ft n n 
 
 REESE LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 fy, *& 
 
 Deceived sftf/yis T^T"- 
 
 P 
 Accession No. ^X5//6 . Class No. 
 
American 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 
 
.Imrnc.in Statesmen 
 
 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 BY 
 
 ALBERT BUSHNELL HART 
 
 CALIFOftf 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 
 re??, Cambribfle 
 
 1899 
 

 Copyright, 1899, 
 BY ALBERT BUSHNELL HART. 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 
 7*7/6 
 
TO 
 
 ALBERT GAILLARD HART 
 
 ABOLITIONIST 
 
 UNDERGROUND-RAILROAD CONDUCTOR 
 LIBERTY MAN, UNION SOLDIER 
 
 A SON S GRATITUDE 
 
PREFACE 
 
 THE biographies of most of the American states 
 men of the Civil War have been written by their 
 contemporaries, who could supplement research by 
 their own impressions and recollections. The work 
 of preparing this volume and estimating the char 
 acter and services of Salmon Portland Chase falls 
 to one who never saw him ; but though dependent 
 upon written and printed materials and the remi 
 niscences of others, I may perhaps claim some 
 special interest in him as an exponent of that 
 Western political anti-slavery movement which 
 early stirred my blood through both heredity and 
 training. 
 
 The life of Mr. Chase has already been told in 
 three published biographies. J. T. Trowbridge s 
 "The Ferry Boy and the Financier," although 
 founded on valuable data furnished by Chase him 
 self, is a romantic tale and really intended as a 
 campaign document. E. B. Warden s long and 
 elaborate " Life of Salmon P. Chase " is uncritical 
 and unsatisfactory, and the mass of material which 
 he had at his disposal was used neither with per 
 sonal discrimination nor literary judgment. The 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 third and best biography, by J. W. Schuckers, is 
 written with historical perspective, but lacks the 
 advantage of many valuable documents which have 
 come to light in the twenty-five years following the 
 death of Mr. Chase. 
 
 Perhaps, therefore, there is room for another 
 briefer biography, in which Warden s and Schuck- 
 ers s works may be used as collections of material, 
 partly accessible in no other form, but of which the 
 chief sources shall be three collections of manu 
 scripts. The first is a file of letters to Chase, about 
 eight thousand in number, running from 1824 to 
 1873, for the use of which I am indebted to the 
 kind permission of Mr. Chase s daughters, Mrs. 
 Kate Chase and Mrs. W. S. Hoyt, and to the cour 
 tesy of Mr. James Ford Rhodes, who recovered 
 them from their place of deposit. The second col 
 lection, which came to me through the late Mr. 
 C. S. Hamlin of Williamsburg, Virginia, includes 
 most of Chase s original diaries, letter-books, and 
 memoranda, together with three autobiographical 
 sketches, written, dictated, or inspired by him at 
 various times. The third set is a considerable body 
 of Mr. Chase s own unpublished letters, kindly lent 
 by many persons, but especially by Major Dwight 
 Bannister of Ottumwa, Iowa, and the late Mr. 
 Edward L. Pierce of Milton, Massachusetts, who 
 also placed at my disposal the letters of Chase to 
 Charles Sumner. 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 Besides this mass of contemporary material, pro 
 fessional, personal, and political, I have freely 
 drawn on the few publications of Chase, on the 
 debates and reports of Congress, and on the works 
 of his fellow statesmen and their biographers. To 
 Mr. Charles E. Ozanne I am much indebted for 
 his patient and discriminating labor in deciphering 
 and analyzing the diaries and letters of Chase. 
 Professor James Bradley Thayer and Professor 
 Charles F. Dunbar have done me the great kind 
 ness to read some of the proofs, and to make some 
 suggestions on the chapters relative to finance and 
 the constitutional decisions. 
 
 It is not the purpose of this volume to give a 
 detailed account of Mr. Chase s private life, nor 
 even to describe fully his long, eventful, and varied 
 public career, but rather to present him as the 
 central figure in three episodes which are of great 
 historic importance, the Western political anti- 
 slavery movement, the financial measures of the 
 Civil War, and the process of judicial reconstruc 
 tion. The biography is therefore intended to be a 
 brief history of these three epochs as seen through 
 the activity of the anti-slavery leader, the financier, 
 and the jurist. 
 
 ALBERT BUSHNELL HART. 
 
 CAMBRIDGE, April 1, 1899. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP. PAGE. 
 
 I. EARLY LIFE 1 
 
 II. THE WESTERN LAWYER 13 
 
 III. ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO . . ... . .28 
 
 IV. THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST .... 54 
 V. THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR . . . .103 
 
 VI. THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR . . . . 149 
 
 VII. THE ELECTION OF 1860 178 
 
 VIII. THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 19^ 
 
 IX. TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS, 1862-63 230 
 
 X. SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 253 
 
 XL NATIONAL BANKS AND THE GOLD QUESTION . 274 
 
 XII. CHASE AND LINCOLN 290 
 
 XIII. THE JUDICIAL PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION . 319 
 
 XIV. THE SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION . . 357 
 XV. FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS . 384 
 
 XVI. THE MAN 415 
 
 INDEX 439 
 

 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 EARLY LIFE 
 
 IN the course of the sixty-five years of his life, 
 from 1808 to 1873, the lot of Salmon Portland 
 Chase was cast in many places. In his boyhood 
 his family lived successively in two towns in New 
 Hampshire, and he went to school and college in 
 three others ; as a lad he lived in Ohio, first in a 
 village and then in a city ; his earliest manhood 
 and much of his senatorial term he spent in Wash 
 ington ; his professional years, in Cincinnati ; his 
 four years service as governor, in Columbus ; and 
 during the last twelve years of his life he had his 
 permanent home in or near Washington. 
 
 Few American public men have had so multi 
 farious an experience, and few illustrate so many 
 types of national character. Chase was endowed 
 with a New England tradition of learning and 
 statesmanship, a Western knowledge of the power 
 of organization, and a national insight into the 
 meaning of the American system of government. 
 His abilities, courage, and good fortune gave him 
 
2 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 many opportunities to show his powers : as leader 
 of the political abolitionists of Ohio from 1841 to 
 1849, as Ohio senator from 1849 to 1855, as gov 
 ernor of Ohio from 1856 to 1860, as secretary of 
 the treasury from 1861 to 1864, and as chief justice 
 of the United States from 1864 to 1873, he moved 
 in the midst of great events, which he helped to 
 make and to modify. 
 
 The Chase family was of the purest American 
 stock. In 1660 Aquila Chase, an Englishman, 
 came to Newbury, Massachusetts, and there built 
 and commanded a ship. He left a son Moses, 
 from whom sprang Daniel; and from Daniel, 
 Samuel, who married Mary Dudley. Their son 
 Dudley emigrated in 1763 from Sutton, Massa 
 chusetts, with his wife, Alice Corbett, and seven 
 children, to the wilds of the upper Connecticut, 
 and helped to found the new town of Cornish, 
 named by the Chases for the English town or 
 county from which their ancestors sprang. From 
 the loins of Dudley sprang nine stout sons, of 
 whom Ithamar, born in 1763, married Janet Rals 
 ton, daughter of a Scotch settler of Keene, and on 
 January 13, 1808, became the father of Salmon 
 Portland Chase. 
 
 Few families have given to their communities 
 such a proportion of energetic leaders. Chase s 
 father, Ithamar, was a man of substance, a farmer 
 and small manufacturer, for years a stout Feder 
 alist and member of the governor s council. The 
 most noted of the kindred were uncle Dudley, twice 
 
EARLY LIFE 3 
 
 a United States senator, and uncle Philander, one 
 of the most striking figures in the development of 
 the West. The boy, Salmon, was heir to a noble 
 tradition of learning, of public spirit, and of use 
 fulness. Chase s birthplace, in what one of his 
 friends once called " hill-ridden New Hampshire," 
 lies in the last roll of the mountain billows which 
 sweep from Monadnock and Kearsage down west 
 ward to the fertile river bottoms of the Connecti 
 cut. From these hill and valley towns have sprung 
 numerous rugged men of affairs, who have made 
 their fortunes in other States; and near by was 
 Dartmouth College, nursery of many great men, 
 and among them of Daniel Webster, with whom 
 Chase once touched elbows for a few weeks in the 
 Senate. 
 
 About 1816 his father removed to Keene, New 
 Hampshire ; but when the boy was nine years old 
 the father died, leaving to his widow a slender pro 
 perty and ten children, the oldest of whom was a 
 son of twenty-five years. The boy s education had 
 already begun in 1816 : a dame school ; a district 
 school in Keene ; a better school in Windsor, Ver 
 mont, where he began Latin, a language which he 
 always liked to quote ; a tutor in Keene, with whom 
 he began Greek, under such training passed the 
 years till 1820. At this time an influence came in 
 which probably determined Chase s career : Uncle 
 Philander appeared as the good genius of the fam 
 ily and took the boy out to his Ohio frontier bish 
 opric " in partibus." Later generations know a 
 
4 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 great deal about the ruder side of the religious 
 development of the West, about camp-meetings 
 and Peter Cartwright ; they do not remember the 
 gentle, more refined, yet upbuilding work of Bishop 
 Chase and his coadjutors. He was poor as Jean 
 Valjean s bishop, so that he almost envied a friend 
 his " good fat living of $1000 a year as clerk in the 
 Navy Department ; " he had an official ecclesiasti 
 cal income which did not pay his postage ; yet he 
 was a man who knew how to unite the secular with 
 the religious, to carry on farms and mills side by 
 side with his school and his churches. 
 
 In the bishop s school at Worthington, near 
 Columbus, the boy simultaneously did farm work 
 and studied Greek. Two years passed in monoto 
 nous life, for which the boy had no love. In 1822 
 Bishop Chase was appointed president of Cincin 
 nati College. Evidently the requirements of Cin 
 cinnati College were not exacting, for the fifteen- 
 year-old lad quickly became a sophomore. The 
 bishop s new activity, however, gave him so little 
 satisfaction that he resigned at the end of a year, 
 and young Chase returned to his New England 
 home in Keene. He never expressed any enthusi 
 asm over his boyhood experience in the West, and 
 the only important direct effect from it that can be 
 traced is that it probably led him later to settle in 
 Ohio. 
 
 On his return to New Hampshire, at sixteen 
 years of age, the boy forthwith became a man, for 
 he began to support himself, at least in part. One 
 
EARLY LIFE 5 
 
 of many children, and much away from home, Chase 
 felt his mother s influence less than most boys ; 
 but her shrewd and affectionate character is re 
 vealed in some letters of the period written to him. 
 She struggled hard to get her children started in 
 life, and in 1824 put Salmon into Dartmouth Col 
 lege. Entering as junior, he taught in country 
 schools during the long winter vacations, and in 
 1826 he was graduated. 
 
 Dartmouth College was a wholesome school, in 
 which young men studied a little classics, mathe 
 matics, and belles-lettres, and got good from each 
 other and from the characters of their instructors. 
 A fellow collegian of Chase said of it in 1826 : 
 " We meddled little with the history, government, 
 or politics of our country : I think not enough to 
 prepare us for the active side of life." Certainly 
 none of Chase s college teachers seem to have im 
 pressed him, and of President Tyler there is not a 
 mention in his reminiscences. Chase was only a 
 moderate student and took no high rank in college. 
 Of his private reading, the " Mysteries of Udolpho " 
 was all that stood in his memory in after life. On 
 the whole, his intellectual advantages were unusual 
 for that time, and in the end he got an excellent 
 education, though it came chiefly from men and 
 books after he had left college ; at least, throughout 
 his life he had the enjoyment of academic brother 
 hood with men everywhere who had been stamped 
 with the same collegiate training as his own. 
 
 The next step in his life was of especial conse- 
 
6 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 quence, for it was to make a cultivated man of the 
 world out of the country boy. When he graduated 
 he had already made up his mind to study law ; 
 but he could no longer accept his mother s sacri 
 fices, and the readiest way to earn his living for the 
 time was to teach school. Uncle Philander, like a 
 genius of the lamp, appeared at the right moment 
 to give him guidance and letters of introduction ; 
 and Chase went to Washington. There he had no 
 better resource than to announce " a select classical 
 school," for which but one pupil was entered. In 
 discouragement he applied to his uncle, Senator 
 Dudley Chase, to get him a government clerkship, 
 and received a warning never to enter government 
 service, with the offer of "fifty cents to buy a 
 spade." The good bishop s letters were more ser 
 viceable, however, for through his influence Chase 
 became the proprietor of an established boys school, 
 and for three years he was a schoolmaster. 
 
 By this time some of the habits of Chase s life 
 were forming: fondness for good company; love 
 of reading; a habit of letter-writing; interest in 
 affairs; a share in the financial burdens of his 
 family ; acquaintance with public men ; and the 
 keeping of a diary. He even spoke to some friends 
 of "a wonderful vision of meeting in the halls 
 of legislation." Chase s later life was distinctly 
 serious, for he was then absorbed in the moral side 
 of existence, and in the hard, practical work of so 
 cial and political organization. These three years 
 in Washington, however, have an altogether differ- 
 
EARLY LIFE 7 
 
 ent tone ; the young man s writings are light and 
 almost frivolous. Perhaps the episode of Parisian 
 gayety in a Puritan life was chiefly due to the 
 family of Chase s patron, nominal preceptor, and 
 friend, William Wirt of Virginia, attorney-general 
 of the United States. In Wirt s family were sev 
 eral lively daughters, whose Southern archness and 
 banter were very agreeable to the young Yankee. 
 In praise of two of them he published a poem, 
 which was no worse than the stock material of the 
 annuals of the day, and closed with fashionable 
 gloom : 
 
 " Even so 
 
 I thought, and with the thought a heavy sigh 
 Came from my inmost heart must fade away 
 All that the earth of the beautiful inherits, 
 And so must these bright creatures pass from earth." 
 
 In the warmth of this delightful family, this 
 "pure and gentle and refined and cultivated cir 
 cle," the young man basked, and it was a keen 
 disappointment to him when they left Washington 
 in 1829, at the end of Wirt s term of office. All his 
 life long he remembered Mr. Wirt, " one of the 
 handsomest men and one of the completest gentle 
 men .of his time ; " and in the furious debates of 
 1854 in the Senate, Chase paid him a tribute as a 
 type of the lovable slaveholder. 
 
 Through the Wirts, his uncle Dudley, and Henry 
 Clay, Chase entered into the pleasant society of the 
 national capital. The town was still raw, ugly, 
 and unclean ; but it was a period of much refined 
 
8 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 hospitality, and he was welcomed by members of 
 the cabinet and at presidential levees. Thus he 
 went to Secretary Porter s, where, as he notes, 
 Daniel Webster tossed off a full glass of whiskey, 
 supposing it to be wine ; and he was invited to 
 " the scene of ceremonious frivolity at Mr. Clay s." 
 The picture of Washington society thus drawn in 
 a contemporary diary is on the whole pleasing, and 
 makes one wish that Mrs. Trollope could have had 
 access to the Wirt household. 
 
 Chase s record of the political conditions of the 
 time is interesting, and especially important be 
 cause it covers the transition period from Adams 
 to Jackson, as seen by the young schoolmaster. 
 An early entry in his diary, under the date of 
 January 28, 1829, is as follows : 
 
 " As Mr. Adams was soon to go out of office, his 
 last Drawing-room was numerously attended. . . . 
 The whole avenue to the palace-door was filled with 
 carriages of those who had arrived before us, and 
 we had only the meagre satisfaction of not being 
 the last of the train. Nearly fifteen minutes 
 elapsed before we were able to reach the door. 
 At length we were set at liberty and entered the 
 house. An immense crowd was present. Three 
 rooms were full of guests. Music was heard in the 
 great, and yet unfurnished, East-Room, inviting the 
 dancers to engage in the cotillion. Many accepted 
 the invitation, and soon many light feet were trip 
 ping over the floor. At ten o clock, the dance 
 broke off, and the supper room was thrown open. 
 
EARLY LIFE 9 
 
 Long tables were spread in a spacious apartment, 
 covered with everything that could please the eye or 
 gratify the taste. They were soon surrounded by 
 a crowd by no means reluctant to disburden them 
 of their load. As each company was satisfied and 
 departed, others filled the vacant places, and the 
 banquet did not end until after eleven o clock. 
 Then the dance was resumed for a little while, 
 until, one by one, the gay group diminished, 
 when the music played Home, Sweet Home, as 
 a finale, and the pleasures of the evening were 
 ended." 
 
 It was the fortune of the young observer, who 
 was of course an Adams man, to see the first recep 
 tion of another President, and to be shocked at the 
 uproar in the White House after the inauguration 
 of Jackson. A few weeks later he notes that a 
 " more savage spirit breathes in the administration, 
 and as a natural consequence distrust has come in 
 place of confidence." Of Jackson himself Chase 
 wrote, " In his manners, he is graceful and agree 
 able, and much excels his predecessor in the art of 
 winning golden opinions from all sorts of men." 
 Van Buren, whom Chase was ardently to support 
 for President in 1848, seemed to him, in 1829, 
 " cold, selfish, base, and faithless. May he never," 
 he exclaims, " reach the golden reward to which he 
 so vehemently aspires." Chase notes the universal 
 belief that Van Buren was really responsible for 
 the policy of removals from office ; and he relates 
 that one of his own acquaintance was informed by 
 
10 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Jackson that the President could not conscien 
 tiously remove an incumbent in order to make a 
 place for the applicant. 
 
 Chase s opinion of several other public men de 
 serves record. He thought it strange that John 
 Randolph was "allowed to exercise his fantastic 
 humors in the House without check and almost 
 without rebuke an aristocrat at heart, and disor 
 dered in intellect, the scorn of the wise ; the laugh 
 ing-stock of the gay, and the abhorrence of the 
 good." Calhoun was " an unfortunate politician, 
 yet a very good man. Few men in our party are 
 gifted with more splendid abilities all that he 
 does and utters and imagines is marked by his 
 grand, characteristic, impetuous energy." When 
 he heard Webster for the first time, in an argu 
 ment before the Supreme Court, he observed : 
 " He states his case with great clearness, and 
 draws his inferences with exceeding sagacity. His 
 language is rich and copious ; his manner dignified 
 and impressive ; his voice deep and sonorous ; and 
 his sentiments high and often sublime. He argues 
 generally from general principles, seldom descend 
 ing into minute analysis where intricacy is apt to 
 embarrass and analogy to mislead. He is remark 
 able for strength rather than dexterity, and would 
 easier rend an oak than untie a knot. If I could 
 carry my faith in the possibility of all things to 
 labor, so far as to suppose that any degree of 
 industry would enable me to reach his height, how 
 day and night should testify of my toils ! " 
 
EARLY LIFE 11 
 
 While thus interested in political events and 
 public men, young Chase was learning his own 
 tastes and was taking in the social world about 
 him. He listened to concerts and felt sure that he 
 understood why he enjoyed them. Tie hobnobbed 
 with artists. He visited the first completed two 
 miles of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and 
 mused on the new system, which " removes the 
 Alleghanies," and "makes Cincinnati and Balti 
 more neighboring cities." Sometimes he indulged 
 also in the natural dreams of a gifted youth. 
 " Knowledge may yet be gained," he writes, "and 
 golden reputation. I may yet enjoy the conscious 
 ness of having lived not in vain. Future scenes of 
 triumph may be mine." 
 
 Already the road to distinction had been chosen, 
 for in 1827 he began to study law, ostensibly as a 
 student of William Wirt, but really as a neglect 
 ful private reader. Neither his diary nor his later 
 reminiscences conceal the fact that his law studies 
 were scanty, and that his preceptor Wirt had asked 
 him only one question in the two years of their 
 relation. Indeed, Chase frankly admits that " very 
 seldom had any candidate for admission to the bar 
 presented himself with -a slenderer stock of learn 
 ing ; " and after the ordeal was over he lamented 
 that the cramming process " had given strength to a 
 habit of superficial reading." When he presented 
 himself for admission to the bar, kindly Justice 
 Cranch demurred, either at the weakness of the 
 preparation or at the shortness of the time of 
 
12 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 study ; but he gave way, and thus, on December 
 14, 1829, Chase became a lawyer. 
 
 With his admission to the bar closed the first 
 period of Chase s life. In twenty-two years he had 
 developed a handsome though still awkward per 
 son, an observant mind, a habit of reflection, and 
 a clear though still somewhat artificial style. In 
 this formative period are seen already the founda 
 tions of the strong and versatile character of the 
 later man. He worked hard, if spasmodically ; he 
 read a little ; he showed perseverance, address, and 
 devotion to principle; he held himself well in hand; 
 and his most intimate correspondence shows him 
 to have been upright without priggishness. He 
 had had opportunities of education and culture 
 such as came to few young men of that period ; he 
 had been among men who could impress his char 
 acter. Out of it all he had brought a wholesome 
 sense of his own deficiencies, expressed in somewhat 
 exaggerated self-examination in the closing entry of 
 his diary for 1829. "I am almost twenty-two, and 
 have, as yet, attained but the threshold of know 
 ledge. I have formed few settled opinions, and 
 have examined but few subjects. The night has 
 seldom found me much advanced beyond the sta 
 tion I occupied in the morning, and the end of the 
 year has at length come round and finds me almost 
 in the very spot I was in at its commencement. I 
 have learned little, and have forgotten much, and, 
 really, to conclude of the future from the past, I 
 almost despair of making any figure in the world." 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE WESTERN LAWYER 
 
 ACCORDING to the statement of Chase himself, 
 the argument which induced Justice Cranch to 
 admit him to the bar was his declaration : " I have 
 made all my arrangements to go to the Western 
 country and practice law." As early as July, 1826, 
 while he was still in college, a friend in Cincinnati 
 wrote, advising him against a place where there 
 were " about sixty lawyers, about thirty ministers, 
 and doctors without number." In February, 1830, 
 Judge Burnet, of Cincinnati, senator from Ohio, 
 rather faintly counseled him to settle in Cincinnati, 
 with the remark : " On the whole it offers to you 
 stronger inducements than any other place in the 
 West." With large expectations and a little money 
 Chase left Washington in March, 1830, to make 
 his fortune in the golden West. 
 
 The choice of Cincinnati as the place for the 
 development of a young and ill-trained lawyer was 
 of course influenced by Chase s Ohio relatives and 
 boyhood experiences, but he sought it chiefly be 
 cause he believed that it offered the largest oppor 
 tunity for brains and ambition. It was no longer 
 a rude frontier town, but the largest city in the 
 
14 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 West, apparently destined to be the metropolis of 
 the Mississippi Valley, on the axis of Eastern and 
 Western commerce, and a terminus for important 
 and growing trade from North to South. The 
 Cumberland road to Wheeling and Zanesville and 
 the road to Pittsburg across southern Pennsylvania 
 were the great Western highways of the time ; and 
 from Pittsburg and Wheeling navigation reached 
 to Cincinnati, St. Louis, St. Paul, and New Or 
 leans. The Northwest was then an undeveloped 
 section, far behind the Ohio River settlements. 
 
 Of all the cities of the West the most individual 
 and the most foreign was Cincinnati. On the con 
 tracted plain above the high-water mark lay the 
 business district ; the rest of the city and suburbs 
 straggled up over the confused hills, everywhere 
 flanked by walls of squared limestone. Among the 
 twenty-five thousand people of Cincinnati in 1830 
 were to be found four different elements, which 
 were slowly and unwillingly combining in a com 
 mon life : the Southerner, the New Englander and 
 Middle State man, the foreigner, and the negro. 
 The Southern element was on the whole the most 
 numerous, for all the lower counties of Ohio, Indi 
 ana, and Illinois had a large number of Southern 
 settlers, and in Cincinnati itself there were many 
 people of distinctly Southern habits of mind. In 
 deed, in many respects Cincinnati was a Southern 
 city on free soil: the Southern buyer gladdened 
 the heart of the merchant ; the Southern traveler 
 and his family took the best rooms in the hotels ; 
 
THE WESTERN LAWYER 15 
 
 and in times of crisis Southern sympathy for slavery 
 was visible in the newspapers. New Englanders 
 were numerous and contended for their familiar 
 standards of education and intellectual life ; but 
 they were not here, as in northern Ohio, the domi 
 nant element. Foreigners had begun to straggle 
 in ; and Cincinnati became an early place of set 
 tlement for Germans, through whom, about 1825, 
 the culture of the grape was introduced. The 
 negro population was only about one fifteenth of 
 the whole, but it was a source of some perplexities, 
 for besides the influx of negroes from other North 
 ern communities, free to shift for themselves, there 
 was an infusion of freed slaves from Kentucky, and 
 even of runaways. 
 
 Commercially Cincinnati was a place of growing 
 importance. The artery which kept the city pro 
 sperous was the Ohio River, which in modern rail 
 way circles is said to be shallow and uncertain, but 
 in 1830 was a natural street, for which pious trav 
 elers thanked the Almighty, even though a voyage 
 from Pittsburg to Cincinnati might take a week. 
 Besides having the direct river trade, Cincinnati 
 was already becoming the centre of a rich coun 
 tryside, and the exchange point for Northern and 
 Southern products. On the north, however, the 
 means of communication were still so poor that 
 even so late as 1839 a traveler leaving Cincinnati 
 on Thursday reported that he arrived at Colum 
 bus, a hundred miles away, on Monday. Canals 
 from Portsmouth to Cleveland and from Cincin- 
 
16 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 nati to Dayton were now almost completed ; but 
 not till the railroad came, in the early fifties, was 
 Cincinnati really united to the shores of Lake Erie. 
 Toward the south, however, it was otherwise. The 
 navigable branches of the Ohio the Kanawha, 
 Licking, Kentucky, Cumberland, and Tennessee 
 gave access to Kentucky and the country farther 
 south ; and Cincinnati was already becoming a 
 favorite supply point for provisions, especially for 
 hog products. There was also some manufactur 
 ing, in cotton, lumber, and machinery, which 
 cheap coal was later to develop. 
 
 The social life of Cincinnati has been much mis 
 represented by Mrs. Trollope s "Domestic Man 
 ners of the Americans." However accurately that 
 author described the life which she saw, the dia 
 ries and letters of Chase, then living in the city, 
 show that there was much which she did not see. 
 To the mind of the cultivated Englishwoman, dirty 
 streets, tobacco chewing, and the coarseness of a 
 frontier town seemed incompatible with refined 
 society ; but such a society there was, and Chase 
 at once found a share in it. In a few months he 
 was the welcome friend of the Burnets and the 
 Longworths, the social leaders in the city. 
 
 The first duty of the newcomer was to establish 
 himself in his profession, and within four years and 
 a half he had taken his place as one of the best 
 and busiest lawyers in Cincinnati. During the 
 first two years, however, progress was very slow. 
 He was admitted to the Ohio bar in June, 1830, 
 
THE WESTERN LAWYER 17 
 
 and in September set up his own office. He after 
 ward said that his first client paid him half a 
 dollar for drawing a deed, and the second client 
 borrowed the half dollar and decamped. 
 
 It is a proof of the strength of Character of the 
 young man that this period of growth into his pro 
 fession is also the period of greatest intellectual 
 progress in his whole life : he read, he reflected, he 
 analyzed, he pondered upon religion, he lectured, 
 he wrote articles, he projected a literary magazine, 
 and he began the only formal publication of his 
 whole career. Chase was throughout his life a 
 great reader, though in a rather haphazard fashion. 
 But to read and reflect was not enough for the 
 active young man ; hence in the fall of 1830 he 
 took a large part in founding the Cincinnati Ly 
 ceum, a system of popular lectures much like that 
 of the modern "Institutes" in the great cities, to 
 which he proposed to add the illustration of sci 
 entific discoveries by simple experiments ; but only 
 that part of the scheme which provided for lectures 
 was carried out. 
 
 Of these lectures, Chase himself delivered four ; 
 and he was thus led directly to his first literary 
 venture, the publication in the " North American 
 Review " of two of his lectures, " The Life and 
 Character of Henry Brougham " (July, 1831), and 
 "Effects of Machinery" (January, 1832). The 
 impulse to this latter article appears in an entry in 
 his diary of March 2, 1831: "Perused an article 
 in the Ed. Rev. on the effects of Machinery and 
 
18 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 accumulation and about 50 pages of the Wealth 
 of Nations and about a dozen pages of Say." The 
 article is a good wholesome statement of the ortho 
 dox doctrine of the real advance resulting from 
 machinery, with a special statement of those Ameri 
 can conditions which take away the force of the 
 argument against factory towns. " Machinery," 
 says Chase, " substitutes bodies of iron with souls 
 of steam to do the work of living men." 
 
 From contributor to editor was a step which 
 Chase longed to take, and in 1832 he was busily 
 writing to his friends in behalf of a scheme for 
 a " Western Quarterly Eeview." The plan was 
 heroic, in a region where there were almost no book 
 sellers, but it was not unexampled. Timothy Flint 
 had for a year or two been issuing his " Western 
 Monthly Review," and James Hall at Vandalia 
 was editing an " Illinois Magazine and Western 
 Souvenir." Some effort was made to consolidate 
 these ventures, but the project lacked support, and 
 the only result seems to have been that Hall gave 
 the name of " Western Monthly Magazine " to his 
 periodical in its later form of 1833-36. 
 
 The only literary careers in the thirties in which 
 a man could make a living in the West were 
 journalism and the writing of law books. For 
 newspaper work Chase had some early inclination, 
 and to some of the local papers he occasionally 
 sent short unsigned articles or editorials. Law 
 books, however, came more directly in the line of 
 his profession ; hence in September, 1832, he 
 
THE WESTERN LAWYER 19 
 
 formed the project of publishing a collection of the 
 laws of Ohio, for the use of lawyers and courts. 
 The state judges took an interest in the plan, and 
 lent him their aid ; and he reprinted in his three 
 volumes all the public acts in the four volumes of 
 "adopted laws" for the Northwest Territory, the 
 four volumes of territorial enactments, and the 
 thirty-one volumes of state laws. He added abun 
 dant notes and references, and his " Laws " at once 
 became the standard edition. Unfortunately, the 
 legislature would buy only a hundred and fifty 
 copies, and Chase s rewards were probably not over 
 a thousand dollars for his immense labor ; but the 
 work at once gave him a solid reputation through 
 out the West. Chancellor Kent and Justice Story, 
 in personal letters of much warmth, testified to its 
 value and its learning. 
 
 From the beginning it had been Chase s intention 
 to prefix to the " Laws " a brief historical sketch 
 of Ohio, and the resulting forty pages remain one 
 of the best accounts of the early constitutional 
 history of the Northwest Territory and of the com 
 monwealth of Ohio. The historical matter is 
 sound ; there are references to some sources, and a 
 successful effort to choose the really interesting and 
 significant events. The Ordinance of 1787 had 
 already been the subject of a long disquisition in 
 Chase s diary, in July, 1831, and his careful dis 
 cussion of it in his historical sketch did much to 
 call attention to its historical importance. The 
 history is a plain, straightforward story, with little 
 
20 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 comment, for the editor avoided political and con 
 troversial questions ; hence the book gives little 
 v indication of Chase s opinions. One of the few 
 subjects on which the future governor of Ohio 
 takes ground, however, is the administration of St. 
 Clair in the Northwest, which afforded him oppor 
 tunity for expressing his satisfaction that " the veto 
 power, that anomaly in republican government, is 
 not recognized by the Constitution of the State of 
 Ohio." As a whole, the history shows Chase full 
 of the spirit of historical investigation, and pos 
 sessed of an unusual power of statement. He had 
 the qualities of a good historian, truth, patience, 
 accuracy, impartiality, discernment, an interesting 
 method, and a readable style. 
 
 Soon after the publication of the Ohio statutes, 
 Chase married. The frank diary of a susceptible 
 young man of twenty-two is certain to record much 
 to vex the same man at forty and to amuse him at 
 sixty. Chase was fond of the ladies, and liked to 
 call on them and to tell his diary what he thought 
 of them. A frequently recurring name is that of 
 Catherine Jane Garniss, a young lady about three 
 years Chase s junior. After a leisurely courtship 
 they were married, March 4, 1834 ; on December 1, 
 1835, she died, leaving him a little girl, who lived 
 only four years longer. To the very end of his life 
 the statesman recalled with tenderness this wife of 
 his youth, who seemed so well suited to be his help 
 meet. The desolation of the young father inten 
 sified a strong religious feeling, to which he gave 
 
THE WESTERN LAWYER 21 
 
 frequent expression in public and in his diary : the 
 Puritan habit of withdrawal and meditation awoke 
 in him ; he constantly reviewed his own life, up 
 braided his few failings, and set himself forward 
 in a new effort. Sincerity and uprightness speak 
 out from the anguish of these months. 
 
 Four years later, September 26, 1839, Chase 
 married his second wife, Eliza Ann Smith, of Cin 
 cinnati, then a girl of eighteen. Of the three chil 
 dren whom she bore to him, his daughter Kate 
 (later Mrs. Sprague) was the only one who lived ; 
 and Mrs. Chase was taken from him September 
 29, 1845. She was a refined woman, who had 
 much influence in moderating in her husband a 
 tendency to harshness and aggressiveness ; but it 
 is evident that she had little connection with the 
 exciting professional and political career in which 
 Chase was busied during their whole married life. 
 
 A third marriage took place November 6, 1846, 
 with Sarah Bella Dunlop Ludlow. This connec 
 tion was in many respects different from the others. 
 In the first place, Miss Ludlow belonged to one of 
 the best-known families in Cincinnati, her grand 
 father, Israel Ludlow, having been one of the 
 founders of the city ; by the marriage of his wife s 
 sister to Randall Hunt, of New Orleans, Chase 
 gained a useful insight into Southern conditions ; 
 and his wife brought some property with her. Mrs. 
 Chase was a woman of much dignity and force of 
 character, showing a beautiful tenderness toward 
 her husband, and sharing in his public life, though 
 
22 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 much of the time too ill to go about with him. She 
 also brought him into close relations with her own 
 anti-slavery family, and especially with her uncle 
 by marriage, John McLean, later an associate jus 
 tice of the United States Supreme Court. Two 
 children were born to them, of whom the only one 
 that lived was Jeanette Ralston (later Mrs. Hoyt). 
 On June 13, 1852, Chase was again bereft of his 
 wife, having thus in seventeen years stood at the 
 biers of three wives and five children ; thencefor 
 ward he lived a widower to the end. 
 
 While the sorrows of life thus descended upon 
 Chase, his professional reputation steadily in 
 creased. In April, 1832, he was received into part 
 nership on equal terms by General Edward King, 
 and Timothy Walker, afterward author of the well- 
 known " American Law." Seven months later 
 Chase entered into a partnership with D. J. Cas- 
 well, the importance of which lay in the fact that 
 Caswell was solicitor for the Cincinnati agency of 
 the Bank of the United States, and divided this 
 valuable employment with Chase. In July, 1834, 
 he withdrew from Caswell, retaining the business 
 of the Bank of the United States on his own ac 
 count ; and in November he was made the solicitor 
 of the Lafayette Bank. These important trusts 
 gave him so lucrative a practice that his literary 
 pursuits were gradually thrust into the background, 
 and finally ceased. 
 
 The estimates of Chase as a lawyer differ widely : 
 to enthusiastic anti-slavery men he was a great 
 
THE WESTERN LAWYER 23 
 
 lawyer because he made out so plausible a con 
 stitutional argument on their side ; to the practi 
 tioner he seemed a very able and effective attorney, 
 but by no means at the head of the Ohio bar. He 
 prepared his cases with great care, sometimes mak 
 ing briefs on both his own and his opponent s side. 
 Once in court, he made an impression by the force 
 of his clear statement, but not by any impassioned 
 appeal ; in fact, he is said to have broken down on 
 his first important argument ; and he never had 
 the art of winning over a reluctant jury. His 
 learning was not great in this period of his life, 
 and he depended on luminous principles rather 
 than on authorities. As one of his friends puts it, 
 " Chase was not a great lawyer, but a great man 
 who had a knowledge of law." 
 
 To carry on his multifarious practice, Chase 
 early felt the need of a partner who should take 
 office work and detail. He first associated himself 
 with Samuel Eels, in the firm of Chase & Eels ; but 
 in 1838 they separated, and Chase took up Flamen 
 Ball, a man who had failed in business, had then 
 studied law in Chase s office, and was now made 
 a partner. As Chase from this time on was much 
 away from home on legal or political business, Ball 
 took most of the office work, for which he had 
 some talent ; but he was much inferior to Chase 
 in abilities, character, and habits, and at times was 
 very neglectful of the firm s business. In 1848, 
 when Chase went to Washington, Horace Wells 
 was taken into the new firm of Chase, Ball & 
 
24 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Wells ; in February, 1849, George Hoadly was 
 made a partner, under the firm name of Chase, 
 Ball & Hoadly. 
 
 From about 1834, when Chase had gained a repu 
 tation as a lawyer, he always had in his office one or 
 more law students. At that period law schools were 
 few and feeble, and trje approved method of legal 
 education was to go into a lawyer s office, do his 
 drudgery, read his books, and pick up crumbs of 
 his wisdom. To Chase, however, the relation was 
 much more serious than that of "teacher to pupil, 
 or of man of affairs to an unpaid employee : he 
 felt a genuine interest in these able young men, 
 cultivated their friendship, impressed them with 
 his strong personality, and sent them out into the 
 world to be good lawyers, and to be "Chase men." 
 Nothing more plainly speaks the real sanity and 
 strength of Chase s character than the later success 
 of many of these men in law and in public life. 
 Among them were George Pugh, supporter of 
 Chase for the Senate in 1849, and in 1855 his 
 political rival and the successor to his seat ; Stan 
 ley Matthews, Chase s confidential agent in the 
 legislature of 1849, later senator from Ohio and 
 justice of the United States Supreme Court ; Wil 
 liam M. Groesbeck, member of Congress from Ohio 
 in 185759 ; Chase s nephew, Ralston Skinner, an 
 officer in the Civil War ; Edward L. Pierce, of 
 Massachusetts, a strong anti-slavery man, and an 
 official of the Treasury Department under Chase s 
 secretaryship, later the biographer of Charles 
 
THE WESTERN LAWYER 25 
 
 Sumner; James Monroe, an Oberlin abolitionist, 
 later sent as consul to Rio by Chase s influence, and 
 afterward member of Congress ; George Hoadly, 
 judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio, governor of 
 Ohio, and the most eminent lawyer who ever came 
 under Chase s influence ; Jacob D. Cox, lawyer, 
 historian, governor of Ohio, and Secretary of the 
 Interior. 
 
 It was a fine thing to be patron and inciter to 
 such spirits, but there was another side to this 
 relation : with genuine love for his young friends, 
 Chase expected that they would some day recipro 
 cate his kindness, and he felt entitled to lay out 
 for them a political future which would contribute 
 to his own advancement. The testimony of several 
 of them is that they felt a pressure put upon them 
 to subordinate their plans to Chase s judgment; 
 a few of them broke loose from him and event 
 ually turned up on the other side of politics. 
 Pierce wrote to him in 1856 : " I have been in 
 company with prominent men more than the ma 
 jority of young men of my age, but at the same 
 time have looked after my own independence, and 
 avoided the appearance of being any one s para 
 site." Yet, though Chase s old students were some 
 times his opponents, they were never his enemies, 
 and those who are now living still carry for him a 
 feeling of warm, admiring gratitude. Upon his own 
 political fortunes these relations with young men 
 were not altogether happy, for his urgency lost 
 him the cordial aid of some of the strongest of 
 
26 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 these friends, and hence at critical times he was 
 compelled to rest upon weaker men, whose counsel 
 was not always wise or disinterested. 
 
 Chase s legal practice was chiefly commercial ; 
 he did, it is true, assist the State to prosecute the 
 murderer Gedney in 1836 ; but outside of the 
 famous fugitive slave cases it was not his lot to be 
 concerned in any great causes. His argument in 
 the telegraph case of O Reilly v. Morse, in 1853, 
 is said to have persuaded Taney to alter the re 
 ceived doctrines of patent law; but the court after 
 wards returned to its former ground. 
 
 The details of the business of Chase and Ball 
 reveal a curious and interesting commercial system. 
 All lawyers see the seamy side of life, but perhaps 
 few knew so much as they of the intricacies of 
 State banking, of the effects of " wild-cat " bank 
 notes, of the difficulty of realizing on any real- 
 estate collateral, of the devices to shore up the 
 credit of despairing merchants, of the years neces 
 sary to straighten out the affairs of a debt-ridden 
 estate. Few firms have less to fear from an exami 
 nation of their records ; in the recesses of his most 
 intimate correspondence with his partner, Chase 
 appears an upright man, an honest lawyer, and a 
 faithful trustee. In 1841 Chase lost his valuable 
 connection with the estate of the Bank of the United 
 States, because his fees were considered too high, 
 and the flood tide in the affairs of Chase and Ball 
 seems to have been reached in 1845, when the firm s 
 annual income was nearly ten thousand dollars. 
 
THE WESTERN LAWYER 27 
 
 It was perhaps this familiarity with banks and 
 banking which caused Chase himself to become a 
 man of affairs. In December, 1845, he figured 
 out his debts at about eleven thousand dollars, 
 against which he had holdings of undivided real 
 estate, partly his own, partly in trust for his chil 
 dren ; and with his good professional income and 
 his rents he should speedily have cleared up his 
 obligations. Instead, he held to his real estate, 
 dribbling out taxes from year to year, and renew 
 ing his notes as they came due. At the end of 
 twenty years of practice he had probably accumu 
 lated a net property of twenty thousand dollars, 
 but he was still renewing his own paper. Had 
 Chase cared to make corporation law the chief 
 business of his life, he must have become rich, for 
 he had the qualities of a great railroad lawyer and 
 manager ; but he gradually took up two interests 
 which withdrew him from his regular practice, and 
 kept him a comfortably poor man, he threw him 
 self into the unpopular anti-slavery movement, and 
 he went into politics as the Ohio leader of the Lib 
 erty Party. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 
 
 MANY of the States of the Union include two 
 communities of widely different origin, interests, 
 and standards ; but even the upper and lower penin 
 sulas of Michigan are not more diverse now than 
 were northern Ohio and southern Ohio in the two 
 decades from 1830 to 1850. The reason was very 
 simple : the two great arteries of travel from the 
 seacoast to the Northwest were by the Potomac 
 valley and over the highlands of southern Pennsyl 
 vania to the Ohio River, and through the Mohawk 
 valley and highlands of New York to Lake Erie. 
 Over the southern road came settlers from the States 
 of Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, even North Caro 
 lina ; and immigrants through the ports of Balti 
 more, Alexandria, and Norfolk. By the northern 
 route came New Englanders and their allies of cen 
 tral New York. Even the land grants were divided 
 between North and South : to Connecticut fell the 
 strip along the south side of Lake Erie, the so- 
 called " Western Reserve " and " Fire Lands ; " to 
 Virginia were left the Military Bounty Lands in 
 southern-central Ohio. The State was also the 
 shortest bridge between the slave-holding territory 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 29 
 
 of Virginia and Kentucky and the free shores of 
 Canada. The northern counties knew negroes 
 chiefly as panting fugitives; the southern coun 
 ties looked across the river upon a mild form of 
 negro slavery, and themselves had a plentiful sprin 
 kling of freemen of the negro race. The northern 
 counties turned eastward for their markets and 
 their stocks of goods, while southern trade was the 
 support of many communities on the Ohio River. 
 It was inevitable that there should be jealousy and 
 antagonism within the State, and that the rivalry 
 of interests should some day find expression in 
 politics; fortunately there were on the southern 
 border a few men like Chase, who shared in the 
 antagonism to slavery, and who eventually created 
 a common political standpoint for both sections 
 of the State. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that the negro question 
 in Ohio was never extraneous, as it was in Massa 
 chusetts and Vermont. However little one might 
 feel responsibility for slaves in Kentucky, it was 
 impossible to dodge questions of the free-negro 
 population in Ohio ; and the majority of the people 
 in the State liked that element as little as it was 
 liked in the South. In 1830 there were about 
 7500 negroes in Ohio, of whom 2200 were in Cin 
 cinnati, and most of the others in towns. Most of 
 the adults had been born slaves, had bought or 
 received their freedom, and had then come across 
 the borders, hoping to find better opportunity for 
 themselves and their children than in the slave 
 
30 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 States ; but they were at the bottom of the com 
 munities from which they came, and most of them 
 remained in a despised and degraded class in Ohio. 
 
 The general policy of the States on both sides of 
 the river was to prevent such people from changing 
 theif domicile. In 1807 the Ohio legislature passed 
 a stringentr4aw for the registration of the free ne 
 groes, requiring them to give bonds that they would 
 not become a public charge, and subjecting them to 
 exclusion from the State if the security were refused 
 or neglected; at the same time, any person who 
 harbored an unregistered free negro was liable to 
 a large fine. This law remained a dead letter, 
 partly from the difficulty of administration, but 
 chiefly because the community needed hewers of 
 wood and drawers of water and seethers of flesh 
 and fullers of fine linen ; and when it came to the 
 point, Cincinnati, like every Southern community 
 which has ever faced the problem, preferred the 
 free negro to no negro at all. 
 
 Under the constitution of Ohio, negroes were as 
 a matter of course excluded from voting, and by 
 statutes similar to those of all slave-holding, and 
 of some free, States, they were put in a position 
 of painful legal inferiority: thus their testimony 
 could not be received against white persons, even 
 to corroborate white witnesses ; they had no right 
 to public education, even though they paid school 
 taxes ; and where law did not reach, public senti 
 ment came in, to prevent white people from em 
 ploying colored mechanics, to keep the negroes out 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 31 
 
 of the best quarters of the cities, and to prevent 
 any kind of social intercourse. 
 
 The negro population was of various kinds. 
 Many of the negroes had lost, or had never pos 
 sessed, legal proofs of their freedom ; many others 
 knew that they were fugitives, and of these a con 
 siderable number were slowly buying their freedom. 
 Indeed, a theological student is known to have 
 provided for his education from the installments 
 thus paid by a man for his own flesh, and to have 
 charged the poor negro twelve per cent on deferred 
 payments ; and a negro child in a charitable school 
 excused her absence by explaining, " I m staying at 
 home to help buy father." Hence when, in 1829, an 
 attempt was made in Cincinnati to enforce the 
 registration law of 1807, the colored people in ex 
 tremity sent a committee to see whether homes 
 could be found in Canada. But before the emigra 
 tion could be arranged, a mob descended upon 
 them, and there were street fights, in which some 
 of the assailants were killed. Eventually fright 
 drove out 1100 of the 2200 negroes in the city, of 
 whom many went to Canada. The whole incident 
 is a proof that the prejudices against the negro 
 race were as strong on the north bank of the Ohio 
 as on the south, and that the ordinary principles of 
 the right to labor, of movement from place to place, 
 and of legal privileges did not apply to men and 
 women of dark skins. 
 
 Side by side with the manifest distaste of the 
 people of Ohio for free negroes stood the entire 
 
 VE 
 
32 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 willingness of certain inhabitants, black and white, 
 to harbor and aid fugitive slaves. The Ohio River 
 was a barrier easily to be passed by anybody who 
 could paddle a skiff, and on the northern side 
 there had been, ever since 1787, forerunners of 
 what came later to be called the " Underground 
 Railroad." By the Ordinance of 1787, the right 
 of masters to recover their slaves from the North 
 west Territory was affirmed ; by the Constitution, 
 that right was to be continued in every State ad 
 mitted to the Union ; and by the federal statute of 
 1793 the method of search was defined. This 
 statute recognized the right of a master, or of his 
 agent, to lay hands upon his fugitive, found any 
 where in a free State, and proprio motu to drag 
 him back, provided any magistrate held that the 
 person arrested was the escaped slave. It pro 
 vided for no system of testimony, allowed no jury 
 to determine even the question of identity, made 
 no promise that the courts of the slave State should 
 examine questions of disputed freedom, and gave 
 the master the powers of an officer of the law in a 
 State of which he was not a citizen. The statute 
 was anomalous, because the existence of free and 
 slave States in the same Union was an anomaly ; it 
 provided no proper security for the actual rights of 
 free negroes, because those rights were little re 
 spected anywhere ; and it ignored the fact that, 
 while in the South the presumption was that a 
 wandering negro was a slave, in the North the pre 
 sumption in every case was that he was a freeman. 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 33 
 
 From the date of the Act of 1793 it proved 
 useless in the New England States. The first case 
 in Massachusetts, arising in that very year, led to 
 a violent rescue in open court ; and in 1796 Presi 
 dent Washington was informed that he could not 
 safely set the machinery of the law in motion to 
 recover a slave woman from Portsmouth, N. H. 
 In the States bordering on slave-holding regions 
 the law had more force. In Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
 Indiana, and Illinois fugitive-slave cases were com 
 mon, and usually the seizure was unresisted. But 
 many masters lost the trail, or would not go to the 
 trouble and expense of pursuit ; and there were 
 many negroes (like an " Uncle Tom " whom the 
 writer remembers in northern Ohio) who were well 
 known in the whole countryside to be fugitives. 
 The legal question was further complicated by the 
 fact that the Ohio River was part of a direct high 
 way from Virginia and Maryland to the far South, 
 and that negroes in transit were often brought into 
 ports on the Ohio side of the channel ; hence the 
 question might fairly be raised whether such per 
 sons were " fugitives." 
 
 O 
 
 By the operation of the Black Laws, by propin 
 quity to slave-holding territory, and by the object 
 lesson of fugitive slaves, the people of Ohio were 
 compelled to know something of the institution 
 and to take some responsibility for it. Both as a 
 question of morals and as a question of political 
 liberty, the startling contrast between slavery and 
 Christian American civilization inevitably came 
 
34 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 before men s minds, and the result was the anti- 
 slavery agitation, which swiftly developed into an 
 abolition movement. Not only was Ohio a free 
 State, it had never had any other than a free 
 organization. The Ordinance of 1787, secured by 
 Massachusetts men who desired to found a colony 
 on the principles with which they were familiar, but 
 also passed with the assent of every Southern mem 
 ber present, provided that " there shall be neither 
 slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Ter 
 ritory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes 
 whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." 
 This clause did not apply to slaves already in the 
 Territory ; but, fortunately, as yet the only slave 
 holders in the Northwest were a few French settlers 
 and some Southern squatters ; and the slaves held 
 in 1787 gradually died off, so that in 1840 slaves 
 appear for the last time in the census list for 
 Ohio. The state constitution of 1802 repeated 
 the phrase of the Ordinance, with the result that 
 there was, and could be, no state statute authoriz 
 ing any person to restrain another of his liberty 
 on the ground that he was a " slave," unless he had 
 " fled " from " another State " and was " found " 
 in Ohio. 
 
 From 1775 to 1830 the opinion of most thought 
 ful statesmen, North and South, was that slavery 
 was a great evil, which good men ought to dis 
 countenance ; and there was in most States of the 
 Union some kind of organization which opposed 
 slavery, with much the same feeling with which 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 35 
 
 reformers might now oppose child labor. An 
 anti-slavery society, founded at Ripley, Ohio, pro 
 bably before 1810, continued to exist for more 
 than twenty years ; and so late as 1820 national 
 anti-slavery conventions were held, usually in South 
 ern States, and sent out appeals against the sys 
 tem, and memorials to Congress. The feeling on 
 this subject was not very different in Ohio and 
 Kentucky, and freedom of speech in criticism of 
 slavery was about as great in one community as 
 in the other. It was the Missouri Compromise 
 debate of 1820 which roused the country to the 
 fact that insensibly slavery had become so profit 
 able that the South held it an unfriendly act to 
 limit its extension. In that great contest the Ohio 
 delegation in Congress was on the side of freedom 
 for Missouri, but eventually consented to the Com 
 promise. 
 
 Between 1820 and 1830 a change of feeling was 
 visible in the South : instead of keeping to the view 
 of men like Jefferson that slavery was an evil, and 
 eventually must disappear, the trend of opinion was 
 toward the doctrine that slavery was unfortunate, 
 but could not be ended without ruin to the whole 
 community. The next step, consciously taken 
 only after the abolition movement gained headway, 
 was to defend slavery as a good thing in itself. 
 Slowly the idea gained ground in the North that 
 slavery would not die a natural death, and that it 
 behooved the friends of freedom to organize. An 
 apostle of anti-slavery was found in Benjamin 
 
36 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Lundy, who worked in Tennessee and Missouri, 
 organized an anti-slavery society in Ohio in 1817, 
 and in 1821 began to publish his " Genius of Uni 
 versal Emancipation " in that State. Other Ohio 
 societies were founded in southern and southeast 
 ern counties, and the movement for an organized 
 protest never wholly died out. In 1824 the Ohio 
 legislature even passed resolutions in favor of 
 emancipation. 
 
 Except for repeated attempts to get rid of slav 
 ery in the District of Columbia, there was between 
 1820 and 1830 no widespread Northern interest 
 either in the attack on slavery or in its defense. 
 William Lloyd Garrison took upon himself in 
 1831 the task of compelling his countrymen to 
 face the question, and his success not only proved 
 his own tremendous intensity, but also showed 
 that thousands of men all over the country were 
 aroused already and only waited for the kindling 
 spark. Garrisonian abolition, however, always had 
 three disadvantages : its seat was in a common 
 wealth not much affected by actual slavery ; it was 
 conducted almost entirely by men born in free 
 States ; and it abjured political action. Although 
 Garrison made addresses in Ohio, his influence 
 in the anti-slavery movement in the West was 
 not direct, but was exerted through his disciples. 
 Once aroused, the Ohio abolitionists had three 
 powerful advantages : they knew the benumbing 
 effect of slavery in neighboring States ; they might 
 call in the aid of anti-slavery men who had been 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 37 
 
 slaveholders ; and they did not underrate the 
 method of political organization. 
 
 Most accounts of the slavery contest have been 
 written by New England men, to whom the word 
 " abolitionist " has brought up chiefly the figures of 
 Garrison and Wendell Phillips; but instead of 
 " the abolition movement " there were three dif 
 ferent movements, working rarely together, though 
 usually side by side, New England abolition, 
 Middle-State abolition, and Western abolition. 
 The third, or Western, movement was from the be 
 ginning the most effective, because it was brought 
 face to face with the actualities of slavery, and 
 because it used political means to destroy the traces 
 of the accursed system in its own communities. 
 
 From 1831 to 1835 the abolitionists in Ohio, as 
 well as those elsewhere, were learning to forge their 
 weapons for the tremendous task which they had 
 undertaken. The movement would have had no 
 more vitality than the contemporary anti-Masonic 
 episode, but for one of those inherent weaknesses 
 in slavery which were ultimately to set at naught 
 the counsels of the ungodly. Upon the face of 
 things, a man might say in Massachusetts or in 
 Ohio that slavery was wrong, or even that slave 
 holders were criminals, as freely as he might say 
 that judicial torture in China was wrong, or that 
 the serf -owners of Russia were criminals ; and an 
 American citizen had as much right to petition for 
 the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia 
 as for regulation of immigrant vessels. Indeed, the 
 
38 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 spirit and the letter of the laws all over the country 
 allowed peaceable public meetings and criticisms 
 by speakers and newspapers, even though acrid 
 things were said about neighbors in other States. 
 In the case of slavery, however, such attacks were 
 held to destroy the value of property, and what 
 was even more serious they tended to make the 
 slaves discontented ; moreover, it was generally 
 believed in the South that they must lead to slave 
 insurrections. None of these dangers dismayed the 
 abolitionist ; if free speech and slavery could not 
 live in the same federal Union, that fact was to his 
 mind an additional reason for giving up slavery, 
 while to the startled slaveholder it seemed a rea 
 son for abolishing free speech. 
 
 In Ohio there was from 1830 to 1849 a specific 
 objective point for the abolitionists in the repeal of 
 the Black Laws, attainable by action of the legis 
 lature ; but even in that State the main issue for 
 some years was simply the right of a man to ex 
 press his sentiments on a public question under pro 
 tection of the state laws. Two centres of abolition 
 agitation were speedily developed, one in the Con 
 necticut Western Reserve in northern Ohio, and 
 the other in and about Cincinnati. In that city 
 was a group of the most powerful enemies who 
 could be raised up against slavery, sons of South 
 ern slaveholders, or themselves former slavehold 
 ers, who out of their own experience had come to 
 hate slavery and to fight it. Among them were 
 Rev. Samuel Crothers ; Dr. John Rankin, long 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 39 
 
 pastor at Ripley on the Ohio, and agent of the 
 Underground Railroad ; the two Dickeys ; Wal 
 lace ; and the Quaker, Levi Coffin. There was also 
 a group of men born or domiciled in Ohio, who 
 hated slavery on their own responsibility, and early 
 joined forces with the immigrants from the South. 
 What was now needed was agitation, organiza 
 tion, and persecution ; and in 1834, 1835, and 
 1836 southern Ohio saw all these ; and influences 
 were then set at work which eventually drew 
 Chase into the anti-slavery ranks. In 1829, at 
 Walnut Hills, a new suburb of Cincinnati, Lane 
 Seminary was founded, for the training of young 
 men for the Presbyterian ministry. Of the one 
 hundred students, more than half were Southern 
 ers ; but the president was Lyman Beecher of 
 Connecticut ; his son-in-law, Stowe, was associated 
 with him as professor, and one of the instructors 
 was Theodore D. Weld of Massachusetts, who had 
 brought a body of students from Oneida Insti 
 tute, New York. Weld had already come under 
 the influence of Garrison, and had thus become an 
 intense abolitionist. In 1833 the young men of the 
 Seminary began to talk on slavery as a natural 
 topic of discussion, of special interest to the com 
 munities from which they came. In 1834 the two 
 forces joined issue in a debate in the chapel, which 
 lasted eighteen consecutive nights ; a former slave 
 was allowed to give his testimony, and the exciting 
 discussion closed with the decision of some of the 
 Southern students, notably Allan and Thome, that 
 
40 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 they were thenceforth enemies to slavery. "Works 
 went hand in hand with faith ; the students began 
 to start Sunday and day schools for negro children 
 at Cincinnati, and to bring a pressure to bear on 
 religious organizations. 
 
 This dangerous crisis was promptly met by the 
 Trustees. In August, 1834, they voted that there 
 should thenceforth be no discussion of slavery in 
 any public room of the seminary, because it was a 
 " political " subject ; and they dropped John Mor 
 gan, one of the anti-slavery men, who had been 
 principal of the preparatory department. One of 
 the Trustees, Rev. Asa Mahan, at once resigned, 
 but Beecher and Stowe were absent, and hence 
 for the time accepted the situation. Not so the 
 students, of whom fifty-one left the seminary in a 
 body. Where were they to go? James C. Lud- 
 low, whose daughter Chase married in 1846, lent 
 them a building near the city, in which for five 
 months they taught themselves, with the aid of 
 some lectures by Dr. Bailey, who about this time 
 became Chase s intimate friend. Thus the effort 
 to save the seminary from the evil effects of con 
 troversy had led only to disruption. When, the 
 next year, one of these students, Amos Dresser, was 
 found in Kentucky with abolition documents in his 
 possession, he was seized by a mob and brutally 
 whipped ; but this incident only called wider public 
 attention to the troubles of Lane Seminary, and 
 was a stock example of the barbarity of the system 
 of slavery. 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 41 
 
 Meanwhile, in northern Ohio, a place was pre 
 paring for an anti-slavery seminary which might 
 receive the Lane seceders and plant a new aboli 
 tion stronghold. In 1833 it entered the minds of 
 Rev. John J. Shipherd of Elyria, Ohio, twenty- 
 five miles west of Cleveland, and Philo P. Stewart, 
 manufacturer of cooking-stoves, to found in the 
 backwoods of Ohio a Christian commonwealth, 
 with " as perfect a community of interest as 
 though we had a community of property." They 
 deliberately chose a spot remote from other vil 
 lages, in the township of Russia, and there in 
 April, 1833, they set up the first house in Ober- 
 lin, so named from a philanthropic pastor of the 
 Vosges Mountains. In December, 1833, a school 
 was founded with forty-four students, under the 
 name of " Oberlin Collegiate Institute," which, like 
 many academies of the time, undertook to carry 
 pupils " from the infant school up through a colle 
 giate and theological course." 
 
 At the very beginning the founders took a pio 
 neer step in college education by setting forth as 
 a purpose of the institution " the elevation of 
 female character by bringing within the reach of 
 the misjudged and neglected sex all the instruc 
 tive privileges which hitherto unreasonably distin 
 guished the leading sex from theirs." The educa 
 tion of negroes, or even of anti-slavery agitators, 
 was not a part of the original plan ; but Mr. Ship- 
 herd was aroused by the news from Lane Seminary, 
 went to Cincinnati, and reported, in December, 
 
42 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 1834, that they must engage as professors Rev. 
 Asa Mahan, and Morgan, the dismissed instructor ; 
 adding that those men would come to Oberlin 
 only on condition that students should be admitted 
 " irrespective of color." 
 
 There was an uproar in Oberlin, with many 
 threats of withdrawal from the community and the 
 school. There were as yet few, if any, out-and-out 
 abolitionists in the place, and the Trustees at first 
 voted not to take action which would put Oberlin 
 on a different footing from other schools in Ohio. 
 In a second meeting, however, they voted : " That 
 the education of the people of color is a matter of 
 great interest, and should be encouraged and sus 
 tained in the institution." Thereupon Mahan ac 
 cepted the presidency and Morgan a professorship, 
 and with them came thirty of the Lane seceders, 
 including Amos Dresser, while others went to West 
 ern Reserve College. The school rapidly increased, 
 though of two hundred and seventy-seven students 
 in 1835 only one was colored. Theodore D. Weld 
 now came to Oberlin as an abolitionist lecturer and 
 converted the doubters, and from that time to the 
 end of the Civil War, Oberlin was a radiating point 
 for an incessant abolition propaganda. The Lane 
 students and their successors went out as apostles 
 all over the State ; they lectured, they preached, 
 they wrote, they endured persecutions ; they scat 
 tered through the Northwest, and brought up their 
 children to fight the slave power. In Oberlin the 
 colored students became about a sixteenth of the 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 43 
 
 whole number, and the colored population about a 
 fourth ; the place was a junction on the Under 
 ground Railroad, and a meeting-place for radical 
 abolitionists ; and since the Oberlinites never for 
 a moment accepted Garrison s policy of non-inter 
 vention, they voted, and in 1848 their votes re 
 turned the man who came to hold the balance of 
 power in the Ohio senatorial contest, and who cast 
 his deciding ballot for Salmon P. Chase. 
 
 Oberlin was not the only anti-slavery centre of 
 northern Ohio. For some years Elizur Wright 
 and Beriah Green were professors in Western Re 
 serve College at Hudson, the Western Yale, 
 where they poured forth anti-slavery doctrine till 
 they were compelled to resign. The Western Re 
 serve was peopled chiefly by immigrants from 
 Connecticut, a church-going and a reading folk, 
 provided with good schools and able newspapers ; 
 hence the anti-slavery seed there fell upon good 
 soil, and gradually there grew up a constituency 
 massed in one congressional district, in which the 
 anti-slavery men were predominant. From that 
 district of the Western Reserve in 1838 came Gid- 
 dings, the first Western anti-slavery member of 
 the national House of Representatives ; and he 
 was steadily reflected at every opportunity up to 
 1860. 
 
 The Lane Seminary and Oberlin movements 
 came to a head early in 1835, and the next step 
 was to form an organization of the anti-slavery 
 men throughout the State. A state convention of 
 
44 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 more than one hundred delegates was held at 
 Putnam in April, 1835, at which many of the 
 Lane seceders were present, among them Weld, 
 H. B. Stanton (later a life-long friend of Chase), 
 and Horace Bushnell. The main work of the 
 meeting was the foundation of the " Ohio Anti- 
 Slavery Society," to be carried on in organic rela 
 tion with the national society. Most of the few 
 remaining old anti-slavery societies in Ohio affili 
 ated themselves with the new society, and other 
 auxiliaries were organized ; so that at the end of 
 the year there were a hundred and twenty socie 
 ties, with more than ten thousand members. An 
 other fruit of the meeting and the society was an 
 able " Report on the Condition of the People of 
 Color in the State of Ohio," which opened the eyes 
 of the community to the character of the Black 
 Laws. 
 
 No Cincinnati newspaper sympathized with the 
 movement ; hence the next step was to found a 
 distinct abolition journal. At this point appears 
 one of the most interesting figures in the whole 
 Western abolition movement, James G. Birney, a 
 Kentuckian by birth, once a slaveholder, who had 
 by sheer force of his own conscience renounced 
 the system and set free his remaining slaves. Bir 
 ney felt that he understood the difficulties of slav 
 ery better than the Garrisonians did, and he planned 
 an anti-slavery journal which should command re 
 spect by its studied moderation of tone and avoid 
 ance of hard language. Although a Kentucky 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 45 
 
 state society was founded in 1835, he found it im 
 possible to start his paper in that State ; accord 
 ingly he crossed the river, and in 1836 set up the 
 " Philanthropist " at a little town above Cincin 
 nati ; and the new state society afterward agreed 
 to publish it in Cincinnati. 
 
 Precisely the issue was now made which caused 
 the murder of Lovejoy at Alton in 1837, namely, 
 the right to publish in a border town a paper 
 censuring the institutions of the neighbor State ; 
 and substantially the same means were adopted to 
 stop the paper as in Lovejoy s case. Cincinnati 
 had at just that time, July, 1836, a number of 
 Southern visitors, and it profited by Southern 
 trade. Accordingly a public meeting was called to 
 protest against the " Philanthropist." The mayor 
 of the city presided, with various local dignitaries 
 as vice-presidents, and resolutions were passed 
 against the proposed paper. As this action had 
 no effect, on July 12 the printing-office was broken 
 into by a mob and badly damaged. The mayor is 
 sued a proclamation against the rioters, but he 
 directed it also against the persistent abolitionists. 
 Birney s rejoinder was to repair his press for the 
 continuance of his paper. The next step, July 23, 
 was a rousing anti-abolition meeting, which repre 
 hended the violence of the abolitionists, and ap 
 pointed a committee to advise Birney to desist. 
 Judge Burnet, Lawrence (the president of the 
 Lafayette Bank), and other friends of Chase ac 
 cepted membership, and urged upon the executive 
 
46 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 committee of the Ohio society that such a paper 
 was damaging to the city ; not a single local news 
 paper defended the right of free speech or spoke 
 out for its own inestimable privilege of a free 
 press. 
 
 During the years of agitation in Ohio, and of 
 especial excitement in Cincinnati, where was the 
 ardent young New England lawyer, Chase ? The 
 question of slavery had several times come before 
 his mind since he first went to Washington. The 
 status of slavery in the District of Columbia was 
 peculiar. Congress had never legislated directly 
 on the subject, but by the act of 1801 had or 
 dained that existing laws of all kinds were to con 
 tinue in force till altered. Those existing laws in 
 cluded an elaborate slave code, which in the course 
 of years was outgrown by the humanitarian spirit 
 of Maryland, and therefore was modified by state 
 statutes, but remained unamended in the District. 
 Besides a system of Black Laws, like that of Ohio, 
 there were also fierce punishments for slave offenses, 
 such as hanging and quartering ; and stray ne 
 groes taken up and unable to give a good account 
 of themselves might be jailed for inquiry, and 
 then sold for their jail fees. In 1828 humanita 
 rian petitioners had for some years been pressing 
 Congress to prohibit slavery in the District, and 
 Chase was drawn into the agitation in a manner 
 which he describes as follows : " One day a respect 
 able Quaker, a mechanic, I think, called on me with 
 a paper, or some scraps of paper containing the 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 47 
 
 leading ideas for a petition to Congress for the 
 gradual abolition of slavery in the District, and 
 requested me to make out from them the draft 
 of a petition for circulation. I complied cheer 
 fully with his request. The petition was drawn 
 and put in circulation, whether exactly as I drew 
 it or after being modified by other hands I cannot 
 say, and received over a thousand signatures from 
 nearly all the leading men of the District of every 
 station and occupation and was presented to Con 
 gress, I think in 1828." 
 
 Biographers and panegyrists of Chase have 
 attempted to prove by this incident a moral in 
 terest which Chase never claimed for it ; he acted 
 simply as a clerk, and during the next seven years 
 he gave no evidence that in his judgment the slav 
 ery question was vital. In 1829, after reading a 
 speech delivered in the Virginia Constitutional 
 Convention, which asserted that the laborers of the 
 free States were no more intelligent than the slaves, 
 and ought to have no more political privileges, he 
 noted in his diary that such a sentiment was " ut 
 terly abhorrent to many people of equal rights." 
 In 1830, in his article on Henry Brougham, he 
 praises him as " the advocate of human liberty " 
 an d as "the able champion of the injured and 
 downtrodden children of Africa ; " and he even 
 quotes with approval Brougham s appeal to " a law 
 above all the enactments of human codes ; . . . 
 and by that law . . . they shall reject the wild 
 and guilty fantasy that man can hold property in 
 
48 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 man." But Chase does not here put himself for 
 ward as an " advocate of liberty," and in June, 
 1831, he even critically discusses the Ordinance of 
 1787, with no word of praise for its anti-slavery 
 clause. In his "History of Ohio," published in 
 1833, he again considers the Ordinance, but care 
 fully avoids any controversy. 
 
 This is all the positive evidence that Chase had 
 convictions on slavery earlier than 1836. In his 
 diaries, his letter-books, and the many letters sent 
 to him, not a word appears which shows that he had 
 so much as heard of Garrison ; the Lane Seminary 
 episode passes unnoticed ; the convention of 1835, 
 the Oberlin contentions, the new state society, 
 Birney s attempts to found the " Philanthropist," - 
 all these were less important in his eyes than ob 
 taining the use of public school rooms for Sunday- 
 schools, or " brother William s debts." 
 
 Like thousands of other anti-slavery men, like 
 John Quincy Adams, like Wendell Phillips, Chase 
 was aroused not by the wrongs of the slave but by 
 the dangers to free white men. He did not hear 
 the cries at the Covington whipping-post across the 
 river, but he could not mistake the shouts of the 
 mob which destroyed Birney s property and sought 
 his life ; his earliest act as an anti-slavery man was 
 to stand for the every-day right of a fellow resident 
 of Cincinnati to express his mind. An autobio 
 graphical fragment, found among his papers, de 
 scribes his conversion to positive anti-slavery. 
 
 " At this time I had come to regard the Slavery 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 49 
 
 question as among the most important questions of 
 the day ; and I was not long in discovering it to be 
 the most important. I heard with disgust and horror 
 the mob violence directed against the Anti-Slavery 
 Press and Anti-Slavery men of Cincinnati in 1836. 
 My own sister was the wife of one of the most 
 worthy and respectable of these Anti-Slavery men, 
 Dr. Isaac Colby. Through them I had become 
 personally acquainted with most of them, though 
 I did not at this time know Mr. Birney, the Editor 
 of the Paper. I knew them to be as pure, upright, 
 and worthy citizens as Cincinnati contained. Yet 
 against these men and their families the fury of a 
 mob, stirred up by politicians and by emissaries 
 from slave States, was directed. My own sister left 
 her house and took refuge in mine. I was opposed 
 at this time to the views of the abolitionists, but I 
 now recognized the slave power as the great enemy 
 of freedom of speech freedom of the press and 
 freedom of the person. I took an open part against 
 the mob. Of the prominent citizens very few 
 stood decidedly on that side. Charles Hammond, 
 a man who had some faults and many virtues, among 
 which last were true greatness of soul and intense 
 horror of cowardice and meanness, was chief among 
 these few. I drafted and he with others signed a 
 call for a meeting of those opposed to mobs. He 
 and I drafted the resolutions intended to be pre 
 sented in the meeting : but when the hour came 
 arid we repaired to the Court House we found the 
 mob there and a meeting organized. A committee 
 
50 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 was appointed and I was named upon it. In the 
 Committee I read the resolutions we had prepared, 
 but they were voted down, and others reported in 
 their place which, under the circumstances, were 
 justly regarded as approving rather than censuring 
 the mob. Shortly after the meeting adjourned 
 I was for a time in a good deal of personal danger 
 in consequence of a declaration that I would sooner 
 give ten thousand dollars than see the press de 
 stroyed by a mob. But my assailants contented 
 themselves with denunciation, without proceeding to 
 a personal attack. On the night of one of these days 
 a mob gathered around the door of the Franklin 
 House, determined to enter and make search for 
 Mr. Birney. I stood in the doorway, and told them, 
 calmly but resolutely, no one could pass. They 
 paused. One of them asked who I was ? I gave my 
 name. One, who seemed a ringleader, said I should 
 answer for this. I told him I could be found at any 
 time. The mob did not choose to attack me in my 
 position, and after a while, to my great relief, the 
 Mayor, who had been in the House, came out and 
 declared to the mob that Mr. Birney was not there, 
 upon which they drew off. 
 
 " From this time on, although not technically an 
 abolitionist, I became a decided opponent of Sla 
 very and the Slave Power : and if any chose to 
 call me an abolitionist on that account, I was at 
 no trouble to disclaim the name. I differed from 
 Mr. Garrison and others as to the means by which 
 the Slave Power could be best overthrown and 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 51 
 
 Slavery most safely and fitly abolished under our 
 American Constitution ; not in the conviction that 
 these objects were of para*mount importance. 
 
 " In 1837 I first publicly declared my views in 
 respect to Legislation under the Constitution for 
 the Extradition of Fugitives from Service." 
 
 Chase s narrative plainly refers to the second 
 Birney mob, of July 30-31, 1836, in which the office 
 of the " Philanthropist " was sacked, and some negro 
 houses were attacked. General William Birney, 
 in his published life of his father and in personal 
 conference with the writer, declares that Chase, 
 together with his partner Eels, had visited James 
 Birney in the previous year, 1835, and had even 
 examined a title for him ; and that his father by 
 elaborate argument prepared Chase s mind to ac 
 cept anti-slavery doctrine. That Chase had already 
 known Birney is disproved by his own positive re 
 membrance that he had no acquaintance with Birney 
 before the mob. Nevertheless there can be no 
 doubt that Birney s genial personality, conviction, 
 and lucidity of statement, were the strongest, most 
 direct, and most effective influences in bringing 
 Chase to place himself decisively among the few 
 score abolitionists of Cincinnati. That Chase 
 would in the end have taken up the anti-slavery 
 cause is probable ; but from Birney proceeded the 
 spark which kindled Chase s soul. General Wil 
 liam Birney cannot be mistaken in his recollections 
 of the long conferences in his father s library ; 
 Chase was Birney s counsel in the Matilda case in 
 
52 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 1837, and thus publicly associated himself with the 
 reformer ; and a close examination shows that the 
 constitutional argument* with which Chase smote 
 the Amalekites were founded on Birney s theses, 
 thought over in Chase s mind till he gave them 
 his own stamp. Should other evidence be in 
 sufficient, a letter of June 5, 1837, from Birney to 
 Chase, written before Chase had ever made any 
 public profession of anti-slavery, shows how com 
 plete was the understanding between them. Birney 
 writes confidentially, in accordance with a promise 
 made to Chase to inform him of the anti-slavery out 
 look in the East. He tells of a visit to Newport 
 and of Dr. Channing s agreement to join in the agi 
 tation ; of his two hours conversation with John 
 Quincy Adams, who desired the support of the abo 
 litionists in his protest against the annexation of 
 Texas ; and he urges Chase to stir up all the Cincin 
 nati newspapers against that project. It is the 
 cry of one soldier calling to another on the battle 
 field. 
 
 The instrument of Chase s conversion to anti- 
 slavery was still not the ultimate cause. There 
 must have been some deeper reason why Chase, just 
 established in a pro-slavery community, should turn 
 his back on his own apparent interests to take up a 
 cause inexpressibly distasteful to most of the refined 
 and educated people there his acquaintances ; 
 and it is still more remarkable that he should 
 have put himself out of relation with both the 
 political cohorts which were about to become 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY IN OHIO 53 
 
 national political parties. The testimony of those 
 who came closest to him is that he took up the anti- 
 slavery cause because he felt it to be a religious 
 duty, because he believed slavery to be a dreadful 
 moral wrong. Ten years later, indeed, he was 
 much concerned at the apathy shown toward slavery 
 by the Episcopal church, of which he was a mem 
 ber ; and all his writings and speeches through 
 out his life are permeated with the prime conviction 
 that slavery can have no legal justification, not 
 only because it is contrary to the laws of nature, 
 but because it offends and outrages the laws of 
 God. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 
 
 WHEN a moral conviction was once established 
 in Chase s mind, it never could be removed ; but 
 he was a man whose convictions grew upon him as 
 time went on, and it was several years before he 
 had worked out in his own mind the argument 
 against slavery which should carry his principles 
 into other minds. Once enlisted in the anti-slavery 
 cause, he gave to it most of the twenty-four years 
 of his life from 1837 to 1861. 
 
 Yet Chase never held himself to be an " aboli 
 tionist," but always insisted that he was an " anti- 
 slavery man." In 1834 the Cincinnati " Gazette " 
 said that he was " one of the most distinguished 
 lawyers of the State and . . . not an abolitionist." 
 In 1840 he declined to sign a call to an anti-slavery 
 convention. In 1843 he " discussed with Mr. H. 
 the principles of Liberty men as distinguished from 
 abolitionists." In 1851 he said in the Senate : 
 " I am aware there are some abolitionists or anti- 
 slavery men who regard the Constitution as at war 
 with moral obligations and the supreme law. I 
 am not of them." His last speech on the Kansas- 
 Nebraska Bill, in 1854, and his public utterances 
 in 1855, indignantly disavowed any sympathy with 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 55 
 
 the disunion sentiments of Garrison, a compliment 
 which the " Liberator " and Edmund Quincy repaid 
 in 1859, when they called him a " political huck 
 ster, who hopes to carry his principles to the presi 
 dential market." Gideon Welles, Chase s colleague 
 in Lincoln s cabinet, says that Chase was sensitive 
 at being considered a political abolitionist ; and in 
 a letter of 1863 Chase himself says of his attitude : 
 " I never was an abolitionist of that school which 
 taught that there could never be a human duty 
 superior to that of the instant and unconditional 
 abolition of slavery." 
 
 The distinction which Chase made had a logical 
 ground and much political importance, so far as it 
 related to that Garrisonian abolition which then as 
 now was too often accepted as the type of abolition 
 in general. It was a distinction perfectly clear-cut 
 in the East, where John Quincy Adams always re 
 fused to be called an abolitionist, though for years 
 the national champion against the slave power. If 
 Garrison and Wendell Phillips were the typical 
 genuine abolitionists, Chase was never an aboli 
 tionist: Garrison was for an aggressive warfare on 
 slavery in the slave States ; Chase was for warfare 
 everywhere except in the slave States: Garrison 
 kept himself and his followers out of politics ; 
 Chase was the great organizer of political anti- 
 slavery : Garrison was for disunion so as to get 
 relief from responsibility for slavery ; Chase was 
 for making the Union free so as to destroy the dis 
 ease altogether. 
 
66 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 On the great question of the immediate purpose 
 of the abolition movement Chase was also at odds 
 with the Garrisonians ; and he thus expressed his 
 dissent in a letter to Theodore Parker, in 1856 : 
 " I adopt your motto very cheerfully and heartily, 
 No slavery anywhere in America. No slavery 
 anywhere on earth ! The latter is, you say, the 
 4 topmost idea. The first, then, is not topmost. 
 My sentence, No slavery outside of the slave 
 States, also is not topmost. But it is, to an 
 earnest man, anxious to get to the top, quite as 
 important. It is fundamental. The general gov 
 ernment has power to prohibit slavery everywhere 
 outside of slave States. A great majority of the 
 people now accept this idea. Comparatively few 
 adopt the suggestion that Congress can legislate 
 abolition within slave States. ... I say, then, 
 take the conceded proposition and make it practi 
 cal. Make it a living, active reality. Then you 
 have taken a great step. Slavery is denationalized." 
 
 With the Ohio abolitionists, however, Chase 
 sympathized and consorted ; for they had a very 
 practical knowledge of what slavery was, frequent 
 occasion to exercise their abolition principles in aid 
 of fugitives, and, above all, the robust intention of 
 making their principles felt through the ballot-box. 
 The Western abolitionists dealt less in invective 
 than did their Eastern brethren, and more in ex 
 postulation, both because so many of them had 
 been born on slave soil, and hence could appeal as 
 repentant brothers to Southerners still out of a 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 57 
 
 state of grace, and also because they knew better 
 than did the New England agitators the real hope 
 lessness of getting the South to act against its ap 
 parent economic interest. The Western men knew 
 what they wanted as well as their Eastern friends, 
 and seemed to know better how to get it : in their 
 aims they were abolitionists like Charles Sumner ; 
 in their methods they were anti-slavery men like 
 John Quincy Adams. But Joshua K. Giddings, 
 their special representative in Congress, found him 
 self the friend, associate, and ally of both Sumner 
 and Adams ; and in like manner Chase worked 
 with out-and-out abolition leaders, like Birney and 
 Samuel Lewis and Dr. Bailey and Levi Coffin, 
 because they all had in view the same ends ; and at 
 the same time he stirred and organized many moder 
 ate anti-slavery men who never would go into an 
 anti-slavery society, but who were willing to vote 
 in a way to help the friends of liberty. 
 
 However Chase may have deprecated the term 
 " abolitionist," his views on slavery were so ad 
 vanced as to cost him friends and clients in Cin 
 cinnati. Several times he was assailed with stones 
 or more fragile missiles when he spoke in Cincin 
 nati, and in 1855 he was unable to carry Hamilton 
 County in his campaign for the governorship. On 
 the other hand, Chase s activity made him ac 
 quainted throughout the State with men who were 
 later very serviceable to him, and his fugitive-slave 
 arguments soon gave him a national reputation. 
 His was a case where honesty proved the best 
 
58 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 policy, where a man deliberately chose an unpopu 
 lar and unpromising cause, and by his very cour 
 age and willingness to sacrifice his interests was 
 launched upon a more splendid career than he could 
 ever have reached by letting himself go with the 
 current. 
 
 From 1841 Chase was a favorite speaker at anti- 
 slavery meetings and conventions throughout Ohio, 
 as well as in neighboring States, and even in the 
 East. He was neither an orator nor a good stump- 
 speaker ; indeed, a nervous hesitancy so affected 
 his speech that he used to say : " My tongue is 
 too large for my mouth ; " hence he used habitu 
 ally a clear, moderate utterance, which gave him 
 time to shape his ideas as they came. For that 
 reason his speeches were easy to report, and read 
 well. Since he never could use the buffoonery 
 which sets a great crowd in a roar, and which made 
 his neighbor Tom Corwin a favorite speaker, he 
 must appeal to reason, to the moral sense, at least 
 to enlightened self-interest, not to the coarser pas 
 sions. Chase s principal deficiency as a public 
 speaker was his lack of a sense of humor. He 
 could not discharge such a barbed arrow of satire 
 as Wade s famous criticism on the proposed annex 
 ation of Cuba : " It is not a question of giving 
 lands to the landless, but of giving niggers to the 
 niggerless." Yet he was a very effective speaker, 
 always well grounded, prepared to confront objec 
 tions if not too unexpectedly put, calm, cool, dig 
 nified, an impersonation of reason inspired with 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 59 
 
 righteous indignation. He had great endurance, 
 and knew how to make many speeches on the same 
 theme without too much repetition. His favorite 
 topic was the illegality of slavery, but he knew also 
 how to deliver good hearty blows against his politi 
 cal opponents, how to detect and bring home their 
 inconsistencies. 
 
 Chase s forte, however, lay in the preparation of 
 formal addresses and platforms, because there he 
 had more room and more opportunity to marshal 
 his thoughts. Such tasks were often intrusted to 
 
 O 
 
 him by the Liberty and Free-Soil men from 1841 
 to 1848. He wrote the national Liberty Platform 
 of 1843, the stirring Liberty Address of 1845, the 
 resolutions of the People s Convention of 1847, 
 and the Free-Soil Platform of 1848. The " Address 
 of the Southern and Western Liberty Convention," 
 of June 12, 1845, is perhaps the best work that 
 fell from Chase s pen during this period ; a short 
 extract from it will illustrate better than could any 
 criticism his style, principles, and method of at 
 tack. 
 
 " WHAT WE MEAN TO DO. 
 
 " Against this influence, against these infrac 
 tions of the Constitution, against these departures, 
 from the national policy originally adopted, against 
 these violations of the national faith originally 
 pledged, we solemnly protest. Nor do we propose 
 only to protest. We recognize the obligations 
 which rest upon us as descendants of the men 
 of the revolution, as inheritors of the institutions 
 
60 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 which they established, as partakers of the blessings 
 which they so dearly purchased, to carry forward 
 and perfect their work. We mean to do it, wisely 
 and prudently, but with energy and decision. We 
 have the example of our fathers on our side. We 
 have the Constitution of their adoption on our 
 side. It is our duty, and our purpose, to rescue 
 the government from the control of the slave 
 holders ; to harmonize its practical administration 
 with the provisions of the Constitution, and to se 
 cure to all, without exception, and without partial 
 ity, the rights which the Constitution guarantees. 
 We believe that slaveholding in the United States 
 is the source of numberless evils, moral, social, and 
 political ; that it hinders social progress ; that it 
 embitters public and private intercourse ; that it 
 degrades us as individuals, as States, and as a na 
 tion ; that it holds back our country from a splen 
 did career of greatness and glory. We are, there 
 fore, resolutely, inflexibly, at all times, and under 
 all circumstances, hostile to its longer continuance 
 in our land. We believe that its removal can be 
 effected peacefully, constitutionally, without real 
 injury to any, with the greatest benefit to all. 
 
 "HOW WE MEAN TO DO IT. 
 
 " We propose to effect this by repealing all 
 legislation, and discontinuing all action, in favor 
 of slavery, at home and abroad ; by prohibiting the 
 practice of slaveholding in all places of exclusive 
 national jurisdiction, in the District of Columbia, 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 61 
 
 in American vessels upon the seas, in forts, ar 
 senals, navy yards ; by forbidding the employment 
 of slaves upon any public work ; by adopting reso 
 lutions in Congress, declaring that slaveholding, in 
 all States created out of national territories, is un 
 constitutional, and recommending to the others the 
 immediate adoption of measures for its extinction 
 within their respective limits ; and by electing and 
 appointing to public station such men, and only 
 such men as openly avow our principles, and will 
 honestly carry out our measures." 
 
 Another agency which Chase valued and cul 
 tivated was the anti-slavery press. There were 
 three kinds of anti-slavery periodicals : the radical, 
 aggressive abolition organs, especially Garrison s 
 " Liberator ; " the political anti-slavery journal, of 
 which the " National Era " was the chief ; and the 
 local Liberty and Free-Soil papers. The " Liber 
 ator" furnished plenty of ammunition for aboli 
 tionists, but was hopelessly out of touch with the 
 practical politics of Ohio. The " National Era," 
 published in Washington, and edited by Dr. Bailey, 
 formerly of Cincinnati, an intimate personal friend 
 of Chase, was a good newspaper, and had a large 
 influence throughout the country. The local papers 
 were sometimes started for no other purpose than 
 to defend abolition, or, more frequently, to defend 
 the Liberty or Free-Soil party, and they found it 
 a hard task to pay printers bills. Chase sub 
 scribed for many of these papers, and raised, lent, 
 or gave outright, money to keep some of the more 
 
G2 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 important of them afloat ; indeed, he confessed in 
 1852 that people expected too much of him in the 
 way of financial support of these enterprises. 
 
 Chase had a keen sense of the influence of news 
 paper editors and of their inside knowledge of the 
 currents of public opinion. Dozens of them cor 
 responded with him, among them J. W. Taylor of 
 the " Sandusky Register," one of Chase s former 
 law students; Orren Follett of the "Ohio State 
 Journal;" and especially E. S. Hamlin, editor of 
 the " Standard" at Columbus, and political lieuten 
 ant to Chase. He also had relations with some of 
 the great dailies in Ohio and outside, with Moli- 
 tur, the Cincinnati German, Bartlett of the Cincin 
 nati " Gazette," Horace Greeley of the New York 
 " Tribune," Bigelow of the " Evening Post," and 
 Dr. Leavitt of the " Independent ; " but it was al 
 ways a serious drawback to Chase s political hopes 
 in Ohio that he had not the friendship of any of 
 the influential Cleveland papers. He knew how to 
 set an item afloat in the press, and how to prepare 
 the way for a discharge of journalistic guns simul 
 taneously all along the line ; he kept scrap-books 
 of newspaper extracts ; he sometimes wrote leading 
 articles ; perhaps he overestimated the effect of the 
 press in creating public opinion. 
 
