 
 "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 
 
 From the moment of the promulgation of 
 this most extraordinary order, the General 
 whom it so peremptory and so insultingly 
 
 superseded, ceased, of course, to be responsi 
 ble for the conduct of any military operation, 
 not carried on directly under his own eyes 
 and specially committed to his own direct 
 control. 
 
 It is necessary to remember here that the 
 armies thus directed to be set in motion upon 
 a given day, thus publicly announced to foes 
 and friends alike, were made up of many 
 thousands of men entirely unfamiliar with 
 war, and commanded, for the most part, by 
 officers as inexperienced as themselves. 
 
 The few " veterans " of this host were men 
 whose nominal service, under armies, had a 
 date of but from four to five months. As to 
 the condition of these great branches of the 
 military service, on which the practicability of 
 k moving such a force must have been absolute 
 ly dependent, had the troops been troops of 
 the line inured to war, no one could possibly 
 form an intelligent notion, excepting the com 
 manding general, under whom they had teen 
 organized, and who, as we have seen, was not 
 so much as consulted upon the subject. 
 
 Viewed in the light of these considerations, 
 this singular Order would seem as unaccount 
 able in itself as it is certainly unique in 
 the history of human warfare, were not an 
 adequate, if not a satisfactory, explanation of 
 its origin and intent furnished to us by ono 
 of the most intrepid defenders of Mr. Lincoln 
 and his administration. 
 
 In his "Life of President Lincoln," Mr. 
 Raymond, of New York, thus simply and 
 clearly states the case : 
 
 "As winter approached without any indi 
 cations of an intended movement of our ar 
 mies, the public impatience rose to the high- 
 mt point of discontent. The Administration 
 was everywhere held responsible for these 
 unaccountable delays, and was freely charged 
 by its opponents, with a design to protract 
 the war for selfish political purposes of its 
 own ; and at the fall elections tlic piiblic dis 
 satisfaction made itself manifest bij adverse 
 votes in every considerable State where elec 
 tions were -held" 
 
 From the moment when considerations of 
 political and partizan expediency thus invaded 
 the great question of the conduct of the war 
 in the mind of the President, all harmonious 
 concert of action between that functionary 
 and General McClellan necessarily came to 
 an end. With such considerations General 
 McClellan, as an honest and single-minded 
 soldier laboring solely for the defeat of the 
 armed enemies of the Union, had and could 
 have nothing whatever to do. The "public 
 dissatisfaction," which "made itself manifest 
 
29 
 
 by adverse votes" in the fall eleclions of 
 1861, had its origin in many other causes be 
 sides the delays in the movement of our 
 armies. The civil administration of the gov 
 ernment had been conducted with an extraor- 
 4 dinary recklessness, alike of the laws of the 
 land and of the liberties of the citizens, while 
 the bare fact of the civil war itself necessarily 
 shook the public confidence in the statesman- 
 * ship of a party who*se leading representative 
 had openly laughed the possibility of such a 
 war to scorn, and had predicted the complete 
 restoration of order throughout the nation within 
 " sixty days" from the passage of the Ordi 
 nance of Secession by the State of South 
 Carolina. To concentrate this "public dis 
 satisfaction," if possible, upon the delays in 
 the movement of our armies ; to brand those 
 delays as "unaccountable;" and to fix the 
 responsibility of them upon the commander 
 of the forces, was such a move in partizan tac 
 tics as seems to have tempted the Administra 
 tion into entire forgctfulness of the fatal conse 
 quences which it was to entail upon the public 
 service and the welfare of the state. 
 
 It would appoar, too, that a singular con 
 fidence in his own capacity as* a military 
 leader, was, at the same time, growing up in 
 the mind of the President. For, not content 
 with assuming the general command, by 
 proclamation, of the armies of the Union, 
 Mr. Lincoln at once proceeded to assume the 
 direct control of the campaign of the Army 
 of the Potomac in particular. 
 
 On the 81st of January, 1862, appeared 
 the President s Special War Order, No. 1, 
 couched in the following terms : 
 
 " EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, 1862. 
 
 "Ordered, That all the disposable force of 
 the Army of the Potomac, after providing 
 safely for the defence of Washington, be 
 formed into an expedition for the immediate 
 object of seizing and occupying a point upon 
 the railroad southwestward of what is known 
 as Manast?.is Junction ; all details to be in the 
 discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, and 
 the expedition to move before or on the twenty- 
 second day of February next. 
 
 "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 
 
 Had the civil war been suddenly brought 
 to an end, by the submission of the South, be 
 fore a single movement had been made in the 
 campaigns of 1862, this " Special War Order, 
 No. 1" would, doubtless, live in history as 
 the most grotesque document which ever 
 emanated from a man elevated by his 
 fellow-men to a position of great trust and 
 
 grave responsibility. The accredited biographer 
 of Mr. Lincoln informs us that he distinguished 
 himself in his early life by his bravery and 
 skill in conducting the defence of a flafe- 
 boat on the Mississippi River against an 
 attack made upon it by seven negroes. The 
 remembrance of this exploit does not seem 
 to have impelled the President to relieve 
 our naval commanders of the responsibilities 
 of their profession. And it is highly improb 
 able that it would ever have occurred to the 
 President had he found himself on board of 
 the " Monitor," during her memorable conflict 
 with the "Merrimac," to assume the com 
 mand of that gallant little craft, and prescribe 
 manoeuvres of battle to Lieutenant Worden. 
 Yet the brief land campaign against the 
 Indians, in which we are assured that Mr. Lin 
 coln once took a creditable part as a captain of 
 militia, appears to have inspired him with the 
 belief that he might reasonably and respecta 
 bly undertake to handle one of the largest 
 armies of modern times, engaged in one of 
 the most formidable and difficult invasions 
 upon record ! 
 
 General McClellan has many times, in the 
 course of iiis career, exhibited a power of self- 
 command, and a forgetfulness of all merely 
 personal considerations in behalf of his obli 
 gations to his country and to the troops 
 under his command, which entitle him to a 
 lofty placo among those true heroes who have 
 dared to feel that 
 
 " The path of duty is the way to glory." 
 
 But never, surely, were these qualities more 
 keenly tested than they must have been by this 
 " War Order," which at once shocked hia 
 common sense as a soldier, and outraged his 
 self-respect as an officer high in command. 
 
 Before this " Order" was issued, General 
 McClellan had explained to the President the 
 plan of campaign which he intended to pur 
 sue in Virginia. Like the immortal Dutch 
 Commissioners, who harassed the soul of 
 Marlborough with their incessant interference 
 in his campaigns, the President certainly had 
 a right, in virtue of his position, to know 
 what operations the general in command of 
 his armies was about to undertake ; but, like 
 those high and mighty marplots, also, his 
 Excellency abused this right into a warrant for 
 assuming the control of those operations, 
 objecting to them, and modifying all the con 
 ditions essential to their success. Had Mr. 
 Lincoln consulted General Halleck on the 
 subject of these pretensions of his, that officer, 
 who has done his country the service of trans- 
 
30 
 
 lating Jomini s great work on the " Art of 
 War," might have enlightened him as to the" 
 Kraits of executive duty, with the following 
 passage upon which the campaign of 1862, 
 on the Peninsula, has furnished a commentary 
 more striking than any which the elder history 
 of war has bequeathed to us : 
 
 In my j adgment, observes Baron Jomini, 
 upon the part taken by the Executive Aulic 
 Council, of Vienna, in directing the opera 
 tions of the Austrian armies, " the only 
 duty which such a council can safely under 
 take is that of advising as to the adoption of 
 a general plan of operations. Of course I 
 do not mean by this a plan which is to em 
 brace the whole course of a campaign, tie 
 down the generals to that cours<?, and GO inev 
 itably lead to their being beaten ; I mean a 
 plan which shall determine the objects of the 
 campaign, decide whether offensive or defen 
 sive operations shall be undertaken, and fix 
 the amount of material means which may be 
 relied upon, in the first instance, for the open 
 ing of the enterprise, and then, for the possi 
 ble reserves in case of invasion. It can not 
 be denied that all these things may be, and 
 even should be discussed in a council of gov 
 ernment mades up of generals and of minis 
 ters : but hsre the action of such a council 
 should stop ; for if it pretends to say to a 
 commando i -in-chief not only that he shall 
 march on Vienna or on Paris, but also in 
 what way he is to manoeuvre to reach those 
 points, the unfortunate commander-in-chief 
 will certainly be beaten, and the WHOLE RE 
 SPONSIBILITY OF HIS REVERSES" WILL REST 
 UPON THOSE WHO, TWO HUNDRED MILES OFF 
 FROM THE ENEMY, PRETEND TO DIRECT AN 
 ARMY, WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO 
 MANAGE WHEN ACTUALLY IN THE FIELD." 
 
 How completely the President, while leav 
 ing to General McClellan the nominal com 
 mand of the Army of the Potomac undertook 
 to direct that army, appears from the following 
 note, sent by him to General McClellan, 
 while the latter, animated by an honorable 
 determination to remember only the respect 
 due the exalted office of the Chief Magistrate, 
 was preparing a paper in which his reasons 
 for the movement he had resolved upon should 
 be clearly set forth. 
 
 "EXECUTIVE MANSION, 
 "WASHINGTON, February, 3, 1862. 
 
 "MAJ.-GSN. McCLELLAN, 
 
 " MY DEAR SIR : You and I h-ive distinct 
 and different plans for a movement of the 
 Army of the Potomac. Yours to be done by 
 the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to 
 Urb.ina, and across and to tha terminus of 
 
 the railroad on the York River ; mine to move 
 directly to a point on the railroad southwest 
 of Manassas. 
 
 " If you will give me satisfactory answers 
 to the following questions, I shall gladly 
 yield my plan to yours. 
 
 " 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly 
 larger expenditure of time and money than 
 mine ? 
 
 " 2d. Wherein is a victory more certain t 
 by your plan than mine ? 
 
 " 3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable 
 by your plan than mine ? 
 
 " 4th. In fact would it not be less valuable 
 in this ; that it would break no great line of 
 the enemy s communications, while mine 
 would ? 
 
 " 5th. In case of disaster, would not a re 
 treat be more difficult by your plan than 
 mine?" 
 
 "Yours truly, 
 
 * ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 It will be observed that there is no ques 
 tion, in this strange note , of the general ob 
 jects of the campaign about to be undertaken ; 
 of the nature, whether offensive or defensive, 
 of the operation about to be begun ; nor of the 
 material means to be provided for the exe 
 cution of these operations. 
 
 The President desires the Commander-in- 
 Chief to discuss with him the way in which 
 Richmond, the admitted objective point of 
 the campaign, is to be reached. He assumes 
 that he is himself at least as good a judge of 
 that way as the Commander-in- Chief can be, 
 and proposes, in fact, though "not in form, 
 that General McClellan shall undertake to 
 execute not his own plan of operations, but 
 a plan of operations conceived by the supe 
 rior military ability of the Chief Magistrate 
 of the republic. The importance of this note 
 to a first comprehension of all the subsequent 
 events not of the Peninsula campaign alone, 
 but of the whole war, cannot well be exag 
 gerated. 
 
 It was answered by General McClellan, so 
 far as concerned the Peninsula campaign, in 
 the paper which, as we have already said, he 
 was drawing up when it was handed in to 
 him. It has been answered, so far as the 
 welfare of the republic, the honor of our 
 arms, and the prospects of the cause of the 
 Union are concerned, by two long and weary 
 and wasting years of Herculean efforts thwart 
 ed and misdirected ; by the unnecessary expen 
 diture of hundreds of millions of dollars, 
 diverted from the pursuits of industry and 
 subtracted from the national wealth ; by the 
 
31 
 
 hearfc-breaking sickness of a nation s hope 
 deferred ; by the irreparable sacrifice of thou 
 sands upon thousands of lives ; answered in 
 blood and tears f orii the heights of Freder- 
 icksburg, and the plains of Manassas, from 
 the wildernesses of CbancellorsviJle, and the 
 unnamed unnumbered graves of Spottsylva- 
 nia. 
 
 The paper presented by General McClollan 
 to the Secretary of War, on the very day of 
 the receipt of this note, is so full and. manly 
 a statenront of the whole case as it then stood, 
 and throws so clear a light not only on the 
 whole military history of the war as well 
 subsequently to its date as before that time, 
 that it cannot, be too often reproduced or too 
 carefully pondered. 
 
 " HEAn-QUATVTERS OF THE ABiLT, 
 
 " WASHINGTON, Feb. 3, 1862. 
 " HON. E. M. STANTON, Sec y of War. 
 
 " SIR : I ask your indulgence for the 
 following paper, rendered necessary by cir 
 cumstances. 
 
 " I assumed command of the troops in the 
 vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27, 
 1801, six days after the battle of Bull Run. 
 I found no" army to command ; a mere collec 
 tion of regiments cowering on the banks of 
 the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dis 
 pirited by the recent defeat. Nothing of any 
 consequence had b.en done to secure the 
 southern approaches to the capital by means 
 of defensive works; nothing whatever had 
 been undertaken to defend tho avenues to 
 the city on the northern side of the Potomac. 
 The troops were not only undisciplined, un- 
 drillecl, and dispirited ; they were not even 
 placed in military positions, the city was 
 almost in a condition to have been taken by 
 a dash of a regiment of cavalry. 
 
 " Without one day s delay I undertook the 
 difficult task assigned to me ; that task the 
 Hon. Secretary knows was given to me with 
 out my solicitation or foreknowledge. How 
 far I have accomplished it will best be shown 
 by the past and the present. The capital is 
 secure against attack ; the extensive foitifica- 
 tions erected by the labor of our troops ena 
 ble a small gamson to hold it against a 
 numerous army ; the enemy have been held 
 in check ; the State of Maryland is securely 
 in our possession ; the detached counties of 
 Virginia are again within the pale of our 
 laws, and all apprehension of trouble in 
 Delaware is at an end ; the enemy are con 
 fined to the positions they occupied before the 
 disaster of the 21st of July; more than all 
 this, I have now under my command a well 
 drilled and reliable army, to which the desti 
 
 nies of the country may be confidently com 
 mitted ; this army is young and untried in 
 battle, but it is animated by the highest 
 spirit, and ia capable of great deeds. That 
 so much has oecn accomplished, and such an 
 army created in so short a time, from noth 
 ing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the 
 highest glories of the Administration and the 
 nation. M ny weeks, I may ry many months 
 ago, this Army of the Potomac was fully \i\ 
 condition to repel any attack ; but there is a 
 vast . difference between that and the efficiency 
 required to enable troops to attack success 
 fully an army elattd by victory and intrench 
 ed in a position long since selected, studied, 
 and fortified. In the earliest papers I sub 
 mitted to the President, I asked for an effec 
 tive and movable force far exceeding the 
 aggregate now on the banks of the Potomac. 
 I have not the force I asked for. Even 
 when in a subordinate position, I always 
 looked beyond the operations of (he Army of 
 Potomac ; I was never satisfied in my own faind 
 with a barren victory, but looked to com 
 bined and decisive operations. When I wa* 
 placed in command of the armies of the 
 United States, I immediately turned my at 
 tention to the whole field of operations, 
 regarding the Army of the Potomac as only 
 one, while the most important, of the masses 
 under my command. I confess ihat I did 
 not then appreciate the total absence of a 
 general plan, which had before existed, 
 nor did I know that utter disorganization and 
 want of preparation pervaded the Western 
 armies. I took it for granted that they were 
 nearly, if not quite, in condition to move 
 toward the fulfilment of my plans ; I ac 
 knowledge that I made a great mistake. 
 I sent at once, with the approval of the Ex 
 ecutive, officers I considered competent to 
 command in Kentucky and Missouri, their 
 instructions looked to prompt movements, 
 I soon found that the labor of creation and 
 organization had to be performed there ; 
 transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, disci 
 pline, all were wanting : these things required 
 time to procure them. The generals in com 
 mand have done their work most creditably ; 
 but we are still delayed. I had hoped that 
 a general advance could be made during the 
 good weather of December ; I was mistaken. 
 My wish was to gain possession of the East- 
 em Tennessee Railroad as a preliminary 
 movement, then to follow it up immediately 
 by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as 
 nearly at the same time as possible. I have 
 ever regarded our true policy as being that of 
 fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking 
 
32 
 
 for the most decisive results. I do not wish 
 to waste life in useless battles, but I prefer 
 to strike at the heart. -.Two bases of opera 
 tions seem to present themselves for the ad 
 vance of the Army of the Porornac. 1st. 
 That of Washington, its present position, 
 involving a direct attack upon the intrenched 
 positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manas- 
 pas, &c., or else a movement to turn one or 
 l)oth flanks of those positions ; or a combina- 
 iion of the two plans. The relative force of 
 the two armies will not justify an attack on 
 both flanks ; an attack on his left flank alone 
 involves a long line of wagon communication, 
 and cannot prevent him from collecting for 
 the decisive battle all the detachments now 
 on his extreme right and left. Should we 
 attack his right flank by the line of the Occo- 
 quan, and a crossing of the Potomac below 
 that river and near his batteries, we could, 
 perhaps, prevent the junction of the enemy s 
 right with his centre (we might destroy the 
 former), we would remove the obstructions 
 to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the 
 length of wagon transportation by establish 
 ing new depots at the nearest points of the 
 Potomac, and strike more directly his main 
 railway communication. 
 
 " The fords of Occoquan, below the mouth 
 of Bull Run, are watched by the rebels ; bat 
 teries are said to be placed x>n the heights in 
 rear (c mcealed by the woods) , and the ar 
 rangement of his troops is such that he can 
 oppose some considerable resistance to a pas 
 sage of that stream. Information has just 
 been received, to the effect that the eeiny 
 are intrenching a line of heights, extending 
 from the vicinity of Sangster s (Union Mills) 
 towards Evansport. Early in January 
 Sprigg s Ford was occupied by Gen. Rhodes 
 with 3,600 men and eight guns. There are 
 strong reasons for believing that Davis s Ford 
 is occupied. These circumstances indicate, or 
 prove, that the enemy anticipates the move 
 ment in question, and is prepared to resist it. 
 Assuming, for the present, that this operation 
 i.i determined upon, it may be well to exam 
 ine briefly its probable progress. In the 
 present state of affairs, our columns (for tho 
 movement of so large a force must be made 
 in several columns, at least five or six) can 
 i each the Accotink without danger ; during 
 the march thence to the Occoquan, our light 
 flank becomes exposed to an attack from 
 Fairfax Station, Sangsters, and Union Mills, 
 this danger must be met by occupying, in 
 some force, either the two first-named places, 
 or better, the point of junction of the roads 
 leading to the village of Occoquan. This 
 
 occupation must be sustained so long as we 
 continue to draw supplies by the roads from 
 this city, or until a battle is won. 
 
 "The crossing of the Occoquan should be 
 made at all the fords from Wolf s Run to the 
 mouth, the points of crossing not being neces 
 sarily confined to the fords themselves. Should 
 the enemy occupy this line in force we must, 
 with what assistance the flotilla can afford, 
 endeavor to force the passage, near the mouth, 
 thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole 
 line, or be taken in flank himself. 
 
 " Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it 
 would be necessary to throw a column, by the 
 shortest route, to Dumfries, partly to force 
 the enemy to abandon his batteries on the 
 Potomac, partly to cover our left flank against 
 an attack from the direction of Acquia, and, 
 lastly, to establish our communication with 
 ! the river by the best roads, and thus give 
 us new depots. The enemy would by this 
 time have occupied the line of the Occoquan 
 above Bull Run, holding Brentsvillo in the 
 force, and perhaps extending his lines some 
 what further to the southwest. 
 
 " Our next step would be to prevent the ene 
 my from crossing the Occoquan between Bull 
 | Run and the Broad Run, to fall upon cur right 
 flank while moving on Brentsville. This 
 might be effected by occupying Bacon Race 
 Church and the cross-roads near the mouth of 
 Bull Run, or still more effectually, by moving 
 to the fords themselves, and preventing him 
 from debouching on our side. 
 
