FOUR YEARS 
 
 WITH 
 
 &ENEK AL LEE 
 
 SEING A SUMMARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS 
 
 TOUCHING THE CAREER OF GENERAL ROBERT E. 
 
 LEE, IN THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES; 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 AN AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF THE STRENGTH OF THE 
 ARMY WHICH HE COMMANDED IN THE FIELD. 
 
 BY 
 
 WALTER II. TAYLOR, 
 \\ 
 
 OP HIS STAFF, AND LATE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY 
 OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 ~r 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 
 
 549 & 551 BROADWAY. 
 
 1878. 
 
( v- 
 
 ,33 
 
 COPTEIGHT BY 
 
 D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 
 1877. 
 
TO THE 
 
 EIGHT THOUSAND VETERANS 
 
 (THE SURVIVING HEROES OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA) 
 
 WHO, IX LINE OF BATTLE, 
 
 ON THE 9Tii DAY OF APEIL, 18G5, 
 
 WERE REPORTED PRESENT FOR DUTY, 
 
 THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED 
 BY 
 
 THE AUTHOE. 
 
" THOSE who undertake to write histories do not, I perceive, take that 
 trouble on one and the same account, but for many reasons, and those such as 
 are very different one from another. For some of them apply themselves to 
 this part of learning to show their great skill in composition, and that they 
 may therein acquire a reputation for speaking finely. Others of them there are 
 who write histories in order to gratify those that happen to be concerned in 
 them ; and on that account have spared no pains, but rather gone beyond their 
 own abilities in the performance. But others there are who, of necessity and 
 by force, are driven to write history, because they were concerned in the facts, 
 and so cannot excuse themselves from committing them to writing, for the ad 
 vantage of posterity. Nay, there are not a few who are induced to draw their 
 historical facts out of darkness into light, and to produce them for the benefit 
 of the public, on account of the great importance of the facts themselves with 
 which they have been concerned. Now, of these several reasons for writing 
 history, I must profess the last two were my own reasons also." JOSEPHUS. 
 
PEEFAOE. 
 
 IT was my peculiar privilege to occupy the position of a 
 confidential staff -officer with General Lee during the entire 
 period of the War for Southern Independence. From the 
 time he assumed the duties of the position of general-in- 
 chief of the Army of Virginia ; through the campaign in the 
 western portion of the State ; during the time of his com 
 mand in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and 
 Florida ; while he was charged with the control of the mili 
 tary operations of all the armies of the South, at Kichmond ; 
 and in all his campaigns, when in command of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia I had the honor to be at his side. Of 
 necessity, therefore, some facts concerning him and the army 
 movements which he directed are known to me, which are 
 not of public record ; and perhaps some value will attach to 
 my statements in regard to those matters of fact which came 
 under my immediate observation, and the recollection of 
 which is still fresh in my memory. I propose to speak of 
 these briefly and with entire candor. The manner of pre 
 senting these memoirs will necessarily be very imperfect. 
 It accords neither with my tastes nor the consciousness of 
 my unfitness for me to attempt a work of this character ; 
 and, moreover, the duties of my daily life are such as do not 
 
8 PREFACE. 
 
 permit any continuous or steady devotion to such an under 
 taking. 
 
 But the conviction that it is the duty of every one, in 
 possession of material information relative to the late sec 
 tional conflict, to do what he can to insure a true under 
 standing of that struggle, silences those personal scruples 
 which would deter me, and impels me to give to the public 
 the following pages. It will be at once seen that it is not 
 my purpose to attempt a review of the military career of 
 General Lee, no$fci critical history of the army which he 
 
 /rjb 
 
 commande4 4 r i the field ; this will devolve upon the future 
 historian.^ minejsp. the more humble task of giving a sum 
 mary of the n)tfre prominent events in the career of the 
 great Confederate leader, together with a comparative state 
 ment of the strength of the Confederate and Federal armies 
 that were engaged in the operations in Virginia . Having 
 for a long time supervised the preparation of the official 
 returns of the Army of Northern Virginia, and having been 
 permitted to make a recent examination of a number of those 
 returns, now on file in the archive-office of the "War Depart 
 ment at Washington, I am enabled to speak with confidence 
 of the numerical strength of the Confederate forces ; my 
 information concerning that of the Federal forces is derived 
 from official documents emanating from the officers and 
 authorities of the United States Government. 
 
 W. H. T. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Organization of the Army of Virginia. General R. EilJjee assigned to the 
 Command of the State Troops. Transfer to^jto Southern Confed 
 eracy 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 General Lee retained in Richmond as 
 
 the Confederate Forces under General 
 
 west Virginia. Lamentable Condition of Affai 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Strength and Positions of the Opposing Armies in Northwest VirgVnia. General 
 Lee determines to take the Offensive. Ineffectual Attempt To carry the 
 Positions held by the Federal Troops. Responsibility for the Failure . 20 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Affairs in Southwestern Virginia. Want of Harmony between Generals Floyd 
 and Wise. General Lee proceeds to that Section. Preparations to resist 
 General Rosecrans. Retreat of the Federals . ,32 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 General Lee repairs to Richmond. He is ordered to the Department of South 
 Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. His Return thence to Richmond. He is 
 charged with the Control of the Military Operations of all of the Confed 
 erate Annies. His Duties in that Position. General Johnston wounded in 
 the Battle of Seven Pines. General Lee in Command of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia. The Seven Days Battles around Richmond. Strength 
 of the Two Opposing Armies 37 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 General Lee manoeuvres to effect the Withdrawal of General McClellan s Army. 
 Jackson engages Pope at Cedar Run, or Slaughter s Mountain. Removal 
 of the Federal Army from James River. The Second Battle of Manassas. 
 The First Invasion. Operations in Maryland. McClellan in Possession of 
 Lee s Order of Battle. Boonesboro, or South Mountain. Capture of Har- 
 
10 CONTENTS. 
 
 per s Ferry by Jackson s Forces. Battle of Sharpsburg. General Lee re 
 tires to Virginia. Incidents illustrating the Devotion to Duty and Great 
 Self-Control of the Confederate Leader PAGE 5*7 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Battle of Fredericksburg. Federal Army One Hundred Thousand strong : Con 
 federate Army Seventy-eight Thousand strong. Battle of Chancellorsville. 
 Federal Army One Hundred and Thirty-two Thousand strong: Confed 
 erate Army Fifty-seven Thousand strong 79 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Campaign. The Battle of Gettysburg. Strength of the 
 Opposing Armies 90 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 General Lee retires to Virginia. Affair at Bristoe Station. The Tete-de-Pont. 
 Mine Run. General Meade s Advance and Retreat. Dahlgren s 
 Raid 115 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 General Grant in Command of the Federal Army of the Potomac. His Advance. 
 From the Wilderness to Petersburg. Strength of the Two Armies . 124 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Siege of Petersburg. General Lee s Views as to the Removal of General John 
 ston from the Command of the Army of Tennessee. Movements of Sher 
 man s Army. Inevitable Result of the Persistent Effort to hold Petersburg 
 and Richmond . 138 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Evacuation of Petersburg. General Lee s Retreat up James River. Appo- 
 mattox. Surrender. General Lee goes to Richmond . . . 149 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 General Lee indicted by the Grand-Jury at Norfolk. His Advice to the Young 
 Men of Virginia. His Purpose to write a History of the Army of North 
 ern Virginia. His Desire to obtain Correct Information of the Strength 
 of that Army 155 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 The Strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, taken from the Original Re 
 turns now on File in the Archive-Office of the War Department, Washing 
 ton, D. C . . .162 
 
 Address on the Character of General Robert E. Lee . . . .190 
 
FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Organization of the Army of Virginia. General R. E. Lee assigned to the 
 Command of the State Troops. Transfer to the Southern Confederacy. 
 
 ON the 2d day of May, 1861, in obedience to telegraphic 
 orders from Governor Letcher, I repaired to Richmond, and 
 was at once assigned to duty at the headquarters of the 
 Army of Yirginia. General Lee had been assigned to the 
 chief command, and Colonel Robert S. Garnett had been 
 announced as the adjutant-general of the active State troops. 
 
 The utmost activity prevailed, and the general-in-chief 
 and his indefatigable and most efficient adjutant-general de 
 voted their entire time and energies to the very difficult task 
 of organizing, arming, equipping, and putting into the field 
 the volunteers, with and without partial organization, who 
 responded with so much alacrity to the call of the State au 
 thorities. The first matter of importance was the discussion 
 and decision of the question as to the period of service for 
 which the troops should be received and mustered in. While 
 the politicians, and indeed the vast majority of the people, 
 anticipated but a very short and decisive struggle, General 
 Lee took a different view, and stands alone, of all of those 
 then known to me whose opinions were entitled to consid 
 eration, as having expressed his most serious apprehensions 
 of a prolonged and bloody war : he, in an especial degree, 
 
12 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 seemed to appreciate the magnitude of the impending con 
 test, and to realize the inevitable suffering, sacrifice, and woe, 
 which would attend a determined and bitter conflict between 
 the two sections of the United States, each animated by a 
 traditional devotion to cherished institutions ; each entitled 
 by inheritance to those characteristic traits of the Anglo- 
 Saxon race, the possession of which precludes the idea of a 
 passive resistance or a mild aggression, when liberty and 
 honor are involved ; each falsely estimating the powers and 
 temper of its adversary, and each confident of success. 
 
 At this period there was a considerable display of bom 
 bastic rhetoric; the purifying process had not yet begun, 
 which ultimately proved the metal of men : would-be and 
 accustomed leaders, not yet stripped of their pretensions, 
 misled the people ; some without judgment discoursed flip 
 pantly about the sixty or ninety days war that we were to 
 have, demanding only so much time to overcome the entire 
 Yankee nation. Many who entertained views equally absurd 
 were to be found in the North. Doubtless these patriots of 
 both sections were content to retire from service at the ex 
 piration of their short terms, convinced that, if the war was 
 not ended, it should have been, and would have been, had 
 they had the direction of affairs. No wonder, then, that when 
 the troops were to be mustered into service there was a de 
 cided sentiment in favor of a twelve months* enlistment. Had 
 General Lee s wishes prevailed, they would have been mus 
 tered in for the war. It is not known how far he endeavored 
 to have his views adopted, beyond the expression of opinion 
 repeatedly made to those who consulted him in his office, in 
 my hearing, in favor of the war enlistment. He contended 
 that, if the conflict should terminate in twelve months, or 
 less, the troops would be at once disbanded and no harm 
 would result; but, if it should be prolonged beyond that 
 period, then there would be a more urgent need for the 
 troops than in the beginning ; and the Government would 
 have to deal with the very serious question of the disintegra- 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 13 
 
 tion and disorganization of the army, and the substitution of 
 recruits for veterans, in the very face of the enemy. The 
 civil authorities, however, were loath to believe that there 
 could possibly be any need of troops beyond the period of 
 twelve months, and accordingly the men were enlisted for 
 that time. The same course had been pursued in the other 
 States in their volunteer organizations; and thus was the 
 first step taken toward creating the necessity for the law of 
 conscription which was subsequently enacted by the Confed 
 erate Congress. 
 
 Under the direction of General Lee, with the aid of the 
 extraordinary administrative ability of Colonel Garnett, the 
 cordial support of the Governor, and the hearty cooperation 
 of a most efficient corps of State officials, the Virginia vol 
 unteers were in a wonderfully short time organized, armed, 
 equipped, and sent to the front : so that when the Confed 
 erate authorities assumed control of affairs after the State 
 had formally joined the Confederacy, Governor Letcher was 
 enabled to turn over to them the " Army of Virginia," vol 
 unteers and provisional, thoroughly organized and ready for 
 work, and around which, as a nucleus, was collected what 
 afterward became the historic " Army of Northern Virginia.". 
 The capital of the Confederacy was removed from Mont 
 gomery to Richmond, and the various departments of the 
 Government immediately transferred to the latter city ; the 
 "War Department carried on the process of organization and 
 preparation; the functions of General Lee as general-in- 
 chief of the Army of Virginia terminated, and he was 
 created one of the five generals provided for by a law of 
 Congress, in the Army of the Confederate States. Briga 
 dier-General G. T. Beauregard l and General J. E. Johnston, 
 already in the field, were assigned to the command of the 
 troops in Virginia the former having the "Army of the 
 Potomac " (Confederate States Army) and the latter the forces 
 
 1 General Bcauregard was promoted to be General immediately after the 
 first battle of Manassas. 
 
14 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 then collected in the lower Yalley of Yirginia ; these two 
 armies were subsequently united and won the first battle of 
 Manassas under General J. E. Johnston. General A. S. 
 Johnston had been assigned to the command of the troops 
 raised in the "West and Southwest, and which were concen 
 trating in Kentucky and Tennessee. 
 
CHAPTEE II. 
 
 General Lee retained in Richmond as Adviser to President Davis. Disaster to 
 the Confederate Forces under General Garnett. General Lee sent to North 
 west Virginia. Lamentable Condition of Affairs in that Department. 
 
 AFTER the transfer of the Virginia forces to the Con 
 federate States, and there being then no suitable command 
 in the field to which General Lee could be assigned, he was 
 retained in Richmond by the President to give the benefit 
 of his counsel and advice in all the important measures in 
 volved in the stupendous undertaking of suddenly transform 
 ing an agricultural people into a nation of soldiers, prepared 
 for immediate war. During the month of July, 1861, in 
 obedience to the orders of Mr. Davis, he made a personal 
 examination of the troops and defenses around Norfolk, and 
 also paid a visit of inspection to the Army of the Potomac 
 (C. S. A.). At this period the President became very anx 
 ious concerning the condition of affairs in the western por 
 tion of Virginia. In the northwest the Confederate forces 
 under Brigadier-General Eobert S. Garnett (who, when re 
 lieved as adjutant-general of the Army of Virginia, had been 
 appointed brigadier-general in the Confederate army, and 
 assigned to the command of the troops in this section) had 
 suffered defeat, and the brave Garnett himself, while en 
 deavoring to rally his troops at Carricksford, had received a 
 mortal wound. Brigadier-General W. W. Loring had been 
 assigned as his successor in the command of this department, 
 and having collected the scattered remnants of Garnett s lit 
 tle army, together with such reinforcements as the Govern- 
 
IQ FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 ment had been able to send to his relief, had taken position 
 at Valley Mountain. In the southwest Brigadier-Generals 
 Floyd and Wise were operating under great disadvantages ; 
 each having an independent command, and neither being 
 disposed to act a part subordinate to the other. It was im 
 possible, under such circumstances, to secure harmonious 
 action or any united and spirited effort to resist the enemy. 
 There was an evident and imperative need in this quarter 
 for the personal presence of some one who could both re 
 store confidence to the troops and compel the respect and 
 subordination of commanders. General Lee, of all men the 
 most fit for this duty, was also the most available. A bat 
 tle, however, appeared imminent at this juncture between 
 the two armies facing each other in the neighborhood of 
 Manassas : it was a critical time, and the President suspend 
 ed the execution of his designs as to Western Virginia un 
 til that crisis was passed ; but immediately after the first bat 
 tle of Manassas General Lee was dispatched to the scene of 
 operations in that department to reconcile the differences 
 between Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Wise, and to aid 
 Brigadier-General Loring in the reorganization and recruit 
 ing of the shattered forces of Garnett, so that, with the aid 
 of the reinforcements sent, the army there collected might 
 be put in such condition as to prevent any aggressive move 
 ment of the enemy, and, if circumstances justified it, to take 
 the offensive. Accompanied by two aides-de-camp Colonel 
 John A. Washington and myself he proceeded by rail to 
 Staunton, and thence on horseback to Valley Mountain. 
 Upon his arrival there he established himself near the head 
 quarters of General Loring, with whom he maintained regu 
 lar and constant communication. He never assumed imme 
 diate personal command of the army, although it was under 
 stood that Brigadier-General Loring was subject to his 
 orders. 
 
 It is useless to attempt to recount all the difficulties this 
 little army encountered in that most impracticable, inhospi- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 17 
 
 table, and dismal country; only those who participated in 
 that campaign can ever properly estimate the disadvantages 
 under which commanders and troops operated. The season 
 was a most unfavorable one : for weeks it rained daily and 
 in torrents ; the condition of the roads was frightful ; they 
 were barely passable. It was very seriously debated whether 
 the army could be fed where it was, and it was feared that 
 it would have to retire to some point nearer the railroad. 
 Time and time again could be seen double teams of horses 
 struggling with six or eight barrels of flour, and the axle 
 of the wagon scraping and leveling the road-bed ; in other 
 words, the wagons were hub-deep in mud, and could only be 
 moved step by step, and then with the greatest difficulty. 
 At the same time, and doubtless as a result of the excessive 
 rains, the troops were sorely afflicted with measles and a 
 malignant type of fever, which prostrated hundreds of each 
 command ; and, being entirely destitute of proper food and 
 other supplies indispensable to the successful treatment of 
 disease, it is not to be wondered at that medical skill failed 
 to arrest the terrible scourge. 
 
 In the subsequent campaigns of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia the troops were subjected to great privations and 
 to many very severe trials in hunger often ; their naked 
 ness scarcely concealed ; strength at times almost exhausted 
 but never did I experience the same heart-sinking emotions 
 as when contemplating the wan faces and the emaciated forms 
 of those hungry, sickly, shivering men of the army at Yal- 
 ley Mountain! I well recall the fact that a regiment of 
 North Carolina volunteers, under Colonel Lee, that reported 
 with one thousand effective men, was in a very short time 
 reduced to one-third of its original strength, without ever 
 having been under fire. Though not to the same extent, 
 the other commands were all seriously reduced by disease ; 
 and it is no exaggeration to say that one-half of the army 
 was ineffective. Moreover, although some of our best and 
 bravest men were from that section, there was great disaffec- 
 2 
 
18 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 tion among that portion of the people who had not respond 
 ed to the call of the State for troops. Spies lurked around 
 every hill ; our weakness, our embarrassments, and our every 
 movement, were promptly reported to the enemy. "With 
 some honorable exceptions, there was an utter absence of 
 sympathy on the part of the inhabitants who had remained 
 at home, and, to all intents and purposes, we were in an 
 enemy s country. In the language of another who witnessed 
 this deplorable hostility : " Northwestern Virginia has 
 brought grief and shame to the State and to the South by 
 her woful defection ; but by none is that felt more keenly 
 than by those sons of that section who have left their homes, 
 and in many instances their wives and little ones, to battle 
 for the right. They hear jeers and sneers thrown out, even 
 at themselves, and endure them with apparent patience, but 
 with an inward resolve to testify on the battle-field their 
 fidelity to their country s cause." 
 
 How little was this lamentable condition of affairs in that 
 department then appreciated by the public mind ! 
 
 From the reputation which General Lee enjoyed, even 
 at that date, much was expected of him when he took the 
 field. The difficulties of his situation were not properly 
 estimated, and the press and people of Virginia became, at 
 first, impatient, then indignant, because the Federal army 
 that had defeated the Confederate forces under Garnett and 
 Pegram was not immediately assailed by him and driven out 
 of the State. 
 
 To those who realized the situation it was an occasion of 
 pain and mortification to learn from the journals of the day, 
 that occasionally reached them, of the general dissatisfaction 
 that found expression in scathing editorials, abounding in 
 sneers and abuse, and which was both unjust to those charged 
 with the conduct of military operations in that impractica 
 ble region, and well calculated to dishearten the men*under 
 their command, whose trials were already of no ordinary 
 character. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 19 
 
 Ko one felt this public judgment so keenly as did Gen 
 eral Lee ; and yet, on one occasion, when his attention had 
 been directed to a fierce newspaper attack, as unjust in its 
 conclusions as it was untrue in its statements, and he was 
 asked why he silently suffered such unwarranted aspersions, 
 he calmly replied that, while it was very hard to bear, it was 
 perhaps quite natural that such hasty conclusions should be 
 announced, and that it was better not to attempt a justifica 
 tion or defense, but to go steadily on in the discharge of 
 duty to the best of our ability, leaving all else to the calmer 
 judgment of the future and to a kind Providence. 
 
CHAPTEK III. 
 
 Strength and Positions of the Opposing Armies in Northwest Virginia. General 
 Lee determines to take the Offensive. Ineffectual Attempt to carry the 
 Positions held by the Federal Troops. Responsibility for the Failure. 
 
 BUT, to return to our narrative, despite the embarrass 
 ments heretofore alluded to, the command was finally brought 
 to a sufficiently efficient condition to induce the general to 
 take the offensive. On the 8th of September, and after full 
 conference with Brigadier-General Loring, the order of attack 
 was prepared ; it was issued, however, in the name of the 
 latter, and prescribed a line of operations which I will now 
 attempt to describe. In order to a correct understanding of 
 what is to follow, it is proper to make some remarks upon 
 the character and prominent features of the immediate local 
 ity which was to be the scene of operations, and of the 
 strength and positions of the two armies. 
 
 The advance force of the enemy held the Cheat Mountain 
 Pass, where the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike crossed 
 the centre-top of Cheat Mountain range, about twelve miles 
 east of Huttonsville. Just where the road crossed the moun 
 tain-top heavy defensive works had been constructed. Na 
 ture assisted in no small degree to render the position im 
 pregnable : the descent on both sides was very precipitous, 
 and the surface of the earth was covered with a most re 
 markable undergrowth of laurel, so dense and interlocked as 
 to be almost impenetrable. The Federals had cleared a con 
 siderable space around their intrenched position, constructed 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 21 
 
 abatis and fosses around their entire work, and, having a gar 
 rison of three thousand men, 1 might well have deemed them 
 selves impregnable. 
 
 They also held a strongly-fortified position at Elk Water, 
 on the road running from Valley Mountain through Tygart s 
 Valley to Huttonsville, at which latter place it intersected 
 the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike. The force in Ty 
 gart s Valley was estimated to be five thousand strong. The 
 reserve force was stationed at Huttonsville, and here also 
 was their depot for supplies. 
 
 The two roads, mentioned as uniting at Huttonsville, 
 were the only practicable routes by which that point could 
 be reached from the east ; both, as before explained, were 
 protected by works of formidable aspect and difficult ap 
 proach. General Reynolds was in command of the troops 
 defending the passes of Cheat Mountain, and had an army 
 estimated at from eight to ten thousand men. General Rose- 
 crans commanded the entire Federal force operating in West 
 ern Virginia, embracing that under General Reynolds, and 
 that operating in the Kanawha Valley, under General Cox. 
 
 One portion of the Confederate army was encamped at 
 " Camp Bartow," on the Parkersburg pike, near its crossing of 
 the Greenbrier River. The force upon this line was under the 
 immediate command of Brigadier-General II. R. Jackson, and 
 consisted of the following organizations : First Georgia Regi 
 ment (Colonel Ramsay), Twelfth Georgia (Colonel Edward 
 Johnson), Twenty-third Virginia (Colonel William B. Talia- 
 ferro), Thirty-first Virginia (Colonel Jackson), Thirty-sev 
 enth Virginia (Colonel Fulkerson), Forty-fourth Virginia 
 (Colonel Scott), Third Arkansas (Colonel Rust), Hans- 
 brough s and Roger s battalions of Virginia Volunteers, two 
 batteries of artillery, and a few companies of cavalry in all 
 about twenty-five hundred effective men. 
 
 1 A requisition for rations for three thousand men was found upon the per 
 son of a staff-officer captured while pursuing the road from Cheat Mountain Pass 
 to Huttonsville. 
 
22 OUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 The other wing of the army, under General Loring, was 
 camped at Valley Mountain, and consisted of a brigade 
 (under General D. S. Donelson) of one North Carolina and 
 two Tennessee regiments ; a brigade of Tennessee troops 
 (under General Anderson) ; a brigade (under Colonel Wil 
 liam Gilham) consisting of the Twenty-first and Forty- 
 second Virginia Regiments, and the Irish Battalion (Pro 
 visional Army of Virginia) ; a small command under Colonel 
 Burk ; and a battalion of cavalry, under Major W. H. F. Lee. 
 
 These commands had been greatly reduced by sickness, 
 and the total effective of this wing of the army did not ex 
 ceed thirty-five hundred men. 
 
 Being without accurate maps of the country, and having 
 no regular engineer-officer available, General Loring had to 
 rely upon his scouts and a few citizens of that country, who 
 acted in a volunteer capacity as guides, for all information as 
 to the roads, and the movements and positions of the enemy. 
 One of these citizen volunteers, a professional surveyor, hav 
 ing been informed that General Lee was particularly anxious 
 to obtain accurate information of the nature and extent of 
 the works of the enemy on the centre-top of Cheat Moun 
 tain, undertook the task of reaching such a point on the 
 mountain as would enable him to take a deliberate and care 
 ful survey of the fortified position. He was also to ascer 
 tain and report if it was practicable to lead a body of infan 
 try to the vicinity of that point, by any route which would 
 prevent the disclosure of the movement. 
 
 The only route other than the turnpike by which this 
 point of the range of mountains could be reached was by 
 pursuing a course along and up the precipitous and ragged 
 sides of the mountain, through undergrowth and trees, over 
 rocks and chasms, and with nothing save the compass or the 
 stars to indicate the direction of the summit. The quasi 
 engineer : oificer made the ascent successfully, and obtained a 
 complete view of the enemy s works. On a second recon 
 naissance he was accompanied by Colonel A. Rust, of the 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 33 
 
 Third Arkansas Regiment, who was very enterprising, and 
 appeared to be most anxious to make a personal observation. 
 Together they made the ascent of the mountain, and again 
 complete success crowned their efforts. A full, unobstructed 
 view of the entire line of works occupied by the enemy was 
 had without discovery. On their return they made their 
 report to General Lee, and represented that the works were 
 of such a character as to justify the hope of being carried, if 
 attacked from the direction of the point reached by them, 
 from which they could plainly see all that was going on 
 within ; and on which flank the enemy appeared to have be 
 stowed but little attention. The only difficulty was, to reach 
 this point with a body of troops without attracting the atten 
 tion of the enemy, so that he might be surprised and the 
 more readily captured. Of the successful accomplishment of 
 this, however, Colonel Rust was sanguine, and enthusiasti 
 cally asked to be permitted to lead a column in an assault 
 upon this position. General Lee decided to give battle. A 
 column of infantry twelve hundred strong, consisting of the 
 Twenty-third, Thirty-first, and Thirty-seventh Virginia Regi 
 ments, the Third Arkansas Regiment, and Hansbrough s 
 Virginia battalion, was selected to assail the works of the 
 enemy on Centre-top. Colonels Taliaferro and Fulkerson, 
 who were senior in rank to Colonel Rust, magnanimously 
 waived the question of rank, and acquiesced in placing them 
 selves at the head of their respective regiments and under 
 Colonel Rust s command. 
 
 The order of battle directed General II. R. Jackson to 
 advance, with the balance of his command, by the turnpike, 
 and to threaten the enemy from this direction this was 
 especially designed to divert attention from Rust s flank- 
 movement. 
 
 The third column, under Brigadier-General Anderson, 
 was to advance to the third or west top of Cheat Mountain, 
 secure possession of the turnpike at that point, and be in 
 position both to take the enemy in rear and prevent any 
 
24 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 escape ; as also to resist any effort that might be made to re- 
 enforce Centre-top with any troops that might be in reserve. 
 The rest of the army was to move down the valley of 
 Tygart s River npon the enemy there stationed ; but, as will 
 appear more fully hereafter, the movements of this column 
 were made to depend upon the success which should attend 
 the assault upon the fortified position on Cheat Mountain. 
 The plan of attack was carefully and maturely considered, 
 and was communicated to the commanders in the following 
 order : 
 
 [CONFIDENTIAL.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS, VALLEY MOUNTAIN, September 8, 1861. 
 [Special Order No. 23.] 
 
 1. General H. R. Jackson, commanding Monterey division, 
 will detach a column of not more than two thousand men under 
 Colonel Rust, to turn the enemy s position at Cheat Mountain 
 Pass at daylight on the 12th instant (Thursday). 
 
 During the night preceding the morning of the 12th instant, 
 General Jackson having left a suitable guard for his own position 
 with the rest of his available force, will take post on the east 
 ern ridge of Cheat Mountain, occupy the enemy in front, and 
 cooperate in the assault of his attacking column should circum 
 stances favor. The march of Colonel Rust will be so regulated 
 as to attain his position during the same night, and at the dawn 
 of the appointed day (Thursday, 12th) he will, if possible, sur 
 prise the enemy in his trenches and carry them. 
 
 2. The " Pass " having been carried, General Jackson, with 
 his whole fighting force, will immediately move forward toward 
 Huttonsville, prepared against an attack from the enemy, taking 
 every precaution against firing upon the portion of the army 
 operating west of Cheat Mountain, and ready to cooperate with 
 it against the enemy in Tygart s Valley. The supply-wagons 
 of the advancing columns will follow, and the reserve will occupy 
 Cheat Mountain. 
 
 3. General Anderson s brigade will move down Tygart s 
 Valley, following the west slope of Cheat Mountain range, con 
 cealing his movements from the enemy. On reaching Wyman s 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 25 
 
 (or the vicinity) he will refresh his force unobserved, send for 
 ward intelligent officers to make sure of his further course, and 
 during the night of the llth (Wednesday) proceed to the 
 Staunton turnpike where it intersects the west top of Cheat 
 Mountain, so as to arrive there as soon after daylight on the 
 12th (Thursday) as possible. He will make dispositions to hold 
 the turnpike, prevent reinforcements reaching Cheat Mountain 
 Pass, cut the telegraph-wire, and be prepared, if necessary, to 
 aid in the assault of the enemy s position on the middle top of 
 Cheat Mountain by General Jackson s division, the result of 
 which he must await. He must particularly keep in mind that 
 the movement of General Jackson is to surprise the enemy in 
 their defenses. He must, therefore, not discover his movement, 
 nor advance before Wednesday night beyond a point where he 
 can conceal his force. Cheat Mountain Pass being carried, he 
 will turn down the mountain and press upon the left and rear of 
 the enemy in Tygart s Valley, either by the old or new turnpike, 
 or the Becky Run road, according to circumstances. 
 
 4. General Donelson s brigade will advance on the right of 
 Tygart s Valley River, seizing the paths and avenues leading 
 from that side to the river, and driving back the enemy that 
 may endeavor to retard the advance of the centre along the 
 turnpike, or turn his right. 
 
 5. Such of the artillery as may not be used on the flanks 
 will proceed along the Huttonsville turnpike, supported by 
 Major Munford s battalion, followed by the rest of Colonel 
 Gilham s brigade in reserve. 
 
 6. Colonel Burk s brigade will advance on the left of Ty 
 gart s Valley River, in supporting distance of the centre, and 
 clear that side of the valley of the forces of the enemy that 
 might obstruct the advance of the artillery. 
 
 7. The cavalry under Major Lee will follow, according to 
 the nature of the ground, in rear of the left, Colonel Burk s 
 brigade. It will watch the movements of the enemy in that 
 quarter ; give notice of, and prevent, if possible, any attempt to 
 turn the left of the line, and be prepared to strike when oppor 
 tunity offers. 
 
 8. The wagons of each brigade, properly parked and 
 
26 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 guarded, under the charge of their respective quartermasters 
 who will personally superintend their movements will pursue 
 the main turnpike, under the general direction of the chief 
 quartermaster, in rear of the army and out of cannon-range of 
 the enemy. 
 
 9. Commanders on both lines of operations will particu 
 larly see that their corps wear the distinguishing badge, and 
 that both officers and men take every precaution not to fire on 
 our own troops. This is essentially necessary, as the forces on 
 both sides of Cheat Mountain may unite. They will also use 
 every exertion to prevent noise and straggling from the ranks, 
 correct quietly any confusion that may occur, and cause their 
 commands to rapidly execute their movements when in presence 
 of the enemy. 
 
 By order of General \V. "W. LORIXG : 
 
 CAKTEE L. STEVENS ox, 
 Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General. 
 
 On the same day that General Loring issued the order 
 of march and attack to his army, General Lee issued the fol 
 lowing: 
 
 HEADQUARTERS. VALLEY MoryrAiy, September 8, 1861. 
 [Special Order Xo. -.] 
 
 The forward movement announced to the Army of the North 
 west in Special Order No. 28, from its headquarters, of this 
 date, gives the general commanding the opportunity of exhort 
 ing the troops to keep steadily in view the great principles for 
 which they contend, and to manifest to the world their deter 
 mination to maintain them. The eyes of the country are upon 
 you. The safety of your homes, and the lives of all you hold 
 dear, depend upon your courage and exertions. Let each man 
 resolve to be victorious, and that the right of self-government, 
 liberty and peace, shall in him find a defender. The progress 
 of this army must be forward. 
 
 R. E. LEE, 
 General commanding. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IX WESTERN VIRGINIA. 27 
 
 Inasmuch as Rust s column had the most difficult part 
 to perform, and it was impossible to estimate accurately the 
 time which would be consumed in reaching his point of 
 attack, he was started in advance of the other columns, and 
 it was determined and ordered that they should await the 
 signal of his attack, before doing anything more than secur 
 ing positions from which they could readily and quickly 
 advance to the work to which they had been respectively 
 assigned. All were ordered to take every precaution to pre 
 vent their movements from being discovered, as the success 
 of the whole undertaking depended on taking the enemy on 
 Centre-top by surprise. Although the several tops of the 
 mountain were in a direct line, not very distant from each 
 other, it was necessary to make a considerable circuit in 
 riding from one to the other ; and as Rust s musketry could 
 be more readily and promptly observed than any other sig 
 nal, the general attack was made to depend upon it. 
 
 The several commands, being in every respect prepared 
 for the anticipated battle, moved forward at the time men 
 tioned, and in the several directions indicated, in the order 
 of march and attack. 
 
 All progressed satisfactorily. Anderson reached and 
 occupied the turnpike at its crossing on the third or rear top 
 of Cheat Mountain. So unsuspecting was the enemy, and so 
 silently was Anderson s movement made, that his men capt 
 ured an engineer-officer of Rosecrans s staff, and others, qui 
 etly and confidently pursuing the road toward their rear. 
 
 General Jackson had his command well in hand, pre 
 pared to engage the enemy in front. 
 
 General Donelson s brigade rested the latter portion of the 
 night not far from the camps of his enemy on Tygart s Val 
 ley River. 
 
 Morning found everything just as the most confident 
 could have hoped, with the exception that the night had been 
 a very rainy, disagreeable one, and the men were conse 
 quently quite uncomfortable ; this, however, would soon be 
 
28 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 forgotten in the excitement of battle and the promise of cer 
 tain victory. All was ready, and Bust s attack was anxiously 
 awaited. General Jackson worried the enemy considerably 
 by attacking his advanced guard on the first top of the moun 
 tain, only awaiting the signal from Bust to press forward 
 earnestly with his entire command. Hours passed, and no 
 signal was heard ! What could have happened ? Enough 
 time had elapsed to enable the troops to reach Centre-top, 
 unless prevented by some unexpected impediment. 
 
 "Would Bust never attack ? Alas ! he never did ! 
 
 As was subsequently learned, upon an examination of 
 the works of the enemy made after he had succeeded in 
 reaching his proper position, he was surprised to find them 
 far more formidable than he had supposed. Whether addi 
 tional strength had been given them since his reconnais 
 sance, or whether he was too easily satisfied and not suffi 
 ciently thorough in his observations when he made that 
 reconnaissance, is not known. He decided that the works 
 were too formidable to justify an assault, and no attack was 
 made. Even had he discharged his guns and vigorously en 
 gaged the enemy, without attempting to carry the works by 
 storm, it is not unreasonable to believe that the combined 
 efforts of the other columns would have been attended with 
 success. 
 
 All, however, depended on the enemy s being surprised, 
 and simultaneously and swiftly attacked. Much precious 
 time had been lost. Donelson s men, uneasy about their 
 arms, fearful that their powder had been dampened by the 
 rain, commenced a spirited fusillade in order to reload and 
 avoid a "flash in the pan." This and Jackson s activity 
 aroused the enemy: hurried preparations to resist attack 
 were made ; scouting-parties of cavalry were sent out to 
 scour the surrounding country. One of these detachments 
 came very near capturing General Lee, who, accompanied by 
 his aide and a few horsemen, on his way to join General 
 Donelson, had scarcely emerged from a piece of woods, when 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 9 
 
 quite a troop thundered along the road skirting the woods, 
 too near to be comfortable, but galloping rapidly away on 
 suddenly observing their proximity to Donelson s column of 
 infantry. It was also in a brush between one of these de 
 tachments of the enemy and a portion of Major "W. H. F. 
 Lee s battalion of cavalry that the pious Christian and gal 
 lant gentleman, Colonel John A. "Washington, who had been 
 sent with Major Lee to reconnoitre the enemy, was shot dead 
 from an ambuscade. 
 
 Detached, discovered, without knowledge of the cause of 
 Bust s silence, the other commands were powerless for good. 
 Occupied with the necessity of providing for their own safe 
 ty, it only remained to have them recalled to their former 
 positions. The enemy made no advance, and, beyond driv 
 ing in their outposts, our troops were not seriously engaged. 
 
 On the next day Colonel Rust personally reported to 
 General Lee. The only cause assigned by him for his non- 
 action is that heretofore given. Possibly his regimental 
 commanders may have agreed with him in esteeming the 
 works of the enemy too formidable to be attacked; but 
 surely the responsibility attached to him alone. 1 
 
 Some may think that this was a proper matter for inves 
 tigation by a court of inquiry, or for trial by court-martial. 
 Neither the one nor the other was ever had, and possibly 
 
 1 " By this time most of the command had come up, and a council of war was 
 held as to what we should do, consisting of Colonels Rust, Taliaferro, and Ful- 
 kerson, and Lieutenant-Colonels Barton, Jackson, and Hansbrough. It should 
 be here stated that none of the officers were fully apprised of the plan of com 
 bined attack, and of the fact that everything depended on the ball being set in 
 motion by our command, except Colonel Rust. 
 
 " I shall never forget the appearance of the officers composing this council ; 
 Fulkerson looked pale and worn, but intrepid ; Taliaferro stern but indifferent. 
 The latter soon broke off the deliberations by saying, Well, if we have to fight 
 these people, let s do it at once. Immediately the rear of the column was 
 deployed around to the right, while we who had led the file remained on the 
 left ; and there we stood anxiously awaiting the word to advance to the assault. 
 This word never came." Extract from letter of Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Hans 
 brough. 
 
30 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 no public good would have resulted had either been con 
 vened. 
 
 Having failed to dislodge the enemy from his strong 
 hold, the season having advanced too far to attempt any 
 movement away from our base of supplies, and there being 
 no probability of any serious advance by the enemy, the 
 campaign in the northwest was regarded as ended for the 
 winter. 
 
 The following letter from General Lee to Governor 
 Letcher, but recently made public, serves to confirm what 
 has been stated : 
 
 VALLEY MOUNTAIN, September 17, 1861. 
 
 MY DEAR GOVERNOR : I received your very kind note of the 
 5th instant just as I was about to accompany General Loring s 
 command on an expedition to the enemy s works in front, or I 
 would have before thanked you for the interest you take in my 
 welfare, and your too flattering expressions of my ability. In 
 deed, you overrate me much, and I feel humbled when I weigh 
 myself by your standard. I am, however, very grateful for your 
 confidence, and I can answer for my sincerity in the earnest en 
 deavor I make to advance the cause I have so much at heart, 
 though conscious of the slow progress I make. I was very san 
 guine of taking the enemy s works on last Thursday morning. 
 I had considered the -subject well. With great effort the troops 
 intended for the surprise had reached their destination, having 
 traversed twenty miles of steep, rugged mountain-paths ; and 
 the last day through a terrible storm which lasted all night, and 
 in which they had to stand drenched to the skin in cold rain. 
 Still their spirits were good. When morning broke, I could see 
 the enemy s tents on Valley River at the point on the Huttons- 
 ville road, just below me. It was a tempting sight. We waited 
 for the attack on Cheat Mountain, which was to be the signal. 
 Till 10 A. M. the men were cleaning their unserviceable arms. 
 But the signal did not come. All chance for a surprise was 
 gone. The provisions of the men had been destroyed the pre 
 ceding day by the storm. They had had nothing to eat that 
 morning, could not hold out another day, and were obliged to be 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 31 
 
 withdrawn. The party sent to Cheat Mountain to take that in 
 rear had also to be withdrawn. The attack to come off from 
 the east side failed from the difficulties in the way the oppor 
 tunity was lost, and our plan discovered. It is a grievous dis 
 appointment to me, I assure you. But for the rain-storm, I 
 have no doubt it would have succeeded. This, Governor, is for 
 your own eye. Please do not speak of it ; we must try again. 
 Our greatest loss is the death of my dear friend Colonel Wash 
 ington. He and my son were reconnoitring the front of the 
 enemy. They came unawares upon a concealed party who fired 
 upon them within twenty yards, and the colonel fell pierced by 
 three balls. My son s horse received three shots, but he escaped 
 on the colonel s horse. His zeal for the cause to which he had 
 devoted himself carried him, I fear, too far. 
 
 We took some seventy prisoners, and killed some twenty- 
 five or thirty of the enemy. Our loss was small besides what I 
 have mentioned. Our greatest difficulty is the roads. It has 
 been raining in these mountains about six weeks. It is impos 
 sible to get along. It is that which has paralyzed all our 
 efforts. With sincere thanks for your good wishes, 
 I am, very truly yours, 
 
 R. E. LEE. 
 
 His Excellency Governor JOHN LETCHER. 
 
CHAPTER IY. 
 
 Affairs in Southwestern Virginia. Want of Harmony between Generals Floyd 
 and Wise. General Lee proceeds to that Section. Preparations to resist 
 General Rosecrans. Retreat of the Federals. 
 
 MEANWHILE the Federal commander had been active in 
 the Kanawha Valley, and, owing to matters of discord be 
 tween Generals Floyd and Wise, it became imperatively 
 necessary for General Lee to repair to that quarter, in order 
 to restore harmony among our own people, and to resist the 
 further advance of the enemy. Simultaneously General 
 Rosecrans moved with a large portion of his army to ree n- 
 force General Cox ; and General Lee ordered General Lor- 
 ing to leave a sufficient force to watch the enemy at Cheat 
 Mountain, and move with the rest of his army to the Kana 
 wha Valley. 
 
 General Lee proceeded without delay across the country 
 in that direction. 
 
 On the 14th of September General Floyd encamped on 
 Big Sewell Mountain, and ordered General "Wise to go into 
 camp a short distance east of him. On the night of the 16th 
 he retreated to Meadow Bluff, directing General "Wise to 
 cover the movement and follow with his command to that 
 point. This. order General Wise positively refused to obey ; 
 and, selecting a favorable position on Little Sewell Mountain, 
 he proceeded to make it good by a line of defensive works. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs as reported to General 
 Lee, who, upon his arrival, found General Floyd with his 
 command at Meadow Bluff, and General Wise some ten or 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 33 
 
 more miles in advance, at Little Sewell, with his legion of 
 seventeen hundred men, now confronted by Rosecrans s en 
 tire army. 
 
