ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1864. 
 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
 
 AND 
 
 MEN OF WAR-TIMES 
 
 SOME PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF WAP 
 AND POLITICS DURING THE LIN 
 COLN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 WITH INTRODUCTION BY DR. A. C. LAMBDIN 
 
 BY 
 
 A. K. McClURE, LLD. 
 
 FOURTH 
 
 PHILADELPHIA 
 
 THE TIMES PUBLISHING COMPANY 
 
 EIGHTH AND CHESTNUT 
 
 1892 
 

 G)pyrighted, 1802. bv A. K. McCLURE. 
 
 FRESSOF 
 
 PRINT:::C Co-, 
 
 PHILADELPHIA. 
 
 ELECTROTYPHD BIT 
 WESTCGTT & THOMSON. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA. 
 
248017 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE chapters in 
 this volume make 
 n o pretensions t o 
 give either a biog 
 raphy of Abraham 
 Lincoln or a history 
 of his memorable 
 Administration. 
 They were written 
 amidst the constant 
 pressure of editorial 
 duties simply to cor 
 rect some popular er 
 rors as to Lincoln s 
 character and actions. So much has been written of 
 him by persons assuming to possess information obtained 
 in the inner circle of his confidence, and such conflicting 
 presentations of his personal attributes and private and 
 public acts have been given to the public, that I have 
 deemed it a duty to contribute what little I could from 
 personal knowledge, to correct some common errors in 
 estimating his character, ability, and efforts. 
 
 The closest men to Abraham Lincoln, both before and 
 
 after his election to the Presidency, were David Davis, 
 
 7 
 
8 PREFACE. 
 
 Leonard Swett, Ward H. Lamon, and William H. Hern- 
 don. Davis and Swett were his close personal and 
 political counselors; Lamon was his Marshal for Wash 
 ington and Herndon had been his law-partner for twenty 
 years. These men, who knew Mr. Lincoln better than 
 all others, unite in testifying that his extreme caution 
 prevented him from making a personal confidant of any 
 one; and my own more limited intercourse with him 
 taught me, in the early period of our acquaintance, that 
 those who assumed that they enjoyed Lincoln s confi 
 dence had little knowledge of the man. It is the gen 
 erally honest but mistaken belief of confidential relations 
 with Lincoln on the part of biographers and magazine 
 and newspaper writers that has presented him to the 
 public in such a confusion of attitudes and as possessing 
 such strangely contradictory individual qualities. 
 
 I saw Mr. Lincoln many times during his Presidential 
 term, and, like all of the many others who had intimate 
 relations with him, I enjoyed his confidence only within 
 the limitations of the necessities of the occasion. I do 
 not therefore write these chapters assuming to have been 
 the confidant of Mr. Lincoln; but in some things I did 
 see him as he was, and, from necessity, knew what he 
 did and why he did it. What thus happened to come 
 under my own observation and within my own hearing 
 often related to men or measures of moment then and 
 quite as momentous now, when the events of the war 
 are about to be finally crystallized into history. 
 
 My personal knowledge of occurrences in which Mr. 
 Lincoln and other great actors in the bloody drama of 
 
PREFACE. 9 
 
 our Civil War were directly involved enables me to pre 
 sent some of the chief characteristics of Mr. Lincoln, 
 and to support them by facts and circumstances which 
 are conclusive. I have, therefore, written only of Lin 
 coln and his relations with the prominent chieftains and 
 civilians with whom I had more or less intimate personal 
 acquaintance. The facts herein given relating to lead 
 ing generals and statesmen are presented to illustrate in 
 the clearest manner possible the dominating character 
 istics of Mr. Lincoln. They may or may not be ac 
 cepted by the public as important, but they have the 
 one merit of absolute truthfulness. 
 
 Abraham Lincoln achieved more in American states 
 manship than any other President, legislator, or diplomat 
 in the history of the Republic; and what he achieved 
 brought no borrowed plumes to his crown. Compelled 
 to meet and solve the most momentous problems of our 
 government, and beset by confused counsels and intensi 
 fied jealousies, he has written the most lustrous records 
 of American history; and his name and fame must be 
 immortal while liberty shall have worshipers in any 
 land. To aid to a better understanding of this " noblest 
 Roman of them all" is the purpose of these chapters; 
 and if they shall, in the humblest degree, accomplish 
 that end, I shall be more than content. 
 
 The portraits in these chapters have been selected with 
 scrupulous care and executed in the best style. The 
 frontispiece portrait of Lincoln is the only perfect copy 
 of his face that I have ever seen in any picture. It was 
 
10 PREFACE. 
 
 taken in March, 1864, on the occasion when he handed 
 Grant his commission as lieutenant-general. Two nega 
 tives were taken by the artist, and only one of them 
 "touched up" and copies printed therefrom at the time. 
 The other negative remained untouched until a few 
 months ago, when it was discovered and copies printed 
 from it without a single change in the lines or features 
 of Lincoln s face. It therefore presents Lincoln true to 
 life. The other portraits of Lincoln present him as he 
 appeared when he delivered his speech in Cooper Insti 
 tute, New York, in 1859, with the cleanly-shaven face 
 that was always maintained until after his election to the 
 Presidency, and as he appeared when studying with his 
 son Tad at his side. These portraits I have selected 
 because they give the most accurate presentations of the 
 man, and to them are added a correct picture of the 
 humble home of his early childhood; of his Springfield 
 home of 1860; of the tomb in which his dust reposes 
 near Springfield, 111. ; and a fac-simile of his letter of 
 acceptance in 1860. 
 
 I am greatly indebted to the Lives of Lincoln given by 
 Nicolay and Hay the most complete and accurate record 
 of dates and events, military and civil, relating to Lin 
 coln by Mr. Herndon, by Mr. Lamon, by Mr. Arnold, 
 and by Mr. Brooks, and to Mr. Blaine s u Twenty Years 
 in Congress," for valuable information on many points 
 referred to in these chapters. 
 
 A. K. McCLURK. 
 PHILADELPHIA, 1892. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THE modern spir 
 it, which is essen 
 tially the democratic 
 spirit, that has so 
 profoundly influ 
 enced every mani 
 festation of human 
 thought, has 
 wrought a great 
 change in the study 
 of history and in 
 the estimate of his 
 torical personages. 
 To the older writers 
 history was mainly a record of the acts of great men 
 monarchs, ministers, and generals who rose out of the 
 mist of the past as independent and irresponsible agents; 
 the champions of opposing ideas, it might be, but them 
 selves the centres of all interest, and to be considered 
 and classified as heroes or villains according as one liked 
 or disliked the general purpose of their lives. The mod 
 ern historian, on the other hand, finds the material for 
 
 a just estimate of times past not in the lives of the few 
 
 ii 
 
1 2 INTROD UCTION. 
 
 as much as in the lives of the many in the general 
 conditions of civilization, of which the men of distinc 
 tion are only the strongest exponents, dramatizing in 
 themselves the forces of their age. 
 
 Most of all is this recognized concerning periods of 
 storm and stress, of war and tumult. Leaders may 
 hasten or retard events, may direct or misdirect the 
 impulses of the people, but they do not create these 
 impulses. They are governed by them. Whether or 
 not we accept that magnificent generalization of Count 
 Tolstoi in his Physiology of War that makes Napoleon 
 and Alexander but cock-boats on the tide, and the 
 private soldier a more genuine power than either of 
 them, the time certainly is past when one could speak 
 of wars or revolutions as the capricious acts of indi 
 vidual men, or could profess to estimate the character 
 and achievements of these men apart from the history 
 of the people that surrounded them. 
 
 This does not diminish the admiration due to the 
 heroes of history. If it takes from them that element 
 of the miraculous by which their proportions were dis 
 torted, it shows more clearly the means and methods of 
 their achievement, which no longer appears due to the 
 mere accident of birth, position, or opportunity, but 
 rather to the individual qualities by which one man is 
 enabled to assert himself as the representative of the 
 mass. Most of all is this the case in a republic, where 
 these accidents of birth or place, while they give oppor 
 tunities, confer no privileges; where incapacity may find 
 preferment, but where it must be soon discovered; and 
 
INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 where, in the long run, it is the man who best appre 
 ciates and can most highly direct the forces of his time 
 that earns his final place among the great. 
 
 It follows that while the history of the individual can 
 be studied only in relation with his surroundings, the 
 history of a nation may be exemplified in that of its 
 representative men. There is no sharp dividing-line 
 between history and biography. As the poet, the 
 painter, the composer must be considered in the light 
 of the poetry, the painting, the music of his period, 
 w r hich he in turn illuminates, so the man of affairs can 
 only be understood if we can see him in his relations 
 with his contemporaries, as he appeared to them and 
 they to him, and as he and they were related to the great 
 popular movements that controlled them all. And these 
 movements, in their turn, may be best understood when 
 we can see them as they were apprehended by the men 
 who had directly to deal with them. 
 
 The history of our civil war is yet to be written. A 
 great popular movement and counter-movement, the 
 contest, now seen to have been inevitable, of ideas de 
 veloped through generations, bearing results more far- 
 reaching than the wisest could foresee and affecting the 
 whole current of the nation s life, requires the perspec 
 tive of a greater distance in time than we have reached 
 perhaps even yet, for the final view that shall give to 
 every part its just proportion. The soldier in battle sees 
 only that part of the field that is about him; the colonel 
 reports only the movements of his own regiment; the 
 general of his brigade, division, corps; yet from these 
 
1 4 JNTR OD UCTION. 
 
 various reports the military historian forms his estimate 
 of the campaign. Thus far, our records of the war are 
 mainly in biography, personal narrative, and this for the 
 most part of a controversial character, designed to set 
 forth some one person s view, to vindicate his conduct, 
 to defend the policy of a party. Even the purely mili 
 tary movements from 1861 to 1865 have scarcely yet 
 crystallized in history, and the vastly more important 
 political and social history of that great era is still in 
 controversy. 
 
 With the exception of Mr. Blaine s delightful narra 
 tive of Twenty Years in Congress, the most comprehen 
 sive, compact, and philosophic summary that has been 
 made of any like experience, we have nothing relating 
 to this period that approaches to the dignity of history. 
 The Life of Lincoln by Nicolay and Hay is an admirable 
 compilation of the political records of the time, and its 
 narrative of public events is invaluable. But as an 
 actual biography of Lincoln it is unsatisfactory, and 
 as a comprehensive view of the great forces for which 
 Lincoln stood it is lacking in proportion as in insight. 
 
 For Lincoln is, above all things, the representative of 
 the people whose President he was, the embodiment and 
 exponent of their convictions, their courage, their per 
 sistence, their limitations as well as their strength, their 
 homely as well as their heroic attributes. The halo of 
 a martyr s death exalted him, in the eyes of those of us 
 who came after, to the plane of the ideal where we lost 
 sight of the actual man. To know Lincoln as he was 
 we must know him in his actual relations to the tre- 
 
INTR OD UC TION. 1 5 
 
 mendous task that devolved upon him, and to all the 
 fluctuations of that public sentiment whose support alone 
 could make the execution of this task possible. To 
 think of him as a specially inspired genius, innocent 
 of the world and holding his triumphant way against 
 all experience by some sort of supernatural insight, is 
 to do needless violence alike to the philosophy of history 
 and to recorded fact. 
 
 The chapters upon Lincoln which make up this vol 
 ume have one supreme value that they present a con 
 vincingly truthful picture of the man as he appeared to 
 an experienced observer who was called at various times 
 into intimate relations with him, and who records only 
 what he personally and directly knew of Lincoln s acts 
 and motives at certain critical and illustrative periods, 
 and of his attitude toward other actors in the same great 
 drama. 
 
 A many-sided character like Lincoln s shows itself 
 under various aspects to various men, and Mr. McClure 
 makes it very plain to us that few if any of those who 
 thought they knew Lincoln intimately knew really more 
 than the one side he showed to each of them. Much of 
 Mr. McClure s intercourse with Lincoln had to do, from 
 time to time, with what we now call practical politics, 
 and his extraordinary shrewdness as a politician is one 
 aspect of this many-sided character that has not before 
 been so intelligently set forth. Yet this seems one of 
 the great secrets of Lincoln s success his ready percep 
 tion of the popular current, his carefulness in guiding 
 it, and his ability to wait for it if he found himself in 
 
 \ 
 
1 6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 danger of going ahead too fast. No man of his time 
 was more earnest and sincere in his convictions, but he 
 could not afford to risk them in impracticable experi 
 ments. He had to achieve results and patiently to await 
 opportunities. The ideal hero of the old-fashioned his 
 torian, who must be always heroic, would not have 
 waited. And he would not have achieved. If those 
 to whom these revelations of Lincoln s shrewdness and 
 ingenuity as a practical politician bring something of a 
 shock will only think of the failures that he witnessed, 
 and what failure in his case would have meant, they 
 will not fear that Lincoln s fame will suffer from the 
 truth. 
 
 It is perhaps best of all in Mr. Lincoln s relations with 
 his immediate associates and subordinates that we ob 
 serve those elements of shrewd judgment, of patience, 
 self-repression, persistence, and abiding faith that are 
 such essential parts of his character. His treatment of 
 Grant is a conspicuous illustration not only of his judg 
 ment of men, but of that cautious policy that so often 
 enabled him to carry his ends by deferring them. His 
 patient endurance with Stanton, often yielding to him 
 against his own convictions in order to avoid a rupture 
 that would have brought disaster, and indeed his rela 
 tions with all the leading members of his Cabinet, not 
 less than the curiously characteristic diplomacy that re 
 sulted in the nomination of Andrew Johnson, illustrate 
 this same thoughtful prudence that ever subordinated 
 the minor issue to the greater which is the art of the 
 statesman. 
 
INTR OD UCTION. 1 7 
 
 This aspect of Mr. Lincoln s character is dwelt upon 
 here because it is one that has been generally obscured 
 in the popular estimate, but that is absolutely essential 
 to any right estimate of the man and his work. No acts 
 of his administration have been less understood than the 
 great achievement of emancipation and his attitude 
 toward the States in rebellion at the close of the war. 
 On both of these points Mr. McClure speaks with the 
 authority of exact knowledge, and he shows us with 
 how little of self-assertion, with how much of prudent 
 self-repression, Mr. Lincoln approached these as all other 
 great crises of his career. He was not more in advance 
 of his time than others were in foreseeing the inevitable 
 destruction of slavery; but to him the one great purpose 
 of the restoration of the Union was ever paramount, and 
 the other must wait till the exigencies of the war should 
 solve the problem or bring the people, the masses as well 
 as the leaders, to recognize an act of emancipation as a 
 supreme necessity. His own plan of compensated eman 
 cipation he brought forward in his Cabinet, and when it 
 was disapproved he folded it up and put it by. And so 
 he watched and waited till the time came when the 
 country called for more heroic measures and he could 
 speak as -the mouthpiece of the nation. 
 
 Again, at the close of the war he had his own plan, 
 deliberately formed, for the recall of the legislatures of 
 the Southern States to resume their functions under the 
 Constitution. There can be no dispute as to Lincoln s 
 intentions, as expressed in his own directions concern 
 ing Virginia, or his communication of these intentions to 
 2 
 
1 8 INTR OD UCTION. 
 
 General Sherman. But when he found that he was not 
 sustained he withdrew his instructions, to await the turn 
 of events; and before he could recast his plans to make 
 the present yielding lead to future achievement, the as 
 sassin s bullet ended his great life. Then all the men 
 who had complained of Lincoln s slowness, his timidity, 
 his indirectness, and who thought it the part of a leader 
 to go ahead, irrespective of whether anybody followed 
 him, had the opportunity they wished to try their various 
 experiments. 
 
 We know what confusion and disaster they wrought. 
 The appeal was not, like his, to the conscience and con 
 victions of the people, but to their passions and resent 
 ments; and it is only now, when a new generation has 
 come upon the scene, that we are emerging from the 
 shadows of that dreadful time, and are learning to esti 
 mate its men and measures justly. And Lincoln rises in 
 our esteem as we see in him not merely an abstract, im 
 possible ideal, nor merely, on the other hand, a rough, 
 unschooled Western politician, but the typical Northern 
 American of his time, the embodiment of the character 
 of the nation in its period of greatest trial. 
 
 Such at least is the idea that comes strongly to me 
 from these chapters. Always somewhat skeptical of the 
 untutored genius, as well as of the genius who thinks 
 himself in advance of his age, I confess that I like much 
 better to think of Lincoln as a man schooled for his 
 work by thoughtful study and patient watchfulness, and 
 meeting the strong men who surrounded him as at least 
 their peer, not alone in singleness of devotion to a cause, 
 
INTR OD UCTION. 1 9 
 
 but in the art of statesmanship as well. Very many of 
 these strong men Mr. McClnre brings before us with the 
 vivid relief of intimate knowledge, and the reader will 
 not fail to recognize the just appreciation with which 
 each one of these great figures is presented. This seems 
 to me another of the qualities that give to this volume a 
 value that is new. While its point of view is that of 
 personal knowledge, it is also that of the impartial stu 
 dent, in whose mind the controversies of a quarter of a 
 century have clarified and confirmed the judgments of 
 the historian. He has given us thus not only a series 
 of illustrative episodes, but a well-proportioned group 
 of figures representing truthfully the political forces of 
 the period of the war, with the one great figure always 
 in the centre the great President, and more than that, 
 the great American, the embodiment of the strength and 
 uprightness, the conscience and the courage, of Amer 
 ican manhood, the realization of our democratic ideal. 
 
 ALFRED COCHRAN LAMBDIN. 
 THE TIMES OFFICE, \ 
 April, 1892. / 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 FACING PAGE 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN Frontispiece. 
 
 LINCOLN S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, 1860 26 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1859 45 
 
 WINFIELD SCOTT 58 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND "TAD" 73 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN S HOMES 86 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN S TOMB 99 
 
 HANNIBAL HAMLIN 116 
 
 SALMON P. CHASE 131 
 
 SIMON CAMERON 148 
 
 EDWIN M. STANTON 169 
 
 ULYSSES S. GRANT 190 
 
 GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN 209 
 
 WILLIAM T. SHERMAN . 226 
 
 ANDREW G. CURTIN, 1860 247 
 
 LINCOLN S LETTER TO CURTIN , 264 
 
 ANDREW G. CURTIN, 1892 271 
 
 THADDEUS STEVENS 276 
 
 STEVENS S LETTER TO MCCLURE 291 
 
 JAMES BUCHANAN 296 
 
 HORACE GREELEY 313 
 
 GREELEY S LETTER TO MCCLURE 330 
 
 JOHN BROWN 333 
 
 GEORGE G. MEADE 354 
 
 GEORGE H. THOMAS 354 
 
 FITZ JOHN PORTER 354 
 
 G. K. WARREN 354 
 
 D. C. BUELL 354 
 
 ROBERT E. LEE 391 
 
 J. E. B. STUART 400 
 
 LEE S LETTER TO MCCLURE 411 
 
 SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD 424 
 
 20 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 LINCOLN IN 1860 His First Nomination for President at Chicago 
 How Seward was Overthrown Curtin and Lane Defeated him and 
 Nominated Lincoln The October States decided it Seward s Nomi 
 nation would have Defeated Curtin in Pennsylvania and Lane in Indi 
 ana at the October Elections The School Question made Seward Un 
 available The Bitterness of Seward s Friends after his Defeat .... 27 
 
 A VISIT TO LINCOLN First Impressions of the New President- 
 Ungraceful in Dress and Manner His Homely Ways soon Forgotten 
 in Conversation Lincoln s Midnight Journey The Harrisburg Dinner 
 to Lincoln by Governor Curtin Discussion of a Change of Route 
 Decided against Lincoln s Protest Colonel Scott s Direction of Lin 
 coln s Departure A Night of Painful Anxiety The Cheering Message 
 of Lincoln s Arrival in Washington received 44 
 
 LINCOLN S SORE TRIALS Without Hearty Support from any Party 
 Confused Republican Councils A Discordant Cabinet from the Start 
 How Union Generals Failed A Memorable Conference with General 
 Scott in the White House His Ideas of Protecting the Capital The 
 People Unprepared for War and Unprepared for its Sacrifices .... 59 
 
 LINCOLN S CHARACTERISTICS The most Difficult of Characters 
 to Analyze None but Himself his Parallel He Confided in None 
 without Reservation How Davis, Swett, Lamon, and Herndon Esti 
 mated him The Most Reticent and Secretive of Men He Heard all 
 and Decided for Himself Among the Greatest in Statesmanship and the 
 Master Politician of his Day How his Sagacity Settled the Mollie 
 Maguire Rebellion in Pennsylvania . 72 
 
 LINCOLN IN POLITICS His Masterly Knowledge of Political Strat 
 egy The Supreme Leader of his Party How he held Warring Fac 
 tions to his Support His First Blundering Venture in his Presidential 
 Contest He was Master of Leaders, and not of Details His Inter 
 vention in the Curtin Contest of 1863 How he made James Gordon 
 Bennett his Friend when the Political Horizon was Dark His Strategy 
 in making a Faithless Officer perform his Duty without Provoking Po 
 litical Complications 85 
 
 LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION Willing to Save or Destroy Slav 
 ery to Save the Union Not a Sentimental Abolitionist His Earnest 
 Efforts for Compensated Emancipation Slavery could have been Saved 
 The Suicidal Action of the Border States The Preliminary Procla 
 mation offered Perpetuity to Slavery if the Rebellion ended January I, 
 1863 How the Republic gradually Gravitated to Emancipation Lin 
 coln eloquently Appeals to the Border-State Representatives The Vio 
 lent Destruction of Slavery the most Colossal Suicide of History Ap 
 peals to Lincoln to avoid Political Disasters by Rejecting Emancipation 
 He Builded Better than he Knew .... . 98 
 
 LINCOLN AND HAMLIN Why Lincoln Nominated Johnson in 1864 
 A Southern War Democrat Needed The Gloomy Outlook of the 
 Political Battle Lincoln would have been Defeated at any Time in 1864 
 before the Victories of Sherman at Atlanta and Sheridan in the Valley 
 The Two Campaign Speeches which Decided the Contest made by 
 Sherman and Sheridan The Republican Leaders not in Sympathy with 
 
CONTEXTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Lincoln The Question of Foreign Intervention in Favor of the Con 
 federacy shaped Lincoln s Political Action Hamlin s Letter admitting 
 that Lincoln Defeated him 115 
 
 LINCOLN AND CHASE Secretary Chase the Fly in the Lincoln 
 Ointment His Presidential Ambition He was an Annual Resigner of 
 his Portfolio His Efforts to Defeat Lincoln How Chase s Presidential 
 Movements grieved Lincoln Lincoln s Story about Declining Chase 
 Lincoln s Fears about his Renomination His Final Acceptance of 
 Chase s Resignation Chase s Resolve to Oppose Lincoln s Re-election 
 His Visits to Lincoln after Lincoln s Re-election was Assured He 
 Declared for Lincoln Two Weeks before the Election, and Telegraphed 
 Congratulations from Ohio His Appointment as Chief-Justice violently 
 Opposed 132 
 
 LINCOLN AND CAMERON Cameron s Exceptional Senatorial Hon 
 ors in Pennsylvania The First Man Four Times chosen His Can 
 didacy for President in 1860 His Battle for the Cabinet The Sander 
 son Compact with Davis at Chicago Lincoln Tendered Cameron a 
 Cabinet Portfolio, and Revoked it Three Days later The Convulsive 
 Contest in Pennsylvania Visit to Lincoln, and what he Said Cameron 
 and Slavery His Report as War Minister on Arming Slaves recalled 
 by Lincoln and Revised The True Story of Cameron s Retirement 
 from the Cabinet The Wonderful Political Power Cameron created in 
 Pennsylvania 147 
 
 LINCOLN AND STANTON Stanton s Strange Medley of Attributes 
 The Fiercest and Gentlest of Men Capable of the Grandest and 
 the Meanest Actions Jere McKibben Imprisoned Lincoln releases 
 McKibben from Old Capitol Prison on Parole Stanton s Angry Re 
 sentment The Conflict over McClellan Lincoln Overrules Stanton s 
 Protests Stanton s Refusal to Execute Lincoln s Order Lincoln s An 
 swer : " Mr. Secretary, it will have to be Done" Lincoln s High Ap 
 preciation of Stanton s Public Services He believed Stanton to be the 
 best War Minister he could Obtain Stanton s Conflict with Johnson 
 His Death 170 
 
 LINCOLN AND GRANT Grant s Trouble in Getting a Command- 
 Given an Insubordinate Regiment Popular Demand for Grant s Dis 
 missal after Shiloh Lincoln alone saved Grant " I can t Spare this 
 Man : he Fights " Lincoln s Heroic and Sagacious Methods to restore 
 Grant to Public Confidence Relieved of Command without Reproach 
 Restored when Fighting was Wanted An Incident of the Battle for 
 Lincoln s Re-election Lincoln Distrusted Grant s Fidelity to him 
 "Phil Sheridan; he s all Right" Grant s Explanation Twelve Years 
 later Injustice done to Grant by Lincoln s Distrust Grant as a Con 
 versationalist A Genial Guest in the Social Circle 189 
 
 LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN Their Relations yet Disputed by their 
 Friends How History will Judge them Lincoln a Successful Presi 
 dent: McClellan an Unsuccessful General Lincoln was McClellan s 
 Friend He Hoped that McClellan would again be Commander-in- 
 Chief McClellan s Misfortune in declining Command of the Pennsyl 
 vania Reserves He was Called to the Chief Command when neither 
 Generals nor the Country understood the Magnitude or the Necessities 
 of the War McClellan would have made the Best Confederate Gen 
 eral Why Lincoln Restored him to Command He was the Great Or 
 ganizer of the War Grant the Great Aggressive General : McClellan 
 the Great Defensive General McClellan s Devoted Loyalty and Pa 
 triotism 208 
 
CONTENTS. 23 
 
 PAGE 
 
 LINCOLN AND SHERMAN Sherman at First sadly Disappointed in 
 Lincoln Lincoln s Early Distrust of Sherman Sherman declared a 
 Lunatic because he Understood the War How Time justified his 
 Judgment Sherman won Lincoln and Grant s Confidence at Shiloh 
 Lincoln s Strong Faith in Sherman in his Atlanta Campaign and March 
 to the Sea Sherman s Qualities as a Commander The Atlanta Cam 
 paign the most Brilliant of the War Sherman s Terms of Surrender 
 given to Johnston They were in Exact Accord with Lincoln s Instruc 
 tions given to Sherman at City Point Lincoln and the Virginia Legis 
 lature He did what he Instructed Sherman to do in North Carolina- 
 Lincoln s Views of Reconstruction looked solely to Peace and (Cordial 
 Reunion 227 
 
 LINCOLN AND CURTIN Their First Meeting at Harrisburg, Febru 
 ary 22, 1861 They were Always in Accord Curtin and Sherman the 
 two Men who Wanted Great Armies The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps 
 Rejected by the Government, then frantically Called for The Loyal 
 Governors united to call for More Troops in June, 1862 The Altoona 
 Conference that made the Emancipation Policy Successful Curtin s 
 Conference with Lincoln that brought the Loyal Governors together 
 Lincoln s Fidelity to Curtin in 1863 Curtin and Stanton How Sol 
 diers Orphans Schools Originated Unexampled Expressions of Con 
 fidence in Curtin in 1867 and 1869 by the Unanimous Votes of the Leg 
 islature 248 
 
 LINCOLN AND STEVENS The Executive and Legislative Leaders 
 of the War Stevens the Great Commoner Two Characters so Like 
 and yet so Unlike Humanity Mastered Lincoln Stevens blended Hu 
 manity with Fierce Resentment Lincoln and Stevens s Personal Rela 
 tions always Kind, but seldom Cordial They Worked on the Same 
 Lines, but far Apart The Influence of their Opposing Qualities upon 
 each Other Stevens s vindictive Policy of Reconstruction How it 
 would have Saved the South from Desolation Stevens as a Lawyer 
 His Defense of Hanway Nominated for Congress when Dead His 
 Tomb and Epitaph 277 
 
 LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN The Injustice done to the Memory of 
 Buchanan He was Patriotic and Loyal Lincoln followed Buchanan s 
 Policy until Sumter was Fired on Buchanan s Cabinet Reorganized 
 in Loyalty Judge Black Reversed the Policy of the Administration- 
 Buchanan s Debt to the South He was Elected because he was in 
 Sympathy with Slavery Progression His Federal Strict-Construction 
 Ideas His Prompt and Heroic Action when he saw the South plunge 
 into Rebellion He did not Reinforce the Southern Forts because he 
 had no Troops His Loyalty to Lincoln and to the Country during the 
 War His many Expressions of Lofty Patriotism His Conscientious 
 Discharge of every Public and Private Duty 297 
 
 LINCOLN AND GREELEY One of the most Fretting of Lincoln s 
 Thorns They First met in Congress Greeley Opposed Lincoln s 
 Election over Douglas How Greeley Aided Lincoln in 1860 He 
 Made the First Breach in the Seward Column Greeley s Embarrass 
 ment to Lincoln by advocating Peaceable Secession His Demand that 
 Force should not be employed to Hold any State in the Union Gree 
 ley s " On to Richmond!" Cry, and the Bull Run Disaster His Arro 
 gant Demand for Emancipation His Letter to Lincoln, and Lincoln s 
 Answer Greeley s Hostility to Lincoln s Renomination, and his Reluc 
 tant Support of Lincoln s Re-election The Jewett Peace Fiasco 
 Greeley s Quarrel with Grant His Candidacy for the Presidency in 
 1872 The Cincinnati Convention Greeley s Defeat and Sad Death. 312 
 
24 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID Brown s Visit to Cham- 
 bersburg Known as " Dr. Smith " No Resident of the Town had 
 Knowledge or Intimation of his Virginia Raid List of Brown s 
 Harper s Ferry Raiders Capture of John E. Cook Dan Logan cap 
 tured Cook in South Mountain Ill-fated in several Chances to Escape 
 His Trial and Execution 77 < 
 
 OUR UNREWARDED HEROES George G. Meade, George H. 
 Thomas, Fitz John Porter, G. K. Warren, and D. C. Buell Meade 
 and Thomas denied Just Honors Porter, Warren, and Buell Dis 
 graced by the Passion of Power The Heroes of Gettysburg and Nash 
 ville The Reluctant Atonement done to the Humiliated Soldiers 
 Meade s Soldierly Qualities at Gettysburg His Heroic Character in 
 every Military Trial Thomas s Disfavor with the Ruling Military 
 Power His Soldierly Ability displayed at Nashville His Great Vic 
 tory won when he had been Relieved of his Command Porter s Cruel 
 and Brutal Conviction by a Packed Tribunal His Aggressive Loyalty 
 at Harrisburg His Courage and Skill as a Commander His Final 
 Complete Vindication and Restoration to Rank Warren s Unjust Dis 
 missal from Command in the Last Battle of the War How Military 
 Hatred smote him when he had done most to Win Victory His Sad 
 Death before his Vindication Buell s Wise and Heroic Campaign in 
 Kentucky and Tennessee He Saved Grant from Annihilation Re 
 lieved from Command by the Partisan Clamor of the Time The Rec 
 ords of his Military Commission suppressed for Ten Years Stanton s 
 Effort at Atonement ?rr 
 
 BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES The First Murmurs of the Civil 
 War The Strain upon the Border People Raids and Battles con 
 stantly Disturbing them How War Despoiled them Stuart s First 
 Great Raid of the War An Interesting Evening with Confederates 
 How Hospitality saved the Host from Capture Incidents of the Battle 
 of Antietam Lee s Gettysburg Campaign The Unknown Scout who 
 gave First Information of Lee s Advance on Gettysburg A Confed 
 erate Hospital Incident The Fierce Passions of Civil War The De 
 struction of Chambersburg by McCausland How a Soldier s Wife 
 Saved her Home The Surrender of Lee Rest for the Border . . . 390 
 
 THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS Its Peculiar Relations 
 to the State as a Distinct Organization Its many Heroic Commanders : 
 McCall, Meade, Reynolds, Ord, and Crawford It Won the First Vic 
 tory for the Army of the Potomac at Dranesville Under McDowell 
 Bayard s Flying Brigade The Reserves Ten Thousand Strong when 
 the Peninsula Battles began Heroic Defense at Games Mills and 
 Mechanicsville Always Fighting on the Retreat to the James River 
 McCall and Reynolds Captured and Fourteen Hundred Reserves Killed 
 or Wounded In the Second Bull Run Campaign under Reynolds 
 Complimented by Pope In the Antietam Campaign under Meade 
 First to Open the Battle Opened the Fight at Fredericksburg, but not 
 Supported Ordered to Washington Crawford called to Command 
 Crawford s Successful Appeal to get the Reserves in the Chancellors- 
 ville Campaign The Bloody Struggle for Round Top .t Gettysburg 
 The Reserves Win it, and were Last in Action on the Field At Mine 
 Run In the Wilderness Campaign The Last Battles of the Gallant 
 Reserves Crawford s Farewell Address Most of them Re-enlist 
 Only Twelve Hundred Officers and Men return 423 
 
 APPENDIX The Nicolay-McClure Controversy 457 
 
 INDEX 483 
 
OP UNCOLN S BETTER OF ACCEPTANCE. 
 
 [Copied from " Abraham lyincoln ; A History," by permission of its authors.] 
 
LINCOLN IN 1860. 
 
 IT was the unexpected that happened in Chicago on 
 that fateful i8th of May, 1860, when Abraham 
 Lincoln was nominated for President of the United 
 States. It was wholly unexpected by the friends of 
 Seward; it was hoped for, but not confidently expected, 
 by the friends of Lincoln. The convention was the 
 ablest assembly of the kind ever called together in this 
 country. It was the first national deliberative body of 
 the Republican party that was to attain such illustrious 
 achievements in the history of free government. The 
 first national convention of that party, held in Phila 
 delphia in 1856, was composed of a loose aggregation 
 of political free-thinkers, embracing many usually de 
 nominated as " cranks." The party was without organ 
 ization or cohesion; its delegates were self-appointed and 
 responsible to no regular constituency. It was the sud 
 den eruption of the intense resentment of the people 
 of the North against the encroachments of slavery in 
 Northern Territories, and neither in the character of 
 its leaders nor in the record of its proceedings did it 
 rank as a distinctively deliberative body. It nomi 
 nated a romantic adventurer for President a man un 
 tried in statesmanship and who had done little to 
 commend him to the considerate judgment of the 
 
 nation as its Chief Magistrate in a period of uncom- 
 
 27 
 
28 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 mon peril. The campaign that followed was one of 
 unusual brilliancy, and resulted in anchoring nearly all 
 of the old Democratic States of the West in the Repub 
 lican column. In 1860 the principles of the Republican 
 party had been clearly denned; its organization had been 
 perfected in every Northern State, and each delegate 
 to that convention at Chicago was regularly chosen and 
 represented a great party inspired by a devotion to its 
 faith that has seldom been equaled and never surpassed 
 in all our political history. The halo of romance that 
 encircled General Fremont, the Pathfinder, four 
 years before had perished, and he was unthought of as 
 a candidate. 
 
 For nearly two years before the meeting of the Chicago 
 Convention in 1860 the Republican party had one pre 
 eminent leader who was recognized as the coming can 
 didate for President. The one man who had done most 
 to inspire and crystallize the Republican organization 
 was William H. Seward of New York. Certainly, two- 
 thirds of the delegates chosen to the convention pre 
 ferred him for President, and a decided majority went 
 to Chicago expecting to vote for his nomination. Had 
 the convention been held in any other place than 
 Chicago, it is quite probable that Seward would have 
 been successful; but every circumstance seemed to con 
 verge to his defeat when the delegates came face to face 
 in Chicago to solve the problem of a Republican national 
 victory. Of the 231 men who voted for Lincoln on the 
 third and last ballot, not less than 100 of them voted 
 reluctantly against the candidate of their choice. It 
 was a Republican-Seward convention; it was not a Sew- 
 ard-Republican convention. With all its devotion to 
 Seward it yielded to a higher devotion to Republican 
 success, and that led to the nomination of Abraham 
 Lincoln. 
 
LINCOLN IN i860. 29 
 
 I have read scores of magazine and newspaper articles 
 assuming- to explain how and why Lincoln was nomi 
 nated at Chicago in 1860. Few of them approach ac 
 curacy, and no one of them that I can recall tells the 
 true story. Lincoln was not seriously thought of for 
 President until but a few weeks before the meeting of 
 the National Convention. Blaine has truly said that the 
 State Convention of Illinois, held but a short time before 
 the meeting of the National Convention, was surprised 
 at its own spontaneous and enthusiastic nomination of 
 Lincoln. He had been canvassed at home and in other 
 States as a more than possible candidate for Vice- Presi 
 dent. I well remember Lincoln mentioning the fact 
 that his own delegation from Illinois was not unitedly in 
 earnest for his nomination, but when the time came for 
 casting their votes the enthusiasm for Lincoln in Chicago, 
 both inside and outside the convention, was such that 
 they could do no less than give him the united vote of 
 the State. Leonard Swett, who was one of the most 
 potent of the Lincoln leaders in that struggle, in a letter 
 written to Mr. Drummond on the 27th of May, 1860, in 
 which he gives a detailed account of the battle made for 
 Lincoln, states that 8 of the 22 delegates from Illinois 
 would gladly have gone for Seward. Thus, not only 
 in many of the other States did Lincoln receive reluc 
 tant votes in that convention, but even his own State 
 furnished a full share of votes which would have been 
 gladly given to Seward had he been deemed available. 
 The first breach made in the then apparently invin 
 cible columns of Seward was made by Horace Greeley. 
 His newspaper, the Tribune, was then vastly the most 
 influential public journal on the continent, and equaled 
 in the world only by the Times of London. His battle 
 against Seward was waged with tireless energy and con 
 summate skill. It was not then known that he had 
 
30 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 separated from immediate political association with Sew- 
 ard and Weed. Had his relations with those gentlemen 
 been fully understood then, as they were soon after the 
 convention, when Greeley s memorable letter of political 
 dissolution was given to the public, it would have greatly 
 impaired his influence in opposing Seward. But I think 
 it just to Greeley to say that, independent of all real or 
 imaginary wrongs from Seward and Weed, he was hon 
 estly convinced that Seward was not an available candi 
 date in 1860. He espoused the cause of Edward Bates 
 of Missouri, who was a man of most distinguished cha 
 racter and ability, and whose record appealed very 
 strongly to the more conservative elements of the party. 
 Indeed, the nomination of Bates would have been within 
 the lines of possibility, instead of the nomination of 
 Lincoln, had the convention been surrounded by local 
 influences in his favor as potent as were the local influ 
 ences for the successful candidate. The Pennsylvania 
 delegation in determining its final choice gave Lincoln 
 barely four majority over Bates, and but for the fact that 
 Indiana had decided to give unanimous support to Lin 
 coln at an early stage of the contest, Bates would have 
 been a much more formidable candidate than he now 
 appears to have been by the records of the convention. 
 The defeat of Seward and the nomination of Lincoln 
 were brought about by two men Andrew G. Curtin of 
 Pennsylvania, and Henry S. Lane of Indiana, and neither 
 accident nor intrigue was a material factor in the strug 
 gle. * They not only defeated Seward in a Seward con- 
 
 * Mrs. Henry S. Lane to the Author, September 16, 1891 : " J 
 read with the greatest interest your excellent article in the St. 
 Louis Globe- Democrat, giving a history of the convention which 
 nominated Lincoln. I thank you for the kindly mention of Mr. 
 Lane s name in that memorable convention. So man}- different 
 versions of the same have been given the public (with many mis- 
 
LINCOLN IN i860. 3 1 
 
 vention, but they decided the contest in favor of Lincoln 
 against Bates, his only real competitor after Seward. 
 Curtin had been nominated for Governor in Pennsyl 
 vania and I v ane had been nominated for Governor in 
 Indiana. The States in which their battles were to be 
 fought were the pivotal States of the national contest. 
 It was an accepted necessity that both Pennsylvania and 
 Indiana should elect Republican Governors in October to 
 secure the election of the Republican candidate for Presi 
 dent in November. Curtin and Lane were naturally the 
 most interested of all the great host that attended the 
 Chicago Convention in 1860. Neither of their States 
 was Republican. In Pennsylvania the name of Repub 
 lican could not be adopted by the party that had chosen 
 Curtin for Governor. The call for the convention sum 
 moned the opposition to the Democratic party to attend 
 the People s State Convention, and all shades of antago 
 nism to the administration then in power were invited to 
 cordial and equal participation in the deliberations of 
 that body. The Republicans had made a distinct battle 
 
 takes) that I was glad to see a true one published to vindicate 
 the truth of history. 
 
 " I was with my husband in Chicago, and may tell you now, 
 as most of the actors have joined the silent majority, what no 
 living person knows, that Thurlow Weed, in his anxiety for the 
 success of Se\vard, took Mr. Lane out one evening and pleaded 
 with him to lead the Indiana delegation over to Seward, saying 
 they would send enough money from New York to ensure his 
 election for Governor, and carry the State later for the New York 
 candidate. 
 
 " His proposal was indignantly rejected, as there was neither 
 money nor influence enough in their State to change my hus 
 band s opinion in regard to the fitness and availability of Mr. 
 Lincoln for the nomination, and with zeal and energy he worked 
 faithfully for his election, remained his firm friend through his 
 administration till the end came and death crystallized his fame. 
 With sincere thanks, respectfully." 
 
32 . LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 for Governor three years before, with David Wilmot as 
 their candidate, against Isaac Hazelhurst, the American 
 candidate, and William F. Packer, the Democratic can 
 didate. The result was the election of Packer by a 
 majority over the combined votes of both the opposing 
 nominees. The American organization was maintained 
 in Philadelphia and in many of the counties of the State. 
 Fillmore had received a large majority of the votes cast 
 for the Fremont-Fillmore Fusion Electoral ticket in 1856 
 in various sections. These elements had been combined 
 in what was then called the People s party in Pennsyl 
 vania in the State elections of 1858 and 1859, an< ^ the 
 Democrats had been defeated by the combination, but 
 the American element remained very powerful and quite 
 intense in many localities. Without its aid the success 
 of Curtin was simply impossible. A like condition of 
 things existed in Indiana. The American element had 
 polled over 22,000 votes for Fillmore in 1856, and in 
 1858, when the same effort was made in Indiana to unite 
 all shades of opposition to the Democracy, the combina 
 tion was defeated by a small majority. While the anti- 
 slavery sentiment asserted itself by the election of a 
 majority of Republicans to Congress in 1858, the entire 
 Democratic State ticket was successful by majorities 
 varying from 1534 to 2896. It was evident, therefore, 
 that in both Pennsylvania and Indiana there would be a 
 desperate battle for the control of the October election, 
 and it was well known by all that if the Republicans 
 failed to elect either Curtin or Lane the Presidential 
 battle would be irretrievably lost. 
 
 Both of the candidates presented in these two pivotal 
 States were men of peculiar fitness for the arduous task 
 they had assumed. Both were admittedly the strongest 
 men that could have been nominated by the opposition 
 to the Democracy, and both were experienced and con- 
 
LINCOLN IN i860. 33 
 
 stimulate politicians. Their general knowledge of poli 
 tics and of the bearing of all political questions likely to 
 be felt in the contest made them not only wise counsel 
 ors, but all appreciated the fact that they were of all men 
 the most certain to advise solely with reference to suc 
 cess. Neither of them cared whether Seward, Lincoln, 
 Bates, or any of the other men named for President 
 should be nominated, if the man chosen was certain to 
 be the most available. They were looking solely to their 
 own success in October, and their success meant the suc 
 cess of the Republican party in the nation. With Lane 
 was John D. Defrees, chairman of his State committee, 
 who had been called to that position because he was re 
 garded as best fitted to lead in the desperate contest 
 before him. I was with Curtin and interested as he was 
 only in his individual success, as he had summoned me 
 to take charge of his October battle in Pennsylvania. 
 The one thing that Curtin, Lane, and their respective 
 lieutenants agreed upon was that the nomination of 
 Seward meant hopeless defeat in their respective States. 
 Lane and Defrees were positive in the assertion that the 
 nomination of Seward would lose the Governorship in 
 Indiana. Curtin and I were equally positive in declar 
 ing that the nomination of Seward would defeat Curtin 
 in Pennsylvania. 
 
 There was no personal hostility to Seward in the efforts 
 made by Curtin and Lane to defeat him. They had no 
 reason whatever to hinder his nomination, excepting the 
 settled conviction that the nomination of Seward meant 
 their own inevitable defeat. It is not true, as has been 
 assumed by many, that the objection to Seward was be 
 cause of his radical or advanced position in Republican 
 faith. It was not Se ward s "irrepressible conflict" or 
 his "higher-law" declarations which made Curtin and 
 Lane oppose him as the Republican candidate. On the 
 3 
 
34 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 contrary, both of them were thoroughly anti-slavery 
 men, and they finally accepted Lincoln with the full 
 knowledge that he was even in advance of Seward in 
 forecasting- the "irrepressible conflict" Lincoln an 
 nounced in his memorable Springfield speech, delivered 
 on the 1 7th of June, 1858, U A house divided against 
 itself cannot stand ; I believe this Government cannot 
 endure permanently half slave and half free," and 
 Seward s "irrepressible-conflict" speech was not deliv 
 ered until the 25th of October. * Lincoln was not only 
 fully abreast with Seward, but in advance of him in 
 forecasting the great battle against slavery. The single 
 reason that compelled Curtin and Lane to make aggres 
 sive resistance to the nomination of Seward was his atti 
 tude on the school question, that was very offensive to 
 the many thousands of voters in their respective States, 
 who either adhered to the American organization or 
 cherished its strong prejudices against any division of 
 the school fund. It was Seward s record on that single 
 question when Governor of New York that made him an 
 
 * It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring 
 forces, and it means that the United States must and will, sooner 
 or later, .become either entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely 
 a free-labor nation .SewanVs speech at Rochester, October 25, 1858. 
 
 But there is a higher law than the Constitution which regu 
 lates our authority over the domain and devotes it to the same 
 noble purposes. The territory is a part, no inconsiderable part, 
 of the common heritage of mankind bestowed upon them by the 
 Creator of the universe. We are His stewards, and must so dis 
 charge our trust as to secure, in the highest obtainable degree, 
 their happiness. Seivard" s Senate speech, March n, 1850. 
 
 " A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this 
 Government cannot endure permanently one half slave and one 
 half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved ; I do not 
 expect the house to fall ; but I do expect it will cease to be di 
 vided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Lincoln s 
 Springfield speech, June 17, 1858. 
 
LINCOLN IN i860. 35 
 
 impossible candidate for President in 1860, unless he was 
 to be nominated simply to be defeated. Had lie been 
 nominated, the American element in Pennsylvania and 
 Indiana would not only have maintained its organi 
 zation, but it would have largely increased its strength 
 on the direct issue of hostility to Seward. It was not 
 an unreasonable apprehension, therefore, that inspired 
 Curtin and Lane to protest with all earnestness against 
 the nomination of Seward. There could be no question 
 as to the sincerity of the Republican candidates for Gov 
 ernor in the two pivotal States when they declared that 
 a particular nomination would doom them to defeat, 
 and it was Andrew G. Curtin and Henry S. Lane whose 
 earnest admonitions to the delegates at Chicago com 
 pelled a Seward convention to halt in its purpose and set 
 him aside, with all his pre-eminent qualifications and 
 with all the enthusiastic devotion of his party to him. 
 It was Curtin and Lane also who decided that Lincoln 
 should be the candidate after Seward had been practi 
 cally overthrown. When it became known that Sew 
 ard s nomination would defeat the party in Pennsylvania 
 and Indiana, the natural inquiry was, Who can best aid 
 these candidates for Governor in their State contests? 
 Indiana decided in favor of Lincoln at an early stage 
 of the struggle, and her action had much to do in de 
 ciding Pennsylvania s support of Lincoln. The Penn 
 sylvania delegation had much less knowledge of Lincoln 
 than the men from Indiana, and there were very few 
 original supporters of Lincoln among them. Wilmot 
 was for Lincoln from the start; Stevens was for Judge 
 McLean; Reeder was for General Cameron. The dele 
 gation was not a harmonious one, because of the hos 
 tility of a considerable number of the delegates to 
 Cameron for President, and it was not until the first 
 day that the convention met that Pennsylvania got into 
 
36 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 anything like a potential attitude. At a meeting of the 
 delegation it was proposed that the first, second, and 
 third choice of the delegates for President should be 
 formally declared. It is needless to say that this propo 
 sition did not come from the earnest supporters of 
 Cameron, but it was coupled with the suggestion that 
 Cameron should be unanimously declared the first choice 
 of the State; which was done. Stevens was stubbornly 
 for McLean, and had a considerable following. He 
 asked that McLean be declared the second choice of the 
 State, and, as McLean was then known to be practically 
 out of the fight, he was given substantially a unanimous 
 vote as the second choice. The third choice to be ex 
 pressed by the delegation brought the State down to 
 practical business, as it was well known that both the 
 first and second choice were mere perfunctory declara 
 tions. The battle came then between Bates and Lin 
 coln, and but for the facts that Indiana had previously 
 declared for Lincoln, and that Curtin and Lane were 
 acting in concert, there is little reason to doubt that 
 Bates would have been preferred. Much feeling was 
 exhibited in deciding the third choice of the State, and 
 Lincoln finally won over Bates by four majority. When 
 it became known that Pennsylvania had indicated Lin 
 coln as her third choice, it gave a wonderful impetus to 
 the Lincoln cause. Cameron and McLean were not 
 seriously considered, and what was nominally the third 
 choice of the State was accepted as really the first choice 
 among possible candidates. The slogan of the Lincoln 
 workers was soon heard on every side, "Pennsylvania s 
 for Lincoln," and from the time that Pennsylvania 
 ranged herself along with Indiana in support of Lincoln 
 not only was Seward s defeat inevitable, but the nomi 
 nation of Lincoln was practically assured. Thus did 
 two men Curtin and Lane not only determine Sew- 
 
LINCOLN IN i860. 37 
 
 ard s defeat, but they practically determined the nomi 
 nation of Lincoln. 
 
 Notwithstanding the substantial advantages gained by 
 the supporters of Lincoln in the preliminary struggles 
 at Chicago, the fight for Seward was maintained with 
 desperate resolve until the final ballot was taken. It 
 was indeed a battle of giants. Thurlow Weed was the 
 Seward leader, and he was simply incomparable as a 
 master in handling a convention. With him were such 
 able lieutenants as Governor Morgan, and Raymond of 
 the New York Times, with Hvarts as chairman of the 
 delegation, whose speech nominating Seward was the 
 most impressive utterance of his life. The Bates men 
 were led by Frank Blair, the only Republican Congress 
 man from a slave State, who was nothing if not heroic, 
 aided by his brother Montgomery, who was a politician 
 of uncommon cunning. With them was Horace Gree- 
 k y, who was chairman of the delegation from the then 
 almost inaccessible State of Oregon. It was Lincoln s 
 friends, however, who were the hustlers of that 
 battle. They had men for sober counsel like David 
 Davis ; men of supreme sagacity like Leonard Swett; 
 men of tireless effort like Norman B. Judd ; and they 
 had what was more important than all a seething mul 
 titude wild with enthusiasm for Abraham Lincoln. For 
 once Thurlow Weed was outgeneraled just at a critical 
 stage of the battle. On the morning of the third day, 
 when the final struggle was to be made, the friends of 
 Seward got up an imposing demonstration on the streets 
 of Chicago. They had bands and banners, immense 
 numbers, and generous enthusiasm; but while the Sew 
 ard men were thus making a public display of their 
 earnestness and strength, Swett and Judd filled the im 
 mense galleries of the wigwam, in which the convention 
 was held, with men who were ready to shout to the echo 
 
38 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 for Lincoln whenever opportunity offered. The result 
 was that when the Seward men filed into the convention 
 there were seats for the delegates, but few for any others, 
 and the convention was encircled by an immense throng 
 that made the wigwam tremble with its cheers for the 
 "rail-splitter." 
 
 Twelve names had been put in nomination for Presi 
 dent, but the first ballot developed to the comprehension 
 of all that the struggle was between Seward and Lincoln. 
 Seward had received 173^2 votes and Lincoln 102. The 
 other votes scattered between ten candidates, the highest 
 of whom (Cameron) received 50^, all of which were from 
 Pennsylvania with the exception of 3. Cameron s name 
 was at once withdrawn, and on the second ballot Seward 
 rose to 184^, with Lincoln closely following at 181, but 
 both lacking the 233 votes necessary to a choice. The 
 third ballot was taken amid breathless excitement, with 
 Lincoln steadily gaining and Seward now and then 
 losing, and when the ballot ended Lincoln had 231^ 
 to 180 for Seward. Lincoln lacked but 2^/2 votes of a 
 majority. His nomination was now inevitable, and be 
 fore the result was announced there was a general 
 scramble to change from the candidates on the scatter 
 ing list to Lincoln. Cartter of Ohio was the first to 
 obtain recognition, and he changed four Ohio votes 
 from Chase to Lincoln, which settled the nomination. 
 Maine followed, changing ten votes from Seward to 
 Lincoln. Andrew of Massachusetts and Gratz Brown 
 of Missouri next came with changes to the Lincoln 
 column, and they continued until Lincoln s vote was 
 swelled to 354.* 
 
 * The following were the ballots for President : 
 
 First. Second. Third. 
 
 Lincoln ....... 102 181 
 
 Seward ........ 173^ 184^ 180 
 
LINCOLN IN i860. 39 
 
 As soon as Ohio gave the necessary number of votes 
 to Lincoln to nominate him a huge charcoal portrait 
 of the candidate was suddenly displayed from the gallery 
 of the wigwam, and the whole convention, with the 
 exception of the New York delegation, was whirled to 
 its feet by the enthusiasm that followed. It was many 
 minutes before the convention could be sufficiently 
 calmed to proceed with business. The New York dele 
 gates had kept their seats in sullen silence during all 
 this eruption of enthusiasm for Lincoln, and it was long- 
 even after quiet had been restored that Evarts tall form 
 was recognized to move that the nomination be declared 
 unanimous. He was promptly seconded by Andrew of 
 Massachusetts, who was also an ardent supporter of 
 Seward, and the motion was adopted with a wild hurrah 
 that came spontaneously from every part of the conven 
 tion excepting the several lines of seats occupied by the 
 seventy delegates from New York. Mr. Evarts motion 
 for a recess was unanimously carried, and the convention 
 and its vast audience of spectators hurried out to make 
 
 Cameron 
 
 First. 
 
 Second. 
 2 
 
 Third 
 
 Bates . . , 
 
 Chase . 
 
 . 48 
 in 
 
 35 
 
 A 2 ^2 
 
 22 
 
 24 
 
 jVIcIvean 
 
 I ^ 
 
 8 
 
 r 
 
 Dayton . . 
 
 ...... 14 
 
 10 
 
 I 
 
 Collamer 
 Wade , . , 
 Read . . 
 
 3* 
 i 
 
 
 
 Simmer . 
 Fremont 
 Clav 
 
 i 
 
 ? 
 
 I 
 
 Before the third ballot was announced changes were made to 
 Lincoln, giving him 354 votes, or 120 more than the number 
 necessary to nominate. 
 
 * Withdrawn. 
 
4 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 the streets ring with shouts for the Illinois candidate 
 for President. 
 
 Until after the nomination of Lincoln little attention 
 had been given to the contest for Vice-President. Had 
 Seward been nominated, Lincoln would have been unan 
 imously tendered the second place on the ticket, but 
 with Lincoln nominated for the first place the leading 
 friends of Lincoln at once suggested to the friends of 
 Seward that they should name the candidate for the 
 Vice- Presidency. Mr. Greeley was sent to Governor 
 Morgan to proffer the nomination to him if he would 
 accept it, or in case of his refusal to ask him to name 
 some man who would be acceptable to the friends of 
 Seward. Governor Morgan not only declined to accept 
 it himself, but he declined to suggest any one of Sew 
 ard s friends for the place. Not only Governor Morgan, 
 but Mr. Evarts and Mr. Weed, all refused to be con 
 sulted on the subject of the Vice-Presidency, and they 
 did it in a temper that indicated contempt for the action 
 of the convention. Hamlin was nominated, not because 
 Seward desired it, for New York gave him a bare major 
 ity on the first ballot, but because he was then the most 
 prominent of the Democratic-Republicans in the East. 
 The contest was really between Hamlin and Cassius M. 
 Clay. Clay was supported chiefly because he was a resi 
 dent of a Southern State and to relieve the party from 
 the charge of presenting a sectional ticket ; but as there 
 were no Southern electoral votes to be fought for, Ham 
 lin was wisely preferred, and he was nominated on the 
 second ballot by a vote of 367 to 86 for Clay.* Not- 
 
 * The following were the ballots for Vice-President : 
 
 First. Second. 
 
 Hamlin 194 367 
 
 Clay ioiK 86 
 
 Hickman 58 18 
 
LINCOLN IN i860. 4 1 
 
 withstanding Governor Morgan s keen disappointment 
 at the defeat of Seward, he was easily prevailed upon to 
 remain at the head of the National Committee, thus 
 charging him with the management of the national 
 campaign. 
 
 I called on Thurlow Weed at his headquarters during 
 the evening after the nominations had been made, ex 
 pecting that, with all his disappointment, he would be 
 ready tc co-operate for the success of the ticket. I found 
 him sullen, and offensive in both manner and expression. 
 He refused even to talk about the contest, and intimated 
 very broadly that Pennsylvania, having defeated Seward, 
 could now elect Curtin and Lincoln. Governor Curtin 
 also visited Mr. Weed before he left Chicago, but re 
 ceived no word of encouragement from the disappointed 
 Seward leader. * Weed had been defeated in his greatest 
 effort, and the one great dream of his life had perished. 
 He never forgave Governor Curtin until the day of his 
 death, nor did Seward maintain any more than severely 
 civil relations with Curtin during the whole time that he 
 was at the head of the State Department. I called on 
 
 First. Second. 
 
 Reeder 51* 
 
 Banks 38)^* . . 
 
 Davis (Henry Winter) . . . 8* 
 
 Dayton 3 
 
 Houston 3 
 
 Read i 
 
 * Withdrawn. 
 
 * I called on Morgan the night after the nomination was 
 made. He treated me civilly, but with marked coolness, and I 
 then called on Weed, who was very rude indeed. He said to me, 
 "You have defeated the man who of all others was most revered 
 by the people and wanted as President. You and Lane want to 
 be elected, and to elect Lincoln you must elect yourselves." 
 That was all, and I left him. Governor Curtin s Letter to the 
 Author, August 18, 1891. 
 
4 2 LINCOLN AND AfEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Seward but once after the organization of the Lincoln 
 Cabinet, and not for the purpose of soliciting any favors 
 from him, but he was so frigid that I never ventured to 
 trespass upon him again. Three months after the Chi 
 cago convention, when the battle in Pennsylvania was 
 raging with desperation on both sides, I twice wrote to 
 Weed giving the condition of affairs in the State and 
 urging the co-operation of himself and Chairman Mor 
 gan to assure the success of the ticket in October. He 
 made no response to either letter, and it so happened 
 chat we never met thereafter during his life. 
 
 The contest in Pennsylvania was really the decisive 
 battle of the national campaign. A party had to be 
 created out of inharmonious elements, and the commer 
 cial and financial interests of the State were almost sol 
 idly against us. I cannot recall five commercial houses 
 of prominence in the city of Philadelphia where I could 
 have gone to solicit a subscription to the Lincoln cam 
 paign with reasonable expectation that it would not be 
 resented, and of all our prominent financial men I recall 
 only Anthony J. Drexel who actively sympathized with 
 the Republican cause. Money would have been useless 
 for any but legitimate purposes, but the organization of 
 a great State to crystallize incongruous elements was an 
 immense task and involved great labor and expense. I 
 visited Chairman Morgan in New York, presented the 
 situation to him, but he was listless and indifferent, and 
 not one dollar of money was contributed from New York 
 State to aid the Curtin contest in Pennsylvania. The 
 entire contributions for the State committee for that great 
 battle aggregated only $12,000, of which $2000 were a 
 contribution for rent of headquarters and $3000 were 
 expended in printing. Three weeks before the election, 
 when I felt reasonably confident of the success of the 
 State ticket, I again visited Governor Morgan, and met 
 
LINCOLN IN i860. 43 
 
 with him Moses Taylor and one or two others, and they 
 were finally so much impressed with the importance of 
 carrying a Republican Congress that they agreed to raise 
 $4300 and send it direct to some six or seven debatable 
 Congressional districts I indicated. Beyond this aid ren 
 dered to Pennsylvania from New York the friends of Mr. 
 Seward took no part whatever in the great October bat 
 tle that made Abraham Lincoln President. Cnrtin was 
 elected by a majority of 32,164, and Lane was elected in 
 Indiana by 9757. With Curtin the Republicans carried 
 19 of the 25 Congressmen, and with Lane the Republi 
 cans of Indiana carried 7 of the n Congressmen of that 
 State. Thus was the election of a Republican President 
 substantially accomplished in October by the success of 
 the two men who had defeated William H. Seward and 
 nominated Abraham Lincoln at Chicago. 
 
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 
 
 I NEVER met Abraham Lincoln until early in Janu 
 ary, 1 86 1, some two months after his election to the 
 Presidency. I had been brought into very close #nd con 
 fidential relations with him by correspondence during the 
 Pennsylvania campaign of 1860. His letters were fre 
 quent, and always eminently practical, on the then su 
 preme question of electing the Republican State ticket 
 in October. It was believed on all sides that unless 
 Pennsylvania could be carried in October, Lincoln s de 
 feat would be certain in November. Pennsylvania was 
 thus accepted as the key to Republican success, and Lin 
 coln naturally watched the struggle with intense interest. 
 In accordance with his repeated solicitations, he was ad 
 vised from the headquarters of the State Committee, of 
 which I was chairman, of all the varied phases of the 
 struggle. It soon became evident from his inquiries and 
 versatile suggestions that he took nothing for granted. 
 He had to win the preliminary battle in October, and he 
 left nothing undone within his power to ascertain the 
 exact situation and to understand every peril involved 
 in it. 
 
 The Republican party in Pennsylvania, although then 
 but freshly organized, had many different elements and 
 bitter factional feuds within its own household, and all 
 who actively participated in party efforts were more or 
 less involved in them. I did not entirely escape the bit- 
 44 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 ABRAHAM UNCOIL-, 1850. 
 
46 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES, 
 
 terness that was displayed in many quarters. Had I 
 been simply a private in the ranks, it would have been 
 of little consequence to Lincoln whether I was compe 
 tent to conduct so important a campaign or not ; but 
 when he was advised, not only from within the State, 
 but from friends outside the State as well, that the party 
 organization in Pennsylvania was not equal to the press 
 ing necessities of the occasion, he adopted his own cha 
 racteristic methods to satisfy himself on the subject. 
 
 I had met David Davis and Leonard Swett for the first 
 time at the Chicago Convention, and of course we knew 
 little of each other personally. Some time toward mid 
 summer, when the campaign in Pennsylvania was well 
 under way, Davis and Swett entered my headquarters 
 together and handed me a letter from Lincoln, in which 
 he said that these gentlemen were greatly interested in 
 his election that they were on East looking into the 
 contest generally, and he would be pleased if I would 
 furnish them every facility to ascertain the condition of 
 affairs in the State. I was very glad to do so, and the> 
 spent two days at my headquarters, where even* informa 
 tion was given them and the methods and progress of the 
 organization opened to them without reserve. They saw 
 that for the first time in the history of Pennsylvania poli 
 tics the new party had been organized by the State Com 
 mittee in every election district of the State, and that 
 everything that could be done had been done to put the 
 party in condition for a successful battle. 
 
 After Davis and Swett had finished their work and 
 notified me of their purpose to leave during the night, 
 they invited me to a private dinner at which none were 
 present but ourselves. During the course of the dinner 
 Swett informed me that they were very happy now to be 
 able to tell me the real purpose of their mission that 
 had their information been less satisfactory they would 
 
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 47 
 
 have returned without advising me of it. He said that 
 they had been instructed by Lincoln to come to Pennsyl 
 vania and make personal examination into the condition 
 of affairs, especially as to the efficiency of the party 
 organization of the State, and that his reason for doing 
 so was that he had been admonished that the direction 
 of the campaign by the State Committee was incompe 
 tent and likely to result in disaster. They added that, 
 inasmuch as their answer to Lincoln must be that the 
 organization was the best that they had ever known in 
 any State, they felt entirely at liberty to disclose to me 
 why they had come and what the result of their inquiry 
 was. 
 
 After their return to Illinois letters from Lincoln were 
 not less frequent, and they were entirely confident in 
 tone and exhibited the utmost faith in the direction of 
 the great Pennsylvania battle. I twice sent him during 
 the campaign once about the middle of August, and 
 again in the latter part of September a carefully-pre 
 pared estimate of the vote for Governor by counties that 
 had been made up by a methodical and reasonably accu 
 rate canvass of each election district of the State. The 
 first gave Governor Curtin a majority of 12,000, leaving 
 out of the estimate a considerable doubtful vote. The 
 last estimate gave Curtin a majority of 17,000, also omit 
 ting the doubtful contingent. The result not only justi 
 fied the estimates which had been sent to him in the 
 aggregate majority, but it justified the detailed estimates 
 of the vote of nearly or quite every county in the State. 
 
 Curtin s majority was nearly double the last estimate 
 given him because of the drift of the doubtful vote to 
 our side, and, being successful in what was regarded as 
 the decisive battle of the campaign, Lincoln accorded me 
 more credit than I merited. From that time until the 
 day of his death I was one of those he called into coun- 
 
48 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 sel in every important political emergency. Much as I 
 grieved over the loss of the many to me precious things 
 which I had gathered about my home in Chambersburg, 
 and serious as was the destruction of all my property 
 when the vandals of McCausland burned the town in 
 1864, I have always felt that the greatest loss I sustained 
 was in the destruction of my entire correspondence with 
 Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 About the ist of January, 1861, I received a telegram 
 from Lincoln requesting me to come to Springfield. It 
 is proper to say that this invitation was in answer to a 
 telegram from me advising him against the appointment 
 of General Cameron as Secretary of War. The factional 
 feuds and bitter antagonisms of that day have long since 
 perished, and I do not purpose in any way to revive 
 them. On the 3ist of December, Lincoln had delivered 
 to Cameron at Springfield a letter notifying him that he 
 would be nominated for a Cabinet position. This fact 
 became known immediately upon Cameron s return, and 
 inspired very vigorous opposition to his appointment, in 
 which Governor Curtin, Thaddeus Stevens, David Wil- 
 mot, and many others participated. Although the Sen 
 ate, of which I was a member, was just about to organize, 
 I hastened to Springfield and reached there at seven 
 o clock in the evening. I had telegraphed Lincoln of 
 the hour that I should arrive and that I must return at 
 eleven the same night. I went directly from the depot 
 to Lincoln s house and rang the bell, which was answered 
 by Lincoln himself opening the door. I doubt whether 
 I wholly concealed my disappointment at meeting him. 
 Tall, gaunt, ungainly, ill clad, with a homeliness of 
 manner that was unique in itself, I confess that my heart 
 sank within me as I remembered that this was the man 
 chosen by a great nation to become its ruler in the grav 
 est period of its history. I remember his dress as if it 
 
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 49 
 
 were but yesterday snuff-colored and slouchy panta 
 loons ; open black vest, held by a few brass buttons ; 
 straight or evening dress-coat, with tightly-fitting sleeves 
 to exaggerate his long, bony arms, and all supplemented 
 by an awkwardness that was uncommon among men of 
 intelligence. Such was the picture I met in the person 
 of Abraham Lincoln. We sat down in his plainly fur 
 nished parlor, and were uninterrupted during the nearly 
 four hours that I remained with him, and little by little, 
 as his earnestness, sincerity, and candor were developed 
 in conversation, I forgot all the grotesque qualities which 
 so confounded me when I first greeted him. Before half 
 an hour had passed I learned not only to respect, but, 
 indeed, to reverence the man. 
 
 It is needless to give any account of the special mis 
 sion on which I was called to Springfield, beyond the 
 fact that the tender of a Cabinet position to Pennsylvania 
 was recalled by him on the following day, although re 
 newed and accepted two months later, when the Cabinet 
 was finally formed in Washington. It was after the 
 Pennsylvania Cabinet imbroglio was disposed of that 
 Lincoln exhibited his true self without reserve. For 
 more than two hours he discussed the gravity of the situ 
 ation and the appalling danger of civil war. Although 
 he had never been in public office outside the Illinois 
 Legislature, beyond a single session of Congress, and had 
 little intercourse with men of national prominence dur 
 ing the twelve years after his return from Washington, 
 he exhibited remarkable knowledge of all the leading 
 public men of the country, and none could mistake the 
 patriotic purpose that inspired him in approaching the 
 mighty responsibility that had been cast upon him by 
 the people. He discussed the slavery question in all its 
 aspects and all the various causes which were used as 
 pretexts for rebellion, and he not only was master of the 
 4 
 
50 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 whole question, but thoroughly understood his duty and 
 was prepared to perform it. During this conversation I 
 had little to say beyond answering an occasional ques 
 tion or suggestion from him, and I finally left him fully 
 satisfied that he understood the political conditions in 
 Pennsylvania nearly as well as I did myself, and entirely 
 assured that of all the public men named for the Presi 
 dency at Chicago he was the most competent and the 
 safest to take the helm of the ship of State and guide 
 it through the impending storm. I saw many dark days 
 akin to despair during the four years which recorded the 
 crimsoned annals from Sumter to Appomattox, but I 
 never had reason to change or seriously question that 
 judgment. 
 
 I next met Abraham Lincoln at Harrisburg on the 2 ad 
 of February, 1861, when he passed through the most 
 trying ordeal of his life. He had been in Philadelphia 
 the night before, where he was advised by letters from 
 General Winfield Scott and his prospective Premier, 
 Senator Seward, that he could not pass through Balti 
 more on the 23d without grave peril to his life. His 
 route, as published to the world for some days, was 
 from Philadelphia to Harrisburg on the morning of 
 the 22d ; to remain in Harrisburg over night as the 
 guest of Governor Curtin; and to leave for Washington 
 the next morning by the Northern Central Railway, that 
 would take him through Baltimore about midday. A 
 number of detectives under the direction of President 
 Felton of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore 
 Railroad, and Allan Pinkerton, chief of the well-known 
 detective agency, were convinced from the information 
 they obtained that Lincoln would be assassinated if he 
 attempted to pass through Baltimore according to the 
 published programme. A conference at the Continental 
 Hotel in Philadelphia on the night of the 2ist, at which 
 
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 51 
 
 Lincoln was advised of the admonitions of Scott and 
 Seward, had not resulted in any final determination as to 
 his route to Washington. He was from the first ex 
 tremely reluctant about any change, but it was finally 
 decided that he should proceed to Harrisburg on the 
 morning of the 22d and be guided by events. 
 
 The two speeches made by Lincoln on the 22d of Feb 
 ruary do not exhibit a single trace of mental disturbance 
 from the appalling news he had received. He hoisted 
 the stars and stripes to the pinnacle of Independence 
 Hall early in the morning and delivered a brief address 
 that was eminently characteristic of the man. He arrived 
 at Harrisburg about noon, was received in the House of 
 Representatives by the Governor and both branches of 
 the Legislature, and there spoke with the same calm de 
 liberation and incisiveness which marked all his speeches 
 during the journey from Springfield to Washington. 
 After the reception at the House another conference was 
 held on the subject of his route to Washington, and, 
 while even- person present, with the exception of Lin 
 coln, was positive in the demand that the programme 
 should be changed, he still obstinately hesitated. He 
 did not believe that the danger of assassination was 
 serious. 
 
 The afternoon conference practically decided nothing, 
 but it was assumed by those active in directing Lincoln s 
 journey that there must be a change. Lincoln dined at 
 the Jones House about five o clock with Governor Curtin 
 as host of the occasion. I recall as guests the names of 
 Colonel Thomas A. Scott, Colonel Sumner, Colonel La- 
 mon, Dr. Wallace, David Davis, Secretary Slifer, Attor 
 ney-General Purviance, Adjutant-General Russell, and 
 myself. There were others at the table, but I do not 
 recall them with certainty. Of that dinner circle, as I 
 remember them, only three are now living Governor 
 
52 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Curtin, Colonel Lamon, and the writer hereof. Mr. Judd 
 was not a guest, as he was giving personal attention to 
 Mrs. Lincoln, who was much disturbed by the suggestion 
 to separate the President from her, and she narrowly es 
 caped attracting attention to the movements which re 
 quired the utmost secrecy. 
 
 It was while at dinner that it was finally determined 
 that Lincoln should return to Philadelphia and go thence 
 to Washington that night, as had been arranged in Phila 
 delphia the night previous in the event of a decision to 
 change the programme previously announced. No one 
 who heard the discussion of the question could efface it 
 from his memory. The admonitions received from Gen 
 eral Scott and Senator Seward were made known to Gov 
 ernor Curtin at the table, and the question of a change 
 of route was discussed for some time by every one with 
 the single exception of Lincoln. He was the one silent 
 man of the party, and when he was finally compelled to 
 speak he unhesitatingly expressed his disapproval of the 
 movement. With impressive earnestness he thus an 
 swered the appeal of his friends: "What would the na 
 tion think of its President stealing into the Capital like 
 a thief in the night?" It was only when the other 
 gtiests w r ere unanimous in the expression that it was 
 not a question for Lincoln to determine, but one for 
 his friends to determine for him, that he finally agreed 
 to submit to whatever was decided by those around him. 
 
 It was most fortunate that Colonel Scott was one of the 
 guests at that dinner. He was wise and keen in percep 
 tion and bold and swift in execution. The time was 
 short, and if a change was to be made in Lincoln s route 
 it was necessary for him to reach Philadelphia by eleven 
 o clock that night or very soon thereafter. Scott at once 
 became master of ceremonies, and everything that was 
 done was in obedience to his directions. There was a 
 
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 53 
 
 rrowd of thousands around the hotel, anxious to see the 
 new President and ready to cheer him to the uttermost. 
 It was believed to be best that only one man should ac 
 company Lincoln in his journey to Philadelphia and 
 Washington, and Lincoln decided that Lamon should be 
 his companion. Colonel Sunnier, who felt that he had 
 been charged with the safety of the President-elect, and 
 whose silvered crown seemed to entitle him to prece 
 dence, earnestly protested against Lincoln leaving his 
 immediate care, but it \vas deemed unsafe to have more 
 than one accompany him, and the veteran soldier was 
 compelled to surrender his charge. That preliminary 
 question settled, Scott directed that Curtin, Lincoln, and 
 Lamon should at once proceed to the front steps of the 
 hotel, where there was a vast throng waiting to receive 
 them, and that Curtin should call distinctly, so that the 
 crowd could hear, for a carriage, and direct the coach 
 man to drive the party to the Executive Mansion. That 
 was the natural thing for Curtin to do to take the Presi 
 dent to the Governor s mansion as his guest, and it ex 
 cited no suspicion whatever. 
 
 Before leaving the dining-room Governor Curtin halted 
 Lincoln and Lamon at the door and inquired of Lamon 
 whether he was well armed. Lamon had been chosen 
 by Lincoln as his companion because of his exceptional 
 physical power and prowess, but Curtin wanted assurance 
 that he was properly equipped for defense. Lamon at 
 once uncovered a small arsenal of deadly weapons, show 
 ing that he was literally armed to the teeth. In addition 
 to a pair of heavy revolvers, he had a slung-shot and 
 brass knuckles and a huge knife nestled under his vest. 
 The three entered the carriage, and, as instructed by 
 Scott, drove toward the Executive Mansion, but when 
 near there the driver was ordered to take a circuitous 
 route and to reach the railroad depot within half an 
 
54 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAK-TIMES. 
 
 hour. When Curtin and his party had gotten fairly 
 away from the hotel I accompanied Scott to the railway 
 depot, where he at once cleared one of his lines from 
 Harrisburg to Philadelphia, so that there could be no 
 obstruction upon it, as had been agreed upon at Phila 
 delphia the evening before in case the change should be 
 made. In the mean time he had ordered a locomotive 
 and a single car to be brought to the eastern entrance of 
 the depot, and at the appointed time the carriage arrived. 
 Lincoln and Lamon emerged from the carriage and en 
 tered the car unnoticed by any except those interested in 
 the matter, and after a quiet but fervent Good-bye and 
 God protect you! the engineer quietly moved his train 
 away on its momentous mission. 
 
 As soon as the train left I accompanied Scott in the 
 work of severing all the telegraph lines which entered 
 Harrisburg. He was not content with directing that it 
 should be done, but he personally saw that every wire 
 was cut. This was about seven o clock in the evening:. 
 
 o 
 
 It had been arranged that the eleven o clock train from 
 Philadelphia to Washington should be held until Lin 
 coln arrived, on the pretext of delivering an important 
 package to the conductor. The train on which he was 
 to leave Philadelphia was due in Washington at six in 
 the morning, and Scott kept faithful vigil during the 
 entire night, not only to see that there should be no res 
 toration of the wires, but waiting with anxious solicitude 
 for the time when he might hope to hear the good news 
 that Lincoln had arrived in safety. To guard against 
 every possible chance of imposition a special cipher was 
 agreed upon that could not possibly be understood by 
 any but the parties to it. It was a long, weary night of 
 fretful anxiety to the dozen or more in Harrisburg who 
 had knowledge of the sudden departure of Lincoln. No 
 one attempted to sleep. All felt that the fate of the na- 
 
A VISIT TO LINCOLN 55 
 
 tion hung on the safe progress of Lincoln to Washington 
 without detection on his journey. Scott, who was of 
 heroic mould, several times tried to temper the severe 
 strain of his anxiety by looking up railway matters, but 
 he would soon abandon the listless effort, and thrice we 
 strolled from the depot to the Jones House and back 
 again, in aimless struggle to hasten the slowly-passing 
 hours, only to find equally anxious watchers there and a 
 wife whose sobbing heart could not be consoled. At last 
 the eastern horizon was purpled with the promise of day. 
 Scott reunited the broken lines for the lightning messen 
 ger, and he was soon gladdened by an unsigned dispatch 
 from Washington, saying, " Plums delivered nuts safely." 
 He whirled his hat high in the little telegraph office as 
 he shouted, u Lincoln s in Washington," and we rushed 
 to the Jones House and hurried a messenger to the Ex 
 ecutive Mansion to spread the glad tidings that Lincoln 
 had safely made his midnight journey to the Capital. 
 
 I have several times heard Lincoln refer to this jour 
 ney, and always with regret. Indeed, he seemed to 
 regard it as one of the grave mistakes in his public 
 career. He was fully convinced, as Colonel Lamon has 
 stated it, that "he had fled from a danger purely imag 
 inary, and he felt the shame and mortification natural to 
 a brave man under such circumstances. Mrs. Lincoln 
 and her suite passed through Baltimore on the 23d with 
 out any sign of turbulence. The fact that there was not 
 even a curious crowd brought together when she passed 
 through the city which then required considerable time, 
 as the cars were taken across Baltimore by horses con 
 firmed Lincoln in his belief. It is needless now to dis 
 cuss the question of real or imaginary danger in Lincoln 
 passing through Baltimore at noonday according to the 
 original programme. It is enough to know that there 
 were reasonable grounds for apprehension that an attempt 
 
56 LINCOLN AND MEN US U AK-1 lMLS. 
 
 might be made upon his life, even if there was not the 
 organized band of assassins that the detectives believed 
 to exist. His presence in the city would have called out 
 an immense concourse of people, including thousands of 
 thoroughly disloyal roughs, who could easily have been 
 inspired to any measure of violence. He simply acted 
 the part of a prudent man in his reluctant obedience to 
 the unanimous decision of his friends in Harrisburg 
 when he was suddenly sent back to Philadelphia to take 
 the midnight train for Washington, and there was no 
 good reason why he should have regretted it; but his 
 naturally sensitive disposition made him always feel 
 humiliated when it recurred to him. 
 
 The sensational stories published at the time of his 
 disguise for the journey were wholly untrue. He was 
 reported as having been dressed in a Scotch cap and 
 cloak and as entering the car at the Broad and Prime 
 station by some private alley-way, but there was no truth 
 whatever in any of these statements. I saw him leave 
 the dining-room at Harrisburg to enter the carriage with 
 Curtin and Lamon. I saw him enter the car at the Har 
 risburg depot, and the only change in his dress was the 
 substitution of a soft slouch hat for the high one he had 
 worn during the day. He wore the same overcoat that 
 he had worn when he arrived at Harrisburg, and the 
 only extra apparel he had about him was the shawl that 
 hung over his arm. When he reached West Philadelphia 
 he was met by Superintendent Kenney, who had a car 
 riage in waiting with a single detective in it. Lincoln 
 and Lamon entered the carriage and Kenney mounted 
 the box with the driver. They were in advance of the 
 time for the starting of the Baltimore train, and they 
 were driven around on Broad street, as the driver was 
 informed, in search of some one wanted by Kenney and 
 the detective, until it was time to reach the station. 
 
A VISIT TO LINCOLN. 
 
 When there they entered by the public doorway on 
 Broad street, and passed directly along with other pas 
 sengers to the car, where their berths had been engaged. 
 The journey to Washington was entirely uneventful, and 
 at six in the morning the train entered the Washington 
 station on schedule time. Seward had been advised, by 
 the return of his son from Philadelphia, of the probable 
 execution of this programme, and he and Washburne 
 were in the station and met the President and his party, 
 and all drove together to Willard s Hotel. Thus ends 
 the story of Lincoln s midnight journey from Harrisburg 
 to the National Capital. 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 LIEUT. -GENERAL WINFIEI.I) SCOTT, I<S6l. 
 
LINCOLN S SORE TRIALS. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN arrived in Washington on the 
 *\ 23d of February, 1861, to accept the most appalling 
 responsibilities ever cast upon any civil ruler of modern 
 times. If he could have commanded the hearty confi 
 dence and co-operation of the leaders of his own party, 
 his task would have been greatly lessened, but it is due 
 to the truth of history to say that few, very few, of the 
 Republican leaders of national fame had faith in Lin 
 coln s ability for the trust assigned f o him. I could 
 name a dozen men, now idols of the nation, whose open 
 distrust of Lincoln not only seriously embarrassed, but 
 grievously pained and humiliated, him. They felt that 
 the wrong man had been elected to the Presidency, and 
 only their modesty prevented them, in each case, from 
 naming the man who should have been chosen in his 
 stead. Looking now over the names most illustrious in 
 the Republican councils, I can hardly recall one who en 
 couraged Lincoln by the confidence he so much needed. 
 Even Seward, who had been notified as early as the 8th 
 of December that he would be called as Premier of the 
 new administration, and who soon thereafter had signi 
 fied his acceptance of the office and continued in the 
 most confidential relations with Lincoln, suddenly, on 
 the 2d of March, formally notified Lincoln of his recon 
 sideration of his acceptance. The only reason given was 
 that circumstances had occurred since his acceptance 
 
 59 
 
60 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 which seemed to render it his duty "to ask leave to 
 withdraw that consent. The circumstances referred to 
 were the hopeless discord and bitter jealousies among 
 party-leaders both in and out of the Cabinet. 
 
 Lincoln found a party without a policy ; the strangest 
 confusion and bitterest antagonisms pervading those who 
 should have been in accord, not only in purpose, but in 
 earnest sympathy, with him in the discharge of his great 
 duties, and he was practically like a ship tempest-tossed 
 without compass or rudder. Even the men called to his 
 Cabinet did not give Lincoln their confidence and co 
 operation. No two of them seemed to have the same 
 views as to the policy the administration should adopt. 
 Seward ridiculed the idea of serious civil war, and then 
 and thereafter renewed his bond for peace in sixty days, 
 only to be protested from month to month and from year 
 to year. Chase believed in peaceable disunion as alto 
 gether preferable to fraternal conflict, and urged his 
 views with earnestness upon the President. Cameron, 
 always eminently practical, was not misled by any senti 
 mental ideas and regarded war as inevitable. Welles 
 was an amiable gentleman without any aggressive quali 
 ties whatever, and Smith and Bates were old and con 
 servative, while Blair was a politician with few of the 
 qualities of a statesman. 
 
 A reasonably correct idea of the estimate placed upon 
 Lincoln s abilities for his position may be obtained by 
 turning to the eulogy on Seward delivered by Charles 
 Francis Adams in 1873. Adams was a Republican mem 
 ber of Congress when Lincoln was chosen President, and 
 he was Lincoln s Minister to England during the entire 
 period of the war. In eulogizing Seward as the master 
 spirit of the administration and as the power behind the 
 throne stronger than the throne itself, he said: "I must 
 affirm, without hesitation, that in the history 7 of our gov- 
 
LINCOLN S SORE TRIALS. 61 
 
 eminent down to this hour no experiment so rash has 
 ever been made as that of electing to the head of affairs 
 a man with so little previous preparation for his task as 
 Mr. Lincoln." Indeed, Lincoln himself seems to have 
 been profoundly impressed with his want of fitness for 
 the position when he was first named as a candidate from 
 his State. In 1859, after he had attained national repu 
 tation by his joint discussion with Douglas in the contest 
 for Senator, Mr. Pickett, the editor of an Illinois Repub 
 lican journal, wrote to him, urging that he should permit 
 the use of his name for President. To this he answered: 
 4 1 1 must in candor say I do not think myself fit for the 
 Presidency. I certainly am flattered and gratified that 
 some partial friends think of me in that connection, but 
 I really think it best for our cause that no concerted 
 effort, such as you suggest, should be made." Seward 
 evidently agreed with his eulogist, Mr. Adams. That is 
 clearly shown by the fact that in less than one month 
 after the administration had been inaugurated he wrote 
 out and submitted to the President a proposition to 
 change the national issue from slavery to foreign war, 
 in which he advised that war be at once declared against 
 Spain and France unless satisfactory explanations were 
 promptly received, and that the enforcement of the new 
 policy should be individually assumed by the President 
 himself or devolved on some member of his Cabinet. 
 He added that while it was not in his special province, 
 " I neither seek to evade nor assume the responsibility." 
 In other words, Seward boldly proposed to change the 
 national issue by a declaration of war against some for 
 eign power, and to have himself assigned practically as 
 Dictator. He assumed that the President was incompe 
 tent to his task, that his policy, if accepted, would be 
 committed to himself for execution, and that he meant 
 to be Dictator is clearly proved by the fact that in his 
 
62 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 formal proposition he provides that the policy once 
 adopted, the debates 011 it must end and all agree and 
 abide." 
 
 Outside of the Cabinet the leaders were equally dis 
 cordant and quite as distrustful of the ability of Lincoln 
 to fill his great office. Sunnier, Trumbull, Chandler, 
 Wade, Henry Winter Davis, and the men to whom the 
 nation then turned as the great representative men of the 
 new political power, did not conceal their distrust of L,in- 
 coln, and he had little support from them at any time 
 during his administration. Indeed, but for the support 
 given him by the younger leaders of that day, among 
 whom Elaine and Sherman were conspicuous, he would 
 have been a President almost without a party. The one 
 man who rendered him the greatest service of all at the 
 beginning of the war was Stephen A. Douglas, his old 
 competitor of Illinois. \Vhen the Republican leaders 
 were hesitating and criticising their President, Douglas 
 came to the front with all his characteristic courage and 
 sagacity, and was probably the most trusted of all the 
 Senators at the White House. It is not surprising that 
 there was great confusion in the councils of the Repub 
 lican leaders when suddenly compelled to face civil war, 
 but it w T ill surprise many intelligent readers at this day to 
 learn of the general distrust and demoralization that ex 
 isted among the men who should have been a solid pha 
 lanx of leadership in the crisis that confronted them. It 
 must be remembered that there were no precedents in 
 history to guide the new President. The relation of the 
 States to the National Government had never been de 
 fined. The dispute over the sovereignty of the States 
 had been continuous from the organization of the Re 
 public until that time, and men of equal intelligence and 
 patriotism widely differed as to the paramount authority 
 of State and Nation. Nor were there any precedents in 
 
LINCOLN S SORE TRIALS. 63 
 
 history of other civilizations that could throw any light 
 upon the dark path of Lincoln. There have been re 
 publics and civil wars, but none that furnish any rule 
 that could be applied to the peculiar condition of our 
 dissevered States. The President was therefore com 
 pelled to decide for himself in the multitude of conflict 
 ing counsels what policy the administration should adopt, 
 and even a less careful and conservative man than Lin 
 coln would have been compelled, from the supreme ne 
 cessities which surrounded him, to move with the utmost 
 caution. 
 
 Lincoln could formulate no policy beyond mere gen 
 eralities declaring his duty to preserve the integrity of 
 the Union. He saw forts captured and arsenals gutted 
 and States seceding with every preparation for war, and 
 yet he could take 110 step to prepare the nation for the 
 defense of its own life. The Border States were - trem 
 bling in the balance, with a predominant Union senti 
 ment in most of them, but ready to be driven into open 
 rebellion the moment that he should declare in favor of 
 what was called coercion by force of arms. Coercion 
 and invasion of the sacred soil of the Southern States 
 were terms which made even the stoutest Southern 
 Union man tremble. As the administration had no 
 policy that it could declare, every leader had a policy 
 of his own, with every invitation to seek to magnify 
 himself by declaring it. The capital was crowded with 
 politicians of every grade. The place-seekers swarmed 
 in numbers almost equal to the locusts of Egypt, and the 
 President was pestered day and night by the leading 
 statesmen of the country, who clamored for offices for 
 their henchmen. I well remember the sad picture of 
 despair his face presented when I happened to meet him 
 alone for a few moments in the Executive Chamber as 
 he spoke of the heartless spoilsmen who seemed to be 
 
<>-! LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 utterly indifferent to the grave dangers which threatened 
 the government. He said: " I seem like one sitting in a 
 palace assigning apartments to importunate applicants 
 while the structure is on fire and likely soon to perish 
 in ashes." 
 