 These operations would possibly be resistr 
 ed, and it would require some time to effect 
 them. As nearly at the same time, as pos 
 sible, we should gain the fords necessary to 
 our purposes above Broad Run. Having se 
 cured our right flank, it would become nece&- 
 sary to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we 
 could not leave it between our right flank and 
 the main body. The final movement on the 
 railroad must be determined by circumstances 
 existing at the time. 
 
 " This brief sketch brings out in bold re 
 lief the great advantage possessed by the 
 enemy in the strong central position he occu 
 pies, with roads diverging in every direction, 
 and a strong line of defence, enabling him to 
 remain on the defensive, with a small force 
 on one flank, while he concentrates everything 
 on the other for a decisive action. 
 
 " Should we place a portion of our force in 
 front of Centreville, while the rest crosses the 
 Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing 
 our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by 
 a distance too great to enable the two parts 
 to support each other, should either be at- 
 
33 
 
 tacked by the masses of the enemy, while 
 the other is held in check. 
 
 "I should, perhaps, have dwelt more de 
 cidedly on the fact that the force left near 
 Gangster s must be allowed to remain some 
 where on that side of the Occoquan until the 
 decisive battle is over, so as to cover our re 
 treat, in the event of disaster : unless it should 
 bo decided to select and intrench a new base 
 somewhere near Dumfries, a proceeding in 
 volving much time. 
 
 After the passage of the Occoquan by 
 the main army, this covering force could be 
 drawn in to a more central and less exposed 
 position, say Brimstone Hill, or nearer the 
 Occoquan. 
 
 " In this latitude the^eather will, for a 
 considerable period, be very uncertain, and a ! 
 movement commenced in force on roads in j 
 tolerably firm condition, will be liable, almost | 
 certain to be much delayed by rains and 
 snow. It will therefore be next to impossi 
 ble to surprise the enemy, or take him at a 
 disadvantage, by rapid manoeuvres. Our 
 slow progress will enable him to divine our 
 purposes, and take his measures accordingly. 
 The probability is, from the best information 
 we possess, that the enemy has improved the 
 roads leading to his line of defence, while we 
 will have to work as we advance. 
 
 * Bearing in mind what has been said, and 
 the present unprecedented and impassable 
 condition of the roads, it will be evident that 
 no precise period can be fixed upon for the 
 movement on this- line, Nor can its duration 
 be closely calculated ; it seems certain that 
 many weeks may elapse before it is possible 
 to commence the march. Assuming the suc 
 cess of this operation, and the defeat of the 
 enemy as certain, the question at once arises 
 as to the importance of the results gained. I 
 think these results would be confined to the 
 possession of the field of battle, the evacua 
 tion of the line of the Upper Potomac by the 
 enemy, and the moral effect of the victory ; 
 important results, it is true, but not decisive 
 of the war, nor securing the destruction of 
 the enemy s main army, for he could fall 
 back upon other positions %nd fight us again 
 and again, should the condition of the troops 
 permit. If he is in no condition to fight us 
 again out of range of the intrcnchments at 
 .Richmond, we would find it a very difficult 
 and tedious matter to follow him up there, for 
 he would destroy his railroad bridges, and 
 otherwise impede our progress through a 
 region where the roads are as bad as they 
 well can be, and we would probably find our 
 selves forced, at last, to change the whole 
 
 8 
 
 theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route 
 to Richmond, with a smaller available force, 
 and at an expenditure of much more time 
 than were we to adopt the short line at once. 
 We would also have forced the enemy to con 
 centrate his forces, and perfect his measures, 
 at the very point where it is desirable to strike 
 him when least prepared. 
 
 " II. The second base of operations, avail 
 able for the Army of the Potomac, is that of 
 the lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the 
 shortest possible land route to Richmond, and 
 strikes directly at the heart of the enemy s 
 power in the east. 
 
 " The roads in that region are passable at 
 all seasons of the year. 
 
 " The country now alluded to is much 
 more favorable for offensive operations than 
 that in front of Washington (which is very 
 unfavorable), much more level, more cleared 
 land, the woods less dense, the soil more 
 sandy, the spring some two or three weeks 
 earlier. A movement in force on that line 
 obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched 
 position at Manassas, in order to hasten to 
 cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do 
 this ; for should he permit us to occupy 
 Richmond, his destruction can be averted 
 only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in 
 which he must be the assailant. This move 
 ment, if successful, gives us the capital, the 
 communications, the supplies of the rebels ; 
 Norfolk would fall ; ail the waters of the Ches 
 apeake would be ours ; all Virginia would be 
 in our power ; and the enemy forced to aban 
 don Tennessee and North Carolina. The 
 alternative presented to the enemy would be, 
 to beat us in a position selected by ourselves ; 
 disperse or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. 
 
 " Should we be beaten in battle, we have 
 a perfectly secure retreat down the Penin 
 sula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks per 
 fectly covered by the fieet. During the 
 whole movement our flank is covered by the 
 water, our right is secure, for the reason that 
 the enemy is too distant to reach us in time ; 
 lie can only oppose us in front, we bring our 
 fleet in full play. 
 
 "After a successful battle, our position 
 would be, Burnside forming our left, Nor 
 folk held securely, our centre connecting 
 Barnside with Baell both by Raleigh and 
 Lvnchburg, Buell in Eastern Tennessee and 
 Northern Alabama, Halleck at Nashville and 
 Memphis. 
 
 The next movement would be to connect , 
 with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wil 
 mington and Charleston : to advance our 
 centre into South Carolina and Georgia ; to 
 
push Buell, either towards Montgomery, or to 
 unite with the main army in Georgia; to 
 throw Halleck southward to meet the naval 
 expedition from New Orleans. 
 
 "We should then be in a condition to 
 reduce, at our leisure, all the Southern pea- 
 ports ; to occupy all the avenues of commu 
 nication ; to use the great outlet of the Mis 
 sissippi ; to reestablish our government and 
 arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas ; to 
 force the slaves to labor for our subsistence, 
 instead of that of the rebels ; to bid defiance 
 to all foreign interference. Such is the 
 object I ever had in view ; this is the general 
 plan which I hope to accomplish. 
 
 " For many long months I have labored to 
 prepare the Army of the Potomac to play its 
 part in the programme. From the day when 
 I was placed in command of all our armies, 
 I have exerted myself to place all the other 
 armies in such a condition, that they, too, 
 could perform their allotted duties. 
 
 " Should it be determined to operate from 
 the lower Chesapeake, the point of landing 
 which promises the most brilliant results is 
 Urbana, on the lower Rappahannoek. This 
 point is easily reached by vessels of heavy 
 draught ; it is neither occupied nor observed 
 by the enemy ; it is but one march from West 
 Point, the key of that region ; and thence but 
 two marches to Richmond. A rapid move 
 ment from Urbana would probably cut off 
 Magrader in the Peninsula, and enable us to 
 occupy Richmond before it could be strongly 
 reinforced. Should we fail in that, we could, 
 with the cooperation of the navy, cross the 
 James and show ou> selves in rear of Rich 
 mond, thus forcing th3 enemy to come out 
 and attack us ; for his position ^vould be 
 untenable, with us on the southern bank of 
 the river. 
 
 tl Should circumstances render it not ad 
 visable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob 
 Jack Bay ; or, the worst coming to the 
 worst, we can take Fort Monroe* as a base, 
 and operate with complete security, although 
 with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up 
 the Peninsula. 
 
 To reach whatever point may be selected 
 as a base, a large amount of cheap water 
 transportation must be collected, consisting 
 mainly of canal-boats, barges, wood-boats, 
 schooners, &c., towed by small steamers, all 
 of a different character from those required 
 for all previous expeditions. This can cer 
 tainly" be accomplished within thirty days 
 from the time the order is given. I propose 
 as the best possible plan that can, in my 
 judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as 
 
 I a landing-place for the first detachments, 
 to transport by water four divisions of 
 infantry with their batteries, the regular 
 infantry, a few wagons, one bridge train, and 
 a few squadrons of cavalry, making the 
 vicinity of Hooker s position the place of 
 embarkation for as many as possible ; to 
 j move the regular cavalry and reserve artil 
 lery, the remaining bridge trains and wagons 
 to a point somewhere near Cape Lookout, 
 then ferry them over the river by means of 
 North River ferry-boats, march them over to 
 the Rappahannoek (covering the movement 
 by an infantry force near Heathsville), and to 
 cross the Rappahannoek in a siinilar way. 
 The expense and difficulty of the movement 
 will thus be very i^uch diminished (a saving 
 of transportation of about 10,000 horses), 
 and the result none the less certain. 
 
 "The concentration of the cavalry, &c., 
 in the lower counties of Maryland, can be 
 effected without exciting suspicion, and the 
 movement made without delay from that 
 cause. 
 
 "This movement, if adopted, will not at 
 all expose the city of Washington to danger. 
 
 " The total force to be thrown upon the 
 new line would be, according to circumstan 
 ces, from 110 to 140,000; 1 hope to use the 
 latter number by bringing fresh troops into 
 Washington, and still leave it quite safe. I 
 fully realize that, in all projects offered, time 
 will probably be the most valuable considera 
 tion. It is my decided opinion, that in that 
 point of view, the second plan should be 
 adopted. It is possible, nay highly probable, 
 that the weather and state of the roads may 
 be such as to delay the direct movement from 
 Washington, with its unsatisfactory results 
 and great risks ; far beyond the time required 
 to complete the second plan. In the first 
 case we cati fix no definite time for an 
 advance. The roads havd gone from bad to 
 worse nothing like their present condition 
 has ever been known here before they are 
 impassable at present, we are entiiely at the 
 mercy of the weather. It is by no means 
 certain that we can beat them at Manassas. 
 On the other line, I regard success as certain 
 by all the chances of war. We demoralize 
 the enemy by forcing him to abandon his pre 
 pared position for one which we have chosen, 
 in which all is in our favor, and where suc 
 cess must produce immense results. 
 
 " My judgment, as a general, is clearly in 
 favor of this project. Nothing is certain in 
 war, but all the chances are in favor of this 
 movement. So much am I in favor of the 
 southern line of operations, that I would pre- 
 
35 
 
 fer the move from Fort Monroe as a base 
 as a certain, though less brilliant movement, 
 than that from Urbana to an attack upon 
 Manassas. 
 
 " I know that his Excellency the Presi 
 dent, you and I, all agree in our wishes, and 
 that tVeso wishes are to bring the war to a 
 close, as promptly as the means in our pos 
 session will permit. I believe that the mass 
 of the people have entire coufidence in us. I 
 am sure of it. Let us then look only to the 
 great result to be accomplished, and disre 
 gard everything else. I am, very respect 
 fully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " G. B. McCLELLAN, 
 " Major-General Commanding" 
 
 At the time when this letter was written 
 the Western armies of the Union were already 
 in motion and, supported by the gun-boats, were 
 beginning that campaign which, resulting in 
 tbe capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, 
 compelled the evacuation of Nashville by the 
 Confederates, and led to the bloody but inde 
 cisive battles of Shiloh and Pittsburg Landing. 
 This movement, naturally enough, excited the 
 public mind to a still greater impatience with 
 what the Administration press persistently 
 represented as the "unaccountable delays" 
 of the Army of the Potomac, and still fur 
 ther indisposed the President to give the com 
 mander of that army the cordial support 
 which he had a right to expect from the 
 National Executive, and which was absolutely 
 necessary to the success of its own far more 
 important movements. 
 
 1 Awakening the Southern government and 
 people to a lively sense of the peril impend 
 ing over them, this campaign at the West 
 accelerated the preparations of General John- 
 stone in Virginia, for the evacuation of Manas 
 sas, and redoubled his efforts to provide for the 
 defence of the Confederate capital against any 
 attack from the line of the James or the 
 York Rivers. Against the loss of important 
 opportunities thus incurred in consequence of 
 the abandonment of General McClellan s 
 plan of a general and simultaneous advance, 
 must be sob, however, the fresh confidence 
 which the Western victories infused into 
 the army of the Union, dispirited by the 
 defeat of Bull Run. The advantages won 
 over the enemy at Port Royal and at Roanoke 
 Island, though not otherwise of any particu 
 lar importance, concurred in producing this 
 wholesome effect; and, had the correspondence 
 of the beginning of February, between Gen 
 eral McClellan, the President, and the Secre 
 tary of War, brought about a frank concession 
 
 to the General of the powers necessary to 
 enable him to act with freedom and with force, 
 great results might still have been secured. 
 
 This, however, was very far from being the 
 case. Mr. Lincoln, indeed, gave way so far 
 as to permit General McClellan to endeavor 
 to proceed with the necessary arrangements 
 for opening his campaign from the Lower 
 Chesapeake, but it was not until the 27th of 
 February that the Secretary of War author 
 ized the Assistant-Secretary, Mr. Tucker, tc 
 procure the transports and steamers for mov 
 ing the forces to their new field of operations. 
 Notwithstanding the urgent representations 
 of General McClellan and of Mr. Tucker, 
 nothing had, before, this date, been permitted 
 to be done towards accomplishing this vital 
 preliminary work ; and it is worthy of notice 
 by all those who have thoughtlessly and 
 ignorantly lent themselves to the outcry 
 which partizanship has raised over the alleged 
 slowness" o*f General McClellan s move 
 ments, that in thirty-seven days from the time 
 when the Government at last put the General 
 at liberty to set about preparing his transpor 
 tation, he had moved, with the assistance of 
 Mr. Tucker, his whole army of 
 
 121,500 men, 
 14,552 animals, 
 1.150 wagons, 
 
 44 batteries, 
 74 ambulances, 
 
 together with pontoon bridges, telegraph mate 
 rials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, 
 luggage, and the like required for a force of 
 this magnitude, from Washington to Fortress 
 Monroe. 
 
 This was done with the loss of but eight 
 mules and nine barges, which latter went 
 ashore at near Fortress Monroe in a gale, 
 the cargoes, however, being saved. 
 
 Well may Mr. Tucker claim for this extraor 
 dinary achievement that, "for economy and 
 celerity of movement, this expedition is with 
 out a parallel on record." 
 
 While General McClellan was superintend 
 ing and carrying out this colossal movement 
 he was not, however, suffered to be entirely 
 his own master, nor was he delivered from the 
 torment of the Presidential plan of campaign. 
 His own conduct, during this trying time, is 
 admirably depicted by an observer whose 
 competency and whose candor no man of 
 intelligence and of character will be likely to 
 dispute. The Prince de Joinville, an edu 
 cated and accomplished military man, whose 
 sole interest in the events passing before his 
 eyes, beyond that of a deep and cordial sym 
 pathy with the cause of the Union, is that of 
 a student of the political and military history 
 
36 
 
 of his times, thus describes the position and 
 Hie bearing of General McClellan, during the 
 months of February and March, 1862. 
 
 " As the day of action drew near, those who 
 suspected the General s project, and were 
 angry at not being informed of it; those 
 whom his promotion had excited to envy ; his 
 political enemies (who is without them in 
 America ? ) , in short, all those beneath him 
 or beside him who wished him ill, broke out 
 into a chorus of accusations of slowness, in 
 action, incapacity. McClellan, with a patri 
 otic courage which I have always admired, 
 disdained these accusations, and made no 
 reply. He satisfied himself with pursuing 
 his preparations in laborious silence." 
 
 On the 8th of March, while these prepara 
 tions, as we have seen, were going rapidly 
 forward, and at a moment when the complet- 
 est freedom and the profoundest secrecy in 
 regard to his movements were essential to the 
 General s success, he was suddenly sent for 
 by the President to learn that the whole mat 
 ter must once more be reconsidered and de 
 bated. He had already been interrupted in 
 the progress of the arrangements, begun on 
 the 27th of February, by the importunities 
 of the President and the Secretary of War, 
 that he would secure the line of the Baltimore 
 and Ohio Railroad, and clear the Potomac 
 River of the rebel batteries. In respect to 
 the former, General McClellan fully showed, 
 what events have since a thousand times con 
 firmed, that the true defence of the Baltimore 
 and Ohio Railroad lay in the occupation of the 
 Shenandoah, an occupation which his army, 
 upon the eve of a great expedition, was not 
 then in a condition to effect, for which it was 
 the duty of the President, now proclaimed 
 by himself to be Commander-in-Chief, to pro 
 vide, and which, in spite of repeated lessons, 
 the President has never since intelligently 
 attempted to carry out. 
 
 In respect to the rebel batteries on the 
 Potomac, established as they all of them 
 were independently of the rebel base at 
 Manassas, it had been long settled by the 
 report of General Barnard, that their estab 
 lishment "could not be prevented by .the 
 army." It was by the navy alone that the 
 liver could be cleared of them, unless the 
 whole Army of the Potomac was to be em 
 ployed in the task by "forcing," to use the 
 words of General Barnard, " a very strong line 
 of defence of the enemy, and doing all that 
 it would have to do if it were really opening 
 a campaign against them." 
 
 The President, however, kept insisting upon 
 this latter operation, and General McClellan, 
 
 on the 8th of March, 1862, called his divis 
 ional commanders into council at head-quar 
 ters, at the request of the President, for the 
 purpose of discussing with them a movement 
 towards the Occoquan upon the enemy s river 
 batteries. At this council the grand ulterior 
 movement to the Lower Chesapeake was ne 
 cessarily revealed. Upon the consequences 
 of this revelation, thus directly forced upon 
 General McClellan by the conduct of his 
 " Commander-in-Chief," the President, the 
 Prince de Joinville simply, but with a terrible 
 significance, remarks : 
 
 " McClellan was then forced to explain his 
 projects, and the next day they were known 
 to the enemy ; informed, no doubt, by one of 
 those thousand female spies who keep up his 
 communications into the domestic circles of 
 the Federal enemy, Johnstone evacuated Ma 
 nassas at once." 
 
 Watchful as Johnstone had all the winter 
 been of the young commander, the value of 
 whose silent and patient preparations he com 
 prehended far better than the petulant and 
 headstrong politicians by whom General Mc 
 Clellan was surrounded, this timely notice 
 enabled him to reach Richmond, and to con 
 centrate his attention and his forces upon the 
 Peninsular defences of that capital a month 
 before the Federal commander was suffered to 
 assume the initiative of his campaign. 
 
 Memorable indeed, on many accounts, was 
 this ominous eighth day of March, 1862. 
 
 On the 8th of March General McClellan 
 was compelled, as we have seen, to make his 
 plan of campaign known far beyond what hae 
 ever been esteemed proper or prudent in the 
 annals of war. 
 
 On the 8th of March another blow was 
 struck at his control of the army with which 
 he was to operate, in the publication by the 
 President, again without consultation with 
 himself, of two more " General War Orders." 
 
 The first of these divided his army into 
 arjny corps, and assigned to these corps their 
 several commanders, thus practically taking 
 out of General McClellau s hands the organ 
 ization of his troops. The second tied up 
 anew his whole campaign in the following 
 almost inconceivable manner : 
 
 " EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, ) 
 " March 8, 1862. j 
 
 " PRESIDENT S GENERAL WAR ORDER, No. 3. 
 
 " Ordered, That no change of the base of 
 operations of the Army of the Potomac shall 
 be made without leaving in and about Wash 
 ington such a force as, in the opinion of the 
 
37 
 
 General-in-Chief and the commanders of army 
 corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. 
 
 " That no more than two army corps (about 
 fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Po 
 tomac shall be moved en route for a new base 
 of operations until the navigation of the Po 
 tomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake 
 Bay, shall be freed from the enemy s batteries 
 and other obstructions, or until the President 
 shall hereafter give express permission. 
 
 " That any movement, as aforesaid , en route 
 for a new base of operations, which may be 
 ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which 
 may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake 
 Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as 
 early as the 18th of March instant, and the 
 General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so 
 moves as early as that day. 
 