 Chase s powers of statement made him a welcome 
 ally of the Ohio anti-slavery men, but he became 
 their leader, in the period from 1837 to 1849, 
 through services which deserve a careful descrip 
 tion. In the first place, he framed a convenient 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 63 
 
 constitutional argument against the legality of 
 slavery ; next, he applied his principles in a series 
 of slavery cases, which drew upon him the atten 
 tion of the whole country ; and then he showed his 
 friends how to build up an effective political organ 
 ization. 
 
 The great safeguard of slavery was its founda 
 tion in vested property rights, protected by what 
 seemed an impregnable legality; the great weak 
 ness of slavery was its total opposition to the sys 
 tem of democracy which existed alike in free States, 
 slave States, and the federal government. So far 
 as slavery within the States was concerned, the 
 South might simply ask the abolitionists, " What 
 are you going to do about it ? " Right or wrong, 
 dangerous or favorable, slavery existed, slavery 
 was lawful, and slavery was protected by public 
 sentiment. When it came to the powers of the 
 national government, however, the status of slav 
 ery was not so clear ; but still the slavocracy had 
 a right to assert that the Convention of 1787 was 
 aware of slavery, and had showed no purpose of 
 interfering with it by its handiwork ; that the Con 
 stitution, in the clauses on the federal ratio, the 
 slave trade, and fugitive slaves, recognized slavery ; 
 and that Congress, through successive statutes, 
 supposed to be constitutional, had authorized slav 
 ery in the District of Columbia, in some of the 
 Territories, and (through the Fugitive Slave Act 
 of 1793) even in the free States. 
 
 If the discussion could have been kept down to 
 
64 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 questions of laws and constitutions, the South had 
 the advantage of a title by undisputed possession. 
 Hence the Garrisonian abolitionists forced the issue 
 upon the other point : they denounced slavery as 
 wasteful, cruel, aristocratic, demoralizing, murder 
 ous, and soul-destroying. To a sensitive people 
 like the Southerners, who sincerely believed that 
 they enjoyed the flower of human civilization, these 
 attacks were unendurable ; and for the sake of 
 their own reputation before mankind they felt com 
 pelled to argue that slavery was economical, kind, 
 democratic, civilizing, and beneficent to both blacks 
 and whites. 
 
 After this exchange of war cries, it would have 
 been the true policy of the South to assume that 
 the advantages of slavery would prove themselves 
 to impartial men, and to rest behind the protection 
 of undeniable state rights. At the beginning of 
 the active controversy, about 1830, there were no 
 Territories in dispute, and all that was needed by 
 slaveholders was to stand on the right of every 
 State to exclusive legislation on its " domestic 
 institutions," and to make such laws as seemed 
 good to them for the punishment of abolitionists or 
 critics within their own borders. They came out 
 of their own intrenchments when they demanded 
 that the free States should throttle the abolition 
 agitation, and when they took the ground that a 
 free discussion of slavery anywhere in the United 
 States was so dangerous to slavery that it must be 
 stopped at any sacrifice of the principles of free 
 speech or even of the Union. 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 65 
 
 The Garrisonian abolitionists rid themselves of 
 all the constitutional and state-rights arguments 
 by declaring that the Constitution was " a league 
 with death and a covenant with hell," and that they 
 were willing to accept the logical consequence, a 
 division of the Union. This position, however con 
 sistent, fortunately was contrary to the instinct of 
 the masses of the people, who felt that in the Union 
 was their salvation. The Western abolitionists 
 took up a more practical and more convincing line 
 of argument, by pressing home the inexpediency 
 and degradation of slavery, and at the same time by 
 crossing the line to attack the South in its strong 
 hold of legality. 
 
 An extreme position was that of Joshua R. Gid- 
 dings, who held that the Declaration of Independ 
 ence had destroyed slavery when it declared that 
 " all men are born equal " and " endowed with cer 
 tain inalienable rights, among which are life, lib 
 erty, and the pursuit of happiness ; " he insisted also 
 that the Constitution was " an anti-slavery docu 
 ment." The more practical minds of Chase and his 
 friends refused to accept Giddings s dogma ; they 
 admitted without hesitation all that the South 
 claimed regarding the legal right of a State to 
 establish slavery, but treated it as simply a techni 
 cal right to organize a status of brute force ; from 
 the right of a State to make a slave they deduced 
 the principle that no other political organization 
 could create a slave, and therefore they made a 
 strenuous fight against any sanction or protection 
 
66 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 for slavery in the federal Constitution or through 
 the federal government. 
 
 This line of argument was suggested by Birney 
 as early as December, 1836 ; it was worked into 
 logical form by Lysander Spooner in 1845 ; it was 
 a stock argument in Western anti-slavery meet 
 ings and newspapers, but Chase was the man who 
 stated it most clearly and effectively. To us, who 
 have lived through a civil war, when people man 
 aged to get on for years without a constitution, the 
 whole discussion seems forced ; why dispute over 
 the phrases of a document framed half a century 
 earlier ? Because to the minds of men of that time, 
 both North and South, an appeal to the Constitu 
 tion had the same kind of force as the equally 
 common appeal to the Bible : they were both codes 
 of law, " what I have written, I have written." 
 To be sure, the South did not maintain slavery 
 simply because it thought the system constitutional 
 or biblical, and the North did not move upon slav 
 ery because so bidden by the Constitution or the 
 Bible ; but since the issue was a difference of moral 
 and political standards in the two sections, each 
 sought to avail itself of the conservative forces of 
 society by showing that it was trying to protect 
 a sound form of government and a God-ordained 
 institution. If Chase could make out even a 
 plausible case for the statement that the Constitu 
 tion was neither anti-slavery nor pro-slavery, but 
 neutral, and that neutrality under American free 
 government always meant freedom, he would give 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 67 
 
 relief and encouragement to thousands of men who 
 were attacking slavery on other than constitu 
 tional grounds. 
 
 Nothing in Chase s life so well shows his logical 
 powers, his moral sense, and the cause of his politi 
 cal success as his argument on slavery. It must 
 of course be remembered that he took a brief in re 
 servi, and made it his business to state every point 
 which could possibly help his client; and it was no 
 part of his function to prepare his opponent s case, 
 or to call attention to decisions which bore against 
 him. It must also be remembered that Chase had 
 to meet an exaggerated argument that the Consti 
 tution invariably recognized and protected slavery 
 wherever it was not clearly prohibited; to which 
 he replied that the federal government " could no 
 more make a slave than make a king ; " and from 
 that he plunged into declamation almost as exag 
 gerated as that of the other side. 
 
 Chase s view of slavery, as a question of moral 
 and political right, grew out of the fact that he 
 was by nature and education a democrat. In 
 addressing colored men in 1845, he said : " The 
 moment the law excludes a portion of the commu 
 nity from its equal regard, it divides the community 
 into higher and lower classes and introduces all 
 the evils of the aristocratic principle." He was 
 really a Jeffersonian, although he appealed to the 
 great Democrat only as an opponent of slavery in 
 the Territories and not as his political master. He 
 was moreover by nature a strict constructionist. 
 
68 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 " The old theory of our fathers," said he, " is the 
 true theory. Let us have a poor government 
 and a rich people, light taxes and abundant in 
 dividual enterprise, economical expenditure and 
 steady prosperity, a general government strictly 
 limited to its sphere, and state governments re 
 spected and honored because competent and ready 
 to protect the rights and guard the interests of the 
 people." 
 
 How was the doctrine of democratic government 
 and strict limitation of national power to be applied 
 to slavery ? By what Chase in many addresses and 
 speeches called the " denationalization of slavery." 
 First of all he maintained that history showed that 
 the fathers of the Constitution publicly discouraged 
 slavery, and that there was an understanding that 
 there should be no slavery in any unorganized or 
 new Territory. " Our national government," said 
 Chase, "therefore went into operation upon the 
 principle of no slavery outside of slave States, upon 
 the principle that slavery is local, not national ; " 
 and he declared that the later doctrine of " equal 
 ity " between freedom and slavery was, " morally 
 speaking, a base forgery," that there had not been 
 an early purpose to keep up a balance of free and 
 slave States. 
 
 To Chase s mind, moreover, the attitude of the 
 Constitution toward slavery was shown not only 
 by its silence but by its language, especially in the 
 amendment by which " no person shall be deprived 
 of life, liberty, or property except by due process 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST G9 
 
 of law," which, he said, added a positive injunction 
 and cut off any implication of a power to establish 
 slavery by national authority. 
 
 So far as the text of the Constitution and the 
 purpose of its framers went, Chase was arguing 
 against indisputable facts, and hence he could not 
 convince slaveholders nor strengthen anti-slavery 
 men. The actual legislation from 1789 to 1830 
 was a continuous refutation of his position, for in 
 1790 slavery was deliberately permitted by Con 
 gress in the territory south of the Ohio Kiver, and 
 three slave States were admitted between 1812 and 
 1819. There can be no historical doubt that the 
 framers of the Constitution perfectly understood 
 the inconveniences of the " house divided against 
 itself," but preferred union to consistency. Nobody 
 could deny Chase s most effective point, the de 
 sire and hope of the fathers that slavery might 
 disappear ; but that argument was set aside in the 
 fifties by the growing Southern opinion that the 
 fathers knew less than their children about what 
 was good for the South, and for mankind. 
 
 Behind the constitutional argument, Chase took 
 up a second line of defense, an absolute denial 
 of any power in Congress to establish slavery any 
 where by any process. Here again he was combat 
 ing the facts of history, for he was obliged to 
 admit that laws had been framed to support slav 
 ery in the District of Columbia, in the Territories, 
 and so far as fugitives were concerned in free 
 States ; but he declared all such laws to be outside 
 
70 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 of the constitutional powers of Congress. Later 
 in his career this position rather embarrassed him, 
 for it was dangerously like Douglas s doctrine of 
 non-intervention and the principles of the Dred 
 Scott decision. The difference, indeed, was chiefly 
 one of motive. Chase denied the power of Con 
 gress to aid slavery, and the Supreme Court dis 
 avowed legislative power to limit slavery ; the South 
 invoked almost at the same moment congressional 
 action and judicial limitation. 
 
 Chase s dialectics were ingeniously applied in 
 the many discussions from 1835 to 1862 on slav 
 ery in the District of Columbia. To deny to Con 
 gress all power to adopt the previous laws of 
 Maryland and Virginia was farther than Chase 
 dared go, since the land titles of the District rested 
 on just such laws. He therefore set up a very 
 subtle and technical distinction, to the effect that 
 the old laws of Maryland ceased to have effect in 
 the District when it was ceded, although " private 
 rights " continued ; and that, since slavery was 
 contrary to the Constitution, Congress could not 
 reenact it. How hard put to it Chase was in this 
 discussion is shown by his appeal to the clause in 
 the preamble of the Constitution professing " to 
 secure the blessings of liberty to our posterity." 
 Such far-fetched arguments were of no service to 
 the cause. A better line of attack would have been 
 to urge that Congress had powers in the premises 
 and should exercise them by emancipating the 
 slaves in the District ; but Chase accepted the con- 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 71 
 
 tradiction of declaring that the Acts of Congress 
 establishing slavery in the District were void, and 
 yet that Congress had power to repeal them. 
 
 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 furnished a 
 better opportunity for thorough and effective con 
 stitutional objections to slavery, and against it 
 Chase appealed literally to earth and heaven. He 
 held it to be contrary to the Ordinance of 1787, 
 which provided for recovery only from " the 
 original States ; " opposed to the intention of the 
 fathers ; and incompatible with the constitutional 
 form of federal government. "When a slave 
 leaves the jurisdiction of the State," said he, " he 
 ceases to be a slave, because he continues to be a 
 man and leaves behind him the law of force which 
 made him a slave." The statute, argued Chase, 
 makes no distinction between apprentices and 
 slaves, and hence slaves have all the immunities of 
 apprentices ; the details of the act are contrary to 
 the letter and spirit of the Constitution, in denying 
 " due process of law " and authorizing " unreason 
 able searches and seizures ; " the expectation of the 
 Constitution was that States and not Congress 
 should be responsible for the apprehension of 
 fugitives ; and, finally, " the legislature cannot 
 authorize injustice by law, it cannot repeal the 
 laws of nature, cannot create any obligation to do 
 wrong, or neglect duty. No court is bound to 
 enforce unjust laws." 
 
 The appeal to fundamental principles of right 
 and wrong, which could not be superseded by laws, 
 
72 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 however little it might convince a court, was the 
 most effective of all the anti-slavery arguments, 
 because it brought back the discussion to the 
 absolute incongruity of democracy and slavery, 
 and emphasized both the question of moral right 
 and the social expediency of upholding the moral 
 law. As Chase put it, slavery was nothing but a 
 forcible denial of inborn and God-given rights, and 
 hence it could not have even a legal status except 
 lay positive, unmistakable laws ; when these laws 
 ceased, slavery ended. Yet in general Chase dwelt 
 less on the wickedness of slavery in the sight of 
 God, than on the iniquity of riveting it upon a 
 free Constitution, meant for a free people ; and he 
 made little use in his early arguments of the de 
 moralizing effect of slavery on freemen, though he 
 wrote to O Connell in 1843 : " We find also and 
 we feel in our bitter experience that free labor is 
 dishonored and its wages rendered insecure through 
 out the whole land by a system which exacts labor 
 without wages and degrades the laborer to the level 
 of the beast." 
 
 Taking Chase s chain of arguments as a whole, 
 it is easy to see defects : he was working on a the 
 ory not grounded on fact ; he argued that slavery 
 could not possibly be covered by the Constitution, 
 chiefly because it ought not to exist ; he assumed 
 the moral wrong, without taking the trouble to 
 prove it by a reference to the facts of slavery ; and 
 he almost ignored the evil consequences of slavery 
 to the slaveholder and to the white laborer. Yet 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 73 
 
 of all the anti-slavery leaders Chase was perhaps 
 the most practical in making his principles tell in 
 concrete cases, in taking advantage of slips by the 
 enemy, in unwearying effort to keep the question of 
 slavery before the minds of his countrymen. Hun 
 dreds of men on both sides liked to make the Con 
 stitution a partner in their speeches ; hardly any 
 other rendered such services as Chase in defending 
 the victims of slavery who got across the line into 
 the free States. Indeed, his skill, courage, and 
 power of constitutional argument made it possible 
 for him to render the second of his great services, 
 the defense of fugitive slaves. It was his courage as 
 counsel in those cases, his use of all possible legal 
 technicalities and expedients in behalf of his client, 
 and his fearless and widely circulated speeches, 
 which have made him best known as an anti- 
 slavery man. 
 
 In March, 1837, Chase was called in as counsel 
 for an alleged fugitive, Matilda, the daughter and 
 slave of a Missouri planter named Lawrence. She 
 was so light in color that she easily passed for 
 white, and her owner treated her as a favored 
 personal attendant. She became clamorous for 
 her freedom, and in May, 1836, while traveling 
 down the Ohio on a steamer with him, she went 
 ashore with or without his knowledge when 
 the boat touched at Cincinnati. She speedily 
 got employment as a servant in the house of the 
 Birneys, who looked on her as a white woman ; but 
 in March, 1837, she was seized by one Riley, in 
 
74 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 behalf of Lawrence, and brought before a magis 
 trate for his certificate that she was a fugitive. 
 Chase, already the intimate friend of Birney, in 
 terposed with habeas corpus proceedings before a 
 state court, and argued that she was a free person 
 because she had been brought to the State of Ohio 
 by her master, and therefore could not be " a per 
 son held to service or labor in one State, under the 
 laws thereof, escaping into another." The judge 
 decided against the claim of Matilda, and she was 
 remanded into slavery. The poor girl was turned 
 over to her captors, carried across the Ohio, and 
 " sold down the river." 
 
 To the pro-slavery men of Cincinnati this 
 seemed an occasion to teach the abolitionists a 
 lesson, and accordingly Birney was indicted for 
 " harboring a slave." He had indeed known a few 
 days before the capture that Matilda had been a 
 bondwoman ; but Chase, as his counsel, again made 
 the issue that a person brought to the State by a 
 master thereby ceased to be a slave. Again the 
 judge decided against Chase s contention ; but 
 Birney appealed, and the State Supreme Court 
 reversed the decision. Unfortunately, its action 
 was based on a technicality which Chase had care 
 fully avoided raising, and not on the bold principle 
 of freedom under the laws of Ohio. Neverthe 
 less, the court took the unusual step of directing 
 that Chase s argument be printed, apparently in 
 order to bring his point to the attention of the 
 profession. 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 75 
 
 By far the most famous of the Ohio fugitive- 
 slave cases was that of Van Zandt, for here was 
 raised the question of punishing a rescuer. John 
 Van Zandt, a Kentuckian turned abolitionist, had 
 a small farm near Cincinnati, and was known to 
 keep a station of the Underground Railroad. 
 April 22, 1842, a party of nine slaves, the property 
 of Wharton Jones of Kentucky, landed on the 
 Ohio side of the river; and very early the next 
 morning, as Van Zandt started from Walnut Hills 
 to drive home, he found the party of negroes on 
 the road. The testimony did not bring out just 
 what influence led the fugitives from the river 
 bank to a place which a known abolitionist was to 
 pass ; at any rate, Van Zandt took the whole party 
 into his covered wagon and proposed to carry them 
 out of danger, and one of the slaves, Andrew, sat 
 on the box and drove. About fifteen miles out of 
 Cincinnati, they were stopped by persons whom 
 Chase designated as " two bold villains," who, 
 although they had no authority from the master or 
 from any one else, simply carried off eight of the 
 slaves and returned them to Kentucky ; the ninth, 
 Andrew the driver, ran away, and never was seen 
 again by his pursuers. Here again is an unex 
 plained mystery, on which light might be shed by 
 some conductor of the Underground Railroad. 
 
 O 
 
 The first legal result of the affair was the prosecu 
 tion of the " two bold villains " for abduction ; but 
 the public prosecutor showed little interest ; and 
 according to Chase they were " acquitted, more by 
 
 OF THP 
 
 UNIVEB 
 
76 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 the public sentiment than by the jury who rendered 
 the verdict of acquittal." 
 
 The period was prolific in slavery suits. In 1838 
 and 1839 came extradition proceedings, in which 
 Governor Kent of Maine and Governor Seward of 
 New York refused to surrender " slave stealers ; " 
 in 1842 the Supreme Court decided the Prigg 
 case, involving the seizure of a fugitive in Penn 
 sylvania without recourse to the courts ; and in the 
 same year Wharton Jones, owner of the runaway 
 slave Andrew, brought civil suit in the federal 
 courts against Van Zandt, first to recover the value 
 of Andrew and the expense of recapturing the 
 others ; and, secondly, to recover the penalty of 
 $500 allowed by the act of 1793 against a person 
 who " after due notice harbored and concealed " a 
 fugitive. Jones s first suit was defended by Chase 
 and Thomas Morris with great zeal and skill ; but 
 in the first trial, in July, 1842, Judge McLean held 
 that Van Zandt s evident knowledge of the charac 
 ter of the negroes was " due notice," and gave 
 damages in $1200, which eventually had to be 
 paid. The other suit for $500 penalty was also 
 decided against Van Zandt, and appealed to the Su 
 preme Court. William H. Seward was now asso 
 ciated with Chase, both serving without fee, 
 and in 1847 they submitted their arguments. The 
 court sustained the decision of the lower court, and 
 Van Zandt was mulcted $1700 and legal expenses 
 for the offense of showing kindness to persons whom 
 " he must have known " to be fugitives. 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 77 
 
 None of Chase s legal arguments ever had such 
 vogue as that presented in this case to the Supreme 
 Court, but never orally delivered. Notwithstand 
 ing the careful courtesy of its language toward the 
 Supreme Court, it is evident that he had not the 
 slightest expectation of winning his case : what he 
 aimed at was simply to put before the country a 
 solemn protest against making the free States 
 share in slavery. Justice Story said of his argu 
 ment, "It is a triumph of freedom ; " and the 
 " Law Reporter " ventured to predict that " his 
 points will seriously influence the public mind and 
 perhaps the politics of the country." 
 
 After an introduction, in which he ventures to 
 remind the judges that several of them are them 
 selves slaveholders and therefore interested par 
 ties, Chase first attacks the averment against Van 
 Zandt in its minutest specifications, but he speed 
 ily advances beyond technicalities, by claiming that 
 the act of 1793 is defective and does not cover such 
 a case as Van Zandt s ; and that it must be strictly 
 construed as it stands. " Shall it be said," he ar 
 gues, " that public security is a less important end, 
 than the right of a master to his slave ? . . . Will 
 this court by construction attempt to supply these 
 defects ? " He now calls into his service the Or 
 dinance of 1787, in his hands a kind of stage pro 
 perty which could do duty on all sorts of occasions. 
 This time he makes it supersede the Federal Con 
 stitution, as an unamendable pre-agreement which 
 provides only for the return of fugitives from " the 
 
78 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 original States," and relieves Ohio from any later 
 fugitive slave law. 
 
 Thus far Chase shows agility rather than wis 
 dom; but he now proceeds to weave a fabric of 
 constitutional objections to the statute under 
 which his client was prosecuted, namely, the Fugi 
 tive Slave Act of 1793. Here he is arguing 
 against a stone wall ; for the Supreme Court had 
 recently decided in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that the 
 act was for the most part constitutional, although 
 the clauses requiring state magistrates to hold 
 proceedings were void. Chase, however, has the 
 confidence to assure the court that this decision 
 was not unanimous, and was a dictum ; and then 
 he uses his favorite argument that the Constitu 
 tion has nothing to do with slavery, except in 
 States where it is established by state law, and 
 that hence of course there is no constitutional au 
 thority possible for a fugitive slave act. 
 
 The advocate now becomes more definite, and 
 argues specifically that Congress can under no cir 
 cumstances legislate on the return of fugitives; 
 that what the clause of the Constitution establishes 
 both for fugitive slaves and fugitive criminals is 
 only " a treaty obligation a covenant or com 
 pact." Elsewhere in the argument Chase goes 
 even further, by the bold assertion that there can 
 be no possible way of giving to one of the parties 
 in a controversy the right to seize the other and to 
 claim a decision on ex parte evidence. " What is 
 that," says he, " but to legalize assault and battery 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 79 
 
 and private imprisonment? I say fearlessly that 
 such acts of legislation as this are subversive of 
 the fundamental principles on which all civil soci 
 ety rests." 
 
 Chase closes with a calm but eloquent prediction, 
 which might have given pause to a court then on 
 the road to the Dred Scott decision : " Upon ques 
 tions such as some of these involved in this case, 
 which partakes largely of a moral and political 
 nature, the judgment, even of this court, must 
 necessarily be rejudged at the tribunal of public 
 opinion, the opinion, not of the American people 
 only, but of the civilized world." 
 
 The importance of the whole argument does not 
 lie in its constitutional cogency or in its effect on 
 the government. Chase ventured to refer to few 
 decisions, for both law and practice were against 
 him ; his doctrine was unacceptable to the Supreme 
 Court, and was rudely ignored by Congress three 
 years later, when a more obnoxious fugitive slave 
 law replaced that of which Chase complained. 
 The real significance of the Van Zandt argument 
 is the passionate protest against making free men ,, 
 and free States responsible for slavery, even though 
 the Constitution, statutes, and practice so bound 
 them. The moral reasons which Chase put for 
 ward applied not only to the fugitive slave law, but 
 also to legislation for the District of Columbia and 
 to the organization of new Territories acquired in 
 1846 ; and in the struggle over the Wilmot Proviso 
 such arguments as he used nerved the abolitionists 
 
80 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 to fight to the bitter end against slavery in the Ter 
 ritories. 
 
 Between 1845 and 1849 Chase was involved in 
 several other fugitive cases. A slave named Sam 
 uel Watson, in January, 1845, went on shore 
 from a steamer lying at the landing in Cincinnati. 
 By habeas corpus Chase brought the case before 
 the Ohio Supreme Court, laying stress on the point 
 that, as the escape was made within the low-water 
 mark, it was undoubtedly in Ohio territory. Judge 
 Read, however, decided that a steamer navigating 
 the waters of the Ohio was, so far as slavery was 
 concerned, within the jurisdiction of the southern 
 shore, though he showed a deference to rising pub 
 lic sentiment by saying : " Slavery is a wrong in 
 flicted by force and supported alone by the muni 
 cipal power of the State or Territory where it 
 exists ; . . . . the master must lose his slave if he 
 brings him into a free State." Nevertheless the 
 abolitionists remembered only that Judge Read 
 had returned Watson to slavery, and in 1849 used 
 their balance of power to drop him from the 
 court. 
 
 Another case in 1845 was that of Francis D. 
 Parish of Sandusky, charged with " harboring and 
 concealing " a slave woman and her child, and also 
 with " obstructing " the legal owners of a slave by 
 refusing to permit the arrest of the two negroes 
 under a power of attorney from the alleged owner. 
 In spite of Chase s efforts as counsel, Parish 
 was convicted and had to pay a fine of a thousand 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 81 
 
 dollars. One of the jurymen afterward wrote to 
 Chase : " I pray God to hasten the day when law 
 such as we as a jury are called upon to apply may 
 be repealed." 
 
 Although Chase was defeated in every one of the 
 slave cases in which he appeared for the defense, 
 a natural result of his zealous efforts was to make 
 him the friend and counselor of distressed colored 
 people both in Cincinnati and far and wide through- 
 out the country. A few examples of the strange 
 relations into which his reputation brought him 
 will throw light on the whole institution of slav 
 ery. In 1840 one John Martin, a Georgia planter, 
 writes pathetically in behalf of three mulatto chil 
 dren whom he has sent to Ohio to be emancipated, 
 the too familiar case of a father seeking to get 
 his own flesh and blood out of bondage. " You 
 will confer a great favor on an unfortunate man 
 to select good homes for them," he says ; and he 
 begs that one of the girls may be taken by Mrs. 
 Chase as a house servant. In March, 1841, Mary 
 Townsend writes in a beautiful hand from Oberlin, 
 asking Chase to learn what her former master will 
 take for free papers for herself, and for three boys 
 left in Kentucky. In September, 1841, R. G. 
 Corwin submits the case of Daniel Washington, 
 slave of Amos Kendall, who was sent South to be 
 sold to pay some of Kendall s debts, but came 
 ashore from a steamer lying at Cincinnati. Corwin 
 declares that " there can be no doubt that he is as 
 free as the God who made him," and proposes to 
 
82 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 send him to Canada. In 1844 Benjamin Stanton 
 writes from Iowa : " I think I heard thee express a 
 desire to get a case to test the constitutionality of 
 slavery," and gives details of such a case. 
 
 In July, 1845, Chase s legal advice is asked in 
 the case of "The State of Ohio for the use of the 
 Poor of Washington Township, Preble County, 
 on complaint of George Wagoner v. H. Monfort" 
 Monfort had been fined for employing a negro 
 woman, who had not given bond that she would 
 not become a public charge. In March, 1846, 
 Chase is called upon in behalf of Jerry Finney, 
 who had been kidnapped at Columbus. " I know," 
 writes his correspondent, " I need not invoke your 
 aid in this matter, always being found ready to 
 assist and protect the poor African." In April, 
 1848, a gentleman from Vicksburg asks Chase how 
 manumission may be obtained in a free State for a 
 family for which the negro mother has purchased 
 freedom at an expense of over five thousand dol 
 lars. In view of these and other instances, it is 
 no wonder that Chase was called the "attorney- 
 general of fugitive slaves." 
 
 The colored people of Cincinnati showed their 
 gratitude for his defense of Watson in 1845 by 
 presenting to him a silver pitcher ; his enemies 
 made much capital out of this selection as the spe 
 cial friend of " the nigger," and more out of his 
 speech to the donors, in which he boldly stated 
 the extremest abolition doctrine of negro suffrage 
 twenty years before any political party would take 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 83 
 
 it up. " I regard," said lie, " the exclusion of the 
 colored people as a body from the elective fran 
 chise as incompatible with true democratic princi 
 ples." The pitcher had an interesting history. 
 Later, when Chase was governor of Ohio, he used 
 it as a kind of official punch-bowl for lemonade, 
 to the wrath of extreme Democrats and moderate 
 drinkers ; and eventually it became an heirloom, 
 treasured for its associations with his anti-slavery 
 career. 
 
 Of more importance to Chase s political future 
 was his position as a kind of Western anti-slavery 
 oracle. During the period from 1840 to 1849 he 
 was in correspondence with most of the Western 
 and Southern abolitionists. W. Aldam, Jr., an 
 Englishman, furnished him material on slavery in 
 the West Indies ; students of Lane Seminary in 
 1843 thanked him for his statement to them of his 
 views on slavery ; John Jay began a correspond 
 ence which lasted for many years. In 1844 John 
 G. Fee and Edgar Needham of Kentucky wrote to 
 him describing their anti-slavery efforts, and from 
 time to time thereafter they reported to him. Fee 
 was a minister, the son of a slaveholder, and one 
 of the sturdy native abolitionists who held their 
 ground in their own State ; later he founded Berea 
 College, a kind of Kentucky Oberlin, where blacks 
 and whites since the Civil War have been educated 
 together. That Chase, the cold New Englander, 
 should be the friend, adviser, and confidant of 
 such men as Birney, Fee, and Needham, shows the 
 
84 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 confidence which had been inspired by his fearless 
 efforts to give the negro his legal rights and to 
 defend the friends of the slave. From this time 
 to the Civil War, he was one of the men upon 
 whom the abolition fraternity called for advice and 
 assistance. 
 
 With all his reputation and all his friends, 
 Chase was in many respects a lonely man in Cin 
 cinnati. His fugitive slave cases brought fame, 
 but no fees and no paying clients ; and when Bir- 
 ney and Bailey left Cincinnati he had no abolition 
 ist intimate of strength and character in whom he 
 confided. It is easy to look back through his life 
 and see what advantages at last came to him 
 through his steadfastness in this dark period ; but 
 at the time he was doing an unpopular service to 
 humanity. 
 
 From 1840 to 1849 Chase led a kind of triple 
 life : he had his private and professional interests ; 
 he had his anti-slavery pursuits ; and he had also 
 the great political task of organizing the Liberty 
 and Free-Soil parties. Anti-slavery now began to 
 play a part in Ohio politics ; long before 1840 a 
 few men in important offices had not been afraid 
 to be known as anti-slavery men ; such were Leices 
 ter King, president of the Ohio Anti-slavery Soci 
 ety, in the state Senate from 1833 to 1838 ; Benja 
 min F. Wade, a Whig, also in the state Senate 
 from 1835 to 1839 ; Joshua R. Giddings, at first a 
 Whig, then abolitionist member of the national 
 House of Representatives from 1838 to 1861 ; and 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 85 
 
 Thomas Morris, United States senator from 1833 
 to 1839. 
 
 For the formation of a distinct anti-slavery party 
 in Ohio, and for the first national organization, two 
 men are chiefly responsible, James G. Birney and 
 Salmon P. Chase. The Garrisonian principle of 
 non-participation never had much influence in 
 Ohio, where all the abolitionist leaders continued 
 to vote at every election and had a keen sense of 
 what might be done by a proper concentration of 
 ballots ; but they were not always agreed as to 
 which to choose out of three possible courses: 
 whether to vote only for candidates who were of 
 their regular party, but were against slavery; to 
 throw their votes from one side to the other, ac 
 cording as this or that party put up an anti-slavery 
 man ; or to form a third party. 
 
 The first of these methods was suggested by Bir 
 ney in the Ohio anti-slavery convention of 1835, 
 when he wanted the " elevated principles of holi 
 ness " applied to politics, and proposed a pledge 
 that abolitionists should vote for no candidate who 
 was not against the Black Laws. Nevertheless, 
 even such decided abolitionists as the Oberlin peo 
 ple continued to vote the Whig ticket at election 
 after election. 
 
 Birney could not stand still in his conception of 
 political abolitionism. In September, 1836, his 
 paper, the "Philanthropist," urged abolitionists 
 not to unite with either of the great parties. The 
 local anti-slavery societies began to take up the 
 
86 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 idea in their conventions, and in 1837 the state 
 society voted : " That it is time for the abolitionists 
 of Ohio to relinquish all party attachments, and 
 act with a single view to the supremacy of the law, 
 the inviolability of constitutional privileges, and 
 the rights of all." For a time the anti-slavery 
 men contented themselves with questioning candi 
 dates as to their principles on slavery ; but this 
 method broke down in 1838, when the abolitionists 
 destroyed the Whig supremacy in the legislature 
 by voting for pledged Democrats, only to see the 
 pledges ignored and to witness the passage of a 
 scandalous state fugitive slave act. 
 
 The natural result was a general movement 
 toward a third-party organization, and in 1839 
 one member of the legislature was elected as an 
 avowed separatist from both parties. Meanwhile 
 similar movements were taking place in other 
 States ; and in 1840 the political abolitionists in 
 the American Anti-slavery Society broke away 
 from the Garrisonians, and through an informal 
 national organization nominated James G. Birney 
 for the presidency, as the candidate of the Liberty 
 party. 
 
 Up to 1840 Chase had little to do with politics, 
 though a delegate to the National Republican con 
 vention which nominated Clay in 1832. When 
 the election of 1836 drew on, he was a Whig, and 
 urged the nomination of Judge McLean ; but he 
 knew General Harrison, who lived near Cincinnati, 
 and finally, with some qualms, voted for him. In 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 87 
 
 1840 lie showed no sympathy when his friend Bir- 
 ney, as the head of the new Liberty party, called 
 out the political anti-slavery forces. He remained 
 a regular Whig, and a second time supported Har 
 rison in the hope that his candidate would look 
 more kindly than Van Buren on the efforts against 
 slavery in the District of Columbia. The result 
 of the campaign was the election of Harrison, while 
 the Liberty movement proved pitifully weak ; out 
 of 1,500,000 votes Birney got only 7000, in his 
 own State of Ohio polling only 903 out of a total 
 of 274,000. 
 
 Thus in November, 1840, Chase was still a 
 Whig ; but in May, 1841, he took an active part 
 in the county convention of the Liberty men in 
 Cincinnati. Since this was the first political crisis 
 in his life, his motives deserve critical examina 
 tion. Schuckers, who got a strong impression from 
 Chase himself, accounts for the change simply by 
 saying that the Birney movement " did express a 
 conviction that some form of organization against 
 slavery had become a political necessity," and 
 " in that conviction Mr. Chase now joined ; " but 
 Schuckers also intimates that Chase looked to see 
 an anti-slavery Democratic president in 1844, and 
 hence he leaves unexplained the union with the 
 Liberty men. Pierce, in his unpublished memoir 
 (inspired by Chase), lays Chase s change of front 
 to his studies into the aggressions of slavery, and 
 to his dissatisfaction with the obtuseness of Harri 
 son and Tyler ; but Chase had as yet not worked 
 
88 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 out bis constitutional theory, and in 1840-41 showed 
 little dissatisfaction with Harrison. Hoadly, in 
 his memorial address, says : " I learn from Hon. 
 Rufus King, who was then a law student in his 
 office, that Mr. Chase was a candidate for the 
 Whig nomination for state senator, and was de 
 feated in the nominating convention principally at 
 the instigation of his brother-in-law, H. H. South- 
 gate, upon the avowed and open ground that he 
 was an abolitionist. How notice could have been 
 more distinctly given to Chase that there was no 
 place in the Whig party of Ohio for him or his 
 principles, I fail to see." This theory might have 
 accounted for a bolt in 1840, but hardly for one in 
 1841, after the election of Chase s candidate for 
 the presidency. 
 
 Chase himself has left several different state 
 ments of his motives. In a letter to Charles 
 Simmer of March 9, 1849, he says : " In 1840 I 
 supported General Harrison, though I then favored 
 the sub-treasury system rather than a bank of the 
 United States. I supported him because I ima 
 gined that his administration would be less pro- 
 slavery than Mr. Van Buren s. As soon as I dis 
 covered my mistake, I was ready to concur in an 
 independent movement, and was one of the first 
 who took an active part in organizing the Liberty 
 party in Ohio." Much later, in 1868, he wrote : 
 " I was not a life-long Whig, but a sort of inde 
 pendent Whig, with Democratic ideas, from 1830 
 to 1841. Sometimes I voted for a Democrat, but 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 89 
 
 more generally for Whigs." These explanations 
 are doubtless sincere, but they do not cover the 
 whole ground ; for when Tyler succeeded to the 
 presidency in 1841, nobody dreamed that he was 
 about to disrupt the Whig party. Moreover the 
 anti-slavery Whigs in Ohio at that time were by 
 far the largest body of anti-slavery men in the 
 State ; in leaving them, Chase went into a small 
 and feeble party. 
 
 The real reason for Chase s change of front may 
 safely be inferred from some scattered and appar 
 ently disconnected facts. During the campaign of 
 
 1840 Harrison said that " he would as soon ap 
 point an abolitionist to office as anybody else, if 
 qualified," and he chose Chase to go to Bailey, 
 editor of the "Philanthropist," and expostulate 
 with him for his criticisms. Numbers of office- 
 seekers supposed Chase to be deep in Harrison s 
 confidence and asked his indorsement. Early in 
 
 1841 Chase took part in a meeting at Cincinnati 
 which urged Harrison to discountenance slavery 
 in the District of Columbia, and he felt himself 
 in a position to justify a letter to Harrison two 
 weeks before his inauguration, urging him not to 
 favor slavery in his inaugural. Harrison wrote 
 civilly in reply, but his inaugural took ground 
 against any interference with slavery, and the slen 
 der hopes based upon him were shattered by his 
 death, in April, 1841. A month later Chase had 
 forever left the Whig party, and had cast in his 
 lot with Birney and Bailey, with the Oberlin aboli- 
 
90 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 tionists, with the Western Keserve supporters of 
 Giddings. 
 
 It is plain that Chase held to the Whig party 
 up to 1841 on the chance of being able to exert a 
 personal influence over Harrison. So far as the 
 Whig " principles " were concerned, Chase had 
 come to see that the old Jacksonian issues of the 
 bank and the tariff were moribund, and hence his 
 natural sympathies were with the Democrats ; but 
 that party in Ohio in 1840 enacted a state fugitive 
 slave law at the demand of the government of Ken 
 tucky. As a member of either regular party Chase 
 must vote for and with active pro-slavery men, and 
 hence he sought other alliances. His change of 
 party was a distinct sacrifice of his material inter 
 ests, for most of the respectable people in Cincin 
 nati were Whigs, and the Liberty party was very 
 feeble and discouraged. Chase reluctantly followed 
 his convictions by throwing in his lot with an un 
 popular set of men engaged in what seemed a hope 
 less crusade. 
 
 From this time to the election of 1860, Chase 
 preserved an undying distrust and hatred of the 
 Whig party, and often of Whigs as individuals. 
 "It is a party of expediency and compromise," 
 he said in 1843 ; " every vote for a Whig is a vote 
 against abolition." Seward in 1845 sent him a 
 letter of protest at his bitterness against his former 
 associates, but in 1850 Chase still made the con 
 fident assertion that the Whigs were really pro- 
 slavery. On the other hand, he always believed 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 91 
 
 that by a proper pressure the Democratic party 
 might be brought to take up the anti-slavery 
 cause. 
 
 The accession of Chase was a great joy to the 
 Liberty men, for hitherto they had been weak in 
 the southern part of the State, and had lacked 
 tacticians. At once he was seized upon for tasks 
 in which he showed great skill : he could write in 
 spiring addresses ; he could organize conventions 
 and get them to do their work in his way ; it was 
 his vigor and snap which made the Ohio Liberty 
 party the most efficient of the political abolitionist 
 organizations in the whole country during the next 
 six years. Issues were plenty : the Ohio Black 
 Laws, which had so far stood against all attacks ; 
 the right of petition to Congress ; slavery in the 
 District of Columbia ; the slave trade ; fugitive 
 slaves and kidnapping; after 1842 the Texas ques 
 tion ; and after 1846 the territorial question and 
 the "Wilmot Proviso. 
 
 Within a year after his conversion Chase had 
 become practically the leader of the Liberty party 
 in Ohio, and for eight years he continued his 
 work of organizing conventions, preparing party 
 addresses, bolstering up the Liberty press, and com 
 forting distressed brethren, with the result that 
 the party had an encouraging growth within its 
 small limits. In the state Liberty convention of 
 1841 Chase was very active, writing at this time 
 the first of his remarkable " Addresses." It was 
 a preliminary statement of the doctrine afterward 
 
92 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 worked out in the Van Zandt arguments of 1847, 
 namely, the absolute disassociation of the Constitu 
 tion from slavery except as States might create the 
 system ; and it led up to a climax in the often 
 quoted sentence: "The honor, the welfare, the 
 safety of our country imperiously require the abso 
 lute and unqualified divorce of the government from 
 slavery." 
 
 By 1842 the question of the attitude of the Lib 
 erty men in the presidential election of 1844 came 
 up, and Chase saw opening before him an attrac 
 tive field of influence in the choice of a national 
 Liberty candidate. Nearly three years before the 
 election Birney wrote to Chase, protesting against 
 the suggested nomination of Governor Seward un 
 til he should become " an abolitionist in name," or 
 of John Quincy Adams, "who," says Birney, " looks 
 on the doctrine of immediate emancipation as held 
 by our friends as ridiculous." In the national 
 Liberty convention at Buffalo in 1843, Birney was 
 again nominated for the presidency ; but the con 
 vention was carried away by one of those cyclones 
 of radicalism which gave such delight to the 
 enemies of the abolitionists, and against Chase s 
 protest it was voted that the fugitive slave 
 clause of the Constitution might be excepted by a 
 mental reservation in taking oath to the Constitu 
 tion. 
 
 The paramount issue in the campaign of 1844 
 was the annexation of Texas. Van Buren was re 
 placed as the Democratic candidate by Polk, an 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 93 
 
 ardent annexationist, on an annexation platform. 
 Clay received the Whig nomination, but under the 
 pressure of the campaign wrote letters to reassure 
 the Southern wing of the party, thereby alien 
 ating some thousands of anti-slavery Whigs. This 
 was the opportunity of the Liberty men, who alone 
 stood for uncompromising opposition to the admis 
 sion of slave territory, and they joyfully received 
 the bolting Whigs. Nevertheless, Birney s total 
 vote was but 62,000. 
 
 Certain charges against Birney no doubt much 
 cut down the Liberty vote in Ohio, which had risen 
 from 900 in 1840 to 2800 in 1841, to 5400 in 
 1842, and to 7000 in 1843 ; but which, in all the 
 excitement of the presidential year, 1844, was but 
 8000. In the pivotal State of New York, however, 
 the Liberty vote, chiefly withdrawn from the Whig 
 party, was more than enough to turn the scale 
 against Clay ; and the result was the transfer of 
 that State, and thus of the electoral majority, from 
 the Whig to the Democratic column. 
 
 Then and since, this use of the balance of power 
 has been laid against the Liberty men as a great 
 error of judgment, on the ground that within four 
 months after the election Texas was annexed. But 
 it was never the political object of the third-party 
 men to put into office men or parties moderately 
 favorable to themselves : what they desired was to 
 impress the country with their determination to 
 accept nothing but the " denationalization of sla 
 very." Of the Polk Democracy most of them were 
 
94 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 hopeless : they saw that the party could not be in 
 clined to their cause whether they voted with it or 
 against it. The Clay Whigs, on the other hand, 
 were supposed to be more friendly to anti-slavery, 
 and for that very reason might perhaps be coerced 
 into the principles of the Liberty party, if other 
 wise they must be beaten. Such was the argument 
 of the Liberty men, and it took ten years to con 
 vince them that neither of the great national par 
 ties would ever take ground which involved the loss 
 of all its Southern following. 
 
 The opportunity for a political anti-slavery party 
 seemed at last to have come ; in 1845 Texas was 
 annexed ; in 1846 the Wilmot Proviso came up ; 
 in 1847 was the culmination of the Mexican war ; 
 yet the vitality of the Liberty party in Ohio was 
 so nearly exhausted that in 1845 its vote fell to 
 7000, and though in 1846, on the local issue of the 
 repeal of the Black Laws, it ran up to 11,000, yet 
 in 1847 there was not even a state convention, and 
 only about 4000 votes were polled. Chase himself 
 was profoundly discouraged, and wrote to John P. 
 Hale in April, 1847 : " I see no prospect of greater 
 future progress, but rather of less. As fast as 
 we can bring public sentiment right, the other par 
 ties will approach our ground. To build up a 
 new party is by no means so easy as to compel old 
 parties to do a particular work. ... If we can 
 once get the Democratic party in motion, regard 
 ing the overthrow of slavery as a legitimate and 
 necessary result of its principles, I would have no 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 95 
 
 apprehensions at all of the work being laid aside 
 until accomplished." 
 
 During 1847 the Liberty men took the field for 
 the campaign of 1848, on the old straight issue. 
 Birney was now out of public life, through the 
 effects of a physical accident, and Chase s corre 
 spondence is full of a manager s talk about candi 
 dates. In January he sounds Judge McLean on 
 accepting a nomination ; in March a New York 
 abolitionist suggests Seward ; in May Chase pro 
 poses Judge John C. Wright of Ohio ; in June the 
 chairman of the New York Liberty state commit 
 tee suggests " Gerrit Smith and Salmon P. Chase " 
 as the ticket, and Chase replies that he would vote 
 for Smith ; in August H. B. Stanton reports that 
 a committee has waited on John P. Hale of New 
 Hampshire, and that "he is with the Liberty 
 party in principles, reasons, and feelings." 
 
 Out of all the candidates suggested, Hale was 
 the most available. In 1846 he was elected to the 
 Senate as an independent anti-slavery man, though 
 of Democratic antecedents ; he was distinguished 
 for his keen and caustic rhetoric and absolute fear 
 lessness. Chase, however, was more alive than his 
 associates to the signs of the times : the question 
 of slavery in the annexed territory must come be 
 fore the next Congress, and he had strong hopes 
 that the Democratic party would take such ground 
 as would enable the Liberty men to unite with 
 them. He therefore urged the postponement of 
 the Liberty convention to the spring of 1848, but 
 
96 % SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 he was overruled, and the convention met at Buf 
 falo in October, 1847. Chase was a delegate, and 
 declined a nomination as vice-president on the ticket 
 with John P. Hale, the nominee of the convention. 
 
 The division of feeling among Liberty men was 
 ominous. In the spring of 1848, Chase took the 
 responsibility of setting a back fire against his own 
 party by manipulating a shrewd call, signed by 
 three thousand disaffected Whigs and Democrats, 
 for an " Ohio Mass Free-Territory Convention," to 
 meet after the nominating conventions of the two 
 regular parties. Meanwhile he was writing right 
 and left to urge the suppression of the national 
 Liberty ticket, even personally urging Hale to 
 withdraw, on the chance of being nominated again. 
 
 When the Whig national convention in May 
 nominated Taylor, a slaveholder on a no-platform 
 platform, and the Democratic convention in June 
 nominated Cass, a Northern dough-face, especially 
 hateful to the Liberty men, many Whig and 
 Democratic politicians and newspapers could stand 
 neither nomination. In New York the anti-slav 
 ery wing of the Democrats the Barnburners 
 bolted solidly under the leadership of their chief 
 tain, ex-President Van Buren ; and it was evident 
 that a union of all anti-slavery men would again 
 hold the balance of power in the campaign and 
 might carry some States. 
 
 In forming such a union no man had a more 
 arduous or a more honorable part than Chase. 
 The apparently spontaneous Ohio mass convention 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 97 
 
 of June 21, 1848, was really skillfully engineered 
 by him and his friends ; a thousand delegates en 
 thusiastically attended ; Chase spoke ; Chase wrote 
 the admirable resolutions ; Chase prepared the 
 addresses ; Chase secured the call for a national 
 Free - Soil convention ; yet Chase as a Liberty 
 leader kept in the background. On the same day 
 and at the same place the Ohio Liberty convention 
 met and formally dissolved the party by accepting 
 the proposed Buffalo Convention. 
 
 For seven years Chase had been the leading 
 manager of the Liberty party in the Northwest ; he 
 knew the men ; he prepared the official addresses ; 
 he kept in touch with the newspapers. For the 
 second time in his life he had left his party, 
 though it had a nominee before the country. In 
 his own mind, and in fact, his principles were un 
 changed, but he had found a new way of expressing 
 them : he was working now to establish a new kind 
 of organization, an " anti-slavery league," in which 
 all the anti-slavery men in the country should re 
 fuse to vote for pro-slavery men. He had no con 
 fidence in the Whig party, and in June, 1847, had 
 expressed the belief that the Democracy would " be 
 compelled to take substantially the ground of the 
 Liberty party." It is plain that in the Barnburner 
 bolt he welcomed what he considered the evidence 
 of the long-desired purifying of the Democratic 
 conscience. He would, however, have left the Lib 
 erty organization even if the Barnburners had re 
 mained with the Democrats, for he saw no hope 
 
98 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 in third-party methods ; a reorganization of the 
 friends of freedom, and a widening of their basis 
 of action, seemed to him essential. 
 
 With the call of the Buffalo Convention the 
 name " Liberty party " disappeared and was never 
 renewed. The term " Free-Soil " implied a nar 
 rower issue, for it meant at the moment no more 
 than the Wilmot Proviso, and thousands of Liberty 
 men hesitated to give up their full principles and 
 their identity in order to go into a new organiza 
 tion. But the foundations of the great deep were 
 breaking up ; the public sentiment of the North 
 seemed now overwhelmingly in favor of the Wil 
 mot Proviso, though it had been repudiated by 
 both the regular parties ; and the obvious course 
 was to give the popular protest an opportunity to 
 crystallize in votes. 
 
 During July, 1848, delegates to the Buffalo Con 
 vention were elected in all the Northern States, 
 and in Delaware, Virginia, and Maryland ; and in 
 the six available weeks men from all over the 
 country asked Chase s counsel as to the platform 
 and the candidates. As an old Whig, long a Lib 
 erty man, inclined to a free Democracy, Chase 
 formed a centre for the Western delegates. He 
 was also the friend and correspondent of many of 
 the New York and Eastern men, especially of H. 
 B. Stanton and Charles Sumner, and he was cer 
 tain to be a power in the convention. He had for 
 months suggested Judge McLean, uncle of the 
 wife whom he had recently married ; but he avoided 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 99 
 
 committing himself to any candidate, and expressed 
 a willingness to accept Hale if the convention nom 
 inated him. 
 
 No national political convention in the United 
 States ever seemed so spontaneous and so un 
 fettered as the assemblage at Buffalo on August 
 9-10, 1848. An immense concourse of voluntary 
 delegates appeared ; as the long-suffering reporter 
 said, " men seemed to think that because they were 
 Free-Soilers and had left home to come up here, 
 they had a perfect right to take possession of any 
 position, place, or seat they might choose." Within 
 this unwieldy mass of attendants was a large num 
 ber of accredited delegates irregularly sent from 
 sixteen States ; out of these a so-called " Commit 
 tee of Conference " was organized, made up of 465 
 members, and this was the real nominating conven 
 tion ; within this body again was a " Committee of 
 Resolutions " of 48 members. While the " Con 
 ference" balloted, the large so-called "Conven 
 tion " amused itself with stump speeches made by 
 all sorts of people, from Joshua R. Giddings to 
 " Mr. Bibb, a colored fugitive." The life and 
 energy of the gathering are set forth in recent 
 reminiscences of Dr. Albert Gaillard Hart, a dele 
 gate from Ohio. 
 
 " I can hardly recall any public gathering where 
 the enthusiasm was so universal and unbounded. 
 Every reference to the determination to stop the 
 aggressiveness of slavery, and to move steadily for 
 ward to its overthrow, was met by the loudest 
 
100 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 response which thousands of throats could offer. 
 On the second day in the afternoon the nomination 
 convention, of which I was a member, met in a 
 Universalist church, not far from the convention. 
 Here Judge Chase presided. I recall perfectly his 
 dignified and impressive bearing, his candor and 
 fairness in presiding. Benjamin F. Butler of New 
 York State, regarded as Mr. Van Buren s first 
 lieutenant, made an adroit and eloquent speech in 
 favor of the nomination of Van Buren. Knowing 
 full well the determination of the North that slav 
 ery should be abolished in the District of Colum 
 bia, and as well that Van Buren had repeatedly 
 declared that it could not be done without the con 
 sent of the South, he in that part of his speech 
 exclaimed, c and if the South refuses to consent to 
 the abolishment of slavery in the District of Co 
 lumbia, then we will remove the seat of government 
 to the bright banks of the Ohio. The anti-slavery 
 men could easily carry the nomination. But here 
 was a host of young, eager, enthusiastic men, 
 ready and anxious to enlist under our banners. 
 We might make the platform, only let them bring 
 with them their old and beloved leader, who, 
 though seventy-four years of age, had much of 
 the fire of youth, and would in time come up to 
 our standards. We knew perfectly that he and 
 the Barnburners were only anxious to beat 
 Cass and the Baltimore Convention, and that they 
 had no hearty hatred of slavery. John P. Hale 
 was the logical candidate of the old guard. But 
 
THE POLITICAL ABOLITIONIST 101 
 
 enough delegates thought it best to act upon the 
 hope that once with us they would continue to be 
 our allies in the future, and so Van Buren was 
 nominated. At the ratification meeting of the 
 general convention held that night, one of the 
 speakers, a Barnburner, quoted : 
 
 " Now is the winter of our discontent 
 
 Made glorious summer by this sun of York, 
 And all the clouds that lour d upon our house 
 In the deep bosom of the ocean buried. 
 
 " Free-Soilers and Barnburners, few after 
 fifty years survive. But of those still living none 
 can fail to recall the fiery wave of enthusiasm and 
 the roar of cheering voices when the Committee on 
 Kesolutions read last : That we inscribe on our 
 banner " Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and 
 Free Men," and under it will fight on and fight 
 ever until a triumphant victory shall reward our 
 exertions. 
 
 In all the work of the Buffalo Convention Chase 
 was the leading spirit ; he drafted the strong reso 
 lutions, the spirit of which was summed up in the 
 phrase, " No more slave States and no more slave 
 territory ; " and he added planks advocating na 
 tional improvements, homestead land grants, and 
 a tariff for revenue. To Chase s influence also is 
 due the choice of Van Buren as a candidate ; for 
 he early came to an understanding with the New 
 York men that they might name the candidate if 
 the Liberty party might frame the platform. Chase 
 probably was no more confident than any one else 
 
102 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 of Van Buren s change of heart, but he had made 
 a practical combination, which he pressed forward 
 in a strong canvass. Hale withdrew, and most of 
 the state Liberty organizations were dropped ; but 
 old Whigs, who had fought Van Buren from 1828 
 to 1844, found it hard to vote for him. Chase did 
 not speak outside of the Ohio districts, but for the 
 first time an effort was made to reach the Germans, 
 through documents and speeches in their language. 
 The election showed only 300,000 votes for Van 
 Buren, and of these 120,000 were in New York. 
 The Free-Soil vote in Ohio was 35,000, the high- 
 water mark of the third-party movement up to 
 1853. Perhaps because of this vote Cass carried 
 Ohio, and nothing but the Barnburner defection 
 caused him to lose New York ; the third party had 
 apparently succeeded only in electing a slave 
 holder. In the very close state election in Ohio, 
 however, the Free-Soilers had eleven members of 
 the state legislature, and enjoyed the balance of 
 power for the choice of a United States senator. 
 Perhaps Chase had this result in mind when he 
 wrote to Charles Surnner in November, 1848, 
 apropos of the Buffalo platform : " I should not be 
 greatly surprised if the coming winter should wit 
 ness a union between the old Democracy and the 
 Free Democracy in our legislature upon the princi 
 ples of that platform." 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 
 
 As the smoke cleared away from the field of 
 1848, it became possible to see how changed was 
 the status of the anti-slavery movement. The old 
 abolition societies and press had been losing vital 
 ity ever since 1841. Their great mission had been 
 to compel the American people to think about 
 slavery ; and all the assaults upon them had only 
 brought out more clearly the fact that slavery and 
 free speech could not exist in the same communities, 
 and hardly in the same federation. They could 
 not stave off the annexation of Texas, a question 
 which presented an issue far short of abolition, 
 but at the same time created anti-slavery allies 
 for the time being among Northern legislators and 
 party agents. Since 1820 not a foot of land had 
 been redeemed from the curse of slavery ; while a 
 small fraction of the present Missouri and all of 
 Texas had come under it. The fierce contest over 
 the Wilmot Proviso, from 1846 to 1850, showed 
 that anti-slavery was put on the defensive, and that, 
 so far from " securing immediate abolition " in the 
 slave-holding States, the system of slavery was ex 
 tending into additional regions formerly free. Even 
 
104 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 the political abolitionists had in 1848 given up the 
 sweeping Liberty platform, and had accepted the 
 issue of Free-Soil as the utmost for which they 
 would at that moment contend. 
 
 Chase was one of the leaders who saw most dis 
 tinctly that the slave power was advancing, and 
 one of his objects in furthering a coalition with the 
 Barnburners was to put a pressure upon Congress 
 to stand by the Wilmot Proviso ; and the plain and 
 predominant purpose of the Free-Soil coalition was, 
 in his mind, to alarm the Democratic party. He 
 supposed also that the Barnburners would stand 
 out till their faction had forced the Democratic 
 party to come over to its ground and thus to be 
 come the party of liberty. 
 
 The union of Free-Soilers and Democrats had 
 elected no President. Could it be effective in other 
 contests, for example, in the choice of a senator 
 from Ohio to succeed William Allen ? That con 
 test included many complications, but came down 
 to this result : Chase s friends voted to admit to 
 the legislature two contested Democrats, on condi 
 tions that the Black Laws be repealed ; and by the 
 aid of those two votes Chase was elected senator. 
 Chase s part in this episode has been a subject of 
 much controversy ; and the senatorial election of 
 1849 must therefore be studied in its details. 
 
 The first element in the struggle was the " Hamil 
 ton County election." A Whig partisan apportion 
 ment act of 1848 had for the first time in the his 
 tory of the State divided a county into electoral 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 105 
 
 districts ; the object being to secure two of the five 
 Hamilton County (Cincinnati) delegates, who had 
 hitherto been all Democrats. 
 
 In the election of 1848 the Democrats in Hamil 
 ton County refused to recognize the statute, though 
 all the other districts in the State had availed 
 themselves of it. Instead they nominated and 
 voted for five candidates as before, all of whom 
 were declared elected by the Democratic county 
 clerk. But the Whigs in their new district had a 
 majority for two candidates, who contested the 
 seats of Pugh and Pierce, Democrats. It fell out 
 that the state election was very close ; the Whig 
 candidate for governor had 148,666 votes against 
 148,321 for his opponent, and the legislature was 
 not controlled by either regular party; while to 
 organize the House the two disputed votes from 
 Hamilton County were necessary. In the House 
 of 72 members the returns were as follows: 
 Straight Democrats, 32 ; straight Whigs, 30 ; 
 Free-Soilers, 8 ; contested seats, 2 ; but when it 
 came to the delicate questions of organization and 
 the choice of a senator, the Free-Soilers broke up 
 into 5 Whig Free-Soilers, 1 Democratic Free-Soiler 
 (who eventually voted with his Whig brethren 
 against Chase), and 2 Independent Free-Soilers 
 (Townshend and Morse). The Whigs, with the 
 Whig Free-Soilers and their 2 Hamilton County 
 contestants, could make the 37 necessary for a 
 quorum; but the straight Democrats, even with 
 Pugh and Pierce and the Democratic Free-Soiler, 
 were at the start 2 short of the quorum of 37. 
 
106 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 In the confused state of the membership, nobody 
 could predict who would form a combination capa 
 ble of organizing the House and of passing on the 
 contested seats. The Democrats, therefore, formed 
 and executed the bold plan of " rushing " the 
 lower House, by coming together unexpectedly just 
 before the regular time of meeting, and hastily 
 swearing in Pugh and Pierce and three straw con 
 testants, thus making 37 members ; they then pro 
 ceeded to elect officers. The Whigs swarmed in a 
 few moments later, swore in their two contestants 
 from Hamilton County, and organized a House in 
 like irregular fashion on the other side of the room. 
 Day after day, from December 4 to December 26, 
 the two bodies harangue^ and voted and skir 
 mished side by side. When the contest was all 
 over, Chase wrote to Charles Sumner the following 
 account of the breaking of the deadlock and its 
 results : 
 
 " These opposing claims, and the bitterness grow 
 ing out of the great question, led to scenes which 
 marked the opening of the session, and I do not 
 doubt would have occasioned the dissolution of the 
 legislature and perhaps bloodshed, had not the 
 Free-Soilers intervened as pacificators, Messrs. 
 Townshend and Morse having been nominated by 
 a convention entirely independent of both the old 
 political parties and elected in opposition to the 
 candidates of both were in a position which gave 
 confidence to the Democrats that their claims would 
 be fairly heard and decided without adverse pre 
 possessions. 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 107 
 
 "The legislature was therefore organized and 
 the claim of the contestants for the seats of Hamil 
 ton County was referred substantially to the umpir- 
 age of these two gentlemen, for it so happened that 
 all the other members were regarded as committed 
 to one side or the other and were equally divided. 
 Upon the question of the prima facie right of the 
 Democratic claimants, and on their certificates, 
 assuming at this stage by common consent the con 
 stitutionality of the division, these gentlemen them 
 selves divided, and the Democratic claimants were 
 excluded by a tie vote. The Whig claimants, whose 
 prima facie evidence was regarded as still more 
 defective, were excluded by a majority of six. 
 Upon the final question of absolute right to seats, 
 which depended upon the constitutionality of the 
 law, these gentlemen declared in favor of the Demo 
 cratic claimant, who was consequently admitted by 
 a majority of one. The first use which the Inde 
 pendent Free-Soilers (for so these gentlemen were 
 distinguished in contradistinction to the Democratic 
 
 O 
 
 Free-Soilers on one side and Whig Free-Soilers on 
 the other), was to demand the repeal of the Black 
 Laws. The Democrats, having obtained justice for 
 themselves, were now the more ready to do jus 
 tice to others. The Black Laws were repealed, the 
 Democratic votes for repeal greatly outnumbering 
 the Whig, and the Whig votes against repeal out 
 numbering the Democfatic. 
 
 " The real thing was the election of a senator. 
 Here the Independents were again divided. Mr. 
 
108 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Morse preferred Mr. Giddings, being his neighbor 
 and personal friend. Dr. Townshend preferred me. 
 The Democratic Free-Soilers preferred me. Sev 
 eral of the Whig Free-Soilers preferred Mr. Gid 
 dings ; while the majority of them preferred neither 
 of us, but wanted a man more diluted with Whig- 
 gism than either of us. But neither Mr. Giddings s 
 friends nor mine would consent to any third man 
 thus brought forward, and it was finally under 
 stood that, if the Whigs would support Mr. Gid 
 dings, and the Democrats would not support me, 
 my friends would vote for him, and also for Whig 
 nominees, if fit and capable for Supreme Judges, 
 etc. ; and, on the other hand, that if the Democrats 
 would not support me, the Whigs would not sup 
 port Mr. Giddings, the Whig Free-Soilers would 
 vote for me and for Democratic Supreme Judges, 
 etc. Most of the Whigs were willing to go for 
 Mr. Giddings, but there were some who refused to 
 go for him under any circumstances, and his elec 
 tion, therefore, became hopeless. The Democrats, 
 on the other hand, had long regarded me with favor. 
 I was known to be opposed to the whole Whig action 
 in regard to the apportionment law, and I have lit 
 tle doubt that, had I been a Democrat in regular 
 party standing, I could have been elected over any 
 candidate they had on my own strength. They, there 
 fore, felt comparatively little reluctance in coming 
 up to my support ; though ^hey found it hard, not 
 only to go out of the ranks, but to vote for an 
 abolitionist. Finally, I received every Democratic 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 109 
 
 vote, fifty in all ; and also the votes of three De 
 mocratic Free-Soilers, and of the two Independents, 
 and was elected by a majority of four. I did not 
 receive a single vote from the Whig Free-Soilers. 
 Why they withheld their votes in disregard of the 
 understanding which my friends certainly sup 
 posed to exist and which on their part would have 
 been faithfully adhered to had Mr. Giddings re 
 ceived the Whig vote and the Democrats treated 
 me as the Whigs treated him, I do not undertake 
 to explain. Mr. Giddings, I have every reason to 
 believe [is] in no respect responsible for their 
 action." 
 
 The above account is accurate and candid so far 
 as it goes, but it minimizes Chase s own part 
 in the struggle, a part for which he was then 
 and afterward assailed with charges of unfair or 
 of corrupt dealing ; Douglas, in the heat of the 
 Kansas-Nebraska struggle, twitted Chase with com 
 ing to the Senate by " a corrupt bargain or a dis 
 honorable coalition." All the accusations against 
 him touch one or other of three points : whether he 
 changed his opinion on the apportionment act of 
 1848 ; whether he made a pretended " deal " in the 
 repeal of the Black Laws ; and whether he brought 
 about a corrupt agreement between the Free-Soilers 
 and Democrats. The evidence, when carefully ex 
 amined, acquits him on all three counts, though it 
 shows that he was the man who secured the admis 
 sion of Pugh and Pierce, who insisted on the repeal 
 of the Black Laws, and who practically arranged 
 the combination for his own election. 
 
110 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 On the question of the Hamilton County elec 
 tion Chase s position was constrained, though not 
 dishonest : he preferred to have the legislature re 
 peal the law, and then call another election on the 
 old apportionment ; but throughout the discussion 
 he steadily took the ground that the apportionment 
 of 1848 was unconstitutional and that Pugh and 
 Pierce were legally elected. Townshend and Morse, 
 the only members really independent of party 
 bonds, were both brought chiefly through Chase s 
 agents to vote for Pugh and Pierce. The ar 
 rangement as to the Black Laws was also due to 
 Chase s agents ; Chase himself drafted the repeal 
 bill, but it was carried through by Morse, one of the 
 two Independents, who, before he gave the vote 
 necessary for the admission of Pugh and Pierce, 
 demanded and secured a written pledge signed by 
 those two men and others, that they would vote for 
 the long- delayed repeal of the Black Laws. 
 
 These two preliminary measures brought about 
 a total breach in the little Free-Soil contingent. All 
 the eight men in the House came from the West 
 ern Reserve, where Whig influence was strong; 
 hence it was plain that in a Free-Soil caucus the 
 five men elected as Free-Soil Whigs would pre 
 dominate, and that the votes of the whole eight 
 would be thrown for some Whig for senator. After 
 the admission of Pugh and Pierce, the legislature 
 was about equally divided, and the balance of 
 power was again in the hands of Townshend and 
 Morse, as is shown in the following table : 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 
 
 111 
 
 
 Demo 
 crats. 
 
 Whigs. 
 
 Free-Soil Whigs. 
 
 Inde 
 pendents. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Senate. 
 
 18 
 
 15 
 
 3 
 
 
 36 
 
 House. 
 
 35 
 
 29 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 72 
 
 
 53 
 
 44 
 
 9 
 
 2 
 
 108 
 
 Necessary for a choice, 55. 
 
 As early as January 11, Stanley Matthews, 
 Chase s lieutenant, reported that he thought he had 
 arranged terms with the Democratic leader on the 
 following basis : " That it was very important that 
 the reliable Free-Soil members (Townshend and 
 Morse) and the Democrats should cooperate toge 
 ther ; that to that end, Pugh and Pierce should be 
 admitted to seats in the contest, to justify which, 
 the Democrats will assist in your election to the 
 U. S. Senate, provided that in other matters of 
 office the Democrats shall have the two supreme 
 judges, the presiding judgeship in Hamilton County 
 and other Democratic counties, the Free-Soil men 
 to have their own selection in the other counties." 
 In the end the Democrats came up to the plan 
 sketched by Matthews and approved by Chase. On 
 January 22 the struggle of nearly three months 
 was ended by the choice of Chase as senator, every 
 Democrat voting with Townshend and Morse to 
 make the necessary majority of 55. 
 
 Of few fiercely contested senatorial elections are 
 there such intimate accounts. Besides the reminis- 
 
112 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 cences of Morse, and of A. G. Riddle, the leader 
 of the Free-Soilers, we have the reports of Chase s 
 envoys, Eli Nichols and Stanley Matthews, as well 
 as Chase s private letter-books and diaries. In the 
 whole transaction Chase had nothing to conceal. 
 He began in November, 1848, to work up his 
 candidacy; he was glad to be acceptable to the 
 Democrats through his attitude on the Hamilton 
 County question ; but he is fully borne out in his 
 own claim : "I will not say that by the counsels I 
 gave last winter I was uninfluenced by personal 
 considerations ; but I can say that I do not believe 
 that I was influenced by such considerations in any 
 extraordinary degree. Certainly I neither modified 
 nor compromised in any way my political principles. 
 I made no pledges, came under no obligations 
 which at all impair my absolute independence of 
 party restraint." 
 
 When Chase took his seat in the Senate at 
 Washington, March 4, 1849, he was beginning his 
 first service as a public officer of the State or of 
 the nation. In his own mind he was the repre 
 sentative of the anti-slavery forces of the West, 
 and at the same time was to take a powerful part 
 in reshaping the Democratic party. An early and 
 unwelcome lesson was the evidence of his own 
 insignificance in the eyes of nearly all his fellow 
 members ; to his colleagues, with one or two 
 exceptions, he came as a member of a small and 
 very disagreeable third party, elected by an acci 
 dent, and likely to follow Giddings s exasperating 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 113 
 
 tactics of dragging the slavery question into de 
 bate when respectable people were tired of it. 
 
 So far as the spread of sound doctrine went, the 
 Senate was the place for a man of Chase s con 
 victions and ability of statement ; and Sumner 
 predicted that he would "trouble Calhoun on 
 the slavery question more than any others." Chase 
 took an early opportunity to arouse the Southern 
 members by a direct attack ; his maiden effort in 
 debate, in January, 1850, was, as he said, " intended 
 only as a first attempt on a small scale by way of 
 feeling my way. It stirred up the Southerners 
 wonderfully." He was quickly cooled and dis 
 armed by the lack of sympathy among his col 
 leagues. To a confidant he wrote : " You . . . know 
 how much we need men in Congress. There is 
 not one in the Senate who is willing to adopt and 
 carry out a systematic plan of operations against 
 the slave power except myself. Hale is a first-rate 
 guerrillist. Seward is a Whig partisan, though, 
 perfectly reliable on any vote where our questions 
 are concerned, and, independent of his Whiggism, 
 a noble fellow. Hale has no love for the Demo 
 cracy. I alone sympathize with the Democrats on 
 general questions and push out my Democratic 
 principles to their anti-slavery application. If I 
 had four more men who held the same relation to 
 the Democratic party in the Senate, the days of 
 doughfacery would be numbered." 
 
 In the course of his term Chase and Hale were 
 reinforced by two other anti-slavery men: Wade 
 
114 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 came from Ohio in 1851, as an anti-slavery Whig, 
 but the two senators always felt that their State 
 was not large enough to hold both of them ; Sum- 
 ner came also in 1851 by a Free-Soil Democratic 
 combination ; already a warm friend and frequent 
 correspondent of Chase, he became his most inti 
 mate coadjutor, but never an aid in his parlia 
 mentary struggles. It was not until the great con 
 flict over Kansas-Nebraska that other Whigs and 
 Democrats Hamlin, Fessenden, Seward, Everett, 
 came forward and joined in the onslaught on 
 slavery. In the House during 1849-51 there were 
 less than a dozen Free-Soilers. Chase enumerated 
 Wilmot and Howe of Pennsylvania, King of New 
 York, Allen of Massachusetts, Booth of Connecti 
 cut, Tuck of New Hampshire, Durkee of Wis 
 consin, Root of Ohio, and, last but first, Giddings. 
 
 The parliamentary side of Chase s senatorial ca 
 reer was a painful disappointment to him. When 
 the time came for forming the committees, in De 
 cember, 1849, his case was duly considered by the 
 Democratic caucus, and nearly all the Northern 
 senators proposed to recognize him as one of them 
 selves by giving him a chairmanship of a good 
 committee ; but Southern men objected ; and when 
 the " slate " was made known, out of the one hun 
 dred and twenty-two committee places there were 
 none for Chase and none for Hale. A little later 
 Chase was put on the insignificant Committee on 
 Revolutionary Claims. In 1851, although he en 
 rolled himself in the official list as a " Democrat," 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 115 
 
 he had only one committee appointment ; and in 
 1852 neither Chase, Seward, nor Hale had any 
 committee places, except as later they were called 
 to fill vacancies. By the next year, however, Chase 
 had won a position for himself, and in the appoint 
 ments for 1853-55 he had three places. 
 
 This cavalier treatment showed a radical differ 
 ence of opinion between the regular Democrats and 
 Chase as to his political status. In his own mind 
 he had created a " Free Democracy," or " Free-Soil 
 Democracy," or " Independent Democracy," in 
 which the great principles of the old party were 
 acknowledged, such as the sub-treasury and free 
 trade ; and, in addition, he expected soon to see the 
 principle of anti-slavery accepted by the regular 
 Democracy. Hence he said in July, 1849 : 
 
 "I am a Democrat, and I feel earnestly solici 
 tous for the success of the Democratic organization 
 and the triumph of its principles. The doctrines 
 of the Democracy on the subjects of trade, currency, 
 and special privileges command the entire assent 
 of my judgment. But I cannot, while boldly as 
 serting their principles in reference to those sub 
 jects, shrink from their just application to slavery." 
 He did not blink the probable effect of the new 
 policy on the party. "Let it be so," he said. 
 " The compensation will be found in the concen 
 tration, unanimity, and the invincibility of the 
 united Democracy in the free States. Triumphant 
 in the free States, and strong in the strength of 
 their principles even in the slave States, the Demo- 
 
116 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 cracy can elect all its national candidates, under 
 such circumstances, in despite of all opposition." 
 
 Throughout his term Chase was a busy and con 
 scientious senator, with a strong sense of interest 
 in his constituents and of duty to his State, but 
 also with an energy to see the public business done, 
 and a watchfulness to protect the public treasury. 
 In the conduct of public business Chase showed 
 a lofty impatience with delays, with extravagance, 
 and with secrecy. He had a strong sense of urban 
 ity in debate, and held himself well against the 
 numerous attacks made upon him ; he had also a 
 timely feeling of the prerogatives of his station, and 
 insisted that the Senate had a right to originate 
 money bills ; but he came out strongly against 
 the private sessions of the Senate, and in 1853 got 
 fourteen votes (including that of Douglas) for 
 opening the doors during executive sessions. 
 
 For his Ohio constituents Chase was a pushing 
 and a successful representative ; he felt the dignity 
 of standing for a great State and expressing its 
 will on public questions ; he also felt that his con 
 stituents were entitled to share in the favors of 
 the federal government. Hence he urged and 
 secured an elaborate custom-house building, a ma 
 rine hospital for Cincinnati, and a canal around 
 the Portland Falls at Louisville, one of the few 
 river improvements which have proved of large 
 benefit to commerce. 
 
 The most serious questions on which Chase had to 
 take ground, aside from the issue of slavery, were 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 117 
 
 those arising out of the public lands. From the 
 beginning, immense areas had been granted, first 
 for bounties, then for state purposes, and finally, 
 since about 1830, to States, to be used for building 
 canals. Since so much was given, sales of course 
 fell off ; hence about 1850 a new idea came to the 
 front, that of offering public lands as gifts to 
 people who would settle them for five years. Both 
 Chase and Wade were among the most ardent sup 
 porters of some kind of land grants, and the Ohio 
 legislature instructed them to push the Homestead 
 Bill. " I regard the public lands," said Chase, " as 
 the estate of the people, and Congress merely as a 
 trustee." In July, 1854, the Homestead question 
 was well debated, and the most serious objection 
 against it was the incitement to immigration. 
 Though the Know-Nothing movement had now 
 begun, and many prudent men hedged on the ques 
 tion of inviting in more foreigners, Chase boldly 
 favored the admission of immigrants, and the be 
 stowal upon them of the privileges of the act ; and 
 he also moved to strike out the limitation to 
 " white " persons. 
 
 The railroad land-grant system, which began in 
 1850, with a gift to the Illinois Central, was con 
 trary to the extreme Democratic principle of with 
 holding governmental support of States or people ; 
 but when so ardent a Democrat as Douglas took 
 the lead, Chase could do no more than try to re 
 duce the acreages granted and the privileges given 
 to the railroad companies. The rapid develop- 
 
118 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 ment of California caused an agitation for a rail 
 road to the Pacific, which took form in a bill de 
 bated in 1852-53. At the very beginning of the 
 discussion, Chase pointed out the political impor 
 tance of the question as to whether the eastern 
 terminus should be placed North or South, and he 
 secured what he afterwards called " the first prac 
 tical measure looking to the organization of a 
 Pacific railroad, which received the sanction of 
 Congress ; " this was an appropriation for surveys 
 to be made previous to any selection of the route. 
 In 1855 he interested himself in the passage of a 
 bill for the construction of the Pacific railroad, but 
 it failed in the House and went over until 1862. 
 
 As a member of a committee on pensions or 
 claims during most of his term, Chase was im 
 pressed by the readiness of the Senate to approve 
 undeserved claims, and to tack upon appropria 
 tion bills items against which committees had re 
 ported. Hence he heartily supported the Court of 
 Claims, proposed in 1850 and finally created in 
 1855. In the annals of the Senate Chase appears 
 almost always as a critic of appropriation bills and 
 as a mover of amendments to strike out doubtful 
 clauses. He patiently watched and repeatedly ex 
 posed certain perennial jobs, especially one involv 
 ing a sum of 350,000, inserted year after year, for 
 " Creek depredations ; " he also blocked an attempt 
 to secure the L Amistad claim, against which the 
 Supreme Court had indirectly decided in 1842. 
 Indeed, Chase pushed his watch-dog character so 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 119 
 
 far that he opposed a new treasury building, and 
 succeeded in striking out a clause for official resi 
 dences for the Vice-President and heads of depart 
 ments, two propositions which would have been 
 very serviceable to him eight years later. He even 
 spoke against new water-works for Washington, and 
 decidedly opposed raising the salary of the district 
 judge of New Hampshire from $1000 to $1400, on 
 the ground that the State paid only $1200 to its 
 supreme judges. No man can be perfect in econ 
 omy, however, and Chase had his pet extrava 
 gance: he strongly urged an appropriation of 
 $30,000 for a statue of America by Hiram Pow 
 ers, notwithstanding the objection of a fellow sen 
 ator, who bluntly affirmed, "I do not believe in 
 buying any more female figures on trust." His 
 ideas of the functions of government in general 
 are summed up in a speech of December, 1852, in 
 which he refers to " these principles of economy, 
 prudence, loyalty, and reform which distinguish 
 genuine from false Democracy." 
 
 On most of the great questions which came before 
 the Senate, Chase rarely made a formal speech. He 
 had his principles and he expressed them ; but he 
 felt that his energies belonged to the cause of anti- 
 slavery, of which he became the national champion 
 in the Senate, as Giddings was in the House. Hale 
 was a free lance, and it was not in his caustic na 
 ture to convince anybody ; Sumner was not a tac 
 tician ; Wade was no man to lay out a line of 
 argument and carry it through a long debate; 
 
120 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Seward was, as Chase said, "first for the Whig 
 party." The watchman on the wall was Chase ; 
 the debater who could confute Douglas was Chase ; 
 and Chase was the man whose speeches summed up 
 the calm argument of the unflinching anti-slavery 
 men and spread it through the country in the crises 
 of 1850 and of 1854. 
 
 His first parliamentary experience was in the 
 furnace heat of the Compromise of 1850. We now 
 know that the purpose of the Mexican war had 
 been to secure California, ancl thus to extend a 
 slave belt across from the Gulf to the Pacific ; 
 therefore the slaveholders felt deprived by the 
 California free constitution, and tricked by Presi 
 dent Taylor, especially when he refused to turn 
 over any part of New Mexico to Texas, and tried 
 to make New Mexico also a free State. Indeed, 
 there was good constitutional reason for believing 
 that in New Mexico and California slavery had 
 already disappeared under Mexican law. The ques 
 tion gave to Chase a new chance to present his 
 favorite constitutional arguments on slavery. 
 
 To the men of the South, however, the issue was 
 not one to be settled on narrow arguments of con 
 stitutionality, or through the application of Mexi 
 can law, or by hostile majorities in Congress. The 
 doctrine that slavery was to be regulated exclu 
 sively by States had served very well in the early 
 days of the republic, when slavery was an institu 
 tion of local concern, like land tenure or primo 
 geniture or the whipping-post. Ever since 1820, 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 121 
 
 however, slavery had become consciously a system, 
 in the maintenance of which slaveholders in every 
 State and Territory were interested, for they were 
 all put on the defensive by the humanitarian pro 
 gress of the world, which had left the South be 
 hind. 
 
 Those writers who charge upon the abolitionists 
 the responsibility of arousing the South and com 
 pelling it to take the offensive-defensive, forget 
 that there must have been numerous and aggressive 
 abolitionists, unless the Northern States were to 
 remain just where they had been in 1750. In 
 colonial times the two sections had the same stand 
 ards of treatment of inferior and dependent beings : 
 they were both brutal to apprentices, indentured 
 servants, debtors, prisoners, paupers, insane people, 
 and slaves. During the half century from 1775 to 
 1825, the frank, undisguised, unashamed cruelty 
 of the eighteenth century gave way in the North ; 
 but it still continued in the South. The jails and 
 penitentiaries had been Gehennas everywhere in 
 1790, and were such still in most of the Southern 
 States in 1850 ; but the Pennsylvania state prison 
 was a model for the world. Hence the cruelty of 
 slavery, which was the stock in trade of the aboli 
 tionists, was to the Southern men of 1850 still a 
 disagreeable necessity ; they even invited Northern 
 friends to come down and view the institution, just 
 as Russian officials have welcomed travelers to 
 see the Siberian prisons, supposing them to be a 
 normal kind of prison. But while intelligent 
 
122 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Northern men admitted the heartlessness of their 
 slaveholding fathers, the South positively denied 
 that slavery had ever been cruel, and treated her 
 own reformers as public enemies. 
 
 Furthermore, the Southerners had grievances 
 which to them seemed to come of simple Northern 
 hypocrisy. The abolition efforts to prohibit slavery 
 in the District of Columbia had in their eyes no 
 other purpose than to degrade them by setting a 
 national disapprobation on a practice which had 
 lasted in Washington half a century. The open 
 defiance of the fugitive slave laws seemed to them 
 not only a refusal to carry out a constitutional obli 
 gation, but also an annulment of regulations with 
 out which the fields could not be tilled, or food 
 prepared for the family. Hence when the South 
 was asked to fulfill its constitutional obligations by 
 proper treatment of free negroes from the North 
 and from abroad, it answered simply that the pre 
 sence of slaves in free States was not a menace to 
 the lives of the people, but that strange free 
 negroes in the South might be inciting insurrec 
 tion, and they could not be allowed to go at large. 
 
 Even had it been true, as Calhoun and his fol 
 lowers alleged, that slavery was " a positive good," 
 the zeal of the South to extend it into other regions 
 was not a benevolent desire to extend the positive 
 good. It was the instinctive feeling that slavery 
 could not stand in the face of the disapprobation 
 of the federal government, and that to prevent 
 such disapprobation they must have more slave 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 123 
 
 States, and more senators and representatives, and 
 more electoral votes. Hence the absolute determi 
 nation of the South never to admit the principle 
 crystallized in the Wilmot Proviso, the principle 
 that freedom was the normal condition of annexed 
 territory. 
 
 Against the compact forces of slavery, with their 
 perfect understanding, was opposed, in the Con 
 gress of 1849-50, a disorganized and temporary 
 coalition of anti-slavery Whigs and Democrats who 
 hated and distrusted each other and could not 
 stand side by side, while many Northern Demo 
 crats and some Northern Whigs were ready to vote 
 with the South. Into this controversy came Chase, 
 then forty-one years old, an able speaker and 
 abler reasoner, and full of the force of conviction. 
 On January 10, 1850, he took occasion to say that 
 no menace of disunion could move the anti-slavery 
 men from their path; he declared that the true 
 Democratic principles were those of the Ordinance 
 of 1787, which included the prohibition of slavery 
 in the Territories. Butler of South Carolina had 
 already prepared himself to crush the upstart, and 
 now read one of Chase s letters, which was plainly 
 a prophecy that the Democratic party must eventu 
 ally shake off its Southern membership and become 
 sectional. Chase made no reply ; and two weeks 
 later Butler accused him of drafting the resolution 
 of 1843, described above, approving " mental reser 
 vations" in an oath to the Constitution. Chase 
 absolutely denied authorship of, or adhesion to, the 
 
124 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 resolution, but was evidently timid of measuring 
 strength with Butler. 
 
 These were skirmishes preliminary to the great 
 debate on the Compromise. February 2 Chase 
 wrote to a friend : " You have seen Clay s Com 
 promise resolutions sentiment for the North, 
 substance for the South just like the Missouri 
 Compromise all that is in issue given up by 
 the non - slaveholders unsubstantial concessions 
 of matters not in issue by the slaveholders. The 
 great discussion is evidently near at hand, and I 
 must speak. Well, I have broken the ice, though 
 all circumstances have conspired to prevent any 
 adequate preparation on my part. I will speak. 
 Perhaps the sling and the five stones from the 
 brook will again avail against Goliath." 
 
 It was impossible for Chase to understand that 
 the Compromise was already decided, since the 
 agreement of Clay and Webster meant the effect 
 ive coalition of the Southern Whigs and Northern 
 " Cotton Whigs." Even Webster s " Seventh of 
 March speech," to which Chase listened with an 
 indignation set forth in a letter of that date to 
 Sumner, was virtually an announcement that the 
 Senate would vote for the Compromise, and that 
 there was no combination of anti-slavery men in 
 the House which could stand out. 
 
 The two great speeches against the Compromise 
 were Seward s and Chase s. The two men had 
 now been for some months associated, but there 
 seems to have been little sympathy between them. 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 125 
 
 In December, 1850, Chase wrote : " I don t know 
 what Seward will do. I have never been able to 
 establish much sympathy between us. He is too 
 much of a politician for me/ When, in January, 
 1851, Seward asked Chase s support for an anti- 
 slavery Whig in Ohio, Chase replied : " So far as 
 I could judge from the tone of his friends in New 
 York towards me, I could not think that I appeared 
 to them in any very agreeable light, for they, espe 
 cially the Tribune, were in the habit of abusing 
 me without any stint." Indeed, there was a strong 
 contrast between the two senators, each in his first 
 term: Seward, fresh from the prestige of service 
 as Governor of New York, leader in a powerful 
 party, protected by the devices of Thurlow Weed, 
 the confidant of the President; Chase, an acci 
 dental senator, with but one sympathetic colleague, 
 fighting in an unpopular cause. Yet of the two 
 men Chase was the stronger assailant of the pro 
 posed Compromise. 
 
 The senator from Ohio was at the time in great 
 anxiety over the dangerous illness of his wife, but 
 his speech of March 26-27, 1850, is the best piece 
 of work which he had as yet done. With a modest 
 allusion to his own lack of experience in debate, 
 he states at once his formidable position : " We 
 have no power to legislate on the subject of slavery 
 in the States. We have power to prevent its ex 
 tension, and to prohibit its existence within the 
 sphere of the exclusive jurisdiction of the general 
 government. Our duty, therefore, is to abstain 
 
126 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 from interference with it in the States. It is also 
 our duty to prohibit its extension into national 
 territories, and its continuance where we are con 
 stitutionally responsible for its existence." By a 
 long historical argument he aims to show that the 
 fathers of the Constitution, so far as they could, 
 legislated against slavery ; and then he points out 
 how the slave power has possessed itself of the 
 federal government, noting, by way of illustration, 
 that the South has always had a majority of the 
 judges of the Supreme Court, and that " no North 
 ern man has filled the office of chief justice during 
 this century." 
 