 Turn where Lincoln might, there was hardly a silver 
 lining to the dark cloud that overshadowed him. The 
 Senate that met in Executive session when he was in 
 augurated contained but 29 Republicans to 32 Democrats, 
 with i bitterly hostile American, and 4 vacancies from 
 Southern States that never were filled. It was only by 
 the midsummer madness of secession and the retirement 
 of the Southern Senators that he was given the majority 
 in both branches of Congress, and when he turned to the 
 military arm of the government he was appalled by the 
 treachery of the men to whom the nation should have 
 been able to look for its preservation. If any one would 
 study the most painful and impressive object-lesson on 
 this point, let him turn to Oreeley s American Conflict 
 and learn from two pictures how the stars of chieftains 
 glittered and faded until unknown men filled their places 
 and led the Union armies to victory. In the first volume 
 of Greeley s history, which was written just at the begin 
 ning of the war and closed with the commencement of 
 hostilities, there is a page containing the portraits of 
 twelve men, entitled Union Generals. The central 
 figure is the veteran Scott, and around him are Fremont, 
 Butler, McDowell, Wool, Halleck, McClellan, Burnside, 
 Hunter, Hooker, Buell, and Anderson. These were the 
 chieftains in whom the country then confided, and to 
 whom Lincoln turned as the men who could be en 
 trusted with the command of armies. In the second 
 volume of Greeley s history, published after the close 
 of the war, there is another picture entitled ( Union 
 Generals," and there is not one face to be found in the 
 
LINCOLN S SORE TRIALS. 6;, 
 
 last that is in the first. Grant is the central figure of 
 
 C5 
 
 the Heroes of the Union at the close of the war, with 
 the faces of Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, Han 
 cock, Blair, Howard, Terr}-, Curtis, Banks, and Gilmore 
 around him. In short, the military chieftains who saved 
 the Union in the flame of battle had to be created by 
 the exigencies of war, while the men upon whom the 
 President was compelled to lean when the conflict 
 began one by one faded from the list of successful 
 generals. 
 
 The ability of the government to protect its own life 
 when wanton war was inaugurated by the Southern Con 
 federacy may be well illustrated by an interview between 
 the President, General Winfield Scott, Governor Curtin, 
 and myself immediately after the surrender of Sumter. 
 The President telegraphed to Governor Curtin and to me 
 as Chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate to 
 come to Washington as speedily as possible for consulta 
 tion as to the attitude Pennsylvania should assume in the 
 civil conflict that had been inaugurated. Pennsylvania 
 was the most exposed of all the border States, and, being 
 the second State of the Union in population, wealth, and 
 military power, it was of the utmost importance that she 
 should lead in defining the attitude of the loyal States. 
 Sumter was surrendered on Saturday evening, the i3th 
 of April, 1 86 1, and on Monday morning Governor Cur 
 tin and I were at the White House to meet the President 
 and the Commander-in-Chief of the armies at ten o clock 
 in the morning. I had never before met General Scott. 
 I had read of him with all the enthusiasm of a boy, as 
 he was a major-general before I was born, had noted 
 with pride his brilliant campaign in Mexico, and remem 
 bered that he was accepted by all Americans as the Great 
 Captain of the Age. I assumed, of course, that he was 
 infallible in all matters pertaining to war, and when I 
 5 
 
66 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIME*. 
 
 met him it was with a degree of reverence that I had 
 seldom felt for any other mortal. 
 
 Curtin and I were a few minutes in advance of the ap 
 pointed time for the conference, and as the Cabinet was 
 in session we were seated in the reception-room. There 
 were but few there when we entered it, and a number of 
 chairs were vacant. We sat down by a window looking 
 out upon the Potomac, and in a few minutes the tall form 
 of General Scott entered. In the mean time a number 
 of visitors had arrived and ever} 7 chair in the room was 
 occupied. Scott advanced and was cordially greeted by 
 Governor Curtin and introduced to me. He was then 
 quite feeble, unable to mount a horse by reason of a dis 
 tressing spinal affection; and I well remember the punc 
 tilious ideas of the old soldier, who refused to accept 
 either Curtin s chair or mine because there were not 
 three vacant chairs in the room, although he could not 
 remain standing without suffering agony. We presented 
 the ludicrous spectacle of three men standing for nearly 
 half an hour, and one of them feeble in strength and 
 greatly the senior of the others in years, simply because 
 there were not enough chairs for the entire party. With 
 all his suffering he was too dignified even to lean against 
 the wall, although it was evident to both of us that he 
 was in great pain from his ceremonial ideas about ac 
 cepting the chair of another. When we were ushered 
 into the President s room the practical work of our mis 
 sion was soon determined. The question had been fully 
 considered by the President and the Secretary of War, 
 who was a Pennsylvania!!. Governor Curtin speedily 
 perfected and heartily approved of the programme they 
 had marked out, and we had little to do beyond inform 
 ing them how speedily it could be executed. How 
 quickly Pennsylvania responded to the request of the 
 government will be understood when I state that in a 
 
LINCOLN S SORE TRIALS. 67 
 
 single day a bill embracing all the features desired was 
 passed by both branches and approved by Governor 
 Cnrtin. 
 
 It was only after the work of Pennsylvania had been 
 defined and disposed of that I began to get some insight 
 into the utterly hopeless condition of the government. I 
 found General Scott disposed to talk rather freely about 
 the situation, and I ventured to question him as to the 
 condition of the capital and his ability to defend it in 
 case of an attack by General Beauregard. The answer 
 to the first question I ventured was very assuring, coming 
 from one whom I supposed to know all about war, and to 
 one who knew just nothing at all about it. I asked Gen 
 eral Scott whether the capital was in danger. His an 
 swer was, "No, sir, the capital is not in danger, the cap 
 ital is not in danger." Knowing that General Scott 
 could not have a large force at his command, knowing 
 also that General Beauregard had a formidable force at 
 his command at Charleston, and that the transportation 
 of an army from Charleston to Washington would be the 
 work of only a few days, I for the first time began to 
 inquire in my own mind whether this great Chieftain 
 was, after all, equal to the exceptional necessities of the 
 occasion. I said to him that, if it was a proper question 
 for him to answer, I would like to know how many men 
 he had in Washington for its defense. His prompt an 
 swer was, "Fifteen hundred, sir; fifteen hundred men 
 and two batteries." I then inquired whether Washing 
 ton was a defensible city. This inquiry cast a shadow 
 over the old veteran s face as he answered, "No, sir; 
 Washington is not a defensible city." He then seemed 
 to consider it necessary to emphasize his assertions of 
 the safety of the capital, and he pointed to the Potomac, 
 that was visible from the President s window. Said he : 
 "You see that vessel? a sloop of war, sir, a sloop of 
 
68 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 war." I looked out and saw the vessel, but I could not 
 help thinking, as I looked beyond to Arlington Heights, 
 that one or two batteries, even of the ineffective class of 
 those days, would knock the sloop of war to pieces in 
 half an hour. 
 
 As Johnson, Cooper, and a number of other able sol 
 diers had left the army but a short time before, I felt 
 some anxiety to know who were commanding the forces 
 under General Scott in Washington. He gave me their 
 names, and within three days thereafter I saw that two 
 of them had resigned and were already in Richmond 
 and enlisted in the Confederate service. My doubts mul 
 tiplied, and a great idol was shattered before I left the 
 White House that morning. I could not resist the con 
 viction that General Scott was past all usefulness ; that 
 he had no adequate conception of the contest before us ; 
 and that he rested in confidence in Washington when 
 there was not a soldier of average intelligence in that 
 city who did not know that Beauregard could capture it 
 at any time within a week. My anxiety deepened with 
 my doubts, and I continued my inquiries with the old 
 warrior by asking how many men General Beauregard 
 had at Charleston. The old chieftain s head dropped 
 almost upon his breast at this question, and a trace of 
 despair was visible as he answered in tremulous tones : 
 "General Beauregard commands more men at Charles 
 ton than I command on the continent east of the fron 
 tier." I asked him how long it would require Beaure 
 gard to transport his army to Washington. He answered 
 that it might be done in three or four days. I then re 
 peated the question, "General, is not Washington in 
 great danger ? The old warrior was at once aroused, 
 straightened himself up in his chair with a degree of 
 dignity that was crushing, and answered "No, sir, the 
 
LINCOLN S SORE TRIALS. 69 
 
 capital can t be taken; the capital can t be taken, sir." 
 President Lincoln listened to the conversation with evi 
 dent interest, but said nothing. He sat intently gazing 
 at General Scott, and whirling his spectacles around in 
 his fingers. When General Scott gave the final answer 
 that the capital could not be taken, Lincoln, in his 
 quaint way, said to General Scott, " It does seem to me, 
 general, that if I were Beauregard I would take Wash 
 ington. This expression from the President electrified 
 the old war-lion again, and he answered with increased 
 emphasis, "Mr. President, the capital can t be taken, 
 sir; it can t be taken." 
 
 There was but one conclusion that could be accepted 
 as the result of this interview, and that was that the 
 great Chieftain of two wars and the worshiped Captain 
 of the Age was in his dotage and utterly unequal to the 
 great duty of meeting the impending conflict. Governor 
 Curtin and I left profoundly impressed with the convic 
 tion that the incompetency of General Scott was one of 
 the most serious of the multiplied perils which then con 
 fronted the Republic. I need not repeat how General 
 Scott failed in his early military movements ; how he 
 divided his army and permitted the enemy to unite and 
 defeat him at Bull Run ; how General McClellan, the 
 Young Napoleon of the time, was called from his vic 
 tories in Western Virginia to take command of the 
 army ; how that change reinspired the loyal people of 
 the nation in the confidence of speedy victories and the 
 overthrow of the rebellion; how he and his Chief soon 
 got to cross purposes; and how, after months of quarrel, 
 the old Chieftain was prevailed upon to resign his place. 
 The inside history of his retirement has never been writ 
 ten, and it is best that it should not. President Lincoln, 
 Secretary Cameron, and Thomas A. Scott were the only 
 men who could have written it from personal knowledge. 
 
7 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 They are dead, and an interesting chapter of history has 
 perished with them. 
 
 Such was the condition of the government at the open 
 ing of our civil war. A great soldier was at the head of 
 our army, with all his faculties weakened by the infirm 
 ities of age, and we were compelled to grope in the dark 
 day after day, week after week, month after month, and 
 even year after year, until chieftains could be created to 
 lead our armies to final victories. It must be remem 
 bered also that public sentiment had at that time no 
 conception of the cruel sacrifices of war. The fall of a 
 single soldier, Colonel Ellsworth, at Alexandria cast a 
 profound gloom over the entire country, and the loss of 
 comparatively few men at Big Bethel and Ball s Bluff 
 convulsed the people from Maine to California. No one 
 dreamed of the sacrifice of life that a desperate war must 
 involve. I remember meeting General Burnside, Gen 
 eral Heintzelman, and one or two other officers of the 
 Army of the Potomac at Willard s Hotel in December, 
 1861. The weather had been unusually favorable, the 
 roads were in excellent condition, and there was general 
 impatience at McClellan s tardiness in moving against 
 Manassas and Richmond. I naturally shared the impa 
 tience that w r as next to universal, and I inquired of Gen 
 eral Burnside why it was that the army did not move. 
 He answered that it would not be a difficult task for 
 McClellan s army to capture Manassas, march upon 
 Richmond, and enter the Confederate capital; but he 
 added with emphasis that he regarded as conclusive that 
 "It would cost ten thousand men to do it." I was 
 appalled to silence when compelled to consider so great 
 a sacrifice for the possession of the insurgents capital. 
 Ten times ten thousand men, and even more, fell in the 
 battles between the Potomac and Richmond before the 
 stars and bars fell frpm the Richmond State House, but 
 
LINCOLN S SORE TRIALS. 7 1 
 
 in the fall of 1861 the proposition to sacrifice ten thou 
 sand lives to possess the Confederate capital would have 
 been regarded by all as too appalling to contemplate. 
 Indeed, we were not only utterly unprepared for war, 
 but we were utterly unprepared for its sacrifices and its 
 bereavements; and President Lincoln was compelled to 
 meet this great crisis and patiently await the fullness of 
 time to obtain chieftains and armies and to school the 
 people to the crimsoned story necessary to tell of the 
 safety of the Republic. 
 
LINCOLN S CHARACTERISTICS. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN was eminently human. As 
 tJL the old lady said about General Jackson when she 
 had finally reached his presence, u He s only a man, after 
 all. Although much as other men in the varied quali 
 ties which go to make up a single character, taking him 
 all in all, "none but himself can be his parallel. " Of 
 all the public men I have met, he was the most difficult 
 to analyze. His characteristics were more original, more 
 diversified, more intense in a sober way, and yet more 
 flexible under many circumstances, than I have ever 
 seen in any other. Many have attempted to portray 
 Lincoln s characteristics, and not a few have assumed 
 to do it with great confidence. Those who have spoken 
 most confidently of their knowledge of his personal 
 qualities are, as a rule, those who saw least of them 
 below the surface. He might have been seen every day 
 during his Presidential term without ever reaching the 
 distinctive qualities which animated and guided him, 
 and thus hundreds of writers have assumed that they 
 understood him when they had never seen the inner in 
 spirations of the man at all. He was a stranger to deceit, 
 incapable of dissembling; seemed to be the frankest and 
 freest of conversationalists, and yet few understood him 
 even reasonably well, and none but Lincoln ever thor 
 oughly understood Lincoln. If I had seen less of him 
 72 
 
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.) 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HIS SON TAD. 
 
74 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAK-TIMES. 
 
 I might have ventured with much greater confidence to 
 attempt a portrayal of his individuality, but I saw him 
 many times when Presidential honors were forgotten in 
 Presidential sorrows, and when his great heart throbbed 
 upon his sleeve. It was then that his uncommon quali 
 ties made themselves lustrous and often startled and con 
 fused his closest friends. 
 
 I regard Lincoln as very widely misunderstood in one 
 of the most important attributes of his character. It has 
 been common, during the last twenty-five years, to see 
 publications relating to Lincoln from men who assumed 
 that they enjoyed his full confidence. In most and per 
 haps all cases the writers believed what they stated, but 
 those who assumed to speak most confidently on the sub 
 ject were most mistaken. Mr. Lincoln gave his confi 
 dence to no living man without reservation. He trusted 
 many, but he trusted only within the carefully-studied 
 limitations of their usefulness, and when he trusted he 
 confided, as a rule, only to the extent necessary to make 
 that trust available. He had as much faith in mankind 
 as is common amongst men, and it was not because he 
 was of a distrustful nature or because of any specially 
 selfish attribute of his character that he thus limited his 
 confidence in all his intercourse with men. In this view 
 of Lincoln I am fully sustained by those who knew him 
 best. The one man who saw more of him in all the 
 varied vicissitudes of his life from early manhood to his 
 elevation to the Presidency was William H. Herndon, 
 who was his close friend and law-partner for a full score 
 of years. In analyzing the character of Lincoln he thus 
 refers to his care as to confidants: "Mr. Lincoln never 
 had a confidant, and therefore never unbosomed himself 
 to others. He never spoke of his trials to me, or, so far 
 as I knew, to any of his friends." David Davis, in 
 whose sober judgment Lincoln had more confidence than 
 
LINCOLN S CHARACTERISTICS. 75 
 
 in that of his other friends, and who held as intimate 
 relations to him as was possible by any, says: "I knew 
 the man so well ; he \vas the most reticent, secretive man 
 I ever saw or expect to see. 
 
 Leonard Swett is well known to have been the one 
 whose counsels were among the most welcome to Lin 
 coln, and who doubtless did counsel him with more free 
 dom than any other man. In a letter given in Herndon s 
 Life of Lincoln he says: "From the commencement of 
 his life to its close I have sometimes doubted whether he 
 ever asked anybody s advice about anything. He would 
 listen to everybody; he would hear everybody; but he 
 rarely, if ever, asked for opinions." He adds in the 
 same letter: "As a politician and as President he arrived 
 at all his conclusions from his own reflections, and when 
 his conclusions were once formed he never doubted but 
 what they were right." Speaking of his generally as 
 sumed frankness of character, Swett says, One great 
 public mistake of his [Lincoln s] character as generally 
 received and acquiesced in is that he is considered by the 
 people of this country as a frank, guileless, and unso 
 phisticated man. There never was a greater mistake. 
 Beneath a smooth surface of candor and apparent decla 
 ration of all his thoughts and feelings he exercised the 
 most exalted tact and wisest discrimination. He handled 
 and moved men remotely as we do pieces upon a chess 
 board. He retained through life all the friends he ever 
 had, and he made the wrath of his enemies to praise 
 him. This was not by cunning or intrigue in the low 
 acceptation of the term, but by far-seeing reason and 
 discernment. He always told only enough of his plans 
 and purposes to induce the belief that he had communi 
 cated all; yet he reserved enough to have communicated 
 nothing. 
 
 Mr. Herndon, in a lecture delivered on Lincoln to a 
 
76 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Springfield audience in 1866, said: "He [Lincoln] never 
 revealed himself entirely to any one man, and therefore 
 he will always to a certain extent remain enveloped in 
 doubt. I always believed I could read him as thor 
 oughly as any man, yet he was so different in many re 
 spects from any other one I ever met before or since 
 his time that I cannot say I comprehended him." Mr. 
 Lamon, who completes the circle of the men who were 
 closest to Lincoln, the man who was chosen by Lincoln 
 to accompany him on his midnight journey from Harris- 
 burg to Washington, and whom he appointed Marshal 
 of the District of Columbia to have him in the closest 
 touch with himself, thus describes Lincoln in his biog 
 raphy: " Mr. Lincoln was a man apart from the rest of 
 his kind unsocial, cold, impassive; neither a good hater 
 nor fond friend." And he adds that Lincoln u made 
 simplicity and candor a mask of deep feelings carefully 
 concealed, and subtle plans studiously veiled from all 
 eyes but one." 
 
 I have seen Lincoln many times when he seemed to 
 speak with the utmost candor, I have seen him many 
 times when he spoke with mingled candor and caution, 
 and I have seen him many times when he spoke but lit 
 tle and with extreme caution. It must not be inferred, 
 because of the testimony borne to Lincoln s reticence 
 generally and to his singular methods in speaking on 
 subjects of a confidential nature, that he was ever guilty 
 of deceit. He was certainly one of the most sincere men 
 I have ever met, and he was also one of the most saga 
 cious men that this or any other country has ever pro 
 duced. He was not a man of cunning, in the ordinary 
 acceptation of the word; not a man who would mislead 
 in any way, unless by silence; and when occasion de 
 manded he \vould speak with entire freedom as far as it 
 was possible for him to speak at all. I regard him as 
 
LINCOLN S CHARACTERISTICS. 77 
 
 one who believed that the truth was not always to be 
 spoken, but who firmly believed, also, that only the 
 truth should be spoken when it was necessary to speak 
 at all. 
 
 Lincoln s want of trust in those closest to him was 
 often a great source of regret, and at times of morti 
 fication. I have many times heard Mr. Swett and Mr. 
 Lamon, and occasionally Mr. Davis, speak of his per 
 sistent reticence on questions of the gravest public mo 
 ment which seemed to demand prompt action by the 
 President. They would confer with him, as I did my 
 self at times, earnestly advising and urging action on his 
 part, only to find him utterly impassible and incompre 
 hensible. Neither by word nor expression could any 
 one form the remotest idea of his purpose, and when he 
 did act in many cases he surprised both friends and foes. 
 When he nominated Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War 
 there was not a single member of his Cabinet who had 
 knowledge of his purpose to do so until it was done, and 
 when he appointed Mr. Chase Chief-Justice there was 
 not a man living, of the hundreds who had advised him 
 and pressed their friends upon him, who had any inti 
 mation as to even the leaning of his mind on the subject. 
 I remember on one occasion, when we were alone in the 
 Executive Chamber, he discussed the question of the 
 Chief-Justiceship for fully half an hour; named the men 
 who had been prominently mentioned in connection with 
 the appointment; spoke of all of them with apparent 
 freedom; sought and obtained my own views as to the 
 wisdom of appointing either of them, and when the 
 conversation ended I had no more idea as to the bent of 
 his mind than if I had been conversing with the Sphinx. 
 I suggested to him, in closing the conversation, that his 
 views on the subject were very much more important 
 than mine, and that I would be very glad to have them, 
 
78 LINCOLN AXD MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 to which he gave this characteristic answer: "Well, 
 McClure, the fact is I m shut pan on that question." 
 
 Lincoln s intellectual organization has been portrayed 
 by many writers, but so widely at variance as to greatly 
 confuse the general reader. Indeed, lie was the most 
 difficult of all men to analyze. He did not rise above 
 the average man by escaping a common mingling of 
 greatness and infirmities. I believe he was very well 
 described in a single sentence by Mr. Herndon when he 
 said: "The truth about Mr. Lincoln is, that he read less 
 and thought more than any man in his sphere in Amer 
 ica." Tested by the standard of many other great men, 
 Lincoln was not great, but tested by the only true stand 
 ard of his owi achievements, he may justly appear in 
 history as one of the greatest of American statesmen. 
 Indeed, in some most essential attributes of greatness I 
 doubt whether any of our public men ever equaled him. 
 We have had men who could take a higher intellectual 
 grasp of any abstruse problem of statesmanship, but few 
 have ever equaled, and none excelled, Lincoln in the 
 practical, common-sense, and successful solution of the 
 gravest problems ever presented in American history. 
 He possessed a peculiarly receptive and analytical mind. 
 He sought information from every attainable source. 
 He sought it persistently, weighed it earnestly, and in 
 the end reached his own conclusions. When he had 
 once reached a conclusion as to a public duty, there was 
 no human power equal to the task of changing his pur 
 pose. He was self-reliant to an uncommon degree, and 
 yet as entirely free from arrogance of opinion as any 
 public man I have ever known. 
 
 Judged by the records of his administration, Lincoln 
 is now regarded as the most successful Executive the 
 Republic has ever had. When it is considered what 
 peculiarly embarrassing and momentous issues were pre- 
 
LINCOLN S CHARACTERISTICS. 79 
 
 sented to him for decision, and issues for which history 
 had no precedents, it is entirely safe to say that no man 
 has ever equaled him as a successful ruler of a free 
 people. This success was due chiefly to one single qual 
 ity of the man the will of the people was his guiding 
 star. He sprang from the people and from close to 
 Mother Earth. He grew up with the people, and in all 
 his efforts, convictions, and inspirations he was ever in 
 touch with the people. When President he looked solely 
 to the considerate judgment of the American people to 
 guide him in the solution of all the vexed questions 
 which were presented to him. In all the struggles of 
 mean ambition and all the bitter jealousies of greatness 
 which constantly surged around him, and in all the con 
 stant and distressing discord that prevailed in his Cabinet 
 during the dark clays which shadowed him with grief, 
 Lincoln ever turned to study with ceaseless care the in 
 telligent expression of the popular will. 
 
 Unlike all Presidents who had preceded him, he came 
 into office without a fixed and accepted policy. Civil 
 war plunged the government into new and most per 
 plexing duties. The people were unschooled to the sad 
 necessities which had to be accepted to save the Re 
 public. Others would have rushed in to offend public 
 sentiment by the violent acceptance of what they knew 
 must be accepted in the end. These men greatly vexed 
 and embarrassed Lincoln in his sincere efforts to advance 
 the people and the government to the full measure of the 
 sacrifices which were inevitable ; but Lincoln waited 
 patiently waited until in the fullness of time the judg 
 ment of the people was ripened for action, and then, and 
 then only, did Lincoln act. Had he done otherwise, he 
 would have involved the country in fearful peril both at 
 home and abroad, and it was his constant study of, and 
 obedience to, the honest judgment of the people of the 
 
80 LINCOLN AND .If EN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 nation that saved the Republic and that enshrined him 
 in history as the greatest of modern rulers. 
 
 If there are yet any intelligent Americans who believe 
 that Lincoln was an innocent, rural, unsophisticated cha 
 racter, it is time that they should be undeceived. I ven 
 ture the assertion, without fear of successful contradiction, 
 that Abraham Lincoln was the most sagacious of all the 
 public men of his day in either political party. He was 
 therefore the master-politician of his time. He was not 
 a politician as the term is now commonly applied and 
 understood; he knew nothing about the countless meth 
 ods which are employed in the details of political effort; 
 but no man knew better indeed, I think no man knew 
 so \vell as he did how to summon and dispose of polit 
 ical ability to attain great political results; and this work 
 he performed with unfailing wisdom and discretion in 
 every contest for himself and for the country. 
 
 A pointed illustration of his sagacity and of his cau 
 tious methods in preventing threatened evil or gaining 
 promised good is presented by his action in 1862 when 
 the first army draft was made in Pennsylvania. There 
 was then no national conscription law, and volunteering 
 had ceased to fill up our shattered armies. A draft under 
 the State law was necessary to fill a requisition made 
 upon Pennsylvania for troops. The need for immediate 
 reinforcements was very pressing, and in obedience to 
 the personal request of both Lincoln and Governor Cur- 
 tin I accepted the ungracious task of organizing and 
 executing the draft under the State laws. How promptly 
 the task was executed may be understood when I say that 
 within sixty days the entire State was enrolled, quotas 
 adjusted, the necessary exemptions made, the draft exe 
 cuted, and seventeen organized regiments sent to the 
 front, and without a dollar of cost to either the State or 
 National Governments for duties performed in my office 
 
LINCOLN S CHARACTERISTICS. 8 1 
 
 beyond the salaries of two clerks. While there were 
 mutterings of disloyalty in a very few sections of Penn 
 sylvania, and they only within a very limited circle, 
 there was one sore spot where open rebellion was threat 
 ened. That was Cass township, Schuylkill county. The 
 Mollie Maguires were then just approaching the zenith 
 of their criminal power, and Cass township was the cen 
 tre of that lawless element. Thirteen murders had been 
 committed in that district within a few years, and not 
 one murderer had been brought to punishment. This 
 banded criminal organization was as disloyal to the gov 
 ernment as it was to law, and it was with the utmost dif 
 ficulty that even an imperfect enumeration had been 
 made and the quota adjusted to be supplied by draft. 
 The draft was made, however, and on the day fixed for 
 the conscripts to take the cars and report at Harrisburg 
 the criminal element of the district not only refused to 
 respond to the call, but its leaders came to the station 
 and drove other conscripts violently from the depot. 
 
 It was open, defiant rebellion. I at once reported the 
 facts to Secretary Stanton, who promptly answered, di 
 recting that the draft should be enforced at every hazard, 
 and placing one Philadelphia regiment and one regiment 
 at Harrisburg subject to the orders of the Governor, with 
 instructions to send them at once to the scene of revolt. 
 Fearing that the Secretary did not fully comprehend the 
 peril of a conflict between the military and the citizens, 
 Governor Curtin directed me to telegraph more fully to 
 Secretary Stanton, suggesting his further consideration 
 of the subject. His answer was promptly given, repeat 
 ing his order for the military to move at once to Cass 
 township and enforce the law at the point of the bayonet. 
 The regiments were given marching orders, and reached 
 Pottsville on the following day. I felt that a conflict 
 between the military and citizens in any part of the State 
 6 
 
82 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 must be very disastrous to the loyal cause, and after full 
 consultation with Governor Curtin, in obedience to his 
 directions, I telegraphed to Lincoln in cipher asking him 
 to consider the subject well. This was in the early part 
 of the day, and I was surprised and distressed when even 
 ing came without any reply. When I entered the break 
 fast-room of the hotel the next morning I saw seated at 
 the table Assistant Adjutant-General Townsend of the 
 United States Army. I knew him well, and when he 
 saw me he beckoned me to his side and asked me to 
 breakfast with him. We were out of hearing of any 
 others at the table, and he at once stated to me the pur 
 pose of his visit. He had arrived at three o clock in the 
 morning, and was waiting to see me as soon as I should 
 appear. He said: "I have no orders to give you, but I 
 came solely to deliver a personal message from President 
 Lincoln in these words: Say to McClure that I am very 
 desirous to have the laws fully executed, but it might be 
 well, in an extreme emergency, to be content with the 
 appearance of executing the laws; I think McClure will 
 understand. To this General Townsend added: U I 
 have now fulfilled my mission ; I do not know to what 
 it relates." 
 
 I of course made no explanation to General Townsend, 
 but hurried from the breakfast-table to summon Benja 
 min Bannan from Pottsville to Harrisburg as speedily as 
 possible. He was the commissioner of draft for that 
 county, a warm friend of the President, and a man of 
 unusual intelligence and discretion. He reached Harris- 
 burg the same day, and Lincoln s instructions were 
 frankly explained to him. No one had any knowledge 
 of them but ourselves and the Governor. Commissioner 
 Bannan appreciated the necessity of avoiding a collision 
 between the military and the citizens of Cass township, 
 but, said he, " How can it be done? How can the laws 
 
LINCOLN S CHARACTERISTICS. 83 
 
 even appear to have been executed ? I told him that in 
 a number of cases evidence had been presented, after the 
 quotas had been adjusted and the draft ordered, to prove 
 that the quotas had been filled by volunteers who had 
 enlisted in some town or city ontside of their townships. 
 In all such cases, where the evidence was clear, the order 
 for the draft was revoked because the complement of 
 men had been filled. I said only by such evidence from 
 Cass township could the order for the draft be revoked 
 and the arrest of the conscripted men for service be 
 avoided. He intuitively comprehended the gravity of 
 the situation, and took the first train home. By the next 
 evening he was back and laid before me a number of 
 affidavits in regular form, apparently executed by citi 
 zens of Cass township, which, if uncontradicted, proved 
 that their quota was entirely full. I asked no explana 
 tions, but at once indorsed upon the testimony that as 
 the quota of Cass township had been filled by volunteers, 
 the draft was inoperative in that district and its con 
 scripts would not be held to service. 
 
 I have never made inquiry into the method of obtain 
 ing those affidavits, and there is none now living who 
 could give any information about it, as Mr. Bannan has 
 long since joined the great majority beyond. The Gov 
 ernor had, in the mean time, halted the troops at Potts- 
 ville, and as the laws seemed to be executed in peace, the 
 regiments were ordered back by the Governor and the 
 conflict between the military and the Mollie Maguires 
 was averted. Stan ton never had knowledge of Lincoln s 
 action in this matter, nor did a single member of his ad 
 ministration know of his intervention. Had Stanton 
 been permitted to have his sway, he would have ruled in 
 the tempest, and Pennsylvania would have inaugurated 
 a rebellion of her own that might have reached fearful 
 proportions, and that certainly would have greatly para- 
 
84 LINCOLN A.VD MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 lyzed the power of the loyal people of the State. I am 
 quite sure that not until after the war was ended, and 
 probably not for years thereafter, did any but Lincoln, 
 Curtin, Bannan, and myself have any knowledge of this 
 important adjustment of the Cass township rebellion. 
 
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 
 
 IF Abraham Lincoln was not a master politician, I am 
 entirely ignorant of the qualities which make up such 
 a character. In a somewhat intimate acquaintance with 
 the public men of the country for a period of more than 
 a generation, I have never met one who made so few 
 mistakes in politics as Lincoln. The man who could 
 call Seward as Premier of his administration, with Weed 
 the power behind the Premier, often stronger than the 
 Premier himself, and yet hold Horace Greeley even 
 within the ragged edges of the party lines, and the man 
 who could call Simon Cameron to his Cabinet in Penn 
 sylvania without alienating Governor Curtin, and who 
 could remove Cameron from his Cabinet without alien 
 ating Cameron, would naturally be accepted as a man of 
 much more than ordinary political sagacity. Indeed, I 
 have never known one who approached Lincoln in the 
 peculiar faculty of holding antagonistic elements to his 
 own support, and maintaining close and often apparently 
 confidential relations with each without offense to the 
 other. This is the more remarkable from the fact that 
 Lincoln was entirely without training in political man 
 agement. I remember on one occasion, when there was 
 much concern felt about a political contest in Pennsyl 
 vania, he summoned half a dozen or more Pennsylvania 
 Republicans to a conference at the White House. When 
 
 85 
 

 LINCOLN S HOME ix CHILDHOOD. 
 
 
 LINCOLN S HOME IN SPRINGFIELD. 
 
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 87 
 
 we had gathered there he opened the subject in his 
 quaint way by saying: "You know I never was a con 
 triver; I don t know much about how things are done 
 in politics, but I think you gentlemen understand the 
 situation in your State, and I want to learn what may 
 be done to ensure the success we all desire." He made 
 exhaustive inquiry of each of the persons present as to 
 the danger-signals of the contest, specially directing his 
 questions to every weak point in the party lines and 
 every strong point of the opposition. He was not con 
 tent with generalities; he had no respect for mere enthu 
 siasm. What he wanted was sober facts. He had abid 
 ing faith in the people, in their intelligence and then 
 patriotism; and he estimated political results by ascer 
 taining, as far as possible, the popular bearing of every 
 vital question that was likely to arise, and he formed 
 his conclusions by his keen intuitive perception as to 
 how the people would be likely to deal with the 
 issues. 
 
 While Lincoln had little appreciation of himself as 
 candidate for President as late as 1859, the dream of 
 reaching the Presidency evidently took possession of 
 him in the early part of 1860, and his first efforts to 
 advance himself as a candidate were singularly awkward 
 and infelicitous. He had then no experience whatever 
 as a leader of leaders, and it was not until he had made 
 several discreditable blunders that he learned how much 
 he must depend upon others if he would make himself 
 President. Some Lincoln enthusiast in Kansas, with 
 much more pretensions than power, wrote him in March, 
 1860, proposing to furnish a Lincoln delegation from that 
 State to the Chicago Convention, and suggesting that 
 Lincoln should pay the legitimate expenses of organ 
 izing, electing, and taking to the convention the prom 
 ised Lincoln delegates. To this Lincoln replied that 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 in the main, the use of money is wrong, but for cer 
 tain objects in a political contest the use of some is both 
 right and indispensable." And he added, " If you shall 
 be appointed a delegate to Chicago I will furnish $100 to 
 bear the expenses of the trip. He heard nothing further 
 from the Kansas man until he saw an announcement in 
 the newspapers that Kansas had elected delegates and 
 instructed them for Seward. This was Lincoln s first 
 disappointment in his effort to organize his friends to 
 attain the Presidential nomination, but his philosophy 
 was w r ell maintained. Without waiting to hear from his 
 friend who had contracted to bring a Lincoln delegation 
 from Kansas he w T rote him, saying, "I see by the dis 
 patches that since you wrote Kansas has appointed dele 
 gates instructed for Seward. Don t stir them up to 
 anger, but come along to the convention, and I will do 
 as I said about expenses." It is not likely that that 
 unfortunate experience cost Lincoln his $100, but it is 
 worthy of note that soon after his inauguration as Pres 
 ident he gave the man a Federal office with a comfort 
 able salary. 
 
 When he became seriously enlisted as a candidate for 
 the Presidential nomination, he soon learned that while 
 he could be of value as an adviser and organizer, the 
 great work had to be performed by others than himself. 
 He gathered around him a number of the ablest poli 
 ticians of the West, among whom were Norman P. Judd, 
 David .Davis, Leonard Swett, O. M. Hatch, and Mr. 
 Medill of the Chicago Tribune. These men had, for the 
 first time, brought a National Convention to the West, 
 and they had the advantage of fighting for Lincoln on 
 their own ground with the enthusiasm his name inspired 
 as a potent factor in their work. They went there to 
 win, and they left nothing undone within the range of 
 political effort to give him the nomination. Two posi- 
 
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 89 
 
 tions in the Cabinet, one for Pennsylvania and one for 
 Indiana, were positively promised by David Davis at an 
 early period of the contest, when they feared that there 
 might be serious difficulty in uniting the delegations of 
 those States on Lincoln. It is proper to say that Lincoln 
 had no knowledge of these contracts, and had given no 
 such authority, and it is proper, also, to say that the con 
 tracts were made in both cases with comparatively irre 
 sponsible parties who had little power, if any, in guiding 
 the actions of their respective delegations. Certainly 
 Lane and Curtin, who were the most important factors 
 in bringing their States to the support of Lincoln, not 
 only were not parties to these contracts, but were entirely 
 ignorant of them until their fulfillment was demanded 
 after Lincoln s election. I have good reasoh to know 
 that in the case of Pennsylvania that contract, while it 
 did not of itself make General Cameron Secretary of 
 War, had much to do with resolving Lincoln s doubts in 
 favor of Cameron s appointment in the end. 
 (There were no political movements of national import 
 ance during Lincoln s administration in which he did 
 not actively, although often hiddenly, participate. It 
 was Lincoln who finally, after the most convulsive efforts 
 to get Missouri into line with the administration, effected 
 a reconciliation of disputing parties which brought Brown 
 and Henderson into the Senate, and it was Lincoln who 
 in 1863 took a leading part in attaining the declination 
 of Curtin as a gubernatorial candidate that year\^ Grave 
 apprehensions were felt that Curtin could not be re- 
 elected because of the bitterness of the hostility of Cam 
 eron and his friends, and also because there were 70,000 
 Pennsylvania soldiers in the field who could not vote. 
 Lincoln was Curtin s sincere friend, but when Curtin s 
 supporters suggested that his broken health called for his 
 retirement, Lincoln promptly agreed to tender Curtin a 
 
90 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 first-class foreign mission if he decided to decline a re- 
 nomination. Curtin accepted the proffered mission, to 
 be assumed at the close of his term, and he published his 
 acceptance and his purpose to withdraw from the field for 
 Governor. 
 
 Curtin s declination was responded to within a week 
 by a number of the leading counties of the State per 
 emptorily instructing their delegates to vote for his re- 
 nomination for Governor. It soon became evident that 
 the party would accept no other leader in the desperate 
 conflict, and that no other candidate could hope to be 
 elected. Curtin was compelled to submit, and he was 
 nominated on the first ballot by more than a two-thirds 
 vote, although bitterly opposed by a number of promi 
 nent Federal officers in the State. Lincoln was disap 
 pointed in the result not because he was averse to Cur 
 tin, but because he feared that party divisions would lose 
 the State. Both Lincoln and Stanton made exhaustive 
 efforts to support Curtin after he had been nominated, 
 and all the power of the government that could be 
 wielded with effect was employed to promote his elec 
 tion. The battle was a desperate one against the late 
 Chief-Justice Woodward, who was a giant in intellectual 
 strength, and who commanded the unbounded confidence 
 and enthusiastic support of his party, but Curtin was 
 elected by over 15,000 majority. 
 
 One of the shrewdest of Lincoln s great political 
 schemes was the tender, by an autograph letter, of the 
 French mission to the elder James Gordon Bennett. No 
 one who can form any intelligent judgment of the polit 
 ical exigencies of that time can fail to understand why 
 the venerable independent journalist received this maik 
 of favor from the President. Lincoln had but one of 
 the leading journals of New York on which he could 
 rely for positive support, That was Mr, Raymond s 
 
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 9 1 
 
 New York Times. Mr. Greeley s Tribune was the most 
 widely read Republican journal of the country, and it 
 was unquestionably the most potent in moulding Repub 
 lican sentiment Its immense weekly edition, for that 
 day, reached the more intelligent masses of the people 
 in ever> r State of the Union, and Greeley was not in 
 accord with Lincoln. Lincoln knew how important it 
 was to have the support of the Herald, and he carefully 
 studied how to bring its editor into close touch with 
 himself. The outlook for Lincoln s re-election was not 
 promising. Bennett had strongly advocated the nomi 
 nation of General McClellan by the Democrats, and that 
 was ominous of hostility to Lincoln; and when McClel 
 lan was nominated he was accepted on all sides as a most 
 formidable candidate. It was in this emergency that 
 Lincoln s political sagacity served him sufficiently to 
 win the Herald to his cause, and it was done by the 
 confidential tender of the French mission. Bennett did 
 not break over to Lincoln at once, but he went by grad 
 ual approaches. His first step was to declare in favor of 
 an entirely new candidate, which was an utter impossi 
 bility. He opened a leader on the subject thus: "Lin 
 coln has proved a failure; McClellan has proved a fail 
 ure; Fremont has proved a failure; let us have a new 
 candidate." Lincoln, McClellan, and Fremont were 
 then all in the field as nominated candidates, and the 
 Fremont defection was a serious threat to Lincoln. 
 Of course, neither Lincoln nor McClellan declined, 
 and the Herald, failing to get the new man it knew 
 to be an impossibility, squarely advocated Lincoln s 
 re-election. 
 
 Without consulting any one, and without any public 
 announcement whatever, Lincoln wrote to Bennett, ask 
 ing him to accept the mission to France. The offer was 
 declined, Bennett valued the offer very much more than 
 
92 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 the office, and from that day until the day of his death 
 he was one of Lincoln s most appreciative friends and 
 hearty supporters on his own independent line. The 
 tender of the French mission to Bennett has been dis 
 puted, but I am not mistaken about it. W. O. Bartlett, 
 a prominent member of the New York bar, and father 
 of the present Judge Bartlett of the Supreme Court of 
 that State, had personal knowledge of Lincoln s auto 
 graph letter that was delivered to Bennett, and Judge 
 Bartlett yet has the original letter, unless he has parted 
 with it within the last few years. Bennett was not only 
 one of the ablest and one of the most sagacious editors 
 of his day, but he was also one of the most independent, 
 and in controversy one of the most defiant. He was in 
 a position to render greater sendee to Lincoln and to the 
 country in its desperate civil war than any other one man 
 in American journalism. He did not pretend to be a 
 Republican; on the contrary, he was Democratic in all 
 his personal sympathies and convictions, but he gave a 
 faithful support to the war, although often freely criti 
 cising the policy of the administration. He had no de 
 sire for public office, but he did desire, after he had ac 
 quired wealth and newspaper power, just the recognition 
 that Lincoln gave him, and I doubt whether any one 
 thing during Bennett s life ever gave him more sincere 
 gratification than this voluntary offer of one of the first- 
 class missions of the country, made in Mr. Lincoln s own 
 handwriting, and his opportunity to decline the same. 
 Looking as Lincoln did to the great battle for his re-elec 
 tion, this was one of the countless sagacious acts by 
 which he strengthened himself from day to day, and it 
 did much, very much, to pave the way for his over 
 whelming majority of 1864. 
 
 That Lincoln understood practical politics after he had 
 been nominated for a second term is very clearly illus- 
 
LINCOLN IN POLITICS, 93 
 
 trated in the letter he wrote to General Sherman on the 
 1 9th of September, 1864. The States of Indiana, Ohio, 
 and Pennsylvania then voted in October for State offices, 
 and Indiana was desperately contested. Ohio was re 
 garded as certain, and Pennsylvania had only Congress 
 men and local officers to elect. The soldiers of Indiana 
 could not vote in the field, and Lincoln s letter to Sher 
 man, who commanded the major portion of the Indiana 
 troops, appeals to him, in Lincoln s usual cautious man 
 ner, to furlough as many of his soldiers home for the 
 October election as he could safely spare. His exact 
 language is: "Anything you can safely do to let your 
 soldiers, or any part of them, go home to vote at the 
 State election will be greatly in point." To this he 
 adds: "This is in no sense an order; it is simply in 
 tended to impress you with the importance to the army 
 itself of your doing all you safely can, yourself being the 
 judge of what you can safely do." While this was " in 
 no sense an order," it was practically a command that 
 Sherman promptly and generously obeyed, and the result 
 was that Morton was elected Governor by some 22,000 
 majority. It was at Lincoln s special request that Gen 
 eral Logan left his command and missed the march to 
 the sea, to stump Indiana and Illinois in the contest of 
 1864. He was one of the ablest and most impressive of 
 all the campaigners of the West, and it was regarded by 
 Lincoln as more important that Logan should be on the 
 hustings than in command of his corps. 
 
 I recall a pointed illustration of Lincoln s rare sagacity 
 when confronted with embarrassing political complica 
 tions that occurred in 1862, when I was in charge of the 
 military department of Pennsylvania pertaining to the 
 draft for troops made under the State law. Harrisburg 
 was an important centre of military supplies, as well as 
 the political centre of the State. Immense army con- 
 
94 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 tracts were there awarded and executed under officers 
 assigned to duty at that place. After the draft had been 
 made the conscripts began to pour into the capital by 
 thousands, and, as the demand for reinforcements in the 
 field was very pressing, I called upon the military officer 
 of the city and urged upon him the necessity of muster 
 ing the new men as prompt!} as possible. To my sur 
 prise, he mustered only two companies the first day out 
 of a thousand men. On the second day, notwithstand 
 ing my earnest appeal to him, he mustered no more than 
 two companies, and on the third day, when I had over 
 5000 men in camp, a mere mob without organization or 
 discipline, the same tedious process of mustering was 
 continued. I telegraphed Secretary Stanton that I had 
 many men in camp, and that they were arriving in large 
 numbers, but that I could not have them mustered that 
 I could forward a regiment of troops every day if the 
 government would furnish the officers to muster and or 
 ganize them. A prompt answer came that it would be 
 done. The following morning a new officer appeared, 
 of course subordinate to the commandant of the place 
 who had charge of the mustering, and he promptly mus 
 tered an entire regiment the first day. On the following 
 morning he was relieved from duty and ordered else 
 where, and the mustering again fell back to two com 
 panies a day. 
 
 In the mean time over 7000 men had been gathered 
 into the camp, and it was evident that the question of 
 supplying the camp and the interests of contractors had 
 become paramount to the reinforcement of the army. I 
 telegraphed Lincoln that I would see him in Washing 
 ton that night, and hurried on to correct the evil by per 
 sonal conference with him. The case was a very simple 
 one, and he readily took in the situation. He knew that 
 I had labored day and night for two months, without 
 
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 95 
 
 compensation or the expectation of it, to hasten the 
 Pennsylvania troops to the aid of our soldiers in the 
 field, and I said to him that if he would send mustering 
 officers to organize them promptly, I would return and 
 finish the work; if not, I would abandon it and go home. 
 Lincoln was greatly pained at the development, but he 
 understood that a change of military officers at Harris- 
 burg, such as this occasion seemed to demand, would 
 involve serious political complications. He was of all 
 things most desirous to strengthen our shattered armies, 
 and it was evident very soon that he meant to do so in 
 some way, but without offense to the political power that 
 controlled the military assignments at Harrisburg. With 
 out intimating his solution of the problem, he rang his 
 bell and instructed his messenger to bring Adjutant-Gen 
 eral Thomas to the Executive Chamber. Soon after the 
 Adjutant-General appeared, and Lincoln said: "General, 
 what is the military rank of the senior officer at Harris- 
 burg?" To which the Adjutant-General replied: " Cap 
 tain, sir," and naming the officer. Lincoln promptly 
 said in reply: " Bring me a commission immediately for 
 Alexander K. McClure as Assistant Adjutant-General of 
 the United States Volunteers, with the rank of major." 
 The Adjutant-General bowed himself out, when I imme 
 diately said to Lincoln that I could not consent to be sub 
 ject to arbitrary military orders that I desired no com 
 pensation for the work I performed, and I must decline 
 the honor he proposed to confer upon me. In his quiet 
 way he replied: "Well, McClure, try my way; I think 
 that will get the troops on without delay and without 
 treading on anybody s toes. I think if you will take 
 your commission back to Harrisburg, call upon the cap 
 tain in command there to muster you into the service of 
 the United States, and show him your assignment to 
 duty there, you will have no trouble whatever in getting 
 
9 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF \VAR-TIMES, 
 
 the troops organized and forwarded as rapidly as you 
 wish. Now try it, won t yon?" 
 
 I saw the wisdom of the suggestion, and well tinder- 
 stood why the President desired to avoid the offense that 
 would have been given by the removal of the military 
 officers, and I agreed to try his plan. When I returned 
 to Harrisburg the next day I sent for the senior officer to 
 come to my office. He came in with all the dignity and 
 arrogance of an offended Caesar and spoke to me with 
 bare civility. I quietly handed him my commission, 
 requested him to muster me into the military service, 
 and also exhibited the order assigning me for duty at 
 Harrisburg. When he saw my commission his hat was 
 immediately removed and he was as obsequious as he 
 had been insolent before. When he had finished mus 
 tering me into the service I said to him, " I presume you 
 understand what this means. I don t propose to make 
 any display of military authority or to interfere with 
 anything except that which I have immediately in hand. 
 There must be a regiment of troops mustered and for 
 warded from this State every day until the troops in 
 camp are all sent to the field, Good-morning." He 
 immediately bowed himself out, saluting in military 
 style as he did so a grace that I had not yet mastered 
 sufficiently to return and from that day until the camp 
 was emptied of conscripts a regiment of troops was mus 
 tered daily and forwarded to Washington. That was the 
 only military authority I ever exercised, and few knew 
 of the military dignity I had so suddenly attained. 
 When the troops were forwarded to the field and the 
 accounts settled I resigned my commission as quietly as 
 I received it and sent my resignation to the President, 
 who, as he had voluntarily promised, ordered its imme 
 diate acceptance. The officer who was thus so unex 
 pectedly superseded, and who was so promptly made 
 
LINCOLN IN POLITICS. 97 
 
 to render efficient service to the country by Lincoln s 
 admirable strategy, is no longer among the living, 
 and I omit his name. He learned how Lincoln 
 could discipline a soldier, and he profited by the 
 lesson. 
 
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN was not a sentimental Aboli- 
 *. tionist. Indeed, he was not a sentimentalist on 
 any subject. He was a man of earnest conviction and 
 of sublime devotion to his faith. In many of his public 
 letters and State papers he was as poetic as he was epi 
 grammatic, and he was singularly felicitous in the pathos 
 that was so often interwoven with his irresistible logic. 
 But he never contemplated the abolition of slavery until 
 the events of the war not only made it clearly possible, 
 but made it an imperious necessity. As the sworn Ex 
 ecutive of the nation it was his duty to obey the Consti 
 tution in all its provisions, and he accepted that duty 
 without reservation. He knew that slavery was the im 
 mediate cause of the political disturbance that culminated 
 in civil war, and I know that he believed from the begin 
 ning that if war should be persisted in, it could end only 
 in the severance of the Union or the destruction of slav 
 ery. His supreme desire was peace, alike before the war, 
 during the war, and in closing the war. He exhausted 
 every means within his power to teach the Southern peo 
 ple that slavery could not be disturbed by his administra 
 tion as long as they themselves obeyed the Constitution 
 and laws which protected slavery, and he never uttered 
 a word or did an act to justify, or even excuse, the South 
 
LINCOLN S TOMB AT SPRINGFIELD. 
 
100 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 in assuming that he meant to make any warfare upon 
 the institution of slavery beyond protecting the free Ter 
 ritories from its desolating tread. 
 
 It was not until the war had been in progress for 
 nearly two years that Lincoln decided to proclaim the 
 policy of Emancipation, and then he was careful to as 
 sume the power as warranted under the Constitution only 
 by the supreme necessities of war. There was no time 
 from the inauguration of Lincoln until the ist of Janu 
 ary, 1863, that the South could not have returned to the 
 Union with slavery intact in every State. His prelimi 
 nary proclamation, dated September 22, 1862, gave notice 
 that on the ist of January, 1863, he would by public 
 proclamation, "warranted by the Constitution upon 
 military necessity," declare that "all persons held as 
 slaves within any State, or designated part of the State, 
 the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the 
 United States, shall be thenceforward and for ever free." 
 Every insurgent State had thus more than three months 
 formal notice that the war was not prosecuted for the 
 abolition of slavery, but solely for the restoration of the 
 Union, and that they could, by returning and accepting 
 the authority oi the National Government at any time 
 before the ist of January, 1863, preserve slavery indef 
 initely. Lincoln s letter to Horace Greeley, written just 
 one month before his preliminary Emancipation Procla 
 mation, presents in the clearest and most concise manner 
 Lincoln s views on the subject of slavery and the Union. 
 After saying that if he could save the Union without 
 freeing any slaves he would do it; that if he could save 
 it by freeing all the slaves he would do it; and that if 
 he could save it by freeing some and leaving others 
 he would also do that, he adds: "What I do about 
 slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it 
 helps to save this Union, and what I forbear I forbear 
 
L INCOLN AND EMANCIPA TION. : o I 
 
 because I do not believe it would help to save the 
 Union." 
 
 As President of the Republic, Lincoln was governed 
 at every step by his paramount duty to prevent the dis 
 memberment of the nation and to restore the Union and 
 its people to fraternal relations. The best expression of 
 his own views and aims in the matter is given in a single 
 brief sentence, uttered by himself on the 13111 of Sep 
 tember, 1862, only nine days before he issued the pre 
 liminary proclamation. It was in response to an appeal 
 from a large delegation of Chicago clergymen, represent 
 ing nearly or quite all the religious denominations of that 
 city, urging immediate Emancipation. He heard them 
 patiently, as he always did those who were entitled to be 
 heard at all, and his answer was given in these words: 
 I have not decided against the proclamation of liberty 
 to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement, and 
 I can assure you the matter is on my mind by day and 
 by night more than any other. Whatever shall appear 
 to be God s will I will do." However Lincoln s relig 
 ious views may be disputed, he had a profound belief in 
 God and in God s immutable justice, and the sentence I 
 have just quoted tells the whole story of Lincoln s action 
 in the abolition of slavery. He did not expect miracles 
 indeed, he was one of the last men to believe in mira 
 cles at all but he did believe that God overruled all 
 human actions; that all individuals charged with grave 
 responsibility were but the means in the hands of the 
 Great Ruler to accomplish the fulfillment of justice. 
 Congressman Arnold, whom Lincoln once declared to 
 me to be the one member of the House in whose per 
 sonal and political friendship he had absolute faith, 
 speaking of the earnest appeals made to Lincoln for 
 Emancipation, says: "Mr. Lincoln listened not un 
 moved to such appeals, and, seeking prayerful guidance 
 
102 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 of Almighty God, the Proclamation of Emancipation 
 was prepared. It had been, in fact, prepared in July, 
 1862." 
 
 Thus from July until September, during which time 
 there was the greatest possible pressure on Lincoln for 
 an Emancipation policy, his proclamation had been for 
 mulated, but his usual caution had prevented him from 
 intimating it to any outside of his Cabinet. It was the 
 gravest step ever taken by any civil ruler in this or any 
 other land, and military success was essential to main 
 tain and execute the policy of Emancipation after it had 
 been declared. Had McClellan been successful in his 
 Peninsula campaign, or had Lee been defeated in the 
 second conflict of Manassas, without bringing peace, the 
 proclamation would doubtless have been issued with the 
 prestige of such victory. Under the shivering hesitation 
 among even Republicans throughout the North, Lincoln 
 felt that it needed the prestige of a military 7 victory to 
 assure its cordial acceptance by very many of the sup 
 porters of the government. The battle of Antietam, 
 fonght by the only general of that time who had pub 
 licly declared against an Emancipation policy, was the 
 first victory the Army of the Potomac had achieved in 
 1862, and five days after the Antietam victory the pre 
 liminary proclamation was issued. 
 
 Only the careful student of the history of the war can 
 have any just conception of the gradual manner in which 
 Lincoln approached Emancipation. He long and earn 
 estly sought to avoid it, believing then that the Union 
 could be best preserved without the violent destruction 
 of slavery; and when he appreciated the fact that the 
 leaders of the rebellion were unwilling to entertain any 
 proposition for the restoration of the Union, he accepted 
 the destruction of slavery as an imperious necessity, but 
 he sought to attain it with the least possible disturbance. 
 
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 103 
 
 The first direct assault made upon slavery was by Sec 
 retary Cameron s overruled annual report in December) 
 
 1861, in which he advised the arming of slaves. The 
 first Congress that sat during the war made steady 
 strides toward the destruction of slavery by the passage 
 of five important laws. The first abolished slavery in 
 the District of Columbia; the second prohibited slavery 
 in all the Territories of the United States; the third 
 gave freedom to the escaped slaves of all who were in 
 rebellion; the fourth gave lawful authority for the enlist 
 ment of colored men as soldiers; and the fifth made a 
 new article of war, prohibiting any one in the military 
 or naval service from aiding in the arrest or return of a 
 fugitive slave under pain of dismissal. Slavery was 
 abolished in the District of Columbia as early as April, 
 
 1862, the act having passed the Senate by 29 to 6, and 
 the House by 92 to 38. A bill prohibiting slavery in the 
 Territories was passed on the i9th of June, and a bill 
 giving freedom to slaves of rebellious masters who per 
 formed military service was passed on the i7th of July. 
 
 Thus was Congress steadily advancing toward Eman 
 cipation, and as early as March, 1862, Lincoln had pro 
 posed his plan of compensated Emancipation. On the 
 6th of March he sent a special message to Congress 
 recommending the adoption of the following joint reso 
 lution : 
 
 RESOLVED, That the United States ought to co-operate with 
 any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giv 
 ing to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its 
 discretion, to compensate for the inconvenience, public and pri 
 vate, produced by such change of system. 
 
 His message very earnestly pressed upon Congress the 
 importance of adopting such a policy, and upon the 
 country the importance of accepting it, North and 
 {South, JIjs concluding sentence is: u ln full view of 
 
104 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I 
 earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to 
 the subject" Again, when revoking General Hunter s 
 order of the Qth of May, 1862, declaring all slaves free 
 within his military district, Lincoln made a most im 
 pressive appeal to the people of the South on the sub 
 ject of compensated Emancipation. He said: u I do 
 not argue; I beseech you to make the argument for 
 yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the 
 signs of the times. . . . The change it contemplates 
 would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending 
 or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So 
 much good has not been done by any one effort in all 
 past time as, in the providence of God, it is now your 
 high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to 
 lament that you have neglected it." Soon after this 
 Lincoln had an interview with the Congressional dele 
 gations from the Border Slave States, at which he again 
 earnestly urged them to accept compensated Emanci 
 pation. Speaking of that interview, Lincoln said: "I 
 believed that the indispensable necessity for military 
 Emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless 
 averted by gradual and compensated Emancipation." 
 Again in July, 1862, only two months before he issued 
 the preliminary proclamation, Lincoln summoned the 
 delegates from the Border Slave States to a conference 
 with him, and again most persuasively appealed to them 
 to accept gradual and compensated Emancipation. He 
 said to them : " I do not speak of Emancipation at once, 
 but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually." He 
 also clearly foreshadowed to them that if they refused it, 
 more violent Emancipation must come. He said: " The 
 pressure in this direction is still upon me and is increas 
 ing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me, 
 and much more can relieve the country, on this import- 
 
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 105 
 
 ant point. n He concluded with these eloqtient words: 
 u Our common country is in great peril, demanding the 
 loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. 
 Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the 
 world; its beloved history and cherished memories are 
 vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and ren 
 dered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any 
 others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness 
 and swell that grandeur, and to link your names there 
 with for ever." 
 
 Strange as it may now seem, in view of the inevitable 
 tendency of events at that time, these appeals of Lincoln 
 were not only treated with contempt by those in rebel 
 lion, but the Border State Congressmen, who had every 
 thing at stake, and who in the end were compelled to 
 accept forcible Emancipation without compensation, al 
 though themselves not directly involved in rebellion, 
 made no substantial response to Lincoln s efforts to save 
 their States and people. Thus did the States in rebel 
 lion disregard repeated importunities from Lincoln to 
 accept Emancipation with payment for their slaves. 
 During long weary months he had made temperate 
 utterance on every possible occasion, and by every 
 official act that could direct the attention of the coun 
 try he sought to attain the least violent solution of the 
 slavery problem, only to learn the bitter lesson that 
 slavery would make no terms with the government, and 
 that it was the inspiration of rebellious armies seeking 
 the destruction of the Republic. Soon after his appeal 
 to the Congressmen of the Border States in July, 1862, 
 Lincoln prepared his Emancipation Proclamation, and 
 quietly and patiently waited the fullness of time for pro 
 claiming it, still hoping that peace might come without 
 resort to the extreme measure of military and uncompen- 
 sated Emancipation. Seeing that the last hope of any 
 
to6 LINCOLN Atib MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 other method of peace had failed, he issued the prelim 
 inary proclamation on the 22d of September, 1862, and 
 his final proclamation on the ist of January following; 
 and there never was a day from that time until Lin 
 coln s death that he ever entertained, even for a mo 
 ment, the question of receding from the freedom he had 
 proclaimed to the slaves. But while he was compelled 
 to accept the issue of revolutionary Emancipation, he 
 never abandoned the idea of compensated Emancipation 
 until the final overthrow of Lee s army in 1865. He 
 proposed it to his Cabinet in February of that year, only 
 to be unanimously rejected, and I personally know that 
 he would have suggested it to Stephens, Campbell, and 
 Hunter at the Hampton Roads Conference in February, 
 1865, had not Vice-President Stephens, as the immediate 
 representative of Jefferson Davis, frankly stated at the 
 outset that he was instructed not to entertain or discuss 
 any proposition that did not recognize the perpetuity of 
 the Confederacy. That statement from Stephens pre 
 cluded the possibility of Lincoln making any propo 
 sition, or even suggestion, whatever on the subject. In 
 a personal interview with Jefferson Davis when I was a 
 visitor in his house at Bevoir, Mississippi, fifteen years 
 after the close of the war, I asked him whether he had 
 ever received any intimation about Lincoln s desire to 
 close the war by the payment of $400,000,000 for eman 
 cipated slaves. He said that he had not heard of it. 
 I asked him whether he would have given such in 
 structions to Stephens if he had possessed knowledge 
 of the fact. He answered that he could not have given 
 Stephens any other instructions than he did under the 
 circumstances, because as President of the Confederacy 
 he could not entertain any question involving its dis 
 solution, that being a subject entirely for the States 
 themselves, 
 
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 107 
 
 Lincoln treated the Emancipation question from the 
 beginning as a very grave matter-of-fact problem to be 
 solved for or against the destruction of slavery as the 
 safety of the Union might dictate. He refrained from 
 Emancipation for eighteen months after the war had 
 begun, simply because he believed during that time that 
 he might best save the Union by saving slavery, and had 
 the development of events proved that belief to be cor 
 rect he would have permitted slavery to live with the 
 Union. When he became fully convinced that the safety 
 of the government demanded the destruction of slavery, 
 he decided, after the most patient and exhaustive con 
 sideration of the subject, to proclaim his Emancipation 
 policy. It was not founded solely or even chiefly on the 
 sentiment of hostility to slavery. If it had been, the 
 proclamation would have declared slavery abolished in 
 every State of the Union; but he excluded the slave 
 States of Delaware, Maryland, and Tennessee, and cer 
 tain parishes in Louisiana, and certain counties in Vir 
 ginia, from the operation of the proclamation, declaring, 
 in the instrument that has now become immortal, that 
 "which excepted parts are for the present left precisely 
 as if this proclamation were not issued. " Thus if only 
 military Emancipation had been achieved by the Presi 
 dent s proclamation, it would have presented the singular 
 spectacle of Tennessee in the heart of the South, Mary 
 land and Delaware north of the Potomac, and nearly one- 
 half of Louisiana and one-half of Virginia with slavery 
 protected, while freedom was accorded to the slaves of 
 all the other slaveholding States. Lincoln evidently 
 regarded the Emancipation policy as the most moment 
 ous in the history of American statesmanship, and as 
 justified only by the extreme necessity of weakening 
 the rebellion that then threatened the severance of the 
 Union. 
 
108 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 From the very day of his inauguration until he issued 
 his Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln was constantly 
 importuned by the more radical element of his supporters 
 to declare his purpose to abolish slavery. Among them 
 were a number of the ablest leaders of his party in the 
 Senate and House, and some of them as impracticable in 
 their methods as they were imperious in their demands. 
 That he was glad of the opportunity to destroy slavery 
 none can doubt who knew him, but he patiently bore the 
 often irritating complaints of many of his friends until 
 he saw that slavery and the Union could not survive to 
 gether, and that the country was at least measurably pre 
 pared to accept and support the new policy. He was 
 many times threatened with open rebellion against his 
 administration by some of the most potent Republicans 
 because of his delay in declaring the Emancipation pol 
 icy, but he waited until the time had come in the fall of 
 1862, when he felt that it was not only a necessity of war, 
 but a political necessity as well. Another very grave 
 consideration that led him to accept Emancipation when 
 he did was the peril of England and France recognizing 
 the Confederacy and thereby involving us in war with 
 two of the greatest powers of Europe. The pretext on 
 which was based the opposition of England to the Union 
 cause in the early part of the war was the maintenance 
 of slavery by the government while prosecuting a war 
 against a slaveholders rebellion, and it seemed to be an 
 absolute necessity that our government should accept the 
 Emancipation policy to impair the force of the public 
 sentiment in England that demanded the recognition of 
 the South as an independent government. These three 
 weighty considerations, each in itself sufficient to have 
 decided Lincoln s action, combined to dictate his Eman 
 cipation policy in the early fall of 1862. The proclama 
 tion did not in itself abolish slavery, but the positive 
 
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. 109 
 
 declaration in the proclamation that the Executive 
 government of the United States, including the military 
 and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and main 
 tain the freedom of said persons," gave notice to every 
 slaveholder and promise to every slave that every bond 
 man brought within the lines of the Union Army would 
 thereafter be for ever free. 
 
 While the Emancipation Proclamation inflicted a mor 
 tal wound upon slavery and assured its absolute extinc 
 tion, sooner or later, throughout the entire country, Lin 
 coln fully appreciated the fact that much was yet to be 
 done, even beyond victories in the field, to efface the blot 
 of slavery from the Republic. As early as the i4th of 
 January, 1863, Representative Wilson of Iowa, then 
 chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and now a United 
 States Senator, reported a proposed amendment to the 
 Constitution declaring slavery u for ever prohibited in 
 the United States." On the loth of February, 1864, 
 Senator Trumbull reported from the Judiciary Com 
 mittee of that body a proposed amendment that was 
 finally adopted in 1865, and is now part of the funda 
 mental law of the nation. It was passed in the Senate 
 on the 1 8th of April by a vote of 38 to 6. It was de 
 feated in the House by a vote of 93 in its favor and 65 
 against it, lacking the requisite two-thirds. Seeing that 
 the amendment was lost, Ashley of Ohio changed his 
 vote from the affirmative to the negative with a view of 
 entering a motion to reconsider, and the subject went 
 over until the next session. On the 6th of January, 
 1865, Ashley made his motion to reconsider and called 
 up the proposed amendment for another vote. One of 
 the most interesting and able debates of that time was 
 precipitated by Ashley s motion, and the notable speech 
 of the occasion was made by Mr. Rollins of Missouri, 
 who had been a large slaveholder, and who declared that 
 
110 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR. TIMES. 
 
 the rebellion instigated and carried on by slaveholders 
 has been the death-knell of the institution." Stevens, 
 the great apostle of freedom from Pennsylvania and the 
 Great Commoner of the war, closed the debate, and 
 probably on no other occasion in the history of Congress 
 was such intense anxiety exhibited as when the roll was 
 called on the adoption or rejection of the amendment. 
 The Republicans did not have two-thirds of the House, 
 but several Democrats openly favored the amendment 
 and a number of others were known to be uncertain. 
 The first break in the Democratic line was when the 
 name of CorTroth of Pennsylvania was called, who 
 promptly answered ay, and was greeted with thunders 
 of applause in the House and galleries. He was fol 
 lowed by Ganson, Herrick, Nelson, Odell, Radford, and 
 Steele, Democrats from New York, by English from 
 Connecticut, and by McAlister from Pennsylvania, and 
 when the Speaker declared that the amendment had 
 been adopted by 119 yeas to 56 nays, being more than 
 the requisite constitutional majority, the great battle of 
 Emancipation was substantially won, and Lincoln hailed 
 it with a measure of joy second only to his delight at 
 the announcement of Lee s surrender. Before the mem 
 bers left their seats salvos of artillery announced to the 
 people of the capital that the Constitutional amendment 
 abolishing slavery had been adopted by Congress, and 
 the victorious leaders rushed to the White House to 
 congratulate Lincoln on the final achievement of 
 Emancipation. 
 
 The acceptance of the proposed amendment by the 
 requisite number of States was not a matter of doubt, 
 and the absolute overthrow of slavery throughout the 
 entire Republic dates from the adoption of the amend 
 ment to the Constitution in the House of Representatives 
 on the 6th of January, 1865. Illinois, the home of Lin- 
 
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION. in 
 
 coin, fitly led off in ratifying the amendment. Massa 
 chusetts and Pennsylvania both ratified on the 8th of 
 February, and one of the most grateful recollections of 
 my life is that as a member of the popular branch of the 
 Pennsylvania Legislature I supported and voted for that 
 measure. Owing to the delay in the meeting of Legis 
 latures in a number of the States the official proclamation 
 of the ratification of the amendment was not made until 
 the 1 8th of December, 1865, on which day Secretary 
 Seward formally declared to the country and the world 
 that the amendment abolishing slavery had become to 
 all intents and purposes valid as a part of the Constitu 
 tion of the United States." Lincoln had thus dealt the 
 deathblow to slavery by his proclamation, but it was not 
 until after he had sealed his devotion to free government 
 by giving his life to the assassin s hate that the great 
 work was consummated and the Republic was entirely 
 free from the stain of human bondage. 
 
 The most earnest discussions I ever had with Lincoln 
 were on the subject of his Emancipation Proclamation. 
 I knew the extraordinary pressure that came from the 
 more radical element of the Republican party, embracing 
 a number of its ablest leaders, such as Sumner, Chase, 
 Wade, Chandler, and others, but I did not know, and 
 few were permitted to know, the importance of an 
 Emancipation policy in restraining the recognition of 
 the Confederacy by France and England. I was earn 
 estly opposed to an Emancipation Proclamation by the 
 President. For some weeks before it was issued I saw 
 Lincoln frequently, and in several instances sat with him 
 for hours at a time after the routine business of the day 
 had been disposed of and the doors of the White House 
 were closed. I viewed the issue solely from a political 
 standpoint, and certainly had the best of reasons for the 
 views I pressed upon Lincoln, assuming that political 
 
112 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 expediency should control his action. I reminded him 
 that the proclamation would not liberate a single slave 
 that the Southern armies must be overthrown, and that 
 the territory held by them must be conquered by military 
 success, before it could be made effective. To this Lin 
 coln answered: u It does seem like the Pope s bull against 
 the comet;" but that was the most he ever said in any 
 of his conversations to indicate that he might not issue 
 it. I appealed to him to issue a military order as Com 
 mander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, proclaiming 
 that every slave of a rebellious owner should be for ever 
 free when brought within our lines. Looking simply to 
 practical results, that would have accomplished every 
 thing that the Emancipation Proclamation achieved; but 
 it was evident during all these discussions that Lincoln 
 viewed the question from a very much higher standpoint 
 than I did, although, as usual, he said but little and 
 gave no clue to the bent of his mind on the subject. 
 
 I reminded Lincoln that political defeat would be in 
 evitable in the great States of the Union in the elections 
 soon to follow if he issued the Emancipation Proclama 
 tion that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
 Indiana, and Illinois would undoubtedly vote Democratic 
 and elect Democratic delegations to the next Congress. 
 He did not dispute my judgment as to the political effect 
 of the proclamation, but I never left him with any rea 
 sonable hope that I had seriously impressed him on the 
 subject. Ever} political prediction I made was fearfully 
 fulfilled in the succeeding October and November elec 
 tions. New York elected Seymour Governor by 10,700 
 majority, and chose 17 Democratic and 14 Republican 
 Congressmen. New Jersey elected a Democratic Gov 
 ernor by 14,500, and 4 Democrats and i Republican to 
 Congress. Pennsylvania elected the Democratic State 
 ticket by 3500 majority and 13 Democrats and n Re- 
 
LINCOLN AND EMANCIPA TION. 1 1 3 
 
 publicans to Congress, with a Democratic Legislature 
 that chose Buckalew to the United States Senate. Ohio 
 elected the Democratic State ticket by 5500 majority and 
 14 Democrats and 2 Republicans to Congress, Ashley and 
 Schenck being the only two who escaped in the political 
 Waterloo. Indiana elected the Democratic State ticket 
 by 9500 majority and 7 Democrats and 4 Republicans to 
 Congress, with 30 Democratic majority in the Legis 
 lature. Illinois elected the Democratic State ticket by 
 16,500 majority and 9 Democrats and 5 Republicans to 
 Congress, and 28 Democratic majority in the Legislature. 
 Confidently anticipating these disastrous political results, 
 I could not conceive it possible for Lincoln to success 
 fully administer the government and prosecute the war 
 with the six most important loyal S.ates of the Union 
 declaring against him at the polls; but Lincoln knew 
 that the majority in Congress would be safe, as the rebel 
 lious States were excluded, and the far West and New 
 England were ready to sustain the Emancipation policy; 
 and he appreciated, as I did not, that the magnitude of 
 his act cast all mere considerations of expediency into 
 nothingness. He dared to do the right for the sake of 
 the right. I speak of this the more freely because, in 
 the light of events as they appear to-day, he rose to the 
 sublimest duty of his life, while I was pleading the mere 
 expedient of a day against a record for human freedom 
 that must be immortal while liberty has worshipers in 
 any land or clime. 
 
 Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation be 
 cause it was an imperious duty, and because the time 
 had come when any temporizing with the question 
 would have been more fatal than could possibly be any 
 temporary revolt against the manly declaration of right. 
 He felt strong enough to maintain the freedom he pro 
 claimed by the military and naval power of the govern- 
 
114 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 inent. He believed it to be the most mortal wound that 
 could be inflicted upon the Confederacy. He believed 
 that it would disarm the strong anti-Union sentiment 
 that seemed to be fast pressing- the English government 
 to the recognition of the South, and he believed that, 
 however public sentiment might falter for a time, like 
 the disturbed and quivering needle it would surely settle 
 to the pole. He did not issue it for the mere sentiment 
 of unshackling four millions of slaves, nor did he then 
 dream of universal citizenship and suffrage to freedmen. 
 In the last public address that he ever delivered, on the 
 nth of April, 1865, speaking of negro suffrage, he said: 
 I would myself prefer that suffrage w r ere now conferred 
 upon the very intelligent and on those who served our 
 cause as soldiers." He believed it to be simply an act 
 of justice that every colored man who had fought for his 
 freedom and for the maintenance of the Union, and was 
 honorably discharged from the military service, should 
 be clothed with the right of franchise; and he believed 
 that "the very intelligent" should also be enfranchised 
 as exemplars of their race and an inspiration to them for 
 advancement. He was always stubbornly for justice, 
 stubbornly for the right, and it was his sublime devotion 
 to the right in the face of the most appalling opposition 
 that made the name of Abraham Lincoln immortal as 
 the author of the Emancipation Proclamation, on which 
 he justly invoked "the considerate judgment of mankind 
 and the gracious favor of Almighty God. 
 
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN. 
 
 THE fact that Abraham Lincoln conceived and exe 
 cuted the scheme to nominate Andrew Johnson for 
 Vice-President in 1864 has been feebly disputed, but is 
 now accepted as the truth of history. It was not an 
 arbitrary exercise of political power on the part of Lin 
 coln. He had no prejudice against Hannibal Hamlin to 
 inspire him to compass Hamlin s defeat. He had no 
 special love for Andrew Johnson to lead him to over 
 throw his old associate of 1860 and make the Military 
 Governor of an insurgent State his fellow-candidate for 
 1864. Hamlin was not in close sympathy with Lincoln; 
 on the contrary, he was known as one who passively 
 rather than actively strengthened a powerful cabal of 
 Republican leaders in their aggressive hostility to Lin 
 coln and his general policy; but Lincoln was incapable 
 of yielding to prejudice, however strong, in planning his 
 great campaign for re-election in 1864. Had Hamlin 
 been ten times more offensive than he was to Lincoln, 
 it would not have halted Lincoln for a moment in favor 
 ing Hamlin s renomination if he believed it good politics 
 to do so. He rejected Hamlin not because he hated him ; 
 he accepted Johnson not because he loved him. He was 
 guided in what he did, or what he did not, in planning 
 the great campaign of his life, that he believed involved 
 the destiny of the country itself, by the single purpose 
 of making success as nearly certain as possible. 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 HANNIBAI, HAMIJN, U 
 
LINCOLN AND IIAMLIN. 117 
 
 Hamlin was nominated for the Vice- Presidency in 1860 
 simply because he was a representative Republican fresh 
 from the Democratic party. Another consideration that 
 favored his selection was the fact that his State had been 
 carried into the Republican party under his leadership, 
 and that its State election in September would be the 
 finger-board of success or defeat in the national contest. 
 His position as Representative, Senator, and Governor, 
 and his admitted ability and high character, fully justi 
 fied his nomination as the candidate for Vice-President; 
 but when elected there was the usual steadily widening 
 chasm between him and the Executive, and, like nearly 
 or quite all Vice- Presidents, he drifted into the embrace 
 of the opposition to his chief. It was this opposition, 
 led by men of such consummate ability as Wade of Ohio 
 and Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, that admonished 
 Lincoln of the necessity of putting himself in the strong 
 est possible attitude for the then admittedly doubtful bat 
 tle of 1864. While the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg and 
 the surrender of Vicksburg the year before had done 
 much to inspire faith in the success of the war, the Con 
 federacy was stubbornly maintaining its armies. The 
 opening of the new year of 1864 called for large drafts 
 of men to fill the thinned ranks of the Union forces, and 
 there was a powerful undertow of despondency among 
 the loyal people of the North. The war was costing 
 $3,000,000 a day, and after three years of bloody conflict 
 the end was not in view. The Republican leaders in the 
 early part of 1864 were divided in councils, distracted by 
 the conflicts of ambition, and very many of the ablest of 
 them regarded the defeat of the party as not only possi 
 ble, but more than probable. The one man who fully 
 understood the peril and who studied carefully how to 
 avert it was Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 Lincoln, as was his usual custom, consulted with all 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 who came within his reach, and developed his views 
 from time to time with extreme caution. In the early 
 part of the year he reached the conclusion that it would 
 be eminently wise to nominate a conspicuous War Demo 
 crat for Vice- President along with himself for President. 
 A number of prominent men who acted with the Demo 
 cratic party in 1860 against Lincoln s election, but who 
 patriotically entered the military service and won dis 
 tinction by their heroism, represented a very large class 
 of Democratic voters upon whom Lincoln felt he must 
 rely for his re-election. Hamlin had been a Democrat, 
 but he did not come iinder the class of War Democrats, 
 while Butler, Dix, Dickinson, Johnson, Holt, and others 
 represented a distinctive and very formidable class of 
 citizens who, while yet professing to be Democrats, were 
 ready to support the war under Lincoln until it should 
 be successfully terminated by the restoration of the Union. 
 Lincoln s first selection for Vice-President was General 
 Butler. I believe he reached that conclusion without 
 specially consulting with any of his friends. As early 
 as March, 1864, he sent for General Cameron, to whom 
 he proposed the nomination of Butler, and that, I as 
 sume, was his first declaration of his purpose to any one 
 on the subject. He confided to Cameron the mission to 
 Fortress Monroe to confer confidentially with Butler. 
 On that journey Cameron was accompanied by Ex-Con 
 gressman William H. Armstrong of Pennsylvania, who 
 was first informed of the real object of Cameron s visit 
 when they were returning home, and after Butler had 
 declined to permit his name to be considered. Butler 
 was at that time a strong man in the loyal States. He 
 had not achieved great military success, but his adminis 
 tration in New Orleans had made him universally popu 
 lar throughout the North, in which the vindictive vitu 
 peration of the Southern people heaped upon him was 
 
LINCOLN AND HAM LIN. 119 
 
 an important factor. Butler s declination was peremp 
 tory, and Cameron returned home without learning in 
 what direction Lincoln would be likely to look for a 
 candidate for Vice- President. 
 
 In a later conference with Cameron, in which the 
 names of Johnson, Dickinson, and Dix were seriously 
 discussed, Lincoln expressed his preference for Johnson, 
 to which Cameron, with unconcealed reluctance, finally 
 assented. While Lincoln at that time decided in favor 
 of Johnson, he did not himself regard it as final. His 
 extreme caution and exceptional sagacity made him 
 carefully consider all possible weak points in Johnson s 
 candidacy before he launched the movement for his 
 nomination. He summoned General Sickles to Wash 
 ington, and sent him to Tennessee on a confidential mis 
 sion to examine and make report to him of the success 
 of Johnson s administration as Military Governor. That 
 State was in a revolutionary condition ; Johnson was 
 charged with violent and despotic official acts, and Lin 
 coln meant to know fully whether Johnson might, by 
 reason of his administration, be vulnerable as a national 
 candidate. Sickles had no knowledge of the real pur 
 pose of his mission. The question of nominating John 
 son for the Vice- Presidency was never suggested or even 
 intimated to Sickles, and he fulfilled his trust and re 
 ported favorably on Johnson s administration, without 
 even a suspicion that he was to determine the destiny 
 of Andrew Johnson, make him Vice-President of the 
 United States, and thus President. 
 
 Lincoln s purpose in seeking Johnson as his associate 
 on the national ticket in 1864 was much more far reach 
 ing than any but himself at the time supposed. He 
 meant to guard against possible defeat by getting a 
 number of the insurgent States in some sort of line to 
 enable their Electoral votes to be counted if needed. 
 
i20 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAk-TIMES. 
 
 His most promising experiment was in Tennessee under 
 the guidance of Johnson, but he obviously intended that 
 the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and West Virginia 
 with Tennessee should be organized with the semblance 
 of full Statehood to make their Electoral votes available 
 should the national contest be close. Had he developed 
 this policy to his party or to Congress, it would have 
 been met with positive and aggressive opposition, but 
 he developed it in the quietest way possible. His first 
 movement in that line was to have delegations elected 
 to the National Convention from the Southern States 
 named, and when they appeared at the Baltimore Con 
 vention on the yth of June the battle for their admission 
 was led with consummate skill by the few who under 
 stood Lincoln s policy. Tennessee being in the strong 
 est attitude, the delegation from that State was selected 
 on which to make the fight. It was desperately con 
 tested, because it was then well understood to mean the 
 nomination of Johnson for Vice- President; but the Ten 
 nessee delegates were admitted by more than a two- 
 thirds vote. With Tennessee accepted as entitled to 
 representation, the contest was ended, and Louisiana 
 and Arkansas were given the right of representation 
 without a serious struggle. 
 
 When Congress met again after the election in No 
 vember, and when Lincoln s election by an overwhelm 
 ing popular as well as Electoral vote was assured, the 
 question of counting the Electoral votes of Louisiana, 
 Tennessee, and Arkansas was raised and elaborately dis 
 cussed in both branches. As Lincoln had 212 Electoral 
 votes to 21 for McClellan, exclusive of the votes of the 
 three insurgent States referred to, there was no political 
 necessity to induce Congress to strain a point for the ac 
 ceptance of these votes; and a joint resolution was finally 
 passed declaring "that no valid election for Electors of 
 
LINCOLN AND HA ML IN. 121 
 
 President and Vice-President of the United States" had 
 been held in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas. Lin 
 coln approved the resolution, but took occasion by spe 
 cial message to disclaim approval of the recital of the 
 preamble. Had the votes of these three States been 
 needed to elect a Republican President, I hazard little in 
 saying that they would have been treated as regular and 
 lawful and counted with the approval of both the Senate 
 and House; as they were not needed and as the develop 
 ment of these States was Lincoln s own conception, those 
 who were not specially friendly scored an empty victory 
 against him. 
 
 He moved with masterly sagacity at every step in his 
 efforts to nominate Johnson, and his selection of General 
 Cameron as early as March to be his first ambassador in 
 search of a War Democrat for Vice-President was not 
 one of the least of his many shrewd conceptions. The 
 relations between Lincoln and Cameron had been some 
 what strained by Cameron s retirement from the Cabinet 
 in 1862. At least Lincoln assumed that they might be 
 somewhat strained on the part of Cameron, and he took 
 early caution to enlist Cameron in his renomination. He 
 knew the power of Cameron in the manipulation of dis 
 cordant political elements, and he fully appreciated the 
 fact that Cameron s skill m?de him a dangerous oppo 
 nent. He bound Cameron to himself by making him 
 one of his trusted leadeis in the selection of a candidate 
 for Vice-President. The man who was probably closest 
 to Lincoln in this movement was Henry J. Raymond, 
 but in this as in all Lincoln s movements his confidence 
 was limited with each of his trusted agents. Raymond 
 was then editor of the only prominent New York journal 
 that heartily supported Lincoln ; and he, with the aid of 
 Seward and Weed, who early entered into the movement 
 for the nomination of Johnson, overthrew Dickinson in 
 
122 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 his own State and was the confessed Lincoln leader in 
 the Baltimore Convention of 1864. With Dickinson 
 beaten in New York and with Hamlin s forces demoral 
 ized early in the contest, the nomination of Johnson was 
 easily accomplished, chiefly because it was what Lincoln 
 desired. 
 
 Neither Swett nor Lamon had any knowledge of Lin 
 coln s positive movement for the nomination of Johnson 
 until within a day or two of the meeting of the conven 
 tion. Colonel Lamon has recently given a description 
 of the scene between Lincoln, Swett, and himself a day 
 or two before they went to Baltimore to aid in Lincoln s 
 renomination. Swett earnestly and even passionately 
 protested against the overthrow of Hamlin, but after 
 hearing Lincoln fully on the subject he consented to go 
 to the convention, in which he was a delegate from Illi 
 nois, and support the nomination of Johnson; but he 
 wisely declared Holt to be his candidate, as a foil to pro 
 tect Lincoln. Swett naturally felt uncertain as to how 
 the suggestion of Johnson s name would be received at 
 Baltimore, as he had no knowledge of the extent to 
 which Lincoln had progressed in the Johnson move 
 ment. In answer to his inquiry whether he was at lib 
 erty to say that Lincoln desired Johnson s nomination, 
 Lincoln answered in the negative, and, as quoted by 
 Colonel Lamon in a recent public letter, said: "No, I 
 will address a letter to Lamon here embodying my views, 
 which you, McClure, and other friends may use if it be 
 found absolutely necessary; otherwise it may be better 
 that I shall not appear actively on the stage of this 
 theatre." The letter was written by Lincoln and deliv 
 ered to Lamon, who had it with him at Baltimore, but, 
 as there was no occasion for using it, it was never shown 
 to any one and was returned to Lincoln after the con 
 vention at his request 
 
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN. 123 
 
 How shrewdly Lincoln moved, and with what extreme 
 caution he guarded his confidence, is well illustrated by 
 the fact that while he consulted Cameron confidentially 
 about the nomination of Johnson some months before the 
 convention, and consulted me on the same subject the 
 day before the convention met, neither of us supposed 
 that the other was acting in the special confidence of 
 Lincoln. On the contrary, I supposed that Cameron was 
 sincerely friendly to Hamlin and would battle for his re- 
 nomination, until he finally proposed to me the night 
 before the convention met that we give a solid compli 
 mentary vote to Hamlin, and follow it with a solid vote 
 for Johnson. Another evidence of his extreme caution 
 in politics is given by the fact that while he carefully 
 concealed from both Cameron and myself the fact that 
 the other was in his confidence in the same movement, 
 he surprised me a few weeks before the convention by 
 sending for me and requesting me to come to the con 
 vention as a delegate-at-large. I had already been unani 
 mously chosen as a delegate from my own Congressional 
 district, and was amazed, when I informed Lincoln of 
 that fact, to find that he still insisted upon me going 
 before the State Convention and having myself elected 
 as a delegate-at-large. To all my explanations that a 
 man in the delegation was good for just what he was 
 worth, whether he represented the district or the State, 
 Lincoln persisted in the request that I should come as a 
 delegate-at-large. When I finally pressed him for an 
 explanation of what seemed to me to be a needless re 
 quest involving great embarrassment to me, he finally 
 with evident reluctance answered : General Cameron 
 has assured me that he will be a delegate-at-large from 
 your State, and while I have no reason to question his 
 sincerity as my friend, if he is to be a delegate-at-large 
 from Pennsylvania I would much prefer that you be one 
 
I2 4 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR TIMES. 
 
 with him. Had he been willing to tell me the whole 
 truth, he would have informed me that Cameron was en 
 listed in the Johnson movement, and that he specially 
 desired at least two of the delegates-at-large, representing 
 opposing factions, to be active supporters of Johnson s 
 nomination. There could be no other reasonable expla 
 nation of his earnest request to me to accept the embar 
 rassing position of seeking an election from the State 
 Convention when I was already an elected delegate from 
 my district. A fortunate combination of circumstances 
 made it possible for me to be elected without a serious 
 contest, Cameron and I receiving nearly a unanimous 
 vote. 
 
 Lincoln realized the fact that the chances were greatly 
 against his re-election unless he should be saved by the 
 success of the Union army. There was no period from 
 January, 1864, until the 3d of September of the same 
 year when McClellan would not have defeated Lincoln 
 for President. The two speeches of that campaign which 
 turned the tide and gave Lincoln his overwhelming vic 
 tory were Sherman s dispatch from Atlanta on the 3d of 
 September, saying: "Atlanta is ours and fairly won;" 
 and Sheridan s dispatch of the iQth of September from 
 the Valley, saying: " We have just sent them (the enemy) 
 whirling through Winchester, and we are after them to 
 morrow." From the opening of the military campaign 
 in the spring of 1864 until Sherman announced the cap 
 ture of Atlanta, there was not a single important victory 
 of the Union army to inspire the loyal people of the 
 country with confidence in the success of the war. 
 Grant s campaign from the Rapidan to the James was 
 the bloodiest in the history of the struggle. He had lost 
 as many men in killed, wounded, and missing as Lee 
 ever had in front of him, and there was no substantial 
 victory in all the sacrifice made by the gallant Army of 
 
LINCOLN AND HAMLIN. 125 
 
 the Potomac. Sherman had been fighting continuously 
 for four months without a decisive success. The people 
 of the North had become heartsick at the fearful sacri 
 fices which brought no visible achievement. Democratic 
 sentiment had drifted to McClellan as the opposing can 
 didate, and so profoundly was Lincoln impressed by the 
 gloomy situation that confronted him that on the 23d of 
 August, seven days before the nomination of McClellan 
 and ten days before the capture of Atlanta, he wrote the 
 following memoranda, sealed it in an envelope, and had 
 it endorsed by several members of the Cabinet, including 
 Secretary Welles, with written instructions that it was 
 not to be opened until after the election: 
 
 EXECUTIVE MANSION, 
 WASHINGTON, August 23, 1864. 
 
 This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly 
 probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then 
 it will be my duty to co-operate with the President-elect so as to 
 save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he 
 will have secured his election on such grounds that he cannot 
 possibly save it afterward. A. LINCOLN. 
 
 Nor was Lincoln alone in his apprehension of defeat. 
 Distrust and disintegration were common throughout the 
 entire Republican organization, and nearly all of the sin 
 cere supporters of Lincoln were in next to utter despair 
 of political success. I spent an hour with him in the 
 Executive Chamber some ten days before he wrote the 
 memoranda before given, and I never saw him more de 
 jected in my life. His face, always sad in -repose, was 
 then saddened until it became a picture of despair, and 
 he spoke of the want of sincere and earnest support from 
 the Republican leaders with unusual freedom. I dis 
 tinctly remember his reference to the fact that of all 
 the Republican members of the House he could name 
 
126 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 but one in whose personal and political friendship he 
 could absolutely confide. That one man was Isaac N. 
 Arnold of Illinois. Stevens, the Great Commoner of 
 the war, while sincerely desiring Lincoln s re-election 
 because he hated McClellan worse than he hated Lin 
 coln, and because he felt that the election of Lincoln 
 was necessary to the safety of the Union, was intensely 
 bitter against Lincoln personally, and rarely missed an 
 opportunity to thrust his keenest invectives upon him. 
 New York had a Democratic Governor of matchless abil 
 ity, and that great State was regarded as almost hope 
 lessly lost. Pennsylvania was trembling in the balance, 
 as was confirmed by the failure of the Republicans to 
 carry the State at the October election, and Indiana 
 would have been almost in rebellion but for the vic 
 tories of Sherman and Sheridan during the month of 
 September. 
 