 " Ordered, That the army and navy co 
 operate in an immediate effort to capture the 
 enemy s batteries upon the Potomac, between 
 Washington and the Chesapeake- Bay. 
 
 " ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 "L. Thomas, Adft Gen" 
 
 By the promulgation of his General AVar 
 Order No. 1, the President had assumed the 
 command of all the armies of the Union. By 
 the promulgation of this " Order No. 3 " he 
 assumed the command of the campaign of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 A single comment upon one single clause 
 of this "Order" will suffice to show the 
 knowledge of military affairs, and the respect 
 for the feelings towards General McClellan 
 himself, which presided over its composition. 
 The " General-in-Chief," as General Mc 
 Clellan is derisively entitled, ,is made "re 
 sponsible " for the readiness of his army " to 
 move upon the Bay as early as the 1 8th of 
 March." 
 
 Now it will be remembered that the araiy 
 could "move upon the Bay" only by the 
 help of steamers and transports; that the 
 President had never consented to any " move 
 ment upon the Bay " at all until the middle 
 of February, there being at that time no 
 transport service whatever available on the 
 Potomac ; and that the Secretary of War had 
 never authorized the establishment of a trans 
 port service until the 27th of February, or 
 less than ten days before the publication of 
 this " Order " which thus called upon Gen 
 eral McClellan to create, within twenty days, 
 the complete sea transportation service neces 
 sary for an army as large as that with which 
 the Allies first invaded the Crimea ! 
 
 On the 8th of March, again, the Merrimac 
 making her appearance suddenly from the port 
 
 of Norfolk, in which, as had been known 
 for months to the Federal Navy Department, 
 she had been raised from the bottom, refitted 
 and equipped for a new and terrible experi 
 ment in naval warfare, assailed the Federal 
 fleet lying in those waters, scattered and dis 
 comfited the ships, and, for the moment, rode 
 supreme over the lower James. 
 
 The engagement which took place the next 
 day between the Merrimac and the Monitor, 
 thougji it recovered the prestige of the Fed 
 eral navy, and secured the safety of Fortress 
 Monroe, failed to establish the power of the 
 Naval Department to control the James 
 River. General McClellan was thus com 
 pelled to modify the plans of his campaign, 
 upon the calculation that the York River alone 
 must make his line of water communication 
 with his base at Fortress Monroe. 
 
 On the 9th of March Johnstone began to 
 evacuate Manassas and Centreville. During 
 the night of that day General McClellan or 
 dered a general movement of the army towards 
 the enemy s abandoned positions, less, of 
 course, with the hope of being able to inflict 
 any serious loss upon him, than in order to pre 
 pare the troops for their entry upon the great 
 campaign before them. The observations which 
 this movement enabled the General to make 
 of the strength of the enemy s position con 
 firmed him in the double belief that an advance 
 upon those positions, during the winter, would 
 have been extremely dangerous to the untried 
 army of the Union, and that they had been 
 held so long only that Johnstone might ascer 
 tain distinctly from what quarter Richmond 
 was likely to be menaced. General McClellan s 
 own language on this subject *has acquired a 
 weight, from the subsequent course of events, 
 which demands its reproduction here : 
 
 " New levies that have never been in battle 
 cannot be expected to advance without cover 
 under the murderous fire from such defences, 
 and carry them by assault. This is work in 
 which veteran trdops frequently falter, and 
 are repulsed with loss. That an assault of 
 the enemy s positions in front of Washington, 
 with the new troops composing the Army of 
 the Potomac during the winter of 1861- 2, 
 would have resulted in defeat and demoral 
 ization, was too probable. The same army, 
 though inured to war in many battles hartley 
 fought and bravely won, has thrice, under 
 other generals, suffered such disasters as it 
 was no excess of prudence then to avoid. 
 
 " My letter to the Secretary of War, dated 
 February 3, 1862, and given above, ex 
 pressed the opinion that the movement to the 
 Peninsula would compel the enemy to retire 
 
38 
 
 from his position at Mauassas, and free Wash 
 ington from danger. 
 
 " When the enemy first learned of that plan, 
 they did thus evacuate Manassas. During 
 tho Peninsular campaign, as at no former pe 
 riod, northern Virginia was completely in our 
 possession, and the vicinity of Washington 
 free from the presence of the enemy. The 
 ground so gained was not lost, nor Washing 
 ton again put in danger, until the enemy 
 learned of the orders for an evacuation of the 
 Peninsula, sent to me at Harrison s Bar, and 
 were again left free to advance northward, 
 and menace the National Capital. Perhaps no 
 one now doubts that the best defence of 
 Washington is a Peuinsula attack on Rich 
 mond." 
 
 While this movement on Centre ville and 
 Manassas was going on, another complete and 
 formal change in the organization of the army 
 was made by the President, the order making 
 it, like so many preceding orders, being pub 
 lished without consultation with General Mc- 
 Clellan, and coming this time ,tp his knowledge 
 through one of his aids-de-camp, who, having 
 seen it in the National Intelligencer of March 
 12, 1862, telegraphed a copy of it to the 
 General at Fairfax Court House. 
 
 The Order ran as follows : 
 
 " EXECUTIVE MANSION, 
 " WASHINGTON, March 11, 1862. 
 
 "Presidents War Order, No. 3. 
 
 " Major-General McClellan, having person 
 ally taken the field, at the head of the army 
 of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he 
 is relieved from the command of the other 
 military departments, he retaining command 
 of the Department of the Potomac. 
 
 * Ordered, further, That the departments, 
 now under the respective commands of Gen 
 erals Halleck and Hunter, together with so 
 much of that under General Buell as lies 
 west of a north and south line indefinitely 
 drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be con 
 solidated and designated the Department of 
 the Mississippi, and that until otherwise 
 ordered, Major-General Halleck have com 
 mand of said department. 
 
 " Ordered, also, Jhat the country west of 
 the Department of the Mississippi be a mili 
 tary department, to be called the Mountain 
 ^Department, and that the same be com 
 manded by Major-General Fremont. 
 
 " That all the commanders of the depart 
 ments, after the receipt of this order by them, 
 respectively report, severally and directly, to 
 the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, 
 
 aad frequent reports will be expected of all 
 and each of them. 
 
 " ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 
 
 When it is remembered that the President 
 
 had permitted General McClellan to "take 
 
 the field " two days before this order was 
 
 issued, without the slightest intimation that 
 
 any such change in the organization of, thu 
 
 army was contemplated , it would certainly 
 
 \ seem to be unnecessary to look elsewhere 
 
 j than to the habitual state of mind of the 
 
 I Chief Executive of the nation for an adequate 
 
 ! explanation of the "unaccountable delays," 
 
 | disappointments, and deceptions which have 
 
 unhappily marked the course of the war 
 
 under Mr. Lincoln s administration oF affairs. 
 
 General McClellan met this fresh blow 
 
 with his usual fortitude and patience. 
 
 On the 10th of August, 1861, being appeal 
 ed to by Mr. Lincoln to "withdraw, a letter 
 addressed, at his own request, to General 
 Scott, on the subject of the then imminent 
 peril of Washington, General McClellan had 
 replied : 
 
 ""WASHINGTON, Aug. 10, 1SC1. 
 
 " The letter addressed by me under dato 
 of the 8th inst. to Lieutenant-General Scott, 
 commanding the United States Army, was 
 designed to be a plain and respectful expres 
 sion of my views of the measures demanded 
 for the safety of the Government in the immi 
 nent peril that besets it at the present hour. 
 Every moment s reflection and every fact 
 transpiring, convinced me of the urgent neces 
 sity of the measures there indicated, and I 
 felt it my duty to him and to the country to 
 communicate them frankly. It is therefore 
 with great pain that I have learned from you, 
 this morning, that my views do not meet 
 with the approbation of the Lieutenant-Gen 
 eral, and that my letter is unfavorably regard 
 ed by him. The command with which I am 
 entrusted was not sought by me, and has onlv 
 been accepted from an earnest and humble 
 desire to serve my country in the moment of 
 the most extreme peril. With these views T 
 am willing to do and suffer whatever may be 
 required for that service. Nothing could bo 
 farther from my wishes than to seek any com 
 mand or urge any measures not required for 
 the exigency of the occasion, and, above all, 
 I would abstain from* any conduct that could 
 give offence to General Scott or embarass the 
 President or any department of the Govern 
 ment. 
 
 " Influenced by these considerations, I 
 yield to your request, and withdraw the letter 
 
39 
 
 referred to. The Government and my supe 
 rior officer Toeing apprised of what I consider 
 to be necessary and proper for the defence of 
 the National Capital, I shall strive faithfully 
 ;nd zealously to employ the means that may 
 be placed in my power for that purpose, dis- 
 r.iWing every personal feeling or considera 
 tion, and praying only the blessing of Divine 
 Providence on my efforts. 
 
 In the same temper of single-minded devo 
 tion to the duty which he had undertaken, 
 General McCleilan now wrote to the Presi 
 dent, who was so recklessly and so wilfully 
 trifling with the gravest military interests of 
 the nation, 
 
 " I believe I said to you some weeks since, 
 in connection with some western matters, 
 that no feeling of self-interest or ambition 
 should ever prevent me from devoting myself 
 to the service. I am glad to have the oppor 
 tunity to prove it, and you will find that, 
 under frequent circumstances, I shall walk 
 just as cheerfully as before, and that no con 
 sideration of self will in any manner inter 
 fere with the discharge of my public duties/ 
 
 The way seemed* now to be cleared at 
 last for the grand movement of the Army 
 of the Potomac against Richmond by the 
 route upon which its commander had fixed. 
 
 The line of the Rappahanriock and the 
 Manassas Gap Railway were left secure from 
 all important menace by the enemy, and a 
 council of generals being held at Fairfax 
 Court IJouse, March lo, 1862, it was 
 agreed that if the Merrimac could be neu 
 tralized aad the transportation arrangements 
 speedily completed, the operations against 
 Richmond, from Fortress Monroe, should be 
 at once commenced. The proceedings of this 
 council were submitted to the President,, by 
 whom they were approved, upon condition 
 that Washington should be entirely secured, 
 and Manassas Junction occupied in suffi 
 cient force. General Banks was accordingly 
 charged by General McCleilan with the occu- 
 });u : o!i of Manassas Junction, and the defences 
 of Washington were put under the command 
 of General Wadsworth. 
 
 At this time General "Stonewall Jack 
 son " was at Winchester, from which on the 
 12th of March, he retreated upon the advance 
 of General Shields, and a brief campaign in 
 the Valley of .the Shenandoah followed, with 
 such results as, had that Valley continued to 
 form a part of General McClellan s com 
 mand, and had the instructions given by him 
 to General Banks been carried out, would have 
 enabled the Union forces completely to clear 
 the country of the enemy. 
 
 But the Valley of the Shenandoah was 
 comprised by the President in a new Moun 
 tain Department, created by him at the re 
 quest of the political friends of General Fre 
 mont, and the lamentable events which speed 
 ily signalized that portion of the theatre of 
 the war have no further connection with the 
 grand campaign of General McCleilan than 
 the sinister influence which they exercised 
 upon its fortunes, and for which the Presi 
 dent alone must be held finally responsible. 
 
 For the defence of Washington, General 
 McCleilan left a force in all amounting to 
 67.428 men and 85 pieces of light artillery. 
 His dispositions taken for the safety of 
 the Capital being fully known to the Pres 
 ident and the (Secretary of War, General 
 McCleilan was permitted by them to de 
 part on his way to the seat of operations 
 with the fully implied understanding tint 
 these dispositions were satisfactory not to him 
 self alone, but to them. On the day after his 
 departure, however, the President submitted 
 these dispositions to two subordinate gen 
 erals, to be by them revised and passed 
 upon, and upon their report proceeded to 
 detach from the grand expeditionary army, 
 and to detain at Washington no less than 
 fifty thousand men, forming one full third of 
 the force upon which General McCleilan had 
 been suffered to count not only in preparing 
 his plan of operations, but in actually com 
 mencing his movement against the enemy. 
 Had the President, in taking this step, been 
 acting under direct instructions from the War 
 Office at Richmond, he could not have more 
 effectually forwarded the purposes of the ene 
 my. Restrained by the conventional pro 
 prieties of his position, General McClellan 
 contents himself with describing it, in his offi 
 cial report, as a "fatal error." It was in 
 truth " a fatal error; " but the circumstances 
 attending a similar step which had been taken, 
 by the President a few days befoie, upon the 
 eve of General MeCIellan s departure, will 
 abundantly justify the use of sterner lan 
 guage from unofficial lips. 
 
 The division of General Blenker, 10,000 
 strong, had been attached to the Army of the 
 Potomac during the whole time of the prepa-. 
 rations for the Peninsular campaign. - A few 
 days before sailing for Fortress Monroe," 
 says General McClellan, in his Report, "while 
 still encamped near Alexandria, I met the 
 President by appointment, on a steamer, if 3 
 then informed me that he had been strc ngly 
 pressed to take General Blenker s fli.v .sion. 
 from my command and give it to U( i^iirl 
 Fremont. His Excellency was good enough* 
 
40 
 
 to suggest several reasons for not taking 
 Blenker s division from me. I assented to 
 the force of his suggestions, and was extreme 
 ly gratified by his decision to allow the divis 
 ion to remain with the Army of the Potomac. 
 It was therefore with surprise that I received, 
 on the 31st, the "following note : 
 J 
 
 " EXECUTIVE MANTSIOX, 
 " WASHINGTON, March 31, 18ii2. 
 
 " MAJOR- GENERAL MCCLELLAII, 
 
 " ( MY DEAR SIR : This morning I felt 
 constrained to order Blenker s division to 
 Fremont ; and I write this to assure you that 
 I did so with great pain, understanding that 
 you would wish it otherwise. If you could 
 know the full pressure of the case, I an con 
 fident you would justify it, even beyond a 
 mere acknowledgment, that the Commandei- 
 in-Chief may order what be pleases. 
 " Yours, very truly, 
 
 " * A. LINCOLN." 
 
 " To this I replied, in substance, that I 
 regretted the order, and could ill afford to lose 
 10,000 troops which had been counted upon 
 in forming rny plan of campaign ; but as there 
 was no remedy, I would yield and do the best 
 I could without them. In a conversation 
 with the President a few hours afterwards, I 
 repeated verbally the same thing, and express 
 ed my regret that Blenker s division had 
 been given to Fremont, from any pressure, 
 other than the requirements of the national 
 exigency. I was partially relieved, however, 
 by the President s positive and emphatic assur 
 ance that I might leave, confident that no 
 more troops beyond these 10,000 should, in 
 any event, be taken from me, or in any way 
 detached from my command. 
 
 What the " full pressure of the case " was to 
 which the President thus confidently alludes, 
 as his justification for an act at once insulting 
 and unjust to the Commander of the Army 
 of the Potomac, to that army itself, and to 
 the whole country, whose dearest interests it 
 imperilled ; we may learn now from the best 
 authority. In bis "Life of President Lin 
 coln," Mr. Raymond carelessly informs us 
 t *that this thing was done " out of deference of 
 the importunities of General Fremont and his 
 friends, and from a belief that this officer 
 could make a good use of a larger force than 
 he then had at his command in the Mountain 
 Department." 
 
 The bitterest opponent of Mr Lincoln and 
 of his Administration may vainly ransack 
 the vocabulary of contempt for phrases which 
 shall intensify the terrible, though unconscious, 
 
 sarcasm of this bland and indifferent para 
 graph. It will stand upon the record of our 
 times forever in melancholy, but irrefragable, 
 proof that the leader of the finest army which 
 the Union had ever sent into battle, went 
 forth upon the most important campaign of 
 the war for the Union at the mercy of a 
 " Commander-in-Chief "whose profound igno 
 rance of the military art was only equalled 
 by his boundless confidence in his own genius 
 for war, and whose inability to comprehend the 
 relative importance of different operations in 
 the field was only less conspicuous than his 
 subservience to political terrorism, and to the 
 lowest considerations of personal expediency 
 in the Cabinet. 
 
 So vital is- a distinct understanding of this 
 fact to the just comprehension of all the sub 
 sequent events of the campaign of the Penin 
 sula, that we may well pause at this point of 
 our narrative long enough to fix the truth 
 clearly in the reader s mind. 
 
 We have already seen that, while General 
 McClellan has been commonly represented as 
 having been in command of the armies of 
 the Union for the greater* part of a year, he, 
 in truth, occupied that position for a little 
 more than two months. All the details of 
 the practical organization of the vast force 
 contributed by the patriotism of the people 
 to the policy of the President were, indeed, 
 confided to him. He was charged with these 
 serious, exhausting, and important, but obscme 
 duties from the moment when he appeared at 
 Washington upon the Macedonian cry of the 
 paralyzed and panic-stricken Cabinet in July, 
 
 1861, down to the time of his departure for 
 the Peninsula. But the formal authority to 
 plan and direct the great campaigns of the 
 army was committed to him on the first of 
 November, 1861, and was withdrawn from 
 him again before the middle of January, 
 
 1862, by the President, whose idea of the 
 whole duty of the military head of the State 
 is happily summed up in his own phrase, that 
 "the Commander-in-Chief may direct what 
 ever he pleases." 
 
 Upon resuming the absolute control of all 
 tho forces, the President proceeded to debate 
 plans of campaign with the commanding gon- 
 /eral, suspendii.g the necessary preparations 
 for the most vital operations of the war until 
 he had convinced himself by the verdict of a 
 jury of twelve officers, that his own notions 
 of the wise and practicable in war were not 
 absolutely better and more profound than 
 those of the young chieftain, of whom Gen 
 eral Scott, even at a moment when the retiring 
 veteran imagined that he had reasons to be 
 
41 
 
 offended with his rising junior, had felt him 
 self obliged to say that he possessed " very 
 high qualifications for military command." 
 
 When at last the President somewhat un 
 graciously made up his mind not to insist 
 upon moving the army into the field by the 
 unassisted light of nature, he resolved that 
 his own genius should still determine the 
 form in which that army should move ; and 
 revolving this weighty matter in the recesses 
 of his own mind, he took such order upon it, 
 as, on three successive occasions, completely 
 modified all the conditions of the tremendous 
 problem which General McClellan was work 
 ing out, at the most critical moments for the 
 successful solution of that problem. 
 
 And this not by any means in exclusive obe 
 dience to such purely military inspirations as 
 may be supposed to have boon vouchsafed to 
 a " Commandcr-in-Chief who could direct 
 whatever he pleased," but under the pressure 
 of strictly political considerations, utterly and 
 fatally foreign to the stern and serious busi 
 ness in hand. o 
 
 How these considerations affected the 
 a- .nonnt of the forces dispensable by General 
 McClellan for his campaign, Mr. Lincoln s 
 friendly biographer, Mr. Raymond, has al 
 ready shown us. From the same source we 
 derive the following light upon the scarcely 
 less important conclusions which the President 
 suddenly sprang upon the commander of the 
 troops, in relation to the division of his army 
 into army corps, and to the assignment of va 
 rious general ofiicers to the command of those 
 corps. 
 
 Mr. Raymond favors us with the following 
 letter, "never before," as he says, "made 
 public," upon this subject : 
 
 "FORTRESS MONROE, May 9, 1S62. 
 