 "Without entering into the merits of the controversy be 
 tween Generals Floyd and "Wise, General Lee perceived at 
 a glance that Little Sewell was the most favorable point at 
 which to make a stand ; that being naturally a strong posi 
 tion, and much more easily defended than Meadow Bluff. 
 General Floyd was therefore at once ordered to move for 
 ward to Little Sewell. The bitter feeling which had been 
 engendered between the two commanders had imparted it 
 self, in some degree, to the troops, and seriously threatened 
 to impair their efficiency. No little diplomacy was required, 
 therefore, to produce harmony and hearty cooperation, where 
 previously had prevailed discord and contention. It will be 
 readily understood that the partisans of Floyd at first viewed 
 in no pleasant frame of mind the apparent indorsement of 
 Wise s judgment, if not, by a forced construction (to w r hich 
 a prejudiced mind is always liable), the approval of his dis 
 obedience and insubordination, implied in General Lee s 
 order that Floyd should forsake his chosen position and re 
 turn to that persistently held by Wise. 
 
 A junction of the commands of Floyd and Wise hav 
 ing been effected, a line of defense was established, and as 
 well fortified as circumstances would admit in that broken 
 country. 
 
 The reinforcements from Loring s army soon arrived, 
 and the aggregate strength of the troops under General Lee 
 was, in round numbers, about eight or nine thousand men. 
 
 Soon after the arrival of General Lee a messenger came 
 with an order from the President, relieving General Wise of 
 his command, and directing him to repair to Richmond for 
 assignment to another field of duty of equal importance and 
 dignity. 
 
 I express no opinion in regard to the matters of differ 
 ence between Generals Floyd and Wise, and no conclusion 
 3 
 
34 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 prejudicial to the latter should be drawn from the action of 
 the War Department, relieving him of his command. Gen 
 eral Lee, so far as is known to me, never undertook to ascer 
 tain or decide the merits of the controversy between those 
 officers ; but, as the good of the service required that one or 
 the other should be relieved from duty with that army, an 
 order to that effect was issued by direction of the President, 
 and with General Lee s concurrence. 
 
 The combined forces of the enemy, under Generals Rose- 
 crans and Cox, were estimated to be from twelve to fifteen 
 thousand strong. 1 
 
 With such an army, elated by its previous encounters 
 with the small force heretofore opposed to it, it was reason 
 ably presumed that the Federal commander would continue 
 on the aggressive. General Lee caused every preparation to 
 be made to give battle. He was but too recently on the field 
 to adopt any other than a defensive policy : he had already 
 demonstrated his unwillingness to recede, by the advance 
 from Meadow Bluff to Little Sewell Mountain. The enemy 
 held a strong position on Big Sewell Mountain, from which, 
 as a base, he had already advanced to engage the troops of 
 General Wise. There was no reasonable cause to doubt that 
 General Hosecrans, \vho was now in command, would con 
 tinue this advance, and assail the Confederate position. It 
 was a matter of great surprise, therefore, when, on the morn 
 ing of the 6th of October, it was discovered that the enemy 
 was no longer in our front ; and this surprise was increased 
 when, on pursuing the road over which Eosecrans s army 
 had retreated, it was evident, from the manner in which pro 
 visions and accoutrements had been tumbled out or left upon 
 the route, that the flight had been somewhat precipitate and 
 disorderly. 
 
 We had now reached the latter days of October : the 
 
 1 This was a great exaggeration on the part of the Confederates. General 
 Rosecrans puts his effective strength at this time at but eight thousand five 
 hundred. " Report on the Conduct of the War," Second Series, vol. iii., p. 10. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 35 
 
 lateness of the season and the condition of the roads pre 
 cluded the idea of earnest aggressive operations, and the cam 
 paign in Western Virginia was virtually concluded. 
 
 Judged from its results, it must be confessed that this 
 series of operations was a failure. At its conclusion a large 
 portion of the State was in possession of the Federals, in 
 cluding the rich valleys of the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers, 
 and so remained until the close of the war. For this, how 
 ever, General Lee cannot be reasonably held accountable. 
 Disaster had befallen the Confederate arms, and the worst 
 had been accomplished, before he reached the theatre of 
 operations ; the Alleghanies then constituted the dividing 
 line between the hostile forces, and in this network of 
 mountains, sterile and rendered absolutely impracticable 
 by a prolonged season of rain, Nature had provided an in 
 surmountable barrier to operations in the transmontane 
 country. 
 
 It was doubtless because of similar embarrassments that 
 the Federal general retired, in the face of inferior numbers, 
 to a point nearer his base of supplies. 
 
 During the time that General Lee was in this depart 
 ment (his first service in the field under Confederate au 
 spices), he manifested that complete self-abnegation and dis 
 like for parade and ceremony which later in the war became 
 characteristic of him. Accompanied originally by a staff of 
 but two persons, and, after the death of Colonel Washington, 
 with but one aide-de-camp, with no escort nor body-guard, 
 no couriers nor guides, he made the campaign under alto 
 gether unostentatious and really uncomfortable circum 
 stances. One solitary tent constituted his headquarters- 
 camp ; this served for the general and his aide ; and when 
 visitors were entertained, as actually occurred, the general 
 shared his blankets with his aide, turning over those of the 
 latter to his guest. His dinner-service was of tin tin plates, 
 tin cups, tin bowls, everything of tin and consequently in 
 destructible ; and to the annoyance and disgust of the sub- 
 
36 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 ordinates, who sighed for porcelain, could not or would not 
 be lost ; indeed, with the help of occasional additions, this tin 
 furniture continued to do service for several campaigns ; and 
 it w r as only in the last year of the war, while the army was 
 around Petersburg, that a set of china was surreptitiously in 
 troduced into the baggage of the headquarters of the army. 
 This displaced for a time the chaste and elaborate plate ; 
 but on resuming "light marching order" at the time of the 
 evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg, the china, which 
 had been borrowed by the staff, was returned ; the tins were 
 again produced and did service until the surrender of the 
 army, when they passed into the hands of individuals who 
 now preserve them as mementos of the greatest commander 
 in the great war. 
 
CHAPTER Y. 
 
 General Lee repairs to Richmond. He is ordered to the Department of South 
 Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. His Return thence to Richmond. He is 
 charged with the Control of the Military Operations of all of the Confed 
 erate Armies. His Duties in that Position. General Johnston wounded in 
 the Battle of Seven Pines. General Lee in Command of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia. The Seven Days Battles around Richmond. Strength 
 of the Two Opposing Armies. 
 
 SOON after the occurrences in Western Virginia just re 
 lated, General Lee returned to Richmond and resumed his 
 position and duties as adviser and counselor to the Presi 
 dent. On the 6th of November, 1861, he proceeded to 
 South Carolina for the purpose of directing and supervising 
 the construction of a line of defense along the coasts of 
 South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He arrived immedi 
 ately after the capture of Port Royal by the Federal navy, 
 and established his headquarters at Coosawhatchie, on the 
 railroad, about midway between Charleston and Savannah. 
 Beyond the prosecution of the work of fortifying the cities 
 and principal points on the coast and rivers, nothing of im 
 portance occurred during his three months stay in this de 
 partment. He was in Charleston at the time of the great 
 conflagration, and was compelled to leave the Mills House, 
 where he had taken rooms, and which was with great diffi 
 culty saved from destruction, and to take refuge in a private 
 house on the " Battery." 
 
 In March, 1862, he returned to Richmond, and was as 
 signed, on the 13th, under the direction of the President, to 
 the conduct of the military operations of all the armies of 
 
38 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 the Confederate States. This position was regarded by some 
 as rather anomalous in character, and yet there devolved 
 upon the general a great deal of work that did not appear on 
 the surface, and was of a kind not to be generally appreci 
 ated. Exercising a constant supervision over the condition 
 of affairs at each important point, thoroughly informed as to 
 the resources and necessities of the several commanders of 
 armies in the field, as well as of the dangers which respec 
 tively threatened them, he was enabled to give them wise 
 counsel, to offer them valuable suggestions, and to respond 
 to their demands for assistance and support to such extent as 
 the limited resources of the Government would permit. It 
 was in great measure due to his advice and encouragement 
 that General Magruder so stoutly and gallantly held his lines 
 on the Peninsula against General McClellan until troops 
 could be sent to his relief from General Johnston s army. I 
 recollect a telegraphic dispatch received by General Lee 
 from General Magruder, in which he stated that a council of 
 war which he had convened had unanimously determined 
 that his army should retreat ; in reply to which General Lee 
 urged him to maintain his lines and to make as bold a front 
 as possible, and encouraged him with the prospect of being 
 early reenforced. 
 
 ISTo better illustration of the nature and importance of 
 the duty performed by General Lee, while in this position, 
 can be given than the following letter one of a number of 
 similar import written by him to General Jackson, the 
 "rough" or original draft of which is still in my possession : 
 
 HEADQUARTERS, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, April 29, 1862. 
 
 Major- General T. J. JACKSON, commanding, etc.. Swift Run Gap, Vir 
 ginia. 
 
 GENEKAL : I have had the honor to receive your letter 
 of yesterday s date. From the reports that reach me that are 
 entitled to credit, the force of the enemy opposite Fredericks- 
 burg is represented as too large to admit of any diminution 
 whatever of our army in that vicinity at present, as it might not 
 
GENERAL LEE IN RICHMOND. 39 
 
 only invite an attack on Richmond, but jeopard the safety of 
 the army in the Peninsula. I regret, therefore, that your re 
 quest, to have five thousand men sent from that army to reen- 
 force you, cannot be complied with. Can you draw enough 
 from the command of General Edward Johnson to warrant you 
 in attacking Banks ? The last return received from that 
 army shows a present force of upward of thirty-five hundred, 
 which, it is hoped, has been since increased by recruits and re 
 turned furloughs. As he does not appear to be pressed, it is 
 suggested that a portion of his force might be temporarily re 
 moved from its present position, and made available for the 
 movement in question. A decisive and successful blow at 
 Banks s column would be fraught with the happiest results, and 
 I deeply regret my inability to send you the reinforcements you 
 ask. If, however, you think the combined forces of Generals 
 Ewell and Johnson, with your own, inadequate for the move, 
 General Ewell might, with the assistance of General Anderson s 
 army near Fredericksburg, strike at McDowell s army between 
 that city and Aquia, with much promise of success ; provided 
 you feel sufficiently strong alone to hold Banks in check. 
 
 Very truly yours, R. E. LEE. 
 
 The reader will observe that this letter bears the date 
 "April 29, 1862." On the 5th or 6th of May General Jack 
 son formed a junction between his own command and that 
 of General Edward Johnson ; on the Sth of May lie defeated 
 Milroy at McDowell. Soon thereafter the command of Gen 
 eral Ewell was united to that already under Jackson, and on 
 the 25tli of the same month Banks was defeated and put to 
 flight. 
 
 Other incidents miglit be cited to illustrate this branch of 
 the important service rendered at this period by General 
 Lee. The line of earthworks around the city of Richmond, 
 and other preparations for resisting an attack, testified to the 
 immense care and labor bestowed upon the defense of the 
 capital, so seriously threatened by the army of General 
 McClellan. 
 
40 FOUR TEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 On the last day of May the battle of Seven Pines, or 
 Fair Oaks, was delivered, and General Johnston was wound 
 ed. On that afternoon the President and General Lee had 
 gone out on the lines, and were present and under a severe 
 fire as the troops of General Whiting went into action. 
 Major-General G. W. Smith was next in rank to General 
 Johnston, and assumed command of the army after the 
 wounding of the latter. The next day, by order of the 
 President, General Lee took personal command of the Army 
 of Northern Virginia. He proceeded at once to make its 
 position secure against attack, and to enhance its efficiency 
 and strength, by every means in his power, so as to justify 
 aggressive movements. 
 
 The brilliant achievements of the army under General 
 Jackson, in the Shenandoah Valley, had so startled and par 
 alyzed the Federal authorities, and had excited such fears for 
 the safety of Washington, as to remove all apprehension of 
 any immediate trouble from the enemy heretofore operating 
 in the Valley, and to render improbable the junction of the 
 army under McDowell with that of McClellan. General 
 Lee, quick to observe and profit by the advantage to be de 
 rived from this propitious state of affairs, conceived the plan 
 of drawing Jackson s command to his aid, swiftly and secret 
 ly, in order that he might, when thus reenforced, fall with 
 all his strength upon the enemy s right flank, and compel 
 him to a general engagement. The necessary orders were 
 given. General Jackson moved with all possible celerity, 
 and when he had reached Ashland, General Lee, having left 
 Generals Magruder, Holmes, and Huger, with about twenty- 
 eight thousand men, in the defenses of Richmond, on the 
 26th of June moved to the north side of the Chickahominy 
 River with the remainder of his army, and took the initia 
 tive in the engagements embraced in the seven days battles, 
 from which resulted the complete discomfiture of the army 
 under General McClellan, and its retreat to the protection 
 of the fleet operating in James Eiver. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 41 
 
 Without attempting an account of any one of the severe 
 engagements embraced in the seven days battles, so fully 
 described in General Lee s official report, I cannot forbear 
 mention of a maladroit performance just before their termi 
 nation, but for which I have always thought that McClellan s 
 army would have been further driven, even " to the wall," 
 and made to surrender a trifling matter in itself apparent 
 ly, and yet worthy of thoughtful consideration. General 
 McClellan had retreated to Harrison s Landing; his army, 
 supply and baggage trains were scattered in much confusion 
 in and about Westover plantation ; our army was moving 
 down upon him, its progress much retarded by natural and 
 artificial obstacles ; General Stuart was in advance, in com 
 mand of the cavalry. In rear of and around Westover there 
 is a range of hills or elevated ground, completely command 
 ing the plains below. Stuart, glorious Stuart ! always at 
 the front and full of fight, gained these hills. Below him, 
 as a panorama, appeared the camps and trains of the enemy, 
 within easy range of his artillery. The temptation was too 
 strong to be resisted : he commanded some of his guns to 
 open fire. The consternation caused thereby was immediate 
 and positive. It frightened the enemy, but it enlightened 
 him. 
 
 Those heights in our possession, the enemy s position was 
 altogether untenable, and he was at our mercy ; unless they 
 could be recaptured his capitulation was inevitable. Half a 
 dozen shells from Stuart s battery quickly demonstrated this. 
 The enemy, not slow in comprehending his danger, soon ad 
 vanced his infantry in force, to dislodge our cavalry and re 
 possess the heights. This was accomplished : the hills were 
 fortified, and became the Federal line of defense, protected 
 at either flank by a bold creek which emptied into James 
 River, and by the heavy batteries of the fleet anchored oppo 
 site. 1 Had the infantry been up, General Lee would have 
 
 1 " The retreat of the army from Malvern Hill to Harrison s Bar was very 
 precipitate. The troops upon their arrival there were huddled together in great 
 
42 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 made sure of this naturally strong line, fortified it well, 
 maintained it against assault, and dictated to General Mc- 
 Clellan terms of surrender ; and had the attention of the 
 enemy not been so precipitately directed to his danger by the 
 shots from the little howitzers, it is reasonable to presume 
 that the infantry would have been up in time to secure 
 the plateau. The following extract from General Stuart s 
 manuscript, " Reports and Notes on the War," 1 gives more 
 in detail the circumstances just related : 
 
 HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY, July 14, 1862. 
 
 .... I therefore sent down that night a howitzer toward 
 Westover, under Captain Pelham, supported by living s squad 
 ron, First Virginia Cavalry, with orders to reach the immediate 
 vicinity of the river-road below, so as to shell it if the enemy 
 attempted to retreat that night. A squadron was left (Georgia 
 Legion) near Shirley, and the main body bivouacked contiguous 
 to oat-fields of necessity our sole dependence for forage since 
 leaving the White House ; but the regiments were warned that 
 the pursuit might be resumed at any moment during the night 
 
 confusion, the entire army being collected within a space of about three miles 
 along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupying the height 
 which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to 
 resist an attack in force by the enemy ; and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby 
 preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army there 
 from destruction. The enemy did succeed in bringing up some of their artillery, 
 and threw some shells into the camp, before any preparations for defense had 
 been made. On the 3d of July the heights were taken possession of by our 
 troops, and works of defense commenced, and then, and not until then, was our 
 army secure in that position." Extract from the "Report of the Committee on 
 the Conduct of the War " (U. S. Congress), Part I., p. 27. 
 
 General Casey testified as follows : " The enemy had come down with some 
 artillery upon our army massed together on the river, the heights commanding 
 the position not being in our possession. Had the enemy come down and taken 
 possession of those heights with a force of twenty or thirty thousand men, they 
 would, in my opinion, have taken the whole of our army, except that small 
 portion of it that might have got off on the transports. I felt very much alarmed 
 for the army until we had got possession of those heights, and fortified them. 
 After that it was a strong position." Ibid., p. 446. 
 
 1 On file in the archives of the Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Ya. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 43 
 
 should Captain Pelham s reconnaissance apprise us of a continu 
 ance of the retreat. 
 
 During the night Captain Pelham wrote to me that the 
 enemy had taken position between Shirley and Westover, nearer 
 the latter, and described the locality, the nature of Herring 
 Creek on the enemy s right, and indicated the advantage to be 
 gained by taking possession with artillery of Evelington Heights 
 a plateau commanding completely the enemy s encamp 
 ment. I forwarded this report at once to the commanding 
 general through General Jackson, and proceeded to the ground 
 with my command, except one regiment the Ninth Virginia 
 Cavalry, Colonel W. H. F. Lee which was ordered down the 
 road by Nance s shop, and thence across toward Charles City 
 Court-House, so as to extend my left, and keep a lookout 
 toward Forge Bridge, by which route I was liable to be at 
 tacked in flank and rear by Stoneman, should he endeavor a 
 junction by land with McClellan. 
 
 I found Evelington Heights easily gained. A squadron in 
 possession vacated without much hesitation, retreating up the 
 road, the only route by which it could reach Westover, owing 
 to the impassability of Herring Creek below Roland s mill. 
 Colonel Martin was sent around farther to the left, and the 
 howitzer brought into action in the river-road, to fire upon the 
 enemy s camp. Judging from the great commotion and ex 
 citement caused below, it must have had considerable effect. 
 We soon had prisoners from various corps and divisions, and 
 from their statements, as well as those of citizens, I learned that 
 the enemy s main body was there, but much reduced and demor 
 alized. I kept the commanding general apprised of my move 
 ments, and I soon learned from him that Longstreet and Jack 
 son were en route to my support. I held the ground from about 
 9 A. M. until 2 P. M., when the enemy had contrived to get one 
 battery into position on this side the creek. The fire was, how 
 ever, kept up until a body of infantry was found approaching 
 by our right flank. I had no apprehension, however, as I felt 
 sure Longstreet was near by ; and, although Pelham reported 
 but two rounds of ammunition left, I held out, knowing how im 
 portant it was to hold the ground until Longstreet arrived. 
 
44 TOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 The enemy s infantry advanced, and the battery kept up its 
 fire. I just then learned that Longstreet had taken the wrong 
 road, and was at Nance s shop, six or seven miles off. Pelham 
 fired his last round, and the sharp-shooters, strongly posted in 
 the skirt of woods bordering the plateau, exhausted every car 
 tridge, and had at last to retire ; not, however, without teaching 
 many a foeman the bitter lesson of death. 
 
 My command had been so cut off from sources of supply, and 
 so constantly engaged with the enemy, that the abundant supply 
 it began with on the 26th of June was entirely exhausted. I kept 
 pickets at Bradley s store that night, and remained with my 
 command on the west side of the creek near Phillip s farm. 
 General Longstreet came up late in the evening ; he had been 
 led by his guide out of his proper route. The next day, July 
 4th, General Jackson s command drove in the enemy s advance- 
 pickets. 
 
 I pointed out the position of the enemy, now occupying, 
 apparently in force, the plateau from which I shelled their camp 
 the day before, and showed him the route by which the plateau 
 could be reached to the left, and submitted my plan for dispos 
 sessing the enemy and attacking his camp. This was subse 
 quently laid before the commanding general. 
 
 The enemy s position had been well reconnoitred by Black- 
 ford, of the engineers, the day before, from a close view, and 
 further on this day, July 4th, demonstrating that his position 
 was strong, difficult to reach, except with rifled cannon, and 
 completely flanked by gunboats all which were powerful ar 
 guments, and no doubt had their due weight with the command 
 ing general against renewing an attack, thus far of unbroken 
 success, against a stronghold where the enemy had been reen- 
 forced beyond a doubt. . . , 
 
 It is most disingenuous to speak of the retreat of Gen 
 eral McClellan s army as a "change of base" which that 
 commander had purposed to make for some time previous 
 to General Lee s attack. This has been claimed by certain 
 writers, but his repeated dispatches to the authorities at 
 Washington, the last bearing date the 25th of June, in which 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 45 
 
 lie signifies his intention to attack General Lee, completely 
 refute the idea that his movements after General Lee s as 
 saults were the carrying out of a preconceived determination 
 to change his base of operations to the James River. His 
 army was well in hand, and greatly outnumbered that of his 
 antagonist; he had proposed to assume the offensive and 
 bring on a " general engagement " on the very day that he 
 was assailed ; 1 after the first attack at Mechanicsville, when 
 the purpose of General Lee was fully disclosed, he received 
 the assaults of the latter on ground of his own selection ; his 
 men were protected to a greater or less extent by hastily- 
 constructed but effective works especially was this the case 
 at Games s Mill, where Hood s command charged upon and 
 captured one of the strongest positions ever assailed by either 
 side during the entire war and he destroyed large quanti 
 ties of stores in his hurried movements to his " new base." 
 In all this there is incontestable proof that he was fairly 
 beaten and compelled to retreat. In this connection I sub 
 mit the following extracts from the dispatches sent by Gen 
 eral McClellan at that period to the President and the Sec 
 retary of War, and published in full in the " Eeport on the 
 Conduct of the War," Part L, pages 327-340 : 
 
 May 21, 1862. ... I believe there is a great struggle before 
 this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish 
 to strengthen its force as much as I can ; but, in any event, I 
 shall fight it with all the skill and caution and determination 
 that I possess. And I trust that the result may either obtain 
 for me the permanent confidence of my Government, or that it 
 may close my career. 
 
 June 2, 1862. . . . The result is, that our left is within four 
 miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall, to cross 
 with the rest of the force, and make a general attack. The 
 morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do 
 not fear for odds against me. . . . 
 
 June 7, 1862. . . . I shall be in perfect readiness to move 
 
 1 General McClellan s report. 
 
46 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 forward to take Richmond the moment that McCall reaches 
 here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. . . . 
 
 June 11, 1862. McCall s troops have commenced arriving 
 at White House. . . . Weather good to-day. . . . Give me a 
 little good weather, and I shall have progress to report here. 
 
 June 12, 1862. . . . Have moved headquarters across the 
 Chickahominy. Weather now good ; roads and ground rapidly 
 drying. 
 
 June 14, 1862. Weather now very favorable. I shall ad 
 vance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit 
 for artillery to move. 
 
 June 18, 1862. . . . A general engagement may take place 
 any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less 
 decisive. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as 
 soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favor 
 able condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some 
 necessary preliminaries. . . . 
 
 June 25, 1862. The rebel force is stated at two hundred 
 thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to 
 contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true ; 
 but this army will do all in the power of men to hold their posi 
 tion and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority of 
 numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it. . . . 
 I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I 
 have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by over 
 whelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate ; 
 but if the result of the action which will probably occur to 
 morrow or within a short time is a disaster, the responsibility 
 cannot be thrown on my shoulders. 
 
 June 27, 1862, 10 A. M. The troops on the other side are 
 now well in hand, and the whole army so concentrated that it 
 can take advantage of the first mistake made by the enemy. . . . 
 White House yet undisturbed. Success of yesterday complete. 
 
 June 27, 1862, 12 M. My change of position on other side 
 just in time. Heavy attack now being made by Jackson and 
 two other divisions. Expect attack also on this side. 
 
 June 27, 1862, 3 P. M. We have been fighting nearly all 
 day against greatly superior numbers. We shall endeavor to 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 47 
 
 hold our own, and if compelled to fall back, shall do it in good 
 order, upon James River if possible. Our men fight like veter 
 ans, and will do all that men can do. If we have to fall back 
 on James River, supplies should be passed up to us, under pro 
 tection of the gunboats, as rapidly as possible. 
 
 June 28, 1862, 12.20 A. M. I now know the full history of 
 the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed 
 several very strong attacks. On the left bank, our men did all 
 that men could do all that soldiers could accomplish ; but they 
 were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I 
 brought my last reserves into action. Had I twenty thousand 
 or even ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could 
 take Richmond ; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be 
 glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of 
 the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our 
 honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I 
 have lost this battle because my force was too small. ... I still 
 hope to retrieve our fortunes. ... I know that a few thousand 
 men more would have changed this battle from a defeat to a 
 victory. 
 
 To this Mr. Lincoln replied : 
 
 June 28, 1862. . . . Save your army at all events. . . . 
 
 From Haxall s plantation General McClellan telegraphed : 
 
 July 1, 1862. . . . My men are completely exhausted, and I 
 dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. . . . 
 I now pray for time. . . . 
 
 Mr. Lincoln to General McClellan : 
 
 July 1, 1862. ... If you are not strong enough to face the 
 enemy, you must find a place of security and wait, rest and 
 repair. Maintain your ground, if you can, but save the army at 
 all events, even if you fall back to Fortress Monroe. 
 
 General McClellan to President Lincoln : 
 
 BERKELEY-HARBISON S BAR, July 2, 1862, 5 p. M. 
 
 I have succeeded in getting this army to this place, on the 
 banks of James River. . 
 
48 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 I have not yielded an inch of ground unnecessarily, but have 
 retired to prevent the superior force of the enemy from cutting 
 me off, and to take a different base of operations. 
 
 In the testimony of General McClellan before the Com 
 mittee 011 the Conduct of the War, the following appears : 
 
 Question. Did you suppose the enemy to be your superior 
 in strength before the battle of Gaines s Mill ? 
 
 Answer. My recollection is that I did. 
 
 Q. And did you suppose at that time that you would be 
 obliged to retreat ? 
 
 A. It was a contingency I thought of. But my impression 
 is that, up to the time of the battle of Gaines s Mill, I still hoped 
 that we should be able to hold our own. 1 
 
 Colonel B. S. Alexander testified before the committee 
 that 
 
 While at headquarters, receiving his instructions (to proceed 
 to James River with an escort to communicate with the gun 
 boats, and order supplies to be brought up the river), he was 
 shown a printed order, not then issued, directing the destruction 
 of the baggage of officers and men, and the tents, camp-equipage, 
 and things of that kind ; appealing to the army to submit to 
 this privation, as it would be only temporary " only for a few 
 days." He remonstrated with General McClellan against issu 
 ing such an order ; that it would have a bad effect, would de 
 moralize the army, as it would be telling them, more plainly 
 than they could be told in any other way, that they were de 
 feated, and running for their lives. The order was not issued, 
 and General McClellan testifies that he has no recollection of 
 any such order. 2 
 
 From these extracts, I think it will be clear to the can 
 did reader that the retreat to James River was a compulsory 
 one, and due to a defeat then acknowledged by General 
 McClellan himself. 
 
 The fighting, however, was not invariably attended with 
 
 1 " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 25. 2 Ibid., Part I., p. 434. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 49 
 
 success to the Confederates ; notably, the defense of Malvern 
 Hill by the Federals was in favor of the latter, which result 
 was as much due to the mismanagement of the Confederate 
 troops as to the naturally strong position occupied by the 
 Federals and their gallantry in its defense. 
 
 Considerable delay was occasioned in the pursuit, from the 
 fact that the ground was unknown to the Confederate com 
 manders. On this occasion General Magruder took the 
 wrong route, and had to be recalled, thereby losing much 
 precious time ; and, when after serious and provoking de 
 lay the lines were formed for attack, there was some misun 
 derstanding of the orders of the commanding general, and, 
 instead of a spirited, united advance by the entire line, as 
 contemplated, the divisions were moved forward at different 
 times, each attacking independently, and each in turn re 
 pulsed. Moreover, owing to the peculiar character of the 
 ground, artillery could not be advantageously placed to aid 
 the assaulting columns ; whereas the Federal batteries, strong 
 ly posted and most handsomely served, contributed in a very 
 great degree to the successful stand made by McClellan s re 
 treating army at Malvern Hill. 
 
 EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES IN THE SEVEN 
 DAYS BATTLES. 
 
 A statement of the strength of the troops under General 
 Johnston, now on file in the Archive-Office of the War De 
 partment, shows that on the 21st of May, 1862, he had pres 
 ent for duty : 
 
 Smith s division : consisting of the brigades of Whiting, Hood, Hamp 
 ton, Hatton, and Pettigrew 10,592 
 
 Longstreet s division : consisting of the brigades of A. P. Hill, Pickett, 
 
 R. H. Anderson, Wilcox, Colston, and Pryor 13,816 
 
 Magruder s division : consisting of the brigades of McLaws, Kershaw, 
 
 Griffith, Cobb, Toombs, and D. R. Jones 15,680 
 
 D. H. Hill s division : consisting of the brigades of Early, Rodes, Raines, 
 
 Featherston, and " the commands " of Colonels Ward and Crump. . 11,151 
 
 Cavalry brigade 1,289 
 
 Reserve artillery , 1,160 
 
50 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 In addition to the troops above enumerated, there were 
 two brigades subject to the orders of General Johnston, then 
 stationed in the vicinity of Hanover Junction : one under 
 the command of General J. E. Anderson, and the other un 
 der the command of General Branch ; they were subsequently 
 incorporated into the division of General A. P.. Hill, and 
 participated in the battles around Eichmond. I have no 
 official data to determine the strength of these two brigades ; 
 that under General Branch was attacked by Porter s corps 
 of McClellan s army, on the 27th of May, and suffered se 
 verely. General McClellan claims to have captured seven 
 hundred and thirty prisoners and to have killed two hun 
 dred of Branch s command in that engagement. General 
 Anderson informs me that the strength of his brigade in the 
 seven days battles was between two thousand and twenty- 
 three hundred effective, and agrees with me in estimating 
 the strength of the two brigades at that time at four thousand 
 effective. 
 
 Subsequent to the date of the return of the army around 
 Eichmond heretofore given, but previous to the battle of 
 Seven Pines, General Johnston was reenf orced by General 
 Huger s division, consisting of three brigades, under Generals 
 Mahone, Armistead, and Wright. In the bound volume of 
 the " Eeports of the Operations of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia " (vol. i., pp. 371-385), I find that Mahone s 
 strength at the commencement of the battles around Eich 
 mond was eighteen hundred ; "Wright s, two thousand ; Ar- 
 mistead s, twelve hundred and eight, present for duty. Total 
 of Huger s division, five thousand and eight effective. 
 
 If the strength of the five brigades just enumerated be 
 added to the return of the 21st of May, we shall have sixty- 
 two thousand six hundred and ninety-six as the effective 
 strength of the army under General Johnston on the 31st 
 of May, 1862. 1 
 
 1 As my purpose is to ascertain the strength of General Lee s army in the 
 battles around Richmond, I put Huger s strength at that time in this estimate. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 51 
 
 Deduct the losses sustained in the battle of Seven Pines, 
 as shown by the official reports of casualties, say six thousand 
 and eighty-four, 1 and we have fifty-six thousand six hundred 
 and twelve as the effective strength of the army when Gen 
 eral Lee assumed the command. 
 
 Previous to the seven days battles the following re- 
 enforcements reached General Lee : 
 
 Hipley^s brigade, officially reported as twenty-three hun 
 dred and sixty-six strong. 2 
 
 Holmes*s command, embracing the brigades of Ransom, 
 Walker, Daniel, and Wise, and a small force of artillery and 
 cavalry. In his official report, General Ransom puts five of his 
 six regiments at three thousand effective. 3 Allowing the aver 
 age strength of the reported five for the excluded sixth, viz., 
 six hundred, and it would give thirty-six hundred as his total 
 effective strength. In General Holmes s report 4 he states the 
 strength of Walker s brigade as thirty-six hundred ; that of 
 Daniel s, as fifteen hundred and seventy ; that of Wise, as seven 
 hundred and fifty-two. Besides the infantry, there were six bat 
 teries of artillery (four hundred and forty-three effective), and 
 a battalion of cavalry (one hundred and thirty strong). The 
 total effective of Holmes s command, including Ransom s bri 
 gade, was, therefore, ten thousand and ninety-five say ten thou 
 sand men. 
 
 Lawtorfs brigade, the last reinforcement received, was 
 thirty-five hundred strong, as by the official report of its com 
 mander. 6 
 
 The result would be the same, though the method would be different, if I took 
 the strength of the three brigades on the 21st of May and deducted their losses 
 previous to the battles around Richmond ; as I have not this information, I 
 adopt the other method. 
 
 1 Longstreet s loss was four thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, including 
 that sustained by D. H. Hill s division. " Southern Historical Society Papers," 
 vol. i., p. 415. 
 
 G. W. Smith s loss was twelve hundred and thirty-three. General John 
 ston s " Narrative," p. 140. 
 
 2 " Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia under Gen 
 eral Lee ; published by Authority of the Comfederate Congress," vol. i., p. 234. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 368. 4 Ibid., p. 151. 5 Ibid., p. 270. 
 
52 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 The commands just enumerated include all the reen- 
 forcements received by General Lee, except the command of 
 General Jackson, brought from the Valley. This consisted 
 of two divisions, viz. : Jackson s old division, embracing 
 three brigades, commanded respectively by General "Win 
 der and Colonels Cunningham and Fulkerson ; and Swell s 
 division, embracing the brigades of Elzey, Trimble, and Sey 
 mour. These two divisions were very much reduced by 
 reason of the active campaign in the Valley. Of Jackson s 
 old division, we have the effective strength of one of its three 
 brigades, before it marched to join General Lee, viz., that 
 under "Winder, which was officially reported eleven hundred 
 and thirty-five strong. 1 Taking this as an average, the divis 
 ion had an effective strength of thirty-four hundred and five. 
 Of Swell s division, one brigade and that the largest viz., 
 Elzey s, numbered twelve hundred and ninety-three, 3 when 
 Jackson s command joined General Lee. Taking that as an 
 average, the division numbered thirty-eight hundred and 
 seventy-nine effective. Add one thousand men for the regi 
 ment of cavalry, and the artillery which accompanied Gen 
 eral Jackson, and we have eight thousand two hundred and 
 eighty-four as the total effective of his command. 
 
 For the purpose of deceiving the enemy, two brigades 
 under "Whiting viz., his own and Hood s were sent to the 
 Valley to join General Jackson just before he moved to re- 
 enforce General Lee. For the same reason, General Law- 
 ton s brigade, on reaching Virginia when on the way to join 
 General Lee, was in like manner diverted. Having already 
 counted these brigades, I do not estimate them in giving the 
 strength of General Jackson s command. 
 
 We have now seen that when General Lee assumed the 
 command of the Army of Northern Virginia its strength 
 was fifty-six thousand six hundred and twelve ; and that he 
 was subsequently reenforced by Eipley s brigade, numbering 
 
 1 " Report of Operations around Richmond," p. 70. 
 
 8 Ibid., " Early s Report," p. 303 ; and Elzey s " Brigade Casualties," p. 142. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 53 
 
 twenty-three hundred and sixty-six men ; Holmes s com 
 mand, ten thousand strong ; Lawton s brigade, thirty-five 
 hundred ; and Jackson s two divisions, eight thousand two 
 hundred and eighty-four : making the total of reenforce- 
 ments received twenty-four thousand one hundred and fifty ; 
 which would make eighty thousand seven hundred and sixty- 
 two as the effective strength of the army under General Lee, 
 in the seven days battles around Richmond. 1 
 
 When General Lee assumed command of the army it was 
 organized into divisions and brigades, as follows : 
 
 Long streets division six brigades, viz. : Pickett s, R. H. 
 Anderson s, Wilcox s, Kemper s, Pryor s, and Featherston s. 
 
 A. P. HiWs division six brigades, viz. : J. R. Anderson s, 
 Gregg s, Field s, Fender s, Branch s, and Archer s. 
 
 D. II. HilVs division four brigades, viz. : Rodes s, G. B. 
 Anderson s, Garland s, and Colquitt s. 
 
 Magruder>s command six brigades, viz. : Semmes s, Ker- 
 shaw s, Griffith s, Cobb s, Toombs s, and D. R. Jones s. These 
 were organized into three divisions of two brigades each, under 
 Generals Magruder, McLaws, and D. R. Jones. 
 
 Huger^s division three brigades, viz. : Mahone s, Armis- 
 tead s, and Wright s. 
 
 Whiting^s division two brigades, viz. : his own, under 
 Colonel Law, and Hood s. 
 
 In all, there were twenty-seven brigades. 
 The army under General Lee in the battles around Rich 
 mond embraced the following commands : 
 
 Longstreetfs division six brigades, viz. : Pickett s, Ander 
 son s, Wilcox s, Kemper s, Pryor s, and Featherston s. 
 
 A. P. Hill s division six brigades, viz. : Anderson s, 
 Gregg s, Field s, Fender s, Branch s, and Archer s. 
 
 D. H. HiWs division five brigades, viz. : Rodes s, Gar 
 land s, Anderson s, Colquitt s, and Ripley s. 
 
 1 General Early, in a very exhaustive article on this subject, published in the 
 "Southern Historical Society Papers," vol. i., p. 407, puts General Lee s 
 strength " under eighty thousand effective." 
 
54 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 Magruder s command six brigades, viz. : Semmes s, Ker- 
 shaw s, Griffith s, Cobb s, Toombs s, and D. R. Jones s. 
 
 Huger s division three brigades, viz. : Mahone s, Armis- 
 tead s, and Wright s. 
 
 Whiting s division two brigades, viz. : his own and 
 Hood s. 
 
 Jackson s division three brigades, viz. : Winder s, Cun 
 ningham s, and Fulkerson s. 
 
 EweWs division three brigades, viz. : Elzey s, Trimble s, 
 and Seymour s. * >> 
 
 Holmfisls Command four brigades, viz. : Walker s, Ran 
 som s, Daniel s, amV^ise s. 
 
 ,- 3$icton > s Mgtide unattached, under General Jackson s 
 commands - -v 
 
 brigades. 
 
 Lee had received, then, but twelve brigades ad 
 ditional after he assumed command of the army. These, as 
 has already been shown, were Ripley s, Walker s, Bansom s, 
 Daniel s, Wise s, Lawton s, and the six brought by General 
 Jackson from the Valley. 
 
 By reference to the official reports of the division com 
 manders of the operations of their respective commands in 
 the battles around Richmond, I find the following concern 
 ing the number of troops employed in those operations : 
 
 General Holmes puts his command, exclusive of Ransom s 
 brigade, at six thousand infantry and six batteries of artillery 
 numbering four hundred and forty-three men; 1 General Ran 
 som s brigade, as already shown, numbered thirty-six hun 
 dred ; 2 thus Holmes s entire command amounted to ten thou 
 sand men. General Magruder reports his strength as thir 
 teen thousand. 3 General Huger s excluding Ransom s brigade, 
 temporarily attached and already estimated as shown by the 
 reports of his brigade commanders, was five thousand. 4 Gen- 
 
 1 " Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," vol. i., 
 p. 151. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 368. 8 Ibid., p. 190. 4 Ibid., pp. 371-385. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 55 
 
 eral A. P. Hill gives his strength as fourteen thousand. 1 Gen 
 eral D. H. Hill puts his at ten thousand. 2 General Lawton 
 gives the strength of his brigade as thirty-five hundred. 3 
 General Longstreet does not state the strength of his divis 
 ion, but General E. P. Alexander, his chief of artillery, quot 
 ing from the official records of Longstreet s command, puts 
 the strength of the division in the seven days battles at nine 
 thousand and fifty-one. 4 General Whiting does not give his 
 strength, but the two brigades on the 21st of May, 1862, num 
 bered four thousand three hundred and twen^fc 5 they lost pretty 
 heavily at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, 
 1862, numbered but thirty-eight hun! 
 fair to estimate them, therefore, on tjie 
 four thousand. General Jackson do< 
 his two divisions, but I have already ac 
 to prove that his command, excluding Whiting 
 not exceed eight thousand two hundred and eighty dftfr Alfow- 
 ing four thousand for the cavalry and the reserve artillery 
 nearly double what it was a month previous and there results 
 a total of all arms of eighty thousand eight hundred and thirty- 
 five. This confirms the estimate obtained by my first method. 
 
 It appears from the official returns of the Army of the 
 Potomac (as given by Mr. Swinton, in his history of that 
 army), that, on the 20th of June, 1862, General McClellan 
 had present for duty one hundred and fifteen thousand one 
 hundred and two. 7 Mr. Swinton also states that General 
 McClellan reached the James Eiver with " between eighty- 
 five and ninety thousand men," and that the Federal loss, in 
 the seven days battles, was fifteen thousand two hundred 
 and forty-nine ; this would make the army one hundred and 
 five thousand strong at the commencement of the battles. 
 
 1 Ibid., p. 173. 2 Ibid., p. 187. 3 Ibid., p. 270. 
 
 4 " Southern Historical Society Papers." 
 
 6 " Return of the Army under General Johnston," Archive-Office, United 
 States War Department, see chapter xiv. 
 
 6 " Return of the Army of Northern Virginia," chapter xiv! 
 
 7 For copy of " Return of the Army of the Potomac," see also " Report on 
 the Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 337. 
 
56 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 I presume that the difference of ten thousand between 
 this statement and the official returns is explained by the 
 fact that no account is taken of General Dix s corps of nine 
 thousand two hundred and seventy-seven effective, stationed 
 at Fort Monroe, but under General McClellan s command and 
 embraced in the returns of his army. The force under Gen 
 eral McClellan, however, appears to shrink as we study this 
 question, for the same author says (page 151), " On the north 
 side of the Chickahominy thirty thousand Union troops were 
 being assailed by seventy thousand Confederates, and twenty- 
 five thousand Confederates on the south side held in check 
 sixty thousand Union troops." The entire strength of Gen 
 eral McClellan s army, according to this last statement, would 
 be but ninety thousand. This is evidently an under-estimate 
 of the Federal strength ; and while the Confederate force on 
 the south side, as here given, is nearly accurate, that on the 
 north side is excessive by at least seventeen thousand. There 
 remained on the south side of the Chickahominy, of Lee s 
 army, the commands of Holmes, Magruder, and Huger; 
 their effective strength on the 26th of June was about twen 
 ty-eight thousand, as shown by the reports of these officers 
 of the operations of their commands in the seven days 
 battles. 
 