 The second half of the speech goes directly to 
 the merits of the various branches of the proposed 
 Compromise : he objects to the " Omnibus Com 
 mittee," and insists that the California question 
 has already been settled by the California consti 
 tution ; he proposes to leave the question of the 
 Texan boundary for later settlement, and denies 
 any obligation to erect new States out of Texas ; 
 and he firmly insists on the recognition of New 
 Mexico without slavery. Regarding the District 
 of Columbia, he denies that Maryland has a right 
 to require the continuance of slavery there, and he 
 affirms the power of Congress to regulate the inter 
 state slave trade. As to fugitive slaves, he finds 
 not the slightest power in Congress to legislate 
 concerning them. On every point, except the slave 
 trade in the District of Columbia, he traverses the 
 Compromise resolutions, and on every point he sur- 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 127 
 
 passes every speaker on his side in clear and cogent 
 statement of the constitutional reasons for his con 
 victions, in insight into the real purposes of the 
 slave power, and in a firm stand against disunion. 
 
 At the time this speech was delivered the seri 
 ous questions before the Senate had narrowed down 
 to two, a new fugitive slave law, and the status 
 of slavery in New Mexico, including the Texan 
 boundary. To these two questions Chase addressed 
 himself in his highest strain. He cited the histori 
 cal precedents for the power of Congress to pro 
 hibit slavery in the Territories ; he called to witness 
 the state legislatures which had instructed nearly 
 half the senators to vote for the Wilmot Proviso ; 
 and he relentlessly followed out, point by point, 
 Webster s declaration " that he would not take 
 pains to reaffirm an ordinance of Nature, nor to 
 reenact the will of God." " Sir," exclaimed Chase, 
 " I should like to know what laws we are to reen 
 act if we are not to reenact the will of God the 
 rights of human nature are not derived from human 
 law. Men are created equal, they are endowed 
 by their Creator with inalienable rights. Aggres 
 sions upon these rights are crimes." As to the 
 national exclusion of slavery from the Territory, 
 Chase took ground which was abundantly justified 
 by the experience of the next ten years : " So long 
 as a powerful and active political interest is con 
 cerned in the extension of slavery into new Terri 
 tories," said he, " it is vain to look for its exclusion 
 from them except by positive law." Furthermore, 
 
128 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 he drew from Southern senators the statement that 
 in their view a master had the same right to take 
 slaves into a Territory as to take any other pro 
 perty thither, and that the federal government was 
 bound to protect such slave property. 
 
 In the light of later history, Chase s argument is 
 sound and convincing ; but he recognized that the 
 question was not wholly one of constitutional right, 
 and that there was a possibility of Southern action 
 contrary to law or reason. Webster had made a 
 splendid apostrophe to union, much dulled by his 
 opinion that the Union was in no danger. Chase 
 took higher ground : " The South will dissolve the 
 Union ! This cry, Mr. President, neither aston 
 ishes nor alarms me. Shall we yield to the outcry ? 
 For one, I say, Never ! In my judgment, it is time 
 to pause. We have yielded point after point ; we 
 have crowded concession on concession, until duty, 
 heroism, patriotism, shame, demand that we should 
 stop. . . . We of the West are in the habit of 
 looking upon the Union as we look upon the arch 
 of Heaven, without a thought that it can ever decay 
 or fall." 
 
 Upon the critical question of slavery in New 
 Mexico, the radical men on both sides demanded 
 some explicit statement. On June 3 Jefferson 
 Davis raised the direct issue by moving, "That 
 nothing herein contained shall be construed to pre 
 vent said territorial legislature passing such laws 
 as may be necessary for the protection of the rights 
 of property of any kind which may have been, or 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 129 
 
 may be hereafter, conformably to the Constitution 
 and laws of the United States, held in or intro 
 duced into said Territory." Then Chase proposed 
 the searching amendment, " that nothing herein 
 contained shall be construed as authorizing or per 
 mitting the introduction of slavery or the holding 
 of persons as property within said Territory." The 
 issue thus presented obliged Cass and Douglas to 
 explain themselves as to their theories regarding 
 the right of the people of the Territories to govern 
 themselves ; and the fierce debate led to a test vote 
 on Chase s amendment showing 21 affirmatives (in 
 cluding both Chase and Douglas) and 36 negatives 
 (including Cass). Although hopelessly beaten by 
 this vote of the Senate on the main question of 
 territorial slavery, Chase continued to offer amend 
 ments intended either to modify or to annul offen 
 sive clauses. 
 
 The death of Taylor made it possible to utilize 
 the majorities hi favor of the Compromise, and 
 from August 9 to September 14, the six successive 
 compromise bills passed the Senate. Chase stood 
 out to the last, and on September 18 introduced a 
 bill to prohibit slavery in the Territories, as an indi 
 cation of his desire to reopen the controversy just 
 settled. But the solid business men of the North, 
 whose influence brought statesmen like Webster to 
 support the Compromise, were satisfied ; and, in 
 deed, a large majority of the voters, both North, 
 and South, were glad to be at peace. The actual 
 question of slavery in New Mexico seemed and 
 
130 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 indeed proved insignificant ; but the organization of 
 the two Territories of Utah and New Mexico with 
 clauses " extending " the Constitution and laws, and 
 promising to admit them as States " with or with 
 out slavery as their constitution may prescribe " 
 was a virtual admission of the two dangerous prin 
 ciples, that the South was entitled to a share of 
 annexed territory, and that in all its portion of 
 such territory it was at liberty to introduce slavery, 
 if circumstances permitted. Chase wrote to Sum- 
 ner, September 8, 1850 : " Clouds and darkness 
 are upon us at present. The slaveholders have suc 
 ceeded beyond their wildest hopes twelve months 
 ago. True, some have demanded even more than 
 they have attained ; but this extreme demand was 
 necessary to receive the immense concession which 
 has been made to them. Without it executive in 
 fluence and bribery would, perhaps, have availed 
 nothing. 4 Well, what now ? I say with blind 
 Milton, glorious child of Freedom, though blind, 
 
 Bate no jot 
 
 Of heart or hope, but still bear up and steer 
 Right onward. " 
 
 The violent rescue of the fugitive Shadrach in 
 Boston, in February, 1851, gave Chase an opportu 
 nity to point out how impossible it was to put an 
 end to discussions on slavery ; indeed, he prophe 
 sied that the Fugitive Slave Law would " produce 
 more agitation than any other which has ever been 
 enacted by Congress," and that it would never be 
 effectively executed. This summary of the facts 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 131 
 
 of the case drew upon Chase the wrath of Dong- 
 las, whose bold misstatemerits were too much for 
 Chase s debating skill. It also led Clay to taunt 
 Chase with being an abolitionist. Chase replied 
 with spirit, denying any connection with disunion- 
 ists, but asserting his fellowship with those " who, 
 within the limits of constitutional obligation, seek 
 to rescue this government from all connection with 
 slavery." 
 
 The greater part of Chase s energy during 1851 
 and 1852 was directed to a vain attempt to build 
 up what he called the " Free Democracy." He 
 made efforts to support and encourage newspapers 
 favorable to his plan, and especially to stem the 
 tide which was drawing Free-Soil Democrats back 
 to their party. On May 30, 1851, in a speech at 
 Toledo before a Democratic mass-meeting, he de 
 clared : " I was elected as a Democrat, recognizing 
 and well known to recognize the duty of carrying 
 out Democratic principles in their practical appli 
 cation to every subject of legislation." But though 
 he might be a good Democrat, the other good 
 Democrats would have nothing to do with Chase s 
 Free-Soil friends, and the tide ran steadily against 
 him. In 1850 the Ohio Democrats refused to 
 accept anti-slavery doctrines ; yet Chase gave for 
 mal notice that he should support the Democratic 
 state ticket against his old Liberty friend, Samuel 
 Lewis. 
 
 At no time in his life was Chase so far separated 
 from his anti-slavery friends as during the two 
 
132 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 years, 1851 and 1852 ; and though he afterward 
 regained their confidence, he never got back the 
 feeling of hearty friendship which would have been 
 so valuable for his own later political hopes. In 
 the campaign of 1852 he was virtually compelled 
 by the nomination of Pierce on a "finality " plat 
 form to join his old Free-Soil allies. 
 
 In the election of 1852 the fortunes of the Free 
 Democracy seemed to be at as low an ebb as those 
 of Chase himself ; they could not strike a respon 
 sive note in the popular mind, and the Whigs, from 
 whom more was to be expected than from the 
 Democrats, were routed. Pierce was triumphantly 
 elected, and Hale got only 157,000 votes, about 
 half the Free-Soil vote of 1848. The new Demo 
 cratic President at once surrounded himself by 
 ultra pro-slavery influences, and made Jefferson 
 Davis a member of his cabinet. Nevertheless the 
 election of 1852 showed the third party in excel 
 lent fighting trim, especially in the Northwest. In 
 1853 it made a strong canvass in the state elec 
 tions ; and in Ohio, where Chase took an active part 
 in the campaign, it raised its vote from 32,000 to 
 50,000. A few far-sighted men saw that the great 
 Whig party was about to resolve itself into its ele 
 ments, and that the field was open for a new politi 
 cal aggregation founded on the slavery issue. 
 
 In an open " Letter to Hon. A. P. Edgerton," 
 dated November 14, 1853, Chase showed his grow 
 ing despair of the national Democracy, which ad 
 hered to the Compromise of 1850 and especially to 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 133 
 
 the Fugitive Slave Law, and was trying to cry down 
 the discussion of slavery everywhere. After that 
 letter there could be no place and no hope for 
 Chase in the Democratic party. In the Ohio 
 state election of 1853 the legislature which would 
 elect his successor to the Senate showed a clear 
 Democratic majority, and in due time elected 
 George E. Pugh ; and Chase s six years effort to 
 influence the Democratic party was at an end. 
 
 The Nebraska Bill, introduced by Douglas in 
 1854, was simply an attempt to make good to the 
 South the expected advantages which had not ac 
 crued from the Compromise of 1820 ; that is, to 
 give to the slave power the strip west of Missouri, 
 at least as far as California, in compensation for 
 the barrenness of New Mexico ; and it came about 
 at just this time because the great electoral ma 
 jority of 1852 made the Democratic leaders think 
 that no excess could deprive them of their power. 
 The proposal to set aside the Missouri Compromise 
 came as a surprise to the Southerners, who had not 
 supposed that the deficiency of which they were 
 beginning to be conscious could be made up with 
 out another annexation ; but it was just the kind of 
 aggressive measure which Chase and other aboli 
 tionists had long predicted. Yet Chase was as 
 much taken aback as others not in the secret. On 
 December 31, 1852, he thought that the adminis 
 tration " would worry along without any marked 
 defeats henceforth ; " but on January 22, 1854, the 
 conflict had begun and he writes : " Douglas, I 
 
134 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 suppose eager to compel the South to come to him, 
 has out-southernized the South ; and has dragged 
 the timid and irresolute administration along with 
 him." 
 
 ^X Chase s greatest opportunity had at last come to 
 him ; for in the Kansas-Nebraska debate he was 
 able to concentrate all the previous experience of 
 his life. A fair parliamentarian, held back by no 
 party allegiance, already cut loose from his con 
 stituency in Ohio, standing for the free Northwest 
 against the Northwestern champion Douglas, strong 
 in constitutional exposition, matured by five years 
 of conflict in the Senate, known far and wide as a 
 fearless political abolitionist, above all inspired by 
 seventeen years of conscientious hatred of slavery 
 and the slave power, Chase showed himself not 
 only a bold, sagacious, high-minded man, but also 
 a skillful leader of the unorganized anti-slavery 
 forces, a formulator of great principles, a herald of 
 freedom to his countrymen, and one of the founders 
 of a new national party. His part in the Kansas- 
 Nebraska contest is attested by his chief adver 
 sary, for Douglas later said of him : "In opposi 
 tion Seward s and Sumner s speeches were essays 
 against slavery. Chase of Ohio was the leader." 
 
 The questions included in the contest may be 
 briefly stated. The prime object was to give to 
 the South a slave State north of Texas ; but the 
 Missouri Compromise stood in the way. To repeal 
 that statute would be an act so aggressive that 
 Douglas invented the ingenious romance that it 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 135 
 
 had already been " superseded " by the Compro 
 mise of 1850. The South demanded something 
 more definite ; Douglas introduced a clause setting 
 forth that the Act of 1820 had been "repealed" 
 by the Act of 1850, and he took his stand on the 
 " principle of non-intervention," by which, he said, 
 the people of a Territory were left free to deal with 
 the question of slavery for themselves. The early 
 stages of the Nebraska Bill, therefore, indicate 
 Douglas s attempt to shape his measure so as to 
 command the support of Northern Democrats by 
 its principle of the freedom of territorial voters, 
 and to satisfy Southern Democrats by its principle 
 of the slavery of the territorial negro. 
 
 On January 4, 1854, Douglas reported his bill 
 in its first form, as a simple proposition for the 
 organization of the Territory of Nebraska ; on 
 slavery the bill simply repeated the uncertain 
 clause of the Compromise of 1850. In a second 
 form, dated January 10, the bill declared that all 
 questions relating to slavery should be settled by 
 the people themselves through their appropriate 
 representatives. The third form, reported January 
 23, divided the region into two Territories, and in 
 express terms declared the Missouri Compromise 
 " inoperative," in that it was " superseded " by the 
 legislation of 1850. In its final form the bill 
 contained what Benton called " a stump speech in 
 jected into the belly of the bill," a long declara 
 tion that the power over slavery in the Territories 
 resided not in Congress, but in the people of the 
 Territories. 
 
136 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 At every step there was constitutional, political, 
 and moral reason for opposing this bill in any of 
 its protean forms. It was unnecessary ; it was 
 illogical ; it was inconsistent ; it was founded on a 
 falsehood ; it broke faith which had been kept a 
 third of a century ; it brought on a sectional con 
 flict. Nevertheless it had elements of strength, and 
 was from the outset likely to pass. In the first 
 place, some act organizing the Territory was neces 
 sary, and this was the bill reported by the regular 
 Committee on Territories. In the second place, 
 Douglas was a terribly hard fighter. He was 
 counted the most dangerous debater in public life, 
 because he had great power of bold and satirical 
 statement, and that advantage which the madman 
 has over men cautious for their own lives, for 
 he could and would say anything that was likely 
 to be damaging to an adversary, without stopping 
 to ask if it were true ; and because he had amazing 
 address in explaining away any previous utterances 
 that might embarrass him ; or, if he were cornered, 
 he would plaintively assert that he had explained 
 these things so many times that it was insulting to 
 the intelligence to repeat his argument. In the 
 third place, Douglas had by instinct seized upon a 
 principle which was certain to be popular. The 
 frontier Territories were really colonies on their 
 way to become States ; their legislatures, counties, 
 towns, and school districts did actually manage 
 nearly all the affairs of their communities ; it was 
 therefore a taking proposition to say that they were 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 137 
 
 as competent to settle the question of slavery as 
 were the States. In the fourth place, Douglas 
 early got the adhesion of Pierce, and thus secured 
 a good part of the Northern Democrats. The South 
 ern Democrats could of course be depended upon 
 to support a party measure introduced for their 
 benefit, and Douglas confidently and with good 
 reason counted on the Southern Whigs to aid him. 
 In the fifth place, Douglas never in his whole life 
 understood why men like Chase and Lincoln were 
 opposed to slavery ; he came from southern Illinois, 
 and inherited the sentiment of its early settlers 
 from the border slave States, the sentiment that 
 slavery was a fact, like fire or rain or human 
 nature, with good and bad sides, but fixed and un 
 questionable. 
 
 Most of the points favorable to the bill were 
 early seen by Chase. January 29, 1854, he wrote : 
 " I am fully advised that the Aments [amend 
 ments] as they now stand were concocted in con 
 sultation with Pierce, and that the administration, 
 with a good deal of trepidation, has resolved to 
 risk its future on the bill as it now stands. Many 
 of its warm friends say that they are sure to go 
 down upon it. There is certainly great alarm and 
 misgiving. Cass told me to-day that he was not 
 consulted and was decidedly against the renewal 
 of the agitation ; but he will vote with the prevail 
 ing side. A personal and near friend of the Presi 
 dent s called on me to-night and told me that Cass 
 was excluded from consultation. They want to 
 
138 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 drag him along. Even New Hampshire wavers 
 about respecting the bill. All Kliode Island, ex 
 cept, perhaps, Jones, is against it. Every Northern 
 Whig without exception is against it. Houston 
 and Benton are against it." 
 
 To concentrate the elements of opposition and 
 to lead the attack on Douglas and his combination 
 of forces, was Chase s task. Among the most sig 
 nificant incidents in the history of the measure 
 are Chase s " Appeal of the Independent Demo 
 crats," Chase s personal controversy with Douglas, 
 and Chase s amendments. The great danger was 
 that the Nebraska Bill might be rushed through 
 both Houses before the public sentiment of the 
 country could be brought to bear or an opposition 
 organized in Congress. On January 25, two weeks 
 after the second report of Douglas s committee, 
 which disclosed the project to make " squatter 
 sovereignty " the basis for the new Territories, there 
 appeared in the press an "Appeal of the Inde 
 pendent Democrats in Congress to the People of 
 the United States." This document, probably 
 suggested by John Quincy Adams s " Appeal 
 against the Annexation of Texas," in 1842, and 
 based on a draft by Giddings, was written by 
 Chase, who a few months later claimed it " as the 
 most valuable of my works." He had aimed at 
 first to get the signatures of Ohio members of all 
 parties, and to address it to Ohio ; but it had 
 taken a wider range, and was signed by Chase, 
 Sumner, Giddings, and Edward Wade of Ohio, 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 139 
 
 Gerrit Smith of New York, and De Witt of Mas 
 sachusetts. The change of purpose had delayed it 
 so long that, though dated January 19, it did not 
 appear until the 25th and 26th. The appeal was 
 at once taken up as the statement of the free 
 North. In terse, brief, vigorous form it revealed 
 the real blackness of the bill, its violation of the 
 compact of the Missouri Compromise, unquestioned 
 for thirty years, its effect on free laborers, its inva 
 sion of human rights. A few extracts will better 
 show its spirit than can any analysis. 
 
 " We arraign this bill as a gross violation of a 
 sacred pledge ; as a criminal betrayal of precious 
 rights ; as part and parcel of an atrocious plot to 
 exclude from a vast unoccupied region immigrants 
 from the Old World and free laborers from our 
 own States, and convert it into a dreary region of 
 despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves. . . . 
 
 " The pretenses, therefore, that the territory cov 
 ered by the positive prohibition of 1820 sustains a 
 similar relation to slavery with that acquired from 
 Mexico, covered by no prohibition except that of 
 disputed constitutional or Mexican law, and that 
 the Compromises of 1850 require the incorporation 
 of the pro-slavery clauses of the Utah and New 
 Mexico Bill in the Nebraska act, are mere inven 
 tions, designed to cover up from public reprehen 
 sion meditated bad faith. Were he living now, no 
 one would be more forward, more eloquent, or more 
 indignant in his denunciation of that bad faith 
 than Henry Clay, the foremost champion of both 
 
140 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 compromises. . . . The interests of freedom and 
 the Union are in imminent peril. Demagogues may 
 tell you that the Union can be maintained only 
 by submitting to the demands of slavery. We tell 
 you that the Union can only be maintained by the 
 full recognition of the just claims of freedom and 
 man. The Union was formed to establish justice 
 and secure the blessings of liberty. When it fails 
 to accomplish these ends it will be worthless, and 
 when it becomes worthless it cannot long endure. 
 
 " We entreat you to be mindful of that funda 
 mental maxim of Democracy EQUAL RIGHTS 
 
 AND EXACT JUSTICE FOR ALL MEN. Do not Sub 
 mit to become agents in extending legalized oppres 
 sion and systematized injustice over a vast territory 
 yet exempt from these terrible evils. 
 
 " We implore Christians and Christian ministers 
 to interpose. Their divine religion requires them 
 to behold in every man a brother, and to labor for 
 the advancement and regeneration of the human 
 race. . . . 
 
 "Whatever apologies may be offered for the 
 toleration of slavery in the States, none can be 
 offered for its extension into territories where it 
 does not exist, and where that extension involves 
 the repeal of ancient law and the violation of sol 
 emn compact. Let all protest, earnestly and em 
 phatically, by correspondence, through the press, 
 by memorials, by resolutions of public meetings 
 and legislative bodies, and in whatever other mode 
 may seem expedient, against this enormous crime. 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 141 
 
 " For ourselves, we shall resist it by speech and 
 vote, and with all the abilities which God has given 
 us. Even if overcome in the impending struggle, 
 we shall not submit. We shall go home to our 
 constituents, erect anew the standard of freedom, 
 and call on the people to come to the rescue of the 
 country from the domination of slavery. We will 
 not despair; for the cause of human freedom is 
 the cause of God." 
 
 Although in form the address was directed against 
 the slave power in general, its spirit was a denun 
 ciation of the men who were responsible for it ; 
 indeed, the third report of Douglas s committee, 
 January 23, had caused Chase to wait a day in or 
 der that he might add a hasty postscript, in which 
 he used such harsh language as the occasion justi 
 fied. The " superseding " clause he called " a 
 manifest falsification of the truths of history Mr. 
 Douglas himself never advanced such a pretense 
 until this session. . . . Will the people permit their 
 dearest interests thus to be made the mere hazards 
 of a presidential game, and destroyed by false 
 facts and false influences ? " 
 
 That Douglas was the one responsible force in 
 bringing forward this bill no one doubted, least of 
 all Douglas himself. Four years later he said to 
 his autobiographer, Cutts : " I refer you to my 
 speeches in the Senate for the whole argument on 
 the Kansas-Nebraska Act. I passed the Kansas- 
 Nebraska Act myself. I had the authority and 
 power of a dictator throughout the whole contro 
 
142 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 versy in both houses. The speeches were nothing. 
 It was the marshaling and directing of men and 
 guarding from attacks and with a ceaseless vigi 
 lance preventing surprise." Hence Douglas must 
 have expected hard knocks, and was prepared to 
 defend himself by one of his usual savage attacks. 
 
 January 30, Douglas came into the Senate in a 
 reckless fury, crying : " Our motives are arraigned 
 and our characters calumniated coarse epithets 
 are applied to me by name. . . . This was done 
 on the Sabbath day and by a set of politicians, to 
 advance their own political purposes, in the name 
 of our holy religion." He declared that Chase 
 had " violated all the rules of courtesy and propri 
 ety ; " and when Chase disclaimed offense, Douglas 
 added : " It may be that I shall be able to nail that 
 denial, as I have the statements which are over 
 his own signature, as a bare falsehood." With 
 his usual hawk-like keenness, Douglas fixed upon 
 Chase, as an evidence of bad faith, an erroneous 
 statement made by some New York papers ; though 
 at the same time he did not hesitate to interpolate 
 words into his own quotations from the " Appeal." 
 
 This study of legislative billingsgate is necessary, 
 because it was the first time that Chase s hon 
 esty had been questioned in the Senate, and be 
 cause behind the vituperation of Douglas was a 
 method, an attempt to transfer the discussion 
 from the objections against the bill to the objectors 
 themselves, and thus to terrorize his opponents. 
 No man living enjoyed debating against Douglas. 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 143 
 
 Lincoln, four years later, was barely able to drive 
 him into a corner ; and Chase would have been 
 glad to avoid the controversy. " I know the 
 gigantic stature of the senator," said he, " I know 
 the weight and importance which he possesses in 
 the country and I know also the great disad 
 vantages under which I enter into any controversy 
 which he provokes." Afterward, indeed, Chase 
 made a rather weak attempt to disclaim having 
 had Douglas especially in his mind. " We spoke 
 of the bill," said he, " and spoke of its character. 
 We said nothing about the individuals who were 
 its authors." But the most powerful argument 
 against the bill was its bad faith ; and who but 
 Douglas had made bad faith its principle ? The 
 next day the controversy was renewed, and Chase 
 was nettled into saying : " I expect no courtesy 
 and desire none from the senator from Illinois." 
 Douglas later recovered his temper and made over 
 tures of peace, but the proud Ohio statesman could 
 not forget the assault upon him. 
 
 Issue was at once joined in both Senate and 
 House on the merits of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, 
 and for many weeks the attention of the whole 
 country was given to the debate. By amendments 
 offered February 3 and supported by a long and 
 able speech, Chase singled out two minor yet vital 
 questions ; namely, whether the Compromise of 
 1850 did in fact " supersede " the Compromise of 
 1820, and whether the territorial legislature was 
 really expected to have full control over slavery. 
 
144 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 To the first point Douglas directed all his formida 
 ble powers, for it was his policy to avoid the role 
 of a disturber of the peace. The second point was 
 distinctly brought out by Chase in the clause usu 
 ally called " the Chase amendment," " under which 
 the people of the Territories, through their appro 
 priate representatives, may, if they see fit, prohibit 
 the existence of slavery therein." This was a 
 direct test of the sincerity of Douglas s doctrine 
 of popular sovereignty. Without such a clause, as 
 Chase showed, the legislature was left subject to 
 a governor s veto and to the construction of judges 
 appointed by the President. Douglas could not be 
 brought to meet this question squarely. He was 
 satisfied to leave to the territorial government 
 powers "subject only to the Constitution of the 
 United States ; " for he knew as well as Chase that a 
 favorite Southern doctrine was that under the Con 
 stitution neither Congress nor a territorial legisla 
 ture could interfere with any master who chose to 
 take his slave into a Territory. Chase s amend 
 ment was therefore voted down, 10 to 36 ; and in 
 like manner was treated every one of his amend 
 ments intended to make the territorial government 
 more popular, such as his proposals to let the 
 people elect their territorial officers, to create only 
 one Territory instead of two, and to extend the suf 
 frage to aliens who had declared their intention of 
 becoming citizens. 
 
 So far as the Senate was concerned, the result 
 was from the first predetermined, for Douglas must 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 145 
 
 have known, on January 24, that he had more than 
 a majority. But the country had become aroused, 
 and by the time the Senate came to a vote, on 
 March 3, Chase was at the head of a compact 
 body of strong men, Whigs and Democrats. Hale 
 was now out of the Senate ; but Chase s colleague, 
 B. F. Wade, stimulated by the overwhelming sen 
 timent of Ohio, came to his aid with a coarse but 
 effective rhetoric, resembling that of Douglas. 
 Seward also entered the lists against Douglas, care 
 fully confining himself to the repeal of the Com 
 promise of 1820 ; and Walker and Dodge of Wis 
 consin, and Fessenden of Maine took valiant part 
 in the debate. For two days, March 2 and 3, there 
 was a running fight, in which Douglas showed his 
 immense powers, silencing his opponents right and 
 left, and returning with the most furious language 
 to his attack on Chase, unblushingly twisting his 
 own record, and insisting over and over again that 
 the Compromise of 1850, though in its terms ap 
 plying to New Mexico and Utah, was intended to 
 repeal the Missouri Compromise, which applied to 
 the Louisiana purchase. Chase was no match in 
 debate for this extraordinary man, and on the test 
 vote, March 3, the bill passed the Senate by 37 
 to 14. 
 
 The fate of the measure now depended on the 
 House, in which Chase s counsels and magazine 
 of arguments were useful ; but he had no such in 
 fluence as that of Douglas, who carried half the 
 Democrats with him, lobbied on the floor of the 
 
146 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 House, and passed the bill by a majority of 108 to 
 100. On its return to the Senate, Chase made his 
 last speech on the subject, presenting a calm view 
 of the real purpose of the bill, the perpetuation 
 of the slave power, and predicting that so far as 
 the new Territory was concerned the South would 
 lose in the end, because this Territory would be 
 colonized by men from the free States. 
 
 Wade truly said : " The humiliation of the North 
 is complete and overwhelming. No Southern enemy 
 of hers can wish her deeper degradation." In 
 1846 most of the Northern States had favored a 
 prohibition by Congress of slavery in every Terri 
 tory in the Union except in the Indian Territory ; 
 in 1854 Northern Democrats opened to slavery 
 every Territory then existing or to be annexed. 
 Slavery, instead of decaying by the slow process of 
 emancipation, for which many slaveholders had 
 once hoped, had resisted every attempt made to 
 check it by national action, and was now advancing 
 into free regions. 
 
 The North was beaten, but it was aroused. 
 From the "Appeal of the Independent Demo 
 crats " in January to the passage of the act in May, 
 there had been a succession of public meetings 
 which threatened political ruin to Northern mem 
 bers of Congress who should side with Douglas, and 
 which sent out addresses, protests, and memorials. 
 For example, John Jay wrote to Chase on February 
 7 : " We accept the gauntlet thus thrown down to 
 the free States. I am ready for the fight between 
 
THE ANTI-SLAVERY SENATOR 147 
 
 Slavery and Freedom. . . . We swear for ourselves, 
 and will teach the oath to our children, never again 
 to enter into a truce with such an accursed and 
 faithless power, but to fight on and to fight ever, 
 until Congress has gone to the farthest limit of its 
 power for the extinction of slavery and the slave 
 trade and the Constitution has been so amended 
 as to leave us free from all responsibility for the 
 devilish system." 
 
 Jay and the thousands of anti-slavery men like 
 him, both old abolitionists and recent converts, had 
 to be organized before their importance could be 
 felt in Congress and in the state administrations. 
 In the last hours of the final debate Chase pointed 
 out, and Douglas anathematized, the inevitable po 
 litical result of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Chase 
 declared that the Whig party was rent in twain, 
 and that the Northern wing was about to unite 
 with the Independent Democrats in a new party. 
 Douglas replied in his fiercest vein, declaring that 
 such a coalition meant " civil war, servile war, and 
 disunion. I do not hesitate," he exclaimed, " here 
 in the presence of its leaders and confederates, to 
 denounce the scheme as involving treason in its 
 most revolting form. I accept your challenge ; 
 raise your black flag ; call up your forces on the 
 Constitution, as you have threatened it here. We 
 will be ready to meet all your allied forces." With 
 that challenge and reply the discussion of the 
 Kansas-Nebraska Bill ended in the Senate, and 
 the Republican party began. 
 
 To Chase the end of his term as senator, in 
 
148 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 March, 1855, was a disappointment. In his six 
 years he had gradually become a power in that 
 conservative body, and, notwithstanding his anti- 
 slavery principles, he appears to have carried away 
 with him the respect of all his colleagues except 
 Douglas ; even Soule, most ardent of the fire- 
 eaters, had a personal regard for him. Though 
 Chase never could learn the quickness and adroit 
 ness which made Seward and Hale such formidable 
 debaters, he knew how to argue, and especially how 
 to state great principles in a popular form. The 
 " New York Evening Post " said of him, at the end 
 of his term : " We always counted on his opposi 
 tion to a corrupt or extravagant expenditure or 
 appropriation ; and we could always depend on his 
 cooperation to restrain action of the federal gov 
 ernment within its proper sphere." On all the 
 phases of the slavery question he was the senator 
 who cared most about it, and who therefore never 
 yielded or compromised. When he left the Senate 
 there was no one to take his place, for Seward and 
 Wade and the other leaders of the new Kepubli- 
 can party had the caution of chieftains, showing 
 a willingness to yield a part of their platform if 
 they could get the rest. In his career in the Sen 
 ate Chase showed that lack of imagination in things 
 political which was a characteristic throughout his 
 life. What seemed to him reasonable he thought 
 must have equal weight in other minds ; but he 
 also showed his other dominant characteristic, a 
 consciousness of moral responsibility in his politi 
 cal service. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 
 
 THE reason for the existence of the political abo 
 litionists was that slavery was a political question, 
 was a vital question, and must eventually become 
 the basis of a division into national parties. The 
 new economic conditions of the country so far 
 caused the disappearance of old party issues that 
 the low revenue tariff of 1846 was in the fifties 
 accepted by the whole country, the Bank was no 
 longer urged by anybody of influence, and though 
 people squabbled over land grants, internal im 
 provements, and homestead laws, none of these 
 questions were tenets of party faith. Ever since 
 the debates on the annexation of Texas, however, 
 the issues which really interested voters and occu 
 pied party leaders brought in some phase of the 
 slavery question. The Liberty men seized upon a 
 live issue, took definite ground upon it, and had 
 reason to expect that large numbers would come 
 out from the old parties to join them. Hence the 
 new life and the elasticity shown in the elections of 
 1853, when the Free Democrats became aware that 
 the Whig party was at last moribund. 
 
 Among the Whigs some strong anti-slavery men, 
 
150 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 like Seward, were always allowed to remain in 
 regular standing with their party ; but the Demo 
 crats deliberately crushed out that element in their 
 party by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Douglas prob 
 ably expected to see the loss of voters through 
 the secession of Northern Democrats made good 
 by the adhesion of Southern Whigs ; and though 
 he was shrewd enough to foresee a combination of 
 the bolting Democrats with the Northern Whigs 
 and the handful of organized Free Democrats, he 
 relied on branding such a coalition as a " sectional 
 party ; " and his inability to understand the moral 
 indignation against slavery caused him to under 
 estimate the number of Democrats who would not 
 accept any further extension of slavery. 
 
 The Kansas - Nebraska Bill was therefore the 
 shock which started a new process of party crystal 
 lization. While the debate was in progress, con 
 ventions of " Anti-Nebraska " men began in the 
 Northern States ; and the passage of the act, May 
 30, 1854, increased the excitement, and stimulated 
 a formal organization of political anti-slavery men. 
 In various Northern States, members of Congress 
 and men at home united in calling local conven 
 tions to nominate state and congressional candi 
 dates for the elections of 1854. The Michigan 
 convention, held at Detroit, July 6, 1854, took upon 
 itself the name of the Republican party, already 
 several times used by local gatherings. The new 
 title was assumed by the Ohio anti-Nebraska con 
 vention of July 13, and during the campaign Repub- 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 151 
 
 lican organizations were formed in all the other 
 Northern States. In this great movement Chase 
 had a large part, perhaps larger than that of any 
 other one man. He describes his action in his own 
 State as follows : " Immediately after the passage 
 of the Nebraska Bill I prepared a call for a con 
 vention in Ohio to organize a 4 Democracy of the 
 people in opposition to the servile Democracy. 
 Wade joined me in a letter inviting signatures, 
 and the letter and call were sent to ... Ohio ; 
 but a movement for a similar convention, less defi 
 nite in object, . . . superseded that which we pro 
 posed." 
 
 This movement at once proved its popularity. 
 Though Pierce had 13,000 majority in Ohio in 
 1852, the election of 1854 showed a Republican 
 majority of 80,000 ; the congressional delegation 
 of 1853 was 12 Democrats, 6 Whigs, and 3 third- 
 party men, but every member elected in 1854 was 
 an anti-Nebraska man. Some States, including 
 Massachusetts, elected Anti-Nebraska state offi 
 cers ; and in the congressional election nearly all 
 the Northern Douglas Democrats in the House lost 
 their seats, and a clear anti-Nebraska majority was 
 chosen for the national House, which would assem 
 ble in 1855. Such was the reply of the country to 
 Douglas s principle of squatter sovereignty. 
 
 From Chase s own statements it is plain that 
 during 1854 he had not yet rid himself of the 
 belief that a purified Democracy was the party of 
 the future ; he could not understand, and never 
 
152 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 did clearly understand, the importance of choosing 
 a new name and making a new party in which 
 Whigs, Democrats, and Free Democrats might all 
 join without feeling that they were accepting the 
 designation or the principles of former political 
 enemies. In December, 1854, he still calls himself 
 an " Independent Democrat," and says : " In the 
 recent election in Ohio I entered heartily into the 
 People s movement, which was nothing more or 
 less than a cooperation of Liberal Democrats, In 
 dependent Democrats, and Whigs, for the election 
 of reliable slavery prohibitionists to the next Con 
 gress and of rebuking the pro-slavery action of 
 the administration party." By cooperation Chase 
 meant temporary fusion rather than a consolidated 
 party. 
 
 Three influences combined to waken Chase from 
 the delusion that there could be a Democratic anti- 
 slavery party : these were the rise and fall of the 
 Native American, or Know-Nothing party, his 
 nomination for governor of Ohio in 1855, and the 
 Kansas troubles. The Know-Nothings began to 
 come up as the Whigs disintegrated ; they formed 
 a convenient rallying point for Northern and 
 Southern Whigs, who liked to act together and 
 were willing to take common ground against the 
 foreigner ; and as their success in the state elec 
 tions of 1854 and early 1855 seemed to promise 
 them continuance as a national party, thousands of 
 ardent anti-slavery men went into their organiza 
 tion. Chase, however, by nature and education 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 153 
 
 was opposed to distinctions founded merely on race 
 or birthplace, and in dignified and spirited, al 
 though cautious, terms expressed his lack of sym 
 pathy with the movement in a private letter to Dr. 
 Paul, December 28, 1854. 
 
 " For one," he says, " I wish to see this People s 
 movement go on in the liberal spirit which has 
 thus far characterized it. But if it is to be under 
 stood that the Know-Nothings who participated in 
 it will henceforth ignore the anti-slavery element 
 or support no candidates who are not members of 
 their order, or whose nominations are not dictated 
 by them, those who regard the slavery question as 
 of paramount importance and whose principles 
 will not allow them to become members of Know- 
 Nothing associations, must of necessity assume 
 an antagonistic position. If this conflict shall 
 arise, it is plain that the People s movement 
 cannot go on or must go on without the Know- 
 No thing cooperation. It becomes the friends of 
 Liberty to be prepared for every event. ... I 
 cannot take upon myself any secret political obli 
 gations. I cannot proscribe men on account of 
 their birth. I cannot make religious faith a polit 
 ical test." . . . 
 
 February 21, 1855, Chase expressed himself with 
 more freedom : " There is not in my opinion the 
 slightest reason to believe that the ultra-Nativism 
 and anti-Catholicism imputed to the Know-Nothings 
 will be permanent characteristics of any great polit 
 ical party. Just as little reason is there to think 
 
154 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 that secrecy can be maintained as a vital element 
 of political organizations. I do not therefore share 
 the apprehension which some of the best friends of 
 Liberty sustain in respect to the Know-Nothing 
 movement." 
 
 Chase s power of political organization, narrowly 
 successful in the senatorial election of 1849, now 
 brought to him a new dignity. In July, 1855, he 
 was nominated by the Anti-Nebraska Republican 
 convention for the governorship of Ohio. Among 
 the " Gome-Outers," Chase still stood as a Demo 
 crat, and among the old Whigs he was still looked 
 upon as a renegade ; hence the decision in both 
 nomination and election lay with the Know- 
 Nothings, who gave him to understand that he 
 might have their nomination only by joining their 
 order. For several months negotiations went on, 
 with a view to securing both Know-Nothing and 
 Republican support; and the letter to Dr. Paul, 
 of December, 1854, was published in June, 1855, 
 to show the kindly feeling of Chase toward good 
 Know-Nothings who were opposed to slavery, and 
 at the same time to make clear to the Germans 
 that he had not bowed the knee to the anti-foreign 
 Baal. 1 
 
 1 A letter of J. M. Ashley, under date of May 9, urges Chase 
 to omit a paragraph and otherwise to revise the letter ; with 
 these changes, he says, " there can be no doubt in our minds of 
 its placing you far in the ascendency of Seward or any other man 
 in the United States." Ashley said that the changes would not 
 affect the principles of the letter. There is no evidence to show 
 that Chase consented thus to appear to have said what he did not 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 155 
 
 In spite of all these efforts, the Independent 
 Democrats and Republicans called separate con 
 ventions. The old Whigs offered Chase the nom 
 ination as state supreme judge, but he insisted on 
 an anti-slavery platform and a fair division of the 
 ticket as the condition of fusion with the Know- 
 No things. The critical date was July 13, when a 
 " People s Convention," in part made up of Know- 
 Nothings, assembled at Columbus and nominated 
 Chase for governor. The old Whigs nominated 
 Trimble, a Know-Nothing ; and the old Democrats 
 nominated Joseph Medill. 
 
 Chase looked upon his nomination as a public 
 protest against the repeal of the Missouri Com 
 promise, and in the campaign which followed he 
 made one of his most arduous and effective tours 
 of stump-speaking. In this triangular campaign, 
 the attitude of the Germans became a matter of 
 great importance ; they had usually preferred the 
 Democratic party in the Northwest, especially 
 after the forced emigration of some of the ablest 
 and most liberal of their countrymen, in 1848, for 
 acting as democrats in Germany. Hence it was a 
 delicate matter for Chase to hold both the native 
 American and the German vote. On election day 
 the vote was as follows : Chase, 146,000, Medill, 
 131,000, Trimble, 24,000. Ford, candidate for 
 lieutenant-governor, got 13,000 more votes than 
 
 say ; but as this is the only approach to untruthf illness discovered 
 in Chase s political life, it has seemed desirable to state the facts 
 upon it. 
 
156 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Chase on the same ticket ; yet there can be no 
 doubt that Chase was the strong element in the 
 political combination. The effects of this election 
 were far-reaching : in 1855 the anti-Nebraska 
 movement seemed to lose elasticity, and State after 
 State went back to the Democracy ; it was Chase 
 who stemmed the tide, held the third State in the 
 Union, strengthened the national party for the 
 election of 1856, and retained his place as one of 
 the official leaders of the Republican party. 
 
 When he was inaugurated as governor of Ohio, 
 in January, 1856, the State was no longer the 
 frontier community of the earlier days, for which 
 a canal-boat was thought to be a proper emblem 
 on the great seal of the commonwealth. Coal 
 mining, long important, had become a large 
 industry since 1845, when bituminous coal was 
 first used in Ohio for smelting iron ; the State was 
 now bound together, east and west, north and 
 south, by lines of railroad ; Cincinnati and Cleve 
 land had become manufacturing cities ; and the 
 population had been much altered by Irish and 
 German immigration. In national affairs Ohio 
 was beginning to assume a position as a central 
 and pivotal State ; indeed, one Northwestern presi 
 dent, Harrison, had been an Ohio man, and Ewing, 
 Corwin, and Lewis Campbell were leaders in Con 
 gress. 
 
 The chief magistrate of Ohio, however, might 
 still be described by a phrase which Chase had used 
 twenty-five years earlier in his History of Ohio, 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 157 
 
 " The governor is a name almost without mean 
 ing." Without a veto power, with very small 
 powers of appointment, with little official ceremony 
 or prestige, the ablest governors had few oppor 
 tunities to affect the destiny of their State, and 
 many chances to make blunders. The governor 
 could not control other state officers elected on the 
 same ticket with himself, and yet was certain to be 
 held responsible for their faults. 
 
 Chase was not cut out for a popular governor. 
 While in the Senate he had been accused of cold 
 ness, aloofness, and lack of human instincts, 
 although his sense of his own uprightness and his 
 belief in his clearness of judgment had been much 
 chastened by his first four years in that body. 
 Now, as a renowned champion of freedom, for the 
 first time in his life chosen to an important office 
 by popular vote, one of the defenders of the cause 
 in Kansas, a sage in his own party, Chase found 
 himself almost in a new atmosphere, and had 
 already begun to muse upon that picture of 
 " President Chase " which came back to his mind 
 every year during the rest of his life. 
 
 The lack of "personal magnetism" did not 
 prevent him from making an excellent governor. 
 His small patronage was skillfully fostered, and 
 the Germans had full recognition. Of his policy 
 in state affairs he says later : " I at once addressed 
 myself to the duties of my new position. I sought 
 to promote all practicable reforms ; encouraged, 
 by all the means in my power, the interests of 
 
158 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 education ; endeavored to reorganize the military 
 system of the State ; and omitted no opportunity 
 of making the voice of Ohio heard on the side of 
 freedom and justice. At the same time, I endeav 
 ored, as far as practicable, to conciliate opposition 
 founded on misapprehension, and succeeded finally 
 in organizing a compact and powerful party, based 
 on the great principles of freedom and free labor." 
 
 There was plenty of opportunity for a man to 
 make his influence felt in such matters. He 
 reformed the militia system, which was in such a 
 condition that a refusal to issue arms to other than 
 uniformed companies was regarded as an inno 
 vation ; he took much interest in securing a 
 geological survey of the State ; he advocated a 
 bureau of statistics ; he urged better opportunities 
 for the state university and for common schools ; 
 and he busied himself in founding a railroad com 
 mission. This last suggestion came from an early 
 foresight as to the power likely to be acquired by 
 great corporations through the control of all the 
 transportation upon a large area. Chase was one 
 of the earliest statesmen to see this danger and to 
 try to provide against it. 
 
 Hardly had the new governor begun his service 
 when the election of 1856 again called out his 
 greatest energy. The national Native American 
 party, of which Horace Greeley had said that 
 " you might as well talk of a national anti-potato- 
 rot party," broke up in February, 1856, by the 
 secession of the anti-slavery Know-Nothings. With 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 159 
 
 their aid and that of the bolting Democrats the 
 Republicans had a fair hope of outrunning, in the 
 Northern States, both the regular Democrats and 
 the old Whigs. This is the secret of the near ap 
 proach to the choice of a president by the Repub 
 licans in 1856 ; for they proved to have pluralities 
 in every Northern State except New Jersey, Penn 
 sylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. 
 
 How far a man may, with good taste and up 
 rightness, enter into a personal canvass for a nom 
 ination to the presidency is a difficult question of 
 ethics. To Chase it seemed simple ; he believed 
 sincerely that he had the qualities of a president ; 
 he believed that the principles for which he stood 
 were those to which the Republican party must 
 commit itself if it was to be honest ; he believed 
 that he had a large popular support throughout 
 the country ; and he believed that proper organiza 
 tion and means of making himself known would 
 bring about his nomination. He had no experi 
 enced lieutenants like Thurlow Weed in New York, 
 political moles to prepare the ground for him un 
 seen ; Hamlin and Ashley and Hoadly were ener 
 getic young men, but of little public reputation ; 
 and though Chase possessed and cultivated an 
 acquaintance in New York and New England, he 
 had no workers in the East who could secure dele 
 gates or make combinations for him. The feeling 
 of leadership, the desire to be President, were right 
 and natural, and it does not appear that Chase 
 used any but straightforward means to secure a 
 
160 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 nomination. It was his fault to overestimate other 
 people s inclination toward him, and his weakness 
 not to be on cordial terms of equal friendship with 
 any of the other Republican leaders. 
 
 During the first half of 1856 Chase and his few 
 friends were hard at work. The preliminary Pitts- 
 burg convention of 1856, the first national Re 
 publican gathering, gave an opportunity for com 
 paring the respective strength of candidates, and 
 one of Chase s friends who was present was sure 
 that he would have been nominated had the con 
 vention undertaken to present a candidate. By 
 this time the possible nominees had all come for 
 ward. Bailey wrote, February 21, that Seward 
 would not risk seeking a nomination, and that the 
 leading candidates were Preston King, Colonel 
 Fremont (brought forward by Frank J. Blair), 
 and John McLean. Just at this time Banks was 
 chosen speaker of the House of Representatives, 
 and he also loomed up as a candidate. In his 
 intimate correspondence with Edward L. Pierce, 
 Chase revealed his own hopes and fears ; he in 
 veighed against " the feeling, which some men seem 
 to have fallen into, of taking up an untried man 
 for President ; " he complained that Hiram Bar 
 ney, his lieutenant in New York, was " a little dis 
 posed sometimes to forbear working, in fear that 
 nothing can be done." But Pierce felt compelled 
 to write a cooling letter, in which he predicted the 
 inevitable nomination of Fremont. 
 
 Even with a solid Ohio delegation and the pres- 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 161 
 
 tige of his governorship, Chase could hardly have 
 been successful against the combination formed in 
 favor of Fremont ; but he was now to learn the 
 strength of his home opponents and enemies. Of 
 the Ohio delegation he could count on only thirty- 
 five, while thirty-four were for either McLean 
 or Fremont. " My friends did not act," said he, 
 " with the skill and decision which was required." 
 In addition to these thirty-five faithful ones, about 
 sixty delegates to the Philadelphia Convention 
 from other States were for Chase ; though it was 
 a sore point with him that he could not secure the 
 New Hampshire delegation. Yet he was still con 
 fident. " It seems to me," said he, " that if the 
 most cherished wishes of the people could prevail, 
 I should be nominated." Nevertheless, he gave to 
 Hoadly a letter of withdrawal, to be used if neces 
 sary. Hoadly saw nothing else to do, Chase s 
 name was withdrawn, and Fremont was nominated. 
 It was well that Chase did not succeed in risking 
 his reputation in that campaign, for no out-and-out 
 anti-slavery man could have polled a larger vote 
 than the neutral and unknown Fremont, and yet 
 he was defeated by James Buchanan. 
 
 Though no man was himself more incorruptible 
 in office, Chase could not help knowing that the 
 state Republican administration, of which he was 
 the titular head, was very corrupt, and that the 
 state treasurer, Gibson, had refused to show his 
 books ; and Ashley wrote : " There has been a very 
 large number of these blood-sucking Republicans 
 
162 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 by name, who have shown that they would ruin not 
 only the party but their nearest friends." Yet it 
 seems to have been an unexpected blow to Chase 
 when in June, 1857, Gibson brazenly and defiantly 
 admitted that $ 500,000 was missing from the state 
 treasury. Chase when roused showed much reso 
 lution, and even invented a new method of removal 
 from office ; for when Gibson refused to resign in 
 order that a successor might be appointed, the gov 
 ernor brought him to terms by threatening to make 
 a vacancy by instituting legal proceedings against 
 him. Still it seemed hard for Chase to admit that 
 embezzlement had been going on among his friends, 
 and he spoke of Gibson as " reckless " and " infat 
 uated," rather than criminal. 
 
 The incident was very dangerous for a party 
 about to enter on a campaign ; hence when pressure 
 was put upon Chase to accept a renomination and 
 head the fight, he could not resist, though he knew 
 that he was taking in his hand his chances for the 
 presidency in 1860. The campaign was more than 
 arduous, it was anxious. Payne of Cleveland, 
 Chase s opponent, tried hard to hold the governor 
 responsible for the Gibson fraud, and is reported 
 to have freely bought votes with money assessed on 
 Buchanan s federal office-holders. The Whigs and 
 Know-Nothings were now completely broken up, 
 and the struggle lay between Republicans and 
 Democrats. Chase was successful by a scanty plu 
 rality of 1500 in a total vote of 330,000 ; but the 
 New York "Evening Post " said of the result : " It 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 163 
 
 is the most complete political victory that the gov 
 ernor has ever achieved." Chase s reelection was 
 a triumph because it set the seal of his own State 
 on his place as a Republican leader. During the 
 next three years, in the State and out of it, he 
 occupied in the Republican party much the same 
 position of general political counselor that he had 
 held in the Liberty party ten years earlier. Even 
 in state affairs he was thinking of national issues, 
 and his second inaugural address was a kind of 
 apostrophe to liberty. He felt himself in a stronger 
 position with the legislature than heretofore. There 
 were no new treasury scandals, and the credit and 
 repute of his State increased ; but a new crop of 
 slavery questions now came up and caused him 
 great trouble. 
 
 On the fugitive slave question the Compromise 
 of 1850 had from the first been a failure : it could 
 not prevent a slave from taking to his heels; it 
 simply stimulated the Underground Railroad to do 
 more business ; and it played into the hands of 
 the abolitionists by furnishing, in nearly all the 
 Northern States, object lessons as to the necessary 
 violence and cruelty of slavery. By taking the 
 execution of the law entirely out of the hands of 
 state officers, the Act of 1850 had only suggested a 
 new batch of " personal liberty laws," passed by 
 Northern States to compel the federal government 
 to do all the work of pursuing the fugitives and 
 securing them in its own buildings. The spectacle 
 of a master laying his hand upon a shaking fugi- 
 
164 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 tive and taking him before a United States com 
 missioner was unpleasant ; and it was still more 
 hateful to the people of the North to see a negro 
 seized by a professional slave -catcher, whom he had 
 never seen before, armed with a power of attorney 
 or a bill of sale ; besides, many people liked the 
 excitement of leading the deputy marshals and 
 their assistants astray, or of defying federal au 
 thority. 
 
 Another self-destructive element in the Fugitive 
 Slave Law was its plain and necessary violation of 
 the ordinary principles of human justice. Under 
 the act, the question whether a man was or was 
 not the fugitive described in the allegation was 
 decided by " summary proceedings," without a 
 jury. If a slave, he was legally subject to the pro 
 cess and had no right to complain ; but if he was a 
 free man, he was entitled to the ordinary protec 
 tion of life and liberty, which this law denied him. 
 A jury trial was what the anti-slavery people con 
 tinually demanded ; but everybody knew that in a 
 free State it was next to impossible to impanel a 
 jury in which twelve members would unite in hold 
 ing any particular negro to be a fugitive or any 
 rescuer to be a criminal ; one might as well expect 
 a Georgia jury to acquit a slave-stealer. In some 
 States personal liberty bilis prescribed a jury trial 
 in defiance of the Act of 1850, or even required 
 state attorneys to defend the negroes claimed. 
 
 On the other side, the Act of 1850 had laid new 
 and severe penalties for interference with capture 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 165 
 
 by " harboring or concealing " the fugitive, or by 
 resisting the pursuer ; in 1852 an attempt was even 
 made, in the Castner Han way case in Philadelphia, 
 to hold resistance to slave-catchers to be construc 
 tive treason, so as to fix upon the crime a death 
 penalty. State governments grew restive over the 
 status of both black and white citizens or residents 
 who were thus swept within the authority of the 
 federal courts on charges growing out of the Fugi 
 tive Slave Law. A favorite method of raising the 
 question as to the rival jurisdictions of State and 
 nation was to get a habeas corpus from a state 
 court, so as to examine the status of alleged fugi 
 tives or their rescuers ; and in 1858, in the famous 
 case of Ableman v. Booth, the Wisconsin Supreme 
 Court hewed through the difficulty of rival jurisdic 
 tion by roundly declaring the Act of 1850 unconsti 
 tutional, and therefore no bar to state proceedings, 
 and no cause for national interference. 
 
 In this exciting controversy Chase was one of 
 the great figures, though by his moderation of con 
 duct he gave much offense to the ultra-abolitionists. 
 Late in March, 1855, he was called as counsel for 
 Kosetta, a colored girl of sixteen, who had been 
 taken from the control of her master, while traveling 
 by rail through Ohio, and declared free by a state 
 court. She was, however, seized by a United States 
 deputy marshal, and from his custody rescued by a 
 writ of habeas corpus, argued before a state court 
 by R. B. Hayes. A second time the marshal seized 
 her. On Chase s advice a test case was made, by 
 
166 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 asking for proceedings for contempt against the 
 marshal ; he was, however, discharged by Justice 
 McLean of the United States court, on the ground 
 that the process authorized by the Fugitive Slave 
 Law was not subject to interference by a state court. 
 To-day it is clear that the federal authorities, in 
 their insistence on the superiority of federal law, 
 were on the side of orderly national life. The 
 Fugitive Slave Law was simply one of the instances 
 in which a proper discretion must include the power 
 to do injustice. 
 
 About two weeks after Chase s inauguration as 
 governor, a slave family named Garner escaped to 
 Cincinnati ; the next day United States Marshal 
 Robinson came to capture them, but the slaves re 
 sisted, and in a frenzy of excitement Margaret 
 Garner seized a butcher s knife and killed her 
 little daughter. The capture of the fugitives was 
 at once traversed by an indictment of the Garners 
 in a state court for murder; nevertheless they 
 were given into the custody of the marshal by 
 habeas corpus proceedings before a United States 
 court, and by him taken before Commissioner Pen- 
 dery, who held them to be fugitives ; thereupon 
 they were forthwith carried to Kentucky and deliv 
 ered to their master. 
 
 These legal proceedings had dragged on for four 
 weeks. The proposed state trial was of course 
 simply a means of holding the negroes out of the 
 master s hands, and was likely to keep up the gen 
 eral excitement over slavery ; for everybody knew 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 167 
 
 that under such circumstances no Ohio jury would 
 convict a slave mother or her accomplices of mur 
 der. The case put Governor Chase into a cruel 
 perplexity. At the beginning he had promised to 
 sanction the process of the state courts " by the 
 whole power at the command of the executive ; " 
 but the final delivery of the fugitives had been 
 hasty and unexpected, and nobody could claim for 
 the negroes that they were not legal slaves. As a 
 last resource, on March 4 he sent a requisition to 
 the governor of Kentucky for the return of the 
 " murderess," arguing with much force that slaves 
 could not be permitted to cross the river into Ohio 
 and there commit crimes with impunity. Governor 
 Morehead of Kentucky granted the request ; but 
 the master had by this time carried the slaves out 
 of his State, and the confidential agent whom Chase 
 sent to buy them reported that Margaret Garner 
 had been sent " down the river." The Kentucky 
 authorities had no wish to examine into the matter 
 again, and no further proceedings could be had. 
 
 In 1864, when the question was again raised by 
 the furious attacks of Wendell Phillips, Chase wrote 
 that Cincinnati was at that time hostile to him, 
 that he was taken by surprise, and that he was in 
 Columbus at the critical moment. The real reason 
 probably lies somewhat deeper ; the governor of a 
 State is bound to exercise more caution than a pri 
 vate man. Chase had formerly been attorney for 
 fugitives ; he was now governor of the whole State, 
 and hence attorney for all its people. In a similar 
 
168 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 case, that of the fugitive Anderson, in 1857, the 
 part which Governor Chase took in the controversy 
 was thus described by himself some years later : 
 
 " Judge Leavitt, at Cincinnati, then issued a 
 writ of habeas corpus directed to the sheriff, re 
 quiring him to produce his prisoners. The writ 
 was obeyed, and application was made to me to 
 have the State represented upon the hearing. I at 
 once directed the attorney-general to appear, who 
 did so, and argued the questions arising in the case 
 with great ability. Mr. Pugh and Mr. Yallandig- 
 ham appeared on the side of the slave-catchers. 
 The result was what was indeed foreseen an 
 order by Judge Leavitt discharging the prisoners. 
 
 "The leading administration paper denounced 
 my action as a declaration of war on the part of 
 Chase and his abolition crew against the United 
 States. I was indifferent to it." 
 
 The matter had grown so serious that in July the 
 governor went to Washington to settle the con 
 troversy. Cass, Secretary of State, had retained a 
 feeling of admiration for Chase from their sena 
 torial days, and he now brought about a meeting 
 with President Buchanan, in which it was agreed 
 that the suits should be dropped on both sides. A 
 few months later, however, Chase, in the canvass 
 for his reelection, took a more belligerent tone. 
 " We have a right," said he, " to have our state 
 laws obeyed. We don t mean to resist federal 
 authority. Just or unjust laws properly adminis 
 tered will be respected. If dissatisfied we will go 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 169 
 
 to the ballot-box and redress our wrongs. But we 
 have rights which the federal government must 
 not invade, rights superior to its power, on which 
 our sovereignty depends ; and we do mean to assert 
 these rights against all tyrannical assumption of 
 authority. I know not what will be done in Cham 
 paign County. The courts will determine that. 
 But I do know that if the marshals who violate our 
 laws are indicted and the writs for their arrest are 
 placed in the hands of our state officers they shall 
 be executed. And we expect the federal govern 
 ment to submit." 
 
 The next year the validity of state process when 
 opposed to national was put to another test. In 
 September, 1858, a fugitive slave, John Price, was 
 rescued out of the hands of his claimants by an 
 armed mob of Oberlin people. The proceedings 
 dragged on till the summer of 1859, when two of 
 the rescuers were convicted. Meantime applica 
 tion had been brought before the Ohio Supreme 
 Court to grant a habeas corpus to inquire into the 
 status of the two convicted men, a step which 
 would practically mean raising the question of the 
 constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law. May 
 24, 1859, a mass meeting was held at Cleveland to 
 protest against the convictions. Governor Chase 
 came, and threw the weight of his official influence 
 against violence, and also against the Fugitive 
 Slave Law. His first words, " Citizens of Cleve 
 land ! law-abiding citizens of Cleveland ! " struck 
 a responsive chord in the meeting, and made it 
 
170 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 easy for him to add : " I will only say what I have 
 frequently said before, that as long as the State of 
 Ohio remains a sovereignty, and as long as I am 
 her chief executive, the process of her courts shall 
 be executed. The process of the United States 
 courts must not be slighted or resisted; but as 
 long as I represent the sovereignty of our State, I 
 will see that the process of our state courts shall 
 not be interfered with or resisted, but shall be fully 
 enforced." 
 
 The state Supreme Court stood three to two 
 against interfering ; whereupon the next Republi 
 can convention punished one of the three, Judge 
 Swan, by refusing him a renomination. Mean 
 while one of the counsel for the prisoners, A. G. 
 Riddle, had made an effective use of state process : 
 the capturers of John Price had been indicted for 
 kidnapping, and as their man was gone they could 
 not prove that he was the person described in their 
 papers. They would be tried in the same county 
 in which Oberlin lay, and they might count on a 
 unanimous and hostile jury. The administration 
 now showed its interest in the whole controversy 
 by sending Attorney-General Black to look into the 
 cases ; and when Riddle proposed to him to aban 
 don the kidnapping suits, if all the suits against 
 the rescuers were discontinued, the astute Phila 
 delphia lawyer saw nothing else for it. This result 
 was summed up by an administration organ in 
 the caustic words : " So the government has been 
 beaten at last, with law, justice, and facts all on 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 171 
 
 its side, and Oberlin, with its relentless, higher- 
 law creed, is triumphant." 
 
 The period of Chase s governorship was also a 
 period of great influence and usefulness in national 
 questions of slavery, especially on " Bleeding Kan 
 sas." Douglas s moral obtuseness had played him 
 a trick when he brought forward the repeal of 
 the Missouri Compromise. He not only failed to 
 foresee the indignation of the North, but he also 
 left out of his calculations the probability that 
 Kansas, the southern of the two new Territories, 
 might be controlled by free-state men. When the 
 Southerners saw the danger of its slipping out of 
 their grasp, they naturally held Douglas responsi 
 ble ; and he, in his wrath at the practical workings 
 of popular sovereignty, could only reply that " the 
 whole trouble in Kansas was due to the Emigrant 
 Aid Societies." In November, 1854, the first ter 
 ritorial election showed 2000 votes from a commu 
 nity with only 1200 voters, and in March, 1855, 
 a territorial legislature was chosen by the most 
 shameless intimidation and fraud. Throughout 
 1855 and 1856 Chase was in communication with 
 the men in* Kansas who were trying to undo this 
 wrong, writing letters of counsel and comfort, 
 rousing energy, promising "good rifles," and in 
 public speeches denouncing the policy of the suc 
 cessive presidents, Pierce and Buchanan. 
 
 Fortunately for Kansas and for the country, the 
 national House of Representatives from 1855 to 
 1857 had a majority of anti-Nebraska men, who 
 
172 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 could and did restrain any action by Congress in 
 favor of the pro-slavery domination of Kansas. 
 When, in July, 1856, a local civil war broke out in 
 Kansas, Governor Chase wrote, in the fiercest indig 
 nation, to Governor Grimes of Iowa : " We must 
 not sit still while our brethren in Kansas are in 
 such imminent peril. You are nearest of all the 
 free-state governors to the theatre of action. . . . 
 It seems to me that no time should be lost and no 
 efforts spared in sending out men fully provided, 
 who will remain in the Territory as actual settlers 
 . . . should the pro-slavery men of western Mis 
 souri and other States again invade Kansas . . . 
 every sentiment of honor and every obligation of 
 duty requires us to give our outraged brethren 
 . . . prompt and efficient succor, without reference 
 to settlement." 
 
 This was not the only suggestion of civil war 
 made by Chase. When Charles Robinson, titular 
 free-state governor of Kansas, called on some of 
 the Eastern governors for support, Chase took the 
 responsibility of sending to the Ohio legislature a 
 stirring message, in which he recounted the wrongs 
 of the Ohio men in Kansas, and rose to the em 
 phatic declaration : " These representations cannot 
 be properly disregarded. As an equal member of 
 the confederacy, Ohio is entitled to demand for her 
 citizens, emigrating to the Territories, free ingress 
 and egress by the ordinary routes and complete 
 protection from invasion, from usurpation, and 
 from lawless violence. If the general government 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 173 
 
 refuse this protection, I cannot doubt the right or 
 the duty of the State to intervene." 
 
 One of the purposes of the Dred Scott decision 
 of March, 1857, was to tie the hands of the free- 
 state men in Kansas, and of their adherents every 
 where. But Chase, the future chief justice, had 
 long entertained and several times expounded his 
 want of confidence in the Supreme Court. In May, 
 1847, he wrote to Hale in protest at the pro-slavery 
 construction of the Constitution : " The people will 
 overthrow it if they have to overthrow the courts 
 too." In his Syracuse speech of August, 1853, he 
 pointed out how there came to be a permanent ma 
 jority of pro-slavery justices, adding, " I take it 
 upon myself to question, and with some degree of 
 boldness, the decision of the court upon the subject 
 of the Fugitive Slave Act ; " and in many public 
 utterances of 1858 and 1859 he repeated his dis 
 sent from the doctrine that slavery must go into 
 the Territories, and his intention to disregard the 
 decrees of the Supreme Court. 
 
 On the question of the Lecompton constitution, 
 in 1858 Chase, like most of his friends, was be 
 fogged ; and he wrote a letter advising the Kansas 
 men to accept it, and then take possession of the 
 new state government and amend their constitution 
 at their leisure. For this counsel Chase was less 
 blamable, because the Republicans in Congress 
 failed to comprehend that the issue was one of prin 
 ciple, and that the Eepublicans could not vote to 
 admit a slave State at any time, whatever the pro- 
 
174 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 spect of its changing its status later, without under 
 mining the foundation of their party. Douglas s 
 opposition to the Lecompton outrage even deceived 
 many good Republicans into supposing that he was 
 about to take their ground, and Horace Greeley 
 urged the Illinois Republicans to drop Lincoln and 
 let Douglas go back to the Senate. But in Decem 
 ber, 1857, Chase wrote : ki I expect little from the 
 Douglas demonstration. He has no solid base in 
 him. He may bluster, but he will not grapple 
 with the slave power ; " and again in November, 
 1859, " The great error in respect to Douglas was 
 that of ... giving him the lead in the anti-Le- 
 compton fight, leaving the Republican senators and 
 representatives only a secondary place, and giving 
 to the country the impression that they were about 
 ready to adopt his doctrine that slavery is as good 
 as freedom, if a majority of qualified voters say so." 
 
 One of the greatest characters in the anti-slavery 
 struggle now appears in direct relations with Chase. 
 In December, 1856, Chase indorsed a recommen 
 dation of Charles Robinson, commending Captain 
 John Brown to the confidence of the friends of Kan 
 sas. In 1857 he subscribed twenty-five dollars for 
 Brown s use, and later he received the following 
 very characteristic letter, sent from Tabor, Iowa, 
 under date of September 10, 1857. 
 
 " Enclosed please find First number of a series 
 of Tracts which have lately been gotten up here. 
 Your frank opinion of it is respectfully asked (not 
 for any kind of publication). My principle object 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 175 
 
 in again troubling you, is to say that / am in im 
 mediate want of from Five Hundred to One Thou 
 sand Dollars for Secret service and no questions 
 asked. I want the friends of Freedom to prove 
 me now herewith. WILL YOU exert your influence 
 to have it made up : in your own hands, subject 
 to my order: or placed in the hands of any suit 
 able, and responsible man you may name ? 
 
 " Please write me or have some person write me, 
 directing Envelope to Jonas Jones Esqr of this 
 place. 
 
 " Very Respectfully Your Friend, 
 
 " JOHN BROWN. 
 
 " Friend J. Jr. will inclose this anew to destina 
 tion at once." 
 
 Like others of John Brown s correspondents, 
 East and West, Chase had shut his eyes to the 
 use that might be made of his subscription, and 
 he was startled by the news of the Harper s Ferry 
 raid in October, 1859. The New York " Herald " 
 accused him of being a party to the conspiracy, 
 a charge which Chase always denied ; but he was 
 drawn into the controversy by a letter of Governor 
 Wise of Virginia, complaining that armed expedi 
 tions were forming in Ohio (presumably for the 
 rescue of Brown), and warning him, " If another 
 invasion should assail the State of Virginia, I 
 shall pursue the invaders into any territory, and 
 punish them wherever they can be reached by 
 arms." Chase quietly replied that Ohio could not 
 " consent to the invasion of her territory by armed 
 
176 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 bodies from other States ; " and with this exchange 
 of defiances the matter was dropped. 
 
 From the above account of Chase s four years 
 as governor, it appears that his chief activity and 
 his interests were, as they had been for the twenty 
 years previous, in the anti-slavery cause. His most 
 important addresses and messages to the Ohio legis 
 lature turned on slavery and on national questions 
 arising out of slavery ; the most stirring events 
 within his State were phases of slavery ; his place 
 as a national leader was due to his eminence as an 
 anti-slavery man ; his warmest personal friends and 
 correspondents were anti-slavery men, and many 
 of them abolitionists. While Seward said strong 
 things and then tempered them, while men like 
 Henry Wilson sought to find other issues for the 
 Kepublican party, while Douglas was reflected sen 
 ator from Illinois on the programme of not caring 
 whether slavery was voted down or voted up, Chase 
 stood out unswervingly as a political abolitionist. 
 
 It is true that while governor he smoothed down 
 his utterances, and avoided making the issue with 
 the general government which his radical friends 
 desired ; but to his mind the great question before 
 the people of the United States was the extension 
 of slavery beyond the limits of the existing slave 
 States, and his influence, voice, and purse were 
 unwaveringly against the taking of fugitives, or the 
 introduction of slavery into the Territories. Sum- 
 ner and Giddings may have had more violent con 
 victions, but neither of them held so prominent a 
 
THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNOR 177 
 
 station as Chase. Seward, Cameron, and Thurlow 
 Weed had more influence in determining the policy 
 of the Republican party, but there was not in the 
 whole country in 1860 any man who had so high a 
 reputation as Chase for long, unceasing opposition 
 to the powers of slavery, through political means. 
 If the Republican party intended in the campaign 
 of 1860 to nominate a man whose name was a plat 
 form, he was the man. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE ELECTION OF 1860 
 
 CHASE S reelection in 1857 showed greater Re 
 publican vitality in Ohio than in some other 
 States, for the party in general lost ground that 
 year. In the congressional elections of 1858, how 
 ever, the Republicans for the first time secured a 
 working majority in the House of Representatives, 
 the House which was to sit from 1859 to 1861 ; 
 and Buchanan took so crushing a rebuke in his own 
 State of Pennsylvania that he himself dolefully 
 said of it : " Our defeat is so complete as to be 
 absurd." As 1860 came in, therefore, the Republi 
 cans were alert and confident : with an available 
 candidate, a safe platform, and prudent manage 
 ment of the campaign, they ought to hold and even 
 increase their vote, especially since their opponents 
 were so disunited that Jefferson Davis, as repre 
 sentative of the Southern wing, had refused fellow 
 ship to Douglas. 
 
 Manoeuvres for the Republican nominations 
 began very early, and Chase conducted in his own 
 behalf a long and anxious preliminary canvass, 
 which throws much interesting light on the me 
 thods of bringing a presidential candidate before 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 179 
 
 the public. For example, in April, 1857, he chides 
 a correspondent for speaking too well of Fremont, 
 and bids him remember that " there is no hope for 
 our cause in the future unless there is a clear mani 
 festation of confidence in our principles and in the 
 men whom the common voice declares to be the 
 true representatives of them." By September, 
 1857, scattered correspondents begin to announce 
 that they will support him for the presidency ; and 
 in November, just after his reelection as governor, 
 Chase himself says : " At present it looks to me as 
 if I might secure it." 
 
 From this time on, though busy as governor, fre 
 quent in counsels on national affairs, and stunned 
 like all his countrymen by the din of the Lecomp- 
 ton controversy, Chase sets himself steadily to in 
 spirit his friends and to impress the public. He 
 revives a plan for a campaign life of himself, which 
 had been projected in 1856 ; he asks his followers 
 to say " good words in correspondence, by the pen, 
 and in conversation till the time shall call for a 
 public movement ; " he stirs up his old friends the 
 newspaper men ; he goes to Commencement at 
 Dartmouth College for the first time in thirty- 
 two years, and is gratified by the cordial feeling in 
 his favor which he thinks he finds in New Hamp 
 shire ; he eats a " complimentary dinner to Gov 
 ernor Chase " at the Parker House in Boston, and 
 keeps the bill of fare. In Ohio everything seems to 
 his satisfaction ; old rivals take the field for him 
 with enthusiasm ; and he learns that the Republi- 
 
180 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 can congressmen from Ohio are for him. In other 
 parts of the country, West and East, he renews 
 correspondence and finds friends. " Governor " 
 Charles Eobinson writes favorably from Kansas ; 
 in Pennsylvania, Joshua Hanna, a Pittsburg 
 banker, and a warm personal friend, works stead 
 ily ; since Sumner has been disabled by Brooks, 
 no man in New England has much interest in him 
 except Pierce, who does intelligent work, and 
 writes candid and discouraging letters about the 
 prospect ; New York is Seward s stronghold, but 
 Chase has there a devoted lieutenant in James H. 
 Briggs, whom he has appointed to the valuable 
 office of financial agent of Ohio. Nevertheless, 
 Chase appears to be the only really energetic sup 
 porter of Chase; at the end of the year he can 
 count up more intrigues of rivals than new sup 
 porters. 
 
 During 1858 Chase became interested in the con 
 test in Illinois, and stumped the State for the Re 
 publican state ticket, but neither he nor his corre 
 spondents mention the local politician who was 
 contesting the Illinois senatorship against Douglas, 
 or appear to have recognized any rivalry from that 
 quarter. Like many other Republicans, however, 
 Chase did discover that there was an intrigue, in 
 which Schuyler Colfax had a leading part, to make 
 Douglas the Republican candidate in 1860. As to 
 Seward, Chase s friends thought, as was the case, 
 that he had injured himself by his " irrepressible 
 conflict " speech at Rochester ; and the " New York 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 181 
 
 Tribune" and the " Independent " were supposed 
 to be against him. Thus far the Ohio man was at 
 least holding his own as a candidate. 
 
 During 1859 it became important to Chase to 
 keep his standing as a man in public life by show 
 ing his strength in Ohio after the expiration of his 
 governorship. He was therefore much gratified 
 when, on February 3, 1860, he was elected senator 
 of the United States for the term beginning March 
 4, 1861. By this time the elements of the presi 
 dential contest were more clearly revealed, and a 
 new and very troublesome question arose, that 
 of Chase s opinions on the tariff. From Rhode 
 Island, from New York, and from Pennsylvania 
 came reports that he was considered unsound on 
 protection. This objection was one of the unavoid 
 able results of his candid belief in the Democratic 
 doctrine of " as little government as possible." He 
 had approved the tariff policy of 1846 ; in many 
 public utterances he had expressed his adherence to 
 the Democratic doctrines as to trade ; and probably 
 he still believed them to be the best ; so that he 
 was hard put to it to know what to say or do. Iiv 
 the Northwest, which was recognized as a weak 
 spot for Chase, a few of his friends were trying to 
 work up a sentiment for him, and reported hope 
 fully. 
 
 The rival candidates now began to come out 
 more distinctly : Banks, in Massachusetts, already 
 almost overborne by his adhesion to remnants of 
 Know-Nothingism ; Cameron, in Pennsylvania ; F. 
 
182 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 P. Blair, patron of Fremont in 1856, had de 
 serted his candidate, and was now pushing hard 
 for Bates of Missouri, who was advertised as able 
 to carry the border States along with the North. 
 Chase s lively counselor, James M. Ashley, pro 
 posed to head off this wicked plot against a West 
 ern candidate s chances by " letting our friends in 
 Illinois put Lincoln on the track ; " but an Illinois 
 editor wrote that his own ticket was " Chase and 
 Lincoln," for there seemed to be an impression 
 that, whoever headed the ticket, Lincoln was likely 
 to be vice-president. 
 
 In his own State Chase had not the warm sup 
 port of any of the recognized party leaders or great 
 newspapers ; but he counted on the good will of the 
 Germans, and felt sure of a unanimous delegation 
 to the national convention. One of his correspond 
 ents felt so much confidence in the future that he 
 asked to be made minister to Persia ; and another 
 so far overestimated Chase s influence on the in 
 coming national House of Representatives, in which 
 there was a Republican majority, as to cry : " I 
 just ache to have the position of clerk, with 20 or 
 30 subs of my own appointment." All that can be 
 said of Chase s chances at the end of 1859 is that 
 he was a man of presidential timber and a founder 
 of the Republican party, who nevertheless was 
 looked upon as a stranger by the leaders of his own 
 party, and seemed to have a poorer chance than 
 any one of half a dozen lesser men. 
 
 In the spring of 1860 came the real struggle. 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 183 
 
 Looking back forty years, we speak of " the Re 
 publican party of 1860," as we might speak of the 
 " Federal party of 1800," or the " Whig party of 
 1840." In reality there was as yet hardly more 
 than a coalition ; in 1854-55 a common term had 
 been " Fusion party ; " in 1856 the Native Ameri 
 cans were almost as important as the Republicans ; 
 in 1860 the former Whigs, former Democrats, and 
 former Know-Nothings, now united as Republicans, 
 had no tradition of common principles or common 
 leaders, and were still jealous of each other and 
 often hostile. They came together like Highland 
 clans for a common fight, marching side by side 
 with men who a short time before had dented their 
 shields and hewn at their heads. Every man sug 
 gested for the nomination was therefore tested by 
 his power to attract, or his likelihood to repel, 
 Conscience Whigs and Cotton Whigs and Hunker 
 Democrats and old Free-Soilers and ultra-aboli 
 tionists, Irish and Germans and Nativists. Hence 
 the strength of a movement for a man like Bates, 
 who hoped to draw the border-state vote because he 
 was an old slaveholder, and to satisfy the aboli 
 tionists because he had emancipated his slaves, to 
 carry Pennsylvania because he was a tariff man, 
 and to sweep Vermont because he was an old 
 Whig. Hence the weakness of a man like Sew- 
 ard, who had assaulted the Democrats in Congress 
 and on the stump ; and of a man like Chase, who 
 had deprived the Whigs of the Ohio senatorship 
 in 1849. As the months drew on, however, the 
 
184 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Chase men believed that the contest was really 
 narrowing to two candidates, the New York and 
 Ohio champions. 
 
 Seward was Chase s most dangerous rival, 
 through both his good and his bad qualities. He 
 was good-natured, companionable, and attractive ; 
 he had had long experience in public life, and 
 was known from end to end of the country ; he was 
 naturally a warm advocate of freedom, and he 
 had gone further than Chase or any other leading 
 Republican in the phrasing of extreme anti-slavery 
 views, especially in his "higher law" speech of 
 1850 and in his "irrepressible conflict" speech 
 of 1858. On the other hand, he Was not a leader in 
 legislation or in organizing resistance to slavery 
 in Congress ; he had a habit of withdrawing or 
 altering his most radical utterances, and he was a 
 very late comer into the Republican party, and 
 might still pass as a radical but reclaimable Whig. 
 
 The chief objection to Seward was the atmo 
 sphere of political corruption which surrounded 
 him. The outcome of the Chicago Convention of 
 1860 cannot be understood without knowing some 
 thing of the frame of mind in which honorable 
 men outside New York, and a small but very de 
 termined band of Republicans within the State, 
 looked upon the regime of Thurlow Weed and his 
 management of Seward. Throughout the canvass 
 suggestions were thrown out that Seward was 
 unavailable because of his friends. Thus, Charles 
 Robinson of Kansas wrote February 3, 1860 : " He 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 185 
 
 is the spendthrift of the party, politically, I mean, 
 and would take from us all arguments against 
 the former corrupt and extravagant administration, 
 and is supported so far as I can learn chiefly by 
 the spoilsmen, who would destroy the party in four 
 years should they get the government with their 
 candidate at the head." H. B. Stanton, a New 
 York delegate who voted for Seward in the Chicago 
 Convention, wrote in July, 1860 : " New York 
 Republicanism has been made a reproach, a by 
 word, by the rascally conduct of our state legisla 
 ture, under the lead of Weed." Even cautious 
 Chase, in a letter of May 10, 1860, said: "If 
 Albany is to be transferred to Washington, the 
 party cannot succeed." In a long and careful let 
 ter of March 27, 1861, R. Campbell, then a New 
 York state senator, thus described Seward s polit 
 ical manager, the New York boss of that time : 
 
 " You can only faintly imagine the extent and 
 ramification of the machinery of that section of our 
 party which acknowledges Mr. Weed as its leader. 
 
 " Pardon me for this personal allusion ; I would 
 ignore it if I could, and never mention it, were it 
 not that in so doing I should stultify my convic 
 tions and become a party to the speedy downfall of 
 Republicanism in this State. Believe me when I 
 assure you that I have not the least feeling person 
 ally against Mr. Weed. He has his good qualities, 
 which I believe I know how to appreciate, and yet 
 is the worst man in our party in this State in the 
 light of influence. 
 
186 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 " To explain to you the means which he resorts 
 to, to control the primary meetings throughout the 
 entire State, his system of levying assessments and 
 holding office to refer to the horde of political 
 pensioners, dependents, and expectants which he 
 has quartered upon our party, and to explain how 
 by these and kindred resorts he has all along con 
 trolled state and local conventions, and, in short, 
 defeated every wish of the better portion of our 
 party, would only be elaborating upon what you 
 can anticipate. . . . 
 
 "Now, dear Governor, I have no other desire 
 than to retire to private life at the earliest possible 
 period. I never asked or desired office, nor have I 
 anything now to ask of Mr. Barney for myself or 
 a single relative on earth. 
 
 " I nevertheless desire to see Mr. Weed s power 
 entirely broken in this State. I desire this, first, 
 because the great majority of the men under his 
 control are mere vassals, and large numbers of 
 them are a disgrace to our party. I desire this 
 because he makes use of favoritism to destroy the 
 political integrity of our entire party. I desire it 
 because I believe in wholesome legislation, in a 
 just, honest, and virtuous administration of public 
 affairs, and because I hate thieving, and utterly 
 abhor an organized system of profligacy and cor 
 ruption. 
 
 " And now let me assure you that I do not 
 believe our ills can be abated by any other means 
 than by keeping these dependents of Mr. Weed 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 187 
 
 just where they would keep all of our friends 
 had they the power, out of office. I do not be 
 lieve in proscription, nor would I advise it in any 
 ordinary case. Depend upon it, however, this is 
 no ordinary case. Every one of these dependents 
 and vassals of Weed are so abject in service that 
 they do nothing else than foster faction continu 
 ally. Whenever appointed to office through his 
 influence, they seem to become his property. 
 
 " A great popular movement is on foot to break 
 forever the power of this unscrupulous political 
 tyrant. That movement is sure to prove success 
 ful. The breaking of that power would disenthrall 
 our party, and restore to the people their represen 
 tative rights." 
 
 Of the other candidates, the one whom Chase 
 and his friends most feared was Bates, as the only 
 Westerner who was likely to compete with Chase 
 for votes wrested from Seward. Cameron s candi 
 dacy none of the Chase men took seriously ; they 
 reasoned that if there were any Eastern nominee 
 it would be Seward. Banks they placated, in the 
 hope that when he realized that he was out of the 
 race he would turn his friends to them instead of 
 to Seward. Lincoln Chase never looked upon as 
 a rival until the day of the convention ; on the con 
 trary, in March, 1860, his lieutenant, Briggs, re 
 ported among other small matters : " Mr. Lincoln 
 of Illinois told me that [he] had a very warm side 
 towards you, for of all the prominent Republicans 
 you were the only one who gave him aid and com- 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
188 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 fort. I urged him by all means to attend the 
 convention. I was pleased with him, I paid him 
 all the attention I could, went with him to hear 
 Mr. Beecher and Dr. Chapin. Mr. Barney went 
 with him to the 4 House of Industry at the Five 
 Points, and then took him home to tea. He was 
 very much pleased with Mr. Barney." Neither 
 Chase nor Barney suspected that within a year the 
 big, modest, friendless visitor, to whom they had 
 exhibited the splendors of the metropolis, would be 
 in a position to requite this kindness by giving 
 Barney the great prize of the collectorship of New 
 York. 
 
 In the early months of 1860 came the choice of 
 delegates, and Chase kept careful watch of the 
 state conventions, preserving a list of delegates 
 elect, on which appear such memoranda as the fol 
 lowing: "California Leland Stanford of Sacra 
 mento and Charles Watrous of San Francisco, will 
 have great influence. The first choice of delegates, 
 Seward ; second, Chase in favor of any well- 
 known Republican and opposed to any old fogy;" 
 " New York George W. Curtis, the author, for 
 Seward first, with a warm side for C." Little 
 comfort, however, was to be had from the choice 
 of delegates. New York sent a solid delegation 
 of Seward men ; Pennsylvania, except six dele 
 gates, of Cameron men (to leave their candidate 
 when the expected consideration was offered) ; Illi 
 nois, of Lincoln men. In order to have any hope 
 of nomination or any standing in the convention, 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 189 
 
 Chase must also have a unanimous and interested 
 delegation from Ohio. On March 3 the Ohio 
 Kepublican convention did indeed vote by 385 to 
 69 that Salmon P. Chase was the first choice of 
 Ohio, but it relegated the choice of delegates to 
 the local conventions, and thus designedly gave 
 the opportunity for Chase s enemies to send men 
 unpledged, or even opposed to him. Although 
 Chase did not realize it, by this action his last 
 chance was gone, many weeks before the Chicago 
 Convention met. 
 
 Through the district conventions several former 
 anti-Chase men got in. Old Judge McLean could 
 neither give up his presidential hopes nor forgive 
 Chase for his part against him in the Free-Soil 
 contest of 1848, and he picked up some delegates 
 in southern Ohio. Senator Wade had his own 
 views as to who was the ablest Eepublican in Ohio, 
 and his friends got delegates in northern Ohio, 
 especially D. K. Cartter of Cleveland, later chief 
 justice of the District of Columbia. Although 
 Hoadly, one of Chase s nearest friends, had warned 
 him in February that he did not stand the slightest 
 chance, Chase was buoyant, and ten days before 
 the Chicago Convention was sure that the Ohio 
 delegates would vote solidly for him, and that he 
 would be nominated, if his friends " had the means 
 and the activity used by Mr. Seward s." 
 
 As the time for the convention approached, 
 Chase found a few friends and stanch delegates 
 from other States ; but he got glimpses also of a 
 
190 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 stratum of intrigue into which he could not de 
 scend. The Spragues were said to have bought the 
 Rhode Island state election for $100,000, and some 
 of the Rhode Island delegates were " purchasable ; " 
 some delegates from Iowa were " on the trading 
 tack," and in Indiana there was a " floating and 
 marketable vote." A Philadelphia editor wrote to 
 him with unblushing frankness that he had worked 
 for Cameron, but that "if any little sub-contract 
 could be given us which would enable us to realize 
 a little profit, we would endeavor to serve Ohio to 
 the full extent of our ability." But neither Rhode 
 Island, Pennsylvania, Iowa, nor Indiana gave any 
 votes for Chase at Chicago. 
 
 The convention which met at Chicago on May 
 16, 1860, was a tumultuous body, excited by the 
 roars of an unusual number of spectators. The 
 state elections of 1859 and early 1860 made it 
 practically certain that all New England would 
 give its electoral vote for any man nominated in 
 Chicago ; the Northwestern States Michigan, 
 Wisconsin, Iowa, and the recently admitted Min 
 nesota seemed also safe. Hence the fighting 
 had to be done in the six doubtful States between 
 the ocean and the Mississippi, New York, New 
 Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. 
 Out of these, only New York and Ohio had been 
 Republican in 1856 ; and Illinois was Douglas s 
 State, and had been carried for him in 1858. 
 Hence the problem before the convention, or rather 
 before the controlling spirits among the delegates, 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 191 
 
 was really, Who can carry all the States of Penn 
 sylvania, Indiana, and Illinois? 
 