 " MY DEAR SIR : I have just assisted the 
 Secretary of War in forming the part of a 
 dispatch to you, relating to army corps, 
 which dispatch, of course, will have reached 
 you long before this will. I wish to say a 
 f . W words to you privately on this subject. 
 I ordered the army corps organization not only 
 on the unanimous opinion of the twelve gen 
 erals of division, but also on the unanimous 
 opinion of every military man I could get an 
 opinion from, and every modern military 
 book, yourself only excepted. Of course I 
 did not, on my own judgment, pretend to un 
 derstand the subject-. I now think it indis 
 pensable for you to know how your struggle 
 against it is received in quarters which we 
 cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon 
 as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, 
 
 and to persecute and degrade their supposed 
 rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, 
 Heintzelman, orKeyes. The commanders of 
 these corps are of course the three highest 
 ofiicers with you, but I am constantly told 
 that you have no consultation or communica 
 tion with them, that you consult and commu 
 nicate with nobody but Fitz John Porter, and, 
 perhaps, General Franklin. I do not say 
 these complaints are true or just ; but, at all 
 events, it is proper you should know of their 
 existence. Do the commanders of corps dis 
 obey your orders in anything V 
 
 " When you relieved General Hamilton of 
 his command, the other day, you thereby lost 
 the confidence of at least one of your best 
 friends in the Senate. And here let me say, 
 not as applicable to you personally, that Sen 
 ators and Representatives speak of me, in 
 their places, as they please without question; 
 and that officers of the army must cease ad 
 dressing insulting letters to them for taking 
 no greater liberty with them. But to return, 
 are you strong enough, even with my help, 
 to set your foot upon the neck of Sumner, 
 Heintzelman, and Keyes, all at once ? This 
 is a practical and very serious question for 
 you. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN." 
 
 Upon this letter it is only necessary to ob 
 serve that General McClellan, as he shows us 
 in his Report, had never opposed the organi 
 zation of the army into army corps. He 
 had merely insisted that it was necessary to 
 test the merits of the divisional commanders 
 under his orders before deciding upon their 
 respective fitness to be trusted with the vitally 
 important responsibilities of a corps command . 
 Regarding the army under his orders as the 
 hope of the nation in the field, and not as, in 
 any sense, a machine for organizing political 
 influence and power, General McClellan never 
 permitted himself to reflect upon the view 
 which " Senators and Representatives" might 
 take of his action in regard to one or another 
 office. He was absorbed in the duty of as 
 certaining and selecting the men to whom the 
 lives of his soldiers and the honor -of the 
 country might be most safely entrusted. 
 
 Whether those whom he found reason to 
 trust would be considered by their rivals as 
 his "pets," or those whom he hesitated to 
 advance would be regarded by their friends 
 as his " victims," were questions which it 
 would have forever and justly disgraced him, 
 as a commander, to entertain. 
 
 The President looked upon the matter 
 from quite another point of view, and being 
 the " Commander-in-Chief, who could direct 
 
42 
 
 whatever he pleased, "he accordingly relieved 
 himself of the "pressure" brought against 
 him by " Senators and Representatives." and 
 compelled the general commanding the army 
 to accept such corps commanders as he thought 
 fit to assign to the service. 
 
 It is with no invidious feeling towards any 
 of the officers so assigned by Mr. Lincoln, 
 that we call attention to the fact that of the 
 four corps commanders, selected by the 
 President, with the help of the " Senators 
 and Representatives " afore-mentioned, every 
 one has been removed from that high station 
 since General McClellan was relieved of his 
 command. 
 
 One of these generals, the brave and vet 
 eran Smniier, has been taken by death from 
 the country he had so nobly served. He 
 had previously, however, been removed by 
 Mr. Lincoln from the command of his corps 
 in the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Another, General McDowell, has been 
 sent by Mr. Lincoln to a post of comparative 
 obscurity in the Far West. A third, General 
 Heintzelman, has been assigned by Mr. Lin 
 coln to the duties of a sort of grand police 
 inspector in the States of Ohio and Indiana. 
 The fourth, General Keyes, has been dis 
 missed by Mr. Lincoln from the army of the 
 Union. 
 
 Whether it would have been better for the 
 fame of those commanders and for the general 
 service of the Union that General j)feClcl!an 
 should have been suffered to come 7 to his own 
 conclusions in respect to the rank which 
 ought to be assigned to them after a practical 
 experience in the field, is a question which 
 the reader may be profitably left to ponder 
 for himself. 
 
 General McClellan reached Fortress Mon 
 roe on the 2d of April. It had been understood 
 that the troops at this point, 10,000 in num 
 ber, under General Wool, were to compose a 
 part of the Army of the Potomac. During 
 the night of April 3d, a telegram from Wash 
 ington announced that this understanding was 
 revoked by the " Commander-in-Chief who 
 could direct what he pleased " j and that 
 General McClellan was deprived of all con 
 trol over General Wool and the troops under 
 his command. This order left the base of all 
 General McClellan s operations under the 
 command of another and independent gen 
 eral ! 
 
 General McClellan, in his Report, tells us 
 that " The council, composed of four corps 
 commanders, organized by the President of 
 the United States, at its meeting on the 13th 
 of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base 
 
 of operations for the movement of the Army 
 of the Potomac upon Richmond. 
 
 For the prompt and successful execution 
 of the projected operation, it was regarded 
 by all as necessary that the whole of the four 
 corps should be employed, with at least the 
 addition of ten thousand men drawn from the 
 forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe: 
 that position and its dependencies being re 
 garded as amply protected by the naval force 
 in its neighborhood, and the advance of the 
 main army up the Peninsula, so that it could 
 be safely left with a small garrison. 
 
 The President having thus been clearly 
 informed, not merely by General McClellan, 
 but by the four corps commanders whom he 
 had himself selected from among the divisional 
 generals for promotion, that, "for the prompt 
 and successful execution of the projected 
 operation, " it was necessary that the whole of 
 the four corps commanded by these officers, 
 with at least ten thousand additional men 
 from Fortress Monroe, should be employed, 
 how did it come to pass nod only that one of 
 these corps, and that the strongest of them, 
 was withdrawn bodily from General Mc Clel- 
 lan s expedition, but that the general com 
 manding it was nominated to the command of a 
 new and independent department, created ex 
 pressly for him? To withdraw nearly one- 
 third of the force necessary for the prompt 
 and successful execution of a great military 
 movement, was for the President to takfc upon 
 himself the terrible responsibility of the fail 
 ure of that movement. Ignorant as the Pres 
 ident was of all military matters, and sur 
 rounded by counsellors no more enlightened 
 than himself, some dim sense of this formid 
 able truth, one would suppose, might have 
 dawned upon his mind. By what was this 
 healing ray obscured ? 
 
 " The order creating a new department for 
 Gen. Irwin McDowell," says the well inform 
 ed New York Times of April 7, 1862, " is but 
 the culmination of a long cherished plan of 
 the progressive Republicans." In other 
 words, the President of the United States 
 deliberately assumed the dread responsibility 
 of ruining the most important campaign of 
 the most important army of the nation, for 
 the sake of propitiating the most "progres 
 sive " and impatient and annoying members 
 of his own political party. This was so dis 
 tinctly understood at the time in Washington 
 that it was the subject of public as well as 
 private conversation ; and the following ex 
 tract from the New York Times of April 6, 
 1862, will show the pleasant and humorous 
 light in which the trifling of the Commanders- 
 
43 
 
 in-Chief who could "direct whatever they 
 pleased," and of "progressive Republicans, " 
 who could control these Conimanclers-iri-Chief 
 with the lives of our soldiers, the honor of 
 t!i oil- generals, and the hopes of the nation 
 was regarded by those who were at home be 
 hind the political scenes: "It looks now 
 very much as though the two Macs had been 
 pitted against each other, and it would be a 
 good joke, after all, if Banks s dashing move 
 ment down the valley should frighten the 
 rebels out of Gordonsville, and drive them 
 precipitately out of Virginia, thus cheating 
 both Macs out of a fight." 
 
 While the Administration and its friends at 
 Washington were taking these cheerful and 
 jocose views of war, its responsibilities and 
 its conditions, .General McClellan, at Fortress 
 Monroe, was earnestly endeavoring to ascertain 
 the truth in regard to the rebel forces before 
 him, resolved to do his best with his army and 
 for the country, in spite of official reckless 
 ness and executive injustice. He found this 
 task not much more easy than Lord Raglan 
 had found it before Sevastopol. His only 
 proper dependence, of course, was upon the 
 reports of General Wool, and General Wool, ( 
 astonishing as it may appear, had no authentic 
 or intelligent reports to give. He could pro 
 tect General McClellan s rear, but could 
 throw no safe light on the state of affairs in 
 his front. On the 5th of April, for example, 
 General Wool telegraphed to the Secretary 
 of War : " The Army of the Potomac will not 
 find many rebel troops to contend with." On 
 the 6th of April, he telegraphed: "General 
 Magruder has thirty thousand men at York- 
 town." Clearly, General McClellan was left to 
 find out all the conditions of the situation 
 for himself. His engineer officers, headed by 
 General Barnard, found the strength of the 
 enemy s lines on the Warwick River and be 
 fore Yorktown so great, that it was "not 
 deemed practicable to break them," and 
 "too hazardous" to attempt the capture of 
 Yorktown by assault. 
 
 The Merrimac, which the President had 
 promised General McClellan should be neutral 
 ized by the navy, was still so far mistress of 
 the James that the naval forces in Hampton 
 Roads were entirely unable to assist the army 
 in the reduction of the water-batteries of 
 Yorktown and Gloucester. 
 
 In short, all the elements of the position 
 in Virginia were so completely different from 
 those upon which General McClellan had 
 been officially led to count, that his whole 
 plan of campaign had now to bo re-cast in the 
 face of the enemy. 
 
 The following letter from General Keyes, 
 one of the four officers appointed by the Pres 
 ident himself to the command of army 
 corps, states the true condition of affairs at 
 this time, so well, that we give it in full : 
 
 " HEAD-QUARTERS, 4xn CORPS, 
 " WARWICK COURT HOUSE, VA. ; April 7, 1862. 
 
 "Mr DEAR SENATOR: The plan of cam 
 paign on this line was made with the distinct 
 understanding that four army corps should 
 be employed, and that the navy should co 
 operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also 
 (as I understood it) support us on our left 
 by moving gun-boats up James River. 
 
 "To-day I have learned that the 1st Corps, 
 which, by the President s order, was to em 
 brace four divisions, and one division (Blen- 
 ker s) of the 2d Corps, have been withdrawn 
 altogether from this line of operations, and 
 from the Army of the Potomae. At the same 
 time, as I am informed, the navy has not 
 means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to 
 send gun-boats up James River for fear of 
 the Merrimac. 
 
 " The above plan of campaign was adopted 
 unanimously by General McDowell and Brig 
 adier-Generals Sumncr, Heintzeiman, and 
 Keyes, and was concurred in by Major-Gen 
 eral McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as 
 our base. 
 
 " This army being reduced by forty-five 
 thousand troops, some of them among the 
 best in the service, and without the support 
 of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced 
 bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I 
 voted for. 
 
 " I command the James River column, and 
 I left my camp, near Newport News, the 
 morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded 
 in getting my artillery ashore the afternoon 
 of the day, before, and one of my divisions 
 had not all arrived in camp the day I left, 
 and, for the want of transportation, has not yet 
 joined me. So you will observe that not a 
 day was lost in the advance ; and in fact we 
 marched so quickly and so rapidly that many 
 of our animals were twenty-four and forty- 
 eight hours without a ration of forage. But, 
 notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, 
 we are stopped by a line of defence nine or 
 ten miles long, strongly fortified by breast 
 works, erected nearly the whole distance, 
 behind a stream or succession of ponds no 
 where fordable, one terminus being York- 
 town and the other ending in the James River, 
 which is commanded by the enemy s gun- 
 ( boats. Yorktown is fortified all around with 
 i bastioned works, and, on the water side, it 
 
44 
 
 and Gloucester are so strong that the navy 
 are afraid to attack either. 
 
 " The approaches on our side are generally 
 through low, swampy, or thickly wooded 
 ground, over roads which we are obliged to 
 repair or to make, before we can get forward 
 our carriages. The enemy is in great force, 
 and is constantly receiving reinforcements 
 from the two rivers. The line in front of us 
 is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed 
 to an invading force in any country. 
 
 " You will then ask why I advocated such 
 a line for our operations ? My reasons are 
 few, but, I think, good. 
 
 With proper assistance from the navy, we 
 could take Yorktown, and then, with gun 
 boats on both rivers, we could beat any force 
 opposed to us on Warwick River, because the 
 shot and shells from the gun-boats would 
 nearly overlap across the Peninsula, so that, 
 if the enemy should retreat, and retreat he 
 must, he would have a long way to go with 
 out rail or steam transportation, and every 
 soul of his army must fall into our hands or 
 be destroyed. 
 
 " Another reason for my supporting the new 
 base and plan was, that this line, it was ex 
 pected, would furnish water transportation 
 nearly to Richmond. 
 
 "Now, supposing we succeed in breaking 
 through the line in front of us, what can we 
 do next? The roads are very bad, and if 
 the enemy retains command of James River, 
 and we do not first reduce Yorktown, it would 
 be impossible for us to subsist this army 
 three marches beyond where it is now. As 
 the roads are at present, it is with the utmost 
 difficulty that we can subsist it in the position 
 it now occupies. 
 
 " You will sec therefore, by what I have 
 said, that the force originally intended for the 
 capture of Richmond should be all sent for 
 ward. If I thought the four army corps 
 necessary when I supposed the navy would 
 cooperate, and when I judged of the obstacles 
 to be encountered by what I learned from 
 maps and the opinions of officers long stationed 
 at Fort Monroe, and from all other sources, 
 how much more should I think the full com 
 plement of troops requisite, now that the navy 
 cannot cooperate, and now that the strength 
 of the enrmy s lines and the number of his 
 guns and men prove to be almost immeasura 
 bly greater than I had been led to expect ! 
 
 The line in front of us, in the opinion of 
 all the military men here who are at all com 
 petent to judge, is one of the strongest in the 
 world, and the force of the enemy capable of 
 being increased beyond the numbers we now 
 
 have to oppose to him. Independently of 
 the strength of the lines in front of us, and 
 of the force of the enemy behind them, we 
 cannot advance until we get command of 
 either York River or James River. The effi 
 cient cooperation of the navy is, therefore, 
 absolutely essential, and so I considered it 
 when I voted to change our base from the 
 Potomac to Fort Monroe. 
 
 " An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown, 
 and if several strong gun-boats could be sent 
 up James River also, our success will be cer 
 tain and complete, and the rebellion will soon 
 be put down. 
 
 " On the other hand, we must butt against 
 the enemy s works with heavy artillery and a 
 great waste of time, life, and material. 
 
 " If we break through and advance, both our 
 flanks will be assailed from two great water 
 courses in the hands of the enemy ; our sup 
 plies would give out, and the enemy, equal, 
 if not superior, in numbers, would, with the 
 other advantages, beat and destroy this army. 
 
 " The greatest master of the art of war has 
 said that if you would invade a country 
 successfully, you must have one line of opera 
 tions and one army, under one general. 
 But what is our condition? The State of 
 Virginia is made to constitute the command, 
 in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz. : 
 Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, 
 and McClclian. besides the scrap, over the 
 Chesapeake, in the care of Dix. 
 
 " The great battle of the war is to come off 
 here. If we win it, the rebellion will be 
 crushed. If we lose it, the consequences will 
 be morej horrible than I care to foretell. The 
 plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out 
 with the means proposed, will certainly suc 
 ceed. If any part of the means proposed 
 are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to 
 myself to say that our success will be uncer 
 tain. 
 
 "It is no doubt agreeable to the commander 
 of the 1st Corps to have a separate depart 
 ment, and, as this letter advocates his return 
 to General McClellan s command, it is proper 
 to state that I am not at all influenced by 
 personal regard or dislike to any of my sen 
 iors in rank. If I were to credit all the 
 opinions which have been poured into my 
 ears, I must believe that, in regard to my 
 present fine command, I owe much to Gen 
 eral McDowell and nothing to General Mc- 
 Clellan. But I have disregarded all such 
 officiousness, and I have from last July to the 
 present day supported General McClellan 
 and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a 
 good-will as though he had been my brother 
 
45 
 
 or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall 
 continue to do so to the last, and so long as 
 he is my commander, and I am not desirous 
 to displace him, and would not if I could. 
 He left Washington with the understanding 
 that he was to execute a definite plan of 
 campaign with certain prescribed means. The 
 plan was good and the means sufficient ; and, 
 without modification, the enterprise was cer 
 tain of success. But, with the reduction of 
 force and means, the plan is entirely changed, 
 and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient 
 for certain success. 
 
 " Do not look upon this communication as 
 the offspring of despondency. I never de 
 spond; and when you see me working the 
 hardest, you may be sure that fortune is 
 frowning upon me. I am working, now, to 
 my utmost. 
 
 " Please show this letter to the President, 
 and I should like, also, that Mr. Stanton should 
 know its contents. Do me the honor to write 
 to me as soon as you can, and believe me, 
 with perfect respect, 
 
 " Your most obedient servant, 
 
 " E. D. KEYES, 
 " Brig.-Gen. Com g Mh Army Corps. 
 
 " HON. IRA HARRIS, 
 
 "C7. S. Senate." 
 
 While General McClellan and his subordi 
 nates, in the field, were thus anxiously con 
 templating the conditions and seeking the 
 solutions of the problem before them, the 
 " Commander-in-$hief," in Washington, stood 
 amazed at their hesitation. He saw what 
 was to be done at once, and suggested it, by 
 telegraph, to General McClellan, in this light 
 and airy fashion : 
 
 " WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862. 8 p. M. 
 " GEN. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, 
 
 " Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. Sec 
 retary of War informs me that the forwarding 
 of transportation, ammunition, and Wood- 
 bury s Brigade, under your orders, is 
 not and will not be interfered with. You 
 have now over one hundred thousand troops 
 with you, independent of General Wool s 
 command. I think you had better break the 
 enemy s line from Yorktown to Warwick 
 River at once. This will probably use time 
 as advantageously as you can. 
 
 "A. LINCOLN, President" 
 
 This despatch, it will be observed, bears 
 date April 6th. The " enemy s line," which 
 the Commander-in-Chief who could " direct 
 whatever he pleased," thus cavalierly recom 
 
 mended should be "broken at once/ had 
 only been discovered by our forces two days 
 before, and is described by General Keyes, 
 who led the advance, as "one of the strong 
 est ever opposed to an invading foe in any 
 country." No trustworthy information being 
 accessible to General McClellan as to the 
 strength of the enemy behind this line, and 
 General Johnston having had ample time, 
 thanks to the premature revelation of General 
 McClellan s plans, forced upon him by the 
 
 Commander-in-Chief," to throw his whole, 
 army, if it should have so pleased him, 
 upon this point, General McClellan ventured 
 to think that he might " use time " more " ad 
 vantageously " than in risking thousands of 
 heroic lives upon the more than dubious as 
 sault of such a position. 
 
 The army and the country have since 
 learned, in an agonizing experience of such 
 murderous assaults at Frerlericksburg and 
 elsewhere, to appreciate the humane soldierly 
 wisdom which declined to act upon Mr. Lin 
 coln s brilliant suggestion. It is the glory of 
 General McClellan that, at a moment when a 
 more vulgar mind might have sought popular 
 eclat, and the favor of " Senators and Repre 
 sentatives, by hurling the army of the Union 
 upon this bristling front of death, he chose 
 that better part which all the ex post facto 
 declamation in the world shall never take away 
 from him ; and the second siege of Yorktown 
 crowns him, in the history of his country, with 
 that title which was held especially honorable 
 by the most warlike race of all time, Victor 
 sine clade, the bloodless conqueror who had 
 the moral courage to hold to what he felt to 
 be wise and right while all the journals of 
 "progressive Republicanism " rang with exul 
 tation over the sanguinary conflicts of Shiloh 
 and Pittsburg Landing, and with insulting 
 comparisons between the loud noise of battle 
 at the West, and the silent but irresistible 
 growth of " great designs " in the East. 
 
 These comparisons, too, be it remembered, 
 were condensed and hurled at the young Gen 
 eral in despatches from the seat of govern 
 ment at Washington, as, for example, in the 
 following characteristic letter from the Presi 
 dent : 
 
 " And once more, let me tell you, it is 
 indispensable to you that you strike a blow, 
 /am powerless to help this. You will do me 
 the justice to remember, I always insisted that 
 going down the bay in search of a field, in 
 stead of fighting at or near Manassas, was 
 only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty ; 
 that we would find the same enemy, and the 
 same or equal intrenchments, at either place. 
 