 At this interview Lincoln seemed to have but one over 
 mastering desire, and that was to attain peace on the basis 
 of a restored Union. He took from a corner of his desk 
 a paper written out in his own handwriting, proposing to 
 pay to the South $400,000,000 as compensation for their 
 slaves, on condition that the States should return to their 
 allegiance to the government and accept Emancipation. 
 I shall never forget the emotion exhibited by Lincoln 
 when, after reading this paper to me, he said: " If I 
 could only get this proposition before the Southern peo 
 ple, I believe they would accept it, and I have faith that 
 the Northern people, however startled at first, would soon 
 appreciate the \yisdom of such a settlement of the war. 
 One hundred days of war would cost iis the $400,000,000 
 I would propose to give for Emancipation and a restored 
 Republic, not to speak of the priceless sacrifice of life 
 and the additional sacrifice of property; but were I to 
 make this offer now it would defeat ine inevitably and 
 
LINCOLN AND tiAMLlN. t2 7 
 
 probably defeat Emancipation. I had seen him many 
 times when army disasters shadowed the land and op 
 pressed him with sorrow, but I never saw him so pro 
 foundly moved by grief as he was on that day, when 
 there seemed to be not even a silvery lining to the polit 
 ical cloud that hung over him. Few now recall the 
 grave perils to Lincoln s re-election which thickened 
 almost at every turn in 1864 until the country was elec 
 trified by Sherman s inspiring dispatch from Atlanta, 
 followed by Sheridan s brilliant victories in the Valley 
 and Sherman s memorable march to the sea; and it was 
 these grave perils and these supreme necessities, long un 
 derstood by Lincoln, which made him, in his broad and 
 sagacious way, carefully view the field for the strongest 
 candidate for Vice- President, and finally led him to nomi 
 nate Andrew Johnson. To Lincoln, and to Lincoln 
 alone, Johnson owed his nomination. 
 
 I had no personal knowledge of Lincoln s purpose to 
 nominate Johnson for Vice-President until the day before 
 the Baltimore Convention met. He telegraphed me to 
 visit Washington before attending the convention, and I 
 did so. He opened the conversation by advising me to 
 give my vote and active support to Johnson as his asso 
 ciate on the ticket. It was evident that he confidently 
 relied on my willingness to accept his judgment in the 
 matter. I had expected to support the renomination of 
 Hamlin. I had little respect for Andrew Johnson, and 
 of all the men named for the position he was the last I 
 would have chosen if I had been left to the exercise of 
 my own judgment. It is more than probable that I 
 would have obeyed the wishes of Lincoln even if he had 
 not presented the very strong and, indeed, conclusive 
 reasons for his request; but after hearing the arguments 
 which had led him to the conclusion that Johnson should 
 be nominated as his associate, I was quite as ready to ac- 
 
128 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 cept the wisdom of the proposition as to obey the wishes 
 of the President. 
 
 There was not a trace of bitterness, prejudice, or even 
 unfriendliness toward Hamlin in all that Lincoln said 
 about the Vice-Presidency, and he was careful to say 
 that he did not desire the nomination of Johnson to 
 gratify any personal preference of his own. He natu 
 rally preferred a new man, as Hamlin was not in sympa 
 thy with Lincoln personally or with the general policy 
 of his administration, but he preferred Johnson for two 
 reasons, which he presented with unanswerable clear 
 ness: First, he was the most conspicuous, most aggres 
 sive, and the most able of all the War Democrats of that 
 time, and was just in the position to command the largest 
 measure of sympathy and support from that very import 
 ant political element. Dix, Dickinson, Butler, and Holt 
 had made no such impressive exhibition of their loyalty 
 as had Johnson in Tennessee. He was then just in the 
 midst of his great work of rehabilitating his rebellious 
 State and restoring it to the Union, and his loyal achieve 
 ments were therefore fresh before the people and certain 
 to continue so during the campaign. There was really 
 no answer to Lincoln s argument on this point. Second, 
 the stronger and more imperative reason for Lincoln pre 
 ferring Johnson was one that I had not appreciated fully 
 until he had presented it. The great peril of the Union 
 at that day was the recognition of the Confederacy by 
 England and France, and every month s delay of the 
 overthrow of the rebellious armies increased the danger. 
 Extraordinary efforts had been made by Lincoln to stim 
 ulate the Union sentiment, especially in England, but 
 with only moderate success, and there was no safety 
 from one day to another against a war with England 
 and France that would have been fatal to the success of 
 the Union cause. The only possible way to hinder recog- 
 
LINCOLN AND HAM LIN. 129 
 
 nition was to show successful results of the war in restor 
 ing the dissevered States to their old allegiance, and Lin 
 coln was firmly convinced that by no other method could 
 the Union sentiment abroad be so greatly inspired and 
 strengthened as by the nomination and election of a rep 
 resentative Southern man to the Vice-Presidency from 
 one of the rebellious States in the very heart of the Con 
 federacy. These reasons decided Lincoln, to prefer John 
 son for Vice-President, and Lincoln possessed both the 
 power to make the nomination and the wisdom to dic 
 tate it without jarring the party organization. 
 
 The fact that Lincoln did not make known to Hamlin 
 and his friends his purpose to nominate another for Vice- 
 President in 1864 does not accuse him of deceit or insin 
 cerity; and the additional fact that when the Convention 
 was in session and he was asked for a categorical answer 
 as -to his position on the Vice-Presidency, he declined to 
 express his wishes or to avow his interference with the 
 action of the party, cannot be justly construed into polit 
 ical double-dealing. It was quite as much a necessity 
 for Lincoln to conceal his movements for the nomination 
 of Johnson as it was, in his judgment, a necessity for him 
 to nominate a Southern man and a War Democrat, and 
 he simply acted with rare sagacity and discretion in his 
 movements and with fidelity to the country, the safety 
 of which was paramount with him. Hamlin was pro 
 foundly grieved over his defeat, as were his many friends, 
 and had they seen the hand of Lincoln in it they would 
 have resented it with bitterness; but Hamlin himself was 
 not fully convinced of Lincoln s opposition to his renomi- 
 nation until within two years of his death. I have in 
 my possession an autograph letter from Hamlin to Judge 
 Pettis of Pennsylvania, to whom Lincoln had expressed 
 his desire for Johnson s nomination on the morning of 
 the day the convention met, in which he says that he 
 9 
 
13 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 had seen and heard statements relating to Lincoln s 
 action in the matter, but he did not believe them until 
 the evidence had lately been made conclusive to his 
 mind. In this letter he says: "I was really sorry to be 
 disabused." And he adds: "Mr. L. [Lincoln] evidently 
 became some alarmed about his re-election, and changed 
 his position. That is all I care to say." I have thus the 
 conclusive evidence from Hamlin himself, that in Sep 
 tember, 1889, he had full knowledge of Lincoln s direct 
 intervention to nominate Johnson for Vice-President in 
 1864. Hamlin gave an earnest support to the ticket, 
 believing that the supreme sentiment of Republicanism 
 had set him aside in the interest of the public welfare. 
 He maintained his high position in the party for many 
 years thereafter, filling the office of Collector of Portland 
 and subsequently returning to the Senate, where he 
 served until he had passed the patriarchal age, and then 
 voluntarily retired to enjoy the calm evening of a well- 
 spent life. 
 
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.) 
 
 SALMON P. CHASE. 
 
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 
 
 SALMON P. CHASE was the most irritating fly in 
 the Lincoln ointment from the inauguration of the 
 new administration in 1861 until the 29th of June, 1864, 
 when his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury was 
 finally accepted. He was an annual resigner in the Cabi 
 net, having petulantly tendered his resignation in 1862, 
 again in 1863, and again in 1864, when he was probably 
 surprised by Mr. Lincoln s acceptance of it. It was 
 soon after Lincoln s unanimous renomination, and when 
 Chase s dream of succeeding Lincoln as President had 
 perished, at least for the time. He was one of the strong 
 est intellectual forces of the entire administration, but in 
 politics he was a theorist and a dreamer and was unbal 
 anced by overmastering ambition. He never forgave 
 Lincoln for the crime of having been preferred for Presi 
 dent over him, and while he was a pure and conscien 
 tious man, his prejudices and disappointments were vastly 
 stronger than himself, and there never was a day during 
 his continuance in the Cabinet when he was able to ap 
 proach justice to Lincoln. Like Sumner, he entered 
 public life ten years "before the war by election to the 
 Senate through a combination of Democrats and Free- 
 Soilers, and it is worthy of note that these two most 
 brilliant and tireless of the great anti-slavery leaders cast 
 their last votes for Democratic candidates for President. 
 
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 133 
 
 From the day that Chase entered the Cabinet he seems 
 to have been consumed with the idea that he must be 
 Lincoln s successor in 1864, and to that end he system 
 atically directed his efforts, and often sought, by flagrant 
 abuse of the power of his department, to weaken his 
 chief. He will stand in history as the great financier of 
 the war; as the man who was able to maintain the na 
 tional credit in the midst of rebellion and disruption, and 
 who gave the country the best banking system the world 
 has ever known. In that one duty he was practical and 
 amenable to wholesome counsel, and his unblemished 
 personal and official integrity gave great weight to his 
 policy as Secretary of the Treasury. With all the vexa 
 tion he gave Lincoln, and with the many reasons he gave 
 his chief to regard him as perfidious, Lincoln never 
 ceased to appreciate his value as a Cabinet officer. In 
 1863, when Chase had become an open candidate for the 
 Presidency, and when many of his political movements 
 were personally offensive to the President, Lincoln said 
 of Chase: u I have determined to shut my eyes so far as 
 possible to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a 
 good Secretary, and I shall keep him where he is. If he 
 becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have 
 a worse man. I have observed with regret his plan of 
 strengthening himself. " This expression from Lincoln 
 conveys a very mild idea of his real feelings on the sub 
 ject. In point of fact, Lincoln was not only profoundly 
 grieved at Chase s candidacy, but he was constantly irri 
 tated at the methods Chase employed to promote his 
 nomination. 
 
 I never saw Lincoln unbalanced except during the fall 
 of 1863, when Chase was making his most earnest efforts 
 to win the Republican nomination. The very widespread 
 distrust toward Lincoln cherished by Republican leaders 
 gave him good reason to apprehend the success of a com- 
 
134 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES, 
 
 bination to defeat him. Scores of national leaders were 
 at that time disaffected, but when they were compelled 
 to face the issue of his renomination or Republican de 
 feat, they finally yielded with more or less ill grace, and 
 supported him. Lincoln saw that if the disaffected ele 
 ments of the party should be combined on one strong 
 candidate, his own success would be greatly endangered. 
 It was the only subject on which I ever knew Lincoln 
 to lose his head. I saw him many times during the sum 
 mer and fall of 1863, when the Chase boom was at its 
 height, and he seemed like one who had got into water 
 far beyond his depth. I happened at the White House 
 one night when he was most concerned about the Chase 
 movement, and he detained me until two o clock in the 
 morning. Occasionally he would speak with great seri 
 ousness, and evidently felt very keenly the possibility of 
 his defeat, while at other times his face would suddenly 
 brighten up with his never-ending store of humor, and 
 he would illustrate Chase s attitude by some pertinent 
 story, at which he would laugh immoderately. After 
 reviewing the situation for an hour, during which I as 
 sured him that Chase could not be the Republican can 
 didate, whoever might be, and that I regarded his re- 
 nomination as reasonably certain, I rose at midnight, 
 shook hands with him, and started to go. He followed 
 me to the end of the Cabinet table nearest his desk, 
 swung one of his long legs over the corner of it, and 
 stopped me to present some new phase of the Chase bat 
 tle that had just occurred to him. After he had gotten 
 through with that I again bade him good-night and 
 started to the door. He followed to the other end of the 
 Cabinet table, again swung his leg over the corner of it, 
 and started in afresh to discuss the contest between Chase 
 and himself. 
 
 It was nearly one o clock when I again bade Lincoln 
 
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 135 
 
 good-night, and got as far as the door, but when just 
 about to open it he called me and with the merriest 
 twinkling of his eye, he said: "By the way, McClure, 
 how would it do if I were to decline Chase?" I was 
 surprised of course at the novel suggestion, and said to 
 him, "Why, Mr. Lincoln, how could that be done?" 
 He answered, "Well, I don t know exactly how it 
 might be done, but that reminds me of a story of two 
 Democratic candidates for Senator in Egypt, Illinois, in 
 its early political times. That section of Illinois was 
 almost solidly Democratic, as you know, and nobody but 
 Democrats were candidates for office. Two Democratic 
 candidates for Senator met each other in joint debate 
 from day to day, and gradually became more and more 
 exasperated at each other, until their discussions were 
 simply disgraceful wrangles, and they both became 
 ashamed of them. They finally agreed that either 
 should say anything he pleased about the other and it 
 should not be resented as an offense, and from that time 
 on the campaign progressed without any special display 
 of ill temper. On election night the two candidates, 
 who lived in the same town, were receiving their returns 
 together, and the contest was uncomfortably close. A 
 distant precinct, in which one of the candidates confi 
 dently expected a large majority, was finally reported 
 with a majority against him. The disappointed can 
 didate expressed great surprise, to which the other can 
 didate answered that he should not be surprised, as he 
 had taken the liberty of declining him in that district 
 the evening before the election. He reminded the de 
 feated candidate that he had agreed that either was free 
 to say anything about the other without offense, and 
 added that under that authority he had gone up into 
 that district and taken the liberty of saying that his 
 opponent had retired from the Contest, and therefore the 
 
136 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 vote of the district was changed, and the declined can 
 didate was thus defeated. I think," added Lincoln, 
 with one of his heartiest laughs, "I had better decline 
 Chase." It was evident that the question of inducing 
 Chase to decline was very seriously considered by Lin 
 coln. He did not seem to know just how it could be 
 done, but it was obvious that he believed it might be 
 done in one way or another, and what he said in jest he 
 meant in sober earnest. 
 
 Lincoln s anxiety for a renomination was the one 
 thing ever uppermost in his mind during the third year 
 of his administration, and, like all men in the struggles 
 of ambition, he believed that his only motive in his de 
 sire for his own re-election was to save the country, 
 rather than to achieve success for himself. That he 
 was profoundly sincere and patriotic in his purpose and 
 efforts to save the Union, and that he would willingly 
 have given his life as a sacrifice had it been necessary to 
 accomplish that result, none can doubt who knew him; 
 but he was only human, after all, and his ambition was 
 like the ambition of other good men, often stronger than 
 himself. In this as in all political or administrative 
 movements Lincoln played the waiting game. When 
 he did not know what to do, he was the safest man in 
 the world to trust to do nothing. He carefully veiled 
 his keen and sometimes bitter resentment against Chase, 
 and waited the fullness of time when he could by some 
 fortuitous circumstance remove Chase as a competitor, 
 or by some shrewd manipulation of politics make him a 
 hopeless one. His inexperience in the details of politics 
 made him naturally distrustful and apprehensive as to 
 his renomination. He could not, at that early day, get 
 together the political forces necessary to make him feel 
 safe in the battle, and it was not until about the close of 
 1863 or early in 1864 that he finally formulated in his 
 
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 137 
 
 mind his political policy, and began the work of consoli 
 dating his forces for action. He did this with a degree 
 of sagacity and method that would have done credit to 
 the ripest politician of the age, but there was no time 
 until the Baltimore Convention met that Lincoln felt 
 secure. Even after an overwhelming majority of the 
 delegates had been instructed in his favor, and when to 
 all but himself it was evident that there could be no 
 effective opposition to him in the convention, he was 
 never entirely free from doubts as to the result. Within 
 a month of his nomination, and when his more violent 
 enemies had abandoned the effort to defeat him, as was 
 evidenced by the Fremont Convention called at Cleve 
 land, he was yet perplexed with anxiety over the possi 
 bility of his defeat. In discussing the question as late 
 as May, 1864, I was surprised to find the apprehensions 
 he cherished. I told him that his nomination was a 
 foregone conclusion, and that it was not possible for any 
 combination to be made that could endanger his success. 
 I presented the attitude of the various States, and re 
 ferred to their delegations to prove to him that his nomi 
 nation must be made on the first ballot by a two-thirds 
 vote, if not with absolute unity. To this he responded: 
 "Well, McClure, \vhat you say seems to be unanswer 
 able, but I don t quite forget that I was nominated for 
 President in a convention that was two-thirds for the 
 other fellow." 
 
 It is needless to say that the official and personal rela 
 tions between Chase and Lincoln during the latter part 
 of the year 1863 and the early part of 1864 were severely 
 strained. Lincoln felt it deeply, but said little to any 
 one on the subject, and never permitted Chase to know 
 how keenly he grieved him. He knew that Chase sin 
 cerely desired to be honest in the performance of his 
 public duty, and he judged his infirmities with generous 
 
138 LINCOLN AND MEN CF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 charity. He fully appreciated the fact, so well stated 
 by Chase s biographer, Judge Warden, that Chase "was 
 indeed sought less by strong men and by good men than 
 by weak men and by bad men." Indeed, Chase, with 
 all his towering intellect and all his admitted devotion 
 to the country s cause, was the merest plaything of the 
 political charlatans who crossed his path, and he was 
 thus made to do many things which were unworthy of 
 him, and which, with any other than Lincoln to judge 
 him, would have brought him to absolute disgrace. He 
 wrote many letters to his friends in different parts of 
 the country habitually complaining of Lincoln s inconi- 
 petency and of the hopeless condition of the war. In 
 none of the many letters which have reached the light 
 did he give Lincoln credit for capacity or fitness for his 
 responsible trust. In disposing of the patronage of his 
 department he was often fretful and generally ill-advised. 
 With all these infirmities of temper and of ambition, 
 Lincoln bore with Chase with marvelous patience until 
 after Lincoln s unanimous renomination in 1864, when 
 Chase sent his third resignation to the President. In 
 his letter of resignation he said: "My position here is 
 not altogether agreeable to you, and it is certainly too- 
 full of embarrassment and difficulty and painful respon 
 sibility to allow in me the least desire to retain it." 
 For the first time Lincoln recognized the fact that he 
 and Chase could not get along together, and he promptly 
 answered Chase s letter of resignation in the following 
 terse but expressive note: u Your resignation of the office 
 of Secretary of the Treasury, sent me yesterday, is ac 
 cepted. Of all I have said in commendation of your 
 ability and fidelity I have nothing to unsay, and yet you 
 and I have reached a point of mutual embarrassment in 
 our official relation which it seems cannot be overcome 
 or long sustained consistently with the public service. " 
 
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 139 
 
 Like all irritable men who are the prey of infirmities, 
 Chase believed, and recorded in his diary, that the em 
 barrassments which arose between him and Lincoln 
 were not of his creation. He thus expresses it in his 
 own language: "I had found a good deal of embarrass 
 ment from him, but what he had found from me I can 
 not imagine, unless it has been caused by my unwilling 
 ness to have offices distributed as spoils or benefits." 
 Chase retired from the Cabinet believing that he had. 
 severed all political relations with Lincoln for the re 
 mainder of his life, and the last thing that he then 
 could have dreamed of was that his name would ever be 
 considered by the President for the office of Chief Justice 
 of the United States. 
 
 When Chase retired from the Cabinet, in the latter 
 part of June, he did not expect to support Lincoln for 
 re-election. Within a week thereafter he recorded in his 
 diary the fact that Senator Pomeroy could not support 
 Lincoln, and he added: U I am much of the same senti 
 ment, though not willing now to decide what duty may 
 demand next fall." But he then hoped much from the 
 revolutionary attitude of the supporters of Fremont and 
 the bold assault made upon Lincoln by Senator Wade 
 and Representative Henry Winter Davis. Chase retired 
 to the White Mountains to await events, and it soon be 
 came evident that the revolt against Lincoln would not 
 materialize. On the contrary, every week brought way 
 ward stragglers into the Lincoln camp, until at last Fre 
 mont himself had to surrender the side-show nomination 
 he had accepted and fall into line in support of the ad 
 ministration, and the manifesto of Wade and Davis had 
 fallen upon listless ears. It soon became evident that the 
 sulking Republican leaders must choose between Lincoln 
 and McClellan between supporting the war and opposing 
 the war, for the McClellan platform distinctly declared 
 
140 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 the war a failure and demanded the restoration of the 
 Union by some other method than an appeal to arms. 
 When Chase returned from his rest in the mountains in 
 the latter part of September, he visited Washington, and 
 of course paid his respects to the President. It is evi 
 dent from Chase s own report of his interview with Lin 
 coln that he was not greatly inspired by Lincoln s pro 
 fessions of devotion. He notes the fact that Lincoln was 
 not at all demonstrative, either in speech or manner, 
 and he adds, "I feel that I do not know him. " It is 
 evident that Chase returned to Washington with the 
 view of getting into some sort of friendly relations with 
 the President. He twice visited Lincoln during his short 
 stay in Washington,- and within a week thereafter he 
 publicly declared himself in favor of Lincoln s election 
 at his home in Ohio. He voted the Republican State 
 ticket in October, and sent a congratulatory telegram to 
 Lincoln on the result of the election. 
 
 It was known to all about Washington during the fall 
 of 1864 that Chief Justice Taney could not long survive, 
 and after the first of September he was likely to die any 
 day. It would be unjust to Chase to say that he was in 
 fluenced in his political action by the hope of succeeding 
 Chief Justice Taney, but the fact that his name was 
 pressed upon Lincoln simultaneously by his friends 
 throughout the country, even before the dead Chief 
 Justice had been consigned to the tomb, proves that 
 Chase had cherished the hope of reaching that exalted 
 judicial position. Taney died on the I2th of October, 
 1864, within two weeks after Chase declared himself in 
 favor of the election of Lincoln, and on the i3th of Oc 
 tober Chase s name was on the lips of all his friends as 
 the man for Chief Justice. The movement was digni 
 fied by the active and earnest efforts of Senator Sumner, 
 who was in a position to exert considerable influence 
 9 
 
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 141 
 
 with the President, although on many questions they 
 had seriously differed. He desired a Chief Justice who 
 could be trusted on the slavery question, and, believing 
 that Chase was the safest of all on that important issue, 
 he made an exhaustive struggle to win the position for 
 Chase. Secretary Stanton, who had been in general 
 harmony with Chase in the Cabinet, was also his earnest 
 friend in the struggle for the Chief Justiceship, but the 
 opposition aroused at the mention of his name came from 
 every part of the country, and from very many of the 
 ablest and most earnest of Lincoln s friends. It was 
 argued against Chase that while his ability \vas admit 
 ted, his practical knowledge of law was limited, and that 
 he was without legal training, because his life had been 
 devoted almost exclusively to politics. He was elected 
 to the Senate a dozen years before the war; he retired 
 from the Senate to become Governor of Ohio, in which 
 position he served two terms, and he was re-elected to 
 the Senate at the close of his gubernatorial service. He 
 gave up the Senatorship to enter the Cabinet in 1861, so 
 that for manv years he had given no thought or efforts to 
 
 J J o o 
 
 the law, and he was regarded by very many as lacking 
 in the special training necessary to the first judicial office 
 of the national government. 
 
 Strong as was the hostility to Chase s appointment in 
 every section of the Union, the most intense opposition 
 came from his own State of Ohio. The suggestion that 
 
 oo 
 
 he should become Chief Justice was resented by a large 
 majority of the leading Republicans of the State, and 
 they severely tested Lincoln s philosophy by the violence 
 of their opposition, and especially by the earnestness 
 with which they insisted that it was an insult to Lin 
 coln himself to ask him to appoint Chase. Pennsylva 
 nia s most prominent official connected with the admin 
 istration, and one of her most learned lawyers, Joseph J. 
 
142 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Lewis, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, reflected 
 the general Republican sentiment of Pennsylvania by 
 his unusual proceeding of sending a formal protest to 
 Lincoln against Chase s appointment. He declared that 
 Chase was not a man of much legal or financial know 
 ledge; that his selfishness had gradually narrowed and 
 contracted his views of things in general; that he was 
 amazingly ignorant of men; that it was the opinion in 
 the department that he really desired, toward the end of 
 his term of office, to injure, and as far as possible to 
 destroy, the influence and popularity of the adminis 
 tration." 
 
 I have, in a previous chapter, related an interview I 
 had with Lincoln a short time before he appointed 
 Chase. It was very evident from Lincoln s manner, 
 rather than from what he said, that he was much per 
 plexed as to his duty in the selection of a Chief Justice. 
 In that conversation he discussed the merits of the half 
 dozen or more prominent men who were suggested for 
 the place. It is hardly proper to say that Lincoln dis 
 cussed the matter, for the conversation was little else on 
 his part than a succession of searching inquiries to ob 
 tain the fullest expression of my views as to the merits 
 and demerits of the men he seemed to have under con 
 sideration. As to his own views he was studiously reti 
 cent. I tried in various ways to obtain some idea of the 
 leaning of his mind on the subject, but did not succeed. 
 The many inquiries he made about Stanton, and the 
 earnestness he exhibited in discussing, or rather having 
 me discuss, Stanton as the possible Chief Justice, im 
 pressed me with the belief that he was entertaining the 
 idea of appointing his Secretary of War; but he gave no 
 expression that could have warranted me in assuming 
 that I could correctly judge the bent of his mind on the 
 subject. The fact that he delayed the appointment for 
 
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 143 
 
 nearly two months after the death of Taney proves that 
 Lincoln gave the subject not only very serious but pro 
 tracted consideration, and I doubt whether he had fully 
 decided in his own mind whom he would appoint until 
 the 6th of December, the day that he sent the name of 
 Chase to the Senate for Chief Justice. 
 
 At no time during Lincoln s administration had he 
 ever submitted to an equal pressure in deciding any pub 
 lic appointment, and, excepting the Emancipation Proc 
 lamation, I doubt whether any question of policy was 
 ever so earnestly pressed and opposed by his friends as 
 was the appointment of Chase. Any other President 
 than Lincoln would not have appointed Chase. His 
 personal affronts to Lincoln had been continuous and 
 flagrant from the time he entered the Cabinet until he 
 resigned from it a little more than three years thereafter, 
 and I am quite sure that at no time during that period 
 did Lincoln ever appeal to Chase for advice as his friend. 
 He had many consultations with him, of course, on mat 
 ters relating to the government, but that Lincoln regarded 
 Chase as his bitter and even malignant enemy during all 
 that period cannot now be doubted. The only pretense 
 of atonement that Chase had ever made was his hesi 
 tating and ungracious support of Lincoln s re-election, 
 but only after the brilliant success of the Union armies 
 under Sherman and Sheridan had absolutely settled the 
 contest in Lincoln s favor. Grant overlooked a malig 
 nant assault made upon him by Admiral Porter when he 
 promoted him to succeed Farragut; but in that case Por 
 ter s record clearly entitled him to the distinction, and 
 Grant simply yielded personal resentment to a public 
 duty. It was not pretended that Chase had any claim 
 to the Chief Justiceship on the ground of eminent legal 
 attainments or of political fidelity, and Lincoln s appoint 
 ment of Chase was simply one of the many exhibitions 
 
144 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 of the matchless magnanimity that was one of the great 
 est attributes of his character. He appointed him not 
 because he desired Chase for Chief Justice so much as 
 because he feared that, in refusing to appoint him, he 
 might permit personal prejudice to do injustice to the 
 nation. * 
 
 Of course, Chase promptly and effusively thanked the 
 President when he learned that his name had been sent 
 to the Senate for Chief Justice. In his letter to Lincoln 
 he said: " Before I sleep I must thank you for this mark 
 of your confidence, and especially for the manner in 
 which the nomination was made." But before he was 
 
 * You give a wrong impression as to Chase s legal training. 
 He was a thorough student of the law, and a careful, painstaking 
 lawyer till he entered the Senate at the age of forty-two. He even 
 was so fond of law as to take up superfluous drudgery, editing 
 with notes and citations the Ohio Statutes. He kept out of poli 
 tics till he was thirty-three. While in the Senate he argued cases 
 in the Supreme Court as one involving the title to lands in and 
 about Keokuk. 
 
 Now, it is the study and practice a lawyer has before forty 
 which determine his quality and equipment as a jurist, and these 
 are not much affected by diversions afterward. A man culmi 
 nates professionally by forty : witness B. R. Curtis, Choate, Fol- 
 lett, etc. Edmunds has been in the Senate twenty or twenty-five 
 years, but he has not lost his legal ability acquired before he 
 entered it. 
 
 My own impression is, from the conversations with Lincoln 
 which different persons have reported to me and from some 
 manuscript letters of Sumner, that Lincoln intended all along to 
 appoint Chase, though somewhat doubting whether Chase would 
 settle down quietly in his judicial office and let politics alone. 
 That was a sincere apprehension which others shared, but I do 
 not think that Lincoln s mind at all rested on any other person. 
 
 I began to write this note only to make the points that Chase 
 had ample legal training, and that his intellect was naturally 
 judicial. See his able argument in the Van Landt case, about 
 1846. Edward L. Pierce to the Author, December 7, 1891. 
 
LINCOLN AND CHASE. 145 
 
 three months in the high office conferred upon him by 
 Lincoln he became one of Lincoln s most obtrusive and 
 petulant critics, and his last letter to Lincoln, written on 
 the very day of Lincoln s assassination, was a harsh criti 
 cism on the President s action in the Louisiana case. 
 Immediately after the death of Lincoln, writing to an 
 old political associate in Ohio, Chase said: " The schemes 
 of politicians will now adjust themselves to the new con 
 ditions; I want no part in them." Indeed, the only 
 specially kind words from Chase to Lincoln that I have 
 been able to discover in all the publications giving 
 Chase s views I find in the one expression of hearty 
 gratitude and friendship, written on the impulse of the 
 moment, when he was first notified of his nomination to 
 the Chief Justiceship. The new conditions of which he 
 spoke after the death of Lincoln, and in which he de 
 clared he could have no part, speedily controlled the new 
 Chief Justice in his political actions. The leader of the 
 radical Republicans when he became Chief Justice, he 
 gradually gravitated against his party until he was ready 
 to accept the Democratic nomination for President in 
 1868, and he never thereafter supported a Republican 
 candidate for President. He hoped to receive the Presi 
 dential nomination from the New York Convention of 
 1868. It had been agreed upon by some who believed 
 that they controlled the convention that Chase should be 
 nominated, and Governor Seymour retired from the chair 
 at the appointed time, as is generally believed, to make 
 the nomination to the convention; but Samuel J. Tilden 
 had no love for Chase, and it was he who inspired the 
 spontaneous movement that forced the nomination of 
 Seymour while he was out of the chair, and carried it 
 like a whirlwind. Tilden did not guide the convention 
 to the nomination of Seymour because he- specially de 
 sired Seymour s nomination; he did it because he desired 
 
 10 
 
146 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 to defeat the nomination of Chase. The result was the 
 keenest disappointment to the Chief Justice. He defined 
 his political position during the contest of 1868 as fol 
 lows: u The action of the two parties has obliged me to 
 resume, with my old faith, my old position that of 
 Democrat; by the grace of God free and independent." 
 After 1868, Chase was unknown as a factor in politics. 
 In June, 1870, he was attacked by paralysis, and from 
 that time until his death, on the jth of May, 1873, he 
 was a hopeless invalid. His last political deliverance 
 was a feeble declaration in favor of Greeley s election in 
 1872, when he w r as shattered in mind and body. It may 
 truthfully be said of him that from 1861 until his death 
 his public life was one continued and consuming disap 
 pointment, and the constant training of his mind to poli 
 tics doubtless greatly hindered him in winning the dis 
 tinction as Chief Justice that he might have achieved 
 had he given up political ambition and devoted himself 
 to the high judicial duties he had accepted. While one 
 of the greatest intellects among all the Republican lead 
 ers, he w r as an absolute failure as a politician, and his 
 persistence in political effort made him fail to improve 
 other opportunities. His life may be summed up in the 
 single sentence: He was an eminently great, a strangely 
 unbalanced, and a sadly disappointed man. 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 
 
 A BRAHAM LINCOLN had more varied and compli- 
 *V. cated relations with Simon Cameron than with any 
 other Pennsylvanian during his Presidential term. In 
 deed, Cameron fijls more pages in the annals of Penn 
 sylvania politics than any citizen of the State since the 
 organization of our government. He is the only man 
 who was four times elected to the United States Senate 
 by the Pennsylvania Legislature until his son attained 
 the same distinction as his successor, and he would have 
 won a fifth election without a serious contest had he not 
 voluntarily resigned to assure the succession to his son. 
 Without great popular following, he was the most con 
 spicuous of all our Pennsylvania politicians, measured 
 by the single standard of success in obtaining political 
 honors and power. He was first elected to the Senate in 
 1845 to succeed Buchanan, who had been transferred to 
 the Polk Cabinet. The tariff of 1842 was then a vital 
 issue in Pennsylvania, and Cameron was known as a 
 positive protectionist. The Legislature was Democratic, 
 and had nominated the late Chief Justice Woodward 
 with apparent unanimity to succeed Buchanan ; but 
 Cameron organized a bolt from the Democratic party, 
 commanded the solid Whig vote on the tariff issue, and 
 was thus elected. The Senate to which he was chosen 
 was Democratic, and he exhibited his peculiar power 
 over that body when he served in it by the rejection of 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 SIMON CAMERON, 1865. 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 1 49 
 
 Judge Woodward when nominated by President Polk as 
 Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. He 
 made a memorable record during his early Senatorial 
 service by his earnest appeal to Vice-President Dallas in 
 favor of protection, when it was known that the repeal 
 of the tariff of 1842 would depend upon the casting vote 
 of the Vice-President. At the expiration of his term, 
 in 1849, Cameron was a candidate for re-election. The 
 balance of power in the Legislature was held by Native 
 American Representatives from Philadelphia, elected on 
 the Fusion ticket. He failed, however, to divert that 
 element from the Whigs, and abandoned the struggle, 
 giving the field to James Cooper, the regular Whig can 
 didate, who was successful. 
 
 In 1854 a strange political revolution occurred in 
 Pennsylvania, in which the new American or Know- 
 Nothing party elected the Whig candidate for Governor 
 and the Democratic candidate for Canal Commissioner, 
 and carried an overwhelming majority of the Legis 
 lature, embracing nominees of both parties. Cameron 
 supported the Democratic ticket, and inade a speech in 
 its favor the night before election, but immediately after 
 the election he associated himself with the Americans 
 and became an aggressive candidate for United States 
 Senator. This was the beginning of the factional con 
 flict between Cameron and Curtin (then Secretary of the 
 Commonwealth) that continued as long as they were in 
 active political life. The new party was without leader 
 ship or discipline, and was speedily broken into frag 
 ments by a dozen aspirants for the Senatorship, of whom 
 Cameron and Curtin were the leading and apparently 
 only hopeful candidates. The struggle became excep 
 tionally bitter, the joint convention meeting and ad 
 journing from time to time without succeeding in a 
 choice, until finally it became a matter of necessity 
 
15 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 to elect Cameron or adjourn without an election; and 
 after a protracted contest over that issue the joint con 
 vention adjourned sine die by one majority. The next 
 Legislature was Democratic, and Governor Bigler was 
 chosen. When the Legislature met in 1857 the Demo 
 crats had three majority on joint ballot, and confidently 
 expected to elect a Senator. The late Colonel Forney 
 was made the candidate by the direct intervention of 
 President-elect Buchanan, who was then just on the 
 threshold of the enormous power and patronage of the 
 Presidency. The nomination would naturally have gone 
 to Henry D. Foster, who was a member of the House, 
 but for the attitude assumed by Buchanan. Forney s 
 nomination somewhat weakened, the Democratic lines 
 by the general and clamorous discontent of the several 
 candidates who had hoped to win in an open contest. 
 The Republicans were intensely embittered against For 
 ney because they believed that he, as chairman of the 
 Democratic State Committee, had controlled the October 
 election unfairly to defeat the Republican State ticket 
 by a small majority, and thus assured the election of a 
 Democratic President. Cameron had for the first time 
 taken open ground against the Democrats in 1856, when 
 he was one of the Republican candidates for elector at 
 large, and actively supported Fremont s election. But 
 he was not in personal favor with most of the Repub 
 licans, and when his name was proposed in the Repub 
 lican caucus as a candidate for Senator, it was not seri 
 ously entertained until Senator Penrose assured the 
 caucus that Cameron could command three Democratic 
 votes if given the solid support of the Republicans. A 
 confidential committee was appointed to ascertain the 
 truth of the statement by personal assurance from the 
 Democratic members, and after a confirmative report, in 
 which the names of the Democratic members w r ere not 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. I 5 l 
 
 given, the Republican caucus resolved to cast one vote 
 for Cameron. That resolution was carried out in joint 
 convention, and three Democratic Representatives (Lebo, 
 Maneer, and Wagonseller) voted for Cameron and elected 
 him. 
 
 In 1 86 1, Cameron resigned the Senatorship to accept 
 the War portfolio under Lincoln. Early in 1862 he was 
 transferred by Lincoln from the War Department to the 
 Russian Mission, and in 1863 he had resigned his mission 
 and again appeared as a candidate for United States Sen 
 ator to succeed Wilmot, who had been chosen to fill 
 Cameron s unexpired term. The Legislature contained 
 one Democratic majority on joint ballot. Wilmot would 
 have been unanimously renominated had it been possible 
 to elect him, but Cameron was nominated upon the posi 
 tive assurance from his friends that he could command 
 one or more Democratic votes and was the only Repub 
 lican who could be successful. His nomination and the 
 contest that followed led to an eruption that not only pre 
 vented any Democratic support, but deprived him of a 
 solid Republican support, and Buckalew was elected. 
 In 1867, Cameron and Curtin again locked horns on the 
 Senatorship, and Cameron was successful after a struggle 
 of unexampled desperation. Cameron served his full 
 term of six years, and was re-elected in 1873 t succeed 
 himself, without a contest. Most of the active oppo 
 nents within his party had broken to the support of 
 Greeley in 1872, and thereafter Cameron was practically 
 supreme in the direction of the Republican organization. 
 He resigned in 1877, when the Legislature was in ses 
 sion, and after it had been ascertained that his son, the 
 present Senator Cameron, could be elected as his suc 
 cessor. Had Cameron not resigned, he would have been 
 elected to his fifth term in 1879 by tne united vote of his 
 party; but from his retirement in 1877 until his death, 
 
J 5 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 a dozen years later, he seemed to enjoy freedom from the 
 cares and perplexities of political life, and had the grati 
 fication of seeing his son thrice elected to the position he 
 had surrendered to him. He had survived all the many 
 intensified asperities of his long and active political life, 
 and died at the ripe age of fourscore and ten years, with 
 his faculties unabated until the long halt came. He and 
 his son have each attained the highest Senatorial honors 
 ever awarded by Pennsylvania to any of her citizens by 
 four elections to the Senate an entirely exceptional rec 
 ord of political success in the history of all the States of 
 the Union. It was often complained by his foes that 
 Cameron fought and won unfairly in his political con 
 tests, but the defeated generals of Europe made the same 
 complaint against Napoleon. 
 
 Cameron was a Senator when Lincoln served his single 
 term in Congress, but they did not become even acquaint 
 ances, and he first became involved in Lincoln s political 
 life in 1860, when both were candidates for the Repub 
 lican nomination for President. Cameron s candidacy 
 was not regarded as a serious effort to nominate him, but 
 the peculiar political situation in Pennsylvania greatly 
 favored him in making himself the candidate of the 
 State, and with his sagacity and energy in political 
 affairs he was not slow to avail himself of it. Curtin 
 was the prominent candidate for Governor, and Cameron 
 led Curtin s opponents. Curtin commanded the nomina 
 tion for Governor, and naturally enough desired a united 
 party to assure his election. Cameron secured a majority 
 of votes in the State Convention for President, and rea 
 sonably claimed that he was as much entitled to the 
 united support of the party for President as Curtin was 
 entitled to it for Governor. The conflict between the 
 two elements of the party led to a compromise, by which 
 a nearly united delegation was given to Cameron for a 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. T 53 
 
 complimentary vote for President. Cameron himself be 
 lieved, in after years, that he could have been nominated 
 and elected if he had been heartily pressed by Pennsyl 
 vania. He many times chided me for refusing to give 
 him an earnest support, saying that he could have been 
 made a successful candidate, and then, to use his own 
 expressive language, " We could all have had everything 
 we wanted." While Cameron had a majority of the 
 delegation, a large minority was more or less bitterly 
 opposed to him, and his name was withdrawn in the 
 convention after the first ballot, because the delegation 
 would have broken. The men who immediately repre 
 sented Cameron on that occasion were John P. Sander 
 son, who was subsequently appointed to the regular army, 
 and Alexander Cummings, whose confused use of mili 
 tary authority conferred upon him in the early part of 
 the war led to a vote of censure upon Cameron by Con 
 gress. They knew before the convention met that the 
 contest was narrowed down to Seward and Lincoln, and 
 that Cameron, Chase, and Bates were not in the fight. 
 Sanderson and Cummings, with little or no control of 
 the delegation, were early in negotiation with David 
 Davis, who was specially in charge of Lincoln s interest 
 in Chicago, and obtained Davis s positive assurance that 
 if the Pennsylvania delegation would support Lincoln 
 and Lincoln succeeded to the Presidency, Cameron would 
 be appointed Secretary of the Treasury. This agreement 
 was not made known at the time to any in the delega 
 tion, nor did it become known to Lincoln, at least as a 
 positive obligation, until after the election. 
 
 The success of Lincoln at the November election left 
 the political situation in Pennsylvania without change, 
 except that the war of factions was intensified. Curtin 
 did not give even a perfunctory support to Cameron for 
 the Presidency, and Cameron gave about the same sort 
 
T 54 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 of support to Curtin for Governor; and when it was an 
 nounced, about the ist of January, that Cameron had 
 been to Springfield and had returned with the proffer of 
 a Cabinet portfolio, it immediately inspired the most ag 
 gressive opposition to his appointment. I was not in 
 sympathy with Cameron, and promptly telegraphed Lin 
 coln, protesting against his appointment, to which Lin 
 coln answered urging me to come immediately to Spring 
 field. When I met Lincoln he frankly informed me that 
 on the last day of December he had given Cameron a 
 letter tendering to him a position in the Cabinet, reserv 
 ing the right to decide whether it should be that of Sec 
 retary of the Treasury or Secretary of War. I explained 
 to the President, with all the ardor of an intense partisan 
 in the factional feud, that the appointment of Cameron 
 would be a misfortune to the party in Pennsylvania, and 
 a misfortune to the President that he must soon realize 
 after his inauguration. It is needless now to review the 
 causes which led to this active and embittered hostility 
 of the friends of Curtin to Cameron s political advance 
 ment. It is sufficient to say that there was persistent 
 war between these elements, and the usual political de 
 moralization that ever attends such conflicts was pain 
 fully visible from the factional battles of that time. I 
 saw that Lincoln was very much distressed at the situ 
 ation in which he had become involved, and he discussed 
 every phase of it with unusual frankness and obviously 
 with, profound feeling. I did not then know that Lin 
 coln had been pledged, without his knowledge, by his 
 friends at Chicago to the appointment of Cameron, nor 
 did Lincoln intimate it to me during our conversation. 
 After an hour or more of discussion on the subject Lin 
 coln dismissed it by saying that he would advise me 
 further within a very few days. 
 
 I left Lincoln conscious that I had seriously impressed 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 1 55 
 
 him with my views, but entirely unable to form any 
 judgment as to what might be his ultimate action. Al 
 though I left him as late as eleven o clock in the even 
 ing, he wrote Cameron a private letter dated the same 
 night, beginning with this sentence: " Since seeing you, 
 things have developed which make it impossible for me 
 to take you into the Cabinet." He added: u You will 
 say this comes from an interview with McClure, and this 
 is partly but not wholly true ; the more potent matter is 
 wholly outside of Pennsylvania, yet I am not at liberty 
 to specify. Enough that it appears to me to be suf 
 ficient." He followed with the suggestion that Came 
 ron should write him declining the appointment, stating 
 that if the declination was forwarded he would "not 
 object to its being known that it was tendered " to him. 
 He concluded by saying: "No person living knows, or 
 has an intimation, that I write this letter," and with a 
 postscript asking Cameron to telegraph the words "All 
 right." * Lincoln also wrote me a letter of a single sen- 
 
 * The following is the text of the Lincoln letters to Cameron 
 on the subject of the Cabinet appointment, as given in Nicolay 
 and Hay s life of Lincoln, published by the Century Company, 
 
 New York : 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 31, 1860. 
 HON. SIMON CAMERON: 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: I think fit to notify you now, that by your per 
 mission I shall at the proper time nominate you to the U. S. Sen 
 ate for confirmation as Secretary of the Treasury, or as Secretary 
 of War which of the two I have not yet definitely decided. 
 Please answer at your earliest convenience. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 A. LINCOLN. 
 (Private.} 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3, 1861. 
 HON. SIMON CAMERON: 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: Since seeing you things have developed which 
 make it impossible for me to take you into the Cabinet. You 
 will say this conies of an interview with McClure; and this is 
 
I5 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 tence, dated the same night, asking that the accusations 
 against Cameron should be put in tangible shape for his 
 
 partly, but not wholly, true. The more potent matter is wholly 
 outside of Pennsylvania, and yet I am not at liberty to specify it. 
 Enough that it appears to me to be sufficient. And now I sug 
 gest that you write me declining the appointment, in which case 
 I do not object to its being known that it was tendered you. 
 Better do this at once, before things so change that you cannot 
 honorably decline, and I be compelled to openly recall the tender. 
 No person living knows or has an intimation that I write this 
 letter. Yours truly, 
 
 A. LINCOLN. 
 P. S. Telegraph me instantly on receipt of this, saying, "All 
 
 right." A. L. 
 
 (Private and confidential^) 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 13, 1861. 
 HON. SIMON CAMERON: 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: At the suggestion of Mr. Sanderson, and with 
 hearty good-will besides, I herewith send you a letter dated 
 Jan. 3, the same in date as the last you received from me. I 
 thought best to give it that date, as it is in some sort to take the 
 place of that letter. I learn, both by a letter of Mr. Swett and 
 from Mr. Sanderson, that }-our feelings were wounded by the 
 terms of my letter really of the 3d. I wrote that letter under 
 great anxiety, and perhaps I was not so guarded in its terms as I 
 should have been; but I beg you to be assured I intended no 
 offense. My great object was to have you act quickly, if possible 
 before the matter should be complicated with the Penn. Senatorial 
 election. Destroy the offensive letter or return it to me. 
 
 I say to you now I have not doubted that you would perform 
 the duties of a Department ably and faithfully. Nor have I for 
 a moment intended to ostracize your friends. If I should make 
 a Cabinet appointment for Penn. before I reach Washington, I 
 will not do so without consulting you, and giving all the weight 
 to your views and wishes which I consistently can. This I have 
 always intended. Yours truly, 
 
 A. LINCOLN. 
 (Inclosurc.} 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3, 1861. 
 HON. SIMON CAMERON: 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: When you were here, about the last of Decein- 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 
 
 consideration. I am unable to quote literally any of the 
 correspondence with Lincoln on this subject, as all of 
 my many letters received from him, and the correspond 
 ence relating to the campaign and the organization of 
 the administration, that I had preserved, were destroyed 
 when Chambersbnrg was burned by McCausland in 1864. 
 I answered Lincoln s very indefinite note by declining to 
 appear as an individual prosecutor of Cameron, and his 
 request for the formulation of Cameron s alleged political 
 and personal delinquencies was not complied with. 
 
 Lincoln s letter to Cameron tendering him the Cabinet 
 appointment had been shown to some confidential friends 
 whose enthusiasm outstripped their discretion, and they 
 made public the fact that Cameron was an assured mem 
 ber of the new Cabinet. The second letter from Lincoln 
 to Cameron, recalling the tender of a Cabinet office, was 
 not made public, and doubtless was never seen beyond 
 a very small and trusted circle of Cameron s associates; 
 but it soon became known that Lincoln regarded the 
 question as unsettled, and that led to exhaustive efforts 
 on both sides to hinder and promote Cameron s appoint 
 ment. Sanderson, who had made the compact at Chi- 
 
 ber, I handed you letter saying I should at the proper time 
 nominate you to the Senate for a place in the Cabinet. It is due 
 to you and to truth for me to say you were here by my invitation, 
 and not upon any suggestion of your own. You have not as yet 
 signified to me whether you would accept the appointment, and 
 with much pain I now say to you that you will relieve me from 
 great embarrassment by allowing me to recall the offer. This 
 springs from an unexpected complication, and not from any 
 change of my view as to the ability or faithfulness with which 
 you would discharge the duties of the place. 
 
 I now think I will not definitely fix upon any appointment for 
 Pennsylvania until I reach Washington. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 A. LINCOLN. 
 
*5 LiA COLfr AND MEM OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 cago with Davis for Cameron s appointment, was sent at 
 once to Springfield to enforce its fulfillment. He reason 
 ably complained that Lincoln s letter to Cameron revok 
 ing the appointment was offensively blunt and needed 
 explanation, as it gave no reason whatever for the sudden 
 change in his judgment. While Sanderson and other 
 prominent Pennsylvanians who visited Lincoln about 
 the same time failed to obtain from him any assurance 
 of his purpose to appoint Cameron, Lincoln was pre 
 vailed upon on the i3th of January, ten days after he 
 had written the letter revoking the appointment, to 
 write a confidential letter to Cameron apologizing for 
 the unguarded term* in \vhich he had expressed himself, 
 and giving the assurance that he intended no offense. 
 He also enclosed to Cameron a new letter, antedated 
 January 3, which he suggested that Cameron should 
 accept as the original of that date, and destroy or re 
 turn the one that had given offense. In this letter he 
 said: " You have not as vet signified to me \vhether you 
 would accept the appointment, and with much pain I 
 now say to you that, you will relieve me from great em 
 barrassment by allowing me to recall the offer." The 
 explanatory letter in which the antedated letter was en 
 closed gave Cameron only this assurance as to Lincoln s 
 purpose: " If I should make a Cabinet appointment for 
 Pennsylvania before I reach Washington, I will not do 
 so without consulting you and giving all the weight to 
 your views and wishes which I consistently can." None 
 of these letters were made public by Cameron, but it was 
 \vell understood that it was an open fight for and against 
 him, and Pennsylvania was convulsed by that struggle 
 from the ist of January until the Cabinet was announced 
 after the inauguration of the President. 
 
 When Lincoln arrived in Washington the five mem 
 bers of the Cabinet who had been positively chosen were 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. *50 
 
 Messrs. Seward, Bates, Chase, Welles, and Smith. The 
 ten days he spent at the Capital before becoming Presi 
 dent were given up almost wholly to a battle over the 
 two remaining Cabinet portfolios. The appointment of 
 Cameron and Blair was not finally determined until the 
 day before the inauguration, and then the Cameron issue 
 was decided by the powerful intervention of Seward and 
 Weed. They were greatly disappointed that Cameron 
 had failed to deliver the Pennsylvania delegation to Sew 
 ard, as they had been led to expect, but they were in 
 tensely embittered against Curtin because he and Lane 
 had both openly declared at Chicago that Seward s nomi 
 nation would mean their inevitable defeat. Looking 
 back upon that contest with the clearer insight that the 
 lapse of thirty years must give, I do not see how Lincoln 
 could have done otherwise than appoint Cameron as a 
 member of his Cabinet, viewed from the standpoint he 
 had assumed. He desired to reconcile party differences 
 by calling his Presidential competitors around him, and 
 that opened the way for Cameron. He acted with entire 
 sincerity, and in addition to the powerful pressure for 
 Cameron s appointment made by many who were en 
 titled to respect, he felt that he was not free from the 
 obligation made in his name by Davis at Chicago to 
 make Cameron a member of his Cabinet. The appoint 
 ment was not made wholly for that reason, but that 
 pledge probably resolved Lincoln s doubts in Cameron s 
 favor, and he was accepted as Secretary of War. That 
 there was some degree of mutual distrust between Lin 
 coln and Cameron was a necessity from the circumstances 
 surrounding the selection; but as there was no very large 
 measure of mutual trust between Lincoln and any of his 
 Cabinet officers, Cameron s relations with the President 
 were little if any more strained than were the relations 
 of his brother constitutional advisers with their chief; 
 
i6o LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 and Cameron s practical views in the grave emergency 
 in which the administration was placed were probably 
 of more value to Lincoln at times than were the coun 
 sels of most of the Cabinet. Every member had his 
 own theory of meeting the appalling crisis, from peace 
 able dismemberment of the Republic to aggressive war, 
 while Lincoln had no policy but to await events, and he 
 counseled with all and trusted none. Cameron entered 
 the Cabinet, therefore, with about equal opportunity 
 among his associates to win and hold po\ver with the 
 President, and his retirement within less than a year was 
 not due to any prejudices or apprehensions which may 
 have been created by the bitter struggle against his ap 
 pointment. 
 
 Had the most capable, experienced, and upright man 
 of the nation been called to the head of the War Depart 
 ment when Lincoln was inaugurated in 1861, it would 
 have been impossible for him to administer that office 
 without flagrant abuses. The government was entirely 
 unprepared for war. It was without armies, without 
 guns, without munitions of war; indeed, it had to im 
 provise everything needed to meet an already well-organ 
 ized Confederate army. Contracts had to be made with 
 such haste as to forbid the exercise of sound discretion 
 in obtaining what the country needed; and Cameron, 
 with his peculiar political surroundings, with a horde 
 of partisans clamoring for spoils, was compelled either 
 to reject the confident expectation of his friends or to 
 submit to imminent peril from the grossest abuse of his 
 delegated authority. He was soon brought under the 
 severest criticism of leading journals and statesmen of 
 his own party, and Representative Dawes, now Senator 
 from Massachusetts, led an investigation of the alleged 
 abuses of the War Department, which resulted in a 
 scathing report against Cameron s methods in adminis- 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 161 
 
 tering the office, and a vote of censure upon Cameron by 
 the House. Lincoln promptly exhibited the generous 
 sense of justice that always characterized him by send 
 ing a special message to the House, exculpating Came 
 ron, because the acts for which he was criticised had not 
 been exclusively Cameron s, but were largely acts for 
 which the President and Cabinet were equally respon 
 sible. Some ten years later the House expunged the 
 resolution of censure. Notwithstanding the message 
 of Lincoln lessening the burden of reproach cast upon 
 Cameron by the House, popular distrust was very gen 
 eral as to the administration of the War Department, 
 and the demands for Cameron s removal grew in both 
 po\ver and intensity. He was not accused of individual 
 corruption, but the severe strain put upon the national 
 credit led to the severest criticisms of all manner of pub 
 lic profligacy, and it culminated in a formal appeal to 
 the President from leading financial men of the country 
 for an immediate change in the Minister of War. 
 
 I have no reason to believe that Lincoln would have 
 appointed a new Secretary of War had not public con 
 siderations made it imperative. His personal relations 
 with Cameron were as pleasant as his relations with any 
 other of his Cabinet officers, and in many respects Came 
 ron was doubtless a valuable adviser because of his clear, 
 practical, common-sense views of public affairs. The 
 one vital issue that Cameron very early appreciated was 
 that of slavery. As early as May, 1861, he wrote to 
 General Butler, instructing him to refrain from surren 
 dering to their masters any slaves who came within his 
 lines, and to employ them u in the services to which 
 they may be best adapted." That was the first step 
 taken by the administration toward the overthrow of 
 slavery. In August of the same year General Fremont 
 issued a proclamation in Missouri declaring the slaves 
 
 ir 
 
1 62 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 of all those in the Confederate service to be for ever free, 
 which was a substantial emancipation of all slaves in 
 Missouri. Lincoln at once revoked the Fremont order, 
 and sent Secretary Cameron and the Adjutant-General 
 to personally examine into the situation in Missouri and 
 report upon it. Cameron obviously sympathized with 
 Fremont s emancipation ideas, and, instead of delivering 
 to Fremont the order for his removal prepared before he 
 left Washington, he finally decided to bring it back with 
 him and to give Fremont an opportunity to retrieve him 
 self. Lincoln, always patient, yielded to Fremont s im 
 portunities, and permitted him to remain in command 
 until October, when he sent General Curtis in person to 
 deliver the order of removal, with the single condition 
 that if Fremont "shall then have, in personal command, 
 fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in 
 battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the 
 enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to be delivered, 
 but held for further orders." As Fremont was not near 
 a battle, he was relieved of his command. 
 
 Cameron pressed the slavery issue to the extent of a 
 flagrant outrage upon his chief by recommending the 
 arming of slaves in his first annual report without the 
 knowledge of the President, and sending it out in printed 
 form to the postmasters of the country for delivery to the 
 newspapers after having been presented to Congress. 
 The slaver} question had then become an important 
 political theme, and politicians were shaping their lines 
 to get into harmony with it. In this report Cameron 
 declared in unqualified terms in favor of arming the 
 slaves for military service. Lincoln was not only shocked, 
 but greatly grieved when he learned the character of 
 Cameron s recommendation, and he at once ordered that 
 the copies be recalled by telegraph, the report revised, 
 and a new edition printed. Cameron submitted as grace- 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 163 
 
 fully as possible, and revised his report, limiting his 
 recommendations about slaves to the suggestion that 
 they should not be returned to their masters.* While 
 this episode did not produce unfriendly personal relations 
 between Lincoln and Cameron, it certainly was a severe 
 strain upon Lincoln s trust in the fidelity of his War 
 
 * It is as clearly a right of the government to arm slaves when 
 it may become necessary, as it is to use gunpowder taken from 
 the enemy. What to do with that species of property is a ques 
 tion that time and circumstance will solve, and need not be 
 anticipated further than to repeat that they cannot be held by the 
 government as slaves. It would be useless to keep them as pris 
 oners of war; and self-preservation, the highest duty of a govern 
 ment or of individuals, demands that they should be disposed 
 of or employed in the most effective manner that will tend most 
 speedily to suppress the insurrection and restore the authority 
 of the government. If it shall be found that the men w y ho have 
 been held by the rebels as slaves are capable of bearing arms and 
 performing efficient military service, it is the right, and may be 
 come the duty, of the government to arm and equip them, and 
 employ their services against the rebels under proper military 
 regulation, discipline, and command. Cameron s Original Re 
 port, recalled by the President for revision. 
 
 It is already a grave question what shall be done with those 
 slaves who were abandoned by their owners on the advance of 
 our troops into Southern territory, as at Beaufort district in 
 South Carolina. The number left within our control at that 
 point is very considerable, and similar cases will probablv occur. 
 What shall be done with them ? Can we afford to send them for 
 ward to their masters, to be by them armed against us or used in 
 producing supplies to sustain the rebellion ? Their labor may be 
 useful to us; withheld from the enemy, it lessens his military re 
 sources, and withholding them has no tendency to induce the 
 horrors of insurrection, even in the rebel communities. They 
 constitute a military resource, and, being such, that they should 
 not be turned over to the enemy is too plain to discuss. Why 
 deprive him of supplies by a blockade, and voluntarily give him 
 men to produce them? Cameron s Report, as revised by direction 
 of the President. 
 
1 64 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Minister; but Lincoln was too wise to put himself in 
 open antagonism to the antislavery sentiment of the 
 country by removing Cameron for his offensive and sur 
 reptitious antislavery report. The financial pressure for 
 Cameron s removal would probably have accomplished 
 it under any circumstances, and Lincoln waited more 
 than a month after the flurry over Cameron s report. 
 
 There have been many and conflicting accounts given 
 to the public of Cameron s retirement from the Lincoln 
 Cabinet, no one of which is wholly correct, and most of 
 them incorrect in vital particulars. Cameron had ver 
 bally assured the President when censured by Congress, 
 and again when the dispute arose over his annual report, 
 that his resignation was at Lincoln s disposal at any 
 time, but he had no knowledge of Lincoln s purpose to 
 make a change in the War Department until he received 
 Lincoln s letter in January, 1862, informing him of the 
 change. In Nicolay and Hays life of Lincoln (volume 
 5, page 128) is given what purports to be the letter de 
 livered to Cameron notifying him of the change. Lin 
 coln certainly wrote that letter, as his biographers have 
 published it from his manuscript, but it is not the letter 
 that was delivered to Cameron. Lincoln sent his letter 
 to Cameron by Chase, who met Cameron late in the 
 evening after he had dined with Colonel Forney, and he 
 delivered the letter in entire ignorance of its contents. 
 I happened to be spending the evening with Colonel 
 Thomas A. Scott, then Cameron s Assistant Secretary 
 of War, when Cameron came in near the midnight hour 
 and exhibited an extraordinary degree of emotion. He 
 laid the letter down upon Scott s table, and invited us 
 both to read it, saying that it meant personal as well as 
 political destruction, and was an irretrievable wrong 
 committed upon him by the President. We were not 
 then, and indeed never had been, in political sympathy, 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. r>5 
 
 but our friendly personal relations had never been inter 
 rupted. He appealed to me, saying: "This is not a po 
 litical affair; it means personal degradation; and while 
 we do not agree politically, you know I would gladly 
 aid you personally if it were in my power." Cameron 
 was affected even to tears, and wept bitterly over what 
 he regarded as a personal affront from Lincoln. I re 
 member not only the substance of Lincoln s letter, but 
 its language, almost, if not quite, literally, as follows: 
 4 I have this day nominated Hon. Edwin M. Stanton to 
 be Secretary of War and you to be Minister Plenipo 
 tentiary to Russia." Although the message did not go 
 to the Senate that day, it had been prepared and was 
 sent in pursuance of that notice. Colonel Scott, who 
 was a man of great versatility of resources, at once sug 
 gested that Lincoln did not intend personal offense to 
 Cameron, and in that I fully agreed; and it was then 
 and there arranged that on the following day Lincoln 
 should be asked to withdraw the offensive letter; to per 
 mit Cameron to antedate a letter of resignation, and for 
 Lincoln to write a kind acceptance of the same. The 
 letter delivered by Chase was recalled; a new corre 
 spondence was prepared, and a month later given to the 
 public. 
 
 Cameron had no knowledge or even suspicion of Stan- 
 ton succeeding him. Chase and Seward, as well as Cam 
 eron, have claimed direct or indirect influence in the 
 selection of Stanton, but there was not a single member 
 of the Cabinet who knew of Stanton s appointment until 
 Lincoln notified Cameron of the change. Stanton had 
 been in open, malignant opposition to the administration 
 only a few months before, but he was then the closest 
 friend and personal counselor of General McClellan ; was 
 in hearty sympathy with the war; was resolutely and ag 
 gressively honest; and Lincoln chose him without con- 
 
1 66 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 suiting any, as far as I have ever been able to learn, 
 unless it was. General McClellan. One of the many 
 good results he expected from Stanton as War Minister 
 was entire harmony between him and the general com 
 manding the armies. 
 
 Cameron well concealed his disappointment at the 
 manner of his retirement from the Cabinet ; wisely 
 maintained personal relations with Lincoln; and when 
 he returned from Russia, after less than a year of service 
 as minister, he resumed active political life, and was one 
 of the earliest of the political leaders to foresee that the 
 people would force the renomination of Lincoln, regard 
 less of the favor or disfavor of politicians. The early 
 movement in January, 1864, in which Curtin cordially 
 co-operated, by which the unanimous recommendation 
 of the Republican members of the Pennsylvania Legis 
 lature was given for Lincoln s renomination, was sug 
 gested by Cameron; and Lincoln, with a sagacity that 
 never failed him, took the earliest opportunity to attach 
 Cameron so firmly to his cause that separation would be 
 impossible. His first movement in that line was the 
 Cameron mission to Fortress Monroe to ask Butler to 
 accept the Vice-Presidency. This was in March, 1864, 
 and Cameron was one of the very few whom Lincoln 
 consulted about the Vice-Presidency until he finally set 
 tled upon the nomination of Johnson, in which Cameron 
 reluctantly concurred, and he went to the Baltimore 
 Convention as a delegate-at-large to execute Lincoln s 
 wishes. He became chairman of the Republican State 
 Committee in Pennsylvania, and doubtless would have 
 been in very close relations with the President during 
 his second term had Lincoln s life been spared. 
 
 I have written of Lincoln and Cameron with some 
 hesitation, because during the thirty years in which 
 Cameron and I were both more or less active in politics 
 
LINCOLN AND CAMERON. 167 
 
 we never were in political sympathy. He had retired 
 from his first term of Senatorial service before I had be 
 come a voter, and was thirty years my senior. He was 
 then a Democrat and I a Whig-, and the political hos 
 tility continued when in later years we were of the same 
 political faith. He never was a candidate with my sup 
 port, nor was I ever a candidate with his support, even 
 when I was the unanimous nominee of onr party. We 
 differed radically in political methods, and often in bit 
 terness, but our personal relations were never strained, 
 and on occasions he confided in me and received friendly 
 personal service that he warmly appreciated. We many 
 times had a truce to attain some common end, but it was 
 never misunderstood as anything more than a truce for 
 the special occasion. When he entered the Lincoln 
 Cabinet he knew that I would gladly have aided him to 
 success, and we seldom met without an hour or more of 
 pleasant personal intercourse over a bottle of wine, the 
 only stimulant he ever indulged in. In 1873 he was 
 elected to his fourth term to the Senate and I was a 
 State Senator. An effort was made by legislative mer 
 cenaries to call into the field some man of large fortune 
 as his competitor. He called on me, stated the case, and 
 appealed to me to oppose the movement, as it was ob 
 viously dishonest. It was expected that my opposition 
 to Cameron would make me willing to join any move 
 ment for his defeat; but I at once assured him that, 
 while I would not support his election, I would earn 
 estly oppose any effort to force him into the corrupt 
 conciliation of venal legislators. He thanked me, and 
 added: U I can rely upon you, and I will now dismiss 
 the thieves without ceremony." The movement failed, 
 and he was elected by the united vote of his party, while 
 I voted for the late William D. Kelley. No man has so 
 strongly impressed his personality upon the politics of 
 
1(58 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Pennsylvania as has Simon Cameron, and the political 
 power he organized is as potent in the State to-day as at 
 any time during his life. He was one of the few men 
 who voluntarily retired from the Senate when he could 
 have continued his service during life. He survived his 
 retirement a full dozen years; his intercourse mellowed 
 into the gentlest relations with old-time friends and foes, 
 and in the ripeness of more than fourscore and ten sum 
 mers and in peaceful resignation he slept the dreamless 
 sleep of the dead. 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 EDWIN M. STANTON, 1865. 
 
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 
 
 OF all the men intimately connected with Abraham 
 Lincoln during our civil war, Edwin M. Stanton 
 presented the strangest medley of individual attributes. 
 He was a man of whom two histories might be written 
 as widely diverging as night and day, portraying him as 
 worthy of eminent praise and as worthy of scorching 
 censure, and yet both absolutely true, His dominant 
 quality was his heroic mould. He could be heroic to a 
 degree that seemed almost superhuman, and yet at times 
 submissive to the very verge of cowardice. Like Lin 
 coln, he fully trusted no man; but, unlike Lincoln, he 
 distrusted all, and I doubt whether any man prominently 
 connected with the government gave confidence to so 
 few as did Stanton. He in turn trusted and hated nearly 
 every general prominent in the early part of the war. 
 He was McClellan s closest personal friend and counselor 
 when he entered the Lincoln Cabinet, and later became 
 McClellan s most vindictive and vituperative foe. The 
 one general of the war who held his confidence without 
 interruption from the time he became Commander-in- 
 Chief of the armies until the close of the war was Gen 
 eral Grant, and he literally commanded it by distinctly 
 defining his independent attitude as General-in-Chief 
 when he accepted his commission as Lieutenant-General. 
 He often spoke of, and to, public men, military and civil, 
 with a withering sneer. I have heard him scores of 
 170 
 
LINCOLN AND STAN7VN. 17 I 
 
 times thus speak of Lincoln, and several timeri thus 
 speak to Lincoln. He was a man of extreme moods; 
 often petulant, irritating, and senselessly unjust, and at 
 times one of the most amiable, genial, and delightful 
 conversationalists I have ever met. He loved antago 
 nism, and there was hardly a period during his remark 
 able service as War Minister in which he was not, on 
 some more or less important point, in positive antago 
 nism with the President. In his antagonisms he was, 
 as a rule, offensively despotic, and often pressed them 
 upon Lincoln to the very utmost point of Lincoln s for 
 bearance; but he knew when to call a halt upon himself, 
 as he well knew that there never was a da} or an hour 
 during his service in the Cabinet that Lincoln was not 
 his absolute master. He respected Lincoln s authority 
 because it was greater than his own, but he had little 
 respect for Lincoln s fitness for the responsible duties of 
 the Presidency. I have seen him at times as tender and 
 gentle as a woman, his heart seeming to agonize over 
 the sorrows of the humblest; and I have seen him many 
 more times turn away with the haughtiest contempt from 
 appeals which should at least have been treated with re 
 spect. He had few personal and fewer political friends, 
 and he seemed proud of the fact that he had more per 
 sonal and political enemies than any prominent officer 
 of the government. Senators, Representatives, -and high 
 military commanders were often offended by his wanton 
 arrogance, and again thawed into cordial relations by his 
 effusive kindness. Taken all in all, Edwin M. Stanton 
 was capable of the grandest and the meanest actions of 
 any great man I have ever known, and he has reared 
 imperishable monuments to the opposing qualities he 
 possessed. 
 
 Stanton had rendered an incalculable service to the 
 nation by his patriotic efforts in the Cabinet of Bu- 
 
172 LINCOLN AJVD MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 clianan. Cass had resigned from the Premiership be 
 cause he was much more aggressive in his ideas of meet 
 ing rebellion than was the President. Attorney -General 
 Black was promoted to the head of the Cabinet, and 
 Stanton was called in as Black s successor. It was Judge 
 Black who saved Buchanan s administration from sud 
 den and irretrievable wreck at the outset of the issue, 
 and he doubtless dictated the appointment of Stanton, 
 who was his close personal friend. From the time that 
 Stanton entered the Buchanan Cabinet the attitude of 
 the administration was so pointedly changed that none 
 could mistake it. He was positively and aggressively 
 loyal to the government, and as positively and aggres 
 sively hated rebellion. While Stanton and Black gen 
 erally acted in concert during the few remaining months 
 of the Buchanan administration, they became seriously 
 estranged before the close of the Lincoln administration 
 so much so that Black, in an article published in the 
 Galaxy of June, 1870, said of Stanton: " Did he accept 
 the confidence of the President (Buchanan) and the Cabi 
 net with a predetermined intent to betray it?" After 
 Stanton s retirement from the Buchanan Cabinet when 
 Lincoln was inaugurated, he maintained the closest con 
 fidential relations with Buchanan, and wrote him many 
 letters expressing the utmost contempt for Lincoln, the 
 Cabinet, the Republican Congress, and the general pol 
 icy of the administration. These letters, given to the 
 public in Curtis s life of Buchanan, speak freely of the 
 "painful imbecility of Lincoln," of the "venality and 
 corruption" which ran riot in the government, and ex 
 pressed the belief that no better condition of things was 
 possible " until Jeff Davis turns out the whole concern." 
 He was firmly impressed for some weeks after the battle 
 of Bull Run that the government was utterly overthrown, 
 as he repeatedly refers to the coming of Davis into the 
 
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 173 
 
 National Capital. In one letter he says that "in less 
 than thirty days Davis will be in possession of Washing-, 
 ton;" and it is an open secret that Stanton advised the 
 revolutionary overthrow of the Lincoln government, to 
 be replaced by General McClellan as military dictator. 
 These letters published by Curtis, bad as they are, are 
 not the worst letters written by Stanton to Buchanan. 
 Some of them were so violent in their expressions against 
 Lincoln and the administration that they have been 
 charitably withheld from the public, but they remain 
 in the possession of the surviving relatives of President 
 Buchanan. Of course, Lincoln had no knowledge of 
 the bitterness exhibited by Stanton to himself personally 
 and to his administration, but if he had known the worst 
 that Stanton ever said or wrote about him, I doubt not 
 that he would have called him to the Cabinet in Janu 
 ary, 1862. The disasters the army suffered made Lin 
 coln forgetful of everything but the single duty of sup 
 pressing the rebellion. From the day that McClellan 
 was called to the command of the Army of the Potomac 
 in place of McDowell, Stanton was in enthusiastic accord 
 with the military policy of the government. The con 
 stant irritation between the War Department and mili 
 tary commanders that had vexed Lincoln in the early 
 part of the war made him anxious to obtain a War Min 
 ister who was not only resolutely honest, but who was in 
 close touch with the commander of the armies. This 
 necessity, with the patriotic record that Stanton had 
 made during the closing months of the Buchanan ad 
 ministration, obviously dictated the appointment of Stan- 
 ton. It was Lincoln s own act. Stanton had been dis 
 cussed as a possible successor to Cameron along with 
 many others in outside circles, but no one had any reason 
 to anticipate Stanton s appointment from any intimation 
 given by the President, Lincoln and Stanton had no 
 
174 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 personal intercourse whatever from the time of Lincoln s 
 inauguration until Stanton became his War Minister. 
 In a letter to Buchanan, written March i, 1862, Stanton 
 says: " My accession to my present position was quite as 
 sudden and unexpected as the confidence you bestowed 
 upon me in calling me to your Cabinet." In another 
 letter, written on the iStli of May, 1862, he said: U I 
 hold my present position at the request of the President, 
 who knew me personally, but to whom I had not spoken 
 from the 4th of March, 1861, until the day he handed 
 me my commission." The appointment was made be 
 cause Lincoln believed that Stan ton s loyal record in the 
 Buchanan Cabinet and his prominence as the foe of every 
 form of jobbery would inspire the highest degree of con 
 fidence in that department throughout the entire country. 
 In that he judged correctly. From the day that he en 
 tered the War Office until the surrender of the Confeder 
 ate armies, Stanton, with all his vagaries and infirmities, 
 gave constant inspiration to the loyal sentiment of the 
 country, and rendered a sendee that probably only Edwin 
 M. Stanton could have rendered at the time. 
 
 Lincoln was not long in discovering that in his new 
 Secretary of War he had an invaluable but most trouble 
 some Cabinet officer, but he saw only the great and good 
 offices that Stanton was performing for the imperiled Re 
 public. Confidence was restored in financial circles by 
 the appointment of Stanton, and his name as W T ar Min 
 ister did more to strengthen the faith of the people in the 
 government credit than would have been probable from 
 the appointment of any other man of that day. He was 
 a terror to all the hordes of jobbers and speculators and 
 camp-followers whose appetites had been whetted by a 
 great war, and he enforced the strictest discipline through 
 out our armies. He was seldom capable of being civil to 
 anv officer awav from the armv on leave of absence un- 
 
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 175 
 
 less he had been summoned by the government for con 
 ference or special duty, and he issued the strictest orders 
 from time to time to drive the throng of military idlers 
 from the capital and keep them at their posts. He was 
 stern to savagery in his enforcement of military law. 
 The wearied sentinel who slept at his post found no 
 mercy in the heart of Stanton, and many times did Lin 
 coln s humanity overrule his fiery minister. Any neglect 
 of military duty was sure of the swiftest punishment, and 
 seldom did he make even just allowance for inevitable 
 military disaster. He had profound, unfaltering faith in 
 the Union cause, and, above all, he had unfaltering faith 
 in himself. He believed that he was in all things except 
 in name Commander-in-Chief of the armies and the navy 
 of the nation, and it was with unconcealed reluctance 
 that he at times deferred to the authority of the Presi 
 dent. He was a great organizer in theory, and harsh to 
 the utmost in enforcing his theories upon military com 
 manders. He at times conceived impossible things, and 
 peremptorily ordered them executed, and woe to the man 
 who was unfortunate enough to demonstrate that Stan- 
 ton \vas wrong. If he escaped without disgrace he was 
 more than fortunate, and many, very many, would have 
 thus fallen unjustly had it not been for Lincoln s cautious 
 and generous interposition to save those who were wan 
 tonly censured. He would not throw the blame upon 
 Stanton, but he would save the victim of Stanton s in 
 justice, and he always did it so kindly that even Stanton 
 could not complain beyond a churlish growl. 
 
 Stanton understood the magnitude of the rebellion, 
 and he understood also that an army to be effective must 
 be completely organized in all its departments. He had 
 no favorites to promote at the expense of the public ser 
 vice, and his constant and honest aim was to secure the 
 best men for every important position. As I have said, 
 
176 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 he assumed, in his own mind, that he was Commander- 
 in-Chief, and there was nothing in military movements, 
 or in the quartermaster, commissary, hospital, secret ser 
 vice, or any other department relating to the war, that 
 he did not claim to comprehend and seek to control in 
 his absolute way. * I doubt whether his partiality ever 
 unjustly promoted a military officer, and I wish that I 
 
 * Mr. Stanton s theory was that everything concerned his own 
 department. It was he who was carrying on the war. It was he 
 who would be held responsible for the secret machinations of the 
 enemy in the rear as well as the unwarranted success of the en 
 emy in front. Hence he established a system of military censor 
 ship which has never, for vastness of scope or completeness of 
 detail, been equaled in any war before or since or in any other 
 country under the sun. The whole telegraphic system of the 
 United States, with its infinite ramifications, centered in his 
 office. There, adjoining his own personal rooms, sat Gen. Eck- 
 ert, Hymer D. Bates, Albert B. Chandler, and Charles A. Tinker, 
 all of them young men of brilliant promise and now shining 
 lights in the electrical world. Every hour in the day and night, 
 under all circumstances, in all seasons, there sat at their instru 
 ments sundry members of this little group. The passage be 
 tween their room and the Secretary s was unobstructed. It was 
 an interior communication they did not have even to go through 
 the corridor to reach him and every dispatch relating to the war 
 or party politics that passed over the Western Union wires, North 
 or South, they read. Cipher telegrams were considered especiallv 
 suspicious, so every one of those was reported. The young men 
 I have mentioned were masters of cipher-translation. Every 
 message to or from the President or any member of his house 
 hold passed under the eye of the Secretary. If one Cabinet Min 
 ister communicated with another over the wire by a secret code, 
 Mr. Stanton had the message deciphered and read to him. If 
 Gen. McClellan telegraphed to his wife from the front, Mr. Stan- 
 ton knew the contents of every dispatch. Hence, as far as the 
 conduct of the war was concerned, Mr. Stanton knew a thousand 
 secrets where Mr. Lincoln knew one; for the Secretary s instruc 
 tions were that telegrams indiscriminately should not be shown 
 to the President. Albert E. H. Johnson, St^nton s confidential 
 clerk, in Washington J ost, July 14, 1891, 
 
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 177 
 
 could say that his prejudices had never hindered the pro 
 motion or driven from the service faithful and competent 
 military commanders. His hatreds were intense, im 
 placable, and yielded to the single authority of Lincoln, 
 and that authority he knew would be exercised only in 
 extreme emergencies. The effect of such a War Minis 
 ter was to enforce devotion to duty throughout the entire 
 army, and it is impossible to measure the beneficent re 
 sults of Stanton s policy in our vast military campaigns. 
 Great as he was in the practical administration of his 
 office that could be visible to the world, he added im 
 measurably to his greatness as War Minister by the im 
 press of his wonderful personality upon the whole mili 
 tary and civil service. 
 
 Stanton s intense and irrepressible hatreds were his 
 greatest infirmity and did much to deform his brilliant 
 record as War Minister. A pointed illustration of his 
 bitter and unreasonable prejudices was given in the case 
 of Jere McKibben, whom he arbitrarily confined in Old 
 Capitol Prison without even the semblance of a pretext 
 to excuse the act. The Constitution of Pennsylvania 
 had been so amended during the summer of 1864 as to 
 authorize soldiers to vote in the field. The Legislature 
 was called in extra session to provide for holding elec 
 tions in the army. It was in the heat of the Presi 
 dential contest and party bitterness was intensified to the 
 uttermost. Despite the earnest appeals of Governor 
 Curtin and all my personal importunities with promi 
 nent legislators of our own party, an election law was 
 passed that was obviously intended to give the minority 
 no rights whatever in holding army elections. The 
 Governor was empowered to appoint State Commis 
 sioners, who were authorized to attend the elections 
 without any direct authority in conducting them. As 
 the law was violent in its character and liable to the 
 
178 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 grossest abuses, without any means to restrain election 
 frauds, the Democrats of the State and country justly 
 complained of it with great earnestness. The Governor 
 decided, as a matter of justice to the Democrats, to ap 
 point several Democratic Commissioners, but it was with 
 difficulty that any could be prevailed upon to accept. 
 He requested me to see several prominent Democrats 
 and obtain their consent to receive his commission and 
 act under it. As McKibben had three brothers in the 
 Army of the Potomac, I supposed it would be pleasant 
 for him to make a visit there in an official way, and I 
 suggested it to him. He promptly answered: "Why, 
 Stanton would put me in Old Capitol Prison before I 
 was there a day. He hates our family for no other 
 reason that I know of than that my father was one of 
 his best friends in Pittsburg when he needed a friend. 
 I assured him that Stanton would not attempt any vio 
 lence against a man who held the commission of the 
 Governor of our State, and he finally consented to go, 
 having first solemnly pledged me to protect him in case 
 he got into any difficult}*. 
 
 McKibben and the other Commissioners from Phila 
 delphia were furnished the election papers and started 
 down to the army, then quietly resting on the James 
 River. On the second day after he left I received a tele 
 gram from him dated Washington, saying: " Stanton has 
 me in Old Capitol Prison ; come at once. I hastened to 
 Washington, having telegraphed to Lincoln to allow me 
 to see him between eleven and twelve o clock that night, 
 when I should arrive. I went direct to the White House 
 and told the President the exact truth. I explained the 
 character of the law of our State; that I had personally 
 prevailed upon McKibben to go as a Commissioner to 
 give a semblance of decency to its execution; that he 
 was not only guiltless of any offense, as he knew how 
 
LIXCOLX AXD STAXTON. 179 
 
 delicately he was situated, but that he was powerless to 
 do any wrong, and I insisted upon McKibben s imme 
 diate discharge from prison. Lincoln knew of Stanton s 
 hatred for the McKibbens, as he had been compelled to 
 protect four of McKibben s brothers to give them the 
 promotion they had earned by most heroic conduct in 
 battle, and he was much distressed at Stanton s act. 
 He sent immediately to the War Department to get the 
 charge against McKibben, and it did not require five 
 minutes of examination to satisfy him that it was utterly 
 groundless and a malicious wrong committed by Stanton. 
 He said it was a "stupid blunder," and at once proposed 
 to discharge McKibben on his parole. I urged that he 
 should be discharged unconditionally, but Lincoln s cau 
 tion prevented that. He said: u It seems hardly fair to 
 discharge McKibben unconditionally without permitting 
 Stanton to give his explanation;" and he added, "You 
 know, McClure, McKibben is safe, parole or no parole, 
 so go and get him out of prison." I saw that it would 
 be useless to attempt to change Lincoln s purpose, but I 
 asked him to fix an hour the next morning when I could 
 meet Stanton in his presence to have McKibben dis 
 charged from his parole. He fixed ten o clock the next 
 morning for the meeting, and then wrote, in his own 
 hand, the order for McKibben s discharge, which I 
 hurriedly bore to Old Capitol Prison and had him 
 released. 
 
 Promptly at ten o clock the next morning I went to 
 the White House to obtain McKibben s discharge from 
 his parole. Lincoln was alone, but Stanton came in a 
 few minutes later. He was pale with anger and his first 
 expression was: "Well, McClure, what damned rebel are 
 you here to get out of trouble this morning ? I had 
 frequently been to Washington before when arbitrary 
 and entirely unjustifiable arrests of civilians had been 
 
ISO LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 made in Pennsylvania, to have the prisoners discharged 
 from military custody; and as I had never applied in 
 such a case without good reason, and never without suc 
 cess even when opposed by Stanton, he evidently meant 
 to square up some old accounts with me over McKibben. 
 I said to him and with some feeling: "Your arrest of 
 McKibben was a cowardly act; you knew McKibben 
 was guiltless of any offense, and you did it to gratify a 
 brutal hatred." I told him also that I had prevailed 
 upon McKibben, against his judgment, to act as a State 
 Commissioner to give a semblance of decency to what 
 would evidently be a farcical and fraudulent election in 
 the army, and that if he had examined the complaint 
 soberly for one minute, he would have seen that it was 
 utterly false. I told him that I had requested his ap 
 pearance there with the President to have McKibben 
 discharged from his parole, and that I now asked him to 
 assent to it. He turned from me, walked hurriedly back 
 and forth across the room several times before he an 
 swered, and then he came up to me and in a voice trem 
 ulous with passion said: " I decline to discharge McKib 
 ben from his parole. You can make formal application 
 for it if you choose, and I will consider and decide it." 
 His manner was as offensive as it was possible even for 
 Stanton to make it, and I resented it by saying: "I 
 don t know what McKibben will do, but if I were Jere 
 McKibben, as sure as there is a God I would crop your 
 ears before I left Washington." He made no reply, but 
 suddenly whirled around on his heel and walked out of 
 the President s room. Lincoln had said nothing. He 
 was used to such ebullitions from Stanton, and after the 
 Secretary had gone he remarked in a jocular way, 
 "Well, McClure, you didn t get on very far with Stan- 
 ton, did you? but he ll come all right; let the matter 
 rest," Before leaving the President s room I wrote out 
 
LINCOLN AND STAN TON. 181 
 
 a formal application to Stanton for the discharge of 
 McKibben from his parole. Several days after I re 
 ceived a huge official envelope enclosing a letter, all in 
 Stanton s bold scrawl, saying that the request for the 
 discharge of Jere McKibben from his parole had been 
 duly considered, and "the application could not be 
 granted consistently with the interests of the public 
 service." McKibben outlived Stanton, but died a pris 
 oner on parole. 
 
 After such a turbulent interview with Stanton it would 
 naturally be supposed that our intercourse thereafter would 
 be severely strained, if not wholly interrupted ; but I had 
 occasion to call at the War Department within a few 
 weeks, and never was greeted more cordially in my life 
 than I was by Stanton. The election was over, the mili 
 tary power of the Confederacy was obviously broken, and 
 the Secretary was in the very best of spirits. He promptly 
 granted what I wanted done, which was not a matter of 
 much importance, and it was so cheerfully and gener 
 ously assented to that I carefully thought of everything 
 that I wanted from his department, all of which was 
 done in a most gracious manner. I puzzled my brain to 
 make sure I should not forget anything, and it finally 
 occurred to me that a friend I much desired to serve had 
 lately appealed to me to aid in obtaining promotion for a 
 young officer in the quartermaster s department whom I 
 did not know personally. It seemed that this was the 
 chance for the young officer. I suggested to Stanton 
 that Quartermaster - was reputed to be a very 
 faithful and efficient officer, and entitled to higher pro 
 motion than he had received. Stanton picked up his 
 pen, saying: "It will give me great pleasure, sir; what 
 is his name ? I had to answer that I could not recall 
 his name in full, but he took down the officer s rank and 
 last name and assured me that he would be promptly pro- 
 
1 82 LINCOLN AND MEN OP WAR-TIMES. 
 
 nioted. I supposed that a change of mood would make 
 him forgetful of this promise; but the young quarter 
 master wore new shoulder-straps within ten days, and 
 won distinction as the chief of his department in large 
 independent army movements in Virginia. I never had 
 the pleasure of meeting the worthy officer who thus un 
 expectedly secured his promotion, and he is doubtless 
 ignorant to this day of the peculiar way in which it was 
 accomplished. 
 
 Stanton s hatred for McClellan became a consuming 
 passion before the close of the Peninsular campaign. 
 When McClellan was before Yorktown and complaining 
 of his inadequate forces to march upon Richmond, Stan- 
 ton summed him up in the folk wing expression: "If he 
 (McClellan) had a million men, he would swear the en 
 emy had two millions, and then he \vould sit down in 
 the mud and yell for three." He was impatient and 
 often fearfully petulant in his impatience. He was dis 
 appointed in McClellan not marching directly upon 
 Richmond by Manassas, and he was greatly disappointed 
 again when McClellan laid siege to Yorktown, but he 
 was ever ready to congratulate, in his blunt way, when 
 anything was accomplished. When General " Baldy v 
 Smith made a reconnoissance at Yorktown that produced 
 the first successful results of that campaign, Stanton an 
 swered McClellan s announcement of the movement: 
 "Good for the first lick; hurrah for Smith and the one- 
 gun battery!" but from that time until the withdrawal 
 of the army from the Peninsula, Stanton never found 
 occasion to commend McClellan, and McClellan was a 
 constant bone of contention between Stanton and Lin 
 coln. Lincoln s patience and forbearance were marked 
 in contrast with Stanton s violence of temper and inten 
 sity of hatred. McClellan so far forgot himself as to 
 telegraph to Stanton after the retreat to the James River: 
 
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 183 
 
 u If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe 
 no thanks to yon or to any other person in Washington. 
 You have done your best to sacrifice this army." Any 
 other President than Lincoln would have immediately 
 relieved McClellan of his command, and Stanton not 
 only would have relieved him, but would have dismissed 
 him from the service. Lincoln exhibited no resentment 
 whatever for the ill-advised and insubordinate telegram 
 from McClellan. On the contrary, he seemed inclined 
 to continue McClellan in command, and certainly ex 
 hibited every desire to sustain him to the utmost. In 
 a letter addressed to the Secretary of State on the same 
 day that McClellan s telegram was received he expressed 
 his purpose to call for additional troops, and said: "I 
 expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till 
 I die, or I am conquered, or my term expires, or Con 
 gress or the country forsakes me." 
 
 This was one of the most perplexing situations in 
 which Lincoln was ever placed. The defeat of the army 
 would not, in itself, have been so serious had Lincoln 
 been able to turn to commanders in whom he could im 
 plicitly confide. He had abundant resources and could 
 supply all needed additional troops, but where could he 
 turn for safe advice? He had, to a very large extent, 
 lost faith in McClellan. When he counseled with Stan- 
 ton he encountered insuperable hatreds, and he finally, 
 as was his custom, decided upon his own course of action 
 and hurried off to West Point to confer with General 
 Scott. His visit to W T est Point startled the country and 
 quite as much startled the Cabinet, as not a single mem 
 ber of it had any intimation of his intended journey. 
 What passed at the interview between Lincoln and Scott 
 was never known to any, so far as I have been able to 
 learn, and I believe that no one has pretended to have 
 had knowledge of it. It is enough to know that Pope 
 
1 84 LINCOLN AND MEN Ut< WAK-TiMLS. 
 
 was summoned to the command of a new army, called 
 the Army of Virginia, embracing the commands of Fre 
 mont, Banks, and McDowell, and that Halleck was made 
 General-in-Chief. The aggressive campaign of Lee, re 
 sulting in the second battle of Bull Run and the utter 
 defeat of Pope, brought the army back into the Washing 
 ton intrenchments in a most demoralized condition. It 
 was here that Lincoln and Stanton came into conflict 
 again on the question of the restoration of McClellan to 
 command. Without consulting either the General-in- 
 Chief or his War Minister, Lincoln assigned McClellan 
 to the command of the defenses of Washington, and as 
 the various commands of Pope s broken and demoralized 
 army came back into the intrenchments in utter confu 
 sion they thereby came again under the command of 
 McClellan. 
 