 The difference between this and eighty-one thousand 
 would give fifty-three thousand as the strength of the Con 
 federate force infantry, artillery, and cavalry under Gen 
 eral Lee, operating in the flank movement on the north side 
 of the Chickahominy. If we adopt as correct the Confed 
 erate loss as given by Mr. Swinton, viz., nineteen thousand, 
 it would then appear that when McClellan reached the river 
 with " eighty-five or ninety thousand men," J he was being 
 pursued by General Lee with but sixty-two thousand. 
 
 1 See General McClellan s testimony, " Report on the Conduct of the War," 
 Part I, p. 437. 
 
CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 General Lee manoeuvres to effect the Withdrawal of General McClellan s Army. 
 Jackson engages Pope at Cedar Kun, or Slaughter s Mountain. Removal 
 of the Federal Army from James River. The Second Battle of Manassas. 
 The First Invasion. Operations in Maryland. McClellan in Possession of 
 Lee s Order of Battle. Boonesboro, or South Mountain. Capture of Har 
 per s Ferry by Jackson s Forces. Battle of Sharpsburg. General Lee re 
 tires to Virginia. Incidents illustrating the Devotion to Duty and Great 
 Self-Control of the Confederate Leader. 
 
 ALTHOUGH defeated, the army under General McClellan 
 was still a formidable force, and was being constantly 
 strengthened. Its proximity to the Confederate capital, and 
 its unassailable position, the facility with which it could be 
 transferred across James River for operations on the south 
 side, the capacity of the North indefinitely to recruit its 
 ranks, and of the Government to repair and increase its 
 equipment, rendered the situation one of profound solicitude, 
 and presented to the Confederate commander the alternative 
 of remaining a passive observer of his adversary s movements, 
 or of devising a campaign which would compel the with 
 drawal of the hostile army from its position of constant 
 menace. 
 
 "With a just conception of the inordinate fear which pos 
 sessed the mind of the Federal civil authorities for the safety 
 of their capital, he concluded that seriously to threaten that 
 city, either by strategic manoeuvres or by a decisive blow 
 struck at the army in its front, would be the surest way of 
 effecting the removal of McClellan s army from its position 
 on James River. 
 
58 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 With this view he sent General Jackson in advance with 
 his two divisions, followed by that of A. P. Hill, to engage 
 General Pope, who commanded the Federal army in North 
 ern Virginia, intending, as soon as his anticipations of the 
 effect of this move were realized, to follow promptly with 
 the bulk of his army. 
 
 In vindication of his sagacity, information was soon re 
 ceived of the transfer of troops from McClellan s army on 
 James River to Washington. 
 
 Leaving two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cav 
 alry at Richmond, he now moved with the rest of the army 
 to join General Jackson, who had already presented a rebel 
 front to the astonished gaze of Major-General John Pope, 
 unaccustomed to such a sight, and had commenced at Cedar 
 Run, on the 9th of August, that series of brilliant manceuvres 
 and engagements which so dazed the Federal commander, 
 and so startled and alarmed the authorities at Washington. 
 
 These movements culminated with a decisive victory for 
 the Confederates, under General Lee, over the army under 
 General Pope, on the plains of Manassas, on the 30th of 
 August. In the series of engagements, " more than seven 
 thousand prisoners were taken, in addition to about two 
 thousand wounded left in our hands. Thirty pieces of artil 
 lery, upward of twenty thousand stand of small-arms, numer 
 ous colors, and a large amount of stores, besides those taken 
 by General Jackson at Manassas Junction, were captured." * 
 
 Vanquished at Manassas, General Pope next essayed to 
 make a stand in the fortified lines about Centreville; but 
 another detour by General Jackson, under General Lee s 
 orders, caused a further retreat in the direction of Wash 
 ington, and in the early days of September the Federal 
 army now embracing the combined forces of McClellan and 
 Pope was retired within the line of fortifications construct 
 ed on the Virginia side of the river, for the protection of the 
 Federal capital. 
 
 1 Extract from General Lee s " Report," p. 24. 
 
SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 59 
 
 Barely three months had elapsed since General Lee took 
 the field, and, behold ! the position of the two hostile armies, 
 with relation to their respective seats of government, was 
 completely reversed ; fortunately for that of the North, a 
 wide and impassable river lay between it and the victorious 
 army of the South. 
 
 With the battles of Cedar Bun, or Slaughter s Mountain, 
 and (second) Manassas, two more victories were recorded for 
 Confederate arms, and another Federal general was added to 
 the list of the discomfited. 
 
 The career of General Pope was as brief and remarkable, 
 when contrasted with his blustering proclamations, as the 
 movements of Generals Lee and Jackson, in bringing it to a 
 grievous termination, were audacious and brilliant. 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING AEMIES IN THE BATTLES OF 
 CEDAR KUN AND (SECOND) MANASSAS. 
 
 The field-return of the u Department of Northern Vir 
 ginia" of the 20th of July, 1862, shows a total "present 
 for duty" in that department of sixty-nine thousand five 
 hundred and fifty -nine. Of this number the Army of 
 Northern Virginia embraced but fifty-seven thousand three 
 hundred and twenty-eight. The remaining twelve thou 
 sand two hundred and thirty-one were serving south of 
 James River, and in North Carolina, and were included in 
 the departmental returns, because that section of country 
 was then comprised within the territorial limits of the de 
 partment under the command of General Lee. This return, 
 however, did not include Jackson s command, consisting of his 
 own and E well s divisions, then near Gordonsville. The move 
 ments of these two divisions doubtless had prevented their 
 making the formal returns usually required. Their effective 
 strength could not have exceeded eight thousand. 1 Jackson was 
 
 1 This estimate allows this division as much as it had in the seven days 
 battles. 
 
60 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 reenforced by A. P. Hill, early in August, whose division in 
 the field-return of the 20th of July, mentioned above, showed, 
 as " present for duty," ten thousand six hundred and twenty- 
 three ; so that, with this reenf orcement, General Jackson had 
 available at the battle of Cedar Run eighteen thousand six 
 hundred and twenty-three men. At that time General Pope 
 had available the three corps of Banks, McDowell, and Si- 
 gel, numbering forty-three thousand men, according to his 
 statement ; l but only Banks s corps and one division of Mc 
 Dowell s corps were engaged. 
 
 "When General Lee moved forward to join General Jack 
 son he took with him the divisions of Longstreet, D. R. 
 Jones, Hood, and Anderson, leaving in front of Richmond 
 the divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws, and two brigades 
 under J. G. Walker. 
 
 A portion of the cavalry under General Stuart accompa 
 nied General Lee, leaving a brigade under General Hamp 
 ton in front of Richmond. 
 
 The total present for duty of the cavalry arm of the ser 
 vice on the 20th of July was four thousand and thirty-five ; 
 probably fifteen hundred remained with Hampton, and 
 twenty-five hundred accompanied General Lee. The pres 
 ent for duty in the artillery of the same date was thirty-two 
 hundred and fifty-two ; of this number certainly not over 
 twenty-five hundred accompanied General Lee. 
 
 Besides the troops embraced in the return of the 20th of 
 July, there were two brigades (Drayton s and Evans s) re 
 cently arrived from South Carolina, which joined General 
 Lee previous to the battle. In a letter dated June 9, 1874, 
 Major Henry E. Young, subsequently on the staff of the 
 commanding general, but then adjutant-general of Drayton s 
 brigade, and also of the division composed of these two bri 
 gades, during its temporary command by General Drayton, 
 states that the strength of the two brigades did not exceed 
 
 1 General Pope s " Report," " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part II, 
 Supplement, p. 109. 
 
SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 61 
 
 four thousand six hundred present for duty. 1 Assuming this 
 estimate to be correct, and taking the strength of the other 
 commands as given on the return of the 20th of July, we 
 have the following as the army under General Lee in the 
 series of engagements that terminated with the second battle 
 of Manassas : 
 
 Jackson s three divisions, as heretofore given 18,623 
 
 Less casualties in battle of Cedar Run (Jackson s official report) 1,314 
 
 17,309 
 
 Longstreet s command viz. : his own division 8,486 
 
 Hood s " 3,852 
 
 Jones s " 3,713 
 
 16,051 
 
 Anderson s division 6,117 
 
 Drayton s and Evans s brigades 4,600 
 
 Total infantry 44,077 
 
 Cavalry (as estimated above) 2,500 
 
 Artillery " 2,500 
 
 Total of all arms 49,077 
 
 At the opening of the campaign, General Pope had un 
 der his command in the field the three army-corps of Gener 
 als Sigel, Banks, and McDowell, numbering, according to 
 the official returns, forty-seven thousand eight hundred and 
 seventy-eight effective, as follows : First Army-Corps (Si- 
 gel s), eleven thousand four hundred and ninety-eight infan 
 try and artillery; Second Army-Corps (Banks s), fourteen 
 thousand five hundred and sixty-seven infantry and artillery ; 
 Third Army-Corps (McDowell s), eighteen thousand five 
 hundred and seventy-five infantry and artillery ; cavalry, 
 eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight ; total, fifty- 
 three thousand three hundred and seventy-eight, from which 
 deduct detached commands and cavalry unfit for service six 
 
 1 General Sorrel, the adjutant-general of Longstreet s command, puts the 
 strength of these brigades at four thousand five hundred when they marched 
 from Gordonsville in 1862, just previous to the battle of Manassas. They were 
 at that time made a part of General Longstreet s command. 
 
62 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 thousand five hundred, and there remains forty-seven thou 
 sand eight hundred and seventy-eight effective. 1 
 
 Only Banks s corps, and Kickett s division of McDowell s 
 corps, were engaged at the battle of Cedar Kun, or Slaughters 
 Mountain. General Pope estimates his loss in that engage 
 ment, in killed, wounded, and missing, at eighteen hundred. 
 
 General Pope then received the following reinforcements : 
 on the 14th of August, Reno s corps of Burnside s army ; 
 on the 23d of August, Reynolds s division of Pennsylvania 
 Reserves ; and on the 26th and 27th of August, the corps of 
 Heintzelman and Porter, of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 In his report, General Pope puts these reenf orcements at 
 twenty-eight thousand five hundred, as follows : Reno s corps, 
 eight thousand ; Reynolds s division, twenty-five hundred ; 
 Heintzelman s and Porter s corps, eighteen thousand. 8 This 
 would make his aggregate effective strength, previous to the 
 second battle of Manassas, seventy-six thousand three hun 
 dred and seventy-eight ; and, deducting the losses at Cedar 
 Run, eighteen hundred, we have seventy-four thousand five 
 hundred and seventy-eight as his total available force in the 
 series of engagements which terminated with his defeat near 
 Groveton (second) Manassas on the 30th of August. 
 
 In this enumeration no mention is made of Sturgis, Cox, 
 or Franklin. A portion of Cox s division was engaged at 
 Manassas Junction, on the 27th of August; and Taylor s 
 brigade of Franklin s division was defeated by the Confeder 
 ates later on the same day, at the same place. 
 
 1 Official return of the Army of Yirginia of July 31, 1862 ; General Pope s 
 "Report," " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part II., Supplement, p. 118. 
 It is proper to state that General Pope disputes the correctness of the return 
 of Banks s corps. In regard to this he says (p. 117): "Although I several 
 times called General Bank s attention to the discrepancy between this return 
 and the force he afterward stated to me he had led to the front, that discrep 
 ancy has never been explained, and I do not yet understand how General 
 Banks could have been so greatly mistaken as to the force under his immedi 
 ate command." 
 
 2 Pope s " Report," p. 122. 3 Ibid., pp. 122, 172. 
 
SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 63 
 
 Although I have adopted General Pope s figures (with 
 the exception of Banks s strength already referred to, where 
 I followed the official return of General Banks), I cannot 
 reconcile his statement of the reinforcements received with 
 the other official data before me. He estimates the troops 
 received from the Army of the Potomac, previous to the 
 battle, viz., Heintzelman s corps, Porter s corps, and Rey 
 nolds s division, at twenty thousand five hundred ; he also 
 puts the combined strength of Sumner s and Franklin s 
 corps, which joined him after the battle, at nineteen thou 
 sand. 
 
 He thus makes it appear that all of McClellan s army, 
 except Keyes s corps and Dix s corps, numbered but thirty- 
 nine thousand five hundred men, although he speaks of that 
 army as the " ninety-one thousand veteran troops from Har 
 rison s Landing." The two corps of Keyes and Dix, and the 
 cavalry, could hardly account for the difference of fifty-one 
 thousand five hundred. 
 
 On the 20th of July, 1862, less than one month before the 
 removal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, 
 the official return 1 of that army showed present for duty 
 one hundred and one thousand six hundred and ninety-one 
 men, as follows : 
 
 Engineer brigade, cavalry division, provost-guard, etc 8,735 
 
 Second Corps, General Sumner 16,952 
 
 Third Corps, General Ileintzelman 16,276 
 
 Fourth Corps, General Keyes 14,490 
 
 Fifth Corps, General Porter 21,077 
 
 Sixth Corps, General Franklin 14,014 
 
 Seventh Corps, General Dix 9,997 
 
 United States Signal Corps 150 
 
 101,691 
 
 General Dix remained at Fortress Monroe. General 
 Keyes with his corps covered the embarkation at Yorktown ; 
 all the rest were moved to reenforce General Pope. General 
 
 1 " Report on the Conduct of the War, 
 
64 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 McClellan, having dispatched Ms corps successively at and 
 near Fortress Monroe, followed with his staff on the 23d of 
 August, and arrived at Aquia Creek the next day. 
 
 It will be seen that the combined strength of the Second 
 and Sixth Corps (Sumner s and Franklin s) was thirty thou 
 sand nine hundred and sixty-six previous to the removal 
 from the Peninsula to the front of Washington. "When 
 these two corps moved out to join General Pope, they num 
 bered twenty-five thousand infantry, 1 although he only puts 
 them at nineteen thousand. The combined strength of the 
 Third and Fifth Corps (Heintzelman s and Porter s), on the 
 20th July, was thirty-seven thousand three hundred and fifty- 
 three ; and, assuming that the proportion of infantry in these 
 corps was the same as in the Second and Sixth, their strength 
 at Manassas should have been near thirty thousand. Por 
 ter s corps alone embraced between twenty and thirty regi 
 ments, and eight batteries of artillery, 3 and two weeks later, 
 September 12th, numbered twenty thousand. 3 
 
 McCall s division of Pennsylvania Reserves numbered on 
 the 15th of June, 1862, nine thousand five hundred and 
 fourteen effective ; * its losses in the battles around Rich 
 mond were officially reported at three thousand and seventy- 
 four, 5 so that it must have numbered about six thousand five 
 hundred when it left the Peninsula to join General Pope, 
 yet the latter reports this division but twenty-five hundred 
 strong when it reached him. 
 
 Mr. Swinton, the author previously quoted, who enjoyed 
 
 1 Sec General McClellan s dispatches, " Report on the Conduct of the War," 
 Part I. " Sumner has about fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or ar 
 tillery, here " (August 28, 1862, p. 461). 
 
 " Franklin has only between ten thousand and eleven thousand ready for 
 duty" (August 29, 1862, p. 462). 
 
 2 General McDowell s testimony, " Report on the Conduct of the War," 
 Part II., Supplement, p. 175. 
 
 3 " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 39. 
 
 4 Ibid., Part L, p. 345. 
 
 5 From official report of casualties in the Army of the Potomac, " The 
 American Conflict," p. 168. 
 
SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 65 
 
 unusual facilities for obtaining accurate information in all 
 matters pertaining to the Federal army, states in his " Cam 
 paign of the Army of the Potomac " that the force under Gen 
 eral Pope, before he received any reinforcements, was " near 
 fifty thousand men." He also states (p. 179) that McDow 
 ell s corps, Sigel s corps, and Reynolds s (McCall s) division 
 of Pennsylvania Reserves, on the 28th of August, made to 
 gether " a force of forty thousand men." If we add to this 
 Banks s corps, Reno s corps, and the two corps of Heintzel- 
 man and Porter, it would appear that on the 28th of August 
 General Pope must have had an available force of seventy- 
 five or eighty thousand men. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th of August the decisive day 
 after deducting the losses incurred in the engagements of 
 the 27th, 28th, and 29th, General Pope reports his effective 
 strength as follows : l McDowell s corps, including Reynolds s 
 division, twelve thousand ; Sigel s corps, seven thousand ; 
 Reno s corps, seven thousand; Heintzelman s corps, seven 
 thousand ; Porter s corps, twelve thousand ; Banks s corps, 
 five thousand : total, fifty thousand. At no time in his 
 operations against General Pope had General Lee so many 
 men. 
 
 In addition to the troops enumerated above, the divisions 
 of Sturgis and Cox, and the corps of Sumner and Franklin, 
 were within an easy march of General Pope, but only joined 
 him after his retreat to Centre ville. Sturgis s division num 
 bered ten thousand ; Cox s division, seven thousand. 2 I have 
 already given the strength of Sumner s and Franklin s corps. 
 From first to last there must have been, according to the 
 official returns, not less than one hundred and twenty thou 
 sand men in front of Washington to resist General Lee s ad 
 vance. General Pope puts his strength on the 1st of Sep 
 tember at Centreville, after the fighting was over, at sixty- 
 three thousand men. His losses in killed and wounded were 
 
 1 General Pope s " Report," p. 156. 2 Ibid., p. 139. 
 
 5 
 
66 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 very heavy, but his " missing " must have been enormous to 
 account for this difference. 1 
 
 Immediately after the victory of second Manassas, the 
 Potomac was crossed, and the army under General Lee 
 entered Maryland ; Generals D. H. Hill and McLaws, who 
 were left at Richmond, having been meanwhile directed to 
 join the main army. 
 
 At Frederick City, information reached General Lee of 
 the purpose of President Davis to follow in the rear of 
 and join the army. To prevent a step so full of personal 
 danger to the President, for the scouting and marauding 
 parties of the enemy s cavalry were active in our rear, I was 
 dispatched to meet him and dissuade him from carrying out 
 such intention ; and I did not rejoin the army until the night 
 previous to the battle of Sharpsburg. 
 
 At this time General Lee conceived his plan of operations, 
 embracing the capture of Harper s Ferry, and a subsequent 
 concentration of the army to join issue in a grand battle 
 with General McClellan, who had again vaulted into the 
 headquarters-saddle of the Federal army, vacated by Gen 
 eral Pope. 
 
 An order of battle was issued, stating in detail the posi 
 tion and duty assigned to each command of the army. Gen 
 eral Jackson was to undertake the reduction and capture of 
 Harper s Ferry, and had assigned to him for this purpose his 
 own two divisions, and those of A. P. Hill, Anderson, and 
 McLaws. Longstreet s two divisions, under Jones and Hood, 
 and D. H. Hill s division, remained to hold in check the 
 army under McClellan pending Jackson s operations. 
 
 It was the custom to send copies of such orders, marked 
 " confidential," to the commanders of separate corps or di- 
 
 1 "It is proper for me to state here, and I do it with regret and reluctance, 
 that at least one-half of this great diminution of our forces was occasioned by 
 skulking and straggling from the army. The troops which were brought into 
 action fought with gallantry and determination, but thousands of men straggled 
 away from their commands, and were not in any action." General Pope s " Re 
 port," p. 164. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 67 
 
 visions only, and to place the address of such separate com 
 mander in the bottom left-hand corner of the sheet contain 
 ing the order. General D. H. Hill was in command of a di 
 vision which had not been attached to nor incorporated with 
 either of the two wings of the Army of Northern Virginia. A 
 copy of the order was, therefore, in the usual course, sent to 
 him. After the evacuation of Frederick City by our forces, 
 a copy of General Lee s order was found in a deserted camp 
 by a soldier, and was soon in the hands of General McClel- 
 lan. This copy of the order, it was stated at the time, was 
 addressed to " General D. II. Hill, commanding division." 
 General Hill has assured me that it could not have been his 
 copy, because he still has the original order received by him 
 in his possession. It is impossible, therefore, to explain how 
 a copy addressed to General D. H. Hill was thus carelessly 
 handled and lost. 1 
 
 But what an advantage did this fortuitous event give the 
 Federal commander, whose heretofore snail-like movements 
 were wonderfully accelerated when he was made aware of 
 the fact of the division of our army, and of the small por 
 tion thereof which confronted him ! 2 
 
 The God of battles alone knows what would have occurred 
 but for the singular accident mentioned ; it is useless to 
 speculate on this point, but certainly the loss of this battle- 
 order constitutes one of the pivots on which turned the 
 event of the war. 
 
 Notwithstanding this unfortunate circumstance, the stub 
 born and heroic defense of the South Mountain Pass by 
 
 1 Colonel Tenable, one of my associates on the staff of General Lee, says in 
 regard to this matter: "This is very easily explained. One copy was sent 
 directly to Hill from headquarters. General Jackson sent him a copy, as he 
 regarded Hill hi his command. It is Jackson s copy, in his own handwriting, 
 which General Hill has. The other was undoubtedly left carelessly by some 
 one at Hill s quarters." 
 
 2 " Upon learning the contents of this order, I at once gave orders for a vig 
 orous pursuit." General McClellan s testimony, " Report on the Conduct of 
 the War," Part L, p. 440. 
 
68 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 Longstreet and D. H. Hill, and Jackson s complete success 
 at Harper s Ferry, including the gallant resistance made at 
 Crampton s Gap by portions of McLaws s and Anderson s 
 commands * against the assaults of Franklin s corps, enabled 
 General Lee to unite his forces at Sharpsburg in time to 
 give battle, on the 17th of September, to his old adversary ; 
 but under altogether different circumstances from such as 
 were anticipated. Longstreet and D. H. Hill 2 in resisting 
 the assaults of the bulk of McClellan s army had suffered 
 very heavily. Jackson had been compelled, after consider 
 able fighting, to hasten from Harper s Ferry (which place 
 was surrendered to him on the 15th), by forced marches of 
 extraordinary character, to join General Lee, who had re 
 mained with Longstreet. The route from Harper s Ferry 
 was strewed with foot-sore and weary men, too feeble to keep 
 up with the stronger and more active ; and, instead of going 
 into battle with full ranks, the brigades were but as regi 
 ments, and in some cases no stronger than a full company. 
 
 After the affair at South Mountain, the commands of 
 Longstreet and Hill w r ere retired to Sharpsburg, and were 
 confronted on the 15th. by McClellan s army, along the line 
 of Antietam Creek, but were not seriously attacked until 
 the next day. 
 
 1 Cobb s and Semmes s brigades of McLaws s division, and Mahone s brigade 
 of Anderson s division. 
 
 2 The resistance made by General D. H. Hill at South Mountain deserves 
 more than a passing notice. On the 14th of September, with the brigades of 
 Rodes, Garland, Colquitt, Anderson, and Ripley, numbering in the aggregate 
 less than five thousand men, for six or seven hours he successfully resisted 
 the repeated assaults of two corps of the army under General McClellan 
 (Burnside s and Hooker s), fully thirty thousand strong. About 3 p. M. he was 
 reenforced by the brigades of Drayton and Anderson, numbering nineteen 
 hundred men, and later in the day was joined by General Longstreet, with the 
 brigades of Evans, Pickett, Kemper, Jenkins, Hood, and Whiting ; only four of 
 these, however, numbering about three thousand men, became seriously engaged, 
 and they not until dusk. Thus it will be seen that a force of less than ten 
 thousand men held McClellan in check for an entire day. " Reports of the Op 
 erations of the Army of Northern Virginia," p. 112 ; " Report on the Conduct 
 of the War," Part I, p. 640. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 69 
 
 On the afternoon of the 16th General McClellan directed 
 an attack by Hooker s corps on the Confederate left 
 Hood s two brigades and during the whole of the lYth the 
 battle was waged, with varying intensity, along the entire 
 line. When the issue was first joined, on the afternoon of 
 the 16th, General Lee had with him less than eighteen thou 
 sand men, 1 consisting of the commands of Longstreet and D. 
 II. Hill, the two divisions of Jackson, and two brigades 
 under "Walker. Couriers were sent to the rear to hurry up 
 the divisions of A. P. Hill, Anderson, and McLaws, hasten 
 ing from Harper s Ferry, and these several commands, as 
 they reached the front at intervals during the day, on the 
 17th, were immediately deployed and put to work. Every 
 man was engaged. We had no reserve. 
 
 The fighting was heaviest and most continuous on the 
 Confederate left. It is established upon indisputable Fed 
 eral evidence that the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and 
 Sumner, were completely shattered in the repeated but fruit 
 less efforts to turn this flank, and two of these corps were 
 rendered useless for further aggressive movements. 2 The 
 
 1 The command of General Longstreet consisted of the six brigades under 
 General D. R. Jones, viz., Kemper, Pickett, Jenkins, George Anderson, Dray- 
 ton, and Toombs, numbering, according to General Jones s official report, twenty- 
 four hundred and thirty men ; two brigades under General Hood, numbering 
 twenty-three hundred and thirty-two effective ; and Evans s brigade, fifteen 
 hundred strong ; making Longstreet s total effective on the morning of the 16th 
 of September six thousand two hundred and sixty-two. General D. H. Hill reports 
 that he had but three thousand infantry in line of battle. General Jackson s 
 command, by the official report of the division commanders, is shown to have 
 been but five thousand strong. The command of General Walker consisted of 
 his own brigade and that of General R. Ransom. I am informed by the latter 
 that the brigades numbered about sixteen hundred effective each, making thirty- 
 two hundred for the two. It will thus be seen that the total effective infantry in 
 line of battle on the 16th was but seventeen thousand four hundred and sixty-two. 
 
 2 " General Hooker s corps was dispersed ; there is no question about that. 
 I sent one of my staff-officers to find where they were, and General Ricketts, 
 the only officer we could find, said that he could not raise three hundred men of 
 his corps. 
 
 " There were some troops lying down on the left, which I took to belong to 
 
70 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 aggregate strength of the attacking columns at this point 
 reached forty thousand men, 1 not counting the two divisions 
 of Franklin s corps, sent at a late hour in the day to rescue 
 the Federal right from the impending danger of being itself 
 destroyed ; while the Confederates, from first to last, had 
 less than fourteen thousand men on this flank, consisting of 
 Jackson s two divisions, McLaws s division, and the two small 
 divisions, of two brigades each, under Hood and Walker, 
 with which to resist their fierce and oft-repeated assaults. 
 
 As a wall of adamant the fourteen thousand received the 
 shock of the forty thousand ; and the latter, staggered by 
 the blow, reeled and recoiled in great disorder. 
 
 The disproportion in the centre and on our right was as 
 great as, or even more decided than, on our left. 
 
 Indeed, the drawn battle of Sharpsburg was as forcible 
 an illustration of Southern valor and determination as was 
 furnished during the whole period of the war, when the 
 great disparity in numbers between the two armies is con 
 sidered. 
 
 From such informal reports as were received at the time, 
 and from my own observation and knowledge, I estimated 
 the effective strength of the Confederate army at Sharps- 
 burg at thirty-seven thousand men twenty-nine thousand 
 infantry and eight thousand cavalry and artillery. 
 
 But I am now satisfied, after reference to the official re 
 ports of the Maryland campaign, published by authority of 
 the Confederate Congress, that my estimate was excessive. 
 Fortunately, these reports are explicit, and enable me to de 
 termine, with almost absolute certainty, the effective strength 
 of the army in the battle of Sharpsburg. From them the 
 following statement of strength is derived : 
 
 Mansfield s command. In the mean time General Mansfield had been killed, 
 and a portion of his corps (formerly Banks s) had also been thrown into con 
 fusion." General Sumner s testimony, " Report on the Conduct of the War," 
 Part I, p. 368. 
 
 1 General Sumner s testimony, " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part 
 I, p. 368. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 71 
 
 The command of General Jackson embraced the division 
 under General J. E. Jones and that under General Lawton. 
 After General Lawton was wounded, the command of the 
 latter division devolved upon General Early. General J. E. 
 Jones reports the effective strength of his division to have 
 been sixteen hundred 1 when the battle began. General 
 Early reports the effective strength of his division as fol 
 lows : Lawton s brigade, eleven hundred and fifty ; Hays s 
 brigade, five hundred and fifty; Walker s brigade, seven 
 hundred ; and his own brigade, one thousand : total effec 
 tive of the division, thirty-four hundred ; a and the total 
 effective of Jackson s command was, therefore, five thou 
 sand men. 
 
 The command of General Longstreet, at that time, em 
 braced the six brigades under General D. K. Jones, the two 
 brigades under General Hood, and an unattached brigade 
 under General K G. Evans. His other three brigades were 
 temporarily detached, under General E. H. Anderson. 
 
 General Jones reports his strength to have been twenty- 
 four hundred and thirty effective. 8 The strength of Hood s 
 division at the commencement of the campaign was thirty- 
 eight hundred and fifty-two ; 4 General Hood puts the losses 
 of his division in its encounters with the enemy previous to 
 the battle of Sharpsburg at fifteen hundred and twenty; 5 
 this, making no deduction for straggling, would make his 
 effective in that engagement but twenty-three hundred and 
 thirty-two. General Evans states that his brigade numbered 
 twenty-two hundred effective at the opening of the campaign, 6 
 and reports his loss in the battles about Manassas at six hun 
 dred and thirty-one ; 7 his brigade was also engaged at South 
 Mountain, and could not have exceeded fifteen hundred 
 
 1 " Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," p. 222. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 190-196. 3 Ibid., p. 219. 
 
 4 " Return of the Army of Northern Virginia of the 20th of July, 1862," 
 chapter xiv. 
 
 5 "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," p. 214. 
 
 6 Ibid., p. 290. 7 Ibid., p. 288. 
 
72 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 effective at Sharpsburg. General Longstreet s command, 
 therefore, numbered six thousand two hundred and sixty-two 
 effective. General D. 11. Hill in his report puts his effective 
 at three thousand * on the morning of the 17th. General R. 
 H. Anderson s division, embracing on this occasion the 
 brigades of Mahone, Wright, Armistead, Wilcox, Pryor, and 
 Featherston, and temporarily assigned to General D. H. Hill, 
 is stated by the latter to have been three or four thousand 
 strong ; 2 call it thirty-five hundred. 
 
 General A. P. Hill s command consisted of the brigades 
 of Branch, Gregg, Archer, Pender, and Brockenborough. 
 He states the strength of the first three at two thousand ; 3 
 and allowing the average of seven hundred each for the 
 other two, we have for his division a total effective of thirty- 
 four hundred. The other brigade of this division (Thomas s) 
 was left at Harper s Ferry. 
 
 The division of General McLaws consisted of the brigades 
 of Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes, and Cobb. He reports the 
 effective strength of the four brigades to have been twenty- 
 eight hundred and ninety-three. 4 
 
 There remains but the small division of two brigades 
 under General J. G. Walker ; General Ransom states his 
 effective strength at sixteen hundred 6 ; General Walker 
 does not give the strength of his brigade, but I have put 
 it at sixteen hundred, on the authority of General Ransom, 
 who says, " So far as my memory serves me, my brigade 
 was stronger all the time than the other of Walker s di 
 vision." 
 
 With the exception of the single brigade last mentioned, 
 the following recapitulation is established upon indisputable 
 and contemporaneous authority, being nothing less than the 
 testimony of the commanding officers, as shown by their offi 
 cial reports, made at the time : 
 
 1 "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," p. 114. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 116. 3 Ibid., p. 129. 4 Ibid., p. 172. 6 Ibid., p. 291. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 73 
 
 Longstreet s command 6,262 
 
 Jackson s command 5,000 
 
 D. H. Hill s division 3,000 
 
 R. H. Anderson s division 3,500 
 
 A. P. Hill s division 3,400 
 
 McLaws s division 2,893 
 
 J. G. Walker s division 3,200 
 
 Total effective infantry 27,255 
 
 I cannot verify the estimate made for the cavalry and 
 artillery, viz., eight thousand ; but I am sure it is rather ex 
 cessive than the reverse. 
 
 This would make General Lee s entire strength thirty- 
 five thousand two hundred and fifty-five. 
 
 General McClellan, in his official report, states that he 
 had in action, in the same engagement, eighty-seven thou 
 sand one hundred and sixty-four of all arms. 1 
 
 Those thirty-five thousand Confederates were the very 
 flower of the Army of Northern Virginia, who, with in 
 domitable courage and inflexible tenacity, wrestled for the 
 mastery, in the ratio of one to three of their adversaries ; 
 and with consummate skill were they manoeuvred and shifted 
 from point to point, as different parts of the line of battle 
 were in turn assailed with greatest impetuosity. The right 
 was called upon to go to the rescue of the left ; the centre 
 was reduced to a mere shell in responding to the demands 
 for assistance from the right and left ; and A. P. Hill s com 
 mand, the last to arrive from Harper s Ferry, reached the 
 field just in time to restore the wavering right. At times 
 it appeared as if disaster was inevitable, but succor never 
 failed, and night found Lee s lines unbroken and his army 
 still defiant. 
 
 The weapon used was admirably tempered ; but much as 
 we may praise the blade, we should not forget the extraor 
 dinary skill and vigor with which it was wielded in that 
 memorable engagement by the great Confederate leader. 
 
 1 Extract from General McClellan s " Report," " The American Conflict," p. 209. 
 
74 FOUR TEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 The army of General McClellau had been too severely 
 handled and was too badly broken to justify a renewal of 
 the attack. In his testimony before the Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War, that officer said (" Report," Part I., p. 
 441) : " The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss 
 had been so great, and there was so much disorganization 
 in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper 
 to renew the attack that day, especially as I was sure of the 
 arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about 
 fifteen thousand men. As an instance of the condition of 
 some of the troops that morning, I happen to recollect the 
 returns of the First Corps General Hooker s made the 
 morning of the 18th, by which there were about thirty-five 
 hundred men reported present for duty. Four days after 
 that, the returns of the same corps showed thirteen thou 
 sand five hundred. I had arranged, however, to renew the 
 attack at daybreak on the 19th." 
 
 The 18th of September, the day after the battle, passed 
 therefore without any serious engagement. General Lee s 
 army, as may be inferred, was in no condition to take the 
 offensive and on the night of that day it recrossed the 
 Potomac River into Yirginia. A force sent by General 
 McClellan to harass the Confederate rear-guard under Gen 
 eral A. P. Hill, who had but two thousand muskets, had the 
 temerity to cross the Potomac in pursuit. Hill promptly 
 made his disposition for battle, and in an incredibly short 
 time the attacking force of the enemy was wellnigh anni 
 hilated ; such as were not killed, captured, or drowned in 
 the river in their efforts to escape, reached the Maryland 
 side in an utterly disorganized and demoralized condition. 1 
 
 After these events, General Lee for some time recruited 
 
 1 " A simultaneous, daring charge was made, and the enemy driven pell-mell 
 into the river. Then commenced the most terrible slaughter that this war has 
 yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating 
 bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account, 
 they lost three thousand men killed and drowned from one brigade alone. 
 Some two hundred prisoners were taken." A. P. Hill s " Report." 
 
EETURN TO VIRGINIA. 75 
 
 his army in the lower Valley of Virginia without moles 
 tation. 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE TWO AKMIES AFTER THE BATTLE. 
 
 The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia, of 
 the 22d of September, 1862, after our return to Virginia and 
 when the stragglers left behind in the extraordinary marches 
 in Maryland had rejoined their commands, shows present for 
 duty thirty-six thousand one hundred and eighty-seven in 
 fantry and artillery ; the cavalry, of which there is no report, 
 would perhaps increase these figures to forty thousand of all 
 arms. 
 
 The return of the Army of the Potomac, of the 20th of 
 September, 1862, shows present for duty, at that date, of the 
 commands that participated in the battle of Sharpsburg, 
 eighty-five thousand nine hundred and thirty of all arms, as 
 follows : * 
 
 General McClellan, staff, engineer brigade, etc 1,393 
 
 First Army-Corps, General Meade 12,237 
 
 Second Army-Corps, General Sumner 13,604 
 
 Fifth Army-Corps, General Porter , 19,477 
 
 Sixth Army-Corps, General Franklin 11,862 
 
 Ninth Army-Corps, General Burnside 10,734 
 
 Twelfth Army-Corps, General Williams 8,383 
 
 Cavalry corps, General Pleasanton 4,543 
 
 Detached commands at Frederick, Williamsport, and Boones- 
 
 boro 3,697 
 
 85,930 
 
 This is exclusive of Crouch s division of the Fourth 
 Corps (seven thousand two hundred and nineteen), which 
 reached General McClellan after the battle. The Federal 
 loss at Boonesboro and Antietam or Sharpsburg was four 
 teen thousand seven hundred and ninety-four. 2 
 
 1 See official return from the Adjutant-General s office, United States Army, 
 " Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 492. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 42. 
 
76 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 Tidings readied General Lee, soon after his return to Vir 
 ginia, of the serious illness of one of his daughters the darling 
 of his flock. For several day s apprehensions were entertained 
 that the next intelligence would be of her death. One morn 
 ing the mail was received, and the private letters were dis 
 tributed as was the custom ; but no one knew whether any 
 home news had been received by the general. At the usual 
 hour he summoned me to his presence to know if there were 
 any matters of army routine upon which his judgment and 
 action were desired. The papers containing a few such cases 
 were presented to him ; he reviewed and gave his orders in 
 regard to them. I then left him, but for some cause returned 
 in a few moments, and with my accustomed freedom entered 
 his tent without announcement or ceremony, when I was 
 startled and shocked to see him overcome with grief, an 
 open letter in his hands. That letter contained the sad in 
 telligence of his daughter s death. 
 
 The reader will probably ask why this incident is intro 
 duced here. 
 
 Although apparently without special significance, it illus 
 trates one of the noblest traits of the character of that noble 
 man. He was the father of a tenderly-loved daughter, one 
 who appealed with peculiar force to his paternal affection 
 and care, and whose sweet presence he was to know no more 
 in this world ; but he was also charged with the command 
 of an important and active army, to whose keeping to a great 
 extent were intrusted the safety and honor of the Southern 
 Confederacy. Lee the man must give way to Lee the patriot 
 and soldier. His army demanded his first thought and care ; 
 to his men, to their needs, he must first attend, and then he 
 could surrender himself to his private, personal affairs. Who 
 can tell with what anguish of soul he endeavored to control 
 himself, and to maintain a calm exterior, and who can esti 
 mate the immense effort necessary to still the heart filled 
 to overflowing with tenderest emotions, and to give attention 
 to the important trusts committed to him, before permitting 
 
RETURN TO VIRGINIA. 77 
 
 the more selfish indulgence of private meditation, grief, and 
 prayer ? Duty first, was the rule of his life, and his every 
 thought, word, and action, was made to square with duty s 
 inexorable demands. 
 
 Scarcely less to be admired than his sublime devotion to 
 duty was his remarkable self-control. General Lee was 
 naturally of a positive temperament, and of strong passions ; 
 and it is a mistake to suppose him otherwise ; but he held 
 these in complete subjection to his will and conscience. He 
 was not one of those invariably amiable men whose temper 
 is never ruffled ; but when we consider the immense burden 
 which rested upon him, and the numberless causes for an 
 noyance with which he had to contend, the occasional crop- 
 ping-out of temper which we, who were constantly near him, 
 witnessed, only showed how great was his habitual self-com 
 mand. 
 
 He had a great dislike to reviewing army communica 
 tions : this was so thoroughly appreciated by me that I would 
 never present a paper for his action, unless it was of decided 
 importance, and of a nature to demand his judgment and de 
 cision. On one occasion when an audience had not been 
 asked of him for several days, it became necessary to have 
 one. The few papers requiring his action were submitted. 
 He was not in a very pleasant mood ; something irritated 
 him, and he manifested his ill-humor by a little nervous 
 twist or jerk of the neck and head, peculiar to himself, ac 
 companied by some harshness of manner. This was per 
 ceived by me, and I hastily concluded that my efforts to save 
 him annoyance were not appreciated. In disposing of some 
 case of a vexatious character, matters reached a climax ; he 
 became really worried, and, forgetting what was due to my 
 superior, I petulantly threw the paper down at my side and 
 gave evident signs of anger. Then, in a perfectly calm and 
 measured tone of voice, he said, " Colonel Taylor, when I 
 lose my temper, don t you let it make you angry." 
 
 Was there ever a more gentle and considerate and yet so 
 
78 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 positive a reproof ? How magnanimous in the great soldier, 
 and yet how crushing to the subordinate ! The rash and dis 
 respectful conduct of the latter would have justified, if it did 
 not demand, summary treatment at the hands of the former. 
 Instead of this, the first man of his day and generation, great 
 and glorious in his humility, condescended to occupy the 
 same plane with his youthful subaltern, and to reason with 
 him as an equal, frankly acknowledging his own imperfec 
 tions, but kindly reminding the inferior at the same time of 
 his duty and his position. 
 
CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 Battle of Fredericksburg. Federal Army One Hundred Thousand strong : Con- 
 federate Army Seventy-eight Thousand strong. Battle of Chancellorsville. 
 Federal Army One Hundred and Thirty-two Thousand strong : Confed 
 erate Army Fifty-seven Thousand strong. 
 
 IN the latter part of October, 1862, General McClellan 
 moved his army to the south side of the Potomac, east of the 
 mountains. On the 4th of November he occupied Ashby s 
 Gap. His entire army was now concentrated in the neigh 
 borhood of Warrenton. He was at this time again relieved 
 of the command of the Army of the Potomac, and General 
 Burnside was appointed to succeed him. After a confer 
 ence with General-in-chief Halleck, the new commander de 
 termined by a rapid movement to secure possession of Fred 
 ericksburg, from which point as a base he proposed to renew 
 the advance upon the Confederate capital. General Lee, 
 whose army at the commencement of these movements was 
 concentrated in the lower Yalley of Virginia, had not been 
 meanwhile inactive. Closely scrutinizing every movement 
 of the enemy, he seemed, by intuition, to divine his purpose, 
 and promptly made such disposition as was necessary to fore 
 stall him. 
 
 When General Burnside s intention to move upon Fred 
 ericksburg was fully developed, General Lee ordered Long- 
 street to that point, and directed Jackson, who was still in 
 the Valley, to move rapidly on Orange Court-House. 
 