 The Seward men were confident that their can 
 didate could carry anything, and the New York 
 delegation of 70 was backed up by a great and 
 enthusiastic band of politicians who argued, shouted, 
 and paraded uproariously. Edward L. Pierce, one 
 of the few earnest Chase men in New England, was 
 bottled up in the Massachusetts delegation, and had 
 to vote for Seward. The Seward men could at 
 the outset count up nearly 200 delegates out of the 
 233 necessary to nominate ; but there were two 
 weak elements in their calculations, the unde 
 served reputation of their candidate as an extreme 
 anti-slavery man, and the relentless hostility of 
 Greeley and some other New York Republicans. 
 
 The next candidate in apparent strength was 
 Chase ; the Ohio delegation of 46 was inferior in 
 size only to those of Pennsylvania and New York ; 
 coming from a Western State, it could appeal to a 
 growing conviction that a Western man must be 
 found to confront Douglas. The situation had 
 some strength, in case it should be found that 
 Seward could get no majority. Therefore Chase s 
 friends made the most of his integrity of character 
 as compared with Seward s loose financial admin 
 istration, of his unwavering devotion to anti-slavery 
 as compared with Cameron s recent conversion, and 
 of his proved ability as a public officer as compared 
 with Lincoln s inexperience. Just before the con 
 vention George Opdyke of New York urged the 
 
192 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 nomination of Chase as a former Democrat, and 
 hence likely to draw from Douglas ; he was confi 
 dent that a combination of Chase s friends with the 
 Banks men and the Blairs could control the con 
 vention. 
 
 But Chase was now to learn the bitter lesson 
 that the approval of a popular vote in Ohio, twice 
 given, did not secure for him the cordial aid of all 
 the Ohio Kepublicans. The old Whig element had 
 never forgiven him for his combination with the 
 Democrats in the senatorial election twelve years 
 before ; his use of his scanty patronage as governor 
 had made some new enemies ; and he had not the 
 art of disarming opponents by suavity and tact. 
 Had there been an Ohio manager at this juncture 
 to compel the forces of the State to pull in the 
 same parallel ; and above all had Chase ever gained 
 the friendship and confidence of the Republican 
 leaders in other States, senators, congressmen, 
 governors, and chieftains, he might perhaps have 
 been nominated, notwithstanding his reputation for 
 abolitionism. 
 
 On the very first ballot in the convention, it was 
 seen that Chase was out of the race. The Ohio 
 delegation was divided, Chase receiving only 34 
 out of 46, and the total Chase vote was only 49 
 out of 465. On the second ballot, since there was 
 no rally ing-point in the Ohio delegation, Chase sank 
 to 42|, and on the third ballot only 15 Ohio men 
 still adhered to him. This danger of a divided 
 Ohio vote had been foreseen ; and inasmuch as the 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 193 
 
 favorable recommendation of the Ohio state con 
 vention was not accepted as an instruction, Chase 
 had urged his friends to secure a vote of the dele 
 gation pledging a unit rule. The Ohio delegation, 
 wrote a correspondent to Chase, " shut themselves 
 up discussing what it was impossible to determine 
 beforehand, how long they should vote for you 
 as a unit, and what other Ohio man they should 
 vote for as a unit. This continued Tuesday, 
 Wednesday, and part of Thursday. Then when 
 they determined to vote their preferences they 
 worked some. But in the meantime those bent on 
 defeating Seward combined to a great extent on 
 Lincoln." 
 
 Delegates who attended these long sessions have 
 revealed the secret of the division in Ohio. Against 
 the proposed unit rule, which was Chase s sole 
 chance, some of Chase s warm adherents voted, 
 because on arrival in Chicago they found that so 
 many men were saying that Chase could not carry 
 the doubtful States, or even Ohio, that they lost 
 heart ; and they feared that when Chase was out of 
 the way, Wade with his many friends in the Ohio 
 delegation would sweep the Western delegates. An 
 other element of Chase s ablest supporters, David 
 Dudley Field, Hiram Barney, and George Opdyke 
 of New York, when they found his weakness in 
 Ohio, went over to the most promising candidate 
 then available, that is, to Lincoln ; and thus Chase 
 suddenly lost support both in and out of his State. 
 
 That the danger from Wade was overestimated, 
 
194 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 and perhaps imaginary, seems almost certain, as 
 we look back on the affair. Wade was an old 
 Whig, a very violent partisan, of rough and bois 
 terous temper, without the prestige of support by 
 his own state convention. If Chase were really 
 out of the way, Lincoln was the strongest Western 
 candidate and the one most acceptable to Chase ; 
 Lincoln was also the second choice of Indiana and 
 Pennsylvania, the two States which really had a 
 right to insist on a nomination which would satisfy 
 them, because their vote was indispensable. Al 
 though correspondents assured Chase that nine 
 tenths of the Republican voters in Ohio desired 
 his nomination, an intimate friend in the conven 
 tion told him that there were "not more than a 
 dozen of the whole delegation earnestly desiring or 
 working for you ; " and Brinkerhoff said : " The 
 truth is, the old Whigs of this State are extremely 
 hostile to you ; even [John] Sherman, who is as 
 liberal a Whig of the old school as I know of, and 
 has a high regard for you, yet I am satisfied is 
 secretly a Seward man." 
 
 The turn of the votes, however, gave Chase s 
 friends a chance to do a service to Lincoln. At 
 the end of the third ballot, when he lacked one 
 and a half votes of a nomination, four votes were 
 suddenly transferred to him by Ohio delegates, 
 for reasons thus frankly explained to Chase by one 
 of the delegation : " The fifteen adhering to you 
 had it in their power to nominate Mr. Lincoln and 
 did it. This places us in good position with the 
 
THE ELECTION OF 1860 195 
 
 Illinois delegation, and leaves you right with the 
 incoming administration." 
 
 That Lincoln felt amicably was shown a few 
 days later by a remark which he made about Chase 
 to George Opdyke : "I prefer him to myself ; 
 for Dr. Branford says Governor Chase combines 
 greater executive, administrative and high states 
 manlike ability than any man living." In May, 
 1861, Chase wrote a cordial note of congratula 
 tion to Lincoln, in which, however, he could not 
 forbear saying : " I err greatly in my estimation 
 of your magnanimity if you do not condemn, as I 
 do, the conduct of delegates from whatever State 
 who disregard, while acting as such, the clearly 
 expounded preference of their own state conven 
 tion." 
 
 Chase had come nearer to the coveted dignity 
 than he was ever again to come, for this was the 
 last time that he had any votes in a Republican 
 nominating convention. His very greatness made 
 him a weak candidate ; he does not appear to have 
 made the slightest concession or concealment of 
 his principles, further than to recommend a plat 
 form of generalities and a candidate " whose name 
 would be a platform." None of his correspondents 
 refer even to the usual promises of cabinet places 
 and other offices as a means of influencing votes. 
 Chase, like Lincoln, had no body of rich and 
 powerful friends to make a campaign for him. 
 His situation and his chances are well summed up 
 in the apothegm of a friend : " If the Republican 
 
196 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 party is consistent, it will nominate Seward, and 
 if it is not consistent, it won t nominate you." 
 
 In the campaign Chase was active, but not con 
 spicuous. His State, by its Republican plurality 
 of 21,000 in October, presaged a triumph in No 
 vember. When, therefore, on November 6, Lin 
 coln and Hamlin got 180 of the 303 electoral votes, 
 it was found that Ohio gave Lincoln a plurality 
 of 44,000 over Douglas, and a clear majority of 
 21,000. It has often been said that Lincoln s elec 
 tion was due to the Democratic split and the exist 
 ence of four tickets. Study of the returns, how 
 ever, shows that had Lincoln or Chase or any other 
 respectable Republican been the candidate against 
 Douglas alone, or Breckinridge alone, or Bell alone, 
 or any two of these candidates, he would still have 
 been elected by small Republican majorities in the 
 free States; for in every Northern State except 
 New Jersey, California, and Oregon, Lincoln had 
 more votes than his three adversaries combined. 
 
 To Chase the result was, notwithstanding his 
 personal disappointment, the crowning of his life 
 work up to that time. The day after the election 
 he wrote to Pierce : " How superb is the Republi 
 can triumph ! At length the first of the great 
 wishes of my life is accomplished. The slave 
 power is overthrown. When will the other, namely 
 the denationalization of slavery and the consequent 
 initiation of emancipation by state action, be re 
 alized?" 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 
 
 "THE very first thing that I settled in my 
 mind," said Lincoln in an account of the result of 
 the election of 1860, "was that these two great 
 leaders of the party should occupy the two first 
 places in my cabinet." The two great leaders 
 were Seward and Chase, and the first places were 
 the State Department and the Treasury; but it 
 was not till after Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated as 
 President, in March, 1861, that he could count un 
 reservedly upon the services of either of the two 
 men. While he " was musing the fire burned ; " 
 before he could frame a policy or form a cabinet, 
 the country had begun to shrink, and on the day 
 of his inauguration fourteen seats in the Senate 
 had been vacated. Yet in the midst of the popu 
 lar excitement and uncertainty, Lincoln struck out 
 a policy of no-compromise, compelled Seward to 
 accept it, inspirited Chase, managed his party in 
 Congress, and drew into his cabinet every man 
 upon whom he had set his heart. 
 
 The political problem was appalling. Ever since 
 the introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, in 
 January, 1854, the country had been divided on 
 
198 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 the question of territorial slavery ; the Republican 
 platform of 1860 was absolutely opposed to the 
 creation of any new slaveholding region, whether 
 by annexation, by territorial laws, or by the 
 admission of a new slave State, while the Southern 
 Democrats in the campaign of 1860 demanded, as 
 the least that they would accept, positive pro 
 tection to slavery in the Territories by federal 
 statute. To the minds of the Republicans, the 
 whole secession agitation was simply a device to 
 deprive them of what they had gained by electing 
 a President, and to compel them to accept a pro- 
 slavery policy. Before enlisting his cabinet minis 
 ters, therefore, it was necessary for Lincoln to 
 make clear to them the solution of the crisis as he 
 saw it, and to come to an understanding as to the 
 future of an administration which many people 
 asserted could never be formed at all. Hence, for 
 a full month after his election he made no offer of 
 any place in his cabinet. 
 
 Meanwhile the status of political affairs changed 
 from week to week, as the secession leaders de 
 veloped their plans, as the border States became 
 conscious of the difference between their interests 
 and those of the gulf States, and as President 
 Buchanan s do-nothing policy stood revealed. On 
 the day after the presidential election the legisla 
 ture of South Carolina began to prepare for seces 
 sion, and from that time on the keenest observers 
 believed that the clisunionists were in earnest, and 
 that the crisis could be met only by one or another 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 199 
 
 of three courses, by accepting secession, by com 
 promise, or by coercion. Though all the three 
 methods were urged at the same time, each had its 
 opportunity in one of three successive periods : 
 peaceable acceptance of secession was put forward 
 especially during November, 1860 ; compromise 
 was demanded during December to stay the cotton 
 States, and during January and February to pla 
 cate the border States ; and people talked of coer 
 cion during March and April. 
 
 During the first of these epochs Chase was sim 
 ply a senator-elect, and for two months he was 
 little consulted by the party leaders, and not at all 
 by Mr. Lincoln. His correspondents kept him 
 informed of the drift of affairs in Washington ; and 
 he knew that in a meeting of the Ohio delegation, 
 on December 18, Senator Pugh scoffed at any 
 attempt to retain the seceding States by force, and 
 Representative Vallandigham predicted that by 
 inauguration day Washington would be in the 
 hands of " a foreign government." The belief 
 that the Union was no union was not confined 
 to Breckinridge Democrats, for the Republican 
 journalist and leader, Horace Greeley, was in the 
 clearest tones preaching non-resistance ; on Novem 
 ber 9, 1860, his New York " Tribune " declared 
 that " if the cotton States shall decide that they 
 can do better out of the Union than in it, we 
 insist on letting them go in peace." Extremists 
 like William Lloyd Garrison of course were de 
 lighted at the opportunity to free the Union from 
 
200 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 its slaveholding contingent ; and thousands of 
 Northern Republicans saw no legal or practicable 
 way of resisting secession, however wrong it might 
 be and however disastrous it might prove. 
 
 Chase meanwhile seemed to be waiting for some 
 thing. For many weeks he expressed no public 
 opinion on the crisis ; but at last, on November 30, 
 he wrote to his sister-in-law, Mrs. Hunt of New 
 Orleans, a letter apparently intended for publi 
 cation, in which he said distinctly : " I abhor the 
 very idea of a dissolution of the Union. If I were 
 President I would indeed exhaust every expedient 
 of forbearance consistent with safety. But at all 
 hazards and against all opposition the laws of the 
 Union should be enforced." These sentences in 
 brief form describe Chase s line of policy down to 
 the firing on Fort Sumter, a policy which involved 
 concessions by grace of the new ad ministration, but 
 none by act of Congress. 
 
 A new phase of the question was opened up 
 when Congress met in December, 1860 ; for the 
 responsibility of preserving the Union was then 
 thrown jointly upon President Buchanan and the 
 two Houses at Washington, with neither of which 
 powers Chase had influence at that time. Seward, 
 on the other hand, had been in conference with 
 Lincoln, and on December 8 was notified that the 
 secretaryship of state would be offered him. As a 
 leading senator he played a large part in the first 
 effort for a compromise ; an editorial in the 
 Albany " Evening Journal " inspired by his inti- 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 201 
 
 mate friend and manager, Thurlow Weed, strongly 
 urged compromise and a constitutional convention. 
 During December an attempt was made to find 
 some halfway point which would satisfy South 
 Carolina and the other cotton States. A com 
 mittee of thirty-three in the House, appointed 
 December 6, undertook the task, and on December 
 13 voted to recommend " additional and more 
 specific and effective guarantees of the constitu 
 tional rights of the South ; " but the next day 
 thirty Southern members of Congress united in a 
 public address, stating that in their judgment no 
 compromise would be offered that the South could 
 accept. No delay was effected in South Carolina, 
 where on December 20 a convention declared the 
 State no longer a part of the Union. 
 
 The Senate Committee of Thirteen did not meet 
 till December 21, and the only hope of compromise 
 then was to make such an offer to the Southern 
 members of that committee as would recall South 
 Carolina. It fell to Seward to frame the Republi 
 can concessions. He agreed to an amendment to 
 the Constitution denying the right of Congress to 
 interfere with slavery in the States, and he was 
 also willing to ask the repeal of the personal 
 liberty bills ; but he would go no further, and 
 coupled his proposals with a demand for a jury 
 trial of alleged fugitives, a proposition very un 
 palatable to the South. The border -state men 
 then proposed the Crittenden compromise, of 
 which the essence was to fix slavery in all the 
 
202 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Territories south of 36 30 . Though SewarcTs own 
 judgment tended toward compromise, he refused 
 to accept this plan, and we now know that he was 
 carrying out the expressed wishes of Abraham 
 Lincoln, and gaining his first experience of sub 
 ordination to the will of that masterful man. The 
 committee broke up without result, and within five 
 weeks six more States had seceded. 
 
 In January, 1861, Chase at last found his bear 
 ings, for he was then approached by Lincoln upon 
 the subject of taking a cabinet position. That he 
 should expect such an offer was natural ; he stood 
 for the principle of aggressive political anti-slavery, 
 which had furnished a large element in the North 
 ern majorities ; he had a good reputation for polit 
 ical skill as well as for ability ; he was probably 
 the most distinguished of the former Democrats 
 then in the Republican party ; and he was one of 
 the few leaders who had shown to Lincoln personal 
 sympathy in his struggle with Douglas in 1858. 
 Letters to three different friends, on November 10, 
 1860, show that he had gone through the process 
 of not definitely making up his mind to refuse 
 cabinet office, long before Lincoln had come to the 
 point of offering it to him ; and he had evidently 
 decided that the secretaryship of state was suited 
 to his powers, and would be a proper recognition 
 of his services. It seems probable that he felt it 
 to be prudent to keep silence during November, 
 till Lincoln had declared himself on secession. 
 
 On December 31 Lincoln at last decided to tele- 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 203 
 
 graph Chase to visit him. The conference lasted 
 two days, and was embarrassing to both. Lin 
 coln began by asking " whether you will accept 
 the appointment of Secretary of the Treasury, 
 without, however, [my] being exactly prepared to 
 make you that offer." Chase replied with good 
 sense and good temper that, if Seward were to 
 have the State Department, he should not refuse 
 the Treasury for any reason of pique. When they 
 parted, neither man stood committed ; but there 
 was a tacit understanding that Mr. Lincoln wanted 
 Chase, and probably could have him if he insisted. 
 Chase later wrote upon the qualified proposition : 
 " Had it been made earlier and with the same 
 promptitude and definiteness as that to Mr. Sew 
 ard, I should have been inclined to make some 
 sacrifices." What was really accomplished was 
 the bringing of both statesmen to an understanding 
 with the future President ; thenceforward Chase 
 felt that he was included in the circle of Lin 
 coln s advisers and probable ministers. A few 
 days after the interview he even took Seward so 
 far into his confidence as to write that they had " a 
 common interest ; " and eloquently counseled him 
 and Thaddeus Stevens " to give countenance to no, 
 scheme of compromise " and to offer no " conces 
 sions of principle." 
 
 The question before the country was no longer 
 secession, for by the middle of January disunion 
 was an accomplished fact; it was whether the 
 border States could be kept in the Union. After 
 
204 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 January 1 the only hope of finding common ground 
 for border-state loyal Democrats and Northern Re 
 publicans was in Crittenden s compromise ; but on 
 a test vote of January 16, 1861, the Republicans, 
 who now had a majority in the Senate, refused to 
 support the measure. Three days later, as a last 
 step, the Virginia legislature called a " Peace Con 
 ference," to be held in Washington. Meantime 
 Chase had set forth his solution of the difficulty in 
 a phrase which rang throughout the country, " In 
 auguration first, adjustment afterwards; " and as 
 one of the Ohio commissioners to the Peace Con 
 ference, at last he had some opportunity to affect 
 the settlement of the issue. In the Conference, 
 which sat from February 4 to February 27, he was 
 the leader of the non-compromisers. Nevertheless, 
 for some weeks he had hopes of " an agreement 
 on something which, without compromising our 
 course or our party at all, will yet help to an 
 amicable understanding." This "something" was 
 a plan for a general constitutional convention, and 
 its chief advantage was that it would postpone 
 action till the new administration could be seated. 
 Behind the plan of delay was a purpose eventu 
 ally to offer a scheme of concession, to be drawn 
 up by the Republican administration as a peace 
 offering ; but at no time in his public career did 
 Chase more distinctly set forth the ultimate author 
 ity of the national government than in his one long 
 speech in the Conference. " If the President does 
 his duty," said he, " and undertakes to enforce the 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 205 
 
 laws, and secession or revolution results, what then ? 
 War ! Civil war ! " The Conference took the 
 line of concession by recommending to Congress 
 an amendment substantially identical with the 
 Crittenden compromise ; it was a third time re 
 jected ; and the insoluble problem was turned over 
 to Lincoln s administration. 
 
 The two things for which the country now looked 
 with eager interest were the inaugural address, as 
 an earnest of the President s policy, and the list of 
 his cabinet advisers, which would reveal the influ 
 ences in his administration. The address proved 
 to be steadfast against a constitutional right of 
 secession ; and the names of the members of the 
 cabinet showed that the President would have good 
 support in trying to save the Union. During the 
 two months since Chase s interview with Lincoln 
 in Springfield, he had never received a distinct pro 
 mise of the Treasury, though he was told at second 
 or third hand that Lincoln had decided upon him. 
 Meanwhile the friends of Cameron continued vig 
 orous efforts to set Chase aside, in order that 
 their favorite might have the coveted Treasury 
 portfolio. Chase was described as a free-trader, 
 who could not be trusted to carry out the new Mor- 
 rill protective tariff ; he was assailed as a former 
 Democrat ; he was held up as the rival and enemy 
 of Seward. Months afterward a correspondent 
 described how, a few days before the inauguration, 
 on Lincoln s refusal to strike Chase out of his list, 
 Thurlow Weed came away in a rage, declaring 
 
206 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 that " Mr. Chase had been placed in the cabinet to 
 control the patronage and appointments in the city 
 and State of Xew York, to prevent Governor Sew- 
 ard from controlling the appointments, and to de 
 prive him [Mr. Weed] of all power and influence." 
 
 It may be doubted whether Lincoln insisted 
 upon appointing Chase because he expected him to 
 back up the anti-Seward men in New York ; but 
 it is equally unlikely that he discovered in him the 
 qualities of a great financier, or indeed that he felt 
 any need of a great financier. It is more probable 
 that he selected him as a representative of a large 
 body of radical Republicans, as a strong rival for 
 the nomination, and as one of those former Demo 
 crats whom he intended to use as a balance to the 
 old Whigs in his cabinet, while at the same time 
 he had a genuine respect for Chase s character and 
 abilities. 
 
 To the last moment Chase had no positive assur 
 ance that he would be appointed, and he was not 
 consulted about the rest of the cabinet slate ; hence 
 he could truthfully say that the sending his nomi 
 nation to the Senate was a surprise to him. How 
 ever honorable the secretaryship, his pride was 
 hurt by the long delay ; and, like Seward, he hesi 
 tated to give up his safe senatorship without some 
 guaranty as to the policy of the President. At 
 any rate, he held off till Lincoln in a personal 
 interview insisted that he should accept, and prob 
 ably gave him some assurance as to his purposes 
 toward secession. Of the weight of financial re- 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 207 
 
 sponsibilities which he was taking upon himself he 
 seems to have had at the beginning no inkling, and 
 there were many times during the next four years 
 when he wished that he had retained his seat in the 
 Senate. 
 
 On the second day of the existence of the new 
 cabinet, Elizur Wright wrote to Chase in praise of 
 the inaugural address : " The whole drift shows 
 that the new President s heart is in the right place, 
 and that, though far in advance of the average 
 North, he knows how to make it follow him." 
 Before the North could follow, however, it was 
 necessary to know who was the leader ; and to 
 several of the members of his own cabinet Lincoln 
 seemed inferior to themselves in initiative, in abili 
 ties, in experience, in administrative powers, and in 
 public confidence. 
 
 For a month or more Seward continued to be 
 lieve that he was to be the head of the new admin 
 istration, an attitude which he had unconsciously 
 assumed in the previous congressional discussions 
 on compromise. During the weeks preceding Sum- 
 ter, while Seward was testing the will of the Presi 
 dent, Chase set himself in a business-like fashion to 
 the duties of his office. Many of his friends had 
 predicted that he and Seward could not sit in the 
 same cabinet ; but from the first the Secretary of 
 the Treasury sought to establish friendly relations 
 with the Secretary of State, and mutual friends 
 were authorized to express good will. If Chase 
 had any notion of controlling the President, it was 
 
208 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 not through personal ascendency : the most that 
 he ever sought was to make the cabinet, as a board 
 of advisers, more powerful than the President. 
 
 The relation of the President with his seven 
 adjuncts was first distinctly defined in their discus 
 sions on the status of Fort Sumter soon after the 
 inauguration. All the government posts in the 
 seceding section had been seized and occupied, 
 except Fort Pickens, Key West and the Dry Tor- 
 tugas, and Fort Sumter, which last was occupied by 
 a garrison under Major Anderson. The authori 
 ties of South Carolina, and later those of the Con 
 federacy, had demanded the surrender of the forts, 
 but had finally been induced to wait for the new 
 administration ; and Sumter, which commanded 
 one of the few Southern cities, at once became the 
 turning-point in the whole controversy. To yield 
 it would be practically to acknowledge the success 
 of secession ; to reinforce it would begin civil war. 
 
 The appearance of three new Confederate com 
 missioners in Washington compelled Lincoln s at 
 tention. General Scott was consulted, and on 
 March 11, 1861, he pointed out the military diffi 
 culties, and discouraged any attempt to retain the 
 forts, It was in this exigency, on March 15, that 
 the President took the written opinions of his 
 advisers. The question which the President had 
 to settle was really neither constitutional nor mili 
 tary nor political ; it was the state of mind of the 
 Northern people ; and this no member of the cabi 
 net could ascertain, because the people themselves 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 209 
 
 did not understand their own minds. On the 
 critical question of relieving Fort Sumter, there 
 fore, only one of the seven, Montgomery Blair, 
 expressed the opinion that it was worth while to 
 put to a test the support which the nation might 
 give to bold measures. Seward and Chase were 
 at one in advising that no step should be taken 
 which would lead to hostilities ; but Chase drew 
 the deduction that the simple provisioning of a fort 
 ought not to lead, and would not lead, to civil war. 
 
 This was one of the few periods of wavering 
 judgment in Chase s life. His best friends were 
 overwhelming him with letters urging him to stand 
 by Fort Sumter ; but he preferred another policy, 
 which he expected to be effective in keeping the 
 border States in the Union, and which he thus 
 frankly explained in a letter of April 20, 1861 : 
 
 " True it is that before the assault on Fort Sum 
 ter, in anticipation of an attempt to provision fam 
 ishing soldiers of the Union, I was decidedly in 
 favor of a positive policy and against the notion of 
 drifting, the Micawber-like policy of waiting for 
 something to turn up. 
 
 " As a positive policy two alternatives were 
 plainly before us : 1. That of enforcing the laws 
 of the Union by its whole power and through its 
 whole extent ; or, 2. That of recognizing the organ 
 ization of actual government by the seven seceded 
 States as an accomplished revolution, accomplished 
 through the complicity of the late administration, 
 and letting that Confederacy try its experiment of 
 
210 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 separation, but maintaining the authority of the 
 Union and treating secession as treason every 
 where else. 
 
 " Knowing that the former of these alternatives 
 involved destructive war and vast expenditure and 
 oppressive debt, and thinking it possible that 
 through the latter these great evils might be 
 avoided, and the Union of the other States pre 
 served unbroken ; the return even of the seceded 
 States, after an unsatisfactory experiment of sepa 
 ration secured ; and the great cause of freedom and 
 constitutional government peacefully vindicated, 
 thinking, I say, these things possible, I preferred 
 the latter alternative." 
 
 The error of judgment was one from which Lin 
 coln alone, among the great statesmen of the pe 
 riod, was wholly free. He alone saw clearly at that 
 time that secession must bring eventual war, and 
 that the issue might as well be met at once, if only 
 the Northern people could be roused to resistance. 
 Chase s faint heart was speedily strengthened, for 
 on March 29, on another call for opinions, he, as 
 well as Welles and Blair, advised reinforcement at 
 all hazards. Three days later Seward submitted 
 to the President his " Scheme for Foreign Rela 
 tions," which in effect suggested that the President 
 incite war on England and France, and give up to 
 him the leadership of the administration. Lincoln 
 quietly put aside this proposal that he abrogate his 
 authority, and he made his own decision to try to 
 throw provisions into Fort Sumter. The intention 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 211 
 
 having been communicated to the Confederate gov 
 ernment, on the morning of April 12, 1861, fire 
 was opened on Fort Sumter. On the 14th it sur 
 rendered, and the dreaded Civil War had begun. 
 
 The practical question whether the North would 
 respond to a call to arms was answered once for 
 all by the pouring forth of men in answer to the 
 President s proclamation of April 15. The next 
 problem to be faced was how an efficient army 
 could be organized and brought to bear for the 
 confusion of the Confederacy. The regular army 
 was small, scattered, unfitted for large operations, 
 and weakened by the resignations of Southern 
 officers. The question of financial ways and 
 means was not so clearly critical throughout 1861 
 as it became later ; and hence for many months the 
 new Secretary of the Treasury felt quite as much 
 responsibility for the army as for the Treasury, and 
 put forth his greatest energies outside the bounda 
 ries of his own department. 
 
 In part this martial activity of the civilian was 
 displayed at his own suggestion, in part it was 
 expected and encouraged by the President, in part 
 it was necessary on account of the President s want 
 of confidence in Cameron. Surely the numbers 
 and organization of the army were within the 
 province of the War Department; but when the 
 President by a proclamation of May 3 called for 
 42,000 three years volunteers and for 41,000 reg 
 ular soldiers and sailors, he turned to Chase and 
 not to the Secretary of War to frame the famous 
 
212 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 "Order No. 15 " and "Order No. 16," which organ- 
 ized the new troops. When Congress reached the 
 subject it legalized the President s extra-constitu 
 tional increase of the army, but it greatly altered 
 and in Chase s opinion diluted the Orders. 
 
 In his double labors the Secretary of the Trea 
 sury put forth his utmost strength. In May, 1861, 
 he wrote : " In laboring for those objects, I know 
 hardly the least cessation and begin to feel the 
 weight as well as the strain of them. Would my 
 criticisers equal me in labor and zeal, I should 
 most cheerfully listen to their criticism." Cam 
 eron showed no resentment, and Chase was careful 
 to cultivate his friendship, and continued to ex 
 press confidence in him long after the country was 
 clamoring for the removal of the Secretary of War, 
 and Chase s friends were begging him to take no 
 more responsibility for a falling chieftain. 
 
 A good reason for giving Chase an unusual 
 responsibility was his recognized status as the 
 representative of the West, and as especially qual 
 ified to deal with the Western border States. 
 Though Bates came from Missouri, Chase through 
 his anti-slavery correspondents in Missouri and 
 Kentucky was better able than he to gauge the 
 feeling of those two States, and to influence their 
 destiny. He felt that he had a right to send to 
 Lincoln a vigorous and sensible letter, begging 
 him to use force to prevent the secession of Mary 
 land ; and in Virginia and West Virginia he exer 
 cised a semi-military responsibility. There are 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 213 
 
 abundant evidences that he had special authority 
 in the first months of the war to organize the West 
 ern troops and even to suggest their destination. 
 
 To a West Virginian he writes, as by authority, 
 promising to accept and maintain such troops as 
 his correspondent may raise. He writes to Gen 
 eral Sherman as though the general were subject 
 to his orders, promising commissions for his subor 
 dinates, and a supply of arms. To General Nel 
 son he writes : " I will go to the War Department 
 at once on the subject of your wants, and do all I 
 can to urge the department to action ; " and a little 
 later : " As to popularity growing or diminishing 
 I care little. I want to support everybody who 
 has tried to do something." Toward McClellan 
 he was at the beginning much attracted, and he 
 assured the young commander that his commis 
 sion of major-general was in large degree due to 
 his representations ; he even suggested a plan of 
 campaign for him, and later wrote to him that 
 " The army and the treasury must stand or fall 
 together." In fact, until Stanton became Secre 
 tary of War, Chase continued to consider himself, 
 and appears to have been considered by the Presi 
 dent, the special administrator of operations in the 
 West. Perhaps he hoped to be Cameron s suc 
 cessor ; at any rate, in September he wrote to a 
 friend : " Who is sufficient for the great work of 
 the War Department ? I see and deplore its de 
 fective organization, but when I look around and 
 ask myself who will bring to this great work the 
 
214 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 needed ability, or indeed more ability and fidelity 
 than its present head, I confess myself perplexed." 
 
 Throughout the war Chase kept up his great 
 interest in the conduct of the army, and he main 
 tained close correspondence with many of the com 
 manders, at first with McClellan, later with 
 Hooker, Lander, H. B. Carrington, Mitchell, Gar- 
 field, McCook, W. B. Smith, Benham, and many 
 others. Western officers and politicians were 
 especially fond of seeking his military influence. 
 Doubtless all the members of the cabinet were 
 beset by requests for commissions and military 
 favors, especially for paymasterships ; certainly 
 they poured in upon Chase by hundreds. One 
 man complains to him that others are promoted 
 over his head ; another informs him that the gov 
 ernor of a Western State is " drunk and incapable 
 all the time ; " another urges the immediate rais 
 ing of 300,000 men ; another wants Chase to con 
 trol the contracts for gunboats on Western rivers ; 
 another pleads that General Lyon be kept in Mis 
 souri ; and another advocates a new government in 
 West Virginia. 
 
 In other fields of politics and administration 
 Chase was much less interested than in the mili 
 tary department. Notwithstanding the threaten 
 ing aspect of foreign relations, he took but little 
 part in external affairs, except to represent strongly 
 to Seward that he expected a share of the foreign 
 patronage ; he figured out that his State was en 
 titled to 33 of the 269 diplomatic places. He 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 215 
 
 secured desirable berths for his own intimate 
 friends, Richard C. Parsons and James Monroe, as 
 consuls to Rio, and he influenced some diplomatic 
 appointments. He even transmitted to the Presi 
 dent in October, 1861, a curious suggestion that 
 " Honorable Andy Johnson " be sent over " to 
 conciliate public opinion in England." Through 
 out the war, Chase had some special channels of 
 foreign information through the letters of a shrewd 
 correspondent, Mr. Wood, then our minister to 
 Denmark, and through the impressions in foreign 
 financial circles which came to him from time to 
 time through New York bankers engaged in pla 
 cing American loans abroad. The one subject in 
 foreign diplomacy in which Chase took a marked 
 interest was the settlement of the Trent affair. 
 In a cabinet meeting of December 26, 1861, he 
 strongly urged the return of Mason and Slidell, 
 on the ground " that the technical right was clearly 
 on the side of the British government ; " and he 
 had an honorable part in settling that controversy. 
 The significance of the national finances was not 
 felt by the secretary till December, 1861 ; but 
 during the anxious earlier months of that year 
 Chase found time to rehabilitate the disorganized 
 and almost bankrupt Treasury, to make the neces 
 sary appointments, to come into relations with the 
 capitalists of the country, to suggest new taxes, 
 and to borrow the money necessary to carry the 
 country through the first period of the war. In a 
 letter of April 6 he writes: "Certainly I never 
 
216 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 worked nearly so hard before ; twice this week I 
 have been at the department till after midnight 
 from nine in the morning, with an interval for 
 luncheon only. Every night except one I have been 
 there till after ten." 
 
 Hard work was necessary, first of all, in order 
 to reorganize the personnel of the department, and 
 to reform the complicated and inadequate system of 
 accounts. Since the end of Robert J. Walker s 
 term in 1849, there had been no efficient Secretary 
 of the Treasury, and the whole civil service at 
 Washington was demoralized by the breaking out 
 of war, and the consequent resignation of many 
 Southern clerks and officials ; while some who re 
 mained in office used their opportunities to send 
 information to the enemy. It was necessary to 
 purify the Treasury service ; and had it been less 
 necessary, no man could have altogether resisted 
 the tremendous pressure for office which came upon 
 Secretary Chase. The New York " Tribune " of 
 March 9 said : " Chase intends to insist that the 
 law requiring subordinates in his department [to] 
 be examined before their appointment shall be 
 strictly enforced ; and no applicant will be admit 
 ted to office without entire qualification. This rule 
 will purge the public service of drones and incompe 
 tents." ^ 
 
 In making appointments, Chase in good faith 
 sought to apply the system of pass-examinations, 
 which had been set up under the act of 1853, and 
 there were instances of appointees who were not 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 18G1 217 
 
 allowed to qualify because of failure to pass. 
 Nevertheless, large numbers of appointments were 
 made on the personal judgment of the secretary 
 himself ; and many others on political recommen 
 dations. Several heads of bureaus and some clerks 
 were allowed to remain in service, and new bu 
 reaus were speedily organized, as the business of 
 the department increased. Perhaps the most im 
 portant of the u hold-overs " was Mr. John J. Cisco, 
 who at the express request of both Chase and Lin 
 coln continued as assistant treasurer in New York 
 City throughout and beyond Chase s administra 
 tion. Out of one hundred and fifteen heads of 
 custom-houses ninety were lopped ; and twelve of 
 the fifteen naval officers, and every appraiser dis 
 appeared. Nearly all the subordinates of such 
 officials went with them ; and where there were no 
 removals, as fast as commissions expired new men 
 were almost invariably appointed. 
 
 The greatest prize within Chase s department was 
 the collectorship of the port of New York, a place 
 highly paid, honorable, and, through its large num 
 ber of employees, a means of affecting the politics 
 of New York City and State. To this office Mr. 
 Hiram Barney was speedily appointed. He had 
 been one of the small circle of Chase men in New 
 York in 1860 ; when the New York delegation came 
 to the President with a slate of appointments, Lin 
 coln informed them that he had himself chosen to 
 nominate Barney. This appointment was out of 
 the regular course, for Barney was not in the favor 
 
218 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 of the Sewarcl- Weed combination, and, on the other 
 hand, he was not sufficiently active as a politician 
 to please Mr. Chase s eager friends ; hence in the 
 end it proved satisfactory to neither faction, and 
 gave occasion for many bitter attacks upon the 
 secretary. 
 
 Long before the beginning of his administra 
 tion, Chase s intimates, his acquaintances, and 
 sometimes his enemies, began to make suggestions 
 to him as to appointments. Among them his far- 
 sighted and public-spirited friend, Joshua Hanna, 
 the Pittsburg banker, desired him to urge Lincoln 
 to " inaugurate a new era in this government by 
 selecting from among the business men of the 
 country those best qualified, who would honestly 
 and intelligently fill their several positions." The 
 editors of the local party papers had a different set 
 of principles, and clamored for office of every kind 
 for themselves and their friends ; and almost every 
 place in New York was hotly contested between 
 Weed and anti-Weed factions. 
 
 As soon as Chase was settled, members of Con 
 gress began to insist that he should make no ap 
 pointments in their districts without their consent. 
 Many of his political and personal friends fur 
 nished him with a variety of amusing reasons why 
 they should have offices : one writes to ask for " a 
 place in Abraham s bosom," and suggests the em 
 bassy to Chili ; another must be appointed because 
 he cannot make a living in any other way ; another, 
 because of his great public services ; another, be- 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 18G1 219 
 
 cause Mr. Chase has in a moment of undue warmth 
 offered him any office in his gift ; another because 
 he is from Ohio ; another, because he will work up 
 a presidential influence for the secretary ; another, 
 a lady, asks a place for her son, because his father 
 would have been competent had he lived. Chase 
 got appointments in other departments fpr his old 
 law partner, Ball, for his brother, and for other 
 kinsmen, and he himself appointed many other old 
 friends ; but the evidence shows that he made it a 
 principle to recognize merit and efficiency, and was 
 glad to find it among his own friends and adher 
 ents, all of whom were of course Republicans or 
 strong war Democrats. 
 
 The patronage of the Treasury, already large 
 and to be increased by the creation of new and 
 lucrative offices, was to an unusual degree left by 
 Mr. Lincoln in the hands of his secretary. Occa 
 sionally a candidate appeared at the department 
 with such a note from Mr. Lincoln as the follow 
 ing : " Ought Mr. Young to be removed ? And if 
 Yea, ought Mr. Adams to be appointed? Mr. 
 Adams is magnificently recommended, but the 
 great point in his favor is that Thurlow Weed and 
 Horace Greeley join in recommending him ; I sup 
 pose the like never happened before, will never 
 happen again, so it is now or never. What think 
 you ? " But the President very rarely pushed an 
 appointment hard, or disregarded a recommenda 
 tion made by Chase. 
 
 While the new men were fitting into their offices, 
 
220 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Chase began to reorganize the routine of his de 
 partment. He was always fond of arranging and 
 analyzing, and showed an aptitude for distributing 
 the work of his great office among the various 
 bureaus. Himself untiring, he expected hard work 
 from those about him. One of the great changes 
 which he introduced into government business was 
 the employment of women in the public service, 
 first as counters of currency, later as assistants in 
 many clerical occupations. But though he thus 
 won the distinction of opening up an important 
 line of employment to women, he very much dis 
 liked to do business with them, and hated to be 
 made the object of their personal demands for ap 
 pointment or other use of his influence. 
 
 Although the Treasury operations were larger 
 during 1861 than ever before, the available me 
 thods were those which had always been employed 
 whenever the expenditures outran the resources: 
 loans, treasury notes, and delayed settlement of 
 accounts. The panic of 1857 so cut down the in 
 come of the United States that it had to borrow to 
 make up running expenses ; and by November, 
 1860, the debt had risen to about 162,000,000. 
 Impending secession reduced the credit of the gov 
 ernment, so that when, toward the end of 1860, 
 Secretary Cobb advertised a loan of $10,000,000, 
 only about $7,000,000 was taken, and on January 
 1, 1861, in order to meet interest payments, money 
 was borrowed on treasury notes at twelve per cent. 
 The net result of these operations during the last 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 221 
 
 four months of Buchanan s administration was an 
 addition of 114,000,000 more of debt, with nothing 
 to show for it. 
 
 Chase was obliged to begin his administration by 
 contracting new loans. April 2, 1861, he accepted 
 tenders for 18,000,000 of six per cent bonds, 
 ranging from par to 94 ; but on May 21, after the 
 war had actually begun, he was obliged to borrow 
 a further sum of $ 7,000,000 in six per cents, at 
 rates from 93 to 85, besides issuing new treasury 
 notes for present needs. 
 
 The meeting of Congress in July, 1861, gave the 
 secretary his first opportunity to suggest a financial 
 plan for the government, and to discover how much 
 criticism and change he must endure from Con 
 gress before any efficient legislation could be had. 
 At this time he desired authority to contract for only 
 such loans as the country might speedily expect to 
 extinguish. " The idea of perpetual debt," said 
 he, " is not of American nativity and should not 
 be naturalized." He therefore recommended such 
 increased taxation as would raise the ordinary an 
 nual revenue of the government from $ 50,000,000 
 to about 180,000,000, including a direct tax of 
 820,000,000, to be apportioned among the States, 
 and an income tax of three per cent. He favored 
 also an extensive measure of confiscation. All 
 these measures were enacted by Congress ; but 
 down to December, 1861, not more than $2,000,000 
 was actually paid into the Treasury from direct 
 taxation, and nothing from the income tax. 
 
222 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 The most important financial measures during 
 the first year were arrangements for new loans, and 
 the actual borrowing of money both matters in 
 which the brief legislation of Congress was very sig 
 nificant, for there was laid the foundation for large 
 issues of bonds, of interest-bearing notes, and of 
 circulating notes. During the short summer ses 
 sion, Chase was authorized to borrow an additional 
 $250, 000, 000 in any or all the three forms, the non- 
 interest-bearing notes not to exceed $ 50,000,000 ; 
 and it was upon the basis of this authority that 
 the funds necessary for the prosecution of the war 
 during the second half of 1861 were obtained. 
 
 One of the first steps taken by the new secretary 
 was to seek the acquaintance of the financiers in 
 Philadelphia, Boston, and especially New York. 
 His retention of Mr. Cisco as local treasurer helped 
 him to win the confidence of bankers ; and several 
 of the metropolitan capitalists and bank presidents 
 were Chase s personal friends, especially George 
 Opdyke, later mayor of the city. Armed with his 
 new authority from Congress, in July Chase had a 
 conference with the heads of the banks in the three 
 great financial centres, and arranged for the placing 
 of $150,000,000 of three-year treasury notes, bear 
 ing interest of seven and three-tenths per cent. 
 Chase has left an account of the language in which 
 he stated to the bankers the only alternative for this 
 loan : "I was obliged to be very firm, and to say, 
 4 Gentlemen, I am sure you wish to do all you can. 
 I hope you will find that you can take the loans 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 223 
 
 required on terms which can be admitted. If not, 
 1 must go back to Washington and issue notes for 
 circulation ; for, gentlemen, the war must go OD 
 until this rebellion is put down, if we have to put 
 out paper until it takes $1000 to buy a breakfast. 
 This suggestion of government notes in denomina 
 tions and on terms which would cause them to cir 
 culate, was a threat of much import to the state 
 banks ; but without it they stood ready cheerfully 
 to take the first installment of $50,000,000 in seven 
 and three-tenths per cent treasury notes. 
 
 The money was spent almost faster than it was 
 received, and a few weeks later Chase arranged 
 for a second call of 150,000,000 on the same terms. 
 But investors showed less confidence than the 
 banks, and when a third call was made for $50,- 
 000,000, the bankers could no longer advance upon 
 the "seven-thirty" notes at par, and Mr. Chase 
 reluctantly issued $50,000,000 in six per cent 
 bonds at about 92. A part of his loan system had 
 been the appointment of one hundred and forty- 
 eight agents for the placing of the loan ; of these, 
 only one, Jay Cooke of Philadelphia, distinguished 
 himself by his success in distributing the treasury 
 notes. Though the system of agents was for the 
 time abandoned, his efficiency was not forgotten, 
 and he later became Chase s special loan dis 
 tributor. 
 
 Thus far, during the nine months of his stay in 
 the Treasury, Chase had had little opportunity to 
 show his qualities either as a great leader in the 
 
224 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Civil War or as an originator of schemes for 
 finance. His military activity in the East was 
 much diminished when McClellan was appointed 
 to the command of the Army of the Potomac and 
 began his system of military organization. After 
 some attempts to form a friendship with the gen 
 eral, Chase found that he was little consulted on 
 the affairs of the Eastern army. The question of 
 slavery, in which Chase was by his history and his 
 convictions a leader, was as yet kept in the back 
 ground, and national finance thus far had consisted 
 in organizing the machinery of the Treasury, in 
 taking up the small amount of available capital at 
 high rates of interest or at a humiliating discount, 
 and in issuing a few millions of so-called " demand 
 notes," which circulated as currency, and were 
 receivable for debts to the government. Had the 
 war ended early in 1862, as was hoped, Chase 
 would never have had an opportunity to show 
 his powers as a financier, or to urge his banking 
 scheme. So long as specie payments continued 
 he had no harder task than that of several secre 
 taries of the Treasury before him. 
 
 During 1861 began one of the peculiar functions 
 of the Treasury which, though it went on through 
 out the war, may be conveniently discussed here. 
 It has already been noted that Mr. Chase looked 
 forward to a large income from the confiscation of 
 the property of rebels : this measure seemed an easy 
 mode of combining revenue with punishment. By 
 the first confiscation act, August 6, 1861, the Pre- 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 225 
 
 sident was authorized to seize any property used 
 in promoting insurrection ; but it proved difficult 
 to get legal proof against such property, and hence 
 the act, in its practical application, had to do prin 
 cipally with slaves. A second act of July 17, 1862, 
 authorized the taking of property belonging to 
 civil and military officers of the Confederacy, or to 
 any persons who had given aid and comfort to the 
 rebellion. In both cases some kind of legal pro 
 ceeding was necessary for condemnation ; but as 
 Federal lines were extended, plantations, buildings, 
 live stock, and especially cotton, were often found 
 without a visible owner ; and since this property 
 was expected to come into the Treasury, it fell 
 within the jurisdiction of Secretary Chase. By 
 a series of orders, approved by the President, he 
 made provision for the collection, sale, and record 
 of such property ; and in order to manage this 
 immense business he was authorized to appoint a 
 special body of Treasury agents, who followed 
 close behind the armies, and sometimes went ahead 
 of them. 
 
 It was also the function of the Secretary of the 
 Treasury to make and enforce regulations for ex 
 ternal commerce, so as to prevent goods sent out 
 of the United States from finding their way eventu 
 ally to the enemy ; and this important power 
 was extended to the control of trade on the land 
 border. Movements of trade which had been es 
 tablished half a century were interrupted by the 
 war, and the traffic from Southern to Northern 
 
226 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Atlantic ports by sea was resolutely and completely 
 suppressed ; but along the whole military land 
 frontier from the James River to the mouth of the 
 Mississippi, there was an unceasing effort to carry 
 on traffic as if there were no war. On one side, the 
 Northwestern States were cut off from their valu 
 able provision trade to the South ; on the other 
 side, cotton accumulated behind the Confederate 
 lines without any home market. Even within the 
 Union lines the condition of the border States was 
 desperate, for sympathizers with the South were so 
 intermixed with loyal men, and the facilities for 
 forbidden trade across the broken country which 
 constituted the military frontier were so abundant, 
 that it became necessary to regulate, and in some 
 cases almost to cut off, the commerce of whole 
 communities. Hence a great pressure was put 
 upon the secretary to grant permits to furnish 
 supplies for particular places and regions ; and 
 rigorously limited permissions were given to fur 
 nish 15000 a month in drugs to such a city, and 
 $10,000 in dry goods and groceries to such another. 
 By a series of Treasury regulations in May and 
 June, 1861, Chase directed the officials of his de 
 partment to refuse clearances to places within the 
 hostile lines ; but under the act of July 13, 1861, 
 the President was authorized to license commercial 
 intercourse with parts of the seceded States, and 
 the regulation of this trade was turned over to the 
 Secretary of the Treasury. When he came to 
 apply the principle in Kentucky and Missouri, 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 227 
 
 Chase laid the foundation of a most bitter hostility 
 to himself ; for the Ohio River trade to all places 
 on the south side of the stream was for some time 
 prohibited, and the commerce of Louisville was 
 checked ; while by cutting off the traffic down the 
 Mississippi from St. Louis, the opposition of the 
 business men of that city was roused. In New 
 Orleans, under General Butler s rule, a brisk traffic 
 began across the Gulf to the Confederacy, salt 
 going in and cotton coming out ; and agents were 
 despatched to bring down cotton from the tribu 
 taries of the Mississippi. 
 
 Suck a system of agents, acting so far from 
 Washington and in the midst of war, was certain 
 to lead to abuses ; for to the special agents of the 
 Treasury had been given an authority independent 
 of the military commanders, and capable of gross 
 misuse. The confidential reports of several of 
 Chase s agents are still in existence, and they show 
 his own earnest desire that the business should be 
 done honestly, and at the same time the impossi 
 bility of carrying it on at such a distance without 
 fraud and corruption. 
 
 The most profitable trade was in cotton and 
 sugar. Cotton inside the Confederate lines was 
 worth not more than ten cents in specie, but once 
 on its way North or abroad it was worth seventy 
 cents and upward. The temptation was too strong 
 to be resisted. George S. Denison, collector of the 
 revenue, Chase s confidential and upright repre 
 sentative in New Orleans, wrote him letter after 
 
228 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 letter about the trade across the border, which was 
 going on under his own eyes, but which he could 
 not check because it was authorized by the general 
 in command. General Butler professed indigna 
 tion, and promised amendment ; but Mr. Denison 
 reported what everybody in New Orleans sus 
 pected that the brother of the general was pro 
 fiting by this unwarrantable trade, and that the 
 general winked at it. A statute of March, 1863, 
 attempted to correct these abuses by affixing a pen 
 alty to the reception of anything which was brought 
 out of the Confederacy except by the authorized 
 agents of the Treasury ; and Chase followed up the 
 statute by renewed regulations, approved from time 
 to time by the President. In 1863 a comprehen 
 sive plan was drawn up by which the country was 
 divided into special agencies with a hierarchy of 
 agents. By the removal of persons proved to be 
 unsound, Chase tried to check the corruption of the 
 agents, and in September, 1863, after the capture 
 of Vicksburg, he successfully resisted a committee 
 from St. Louis backed by Attorney-General Bates, 
 which demanded that the Mississippi be opened to 
 trade throughout its length. 
 
 The administration of the Treasury during the 
 war has no more unsavory side than the scramble 
 for permits and the collusion of military officers in 
 getting out property from the enemy s lines; yet 
 for no object did the secretary more honestly bestir 
 himself than to regulate the trade. The circum 
 stances were too much for him, as they were for 
 
THE CRITICAL YEAR 1861 229 
 
 the most upright commanders in the field. A few 
 days before Chase s resignation in 1864, General 
 Sickles wrote : " The real truth is that it has come 
 almost to a direct trade with the enemy. In Ken 
 tucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi and Arkansas 
 immense quantities of merchandise go through our 
 lines, often in unbroken packages." Though the 
 Treasury was defeated in its effort to keep the 
 trade in proper channels, it would be unjust to 
 hold the secretary culpable. Chase could and did 
 remove delinquent agents ; but he could not guar 
 antee that their successors would be proof against 
 the temptations of their unrivaled opportunities. 
 
 In later chapters the attempt will be made to 
 describe Chase s financial policy. The fiscal and 
 financial history of the Civil War is yet to be writ 
 ten ; but it is possible to show the plans, hopes, and 
 fears of the secretary, to bring out the personal 
 side of his administration, to discuss his problems. 
 Throughout the financial chapters the reader will 
 find useful the brief financial tables, printed as an 
 appendix to this book. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS, 1862-1863 
 
 WITH the meeting of Congress in December, 
 1861, there came upon Chase a new set of anxieties, 
 both financial and political. Upon him lay the 
 responsibility of suggesting a financial system 
 which should keep up the government s credit on 
 $267,000,000 of outstanding loans and notes ; which 
 should provide at once for a deficit, already in 
 curred, of 1143,000,000 ; and which should make 
 possible the prosecution of the war upon the scale 
 which it now assumed. It was his duty also to con 
 vince the capitalists of the country that his schemes 
 would work ; and perhaps more difficult still 
 he must persuade Congress of his superior wisdom. 
 
 His first annual report appeared December 9 ; 
 but before it could produce any effect, his hand had 
 been forced by a crisis in the currency. The three 
 successive interest-bearing loans of $50,000,000 
 each had drawn heavily on the specie reserves of 
 the country ; and at the same time, $27,000,000 
 of treasury notes were in circulation as a currency, 
 in competition with state bank notes. Feeling 
 the drain upon their gold, the banks urged the gov 
 ernment to receive their bank notes for bonds, a 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 231 
 
 proposition which meant that the state bank issues 
 were to be bolstered up by government credit. To 
 this suggestion Chase replied with firmness : " If 
 
 OO A 
 
 you can lend me all the coin required or show me 
 where I can borrow it elsewhere at fair rates, I will 
 withdraw every note already issued, and pledge my 
 self never to issue another ; but if you cannot, you 
 must let me stick to United States notes, and in 
 crease the issue of them just as far as the deficiency 
 of coin may require." The real difficulty was not 
 scarcity of specie, but a want of public confidence 
 in the success of the war, which affected both the 
 government notes and the new securities still held 
 in large quantities by the banks. 
 
 In 1812, in 1837, in 1839, and in 1857, the 
 banks had all refused to redeem their own notes in 
 specie, and it was plain that they were likely to 
 suspend specie payment again. It was a painful 
 suggestion to Chase, for he had insisted that no 
 suspension would be necessary ; but he had no 
 power to control public confidence, and had made 
 no preparations for such a crisis. On December 30 
 all the banks by general agreement suspended pay 
 ment of their demand notes, and the government 
 followed, with the result that after a few days a 
 small premium was exacted for specie, gold became 
 a commodity, and the government issues of notes 
 and bonds began to decline in value. 
 
 Looking backward over the experience of nearly 
 forty years, it is easy to criticise the banks, the 
 country, and the secretary for this suspension. 
 
232 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Ought not resolution, bold taxation, or loans at high 
 interest to have held the country up to the specie 
 standard ? So far as the previous experience of 
 the United States shows, a suspension was inevi 
 table, and would have come about had there been 
 no government circulating notes. But considering 
 the special difficulties of the time, none but an 
 extraordinary financier, a Hamilton, could have 
 prevented this misfortune. The banks of issue 
 had state charters, and were subject to no control 
 and no penalties from the general government if 
 they failed to redeem their notes. When the 
 banks gave up specie for Chase s seven-thirty notes, 
 they expressed their own confidence that the gov 
 ernment would punctually pay interest and princi 
 pal ; but so far as they held those notes, and had 
 not sold them to investors, they were basing their 
 own solvency on the national confidence that the 
 government would speedily break down the South 
 ern Confederacy ; and neither banks nor investors 
 were keyed up to the enormous expenditures which 
 liad begun to appear essential. 
 
 The government notes affected the question of 
 suspension indirectly, because they showed that 
 borrowing had already begun to lag, and because 
 the United States could not keep them afloat as a 
 special gold-value currency ; but the real reason 
 for the suspension of specie payments was that no 
 body could see where the specie was coming from 
 to keep up the reserves, in view of the probable 
 demands by the federal government. Vigorous 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 233 
 
 and immediate taxation would have checked the 
 fall of paper money, but it could not have pro 
 vided for the expenses of 1862 ; and both pri 
 vate and public finance were disorganized for a 
 time by the conditions of a civil war. Business 
 was disconcerted by loss of foreign trade, by the 
 closing of the Southern market, and by the can 
 cellation of most of the debts due from Southern 
 merchants. 
 
 As for the Treasury, in 1861 the administration 
 had to feel its way ; it had not foreseen the neces 
 sary changes in its financial system, because it had 
 not foreseen a long war. As yet there was no 
 powerful syndicate of American money lenders to 
 absorb loans or sell abroad ; no machinery for 
 placing popular loans ; no experience of the capa 
 city of the people for bearing taxation ; no know 
 ledge of the terrible war expenses which ate up 
 the revenue long before it was available ; no suffi 
 cient understanding between secretary and Con 
 gress. The only thing of which Chase could feel 
 reasonable certainty in December, 1861, was that 
 the country would carry on the war through the 
 next campaign ; the task of straightening out the 
 national forces and causing them to run parallel 
 was the work of many months to follow. 
 
 Chase s position would have been stronger had 
 the beginnings of a consistent financial system been 
 presented to the July session of Congress ; but the 
 finance of 1861 was practically a series of make 
 shifts. First, there were the scanty proceeds of 
 
234 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 peace taxes ; then loans, till they broke the mar 
 ket ; then treasury notes, to tide over a few months. 
 The crude devices of direct tax, of confiscation acts, 
 and of income tax had as yet produced little ; and 
 when in December, 1861, the secretary was ready 
 with a comprehensive scheme taxes, loans, notes, 
 and banks his plans were pushed aside by Con 
 gress, till the mischief of the suspension of specie 
 payments had been done, and the Treasury was 
 empty ; and then began a hurried course of legis 
 lation in which the plans of the secretary were 
 treated with little respect. 
 
 It was not in Chase s nature to be persuasive ; 
 in all his public life his successes were those of the 
 downright man, convincing without pleasing. Him 
 self a most capable legislator when in the Senate, 
 he had little patience with slow intellects, and less 
 of that urbane yielding of non-essentials which se 
 cures the adoption of the larger matters of principle. 
 The Congress of 1861-63 was at best a body hard 
 to conciliate ; the majority was made up of ele 
 ments suspicious of each other, and the eventual 
 crystallization was around very aggressive men, 
 like Wade and Thaddeus Stevens ; moreover, the 
 temper of Congress shortly became so radical that, 
 even on such a question as slavery, men like Chase 
 were found among the conservatives. The lack of 
 harmony between appropriations and "ways and 
 means," which had been of small consequence be 
 fore 1861, became dangerous during the war ; for 
 to vote supplies seemed a patriotic duty, to be per- 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 235 
 
 formed instantly and without too much discussion, 
 while the raising of money required long debates, 
 and affected a member s popularity in his own dis 
 trict. 
 
 To deal with Congress Chase needed lieutenants, 
 and he never had them. Senator Fessenden of 
 Maine was sincerely interested in financial ques 
 tions, and was as helpful as any member of Con 
 gress ; but Chase had few personal friends in either 
 house and fewer spokesmen. He had to keep in 
 relations with the Committee of Ways and Means 
 of the House, and the Finance Committee of the 
 Senate ; and he argued before them, button-holed 
 members, wrote letters, placated them with minor 
 appointments, and brought pressure to bear from 
 constituents and newspapers ; but he understood 
 not the arts of lobbying, and he never could bring 
 Congress to accept his financial scheme in an en 
 tirety, or any part of it without great modification 
 of details. 
 
 So far as expenditures went, Chase never had 
 any control over them, and yet he was held respon 
 sible for at least the suggestions of means to meet 
 them. An example or two will show how far out 
 of the way his estimates sometimes were. In July, 
 1861, it seemed to him safe to predict that the 
 expenditures for the fiscal year 1861-62 would be 
 1318,000,000; but the revised estimates in De 
 cember were 1543,000,000, and the actual sum 
 eventually shown to have been expended was $475,- 
 000,000, For the year 1862-63 the secretary 
 
236 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 estimated 1475,000,000, and in the end paid out 
 $715,000,000. Both the committee system and the 
 exigencies of the war made it impossible for Chase 
 to impress upon Congress a conviction that he had 
 a firm grasp of the problems of national finance. 
 
 All the elements of Chase s whole system of 
 finance are to be found in his careful report of 
 December, 1861. In expenditure he urged an 
 economy which he was never able to secure. For 
 receipts he recognized five possible sources : taxa 
 tion, time loans, confiscation of property of the 
 insurgents, treasury notes to be issued for brief 
 periods on interest, and demand notes circulating 
 as currency ; out of these sources he meant soon 
 to eliminate the government notes of both kinds, 
 except for temporary uses ; and he intended to rely 
 on taxation, long loans, and confiscation. The ques 
 tions which most exercised his mind were : in what 
 proportion to use loans and taxes, and how to find 
 a market for his loans ? The force of circum 
 stances, however, speedily forced upon him as his 
 main resources short term loans bearing high in 
 terest ; and treasury notes, circulating as currency, 
 irredeemable, and a legal tender. 
 
 At the moment, the most serious problem seemed 
 to be whether the Treasury should rely on heavy 
 taxation to furnish a considerable part of its rev 
 enues, to create confidence in the payment of inter 
 est, and to form the basis of a sinking fund for 
 the bonds. Chase did not in either 1861 or 1862 
 urge high taxation, and in December, 1863, he very 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 237 
 
 distinctly stated his reasons. " I can see clearly 
 that we can go no further without heavy taxation ; 
 and he has read history to little purpose wlio does 
 not know that heavy taxes will excite discontent." 
 
 The experience of 1864 and 1865 proved that the 
 country could pay enormous taxes ; hence it is a 
 serious question whether Chase ought not to have 
 made taxation the basis of his whole scheme. It 
 must not be forgotten how unused people were 
 to any national taxes except indirect customs, 
 and how light even state and local taxation had 
 been for many years. From 1837 to 1861 the na 
 tional revenue was practically derived from import 
 duties, except a few millions from public lands. 
 The excise had twice been laid, but the second ex 
 cise expired in 1817, and it had always been a very 
 unpopular impost. No direct tax had been levied 
 since the War of 1812, and it was a device which 
 bore hardest on the poorest communities. Chase s 
 political instincts were against high protective du 
 ties, and Congress never knew how to force up the 
 tariff to a basis which would be productive and yet 
 not impair its revenue capacity. The strongest 
 reason for holding off from war taxation in 1861 
 was the expectation that the war would be over 
 in twelve months ; Chase hesitated, and Lincoln 
 hesitated with him, to lay a permanent war tax, 
 and both deliberately faced the prospect of going 
 through the calendar year 1862 chiefly on loans 
 and on the expected proceeds of confiscations. 
 
 In his report Chase expressly disclaimed a pur- 
 
238 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 pose of depending on government circulating 
 notes. He expected to borrow, but on obligations 
 running many years, and lie brought forward in 
 its first form his great project for a system of na 
 tional bank corporations, which should give the 
 country a stable currency and at the same time 
 become large lenders to the government. To his 
 mind the new banks were to be the keystone of 
 his financial arch ; they were to interest the finan 
 ciers in the success of the government, to take 
 away the competition between state bank notes 
 and government issues, to absorb and sell the gov 
 ernment securities, and to replace the temporary 
 treasury notes. 
 
 As soon as the recommendations of the secre 
 tary were sent to Congress it became evident that 
 that body was little disposed to follow his lead. 
 The customs duties had produced $64,000,000 in 
 1856-57, but only $40,000,000 in 1860-61. The 
 Merrill tariff took effect April 1, 1861 ; but as it 
 could be applied only to the loyal States, on Chase s 
 recommendation a special act of August 5 had 
 imposed revenue duties on tea, coffee, sugar, and 
 molasses ; and on December 24, also on Chase s 
 suggestion, Congress further raised those rates so 
 as to add at once to the revenue. As new sources 
 of revenue, Chase proposed direct, income, and in 
 ternal taxes to the amount of $50,000,000 a year, 
 which, with the increased customs, would make an 
 income of $90,000,000. 
 
 Although he apologized for asking such large 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 239 
 
 sums, Congress parted from him at this critical 
 moment, and under the leadership of Thaddeus 
 Stevens the House directed the Committee on 
 Ways and Means to lay new taxes which should 
 produce $150,000,000. But if Chase asked less 
 than the country was willing to give, at least he 
 wanted speedy action ; and Congress let six months 
 slip away before the comprehensive internal revenue 
 act of July 1, 1862, was passed. In this statute a 
 large number of articles, processes, and evidences 
 of wealth were included ; and a necessary part of 
 the scheme was a new tariff, by which additional 
 duties were placed on imported goods, to corre 
 spond with the new burdens placed on American 
 manufactures. This act required a wholly new 
 and very elaborate machinery, which could not be 
 improvised. Hence the net result of the disregard 
 of the secretary s suggestion was that during the 
 fiscal year 1861-62 he had no income from new 
 taxation except driblets from the direct tax to the 
 amount of about 12,000,000 ; and in 1862-63 he 
 got less than $40,000,000 from new taxes, while 
 the tariff receipts for that year were hardly greater 
 than for 1856. Chase s own modest plan would 
 have yielded from $60,000,000 to $70,000,000 a 
 year during the same period, with an immediate 
 good effect on the public credit. 
 
 The full influence of the legislation of 1862 was 
 not felt till the fiscal year 1863-64, when customs 
 and internal revenue raised the income at last to 
 more than the $200,000,000 which Chase had ex- 
 
240 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 pected in 1862, and with the aid of 130,000,000 of 
 confiscations the revenue ran up to 260,000,000. 
 In 1864-65, after Chase s retirement, the taxes rose 
 to $300,000,000, and in 1865-66 to $490,000,000 ; 
 and the country from which Chase hesitated to ask 
 $90,000,000 in December, 1861, five years later 
 furnished $570,000,000 to the federal treasury, 
 besides tremendous sacrifices of men and money. 
 
 It would not be fair either to the secretary or to 
 Congress to think the conditions of 1866 like those 
 of 1861. Flush times, sudden revival of business, 
 resumption of immigration, national self-confidence, 
 the restoration of the South, had by that time 
 taken the place of distress and forebodings. Chase 
 might have struck a higher note in his policy of 
 taxation, and every dollar raised in 1862 would 
 have saved three dollars in 1864 ; but he had an 
 intelligent plan of successive increases of taxation, 
 which would have accustomed the country to the 
 machinery of collection, while the congressional 
 system of taxes was slow at a critical time, and in 
 the end bore harder than was intended. 
 
 In all the previous crises in the finances of the 
 United States, 1776, 1794, 1812, 1837, 1842, 
 1857, taxation had been both inadequate and 
 slow ; and three other means of raising money had 
 been employed, temporary loans, funded loans, 
 and a form of paper currency. The easiest method 
 was to issue the so-called " treasury notes," usually 
 in large denominations and bearing interest. They 
 were used to satisfy for the time being the claims 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 241 
 
 of contractors, and also to attract idle capital, 
 since they had commonly but a few months to run, 
 and were as sound as any security in the country. 
 They were almost always treated as an investment, 
 and did not circulate except among banks and capi 
 talists. 
 
 Chase found outstanding when he came into 
 office more than $10,000,000 in one-year notes; 
 and he also found authority, by an act of March 2, 
 1861, to issue more treasury notes ; and before De 
 cember 1, 1861, he had put out $22,000,000 of two- 
 year notes, besides a large amount of very short- 
 term notes, which were redeemed as they fell due. 
 Under the discretion given him by the statutes, he 
 revived a form of note devised in the War of 
 1812, a 7-j^- per cent three-year "bond," as he 
 called it, issued in denominations of $50 and up 
 wards. The rate of interest was high ; it was easy 
 to calculate, and it was hoped that the people 
 would hoard the notes : as a matter of fact they 
 were taken chiefly by banks and large investors. 
 In July, 1865, $810,000,000 of these notes were 
 outstanding, and they were not all extinguished 
 till 1870. 
 
 Several other forms of temporary obligations 
 were worked out by the ingenious secretary : such 
 were the ordinary one-year and two-year notes at 
 five per cent and six per cent interest ; " certifi 
 cates of indebtedness," bearing six per cent and 
 running a year; and "temporary loans," payable 
 on ten days notice, with four per cent, five per 
 
242 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 cent, or six per cent interest, a very popular 
 method of obtaining interest on temporary deposits. 
 A favorite form with Chase was the "demand 
 notes," as issued under acts of July 17 and Au 
 gust 5, 1861, the authority to terminate December 
 31, 1862. These were in denominations as low as 
 five dollars, bore no interest, and were not legal 
 tender ; eventually they reached $60,000,000, but 
 they were superseded by the legal tenders and re 
 tired in 1862 and 1863. The demand notes were 
 the forerunners of the United States paper cur 
 rency, or " greenbacks," and were from the first 
 intended to circulate side by side with state bank 
 notes. Even after the suspension of specie pay 
 ments they stood at par in gold, because they were 
 receivable for customs. 
 
 The whole system of short loans was an unfortu 
 nate makeshift. Since it was impossible to foresee 
 expenses a year ahead, Chase s budgets were all 
 estimates. What he did was to raise all the money 
 he could, in every possible way ; to refund his tem 
 porary loans into bonds, so far as he could, and 
 then to resort to new short loans for pressing 
 needs. When everything else failed he issued 
 more legal tenders. 
 
 In December, 1861, the funded debt of the 
 United States (not including notes) was $280,- 
 000,000, of which about $200,000,000 had been 
 contracted since March, 1861. While the question 
 of taxes was pending, and indeed during the many 
 months before they could become productive, 
 
\ 
 TAXATION, LOANS, ANti LEGAL TENDERS 243 
 
 Chase was by the necessities of the case obliged to 
 put forth new issues of bonds. The second great 
 loan act, February 25, 1862, authorized the issue 
 of $500,000,000 in the so-called " five-twenty " 
 bonds. Chase himself proposed the two limitations 
 in the issue the fixing of the interest at six per 
 cent, and the payment of interest in gold. A 
 twenty-year bond at such rates of interest as were 
 usual in the country during the Civil War should 
 have been a good investment ; but neither of the 
 two provisions worked as had been expected. To 
 furnish the specie for the interest the import 
 duties were levied in gold, a provision reasonable 
 in itself and helpful to the Treasury ; but the bonds 
 would not sell at par on a specie basis, because 
 the investing public in the United States and 
 abroad thought six per cent too little for the risk ; 
 and by making the legal tenders convertible into 
 the bonds, Chase did not raise the credit of the 
 notes, and did inevitably depress the price of his 
 bonds to par in greenbacks. The continued effect 
 of these causes was that large blocks of Civil War 
 bonds were sold at gold values of 50 or even 40, 
 on which was paid an interest which, measured in 
 greenbacks, was 12 per cent to 15 per cent, with 
 the obligation of eventually redeeming in full in 
 gold. The purchaser of a " ten-forty " five per 
 cent bond in 1864 had therefore virtually a 20 
 per cent investment for at least ten years. 
 
 In placing the bonds, Chase wisely determined 
 not to depend longer upon banks, but to put the 
 
244 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 whole matter in charge of a general agent. The 
 person selected for this important national service 
 was Jay Cooke, a man of great energy, which he 
 infused into local agencies established with banks 
 and bankers throughout the United, States. But 
 in order to place the bonds at all, it was necessary 
 to allow a commission of three-eighths of one per 
 cent ; which, however moderate in itself, was a 
 monopoly privilege, and caused plenty of hard 
 feeling and some reflections on the secretary. 
 With every exertion, the actual subscriptions to 
 permanent loans during 1862-63 amounted to only 
 1175,000,000, while the taxes produced only $111,- 
 000,000; the expenditures were 1704,000,000, 
 leaving 1418,000,000 to be raised by temporary 
 loans and paper money. For two years, from 
 July, 1861, to July, 1863, the total expenditures 
 were $1,189,000,000, the receipts from taxation 
 $163,000,000, and from funded loans only $235,- 
 000,000. This leaves $791,000,000, or more than 
 two thirds of the whole, which had to be made up 
 by temporary loans of various kinds and by legal 
 tender notes which were a forced loan. In the 
 next year, 1863-64, much of the floating obligation 
 was at last funded, and the rising taxes came to 
 the relief of the government, so that when Chase 
 went out of office, in July, 1864, he left a funded 
 debt of $769,000,000, short-term debts of $516,- 
 000,000, and paper currency to the amount of 
 $455,000,000. This was simply hand to mouth 
 finance, issues of notes from time to time making 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 245 
 
 up for fluctuations in the various forms of tem 
 porary debt ; and the proceeds of loans anticipated 
 long before they were paid in. 
 
 Except certain one, two, and three year interest- 
 bearing legal tender notes first authorized March 
 3, 18G3, the obligations just described might be 
 refused by any creditor of the government who did 
 not choose to accept them ; and the early demand 
 notes were the only ones that freely circulated 
 during 1861. But in November, 1861, Chase was 
 cogitating a larger issue of some kind, and he said 
 to the banks : " You ask me to borrow the credit 
 of local banks in the form of circulation. I prefer 
 to put the credit of the people into notes and use 
 them as money." 
 
 The necessity for some kind of regular currency 
 had been felt throughout 1861, when the Western 
 bank circulation was giving way ; and it was ac 
 cented in January, 1862, when the specie began to 
 disappear from circulation. The state bank notes 
 then amounted only to 1184,000,000, which was 
 not sufficient for the needs of the country ; and 
 many of them were of doubtful value. The pa 
 tient secretary was at once beset by all sorts of 
 wild schemes for replacing or supplementing them 
 by a government currency. One friend suggested 
 circulating notes with accumulating interest at 
 3 T 6 <j% per cent ; another proposed a system of gov 
 ernment notes redeemable in land ; another thought 
 that the United States should take up the outstand 
 ing bank paper ; and others that the secretary 
 
246 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 should ask for authority to issue legal tender gov 
 ernment notes. For some months the premium on 
 gold was very slight, but after the military disas 
 ters of July, 1862, the United States notes sank 
 to 84 per cent, measured in specie. 
 
 Two rival plans now presented themselves to 
 Congress. Mr. Chase was willing to issue large 
 amounts of demand notes, taking the chances of 
 their deterioration ; on the other hand, Judge 
 Spaulding, the chairman of the sub-committee of 
 the Committee of Ways and Means, was convinced 
 that the only way to sustain such issues was to 
 make them legal tender. After a long fight in 
 Congress, an act was passed on February 25, 1862, 
 authorizing the issue of $ 150,000,000 in notes, to 
 be reissued as they were presented for redemption, 
 " and to be lawful money and a legal tender in 
 payment of all debts, public and private, within 
 the United States, except duties on imports and 
 interest on the public debt." The country was 
 thus committed to a policy of government legal 
 tender notes, and throughout the war, whenever 
 taxes and loans proved insufficient, recourse was 
 always had to this expedient ; when the war ended, 
 $431,000,000 of these legal tender notes were in 
 circulation. As silver suddenly disappeared from 
 circulation, acts of July 17, 1862, and March 3, 
 1863, authorized also the issue of fractional cur 
 rency in paper, and the amount eventually reached 
 145,000,000. 
 
 No act in Chase s life has caused so much dis- 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 247 
 
 cussion as his attitude on the legal tenders ; he 
 has been held up to odium as yielding to a pressure 
 from an uninformed Congress, which he might have 
 safely resisted. In his report of December, 1861, 
 he had dwelt upon the dangers of a national paper 
 currency, even without the legal tender quality, 
 saying that " in his judgment possible disasters so 
 far outweigh the probable benefits from the plan, 
 that he feels himself constrained to forbear recom 
 mending its adoption." Judge Spaulding pre 
 pared the draft of a statute to authorize in terms 
 the issue of legal tender notes, and thereby raised 
 the question of constitutionality ; whereupon Attor 
 ney-General Bates gave the informal opinion that 
 Congress had the power to issue legal tenders. 
 Chase saw that Congress was outrunning his 
 recommendations, and he called a conference of 
 bankers and members of the committees of Con 
 gress to find some counter plan upon which all 
 might combine. On January 15 the representa 
 tives of the banks agreed to a plan which was to 
 relieve the country from the necessity of a legal 
 tender act ; but on January 22, when the currency 
 bill was sent to Chase for his comments, he had 
 no argument to make against the legal tender 
 clause further than to express the regret that it 
 was considered necessary ; thenceforth the oppo 
 nents of the measure were deprived of his power 
 ful influence. On a test vote in the House, the 
 legal tender clause stood 93 to 53 ; and on Feb 
 ruary 4 Chase gave up the struggle, " on condition 
 
248 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 that a tax adequate for interest and sinking fund 
 and the ordinary expenditures be provided, and 
 that a uniform banking system be authorized." 
 
 The responsibility for the issue of legal tender 
 notes, and especially for the continued and exces 
 sive issue, is difficult to place. It has often been 
 urged that by insisting on high taxation and by 
 issuing demand notes without the legal tender 
 quality, the war might have been fought through 
 without recourse to this expedient. The responsi 
 bility for the delay in new taxes certainly lies 
 with Congress, or perhaps with the administration 
 as a whole, rather than with the secretary ; though 
 it must not be forgotten that the new taxes of 1862 
 were supposed to be severer than they proved, for 
 all authorities much overestimated their probable 
 proceeds. When their inadequacy was seen in 
 1863, Chase urged " the enactment of such laws as 
 will secure the increase of the internal revenue to 
 the amount originally estimated, of 1150,000,000 
 a year." From the tariff alone adequate revenue 
 was not to be expected ; for Congress was much 
 more disposed to add to the protective than to the 
 revenue schedules. The real difficulty, so far as 
 taxation was concerned, was the continued under 
 estimate of the probable duration of the war, and 
 the lack of experience of the ability of a prosperous 
 and energetic people to bear the burdens of a long 
 conflict. Without, high taxes to give a basis for 
 the credit of the government, borrowing was diffi 
 cult and the time loans expected in 1862 could not 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 249 
 
 be obtained in sufficient sums. There was plenty 
 of capital, as was shown by the large temporary 
 deposits with the government, but the capitalists 
 had many profitable investments before them, and 
 felt doubtful of the outcome of the war. So far 
 as taxation is concerned, Chase showed little initia 
 tive, and as a consequence, lost his leadership at 
 the outset. 
 
 Nobody then or since has been able to point out 
 a way whereby the issue of government notes of 
 some kind might have been averted. There was, 
 however, a very strong objection to giving them 
 the legal tender quality, although the idea was by 
 no means new, and was proposed in Congress about 
 the end of the War of 1812. Chase had evidently 
 been turning the objections to the plan over in his 
 mind, for on June 3, 1861, a friend sent him a 
 scheme for legal tender notes redeemable in gold, 
 silver, or interest-bearing treasury notes ; but the 
 secretary s instincts were against any system which 
 stretched the national powers and impaired preex 
 isting contracts. For two months before the act 
 passed he stood out against a legal tender clause, 
 first by direct argument, then by trying to organize 
 a counter scheme, and finally by refusing to give 
 his influence in favor of the plan ; but as has been 
 seen, his arguments did not convince Congress, his 
 counter scheme did not satisfy the bankers, and in 
 the end the clause was put into the bill whether he 
 would or no. 
 
 Undoubtedly it was the duty of a finance minis- 
 
250 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 ter to lead, and of Congress to defer, in such a 
 discussion as that on legal tenders ; but if Chase 
 ever thought of appealing to the country over the 
 head of Congress, he quickly gave up the idea ; 
 for when the question came to the test, he found 
 against him, not only the Committee on Ways and 
 Means, but the great banking interests of the coun 
 try ; and the imperious need of speedy provision 
 for the Treasury did not allow delay. Chase was 
 simply overborne by the weight of his counselors, 
 and further opposition would only have emphasized 
 his defeat. 
 
 Besides the testimony of shrewd observers at 
 the time, there are still in existence letters from 
 many bankers and business men in all parts of the 
 country, and especially in New York, Philadelphia, 
 and Boston, insisting on the legal tender clause. 
 Among these men were Assistant Treasurer John 
 J. Cisco ; and George Opdyke, who in an elaborate 
 memorial of January 28, 1862, set forth the argu 
 ment that the legal tender clause would strengthen 
 the interest-bearing securities of the government, 
 and urged that without it the government would 
 soon be unable to purchase supplies for the army 
 or to keep its bonds from a rapid fall. Another 
 phase of the question is set forth in a letter from 
 T. C. Henry of Philadelphia, who insisted upon 
 a legal tender quality in order to prevent the gov 
 ernment notes from sinking below bank paper ; for 
 some of the banks at this time adopted the ill- 
 timed practice of refusing to take the demand 
 
TAXATION, LOANS, AND LEGAL TENDERS 251 
 
 notes in ordinary deposits, with a view to show 
 that the credit of their own notes was better than 
 that of the Treasury ; while other concerns, espe 
 cially the savings banks, were furious at this at 
 tempt to throw them back upon wholly irredeem 
 able bank notes. A few men, like William "Welsh 
 of Philadelphia, urged the secretary not to yield 
 the point ; but had he continued to hold out against 
 Congress, he would have parted company with the 
 men through whom alone he could expect to place 
 loans. He yielded, not to an uninformed Con 
 gress, but to the wisest men with whom he could 
 consult; and he yielded because he expected to 
 hold the legal tender notes near par. 
 
 The constitutional question played a great part 
 in the debates in Congress, giving rise to indignant 
 remonstrances and denunciations ; but this side of 
 the problem seems at the time to have had less 
 weight in Chase s mind than the disorganization 
 of contracts and the danger of a depreciated cur 
 rency. In his thought this latter danger was to 
 be removed by his national bank project, through 
 which a new and sound currency was speedily to 
 take the place of the government issues. He and 
 his friends expected a moderate issue of the new 
 notes to tide the government over until the rising 
 flood of taxes, the large subscriptions to loans, and 
 the credit of national banks should make it possi 
 ble to refund the notes and at the same time to 
 meet the expenses of the government. 
 
 It is remarkable that Chase did not foresee the 
 
252 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 two interactive features of the legal tender act 
 which gave him much trouble in the long run, 
 namely, the coin duties, and the conversion of legal 
 tenders at par into six per cent, bonds. Since 
 gold was necessary for the payment of duties, it 
 must be had by the importers at any price, and 
 the arrangement therefore lent itself to a specu 
 lation in gold, which was really a speculation in 
 depreciation of the legal tender notes. But, on the 
 other hand, the scheme was really a somewhat 
 clumsy system of redemption, since the holder of 
 legal tenders could always turn them into a coin- 
 bearing security. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 
 
 TOWARD the end of 1861 slavery became the 
 central point, both of divergence between parties 
 and of differences within the parties ; and there 
 after the question became more and more momen 
 tous, till it culminated in the second Emancipation 
 Proclamation of January 1, 1863. From that time 
 on, the anti-slavery forces were in the ascendant, 
 and did not rest till in March, 1865, the Thirteenth 
 Amendment to the Constitution was laid before 
 the state legislatures. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the Republican 
 party was not an anti-slavery party, its most ad 
 vanced principle being that no new slave Territo 
 ries or slave States should be permitted ; and in 
 the tumultuous tides of public feeling after the fir 
 ing on Fort Sumter, the greatest efforts were made 
 to prevent the slave question from coming to the 
 front. At least four different elements may be 
 distinguished in the supporters of Mr. Lincoln s 
 administration : first, the anti-slavery Republi 
 cans, of whom Chase was the only distinct repre 
 sentative in the cabinet ; second, the moderate 
 Republicans, of whom a type, if not a leader, was 
 
254 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Seward ; third, the war Democrats, at first headed 
 by Stephen A. Douglas, who offered his personal 
 support and aid to the President, and who, with 
 his followers, believed and expected that the war 
 would be finished without affecting slavery in 
 the States ; fourth, the loyal border-state men, 
 many of them slaveholders, represented in the 
 South by Crittenden, and in the cabinet by Bates 
 and Montgomery Blair. Such men adhered to the 
 Union under the assurance that their property 
 rights would be safeguarded. 
 
 To reassure both war Democrats and border- 
 state men, the House of Representatives, on the 
 day after the battle of Bull Run, by a vote of 107 
 to 2, passed the following resolution : " Resolved 
 by the House of Representatives of the, Congress 
 of the United States, That the present deplorable 
 civil war has been forced upon the country by the 
 disunionists of the Southern States, now in arms 
 against the constitutional government, and in arms 
 around the capital ; that in this national emer 
 gency Congress, banishing all feelings of mere 
 passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty 
 to the whole country ; that this war is not waged 
 on their part in any spirit of oppression, or for any 
 purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of 
 overthrowing or interfering with the rights of es 
 tablished institutions of those States, but to defend 
 and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution 
 and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, 
 equality, and rights of the several States unim- 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 255 
 
 paired, and that as soon as these objects are accom 
 plished the war ought to cease." 
 
 In most of the States an attempt was made to 
 find a common political ground for Republicans, 
 and for those war Democrats who could not accept 
 the party designation of their former opponents. 
 Throughout 1861 and 1862 this fusion was kept 
 up, and in 1863 for a time took the name of 
 Union Party. Not until 1864 did the Republican 
 party again come forward as an entirely independ 
 ent organization, and rid itself of such of the 
 remaining war Democrats as preferred to return to 
 their own Democratic organization. 
 
 That the war might be fatal to slavery was, 
 however, evident to some minds from the first ; and 
 in April, 1861, a correspondent pointed out to 
 Chase the precise method which was to be the solu 
 tion of the question. " Why should not this ad 
 ministration place itself upon the construction 
 given to the Constitution by John Quincy Adams, 
 that the state of war would confer a constitutional 
 power upon the government to proclaim emancipa 
 tion ; then declare the seceded States in a condi 
 tion of rebellion, and by a proclamation of 
 emancipation obtain a power over the subject race 
 to assist in the restoration of order in the rebellious 
 States?" 
 
 At that time Lincoln was not ready to take up 
 either the idea of emancipation by proclamation or 
 the enlistment of negro troops ; he still believed 
 that the solution was to be emancipation by the 
 
 /^?s 
 
 f TT -NT TV F.RS1T Y 
 
256 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 voluntary action of the States, through the assist 
 ance of the general government. Throughout 1861 
 his mind dwelt on schemes for compensated eman 
 cipation and the deportation of the freedmen to 
 some other part of the world, schemes which had 
 been favorite ideas with him for ten years ; and 
 nothing but the relentless logic of events convinced 
 him that more violent methods were both possible 
 and desirable. 
 
 The hostilities of 1861 brought out several points 
 of altercation concerning slaves, especially the con 
 fiscation of slaves belonging to rebel masters and 
 the status of fugitives who had come within the 
 Federal lines. It was a grief to Chase that he 
 could not support General Fremont s proclamation 
 of August 30, 1861, which declared free the slaves 
 of all persons in the State of Missouri who were 
 taking an active part with the enemy in the field. 
 Chase defended the action of the President in an 
 nulling this pronunciamento, partly on the technical 
 grounds that the recent confiscation act of Congress 
 had limited the confiscation of slaves to such ne 
 groes as had actually been used in the rebellion, 
 and partly because, as he wrote, " I am sure that 
 neither the President nor any member of his ad 
 ministration has any desire to convert this war for 
 the Union and for national existence . . . into a 
 war upon any state institution." 
 
 Butler s shrewd solution of the fugitive question 
 in May, 1861, held the negroes who had come 
 within his lines to be " contraband of war ; " this 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 257 
 
 declaration had Chase s sympathy and support, and 
 on October 8 he took the unusual step of sending 
 to the " National Intelligencer " a leading article, in 
 which he approved using the service of the fugitive 
 negroes in the same way in which it had been em 
 ployed on the other side ; but suggested that in the 
 end such persons ought to be transported to some 
 tropical region, in order that " all injurious influ 
 ence from their emancipation would be averted, 
 while loyal masters, provided that they remain 
 loyal, can be, and doubtless will be, fully indemni 
 fied." 
 
 The same Congress which in 1861 and in 1862 
 showed a disposition to make a financial policy of 
 its own, also outran the President and his cabinet 
 on the question of slavery. On December 16, 1861, 
 a bill was offered for the total abolition of slavery 
 in the District of Columbia, and on April 16, 1862, 
 the act was passed, including a compensation to the 
 owners. As a consequence the three thousand 
 slaves in the District were shortly emancipated at 
 a cost to the government of about 81,000,000. 
 The District of Columbia act was an assertion of a 
 constitutional right which had always been claimed 
 by the North; but before that bill became law 
 another proposition was introduced, nominally " to 
 render freedom national and slavery sectional." 
 but really to put into practice, in defiance of the 
 Dred Scott decision, the doctrine that Congress 
 could and should prohibit slavery in the Territories. 
 Eventually this bill became a statute, prohibiting 
 
258 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 slavery and involuntary servitude in all the Terri 
 tories of the United States then existing or which 
 thereafter might be formed. On July 17 a second 
 confiscation act provided that the disloyalty of a 
 master should be a bar to any legal proceedings 
 which he might bring to claim the service of his 
 slave. By another statute, officers of the army 
 were forbidden to render any assistance in the 
 return of fugitives even to loyal masters. 
 