 When it was discovered that McClellan was thus prac 
 tically in command of the Army of the Potomac again, 
 Stanton was aroused to the fiercest hostility. He went 
 so far as to prepare a remonstrance to the President in 
 writing against McClellan s continuance in the com 
 mand of that army or of any army of the Union. This 
 remonstrance was not only signed by Stanton, but by 
 Chase, Bates, and Smith, with the concurrence of Welles, 
 who thought it indelicate for him to sign it. After the 
 paper had been prepared under Stanton s impetuous lead, 
 some of the more considerate members of the Cabinet 
 who had joined him took pause to reflect that Lincoln 
 was in the habit not only of having his own way, but of 
 having his own way of having his own way, and the 
 protest was never presented. Lincoln knew McClellan s 
 great organizing powers, and he knew the army needed 
 first of all a commander who was capable of restoring it 
 to discipline. To use his own expressive language about 
 the emergency, he believed that ( there is no one in 
 
LINCOLN AND STAN TON. 185 
 
 the army who can command the fortifications and lick 
 those troops of ours into shape one-half as well as he 
 could." It was this conviction that made Lincoln 
 forget all of McClellan s failings and restore him to 
 command, and Stanton was compelled to submit in 
 sullen silence. 
 
 Lincoln s restoration of McClellan to command in dis 
 regard of the most violent opposition of Stanton was only 
 one of the many instances in which he and his War Min 
 ister came into direct and positive conflict, and always 
 with the same result; but many times as Stanton was 
 vanquished in his conflicts with Lincoln, it was not in 
 his nature to be any the less Edwin M. Stanton. As late 
 as 1864 he had one of his most serious disputes with Lin 
 coln, in which he peremptorily refused to obey an order 
 from the President directing that certain prisoners of 
 war, who expressed a desire to take the oath of alle 
 giance and enter the Union army, should be mustered 
 into the service and credited to the quotas of certain 
 districts. An exact account of this dispute is preserved 
 by Provost-Marshal General Fry, who was charged with 
 the execution of the order, and who was present when 
 Lincoln and Stanton discussed it. Stanton positively 
 refused to obey the order, and said to Lincoln: "You 
 must see that your order cannot be executed. Lincoln 
 answered with an unusually peremptory tone for him: 
 "Mr. Secretary, I reckon you ll have to execute the 
 order." Stanton replied in his imperious way: "Mr. 
 President, I cannot do it; the order is an improper one, 
 and I cannot execute it. To this Lincoln replied in a 
 manner that forbade all further dispute: " Mr. Secretary, 
 it will have to be done. A few minutes thereafter, as 
 stated by Provost-Marshal General Fry in a communica 
 tion to the New York Tribune several years ago, Stanton 
 
1 86 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR TIMES. 
 
 issued instructions to him for the execution of the Presi 
 dent s order. 
 
 Notwithstanding the many and often irritating con 
 flicts that Lincoln had with Stanton, there never was an 
 hour during Stanton s term as War Minister that Lincoln 
 thought of removing "lim. Indeed, I believe that at no 
 period during the war, after Stanton had entered the 
 Cabinet, did Lincoln feel that any other man could fill 
 Stanton s place with equal usefulness to the country. 
 He had the most unbounded faith in Stanton s loyalty 
 and in his public and private integrity. He was in 
 hearty sympathy with Stanton s aggressive earnestness 
 for the prosecution of the war, and at times hesitated, 
 even to the extent of what he feared was individual in 
 justice, to restrain Stanton s violent assaults upon others. 
 It will be regretted by the impartial historian of the 
 future that Stanton was capable of impressing his in 
 tense hatred so conspicuously upon the annals of the 
 country, and that Lincoln, in several memorable in 
 stances, failed to reverse his War Minister when he had 
 grave doubts as to the wisdom or justice of his methods. 
 It was Stanton s fierce resentment that made just verdicts 
 impossible in some military trials which will ever be his 
 toric notably, the unjust verdict depriving Fitz John 
 Porter at once of his commission and citizenship, and 
 the now admittedly unjust verdict that sent Mrs. Surratt 
 to the gallows. Lincoln long hesitated before giving his 
 assent to the judgment against Porter, as is clearly shown 
 by the fact that, with Pope s accusations against Porter 
 fresh before him, he assented to McClellan s request and 
 assigned Porter to active command in the Antietam cam 
 paign, and personally thanked Porter on the Antietam 
 field, after the battle, for his services. Another enduring 
 monument of Stanton s resentment is the Arlington Na 
 tional Cemeterv. The home of Lee was taken under the 
 
LINCOLN AND STANTON. 187 
 
 feeblest color of law that Stanton well knew could not be 
 maintained, and the buildings surrounded with graves 
 even to the very door of the venerable mansion, so that 
 it might never be reclaimed as the home of the Confed 
 erate chieftain. The government made lestitution to the 
 Lees in obedience to the decision of its highest court, 
 but the monument of hate is imperishable. 
 
 Soon after the surrender of Lee, Stanton, severely 
 broken in health by the exacting duties he had per 
 formed, tendered his resignation, believing that his great 
 work was finished. Lincoln earnestly desired him to re 
 main, and he did so. The assassination of Lincoln called 
 him to even graver duties than had before confronted 
 him. His bitter conflict with Johnson and his violent 
 issue with Sherman stand out as exceptionally interest 
 ing chapters of the history of the war. It was President 
 Johnson s attempted removal of Stanton in violation of 
 the Tenure-of-Office Act that led to the President s im 
 peachment, and Stanton persisted in holding his Cabinet 
 office until Johnson was acquitted by the Senate, when he 
 resigned and was succeeded by General Schofield on the 2cl 
 of June, 1868. After his retirement Stanton never exhib 
 ited any great degree of either physical or mental vigor. 
 I last saw him in Philadelphia in the fall of 1868, where 
 he came in answer to a special invitation from the Union 
 League to deliver a political address in the Academy of 
 Music in favor of Grant s election to the Presidency. I 
 called on him at his hotel and found him very feeble, 
 suffering greatly from asthmatic disorders, and in his 
 public address he was often strangely forgetful of facts 
 and names, and had to be prompted by gentlemen on 
 the stage. It may be said of Stanton that he sacrificed 
 the vigor of his life to the service of his country in the 
 sorest trial of its history, and when President Grant 
 nominated hiin as Justice of the Supreme Court, on the 
 
1 88 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 20th of December, 1869, all knew that it was an empty 
 honor, as he was both physically and mentally unequal 
 to the new duties assigned to him. Four days thereafter 
 the inexorable messenger came and Edwin M. Stanton 
 joined the great majority across the dark river. 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN and Ulysses S. Grant were 
 *V. entire strangers to each other personally until the 
 9th of March, 1864, when Lincoln handed Grant his 
 commission as Lieutenant-General, which made him 
 three days later Commander-in-Chief of all the armies 
 of the Union. Although Grant entered the army as a 
 citizen of Lincoln s own State, he had resided there only 
 a little more than a year. When he retired from the 
 army by resignation on the 3ist of July, 1854, as a cap 
 tain, he selected Missouri as his home and settled on a 
 farm near St. Louis. He had won promotion at the 
 battles of Molino del Rey and Chapultepec in the Mex 
 ican War, and was brevetted for special gallantry. Dur 
 ing the nearly seven years between his retirement from 
 the army and re-entering the military service at the be 
 ginning of the civil war he had done little or nothing 
 to make himself known to fame. He had moved from 
 Missouri to Galena early in 1860 to improve his worldly 
 condition by accepting a salary of $600 from his two 
 brothers, who were then engaged in the leather business. 
 After remaining with them for a year his salary was ad 
 vanced to $800, and in a letter to a friend he exhibited 
 his gratification at his business success and expressed the 
 hope of reaching what then seemed to be his highest 
 ambition a partnership in the firm. His life in Galena 
 was quiet and unobtrusive as was Grant s habit under 
 
 189 
 
~ 
 
 (Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.) 
 
 GENERAL U. S. GRANT, 1864. 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 19* 
 
 all circumstances; and when the first call for troops was 
 issued and Grant brought a company from Galena to 
 Springfield without any friends to press his promotion, 
 it is not surprising that, while political colonels were 
 turned out with great rapidity, Grant remained without 
 a command. He served on the staff of Governor Yates 
 for several w r eeks, giving him the benefit of his military 
 experience in organizing new troops, but it does not 
 seem to have occurred to Grant to suggest his own ap 
 pointment to a command or to Governor Yates to tender 
 him one. He returned to Galena, and on the 24th of 
 May, 1861, sent a formal request to the Adjutant-General 
 of the army at Washington for an assignment to military 
 duty u until the close of the war in such capacity as may 
 be offered. To this no reply was ever received, and a 
 month later he made a personal visit to the headquarters 
 of General McClellan, then in command of the Ohio 
 volunteers at Cincinnati, hoping that McClellan would 
 tender him a position on his staff; but he failed to meet 
 McClellan, and returned home without suggesting to 
 any one a desire to enter the service under the Cin 
 cinnati commander. 
 
 It was a wayward and insubordinate regiment at 
 Springfield that called Grant back to the military ser 
 vice and started him on his matchless career. The 
 Twenty-first Illinois defied the efforts of Governor Yates 
 to reduce it to discipline, and in despair he telegraphed 
 to the modest Captain Grant at Galena, asking him to 
 come and accept the colonelcy. The prompt answer 
 came: u I accept the regiment and will start imme 
 diately." It is needless to say that the appearance of a 
 plain, ununiformed, and modest man like Grant made 
 little impression at first upon his insubordinate com 
 mand, but in a very short time he made it the best dis 
 ciplined regiment from the State, and the men as proud 
 
1 92 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 of their commander as he was of them. The story of 
 Grant s military achievements from Belmont to Shiloh 
 is familiar to every reader of American history. It was 
 Grant s capture of Fort Henry, soon followed by the 
 capture of Fort Donelson and Nashville, that opened 
 the second year of the war with such brilliant promise 
 of an early overthrow of the Confederate armies. It was 
 his sententious answer to General Buckner at Fort Don 
 elson that proclaimed to the nation his heroic qualities 
 as a military commander. He said: u No terms except 
 unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted; 
 I propose to move immediately upon your works. " He 
 soon became popularly known as Unconditional Sur 
 render Grant," and while his superior officers, including 
 General-in-Chief McClellan and his immediate division 
 commander Hal leek, seemed to agree only in hindering 
 Grant in his military movements, the country profoundly 
 appreciated his victories. Soon after the capture of 
 Nashville he was ordered by Halleck to make a new 
 military movement that was rendered impossible by im 
 mense floods which prevailed in the Western waters. 
 Halleck reported him to McClellan, complaining that he 
 had left his post without leave and had failed to make 
 reports, etc., to which McClellan replied: "Do not hesi 
 tate to arrest him at once if the good of the service re 
 quires it, and place C. F. Smith in command." Halleck 
 immediately relieved Grant and placed Smith in com 
 mand of the proposed expedition. Grant gave a tem 
 perate explanation of the injustice done to him, but as 
 the wrong was continued he asked to be relieved from 
 duty. In the mean time Halleck had discovered his 
 error, and atoned for it by answering to Grant: " Instead 
 of relieving you, I wish you, as soon as your new army 
 is in the field, to assume the immediate command and 
 lead it 011 to new victories." 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 19$ 
 
 It was not until after the battle of Shiloh, fought on 
 the 6th and yth of April, 1862, that Lincoln was placed 
 in a position to exercise a controlling influence in shap 
 ing the destiny of Grant. The first day s battle at Shiloh 
 was a serious disaster to the Union army commanded by 
 Grant, who was driven from his position, which seems to 
 have been selected without any special reference to re 
 sisting an attack from the enemy, and, although his 
 army fought most gallantly in various separate encoun 
 ters, the day closed with the field in possession of the 
 enemy and Grant s army driven back to the river. For 
 tunately, the advance of Buell s army formed a junction 
 with Grant late in the evening, and that night all of 
 Buell s army arrived, consisting of three divisions. The 
 two generals arranged their plans for an offensive move 
 ment early the next morning, and, after another stub 
 born battle, the lost field was regained and the enemy 
 compelled to retreat with the loss of their commander, 
 General Albert Sidney Johnston, who had fallen early in 
 the first day s action, and with a larger aggregate loss of 
 killed, wounded, and missing than Grant suffered. The 
 first reports from the Shiloh battle-field created profound 
 alarm throughout the entire country, and the wildest 
 exaggerations were spread in a floodtide of vituperation 
 against Grant. It was freely charged that he had ne 
 glected his command because of dissipation, that his 
 army had been surprised and defeated, and that it was 
 saved from annihilation only by the timely arrival of 
 Buell. 
 
 The few of to-day who can recall the inflamed condi 
 tion of public sentiment against Grant caused by the dis 
 astrous first day s battle at Shiloh will remember that he 
 was denounced as incompetent for his command by the 
 public journals of all parties in the North, and with 
 
 almost entire unanimity by Senators and Congressmen 
 13 
 
194 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 without regard to political faith. Not only in Washing 
 ton, but throughout the loyal States, public sentiment 
 seemed to crystallize into an earnest demand for Grant s 
 dismissal from the army. His victories of Forts Henry 
 and Donelson, which had thrilled the country a short 
 time before, seemed to have been forgotten, and on every 
 side could be heard the emphatic denunciation of Grant 
 because of his alleged reckless exposure of the army, 
 while Buell was universally credited with having saved 
 it. It is needless to say that owing to the excited condi 
 tion of the public mind most extravagant reports gained 
 ready credence, and it was not uncommon to hear Grant 
 denounced on the streets and in all circles as unfitted by 
 both habit and temperament for an important military 
 command. The clamor for Grant s removal, and often 
 for his summary dismissal, from the army surged against 
 the President from every side, and he was harshly criti 
 cized for not promptly dismissing Grant, or at least re 
 lieving him from his command. I can recall but a single 
 Republican member of Congress who boldly defended 
 Grant at that time. Elihu B. Washburne, whose home 
 was in Galena, where Grant had lived before he went 
 into the army, stood nearly or quite alone among the 
 members of the House in wholly justifying Grant at 
 Shiloh, while a large majority of the Republicans of 
 Congress were outspoken and earnest in condemning 
 him. 
 
 I did not know Grant at that time; had neither par 
 tiality nor prejudice to influence my judgment, nor had I 
 any favorite general who might be benefited by Grant s 
 overthrow, but I shared the almost universal conviction 
 of the President s friends that he could not sustain him 
 self if he attempted to sustain Grant by continuing him 
 in command. Looking solely to the interests of Lincoln, 
 feeling that the tide of popular resentment was so over- 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT, 195 
 
 whelming against Grant that Lincoln must yield to it, I 
 had repeated conferences with some of his closest friends, 
 including Swett and Lamon, all of whom agreed that 
 Grant must be removed from his command, and com 
 plained of Lincoln for his manifest injustice to himself 
 by his failure to act promptly in Grant s removal. So 
 much was I impressed with the importance of prompt 
 action on the part of the President after spending a day 
 and evening in Washington that I called on Lincoln at 
 eleven o clock at night and sat with him alone until after 
 one o clock in the morning. He was, as usual, worn out 
 with the day s exacting duties, but he did not permit me 
 to depart until the Grant matter had been gone over and 
 many other things relating to the war that he wished to 
 discuss. I pressed upon him with all the earnestness I 
 could command the immediate removal of Grant as an 
 imperious necessity to sustain himself. As was his cus 
 tom, he said but little, only enough to make me continue 
 the discussion until it was exhausted. He sat before the 
 open fire in the old Cabinet room, most of the time with 
 his feet up on the high marble mantel, and exhibited un 
 usual distress at the complicated condition of military 
 affairs. Nearly every day brought some new and per 
 plexing military complication. He had gone through a 
 long winter of terrible strain with McClellan and the 
 Army of the Potomac; and from the day that Grant 
 started on his Southern expedition until the battle of 
 Shiloh he had had little else than jarring and confusion 
 among his generals in the West. He knew that I had 
 no ends to serve in urging Grant s removal, beyond the 
 single desire to make him be just to himself, and he lis 
 tened patiently. 
 
 I appealed to Lincoln for his own sake to remove 
 Grant at once, and in giving my reasons for it I simply 
 voiced the admittedly overwhelming protest from the 
 
l LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 loyal people of the land against Grant s continuance in 
 command. I could form no judgment during the con 
 versation as to what effect my arguments had upon him 
 beyond the fact that he was greatly distressed at this new 
 complication. When I had said everything that could 
 be said from my standpoint, we lapsed into silence. 
 Lincoln remained silent for what seemed a very long 
 time. He then gathered himself up in his chair and 
 said in a tone of earnestness that I shall never forget: 
 "/ cart 7 spare this man; he fights" That was all he 
 said, but I knew that it was enough, and that Grant was 
 safe in Lincoln s hands against his countless hosts of 
 enemies. The only man in all the nation who had the 
 power to save Grant was Lincoln, and he had decided to 
 do it. He was not influenced by any personal partiality 
 for Grant, for they had never met, but he believed just 
 what he said "I can t spare this man; he fights." I 
 knew enough of Lincoln to know that his decision was 
 final, and I knew enough of him also to know that he 
 reasoned better on the subject than I did, and that it 
 would be unwise to attempt to unsettle his determina 
 tion. I did not forget that Lincoln was the one man 
 who never allowed himself to appear as wantonly defy 
 ing public sentiment. It seemed to me impossible for 
 him to save Grant without taking a crushing load of con 
 demnation upon himself; but Lincoln was wiser than all 
 those around him, and he not only saved Grant, but he 
 saved him by such well-concerted effort that he soon won 
 popular applause from those who were most violent in 
 demanding Grant s dismissal. 
 
 The method that Lincoln adopted to rescue Grant from 
 the odium into which he had, to a very large degree, un 
 justly fallen was one of the bravest and most sagacious 
 acts of his administration. Halleck was commander of 
 the military division consisting of Missouri, Kentucky, 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 1 97 
 
 Tennessee, and possibly other States, but he remained at 
 his headquarters in St. Louis until after the battle of 
 Shiloh. Lincoln s first move was to bring Halleck to 
 the field, where he at once superseded Grant as com 
 mander of the army. This relieved public apprehen 
 sion and soon calmed the inflamed public sentiment that 
 was clamoring for Grant s dismissal. Lincoln knew that 
 it would require time for the violent prejudice against 
 Grant to perish, and he calmly waited until it was safe 
 for him to give some indication to the country of his 
 abiding faith in Grant as a military commander. Hal 
 leck reached the army at Pittsburg Landing on the nth 
 of April, four days after the battle had been fought, and 
 of course his presence on the field at once made him the 
 commanding officer. On the 3Oth of April, when the 
 public mind was reasonably well prepared to do justice 
 to Grant, an order was issued assigning him as second 
 in command under the major-general commanding the 
 department. 
 
 This was an entirely needless order so far as mere 
 military movements were involved, and it is one of the 
 very rare cases in the history of the war in which such 
 an order was issued. Orly under very special circum 
 stances could there be any occasion for an order assign 
 ing a particular general as second in command of an 
 army. While the army is within reach of orders from 
 the commanding general there can be no second in com 
 mand. In case of his death or inability to take active 
 command in battle, the military laws wisely regulate the 
 succession, and only in extraordinary 7 cases is it departed 
 from. In this case the purpose of it was obvious. Lin 
 coln had quieted public apprehension by bringing Gen 
 eral Halleck to the field and thus relieving Grant of 
 command without the semblance of reproach; but he 
 desired to impress the country with his absolute faith 
 
I9 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 in Grant as a military leader, and it was for that reason 
 that the special order was issued assigning him as second 
 in command of Halleck s army. The effect of that order 
 was precisely what Lincoln anticipated. It made all 
 loyal men take pause and abate or yield their violent 
 hostility to Grant in obedience to the publicly expressed 
 confidence of Lincoln. The country knew that Lincoln 
 best understood Grant, and from the date of Grant s as 
 signment as second in command of the army the preju 
 dice against him rapidly perished. It was thus that 
 Lincoln saved Grant from one of the most violent surges 
 of popular prejudice that was ever created against any 
 of our leading generals, and on the nth of July, when 
 it was entirely safe to restore Grant to his command for 
 active operations, Halleck was ordered to Washington 
 by Lincoln and assigned as commander-in-chief. Thus 
 was Grant restored to the command of the army that he 
 had lost at the battle of Shiloh, and it was Lincoln, and 
 Lincoln alone, who saved him from disgrace and gave to 
 the country the most lustrous record of all the heroes of 
 the war. 
 
 I doubt whether Grant ever understood how Lincoln, 
 single and alone, protected him from dishonor in the 
 tempest of popular passion that came upon him after 
 the disaster at Shiloh. Grant never was in Washington 
 until he was summoned there early in 1864 to be com 
 missioned as Lieutenant-General, and he was entirely 
 without personal acquaintance with Lincoln. After he 
 became Commander-in-Chief he made his headquarters 
 in the field with the Army of the Potomac, and was very 
 rarely in Washington after he crossed the Rapidan and 
 opened the campaign by the battles of the Wilderness. 
 That he frequently saw Lincoln between February and 
 May while perfecting his plans for army movements is 
 well known, but Grant was one of the most silent of 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 199 
 
 men and most of all reluctant to talk about himself, 
 while Lincoln was equally reserved in all things per 
 taining to himself personally. Especially where he had 
 rendered any service to another he would be quite un 
 likely to speak of it himself. Judging the two men from 
 their chief and very marked characteristics, it is entirely 
 reasonable to assume that what Lincoln did to save 
 Grant from disgrace was never discussed or referred to 
 by them in personal conversation. Grant never, in any 
 way known to the public, recognized any such obligation 
 to Lincoln, and no utterance ever came from him indi 
 cating anything more than the respect for Lincoln due 
 from a general to his chief. 
 
 I never heard Lincoln allude to the subject but once, 
 and that was under very painful circumstances and when 
 the subject was forced upon him by myself. Lincoln 
 knew that I had personal knowledge of his heroic effort 
 to rescue Grant from the odium that came upon him 
 after Shiloh, and an accidental occasion arose in the 
 latter part of October, 1864, when his relations to Grant 
 became a proper subject of consideration. The October 
 elections in 1864, when Lincoln was a candidate for re 
 election, resulted favorably for the Republicans in Ohio 
 and Indiana, but unfavorably for them in Pennsylvania. 
 There was no State ticket to be elected in Pennsylvania 
 that year, and the vote for Congress and local officers 
 gave a small Democratic majority on the home vote in 
 the State. McClellan, a native of Pennsylvania, was 
 the Democratic candidate for President, and State pride 
 naturally added to his strength. General Cameron was 
 chairman of the Republican State Committee. He was 
 well equipped for the position, but was so entirely con 
 fident of success that he neglected to perfect the organ 
 ization necessary to gain the victory, and the prestige of 
 success fell to McClellan. New York was regarded as 
 
200 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 extremely doubtful, and there was much concern felt 
 about the possibility of New York and Pennsylvania 
 both voting against Lincoln in November. It was not 
 doubted that the army vote would give Pennsylvania to 
 Lincoln, but it was of the utmost importance, to give 
 moral force and effect to the triumph, to give Lincoln a 
 majority on the home vote. Lincoln was much con 
 cerned about the situation, and telegraphed me to come 
 to Washington the day after the October election. I 
 went on at once, and after going over the political situ 
 ation carefully, Lincoln asked me whether I would be 
 willing to give my personal services to aid the State 
 Committee during the month intervening between the 
 October and November elections. I reminded him that 
 General Cameron and I were not in political sympathy, 
 and that he would regard it as obtrusive for me to volun 
 teer assistance to him in the management of the cam 
 paign. To this Lincoln replied: "Of course, I under 
 stand that, but if Cameron shall invite you can you give 
 your time fully to the contest?" I answered that I 
 would gladly do so. He did not suggest how he meant 
 to bring about co-operation between Cameron and my 
 self, but I knew him well enough to know that he would 
 be very likely to accomplish the desired result. Two 
 days thereafter I received a cordial letter from General 
 Cameron inviting me to join him at the headquarters 
 and assist in the November contest. 
 
 I at once went to Philadelphia, and found Wayne 
 MacVeagh already with General Cameron in obedience 
 to a like invitation that had been brought about by Lin 
 coln. MacVeagh had been chairman of the State Com 
 mittee the previous year, when Curtin was re-elected, as 
 I had been chairman in 1860 when Lincoln was first 
 elected, and both of us were at the time regarded as 
 somewhat conspicuous among the opponents of Came- 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 2OI 
 
 ron. The failure in Pennsylvania, contrasted with the 
 party successes in Ohio and Indiana, was very mortify 
 ing 1 to Cameron, and he was ready to employ every avail 
 able resource to redeem the State in November. There 
 was the heartiest co-operation by MacVeagh and myself, 
 all being done under the name and immediate direction 
 of Cameron as chairman, and there was not a jar during 
 the month of desperate effort to win the State for Lin 
 coln. I took a private room at another hotel, and never 
 was at headquarters except for confidential conference 
 with Cameron himself; and, as requested by Lincoln, I 
 wrote him fully every night my impressions of the prog 
 ress we were making. The Democrats were highly 
 elated by their rather unexpected success in October, 
 and they made the most desperate and well-directed 
 battle to gain the State for McClellan. So anxious was 
 Lincoln about the campaign that after I had been a 
 week in co-operation with the State Committee, he sent 
 Postmaster-General Dennison over to Philadelphia spe 
 cially to talk over the situation more fully than it could 
 be presented in my letters, and to return the same night 
 and make report to him. It was evident that we had 
 gained nothing, and I so informed the Postmaster-Gen 
 eral, and expressed great doubts as to our ability to do 
 more than hold our own, considering the advantage the 
 Democrats had in the prestige of their October victory. 
 I told him, however, that in another week the question 
 could be determined whether we were safe on the home 
 vote in Pennsylvania, and that if there was reasonable 
 doubt about it I \vould notify Lincoln and visit Wash 
 ington. 
 
 A week later, as I had advised Lincoln from day to 
 day, I saw nothing to warrant the belief that we had 
 gained any material advantage in the desperate battle, 
 and I telegraphed Lincoln that I would see him at ten 
 
202 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 o clock that night. I found him waiting, and he exhib 
 ited great solicitude as to the battle in Pennsylvania. 
 He knew that his election was in no sense doubtful, but 
 he knew that if he lost New York and with it Pennsyl 
 vania on the home vote, the moral effect of his triumph 
 would be broken and his power to prosecute the war and 
 make peace would be greatly impaired. His usually sad 
 face was deeply shadowed with sorrow when I told him 
 that I saw no reasonable prospect of carrying Pennsylva 
 nia on the home vote, although we had about held our 
 own in the hand-to-hand conflict through which we were 
 passing. "Well, what is to be done?" was Lincoln s 
 inquiry after the whole situation had been presented to 
 him. I answered that the solution of the problem was a 
 very simple and easy one that Grant was idle in front 
 of Petersburg; that Sheridan had won all possible vic 
 tories in the Valley; and that if 5000 Pennsylvania sol 
 diers could be furloughed home from each army the elec 
 tion could be carried without doubt. Lincoln s face 
 brightened instantly at the suggestion, and I saw that 
 he was quite ready to execute it. I said to him : " Of 
 course, you can trust Grant to make the suggestion to 
 him to furlough 5000 Pennsylvania troops for two 
 weeks ?" To my surprise, Lincoln made no answer, 
 and the bright face of a few moments before was in 
 stantly shadowed again. I was much disconcerted, as I 
 supposed that Grant was the one man to whom Lincoln 
 could turn with absolute confidence as his friend. I then 
 said with some earnestness: "Surely, Mr. President, you 
 can trust Grant with a confidential suggestion to furlough 
 Pennsylvania troops?" Lincoln remained silent and evi 
 dently distressed at the proposition I was pressing upon 
 him. After a few moments, and speaking with empha 
 sis, I said: "It can t be possible that Grant is not your 
 friend; he can t be such an ingrate?" Lincoln hesitated 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 203 
 
 for some time, and then answered in these words: " Well, 
 McClure, I have no reason to believe that Grant prefers 
 my election to that of McClellan." 
 
 I must confess that my response to this to me appalling 
 statement from Lincoln was somewhat violative of the 
 rules of courteous conversation. I reminded Lincoln 
 how, in that room, when I had appealed to him to re 
 spect the almost universal demand of the country for 
 Grant s dismissal, he had withstood the shock alone and 
 interposed his omnipotence to save Grant when he was 
 a personal stranger. Lincoln, as usual, answered intem 
 perance of speech by silence. I then said to him : Gen 
 eral Meade is a soldier and a gentleman; he is the com 
 mander of the Army of the Potomac; send an order to 
 him from yourself to furlough 5000 Pennsylvania soldiers 
 home for two weeks, and send that order with some 
 trusted friend from the War Department, with the sug 
 gestion to Meade that your agent be permitted to bring 
 the order back with him." After a little reflection Lin 
 coln answered: "I reckon that can be done." I then 
 said, "What about Sheridan?" At once his sad face 
 brightened up, like the noonday sun suddenly emerging 
 from a dark cloud, as he answered: " Oh, Phil Sheridan; 
 he s all right." Before I left his room that night he had 
 made his arrangements to send messengers to Meade and 
 Sheridan. The order was sent to Meade, and he per 
 mitted it to be returned to the President, but Sheridan 
 needed no order. The 10,000 Pennsylvania soldiers were 
 furloughed during the week, and Lincoln carried Penn 
 sylvania on the home vote by 5712 majority, to which 
 the army vote added 14,363 majority. It was thus that 
 Lincoln made his triumph in Pennsylvania a complete 
 victory without what was then commonly called the 
 "bayonet vote," and Lincoln carried New York by 
 6749, leaving McClellan the worst defeated candidate 
 
204 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES 
 
 ever nominated by any of the great political parties of 
 the country. 
 
 I left Lincoln fully convinced that Grant was an in- 
 grate, and Lincoln certainly knew that he permitted that 
 conviction to be formed in my mind. He did not in any 
 way qualify his remark about Grant, although it was his 
 custom when he felt compelled to disparage any one to 
 present some charitable explanation of the conduct com 
 plained of. The fact that he refused to send his request 
 to Grant, while he was willing to send it to Meade, 
 proved that he was, for some reason, disappointed in 
 Grant s fidelity to him; and the enthusiasm with which 
 he spoke of Sheridan proved how highly he valued the 
 particular quality that he did not credit to Grant. I con 
 fess that the conviction formed that day made the name 
 of Grant leave a bad taste in my mouth for many years. 
 I heartily supported his nomination for the Presidency in 
 1868, and was chairman of the Pennsylvania delegation 
 in the Chicago Convention that nominated him, because 
 I believed that the chivalrous victor of Appomattox 
 would command the highest measure of confidence from 
 the Southern people and hasten the restoration of peace 
 and business prosperity; but Grant and his immediate 
 friends knew that while I earnestly supported his nomi 
 nation and election, I did not have the confidence in him 
 that he generally commanded. I now believe that Lin 
 coln was mistaken in his distrust of Grant. It was not 
 until after Grant s retirement from the Presidency that I 
 ever had an opportunity to hear his explanation. I re 
 membered that on election night, when Grant was ad 
 vised at his headquarters in front of Petersburg of Lin 
 coln s election, he sent Lincoln a dispatch heartily con 
 gratulating him upon his triumph. I never heard Lin 
 coln allude to the subject again, and I am therefore 
 ignorant as to whether his belief was ever changed. 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 205 
 
 I never visited the White House during Grant s Presi 
 dency, although twice specially invited to do so to con 
 sider what I regarded as an impracticable or impossible 
 political suggestion, but I accidentally met him in the 
 Continental Hotel, soon after his retirement, in company 
 with Mr. Childs. Grant came forward in the most cor 
 dial manner and thanked me for an editorial that had 
 appeared in The Times on the day that ended his Presi 
 dential term, in which I had spoken of him and his 
 achievements as history would record them, regardless 
 of the political passions and prejudices of the day. The 
 meeting ended with an invitation to lunch with him that 
 afternoon at Mr. Drexel s office, which I accepted. 
 There were present only Mr. Drexel, Mr. Childs, and 
 one or two others connected with the Drexel house. 
 After luncheon all dispersed but Grant, Childs, and my 
 self, and we had a most delightful conversation with 
 Grant for an hour or more. I was anxious to learn, if 
 possible, what Grant s feelings were in the Presidential 
 battle of 1864. Without intimating to him that Lincoln 
 had doubted his fidelity, I reminded him that he had 
 maintained such a silent attitude that some of Lincoln s 
 closest friends were at a loss to know his preference in 
 the contest. He answered very promptly that he sup 
 posed none could have doubted his earnest desire for the 
 re-election of Lincoln, although he studiously avoided 
 any expression, public or private, on the subje He 
 said: " It would have been obviously unbecoming on my 
 part to have given a public expression against a general 
 whom I had succeeded as Commander-in-Chief of the 
 army." I. do not doubt that Grant declared the exact 
 truth in that statement. Naturally silent and averse to 
 any expressions whatever on politics, he felt that he 
 could not with propriety even appear to assail a man 
 who had failed and fallen in the position that he had 
 
206 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 won and maintained. Thus for twelve years I cherished 
 a personal prejudice against Grant because of his sup 
 posed want of fidelity to Lincoln that I now believe to 
 have been wholly unjust. One revelation to me at the 
 meeting with Grant at the Drexel luncheon was his re 
 markable and attractive powers as a conversationalist. 
 He discussed politics during his term and the politics of 
 the future, public men and public events, with great free 
 dom and in a manner so genial as to amaze me. I had 
 shared the common impression that Grant was always 
 reticent, even in the circle of his closest friends, but the 
 three hours spent with him on that day proved that when 
 he chose he could be one of the most entertaining of men 
 in the social circle. 
 
 It is evident that from the day that Grant became 
 Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln had abiding faith in him. 
 He yielded implicitly to Grant s judgment in all matters 
 purely military; Grant, like all great soldiers, yielded as 
 implicitly to Lincoln in all matters relating to civil ad 
 ministration, and the annals of history will testify that 
 Grant fulfilled every expectation of the government and 
 of the loyal people of the nation as military chieftain. 
 Many have criticised some of his military movements, 
 such as his assaults at Vicksburg and Cold Harbor and 
 his battles in the Wilderness, but he met the great need 
 of the country and was as heroic in peace as in war. 
 When President Johnson attempted to punish Lee for 
 treason, Grant not only admonished the President, but 
 notified him that " the officers and men paroled at Appo- 
 mattox Court-House, and since upon the same terms 
 given to Lee, cannot be tried for treason so long as they 
 preserve the terms of their parole;" and he went so far 
 as to declare that he would resign his commission if the 
 government violated the faith he had given when Lee 
 surrendered to him, He fought more battles and won 
 
LINCOLN AND GRANT. 207 
 
 more victories than any general of any country during 
 his generation, and when on the 23d of July, 1885, 
 Ulysses S. Grant met the inexorable messenger, the 
 Great Captain of the Age passed from time to eternity. 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 
 
 NOT until all the lingering personal, political, and 
 military passions of the war shall have perished 
 can the impartial historian tell the true story of Abra 
 ham Lincoln s relations to George B. McClellan, nor 
 will the just estimate of McClellan as a military chief 
 tain be recorded until the future historian comes to his 
 task entirely free from the prejudices of the present. 
 Although more than a quarter of a century has elapsed 
 since the close of the war, and countless contributions 
 have been given to the history of that conflict from 
 every shade of conviction that survived it, McClellan s 
 ability as a military commander, and the correctness of 
 Lincoln s action in calling him to command and in dis 
 missing him from command, are as earnestly disputed 
 to-day as they were in the white heat of the personal 
 and political conflicts of the time. Notwithstanding 
 the bitter partisan assaults which have been made upon 
 McClellan in the violence of party struggles, at times 
 impugning his skill, his courage, and his patriotism, it 
 is safe to say that fair-minded men of every political 
 faith now testify to the absolute purity of his patriotism, 
 to his exceptional skill as a military organizer, and to 
 his courage as a commander. I knew McClellan well, 
 and I believe that no reasonably just man could have 
 known him without yielding to him the highest measure 
 
 of personal respect. He was one of the most excellent 
 208 
 
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.) 
 
 GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN, 1862. 
 
210 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 and lovable characters I have ever met, and that he was 
 patriotic in even-thing that he did, however he may 
 have erred, and that he would have given his life as a 
 sacrifice to his army or his country had duty required 
 it, will not be doubted within the circle of his personal 
 associations. I saw him frequently after he came to 
 Washington heralded as the "Young Napoleon," to 
 perform the herculean task of organizing the best army 
 that ever was organized in any country within the same 
 period of time. I saw him when he started upon his 
 Peninsula campaign with the hope of victory beaming 
 from his bright young face, and I stood close by his side 
 most of the day when he fought his last battle at An- 
 tietam. Only a few months thereafter he was finally 
 relieved from his command, and his military career 
 ended on November 5, 1862, when, by order of the Pres 
 ident, he transferred his army to General Burnside and 
 went to Trenton, New Jersey, "for further orders." 
 The * further orders never came until Presidential 
 election day, 1864, when McClellan resigned his com 
 mission as major-general in the army and Sheridan was 
 appointed to his place. 
 
 Both Lincoln and McClellan now live only in history, 
 and history will judge them by their achievements as it 
 has judged all mankind. Lincoln was a successful Pres 
 ident, and, like the great Roman Germanicus, " fortunate 
 in the opportunity of his death. McClellan was an un 
 successful general and a defeated politician. Such will 
 be the imperishable records of history as to these two 
 men; but even the next generation will see continued 
 disputation as to McClellan s capabilities as a com 
 mander, and Lincoln will be censured alike for having 
 maintained and supported McClellan as a military 
 leader, and for having failed to appreciate and support 
 Jiim after having called him to responsible command. 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 211 
 
 None the less, however, will be the irrevocable judgment 
 of history that Lincoln succeeded and that McClellan 
 failed. But why did McClellan fail as a military com 
 mander? The answer of his devoted partisans is that 
 he was deliberately hindered and embarrassed in every 
 military movement, and that he would have achieved 
 great success had he been supported as the more success 
 ful generals later in the war were supported by the gov 
 ernment. To this comes the response from the friends 
 of Lincoln that he earnestly and heartily seconded 
 McClellan to the utmost of his resources; that he long 
 confided in him when the confidence of his friends had 
 been greatly shattered ; that he reappointed him to com 
 mand against his Cabinet and against the general senti 
 ment of his party leaders; and that whatever failures 
 were suffered by McClellan were the result of his own 
 incompetency or of the inability of the government to 
 meet his wants. 
 
 It is unjust to McClellan to judge him by the same 
 standard that is applied to the successful generals who 
 succeeded him. I believe that it was McClellan s great 
 est misfortune that he was suddenly called to the daz 
 zling position of Commander-in-Chief when he was a 
 comparative novice in great war operations and without 
 the experience necessary to make a great commander. 
 I believe that the 23d of April, 1861, was the fateful day 
 that dated the beginning of McClellan s misfortunes. 
 He was then in Cincinnati, in charge of one of the 
 railroads connected with that city. Pennsylvania troops 
 were then being organized by Governor Curtin, and he 
 was in search of a Pennsylvania!! of military education 
 and attainments to be placed in command. He first 
 offered the position to McClellan, who promptly arranged 
 his business to go to Harrisburg in person with the view 
 of accepting it. By special request he stopped at Colum- 
 
212 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 bus on his way to Harrisburg to confer with Governor 
 Dennison on some military problems which were vexing 
 the Governor of Ohio. He expected to remain at Colum 
 bus only a few hours and then proceed to Pennsylvania. 
 While in conference with Governor Dennison he was 
 tendered the commission of major-general commanding 
 the volunteers of Ohio, although ineligible because of 
 his want of residence in that State. The difficulty was 
 obviated by both branches of the Legislature passing, in 
 a few hours, a bill making him eligible, and on the same 
 23d of April, 1861, he was commissioned as major-gen 
 eral and assigned to the command of the Ohio State 
 troops. This led to his skirmishes in West Virginia, 
 which in that day were magnified into great battles and 
 great victories, and, when it became necessary to select 
 a successor to Scott as Commander-in-Chief, McClellan 
 was the only general whose victories had attracted the 
 attention of the nation. He was thus called to the re 
 sponsible position of Commander-in-Chief when a little 
 over thirty years of age, with no experience in war be 
 yond a brief campaign in Mexico, and without the train 
 ing necessary to enable him to comprehend the most 
 colossal war of modern times. Had he accepted the 
 command of the Pennsylvania troops he would doubtless 
 have made them the best disciplined and most effective 
 division of the Army of the Potomac, would have fought 
 them wisely and gallantly in every conflict, and would 
 have won distinction as a commander with the experi 
 ence that would have enabled him to maintain it. In 
 stead of floundering along in untrodden paths and com 
 mitting errors for others to profit by, he would have seen 
 others charged with the gravest responsibility that could 
 be assigned to any military man, would have seen them 
 blunder and fall, and would have been ripened, by his 
 own experience and by the misfortunes of his superiors, 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 21$ 
 
 for the command that he won so suddenly and twice lost 
 by order of a President who sincerely desired to be 
 McClellaii s friend and to give him success. 
 
 McClellan s fundamental error, and the one that I be 
 lieve was the fountain of most, if not all, his misfortunes, 
 was in his assumption not only that Lincoln and the 
 government generally were unfriendly to him when he 
 started out on his spring campaign of 1862, but that they 
 deliberately conspired to prevent him from achieving 
 military success.* This was a fatal error, and it was 
 certainly most unjust to Lincoln. If McClellan really 
 believed that the government had predetermined his 
 military failure or if he seriously doubted its fidelity, 
 it exhibited moral cowardice on his part to march an 
 army into hopeless battle. He might have believed the 
 President, the Secretary of War, and the administration 
 generally to have been unfriendly to him, and yet, rely 
 ing upon his ability to win their confidence by winning 
 victory, he could have retained his command with just 
 ice to himself and to the country; but his own statements 
 show that he believed then that he would not be permit 
 ted to win a victory or to capture Richmond; and, thus 
 believing, he owed it to himself, to the great army he 
 had organized as none other could have organized it, and 
 to the country to whose cause he was undoubtedly loyal, 
 to resign the command and put the responsibility upon 
 
 * Don t worry about the wretches in Washington. They have 
 done nearly their worst, and can t do much more. I am sure that 
 I will win in the end, in spite of all their rascality. History will 
 present a sad record of these traitors, who are willing to sacrifice 
 the country and its army for personal spite and personal aims. 
 The people will soon understand the whole matter. Gen. McClel 
 lan s Letter to his Wife, dated Yorktown, April n, 1862, in McClel 
 lan s OiL n Story, page 310. 
 
214 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 those lie believed to be conspirators for the destruction 
 of himself and his army. 
 
 McClellan has not left this question open to dispute. 
 In McClellarf s Ozvn Story, written by himself, on page 
 150, he says: "They (the President and others) deter 
 mined to ruin me in any event and by any means. 
 First, by endeavoring to force me into premature move 
 ments, knowing that a failure would end my military 
 career; afterward by withholding the means necessary to 
 achieve success." On the same page he says: "They 
 determined that I should not succeed, and carried out 
 their determinations only too well, at a fearful sacrifice 
 of blood, time, and treasure." On page 151 in the same 
 book McClellan says: "From the light that has since 
 been thrown on Stanton s character I am satisfied that 
 from an early day he was in this treasonable conspir 
 acy. " * It will thus be seen that McClellan started on 
 
 * From the light that has since been thrown on Stanton s cha 
 racter I am satisfied that from an early date he was in this trea 
 sonable conspiracy, and that his course in ingratiating himself 
 with me, and pretending to be my friend before he was in office, 
 was only a part of his long system of treachery. . . . 
 
 I had never seen Mr. Stanton, and probably had not even heard 
 of him, before reaching Washington in 1861. Not man}* weeks 
 after arriving I was introduced to him as a safe adviser on legal 
 points. From that moment he did his best to ingratiate himself 
 with me, and professed the warmest friendship and devotion. I 
 had no reason to suspect his sincerity, and therefore believed him 
 to be what he professed. The most disagreeable thing about him 
 was the extreme virulence with which he abused the President 
 the administration, and the Republican party. He carried this 
 to such an extent that I was often shocked by it. 
 
 He never spoke of the President in any other way than as the 
 "original gorilla," and often said that Du Chaillu was a fool to 
 wander all the way to Africa in search of what he could so easily 
 have found at Springfield, Illinois. Nothing could be more bitter 
 than his words and manner always were when speaking of the 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 21$ 
 
 his Peninsula campaign not merely believing that the 
 President and the administration generally were un 
 friendly to him, but really believing that they had 
 formed a treasonable conspiracy by which his military 
 movements should be made disastrous and the blood of 
 thousands of brave soldiers sacrificed to accomplish 
 McClellan s overthrow. This is a monstrous accusation 
 against Lincoln, and but for the fact that McClellan pre 
 sents it so clearly in language from his own pen that 
 none can mistake, it would seem incredible that he could 
 have believed such a conspiracy to exist, and yet led a 
 great army to defeat that treachery on the part of the 
 government would make inevitable. In this I am sure 
 that McClellan does both himself and Lincoln the gravest 
 injustice. Lincoln was the one man of all who was ut 
 terly incapable of deliberately hindering military success 
 under any circumstances. There were those who be 
 lieved it best to protract the war in order to accomplish 
 the overthrow of slavery, but Lincoln was not of that 
 number. On the contrary, he offended many when he 
 distinctly declared in his letter to Greeley, August 22, 
 1862: " If there be those who would not save the Union 
 unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do 
 not agree with them. My paramount object in this 
 struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save 
 or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without 
 freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by 
 
 administration and the Republican party. He never gave them 
 credit for honesty or patriotism, and very seldom for any ability. 
 At some time during the autumn of 1861, Secretary Cameron 
 made quite an abolition speech to some newly-arrived regiment. 
 Next day Stanton urged me to arrest him for inciting to insub 
 ordination. He often advocated the propriety of my seizing the 
 government and taking affairs into my own hands. Gen. McClel 
 lan in McClellan 1 s Own Story, pages 151, 152. 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 freeing all the slaves I would do it, and if I could save 
 it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also 
 do that." What Lincoln wanted was the speediest over 
 throw of the rebellion and the restoration of the Union, 
 with or without the destruction of slavery; and the as 
 sumption that he could have been capable of such a 
 treasonable conspiracy as to deliberately send a general 
 to the field with a great army solely to have that army 
 sacrificed and its commander dishonored is at war with 
 every attribute of Lincoln s character. There never was 
 the blood of a soldier shed in battle that did not bring 
 grief to the heart of Abraham Lincoln, and there never 
 was a disaster of the Union troops that did not shadow 
 his face with sorrow, no matter whether he loved or dis 
 trusted the commander. I am quite sure that the two 
 men of all the nation who most desired McClellan s 
 success in the field were Lincoln and McClellan them 
 selves. 
 
 I have said that it is unjust to McClellan to compare 
 his achievements in the first great campaign of the war 
 with the achievements of Grant and Sherman in the 
 later campaigns which culminated in the overthrow of 
 the rebellion. All the generals of the early part of the 
 war were making object-lessons to guide themselves and 
 those who succeeded them in later conflicts. In this 
 work the many failed, and many of the most promising 
 among them. The few succeeded and made their names 
 immortal. One of the greatest wars of history produced 
 but one Grant and one Lee; but one Joe Johnston and 
 one Tecumseh Sherman; but one Phil Sheridan and one 
 Stonewall Jackson. Scores of generals on both sides 
 had opportunities of winning 1 the laurels of these great 
 chieftains, but none was equal to the task. It is no re 
 proach to McClellan to say that Grant fought few bat 
 tles which McClellan would have fought under precisely 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 217 
 
 similar circumstances. McClellan was an organizer, a 
 disciplinarian, and the best defensive general in all the 
 armies of the late war. He would have made a greater 
 Confederate leader than Lee himself. He would never 
 have made the exhaustive and fruitless campaigns of 
 the second Bull Run and Antietam which cost Lee one- 
 fourth of his army when he had feeble means to replace 
 his losses. He never would have made an aggressive 
 campaign to Gettysburg when the resources of the Con 
 federacy were so nearly exhausted, and Pickett s charge 
 would never have been dreamed of by McClellan. He 
 was the greatest organizer and defensive officer of the 
 age, but the Union cause demanded swift and terrible 
 blows and countless sacrifices. It had to fight on fields 
 chosen by the enemy. It had often to give two men for 
 one in the death-lists of the struggles, but it had bound 
 less resources to fill the shattered ranks. The most ag 
 gressive warfare was certain to bring the speediest vic 
 tor}- and with the least sacrifice of life and treasure in 
 the end. Grant met this want. He was the great ag 
 gressive general of the war. He always fought when he 
 should have fought, and sometimes fought when it would 
 have been wiser to have refrained. Had he been a South 
 ern general, he would have been an utter failure, for the 
 Southern general had to study how to husband his re 
 sources; how to protect the life of every soldier; how to 
 fight only when a thousand men could withstand two 
 thousand; and to that system of warfare Grant was an 
 entire stranger. He was the embodiment of aggressive 
 warfare; McClellan was the embodiment of defensive 
 warfare, and McClellan was as great as Grant in his line, 
 and with no greater limitations upon his military genius. 
 Grant fought one defensive battle at Shiloh and lost 
 it and lost his command. McClellan fought only one 
 pitched battle as the aggressor at Antietam, and then he 
 
218 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 was strategically defensive, while tactically aggressive, 
 but his military genius shone resplendent in his de 
 fensive battles when retreating to the James River.* 
 Thus a condition confronted McClellan to which his 
 great military genius and attainments were not best 
 adapted, and Grant s star rose and brightened as 
 McClellan s faded, because Grant possessed, in the full 
 est measure, the qualities needed to win peace and re 
 store the Republic. 
 
 No man ever commanded the Army of the Potomac 
 for whom the soldiers had so much affection as they had 
 for McClellan. They knew that he was a soldier and a 
 great soldier. They knew that he would never put 
 them into action unless good generalship dictated it. 
 They knew they were safe from wanton sacrifice while 
 under his command. They knew that he valued the 
 life of every man with the tenderness of a parent, and 
 they loved him because they revered and trusted him. 
 Lincoln fully appreciated and greatly valued the devo 
 tion of the army to McClellan. He believed that no 
 other general could have so quickly organized and dis 
 ciplined a great army out of entirely raw materials as 
 McClellan had done, and he never gave up faith in 
 McClellan until he felt that he could no longer trust the 
 destiny of the war to his direction. He was many times 
 
 * The movement from Washington into Maryland, which cul 
 minated in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not 
 a part of an offensive campaign, w r ith the object of the invasion 
 of the enemy s territory and an attack upon his capital, but was 
 defensive in its purposes, although offensive in its character, and 
 would be technically called a "defensive-offensive campaign." 
 It w r as undertaken at a time when our army had experienced 
 severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the national capital 
 and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and to 
 drive the enemy out of Maryland. Gen. McClellan in McClellan s 
 Own Story, page 642. 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 2ig 
 
 justly fretted at McClellan s complaints about military 
 matters, at his obtrusive criticism about political mat 
 ters, and especially at his insulting declaration to the 
 Secretary of War, in a letter dated at army headquarters 
 on the Peninsula, June 28, 1862, just after his retreat to 
 the James River, in which he said: " If I save this army 
 now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to 
 any other person in Washington. You have done your 
 best to sacrifice this army." This letter, although ad 
 dressed to the Secretary of War, distinctly embraced the 
 President in the grave charge of conspiracy to defeat 
 McClellan s army and sacrifice thousands of the lives of 
 his soldiers. None but a man of Lincoln s exceptional 
 forbearance and patience would have tolerated McClel- 
 lan in command for a day after such a declaration, writ 
 ten from the headquarters of a defeated army, but Lin 
 coln neither dismissed nor reproached him, nor, as far as 
 I can learn, did he, ever allude to it. 
 
 Ten days after the offensive and insubordinate letter 
 was written Lincoln visited McClellan at his headquar 
 ters on the James River. While Lincoln was there 
 McClellan personally handed him a letter dated July 7, 
 1862, that was a caustic criticism of the political and 
 military policy of the administration, and assumed to 
 define not only the military action of the government, 
 but the civil and political policy of the government on 
 all important questions relating to the war. McClellan 
 himself records the fact that Lincoln read the letter in 
 McClellan s presence without comment, and that he 
 never alluded to the subject again. McClellan vigor 
 ously protested against the withdrawal of the army from 
 the Peninsula, but the order was peremptory, and he 
 obeyed it with obvious reluctance. His personal feeling 
 toward Lincoln and the administration is clearly exhib 
 ited in a letter to his wife written on the 3ist of August 
 
220 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 and published in McClellan^ s Own Story, p. 532. Speak 
 ing of Washington, he says: " As a matter of self-respect 
 I cannot go there." On the ist of September, however, 
 he was called to Washington and given a verbal order 
 by General Halleck, then Commander-in-Chief, to take 
 charge of the defenses of Washington. On the follow 
 ing morning Lincoln and Halleck called on General 
 McClellan at his house and asked him to take command. 
 McClellan states that Lincoln asked him as a favor to the 
 President to "resume command and do the best that 
 could be done." The same day an order was issued 
 from the War Department by Halleck stating that " Ma 
 jor-General McClellan will have command of the fortifi 
 cations of Washington and all the troops for the defense 
 of the capital." The manner of the restoration of 
 McClellan to command has given rise to latitudinous 
 dispute, but the short story is that most of the Army of 
 the Potomac had been put under command of General 
 Pope in his disastrous battles of the second Bull Run 
 campaign, and both the armies of McClellan and Pope 
 were compelled to retreat into the Washington defenses 
 in a very demoralized condition. 
 
 No man better understood McClellan s value as an 
 organizer and as a defensive commander than Lincoln, 
 and he solved the problem himself by calling McClellan 
 to the new command because he believed the capital to 
 be in danger and McClellan the best man to protect it. 
 If he ever consulted any one on the subject, the fact has 
 never been given to the public in any authentic form. 
 Had he consulted his Cabinet, it would have been next 
 to unanimous against giving McClellan any command 
 whatever, and the administration leaders in both branches 
 of Congress would also have been nearly unanimous in 
 demanding McClellan s dismissal from command. Lin 
 coln acted in this case, as was liis custom in all severe 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 221 
 
 trials, on his own personal responsibility, and Lincoln, 
 and Lincoln alone, is responsible for calling McClellan 
 to command the defenses of Washington and for per 
 mitting McClellan, under that assignment, to take the 
 field for the Antietam campaign without any special 
 orders from the government. The assumption that Lin 
 coln simply consulted his fears in restoring McClellan to 
 command is an absurdity. There were twenty generals 
 in the Army of the Potomac and in Pope s army who 
 could have taken command of the complete defenses of 
 Washington, constructed under McClellan s faultless en 
 gineering skill, and protected the capital against double 
 the number of men Lee had in his entire army. That 
 McClellan handled the demoralized army better than any 
 other could have done I do not doubt, but that he was a 
 necessity to save the capital is not to be considered for 
 a moment. It is obvious also that Lincoln believed 
 McClellan to be the best man to command the army in 
 the campaign in pursuit of Lee, but he was prudent 
 enough to avoid any specific order to McClellan assign 
 ing him to the command. He put McClellan in position 
 to take the command to move against Lee, and McClel 
 lan, always obedient to what he believed to be his duty, 
 availed himself of it and fought the battle of Antietam. 
 So far from Lincoln being unfriendly to McClellan 
 when he started on his spring campaign of 1862, there 
 is the strongest evidence in support of the belief that 
 Lincoln hoped for McClellan s success and earnestly de 
 sired him to win his way back as Commander-in-Chief 
 of the armies. It was on March n, 1862, that Lincoln 
 relieved McClellan from his position of Commander-in- 
 Chief and limited him to the command of his own im 
 mediate army, but no Commander-in-Chief was ap 
 pointed until July u, 1862. Had Lincoln intended that 
 McClellan should never return to the command of all the 
 
222 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 armies, he certainly would have appointed Halleck Com- 
 mander-in-Chief before the nth of July. It is known 
 that General Scott, when he retired from the command, 
 desired the appointment of Halleck as his successor, and 
 McClellan himself was in doubt for some weeks whether 
 he or Halleck would be called to the supreme command. 
 After McClellan, Halleck was the one man to whom Lin 
 coln turned as the most competent for Commander-in- 
 Chief, but he delayed filling the position not only until 
 after the disastrous close of the Peninsula campaign, but 
 for two weeks after McClellan s insulting letter to Stan- 
 ton and four days after McClellan s offensive political 
 letter handed to the President at Harrison s Landing. It 
 was not until McClellan had proclaimed himself a polit 
 ical as well as a military general on the yth of July, 
 1862, that Lincoln abandoned all hope of McClellan ever 
 regaining the position of Commander-in-Chief, and four 
 days thereafter he called Halleck to that task. I many 
 times heard Lincoln discuss McClellan. I do not mean 
 that he usually or even at any time expressed fully his 
 views as to McClellan, but I have reason to know that 
 with all the troubles he had with him about moving in 
 the early part of 1862 and about the Peninsula campaign, 
 he sincerely and earnestly hoped that McClellan would 
 capture Richmond and thus reinstate himself as Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of the armies, with his laurels fairly 
 won and his ability to maintain them clearly demon 
 strated. 
 
 If Lincoln had been capable of resentment against 
 McClellan or against any of his military leaders, many 
 heads would have fallen that were saved by Lincoln s 
 patience and generosity. He knew that McClellan and 
 more than one other general had at times listened to the 
 whispers of a military dictatorship. McClellan states, 
 on page 152 of his own book, that Stanton once urged 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 223 
 
 him to arrest Secretary Cameron for inciting to insubor 
 dination by making an Abolition speech to a newly- 
 arrived regiment, and he adds: "He (Stanton) often ad 
 vocated the propriety of my seizing the government and 
 taking affairs in my own hands." In a letter to his wife, 
 dated August 9, 1861, also published in his own volume, 
 page 85, McClellan refers to the fact that he is earnestly 
 pressed by letter after letter and conversation after con 
 versation to save the nation by assuming the powers of 
 the President as dictator. Writing in the free confidence 
 of a devoted husband to a devoted wife, he said: " As I 
 hope one day to be united with you for ever in heaven I 
 have no such aspiration. I would cheerfully take the 
 dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the 
 country is saved. Had Lincoln been jealous of McClel 
 lan s power, he had ample opportunity to relieve him 
 from command long before he did, but he never feared 
 those who prattled about the dictatorship, although well 
 informed of the many, including some prominent gen 
 erals, who had advised it. His generosity to military 
 men who committed such follies is clearly exhibited in 
 his letter of January 26, 1863, to General Hooker, notify 
 ing him of his assignment to the command of the Army 
 of the Potomac. Hooker was one of those who had be 
 lieved in a military dictatorship, and Lincoln believed 
 that Hooker had not given cordial support to General 
 Burnside when he was in command of the army. To 
 use Lincoln s own plain language, he told Hooker that 
 he had done "a great wrong to the country and to a 
 most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. " He 
 then said to Hooker: "I have heard, in such a way as 
 to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army 
 and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was 
 not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the 
 command. Only those generals who gain success can be 
 
224 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, 
 and I will risk the dictatorship. Thus did Lincoln as 
 sign Hooker to the command of the Army of the Poto 
 mac when he knew that Hooker had been guilty of the 
 failure to support his commanding officer in important 
 military movements, and that he had advised a dictator 
 to usurp the prerogatives of the President. He believed 
 McClellan to be in political sympathy with the men who 
 were most implacably hostile to his administration, but 
 he was sagacious enough to know that military success 
 under any general of his appointment would give polit 
 ical success to the administration; and I am certain that 
 he would have preferred McClellan as the conqueror of 
 Richmond in 1862, and would gladly have restored him 
 to the command of all the armies, knowing that the vic 
 tory would have been as much the victory of Lincoln as 
 the victory of McClellan. 
 
 I saw Lincoln many times during the campaign of 
 1864, when McClellan was his competitor for the Presi 
 dency. I never heard him speak of McClellan in any 
 other than terms of the highest personal respect and 
 kindness. He never doubted McClellan s loyalty to the 
 government or to the cause that called him to high mili 
 tary command. But he did believe, until after the cap 
 ture of Atlanta by Sherman and Sheridan s victories in 
 the Valley, which settled the political campaign in favor 
 of Lincoln, that McClellan was quite likely to be elected 
 over him, and that if elected, with all his patriotism and 
 loyalty to the Union, he would be powerless to prevent 
 the dissolution of the Republic. The convention that 
 nominated McClellan for President met only a few days 
 before Sherman captured Atlanta. There had been no 
 important victories for any of the Union armies until 
 that time during the year 1864, and there had been great 
 sacrifice of life in both Sherman s and Grant s campaigns. 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN. 225 
 
 The convention that nominated McClellan voiced the 
 sentiment that regarded the war as a failure, and it was 
 so declared in the platform in the clearest terms, with 
 the call for a suspension of hostilities because of the fail 
 ure to obtain peace by force of arms. Lincoln believed 
 that McClellan, if elected, would be coerced into a pol 
 icy of humiliating peace and the loss of all the great 
 issues for which so much blood and treasure had been 
 sacrified. But that he ever cherished the semblance of 
 resentment against McClellan, even when McClellan was 
 offensively insubordinate as a military man and equally 
 offensive in assuming to define the political policy of the 
 administration, I do not for a moment believe. Had 
 McClellan understood Lincoln half as well as Lincoln 
 understood McClellan, there never would have been 
 serious discord between them. It was the creation of 
 what I believe to be McClellan s entirely unwarranted 
 distrust of Lincoln s personal and official fidelity to him 
 as a military commander, and that single error became a 
 seething cauldron of woe to both of them and a consum 
 ing misfortune to McClellan. 
 
 Lincoln s position in history is secure, but it is doubt 
 ful whether the impartial historian of the future will give 
 McClellan his full measure of justice. History records 
 results only achievements and failures. It will tell of 
 McClellan that he was an unsuccessful military chieftain, 
 and that on his own record in an appeal to the country 
 he was the most overwhelmingly defeated candidate for 
 President in the history of the present great parties of 
 the nation; but no truthful historian can fail to say of 
 him that he was one of the great military geniuses of his 
 day, one of the purest of patriots, and one of the most 
 loyal of men in the great battle for the preservation of 
 the Union. 
 15 
 
(Photo by Sarony, New York.) 
 
 GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, 1890. 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN and William T. Sherman had 
 <f~V never met until Sherman came to Washington to 
 visit his brother, the present Senator Sherman, ten days 
 after Lincoln s inauguration. Sherman s mission to the 
 capital was not to obtain a command. He had resigned 
 as president of a military institute in Louisiana, because, 
 as he frankly said to the State officials who controlled 
 the institution, he could not remain and owe allegiance 
 to a State that had withdrawn from the Union. In his 
 letter of resignation, dated January 18, 1861, he said: 
 " Should Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I 
 prefer to maintain my allegiance to the Constitution as 
 long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay 
 here would be a w r rong in every sense of the word." 
 He left New Orleans about the ist of March to make his 
 home in the North. Like Grant, he tendered his ser 
 vices to the government, but, again like Grant, his offer 
 was not answered. His first meeting with Lincoln was 
 in company with his Senator brother to pay a brief visit 
 of courtesy to the President. After the Senator had 
 transacted some political business with Lincoln, he 
 turned to his brother and said: "Mr. President, this is 
 my brother, Colonel Sherman, who is just up from Lou 
 isiana; he may give you some information you want." 
 To this Lincoln replied, as reported by Sherman him 
 self: "Ah! How are they getting along down there?" 
 
 227 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Sherman answered: u They think they are getting along 
 swimmingly; they are prepared for war." To which 
 Lincoln responded: "Oh, well, I guess we ll manage to 
 keep house." Sherman records in his Memoirs that 
 he was sadly disappointed, and that he broke out 
 on John, damning the politicians generally," saying: 
 4 * You have got things in a hell of a fix ; you may get 
 them out as best you can. Sherman then, as ever, was 
 ruggedly honest and patriotic, and often more impressive 
 than elegant in his manner of speech. Some old St. 
 Louis friends had obtained for him the presidency of a 
 street-railway of that city at a salary of $2500. Speak 
 ing of this position, he says: "This suited me exactly, and 
 I answered Turner that I would accept with thanks. 
 
 Before Sherman was comfortably installed in his posi 
 tion as street-railway president, Postmaster-General Blair 
 telegraphed him, on the 6th of April, asking him to 
 accept a chief clerkship in the War Department, with 
 the assurance that he would be made Assistant Secretary 
 of War when Congress met. Sherman answered with 
 the laconic dispatch: "I cannot accept." In a letter 
 written at the same time to Blair he says that after his 
 visit to Washington, where he saw no chance of em 
 ployment, he had gone to St. Louis, accepted an official 
 position and established his home, and that he was not 
 at liberty to change. He added that he was thankful 
 for the compliment, and that he wished the adminis 
 tration all success in its almost impossible task of gov 
 erning this distracted and anarchical people." A few 
 days thereafter General Frank Blair called on Sherman 
 and said that he was authorized to select a brigadier-gen 
 eral to command the Department of Missouri, and he ten 
 dered the position to Sherman, who declined it, and Gen 
 eral Lyon was then appointed. Feeling, however, as the 
 clouds of war darkened upon the country, that his ser- 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 2 29 
 
 vices might be needed, on the 8th of May Sherman ad 
 dressed a formal letter to the Secretary of War, again 
 tendering his services to the government, and on the 
 i4th of the same month he was appointed colonel of the 
 Thirteenth regiment of regulars. On the 2oth of June 
 he reported at Washington in obedience to orders from 
 General Scott, who assigned him to inspection duty; and 
 before the movement was made to Manassas, Sherman 
 was ordered to the command of a brigade of Hunter s 
 division, and in that position was in the first battle of 
 the war. 
 
 Sherman was one of the very few generals who seldom 
 grieved Lincoln. While he was one of the most volum 
 inous of writers on every phase of the war and every 
 question arising from it, he never assumed to be wiser 
 than the government, and he never committed a serious 
 blunder. He had the most profound contempt for poli 
 ticians in and out of the army, and for political methods 
 generally, and his bluntness of both manner and expres 
 sion emphasized his views and purposes so that none 
 could misunderstand them. Naturally impulsive, he 
 often felt keenly the many complications which sur 
 rounded all great generals, and he spoke and wrote with 
 unusual freedom, but always within the clearest lines of 
 military subordination. He was an earnest, ardent, out 
 spoken patriot, and had more controversy than any other 
 general with the single exception of McClellan; but I 
 doubt whether there is a single important utterance of 
 Sherman s during the four long years of war, when new 
 and grave problems had to be met and solved from time 
 to time, that he would have recalled in the later years 
 of his life. He had learned to cherish the most pro 
 found respect for Lincoln, although they never met after 
 his first introduction to the President during the early 
 period of the war, until the spring of 186^ at City Point, 
 
230 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES, 
 
 after Sherman had made his march to the sea and his 
 great campaign had practically ended at Raleigh, North 
 Carolina. 
 
 There is no doubt that Lincoln s earliest impressions 
 of Sherman were quite as unfavorable to Sherman as 
 were Sherman s early impressions of Lincoln. It was 
 not until Sherman had been assigned to Kentucky, along 
 with General Anderson, that he attracted the attention 
 of the country. Along with a number of others he had 
 won his star at Bull Run, and on the 24th of August he 
 was sent with Anderson to Louisville. Anderson s feeble 
 health soon demanded that he should be relieved, and 
 Sherman was thus left in command. The position of 
 Kentucky was a most delicate and important one. Sher 
 man succeeded to the command on the 8th of October, 
 and within a few weeks thereafter it was whispered 
 throughout Washington that he was a lunatic. This 
 belief was accepted in most if not all military circles at 
 the capital, and was doubtless shared by Lincoln himself, 
 as in little more than two months after Sherman had as 
 sumed command in Kentucky he was ordered to report 
 at Benton Barracks, St. Louis, and General Buell was 
 assigned as his successor. The attitude of Kentucky at 
 tracted very general interest throughout the country, and 
 the repeated changes of commanders caused great solici 
 tude. I remember calling on Colonel Scott, Assistant 
 Secretary of War, on the day that the announcement 
 was made of Sherman s transfer to Missouri and Buell s 
 appointment to Kentucky, and asking him what it 
 meant. Scott answered: " Sherman s gone in the 
 head;" and upon inquiry I found that Scott simply 
 voiced the general belief of those who should have been 
 best informed on the subject. Reports were published 
 in all the leading newspapers of the country speaking 
 of Sherman as mentally unbalanced, and it naturally 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 231 
 
 mortified the blunt, straightforward soldier to the last 
 degree. General Halleck, in a letter to McClellan ask 
 ing for more officers, said: "I am satisfied that General 
 Sherman s physical and mental system is so completely 
 broken by labor and care as to render him, for the pres 
 ent, unfit for duty. Perhaps a few weeks rest may re 
 store him." But it is only just to Sherman to say that 
 the chief reason for the military authorities in Washing 
 ton assuming that he was a lunatic was his report soon 
 after assuming command in Kentucky, stating that it 
 would require an army of 60,000 men to hold Kentucky 
 and 200,000 men to open the Mississippi and conquer the 
 rebellion in the South-west. This was at that time re 
 garded as conclusive evidence of his insanity, and his 
 mental condition was a matter of almost daily discussion 
 in the public journals, with Halstead s Cincinnati Com 
 mercial, published in Sherman s own State, leading the 
 attack against his mental capacity. 
 
 When Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General 
 Thomas were returning from their investigation of 
 General Fremont s department, soon after Sherman had 
 assumed command of Kentucky, Sherman took special 
 measures to prevail upon Cameron to stop over in Louis 
 ville and personally inquire into the condition of that 
 State. Cameron did so, and had a confidential confer 
 ence with Sherman at the Gait House, in which Sherman 
 said to Cameron that for the purpose of defense in Ken 
 tucky he should have 60,000 men, and for offensive 
 movements 200,000 would be necessary. Cameron s an 
 swer, as reported by Sherman himself, was: " Great God! 
 where are they to come from?" That demand of Sher 
 man s convinced Cameron that Sherman was mentally 
 unbalanced, and on his return to Washington he united 
 with all the military authorities of that day in ridiculing 
 Sherman s demand. Those who have distinct rccollec- 
 
232 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 tions of the war, as well as even- intelligent reader of its 
 history, need not now be reminded that Sherman was the 
 only military man of that day who thoroughly and accu 
 rately appreciated the situation in the South-west, and 
 that his original estimate of the forces necessary to over 
 throw the rebellion in that section of the country is 
 proved to have been substantially correct. Buell, w r ho 
 succeeded Sherman in command of Kentucky, had 
 nearly 60,000 men when he was ordered to Grant at 
 Shiloh, and full} 200,000 men were reapers in the har 
 vest of death before the rebellion was conquered in the 
 South-west and the Father of Waters again went un- 
 vexed to the sea." 
 
 Sherman was not permitted to take the field until after 
 the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the city 
 of Nashville. From December 23, 1861, to the i3th of 
 February, 1862, he was in charge of the St. Louis bar 
 racks as military instructor. He was first ordered from 
 St. Louis to take command of the post at Paducah, Ken 
 tucky, where he remained until the loth of March, when 
 he was placed in command of a division and ordered to 
 join Grant for the Shiloh campaign. It will be remem 
 bered that he exhibited great skill and courage as a gen 
 eral during the disastrous first day at Shiloh. That was 
 the first action in which Sherman had an opportunity to 
 prove his ability as a military commander, and it is safe 
 to say that from that day until the close of the war Grant 
 regarded him as the best lieutenant in his entire army. 
 He was with Grant at Vicksburg, shared Grant s victory 
 at Missionary Ridge, and when the Atlanta campaign 
 was determined upon in the spring of 1864 there was no 
 question in military circles as to the pre-eminent fitness 
 of Sherman to take the command. His campaign from 
 Chattanooga to Atlanta was one of the most brilliant of 
 all the campaigns of the war. It exhibited the most ac- 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 233 
 
 complished military strategy coupled with the wisest di 
 rection of an army that had to contend with an enemy 
 always intrenched and to fight every battle under the 
 greatest disadvantages. Many even of onr successful 
 military campaigns have been severely criticised, but I 
 doubt whether any intelligent military man at home or 
 abroad has ever found fault with Sherman s generalship 
 in his Atlanta campaign. With all his natural impetu 
 osity of temper, he was always clear-headed and abun 
 dant in caution when charged with the command of an 
 army. In his march to Atlanta he was passing through 
 a country that was, to use his own language, "one vast 
 fort," and with " at least fifty miles of connected trenches 
 with abatis and finished batteries. With the single ex 
 ception of his assault upon Johnston s lines at Kenesaw 
 he did not meet with a serious reverse until he entered 
 Atlanta, and it was his dispatch to Lincoln, announcing 
 the capture of that city, that reversed the political tide 
 of the country and assured Lincoln s re-election. 
 
 Sherman s march to the sea, that furnished the most 
 romantic story of the civil war, was really a holiday pic 
 nic as compared with the march from Chattanooga to 
 Atlanta. On the i2th of November, 1864, Sherman 
 severed communications with the North, and started for 
 Savannah with a picked army full 60,000 strong, and on 
 the loth of December he was in front of the Confederate 
 defenses of Savannah. On the I3th, after the capture 
 of Fort McAllister, he had opened communications with 
 the Union squadron and was enabled to obtain the sup 
 plies his army so much needed. Thus for more than 
 one entire month the country had no word whatever 
 from General Sherman except in the vague and often 
 greatly exaggerated reports which came from the South 
 ern newspapers. I saw Lincoln several times during 
 Sherman s march, and while he did not conceal his 
 
-34 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 anxiety concerning him, he always frankly expressed his 
 unbounded confidence in Sherman s ability to execute 
 what he had undertaken. He had the strongest faith in 
 Sherman as a military commander. On one occasion 
 during Sherman s march, when he had been out for two 
 or three weeks, I called at the War Department and as 
 certained that no word had been received from him, and 
 that none need be expected for some days to come. I 
 went from the War Department to the White House, and 
 after a brief conference with Lincoln, in which Sherman 
 was not alluded to at all, I bade him good-day and started 
 to leave the room. Just as I reached the door he turned 
 round and with a merry twinkling of the eye he said: 
 u McClure, wouldn t you like to hear something from 
 Sherman?" The inquiry electrified me at the instant, 
 as it seemed to imply that Lincoln had some information 
 on the subject. I immediately answered: "Yes, most 
 of all I should like to hear from Sherman." To this 
 Lincoln answered with a hearty laugh: u Well, I ll be 
 hanged if I wouldn t myself." When Sherman reached 
 Savannah, Lincoln overflowed with gratitude to him and 
 his army. He then fe!t fully assured that the military 
 pow r er of the rebellion was hopelessly broken. 
 
 The names of Lincoln and Sherman are indissolubly 
 linked together in the yet continued dispute over Lin 
 coln s original views on reconstruction, as Sherman 
 claimed to represent them in the terms of the first sur 
 render of Johnston to Sherman at Durham Station, North 
 Carolina. On the i8th of April, 1865, Sherman and 
 Johnston met at the house of Mr. Bennet to agree upon 
 the terms for the surrender of Johnston s army. On the 
 1 2th of April Sherman had announced to his army the 
 surrender of Lee. Two days later a flag of truce was 
 received from Johnston proposing u to stop the further 
 effusion of blood and devastation of property," and sug- 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. ^35 
 
 gesting that the civil authorities of the States be per 
 mitted u to enter into the needful arrangements to termi 
 nate the existing war." Sherman s answer of the same 
 date said: "I am fully empowered to arrange with yon 
 any terms for the suspension of further hostilities be 
 tween the armies commanded by yon and those com 
 manded by myself." An interview with Johnston hav 
 ing been arranged by a staff officer, Sherman started 
 from Raleigh on the zytli to fill the appointment with 
 Johnston. When he was about to enter the car he was 
 stopped by a telegraph-operator, who gave him the start 
 ling information of the assassination of Lincoln on the 
 1 4th. He gave orders that no publicity should be given 
 to the death of Lincoln, and he did not even inform the 
 staff officers accompanying him. As soon as he was 
 alone with Johnston he communicated to him the fact 
 of Lincoln s assassination, and he adds that "the per 
 spiration came out in large drops on his (Johnston s) 
 forehead, and he did not attempt to conceal his distress." 
 This conference with Johnston did not result in formu 
 lating the terms of surrender. Johnston did not assume 
 to possess authority to surrender all the various armies 
 yet in the field, but as Jefferson Davis, with Breckenridge, 
 his Secretary of War, and Reagan, his Postmaster-Gen 
 eral, was within reach of Johnston, he proposed to meet 
 Sherman on the following day, when he hoped to have 
 authority to surrender the entire Confederate armies re 
 maining in the service. When they met again Brecken 
 ridge was with Johnston without assuming to act in any 
 official capacity, and the terms of surrender were formu 
 lated and signed by Sherman and Johnston. So far as 
 the purely military terms were involved, they were prac 
 tically the same as those agreed to by Grant and Lee at 
 Appomattox. The third article of the basis of agree 
 ment provided for the recognition by the Executive of 
 
236 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 the United States of the several State governments on 
 their officers and legislatures taking the oath prescribed 
 by the Constitution of the United States." The fifth 
 article provided for substantial amnesty, so far as in the 
 power of the President, to all who accepted the terms of 
 surrender, who should be protected in u their political 
 rights and franchise as well as their rights of person and 
 property. It was provided also that the armies of Sher 
 man and Johnston should refrain from all warlike move 
 ments until the terms of surrender were finally accepted, 
 and in the event of failure forty-eight hours notice 
 should be given by either side for the resumption of 
 hostilities. Sherman transmitted the agreement to the 
 government through Grant, and Stanton published the 
 disapproval by the administration with most offensive 
 reflections upon Sherman. 
 
 But for the dispute that arose over Sherman s original 
 terms of surrender with Johnston, Lincoln s views as to 
 reconstruction would never have been crystallized in his 
 tory. The fact that Sherman claimed to act under the 
 direct authority of Lincoln in the terms he gave to John 
 ston and to the civil governments of the insurgent States 
 brings up the question directly as to Lincoln s contem 
 plated method of closing the war; and it is notable that 
 many of Lincoln s biographers have injected partisan 
 prejudice into history and have studiously attempted to 
 conceal Lincoln s ideas as to the restoration of the Union. 
 Whether he was right or wrong, it is due to the truth of 
 history that his convictions be honestly presented. The 
 plain question to be considered is this: Did or did not 
 Lincoln expressly suggest to Sherman the terms he gave 
 to Johnston in his original agreement of surrender? If 
 he did, it clearly portrays Lincoln s purposes as to recon 
 struction and fully vindicates Sherman. If he did not 
 thus suggest and instruct Sherman, then Sherman is a 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 237 
 
 deliberate falsifier; and who is prepared to doubt the in 
 tegrity of any positive statement made by William T. 
 Sherman ? There were four persons present at the con 
 ference held at City Point on the 28th of March, 1865. 
 They were Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Admiral Por 
 ter. It was before these men that Lincoln freely dis 
 cussed the question of ending the war, and in Sherman s 
 Memoirs he says: "Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in 
 his conversation, assuring me that in his mind he was all 
 ready for the civil reorganization of affairs at the South 
 as soon as the war was over." Had Lincoln stopped 
 with the general assurance of his purpose to restore the 
 South to civil government, it might be plausible to as 
 sume that Sherman misinterpreted his expressions, but 
 Sherman adds the following positive statement: "He 
 (Lincoln) distinctly authorized me to assure Governor 
 Vance and the people of North Carolina that as soon as 
 the rebel armies laid down their arms and resumed their 
 civil pursuits they would at once be guaranteed all their 
 rights as citizens of a common country ; and that to avoid 
 anarchy the State governments then in existence, with 
 their civil functionaries, would be recognized by him as 
 the governments de facto till Congress could provide 
 others." There was no possibility for Sherman to 
 
 * Your note of the 26th inst, enclosing proof sheet of your 
 article on Lincoln and Sherman, has been received and very care 
 fully read. I have no criticisms to make, for I think it is a just 
 and fair delineation, well stated, of the character of these two 
 conspicuous actors in the war of the Rebellion. I remember 
 very well the interview with Mr. Lincoln in March, 1861. A 
 good deal more was said than you have noted. Among other 
 things, I remember that Lincoln said to Sherman: "I guess we 
 will get along without you fellows," or some such remark, mean 
 ing that he thought there would be no war. This was the remark 
 that made the most impression upon Captain Sherman, as he was 
 then called, and led him to a want of confidence in Lincoln, who 
 
238 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIME^ 
 
 mistake this expression of Lincoln. He was distinctly 
 instructed to assure the Governor of North Carolina, the 
 State in which Sherman s army was then operating, that 
 upon the surrender of the insurgent forces all would be 
 guaranteed their rights as citizens, and the civil govern 
 ments then in existence would be recognized by Lincoln. 
 There was no chance for misunderstanding on this point. 
 
 did not seem to appreciate the condition of the South and the 
 peril in which the whole country was then involved. During 
 General Sherman s march to the sea I went to Lincoln as you 
 did. I was somewhat troubled by the reports from rebel sources 
 that General Sherman had been flanked and that this wing- or 
 that wing had been driven back, etc., and went to Lincoln for 
 encouragement, and asked him if he knew anything about the 
 correctness of these reports. Lincoln said, "Oh no. I know 
 what hole he went in at, but I can t tell what hole he will come 
 out of," but seemed to be entirely confident that he would come 
 out safely. 
 
 In respect to the conditional arrangement made between Gen 
 eral Sherman and General Johnston for the surrender of John 
 ston s army your statement agrees entire!} with what I under 
 stood from General Sherman a few days after the surrender. I 
 went with General Sherman on his return from the interview 
 with Lincoln to Goldsborough, N. C., where the army was en 
 camped, and was fully advised by General Sherman of the con 
 ference between Lincoln, Grant, Porter, and himself at Hampton 
 Roads. I did not at the time agree with the generous policy pro 
 posed by Mr. Lincoln, but at the meeting with Johnston General 
 Sherman acted upon it in exact accordance with what he under 
 stood were the instructions of Mr. Lincoln, and afterward com 
 plained bitterly at the injustice done him for obeying what he 
 regarded as the orders of the President. Immediately after Stan- 
 ton s cruel statement of his reasons for setting aside the agree 
 ment between Sherman and Johnston, I wrote a reply which was 
 published in Washington, stating my view of this agreement at 
 that time. I have not seen it since, but I have no doubt if } r ou 
 have access to it you will find it supports the statements 3-011 
 now make. You are at liberty to use the contents of this letter 
 or any part of it at your discretion. Senator John Sherman to 
 the Author, January 29, 1892. 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 239 
 
 Either Lincoln thus instructed Sherman or Sherman 
 states what is deliberately untrue. 
 
 These were the last instructions that Sherman received 
 from Lincoln or from the government until the surrender 
 of Johnston. In a little more than two weeks thereafter 
 Lincoln was assassinated, and the only event that could 
 have been regarded as an additional guide for Sherman 
 was the surrender of Lee, in which all the rights that 
 Sherman accorded to Johnston s army were given to 
 Lee s army by Grant. The testimony of Lincoln could 
 not be had after the issue was raised with Sherman, as 
 Lincoln was then dead; but Sherman knew that on the 
 6th of April, Lincoln had authorized the reconvening 
 of the Virginia Legislature, and thus felt sure that Lin 
 coln was doing in Virginia precisely what he had in 
 structed Sherman to do in North Carolina. Grant, 
 always reticent in matters of dispute except when tes 
 timony was a necessity, was not called upon to express 
 any opinion as to the correctness of Sherman s under 
 standing of Lincoln s instructions. General Badeau, 
 who w r as with Grant at the time he received Stan ton s 
 offensive revocation of the agreement between Sherman 
 and Johnston, says that Grant pronounced Stanton s ten 
 reasons for rejecting the terms of surrender to be "in 
 famous." An entirely new condition had been pro 
 duced by the murder of Lincoln and the succession of 
 Johnson, and had Sherman been advised of the frenzy 
 of public sentiment that followed the assassination of the 
 President, he probably would not have obeyed Lincoln s 
 instructions by giving the promise that the government 
 would recognize the Confederate civil authorities of the 
 States. 
 
 The tragic death of Lincoln aroused public sentiment 
 to the highest point of resentment. The new President 
 was ostentatious in his demand for vengeance upon the 
 
240 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 Southern leaders. Stanton was most violent in his cry 
 for the swiftest retribution, and it was in this changed 
 condition of sentiment and of authority that Sherman s 
 terms, accorded to Johnston in obedience to the peaceful 
 purposes of Lincoln, were sent to the government for 
 approval or rejection. Stanton immediately proclaimed 
 the rejection of the terms of surrender in a dispatch given 
 to the public press, in which he denounced Sherman with 
 unmingled ferocity as having acted without authority and 
 surrendered almost every issue for which the war had been 
 fought. So violent was this assault upon Sherman from 
 Stanton that soon after, when Sherman s victorious army 
 was reviewed in Washington by the President and Sec 
 retary of War, Sherman refused the proffered hand of 
 Stanton before the multitude. President Johnson subse 
 quently assured Sherman that Stanton s public reflection 
 upon him had not been seen by the President nor any 
 of Stanton s associates of the Cabinet until it had been 
 published. Admiral Porter, who was the remaining wit 
 ness to the instructions received by Sherman, took down 
 notes immediately after the conference ended, and within 
 a year thereafter he furnished Sherman a statement of 
 what had occurred, in which he fully and broadly sus 
 tained Sherman as to Lincoln s instructions. I assume, 
 therefore, that it is true beyond all reasonable dispute 
 that Sherman in his original terms of Johnston s sur 
 render in North Carolina implicitly obeyed the direc 
 tions of Lincoln, and was therefore not only fully jus 
 tified in what he did, but would have been false to his 
 trust had he insisted upon any other terms than those he 
 accepted. 
 
 This issue made with General Sherman and feebly 
 sustained by a few partisan historians of the time has 
 led intelligent students to study carefully Lincoln s ideas 
 pf reconstruction, and they should be correctly under- 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 241 
 
 stood to correctly estimate Lincoln s character. I fre 
 quently saw Lincoln during the summer and fall of 1864 
 and winter of 1865. Some time in August, 1864, I spent 
 several hours with him alone in the White House, when 
 he spoke most earnestly about the closing of the war. 
 He had but a single purpose, and that was the speedy 
 and cordial restoration of the dissevered States. He 
 cherished no resentment against the South, and every 
 theory of reconstruction that he ever conceived or pre 
 sented was eminently peaceful and looking solely to re- 
 attaching the estranged people to the government. I 
 was startled when he first suggested that it would be 
 wise to pay the South $400,000,000 as compensation for 
 the abolition of slavery, but he had reasoned well on the 
 subject, and none could answer the arguments he ad 
 vanced in favor of such a settlement of the war. He 
 knew that he could not then propose it to Congress or to 
 the country, but he clung to it until the very last. He 
 repeatedly renewed the subject in conversations when I 
 was present, and on the 5th of February, 1865, he went 
 so far as to formulate a message to Congress, proposing 
 the payment of $400,000,000 for emancipation, and sub 
 mitted it to his Cabinet, only to be unanimously rejected. 
 Lincoln sadly accepted the decision of his Cabinet, and 
 filed away the manuscript message with this indorsement 
 thereon, to which his signature was added: " February 5, 
 1865. To-day these papers, which explain themselves, 
 were drawn up and submitted to the Cabinet and unani 
 mously disapproved by them." When the proposed 
 message was disapproved Lincoln soberly asked: "How 
 long will the war last?" To this none could make an 
 swer, and he added: "We are spending now in carrying 
 on the war $3,000,000 a day, which will amount to all 
 this money, besides all the lives." 
 
 At Lincoln s conference with Sherman and Grant at 
 16 
 
242 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 City Point on the 28th of March he exhibited profound 
 sorrow at the statement of these generals that another 
 great battle would probably have to be fought before 
 closing the war. Sherman says that "Lincoln ex 
 claimed more than once that there had been blood 
 enough shed, and asked us if another battle could not 
 be avoided." His great desire was to attain peace with 
 out the sacrifice of a single life that could be saved, and 
 he certainly desired that there should be no policy of 
 retribution upon the Southern people. He intimated to 
 Sherman very broadly that he desired Jefferson Davis to 
 escape from the country. Sherman in his Memoirs re 
 peats a story told by Lincoln to him illustrative of his 
 wish that Davis should escape "unbeknown to him;" 
 and in discussing the same subject in the White House 
 in the presence of Governor Curtin, Colonel Forney, sev 
 eral others, and myself, he told the same story to illus 
 trate the same point, obviously intending to convey very 
 clearly his wish that the Southern leaders should escape 
 from the land and save him the grave complications 
 which must follow their arrest. Secretary Welles, in an 
 article in the Galaxy, quotes Lincoln as saying on this 
 subject: " No one need expect he would take any part in 
 hanging or killing these men, even the worst of them. 
 Frighten them out of the country; open the gates; let 
 down the bars, scare them off. Enough lives have been 
 sacrificed; we must extinguish our resentments if we ex 
 pect harmony and union." 
 
 Lincoln s greatest apprehension during the last six 
 months of the war was that the South would not return 
 to the Union and recognize the authority of the govern 
 ment. He knew that the military power of the rebellion 
 was broken, but he knew that the bitterness that pre 
 vailed among the Southern people would be an almost 
 insuperable barrier to anything like cordial reconstruc- 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 243 
 
 tion. He knew that they were impoverished, and he 
 feared almost universal anarchy in the South when the 
 shattered armies of the Confederacy should be broken 
 up, and, instead of a restoration of peace and industry 
 or anything approaching friendly relations between the 
 Southern people and the government, he anticipated 
 guerilla warfare, general disorder, and utter hopelessness 
 of tranquility throughout the rebellious States. It was 
 this grave apprehension that made Lincoln desire to close 
 the war upon such terms as would make the Southern 
 people and Southern soldiers think somewhat kindly of 
 the Union to which they were brought back by force of 
 arms. It was this apprehension that made him instruct 
 Sherman to recognize the civil governments of the South 
 until Congress should take action on the subject, and 
 that made him personally authorize General Weitzel to 
 permit the Virginia State government to reconvene, as 
 he himself stated it, to "take measures to withdraw the 
 Virginia troops and their support from resistance to the 
 general government." He meant to do precisely what 
 Sherman agreed to do in his terms with Johnston. On 
 Lincoln s return to Washington from Weitzel s head 
 quarters in Richmond he was surprised to find that his 
 consent to the reassembling of the Virginia State gov 
 ernment, like his proposed message offering $400,000,000 
 as compensation for slavery, was disapproved by the Cab 
 inet, and that it was likely to be disapproved by the 
 country. He was greatly distressed, and hesitated some 
 time before he attempted to extricate himself from the 
 complication. Secretary Welles, in the Galaxy of April, 
 1872, page 524, speaking of the question in the Cabinet, 
 says: "The subject had caused general surprise, and on 
 the part of some dissatisfaction and irritation." Stanton 
 and Speed were especially disturbed about it, and Secre 
 tary Welles quotes Lincoln as finally saying that he " was 
 
244 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 surprised that his object and the movement had been so 
 generally misconstrued, and under the circumstances per 
 haps it was best the proceeding should be abandoned." 
 