 Sumner s grand division led the van of the Federal army, 
 and its advance arrived opposite Fredericksburg on the after- 
 
80 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 noon of the 17th of ISTovember. ISTo serious effort was made 
 by General Sumner to cross the river and occupy the town, 
 and time was thus afforded for the advance divisions of the 
 Confederates to reach the point threatened ; so that when the 
 Federal commander arrived opposite, doubtless to his sur 
 prise he found no despicable array of Confederate bayonets 
 prepared to dispute his passage of the river. With his entire 
 army he soon occupied Stafford Heights; and, casting his 
 eye southward beyond the level plain or belt which skirts 
 the south bank of the river, he saw the Army of Northern 
 Virginia strongly posted upon the range of hills overlooking 
 the intervening plain. Again General Lee gave " check ! " 
 
 The nature of the ground rendered it an easy matter for 
 the Federal commander to control the southern bank of the 
 river. On the llth of December he threw a force across, 
 and occupied the town. The entire army, with the excep 
 tion of one corps, under General Hooker, followed, and by 
 the evening of the 12th was well established on the south 
 side. 1 As the fog lifted on the morning of the 13th, the 
 Confederates beheld the Army of the Potomac drawn up in 
 most imposing array, fully one hundred thousand strong, 2 
 stretching from above Fredericksburg to Deep Run. It was 
 a grand and beautiful sight ; rarely is one more glorious 
 vouchsafed to mortal eye. And now, as the command is 
 given to the Federal troops to advance, a new interest, a 
 spirit of intense excitement, is added to the scene ; and as 
 the whole line of blue solid and regular, bristling with the 
 glittering bayonets moves steadily forward, accompanied by 
 the deafening roar of the artillery, the eye taking in the 
 whole panorama at a glance, men hold their breath, and 
 realize that wa is indeed as glorious as it is terrible. 
 
 1 Three divisions of Hooker s corps followed on the 13th, and are included 
 in the estimate of the Federal strength. 
 
 2 General Burnside testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War that he had a hundred thousand men on the south side of the river, and in 
 action." Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 656. 
 
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 81 
 
 The Federal soldiers advanced right gallantly to the des 
 perate work assigned them ; time and again was the assault 
 renewed on the right and on the left of the Confederate line, 
 but all in vain. The cool, steady veterans of Lee, under the 
 protection of their hastily-constructed or extemporized works, 
 made terrible havoc in the ranks of the assailing columns ; 
 and division after division recoiled from the terrible shock, 
 shattered, discomfited, and demoralized. Their allotted task 
 exceeded human endeavor ; and no shame to them that, after 
 such courageous and brilliant conduct, their efforts lacked 
 success. Less than twenty thousand Confederate troops 
 (about one-fourth of the army under General Lee) 1 were 
 actively engaged. It was certainly the most easily won of 
 all the grand battles of the war, and it was, indeed, the most 
 exhilarating and inspiring to look upon, as beheld from the 
 summit of one of the hills occupied by our troops, where 
 army headquarters were temporarily established. 
 
 Contrary to the expectation of General Lee, the assault 
 was not renewed, 2 and, on the night of the 15th, General 
 Burnside retired his army from the south side of the river, 
 and resumed his former position on Stafford Heights. 
 
 Much has been said and written about a proposition having 
 been made to General Lee by General Jackson, that he be 
 allowed to make a night-attack on the enemy after his re 
 pulse. Some of the features of this alleged proposition, as 
 published some years ago, are so absurd as to carry in them- 
 
 1 The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia show that on the 10th De 
 cember, 1862, General Lee had present for duty seventy-eight thousand two 
 hundred and twenty-eight, and, on the 20th December, seventy-five thousand 
 five hundred and twenty-four of all arms, including the reserve artillery, parked 
 some distance in the rear. 
 
 2 " The attack on the 13th had been so easily repulsed, and by so small a 
 part of our army, that it was not supposed the enemy would limit his efforts to 
 one attempt, which, in view of the magnitude of his preparations and the extent 
 of his force, seemed to be comparatively insignificant. Believing, therefore, 
 that he would attack us, it was not deemed expedient to lose the advantages of 
 our position, and expose the troops to the fire of his inaccessible batteries be 
 yond the river, by advancing against him." General Lee s "Report." 
 
 6 
 
82 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 selves evidence of their fictitious character. I can only say 
 that I never heard of any such proposition, and I have excel 
 lent authority for asserting, as I do, that none such was ever 
 made. 
 
 In speaking of the engagement, General Jackson has the 
 following in his official report : " Repulsed on the right, left, 
 and centre, the enemy soon after reformed his lines, and 
 gave some indications of a purpose to renew the attack. I 
 waited some time to receive it ; but he making no forward 
 movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The 
 artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make 
 an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous ; yet 
 it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, 
 as to induce me to make preparations for the attempt. In 
 order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be pre 
 ceded by artillery, and the movement postponed until late in 
 the evening, so that, if compelled to retire, it would be under 
 the cover of night. Owing to unexpected delay, the move 
 ment could not be gotten ready until late in the evening. 
 The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood a 
 hundred yards, when the enemy s artillery reopened, and so 
 completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed 
 movement should be abandoned." In this, perhaps, is to be 
 found the explanation of, and all of truth there is in, the 
 report referred to. 
 
 For several months after this the army rested in winter- 
 quarters, and nothing of special interest occurred, save an 
 abortive attempt made in the midst of winter by General 
 Burnside to cross the river at United States Ford, in which 
 attempt he was completely foiled by the execrable condition 
 of the roads, and his troops, after floundering in the mud for 
 several days, returned to their camps. 
 
 The Confederate artillery, or a large portion thereof, 
 which was parked in the rear, near the railroad, for greater 
 convenience in supplying the animals with food, was ordered 
 forward by General Jackson General Lee being in Rich- 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. $3 
 
 mond at tlie time as soon as intimation of the purpose of 
 General Burnside was disclosed, and was much damaged in 
 its hasty but (as events proved) unnecessary efforts to get to 
 the front. General Burnside was compelled to relinquish 
 whatever design he had entertained, and quiet was again 
 established in the two opposing armies. 
 
 Active operations were resumed in the spring. General 
 Hooker, whose turn it now was, under Federal dispensation, 
 to wrestle with General Lee, crossed the Rappahannock in 
 the latter part of April, 1863 ; took position at Chancellors- 
 vine, and constructed a formidable line of earthworks, from 
 which secure position he proposed to move on General Lee s 
 flank. 
 
 Of all the battles fought by the Army of Northern Vir 
 ginia, that of Chancellorsville stands first, as illustrating the 
 consummate audacity and military skill of commanders, and 
 the valor and determination of the men. General Lee, with 
 fifty-seven thousand troops of all arms, intrenched along the 
 line of hills south of the Rappahannock, near Fredericks- 
 burg, was confronted by General Hooker, with the Army of 
 the Potomac, one hundred and thirty-two thousand strong, 
 occupying the bluffs on the opposite side of the river. 
 
 On the 29th of April the Federal commander essayed to 
 put into execution an admirably-conceived plan of operations, 
 from which he doubtless concluded that he could compel 
 either the evacuation by General Lee of his strongly-fortified 
 position, or else his utter discomfiture when unexpectedly 
 and vigorously assailed upon his left flank and rear by the 
 " finest army on the planet " really more than twice the 
 size of his own. 
 
 A formidable force, under General Sedgwick, was thrown 
 across the river below Fredericksburg, and made demonstra 
 tions of an intention to assail the Confederate front. Mean 
 while, with great celerity and secrecy, General Hooker, with 
 the bulk of his army, crossed at the upper fords, and, in an 
 able manner and wonderfully short time, had concentrated 
 
84 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 four of his seven army-corps, 1 numbering fifty-six thousand 
 men, at Chancellorsville, about ten miles west of Fredericks- 
 burg. His purpose was now fully developed to General Lee 
 who, instead of awaiting its further prosecution, immediately 
 determined on the movement the least expected by his oppo-, 
 nent. He neither proceeded to make strong his left against 
 attack from the direction of Chancellorsville, nor did he 
 move southward, so as to put his army between that of Gen 
 eral Hooker and the Confederate capital ; but, leaving Gen 
 eral Early, with about nine thousand men, to take care of 
 General Sedgwick, he moved with the remainder of his 
 army, numbering forty-eight thousand men, toward Chancel 
 lorsville. As soon as the advance of the enemy was encoun 
 tered, it was attacked with vigor, and very soon the Federal 
 army was on the defensive in its apparently impregnable 
 position. It was not the part of wisdom to attempt to storm 
 this stronghold ; but Sedgwick would certainly soon be at 
 work in the rear, and Early, with his inadequate force, could 
 not do more than delay and harass him. It was, therefore, 
 imperatively necessary to strike to strike boldly, effectively, 
 and at once. There could be no delay. Meanwhile two 
 more army-corps had joined General Hooker, who now had 
 about Chancellorsville ninety -one thousand men six corps, 
 except one division of the Second Corps (Couch s), which had 
 been left with Sedgwick, at Fredericksburg. It was a criti 
 cal position for the Confederate commander, but his confi 
 dence in his trusted lieutenant and brave men was such that 
 he did not long hesitate. Encouraged by the counsel and 
 confidence of General Jackson, he determined still further 
 to divide his army ; and while he, with the divisions of An 
 derson and McLaws, less than fourteen thousand men, 
 should hold the enemy in his front, he would hurl Jackson 
 upon his flank and rear, and crush and crumble him as be 
 tween the upper and nether millstone. The very boldness 
 of the movement contributed much to insure its success. 
 
 1 Except one division. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 85 
 
 This battle illustrates most admirably the peculiar talent 
 and individual excellence of Lee and Jackson. For quick 
 ness of perception, boldness in planning, and skill in direct 
 ing, General Lee had no superior : for celerity in his move 
 ments, audacity in the execution of bold designs and impetu 
 osity in attacking, General Jackson had not his peer. 
 
 The flank movement of Jackson s wing was attended 
 with extraordinary success. On the afternoon of the 2d of 
 May he struck such a blow to the enemy on their extreme 
 right as to cause dismay and demoralizatian to their entire 
 army ; this advantage was promptly and vigorously followed 
 up the next day, when Generals Lee and Stuart (the latter 
 then in command of Jackson s wing) * joined elbows ; and 
 after most heroic and determined effort, their now united 
 forces finally succeeded in storming and capturing the works 
 of the enemy. 
 
 Meantime Sedgwick had forced Early out of the heights 
 at Fredericksburg, and had advanced toward Chancellors- 
 vine, thus threatening the Confederate rear. General Lee 
 having defeated the greater force, and driven it from its 
 stronghold, now gathered up a few of the most available of 
 his victorious brigades, and turned upon the lesser. 
 
 On the 3d of May Sedgwick s force was encountered in 
 the vicinity of Salem Church, and its further progress checked 
 by General McLaws, with the five brigades detached by 
 General Lee for this service including Wilcox s, which had 
 been stationed at Banks s Ford. On the next day General 
 Anderson was sent to reenf orce McLaws with three addition 
 al brigades. Meanwhile, General Early had connected with 
 these troops, and in the afternoon, so soon as dispositions 
 could be made for attack, Sedgwick s lines were promptly 
 assailed and broken the main assault being made on the 
 enemy s left by Early s troops. The situation was now a 
 
 1 General Jackson fell mortally wounded late in the evening of the 2d ; 
 General A. P. Hill, who would have succeeded to the command of Jackson s 
 wing, was also wounded, and General Stuart assumed the command. 
 
86 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 critical one for the Federal lieutenant. Darkness came to 
 his rescue, and on the night of the 4th he crossed to the north 
 side of the river. 
 
 On the 5th General Lee concentrated for another assault 
 on the new line taken up by General Hooker ; but on the 
 morning of the 6th it was ascertained that the enemy, in 
 General Lee s language, "had sought safety beyond the 
 Rappahannock," and the river flowed again between the 
 hostile hosts. 
 
 Glorious as was the result of this battle to the Confeder 
 ate arms, it was accompanied by a calamity in the contem 
 plation of which the most brilliant victory of that incompar 
 able army must ever be regarded as a supreme disaster. The 
 star of Confederate destiny reached its zenith on the 2d day 
 of May, when Jackson fell wounded at the head of his vic 
 torious troops ; it began to set on the 10th of May, when 
 Jackson was no more. 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING AEMIES. 
 
 In confirmation of the figures just given as representing 
 the strength of the two armies, I submit the following : Gen 
 eral Longstreet with a portion of his corps was at this time 
 operating on the south side of James River, in the neigh 
 borhood of Suffolk. Of his command there remained with 
 General Lee but the two divisions of Generals McLaws and 
 Anderson. The official return of the Army of ^Northern 
 Virginia, of Slarch 31, 1863, after a long period of rest and 
 recruiting, and when perhaps the several commands attained 
 their greatest strength, shows, as present for duty : 
 
 Anderson s and McLaws s divisions 15,649 
 
 Jackson s command 33,833 
 
 Cavalry 6,509 
 
 Reserve artillery (parked in rear) 1,621 
 
 Total of all arms 57,112 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 87 
 
 I exclude the troops serving in the Valley district thirty- 
 one hundred and eighty-six included hi the departmental 
 return, but not available at Fredericksburg. This return is 
 the nearest to the date of the battle of Chancellorsville of all 
 those in the archive-office at Washington, and of all now in 
 existence known to me. 1 General Early had with him at 
 Fredericksburg his own division, and one brigade of another 
 in all, according to his statement, nine thousand men. 
 General Lee remained in front of General Hooker at Chan 
 cellorsville with fourteen thousand men, viz., the two di 
 visions of McLaws and Anderson, with the exception of 
 Barksdale s brigade left with General Early ; this estimate 
 includes Wilcox s brigade at Banks s Ford. General Jackson 
 had with him in his flanking movement his command, less 
 Early s division, in round numbers say twenty-six thousand 
 men. General Stuart had six thousand five hundred and 
 nine sabres with which to oppose the cavalry column of the 
 Federals, numbering twelve thousand men. 
 
 In regard to the Federal strength, I have adopted the 
 figures given in the book of Mr. Swinton, confirmed by the 
 evidence given before the Congressional Committee on the 
 Conduct of the "War. The Army of the Potomac, under Gen 
 eral Hooker, consisted of seven army-corps and a body of 
 horse, numbering one hundred and thirty-two thousand a 
 present for duty, as follows : 
 
 1 On the 20th of May, 1863, two weeks after the battle, and when Pickett s 
 and Hood s divisions had rejoined the array, the total infantry force numbered 
 but fifty-five thousand two hundred and sixty-one effective, from which if the 
 strength of Pickett s and Hood s divisions is deducted, there would remain forty- 
 one thousand three hundred and fifty-eight as the strength of the commands 
 that participated in the battle of Chancellorsville, on the 20th of May. See 
 "Return " of the 20th of May, 1863, chapter xiv. 
 
 2 " It " (the Army of the Potomac) " numbered one hundred and twenty thou 
 sand men, infantry and artillery, with a body of twelve thousand well-equipped 
 cavalry, and a powerful artillery force of above four hundred guns." Swinton s 
 u Army of the Potomac," p. 269. In a foot-note Mr. Swinton thus substantiates 
 his estimate of the infantry and artillery : " This estimate is approximate; the 
 data are as follows : the effective of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps was 
 
88 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 The Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Army-Corps 44,661 
 
 The Sixth Army-Corps 22,000 
 
 The First and Third Army-Corps 35,000 
 
 The Second Army-Corps 18,000 
 
 Total infantry and artillery 119,661 
 
 And the corps of cavalry 12,000 
 
 Total of all arms 131,661 
 
 General Sedgwiek s force at Falmouth and Fredericks- 
 burg originally consisted of the First, Third, and Sixth Army- 
 Corps, and one division of the Second Corps, and numbered 
 sixty-three thousand men, though only a portion crossed the 
 river ; it was subsequently reduced to twenty-eight thousand 
 by the withdrawal of the First and Third Corps, which 
 joined General Hooker. The latter, when he first moved 
 to Chancellorsville, had with him the Fifth, Eleventh, 
 Twelfth, and Second Corps (save one division with Sedg- 
 wick), numbering, according to the returns, fifty-six thousand 
 men; and when he was subsequently joined by the First and 
 Third Corps thirty-five thousand strong (that is, previous 
 to the assault by General Lee at Chancellorsville) he must 
 have had with him nearly ninety thousand men. It has al 
 ready been shown that in the assault General Lee had but 
 forty thousand men. 
 
 In this comparative statement of strength I have fol 
 lowed the official returns as to both armies. It is proper to 
 state that General Hooker in his testimony before the Com 
 mittee on the Conduct of the War (second series, vol. i., p. 
 120) puts the effective strength of the Fifth, Eleventh, and 
 Twelfth Corps, at Chancellorsville, at thirty-six thousand 
 
 put by General Hooker, just before Chancellorsville, at forty-four thousand six 
 hundred and sixty-one ( Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. 
 i., p. 120). The effective of the Sixth Corps is given by General Sedgwick (ibid., 
 p. 95) as twenty-two thousand ; and the effective of the First and Third Corps, 
 by the same authority, was thirty-five thousand. There remains the Second 
 Corps, to which if we give a minimum of eighteen thousand, there will result 
 the aggregate of one hundred and nineteen thousand six hundred and sixty- 
 one." 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 89 
 
 men. He explains the discrepancy between this and the 
 strength of these corps on the 30th of April, viz., forty-four 
 thousand six hundred and sixty-one, by stating that the re 
 turns included the artillery, and that the greater portion of 
 the latter did not march with the corps ; he also excludes 
 heavy detachments left with the trains, "as well as regi 
 ments left behind for discharge" (from service?). Now, the 
 same necessity existed for General Lee to guard his trains ; 
 and, of his strength, quite as large a proportion of the artil 
 lery was not up. None of the reserve artillery which I have 
 included in my estimate of the Confederate strength was 
 engaged, being some miles in rear at the time. But even 
 adopting General Hooker s estimate of the three corps men 
 tioned, then adding twelve thousand for that portion of the 
 Second which joined him (all but Gibbon s division), and the 
 First and Third Corps thirty-five thousand, as given by 
 General Sedgwick and his strength at Chancellorsville, ex 
 clusive of Pleasanton s cavalry, was eighty-three thousand. 
 The testimony of General Hancock and General Sedgwick 
 confirms this estimate. 
 
CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Campaign. The Battle of Gettysburg. Strength of the 
 Opposing Armies. 
 
 FKOM the very necessities of the case, the general theory 
 upon which the war was conducted on the part of the South 
 was one of defense. The great superiority of the North in 
 men and material made it indispensable for the South to 
 husband its resources as much as possible, inasmuch as the 
 hope of ultimate success which the latter entertained, rested 
 rather upon the dissatisfaction and pecuniary distress which 
 a prolonged war would entail upon the former making the 
 people weary of the struggle than upon any expectation of 
 conquering a peace by actually subduing so powerful an ad 
 versary. 
 
 Nevertheless, in the judgment of General Lee, it was a 
 part of a true defensive policy to take the aggressive when 
 good opportunity offered; and by delivering an effective 
 blow to the enemy, not only to inflict upon him serious loss, 
 but at the same time to thwart his designs of invasion, 
 derange the plan of campaign contemplated by him, and 
 thus prolong the conflict. 
 
 The Federal army, under General Hooker, had now re- 
 occupied the heights opposite Fredericksburg, where it could 
 not be attacked except at a disadvantage. Instead of quietly 
 awaiting the pleasure of the Federal commander in design 
 ing and putting into execution some new plan of campaign, 
 General Lee determined to manoeuvre to draw him from his 
 impregnable position and if possible to remove the scene of 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 91 
 
 hostilities beyond the Potomac. His design was to free the 
 State of Virginia, for a time at least, from the presence of 
 the enemy, to transfer the theatre of war to Northern soil, 
 and, by selecting a favorable time and place in which to 
 receive the attack which his adversary would be compelled 
 to make on him, to take the reasonable chances of defeating 
 him in a pitched battle ; knowing full well that to obtain 
 such an advantage there would place him in position to 
 attain far more decisive results than could be hoped for 
 from a like advantage gained in Virginia . But even if un 
 able to attain the valuable results w r hich might be expected 
 to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in 
 Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was thought that the move 
 ment would at least so far disturb the Federal plan for the 
 summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the 
 season for active operations. 1 
 
 In pursuance of this design, early in the month of June, 
 General Lee moved his army northward by way of Cul- 
 peper, ,and thence to and down the Valley of Virginia to 
 Winchester. 
 
 The army had now been reorganized into three army- 
 corps, designated the First, Second, and Third Corps, and 
 commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, 
 Ewell, and A. P. Hill. 
 
 The Second Corps was in advance, and crossed the 
 branches of the Shenandoah, near Front Royal, on the 12th 
 of June. Brushing aside the force of the enemy under Gen 
 eral Milroy, that occupied the lower Valley most of which 
 was captured and the remnant of which sought refuge in the 
 fortifications at Harper s Ferry 3 General Ewell crossed the 
 
 1 General Lee s " Report." 
 
 2 " These operations resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the Valley, 
 the capture of four thousand prisoners, with a corresponding number of small- 
 arms, twenty-eight pieces of superior artillery, including those taken by Gen 
 eral Rodes and General Hays, about three hundred wagons and as many horses, 
 together with a considerable quantity of ordnance, commissary, and quarter 
 master s stores." General Lee s " Report of the Pennsylvania Campaign." 
 
92 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 Potomac Hiver with liis three divisions in the latter part of 
 June, and, in pursuance of the orders of General Lee, trav 
 ersed Maryland and advanced into Pennsylvania. 
 
 General A. P. Hill, whose corps was the last to leave the 
 line of the Eappahannock, followed with his three divisions 
 in Swell s rear. General Longstreet covered these move 
 ments with his corps ; then moved by Ashby s and Snicker s 
 Gaps into the Valley and likewise crossed the Potomac 
 Eiver, leaving to General Stuart the task of holding the 
 gaps of the Blue Eidge Mountains with his corps of cavalry. 
 
 The Federal commander had meanwhile moved his army 
 so as to cover Washington City; and, as soon as he was 
 thoroughly informed, by Ewell s rapid advance, of the real 
 intention of his adversary, he too crossed into Maryland. 
 
 On the 27th of June General Lee was near Chambers- 
 burg with the First and Third Corps, the Second being still 
 in advance, but within supporting distance. 
 
 With the exception of the cavalry, the army was well in 
 hand. The absence of that indispensable arm of the service 
 was most seriously felt by General Lee. He had directed 
 General Stuart to use his discretion as to where and when 
 to cross the river that is, he was to cross east of the moun 
 tains, or retire through the mountain-passes into the Valley 
 and cross in the immediate rear of the infantry, as the move 
 ments of the enemy and his own judgment should deter 
 mine but he was expected to maintain communication with 
 the main column, and especially directed to keep the com 
 manding general informed of the movements of the Federal 
 army. 
 
 The army continued to advance. On the 1st of July 
 General Lee reached Cashtown and stopped to confer with 
 General A. P. Hill, whose corps was concentrating at that 
 point, and who reported that the advance of Heth s division 
 had encountered the cavalry of the enemy near Gettysburg. 
 Instructions had been sent to General Heth to ascertain 
 what force was at Gettysburg, and, if he found infantry 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 93 
 
 opposed to him, to report the fact immediately, without 
 forcing an engagement. 
 
 No tidings whatever had been received from or of our 
 cavalry under General Stuart since crossing the river ; and 
 General Lee was consequently without accurate information 
 of the movements or position of the main Federal army. 1 
 An army without cavalry in a strange and hostile country is 
 as a man deprived of his eyesight and beset by enemies ; he 
 may be never so brave and strong, but he cannot intelli 
 gently administer a single effective blow. 
 
 The sound of artillery was soon heard in the direction of 
 Gettysburg. General Hill hastened to the front. General 
 Lee followed. 
 
 On arriving at the scene of battle, General Lee ascer 
 tained that the enemy s infantry and artillery were present in 
 considerable force. Heth s division was already hotly en 
 gaged, and it was soon evident that a serious engagement 
 could not be avoided. 
 
 Orders had previously been sent to General Ewell to re 
 call his advanced divisions, and to concentrate about Cash- 
 town. While en route for that point, on the morning of the 
 1st of July, General Ewell learned that Hill s corps was mov 
 ing toward Gettysburg, and, on arriving at Middletown, he 
 
 1 " On the morning of the 29th of June the Third Corps, composed of the divis 
 ions of Major-Generals Anderson, Heth, and Pender, and five battalions of artil 
 lery, under command of Colonel R. L. Walker, was encamped on the road from 
 Chambersburg to Gettysburg, near the village of Fayetteville. I was directed 
 to move on this road in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehanna, 
 menacing the communications of Harrisburg with Philadelphia, and to coop 
 erate with General Ewell, acting as circumstances might require. Accordingly, 
 on the 29th I moved General Heth s division to Cashtown, some eight miles 
 from Gettysburg, following on the morning of the 30th with the division of Gen 
 eral Pender, and directing General Anderson to move in the same direction on 
 the morning of the 1st of July. On arriving at Cashtown General Heth, who 
 had sent forward Pettigrew s brigade to Gettysburg, reported that Pettigrew 
 had encountered the enemy at Gettysburg, principally cavalry, but in what 
 force he could not determine. A courier was then dispatched with this informa 
 tion to the general commanding." Extract from A. P. Hill s " Report," " South 
 ern Historical Society Papers," November, 1ST6. 
 
94 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 turned the head of his column in that direction. When 
 within a few miles of the town, General Rodes, whose divis 
 ion was in advance, was made aware, by the sharp cannon 
 ading, of the presence of the enemy in force at Gettysburg, 
 and caused immediate preparations for battle to be made. 
 
 On reaching the scene of conflict, General Rodes made 
 his dispositions to assail the force with which Hill s troops 
 were engaged, but no sooner were his lines formed than he 
 perceived fresh troops of the enemy extending their right 
 flank, and deploying in his immediate front. With this 
 force he was soon actively engaged. The contest now be 
 came sharp and earnest. Neither side sought or expected a 
 general engagement ; and yet, brought thus unexpectedly in 
 the presence of each other, found a conflict unavoidable. 
 
 The battle continued, with varying success, until perhaps 
 3 P. M., when General Early, of Ewell s corps, reached the 
 field with his division, moved in on Rodes s left, and attacked 
 the enemy with his accustomed vigor and impetuosity. This 
 decided the contest. The enemy s right gave way under 
 Early s assault. Fender s division, of Hill s corps, had mean 
 while been advanced to relieve that of Heth ; and Rodes, 
 observing the effect of Early s attack, ordered his line for 
 ward. There resulted a general and irresistible advance of 
 our entire line ; the enemy gave way at all points, and were 
 driven in disorder through and beyond the town of Gettys 
 burg, leaving over five thousand prisoners in our hands. 
 
 In this action the force engaged on the Confederate side, 
 as already stated, consisted of the divisions of Heth and Fen- 
 der, of Hill s corps, and those of Early and Rodes, of Ewell s 
 corps. On the side of the Federals there was the First 
 Corps, embracing the divisions of Wads worth, Doubleday, 
 and Robinson ; the Eleventh Corps, embracing the divisions 
 of Schurz, Barlow, and Steinwehr ; and the cavalry force 
 under General Buford. The infantry force on each side was 
 about the same, 1 and the preponderance in numbers was with 
 
 1 The four divisions of Confederates had an average strength of six thousand 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 95 
 
 the Federals, to the extent of General Buford s cavalry 
 command. 
 
 General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through 
 Gettysburg and up the hills beyond. He then directed me 
 to go to General Ewell and to say to him that, from the 
 position which he occupied, he could see the enemy retreat 
 ing over those hills, without organization and in great con 
 fusion, that it was only necessary to press " those people " 
 in order to secure possession of the heights, and that, if pos 
 sible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these in 
 structions, I proceeded immediately to General Ewell and 
 delivered the order of General Lee ; and, after receiving 
 from him some message for the commanding general in re 
 gard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter and 
 reported that his order had been delivered. 
 
 General Ewell did not express any objection, or indicate 
 the existence of any impediment, to the execution of the 
 order conveyed to him, but left the impression upon my mind 
 that it would be executed. In the exercise of that discre 
 tion, however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord 
 to his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard 
 for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate 
 a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it unwise to 
 make the pursuit. The troops were not moved forward, 
 and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the po- 
 
 when General Lee started on this campaign, reduced at this date to about five 
 thousand five hundred, as will be shown later in this narrative ; making the 
 total engaged in the action of the first day twenty-two thousand. It could not 
 have exceeded twenty-four thousand. General Butterfield, chief of staff of the 
 Army of the Potomac, testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War (" Report," second series, p. 428) that on the 10th of June the First 
 Corps had eleven thousand three hundred and fifty, and the Eleventh Corps ten 
 thousand one hundred and seventy-seven, present for duty ; and that previous to 
 the battle of Gettysburg the First Corps was increased by the addition of Stan- 
 nard s Vermont Brigade. It would appear, then, that the First and Eleventh 
 Corps, at the time of the engagement, had a total strength of from twenty-two 
 to twenty-four thousand. Mr. Swinton puts the loss sustained by these two 
 corps at " near ten thousand men." 
 
96 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 sition which it was designed that General Ewell should 
 seize. 
 
 Major-General Edward Johnson, whose division reached 
 the field after the engagement, and formed on the left of 
 Early, in a conversation had with me, since the war, about 
 this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our 
 inaction at that time, assured me that there was no hinderance 
 to his moving forward ; but that, after getting his command 
 in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged or 
 had advanced any great distance, for some unexplained rea 
 son, he had received orders to halt. This was after General 
 Lee s message was delivered to General Ewell. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs when darkness veiled 
 the scene on the evening of the first day. The prevailing 
 idea with General Lee was, to press forward without delay ; 
 to follow up promptly and vigorously the advantage already 
 gained. Having failed to reap the full fruit of the victory 
 before night, his mind was evidently occupied with the idea 
 of renewing the assault upon the enemy s right with the 
 dawn of day on the second. The divisions of Major-Gen 
 erals Early and Rodes, of Swell s corps, had been actively 
 engaged, and had sustained some loss, but were still in ex 
 cellent condition, and in the full enjoyment of the prestige 
 of success and a consequent elation of spirit, in having so 
 gallantly swept the enemy from their front, through the 
 town of Gettysburg, and compelled him to seek refuge be 
 hind the heights beyond. The division of Major-General 
 Edward Johnson, of the same corps, was perfectly fresh, not 
 having been engaged. Anderson s division, of Hill s corps, 
 was also now up. With this force General Lee thought that 
 the enemy s position could be assailed with every prospect 
 of success ; but, after a conference with the corps and divis 
 ion commanders on our left, who represented that, in their 
 judgment, it would be hazardous to attempt to storm the 
 strong position occupied by the enemy, with troops some 
 what fagged by the marching and fighting of the first day; 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 97 
 
 that the ground in their immediate front furnished greater 
 obstacles to a successful assault than existed at other points 
 of the line, and that it could be reasonably concluded, since 
 they had so severely handled the enemy in their front, that 
 he would concentrate and fortify with special reference to 
 resisting a further advance just there, he determined to make 
 the main attack well on the enemy s left, indulging the hope 
 that Longstreet s corps would be up in time to begin the 
 movement at an early hour on the 2d. He instructed Gen 
 eral Ewell to be prepared to cooperate by a simultaneous ad 
 vance by his corps. General Longstreet was unexpectedly 
 detained, however, as will best appear from the following 
 extract from his report of the Gettysburg campaign. In 
 speaking of his movements on the 1st day of July^ he says : 
 
 Our march on this day was greatly delayed by Johnson s 
 division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from 
 Shippensburg, and the long wagon-trains that followed him. 
 McLaws s division, however, reached Marsh Creek, four miles 
 from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood s division got 
 within nearly the same distance of the town about twelve o clock 
 at night. Law s brigade was ordered forward to its division dur 
 ing the day, and joined about noon on the 2d. 
 
 Previous to his joining I received instructions from the 
 commanding general to move with the portion of my command 
 that was up around to gain the Emmettsburg road on the en 
 emy s left. The enemy, having been driven back by the corps 
 of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill the day previous, 
 had taken a strong position extending from the hill at the cem 
 etery along the Emmettsburg road. 
 
 Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an 
 attack, I delayed until General Law s brigade joined its divis 
 ion. As soon after his arrival as we could make our prepara 
 tions, the movement was begun. 
 
 Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself, 
 
 guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the 
 
 move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. 
 
 McLaws s division got into position opposite the enemy s left 
 
 Y 
 
98 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 about 4 P. M. Hood s division was moved on farther to our right, 
 and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy s left. 
 
 General Longstreet here explains the cause of the delay 
 in bringing up his troops on the first day ; but, notwith 
 standing this, the divisions of Hood and McLaws (with the 
 exception of Law s brigade) encamped within four miles of 
 Gettysburg at midnight of the 1st of July. He then re 
 ceived instructions to move with the portion of his command 
 that was then up, to gain the Emmettsburg road on the 
 enemy s left ; but fearing that his force was too weak to 
 venture to make an attack, he delayed until Law s brigade 
 joined its division, about noon on the 2d. 
 
 In this, General Longstreet clearly admits that he as 
 sumed the responsibility of postponing the execution of the 
 orders of the commanding general. Owing to the causes 
 assigned, the troops were not in position to attack until 4 
 p. M. One can imagine what was going on in the Federal 
 lines meanwhile. Round Top, the key to their position, 
 which was not occupied in the morning, they now held in 
 force, and another corps (Sedgwick s) had reached the field. 
 
 Late as it was, the original plan was adhered to. The 
 two divisions of Longstreet s corps gallantly advanced, forced 
 the enemy back a considerable distance, and captured some 
 trophies and prisoners. 
 
 Swell s divisions were ordered forward, and likewise 
 gained additional ground and trophies. 
 
 On Cemetery Hill the attack by Early s leading brigades 
 was made with vigor. They drove the enemy back into the 
 works on the crest, into which they forced their way, and 
 seized several pieces of artillery ; but they were compelled 
 to relinquish what they had gained, from want of expected 
 support on their right, and retired to their original position, 
 bringing with them some prisoners and four stands of colors. 
 In explanation of this lack of expected support, General 
 Eodes, who was on General Early s right, states in his report 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 99 
 
 that after lie had conferred with General Early, on his left, 
 and General Lane, on his right, and arranged to attack in 
 concert, he proceeded at once to make the necessary prepara 
 tions ; but as he had to draw his troops out of the town by 
 the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then 
 traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards, 
 while General Early had to move only half that distance, 
 without change of front, it resulted that, before he drove in 
 the enemy s skirmishers, General Early had attacked, and 
 been compelled to withdraw. 
 
 The whole affair was disjointed. There was an utter 
 absence of accord in the movements of the several com 
 mands, and no decisive result attended the operations of the 
 second day. 
 
 It is generally conceded that General Longstreet, 011 this 
 occasion, was fairly chargeable w r ith tardiness, and I have 
 always thought that his conduct, in this particular, was due 
 to a lack of appreciation on his part of the circumstances 
 which created an urgent and peculiar need for the presence 
 of his troops at the front. 
 
 As soon as the necessity for the concentration of the 
 army was precipitated by the unexpected encounter on the 
 1st of July with a large force of the enemy near Gettysburg, 
 General Longstreet was urged to hasten his march, and this, 
 perhaps, should have sufficed to cause him to push his 
 divisions on toward Gettysburg, from which point he was 
 distant but four miles, early on the 2d ; but I cannot say that 
 he was notified, on the night of the 1st, of the attack pro 
 posed to be made on the morning of the 2d, and the part his 
 corps was to take therein. Neither do I think it just to 
 charge that he was alone responsible for the delay in attack 
 ing that ensued after his arrival on the field. I well remem 
 ber how General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of 
 the troops, until he finally became restless, and rode back to 
 meet General Longstreet, and urge him forward ; but, then, 
 there was considerable delay in putting the troops to work 
 
100 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 after they reached the field, and much time was spent in dis 
 cussing what was to be done, which, perhaps, could not be 
 avoided. At any rate, it would be unreasonable to hold 
 General Longstreet alone accountable for this. 
 
 Indeed, great injustice has been done him in the charge 
 that he had orders from the commanding general to attack 
 the enemy at sunrise on the 2d of July, and that he dis 
 obeyed these orders. This would imply that he was in posi 
 tion to attack, whereas General Lee but anticipated his early 
 arrival on the 2d, and based his calculations upon it. I have 
 shown how he was disappointed, and I need hardly add that 
 the delay was fatal. In this connection, I submit the follow 
 ing correspondence : 
 
 NEW ORLEANS, LA., April 20, 1875. 
 
 MY DEAR COLONEL : Upon reading an address by Mr. Pen- 
 dleton, published in the December number of the Southern 
 Magazine, I saw for the first time that General Lee had ordered 
 me to attack the left of the Federal army at " sunrise," on the 
 second day of the battle of Gettysburg. 
 
 It occurs to me that if General Lee had any such idea as an 
 attack at sunrise, you must surely be advised of it. Right sure 
 am I that such an order was never delivered to me, and it is not 
 possible for me to believe that he ever entertained an idea that 
 I was to attack at that hour. My two divisions, nor myself, did 
 not reach General Lee until 8 A. M. on the 2d, and if he had 
 intended to attack at sunrise he surely would have expressed 
 some surprise, or made some allusion to his orders. 
 
 Please do me the favor to let me know what you know of 
 this sunrise attack. . . . 
 
 I remain very respectfully and truly yours, 
 
 JAMES LONGSTREET. 
 Colonel W. H. TAYLOR, Norfolk, Virginia. 
 
 NORFOLK, VA., April 28, 1875. 
 
 DEAR GENERAL : I have received your letter of the 20th 
 inst. I have not read the article of which you speak, nor have 
 I ever seen a copy of General Pendleton s address ; indeed, I 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 101 
 
 have read little or nothing of what has been written since the 
 war : in the first place, because I could not spare the time ; and, 
 in the second, because, of those of whose writings I have heard, 
 I deem but very few entitled to any attention whatever. 
 
 I can only say that I never before heard of the " sunrise at 
 tack " you were to have made, as charged by General Pendle- 
 ton. If such an order was given you, I never knew it, or it has 
 strangely escaped my memory. I think it more than probable 
 that, if General Lee had had your troops available the evening 
 previous to the day of which you speak, he would have ordered 
 an early attack / but this does not touch the point at issue. 
 
 I regard it as a great mistake on the part of those who, per 
 haps because of political differences, now undertake to criticise 
 and attack your war record. Such conduct is most ungenerous, 
 and I am sure meets the disapprobation of all good Confeder 
 ates with whom I have the pleasure of associating in the daily 
 walks of life. 
 
 Yours very respectfully and truly, 
 
 W. H. TAYLOR. 
 
 General JAMES LONGSTREET, New Orleans. 
 
 Since the date of this correspondence, several communi 
 cations have appeared in the public prints, from the pen of 
 General Longstreet, in reference to the battle of Gettysburg. 
 He claims that General Lee gave battle there in spite of his 
 remonstrances. Had such been the fact, it would work no 
 discredit to General Lee, though at variance with his usual 
 propensity to defer to such objections on the part of his lieu 
 tenants ; but I never heard of it before, neither is it consistent 
 with General Longstreet s assertion to Mr. Swinton, since 
 made, that at the time in question " the Army of Northern 
 Yirginia was in condition to undertake anything" In this 
 opinion he but expressed the sentiment of the whole army ; 
 an overweening confidence possessed us all. Now, in a 
 retrospective view of the results attained, it is easy to con 
 clude that it would have been well not to have attacked the 
 third day. But did we accomplish all that could have been 
 
102 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 reasonably expected ? And if we failed to attain results 
 reasonably to be expected of an army in condition to -under 
 take anything, how did it happen ? 
 
 General Lee determined to renew the attack upon the 
 enemy s position on the 3d day of July. In his report of 
 the campaign, in speaking of the operations of the second 
 day, he says : 
 
 The result of this day s operations induced the belief that, 
 with proper concert of action, and with the increased support 
 that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery 
 to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed; 
 and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. 
 
 The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reenforced by 
 Pickett s three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field dur 
 ing the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next 
 morning ; and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy s 
 right at the same time. 
 
 General Longstreet s dispositions were not completed as 
 early as was expected ; it appears that he was delayed by 
 apprehensions that his troops would be taken in reverse as 
 they advanced. General Ewell, who had orders to cooperate 
 with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware 
 of any impediment to the main attack arranged to be made 
 on the enemy s left, having reenforced General Johnson, 
 whose division was upon our extreme left during the night 
 of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning. 
 
 In obedience to these instructions, General Johnson be 
 came hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed 
 of the halt which had been called on our right. 
 
 After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy 
 was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General John 
 son found himself unable to carry the strongly-fortified crest of 
 the hill. The projected attack on the enemy s left not having 
 been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely 
 superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 103 
 
 flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his 
 original position about 1 p. M. 1 
 
 General Lee then had a conference with General Long- 
 street, and the mode of attack and the troops to make it 
 were thoroughly debated. I was present, and understood the 
 arrangement to be that General Longstreet should endeavor 
 to force the enemy s lines in his front. That front was held 
 by the divisions of Hood and McLaws. To strengthen him 
 for the undertaking, it was decided to reenforce him by such 
 troops as could be drawn from the centre. 
 
 Pickett s division, of Longstreet s corps, was then up, 
 fresh and available. Heth s division, of Hill s corps, was 
 also mentioned as available, having in great measure recuper 
 ated since its active engagement of the first day ; 3 so also 
 were the brigades of Lane and Scales, of Fender s division, 
 Hill s corps; and as our extreme right was comparatively 
 safe, being well posted, and not at all threatened, one of the 
 divisions of Hood and McLaws, and the greater portion of 
 the other, could be moved out of the lines and be made to 
 take part in the attack. Indeed, it was designed originally 
 that the two divisions last named, reenforced by Pickett, 
 should make the attack ; and it was only because of the ap 
 prehensions of General Longstreet that his corps was not 
 strong enough for the movement, that General Hill was 
 called on to reenforce him. 
 
 Orders were sent to General Hill to place Heth s division 
 and two brigades of Pender s at General Longstreet s dis 
 posal, and to be prepared^BTgive him further assistance if 
 requested. ^^ 
 
 The assault was to have been made with a column of not 
 
 1 Extract from General Lee s " Report." 
 
 3 NOTE BY COLONEL VENABLE. u They were terribly mistaken about Heth s 
 division in this planning. It had not recuperated, having suffered more than 
 was reported on the first day. Heth had suffered heavily on the 1st, before 
 Pender and Rodes got up. He had gone almost into Gettysburg. Rodes found 
 dead Mississippians on the wooded hill just above the town." C. S. V. 
 
104 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 less than two divisions, and the remaining divisions were to 
 have been moved forward in support of those in advance. 
 This was the result of the conference alluded to as under 
 stood by me. 
 
 Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill appears to have had the 
 same impression, for he says in his report of the operations 
 of his corps at this time : " I was directed to hold my line 
 with Anderson s division and the half of Fender s, now com 
 manded by General Lane, and to order Heth s division, com 
 manded by Pettigrew, and Lane s and Scales s brigades, of 
 Pender s division, to report to Lieutenant-General Longstreet 
 as a support to his corps, in the assault on the enemy s lines." 
 
 General Longstreet proceeded at once to make the dis 
 positions for attack, and General Lee rode along the portion 
 of the line held by A. P. Hill s corps, and finally took posi 
 tion about the Confederate centre, on an elevated point, from 
 which he could survey the field and watch the result of the 
 movement. 
 