46 
 
 The country will not fail to note is now 
 noting that the present hesitation to move 
 upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of 
 Manassas repeated. 
 
 "I beg to assure you that I have never 
 written you, or spoken to you, in greater 
 kindness of feeling than now, nor with a 
 fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in ray 
 most anxious judgment I consistently can. 
 But you must act. 
 
 " Yours very truly, 
 
 " A. LINCOLN." 
 
 Not less characteristic is the calm comment 
 which General, McClellan,in his Report, makes 
 upon this appeal to his selfish fears and 
 hopes. "I could not forego the conclusions 
 of my most instructed judgment for the mere 
 sake of avoiding the personal consequences 
 intimated in the President s despatch." 
 
 A speedier evacuation of Yorktown might 
 have been forced upon the Confederates by a 
 movement which General McClellan had plan 
 ned of the corps of McDowell up the left 
 bank of the York River, but the creation of 
 the Department of the Rappahannock had 
 made this movement impossible. 
 
 Finally, on the 4th of May, 1862, the 
 overwhelming batteries of the Union army 
 having just been completed, and ready to open, 
 from all quarters, their irresistible fire upon 
 the rebel positions, General Johnstone com 
 manded the evacuation of Yorktown. 
 
 The news of this event was hailed with 
 delight throughout the North, and in Congress 
 a vote of thanks was moved to the General and 
 to his army, by a member from the West 
 belonging to the extreme section of the 
 Republican party, Mr. Owen Lovejoy. Those 
 who have since honored as -a martyr this lead 
 er in their own faith now departed, are now not 
 ashamed to deride the great and substantial 
 victory which then moved him to this just and 
 creditable action. 
 
 The evacuation of Yorktown was followed 
 immediately by an advance of the victorious 
 army as rapid as the horrible condition of the 
 roads and the necessity of establishing a new 
 base of supplies on the York River would 
 permit. Having the advantage of the rail 
 way in his rear, and being much too strong in 
 point of numbers to be easily pushed, in 
 retreating through a friendly country, General 
 Johnstone fell back fighting. General Sum- 
 nor, in the front of General McClellan s pur 
 suit, came with a small part of bis corps upon 
 the -enemy strongly intrenched in front of 
 Willianisburg. Such was the state of the 
 roads, "narrow and full of frightful mo 
 
 rasses from which it was difficult to extricate 
 the cannon," says the Prince de Joinville, 
 * although the weather had been fine and dry 
 for several days," that no such thing as a 
 general action was to be thought of in these 
 virgin forests. The Confederate intrench- 
 ments were gallantly, but fruitlessly assailed by 
 General Sumner s cavalry under General 
 Stoneman. The infantry of Sumner came 
 up too late in the evening to affect anything, 
 and during the night one of those tropical 
 rains began, which in the early spring so often 
 onvert whole square miles of country, in 
 Eastern Virginia, into one immense lake. 
 The next day was fought the battle of Wil- 
 liamsburg, begun, practically by accident, 
 while the commander of the army was where 
 his duty called him to be, in the rear, organ 
 izing and pushing forward the tremendous 
 work of the general advance. The Union 
 troops of General Hooker were first engaged, 
 and although they fought with extraordinary 
 gallantry, suffered terribly, and had begun to 
 fall back when the battle was reestablished by 
 General Hancock, and by General McClellan, 
 who, having been notified of what was going 
 on, had made his way through incredible 
 difficulties to the front, and appeared in person 
 on the field at the decisive moment to secure 
 the victory to the army of the Union. The 
 Prince de Joinville thus paints, in simple but 
 burning words, this critical and glorious scene : 
 "The Federal General Hancock, seizing 
 the moment, cried to his soldiers, as he waved 
 his cap, Now, gentlemen, the bayonet ! and 
 charged with his brigade. The enemy could 
 not withstand the shock, broke and fled, strew 
 ing the field with his dead. At this very 
 moment General McClellan, who had been 
 detained at Yorktown, appeared on the field. 
 It was dusk, the night was coming on, the 
 rain still falling in torrents. On three sides 
 of the plateau on which the General was, the 
 cannon and the musketry were rattling unin 
 terruptedly. The success of Hancock had 
 been decisive, and the reserves brought 
 up by the General-in Chief, charging upon die 
 field, settled the affair. Then it was that I 
 saw General McClellan pressing in front of 
 the Sixth Cavalry, give his hand to Major 
 Williams, with a few words on his brilliant 
 charge of the day before. The regiment did 
 not hear what he said, but it knew what he 
 meant, and from every heart went up one of 
 those masculine, terrible shouts which are only 
 to be heard on the field of battle. These 
 shouts, taken up along the whole line, struck 
 terror to the enemy. W*e saw them come 
 upon the parapets and look out in silence and 
 
47 
 
 motionless upon the scene. Then the firing 
 died away, and night fell on the combat, which, 
 in America, is called the battle of Williams- 
 burg." 
 
 The battle of Williamsburg was but an 
 episode in the march upon Richmond, and, 
 in the circumstances of the case, could not 
 possibly have been any more than an epi 
 sode in that march. But it threw the elec 
 tric light of battle over that love of the 
 Army of the Potomac for its commander, 
 which had already developed itself, and 
 which has since inwrought itself so deeply 
 into the moral substance of that splendid 
 organization that, in spite of two years of 
 incessant obloquy, misrepresentation, and 
 calumny poured out upon his head, the 
 name of General McClellan rings still like 
 a trumpet through its heart. 
 
 " It seems," observes one of the most 
 brilliant of modern historical writers, 
 "that although by human contrivance a 
 whole people may be shut out from the 
 knowledge of momentous events, in which 
 its armies are taking a part, there is yet a 
 subtile essence of truth which will per 
 meate into the heart of a nation those kept 
 in ignorance." 
 
 Through all the cloud, which partizan 
 passion has raised about the name of Gen 
 eral Mc Jlellan, through all the rolling and 
 swelling slanders of a partizan press, and 
 the wordy mists of partizan reports on the 
 conduct of the war, this truth has made its 
 way into the nation s heart, that the real 
 history of that arduous march through the 
 swampy forests of the Peninsula, and of 
 that great siege which has made the rude 
 name of the Chickahominy immortal, is 
 written in the love which the soldiers of 
 McClellan bear to their commander. 
 
 Criticism may assail this love ; malignity 
 may denounce it ; but impartial history has 
 only one verdict upon such affections. 
 Their root is in reality reality proved and 
 tested by all that is sharpest and sternest 
 in human experience. Their meaning is 
 incontrovertible. He who wins such affec 
 tions is worthy to have won them. 
 
 The progress of our sketch has brought 
 us now to that portion of Qeneral McOlel- 
 lan s career which is best known to the 
 public, which has been most discussed by 
 friends and foes, and which has been most 
 tally set forth by himself in his Report upon 
 the Peninsular Campaign. 
 
 it is not necessary that we should here 
 re-write, in detail, the history of the siege of 
 Richmond. It has, already, we trust, been 
 
 made sufficiently clear that the course of 
 policy pursued towards General McClellan 
 and his army from the moment when, on 
 the 8th of March, the President found 
 himself constrained to waive the adoption 
 of his own " plan," for the campaign against 
 Richmond had made it impossible for Gen 
 eral McClellan to look for success in his 
 enterprise to anything like those bold and 
 decisive movements by which, when un 
 trammelled and at liberty to act, he had 
 organized victory in Western Virginia. In 
 the execution of such movements it is 
 vitally essential that he who undertakes 
 them should know precisely upon what 
 amount of force he may count, and that he 
 should be the absolute master of the dis 
 positions of that force. 
 
 For General McOlellan, in the face of his 
 experience of the President s theory and 
 practice of the " command-in-chief " of the 
 armies, to have risked a single important 
 manoeuvre upon the belief that any one of 
 the corps under his orders was so attached 
 to his army that it might .not at any mo 
 ment be detached from him by telegram, 
 for service in the Rocky Mountains of the 
 West, or the sea islands of the South, 
 would have been little less than a crime. 
 
 Immediately after the evacuation of 
 Yorktown, the Confederates abandoned 
 Norfolk, and blew up the Mcrrimac. The 
 troops of General Huger, to the number of 
 18,000 men, were drawn in upon the main 
 body at Richmond, before which city John- 
 stone prepared himself for a desperate 
 stand on the formidable defensive line of 
 the Chickahominy. The crew of the Mer- 
 rimac were transferred to the naval batter 
 ies, which, suddenly thrown up at Drury s 
 Bluff, on the James River, proved them 
 selves, when assailed by the gun-boats and 
 iron-clads of the Federal fleet, a not less 
 formidable barrier to the passage of that 
 river than the Merrwiac in her time had 
 been. 
 
 This repulse of the gun-boats, and this 
 increase of the force assembled at Rich 
 mond, made it impossible for General Mc 
 Clellan, situated as he was, to venture upon 
 the grand flank movement for transferring 
 his base to the James, to which the de 
 struction of the Mcrrimac would otherwise 
 have invited him. Although his army had 
 been reduced by the policy of the Adminis 
 tration far below the figure which had been 
 deemed necessary to its safety by the Presi 
 dent himself and his councillors, when 
 the expedition was decided upon, it was 
 
48 
 
 still however strong enough, with the aid of 
 the gun-boats on the York and the Pamun- 
 key, to threaten and advance upon Rich 
 mond, to drive the Confederates within the 
 lines of their capital, and to compel them 
 to a decisive battle whenever it should 
 receive the reinforcements which it could 
 scarcely be deemed the Government would 
 hesitate to throw into its thinned but tri 
 umphant ranks. 
 
 " Who," exclaims the Prince de Join- 
 ville, with very natural amazement, " who 
 could foresee that the 80,000 men assem 
 bled before Washington, would do noth 
 ing and less than nothing to aid the army 
 in overcoming the concentration of forces 
 it was called upon to encounter ? " 
 
 General McClellan urged the exigency 
 of the position, in repeated telegrams, upon 
 the President and the Secretary of War, 
 as he advanced. Imperfect as all sources 
 of information necessarily were in a coun 
 try profoundly and passionately hostile to 
 his army, he yet learned -enough of the 
 true state of things in Richmond to satisfy 
 him that it was the intention of the Con 
 federate government, reassured as they 
 were, by the repulse of the gun-boats, as to 
 the safety of their capital from an ^attack 
 by the James, to concentrate all their avail 
 able forces for defence on the line of the 
 Chickahominy. The following telegram, of 
 May 14, will show how his representations 
 of these facts were received at Washing 
 ton : 
 
 4 
 
 " CAMP AT CUMBERLAND, May 14, 1862. 
 
 " His EXCELLENCY, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 
 " President of the United States : 
 
 " I have more than twice telegraphed to 
 the Secretary of War, stating that, in my 
 opinion, the enemy were concentrating all 
 their available force to fight this army in 
 front of llichmond, and that such ought 
 to be their policy. I have received no 
 reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. 
 
 " I beg leave to repeat their substance to 
 your Excellency, and to ask that kind con 
 sideration which you have ever accorded 
 to my representations and views. All my 
 information from every source accessible 
 to me, establishes the fixed purpose of the 
 rebels to defend Richmond against this 
 army by offering us battle with all the 
 troops they can collect from east, west, 
 and south, and my own opinion is confirmed 
 by that of all my commanders whom 1 
 tave been able to consult. 
 
 " Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and 
 guards have much weakened my force, 
 and will continue to do so. I cannot bring 
 into actual battle against the enemy more 
 than eighty thousand men at the utmost, 
 and with them I must attack in position, 
 probably intrenched, a much larger force 
 perhaps double my numbers. It is pos 
 sible that Richmond may be abandoned 
 without a serious struggle ; but the enemy 
 are actually in great strength between here 
 and there, and it would be unwise, and 
 even insane, for me to calculate upon any 
 thing but a stubborn and desperate resist 
 ance. If they should abandon Richmond, 
 it may well be that it is done with the pur 
 pose of making the stand at. some place in 
 Virginia, south or west of there, and we 
 should be in condition to press them with 
 out delay. The Confederate leaders must 
 employ their utmost efforts against this 
 army in Virginia, and they will be sup- 
 popted by the whole body of their military 
 officers, among whom there may be said to 
 be no Union feeling, as there is also very 
 little among the higher class of citizens in 
 the seceding States. 
 
 " I have found no fighting men in this 
 Peninsula all are in the ranks of the 
 opposing foe. 
 
 " Even if more troops than I now have 
 should prove unnecessary for purposes of 
 military occupation, our greatest display 
 of imposing force in the capital of the 
 rebel government will have the best moral 
 effect. I most respectfully and earnestly 
 urge upon your Excellency that the oppor 
 tunity has come for striking a fatal blow at 
 the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg 
 that you will cause this army to be rein 
 forced without delay by all the disposable 
 troops of the Government. I ask for every 
 man that the Government can send me. 
 Any commander of the reinforcements, 
 whom your Excellency may designate, will 
 be acceptable to me, whatever expression I 
 may have heretofore addressed io you on 
 that subject. 
 
 " I will fight the enemy, whatever their 
 force may be, with whatever force I may 
 have, and I firmly believe that we shall 
 beat them ; but our triumph should be 
 made decisive and complete. The soldiers 
 of this army love their Government, and 
 will fight well in its support; you may rely 
 upon them. They have confidence in me 
 as their General, and in you as their Presi 
 dent. Strong reinforcements will, at least, 
 save the lives of many of them. The 
 
49 
 
 greater our force, the more perfect will be 
 our combinations, and the less our loss. 
 
 " For obvious reasons, I beg you to give 
 immediate consideration to this communi 
 cation, and to inform me fully at the ear 
 liest moment of your final determination. 
 
 " GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
 
 " Major- General Com g." 
 
 To this telegram a reply finally came, 
 dated May 18, and signed by Mr. Stanton, 
 who had now begun to rule the situation. 
 
 " WASHINGTON, May 18 2 P. M. 
 
 " GENERAL: Your despatch to the Presi 
 dent, asking reinforcements, has been re 
 ceived and carefully considered. 
 
 " The President is not willing to uncover 
 the Capital entirely; and it is believed that 
 even if this were prudent, it would require 
 more time to effect a junction between your 
 army and that of the Rappahannock by the 
 way of the Potomac and York Rivers, than 
 by a land march. In order, therefore, to 
 increase the strength of the attack upon 
 Richmond at the earliest moment, General 
 McDowell has been ordered to march upon 
 that city by the shortest route. He is or 
 dered, keeping himself always in position, 
 to save the Capital from all possible attack, 
 so to operate as to put his left wing in 
 communication with your right wing and 
 you are instructed to cooperate so as to es 
 tablish this communication as soon as pos 
 sible by extending your right wing to the 
 north of Richmond. 
 
 " It is believed that this communication 
 can be safely established either north or 
 south of the Panmnkey River. 
 
 " In any event, you will be able to prevent 
 the main body of the enemy s forces from 
 leaving Richmond, and falling in over 
 whelming force upon General McDowell. 
 He will move with between thirty-five and 
 forty thousand men. 
 
 " A copy of the instruction to General 
 McDowell are with this. The specific task 
 assigned to his command has been to pro 
 vide against any danger to the Capital of 
 the nation. 
 
 "At your earnest call for reinforcements, 
 he is sent forward to cooperate in the re 
 duction of Richmond, but charged, in at 
 tempting this, not to uncover the city of 
 Washington, and you will give no order, 
 either before or after your junction, which 
 can put him out of position to cover this 
 city. You and he will communicate with 
 each other by telegraph or otherwise, as 
 7 
 
 frequently as may be necessary for suffi 
 cient cooperation. When Gen. McDowell 
 is in position on your right, his supplies 
 must be drawn from West Point, and you 
 will instruct your staff oificers to be pre 
 pared to supply him by that route. 
 
 " The President desires that General Mc 
 Dowell retain the command of the Dcpart- 
 me.nt of the Rappahannock, and of the 
 forces with vjhich he moves forward. 
 
 " By order of the President. 
 
 "EDWIN M. STANTON." 
 
 The sentences which we have italicized 
 in this strange despatch are an apocalypse 
 of the views which had prevailed in Wash 
 ington as to the Peninsular campaign. 
 That movement against Richmond had now 
 become entirely secondary in the minds of 
 Mr. Lincoln and his advisers to the " de 
 fence of Washington." The commander of 
 the Department of the Rappahannock was 
 to vindicate the wisdom of the White House 
 by moving against Richmond " by the 
 shortest route," and Richmond was to be 
 taken by his forces, those of General Mc- 
 Clellan cooperating. 
 
 By advancing General McDowell on this 
 route instead of sending him by water, the 
 Administration, as a glance at the map will 
 show, not only compelled General McClel- 
 lan to abandon entirely all hope of taking 
 advantage of the possible reopening of the 
 James, but forced him to extend his right 
 wing inordinately in order to meet and 
 make his junction with McDowell march 
 ing from the north ; drove him to the 
 tedious and wasting work of bridging the 
 Chickahominy, and finally exposed him, by 
 the sudden withdrawal of McDowell s army, 
 which took place as soon as those peril 
 ous preparations for " cooperating " with 
 it were fairly under way, - to the terrible 
 blow which the Confederates eventually 
 struck. 
 
 A telegram from Mr. Lincoln, on the 
 4th of May, put General McDowell under 
 the orders^ of General McClellan, in the 
 case of the junction of their forces, and 
 announced that the Army of the Rappa 
 hannock would positively move on the next 
 day but one. 
 
 While all this, however, was going on, 
 the Confederates had not been idle. They 
 had clearly ascertained that the relative 
 importance of the operations on the Poto 
 mac and in the Shenandoah Yalley, and of 
 those before Richmond, was far from being 
 understood at Washington, and they were 
 
50 
 
 swift to take advantage of the discovery. 
 General " Stonewall " Jackson appeared in 
 the valley, and spread such consternation 
 by his movements, that in the afternoon of 
 the 24th of May the President telegraphed 
 again to General McClellan, announcing 
 that, in consequence of " Banks s critical 
 position," he had been obliged to " sus 
 pend " McDowell ^ advance. 
 
 This change of purpose leaving General 
 McClellan with a line immensely and dan 
 gerously extended, and entirely in the dark 
 as to what he might ultimately expect in 
 the way of support from McDowell, it be 
 came more than ever necessary for him to 
 strengthen himself artificially, and to con 
 struct such a number of bridges over the 
 Chickahominy as would enable him safely 
 to hold both banks of that stream in order 
 to guard his communications. Arduous at 
 all times in the face of a powerful and ac 
 tive enemy, this work was made trebly 
 arduous by the unprecedented state of the 
 weather. Incessant rains, such as had not 
 been known for twenty years, flooded the 
 low and swampy banks of the Chickahom 
 iny and swelled that brook itself to a river. 
 Still the General urged his men to their 
 ungrateful toil, and still the men unmur- 
 muringly responded to his calls. That the 
 Army of the Potomac was tojbe left to 
 itself to await, as best it might, the moment 
 when the enemy should feel himself strong 
 enough to assume the offensive, became 
 daily more and more plain. Such was the 
 panic spread by the dashing and eccentric 
 demonstrations of Jackson, and such the 
 profound obfuscation which he contrived 
 to breed in the official mind at Washington, 
 that he actually wrung from Mr. Lincoln, 
 on the 25th of May, the following tel 
 egram : 
 
 " WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862, 2 p. M. 
 
 " MAJ.-GEN. MCCLELLAN : The enemy 
 is moving north in sufficient force to drive 
 Gen. Banks before him ; precisely in what 
 force we cannot tell. He is also threaten 
 ing Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas 
 Gap Railroad from both north and south 
 in precisely what force we cannot tell. I 
 think the movement is a general and a con 
 certed one, such as could not be if he was 
 acting upon the purpose of a very desperate 
 defence of Richmond. I think the time is 
 near when you must either attack Richmond 
 or give up the job, and come back to the de 
 fence of Washington. Let me hear from 
 you instantly. " A. LINCOLN, 
 
 "President." 
 