 In the mean time Lee s army had surrendered, and 
 Lincoln was given a reasonable opportunity to stop the 
 proposed meeting of the Virginia Legislature; and on 
 the 1 2th of April he wrote to General Weitzel that as 
 the proposed meeting had been misconstrued, and that 
 as Grant had since captured the Virginia troops, so that 
 they could not be withdrawn by the Virginia Legislature, 
 his letter to Judge Campbell should be recalled and the 
 legislature not allowed to assemble; but if any had come 
 in pursuance of the order to allo\v them a safe return to 
 their homes. In his interview with Judge Campbell and 
 others in relation to the proposed assembling of the Vir 
 ginia Legislature, Lincoln had distinctly agreed that if 
 Virginia could be peaceably restored to the Union, con 
 fiscation should be remitted to the people. The evidence 
 is multiplied on every side that Lincoln intended to give 
 the Virginians exemption from all the retributory laws 
 of war, including amnesty to all who obeyed the govern 
 ment, just as Sherman provided in his terms of surrender 
 with Johnston ; but he was halted in his purpose, as he 
 was halted in his proposed compensated emancipation, 
 by the bitter resentments of the time, which prevailed 
 not only in his Cabinet, but throughout the country. 
 Had he been able to see Sherman after he had revoked 
 the authority for the Virginia Legislature to assemble, 
 he would doubtless have modified his instructions to him, 
 but Lincoln never again communicated with Sherman. 
 Two days after his revocation of the Weitzel order he 
 was assassinated, and four days after Lincoln s assassina 
 tion Sherman made his terms of surrender with John 
 ston. Had Lincoln been alive when Sherman s first 
 report of Johnston s surrender was received in Washing- 
 
LINCOLN AND SHERMAN. 245 
 
 ton, his experience in assenting to the reassembling of 
 the Virginia State government would doubtless have 
 made him disapprove the terms given to Johnston in 
 obedience to Lincoln s instructions to Sherman; but he 
 would have cast no reproach upon the heroic victor of 
 Atlanta and Savannah, and would have manfully as 
 sumed his full share of responsibility for Sherman s 
 action. * What policy of reconstruction Lincoln would 
 
 * In a recent publication which I understand to be a fragment 
 of a forthcoming book from your pen you referred to the terms 
 of surrender which Gen. Sherman agreed to with Gen. Jo John 
 ston at the close of the civil war. You express the opinion that 
 had Mr. Lincoln been alive he would have rejected these terms, 
 but you censure Mr. Stanton very emphatically for publishing 
 the reasons for their disapproval. You seem to think that Mr. 
 Stanton in stating these reasons to Gen. John A. Dix, and per 
 mitting their publication, w r as guilty of a wanton and unneces 
 sary assault on Gen. Sherman. In reply to your criticism I beg 
 leave to submit to you the opposite view from yours expressed in 
 a letter written at the time by a statesman of calm temper and 
 good judgment. The letter is as follows: 
 
 WOODSTOCK, VT., June i4th, 1865. 
 DEAR SIR: 
 
 Gen. Sherman promulgated to his army and the world his ar 
 rangements with Johnston. Indeed, the armistice could be in no 
 other way accounted for, and the army were gratified with the ex 
 pectation of an immediate return home. 
 
 To reject that arrangement was clearly necessary, and to do it 
 without stating any reason for it \vould have been a very danger 
 ous experiment, both to the public and the army. Indeed, many 
 had serious apprehensions of its effect on the army even w r ith the 
 conclusive reasons which were given. Should not this view be 
 presented in any and every true manifesto of the case ? 
 
 Yours respectfully, 
 
 J. CoivLAMER. 
 HON. E. M. STANTON: 
 
 There is no ground for the belief that Mr. Stanton had any 
 other motive in the action he took than to guard against the 
 
246 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 have adopted had he lived to complete his great work 
 cannot now be known ; but it is entirely safe to assume 
 that, while he would have yielded to the mandatory sen 
 timent of the nation, he would in the end have taught 
 the country that "with malice toward none, with char 
 ity for all," he could assure the world that "government 
 of the people by the people and for the people shall not 
 perish from the earth." 
 
 danger of disturbances in the army and throughout the country, 
 which might have resulted had the inadmissible terms been re 
 jected without explanation. Hon. George C. Gorham to the Au 
 thor, February 16, 1892. 
 
(From Sypher s Pennsylvania Reserves.) 
 
 ANDREW G. CURTIN, l86o. 
 
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 
 
 ANDREW G. CURTIN lias written the most brilliant 
 -^i. chapters in the annals of our great civil conflict by 
 his official record as Governor of Pennsylvania. I am 
 not unmindful, in paying this high tribute to the great 
 War Governor of the Union, that there are many Penn 
 sylvania names that have become memorable for their 
 heroism in the struggle for the preservation of our free 
 institutions. Nor am I unmindful that Pennsylvania 
 has within her borders the great battle-field of the war, 
 and that the names of such Pennsylvania heroes as 
 Meade, Reynolds, and Hancock are inseparably linked 
 with the decisive victory that gave assured safety and 
 unsullied freedom to the Union. While Pennsylvania 
 heroism was making itself immortal on every battle-field 
 of the war, the civil administration of the State was 
 more intimately involved with every issue growing out 
 of the war than that of any other State of the Republic. 
 Pennsylvania was second only to New York in popu 
 lation and physical power, and first of all in the import 
 ance of her position and in moulding the policy of the 
 States and their relations to the parent government. 
 Bordered by slave commonwealths from her eastern to 
 her western lines, and more exposed to the perils of war 
 than any of the other loyal States, her people were con 
 servative to the utmost limits of positive loyalty to the 
 Union. In January, 1861, when Curtin was inaugurated 
 248 
 
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 249 
 
 as Governor, not a single Northern State had officially 
 denned its relations to the Union or its attitude as to the 
 threatened civil war, and any utterance from a State of 
 such pre-eminent physical and political power could not 
 but make its impression on every State of the Union, 
 North and South. 
 
 Few of the present day can have any just appreciation 
 of the exceptional delicacy and grave responsibility of 
 the position of the new Governor of Pennsylvania. An 
 ill-advised utterance from him might have wantonly in 
 flamed the war spirit of the South or chilled the loyal 
 devotion of the North. He was called upon to define, 
 in advance of all the other States, the position of the 
 North when confronted by armed treason, and there 
 were no precedents in our history to guide him. His 
 inaugural address was prepared entirely by himself be 
 fore he came to the capital to assume his most respon 
 sible trust Before he delivered it he summoned to his 
 council a number of the most intelligent and considerate 
 men of both parties in the State, but after careful and 
 dispassionate reflection upon every sentence of the docu 
 ment it was not substantially changed in any particular, 
 and the highest tribute that history could pay to his 
 statesmanship is in the fact that the position of his great 
 State, and its relations with the general government as 
 denned in that address, were accepted by every loyal 
 State and vindicated alike by the loyal judgment of the 
 nation and by the arbitrament of the sword. 
 
 Curtin stood single among the public men of Pennsyl 
 vania in 1860 as a popular leader. His strength was 
 with the people rather than in political invention. He 
 had made himself conspicuously known by his services 
 as Secretary of the Commonwealth when that officer was 
 charged with the control of the school system. It was 
 he who first organized a distinct department to extend 
 
250 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 and elevate our schools, and he succeeded in greath 
 liberalizing our educational system and starting it on 
 the high way to its present matchless advancement. As 
 early as 1844 he had made himself known as one of the 
 most eloquent stump-speakers of the State, and from that 
 time until his nomination for Governor in 1860 he was in 
 the forefront of every political contest, and was greeted 
 with boundless enthusiasm by his political followers 
 wherever he appeared. When the great battle of 1860 
 was to be fought Pennsylvania was accepted by all as a 
 doubtful State, and as her vote in October would be the 
 unerring finger-board of national victory or defeat in 
 November, it became not only a State but a national 
 necessity for the Republicans to nominate their most 
 available candidate to lead in that pivotal contest. The 
 Republican people, almost as with one voice, demanded 
 the nomination of Curtin, and there would have been no 
 other name presented to the convention but for the pecu 
 liar political complications arising from General Came 
 ron being a candidate for President before the same con 
 vention, and bitterly hostile to Curtin. But despite the 
 peculiar power of Cameron as an organizer and manager 
 of political conventions, he was finally compelled to 
 assent to Curtin s nomination without being able to 
 obtain an earnestly united delegation in his favor for 
 President. When Curtin was called before the conven 
 tion to accept the leadership conferred upon him, he 
 aroused the enthusiasm of that body and of his party 
 friends throughout the State by declaring that he ac 
 cepted the flag of the convention and would carry it in 
 the front of battle from Lake Erie to the Delaware; and 
 he grandly fulfilled his promise. He was one of the 
 most magnetic popular speakers Pennsylvania has ever 
 known, combining matchless wit, keen invective, and 
 persuasive argument with singular felicity, and his tow- 
 
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 251 
 
 ering and symmetrical form and his genial face and 
 manner made him the most effective of all our men on 
 the hustings. He was aggressive from the day he entered 
 the battle until it closed with his magnificent victory that 
 declared him Governor by a majority of over thirty-two 
 thousand. 
 
 Many circumstances combined to bring Lincoln and 
 Curtin into the closest official and personal relations 
 from Lincoln s nomination until his death. As I have 
 shown in a previous chapter, the nomination of Lincoln 
 was made possible by two men Henry S. Lane of Indi 
 ana and Curtin of Pennsylvania. Both would have been 
 defeated had Seward been nominated, and Curtin s first 
 great struggle to give himself even a winning chance in 
 Pennsylvania \vas his effort to defeat the nomination of 
 Seward at Chicago. After that had been accomplished 
 he united with Lane to nominate Lincoln. He and Lin 
 coln never met until Curtin received the President-elect 
 on his \vay to Washington on the 22d of February, 1861, 
 and it was at the dinner given to Lincoln by Curtin on 
 the evening of that day that Lincoln s route was changed 
 and he suddenly started on his memorable midnight jour 
 ney to the national capital. The appointment of Came 
 ron to the Lincoln Cabinet was regarded by Curtin as 
 unfortunate, and would have made very strained rela 
 tions between Lincoln and Curtin had not both been 
 singularly generous in all their impulses and actions. 
 Notwithstanding the frequent irritating complications 
 which arose between the Secretary of War and the Gov 
 ernor in the organization of troops in the early part of 
 the war, there never was a shadow upon the relations 
 of these two men. Curtin was profoundly loyal and an 
 enthusiast in everything pertaining to the war. He was 
 proud of his great State, and especially of the hundreds 
 of thousands of heroes she sent to the field, and so tire- 
 
252 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 less in his great work that he always commanded the 
 sincerest affection and confidence of the President. Al 
 though often disappointed in the political action of the 
 national administration, and at times keenly grieved per 
 sonally because of political honors unworthily conferred, 
 or withheld from those he deemed most worthy of them, 
 he never for a moment lost sight of his paramount duty 
 to give unfaltering support to the government in the 
 great struggle for the maintenance of the Union. 
 
 The two men of the country who are distinctly upon 
 record as having appreciated the magnitude of the war 
 when it first began are General Sherman and Governor 
 Curtin. Sherman was judged a lunatic and relieved of 
 his command in Kentucky because he told the govern 
 ment the exact truth as to the magnitude of the rebellion 
 in the South-west and the forces necessary to overthrow 
 it. In a little time the country began to appreciate Sher 
 man s military intelligence. He was finally permitted to 
 go to the front in command of a division, and in his first 
 battle he proved himself to be one of the most skillful 
 and courageous of our generals. Curtin proved his ap 
 preciation of the necessities of our imperiled government 
 by issuing his proclamation on the 25th of April, 1861, 
 calling for twenty-five additional regiments of infantry 
 and one of cavalry to serve for three years or during the 
 war, in addition to the quota furnished by Pennsylvania 
 under the President s call of April 15, 1861, summoning 
 75,000 three months men to the field. This call of Cur 
 tin was made without the authority of the general gov 
 ernment, and entirely without the knowledge of the 
 President or Secretary of War. Pennsylvania and the 
 whole loyal North had been cut off from all communi 
 cation with the national capital for several days by trea 
 sonable rioters in Baltimore, who burned the railroad 
 bridges and prevented all railroad or even telegraphic 
 
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 253 
 
 communication with Washington. In this grave emer 
 gency, although Pennsylvania had furnished every man 
 called for by the government, and had offered many more 
 than the quota, after the most careful study of the situ 
 ation with General Robert Patterson and Colonel Fitz 
 John Porter, then serving as Assistant Adjutant-General, 
 and a number of civilians who were heartily sustaining 
 Curtin in his arduous labors, it was decided to assume 
 the responsibility of calling out twenty-six additional 
 regiments for service under the general government, be 
 cause it was believed by all that they would be needed as 
 speedily as they could be obtained. * 
 
 The requisition for troops made by Pennsylvania was 
 in pursuance of the unanimous judgment of the military 
 and civil authorities then at Harrisburg, and it was not 
 doubted that the government would gratefully accept 
 them. The response to Curtin s proclamation for vol- 
 
 * HEADQUARTERS 
 MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON, 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, April 25th, 1861. 
 SIR: 
 
 I feel it my duty to express to you my clear and decided opin 
 ion that the force at the disposal of this department should be 
 increased without delay. 
 
 I therefore have to request Your Excellency to direct that 
 twenty-five additional regiments of infantry and one regiment 
 of cavalry be called for forthwith, to be mustered into the service 
 of the United States. 
 
 Officers will be detailed to inspect and muster the men into 
 service as soon as I am informed of the points of rendezvous 
 which may be designated by Your Excellency. 
 I have the honor to be, with great respect, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 R. PATTERSON, 
 
 Major- Gen eral. 
 
 His Excellency ANDREW G. CURTIN, 
 Governor of Pennsylvania. 
 
254 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 unteers was unexampled, and in the few days during 
 which Harrisburg was without communication with 
 Washington thousands of patriotic men were crowding 
 the trains for the capital from every part of the State 
 to enter the military service. To the utter surprise of 
 the Governor and the commander of the department, 
 the first communication received from Washington after 
 notice of this requisition for additional troops had been 
 forwarded was a blunt refusal to receive any of the regi 
 ments under the new call; and to emphasize the attitude 
 of the government and its appreciation of the magnitude 
 of the war, Secretary Cameron stated in a dispatch to the 
 Governor not only that the troops could not be received, 
 but " that it was more important to reduce than enlarge 
 the number." Earnest appeals were made to the Presi 
 dent and the War Department from the Governor and 
 General Patterson to have these troops, or at least part 
 of them, accepted, but every such appeal was met with 
 a positive refusal. John Sherman, then as now Senator 
 from Ohio, was a volunteer aide on General Patterson s 
 staff, and he fully agreed with the authorities at Harris- 
 burg that it was of the utmost importance to the govern 
 ment that the additional Pennsylvania troops be accepted. 
 In view of his important political position and presumed 
 influence with the President and Secretary of War, he 
 was hurried to Washington as soon as communications 
 were opened to make a personal appeal for the accept 
 ance of the troops. On the 3oth of May, five days after 
 the requisition had been made, he wrote General Patter 
 son from Washington, stating that he had entirely failed 
 to persuade the government to accept any part of these 
 new regiments. It was not within the power of the gov 
 ernment to depose Governor Curtin and order him to 
 some military barracks as a lunatic, but it could rebuke 
 him for proposing to furnish a large number of addi- 
 
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 255 
 
 tional troops, when, as subsequent events proved, the 
 government had the most pressing need for them. For 
 tunately for the government and for the complete vindi 
 cation of the broad sagacity and heroic fidelity of Curtin, 
 he resolved to perform his duty to his State and nation 
 regardless of the Washington authorities. 
 
 After a bitter contest, in which some prominent Re 
 publicans opposed the Governor s recommendations, a 
 bill had been passed by the Legislature some weeks be 
 fore appropriating half a million of dollars to provide for 
 the defense of the State, and he had issued his call for 
 an extraordinary session of the Legislature as early as 
 the 2Oth of April to meet the great issue of civil war. 
 He revoked his proclamation for additional regiments 
 called for by General Patterson s requisition, but much 
 more than one-half the number called for had already 
 volunteered, and were practically in charge of the State 
 for organization. When the special session of the Leg 
 islature met on the 3Oth of April he sent an earnest mes 
 sage calling for the organization of the volunteers then 
 in camp into fifteen regiments as a State corps, but to be 
 subject to the call of the United States in any emergency. 
 It was this brave action of Curtin that gave us the Penn 
 sylvania Reserve Corps, whose heroism crimsoned nearly 
 every battle-field of the Army of the Potomac. These 
 troops were organized not only "without the aid of the 
 national government, but in defiance of its refusal to 
 accept them and of its positive declarations that they 
 could not and would not be needed. It was a most 
 heroic policy on the part of Curtin. It involved a loan 
 of $3,000,000 when the credit of the State was severely 
 strained, and every partisan or factional foe was inspired 
 to opposition by the known fact that the national govern 
 ment declared additional troops to be entirely unneces 
 sary. The Legislature and the people had faith in Cur- 
 
256 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 tin, had faith in his integrity, his patriotism, and his 
 judgment of the nation s peril, and the bill creating a 
 loan and organizing fifteen regiments of the Reserve 
 Corps was passed by an overwhelming majority in both 
 branches of the Legislature. He had around him a 
 number of leading men of both parties who cheerfully 
 gave their time and ceaseless labor to assist him. Among 
 those I recall who sat in his councils by day and night to 
 strengthen his hands by voluntary service on his staff 
 were such men as the late Thomas A. Scott, John A. 
 Wright, R. Biddle Roberts, Reuben C. Hale, and John 
 B. Parker, and Craig Biddle and Joseph E. Potts, who 
 yet survive. These men, as well as the military officers 
 on duty in Pennsylvania with General Patterson, all 
 heartily concurred in the policy of the Governor and 
 shared his vindication at an early day. 
 
 Even before the disastrous battle of Bull Run was 
 fought on the 2ist of July, two of the Reserve regiments 
 were called for by the government to march to Cumber 
 land to the relief of Colonel Wallace, and the regiments 
 commanded by Colonel Charles J. Biddle and Colonel 
 Simmons and a battery of artillery were on the march 
 the same day the order was received, and soon thereafter 
 the Tenth regiment followed. Notwithstanding the re 
 fusal to entertain the question of accepting these troops, 
 Curtin again tendered 4:he Reserve Corps to the govern 
 ment on the i8th of July, just before the battle of Bull 
 Run, and the same day brought orders from the War 
 Department that four regiments should be sent to Ha- 
 gerstown and the remaining, exclusive of those in West 
 Virginia, should be sent to Baltimore. These regiments 
 were encamped at Pittsburg, Easton, West Chester, and 
 Harrisburg, and the Governor at once ordered them to 
 march as requested by the Washington authorities. His 
 answer to the request to forward the troops was in these 
 
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 25? 
 
 words: " All the regiments have been ordered to Harris- 
 burg in obedience to your dispatch just received, and on 
 arrival will be immediately forwarded to the seat of war, 
 as previously ordered. If there is not time to muster 
 them in at this place, mustering officers can follow them 
 into the field." Had these troops been on the battle 
 field of Bull Run, as they could have been had not the 
 government persistently refused to accept them, it would 
 have given an overwhelming preponderance of numbers 
 to the Union forces, and doubtless reversed the disaster 
 of that day. On the night of July 2ist, when the gov 
 ernment learned that the army had been routed at Bull 
 Run, most frantic appeals were made to Curtin from the 
 Washington authorities to hasten his troops to the front 
 to save the National Capital, and within twenty-four 
 hours after the retreat of McDowell s army into the 
 Washington fortifications the welcome tread of the Penn 
 sylvania Reserves was heard on Pennsylvania Avenue, 
 and the panic was allayed and confidence restored by 
 regiment after regiment of the once-rejected troops 
 hurrying to Washington. One dispatch from the War 
 Department thus appeals to Curtin: " Get your regiments 
 at Harrisburg, Easton, and other points ready for imme 
 diate shipment. Lose no time in preparing. Make 
 things move to the utmost." Another dispatch said: 
 "To-morrow won t do for your regiments; you must 
 have them to-night. Send them to-night. It is of the 
 utmost importance." Another appeal to him said: u Stop 
 the regiment at Greencastle, and send it to Washington 
 to-night. Do not fail." Thus the war authorities that 
 had treated with contempt the appeals of Curtin to accept 
 the troops he had called for when cut off from the na 
 tional capital, in a few months thereafter sent the most 
 earnest appeals to him to save them from their own folly 
 17 
 
258 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 by forwarding the troops he had organized in defiance of 
 their protest. 
 
 I speak advisedly when I say that there was not a sin 
 gle new phase of the war at any time that did not sum 
 mon Curtin to the councils of Lincoln. He was the first 
 man called to Washington after the surrender of Sumter, 
 and I accompanied him in obedience to a like summons 
 to me as chairman of the Military Committee of the Sen 
 ate. Pennsylvania was to sound the keynote for all the 
 loyal States of the North in the utterance of her loyal 
 Governor, and her action was to be the example for 
 every other State of the Union. How grandly Curtin 
 performed that duty is proved by the fact that he organ 
 ized and furnished to the national government during 
 the war 367,482 soldiers, and organized, in addition to 
 that number, 87,000 for domestic defense during the 
 same period. New duties and grave responsibilities 
 were multiplied upon him every week, but he was al 
 ways equal to them, and was a tireless enthusiast in the 
 performance of his labors. Three times during the war 
 was his State invaded by the enemy, and at one time 
 90,000 of Lee s army, with Lee himself a,t their head, 
 were within the borders of our State on their way to 
 their Waterloo at Gettysburg. While responding with 
 the utmost promptness to every call of the national gov 
 ernment, whether for troops or for moral or political sup 
 port, he was most zealous in making provision for the 
 defense of his exposed people in the border counties. 
 He had an ample force within the State to protect the 
 border against raids by the, enemy, and would have saved 
 Chambersburg from destruction by the vandal torch, had 
 not his own State troops been ordered away from him to 
 save General Hunter after his disgraceful and disastrous 
 raid into Virginia in 1864. Hunter s vandalism had 
 justly inflamed the South, and when he was driven 
 
/AV( OLA AA D CUR TIN. 259 
 
 across the Potomac the Pennsylvania regiments organ 
 ized for the special defense of the State, being subject 
 to orders from Washington because mustered into the 
 United States service, passed through Chambersburg, 
 within forty-eight hours of the period of its destruction, 
 to join Hunter in Maryland and save him from the retri 
 bution his folly had invited. Had these Pennsylvania 
 troops remained subject to the orders of the State author 
 ities, they could have been in Chambersburg before 
 McCausland reached there, and would have outnum 
 bered him nearly three to one. Chambersburg was thus 
 destroyed solely because of the grave emergency that 
 called the State troops to the support of Hunter, and 
 they were almost within sound of McCausland s guns 
 when he opened on the defenseless people of Chambers 
 burg at daylight on the 3oth of July, 1864, before he 
 entered the town to destroy it. 
 
 Curtiii s relations with Stan ton were never entirely 
 cordial and at times embarrassing; but Lincoln always 
 interposed when necessary, and almost invariably sus 
 tained Curtin when a vital issue was raised between 
 them. The fact that Lincoln supported Curtin against 
 Stanton many times greatly irritated the Secretary of 
 War, and doubtless intensified his bitterness against the 
 Pennsylvania War Governor. In one notable instance 
 only, in which Curtin and Stanton were in bitter con 
 flict, did Lincoln hesitate to sustain Curtin, but Lincoln 
 was overruled by his military commanders and bowed to 
 their exactions with profound reluctance. In the winter 
 or early spring of 1864, Curtin, always alive to the inter 
 ests of humanity, and feeling keenly the sorrows of the 
 Pennsylvania soldiers who were in Southern prison-pens 
 suffering from disease and starvation, went to Washing 
 ton on three different occasions and appealed to both 
 Stanton and Lincoln for the exchange of prisoners as 
 
260 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 the Southern commissioners proposed. We then held 
 about 30,000 Southern prisoners, and the South held as 
 many or more of Union soldiers, and General Grant, 
 looking solely to military success, peremptorily refused 
 to permit the exchange of these men, because Lee would 
 gain nearly 30,000 effective soldiers, while most of the 
 30,000 Union prisoners would be unfit for service because 
 of illness. On Curtin s third visit to Washington on that 
 subject he was accompanied by Attorney-General Wil 
 liam M. Meredith, and they both earnestly pressed upon 
 the government the prompt exchange of prisoners. Stan- 
 ton grew impatient and even insolent, retorting to the 
 Governor s appeal: u Do you come here in support of the 
 government and ask me to exchange 30,000 skeletons for 
 30,000 well-fed men?" To which Curtin replied with 
 all the earnestness of his humane impulses: " Do you 
 dare to depart from the laws of humane warfare in this 
 enlightened age of Christian civilization?" Curtin and 
 Meredith carried their appeal to Lincoln, who shared all 
 of Curtin s sympathies for our suffering prisoners, and 
 who exerted himself to the utmost, only to effect a par 
 tial exchange. In 1863, when Curtin was a candidate 
 for re-election, Stanton gave most earnest support to his 
 cause, notwithstanding he rarely spoke of Curtin person 
 ally except with bitterness. Curtin keenly appreciated 
 what Stanton had done, and went to Washington soon 
 after his election with the purpose of paying his respects 
 to Stanton and thanking him for the hearty support he 
 had given him. A mutual acquaintance, who knew that 
 Curtin was in Washington to pay his respects to Stanton, 
 happened to meet Stanton during the evening and spoke 
 with much enthusiasm of Curtin s victory, and of his 
 presence there to visit and thank the Secretary of War. 
 Stanton replied in his cynical way : Yes, Pennsylvania 
 must be a damned loyal State to give such a victory to 
 
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 261 
 
 Curtin. " This was repeated to Curtin the same even 
 ing, and the result was that Curtin s visit to the War 
 Office was indefinitely postponed, and Stanton died 
 without having received the thanks that Curtin had in 
 tended for him. Soon after the war was over, however, 
 Stanton seemed to have justly appreciated Curtin, as he 
 wrote him a voluntary and most affectionate letter, re 
 viewing the great work he had done as Governor of 
 Pennsylvania, thanking him for his patriotism and fidel 
 ity, and offering a full apology for anything that he 
 might have done to give him unpleasant recollections. 
 Lincoln played a most conspicuous part in Curtin s 
 second nomination and re-election. So profoundly was 
 Curtin impressed with the necessity of uniting all par 
 ties in the support of the war for the suppression of the 
 rebellion that he was the first man to suggest his own 
 retirement from the office of Governor if the Democrats 
 would present the name of General William B. Frank 
 lin, a gallant Pennsylvania Democratic soldier. I was 
 present when Curtin first made this suggestion to a 
 number of his friends, and he made it with a degree of 
 earnestness that impressed every one. He said that it 
 was vastly more important to thus unite the whole 
 Democratic party with the Republicans on an honest 
 war platform than that any party or any individual 
 should win political success. So earnestly did he press 
 the matter that communication was opened with a num 
 ber of leading Democrats of the State, many of whom 
 regarded the suggestion with favor and sought to accom 
 plish it. Unfortunately for the Democracy, the more 
 Bourbon element controlled its councils and a Supreme 
 Judge who had declared the national conscription act 
 unconstitutional, thereby depriving the government of 
 the power to fill its wasted armies, was nominated for 
 Governor when the thunders of Lee s guns were heard 
 
262 LINCOLN AXD MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 in the Cumberland Valley and almost within hearing of 
 the capital where the convention sat. Had Franklin 
 been nominated by the Democrats, Cnrtin would have 
 publicly declared for him, and the Republican Conven 
 tion would have welcomed him as their candidate, re 
 gardless of his political faith. Failing in that move 
 ment, there seemed to be but one hopeful loyal candi 
 date for Governor Curtin himself. He was broken in 
 health and entirely unequal to the strain of a desperate 
 battle. In political contests he was expected to be 
 leader of leaders in Pennsylvania. In addition to his 
 shattered health, there were over 70,000 of his soldiers 
 in the field \vho had not then the constitutional right to 
 
 o 
 
 vote in their camps, while the bitter factional feud be 
 tween the Curtin and Cameron wings of the party seri 
 ously threatened his defeat. Curtiu s greatest desire, 
 next to the faithful fulfillment of the high responsi 
 bilities cast upon him, was to retire from public office 
 and recover his physical vigor. It was believed in his 
 own household that he could not survive another polit 
 ical campaign in which he was compelled to take the 
 lead. His devoted and estimable wife, who brightened 
 every public honor he attained, appealed to me with 
 tears in her eyes to take absolute measures to retire him 
 from the field, and the Governor heartily assented if he 
 could be permitted to retire in any way honorable to 
 himself. 
 
 Of Curtin s renomination there was no doubt what 
 ever if he permitted his name to be used, and it became 
 merely a question how he could retire gracefully. En 
 trusted with this matter, acting entirely upon my own 
 judgment, I went to Washington, called upon Colonel 
 Forney and told him my mission. I said: "Senator 
 Cameron will desire the retirement of Curtin because he 
 is his enemy; I desire it because I am his friend; may we 
 
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 263 
 
 not co-operate in bringing it about ? Cameron was sent 
 for; the matter was presented to him, and he at once said, 
 with some asperity, that u Curtin should be got rid of." 
 I suggested that if Lincoln would tender to Curtin a 
 foreign mission in view of his broken health, it would 
 solve the difficulty and enable Curtin to retire. To this 
 Cameron agreed, and within half an hour thereafter we 
 startled Lincoln by appearing before him together, ac 
 companied by Forney. It was the first time Cameron 
 and I had appeared before Lincoln to unite in asking 
 him to perform any public act. I stated the case briefly 
 but frankly, and he promptly responded that Curtin was 
 entitled to the honor suggested, and that it would be a 
 great pleasure to him to tender him the place. u But," 
 said he, "I m in the position of young Sheridan when 
 old Sheridan called him to task for his rakish conduct, 
 and said to him that he must take a wife; to which young 
 Sheridan replied: Very well, father, but whose wife shall 
 I take? It s all very well," he added, "to say that I 
 will give Curtin a mission, but whose mission am I to 
 take ? I would not offer him anything but a first-class 
 one. To this Cameron replied that a second-class mis 
 sion would answer the purpose, but Forney and I resented 
 that, and said that if a second-class mission was to be dis 
 cussed we had nothing further to say. Lincoln closed 
 the conference by suggesting that as it seemed to be my 
 affair I should call to see him in the morning. I did so, 
 when Lincoln handed me the following autograph letter, 
 tendering Curtin a first-class mission, to be accepted at 
 the close of his gubernatorial term: 
 
 EXECUTIVE MANSION, 
 WASHINGTON, April 13, 1863. 
 HONORABLE ANDREW G. CURTIN. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR : If, after the expiration of your present term as 
 Governor of Pennsylvania I shall continue in office here, and you 
 
LINCOLN AND CURTlN. 265 
 
 shall desire to go abroad, you can do so with one of the first-class 
 missions. Yours truly, 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 This letter I delivered to Curtin. The announcement 
 was at once made to the Associated Press that a foreign 
 mission had been tendered to Curtin, that he had signi 
 fied his acceptance of it, and that he would not be a can 
 didate for renomination for Governor. The popular de 
 mand for Curtin s renomination came with such emphasis 
 from every section of the State that within a few weeks 
 after his declination he was compelled to accept the can 
 didacy, and he was nominated in Pittsburg by an over 
 whelming majority on the first ballot, and after one of 
 the most desperate contests ever known in the State was 
 re-elected by over 15,000 majority, even with his soldiers 
 disfranchised. Lincoln exhibited unusual interest in that 
 struggle, and his congratulations to Curtin upon his re 
 election were repeated for several days, and were often as 
 quaint as they were sincere. 
 
 The secret of Curtin s re-election in 1863 was the de 
 votion of the Pennsylvania soldiers to him and his cause. 
 He was the earliest of all the Governors in the States to 
 devise and put into practical execution every measure 
 that could lessen the sorrows of war to his people. After 
 every battle in which Pennsylvania troops were engaged 
 Curtin was always among the first visitors to camp and 
 hospital, and his sympathetic hand was felt and his voice 
 heard by the sick and wounded. He had his official 
 commissioners to visit every part of the country in search 
 of Pennsylvania troops needing kind ministrations, and 
 early in the war he obtained legislative authority to 
 bring the body of every soldier who was killed or died 
 in the service home for burial at the cost of the State. 
 Every Pennsylvania soldier in the army felt that he had 
 
266 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 one friend upon whom he could always rely in the War 
 Governor of his State, and many hundreds of letters 
 poured in upon Curtin at the Capitol every day appeal 
 ing to him for redress from real or imaginary grievances, 
 every one of which was promptly answered. If injustice 
 was done to any Pennsylvania officer or any hindrance 
 of gallant men in the ranks from just promotion, an early 
 appeal to Curtin invariably brought him to the front to 
 correct it. It is not surprising, therefore, that when he 
 became a candidate for re-election and was assailed on 
 every side with bitterness, nearly every soldier in the 
 army, whether Democrat or Republican, appealed to his 
 people at home to support and vote for Curtin. While 
 the soldiers were themselves unable to testify their ap 
 preciation of their patriotic Governor at the polls, every 
 soldier at home on leave, however unskilled in rhetoric, 
 was a most eloquent advocate of Curtin s re-election, and 
 there was hardly a home in the State that had a soldier 
 in the field to which did not come earnest appeals by 
 letters to fathers and brothers to vote for the Soldier s 
 Friend. Thus was Curtin re-elected by a large majority, 
 and by the votes of Democrats who were influenced solely 
 by their sympathy with their sons and brothers in the 
 field whose gratitude to Curtin was reflected in almost 
 every family circle. 
 
 It was on Thanksgiving Day of 1863 that Curtin first 
 conceived the idea of State provision for the care and 
 education of the orphans of our fallen soldiers. While 
 on his way in Harrisburg to hear Dr. Robinson s Thanks 
 giving sermon, he was met by two shivering and starving 
 children, who piteously appealed to him to relieve them 
 of their distress, saying that their father had been killed 
 on the Peninsula and that their mother was broken in 
 health by her efforts to provide for them. He was so 
 deeply impressed and his sympathies so keenly aroused 
 
LINCOLN AND CURTIN. 267 
 
 by the children that he heard little of the eloquent ser 
 mon. He remembered that all over Pennsylvania there 
 were such orphans without home or bread, and he re 
 solved from that day that some provision should be made 
 for the care of these helpless little ones. Soon after he 
 presided at a meeting at which Henry Ward Beecher was 
 the speaker. Beecher had just returned from England, 
 where he had been most eloquent in his defense of the 
 Union cause, and he was welcomed in Pennsylvania with 
 enthusiasm by the loyal people. In Curtin s introductory 
 speech he, for the first time, made public allusion to the 
 duty of the State to provide for the orphans of our sol 
 diers who had fallen in battle, and the suggestion was 
 greeted with round after round of applause. Some time 
 before that period the Pennsylvania Railroad had placed 
 at the disposal of the State $50,000 to equip troops. The 
 money was received by Curtin, but he had no need to 
 use it for the equipment of troops, and if he had covered 
 it into the treasury, it would have merged into the gen 
 eral fund. This money lay idle on special deposit for 
 some months, and Curtin conceived the plan of making 
 it the basis of a fund for the care of our soldiers orphans. 
 To this President Thomson assented, and with $50,000 
 already assured, the Governor presented the subject to 
 the Legislature in his annual message, and earnestly 
 urged early action. There was much hesitation to sup 
 port such a bill, and no progress was made in it until 
 near the close of the session. The bill was finally de 
 feated, and when the next Legislature met Curtin ar 
 ranged with President Thomson for the transportation 
 of a large number of our soldiers orphans to visit Har- 
 risburg. They were sent free of cost for transportation, 
 and were received into the homes of generous people, ten 
 of them being guests of Curtin in the Executive Man 
 sion. They came bearing the flag under which their 
 
268 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 fathers had fallen, and the House received them at three 
 o clock, when patriotic speeches were made, the little 
 orphans sang patriotic songs, and Curtin made a most 
 eloquent appeal to the Legislature to make these chil 
 dren the wards of the commonwealth. The Legislature 
 speedily retraced its steps, passed the bill, and the Gov 
 ernor had the gratification of signing it the next morn 
 ing. Such was the beginning of the Soldiers Orphans 
 Schools which have lasted now for nearly thirty years, 
 w r hich have educated thousands and thousands of the 
 war orphans of the State, and are still performing that 
 humane mission to the few yet in our midst. In this 
 sublime beneficence to the helpless children of our heroes 
 Pennsylvania stands single and alone among the loyal 
 States, and there has not been a class of orphans in any 
 school in Pennsylvania that has not lisped the name of 
 Curtin with affectionate reverence. 
 
 Some of the most momentous official acts of Curtm s 
 public career have almost passed from the recollection 
 of the men of the present who lived at that day, yet they 
 rendered the greatest service to the national government 
 when it was in the gravest peril. After the disastrous 
 Peninsula campaign it became a necessity to summon a 
 large additional force to the field, and it was regarded as 
 a dangerous experiment in view of the despairing condi 
 tion of public sentiment in the North. Volunteering 
 had entirely ceased; there was at that time no national 
 conscription act; the appeal had to be made directly to 
 the States to raise their respective quotas of troops. As 
 was common in even- serious emergency, Curtin was 
 called into the councils of Lincoln, and the subject dis 
 cussed with a full appreciation of the solemn responsi 
 bilities that devolved upon both of them. It was Cur- 
 tin s suggestion that the Governors of the loyal States 
 should be conferred with and got to unite in a formal 
 
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 269 
 
 demand upon the President to call out a large additional 
 force. Eighteen loyal Governors responded, and on the 
 28th of June, 1862, they aroused every loyal heart in the 
 country by their bold demand for the promptest measures 
 to fill up our armies and for the most vigorous prosecu 
 tion of the war. The address concludes with this patri 
 otic sentence: u All believe that the decisive moment is 
 near at hand, and to that end the people of the United 
 States are desirous to aid promptly in furnishing all rein 
 forcements that you may deem necessary to sustain our 
 government. This address was delivered in person by 
 a number of the Governors themselves, and Lincoln re 
 plied: "Gentlemen: Fully concurring in the wisdom of 
 the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by 
 you in the communication of the 28th of June, I have 
 decided to call into the service an additional force of 
 300,000 men." The Altoona conference of the loyal 
 Governors was originally proposed by Curtin to Lincoln 
 and cordially approved by the President before the call 
 was issued. It was a supreme necessity to crystallize the 
 loyal sentiment of the country in support of the coming 
 and then clearly foreshadowed Emancipation policy. 
 Curtin telegraphed Governor Andrew of Massachusetts: 
 In the present emergency would it not be well that the 
 loyal Governors should meet at some point in the Border 
 States to take measures for the more active support of 
 the government?" The Governors of Massachusetts, 
 Ohio, and West Virginia responded promptly, and the 
 call was issued on the 14^1 of September, and the Al 
 toona conference met on the 24th, the day after the 
 Emancipation Proclamation had been published to the 
 world. There were seventeen Governors in attendance, 
 and after a full interchange of views, Curtin and Andrew 
 were charged with the duty of preparing an address to 
 the President and the country. That address, coming ar 
 
270 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 the united voice of the loyal States through their Gov 
 ernors, was regarded by Lincoln as of inestimable service 
 to the cause of the Union. It not only gave the keynote 
 for every loyal man to support the Emancipation policy, 
 but it suggested to the President to call out additional 
 troops to keep a reserve of 100,000 men for any emer 
 gency of the war.* 
 
 * In 1862, after the disaster on the Peninsula, and when I was 
 in New York under medical treatment and not able to receive my 
 personal friends, I sent for a newspaper and read of the defeat of 
 McClellan s army. Soon after a messenger came to see me from 
 Mr. Seward, who was at the Astor House, inviting me to meet 
 Mr. Seward, saying that he would come to see me if I could not 
 go to see him. With much risk and suffering I went at once to 
 the Astor House, where I found Mr. Seward with the Mayor of 
 New York and the Mayor of Philadelphia, who were then con 
 sidering the question of going to Boston. Mr. Seward gave me 
 all the telegrams from the front, which I read carefully, and found 
 that of McClellan s army there w r ere not over 80,000 effectives left. 
 I suggested to Mr. Seward that it might be better to ask the Gov 
 ernors of the loyal States than the Mayors of our cities to unite 
 in an address to the President, asking for a more vigorous prose 
 cution of the war and an immediate call for additional troops. 
 He asked me to put it in writing. I did so, and he immediately 
 telegraphed it to the President, who promptly answered that it 
 was just what he wanted done. I at once prepared a telegram 
 to the other Governors, and Colonel Scott, who happened to be 
 there, hurried it off to all the Governors of the loyal States. Ap 
 proving answers were received from all but Governor Andrew, 
 who made the objection that a public policy should be declared, 
 which of course meant Emancipation. The names of the Gov 
 ernors were appended to the paper, and it was immediately re 
 turned to Lincoln. Governor Andrew afterward acquiesced, and 
 I then wrote him asking his views as to the propriety of calling 
 the loyal Governors to meet at Altoona for the purpose of declar 
 ing a policy and demanding a more vigorous prosecution of the 
 war. He agreed to it at once, and we commenced writing and 
 telegraphing to the Governors, and I had favorable answers to 
 all excepting Governor Morgan of New York, whose relations 
 with me were not friendly. Governor Andrew, Governor Todd, 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 ANDREW G. QURTIN, 1892. 
 
272 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIAIES. 
 
 Thus, from the day that Curtin welcomed Lincoln in 
 the Hall of the House of Representatives at Harrisburg 
 when on his way to be inaugurated, until their last meet 
 ing in the same hall when it was the chamber of death, 
 and sorrowing patriots passed silently through it to take 
 their last look upon the face of the martyred President, 
 he was side by side with Lincoln in every trial; and, 
 backed by his great State, he was enabled to render a 
 service to the President and to the country unapproached 
 by any other Governor of the Union. How gratefully 
 his public record was appreciated by the people of Penn 
 sylvania of that day is clearly shown by reference to the 
 journals of our Legislature of April 12, 1866, when a 
 resolution was passed, by unanimous vote in both 
 branches, thanking him, in the name of Pennsylvania, 
 "for the fidelity with which, during the four years of 
 war by which our country was ravaged and its free in 
 stitutions threatened, he stood by the national govern 
 ment and cast into the scales of loyalty and the Union 
 the honor, the wealth, and the strength of the State." 
 These resolutions were offered in the House by Repre- 
 
 and myself consulted Mr. Lincoln, and he highly approved of 
 bur purpose. In that interview he did not attempt to conceal 
 the fact that we were upon the eve of an Emancipation policy, 
 and he had from us the assurance that the Altoona conference 
 would cordially endorse such a policy. All that was done at the 
 Altoona conference had the positive approval of President Lin 
 coln in advance, and he well understood that the whole purpose 
 of the movement was to strengthen his hands and support the 
 bolder policy that all then knew was inevitable. The address 
 presented to Mr. Lincoln from the Altoona conference was pre 
 pared by Governor Andrew and myself. I did not then doubt 
 that it would lose us the coming election in Pennsylvania, and 
 so said to Mr. Lincoln, but I believed that the country then knew 
 what the war was about, and that it was time to bring slavery to 
 the front as the great issue. Ex-Governor Curtin s Letter to the 
 Author, Feb. 16, 1892. 
 
LINCOLN AND CUR TIN. 273 
 
 sentative Ruddiman, the Republican leader of that body, 
 and were passed by a vote of 97 ayes and no nays, being 
 within 3 of the entire membership of the body.* On 
 the same day the resolutions were called up in the Sen 
 ate by Senator Wallace, the Democratic leader of that 
 body, and on the call of the ayes and nays received the 
 vote of every Senator. No Governor of any State ever 
 received such a tribute as this from all parties when 
 about to retire from his high office after six years of ser 
 vice during the most heated partisan and factional strife 
 
 * Whereas, The term of His Excellency Andrew G. Curtin as 
 Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will expire 
 with the present year, and the Legislature of the State will not 
 stand toward him in the relation of official courtesy and personal 
 regard which they have heretofore sustained; 
 
 And whereas, This House cannot contemplate his course dur 
 ing the recent struggle of our country without admiration of the 
 patriotism which made him one of the earliest, foremost, and 
 most constant of the supporters of the government, and without 
 commendation of the spirit which has prompted him with un 
 tiring energy and at the sacrifice of personal repose and health 
 to give to the soldier in the field and in the hospital, and to the 
 cause for which the soldier fell and died, fullest sympathy and 
 aid; be it 
 
 Resolved, That in the name of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl 
 vania we tender to Governor Curtin our thanks for the fidelity 
 with which, during the four years of war by which our country 
 was ravaged and its free institutions threatened, he stood by the 
 national government and cast into the scale of loyalty and the 
 Union the honor, the wealth, and strength of the State. 
 
 Resolved, That by his devotion to his country, from the dark 
 hour in which he pledged to the late lamented President of the 
 United States the faith and steadfast support of our people, he 
 has gained for his name an historical place and character, and 
 while rendering himself deserving of the nation s gratitude he 
 has added lustre to the fame and glory to the name of the Com 
 monwealth over which he has presided during two terms of office 
 with so much ability, and in which he has tempered dignity with 
 kindness and won the high respect and confidence of the people. 
 18 
 
274 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 ever known in our political history. Again on the 6th 
 of April, 1869, when he had been a private citizen for 
 several years, the Legislature passed joint resolutions of 
 thanks to President Grant for his appointment of Curtin 
 as Minister to Russia, and they received the vote of every 
 member present of both branches, and were approved by 
 Governor Geary on the following day.* In 1868 the 
 Republican State Convention proclaimed Curtin with 
 almost entire unanimity for the Vice-Presidency of the 
 United States on the ticket with Grant, who was then 
 the accepted candidate of the party for President, and I 
 went to Chicago as chairman of the Pennsylvania dele 
 gation to present his name and cast the vote of the State 
 for her honored War Governor. 
 
 Political necessities rather than individual merit con 
 trolled the National Convention, and Schuyler Colfax 
 
 * Joint Resolutions relative to the appointment of Andrew 
 Gregg Curtin Minister to Russia: 
 
 Whereas, His Excellency the President of the United States 
 has appointed Andrew Gregg Curtin, the former Chief Magis 
 trate of this Commonwealth, to a high and responsible position 
 in the representation at the Court of the ruler of the European 
 nation whose boast is that he has always been a friend of the 
 United States of America; 
 
 Be it resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met, 
 That the best wishes of the members of this Assembly be con- 
 ve} r ed to His Excellency Andrew G. Curtin, Minister Plenipo 
 tentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the United States at St. 
 Petersburg, Russia, for his restoration to health, so much impaired 
 by his heroic and constant labors in behalf of this Commonwealth, 
 and that he has and always will receive the grateful assurance of 
 the high regard and esteem in which he is held by his fellow-citi 
 zens, without regard to partisan views, on account of the noble 
 and self-sacrificing spirit displayed by him alike in the hours of 
 victory and defeat, and the fidelity with which he executed the 
 solemn and responsible trusts committed to his hands by his fel 
 low-citizens, 
 
Lf. \COLiY A* T D CURTIN. 275 
 
 was taken to turn the scale in doubtful Indiana; but 
 Curtin was, as ever, in the front of the battle, as Grant 
 gratefully acknowledged by nominating him as Minister 
 to Russia a few days after the inauguration. He had 
 been offered the same mission by President Johnson sev 
 eral years earlier, but his fidelity to the cause that had 
 enlisted the best efforts of his life forbade his even con 
 sidering it. In the Republican revolt against the des 
 potic political and sectional policy of Grant in 1872, 
 Curtin sincerely sympathized with the Liberals, and he 
 resigned his mission to obtain freedom in political action. 
 When on his way home he was met in both Paris and 
 London by authorized offers of either of those missions 
 if he would remain abroad, but he declined. On his 
 return home he was nominated by the Liberal Repub 
 licans for delegate-at-large to the Constitutional Conven 
 tion, and Ex-Governor Bigler voluntarily retired from 
 the Democratic ticket to enable that party to tender Cur 
 tin an unanimous nomination, resulting in his election. 
 His exceptional experience in State government made 
 him one of the most practical and useful members of 
 the body, and many of the most beneficent reforms of 
 the new fundamental law are of his creation. In 1880, 
 and again in 1882 and 1884, he was elected to Congress, 
 and during his six years of service in the House he was 
 the favorite of every social and political circle. Since 
 then he has enjoyed the mellow evening of his life in his 
 mountain-home, where every face brightens at his com 
 ing, and on every hillside and valley of the State there 
 are grizzled veterans and their children and their chil 
 dren s children whose hearts throb with grateful emotion 
 as they speak of the Soldier s Friend. 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 THADDKUS STEVENS, l866. 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN and Thaddeus Stevens were 
 strangely mated. Lincoln as President and Stevens 
 as Commoner of the nation during the entire period of our 
 sectional war assumed the highest civil responsibilities in 
 the administrative and legislative departments of the gov 
 ernment. While Lincoln was President of the whole peo 
 ple, Stevens, as Commoner, was their immediate represen 
 tative and oracle in the popular branch of Congress when 
 the most momentous legislative measures of our history 
 were conceived and enacted. No two men were so much 
 alike in all the sympathy of greatness for the friendless 
 and the lowly, and yet no two men could have been 
 more unlike in the methods by which they sought to 
 obtain the same great end. Lincoln s humanity was 
 one of the master attributes of his character, and it was 
 next to impossible for him to punish even those most de 
 serving of it. In Stevens humanity and justice were 
 singularly blended, and while his heart was ever ready 
 to respond to the appeal of sorrow, he was one of the 
 sternest of men in the administration of justice upon 
 those who had oppressed the helpless. No man pleaded 
 so eloquently in Congress for the deliverance of the bond 
 men of the South as did Stevens, and he made ceaseless 
 battle for every measure needed by ignorant freedmen for 
 the enjoyment of their rights obtained through the mad 
 ness of Southern rebellion ; and there was no man of all 
 
27 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 our statesmen whose voice was so eloquent for the swift 
 punishment of the authors of the war. He declared on 
 the floor of Congress that if he had the power he would 
 summon a military commission to try, convict, and exe 
 cute Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the rebellion 
 " for the murders at Andersonville, the murders at Salis 
 bury, and the shooting down of prisoners-of-war in cold 
 blood;" and when the whole world was shocked by the 
 relentless vengeance of Juarez in the summary execution 
 of Maximilian, he was the one man of Congress who rose 
 and boldly defended the Mexican President; and his 
 ground of defence was that Maximilian had sought to 
 usurp power from the weak. Lincoln s humanity was 
 always predominant in his nature and always reflected 
 itself in his public and private acts. He never signed a 
 death-warrant unless it w r as absolutely unavoidable, and 
 then always with a degree of sorrow that could not be con 
 cealed. He earnestly desired that Davis and all South 
 ern leaders who might be called to account after the war 
 for precipitating the nation into fraternal strife should 
 safely escape from the country; and Maximilian could 
 not have appealed in vain to Lincoln for his life had it 
 been within his power to save him. Such were the con 
 flicting attributes of the two great civil leaders of the 
 country during the war. Each filled his great trust with 
 masterly fidelity, and the opposing qualities of each were 
 potent upon the other. 
 
 The country lias almost forgotten the exceptionally re 
 sponsible position of Stevens as the Great Commoner of 
 our civil war. It is the one high trust of a free govern 
 ment that must be won solely by ability and merit. The 
 Commoner of a republic is the organ of the people, and 
 he can hold his place only when all confess his pre-emi 
 nent qualities for the discharge of his duties. Presi 
 dents, Cabinets, Senators, and Representatives may be 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 279 
 
 accidents. Fortuitous circumstances or sudden muta 
 tions in politics may create any of these civil function 
 aries in a popular government to serve their brief terms 
 and pass away into forgetfulness, but the Commoner of 
 the nation must be the confessed leader of leaders. 
 Mere popular attributes are valueless in struggling for 
 such a place. Only he who can come to the front when 
 ever occasion calls, lead discordant elements to a common 
 end, and maintain his position in all the sudden changes 
 of a mercurial body can go into history as an American 
 Commoner; and Stevens grandly, undisputedly, met these 
 high requirements. There were those around him in 
 Congress much riper in experience in national legis 
 lation, for he had served but six years in the House 
 when the war began, and four of those were nearly a 
 decade before the rebellion ; but when the great conflict 
 came before which all but the bravest-hearted quailed, 
 Stevens supreme ability and dauntless courage made 
 him speedily accepted by all as the leader of the popular 
 branch of Congress. In all the conflicts of opinion and 
 grave doubts among even the sincerest of men as to the 
 true policy of the government in meeting armed rebel 
 lion, Stevens was the one man who never faltered, who 
 never hesitated, who never temporized, but who was ready 
 to meet aggressive treason with the most aggressive as 
 saults. He and Lincoln worked substantially on the 
 same lines, earnestly striving to attain the same ends, 
 but Stevens was always in advance of public sentiment, 
 while Lincoln ever halted until assured that the con 
 siderate judgment of the nation would sustain him. 
 Stevens was the pioneer who was ever in advance of the 
 government in every movement for the suppression of 
 the rebellion, whether by military or civil measures. He 
 always wanted great armies, heroic chieftains, and relent 
 less blows, and he was ready to follow the overthrow of 
 
2 So LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 rebellion with the sternest retributive policy. He had 
 faith that the people would sustain the war that they 
 would patriotically submit to any sacrifice of blood and 
 treasure necessary to preserve the Union and overthrow 
 slavery that was the cause of fraternal conflict, and he 
 was always in the lead in pressing every measure that 
 promised to weaken the slave power in any part of the 
 Union. 
 
 Lincoln was inspired by the same patriotic purpose 
 and sympathies with Stevens in everything but his pol 
 icy of vengeance. Lincoln possessed the sagacity to 
 await the fullness of time for all things, and thus he 
 failed in nothing. These two great civil leaders were 
 not in close personal relations. Stevens was ever im 
 patient of Lincoln s tardiness, and Lincoln was always 
 patient with Stevens advanced and often impracticable 
 methods. Stevens was a born dictator in politics; Lin 
 coln a born follower of the people, but always wisely aid 
 ing them to the safest judgment that was to be his guide. 
 When Stevens proposed the abolition of slavery in the 
 District of Columbia, and followed it with the extension 
 of the elective franchise to the liberated slaves, very 
 many of his party followers in the House faltered and 
 threatened revolt, and only a man of Stevens iron will 
 and relentless mastery could have commanded a solid 
 party vote for the measures which were regarded by 
 many as political suicide. I sat by him one morning 
 in the House before the session had opened when the 
 question of negro suffrage in the District of Columbia 
 was about to be considered, and I heard a leading Penn 
 sylvania Republican approach him to protest against 
 committing the party to that policy. Stevens grim face 
 And cold gray eye gave answer to the man before his bit 
 ter words were uttered. He waved his hand to the trem 
 bling suppliant and bade him go to his seat and vote for 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 281 
 
 the measure or confess himself a coward to the world. 
 The Commoner was obeyed, for had disobedience fol 
 lowed the offender would have been proclaimed to his 
 constituents, over the name of Stevens, as a coward, and 
 that would have doomed him to defeat. 
 
 The relations between Lincoln and Stevens were 
 always friendly, but seldom cordial. Stevens did not 
 favor the nomination of Lincoln in 1860, although he 
 voted for him as a second choice in preference to Seward. 
 He was the champion of John McLean for President, 
 and presented the anomaly of the most radical Repub 
 lican leader of the country, Giddings excepted, support 
 ing the most conservative candidate for the Presidency. 
 He was politician enough to understand that there was 
 a large conservative element, especially in Pennsylvania 
 and Indiana, that had to be conciliated to elect a Repub 
 lican President, and he loved McLean chiefly because 
 McLean had dared to disobey the commands of Jackson 
 when in his Cabinet. He was again a delegate when 
 Lincoln was renominated in 1864, and he voted for Lin 
 coln simply because it was not possible to nominate any 
 other man more in accord with his convictions; but in 
 neither of these conventions, in both of which he voted 
 for Lincoln, was he enthusiastic in Lincoln s cause. He 
 had faith in Lincoln s patriotism and integrity, but he 
 believed him weak because he kept far behind Stevens 
 in his war measures, and he was especially bitter against 
 the nomination of Johnson for Vice-President instead 
 of Hamlin, but he permitted his vote to be recorded for 
 Johnson in obedience to the obvious purpose of his own 
 delegation and of the convention to nominate him. I 
 sat close by him in the first informal meeting of the 
 Pennsylvania delegation in Baltimore in 1864, and, being 
 a delegate-at-large, I was one of the first four who voted 
 on the choice for Vice-President. When I voted for 
 
282 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Johnson, Stevens was startled, and turning to me he 
 said in a tone of evident bitterness, "Can t yon find a 
 candidate for Vice-President in the United States, with 
 out going down to one of those damned rebel provinces 
 to pick one up ?" I gave a kind answer and evaded dis 
 cussion of the subject. He had no personal love for 
 either of the candidates for whom his own vote had been 
 finally cast, but his hatred of McClellan called out his 
 fiercest invective and made him ready to do tireless battle 
 for his defeat. He harshly judged all men who pretended 
 to prosecute the war while protecting slavery, and he be 
 lieved that McClellan was a traitor to the cause for which 
 he was leading his armies, and, believing it, he declared 
 it. 
 
 Stevens never saw Lincoln during the war except when 
 necessity required it. It was not his custom to fawn 
 upon power or flatter authority, and his free and incisive 
 criticism of public men generally prevented him from 
 being in sympathetic touch with most of the officials 
 connected with the administration. He was one of the 
 earliest of the party leaders to demand the unconditional 
 and universal freedom of the slaves, and he often grieved 
 Lincoln sorely by his mandatory appeals for an Emanci 
 pation Proclamation, and by the keen satire that only he 
 could employ against those who differed from him. It 
 was known to but few that he suffered a serious disap 
 pointment from Lincoln when Cameron was appointed 
 to the Cabinet. Stevens took no part in the contest for 
 a Pennsylvania Cabinet officer until after it became 
 known that Lincoln had revoked his offer of a Cabinet 
 portfolio to Cameron about the ist of January. Stevens 
 then entered the field with great earnestness as a candi 
 date for the Cabinet himself, and the position he desired 
 was that of Secretary of the Treasury. In obedience to 
 his invitation I met him at Harrisburg, and found him 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 283 
 
 more interested in reaching the Cabinet than I had ever 
 known him in any of his political aspirations. Later, 
 when Cameron became again prominent as a Cabinet 
 expectant, Stevens bitterly protested, and when Cam 
 eron s appointment was announced he felt personally 
 aggrieved, although few even of his most intimate ac 
 quaintances had any knowledge of it. It was his second 
 disappointment in his efforts to reach Cabinet honors. 
 In December, 1839, when the Whig National Convention 
 was about to meet at Harrisburg to decide whether Clay, 
 Harrison, or Scott should be honored with the candidacy, 
 Harrison sent to Stevens by Mr. Piirdy an autograph 
 letter voluntarily proposing that if Harrison should be 
 nominated and elected President, Stevens would be made 
 a member of his Cabinet. Stevens was one of the most 
 potent of the political leaders in that convention, and he 
 finally controlled the nomination for Harrison. He never 
 saw or heard from Harrison from that time until he was 
 inaugurated as President, and he was astounded when 
 the Cabinet was nominated to the Senate to find his 
 name omitted. So reticent was he as to Harrison s pre 
 vious proffer of the position that Mr. Burroughs, who 
 was at the head of the Pennsylvanians in Washington 
 urging Stevens appointment, was never advised of the 
 promise he held from Harrison for the place. Harrison 
 died too early to feel the retribution that would surely 
 have come from Stevens, but in his second disappoint 
 ment Stevens was face to face with Lincoln and side by 
 side with him until death divided them. Only once 
 during Lincoln s administration can I recall Stevens 
 positive and enthusiastic commendation of Lincoln, and 
 that was when he issued his Emancipation Proclamation 
 in 1862. He then believed in Lincoln, and expected a 
 rapid advance in every line of aggression against slavery 
 and rebellion, but soon new causes of dissent arose be- 
 
284 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES, 
 
 tween them, as Stevens called for the speedy confiscation 
 of property of those in rebellion and for the punishment 
 of all who were responsible for the civil war. Thus they 
 continued during the whole period of Lincoln s adminis 
 tration, both earnestly working to solve the same great 
 problems in the interest of free government, and yet sel 
 dom in actual harmony in their methods and policies. 
 
 I am quite sure that Stevens respected Lincoln much 
 more than he would have respected any other man in 
 the same position with Lincoln s convictions of duty. 
 He could not but appreciate Lincoln s generous forbear- 
 ance even with all of Stevens irritating conflicts, and 
 Lincoln profoundly appreciated Stevens as one of his 
 most valued and useful co-workers, and never cherished 
 resentment even when Stevens indulged in his bitterest 
 sallies of wit or sarcasm at Lincoln s tardiness. Strange 
 as it may seem, these two great characters, ever in con 
 flict and yet ever battling for the same great cause, ren 
 dered invaluable service to each other, and unitedly ren 
 dered incalculable service in saving the Republic. Had 
 Stevens not declared for the abolition of slavery as soon 
 as the war began, and pressed it in and out of season, 
 Lincoln could not have issued his Emancipation Procla 
 mation as early as September, 1862. Stevens was ever 
 clearing the underbrush and preparing the soil, while 
 Lincoln followed to sow the seeds that were to ripen in 
 a regenerated Union; and while Stevens was ever hast 
 ening the opportunity for Lincoln to consummate great 
 achievements in the steady advance made for the over 
 throw of slavery, Lincoln wisely conserved the utter 
 ances and efforts of Stevens until the time became fully 
 ripe when the harvest could be gathered. I doubt not 
 that Stevens, had he been in Lincoln s position, would 
 have been greatly sobered by the responsibility that the 
 President must accept for himself alone, and I doubt not 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 285 
 
 that if Lincoln had been a Senator or Representative in 
 Congress, he would have declared in favor of Emancipa 
 tion long before he did it as President. Stevens as Com 
 moner conld afford to be defeated, to have his aggressive 
 measures postponed, and to take up the battle for them 
 afresh as often as he was repulsed; but the President 
 could proclaim no policy in the name of the Republic 
 without absolute assurance of its success. Each in his 
 great trust attained the highest possible measure of suc 
 cess, and the two men who more than all others blended 
 the varied currents of their efforts and crystallized them 
 in the unchangeable policy of the goverment were Abra 
 ham Lincoln and Thaddeus Stevens. 
 
 After the death of Lincoln, Stevens was one of t>ie 
 earliest of the Republican leaders to place himself in an 
 aggressively hostile attitude to Johnson, and he persisted 
 in it with tireless energy until he performed his last great 
 task in his plea before the Senate for the conviction of 
 the President under articles of impeachment preferred 
 by the House. He was then greatly enfeebled by broken 
 health, but his mental powers were unabated. I remem 
 ber meeting him one morning in acting Vice- President 
 Wade s room of the Capitol, before the meeting of the 
 Senate, when the impeachment trial was in progress. 
 Chase had just startled some of the Republican leaders 
 by rulings which foreshadowed the probable acquittal 
 of Johnson. Stevens came limping into Wade s room, 
 dropped into an easy-chair, and at once opened his in 
 vective upon Chase. He ended his criticism of the trial 
 with these words: "It is the meanest case, before the 
 meanest tribunal, and on the meanest subject of human 
 history." After the acquittal of Johnson he seemed al 
 most entirely hopeless of preserving the fruits of the vic 
 tory won by our armies in the overthrow of the rebellion. 
 I remember meeting him at his house some three weeks 
 
286 LINCOLN AND MEN OP WAR-TIMES. 
 
 before his death. He spoke of the perfidy of Johnson 
 with great bitterness, and seemed clouded with gloom as 
 to the achievements of his own life. He then hoped to 
 go to Bedford Springs to recover sufficient vigor to be 
 able to resume his seat at the next session, but he saw 
 little of the future that promised restoration of the Union 
 with justice to the liberated slaves. Although he was the 
 acknowledged Commoner of the war, and the acknow 
 ledged leader of the House as long as he was able to re 
 tain his seat after the war had closed, he said, " My life 
 has been a failure. With all this great struggle of years 
 in Washington, and the fearful sacrifice of life and trea 
 sure, I see little hope for the Republic." After a mo 
 ment s pause his face suddenly brightened, and he said, 
 After all, I may say that my life has not been entirely 
 vain. When I remember that I gave free schools to 
 Pennsylvania, my adopted State, I think my life may 
 have been worth the living. He had lately reprinted 
 his speech delivered in the Pennsylvania House in 1835 
 that changed the body from its purpose to repeal the 
 free-school law, and he handed me a copy of it, say 
 ing, "That was the proudest effort of my life. It gave 
 schools to the poor and helpless children of the State." 
 Thus did the Great Commoner of the nation, crowned 
 with the greenest laurels of our statesmanship, turn back 
 more than a generation from his greatest achievements 
 because they were incomplete, although fully assured, 
 to find the silver lining to the many disappointments 
 of his life. 
 
 Stevens, like Lincoln, had few intimate acquaintances, 
 and no one in whom he implicitly confided. That he 
 had had some untold sorrow was accepted by all who 
 knew him well, but none could venture .to invade the 
 sacred portals of his inner life. He seldom spoke of 
 himself, but his grim, cynical smile and his pungent 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 287 
 
 invective against the social customs of the times pro 
 claimed his love of solitude, except when his lot could 
 be cast with the very few congenial spirits he found 
 around him. One name alone ever brightened his stern 
 face and kindled the gray eye that was so often lustre 
 less, and that name was "mother." He loved to speak 
 of her, and when he did so all the harsh lines of his 
 countenance disappeared to give place to the tenderness 
 of a child. That one devotion was like an oasis in the 
 desert of his affections, and, regardless of his individual 
 convictions, he reverenced everything taught him by his 
 mother. In his will he provided that the sexton of her 
 little churchyard in the bleak hills of Vermont should 
 ever keep her grave green, "and plant roses and other 
 cheerful flowers at each of the four corners of said grave 
 every spring." He also made a devise of $1000 to aid 
 in the building of a Baptist church in Lancaster, giving 
 in the will this reason for it: "I do this out of respect to 
 the memory of my mother, to whom I owe what little 
 prosperity I have had on earth, which, small as it is, I 
 desire emphatically to acknowledge." 
 
 I need hardly say that a man of Stevens positive and 
 aggressive qualities left an enduring record of his great 
 ness in both the statutes and the fundamental law of the 
 nation. Unlike his distinguished fellow-townsman, Pres 
 ident Buchanan, who with all his long experience in both 
 branches of Congress never formulated a great measure 
 to stand as a monument of his statesmanship, Stevens 
 was the master-spirit of every aggressive movement in 
 Congress to overthrow the rebellion and slavery. His 
 views of the civil war and of reconstruction were point 
 edly presented in the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862. 
 It was a radical measure, and clearly foreshadowed the 
 employment of freedmen in the military service of the 
 Union. It was practically the abolition of slavery by 
 
2&S LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Congress under the war powers of the government. Lin 
 coln saw that the passage of the bill was inevitable, and 
 he took occasion to make known the fact that it could 
 not meet with his approval, because it assumed that Con 
 gress had the power to abolish slavery within a State. 
 He went so far as to prepare a veto, but Stevens wisely 
 obviated the necessity of a veto by consenting to an ex 
 planatory joint resohition of Congress relieving the bill of 
 its acutely offensive features, and Lincoln signed the bill 
 and the explanatory resolutions together. Stevens was 
 the author of the Fourteenth Amendment to the national 
 Constitution, although it was not accepted as he would 
 have preferred it. This new article of the fundamental 
 law, next to the Thirteenth Article abolishing slavery, is 
 the most important of all the actions of Congress relating 
 to reconstruction. It conferred unchangeably upon the 
 liberated slaves the high right of American citizenship, 
 and made it impossible for any State to abridge the privi 
 leges of any race. It also limited representation to the 
 enfranchised voters of the States; it made the validity 
 of the public debt absolutely sacred; prohibited the as 
 sumption or payment of Confederate debt by any State; 
 and it disqualified most of the Southern leaders from ever 
 again enjoying citizenship unless their disability were 
 relieved by a two- thirds vote of Congress. Stevens w r as 
 bitterly opposed to the provision allowing restoration to 
 citizenship of any who had taken the oath of office, mili 
 tary or civil, to support the government and afterward 
 engaged in the rebellion, but, being unable to obtain the 
 absolute disqualification of those men, he accepted the 
 gravest obstacles that he could interpose against the res 
 toration of civil rights. His policy of reconstruction, 
 exclusive of his fierce confiscation and retributive pur 
 poses, would have been a priceless blessing to the South, 
 although at the time it would have been accepted as ex- 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 289 
 
 tremely vindictive. He would have held the rebellious 
 States as provinces and governed them as Territories, to 
 await the period when they might with safety be restored 
 to the Union. Had that policy been adopted the desola 
 tion almost worse than war would have been averted in 
 the Southern States. Sadly as the people of the South 
 were impoverished by war, the greatest humiliation they 
 ever suffered was in the rule of the carpet-bagger and 
 the adventurer who despoiled them of safety and credit 
 and ran riot in every channel of State authority. Had 
 they been held as provinces there would have been peace, 
 their industries would have been speedily revived, mu 
 tual confidence between the North and South would have 
 rapidly strengthed, and in a very few years at the most 
 they would have resumed their position in the galaxy of 
 States; and universal negro suffrage would not have been 
 in the cup of bitterness they had to drain. Stevens was 
 bitterly denounced by many for his vindictive recon 
 struction policy; but, stripped of its utterly impracti 
 cable and impossible confiscation and retributive fea 
 tures, it would have been the wisest policy for both 
 North and South that could have been adopted. 
 
 It is a common belief that on the question of recon 
 struction and on many other questions relating to the 
 war Stevens planted himself entirely above the Consti 
 tution and acted in utter contempt of the supreme law. 
 I have heard thoughtless and malicious people many 
 times quote him as having said Damn the Constitu 
 tion!" but Stevens never uttered or cherished such a 
 sentiment. He defined his views on the subject so 
 clearly that none could mistake them in his speech giv 
 ing his reasons for voting for the admission of West 
 Virginia as a State. He quoted the requirements of the 
 Constitution, and said that it was a mockery to assume 
 that the provisions of the Constitution had been com- 
 19 
 
2QO LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 plied with. He did not justify or excuse his vote in 
 favor of the creation of a new State because of his dis 
 regard of, or contempt for, the Constitution. On the 
 contrary, he presented the unanswerable argument that 
 Virginia was in rebellion against the government and 
 the Constitution, and had been conceded belligerent 
 rights by our government and by the governments of 
 Europe, thus making her subject to the rules of war 
 governing a public enemy, whereby she placed herself 
 beyond the pale of the Constitution and had no claim 
 upon its protecting attributes. He said, u We may ad 
 mit West Virginia as a new State, not by virtue of any 
 provision in the Constitution, but under the absolute 
 power which the laws of war give us under the circum 
 stances in which we are placed. I shall vote for this bill 
 upon that theory, and upon that alone, for I will not 
 stultify myself by supposing that we have any warrant 
 in the Constitution for this proceeding." The logic that 
 a belligerent power, recognized by ourselves and by the 
 world, was entirely beyond the protecting power of our 
 Constitution was indisputable, and in that case, as in all 
 cases, he always maintained the sanctity of the Consti 
 tution to all who had not become public enemies with 
 conceded belligerent rights. 
 
 Being outside the pale of the Constitution in war, he 
 held that the insurgent States occupied the legal status 
 of conquered enemies when the war closed, and upon 
 that theory was based his whole policy of reconstruction, 
 including the confiscation of property and the punish 
 ment of the leaders of the rebellion. That he was ab 
 stractly right in his interpretation of the laws of war 
 cannot be questioned, however widely others may differ 
 from him in the expediency or justice of the measures 
 he proposed. He was one of the first to appreciate the 
 truth that President Johnson had adopted a policy of re- 
 
FAC-SIMII.E; OF BETTER FROM STEVENS. 
 
292 LINCOLN A\D MEN OF WAR-TJMES. 
 
 construction that the Republican party could not sustain. 
 In this I heartily agreed with him, and one of my most 
 valued mementos of the men of war-times is an auto 
 graph letter received from Mr. Stevens warmly com 
 mending an editorial on the subject published in the 
 Chambersburg Repository, which I then edited, in which 
 he expressed the hope, since proved gratefully prophetic, 
 that I should one day conduct a daily newspaper in Phila 
 delphia with a hundred thousand readers. * I had voted 
 for Johnson s nomination for Vice-President in disregard 
 of Stevens bitter complaint, but when Johnson had dis 
 graced himself before the nation and the world by his 
 exhibition of inebriety at his inauguration, I had de 
 nounced him and demanded his resignation. He never 
 was permitted to return to the Senate as Vice-President, 
 but a little more than a month thereafter the assassination 
 of Lincoln made him President. Assuming that my free 
 criticism and demand for his resignation would preclude 
 cordial relations between us, I did not visit him in the 
 White House until he had twice requested me to do so 
 through Governor Curtin, and my first and only inter 
 view with him convinced me that his policy of recon 
 struction could not be sustained by the North. 
 
 My relations with Stevens for a dozen years before his 
 death were peculiarly pleasant, and as intimate perhaps 
 as was common between him and those in the narrow 
 circle of his close acquaintances. He spen f his summers 
 
 * WASHINGTON, Dec. 16, 1865. 
 
 DEAR SIR : I thank you for the kindness to me personally in 
 your letter; but I more particularly thank you for the grand argu 
 ment in favor of the right policy. 
 
 You ought to speak from Philadelphia in a daily of 100,000 
 circulation. Why cannot you get up such a paper? 
 
 THADDEUS STEVENS. 
 COL. A. K. McCLURE. 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 293 
 
 at his quiet mountain-furnace home in Franklin county, 
 where I resided, and during the few years that I was in 
 active practice at the bar in Chambersburg he attended 
 our courts and tried one side of nearly every important 
 cause. In all my acquaintance with the lawyers of 
 Pennsylvania I regard Stevens as having more nearly 
 completed the circle of a great lawyer than any other 
 member of the Pennsylvania bar. He was perfect in 
 practice, a master of the law, exceptionally skillful in 
 eliciting testimony from witnesses, a most sagacious, elo 
 quent, and persuasive advocate, and one of the strongest 
 men before a law court that I have ever heard. He was 
 thoroughly master of himself in his profession, and his 
 withering invective and crushing wit, so often employed 
 in conversation and in political speeches, were never dis 
 played in the trial of a cause unless it was eminently wise 
 to do so; and he was one of the most courteous of men 
 at the bar whether associate or opponent. He was espe 
 cially generous in his kindness to young members of the 
 bar unless they undertook to unduly flap their fledgling 
 wings, when they were certain to suffer speedy and 
 humiliating discomfiture. His trial of the Hanway trea 
 son case before Judge Greer in the United States Court 
 at Philadelphia exhibited his matchless skill in the best 
 use of his matchless powers. While he conceived and 
 directed every feature of the defence, he was the silent 
 man of the trial. He knew the political prejudices 
 which were attached to his then odious attitude on the 
 slavery question, and he put upon the late Chief Justice, 
 John M. Read, the laboring oars of the trial, as Read 
 was a Democrat of State and even national fame. It was 
 a trial that attracted the attention not only of the nation, 
 but of the civilized world, and was the first case adjudi 
 cated in Pennsylvania in our higher courts under the 
 Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Mr. Gorsuch, a Virginia 
 
294 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 minister, pursuing his slave into Chester county, was 
 killed in an altercation at Christiana by the friends of 
 the hunted bondman, and Hanway and others were in 
 dicted for treason in inciting to rebellion and murder. 
 Hanway was acquitted, and he owed his deliverance to 
 the legal acumen and skill of Thaddeus Stevens. 
 
 The highest tribute ever paid to an American states 
 man since the foundation of the Republic was paid to 
 Thaddeus Stevens by his bereaved constituents of Lan 
 caster county when his dead body lay in state at his 
 home. He died on Thursday, the nth of August, 1868, 
 and his body was brought from Washington to his home 
 on the following day, and on Saturday it was viewed by 
 thousands of sorrowing friends. The Republican prim 
 ary elections had been called for that day, and, although 
 Stevens had died three days before and a nomination was 
 to be made for his successor, no one of the several candi 
 dates in the county dared to whisper his name as an as 
 pirant while Stevens body was untombed. Acting under 
 a common inspiration, the people of the county who were 
 entitled to participate in the primary elections cast a 
 unanimous vote for Stevens renomination as their can 
 didate for Congress when they knew that he had passed 
 away and his body was in state in his humble house in 
 Lancaster. There is nothing in Grecian or Roman story 
 of such a tribute to a dead leader. Monuments were 
 erected in those days to greatness which have crumbled 
 away under the gnawing tooth of time, but the dust of 
 Thaddeus Stevens reposes under an humble monument 
 suggested by himself, located in an humble "City of 
 the Silent," chosen by him because it recognized " equal 
 ity of man before his Creator," and admitted any of 
 every race and color to sleep the sleep that knows no 
 waking. The inscription on his monument, dictated by 
 himself, is in these words; 
 
LINCOLN AND STEVENS. 295 
 
 THADDEUS STEVENS, 
 Born at Danville, Caledonia Co., Vermont, 
 
 April 4, 1792. 
 
 Died at Washington, D. C., 
 August n, 1868. 
 
 I repose in this quiet and secluded spot, 
 Not from any natural preference for solitude, 
 But, finding other Cemeteries limited as to Race 
 
 By Charter Rules, 
 I have chosen this that I might illustrate 
 
 In my death 
 
 The Principles which I advocated 
 Through a long life: 
 
 EQUALITY OF MAN BEFORE HIS CREATOR. 
 
 Thus passed away the Great Commoner of the war; the 
 friend of the lowly, the oppressed, and the friendless; the 
 author of our free-school system of Pennsylvania that now 
 gives education to the humblest of every township; and I 
 can fitly quote the eloquent tribute of Charles Sumner: 
 u I see him now as I have so often seen him during life; 
 his venerable form moves slowly with uncertain steps, 
 but the gathered strength of years in his countenance 
 and the light of victory on his path. Politician, calcu 
 lator, time-server, stand aside; a Hero Statesman passes 
 to his reward. 
 
(Photo by Saylor, Lancaster, Pa.) 
 
 JAMES BUCHANAN, 1865. 
 
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 
 
 IT is now more than thirty years since James Buchanan 
 retired from . the office of President of the United 
 States, but I doubt whether there is any one of our great 
 national characters whose relations to our civil war are 
 so widely and so flagrantly misunderstood. It will sur 
 prise many at this day when I say that Abraham Lincoln 
 took up the reins of government just where James Bu 
 chanan left them, and continued precisely the same pol 
 icy toward the South that Buchanan had inaugurated, 
 until the Southern leaders committed the suicidal act of 
 firing upon Fort Sumter. From the time that Buchan 
 an s original Cabinet was disrupted on the sectional 
 issues that culminated in armed rebellion, the adminis 
 tration of Buchanan was not only thoroughly loyal to 
 the preservation of the Union, but it fixed the policy 
 that Lincoln accepted, and from which he took no 
 marked departure until actual war came upon him. 
 This is not the common appreciation of Buchanan 
 among the American people, but it is the truth of his 
 tory. He retired from his high office in the very flood- 
 tide of sectional and partisan passion. The loyal people 
 were frenzied to madness by what was regarded as the 
 perfidy of Buchanan s War Minister, Mr. Floyd, in ship 
 ping valuable arms and munitions to the South ; by 
 the insolent treason of his Secretary of the Treasury, 
 
 Mr. Cobb; by the boldly-asserted and generally-believed 
 
 297 
 
29 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 treachery of his Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Toucey, in 
 scattering our navy throughout the world; and it is now 
 accepted by many, amongst even intelligent people of 
 this country, that Buchanan was faithless to his duty in 
 failing to reinforce Major Anderson at Sumter. In addi 
 tion to these deeply-seated unjust convictions in regard 
 to Buchanan, he is commonly believed to have been in 
 hostility to the Lincoln administration and to the war, 
 and his sympathies to have been with the South in the 
 bloody struggle for the preservation of the Union. It 
 is certainly time that these utterly erroneous and most 
 unjust impressions as to Buchanan should be dissipated; 
 and, fortunately for his own good name, he has left on 
 record the most positive evidence of his devotion to the 
 Union and his earnest support of the government in the 
 most vigorous prosecution of the war that had been, as 
 he always held, wantonly precipitated upon the nation 
 by the South. I never was in political sympathy with 
 Buchanan while he was in public life, excepting the few 
 closing months of his administration, when, as I then 
 knew, both he and his Cabinet were estranged from their 
 ultra-Democratic friends North and South, and were in 
 daily intercourse with the leading friends of Lincoln as 
 the incoming President. My personal acquaintance with 
 him was of the most casual character, and I have there 
 fore neither lingering personal nor political affection to 
 inspire me to any strained attempt to vindicate his 
 memory. 
 
 Buchanan as President should be judged by the cir 
 cumstances under which he reached that position, by his 
 long-cherished and conscientious convictions, and by his 
 peculiar political environment, that led him into the 
 most sympathetic relations with the South. It should 
 be remembered that he was elected President over Gen 
 eral Fremont, a distinctly sectional candidate who was 
 
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 299 
 
 not thought of with any degree of favor in any State 
 south of Mason and Dixon s line. It was an earnest 
 battle against what was assailed as the ultra-sectionalism 
 
 o 
 
 of the North, and it consolidated the South in support 
 of Buchanan. It naturally intensified the sober judg 
 ment of his life against political Abolitionism, and he 
 entered the Presidency owing his election to the solid 
 vote of the Slave States. To these facts, which could 
 not fail to profoundly impress Buchanan, it should be 
 added that he was naturally a most conservative and 
 strict-constructionist statesman. Born and reared in the 
 Federal school, acting with the Federal party until he 
 had become noted as a leader in Congress, and gravi 
 tating thence into the Democratic school when strict 
 
 o 
 
 constructionists had settled upon State rights as the 
 jewel of their faith, it is not surprising that Buchanan 
 sympathized with the South in all the preliminary dis 
 putes which finally ended in sanguinary war. That he 
 was radically wrong on the fundamental issues relating 
 to the war when he entered the Presidency cannot be 
 doubted. He foreshadowed the Dred Scott decision in 
 his inaugural address, and evidently believed that it was 
 to come as a final solution of the slavery dispute, as it 
 greatly enlarged the constitutional protection of slave 
 holders; and his support of the lawless and revolutionary 
 Lecompton policy, into which he and his party were 
 dragooned by the Southern leaders, engulfed him and 
 his administration in the maelstrom of secession. Thus 
 was he drifting, step by step, insensibly into the hands 
 of those who, however fair in declaration or promise, 
 were treasonable in purpose, and sought through him to 
 wield the power of the government to aid rather than 
 hinder the disruption of the Republic. It is only just to 
 Buchanan, however, to say that whenever he was brought 
 face to face with the true purposes of the Southern lead- 
 
300 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 ers he reversed his own policy, revised his Cabinet, and 
 made his administration quite as aggressive as was wise 
 under the circumstances in asserting the paramount au 
 thority of the Union. 
 
 The crisis that changed Buchanan s whole policy on 
 the question of Secession was initiated on the i2th of 
 December, 1860, when General Cass resigned his posi 
 tion as Secretary of State because he could not har 
 monize with Buchanan s views in meeting the question. 
 Cass was greatly enfeebled by age, and Buchanan left a 
 private record on Cass resignation in which he stated 
 that until that time the only difference between them 
 that he had knowledge of was on the ground that 
 Buchanan had failed to assert with sufficient clearness 
 that there was no power in Congress or the government 
 to make war upon a State to hinder it in separating from 
 the Union. The retirement of Cass was speedily followed 
 by the enforced resignations of Floyd from the War De 
 partment and Cobb from the Treasury. Philip Thomas 
 of Man-land succeeded Cobb; Joseph Holt of Kentucky 
 succeeded Floyd; Attorney-General Black was promoted 
 to Secretary of State; and Edwin M. Stanton made his 
 successor as Attorney-General. Thomas remained in 
 office only a month, when he was succeeded by General 
 Dix, an aggressive loyalist. Stanton, Dix, and Holt 
 were aggressively against ever} form of treasonable re 
 bellion, and they gave a visibly altered tone to every 
 thing about the administration in the preliminary dis 
 putes with the leading Secessionists. One of the first 
 acts of South Carolina after her formal withdrawal from 
 the Union was to appoint Commissioners to proceed to 
 Washington to treat with the government of the United 
 States for peaceable separation and the recognition of 
 the independence of the Palmetto State. These Com 
 missioners proceeded to Washington, and were cour- 
 
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 301 
 
 teously received by Buchanan as citizens of South Caro 
 lina, without any recognition of their official capacity, 
 and several misunderstandings arose between them as to 
 what was accepted or agreed upon in relation to the mili 
 tary status in Charleston. 
 
 It finally became necessary for Buchanan to give a 
 formal answer to the South Carolina Commissioners as 
 to the attitude of the government and his purposes as its 
 Executive. He prepared an answer without consulting 
 any of the members of his Cabinet, in which he said: 
 "I have declined for the present to reinforce these forts 
 (in Charleston harbor), relying upon the honor of South 
 Carolinians that they will not be assaulted while they 
 remain in their present condition, but that Commis 
 sioners will be sent by the convention to treat with Con 
 gress on the subject. In this paper Buchanan assumed 
 that he had no power to take any action as President 
 that the whole dispute was one to be submitted to Con 
 gress. He added, however, that if South Carolina 
 should take any of these forts, she will then become the 
 assailant in a war against the United States." In the 
 many interesting conversations I had with the late Judge 
 Black on the subject of the difficulties in Buchanan s 
 Cabinet, I received from his own lips detailed accounts 
 of almost every incident of importance that occurred, 
 and what I state in regard to the answer of Buchanan to 
 the South Carolina Commissioners I give from distinct 
 recollection on his authority. On the 29th of December, 
 soon after Buchanan had written the original draft of his 
 answer to the Commissioners, he submitted it to his Cab 
 inet. It was little criticised at the Cabinet meeting by 
 any of the President s constitutional advisers, and Black 
 was ominously silent. He was profoundly grieved at the 
 attitude the President had assumed, and his strong per 
 sonal devotion to Buchanan made his position one of 
 
302 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 extreme delicacy. He was the one man of the Cabinet 
 whom Buchanan regarded as his close personal and po 
 litical friend. He did not express his views to any of 
 his Cabinet associates until he had spent an entire night 
 in anxious reflection as to his duty. On the following 
 day he called upon Buchanan and told him frankly that 
 if he sent the answer to the South Carolina Commission 
 ers as originally prepared he (Black) must resign from 
 the Cabinet, because he could not assent to the govern 
 ment being placed in such an attitude. It was seldom 
 that Buchanan ever betrayed emotion, but when Black 
 informed him that they must separate Buchanan was 
 moved even to tears. Few words passed between them, 
 and Buchanan handed Black the original paper with the 
 request to modify it in accordance with his own views, 
 and return it as speedily as possible. Black then wrote 
 the paper that went into history as the answer of 
 Buchanan to the Commissioners. Before he presented it 
 to the President it was carefully considered and revised 
 by Black, Holt, and Stanton, who then were, and there 
 after continued to be, with Dix, the aggressively loyal 
 members of the Buchanan Cabinet; and in their actions 
 they had the hearty sympathy and support of the Pres 
 ident. 
 
 One of the common accusations against Buchanan is 
 that he failed to reinforce the garrisons in the Southern 
 forts and protect them from capture by the Secessionists. 
 A careful study of the facts, however, shows that Bu 
 chanan was utterly without an army to protect these 
 forts. He and General Scott had a somewhat bitter dis 
 pute on this point after Buchanan s retirement from 
 office, but Scott s own statement proves that he had no 
 intelligent knowledge of the ability of the government 
 to reinforce the forts, or that he, as commander-in-chief 
 of the army, made an official suggestion to the President 
 
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 303 
 
 that was impossible of execution. On the 2Qth of Octo 
 ber, 1860, Scott addressed Buchanan on the subject of 
 these Southern forts, and he enumerated nine of them 
 that would be exposed to easy capture unless speedily 
 reinforced. On the day after thus addressing the Presi 
 dent, Scott pointedly illustrated the absurdity of his 
 recommendation by saying to the President, There is 
 one regular company at Boston, one here at the Narrows, 
 one at Portsmouth, one at Augusta, Georgia, and one at 
 Baton Rouge." According to Scott s own statement, 
 there were but five companies of the army then within 
 the reach of the government to garrison or reinforce the 
 threatened forts. These five companies did not aggre 
 gate four hundred men, and these four hundred men, 
 scattered from Boston to Baton Rouge, were presented 
 by Scott himself as the resources of the government for 
 the protection of nine forts in six Southern States. 
 
 Our little army of that day was all needed on our then 
 remote frontiers to protect settlers and emigrants from, 
 the savages who ruled in those regions, and it would 
 have required weeks, and in some cases months, to bring 
 them to the East for the protection of the endangered 
 forts. Even when war came and the frontiers had to be 
 stripped of their military protection wherever it was pos 
 sible, there were but few regular troops at the battle of 
 Bull Run. Scott and Buchanan both agreed that there 
 was danger of turbulence at the inauguration of Lin 
 coln, and they cordially co-operated with each other to 
 take the most effective measures to preserve peace on 
 that occasion. After gathering all the troops that could 
 be marshaled from every part of the country to serve at 
 the inauguration, they finally got together six hundred 
 and thirty, and they made their arrangements for the 
 inauguration with that small military display because 
 the commander-in-chief of the army could not summon 
 
304 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 a larger force. It was simply impossible, therefore, for 
 President Buchanan to garrison or reinforce the South 
 ern forts, for the reason that he had not the men with 
 which to do it. There was but one way to save the 
 Southern forts, and that was to garrison them so strongly, 
 with ample provisions and munitions of war, that they 
 would be invulnerable to assault. To have sent inade 
 quate reinforcements to any of these forts in the then 
 inflamed condition of the public mind in the South 
 would have been to wantonly provoke attack upon forces 
 that could not protect themselves. Had Lincoln been 
 President he could not have done more without doing 
 wha y vvould have been accepted as an open declaration 
 of war against the South, and Lincoln would no more 
 have committed that folly than did Buchanan. It would 
 have been a wise thing to do if we had had an army of 
 thirty or forty thousand men. Then all the forts could 
 have been garrisoned and reinforced, and they could 
 have had the support necessary in case of threatened 
 assault; but our government was entirely unprepared for 
 defence, and when we were compelled to face the peril 
 of war the army could not be increased without making 
 the North either measurably or wholly responsible for 
 precipitating a civil conflict. The intelligent and dis 
 passionate American citizen, who carefully reads the 
 whole story of the action of Buchanan and his Cabinet 
 in co-operation with Scott, must reach the conclusion 
 that Buchanan was not in any degree at fault for the 
 failure to garrison or reinforce the forts in the South 
 ern States. 
 