 After a heavy artillery fire along the entire line, and at 
 a given signal, the movement began, but the plan agreed on 
 was not carried out. The only troops that participated in 
 the attack were the divisions of Pickett (First Corps) and 
 Heth (Third Corps) the latter, since the wounding of Gen 
 eral Heth, commanded by General Pettigrew and the bri 
 gades of Lane, Scales, and "Wilcox. The two divisions were 
 formed in advance the three brigades as their support. 
 The divisions of Hood and McLaws (First Corps) were pas 
 sive spectators of the movement. 
 
 To one who observed the charge, it appeared that Pet- 
 tigrew s line was not a continuation of that of Pickett, but 
 that it advanced in echelon. It would seem that there was 
 some confusion in forming the troops, for Captain Louis G. 
 Young, of General Pettigrew s staff, says : 
 
 On the morning of the 3d of July, General Pettigrew, com 
 manding Heth s division, was instructed to report .to General 
 Longstreet, who directed him to form in the rear of Pickett s divi- 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 105 
 
 sion, and sypport his advance upon Cemetery Hill, which would 
 be commenced as soon as the fire from our artillery should have 
 driven the enemy from his guns and prepared the way for at 
 tack. And I presume that it was in consequence of this having 
 been the first plan settled on, that the erroneous report was cir 
 culated that Heth s division was assigned the duty of support 
 ing that of Pickett. But the order referred to was counter 
 manded almost as soon as given, and General Pettigrew was in 
 structed to advance upon the same line with Pickett, a portion 
 of Pender s division acting as supports. 
 
 "Wilcox s brigade was ordered to support Pickett s right 
 flank, and the brigades of Lane and Scales acted as supports 
 to Heth s division. 
 
 General Lane, in Ins report, says : 
 
 General Longstreet ordered me to form in rear of the right 
 of Heth s division, commanded by General Pettigrew. Soon 
 after I had executed this order, putting Lowrance on the right, 
 I was relieved of the command of the division by Major-General 
 Trimble, who acted under the same orders that I had received. 
 Heth s division was much longer than Lowrance s brigade and 
 my own, which constituted its only support, and there was, con 
 sequently, no second line in rear of its left. 
 
 The assaulting column really consisted of Pickett s di 
 vision two brigades in front, and one in the second line as 
 a support with the brigade of "Wilcox in rear of its right 
 to protect that flank ; while Heth s division moved forward 
 on Pickett s left in echelon, or with the alignment so imper 
 fect and so drooping on the left as to appear in echelon, 2 with 
 Lane s and Scales s brigades in rear of its right, and its left 
 without reserve or support, and entirely exposed. 
 
 Thus the column moved forward. It is needless to say a 
 word here of the heroic conduct of Pickett s division ; that 
 
 1 Pickett had but three brigades at Gettysburg : Corse had been left with his 
 brigade at Hanover Junction. 
 
 2 " It was formed in echelon a hundred yards in rear." C. S. VENABLE. 
 
106 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 charge lias already passed into history as " one of the world s 
 great deeds of arms." While, doubtless, many brave men of 
 other commands reached the crest of the height, this was the 
 only organized body that entered the works of the enemy. 1 
 Much can be said in excuse for the failure of the other com 
 mands to fulfill the task assigned them. As a general rule, 
 the peculiarly rough and wooded character of the country in 
 which our army was accustomed to operate, and which in 
 some respects was unfavorable for the manoeuvres of large 
 armies, was of decided advantage to us ; for, in moving upon 
 the enemy through bodies of woods, or in a broken, rolling 
 country, not only was the enemy at a loss how to estimate 
 our strength, but our own men were not impressed with that 
 sense of insecurity which must have resulted from a thor 
 ough knowledge of their own weakness. 
 
 1 " The troops moved steadily on under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, 
 the main attack being directed against the enemy s left centre. His batteries 
 reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own, having nearly exhausted their 
 ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the in 
 fantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking 
 party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took 
 place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our 
 left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in 
 front, and from Cemetery Hill on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, 
 after penetrating the enemy s lines, entering his advance-works, and capturing 
 some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, 
 and driven back with heavy loss." Extract from General Lee s "Report," 
 "Southern Historical Society Papers," July, 1876, p. 44. 
 
 In justice to the gallant men and officers of Heth s division, I here append 
 the testimony of Captain Louis G. Young, aide to General Pettigrew, who, in 
 describing the part taken in the third day s fight by the division, says : " Under 
 this fire from artillery and musketry, the brigade on our left, reduced almost to 
 a line of skirmishers, gave way. Pettigrew s and Archer s brigades advanced a 
 little farther, and in perfect continuation of Pickett s line, which arrived at the 
 works before we did, only because they jutted out in his front, and because his 
 had to move over a considerably shorter distance. The right of the line, formed 
 by Archer s and Pettigrew s brigades, rested on the works, while the left was, 
 of course, farther removed, say forty to sixty yards. Subjected to a fire even 
 more fatal than that which had driven back the brigade on our left, and the men 
 listening in vain for the cheering commands of officers, who had, alas ! fallen, 
 our brigade gave way likewise, and, simultaneously with it, the whole line." 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 107 
 
 It was different here. The charge was made down a 
 gentle slope, and then up to the enemy s lines, a distance of 
 over half a mile, denuded of forests, and in full sight of the 
 enemy, and perfect range of their artillery. These combined 
 causes produced their natural effect upon Pettigrew s division 
 and the brigades supporting it, caused them to falter, and 
 finally retire. Then Pickett s division continuing the charge 
 without supports, and in the sight of the enemy, was not 
 half so formidable or effective as it would have been had 
 trees or hills prevented the enemy from so correctly estimat 
 ing the strength of the attacking column, and our own troops 
 from experiencing that sense of weakness which the known 
 absence of support necessarily produced. In spite of all this, 
 it steadily and gallantly advanced to its allotted task. As 
 the three brigades under Garnett, Armistead, and Kemper, 
 approach the enemy s lines, a most terrific fire of artillery 
 and small-arms is concentrated upon them ; but they swerve 
 not there is no faltering; steadily moving forward, they 
 rapidly reduce the intervening space, and close with their 
 adversaries : leaping the breastworks, they drive back the 
 enemy, and plant their standards on the captured guns, amid 
 shouts of victory dearly won and short-lived victory. 
 
 No more could be exacted, or expected, of those men of 
 brave hearts and nerves of steel ; but where are the supports 
 to reap the benefit of their heroic efforts, and gather the 
 fruits of a victory so nobly won ? "Was that but a forlorn 
 hope, on whose success, not only in penetrating the enemy s 
 lines, but in maintaining its hold against their combined and 
 united efforts to dislodge it, an entire army was to wait in 
 quiet observation? "Was it designed to throw these few 
 brigades originally, at the most, but two divisions upon 
 the fortified stronghold of the enemy, while, full half a mile 
 away, seven-ninths of the army in breathless suspense, in 
 ardent admiration and fearful anxiety, watched, but moved 
 not ? I maintain that such was not the design of the com 
 manding general. Had the veteran divisions of Hood and 
 
108 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 McLaws been moved forward, as was planned, in support of 
 those of Pickett and Pettigrew, 1 not only would the latter 
 division, in all probability, have gained the enemy s works, 
 as did that of Pickett, but these two would have been enabled, 
 with the aid of Hood and McLaws, to resist all efforts of the 
 enemy to dislodge them. The enemy closing in on Pickett s 
 brigades, concentrating upon that small band of heroes the 
 fire of every gun that could be brought to bear upon them, 
 soon disintegrated and overpowered them. Such as were 
 not killed, disabled, and made captive, fell back to our lines. 
 
 It appears that General Longstreet deemed it necessary 
 to defend his right flank and rear with the divisions of Mc 
 Laws and Hood. These divisions, as before stated, consti 
 tuted all of the Confederate line held by Longstreet s troops, 
 and it is not apparent how they were necessary to defend 
 his flank and rear. The nearest infantry force of the enemy 
 to our right occupied the hills Kound Top and Little Hound 
 Top and the only force that could be said to have threat 
 ened our flank and rear consisted of a few brigades of cav 
 alry, so posted as to protect the enemy s left. 
 
 It is not my purpose here to undertake to establish the 
 wisdom of an attack on the enemy s position on the third 
 day, which General Longstreet contends was opposed by his 
 judgment, and of which, he says, he would have stayed the 
 execution, had he felt that he had the privilege so to do ; nor 
 do I propose to discuss the necessities of his position, which 
 he represents to have been such as to forbid the employment 
 of McLaws s and Hood s divisions in the attack ; neither do I 
 seek any other than a just explanation of the causes of our 
 failure at that time ; but w r ell recalling my surprise and dis 
 appointment when it was ascertained that only Pickett s 
 division and the troops from Hill s corps had taken part in 
 the movement, and with positively distinct impressions as 
 
 1 " As they were ordered to do by General Lee, for I heard him give the orders 
 when arranging the fight ; and called his attention to it long afterward, when 
 there was discussion about it. He said, I know it ! I know it ! " Colonel C. 
 S. VENABLE. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 109 
 
 to the occurrences just related, I deem it proper to record 
 them for confirmation or refutation as the undisputed facts 
 of the case, and the testimony of others, may determine. 1 
 
 1 The following correspondence explains itself, and is submitted, without 
 comment, in connection with the assertions of fact just made : 
 
 NORFOLK, VA., January 29, 1877. 
 General JAMES LONGSTREET, New Orleans. 
 
 DEAR GENERAL : I have been anxious to ascertain definitely the relative 
 strength of the two opposing armies during the war, and, after devoting my odd 
 moments to an investigation of the matter for a long time past, I have at last 
 iSucceeded in reaching a satisfactory result. In putting these matters in shape, 
 and in order to give continuity and connection to the notes, I have touched upon 
 the more important incidents in General Lee s career, placing on record my 
 recollection of facts, and sustaining myself as much as possible by the contem 
 poraneous testimony of those who participated in the several events. 
 
 In regard to the third day s operations at Gettysburg, according to my recol 
 lection, General Lee had a conference with you as to the attack to be made 
 that day, when it was determined that an assault should be made on your front, 
 by your corps, reenforced by Heth s division and two brigades of Fender s. 
 My recollection is distinct in that all of your divisions were to take part in the 
 assault, and I never did understand why Hood and McLaws were never 
 ordered forward. Colonel V enable agrees with me entirely in this particular. 
 
 I write, therefore, to say that if you differ from me, or care to present any 
 explanation of the non-action of Hood and McLaws, I should be pleased to have 
 any statement you may make accompany that which I propose to present in 
 my notes. 
 
 My desire is to do what I can toward eliminating the truth from the mass of 
 contradictory evidence that exists, and particularly anxious am I to avoid doing 
 injustice to any one, especially to one who dealt such vigorous blows for the 
 South, and whom I learned, during the war, to esteem so highly as yourself. 
 Yours respectfully, W. H. TAYLOR. 
 
 NEW ORLEANS, LA., February 2, 1S77. 
 Colonel W. H. TAYLOR, Norfolk, Va. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: I have your esteemed favor of the 29th ult, and have noted 
 its contents. 
 
 In reply to your inquiry for a statement in regard to the supposed orders of 
 General Lee in reference to the battle of the third day, I have only to say that 
 General Lee gave no orders for placing the divisions of McLaws and Hood in 
 the column of attack on that day. I cannot, therefore, have any explanation to 
 make at this time why these divisions were not in that column. 
 
 In putting your notes upon the events of the .war together for publication, it 
 seems to me that care should be had that undue influences should not give 
 shape or tone to them. Least of all should you omit items that you may deem 
 essential to General Lee s vindication, upon account of kindly feelings that may 
 have subsisted between us. Nor do I know of good reasons why a report of 
 your views upon matters of public history should interrupt personal relations. 
 
 I have the privilege of giving my account afterward, and am quite willing to 
 have a minute investigation of Gettysburg, and to have the world know my con 
 nection with it from the inception of the campaign to its close. 
 I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JAMES LOKGSTREET. 
 
110 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 After the assault on the enemy s works on the 3d of 
 July, there was no serious fighting at Gettysburg. The 4th 
 passed in comparative quiet. Neither army evinced any dis 
 position to assail the other. Notwithstanding the brilliant 
 achievements of Ewell and Hill on the first day, and the de 
 cided advantage gained by Longstreet on the second, the 
 failure of the operations of the third day, involving, as they 
 did, but two divisions of the army, deprived us of the pres 
 tige of our previous successes, and gave a shadow of right to 
 our adversary s claim of having gained a victory. Their 
 exultation, however, should be tempered with moderation, 
 when we consider that, after one day of absolute quiet, the 
 Confederates withdrew from their front without serious 
 molestation, and with bridges swept away, and an impas 
 sable river in rear, stood in an attitude of defiance until their 
 line of retreat could be rendered practicable, after which 
 they safely recrossed into Yirginia. Then, again, so serious 
 was the loss visited upon the Federals in the engagements 
 of the first and second days, and so near success was the 
 effort to storm their position on the third day, that they were 
 themselves undecided as to whether they should stand or re 
 treat. In discussing several councils or conferences held 
 by General Meade with his corps-commanders, General 
 Sickles testified, before the Committee on the Conduct of 
 the War, that the reason the Confederates were not fol 
 lowed up was on account of differences of opinion whether 
 or not the Federals should themselves retreat, as " it was by 
 no means clear, in the judgment of the corps-commanders, or 
 of the general in command, whether they had won or not." l 
 
 EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES IN THE GETTYSBURG 
 
 CAMPAIGN. 
 
 It appears from the official returns on file in the War 
 Department, that on the 31st of May, 1863, the Army of 
 Northern Virginia numbered : infantry, fifty-four thousand 
 
 1 " Report on the Conduct of the War," second series, vol. i., p. 302, 1865. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. HI 
 
 three hundred and fifty-six ; cavalry, nine thousand five hun 
 dred and thirty-six ; and artillery, four thousand four hun 
 dred and sixty ; of all arms, sixty-eight thousand three hun 
 dred and fifty-two effective. This was immediately before 
 the invasion of Pennsylvania, and may be regarded as rep 
 resenting the maximum of General Lee s army in the Gettys 
 burg campaign. 
 
 At the time of that return the army was divided into but 
 two corps or wings, one under Longstreet, and the other 
 Jackson s old corps under A. P. Hill. The former em 
 braced the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, Pickett, and 
 Hood ; and the latter those of A. P. Hill, Early, Eodes, and 
 Johnson. Immediately after the date of this return, the 
 army was reorganized into three corps, as follows : Long- 
 street s (First Corps), embracing the divisions of McLaw r s, 
 Pickett, and Hood ; Swell s (Second Corps), embracing the 
 divisions of Early, Rodes, and Johnson ; and Hill s (Third 
 Corps), embracing the divisions of Anderson, Heth, and 
 Pender. 
 
 The last two divisions of Hill s corps were formed by 
 adding Pettigrew s brigade, which joined the army just at 
 that time, and J. K. Davis s brigade (formed for him by 
 taking scattered Mississippi regiments from mixed brigades), 
 to the six which constituted A. P. Hill s old division, and 
 dividing the eight into two divisions of four brigades each. 
 The army remained the same as to brigades, with the excep 
 tion of the one additional under General Pettigrew. Gen 
 eral Corse was left with his brigade of Pickett s division, and 
 a North Carolina regiment, 1 at Hanover Junction, and took 
 no part in the Pennsylvania campaign ; his command offset 
 the brigade brought to the army by General Pettigrew, and 
 I therefore assume that the army return just now quoted 
 shows General Lee s maximum strength in that campaign. 
 
 On the 20th of July, 1863, after the return of General 
 Lee to Virginia, his army numbered forty-one thousand 
 
 1 The Forty-fourth North Carolina, of Pettigrew s brigade. 
 
112 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 three hundred and eighty-eight effective, exclusive of the 
 cavalry corps, of which no report is made in the return of 
 the date last mentioned ; allowing seven thousand six hun 
 dred and twelve, a fair estimate for the cavalry, the effective 
 total of the army, on the 20th of July, was forty-nine thou 
 sand. It appears, therefore, that General Lee s loss in the 
 Pennsylvania campaign was about nineteen thousand. 
 
 Concerning the strength of the Federal army, General 
 Meade testified as follows before the Committee on the Con 
 duct of the War (second series, vol. i., p. 337) : u Including all 
 arms of the service, my strength was a little under one hun 
 dred thousand men about ninety-five thousand. I think Gen 
 eral Lee had about ninety thousand infantry, four thousand 
 to five thousand artillery, and about ten thousand cavalry." 
 Again he testifies : " I think the returns showed me, when I 
 took command of the army, amounted to about one hundred 
 and five thousand men : included in those were the eleven 
 thousand of General French." In this latter matter the evi 
 dence is against General Meade. General Hooker, on the 
 27th of June, 1863, telegraphed to General Halleck, from 
 Poolesville, " My whole force of enlisted men for duty will 
 not exceed one hundred and five thousand (105,000)." This 
 would make his total effective (officers and men) fully one 
 hundred and twelve thousand. This dispatch x was received 
 by General Halleck at 9 A. M. On reaching Sandy Hook, 
 subsequently, on the same day, General Hooker telegraphed 
 as follows concerning the garrison at Harper s Ferry under 
 General French : " I find ten thousand men here in condi 
 tion to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. 
 They cannot defend a ford of the river ; and, as far as Har 
 per s Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the 
 fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the 
 troops are withdrawn. ISTo enemy will ever take possession 
 of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public 
 property could have been secured to-night, and the troops 
 
 1 "Report on the Conduct of the War," second series, vol. i., p. 291, 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN. 113 
 
 marched to where they could have been of some service." 
 This dispatch was received by General Halleck at 2.55 p. M. 1 
 
 It is evident that the garrison at Harper s Ferry was not 
 embraced in the returns alluded to by General Hooker, in 
 his first dispatch. Although General Halleck refused these 
 troops to General Hooker, they were immediately awarded 
 to General Meade on his assuming command when General 
 Hooker was relieved. 
 
 Without more accurate returns of the two armies at Get 
 tysburg, we are left to form our conclusions as to their 
 strength from the data given above. I put the Army of the 
 Potomac at one hundred and five thousand, and the Army 
 of Northern Virginia at sixty-two thousand of all arms 
 fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and four 
 thousand artillery and believe these figures very nearly 
 correct. 
 
 In this estimate, I adopt the strength of the Federal 
 army as given by its commander on the 2Yth of June, but 
 four days before the first encounter at Gettysburg, excluding 
 all consideration of the troops at Harper s Ferry, although 
 General Meade, on assuming command, at once ordered Gen 
 eral French to move to Frederick with seven thousand men, 
 to protect his communications, 2 and thus made available a 
 like number of men of the Army of the Potomac, who would 
 otherwise have been detached for this service. 
 
 On the side of the Confederates, the entire cavalry corps is 
 included. That portion which General Stuart accompanied 
 made a complete circuit of the Federal army, and only joined 
 General Lee on the evening of the second day; and the 
 brigades under Generals Jones and Robertson, which had 
 been left to guard the passes of the Blue Eidge, did not 
 rejoin the army until the 3d of July ; only the commands 
 of Generals Imboden and Jenkins had been with the army 
 from the time of crossing the Potomac, and they accom- 
 
 1 " Report on the Conduct of the War," second series, vol. i., p. 292. 
 3 Ibid., p. 335. 
 8 
 
114 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 panied General Ewell. "General Stuart had several skir 
 mishes during his march, and at Hanover quite a severe en 
 gagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which 
 was finally compelled to withdraw from the town. The ranks 
 of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous 
 march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food 
 and forage." : I have deducted from the strength of Gen 
 eral Lee s army, at the opening of the campaign, one month 
 previous to the battle, only a reasonable allowance for losses 
 by sickness and straggling, casualties in the encounters with 
 the enemy under General Milroy and in the constant skir 
 mishing of the cavalry before and after leaving Virginia, and 
 the detachments left to guard our communications, to pro 
 tect captured property, and to escort prisoners taken on the 
 Virginia side of the river. 
 
 1 General Lee s " Report of the Pennsylvania Campaign." 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 General Lee retires to Virginia. Affair at Bristoe Station. The Tete-de-Pont. 
 Mine Run. General Meade s Advance and Retreat. Dahlgren s Raid. 
 
 ON the 5th of July our army left Gettysburg. Owing 
 to the swollen condition of the Potomac, it did not recross 
 into Virginia until the 13th of the same month ; it was not, 
 however, seriously annoyed or molested in the interval, 
 though confidently and anxiously expecting to be attacked. 
 In consequence of Meade s advance into Virginia east of the 
 mountains, General Lee moved his army so as to confront 
 him, and soon established his line of defense along the Rap- 
 idan River, where the army was allowed two months of com 
 parative rest and quiet. In October General Lee again 
 advanced, but no general engagement ensued. The follow 
 ing extracts from notes taken by me at the time will serve 
 to illustrate the nature and extent of the movements then 
 made: 
 
 BRISTOE STATION, October, 1863. 
 
 On Sunday (llth) we continued our march for Culpeper 
 Court-House, where the enemy had been in position, with a 
 view of reaching bis flank or forcing him to retire. On ar 
 riving at a point five miles from the Court-House, we learned 
 that Meade had taken refuge on the farther side of the Rap- 
 pahannock River, and it was necessary to try another flank- 
 movement. On Monday, therefore, we started for Warrenton 
 by way of Warrenton Springs. On reaching the river near 
 the latter point onr progress was opposed by the enemy 
 who held the opposite bank ; but we very soon succeeded in 
 
116 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 forcing a passage at the ford. We camped near the springs 
 that night, and passed them the next day on our way to War- 
 renton. On Wednesday we left Warrenton and reached this 
 place the same day. Here Hill s advance met a corps of the 
 enemy and at once engaged it. Our other corps came up in 
 good time, and we should have punished the enemy severely ; 
 but matters were not properly managed and they all escaped 
 us, and, what is worse, they got the better of us in what little 
 fighting there was. Our people were not put into battle cor 
 rectly, too few of one corps being engaged, and the other not 
 having its line of battle in the proper direction. By unpardon 
 able mismanagement the enemy was allowed to capture five 
 pieces of our artillery. There was no earthly excuse for it, as 
 all our troops were well in hand, and much stronger than the 
 enemy. 
 
 The next morning it was discovered that the latter had re 
 treated toward Centreville and taken refuge behind his fortifica 
 tions. For the past two days we have been destroying this 
 railroad, which is highly essential to the Federals in their "on 
 to Richmond ; " and from present indications I think that a gen 
 eral engagement is improbable, and that the fighting for this 
 season is pretty much over. We have taken about fifteen hun 
 dred prisoners, forced the enemy back to Alexandria and Cen 
 treville without any general battle, and gained from him, for a 
 time at least, a large portion of our State. 
 
 CAMP NEAR BRANDY STATION, November 7, 1863. 
 
 This evening the enemy advanced upon us at Kelly s Ford on 
 the Rappahannock River, and also at Rappahannock Station ; 
 effected a crossing at the former place, rushed upon our men (two 
 brigades) who were at the latter place defending the bridge, 
 overwhelmed and captured most of them. Thus, in a very few 
 words, I record the saddest chapter in the history of this army. 
 Twelve or fifteen hundred men were captured, and also a battery 
 of artillery of four pieces. 
 
 Reference is here made to the unfortunate affair of the 
 tete-de-pont near Rappahannock bridge. At the time, great 
 
OPERATIONS ALONG THE RAPPAHANNOCK. H? 
 
 chagrin was felt at the disaster, and much discussion was had 
 as to the responsibility therefor. 
 
 Some maintained that the place was naturally strong, and 
 that, with the aid of the earthworks, it could be readily de 
 fended ; others contended that the works were of but little 
 protection, and the means of escape, in event of disaster, in 
 adequate. I cannot do better, in aiding to effect a deter 
 mination of these questions, than quote, from the official 
 reports of General Lee and Major-General Early, the views 
 they respectively entertained. 
 
 General Lee says : 
 
 To hold the line of the Rappahannock at this part of its 
 course it was deemed advantageous to maintain our communi 
 cation with the north bank, to threaten any flank-movement 
 the enemy might make above or below, and thus compel him to 
 divide his forces, when it was hoped that an opportunity would 
 be presented to concentrate on one or the other part. For this 
 purpose, a point was selected a short distance above the site of 
 the railroad-bridge, where the hills on each side of the river 
 afforded protection to our pontoon-bridge, and increased the 
 means of defense. The enemy had previously constructed some 
 small earthworks on these hills, to repel an attack from the 
 south. That on the north side was converted into a ttte-de-pont, 
 and a line of rifle-trenches extended along the crest on the right 
 and left to the river-bank. The works on the south side were 
 remodeled, and sunken batteries for additional guns constructed 
 on an adjacent hill to the left. Higher up on the same side 
 and east of the railroad, near the river-bank, sunken batteries 
 for two guns, and rifle-pits, were arranged to command the rail 
 road embankment, under cover of which the enemy might ad 
 vance. The works were slight, but were deemed adequate to 
 accomplish the object for which they were intended. The pon 
 toon-bridge was considered a sufficient means of communication, 
 as, in the event of the troops north of the river being compelled 
 to withdraw, their crossing could be covered by the artillery 
 and infantry in the works on the south side. Four pieces of 
 
118 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 artillery were placed in the tete-de-pont and eight others in the 
 works opposite. 
 
 In speaking of the assault by the enemy, he continues : 
 
 As soon, however, as it became dark enough to conceal his 
 movements, the enemy advanced in overwhelming numbers 
 against our rifle-trenches and succeeded in carrying them in the 
 manner described in the reports of Generals Early and Hays. 
 It would appear from these reports, and the short duration of 
 the firing, that the enemy was enabled to approach very near 
 the works before being seen. The valley in our front aided in 
 concealing his advance from view, and a strong wind effectually 
 prevented any movements from being heard. It was essential 
 to the maintenance of the position, under these circumstances, 
 that sharp-shooters should have been thrown forward to give 
 early information of his approach, in order that he might be 
 subjected to fire as long as possible, but it is not stated that 
 this precaution was taken. The breaking of the enemy s first 
 line and the surrender of part of it, as described in the reports, 
 also contributed to divert attention from the approach of the 
 second and third, and enabled them to press into the works. 
 The darkness of the night, and the fear of injuring our own men 
 who had surrendered, prevented General Early from using the 
 artillery on the south bank. . . . 
 
 The suggestions above mentioned afford the only explana 
 tion I am able to give of this unfortunate affair, as the courage 
 and good conduct of the troops engaged have been too often 
 tried to admit of any question. 
 
 The loss of this position made it necessary to abandon the 
 design of attacking the force that had crossed at Kelly s Ford, 
 and the army was withdrawn to the only tenable line between 
 Culpeper Court-House and the Rappahannock, where it re 
 mained during the succeeding day. The position not being 
 regarded as favorable, it returned the night following to the 
 south side of the Rapidan. 
 
 General Early, whose division alternated with that under 
 
OPERATIONS ALONG THE RAPPAHANNOCK. H9 
 
 General Johnson in furnishing a garrison for the works, and 
 whose troops were on duty the day in question, says : 
 
 The works on the north side of the river were, in my judg 
 ment, very inadequate and not judiciously laid out or con 
 structed. . . . There was no ditch on the outside of the work. 
 ... I had myself pointed out some of the defects of the works to 
 the engineers having charge of them, and I had urged the neces 
 sity of having another bridge farther up the stream. The fact is, 
 in my opinion, the position was susceptible of being made very 
 strong, but, in order to enable a small force to hold it against a 
 large attacking force, the works ought to have been entirely in 
 closed, and with a deep ditch on the outside, so that an attack 
 ing column could have had its progress checked. But the works 
 were so constructed as to afford no obstacle in themselves to an 
 attacking enemy, and only furnished a temporary protection 
 to our troops. . . . In a short time some firing of musketry at 
 and in front of the rifle-trenches was observed from the flashes 
 of the guns, it being impossible to hear the report by reason of 
 the wind, though the distance was but short. After this firing 
 had continued for some minutes it slackened somewhat, and, 
 not hearing from it, we were of opinion that it was from and at 
 the enemy s skirmishers. 
 
 The works were quickly overran, and, as before stated, 
 the greater part of two brigades was captured, as also the 
 four pieces of artillery in the tete-de-pont. After this the 
 pontoon-bridge was burned. 
 
 CAMP NEAR BRANDT STATION, November 7, 1863. 
 
 We are all packed up and will move to-night. We are now 
 in the line of outposts, and this is not exactly the place for the 
 commanding general. No sleep to-night, and to-morrow an 
 active, stirring Sunday. How singular it is that most of our 
 battles and movements occur on that day, when, of all others, 
 we should most enjoy quiet and be most reminded of peace ! 
 
 I think that General Meade means to fight, and General Lee 
 will accommodate him, but on ground of his own choosing. 
 
120 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 The movements here alluded to only resulted in both 
 armies being reestablished in their old lines along the Rapi- 
 dan River, without an engagement. 
 
 CAMP NEAR ORANGE, November 26, 1863. 
 
 We are just on the eve of another move. This morning 
 and afternoon all the indications favor the supposition that the 
 enemy is moving down the river, and we have been busy pre 
 paring for a counter-move in the same direction. Matters seem 
 to be drifting toward our old and renowned battle-fields, Chan- 
 cellorsville and Fredericksburg. The enemy occupies the line 
 of the Rapidan on the north side, we on the south side. He 
 will in all probability move to Germania Ford, near the conflu 
 ence of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, where he will 
 cross. Then, as we will be advancing in that direction, there 
 will be a clash somewhere between that point and Fredericks- 
 burg. We have all our arrangements made to move before 
 dawn in the morning. 
 
 CAMP NEAR ORANGE, December, 1863. 
 
 By the dawn of day on the 27th of last month, we were 
 many miles from Orange on our way to meet Meade s army, 
 which had crossed to the south side of the Rapidan. It was 
 intensely cold. We left camp at 3 A. M. as usual, the general 
 was ahead of every one else and we arrived at Verdiersville 
 without any army whatever, the troops not having progressed 
 that far. During the morning the army caught up with us, and 
 we proceeded to advance toward Fredericksburg. In the after 
 noon we first met the enemy ; on the right there was a little 
 skirmishing; on the left, Johnson s division engaged and severe 
 ly chastised a corps of the enemy ; at the same time our cavalry, 
 under General Rosser, attacked and destro} T ed a large ordnance- 
 train in the enemy s rear. With the exception of one other 
 cavalry affair, no more fighting of any consequence occurred. 
 On Saturday we selected our position on the line of Mine Run, 
 and proceeded to fortify it. In an incredibly short time (for our 
 men work now like beavers) we were strongly intrenched, and 
 ready and anxious for an attack. The general gave his atten 
 tion to the whole line directing important changes here and 
 
MINE RUN. 121 
 
 there ; endeavoring to impress the officers with the importance 
 of success in the impending engagement ; and presenting a fine 
 example of untiring energy and zeal. He was busy the whole 
 time. 
 
 On Sunday, as we were riding down the lines, attended by 
 General Hill with his staff and others, we came upon a collec 
 tion of men engaged in divine worship. "We had been riding at 
 a pretty fair gait, but the general at once halted, and listened 
 to the singing of the men. He heard the entire hymn, and as 
 the benediction was pronounced, reverently raised his hat from 
 his head, received the blessing, and then continued his ride 
 along the fortifications. It was a striking scene, and one well 
 calculated to impress solemnly all who witnessed it. The para 
 pet was crowded with men ; here and there at proper intervals 
 waved the battle-flags ; and from many dozen embrasures 
 frowned the now silent artillery. This all looked exceedingly 
 warlike, and it was a cheering thing to see that, while ready for 
 action, our men did not forget that, to secure victory, divine 
 help should be implored. 
 
 On Monday we confidently looked for an attack. It passed 
 without one. The enemy was in our immediate front, and he, 
 too, had intrenched. This looked rather queer, to see two large 
 armies face to face, each busily constructing works for defense. 
 
 Tuesday came and went without an attack. General Lee 
 had now become impatient, and, seeing how reluctant the enemy 
 was to bring on an engagement, he determined to relieve him of 
 further embarrassment by becoming the aggressor, and forcing 
 him into a fight. Consequently, during the night two fine 
 divisions were relieved from the trenches and concentrated on 
 our right, ready to be thrown on the enemy s left flank ; other 
 necessary arrangements for a grand battle were completed 
 before morning. 
 
 Information received during the night indicated some activity 
 in the enemy s lines, and at dawn of day it was found that he 
 had fled, and was fast making his way back toward the river. 
 Pursuit was immediately ordered and made; but General Meade 
 had too much the advance of us, and reached the north side of 
 the Rapidan before we could overtake him. Both armies then 
 
122 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 retired to their original positions. Undoubtedly- we were most 
 benefited by the movement. We captured about seven hun 
 dred prisoners, four hundred mules and horses, and destroyed 
 or secured one hundred and twenty or one hundred and thirty 
 wagons ; the enemy s loss in killed and wounded will reach per 
 haps one thousand. So, all things considered, we may be said 
 to have canceled Bristoe Station. It was an almost bloodless 
 victory ; for we enjoy all the moral effects of a victory, without 
 its usual and distressing losses. General Meade expected either 
 to take us unawares, turn our flank, and force us from behind 
 the fortifications on the Rapidan, or 6lse he concluded that, as 
 soon as he crossed, General Lee would retreat to Hanover Junc 
 tion ; but our general is not so easily frightened into a retreat, 
 and can very readily change his front. 
 
 Both armies remained in a state of comparative inaction 
 during the months of January and February, 1864, until the 
 28th day of the latter month, when a powerful cavalry ex 
 pedition, embracing three columns, under Kilpatrick, Dahl- 
 gren, and Ouster, started from the Federal lines with the 
 avowed purpose of capturing and sacking the city of Kich- 
 mond. At this time General Lee was at Eichmond. The 
 indications of the advance of Ouster s column on our left, 
 received at army headquarters on the evening of the 28th, 
 were confirmed on the 29th, when the whole movement was 
 fully developed. The route of this column was to have been 
 via Charlottesville, at which point there was no Confederate 
 force, and the country intervening was filled with our artil 
 lery and wagon camps. Upon the receipt of the first intelli 
 gence of this movement on the evening of the 28th, all the 
 trains moving in the direction of the threatened route were 
 
 o 
 
 diverted. On the 29th a force of infantry was dispatched 
 by rail to Charlottesville; but the advance of the enemy 
 operating on this flank was effectually checked before reach 
 ing that place by our horse-artillery and dismounted cavalry. 
 The column which moved upon our right, under Kilpat 
 rick, was more successful. The entire Confederate cavalry 
 
DAHLGREN S RAID. 123 
 
 picket stationed at Eley s Ford was captured ; and this col 
 umn of the enemy reached the Central Railroad before any 
 intelligence was received of its advance. After cutting the 
 road, it proceeded toward Richmond. General Lee returned 
 to the army on the last train, which passed up but a few 
 hours before the enemy reached the road, and thus barely 
 escaped capture. The fate of this column, and especially of 
 that portion of it commanded by Colonel Dahlgren, is well 
 known. The results were most disastrous to the Federals, 
 including the death of that officer, and the capture of his 
 orders, exposing the damaging fact of the intention of the 
 enemy to pillage and burn the city and kill the most promi 
 nent Confederate officials. 
 
 Early in April General Lee was directed to inquire of 
 General Meade, by nag of truce, if he or his Government 
 sanctioned what Colonel Dahlgren had proposed and ordered 
 in his address to his troops. On the 18th of April a reply to 
 this communication was received, to the effect that neither 
 General Meade, General Kilpatrick, nor the authorities at 
 "Washington, ordered or approved the burning of Richmond, 
 the killing of Mr. Davis and his cabinet, or anything else 
 not rendered necessary by military causes or not legitimate 
 in civilized warfare. General Kilpatrick stated that the 
 photographic copy of the " address " which had been received 
 through General Lee was a fac-simile of an address which 
 Colonel Dahlgren had submitted to him for his approval, 
 and which he had approved in red ink, except that it lacked 
 that approval and contained the objectionable exhortations 
 or orders, which were not in that submitted to him. The 
 disclaimer of General Meade was most candid and emphatic. 
 
 Information was received, about the latter part of April, 
 of the advance of the Ninth (Federal) Corps from the neigh 
 borhood of Annapolis to reenforce General Grant, who had 
 now assumed command of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 General Grant in Command of the Federal Army of the Potomac. His Advance. 
 From the Wilderness to Petersburg. Strength of the Two Armies. 
 
 BY reference to the official returns of the Army of North 
 ern Virginia, 1 1 find that on the 20th of April, 1864, the 
 Second Corps reported seventeen thousand and seventy-nine 
 and the Third Corps twenty-two thousand one hundred and 
 ninety-nine present for duty ; there were also two unattached 
 commands viz., the Maryland line and the Provost Guard, 
 numbering together eleven hundred and twenty-five effective. 
 Two divisions of the First Corps had but recently arrived 
 from Tennessee, and were not embraced in this return. I 
 am without certain information as to their strength at that 
 time. When the First Corps was detached for service in 
 Tennessee, the effective strength of its three divisions was 
 fourteen thousand six hundred and sixty-eight (see return of 
 August 31, 1863). After the hard service in the "West, I am 
 sure that the two divisions under Generals Field and Ker- 
 shaw, when they rejoined the army, could not have exceeded 
 ten thousand effective. "With this liberal estimate, it appears 
 that General Lee s total infantry force was fifty thousand 
 four hundred and three; to which if we add the cavalry 
 corps, eight thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven, and 
 the artillery corps, four thousand eight hundred and fifty- 
 four, as given in the same return, we have a total present for 
 duty, of all arms, of sixty-three thousand nine hundred and 
 
 1 Now on file in the Archive-Office, War Department, Washington, D. C. 
 
IN THE WILDERNESS. 125 
 
 eighty-four in round numbers say sixty-four thousand men 
 under General Lee, at the opening of the campaign of 
 1864. 
 
 The official return of the Army of the Potomac of the 1st 
 of May, 1864, shows present for duty one hundred and 
 twenty thousand three hundred and eighty men of all arms ; 
 to which if we add the Ninth Corps, not embraced in this 
 return, but which joined General Grant before he commenced 
 active operations, and which numbered, according to official 
 returns, twenty thousand seven hundred and eighty, we have 
 a total of one hundred and forty-one thousand one hundred 
 and sixty men of all arms under General Grant at the open 
 ing of the campaign. 1 
 
 I have given the relative strength of the two armies at 
 the outset of this campaign, in order that the reader, in fol 
 lowing the course of events, may have a proper appreciation 
 of the difficulties which beset General Lee in the task of 
 thwarting the designs of so formidable an adversary, and 
 realize the extent to which his brilliant genius made amends 
 for paucity of numbers, and proved more than a match for 
 brute force, as illustrated in the hammering policy of General 
 Grant. 
 
 If one hundred and forty thousand men are made to 
 grapple in a death-struggle with sixty thousand men, of the 
 former twenty thousand should survive the total annihilation 
 of the latter, even though the price exacted for such destruc 
 tion be in the ratio of two for one. Behold the theory of 
 the Federal commander and an epitome of his conception of 
 strategy, as exemplified on the sanguinary field extending 
 from the Wilderness to James River ! 
 
 On the 4th day of May General Grant opened the cam 
 paign by crossing to the south side of the Rapidan River, 
 with the intention of placing his army between that of Gen 
 eral Lee and Richmond, his objective point. 
 
 1 These figures are taken from the " Report of the Secretary of War to the 
 First Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress," vol. i., 1865- 66, pp. 3-5, 55. 
 
126 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 General Lee was fully aware of the great disparity in the 
 strength of the two armies, and of the efforts that had been 
 made, under General Grant s direction, to increase the effi 
 ciency of the Army of the Potomac by every possible means, 
 and it was doubtless expected that he would hesitate to give 
 battle against such fearful odds, and proceed to manoeuvre 
 to avoid a general engagement, and, by " masterly retreat," 
 retard the progress of his adversary. 
 
 The Federal commanders should by this time have learned 
 to expect, with moral certainty, that, just as soon as they 
 emerged from their own lines, there was an arm uplifted 
 that would inevitably fall upon them with the speed of light 
 ning and with tremendous power. 
 
 So soon as the real design of General Grant was disclosed, 
 General Lee advanced to attack him. It was, indeed, a bold 
 movement ; but, strange to relate, it appears not to have 
 been expected by the enemy. Moving down on the south 
 side of the Rapidan, the Army of Northern Yirginia soon 
 encountered its old adversary, under its new commander, in 
 the Wilderness, and, without parley or delay, grappled it, 
 and took the initiative in what was destined to be a pro 
 longed and bitter struggle. 
 
 General Grant, who had started for a march, found it 
 necessary to concentrate for battle. Much hard fighting en 
 sued : for two days there was a murderous wrestle ; severe 
 and rapid blows were given and received in turn, until sheer 
 exhaustion called a truce, with the advantage on the Confed 
 erate side. Notably was this the case in a brilliant assault 
 made by General Longstreet on the Federal left on the 6th 
 of May ; and in a turning movement on their right on the 
 same day, executed by a portion of General Swell s (Second) 
 corps the brigades of Gordon, Johnston, and Pegram 
 doubling up that flank and forcing it back a considerable 
 distance. 
 
 Mention should also be made of the stubborn and heroic 
 resistance, on the 5th of May, by the divisions of Heth and 
 
IX THE WILDERNESS. 127 
 
 Wilcox of Hill s (Third) corps fifteen thousand strong l 
 against the repeated and desperate assaults of five divisions 
 of the enemy the four divisions of Hancock s corps and one 
 of Sedgwick s numbering about forty-five thousand men, in 
 which the Confederates completely foiled their adversaries, 
 and inflicted upon them most serious loss. 2 
 
 The Third Division of Hill s (Third) corps, tinder General 
 Anderson, and the two divisions of Longstreet s (First) corps, 
 did not reach the scene of conflict until dawn of day on the 
 morning of the 6th. Simultaneously the attack on Hill was 
 renewed with great vigor. In addition to the force which 
 he had so successfully resisted the previous day, a fresh 
 division of the Fifth Corps, under, General Wadsworthj had 
 secured position on his Bank, and cooperated with the column 
 assaulting in front. After a short contest, the divisions of 
 Heth and Wilcox, who had expected to be relieved, and were 
 not prepared for the enemy s assault, were overpowered and 
 compelled to retire, just as the advance of Longstreet s col 
 umn reached the ground. The defeated divisions were in 
 considerable disorder, and the condition of affairs was exceed 
 ingly critical. General Lee fully appreciated the impending 
 crisis, and, dashing amid the fugitives, personally called upon 
 the men to rally. General Longstreet, taking in the situation 
 at a glance, was prompt to act immediately caused his 
 divisions to be deployed in line of battle, and gallantly ad 
 vanced to recover the lost ground. 
 