 Possessed with an extraordinary infatu 
 ation as to the probability of the enemy s 
 swooping down upon Washington by the 
 way of Fredericksburg, the President, for 
 some days, could not be made to compre 
 hend that there was anything important in 
 the world to be done excepting to cut the 
 Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. 
 In vain did General McClellan urge some 
 attention to the true principles of the de 
 fence of Washington, as laid down by him 
 before leaving the Potomac. The whole 
 concern of the Administration centred 
 upon the city of the Rappahannock. 
 
 On the 26th General McDowell advanced 
 beyond the Rappahannock, and the enemy 
 in that quarter began to fall back towards 
 Hanover Court House and Richmond. 
 This rebel force, commanded by Generals 
 Anderson and Branch, was considerable 
 enough in numbers to threaten the right 
 and rear of General McClellan s extended 
 line, and he at once ordered General Fitz 
 John Porter justly described by the 
 New York Times, as one of the " noblest, 
 most painstaking, and trustworthy of our 
 officers " to attack and dislodge it. 
 
 General Porter performed this duty with 
 signal success. The battle of Hanover 
 Court House was fought by him on the 27th 
 of May. The whole division of General 
 Branch, about 10,000 strong, was utterly 
 routed, and General Anderson, who was 
 supporting him at Ashland, hastily re 
 treated upon Richmond. The fugitives 
 from these points carried the news of the 
 disaster into the rebel capital, where it was 
 universally supposed that the action indi 
 cated the junction of the army of McDowell 
 with the army of McClellan. This belief 
 threw the city into the greatest alarm and 
 confusion. The roads leading to the South 
 were crowded with escaping citizens, women 
 and children; and had th$ junction of the 
 two Union armies been really now effected, 
 and General McClellan been thus enabled 
 to force a decisive battle for the possession 
 of Richmond, it can scarcely be doubted 
 that the place must have fallen into his 
 hands. So well aware of this was General 
 McClellan, that immediately after the vic 
 tory he telegraphed to the Government 
 " There is no doubt that the enemy are 
 concentrating everything on Richmond. I 
 will do my best to cut off Jackson, but am 
 doubtful whether I can." 
 
 " It is the policy and duty of the Govern 
 ment to send me by water all the well- 
 drilled troops available. I am confident 
 
51 
 
 that Washington is in no danger. Engines 
 and cars in large numbers have been sent 
 up to bring down Jackson s command. 
 
 11 1 may not be able to cut them off, but 
 will try we have cut all but the F. & 11. 
 R. R. The real issue is in the battle about 
 to be fought in front of Richmond. All 
 our available troops should be collected 
 here, not raw regiments, but the well- 
 drilled troops. It cannot be ignored that 
 a desperate battle is before us ; if any regi 
 ment of good troops remain unemployed it 
 will be an irreparable fault committed. 
 
 " G. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. 
 " HON. E. M. STANTON, Sec y of War." 
 
 On the next day, the 29th, having 
 gained information that there was positively 
 no rebel force between Hanover Junction 
 and Fredericksburg, he telegraphed this 
 also to Washington. The President and 
 Secretary of War, however, on the au 
 thority of certain contrabands, preferred to 
 believe that the rebels were nofc concen 
 trating on Richmond, but, on the con 
 trary, reinforcing the terrible Stonewall 
 Jackson, who might at any moment de 
 stroy Gen. Banks, devour Gen. Fremont, 
 and annihilate Washington. 
 
 They accordingly threw away all the re 
 sults of the battle of Hanover Court House, 
 by refusing to permit McDowell to join the 
 Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Two years of waiting and fruitless efforts 
 have since atoned for the colossal blunder 
 then committed at Washington. 
 
 The golden opportunity offered to the 
 country at the end of May, 1862, by Por 
 ter and McClellan, has never since re 
 turned. The Confederates were not slow 
 to avail themselves of the advantages held 
 out to them by the bewilderment and vac 
 illation of the Washington government. 
 Gen. McClellan, as we have already seen, 
 had been obliged to extend his line danger 
 ously, in order to meet the overland ad 
 vance of McDowell, and to attempt to hold 
 both banks of the Chickahominy, in order 
 to secure his own communications. 
 
 As soon as it was ascertained that Stone 
 wall Jackson had arrested the advance of 
 McDowell, Gen. Johnstone at Richmond, at 
 once determined to throw himself upon the 
 weakest point of Gen. McClellan s position. 
 
 A rain-storm of unparalleled violence, 
 on the night of May 80th, favored his de 
 sign. In a few hours the Chickahominy 
 was converted into a roaring torrent. All 
 the bridges of the Army of the Potomac, 
 
 with a single exception, were rendered im 
 practicable. The roads were destroyed. 
 And on the 31st of May, the Confederates 
 furiously assailed the left wing of Gen. 
 McClellan s army at Fair Oaks. Gen. 
 Casey s redoubts, in the advance of this 
 wing, were stormed and carried and after 
 a desperate battle, in which the advantage 
 rested with the Confederates, their victori 
 ous progress, threatening . the absolute de 
 struction of the whole left wing, was arrest 
 ed with difficulty, just at nightfall, by the 
 artillery of Gen. Suniner. 
 
 Night put an end to the conflict. Dur 
 ing the night an attempt was made to 
 throw new bridges across the stream, and 
 pass over the whole right wing of the 
 Army of the Potomac. It was too late ; 
 the floods increasing prevented the execu 
 tion of the work. All that men could do 
 General McClellan and his subordinates 
 did. The General-in-Chief, rising from a 
 sick-bed, spent the greater part of the 
 night on horseback conferring with his 
 generals and pushing on the operations. 
 Snatching a slight repose towards day 
 break, he remounted his horse at the first 
 sound of the guns, arid appeared in the ad 
 vance of Simmer s corps when the battle 
 began again in the morning ; on the side of 
 the Federal troops, with all the valor of des 
 peration ; on the side of the Confederates in 
 a fierce, confused disorderly fashion, attrib 
 utable to the fact, not then generally known 
 to either army, that Gen. Johnstone, expos 
 ing himself with his usual gallantry, had 
 fallen dangerously wounded. This circum 
 stance left the rebel army for a time with 
 out a recognized leader. Failing to over 
 come the determined resistance of the Fed 
 eral troops, the Confederates about noon on 
 the 1st of June fell back in confusion on 
 Richmond. 
 
 Thus ended the battle of Fair Oaks. 
 Had it been possible for Gen. McClellan 
 at this time to throw his right wing, with 
 his artillery, across the Chickahominy, and 
 advance upon Richmond during the two or 
 three days of confusion which followed 
 the failure of the Confederate attack and 
 the fall of Gen. Johnstone, Richmond might 
 have been seized and occupied. 
 
 Thanks to the confused and contradic 
 tory orders from Washington, by which his 
 army had been forced to assume the posi 
 tion which it held before the battle, and to 
 the tremendous rains of the 3Uth of May, 
 this was simply impossible. 
 
 Gen. Lee succeeded immediately to the 
 
52 
 
 command of Gen. Johnstone ; the Army of 
 the Potomac strengthened itself in its posi 
 tion ; and on the 3d of June Mr. Lincoln 
 kindly telegraphed to Gen. McClellan to 
 keep a close eye " on the Chickahominv 
 River ! " 
 
 The first days of June passed on ; con 
 tinual rains surrounded the operations of 
 the army with difficulties, which, as Mr. 
 Stantou, on the llth, telegraphed to Gen. 
 McClellan, " No art or skill could possibly 
 avoid, but onlj- endure ; " the reinforce 
 ments, so urgently needed, still failed to 
 arrive. 
 
 So weak had now become the extended 
 lines that, on the loth of June, the rebel 
 Gen Stuart, with 1500 cavalry and four 
 guns, was able to make a clever circuit of 
 the whole army. 
 
 Thoroughly appreciating the dangers of 
 his position, and determined not to imitate 
 the inaction which had paralyzed the army 
 before Corinth, Gen. McClellan, after tak 
 ing the precaution to order supplies to 
 City Point on the James, in preparation 
 for a movement which he was already med 
 itating, to a new, safer, and stronger base, 
 on that river, devoted himself to bringing 
 on a general engagement before Richmond. 
 
 The Prince de SToinville thus describes 
 some of the adventures which attended the 
 preliminary reconnoissances now become 
 necessary : 
 
 " On one occasion," says the Prince, 
 " the General had climbed, with several of 
 his officers, to the top of a high tree, and 
 there, every man on his branch, with spy 
 glass in hand, they had held a sort of coun 
 cil of war. This took place within a hun 
 dred paces of the hostile pickets, whom no 
 attempt at observation could escape. We 
 dreaded to hear the crack of the rifles of: 
 the famous Southern squirrel-shooters ; but 
 they were magnanimous, and the reconnois- 
 sance ended without a mishap. On an 
 other occasion, the staff of a Confederate 
 commander appeared, simultaneously with 
 our own, upon the banks of the Chicka- 
 homiuy. At once, the hostile gentlemen 
 ordered up one of their bands, which 
 played a popular air; but it was hardly 
 ended before the musicians gave way to a 
 battery, which, coming up at full gallop, 
 opened a terrible fire, to which we soon re 
 sponded. These examinations convinced 
 us that the enemy was not idle, and that 
 he had thrown up works, armed with heavy 
 guns, precisely where we did not wish to 
 see them." 
 
 During all this time General McClellan 
 was vainly attempting to convince the 
 Government of the importance of con 
 centrating all its efforts on the reduction 
 of Richmond. He suggested that move 
 ment upon Atlanta which has since, after 
 two years, been adopted, as a means of 
 compelling the enemy to divide the force 
 which they were gathering up for the 
 decisive struggle before their capital. 
 He reiterated his appeal for the coopera 
 tion of McDowell, and his conviction 
 that the movements of " Stonewall " 
 Jackson were, .designed to culminate in 
 the sudden return of that commander to 
 Richmond, when he should have suc 
 ceeded in preventing this cooperation. 
 
 Meanwhile, if the Army of the Poto 
 mac, thinned by battle and disease, was 
 really to be left to itself, General McClel 
 lan determined so to wield it that when 
 attacked, as he saw that he in that case 
 should be, by an overwhelming concen 
 tration of the enemy, he might hold his 
 communications by the York River long 
 enough to enable him to change his base 
 successfully to the James. This once 
 effected, lie supposed, as he had a right 
 to suppose, that the Government at 
 Washington, awakened at last to under 
 stand the designs of the Confederates, 
 would finally abandon its strange, inco 
 herent, and inconclusive military policy, 
 and throw the whole strength of the 
 army upon this decisive point. 
 
 On the 25th of June, the bridge and 
 intrenchments being at last completed, an 
 advance of Heintzelman s corps brought 
 on a smart action, preliminary to the 
 general advance, which resulted advan 
 tageously to the Federal troops. But 
 in the evening of the same day McClel 
 lan learned that Jackson, with 30,000 
 men, had reached Hanover Court House, 
 threatening his right and rear. Other 
 rumors, some of them no doubt incor 
 rect, were brought in to him, of the re 
 inforcements pouring into Richmond ; 
 but the substantial truth that the Confed 
 erate Commander-in-chiefhad completejy 
 outwitted the Government at Washing 
 ton, and was ready to pour his whole 
 available force upon the devoted army 
 before Richmond, was no longer to be 
 questioner]. On the next day, the 26th, 
 the Confederates attacked the right wing 
 of the army in force, and the retreat to 
 the James began. 
 
 The forces which had been befooled 
 
53 
 
 and beaten by Jackson, in the valley and 
 along the Potomac, were now consoli 
 dated by the Administration into the 
 " Army of Virginia," a commander for 
 which army was sought in the person of 
 General Pope, and the Army of the Po 
 tomac was left to Providence, to the skill 
 of its commander, and to its own heroic 
 bravery. 
 
 The history of the seven days which 
 followed need not here be written. 
 Through every hour of that tremendous 
 week the army proved itself worthy of 
 the firm reliance upon its conduct and 
 its courage in which its General began 
 one of the most dangerous and difficult 
 undertakings ever attempted in war. 
 
 " I was confident," says McClellan, in 
 his Report, " in the valor and discipline 
 of my brave army, and knew that it 
 could be trusted equally to retreat or 
 advance, and to fight the series of battles 
 now inevitable, whether retreating from 
 victories or marching through defeats; 
 in short, I had no doubt whatever of its 
 ability, even agmnst superior numbers, to 
 fight its way through to the James, and 
 get a position whence a successful ad 
 vance npon Richmond would be again 
 possible. Their superb conduct through 
 the next seven days justified my faith." 
 
 How well the Army of the Potomac 
 might have borne itself through this ter 
 rible ordeal had it been commanded by 
 a " Congressional Committee on the Con 
 duct of the War," or even by the adminis 
 trative officers who suffered Gen. Jackson 
 to paralyze for weeks with twenty thousand 
 men the powerful armies of the Rappahan- 
 nock, the Mountains, and Washington City, 
 might be an interesting subject of histori 
 cal inquiry. By what qualities it was that 
 the general who actually led them through 
 a week of battle and of victory, without 
 the loss of a gun, unbroken in discipline, 
 and unshaken in spirit, from positions 
 which the folly or the recklessness of their 
 own government had rendered untenable, 
 back to the most formidable base of opera 
 tions which has ever been held by an army 
 of the Union operating against Richmond, 
 a foreign witness, competent to the task, 
 has very adequately set forth. 
 
 Mr. Motley, the accomplished Minister 
 of the United States in Austria, in October, 
 1362, sent to Mr. Seward the following ex 
 tract from the leading military journal of 
 the Austrian Empire.- "It is not to be 
 wondered at, then, if the General-in-Chief 
 
 of the Army of the Potomac was in haste 
 to save the army intrusted to him from 
 the dangers surrounding it, even from cer 
 tain destruction ; from a noose, in fact, 
 which required only to be drawn a little 
 closely together in order to suffocate the 
 soul of the. Union. The manner in which 
 he acquitted himself of this most difficult 
 of all military tasks redounds to his infinite 
 honor, and places him at once in the ranks 
 of those memorable commanders whose 
 names history treasures for posterity ; men 
 who, if they have, perhaps, not had the 
 art to chain victory to their banners, pos 
 sessed, at any rate, the fortitude, the audac 
 ity, and the circumspection to rescue their 
 armies from impending ruin. The Ameri 
 can General has made a thorough study 
 of war in the swamps of the Chickahom- 
 iny, and has made himself a complete mas 
 ter in that most difficult of professions. 
 .He has manifested the unquestioned talent 
 to save his army in a manner not suffi 
 ciently to be admired, out of the most des 
 perate of situations. Moreau made himself 
 immortal by his famous retreat from the 
 Iller to the Rhine, in the year 1796. What 
 is due to the American General-in-Chief, 
 who conducted, with a morally and physi 
 cally exhausted army through a swampy, 
 pathless country, covered with ancient for 
 ests, and in face of an open enemy out 
 numbering him two to one, the most clas 
 sical of all retreats recorded in military 
 history, without a single disaster ! " 
 
 The President of the United States 
 seems to have conceived that this great 
 achievement was adequately recognized 
 in the following telegrams sent imme 
 diately after that magnificent victory of 
 Malvern Hill, which dissipated all the 
 hopes formed by the Confederates of 
 the destruction of McClellan s army, and 
 assured its quiet reorganization at its new 
 base : 
 
 , July 3, 1SC2 5 r. M., 
 " MA.T.-GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN, 
 
 " Yours of 5.30 yesterday, is just re 
 ceived. I am satisfied that yourself, offi 
 cers, and men have done the best you 
 could. All accounts say better fighting 
 was never done. Ten "thousand thanks 
 for it." 
 
 "JULY 5, 1862 9P.M. 
 
 " A thousand thanks for the relief 
 your two despatches gave me. Be assured 
 the heroism of yourself, officers, and men 
 
54 
 
 is, and forever will be, appreciated. If 
 you can hold your present position we 
 can hive the enemy yet. 
 
 "A. LINCOLN." 
 
 These despatches are the more signif 
 icant that, coming as they did after a des 
 patch sent by Gen. McClellan on the 28th 
 of June, from Savage s Station, in which, 
 standing amid the dead and dying of his 
 heroic army, and " feeling in his heart," to 
 use his own warm words, the loss of every 
 brave man who had been needlessly sac 
 rificed, he had plainly said to Mr. Stan- 
 ton " you have done your best to sacrifice 
 this army," the words of the President 
 virtually indorsed this terrible indict 
 ment, and authorized the General, who 
 made it to anticipate that the necessary 
 means would be given him, to " hold his 
 position and to hive the enemy." 
 
 But irresolute and vacillating as ever, 
 the President speedily subsided into fresh 
 acquiescence in the will of those who had 
 determined to eliminate General McClel 
 lan and his army from the contest. * 
 
 To the latter, after all that they had 
 borne and done, no word of recognition 
 or of gratitude came from the Govern 
 ment, and when their commander, after 
 waiting many days, ventured to ask for 
 them this simple act of justice, in the fol 
 lowing touching words, no reply, what 
 ever, was made to his request. 
 
 " Please say a kind word to my army, 
 that I can repeat to them in general or 
 ders, in regard to their conduct at York- 
 town, Willinmsburg, West Point, Hano 
 ver Court House, and on the Chickahom- 
 iny, as well as in regard to the (7) seven 
 days, and the recent retreat. 
 
 "No one has ever said anything to 
 cheer them but myself. Say nothing 
 about me, nxercly give my men and offi 
 cers credit for what they have done. It 
 will do you much good, and will strength 
 en you much with them if you issue a 
 handsome order to them in regard to 
 what they have accomplished. They de 
 serve it. G McCLELLAN, 
 
 " Major-General. 
 " MAJ.-GENEKAL HALLECK, 
 
 " Comd g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C." 
 
 During the whole month of July Gen. 
 McClellan remained at Harrison s Bar, 
 pleading for the reinforcements which 
 were never to come ; refused even the 
 slightest light as to the future plans of 
 
 the Government; and watching the pow 
 erful and vigilant enemy at Richmond 
 with the full knowledge that they wait 
 ed only the moment of the embarkation 
 of his troops, should so mad a measure 
 be adopted, to precipitate themselves in 
 force upon the "Army of Virginia," and 
 overwhelming its boastful and incompe 
 tent leader in the North. 
 
 Military literature has nothing more 
 solemn, nothing which in the light of the 
 misfortunes which, since it was written, 
 have overtaken the country, can be re 
 garded as more wisely prophetic than 
 the letter which, during this weary sea 
 son, General McClellan, on the 7th of 
 July, 1862, addressed to the President. 
 
 All that he had affirmed in the hour 
 of victory among the mountains of West 
 Virginia in respect to the true aims and 
 policy of the war for the Union, General 
 McClellan, in this letter, reaffirms with all 
 the weight of his subsequent, his sadder, 
 and his larger experience. 
 
 " HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 
 CAMP NEAR HARRISON LANDING, Va., July 7 r 1862. 
 
 "MR. PRESIDENT, 
 
 " You have been fully informed that the 
 rebel army is in our front, with the pur 
 pose of overwhelming us by attacking 
 our positions or reducing us by blocking 
 our ( river-oemmunications. I cannot but 
 regard our condition as critical, and I 
 earnestly desire, in view of possible con 
 tingencies, to lay before your Excellency, 
 for your private consideration, my gen 
 eral views concerning the existing state 
 of the rebellion, although they do not 
 strictly relate to the srtuaticn of this 
 army, or strictly come within the secrpe 
 of my official duties. These views amount 
 to convictions, and are deeply impressed 
 upon my mind and heart. Our cause 
 must never be abandoned; it is the cause 
 of free institutions and self-government. 
 The Constitution and the Union must 
 be preserved, whatever may be the cost 
 in time, treasure, and blood. If secession 
 is successful other dissolutions are clearly 
 to be seen in the future. Let neither 
 military disaster, political faction, nor 
 foreign war, shake your settled purpose 
 to enforce the equal operation of the 
 laws of the United States upon the peo 
 ple of every State. 
 