 Though slavery was undermined by this series of 
 acts, all passed within a year from the beginning 
 of active hostilities, it still remained legal in the 
 loyal border States, and the machinery of the Fugi 
 tive Slave Act of 1850 was in operation ; while 
 slaveholders in the seceded States remained in legal 
 possession of their slaves, provided the masters had 
 taken no actual part in the war. Nevertheless, on 
 both sides of the military lines the institution was 
 disorganized and in danger ; thousands of negroes 
 flocked to the camps from the border States, and 
 in the disturbed conditions of the time could not 
 be recovered by their masters ; other thousands 
 found their way out of the Confederacy across the 
 front, and gathered about the headquarters of the 
 Northern armies. 
 
 By this time Chase had come forward as the 
 leading anti-slavery spirit in the cabinet, and 
 sought an opportunity to make his principles felt. 
 Through his functions as the head of the department 
 which dealt with confiscated and abandoned pro 
 perty, he had a special relation with the refugees 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 259 
 
 from the South ; and after the taking of Port Royal, 
 on the coast of North Carolina, in November, 1861, 
 he was allowed to direct the first experiment in 
 organizing and civilizing the former slaves. In 
 January, 18G2, he sent down his friend, Edward 
 L. Pierce of Boston, an old-time abolitionist, who 
 had already been at Port Royal and hence knew 
 something of the conditions there. When Pierce, 
 at Chase s request, waited upon Lincoln to discuss 
 with him what might be done for the freedmen, 
 the President broke in upon him impatiently with 
 the inquiry, " What s all this itching to get niggers 
 into our lines ? " and he reluctantly authorized the 
 Secretary of the Treasury to give to Pierce such 
 instructions as might be necessary. In these in 
 structions Chase expressed his judgment that " the 
 persons who have thus been abandoned by their 
 masters, and who are received into the service of 
 the country, can never, without great inhumanity 
 on the part of the government, be reduced again to 
 slavery." In his mind, therefore, military emanci 
 pation had begun, and the problem of caring for 
 the former slaves must be assumed by the govern 
 ment. He took a great interest in the gathering 
 and training of the refugees, and several times 
 visited the station in person. 
 
 In the spring of 1862 the direction of the work 
 was transferred to the War Department, but 
 Chase, through his special control of the collection 
 of cotton, kept in close touch with the missionary 
 enterprise. General Hunter was put in command 
 
260 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 of the troops, but General Saxton was by Chase s 
 personal request appointed military governor of 
 South Carolina, and supervised the fugitives who 
 occupied most of the little district within the 
 Federal lines. The sea islands were again brought 
 under cultivation ; plantations were started, and 
 lands in small plots were assigned to individual 
 negroes. Schools were established by benevolent 
 societies in the North, and, in spite of many dis 
 couragements, the experiment of making former 
 slaves self-supporting was on the whole successful. 
 In this work Chase felt that he had had neither sup 
 port nor sympathy from the President ; but when 
 negro troops began to be organized, the settlement 
 at Port Royal became important as a recruiting sta 
 tion, and at the end of the war a prosperous com 
 munity appeared to have been founded. Then 
 questions were raised as to the title to the lands 
 distributed to the f reedmen ; and in time most of 
 them were dispossessed of the little holdings for 
 which they had worked so hard, and the experi 
 ment came to an unhappy end. The Port Royal 
 principle of special supervision and protection by 
 the government was, however, continued to the end 
 of reconstruction times. 
 
 Neither fugitives nor refugees could much affect 
 the other great problem of slavery, the status 
 of the slaves in the seceded States. President 
 Lincoln, himself a native of Kentucky, had always 
 had a strong sense of the practical difficulties 
 and dangers of emancipation in regions where the 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 261 
 
 negroes were numerous ; hence from 1861 to 1864 
 he continued to press his influence to the farthest 
 point possible in favor of compensated emancipa 
 tion, at least in the border States. Although 
 Chase had looked with some favor on this plan 
 in 1861, he finally set himself distinctly against 
 Mr. Lincoln s corollary scheme for colonization 
 of the freed negroes in the West Indies or in 
 Central America. Chase felt that the Port Royal 
 experiment had been neglected because u the col 
 onization delusion and negrophobia dread are too 
 potent yet." Upon this point his view was clearer 
 than that of the President ; for colonization in 
 volved depriving the South of its laborers and the 
 North of needed soldiers, and Chase was quicker 
 than Lincoln to reach the point where he was 
 willing to risk defection of the border States and 
 political disturbance in the North, by setting free 
 all the slaves in the Confederacy. 
 
 Before the war had been going on many months 
 the usefulness of the negroes as laborers on the 
 fortifications began to be seen, and a few early 
 voices were heard urging their enrollment as 
 troops. Probably one of the earliest of these sug 
 gestions was made in May, 1861, by Elizur Wright. 
 " At its foundation the war is all about the black 
 man. Between magnanimity and contempt, we 
 Northerners may be willing to fight it out for 
 him, and entirely without his aid. But events are 
 not ruled by men, and before the war is through 
 the black man is pretty likely to be fighting for 
 
262 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 himself on one side or the other." Notwithstand 
 ing the fundamental objection to using slaves as 
 soldiers, they were gathered in large quantities 
 by the Southern authorities for work on fortifica 
 tions, and free negroes were in a few cases ac 
 tually enlisted and disciplined in the rebel army. 
 At the capture of New Orleans a regiment of such 
 negro troops was found there. 
 
 Serious political objections stood in the way of 
 negro enlistments either in Northern States or in 
 conquered territory : white troops objected to ser 
 vice alongside negro soldiers ; and it was feared by 
 many and hoped by a few that the effect of enlist 
 ment would be to stir up slave insurrections in 
 the South. On May 9, 1862, General Hunter at 
 Hilton Head raised the issue by proclaiming that 
 " slavery and martial law in a free country are 
 altogether incompatible. The persons in these 
 three States, Georgia, Florida, and South Caro 
 lina, wherever held as slaves, are therefore de 
 clared forever free ; " at the same time he began 
 upon his own responsibility to organize colored 
 troops. With this action, which was as insubor 
 dinate as the similar proclamation of Fremont the 
 year before, Chase sympathized, and he exerted 
 his influence, though without avail, against its 
 revocation by the President. " I have never been 
 so sorely tried," he wrote to Horace Greeley, " in 
 all that I have seen in the shape of irregularities, 
 assumptions beyond the law, extravagances, defer 
 ence to generals and reactionists which I cannot 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 263 
 
 approve, ... as by the nullifying of Hunter s pro 
 clamation." From this time on Chase remained a 
 strong advocate of arming the negroes, and of mak 
 ing them eventually full citizens. Congress soon 
 came to the point of authorizing the enlistment 
 of negroes, by the act of July 17, 1862, which 
 empowered the President " to employ as many 
 persons of African descent as he may deem neces 
 sary and proper for the suppression of the rebel 
 lion, and for these purposes he may organize and 
 use them in such/ manner as he may judge best 
 for the public welfare." A few weeks later Secre 
 tary Stanton authorized the enlistment of troops 
 at Port Royal, and in the Emancipation Proclama 
 tion of January 1, 1863, the President formally 
 promised to receive negroes into the military ser 
 vice of the United States. 
 
 Though Chase had no strong influence in any 
 of the legislative or executive measures relative 
 to slavery, he was always the mainspring of anti- 
 slavery influence within the councils of the Presi 
 dent ; to him the abolitionists throughout the coun 
 try appealed for such action by the President as 
 should forever stamp the institution of slavery 
 with the crushing disapproval of the people in 
 arms. Every week brought suggestions not only 
 that the government had a duty in protecting fugi 
 tives and in punishing disloyal masters by freeing 
 their slaves, but also that the great opportunity 
 had come for a declaration that the war was a war 
 upon slavery ; that, as Chase told Motley in June, 
 
264 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 1861, if the North was otherwise unable to put 
 down the rebellion, " we shall then draw that sword 
 which we prefer at present to leave in the sheath, 
 and we shall proclaim the total abolition of slavery 
 on the American continent. We do not wish this, 
 we deplore it because of the ruin, confiscation of 
 property, and of the servile insurrections, too hor 
 rible to contemplate, which would follow." 
 
 That the negroes would rise if there was a good 
 opportunity seems to have been accepted as an 
 axiom on both sides; but the South understood 
 the character of the negro better than did the 
 North, and confidently denied its own axiom, with 
 drawing its able-bodied white men from the plan 
 tations, for military service. In the whole history 
 of the Civil War, there is no case of a rising of 
 slaves, though, till the first proclamation of eman 
 cipation was actually issued, Lincoln shrank from 
 what seemed a desperate and dangerous appeal 
 to their passions. Chase never faltered, but used 
 all the influence that he possessed upon the Pre 
 sident and his fellow members of the cabinet to 
 secure the desired proclamation ; and he so far 
 realized the importance of the issue that he made 
 in his diary from day to day those careful entries 
 of the discussions in the cabinet which are the most 
 definite source of our information about the mo 
 tives of Lincoln and his advisers at this crisis. 
 
 In July, 1862, the political situation was threat 
 ening for the Republican party. The country was 
 alarmed by disasters in the field, by new taxation, 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 265 
 
 and by heavy loans, and it saw no likelihood of 
 concentrated military energy. Chase himself was 
 out of patience, and thought seriously of seeking 
 a senatorship. In this gloomy period Chase earn 
 estly supported and even outran Lincoln s purpose 
 to take a definite step which would be unmistak 
 able to the country and to foreign nations. His 
 record of the discussion in the cabinet runs as 
 follows : 
 
 July 21, " I went at the appointed hour, and 
 found that the President had been profoundly con 
 cerned at the present aspect of affairs, and had 
 determined to take some definite steps in respect to 
 military action and slavery." To such a step most 
 of the members of the cabinet were favorably in 
 clined. August 3, " I expressed my conviction 
 . . . that the time for the suppression of the re 
 bellion without interference with slavery had long 
 passed. . . . Mr. Seward expressed himself as in 
 favor of any measures likely to accomplish the 
 results I contemplated, which could be carried into 
 effect without Proclamations ; and the President 
 said he was pretty well cured of objections to any 
 measure except want of adaptedness to put down 
 the rebellion ; but did not seem satisfied that the 
 time had come for the adoption of such a plan as I 
 proposed." 
 
 In September Chase was discouraged, and says : 
 " I have urged my ideas on the President and my 
 associates, till I begin to feel that they are irk 
 some to the first, and to one or two, at least, of the 
 
266 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 second." September 21, hearing that the Presi 
 dent was busy, he conjectures, " Possibly engaged 
 on Proclamation." September 22 another cabinet 
 meeting was held, the result of which was the pro 
 clamation of 1862. Of this important meeting we 
 have a full and animated account in Chase s diary 
 and memoranda : 
 
 " To Department about nine. State Depart 
 ment messenger came, with notice to Heads of 
 Departments to meet at 12. Received sundry 
 callers. Went to White House. 
 
 " All the members of the Cabinet were in attend 
 ance. There was some general talk ; and the Pre 
 sident mentioned that Artemas Ward had sent 
 him his book. Proposed to read a chapter which 
 he thought very funny. Read it, and seemed to 
 enjoy it very much the Heads also (except Stan- 
 ton) of course. The chapter was High handed 
 Outrage at Utica. 
 
 " The President then took a graver tone and 
 said : 
 
 " Gentlemen : I have, as you are aware, thought 
 a great deal about the relation of this war to 
 Slavery ; and you all remember that, several weeks 
 ago, I read to you an Order I had prepared on this 
 subject, which, on account of objections made by 
 some of you, was not issued. Ever since then, my 
 mind has been much occupied with this subject, 
 and I have thought all along that the time for act 
 ing on it might very probably come. I think the 
 time has come now. I wish it was a better time. 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 267 
 
 I wish that we were in a better condition. The 
 action of the army against the rebels has not been 
 quite what I should have best liked. But they 
 have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsyl 
 vania is no longer in danger of invasion. When 
 the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as 
 soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to 
 issue a Proclamation of Emancipation such as I 
 thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to 
 any one ; but I made the promise to myself, and 
 (hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army 
 is now driven out, and I am going to fulfill that 
 promise. I have got you together to hear what I 
 have written down. I do not wish your advice 
 about the main matter for that I have deter 
 mined for myself. This I say without intending 
 anything but respect for any one of you. But I 
 already know the views of each on this question. 
 They have been heretofore expressed, and I have 
 considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I 
 can. What I have written is that which my re 
 flections have determined me to say. If there is 
 anything in the expressions I use, or in any other 
 minor matter, which any one of you thinks had best 
 be changed, I shall be glad to receive the sugges 
 tions. One other observation I will make. I know 
 very well that many others might, in this matter, as 
 in others, do better than I can ; and if I were sat 
 isfied that the public confidence was more fully pos 
 sessed by any one of them than by me, and knew 
 of any Constitutional way in which he could be 
 
268 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly 
 yield it to him. But though I believe that I have 
 not so much of the confidence of the people as I had 
 some time since, I do not know that, all things con 
 sidered, any other person has more ; and, however 
 this may be, there is no way in which I can have 
 any other man put where I am. I am here. I 
 must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility 
 of taking the course which I feel I ought to take. 
 
 "The President then proceeded to read his 
 Emancipation Proclamation, making remarks on 
 the several parts as he went on, and showing that 
 he had fully considered the whole subject, in all the 
 lights under which it had been presented to him. 
 
 " After he had closed, Gov. Seward said : The 
 general question having been decided, nothing can 
 be said further about that. Would it not, however, 
 make the Proclamation more clear and decided, to 
 leave out all reference to the act being sustained 
 during the incumbency of the present President ; 
 and not merely say that the government " recog 
 nizes," but that it will maintain, the freedom it 
 proclaims ? 
 
 " I followed, saying : What you have said, 
 Mr. President, fully satisfies me that you have 
 given to every proposition which has been made, a 
 kind and candid consideration. And you have 
 now expressed the conclusion to which you have 
 arrived, clearly and distinctly. This it was your 
 right, and under your oath of office your duty, to 
 do. The Proclamation does not, indeed, mark out 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 269 
 
 exactly the course I should myself prefer. But I 
 am ready to take it just as it is written, and to 
 stand by it with all my heart. I think, however, 
 the suggestions of Gov. Seward very judicious, and 
 shall be glad to have them adopted. 
 
 " The President then asked us severally our 
 opinions as to the modifications proposed, saying 
 that he did not care much about the phrases he 
 had used. Every one favored the modification 
 and it was adopted. Gov. Seward then proposed 
 that in the passage relating to colonization, some 
 language should be introduced to show that the 
 colonization proposed was to be only with the con 
 sent of the colonists, and the consent of the States 
 in which colonies might be attempted. This, too, 
 was agreed to ; and no other modification was pro 
 posed. Mr. Blair then said that the question 
 having been decided, he would make no objection 
 to issuing the Proclamation ; but he would ask to 
 have his paper, presented some days since, against 
 the policy, filed with the Proclamation. The Pre 
 sident consented to this readily. And then Mr. 
 Blair went on to say that he was afraid of the in 
 fluence of the Proclamation on the Border States 
 and on the Army, and stated at some length the 
 grounds of his apprehensions. He disclaimed most 
 expressly, however, all objection to Emancipation 
 per se, saying he had always been personally in 
 favor of it always ready for immediate Emanci 
 pation in the midst of Slave States, rather than 
 submit to the perpetuation of the system." 
 
270 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 The proclamation was preliminary, but its effect 
 was immediate : it caused parties and individuals 
 to declare themselves. Nevertheless in the October 
 and November elections for the next House no 
 Republican majority could be secured out of the 
 free States : but a silent and drastic process was 
 applied by the military in the loyal border States, 
 which caused them to furnish enough Republican 
 members to make up the majority without which 
 the war must fail. Upon the South and the slaves, 
 the proclamation had no immediate effect ; con 
 trary to Chase s judgment, it excepted the only 
 territory where it could at once be applied, those 
 portions of the seceded States then occupied by 
 Northern forces. 
 
 At the cabinet meeting of December 31, 1862, 
 the President called for suggestions on a final pro 
 clamation, and Chase proposed two alternatives : to 
 make the proclamation apply to all parts of the 
 seceded States except to West Virginia, and to 
 omit any phrases which might be construed to in 
 cite servile insurrections. Neither of these sugges 
 tions found favor with the President, but he did 
 adopt almost verbatim the dignified final paragraph 
 written by the Secretary of the Treasury : " And 
 upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of 
 justice, warrantable by the Constitution, upon mili 
 tary necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment 
 of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty 
 God." With that invocation it went to the world 
 on the first day of 1863. 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 271 
 
 Whether the proclamation of emancipation had 
 legal effect as a constitutional exercise of the war 
 power, or whether it was only a declaration of polit- 
 cal policy, to be finally carried out by the action of 
 the Southern States and the Thirteenth Amend 
 ment, was a question which gave little concern to 
 anti-slavery men during 1863 and 1864. The 
 purpose of the administration was thenceforward 
 undoubted, and the whole controversy entered upon 
 a new stage, in which the principal issues were 
 the emancipation acts of Maryland and Missouri, 
 the political status of the emancipated negroes, and 
 the use of negro troops. 
 
 In the movements for constitutional amend 
 ments against slavery in the border States, Chase 
 had great interest and little influence. Though 
 opposed by the powerful influence of the Blairs, he 
 continued a most efficient friend of the Southern 
 negroes, and he used his opportunities as Secretary 
 of the Treasury in special charge of border traffic, 
 to support schemes for reconstruction intended to 
 protect the freedmen. His interposition was asked 
 in cases in which negroes floating about the border 
 States were taken up and sold for their jail fees ; in 
 February, 1863, he assumed the right to supervise 
 contracts between whites and negro laborers within 
 the Union lines ; and he sought the creation of a 
 proposed Bureau of Emancipation, which eventu 
 ally developed into the Freedmen s Bureau. 
 
 Serious questions arose out of the enlistment of 
 black troops, which proceeded rapidly during 1863. 
 
272 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Through Denison and other federal officeholders 
 and correspondents Chase did his utmost to stimu 
 late the enlistment of negroes. General Butler to 
 some degree sympathized with this purpose, and 
 enrolled several thousand negroes; but his suc 
 cessor, Banks, held back, notwithstanding Chase s 
 efforts to encourage him. In March, 1863, Jack 
 sonville was taken and held by Northern troops, 
 and Chase urged that it be made a centre of re 
 cruiting. His purpose in both States was not only 
 to recruit needed troops but to draw negroes out of 
 the Southern lines, and in the persons of the negro 
 soldiers to furnish object lessons of the necessity 
 of supplementing emancipation by sweeping away 
 all the legal distinctions which hedged the negro 
 about. 
 
 Plainly, Chase s system must in the end come to 
 an insistence on negro suffrage. It took a long 
 time for him clearly to see that this was the logical 
 result, but in December, 1863, he urged his friends 
 in New Orleans to recognize the principle of " re 
 organization on the free labor and free suffrage 
 basis." " How would it do," he asked of Horace 
 Greeley, " to advocate something like this : that 
 the new constitution [of Louisiana] contain a suf 
 frage article ; . . . that all citizens not imprisoned 
 for crime in the country, who desire to exercise 
 the right of suffrage, being twenty-one years of 
 age, present themselves for examination to these 
 commissioners, and on being found able to read 
 and write, and possessed of a competent knowledge 
 
SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR 273 
 
 of the Constitution of the State and the United 
 States, receive certificates, describing each suffi 
 ciently so as to identify him, in virtue of which 
 the citizen receiving it shall be entitled to receive 
 the right of suffrage? Would it not be very 
 honorable for Louisiana and Florida to lead the 
 way in this country to an electoral community with 
 no test except virtue and intelligence ? " 
 
 So long as Lincoln lived, little progress was 
 made in this direction, and a year later Chase 
 wrote : " I fear our good President is so anxious 
 for the restoration of the Union that he will not 
 care sufficiently about the basis of representation. 
 In my judgment there is none sound except abso 
 lute justice for all, and ample security of justice 
 in law and suffrage." The progress of public sen 
 timent on this subject is a part of the story of 
 reconstruction. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 NATIONAL BANKS AND THE GOLD QUESTION 
 
 IN his first formal report to Congress, Chase 
 foreshadowed that part of his financial system 
 which was most original, most permanent, and per 
 haps most serviceable to the country, the na 
 tional bank scheme. From the beginning of the 
 government, the States had chartered banks of 
 issue upon such terms and with such security as 
 seemed good to the legislatures. The United 
 States Bank of 1791 had been a competitor with 
 these state institutions ; and the second United 
 States Bank (1816 to 1836) was chartered with 
 the express purpose of furnishing a safe note cir 
 culation, which, by competition, should compel 
 state banks to keep their currency on a specie 
 basis. In 1861 the number of such banks was 
 1600, with a capital of 8430,000,000 and a cir 
 culation of over 8200,000,000, of which nearly 
 8150,000,000 was in Northern States. 
 
 Some of the more conservative New England 
 and Middle States required a deposit of securi 
 ties, in order to redeem the circulating notes in 
 case of the failure of the banks, and Louisiana 
 and Kentucky had two of the securest systems 
 
NATIONAL BANKS AND GOLD QUESTION 275 
 
 in the Union. The best Western banks had re 
 demption agencies in Eastern cities ; and several 
 of the Western States had each chartered a bank 
 as a state institution, for which the ultimate se 
 curity was the credit of the commonwealth. Mul 
 titudes of other banks had no separate or adequate 
 security for their circulating notes ; while hundreds 
 of kinds of bills were in circulation, and new 
 counterfeits appeared every day. The result was 
 that in 1861 more than five thousand sorts of al 
 tered, raised, or spurious notes were afloat, and 
 such was the suspicion of an unfamiliar bill that 
 cases have been known where the owner of a 
 perfectly good fifty-dollar note, exchangeable for 
 specie on demand, has traveled for days before 
 he could find any one who would so much as 
 change it. 
 
 The experience of the eight months of 1861, 
 when great difficulty was found in placing loans 
 through even the best of these banks, convinced 
 Chase that they were not to be depended upon to 
 stand as the permanent intermediary between the 
 government and the people ; and we have already 
 seen that the legal-tender controversy was, in his 
 judgment, precipitated by the existence of the 
 bank currency. From session of Congress to ses 
 sion, and from year to year, Chase insisted upon 
 a new bank system, till in 1865 he saw his project 
 carried out in all the details which he thought 
 essential, and the system still remains a monu 
 ment to its founder. 
 
276 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Just when or why Chase first resolved to break 
 up the state bank currency is uncertain. In his 
 report of July 4, 1861, appears an innocent recom 
 mendation of taxes " on distilled liquors, on bank 
 notes, on carriages, and similar descriptions of 
 property ; " but in a letter a few months later he 
 explains the recommendation as intended to break 
 down the competition of the poorer currency with 
 government notes, then redeemable in gold. He 
 also fearlessly asserted u the duty of the general 
 government to furnish a national currency. . . . 
 Its neglect of this duty has cost the people as 
 much as this war will cost them." In his re 
 port of December, 1861, Chase laid down his 
 favorite principle, that a paper circulation was a 
 loan without interest made by the people, and that 
 the government was fairly entitled to the profitable 
 privilege. He followed this up by a clear state 
 ment, from which he never wavered, " that Con 
 gress under its constitutional powers to lay taxes, 
 to regulate commerce, and to regulate the issue 
 of coin possesses ample authority to control the 
 credit circulation." The characteristic features of 
 the system which Chase outlined, and for which he 
 presented the draft of a bill, were three : the issue 
 of demand bank notes redeemable in coin ; the 
 requirement that United States bonds should be 
 the only non-metallic basis for circulation ; and the 
 preparation and issue of all notes under the direc 
 tion of the government. He thus intended to 
 secure simultaneously the three advantages of a 
 
NATIONAL BANKS AND GOLD QUESTION 277 
 
 safe currency, of loans to the government, and of 
 a simple and uniform system of notes, under tlie 
 guaranty of the nation. 
 
 It was one thing to propose so sweeping a re 
 form, and to point out the ease with which the 
 change might be brought about through a simple 
 transformation of the state bank currency into a 
 currency founded on national authority ; it was 
 quite another to meet the conservatism of Con 
 gress ; and it was still more difficult to overcome 
 the opposition of the banks themselves to the 
 transformation thus suggested. Though Hooper 
 of Massachusetts, one of the few approvers of the 
 proposition, was a member of the Committee of 
 Ways and Means, Thaddeus Stevens, as chairman, 
 reported against the project early in 1862 ; and 
 Chase thus lost the opportunity to enter on what 
 in private conversation he declared to be " the 
 only way by which we can raise the means to carry 
 on the war and save the country." 
 
 During 1862 the legal-tender notes were freely 
 poured out, till by October 1 they reached $200,- 
 000,000. The expectation that they would be con 
 verted in large quantities into interest -bearing 
 loans was not realized. On the other hand, the 
 state bank circulation also increased, and the state 
 banks grew more determined in their opposition to 
 the renewal, at the next session of Congress, of the 
 effort to charter national banks. Again, in his 
 second annual report, December, 1862, the secre 
 tary feelingly pointed out that government legal 
 
278 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 tender notes were being used instead of specie to 
 form bank reserves, and were thus withdrawn from 
 circulation and replaced by state bank notes ; and 
 he proposed in round terms that " the circulation 
 furnished by the government be issued by banking 
 associations, organized under a general act of Con 
 gress." 
 
 Several factors combined to give the whole pro 
 ject greater strength than in the previous year. 
 The delay of Congress had the excellent effect of 
 showing that the weaker banks would not volun 
 tarily give up the privileges of their state charters 
 and accept a currency under national auspices ; 
 but that the cohort was broken by the decision 
 of some of the strongest banks to take federal 
 charters as well as federal circulation. Men like 
 President Walley of the Revere Bank of Boston 
 saw no objection to creating national banks in the 
 great financial centres ; and some of the savings 
 banks discovered the preference of their depositors 
 for government notes, and were plagued by the 
 miscellaneous state bank notes which they had to 
 receive from the regular banks of issue. Mean 
 while Chase s renewed effort to get a tax on state 
 bank notes gave some alarm to the regular banks ; 
 and his personal friends went to various state 
 legislatures urging them to indorse his plan. At 
 length, on January 17, 1863, Chase secured from 
 Lincoln a special message asking Congress to pass 
 a national bank act ; and by the middle of Febru 
 ary, amateur lobbyists were asking Chase s favor 
 
NATIONAL BANKS AND GOLD QUESTION 279 
 
 on the ground that they were influencing- votes for 
 his scheme. Finally, on February 25, 1863, the 
 National Bank Act was passed by the narrow 
 votes of 23 to 21 in the Senate, and 78 to 64 in 
 the House. 
 
 The statute, however, did not go to the point 
 which Chase felt to be absolutely essential. It 
 authorized the chartering of associations which 
 should deposit with the Treasury of the United 
 States bonds of the United States to the amount of 
 not less than one half of their capital ; it permitted 
 such banks to receive notes to the amount of ninety 
 per cent of the par value of the bonds thus depos 
 ited, the total amount of notes to be limited to 
 8300,000,000 ; and it exempted the new banks 
 from taxation, a privilege which tended to make 
 them unpopular in the States. But the act also 
 authorized the issuance of similar notes to the 
 amount of eighty per cent of the face value of 
 United States bonds deposited by state corpora 
 tions. The bill was therefore little more than a 
 permission to new institutions to enter into compe 
 tition with state banks, or to existing state banks 
 to reorganize under a national charter. 
 
 A few months experience showed how little the 
 privileges were valued ; and the old state bank 
 notes continued to increase. In vain did Chase s 
 friends, political and financial, make a personal 
 effort to found new banks ; in vain did Jay Cooke 
 give a dinner to all the editors in New York, in the 
 hope to swing them into line. The bankers thought 
 
280 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 the old system more profitable ; and men like 
 Chase s friend George Opdyke, who tried to organ 
 ize national banks, found themselves hampered and 
 chilled by political opposition. 
 
 After more than two years of effort Chase s 
 national bank scheme had actually done little for 
 the government and less for the public. By De 
 cember, 1863, thirty-four of the new banks had 
 been formed ; but their whole capital was only 
 16,000,000 and their notes actually issued were 
 not much above 83,000,000, while $450,000,000 
 of legal tender had been authorized and $447,000,- 
 000 had been issued. In his third annual report, 
 in 1863, Chase indefinitely suggested " proper 
 measures " to induce the conversion of the state 
 banks into national banks, though he still ex 
 pected that large numbers of the banks would 
 voluntarily accept the change. A few months 
 more of experience convinced him of the con 
 trary, and early in 1864 he proposed a prohibitory 
 taxation of state banks, on the ground that the 
 effect of the legal tender act had been to relieve 
 them from their charter obligation to redeem their 
 notes in specie, and that therefore they had pro 
 vided themselves with reserves of legal tenders, 
 with the result that the irredeemable notes of the 
 United States were made the basis of a second 
 issue of paper money of greater amount than the 
 paper reserve of the banks. 
 
 In March, 1864, Chase brought forward an 
 amendatory national bank bill, ill-naturedly chur- 
 
NATIONAL BANKS AND GOLD QUESTION 281 
 
 acterized by an opponent as made up of a special 
 clause for the benefit of the Bank of Commerce in 
 New York city, an admission that the original bill 
 had failed, and an appeal to adopt the principles of 
 the first bill. Even now the secretary had not 
 thought it prudent to introduce a prohibitory clause 
 against the state institutions, contenting himself 
 with a bill which would make easier the transition 
 from state to national charters ; but this moderate 
 measure, though it much improved the original 
 bank act, failed mainly on the question of the ex 
 emption of the national banks from all state taxes ; 
 and on April 6, with the assent of its friends, it 
 was laid on the table. Chase exerted himself de 
 sperately in behalf of his favorite measure. He 
 urged Horace Greeley to " say in the ; Tribune 
 that it is as wrong in principle to issue and cir 
 culate . . . paper money without the imprint and 
 sanction of the nation as it is to issue and cir 
 culate a piece of metallic money." A few days 
 later he addressed a remonstrance to Thaddeus 
 Stevens, urging that the " emission of notes of cir 
 culation by private, municipal, or state authority is 
 as indefensible as the emission of coin by the same 
 authority." To Greeley he had also thrown out 
 suggestions that the state banks must be taxed " as 
 
 OS 
 
 much as they can bear," and he appealed also to 
 the President to stand by the prohibition of bank 
 issues. 
 
 Under these influences, Chase s bill was revived 
 and passed, June 3, 1864, including a special clause 
 
282 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 permitting the transfer of the anomalous Bank of 
 Commerce of New York, with its 110,000,000 
 of capital, into a national bank ; and the taxation 
 question was stilled by allowing taxes on the shares 
 of a national bank only in the State where it was 
 located, at the same rates as for other similar insti 
 tutions ; while a tax of about one per cent was also 
 laid on the national banks by the national treasury. 
 The new system stimulated conversions, and in 
 December, 1864, there were nearly six hundred 
 national banks, with a circulation of 165,000,000. 
 ^The final step was taken long after Chase s resig 
 nation, by the passing of the act of March 3, 1865, 
 which embodied the provision which had been in 
 Chase s mind more than four years earlier, a tax 
 of ten per cent on all state bank notes. Although 
 many of the state institutions never accepted gov 
 ernment charters, they were obliged to give up their 
 issues ; and when the tax took effect, the whole issue 
 of bank paper notes was transferred to 1650 national 
 banks, having a circulation of over 1400,000,000. 
 
 The plan of a national bank system is indubita 
 bly Chase s. His was the first definite conception 
 of a circulation under national authority, backed up 
 by a prohibitory, or at least a discriminating, tax 
 on other issues ; and in 1862 he added the neces 
 sary feature that all the banks of issue should owe 
 their charter to the United States and be subject 
 to national supervision. In Chase s mind a great 
 advantage of the scheme was the demand thus cre 
 ated for government bonds, and the consequent 
 
NATIONAL BANKS AND GOLD QUESTION 283 
 
 relief of the legal tender notes ; and it was not liis 
 fault that during his administration little progress 
 was made in the actual accepting of United States 
 securities as a basis for notes. A second consider 
 ation which Chase had always in mind was the 
 national need of a currency at once uniform and 
 safe. He approved of all three of the measures 
 which were finally passed into law ; and much of 
 the present organization of the national banks is 
 due to his invention. He had many disappoint 
 ments in dealing with Congress ; but his is the 
 triumph of conceiving a working national bank 
 system, of showing its possibilities, and of putting 
 it into force. 
 
 Though a central idea of the national bank sys 
 tem was that the notes should always be redeem 
 able in specie, Chase had the mortification to see 
 the circulating notes of the government gradually 
 sink. In April, 1862, the depreciation was less 
 than two per cent; but after the failure of the 
 Peninsular campaign greenbacks fell to about 
 eighty-seven cents on the dollar, and by December, 
 1862, to about seventy-five cents. 
 
 This depreciation was a sore point with Chase, 
 and in his reports he attempted, with but poor 
 success, to show, first that it was less than it ap 
 peared to be, and second, that it was not due to 
 excess of government paper. " Gold," he said, 
 "had become an article of merchandise, subject 
 to the ordinary fluctuations of supply and demand 
 and to the extraordinary fluctuations of mere spec- 
 
284: SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 ulation." In December, 1862, the aggregate circu 
 lation of paper, national and state, was about $400,- 
 000,000, which he considered hardly more than 
 was necessary, considering the active condition of 
 business ; any excess of currency he attributed to 
 the state banks. During 1863, however, while the 
 bank issues were about stationary, the government 
 increased its legal tenders and fractional notes by 
 nearly 1300,000,000. Once more the secretary 
 could not believe that " the increase in price is 
 attributable wholly or in very large measure to this 
 circulation," and he still asserted that not his notes 
 but those of the banks were at fault. 
 
 Though Chase could argue that paper money did 
 not fall, he could not deny that " gold was rising," 
 and various expedients were suggested for stop 
 ping the process. In November, 1862, a plan was 
 sent him for issuing gold and silver notes, to be 
 always redeemable in specie, and available for the 
 payment of customs and other specie obligations. 
 But some bankers and public men kept calling 
 for issues of government paper, even to the extent 
 of replacing all the interest-bearing bonds ; and in 
 February, 1863, owing to some temporary flurry, 
 a small premium was offered for state bank notes 
 over United States notes, and some creditors of the 
 government even declined to receive those trea 
 sury notes which were not specifically legal tender. 
 The only part of the country where gold contin 
 ued to circulate was the Pacific coast, and through 
 his special agent in San Francisco Chase made 
 
NATIONAL BANKS AND GOLD QUESTION 285 
 
 several unsuccessful efforts to introduce the legal 
 tenders there and thus to drive out the gold. Gold 
 stood January 31, 1863, at 160, and during the 
 year various devices were proposed for checking the 
 depreciation of paper. One was Colfax s scheme, 
 tried and found wanting in the Revolution, that 
 of fixing the legal tender notes at a depreciation of 
 one third their face, with the hope thus to prevent 
 their sinking lower. Wilder schemes were sug 
 gested, such as the sending out of treasury agents 
 to corner all floating gold and force down its price 
 by drawing on the reserve of the Treasury ; or to 
 tax the business of gold speculation. 
 
 In March, 1862, the first legislation on this sub 
 ject was obtained in the form of a statute author 
 izing the government to purchase gold with bonds 
 or notes ; and in March, 1863, the secretary re 
 ceived authority to pay gold interest in advance ; 
 and a tax was laid on all contracts for the purchase 
 of coin or bullion. In the spring of 1864 the pub 
 lic uneasiness had reached such a point that the 
 secretary attempted first one and then another 
 measure of repression. His first idea was the sell 
 ing of treasury gold, in order to " bear " the gold 
 market ; and in the middle of April, he himself went 
 to New York, where, by the sale of 111,000,000, 
 he did succeed for a few days in running the pre 
 mium down from 189 to 165, though he soon saw 
 that he could not achieve a permanent effect. Only 
 one means seemed left : through the President and 
 through Congress, he pushed again his favorite 
 
286 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 scheme for prohibiting state bank notes, a plan 
 which might have had some effect, but found no 
 favor; at the same time he urged a statute for 
 punishing criminally the business of dealing in gold 
 futures. 
 
 The " Gold Bill," long delayed in the House, 
 did not become law until June 17. It provided 
 penalties for effecting contracts in gold coin or 
 bullion or foreign exchange for future delivery, 
 and also declared all such contracts absolutely void. 
 The result was that in ten days, from June 20 to 
 June 30, gold rose from about 200 to 250. It was 
 useless for Chase to write to his financial supporters 
 in New York that " there is not the slightest reason 
 for any rise in the price of gold, either in the finan 
 cial or military situation ; " and it was equally fu 
 tile to draft a new bill for the sale of gold and 
 silver mining lands, as a means of restoring confi 
 dence in the ultimate payment of the notes. The 
 great bankers of New York came to Congress to 
 demand the repeal of the act, on the ground that 
 it only made it easier for gold speculators to mono 
 polize their commodity ; and they secured a hasty 
 repeal of the Gold Bill on July 2, 1864. The 
 almost simultaneous resignation of Chase further 
 excited the gold speculators, causing gold a few 
 days later to reach its highest figure of about 285 ; 
 in August and September it began to decline, with 
 irregularity. In February, 1865, it fell to 200 ; 
 and in March to 150. 
 
 It has often been asserted that the real cause of 
 
NATIONAL BANKS AND GOLD QUESTION 287 
 
 Chase s withdrawal from the Treasury was the 
 failure of this measure and the revealed inability 
 of the secretary to keep up the public credit ; but 
 there is nothing in the private papers of either 
 Chase or Lincoln to show that the President felt 
 his secretary responsible for the fall of the legal 
 tenders or that Chase had lost the confidence of the 
 financiers of the country. The premium on gold 
 was an index of the distress and uneasiness of the 
 people at the long progress of the war; and the 
 reason for the gradual recovery of the public credit, 
 after Chase s withdrawal, was simply the conviction 
 that the military commanders then at the head of 
 the army would carry the war to a successful end. 
 ^ No doubt one reason why Chase offered his resig 
 nation was his conviction that he was rendering so 
 great a service to the country that he could not be 
 spared and must be conciliated. How far did the 
 events of his secretaryship justify this confidence 
 in Chase s financial abilities, held not only by him 
 self but by multitudes of his admirers throughout 
 the country ? The question is not simply what he 
 did, but what he did under the circumstances and 
 conditions of the times. Chase took the Treasury 
 when the country had for more than forty years 
 known no sort of a national taxation except cus 
 toms duties, when state taxes were also very low, 
 and when the private finance of the country was 
 as yet little organized in powerful associations or 
 syndicates. He suffered from the lack of ade 
 quate personal backing in Congress, through which 
 
288 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 he might have more urgently presented his finan 
 cial schemes. He suffered also from the lack of 
 previous acquaintance with the bankers and lend 
 ers of the country ; and he was most of all ham 
 pered by the inability of all the leading public 
 men, including himself, to foresee how long and 
 how desperate the Civil War must be. He was 
 not fairly aroused until 1863, and by that time 
 the Treasury was too deep in its legal tender 
 notes to free itself, either through taxation, or 
 through the better market for loans which resulted 
 from the victories of Vicksburg, Gettysburg, and 
 Chattanooga, and from the success of the blockade 
 of the Southern ports. His loans were wisely and 
 shrewdly managed, and would have been more 
 successful had Congress carried out his full na 
 tional bank system in 1862 instead of 1865, and 
 had he avoided the serious mistake of refusing to 
 make long loans at par at high rates of interest. 
 Here again the defective currency system came in 
 to check his best laid plans, for he was justified in 
 the hope to strengthen his legal tenders by making 
 them convertible into bonds, and can hardly be 
 held to account for failing to foresee that the bonds 
 were weakened by the bringing of their price 
 down to the level of the greenbacks. 
 
 The legal tenders came upon him unexpectedly 
 and like a flood. Here his fault, if there were 
 one, lay in supposing that he could immediately 
 stop the state bank issues and thus prevent infla 
 tion ; and in failing to see that Congress, and even 
 
NATIONAL BANKS AND GOLD QUESTION 289 
 
 the secretary, would inevitably fall back upon the 
 printing-press whenever there was a crisis in the 
 Treasury. Having once yielded to the pressure 
 of many of his financial advisers, as well as to 
 the popular feeling reflected in Congress, Chase 
 could never recover his ground, and later said that 
 the only thing he regretted in his treasury experi 
 ence was his giving way on that point. As for the 
 national banks, Chase, with all his energy, could 
 succeed only in laying the foundations upon which 
 his successors built ; but he laid them deeply and 
 firmly. 
 
 ^j The errors in Chase s finance were, then, due 
 partly to inexperience, partly to want of apprehen 
 sion of the tremendous task thrust upon him, and 
 partly to the hurry and rush of a desperate time. 
 His positive measures were on the .whole success 
 ful, and it must never be forgotten that he had two 
 qualities which were more valuable to the country 
 and the Treasury than financial genius : he had 
 indomitable persistence, and he had the honesty 
 which needed not his own too frequent approval. 
 However much he groaned over the difficulties of 
 his place, he met those difficulties firmly day by 
 day, and he did not deceive or cajole. Nor did 
 he protect dishonest men : his immediate subordi 
 nates were trustworthy and efficient, and justified 
 his confidence ; indeed, the average character of 
 the treasury official was higher than in any other 
 department of the public service except perhaps 
 the Navy. Chase deserves to be called a great Sec 
 retary of the Treasury. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 CHASE AND LINCOLN 
 
 THE relations of the Secretary of the Treasury 
 with the President during the Civil War have been 
 much discussed and much misunderstood. Though 
 each at times found his patience sorely tried by 
 the other, the two men had always a genuine re 
 spect and esteem for each other, and they were 
 perhaps more nearly in accord in their judgment 
 on political questions than w r ere any others in the 
 cabinet council. 
 
 It was a misfortune that the two men had known 
 each other but little before their association in the 
 same administration. When Chase came to Wash 
 ington, he expected a more intimate friendship 
 with the President than he ever gained ; in after 
 years he felt that perhaps he had made a mistake in 
 choosing a house more than a mile from the White 
 House ; for Seward, he thought, lived so near by 
 that he had an opportunity to know Lincoln in an 
 informal good fellowship which was denied to him. 
 But the real cause that kept Lincoln and Chase 
 from coming close together lay much deeper than 
 a separation by a few furlongs. While kindly, 
 genial, and agreeable among his friends, Chase had 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 291 
 
 the misfortune to lack a sense of humor ; and a 
 Puritan conception of the gravity and seriousness 
 of his work kept him from really understanding 
 the easier and less strenuous attitude of the born 
 Kentuckian. Chase was also apt to feel that his 
 good counsels were slighted or disregarded, and he 
 was touchy about the conduct of his office ; while 
 Lincoln was willing to go great lengths in order 
 to preserve the peace and keep the machinery of 
 government moving. 
 
 In the duties of his office Chase experienced 
 from Lincoln such consideration and such willing 
 ness to leave department matters to his secretary s 
 judgment as fall to the lot of few cabinet officers. 
 Lincoln was satisfied to throw the responsibility 
 of the Treasury upon his secretary s shoulders, 
 though he sometimes helped him out by a special 
 message to Congress. In the great questions of 
 the Civil War, the two men had the same high 
 sense of their duty to preserve the country from 
 dissolution and the people from injustice, but by 
 their natural habits of thought they felt in very 
 different proportions an interest in the main issues ; 
 for instance, Lincoln had a much stronger sense 
 of the political and military necessity of placating 
 the border States than was possible to the Ohio 
 anti-slavery man. On the question of slavery also 
 the two men had different points of view, for 
 Chase hoped and expected that slavery would 
 receive its death-blow, while Lincoln a few days 
 before his Emancipation Proclamation announced 
 
292 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 that he was willing to save the Union without free 
 ing a slave. The hostility of the two men to the 
 institution itself was very similar ; but in Chase s 
 mind the war was a means to emancipation, in Lin 
 coln s mind emancipation was a means to success 
 ful war. In political matters also the two men 
 never pulled together. Chase sought to build up 
 the Republican party because he thought it the 
 safeguard of freedom ; Lincoln hoped to get the 
 support of the people in order that he might re 
 store the Union. To sum up the whole matter in 
 a sentence, union and freedom were dear to both 
 men, but to Chase freedom was the necessary foun 
 dation of union, and to Lincoln union was the 
 prerequisite of freedom. 
 
 Considering the free scope which Chase had in 
 his own department, it must have been trying to 
 the President that the Secretary of the Treasury 
 should so often attempt to put pressure upon him 
 in military matters. Chase reasoned that he was 
 witness to a military expenditure which he could 
 not control, and yet which he must meet, at the 
 risk of his reputation as a financier, and even at 
 the peril of the national credit. He found it pos 
 sible to concentrate the capital of the country be 
 hind him and to impress upon Congress the need 
 of financial vigor, and hence he thought that simi 
 lar energy in other departments would bring the 
 war to a speedy end. Maunsell Field, one of 
 Chase s subordinates in the treasury, says that on 
 one occasion Chase was so wrought up by the reports 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 293 
 
 of scandalous waste in the quartermaster s depart 
 ment that he personally upbraided Stanton. From 
 time to time his letters and his diary express wrath 
 and grief over unnecessary expenditure, which 
 seemed to produce no military advantage, in such 
 terms as this entry in his diary for September, 
 1862 : " Warrants to-day enormous, over $4,000,- 
 000, and unpaid requisitions still accumulating 
 now over 140,000,000. Where will this end?" 
 All the world now knows that Chase was right in 
 feeling that the men and money were not so 
 applied as to get the greatest result ; his error was 
 in failing to realize the political difficulty of mana 
 ging so complex a machinery as the volunteer army. 
 Another cause of friction with the President was 
 a different conception of the functions of heads 
 of departments. From time to time Chase com 
 plained in his private diary and in conversations 
 and letters that there was no cabinet. On one 
 occasion he " told Weed that we must have de 
 cided action and that he [Weed] could insure 
 it ; was going to meeting of heads of departments, 
 not to cabinet." A few days later he wrote to 
 Greeley : " It seems to me that in this government 
 the President and his cabinet ought to be well 
 advised of all matters vital to the military and 
 civil administration ; but each one of us, to use a 
 presidential expression, turns his own machine, 
 with almost no comparison of views or consultation 
 of any kind. It seems to me all wrong and I have 
 tried very hard to have it otherwise unavail- 
 
294 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 ingly." About the same time he complained to 
 Senator John Sherman of the lack of discussion on 
 the campaign. " We have as little to do with it 
 as if we were heads of factories, supplying shoes or 
 clothing. No regular and systematic reports of 
 what is done are made, I believe, even to the 
 President ; certainly none are made to the cabi 
 net." That there ought to have been some sort of 
 clearing-house in which the several heads of de 
 partments might understand each other s purposes 
 is undeniable, but Chase appears to have reached 
 out farther : even when the cabinet was summoned 
 to discuss great military crises he felt aggrieved 
 if the President went on his way, disregarding the 
 plentiful good advice of the Secretary of the Trea 
 sury. 
 
 Occasionally Chase tried giving unasked coun 
 sel. In June, 1862, when McClellan was engaged 
 in the Peninsula, Chase strongly urged the Presi 
 dent to direct a column of troops to Charlottes- 
 ville, and was much pained that his judgment was 
 not followed. A little later he was writing to 
 General Pope and General Butler on the slavery 
 question, and was trying to impress the President 
 with the necessity of a campaign against Vicks- 
 burg. In August, 1862, he joined Seward in an 
 attempt to coerce the President into dismissing 
 McClellan from command of the troops before 
 Washington ; the two got Bates and Smith to join 
 them in a protest, and secured Stanton s neutrality. 
 Lincoln expressed his distress to "find himself 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 295 
 
 differing on such a point from the Secretary of 
 War and the Secretary of the Treasury ; that he 
 would gladly resign his place, but he could not 
 see who could do the work wanted so well as 
 McClellan." 
 
 Chase s military interest was not confined to the 
 cabinet ; his active correspondence with army offi 
 cers in the field, and his exchange of views with 
 them about the military policy of the President, 
 have been brought out clearly by letters printed 
 by Warden, Schuckers, and Hay and Nicolay ; 
 which might be enlarged from the files of his cor 
 respondence. Upon these letters, biographers of 
 Lincoln have even founded an indictment against 
 Chase, as a man trying to undermine his superiors 
 and counseling disobedience to the President s 
 orders. 
 
 From December, 1861, to the final failure of the 
 campaign of 1862, Chase did attempt to infuse 
 vigor into the commanders by direct incentive. 
 In December, 1861, he asked McClellan to confer 
 with him, and the next day he sent a direct com 
 munication to the general asking him to protect 
 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In 1862 he 
 began a correspondence with Colonel James A. 
 Garfield, with whom he maintained intimate rela 
 tions throughout the war. General Morgan asked 
 him for regular troops ; General Shields wanted 
 him to confer in his behalf with the President ; he 
 was in direct and confidential correspondence with 
 General Butler in New Orleans ; General Banks 
 
296 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 sent him a message saying that he should like to 
 join forces with Chase, the two to be " head and 
 arm ; " to General McDowell, in March, 1862, he 
 sent an article from the " Cincinnati Commercial " 
 criticising McClellan, who was then superior in 
 rank to McDowell ; to Colonel Key he expressed 
 his reasons for approving Lincoln s orders to 
 McDowell before McClellan s campaign of 1862. 
 When his confidence in McClellan at last broke 
 down, he wrote again to McDowell, saying : " With 
 50,000 men and you for a general I would under 
 take to go from Fortress Monroe to Richmond in 
 two days." A note to Greeley on May 21, 1862, 
 sums up his opinion in a few words : " McClellan 
 is a dear luxury fifty days fifty miles fifty 
 millions of dollars easy arithmetic, but not satis 
 factory. If one could have some faith in his com 
 petency in battle, should his army ever fight one, if 
 not in his competency for movement, it would be a 
 comfort." 
 
 After the failure of the Peninsular campaign, 
 Chase was very anxious to be rid of McClellan. 
 Nevertheless when a few days later he called on 
 General Halleck he " judged it prudent not to say 
 much of the war." For McDowell and for Pope 
 ,,he had a special sympathy, and he did what he 
 could to make their retiring easier. On Septem 
 ber 23, 1862, he called on Hooker, and gave 
 that general to understand that he had favored 
 his appointment immediately after the Peninsular 
 campaign. As new officers came forward in 1862 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 297 
 
 and 1863, Chase made it a point to get into re 
 lations with them. He congratulated Rousseau ; 
 he wrote to Kosecrans, regretting that his only 
 connection with the general s fortune had been an 
 effective influence in obtaining his brigadiership ; 
 and urging him to seize East Tennessee. Just be 
 fore the battle of Gettysburg he wrote to the Presi 
 dent, urging that Hooker should not be relieved. 
 He also wrote a personal letter to Grant, intimating 
 that the treasury agents had done the general a 
 service by favorable reports upon his campaigns. 
 No one can blame a man, who had such opportuni 
 ties of seeing actual difficulties, for suggesting and 
 remonstrating. The reprehensible thing in Chase s 
 system was that he entered into relations with 
 military men and gave them advice which did not 
 come from the consent of the other members of 
 the cabinet or from an understanding with the 
 President. Hence he could never escape the sus 
 picion that he was trying to make friends who 
 would be useful to him in politics. 
 
 Secretary Chase did not mean to reverse, but 
 rather to supplement, the direct orders of the Pres 
 ident and of the Secretary of War, he meant to 
 enforce energy and not to divide counsels. He 
 had a natural breadth and definiteness of view, 
 and his military instincts though untrained were 
 good. Unfortunately, when things went wrong he 
 could not refrain from expressing his disapproba 
 tion, even to the point of direct criticism on the 
 President. For instance, on May 30, 18G1, he 
 
298 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 protested against a proposition to call out more 
 three-months men, complaining that in the cabinet 
 meeting " the President did not give me a chance 
 to express my views." He also advocated the 
 seizure and fortification of Manassas two months 
 before the battle of Bull Run ; but, said he, " I 
 have not been able to make our friends in the 
 administration see as I have seen ; when, there 
 fore, I am overruled, I have quietly submitted." 
 
 These discussions were of course within the cir 
 cle of the administration, but at various times 
 Chase wrote letters to other persons who doubt 
 less circulated them in which he expressed his 
 distrust of the President. " We have not accom 
 plished what we ought to have accomplished," he 
 writes, September 8, 1862 : " we have put small 
 forces where large forces were needed, and have 
 failed to improve advantages and successes when 
 obtained." September 12 he notes : " Expenses are 
 enormous, increasing instead of diminishing ; and 
 the ill success in the field has so affected govern 
 ment stocks that it is impossible to obtain money 
 except on temporary deposit. . . . It is a bad state 
 of things ; but neither the President, his council 
 ors, nor his commanding generals seem to care. 
 They rush on from expense to expense, and from 
 defeat to defeat, heedless of the abyss of bank 
 ruptcy and ruin which yawns before us. May God 
 open the eyes of those who control us before it is 
 too late ! " 
 
 To John Sherman he wrote, September 20, 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 299 
 
 1862; "It is painful, however, to hear complaints 
 of remissness, delays, discords, dangers, and to 
 feel that there must be ground for such complaints, 
 and to know that one has no power to remedy the 
 evils, and yet is thought to have." And on the 
 same day to John Owen : " Oh ! that the Presi 
 dent and those who control military movements 
 may see the necessity of following up vigorously 
 and indefatigably the success now achieved." To 
 an intimate friend he wrote, four days later, that 
 if his advice had been taken the war would have 
 been already finished. " What could I do beyond 
 what I have done," he added, " except resign and 
 come home ? " And a few weeks later he was sure 
 that, if McClellan had conferred with him, the 
 rebellion would have been ended before that time. 
 To another correspondent he complains : " The 
 President, from the purest motives, committed the 
 management of the war almost exclusively to his 
 political opponents ; it is sad to think of the delay 
 and anxiety which have marked the past, but I am 
 confident that it will not characterize the future." 
 
 From these examples it is evident that Chase 
 expostulated and sometimes wrangled with the 
 President about military matters, and that he 
 many times expressed his dissatisfaction to his 
 friends. This is the greatest weakness in his polit 
 ical life, and must be contrasted with the Presi 
 dent s own forbearance and his care not to throw 
 the responsibility of the national defense upon 
 other people. The explanation is that Chase 
 
300 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 understood neither the President s difficulties nor 
 the temperament of the people, nor the efficiency 
 of Secretary Stanton, a man as vigorous and de 
 termined as Chase himself. What the country 
 really needed was not simply commanders of great 
 military genius, but commanders of experience in 
 handling armies, and of reputation such as would 
 gain the confidence of the country; and nothing 
 could be more certain than that a military admin 
 istration such as Chase desired a coalition of cab 
 inet officers with a few military men would have 
 been far less likely to discover and support such 
 commanders than was the administration of a 
 single person. 
 
 Another cause of disagreement between Lincoln 
 and Chase was the latter s uneasiness at the appli 
 cation of military government to regions where no 
 war was going on. Chase disapproved of the mili 
 tary court-martial of Yallandigham in 1862, on 
 which the Supreme Court later passed an unfavor 
 able judgment; "not," he said, " that I am averse 
 to arrests for sufficient cause and in the proper time 
 and place, . . . but I think the exercise of such 
 power ought to be reserved for grave and clear 
 occasions." In cabinet discussions of the habeas 
 corpus, Chase stood out for the right of state 
 courts to issue the writ in order to discharge per 
 sons wrongfully detained as enlisted men; but 
 after consideration the secretary admitted that the 
 President had the constitutional power to suspend 
 the writ as to both state and federal judges, with- 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 301 
 
 out authority of Congress, though he insisted that 
 the authority of the President was based distinctly 
 on the habeas corpus clause of the Constitution (to 
 some degree defined by statutes) and not upon any 
 general military power. With the military trials 
 of civilians Chase had little sympathy : and later 
 as chief justice he had the opportunity for assert 
 ing the supremacy of the judiciary over military 
 government outside the theatre of war. 
 
 On the whole, Chase s interference in military 
 matters did not lead to friction in the cabinet, both 
 because he was disregarded and because he kept 
 on good terms alike with the too facile Cameron 
 and with the testy and violent Stanton. When 
 Cameron was compelled to resign, Chase asked and 
 secured from the President a letter of polite regret. 
 Of Stanton Chase wrote, eight years later : " I do 
 not know that we ever agreed fully either as to 
 theory or practice in respect to the rights of colored 
 citizens or as to the duties of the government and 
 the nation to them, . . . though he came into the 
 cabinet adopting practical principles more akin to 
 mine, especially on the subject of enlisting colored 
 men as soldiers." The two men respected each 
 other s energy, and Chase rebuked his correspond 
 ents for holding Stanton responsible for failures 
 in the field. 
 
 With Seward, Chase s relations were peculiar. 
 Coming in with a strong sense of rivalry, each man 
 hoping and perhaps expecting to obtain the ascend 
 ency over the President, the two secretaries found 
 
302 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 it difficult to harmonize. They could cooperate in 
 the appointment of Stanton, and during 1862 their 
 relations were more cordial. Chase wrote to Sew- 
 ard frankly and confidentially, asking that Came 
 ron be allowed to come home from Russia, and to 
 mutual friends he expressed his " wishes for har 
 mony." In September, 1862, a strong current 
 began to set against Seward, because he was sup 
 posed to be resisting the radical views on the sla 
 very question ; Thurlow Weed even came to Chase 
 with stories of dissatisfaction in New York toward 
 Seward. If this were a trap, Chase avoided it, but 
 he seemed struck by Weed s suggestion that he 
 and Seward " must agree on a definite line, espe 
 cially on the slavery question, which we must recom 
 mend to the President." Matters came to a head 
 on December 17, 1862, when a caucus of the Re 
 publican senators agreed, with one dissentient, that 
 the President must " reconstruct his cabinet." 
 
 In this crisis Chase and Seward came to an un 
 derstanding by which each sent in his resignation. 
 Major D wight Bannister, in reminiscences written 
 many years later, records Chase s explanation to a 
 congressman as follows : " He told the gentleman 
 that he resigned from the cabinet much through 
 disgust at Mr. Lincoln s weakening and consenting 
 that, at the dictation and demand of the disaffected 
 senators, he should be willing to let his chief friend 
 in the cabinet be driven out. That six months 
 after the whole country had lost all confidence in 
 the ability or fitness of General McClellan, Mr. 
 
i CHASE AND LINCOLN 303 
 
 Seward almost solely and alone of the cabinet offi 
 cers had supported the President in still retaining 
 McClellan in command of the Army of the Poto 
 mac ; and now, to let him be driven out simply be 
 cause he has faithfully stood by him in his policy 
 seems to me almost pusillanimous. And, besides, 
 Seward is the only distinctive and original anti-sla 
 very man besides myself in the cabinet ; and when 
 he is allowed to go out, I stand as such almost soli 
 tary and alone. There is no cabinet ; there are 
 certain heads of departments, but no real cabinet. 
 I tell you I am sick of it and I am glad to get out 
 of it." 
 
 Chase s three letters written to Lincoln on the 
 three successive days of the crisis clearly show 
 that he expected that more attention would thence 
 forward be paid to his own opinions, and those of 
 his colleagues. In the first letter, December 20, he 
 resigned without any suggestion of reasons. When 
 the President at once replied to Seward and Chase 
 that the public interest did not allow him to accept 
 their resignations, Seward promptly and cheerfully 
 resumed his office, but Chase still held out on the 
 ground that, " being once honorably out of the Cab 
 inet, no important public interest now requires my 
 return to it." On December 22 he sent a second 
 letter to the President to the effect that he had 
 been led " to the conclusion that I ought in this 
 matter to conform my action to your judgment and 
 wishes ; " but he could not forbear sending also a 
 third letter prepared two days beforehand, setting 
 
304 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 forth that, " I could not, if I would, conceal from 
 myself that recent events have too rudely jostled 
 the unity of your Cabinet, and disclosed an opinion 
 too deeply seated and too generally received in 
 Congress and in the country, to be disregarded, 
 that the concord in judgment and action, essen 
 tial for successful administration, does not prevail 
 among its members." 
 
 Although it cannot be actually proven, it is prob 
 able that Chase had expected Seward to join him 
 in making some definite terms with the President. 
 If it be so, the scheme was broken up by Se ward s 
 eagerness to have the President s protection, and 
 Lincoln came out of the controversy with much 
 greater prestige than either of the two secretaries. 
 For a few days there were threats of military con 
 spiracies to depose both the President and cabinet, 
 but the issuance of the final Proclamation of Eman 
 cipation swept the affair out of sight. On Janu 
 ary 26, 1863, Chase wrote to Greeley : " Let us get 
 the measures necessary to the success of any Re 
 publican administration adopted, and then let the 
 cabinet be reconstructed if you will. For one I 
 am quite willing to be reconstructed." 
 
 Two months later, however, the Secretary of the 
 Treasury could not forbear again measuring his 
 powers against those of the President. The issue 
 was the rejection by the Senate of the nomination 
 of Mark Howard to be the collector of internal 
 revenue in Connecticut. Chase believed that the 
 rebuff was due to the personal influence of Senator 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 305 
 
 Dixon, and he demanded categorically that no per 
 son proposed by Dixon should be appointed, and 
 that he himself should nominate to the vacancy. 
 When the President decided to select a name on 
 Dixon s list, Chase protested ; and though the diffi 
 culty was removed by personal conference between 
 Dixon and Chase, the secretary could not forbear 
 laying down a new ultimatum : " To secure fit men 
 for responsible place, without admitting the rights 
 of senators or representatives to control appoint 
 ments, for which the President and the Secretary, 
 as his presumed adviser, must be responsible. Un 
 less these points can be practically established, I 
 feel that I can not be useful to you or the country 
 in my present position." As the President still 
 stood by the prerogatives of his office, Chase pre 
 pared a note of resignation, but the dangerous 
 paper was withdrawn, and a second time the sec 
 retary reassumed his functions. 
 
 Three months later, in May, 1863, trouble came 
 up again over one of Chase s subordinates. One 
 of the early appointments made by the President, 
 at Chase s express desire, was that of Victor Smith 
 of Cincinnati to be collector of Puget Sound. 
 Smith had been a personal friend of Chase, and 
 went away owing him money, perhaps remnants of 
 old transactions, perhaps sums borrowed in order 
 to pay his passage to his new post of duty. Smith 
 went out to his office full of zeal, and wrote fre 
 quent and confidential letters to the secretary. 
 He very soon became engaged in land speculations 
 
306 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 and made strenuous efforts to have the Custom 
 House removed to a little place which he was try 
 ing to build up. By temperament and reputation 
 he was not fitted for the important post given to 
 him, and eventually charges of corruption were 
 brought against him, and strong pressure against 
 him was put upon the President by members of 
 Congress from the Pacific coast. For the charges 
 there seems to have been no sufficient ground, but 
 Lincoln notified Chase that his mind was made up 
 to remove Smith on the ground that " the degree of 
 dissatisfaction with him there is too great for him 
 to be retained." Finally, in Chase s absence the 
 President did remove him, whereupon Chase wrote 
 a solemn letter claiming the right to be consulted 
 on the appointment of persons " for whose action I 
 must be largely responsible." He protested against 
 the appointment of the successor of Smith, and 
 ended with saying : " If you find anything in my 
 views to which your own sense of duty will not per 
 mit you to assent, I will unhesitatingly relieve you 
 from all embarrassment, so far as I am concerned, 
 by tendering you my resignation." The Presi 
 dent felt the matter to be so serious that he went 
 himself to Chase s house ; as he told a friend after 
 wards : " I went directly up to him with the resig 
 nation in my hand, and, putting my arm around 
 his neck, said to him, Chase, here is a paper with 
 which I wish to have nothing to do ; take it back 
 and be reasonable. I told him that I could n t 
 replace the person whom I had removed that 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 307 
 
 was impossible but that I would appoint any one 
 else whom he should select for the place. It was 
 difficult to bring him to terms ; I had to plead with 
 him a long time, but I finally succeeded, and heard 
 nothing more of that resignation." Smith took the 
 matter better than did his superior, and accepted 
 his removal with good nature ; but the continued 
 strain of these differences between the President 
 and secretary was beginning to tell upon the good 
 humor of both, and the question of the nomination 
 of 1864 now came in to sow still greater dissensions. 
 To understand the point of view of Secretary 
 Chase in the preliminary canvass of 1863 and 1864, 
 we must remember that to his mind and that of 
 most of the. old Republicans Mr. Lincoln was an 
 accidental President. Congress pulled against him, 
 and Seward, Stanton, and Chase, each in his own 
 way, tested the President s mastery. Stanton s 
 practice was occasionally to defy the President in 
 minor matters by refusing to carry out his orders, 
 or by returning a commission with the curt in 
 dorsement : " The President may get another Sec 
 retary of War, but this Secretary of War will not 
 sign that paper." Aware of Stanton s infirmity of 
 temper, and sincerely prizing his administrative 
 power and his undeniable abilities and patriotism, 
 the President gave way in many small matters, but 
 was tenacious on questions of principle. Seward 
 yielded easily in details, but occasionally ventured 
 to take upon himself a responsibility which be 
 longed to the President, as for instance in his 
 
308 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 promise to the British ambassador that the mails 
 of prizes should be sent to England unbroken, a 
 promise which enraged the Secretary of the Navy. 
 Chase s habit was that of direct obedience where 
 the President gave a disagreeable order, accom 
 panied, in what he thought critical affairs, by a 
 threat of resignation. His method had its founda 
 tion in the assurances of Chase s correspondents 
 all over the country that he was the mainstay of 
 the administration. He could not help knowing 
 that his was the most effective and successful of 
 the great departments of the government, and his 
 position as a leader in anti-slavery movements gave 
 him weight in the cabinet. However wearisome it 
 may have been for the President to be called on 
 so often to dispel the clouds in his secretary s 
 mind, he had at least the assurance that Chase 
 would not disregard his directions, nor usurp pre 
 sidential powers. 
 
 The war was but a part of the President s anx 
 ieties. He understood that he was dependent on 
 the support of a majority in Congress, and he felt 
 that upon him fell the duty of maintaining such 
 influence in the country at large as would give him 
 the support of state governors and administrations, 
 and would keep Congress in line. This political 
 function was always before his mind; and when 
 the question of the Republican nomination of 1864 
 arose, there was a rivalry between him and Chase 
 which accentuated minor differences. Chase, too, 
 felt the keenest interest in keeping up the Repub- 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 309 
 
 lican majority in Congress ; but one of the effects, 
 foreseen but inevitable, of the first proclamation 
 of emancipation was an increase of the Democratic 
 vote in Ohio and Indiana, and the consequent 
 election of many Democratic members of Congress ; 
 and Chase s influence could not stay the tide. 
 
 From the early part of 1862 Chase had also in 
 mind the presidential nomination of 1864 ; but for 
 some time his only share in the agitation was to 
 try to heal dissensions in his own party, and espe 
 cially to come into pleasanter relations with Sena 
 tor Wade. In the spring of 1863 the canvass 
 began to take more distinct form, and Chase al 
 lowed it to be known that he was willing to accept 
 any responsibility that the country might think 
 proper to impose on him. In August, 1863, his 
 friends were openly suggesting him for the presi 
 dency ; and although he repeatedly expressed a pre 
 ference for " a judicial position," he felt sure that 
 " he could administer the government of this coun 
 try so as to secure . . . our institutions." In Octo 
 ber he went out to Ohio and took part in the state 
 election by making a series of excellent speeches. 
 Greeley took up his cause, and in private corre 
 spondence expressed the liope that he would be 
 nominated. 
 
 The motives in Chase s mind are well expressed 
 in an intimate letter of November 26, 1863. " I 
 doubt the expediency of reflecting anybody, and 
 I think a man of different qualities from those the 
 President has will be needed for the next four 
 
310 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 years. ... I can never permit myself to be driven 
 into any hostility or unfriendly position as to Mr. 
 Lincoln. His course toward me has always been 
 so fair and kind ; his progress toward entire agree 
 ment with me on the great question of slavery has 
 been so constant, though rather slower than I 
 wished for, and his general character is so marked 
 by traits which command respect and affection, 
 that I can never consent to anything which he him 
 self could or would consider as incompatible with 
 perfect honor and good faith, if I were capable 
 which I hope I am not of a departure from 
 either, even where an enemy might be concerned." 
 The interpretation of this sincere and creditable 
 letter is very clear : Chase saw no reason why he 
 should not seek the nomination of the convention, 
 and prepared the way for it by the organization of 
 his friends ; but he would not take part in any 
 effort to divide the Republican party. At the 
 same time his old delusion as to the free principles 
 of the regular Democracy came up to plague him. 
 He had some dim idea of making a combination of 
 Republicans and war Democrats, on the platform 
 of freedom ; of such a combination he would have 
 been the logical candidate. 
 
 That his canvass showed disloyalty to Lincoln did 
 not enter his mind ; for in 1863 the real strength of 
 Lincoln before the people was not evident to Con 
 gress nor to some of the greatest Republican news 
 papers, and there was a disposition to hold him 
 responsible for every military defeat, and to give 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 311 
 
 credit to the generals for all the victories ; nobody 
 could then predict that Lincoln would be renom- 
 iuated, and to Chase s mind the field was fair and 
 open. 
 
 A great pressure was now put upon the secretary 
 to make political use of his enormous patronage 
 throughout the Union. Some of his nominees, 
 especially in southern Ohio and the Pacific coast, 
 were anxious to press him for the presidency ; but 
 the executive journals of the Senate bear indubita 
 ble testimony to the fact that, after the first series 
 of appointments in 1861, removals in the Treasury 
 Department were very few, probably no more than 
 were justified by in competency and fraud ; and 
 that, so far from building up a treasury machine, 
 he resisted the piteous appeals of his friends to 
 reorganize the Custom House in New York and 
 other important offices. Collector Barney had 
 many enemies, who worked upon the President to 
 remove him ; yet, in a place where the temptation 
 was strong and the power unquestioned, Chase 
 forbore to use his patronage for his own advantage, 
 and thereby he incurred the reproaches and even 
 the scorn of some would-be supporters. All the 
 evidence bears him out in his own statement of 
 January, 1864 : " I should despise myself if I were 
 capable of appointing or removing a man for the 
 sake of the presidency." 
 
 Early in Chase s canvass it appeared that he had 
 not the open support of a single great party leader, 
 and his smaller friends brought upon him a need- 
 
312 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 less humiliation and took away every chance of his 
 nomination by the so-called Pomeroy Circular, is 
 sued in February, 1864, by a committee purporting 
 to be in charge of Chase s canvass, headed by Sen 
 ator Pomeroy of Kansas, who was known to be a 
 friend of the secretary. The circular asserted that 
 Chase had "more of the qualities needed in a 
 President, during the next four years, than are 
 combined in any other available candidate ; " but 
 it also declared that " the cause of human liberty 
 and the dignity of the nation " suffered from Lin 
 coln s tendency toward compromise ; and that the 
 growth of the patronage of the government de 
 manded a one-term principle. The circular there 
 fore distinctly measured the two men against each 
 other, and attempted to build up Chase s fortunes 
 by depressing the President s. 
 
 This premature and unwise action put Chase in 
 a very serious dilemma. He wrote one of his long 
 letters to the President, explaining that he had 
 indeed conferred with the committee, but had no 
 part in their circular, and for at least the fourth 
 time he intimated that he was ready to withdraw 
 from the Treasury if the President thought best. 
 Chase s mortification was made plain in a letter to 
 Greeley a few days later, with an account of Lin 
 coln s answer : " To this he replied, closing with 
 the statement that there was nothing in the condi 
 tion of the public interests which called for a 
 change in the headship of my department ; but 
 there was no response in his letter to the senti- 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 313 
 
 ments of respect and esteem which mine contained. 
 But this is not remarkable. Whatever apprecia 
 tion he may feel for the public service he never 
 expresses any. So I have worked on." 
 
 Under such conditions Chase s continuance in 
 the treasury was only possible if no new accident 
 came up to disturb the truce. From various causes, 
 but chiefly from the necessary restrictions on trade 
 in the Southwest, Chase had the ill-will of many 
 of the Republican politicians of Missouri, and espe 
 cially of the two Blair brothers, who together formed 
 a considerable political power ; and Chase consid 
 ered their relations to him " all the more embar 
 rassing by their uncontradicted claim to be the 
 special representative of the policy and views of 
 Mr. Lincoln." On the 27th of April, 1864, Frank 
 P. Blair made a scurrilous attack on Chase in the 
 House, asserting that certain statements with regard 
 to himself were a forgery prepared by a person in 
 the Treasury, " uttered and put in circulation by 
 a special agent of the Treasury, and put in a news 
 paper which was pensioned by the Secretary of the 
 Treasury." Against Chase he personally brought 
 charges of weakness in resisting secession, based 
 upon information as to a private cabinet meeting 
 communicated by his brother, Montgomery ; Blair 
 at last worked himself up to the charge that Chase 
 was using his authority to control border inter 
 course and to collect abandoned property " as a 
 fund to carry on his war against the administra 
 tion which gave him place." 
 
314 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 No wonder Chase was that night found in a 
 condition of violent rage ; and that, when he 
 learned that after this speech the President had 
 carried out a long standing promise of reviving 
 Blair s commission as major-general in the army, 
 he was on the point of resigning. It was not a 
 question on which Lincoln cared to make an issue. 
 To him the Blairs had become disagreeable annoy 
 ances, to be palliated as much as possible. The 
 President told Chase s friends that he had restored 
 Blair to the army before his speech. " Within 
 three hours I heard that this speech had been made, 
 when I knew that another bee-hive was knocked 
 over. My first thought was to have canceled the 
 orders restoring him to the army, and assigning 
 him to command. Perhaps this would have been 
 best. On such information as I was able to gain 
 about the matter, however, I concluded to let 
 them stand." The matter was thus patched up 
 for the time being, and in the course of the next 
 few weeks it became evident that Lincoln was cer 
 tain to be renominated. Even in Ohio, despite 
 the strong efforts of Chase s friends, the Republi 
 can members of the state legislature passed a re 
 solution in favor of Lincoln ; and on April 26 
 Chase wrote a public letter of withdrawal. 
 
 When on June 7 the Baltimore Convention re- 
 nominated Lincoln, Chase s friendly relations with 
 the President ought once for all to have been re 
 established : thereafter, no longer a rival, he might 
 nave gone steadily forward with his own important 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 315 
 
 duties. It was, however, a dark period in the 
 financial history of the war : the credit of the gov 
 ernment measured by its legal tender notes was 
 steadily declining, and the strain on Chase s mind 
 and temper was growing more and more severe, till 
 it culminated in the Gold Bill of June 17. An 
 unusual self-abnegation on Chase s part might have 
 prevented a rupture, but that self-abnegation he 
 did not show, for even after the nomination he felt 
 injured and sore. Another cloud now arose in the 
 New York Custom House. On June 6, the Presi 
 dent called on Chase, and pressed for the removal 
 of Barney, to whom he had previously offered a 
 diplomatic position. This personal conference re 
 moved the difficulty for the time being ; there is 
 some reason to suppose that Chase again threat 
 ened to resign, and that the President again gave 
 way. 
 
 A few days later, another question of patronage 
 in New York came up, by the action of John J. 
 Cisco, in resigning his post of assistant treasurer, 
 because the office, one of great fiduciary import 
 ance, was underpaid. Mr. Chase at once noti 
 fied Lincoln that he would himself shortly desig 
 nate a successor. After several failures to secure 
 an eminent New York financier, he offered the 
 place to Maunsell B. Field, then assistant secretary 
 of the Treasury. Senator Morgan, of New York, 
 insisted that it was necessary to appoint a man 
 who would reorganize the assistant treasurer s 
 office, and turn out a lot of the clerks. The issue 
 
316 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 was decidedly offensive to Chase, who felt himself 
 assaulted in his prerogative of appointing his im 
 mediate and confidential subordinates, and who 
 was himself called upon to assent to the political 
 dismissal of experienced subordinates. 
 
 Field s remembrance of the President s account 
 to him of the whole transaction is characteristic 
 and probably not far from correct. " The Eepub- 
 lican party in your State is divided into two fac 
 tions, and I can t afford to quarrel with them. 
 By accident rather than by any design of mine, the 
 radicals have got possession of the most important 
 Federal offices in New York. . . . Had I under 
 these circumstances consented to your appoint 
 ment, it would have been another radical triumph, 
 and I could n t afford one." 
 
 Nevertheless the President bent himself to a 
 peaceful settlement of the perplexing question : he 
 promoted a conference between Senator Morgan 
 and Chase, and promised to appoint any man upon 
 whom Chase and the New York senators could 
 agree. But when Chase asked for a personal con 
 ference, the President replied that he hesitated, 
 " because the difficulty does not, in the main part, 
 lie within the range of a conversation with you. 
 As the proverb goes, No man knows so well 
 where the shoe pinches as he who wears it. 
 
 On June 29, Chase solved the difficulty by per 
 suading Cisco to withdraw his resignation ; and 
 there the matter might have ended, had he so 
 chosen ; but he had already written a letter of re- 
 
CHASE AND LINCOLN 317 
 
 signation, which he could not deny himself the 
 satisfaction of sending, as a suggestion of the dan 
 ger which had been escaped. u I can not help 
 feeling," said he, " that my position here is not 
 altogether agreeable to you ; and it is certainly 
 too full of embarrassment and difficulty and pain 
 ful responsibility, to allow in me the least desire to 
 retain it. I think it my duty, therefore, to inclose 
 to you my resignation. I shall regard it as a real 
 relief if you think proper to accept it, and will 
 most cheerfully render to my successor any aid he 
 may find useful in entering upon his duties." 
 
 This fourth or perhaps fifth formal resignation of 
 Secretary Chase ended his official life. The Presi 
 dent unexpectedly accepted it, and though the next 
 day Chase hinted to Stanton, " I feared you might 
 be prompted by your generous sentiment to take 
 some step injurious to the country," no other mem 
 ber of the Cabinet stirred. In truth, Chase was 
 taken by surprise that the President had not put 
 the resignation through the usual course of remon 
 strance, argument, and recall ; and his anger and 
 disappointment are too frankly recorded in his own 
 diary : " There I found a letter from the President, 
 accepting my resignation, and putting the accept 
 ance on the ground of the difference between us 
 indicating a degree of embarrassment in our official 
 relations which could not be continued or sustained 
 consistently with the public service. I had found 
 a good deal of embarrassment from him ; but what 
 he had found from me I could not imagine, unless 
 
318 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 it has been caused by my unwillingness to have 
 offices distributed as spoils or benefits, with more 
 regard to the claims of divisions, factions, cliques, 
 and individuals, than to fitness of selection. He 
 had never given me the active and earnest support 
 I was entitled to ; and even now Congress was 
 about to adjourn without passing sufficient tax bills, 
 though making appropriations with lavish profu 
 sion, and he was, notwithstanding my appeals, tak 
 ing no pains to insure a different result." 
 
 The real reason for the resignation was expressed 
 by Chase in a private conference with Whitelaw 
 Reid : " He supposed that the root of the matter 
 was a difficulty of temperament. The truth is 
 that I have never been able to make a joke out of 
 this war." At first he could not believe that he 
 was actually out of the administration. When his 
 successor, Fessenden, informed him that the Presi 
 dent had asked him not to remove Chase s friends, 
 Chase entered in his diary : " Had the President 
 in the reply to my note tendering my resignation 
 expressed himself as he did now to Mr. Fessenden, 
 I should have cheerfully withdrawn it." And when 
 Sumner suggested that he might be recalled as 
 Necker had been in France a century earlier, he 
 replied that Lincoln was no Louis the Sixteenth. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE JUDICIAL PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 
 IN an article written in early life, Chase eulo 
 gized Chief Justice Marshall, " whose decisions 
 upon the delicate and important questions at this 
 period perpetually arising, by their wisdom, their 
 justice, and their explicitness, commend themselves 
 equally to the understanding, the conscience, and 
 the heart of all our citizens." An interest in the 
 position of chief justice never ceased to influence 
 him. While still a senator he said to a friend that 
 there were two offices which he should like to hold : 
 " I should like to be chief justice of the Supreme 
 Court and overrule all the pro-slavery decisions ; 
 I should like to be President of the United States 
 and reverse the policy of the administration as 
 Jefferson reversed it." When, in the third year 
 of the secretaryship, Taney was known to be fail 
 ing, the thought was evidently in Chase s mind 
 that he himself might be the successor. He had 
 already dropped the remark to the President, that 
 he " would rather be Chief Justice than hold any 
 other position that could be given ; " and in July, 
 1864, Lincoln told the Senate Committee on Fi 
 nance that he should appoint him to the office if 
 
320 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 there were a vacancy. He afterward said to Car 
 penter that " there had never been a time during 
 his presidency when, in the event of the death of 
 Judge Taney, he had not fully intended and ex 
 pected to nominate Salmon P. Chase for chief 
 justice." Hence it is probable that if the death of 
 Taney had occurred in the spring of 1864 instead 
 of in October, Chase would have been at once 
 transferred, in time to prevent the pain and humili 
 ation of his retirement from the treasury. Mean 
 while after his withdrawal he said many bitter 
 things of Lincoln, and for three months he hung 
 back in the presidential campaign ; not until Sep 
 tember did he begin to work on the stump in 
 behalf of the Republican ticket. That he was 
 unaware of Lincoln s magnanimous purpose seems 
 clear from the strong but unsuccessful attempt of 
 his friends, in August, to secure for him a nomi 
 nation from the Cincinnati district to the lower 
 house of Congress. 
 
 As soon as the presidential election was over, the 
 President set himself seriously to the selection of 
 a successor to Taney. Candidates were numerous : 
 Justice Swayne of Ohio desired and manoeuvred 
 for promotion, and had the powerful support of 
 Justice David Davis, a personal friend of Lincoln ; 
 Montgomery Blair, who had been cast out of the 
 cabinet, sought for the nomination ; Chase at one 
 time believed that Stanton was the person to be 
 designated ; of another candidate put forward by 
 Massachusetts men, Chase said : " Evarts is a man 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 321 
 
 of sterling abilities and excellent learning and a 
 much greater lawyer than I ever pretended to be. 
 The truth is, I always thought myself much overesti 
 mated. And yet I think I have more judgment 
 than Evarts, and that tried by the Marshall stand 
 ard [I] should make a better judge ; while he 
 might, tried by the Story standard." Chase s 
 warmest friend and most effective supporter was 
 Sumner, who thought that months earlier he had 
 secured a promise for his friend from Lincoln ; 
 and he did not cease to press his candidate. 
 
 On the other side there was a strong objection 
 to Chase from leading Republicans the country 
 over ; delegations appeared from Ohio, and protests 
 were filed. Lincoln had no longer any personal 
 rivalry to fear, but those who were nearest to him 
 were at the time convinced that he hesitated be 
 cause he feared that Chase would make the bench 
 a stepping-stone to the White House ; when Riddle, 
 at Chase s urgent request, waited on Lincoln to 
 urge his claims, the President asked him whether 
 Chase would be satisfied to remain chief justice. 
 His own recent differences with his imperious 
 secretary, and even the reports of Chase s exasper 
 ated comments, made so little impression on Lin 
 coln that on December 6 Chase was nominated for 
 the chief justiceship and forthwith confirmed by 
 the Senate without reference to committee. He 
 accepted the appointment in a very warm note, 
 assuring Lincoln that he prized his confidence and 
 good-will more than any nomination to office. 
 
322 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Upon the whole the appointment seemed ju 
 dicious and was well received. It was true that 
 Chase s experience had been chiefly legislative ; but 
 it was also true that both Marshall and Taney had 
 been appointed from cabinet offices and not from 
 active practice or the bench ; and that the immedi 
 ate questions which confronted the court required 
 less a consummate knowledge of law than a broad 
 statesmanship, which could take into account the 
 significant legal and political changes brought 
 about by the Civil War, together with such a sense 
 of the dignity of the court as might restore its 
 weakened prestige. 
 
 Although Chase had never sat upon the bench, 
 he fell easily into the routine of the court, and 
 interested himself in improving its library and 
 other facilities. He was thought by some of the 
 subordinate judicial officers to be unduly severe ; 
 and sometimes freely criticised the reporter or even 
 associate justices for what he thought inaccurate 
 statements of his opinions. He had in his hands 
 a considerable patronage, of which the most valu 
 able was the designation of the marshalship of 
 the Supreme Court. The incumbent when Chase 
 assumed his office was Ward H. Lamon, a personal 
 friend of Lincoln ; but Chase complained of his 
 accounts ; he retired in June, 1865. The chief 
 justice took an opportunity in April, 1867, to secure 
 the appointment of his intimate friend, Richard 
 C. Parsons, of Cleveland. Unfortunately, in 1872, 
 Parsons became involved in a lobbying enterprise 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 323 
 
 with Judge Charles Sherman, the result of which 
 was that both were compelled to resign, and John 
 G. Nicolay was appointed in Parsons place. 
 
 In 1867 the new bankruptcy act required the 
 commissioning of a large number of registers in 
 bankruptcy. Since Congress was unwilling to give 
 additional patronage to the President, it made the 
 unusual provision that the registers should be ap 
 pointed by the district courts, but only on recom 
 mendations by the chief justice. Barney wrote to 
 Chase from New York : " At least three hundred 
 members of the bar have asked me for letters re 
 commending them or their friends for register." 
 The distribution of this patronage gave the chief 
 justice much annoyance, but also a power, which 
 he highly enjoyed, of pleasing his friends and of 
 exercising his discrimination. 
 
 No man in the history of the country, except 
 perhaps John Jay, has ever had such opportunities 
 for experience in all three of the great depart 
 ments of the government. Chase had been senator 
 and had seen much of the working of Congress dur 
 ing the Civil War, had been the most important 
 figure in a cabinet, and was now to learn the inner 
 workings of the federal judiciary department. He 
 found it in a depressed and humiliated condition, 
 its jurisdiction limited by the creation of extra- 
 judicial tribunals, its machinery embarrassed by 
 an outgrown, clumsy, and laborious system of cir 
 cuits. The Supreme Court, although it still con 
 tinued its decisions in cases of private law, showed 
 
324 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 little vitality during the Civil War, and avoided 
 decisions which bore on the great questions then 
 before the country. 
 
 In 1864 the court was undergoing the process 
 of rapid renewal, which it had experienced twice 
 before in the history of the country : between 1804 
 and 1811 five of the seven justices were newly ap 
 pointed ; and again, between 1829 and 1837, Jack 
 son had the nomination of six of the nine judges ; 
 and the court which he thus reconstituted at once 
 took more conservative ground on the powers of 
 Congress and the limitations on the States. Lin 
 coln found among the nine justiceships one vacancy 
 which had not been filled by Buchanan ; and the 
 death of McLean in April, 1861, and the resigna 
 tion of Campbell in May, 1861, together with a 
 tenth justiceship created by the act of March 3, 
 1863, and the death of Taney in 1864, gave the 
 opportunity of replacing five conservative judges 
 with Eepublicans and anti-slavery men. For some 
 time Lincoln hesitated to use his power. In his 
 annual message of 1861, he pointed out the diffi 
 culties due to the existence of civil war in two of 
 the vacant districts, and said: " I have been un 
 willing to throw all the appointments northward, 
 thus disabling myself from doing justice to the 
 South on the return of peace." He proposed the 
 creation of additional circuit judges, to relieve the 
 supreme justices from the increasing labor of ser 
 vice on circuit. 
 