 The soldiers, seeing General Lee s manifest purpose to 
 advance with them, and realizing the great danger in which 
 he then was, called upon him in a beseeching manner to " go 
 
 ^ {JLt* > 
 
 " Return of the Army of Northern Virginia," April 20, 1864, chap. xiv. 
 2 The troops engaged in this assault were, Getty s division (four brigades) of \y J"" ^ 
 the Sixth Corps ; Hancock s corps viz., Birney s division (two brigades), Mott s C ~* ( 
 division (two brigades), Gibbon s division (three brigades), and Barlow s division ) 
 (four brigades) : in all, fifteen brigades. The Army of the Potomac embraced 
 but thirty-two brigades, and numbered near one hundred thousand infantry. I 
 therefore estimate that the fifteen brigades here engaged numbered forty-five 
 thousand men. (See Swinton s " Army of the Potomac," pp. 425, 426.) 
 
128 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 to the rear," promising that they would soon have matters 
 rectified, and begging him to retire from a position in which 
 his life was so exposed. The general was evidently touched 
 and gratified at this manifestation of interest and anxiety on 
 the part of his brave men, and waved them on, with some 
 words of cheer. Their advance under such circumstances 
 was simply irresistible ; every man felt that the eye of the 
 commanding general was upon him, and was proud of the 
 opportunity of showing him that his trust in his men was 
 not misplaced. The Federal advance was checked, and the 
 Confederate lines reestablished. 
 
 Not content with this, as soon as the proper dispositions 
 could be made, General Longstreet, as before mentioned, 
 took the offensive, and assailed, with great impetuosity, the 
 force which had overwhelmed Hill s divisions. The Fed 
 erals were in turn soon compelled to yield all the ground 
 heretofore gained, and, upon being further pressed, to fall 
 back for shelter to a line of works some distance in rear of 
 the line, held by them the day previous, and which had been 
 constructed for the protection of the Brock Road, along 
 which one of their columns advanced on the 4th of May. 
 
 So far, complete success had crowned General Longstreet s 
 movement. The necessary orders were given by him to fol 
 low up the advantage gained, and dispositions were made to 
 press the dismayed and fleeing enemy. Surely a decisive 
 victory was now to be vouchsafed the Confederate arms, 
 when, lo ! by an accident truly calamitous in its results, the 
 Confederates were deprived of their leader. General Long- 
 street, with his stafe, was advancing along the road at the 
 head of Jenkins s brigade, when the latter mistaken for a 
 body of the enemy by a portion of the flanking column, 
 which continued its advance through the woods was fired 
 into. General Longstreet was seriously wounded, and Gen 
 eral Jenkins fell dead. The forward movement was checked, 
 and thus was time afforded the Federals in which to rally, 
 reenforce, and reform, behind their intrenchments. Thus, 
 
IN THE WILDERNESS. 129 
 
 by a strange fatality, a second time was Lee s lieutenant 
 stricken down in the tangled mazes of the Wilderness, when 
 in the full tide of victory, and that not by hostile hand ! 
 
 In these encounters in the Wilderness the Confederates 
 inflicted severe losses upon the enemy, and, besides gaining 
 ground, captured prisoners, artillery, and other trophies. As 
 can be well understood, these results were attained, however, 
 at serious cost to General Lee, who, constrained to spare his 
 men as much as possible, hesitated to assail the enemy in his 
 intrenched position, and hopefully awaited attack. General 
 Grant did not again assume the aggressive, and so the Yth 
 passed in comparative quiet. 
 
 General Grant, in pursuance of his original design, then 
 attempted, by a rapid flank movement, to secure possession of 
 Spottsylvania Court-House ; but General Lee, on the night of 
 the 7th, anticipated his purpose, and detached a portion of 
 Longstreet s corps, under command of General E. H. Ander 
 son, to move at once to that point. The van of the opposing 
 forces, each making for the same goal, arrived almost simul 
 taneously on the morning of the 8th at the Court-House. 
 The Federals, a little in advance, drove back the Confederate 
 cavalry, but were in turn quickly dispossessed of the strategic 
 point by the opportune arrival of Anderson s infantry. The 
 two armies then swung round, each forming on its advanced 
 guard as a nucleus, and on the 9th confronted each other in 
 line of battle. 
 
 General Lee was still between his adversary and Rich 
 mond. These movements were necessarily made with great 
 rapidity, and the several commands, as they moved into line, 
 proceeded at once to fortify in the positions in which they 
 found themselves, without due regard to a perfect alignment, 
 and ignoring to a certain extent natural advantages and dis 
 advantages. The line of defense, as thus originally con 
 structed, was consequently imperfect, and at some points 
 quite vulnerable. 
 
 On the 10th of May, by a spirited dash, the enemy made 
 9 
 
130 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 a lodgment on the left of General Ewell, obtaining tempo 
 rary possession of a portion of the lines and a battery of 
 artillery. It was there again that General Lee started for the 
 breach, with the purpose of leading the troops in the effort 
 to regain the lost ground, when his staff and other officers 
 surrounded him and urged him to desist, imploring him not 
 thus to expose himself to an almost certain death. To their 
 expostulations he replied that he would relinquish his pur 
 pose if they would see to it that the lines were reestablished 
 that that " must be done." And it was done ! The 
 enemy was quickly made to relinquish his temporary advan 
 tage, and both guns and ground were recovered. 
 
 Upon an examination of the lines, General Lee had de 
 tected the weakness of that portion known as " the salient," 
 to the right of the point assailed on the 10th, to which I have 
 just alluded, and occupied by the division of General Edward 
 Johnson (Swell s corps), and had directed a second line to be 
 constructed across its base, to which he proposed to move 
 back the troops occupying the angle. These arrangements 
 were not quite completed, when he thought he saw cause to 
 suspect another flank-movement by General Grant, and, on 
 the night of the llth, ordered most of the artillery at this 
 portion of the lines to be withdrawn, so as to be available to 
 take part in a counter-movement. Toward the dawn of day, 
 on the 12th, General Johnson discovered indications of an 
 impending assault upon his front. He sent immediate orders 
 for the return of his artillery, and caused other preparations 
 for defense to be made ; but the enemy, who could advance 
 without discovery to within a short distance of the works 
 under cover of a body of woods, had massed there a large 
 force, and, with the advent of the first rays of morning light, 
 by a spirited assault, quickly overran that portion of the lines 
 before the artillery could be put in position, and captured 
 most of the division, including its brave commander. The 
 army was thus cut in twain, and the situation was one well 
 calculated to test the skill of its commander and the nerve 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA. 
 
 and courage of the men. Dispositions were immediately 
 made to repair the breach, and troops were moved up from 
 the right and left to dispute the further progress of the as 
 saulting column. Then occurred the most remarkable mus 
 ketry-tire of the war : from the sides of the salient, in the 
 possession of the Federals, and the new line, forming the 
 base of the triangle, occupied by the Confederates, poured 
 forth, from continuous lines of hissing fire, an incessant, ter 
 rific hail of deadly missiles. ~No living man nor thing could 
 stand in the doomed space embraced within those angry 
 lines ; even large trees were felled their trunks cut in twain 
 by the bullets of small-arms. Never did the troops on either 
 side display greater valor and determination. Intense and 
 bitter was the struggle. The Confederates, moving up to 
 fill the gap, fell with tremendous power upon the Federal 
 mass, caused it to recoil somewhat, closed with it in a hand- 
 to-hand conflict, but failed to dislodge it ; while the Federal 
 assault, w T hich threatened such serious consequences, was 
 effectually checked, and the advantage to the enemy result 
 ing therefrom was limited to the possession of the narrow 
 space of the salient and the capture of the force which had 
 occupied it. The loss of this fine body of troops was serious 
 ly felt by General Lee ; but sadly reduced though his army 
 was, by this and a week s incessant fighting, such was the 
 metal of what remained that his lines, thus forcibly rectified, 
 proved thereafter impregnable. 
 
 Several days of comparative quiet ensued. The army 
 under General Grant was at this time heavily reenforced 
 from Washington. In his official report of this campaign he 
 says, " The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th (of May), 
 were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of 
 reinforcements from Washington." 1 In numerical strength 
 his army so much exceeded that under General Lee that, 
 after covering the entire Confederate front with double lines 
 
 1 General Grant s " Report," " Report of the Secretary of War to the Thirty- 
 ninth Congress," vol. ii., p. 1106. 
 
132 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 of battle, lie had in reserve a large force with which to extend 
 his flank, and compel a corresponding movement on the part 
 of his adversary, in order to keep between him and his covet 
 ed prize the capital of the Confederacy. 
 
 On the 18th another assault was directed against the 
 Confederate lines, but it produced no impression. J^o effort 
 was made after this the task was a hopeless one, and was 
 reluctantly relinquished. 
 
 On the night of the 20th, General Grant started on an 
 other flank -movement in the direction of Bowling Green. 
 General Lee in order to intercept him moved to Hanover 
 Junction. 
 
 I again make one or two extracts from notes taken at the 
 time, as illustrating the spirit of the army and the character 
 of the work it was called on to perform : 
 
 CAMP AT HANOVER JUNCTION, May 23, 1864:. 
 
 .... For the first time since the 4th of the month we 
 were on yesterday spared the sight of the enemy. On the day 
 before it was discovered that he was leaving our front and mov 
 ing toward Bowling Green. He dared not, as we prayed he 
 would, attack us again at Spottsylvania. With several rivers 
 between his army and ours, he could move to Bowling Green 
 and below without any danger of our intercepting him. He 
 would thus get some miles nearer Richmond, in a geographical 
 sense, but in reality be as far from that city as ever, because 
 this army will still confront him, let him change his base as 
 often as he pleases. To counteract his new design, our army 
 was put in motion for this place. The enemy had the start of 
 us, but by excellent marching we have again placed him in our 
 front. It is probable that he will make still another move to 
 our right, and land somewhere near West Point. 
 
 This would of course necessitate our moving between that 
 point and Richmond. Why General Grant did not carry his 
 army to his new base without incurring the heavy losses he has 
 sustained in battle, I cannot say. If Fredericksburg was his 
 destination, he could have attained possession of it without the 
 
HANOVER JUNCTION". 133 
 
 loss of a hundred men. The same can be said of West Point. 
 After his discomfiture in the Wilderness, he started for Spott- 
 svlvania Court-House, hoping to reach there before General Lee. 
 There were but few indications of his intended departure from 
 our front at that time to most of us, but General Lee seemed to 
 divine his intention, and sent a corps to Spottsylvania just in 
 time to meet the enemy at that place. We engaged them and 
 beat them back, thereby securing the Court-House. In com 
 menting upon this, the Northern papers say that we retreat 
 ed and that Grant pursued us ; while the truth is, General 
 Grant was completely outgeneraled. No doubt the entire 
 North is this day rejoicing over our retreat to this point ; yet 
 the battle-field was left in our possession, and we marched here 
 without any molestation whatever. This does not look like a 
 retreat. Our army is in excellent condition ; its morale as good 
 as when we met Grant two weeks since for the first time. 
 He will feel us again before he reaches his prize. His losses 
 have been already fearfully large. Our list of casualties is a 
 sad one to contemplate, but does not compare with his terrible 
 record of killed and wounded : he does not pretend to bury 
 his dead, leaves his wounded without proper attendance, and 
 seems entirely reckless as regards the lives of his men. This, 
 and his remarkable pertinacity, constitute his sole claim to su 
 periority over his predecessors. He certainly holds on longer 
 than any of them. He alone, of all, would have remained this 
 side of the Rapidan after the battles of the Wilderness. 
 
 The gage of battle proffered by General Lee at Hanover 
 Junction was declined by General Grant, who, in order to 
 extricate his army from a position of some embarrassment, 
 about the 26th of May, recrossed to the north side of the 
 North Anna River, and made another detour to the east. 
 General Lee moved upon a parallel line. If his army had 
 been of even reasonable proportions in comparison with that 
 of his adversary, his movement would have been of another 
 character, and one of the two wings of the Federal army 
 would have been assailed while on the south side of the 
 river. 
 
134: FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 On the 30th of May General Lee was in line of battle, 
 with his left at Atlee s Station. 
 
 CAMP AT ATLEE S STATION, early Morning, May 30, 1864. 
 
 .... We are confronting General Grant, and only waiting 
 to have him located to have his position well developed 
 before this army is let loose at its old opponent. On yesterday 
 afternoon the enemy appeared to be advancing toward us, and 
 this morning I confidently expected to hear the firing of small- 
 arms before this hour. . . . We have now had three weeks of 
 constant fighting, marching, and watching. . . . 
 
 The general has been somewhat indisposed, and could at 
 tend to nothing except what was absolutely necessary for him 
 to know and act upon. . . . He is now improving. 
 
 The indisposition of General Lee here alluded to was 
 more serious than was generally supposed. Those near him 
 were very apprehensive lest he should be compelled to give 
 up. To quote the words of one of his greatest admirers and 
 most trusted friends, Lieutenant-General Early : 
 
 One of his three corps commanders had been disabled by 
 wounds at the Wilderness, and another was too sick to com 
 mand his corps, while he himself was suffering from a most an 
 noying and weakening disease. In fact, nothing but his own 
 determined will enabled him to keep the field at all ; and it was 
 there rendered more manifest than ever that he was the head 
 and front, the very life and soul of his army. 
 
 After feeling the Confederate position, attack was de 
 clined by the enemy. By another gyratory movement of the 
 kind so persistently pursued by General Grant in this cam 
 paign, the two armies again gravitated east, and were soon 
 (June 3d) face to face on the historic field of Cold Harbor. 
 Here, gallant but fruitless efforts were made by General 
 Grant to pierce or drive back the army under General Lee. 
 The Confederates were protected by temporary earthworks, 
 and while under cover of these were gallantly assailed by 
 
COLD HARBOR. 135 
 
 the Federals. But in vain : the assault was repulsed along 
 the whole line, and the carnage on the Federal side was 
 frightful. I well recall having received a report after the 
 assault from General Hoke whose division reached the army 
 just previous to this battle to the effect that the ground in 
 his entire front, over which the enemy had charged, was 
 literally covered with their dead and wounded ; and that up 
 to that time he had not had a single man killed. ISTo won 
 der that, when the command was given to renew the assault, 
 the Federal soldiers sullenly and silently declined to advance. 1 
 After some disingenuous proposals, General Grant finally 
 asked a truce to enable him to bury his dead. Soon after 
 this he abandoned his chosen line of operations, and moved 
 his army to the south side of James Kiver. The struggle 
 from the Wilderness to this point covered a period of over 
 one month ; during which time there had been an almost 
 daily encounter of hostile arms, and the Army of Northern 
 Virginia had placed hors de combat of the army under Gen 
 eral Grant a number equal to its entire numerical strength at 
 the commencement of the campaign, and, notwithstanding its 
 own heavy losses and the reinforcements received by the 
 enemy, still presented an impregnable front to its opponent, 
 and constituted an insuperable barrier to General Grant s 
 " On to Eichmond ! " 
 
 After an unsuccessful effort to surprise and capture 
 Petersburg which was prevented by the skill of Generals 
 Beauregard and Wise, and the bravery of the troops, consist 
 ing in part of militia and home-guards and a futile endeav 
 or to seize the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad, General 
 Grant concentrated his army south of the Appomattox River. 
 General Lee, whom he had not been able to defeat in the 
 
 1 " The order was issued through these officers to their subordinate command 
 ers, and from them descended through the wonted channels ; but no man stirred, 
 and the immobile lines pronounced a verdict, silent, yet emphatic, against fur 
 ther slaughter. The loss on the Union side in this sanguinary action was over 
 thirteen thousand, while on the part of the Confederates it is doubtful whether 
 it reached that many hundreds." (Swinton, " Army of the Potomac," p. 487.) 
 
136 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 open field, was still in his way, and the siege of Petersburg 
 was begun. 
 
 General Lee was compelled about this time to detach 
 General Early, with the Second Corps, to check the advance 
 of the Federal force under General Hunter that was moving 
 up the Yalley, laying waste as it advanced and threatening 
 our communications with the interior via Lynchburg. It 
 will be well understood that he could not spare any portion 
 of his army, already greatly inferior in numerical strength 
 to its opponent, but no other troops were available. 
 
 It has been seen that, at the commencement of this ex 
 traordinary campaign, the effective strength of the army un 
 der General Lee was sixty-four thousand men, and that 
 under General Grant one hundred and forty-one thousand 
 one hundred and sixty men. The only reinforcements re 
 ceived by General Lee were as follows : Near Hanover Junc 
 tion he was joined by a small force under General Breckin- 
 ridge, from Southwestern Yirginia, twenty-two hundred 
 strong, and Pickett s division of Longstreet s (First) corps, 
 which had been on detached service in North Carolina ; 
 Hoke s brigade of Early s division, twelve hundred strong, 
 which had been on detached duty at the Junction, here also 
 rejoined its division ; and at Cold Harbor General Lee re 
 ceived the division of General Hoke, also just from North 
 Carolina the two divisions (Pickett s and Hoke s) number 
 ing eleven thousand men. 1 The aggregate of these reinforce 
 ments (fourteen thousand four hundred men) added to Gen 
 eral Lee s original strength would give seventy-eight thou- 
 
 1 The " Monthly Return of General Lee s Army," of the 30th of June, 1864, 
 shows that at that date Pickett s division numbered four thousand eight hun 
 dred and eighty-four, and Hoke s division five thousand two hundred and eighty- 
 six, making together ten thousand one hundred and seventy effective. Hoke 
 was engaged at Cold Harbor, but suffered little loss ; Pickett lost a few hundred 
 men in his assault on the enemy s lines between the James and Appomattox 
 Rivers on the 16th of June. The joint loss of the two divisions did not ex 
 ceed eight hundred men between the time they joined General Lee and the date 
 of the return quoted. 
 
COLD HARBOR. 137 
 
 sand four hundred as the aggregate of all troops engaged 
 under him from the "Wilderness to Cold Harbor. 
 
 When at Spottsylvania Court-House General Grant was 
 reenforced from Washington, but I can only conjecture to 
 what extent. The Secretary of "War states that " the chief 
 part of the force designed to guard the Middle Department 
 and the Department of Washington was called forward to 
 the front" 1 at this time. The same authority puts the effec 
 tive strength of these two departments on the 1st of May at 
 forty-seven thousand seven hundred and fifty-one men, 2 of 
 which the chief part let us say, thirty-five thousand was 
 sent to the aid of General Grant. At Cold Harbor he was 
 joined by General W. F. Smith with four divisions, taken 
 from the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, numbering sixteen 
 thousand men. 3 Adding these reinforcements to General 
 Grant s original strength, we have one hundred and ninety- 
 two thousand one hundred and sixty men as the aggregate 
 of the troops employed by him in his operations from the 
 Rapidan to the James. 
 
 The Federal loss in the battles of the Wilderness, Spott 
 sylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, is put at " above 
 sixty thousand men " by Mr. Swinton in his history of the 
 " Army of the Potomac." 
 
 1 " Report of the Secretary of War, First Session, Thirty-ninth Congress," 
 vol. i., 1865- 66, p. 7. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 5, 6. 
 
 3 Swinton, " Army of the Potomac," p. 482. 
 
CHAPTEE XI. 
 
 Siege of Petersburg. General Lee s Views as to the Kemoval of General John 
 ston from the Command of the Army of Tennessee. Movements of Sher 
 man s Army. Inevitable Result of the Persistent Effort to hold Petersburg 
 and Richmond. 
 
 HAVING failed to obtain possession of Petersburg by sur 
 prise, and General Lee being now well established in his line 
 of defense, General Grant determined upon the method of 
 slow approaches, and proceeded to invest the city and its 
 brave defenders by a line of earthworks and mines. While 
 with his constantly-increasing numbers General Grant under 
 took to tighten the ligature thus applied to the carotid artery 
 of the Confederacy, General Sherman was sent upon his des 
 olating expedition through the States of Georgia and South 
 Carolina to add the policy of starvation to that of attrition 
 inaugurated a few months previous. After this manner it 
 was proposed to exhaust and wear out the people who could 
 not be beaten in a trial of arms. It is beyond the scope of 
 my undertaking to record, in detail, the events and incidents 
 of that ten months siege. Reduced in numbers as was the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, and limited as it was in sup 
 plies of all kinds, it nevertheless dealt many vigorous and 
 destructive blows to its adversary, and contributed much to 
 its already imperishable renown. I note as especially wor 
 thy of mention the recapture of our lines, after the explo 
 sion of the Federal mine at the " Crater," by the troops un 
 der General Mahone, and the many brilliant sorties made 
 under the direction of that gallant soldier upon the Federal 
 
SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 139 
 
 left near the Weldon road; the very successful attack on 
 Hancock, at Reams s Station, by Heth s division and a por 
 tion of Wilcox s, on the 25th of August, under the direction 
 of General A. P. Hill ; as also the bold and successful ex 
 ploits of our cavalry under General Hampton; the final 
 charge made upon the Federal lines by General Gordon s 
 troops, on the 25th of March ; and, last but not least, the 
 heroic defense of Fort Gregg, on the 2d of April, by a 
 mixed command of infantry and dismounted artillery- 
 drivers armed with muskets. 
 
 In chronological order it is well here to mention a mat 
 ter about which there has been some misapprehension in the 
 public mind. Reference is made to the part taken by Gen 
 eral Lee in the removal of General Johnston from the com 
 mand of the Army of Tennessee. In the early part of July 
 a telegram was received by General Lee from the President, 
 stating that a heavy pressure was being brought to bear 
 upon him for the removal of General Johnston, asking his 
 views in regard to it, and what he thought of the appoint 
 ment of General Hood to the command of that army. The 
 reply of General Lee was, in substance, that, while he re 
 garded General Hood as a most capable and deserving offi 
 cer, he could not recommend the change proposed ; and that, 
 in his judgment, it would be unwise, under the circumstances 
 then existing, to make any change in commanders. The 
 telegraphic communication between the President and Gen 
 eral Lee was conducted in cipher in all matters of impor 
 tance. The duty of interpreting these dispatches and put 
 ting them into cipher devolved upon me, and their contents 
 were more positively and permanently impressed upon my 
 memory than would have been the case in the mere reading 
 or copying of an ordinary message. 
 
 Conscious that it would be unbecoming on my part to 
 express any opinion concerning the order of the President 
 directing the change alluded to, I touch upon this delicate 
 matter only as it concerns General Lee, and not with the de- 
 
140 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 sire of adding a feather s weight to the arguments for or 
 against the wisdom or propriety of the order relieving Gen 
 eral Johnston of command, save that which my former com 
 rades in arms will attach to the opinion of General Lee. 
 
 Reverting to the notes from which I have previously 
 quoted, I append additional extracts, whose only value, if 
 any they have, is derived from the fact that they were writ 
 ten by one who was brought into daily and intimate relations 
 with General Lee, and whose position made him thoroughly 
 informed as to all matters of routine in the Army of North 
 ern Virginia ; and, therefore, their tone may be regarded as 
 in some measure indicative of the spirit and temper of that 
 army ; and the intimations of contemplated changes or prob 
 able movements therein made, as the reflex of the views and 
 opinions of General Lee as to what was regarded as expedi 
 ent or probable : 
 
 NEAR PETERSBURG, V A., August 28, 1864. 
 
 We have had some irregular but quite severe fighting dur 
 ing the past two weeks, and in summing up the result there is 
 a decided balance in our favor. Still, the enemy retains pos 
 session of the Weldon Railroad. To do this, however, has cost 
 General Grant about twelve thousand men. 
 
 NORTH SIDE JAMES RIVER, October 27, 1864. 
 
 There are indications of a general movement. The enemy 
 is in motion at all points. We may have to move any moment. 
 General Hill, at Petersburg, reports the enemy making a general 
 advance on his right. General Longstreet here reports a dem 
 onstration along his entire line, and there is some activity on 
 the river and between the James and Appomattox. The gen 
 eral has gone to the lines alone. 
 
 NORTH SIDE, November 1, 1864. 
 
 The general informed me last night that he wished to go to 
 Petersburg, and, as he would probably remain a week or more, 
 it would be necessary to take everything along with us. He 
 has gone ahead, and will take a ride by Pickett s line. 
 
SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 141 
 
 PETERSBURG, VA., November 7, 1864. 
 
 On leaving the north side the general left it to me to select 
 an abiding-place for our party here. I, of course, selected a 
 place where I thought he would be comfortable, although I 
 firmly believe he concluded that I was thinking more of myself 
 than of him. I took possession of a vacant house and had his 
 room prepared, with a cheerful fire, and everything made as 
 cozy as possible. It was entirely too pleasant for him, for he is 
 never so uncomfortable as when comfortable. A day or two 
 after our arrival he informed me that he desired to visit the cav 
 alry-lines, and thought it best to move our camp down. So we 
 packed up bag and baggage books and records and moved to 
 a point about eight miles distant, pitched our tents, and con 
 cluded that we were fixed for some days at least. The next 
 morning, however, the general concluded that we had better re 
 turn. So back I came to Petersburg, and as I could find no 
 better place nor a worse one that was suitable I returned to 
 the house we had vacated, where we are now comfortably estab 
 lished. This is the first time we have been quartered in a house. 
 
 NEAR PETERSBURG, VA., November 27, 1864. 
 
 While General Lee was in Richmond, I concluded to move 
 headquarters, as a party that proposed to occupy the house as 
 soon as we should vacate had given a gentle hint by sending to 
 inquire " when General Lee would leave the house." The only 
 other house available was one two miles from the city, kindly 
 offered by the owner, Mr. Turnbull. So here we are at " Edge 
 Hill." I am finely fixed in the parlor with piano, sofas, rock 
 ing-chairs, and pictures ; capital surroundings for a winter cam 
 paign. After locating the general and my associates of the 
 staff, I concluded that I would have to occupy one of the miser 
 able little back-rooms, but the gentleman of the house sug 
 gested that I should take the parlor. I think that the general 
 was pleased with his room, and on entering mine he remarked: 
 " Ah ! you are finely fixed. Couldn t you find any other room ? " 
 " No," I replied, " but this will do. I can make myself tolerably 
 comfortable here." He was struck dumb with amazement at 
 my impudence, and soon vanished. 
 
142 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 EDGE HILL, December 4, 1864. 
 
 Since the affair at Stony Creek we have had perfect quiet on 
 our lines. The Sixth Corps, which has been with Sheridan in 
 General Early s front, has started for City Point so we are in 
 formed by telegraph. General Gracie, who showed such tact in 
 getting General Lee to descend from a dangerous position, was 
 killed near the lines a day or so ago. He was an excellent 
 officer, had passed through many hard-fought battles, escaped 
 numberless dangers, and was finally killed while quietly viewing 
 the enemy from a point where no one dreamed of danger. I 
 have just received a telegram from General Ewell reporting 
 great commotion on the part of the enemy in his front this 
 evening. Movements tend to Fort Harrison. 
 
 EDGE HILL, December 12, 1864. 
 
 "We have had much excitement during the past week; nor 
 has the end yet come. Couriers were arriving during the whole 
 of last night and what a bitter cold night it was ! So far the 
 enemy have accomplished but little. The whole movement 
 seems to have been a grand raid on the Weldon Railroad, and, 
 although the bridge was saved by the valor of our troops, the 
 enemy succeeded in destroying about ten miles of the road. 
 There were other movements along the lines, but in results they 
 were trifling. Last night another advance was reported, but it 
 was probably only reinforcements going to the rescue of the 
 first column. 
 
 EDGE HILL, December 18, 1864. 
 
 We have had comparative quiet since the recent affair on 
 the Weldon road. It is difficult to anticipate events now, but 
 it appears more probable that the vicinity of "Wilmington^ 
 North Carolina, will be the scene of the next engagement than 
 either Petersburg or Richmond. 
 
 EDGE HILL, February 5, 1865. 
 
 Instead of a quiet Sunday, we have had one of considerable 
 excitement: the indications are that General Grant is once more 
 moving on us. It is not positively known whether or not he 
 has been reenforced by General Thomas, but, all things consid- 
 
SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 143 
 
 ered, it is better that we should fight now than later. The 
 present movement is probably a raid upon our railroads the 
 South Side and the Richmond & Danville. We are sanguine, 
 and never expect anything but success; but the approaching 
 spring campaign will be a trying one. Sherman may occasion 
 us a great deal of trouble, and it may be necessary to make 
 very important changes in the campaign, and for this army 
 to change its position. 
 
 EDGE HILL, February 6, 1865. 
 
 After all, yesterday s excitement resulted in but little. The 
 enemy have not gone after our railroads, having been checked 
 at Dinwiddie Court-House. They have extended their lines 
 somewhat, but as yet show no disposition to attack in force. 
 Richmond is doubtless much excited over the return of the Peace 
 Commission and the result of its mission. Our people now 
 know what they have to expect. 
 
 EDGE HILL, February 20, 1865. 
 
 Truly matters are becoming serious and exciting. If some 
 body doesn t arrest Sherman s march, where will he stop ? They 
 are trying to corner this old army, but like a brave lion brought 
 to bay at last it is determined to resist to the death, and if die 
 it must to die game. We are to have some hard knocks, we are 
 to experience much that is dispiriting, but if our men are true 
 (and I really believe that most of them are) we will make our 
 way successfully through the dark clouds that now surround 
 us. Our people must make up their minds to see Richmond go, 
 but must not lose spirit, must not give up. The general left 
 but a few moments ago. My orders are to be in marching 
 order, to lose no time, to begin my preparations to-morrow. 
 These instructions apply to army headquarters only. The army 
 will retain its position still a time longer, but the general-in- 
 chief may soon bid it a temporary adieu and repair to another 
 scene of excitement. 
 
 EDGE HILL, February 24, 1865. 
 
 Now that General Johnston has been, placed in command of 
 his old army by General Lee, it is not probable that the latter 
 will go to South Carolina at any rate not immediately. . . . 
 It is not to be denied that our condition at this time is a criti- 
 
144 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 cal one; but, although it is a crisis in our affairs, it is the same 
 with the enemy. Suppose we were to concentrate on Sherman 
 and crush him, would not the aspect of affairs be entirely 
 changed ? Well, that is not beyond the range of possibility. 
 Much depends on the check given to Sherman s career. Rich 
 mond may be lost to us and Sherman may be overwhelmed. 
 The defeat of Sherman would restore Richmond. To be rid of 
 him would more than compensate for such temporary sacrifice. 
 The rumors in Richmond are great exaggerations of facts. 
 Some of our weaker men have deserted their colors, but the de 
 sertion is not so great as reported. We are getting something 
 to eat, and most of our brave fellows are in good heart, although 
 grieved to hear of despondency behind them. All at home 
 should send words of cheer and encouragement to the army. 
 
 EDGE HILL, March 5, 1865. 
 
 I do not, cannot, yet despair; but it is evident that there 
 has been a rapid, radical change in the tone of public sentiment, 
 in which some of our officials participate. Some high in au 
 thority tell us that the people are tired, that they are not sup 
 ported by the people, and that public sentiment has undergone 
 a change. Claiming to be prompted by a desire to prevent the 
 further effusion of blood, these talk of terms and reconstruc 
 tion. I do not think our military situation hopeless by any 
 means; but I confess matters are far worse than I ever ex 
 pected to see them. 
 
 EDGE HILL, Marcli 23, 1865. 
 
 The dread contingency of which some intimation has been 
 given is near at hand. No one can say what the next iveeTc may 
 bring forth, although the calamity may be deferred a while 
 longer. Now is the hour when we must show of what stuff we 
 are made. It would be worse than useless to indulge in repin- 
 ings and regrets, which could only impair our efficiency and 
 tend to dishearten those who look to us for protection. 
 
 EDGE HILL, March 27, 18C5. 
 
 Matters have not improved since the 23d; there is no cause 
 for hope now which did not exist then. The probable contin- 
 
SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 145 
 
 gency is a foregone conclusion. There appears to be an unac 
 countable apathy and listlessness in high places. It would be 
 better to face the misfortune bravely, and prepare for it in an 
 ticipation. There seems to be no preparation for the removal 
 of the several departments of the government; when the press 
 ure is upon us it may be impracticable. I say nothing of our 
 fight; it was gallantly done, as far as it went. [Allusion is here 
 made to the attack made on the Federal lines by a portion of 
 Gordon s command.] 
 
 It is a very simple matter to trace, through the dates 
 here given, the steady progress toward the inevitable doom 
 which, sooner or later, awaited the Confederates in their 
 inflexible purpose to hold the city of Richmond. 
 
 General Lee was opposed to that policy winch desig 
 nated certain points as indispensable to be held, except so 
 far and so long as they possessed strategic value to the ar 
 mies operating in the field. He maintained that the deter 
 mination to retain possession of such, under all circumstances 
 and at any cost, caused a fallacious value to attach to suc 
 cess in such endeavor, and, in event of failure, entailed a 
 moral loss on us, and assured an elation to the enemy alto 
 gether disproportionate to the material benefit to be derived 
 from continued possession ; not that he would not have 
 made an earnest effort to save such points as Yicksburg 
 and Richmond from falling into the hands of the enemy 
 especially the latter, which had a real value, strategical 
 ly considered ; but when it came to a siege, to settle down 
 behind intrenchments and permit the gradual and complete 
 circumvallation of the place besieged, by an adversary with 
 unlimited resources of men and material, he preferred to 
 move out, to manoeuvre, to concentrate, and to fight. 
 
 His policy at Petersburg would have been to unite 
 the greater portion of his army before it wasted away 
 from incessant battle and from desertion 1 with that under 
 
 1 A few words in regard to this desertion : The condition of affairs through- 
 10 
 
146 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 General Johnston, and to fall upon General Sherman with 
 the hope of destroying him, and then, with the united 
 armies, to return to confront General Grant. Having the 
 interior line, he could move to accomplish such purpose 
 much more quickly than his adversary could to thwart it. 
 Such a policy involved the giving up of Richmond, it is 
 true ; but that which was pursued involved the same thing 
 w r ith a certainty more absolute, and left Sherman to over 
 whelm Johnston, and at the same time to destroy the gran 
 aries of the Confederacy, from which Lee s army was sup 
 plied. 
 
 In my opinion, as a general rule, the Administration was 
 in perfect accord with General Lee in all his designs, and 
 gave a hearty cooperation in all his movements ; but I think 
 the exception was furnished in the persistent effort to hold 
 Richmond and Petersburg, after it became evident that it 
 could be but a question of time, and would probably involve 
 the complete exhaustion of the principal army of the Con 
 federacy. 
 
 If it shall be the verdict of posterity that General Lee 
 in any respect fell short of perfection as a military leader, it 
 may perhaps be claimed : first, that he was too careful of 
 the personal feelings of his subordinate commanders, too 
 fearful of wounding their pride, and too solicitous for their 
 reputation. Probably it was this that caused him sometimes 
 to continue in command those of whose fitness for their 
 position he was not convinced, and often led him, either 
 avowedly or tacitly, to assume responsibility for mishaps 
 
 out the South at that period was truly deplorable. Hundreds of letters ad 
 dressed to soldiers were intercepted and sent to army headquarters, in which 
 mothers, wives, and sisters, told of their inability to respond to the appeals of 
 hungry children for bread, or to provide proper care and remedies for the 
 sick ; and, in the name of all that was dear, appealed to the men to come 
 home and rescue them from the ills which they suffered and the starvation 
 which threatened them. Surely never was devotion to one s country and to 
 one s duty more sorely tested than was the case with the soldiers of Lee s 
 army during the last year of the war. 
 
SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 147 
 
 clearly attributable to the inefficiency, neglect, or careless 
 ness, of others. I have heard him express the wish that 
 General A had the command of a certain division instead 
 of Genera] B, when General A was a brigadier in Major- 
 General B s division, and a recommendation from the 
 general to the department would doubtless have procured 
 the change. The world already knows how prone he was 
 at all times to take upon his own shoulders the respon 
 sibility for failure or mishap, and thus shield those from 
 censure who had really failed to execute his orders or 
 designs. 
 
 In the next place it may be said that he was too law- 
 abiding, too subordinate to his superiors in civil authority 
 those who managed the governmental machinery. Brought 
 up in the school of the soldier he had early imbibed the 
 idea that discipline was essential in the military life, and 
 that subordination was the key-stone of discipline. Obedi 
 ence to orders w T as, in his judgment, the cardinal principle 
 with all good soldiers of every grade. As a rule, no one 
 can deny the correctness of this view ; but those were ex 
 traordinary times, and, in some matters, ordinary rules were 
 extraordinary evils. General Lee should have been supreme 
 in all matters touching the movements and discipline of his 
 army, whereas, under the law and the regulations of the 
 Department of War made in conformity thereto, he had not 
 even the power to confer promotion on the field of battle, 
 and thus to recognize and reward meritorious conduct ; and 
 in matters concerning the movements of his army he was of 
 course under authority, and more or less controlled by politi 
 cal considerations. Perhaps it could not be otherwise under 
 our peculiar form of government, but it would never be pos 
 sible to get the full measure of a man s capacity for military 
 affairs w r ho was thus trammeled. 
 
 A month or two before the close of the war the scope 
 of General Lee s authority was enlarged, and he was made 
 general-in-chief of all the armies of the Confederacy ; but 
 
148 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 the end was then near at hand, and the affairs of the South 
 hopeless. 
 
 The traits of character alluded to, excessive generosity 
 and perfect subordination, while they adorned the life of 
 General Lee, are not compatible with the generally accepted 
 notions of perfection in a revolutionary leader. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Evacuation of Petersburg. General Lee s Retreat up James River. Appo- 
 mattox. Surrender. General Lee goes to Richmond. 
 
 ON the first day of April General Grant directed a heavy 
 movement against the Confederate right near Five Forks ; 
 this necessitated the concentration of every available man at 
 that point to resist the Federal advance, and a consequent 
 stretching out of our line, already so sadly attenuated that 
 at some places it consisted of but one man to every seven 
 yards nothing more than a skirmish-line. It was without 
 serious resistance, therefore, that on the 2d of April the 
 Federals obtained possession of a portion of the lines be 
 tween Hatcher s Run and the city. Indeed, we had so few 
 men to contest the matter with them that they were within 
 our lines before it was reported to General Lee or General 
 Hill. From the point occupied by these officers, detached 
 squads of men were observed advancing toward us in the 
 plateau beyond ; it was impossible to say whether they were 
 our men or the enemy; and it was for the purpose of solv 
 ing this doubt and ascertaining the actual condition of affairs 
 in that locality, that General A. P. Hill rode toward these 
 detachments, by the fire from one of which he was shot dead 
 from his horse. 
 
 Under cover of a heavy fire of artillery the Federal army 
 now made a general advance. It was apparent that our 
 position could be no longer maintained. General Lee com 
 municated to the authorities at Richmond his intention of 
 
150 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 evacuating his lines that night, for which emergency they 
 should have been prepared. 
 
 During the whole day he was engaged in issuing orders 
 and sending dispatches by couriers and by telegraph, in 
 preparation for this event. Early in the forenoon, while 
 the telegraph-operator was working his instrument at head 
 quarters, under the supervision of the staff-officer charged 
 with the duty of transmitting these orders, a shell came 
 crashing through the house, and the operator declared him 
 self unable longer to work his instrument. He was ordered 
 to detach it, and as the staff-officer and the operator emerged 
 from the house, they with difficulty escaped capture at the 
 hands of the Federal infantry, which just then advanced 
 upon and drove away the battery of artillery which had 
 been placed in position around the house to assist in delay 
 ing the advance of the enemy. The comfortable dwelling 
 of Mr. Turnbull, occupied by General Lee as his headquar 
 ters, and thus hastily evacuated by the rear-guard of his 
 military family, was soon enveloped in flames. It is to be 
 hoped that the fire was accidental ; by General Lee it was 
 then thought and feared to have been by design. One of 
 the many arguments always advanced by him why he should 
 not occupy a house was, that, in event of its falling into the 
 hands of the enemy, the very fact of its having been occu 
 pied by him might possibly cause its destruction ; and, as 
 before stated, it was only during the last year of the war, 
 when his health was somewhat impaired, that one of his 
 staff had the temerity, 011 the occasion of one of the gen 
 eral s visits to Richmond, to turn in his tent to the quarter 
 master s department, and move his effects into a house, 
 which he was thus almost compelled to occupy. 
 
 After a gallant resistance our forces were retired to the 
 second or inner line of defense around the city of Peters 
 burg, and there maintained their ground till nightfall. By 
 the dawn of day next morning the lines had been evacuated, 
 and the gallant but sadly-reduced Army of Northern Yir- 
 
GENERAL LEE S RETREAT. 151 
 
 ginia had made good way in its retreat westwardly toward 
 Amelia Court-House. The intention was to take the direc 
 tion of Danville, and turn to our advantage the good line 
 for resistance offered by the Dan and Staunton Rivers. 
 The activity of the Federal cavalry and the want of sup 
 plies compelled a different course, and the retreat was con 
 tinued up the South Side Railroad toward Lynchburg. 
 
 Despite the great numerical superiority of the Federals 
 and their immense resources, General Lee managed to check 
 their pursuit from time to time, and t o continue his retreat 
 for seven days, until, on the morning of the 9th of April, 
 our advance under General Gordon was confronted by the 
 enemy in the neighborhood of Appomattox Court-House. 
 The returns from the various commands made that morning 
 showed an aggregate of eight thousand muskets in line of 
 battle. 
 
 On the previous evening I became separated from Gen 
 eral Lee in the execution of his orders in regard to the park 
 ing of our trains in places of safety, and did not rejoin him 
 until the morning of the 9th. After making my report the 
 general said to me, 1 " Well, colonel, what are we to do ? " 
 
 In reply, a fear was expressed that it would be necessary 
 to abandon the trains, which had already occasioned us such 
 great embarrassment ; and the hope was indulged that, re 
 lieved of this burden, the army could make good its escape. 
 
 " Yes," said the general, " perhaps we could ; but I have 
 had a conference with these gentlemen around me, and they 
 agree that the time has come for capitulation." 
 
 "Well, sir," I said, "I can only speak for myself; to 
 me any other fate is preferable 
 
 " Such is my individual way of thinking," interrupted 
 the general. 
 
 1 General Lee frequently thus addressed those around him not that he at 
 tached any importance to or expected any aid from what might be said in re 
 ply ; but, in giving expression to that which occupied his own mind thinking 
 aloud, so to speak he at the same time drew from others such information as 
 they might possess, or such views as they might entertain. 
 
152 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 " But," I immediately added, " of course, general, it is 
 different with you. You have to think of these brave men 
 and decide not only for yourself, but for them." 
 
 " Yes," he replied ; " it would be useless and therefore 
 cruel to provoke the further effusion of blood, and I have 
 arranged to meet General Grant with a view to surrender, 
 and wish you to accompany me." 
 
 Shortly after this the general, accompanied by Colonel 
 Marshall and myself, started back in the direction from 
 which we had come, to meet General Grant as had been 
 arranged. 
 