 " The time has come when the Govern 
 ment must determine upon a civil and 
 military policy covering the whole ground 
 
55 
 
 of our national trouble. The responsi 
 bility of determining, declaring, and sup 
 porting such civil and military policy, 
 and of directing the whole course of na 
 tional affairs in regard to the rebellion, 
 must now be assumed and exercised by 
 you, or our cause will be lost. The Con 
 stitution gives you power sufficient even 
 for the present terrible exigency. 
 
 " This rebellion has assumed the charac 
 ter of war ; as such it should be regard 
 ed, and it should be conducted upon the 
 highest principles known to Christian 
 civilization. It should not be a war 
 looking to the subjugation of the people 
 of any State in any event. It should not 
 be at all a war upon populations, but 
 against armed forces and political organ 
 izations. Neither confiscation of prop 
 erty, political executions of persons, 
 territorial organizations of states, or for 
 cible abolition of slavery should be con 
 templated for a moment. In prosecuting 
 the war, all private property and unarmed 
 persons should be strictly protected, sub 
 ject only to the necessity of military 
 operations. All private property taken 
 for military use should be paid or re 
 ceipted for : pillage and waste should be 
 treated as high crimes : all unnecessary 
 trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive 
 demeanor by the military towards cit 
 izens promptly rebuked. Military ar 
 rests should not be tolerated, except in 
 places where active hostilities exist, and 
 oaths not required by enactments con 
 stitutionally made, should be neither de 
 manded nor received. Military govern 
 ment should be confined to the preserva 
 tion of public order and the protection, of 
 political rights. Military power should 
 not be allowed to interfere with the rela 
 tions of servitude, either by supporting 
 or impairing the authority of the master, 
 except for repressing disorder, as in other 
 cases. Slaves contraband under the act 
 oi Congress, seeking military protection, 
 should receive it. The right of the Gov 
 ernment to appropriate permanently to 
 its own service, claims to slave labor, 
 should be asserted, and the right of the 
 owner to compensation therefor should 
 be recognized. 
 
 "This principle might be extended, upon 
 grounds of military necessity and security, 
 to all the slaves within a particular State, 
 thus working manumission in such State; 
 and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Vir 
 ginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, 
 
 the expediency of such a measure is only 
 a question of time. 
 
 " A system of policy thus constitutional 
 and conservative, and pervaded by the 
 influences of Christianity and freedom, 
 would receive the support of almost all 
 truly loyal men, would deeply impress 
 the rebel masses and all foreign nations, 
 and it might be humbly hoped that it 
 would commend itself to the favor of the 
 Almighty. 
 
 " Unless the principles governing the 
 future conduct of our struggle shall be 
 made known and approved, the effort 
 to obtain requisite forces will be almost 
 hopeless. A declaration of radical views, 
 especially upon slavery, will rapidly dis 
 integrate our present armies. 
 
 "The policy of the Government must be 
 supported by concentrations of military 
 power. The national forces should not 
 be dispersed in expeditions, posts of 
 occupation, and numerous armies, but 
 should be mainly collected into masses, 
 and brought to bear upon the armies of 
 the Confederate States. Those armies 
 thoroughly defeated, the political struct 
 ure which they support would soon cease 
 to exist. 
 
 " In carrying out any system of policy 
 which you may form, you will require a 
 commander-in-chief of the army ; one 
 who possesses your confidence, under 
 stands your views, and who is compe 
 tent to execute your orders by directing 
 the military forces of the nation to the 
 accomplishment of the objects by you 
 proposed. I do not ask that place for 
 myself. I am willing to serve you in 
 such position as you may assign me, and 
 I will do so as faithfully as ever subordi 
 nate served superior. 
 
 " I may be on the brink of eternity, and 
 as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, 
 I have written this letter with sincerity 
 towards you, and from love for my 
 country. 
 " Very respectfully, your oVt servant, 
 
 " G. B. McCLELLAN, 
 
 " Major-General ComcTg" 
 
 The response to this letter was long in 
 coming. But it came at last on the 3d 
 of August, in this brief and imperative 
 sentence from General Helleck, 
 
 "It is determined to withdraw your 
 army from the Peninsula to Acquia 
 Creek." 
 
 In the morning of the next day, Gen- 
 
56 
 
 eral McClellan thus replied to this fatal 
 order : 
 
 " Your telegram of last evening is re 
 ceived. I must confess it has caused me 
 the greatest pain I ever experienced, for 
 I am convinced that the order to with 
 draw this army to Acquia Creek will 
 prove disastrous to our cause. 
 
 " I fear it will be a fatal blow. 
 
 " Several days are necessary to complete 
 the preparations for so important a move 
 ment as this ; and while they are in prog 
 ress I beg that careful consideration 
 may be given to my statements. 
 
 " This army is now in excellent disci 
 pline and condition. We hold a de- 
 bouche on both banks of the James 
 River, so that we are free to act in any 
 direction, and, with the assistance of the 
 gun-boats, I consider our communications 
 as now secure. We are (25) twenty-five 
 miles from Richmond, and are not likely 
 to meet the enemy in force sufficient to 
 fight a battle, until we have marched 
 (15) fifteen to (18) eighteen miles, which 
 brings us practically within (10) ten 
 miles of Richmond. Our longest line 
 of land transportation would be from 
 this point (25) twenty-five miles ; but 
 with the aid of the gun-boats we can 
 supply the army by water during its ad 
 vance, certainly to within (12) twelve 
 miles of Richmond. 
 
 " At Acquia Creek we would be (75) 
 seventy-five miles from Richmond, with 
 land transportation all the way. 
 
 "From here to Fort Monroe is a march 
 of about (70) seventy miles ; for I regard 
 it as impracticable to withdraw this army 
 and its material except by land. 
 
 " The result of the movement would 
 thus be a march of (145) one hundred 
 and forty-five miles to reach a point now 
 only (25) twenty-five miles distant, and 
 to deprive ourselves entirely of the pow 
 erful aid of the gun-boats and water 
 transportation. Add to this the certain 
 demoralization of this army, which 
 would ensue, the terribly depressing 
 effect upon the people of the North, and 
 the strong probability that it would influ 
 ence foreign powers to recognize our 
 adversaries, and there appear to me suffi 
 cient reasons to make it my imperative 
 duty to urge, in the strongest terms 
 afforded by our language, that this order 
 may be rescinded, and that, for from 
 recalling this army it be promptly rein 
 forced to enable it to resume the offensive. 
 
 " It may be said that there are no rein 
 forcements available. I point to Burn- 
 side s force, to that of Pope, not neces 
 sary to maintain a strict defensive in 
 front of Washington and Harper s Fer 
 ry, to those portions of the Army of the 
 West not required for a strict defensive 
 there. Here, directly in front of this ar 
 my, is the heart of the rebellion ; it is here 
 that all our resources should be collected 
 to strike the blow which will determine 
 the fate of the nation. All points of sec 
 ondary importance elsewhere should be 
 abandoned, and every available man 
 brought here, a decided victory here, 
 and the military strength of the rebellion 
 is crushed, it matters not what partial 
 reverses we may meet with elsewhere ; 
 Here is the true defence of Washington, 
 it is here, on the banks of the James, that 
 the fate of the Union should be decided. 
 
 " Clear in my conviction of right, strong 
 in the consciousness that I have ever 
 been, and still am, actuated solely by 
 love of my country, knowing that no 
 ambitious or selfish motives have influ 
 enced me from the commencement of 
 this war, I do now, what I never did 
 in my life before, I entreat that this 
 order may be rescinded. 
 
 "If my council does not prevail, I will, 
 with a sad heart, obey your orders to the 
 utmost of my power, directing to the 
 movement, which I clearly foresee will be 
 one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, 
 whatever skill I may possess. 
 
 " Whatever the result may be, and may 
 God grant that I am mistaken in my 
 forebodings, I shall at least have the 
 internal satisfaction that I have written 
 and spoken frankly, and have sought to 
 do the best in my power to avert dis,as- 
 ter from my country. 
 
 "G. B. McCLELLAX, 
 
 " Major-General Commanding. 
 
 MAJ.-GEN. H. W. HALLECK, 
 
 "Major-General Comd g U. S. A." 
 
 Vain entreaty ! answered only by or 
 ders more peremptory and positive than 
 the first, for the instant removal of the 
 whole army. No adequate means of 
 transportation having been provided by 
 the Government for the execution of 
 these orders, the movement went on 
 more slowly than they wished. 
 
 This was regarded at Washington as^ 
 a misfortune. In point of fact the 
 delay probably saved General Pope from 
 
57 
 
 a still more crushing defeat than that 
 which he was soon to experience. For 
 it induced General Lee to doubt whether 
 the removal from Harrison s Bar upon 
 which he was counting was after all real 
 ly to take place, and led him accordingly 
 to delay the movement of the mass of 
 his troops from Kichmond. On the 18th 
 of August General McClellan determined 
 to push forward two of his army corps, 
 on their return, as far as Yorktown by 
 land ; and on the same day, there being 
 no longer any question as to the reality 
 of the raising of the siege of Richmond, 
 the Confederate General Longstreet hur 
 ried forward with his whole force to 
 ward the North. 
 
 General Porter, with the first of the 
 Federal Corps which left Harrison s Bar, 
 having intercepted a letter at Williams- 
 burg which led him to believe that the 
 enemy were massing themselves rapidly 
 against Pope, pushed his men on without 
 a pause to Newport News, which he 
 reached on the 18th of August, having 
 marched his troops, with but one halt in 
 three days and one night, sixty miles, 
 through the tangled and swampy wilder 
 ness of the Peninsula. This was the 
 same General Fitz John Porter who was 
 destined to be a fterwards persecuted out 
 of the army, with the honorable history 
 of which his name is indissolubly con 
 nected, on the charge of withholding his 
 men from action in order to prevent 
 General Pope from winning a victory! 
 
 After giving his last orders for the 
 defence of the Peninsula, General Mc 
 Clellan sailed for Aquia Creek, where he 
 reported for orders, Aijgust 24th, 1862. 
 When he arrived there he found every 
 thing in the wildest confusion. To his 
 request for information as to the wherea 
 bouts of the army, the General-in-Chief 
 (General Ilalleck) replied: "I do not 
 know where General Pope is, or where 
 the enemy in force is." Two days af 
 terwards General McClellan, at the 
 request of the General-in-Chief, went to 
 Alexandria, where he was to take charge 
 of the sending out of the troops, nobody 
 being able to tell him, however, where 
 the troops were to be sent, or to whom. 
 General Pope, indeed, scarcely seems 
 to have known where he was himself. 
 He had been fighting, or rather he had 
 been fought, ever since the 10th of 
 August, and it is a curious illustration 
 of the way in which General McClellan s 
 
 history has been written by his enemies, 
 that Mr. Lincoln s biographer denounces 
 him for not having begun to join Pope on 
 the 10th of August, the order moving 
 General McClellan from the Peninsula 
 having been issued exactly one week 
 before that date, on the 3d of August ! 
 
 The charge of delay brought against 
 a general for failure to move ninety 
 thousand men from the James River to 
 Northern Virginia in the space of one 
 week, is a brilliant novelty in the history 
 of human accusations. The telegrams 
 of General Halleck and the President to 
 General McClellan, during the week 
 which followed his arrival at Alexandria, 
 tell a pitiful story of executive imbecility. 
 Deprived of his command, charged with 
 neglecting duties which he had no means 
 of performing, and with failing to exe 
 cute the most chaotic and contradictory 
 orders, General McClellan was still called 
 upon continually for light and counsel in 
 the midst of the general darkness and 
 hurley-burley. 
 
 On the 30th of August, for example, the 
 War Department issued an order reduc 
 ing General McClellan s command to his 
 personal staff* and about one hundred 
 men. On the next day General Halleck 
 telegraphed to him : " I beg of you to 
 assist me in this crisis, with your ability 
 and experience, I arn entirely tired out." 
 Without a murmur of dissatisfaction at 
 the indecent treatment to which he had 
 been subjected, General McClellan ear 
 nestly devoted himself to the task of 
 bringing order and safety out of the 
 chaos around him, chaos so complete 
 that it compelled him to telegraph to 
 General Halleck, " There appears to be 
 a total absence of brains, and I fear the 
 total destruction of the army." On the 
 day before this decided despatch was 
 sent, General Pope had contrived to loose 
 fifteen thousand men. On the 1st of 
 September General Halleck sent for 
 General McClellan to come to Washing- 
 ington and take command of its defen 
 ces. He went, and suggested the pro 
 priety of sending some one in authority 
 to find out what had really happened to 
 General Pope, The suggestion was 
 adopted in the afternoon of the same 
 day. The President requested an inter 
 view with General McClellan ; came to 
 General Halleck s house to see him ; 
 assured him that he had always been his 
 friend, and begged the displaced com- 
 
58 
 
 mander, as a personal favor, to use his 
 influence with the Army of the Potomac 
 to secure its; cooperation with General 
 Pope. General McClellan replied that 
 the Army of the Potomac needed no 
 such stimulus to its duty, but the Presi 
 dent insisting, with tears in his eyes, 
 General McClellan telegraphed to Gen 
 eral Porter : 
 
 " MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER, 
 
 "I ask of you for my sake, and that 
 of the country, and the old Army of the 
 Potomac, that you and all my friends 
 will lend the fullest and most cordial 
 cooperation to General Pope, in all the 
 operations now going on. The destinies 
 of our country, the honor of our army 
 are at stake, and all depends now upon 
 the cheerful cooperation of all in the 
 field. This week is the crisis of our 
 fate. Say the same thing to my friends 
 in the Army of the Potomac, and that 
 the last request I have to make of them 
 is that, for their country s sake, they will 
 extend to General Pope the same sup 
 port they ever have to me. 
 
 " I am in charge of the defences of 
 Washington, and am doing all I can to 
 render your retreat safe, should that 
 become necessary. 
 
 "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN." 
 
 To this telegram General Porter re 
 plied : 
 
 "FAIRFAX COURT HOUSK, 
 
 10 A. M., Sept. 2, 1802. 
 
 " You may rest assured that all your 
 friends, as well as every lover of his 
 country, will ever give, as they have 
 given, to General Pope -their cordial 
 cooperation and constant support in the 
 execution of all orders and plans. Our 
 killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops 
 attest our devoted duty. 
 
 "F. J. PORTER, 
 " Major- General Commanding. * 
 
 The next day the President and Gen 
 eral Halleck came to General McClellan s 
 house with news from General Pope. 
 They announced that everything was in 
 the worst possible condition, the army 
 retreating rapidly and in confusion upon 
 Washington, and ruin impending over 
 the country. The President implored 
 General McClellan to take the whole 
 matter into his own hands, assume com 
 mand of the troops, and save the state. 
 
 Never, perhaps, in the history of the 
 
 world, has a man of character and of 
 ability, dishonorably and unworthily dealt 
 with by his official superiors, been so sud 
 denly and rapidly avenged by the course 
 of events as was General McCiellan at 
 this moment. J 
 
 A month had scarcely elapsed since 
 -the constitution of the Army of Virginia, 
 under General Pope, had deprived him 
 of his last hope of vindicating, by the 
 capture of Richmond, the wisdom of his 
 plans of campaign against that city. All 
 that had been refused to him had been 
 conceded to General Pope ; and when he 
 was recalled from the Peninsula it was 
 with the scarcely disguised intention 
 on the part of the Government to dis 
 miss him in disgrace from the service. 
 So late as the 18th of August, the mili 
 tary authorities in Washington had ridi 
 culed the idea that Lee could possibly 
 venture upon an attempt to overwhelm 
 Pope, and to retaliate upon the North 
 the invasion of Virginia. 
 
 A fortnight later the heads of the 
 Government were kneeling to the Gen 
 eral whom they had thus insulted and 
 wronged, and praying him to relieve 
 them of a burden of command to which 
 their force was no longer equal. 
 
 That this was asked of him in no large 
 and magnanimous spirit, is painfully evi 
 dent from the fact that no formal order 
 reinstating him in the command of his 
 army was issued. He was merely ap 
 pointed to the command of the " troops 
 for the defence of the Capital." 
 
 But whatever the temper in which 
 the public servants of the Union set the 
 Union s sore need before him, General 
 McClellan saw that need and saw no 
 more. Making no conditions, nobly 
 throwing himself on the justice and 
 honor of the State, he accepted the 
 dread responsibility of attempting to 
 rally a disorganized army and to beat 
 back with it an exulting and confident 
 foe. 
 
 Getting at once into the saddle, Gen 
 eral McClellan rode out to meet the 
 retreating forces. He came upon Gen 
 eral Pope in person at no great distance 
 from the Capital, but could learn nothing 
 from him as to the position either of the 
 enemy or of our own men. It was not 
 till long after nightfall that he succeeded 
 in gaining such a definite idea of the con 
 dition of things as enabled him to begin 
 to issue his orders. But the fact of his 
 
59 
 
 reappearance at the head of affairs was 
 the signal of a sudden and astonishing 
 change in the morale of the retreating 
 troops. The soldiers of the Potomac 
 army received him everywhere with 
 enthusiastic cheers, the routed horde 
 became a formidable host again, and 
 before midnight of the 2d of September, 
 Washington was safe against any attack 
 from the enemy. 
 
 The ulterior plans of Lee now began to 
 develop themselves. His movements on 
 the 3d of September indicated his inten 
 tion to, cross the Upper Potomac, thus 
 threatening Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
 
 By the 7th General McCIellan had 
 restored the framework of the army 
 sufficiently to enable him to take the 
 field in pursuit of the adventurous in 
 vader. It is curious to see that the 
 same authorities who had so constantly 
 pursued General McCIellan with the 
 charge of his excessive "slowness" to 
 move during the spring and summer of 
 186 2, now opened upon him eagerly for 
 moving too fast and too far. 
 
 General Halleck, unwilling to give up 
 his pet belief that Lee would never ven 
 ture into Pennsylvania, followed General 
 McCIellan on his march with telegrams, 
 urging such movements on his part as, if 
 he had made them, would have resulted 
 in the complete success of Lee s campaign 
 of invasion. On the 1*2 th of September 
 the President sent him the following de 
 spatch : " Receiving nothing from Har 
 per s Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and 
 positive information from Wheeling that 
 the line is cut, corroborates the idea that 
 the army is recrossing the Potomac. 
 Please do not let him get off without 
 being hurt" 
 
 Three days before this despatch was 
 sent, General Lee had issued his orders 
 to his army for the capture of the Balti 
 more and Ohio Railroad, the cutting off 
 and seizure of Harper s Ferry, and the 
 concentration of the main body in Mary 
 land, at a point from, which it would 
 equally menace Baltimore and the heart 
 of Pennsylvania. And at the very mo 
 ment when the President was inditing 
 this despatch, Stonewall Jackson was 
 appearing in force before Harper s Ferry. 
 
 The disgraceful surrender of that place 
 by Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford al 
 most immediately followed, the post 
 being given up to the Confederates .it- 
 eight, A. M., on the 15th of September. 
 
 General Franklin, moving by order of 
 General McCIellan to its relief, was then 
 actually within three miles of the posi 
 tion of Maryland Heights, and within 
 seven miles of Harper s Ferry, at a point 
 in Pleasant Valley where his advance 
 had rested the night before from the 
 combat and victory of Crampton s Gap. 
 
 On the same day with the combat at 
 Crampton s Gap, the battle of South 
 Mountain was fought and won for the 
 possession of Turner s Gap. In this 
 battle, one of the best contested of the 
 war, about 30,000 men were engaged on 
 each side. Here fell General Reno, in 
 whom says the commander, "the nation 
 lost one of its best general officers." 
 