 On the important question of Buchanan s support of 
 the government after war had been commenced by the 
 assault on Sumter, he has fortunately left the most posi 
 tive and multiplied evidence of his patriotic loyalty to 
 the Union, He was singularly reticent during the war, 
 
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 35 
 
 and his silence was misconstrued into a lack of sympa 
 thy with the government. After his retirement from 
 the Presidency he was most mercilessly vilified, brutally 
 misrepresented as deliberately disloyal, and he seems to 
 have abandoned the hope of correcting public sentiment 
 and doing himself justice until the flood-tide of passion 
 had run its course. He was, however, in constant com 
 munication with his leading friends throughout the 
 country, and to every one of them, from the beginning 
 of the war until its close, he expressed the most patriotic 
 convictions, and uniformly urged the earnest support of 
 the war and its most vigorous prosecution. In Septem 
 ber, 1 86 1, he was invited by an intimate friend to deliver 
 a public address on the condition of the country and the 
 attitude of the government. In his answer he said, wri 
 ting in the frankness of sacred friendship, Every per 
 son who has conference with me knows that I am in 
 favor of sustaining the government in the vigorous pros 
 ecution of the war for the restoration of the Union. But 
 occasion may offer when it may be proper for me author 
 itatively to express this opinion to the public. Until that 
 time shall arrive I desire to avoid any public exhibition. 
 In a private letter to James Buchanan Henry, his nephew, 
 immediately after he had heard of the firing upon Sum- 
 ter, he said: "The Confederate States have deliberately 
 commenced a civil war, and God knows where it may 
 end. They were repeatedly warned by my adminis 
 tration that an assault on Fort Sumter w r ould be civil 
 war and they would be responsible for the conse 
 quences. 
 
 On the iQth of April, 1861, soon after the bombard 
 ment of Sumter, he wrote to General Dix, who had then 
 been announced as the president of a great Union meet 
 ing soon to be held, at which he advised him to repeat 
 
 the admonitions the administration had given to South 
 20 
 
306 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Carolina against precipitating war. He referred to the 
 fact that as Dix had been a member of the Cabinet at 
 the time he could speak with great propriety of the utter 
 want of excuse on the part of South Carolina for firing 
 upon Sumter. In this letter he said: "The present ad 
 ministration had no alternative but to accept the war 
 initiated by South Carolina or the Southern Confed 
 eracy. The North will sustain the administration to a 
 man, and it ought to be sustained at all hazards." 
 Again, on the 26th of April, writing to Mr. Baker, he 
 said : The attack on Fort Sumter was an outrageous 
 act. The authorities at Charleston were several times 
 warned by my administration that such an attack would 
 be civil war, and would be treated as such. If it had 
 been made in my time it should have been treated as 
 such." In a letter to Mr. Stanton, May 6, when Stan- 
 ton was writing to Buchanan fiercely criticising Lincoln 
 and every act of the administration, Buchanan said: 
 "The first gun fired by Beauregard aroused the indig 
 nant spirit of the North as nothing else could have done, 
 and made us an unanimous people. I repeatedly warned 
 them that this would be the result." In a letter to Mr. 
 King, July 13, he said: "The assault upon Fort Sum 
 ter was the commencement of war by the Confederate 
 States, and no alternative was left but to prosecute it 
 w r ith vigor on our part. Up until all social and political 
 relations ceased between the Secession leaders and my 
 self I had often warned them that the North would rise 
 to a man against them if such an assault was made. . . . 
 I am glad that General Scott does not underrate the 
 strength of his enemy, which would be a great fault in 
 a commander. With all my heart and soul I wish him 
 success." In a letter to Mr. Leiper, August 31, he said: 
 "I agree with you that nothing but a vigorous prose 
 cution of the war can now determine the question be- 
 
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 37 
 
 tween the North and the South. It is vain to think of 
 peace at the present moment." 
 
 In a letter to Dr. Blake, September 12, he said: "We 
 must prosecute the war with the utmost vigor. May 
 God grant us a safe deliverance and a restoration of the 
 Union!" In a letter to Mr. King, September 18, he 
 said: " I think I can perceive in the public mind a more 
 fixed, resolute, and determined purpose than ever to pros 
 ecute the war to a successful termination with all the 
 men and means in our power. Enlistments are now pro 
 ceeding much more rapidly than a few weeks ago, and I 
 am truly glad of it. The time has passed for offering 
 compromises and terms of peace to the seceded States. . . . 
 There is a time for all things under the sun, but surely 
 this is not the moment for paralyzing the arm of the 
 national administration by a suicidal conflict among our 
 selves, but for bold, energetic, and united action." On 
 the 28th of September, Buchanan addressed a letter to 
 a committee of the citizens of Chester and Lancaster 
 counties who had invited him to address a Union meet 
 ing at Hagersville. He declined because "advancing 
 years in the present state of my health render it impos 
 sible. " He said: "Were it possible for me to address 
 your meeting, waiving all other topics, I should confine 
 myself to a solemn and earnest appeal to my countrymen, 
 and especially those without families, to volunteer for the 
 war and join the many thousands of brave and patriotic 
 volunteers who are already in the field. This is the 
 moment for action for prompt, energetic, and united 
 action and not for discussion of peace propositions." 
 In closing the letter he said that until the South shall 
 voluntarily return to the Union "it will be our duty to 
 support the President with all the men and means at the 
 command of the country in a vigorous and successful 
 prosecution of the war." 
 
3 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 In a letter to Mr. King, January 28, 1862, he said: " I 
 do most earnestly hope that our army may be able to do 
 something before the first of April. If not, there is 
 great danger not merely of British, but of European, 
 interference." In a letter to Mrs. Boyd, February 16, 
 he said: "The Confederate States commenced this un 
 happy war for the destruction of the Union, and until 
 they shall be willing to consent to its restoration there 
 can be no hopes of peace." On the 4th of March he 
 wrote Judge Black: "They (the South) chose to com 
 mence civil war, and Mr. Lincoln had no alternative but 
 to defend the country against dismemberment. I cer 
 tainly should have done the same thing had they begun 
 the \var in my time, and this they well knew." In a 
 letter to Dr. Blake, July 12, he speaks of the deep anx 
 iety he felt about the safety of McClellan s army, with a 
 heavy pressure removed from his heart when he learned 
 that it was safe, and he then adds: "Without doubt his 
 change of position in the face of a superior army evinced 
 great skill in strategy; but why was the wrong position 
 originallv selected? I still feel great confidence in 
 McClellan, and with all my heart wish him success. 
 Still, there is a mystery in the whole affair which time 
 alone can unravel." On February 14, 1863, in a letter 
 to Mr. Roosevelt, he expressed his great disappointment 
 that a country so great as ours has not yet produced 
 one great general." In a letter to Mr. Leiper, March 
 19, he said: "I cannot entertain the idea of a division 
 of the Union; may God in His good providence restore 
 it!" In a letter to Mr. Schell, July 25, he expresses his 
 profound regret at Governor Seymour s hostility to the 
 national conscription law, and said: " The conscription 
 law, though unwise and unjust in many of its provisions, 
 is not in my opinion unconstitutional." So earnest was 
 Buchanan in his efforts to have the Democracy of Penn- 
 
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 3O9 
 
 sylvania give the most cordial support to Lincoln and to 
 Liie war that he even trangressed the lines of delicacy in 
 a letter addressed to Judge Woodward, then a Supreme 
 Justice and candidate for Governor of Pennsylvania, ear 
 nestly appealing to him to sustain the national conscrip 
 tion law by a judicial decision. This he did as early as 
 July, 1863, when the question was first raised in our 
 courts. In a letter of September 5, also addressed to 
 Judge Woodward, he offered an apology for having ad 
 vised him as to his judicial duties, and his apology was, 
 as stated by himself, " I perceived that in New York the 
 party was fast making the unconstitutionality of the 
 conscription law the leading prominent point in the 
 canvass. 
 
 On January 27, 1864, he wrote Mr. Capen, expressing 
 his regret that "the Democrats have made no issue on 
 which to fight the Presidential battle," and on the i4th 
 of March he wrote to the same friend, expressing the 
 belief that it would be best if the Democrats would fail 
 to succeed to power at the Presidential election of that 
 year. On the 25th of August he wrote to the same 
 friend, assuming that McClellan would be nominated, in 
 which he said: " A general proposition for peace and an 
 armistice without reference to the restoration of the 
 Union would be, in fact, a recognition of their inde 
 pendence. For this I confess I am far from being pre 
 pared." On the 22d of September, writing to his 
 nephew, Mr. Henry, he said: "Peace would be a very 
 great blessing, but it would be purchased at too high a 
 price at the expense of the Union." In a letter to Mr. 
 Capen of October 5 he declares his purpose to support 
 McClellan for President, and he denounces the Chicago 
 peace platform, and specially commends McClellan for 
 having patriotically dissented from it. In the same let 
 ter he expresses some hope of McClellan s election, and 
 
310 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 frankly says that "the recent victories of Grant, Sher 
 man, and Farragnt have helped the Republicans," but 
 he rejoiced at the victories of our armies and the pros 
 pect of the South submitting to a restoration of the 
 Union. In a letter to Mr. Capen, December 28, he says: 
 "I agree in opinion with General McClellan that it is 
 fortunate both for himself and the Democratic party that 
 he was not elected." In a letter to Mr. Flinn, April, 
 1865, he speaks most feelingly of the assassination of 
 Lincoln, and says: "I deeply mourn his loss from pri 
 vate feelings, and still more deeply for the sake of the 
 country. Heaven, I trust, will not suffer the perpetra 
 tors of the deed and their guilty accomplices to escape 
 just punishment, but we must not despair of the Repub 
 lic." In a letter to Mr. Capen, October 19, 1867, he 
 says: "Negro emancipation is a fixed fact, and so let 
 it remain for ever; but the high privilege of voting can 
 only be constitutionally granted by the legislatures of 
 the respective States." He heartily accepted emanci 
 pation, but he felt that the Democracy had an issue on 
 which it could stand in a patriotic attitude opposing 
 universal negro suffrage. 
 
 Thus from th?. day that civil war was precipitated 
 upon the country by the madness of secession until the 
 last insurgent gun was fired there was not an utterance 
 from James Buchanan that did not exhibit the most 
 patriotic devotion to the cause of the Union. 
 
 In the flood of light thrown upon the actions of 
 Buchanan and Lincoln as nearly a generation has come 
 and passed away, the intelligent and unbiased reader of 
 the truth of history will be amazed to learn how closely 
 the policy of Lincoln adhered to the policy inaugurated 
 by Buchanan after he had been compelled to face the 
 issue of actual secession and armed rebellion. From the 
 day that Judge Black revised the answer of Buchanan to 
 
LINCOLN AND BUCHANAN. 311 
 
 the South Carolina Commissioners the aims and efforts 
 of Buchanan were uniformly and earnestly in the line 
 of the most patriotic devotion to his responsible duties; 
 and when he had such men as Black, Dix, Stanton, and 
 Holt by his side, the majority, and the absolutely domi 
 nant element, of his Cabinet were aggressively loyal to 
 the government, and made heroic effort to exercise every 
 power they possessed to maintain the integrity of the 
 Union. Whatever may have been Buchanan s political 
 errors during the greater part of his administration, and 
 however those errors may have strengthened the arms of 
 secession, it is only simple justice to one of the most con 
 scientious and patriotic of all our Presidents to say that 
 when Buchanan was brought face to face with the fruits 
 of his policy he severed all political and social intercourse 
 with the leaders who had controlled his election, and cast 
 his lot and all the power of the government on the side 
 of unqualified loyalty. Not only did the call of Lincoln 
 for troops to prosecute the war after the firing upon 
 Sumter command the uniform and earnest support of 
 Buchanan, but he heartily sustained the government in 
 every war measure, even to the extent of assenting to 
 emancipation. Such a record demands the commenda 
 tion rather than the censure of our only Pennsylvania 
 President; and I have performed the task of attempting 
 to present him justly to the American people all the more 
 gratefully because there are no lingering bonds of special 
 personal or political sympathy between us. He is entitled 
 to justice from every honest American citizen, and I have 
 sought to /i /e him justice nothing more, nothing less. 
 
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 
 
 HORACE GREELEY was one of the earliest and 
 most fretting of the many thorns in the political 
 pathway of Abraham Lincoln. They served together in 
 Congress in the winter of 1848-49, when Greeley was 
 chosen to a short term to fill a vacancy. Speaking of 
 Lincoln some years after his death, Greeley, referring to 
 his association with him in Congress, said that Lincoln 
 was personally a favorite on our side, and adds : * He 
 seemed a quiet, good-natured man; did not aspire to 
 leadership, and seldom claimed the floor." For ten 
 years after these two memorable characters separated as 
 members of Congress Lincoln was little known or heard 
 of outside of his State of Illinois, and when his great 
 contest with Douglas for the Senate attracted the atten 
 tion of the whole country in 1858, Greeley, with his 
 powerful Republican organ, vastly the most potent polit 
 ical journal in the country, took positive grounds in favor 
 of the return of Douglas to the Senate by the Republi 
 cans of Illinois, because of Douglas open hostility to 
 the Lecompton policy of the Buchanan administration. 
 This attitude of Greeley s Tribune was one of the most 
 serious obstacles that confronted Lincoln in his great 
 campaign against Douglas, and it is possible that the 
 influence of the Tribune may have lost Lincoln the leg 
 islature. He carried the popular vote and elected the 
 
 Republican State ticket, but Douglas won the legislature 
 312 
 
HORACE GREEDY, 1872. 
 
314 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 and was re-elected to the Senate. Thus did Greeley 
 antagonize Lincoln in the first great battle he made for 
 national leadership in politics, and with the exception 
 of a single act of Greeley s, in which he served Lincoln 
 to an extent that can hardly be measured, when in the 
 early part of 1860 he opened the broadsides of the 
 Tribune against Seward s nomination for President, he 
 was a perpetual thorn in Lincoln s side, seldom agreeing 
 with him on any important measure, and almost con 
 stantly criticising him boldly and often bitterly. 
 
 The first assault made on the Seward lines that at 
 tracted any attention from the country was the unex 
 pected and aggressive revolt of Greeley s Tribune against 
 Seward some months before the meeting of the Chicago 
 Convention that nominated Lincoln. It attracted special 
 attention from considerate Republicans throughout the 
 country, because this assault came from the ablest Re 
 publican editor of the nation, from Seward s own State. 
 and from one who was presumed to be Seward s personal 
 and political friend. It was not then known to the pub 
 lic that on the nth of November, 1854, he had written 
 a pungent letter to Seward and formally severed all po 
 litical association with him, to take effect in the follow 
 ing February, when Seward was re-elected to the United 
 States Senate. The letter was written in strict confi 
 dence, but in 1860, when the friends of Seward keenly 
 felt Greeley s criticisms on Seward s availability as a 
 Presidential candidate, and especially in the bitter dis 
 appointment of Seward s friends after his defeat at Chi 
 cago, such free allusions were made to the contents of 
 this letter and to Greeley s personal animosity that at 
 Greeley s request the letter was made public. Until 
 Greeley had thus thrown his great Tribune into the con 
 test against Seward s nomination Seward was the gen 
 erally-accepted Republican candidate for President in 
 
LINCOLN AND G REE LEY. 315 
 
 1860, and, notwithstanding the ability and influence 
 exerted by Greeley and his newspaper, the Republicans 
 of the country elected a convention overwhelmingly in 
 favor of Seward. It was Greeley, however, who drove 
 the entering wedge that made it possible to break the 
 Seward column, and I shall never forget the smile that 
 played upon his countenance as he sat at the head of the 
 Oregon delegation in the Wigwam at Chicago and heard 
 the announcement that Abraham Lincoln had been nomi 
 nated as the candidate of the convention for President. 
 He had made no battle for Lincoln. His candidate was 
 Edward Bates of Missouri, whose cause he championed 
 with all his fervency and power; but it is evident that in 
 selecting Bates as his favorite he had been influenced 
 solely to choose the most available candidate to contest 
 the honor with Seward. After Bates, he was for any one 
 to beat Seward, and when Lincoln became the chief 
 competitor of Seward he was more than willing to ac 
 cept him. After the nomination of Lincoln, Greeley s 
 Tribune was leader of leaders among the Republican 
 journals of the land in the great struggle that elected 
 Lincoln President. But his rejoicing over the success 
 of Lincoln was speedily chilled by the announcement 
 that Seward would be called as premier of the new ad 
 ministration. The appointment of Seward as Secretary 
 of State meant the mastery of Thurlow Weed in wield 
 ing the patronage and power of the administration in 
 New York, and it meant much more than that to Gree 
 ley. It meant that all the power that Seward and Weed 
 could exercise would be wielded relentlessly to punish 
 Greeley for his revolt against Seward. On the very day 
 that Lincoln entered the Presidency, therefore, Greeley 
 was hopelessly embittered against him, and while no 
 man in the whole land was more conscientious than 
 Greeley in the performance of every patriotic and per- 
 
31 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 sonal duty, he was also human, and with all his bound 
 less generosity and philanthropy he was one of the best 
 haters I have ever known. 
 
 Soon after Lincoln s election Greeley put himself in 
 an attitude that he must have known at the time was an 
 utterly impossible one for Lincoln to accept. That he 
 was influenced in any degree by a desire to embarrass 
 Lincoln I do not for a moment believe, but it is none 
 the less the truth of history that, after having done 
 much to make Lincoln s nomination possible, he did 
 more perhaps than any one man in the country to assure 
 his election, and then he publicly demanded that Lin 
 coln should be so far forgetful of his oath to maintain the 
 Constitution as to permit the Southern States to secede 
 in peace. Only three days after Lincoln s election Gree 
 ley published an editorial in the J^ribunc in which he 
 said: "If the Cotton States shall become satisfied that 
 they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist 
 on letting them go in peace. . . . The right to secede 
 may be a revolutionary one, but it exists nevertheless. 
 We must ever resist the right of any State to remain in 
 the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof. To 
 withdraw from the Union is quite another matter, and 
 whenever a considerable section of our Union shall de 
 liberately resolve to get out we shall resist all coercive 
 measures designed to keep it in. We hope never to live 
 in a republic whereof one section is pinned to another 
 by bayonets." Again, on the i/th of December, 1860, 
 just after the secession of South Carolina, a leading edi 
 torial in the Tribune, speaking of the Declaration of 
 Independence, said: "If it justified the secession from 
 the British empire of three million of colonists in 1776, 
 we do not see why it would not justify the secession of 
 five million of Southerners from the Federal Union in 
 1861. ... If seven or eight contiguous States shall pre- 
 
LINCOLN AND GKEELEY. 317 
 
 sent themselves at Washington saying, We hate the 
 Federal Union; we have withdrawn from it; we give 
 you the choice between acquiescing in our secession and 
 arranging amicably all incidental questions on the one 
 hand, and attempting to subdue us on the other, we 
 would not stand up for coercion, for subjugation, for we 
 do not think it would be just. We hold to the right of 
 self-government even when invoked in behalf of those 
 who deny it to others." Less than two weeks before 
 the inauguration of Lincoln, on the 23d of February, 
 1 86 1, and the same day on which his paper announced 
 Lincoln s midnight journey from Harrisburg to Wash 
 ington, Greeley said in a leading editorial: "We have 
 repeatedly said, and we once more insist, that the great 
 principle embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of 
 American Independence, that governments derive their 
 just powers from the consent of the governed, is sound 
 and just, and that if the Slave States, the Cotton States, 
 or the Gulf States only choose to form an independent 
 nation, they have a clear moral right to do so. When 
 ever it shall be clear that the great body of Southern 
 people have become conclusively alienated from the 
 Union and anxious to escape from it, we will do our best 
 to forward their views. 
 
 Such were the pointed and earnest utterances of Gree 
 ley between the period of Lincoln s election and of his 
 inauguration, and it is needless to say that these utter 
 ances not only grieved but embarrassed Lincoln to an 
 extent that can hardly be appreciated at this time. Had 
 Greeley stood alone in these utterances, even then his 
 position and power would have made his attitude one of 
 peculiar trouble to Lincoln, but he did not stand alone. 
 Not only the entire Democratic party, with few excep 
 tions, but a very large proportion of the Republican 
 party, including some of its ablest and most trusted 
 
318 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 leaders, believed that peaceable secession, that might 
 reasonably result in early reconstruction, was preferable 
 to civil war. The constitutional right of coercion by 
 the government upon a seceded State was gravely dis 
 puted by most Democratic statesmen and by many Re 
 publican statesmen; and it is worthy of note that Lin 
 coln, like Buchanan, studiously avoided any attempt at 
 coercion until the South wantonly precipitated war by 
 firing upon the starving garrison in Fort Sumter. The 
 first gun fired upon Sumter solved the problem of coer 
 cion. Coercion at once ceased to be an issue. The 
 South had coerced the government into war by cause 
 lessly firing upon the flag of the nation and upon a gar 
 rison that had committed no overt act of war; and from 
 that day until the surrender of the Southern armies to 
 Grant and Sherman the overwhelming sentiment of every 
 Northern State demanded the prosecution of the war to 
 conquer Secession. Had Buchanan or Lincoln fired a 
 single gun solely to coerce the Southern States to re 
 main in the Union, the North would have been hope 
 lessly divided, and the administration would surely have 
 been overthrown in any attempt to prosecute the war. 
 Greeley recognized the fact that the firing upon Sumter 
 ended the issue of coercion as understood and discussed 
 until that time, and from the day that Lincoln issued his 
 call for seventy-five thousand troops to engage in the war 
 that had been so insanely precipitated against the gov 
 ernment he heartily sustained the President and his 
 policy; but he added new grief and fresh embarrassments 
 to Lincoln by his fretful impatience and his repeated 
 and emphatic demands that the army should be hurled 
 against the Confederates as soon as it was organized. 
 u On to Richmond!" was his almost daily battle-on- 
 and Greeley was overwhelmed with sorrow and humil 
 iation when at last his impetuous orders were obeyed 
 
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 319 
 
 and McDowell s army was defeated and hurled back into 
 the intrenchments of Washington. 
 
 When war was accepted as a necessity no man in the 
 country was more earnest in his support of a most vig 
 orous and comprehensive war policy than was Greeley. 
 After the lesson of the first Bull Run he appreciated the 
 fact that a great war was upon us, and every measure 
 looking to the increase of our armies and the mainte 
 nance of our severely strained credit was supported by 
 the Tribiine with all of Greeley s matchless ability and 
 vigor; but he was never without some disturbing issue 
 with Lincoln and the policy of the administration. Sin 
 cerely patriotic himself, he was as sincere in his convic 
 tions on all questions of public policy, and he seldom 
 took pause to consider the claims of expediency when 
 he saw what he believed to be the way dictated by the 
 right. He believed Lincoln equally patriotic with him 
 self, and equally sincere in every conviction and public 
 act, but no two men were more unlike in their mental 
 organization. Greeley was honest, aggressive, impul 
 sive, and often ill advised in attempting to do the right 
 thing in the wrong way. Lincoln was honest, patient, 
 considerate beyond any man of his day, and calmly 
 awaited the fullness of time for accomplishing the great 
 achievements he hoped for. Writing of Lincoln some 
 time after his death, Greeley said that after the war be 
 gan " Lincoln s tenacity of purpose paralleled his former 
 immobility; I believe he would have been nearly the 
 last, if not the very last, man in America to recognize 
 the Southern Confederacy had its armies been triumph 
 ant. He would have preferred death." That two such 
 men should differ, and widely differ, and that Greeley 
 should often differ in bitterness from Lincoln s apparent 
 tardiness, was most natural; and with a great war con 
 stantly creating new issues of the gravest magnitude 
 
320 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Greeley was kept in constant conflict with Lincoln on 
 some great question while honestly and patriotically sup 
 porting the government in the prosecution of the war. 
 
 The question of destroying slavery enlisted Greeley s 
 most earnest efforts when it became evident that a great 
 civil war must be fought for the preservation of the 
 Union, and on that issue he fretted Lincoln more than 
 any other one man in the United States, because he had 
 greater ability and greater power than any whose criti 
 cisms could reach either Lincoln or the public. While 
 the Cabinet had as much discord as there was between 
 Lincoln and Greeley, and while even great Senators and 
 Representatives of the same political faith with the Pres 
 ident had serious dispute with him on the subject, Gree 
 ley was the most vexatious of all, for he was tireless in 
 effort and reached the very heart of the Republican party 
 in every State in the Union with his great newspaper. 
 Notwithstanding the loyal support given to Lincoln by 
 the Republicans throughout the country, Greeley was in 
 closer touch with the active loyal sentiment of the peo 
 ple than even the President himself, and his journal con 
 stantly inspired not only those who sincerely believed in 
 early Emancipation, but all who were inclined to factious 
 hostility to Lincoln, to most aggressive efforts to embar 
 rass the administration by untimely forcing the Emanci 
 pation policy. Finally, Greeley s patience became ex 
 hausted over what he regarded as the inexcusable inac 
 tion of Lincoln on the subject of Emancipation, and on 
 the 2Oth of August, 1862, he published in his own news 
 paper an open letter to Lincoln denouncing him for his 
 failure to execute the Confiscation Act in "mistaken 
 deference to rebel slavery," for bowing to the influence 
 of what he called " certain fossil politicians hailing from 
 the Border States," and because our army officers 
 u evinced far more solicitude to uphold slavery than to 
 
LINCOLN AND G REE LEY. 321 
 
 put down the rebellion." Thus plainly accused by one 
 whose patriotism Lincoln did not question and whose 
 honesty of purpose he could not doubt, Lincoln felt that 
 he could no longer be silent, and on the 22d of August 
 he addressed a letter to Greeley that did more to steady 
 the loyal sentiment of the country in a very grave emer 
 gency than anything that ever came from Lincoln s pen. 
 It is one of Lincoln s clearest and most incisive presenta 
 tions of any question. Greeley, with all his exceptional 
 tact and ability in controversy, was unable successfully to 
 answer it. It was in that letter that Lincoln said: "I 
 would save the Union ; I would save it the shortest way 
 under the Constitution;" and he followed these terse ut 
 terances with the statement, several times referred to in 
 these articles, that he would save the Union either by the 
 destruction or the maintenance of slavery as might best 
 serve the great end he had in view. It should be remem 
 bered that at the time this letter was written by Lincoln 
 to Greeley his draft of the Emancipation Proclamation 
 had been prepared nearly one month, and precisely one 
 month after he wrote the letter he issued his preliminary 
 proclamation ; but the letter gives no indication whatever 
 as to his action on the issue beyond his concluding sen 
 tence, in which he says: "I intend 110 modification of 
 my often expressed personal wish that all men for ever 
 could be free." 
 
 This constant friction between Greeley and Lincoln 
 logically led Greeley into the ranks of the opposition to 
 Lincoln s renomination in 1864, and he labored most 
 diligently to accomplish Lincoln s overthrow. His ripe 
 experience in politics prevented him from falling in with 
 the few disappointed Republican leaders who nominated 
 Fremont at Cleveland before the Baltimore Convention 
 met. He would gladly have joined in that effort had he 
 not fully appreciated the fact that the occasion was too 
 
 21 
 
322 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAK-TIMES. 
 
 momentous to organize a faction on personal or political 
 grievances; but, while he kept aloof from the Fremont 
 movement, he aggressively resisted the nomination of 
 Lincoln, and on the day the convention met he published 
 an earnest protest and indicated very clearly that Lin 
 coln s nomination meant Republican defeat. He had 
 long been in intercourse with the friends of Chase, and 
 he would gladly have accepted Chase or Grant, or, in 
 deed, almost any other Republican in the country whose 
 name had been mentioned for the Presidency, in prefer 
 ence to Lincoln. When Lincoln was renominated by 
 practically an unanimous vote, Greeley avoided direct 
 antagonism to the party, but earnestly co-operated with 
 Senator Wade and Representative Davis in their open 
 rebellion against Lincoln. Wade and Davis issued an 
 address to the people of the United States that appeared 
 in Greeley s journal on the 5th of August, in which Lin 
 coln was severely arraigned for usurping the authority 
 of Congress and for withholding his approval to a bill 
 presented to him just on the eve of adjournment, for the 
 purpose, as they assumed, of holding "the Electoral 
 votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his personal 
 ambition." Such an appeal, coming from two of the 
 ablest of the Republican leaders, cast a dark gloom over 
 the prospects of the Republican party, and to the sup 
 port of this revolt Greeley added an ostentatious and ill- 
 advised effort to negotiate a peace through a plausible 
 adventurer commonly known as Colorado Jewett. 
 The effusive and irrepressible George N. Sanders was 
 involved in it, and through Greeley they communicated 
 to Lincoln a basis of peace that Greeley was led to be 
 lieve the South would accept. 
 
 The terms suggested were the restoration of the Union, 
 the abolition of slavery, universal amnesty, payment of 
 $400,000,000 for the slaves, full representation to be given 
 
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 323 
 
 to the Southern States in Congress, and a National Con 
 vention to be called at once to engraft the new policy on 
 the Constitution. Instead of maintaining the secresy 
 necessary to the success of an adjustment of the difficulty 
 between the sections then at war, the Greeley-Jewett ne 
 gotiations soon became public, and Lincoln was earnestly 
 importuned by Greeley to meet the emergency by open 
 ing the doors widely to the consideration of any proposi 
 tion of peace. Lincoln, in his abundant caution, al 
 though entirely without hope of accomplishing anything 
 by the Greeley negotiations, transmitted a paper to be 
 delivered to the Confederates who were assuming to act 
 for the South a statement over his signature saying 
 that any proposition for "the restoration of peace, the 
 integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of 
 slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that 
 can control the armies now at war against the United 
 States, will be received and considered by the executive 
 government of the United States, and will be met by 
 liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, 
 and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe-conduct 
 both ways." Greeley had become enthusiastic in his 
 efforts to accomplish peace. He was a lover of peace, an 
 earnest and inherent foe of the arbitrament of the sword 
 under all circumstances, and when he found that the 
 whole effort made to arrest fraternal war brought only 
 a contemptuous rejection of Lincoln s proposition from 
 those who assumed to represent the Confederate govern 
 ment, he was profoundly humiliated. It is fortunate for 
 both Greeley and the country that Messrs. Clay and Hoi- 
 combe, who assumed to speak for the Confederate gov 
 ernment, refused even to consider the question of peace 
 on the basis of a restored Union and the abandonment 
 of slavery. Had they entertained the proposition, or 
 even pretended to entertain it, they would have misled 
 
324 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Greeley into a violent crusade against the further prose 
 cution of the war and into as violent hostility to the 
 re-election of Lincoln. 
 
 The pronounced anti-war platform of the Democratic 
 Convention that nominated McClellan against Lincoln 
 was even less to Greeley s liking than the attitude of the 
 Republicans, and finally, as the Wade and Davis mani 
 festo seemed to have fallen stillborn upon the country, 
 and Greeley s negotiations for peace had ended disas 
 trously, without credit to any, Greeley had no choice but 
 to fall in with the Lincoln procession and advocate the 
 success of the Republican ticket. Sherman s capture 
 of Atlanta and Sheridan s victories in the Valley started 
 the tidal wave in favor of Lincoln, and Greeley was quite 
 prepared, through his sad experiences in his hostility to 
 the administration, to fall in with the tide and share the 
 victory his party was then certain to win. After Lin 
 coln s re-election there was little opportunity for Greeley 
 to take issue with Lincoln. During the winter of 1865 
 he earnestly favored every suggestion looking to the ter 
 mination of the war upon some basis that would bring 
 the South back into cordial relations with the Union. 
 The failure of the Hampton Roads conference between 
 Lincoln and the Confederate Commissioners w r as regretted 
 by Greeley, but he no longer criticised Lincoln with his 
 old-time severity; and when, after Lee s surrender and 
 the final triumph of the Union cause, Lincoln s life was 
 taken by the assassin s bullet, Greeley and Lincoln were 
 more nearly in harmonious relations than they had ever 
 been at any time from the day of Lincoln s inauguration. 
 When the \var ended Greeley was the first prominent 
 man of the country to demand universal amnesty and 
 impartial suffrage. A leading editorial in the lyibunc 
 demanding the forgiveness of the insurgents as the price 
 of universal suffrage to the freedinen startled the couu- 
 
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 325 
 
 try, and cost Greeley the Senatorial honors he much 
 coveted. 
 
 While Greeley was one of the founders of the Repub 
 lican party, and certainly did more to make it successful 
 than any other one man of the nation, he gathered few 
 of its honors and was seldom in harmony with Repub 
 lican authority in State or nation. His rebellion against 
 Seward in 1860 cost him an election to the United States 
 Senate in 1861. His universal amnesty and suffrage pol 
 icy, proclaimed immediately after the war, again defeated 
 him as a Senatorial candidate in 1865, and while he ac 
 cepted Grant for President in 1868 and supported his 
 election with apparent cordiality, he very soon drifted 
 into a hostile attitude toward the administration. Grant 
 had none of Lincoln s patience and knew little of Lin 
 coln s conciliatory methods; and when Greeley rebelled 
 Grant allowed him to indulge his rebellious ideas to his 
 heart s content. Long before the close of Grant s first 
 administration Greeley was ripe for revolution, and was 
 one of the earliest of those who inaugurated the Liberal 
 Republican movement of 1872 that nominated Greeley 
 as its candidate for President. I cordially sympathized 
 with the revolt against Grant in 1872, and was chairman 
 of the delegation from Pennsylvania in the Cincinnati 
 Convention. My relations with Greeley had been of the 
 most friendly character from the time I first met him 
 when a boy-journalist at the Whig Convention in Phila 
 delphia in 1848, and I not only profoundly respected his 
 sincerity, his philanthropy, and his masterly ability, but 
 I cherished an affection for him that I felt but for few, 
 if any, of our public men. He was surprised when he 
 learned from me, after the delegation to the Liberal Con 
 vention had been selected in Pennsylvania, that I was 
 not urging his nomination for President. He believed 
 that all my personal inclinations would make me favor 
 
326 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 him at any time that it might be in my power to do so, 
 and he made an appointment by telegraph to meet me at 
 the Colonnade Hotel in Philadelphia to discuss the ques 
 tion of the Presidency. We met at the appointed time, 
 and I greatly pained Greeley when I told him that I did 
 not believe his nomination would be a wise one, because 
 I saw no possible chance for his election. He believed 
 me when I assured him that I had no candidate whom I 
 preferred to him, and that I was influenced solely by my 
 desire to protect him from a great personal disaster and 
 the country from a failure in the then promising effort to 
 overthrow the despotic political rule that had obtained 
 under Grant. I told him that I did not believe it pos 
 sible for the Democrats to support him, and without 
 their support his election would be utterly hopeless. 
 After hearing me very fully, and evidently in great sor 
 row because of the attitude I assumed, he finally made 
 this significant remark: "Well, perhaps the Democrats 
 wouldn t take me head foremost, but they might take 
 me boots foremost." I well understood that Greeley 
 meant that while he might not be an available candidate 
 for President, he might be an acceptable candidate for 
 the second place on the ticket. I at once answered: 
 " Yes, Mr. Greeley, with a conservative Republican for 
 President you can easily be nominated for Vice- Pres 
 ident and add great strength to the ticket." I said: 
 "There are two names which seem to me to be the 
 strongest David Davis and Charles Francis Adams: 
 which would you prefer?" Greeley answered: ".The 
 name of Adams leaves a bad taste in my mouth ; I would 
 prefer Davis;" and we finally agreed that I should go to 
 the Cincinnati Convention and support the nomination 
 of Davis for President and Greeley for Vice-President. 
 While I knew that Greeley most reluctantly gave up 
 the idea of being nominated for President, I did not 
 
LINCOLN AND GREELEY. 327 
 
 doubt that his candidacy for that office was practically 
 ended by our conference. When I went to Cincinnati, 
 I there met Leonard Swett, John D. Defrees, Senator 
 Fenton, and others, and we started out to accomplish 
 the nomination of Davis and Greeley. Some fifteen or 
 twenty of us met at ten o clock in the evening and de 
 cided on a programme by which we confidently expected 
 to nominate Davis and Greeley on the first ballot. But 
 while we were thus conferring General Frank P. Blair 
 had gotten together a conference between some of the 
 more radical supporters of Greeley and the supporters of 
 B. Gratz Brown, and their conference ended by deciding 
 to nominate Greeley for President and Brown for Vice- 
 President. By this new combination we were deprived 
 of the support of the important State of New York, and 
 also lost a large support in the West. While many of 
 the New York 4elegat.es would have preferred the nomi 
 nation of Davis and Greeley, when Greeley was presented 
 as a hopeful candidate for President the delegation natu 
 rally united in his support, and Brown brought into the 
 combination a large number of Western delegates who 
 would have preferred Davis had they been free to exer 
 cise their own judgment in selecting a candidate. Davis 
 was thus practically out of the race, and after giving a 
 complimentary vote to Curtin a large majority of the 
 Pennsylvania delegation united with me in supporting 
 the nomination of Adams. I did not regard Adams as 
 possessing the qualities of availability presented in Davis, 
 but Adams seemed to be the only man who had a reason 
 able prospect of winning the nomination over Greeley. 
 I was placed in the most unpleasant attitude of support 
 ing a man for President to whom I was almost an entire 
 stranger, and for whom I had little personal sympathy, 
 against Greeley, for whom I cherished the profoundest 
 respect and affection. 
 
328 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES, 
 
 On the first ballot Adams led Greeley by a vote of 203 
 to 147, with a large scattering vote between Trumbull, 
 Brown, Davis, Cnrtin, and Chase. On the second ballot 
 Adams rose to 243 and Greeley to 239, with Trumbull to 
 148. On the third ballot Adams had 264, Greeley 258, 
 and Trumbull 156. On the fourth ballot Adams in 
 creased to 279, and Greeley fell off to 251, with Trum 
 bull still holding 141. On the fifth ballot Adams had 
 309 and Greeley 258; and on the sixth and final ballot, 
 as first reported, Greeley led Adams 8 votes, having 332 
 to Adams 324. This was the first ballot on which Gree 
 ley led Adams, and it clearly indicated that the conven 
 tion was resistlessly drifting to Greeley as its candidate. 
 There was at once a rush from different delegations to 
 change votes from Adams to Greeley. I did not partici 
 pate in it, and only when a majority of votes had been 
 cast and recorded for him did I announce the change 
 of the Pennsylvania delegation to Greeley. The ballot 
 as finally announced was 482 for Greeley and 187 for 
 Adams. While the balloting was in progress Greeley 
 was sitting in his editorial room in the Tribune office 
 along with one of his editorial assistants, who informed 
 me that Greeley became intensely agitated as the sixth 
 ballot developed his growing strength; and when the 
 telegrams announced that he led Adams on that vote, he 
 excitedly exclaimed: "Why don t McClure change the 
 vote of Pennsylvania ? The next bulletin he received 
 announced his nomination, and he promptly telegraphed 
 to Whitelaw Reid, then his chief editorial associate, who 
 was in attendance at the convention: u Tender my grate 
 ful acknowledgments to the members of the convention 
 for the generous confidence they have shown me, and 
 assure them that I shall endeavor to deserve it." 
 
 I was greatly disappointed at the result of the conven 
 tion, and was deeply grieved at what I regarded as a 
 
LINCOLN AND G REE LEY. 329 
 
 cruel sacrifice of one of the men I most loved and the 
 surrender of a great opportunity to win a national vic 
 tory in the interest of better government and sectional 
 tranquil ity. The nomination of Greeley carried with it 
 the nomination of B. Gratz Brown for Vice-President, 
 and when the convention adjourned I returned to my 
 room at the hotel feeling that our work was farcical, 
 because I did not regard it as possible for the Democrats 
 to accept Greeley. Before midnight, however, a number 
 of leading Democrats from different parts of the country 
 who were in constant touch with the convention pulled 
 themselves together, and their utterances given to the 
 world the next morning foreshadowed the possibility 
 that the Democrats would accept Greeley and Brown; 
 but even when the Democratic National Convention 
 with substantial unanimity accepted both the candidates 
 and the platform of the Liberal Republicans, I saw little 
 hope for Greeley s election, as I feared that the Demo 
 cratic rank and file could not be brought to his support. 
 For some time after both conventions had nominated 
 Greeley we had a Greeley tidal-wave that seemed likely 
 to sweep the country. In Pennsylvania, as chairman 
 of the Liberal State Committee, I had voluntary letters 
 from hundreds of leading Republicans in every section 
 of the State indicating their purpose to fall in with the 
 Greeley current, but the loss of North Carolina early in 
 August not only halted the Greeley tide, but made its 
 returning ebb swift and destructive. With this obvious 
 revulsion in the political current the great business in 
 terests of the country were speedily consolidated in oppo 
 sition to any change in the national administration, and 
 there never was a day after the North Carolina defeat 
 when Greeley s election seemed to be within the range 
 of possibility. 
 
 The September elections proved that Greeley s nomi- 
 

 GRBEI.EY 3 LAST LETTER. 
 
LINCOLN AND G REE LEY. 331 
 
 nation made no impression upon the Republicans in New 
 England, including his native State of Vermont, where 
 it was hoped he would have thousands of Republican 
 followers, and the October elections came like an ava 
 lanche against the Liberal movement. Greeley delivered 
 campaign speeches in New England and in the Middle 
 States which were models of statesmanlike ability, but 
 he was fighting a hopeless battle; and when the October 
 elections cast their gloom upon his political hopes he was 
 called to nurse a dying wife, where for nearly a month 
 he passed sleepless nights, and closed her eyes in death 
 only a week before his overwhelming defeat in Novem 
 ber. Thus at once broken in heart and hope, the most 
 brilliant and forceful editor the country has ever pro 
 duced, and one of the sincerest and most tireless of 
 American philanthropists, pined away in the starless 
 midnight of an unsettled mind until the 2Qth of No 
 vember, 1872, when he passed to his final account. Im 
 mediately after the election I had written him a personal 
 letter expressing my sincere sympathy with him in his 
 multiplied misfortunes. One of the most valued of my 
 mementos of the men of the past is his reply, dated No 
 vember loth, the last day on which he ever wrote any 
 thing, as follows: 
 
 (Private.} 
 
 NEW YORK, November 10, 1872. 
 MY DEAR FRIEND : 
 
 I am a man of many sorrows, and doubtless have deserved 
 them, but I beg to say that I do not forget the gallant though 
 luckless struggle you made in my behalf. I am not well. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 HORACE GREELEY. 
 COL. A. K. McCLURE, 
 
 144 So. Sixth St., Philada. 
 
 Thus ended one of the most useful and one of the sad 
 dest lives of the last generation. He was of heroic 
 
33 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 mould in his matchless battles for the lowly and help 
 less, and was always invincible in political controversy, 
 because his integrity was ever as conspicuous as his abil 
 ity; but he was as impatient as he was philanthropic, 
 and he most longed for what was so pointedly denied 
 him the generous approval of his countrymen. He 
 was made heart-sore when he saw the colored voters, 
 whose cause he had championed when no political party 
 had the courage to espouse it, almost unitedly oppose his 
 election to the Presidency; and finally, smitten in his 
 home, in his ambition, and in his great newspaper, Hor 
 ace Greeley, broken in heart and hopelessly clouded in 
 intellect, gave up the battle of life, and slept with his 
 loved ones who had gone before. 
 
[photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.) 
 
 JOHN BROWN. 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 
 
 FAR down in the beautiful Cumberland Valley, the 
 old-time heartsome village of Chambersburg was 
 one of the chief attractions a generation ago. It was 
 founded by the sturdy Scotch-Irish pioneers, who carried 
 their severe religion and not less severe detestation of 
 despotism with them, and mingled their prayers with 
 their warfare against the savage and the soldiers of King 
 George. The memorable pioneer whose name the village 
 bears chose a lovely spot as his home and the heritage of 
 his children, where the soft murmurs of the crystal waters 
 of Falling Spring are lost in the Conococheague, and the 
 j united waters course through the centre of the town on 
 C^-their journey to the sea. Here more than a century had 
 been devoted to the genial civilization that made Cham 
 bersburg first in the affections of its people; and its homes, 
 palatial for that day; its grand elms and lindens which 
 arched the walks with their shades; its cultured people, 
 with just pride of ancestry and equal pride of present 
 character and usefulness, made it one of the most de 
 lightful of Pennsylvania towns for citizen or visitor. It 
 had none of the paralysis that comes when "wealth ac 
 cumulates and men decay;" large fortunes were unknown, 
 but plenty, thrift, and comfort stamped their impress 
 upon the community. 
 
 In the summer of 1859 a man of rather rude aspect, 
 but of grave and quiet demeanor, was noticed by the 
 334 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 335 
 
 village crowd that usually gathered in social converse 
 about the post-office while the evening mail was being 
 distributed. He attracted little attention, as he seldom 
 spoke save when spoken to, and then only in the briefest 
 way. He was known as Dr. Smith, and was reputed 
 to be engaged in the development of iron-mines on the 
 Potomac, some twenty-five miles distant. He lodged at 
 a private boarding-house off from the centre of the town, 
 and there was nothing in his sayings or doings to excite 
 any apprehension that his mission was anything else than 
 a peaceful one. This man was John Brown, then of 
 Kansas fame, and later immortalized in song and story 
 throughout every civilized land. The supposed mining- 
 implements which he was storing in Chambersburg were 
 the rude pikes with which the negroes of Virginia were 
 to be armed in their expected insurrection against their 
 masters. There was not a man, woman, or child in 
 Chambersburg who then dreamed that "Dr. Smith" 
 was John Brown not one who knew or suspected his 
 real purpose. None of the many who then saw him 
 casually from day to day could have dreamed that the 
 harmless-looking and acting " Dr. Smith " was engaged 
 in a drama the sequel of which would be enacted when 
 the vandals torch left the beautiful old village in ashes 
 only five years later. The South ever believed that John 
 Brown made Chambersburg the base for his mad raid on 
 Harper s Ferry because he had many sympathizing con 
 fidants and abetters there; and that unjust prejudice re 
 solved all doubts as to dooming the town when McCaus- 
 land rioted in its destruction on the 3Oth of July, 1864. 
 
 In the early part of October, 1859, two men j unknown 
 to me, entered my office and asked to submit some legal 
 matters in private. We retired to the private office, 
 when the younger of the two, an intelligent and evi 
 dently positive man, gave his name as Francis Jackson 
 
336 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Meriam of Boston, and his companion gave his name as 
 John Henry. Meriam said that he was going on a jour 
 ney South; that he had some property at home; that acci 
 dents often happened to travelers; and that he desired me 
 to draw his will. I did so, and was not surprised that a 
 young Boston traveler, after making a few special be 
 quests, gave his property to the Abolition Society of his 
 native State. There was nothing in his appearance, 
 manner, or conversation to attract any special attention 
 to his proceeding, and his will was duly executed, wit 
 nessed, and, in obedience to his orders, mailed to the 
 executor in Boston. When I asked Meriam s companion 
 to witness the will, he declined, saying that he was a 
 traveler also, and that both the witnesses had better be 
 in the same town. His real reasons for declining to wit 
 ness the will of his friend were first, that "John Henry " 
 was none other than John Henry Kagi, and, second, be 
 cause he presumed his life to be as much in peril as was 
 that of his friend. The sequel proved that he judged 
 well, for Kagi was killed in the attack on Harper s 
 Ferry, \vhile Meriam escaped. When the two visitors 
 left they were no more thought of in the village lawyer s 
 office until the startling news came of Brown s attempt 
 to capture Harper s Ferry and to arm the slaves of Vir 
 ginia in general insurrection. Then, to my surprise, I 
 read the name of the testator in the will I had written a 
 short time before, and the name and description of an 
 other assured me that his fellow-visitor in my office was 
 the then fallen John Henry Kagi. 
 
 It may be remembered that of the twenty-one who 
 composed John Brown s army of invasion, Watson 
 Brown, Oliver Brown, John Henry Kagi, Adolphus 
 Thompson, and Stewart Taylor, whites, and Sherrard 
 Lewis Leary, Dangerfield Newby, and Jeremiah Ander 
 son, colored, were killed in the battle, and that William 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 337 
 
 H. Leeman and William Thompson were killed in at 
 tempting to retreat. Owen Brown, Barclay Coppoch, 
 Charles P. Tidd, and Francis Jackson Meriam, whites, 
 and Osborne P. Anderson, colored, escaped. They made 
 their way through the forests of the South Mountain to 
 Chambersburg, traveling only by night; were concealed 
 in a retired grove near Chambersburg for several days to 
 enable the wounded men of the party to recruit their 
 strength, and then went on by short night-marches 
 across the North Mountain to the Juniata Valley, near 
 Bell s Mills, where they were taken in charge by a 
 prominent citizen of Harrisburg, whose dust has long 
 mouldered with that of John Brown. Meriam left the 
 party at Chambersburg, took the cars, and went through 
 to Boston without detection. Only two residents of 
 Chambersburg knew of the presence of the fugitives, 
 and they are no longer numbered among the citizens of 
 the town whose history forms such an important chapter 
 in the annals of our terrible civil war. John E. Cook, 
 Edwin Copnoch, Aaron D wight Stevens, and Albert 
 Hazlitt, whites, and John Copeland and Shields Green, 
 colored, were captured, and, w T ith John Brown their 
 leader, convicted of murder at Charlestown, Virginia, 
 and executed in December, 1859. Hazlitt was the first 
 of the fugitives captured in Pennsylvania. He was 
 arrested while walking along the Cumberland Valley 
 Railroad near Shippensburg, and lodged in the jail at 
 Carlisle. His captors supposed him to be Captain Cook, 
 and that error cost Cook his life on the gibbet. A requi 
 sition was quietly obtained from Richmond for the ren 
 dition of Cook. When it arrived the identity of Hazlitt 
 had been established, but the requisition remained within 
 thirty miles of Chambersburg, to siirprise Cook and return 
 him to Virginia just when he had perfected his plans for 
 escape. Cook was the last of the fugitives to be cap- 
 
338 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 hired, and the circumstances and manner of his arrest, 
 the strange miscarriage of his apparently certain oppor 
 tunities of escape, and his heroism in the lawless cause 
 that so blindly misguided him make a truthful story be 
 fore which the fascinating inventions of romance pale. 
 
 I was the counsel of John E. Cook in Chambersburg, 
 and the only person entirely familiar with the inner his 
 tory of his capture and the plans of escape. The com 
 munity of which Chambersburg was the centre of busi 
 ness and sentiment was nearly equally divided on the 
 political issues of that day; but the undertow of anti- 
 slavery conviction was stronger than the partisan dogmas 
 which made one-half the people declare slavery a lawful 
 and therefore a defensible institution. Fervent and elo 
 quent speeches would be made on the stump in every 
 campaign against interference with slavery and in favor 
 of the faithful observance of the mandates of the Con 
 stitution, and glittering resolves would emanate from 
 party conventions in favor of the Union, the Constitu 
 tion, and tne laws; but the practical division of the com 
 munity on the issues of obedience to the Constitution and 
 the laws which commanded the rendition of fugitive slaves 
 left here and there a despised negro-catcher on the one side 
 and all the people on the other side. There was no Demo 
 crat in Franklin County to accept a commissionership under 
 the Fugitive Slave Law. I have seen two Democratic 
 president judges administer the laws with a singleness of 
 purpose to hold the scales of justice in even balance; and 
 I have known a prominent Democratic candidate for the 
 same position, once a member of Congress, who pub 
 licly demanded justice to the South by the rendition of 
 slaves; but all of them would feed the trembling sable 
 fugitive, hide him from his pursuers, and bid him God 
 speed on his journey toward the North Star. The Demo 
 cratic president judge who personally remanded Captain 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 539 
 
 Cook to the custody of the Virginia authorities for exe 
 cution would have assented to and aided his escape had 
 they met simply as man and man outside the sacred obli 
 gations of the law. There was no sentiment in Frank 
 lin County or elsewhere in the North to give any practical 
 enforcement to the Fugitive Slave L,aw; and in every 
 contest between slave and master and in every issue re 
 lating to slavery the people were profoundly anti-slavery, 
 however they resolved in convention or spoke in the 
 forum or voted at the polls. This statement of the pub 
 lic sentiment that prevailed a quarter of a century ago 
 in Southern Pennsylvania, hard by the slave border, and 
 which was but a reflex of the sentiment of the North 
 that gave practical effect to its teachings, will make the 
 story of Captain Cook s apparently certain but singularly- 
 defeated opportunities of escape better understood. 
 
 It had been known for some days after the Brown raid 
 on Harper s Ferry that Captain Cook was at large, and, 
 as a liberal reward for his capture had been offered by 
 Governor Wise of Virginia, and a minute description of 
 his person published throughout the country, the whole 
 skilled and amateur detective force of the land was 
 watching every promising point to effect his capture. 
 The Northern cities, East and West, were on the watch 
 to discover his hiding-place, but the forest-schooled and 
 nature-taught detective of the South Mountain knew 
 that some of its fastnesses must be his retreat. The 
 broken ranges of the mountain on the southern border 
 of Franklin embraced the line between Pennsylvania 
 and Maryland, between the free and the slave States. 
 It was the favorite retreat of the fugitive slave, and its 
 nearness to Harper s Ferry, and its sacred temples of 
 solitude where only the hunter or the chopper wandered, 
 made it the most inviting refuge for the fleeing insurrec 
 tionist. Cook was known as a man of desperate courage, 
 
3-P LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 as a rare expert in the use of pistol and rifle, as a reckless 
 desperado in the anti-slavery crusade; and his capture 
 alive was not expected. He had braved assassination in 
 Kansas, and all believed that he would resist to the death 
 any attempt to capture him for Virginia vengeance on 
 the gallows. He had been concealed in the mountain- 
 recesses for some days with his companions, who subse 
 quently escaped through Chambersburg to the North, 
 when he decided to seek out some woodman s home and 
 obtain provisions. They were afraid to shoot game, lest 
 the reports of their guns might indicate their retreat and 
 lead to their capture. Cook was of a nervous, restless, 
 reckless disposition, and he started out alone, going he 
 knew not whither, to obtain food. He reasoned plausi 
 bly that he could not be captured by any one or two 
 men, as he was well armed and thoroughly skilled in the 
 use of his weapons. He took no thought of arrest, as, 
 had a score of armed men confronted him, he would 
 have sold his life as dearly as possible and died in the 
 battle for his liberty. He understood that he might die 
 any day or hour, but to be made a prisoner and be ren 
 dered up to Virginia justice to die on the gibbet was the 
 one doom that he meant to escape. He felt safe, there 
 fore, in his venture out in the pathless mountains to 
 claim the hospitality of some humble home in the wil 
 derness. And his judgment would have been justified 
 had he not walked into the hands of the only man in 
 Franklin County who combined with the courage and 
 the skill the purpose to capture him. 
 
 Among the sturdy population of the mountaineers 
 on the southern Pennsylvania border was a family of 
 Logans. There were two brothers, both shrewd, quiet, 
 resolute men, both strongly Southern in their sympathies, 
 both natural detectives, and both trained in the summary 
 rendition of fugitive slaves without process of law. It 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 341 
 
 was common for slaves to escape from Maryland and 
 Virginia into the South Mountain, whose broken spurs 
 and extended wings of dense forest gave them reasonably 
 safe retreat. Their escape would be followed by hand 
 bills describing the fugitives and offering rewards for 
 their capture and return. These offers of rewards always 
 found their way into the hands of Daniel and Hugh 
 Logan, and many fleeing sons of bondage were arrested 
 by them and quietly returned to their masters. Hugh 
 followed his natural bent and went South as soon as the 
 war began. He at once enlisted in the Confederate ser 
 vice, rose to the rank of captain, and was the guide in 
 General Stuart s raid to Chambersburg in October, 1862. 
 He then saved me from identification and capture, al 
 though my arrest was specially ordered, with that of a 
 dozen others, in retaliation of Pope s arrest of Virginia 
 citizens; and I was glad at a later period of the war to 
 save him from summary execution as a supposed bush 
 whacker by General Kelley. Whatever may be said or 
 thought of his convictions and actions, he sealed them 
 with his life, as he fell mortally wounded in one of the 
 last skirmishes of the war. His brother Daniel was less 
 impulsive, and he did not believe that either slavery or 
 freedom was worth dying for. He was then just in the 
 early vigor of manhood and a man of rare qualities. 
 He possessed the highest measure of courage, but never 
 sought and seldom shared in a quarrel. He was a com 
 plete picture of physical strength, compactly and sym 
 metrically formed, and with a face whose clear-cut fea 
 tures unmistakably indicated his positive qualities. He 
 was a born detective. Silent, cunning, tireless, and reso 
 lute, he ever exhausted strategy in his many campaigns 
 against fugitives, and he seldom failed. Had he been 
 city-born, with opportunities for culture in the pro 
 fession, Logan would have made one of the best chiefs 
 
342 LINCOLN AMD MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 of a detective bureau to be found in the country. But, 
 mountain-born, unschooled save by himself, and trained 
 only in the rude contests with fugitive slaves and an 
 occasional criminal in the border wilderness, he finally 
 wearied of his trade, and his arrest of Captain Cook was 
 his last exploit in the detective line. He subsequently 
 removed to Lancaster, where a very quiet, w r ell-to-do, 
 well behaved, and respected dealer in horses answers to 
 the name of Daniel Logan. 
 
 In a mountain-ravine near Mont Alto Furnace, Cleg- 
 gett Fitzhugh, manager of the works, and a man of 
 Southern birth and strong Southern sympathies, was 
 overseeing a number of men at work, and Daniel Logan 
 had happened to come that way and was engaged in 
 casual conversation with him. The ravine is so hidden 
 by the surrounding forest that one unacquainted with 
 the locality would not know of its existence until he 
 entered it. Captain Cook, in his wanderings in search 
 of food, was surprised to find himself suddenly emerge 
 from the mountain-thicket into an open space and within 
 less than fifty yards of a number of workmen. He was 
 clad and armed as a hunter, and he at once decided to 
 evade suspicion by boldly meeting the men he could not 
 hope to escape by flight. The moment he appeared the 
 keen eye of Logan scanned him, and, without betraying 
 his discovery in any way, he quietly said to Fitzhugh, 
 "That s Captain Cook; we must arrest him; the reward 
 is one thousand dollars." Fitzhugh heartily sympathized 
 with Logan alike in hatred of the John Brown raiders 
 and in desire for the reward, and he knew enough about 
 Logan to say nothing and obey. Cook advanced in a 
 careless manner to Logan and Fitzhugh, and told them 
 that he was hunting on the mountains and wanted to re 
 plenish his stock of bread and bacon. Logan at once 
 disarmed suspicion on the part of Cook by his well- 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAW. 343 
 
 affected hospitality, as lie proposed to go at once with 
 Cook to Logan s store which had no existence, by the 
 way and supply the hunter s wants. Cook was so com 
 pletely thrown off guard by the kind professions of Lo 
 gan and Fitzhugh that he fell in between them without 
 noticing how he was being flanked. His gun rested 
 carelessly on his shoulder, and the hand that could grasp 
 his pistol and fire with unerring aim in the twinkling of 
 an eye was loosely swinging by his side. None but a 
 Daniel Logan could have thus deceived John B. Cook, 
 who had studied men of every grade in many perils; but 
 there was not the trace of excitement or the faintest be 
 trayal of his desperate purpose on the face of Logan. 
 Thus completely disarmed by strategy, the little blue- 
 eyed blonde, the most sympathetic and the fiercest of all 
 John Brown s lieutenants, was instantly made powerless, 
 as two rugged mountaineers, at a signal from Logan, 
 grasped his arms and held him as in a vice. Cook was 
 bewildered for a moment, and when the truth flashed 
 upon him he struggled desperately; but it was one small, 
 starved man against two strong mountaineers, and he 
 soon discovered that resistance was vain. 
 
 u Why do you arrest me?" was his inquiry, when he 
 perceived that violence was useless. 
 
 u Because you are Captain Cook," was the cool reply 
 of Logan. 
 
 Cook neither affirmed nor denied the impeachment, 
 and the speedy search of his person settled the question, 
 as his captain s commission in John Brown s army wa^ 
 found in an inner pocket. Cook was taken to Fitz 
 hugh s house and stripped of his weapons, consisting 
 of gun, revolver, and knife. He was allowed to eat a 
 hasty meal, and was then placed, unbound, in an open 
 buggy with Logan, to be taken to Chambersburg. He 
 was informed that if he attempted to escape he would be 
 
344 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 shot; and it did not need an extended acquaintance with 
 his captor to assure him that what he threatened he 
 would certainly perform. He then gave up all hope of 
 escape by either fight or flight. As they were journey 
 ing along the eighteen miles Cook found that his captor 
 was less bloodthirsty than mercenary ; and the following 
 conversation, subsequently repeated to me by both par 
 ties, passed substantially between them: 
 
 "You will get a reward of one thousand dollars for 
 me, you say?" queried Cook. 
 
 "Yes, a thousand dollars," answered the sententious 
 Logan. 
 
 u They will hang me in Virginia, won t they?" was 
 Cook s next inquiry. 
 
 " Yes, they will hang you," was the chilling answer. 
 
 " Do you want to have me hung?" was Cook s first 
 venture upon the humane side of his captor. 
 
 No, was the prompt but unimpassioned answer of 
 Logan. 
 
 "Then you want only the reward?" was Cook s half- 
 hopeful appeal to Logan. 
 
 "Yes; that s all," was Logan s reply. 
 
 Cook s naturally bright face beamed at once with hope 
 as he enthusiastically entered into various plans for the 
 payment of the sum that would ransom his life. He told 
 Logan how a thousand dollars, or five times that sum, 
 would not be a matter of a moment s consideration to 
 his brother-in-law, Governor Willard of Indiana, or his 
 other brother-in-law, a man of large fortune residing in 
 Brooklyn; but Logan distrusted this story of high digni 
 taries and large fortunes, and no practical way seemed 
 open to make Cook s credit good enough to assure his 
 discharge. Finally, he inquired of Logan whether there 
 was no one in Chambersburg who would be likely to take 
 an interest in him, and who could act as his counsel and 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 345 
 
 assure Logan of the payment of the reward. Logan 
 named me as a Republican Senator just elected, who 
 might agree to act as his counsel. He proposed to take 
 Cook to my office without revealing his identity to any 
 others, and if I assured him of the payment of the re 
 ward he would walk away and leave Cook with me. 
 With this truce between captor and captive they arrived 
 in Chambersburg a little before sunset, put up at a hotel, 
 and Logan sent for me. I had walked out to the south 
 ern suburbs of the town that evening after tea to look at 
 some lots, and on my way back had stopped with a circle 
 of men gathered about a small outskirt store. We had 
 just closed one of the most desperate local contests of 
 the State, and only those who know the sunny side of 
 village politics can appreciate how an evening hour or 
 more could thus be pleasantly spent. It was an out-of- 
 the-way place, and among the last that would be thought 
 of in deciding to look for me. Meantime, Logan had 
 me searched for in every place where I was accustomed 
 to stroll in the evening, until, as it grew late, his evident 
 concern attracted attention, and he feared the discovery 
 or suspicion of the identity of his prisoner. When dark 
 ness began to gather and all efforts to find me had been 
 unsuccessful, he sent for an officer and started with his 
 prisoner for the office of Justice Reisher, to deliver Cook 
 to the custody of the law. The office of the justice was 
 on the main street, about midway between the hotel and 
 the suburban store where I had tarried, and as I walked 
 leisurely homeward I noticed a crowd about the door of 
 the little temple of justice. As I came up to the door 
 Logan first noticed me from the inside, and hurried out 
 to meet me, exclaiming in a whisper, with a betrayal of 
 excitement that I had never before seen in him, " My 
 God, Colonel McClure! where have you been? I have 
 been hunting you for more than an hour. That s Cap- 
 
346 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 tain Cook, and I had agreed to bring him to you. Can t 
 you get him yet?" 
 
 I was greatly surprised, of course, and equally per 
 plexed at the grave results likely to follow. I quietly 
 pressed my way into the office until the justice noticed 
 me, and he at once addressed Cook, saying, "Here s 
 your counsel now." 
 
 Cook beckoned me to his side in the corner, and said, 
 in a tone of visible despair, u I had expected to meet you 
 at your office and escape this misfortune. " He added, 
 " I am Cook: there s no use in denying it. What s to be 
 done?" 
 
 I turned to the justice, and said, "There is no dispute 
 as to the identity of the prisoner: a hearing is needless. 
 Let him be committed to await the demand for his ren 
 dition. 
 
 The justice would have been quite content had Cook 
 been able to bounce through a window and escape, but 
 that was not possible, and Cook was committed to prison. 
 Logan repented of his \vork when he saw that he had sur 
 rendered a life for a price, and his last direction to me as 
 we passed out of the office was, " Get Cook away, reward 
 or no reward." 
 
 Cook was conducted to the old jail, accompanied by 
 the officer and myself; and I shall never forget the trem 
 ulous voice in which the sheriff inquired of me what pre 
 cautions he should take to secure the prisoner. I was 
 in the doubly unpleasant position of being counsel for a 
 prisoner whose life depended upon his escape from prison, 
 and also counsel for the sheriff, who was more than ready 
 to obey any instructions I might give him to facilitate 
 Cook s escape without legal responsibility for the act. 
 The sheriff was one of a class of simple countrymen who 
 are as rugged in their political convictions and prejudices 
 as in their physical organization. He ill concealed his 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAi). 347 
 
 willingness to let Cook get away if it could be done with 
 out official responsibility for the escape; and this he was 
 more than willing to leave me to decide. I told him to 
 take Cook and myself to a cell, leave us together, and 
 admit no others. When the lawless little captive had 
 got comfortably seated in his cell, I had my first oppor 
 tunity to note his appearance and qualities. His long, 
 silken, blonde hair curled carelessly about his neck; his 
 deep-blue eyes were gentle in expression as a woman s; 
 and his slightly bronzed complexion did not conceal the 
 soft, effeminate skin that would have well befitted the 
 gentler sex. He was small in stature, barely five feet 
 five, and his active life on the Western theatre of war 
 had left him without superfluous flesh. He was nervous 
 and impatient; he spoke in quick, impulsive sentences, 
 but with little directness, save in repeating that he must 
 escape from prison. I reminded him that he could not 
 walk out of jail, and that his escape that night, under 
 any circumstances, would be specially dangerous to him 
 self and dangerous to the sheriff. My presence with him 
 in the jail until a late hour and my professional relations 
 as counsel of the sheriff forbade any needless haste. We 
 carefully considered every possible method of getting a 
 requisition for him from Richmond; and, assuming that 
 Cook s arrest was telegraphed to Richmond that evening, 
 a requisition by mail or special messenger could not pos 
 sibly reach Chambersburg the next day or night. It was 
 decided, therefore, that he should not attempt to escape 
 that night, but that the next night he should have the 
 necessary instructions and facilities to regain his liberty. 
 How or by whom he was to be aided need not be told. 
 The two men who took upon themselves the work of 
 ascertaining just where and by what means Cook could 
 best break out of the old jail were never known or sus- 
 
348 LINCOLN AND MEN OF irAK 
 
 pected as actively aiding the prisoner. One is now dead 
 and the other is largely interested in Southern enter 
 prises. They did their part well, and, had Cook re 
 mained in Chambersburg over the next day, he would 
 have been following the North Star before the midnight 
 hour. 
 
 I had spent half an hour with Cook when he first en 
 tered the prison, and then left him for an hour to confer 
 with my law- partner about the possibility of a legal con 
 test to delay or defeat the requisition in case it should be 
 necessary. I returned to the jail about ten o clock, and 
 had my last interview with Cook. As he never dreamed 
 of a requisition reaching him before the second day, and 
 as he was entirely confident of his escape the following 
 night, he threw off the cloud of despair that shadowed 
 him in the early part of the evening, and startled me 
 with the eloquence and elegance of his conversation. 
 His familiar discussion of poetry, painting, and every 
 thing pertaining to the beautiful would have made any 
 one forget that he was in a chilly prison-cell, and im- 
 gine that he was in the library of some romantic lover 
 of literature and the fine arts. I became strangely in 
 terested in the culture that was blended with the mad 
 desperation of the Virginia insurgent. He was evidently 
 a man of much more than common intellectual qualities 
 and thoroughly poetic in taste and temperament, with a 
 jarring mixture of wild, romantic love of the heroic. 
 He told me of his hairbreadth escapes in Kansas, of the 
 price set upon his head; and his whole soul seemed to be 
 absorbed in avenging the Kansas slavery crusades by 
 revolutionary emancipation in the Slave States. When 
 I asked him whether he would not abandon his lawless 
 and hopeless scheme when he escaped, his large, soft eyes 
 flashed with the fire of defiance as he answered, with an 
 emphasis that unstrung every nerve in his body: u No! 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 349 
 
 the battle must be fought to the bitter end; and we must 
 triumph, or God is not just." 
 
 It was vain to argue with him the utter madness of 
 attempting such a revolution, and its absolute lawless 
 ness: he rejected all law and logic and believed in his 
 cause. And more: he fully, fanatically, believed in its 
 justice: he believed in it as a duty as the rule of patriot 
 ism that had the sanction of a higher law than that of 
 man. In short, John K. Cook was a wild fanatic on the 
 slavery question, and he regarded any and every means 
 to precipitate emancipation as justified by the end. He 
 did not want to kill or to desolate homes with worse than 
 death by the brutal fury of slave insurrection; but if such 
 appalling evils attended the struggle for the sudden and 
 absolute overthrow of slavery, he was ready to accept the 
 responsibility and believe that he was simply performing 
 his duty. I do not thus present Cook in apology for his 
 crime; I present him as he was a sincere fanatic, with 
 mingled humanity and atrocity strangely unbalancing 
 each other, and his mad purposes intensified by the bar 
 barities which crimsoned the early history of Kansas. 
 
 After half an hour thus spent almost wholly as a lis 
 tener to the always brilliant and often erratic conversa 
 tion of the prisoner, I rose to leave him. He bade me 
 good-night with hope beaming in every feature of his 
 attractive face. I engaged to call again the next after 
 noon, and left him to meet nevermore. He could have 
 made his escape in thirty minutes that night, but it 
 would have compromised both the sheriff and myself, 
 and the second opportunity for his flight was lost. I 
 reached my home before eleven o clock, and was sur 
 prised to find Mrs. McClure and her devoted companion, 
 Miss Virginia Reilly, awaiting me in the library, dressed 
 to face the storm that had begun to rage without. They 
 stated that they were about to proceed to the jail, ask to 
 
350 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 see Cook which they knew would not be refused them 
 by the sheriff dress him in the extra female apparel 
 they had in a bundle, and one of them walk out with 
 him while the other remained in the cell. It was en 
 tirely practicable, and it required more than mere prot 
 estation on my part to prevent it. Even when assured 
 that Cook would certainly escape the following night 
 without embarrassment to the sheriff or any one else, the 
 woman s intuition rejected the reason it could not answer, 
 and only when it was peremptorily forbidden as foolish 
 and needless did they reluctantly consent to abandon the 
 last chance Cook could then have to escape. They were 
 both strongly anti-slavery by conviction, and their lives 
 were lustrous in the offices of kindness. Miss Reilly, 
 better known in Philadelphia as the late accomplished 
 wife of Rev. Thomas X. Orr, was the daughter of a 
 Democratic member of Congress, and was positive in 
 her party faith in all save slavery; and both women were 
 of heroic mould. They many times reproached them 
 selves for not acting upon their woman s intuition with 
 out waiting to reason with man on the subject. Had 
 they done so, Cook would have been out of prison, fleetly 
 mounted, and the morning sun would have greeted him 
 in the northern mountains. Their mission failed because 
 forbidden when the escape of the prisoner by other means 
 seemed as certain as anything could be in the future, and 
 the ill-fated Cook lost his third chance for liberty. Both 
 his fair would-be rescuers sleep the dreamless sleep of 
 the dead, and the winds of the same autumn sang their 
 requiem and strewed their fresh graves with Nature s 
 withered emblems of death. 
 
 About noon on the following day the sheriff rushed 
 into my office, wild with excitement and his eyes 
 dimmed by tears, and exclaimed, u Cook s taken away!" 
 A .thunderbolt from a cloudless sky could not have 
 
A A 7 EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 351 
 
 startled me more, but the painful distress of the sheriff 
 left no doubt in my mind that he had stated the truth. 
 He soon calmed down sufficiently to tell me how a req 
 uisition for Cook had been lying in Carlisle, only thirty 
 miles distant by railroad, where it had been brought 
 some days before when Hazlitt had been arrested and 
 was believed to be Cook. The error had been corrected 
 when the identity of Hazlitt had been discovered, and 
 another requisition forwarded, on which he had been 
 returned to Virginia; but the Cook requisition remained 
 with the sheriff of Cumberland. When Cook s arrest 
 was announced the requisition was brought on to Cham- 
 bersburg in the morning train, and the officer, fearing 
 delay by the sheriff sending for his counsel, called on the 
 president judge, who happened to be in the town, and 
 demanded his approval of the regularity of his papers 
 and his command for the prompt rendition of the pris 
 oner. The judge repaired to the prison with the officer, 
 and performed his plain duty under the law by declaring 
 the officer entitled to the custody of Cook. The noon 
 train bore the strangely ill-fated prisoner on his way 
 to Virginia and to death. No man in like peril ever 
 seemed to have had so many entirely practicable oppor 
 tunities for escape; but all failed, even with the exercise 
 of what would be judged as the soundest discretion for 
 his safety. 
 
 His return to the Charlestown jail, his memorable 
 trial, his inevitable conviction, his only cowardly act of 
 submitting to recapture when he had broken out of his 
 cell a few hours before his execution, and his final exe 
 cution with his captive comrades, are familiar to all. 
 His trial attracted more attention than that of any of 
 the others, because of the prominent men enlisted in his 
 cause and of the special interest felt in him by the com 
 munity in and about Harper s Ferry. He had taught 
 
352 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 school there some years before, had married there, and 
 his return as one of John Brown s raiders to kindle me 
 flame of slave insurrection intensified the bitterness of 
 the people against him. From the 28th day of October, 
 1859, when he was lodged in the Charlestown jail, until 
 the last act of the tragedy, when he was executed, Cook 
 attracted the larger share of public interest in Harper s 
 Ferry, much as Brown outstripped him in national or 
 worldwide fame. Governor Willard, the Democratic 
 executive of Indiana, appeared in person on the scene, 
 and made exhaustive efforts to save his wayward but be 
 loved brother-in-law. Daniel W. Voorhees, now United 
 States Senator from Indiana, was then United States Dis 
 trict Attorney of his State, and his devotion to his party 
 chief made him excel every previous or later effort of his 
 life in pleading the utterly hopeless cause of the brilliant 
 little Virginia insurgent. It w r as a grand legal and for 
 ensic battle, but there was not an atom of law to aid the 
 defense, and public sentiment was vehement for the 
 atonement. 
 
 Viewed in the clearer light and calmer judgment of 
 the experience of more than thirty years, it would have 
 been wiser and better had Virginia treated John Brown 
 and his corporal s guard of madmen as hopeless lunatics 
 by imprisonment for life, as was strongly advised by con 
 fidential counsels from some prominent men of the land 
 whose judgment was entitled to respect; but Governor 
 Wise, always a lover of the theatrical, made a d cess- 
 parade burlesque of justice, and on the i6th day of De 
 cember, 1859, amidst the pomp and show of the concen 
 trated power of the Mother of Presidents, John E. Cook 
 paid the penalty of his crime on the gallows. No demand 
 was ever made for the rendition of Cook s companions 
 who had escaped from Harper s Ferry- into the South 
 Mountain with him. Some of them lived in Northern 
 
AN EPISODE OF JOHN BROWN S RAID. 353 
 
 Pennsylvania without concealment, but no one thought 
 of arresting them. A few months thereafter the long- 
 threatening clouds of fraternal war broke in fury upon 
 the country; the song of John Brown inspired great 
 armies as they swept through the terrible flame of battle 
 from the Father of Waters to the Southern Sea, and the 
 inspiration that made lawless madmen of Brown and 
 Cook at Harper s Ferry crowned the Republic with uni 
 versal freedom at Appomattox. 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 
 
 Aviv great wars produce great victors, and they are 
 crowned with the greenest laurels of the people for 
 whose cause they have achieved success. These chief 
 tains live in history and their memory is gratefully cher 
 ished long after they have passed away ; but every great 
 war has also its unrewarded heroes, whose merits are 
 often equal to, sometimes even greater than, those who 
 attained the highest measure of distinction. In war 
 and politics nothing is successful but success, and the 
 unsuccessful military commander and the unsuccessful 
 politician are forgotten, whatever may be their personal 
 merits, while those who win victories win the applause 
 of the world. Accident, fortuitous circumstance, and 
 personal or political influence aid largely in winning 
 promotion in both peace and war, and a lost battle, how 
 ever bravely and skillfully fought, often deposes a com 
 mander, while a victory won, even in spite of the absence 
 of the elements of greatness, may make a name immor 
 tal. The rewarded heroes of our late civil war are well 
 known to the country and to the world, but that great 
 conflict left unrewarded heroes whose names and merits 
 should be crystallized in the history of the Republic. 
 Prominent among these are General George G. Meade, 
 General George H. Thomas, General Fitz John Porter, 
 General G. K. Warren, and General D. C. Buell. 
 
 The country has never done justice to General Meade 
 
 355 
 
356 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 as a military commander, and onr varied histories, as a 
 rule, have grudgingly conceded to him only what could 
 not be withheld from him. The man who fought and 
 won the battle of Gettysburg should have been the com- 
 mander-in-chief of the armies of the Union and held 
 that position during life. It was the great battle of the 
 war; it was the Waterloo of the Confederacy, and the 
 victor} 7 there achieved was won by the skill of the com 
 manding general and the heroism of his army. No man 
 ever accepted a command under circumstances as embar 
 rassing and in every way discouraging as those which 
 confronted General Meade when he succeeded Hooker as 
 commander of the Army of the Potomac. That superb 
 army had never up to that time won a decisive victory 
 in a great battle. It had been defeated in 1861 under 
 McDowell, in the spring of 1862 under McClellan on the 
 Peninsula, again under Pope on the second Bull Run 
 field, next under Burnside at Fredericksburg in the fall 
 of 1862, and in 1863 under Hooker at Chancellorsville; 
 and the only success it had achieved in pitched battle 
 was the victory of Antietam. That was a victory only 
 because Lee left the field unassailed after the battle had 
 been fought. Meade was called to the command within 
 three days of the battle of Gettysburg, and was compelled 
 to advance to meet the strongest and most defiant army 
 that ever marched under the Confederate flag, and one 
 that fully equaled his in numbers and that was flushed 
 with repeated triumphs. His army was fresh from the 
 humiliating discomfiture of Chancellorsville, distrustful 
 of its own ability because of distrust in its commanders, 
 and it had to be concentrated by forced marches to meet 
 the shock of battle on Cemetery Hill. 
 
 The Gettysburg campaign was in all material respects 
 defensive. The government had little hope of anything 
 more than repelling Lee s advance upon the national 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 357 
 
 capital or upon Baltimore or Philadelphia. The destruc 
 tion of Lee s army was not to be thought of, for it was 
 equal in numbers, equipment, and prowess to the ever- 
 gallant though often-defeated Army of the Potomac. It 
 was the single hope of the nation, for had it been de 
 feated in a great battle Washington and the wealth of our 
 Eastern cities would have been at the mercy of the in 
 surgents. It was an occasion for the most skillful and 
 prudent generalship, united with the great courage essen 
 tial to command successfully in such an emergency. .All 
 these high requirements General Meade fully met, and 
 the most critical examination of the records he made in 
 the Gettysburg campaign develops nothing but what 
 heightens his qualities for the peculiarly grave emer 
 gency that confronted him. He has been thoughtlessly 
 or maliciously criticised because he took the wise pre 
 caution to provide for his retreat from Gettysburg had 
 the chances of war made it necessary, and also because 
 he failed to pursue Lee more vigorously on the retreat, 
 and decided not to assault him at Williamsport. 
 
 When General Meade arrived at Gettysburg, which he 
 did at the earliest hour possible, he knew how desperate 
 the battle must be and how the advantage was with the 
 enemy, as Lee had largely superior numbers on the first 
 day, and should have had largely superior numbers on 
 the second day. Not until the morning of the third day 
 was Meade s army all upon the field, and then one corps 
 had made a forced march of nearly thirty miles. He 
 had expected to fight a defensive battle east of Gettys 
 burg, and his topographical examinations had been care 
 fully made and his lines fully formulated. He thus acted 
 as a wise and skillful general in making the earliest prepa 
 rations for the retirement of his army to another position 
 in case he should be assaulted or flanked from his lines 
 on Cemetery Hill. He was thus prepared to retire his 
 
358 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 army at any moment in perfect order, with every corps 
 advised precisely where to form its new lines; but he 
 proved by the dauntless courage with which he held his 
 position at Gettysburg that he did not contemplate retreat 
 until retreat became an absolute necessity. So far from 
 being complained of for having looked beyond Gettys 
 burg for a position in which to fight the decisive battle 
 with Lee, he is entitled to the highest commendation as 
 a most skillful, brave, and considerate soldier. 
 
 When Lee was defeated and retired from the field, the 
 Army of the Potomac was worn by forced marches and 
 fighting for more than a week, and more than twenty 
 thousand of its gallant warriors were killed or wounded, 
 and when the two armies were brought face to face again 
 at Williamsport, they were yet equal in numbers, equal 
 in prowess, and presumably equal in equipment, and Lee 
 had the advantage of a chosen position for repelling as 
 saults upon his lines. Meade might have won another 
 victory, but it would have been at such fearful sacrifice 
 that no wise soldier would have attempted it. After 
 Gettysburg, General Meade had but a single opportunity 
 of displaying his generalship in handling the Army of 
 the Potomac, and that was in the fruitless movement 
 upon Mine Run, where by disobedience of his orders, 
 owing to a mistake of one of his corps commanders, Lee 
 was enabled to unite his forces in an impregnable posi 
 tion before the Army of the Potomac was ready for as 
 sault. He might have done at Mine Run as Grant did 
 at Vicksburg and Cold Harbor, and as Burnside did at 
 Fredericksburg, and sacrificed ten thousand men with 
 only defeat as his reward; but General Meade was too 
 great a soldier to sacrifice an army to conceal failures in 
 generalship. General Grant, the victor of Vicksburg on 
 the same day that Meade was victor at Gettysburg, added 
 fresh laurels to his crown at Missionary Ridge, where he 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 359 
 
 had overwhelming numbers to assure success. That 
 achievement made him Lieutenant-General, as Meade 
 would have been made had he succeeded at Mine Run 
 and Grant failed at Missionary Ridge, and thenceforth 
 Grant was the only chieftain the nation could know until 
 his final victory at Appomattox. 
 
 I first saw General Meade on the day that he reported 
 for duty at Tenleyfown, wearing his new brigadier s uni 
 form, to take command of a brigade of the Pennsylvania 
 Reserves. He impressed me then, as he ever impressed 
 those who came in close contact with him, as a thorough 
 gentleman and soldier, quiet, unobtrusive, intelligent, and 
 heroic, and in every battle in which he led his brigade 
 or his division or his corps he was ever first in the fight 
 and last to leave it. He would have won Fredericksburg 
 had he been half supported, as his movement in the early 
 part of the clay was the only success achieved by any 
 effort of the army in that disastrous battle; and when he 
 was called to the command of the Army of the Potomac 
 he hesitated long before accepting it, and finally accepted 
 it only when it was pressed upon him as an imperious 
 duty that he could not evade. 
 
 I have reason to believe that Meade lost the Lieuten 
 ant-Generalship that was conferred upon Sheridan in 
 1869 because of the disappointment in Washington at 
 his failure to deliver battle to Lee at Williamsport. I 
 saw Lincoln within a week after Lee s retreat from Penn 
 sylvania, and he inquired most anxiously and in great 
 detail as to all the roads and mountain-passes from Get 
 tysburg to the Potomac. I was entirely familiar with 
 them, and gave him minute information on the subject. 
 After a somewhat protracted inquiry into the topography 
 of the country, I asked Lincoln whether he was not sat 
 isfied with what Meade had accomplished. He answered 
 with the caution that alwavs characterised Lincoln in 
 
360 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 speaking of those who were struggling for the preserva 
 tion of the government. I remember his exact language 
 as well to-day as if it had been spoken but yesterday. 
 He said: " Now, don t misunderstand me about General 
 Meade. I am profoundly grateful down to the bottom of 
 my boots for what he did at Gettysburg, but I think that 
 if I had been General Meade I would have fought an 
 other battle." The atmosphere about Washington was 
 not friendly to Meade. He was all soldier, and would 
 have died unpromoted had he been compelled to seek 
 or conciliate political power to attain it. Stanton raved 
 against him because he did not do the impossible thing 
 of capturing Lee and his army, and political sentiment 
 in and around the administration and in Congress settled 
 down in the conviction that Meade had lost a great op 
 portunity. They would have deified Meade, when terror- 
 stricken as Lee was marching upon Gettysburg, had he 
 given them the assurance that he could drive Lee s army 
 back defeated and broken upon its desolated Virginia 
 homes; but when their fears were quieted by Meade s 
 hard-fought battle and decisive victory, they forgot the 
 grandeur of his achievement and accused him of incom- 
 petency for failing to fight at Williamsport. Had he 
 fought there and been repulsed, as he had every reason 
 to believe was more than probable had he attacked, he 
 would have been denounced as rash and unfitted for com 
 mand; but he was censured for his wisdom; multiplied 
 censure fell upon him for his wisdom at Mine Run; and 
 thus the man who should have been the Great Captain 
 of the war was subordinated, but performed his duty with 
 matchless fidelity until the last insurgent flag was furled. 
 That Meade was sore at heart because he felt that his 
 best efforts as a soldier were not fully appreciated is 
 known to all his personal associates. One month before 
 General Grant was inaugurated as President, I met him 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 361 
 
 on a railway-train going to Washington. He and his 
 family were in a private car at the rear of the train. 
 When I learned that he was there, along with others I 
 called to pay my respects. After a very brief conversa 
 tion I was about to leave him when he asked me to 
 remain for a moment, as he wished to speak to me about 
 the proposed abolishment of the rank of General, which 
 he was soon to vacate when he became President, and to 
 which Sherman was fairly entitled by regular promotion. 
 He asked me to take some interest in the matter at Wash 
 ington and urge some of our prominent Pennsylvania 
 Representatives to defeat the passage of the bill. I fully 
 agreed with him, and in leaving him said, "The coun 
 try well understands who should succeed you as General 
 in the army, but there is dispute as to who should suc 
 ceed Sherman as Lieutenant-General. " I did not expect 
 any intimation from Grant as to his choice for Lieuten 
 ant-General, but to my surprise he answered, "Oh, that 
 is not a matter of doubt; Sheridan is fully entitled to it." 
 The remark was not made in confidence, although none 
 heard it but his family and myself. The names of Meade 
 and Thomas were both freely discussed at that time as 
 likely to reach the Lieutenant-Generalship, while few, 
 if any, expected Sheridan, a junior major-general, to 
 attain it. On my return from Washington I happened 
 to meet General Meade in Col. Scott s room of the Penn 
 sylvania Railroad office, and without intimating that I 
 had any information on the subject I inquired of him 
 whether the Lieutenant-Generalship, soon to be vacant, 
 would not, of right, go to the senior major-general of the 
 army. General Meade answered very promptly and with 
 great emphasis: " Of course, it can go only to the senior 
 major-general; I could not with self-respect remain in 
 the army for a day if any other should be appointed over 
 me. I need hardly say that I did not venture to inform 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 General Meade of the positive views expressed by Gen 
 eral Grant on the subject, as it would have wounded him 
 beyond expression. A few weeks thereafter Grant was 
 inaugurated and Sheridan promptly appointed to the Lieu 
 tenant-Generalship. I saw Meade many times thereafter, 
 but always wearing the deep lines of sad disappointment 
 in his finely-chiseled face. The Lieutenant-Generalship 
 was obviously a forbidden topic with him, and he went 
 down to his grave one of the sorrowing and unrewarded 
 heroes of the war. 
 
 GEORGE H. THOMAS war. another of the unrewarded 
 heroes of the war. He was the same type of soldier as 
 General Meade, cautious in movement and heroic in 
 action, and both were modest and gentle as a woman in 
 their private lives. No two men in the army more per 
 fectly completed the circle of soldier and gentleman, and 
 either was equal to the highest requirements of even the 
 exceptional duties imposed upon a great commander by 
 our civil war. Either would have taken Richmond with 
 Grant s army, and saved tens of thousands of gallant 
 men from untimely death. Both of these men fought 
 one great battle when in supreme command, Meade at 
 Gettysburg and Thomas at Nashville, and they stand 
 out single and alone in history as the two most decisive 
 battles of the war. Meade dealt the deathblow to the 
 Confederacy from Cemetery Hill; Thomas annihilated 
 the army of Hood from the heights of Nashville, and 
 thenceforth Hood s army is unknown in the history of 
 the conflict. In all the many other achievements of 
 these men they fought as subordinate commanders, and 
 their records are unsurpassed by any of the many heroic 
 records made by our military commanders. Both were 
 considered as hopeful candidates for the Lieutenant-Gen- 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 363 
 
 eralship to which Grant appointed Sheridan. I remem 
 ber a conversation with Senator John Sherman soon 
 after the election of Grant to the Presidency in 1868, in 
 which he expressed the opinion that either Thomas or 
 Meade would certainly be promoted when Grant became 
 President; and at that time he certainly reflected the be 
 lief of his brother, then Lieutenant-General, who was 
 soon to be promoted to the highest rank of the army. 
 General Thomas s military record is one of the most 
 remarkable to be found in the history of our civil con 
 flict. He is one of the very few commanders who never 
 committed a serious military error, who never sacrificed 
 a command, and who never lost a battle. He was prob 
 ably more cautious than Meade, but I doubt whether 
 any man of all the generals of the war was better 
 equipped for the supreme command of all our armies 
 than George H. Thomas. He lacked Grant s persistent 
 aggression, but Grant never lost a battle that Thomas 
 would have fought, and never failed in an assault that 
 Thomas would have ordered. His battle at Mill Spring, 
 fought on the I9th of January, 1862, with an army of 
 entirely raw troops, was one of the first important vic 
 tories of the war, and it directed the attention of the 
 country to the great skill and energy of Thomas as a 
 military commander. Soon after he was called to the 
 command of one of the three wings of the army of 
 Rosecrans, and in the bloody battle of Stone River his 
 command played a most conspicuous part and contrib 
 uted more than any other to the victory that was finally 
 wrested from Bragg on that memorable field. Again his 
 name called out the homage of every loyal heart as he 
 and his brave warriors stood alone to resist the success 
 ful enemy on the sanguinary battle-field of Chickamauga. 
 He, and he alone, saved the army from utter rout in that 
 disastrous battle, and it led to his promotion to the com- 
 
3 6 4 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 mand of the army as the successor of Rosecrans. In 
 Sherman s great campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 
 Thomas was one of his most efficient lieutenants. So 
 highly was he appreciated by Sherman that he was 
 chosen from all of Sherman s subordinates to protect 
 Sherman s rear by confronting Hood in Tennessee when 
 Sherman started on his march to Savannah. When 
 Sherman cut loose from his base of supplies and started 
 on his romantic march through the heart of the rebel 
 lion, he left Thomas to give battle to Hood, knowing 
 that Thomas would be outnumbered by the enemy, but 
 entirely confident in Thomas s ability to maintain his 
 position. 
 