 "We continued some distance without meeting any one 
 after passing our lines ; but finally came upon a staff-officer 
 sent by General Grant s order to say to General Lee that he 
 had been prevented from meeting him at that point, and to 
 request that he would meet him upon the other road. Gen 
 eral Lee then retraced his steps, and, proceeding toward 
 our front in the direction of Appomattox Court-House, dis 
 mounted at a convenient place to await General Grant s 
 communication. Very soon a Federal officer, accompanied 
 by one of General Gordon s staff, rode up to where General 
 Lee was seated in a small orchard on the road-side. This 
 proved to be General Forsythe, of General Sheridan s staff, 
 who was sent by General Sheridan to say that, as he had 
 doubt as to his authority to recognize the informal truce 
 which had been agreed upon between General Gordon and 
 himself, he desired to communicate with General Meade on 
 the subject, and wished permission to pass through our lines 
 as the shortest route. I was assigned to the duty of escort 
 ing General Forsythe through our lines and back. This 
 was scarcely accomplished, when General Babcock rode up 
 and announced to General Lee that General Grant was pre 
 pared to meet him at the front. 
 
 I shrank from this interview, and while I could not then, 
 and cannot now, justify my conduct, I availed myself of the 
 excuse of having taken the two rides through the extent of 
 
SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX. 153 
 
 our lines and to those of the enemy, already mentioned, and 
 did not accompany my chief in this trying ordeal. 
 
 The scene witnessed upon the return of General Lee 
 was one certain to impress itself indelibly upon the memory ; 
 it can be vividly recalled now, after the lapse of many years, 
 but no description can do it justice. The men crowded 
 around him, eager to shake him by the hand ; eyes that had 
 been so often illumined with the fire of patriotism and true 
 courage, that had so often glared with defiance in the heat 
 and fury of battle, and so often kindled with enthusiasm 
 and pride in the hour of success, moistened now ; cheeks 
 bronzed by exposure in many campaigns, and withal be 
 grimed with powder and dust, now blanched from deep 
 emotion and suffered the silent tear ; tongues that had so 
 often carried dismay to the hearts of the enemy in that in 
 describable cheer which accompanied " the charge," or that 
 had so often made the air to resound with the psean of vic 
 tory, refused utterance now ; brave hearts failed that had 
 never quailed in the presence of an enemy ; but the firm 
 and silent pressure of the hand told most eloquently of souls 
 filled with admiration, love, and tender sympathy, for their 
 beloved chief. He essayed to thank them, but too full a 
 heart paralyzed his speech ; he soon sought a short respite 
 from these trying scenes and retired to his private quarters, 
 that he might, in solitude and quiet, commune with his own 
 brave heart and be still. Thus terminated the career of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia an army that was never van 
 quished ; but that, in obedience to the orders of its trusted 
 commander, who was himself yielding obedience to the dic 
 tates of a pure and lofty sense of duty to his men and 
 those dependent on them, laid down its arms, and furled the 
 standards never lowered in defeat. 
 
 The work of paroling the army was now proceeded with, 
 and was completed on the 10th of April. On the same day 
 General Meade called to pay his respects to General Lee. 
 The latter reported to his staff, after the visit, that the con- 
 
154 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 versation had naturally turned upon recent events, and that 
 General Meade had asked him how many men he had at 
 Petersburg at the time of General Grant s final assault. He 
 told him in reply that by the last returns he had thirty- 
 three thousand muskets. (In his recital of the matter he 
 appealed to me to know if his memory was correct, and was 
 answered in the affirmative.) General Meade then said, 
 " You mean that you had thirty-three thousand men in the 
 lines immediately around Petersburg ? " to which General 
 Lee replied " No," that he had but that number from his 
 left on the Chickahominy Eiver to his right at Dinwiddie 
 Court-House. At this General Meade expressed great sur 
 prise, and stated that he then had with him, in trie-one wing 
 of the Federal army which he commanded, over fifty thou 
 sand men. 
 
 The number of men and officers paroled, including the 
 stragglers who had caught up with the army, and all the 
 extra-duty or detailed men of every description, was in round 
 numbers between twenty-six and twenty-seven thousand. 
 
 On his way to Richmond General Lee stopped for the 
 night near the residence of his brother, Mr. Carter Lee, of 
 Powhatan County ; and, although importuned by his brother 
 to pass the night under his roof, the general persisted in 
 pitching his tent by the side of the road, and going into 
 camp as usual. This continued self-denial can only be ex 
 plained upon the hypothesis that he desired to have his men 
 know that he shared their privations to the very last. 
 
 On the 12th day of April he returned to the city of 
 Richmond a paroled prisoner of war, but a monarch still in 
 the hearts of his countrymen, and an object of admiration in 
 the eyes of the civilized world. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 General Lee indicted by the Grand-Jury at Norfolk. His Advice to the Young 
 Men of Virginia. His Purpose to write a History of the Army of North 
 ern Virginia. His Desire to obtain Correct Information of the Strength 
 of that Army. 
 
 IN June of the same year a United States grand-jury in 
 Norfolk, Virginia, indicted Mr. Davis, General Lee, and 
 others, for treason, or something similar to it. I immedi 
 ately informed General Lee of the fact, and at the same time 
 expressed a regret that some of our young men were dis 
 couraged at not being able to obtain employment, and many 
 in consequence talked of migrating to other countries. He 
 replied as follows : 
 
 RICHMOND, VA., June 17, 1865. 
 
 MY DEAR COLONEL: I am very much obliged to you for 
 your letter of the 13th. I had heard of the indictment by the 
 grand-jury at Norfolk, and made up my mind to let the au 
 thorities take their course. I have no wish to avoid any trial 
 the Government may order, and cannot flee. I hope others may 
 be unmolested, and that you at least may be undisturbed. 
 
 I am sorrv to hear that our returned soldiers cannot obtain 
 employment. Tell them they must all set to work, and, if they 
 cannot do what they prefer, do what they can. Virginia wants 
 all their aid, all their support, and the presence of all her sons 
 to sustain and recuperate her. They must therefore put them 
 selves in a position to take part in her government, and not be 
 deterred by obstacles in their way. There is much to be done 
 which they only can do. . . . 
 
 Very truly yours, R. E. LEE, 
 
 Colonel W. II. TAYLOR. 
 
156 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 This letter utterly refutes the charge repeatedly made by 
 writers at the North that, after the cessation of hostilities, 
 General Lee held himself aloof in sullen silence, declining 
 to accept the situation. But two months had elapsed since 
 the surrender at Appomattox not a sufficient time for the 
 subsidence of the passion engendered by war and the heal 
 ing of the wounds occasioned by defeat ; the hearts of the 
 people of the South were yet filled with resentment and 
 bitter hatred toward their Northern adversaries and yet 
 he, their greatest captain, counseled a prompt and ready 
 acquiescence in the inevitable, urging his countrymen not 
 to be deterred by seeming obstacles from resuming their 
 citizenship with all its obligations that is, not to flinch 
 from a compliance with distasteful requirements, but to con 
 form to all legal enactments necessary to enable them to 
 resume the reins of the government of their State, and thus 
 save her from adventurous aliens, and consequent spoliation 
 and ruin. 
 
 Soon after this, General Lee conceived the idea of pre 
 paring the data for a complete history of the campaigns of 
 the Army of Northern Yirginia. Early in August I received 
 the following letter from him, which fully explains his pur 
 pose in this regard : 
 
 NEAR CARTERSVILLE, July 31, 1865. 
 
 MY DEAR COLONEL : I am desirous that the bravery and de 
 votion of the Army of Northern Virginia shall be correctly 
 transmitted to posterity. This is the only tribute that can now 
 be paid to the worth of its noble officers and soldiers ; and I am 
 anxious to collect the necessary data for the history of the 
 campaigns in Virginia, from the commencement of its organiza 
 tion to its final surrender. I am particularly anxious that its 
 actual strength in the different battles it has fought be correctly 
 stated. You know all its official returns, records, etc., from the 
 time of my connection with it, have been lost or destroyed. 
 
 As you prepared the tri-monthly returns for so long, and 
 tested their accuracy, I have thought its gradual changes may 
 
CONJECTURAL RETURNS OF FORCE, ETC. 157 
 
 have been impressed upon your memory, and that you might 
 state with some confidence its effective strength, at each of the 
 great battles it has fought, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery. 
 You may also have some memoranda within your reach that 
 would assist your memory. Please give me at least the benefit 
 of your recollection. . . . 
 
 Very truly yours, B. E. LEE. 
 
 Colonel WALTER H. TAYLOR. 
 
 Upon the receipt of this letter, I communicated with Mr. 
 Thomas "White, of Alexandria, Virginia, a detailed soldier and 
 most estimable gentleman, who occupied, during the period 
 of the whole war, the position of chief clerk in the office of 
 the adjutant-general of the Army of Northern Virginia, and 
 whose duty it was, under the supervision of the adjutant- 
 general, to compile the army field-returns from those of the 
 Several corps, and requested him to give his recollection of 
 our effective strength at the important periods of the war. 
 In response to this request, Mr. "White sent the following 
 statement of the effective strength, of the army at the several 
 dates given, according to liis recollection : 
 
 SEVEN DAYS BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND. 
 
 Effective infantry 73,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 3,000 
 
 Effective artillery 4,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms 80,000 
 
 CEDAR RUN, OR SLAUGHTER S MOUNTAIN. 
 
 Effective infantry 18,500 
 
 Effective cavalry 2,000 
 
 Effective artillery 1,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms 21,500 
 
 SECOND MANASSAS. 
 
 Effective infantry 38,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 5,000 
 
 Effective artillery 4,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms. . 47,000 
 
158 CONJECTURAL RETURNS OF FORCE 
 
 HARPER S FERRY. 
 
 Jackson 12,000 
 
 J. G. Walker 3,000 
 
 Infantry 15,000 
 
 CRAMPTON GAP. 
 
 McLaws 4,000 
 
 Anderson 4,000 
 
 Infantry 8,000 
 
 BOOXSBORO . 
 
 Longstreet 8,000 
 
 D. H. Hill 7,000 
 
 Infantry 15,000 
 
 SHARPSBURG. 
 
 Effective infantry 33,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 4,500 
 
 Effective artillery 4,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms 41,500 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 Effective infantry 50,500 
 
 Effective cavalry 4,000 
 
 Effective artillery 4,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms 58,500 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 Effective infantry 42,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 4,000 
 
 Effective artillery 3,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms 49,000 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 Effective infantry 55,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 7,000 
 
 Effective artillery 5,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms 67,000 
 
OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 159 
 
 BRISTOE STATION. 
 
 Effective infantry 32,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 6,000 
 
 Effective artillery 4,500 
 
 Total effective of all arms 42,500 
 
 MINE RUN. 
 
 Effective infantry 30,500 
 
 Effective cavalry 6,000 
 
 Effective artillery 4,500 
 
 Total effective of all arms 41,000 
 
 WILDERNESS. 
 
 Effective infantry 48,500 
 
 Effective cavalry. 8,000 
 
 Effective artillery 5,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms 01,500 
 
 SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE. 
 
 Effective infantry 41,500 
 
 Effective cavalry 7,000 
 
 Effective artillery 4,500 
 
 Total effective of all arms 53,000 
 
 COLD HARBOR. 
 
 Effective infantry 47 QOO 
 
 Effective cavalry 6,000 
 
 Effective artillery 4 500 
 
 Total effective of all arms 57,500 
 
 PETERSBURG, JUNE 21, 1864. 
 
 Effective infantry 36,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 4,000 
 
 Effective artillery 3,500 
 
 Total effective of all arms 43,500 
 
 PETERSBURG, OCTOBER 1, 1864. 
 
 Effective infantry 32,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 3,000 
 
 Effective artillery 3,500 
 
 Total effective of all arms 38,500 
 
160 CONJECTURAL RETURNS OF FORCE 
 
 PETERSBURG, JANUARY 1, 1865. 
 
 Effective infantry 38,500 
 
 Effective cavalry 2,500 
 
 Effective artillery 4,500 
 
 Total effective of all arms 45,500 
 
 PETERSBURG, APRIL 1, 1865. 
 
 Effective infantry 36,000 
 
 Effective cavalry 3,500 
 
 Effective artillery 4,000 
 
 Total effective of all arms 43,500 
 
 A duplicate of the statement of Mr. White was sent by 
 him to General Lee, who, on the 2d of November, 1865, 
 wrote as follows : 
 
 LEXINGTON, VA., November 2, 1865. 
 
 MY DEAK COLONEL : Your letter of August has remained a 
 long time unanswered. Since then, I have received from White, 
 to whom I had written, a statement of our effective strength at 
 the chief battles, which appeared to me larger at some points 
 than I thought. Marshall has also given me his recollection on 
 the subject, which does not entirely correspond with mine, 
 either. When I get yours, I shall have to make a just average. 
 
 I have made no progress as yet in writing, and very little in 
 collecting information. Every one, I suppose, is embarrassed 
 by loss of papers, and the necessary devotion to his business. 
 It is as much as I can do to answer applications of our dis 
 tressed soldiers and bereaved parents. Matters are working 
 much smoother, and time will cure all things. 
 
 Most truly yours, R. E. LEE. 
 
 Colonel WALTER II. TAYLOR. 
 
 The reader will observe that, with the statement of Mr. 
 White before him, General Lee s only criticism in regard 
 thereto was, that it represented our strength to have been 
 greater at certain periods than he thought it was. It is very 
 much to be regretted that the general did not prepare, over 
 
OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 161 
 
 his own signature, a statement of the effective strength of 
 his army at the most important epochs in its history. Such 
 a statement would have been accepted without question by 
 the world. In its absence, his letter commenting upon the 
 foregoing statement which fortunately has been preserved 
 assumes great historical value, for it establishes beyond 
 all cavil or doubt the extent of the disparity of numbers be 
 tween the two armies, should Mr. White s estimates be made 
 the standard of comparison. 
 
 11 
 
CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 The Strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, taken from the Original Re 
 turns now on File in the Archive-Office of the War Department, Washing 
 ton, D. C. 
 
 AFTEK the notes contained in the preceding chapter had 
 been prepared, and when I was about to address myself to 
 the task of reproducing the statement of the strength of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, made by me from memory, 
 soon after the war, in compliance with the request of Gen 
 eral Lee, I ascertained that some of the field and monthly 
 returns of that army were on file in the archives of the War 
 Department at Washington. 
 
 Inasmuch as several unsuccessful attempts had been made 
 to obtain permission to examine the Confederate papers there 
 on file, and recognizing the force of the objection of the offi 
 cials in charge to a general inspection of those documents, it 
 was with considerable misgiving, and indeed with but little 
 hope, that I caused application in my behalf to be made to 
 the authorities for permission to examine the army returns 
 alluded to ; relying solely upon the fact of my having super 
 vised the preparation of those returns for several years as an 
 argument in favor of havdng an exception made in my case. 
 
 Success crowned my effort, and I take this opportunity 
 of expressing my appreciation of the very kind and courteous 
 treatment I received at the hands of the officials of the War 
 Department, who extended to me every facility for the ac 
 complishment of my purpose ; and at the same time I take 
 pleasure in assuring my former comrades-in-arms of the evi 
 dent purpose of the Government authorities charged with 
 
OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, ETC. 163 
 
 the custody of these records to discard all sectional bias in 
 the prosecution of their labors, and to preserve faithfully and 
 impartially all documents which are now in their custody, or 
 which may be hereafter committed to their care, in order 
 that, so far as it is in their power, the truth, and nothing but 
 the truth, shall be preserved. Let us indulge the hope that 
 the day is not far distant when the American people, with 
 out distinction, will find pleasure in the contemplation of all 
 that was manly, all that w T as virtuous, all that was noble, all 
 that was praiseworthy, in the recent struggle between the 
 sections, whether developed on the side of the North or that 
 of the South ; and that the next generation will cherish, with 
 pardonable pride, the remembrance of the deeds of valor, 
 sacrifice, and noble daring, with which the history of that 
 war so richly abounds, wiiether the heroes thereof wore the 
 blue or the gray. 
 
 Let censure fall only where fanatics feigned to be patriots, 
 or men forgot their manhood, and, screened behind an al 
 leged military necessity, gave evidence of an evil heart in 
 deeds of malignant cruelty or w r anton destruction ; and let 
 merit be acknowledged and praise be bestowed wherever firm 
 devotion to principle and to duty found illustration in deeds 
 of valor and of sacrifice. 
 
 As soon as practicable I availed myself of the permission 
 accorded me, and proceeded to make an examination of the 
 army returns on file in the Department. The first paper that 
 was examined by me proved to be an informal return of the 
 strength of the army commanded by General Joseph E. 
 Johnston, which I at once recognized as having been on file 
 in General Lee s oifice, and the indorsement upon which was 
 in my own handwriting, except the date, w T hich was added 
 either by Mr. Davis or General Long, who was then private 
 secretary to General Lee, and read as follows : " Army near 
 Richmond, Department of Northern Yirginia, May 21, 
 1862." Within was the following statement of the strength of 
 the several commands of which that army was then composed : 
 
164 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 FIRST DIVISION MAJOR-GENERAL G. W. SMITH. 
 
 Whiting s brigade 2,398 
 
 Hood s brigade 1,922 
 
 W. H. Hampton s brigade 2,225 
 
 S. R. Hatton s brigade 2,030 
 
 Pettigrew s brigade 2,017 
 
 Total 10,592 
 
 SECOND DIVISION MAJOR-GENERAL LONGSTREET. 
 
 A. P. Hill s brigade 2,512 
 
 Pickett s brigade 2,460 
 
 R. H. Anderson s brigade 2,168 
 
 Wilcox s brigade 2,616 
 
 Colston s brigade 1,750 
 
 Pryor s brigade 2,310. 
 
 Total 13,816 
 
 THIRD DIVISION MAJOR-GENERAL MAGRUDER. 
 
 McLaws s brigade 2,084 
 
 Kershaw s brigade 2,567 
 
 Griffith s brigade 2,534 
 
 H. Cobb s brigade 3,796 
 
 Toombs s brigade 2,357 
 
 D. R. Jones s brigade 2,342 
 
 Reserve artillery Cabell 240 
 
 Total 15,920 
 
 FOURTH DIVISION MAJOR-GENERAL D. H. HILL. 
 
 Early s brigade 2,380 
 
 Rodes s brigade 3,040 
 
 Colonel Ward s command 890 
 
 Raines s brigade 1,830 
 
 Featherstone s brigade 2,224 
 
 Colonel Crump s command 787 
 
 Total 11,151 
 
 Cavalry brigade 1,289 
 
 Reserve artillery : 
 
 Pendleton s 611 
 
 Washington 309 
 
 Total. . 920 
 
 Total strength of all arms 53,688 
 
 I then examined carefully all the field and monthly re 
 turns of the " Department of Northern Virginia " on file in 
 the Archive-Office, and copied therefrom the following ex 
 tracts, which make an authoritative statement of the strength 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 165 
 
 of the army commanded by General Lee at the periods 
 named : 
 
 DATE OF RETURN, JULY 20, 1862. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AND NORTH 
 
 PRESENT i 
 
 roR DUTY. 
 
 CAROLINA. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Department of North Carolina. ... 
 
 722 
 
 11,509 
 
 
 657 
 
 7,929 
 
 D H Hill s division . . 
 
 650 
 
 8,998 
 
 
 614 
 
 7,188 
 
 A. P Hill s division 
 
 619 
 
 10,104 
 
 Anderson s division 
 
 357 
 
 5,760 
 
 D. R. Jones s division 
 
 213 
 
 3,500 
 
 Whiting s division 
 
 252 
 
 3,600 
 
 
 295 
 
 3,740 
 
 Pendleton s artillery 
 
 103 
 
 1,716 
 
 Rhett s artillery 
 
 78 
 
 1,355 
 
 
 
 
 Total, including Department of North Carolina. . 
 
 4,160 
 
 65,399 
 
 SEPTEMBER 22, 1862. 
 
 ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Lon ^street s command 
 
 1,410 
 
 19,001 
 
 Jackson s command : 
 D. H. Hill s division 
 
 310 
 
 4 739 
 
 
 318 
 
 4,435 
 
 Ewell s division 
 
 280 
 
 3 144 
 
 Jackson s division 
 
 183 
 
 2,367 
 
 
 
 
 Total . . 
 
 2.501 
 
 33,686 
 
 PRESENT FOE DUTY. 
 
 SEPTEMBER 30, 1862. 
 
 PRESENT FOB DUTY. 
 
 ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 
 1,927 
 
 26,489 
 
 Jackson s command . ... 
 
 1 699 
 
 21 728 
 
 Reserve artillery 
 
 50 
 
 716 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 3 676 
 
 48,933 
 
 
 
 
 No report of cavalry. 
 
1G6 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 OCTOBER 10, 1862. 
 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT FOK DUTY. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreet s command 2,022 27,934 
 
 Jackson s command 1,841 25,603 
 
 Cavalry 395 5,338 
 
 Reserve artillery 48 858 
 
 Total 4,306 59,733 
 
 NEAR WINCHESTER, OCTOBER 20, 1862. 
 
 PRESENT FOB DUTY. 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreet s command 2,241 29,748 
 
 Jackson s command 2,002 26,368 
 
 Cavalry 417 6,119 
 
 Reserve artillery 45 865 
 
 Total 4,705 63,100 
 
 CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, NOVEMBER 10, 1862. 
 
 PRESENT FOR DUTY. 
 
 AEMY OF NORTHERN VIEGINIA. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreet s command 2,308 29,522 
 
 Jackson s command 2,243 29,461 
 
 Cavalry.., 457 6,697 
 
 Reserve artillery No report. No report. 
 
 Total 5,008 65,680 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG, NOVEMBER 20, 1862. 
 
 PRESENT FOR DUTY. 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreet s command 2,325 29,288 
 
 Jackson s command 2,346 30,441 
 
 Cavalry..., 603 8,551 
 
 Reserve artillery No report. No report. 
 
 Total 5,274 68,280 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 167 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG, DECEMBER 10, 1862. 
 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PBESKNT i 
 
 <X>B DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreetfs command: 
 
 531 
 
 7 083 
 
 McLaws s division. . . . 
 
 559 
 
 7311 
 
 Pickett s division 
 
 675 
 
 6 860 
 
 Hood s division ... . 
 
 521 
 
 6 795 
 
 
 253 
 
 3 595 
 
 Alexander s artillery. . 
 
 24 
 
 402 
 
 Walton s artillery 
 
 13 
 
 184 
 
 
 
 
 Total under Longstreet 
 
 2 576 
 
 32 230 
 
 
 
 
 Jackson s command: 
 Jackson s division .... 
 
 463 
 
 4 526 
 
 D. H. Hill s division 
 
 588 
 
 8 327 
 
 Ewell s division 
 
 594 
 
 7 100 
 
 A. P. Hill s division 
 
 781 
 
 10 743 
 
 Brown s artillery 
 
 24 
 
 449 
 
 
 
 
 Total under Jackson 
 
 2450 
 
 31 145 
 
 
 
 
 Cavalrv 
 
 602 
 
 8 512 
 
 Reserve artillery 
 
 36 
 
 677 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 5 664 
 
 72 564 
 
 
 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG, DECEMBER 20, 1862. 
 
 PKESENT FOB DUTY. 
 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIBGINIA. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Lion cr street s command 
 
 2,620 
 
 31,670 
 
 Jackson s command . 
 
 2,353 
 
 29,046 
 
 Cavalry (report of December 10th used) 
 
 602 
 
 8,512 
 
 
 38 
 
 683 
 
 
 
 
 Total . 
 
 5,613 
 
 69,911 
 
 
 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG, DECEMBER 31, 1862. 
 
 Longstreet s command Total effective 30,060 
 
 Jackson s " " 27,608 
 
 Cavalry " 8,814 
 
 Artillery 4,490 
 
 Total effective of all arms. 
 
 70,972 
 
168 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG, JANUARY 31, 1863. 
 
 Longstreet s command Total effective , 
 
 Jackson s 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Valley District (General W. E. Jones) 
 
 .. , 28,696 
 
 29,698 
 
 7,125 
 
 2,874 
 
 3,833 
 
 Total effective, including troops in the Valley of Virginia 72,226 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG, FEBRUARY 28, 1863. 
 
 Anderson s and McLaws s divisions Total effective 14,540 
 
 Jackson s command 30,977 
 
 Cavalry 5,912 
 
 Artillery 3,552 
 
 Valley District 3,578 
 
 Total effective, including troops in the Valley of Virginia 58,559 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG, MARCH 31, 1863. 
 Anderson s and McLaws s divisions l Total effective. 
 Jackson s four divisions 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery in rear 
 Valley District 
 
 ... 15,649 
 
 ... 33,333 
 
 ... 6,509 
 
 ... 1,621 
 
 ... 3,186 
 
 Total effective, including troops in the Valley of Virginia 60,298 
 FREDERICKSBURG, MAY 20, 1863. 
 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 PEESENT i 
 
 -OR DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreefs command: 
 Anderson s division . . 
 
 553 
 
 6439 
 
 McLaw s division ... . .. 
 
 579 
 
 6,454 
 
 
 558 
 
 6,847 
 
 Hood s division . . 
 
 640 
 
 6,858 
 
 
 
 
 
 2,330 
 
 25,598 
 
 
 
 
 HiWs command: 
 
 722 
 
 7,986 
 
 Rodes s division . . 
 
 545 
 
 6,457 
 
 Early s division 
 
 496 
 
 5,925 
 
 Johnson s division 
 
 419 
 
 4,783 
 
 
 
 
 Total under Hill 
 
 2,182 
 
 25,151 
 
 
 
 
 
 482 
 
 6,524 
 
 Artillery (Dearing s battalion and two batteries not re 
 ported) 
 
 245 
 
 4,708 
 
 
 
 
 Total . 
 
 5 239 
 
 61,981 
 
 
 
 
 1 Pickett, Hood, and Eansom, detached. 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 169 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG, MAT 31, 1863. 
 
 Longstreet s command Total effective 26,583 
 
 A. P. Hill s 27,773 
 
 Cavalry " 9,536 
 
 Artillery 4,460 
 
 Total effective of all arms 68,352 
 
 BUNKER HILL, JULY 20, 1863. 
 
 PRESENT FOR DITTY. 
 AKMY OF NOETHEBN VIEGINIA. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreefs Corps : 
 McLaws s division ) 
 Pickett s division >- 
 
 1 186 
 
 11 731 
 
 Hood s division ) 
 Ewell s Corps : 
 Rodes s division ) 
 Early s division > 
 
 1,277 
 
 12,440 
 
 Johnson s division ) 
 HiWs Corps: 
 Anderson s division ) 
 Heth s division >- 
 
 961 
 
 8 930 
 
 Pender s division ) 
 Cavalry 
 
 No report 
 
 No report. 
 
 Artillery .... 
 
 274 
 
 4 589 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 3,698 
 
 37,690 
 
 CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, JULY 31, 
 
 Longstreet s corps Total effective 
 
 Ewell s corps 
 
 Hill s corps " 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 Cavalry corps 
 
 1863. 
 
 ... 12,823 
 . . . 12,369 
 ... 11,207 
 . . . 4,736 
 No report. 
 
 Total effective of all arms 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, AUGUST 10, 
 
 41,135 
 
 1863. 
 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreet s corps 
 
 1 279 
 
 13 559 
 
 Ewell s corps. ... ... 
 
 1,371 
 
 14,422 
 
 Hill s corps 
 
 1 115 
 
 12 398 
 
 Cavalry corps 
 
 595 
 
 8,404 
 
 
 277 
 
 4,880 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 4,637 
 
 53,663 
 
 PRESENT FOK DUTY. 
 
170 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, AUGUST 20, 1863. 
 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT FOE DUTY. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Longstreet s corps 1,242 13,323 
 
 Ewell s corps 1,369 14,900 
 
 Hill s corps 1,094 13,059 
 
 Cavalry corps 617 8,094 
 
 Artillery corps 290 4,906 
 
 Total 4,612 54,282 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, AUGUST 31, 1863. 
 
 Longstreet s corps Total effective 14,668 
 
 Ewell s corps " 15,428 
 
 Hill s corps 13,601 
 
 Cavalry corps (1,333 dismounted) 7,701 
 
 Artillery corps Total effective 4,929 
 
 Total effective of all arms 56,327 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, SEPTEMBER 10, 1863. 
 
 PRESENT FOR DUTY. 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Ewell s corps 1,274 15,804 
 
 Hill s corps 1,034 14,087 
 
 Cooke s brigade (unattached) 134 2,100 
 
 Artillery 147 3,226 
 
 Cavalry No report. No report. 
 
 Total 2,589 35,217 
 
 Longstreet s corps detached. 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, SEPTEMBER 20, 1863. 
 
 PRESENT FOR DUTY. 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Ewell s corps 1,391 16,235 
 
 Hill s corps 1,075 14,297 
 
 Cooke s brigade 135 2,045 
 
 Cavalry corps 560 7,547 
 
 Artillery corps 3,337 
 
 Total... .... 3,345 43,461 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN TJ. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 171 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, SEPTEMBER 30, 1863. 
 
 Ewell s corps Total effective 16,638 
 
 Hill s corps 15,073 
 
 Cooke s brigade 2,150 
 
 Cavalry corps 6,744 
 
 Artillery corps 3,762 
 
 Total effective of all arms 44,367 
 
 NEAR BRANDY STATION, OCTOBER 20, 1863. 
 
 PRESENT FOE DUTY. 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Ewell s corps 1,526 16,595 
 
 Hill s corps 1,328 16,069 
 
 Cavalry corps 505 6,867 
 
 Artillery corps 218 3,620 
 
 Total 3,577 43,151 
 
 Cooke s brigade attached to Heth s division. 
 
 BRANDY STATION, OCTOBER 31, 1863. 
 
 Ewell s corps Total effective 17,097 
 
 Hill s corps , 16,533 
 
 Cavalry corps 7,917 
 
 Artillery corps 4,067 
 
 Total effective of all arms 45,614 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, NOVEMBER 20, 1863. 
 
 PRESENT FOE DUTY. 
 AEMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Ewell s corps 1,321 1 5,649 
 
 Hill s corps 1,361 17,522 
 
 Cavalry corps. 495 7,139 
 
 Artillery corps 233 4,418 
 
 Total 3,410 44,728 
 
172 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, DECEMBER 10, 1863. 
 
 ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT 
 
 FOE DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 
 1,413 
 
 15447 
 
 Hill s corps . . 
 
 1415 
 
 17 872 
 
 
 552 
 
 7481 
 
 Artillery corps . . 
 
 244 
 
 4 371 
 
 
 18 
 
 811 
 
 
 9 
 
 114 
 
 
 
 
 Total . . 
 
 3 651 
 
 45 596 
 
 Add Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment just report- 
 
 
 500 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 3,651 
 
 46,096 
 
 
 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, DECEMBER 20, 1863. 
 
 ARMY OP NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PBESENT r 
 
 OE DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 E well s corps 
 
 1,413 
 
 15,735 
 
 
 1,187 
 
 15,543 
 
 Cavalry corps 
 
 551 
 
 7,530 
 
 Artillery corps . . 
 
 244 
 
 4,371 
 
 Headquarters battalion 
 
 8 
 
 106 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 3,403 
 
 43,285 
 
 
 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, DECEMBER 31, 1863. 
 
 Swell s corps Total effective 15,540 
 
 Hill s corps 15,468 
 
 Cavalry corps 7,550 
 
 Artillery corps 4,138 
 
 Total effective of all arms 42,696 
 
 Unattached commands, Yalley District, Maryland line, provost 
 
 guard, and headquarters battalion 862 
 
 Walker s brigade, Ileth s division, and Thomas s brigade, "Wilcox s division, detached. 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, JANUARY 10, 
 
 DEPARTMENT. 173 
 
 1864. 
 
 
 PRESENT i 
 
 OE DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 
 406 
 
 4714 
 
 Second Corps J John } Ws division . . 
 
 410 
 
 4 476 
 
 Lieutenant-General Ewell. | Rodes , g ^.^ """ 
 
 440 
 
 6 134 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,256 
 
 15,324 
 
 m A n ( Anderson s division.. . 
 
 412 
 
 5,957 
 
 i*J5iS25m 
 
 258 
 
 325 
 
 4,391 
 4 972 
 
 
 
 
 
 995 
 
 15,320 
 
 Cavalry Corps, j Hampton s division 
 
 273 
 
 3,931 
 
 Major -General Stuart. ( Fitz Lee s division 
 
 250 
 
 3,617 
 
 
 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 523 
 217 
 
 7,548 
 4,338 
 
 
 
 
 Total Army of Northern Virginia 
 
 2,991 
 
 42,530 
 
 Unattached commands, Maryland line, provost-guard, 
 and headquarters battalion 
 
 67 
 
 1,073 
 
 
 
 
 Total Department of Northern Virginia 
 
 3 058 
 
 43,603 
 
 Valley District not reported. 
 
 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, JANUARY 31, 1864. 
 
 Total Effective. 
 
 f Early s division. . . . 3,604 Hoke s brigade detatched. 
 Second Corps, I Johnson s division. . 4,156 
 
 Lt.-Gen. Ewell. ] -p , , r . . , n , ( 12th and 21st Ga., and 43d N. 
 
 < L Rodes s division . . . 5,042 -J a Regimentg n ^ reported . 
 
 12,802 
 
 mi . j PnrT ( Anderson s division 5,577 
 
 inira uorps j Heth , g diyision> ^ _ _ 4 ^ 2 ^alker s brigade detached. 
 
 ( Wilcox s division. . 4,896 Thomas s brigade detached. 
 
 14,745 
 
 fRosser s brigade, Lee s brigade, 
 Cavalry Corps, j Hampton s division, 2,198 J tfc ree regiments of Wickham s 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Stuart | Fitz Lee s 1,162 1 brigade, and two of Gordon s, 
 
 [ not reported. 
 3,360 
 
 g. f Artillery corps 3,842 
 
 1 1 I Maryland line 706 
 
 S | Provost-guard 281 
 
 [Q [_ Headquarters battalion 113 
 
 Total effective 35,849 
 
174 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, FEBRUARY 10, 1864. 
 
 ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PEESENT F 
 
 OK DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 ( Early s division 
 
 295 
 
 3 653 1 
 
 Second Corps \ j ^ , division 
 Lieutenant-General Ewell. | Rodcg , s divigion 
 
 364 
 392 
 
 4,140 
 5 129 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,051 
 
 12,922 
 
 ( Anderson s division 
 
 415 
 
 5 595 
 
 Third Corps J H j , division 
 
 267 
 
 4,411 3 
 
 Lieutenant-General Hill. | divigion 
 
 330 
 
 4,962 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,012 
 
 14,968 
 
 Cavalry corps 
 
 Not 
 
 reported. 
 
 
 139 
 
 2,588 
 
 
 46 
 
 706 
 
 Provost-guard 
 
 17 
 
 228 
 
 
 7 
 
 123 
 
 
 
 
 Total . . 
 
 2,272 
 
 31,535 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, MARCH 10, 1864. 
 
 ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PEESENT FOB DUTY. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Second Corps, 
 Lieutenant-General Ewell. 
 
 Third Corps, 
 Lieutenant-General Hill. 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 {Early s division. . 
 
 229 
 392 
 429 
 
 3,781 5 
 4,362 
 5,898 8 
 
 Johnson s division 
 Rodes s 
 
 ( Anderson s division 
 
 1,050 
 
 14,041 
 
 419 
 406 
 440 
 
 5,684 
 6,038 
 6,571 
 
 < Heth s division 
 
 ( Wilcox s division 
 
 
 1,265 
 
 18,293 
 
 Not 
 200 
 26 
 
 reported. 
 4,100 
 428 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 
 Provost-guard and headqi 
 Total 
 
 larters battalion 
 
 
 2,541 
 
 36,862 
 
 
 
 1 Iloke s brigade detached. 
 
 2 Twelfth and Twenty-first Georgia and Forty-third North Carolina Regiments detached. 
 
 3 Walker s brigade detached. * Thomas s brigade detached. 
 3 Hoke s brigade detached. 
 
 6 Twenty-first Georgia and Forty-third North Carolina Regiments detached. 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 175 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, MARCH 20, 1864. 
 
 DEPAETMENT OF 
 
 NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT FOR DUTY. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Second Corps, 
 Lieutenant-General Ewell 
 
 Third Corps, 
 Lieutenaut-General Hill. 
 
 ( Early s division 
 
 310 
 426 
 426 
 
 3,917 
 
 4,568 
 6,143 2 
 
 < Johnson s division 
 
 { Rodes s division 
 
 ( Anderson s division 
 
 1,162 
 
 14,628 
 
 452 
 419 
 474 
 
 5,831 
 6,245 
 6,793 
 
 < Ileth s division 
 
 ( Wilcox s division 
 
 
 1,345 
 
 18,869 
 
 292 
 207 
 
 4,478 3 
 4,066 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 
 Total Army of 
 
 Northern Virginia . . . 
 
 3,006 42,041 
 
 
 55 
 41 
 20 
 12 
 
 736 
 761 
 237 
 200 
 
 Maryland line 
 
 
 
 
 Headquarters battalion 
 
 
 Total Department of Northern Virginia. . . 
 
 3,134 
 
 43,975 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, APRIL 10, 1864. 
 
 DEPAETMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 
 ( Early s division 
 
 349 
 
 4,1 85 4 
 
 Second Corps, 
 
 \ Johnson s division 
 
 496 
 
 4 849 
 
 Lieutenant-General Ewell. 
 
 ( Rodes s division 
 
 502 
 
 6 603 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,347 
 
 15,637 
 
 
 ( Anderson s division 
 
 490 
 
 6,381 
 
 Third Corps, 
 
 < Ileth s division 
 
 460 
 
 6,507 
 
 Lieutenant - General Hill 
 
 ( Wilcox s division 
 
 515 
 
 7,311 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,465 
 
 20,199 
 
 PRESENT FOR DUTY. 
 
 1 Hoke s brigade detached. 
 
 2 Twenty-first Georgia and Forty-third North Carolina Eegiments detached. 
 
 3 Chambliss s and Lomax s brigades not reported. 
 
 4 Hoke s brigade detached. 
 
 5 Twenty-first Georgia and Forty-third North Carolina Regiments detached. 
 
176 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, APRIL 10, 1864 Continued. 
 
 
 PRESENT 
 
 FOB DUTY. 
 
 DEPAETMENT OF NOETHEEN VIRGINIA. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Cavalry Corps ( Hampton s division . . 
 
 180 
 
 2 667 
 
 Major- General Stuart. ( Fitz Lee s division 
 
 285 
 
 4 796 
 
 
 
 
 
 465 
 
 7,463 
 
 
 234 
 
 4486 
 
 
 
 
 Total Army of Northern Virginia 
 
 3 511 
 
 47,785 
 
 
 Not 
 
 reported. 
 
 Maryland line. . . . . .... 
 
 42 
 
 737 
 
 
 22 
 
 286 
 
 Headquarters battalion . . 
 
 12 
 
 223 
 
 
 
 
 Total Department of Northern Virginia. . . . 
 
 3,587 
 
 49,031 
 
 ORANGE COURT-HOUSE, APRIL 20, 1864. 
 
 DEPAETMENT OF NORTHERN YIEGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT FOB DUTY. 
 
 Officers. lEnlisted Men. 
 
 Second Corps, 
 Lieutenant-General Ewell. 
 
 Third Corps, 
 Lieutenant - General Hill. 
 
 Cavalry Corps, 
 Major- General Stuart. 
 
 {Early s division 
 
 356 
 506 
 512 
 
 4,182 
 4,894 
 6,629 
 
 Johnson s division 
 
 Rodes s division . . 
 
 ( Anderson s division 
 
 1,374 
 
 15,705 
 
 507 
 516 
 
 528 
 
 6,439 
 6,948 
 7,261 
 
 J Heth s division . . 
 
 ( Wilcox s division 
 
 j Hampton s division 
 
 1,551 
 
 20,648 
 
 286 
 279 
 
 2,931 
 5,001 
 
 1 Fitz Lee s division. . . 
 
 
 565 
 
 7,932 
 
 237 
 
 4,617 
 
 Total Army o 
 Valley District 
 
 
 3,727 
 Not 
 45 
 27 
 11 
 
 48,902 
 reported. 
 760 
 293 
 219 
 
 
 Maryland line 
 
 
 Provost-guard 
 
 
 Headquarters battalion of 
 Total Dcpartir 
 
 couriers . . 
 
 ent of Northern Virginia. . . . 
 
 3,810 
 
 50,174 
 
 Hoke s brigade, Early s division, and two regiments of Rodes s division, 
 detached. 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN TJ. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 177 
 
 PETERSBURG, JUNE 30, 1864. 
 
 TEOOPS UNDER GENERAL LEE. 
 
 PBESENT FOB DUTY. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 Depart. N. C. and So. Va., 
 General Beauregard. 
 
 First Corps, 
 Major -General Anderson. 
 
 Third Corps, 
 Lieutenant -General Hill. 
 
 Cavalry Corps, 
 Major -General Hampton. 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 j B. R. Johnson s division . . 
 1 Hoke s division 
 
 472 
 350 
 
 6,364 
 4,936 
 
 ( Pickett s division 
 
 822 
 
 11,300 
 
 348 
 413 
 
 337 
 
 4,536 
 4,344 
 
 4,180 
 
 -< Field s division 
 
 ( Kershaw s division 
 
 ( Anderson s division 
 
 1,098 
 
 13,060 
 
 411 
 440 
 351 
 
 4,880 
 5,159 
 4,289 
 
 < Heth s division 
 
 f "Wilcox s division 
 
 C Hampton s division 
 < Fitz Lee s division . ... 
 
 1,202 
 
 14,328 
 
 130 
 173 
 
 2,888 
 1,553 
 
 2,677 
 
 ( W. H. F. Lee s division. . . 
 
 303 
 
 7,118 
 
 257 
 
 5,263 
 
 Total.. . 
 
 
 3,682 
 
 51,069 
 
 Second Corps detached under General Early. Dearing s brigade of cavalry 
 not reported. Only three battalions of artillery of the Second Corps reported. 
 
 NEAR PETERSBURG, JULY 10, 1864. 
 
 TKOOPS UNDER GENERAL LEE. 
 
 PBESENT FOE DUTY. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Dept. N. C. and So. Va., 
 General Beauregard. 
 
 First Corps, 
 Major-General Anderson. 
 
 j B. R. Johnson s division. . 
 ") Hoke s division 
 
 487 6,391 
 346 4,678 
 
 ( Pickett s division 
 
 833 11,069 
 
 381 4,472 
 427 4,284 
 342 4,217 
 
 < Field s division 
 
 ( Kershaw s division 
 
 
 1,150 12,973 
 
 12 
 
178 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 NEAR PETERSBURG, JULY 10, 1864 Continued. 
 
 TEOOPS UNDEK GENERAL LEE. 
 