 In 1862 Lincoln overcame these scruples, and 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 325 
 
 appointed in quick succession Swayne of Ohio, 
 Miller of Iowa, and Davis of Illinois ; in 1863 he 
 added Field of California as tenth justice ; and in 
 1864 , he appointed Chase. Though Catron died 
 in May, 1865, and Wayne in 1867, no successors 
 to them were appointed, and no further change 
 occurred till after the first legal-tender decision in 
 1870. From 1865 to 1870 the court remained 
 made up of Lincoln s five appointees, together with 
 Nelson, Grier, Clifford, and (till 1867) Wayne. 
 
 It had thus unexpectedly been put into the 
 power of Lincoln to carry out a plan which he him 
 self suggested in 1858, the plan of reorganizing 
 the Supreme Court till it should reverse the Dred 
 Scott decision ; but before a majority of the judges 
 had been obtained, the spirit of the Dred Scott 
 decision was effectually reversed by the Thirteenth 
 Amendment ; and precisely as had happened under 
 Jefferson and Madison, it was found that the re 
 constructed court inherited the conservative spirit 
 of its predecessors. The Supreme Court continued 
 to hold fast to its time-honored principles on pub 
 lic law and private rights rather than to set up a 
 new regime ; and Chase s influence bore for caution 
 and restraint, and not for radical changes. 
 
 Notwithstanding the violent legislation of the 
 Civil War, and the disturbance of property rights 
 caused by military movements, the Supreme Court 
 from 1861 to 1864 pronounced but three decisions 
 on what could fairly be considered political cases ; 
 and in neither of the three did it stand against 
 
326 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 authority claimed by Congress or the President. 
 In the first of these cases (State of New York v. 
 Commissioners of Taxes, 1862-63) the court held 
 that a State could not tax bank capital which stood 
 in the form of United States securities. The deci 
 sion in the Prize Cases of 1863 gave the Supreme 
 Court an opportunity to acknowledge the existence 
 of " civil war," and the right of the President to 
 declare a blockade, while it held also that the war 
 " may be called an 4 insurrection by one side, and 
 the insurgents be considered as rebels or traitors ; " 
 and all persons residing within the Southern lines 
 were " liable to be treated as enemies." The deci 
 sion plainly applied the principles of international 
 law to the struggle, without denying that in the 
 end the participants might also be subjected to the 
 penalties of the municipal law. 
 
 Various attempts were made to secure from the 
 Supreme Court a decision against the arbitrary 
 powers assumed by Congress and the President; 
 but, though the court held back, Chief Justice 
 Taney delivered an opinion in the case of Ex parte 
 Merryman, which was intended to be a protest 
 against the suspension of habeas corpus by execu 
 tive regulation. In May, 1861, Merryman was 
 arrested in Maryland on a charge of treason, and 
 confined in Fort McHenry. Taney sitting alone on 
 the Circuit bench issued a writ of habeas corpus, to 
 which the military officer though no public notice 
 of any executive orders had been given replied 
 that he was authorized by the President to sus- 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 327 
 
 pend the writ of habeas corpus for the public 
 safety. Taney thereupon ordered the arrest of the 
 officer, on the ground that there was no process 
 short of an act of Congress which could justify 
 military detention of a civilian, and that the Presi 
 dent had no constitutional authority to suspend the 
 habeas corpus, and of course none to delegate such 
 suspension. The marshal was, however, by mili 
 tary force prevented from serving the writ, and 
 Taney, with a clear understanding of his helpless 
 ness, certified his decision to the President, in 
 order that, as he said, that officer might " perform 
 his constitutional duty to enforce the laws ; or at 
 least to enforce a process of this kind." The Presi 
 dent simply ignored Taney s decision, and through 
 out the war continued to hold suspected persons 
 under arrest, at first by his own authority and then 
 under legislation obtained from Congress. 
 
 March 3, 1863, Congress passed an act authoriz 
 ing the suspension of habeas corpus by the Presi 
 dent, and this was subsequently construed to au 
 thorize military commissions even within the limits 
 of Northern States removed from the theatre of 
 war. The only legal authority for such action was 
 to be sought in a broad and dangerous extension 
 of the power to make war, and it ignored the ordi 
 nary judiciary. In the Vallandiyham Case, in 
 February, 1864 (the third of the political cases 
 brought before the court) an attempt was made to 
 reverse the decision of a military commission held 
 in Ohio, which condemned Vallandigham for offen- 
 
328 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 sive and treasonable utterances in public speeches. 
 The Supreme Court, however, refused to interfere, 
 basing its decision on the technical ground that, 
 whatever the merits of the case, it had no jurisdic 
 tion, because there was no legal method of appeal 
 ing from a military commission to the Supreme 
 Court. 
 
 On slavery, on the validity of the acts of the 
 seceded States under the Confederacy, and on the 
 relation of those States to the Union, the Supreme 
 Court expressed no opinion ; and, so far as possi 
 ble, it staved off cases which involved such ques 
 tions. At the end of 1865, Chase informed the 
 President : " The Supreme Court has hitherto de 
 clined to consider cases brought before it by bill 
 or writs of error from circuit or district courts in 
 the rebellious portion of the country." This prin 
 ciple applied even in those parts of Virginia within 
 the Union lines, in which the federal courts had 
 maintained a formal existence. Chase himself, 
 when he first faced the problems likely to come 
 before the court, intimated to a friend that he 
 might be more useful off the bench than on it 
 " when the reorganization comes about ; " but his 
 correspondent replied : " The Supreme Court may 
 be the great power yet that is to settle the great 
 questions upon which perhaps may depend the 
 perpetuity of our government." 
 
 This prophecy was soon to be justified, for within 
 two years after Chase s appointment the court had 
 begun to render a series of brilliant and far-reach- 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 329 
 
 ing decisions, which at the same time restored its 
 own prestige, crystallized the body of law arising 
 out of the Civil War, and moderated the excesses 
 of Congress. All the questions which finally stood 
 forth for judicial decision had been presented to 
 Chase while he was still Secretary of the Treasury, 
 and upon most of them he had then made up his 
 mind. The first and most difficult inquiry was, 
 What is the legal status of the seceded States ? 
 The second was, By whose authority shall they be 
 allowed to resume their place in the Union after 
 the war? A third was, What shall be the status 
 and punishment of the individuals who have joined 
 in the rebellion ? The fourth question, which grew 
 more important throughout the war and was the 
 last of all to be completely decided was, What legal 
 and political status shall be given to the negro ? 
 
 On all these points Lincoln early took ground, 
 and on nearly all Chase opposed him. Lincoln s 
 theory of the status of the States was set forth in 
 his own fashion in an argument which he made 
 in July, 1862 : " Broken eggs cannot be mended ; 
 but Louisiana has nothing to do now but to take 
 her place in the Union as it was, barring the 
 already broken eggs. The sooner she does so, 
 the smaller will be the amount of that which will 
 be past mending. This government cannot much 
 longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its 
 enemies stake nothing. Those enemies must un 
 derstand that they cannot experiment for ten years 
 trying to destroy the government, and if they fail 
 
330 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 still come back into the Union unhurt." This pun 
 gent statement indicated Lincoln s purpose to re 
 store the States as soon as they were sufficiently 
 cleared of the Confederate troops, and he carried 
 out his policy in 1862 by favoring the admission 
 of West Virginia with a separate state govern 
 ment, and by securing through his military com 
 manders a choice of two congressmen from Louisi 
 ana ; and the House of Representatives admitted 
 the principle by admitting those two as members. 
 Chase was from the first opposed both to the prin 
 ciple of presidential reconstruction, and to the 
 method ; for he could not accept the idea that the 
 States were to come back into the Union whenever 
 they withdrew from the Confederacy. In March, 
 
 1862, he gave his adhesion to the theory that " the 
 government in suppression of rebellion, in view of 
 the destruction by suicide of the State governments 
 with the actual or strongly implied consent of the 
 majority of the citizens of the several rebel States 
 [which] have so far forfeited all right to be re 
 garded as States, might justly treat them as terri 
 tories," and he preferred to have Congress assert 
 authority to set up provisional governments in place 
 of those supported by the President. 
 
 On the question of the Southern whites, Lincoln 
 took ground by his proclamation of December 8, 
 
 1863, in which he prescribed a test oath, which 
 committed the taker to support all acts of Con 
 gress and proclamations of the President with re 
 gard to slavery, " so long and so far as not repealed, 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 331 
 
 modified, or held void by Congress or by decision 
 of the Supreme Couft." He promised to recognize 
 such state government in each of the seceded 
 States as might be set up by persons who could 
 and would take the oath and were in number not 
 less than one tenth of the vote cast at the election 
 of 1860. This meant that the authority in the 
 reconstructed -States should be committed to such 
 of the whites as- had not held conspicuous stations 
 in the service of the Confederacy and were willing 
 to accept the emancipation proclamation. Chase 
 criticised this proposition, which indeed had many 
 elements of weakness. " I don t like the qualifi 
 cation in the oath required," said he, "nor the 
 limitation of the right of suffrage to those who 
 take the oath, and are otherwise qualified accord 
 ing to the state laws in force before rebellion. I 
 fear these are fatal concessions. Why should not 
 all soldiers who fight for their country vote in it ? " 
 On the question of the negroes Chase held the 
 strongest convictions of his life, and he protested 
 against excluding them from a share in the recon 
 structed governments. During 1863 Chase put 
 forth a strong pressure for the reorganization of 
 Florida, of which a small tract in the neighborhood 
 of Fernandina and Jacksonville was occupied by 
 Federal troops. His interest in this enterprise led 
 him to analyze more carefully the conditions of the 
 problem. As a result he came to see how import 
 ant was the future of the negro, and how hard it 
 would be to protect him. He proposed arming the 
 
332 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 " loyal native population, white and black," and 
 holding back the States from reconstruction till 
 they should abolish slavery. By the beginning of 
 1864 he was writing of " the free labor and free 
 suffrage basis," and had proposed to his agents in 
 Louisiana to secure negro suffrage with an educa 
 tional clause. 
 
 Meanwhile Congress had become aroused to the 
 gravity of the problem, and to the immense power 
 which the President proposed to exercise, by him 
 self deciding the conditions of reentrance to the 
 Union ; and in July, 1864, the so-called " Davis- 
 Wade Bill " brought the President and Congress 
 into sharp collision over the fundamental question 
 as to which of the two authorities was to determine 
 when the States were ready to reassume their place 
 in the Union. Though the bill authorized the 
 President to set up provisional state govern 
 ments, it provided that these were to be trans 
 formed into permanent governments only through 
 action of Congress. Accordingly Lincoln refused 
 to sign it, and took the unusual step of issuing a 
 proclamation, declaring his purpose to decide that 
 question himself. During the adjournment of 
 Congress and the campaign of 1864, Lincoln on 
 his own responsibility caused the reorganization of 
 state governments in Louisiana, Arkansas, and 
 Tennessee ; and had he lived to the session of 1865- 
 1866, the conflict of his authority with that of 
 Congress must have again come up in a more seri 
 ous form. 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 333 
 
 The assassination of Lincoln, and the accession 
 of a man who hated the dominant white element in 
 the South, threw the whole scheme of reconstruc 
 tion into confusion ; and during the year 1865 the 
 conditions of the South and the dimensions of the 
 problem began to be more clearly appreciated in 
 the North. The most important question at the 
 outset was the status of the Southern whites. 
 Events had long since destroyed the belief, held 
 at the beginning of the war, that a large majority 
 in most of the Southern States was really opposed 
 to secession ; nearly all the able-bodied men in 
 the South went into the Confederate Army, or at 
 least into the civil service of the Confederacy or 
 the state governments. If secession were treason, 
 almost all Southerners had involved themselves in 
 the penalties for the act ; and general convictions 
 and executions would be very like massacres. 
 
 Economically the South was prostrate. The 
 great slaveholders, who had held the most impor 
 tant stations before the war and the most dangerous 
 responsibilities during it, had met financial ruin. 
 Their invested funds had gone directly or indirectly 
 into Confederate loans ; their accumulations had 
 been swept away by the demands of the war ; large 
 numbers of their negroes either were wanderers or 
 had disappeared altogether. Only the soil was 
 left, and even that in many cases had been devas 
 tated by campaigns. Politically the old leaders 
 were for the time overborne ; some were in exile, 
 and many were glad to seek obscurity; a few, 
 
334 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 including Jefferson Davis, were in the hands of the 
 federal government, and it was expected that an 
 example would be made of them by trials for 
 treason. 
 
 In May, 1865, practically under commission of 
 the President, Chase made a visit to the Southern 
 ports of South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, 
 returning by the Mississippi River. He reported to 
 the President a belief that many of the white men 
 who had engaged in the rebellion would be glad to 
 take a loyal part in the reconstructed government : 
 but before he returned Johnson had issued his 
 proclamation of May 29, 1865, granting general 
 amnesty and pardon to such as would take an oath 
 to support all laws and proclamations made, during 
 the rebellion, with reference to the emancipation 
 of slaves. From the privileges of this amnesty, 
 however, he excluded fourteen classes of persons, 
 including nearly all those who had shown energy 
 and character during the Civil War. It was there 
 fore apparent that the President intended to let the 
 poor whites organize and carry on the Southern 
 state governments with the assistance of such of 
 the more distinguished persons as he might indi 
 vidually pardon. The class upon which Johnson 
 depended was not equal to the responsibility which 
 he thrust upon it. The former small slaveholders 
 stood not far from where they had been at the 
 beginning of the war, for they could easily replace 
 their lost slaves with hired laborers, and they were 
 not on the lists of proscriptions. The poor whites, 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 335 
 
 notwithstanding their great sacrifice of life during 
 the war, found their condition hardly altered. 
 Throughout the South was also a sprinkling of 
 Northerners, in many cases former federal officers, 
 who had taken part in the founding of the new 
 governments in 1865. These "carpet-baggers" 
 were already hated, and now, as centres of organi 
 zation for the negroes, they became the point of 
 attack by the native Southerners. 
 
 Of all the questions of reconstruction, that in 
 which Chase was most interested from beginning 
 to end was the status of the negroes. As far back 
 as September, 1862, he notes that he " called on 
 attorney general about citizenship of colored men. 
 Found him adverse to expressing official opinion ; " 
 and in an earlier chapter we have seen how faith 
 fully he followed up the interests of the freedman. 
 So far as the existence of slavery went, the 
 Thirteenth Amendment, declared to be in force in 
 December, 1865, was a constitutional guarantee 
 which superseded the revocable abolition acts of 
 the States reconstructed during that year; and 
 it took out of the list of conditions which might be 
 imposed upon the States an acknowledgment of 
 the freedom of the former slaves ; it superseded 
 also the special conditions of the amnesty pro 
 clamations of Lincoln and Johnson. There still 
 remained a necessity for statutes or constitutional 
 amendments to define the judicial and other civil / 
 rights of the negroes ; andHJhase was one of the f 
 earliest among public men to insist that negro 
 
336 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 suffrage must be made a general system, and must 
 be imposed as a condition of reconstruction. This 
 conviction found voice in his last letter to Lincoln, 
 April 12, 1865 : " Once I should have been, if not 
 satisfied, partially, at least, contented with suffrage 
 for the intelligent and for those who had been 
 soldiers ; now I am convinced that universal suf 
 frage is demanded by sound policy and impartial 
 justice." 
 
 During 1865 both the legal and the economic 
 status of the negroes were confused and unsatis 
 factory. President Johnson s favored state govern 
 ments in the South showed little sympathy with the 
 blacks, and in several of the States, according to 
 Chase s own observation, they seemed likely to re 
 turn to a legal restraint very like their former 
 bondage. In some cases vagrant laws were passed, 
 so stringent that the negroes would practically have 
 been again subjected to the forcible control of their 
 former masters. 
 
 The war had brought about, not only freedom, 
 but great changes in economic conditions. Many 
 thousands of the freedmen had abandoned their 
 plantations and were still under government super 
 vision ; hence at the end of the war it was found 
 necessary to continue the control and support 
 which had for several years been carried on under 
 military authority. This was done through the 
 so-called " Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
 Abandoned Lands," which was created by an act of 
 March 3, 1865, and put under the control of a 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 337 
 
 special commissioner. This institution was con 
 tinued by an act of July, 1866, passed over the 
 President s veto ; and the United States was thus 
 committed to the position of guardian to thousands 
 of negroes. The system had Chase s warm sym 
 pathy, and in 1866 he accepted the presidency of 
 the " American Freedman s Union Commission," 
 one of the benevolent societies intended to carry on 
 the work of civilization. Both under government 
 supervision and through the missionary associa 
 tions, schools were started, and the negroes showed 
 a great desire to learn ; but they were unorganized, 
 very ignorant, poor, and dependent upon day wages ; 
 and moreover the efforts to relieve them were 
 viewed by the Southern people as an attempt to 
 give them social equality with white people. 
 
 The conditions of the problem were difficult in 
 themselves, and its solution was delayed by the 
 unfortunate controversy between President John 
 son and Congress, which began as soon as Congress 
 assembled in December, 1865. In the details of 
 that controversy and in the discussion of the funda 
 mental basis on which it rested, Chase took little 
 part, except so far as the special interests of the 
 negroes were concerned. He saw as clearly as 
 anybody that peace had brought about a logical 
 dilemma from which there was no escape : the war, 
 begun in 1861 on the theory that it was impossible 
 for a State to withdraw from the Union, ended in 
 the plain fact that the seceded States were practi 
 cally out of the Union ; and the President, Con- 
 
338 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 gress, and the Northern people all took for granted 
 that the Southern States should be subjected to 
 some kind of expiatory process before individuals 
 returned to their former public rights, and before 
 communities recovered their privileges as a part 
 of the federal government. Significant differences 
 of opinion arose over the question as to what the 
 expiatory process should be. The Southern people 
 supposed that an oath of allegiance to the United 
 States would readmit them into its fellowship ; 
 Johnson took the ground that all the important 
 participants in the rebellion would be punished by 
 loss of the suffrage, until he should restore the 
 privilege by individual pardons ; Congress in 
 tended that it was to decide what persons might 
 take part in reviving the state governments, and 
 was determined that the States as communities 
 should be punished by the imposition of humiliat 
 ing conditions of restoration. The only logical 
 and consistent theory was that of the Southerners, 
 and that was impracticable because it did not se 
 cure to the country the objects for which the war 
 had been fought. Restoration by amnesty was not 
 popular in Congress under Lincoln, and was im 
 possible under Johnson. It proved in the end that 
 the only force capable of settling the controversy 
 was the two-thirds majority in both houses of Con 
 gress, through which the President s veto could be, 
 and was, relentlessly overridden. But the process 
 was long and heated : the first stage ended in the 
 appointment of a joint committee on reconstruc- 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 339 
 
 tion, and a joint resolution of March 2, 1866, pro 
 viding that " no senator or representative should be 
 admitted into either branch of Congress from any 
 of the said States until Congress should have de 
 clared such State entitled to such representation." 
 
 In the discussion of 1865-66 Chase was rather 
 a spectator than an actor, but he did not hesitate 
 to express his personal opinions on that part of the 
 controversy which most interested him, the status 
 of the freedmen ; and he was one of the first to 
 insist that no seceded State ought to be admitted 
 back into the Union until it had given suffrage to 
 negroes. He said : " It would really be a greater 
 crime to continue slavery itself than to leave the 
 only class which, as a class, had been loyal, unpro 
 tected by the ballot." 
 
 As soon as it became evident that Johnson had 
 no interest in negro suffrage, and was willing to 
 reinstate by his pardoning power a large proportion 
 of those who had been concerned in the rebellion, 
 Chase found himself separated from the President, 
 who no longer invited an expression of his opinion. 
 At the same time his friends in the South assured 
 him that, without protection from the United 
 States, the Union men would be completely over 
 borne and the freedmen in danger. For instance, 
 a correspondent wrote : " Criminal law is a dead 
 law in Texas, and but few troops are stationed 
 among us. As matters stand, Congress might de 
 clare every rebel to be disfranchised, and all would 
 vote at the first election. Congress might by law 
 
340 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 .enfranchise every freedman, and not a single freed- 
 man would be permitted to vote." 
 
 Chase s sympathy now began to turn toward the 
 congressional plan, and he especially approved the 
 Civil Rights Act, passed over the President s veto, 
 April 9, 1866, which declared " all persons born in 
 the United States and not subject to any foreign 
 power to be citizens of the United States," arid 
 provided for equality of civil rights. This was a 
 legislative reversal of whatever was left of the Dred 
 Scott decision ; and the special machinery pro 
 vided to carry out the act was a satirical adapta 
 tion of the clauses of the Fugitive Slave Act of 
 1850, which had aroused such an uproar among 
 anti-slavery men. 
 
 The act was certain to rouse the opposition of 
 the South, and was itself liable to repeal. It 
 seemed therefore desirable to put its provisions 
 into a constitutional amendment, which would for 
 ever protect the rights of the negroes and which 
 at the same time would take out of the hands of 
 the President the restoration of former rebels to 
 their political status. This suggestion of another 
 amendment aroused Chase. On April 30, 1866, 
 he wrote to Associate Justice Field that the pro 
 posed plan of congressional reconstruction " seems 
 very well, provided it could be carried out ; but I 
 am afraid that it is, as people say, rather too big a 
 contract." He thereupon drew up a brief amend 
 ment, to be " Article Fourteen of the Constitution," 
 which provided that, in case the suffrage were re- 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 341 
 
 duced by any State, the basis of representation 
 should be correspondingly reduced, and that no 
 debts should ever be paid that had been incurred 
 in behalf of the rebellion ; and he proposed that 
 the ratification of this amendment should be made 
 a condition of reconstruction. Congress finally 
 adopted these two clauses substantially as Chase 
 wrote them ; but it adhered to its own clauses as 
 serting the citizenship and civil rights of the negroes 
 and granting Congress the power to enforce them ; 
 that is, it put the Civil Rights Act into the Con 
 stitution. To Chase s mind these additional propo 
 sitions were inexpedient, because, as he said, " it 
 seems to me that nothing is gained sufficiently im 
 portant, and unattainable by legislation, to warrant 
 our friends in overloading the ship with amend 
 ment freight." Nevertheless, he later applied the 
 amendment in its most sweeping form in his dis 
 sent from the decision of the Supreme Court in the 
 Slaughter-house Cases. 
 
 The continued holding of troops in the South 
 had caused several vexed questions as to the rela 
 tions between civil and military authority ; hence, 
 on April 2, 1866, Johnson issued a proclamation 
 announcing that the war had ceased in ten of the 
 seceded States, and on August 30, another procla 
 mation setting forth that it had ceased also in 
 Texas. The process of reconstruction was, how 
 ever, delayed until the next year, when the elabo 
 rate statutes of March 2 and March 23, 1867, 
 established the legal basis of reconstruction, and 
 
342 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 also prescribed the conditions of the reentrance of 
 the States into the Union. The existing state 
 governments were declared to be provisional, and 
 no State was to be received back until it had es 
 tablished negro suffrage ; in order to have assur 
 ance that the States should actually fulfill these 
 conditions, they were for the time being put into 
 the hands of military commanders. 
 
 Down to the end of 1866, as we have seen, 
 Chase s connection with reconstruction was that of 
 a statesman and not that of a judge. The strife 
 between President and Congress had, however, an 
 indirect influence on the Supreme Court. There 
 was an apprehension that the court would take 
 sides ; and hence when Justice Catron died in May, 
 1865, and President Johnson nominated as his suc 
 cessor his Attorney-General, Mr. Stanbery, the Sen 
 ate declined to confirm the nomination. The fed 
 eral courts were just then distressed by the serious 
 crowding of the circuits, and nearly all the justices 
 favored a pending bill for reorganization by add 
 ing new circuit judges. Upon this bill was tacked 
 a provision to reduce the number of associates to 
 eight, which of course took away the necessity for 
 an immediate appointment by Johnson. The Sen 
 ate went even farther by an amendment through 
 which, as vacancies should occur, the number of 
 associates was to be reduced to six ; the purpose 
 was to put it out of the power of the President, 
 during his whole term, to appoint any justices who 
 might be favorable to his side of the controversy. 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 343 
 
 On this proposition Johnson did not choose to take 
 issue, and it became law July 29, 1866. 
 
 About the same time the long-suspended federal 
 courts began to resume their sittings in the South 
 ern States. During 1866 the federal district 
 judges, Underwood and Brooks of Virginia, Hill 
 of Mississippi, and Busteed of Alabama, all under 
 took to hold courts. As successor to Taney, Chase s 
 circuit included Maryland, Virginia, and North 
 Carolina ; but even after the President s proclama 
 tions declaring the Civil War at an end, he stead 
 fastly refused to hold any court in Virginia or 
 North Carolina " until all possibility of claim that 
 the judicial is subordinate to the military power is 
 removed by express declaration by the President." 
 
 Chase s attitude was practically an opinion that 
 the military governments established by the Presi 
 dent were abnormal ; and also an indirect asser 
 tion of the supremacy of ordinary tribunals in time 
 of peace ; and it reinforced the decision of the 
 Supreme Court in the Vallandigham Case of 1864. 
 But in the other Southern circuits decisions were 
 made, and soon after appeals began to be taken to 
 the Supreme Court. Under the judiciary act of 
 1866, the Supreme Court justices had no circuit 
 jurisdiction in the South : but in March, 1867, that 
 jurisdiction was restored, and Chase soon after 
 assumed his functions at Raleigh, and delivered an 
 opinion on June 16, 1867. The service of process 
 under his decisions was resisted by the military 
 authority, acting under orders from General Sickles, 
 
344 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 the commander of the department. Chase was 
 willing to force the issue by direct prosecution of 
 the military officer concerned ; but the President 
 speedily removed Sickles, and appointed a succes 
 sor with instructions not to interfere with the pro 
 cesses of the court: and the jurisdiction of the 
 federal courts within the States lately in rebellion 
 was not again brought into question. 
 
 While the contest between Johnson and Con 
 gress was reaching its height, during 1866 and 
 1867, the Supreme Court at last began to prove its 
 vitality in a series of decisions which involved 
 questions arising out of the Civil War. Within 
 four months six cases were decided, in four of 
 which the court took jurisdiction, and stood forth 
 once more as an arbiter between the States and the 
 nation, if not between the other two departments 
 of the federal government. The first of these 
 cases, Ex parte Milligan, in the term of Decem 
 ber, 1866, gave the desired opportunity to reassert 
 the right of the court to be the expounder of the 
 Constitution, for it traversed the authority of the 
 unpopular military commissions at a time when 
 their necessity was past. L. P. Milligan was ar 
 rested in Indiana in October, 1864, under color of 
 the act of March 3, 1863, authorizing the suspen 
 sion of habeas cor/ms, an act which had already 
 been held void by the Supreme Court in the case 
 of Gerder v. the U. S. (1864-65) so far as ap 
 peals from the Court of Claims were concerned. 
 He was duly tried by a military commission, and 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 345 
 
 sentenced to be hanged. Lincoln approved the 
 finding, but execution was delayed, and hostilities 
 soon after ceased. In May, 1865, Milligan ap 
 pealed to the Circuit Court for a writ of habeas 
 corpus, which would raise the question of jurisdic 
 tion. The circuit judges disagreed and referred 
 the case to the Supreme Court ; but the case was 
 long held under advisement, and the decision was 
 not announced till December, 1866. The fact that 
 James A. Garfield took up Milligan s cause with 
 spirit and force, and argued the case as his counsel 
 before the Supreme Court, was a sufficient proof 
 that the whole system of military courts was un 
 popular ; and the behavior of the commission ap 
 pointed to try Lincoln s murderers in May, 1865, 
 had not increased public confidence in that arbi 
 trary kind of justice. 
 
 In the decision of the appeal by the Supreme 
 Court, all the nine justices agreed that the com 
 mission which had tried Milligan had no jurisdic 
 tion under the terms of the statute, and therefore 
 ordered him to be discharged and the proceedings 
 of the military court to be nullified. But a fun 
 damental and nearly evenly balanced difference of 
 opinion was revealed on an important principle ; 
 for five judges held that Congress could not au 
 thorize such tribunals in regions where the civil 
 courts were open, while Chase and three of his fel 
 lows held the contrary. Though Chase at that 
 time gave no evidence of a desire that the court 
 exercise restraint over the legislative power of Con- 
 

 346 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 gress, the decision was everywhere accepted as the 
 triumph of the civil over the military power, even 
 during war. The reign of military law within the 
 Northern States was at last over. 
 
 This famous decision has so long been recognized 
 as a public service that it is difficult to realize the 
 storm of unpopularity which fell upon the court. 
 According to the New York " Independent," the 
 decision restored the court " to the proud eminence 
 it occupied when Taney directed its decrees." The 
 " National Anti-Slavery Standard " declared that 
 " an alliance, offensive and defensive, has at length 
 been favorably concluded between the Supreme 
 Court and the President ; " and Wendell Phillips 
 proposed that the court be abolished out of hand, 
 for " the nation must be saved, no matter what or 
 how venerable the foe whose existence goes down 
 before that necessity." 
 
 A few days later, January 14, 1867, the court 
 held void a clause of a state constitution, in the 
 so-called "Test oath" cases (Cummings v. Mis 
 souri and In re Garland). Arguments had been 
 heard many months earlier, and Chase appears to 
 have interested himself in postponing the decision 
 for the time being. Nevertheless, somehow John 
 son learned or supposed that the court had come 
 to a decision against the validity of the oaths, for 
 he publicly stated in the campaign of 1866 that 
 his own opinion on that subject had their concur 
 rence. 
 
 The point in the Cummings Case was the validity 
 
 A" ^. 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 347 
 
 of a retrospective oath of loyalty imposed by the 
 radical Missouri Constitution of 1864, under which 
 any person, who had " by act or word " manifested 
 sympathy with those engaged in rebellion, was dis 
 franchised and excluded from public office, from 
 office in any corporation, and from the practice of 
 any profession. This enactment was applied to 
 Curnmings to prevent him from officiating as a 
 Catholic priest. It was defended as the act of a 
 State possessing " attributes of sovereignty," and 
 it was a problem to find constitutional limitations 
 which would annul this disagreeable clause in the 
 Missouri Constitution, and yet leave no loophole of 
 escape from the philanthropic articles of the con 
 stitutions of the reconstructed States. Five judges, 
 the bare majority of the court, found the desired 
 limitations in the constitutional prohibitions of ex 
 post facto laws and bills of attainder. From this 
 conclusion Chase dissented, together with Swayne, 
 Miller, and Davis, all four appointees of Lincoln ; 
 their ground was mainly that the ex post facto 
 clause applied only to criminal cases and not to 
 civil disabilities. 
 
 The Garland Case turned on the validity of an 
 act of Congress of January 14, 1865, which im 
 posed a test oath for attorneys before the Supreme 
 Court. Garland had been admitted as a coun 
 selor before the war, but now found himself ex 
 cluded, although he had fortified himself with a 
 pardon from the President. The majority of the 
 court held that it was not in the power of Congress 
 
348 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 to stretch its power of prescribing qualifications 
 for attorneys so as to make it " a means for the 
 infliction of punishment, against the prohibition of 
 the Constitution," or "to inflict punishment be 
 yond the reach of executive clemency." Again 
 Chase and his three fellows dissented, partly on 
 legal grounds, and partly from the political reason 
 that u to suffer treasonable sentiments to spread 
 here unchecked is to permit the stream on which 
 the life of the nation depends to be poisoned at its 
 source." They held also that the President s par 
 don could not relieve from a qualification, though 
 it might from a punishment. 
 
 The significance of these cases is not only that 
 all the older judges united in annulling, on narrow 
 and technical grounds, provisions of a state Con 
 stitution and of a federal statute, but also that the 
 decision suggested to Congress what might be ex 
 pected when the pending reconstruction acts came 
 up for judicial examination. Within a few weeks 
 efforts were made to stop the execution of those 
 acts, which had passed Congress by two-thirds 
 majorities, in the face of hostile veto messages, in 
 which Johnson had freely declared them unconsti 
 tutional. The statutes by which existing state 
 governments were placed under military control 
 were assailed by Governor Humphrey of Mississippi, 
 who through his attorney, Kobert J. Walker, asked 
 for an injunction to restrain President Johnson 
 from carrying out the statutes in Mississippi ; by 
 this proceeding troublesome preliminaries of cases 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 349 
 
 brought slowly from the lower courts might be 
 avoided, and a decision might almost be forced 
 from the Supreme Court. The petitioner argued 
 that no penalties or disabilities could be laid upon 
 the State as such, but only upon individuals who 
 might have violated the laws of the United States ; 
 and he thus brought up the whole question of the 
 status of the seceded States. The President had 
 no wish to raise a contest on that issue, and there 
 fore the Attorney-General . objected to the injunc 
 tion ; indeed, the case was without precedent, since 
 this was the first attempt in the history of the court 
 to make the President party of record to a suit 
 before the Supreme Court. The brief decision 
 rendered April 15, 1867, took the sagacious ground 
 that the duties imposed by the act were " purely 
 executive and political ; " and, without a dissent, 
 the court declined to assume jurisdiction, and left 
 the President and Congress to settle their own 
 differences. 
 
 Another suit was pending, however, in which 
 the authorities of the State of Georgia asked for 
 an injunction, not against the President, but against 
 the Secretary of War, and for this form of action 
 there were precedents. President Johnson had his 
 own reasons for unwillingness to protect Stanton, 
 and interposed no objection. The court, therefore, 
 gave renewed consideration to the issue, but ad 
 hered to the principle of the first case. Notwith 
 standing the excitement of the secretary, and the 
 widespread belief that the remedy sought would be 
 
350 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 granted by a majority of five to four as in the Mil- 
 ligan case, the case was dismissed on May 15, 1867, 
 upon the ground that it was a political question 
 which could not be settled by a court. Some 
 thoughtful men, who had expected to see a check 
 applied to the rising power of Congress, exclaimed 
 in despair that " no State in the Union could rely 
 upon the protection of the Supreme Court." 
 
 The end had not yet been reached ; another case 
 was now presented, in which the parties were not 
 executives of State or nation, in which the point 
 involved was supposed to be the same as that in 
 the Milligan case, and yet which brought up the 
 validity of the reconstruction acts. Colonel Mc- 
 Cardle, the editor of a Vicksburg paper, was 
 brought by the military commander of the district 
 before a military commission on the charge of pub 
 lishing insurrectionary articles. Application was 
 made to Judge Hill of the United States Circuit 
 Court to grant a writ of habeas corpus, by which 
 the authority of this extra-judicial tribunal might 
 be tested. Hill asserted the constitutionality of 
 the commission, but appeal was taken to the Su 
 preme Court, and speedily argued before it. In 
 December, 1867, that body, in preliminary pro 
 ceedings, asserted its jurisdiction, but argument on 
 the principle involved was postponed till the next 
 term. The question was now distinctly presented 
 of the power to pass statutes authorizing trials by 
 military commissions after the official announce 
 ment that no war was going on ; and no one could 
 predict the decision. 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 351 
 
 Until after the impeachment of Johnson in 
 1868, the court made no more great constitutional 
 decisions ; it never had to decide a fundamental 
 case of freedom under the Emancipation Procla 
 mation, or even under the Thirteenth Amendment ; 
 and none of the legal questions of treason reached 
 it. But to Chase, as judge in a Southern circuit, 
 came the opportunity by a judicial decree to strike 
 the bonds from a large number of helpless Afri 
 cans. At the time of the abolition of slavery in 
 Maryland, in 1864, Elizabeth Turner was immedi 
 ately bound as apprentice to her former master. 
 This indenture, servile in terms, and forced on a 
 defenseless child, Chase had the satisfaction to de 
 clare void, on two grounds : because it established 
 a modified form of slavery, contrary to the Thir 
 teenth Amendment ; and also because it violated 
 the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which assured equal 
 legal privileges to negroes and whites. The ap 
 prentice decision attracted wide discussion, and 
 General Howard reported that it brought about 
 the release of a large number of children held 
 in virtual slavery. It was also a notice to the 
 Southern States that their offensive vagrant laws 
 of 1865 and 1866 would not stand before the fed 
 eral courts. 
 
 The fact that Chase s circuit included the former 
 seat of the Confederate government brought within 
 his jurisdiction the prosecutions for treason against 
 former officials of that government. At the end 
 of the war, under Stan ton s authority, writs were 
 
352 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 issued for the arrest of the principal military and 
 civil leaders, including both Lee and Davis ; and 
 though General Grant interfered effectively to pre 
 vent the arrest of the .military commanders, Jeffer 
 son Davis was confined in Fortress Monroe from 
 1865 to 1867, and remained under indictment till 
 1869. If the war was to be followed by criminal 
 trials for treason, a clearer case than his could not 
 be made out, and President Johnson was at first anx 
 ious that Davis be put on his trial ; so that Chase 
 seemed likely to have an opportunity to expound 
 the law of treason, such as Marshall had in the 
 Burr Case. 
 
 From the first, Chase disliked the prospect : that 
 Davis s acts were treasonable he never doubted, and 
 he must have so ruled had there ever been a trial ; 
 but he thought that a military commission was the 
 suitable tribunal ; and by 1867 he was out of har 
 mony with Johnson, whose Attorney-General must 
 direct the preliminaries of a prosecution. So long, 
 therefore, as military rule continued in the South, 
 Chase declined to hold any court for the trial of 
 Davis on indictments found in Virginia. Another 
 indictment found in the District of Columbia was 
 inadequate ; and the trial hung fire, even after the 
 President s proclamation of 1866, declaring the 
 war at an end, and notwithstanding resolutions in 
 Congress demanding prosecution. In May, 1867, 
 the President definitely threw the responsibility on 
 the judiciary, by allowing the military custodian to 
 surrender Davis to the custody of the federal court 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 353 
 
 under a habeas corpus issued by Chase. At last 
 there seemed a prospect of a trial ; but when Davis 
 appeared in court for the first time, Chase refused 
 to sit, and Davis was admitted to bail by Judge 
 Underwood. 
 
 By this time it was plain that the chief justice 
 had no heart in the prosecution, that the adminis- 
 istration would not urge it, and that Northern 
 men saw no advantage in making a martyr of the 
 President of the Confederacy. The trial was, by 
 agreement, postponed from term to term, till No 
 vember, 1868. Then for the first time Chase sat 
 as judge in the court ; but Davis s counsel set up 
 the plea that their client was one of those included 
 in the Fourteenth Amendment (which had just 
 gone into effect), and that the penalties there enu 
 merated took the place of any previously incurred 
 penalties for treason. The plea seems far-fetched, 
 but Chase approved it. The regular circuit judge, 
 probably by arrangement, took the other side, and 
 the court certified its divergence up to the Su 
 preme Court for settlement there. A few days later, 
 however, December 25, 1868, President Johnson 
 issued a proclamation of general amnesty, and at 
 the next term the circuit judge discharged Davis 
 on the ground that he was included in that pardon. 
 The Supreme Court did not interfere, and thus 
 ended the great treason case, with no trial on its 
 merits. 
 
 Though fiercely assailed at the time for his 
 lukewarmness, and though accused of favoring 
 
354 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Davis as a means of making friends with the 
 Southern Democrats, Chase performed a public 
 service by delaying a trial ; the release of Davis 
 made the Confederate leader harmless, and he could 
 never have been convicted in Virginia without pack 
 ing the jury. By this time all the country was ad 
 justed to the principle of the reconstruction acts, 
 that the South was to be punished by penalties on 
 the States as communities, and not by executing in 
 dividuals pour encourager les autres." 
 
 The year 1867 was not a favorable time for the 
 Supreme Court to emphasize its authority to re 
 view acts of Congress. The two-thirds majority 
 of that body relentlessly overrode the President s 
 vetoes, and was in no temper to be restrained by 
 a court. It was remembered that in 1802 Congress 
 had disposed of a hostile judiciary by a statute dis 
 solving some of the courts, and thus depriving the 
 judges of their places ; and that the whole ma 
 chinery of appeals was fixed by revocable acts of 
 Congress. Suggestions were promptly made in 
 Congress that unfavorable decisions by the Su 
 preme Court might be prevented by resolute legis 
 lation, and members complained that the judges 
 were " too apt to turn their attention back in 
 search of some stale precedent of the dark ages." 
 It was supposed that Justice Wayne of Georgia 
 was arbiter between two factions of four judges 
 each, and that his sympathies were with the presi 
 dential policy ; still he had shown remarkable im 
 partiality during the Civil War, and but for his 
 
PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 355 
 
 death in 1867 he would probably have backed up 
 the congressional theory. 
 
 When Congress assembled in December, 1867, 
 one of the first questions to come before it was 
 that of the Supreme Court. An early bill pro 
 posed that two thirds of the entire court must con 
 cur in deciding adversely on the constitutionality 
 of any law of the United States ; another plan 
 required unanimous agreement in such cases. Al 
 though men like Simmer supported this extrava 
 gant proposition, it finally gave way to a bill taking 
 away part of the appellate jurisdiction, the purpose 
 being to prevent the further consideration of the 
 McCardle case. Schenck of Ohio supported the 
 measure, because, as he said, " I have lost confi 
 dence in the majority of the Supreme Court. I 
 believe that they usurp power whenever they dare 
 to undertake to settle questions purely political." 
 It passed both Houses, and though the President at 
 once interposed his veto, in March, 1868, it was 
 carried over his head. When at the next term of 
 the court, McCardle s case came up, the court 
 wisely held that its jurisdiction had been removed : 
 as Chase expressed it in his opinion, " Judicial duty 
 is not less fully performed by declining ungranted 
 jurisdiction than by exercising firmly that which 
 the Constitution and the laws conferred." 
 
 Notwithstanding the panic in Congress, there 
 seems little reason to suppose that the court would 
 have thrown the process of reconstruction into con 
 fusion by holding the main acts unconstitutional. 
 
356 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 It is alleged that Justice Field told his friends that 
 in the court s opinion the acts were unconstitu 
 tional ; if it were so, Chase took care that no such 
 opinion should be pronounced. On August 7, 1867, 
 he wrote to General Garfield : " The country is well 
 satisfied with the action of Congress, not, I think, 
 that the people want a continuance of military au 
 thority, but because they want restoration on solid 
 and just foundation as soon as possible the Presi 
 dent must yield to the People ; or the People will 
 take up and put through impeachment." 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 
 THROUGHOUT the first stage of reconstruction, 
 Chase s attitude had been dignified and his influ 
 ence conservative and conciliatory : he had done 
 his best to restrain Johnson from excess ; he had 
 as circuit judge, and as judge in the Supreme 
 Court, thrown his influence against technical deci 
 sions ; he had allowed the method of congressional 
 reconstruction to go on untroubled to the end. 
 The Southern States duly paid the price of their 
 readmission by ratifying the Fourteenth Amend 
 ment, and from 1868 they were gradually allowed 
 to reoccupy seats in Congress. But the struggle 
 between the President and Congress had grown so 
 bitter that it was determined to remove Johnson 
 from his office, though his term had but a few 
 months longer to run, and though there was not 
 the slightest danger of his reelection. His vio 
 lence, even when he was in the right, had weak 
 ened him beyond any power of harm, and the 
 relentless two-thirds majority in Congress could 
 override him at will ; impeachment was unneces 
 sary, and therefore tactless. The issue finally 
 selected was that he should be impeached for a 
 
358 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 violation of the Tenure of Office Act, passed to 
 curb him in March, 1867. In August, 1867, John 
 son removed Secretary Stanton, and designated 
 General Grant as secretary ad interim. When 
 at the next session of Congress in December, 
 1867, the Senate refused to assent to the removal, 
 Stanton, according to the terms of the statute, was 
 restored to his office ; but Johnson refused to ac 
 knowledge him, and took some steps to make up 
 a test case for the Supreme Court. Within two 
 days a resolution of impeachment passed the 
 House, and in March, 1868, the Senate began to 
 sit as a court of impeachment. 
 
 For the first time in the nation s history had 
 come about the impeachment of a president, a 
 proceeding in which the Constitution designates 
 the chief justice to preside over the Senate. Not 
 withstanding his judicial office and his special 
 function as presiding officer, Chase did not conceal 
 his strong opinion that the trial was impolitic and 
 unjust. Although his friend Ashley had been the 
 first to urge impeachment, Chase could not share 
 in the violent antipathies of Congress ; for his 
 personal relations with Johnson had not been un 
 friendly, and he could see clearly the danger of the 
 supremacy of Congress if it succeeded in remov 
 ing a President. Nor is it likely that he looked 
 forward with pleasure to the prospects of his old 
 rival, Benjamin F. Wade, then president of the 
 Senate, and hence next in succession to the vice- 
 president. A few days after the end of the trial, 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 359 
 
 he expressed in a letter to Greeley sentiments 
 which had been sufficiently evident throughout the 
 proceedings : " I was against impeachment as a 
 policy so were you ; my strong impressions were 
 against the sufficiency of the article and the proof 
 to warrant conviction and these impressions have 
 gradually ripened into beliefs." 
 
 From the first, the Senate felt uneasy at his par 
 ticipation, and, before organizing under his presi 
 dency, drew up a set of rules to govern the trial. 
 When, on March 6, Chase was notified to attend, 
 he properly protested against any official action of 
 the Senate upon the impeachment without his pre 
 sence ; and he insisted that the rules should be 
 adopted by the Senate as a court, before going 
 farther. As soon as the trial had fairly begun, it 
 became evident that it was the intention of the 
 leaders to deny the chief justice any real part in 
 the proceedings ; they therefore maintained that 
 the Senate did not sit as a court, and hence was 
 not bound by legal procedure and principles of 
 evidence. Against this assertion Chase set him 
 self with effect ; and he successfully used his right 
 to act, not simply as a moderator, but as the pre 
 siding judge in the tribunal. When the question 
 of the admissibility of evidence came up, he de 
 cided upon his own motion, subject to the revision 
 of the Senate if a vote were demanded ; and the 
 Senate did not know how to avoid his action. An 
 understanding had been reached among the radical 
 Republicans that, on the first attempt of Chase to 
 
360 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 vote upon a tie, a rule should be passed against 
 him ; but the first tie arose unexpectedly on a 
 question of the retirement of the Senate for con 
 sultation, and instantly Chase added his vote in 
 favor of adjournment, and declared the session 
 closed. 
 
 From this time it was evident that Chase could 
 not be set aside. His moderating influence aroused 
 the wrath of Thaddeus Stevens, who said in the 
 course of the trial : " It is the meanest case, be 
 fore the meanest tribunal, and on the meanest sub 
 ject of human history." Party feeling ran high. 
 It was known that some of the Republican sena 
 tors would not support the impeachment, and 
 Chase drew upon himself the anger of the disap 
 pointed radicals. He was even accused, notwith 
 standing his positive denial, of personally solicit 
 ing votes for acquittal. On the contrary, he failed 
 to gauge the play of feeling, and was surprised, on 
 the test vote of May 16, to see that seven Repub 
 lican senators voted for acquittal, and that the op 
 ponents of Johnson thus lacked one vote of the 
 necessary two thirds. At no time in his life did 
 he show more calmness, good judgment, and fore 
 sight than in the impeachment trial ; and for his 
 effort to raise the proceedings above a partisan in 
 vestigation, and to hold them to their proper char 
 acter of a judicial process, he deserves the credit 
 of averting a great public danger. Though he 
 had no vote, and little opportunity for direct inter 
 ference, the weight of his character, his reputation 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 3G1 
 
 as an anti-slavery man, and his great office were 
 thrown into the conservative side of the nearly 
 evenly balanced scale. 
 
 It was unfortunate for Chase, that, even while 
 the trial was going on, he permitted his friends 
 again to urge him for the presidency. In his 
 service as chief justice he had an excellent oppor 
 tunity to show his powers as a constitutional law 
 yer; and the decisions of the court during that 
 period, on both public and private law, were nof 
 inferior to those of the previous decade. Had he 
 withdrawn altogether from political strife, his 
 motives on the bench would have been unassail 
 able ; but from the moment he sought the presi 
 dency he could not escape the suspicion that his 
 decisions had been influenced by his conception of 
 their effect upon his political chances. 
 
 In the four years of his chief-justiceship, Chase 
 had never lost sight of the Republican nomination 
 of 1868. One reason was, that he did not feel an 
 absorbing interest in the work of a judge. " The 
 office is dignified," said he in 1868 ; " I enjoy 
 many things in the work, but I confess that my 
 own mind is executive rather than judicial. I 
 should prefer to conduct affairs in the way that 
 seems to me wisest, rather than to decide on mat 
 ters that are past ; " and very soon after his induc 
 tion he wrote : " Working from morning till mid 
 night, and no result, except that John Smith owned 
 this parcel of land or other property instead of 
 Jacob Robinson ; I caring nothing, and nobody 
 
362 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 caring much more, about the matter." For several 
 years it seemed doubtful whether the Supreme 
 Court under Chase would recover its great po 
 sition as a national arbiter ; while the opportuni 
 ties for distinction to a vigorous and commanding 
 President were never more alluring. 
 
 To blame Chase for desiring to be President is 
 to blame him for being what he was : conscious of 
 his own great abilities, he felt that he had never 
 had a full opportunity to show his powers ; and he 
 was extremely sensitive to the opinion of those 
 about him, and desired the highest approval that 
 could be given. He would have been a greater 
 judge and a happier man without this unsatisfied 
 ambition ; he would have left a greater reputation 
 had he set Marshall before his mind as a model 
 rather than Washington ; and all our national 
 experience had shown how unsettling to the man 
 and to the court is the ambition of a judge for po 
 litical office. But Chase was a great man who had 
 played a great part, and the quality of his ambi 
 tion can only be settled by an ethical inquiry into 
 his motives. As one of the founders of the Repub 
 lican party, which, in his own judgment, owed him 
 loyal support, Chase felt that he was the legiti 
 mate candidate for its nomination in 1868 ; and 
 no other civilian of equal abilities and reputa 
 tion was suggested. Seward had lost reputation 
 in the cabinets of both Lincoln and Johnson, and 
 none of the senators stood forth preeminent. By 
 1867, however, it became evident that the party 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 363 
 
 might look for a military candidate, and against 
 sueli a nomination Chase threw himself with all 
 his strength, not only because he desired to be Pre 
 sident, but because he felt the danger of electing 
 military heroes. 
 
 He did not hesitate to put himself forward in 
 the presidential struggle, and to follow the same 
 methods as in the three previous preliminary cam 
 paigns. In 1866 his supporters began to suggest 
 to him that the time had come to organize, and in 
 June and July, 1867, he sent a confidential friend 
 to sound the Republicans in the West ; he was 
 pleased to be told that Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, 
 and Missouri could be counted for him, and that 
 there was a strong feeling against Grant, who 
 loomed up as the probable military candidate. 
 But, just as in 1856, 1860, and 1864, Chase was 
 compelled to face the fact that he roused no enthu 
 siasm among the people, and that he had no strong 
 friends among the leading politicians or public men 
 who would or could prepare the way for him. Dur 
 ing 1867 and early 1868 the current ran against 
 him, and in March, 1868, at about the beginning 
 of the impeachment trial, he threw up the contest, 
 and assumed " only the interest of a citizen who 
 loves his country, and desires earnestly the speedi 
 est possible restoration." It had by this time 
 become evident, not only that General Grant 
 would be nominated by the Republicans, but that 
 he must be so nominated unless they were willing 
 that he should be the candidate of the Democrats. 
 
364 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 After the persistent efforts to make Chase the 
 Republican nominee, it seemed to many of his 
 friends almost treasonable that within a few weeks 
 he should be seeking the Democratic nomination. 
 Nothing in Chase s life has caused such fierce crit 
 icism, and nothing has done so much to diminish 
 a well-earned reputation for sagacity, patriotism, 
 and consistency, as his desire for that nomination. 
 But, however faulty Chase s judgment, and however 
 lame his logic, his course is not indefensible. His 
 own explanation was loss of confidence in his old 
 party. " I cannot approve in general," he wrote in 
 September, 1868, " of what the Republican party 
 has done. ... I hold my old faith in universal suf 
 frage, in reconstruction upon that basis, in univer 
 sal amnesty, and in inviolate public faith ; but I do 
 not believe in military government for American 
 States, nor in military commissions for the trial of 
 American citizens, nor in the subversion of the 
 executive and judicial departments of the general 
 government by Congress, no matter how patriotic 
 the motive may be." To be sure, he had just 
 eagerly sought the support of this faulty organiza 
 tion ; but Chase always overestimated the influ 
 ence which he might have as President in directing 
 and moderating his party, and his indictment of 
 Congress was justified by the intention of the lead 
 ers to make that body supreme over both Presi 
 dent and Supreme Court. 
 
 Neither the question of the form of government, 
 nor even the question of the reconstruction of the 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 365 
 
 States, was the issue in 1868. In Congress, in 
 terest bad been transferred from tbe disabilities of 
 the Southern whites to the possibilities of govern 
 ment under negro suffrage ; and the Republican 
 party, with Chase as one of its leaders, stood in 
 the public eye as the defenders of the freedom, the 
 equal rights, and the political privileges of the 
 negroes. How could he put himself into relations 
 with a party whose traditional tenets were against 
 negro equality in any form? The chief justice 
 found himself denounced in savage terms by his 
 old anti-slavery associates for one moment trusting 
 Democrats to do justice to the negro. In his 
 mind, however, had always lain the belief that the 
 Democratic party had by nature anti-slavery prin 
 ciples. Now in 1868 the Democrats in the North 
 were humbled and discouraged, and the Democrats 
 of the South were disfranchised or reduced to im 
 potence. Some of the shrewdest leaders, among 
 them Samuel J. Tilden, favored a new departure, 
 in which the party should accept the results of the 
 war, including the new conditions of the South, 
 as accomplished facts, and should make a stand 
 against the threatened concentration of govern 
 ment in Washington. This was good fighting- 
 ground, and it was upon this basis that overtures 
 were made to Chase to consider the Democratic 
 nomination. The phrase by which he described 
 the new policy was " universal amnesty and uni 
 versal suffrage," which meant that the Southern 
 white voters were to be restored, but that the 
 
366 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 negroes should maintain their suffrage side by side 
 with them. 
 
 The difficulty with this whole suggestion lay in 
 the obvious fact that negro suffrage, honestly ad 
 ministered, meant that the Southern Democrats 
 should be placed in a permanent minority in most 
 of the Southern States, and without Southern 
 electoral votes it was folly to think of electing a 
 Democratic President. The strength of the propo 
 sition was in the hope that a candidate like Chase 
 would draw into coalition with the Democrats such 
 Republicans as were alarmed at the radicalism of 
 Congress and at the militarism of the Republican 
 candidate. In April, 1868, while the impeach 
 ment trial was still pending, Chase indicated his 
 willingness to accept the Democratic nomination, 
 and on May 5, before a final vote by the Senate, 
 he wrote, speaking of earlier years : "I was a 
 Democrat then, too democratic for the Democratic 
 party of those days ; for I admitted no exception, 
 on ground of race or color or condition, to the 
 impartial application of Democratic principles to 
 all measures and to all men. Such a Democrat I 
 am to-day." 
 
 To many of the Democratic leaders he seemed 
 an opportune candidate, and the chieftains at 
 tempted to find some common ground upon which 
 their followers might stand with him. A letter of 
 May 30 to August Belmont contains a candid 
 statement of Chase s position ; he held to his con 
 viction of many years that negro suffrage was a 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 3G7 
 
 necessary condition in the future South, adding: 
 " I would eradicate if possible every root of bitter 
 ness. I want to see the Union and the Constitution 
 established in the affections of all the people, and 
 I think that the initiative should be taken by the 
 successful side in the late struggle. I have been 
 and am in favor of so much of the policy of Con 
 gress as bases the reorganization of the State gov 
 ernments in the South upon universal suffrage." 
 
 For some days before the New York Convention 
 of July, 1868, Chase s nomination seemed likely ; 
 the strongest regular Democratic candidate, Pen- 
 dleton, was found not to control two thirds of the 
 convention, and Horatio Seymour absolutely de 
 clined to be considered as a candidate. A provi 
 sional platform was drawn up and submitted to 
 Chase, who gave his assent and wrote numerous 
 letters for publication, defining his ground and 
 pledging himself to withdraw the troops from the 
 Southern States. To John Van Buren, son of the 
 late President, who acted as his representative, he 
 took pains to write privately : " I must not be 
 understood as expressing any opinion on questions 
 of constitutional law which may come before the 
 court." 
 
 As the date of the convention, July 8, drew 
 near, negotiations grew closer ; unfortunately for 
 Chase most of his old and tried friends had no 
 place in a Democratic convention ; but Vallandig- 
 ham of Ohio and other ultra-Democrats favored 
 his nomination, and a majority of the New York 
 
368 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 delegation had agreed to bring him forward. As 
 the voting proceeded in the convention on July 9, 
 it was clearly seen that Pendleton could not be 
 nominated, and the moment was approaching when 
 the name of the chief justice was to be brought 
 before the assembly. Seymour, the president of 
 the convention, had been most earnest in Chase s 
 behalf, and expected the nomination of the chief 
 justice ; but when Pendleton s Ohio leader, Gen 
 eral McCook, saw that his favorite could not be 
 chosen, he nominated Seymour, and despite the 
 latter s protestations the nomination was carried 
 with an uproar, Chase s name having barely been 
 mentioned before the convention. 
 
 Never in his whole life had Chase come so near 
 to the first step on the way to the presidency. 
 The wrath and indignation of his immediate friends 
 are reflected in a letter from one of his family, who 
 was on the ground : " You have been most cruelly 
 deceived and shamefully used by the man whom 
 you trusted implicitly, and the Country must suffer 
 for his duplicity. . . . Mr. Tilden and Mr. Seymour 
 have done this work, and Mr. Van Buren has been 
 their tool." The real reason why Chase was not 
 nominated was undoubtedly that put into an apo 
 thegm by a friend : "Mr. Chase was willing to 
 swallow the Democracy, but not to be swallowed by 
 the Democracy." The principle of negro suffrage, 
 to which he had adhered, and must as an honest 
 man adhere, was too much for the convention, and 
 would have been too much for the voters. The dis- 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 369 
 
 astrous effect of such a nomination was sufficiently 
 shown in 1872 in the fate of Horace Greeley ; and 
 Chase simply escaped a crushing overthrow when 
 the convention refused to put him in nomination. 
 
 The impeachment of Andrew Johnson marked 
 the high tide of national feeling as well as of con 
 gressional supremacy in reconstruction matters ; 
 and when General Grant became President, in 
 March, 1869, there were already evidences of re 
 action. Notwithstanding the " carpet-bag " gov 
 ernments in the South, the Kepublican majority 
 in the lower house of Congress was reduced, and 
 the Supreme Court seemed to feel free to decide 
 an accumulation of cases involving the details of 
 reconstruction, and eventually touching the effect 
 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As before, Chase 
 assumed the double function of a public man of 
 large experience and influence who desired to see 
 what he believed to be the principles of the Civil 
 War carried out in legislation, and of the head of 
 the court which had the responsibility of applying 
 that legislation. 
 
 This double attitude was a part of Chase s na 
 ture. Quite apart from his ambition to be Presi 
 dent, he could not stand aloof from the public 
 movement of reconstruction; hence in 1869 and 
 1870 he took a large part in defending negro suf 
 frage. The radical Republican leaders desired it 
 even more than he did, though for other reasons. 
 Indeed, in 1869 suffrage had been given to the 
 negroes in every Southern State, as a condition of 
 
370 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 reconstruction : but it was easy to foresee that as 
 soon as the States were left to themselves some of 
 them would surely take away the ballot, with the 
 result of an immediate loss of Eepublican control. 
 The radical Republican leaders looked on negro 
 suffrage as the basis of their electoral and con 
 gressional votes in the South : to passionate recon- 
 structionists, like Charles Sumner and Thaddeus 
 Stevens, negro suffrage meant a final triumph over 
 the hated rebel ; to Chase it seemed the means not 
 only of protecting but of ennobling the negro. He 
 championed it earlier than any other public man ; 
 from 1862 he urged it in season and out of season ; 
 he pleaded for it in the cabinet ; and he separated 
 from Lincoln s plan of reconstruction principally 
 because that plan was based on white government. 
 "With Sumner he waited on Johnson, immediately 
 on his becoming President, to urge negro suffrage ; 
 and the occasion of his opposition to Johnson s 
 reconstruction policy was the President s failure to 
 follow those good counsels. As time went on, the 
 suffrage occupied more and more of his thoughts ; 
 he felt sure that Congress woidd have made easier 
 terms for the Southern States if the South had 
 voluntarily enfranchised the negroes ; he was con 
 vinced that universal suffrage was everywhere the 
 only safe basis for popular government ; and he 
 thought that it was especially necessary in the 
 South, in order to quiet the terrors of the negroes 
 and to bring them back into harmonious relations 
 with their former masters. Indeed, it is probable 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 371 
 
 that for their own purposes the Southern leaders 
 would have done better to accept negro suffrage, 
 and then to organize and influence the negro vote 
 themselves. To secure this blessing, Chase was 
 willing and anxious to have " universal amnesty," 
 that is, the restoration of nearly all the whites to 
 their public rights. In a letter of May 29, 1869, 
 he says : " I have lived to see all men free in 
 America; I have lived to see one currency pro 
 vided for the people. I hope to live to see univer 
 sal freedom grounded on universal suffrage, and a 
 national currency perfected into equality with gold. 
 These things are only foundations ; future genera 
 tions must build on them." 
 
 Nevertheless, he hesitated when, in 1869, the 
 Fifteenth Amendment was introduced, putting the 
 suffrage into irrepealable form. On April 3, 1869, 
 he wrote to a friend : " After the Fourteenth Amend 
 ment was adopted, I thought the suffrage should 
 be left to the States after restoration, and I still 
 think so. Centralization and consolidation have 
 gone far enough and too far. And yet, inasmuch 
 as the proposed Fifteenth Amendment does not 
 prevent the States from imposing suitable qualifi 
 cations, if qualifications should be found necessary, 
 I incline to wish that it may be ratified. I should 
 have no reservation in that wish if the clause giv 
 ing Congress power to legislate were left out. I 
 want as little legislation by Congress in respect to 
 the internal concerns of the States as possible." 
 Once decided, however, he supported the amend- 
 
372 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 ment heartily, and his influence was strong if not 
 decisive in the Ohio legislature in securing the 
 ratification by that State, and thus completing 
 the three-fourths majority necessary to make the 
 amendment part of the Constitution. When it 
 was duly proclaimed, November 30, 1870, Chase 
 felt that the structure was now complete, and he 
 wrote : " No man can now be found who will re 
 store slavery; a few years hence, if the colored 
 men are wise, it will be impossible to find a man 
 who will avow himself in favor of denying or 
 abridging their right to vote." 
 
 Chase s remark about centralization is a key to 
 his general attitude in the court from this time on. 
 It must be remembered that all his life long he had 
 been accustomed to look upon the States as but 
 tressed in impregnable rights. He had always 
 acknowledged the privilege of the States to estab 
 lish slavery if they chose, and for that very reason 
 had been determined that express constitutional 
 amendments must be secured to deprive them of 
 that right. He had been alarmed both at the im 
 mense and unrestrained power exercised by the 
 President during the Civil War, and at the arbi 
 trary power asserted by Congress during recon 
 struction ; and he could see that, if the vitality of 
 the States should be destroyed, the power taken 
 from them must inevitably fall into the hands of 
 the President or of Congress. 
 
 No case came before the Supreme Court at this 
 time which involved the right of the individual to 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 373 
 
 freedom. In December, 1865, a negro was form 
 ally admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court by 
 Chase s direct influence ; and in 1867 he ordered 
 that in the district of North Carolina the marshal 
 should summon negroes as well as whites to serve 
 on the jury. His decision in the Maryland Appren 
 tice Case has already been noted. The only slavery 
 cases which came before the Supreme Court in 
 volved the enforcement of unexecuted contracts for 
 buying slaves. In the first of these cases ( White v. 
 Hart, 1872) suit was brought for the collection of 
 a note given in 1859, the consideration for which 
 was a slave. Though the Georgia Constitution of 
 1868 positively denied all jurisdiction for the en 
 forcement of any debt of that kind, the Supreme 
 Court held that neither a state constitution nor a 
 statute could impair the obligation of the contract. 
 In the case of Osborn v. Nicholson, decided at the 
 same time, the court construed the Thirteenth 
 Amendment, and held that it did not alter con 
 tractual rights which had previously accrued. From 
 these decisions the chief justice was the only mem 
 ber of the court to dissent, and his opinion goes 
 back to the same general principle as did his argu 
 ment in the Van Zandt Case, twenty-four years 
 earlier. He held " that contracts for the purchase 
 and sale of slaves were and are against sound 
 morals and justice, and without support except in 
 positive law," and that all laws which supported 
 slavery and slavery contracts were annulled by the 
 Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
 
374 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 same question came up again in Bryce v. Tabb, 
 in 1873, and the court took substantially the same 
 ground. 
 
 A large group of Supreme Court cases turned 
 upon the effect of the Civil War on the rights of 
 property. In two cases, United States v. Ander 
 son (1869-70), and the Protector (1871), the 
 court passed on the important question as to when 
 the war legally began and ended, but the two de 
 cisions did not harmonize. In the first case the 
 court held without dissent that the proclamation 
 of August 20, 1866, was " the first official declara 
 tion that we have on the part of the executive that 
 the rebellion was wholly suppressed, and . . . the 
 limitation . . . did not begin to run until the re 
 bellion was suppressed throughout the whole coun 
 try." In the second case it was held without dis 
 sent that " the war did not begin or close at the 
 same time in all the States ; " but that it began in 
 the first seven States by the proclamation of block 
 ade, April 19, 1861, and in Virginia and North 
 Carolina by the similar proclamation of April 27, 
 1861 ; and that it ceased in twelve States by the 
 proclamation of April 12, 1866, and in Texas by 
 the proclamation of August 25, 1866. In another 
 decision of much importance, The Grapeshot, the 
 court upheld provisional courts set up by direction 
 of the President, without any legislative authority, 
 in parts of the seceded States occupied by the 
 federal troops. 
 
 Three important decisions expounded the vexed 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 375 
 
 relation of seceded States to the Union, the 
 question which had so perplexed Congress. In 
 Tlior mgton v. Smith, the court without dissent 
 recognized as a fact the existence of Confederate 
 paper notes during the war, and their use in con 
 tracts then made. Chase, who drew the opinion, 
 took the ground that the Confederacy " was an act 
 ual government of all the insurgent States ; " 
 though he refused to recognize it as having been a 
 de facto government, obedience to which did not 
 constitute treason to the United States, he did style 
 it a " government of paramount force ; . . . the 
 rights and obligations of a belligerent were conceded 
 to it, in its military character, very soon after the 
 war began, from motives of humanity and expedi 
 ency by the United States." This ground was 
 modified a little later in the case of United States 
 v. Keehler, in which it was held that " the whole 
 Confederate power must be regarded by us as a 
 usurpation of unlawful authority, incapable of pass 
 ing valid laws," and that " acts of the Confederate 
 Congress can have no force, as law, in divesting or 
 transferring rights ; " and again in Hickman v. 
 Jones, et al., when it was held that the recognition 
 of belligerent rights " did not extend to the pre 
 tended government of the Confederacy. The in 
 tercourse was confined to its military authorities ; 
 . . . the act of the Confederate Congress creating 
 the tribunal in question was void. It was as if it 
 were not." 
 
 Another group of cases in which Chase took 
 
376 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 particular interest related to the border intercourse, 
 which as Secretary of the Treasury he had alter 
 nately prohibited and regulated. In Padelford s 
 Case (186970), the question was raised as to 
 whether Lincoln s amnesty proclamation of Decem 
 ber 8, 1863, restored the property rights of a man 
 who had accepted the provisions of that proclama 
 tion. The court held that the amnesty did restore 
 him to his rights ; and in this instance^and also in 
 the case of United /States v. Anderson, the court 
 enforced, and thereby gave its adhesion to, the con 
 fiscation acts of 1861-62, and to the acts for the 
 collection of abandoned property, under which the 
 Treasury had taken possession of immense quan 
 tities of property. In the case of Miller v. United 
 States, the court declined to apply the constitu 
 tional amendment allowing jury trial and due pro 
 cess of law to those confiscation acts, on the ground 
 that they were not punitive but military acts, ex 
 ercised under power to declare war and make rules 
 respecting captures. In the case of Corbctt v. Nutt 
 (1870-71), the court refused to apply the principle 
 of the confiscation acts to commercial transactions 
 within the Confederate lines, and thus "to taint 
 with invalidity even the commonest transactions of 
 exchange in the daily life of these people." 
 
 These decisions taken together show that the 
 action of the court was both sensible and humane. 
 It refused to hold the internal transactions of in 
 dividuals within the Confederacy, or those of the 
 Confederate and state governments with Individ- 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 377 
 
 uals, to be simply a mass of futile agreements and 
 restrictions ; only so far as acts of individuals or 
 of the Confederacy had been made the means of 
 opposition to the United States were they held il 
 legal and invalid. In this group of decisions there 
 was little dissent, and in no case was Chase among 
 the dissenters. 
 
 It was inevitable that the Supreme Court should 
 eventually construe and limit the reconstruction 
 acts so far as they related to the domain of the 
 President. The President s contact with the judi 
 ciary power came principally through his pardon 
 ing power ; and in the Padelford, Klein, and Arm 
 strong cases the court affirmed that his pardon re 
 moved any responsibility for an offense connected 
 with the rebellion, and that though an act of Con 
 gress might carry the pardon into effect, it could 
 not abridge the President s pardoning power. 
 Though the right of the President to set up pro 
 visional courts in the seceded States was approved 
 by the court, Chase could not forget the arbitrary 
 tribunals of the Civil War, to which he had given 
 a reluctant consent when they were founded ; and 
 therefore in TarbeWs Case (1871), when the Su 
 preme Court denied the power of a state court by 
 habeas corpus to release men illegally enlisted 
 in the army, Chase felt it his duty to dissent. 
 This was very nearly the point which had been 
 raised in the Garner controversy in 1856, when as 
 governor of Ohio he had insisted on the power of 
 state habeas corpus against federal officials. He 
 
378 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 now entered his protest in favor of his old principle 
 that " a writ of habeas corpus may issue from a 
 state court to inquire into the validity of imprison 
 ment or detention without a sentence of any court 
 whatever, by an officer of the United States," even 
 though the President s proclamation of December, 
 1863, issued after the adoption of the Fourteenth 
 Amendment, was " a public act of which all courts 
 of the United States are bound to take notice." 
 This decision, however, was not construed to tra 
 verse the authority to exclude from office certain 
 classes of persons who had engaged in the rebellion, 
 given to Congress under the Fourteenth Amend 
 ment. 
 
 In the famous case of Texas v. White, decided 
 in 1869, the court drew nearer to the fundamental 
 question of the status of the Southern States dur 
 ing the war ; the opinion was written by the chief 
 justice, who considered it his most important work 
 on the bench. The critical point before the court 
 was whether Texas was a State in the Union in 
 1862 and 1865. In a splendid phrase Chase laid 
 down his theory of government : " The Constitu 
 tion, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible 
 Union composed of indestructible States. When, 
 therefore, Texas became one of the United States 
 she entered into an indissoluble relation. There 
 was no place for reconstruction, or revocation, ex 
 cept through revolution, or through consent of the 
 States." Hence, he argued, the acts of the seced 
 ing legislature were null, for " Texas continued to 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 379 
 
 be a State and a State of the Union." But the 
 chief justice went on to show that although the 
 obligations of Texas were unimpaired, its federal 
 relations were affected, and some of its privileges 
 for the time being forfeited ; and that under the 
 power to guarantee to every State a republican 
 form of government Congress had the right to pro 
 vide for the reconstruction of a State. The deci 
 sion not only admitted that reconstruction had been 
 constitutionally performed under the acts of Con 
 gress, it also recognized, as legitimate and as re 
 presenting the State, the provisional government 
 which was actually in existence before Texas was 
 readmitted to representation in Congress. Grier, 
 Swayne, and Miller, in dissenting opinions, denied 
 that under the provisional government, subject as 
 it was to military power and deprived of represen 
 tation in Congress, Texas could be considered as a 
 State in the Union. 
 
 The plain effect of this decision was to deny that 
 theory of state suicide to which Chase had earlier 
 given his adhesion ; for it asserted that, as soon as 
 the war ended and the people of Texas chose to 
 reconstitute the government, they recovered state 
 hood, though not necessarily complete privileges 
 in the Union, since those involved a question to be 
 decided by the national government. The " Nation " 
 said of the decision : " The Supreme Court has 
 thus in this judgment placed the nation and the 
 State upon exactly the same footing : whatever 
 weakens the one weakens the other ; whoever denies 
 
380 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 the historical origin of the one denies the same 
 origin for the other. This theory gives the greatest 
 security both to the State and to the Union." In 
 the announcement of this decision the court placed 
 itself side by side with Congress and the new Pre 
 sident, in affirming that the process of reconstruc 
 tion had been constitutional, or at least allowable, 
 and could no longer be questioned. 
 
 Three years later, in the case of White v. Hart, 
 (1872), though Chase dissented on one point, he 
 acquiesced in a sweeping approval of the whole 
 system of constitutional reconstruction. " The 
 action of Congress upon the subject," said he, 
 " cannot be inquired into. The case is clearly one 
 in which the judicial is bound to follow the action 
 of the political department of the government, and 
 is concluded by it." Congress had never been 
 quite certain of the constitutional ground upon 
 which it reconstructed the Southern States, and the 
 Supreme Court eliminated most of the prevail 
 ing theories. The theory of state suicide it denied 
 resolutely : " At no time were the rebellious 
 States out of the pale of the Union. Their rights 
 under the Constitution were suspended but not 
 destroyed. Their constitutional duties and obliga 
 tions were unaffected and remained the same." 
 The doctrine of conquered provinces was also de 
 nied. " The Constitution," said the court, " as 
 sumed that the government and the Union which 
 it created, and the States which it incorporated into 
 the Union, would be indestructible and perpetual." 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 381 
 
 The decision thus rested squarely upon a modifica 
 tion of the theory of forfeited rights. " A citizen 
 is still a citizen though guilty of crime and visited 
 with punishment. His political rights may be put 
 in abeyance or forfeited." 
 
 As might have been expected, so soon as the 
 Southern States were again admitted to seats in 
 Congress there was a tendency in the South to put 
 an end by violence to negro suffrage ; hence Con 
 gress passed a statute, the so-called Civil Rights 
 Bill, under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend 
 ments, to protect the negroes. With reference to 
 this act Chase, in the term of 1871-72, took the 
 unusual step of writing to the judges on his circuit, 
 asking them to send up a divided opinion on a 
 test case for adjudication by the Supreme Court. 
 No such case reached the court during Chase s life 
 time, and his judicial activity was now practically 
 over. 
 
 A short time before his death, other issues arising 
 out of the amendments were presented to the court 
 in the Slaughter-house Cases, which are the most 
 important and far-reaching of the series of recon 
 struction decisions. The decision was rendered by 
 a nearly divided court : with Field, Bradley, and 
 Swayne, Chase dissented from the opinion of the 
 court ; but he was too ill to prepare a statement of 
 his reasons, hence it can only be inferred that he 
 agreed with Field that the Fourteenth Amendment 
 was intended not only to protect the negro s rights, 
 but to remove forever from the States the power of 
 
382 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 making distinctions between different classes of 
 persons. The case involved the monopoly of the 
 slaughtering business conferred by the legislature 
 of Louisiana : and the counsel whose arguments 
 seemed to find favor with the minority of the court 
 was John A. Campbell, who had resigned from the 
 court in 1861 when his State seceded. His con 
 tention was that, by forbidding other butchers to 
 slaughter for the New Orleans market, the govern 
 ment of Louisiana had acted contrary to the Thir 
 teenth Amendment, which prohibited involutary 
 servitude ; and that, in violation of the Fourteenth 
 Amendment, the petitioners, engaged in the busi 
 ness of slaughtering, were deprived of the privi 
 leges and immunities of citizens, and were also 
 deprived of their property without due process of 
 law. 
 
 The argument drawn from the Thirteenth Amend 
 ment was swept away by the court with little more 
 than the remark that " with a microscopic search 
 [to] endeavor to find in it a reference to servitudes 
 which may have been attached to property in cer 
 tain localities, requires an effort, to say the least of 
 it." The main object of the decision was to con 
 sider and construe the Fourteenth Amendment, 
 and the majority of the court put upon it a narrow 
 construction which left to the States most of the 
 powers which they had possessed before the Civil 
 War. They held that historically the amendment 
 was intended to overthrow the Dred Scott decision, 
 for the benefit of the negro race ; indeed, that all the 
 
SECOND STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 383 
 
 amendments were " addressed to the grievances of 
 that race and designed to remedy them." " Where 
 it is declared that Congress shall have the power 
 to enforce that article, was it intended to bring 
 within the power of Congress the entire domain of 
 civil rights, heretofore belonging exclusively to the 
 States ? " This reasoning of course withdrew from 
 federal legislation large areas of protective law 
 which had been supposed to be vested in Congress, 
 and it was accepted by the whole country as a with 
 drawal of powers which would otherwise have been 
 exercised by the national government. In fact, the 
 consciousness of the court that it was acting as a 
 balance-wheel was expressed in the final paragraph 
 of the decision : " But whatever fluctuations may 
 be seen in the history of public opinion on this sub 
 ject, during the period of our national existence, 
 we think it will be found that this court, so far as 
 its functions require, has always held with a steady 
 and an even hand the balance between State and 
 federal power." 
 
 With this decision the Civil War virtually ended, 
 and the Supreme Court reached the height of its 
 conservative influence. During the eight years of 
 his service as chief justice, Chase s influence had 
 been on the whole for moderation, for the continu 
 ance of the Union as he had first known it, for the 
 pruning of the excessive powers which had grown 
 out of the Civil War, and for the protection of 
 human rights. Though he could not agree in this 
 final decision, his own influence had long been ex 
 erted in the direction which it marked. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 
 
 IN the previous chapter account has been taken 
 of the principal political decisions of the Supreme 
 Court under Chase s leadership, decisions which 
 dealt with broad questions of human liberty, of 
 arbitrary government, of the methods of protecting 
 civilians, and of the relations of the departments 
 of government with each other ; decisions which 
 involved conflicts of jurisdiction between state 
 and national courts, or between civil and military 
 tribunals. Side by side with these judgments 
 came the usual series of ordinary private cases in 
 volving property or franchises ; but the immense 
 change in the system of public finance caused some 
 of these latter controversies to bring before the 
 court grave constitutional questions growing out of 
 the Civil War. New systems of taxation involved 
 vexed questions of personal rights and of the privi 
 leges of the States ; the revision of the banking 
 system of the country made necessary new defini 
 tions of the power of Congress over corporations ; 
 and the government paper currency, and especially 
 the legal-tender notes, furnished a new subject for 
 judicial settlement. 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 385 
 
 In the most important tax case during the Civil 
 War, People of New York v. Commissioner of 
 Taxes, 1862, the jSupreme Court upheld the ex 
 emption from taxation of such United States bonds 
 as formed part of the capital of banks. The re 
 organized court saw no reason for interfering with 
 the execution of the laws as they stood ; and in only 
 one case, Hepburn v. Griswold, held any part of a 
 financial statute to be unconstitutional. On the 
 contrary, besides many cases in which principles of 
 limitation on state and municipal finance were laid 
 down, the court built up a new system of law based 
 on the national powers of taxation. First by impli 
 cation and later by specific decisions, it enforced the 
 income tax, the internal revenue, and the modifica 
 tions of the tariff. In these decisions Chase had 
 the rare opportunity as a justice of the Supreme 
 Court to review judicially and to construe the 
 statutes which he himself had set in motion as an 
 administrative officer. His familiarity with the 
 revenue system gave him a special competency 
 and aided him to strengthen the whole system of 
 national finance. 
 
 The first important financial decision was ren 
 dered in 1866-67 in the License Tax Cases, which 
 turned upon a provision of the internal revenue act 
 of 1864 prohibiting persons from engaging in cer 
 tain trades or occupations, including those of sell 
 ing lottery tickets and liquors at retail, until they 
 should have obtained a license. The court held 
 that such legislation was allowable because the 
 
386 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 licenses were " mere receipts for taxes," and gave 
 no authority to carry on a business which was pro 
 hibited by a State ; but at the same time the opin 
 ions most explicitly set forth that Congress had 
 no power of regulation of commerce or business 
 within the State, except as incidental to the exer 
 cise of powers clearly implied from expressly 
 granted powers. Between the argument and the 
 final decision in these cases, Congress by new legis 
 lation reiterated the power to stop the exercise of 
 a business till the license was paid, and the court 
 referred incidentally to the new statute with clear 
 approval of its constitutionality. 
 
 Three years later the court had occasion again 
 to decide fundamental questions of taxation, and 
 between 1869 and 1871 it rendered three decisions, 
 in all of which may be seen the influence of Chase s 
 identification with the financial measures of the 
 Civil War. The first of these, Veazie Bank v. 
 Fenno, 1869-70, was a test case upon the most 
 sweeping portion of the national bank legislation, 
 the ten per cent tax on state bank notes, which 
 Chase had so long and so unsuccessfully advocated 
 when Secretary of the Treasury, and which was first 
 imposed by an act of March 3, 1865. The opinion 
 was written by the chief justice, and is in effect a 
 brief history of his purpose and understanding in 
 drafting the national bank legislation. To defend 
 the principle that Congress might prohibit state 
 bank notes under color of taxing them out of exist 
 ence was difficult, in the face of the long estab- 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 387 
 
 lished legal principle that the States might not tax 
 a federal corporation in the same fashion ; and the 
 prohibitory tax had always seemed drastic. It was 
 easy to dispose of the contention that the tax was 
 " direct," and therefore must be assessed in pro 
 portion to population ; but it was more difficult to 
 make out that the United States might tax a fran 
 chise granted by a State, and presumably an instru 
 mentality of the State, and might make the tax so 
 excessive as to nullify a power of issuing notes, 
 which was unquestionably possessed by the States. 
 " The first answer to this is," said Chase, " that the 
 judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative depart 
 ments of the government limitations upon the exer 
 cise of its acknowledged powers, and that as a 
 means to provide a currency for the whole country, 
 Congress might restrain the issue of their [the 
 States] notes." Only two of the justices, Nelson 
 and Davis, dissented, and the principle of the tax 
 has never since been disturbed by Congress or the 
 court. 
 
 The State Tonnage Tax Cases in 1870-71 had 
 no special relation to civil war finance, though they 
 asserted the superior force of national over state 
 taxes ; but in the Case of the State Tax on For 
 eign-held Bonds, in 1872-73, the court by five 
 to four affirmed the important doctrine that a 
 State could not tax bonds held by persons in an 
 other State, though secured by property within its 
 limits. 
 
 The last of the important tax cases during 
 
388 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Chase s continuance in the court, Collector v. Day, 
 1870-71, raised the general question of the constitu 
 tionality of the national income tax, which had been 
 laid for the first time in accordance with Chase s 
 suggestions, and had been collected under his super 
 vision. The immediate question was whether an 
 income tax could be levied on the salary of a state 
 officer ; and the court held such incomes to be ex 
 empt, on the same ground that would prevent a 
 State from taxing the salary of a federal officer. 
 Throughout its decision the court recognized the 
 constitutionality of the income tax as it stood ; and 
 the only ordinary financial legislation which it dis 
 allowed was a proviso in an appropriation act (case 
 of United States v. Klein), inserted to prevent the 
 proof of claims by persons who had adhered to the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 The general result, then, of the decisions which 
 related to the finances of the Civil War was to 
 uphold the legislation of Congress ; and in several 
 instances Chase took the opportunity to vindicate 
 his policy by a brief historical and judicial re 
 view of the principles and probable reasons of that 
 legislation. The most important decision was that 
 upholding the tax on state bank notes ; and that 
 principle has never since been disturbed. The 
 next in consequence was that affirming the income 
 tax. Twenty-five years later, by the narrowest 
 majority, the court practically reversed this deci 
 sion, and by implication held the statutes of 1861 
 and 1862 unconstitutional. 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 389 
 
 Undoubtedly the greatest deviation from the 
 former constitutional principles of the government 
 made during the Civil War was the issue of legal 
 tender notes. It was much contested at the time 
 the first statute was passed in 1862 ; test cases were 
 made up within a few months which could not be 
 prevented from eventually reaching the Supreme 
 Court ; and the history of the issues of government 
 notes from 1862 to 1869 was such as to give pause 
 to some of the early supporters of the legal tender 
 principle. So long as Chase remained in the Trea 
 sury he felt it incumbent upon him to defend both 
 the expediency and the constitutionality of the 
 notes. In 1863 the first important test case was 
 made up in New York, although Chase seemed to 
 expect that, notwithstanding the legal tender clause, 
 the state banks might be bound to redeem their 
 outstanding issues in specie. David Dudley Field 
 and S. A. Foote were designated in behalf of the 
 Treasury Department to argue in favor of the con 
 stitutionality of the act, and George T. Curtis wrote 
 to Chase to remonstrate on " the improper effort 
 on the part of the administration to influence the 
 court of the State." Both the New York and the 
 Pennsylvania courts speedily affirmed the consti 
 tutionality of the legal tender act, and the judges 
 in both States sent messages or letters to Chase to 
 inform him of their decisions. It is plain, there 
 fore, that he was recognized, the country over, as the 
 champion of the constitutionality of the acts, and 
 in a letter of May 18, 1864, he says to a friend : 
 
390 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 " I do not agree with you in advocating that the 
 Constitution prohibits the issue of legal tender 
 notes under authority of Congress." 
 
 In the same letter Chase goes on to say : " I do 
 agree in the opinion that an inflated paper currency 
 is a great evil, and should be reformed as soon as 
 possible." The sentence really indicates the begin 
 ning of the change in his mind, as he saw the dan 
 gerous results of the legal tender clause, and when 
 the war was over and he saw the notes still con 
 tinue, he took alarm, and began to urge the speedy 
 resumption of specie payments. What he had 
 first intended was only to make a provision for a 
 national exigency, to issue 1150,000,000, which 
 could be withdrawn as soon as he could place 
 his loans and organize the national bank system ; 
 what he saw in 1869 was a prosperous country 
 accepting issues then irredeemable and likely to 
 be unredeemed, and refusing to provide either 
 for their withdrawal or their restoration to a specie 
 basis. 
 
 In the original draft of the statute which came 
 from Chase s hands, the issue of notes, even without 
 the legal tender clause, was stated to be for " tem 
 porary purposes." As soon as the war was over, 
 Congress, under the efficient lead of Hugh McCul- 
 loch, the able Secretary of the Treasury, proceeded 
 to redeem those notes, of which nearly $ 450,000,- 
 000 were then outstanding. December 8, 1865, 
 with but six negative votes, the House voted that it 
 " approved the contraction of currency with a view 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 391 
 
 to as early a resumption of specie payments as 
 the business interest of this country will permit ; " 
 and the secretary took advantage of the large in 
 come of the government and the sales of military 
 material to withdraw legal tenders as fast as they 
 came into the Treasury. On March 12, 1866, how 
 ever, Congress limited this necessary process by 
 directing that $10,000,000 of the notes might be 
 retired in six months and $4,000,000 every month 
 from that time on ; and even this limited with 
 drawal was checked by the commercial disasters of 
 1866 and by reduction of the national income. 
 