 The duty assigned to Thomas was one that required 
 exceptional discretion and courage, and he was doubt 
 less chosen because he possessed those qualities in a pre 
 eminent degree. Had he given battle to Hood before 
 he was entirely prepared to fight, even under the most 
 favorable circumstances, he could have been easily over 
 whelmed, but Sherman confidently trusted Thomas, 
 knowing that if any irian could save an army Thomas 
 was the man. Because of the inadequacy of his force to 
 make an aggressive movement against Hood, Thomas 
 was compelled to fall back upon Nashville, where he 
 could best concentrate his army for the decisive conflict. 
 He reached Nashville on the 3d of October, 1864, where 
 he summoned scattered commands with all possible speed 
 until he had gathered 25,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry 
 to resist Hood s advance with 40,000 infantry and over 
 10,000 cavalry. 
 
 Sherman did not start upon his march to the sea until 
 a month or more after Thomas had begun the concentra 
 tion of his army at Nashville, and until Hood had moved 
 far enough against Thomas to make it impossible for him 
 to pursue Sherman. So rapidly did Hood march north- 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 365 
 
 ward that General Schofield was compelled to fight a 
 desperate battle at Franklin before he was able to join 
 Thomas at Nashville, where he arrived on the ist of 
 December. On the next day after Schofield s arrival 
 the authorities at Washington became most importunate 
 to have Thomas deliver battle at once. Stanton tele 
 graphed Grant on the 2d of December, complaining of 
 the u disposition of Thomas to lay in fortifications for an 
 indefinite period. . . . This looks like the McClellan and 
 Rosecrans strategy of do nothing and let the enemy raid 
 the country." On the same day Grant telegraphed 
 Thomas urging him to make an early attack upon Hood. 
 On the same day he telegraphed him again, complaining 
 that he had not moved out from Nashville to Franklin 
 and taken the offensive against the enemy. To these 
 complaints General Thomas replied on the same day that 
 had he joined Schofield at Franklin he could have had 
 no more than 5,000 men to take the offensive against 
 nearly 50,000. Again, on the 5th of December, Grant 
 telegraphed Thomas complaining of his delay in attack 
 ing Hood, and again Thomas answered that he could not 
 take the aggressive for want of sufficient cavalry force 
 that he was rapidly increasing and equipping. On the 
 6th of December, Grant telegraphed Thomas a peremp 
 tory order in these words: "Attack Hood at once, and 
 wait no longer for a remount for your cavalry." This 
 dispatch was dated 4 P. M., and at 9 P. M. of the same 
 evening Thomas replied: "I will make the necessary 
 disposition and attack Hood at once, agreeably to your 
 orders, though I believe it will be hazardous with the 
 small force of cavalry now at my service." On the next 
 day Stanton telegraphed Grant: "Thomas seems unwill 
 ing to attack because it is hazardous, as if all war was 
 any but hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, 
 Gabriel will be blowing his last horn." On the 8th of 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 December, Grant telegraphed Halleck: u If Thcmas has 
 not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand over his 
 command to Schofield. There is no better man to repel 
 an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to 
 take the initiative." Halleck replied: "If you wish 
 General Thomas relieved, give the order. No one here 
 wil! 5 I think, interfere. The responsibility, however, 
 will be yours, as no one here, so far as I am informed, 
 wishes General Thomas removed." On the same day 
 Grant telegraphed Thomas: "Why not attack at once? 
 By all means avoid the contingency of a foot-race to see 
 which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio." On the 
 same day, in answer to Halleck s inquiry about removing 
 Thomas 5 Grant said: " I would not say relieve him until 
 I hear further from him." At 11.30 P. M. of the same 
 day Thomas telegraphed Grant: "I can only say, in 
 further extenuation why I have not attacked Hood, that 
 I could not concentrate my troops and get their trans 
 portation in order in shorter time than it has been done, 
 and am satisfied I have made every effort that was pos 
 sible to complete the task." On the Qth of December, 
 Halleck telegraphed Thomas: " Lieutenant-General Grant 
 expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking 
 the enemy;" and on the same day Grant telegraphed to 
 Halleck: " Please telegraph orders relieving him (Thomas) 
 and placing Schofield in command." In obedience to 
 this request of Grant, the War Department issued a gen 
 eral order reciting Grant s request to have Thomas re 
 lieved by Schofield, and assigning Schofield to the com 
 mand of the Department and Army of the Cumberland. 
 On the afternoon of December Qth, Thomas telegraphed 
 Halleck, expressing his regret at Grant s dissatisfaction 
 at his delay in attacking the enemy, and saying that "a 
 terrible storm of freezing rain has come on since day 
 light, which will render an attack impossible till it 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 367 
 
 breaks." On the same day he telegraphs Grant that if 
 Grant should deem it necessary to relieve him, U I will 
 submit without a murmur." At 5.30 P. M. of the same 
 day Grant thought better of his purpose to relieve 
 Thomas, and telegraphed to Halleck: "I am very un 
 willing to do injustice to an officer who has done so 
 much good service as General Thomas has, however, 
 and will therefore suspend the order relieving him until 
 it is seen whether he will do anything." Two hours 
 later he telegraphed to General Thomas, earnestly press 
 ing him to give early battle. The severe freeze that had 
 covered the ground with ice, so that troops could not be 
 manoeuvred at all, contiiied for several days, and on the 
 nth Grant again telegraphed Thomas: u Delay no longer 
 for weather or reinforcements. To this dispatch Thomas 
 answered: u The whole country is now covered with a 
 sheet of ice so hard and slippery it is utterly impossible 
 for troops to ascend the slopes, or even move on level 
 ground in anything like order. . . . Under these circum 
 stances I believe that an attack at this time would only 
 result in a useless sacrifice of life." On the following 
 day, December I3th, Grant issued special orders No. 149, 
 as follows: u Major-General John A. Logan, United States 
 Volunteers, will proceed immediately to Nashville, Ten 
 nessee, report by telegraph to the Lieutenant-General his 
 arrival at Louisville, Kentucky, and also his arrival at 
 Nashville, Tennessee." 
 
 General Logan started immediately upon his mission 
 with an order in his pocket requiring General Thomas 
 to transfer to him the command of the army. When 
 he reached Louisville he learned that the battle was in 
 progress, and he wisely halted and returned without vis 
 iting Nashville. On the evening of the I4th, Thomas 
 telegraphed Halleck: "The ice having melted away to 
 day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning." 
 
368 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 In the mean time Grant had become alarmed at the pos 
 sible consequences of his own order in transferring the 
 command from Thomas to Logan, and on the i4th he 
 started for Nashville himself to take personal command. 
 When he reached Washington he received the first infor 
 mation of Thomas s attack, and later in the evening a 
 report of the great victory achieved, to which Grant re 
 sponded by the following dispatch to Thomas: "Your 
 dispatch of this evening just received. I congratulate 
 you and the army under your command for to-day s ope 
 rations, and feel a conviction that to-morrow will add 
 more fruits to your victory." Stan ton also telegraphed 
 Thomas: "We shall give you a hundred guns in the 
 morning." Two days later, when Grant learned how 
 complete were Thomas s methods and his victory, he 
 telegraphed Thomas: "The armies operating against 
 Richmond have fired two hundred guns in honor of 
 your great victory." 
 
 I give the substance of these dispatches because it is 
 necessary to convey to the public the peculiar attitude in 
 which Thomas was placed before he fought the battle at 
 Nashville. He was soldier enough to disobey the per 
 emptory order of the commander-in-chief when he knew 
 that his commander could not know or appreciate the 
 peril of an attempt to obey his orders, and he exhibited 
 the most sublime qualities of a great soldier when, even 
 in the face of his threatened removal from his command, 
 he peremptorily refused to fight a battle that he was con 
 vinced could result only in disaster and in the needless 
 sacrifice of life. The result so" fully vindicated General 
 Thomas that none have since questioned the wisdom of 
 the position he assumed and maintained so heroically; 
 but the fact that the battle of Nashville proved that 
 Thomas was entirely right, and that Grant, Halleck, 
 and Stanton were entirely wrong, doomed Thomas to 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 369 
 
 disfavor with the government; and while he never could 
 be censured by those who so severely criticised him, I 
 fear that even Grant, with all his greatness, never fully 
 forgave Thomas for the wrong that Grant had done him 
 in regard to the battle of Nashville. It was the one 
 battle of the war that was planned on the most thorough 
 principles of military science and executed in its entirety 
 with masterly skill; and it is the only great battle of our 
 civil war that is studied in the military schools of the 
 world because of the completeness of the military strat 
 egy exhibited by Thomas. There were no more battles 
 to be fought in the South-west after the battle of Nash 
 ville, as Thomas had left no enemy to confront him. 
 
 I first met George H. Thomas in May, 1861, when he 
 dined at my home in Chambersburg along with Generals 
 Patterson, Cadwalader, Doubleday, and Keim, and Col 
 onels Fitz John Porter and John Sherman, who were 
 serving as staff officers. Thomas was then a colonel, 
 and commanded the regulars in Patterson s movement 
 into the Shenandoah Valley. The war was freely dis 
 cussed by this circle of military men, and I well remem 
 ber that all those present, with the exception of Double- 
 day and Thomas, freely predicted that it would not last 
 over three months, and that no more than one or two 
 battles would be fought. Doubleday aggressively dis 
 puted the theory generally advanced of an early peace, 
 and Thomas, with that modesty that always character 
 ized him, was silent. .Doubleday had met the South 
 erners in battle at Sumter, and he knew how desperately 
 earnest they were; and Thomas was a son of Virginia, 
 and knew that the Southern people were as heroic as 
 any in the North. I saw him several times during that 
 campaign, and much enjoyed visits to his camp; but 
 even in the privacy of personal conversation he was 
 
 most reluctant to discuss the situation, evidently because 
 
 24 
 
370 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 he knew that the North did not understand, and could 
 not be made to understand, the determined purpose of 
 the Southern people to win independence. Our ac 
 quaintance that began at Chambersburg was maintained 
 until his death, and whenever opportunity presented I 
 always sought his companionship. He was one of the 
 most lovable characters I have ever known, but it re 
 quired exhaustive ingenuity to induce him to speak 
 about an} military movements in which he was a prom 
 inent participant. Any one might have been in daily 
 intercourse with him for years and never learned from 
 him that he had won great victories in the field. 
 
 After the war Thomas suffered in silence the disfavor 
 of those in authority. It was doubtless the more dis 
 tressing to one of his sensitive temperament from the 
 fact that there was no visible evidence of the injustice 
 that was studiedly done him. Politicians tempted him 
 to enter the field as a candidate for President, but he 
 wisely declined, and on no occasion did he so grandly 
 exhibit the higher qualities of the soldier and gentleman 
 as when President Johnson, having quarrelled with Grant, 
 decided to supersede Grant as commander-in-chief of the 
 army by nominating Thomas to the same brevet rank 
 held by Grant. The President went so far as to send his 
 name to the Senate for confirmation as General by brevet, 
 which would have enabled Johnson to assign Thomas to 
 the command of the army. The President acted without 
 conference with or the knowledge of Thomas, and as 
 soon ns Thomas learned of it he promptly telegrapher 1 
 to Senator Chandler and others -peremptorily refusing to 
 accept the proffered promotion. After having served as 
 commander of the third military district in the South 
 and of his old Department of the Cumberland, he was 
 finally assigned to the Military Division of the Pacific, 
 and he arrived in San Francisco to assume his last, com- 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 
 
 371 
 
 mand in June, 1869. My last meeting with him was some 
 time during- the winter of 1870, when he made his last 
 visit to Washington. We spent the evening together at the 
 opera, and afterward sat until late in the night conversing 
 on topics of general interest. I cloubt whether any one 
 ever heard him utter a single complaint, but it was ob 
 vious to those who knew him well that he felt humiliated 
 and heart-sore at the treatment he had received from the 
 military power of the government. Within a few weeks 
 thereafter the lightning flashed from the Western coast 
 the sad news that the great warrior s head had fallen 
 upon his breast while sitting in his office, and on the 
 evening of the same day one of the noblest but unre 
 warded heroes of the war passed away. 
 
 GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER was the most conspicu 
 ous victim of military injustice in the history of our civil 
 war. I doubt whether the military records of modern 
 times in any civilized country present such a flagrant 
 instance of the overthrow of one of the bravest and most 
 skillful of officers by a deliberate conspiracy of military 
 incompetents and maddened political partisans. He was 
 the only one of McClellan s lieutenants who had proved 
 his ability to exercise supreme command in fighting great 
 battles, and I doubt whether there was then in the entire 
 Army of the Potomac a more competent man for the su 
 preme command than, Fitz John Porter; and certainly no 
 one was more patriotic in his devotion to the cause of the 
 Union. I first met him in the dark days of April, 1861, 
 when he was sent to Harrisburg to represent General 
 Scott in organizing and forwarding troops to the national 
 capital. When communication between Washington and 
 the North had been severed by the treasonable revolution 
 in Baltimore, it became a grave question what action 
 
37" LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 should be taken in Pennsylvania in the absence of orders 
 from the national authorities. I shall never forget the 
 last council held in the Executive Chamber at Harris- 
 burg when General Patterson, Governor Cnrtin, and 
 their advisers were compelled to act upon their own re 
 sponsibility. Each in turn advised caution, as revolu 
 tion was in the air and it was impossible to devise a plan 
 of operations with any assurance of safety. After all 
 had spoken Fitz John Porter, the youngest of the party, 
 who had won his promotion on the battle-fields of Mex 
 ico, spoke with an earnestness that inspired even one 
 present. With his handsome face brightened by the 
 enthusiasm of his patriotism, and his keen eye flashing 
 the fire of his courage, he said to General Patterson and 
 Governor Curtin: U I would march the troops through 
 Baltimore or over its ashes to the defence of the capital 
 of the nation." He was a thorough soldier and an ear 
 nest patriot, and had his counsels prevailed it would not 
 have been left for General Butler to command obedience 
 to the laws in Baltimore by his shotted guns on Federal 
 Hill, nor would the government have been compelled to 
 confess its weakness by shipping troops surreptitiously by 
 Annapolis to Washington. 
 
 Colonel Porter had been among the first of our soldiers 
 called to active duty when the madness of Secession took 
 shape by the capture of forts in the Secession States. 
 He was ordered by General Scott to Texas, where he 
 made earnest effort to save Albert Sydney Johnson from 
 being engulfed in the maelstrom of rebellion. By his 
 skill and energy the garrisons at Key West and Tortugas 
 were reinforced and saved from capture, and when at 
 Harrisburg, unable to reach his commander-in-chief or 
 the War Department because of the interruption of com 
 munications, he took the responsibility of telegraphing 
 to General Frank P. Blair of Missouri authoritv to inns- 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 373 
 
 ter in troops for the protection of that State, whereby, as 
 General Blair subsequently stated, Missouri was saved to 
 the Union. Before the close of the first year of the war 
 he had organized a division that attained the highest 
 reputation as a model of discipline, and early in 1862 he 
 went to the Peninsula with McClellan as a division com 
 mander. Immediately after the capture of Yorktown he 
 was assigned to the command of the Fifth Army Corps, 
 and with that corps he fought the battles of Mechanics- 
 ville and Games Mill, and won the highest encomiums 
 from both General McClellan and the government for the 
 ability he exhibited. After the failure of the Peninsula 
 campaign, and when Pope was playing the braggart and 
 sacrificing his army to his incompetency in the second 
 Bull Run campaign, Porter was ordered to the relief of 
 Pope, and, learning that Lee was rapidly advancing upon 
 Pope s defeated army, Porter disobeyed orders to stop at 
 Williamsburg, and assumed the responsibility whereby 
 he was enabled to join Pope several days earlier. He 
 participated in the second Bull Run battle, and was 
 finally compelled with the rest of the army to retreat 
 into the defences of Washington. 
 
 Pope was smarting under the disgraceful failure he had 
 made as a military commander, and his cause was taken 
 up by the embittered partisans who then sought the over 
 throw of McClellan and all who were supposed to be in 
 friendly relations with him. General Porter was singled 
 out for sacrifice, although so fully did General-in-chief 
 Halleck and Secretary-of-War Stan ton confide in Porter s 
 ability as a military commander that when the movement 
 was made against Lee in the Antietam campaign, Porter 
 was directed to select a division of 12,000 from among 
 several divisions and a commander among twenty gen 
 eral officers, and add them to his corps. With this com 
 mand he held the centre of the line of battle at Antie- 
 
J74 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 tain, and was one of the first to pursue Lee in his retreat, 
 and with his single corps fought the battle *f Shepherds- 
 town. Early in November, General McClellan was re 
 moved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, 
 and one week later General Porter was relieved of the 
 command of his corps. Pope preferred charges against 
 him, and on the 25th of November, Porter was placed 
 under arrest. The substance of the charges against him 
 was that he had failed to obey an order from General 
 Pope requiring him to start with his division to General 
 Pope in the field. The court was chosen by Secretary 
 Stanton, who had become so intensely inflamed against 
 McClellan and all who were supposed to be in sympathy 
 with him that he had determined to eliminate them from 
 the army, and he could dispense with so skillful and he 
 roic a soldier as Porter, after Lee had been driven back 
 to Virginia, only by disgracing him. The court was 
 organized to convict. By the verdict of the court-mar 
 tial he was not only dismissed from the army, but he was 
 made a stranger to the country for which he had so gal 
 lantly fought, by depriving him of his citizenship and 
 making him ineligible to any public position under the 
 government. 
 
 For fifteen years General Porter was compelled to bear 
 the fearful stigma that had been put upon him by a court 
 that simply obeyed the vindictive orders of its master. 
 Many applications had been made from time to time to 
 have his case reopened, and fully ten years before the 
 effort w r as successful men like Governor Curtin, Senator 
 Wilson of Massachusetts, and others had made earnest 
 efforts to have a review of Porter s case. During the 
 eight years in which Grant was President he had been 
 earnestly urged to open the door for justice to a fellow- 
 soldier, but he stubbornly refused; and it was not until 
 after he had retired from the Presidency, and had care- 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 375 
 
 fully studied the whole question from the accurate his 
 tory of both sections, that he became fully convinced of 
 his error, and manfully declared, in an article published 
 in the North American Rcviciv, that Porter had not only 
 not failed to perform his duty as a soldier, but that he 
 was entitled to the highest measure of credit for having 
 performed his duty to the uttermost. In 1878, President 
 Hayes authorized a military commission to review the 
 judgment in Porter s case, and three of the most expe 
 rienced and respected generals of the army, Schofield, 
 Terry, and Getty, were assigned to that duty. Two of 
 these generals entered upon that duty inclined to the be 
 lief that Porter deserved censure if not dismissal, and it 
 is not known that any one of the three \vas specially 
 friendly to his cause. They heard all the evidence in 
 the case, and they not only reversed the judgment of the 
 partisan court that had condemned Porter by relieving 
 him of all accusations of failing to perform his duty, but 
 they declared: u Porter s faithful, subordinate, and intel 
 ligent conduct that afternoon (August 29th) saved the 
 Union army from the defeat which would otherwise have 
 resulted that day in the enemy s more speedy concentra 
 tion. . . . Porter had understood and appreciated the mil 
 itary situation, and so far as he had acted upon his own 
 judgment his action had been wise and judicious. Such 
 was the unanimous judgment of three of the ablest and 
 confessedly among the most fair-minded generals of the 
 army, but it was not until 1885 that a bill was finally 
 passed authorizing General Porter s restoration to the 
 army roll, upon which he had shed such conspicuous 
 Justre in the early part of the war, and that bill was 
 vetoed by President Arthur. General Porter was re 
 stored to the army on the yth of August, 1886, by a 
 subsequent act of Congress, and was permitted to exer 
 cise his own discretion as to active service or retiring 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES 
 
 with his original rank. In obedience to his own request 
 he was placed upon the retired list. 
 
 A memorable incident, not generally known in history, 
 occurred about this time, arising from the retirement of 
 General Pope from the major-generalship to which he 
 had been so unjustly promoted. General Tern*, who was 
 one of the members of the military commission that had 
 heard and decided the Porter case, was entitled by rank 
 to succeed Pope as major-general, but he was as chival 
 rous in peace as he was in war, and so keenly did he feel 
 the injustice under which General Porter had suffered 
 that he not only proposed, but insisted, that General Por 
 ter should be promoted to the major-generalship in prefer 
 ence to himself as the only possible atonement the gov 
 ernment could make for the unspeakable wrong it had 
 perpetrated. General Porter gratefully appreciated this 
 manly action of General Terry, and, in the face of Gen 
 eral Terry s appeal to him to accept the promotion, he 
 resolutely declined to be considered for the place, because 
 it would have hindered the promotion of the equally gal 
 lant soldier who had vindicated the majesty of justice. 
 General Grant, in a letter written December 30, iSSi, 
 speaking of Porter s case, said: "I have done him an 
 injustice, and have so written to the President;" and 
 from that time until the verdict of the military commis 
 sion was rendered Grant left no opportunity unemployed 
 to aid in the restoration of Porter to the position and 
 respect to which he was justly entitled. 
 
 In 1869, General Porter was tendered by the Khedive 
 of Egypt the position of commander-in-chief of his 
 army, but he declined it, and recommended General 
 Stone, who accepted it. Since then he has made his 
 home in New York, where he has filled most important 
 public and private positions, having served as Commis 
 sioner of Public Works, Assistant Receiver of the Cen- 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 377 
 
 tral Railroad of New Jersey, as Police Commissioner, 
 and later as Fire Commissioner of that city. He retired 
 in 1889, since when he has been engaged in private busi 
 ness pursuits. Despite the fearful flood-tide of injustice 
 that was flung upon him, General Porter has survived 
 nearly all his assailants, and the few who survive with 
 him are now ashamed to whisper even an accusation 
 against his heroism or his honor as a soldier. He is yet 
 in the full vigor of life, and while his accusers have been 
 forgotten where the names of men are cherished with 
 respect, he lives beloved by all who know him and hon 
 ored by every soldier of the land. Many of the heroes 
 of the war failed to meet just reward for the devotion 
 they gave to the country, but Fitz John Porter stands out 
 single from all as the one man who suffered a judgment 
 of infamy, formally declared by a military court, for the 
 single offence of having been one of the wisest, noblest, 
 and bravest of our army s commanders. 
 
 THE record of GENERAL G. K. WARREN is the story 
 of a brilliant military career touched with every hue of 
 promise cut short by the unjust exercise of that power 
 that resides in military rank, used upon impulse and in 
 ignorance of actual existing conditions, without hesita 
 tion and without reference to inquiry or investigation. 
 It was the ist of April, 1865; the war was yet in progress, 
 and the two armies still faced each other at Petersburg. 
 Our lines had been extended to the left, which brought 
 them in immediate contact with the enemy. On the 
 3ist of March, Sheridan with his cavalry had struck the 
 enemy s combined force of infantry and cavalry at Din- 
 widdie Courthouse under Pickett, and had been roughly 
 handled. Warren with the Fifth Corps had come to his 
 support; upon the next day a battle was fought at Five 
 
378 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Forks, wholly decisive, far-reaching in its results, and 
 ending in the rout of the enemy s forces. The whole 
 nation was exulting, when suddenly the news was flashed 
 over the land that Major-General Warren, the commander 
 of the Fifth Corps, had been relieved of his command 
 by order of General Sheridan, on the field of battle. 
 
 It is with a recognition of what Warren, in long and 
 faithful service, in character and achievement, brought 
 to the discharge of his duties as a corps commander in 
 this battle that I am to deal with him. Just before the 
 Wilderness campaign, when Sykes had been relieved as 
 commander of the Fifth Corps, Warren was at once 
 named as its commandant. He brought to the command 
 of the Fifth Corps a reputation for ability and energy 
 and brilliant service that had won for him steady and 
 well-deserved promotion. With a courage that never 
 quailed he had fought his way from the command of a 
 regiment to that of an army corps. There was no mili 
 tary reputation more promising than his when at the 
 head of one of the army s best corps of veteran soldiers 
 he crossed the Rapidan and became at once involved in 
 the battles of the Wilderness. Initiating almost every 
 flank movement after the investment of Petersburg, his 
 corps participated prominently in all the battles of the 
 army, his restless spirit knowing no repose. He \vas be 
 loved by his men, who trusted him, and who testified to 
 their affection when, on the return march of the corps 
 through Petersburg, recognizing him as he stood among 
 the crowd, they rent the air with shouts of recognition. 
 
 On the ist of April, 1865, after some preliminary fight 
 ing in front of Dinwiddie Courthouse on the 3ist, in 
 which he had been unsuccessful, Sheridan applied to 
 Grant for infantry support. He wanted the Sixth Corps, 
 which had been with him in the Valley of the Shenan 
 doah, He objected to Warren, and only took him ar4 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 379 
 
 his corps when Grant had authorized him to relieve War 
 ren upon any occasion justifying that action. Warren 
 moved his corps to Gravelly Run Church. Pickett had 
 fallen back to the White Oak road and intrenched. 
 Warren with his corps was to move upon the left in 
 trenched flank of Pickett s works. A faulty reconnais 
 sance had been made, and when the Fifth Corps moved 
 at noon of the ist the intrenchments of the enemy were 
 found to be three-quarters of a mile to the left of the 
 position supposed by Sheridan. To meet this unexpected 
 fire upon his flank Ayres broke away from Crawford and 
 Griffin. Warren went at once to these flanking divisions, 
 where he remained in person, directing their movements, 
 changing their direction to meet the force on Ayres s 
 flank as well as their own front, getting into the enemy s 
 rear with Crawford s division, capturing guns and thir 
 teen hundred prisoners, and compelling the retreat of the 
 enemy. 
 
 The battle as it was fought was a series of flank move 
 ments, and was, as such, wholly unanticipated by Sheri 
 dan. Warren had just reached a point directly in rear 
 of the enemy at the Forks, and was pursuing his success 
 when he sent his adjutant-general to Sheridan to report 
 that he was in the enemy s rear, had taken a large num 
 ber of prisoners, and was pursuing his advantages, when 
 the stroke fell, in the midst of the victory he had done 
 so much to secure. " Tell General Warren," said Sheri 
 dan, "that, by God! he was not at the front: this is all 
 I ve got to say to him." He had already replaced him 
 without any attempt to communicate with him, and 
 this with the victory won, the enemy in retreat, and the 
 evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg made inevit 
 able. Conscious of his innocence and knowing what he 
 had accomplished, Warren went in person to Sheridan 
 and asked him to reconsider his action, "Hell!" said 
 
380 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Sheridan; " I don t reconsider my determinations." Nor 
 did he. 
 
 Warren at once sought an investigation, which was 
 then refused him, and fifteen years of incessant applica 
 tion and pleading were to pass before it was secured; but 
 at last the long-hoped-for investigation came, an inquiry 
 where the keenest legal acumen was instrumental in 
 bringing facts to light, wholly regardless of that pedantry 
 that belongs to military life a search for truth, unawed 
 by the glitter of the uniform or the prestige of rank, no 
 matter how high, and with a result so wholly different 
 from that which had been assumed and acted upon as to 
 seem almost romance. And what was gained by this 
 investigation, to which were summoned witnesses from 
 every quarter, and where the Confederate testimony es 
 tablished the facts of the battle beyond controversy? 
 This, that but for the movement of Crawford s division 
 under Warren s immediate orders the enemy s lines 
 would have been held, and were held until the move 
 ment of Crawford, and that the results of Ay res s attack 
 were rendered possible by that movement. What, then, 
 could excuse the action of General Sheridan in view of 
 the victory secured to him ? Nothing but that he was 
 ignorant of what was done, as he himself testifies, and 
 that he knew nothing of the Confederate Mumford s en 
 gagement with Crawford s division, nor of the fighting 
 of that division, nor of the cavalry. He knew that in 
 relieving Warren he was pleasing General Grant, and he 
 ignored then and subsequently anything presented to 
 him that might in any way question his action. War 
 ren made every effort to carry out the order and execute 
 the plan of this battle; and when asked by his own coun 
 sel if he had or had not done this, his reply was noble. 
 Asking that the question be withdrawn, he said, " I do 
 it on the ground that I am willing to be judged by my 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 381 
 
 deeds." Sheridan, with a magnetism second to none, a 
 fighter beyond all other qualities, was deficient in strong 
 mental or moral sense. 
 
 When the battle of Five Forks had been fought and 
 won he did not know what had been accomplished nor 
 by whom. His testimony distinctly shows this: he made 
 his official report without that knowledge, and, although 
 the commanding general upon the field, he saw but one 
 of the many movements which contributed to the vic 
 tory, and ignored the rest; nor would he give any ac 
 count of his own personal movements after Ayres s as 
 sault; and yet he committed an act of despotic power so 
 uncalled for, unjust, and cruel as to welhiigh constitute a 
 crime. The record of Warren s court of inquiry will 
 remain for ever an enduring stain upon an otherwise 
 great reputation. Warren, after long and patient wait 
 ing, at last began to despond and to doubt as to the final 
 result. His health was breaking. He lost the fiery spirit 
 that had animated him. Grant and Sheridan were om 
 nipotent, the heroes of the hour, and unassailable. And 
 so the end came at last before the decision of his court 
 was known, and they buried him in that sunny city by 
 the sea where he \vas known and loved and where he 
 worked in peace. His last request was that there should 
 be no military display, no emblems of his profession upon 
 his coffin, and no uniform upon his person. Devoted 
 friends followed him to his last resting-place, and as they 
 turned homeward the conviction came to each of them 
 that the earth with which they had filled his grave gave 
 rest to a generous and broken heart. 
 
 GENERAL DON CARLOS BUELL very clearly demon 
 strated in the early part of the war that he was one of 
 the most accomplished soldiers of our army. W T hile he 
 
382 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 was not dishonored, as were General Porter and General 
 Warren, he was displaced from command in obedience to 
 partisan clamor. He was a thorough soldier, brave, in 
 telligent, skillful, and equal to every emergency in which 
 he was placed; but he was not a politician. He believed 
 that war was war; he believed that armies were organized 
 to fight battles, and to fight them, according to the estab 
 lished rules of military science, to accomplish the speedi 
 est and most substantial results. During the period that 
 he was in command in Kentucky he accomplished more 
 in the same length of time than any other general in the 
 Western army. When he assumed command at Louis 
 ville on the 1 5th of November, 1861, his entire effective 
 Union force was less than 30,000 men, and they largely 
 without organization, arms, equipment, or transportation. 
 During the seven months he remained there he organized 
 one of the best disciplined armies that ever marched on 
 the continent. He defeated the enemy at Middle Creek 
 and Mills Springs in January, aided in the capture of 
 Fort Donelson, occupied Middle Tennessee and the north 
 ern part of Alabama, and moved with the main body of 
 his army by a forced march to the rescue of Grant at 
 Shiloh. All this was accomplished between the i5th of 
 November, 1861, and the loth of January, 1862. He 
 committed no military mistakes, met with no military 
 disasters, and he strengthened the Union cause unspeak 
 ably in Kentucky by the strict discipline he enforced in 
 his command. 
 
 The temptation was great to Union troops in Kentucky 
 to demoralize themselves by pillage and plunder, as one- 
 half the people of the State were earnestly disloyal and 
 very many of them in the Confederate service; but Buell 
 was placed in command in Kentucky to save it to the 
 Union, and he performed that duty most conscientiously 
 and patriotically. But the most effective means he em- 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 383 
 
 ployed to save Kentucky were seized upon by the poli 
 ticians of the times, and he was denounced from one end 
 of the country to the other as a semi-rebel because he 
 strictly restrained his troops from the plundering of pri 
 vate property of either friend or foe. He was not only a 
 soldier himself, but he made a soldier of every man in 
 his command as far as he could be obeyed. But for his 
 timely arrival at Pittsburgh Landing on the evening of 
 the first day s battle, when Grant s army had been liter 
 ally routed and driven to the river, the army of Grant 
 would have ceased to exist in history at the close of the 
 following day. It was Buell whose energy and skill as 
 a soldier brought relief to Grant, and it was his courage 
 and skill on the battle-field, co-operating with Grant on 
 the second day, that gave the victory to the Union armies 
 at Shi loh. Both were as generous as they were brave, 
 and Buell never claimed the victory as his, and Grant 
 proved his appreciation of Buell by asking his assign 
 ment to an important command when he was com- 
 mander-in-chief of the army. Stanton was implacable 
 iu his hatred of Buell, as he was in his hatred against 
 all who incurred his displeasure, and Buell was left with 
 out a command, although his services were called for by 
 the one who certainly best understood his value as a 
 soldier. 
 
 On the loth of June, Buell was assigned to make a 
 campaign for the capture of Chattanooga. It was ordered 
 by General Halleck, who was then in personal command 
 at Corinth. This movement was regarded by the author 
 ities at Washington as the most important of all our 
 army operations, with the single exception of the cam 
 paign against Richmond. Stanton, in a dispatch to 
 Halleck, declared that the capture of Chattanooga 
 "would be equal to the capture of Richmond," but 
 soon after Buell was assigned to this task the disasters 
 
384 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 on the Peninsula and the second Bull Rim campaign 
 brought importunate calls from Washington for troops 
 from Halleck s army to strengthen the Army of the 
 Potomac. On the 4th of July, Lincoln telegraphed Hal- 
 leek: "You do not know how much you would oblige 
 us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, 
 you could promptly send us 10,000 infantry. Can you 
 not?" On receipt of this dispatch Halleck called a 
 council of war, and sent a dispatch saying that no troops 
 could be sent to the East without abandoning the Chat 
 tanooga expedition, and Halleck himself became alarmed 
 at his position at Corinth, as, after having detached Buell 
 to the Chattanooga campaign, he had sent reinforcements 
 to General Curtis in Arkansas. After having started 
 Buell on his Chattanooga campaign, in which he was 
 to confront Bragg with his 75,000 men and maintain a 
 long line of communication, Buell was notified by Hal 
 leck that Thomas s division must be withdrawn from 
 him, and perhaps other portions of his command would 
 be called away. Thus, after starting Buell with an in 
 ferior force to fight his way to Chattanooga and maintain 
 hundreds of miles of communication in an enemy s coun 
 try, his force was depleted, his plan of campaign was 
 overruled, and because he failed to march with a rapidity 
 that Halleck had never approached he was censured from 
 day to day by both Halleck and the War Department for 
 his failure to accomplish the impossible. Halleck had 
 required two months to remove his army from Shiloh to 
 Corinth, a distance of twenty miles, and soon thereafter 
 he telegraphed Buell complaining of his slow movement, 
 when he had marched with four times the rapidity that 
 Halleck had himself. 
 
 When it is remembered that Buell was compelled to 
 fortify even- bridge for more than three hundied miles 
 of road in his rear, the depletion of his forces and the 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 385 
 
 necessity for caution may be intelligently understood. 
 Especially did Halleck become mandatory about rapid 
 movements on the part of Buell after he became com- 
 mander-in-ciiief and had been transferred to Washing 
 ton. On the 1 3th of August he telegraphed Buell that 
 he had been notified to have him removed, but inti 
 mating that he interposed to save him. To this Buell 
 replied on the same day: " I beg that you will not inter 
 pose in my behalf. On the contrary, if the dissatis 
 faction cannot cease on grounds which I think may be 
 supposed if not apparent, I respectfully request that I 
 may be relieved. My position is far too important to be 
 occupied by any officer on sufferance. I have no desire 
 to stand in the way of what may be deemed for the pub 
 lic good." Buell was not then relieved from command, 
 but the clamor for his removal grew more imperious, 
 and all the partisan rancor of that time was thrown into 
 the scale against Buell as a military commander. His 
 command was composed largely of Illinois and Indiana 
 troops, and Governors Morton and Yates pursued him 
 with intense ferocity because he enforced discipline in 
 his army and would not permit his soldiers to plunder 
 private homes. It was political clamor and not military 
 necessity, nor even military expediency, that made the 
 War Department issue an order on the 27th of Septem 
 ber relieving Buell of his position and ordering him to 
 Louisville, limiting his authority to the command of the 
 troops in that city, and directing him to transfer the 
 army to the direction of General Thomas. Buell 
 promptly called General Thomas to this place, but 
 Thomas was one of the bravest and noblest of our sol 
 diers, and he at once telegraphed to Secretary Stan ton: 
 "General Buell s preparations have -been complete to 
 move against the enemy, and I therefore respectfully ask 
 that he may be retained in command." In obedience to 
 25 
 
3$6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Thomas s request the order relieving Buell was revoked, 
 only to be met by a fiercer clamor from the political pas 
 sions of the day for his sacrifice. On the 8th of October 
 he fought and won the battle of Perrysville, after a san 
 guinary conflict in which he lost over four thousand 
 men. Even when Buell had won a decisive victory, 
 instead of being complimented by the authorities at 
 Washington, he was daily criticised for his failure to 
 pursue and destroy Bragg s army that largely outnum 
 bered him. On the iQth of October he was notified by 
 Halleck that the capture of East Tennessee should be 
 the main object of his campaign, and saying, "Buell 
 and his army must enter East Tennessee this fall." 
 Four days later, on the 23d of October, Buell was re 
 moved from his command and General Rosecrans as 
 signed to it. General Buell in his modest but soldier 
 like farewell to his army, after referring to its heroic 
 achievements, broadly took upon himself all responsi 
 bility for any failures it might be charged with. He 
 said: "If anything has not been accomplished which 
 was practicable within the sphere of its duty, the gen 
 eral cheerfully holds himself responsible for the failure." 
 Strange as it may seem, while the Secretary of War 
 notified Halleck in the early part of the Tennessee cam 
 paign that the capture of Chattanooga was second only 
 in importance to that of Richmond, and while only ten 
 days before Buell was relieved of command General Hal 
 leck notified him that he "must enter East Tennessee 
 this fall," Rosecrans immediately abandoned the East 
 Tennessee movement and pushed his army as directly as 
 possible to Nashville. To show how promptly Buell had 
 moved in comparison with others, it may be stated that 
 General Rosecrans, although only thirty-two miles away 
 from Bragg, permitted two months to elapse before he 
 delivered battle at Stone River; and he did not march 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 387 
 
 his army a mile for six months thereafter. The same 
 army under Btiell in about the same period of eight 
 months marched across the State of Kentucky, 185 
 miles; thence across Tennessee, 217 miles; thence across 
 the State of Alabama to East Tennessee, 217 miles; 
 thence across Tennessee and Kentucky to Louisville, 
 336 miles; thence through Central and Eastern Ken 
 tucky in pursuit of Bragg and back to Nashville, 485 
 miles making nearly fifteen hundred miles of march 
 and several hard-fought battles. 
 
 Thus ended the military career of one who could and 
 should have been one of the great military leaders of our 
 civil war. He was retired from command solely because 
 of the intense partisan hatred that had pursued him for 
 no other reason than being a true, faithful, and skillful 
 soldier. When Grant asked for his restoration to com 
 mand on the iQth of April, 1864, Halleck replied: "I 
 would like very much to see Buell restored to command, 
 and have several times pressed him at the War Depart 
 ment, but there has been such a pressure against him 
 from the West that I do not think the Secretary will give 
 him any at present" In obedience to Buell s request for 
 an official investigation of the operations GI the armies 
 under his command, *a military commission was appoint 
 ed for the purpose on the 2oth of November, 1862, and 
 its labors continued until May 10, 1863. The record and 
 opinion of the commission were received at the War De 
 partment, but were never published, and after they had 
 been suppressed for nearly ten years the House of Repre 
 sentatives, by resolution passed March i, 1872, called for 
 a copy of the proceedings, which brought the astounding 
 answer from the Secretary of War that "a careful and 
 exhaustive search among all the records and files of the 
 Department fails to discover what disposition was made 
 of the proceedings of the commission and the papers en- 
 
388 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 closed. " It is obvious that the evidence and the finding 
 of the commission were not in accord with the violent 
 passions which had forced the removal of one of the most 
 gallant soldiers of our army, and the proceedings were 
 deliberately suppressed and justice withheld from General 
 Btiell. The Governors of the Western States who had 
 so boldly assailed Buell w T ere called upon to confront him 
 and testify before the commission, but all refused. His 
 accusers dared not meet him, and when a packed com 
 mission, chosen and manipulated by the filling of va 
 cancies to hinder justice, had failed to convict him, the 
 proceedings were deliberately suppressed for ten years, 
 and General Buell permitted to live under the false and 
 malicious charges made against him by reckless poli 
 ticians who did. not even venture to testify against him. 
 That Stanton himself felt that his injustice to Buell 
 was so flagrant as to call for some atonement is evident 
 by the i act that in the spring of 1864 he invited Buell to 
 a personal interview, received him most cordially, and 
 asked him which one of several important commands he 
 would prefer to receive. Buell s only answer was that it 
 was first a necessity to dispose of the proceedings of the 
 military commission that inquired into his case. BuelPs 
 self-reject as a soldier forbade his ^acceptance of a com 
 mand when his fidelity and ability as a commander had 
 been inquired into by a military commission ^hose judg 
 ment was withheld not only from the accused, but from 
 the public. This was a degree of manliness that Stanton 
 was unprepared for, and they parted for the last time, as 
 Stanton never again conferred with Buell. Subsequently, 
 Stanton twice voluntarily offered Buell important com 
 mands, but he very properly declined both, as the verdict 
 of the commission was denied publicity, and in both cases 
 he would have been compelled to serve under officers 
 whom he outranked. 
 
OUR UNREWARDED HEROES. 3 8 9 
 
 Thus the war closed with one of its ablest and most 
 patriotic chieftains not only refused the right to give the 
 gallant service he offered, but he was assailed by partisan 
 passion for having faithfully performed his duty as a sol 
 dier, and he was finally tried by a military commission 
 whose testimony and judgment were stolen from the 
 archives of the Department to give license to his ma 
 licious slanderers. His chief accusers have all passed 
 away, but General Buell yet lives, honored and respected 
 by the country as one of the noble but unrewarded 
 Heroes of the War. 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 
 
 WHILE all sections of the country keenly felt the 
 sad bereavements and sacrifices of the civil v r ar, 
 only those who lived on the border between the two con 
 tending sections involved in bloody fraternal strife, with 
 all the fierce passions it inspires, can have any just con 
 ception of the severe trials and constant strain which fell 
 upon the border people. My home \vas tlien in Cham- 
 bersburg, in one of the most beautiful valleys of the 
 country, and among a people exceptionally comfortable 
 and forming one of the most delightful communities of 
 the State. The first distant murmurs of the coming war 
 were heard in Chambersburg in October, 1859, when 
 John Brown and his few insane followers attempted the 
 conquest of Virginia by assaulting Harper s Ferry. Al 
 though Brown had made Chambersburg his base of ope 
 rations for some weeks before he moved upon Harper s 
 Ferry, freely mingling with the citizens of the town and 
 known only as u Dr. Smith," who was ostensibly en 
 gaged in mining pursuits in Maryland, there was not a 
 single resident of Chambersburg who had any concep 
 tion or suspicion of his purpose; but when the startling 
 news came that actual conflict had been precipitated at 
 Harper s Ferry by the stubborn fanatic fresh from the 
 Kansas battles, it appalled the community, as it seemed 
 to be the precursor of civil war. In little more than a 
 year thereafter the people of the town were again startled 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 ROBERT . tEE, 1865. 
 
392 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 by Lieutenant Jones and straggling members of his com 
 mand reaching there, exhausted and footsore, to announce 
 that he had been compelled to abandon Harper s Ferry, 
 where he was in command, and had blown up the works 
 as far as he was able to accomplish it. This was one of 
 the first of the many thrilling events of the great war 
 that was soon to burst upon us. From that time, through 
 four long years of bloody battle until the end came at 
 Appomattox, there was not a day nor an hour of absolute 
 peace in the border counties. 
 
 Chambersburg was within a night s ride of the Con 
 federate lines during the whole war, and not only the 
 repeated raids made into that community by the Con 
 federate commanders, but the constant sense of insecurity 
 and the multiplied reports of incursions from the enemy, 
 made tranquility impossible. Not only did these people 
 suffer their full share of the exactions of war which fell 
 upon every community, but they were subject to constant 
 convulsions by actual or threatened raids of the enemy, 
 and often by destructive incursions of militia defenders; 
 and they suffered unspeakable loss of property from both 
 armies. Finally, upon Chambersburg fell the avenging 
 blow for Hunter s vandalism in Virginia, and the beau 
 tiful old town was left in its ashes and its people largely 
 impoverished. On the I2th of April, 1861, the brief tel 
 egraphic bulletins which were then obtainable in coun 
 try districts announced the bombardment of Sumter. 
 Business was practically suspended, public meetings were 
 held in support of the government at which the leading 
 men of every political faith were orators, the Stars and 
 Stripes were displayed from every house, and patriotic 
 badges and shields graced almost every person. Volun 
 teering was so rapid that companies could not even be 
 organized to keep pace with them. The first call for 
 troops was responded to more generously in that sectioq 
 
BORDER-LI1-E IN WAR-TIMES. 393 
 
 than from any other in the State. Its very nearness to 
 the seat of war and the exceptional dangers which fell 
 upon it seemed to call out the highest measure of 
 patriotic purpose and action. Party differences were 
 obliterated in the common effort to maintain the cause 
 of the Union. It is only in times of great danger that 
 the greatest qualities of both men and women are devel 
 oped, and the border people, of whom Chambersburg was 
 the central altar, grandly illustrated the truth of the 
 adage. 
 
 On the 28th of May the advance of General Patterson s 
 army reached Chambersburg, and from that day until the 
 war closed Chambersburg was the military headquarters 
 for all movements on the border. Even with a great 
 army in our midst, it was impossible for the people to 
 appreciate what war really meant. I well remember that 
 when two officers of General Patterson s command had 
 crossed the Potomac as scouts, and had been captured by 
 the Confederates, it was spoken of by all in bated breath 
 as if some unspeakable calamity had befallen them. 
 Both the North and the South seemed to believe that 
 they were about to engage in war with a barbarous 
 enemy, and all expectations of humane and civilized 
 warfare appeared to have perished in the minds of the 
 people. For two months General Patterson s army kept 
 the border people in a state of restless suspense. He 
 crossed the Potomac to Falling Waters, then fell back 
 upon Maryland, and then renewed his march into the 
 enemy s country. The wildest excitement prevailed in 
 every circle: a great battle was expected every day, as 
 Patterson was threatening Johnson at Winchester and 
 McDowell marched against Beauregard at Manassas. 
 Finally, on Monday, July 22d, the news of a great tri 
 umph won by McDowell was posted on the bulletin- 
 boards, and all business was forgotten as the people re- 
 
394 LIKCOLX AND MEK Ol U AR-TIMF.S. 
 
 joiced over the victory, but before the sun had set on the 
 same day the reports from Manassas told the sad story 
 that McDowell was not only defeated, but that his army 
 was routed and retreating into the defences of Washing- 
 ton, with little hope that the capital would be saved from 
 tiie enemy. 
 
 The call for additional troops was responded to by a 
 regiment of volunteers made up almost entirely of the 
 sturdy young men of Franklin and Fulton counties. 
 When the regiment started for Harrisburg the people 
 turned out almost en masse to inspire them in their patri 
 otic work. Speeches were made, flags were waved, tears 
 shed, sorrowing hearts were left behind as the brave men 
 went to their great task, and many to death. In May, 
 1862, the border people were thrown into convulsion by 
 the retreat of Banks from Strasburg to Winchester, 
 thence to Martinsburg, and finally to the north side of 
 the Potomac. This was assumed to mean the invasion 
 of Pennsylvania. Stock and valuables, including the 
 goods of merchants and money of banks, were all hur 
 ried away to places of safety. This was only the first 
 of many like disturbances that came during every year 
 of the war. General Ewell, who had driven Banks to 
 the north side of the Potomac, did not pursue his victory 
 upon Northern soil, but in August of the same year, when 
 Pope was defeated in the second Bull Run campaign and 
 Lee crossed the Potomac into Maryland, war was brought 
 to the very doors of the people of the border. As Lee s 
 army moved westward from Frederick, a portion of it 
 extended northward as far as Hagerstown, while Jackson 
 hastened to Williamsport, thence to Martinsburg and 
 Harper s Ferry, where he captured 10,000 men and 60 
 guns, and was back on the Antietam battle-ground in 
 time to fight McClellan. 
 
 An interesting story may here be told of the methods 
 
tlORDER-llFR IN WAR TIMES. 395 
 
 by which information was obtained to guide the actions 
 of great armies. I was then Assistant Adjutant-General 
 of the United States, assigned to duty at Harrisburg to 
 make a draft under the State laws of Pennsylvania. 
 There was no military force on the border, and not even 
 an officer of the army who had exercised any command 
 of troops. I was compelled, therefore, to exercise what 
 little military authority could be enforced under the cir 
 cumstances, and Governor Curtin ordered a half-organ 
 ized company of cavalry, that Captain W. J. Palmer was 
 recruiting at Carlisle, to report to me at Chambersburg 
 for duty as scouts. I thus became commander of an 
 army of nearly one hundred men, or about one man to 
 each mile of border I had to guard, but Captain Palmer 
 proved to be a host within himself, as he entered the 
 Confederate lines every night for nearly a week under 
 various disguises, obtained all information possible as to 
 the movements of Lee s command, and with the aid of 
 William B. Wilson, an expert telegrapher, who was co 
 operating with him, attached his instrument to the first 
 telegraph-wire he struck and communicated to me all 
 movements of the enemy, present and prospective, as far 
 as he had been able to ascertain them. As rapidly as 
 these telegrams reached me they were sent to Governor 
 Curtin, who promptly forwarded them to the War De 
 partment, whence they were hastened to General McClel- 
 lan s headquarters, who was then moving through Mary 
 land against Lee; and all the important information that 
 McClellan received from the front of Lee s army until 
 their lines faced each other at Antietam came from Cap 
 tain Palmer s nightly visits \vithin the enemy s lines and 
 his prompt reports to me in the morning. Howell Cobb s 
 division finally reached as far north as Hagerstown, and 
 Captain Palmer spent most of the night within Cobb s 
 camp, and learned from leading subordinate officers that 
 
396 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 the destination of Lee s army was Pennsylvania, and that 
 Cobb s command would lead the movement probably the 
 next day. 
 
 I need hardly say that I hastened the information to 
 Curtin, who hurried it through to Washington, whence 
 McClellan received it within a few hours. McClellan 
 was then ignorant of the exact movements of General 
 Reynolds, whom he had sent to Pennsylvania to organize 
 a force of u emergency-men " and bring them to the aid 
 of McClellan in Western Maryland. He did not know, 
 therefore, who was in command at Chambersburg or 
 what force was there, but doubtless supposed that either 
 Reynolds or some part of his command was already there 
 011 its way to join him. General McClellan, on receipt 
 of the news that Lee was likely to advance into Pennsyl 
 vania, sent substantially this telegram to the commander 
 at Chambersburg, without naming him: "I am advised 
 that Lee s probable destination is Pennsylvania, and if 
 he shall advance in that direction, concentrate all your 
 forces and obstruct his inarch until I can overtake him 
 and give battle. The occasion calls for prompt action." 
 As I was the commander and had less than one hundred 
 men, all told, and not twenty of them within fifteen 
 miles of me, the prospect of concentrating my forces 
 and marching out to meet one of Lee s army corps was 
 not specially enticing. I promptly advised Curtin of the 
 situation and of the orders I had received from McClel 
 lan. Thaddeus Stevens happened to be in the Executive 
 Chamber when the message was received, and McClel- 
 lan s order to me to confront one of Lee s army corps 
 with my force, which did not amount to a corporal s 
 guard within reach, caused considerable merriment. 
 Stevens, who at that time never lost an opportunity to 
 slur McClellan, said: "Well, McClure will do something. 
 If he can t do better, he ll instruct the tollgate keeper 
 
BORDER-LIFE LV WAX- TIMES. 397 
 
 not to permit Lee s army to pass through; but as to 
 McClellan, God only knows what he ll do." 
 
 Thus one bold, heroic, and adventurous young captain, 
 aided by an equally heroic young telegrapher, furnished 
 McClellan all the reliable information he received about 
 Lee s movements from the time McClellan left Rockville 
 in the Antietam campaign until the shock of battle came 
 ten days later. I met Captain Palmer at Antietam when 
 the battle was in progress, and, after complimenting him 
 as he so well deserved for the great work he had done, I 
 earnestly cautioned him against attempting to repeat his 
 experiments if Lee should be driven into Virginia. He 
 was a young man of very few words, and made no re 
 sponse to my admonition beyond thanking me for my 
 kind expressions of confidence. When Lee retreated 
 across the Potomac, Captain Palmer followed him the 
 next night, entered his lines again, and brought import 
 ant reports which, as I believe, led to the battle of Shep- 
 herdstown that was successfully fought by General Fitz 
 John Porter. He then passed beyond my jurisdiction, 
 and became known to some of the leading officers of 
 McClellan s army as the scout or spy who had given 
 McClellan most reliable and important information. For 
 several nights he entered Lee s lines and reported in the 
 morning. Finally, he was missed at the usual time his 
 report was expected. When the second day passed with 
 out any word from him, great anxiety was felt for his 
 safety, and every effort was made that could be made 
 without exposing him to the discovery of his identity to 
 learn of his whereabouts, but without success. When he 
 had been missing a week it was evident that he had been 
 captured, and, upon being advised of it from the head 
 quarters of McClellan s army, I hastened to Philadelphia 
 to confer with President J. Edgar Thompson of the Penn- 
 
398 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 sylvania Railroad Company, whose secretary Captain Pal 
 mer had been until he entered the service, and who was 
 greatly interested in him personally. 
 
 A conference with President Thompson and Vice-Pres- 
 ident Scott resulted in the purpose to endeavor to save 
 Palmer from being identified by his captors, and it was 
 finally decided that I should go to the offices of the North 
 American, the Press, and the Inquirer, the leading morn 
 ing journals of the city, and write up for publication the 
 next morning displayed dispatches announcing the arrival 
 in Washington of Captain W. J. Palmer, who had been 
 scouting in Virginia for some days, and who had brought 
 most important information of the movements and pur 
 poses of the enemy. Some details of his reported facts 
 were given to make the story plausible, to which was 
 added the statement that he had brought momentous in 
 formation that could not be given to the public, but that 
 would doubtless lead to early military movements against 
 the enemy. The dispatches were all accepted by the pub 
 lishers, as all felt a special interest in Captain Palmer s 
 fate, and that publication doubtless saved him from being 
 gibbeted as a spy. He had been arrested by the enemy, 
 tried, and convicted as a spy, but he had managed to 
 maintain doubt as to his identity. His execution was 
 delayed from time to time to ascertain who he was. The 
 dispatches published in the Philadelphia papers, all of 
 which reached the enemy s lines within forty-eight hours, 
 if not sooner, entirely misled the Confederates as to Cap 
 tain Palmer, and the failure to identify him saved him, 
 until he finally effected his own exchange by quietly tak 
 ing the place of a dead prisoner in the ranks and re 
 sponding to his name when the roll was called for the 
 men who were to be sent to the North. He is better 
 known to the world of to-day as President Palmer of 
 New York, lately of the Denver and Rio Grande Rail- 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES 399 
 
 way, and one of the fortunate and potential railroad 
 magnates of the land. 
 
 After the battle of Antietam and the retreat of Lee 
 beyond the Potomac the border people began to breathe 
 freely again, and felt that they were reasonably safe at 
 least for a season, but twenty days after the retreat of 
 Lee they were thrown into panic again, as General Stuart 
 made the first great raid of the war clear around McClel- 
 lan s army, crossing the Potomac near Hancock, swing 
 ing through Mercersburg and Chambersburg, and getting 
 safely back to Lee again. It was on Friday evening, 
 October 10, 1862, and I had gone home from Harrisburg 
 after weeks of almost ceaseless labor night and day, ex 
 pecting a quiet rest until Monday morning. When I 
 landed on the depot platform at Chambersburg, Mr. Gil- 
 more, the telegraph-operator, called me into his private 
 office and exhibited to me several dispatches he had just 
 received from Mercersburg, stating that a strong Confed 
 erate force of cavalry was just entering that town, and 
 other dispatches stating that they were moving from 
 Mercersburg toward St. Thomas, which was on the 
 direct line toward Chambersburg. I could not believe 
 it possible that Stuart would venture to Chambersburg, 
 when he must have known that part of McClellan s force 
 was at Hagerstown, within one hour of us by railway, 
 and that troops could be brought there to overwhelm him 
 by the exercise of any reasonable military skill. I at 
 once telegraphed to the commander at Hagerstown, who 
 turned out to be General Wood, telling him that Stuart 
 was approaching Chambersburg, to which I received an 
 impertinent reply ; saying in substance that Stuart was 
 no such fool, and not to bother myself about it. I re 
 mained at the telegraph -office for two hours without com 
 municating the information to any one, as I hoped that 
 Stuart would not get so far from his base as Chambers- 
 
(Photo by Brady, Washington.) 
 
 GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, 1862. 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 401 
 
 burg, and that our people could be spared the panic that 
 must follow the announcement of his coming. I soon 
 learned that Stuart s force had reached the turnpike six 
 or eight miles west of Chambersburg, and was moving 
 toward us, and I urgently appealed to General Wood to 
 throw a force into Chambersburg to protect the town. 
 Even then he had ample time to do so, as the railway 
 facilities were at his command, but the only answer I 
 received was a repetition of the assumption that Stuart 
 would not dare to venture into Chambersburg, and 
 broadly intimating to me not to annoy him any further. 
 Finding that nothing could be done to protect Cham 
 bersburg, I quietly went to my home, took tea, and re 
 turned to my office to await events. A cold, drizzling 
 rain had been falling during the day, and between the 
 clouds and fog darkness came unusually early. Some 
 of the prominent citizens of the town had been advised 
 of the approach of Stuart, but all agreed that it could do 
 no good to make an alarm or to attempt defence. About 
 seven o clock in the evening there was a knock at my 
 office-door, which I promptly opened, and in came three 
 Confederate soldiers with a dirty rag tied to a stick which 
 they called a flag of truce. Judge Kimmell and Colonel 
 Thomas B. Kennedy were present. The Confederate 
 officer said he had been sent in advance to demand the 
 surrender of Chambersburg. We told him that there 
 were no troops in the town and nobody to oppose the 
 entrance of the insurgents. I asked who was in com 
 mand of the Confederate forces, but they refused to an 
 swer. I then asked where the forces were, which they 
 also refused to answer. I then asked them whether they 
 would take us to the commanding general and give us 
 safe-conduct back. They assured us that they would do 
 so, and we three mounted horses and rode out on the west 
 ern turnpike for nearly a mile, and were there brought 
 26 
 
402 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 up before a solid column of soldiers. General Wade 
 Hampton came to the front and announced his name. 
 He said he desired to take peaceful possession of the 
 town, and in answer to our inquiries assured us that pri 
 vate citizens and private property would be respected, 
 excepting such property as might be needed for the pur 
 poses of the army. Remembering that I was a commis 
 sioned officer, I said to General Hampton: u There are 
 several military officers in the town in charge of hos 
 pitals, recruiting service, etc. ; what will be done with 
 them ?" He promptly answered: " They will be paroled, 
 unless there are special reasons for not doing so, but you 
 must not give information to any of them, so that they 
 may escape." As \ve were not in a position to quibble 
 about the terms of surrender, and as General Hampton s 
 proposition seemed reasonably fair, we decided to give 
 him a town that he could take without opposition, and 
 rode back into Chambersburg, with Hampton s command 
 immediately following. 
 
 In a short time the large square in the centre of the 
 town was filled with soldiers in gray, the first our people 
 had ever seen in fighting force. In crossing the square 
 to my office through a crowd of the enemy, I was tapped 
 on the shoulder, and, turning round, I recognized Hugh 
 Logan, who was a Franklin county man, and to whom I 
 had rendered some professional service when he was a 
 resident of the county. His exclamation was: "Why, 
 colonel, what are you doing here? Don t you know that 
 Stuart has orders to arrest a number of civilians, and you 
 among them, and that we have half a dozen with us now, 
 including Mr. Rice of Mercersburg ?" I answered that 
 I had not been informed of that interesting fact. He 
 advised me quietly to get out of the way, and I reminded 
 him that I was a commissioned officer, and that under 
 my agreement with General Hampton I assumed that I 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 403 
 
 would be entitled to parole if arrested. His answer was 
 unpleasantly significant. He said: "If you are arrested 
 and can reach Hampton he will parole you, for he s a 
 gentleman ; but Jeb Stuart wants you, and I am not cer 
 tain that he would release you on parole." As I lived a 
 mile out of the centre of the town, I decided that I would 
 return home and await events, rather than leave my fam 
 ily alone. When I reached there, I found that a detach 
 ment of Stuart s troops had been in advance of me and 
 relieved me of the possession of ten fine horses. My 
 house stood back from the highway some fifty yards and 
 was largely hidden by shade trees, and I closed up the 
 house, so as to leave no lights visible, and sat on the 
 porch awaiting visitors, whom I sincerely hoped would 
 not come. Shortly after midnight I heard the clatter 
 of hoofs and the jingle of sabres coming down the road 
 toward the town. Soon they arrived in front of my 
 house. They saw corn-shocks on one side of the road, 
 a large barn and water on the other side, and a paling 
 fence that promised a quick fire. They halted, appa 
 rently about one hundred and fifty in number, and im 
 mediately proceeded to tumble the corn-shocks over to 
 the horses and tear down the palings to start the fire. 
 Seeing that their acquaintance was inevitable, I walked 
 down to the gate and kindly said to them that if they 
 wanted to make a fire they would find wood just a few 
 feet from them, and showed them a short way to water. 
 The commander of the detachment stepped up to me and 
 very courteously inquired whether I resided there, with 
 out asking my name, and said he would be greatly 
 obliged if he and some of his officers could get a cup 
 of coffee. I told them that I had plenty of coffee, but 
 that my servants were colored and had hidden. He as 
 sured me that they were not after negroes, whether slave 
 or free, and that if I could find the servants and get them 
 
404 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES, 
 
 some coffee I could promise them absolute safety. My 
 servants were hidden in the thicket but a little distance 
 from the house, and I soon found some twenty negroes, 
 who swarmed back and speedily had hot coffee and tea 
 for the officers of the command. It was evident they 
 had no idea at whose place they were stopping, but they 
 were thinly clad, without their overcoats and blankets, 
 in order to be in the lightest trim for rapid marching, 
 and they were suffering from the cold rain of the entire 
 day. They gladly accepted my invitation to come into 
 the house and warm themselves, and they were not five 
 minutes in the library, where the New York and Phila 
 delphia papers lay on my table with my name on them, 
 before they all intuitively comprehended the fact that 
 they had asked hospitality and were about to receive it 
 in the house of a man whom they were ordered to take 
 as a prisoner to the South. They were all Virginians 
 and gentlemen of unusual intelligence and culture, as 
 the young bloods of that State with fine horses filled up 
 the ranks of the cavalry in the early part of the war. I 
 watched with unusual interest to see what the effect 
 would be when they discovered in whose house they 
 were as guests, but they did not long leave me in doubt 
 as to their appreciation of the peculiar condition in which 
 they were placed. They at once took in the situation 
 without opportunity to confer on the subject. It was 
 soon evident that they had decided that, having asked 
 and accepted hospitality, they would not permit them 
 selves to know that they were in the house of a host 
 whom it was their duty to arrest as a prisoner. We sat 
 at tea and over our pipes and cigars until at daylight the 
 bugle called them to the march. Every phase of the 
 war was discussed with the utmost freedom, but no one 
 of them spoke the name of himself or any of his fellows, 
 and not one assumed to know my identity. It was to 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 405 
 
 me one of the most interesting events of the war, and I 
 doubt whether the war itself was ever discussed with 
 equal candor on both sides without a single exhibition 
 of prejudice or passion. When the bugle sounded they 
 arose and bade me good-bye, thanking me for my hospi 
 tality and earnestly expressing the hope that we should 
 some time meet again under more pleasant auspices. 
 Soon after I followed them into the town, and stood in 
 the crowd close beside Jeb Stuart for some time before 
 he started on his homeward march. He did not doubt 
 that I was one of his prisoners, and it was not until he 
 had crossed the Potomac that he learned that I was not 
 among his captives, when, as I have since been told by 
 officers who were present, he made the atmosphere blue 
 with his profane lamentations. 
 
 I much regretted that I had no clue whatever to the 
 identity of any of the Virginia officers who had spent the 
 night with me, and after the war had closed, and Presi 
 dent Johnson was breathing the fiercest vengeance against 
 the South, I felt that I might be of some service to these 
 men if I could discover who they were. I wrote to a 
 newspaper in Winchester and also to the Richmond 
 Whig, stating the facts and asking for information as to 
 these officers, but there was then universal distrust in the 
 South, and, as my property had been burned with Cham- 
 bersburg but a year before, I infer that my suggestions 
 were regarded as insincere, and no answers were received 
 to either of my letters. It was not until ten years after 
 the war that I accidentally learned the names of some of 
 the officers who were with me. On a visit to Washing 
 ton I was in conversation with the late Heister Clymer 
 on the floor of the House just before the meeting of the 
 body, when he remarked to me that a Virginia member 
 desired to renew his acquaintance with me, and asked 
 permission to bring him and introduce him. I of course 
 
46 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 assented, and he brought up Colonel Whiteliead, then a 
 Congressman from the Lynchburg district, who informed 
 me that he had spent a night with me at my house during 
 Stuart s raid, and that he desired to renew his acquaint 
 ance of that evening under the more pleasant circum 
 stances which then surrounded us, and to thank me for 
 the kindness they had all received. From him I learned 
 that Lieutenant-Colonel James W. Watts commanded the 
 detachment, and that Captain W. W. Tebbs, Captain 
 Thomas W. Whitehead (himself), Lieutenant Kelso, and 
 two others, whose names he did not then recall, consti 
 tuted the unique tea-party at Norland on the night of 
 October 10, 1862. John Paxton of Adams County, who 
 was on the list with myself from that town, was taken 
 by Stuart s command, but released soon after he had 
 reached Richmond. Perry A. Rice of Mercersburg, a 
 prominent member of the bar, was held in Libbey Prison 
 for some months, and died there. It was thus that I es 
 caped being Jeb Stuart s captive in the first and one of 
 the most brilliant cavalry raids of the war. It is but just 
 to Captain Hugh Logan, however, to state that he ad 
 vised me, when telling me of my danger, that if cap 
 tured and refused parole I should quietly submit and join 
 the procession, and he would put me out of the ranks the 
 first night. That he would have done so, even at the 
 peril of his life, I do not doubt, and I am as grateful to 
 him as if he had had occasion to perform that act of 
 kindness to me. 
 
 The Stuart raid of October, 1862, was the first actual 
 experience of the border people of Pennsylvania with a 
 Confederate force in their midst, but beyond the general 
 panic and disturbance it produced, the loss of some twelve 
 hundred horses by our farmers and the destruction of rail 
 road property, we felt none of the serious results of war. 
 The Pennsylvania "emergency-men" followed to give 
 
BORDER-LIFE h\ WAR-TIMES. 47 
 
 protection when it was no longer needed, as they did 
 again in 1863, after Lee had retreated, and again in 1864, 
 after McCausland had burned Chambersbnrg. These 
 suddenly-organized and undisciplined commands were 
 inspired by patriotic purpose, but they really never ren 
 dered any service in protecting the people of the border, 
 and at times were very destructive because of their want 
 of discipline and properly-organized supplies. 
 
 After the militia had been quietly disposed of, there 
 was comparative peace along the border until after the 
 defeat of Hooker at Chancellorsville and Lee commenced 
 his movement northward. The first sullen murmurs of 
 invasion came, as usual, from the Shenandoah Valley, as 
 General Milroy was routed at Winchester and his stam 
 peded army scattered in fragments over the border region. 
 With them came fleeing loyal fugitives from Virginia 
 and swarms of negroes, creating panic in every direction, 
 and on the evening of the I5th of June positive informa 
 tion was received that General Jenkins, commanding the 
 cavalry advance of Lee s army, was approaching. They 
 took possession of Chambersburg the same night, and 
 General Jenkins exhibited the good taste of all com 
 manders of both armies by camping on my farm, and 
 he further honored me by taking possession of my house 
 as his headquarters. 
 
 A short time before this advance of Lee a prominent 
 citizen who lived just south of the Pennsylvania line in 
 Maryland, who was a client and friend of mine, and 
 whose release I had obtained after he had been con 
 demned by General Schenck and banished into the 
 Southern lines, rode nearly all night from his home to 
 Chambersburg to advise me that an invasion was inevit 
 able, and that I must not permit myself to be captured. 
 He had spent some weeks within the Confederate lines 
 after he had been banished by court-martial, and he fell 
 
4 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 it to be his duty to inform me of the excessive estimate 
 the Southern leaders put upon me as a prisoner, as they 
 supposed that with me as captive they could make un 
 usually good terms with Governor Curtin and President 
 Lincoln. I heeded his advice, and thereafter did not 
 remain in Chambersburg to extend hospitality to the 
 sons of the South. General Jenkins was hospitably 
 treated by my family, and his sick soldiers, for whom 
 my barn had been improvised as hospital, w r ere kindly 
 ministered to by Mrs. McClure. It was this same com 
 mand that one year later, under General McCausland, 
 burned Chambersburg and went a mile out of its way to 
 burn my house and barn. Of course all stock and valu 
 ables that could be shipped away had been sent to Har- 
 risburg or points beyond, and our people were living 
 under many discomforts. Jenkins remained only a few 
 days in Chambersburg, when he suddenly fell back toward 
 the Potomac between Greencastle and Hagerstown, and 
 from there sent out marauding parties to capture horses 
 and supplies. The whole southern portion of Franklin 
 county was mercilessly plundered while Jenkins was 
 waiting the arrival of Lee s infantry. General Rhodes 
 division was the first to reach Pennsylvania, and with 
 that command Jenkins again advanced and took posses 
 sion of Chambersburg. 
 
 The history of the great Gettysburg campaign and 
 battle is so familiar to all that I need not dwell on de 
 tails. Lee then commanded the largest and the most 
 defiant army the Confederates ever had during the war. 
 General Ewell s corps, over twenty thousand strong, en 
 camped on my farm, and thence Generals Rhodes and 
 Early made their movements against York and Harris- 
 burg. On the 26th of June, General Lee entered Cham 
 bersburg with his staff, and it is needless to say that his 
 movements were \vatched with intense interest by all in- 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 49 
 
 telligent citizens. Early and Rhodes were already ope 
 rating on the lines of the Susqnehanna, and Lee s army 
 was so disposed that it could be rapidly concentrated for 
 operations in the Cumberland Valley and against Phila 
 delphia or thrown south of the South Mountain to ope 
 rate against Washington. Lee held a brief council in 
 the centre square of Chambersburg with General A. P. 
 Hill and several other officers, and when he left them 
 intense anxiety was exhibited by every one who observed 
 them to ascertain whether his movements would indicate 
 the concentration of his army in the Cumberland Valley 
 or for operations against Washington. When he came 
 to the street where the Gettysburg turnpike enters the 
 square, he turned to the right, went out a mile along 
 that road, and fixed his headquarters in a little grove 
 close by the roadside then known as Shatters 7 Woods. 
 When Lee turned in that direction, Benjamin S. Huber, 
 a country lad, happened to be present, and, as he had 
 already exhibited some fitness for such work, he was 
 started immediately overland for Harrisburg to commu 
 nicate to Governor Curtin the fact that Lee s movement 
 indicated Gettysburg as his objective point. Lee was 
 fated to lose three days of invaluable time at his head 
 quarters in the quiet grove near Chambersburg, as his 
 cavalry had been cut off from him by encountering our 
 cavalry forces in Eastern Maryland, and he could get no 
 information whatever of the movements of the Union 
 army. 
 
 It was not until the 29th of June that he received in 
 formation from one of Longstreet s scouts of the position 
 of the Army of the Potomac, and he immediately de 
 cided to cross South Mountain and accept battle on the 
 line to Baltimore and Washington. On the night of 
 Monday, June 2Qth, General Ewell s wagon-trains passed 
 through Chambersburg and turned eastward on the Get- 
 
4 10 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 tysburg turnpike. This movement was carefully watched, 
 and it soon became evident to intelligent observers that 
 Lee s army was moving rapidly to concentrate south of 
 the South Mountain. I was then at Harrisburg with 
 Governor Curtin, and the only news we received of Lee s 
 movement, and the only reliable news received at Meade s 
 headquarters for some days, came from the several ener 
 getic young men who performed scout-duty between 
 Chambersburg and Harrisburg by traversing the moun 
 tains north of the Cumberland Valley. It was known 
 to us that Lee was in the Cumberland Valley with the 
 largest Southern army ever organized, and the gravest 
 apprehensions were felt by all as to the ability of the 
 Army of the Potomac to meet it in battle. There was 
 no sleep for the weary men at Harrisburg who were com 
 pelled to watch and to await events. 
 
 The first intimation received of Lee s movement toward 
 Gettysburg came from John A. Seiders of Chambersburg, 
 who had entered the enemy s lines in Confederate uni 
 form and saw General Rhodes begin the movement from 
 Carlisle in the direction of Gettysburg; but as Rhodes 
 and Early were both moving from point to point, the 
 fact that Rhodes was apparently retiring from Carlisle 
 was no indication of Lee s movements in Chambers 
 burg. 
 
 I shall never forget the first dispatch received at the 
 Executive Mansion at Harrisburg giving the information 
 that Lee had moved toward Gettysburg. It was some 
 time between midnight and morning on the ist of July, 
 while a dozen or more were waiting with the intensest 
 interest for news, that an unsigned dispatch was received 
 by Governor Curtin from Port Royal in Juniata county, 
 stating that the writer had left Chambersburg the day 
 before at the request of Judge Kimmell to convey the 
 information to the Governor that Lee was marching 
 
42x 
 
 /, 
 
 V. 
 
 <^>txt 
 
 / 
 
 / 
 
 J-AC-SIMII,I5 OF I,eTTER FROM GENERAL. 
 
412 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 toward Gettysburg. The fact that the dispatch was un 
 signed threw doubt upon the value of the information, 
 but as it described minutely the route the scout had trav 
 eled through Franklin and Juniata counties, with which 
 I was personally quite familiar, I was able to give reason 
 able assurance that the dispatch was genuine. The tele 
 graph-office at Port Royal had been opened to send the 
 dispatch, and was closed immediately after, so that no 
 details could be obtained. General Couch, then in com 
 mand of the Union force at Harrisburg, was present in 
 the Governor s room, and he immediately communicated 
 with General u Baldy " Smith, giving the information 
 received and asking him to see whether the enemy had 
 retired from his front. Before noon the next day the 
 correctness of the statement given by the unknown scout 
 was fully verified; and it is a most remarkable fact that 
 the identity of this man was never discovered by Gov 
 ernor Curtin until twenty years thereafter. 
 
 This scout was Stephen W. Pomeroy, whose father had 
 sat on the bench as associate with Judge Kimmell, and 
 Kimmell, knowing the trustworthiness of the young 
 man, wrote the dispatch for Governor Curtin, cut a hole 
 in the buckle-strap of Pomeroy s pantaloons, and hid the 
 telegram therein. Information came from so many quar 
 ters during the next day that the message of the young 
 scout was almost forgotten, and the thrilling events that 
 followed and the many conspicuous feats performed by 
 the young men of the Cumberland Valley in scouting 
 service prevented minute inquiry into the source of the 
 important dispatch of the early morning. Twenty years 
 later the Presbyterian Synod of that section met in Belle- 
 fonte, and several ministers in attendance were guests of 
 Governor Curtin. In the course of his reminiscent con 
 versations about the war he happened to mention the 
 receipt of this important dispatch, and the fact that he 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 413 
 
 had never been advised as to the author of it. To his 
 surprise, Rev. S. W. Pomeroy, then his own guest, told 
 him that he was the man, and at Curtin s request he 
 wrote a letter that was given to the public stating the 
 full particulars of his marvelous journey. * It was upon 
 
 * MOUNT UNION, PA., Nov. 13, 1883. 
 
 HON. A. G. CURTIN DEAR SIR: In compliance with your 
 request, I send you the account of how I came to send you the 
 telegram of the concentration of the Confederate army at Gettys 
 burg during the \var. After being discharged from the nine 
 months service of the Pennsylvania volunteers, I happened to 
 be home, at my father s Judge Pomeroy of Roxbury, Franklin 
 county when the enemy were marching down the Cumberland 
 Valley. There was, of course, great excitement, for the enemy 
 were at our doors and taking what they would. Farmers hid 
 their horses and other stock in the mountains as far as possible. 
 One day three hundred cavalry marched into Roxbury. When 
 we learned of their coming, ten of the men who had been out in 
 the nine months service armed ourselves as best we could and 
 went out to intercept them ; but the odds were too great, so we 
 retired. Anxious to hear the news and render what service we 
 might to our country, a number of us walked to Chambersburg, 
 a distance of fourteen miles, reaching there in the afternoon. 
 That night the rebels w T ere concentrated at Gettysburg. Next 
 morning Judge F. M. Kimmell, with whom my father sat as 
 associate judge, learned that a son of Thomas Pomeroy was in 
 town. He sent for me to come to him at once. I found the judge 
 on the street that leads to McConnellsburg, a short distance from 
 the Franklin Hotel, where the Central Presbyterian Church now 
 stands. As the town was full of rebels and a rebel had his beat 
 near us, the judge asked me in a low tone if I was a son of Judge 
 Pomeroy. I replied in the affirmative. With apparent unconcern 
 he asked me to follow him. I did so, and he led me into a little 
 dark back room and told me that the rebels were concentrating 
 at Gettysburg and Governor Curtin did not know it. He said it 
 was of the utmost importance that the Governor should know at 
 the earliest possible moment, and asked me if I would take a tel 
 egram to the nearest point on the Pennsylvania Railroad and 
 send it to him. He added: " It is of infinite importance to him 
 and to our country." I replied that I would try it. The telegram 
 
41 4 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 this information that General Meade, then just placed in 
 the command of the Army of the Potomac, hastened to 
 
 was already written, so he cut a hole in the buckle-strap of my 
 pantaloons and deposited there the telegram to be sent, and 
 said: "Get this safely and in the shortest time possible to the 
 Governor." Assuming indifference, I came to the street and met 
 the rebel guard, who did not disturb me. Some of those who 
 came with me wishing to return to Roxbury, we set out together. 
 We met many at the edge of the town returning who could not 
 get through the guards, who were stationed around the town. 
 
 Coming to the forks of the Strasburg and Roxbury roads, we 
 found both cavalry and infantry. On the left there was a slight 
 hollow, also several wheat-fields, and beyond these there were 
 woods. This was the only way to hope for escape. At my pro 
 posal we crept along this hollow, at the end of which there were 
 some wheat-fields; we kept these between us and the guard till 
 we reached the woods. When getting over the fence into the 
 woods we were seen by the enemy. They called, rode after us, 
 and leveled their muskets at us, but we ran on, and, as they did 
 not fire or follow far, we escaped. Still fearing capture, we kept 
 to the fields. Before we reached Strasburg all had fallen behind 
 but one. We must have walked about seventeen miles before we 
 got to Roxbury. As the horses were hid in the mountains, I was 
 in dread lest I should not get a horse; but I met Mr. L. S. Sent- 
 man riding into town to get feed for his horses in the mountains. 
 Telling him of the message I was carrying, he gave me his horse. 
 Informing my father of my errand, I set out on my trip at once. 
 It was about noon. The mountain-road to Amberson Valley 
 was, I knew, blockaded with trees to prevent the marauders from 
 entering the valley to steal horses. The Barrens below Concord 
 were blockaded by citizens of Tuscarora Valley, many of whom 
 knew me. The report having reached them that I was killed 
 while trying to hinder the rebels from entering Roxbury, the ob 
 stacles and excitement of 1113 friends at finding me alive hindered 
 me about ten minutes. Free from them, I hastened down the 
 Tuscarora Valley as fast as my horse could carry me. At Beal- 
 town, Mr. Beal (now the Rev. D. J. Beal) speedily got me a fresh 
 horse. When I reached Silas E. Smith s I did these two things: 
 got lunch and proved to the future Mrs. Pomeroy that I was not 
 dead, as she supposed, but good for many years to come. From 
 thence I rode to my uncle s, Joseph Pomeroy, at Academia, found 
 
t*ORDER-Lll E IN WAR-TlAlkS. 415 
 
 concentrate his army, and he ordered General Reynolds 
 to make a recognizance in force at Gettysburg to ascer 
 tain the position of the enemy. The young men who 
 performed the most important duty of maintaining com 
 munications between Harrisburg and Chambersburg by 
 circuitous journeys through the mountains were Stephen 
 W. Pomeroy, Thomas J. Grimison, Sellers Montgomery, 
 J. Porter Brown, Anthony Holler, Shearer Houser, Ben 
 jamin S. Huber, and probably others whose names I can 
 not recall. 
 
 When Lee had passed the South Mountain and the 
 battle at Gettysburg had begun it was impossible to ob 
 tain any news from Lee s rear as to important movements 
 between the two armies, and thenceforth until Lee s re 
 treat the only information received at Harrisburg and 
 Chambersburg came from General Meade through Wash 
 ington. On the evening of the first day s battle we 
 learned the sad news that Reynolds had fallen and that 
 
 them likewise mourning my supposed death, and he supplied an 
 other horse, the fastest he had. That carried me to within a mile 
 of my destination, when a soldier on guard called, "Halt!" I 
 told the sergeant on guard my mission, and requested one of the 
 guard to go with me, that I might get the telegram off to Harris 
 burg in the shortest time possible. 
 
 Getting on the horse behind me, we rode in a few minutes to 
 the office. Finding the operator, he cut the telegram out of the 
 strap of my pantaloons and sent it at once to you. The excite 
 ment and journey being over and the telegram being off to you, 
 I began to look at the time and found it about midnight. I had 
 walked that day about seventeen miles and ridden about forty- 
 one miles. Anxious as I was about the critical state of the coun 
 try, I was so tired I had to seek the house of my kinsman, Major 
 J. M. Pomeroy, in Perryville (now Port Royal), for rest. 
 
 The above is the history of that telegram that, I believe, first 
 gave you notice of the concentration of the rebel troops at Gettys 
 burg just before the famous battle in that place. 
 
 Respectfully yours, 
 
 STEPHEN W. POMEROY. 
 
416 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAK-T/MI .S. 
 
 the Union troops had been badly defeated. On the sec 
 ond day no material news came, and for two days the 
 government at Harrisbtirg and the people in the Valley 
 were agonized by fearful suspense as to the issue of the 
 conflict. Late in the evening of July 3d, Wayne Mac- 
 Veagh, who had been with the Governor during the 
 whole period of trial, and whose anxiety kept him close 
 beside the telegraph-operator, rushed into the Executive 
 Chamber with Meade s report of the repulse of Pickett 
 on Cemetery Hill. It was the first silver lining of the 
 dark cloud flung upon us by the Gettysburg invasion, 
 and when the next morning it was known that Lee had 
 retreated, while every loyal heart of the land was glad 
 dened, the border people felt a relief that was unknown 
 in any other part of the country. 
 
 One of the incidents of Lee s retreat I do not recall 
 with pleasure, but it is due to the truth of history to tell 
 the story of the fierce passions which ran riot in our civil 
 war. Lee left thousands of his wounded scattered along 
 the line of his retreat, and a number of them were gath 
 ered into a hospital in Chambersburg. Little attention 
 was paid to the fact that there was a Confederate hospital 
 in our midst, as "uncommon things make common 
 things forgot." Some ten days after Lee s retreat, Dr. 
 A. H. Senseny, my own family physician, came to me 
 and informed me that he was attending the Confederate 
 wounded in the hospital, and that they were in great 
 need of some things which were not supplied by army 
 regulations. He appealed to me to go in person and see 
 them and take the lead to have them properly supplied, 
 as he believed I could do it without suspicion of disloy 
 alty. I visited the hospital with him and found a num 
 ber of severely- wounded men who had great need of some 
 delicacies necessary to their recovery or comfort. Mrs. 
 McClure immediately took charge of the effort, and was 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR- TIMES. 417 
 
 heartily seconded by a number of estimable ladies. I 
 became specially interested in a young Confederate, 
 Colonel Carter, who resided in Texas, but who was a 
 native of Tennessee. It was evident that his wound was 
 mortal, and he fully understood it. When he was in 
 formed by the doctor that I had come to perform some 
 kind offices for the wounded in that hospital, he thanked 
 me effusively, and made a piteous appeal to me to assure 
 him decent Christian burial after his death. I gave him 
 the promise, little dreaming of the angry passions it 
 would arouse in a Christian community. He died a few 
 days thereafter, and I applied to the trustees of the Pres 
 byterian church I attended for permission to bury him in 
 the graveyard attached to it. To my surprise it was 
 refused. I made like application to the several other 
 churches in the town which had cemeteries, and was 
 refused in every instance. I then applied to a company 
 that had recently started a new cemetery near the town, 
 and proposed to purchase a lot for the burial of the dead 
 Confederate colonel, but that was refused, and indigna 
 tion was expressed on almost every side because of my 
 effort to give a Confederate soldier decent burial. I then 
 announced that I would set apart a small lot in the corner 
 of the field in front of my house to bury him there and 
 dedicate it as his resting-place. Finally Mr. Burnett, an 
 estimable Christian character, gave Colonel Caiter s re 
 mains a resting-place in his own lot in the Methodist 
 burial-ground. Such were the fierce passions of civil 
 war in one of the most intelligent, generous, and Chris 
 tian communities of the North, and I recall it often as 
 one of the saddest memories of our fraternal conflict. 
 
 After the battle of Gettysburg the border people had 
 
 seen war in its most horrible aspect. The constant peril 
 
 from incursions of the enemy, and the possibility of other 
 
 great battles being fought upon the border or north of 
 
 27 
 
41 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 the Potomac, destroyed all hope of tranquility in that 
 region until the war closed. There was comparative 
 peace and quiet during the winter of 1863-64, but when 
 the spring of 1864 opened the border counties were almost 
 constantly threatened by cavalry raids or hostile armies. 
 Governor Curtin had taken the precaution to organize an 
 ample force to protect the border from raids, but as these 
 troops were mustered into the service of the national 
 government, and thereby subject to the call of the War 
 Department, they were ordered from the State to rein 
 force Hunter on the north side of the Potomac after his 
 disastrous advance into Virginia. While Hunter was 
 thus endeavoring to reorganize his demoralized forces 
 and the border was threatened in the direction of Hagers- 
 town, the startling news came to General Couch s head 
 quarters on the evening of July 29, 1864, that a Confed 
 erate force had entered Mercersburg and was marching 
 toward Chambersburg. General Couch, although com 
 manding a department with headquarters at Chambers- 
 burg, had but one hundred and fourteen men under his 
 command, and they were scattered over half as many 
 miles as scouts on the border. The troops that he could 
 have summoned to repel invasion under ordinary circum 
 stances had passed through Chambersburg within twenty- 
 four hours to join Hunter, in command of another de 
 partment, and were beyond his control. 
 
 I remained with Couch the night of the 29th until 
 three o clock the next morning. He received frequent 
 reports from the heroic Lieutenant McLean, who had just 
 thirteen men with him, but who in the darkness of the 
 night confronted McCausland at every cross-roads in his 
 advance upon Chambersburg, and so hindered him that 
 he did not arrive in front of the town until daylight. 
 McCausland in his official report states that he was con 
 fronted by a regiment that fought him most gallantly and 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 419 
 
 greatly delayed his advance, but I happened to know that 
 the entire force opposed to him was the lieutenant and his 
 thirteen men. It was evident at three o clock in the 
 morning that the Confederate force would reach the town 
 before daylight, and, as General Couch had no means 
 whatever for defending the place, he ordered a special 
 train to be in readiness to take himself, staff, and official 
 records away when it became necessary. He urged me 
 to go with him, believing that it was unsafe for me to 
 remain at home, but I decided that I would not leave my 
 family, perilous though it seemed to be, and left him to 
 go to my own house. When I reached there and gave 
 the condition of affairs, Mrs. McClure most earnestly 
 urged me to go with General Couch, and while I was 
 hesitating he sent a staff-officer to my house, saying that 
 he felt it his duty to command me to accompany him out 
 of the town, and to come at once and leave with him on 
 the train. I still hesitated and sent his staff-officer away, 
 but soon after Mr. Taylor, an old friend, drove up in his 
 buggy and proposed to take me with him, and I accom 
 panied him to Shippensburg. 
 
 Telegraphic communication was of course cut off, but 
 the next morning I took the cars for Harrisburg, where 
 I was greeted with the information that McCausland had 
 burned the town and had sent a special detachment, com 
 manded by a son of Ex-Governor Smith of Virginia, to 
 burn my house and barn, after having .burned my print 
 ing-office and law-office in the town. Rev. Samuel J. 
 Niccolls, now of St. Louis, was my immediate neighbor, 
 and he came to my house when he found that a detach 
 ment of the enemy had entered it. Mrs. McClure was 
 ill, confined to her room, but Captain Smith entered it 
 and notified her to leave immediately, as he was going to 
 burn the house in retaliation for the destruction of pri 
 vate property by Hunter in Virginia, and forbade her to 
 
420 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 take anything with her. Mr. Niccolls attempted to take 
 some of my clothing on his arms, but it was grasped 
 from him and cast into the flames. The only thing 
 saved from the house was a portrait that Miss Virginia 
 Riley seized, and with it ran out of the house through a 
 back door, and the family Bible was taken charge of by 
 Mrs. Gray, the mother of my wife. When Captain Smith 
 was about to fire the room in which Mrs. McCltire was 
 an invalid, she opened a drawer in her bureau and handed 
 him a letter she had received but a few days before and 
 requested him to read it. It was from one of the same 
 command who had been there under Jenkins the year 
 before, and who had been ill and received generous min 
 istrations from her. It was a letter of thanks from one of 
 Captain Smith s own associates for the kind offices she 
 had given to an enemy when in distress, but it did not 
 stop the vandal s work, and everything perished by the 
 vandal s torch. 
 