 PRESENT FOB DUTY. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 Third Corps, 
 Lieutenant-General Hill. 
 
 Cavalry Corps, 
 Major-General Hampton. 
 
 ( Anderson s division 
 
 468 5,567 
 447 5,276 
 373 4,410 
 
 < Heth s division 
 
 ( Wilcox s division 
 
 ( Hampton s division. 
 
 1,288 15,253 
 
 195 2,888 
 115 1,591 
 216 3,957 
 
 < Fitz Lee s division 
 
 ( W. H. F. Lee s division... . 
 
 526 8,436 
 
 276 5,293 
 
 Total 
 
 
 4,073 53,024 
 
 
 
 PETERSBURG, AUGUST 81, 1864. 
 
 Total Effective. 
 
 First Corps, 
 Anderson. 
 
 Second Corps. 
 Early. 
 
 Third Corps, 
 A. P. Hill. 
 
 Cavalry Corps 
 
 ( Pickett s division 4,544 
 
 j Field s division 3,944 
 
 r Kershaw s division 3,445 
 
 f Breckinridge s division 2,104 
 
 J Rodes s division 3,013 
 
 1 Gordon s division 2,544 
 
 ( Ramseur s division 1,909 
 
 fMahone s division 4,094 
 
 I Heth s division 4,075 
 
 1 Wilcox s division 4,054 
 
 l_ Fifth Alabama Battalion 151 
 
 f Hampton s division 2,769 
 
 J Fitz Lee s division Detached. 
 
 j W. H. F. Lee s division 2,575 
 
 ^ Bearing s brigade 1,395 
 
 11,933 
 
 9,570 
 
 12,374 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 Total effective of all arms. 
 
 6,739 
 3,631 
 
 44,247 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 179 
 
 PETERSBURG, SEPTEMBER 10, 1864. 
 
 PRESENT FOR DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 First Corps, j 
 Anderson. 1 
 
 Second Corps, J 
 Early. 1 
 
 Third Corps, J 
 A. P. Hill. 1 
 
 Cavalry Corps, 
 Hampton. 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 Pickett s division 
 
 361 
 409 
 No report. 
 
 4,542 
 4,046 
 
 Field s division 
 
 Kershaw s division 
 
 Breckinridge s division. . . 
 
 770 
 
 8,588 
 
 194 
 
 307 
 271 
 
 182 
 39 
 
 2,172 
 3,244 
 2,690 
 2,010 
 818 
 
 Rodes s division 
 
 Gordon s division. . 
 
 Ramseur s division 
 
 Carter s artillery 
 
 
 993 
 
 10,934 
 
 323 
 321 
 351 
 14 
 
 4,159 
 4,120 
 4,211 
 145 
 
 Mahone s division. . 
 
 Wilcox s division 
 
 Fifth Alabama Battalion 
 
 Hampton s division 
 
 1,009 
 
 12,635 
 
 184 
 
 2,736 
 Detached. 
 2,545 
 3,215 
 225 
 1,430 
 
 Fitz Lee s division 
 
 W. H. F. Lee s division 
 
 133 
 353 
 16 
 
 82 
 
 Lomax s division 
 
 Horse artillery 
 
 Dealing s brigade 
 
 
 768 
 249 
 
 10,151 
 4,486 
 
 Total 
 
 
 3,7<89 
 
 46,794 
 
 
 
 CHAFIN S BLUFF, OCTOBER 20, 1864. 
 
 ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT FOR DUTY. 
 
 Officers. Enlisted Men. 
 
 First Corps, j 
 Longstreet. 1 
 
 Pickett s division 
 
 364 4,967 
 330 3,491 
 301 3,787 
 
 Field s division 
 
 
 
 995 12,245 
 
180 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 CHAFIN S BLUFF, OCTOBER 20, 18G4 Continued. 
 
 AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT i 
 
 OR DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 
 837 
 
 4,540 
 
 Third Corps, \ Wilcox > s division 
 
 360 
 
 4,730 
 
 A. P. Hill. | Hahone s division. 
 
 348 
 
 4,368 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,045 
 
 13,638 
 
 f Hampton s division 
 
 101 
 
 1,330 
 
 Cavalry Corps 1 "YV H F Lee s division. . . 
 
 130 
 
 2,834 
 
 Hampton ] Dearing s brigade 
 
 70 
 
 1,211 
 
 1 Horse artillery 
 
 3 
 
 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 304 
 
 5,453 
 
 
 252 
 
 4,246 
 
 First District, Department North Carolina and South 
 ern Virginia \Vise s command 
 
 149 
 
 2,248 
 
 Provost-guard 
 
 22 
 
 194 
 
 
 
 
 Total.. . 
 
 2,767 
 
 38,024 
 
 NOTE. No return received of the troops serving in the Valley District, nor 
 of Johnson s division, nor of the Second and Third Military Districts of the De 
 partment of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. Hoke s division is included 
 in the above report of Longstreet s corps in place of Kershaw s division, de 
 tached (in the Valley of Virginia). Of the cavalry, 1,249 men are dismounted. 
 
 First Corps, 
 Longstreet. 
 
 Third Corps, 
 A. P. Hill. 
 
 PETERSBURG, OCTOBER 31, 1864. 
 
 Total Effective. 
 
 ( Pickett s division 5,764 
 
 j Field s division 3,994 
 
 ( Hoke s division 4,505 
 
 14,263 
 
 Heth s division 4,198 
 
 Wilcox s division 5,034 
 
 Mahone s division 4,546 
 
 1,435 
 
 B. R. Johnson s division 
 
 f Hampton s division 
 
 Cavalry Corps, J W. H. F. Lee s division 
 
 Hampton. 1 Dearing s brigade 1,248 
 
 [ Horse artillery 83 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 Total effective of all arms, Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 13,778 
 6,329 
 
 5,654 
 5,057 
 
 45,081 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 181 
 
 Total effective of all arms, Army of Northern Virginia, 
 First Military District, Department of North Carolina 
 
 and Southern Virginia, Wise commanding 
 
 Third Military District, Department of North Carolina 
 and Southern Virginia, Whiting commanding. ... 
 
 f Rodes s division 2,316 
 
 1,794 
 
 2,073 
 
 1,538 
 
 2,856 
 
 923 
 
 Total Effective. 
 
 45,081 
 
 j 
 [Artillery 
 
 division., 
 division. . 
 
 Provost-guard 
 
 Total effective detached commands 
 
 Total effective, Departments of Northern Vir 
 ginia, and North Carolina and Southern Vir 
 ginia 
 
 2,226 
 3,863 
 
 11,500 
 205 
 
 17,794 
 
 62,875 
 
 PETERSBURG, NOVEMBER 10, 1864. 
 
 PRESENT FOB DUTY. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 ( Pickett s division 
 
 397 
 
 5,986 
 
 First Corps, \ Y ^ d - . . 
 
 373 
 
 4,227 
 
 Longstreet. j ! . ] . . . . 
 
 349 
 
 4,956 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,119 
 
 15,169 
 
 ( Heth s division. . 
 
 333 
 
 4,520 
 
 Third Corps, \ Wilcox>8 divigion 
 
 375 
 
 5,360 
 
 A. P. Hill. | Mahone s division 
 
 368 
 
 4,795 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,076 
 
 14,675 
 
 B R Johnson s division 
 
 529 
 
 6,494 
 
 
 
 
 f Hampton s division 
 
 96 
 
 1,224 
 
 Cavalry Corps ] W H F Lee s division 
 
 141 
 
 3 123 
 
 Hampton ] Dear/ing s brigade 
 
 61 
 
 1,303 
 
 [Horse artillery. . . . 
 
 3 
 
 94 
 
 
 
 
 
 301 
 
 5,744 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 249 
 
 5,174 
 
 First Mil. Disk, Dept. N. C. and So. Va., Brigadier-Gen 
 eral H. A. Wise 
 
 203 
 
 2,271 
 
 Provost-guard 
 
 21 
 
 200 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 3,498 
 
 49,727 
 
 
 
 
 No return received of troops serving in the Valley of Virginia since October 
 31, 1864. 
 
182 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 First Corps, 
 Longstreet. 
 
 Third Corps, 
 A. P. Hill. 
 
 PETERSBURG, NOVEMBER 30, 1864. 
 
 Total Effective. 
 
 fPickett s division 6,176 
 
 I Field s division 4,548 
 
 1 Hoke s division 5,273 
 
 I Kershaw s division 3,414 
 
 ( Heth s division 4,957 
 
 J Wilcox s division 5,742 
 
 ( Mahone s division 4,844 
 
 B. R. Johnson s division 
 
 First Military District, Department of North Carolina 
 and Southern Virginia, Brigadier-General Wise. . . 
 
 Provost-guard 
 
 f Hampton s division 1,506 
 
 Cavalry Corps, J W. H. F. Lee s division 3,605 
 
 Hampton. 1 Dearing s brigade 995 
 
 [Horse artillery 102 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 Total effective of all arms, Army Northern Virginia, 
 
 f Early s division 2,345 
 
 Rodes s division 2,789 
 
 Valley District, J Gordon s division 2,662 
 
 Early commanding, j Wharton s division 1,859 
 
 Lomax s cavalry 1,846 
 
 I^Fitz Lee s cavalry 1,455 
 
 19,411 
 
 15,543 
 6,594 
 
 2,305 
 219 
 
 6,208 
 6,144 
 
 Total effective in Valley District 
 
 Total effective in Department of Northern Virginia, 
 Of Hampton s cavalry, reported above, 1,298 are dismounted. 
 
 PETERSBURG, DECEMBER 20, 1864. 
 
 56,424 
 
 12,956 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF NOETIIEEN VIEGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT FOE DUTY. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 First Corps, 
 Longstreet. 
 
 Second Corps, 
 Gordon. 
 
 Third Corps, 
 
 f Pickett s division . . 
 
 432 
 397 
 376 
 
 298 
 
 6,365 
 4,576 
 5,517 
 3,552 
 
 J Field s division 
 
 "j Hoke s division 
 
 [Kershaw s division. 
 
 ( Rodes s division 
 
 1,503 
 
 20,010 
 
 193 
 133 
 179 
 
 3,056 
 2,406 
 2,717 
 
 K Early s division . 
 
 ( Gordon s division 
 
 ( Mahone s division. 
 
 505 
 
 8,179 
 
 353 
 361 
 383 
 
 4,544 
 
 4,905 
 5,825 
 
 < Heth s division 
 
 ( Wilcox s division 
 
 
 1,097 
 
 15,274 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN TJ. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 183 
 
 PETERSBURG, DECEMBER 20, 1864 Continued. 
 
 
 PRESENT 
 
 FOE DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 B R Johnson s division 
 
 504 
 
 6,692 
 
 
 
 
 ( Hampton s division 
 
 145 
 
 2,431 
 
 Cavalry Corps, j w j| p Lee , s division> . 
 
 158 
 
 3,592 
 
 Hampton. | Hor8e artillery 
 
 3 
 
 109 
 
 
 
 
 
 306 
 
 6,132 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 266 
 
 5,190 
 
 First Mil. Dist. Dept. N. C. and So. Va., Brigadier-Gen 
 eral H A Wise 
 
 94 
 
 520 
 
 Provost-guard 
 
 22 
 
 239 
 
 
 
 
 Total . . . 
 
 4,297 
 
 62,236 
 
 
 
 
 PETERSBURG, JANUARY 10, 1865. 
 
 
 PRESENT 
 
 FOR DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 TT j. /i ( Pickett s division 
 
 279 
 
 4 704 
 
 First Corps, ] Field > s d ivision . . ] 
 
 395 
 
 4 569 
 
 Longstreet. | K ershaw s division 
 
 260 
 
 3 140 
 
 
 
 
 
 934 
 
 12,413 
 
 c j n C Rodes s division 
 
 203 
 
 3 077 
 
 Second Corps, \ on 
 
 136 
 
 2 411 
 
 Gordon - ( Gordon s division. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 161 
 
 2 684 
 
 
 
 
 
 500 
 
 8,172 
 
 mu- A n ( Mah one s division.. . 
 
 312 
 
 4 536 
 
 Third Corps, \^^ division... 
 
 353 
 
 4 827 
 
 -A.. Jr. Jtllll. j TTri i i 
 
 ( VVilcox s division 
 
 362 
 
 5 827 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,027 
 
 15,190 
 
 B. R. Johnson s division. . . 
 
 433 
 
 6 608 
 
 
 
 
 r\ -i r\ ( Hampton s division 
 
 133 
 
 2 183 
 
 Orps -1 W. H. F. Lee s division 
 
 146 
 
 3 190 
 
 Hampton. ) TT 
 ( Horse artillery 
 
 3 
 
 104 
 
 
 
 
 
 282 
 
 5,477 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 256 
 
 5 120 
 
 
 
 
 Total Army of Northern Virginia . . 
 
 3,432 
 
 52,980 
 
184 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 PETERSBURG, JANUARY 10, 1865 Continued. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 ( Wharton s division., 
 
 Brigadier-General 
 
 J. A. Walker. 
 Provost-guard .... 
 
 Richmond & Danville Railroad de 
 fenses 
 
 PBESENT FOE DUTY. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 110 
 
 42 
 Not 
 
 1,914 
 950 
 reported. 
 
 152 
 
 2,864 
 
 110 
 
 22 
 
 1,472 
 219 
 
 3,716 
 
 57,535 
 
 Total Department of Northern Virginia 
 
 NOTE. Hoke s division transferred to North Carolina ; Conner s brigade, 
 Kershaw s division, transferred to South Carolina. Of cavalry reported, 1,799 
 are dismounted. 
 
 PETERSBURG, JANUARY 31, 1865. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 TOTAL EFFECTIVE. 
 
 T,. . r\ ( Pickett s division. . . 
 
 4,684 
 4,418 
 3,066 
 
 12,168 
 7,762 
 
 14,805 
 6,248 
 4,057 
 4,881 
 
 49,921 
 3,524 
 
 First Corps, \ 
 
 Longstreet. | K ershaw s division. "I. 
 c, , n ( Rodes s division . . 
 
 2,914 
 2,319 
 2,529 
 
 Second Corps, 3 Early s division 
 
 Gordon. ^ Gordon s division. 
 
 mi_ j /i ( Heth s division 
 
 4,319 
 5,840 
 4,646 
 
 Third Corps, \ WUcox , g division 
 
 ( Mahone s division 
 
 B. R. Johnson s division 
 
 1,112 
 
 775 
 Not 
 
 W. H. F. Lee s division, cavalry. . 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 Total effective of all arms, Army of 
 
 Valley District, < ^* tatary - 
 
 reported. 
 
 1,887 
 1,438 
 199 
 
 Ear1 ? ( Cavalry. . 
 
 J. A. Walker R. & D. Railroad defenses. 
 Provost-guard 
 
 
 Total effective of all arms, Depart 
 ment of Northern Virginia 
 
 
 53,445 
 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 185 
 
 PETERSBURG, FEBRUARY 10, 1865. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 PRESENT i 
 
 OK DUTY. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted Men. 
 
 P.- , n ( Pickett s division . . 
 
 306 
 
 4 773 
 
 First Corps, \ K w , divigion 
 
 334 
 
 4 453 
 
 Longstreet. | Kershaw > s division 
 
 2 9 7 
 
 3 083 
 
 
 
 
 
 867 
 
 12,309 
 
 ci j n ( Rodes s division. . . 
 
 183 
 
 2 929 
 
 Second Corps, \ Gordon , g divigion> 
 
 148 
 
 2 281 
 
 Gordon. | Early , g divigion 
 
 119 
 
 2,151 
 
 
 
 
 
 450 
 
 7,361 
 
 _...,_, ( Mahone s division 
 
 284 
 
 3 890 
 
 A ir p nT \ Heth s division 
 
 295 
 
 4,190 
 
 A. r. Mill. J Wilcox s division 
 
 316 
 
 5,445 
 
 
 
 
 
 895 
 
 13,525 
 
 B R Johnson s division . 
 
 426 
 
 6 527 
 
 
 
 
 W. H. F. Lee s cavalry 
 
 137 
 
 2,664 
 
 
 54 
 
 1,112 
 
 
 
 
 
 191 
 
 3,776 
 
 Total Army of Northern Virginia 
 
 2,829 
 
 43,498 
 
 
 
 
 Vallcv District ( TVharton s infantry . . . 
 
 66 
 
 1,076 
 
 Early. ( Long s artillery 
 
 18 
 
 390 
 
 
 
 
 
 84 
 
 1,466 
 
 J A Walker R & D Railroad defenses 
 
 100 
 
 1,417 
 
 Provost-guard and signal corps . 
 
 27 
 
 341 
 
 
 
 
 Total Department of Northern Virginia 
 No report of artillery embraced in this return. 
 
 3,040 
 
 46,722 
 
186 OFFICIAL RETURNS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 PETERSBURG, FEBRUARY 28, 1865. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIR 
 GINIA. 
 
 OFFICERS. 
 
 ENLISTED 
 MEN. 
 
 TOTAL. 
 
 ( Pickett s division... 
 First Corps, \ Fie]d , g division 
 
 304 
 341 
 206 
 
 4,761 
 4,436 
 2,967 
 
 42,484 
 
 6,041 
 5,399 
 
 3,105 
 2,064 
 
 53,924 
 5,169 
 
 Longstreet. | Kershaw > a division. . 
 
 ( Gordon s division. . 
 Second Corps, i Rodes , s division . . . . 
 Gordon. j Early s division . . 
 
 851 
 
 12,164 
 
 143 
 
 186 
 129 
 
 458 
 
 2,309 
 3,022 
 2,292 
 
 ( Mahone s division . . . 
 Third Corps, \ Heth , g divis}on 
 
 7,623 
 
 262 
 294 
 309 
 
 3,880 
 4,324 
 5,383 
 
 A. P. Hill. ( Wilcox > s division... 
 B R Johnson s division . . 
 
 865 
 
 13,587 
 
 431 
 
 6,505 
 
 Effective infantry 
 
 185 
 96 
 
 3,935 
 1,825 
 
 (W. H. F. Lee s di- 
 Cavalry Corps -< vision 
 
 ( Fitz Lee s division. . . 
 Effective cavalry 
 
 68 
 20 
 154 
 
 104 
 42 
 
 1,112 
 
 368 
 1,383 
 
 1,414 
 
 504 
 
 Effective artillery 
 
 Total effective of all arms, Army of 
 Northern Virginia 
 
 f Wharton s division, 
 infantry 
 
 Yalley District, \ Long s division, ar- 
 Early 1 tillery 
 
 j L o m a x s division, 
 (_ cavalry 
 
 Total effective . . 
 
 J. A. Walker. \ R f * ^^^ d * 
 
 Unattached commands. . . 
 
 Total effective, detached commands. 
 
 Total effective of all arms, Depart 
 ment of Northern Virginia. 
 
 
 
 
 59,093 
 
FROM ORIGINAL PAPERS IN U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT. 187 
 
 By reference to the returns of the Federal armies of the 
 1st of March, 1865, as given in the report of the Secretary of 
 War to the Thirty-ninth Congress (vol. v., p. 55), I find that 
 General Grant had available at that date, the Army of the 
 Potomac under General Meade, one hundred and three thou 
 sand two hundred and seventy-three present for duty ; the 
 army in the " Department of Virginia " under General Ord, 
 numbering forty-five thousand nine hundred and eighty-six ; 
 and the cavalry force of the Middle Military Division under 
 General Sheridan, twelve thousand nine hundred and eighty 
 strong : making an effective total of all arms of one hundred 
 and sixty-two thousand two hundred and thirty-nine. 
 
 There is no return of the Army of Northern Virginia 
 on file in the Archive-Office, at Washington, of later date 
 than that last given. It will be seen that on the 28th of 
 February, 1865, General Lee had available thirty-nine thou 
 sand eight hundred and seventy-nine muskets. During the 
 month of March the army lost heavily. In the assault made 
 by General Gordon s troops on the line of the enemy, on the 
 25th, the Confederate loss -was between twenty-five hundred 
 and three thousand. The loss to the army by desertion, in 
 the last thirty days of the siege, was three thousand men ; 
 an average of one hundred per day. On the 31st of March, 
 General Lee had therefore but thirty-three thousand mus 
 kets, with which to defend a line over thirty miles in length 
 one thousand men to the mile ! 
 
 In the engagement at Five Forks on the 1st of April, 
 the divisions of Pickett and Bushrod Johnson were well- 
 nigh annihilated by the Federal turning force, under Sheri 
 dan and Warren, which overwhelmed them ; the loss sus 
 tained there reached seven thousand men. 1 In the encounters 
 at other points on the 31st of March and the 1st of April, 
 and in the general assault on the lines made on the 2d of 
 April, the loss was very heavy, perhaps six thousand men. 
 So that, when General Lee withdrew his army from the 
 
 1 The Federals claim to have taken five thousand prisoners. 
 
188 FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 
 
 lines during the night of the 2d of April, he had not over 
 twenty thousand muskets available. The cavalry had also 
 suffered heavily, and, of all arms, not over twenty-five thou 
 sand men began the retreat that terminated at Appomattox 
 Court-House. 
 
 Speaking in behalf of my former comrades of the Army 
 of Northern Virginia, I here rest our case, and declare our 
 readiness to accept the judgment of the world, as to the 
 genius and skill of the commander, and the valor and endur 
 ance of the men, who fought so nobly and fell so bravely, 
 full of honors, though denied success. 
 
 In what I have written, I have endeavored, first, to as 
 sist in making clear some matters touching the history of 
 General Lee, heretofore shrouded in obscurity or doubt ; 
 secondly, to present a statement of the strength of the army 
 which he commanded, that could be relied upon as accurate. 
 
 In regard to the first branch of my undertaking, I need 
 not that others should remind me of the imperfect manner 
 of its execution ; but, of the matter, and of the spirit in 
 which I addressed myself to the work, I claim that my only 
 aim has been historic accuracy. Indeed, I have written as 
 if under the supervision of General Lee himself, fully realiz 
 ing that, were that illustrious man now living, he would scorn 
 any advantage obtained through injustice to others, or the 
 sacrifice of truth : and this conviction has been present to 
 my mind as a controlling force through my entire narrative. 
 
 In regard to the second branch of my subject, I feel as 
 sured that the statement of the strength of the Confederate 
 army has been presented in such form as to command the 
 confidence of all. Startling to some as the disparity in num 
 bers between the two armies on certain occasions may ap 
 pear, it is nevertheless established upon incontrovertible evi 
 dence, and makes pardonable the emotions of pride with 
 which the soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia points 
 to the achievements of that incomparable body of soldiery, 
 under its peerless and immortal leader. Had he lived, I have 
 
FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE. 189 
 
 shown that it was his purpose to prepare for the benefit of 
 posterity, and as a just tribute to the courage and endurance 
 of his men, a true statement of the odds against which they 
 had to contend. What the designs of an inscrutable but all- 
 wise Providence prevented him from doing, in this particu 
 lar, I have had the temerity to attempt, and now submit the 
 result of my labor to the judgment of my countrymen, in the 
 hope that in criticising my work they will not lose sight of 
 the purpose by which I have been actuated, or the spirit in 
 which I have performed my task. 
 
ADDEESS 
 ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL R. E. LEE, 
 
 Delivered in Richmond, on Wednesday, January 19, 1876, the Anniversary of 
 General Lee s Birth, by Captain John Hampden Chamberlayne. 
 
 FELLOW-CITIZENS : I shall not obtrude upon you apologies 
 or explanations, as if I had the orator s established fame to 
 lose, or looked that future fame to win. You are not come 
 to hear of my small hopes or fears. Yet, to you, and to the 
 gravity of the occasion, it is due to say that I appear before you 
 on sudden order, to my sense of duty hardly less imperative 
 than those famous commands under which we have so often 
 marched at " early dawn." 
 
 By telegraph, on last Saturday night, this duty was laid up 
 on me, and I come with little of preparation, and less of ability, 
 to attempt a theme that might task the powers of Bossuet or 
 exhaust an Everett s rhetoric. 
 
 It can scarcely be needful to rehearse before you the facts 
 of our commander s life. They have become, from least to 
 greatest, parts of history, and an ever-growing number of books 
 record that he was born in 1807, at Stratford, in Westmoreland 
 County, of a family ancient and honorable in the mother-country, 
 in the Old Dominion, and in the State of Virginia ; that he was 
 appointed a cadet at the United States Military Academy in 
 1825, and was graduated first in his class, and commissioned 
 lieutenant of engineers ; that he served upon the staff of Gen 
 eral Scott through the brilliant campaign from Vera Cruz to 
 
ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 191 
 
 the city of Mexico, was thrice brevetted for gallant and meri 
 torious conduct, and was declared by General Scott to have 
 borne a chief part in the counsels and the battles which ended 
 with the triumph of our arms ; that he was promoted lieutenant- 
 colonel of cavalry, and served for years upon the Southwestern 
 frontier ; that he was in 1861 called to Washington as one of a 
 board to revise the army regulations ; and that on the 20th day 
 of April, 1861, four days after the withdrawal of Virginia from 
 the Union, he resigned his commission in the United States 
 Army, and that he became commander-in-chief of Virginia s 
 forces, and thereafter accepted the commission of general in the 
 army of the Confederate States. 
 
 Still more familiar to you than these facts are the events of 
 which you and I had personal knowledge : how Lee organized, 
 patiently and skillfully, the raw resources of Virginia ; how he 
 directed the coast defenses of the South Atlantic States, and 
 how he labored against a thousand difficulties in the mountains 
 of West Virginia, serenely accepting without a murmur the 
 popular verdict on what ignorant presumption adjudged a fail 
 ure. In June of 1862 he was at length placed in a command to 
 meet whose vast responsibility his life had been the preparation, 
 and at once his name became forever linked with that Army of 
 Northern Virginia which met and mastered army after army, 
 baffled McClellan, and destroyed successively Pope, Burnside, 
 and Hooker ; which twice invaded the enemy s country, and 
 which, when at last against it were thrown all the resources of 
 the United States, Grant in its front and Sherman in its rear, 
 Europe for their recruiting-ground, and a boundless credit for 
 their military chest, still stood for eleven months defiantly at 
 bay, concentrated on itself the whole resources of the United 
 States, and surrendered at Appomattox eight thousand starving 
 men to the combined force of two great armies whose chiefs had 
 long despaired to conquer it by skill or daring, and had worn it 
 away by weight of numbers and brutal exchange of many lives 
 for one. We all know, too, how the famous soldier sheathed 
 his sword, and without a word of repining, without a look to 
 show the grief that was breaking his heart and sapping the 
 springs of his noble life, accepted the duty that came to him, 
 
192 ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 
 
 and bent to his new task, as guide and teacher of boys, the 
 powers which had wielded the strength of armies and almost 
 redressed the balances of unequal fate. 
 
 Such are the leading facts, in barest outline, of the great 
 life that began sixty -nine years ago to-day. Well known as 
 they are, it is wise to recall them when we gather as we have 
 gathered here. In these hurrying days men pass swiftly away 
 from human sight, the multitude of smaller figures vanishing 
 behind the curtain of forgetfulness, the few mighty ones soon 
 wrapped in the hazy atmosphere of the heroic heights, enlarged, 
 it may be, but ofttimes dim and distorted, always afar off, unfa 
 miliar, not human, but superhuman, demi-gods rather than men ; 
 our wonder and our despair, who should be our reverence and 
 our inspiration. 
 
 Thus has it already been with him who lies at Mount Ver- 
 non. Let it be our care, men of this generation, that it be not 
 so in our day with him who lies at Lexington ; let it be our care 
 to show him often to those who rise around us to take our place, 
 to show him not only in his great deeds and his famous victories, 
 but also as citizen and as man. 
 
 The task is hard to divide what is essentially one, and Lee 
 so bore himself in his great office as that the man was never 
 lost in the soldier. Never of him could it be said that he was 
 like the dyer s hand, subdued to what he worked in : always the 
 sweet human quality tempered his stoic virtue, always beneath 
 the soldier s breast beat the tender, loving heart. 
 
 Most of us here have seen and known him, if not in his 
 splendid youth, fit at once to charm the eye of the Athenian 
 multitude and to awe a Roman Senate, yet in his maturer years, 
 when time and care had worn his body but to show more glori 
 ous the lofty soul within. Among us and ours his life was led, 
 so blameless as might become a saint, so tender as might be 
 come a woman, so simple as might become the little children 
 " of whom is the kingdom of heaven." So consistent was that 
 life, so devoted to duty, without a glance to right or left, so 
 fixed on the golden rule, adopted once and forever, that his 
 biographer, even now in a time of passion and distorted truth, 
 hesitates what to choose for his highest praise lingering in 
 
ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 193 
 
 turn over Lee the son, Lee the husband, Lee the father, Lee the 
 friend. Idle, then, it were for me to picture him in all the rela 
 tions he bore to those around him, and worse than idle were I 
 to follow what is much the fashion nowadays and make a study 
 of Lee the Christian, pry with curious glance into the sacred 
 chamber wherein man kneels to his God, or dare to touch the 
 awful veil which fools are swift to rend. 
 
 " But," says the critic, "private virtue is not for public use; 
 a Torquemada may be gentle in his home, and a Stuart seek to 
 enslave his people, yet lead a life of chastity." 
 
 Tis true, but still our great commander shines flawless and 
 perfect, at once in the quiet beams of the household hearth and 
 in the fierce light that beats upon the throne of him born to be 
 king of men. 
 
 Let one great example show it. None but those who know 
 the power of lofty ambition can tell what vast temptation beset 
 our leader ; none can know the heroism of the decision in the 
 dark days of 1861. He was the favorite soldier of all who fol 
 lowed Scott ; he was the picked and chosen man for high com 
 mand in the armies of the United States. He was besought 
 almost with tears by him he reverenced as a second father ; to 
 him was tendered the baton of general-in-chief. Who can tell 
 what visions trooped upon his sight of power, that dearest 
 boon to the powerful, of fame world-wide, of triumph, not easy 
 but certain ? And who can tell but fairer dreams than these 
 assailed him ; hope, nay, almost belief, that he and he alone 
 might play the noble part of pacificator and redintegrator pa- 
 trice, that he might heal the wounds of civil strife, and be hailed 
 by North and South as worthy the oaken garland ? 
 
 He had been more or less than human had not these 
 thoughts, or such as these, arisen when he strove through days 
 and bitter nights to find his duty. 
 
 He, we must remember, was wedded to no theory ; his mind 
 grasped concrete truth rather than abstractions. His horizon 
 was bounded by no lines of neighborhood or of States. He 
 knew the men of the North, as well as of the South ; he had 
 maturely weighed the wealth of the one and the poverty of the 
 other. Few knew so well as he, none better, the devotion we 
 13 
 
194 ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 
 
 could offer to any cause, but he knew likewise the stubborn, 
 deep-resting strength of the Northern will that we took for a 
 passing whim. He had all his life obeyed and respected the 
 organized, concentrated form of the Union; and he, the pupil 
 of Scott, the follower of Washington, the son of Light-Horse 
 Harry, might and should and did pause long. Paused long, to 
 decide forever to decide with never a look backward, with 
 never a regret, even when the end had come, darker than his 
 fears had pictured. 
 
 Cast away all, to obey the voice of Virginia, his country; to 
 defend Virginia, his mother. Scarcely twice since the world 
 began has mortal man been called to make such choice. 
 
 Will not history consent, will not mankind applaud, when 
 we still uphold our principles as right, our cause as just, our 
 country to be honored, when those principles had for disciple, 
 that cause for defender, that country for son, Robert Lee ? 
 
 The day has by no means come to fix with absolute precision 
 the rank of Lee among the world s great soldiers. But the day 
 will come, and it is ours to gather and preserve and certify the 
 facts to be the record before the dread tribunal of time. 
 
 Turning, then, to the soldiership of Lee : from first to last, 
 we see his labor and exactness, giving always the power to gain 
 from every means its utmost result. Thus he so pursued the 
 sciences which underlie the soldier s art that he entered the 
 army fully equipped with all that theory could teach, and while 
 yet a subaltern was more than once intrusted with tasks of the 
 engineers bureau which had baffled the skill of men far older 
 and more experienced. The same qualities were shown when 
 he first saw actual war. To us, who look back across the field 
 of a gigantic strife, of a struggle where not brigades nor divis 
 ions but great armies were the units, where States were forti 
 fied camps and a continent the battle-ground to us that march 
 on Mexico seems as small as it is, in fact, far off in time and 
 space. But small and great are relative, and the little army of 
 Scott which gathered on the sands of Vera Cruz was little in 
 much the same sense as that other army, of Cortez, whose foot 
 steps it followed and whose prowess it rivaled. In that cam 
 paign Lee s soldiership first found fit field. It was he whose 
 
ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 195 
 
 skill gave us the quick foothold of Vera Cruz. At Cerro Gordo 
 and Contreras his was no mean part of the plan and its accom 
 plishment. At the city of Mexico it was his soldier s eye and 
 soldier s heart which saw and dared what Cortez had seen and 
 dared before, to turn the enemy s strongest position, and assault 
 as well by the San Cosme as by the Belen gateway, a movement 
 greatly hazardous, but, once executed, decisive. In the endless 
 roll of wars that campaign of Mexico must always remain to the 
 judicious critic masterly in conception and superb in execution. 
 But to us it is memorable chiefly as the training-school whose 
 pupils were to ply their art on a wider scale to ends more ter 
 rible, and Winfield Scott selected from them all Robert E. Lee 
 as the chosen soldier. 
 
 The time was soon to come when he should try conclusions 
 with many of that brilliant band, and prove himself the master 
 of each in turn of McClellan, of Burnside, of Hooker, of Pope, 
 of Meade, of Grant, of whomsoever could be found to lead them 
 by the millions he confronted. When the War of Secession be 
 gan, you all remember how for a time Lee held subordinate 
 place, and how, when what seemed chance gave him command 
 of the forces defending Richmond from the hundred thousand 
 men who could hear, if they would, the bells of our churches 
 and almost the hum of our streets you all remember how the 
 home-staying critic found fault with him, how he was described 
 as a closet-soldier and a handler of spade and mattock, rather 
 than of gun and bayonet. Sudden and swift was the surprise 
 when the great plan disclosed itself, and the guns at the 
 Meadow Bridges of the Chickahominy cleared the way for the 
 first of those mighty blows which sent McClellan in hopeless 
 rout to the shelter of his shipping, thence to hurry as he might 
 to the rescue of Pope s bewildered divisions, and to organize 
 home-guards in the defenses of Washington. That single cam 
 paign of the Seven Days is itself fame. To amuse an army out 
 numbering his own by fifty thousand ; to watch with a large 
 detachment lest that army should make a junction with the 
 divisions at Fredericksburg ; to bring Jackson s skill and Jack 
 son s devoted men to his aid ; to cross a marshy and often im 
 practicable stream ; to attack McClellan on his flank and to roll 
 
196 ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 
 
 up his army like a scroll, while, at each step gained, his enemy 
 should be weaker and himself be stronger and in stronger posi 
 tion, yet at the same time to guard lest his enemy should break 
 his centre as Napoleon pierced the Russians on Austerlitz field 
 
 such was the problem. You know, all the world knows, its 
 
 execution. Despite the errors of subordinates ; despite the skill 
 of his opponent, a soldier truly great in defense ; despite the 
 rawness of many of his troops ; despite the lack in the general 
 officers of the skill necessary to movements so delicate ; and 
 despite the inferiority of his force, Lee succeeded fully in his 
 main object, relieved Richmond, inflicted on his enemy losses 
 materially immense and morally infinite ; in seven days abso 
 lutely undid what McClellan took six months to do, and by a 
 single combination threw back his enemy from the hills in sight 
 of Richmond to a defensive line in Washington s suburbs. This 
 campaign, for its audacity, its wide combination, its insight into 
 the opponent s character, its self-reliance, its vigor of execution, 
 and its astonishing results, may be safely compared with the 
 best campaigns of the greatest masters in the art of war with 
 Frederick s Leuthen, to which it bears as much likeness as a 
 campaign of days can bear to a battle of hours, or with that 
 greater feat, the amazing concentration by Washington of con 
 tingents from New York and from North Carolina, of new levies 
 from the Virginia Valley, and of a French fleet from the West 
 Indies, to besiege and to capture the army of Cornwallis. 
 
 It is argued that Lee was strong only in defense, and was 
 averse to taking the offensive. Nothing could be more false. He 
 was to prove in the last year of the war his fertility of defensive 
 resource and his unrivaled tenacity of resistance. But his genius 
 was aggressive. Witness the bold transfer of his army from 
 Richmond to the Rapidan, while McClellan s troops still rested 
 on the James River. Witness the audacity of detaching Jack 
 son from the Rappahannock line to seize Manassas Junction and 
 the road to Washington in Pope s rear. Witness the magnifi 
 cent swoop on Harper s Ferry, of which accident gave to Mc 
 Clellan the knowledge and by which timidity forbade him to 
 profit. Witness that crowning glory of his audacity, the change 
 of front to attack Hooker, and that march around what Hooker 
 
ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 197 
 
 called " the best position in America, held by the finest army on 
 the planet." Witness his invasion of Pennsylvania, a campaign 
 whose only fault was the generous fault of over-confidence in 
 an army whose great deeds might, if anything, excuse it an 
 over-confidence, as we ourselves know, felt by every man he 
 led, and which made us reckless of all difficulties, ready to think 
 that to us nothing was impossible. He was a commander who 
 had met no equal ; we were an army who saw in half the guns 
 of our train the spoil of the enemy, who bore upon our flags the 
 blazon of consistent victory. If he and we confided in our 
 daring, and trusted to downright fighting for what strategy 
 might have safely won, who shall blame us and which shall 
 blame the other ? It was a fault, if fault there were, such as in 
 a soldier leans to virtue s side ; it was the fault of Marlborough 
 at Malplaquet, of the Great Frederick at Torgau, of Napoleon at 
 Borodino. It is the famous fault of the column of Fontenoy, 
 and the generous haste that led Hampclen to his death. 
 
 Lee chose no defensive of his own will. None knew better 
 than he that axiom of the military art which finds the logical 
 end of defense in surrender. None knew better than he that 
 Fabius had never earned his fame by the policy some attribute 
 to him, nor saved his country by retreats, however regular, or 
 the skill, however great, to choose positions only to abandon 
 them. The defensive was not his chosen field, but he was fated 
 to conduct a defensive campaign rivaled by few and surpassed 
 by none in history. Of that wonderful work the details are yet 
 to be gathered, but the outlines are known the world over. 
 The tremendous onset of Lee in the tangled Wilderness upon 
 an enemy three times his force, who fancied him retreating; the 
 grim wrestle of Spottsylvania ; the terrible repulse of Cold Har 
 bor, from which the veteran commanders of Grant shrank back 
 aghast these great actions will be known so long as war 
 shall be studied, and future generations will read with admira 
 tion of that battle-field of seventy miles, where Lee with fifty- 
 one thousand men confronted Grant with his one hundred and 
 ninety thousand attacked him wherever he showed uncovered 
 front, killed, wounded, and captured, more men than his own 
 army numbered ; and, in a campaign of thirty-five days, forced 
 
198 ADDRESS OX THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 
 
 the most tenacious soldier of the Union armies to abandon 
 utterly his line of attack, to take a new position always open to 
 him but never chosen, and to exchange the warfare of the open 
 field for the slow and safe approach of the earthwork and the 
 siege. 
 
 They will read, too, that in the midst of this campaign Lee 
 was bold to spare from his little army force enough to take once 
 more the offensive, to traverse once more the familiar Valley, to 
 break once more through the gate of the Potomac, and to insult 
 with the fires of his bivouacs the capital city of his enemy. 
 Reading these things, they will refuse to believe, what we know,, 
 that men were found here and now to call this marvelous cam 
 paign a retreat. 
 
 The truth is, that Lee took a real defensive, if at all, only 
 in the trenches of Petersburg ; was driven to that defensive not 
 by one army nor by many armies in succession, but by the com 
 bined force of the armies in his front and in his rear. Vicks- 
 burg it was, not Cemetery Hill, which baffled the Army of Nor 
 thern Virginia ; at Nashville and Atlanta, not from the lines of 
 Petersburg, came the deadly blows ; and the ragged remnant of 
 Appomattox surrendered not to the valor or skill of the men 
 they had so often met and overcome, but to the men they had 
 never seen, and yielded neither to stubborn Grant nor braggart 
 Sheridan, but to the triumphant hosts of Rosecrans, of Thomas, 
 and of Sherman. 
 
 It is not hard, then, my friends, to see that history will hold 
 Lee to be a great soldier, wise in counsel, patient in prepara 
 tion, swift in decision, terrible in onset, tenacious of hold, sullen 
 in retreat, a true son of that Berserker race that rushed from 
 the bosom of Europe s darkest age, furious to fight, lovers of 
 battle, destined to sweep away the old world and to mould the 
 modern. 
 
 Rightly to estimate his power as commander is not and may 
 never be possible. There is no second term of comparison. He 
 was in a position as novel as were the conditions of a war where 
 the railroad existed, but the highway was not ; where telegraphs 
 conveyed orders, yet primeval forests still stood to conceal 
 armies ; where concentration was possible at a speed unknown 
 
ADDRESS ON THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL LEE. 199 
 
 to war before, but where concentration might easily starve it 
 self before it could strike its enemy. 
 
 Strange as the material, were the moral conditions of Lee s 
 command. He was hampered by political considerations ; he 
 was trammeled by the supreme importance of one city ; and, 
 above all, on him was complete responsibility, but never com 
 mensurate power. To the integrity of his army, to the morale 
 of half his force, the successful defense of the South and South 
 west was essential, and on operations in which he had no voice 
 turned the issue of his campaigns. 
 
 Of these things account will yet be taken, let us be sure of 
 that ; for though in barbarous ages conquered peoples write no 
 histories, yet, as the world grows older, history grows more 
 and more a judge, less and less a witness and advocate ; more 
 and more to every cause that appeal lies open which Francis 
 Bacon, of Verulam, made " to future ages and other countries." 
 
 Fit is it that we trust to that great verdict, seeing that 
 nothing less than the tribunal of mankind can judge this man, 
 who was born not for a period, but for all time ; not for a coun 
 try, but for the world ; not for a people, but for the human 
 race. 
 
 Not for him shall the arch of triumph rise ; not for him col 
 umns of victory, telling through monumental bronze the hideous 
 tale of tears and blood that grins from the skull-pyramids of 
 Dahomey. Not to his honor shall extorted tributes carve the 
 shaft or mould the statue ; but this day a grateful people give 
 of their poverty gladly, that in pure marble, or time-defying 
 bronze, future generations may see the counterfeit presentment 
 of this man the ideal and bright consummate flower of our 
 civilization ; not an Alexander, it may be ; nor Napoleon, nor 
 Timour, nor Churchill greater far than they, thank Heaven 
 the brother and the equal of Sidney and of Falkland, of Hamp- 
 den and of Washington ! 
 
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