 Meantime greenbacks circulated everywhere, side 
 by side with the national bank notes, and no 
 thing but more bank currency could take their 
 place. The banks, however, were already looked 
 upon with suspicion as capitalistic monopolies, and 
 on January 22, 1868, the Secretary of the Treasury 
 was directed to reissue legal tenders as they came 
 in, leaving outstanding a maximum of $382,000,- 
 000, which was reduced gradually to $346,000,000; 
 this amount was in 1878 made permanent. John 
 son outbid Congress, in his last annual message of 
 December, 1868, by proposing that the bondholders 
 be compelled to receive legal tenders in exchange 
 for the face of their bonds, in sixteen annual in 
 stallments without interest ; and though Congress 
 on the last day of Johnson s term voted that the 
 government "solemnly pledges its faith to make 
 provision, at the earliest practical period, for the 
 redemption of the United States notes in coin," it 
 
392 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 took no steps to redeem that pledge, and a party 
 sprang up which desired to base the national 
 finance on unlimited paper money. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court had been listen 
 ing twice over to arguments against the consti 
 tutionality of the legal tenders. Grant became 
 President in 1869, and appointed Bout well his 
 Secretary of the Treasury ; it was seen that no 
 remedy for the evils of paper money was likely to 
 go through Congress ; and hence the Supreme 
 Court undertook to settle the question by annulling 
 the legal tender legislation and thus compelling 
 a return to a " specie basis." The continuance of a 
 war measure of finance in time of peace seemed to 
 Chase especially unfortunate because, by 1868, the 
 national banks were working so well that they had 
 1300,000,000 of circulation, and had thus justified 
 his original expectation that they would eventually 
 furnish a currency adequate in amount and per 
 fectly secure for all the needs of the country. To 
 his mind, the time had come when the temporary 
 makeshift of the legal tenders might safely give 
 place to a larger national bank currency. 
 
 In the term of 1867-68, the case of Hepburn v. 
 Griswold, involving the constitutionality of the 
 legal tenders, reached the Supreme Court on appeal 
 from the state court of Kentucky, Up to this 
 time, this appears to have been the only decision 
 of a highest state court against the legal validity 
 of the issues. The case was argued and adjourned ; 
 and, at the next term, 1868-69, it was reargued, 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 393 
 
 but still no decision was forthcoming. That the 
 chief justice and others of the court felt uneasy, 
 was, however, shown by three important limita- 
 tations which the court in 1866-69 placed upon 
 the legal tenders. In the case of Lane County v. 
 Oregon, the court held that the notes were not 
 legal tender for state taxes, because " Congress 
 must have had in contemplation debts originating 
 in contracts or claims carried into judgment and 
 only debts of this character." In the case of 
 The Bank v. Supervisors, the court took the gen 
 eral ground that the United States notes were " ob 
 ligations, therefore strictly securities," and hence 
 excepted from taxation ; and, in the case of Bronson 
 v. Rodes, 1868-69, the court, with one dissent, en 
 forced a contract specifically promising the pay 
 ment of specie. 
 
 These cases not only limited the uses of the 
 legal tenders, by distinctly excepting from the 
 legal tender privilege all express specie contracts : 
 they also treated the notes as evidences of national 
 debt rather than as currency ; and, in the last of 
 the cases, the chief justice foreshadowed more 
 sweeping action by the remark : " The quality of 
 these notes as legal tenders belongs to another 
 discussion." At that time, December, 1868, he had 
 already made up his mind to disallow the legal 
 tender clause, and was discussing the question 
 with the other justices over the case of Hepburn 
 v. Griswold. At length, in December, 1869, the 
 court came to a determination, and directed opin- 
 
394 SALMON PORTLAND 
 
 ions to be prepared. In addition to the two 
 arguments heard in this case, the question had five 
 times been presented to the court in other cases, 
 which they had chosen to decide 011 grounds not 
 involving the legal tender controversy. No judicial 
 question was ever more thoroughly discussed : if 
 Chase and his colleagues erred, it was not for want 
 of information, or of argument by distinguished 
 counsel, including a representative of the admin 
 istration, or of long deliberations by the judges. 
 
 Unfortunately the question was so serious, and 
 involved such strong political passions, that when 
 the long expected decision was handed down, Feb 
 ruary 7, 1870, the court was almost evenly di 
 vided ; but in this case the chief justice was one 
 of the five who united in declaring that the Con 
 stitution had not authorized the issuance of notes 
 which should be legal tender in payment of debts 
 contracted before the statute. Since by the Bron- 
 son case the court had recognized as legal all con 
 tracts specifying specie, the court might be expected 
 thenceforward to hold that notes could be legal 
 tender only for debts which had been incurred 
 after February 25, 1862, and for which no other 
 medium of payment had been distinctly stated. 
 
 The opinion was prepared by Chase, and is prac 
 tically a legal defense for a change of mind which 
 was founded really on financial and political con 
 siderations. The argument makes few references 
 to previous decisions of the court as sustaining 
 its principles ; instead, there is an appeal to the 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 395 
 
 general theory of the Constitution, and an argu 
 ment upon the unfavorable effects of irredeemable 
 paper money. To be sure, he holds that the legal 
 tender act was an impairment of contracts, but he 
 does not dispose of the argument that the federal 
 government might, under some circumstances, im 
 pair contracts. The main argument is essentially 
 Jeffersonian : while Chase accepted the familiar 
 constitutional doctrine that Congress might choose 
 the methods of exercising clearly granted powers, 
 he denied that there are any powers, such as the 
 dissenting justices described, resulting from the 
 general nature of the Constitution. On the argu 
 ment that the legal tender quality was necessary as 
 a war measure, he replied that this was a mistake 
 in the facts, since notes without that quality freely 
 circulated on equal terms with the legal tenders. 
 
 Throughout the argument there is almost no 
 thing to suggest that the writer had any special 
 opportunity of knowing the purposes of Congress 
 or judging the necessity of the legal tender clause. 
 But at the end he adds a paragraph evidently in 
 tended as a personal justification : " It is not sur 
 prising that amid the tumult of the late Civil War, 
 and under the influence of apprehensions for the 
 safety of the republic almost universal, different 
 views, never before entertained by American 
 statesmen or jurists, were adopted by many. The 
 time was not favorable to considerate reflection 
 upon the constitutional limits of legislative or exe 
 cutive authority. If power was assumed from 
 
396 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 patriotic motives, the assumption found ready jus 
 tification in patriotic hearts. Many who doubted 
 yielded their doubts ; many who did not doubt were 
 silent. Some who were strongly averse to making 
 government notes a legal tender felt themselves 
 constrained to acquiesce in the views of the advo 
 cates of the measure. Not a few who then insisted 
 upon its necessity, or acquiesced in that view, 
 have since the return of peace, and under the influ 
 ence of the calmer time, reconsidered their conclu 
 sions, and now concur in those which we have just 
 announced." 
 
 Hepburn v. Griswold appears to have been 
 selected out of several pending cases, because it 
 turned on a tender of notes in satisfaction of a 
 contract which antedated the first legal tender act. 
 Chase again and again limits the effect of the deci 
 sion to such contracts ; and Justice Grier expressed 
 the opinion that the legal tender act was never in 
 tended to cover previous contracts, and that hence 
 the case could be decided without holding that act 
 unconstitutional. But the principles of Chase s 
 decision were just as applicable to later as to 
 earlier contracts ; and throughout he is arguing 
 against the whole system. The court was not 
 then ready to go further and apply its principles 
 to contracts then in daily making ; but Chase was 
 convinced on that subject also, and shortly drew 
 up an opinion which he expected to file in dissent 
 in another case, maintaining that any creditor who 
 was entitled to " dollars " might insist on coin dol 
 lars. 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 397 
 
 The status of the question in February, 1870, 
 was as follows : the Supreme Court would protect 
 creditors in refusing to accept legal tenders for 
 debts incurred and contracts made before February 
 25, 1862, or where specie had been specifically pro 
 mised ; hence the legal tender acts were in part un 
 constitutional ; Chief Justice Chase had examined 
 and found insufficient the arguments of Secretary 
 Chase ; and it was widely expected that the court 
 would proceed to declare void the whole system of 
 legal tenders. 
 
 In the country at large the decision was received 
 as though it meant an immediate dissolution of 
 existing contracts. At that time gold stood at 
 about 120, so that, if the decision held, all debts 
 and obligations would speedily represent one and a 
 fifth times their value as here expressed in green 
 backs. This was a weak point for the court, for it 
 set against it the powerful influence of many cor 
 porations, especially those, like the Pennsylvania 
 Railroad, with maturing ante helium obligations. 
 As a railroad president wrote to Chase : " How do 
 you suppose the Railroads of the country are to 
 pay their interest in gold and receive only a depre 
 ciated currency for their revenues, limited as they 
 are by their charters to a fixed price ? Would n t 
 we have a nice time in making Passengers pay 
 their fares in gold ? " And another correspondent 
 wrote : " Your decision in regard to legal tenders, 
 if not reversed, is likely to cause the greatest pos 
 sible distress and ruin among the classes of people 
 
398 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 already in debt ; among the rest, very many widows 
 and orphans owing money on mortgage of real 
 estate of a long date back." To be sure there 
 had been similar distress and loss soon after the 
 time of the passage of the legal tender acts ; but 
 that episode was over. The real difficulty with the 
 decision was that it was an attempt to make up for 
 the failure of Congress to bring the country back 
 to a specie basis ; in view of the probable shock of 
 an immediate change it seems very unlikely that 
 the decision would ever have been pronounced, had 
 McCulloch been allowed to continue his contrac 
 tion policy so that the defects of the system might 
 gradually have righted themselves. It was further 
 unfortunate that the court should have taken the 
 responsibility of declaring a statute void even with 
 reference to ante bellum contracts. In his opinion 
 Chase said : " This court always approached the 
 consideration of questions of this nature reluc 
 tantly ; and its constant rule of decision has been, 
 and is, that Acts of Congress must be regarded as 
 constitutional, unless clearly shown to be other 
 wise." The court might safely have drawn further 
 limitations around the legal tenders ; or it might 
 have held the act to be a war measure which would 
 expire by its own virtual limitation when the war 
 was definitely over. To set itself against Congress, 
 against the President, against corporations, and 
 against a popular prejudice, and that by a vote of 
 five to three, was an unsafe experiment. The small 
 effect of the decision in the money markets showed 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 399 
 
 that the great financiers did not believe that the 
 legal tender quality would really be destroyed ; and 
 in view of the greenback agitation of the time it 
 was dangerous to hold that a war-time statute 
 
 O 
 
 might be invalidated, after its work was done ; for 
 the same principle might apply in the popular 
 mind to government bonds. 
 
 At the time this decision was rendered the court 
 was already in process of reorganization. Grier, 
 one of the five justices who adhered to the decision, 
 resigned before it was formally pronounced, so that 
 strictly speaking the court stood four to three in 
 the decision. The President at once nominated a 
 successor, Strong of Pennsylvania, and also made 
 an additional appointment, shortly before author 
 ized by a statute increasing the number of the as 
 sociate justices to eight, by designating Bradley of 
 New Jersey. It was Chase s positively expressed 
 belief that through those appointments the court was 
 reorganized with the purpose of securing a reversal 
 of the decision in the Hepburn v. Griswold case ; 
 and President Grant, his Attorney-General, Judge 
 Hoar, and his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. 
 Boutwell, were openly accused by the press of a 
 conspiracy to " pack the Supreme Court for the 
 purpose of establishing repudiation as a constitu 
 tional doctrine." 
 
 If by " packing " is to be understood the appoint 
 ment of men whose views on political questions 
 were likely to be those of the administration, the 
 charge is true, and is equally true of President 
 
400 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Lincoln and of all of his successors down to 1886 ; 
 for during that whole period no Supreme Court 
 judge was designated who was not of the same po 
 litical party as the President for the time being. 
 If " packing " means the selection of individuals 
 with a previous understanding of their views on 
 the question of legal tenders, and with instructions 
 to bring about a reversal of the actual decision, 
 the evidence shows that the charge is unfounded. 
 Neither Strong nor Bradley was the first choice of 
 the President. To the new judgeship, created by 
 the act of 1869, the President first nominated 
 Attorney-General Hoar ; and when Justice Grier, 
 in December, 1869, gave in his resignation, to take 
 effect on February first, the President nominated 
 as his successor ex-secretary Stanton, who had the 
 support of every Republican member of the Senate, 
 but died four days afterward. The Senate refused 
 to confirm Judge Hoar, and thereupon the Pre 
 sident, on February 7, 1870, simultaneously nomi 
 nated Bradley and Strong. 
 
 On February 7. at noon, the court rendered its 
 decision in the Hepburn v. Griswold case, and the 
 coincidence of date led to a subsequent charge, 
 that the moment the President heard of the de 
 cision he took steps to annul it by appointing two 
 faithful supporters of the legal tender act ; but 
 Judge Hoar was consulted upon these appoint 
 ments, and no suggestion was made to him or by 
 him that the legal tender cases bore on the appoint 
 ments ; the members of the cabinet when the nomi- 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 401 
 
 nations were discussed had no knowledge of any 
 " packing ; " and it is completely established that, 
 unless by some unprofessional indiscretion of one 
 of the justices, the nature of the decision of the 
 court was not known to the President at the time 
 the two new judges were nominated ; and Judge 
 Hoar expected until the decision was announced 
 that Chase would stand for the legality of the legal 
 tenders. 
 
 Though the President and the Attorney-Gen 
 eral stand absolved from a deliberate purpose of 
 changing a majority of four to three into a minor 
 ity of four to five, there can be no reasonable 
 doubt that the President and his advisers intended, 
 as vacancies occurred in the court, to fill them with 
 men who would reflect the opinions of the Republi 
 can party ; and that party had declined to commit 
 itself even to the speedy restoration of the notes to 
 a gold basis. It was true that Strong, as state 
 judge in Pennsylvania, had rendered a decision in 
 favor of the constitutionality of the legal tenders, 
 and so had most of the judges in the sixteen other 
 States before whom the question had come. Yet 
 there was no lack of good lawyers in the Republi 
 can party who had not committed themselves upon 
 the question. Had it been the purpose of the 
 President to choose two judges who would balance 
 each other, he could have found two such men ; 
 he and his advisers, with few exceptions, desired 
 the legal tender act to stand ; and the appointments 
 were generally taken to mean that it would be re 
 affirmed. 
 
402 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Justice Strong entered the court February 14, 
 and Justice Bradley, March 24 ; whatever the rea 
 son for their appointments, the two new justices 
 were no sooner inducted than they began a dra 
 matic struggle by seeking to call up a pending case 
 upon which the legal tender decision might be re 
 versed in the same term of the court in which it 
 had been rendered. Among the long-standing 
 causes not yet decided was Lathams v. United 
 States, a suit involving the question of specie con 
 tracts. The Lathams had a contract with the 
 United States, executed in 1855, with a stipulation 
 that payments were to be made in " good and law 
 ful money of the coin of the United States ; " but 
 Chase, as Secretary of the Treasury, in 1863 re 
 fused to pay coin, and tendered greenbacks, which 
 had been received under protest. Suits, claiming 
 the difference in value between greenbacks and gold 
 coin, had been continued, to wait for the decision 
 of the principle in the Hepburn Case. Although 
 special leave was given to the United States to 
 appear in the case because it involved the consti 
 tutionality of an act of Congress, Chase foresaw 
 trouble and repeatedly announced that no further 
 arguments would be heard on the legal tender 
 question, that having already been decided in the 
 Hepburn Case. However, on the second day after 
 Bradley formally took his seat, the new judge re 
 opened the question by urging the court to take up 
 the Lathams Case, and suggesting that the legal 
 tender question might thereupon be argued; the 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 403 
 
 three dissentients in the Hepburn Case voted with 
 the two incoming judges to hear new arguments, 
 with the plain intention to reverse the recent de 
 cision forthwith. Chase and his three adherents 
 protested, stood on the technicalities of the internal 
 rules of the court, and resisted to the utmost ; but 
 in vain. When the case came on for argument, 
 however, the counsel for the Lathams, J. M. Car 
 lisle, declined to proceed further, on the ground 
 that the rights of his clients were already pro 
 tected ; and against the protest of Justice Bradley 
 the case was discontinued. 
 
 In the course of the proceedings occurred an 
 incident which showed tension and almost hostility 
 between the two factions of the court; the chief 
 justice stated that the court had agreed that the 
 principle of the Hepburn v. Griswold case should 
 apply to all later cases. Justice Miller thereupon 
 stated that this was not the statement of the court 
 but of the chief justice, and the justices on the 
 bench expressed their differences of memory in 
 unjudicial fashion. The effect of the withdrawal 
 of this case was to prevent the raising of the legal 
 tender question at that time, and the court finally 
 adjourned without further action, But its un 
 settled state of opinion was well known ; and it 
 was confidently predicted that within a few months 
 it would overrule itself. 
 
 The expectation that the legal tenders would 
 again be held constitutional was so widespread 
 that the premium on gold was not reduced, and 
 
404 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 there was no general tendency to specify coin in 
 contracts. Meanwhile the so-called Sheep case 
 (Knox v. Lee) had long been pending in the court, 
 and it involved the question of contracts subse 
 quent in date to the legal-tender act. The contro 
 versy had arisen in March, 1863, and the United 
 States Circuit Court of Texas had held in 1867 
 that the contract might be satisfied by the payment 
 of greenbacks ; at the same time came up the case 
 of Parker v. Davis, brought up from the Massa 
 chusetts state courts, which involved the question 
 of a contract made before 1863. In the term of 
 1870-71 the United States Supreme Court heard 
 elaborate arguments in these cases ; but to listen to 
 argument at all was evidence that the court did not 
 intend to hold itself bound by the decision in the 
 case of Hepburn v. Griswold. When, on May 1, 
 1871, a decision was announced, the opinion of the 
 majority of the court was drawn by Justice Strong 
 supported by four other justices, and the chief 
 justice, with the three who had agreed with him 
 in 1870, dissented. But though the decision was 
 announced, the court took the very unusual step 
 of delaying the statement of its reasons. The 
 chief justice was very ill, and unable to write an 
 argument, and the texts of the opinions were there 
 fore not made public till January 15, 1872. 
 
 This time the court distinctly faced the question 
 both of ante bellum and of later contracts, and the 
 first paragraph contains the essence of the whole 
 argument : " It would be difficult to overestimate 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 405 
 
 the consequences which must follow our decision. 
 They will affect the entire business of the country, 
 and take hold of the possible continued existence 
 of the government. If it be held by this court 
 that Congress had no constitutional power, under 
 any circumstances or in any emergency, to make 
 treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of 
 all debts (a power confessedly possessed by every 
 independent sovereignty other than the United 
 States), the government is without the means of 
 self-preservation which, all must admit, may in cer 
 tain contingencies become indispensable, even if 
 they were not so when the acts of Congress now 
 called in question were enacted. ... If, contrary 
 to the expectation of all parties to these contracts, 
 legal tender notes are rendered unavailable, the 
 government has become an instrument of the gross 
 est injustice ; all debtors are loaded with an obliga 
 tion it was never contemplated they should assume ; 
 a large percentage is added to every debt, and such 
 must become the demand for gold to satisfy con 
 tracts, that ruinous sacrifices, general distress, and 
 bankruptcy may be expected." 
 
 The court was careful not to pin itself too 
 closely to specific powers of Congress ; instead, it 
 recognized " that general power over currency 
 which has always been an acknowledged attribute 
 of sovereignty in every other civilized country than 
 our own." To this general power the court adds 
 a distinct assertion of the doctrine of resulting 
 powers: "It is allowable to group together any 
 
406 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 number of them and infer from them all that the 
 power claimed has been conferred." The court also 
 argues very strongly that the legal tender quality 
 was absolutely necessary for the life of the govern 
 ment. " Something revived the drooping faith of 
 the people ; something brought immediately to the 
 government s aid the resources of the nation, and 
 something enabled the successful prosecution of 
 the war, and the preservation of the national life. 
 What was it, if not the legal tender enactments ? " 
 
 Finally, the court left no doubt as to the purpose 
 of its decision. " We hold the acts of Congress 
 constitutional as applied to contracts made either 
 before or after their passage. In so holding we 
 overrule so much of what was decided in Hepburn 
 v. Griswold, 8 Wallace, 603, as ruled the Acts un 
 warranted by the Constitution so far as they apply 
 to contracts made before their enactment. That 
 case was decided by a divided court, and by a court 
 having a less number of judges than the law then 
 in existence provided this court shall have. . . . 
 And it is no unprecedented thing in courts of last 
 resort, both in this country and in England, to 
 overrule decisions previously made. We agree 
 this should not be done inconsiderately, but in a 
 case of such far-reaching consequences as the pre 
 sent, thoroughly convinced as we are that Congress 
 has not transgressed its powers, we regard it as 
 our duty so to decide and to affirm both these 
 judgments." 
 
 The separate concurring opinion of Bradley was 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 407 
 
 based not so much on tne theory of constitutional 
 government as on what governments ought in the na 
 ture of things to be. " It seems to be a self-evident 
 proposition that it (the general government) is in 
 vested with all these inherent and implied powers 
 which at the time of adopting the Constitution 
 were generally considered to belong to every gov 
 ernment as such." He goes further: Since the 
 States are prohibited from issuing legal tender 
 notes, and there is no express prohibition of the 
 federal government, it must have been expected 
 that it would issue them, and the power to emit 
 treasury notes " has been exercised by the govern 
 ment without question for a large portion of its 
 history. This being conceded, the incidental power 
 of giving such bills the quality of legal tender fol 
 lows almost as a matter of course. . . . Can the 
 poor man s cattle and horses and corn be thus 
 taken by the government as the public exigency 
 requires it, and cannot the rich man s notes and 
 bonds be in like manner taken to reach the same 
 end?" 
 
 For our purposes the most important of the 
 justices opinions is that filed by the chief justice, 
 which was a disquisition in the familiar vein on the 
 implied powers of Congress and the limitations on 
 Congress. It was impossible for him to ignore the 
 criticism made upon him in the majority opinion, 
 that " even the head of the treasury represented to 
 Congress the necessity for making the new issues 
 legal tender, or rather, declared it impossible to 
 
408 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 avoid the necessity." The statement was undeni 
 able, and the only manly explanation was that 
 which he made : " Examination and reflection under 
 more propitious circumstances have satisfied him 
 that this opinion was erroneous, and he does not 
 hesitate to declare it. He would do so just as un 
 hesitatingly if his favor to the legal tender clause 
 had been at that time decided, and his opinion as 
 to the constitutionality of the measure clear." 
 
 Chase s attitude upon the legal tenders is one of 
 the critical points in his life, and involves three 
 distinct questions, the ultimate argument as to 
 the constitutionality of the statutes, the argument 
 as presented by the Supreme Court, and the re 
 sponsibility for his change of mind. The question 
 of constitutionality goes to the very bottom of the 
 national authority. We have already seen that 
 no suggestion of legal-tender notes had ever been 
 taken up by a responsible administrator till 
 Chase s letter to the Committee of Ways and 
 Means in February, 1862, although treasury notes 
 had been very familiar. Perhaps the argument 
 over the constitutionality of forced issues may best 
 be put in the form that it not only would have 
 been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
 before the Civil War, but would have been con 
 trary to the principles of government then estab 
 lished ; but that during and after the Civil War 
 it was constitutional because the government had 
 changed its foundations. Both Congress and the 
 President had freely departed in many directions 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 409 
 
 from any power reasonably implied in the Consti 
 tution, but at the end of the Civil War most of 
 these extraordinary powers lapsed, from the cessa 
 tion of the circumstances which called them out ; 
 and by 1871 reconstruction was practically ended, 
 and thus another group of assailable acts ceased to 
 have force. The legal tender issue was one of the 
 few large extensions of national powers that con 
 tinued still to have the same influence in time of 
 peace ; and Chase s effort was to restore that power 
 also to ante-bellum conditions. Had he been able 
 to carry with him a decided majority of the court, 
 it is probable that the country would have acqui 
 esced ; but the division showed the powerful influ 
 ence on public life and private finances caused by 
 the changes which had been brought about by the 
 creation of the notes. 
 
 The arguments in both the Hepburn and Legal- 
 Tender cases were really less legal than political. 
 Neither side was able to find a series of consistent 
 precedents either in state or national decisions; 
 and both majority and minority opinions consist in 
 the first place of elaborate essays on the nature of 
 government in general and especially on the fed 
 eral government, with appropriate quotations from 
 Marshall s decisions ; and in the second place of 
 long and often passionate arguments as to what was 
 most expedient for the welfare of the country dur 
 ing the Civil War. It is noteworthy that both 
 sides avoided the issue of treating the legal tenders 
 as simply a war measure which ceased to have 
 
410 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 force when the war was over, but preferred to dis 
 cuss the nature of legal tenders as incidental to the 
 regulation of the currency and to general financial 
 powers. In dignity and logic the chief justice 
 was superior to his opponents, and pointed out with 
 clearness the danger of the principle, announced 
 by the majority, that the government might per 
 form certain acts, because they were usual among 
 sovereign powers. Throughout the discussion is 
 evident also the curious feeling of the sanctity of 
 legal tender notes, because they were supposed to 
 have performed a great service in time of war. 
 This was perhaps a result of the rising tide of 
 demagogism in the country, which threatened to 
 make wholly irredeemable the already depreciated 
 paper notes, on precisely the ground stated by Jus 
 tice Bradley, the comparison of " the poor man s 
 cattle and houses "with "the rich man s notes and 
 bonds." 
 
 As to Chase s change of mind, his own state 
 ment in his two opinions is his best defense. Per 
 haps he might have said more ; he might have 
 urged that he was returning to the convictions of a 
 lifetime, disturbed for the time being by the anxi 
 eties of his secretaryship. When the justices des 
 canted on the importance of the national currency, 
 Chase could have replied that the permanent na 
 tional currency ought not to be, and was not in 
 tended to be, composed of government notes with 
 the legal tender quality, but of national bank 
 notes, which could do their work without any such 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 411 
 
 support. That sober judgment which absolves 
 Lincoln for his assumption of hitherto undreamed 
 powers, and approves the progressive changes in 
 his point of view towards both national and re 
 bellious governments, must also apply to Chase. 
 In 1869 he saw results of his own action which 
 he could not see seven years before. 
 
 Yet his attitude on the legal tenders was unfor 
 tunate, both for his reputation and for the welfare 
 of the country ; and his connection with the issue of 
 the legal tenders put it out of his power to help in 
 the restoration of the government to the sounder 
 financial principles for which he was so ardent. 
 His own honesty stood in his way, for he could not 
 convince people that he had in 1862 assented to a 
 measure really fraught with danger to the country; 
 and when he found that he could count on but five 
 judges out of eight, it would have been politic to 
 proceed on the lines of the Bronson and Oregon 
 cases, setting up all the limitations possible on 
 the exercise of the power, but leaving the legal 
 tenders where they were. Undoubtedly Chase s 
 judgment was better in 1869 than in 1862 ; the 
 country would have been better off if it had not 
 insisted on the legal tender act ; and it would have 
 been better off if it could have accepted the judg 
 ment of 1869 ; but that judgment was pronounced 
 with an incomplete court, which in the nature of 
 things must speedily be remodeled, and it would 
 have been wiser not to provoke the issue of a 
 reversal. 
 
412 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 The reputation and prestige of the court neces 
 sarily suffered from the sudden change of front, a 
 change of which there has been but one subsequent 
 instance. " The rehearing," said the " Nation " in 
 1871, " on the first point, is an acknowledgment 
 by the court of the soundness of the arithmetical 
 view of its powers, e. g., that the claims of its 
 decisions to popular respect depend for their valid 
 ity on the number of judges who concur in them. 
 Considering that Congress has the right to increase 
 the number of judges at pleasure, it is hardly short 
 of suicidal for the court to give any countenance 
 to the notion that nine judges have power which 
 seven have not, or that a majority of three could 
 give weight to a judgment which a majority of one 
 could not give it. We therefore loo 1 *" on the 
 reopening of the question of the applicability of 
 the legal-tender act to contracts made before Feb 
 ruary, 1862, as a great misfortune." 
 
 Chase s service on the Supreme Court was for 
 many reasons onerous : the docket was long and 
 the decisions many and intricate ; his circuit court 
 business was also harassing, and his feeling of 
 responsibility in public affairs kept him upon a 
 continual strain. The contest over the legal tender 
 decision in the spring of 1870 was especially try 
 ing, for it seemed to him an attempt to undo the 
 most important service which the court had ren 
 dered the country. He was a man of strong and 
 aggressive health, but he never spared himself or 
 distributed his work so as to keep up his highest 
 
FINANCIAL AND LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS 413 
 
 efficiency. In August, 1870, he was seized with 
 paralysis. Though the attack was severe, he gradu 
 ally improved, but was not able to take his place 
 on the bench during the term of 187071. During 
 1871 he spent a considerable part of his time in 
 health resorts, east and west, and even contem 
 plated going abroad. He did, however, sit with 
 the court during the terms of 1871-72 and 1872- 
 73, and prepared many opinions, but he felt ex 
 hausted and would have been glad to retire 
 altogether had the law given the privilege at an 
 earlier age than seventy years. 
 
 An evidence that he had lost his keenness of ob 
 servation and discrimination was his continued 
 hope of the Democratic nomination in 1872. 
 Many obscure correspondents during 1869, 1870, 
 and 1871 assured him of their support, while 
 Cassius M. Clay got twenty leading Democrats to 
 agree to stand by him. Chase could no longer 
 claim to be a Republican: he was much dis 
 appointed in General Grant, and would have been 
 glad to aid in his defeat. In March, 1872, he 
 pulled some wires for the Cincinnati Liberal Con 
 vention, and wrote in accustomed phraseology that 
 he did not seek a nomination, but " if those who 
 agree with me in principles think that my nomi 
 nation will promote the interests of the country, I 
 shall not refuse the use of my name." When 
 Greeley was nominated he announced his purpose 
 of voting for him. " I am," he wrote, " as you are 
 aware, a Democrat 8 separated in nothing from the 
 
414 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 Democrats of the Jackson and Benton school, 
 except iny convictions on the slavery question in 
 times past, and now by nothing." 
 
 In the spring of 1873 he appeared noticeably 
 older and weaker ; though he felt great interest in 
 the Slaughter House cases, he was not able to pre 
 pare a dissenting opinion. Indeed, he began to 
 look forward to his end, and chose Judge Warden 
 to be his biographer ; in his hands he placed his 
 most confidential journals and correspondence, and 
 to him he talked freely about the events of his 
 life. On May 6, 1873, a second shock of paralysis 
 came upon him while in New York. He never 
 recovered consciousness, and died, May 7, 1873, 
 at the premature age of sixty-five. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE MAN 
 
 CHASE S public life has now been reviewed, and 
 it remains to sum up the things which made him so 
 strong a personality, so distinguished a man, and 
 so important a statesman. In person he was one of 
 the most striking men of his time. More than six 
 feet tall, with a broad and majestic form, strongly 
 carved and individual features, a keen eye, and re 
 solute although opinionated mouth, he always made 
 an impression of strength, readiness, and power. In 
 massiveness and appearance of reserve strength he 
 is comparable with Webster, whom he somewhat 
 resembled in feature. A little conscious of his 
 own advantages of person, he was always careful 
 to set them off with appropriate dress. In man 
 ner he was agreeable but never deferential. Most 
 people who met him admired his incisiveness and 
 force, but he did not hold back his opinions, and 
 was not always considerate in expressing them. 
 Among his own friends he was genial, and even 
 warm-hearted and affectionate, but he had a strong 
 sense of what was due him, and sometimes his tem 
 per got the better of his judgment, and he would 
 break out into reproaches. He wrote a great deal 
 
416 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 with his own hand as well as through secretaries, 
 and his handwriting, never remarkably legible, at 
 last became difficult to read. He was methodical 
 in his habits, but was too busy to hold himself 
 to any routine, and his papers abound in journals 
 and letter-books begun but not completed. 
 
 Chase was always fond of building houses and 
 laying out grounds, and in the course of his life 
 owned four or five different houses : two in Cincin 
 nati, both of which were sources of expense long 
 after he had ceased to occupy them ; the handsome 
 house which he built in Columbus while gover 
 nor ; and finally his estate of Edgewood, about two 
 miles west of the Capitol at Washington. This 
 estate of fifty-five acres with a broad, old-fashioned 
 house, crowning a hill, though it absorbed plenty 
 of money for repairs and improvements, turned 
 out in the end to have been one of the few good 
 investments that he made. He took great plea 
 sure in planning and occupying it, and though not 
 very far from the Capitol, it was at that time quite 
 outside the city, and served him as a country resi 
 dence. 
 
 Throughout his life Chase suffered inconvenience 
 and loss because he could not make up his mind to 
 turn into cash a sufficient part of his property to 
 extinguish his debts. Some parts of his real estate 
 he was unable to sell until his youngest daughter 
 reached her majority, in 1865, inasmuch as she 
 had an interest in it ; and it was not until about 
 18G7 that the sales of real estate in Cincinnati 
 
THE MAN 417 
 
 and Brooklyn cleared him of long-standing debts. 
 Then for a time he was prosperous. He had some 
 railroad and telegraph stock which suddenly be 
 came valuable, and at one time he held in his pos 
 session marketable securities to the value of nearly 
 150,000 ; but in his private finances he never was 
 happy. On the advice of one of his oldest and 
 shrewdest friends, Joshua Hanna, he put a little 
 money into gold mining stock, with the usual re 
 sult that the stamp mill was always " just about to 
 start up." 
 
 Ever since his first days in the Treasury he had 
 retained a warm personal friendship for Jay Cooke, 
 the great Philadelphia banker, as well as for his 
 brother, H. D. Cooke of Washington, who later 
 became his executor. Jay Cooke made a large 
 fortune, partly out of his extensive banking busi 
 ness, partly out of his deserved profits from the 
 agency for the sale of government bonds, and 
 partly through his interest in the Northern Pacific 
 Railroad. For Chase s own finances this friend 
 ship was disastrous. He had several times pro 
 tested against offers of Mr. Cooke to enrich him 
 against his will, and in 1868 declined to accept cer 
 tain stock which Cooke informed him had paid for 
 itself through the simple process of charging Chase 
 with the cost price of the securities and selling 
 them out at an advance without his having fur 
 nished any money, given any directions, or assumed 
 any responsibility. On this episode Chase wrote : 
 " I shall never cease to be glad and grateful that I 
 
418 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 laid down for myself the rule, after Congress gave 
 me such great powers, enabling me to raise and 
 depress values very largely at my discretion, that I 
 would have nothing to do, directly or indirectly, 
 with speculations or transactions, in gold or securi 
 ties of any sort, for my own or anybody s private 
 benefit." 
 
 He did, however, accept Cooke s advice on cer 
 tain cash investments which proved profitable, and 
 in December, 1869, turned over to him cash and 
 cash securities to the value of $40,000, for which 
 he took 150,000 of Northern Pacific bonds at 80, 
 they were then paying seven per cent. The 
 investment was speculative and eventually proved 
 a heavy loss, as did also an investment of 19000 in 
 Potomac Ferry stock which the Cookes carried for 
 him on their books for six years, till it had by in 
 terest charges accumulated to $14,000. Notwith 
 standing an excellent salary as chief justice and 
 considerable revenues from his investments, the 
 executors of the chief justice found little to show 
 at the end of his eight years t service, except 
 the estate of Edgewood. His daughters, however, 
 both married men of property, and were not de 
 pendent upon him. 
 
 One reason why Chase rarely had ready money 
 was his generosity towards his poor relations. 
 Year after year he sent money to certain pension 
 ers whose lot he raised out of misery into comfort. 
 Throughout his early life brothers, sisters, nephews, 
 and nieces looked to him for counsel, and some- 
 
THE MAN 419 
 
 times for support ; and he was subject to many 
 calls for charity and public subscriptions. 
 
 Chase was a man of warm attachments, and in 
 the twenty years that he lived a widower he suf 
 fered for the lack of his wife s companionship, 
 sympathy, and counsel. Many people predicted 
 that he would marry a fourth time ; and there were 
 several ladies in whom he took a cautious interest, 
 and one who was thought by his friends to be se 
 lected. His grown daughter was not likely to feel 
 enthusiastic over a fourth marriage ; and when this 
 lady came by invitation to visit at his house she 
 did not find a warm atmosphere, and the visit was 
 never repeated. He had little inclination to change 
 his estate again, for so long as he lived his daugh 
 ters continued to be his greatest human interest 
 and happiness. The attachment of the brilliant 
 young Senator Sprague for Miss Chase became evi 
 dent soon after they went to Washington in 1861, 
 and they were married in much state. Sprague 
 was afterwards governor of Rhode Island, was a 
 warm supporter of Chase in his presidential aspi 
 rations, and cordially welcomed him to his home 
 and his circle of friends in Rhode Island ; and it 
 was for many years the custom of the secretary 
 and of the chief justice to spend at least part of 
 the summer at Narragansett Pier, though he was 
 also fond of the White Mountains. His younger 
 daughter, Nettie, was married, March 23, 1871, to 
 Mr. W. S. Hoyt of New York, and both sisters 
 remained not only attached to their father, but in 
 
420 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 close relations with him, and shared in his interests 
 and his career. 
 
 No account of Mr. Chase could be complete 
 which ignored the remarkable connection of Kate 
 Chase, later Mrs. Sprague, with her father s public 
 life. Young, remarkably beautiful, regal, and cap 
 tivating, she made it her business in life to estab 
 lish cordial relations with his political friends, and 
 she was a gracious hostess for the hospitality which 
 her father enjoyed giving ; ambassadors, senators, 
 and politicians were eager for her good-will and 
 willing to promise her aid, and Mrs. Lincoln had 
 battles royal with her for (as she said) coming to 
 the receptions at the White House as a guest and 
 holding court on her own account. She had a re 
 solute purpose to bring about her father s nomina 
 tion in 1864, and perhaps her influence held her 
 father to his opposition to Lincoln. Indeed, this 
 remarkable woman was generally considered to be 
 a political force of magnitude, and she is the only 
 woman in the history of the United States who has 
 had such public influence. She felt keenly indig 
 nant with Lincoln for letting her father leave the 
 Treasury, and jokingly accused Sumner on the day 
 of the nomination of the chief justice of being in 
 a plot to " shelve her father." The influence and 
 spirit of his daughter again held Chase up to his 
 strife for the presidency in 1868. She was virtu 
 ally his manager in New York, and competent 
 judges have believed that had she been able to go 
 into the convention and make her combinations on 
 the spot she would have secured his nomination. 
 
THE MAN 421 
 
 Within his family Chase unbent from that Jove- 
 like serenity which distinguished him, and was 
 an interesting and lovable man. Throughout his 
 life he wrote frequently to his children with sym 
 pathy, interest, and good sense. His numerous 
 kindred were welcomed to his house. Perhaps he 
 needed a more robustious atmosphere ; perhaps his 
 public life would have been freer from mistake had 
 he lived more with other public men and been 
 more subject to the virile criticism of less admiring 
 associates. 
 
 Chase was a man who cared very much for the 
 favorable opinion of other people, and who loved 
 to serve and advise his friends. He genuinely 
 liked men and women, liked to be among them, 
 liked to be well thought of by them ; and he had 
 many devoted friends, especially among younger 
 men. For instance, he enjoyed the cordial regard 
 of the young, brilliant, and rising public man, 
 James A. Garfield. He was pleased with the 
 blunt, straightforward respect of men like Edward 
 L. Pierce, with whom he was in correspondence 
 for more than twenty years. From Major Dwight 
 Bannister, of Iowa, Chase received almost chivalric 
 tokens of his interest, for he offered to throw up 
 his profession that he might take care of Chase in 
 his last illness. He had the power of attaching 
 such men and making them lifelong correspond 
 ents, admirers, and political aids. 
 
 To men more nearly of his own age and position 
 in life Chase was less attractive. Upright, honor- 
 
422 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 able, kindly, accustomed from his birth up to asso 
 ciating with the best in the land, Chase yet seemed 
 throughout his life unable to form warm friend 
 ships with other public men. In the galaxy of the 
 great men of the Civil War period, his only inti 
 mate personal friend was Charles Sumner. John 
 Jay, of New York, wrote often, and had a very 
 cordial interest and respect for him, but they were 
 seldom thrown together. Among his associates in 
 the cabinet Chase had not one intimate friend, not 
 even Stanton. In Congress Fessenden of Maine 
 most nearly represented his views and became his 
 worthy successor, but in the House in the crisis of 
 the taxation, currency, and bank discussions, the 
 only member of large influence who was personally 
 attached to him seems to have been Ashley, and 
 his championship was at that time of little service. 
 Among the Republican war governors, not one was 
 an ardent supporter of Chase at any time, and 
 even in the Supreme Court there appears to have 
 been no one with whom Chase was familiar ; while 
 the coterie of leading Republican politicians, Ben 
 Wade, Thaddeus Stevens, and the rest, were 
 openly hostile to him. Though in abilities and 
 reputation Chase surpassed all these men, his 
 warmest and most devoted political friends were 
 for the most part men who merged their political 
 identity in his, and both in 1864 and 1868 he 
 could not stir the levers through which public sen 
 timent works its will. Politically and even so 
 cially he was throughout a novus homo. Notwith- 
 
THE MAN 423 
 
 standing his excellent social and professional start 
 in Washington and Cincinnati he took a side in the 
 anti-slavery contest which, in the minds of many 
 aristocratic people, set him among fanatics and 
 persons of imperfect social instincts. To defend 
 negroes, to appear before the Supreme Court as 
 their champion, to tell them that they ought to 
 have a ballot, was to create against himself that 
 social prejudice which was felt in equal measure 
 by Charles Sumner. 
 
 Nor was Chase at any time in his life genuinely 
 popular. He was submitted to an election by ballot 
 but twice, in the Ohio campaigns of 1855 and 1857, 
 and in the second of these contests his majority 
 was very narrow. He had a certain Roman aggres 
 sive virtue about him, a Cato-like consciousness of 
 uprightness, which somehow vexed and repelled 
 the ordinary voter, and was one reason for his lack 
 of personal relations with other public men. But 
 on the other hand, he had not the bonhomie, the 
 power of putting himself in relations with the 
 average man, which carried a man like Abraham 
 Lincoln beyond all questions of social prejudice. 
 Chase was a representative neither of the tradi 
 tional aristocratic classes nor of the laborer; and 
 his splendid championship of the cause of the negro 
 did little to endear him to the masses, yet gave him 
 a radical reputation which did not commend him to 
 the leaders. 
 
 Few men leave behind them such minute memo 
 randa of their private lives as those which are open 
 
424 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 to the biographer of Chase. Mr. Warden knew 
 no other use to make of the mass of his diaries 
 and correspondence than to print the most private 
 and sacred passages with the rest. But the char 
 acter of the man stands both the test of his printed 
 journals and of his immense unpublished corre 
 spondence. He was by nature religious, not only 
 maintaining the formal observances of religious 
 worship in his family, but holding to the faith of 
 the Christian. He was a man of sobriety of char, 
 acter, whose jokes were clumsy, whose conversation 
 was almost painfully decorous, and whose letters 
 even to intimates, were stately and sometimes ob 
 viously intended for posterity. He was a truthful 
 man from top to toe ; perhaps he was over-anxious 
 to defend himself, to deprecate or forestall criti 
 cism; but deceit was not in him, and his worst 
 enemies might accuse him of being too blunt, but 
 not of an unworthy finesse. In the course of his 
 life he knew much violent abuse, and was often 
 accused of getting his senatorship by a political 
 job, but the terms of the combination in the Ohio 
 legislature of 1849 were known to everybody at 
 the time, and involved no concealment nor dis 
 honesty. 
 
 Chase was a man of varied interests, who always 
 had many irons in the fire, and was harassed by 
 the effort to keep them all hot; but he was a 
 painstaking lawyer, a careful and considerate sen 
 ator, a hard-working secretary, and a thoughtful 
 judge. Perhaps what he most lacked was health- 
 
THE MAN 425 
 
 ful pessimism ; he had always too much preliminary 
 confidence that everything was to be for the best, 
 and a corresponding sinking of heart when his 
 plans miscarried. His greatest fault was a life 
 long habit of self-introspection, to assure himself 
 how upright were his purposes ; but his belief in 
 himself does not lessen the truth that the roots of 
 his private character were a strong sense of duty 
 and a high standard of conduct. 
 
 While the great variety of his life experiences 
 did much to make Chase a broad and far-seeing 
 man, it is unfortunate for his reputation as a jurist 
 that he had so short a time of service on the 
 bench, and allowed so much of his energies during 
 that period to go into political and personal ques 
 tions. Chase had the foundations of great judicial 
 eminence : as a lawyer he was industrious and pains 
 taking ; his mind had the habit of throwing aside 
 unimportant things right and left, so that he might 
 get at the essential questions ; he saw broad rela 
 tions, and at the same time had a power of dis 
 crimination which enabled him to apply effective 
 precedents and to get rid of comparisons which were 
 not really parallel. 
 
 In judicial style Chase has little of Marshall s 
 marvelous art of arrangement, and of luminous, 
 unmistakable statement of great principles in a 
 literary form. His opinions lacked method, and 
 did not clearly reveal the progress of the argument 
 in his own mind ; but his law was safe, conservative, 
 and respectable, if never brilliant; and the deci- 
 
426 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 sions of the Supreme Court during his incumbency 
 in general show consistency and an accretion of 
 principles which harmonize with each other. 
 \J The exact character of his influence on the Su 
 preme Court is difficult to determine, and little 
 light is thrown upon it by the official tributes paid 
 by his colleagues after his death. The reorganiza 
 tion of the court from 1865 to 1870 brought heart 
 burnings and some dissensions, although the pub 
 lic saw little of these troubles until the explosion 
 over the legal tender decisions ; and in that crisis 
 the pressure of the majority was resisted by Chase 
 not very gracefully or graciously. Indeed, Chase s 
 best judicial service was given in the four years 
 from 1865 to 1869, while he was still in the fullness 
 of his powers, and before the court stood before 
 the country as a divided and disagreeing body. 
 Chase s greatest opinion was that in the Texas v. 
 White case, which shows such power of compressed 
 historical statement and such application of great 
 principles to the problems of the Civil War, that 
 his admirers must wish that he had lived to render 
 a series of such decisions, for in them he would 
 have gone upon the roll of the greatest American 
 jurists. Even in his brief experience his reputa 
 tion remains that of a sound, hard-headed, well- 
 informed, well-trained jurist. He stands below 
 Jay and Marshall and Story ; but in general quali 
 ties and services as a judge he has an honorable 
 place among the judges who have sat upon the 
 Supreme Bench. 
 
THE MAN 427 
 
 Into his public life Chase carried the character 
 istics which marked his private life : the same 
 sense of duty and the same optimism, tempered in 
 later life by his own experience, the same restless 
 spirit of hard work, the same application of a high 
 standard. He was a great man, who would have 
 left a greater impression upon his contemporaries 
 had he been content to do one piece of work at a 
 time, and to give to it his whole mind. His con 
 ception of public life was that of public service ; 
 that he should have handled hundreds of millions 
 of dollars without any part of it sticking to his 
 fingers was hardly a subject for the self -congratu 
 lation which he bestowed upon it ; but it was an 
 achievement to administer the Treasury during the 
 Civil War without giving to any of his friends a 
 hint which would have enabled them to make money 
 in private speculation. His acts as a public ser 
 vant he understood to be for the public welfare. 
 In the midst of a venal and corrupt period, when 
 even some of his colleagues were suspected of put 
 ting good things in the way of their friends, Chase 
 remained honest. He had an immense opportunity 
 through his control of the border trade, and doubt 
 less permits to trade were often issued to inferior 
 men ; but he intended that that difficult business 
 should be honestly carried through, and was not 
 more deceived than must have been the case with 
 any administrator dealing with the seizure of pri 
 vate property in the midst of such turmoil. 
 
 Chase had also the honesty of expressing unpop- 
 
428 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 ular opinions and adhering to them when it seemed 
 likely to be to his own hurt. A few times in his 
 life he shifted his beliefs, once when he went into 
 the Liberty party in 1842, once when he changed 
 ground on the question of resisting secession by 
 force in 1861, and once 011 the constitutionality of 
 legal tenders. But certainly the first and the third 
 of these changes were likely to bring him nothing 
 but ill-will and difficulty. For the great prize of 
 the presidency, which always eluded him, he made 
 long and astute preparations beforehand, but he 
 was not at any time willing to change his opinions 
 in order to win votes, nor to compel his subordi 
 nate officials to work for his political advancement. 
 As a politician Chase lacked conciliation and 
 alertness ; yet he did first and last win many votes 
 for the measures and the men whom he supported. 
 He was in large degree an opportunist. In the 
 Kansas-Nebraska Bill, where his qualities as a man 
 were perhaps more clearly revealed than in any 
 other episode of his life, he did everything that 
 could be done to modify the bill, except to give up 
 the principles upon which his objection was founded. 
 However strong his sense of his own judgment he 
 was willing to yield in details, and to work with 
 other men. If he yielded to Congress on $$ legal 
 tenders, Congress yielded to him on internal reve 
 nue, on methods of collection, and especially on 
 the national bank system; and as a constructive 
 statesman Chase must ever stand among the great 
 est Americans. 
 
THE MAN 429 
 
 Chase saw more clearly than any other public 
 man of his time, except Lincoln, the importance, 
 the necessity, and the moral effect of sticking to a 
 consistent principle. He entered public life as an 
 anti-slavery man, and nothing ever drew him aside 
 from what he conceived to be the right of the bond 
 man, and the parallel right of the community to 
 be freed from bondage. In this respect he stood 
 far above William H. Seward, a man whose career 
 was in many respects like his own. In the dark 
 months of 1860 and 1861, both men were inclined 
 to give up the strenuous opposition to secession, 
 Seward, because he believed the Southern States 
 were not in earnest ; and Chase, because he could 
 not at once see that the future freedom of the con 
 tinent depended upon striking at the Confederacy 
 before it was completed. The national banking 
 system was Chase s creation, and from 1861 to 
 1864 he thought of it continuously, losing no op 
 portunity of showing how much it was needed ; 
 and eventually his principles triumphed. Begin 
 ning with the conviction that the self-control of the 
 States in their own concerns was necessary for free 
 dom in the North, Chase never divested himself of 
 the belief that it was best to leave even the South 
 ern States after reorganization to manage their own 
 affairs ; and at his death he stood on the great ques 
 tion of state rights about where he had stood thirty 
 years earlier. Other men of his time had changed 
 their minds, and Chase was not the man to be bound 
 forever by a partial conception arrived at early 
 
430 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 in life ; his view was simply that it lay in the na 
 ture of man to misuse the powers of government 
 if too much were assembled in the national part of 
 the American system. 
 
 Why is it that a man so large, so farsighted, so 
 upright, whose principles were so excellent, should 
 have failed to leave an impression of superem- 
 inence ? One reason is that the times were not so 
 favorable for the reputation of a civilian as of a 
 military man ; but a still stronger reason is that 
 Lincoln, in the public mind, so overtopped all 
 other statesmen. There were plenty of striking 
 civilians during the Civil War, and Chase came 
 into relations with most of them ; but their repu 
 tations are all stunted by the greatness of that 
 most overpowering personality. Charles Francis 
 Adams, Stanton, Seward, Sumner, and Thaddeus 
 Stevens, would all have shone more brightly in 
 earlier or later times. They are the men with 
 whom Chase is to be compared; and not one of 
 them has such claims to our admiration as he. 
 A fierce and implacable radical in his younger 
 days, Chase came to have a spirit of moderation, 
 and a conception that there was possibly another 
 side to the controversy, which could never enter 
 into the minds of Sumner and Stevens. In breadth 
 of view and insight into the conditions of the 
 
 O 
 
 country he certainly surpassed Adams ; in balance 
 and in power of working with other men as in 
 strumentalities Stanton was far his inferior ; and 
 the whole course of the Civil War and Recon- 
 
THE MAN 431 
 
 struction showed that lie had in his mind a basis of 
 solid conviction which was lacking in the fiery, 
 more astute, and genial Seward. 
 
 The truth of this statement does not take away 
 the fact that in his own lifetime Chase had fewer 
 warm friends and admirers than almost any one 
 of these rivals, and that somehow he repeatedly 
 gave an impression of smallness in small matters, 
 which dimmed his reputation. This came first of 
 all from his measuring himself with Lincoln, and in 
 that unhappy difference he did not show a great 
 man s appreciation of another great man s character 
 and personality. Little men, buzzing newspaper 
 correspondents, disappointed candidates for office, 
 and unsuccessful generals, might have been expected 
 to carp at Lincoln s oddities of manner and slowness 
 in making up his mind, but it was reasonable to 
 expect a broader view and a loyal sympathy from 
 a man like Chase, so closely associated with the 
 President, so cognizant of the tremendous econo 
 mic and political difficulties which beset him. 
 
 It is not a defense to say that for some years 
 Chase thought that his own experience and long 
 service as an anti-slavery man gave him a deeper 
 insight than Lincoln possessed. In the crisis of 
 1862 and the supreme effort of 1864 he ought to 
 have taken his place as Lincoln s strongest and 
 most generous supporter. That he did not is due 
 to two defects in his make-up : he lacked a sense 
 of proportion and he lacked imagination. It was 
 not in him to see that in 1864 the question was 
 
432 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 not of military success, nor of putting at the head 
 of affairs a man of great intelligence and good 
 judgment, that is, Chase himself, but in unit 
 ing the country in its final, desperate effort under 
 the headship of the one man who by that time 
 could unite the country. Again, Chase s lack of 
 humor put him out of relations with the President. 
 They never understood each other ; Seward, though 
 far inferior to Chase in the conduct of his own pub 
 lic business, and though a much weaker element in 
 the relations of the administration to the country, 
 could obliterate himself and be content to be a lieu 
 tenant of the greater man ; but Chase in his whole 
 life could not learn the lesson of subordination. 
 He never looked upon himself as under the direc 
 tions of the President ; he always considered Lin 
 coln to be only a primus inter pares, and his con 
 ception of the Lincoln administration was that it 
 ought to be a collegiate body in which the strong 
 intellects were to shape a majority. Had Chase 
 shown towards Lincoln the kind of patriotic 
 fidelity which General Sherman showed towards 
 Grant, his name might have gone down linked 
 indissolubly with that of the greatest American, 
 instead of standing as a representative of discon 
 tent and protest against his president and his 
 chief. 
 
 Another reason for the disappointment which 
 Americans have felt not only in Chase, but in all 
 the leaders of the Civil War, both civil and mili 
 tary, is that we no longer realize the tremendous 
 
THE MAN 433 
 
 task which settled down upon them. Lincoln 
 was wise enough to write : "I have made mis 
 takes ; " and yet we feel impatience with the unsuc 
 cessful generals and the imperfect statesmen. This 
 generation measures the last by results which 
 the wisest throughout the world did not in that 
 day foresee. It seemed simply common sense for 
 foreign observers in 1861 to predict that the Union 
 would be permanently divided by secession ; no 
 American, North or South, was justified in con 
 fidence that the North could be united for a single 
 year s campaign, until the firing upon Fort Sumter 
 raised a storm of wrath and resistance ; and even 
 then a large minority in the North was opposed to 
 the war, and a small minority ventured to express 
 its dissent. Is it reasonable to hold Chase and 
 Seward and Stanton, Grant, Halleck, and Buell, 
 Adams and Sumner, responsible because they could 
 not look forward even half a year into the future ? 
 A Napoleon could have broken up the Southern 
 confederacy in three months, but he could not have 
 organized the moral forces of the Union to remove 
 the causes of secession and restore mutual respect. 
 Whatever the defects of the American public 
 system, it did bring to the front in the great crisis 
 of the slavery conflict those Americans who were 
 best able to understand both their own country 
 men and the problems which had to be solved. 
 So far as they failed, there were no others who 
 could have better succeeded. 
 
 " There is a glory of the sun, and a glory of the 
 
434 SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 
 
 moon, and a glory of the stars, and one star differ- 
 eth from another in glory." Let not Lincoln s sur 
 passing power to gather within his own mind the 
 means and hopes and purposes of the American 
 people dim our admiration for the men who sur 
 rounded him ! Of these men there may have been 
 abler statesmen than Chase, and there certainly 
 were more agreeable companions, but none of 
 them contributed so much to the stock of Ameri 
 can political ideas as he, both before, during, and 
 after the Civil War. At first an obscure member 
 of a little group of anti-slavery politicians, he came 
 to something like headship of that party in the 
 campaign of 1848. He was the first efficient anti- 
 slavery senator, and in his management of the 
 opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Bill showed 
 great qualities as a parliamentary leader. He 
 came forward as secretary of the treasury in the 
 midst of chaos, and made suggestions and de 
 veloped financial ideas which may have been im 
 perfect, but which were so clear and definite that 
 Congress was compelled to adopt most of them. 
 Almost single-handed he began the attack upon 
 the sixteen hundred state banks which were the 
 entrenched fortresses of a vicious system, and com 
 pelled both bankers and congressmen to accept a 
 better scheme. More than any other man he seized 
 upon the conditions of the Civil War as leading 
 straight to the legal and political freedom of the 
 negro, and to him more than to any one else is 
 due that system of negro suffrage which he ad- 
 
THE MAN 435 
 
 vocated, not because he thought it was ideal, but 
 because he saw no halfway place in giving to the 
 negro his long-usurped rights. In his latest years 
 he well used his opportunity to stand for the prin 
 ciple of limited powers, as against the conception 
 of a sovereign legislature, both in the States and 
 the Union. 
 
 Chase could never have been a father of his 
 country ; he was rather one of those elder brethren 
 who freely suggest, criticise, and complain, and 
 who by the rectitude of their own lives, and by 
 their upholding of high standards, influence the 
 children as they grow up. No man of his time 
 had a stronger conception of the moral issues in 
 volved in the Civil War ; none showed greater 
 courage and resolution ; none came nearer to doing 
 the thing for which he existed. The underlying 
 idea of his public life was to bring the law up to 
 the moral standards of the country, and to make 
 both moral standards and law apply to black men 
 as well as to white men. He had ambitions which 
 sometimes dimmed his understanding and led him 
 into injustice, but his life was sincerely given to 
 the service of his country. Lincoln was a keen 
 knower of men, and nobody had better oppor 
 tunity to observe Chase s deficiencies ; and Lin 
 coln said of him : " Chase is about one and a 
 half times bigger than any other man that I ever 
 knew." 
 
436 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
 SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL 
 
 
 1860-61 
 
 1861-62 
 
 REVENUES. 
 
 39 582 000 
 
 49 056 000 
 
 Direct Tax 
 
 
 1,795,000 
 
 Internal Revenue 
 
 
 
 Miscellaneous . . . . . 
 Public Land 
 
 892,000 
 871,000 
 
 932,000 
 152,000 
 
 
 
 
 Total . . 
 
 41 345 000 
 
 51,935 000 
 
 
 
 
 PAYMENTS. 
 Ordinary civil expenses . . 
 
 26,947,000 
 22 981 000 
 
 24,511,000 
 394 368 000 
 
 Navy 
 
 12,429,000 
 
 42,675,000 
 
 Interest on debt 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 13,190,000 
 
 Total 
 
 66 357 000 
 
 474 744 000 
 
 
 
 
 DEBT OUTSTANDING. 
 Funded Loans 6 per cent . . 
 Funded Loans 5 per cent . 
 7-3/10 per cent Notes . . . 
 Treasury Notes . . 
 
 June 30, 1861 
 
 39,773,000 
 30,483,000 
 
 20 611 000 
 
 June 30, 1862 
 
 100,754,000 
 30,483,000 
 122,837,000 
 2 849 000 
 
 Demand Notes 
 
 
 53 040 000 
 
 
 
 96 620 000 
 
 Temporary Deposits .... 
 Certificates of Indebtedness . 
 Fractional and Postal Currency 
 
 
 57,746,000 
 49,882,000 
 
 Total 
 
 90,867,000 
 
 514 211 000 
 
 
 
 
 The figures are in every case the nearest thousand to the full figures ; hence 
 the totals do not always tally exactly with the items. 
 
APPENDIX A 
 FINANCES, BY FISCAL YEARS, 1860-1866 
 
 437 
 
 1862-63 
 
 1863-64 
 
 1864-65 
 
 1865-66 
 
 69,050,000 
 1,485,000 
 37,185,000 
 456,000 
 3,047,000 
 167,000 
 
 102,316,000 
 475,000 
 94,822,000 
 14,919,000 
 47,511,000 
 588,000 
 
 84,928,000 
 1,201,000 
 188,897,000 
 20,567,000 
 32,978,000 
 997,000 
 
 179,047,000 
 1,975,000 
 248,333,000 
 60,894,000 
 67,119,000 
 665,000 
 
 111,399,000 
 
 260,633,000 
 
 329,568,000 
 
 558,033,000 
 
 27,470,000 
 599,299,000 
 63,211,000 
 24,730,000 
 
 35,024,000 
 690,792,000 
 85,733,000 
 53,685,000 
 
 59,024,000 
 1,031,323,000 
 122,568,000 
 77,398,000 
 
 59,909,000 
 284,450,000 
 43,324,000 
 133,068,000 
 
 714,710,000 
 
 865,234,000 
 
 1,290,313,000 
 
 520,751,000 
 
 June 30, 1863 
 257,085,000 
 30,483,000 
 139,971,000 
 895,000 
 3,351.000 
 387,644,000 
 162,385,000 
 156,784,000 
 20,192,000 
 
 June 30, 1864 
 672,162,000 
 102,509,000 
 109,356,000 
 168,750,000 
 781,000 
 431,179,000 
 72,330,000 
 160,729,000 
 22,895,000 
 
 June 30, 1865 
 
 771,324,000 
 200,634,000 
 810,766,000 
 236,213,000 
 473,000 
 432,687,000 
 89,717,000 
 115,772,000 
 25,006,000 
 
 June 30, 1866 
 891,246,000 
 198,800,000 
 945,553,000 
 162,584,000 
 272,000 
 400,619,000 
 120,176,000 
 26,391,000 
 27,071,000 
 
 1,098,790,000 
 
 1,740,691,000 
 
 2,682,592,000 
 
 2,772,712,000 
 
 The footing for June 30, 1866, is about 11 millions less than the official 
 total, because the gold certificates were not included here. 
 
438 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 BANKS AND CURRENCY, 1860-1866 
 
INDEX 
 
INDEX 
 
 ABOLITIONISTS, begin as followers of 
 Garrison, 36; different groups of, 
 36, 37 ; obliged to struggle for free 
 speech, 38 ; the name disavowed by 
 Chase, 54, 55 ; denounce Chase, 55 ; 
 Western ones less extreme than Gar- 
 risonians, 56, 57 ; Garrisonian wing 
 advises non-resistance, 85 ; Western 
 wing practices political action, 85 ; 
 cease to influence the country after 
 1841, 103 ; what they did effect, 103 ; 
 welcome secession, 199. 
 
 Adams, Charles Francis, compared 
 with Chase, 430. 
 
 Adams, John Quincy, his last recep 
 tion as President described by Chase, 
 8 ; visited by Birney in 1837, 52 ; re 
 fuses to be called an abolitionist, 55, 
 92 ; plan for his nomination op 
 posed by Birney, 92 ; his suggestion 
 as to power to abolish slavery re 
 vived in 1861, 255. 
 
 Aldam, W., Jr., corresponds with 
 Chase on slavery, 83. 
 
 Allen, Charles, in House in 1849, 114. 
 
 Allen, William, Democratic senator 
 from Ohio, 104. 
 
 Anderson, Major Robert, in command 
 at Fort Sumter, 208. 
 
 Anderson, , in fugitive slave 
 
 case, 168. 
 
 Anti-slavery movement in 1775-1830, 
 34 ; early societies for, 35. 
 
 Ashley, James M., political lieutenant 
 of Chase, 159 ; on corruption in Ohio 
 Republican officeholders, 161 ; pro 
 poses Lincoln in 1860 to counteract 
 Bates, 182 ; urges impeachment of 
 Johnson, 358 ; unable to aid Chase 
 during war, 422. 
 
 BAILEY, GAMALIEL, friend of Chase, 
 aids Lane Seminary seceders, 40 ; 
 
 typical Western abolitionist, 57; 
 edits the "National Era," 61; on 
 possible Republican candidates in 
 1856, 160. 
 
 Ball, Flamen, law partner of Chase, 
 23, 26 ; given an office by Chase, 
 219. 
 
 Banks, N. P., candidate for Republi 
 can nomination in 1856, 160 ; again 
 in 1860, 181 ; attempts of Chase to 
 placate, 187 ; discourages enlistment 
 of negroes, 272 ; corresponds with 
 Chase, 295. 
 
 Bannister, Dwight, on Chase s reasons 
 for resigning from Lincoln s cabi 
 net, 302 ; his devotion to Chase, 
 421. 
 
 Barnburners, bolt Democratic ticket, 
 96 ; their action at the Buffalo con 
 vention, 100. 
 
 Barney, Hiram, political lieutenant of 
 Chase in New York, 160 ; tries to 
 win over Lincoln, 188 ; abandons 
 Chase for Lincoln, 193; appointed 
 collector of port of New York, 217, 
 218 ; his enemies, 311 ; his removal 
 pressed by Lincoln, 315 ; reports to 
 Chase the demand for registerships 
 in bankruptcy, 323. 
 
 Bartlett, , editor of " Cincinnati 
 
 Gazette," corresponds with Chase, 
 62. 
 
 Bates, Edward, candidate for Re 
 publican nomination in 1860, 182 ; 
 reasons for his availability, 183; 
 his candidacy dreaded by Chase, 
 187 ; in Lincoln s cabinet, 212 ; de 
 mands opening of Mississippi to 
 trade, 228 ; gives opinion in favor 
 of constitutionality of legal tender, 
 247. 
 
 Beecher, Lyman, president of Lane 
 Seminary, 39, 40. 
 
442 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Benham, Henry, corresponds with 
 Chase, 214. 
 
 Benton, Thomas H., opposes Nebraska 
 bill, 138. 
 
 Bigelow, John, editor of " Evening 
 Post," corresponds with Chase, 62. 
 
 Birney, James G., becomes an aboli 
 tionist, 44 ; establishes " Philan 
 thropist," 44, 45 ; mobbed in Cincin 
 nati, 45, 49 ; protected by Chase, 
 50; his influence upon Chase s views, 
 51 ; furnishes Chase with arguments 
 in Matilda case, 51, 52 ; urges Chase 
 to oppose annexation of Texas, 52 ; 
 agrees politically with Chase, 57 ; 
 suggests practicable methods of at 
 tacking slavery, G6 ; aids fugitive 
 slave Matilda, 73 ; indicted, and de 
 fended by Chase, 74 ; leaves Cincin 
 nati, 84 ; suggests an anti-slavery 
 political party, 85 ; nominated for 
 President, 86 ; draws a slight vote, 
 87 ; protests to Chase against nomi 
 nating Seward or Adams, 92 ; re- 
 nominated for President, 92 ; re 
 ceives a small vote, 93 ; retires from 
 public life, 95. 
 
 Birney, William, on Birney s conver 
 sion of Chase to anti-slavery princi 
 ples, 51. 
 
 Black, Jeremiah S., Attorney-General, 
 agrees to abandon Oberlin rescue 
 suits, 170. 
 
 Blair, Frank P., proposes Fremont for 
 candidate in 1856, 160; proposes 
 Bates in 1860, 182 ; attacks Chase in 
 Congress, 313. 
 
 Blair, Montgomery, urges the relief of 
 Sumter, 209, 210 ; represents border 
 States in cabinet, 254 ; wishes to 
 file protest against emancipation 
 proclamation, yet favors emancipa 
 tion in theory, 269 ; candidate for 
 chief justiceship, 320. 
 
 Booth, Walter, in House in 1849, 114. 
 
 Border States, support Union, 254 ; not 
 affected by emancipation proclama 
 tion, 270. 
 
 Boutwell, George S., Secretary of 
 Treasury, 392 ; accused of conspir 
 ing to pack the Supreme Court, 399. 
 
 Bradley, Joseph P., dissents in Slaugh 
 ter-house Cases, 381 ; question of his 
 
 having been nominated to pack the 
 Supreme Court, 400; urges reopening 
 of legal tender cases, 402 ; his opin 
 ion in Hepburn and Griswold case, 
 406, 410. 
 
 Briggs, James H., works for Chase s 
 nomination in 1860, 180 ; describes 
 efforts in Chase s behalf to win over 
 Lincoln, 187, 188. 
 
 Brinckerhoff, Jacob, tells Chase of the 
 hostility toward him of Ohio Whigs, 
 194. 
 
 Brooks, Judge, holds federal court in 
 Virginia, 343. 
 
 Brown, John, asks Chase for money, 
 174, 175. 
 
 Buchanan, James, elected President in 
 1856, 161 ; agrees with Chase to com 
 promise Anderson fugitive case, 168; 
 comments on defeat of Democrats 
 in Pennsylvania, 178 ; his policy 
 during secession movement, 198. 
 
 Buffalo Free Soil convention, call for, 
 97; election of delegates to, 98; 
 organization of, 99 ; its character, 
 enthusiasm, and determination, 99- 
 101 ; deal in, between Barnburners 
 and anti-slavery men, 100, 101 ; in 
 fluence of Chase in, 101. 
 
 Burnet, Jacob, advises Chase to settle 
 in Cincinnati, 13 ; on committee to 
 advise Birney to abandon his paper, 
 45. 
 
 Bushnell, Horace, at founding of Ohio 
 Anti-Slavery Society, 44. 
 
 Busteed, Richard, holds federal court 
 in Alabama, 343. 
 
 Butler, Andrew P., attacks Chase in 
 Senate, 123. 
 
 Butler, Benjamin F., presents Van 
 Buren s name to Buffalo convention, 
 100. 
 
 Butler, General Benjamin F., permits 
 trade in cotton at New Orleans, 227; 
 his corrupt reasons, 228 ; his " con 
 traband " theory supported by 
 Chase, 257 ; enlists negroes, 272 ; 
 corresponds with Chase, 295. 
 
 CALHOCN, JOHN C., Chase s opinion of, 
 in 1829, 10 ; calls slavery a positive 
 good, 122. 
 
 California formed as a State, 120 ; its 
 
INDEX 
 
 443 
 
 admission demanded by Chase, 
 126. 
 
 Cameron, Simon, influences Republi 
 can party policy more than Chase, 
 177 ; candidate for nomination in 
 1860, 181 ; his candidacy not re 
 garded seriously, 187, 188; his friends 
 try to exclude Chase from Treasury, 
 205 ; on good terms with Chase, 212, 
 301. 
 
 Campbell, John A., resigns from Su 
 preme Court, 324 ; his argument in 
 Slaughter-house Cases, 382. 
 
 Campbell, Lewis D., his career in Con 
 gress, 156. 
 
 Campbell, R. , describes Weed s 
 
 corrupt politics, 185-187. 
 
 Canada, the refuge of negro fugitives, 
 .31- 
 
 Carlisle, J. M., counsel in Latham s 
 case, 403. 
 
 Carrington, H. B., corresponds with 
 Chase, 214. 
 
 Cartter, D. K., political lieutenant of 
 Wade in Ohio, 189. 
 
 Cartwright, Peter, 4. 
 
 Cass, Lewis, his nomination causes 
 Barnburners bolt in 1848, 96 ; his 
 vote, 102; votes against excluding 
 slavery from Territories, 129 ; disap 
 proves agitation, but supports Ne 
 braska Bill, 137 ; his friendly feel 
 ings for Chase, 168 ; arranges a com 
 promise in Anderson fugitive slave 
 case, 168. 
 
 Caswell, D. J., law partner of Chase, 
 22. 
 
 Catron, John, his death, 325. 
 
 Channing, William E., his conference 
 with Birney in 1837, 52. 
 
 Chase, Dudley, uncle of S. P. Chase, 
 
 2 ; advises him not to enter a gov 
 ernment clerkship, 6 ; brings Chase 
 into Washington society, 7. 
 
 Chase, Ithamar, father of S. P. Chase, 
 
 2,3. 
 Chase, Philander, uncle of S. P. Chase, 
 
 3 ; takes Chase to Ohio, 3; his career 
 as bishop, 4 ; president of Cincinnati 
 College, 4 ; gives Chase letters of in 
 troduction in Washington, 6. 
 
 Chase, Salmon P., his varied career, 1, 
 2 ; birthplace, 2, 3; early schooling, 
 
 3 ; life in Ohio with Bishop Chase, 3, 
 4 ; returns to New Hampshire, 4 ; 
 studies in Dartmouth College, 5; 
 teaches school in Washington, 6 ; his 
 social life in Wirt s family, 6-8 ; his 
 esteem for Wirt, 7 ; describes draw 
 ing-room in Adams s administration, 
 8 ; sees inauguration of Jackson, 9 ; 
 comments on Jackson, 9 ; on Van 
 Buren s responsibility for the spoils 
 system, 9 ; on Randolph, Calhoun, 
 and Webster, 10 ; gains social 
 breadth, 11 ; studies law under 
 Wirt, 11 ; admitted to the bar, 12 ; 
 his attainments at this stage, 12 ; 
 has low estimate of himself, 12. 
 
 Lawyer in Ohio. Contrary to ad 
 vice, goes to Cincinnati to begin 
 practice, 13 ; enters best local soci 
 ety, 16 ; gains practice slowly, 16, 
 17 ; his reading habits, 17 ; aids in 
 founding Lyceum, 17 ; writes period 
 ical articles, 17, 18 ; plans a Quar 
 terly Review, 18 ; compiles an edi 
 tion of Ohio laws, 18, 19 ; his 
 opinions on the ordinance of 1787, 
 19, 20 ; his first marriage, 20 ; his 
 second marriage, 21 ; his third mar 
 riage, 21, 22 ; gains professional rep 
 utation, 22; his standing as a lawyer, 
 22, 23 ; membership in various law 
 firms, 23, 24 ; his influence over his 
 law students, 24-26 ; exacts support 
 from them, 25 ; not involved in many 
 great cases, 26 ; loses connection 
 with Bank of United States, 26 ; his 
 debts and financial expedients, 27. 
 
 Anti - slavery Leader in Ohio. 
 Friendship with Dr. Bailey, 40 ; 
 drafts an anti-slavery petition in 
 1828 for some Quakers, 46, 47 ; oc 
 casionally shows dislike for slavery, 
 47 ; does not notice early abolition 
 ist movements in Cincinnati, 48 ; his 
 account of his intervention in behalf 
 of Birney in 1836, 48-51 ; becomes 
 an opponent of slavery, 50, 51 ; pro 
 bably converted by Birney, 51, 52 ; 
 religious basis for his course, 52, 53 ; 
 declines to be called an " abolition 
 ist," 54 ; denounces Garrison s 
 views, 54, 55 ; difference between 
 his opinions and Garrison s, 55, 56 ; 
 
444 
 
 INDEX 
 
 loses popularity in Cincinnati, 57 ; 
 gains a greater general reputation, 
 67, 58 ; speaks at anti-slavery meet 
 ings, 58 ; his characteristics as a 
 speaker, 58, 59 ; successful in writ 
 ing addresses and resolutions, 59-61 ; 
 aids local Liberty papers, 61 ; corre 
 sponds with leading editors, 62 ; be 
 comes leader of cause in Ohio, 62, 
 63 ; his constitutional argument 
 against slavery, 66-70 ; deduces anti- 
 slavery argument from Jeffersonian 
 democracy, 67, 68 ; fallacies in his 
 historical argument, 69 ; his dubious 
 position on slavery in the District of 
 Columbia, 70 ; his constitutional ar 
 gument against the Fugitive Slave 
 Act, 71 ; seldom enlarges on wrongs 
 of slavery, 72 ; his career as defender 
 of fugitive slaves, 73-82 ; in Matilda 
 case, 73, 74 ; in Van Zandt case, 75- 
 80 ; his theory of the Ordinance of 
 1787, 77, 78 ; denounces Act of 1793, 
 
 78, 79 ; significance of his argument, 
 
 79, 80 ; in Watson case, 80 ; in Par 
 ish case, 80, 81 ; appealed to on be 
 half of slaves, 81, 82 ; given a silver 
 pitcher by free negroes, 82 ; ap 
 proves negro suffrage, 83 ; called 
 upon for advice from all quarters, 
 83, 84 ; leads lonely life in Cincin 
 nati, 84. 
 
 Organizer of Liberty and Free-Soil 
 Parties. A National Republican in 
 1832, 86 ; votes for Harrison in 1836, 
 86 ; and in 1840, 87 ; joins Liberty 
 party in 1841, 87 ; discussion of 
 reasons for his change, 87-90 ; va 
 rious accounts of his dissatisfaction 
 with Harrison, 87, 88 ; real rea 
 sons for his abandonment of Whig 
 party, 89, 90 ; after 1840 never trusts 
 Whigs, 90 ; his services in the Ohio 
 Liberty party, 91, 92; disapproves 
 Liberty platform of 1843, 92 ; con 
 siders Liberty party a failure and 
 looks to the Democratic party, 94 ; 
 discusses possible candidates in 
 1847, 95; urges postponement of 
 Liberty nomination, 95 ; declines 
 nomination fop Vice-President, 96 ; 
 issues call for Free Territory con 
 vention, 96 ; urges Hale to withdraw, 
 
 96 ; engineers proceedings of the 
 Free Territory convention, 97 ; looks 
 upon Barnburners movement as 
 likely to purify the Democratic 
 party, 97 ; his influence before the 
 Buffalo convention, 98 ; favors Mc 
 Lean for nominee, 98; presides 
 over committee of conferrees at 
 Buffalo, 100 ; drafts resolutions, 101; 
 agrees with Barnburners to secure 
 Van Buren s nomination, 101, 102 ; 
 in campaign of 1848, 102. 
 United States Senator. Expects 
 Free-Soilers to force Democrats to 
 join them, 104 ; describes his part in 
 the Ohio legislative contest of 1848- 
 49, 106-109; accuses Whig Free- 
 Soilers of bad faith, 109 ; exonerates 
 Giddings, 109 ; accused of having 
 entered Senate by a corrupt bargain* 
 
 109 ; practically secures his election 
 by aiding Democrats in Hamilton 
 County question, 109 ; honest in his 
 position favoring the Democrats, 
 
 110 ; arranges repeal of Black Laws 
 and drafts bill, 110 ; approves a di 
 vision of offices with Democrats, 
 
 111 ; asserts his entire freedom from 
 bargains or pledges, 112 ; his view of 
 his position on entering Senate, 112 ; 
 his first attack on slavery, 113 ; his 
 opinions of Seward and Hale, 113 ; 
 his other Free-Soil colleagues, 113, 
 114 ; excluded by South from com 
 mittees, 114 ; later, gains consider 
 ation, 115 ; considers himself a 
 Democrat, 115 ; does not fear disrup 
 tion of the party, 115, 116 ; his gen 
 eral conduct as senator, 116 ; urges 
 improvements in Ohio, 116 ; urges 
 homestead system, 117 ; disapproves 
 excessive grants to railroads, 117 ; 
 attitude on Pacific railroads, 118 ; 
 opposes extravagance in paying 
 claims, 118 ; opposes new federal 
 buildings and increased salaries, 
 119 ; reserves strength for slavery 
 struggle, 119 ; his early speeches in 
 1850, 123 ; avoids controversy with 
 Butler, 123 ; prepares to attack 
 Clay s compromise, 124 ; on Web 
 ster s 7th of March speech, 124 ; his 
 relations with Seward, 125 ; his 
 
INDEX 
 
 445 
 
 speech on the compromise, 125-128; 
 defies the South to dissolve the 
 Union, 128 ; defeated on motion to 
 exclude slavery from Territories, 
 129 ; refuses to accept the compro 
 mise, 129, 130; on the Fugitive 
 Slave Law, 130 ; denounced by Doug 
 las, 131 ; attempts to build up " Free 
 Democracy," 131 ; supports Demo 
 cratic ticket in Ohio against Free- 
 Soilers, 131 ; rejoins Free-Soil party 
 in 1852, 132 ; not reflected to Sen 
 ate, 133 ; does not expect revival of 
 slavery struggle, 133 ; his part in 
 the Kansas-Nebraska debate, 134 ; 
 his early opinion of the chances of 
 passing the bill, 137, 138 ; drafts 
 " appeal of the Independent Demo 
 crats," 138-141; accuses Douglas 
 of a trick, 141 ; called a liar by 
 Douglas, 142 ; his reply, 143 ; pro 
 poses amendment to permit a legis 
 lature to prohibit slavery, 144 ; out 
 done in debate by Douglas, 145 ; his 
 last speech on the bill, 146, 147 ; 
 predicts a disruption of parties, 147 ; 
 summary of his career in the Sen 
 ate, 148. 
 
 Governor of Ohio. Plans to organ 
 ize a new party in Ohio, 151 ; con 
 tinues to expect a new Democratic 
 party, 151 ; considers Anti-Nebraska 
 movement a coalition, 152 ; from 
 beginning opposes Know-Nothings, 
 153 ; nominated by Republicans for 
 governor of Ohio, 154 ; attempts to 
 get him to trim, 154; his share in 
 campaign, 155 ; elected by a close 
 vote, 155 ; not the man to make a 
 popular governor, 157; his state 
 ment of his own services, 157, 158 ; 
 reforms militia service, 158 ; urges 
 state improvements, 158 ; his presi 
 dential aspirations, 159 ; handi 
 capped by lack of political lieuten 
 ants, 159 ; lacks personal friends, 
 160 ; his efforts to secure nomina 
 tion, 160, 161 ; his name withdrawn 
 by Hoadly, 161 ; his connection 
 with Gibson s defalcation, 161, 162 ; 
 nominated and elected governor in 
 1857, 162 ; acknowledged leader of 
 new party, 163; in Rosetta slave 
 
 case, 165, 166 ; his action in the Gar 
 ner slave case, 166, 167 ; later, de 
 fends his cautious action, 167 ; in 
 the Anderson case, 168 ; agrees with 
 Cass and Buchanan to have suits 
 dropped, 168 ; announces purpose to 
 assert state rights, 169 ; prevents 
 violence in Oberlin rescue case, 
 169 ; aids and counsels Kansas free- 
 state men, 171 ; urges Governor 
 Grimes of Iowa to act, 172 ; suggests 
 that Ohio intervene to secure ingress 
 of its citizens to Kansas, 172 ; pre 
 pared to disregard the Supreme 
 Court if pro-slavery, 173; advises 
 the acceptance and later modifica 
 tion of the Lecompton constitution, 
 173 ; disapproves of a Republican 
 coalition with Douglas, 174 ; sub 
 scribes to aid John Brown, 174 ; de 
 nies complicity in Brown s raid, 175; 
 defies Wise s threat of invading 
 Ohio, 175 ; his governorship occu 
 pied with slavery interests, 176 ; 
 the leading anti-slavery man in the 
 Republican party, 177. 
 
 Candidate for Presidency. Begins 
 to canvass for the Republican nom 
 ination, 178 ; asks his friends for as 
 sistance, 179 ; his leading support 
 ers, 180; takes part in Illinois 
 campaign of 1858, 180 ; reflected to 
 the Senate, 181 ; damaged as a can 
 didate by his tariff views, 181 ; feels 
 sure of unanimous support of Ohio? 
 182; unpopular with Whigs, 183; 
 on corruption of New York politics, 
 185 ; his opinion of his rivals, 187, 
 188 ; loses delegates in Ohio, 189 ; 
 declines to bribe, 190; his support 
 at the Republican convention, 191, 
 192 ; fails to secure unit rule for 
 Olu o, 193 ; congratulates Lincoln on 
 his nomination, 195 ; reasons for his 
 failure, 195 ; wishes to avoid vio 
 lence, but maintain the Union, 200 ; 
 his claims for a cabinet position, 
 202 ; offered Treasury Department 
 by Lincoln, 203 ; warns Seward 
 against concession, 203 ; his action 
 in the peace conference, 204; in 
 trigues to keep him out of cabinet, 
 205; reasons for his appointment, 
 
446 
 
 INDEX 
 
 206 ; hesitates to accept nomination, 
 206. 
 
 Secretary of Treasury. Does not 
 foresee his difficulties, 207 ; does not 
 expect to control Lincoln, 207 ; op 
 poses provisioning of Sumter, 209; 
 willing to recognize seceded States, 
 209, 210; later, advises relieving 
 Sumter, 210 ; assumes military du 
 ties on outbreak of war, 211 ; frames 
 Orders 15 and 16, 212 ; keeps on 
 good terms with Cameron, 212 ; rep 
 resents the West in the cabinet, 212 ; 
 his supervision of Western move 
 ments, 212, 213 ; corresponds with 
 generals, 214 ; appealed to for fa 
 vors, 214 ; demands a share of the 
 diplomatic places, 214 ; urges return 
 of Mason and Slidell, 215 ; begins to 
 reorganize the Treasury, 215 ; his 
 policy regarding new appointments, 
 216-219 ; reappoints a few officials, 
 217 ; appoints a friend to the collec- 
 torship of New York, 217 ; appealed 
 to for spoils, 218; appoints none but 
 Republicans or War Democrats, 219; 
 not interfered with by Lincoln, 219; 
 employs women as clerks, 220; 
 makes new loans, 221 ; proposes to 
 Congress new loans and taxes, 221 ; 
 his relations with bankers, 222 ; 
 obliges them to take up Treasury 
 notes by threat of suspension, 222, 
 223 ; his subsequent loans in 1861, 
 223 ; his relations with McClellan, 
 224 ; confines his interest more to 
 the Treasury, 224 ; expects revenue 
 from confiscations, 224 ; manages 
 seizure and sale of confiscated pro 
 perty, 225 ; regulates commerce to 
 prevent trade with the South, 225- 
 229 ; tries to check corruption in 
 agents, 228 ; opposes opening Missis 
 sippi River to trade, 228 ; his diffi 
 cult situation in December, 1861, 
 230 ; refuses to aid state banks to 
 maintain their notes, 230, 231 ; una 
 ble to compel public confidence, 231 ; 
 his course discussed, 232, 233 ; his 
 plans ignored by Congress, 234 ; not 
 able to manage Congress, 234; lacks 
 supporters in Congress, 235; unable 
 to predict expenditures, 235 ; his 
 
 first report of 1861, 236; reluctant to 
 advise taxation, 236, 237 ; prefers 
 loans, 237 ; proposes a banking sys 
 tem, 238 ; secures passage of new 
 taxes, 238 ; advantages of his plan 
 over that adopted, 240 ; issues vari 
 ous forms of Treasury notes, 241, 
 242 ; fails to secure good terms for 
 the " five-twenty " bonds, 243 ; em 
 ploys Jay Cooke as general agent, 
 244 ; annoyed by wild suggestions, 
 245 ; willing to rely on demand notes 
 without legal tender, 246; tries to 
 prevent issue of legal tender notes, 
 247, 249; fails to protest on passage 
 of legal tender act, 247 ; yields to 
 general demand for legal tender, 
 250, 251 ; does not foresee the over 
 issue of notes, 251 ; does not foresee 
 effect on gold, 252 ; represents anti- 
 slavery element in the cabinet, 253 ; 
 defends Lincoln s action in annul 
 ling Fremont s emancipation order, 
 256 ; suggests employment of fugi 
 tive slaves in the war, 257 ; takea 
 measures to benefit refugees, 259 ; 
 aids fugitives on Sea Islands, 260 ; 
 opposes Lincoln s colonization ideas, 
 261 ; tries to prevent revocation of 
 Hunter s proclamation, 262 ; looked 
 to by abolitionists to influence the 
 President, 263 ; predicts emancipa 
 tion even at cost of slave insurrec 
 tion, 264; urges a proclamation, 
 264-266 ; describes in his diary Lin 
 coln s reading of proclamation to 
 cabinet, 266-269 ; promises to sup 
 port this policy, 268 ; makes sugges 
 tions for final draft of emancipation 
 proclamation, 270; urges abolition 
 in border States, 271 ; supervises 
 freedmen, 271 ; urges enlistment of 
 negroes, 272 ; suggests universal suf 
 frage in reconstruction on an edu 
 cational qualification, 272 ; distrusts 
 state banks as federal agents, 275 ; 
 early suggests a tax on bank notes, 
 276 ; urges a federal banking system 
 in 1861, 276, 277 ; secures Lincoln s 
 aid, 278 ; fails to induce state banks 
 to use first bank act, 279 ; suggests 
 compelling state banks to take fed 
 eral charters, 280 ; proposes a new 
 
INDEX 
 
 447 
 
 bill which at first fails, 280, 281; his 
 plan carried out after his retire 
 ment, 282 ; his credit for the mea 
 sure, 282, 283; mortified at depre 
 ciation of legal tender notes, 283 ; 
 attempts to explain it, 283; accuses 
 bank issues of inflation, 284 ; fails to 
 introduce legal tenders in California, 
 284 ; attempts to reduce premium by 
 selling gold, 285 ; proposes bill to 
 punish gold speculation, 28C ; his 
 resignation not connected with the 
 repeal of the bill, 287 ; estimate of 
 his services as secretary, 287-289 ; 
 his difficulties, 287, 288 ; his plans 
 hampered by Congress, 288 ; shows 
 short-sightedness in dealings with 
 legal tender, 288, 289 ; his persist 
 ence and honesty, 289 ; fails to be 
 come intimate with Lincoln, 290 ; 
 does not sympathize with Lincoln s 
 humor, 291 ; left full authority by 
 Lincoln in his department, 291 ; his 
 attitude toward slavery contrasted 
 with Lincoln s, 291, 292 ; more of a 
 party man than Lincoln, 292 ; tries 
 to interfere in military matters, 292 ; 
 complains to Stanton of wasteful 
 ness, 293 ; disappointed at Lincoln s 
 failure to consult with the cabinet, 
 293, 294; suggests military move 
 ments, 294 ; joins rest of cabinet in 
 trying to force McClellan s dis 
 missal, 294 ; corresponds with army 
 officers, 295-297 ; favors McDowell 
 and Pope, 2%; seeks friendship 
 with Hooker, Rosecrans, and Grant, 
 296, 297 ; questionable appearance of 
 his conduct, 297 ; writes in criticism 
 of the administration, 298, 299 ; his 
 failure to understand the situation, 
 299, 300 ; disapproves of military 
 government, 300, 301 ; remains on 
 good terms with Stanton, 301 ; at 
 first a rival of Seward, 301 ; agrees 
 with Seward to resign in 1862, 302 ; 
 his reasons, 302, 303 ; slow to with 
 draw his resignation, 303 ; sends 
 Lincoln explanatory letters, 304 
 demands right to nominate treasury 
 officials without dictation of sena 
 tors, 305 ; threatens to resign, 305 
 protests against Lincoln s remova 
 
 of Smith, 305, 306 ; won over by Lin 
 coln, 306, 307 ; not disobedient or 
 presumptuous, 308 ; tries to heal 
 dissensions in Ohio, 309 ; begins to 
 hope for nomination in 1864, 309 ; 
 states his intention to be fair to Lin 
 coln, 310 ; wishes to be candidate of 
 the war Democrats, 310 ; refuses to 
 use Treasury patronage to aid his 
 canvass, 311; publicly recommended 
 by the Pomeroy Circular, 312 ; 
 apologizes to Lincoln and offers 
 to resign, 312 ; attacked by the 
 Blair brothers in Congress, 313; 
 enraged on learning of Blair s ap 
 pointment in the army, 314 ; with 
 draws from the canvass, 314 ; grows 
 irritable, 315 ; again threatens re 
 signation over a question of patron 
 age, 315 ; has difficulties over the 
 position of assistant treasurer, 316 ; 
 again offers resignation, 317; sur 
 prised at Lincoln s acceptance of it, 
 317 ; his comments, 317, 318. 
 