 The President acknowledged the tid 
 ings of this victory in the following 
 characteristic manner : 
 
 DEPARTMENT, 
 "WASHINGTON, Sept. 15, 1862 2.45 p. M. 
 
 "Your despatch of to-day received. 
 God bless you, and all with you. De 
 stroy the rebel army if possible. 
 
 "A. LINCOLN. 
 
 " To MAJ.-GEX. MCCLELLAN." 
 
 The " rebel army," which the victors 
 of South Mountain were thus requested 
 to "destroy," was the same army, it will be 
 remembered, which had destroyed Pope s 
 "Army of Virginia," and thrown the Capi 
 tal at Washington into a paroxysm of 
 terror. The army invited to "destroy" 
 it was an army which had become almost 
 a mob but a fortnight before, and which 
 had only been brought and held together 
 in the advance upon a victorious enemy 
 by the moral power which the name and 
 the character of its commanding general 
 exerted upon the men. 
 
 Two days afterward was fought the 
 signal battle of Antictam Creek, near 
 Sharpsburg, by which the whole Confed 
 erate plan of campaign was broken up ; 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania were de 
 livered from the presence and the terror 
 of the foe; and the triumphant and 
 aggressive enemy, driven across the Poto 
 mac, was put once more upon the defen 
 sive. Never before had two such armies 
 contended for victory on a single field 
 in the new world. For fourteen hours 
 nearly two hundred thousand men and 
 five hundred pieces or* artillery had 
 shaken the solid earth, with their thun 
 der of battle, among the Maryland hills. 
 
60 
 
 The failure of General Burn side, on 
 the. left of the Federal line, to attack the 
 enemy at the time when he was ordered 
 so to do, and the subsequent delay of 
 the same general in executing one of the 
 vital movements of the day, prevented 
 the Federal army from achieving the 
 complete results of its victory. But the 
 Army of the Potomac remained masters 
 of the field of battle. Enough had been 
 done for glory, enough for the safety of 
 the State; and a thrill of triumph and 
 of gratitude ran through the whole land. 
 
 On the next day the condition of the 
 troops, as reported by their commanders, 
 Meade, Sunnier, Burnside, Hooker, and 
 others, was not such as to make a re 
 newal of the action desirable during this 
 day, the 18th; reinforcements came up, 
 though by no means in the numbers which 
 had been expected, and General McClel- 
 lan made his preparations for a fresh 
 attack on the positions of Lee at day 
 light of the 19th. 
 
 But Lee had no disposition to risk 
 another conflict at this point. After 
 making a show, during the day, of moving 
 over fresh troops from Virginia, Lee, 
 under cover of the night, withdrew his 
 army to the south side of the Potomac. 
 
 As the rebel lines were but a short 
 distance from the river, this evacuation 
 was effected without difficulty before 
 daylight, and when, the Federal advance 
 reached the river, early in the morning 
 of the 19th, it was discovered that their 
 C?ar was then escaping under cover of 
 eight batteries, placed in strong positions 
 upon the elevated bluffs on the Virginia 
 shore. 
 
 At dark on the same day a detach 
 ment from Fitz John Porter s corps 
 crossed the Potomac, took the enemy s 
 batteries, and drove back his supports a 
 considerable distance. 
 
 After recrossing the river, General 
 Lee, who knew ho\v completely the army 
 which defeated him at Antietam had 
 been exhausted by its previous efforts 
 and sufferings before Washington, con 
 centrated his forces at Martinsburg and 
 Winchester, and maintained a strong 
 front to the foe. 
 
 On the 19th General McClellan tele 
 graphed, "No fears .need now be enter 
 tained for the safety of Pennsylvania." 
 It is probable that those persons in power 
 at Washington, whose obstinacy and in 
 capacity alone had made it possible that 
 
 "fears" ever should have been enter 
 tained for the "safety of Pennsylvania," 
 found it impossible to forgive the man 
 who had saved themselves arid the 
 nation from the fruits of their folly. Be 
 this as it may, the only acknowledgment 
 vouchsafed to the deliverer of the North 
 and to his heroic army, was the follow 
 ing telegram from General Halleck. It 
 bears date Sept. 20, 1862, at a moment 
 when the heart of the whole nation out 
 side of the official councils at Washing 
 ton was throbbing with gratitude to God, 
 and with admiration of the gallant chief 
 tain and the gallant army to which, un 
 der God, the safety of the North was 
 due. 
 
 "WASHINGTON, Sept. 20, 18622 P. M. 
 
 " MAJOR-GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN, 
 
 " We are still left entirely in the dark in 
 regard to your own movements and those of 
 the enemy. This should not be so. You 
 should keep me advised of both, so far as 
 you know them. 
 
 " IT. W. HALLECK, 
 
 " General-in-Chief: 
 
 Patient as he was, General McClellan, 
 for his brave army s sake, could not tamely 
 brook the tone of this peevish and insolent 
 despatch at such a moment, and he replied 
 at once in these sharp, but dignified words : 
 
 " I regret that you find it necessary to 
 couch every despatch, I have the honor to 
 receive from you, in a spirit of fault-find 
 ing, and that you have not yet found leisure 
 to say one word in commendation of the 
 recent achievements of this army, or even to 
 allude to them. 
 
 " I have abstained from giving the num 
 ber of guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, 
 c., captured, until I could do so with 
 some accuracy. I hope by to-morrow even 
 ing to be able to give at least an approxi 
 mate statement. 
 
 " G. B. MCCLELLAN, 
 
 " Major- Gen. Gomd y." 
 
 Something of course must be pardoned 
 to men who, being no more than mortal 
 found themselves in the humiliating position 
 into which the official superiors of General 
 McClellan had now, by their real inferiority 
 to that officer, been brought. The campaign, 1 ? 
 of Pope in Virginia, and McClellan in 
 Maryland had demonstrated this inferiority, 
 not merely to all other competent observers, 
 hut to these official superiors themselves. 
 The President and General Halleck knew 
 
61 
 
 that, but for General McClellan and the 
 army which he alone had been able to hold 
 toother, the beginning of September would 
 have seen them fugitives from Washington 
 or prisoners in Richmond ; and it would 
 be asking too much, perhaps, of feeble hu 
 man nature to find fault with them for a 
 certain degree of restlessness and discomfort 
 in his presence. 
 
 But that they should have set themselves 
 at work, as soon as the safety of the North 
 was assured, to find or make an occasion for 
 depriving its saviour of his command, was a 
 crime against the state, the magnitude of 
 which is only to be measured by all that the 
 nation has since been thereby called to bear 
 of loss, of suffering, and of shame. 
 
 Yet all the evidence in the case compels 
 us to believe that of this crime against the 
 state, the authorities at Washington will 
 eventually be found guilty at the bar of im 
 partial history. 
 
 On the 22d of September the President 
 issued his proclamation of emancipation, 
 declaring a general war against the social 
 system of the seceded States, to begin on 
 the 1st of January, 1863. 
 
 This proclamation, of course, was utterly 
 inconsistent with all those principles in 
 obedience to which alone General McClellan, 
 in his letter from Harrison s Landing, had 
 expressed his belief that the war could be 
 honorably and successfully conducted. But 
 General McClellan felt that this circum 
 stance only made it more imperative upon 
 him to impress on the minds of his army 
 the true nature of the relations between the 
 civil and the military authorities. 
 
 " The principles upon which, and the 
 object for which armies, shall be employed 
 in suppressing rebellion," said General 
 McClellan, in a General Order to his 
 troops, October 7th, 1862, " must be 
 determined and declared by the civil au 
 thorities ; and the Chief Executive, who is 
 charged with the administration of the 
 national affairs, is the proper and only 
 source through which the needs and orders 
 of the Government can be made known to 
 the armies of the nation. Discussions by 
 officers and soldiers concerning public meas 
 ures determined upon and declared by the 
 Government, when once carried beyond 
 temperate and respectful expressions of 
 opinion, tend greatly to impair and destroy 
 the discipline and efficiency of troops, by 
 substituting the spirit of political faction 
 for that firm, steady, and earnest support of 
 the authority of the Government which is 
 
 the highest duty of the American soldier. 
 The remedy for political errors, if any are 
 committed, is to be found only in the 
 action of the people at the polls." 
 
 " In carrying out all measures of public 
 policy," added the General in conclusion, 
 " this army will, of course, be guided by 
 the same rules of mercy and Christianity 
 that have ever controlled their conduct 
 towards the defenceless." 
 
 General McClellan s abstinence from in 
 terference in the civil policy of the Admin 
 istration was not reciprocated by a similar 
 abstinence on the part of the Administra 
 tion from interference in his own military 
 plans. 
 
 On the 1st of October the President vis 
 ited General McClellan at his head-quarters, 
 went through the camps, and went over the 
 battle-fields of South Mountain and Antie- 
 tam. It was upon this occasion that the 
 President shocked the army and the nation 
 by calling upon one of his suite to entertain 
 him with certain comic songs while riding 
 among the fresh graves of the soldiers who 
 had fallen in the terrible battles of Sep-J 
 tember. 
 
 The condition of the army was fully ex 
 plained to the President, who recognized, or 
 seemed to recognize, the absolute impossi 
 bility of moving now upon a new cam 
 paign of invasion in the face of an organized 
 and powerful enemy, and who expressed 
 his renewed and grateful confidence in its 
 commander. 
 
 The army under General McClellan was 
 indeed utterly worn down by the efforts 
 which it had made. The main body was 
 composed of the troops which General Pope 
 had exhausted in his fatal campaign at the 
 end of August. Hastily reorganized by 
 General McClellan in the first week of Sep 
 tember, the army had been marched through 
 the mountains of Maryland to fight the 
 fierce battles of South Mountain and An- 
 tietam. It needed everything that an army 
 can need. 
 
 But the President, returning to Wash 
 ington, caused his General-in-Chief to issue, 
 on the 6th of October, an order directing 
 General McClellan to " cross the Potomac 
 and give battle to the enemy or drive him 
 South." 
 
 The President, the Secretary of War, 
 and General Halleck knew, when this order 
 was issued, that it would not be obeyed, for 
 they knew that it could not be obeyed. 
 Whether they expected by issuing it to 
 drive General McGlellan into a resignation, 
 
62 
 
 or were merely preparing a "record" to 
 which they might afterwards appeal in 
 proof of his "tardiness" and their own 
 "energy" is, perhaps, a question. There can 
 be no question, however, that the order it 
 self was an outrage alike upon common 
 sense and all military propriety. It was 
 followed up, a week later, by another of 
 those astonishing militarjr letters of advice 
 and instruction which President Lincoln 
 seems never to have ceased writing until 
 the success of General Grant in taking 
 Vicksburg, a year afterwards, on a plan 
 which his Excellency had not suggested, in 
 duced him to admit that a general in the 
 field might sometimes understand what he 
 was doing better than a politician in the 
 White House. 
 
 Whether from neglect at Washington, 
 or from an inadequate organiiation of the 
 transportation service, the necessary sup 
 plies came forward to the army so slowly, 
 in such small quantities, and in such poor 
 condition, that the " horses," in one case, as 
 General Meigs testifies, " remained fifty 
 hours on the cars without food or water." 
 
 Before moving upon the enemy, General 
 McClellan was extremely anxious so to 
 guard the line of the Potomac as to put a 
 stop to the possibility of those raids by the 
 Shenandoah which have since inflicted, 
 through three consecutive years, so much 
 shame upon our army, arid so much loss 
 upon the people of the Pennsylvania and 
 Maryland border. The importance of tak 
 ing these precautions was increased in the 
 mind of General McClellan by the fact 
 that Bragg s rebel army was then at liberty 
 to reinforce Lee, and so to enable him to 
 do precisely what he has since done, not 
 once nor twice, but regularly with the recur 
 rence of the harvest season of the Sheiian- 
 doah. 
 
 General McClellan urged this matter upon 
 Greneral Halleck at Washington. The on 
 ly reply which the " General-in-chief " 
 vouchsafed was the information that " no 
 appropriation existed for permanent in- 
 trenchments," and a silly sneer to the ef 
 fect that Bragg was four hundred miles 
 away while Lee was but twenty. 
 
 On the 26th of October the army began 
 to cross the Potomac, and marching on a 
 line east of the Blue llidge, the 7th of 
 November its several corps were massed at 
 and near Warrenton. " The army," says 
 General McClellan, " was in admirable 
 condition and spirits. I doubt whether 
 during the whole period that I had the 
 
 honor to command the Army of the Poto 
 mac it was ever in such excellent condition 
 to fight a great battle." The Confederates, 
 under Longstreet, were directly in front at 
 Culpepper, and the rest of Lee s army lay 
 west of the Blue Ridge. The army and 
 its General alike expected, with confidence 
 arid hope, the issue of a new and near im 
 pending passage-of-arms with their antag 
 onists. 
 
 Delivered from the terror of Lee s pres 
 ence in the North ] reassured for the safety 
 of Washington by the position of McClel-. 
 lan s army, and persuaded that victory 
 must crown its next efforts, the Adminis 
 tration judged the moment come for strik 
 ing down the General whom they hated, as 
 men hate those whom they have injured. 
 
 Late on the night of November 7th, in a 
 storm of wind and rain, General Bucking 
 ham reached the tent of General Mc Clel- 
 lan at Rectortown. He found the com 
 mander surrounded by his staff and by 
 some of the generals of the, army, and 
 handed him a despatch of which he was 
 the bearer. 
 
 Opening .the despatch, and reading it 
 without a change of countenance or of 
 voice, General McClellan passed over to 
 General Burnside a paper which it con-, 
 tainecl, saying, as he did so, " Well, Burn- 
 side, you are to command the army." 
 
 Of General Burnside, let it be said, that 
 no man in the Army of the Potomac has 
 ever more emphatically than himself de 
 nounced the fatal step by which he. was 
 called to take the place of a commander 
 whose superiority he fully recognized ; and 
 whose well-earned hold upon the confidence 
 of his whole army he knew could never be 
 transferred to any other officer by the de 
 spatches of presidents or the order of " gen- 
 erals-in-chief." But of the officials who 
 thrust upon the destined victim of Freder- 
 icksburg this fearful responsibility, and in 
 flicted upon the her.o of Antietam this un 
 paralleled wrong, what can present condem 
 nation say that shall not seem tame in the 
 eyes of future contempt ? 
 
 The order relieving General McClellan 
 instructed him to repair to " Trenton in 
 New Jersey." 
 
 A soldier to the last, he lost no time in 
 obeying this injunction. On Monday, the 
 10th, he rode through the camps, and bade 
 farewell to his tried and trusty men. Ha 
 tred itself has never ventured to question 
 the evidence which the conduct of the army 
 on that day bore to the merit and the char- 
 
63 
 
 acter of its commander ; and the " Fare 
 well at Warrenton " will one day take its 
 place among the noblest subjects be 
 queathed by American history to American 
 art, with the " Adieux of Fontainebleau " 
 in the fasti of France. 
 
 The words of General McClellan s Fare 
 well Order are weighty with manly and 
 mastered emotion. No man can read them 
 and fail to feel that in the heart from which 
 they sprang lies the true secret of that faith 
 in their commander which, in the soldiers 
 of Williamsburg and Fair Oaks, of Games 
 Mill and Malvern, of South Mountain and 
 Antietam, has lived through all their sub 
 sequent experience of war, and defies alike 
 the wasting influence of time and the ma 
 lignity of remorseless and unwearied de 
 traction : 
 
 " Officers and Soldiers of the Army of 
 the Potomac : An order of the President 
 devolves upon Major-General Burnside the 
 command of this army. In parting from 
 ou I cannot express the love and gratitude 
 
 bear you. As an army you have grown 
 up under my care. In you I have never 
 found doubt or coldness. The battles you 
 have fought under my command will 
 proudly live in our nation s history. The 
 glory you have achieved, our mutual perils 
 arid fatigues, the graves of our comrades 
 fallen in battle and disease, the broken 
 forms of those whom wounds and sickness 
 have disabled, the strange associations 
 which can exist among men, unite us still 
 by an indissoluble tie. 
 
 " We shall ever be comrades in support 
 ing the Constitution of our country, and the 
 nationality of its people. 
 
 " GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, 
 
 "Major- Gen. U. S. Army." 
 
 i 
 
 Two years have passed since these brave 
 and touching words were addressed by 
 George Brinton McClellan to the Army of 
 the Potomac. Keviled, calumniated, per 
 secuted with an ever-increasing malignity 
 during theye two years ; every act of his 
 life sifted for a matter of accusation against 
 him; every conspicuous officer of his old 
 army who could be proved to be loyal to his 
 merits, made the partaker of his disgrace, 
 George Brinton McClellan has calmly 
 waited in silence for the certain victorious 
 vindication which time and the justice 
 of the popular heart reserve for honor, 
 forbearance, and fortitude in the long 
 duel with power and calumny and corrup 
 tion. 
 
 No word has he uttered, no line has 
 he written during this long ordeal of 
 patience, which fits not with the temper of 
 all that he had said and written while wear 
 ing the triple stars and marshalling his 
 great army for battle. From the dignified 
 consistency of his civil record he speaks 
 to-day to every American citizen as from 
 the untarnished honor of his military 
 career he speaks to every American 
 soldier : " WE SHALL BE COMRADES IN 
 
 SUPPORTING THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR 
 COUNTRY AND THE NATIONALITY OF ITS 
 PEOPLE." 
 
 With these words a deposed general, 
 whom a faction in power sought in vain to 
 disgrace, bade farewell to the grand army 
 of the Union on the 7th of November, 
 18G2. With these words a President elect, 
 whom the nation has determined to honor, 
 will greet the people of the Union regen 
 erated and disenthralled, on the 7th of 
 November, 1864 ! 
 
WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS. 
 
 MOTTOES FOB THE CAMPAIGN, SELECTED FROM GENERAL 
 
 McCLELLAN S WRITINGS. 
 
 \ 
 
 The true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and 
 upholding the laws of the general government. Instructions to General -Burn- 
 side, January 7, 1862. 
 
 We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of 
 our national government, and to restore to the nation tne blessings of peace and 
 good order. Instructions to General Ilalleck, November 11, 1861. 
 
 You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are 
 fighting ; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full 
 authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. Instruc 
 tions to General JBuell, November 7, 1861. 
 
 We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore, the authority of the 
 government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. Instructions 
 to General Buell, November 7, 1861. 
 
 Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the 
 breach existing between us and the rebels. Instructions to General lyuell, 
 November 12, 1861. 
 
 I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious 
 arrrests on mere suspicion. Instructions to General Buell, November 12, 1861. 
 
 Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. Instructions to General 
 Burnside, January 7,. 1862. 
 
 The uiiity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me 
 that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing 
 my duty to my country. Letter to Secretary Cameron, October, 1861. 
 
 Whatever the determination of the Government may be, I will do the best I can 
 with the Army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task 
 imposed upon me. Letter to Secretary Cameron, October, 1861. 
 
 Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial or 
 ganization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a 
 moment. Letter to President Lincoln, July 7, 1862. 
 
 In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be 
 strictly protected, subject to the necessity of miltary operations. Letter to the 
 President, July 7, 1862. 
 
 Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities 
 exist; and oaths, not. required by enactments constitutionally made, should be 
 neither demanded nor received. Letter to the President, July!, 1862. 
 
 A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate 
 our^rcsent armies. Letter to the President, July 7, 1862. 
 
 If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own 
 army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. Des 
 patch to General Ilalleclt, August 30, 1862. 
 
 In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to 
 professional soldiers. General McClellaris Report. 
 
 By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring 
 about a permanent restoration of the Union a re-union by which the rights ot 
 both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self- 
 respect, while they respect each other/ General Me Clell arts Report. 
 
 I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a vic 
 tory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. Gen 
 eral McClelland Report. 
 
 At such a time as this, and in such a strn.jrgle, political partisanship should be 
 merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the 
 whole country. General McClellarfs West Point Oration. 
 
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