 Chief Justice. His early interest in 
 the Supreme Court, 319 ; hints to 
 Lincoln that he would like to suc 
 ceed Taney, 319 ; ignorant of Lin 
 coln s intention to nominate him, 
 320 ; his opinion of Evarts s merits, 
 
 320 ; opposition to his nomination, 
 
 321 ; nominated and confirmed by 
 the Senate, 321 ; thanks Lincoln, 
 321 ; his fitness for the bench, 322 ; 
 his court patronage, 322, 323 ; finds 
 Supreme Court in a depressed con 
 dition, 323 ; doubts his chance to aid 
 in reconstruction, 328 ; opposes Lin 
 coln s theory of reconstruction, 330; 
 criticises his amnesty proclamation, 
 331 ; favors negro suffrage, 331, 335, 
 339 ; visits South in 1865, 334; favors 
 Freedman s Bureau, 337 ; does not 
 take part in reconstruction contro 
 versy, 337 ; alienated from Johnson, 
 339 ; approves Civil Rights Act, 340; 
 suggests Fourteenth Amendment, 
 340, 341 ; refuses to hold court in 
 districts under military government, 
 343 ; holds court in South Carolina, 
 
 343 ; has controversy with Sickles, 
 
 344 ; dissents from opinion in Milli- 
 gan Case, 345 ; dissents in Cummings 
 
448 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Case, 347 ; and in Garland Case, 
 348; gives decision annulling ap 
 prentice act in Maryland, 351 ; re 
 fuses to allow prosecution of Davis 
 for treason, 352, 353 ; declares Da 
 vis free under Fourteenth Amend 
 ment, 353 ; value of his action, 354 ; 
 prevents consideration of recon 
 struction acts, 356 ; presides over 
 impeachment of Johnson, 358-361 ; 
 disapproves of the impeachment, 
 358 ; insists upon the Senate sitting 
 as a court, 359 ; decides on admis- 
 sibility of evidence, 359 ; votes to 
 break a tie, 360 ; denounced by radi 
 cals, 360 ; surprised at Johnson s 
 escape, 360 ; his conduct creditable, 
 360 ; continues to consider himself 
 a candidate for the presidency, 361 ; 
 finds judicial office uninteresting, 
 361 ; effect of his ambition on his 
 career, 362 ; expects Republican 
 nomination in 1868, 362; opposes a 
 military candidate, 362 ; his secret 
 canvass, 363; recognizes hopeless 
 ness of opposition to Grant, 363 ; de 
 sires Democratic nomination, 364 ; 
 his grounds of opposition to the Re 
 publican programme, 364; his ap 
 parent inconsistency in joining a 
 party opposed to negro suffrage, 365 ; 
 elements of strength in his position, 
 366 ; declares himself a Democrat, 
 366 ; announces his policy toward 
 the South, 367 ; has no strong sup 
 porters in the Democratic conven 
 tion, 367; fails to be nominated, 368; 
 reasons for his failure, 368 ; remains 
 statesman as well as judge, 369 ; 
 defends negro suffrage, 369, 370 ; 
 wishes universal amnesty, 371 ; 
 doubts wisdom of Fifteenth Amend 
 ment, 371 ; assists in securing its 
 : ratification, 372 ; dislikes centraliza 
 tion resulting from the war, 372 ; 
 admits a negro to bar of Supreme 
 Court, 373 ; dissents from opinions 
 of court enforcing payment on slave 
 contracts, 373 ; on the status of the 
 Confederate States Government, 
 375 ; dissents in TarbelVs Case, 377 ; 
 writes opinion in Texas v. White, 
 378 ; his doctrine of the effects of 
 
 secession, 378, 379 ; in White v. Hart 
 approves the reconstruction policy, 
 380 ; asks circuit judges to allow Su 
 preme Court to pass on Civil Rights 
 Bill, 381 ; dissents from decision in 
 Slaughter-house Cases, 381, 382 ; his 
 opinion in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 
 386, 387 ; while secretary, stands as 
 defender of legal tender acts, 389 ; 
 later, urges speedy resumption, 390; 
 deplores continuance of legal tender 
 act in time of peace, 392 ; begins to 
 consider possibility of disallowing 
 legal tender, 393 ; his opinion in 
 Hepburn v. Griswold, 394-396 ; ac 
 cuses Grant of reorganizing court so 
 as to reverse decision, 399 ; protests 
 against rehearing of legal tender 
 cases, 402, 403 ; his dissenting opin 
 ion, 407, 408, 410 ; reasons for his 
 change of mind since 1862, 410 ; his 
 action unfortunate, 411 ; suffers in 
 health from judicial labors, 412; at 
 tacked by paralysis, 413 ; ready for 
 Democratic nomination in 1872,413; 
 last illness and death, 414. 
 Personal Characteristics. Personal 
 appearance, 415 ; self-importance, 
 415; fondness for building, 416; slow 
 to pay his debts, 416 ; prospers from 
 railway and telegraph stock, 417 ; 
 makes unfortunate investments at 
 Jay Cooke s suggestion, 417, 418; 
 generous to poor relations, 418 ; ex 
 pected to marry a fourth time, 419 ; 
 his relations with his son-in-law, 
 419; interest of his daughter in his 
 political ambitions, 420 ; his private 
 life, 421 ; his friendships, 421 ; has 
 few friends among leaders, 421, 422; 
 liis enemies, 422 ; suffers from anti- 
 negro prejudices, 423 ; lacks ele 
 ments of popularity, 423 ; his diaries, 
 423 ; his religious nature, 424 ; his 
 honesty, 424 ; misled by self-esteem 
 and optimism, 424, 425; his standing 
 as a judge, 425, 426 ; his masterpiece 
 in Texas v. White, 426; his industry 
 devoted to too many objects, 427 ; 
 his incorruptibility in the Treasury, 
 427 ; not afraid to change his views 
 to his own hurt, 428 ; in politics, al 
 ways practical, 428 ; stands consist- 
 
INDEX 
 
 449 
 
 ently for anti-slavery principles, 
 429 ; favors national banking system 
 continuously, 429 ; adheres always 
 to state rights, 429 ; fails to gain 
 greater reputation because of Lin 
 coln s preeminence, 430 ; gains mod 
 eration and breadth superior to 
 Seward and Adams, 430 ; makes 
 mistake of measuring himself with 
 Lincoln, 431 ; his error in aban 
 doning Lincoln in 18G4, 431 ; unable 
 to subordinate himself, 432 ; final 
 summary of his career, 434, 435. 
 Political Opinions. Abolitionists, 
 50, 54-5G ; anti-slavery programme, 
 59-61, 68, 92, 125, 176; appointments 
 to office, 9, 157, 216-219, 304, 306 ; 
 banks, national and state, 251, 276- 
 283, 383, 387 ; cabinet, 293, 294, 304; 
 Civil Rights Act, 340; coercion in 
 1861, 200, 203-205, 209, 210, 429; 
 colonization, 261 ; Compromise of 
 1850, 124, 126,130; Constitution and 
 slavery, 68-70, 78, 126 ; Confederate 
 government, 375, 376 ; democracy, 
 67, 68, 366; Democratic party, 90, 
 91, 94, 95, 97, 104, 112-115, 131, 132, 
 151, 152, 364, 366, 413 ; District of 
 Columbia, abolition in, 46, 70, 126 ; 
 emancipation, 256, 262, 265,266, 268, 
 271 ; Fourteenth Amendment, 341, 
 382; freedmen, 259, 271, 331, 337; 
 free speech, 47; Fugitive Slave Law, 
 71, 74, 77-80, 126, 130, 165, 167-170 ; 
 habeas corpus, suspension of, 300, 
 345, 377 ; impeachment, 358-361 ; in 
 ternal improvements, 101, 116, 118; 
 judiciary, 319; Kansas, 171-173; 
 Know Nothings, 153, 154; legal ten 
 der notes, 245-249, 283-286, 389, 392- 
 396, 407-411 ; Nebraska Bill, 133, 137, 
 139-141, 144 ; negro soldiers, 262, 
 264, 272 ; negro suffrage, 272, 273, 
 332, 336, 339, 364, 366, 370-372 ; 
 ordinance of 1787, 19, 77 ; public 
 debt, 221 ; public lands, 117 ; presi 
 dency, ambition for, 159-161, 178- 
 196, 309-314, 361-363, 413 ; recon 
 struction, 330, 331, 339, 340, 343, 
 347, 356, 371, 372, 380 ; Republican 
 party, 151, 153, 162, 174,308, 364; 
 slavery, 47-53, 72, 176, 291, 373, 429; 
 tariff, 101, 181, 237 ; taxation, 236- 
 
 238 ; Trent affair, 215 ; treason of 
 Jefferson Davis, 352, 353; Union, 
 nature of, 378, 379 ; veto power, 20 ; 
 war, conduct of, 297-300, 302 ; war 
 finances, 230-233, 235-237, 241, 242, 
 387, 388; Whig party, 86-90, 97; 
 Wilinot proviso, 127-129. 
 
 Cincinnati, Southern elements in, 14 ; 
 social life in, 16 ; riots in, against 
 negroes, 31 ; mobs in, against the 
 " Philanthropist," 45, 46, 49, 50. 
 
 Cincinnati College, studies of Chase 
 at, 4. 
 
 Cisco, John J., retains office of assist 
 ant treasurer at Chase s and Lin 
 coln s request, 217, 222 ; urges issue 
 of legal tender, 250 ; resigns his 
 office, 315 ; persuaded to withdraw 
 resignation, 316. 
 
 Clay, Cassius M., suggests Democratic 
 nomination of Chase in 1872, 413. 
 
 Clay, Henry, relations with Chase in 
 1829, 7 ; alienates anti-slavery men 
 in 1844, 93; Chase s opinion of his 
 compromise resolutions, 124 ; calls 
 Chase an abolitionist, 131. 
 
 Clifford, Nathan, member of Supreme 
 Court during war, 325. 
 
 Cobb, Howell, his management of 
 Treasury, 220. 
 
 Coffin, Levi, agent of Underground 
 Railroad in Ohio, 39 ; typical West 
 ern abolitionist, 57. 
 
 Colby, Isaac, brother-in-law of Chase, 
 49. 
 
 Colfax, Schuyler, favors Douglas for 
 Republican candidate, 180 ; suggests 
 regulating depreciation of notes by 
 law, 285. 
 
 Colonization urged by Lincoln, 261. 
 
 Compromise of 1850, struggle over, 
 124-129 ; passed because of death of 
 Taylor, 129. 
 
 Congress, its policy in recognizing 
 slavery, 46, 69, 70 ; its power over 
 slavery in Territories, 127 ; passes 
 Nebraska Bill, 146 ; efforts in, to 
 compromise in 1860, 200-202 ; mem 
 bers of, insist on dictating appoint 
 ments, 218 ; grants loans and taxes 
 in 1861, 221,222; passes confiscation 
 acts, 224, 225 ; postpones financial 
 legislation, 234 ; led by radicals, ina- 
 
450 
 
 INDEX 
 
 bility of Chase to control, 234, 235 ; 
 raises tariff, 238, 239 ; adopts new 
 internal taxes, 239; passes legal 
 tender act, 246 ; passes Crittenden 
 resolution, 254 ; passes emancipation 
 acts, 257, 258 ; passes act to arm 
 negroes, 203 ; rejects Chase s bank 
 scheme, 277 ; passes national bank 
 acts, 279, 282 ; passes and repeals 
 "Gold Bill," 286; authorizes sus 
 pension of habeas corpus, 327 ; passes 
 early acts in behalf of negroes, 336, 
 337, 340 ; adopts Fourteenth Amend 
 ment, 340, 341 ; passes reconstruc 
 tion acts, 341, 342 ; prevents ap 
 pointments by Johnson to Supreme 
 Court, 342 ; proposed attack of, on 
 Supreme Court, 354, 355 ; removes 
 McCardle Case from its jurisdiction, 
 355 ; impeaches Johnson, 357-361 ; 
 passes secoud Civil Rights Act, 381; 
 favors contraction of currency, 390, 
 391; limits contraction, 391; orders 
 reissue of legal tenders, 391 ; pledges 
 faith to redeem notes, 391. 
 Constitution, in relation to slavery, 63, 
 65-67 ; appealed to in all arguments, 
 66 ; Chase s historical argument as 
 to its anti-slavery character, G8, 69; 
 Chase s argument on, in Van Zandt 
 case, 78 ; its position on slavery in 
 Territories, 127 ; opinion of Attor 
 ney-General on legal tender, 247 ; in 
 relation to emancipation proclama 
 tion, 271 ; discussion over right to 
 suspend habeas corpus, 300, 301 ; 
 cases involving, during Civil War, 
 326 ; Merryman Case, 326, 327 ; in 
 Cummings and Garland Cases, 346- 
 348 ; in relation to Maryland appren 
 tice law, 351 ; Fifteenth Amendment 
 to, 371, 372 ; in White v. Hart and 
 Osborn v. JVicolson, 373, 374 ; in 
 cases on nature of Confederate Gov 
 ernment, 375-377 ; in Texas v. White, 
 on nature of secession, 378-380 ; in 
 White v. Hart, on reconstruction, 
 380 ; in Slaughter-house Cases , on 
 Fourteenth Amendment, 381-383 ; 
 cases upholding taxing power of 
 United States, 3S5-388 ; early cases 
 on legal tender in state courts, 389 ; 
 early cases on legal tender in Su 
 
 preme Court, 393; in Hepburn v. 
 Griswold, 394-397 ; in Legal Tender 
 Cases, 404-408. 
 
 Cooke, H. D., Chase s executor, 417. 
 
 Cooke, Jay, has success in distributing 
 treasury notes, 223 ; appointed gen 
 eral agent for placing U. S. bonds, 
 244 ; tries to induce New York edi 
 tors to favor Chase s bank bill, 279 ; 
 tries to benefit Chase and induces 
 him to make poor investments, 417- 
 
 Corwin, R. C., asks Chase s advice 
 about aiding a fugitive slave, 81. 
 
 Corwin, Thomas, his success as a 
 speaker, 58, 156. 
 
 Cotton, smuggling of, during war, 227, 
 228. 
 
 Court of Claims, its creation favored 
 by Chase, 118. 
 
 Cox, Jacob D., studies law under 
 Chase, 25. 
 
 Cranch, William, reluctant to admit 
 Chase to the bar, 11, 13. 
 
 Crothers, Samuel, early abolitionist in 
 Ohio, 38. 
 
 Curtis, George T., remonstrates to 
 Chase on efforts of Treasury De 
 partment to influence New York 
 courts, 389. 
 
 Curtis, George W., delegate to Repub 
 lican convention of 1860, 188. 
 
 DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, studies of Chase 
 in, 5 ; visited by Chase in 1858, 179. 
 
 Davis, David, candidate to succeed 
 Taney, 320 ; appointed to Supreme 
 Court, -325 ; dissents in Cummings 
 Case, 347 ; dissents in case of Veazie 
 Hank v. Fenno, 387. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, offers resolution to 
 permit slavery in Territories, 128 ; 
 cabinet officer under Franklin 
 Pierce, 132 ; refuses fellowship to 
 Douglas, 178 ; taken prisoner, 339 ; 
 anxiety of Johnson to have him tried 
 for treason, 352 ; refusal of Chase to 
 sit in his trial, 352, 353 ; released by 
 Chase in Circuit Court, 353 ; neces 
 sity for his release, 354. 
 
 Democratic party, early attitude of 
 Chase toward, 88; passes Fugitive 
 Slave Law in Ohio, 90; wins election 
 of 1844, 93; not attacked by Liberty 
 
INDEX 
 
 451 
 
 party because considered hopeless, 
 93; looked to by Chase as likely to 
 become anti-slavery, 94, 95 ; nomi 
 nates C ass, %; expected by Chase to 
 be forced to join Barnburners, 104 ; 
 contests organization of Ohio House 
 with Whigs, 105, 10G; given control 
 of House by Free-Soilers, 107; 
 agrees to vote for Chase in return 
 for state judges, 108, 111; members 
 of, in Senate decline to recognize 
 Chase, 114; Chase s hopes of re 
 forming, 115; abandoned by Chase 
 in 1852-53, 132; over-confident in 
 1854, 133; defeated in Congressional 
 election, 151 ; war faction of, sup 
 ports Lincoln, 254; fuses tempora 
 rily with Republicans, 25") ; reor 
 ganizes in 18G8, 3G5; candidacy of 
 Chase for its nomination, 3G5-367; 
 its convention of 1868 and candi 
 dates, 3G7 ; stampeded for Seymour, 
 368; reasons why it failed to nom 
 inate Chase, 368; renewed desire of 
 Chase for its nomination in 1872, 
 413. 
 
 Denison, George S., complains to 
 Chase of corrupt trade with Con 
 federacy at New Orleans, 226, 228; 
 tries to stimulate enlistment of ne 
 groes, 272. 
 
 DeWitt, Alexander, signs appeal of 
 Independent Democrats, 139. 
 
 District of Columbia, slavery in, 46; 
 movement for abolition in, 46, 47; 
 its status under Constitution, 126; 
 emancipation in, 257. 
 
 Dixon, James, quarrel of Chase with, 
 over patronage, 305. 
 
 Dodge, Henry, in Nebraska debate, 
 145. 
 
 Douglas, Stephen A., calls Chase s 
 election in 1849 a corrupt bargain, 
 109; votes against executive ses 
 sions, 116; supports granting land 
 to Illinois Central Railroad, 117; 
 votes for Chase s anti- slavery 
 amendment in 1850, 129; too 
 strong for Chase in debate, 131; in 
 troduces Kansas-Nebraska Bill, 133; 
 on Chase as an opponent, 134; his 
 purpose in introducing bill, 135; 
 his great powers as a debater, 136 ; 
 
 secures aid from Pierce, 137; unable 
 to understand anti-slavery men, 137; 
 assailed in Appeal of Independent 
 Democrats, 141 ; attacks Chase sav 
 agely in Senate, 141, 142; forces 
 Chase into a disclaimer, 143; de 
 bates Nebraska Bill against Chase, 
 144, 145; lobbies to carry bill 
 through House, 145, 14G ; denounces 
 new party as dangerous to Union, 
 147 ; does not foresee rising of the 
 North, 150, 171 ; denounces emi 
 grant aid societies, 171 ; opposes 
 Lecompton constitution, 174 ; urged 
 by Greeley as Republican candidate, 
 174, 180 ; defeated in 180G, 196 ; sup 
 ports Lincoln s administration, 254. 
 
 Dresser, Amos, whipped in Tennessee 
 for possessing abolition documents, 
 40 ; student at Oberlin, 42. 
 
 Durkee, Charles, in House in 1849, 
 114. 
 
 Eels, Samuel, law partner of Chase, 
 23; visits Birney, 51. 
 
 Emancipation, early demand for, 250, 
 263, 265 ; discussion in cabinet over, 
 265, 266 ; preliminary proclamation 
 of, discussed, 266-270; Blair s op 
 position to, 269. 
 
 Evarts, William M., thought by Chase 
 to be a candidate for chief justice 
 ship, 320, 321. 
 
 Ewing, Thomas, his career in Con 
 gress, 15G. 
 
 Fee, John G., Kentucky abolitionist, 
 corresponds with Chase, his later 
 career, 83. 
 
 Fessenden, W. P., in Nebraska de 
 bate, 145 ; supports Chase s finan 
 cial schemes, 235 ; succeeds Chase 
 in Treasury, 318. 
 
 Field, David Dudley, argues in favor 
 of constitutionality of legal tender, 
 389. 
 
 Field, Maunsell, on Chase s indipna- 
 tion at wasteful expenditure, 292; 
 offered place of assistant treasurer 
 by Chase, 315. 
 
 Field, Stephen J., appointed to Su 
 preme Court, 325; said to have 
 reported that the court held the 
 
452 
 
 INDEX 
 
 reconstruction acts unconstitu 
 tional, 356; dissents in Slaughter 
 house Cases, 381. 
 
 Financial history, bad condition of 
 the Treasury in I860, 220 ; failure of 
 Cobb s loan and issue of treasury 
 notes, 220 ; Chase s early loans, 221 ; 
 new loans and taxes granted by 
 Congress, 221; difficulties in placing 
 these loans, 222, 223; situation in 
 December, 1861, 230 ; refusal of 
 Chase to aid banks, 231 ; suspension 
 of specie payments by banks , 231 ; 
 lack of general confidence, 232 ; dis 
 cussion of Chase s failure to prevent 
 suspension, 232, 233 ; errors due to 
 expectation of a short war, 233 ; re 
 venue still deficient, 234 ; inability 
 of Chase to foresee expenditures, 
 235 ; Chase s report of December, 
 1861, 236; reluctance of Chase to 
 ask for taxes justified, 237 ; new 
 tariff rates, 238 ; new internal taxes 
 and their slow increase, 239 ; great 
 receipts after Chase s retirement, 
 240 ; use of treasury notes, 240, 241; 
 new forms devised by Chase, 241, 
 242 ; the five-twenty bonds, 242, 
 243 ; effect of legal tenders upon 
 them, 243 ; revenue and expendi 
 tures to 1864, 244, 245 ; disappear 
 ance of specie, 245 ; demand for 
 currency, 245 ; passage of legal ten 
 der act, 246 ; discussion of its ne 
 cessity, 248-250 ; backwardness of 
 Chase in taxation, 249 ; public de 
 mand for legal tender, 250, 251 ; 
 legal tenders cause speculation in 
 gold, 252 ; condition of state banks 
 during war, 274, 275; proposed 
 taxation of state bank notes, 276 ; 
 Chase s scheme for national banks, 
 
 276 ; continued use of legal tenders, 
 
 277 ; gradual growth of feeling in fa 
 vor of national banks, 278 ; the first 
 national bank act and its failure, 
 279 ; proposal of Chase to tax state 
 bank notes, 280, 281 ; amended bank 
 bill, 282 ; taxation of state bank cir 
 culation, .282; success of Chase s 
 policy, 282, 283; depreciation of 
 legal tender, 283-285; gold contin 
 ues on Pacific coast, 284 ; futile 
 
 measures to prevent gold specula 
 tion, 285; failure of the "Gold 
 Bill," 286 ; criticism of Chase s 
 measures, 288, 289 ; early cases up 
 hold legal tender, 389 ; redemption 
 begun under McCulloch, 390; re 
 demption of legal tender prevented, 
 391 ; Hepburn v. Griswold, 392- 
 396 ; Legal Tender Cases, 404-412 ; 
 discussion of question from finan 
 cial standpoint, 410, 411. 
 
 Finney, Jerry, a fugitive slave, kid 
 naped at Columbus, 82. 
 
 Flint, Timothy, publishes "Western 
 Monthly Review," 18. 
 
 Follett, Orren, Ohio editor, corre 
 sponds with Chase, 62. 
 
 Foote, S. A., argues m favor of the 
 constitutionality of legal tender, 
 389. 
 
 Freedmen, attempt of Chase to bene 
 fit, at Port Royal, 259, 260 ; propos 
 als to enlist, 262 ; armed by act of 
 Congress, 263; continued efforts of 
 Chase to assist, 271, 272; proposal 
 of Chase to grant suffrage to, 272, 
 273, 332, 335, 336, 339; assailed by 
 vagrant laws, 336; protected by 
 Bureau of Refugees, 336, 337 ; mis 
 sionary movement in behalf of, 337 ; 
 protected by Civil Rights Act, 340; 
 and by Fourteenth Amendment, 
 341 ; exercise of suffrage by, under 
 debate in 1868, 365-368; Chase s 
 continued advocacy of, 370, 371. 
 
 Free-Soil party, first steps towards, in 
 Ohio taken by Chase, 96; proposed 
 by Free Territory convention, 97; 
 formed at Buffalo convention, 98- 
 101; its vote in 1848, 102; expected 
 by Chase to coalesce with Demo 
 crats, 102, 104; disrupted by events 
 in Ohio senatorial election, 110; ef 
 forts of Chase to support, 131 ; aban 
 doned by Chase in 1851, 131 ; re 
 joined by Chase in 1852, 132; 
 nominates Hale, its vote, 132; in 
 creases vote in 1853, 150. 
 
 FnSmont, John C., nominated for 
 president in 1856, 160, 16-1 ; issues 
 emancipation proclamation in Mis 
 souri, 256. 
 
 Fugitive Slave Law, of 1793, 32 ; can- 
 
INDEX 
 
 453 
 
 not be enforced in New England, 33; 
 operates in Pennsylvania and the 
 Northwest, 33; its validity denied 
 by Chase, 71 ; attacked by Chase in 
 Van Zandt Case, 77; in 1850 at 
 tacked by Chase, 120, 130; its effect 
 on the North, 163; attempts of 
 States to block, 163-165; fought by 
 Chase s administration in Ohio, 
 165-170; declared unconstitutional 
 in Wisconsin, 175. 
 
 GARFIELD, JAMES A., corresponds 
 with Chase, 214, 295; counsel for 
 Milligan, 345 ; his friendship with 
 Chase, 421. 
 
 Garland, A. H., in case before Su 
 preme Court, 347, 348. 
 
 Garner, Margaret, fugitive slave, kills 
 her child, 166 ; struggle over, be 
 tween federal and Ohio courts, 166. 
 
 Garuiss, Catherine Jane, marries 
 Chase, her death, 20. 
 
 Garrison, William Lloyd, his success 
 in beginning anti-slavery agitation, 
 36 ; his influence not strong in the 
 West, 36 ; influences Weld of Lane 
 Seminary, 39; Chase s opinion of, 
 50, 54 ; his views contrasted with 
 those of Chase, 55 ; character of 
 his paper, 61 ; rejoices at secession, 
 199. 
 
 Germans, settle in Ohio, 15 ; impor 
 tance of retaining them in 1855, 154, 
 155; recognized by Chase, 157 ; their 
 support expected by Chase, 182. 
 
 Gibson, , commits defalcation 
 
 as Ohio state treasurer, 161, 162 ; 
 removed by Chase, 162. 
 
 Giddiugs, Joshua R., representative 
 of Western Reserve, 43, 57 ; on the 
 uuconstituti Quality of slavery, 65; 
 his early career as anti- slavery 
 leader, 84; makes speeches at Buf 
 falo convention, 99; candidate of 
 Free-Soil Whigs for senator from 
 Ohio, 108; fails of election, 109; 
 Free-Soil leader in House, 114, 119 ; 
 drafts Appeal of Independent De 
 mocrats, 138; less prominent than 
 Chase, 176. 
 
 Grant, Ulysses S., attempts of Chase 
 to make friends with, 297 ; prevents 
 
 trial of Confederate generals for 
 treason, 352 ; appointed by Johnson 
 to succeed Stan ton, 358 ; movement 
 to nominate, in 1868, 363; appoints 
 Boutwell Secretary of Treasury, 
 392; appoints new judges to Su 
 preme Court, 397 ; discussion of his 
 having packed the court, 399-401 ; 
 his administration disapproved of 
 by Chase, 413. 
 
 Greeley, Horace, corresponds with 
 Chase, 62 ; hostile to Seward, 191 ; 
 favors allowing peaceable seces 
 sion, 199 ; works for Chase s nomi 
 nation in 1864, 309 ; his campaign in 
 1872, 369 ; supported by Chase, 413. 
 
 Green, Beriah, anti-slavery professor 
 at Western Reserve College, 43. 
 
 Grier, Robert C., in Supreme Court 
 during war, 325 ; dissents in case of 
 Texas v. White, 379 ; his opinion in 
 Hepburn v. Griswold, 396 ; resigns, 
 399. 
 
 Grimes, James W., urged by Chase to 
 aid Kansas Free-Soilers, 172. 
 
 Groesbeck, William M., law student 
 under Chase, 24. 
 
 HALE, JOHN P., suggested as Liberty 
 candidate in 1847, 95 ; nominated at 
 Buffalo convention, 96 ; urged by 
 Chase to withdraw, 96 ; the logical 
 candidate of Free-Soilers, 100; with 
 draws from Liberty nomination, 
 102 ; Chase s estimate of, 113 ; ex 
 cluded from Senate committees, 114, 
 115 ; not a leader of Free-Soilers, 
 119 ; Free-Soil candidate in 1852, 
 132 ; superior to Chase in debate, 
 148. 
 
 Hall, James, issues Illinois Maga 
 zine and Western Souvenir," 18. 
 
 Halleck, General Henry W., call of 
 Chase upon, 296. 
 
 Haniliu, E. S., Ohio editor, supporter 
 of Chase, 62; becomes Chase s politi 
 cal lieutenant, 159. 
 
 Hamlin, Hannibal, elected vice-presi 
 dent, 196. 
 
 Hammond, Charles, joins Chase in a 
 protest against mobbing Birney, 49. 
 
 Hanna, Joshua, political lieutenant of 
 Chase, 180 ; urges appointments for 
 
454 
 
 INDEX 
 
 merit, 218 ; suggests an investment 
 for Chase, 417. 
 
 Hanway, Castner, tried for treason in 
 resisting slave-catchers, 1G5. 
 
 Harrison, William H., supported by 
 Chase for President in 183G, 86; and 
 again in 1840, 87 ; alleged dissatisfac 
 tion of Chase with, 87, 88 ; tries to 
 placate abolitionists in 1840, 89 ; 
 urged by Chase not to favor slavery, 
 89 ; his inaugural disappoints aboli 
 tionists, 89. 
 
 Hart, Albert Gaillard, describes Buf 
 falo convention, 99-101. 
 
 Hayes, Rutherford B., in Rosetta fugi 
 tive slave case, 165. 
 
 Henry, T. C., urges issue of legal ten 
 der, 250. 
 
 Hill, Judge, holds federal court in 
 Mississippi, 343 ; asserts constitu 
 tionality of reconstruction law, 350. 
 
 Hoadly, George, law partner of 
 Chase, 24; studies law with Chase, 
 25 ; on Chase s motives for leaving 
 Whigs in 1841, 88 ; Chase s political 
 lieutenant, 159 ; withdraws Chase s 
 name from Republican convention, 
 161 ; warns Chase that he has no 
 chance in 1860, 189. 
 
 Hoar, Ebenezer R., accused of con 
 spiring to pack the Supreme Court, 
 399 ; his nomination to Supreme 
 Court rejected by Senate, 400. 
 
 Hooker, General Joseph, corresponds 
 with Chase, 214, 29G ; efforts of 
 Chase in his behalf, 297. 
 
 Hooper, Samuel, favors Chase s bank 
 ing plans, 277. 
 
 Houston, Sam, opposes Nebraska Bill, 
 138. 
 
 Howard, Mark, his nomination re 
 jected by Senate, 304. 
 
 Howe, John W., in House in 1849, 
 114. 
 
 Hoyt, Jeanette Ralston Chase, her 
 birth, 22 ; her marriage, 419, 420. 
 
 Humphrey, Governor, brings suit to 
 restrain operation of reconstruction 
 act, 348. 
 
 Hunt, Randall, brother-in-law of 
 Chase, 21. 
 
 Hunter, General David, in command 
 in Carolina, 259 ; issues proclama 
 
 tion freeing slaves in three States, 
 262. 
 
 ILLINOIS stumped by Chase in 1858, 
 180. 
 
 Impeachment of Johnson, basis of, 
 358; disapproved of by Chase, 358, 
 359; action of Chase as president 
 during, 359, 360; its failure, 360. 
 
 Internal improvements supported by 
 Chase in Senate, 116. 
 
 JACKSON, ANDREW, Chase s opinion of, 
 in 1829, 9 ; not responsible for re 
 movals, according to Chase, 10 ; 
 reconstitutes the Supreme Court, 
 324. 
 
 Jay, John, his experience in public 
 office compared to Chase s, 323. 
 
 Jay, John, corresponds with Chase, 83, 
 422; on the results of the Nebraska 
 Bill, 146. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, his political prin 
 ciples held by Chase, 67. 
 
 Johnson, Andrew, suggested by Chase 
 as emissary to conciliate public 
 opinion in England, 215; issues 
 amnesty proclamation, 334 ; shows 
 little interest in aiding freedmen, 
 336; fails to prevent passage of 
 Freedman s Bureau Act, 337 ; his 
 quarrel with Congress, 338 ; alien 
 ates Chase by his attitude, 339; 
 announces cessation of war in eleven 
 States, 341 ; nominates Stanbery for 
 Supreme Court, 342 ; agrees with 
 judgments of court on validity of 
 test oaths, 346; pardons Garland, 
 347; declares reconstruction acts 
 unconstitutional, 348 ; objects to 
 case of Mississippi v. Johnson, 349 ; 
 declines to interfere in case of 
 Georgia v. Stanton, 349; anxious 
 for trial of Davis, 352 ; directs sur 
 render of Davis to federal courts, 
 352 ; issues general amnesty, 353 ; 
 vetoes act diminishing jurisdiction 
 of Supreme Court, 355; attempt to 
 impeach, 357-361 ; removes Stanton, 
 358 ; refuses to obey tenure of 
 office act, 358 ; escapes conviction, 
 360 ; proposes to enforce use of 
 legal tender, 391. 
 
INDEX 
 
 455 
 
 Jones, Wharton, his slaves aided by 
 Van Zandt to escape, 75 ; brings 
 suits against Van Zandt, 76. 
 
 KANSAS, struggle for possession of, 
 between North and South, 171, 172. 
 
 Kendall, Amos, loses a fugitive slave, 
 81. 
 
 Kent, Edward, Governor of Maine, 
 refuses to surrender a " slave 
 stealer," 76. 
 
 Kent, James, compliments Chase on 
 his " Ohio Laws," 19. 
 
 Kentucky, abolitionism in, 45, 83. 
 
 King, Edward, law partner of Chase, 
 22. 
 
 King, Leicester, early Ohio abolition 
 ist, 84. 
 
 King, Preston, in House in 1849, 114 ; 
 candidate for Republican nomina 
 tion in 1856, 160. 
 
 King, Rufus, on Chase s reasons for 
 joining Liberty party, 88. 
 
 Know-Nothings, their origin and early 
 success, 152 ; condemned by Chase, 
 153; demand that Chase join their 
 order to secure their support, 154 ; 
 break-up in 185C, 158. 
 
 LAMON, WARD H., removed from mar- 
 shalship by Chase, 322. 
 
 Lander, Frederick W., corresponds 
 with Chase, 214. 
 
 Lands, public, regulated by Home 
 stead Act, 117 ; granted to railways, 
 117. 
 
 Lane Seminary, anti-slavery episode 
 at, 39-42. 
 
 Lawrence, , in Matilda fugitive 
 
 slave case, 73. 
 
 Leavitt, Humphrey H., his decision 
 in Anderson fugitive slave case, 168. 
 
 Leavitt, Joshua, corresponds with 
 Chase, 62. 
 
 Legislature of Ohio, elects Chase 
 senator, 104-112 ; divides Hamilton 
 County in 1848, 105; contest over 
 elections to, from Hamilton County, 
 105; contest over organization of 
 House, 105, 106; organized by 
 Tpwnsheud and Morse at Chase s 
 suggestion, 106, 107; repeals Black 
 Laws, 107 ; elects Chase to Senate, 
 
 109, 111 ; declines to reelect Chase, 
 133 ; urged by Chase to aid Kansas, 
 172 ; elects Chase senator, 181. 
 
 Lewis, Samuel, typical Western abo 
 litionist, 57 ; as Free-Soil candidate 
 voted against by Chase in 1850, 131. 
 
 Liberal Republicans sympathized with 
 by Chase, 413. 
 
 Liberty newspapers aided by Chase, 
 61, 62. 
 
 Liberty party, origin of, in Ohio in 
 years 1835-40, 85, 86 ; its vote in 
 1840, 87; joined by Chase, 87-90; 
 organized and inspired by Chase, 
 91, 92; nominates Birney in 1843, 
 its platform, 92; its vote in 1844, 93, 
 its refusal to vote for Clay justified, 
 93,94; fails to grow in Ohio, 94 ; 
 available candidates for, in 1847, 
 95; at Buffalo nominates Hale, 95, 
 96; desired by Chase to coalesce 
 with Free-Soilers, 96; dissolves in 
 Ohio, 97. 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, as a debater com 
 pared with Douglas, 143 ; his cam 
 paign against Douglas for the Sen 
 ate, 174, 180; not recognized by 
 Chase as a rival for Republican 
 nomination, 180, 187; proposed as 
 vice-president, 182 ; attempts of 
 Chase s lieutenants to win over, 187, 
 188; receives solid support of Illi 
 nois, 188 ; receives support of all 
 elements opposed to Seward, 193; 
 bis nomination secured by some 
 Chase delegates, 194; congratulated 
 by Chase, 195; elected to presi 
 dency, 196; plans to have both Sew 
 ard and Chase in his cabinet, 197; 
 makes no offers for a month, 198; 
 wishes Seward to oppose Crittenden 
 compromise, 202; asks Chase if he 
 will accept the Treasury Depart 
 ment, 202, 203; refuses to change 
 his mind, 205; urges Chase to ac 
 cept, 206; his inaugural, 207; his 
 leadership not realized at first by 
 cabinet, 207 ; asks opinion of cabi 
 net on question of relieving Sum- 
 ter, 208, 209; ignores Seward s 
 proposal for foreign war, 210; issues 
 proclamation calling for volunteers, 
 211; lacks confidence in Cameron, 
 
456 
 
 INDEX 
 
 211; asks Chase s aid in drafting 
 orders, 211, 212 ; urges Cisco to 
 hold office, 217; appoints Barney 
 collector of port of New York, 217; 
 seldom interferes with Chase s pa 
 tronage, 219; approves Chase s or 
 ders for sale of confiscated property, 
 225; approves Chase s orders regu 
 lating trade with the South, 228; 
 dreads heavy taxation, 237; annuls 
 Fremont s emancipation proclama 
 tion, 256; reluctant to authorize 
 Chase to provide for negro refu 
 gees, 259, 260; favors compensated 
 emancipation, 260, 261; favors colo 
 nization, 261; annuls Hunter s 
 emancipation proclamation, 262 ; 
 reluctant to proclaim emancipa 
 tion, 264, 265; reads draft to cabi 
 net, 265-269; asks for suggestions 
 on final proclamation, 270 ; his in 
 difference to negro suffrage de 
 plored by Chase, 273 ; sends message 
 recommending national banks, 278; 
 not dissatisfied with Chase s finan 
 cial management, 287 ; not intimate 
 with Chase, 290; reasons for his 
 attitude, 290, 291 ; shows considera 
 tion and fairness toward Chase, 
 291 ; differs from Chase in his atti 
 tude on union and slavery, 291, 292; 
 harassed by Chase s advice in mili 
 tary matters, 292; his disregard of 
 cabinet opinion complained of by 
 Chase, 293, 294; pains Chase by neg 
 lecting his advice, 294; refuses to 
 dismiss McClellan, 294, 295; criti 
 cised by Chase, 297-299; his forbear 
 ance, 299 ; urged by Republican sena 
 tors to reconstruct his cabinet, 302 ; 
 dissatisfaction of Chase with his 
 weakness, 302, 303; refuses to ac 
 cept Seward s and Chase s resigna 
 tions, 303; appears better in affair 
 than the secretaries, 304; attempt 
 of Chase to coerce in matter of ap 
 pointments in Treasury Department, 
 304, 305; removes Victor Smith, 
 306; persuades Chase to withdraw 
 his resignation, 306, 307; defied by 
 Stanton in minor matters, 307; 
 sometimes ignored by Seward, 307 ; 
 annoyed by Chase s captiousness, 
 
 308; obliged to keep his party in 
 line, 308; tribute of Chase to his 
 fairness, 310; temporarily dis 
 credited in 1S63, 310,311; declines 
 to call for Chase s resignation after 
 the Pomeroy Circular, 312; enrages 
 Chase by giving Blair a position in 
 the army, 314; renominated for 
 President, 314; asks Chase for 
 removal of Barney, 315; tries to 
 harmonize Chase s and Morgan s 
 quarrel over offices, 316; accepts 
 Chase s resignation, 317; Chase s 
 comments on his action, 317, 318; 
 announces purpose to appoint Chase 
 to succeed Taney, 319; unmoved by 
 opposition to Chase, 321 ; nominates 
 Chase for Chief Justice, 321 ; recon 
 stitutes the Supreme Court, 324, 
 325; proposes circuit judges, 324; 
 declines to notice Taney s opinion 
 in Merryman Case, 327 ; his theory 
 of reconstruction, 329; secures ad 
 mission of West Virginia and recog 
 nition of Louisiana, 330 ; his amnesty 
 proclamation, 330, 331; criticised 
 by Chase, 331; vetoes Congressional 
 reconstruction bill, 332 ; causes re 
 organization in three States, 332 ; 
 assassinated, 333; his reputation 
 overshadows other war leaders, 430; 
 not appreciated properly by Chase, 
 431,432; his opinion of Chase, 435. 
 
 Lincoln, Mrs. Abraham, her rivalry 
 with Mrs. Sprague, 420. 
 
 Ludlow, Israel, founder of Cincinnati, 
 21. 
 
 Ludlow, James C., father-in-law of 
 Chase, aids Lane Seminary seceders, 
 40. 
 
 Ludlow, Sarah B. D., third wife of 
 Chase, her character, 21. 
 
 Lundy, Benjamin, his anti-slavery 
 labors in Ohio and the West, 36. 
 
 McCARDLE, Colonel, case of, before 
 Supreme Court, 350; taken out of 
 jurisdiction of court by act of Con 
 gress, 355. 
 
 McClellan, George B., early friend 
 ship of Chase for, 213; repulses 
 Chase, 224 ; attempt of Chase and 
 Seward to compel his dismissal, 294; 
 
INDEX 
 
 457 
 
 attempts of Chase to inspire, 295 ; 
 loses confidence of Chase, 296; sup 
 ported by Seward, 303. 
 
 McCook, , corresponds with 
 Chase, 214; nominates Seymour in 
 Democratic convention of 18G8, 3G8. 
 
 McCulloch, Hugh, as Secretary of 
 Treasury begins redemption of legal 
 tender notes, 390. 
 
 McDowell, General Irwin, favored by 
 Chase, 296. 
 
 McLean, John T., uncle of Chase by 
 marriage, 22; his decision in Van 
 Zandt Case, 76; candidate for Whig 
 nomination in 1840, 8G; considered 
 as possible Liberty candidate, 95; 
 considered as possible Free-Soil 
 candidate, 98; candidate for Re 
 publican nomination in 1856, 160, 
 161; his opinion in Rosetta slave 
 case, 166; candidate for Republican 
 nomination in 1860, 189; his death, 
 324. 
 
 Mahau, Asa, resigns trusteeship of 
 Lane Seminary, 40 ; accepts presi 
 dency of Oberlin College, 42. 
 
 Marshall, John, Chase s opinion of, 
 319; compared with Chase, 425. 
 
 Martin, John, asks Chase s aid for his 
 mulatto children, 81. 
 
 Matilda, fugitive slave, defended by 
 Birney and Chase, 73. 
 
 Matthews, Stanley, studies law under 
 Chase, 24; his part in arranging for 
 Chase s election to Senate, 111, 112. 
 
 Medill, Joseph, Democratic candidate 
 for governor of Ohio, 155. 
 
 Merryman, John, case of, 326, 327. 
 
 Mexican war, its purpose, 120. 
 
 Miller, Samuel F., appointed to Su 
 preme Court, 325; dissents in Cum- 
 mings Case, 347 ; dissents in Texas v. 
 White, 379; contradicts Chase re 
 garding Hepburn v. Griswold, 403. 
 
 Milligan, L. P., in case before Supreme 
 Court, 344-346. 
 
 Mitchell, , corresponds with 
 
 Chase, 214. 
 
 Molitor, , Ohio editor, friend of 
 
 Chase, 62. 
 
 Monfort, H., fined for employing a 
 negro woman, 82. 
 
 Monroe, James, studies law with 
 
 Chase, 25; secured an office by Chase, 
 215. 
 
 Morehead, Charles S., asked by Chase 
 to extradite Margaret Garner, 167. 
 
 Morgan, General C. H., corresponds 
 with Chase, 295. 
 
 Morgan, Edwin D., insists on spoils of 
 New York assistant treasurer s 
 office, 315; his dealings with Chase 
 and Lincoln, 316. 
 
 Morgan, John, anti-slavery instructor, 
 dismissed from Lane Seminary, 40; 
 accepts professorship in Oberlin Col 
 lege, 42. 
 
 Morris, Thomas, counsel for Van 
 Zandt, 76 ; first abolitionist senator, 
 85. 
 
 Morse, J. F., elected to Ohio legisla 
 ture in 1848, 105, 106; prefers Gid- 
 dings to Chase for senator, 108; 
 influenced by Chase in Hamilton 
 County question, 110; carries bill 
 for repeal of Black Laws, 110. 
 
 NEBRASKA BILL, struggle over, 133- 
 146 ; reasons for its introduction, 
 133; leaders in debate over, 134; bill 
 reshaped to suit South, 134, 135; 
 reasons for and against the bill, 
 136; attacked in appeal of Indepen 
 dent Democrats, 138-141; passed, 
 145, 146; results predicted by Chase, 
 147. 
 
 Needham, Edgar, abolitionist in Ken 
 tucky, 83. 
 
 Negroes, free, origin of, in Ohio, 15, 
 29 ; number of, 29 ; laws regulating, 
 30; buy their freedom, 31; mobs 
 against, in Cincinnati, 31 ; efforts of 
 Lane Seminary students to benefit, 
 40; report on their condition, 44; 
 give Chase a silver pitcher, 82; 
 Black Laws concerning, repealed, 
 110. 
 
 Nelson, Judge Samuel, on Supreme 
 bench during war, 325; dissents in 
 case of Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 387. 
 
 Nelson, General W., efforts of Chase 
 to assist, 213. 
 
 New Mexico, status of slavery in, 120. 
 
 New York, efforts of Chase to obtain 
 support in, 180; corruption of 
 Weed s politics in, 184-187. 
 
458 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Nichols, Eli, Chase s agent in election 
 of 1849, 112. 
 
 Nicolay, John G. , marshal of Supreme 
 Court, 323. 
 
 North, causes for anti-slavery move 
 ment in, 35, 36; humanitarian 
 advance in, since colonial times, 
 contrasted with backwardness of 
 South, 121 ; members of, in Con 
 gress not combined against slavery, 
 123; aroused by the passage of the 
 Nebraska act, 146; passes personal 
 liberty laws to impede slave-catch 
 ing, 163, 164; carried by Republi 
 cans in 1860, 196; apparently ready 
 to permit secession, 199, 200 ; roused 
 by fall of Sumter, 211. 
 
 Northwest, historical sketch of, by 
 Chase, 19, 20; peculiarities of abo 
 litionism in, 37, 56, 57. 
 
 OBEELIN COLLEGE, foundation of, 41 ; 
 receives Lane Seminary seceders, 
 42; political influence of, 42, 43. 
 
 Ohio, early religious life in, 4; pro 
 sperity of southern part of, 14 ; early 
 settlers of, 14, 15, 28; trade com 
 munications in, 15, 16; laws of, 
 codified by Chase, 19; rivalry in, 
 between northern and southern 
 parts, 29 ; Black Laws in, 30, 31 ; 
 slavery prohibited in, 33, 34 ; early 
 anti-slavery societies in, 35, 36; 
 legislature of, passes resolutions 
 favoring emancipation, 36; begin 
 ning of abolitionism in, 36-39; for 
 mation of State Anti-Slavery Society 
 in, 44 ; courts of, return fugitive 
 slaves and convict rescuers, 73-75, 
 80,81; early abolitionists in, politics 
 in, 84, 86; Liberty party vote in, 93, 
 94; Free-Territory Convention in, 
 96, 97 ; senatorial struggle in, 104- 
 112; efforts of Chase to benefit, as 
 senator, 116; fortunes of Free-Soil 
 party in, 131, 132; carried by anti- 
 Nebraska movement, 151; campaign 
 of Chase in, for governor, 154-156; 
 important effect of its being carried 
 by Republicans, 156; economic con 
 dition under Chase s administra 
 tion, 156; political management in, 
 by Chase, 157; principal features of 
 
 Chase s administration, 158; corrup 
 tion in treasurer s office, 161, 162; 
 again carried by Republicans, 162, 
 163; fugitive slave cases in, during 
 Chase s administration, 165-170; its 
 courts conflict with federal courts, 
 166, 167, 169, 170; failure of Chase 
 to control Republican delegates in, 
 189, 192, 193; recommends Lincoln s 
 renomination, 314; ratifies Fifteenth 
 Amendment through Chase s influ 
 ence, 372. 
 
 Opdyke, George, supports Chase for 
 Republican nomination in 1860, 191 ; 
 abandons Chase for Lincoln, 193; 
 aids Chase s financial measures, 222; 
 urges issue of legal tender, 250; 
 tries to organize national banks, 
 280. 
 
 Ordinance of 1787, Chase s history of, 
 19; prescribes return of fugitive 
 slaves, 33; prohibits slavery, 34; 
 held by Chase to invalidate Fugi 
 tive Slave Act, 71; Chase s use of, 
 in Van Zandt argument, 77; ap 
 pealed to by Chase, 123. 
 
 PACIFIC RAILROAD, plan to construct, 
 favored by Chase, 118. 
 
 Parish, Francis D., convicted in a 
 fugitive slave case, 80. 
 
 Parker, Theodore, letter of Chase to, 
 on his political principles, 56. 
 
 Parsons, Richard C., secured a po 
 sition by Chase, 215; marshal of 
 Supreme Court, 322; obliged to re 
 sign, 323. 
 
 Paul, Dr., Chase s letter to, on Know- 
 Nothing party, 133, 134. 
 
 Payne, Henry B., defeated by Chase 
 for governor, 162. 
 
 Peace Conference in 1860 fails to se 
 cure a compromise, 204. 
 
 Pendleton, George H., candidate for 
 Democratic nomination in 1868, 367, 
 368. 
 
 Phillips, Wendell, his true place in the 
 abolition movement, 37, 55 ; attacks 
 Chase for his attitude in Garner case, 
 167 ; proposes abolition of Supreme 
 Court, 346. 
 
 Pierce, Edward L. , studies law under 
 Chase, 24 ; on Chase s self-interest, 
 
INDEX 
 
 459 
 
 25 ; on Chase s reasons for joining 
 Liberty party, 87 ; tells Chase his 
 chances for nomination in 1856 are 
 hopeless, 160 ; works for Chase in 
 I860, 180 ; has to vote for Seward in 
 convention, 191 ; visits North Caro 
 lina in interests of freedruen, 259; his 
 friendship with Chase, 421. 
 
 Pierce, Franklin, elected President, 
 adopts a pro-slavery policy, 132. 
 
 Polk, James K., nominated for Presi 
 dent as an annexationist, 92, 93. 
 
 Pomeroy, Samuel C., issues circular 
 proposing Chase for President, 312. 
 
 Pope, General John, sympathy of 
 Chase with, 296. 
 
 Popular sovereignty, reasons for popu 
 larity of the doctrine, 136. 
 
 Powers, Hiram, purchase of his statue 
 of America urged by Chase, 119. 
 
 Price, John, fugitive slave rescued by 
 mob in Oberliu, 169. 
 
 Pugh, George, law student under 
 Chase, 24 ; Democratic contestant 
 for seat in Ohio legislature, 105, 
 106 ; gains seat through Chase s in 
 fluence, 109, 110, 111 ; elected sena 
 tor in 1854, 133 ; counsel for slave- 
 catchers in Anderson case, 168 ; calls 
 coercion impossible, 199. 
 
 QUINCY, EDMUND, calls Chase a politi 
 cal huckster, 55. 
 
 RALSTON, JANET, mother of S. P. 
 Chase, 2 ; struggles to give her chil 
 dren an education, 5. 
 
 Randolph, John, Chase s opinion of, 
 in 1829, 10. 
 
 Rankin, Dr. John, early abolitionist in 
 Ohio, 38. 
 
 Read, Judge, renders decision return 
 ing a fugitive slave, and later is 
 turned out of office by Free-Soilers, 
 80. 
 
 Reconstruction, problem of, 329 ; Lin 
 coln s theory of, 329,330; Chase s 
 opposing view of, 330 ; begun in 
 Louisiana, 330 ; outlined in amnesty 
 proclamation, 330, 331 ; Lincoln s 
 veto of reconstruction bill, 332 ; 
 process continues in two States, 
 332 ; renewed by Johnson s amnesty 
 
 proclamation, 334 ; process of, 336 ; 
 different views of Congress and 
 Johnson regarding, 338 ; passage of 
 Civil Rights Act, 340; reconstruc 
 tion acts of 1867, 341, 342; refusal 
 of Supreme Court to consider cases 
 involving, 348-350; completed in the 
 South, 357; upheld in Texas v. White, 
 378 ; and in White v. Hart, 380. 
 Republican party, beginnings of, 146 ; 
 formation of, predicted by Chase, 
 147 ; its origin in Anti-Nebraska ac 
 tion, 150, 151 ; elects a majority of 
 congressmen, 151 ; not regarded by 
 Chase as permanent, 152 ; infected 
 with Know-Nothingism, 153; nomi 
 nates Chase for governor in Ohio, 
 154, 155; suffers reaction in 1855, 
 156 ; gains by disruption of Know- 
 Nothing party, 159 ; efforts of Chase 
 to secure its nomination for Presi 
 dent, 159-161 ; holds preliminary 
 convention at Pittsburg, 160 ; nomi 
 nates Fremont, 161 ; carries Ohio in 
 1857, 162 ; place held by Chase in, 
 163 ; vacillates regarding Kansas, 
 173; movement in, to support Doug 
 las, 174, 180 ; gains ground in 1858, 
 178 ; canvass for presidential nomi 
 nation in, 178-190 ; not consolidated 
 in 1860, 183 ; different elements in, 
 183; corrupt elements of, 190; holds 
 convention at Chicago, 190; nomi 
 nates Lincoln, 191-194 ; reasons why 
 it fails to nominate Chase, 195 ; 
 elects Lincoln, 196 ; its platform, 
 198 ; regards secession as a trick, 
 198 ; ready to compromise in 1860, 
 201 ; refuses to pass Crittenden 
 compromise, 204 ; not anti-slavery 
 in 1861, 253 ; different elements of, 
 253, 254 ; supported by war Demo 
 crats, 255 ; dissatisfaction in, with 
 Lincoln and Seward, 302, 310 ; ques 
 tion of nomination in 1864, 308-314 , 
 movement in, for Chase, 309 ; re- 
 nominates Lincoln, 314 ; campaign 
 of 1864, 320; opposition in, to 
 Chase s appointment as chief jus 
 tice, 321 ; desire of Chase for nomi 
 nation in 1868, 361-363 ; nominates 
 Grant, 363; abandoned by Chase, 
 365 ; loses ground in country, 369 ; 
 
460 
 
 INDEX 
 
 leaders of, as a rule , oppose Chase, 
 422. 
 
 Riddle, A. G., on the election of Chase 
 to Senate, 112 ; his skill m Ober- 
 lin rescue case, 170 ; urges Chase 
 upon Lincoln for chief justiceship, 
 321. 
 
 Robinson, Charles, free-state gover 
 nor of Kansas, visits Chase, 172 ; 
 recommends Brown to Chase, 174 ; 
 on Chase s chances for nomination, 
 180 ; on Weed s corruption, 184. 
 
 Root, J. P., in House in 1849, 114. 
 
 Rosecrans, General W. S., corresponds 
 with Chase, 297. 
 
 Rosetta, fugitive slave, contended for 
 by Ohio and federal courts, 165. 
 
 Rousseau, General L. H., congratu 
 lated by Chase, 297. 
 
 SAXTON, GENERAL RUFUS, appointed 
 military governor of South Carolina, 
 aids negro refugees, 2GO. 
 
 Schenck, Robert C., on necessity for 
 curbing power of Supreme Court, 
 355. 
 
 Schuckers, J. W., on Chase s reasons 
 for joining Liberty party in 1841, 
 87. 
 
 Scott, General Winfield, advises 
 against provisioning Sumter, 208. 
 
 Secession, defied by Chase in 1850, 
 128 ; threatened in I860, 198 ; possi 
 ble methods of meeting, 199 ; at 
 first meets no opposition, 199 ; at 
 tempts to avoid, by compromise, 
 201-205 ; Lincoln s attitude on, 
 205. 
 
 Senate of the United States, regards 
 Chase as insignificant, 112 ; anti- 
 slavery men in, 113, 114; excludes 
 Chase and others from committees, 
 114, 115 ; share in business of, taken 
 by Chase, 116-119; debates Clay s 
 Compromise resolutions, 124-129 ; 
 controlled by junction of Webster 
 with the South, 124 ; Chase s speech 
 in, on compromise, 125-128 ; defeats 
 Chase s motion to exclude slavery 
 from New Mexico, 129 ; debates Ne 
 braska Bill, 142-145 ; rejects Chase s 
 amendments, 144 ; passes the bill, 
 145, 146 ; summary of Chase s ca 
 
 reer in, 148 ; in impeachment of 
 Johnson, 357-361. 
 
 Seward, William H., as governor of 
 New York, refuses to extradite a 
 " slave-stealer," 76 ; counsel in Van 
 Zandt Case,, 76 ; protests against 
 Chase s bitterness toward Whigs, 
 80 ; plan to nominate, protested 
 against by Birney, 92 ; suggested 
 as Liberty candidate in 1847, 95 ; 
 Chase s opinion of, as a senator, 
 113 ; excluded from Senate commit 
 tees, 115 ; for the Whig party first, 
 120 ; not in sympathy with Chase, 
 124, 125 ; his political prestige, 125; 
 Douglas s opinion of, 134; his minor 
 part in Nebraska debate, 145 ; does 
 not seek Republican nomination in 
 1856, 160 ; his caution, 176 ; a better 
 party leader than Chase, 177 ; his 
 " irrepressible conflict " speech, 
 180 ; elements of weakness in his 
 candidacy in 1860, 183, 184 ; dam 
 aged by his corrupt support, 184; 
 receives solid support of New York, 
 188 ; apparently sure of nomination, 
 191 ; defeated by coalition, 193, 194; 
 desired by Lincoln in his cabinet, 
 197, 200; acts as leader in discussing 
 compromises, 200, 201 ; refuses to 
 accept Crittenden compromise, 202; 
 follows Lincoln s wish, 202 ; urged 
 by Chase not to make concessions, 
 203 ; assumes attitude of leader of 
 administration, 207 ; on good terms 
 with Chase, 207 ; opposes attempt 
 to relieve Sumter, 209 ; submits his 
 foreign policy to Lincoln, 210; ready 
 to favor action against slavery, 265 ; 
 suggests modifications of Emancipa 
 tion Proclamation, 268, 269; his per 
 sonal intimacy witli Lincoln envied 
 by Chase, 290 ; at first a rival, later 
 on good terms with Chase, 301, 302; 
 dissatisfaction of radicals with, 302; 
 agrees with Chase to resign from 
 cabinet, 302 ; Lincoln s principal 
 supporter, 303; resumes office, 303 ; 
 eager for Lincoln s protection, 304 ; 
 sometimes assumes undue responsi 
 bility, 307 ; loses reputation under 
 Johnson, 362 ; morally inferior to 
 Chase, 429, 431, 432. 
 
INDEX 
 
 461 
 
 Seymour, Horatio, declines to be 
 Democratic candidate, 367 ; nomi 
 nated by a stampede, 3G8. 
 
 Sherman, Judge Charles, obliged to 
 resign, 323. 
 
 Sherman, John, prefers Sevvard to 
 Chase in I860, 194. 
 
 Sherman, W. T., letters of Chase to, 
 on military matters, 213. 
 
 Shields, General James, asks Chase 
 to confer on his behalf with Lincoln, 
 295. 
 
 Shipherd, John J., founds Oberlin 
 College, 41 ; insists on engaging in 
 structors dismissed from Lane Sem 
 inary and on opening college to 
 colored students, 41, 42. 
 
 Sickles, Daniel, complains of failure 
 of efforts to prevent trade with 
 South, 229 ; has controversy with 
 Chase as federal judge, 343; re 
 moved by Johnson, 344. 
 
 Skinner, Ralston, studies law under 
 Chase, 24. 
 
 Slavery, Chase s argument against its 
 legality, G3-73 ; its status under the 
 Constitution, 63; question of its 
 moral good or ill, 64 ; Giddings s 
 doctrine of its uncoiistitutionality, 
 6G ; real attitude of Constitution on, 
 69 ; permitted by Congress south of 
 Ohio, 69 ; struggle over, in the Ter 
 ritories begins, 103, 120; keeps South 
 backward in civilization, 121 ; new 
 attitude of South toward, 122, 123 ; 
 not in question in 1861, 253; inten 
 tion of attacking, disclaimed, 254 ; 
 Lincoln s plans for emancipation, 
 256; abolished in Territories, 257, 
 258 ; attempt of Hunter to abolish, 
 in coast States, 262, 263. 
 
 Slaves, fugitive, in Ohio, 29, 32 ; 
 helped by Underground Railroad, 
 32 ; reclaimed in Ohio, 33 ; Chase s 
 efforts in behalf of, 73-83; appeal to 
 Chase for all kinds of help, 81, 82 ; 
 in Civil War, status of, 255, 256; 
 take refuge in Union lines, 258 ; ex 
 pected to rise if emancipated, 263, 
 264 ; freed by Lincoln s Emancipa 
 tion Proclamation, 270. 
 
 Smith, Eliza Ann, second wife of 
 Chase. 21. 
 
 Smith, Gerrit, candidate for Liberty 
 nomination in 1847, 95 ; signs Appeal 
 of Independent Democrats, 139. 
 
 Smith, Victor, appointed to office at 
 Chase s suggestion, 305 j commits 
 indiscretions as collector at Puget 
 Sound, 305, 306 ; removed by Lin 
 coln, 306; less disturbed than Chase, 
 307. 
 
 Smith, W. B., corresponds with Chase, 
 214. 
 
 Soule, Pierre, his relations with Chase, 
 148. 
 
 South, gradual change of its opinion 
 regarding slavery, 35 ; reasons for 
 its desire to suppress abolitionists, 
 38; driven by abolitionists attacks 
 into defense of slavery, 64 ; enraged 
 at failure to secure California, 120; 
 continues brutality of eighteenth 
 century into the nineteenth, 121 ; 
 considers itself aggrieved by atti 
 tude of North toward District of 
 Columbia and Fugitive Slave Law, 
 122; its real reasons for demanding 
 extension of slavery, 122, 123; gains 
 by Compromise of 1850, 130 ; pro 
 poses to gain by Nebraska Bill, 133 ; 
 wishes explicit repeal of Missouri 
 Compromise, 135 ; plans secession, 
 198 ; secedes, 202, 203 ; unaffected 
 by Emancipation Proclamation, 270; 
 political and economic condition 
 after war, 333, 334 ; elements of re 
 construction in, 334, 335 ; cessation 
 of war in, proclaimed by Johnson, 
 341 ; beginnings of federal courts in, 
 343, 344 ; completion of reconstruc 
 tion in, 357 ; suppression of negro 
 vote in, 381. 
 
 Southgate, H. H., prevents nomination 
 of Chase for state senator in 1840, on 
 anti-slavery grounds, 88. 
 
 Spaulding, Elbridge G., urges issue of 
 legal tender notes, 246, 247. 
 
 Spoils system, introduction of, ob 
 served by Chase, 9 ; under Lincoln s 
 administration, 216-219, 304-306, 
 315, 316 ; refusal of Chase to em 
 ploy, 311. 
 
 Spooner, Lysander, his doctrine as to 
 relation of Constitution and slavery, 
 66. 
 
462 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Sprague, Kate Chase, her birth, 21; 
 marriage to Senator Sprague, 419; 
 sketch of her character and ambi 
 tions, 420. 
 
 Stanbery, Henry, his nomination to 
 Supreme Court rejected by Senate, 
 342. 
 
 Stanford, Leland, delegate to Repub 
 lican convention of I860, 188. 
 Stanton, Benjamin, suggests a case 
 to test constitutionality of slavery, 
 82. 
 
 Stanton, Edwin M., authorizes enlist 
 ment of negroes, 263 ; fails to enjoy 
 Lincoln s jokes, 2GG ; upbraided by 
 Chase for wastefulness, 293; his 
 efficiency not understood by Chase, 
 300; Chase s opinion of, 301 ; defies 
 Lincoln in small matters, 307 ; ex 
 pected by Chase to resign when he 
 does, 317 ; thought by Chase to be a 
 candidate to succeed Taney, 320; 
 suit of Georgia against, 349 ; issues 
 writs for arrest of leading Con 
 federates, 352 ; removed from office 
 by Johnson, 358 ; named for Su 
 preme Court, but dies, 400 ; com 
 pared with Chase, 430. 
 Stanton, H. B., at organization of 
 Ohio Anti-Slavery Society, 44; sug 
 gests J. P. Hale as Liberty candi 
 date in 1847, 95; corresponds with 
 Chase, 98 ; on Weed s corrupt man 
 agement, 185. 
 
 4 Stevens, Thaddeus, urged by Chase to 
 make no concessions, 203; leads 
 House, 234; exceeds Chase s plans 
 for taxation, 239; opposes Chase s 
 plan for national banks, 277; dis 
 gusted at Chase s action in Johnson 
 impeachment, 3P>0; his reasons for 
 advocating negro suffrage, 370; 
 compared with Chase, 430. 
 Stewart, Philo P., founds Oberlin Col 
 
 lege, 41. 
 
 Story, Joseph, compliments Chase on 
 his "Ohio Laws," 19; on Chase 
 Van Zandt argument, 77. 
 Strong, William, appointed to Supreme 
 Court, 399 ; known to be a supporte 
 of the constitutionality of legal ten 
 der, 401; gives decision in Lega 
 Tender Cases, 404. 
 
 uffrage, negro. See Freedmen. 
 
 umner, Charles, compared with 
 Western abolitionists, 57 ; corre 
 sponds with Chase, 98 ; predicts 
 Chase s success in Senate, 113; 
 elected to Senate, 114 ; not a parlia 
 mentarian, 119 ; Douglas s opinion 
 of, 134 ; signs Appeal of Independent 
 Democrats, 138 ; less prominent than 
 Chase, 17G; disabled by Brooks, 180; 
 urges appointment of Chase as chief 
 justice, 321 ; his reasons for advo 
 cating negro suffrage, 370 ; Chase s 
 only intimate friend among leaders, 
 422; compared with Chase, 430. 
 
 umter, Fort, question of its relief, 
 208-211 ; successive consultations of 
 cabinet on, 208, 210. 
 
 upreme Court, decides Prigg Case, 
 1G ; decides against Chase in Van 
 Zandt Case, 7G; Chase s early opin 
 ion of, 319; patronage of, 322, 323; 
 its depressed condition during war, 
 
 323, 324 ; its political character 
 changed by Lincoln s appointments, 
 
 324, 325 ; continues conservative tra 
 ditions, 325 ; in case of New York v. 
 Commissioners, 326 ; decides Prize 
 Cases, 326 ; in Vallandigham Case, 
 327, 328 ; declines to pass on cases 
 involving status of seceded States, 
 328 ; its numbers reduced by Con 
 gress, 342 ; decides Milligan Case, 
 344-346; gains unpopularity, 346; 
 in Cummings v. Missouri, 346, 347 ; 
 in Garland Case, 347, 348 ; declines 
 to consider reconstruction in Mis 
 sissippi v. Johnson, 348, 349; de 
 clines to consider Georgia v. Stanton, 
 349, 350; hears McCardle Case, 350; 
 refuses to consider treason cases, 
 351-353; in danger of attack from 
 Congress, 354 ; its jurisdiction di 
 minished by Congress, 355 ; admits 
 a negro to bar, 373 ; decides to en 
 force anti-bellum slave contracts in 
 White v. Hart, 373; gives conflict 
 ing decisions as to beginning and 
 end of war, 374; on the Confederate 
 government, 375; decides cases on 
 amnesty and confiscation acts, 376; 
 in Tarbeirs Case, 377, 378; in Texas 
 v. White announces doctrine of 
 
INDEX 
 
 463 
 
 indestructible Union, 378-380; in 
 White v. Hart on reconstruction, 
 380 ; in Slaughter-house Cases 
 restricts bearing of anti-slavery 
 amendments, 381-383; enforces war 
 taxes, 385; in License Tax Cases, 
 386 ; in Veazie Bank Case supports 
 tax on state bank notes, 38G, 387; 
 in three cases limits use of legal 
 tender, 393 ; in Hepburn v. Grisivold 
 holds legal tender unconstitutional, 
 394-397 ; this decision criticised, 
 
 398, 399; reorganized by Grant, 
 
 399, 401 ; struggle in, between new 
 members and old over reconsidera 
 tion of legal tender question, 402, 
 403 ; in Legal Tender Cases reverses 
 decision, 404-408; discussion of its 
 decision, 408-410 ; damaged in pre 
 stige, 412 ; upholds income tax in 
 Collector v. Day, 388. 
 
 Swan, Joseph W., refused reelection 
 by Republicans on anti-slavery 
 grounds, 170. 
 
 Swayne, Noah H., wishes to succeed 
 Taney, 320; appointed to Supreme 
 Court, 325; dissents in Cummings 
 Case, 347; dissents in Texas v. White, 
 379; dissents in Slaughter-House 
 Cases, 381. 
 
 TANEY, ROGER B., said to have been 
 influenced by Chase s argument in 
 Morse telegraph case, 2G; dies in 
 office, 320, 324; protests against 
 suspension of habeas corpus in 
 Merry man Case, 32G, 327. 
 
 Taylor, J. W., Ohio editor, studies 
 law with Chase, 62. 
 
 Taylor, Zachary, nominated by Whigs 
 for President, 96; his policy toward 
 California and New Mexico angers 
 South, 120; effect of his death on 
 the territorial struggle, 128. 
 
 Texas, question of its annexation in 
 campaign of 1844, 92-94; question 
 of responsibility of Liberty party 
 for its annexation, 93; question of 
 its boundary in 1850, 126; necessity 
 of reconstruction in, 339; in case of 
 Texas v. While, 379. 
 
 Thome, J. A., anti-slavery leader at 
 Lane Seminary, 39. 
 
 Tilden, Samuel J., favors a new policy 
 for Democratic party, 365. 
 
 Townshend, Mary, asks Chase s aid in 
 purchasing freedom for her family, 
 81. 
 
 Townshend, Norton, elected to Ohio 
 legislature in 1848, 105, 106; favors 
 Chase for senator, 108 ; his course 
 in struggle of 1849 dictated by 
 Chase, 110, 111. 
 
 Treasury Department, Chase ap 
 pointed to, 206; its management 
 learned by Chase, 207; demoralized 
 in 1860, 216; new officials in, ap 
 pointed by Chase, 216-219; diffi 
 culties over spoils in, 217, 218; new 
 administration of, by Chase, 220; 
 takes charge of confiscated property ? 
 224,225; supervises prohibition of 
 trade with enemy, 225-229. 
 
 Trent affair, Chase s attitude in, 215. 
 
 Trimble, Allen, Whig and Know-No- 
 thing candidate for governor of 
 Ohio, 155. 
 
 Trollope, Mrs., her description of Cin 
 cinnati not adequate, 16. 
 
 Tuck, Amos, in House in 1849, 114. 
 
 Turner, Elizabeth, released by Chase s 
 decision against Maryland emanci 
 pation act, 351. 
 
 Tyler, John, Chase s opinion of, 87. 
 
 UNDERGROUND RAILROAD, its begin 
 nings, 32, 39 ; its operation, 75. 
 
 Underwood, John C., holds federal 
 courts in Virginia, 343 ; admits 
 Davis to bail, 353. 
 
 VALLANDIGHAM, CLEMENT L., counsel 
 for slave-catchers, 168 ; predicts 
 Southern occupancy of Washington 
 in 1860, 199 ; his sentence by court- 
 martial disapproved of by Chase, 
 300 ; case of, before the Supreme 
 Court, 327 ; favors nomination of 
 Chase in 1868, 367. 
 
 Van Bur en, John, acts as Chase s 
 agent in 1868, 367. 
 
 Van Buren, Martin, low opinion re 
 garding, held by Chase in 1829, 9 ; 
 opposed by Chase in 1840, 87 ; leads 
 bolt of Barnburners, 96 ; his name 
 presented to Buffalo convention by 
 
464 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Butler, 100; nominated for Presi 
 dent, 101 ; his vote in 1848, 102. 
 Van Zandt, John, keeps station of 
 Underground Railroad, 75 ; sued 
 for aiding runaway slaves, 76 ; de 
 fended by Chase and others, but 
 convicted, 76. 
 
 WADE, BENJAMIN F., begins public 
 career as anti-slavery state senator, 
 84 ; elected to United States Senate, 
 113 ; a rival of Chase, 114 ; supports 
 Homestead Bill, 117 ; not fitted to 
 lead anti-slavery men in Senate, 119, 
 148 ; attacks Nebraska Bill, 145 ; 
 comments on its passage, 146 ; pre 
 vents Chase from receiving whole 
 support of Ohio in Republican con 
 vention, 189; fears of Chase s friends 
 that he may sweep convention, 193, 
 194 ; leads radicals in Senate, 234 ; 
 effort of Chase to placate, 309. 
 
 Wade, Edward, signs Appeal of Inde 
 pendent Democrats, 138. 
 
 Walker, I. P., in Nebraska debate, 
 145. 
 
 Walker, Robert J., the last efficient 
 Secretary of the Treasury before 
 Chase, 216; brings suit of Mississippi 
 v. Johnson, 348. 
 
 Walker, Timothy, law partner of 
 Chase, 22. 
 
 Walley, Samuel H., favors creation of 
 national banks, 278. 
 
 War of Rebellion, begun, 211 ; call for 
 volunteers, 211, 212; early share of 
 Chase in organizing army, 212-217 ; 
 the blockade, 226 ; attempts to pre 
 vent internal trade, 226-229 ; at 
 tempts of Chase to suggest move 
 ments in, 294-297. 
 
 Warden, Robert B., named by Chase 
 to be his biographer, 414, 424. 
 
 Washington, Daniel, fugitive slave of 
 Amos Kendall, 81. 
 
 Washington, George, unable to re 
 cover a fugitive slave in 1796, 33. 
 
 Washington, social life in, 7-9. 
 
 Watrous, Charles, delegate to Repub 
 lican convention of 1860, 188. 
 
 Watson, Samuel, fugitive slave de 
 fended by Chase, 80. 
 
 Wayne, Judge James M., his death, 
 
 325 ; supposed to have the deciding 
 voice in the Supreme Court, 354. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, anecdote of, by 
 Chase, 8 ; his legal power described 
 by Chase, 10 ; indignation of Chase 
 at his Seventh of March speech, 
 124; his arguments assailed by 
 Chase, 127 ; influenced by business 
 men, 129 ; compared to Chase, 415. 
 
 Weed, Thurlow, Seward s manager in 
 politics, 125 ; influences Republican 
 party policy, 177 ; his corrupt man 
 agement in New York, 184-187 ; fa 
 vors compromise in 1860, 201 ; en 
 raged at Lincoln s giving Chase the 
 Treasury Department, 205; joins 
 with Greeley to recommend a man 
 for office, 219 ; sounds Chase on his 
 attitude toward Seward, 302. 
 
 Weld, Theodore D., abolitionist in 
 structor in Lane Seminary, 39 ; lec 
 tures at Oberlin, 42 ; aids in forming 
 Ohio Anti-Slavery Society, 44. 
 
 Welles, Gideon, on Chase s aversion 
 to the name abolitionist, 55; urges 
 relief of Fort Sumter, 210. 
 
 Wells, Horace, law partner of Chase, 
 23. 
 
 Welsh, William, opposes issue of legal 
 tender, 251. 
 
 Western Reserve becomes strongly 
 anti-slavery, 43. 
 
 Western Reserve College, early anti- 
 slavery centre, 42, 43. 
 
 Whig party elects Harrison, 86, 87 ; 
 reasons for Chase s abandonment 
 of, 87-90 ; distrusted and hated by 
 Chase, 90 ; loses Liberty votes and 
 is defeated in 1844, 93 ; reasons why 
 attacked by Liberty party, 94 ; nomi 
 nates Taylor, 96 ; in Ohio senatorial 
 election, 104-112 ; votes against re 
 peal of Black La\vs,107 ; votes against 
 Chase, and refuses to vote for Gid- 
 dings, 108, 109 ; defeated in presi 
 dential election of 1852, 132 ; its dis 
 solution foreseen, 132, 149; members 
 of, in Ohio nominate a ticket in 
 1855, 155. 
 
 Wilmot, David, in House in 1849, 114. 
 
 Wilson, Henry, a Know-Nothing, 176. 
 
 Wirt, William, receives Chase in his 
 law office, 7, 11. 
 
INDEX 
 
 465 
 
 Wise, Henry A., threatens, as gover 
 nor of Virginia, to pursue John 
 Brown raiders into Ohio, 175. 
 
 Wood, General Thomas J., corresponds 
 with Chase, 215. 
 
 Wright, Elizur, anti-slavery professor 
 
 at Western Reserve College, 43; 
 praises Lincoln s inaugural address, 
 207 ; suggests arming the negroes, 
 261. 
 
 Wright, John C., suggested as possible 
 Liberty candidate, 95. 
 
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 JAMES MADISON. By Sydney Howard Gay. 
 ALBERT GALLATIN. By John Austin Stevens. 
 JAMES MONROE. By President D. C. Gilman. 
 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. By John T. Morse, Jr. 
 JOHN RANDOLPH. By Henry Adams. 
 ANDREW JACKSON. By Prof. William G. Sumner. 
 MARTIN VAN BUREN. By Edward M. Shepard. 
 HENRY CLAY. By Carl Schurz. 2 vols. 
 DANIEL WEBSTER. By Henry Cabot Lodge. 
 JOHN C. CALHOUN. By Dr. H. Von Hoist. 
 THOMAS HART BENTON. By Theodore Roosevelt. 
 LEWIS CASS. By Prof. Andrew C. McLaughlin. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN. By John T. Morse, Jr. With 
 
 Portrait and Map. 2 vols. 
 
 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. By Thornton K. Lothrop. 
 SALMON P. CHASE. By Prof. A. B. Hart. 
 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. By C. F. Adams. 
 CHARLES SUMNER. By Moorfield Storey. 
 THADDEUS STEVENS. By Samuel W. McCall. 
 
CRITICAL NOTICES. 
 
 ^ e ^ as mana S e d to condense the whole mass of 
 matter gleaned from all sources into his volume 
 without losing in a single sentence the freedom or lightness of his 
 style or giving his book in any part the crowded look of an epitome. 
 The Independent (New York). 
 
 SAMUEL ADAMS. 
 
 biography is a piece of good work a clear and simple presentation 
 of a noble man and pure patriot ; it is written in a spirit of candor 
 and humanity. Worcester Spy, 
 
 TTJJ 7yr> Y P r f essor Tyler has not only made one of the best 
 . and most readable of American biographies ; he may 
 fairly be said to have reconstructed the life of Patrick Henry, and to 
 have vindicated the memory of that great man from the unapprecia- 
 tive and injurious estimate which has been placed upon it. New 
 
 York Evening Post. 
 
 Mr. Lodge has written an admirable bio- 
 grapny> and one which cannot but confirm 
 
 the American people in the prevailing estimate concerning the Father 
 of his Country. New York Tribune. 
 
 A good piece of literar y work - 
 
 erg the ground thoroughly, and gives just 
 
 the sort of simple and succinct account that is wanted. New York 
 Evening Post. 
 
 IT A T(/TTT TH A7 ^ r> Lodge has done his work with conscien- 
 JIAMIJ^J. U1V. tioug care> and the biography of Hamilton is a 
 
 book which cannot have too many readers. It is more than a bio 
 graphy ; it is a study in the science of government. St. Paul Pioneer 
 Press. 
 
 Mr> Roosevelt ftas produced an animated and in- 
 t ense iy interesting biographical volume. . . . Mr. 
 Roosevelt never loses sight of the picturesque background of poli 
 tics, war-governments, and diplomacy. Magazine of American His 
 tory (New York). 
 
 rv,j Y ^ is an important addition to the admirable series of 
 J-sL X . , t American Statesmen," and elevates yet higher the charac 
 ter of a man whom all American patriots most delight to honor. 
 New York Tribune. 
 
 Well done, with simplicity, clearness, precision, 
 and j uc ig ment> and in a spirit of moderation and 
 equity. A valuable addition to the series. New York Tribune. 
 
w i? i? 7? K> <?n AT" ^ sm g u l ar ly J ust > well-proportioned, and in- 
 y. AA.fi/coC/7V. teresting sketch of the personal and political 
 career of the author of the Declaration of Independence. Boston 
 Journal. 
 
 The execution of the work deserves the highest 
 praise. It is very readable, in a bright and vigor 
 ous style, and is marked by unity and consecutiveness of plan. The 
 Nation (New York). 
 
 ~ A j- Y A TYTV ^ * s one ^ *^ e most care f u lty prepared of these 
 LrAL,L,Alll\. ver y va i ua ble volumes, . . . abounding in infor 
 mation not so readily accessible as is that pertaining to men more 
 often treated by the biographer. Boston Correspondent Hartford 
 Coitrant. 
 
 MHTJPnR President Oilman has made the most of his hero, 
 MUlVKUa. without the least hero-worship, and has done full 
 justice to Mr. Monroe s " relations to the public service during half a 
 century." . . . The appendix is peculiarly valuable for its synopsis of 
 Monroe s Presidential Messages, and its extensive Bibliography of 
 Monroe and the Monroe Doctrine. N. Y. Christian Intelligencer. 
 
 vn rfAi n TTTATC v AHA M<z That Mr - Morse s conclusions 
 JOHN QU1JML Y AVAMb. win in the main be those of 
 
 posterity we have very little doubt, and he has set an admirable 
 example to his coadjutors in respect of interesting narrative, just pro 
 portion, and judicial candor. New York Evening Post. 
 
 The book has been to me intensely interesting. 
 T ; . It is rich }n new facts and side ]ightSj and 
 
 is worthy of its place in the already brilliant series of monographs 
 on American Statesmen. Prof. MOSES COIT TYLER. 
 
 Prf essor Sumner has ... all in all, made the 
 j ustest ] ong estimate of Jackson that has had itself 
 put between the covers of a book. New York Times. 
 
 VA A7 7? TTf? 77 AT" T^ s absorbing book. . . . To give any ade- 
 quate idea of the personal interest of the book, 
 or its intimate bearing on nearly the whole course of our political 
 history, would be equivalent to quoting the larger part of it. Brook- 
 lyn Eagle. 
 
 r-TA Y ^ e h ave m this ltf f Henry Clay a biography of one of 
 . t he mos t- distinguished of American statesmen, and a po 
 litical history of the United States for the first half of the nineteenth 
 century. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, for the period 
 covered, we have no other book which equals or begins to equal this 
 life of Henry Clay as an introduction to the study of American poli 
 tics. Political Science Quarterly (New York). 
 
 IV 7? 7? ^iTffJ? I* w ^ b read by students of history; it will be 
 
 >^^yt. in v a i ua ble as a work of reference; it will be an 
 
 authority as regards matters of fact and criticism ; it hits the key- 
 
note of Webster s durable and ever-growing fame ; it is adequate, 
 calm, impartial ; it is admirable. Philadelphia Press. 
 
 Nothing can exceed the skill with which the political 
 career the great g out h Carolinian is portrayed 
 in these pages. . . . The whole discussion in relation to Calhoun s 
 position is eminently philosophical and just. The Dial (Chicago). 
 
 n p AT TQ AT An interesting addition to our political literature, 
 and will be of great service if it spread an admiration 
 for that austere public morality which was one of the marked charac 
 teristics of its chief figure. The Epoch (New York). 
 
 CA S" S 1 P r f essor McLaughlin has given us one of the most satis- 
 factory volumes in this able and important series. . . . 
 The early life of Cass was devoted to the Northwest, and in the 
 transformation which overtook it the work of Cass was the work of 
 a national statesman. New York Times. 
 
 T TATm T AT As a life of Lincoln it has no competitors ; as a 
 LV political .history of the Union side during the Civil 
 War, it is the most comprehensive, and, in proportion to its range, 
 the most compact. Harvard Graduates Magazine. 
 
 077- TXfAf?T) The public will be grateful for his conscientious 
 efforts to write a popular vindication of one of the 
 ablest, most brilliant, fascinating, energetic, ambitious, and patriotic 
 men in American history. New York Evening Post. 
 
 r*TT/i o 37 His great career as anti-slavery leader, United States 
 Senator, Governor of Ohio, Secretary of the Treasury, 
 and Chief Justice of the United States, is described in an adequate 
 and effective manner by Professor Hart. 
 
 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. Cv 
 
 and the masterly ability and consummate diplomatic skill displayed 
 by him while Minister to Great Britain, are judiciously set forth by 
 his eminent son. 
 
 9 TTMATJi 7? The ma j est i c devotion of Sumner to the highest po- 
 uiviwjm. litical ideals b efore an d during his long term of lofty 
 service to freedom in the United States Senate is fittingly delineated 
 by Mr. Storey. 
 
 STE VP1V^ Thaddeus Stevens was unquestionably one of the 
 most conspicuous figures of his time. . . . The book 
 shows him the eccentric, fiery, and masterful congressional leader 
 that he was. City and State (Philadelphia). 
 
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