 I need not describe the brutality that is inevitable 
 when a military command is ordered to play the barba 
 rian. Many of the men became intoxicated, and there 
 were numerous records of barbarity which all would be 
 glad to forget. A large brick house on another part of 
 my farm was fortunately occupied by the family of Col 
 onel Boyd, one of our most gallant troopers and success 
 ful scouts. Learning that that property belonged to me, 
 Colonel Harry Gihnore led a detachment to burn it. 
 Colonel Boyd was absent on duty, but his wife was an 
 heroic woman, and, when Colonel Gilniore entered the 
 house and informed her of their purpose, she amazed 
 them by her coolness of manner and much more by her 
 defiance. She said: "Do you know whose home this 
 is?" The answer was: u Yes, we know that this belongs 
 to Colonel McClure, and we are ordered to burn it." 
 Her answer was: "This is the home of Colonel Boyd, 
 
BORDER-LIFE IN WAR-TIMES. 421 
 
 of whom you have some knowledge. I am now ready 
 to walk out of it, and you can burn it if you choose, but 
 don t forget that it is the home of Colonel Boyd." They 
 knew of Colonel Boyd, and they knew also that if his 
 home was burned it would make a hundred Virginians 
 homeless before another month, as he would have given 
 fearful retribution. Colonel Gilmore bowed to Mrs. Boyd, 
 saying: "We will not burn the home of so gallant a sol 
 dier;" and thus the property was saved. He gives a dif 
 ferent account of the incident in his book, but all who 
 remember Mrs. Boyd well know that she was not the 
 whimpering dame he represents her. 
 
 I need not describe the burning of Chambersburg. It 
 was ordered by General Early upon the failure of the 
 people to pay a tribute of $500,000, which was an impos 
 sible demand, and the order was executed in unexampled 
 barbarity. It accomplished nothing in the war beyond 
 making hundreds of homeless families in the South, and 
 especially in Columbia, South Carolina, when Sherman 
 was marching north, where the people learned to asso 
 ciate the cry of Chambersburg with sweeping destruc 
 tion. Bvery drunken Union soldier in Southern cities 
 applied the torch as did the drunken soldiers of McCaus- 
 land in Chambersburg, always preceding it with the cry 
 of " Remember Chambersburg!" The fact remains that 
 one of the most beautiful towns of the State had been 
 ruthlessly destroyed by war; that the people of Cham 
 bersburg and of the border regions had suffered spoliation 
 to the extent of not less than $4,000,000; and that the 
 burning of Chambersburg was the direct result of the 
 general government calling away the troops organized 
 for State service that would have been ample to defend 
 the town. It was not the accident of a lost battle; it 
 was the result of the extreme necessities of the national 
 government that deprived Pennsylvania of her own right- 
 
422 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 ful defenders, and it is a blistering stain upon the gov 
 ernment that it has not made reasonable restitution for 
 the loss which resulted from the action of the govern- 
 
 o 
 
 ment itself. The people of Chambersburg heroically 
 struggled to rebuild their homes and revive their busi 
 ness, but soon after the war closed there was a general 
 paralysis and depression of values, and many were hope 
 lessly bankrupted, while others struggled on for years in 
 the vain effort to retrieve their fortunes. 
 
 This fearful strain upon the people of the border con 
 tinued for four long years. Finally, on the night of 
 April 9, 1865, when the long-suffering residents of Cham 
 bersburg were at rest in the homes they had improvised 
 in their ashes, they were suddenly startled by the ringing 
 of the courthouse bell, in which the chimes of several 
 church bells were soon mingled. There had been no 
 rumors of a raid, but the people hurried from their beds 
 to inquire what new peril confronted them or what great 
 victory had been achieved. In a very short time the 
 streets resounded with the shouts: u Lee has surren 
 dered!" Soon the people of the town, young and old, 
 were upon the streets, many of them weeping with joy, 
 and all mingling in congratulations; and thus the fearful 
 strain upon them was ended. To them it meant more 
 than peace between the North and the South ; it meant 
 much -more than a restored nation: it meant the ending 
 of the strife that entered their own homes and desolated 
 the places where their affections centered, and it meant 
 that at last, after the bloodiest war of modern history, 
 they had rest. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 
 
 WHILE none will claim that the soldiers of the 
 Pennsylvania Reserve Corps were more heroic 
 than other scores of thousands of Pennsylvania soldiers 
 who volunteered for the defence of the Union, it is none 
 the less true that this organization, alike by reason of the 
 peculiar circumstances under which it was created and 
 because of its opportunities for the most heroic service 
 in nearly every battle of the Army of the Potomac, oc 
 cupies a distinctive place in the history of Pennsylva 
 nia heroism. How it was organized has already been 
 stated in these articles. How it was summoned by the 
 patriotism and sagacity of Governor Curtin when the 
 national government had not only not called for it, but 
 refused to accept it; how the legislature was appealed to 
 by the Governor, and a State organization effected alike 
 for the protection of the State and the general govern 
 ment; how it was frantically called for by the same au 
 thorities who had rejected it when disaster fell upon the 
 Union forces at Bull Run; how it promptly marched to 
 Washington and ended panic by assuring the safety of 
 the capital, are matters of history known to all; and 
 when it is remembered that it had such commanders as 
 McCall, Meade, Reynolds, Ord, and Crawford, and bri 
 gade commanders who have shed lustre upon the skill 
 and heroism of Pennsylvania soldiers, and that more 
 than one-half of its entire force fell wounded or dead 
 
 423 
 
(Photo by Gutekunst, Philadelphia.) 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL S. W. CRAWFORD, 1865. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 4 2 5 
 
 in battle, it is not surprising that the Pennsylvania Re 
 serve Corps occupies a unique position in the annals 
 of Pennsylvania achievement and sacrifice in our civil 
 war. 
 
 The command of the Reserves was first offered to Gen 
 eral McClellan, and he had accepted, but on his way to 
 Harrisburg he was stopped at Columbus, Ohio, where he 
 was prevailed upon to accept the command of the Ohio 
 State troops. It was then offered to General Franklin, 
 but he declined, as he had been promoted to a colonelcy 
 in the regular army. It was then tendered to General 
 McCall of Chester county, Pennsylvania, a retired army 
 officer, who proved to be an excellent disciplinarian and 
 a most gallant soldier. General McCall earnestly devoted 
 himself, and at once, to the organization for service of 
 the division, to its drill and discipline, and gave to the 
 Bucktails, or First Rifles, his especial care a regiment 
 to become famous as skirmishers wholly unique, and 
 whose value in thick woods, tangled overgrowth, streams, 
 and mountain-passes was unequaled anywhere. Three 
 brigades were formed, under Reynolds, Meade, and Ord 
 names soon to become famous for ability and conspicu 
 ous service; and it cannot be questioned that the impres 
 sion left by these able soldiers of the highest class in 
 their discipline and instruction was long effective and 
 contributed greatly to the reputation of the division. 
 
 Before the advance of our lines in front of Washington 
 to a stronger position the Reserves were ordered to Lang- 
 ley, at Camp Pierpoint, beyond the Chain Bridge, where 
 McCalPs division constituted the right of the army, 
 which it held until after the seven days retreat on the 
 Peninsula. Constantly in contact with the enemy, and 
 always with credit to itself, it was preparing for the 
 larger operations of war so soon to devolve upon it. A 
 reconnaissance in force showed the presence of the enemy 
 
426 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 in uncertain numbers near Dranesville, and an attack 
 from the direction of Centreville was anticipated, in re 
 gard to which McCall s division was warned. Had the 
 reconnaissance to Dranesville resulted in holding that 
 place, the disaster to Baker and his command at Ball s 
 Bluff, and his subsequent rout, might have been avoided. 
 
 From intelligence received by a scout it was learned 
 that the enemy was in force at Dranesville, and that 
 his object was to forage in the unoccupied country in 
 his immediate front. He had advanced his pickets in 
 front of his line, and \vas molesting Union men about 
 him, when it was determined to drive his line back 
 and take possession of the supplies of grain and forage 
 available. 
 
 On the 20th, Ord s brigade, with Easton s battery 
 and a detachment of cavalry, and with the Bucktails 
 as skirmishers, was ordered to move up the Dranesville 
 road. Reynolds with his brigade, in support, was to 
 move in the same direction later, \vhile Meade was held 
 in reserve in camp. Ord reached Dranesville, and soon 
 developed the enemy, who opened fire with his artillery. 
 The brigade soon became closely engaged, Easton s bat 
 tery coming rapidly into position and rendering most 
 effective service through the battle. Ord s dispositions 
 were admirable, and he directed in person the operations 
 of his regiments, with Easton s guns and the Bucktails. 
 In an attempt to turn the left of our position the enemy 
 was repulsed by Easton s guns and the Sixth regiment. 
 There was close firing along the line, when an advance 
 was ordered and the enemy rapidly retreated toward 
 Centreville. Meantime, Reynolds brigade, followed 
 by that of Meade, had come up, but the battle was 
 over a most successful affair, hardly to be dignified 
 with the name of a battle, and, in view of the immense 
 issues of the future, insignificant, but in its moral as- 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 42 f 
 
 pects immense. Young men gathered from all parts 
 of Pennsylvania had assumed the panoply of war, and 
 had gone into action and moved and fought with the 
 confidence of veteran soldiers; and it was the first vic 
 tory of the Army of the Potomac. Pennsylvania was 
 thrilled at the achievement of her sons, and not only 
 through her Governor, but through the Secretary of 
 War, himself a Pennsylvania!!, congratulations and com 
 mendations, official and private, upon the conduct of 
 the division came in profusion. 
 
 The division now returned to its camp (Pierpoint) and 
 made preparations to go into winter quarters. McClellan 
 had been appointed to the command of the army, which 
 for seven long months remained inactive confronting 
 the enemy s lines. The Reserves under their competent 
 officers were daily attaining efficiency in drill and in dis 
 cipline and in preparation for battle an efficiency that 
 w r as never to leave them during their service. The 
 whole heart of their State had gone out to them, and the 
 patriotic Governor, who ever considered them his own 
 special creation, never wearied in the exercise of his 
 paternal care. 
 
 McClellan now moved from Alexandria to Fortress 
 Monroe, and the advance of the Army of the Potomac 
 began. To reach Yorktown and the Peninsula the army 
 embarked by divisions. McDowell s corps, with the 
 Pennsylvania Reserves, was in the rear. But while all 
 was in motion, the President, learning that Washington 
 had not been protected by a sufficient force in accordance 
 with his orders, detached McDowell s corps and ordered 
 him to report to the Secretary of War. This conse 
 quently kept the Pennsylvania Reserves from the Penin 
 sula, and they accompanied their corps to Alexandria. 
 Soon after another advance was made into Virginia to 
 Falmouth and Fredericksburg. But when McDowell 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 arrived and was about to take up the line of march, he 
 received an order, directly from the President, forbidding 
 him to cross the river. Here the Reserves remained for 
 over a month, going through all the phases and vicissi 
 tudes of military life, and becoming hardened and thor 
 oughly fitted for the future service in store for them. 
 They were directly on the road to Richmond. The gal 
 lant Bayard was made a brigadier-general on the 28th of 
 April, and the flying brigade was organized under his 
 command. 
 
 Again a forward movement toward Richmond was 
 ordered, and McDowell s corps had begun its movement 
 by the advance of Bayard s brigade, and even-thing 
 looked favorable to the speedy junction of McDowell and 
 his corps with the Army of the Potomac, when the Presi 
 dent and his Cabinet arrived at Fredericksburg to confer 
 with McDowell as to the movement. All was in readi 
 ness, the transportation secured, the men eager, and only 
 awaited the final order. It was Saturday, the 24th of 
 May. The next day being Sunday, the President ob 
 jected to beginning a campaign on that day, w r hen Mon 
 day morning was fixed upon. Meantime a despatch was 
 received by McDowell revoking the order and changing 
 the whole plan of campaign. Jackson had again burst 
 into the Valley of the Shenandoah and was in full march 
 northward. The President personally interfered, Bayard 
 was quickly recalled, and the three divisions of Shields, 
 King, and Ord were hurried to the Shenandoah Valley 
 to meet him. McCall with the Pennsylvania Reserves 
 was to hold Fredericksburg temporarily, some troops of 
 the cavalry only accompanying the expedition on their 
 march. Bayard with his brigade encountered the enemy 
 in Jackson s rearguard, other troops, from Fremont s 
 command, joined him, and there was a brisk fight with 
 the enemy. Bayard s brigade remained with Fremont. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 429 
 
 Meantime the Reserves remained at Fredericksburg under 
 McCall, when, on the 4th of June, McClellan called ear 
 nestly for reinforcements, and the Reserves were prom 
 ised him to go to the White House. McClellan had 
 assured the President that upon McCall s arrival with 
 his division, if the state of the ground permitted, he 
 would advance. McDowell moved promptly with the 
 division of the Reserves alone. By the I4th of June 
 the division was united at Tunstall s Station. Stuart s 
 Confederate cavalry had threatened an attack upon the 
 depot and had opened fire upon a train at the station. 
 Upon the appearance of Reynolds with his brigade the 
 cavalry retreated. 
 
 The Reserves, now united, mustered nearly ten thou 
 sand strong, of effective material. Fully organized, well 
 drilled and equipped, under favorite and skilled com 
 manders, they marched on the lyth with enthusiasm to 
 take their place on the right of the army. It was the 
 place of honor; they occupied it upon the iQth, and 
 almost at once came under the fire of the enemy. It 
 was a position which should have never been chosen, 
 but which McCall with admirable sagacity and judg 
 ment at once made strong and formidable, taking ad 
 vantage of the natural features of the ground and dis 
 posing his force with reference to the efficiency of its 
 fire, putting two of his brigades in line and holding 
 Meade s brigade in reserve. 
 
 The enemy was in plain view. At three o clock he 
 threw forward his skirmishers, which were at once 
 driven back. Advancing his main body under cover 
 of his artillery fire, he attacked the Reserves along their 
 whole front. The fighting was long continued, and 
 from the right centre to the left was hotly maintained. 
 Various attempts were made by the enemy to find weak 
 places in our line, but without success. The Reserves 
 
43 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 maintained their position, inflicting great losses upon 
 the enemy, who finally retired at nine o clock p. M. 
 McCall at once prepared for a renewal of the attack in 
 the morning, when he received McClellan s order to fall 
 back to Games Mills. Jackson was marching from the 
 direction of Gordonsville upon the right flank and rear 
 of our army. This compelled an immediate change to 
 one definite side of the Chickahominy, the right bank. 
 The movement was executed with skill and success. 
 The Reserves moved speedily, and the spectacle of an 
 army with an impassable boggy stream flowing through 
 its centre was no longer seen. 
 
 The command fell back with regret, in perfect order, 
 behind the lines of Games Mills at ten A. M., June 
 syth a movement which the corps commander doubted 
 his ability to accomplish. Here it was held in reserve. 
 No veteran troops could have behaved with any greater 
 distinction than did the Pennsylvania Reserves in this 
 battle of Mechanicsville, and the glowing approbation 
 of their commander, McCall, was wholly deserved. 
 They had met most honorably every requirement of 
 their position with a devotion and courage worthy of 
 any troops in any army; and Mechanicsville will ever 
 remain one of their proudest achievements. 
 
 The withdrawal had been successfully accomplished, 
 and Porter s corps was in strong position at Games Mill 
 by noon on the 2ji\\ of June, its flanks resting on the 
 creeks. The Pennsylvania Reserves, in justice to them 
 after their continued and gallant fighting, were held at 
 first in reserve and rear. But the enemy in strong 
 columns commenced his attack at four o clock, and It 
 was so determined and persistent that the second line 
 had been moved up by the corps commander s order; 
 and the Second and Third brigades were ordered at once 
 to the support of the left centre, now severely engaged. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 43 1 
 
 The conflict became desperate, and the men fought with 
 out regard to anything but the enemy in their front and 
 the officers who commanded them. Other troops were 
 moved up and much confusion prevailed. Again and 
 again the enemy was repulsed, only to re-form, and, 
 being reinforced, to again attack. 
 
 On our side the troops held their position bravely 
 until every cartridge had been fired. One regiment on 
 the left was repulsed and driven across the Chickahominy. 
 Regiments of different corps were gotten together, led 
 on a charge into the woods, and advanced against the 
 enemy, when their flanks were assailed and broken, and 
 in disorder they fell back to their old position. The 
 Bucktails, by their unerring fire, forced a Confederate 
 battery to change its position, and finally drove it from 
 the field. One regiment that had gone to the relief of 
 another then in line remained fighting until, its ammu 
 nition exhausted, with half its number captured, and 
 with the enemy all around it, it was forced to surrender. 
 Easton, after most heroic fighting, his support gone, his 
 gunners killed at their pieces, his retreat cut off, lost 
 four of his guns and two caissons. 
 
 The action had now become general, and for four hours 
 raged furiously. The left, unable to withstand the re 
 peated and desperate attacks upon it, had broken and 
 was falling back in confusion, when McCall by his per 
 sonal efforts partially restored order. It was now after 
 sunset. The enemy, after forcing our left, had cut off 
 the retreat of the Eleventh regiment and the Fourth New 
 Jersey, to whose relief Reynolds had gone. While at 
 tempting to regain our lines the next morning he was 
 captured with his adjutant-general. The enemy, believ 
 ing that reinforcements had reached us, made no further 
 attack. He had before displayed no such strength or de 
 termination, The Reserves fought against superior num.- 
 
43 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR- TIMES. 
 
 bers and bravely, wholly u supporting the character they 
 had previously gained," as was justly said by their com 
 mander. Reynolds had been everywhere, and in the ex 
 ercise of that personal magnetism so characteristic of him 
 was of the greatest influence in restoring order. We lost 
 twenty-two guns in the battle, and the Pennsylvania Re 
 serves alone had lost, including the affair at Beaver Dam 
 Creek, fourteen hundred men. The enemy had been 
 held in check, and this, the commanding general said, 
 was all that he proposed, to secure his changed base on 
 the James River. 
 
 But there was to be no rest yet for the division. On 
 the 2yth of June, after the affair at Gainesville, the Penn 
 sylvania Reserves crossed the Chickahominy. It was 
 late before their orders reached them to move to White 
 Oak Creek as an escort and protection to Hunt s reserve 
 artillery. It was an important and hazardous service, 
 and it seemed to fall to the lot of the Reserves, as other 
 details had done, without much reference to justice or 
 routine. The transfer of so important an element of his 
 fighting material might well occasion anxiety to the com 
 manding general, and he had especially entrusted its care 
 to McCall s division of Pennsylvanians. He had been 
 satisfied with its brilliant seivice, and his unjust criti 
 cisms upon its action at New Market road had not yet 
 been made. 
 
 The demoralization at Savage Station was great; every 
 thing was in confusion; nearly three thousand sick and 
 wounded men were in tents and under any shelter that 
 could be found, and all sorts of rumors of the approach 
 of the enemy tended to demoralize the men. Upon their 
 arrival the Reserves at once sought out and ministered to 
 the wants of their comrades as far as they were able to do. 
 The wounded and sick were to be left behind, and when 
 this became known it occasioned a feeling that moved 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 433 
 
 the stoutest heart. McCall had crossed the swamp with 
 the artillery train, and had formed his division in line 
 of battle, when he was relieved from his escort duty and 
 ordered forward on the Quaker road toward the James 
 River. The division moved with its corps. When on 
 the march some confusion and delay took place in regard 
 to the exact location of the Quaker road. The whole 
 command was countermarched, except the Reserve divis 
 ion, to whom Porter, in command of the corps, sent no 
 instructions, leaving the division in front and in sight 
 of the enemy. His explanation was that he did not con 
 sider the division then under his command. The enemy 
 had now discovered McClellan s intention to change his 
 base, and resolved to go in pursuit. The army was 
 formed in line of battle, and Sumner with the rearguard 
 held Savage Station, the point of honor, and nobly re 
 pulsed a determined attack of the enemy. 
 
 Porter with his corps, including the Reserves, was in 
 line of battle, with the remainder of the army across the 
 roads and facing Richmond. The position originally 
 taken by McCall was at the crossing of the Quaker road 
 and the New Market road. Ordered back from this posi 
 tion, McCall received orders from McClellan himself to 
 form his division on the New Market road, and to hold 
 that position until our trains had passed on toward the 
 James River. There was no continuous line of battle. 
 The divisions were disjointed and McCall held the centre. 
 He had formed his division with his usual ability. Meade 
 with the Second brigade was on his right; Seymour on 
 the left; Simmons with the First brigade in reserve, and 
 his batteries were strongly posted. The Confederates 
 had determined to seize the point where the Charles City 
 and New Market roads crossed each other, and thus place 
 themselves on our Hue of retreat. This movement, if 
 
 successful, would have divided McClellan s army. Hill s 
 28 
 
434 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Confederate division, that had been repulsed by the 
 Reserves at Mechanicsville, was again to attack, and 
 McCall s division of Pennsylvania Reserves was again 
 to meet it. 
 
 At half-past two o clock the battle began by the driv 
 ing in of our skirmishers. The enemy threw forward 
 two regiments to feel McCall s line. Colonel Sickel with 
 the Third and Colonel Harvey with the Seventh drove 
 them back, when the enemy moved a large column upon 
 our left flank and made a determined assault with his 
 artillery and infantry. For two long hours the battle 
 raged fiercely. The brave Simmons fell and the enemy 
 was driven back. Our batteries, under Kern and Cooper, 
 were well served, and a reckless and desperate charge 
 made upon Randall s guns was bravely repulsed, the 
 enemy coming up to the muzzles of the guns. Our men 
 crossed bayonets with the Alabama troops, and a hand- 
 to-hand fight occurred, a rare thing at any time in war. 
 But there were no supports; every man had been put in; 
 our lines were broken and could not re-form, and fell 
 back in disorder. At once McCall began to re-form his 
 line, to get his scattered men together, and to present 
 again his front to the enemy. But all was changed: his 
 brigade commanders had gone; his staff had all been dis 
 abled or killed, and even his personal escort wounded or 
 dispersed, and he himself exhausted. While riding for 
 ward, unaccompanied by any of his staff, to look for one 
 of his officers, he was captured. 
 
 At no previous battle had there been so many instances 
 of hand-to-hand fighting, no such display of personal 
 courage. Well might the enemy regard this battle as 
 one of the most stubborn and long-contested that had 
 yet occurred, and say, as Longstreet did, that if McCall s 
 division had not fought as it did they would have cap 
 tured our army. The Reserves had met the divisions of 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 435 
 
 Longstreet and A. P. Hill, among the best of the Con 
 federate troops, and from eighteen to twenty thousand 
 strong. The conduct of the Reserve division, as its 
 commander said, was worthy of all praise. It had 
 added to its laurels by as devoted and valiant a service 
 as had ever been rendered by any troops. Meade had 
 been wounded, but remained for a while, when he finally 
 left the field. Seymour became separated from his com 
 mand, and retired. In his official report the division 
 commander thanks Colonels Roberts, Sickel, Hays, Jack 
 son, and others. Three stands of colors, with two hun 
 dred prisoners, were captured, while the loss of the di 
 vision in the three battles of the 26th, 27th, and 3oth of 
 June amounted to 3180; the killed and wounded amounted 
 to 650 out of the 7000 who went into battle at Mechanics- 
 ville on the 26th of June. 
 
 The Reserve commander and Reynolds being now pris 
 oners in the hands of the enemy, and Meade wounded, 
 the command of the division devolved upon Seymour 
 temporarily as the senior. Porter with the Fifth corps 
 reached Malvern Hill only on the 3oth of June, and took 
 position to cover the passage of our trains and reserve 
 artillery to the river behind Malvern Hill. 
 
 Lee, failing to break our centre on the New Market 
 road, now determined to turn our left flank at Malvern 
 Hill. _A strong line was formed by our troops, and in 
 front of it the enemy appeared on the morning of the ist 
 of July. Porter s corps held the left of the line. The 
 Pennsylvania Reserve division was held in reserve be 
 hind Porter and Couch. In the attacks upon these com 
 mands the Reserves were not engaged. At the conclusion 
 of the fight McClellan withdrew his army to Harrison s 
 Landing, which had been previously determined upon, 
 but which was received with regret by both officers and 
 men. 
 
43 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 The condition of the Reserves was not an encouraging 
 one. Reduced in numbers, many sick, their officers 
 gone, the severe service imposed upon them had affected 
 their well-being and touched their morale. They were 
 broken down, and their losses in men and officers had 
 affected them; many were sent to hospitals only to die; 
 many never again returned to their commands. But 
 there was no giving up. Early in August, McCall, Rey 
 nolds, and the prisoners captured in the previous fights 
 were exchanged and returned to the army. McCall s re 
 turn was warmly welcomed by the division, but he too, 
 broken down in health, was obliged to seek relief at his 
 home. Failing to regain his strength, he resigned his 
 commission, when Reynolds assumed command of the 
 division, and was welcomed by the men with every ex 
 pression of gratification and joy. 
 
 The government had now determined upon a new plan 
 of operations. The Peninsula campaign had failed; a 
 junction of the corps of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell 
 had taken place, and Major-General Pope placed in com 
 mand. While Pope protected Washington and made 
 demonstrations toward Gordonsville, the Army of the 
 Potomac was to be withdrawn from Harrison s Landing 
 and to join him. The Confederates soon learned what 
 was contemplated, and by the iSth their united forces 
 were in Pope s front. An order to McClellan required 
 him to withdraw his army to the Potomac. There 
 was unaccountable delay. The Pennsylvania Reserves 
 took the advance on the nth of August, and by the 
 1 5th were en route to join Burnside. They were pushed 
 forward with the greatest promptness, and on the 25th 
 joined Pope s forces at Warrenton Junction, to resume 
 their old position as a division of McDowell s corps. 
 With Kearney s division they were the only organized 
 troops that joined Pope until the 26th of August 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 437 
 
 Pope was now on the Rapidan, but the concentration 
 and force of the enemy on the south bank, the failure to 
 receive reinforcements again and again demanded, both 
 flanks exposed, and his communications with Fredericks- 
 burg threatened by which his relief was to arrive, com 
 pelled him to fall back to the Rappahannock. Lee fol 
 lowed with his army, and extended his line far beyond 
 Pope s right. There was now constant fighting and skir 
 mishing, and Pope s position again became untenable. 
 The enemy was crossing to his left, when the river rose 
 in floods and became an impassable barrier. Reynolds 
 had now joined Pope, who fell back to Warrenton Junc 
 tion and Manassas. Pope believed that he had thrown 
 his force between Jackson and Longstreet, and he deter 
 mined at once to force the fighting on the 28th and to 
 attack Jackson. Reynolds, without waiting for formal 
 orders from his chief, formed on Sigel s left, and on the 
 march to Manassas came under the enemy s fire, which 
 he repulsed with his artillery. 
 
 The Reserves, in connection with McDowell s other 
 divisions and with Sigel, had succeeded in getting be 
 tween Jackson and Thoroughfare Gap, and on the 29th 
 Reynolds with his division was at once engaged with the 
 enemy all day. On the morning of the 3oth, Reynolds 
 posted his division with all of his artillery on the left. 
 Pushing forward his skirmishers and their support, he 
 found a large force of the enemy ready for attack. He 
 was ordered to resist this attack, and other troops were 
 to support him. Porter s corps had been repulsed, and 
 the Reserves were to form a line behind which it could 
 rally. Heintzelman s corps was in retreat amid much 
 confusion, leaving but one brigade of the Reserves under 
 Anderson, with its batteries, to resist the attack. Here 
 the command suffered great loss. Kern lost four of his 
 guns; he himself was wounded and left on the field. 
 
LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Colonel Hardin of the Twelfth was severely wounded. 
 The command now fell back by order to the right of the 
 Henry House, where Meade s and Seymour s brigades, 
 with Ransom s batteries, "gallantly maintained their 
 position." It was in this battle, when our left was forced 
 back and the troops on the right of the Reserves had 
 given way, that the brave Reynolds, seizing the flagstaff 
 of the Second regiment, dashed along his line, cheering 
 on his men with magnetic effect. The bridge over Bull 
 Run was saved to the army. 
 
 Thus ended another battle most creditable to the 
 Reserves, wholly sustaining their reputation. Well 
 might the army commander say in his official report: 
 "The Pennsylvania Reserves under Reynolds . . . 
 rendered most gallant and efficient sendee." In this 
 campaign they lost 4 officers and 64 privates killed, 
 31 officers and 364 privates wounded, which makes an 
 aggregate loss of 463 men. 
 
 The army had hardly become reunited in the defences 
 of Washington when the Confederates crossed the Poto 
 mac in force and marched tow r ard Maryland. The Army 
 of the Potomac at once took the field. The Pennsylvania 
 Reserves were now a division in the First army corps, 
 commanded by Hooker. Meantime the Governor of 
 Pennsylvania had called out 75,000 of the militia, and 
 Reynolds had been relieved of his command of the Re 
 serves and ordered to Harrisburg to assist the Governor. 
 General Meade now took command of the division, and 
 on the 1 3th of September they crossed the Monocacy. 
 The enemy, pushing northward, had taken position on 
 South Mountain. McClellan at once made his disposi 
 tions to attack him, and if possible to throw Franklin 
 with the Sixth corps and Couch s division between 
 the main body of the enemy and Jackson at Harper s 
 Ferry. Franklin forced the enemy to take position on 
 
PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 439 
 
 the top of South Mountain, where he strongly posted 
 himself at Turner s Gap. Burnside reported the fact 
 to McClellan, when the whole army was ordered to 
 move to the attack. 
 
 At one o clock the Reserves were in position on our 
 right, with orders to create a diversion in favor of Reno, 
 who was pressed on our left by the enemy. They were 
 to advance and turn the enemy s flank. Seymour s bri 
 gade, under Meade s order, took the crest of the first 
 ridge, and, forming line of battle with the other bri 
 gades, advanced upon the enemy, the Bucktails leading. 
 The enemy was engaged, and after determined fighting 
 was driven from the walls and rocks and thick under 
 growth. Reinforcements came up, but too late to open 
 fire, when the enemy, who was not in large force, retired 
 amid the loud shouts of our men. 
 
 The Reserves lost in this battle an aggregate of 392 
 officers and men. In his official report Meade states his 
 indebtedness to the Bucktails, which he says "have al 
 ways been in the advance," for ascertaining the exact 
 position of the enemy. The battle was not renewed in 
 the morning. During the night the enemy had fallen 
 back across the Antietam Creek to Sharpsburg. Push 
 ing through Boonesboro and Keedysville, the enemy 
 was found in force on the Antietam in front of Sharps- 
 burg, and an attack in the morning was determined 
 upon. The enemy had meantime changed his position 
 to one of more strength, and had strongly posted his 
 artillery. 
 
 Hooker with his corps, including the Pennsylvania Re 
 serves, was to cross the Antietam and was to attack the 
 enemy s left; Meade with the Reserves led the advance 
 and opened the battle. The Bucktails soon found the 
 enemy, and Meade at once ordered in Seymour with his 
 brigade and posted his batteries. The engagement be- 
 
44 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 came general, when the remaining brigades were ordered 
 up, and the fight continued until dark, with active artil 
 lery firing from Cooper s and Simpson s batteries. The 
 opposing forces were almost hand to hand. 
 
 At daylight on the ijth the battle was renewed. Fresh 
 troops had come up and the line was strengthened. The 
 Reserves w r ere at once engaged on the left. Cooper and 
 Simpson, on the enemy s left flank, served their batteries 
 actively. Warner with the Tenth Reserves was ordered 
 to join Crawford s division of Mansfield s corps in his 
 attack upon the enemy in the morning. The now noted 
 cornfield was carried, then lost, again reoccupied with 
 cheers, when their ammunition became exhausted, and 
 the enemy, reinforced, pressed them again back and 
 came on in heavy force; again the enemy was driven 
 back, and not an inch of ground was lost. 
 
 The struggle was for the possession of the cornfield. 
 Hooker with part of Mansfield s corps determined to take 
 it. While in the act of initiating the movement he was 
 wounded in the foot, and Meade took command of the 
 corps, while Seymour assumed command of the Reserves. 
 The Reserves were relieved at noon, after having been 
 engaged for five hours and having exhausted their am 
 munition. Mansfield had now come up with all of his 
 corps. 
 
 In his official report Meade gives to Ransom s battery 
 the credit of repulsing the enemy in the cornfield at one 
 of the most critical periods. He highly commends Sey 
 mour for his admirable service. In this battle the Re 
 serves lost 573 men 9 officers and 96 men killed; 22 
 officers and 444 men wounded; and 2 missing. 
 
 Constant fighting and marching had now reduced the 
 strength of the division to little more than a third of 
 its effective strength. It was desired by Governor Curtin 
 that it should be sent back to the State to be reorgan- 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 44 l 
 
 ized and recruited. This was not acceded to, and the 
 work went on in the field; other regiments were added 
 to the Second brigade. Colonel Biddle Roberts, who 
 had done excellent service in every capacity, now re 
 signed to assist Governor Cnrtin, and was placed on his 
 staff. Reynolds upon his return was given the First 
 army corps, while Meade went back to his division. 
 
 The army now rested at Sharpsburg and Harper s 
 Ferry. But the President and authorities became anx 
 ious, and after repeated orders to move, the President, on 
 the 6th of October, directed that McClellan should cross 
 the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him 
 southward " a very positive military order, but in which 
 the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief concurred. 
 At last, on the 26th of October, the army moved. The 
 Reserves under Meade marched with their corps to War- 
 renton, arriving on the 6th of November. Meantime, 
 McClellan was relieved from his command by Burnside 
 unwillingly, and later resigned his position in the army. 
 Seymour had been relieved and sent South. The army 
 was now formed into three grand divisions, and the Re 
 serves were attached to the left grand division, under 
 Franklin. 
 
 In accordance with a plan of campaign of the new 
 general, the army was to march to Fredericksburg by a 
 forced movement, having made a feint toward Gordons- 
 ville. This was ordered, and on the i6th of November 
 the movement commenced. By another blunder the 
 pontoon bridges were not forwarded, and valuable time 
 was lost while others were constructing, and the enemy 
 had strongly occupied Fredericksburg. Finally, the 
 river was crossed and the Reserves were placed on the 
 extreme left of the army, and Meade was designated to 
 lead the charge that was to break through the enemy s 
 Ijne. No description of their heroic service can be better 
 
44 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 than the testimony of General Meade himself: "The 
 attack was for a time perfectly successful. The enemy 
 was driven from the railroad, his rifle-pits, and breast 
 works for over half a mile. Over three hundred pris 
 oners were taken and several standards, when the ad 
 vancing line encountered the heavy reinforcements of 
 the enemy, who, recovering from the effects of our as 
 sault, and perceiving both our flanks unprotected, poured 
 in such a destructive fire from all three directions as to 
 compel the line to fall back, which was executed without 
 confusion;" and he subsequently says that "the best 
 troops would be justified in withdrawing without loss of 
 honor." The list of his losses, which he subsequently 
 corrected, was not less than 14 officers and 161 men 
 killed; 59 officers and 1182 men wounded; 12 officers 
 and 425 men captured or missing. 
 
 It was the old story again of hesitancy and slowness 
 of movement upon the part of the supporting forces at a 
 critical time. No support, all in confusion from their 
 attack, the enemy all around them, their work accom 
 plished, their ammunition gone, broken, destroyed al 
 most, they were driven from the hills to the low grounds, 
 where they re-formed, and had left 176 killed, 1197 
 wounded, and 400 missing. Jackson of the Third bri 
 gade was killed while in command of his men: a most 
 excellent and gallant officer was thus lost to the division. 
 
 No proper account of the battle can fail to mention the 
 service of Captain O Rourke of the First regiment, who 
 had command of the ambulance corps, and a voluntary 
 testimonial to his coolness, energy, and efficiency was 
 tendered to him by the division and brigade surgeons. 
 On Monday the army recrossed the river, having lost ten 
 thousand men. Hooker relieved Burnside. The Reserves 
 were now encamped at Belle Plaine. Meade had mean 
 time been promoted to a major-generalcy, and was as- 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 443 
 
 signed to the command of the Fifth corps, while Colonel 
 Sickel, and subsequently General Doubleday, took tem 
 porary command of the division. 
 
 The effort to withdraw the Reserves from the army to 
 recruit them was again made, and was again unsuccessful. 
 Hooker reorganized the army and prepared for a forward 
 movement. But before this, on the 8th of February, the 
 Reserves under the command of Sickel were ordered to 
 Washington and assigned to stations in the defenses 
 under the command of Heintzelman, and were thus 
 absent from Chancellorsville. They were placed on duty 
 to guard the railroads, and the troops they relieved took 
 their place as the Third division of the First corps of the 
 Army of the Potomac. Finally, they were withdrawn 
 from the railroad and assigned to duty at Upton Hill, 
 Fairfax Courthouse, and Alexandria. Strong recom 
 mendations for their withdrawal to rest and recruit were 
 again made to the authorities. Meade, just before his 
 relief from their command, had made a strong represen 
 tation to Franklin, and Colonel Sickel had made a sim 
 ilar statement to Governor Curtin; but the Secretary of 
 War did not see his way to consent, as similar applica 
 tions had been made by other States, and all could not 
 be granted. Everything was now done to recall the ab 
 sentees, those who had recovered from wounds and sick 
 ness, and to recruit and refit the command. Brigadier- 
 General S. W. Crawford, an officer of the regular army 
 and a Pennsylvania!! by birth, who had served at Fort 
 Sumter, who had commanded a brigade and division 
 after Cedar Mountain, and who had been severely 
 wounded at Antietam, although not yet wholly recov 
 ered from his wounds, was in Washington, and upon the 
 request of Governor Curtin, Senator Cameron, and my 
 self was placed in command of the division on the 3d of 
 June, and made his headquarters at Upton Hill, with the 
 
444 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 First brigade under McCandless. Here the division 
 rested through the month of June, preparing for further 
 service. 
 
 Meantime, elated with his success at Chancellorsville, 
 the enemy under his ablest general had crossed the 
 Rapidan and was moving northward. As soon as the 
 movement was known Hooker promptly crossed the Po 
 tomac at Edwards Ferry and the Point of Rocks on the 
 24th of June, and moved upon Frederick City, where he 
 got his army together. As soon as it was known among 
 the Reserves that the enemy w r as moving in the direction 
 of their State some of the regiments at once asked for 
 orders to accompany the Army of the Potomac into 
 Maryland. Crawford earnestly and repeatedly urged, 
 both by letter and in person, upon the government and 
 upon the Governor of the State the necessity that the 
 Reserves should be ordered to join the army. On the 
 2Oth of June he went at night to Hooker s headquarters, 
 a considerable distance off, and in person induced him to 
 ask for the division. This was successful, and at once, 
 upon the receipt of the order, Crawford moved his com 
 mand on the 25th of June toward Leesburg, crossing the 
 Potomac at Edwards Ferry to the Monocacy, leaving his 
 camp and garrison equipment and his trains to follow 
 him. 
 
 Early on the 28th the division reached Fredericksburg. 
 Meantime, Hooker had been relieved and Meade assigned 
 to the command of the army. This caused the greatest 
 joy and satisfaction to the Reserves, who loved the gen 
 eral who had shared all of their dangers and successes 
 with them. At Fredericksburg, Crawford reported at 
 first to General Meade, w r ho expressed his gratification 
 at the return of his old division, which again became the 
 Third division of the Fifth corps, under General Sykes. 
 The division joined the corps on Rock Creek in the rear 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 445 
 
 of our right, after a severe night-march to Hanover and 
 Bonnoughtown, and prepared at once for the coming 
 struggle. As it crossed the boundary-line of Maryland 
 at Silver Springs its commander addressed it in a few 
 stirring words of congratulation and encouragement. 
 At three o clock the corps moved to take its positions 
 on our left. The Reserves arrived upon the field so 
 promptly as to elicit the commendation of the corps 
 commander. 
 
 After some contradictory orders, made necessary by the 
 enemy s movements, the Reserves were drawn up in line 
 of battle on the slopes and near the crest of the Little 
 Round Top, on the edge of the woods and undergrowth. 
 Fisher s brigade had been sent to Big Round Top to sup 
 port Vincent, when Crawford retained the Eleventh regi 
 ment under Jackson, attached it to McCandless s brigade, 
 and took personal command. Seeing the advance of the 
 enemy over the wheatfield and his approach to the Round 
 Top, the retreat and confusion of our troops, and the fall 
 ing back of the Second division of Ayres s regulars, 
 Crawford, who had been left to act in accordance with 
 his own judgment, rode forward and ordered the com 
 mand to advance. The line moved at once, after open 
 ing fire; the Bucktails and the Sixth regiment, being in 
 the rear of each flank, were subsequently deployed, and 
 the line moved forward. Seizing the colors of the First 
 regiment, near which he was, Crawford took them upon 
 his horse and led on his men. The enemy was ad 
 vancing irregularly, and had crossed the stone wall on 
 the side of the wheatfield, when he was met by the 
 Reserves and driven back to the stone wall, for the pos 
 session of which there was a short and active struggle, 
 when he was driven across the wheatfield and made 
 no further attempt at any advance. 
 
 On the left, Colonel Taylor of the Bucktails was killed 
 
44 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 while leading his regiment. The line of the stone wall 
 was firmly held by the Reserves until the afternoon of 
 the next day, after Pickett s charge, when Crawford, in 
 carrying out the direct orders of General Meade, who 
 with other general officers was present, directed an ad 
 vance. During the night the enemy had established 
 himself in the woods opposite the Round Tops. Ander 
 son s brigade of Hood s division lay in line, his left flank 
 resting on the wheatfield, while Benning s brigade was 
 in the rear in support. The presence of these troops was 
 unknown to Meade or to Sykes. Craw r ford in person di 
 rected McCandless s movements. The command moved 
 steadily, but in a wrong direction, when orders were sent 
 to McCandless to halt, change front, and move toward 
 the Round Top. When he entered the woods, striking 
 the flanks of Anderson s brigade, which was behind tem 
 porary breastworks, that brigade gave way, involving 
 Benning s brigade in its flight, and retiring to a dis 
 tance of a mile, where it strongly entrenched itself 
 along the general line of the army. 
 
 It was the last of the fighting upon the field of Gettys 
 burg, and done by Pennsylvania troops, as the battle had 
 been opened by the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania regiment 
 on the right. Had the force of the enemy been known, 
 it were foolhardy to send such a force unsupported under 
 such circumstances. Meade himself declared that there 
 was no force in the woods but sharpshooters and stragglers 
 only. The result was the capture of over two hundred 
 prisoners, the battle-flag of the Fifteenth Georgia regi 
 ment, and the retaking of a great portion of the ground 
 lost the previous day by our troops, and the recovery of 
 one gun, two caissons, and over seven thousand stand of 
 arms. Our picket-line was largely advanced. 
 
 And thus ended the battle of Gettysburg, the Pennsyl 
 vania Reserves adding largely to their well-earned repu- 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 447 
 
 tation upon the soil of their own State. Their losses 
 were between two hundred and three hundred men. The 
 enemy maintained his front until Sunday night, when he 
 fell back to the Potomac and strongly entrenched at Fall 
 ing Waters in Virginia. The army followed, and on 
 the 1 4th a reconnaissance was made by three selected 
 divisions of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps, under 
 Caldwell, Crawford with his Reserves, and Wright. The 
 enemy had retreated. The Reserves alone followed to 
 the river with the cavalry. The army soon after re- 
 crossed the Potomac and advanced into Virginia, ma 
 noeuvring and skirmishing for position, while detach 
 ments were sent to various points of importance. 
 
 While on the Rappahannock, on the 28th of August, 
 advantage was taken of a moment of inaction to present 
 to General Meade, upon the part of the officers and men 
 of the division, a costly sword of the finest workmanship, 
 with sash and belt and a pair of golden spurs. A large 
 number of distinguished people had been assembled. 
 General Crawford in a few appropriate and stirring 
 words made the presentation. General Meade replied, 
 referring touchingly to his association with the division, 
 justifying its action at New Market road, and regard 
 ing its service generally said "that no division in this 
 glorious army is entitled to claim more credit for its uni 
 form gallant conduct and for the amount of hard fighting 
 it has gone through than the division of the Pennsylva 
 nia Reserve Corps." 
 
 Finally, the enemy determined upon a forward move 
 ment, apparently to seize the line of the Rapidan. He 
 occupied Culpepper and its vicinity in great force. It 
 was the middle of October when Meade concluded that 
 the enemy s intention was to seize the heights of Centre- 
 ville. By a rapid movement Meade succeeded in seizing 
 the strong position at Bull Run, where on the I4th the 
 
44$ LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Fifth corps under Warren came up with the Confederates 
 under Heth at Bristoe Station and engaged the enemy, 
 when the Pennsylvania Reserves fell upon the left flank 
 of the enemy and completely routed him, capturing 
 some pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners. 
 Lee then fell back to the Rapidan, extending to Bart- 
 lett s Mills on Mine Run. Meade then commenced his 
 movement to attack Lee s scattered forces. This Lee 
 anticipated, and concentrated on Mine Run, which he 
 strongly fortified. Meade determined to attack, and sent 
 Warren with a strong force to feel the enemy s line and 
 flanks. Warren had 24,000 men under his command. 
 All was in readiness, and on the 3oth the batteries opened 
 upon the whole line. But Warren, finding the enemy 
 more strongly posted than he had anticipated, took the 
 responsibility of suspending his movements until further 
 orders. The attack was not made, and Meade again fell 
 back across the Rapidan. 
 
 In these operations the Reserves had been sent in sup 
 port of Gregg s cavalry, and were ordered to attack the 
 position which had proved too strong for our cavalry. 
 The Sixth regiment, under Ent, rapidly advanced, driv 
 ing in the skirmishers, when the enemy retired a work 
 that elicited the approval of Sykes, not at all partial to 
 the division. On the 3d they had moved to the right 
 into the woods with the large body of infantry under 
 Sedgwick, anticipating the storming of the enemy s 
 works. It was intensely cold, and many perished then 
 and from the subsequent effects. Finally, they fell back 
 with the army to Bristoe Station and Manassas, where 
 they guarded the Orange and Alexandria Railroad until 
 the end of April, 1864. 
 
 Grant, who had on the 22d of March been appointed 
 General-in-Chief of all the armies, made his headquar 
 ters with the Army of the Potomac. The army was 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 449 
 
 again to move, and the Reserves now entered upon their 
 last campaign. Sykes had been relieved and Warren 
 placed in permanent command of the Fifth corps. On 
 the 3d of May the army crossed the Rapidan, the Re 
 serves crossing at Germania Ford, and they moved out 
 to the old Wilderness Tavern on the 4th. On this day 
 the Ninth regiment was relieved, as it had completed its 
 term of service, and it was ordered home. Warren moved 
 out toward Parker s Store, with Hancock on his left and 
 Sedgwick on his right. The enemy moved promptly, 
 and Longstreet was ordered to attack at the Wilderness 
 Tavern, and fell heavily on Warren s corps. Griffith 
 successfully resisted the attack, and was supported by 
 some of Crawford s division of the Reserves, and also by 
 the divisions of Wadsworth and Robinson. 
 
 The Reserve division had been ordered to Parker s 
 Store on the plank road. Upon advancing the enemy 
 was found in force. It was when the regiments under 
 McCandless were supporting Wadsworth that a gap had 
 been opened between the Reserves and the other divis 
 ions: the enemy pushed into this gap and nearly sur 
 rounded the Reserves, which were extricated with dif 
 ficulty, McCandless coming in with only two of his 
 regiments and losing many of his men. Colonel Bol- 
 linger with the Seventh regiment, pressing too far to the 
 front, was surrounded by the enemy; he was wounded 
 and captured with a large portion of his regiment. The 
 battle raged with varying success. Warren advanced his 
 division in the centre, with the Reserves on his right, 
 with some losses. The attack upon the right of the 
 Sixth corps had driven Shaler s and Seymour s brigades, 
 and, the enemy getting into the rear, Sedgwick was cut 
 off. At this juncture the Reserves were ordered to the 
 support of Sedgwick. The country was most difficult 
 
 of passage, but the men pushed on and found Sedgwick, 
 29 
 
45 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 who had meantime restored his line, when the Reserves 
 returned to their former position at Lacy Farm. The 
 army again was in motion to the left, the fight of Gregg 
 and Curtis at Todd s Tavern having opened the way 
 to Spottsylvania. Warren s corps, with the Reserves in 
 front, marched all night. The great effort now making 
 was to secure the heights of Spottsylvania, which were 
 gained by the enemy. 
 
 Meantime all of the divisions of the Fifth corps had 
 come up, and the enemy had concentrated his forces to 
 attack them. The Reserves and Coulter with Wads- 
 worth s division were ordered to attack, which resulted 
 in driving the enemy upon his second line of entrench 
 ments. McCandless, commanding the First brigade, was 
 wounded and left the field. After a short respite the 
 Reserves were again ordered to form in two lines under 
 Tally, and a determined assault on the enemy s lines was 
 again made three times, but without success. Again and 
 again the assault was renewed at different portions of the 
 line and with varied success day after day. The enemy 
 had been driven from the Wilderness, his right flank 
 turned, and Spottsylvania relinquished. Meade on the 
 1 3th issued a complimentary order to his army, and an 
 nounced the enemy s loss to be 18 guns, 22 stands of 
 colors, and 8000 prisoners. 
 
 Again a movement to the left was made, and again the 
 enemy was encountered, and assaults, again and again 
 repeated, were made, fighting along the whole line often 
 for days at a time. The enemy, losing a position, would 
 make desperate efforts to retake it; and " so terrific," says 
 a writer, "was the death-grapple that at different times 
 of the day the rebel colors were planted on one side of the 
 works and ours on the other." On the I4th the Fifth 
 corps changed its position, and the Reserves became 
 again the extreme right of the army. Again marched 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 451 
 
 to the left, they were constantly engaged, until the rains 
 and impassable roads gave the army a temporary respite. 
 
 On Thursday, May i9th, an attempt was made to turn 
 our left. Tyler s heavy artillery regiments were the only 
 troops at the point threatened. They were new and had 
 just arrived from Washington, but they behaved gal 
 lantly and repulsed the enemy, when Crawford with his 
 Reserves was sent to their support and to take com 
 mand. They moved at once, but the enemy had rapidly 
 retreated. Spottsylvania was now to be abandoned, and 
 once more a flank movement to the left decided upon. 
 On the 22d the Fifth corps marched toward Bowling 
 Green, Crawford s division in advance. On Monday, the 
 23d, the Fifth corps removed to the North Anna. The 
 enemy had fortified his position on both flanks. Griffin s 
 division had crossed, and the Reserves were formed on 
 his left. The enemy assaulted the lines, but were re 
 pulsed. Warren had taken a strong position. On Tues 
 day the Reserves were ordered to advance to support 
 Hancock. Early on Tuesday, General Warren had or 
 dered Crawford to send a small detachment along the 
 river-bank to open communication with Hancock s 
 troops. This detachment was finally supported by an 
 other regiment under Colonel Stewart. It was a hazard 
 ous movement. Crawford had asked to move with his 
 division. The enemy was in force, and had wellnigh 
 cut off the regiment sent in advance, when Warren, see 
 ing that his orders had isolated the regiment, directed 
 Crawford to move to its position. Crittenden s division 
 of Hancock s corps had not crossed, and seemed to have 
 gone astray, when Crawford and his Reserves opened 
 communications, and Crittenden crossed, followed shortly 
 by the rest of his corps, to a firm position on the south 
 bank. 
 
 Finding the enemy s position too strong for attack, 
 
452 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Grant on Thursday recrossed the North Anna. The 
 Reserves moved with their corps in advance, crossed the 
 Pamunkey at Hanover, advanced on the Mechanicsville 
 road, and entrenched. By night the whole army had 
 concentrated, when the enemy took tip a new line to 
 oppose the advance. On the 3oth of May the Fifth 
 corps crossed the Tolopotamy. The Reserves moved 
 forward on the Mechanicsville road to connect with 
 Griffin, who, finding himself a mile north of the ene 
 my s outposts, determined to seize the road by a vigorous 
 movement, and advanced upon Mechanicsville. The 
 Bucktails in their advance drove back the enemy s cav 
 alry to Bethesda Church. Hardin s brigade was ad 
 vanced, but exposed his flank, when Crawford ordered 
 Kitchen s brigade of heavy artillery to support him. 
 Together these brigades drove back the enemy s right 
 wing and centre. Fisher with the Third brigade was 
 now ordered up to defend the right, and the whole divis 
 ion was posted on strong and irregular ground and light 
 defenses were thrown up hastily. Two pieces of Rich 
 ardson s batteries were placed in position on Hardin s 
 left and two on his right. 
 
 Crawford had hardly made his dispositions when the 
 enemy opened with his artillery, and soon after his in 
 fantry advanced, and the whole line engaged. In this 
 attack on the Fifth corps Crawford with the Reserves 
 was on the left. On came the enemy with his assaulting 
 column, opening with artillery and infantry fire. Three 
 times the attack was renewed, and as often repulsed. 
 The men, now veterans, reserved their fire until the 
 enemy s lines were close to them, and thus secured the 
 result. The enemy was driven back with loss. The 
 Reserves then advanced, captured seventy prisoners, and 
 compelled the retreat of the enemy in confusion; a col 
 onel, five commissioned officers, and three hundred pri- 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS, 453 
 
 vates were left upon the field. The Richmond papers, 
 in commenting upon this affair, pronounced it u sad and 
 distressing. 
 
 This brilliant success of the Pennsylvania Reserves 
 marked the close of their service. They had fought a 
 successful battle when within a few hours they were to 
 be free. All around them were souvenirs of their early 
 and devoted service, Beaver Dam Creek and Mechanics- 
 ville, and now the whole was crowned by a brilliant suc 
 cess due alone to them and to their officers. On the 
 3ist of May the Reserves were relieved from all further 
 service with the army.. Taking farewell of Warren, they 
 crossed the Tolopotamy, and soon after, on June ist, de 
 parted with the remnant of that brave and devoted body 
 of men who had been the first to offer themselves to the 
 government. But even now they were not all to return. 
 Nearly two thousand men re-enlisted to follow the for 
 tunes of the army. About twelve hundred officers and 
 men were all that returned to the State. The two thou 
 sand that were veteranized were organized into two regi 
 ments, the One-Hundred-and-Ninetieth and One-Hun- 
 dred-and-Ninety-first, by General Crawford at Peebles 
 Farm, and remained in service till the end of the war. 
 Before their march their general issued the following 
 farewell to the faithful men who had so nobly borne 
 themselves under his command: 
 
 Soldiers of the Pennsylvania Reserves: To-day the connection 
 which has so long existed between us is to be severed for ever. 
 
 I have no power to express to you the feelings of gratitude and 
 affection that I bear to you, nor the deep regret with which I now 
 part from you. 
 
 As a division you have ever been faithful and devoted soldiers, 
 and you have nobly sustained me in the many trying scenes 
 through which we have passed with an unwavering fidelity. 
 The record of your service terminates gloriously, and "the Wil 
 derness," " Spottsylvania Courthouse," and " Bethesda Church" 
 
454 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 have been added to the long list of battles and of triumphs that 
 have marked your career. 
 
 Go home to the great State that sent you forth three j-ears ago 
 to battle for her honor and to strike for her in the great cause of 
 the country; take back your soiled and war-worn banners, your 
 thin and shattered ranks, and let them lell how you have per 
 formed your trust. Take back those banners, sacred from the 
 glorious associations that surround them, sacred with the mem 
 ories of our fallen comrades who gave their lives to defend them, 
 and give them again into the keeping of the State for ever. 
 
 The duties of the hour prevent me from accompanying you, 
 but my heart will follow you long after you return, and it shall 
 ever be my pride that I was once your commander, and that side 
 by side we fought and suffered through campaigns which will 
 stand unexampled in history. Farewell! 
 
 Upon their return to the capital of their State they 
 were received by the civil and military authorities and 
 the people with a welcome and a demonstration wholly 
 unprecedented. Nothing was omitted to show them the 
 loving appreciation in which they were held, how warmly 
 their services had been appreciated, and of the affection 
 in which they must ever be cherished, and the State 
 pride that was to continue to follow them ; and all this 
 was renewed at their homes. After a short rest many 
 of the officers and men returned to the army in various 
 regiments and batteries, and remained until the end of 
 the war. 
 
 The Second brigade had been divided at Alexandria, 
 and two of the regiments had been ordered to West Vir 
 ginia, where they served creditably in all the relations 
 they were called upon to fulfill under General Crook. 
 Their term of service having expired in June, they were 
 in turn transferred to their State to be mustered out of 
 service. An effort was made to preserve the organiza 
 tion, but failed, as the authorities at Washington could 
 only act for all regiments and organizations. Before 
 separating at Harrisburg the Reserves sent for their old 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE CORPS. 455 
 
 commander, McCall, and abundantly testified to him 
 their enduring confidence and affection. 
 
 And thus passed into history the record of one of the 
 most extraordinary bodies of men that had ever assem 
 bled for any single purpose. I have from time to time 
 alluded to the peculiar conditions, the peculiar associa 
 tions and characteristics, and their constant and heroic 
 source. It is not now intended to enlarge upon this. To 
 no other body of troops was it given to secure so entirely 
 distinct a reputation that will go into history. Whatever 
 credit may arise to them as a simple division, they will 
 be known as the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, as under 
 that appellation they achieved their fame. To this title 
 they ever adhered with a tenacity that assured it. Give 
 them that, and you might add the name of any body to 
 the division, and, although in accordance with orders, 
 they were called by the name of the general command 
 ing them, they ever retained among themselves their 
 favorite title of Pennsylvania Reserves. 
 
 And what a peculiar soldiery they became! For all 
 purposes of drills and discipline and in preparation for 
 battle they ever gave the readiest acquiescence and obe 
 dience; but to all the special detail that went to make 
 up the technical soldier they never would and never did 
 yield until the last. They believed that they were ever 
 cit zens in arms for the nation s life, and they never lost 
 sight of their coming return to their homes and the pur 
 suits of peace. As to their service, it makes but little 
 difference as to the necessity of their employment: the 
 fact remains that they were constantly called upon for 
 every variety of service, thrown into critical positions 
 without hesitancy, and their services but poorly acknow 
 ledged. There was no murmur or complaint; they ac 
 cepted every detail of the service required of them from 
 Dranesville to Bethesda Church, and how they performed 
 
456 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 it let the official reports of their commanders and the sad 
 lists of their losses attest. 
 
 It is not pretended that in this imperfect sketch any 
 thing like justice has been done to the living or the dead. 
 Most is merely reference; honored names that will be re 
 membered in history have not been mentioned, and many 
 instances of personal valor unrecorded. If, however, the 
 memory of their deeds has been recalled at all, and has 
 again awakened a feeling of appreciation and gratitude 
 upon the part of their fellows, with praise for those who 
 yet survive and an affectionate memory for the self-sacri 
 ficing dead, then my object will not have been wholly 
 lost in recalling the memory of their conspicuous service 
 to the minds of a new generation. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 THE NICOLAY-McCLURE CONTROVERSY. 
 
 LINCOLN AND HAMLIN. 
 [Trom The Philadelphia Times, July 6, 1891.] 
 
 THE death of Hannibal Hamlin, one of the few lingering pict 
 uresque characters of the political revolution that conquered 
 armed rebellion and effaced slavery, has inspired very free dis 
 cussion of the early conflicts of Republicanism and of the rela 
 tions which existed between Lincoln and Hamlin. Hamlin was 
 one of the central figures of the first national Republican battle 
 in 1856; he was the first elected Republican Vice-President; his 
 personal relations with President Lincoln were admittedly of the 
 most agreeable nature; his public record while Vice-President 
 had given no offense to any element of his party; and his then 
 unexpected and now apparently unexplainable defeat for renomi- 
 nation with Lincoln in 1864 has elicited much conflicting dis 
 cussion. 
 
 Looking back over the dark days of civil war, with their often 
 sudden and imperious necessities in field and forum, and in po 
 litical directions as well, it is often difficult to explain results in 
 accord with the sunnier light of the present; and as yet we have 
 seen no explanation of the rejection of Vice-President Hamlin 
 in 1864 that presents the truth. Most of our contemporaries 
 which have discussed the question have assumed that the defeat 
 of Hamlin was accomplished against the wishes of Lincoln. This 
 point is taken up in the elaborate Life of Lincoln by Nicolay and 
 Hay, and they assume to settle it by stating that Mr. Lincoln 
 was accused by members of the Baltimore Convention of prefer 
 ring a Southern or a new man for Vice-President, and Mr. Nicolay 
 communicated with Lincoln on the subject and reported a denial 
 of Lincoln s purpose to interfere in the contest. 
 
 457 
 
45 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR -TIMES. 
 
 The Evening Telegraph of this city, usually accurate in the 
 presentation of political history, states that "it was not the 
 President s (Lincoln s) doings that his trusted and cherished 
 coadjutor was deposed; it was a piece of politics, pure and sim 
 ple; a mistaken attempt to placate Southern feeling before the 
 time was ripe for it." In the same article it is assumed that " if 
 Mr. Hamlin had been renominated President Lincoln would 
 have lived through his second term," and the motive for Lin 
 coln s assassination is ascribed to " the fact that a Soiithern man 
 was to succeed as a result of his (Booth s) murderous deed." The 
 theory that Lincoln was murdered to bring a Southern man to 
 the Presidency is clearly refuted by the well-known historical 
 fact that of all men North or South no one was at that time more 
 execrated in the South than Andrew Johnson. 
 
 It is true that Hamlin, an entirely unobjectionable Vice-Presi- 
 dent and a leader with peculiar claims upon the Republican 
 party, was rejected as Vice-President by the Republican Conven 
 tion of 1864 to place a Southern man in that office, and it is 
 equally true that it w r ould not and could not have been done had 
 President Lincoln opposed it. So far from opposing it, Lincoln 
 discreetly favored it; indeed, earnestly desired it. The writer 
 hereof was a delegate at large from Pennsylvania in the Balti 
 more Convention of 1864, and in response to an invitation from 
 the President to visit Washington on the eve of the meeting of 
 the body, a conference was had in which Lincoln gravely urged 
 the nomination of Johnson for Vice-President. It \vas solely in 
 deference to Lincoln s earnest convictions as to the national and 
 international necessities which demanded Johnson s nomination 
 for the Vice-Presidency that the writer s vote was cast against 
 Hamlin, and other Pennsylvania delegates were influenced to the 
 same action by the confidential assurance of Lincoln s wishes. 
 
 It should not be assumed that Lincoln was ambitious to play 
 the role of political master or that he was perfidious to any. His 
 position was not only one of the greatest delicacy in politics, but 
 he was loaded with responsibilities to which all former Presidents 
 had been strangers. His one supreme desire was the restoration 
 of the Union, and he would gladly have surrendered his own 
 high honors, and even his life, could he thereby have restored 
 the dissevered States. The one great shadow that hung over 
 him and his power was the sectional character of the ruling 
 party and the government. It weakened his arm to make peace ; 
 it strengthened European hostility to the cause of the Union; 
 
APPENDIX. 459 
 
 and it left the South without even a silver lining to the dark 
 cloud of subjugation. Lincoln firmly believed that the nomi 
 nation of Johnson, an old Democratic Southern Senator who had 
 been aggressively loyal to the Union, and who was then the Mili 
 tary Governor of his rebellious but restored State, would not only 
 desectionalize the party and the government, but that it would 
 chill and curb the anti-Union sentiment of England and France, 
 and inspire the friends of the Union in those countries to see a 
 leading Southern statesman coming from a conquered insurgent 
 State to the second office of the Republic. 
 
 Such were Lincoln s sincere convictions, and such his earnest 
 arguments in favor of the nomination of Johnson in 1864, and 
 but for Lincoln s convictions on the subject Hamlin would have 
 been renominated and succeeded to the Presidency instead of 
 Johnson. It is easy, in the clear light of the present, to say that 
 the nomination of Johnson was a grave misfortune, and to specu 
 late on the countless evils which could have been averted; but 
 the one man who was most devoted to the endangered nation, 
 and who could best judge of the sober necessities of the time, 
 believed that it was not only wise, but an imperious need, to 
 take a Vice-President from the South, and that is why Hannibal 
 Hamlin was not renominated in 1864. 
 
 MR. NICOLAY S DENIAL. 
 [Telegram given to Associated Press.] 
 
 WASHINGTON, July 7, 1891. 
 MRS. HANNIBAL HAMLIN, Bangor, Me. : 
 
 The editorial statement from The Philadelphia Times, printed 
 in this morning s news dispatches, to the effect that President 
 Lincoln opposed Mr. Hamlin s renomination as Vice-President, 
 is entirely erroneous. Mr. Lincoln s personal feelings, on the 
 contrary, were for Mr. Hamlin s renomination, as he confiden 
 tially expressed to me, but he persistently withheld any opinion 
 calculated to influence the convention for or against any candi 
 date, and I have his written words to that effect, as fully set forth 
 on pages 72 and 73, chapter 3, volume ix. of Abraham Lincoln: 
 A History, by Nicolay and Hay. 
 
 Permit me, in addition, to express my deepest sympathy in 
 yours and the nation s loss through Mr. Hamlin s death. 
 
 JOHN G. NICOLAY. 
 
4^>0 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIM&S. 
 
 THE EXTRACT NICOLAY REFERRED TO. 
 
 [From Nicolay and Hay s Life of Lincoln, vol. ix., pages 72, 73.] 
 The principal names mentioned for the Vice-Presidency were, 
 besides Hannibal Hamlin, the actual incumbent, Andrew John 
 son of Tennessee and Daniel S. Dickinson of New York. Be 
 sides these General L. H. Rousseau had the vote of his own 
 State, Kentucky. The Radicals of Missouri favored General B. 
 F. Butler, who had a few scattered votes also from New England. 
 But among the three principal candidates the voters were equally 
 enough divided to make the contest exceedingly spirited and 
 interesting. 
 
 For several days before the convention the President had been 
 besieged by inquiries as to his personal wishes in regard to his 
 associate on the ticket. He had persistently refused to give the 
 slightest intimation of such wish. His private secretary, Mr. 
 Nicolay, was at Baltimore in attendance at the convention, and 
 although he was acquainted with this attitude of the President, 
 at last, overborne by the solicitations of the chairman of the Illi 
 nois delegation, who had been perplexed at the advocacy of 
 Joseph Holt by Leonard Swett, one of the President s most in 
 timate friends, Mr. Nicolay wrote a letter to Mr. Hay, who had 
 been left in charge of the executive office in his absence, contain 
 ing, among other matters, this passage: "Cook wants to know 
 confidentially whether Swett is all right; whether in urging Holt 
 for Vice-President he reflects the President s wishes; whether the 
 President has any preference, either personal or on the score of 
 policy; or whether he wishes not even to interfere by a confiden 
 tial intimation. . . . Please get this information for me if pos 
 sible." The letter was shown to the President, who indorsed 
 upon it this memorandum: "Swett is unquestionably all right. 
 Mr. Holt is a good man, but I had not heard or thought of him 
 for V.-P. Wish not to interfere about V.-P. Cannot interfere 
 about platform. Convention must judge for itself." 
 
 This positive and final instruction was sent at once to Mr. 
 Nicola}*, and by him communicated to the President s most inti 
 mate friends in the convention. It was, therefore, with minds 
 absolutely untrammeled by even any knowledge of the Presi 
 dent s wishes that the convention went about its work of select 
 ing his associate on the ticket. 
 
APPENDIX. 461 
 
 McCLURE ANSWERS NICOLAY. 
 [From The Philadelphia Times, July 9, 1891.] 
 
 The ignorance exhibited by John G. Nicolay in his public tele 
 gram to the widow of ex-Vice-President Hamlin is equaled only 
 by his arrogance in assuming to speak for Abraham Lincoln in 
 matters about which Nicolay was never consulted, and of which 
 he had no more knowledge than any other routine clerk about 
 the White House. I do not regret that Mr. Nicolay has rushed 
 into a dispute that must lead to the clear establishment of the 
 exact truth as to the defeat of Hamlin in 1864. It will surely 
 greatly impair, if not destroy, Nicolay s hitherto generally ac 
 cepted claim to accuracy as the biographer of Lincoln, but he 
 can complain of none but himself. 
 
 I saw Abraham Lincoln at all hours of the day and night 
 during his Presidential service, and he has himself abundantly 
 testified to the trust that existed between us. Having had the 
 direction of his battle in the pivotal State of the Union, he 
 doubtless accorded me more credit than I merited, as the only 
 success in politics and war is success; and the fact that I never 
 sought or desired honors or profits from his administration, and 
 never embarrassed him with exactions of any kind, made our 
 relations the most grateful memories of my life. 
 
 In all of the many grave political emergencies arising from the 
 new and often appalling duties imposed by intern icine war, I 
 was one of those called to the inner councils of Abraham Lin 
 coln. He distrusted his own judgment in politics, and was ever 
 careful to gather the best counsels from all the varied shades of 
 opinion and interest to guide him in his conclusions; and there 
 were not only scores of confidential conferences in the White 
 House of which John G. Nicolay never heard, but no man ever 
 met or heard of John G. Nicolay in such councils. He was a 
 good mechanical, routine clerk; he was utterly inefficient as the 
 secretary of the President; his removal was earnestly pressed 
 upon Lincoln on more than one occasion because of his want of 
 tact and fitness for his trust, and only the proverbial kindness of 
 Lincoln saved him from dismissal. He saw and knew President 
 Lincoln; the man Abraham Lincoln he never saw and never 
 knew; and his assumption that he was the trusted repository of 
 Lincoln s confidential convictions and efforts would have been 
 regarded as grotesque a quarter of a century ago, when Lincoln 
 and his close surroundings were well understood, His biography 
 
462 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 of Lincoln is invaluable as an accurate history of the public acts 
 of the Lincoln administration, but there is not a chapter or page 
 on the inner personal attributes of the man that is not burdened 
 with unpardonable errors. Nicolay was a plodding, precise, me 
 chanical clerk, well fitted to preserve historical data and present 
 them intelligently and correctly; but there his fitness as a biog 
 rapher ended. 
 
 I now repeat that, in obedience to a telegraphic request from 
 President Lincoln, I visited him at the White House the day 
 before the meeting of the Baltimore Convention of 1864. At that 
 interview Mr. Lincoln earnestly explained why the nomination 
 of a well-known Southern man like Andrew Johnson who had 
 been Congressman, Governor, and Senator by the favor of his 
 State would not only nationalize the Republican party and the 
 government, but would greatl}- lessen the grave peril of the recog 
 nition of the Confederacy by England and France. He believed 
 that the election to the Vice-Presidency of a representative states 
 man from an insurgent State that had been restored to the Union 
 would disarm the enemies of the Republic abroad and remove the 
 load of sectionalism from the government that seemed to greatly 
 hinder peace. No intimation, no trace, of prejudice against Mr. 
 Hamlin was exhibited, and I well knew that no such consider 
 ation could have influenced Mr. Lincoln in such an emergency. 
 Had he believed Mr. Hamlin to be the man who could best pro 
 mote the great work whose direction fell solely upon himself, he 
 would have favored Hamlin s nomination regardless of his per 
 sonal wishes ; but he believed that a great public achievement 
 would be attained by the election of Johnson; and I returned to 
 Baltimore to work and vote for Johnson, although against all my 
 personal predilections in the matter. 
 
 Mr. Nicolay s public telegram to Mrs. Hamlin, saying that the 
 foregoing statement " is entirely erroneous," is as insolent as it 
 is false, and the correctness of my statement is not even inferen- 
 tially contradicted by Nicolay s quotation from Lincoln. On the 
 contrary, Nicolay s statement given in his history (vol. ix. pages 
 72, 73) proves simply that Nicolay was dress-parading at Balti 
 more and knew nothing of the President s purposes. True, he 
 seems to assume that he had responsible charge of the Executive 
 duties, as he says that "Mr. Nicolay wrote a letter to Mr. Ha}*, 
 who had been left in charge of the Executive office," asking 
 whether Leonard Swett, "one of the President s most intimate 
 friends," was "all right" in urging the nomination of Judge- 
 
APPENDIX. 463 
 
 Advocate-General Holt for Vice President. Had Nicolay ever 
 learned anything in the White House, he would have known 
 that of all living men Leonard Swett was the one most trusted 
 by Abraham Lincoln, and he should have known that when 
 Swett was opposing Hamlin, Lincoln was not yearning for Ham- 
 lin s renomination. Then comes Lincoln s answer to Nicolay s 
 bombastic query, saying: "Swett is unquestionably all right;" 
 and because Lincoln did not proclaim himself a fool by giving 
 Nicolay an opportunity to herald Lincoln s sacredly private con 
 victions as to the Vice-Presidency, he assumes that he has Lin 
 coln s "written words" to justify his contradiction of a circum 
 stantial statement and an executed purpose of which he could 
 have had no knowledge. When Leonard Swett was against 
 Hamlin, none could escape the conclusion that opposition to 
 Hamlin was no offense to Lincoln. I saw and conferred with 
 Swett almost every hour of the period of the convention. We 
 both labored to nominate Johnson, and Swett made Holt, who 
 was an impossible candidate, a mere foil to divide and conquer 
 the supporters of Hamlin. Had Lincoln desired Hamlin s nomi 
 nation, Swett would have desired and labored for it, and Hamlin 
 would have been renominated on the first ballot. The conven 
 tion was a Lincoln body pure and simple, and no man could have 
 been put on the ticket with Lincoln who was not known to be 
 his choice. It was not publicly proclaimed, but it was in the 
 air, and pretty much everybody but John G. Nicolay perceived 
 and bowed to it. 
 
 Of the few men who enjoyed Lincoln s complete confidence, 
 Charles A. Dana was conspicuous, and his statement is as cred 
 ible testimony as could now be given on the subject. He was 
 trusted by Lincoln in most delicate matters political and mili 
 tary, and he logically tells of Johnson s "selection by Lincoln " 
 for the Vice-Presidency in 1864. With Dana s direct corrobo- 
 ration of my statement added to the strongly corroborative facts 
 herein given, I may safely dismiss John G. Nicolay and the dis 
 pute his mingled ignorance and arrogance have thrust upon me. 
 
 A. K. M. 
 
 NICOLAY TO McCLURE. 
 
 To the Editor of The Philadelphia Times : 
 I will not reply to your personal abuse; it proves nothing but 
 
464 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 your rage and wounded vanity at being exposed in a gross his 
 torical misstatement. 
 
 You asserted that President Lincoln opposed the renomination 
 of Hannibal Hamlin for Vice-President. I refuted that assertion 
 by calling attention to the written record wherein Lincoln in his 
 own handwriting explicitly states to the contrary. You now re 
 assert your statement, or, to put it in other w r ords, you accuse 
 President Lincoln of acting a low political deceit and with his 
 own hand writing a deliberate lie. The country will not believe 
 the monstrous implication. 
 
 Allow me to restate the facts. I was at the Baltimore Conven 
 tion as a spectator. The chairman of the Illinois delegation, 
 Hon. B. C. Cook, had a conversation with me about the course 
 of certain disaffected leaders in Illinois. That conversation I 
 reported to the President in a letter to Major Hay, my assistant 
 private secretary, in part as follows: 
 
 What transpired at home and what he has heard from several 
 sources have made Cook suspicious that Swett may be untrue to 
 Lincoln. One of the straws which lead him to this belief is that 
 Swett has telegraphed here urging the Illinois delegation to go 
 for Holt. . . . Cook wants to know confidentially whether Swett 
 is all right; whether in urging Holt for Vice-President he reflects 
 the President s wishes; whether the President has any preference, 
 eithej personally or on the score of policy; or whether he wishes 
 not even to interfere by a confidential indication." 
 
 Upon this letter President Lincoln made the following indorse 
 ment in his own handwriting : 
 
 "Swett is unquestionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man, 
 but I had not heard or thought of him for V.-P. Wish not to 
 interfere about V.-P. Cannot interfere about platform conven 
 tion must judge for itself." 
 
 This written evidence is quoted in our history, and no amount 
 of denial or assertion to contrary can overturn it. 
 
 In trying to evade its force you assert that Lincoln called you 
 to Washington and urged the nomination of Johnson, and that 
 you returned to Baltimore to work and vote in obedience to that 
 request, against your personal predilections. Let us examine 
 this claim. The official proceedings of the convention show that 
 you were one of the four delegates at large from Pennsylvania, 
 the others being Simon Cameron, W. W. Ketchum, M. B. Lowry, 
 while the list of district delegates contains the names of main- 
 Other eminent Pennsylvariians. The proceedings also show that 
 
APPENDIX. 465 
 
 you acted an entirely minor part. You were a member of the 
 Committee on Organization and presented its report recommend 
 ing the permanent officers which were elected. With that pres 
 entation your service and influence ended, so far as can be gath 
 ered from the proceedings. 
 
 Of other Pennsylvania delegates, William W. Ketchum was 
 one of the vice-presidents of the convention. E. McPherson was 
 on the Committee on Credentials, A. H. Reeder on the Committee 
 on Organization, M. B. Lowry on the Committee on Resolutions, 
 S. F. Wilson on the Committee on Rules and Order of Business, 
 S. A. Purviance on the National Committee, while General Simon 
 Cameron held the leading and important post of chairman of the 
 Pennsylvania delegation. So again, among those who made 
 motions and speeches were Cameron, Thaddeus Stevens, A. H. 
 Reeder, C. A, Walborn, Galusha A. Grow, and M. B. Lowry, but 
 beyond the presentation of the routine report I have mentioned 
 your name did not give forth the squeak of the smallest mouse. 
 Is it probable that Lincoln among all these men would have 
 called you alone to receive his secret instructions ? 
 
 It is a matter of public history that Simon Cameron was more 
 prominent and efficient than any other Pennsylvanian in the 
 movement in that State to give Lincoln a second term, and that 
 on the I4th of January, 1864, he transmitted to the President the 
 written request of every Union member of the Pennsylvania Leg 
 islature to accept a renomination. This and his subsequent open 
 and unvarying support left no doubt of Cameron s attitude. How 
 was it with you? I find among Lincoln s papers the following 
 letter from you: 
 
 FRANKLIN REPOSITORY OFFICE, 
 
 CHAMBERSBURG, PA., May 2, 1864. 
 
 SIR: I have been amazed to see it intimated in one or two jour 
 nals that I am not cordially in favor of your renomination. I 
 shall notice the intimations no further than to assure you that 
 you will have no more cordial, earnest, or faithful supporter in 
 the Baltimore Convention than your obedient servant, 
 
 A. K. McCLURE. 
 To the President. 
 
 That is, only a month before the Baltimore Convention you 
 
 felt called upon to personally protest against accusations of party 
 
 disloyalty. But this is not all. When the time came to make 
 
 the nominations for Vice-President, Simon Cameron, chairman 
 
 30 
 
466 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 of the Pennsylvania delegation and one of the earliest and most 
 persistent friends of Lincoln, himself nominated Hannibal Ham- 
 lin for Vice-President, \vhile the whole vote of Pennsylvania was 
 on the first ballot cast for Hamlin s nomination. So also the 
 Illinois delegation cast its entire vote for Hamlin on the first 
 ballot. Does it stand to reason that Lincoln called upon you to 
 defeat Hamlin and nominate Johnson, and gave no intimation of 
 this desire to the chairmen of the Pennsylvania delegation and 
 of the Illinois delegation ? 
 
 And once more, is it probable that if Lincoln had desired the 
 nomination of Johnson he would have allowed Svvett, " one of the 
 President s most intimate friends," to urge the nomination of 
 Holt ? Dare you venture the assertion that Lincoln was deceiv 
 ing Cameron, deceiving Cook, carrying on a secret intrigue 
 against Hamlin and another secret intrigue against Holt, and 
 that on top of the whole he was writing a deliberate lie to us ? 
 That may be your conception of Abraham Lincoln, but it is not 
 mine. That may be your system of politics, but it was not his. 
 
 JOHN G. NICOLAY. 
 
 McCLURE TO NICOLAY. 
 [From The Philadelphia Times, July 12, 1891.] 
 To JOHN G. NICOLAY: 
 
 The public will be greatly surprised that such an undignified 
 and quibbling letter as yours addressed to me could come from 
 one who claims to be the chosen biographer of Abraham Lincoln. 
 It must so generally offend the dispassionate opinion of decent 
 men that answer to it is excusable only to expose several se 
 verely-strained new falsehoods you present, either directly or by 
 the suppression of the vital parts of the truth. 
 
 Had you known anything about the inside political movements 
 in the White House in 1864, you would have known that my let 
 ter to Lincoln, quoted in your defense, was written because of a 
 suddenly-developed effort in this State to divide the lines drawn 
 by the then bitter Cameron and Curtin factional war for and 
 against Lincoln. The Cameron followers claimed to be the 
 special supporters of Lincoln, and attempted to drive Curtin and 
 the State administration into hostility to the President. My 
 justly-assumed devotion to Curtin was the pretext for declaring 
 me as either restrained in my support of Lincoln or likely to be 
 
APPENDIX. 467 
 
 in the opposition. The moment I saw the statement in print I 
 wrote the letter you quote to dismiss from Lincoln s mind all 
 apprehensions about either open or passive opposition from Cur- 
 tin s friends. Had you stated these facts you would have been 
 truthful. As you probably did not know of them, you may be 
 excused for not stating them; but your ignorance can be no ex 
 cuse for the entirely false construction you put upon my letter. 
 
 Equally indeed even more flagrantly false is your statement 
 of only a minor part of the truth about the action of the Penn 
 sylvania delegation at Baltimore in 1864. You say that General 
 Cameron cast the solid vote of the State for Hamlin. Had you 
 told the whole truth, ignorant as you seem to be of the force of 
 important political facts, you would have known that your as 
 sumption that Johnson had no votes in the delegation was untrue. 
 Had you desired to be truthful, you would have added that Gen 
 eral Cameron cast the solid vote of the delegation for Johnson 
 before the close of the first ballot. Were you ignorant of this 
 fact ? or have you deliberately attempted to so suppress the truth 
 as to proclaim a palpable falsehood ? 
 
 The Pennsylvania delegation was personally harmonious, al 
 though divided on Vice-President. In the Pennsylvania caucus 
 an informal vote put Johnson in the lead, with Hamlin second 
 and Dickinson third. Cameron knew that Hamlin s nomination 
 was utterly hopeless, and he accepted the result without special 
 grief. He urged a solid vote as a just compliment to Hamlin, 
 and it was given with the knowledge that it could not help Ham 
 lin and that a solid vote for Johnson would follow. The solid 
 vote for Johnson was the only vital vote cast for Vice-President, 
 and that record, accessible to every schoolboy, you studiously 
 suppress to excuse a falsehood. 
 
 I was a doubly-elected delegate to the Baltimore Convention, 
 having been first unanimously chosen as a district delegate with 
 out the formality of a conference, and when a district delegate I 
 was one of two delegates elected at large on the first ballot by 
 the State Convention. What I did or did not, or how important 
 or unimportant I w r as as a member of the convention, is an issue 
 that I have not raised or invited. I .stated the simple fact that 
 Lincoln had sent for me, had urged me to support Johnson, and 
 that I had done so. Had Lincoln chosen to confide his wishes to 
 another than myself, I would not have imitated his secretary and 
 charged him with deceit and falsehood because he did not tell me 
 all his purposes. He did not trust you with what you probably 
 
468 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 could not have understood had he told you, but that is no reason 
 why you should accuse him of deceit, intrigue, and "writing a 
 deliberate lie. He wrote you the exact truth in the only paper 
 you have as the basis of your inexcusable misconception of his 
 language. In it he says that " Swett is unquestionably all 
 right;" and the only thing he could have been right about in the 
 matter was in his active opposition to Hamlin s renomination. 
 Your history is quite right in quoting Lincoln, but he cannot be 
 justly held responsible for the want of common understanding 
 of one of his biographers more than a quarter of a century* after 
 his death. 
 
 For answer to your undignified and unmanly efforts to belittle 
 my relations with Lincoln, I refer you to your more discreet co- 
 biographer, Mr. Hay. He refused to sustain your interpretation 
 of Lincoln s note on the Vice-Presidency. He added that the 
 dispute is a question of veracity between you and me, and he 
 speaks of me as "evidently armed with his enviable record of 
 close intimacy with our illustrious Lincoln." One of you is 
 lying on this point : is it Mr. Hay or is it you ? 
 
 Had you sought the truth as an honest biographer, you could 
 have obtained it without offensive disputation, not only from me 
 so far as I knew it, but from such living witnesses as Charles A. 
 Dana and Murat Halstead, and from the recorded testimony of 
 General Cameron, Colonel Forney, and others who know much 
 of Lincoln and but little of you. Instead of seeking the truth, 
 you flung your ignorance and egotism with ostentatious inde 
 cency upon the bereaved household of the yet untombed Hamlin, 
 and when brought to bay by those better informed than yourself, 
 you resent it in the tone and terms of the ward-heeler in a wharf- 
 rat district battling for constabulary honors. I think it safe to 
 say that the public judgment will be that it would have been 
 well for both Lincoln s memory and for the country had such a 
 biographer been drowned when a pup. Dismissed. 
 
 A. K. M. 
 
 NICOLAY TO McCLURE. 
 
 WASHINGTON, July u, 1891. 
 
 To COL. A. K. McCLURE, Editor Philadelphia Times : 
 
 I will not allow you to retreat in a cloud of vituperation from 
 full conviction of having made a misstatement of history. I 
 nee4 only to sum up the points of evidence. 
 
APPENDIX. 469 
 
 You allege that Mr. Lincoln called and instructed you to op 
 pose Hamlin and nominate Johnson. 
 
 1. This is proven to be a misstatement by Lincoln s written 
 words: " Wish not to interfere about V. -P.; cannot interfere about 
 platform convention must judge for itself." 
 
 It is not a question between your assertion and my assertion, 
 but between your assertion and Lincoln s written word. 
 
 It is proven to be a misstatement by the testimony of Hon. 
 B. C. Cook, chairman of the Illinois delegation, who says : " Mr. 
 Nicolay s statement that Mr. Lincoln was in favor of Hannibal 
 Hamlin is correct. The dispatch which is published this morn 
 ing was sent to me in reply to an inquiry to Mr. Lincoln in re 
 gard to the matter. It read: Wish not to interfere about V.-P. 
 Cannot interfere about platform convention must judge for 
 itself. 
 
 "I went to see Mr. Lincoln personally, however. There are 
 always men who say the Presidential candidates prefer this man 
 or that, and they do it without the slightest authority. It was 
 so in this campaign. It was reported that Andrew Johnson was 
 Mr. Lincoln s choice, and it was my business to find out whether 
 it was or not. We were beyond all measure for Mr. Lincoln first, 
 last, and for all time. Had he desired Mr. Johnson he would 
 have been our choice, but he did not. 
 
 " As the dispatch indicates, Mr. Lincoln was particularly anx 
 ious not to make known his preferences on the question of his 
 associate on the ticket. But that he had a preference I positively 
 know. After my interview with him I was as positive that Han 
 nibal Hamlin was his favorite as I am that I am alive to-day. 
 The fact is further proven by the action of the entire Illinois 
 delegation, which was a unit for Mr. Hamlin, and, as I stated 
 before, we were at his service in the matter." 
 
 2. It is proven to be a misstatement by Colonel Hay, who says: 
 " I have nothing to say about Mr. Nicolay s assertion nor about 
 this telegram, but I do corroborate the statement that Mr. Lin 
 coln withheld all opinion calculated to influence the Baltimore 
 Convention of 1864." And further: "I stand simply by the 
 proposition contained in our History. . . . For several days be 
 fore the convention the President had been besieged by inquiries 
 as to his personal wishes in regard to his associate on the ticket. 
 He had persistently refused to give the slightest intimation of 
 such wish. ... It was therefore with minds absolutely untram- 
 meled by any knowledge of the President s wishes that the con- 
 
47 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 vention went about the work of selecting his associate on the 
 ticket." 
 
 3. It is proven to be a misstatement by the action of Simon 
 Cameron, chairman of the Pennsylvania delegation, in nomina 
 ting Hamlin as a candidate for Vice-President and casting for 
 him the whole fifty-two votes of the Pennsylvania delegation. 
 
 4. It is proven to be a misstatement by your own action in the 
 Baltimore Convention, when, at the first vote for Vice-President, 
 after the supposed instructions which you claim to have received 
 from Lincoln, and having, as you say, "returned to work and 
 vote for Johnson," you as a member of the Pennsylvania dele 
 gation voted for Hannibal Hamlin for Vice-President. If you 
 did this willingly, you betrayed Lincoln s confidence and instruc 
 tions which you alleged to have received. If you did it unwill 
 ingly, you proved yourself a political cipher a pretended agent 
 to manipulate a national convention who had not influence 
 enough in his own delegation to control his own vote. The first 
 roll-call was decisive in showing Johnson s strength against the 
 Pennsylvania vote (yourself included), and it show s that you 
 contributed nothing for, but everything against, the result you 
 say you w r ere commissioned to bring about. Subsequent changes 
 still on the first ballot (for there was no second) were simply the 
 usual rush to make the choice unanimous, in which Pennsylvania 
 did not lead, but only joined after the rush became evident, just 
 as Maine and Illinois did. 
 
 JOHN G. NICOLAY. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF LEADING POLITICAL ACTORS. 
 
 LINCOLN ADVISES JUDGE PETTIS. 
 [From The Philadelphia Times, Aug. I, 1891.] 
 
 Hox. S. NEWTON PETTIS, who was an active supporter of Lin 
 coln at the conventions of 1860 and 1864, and who has been Con 
 gressman, Judge, and Foreign Minister, was personally advised 
 by Lincoln in 1864 to support Johnson for Vice-President. The 
 following is his testimony on the point: 
 
 MEADVILLE, July 20, 1891. 
 HON. A. K. McCLURE: 
 
 DEAR SIR: Your favor of last week reached me at Washington, 
 asking for a copy of Mr. Hamlin s letter to me in 1889, and in- 
 
APPENDIX. 471 
 
 stead of a copy I enclose the original, which you can return to 
 me at your convenience. 
 
 You will remember the circumstances connected with it, for we 
 spoke about it shortly after. On the morning of the meeting of 
 the Baltimore Convention in 1864 which nominated Mr. Lincoln, 
 and immediately before leaving for Baltimore, I called upon Mr. 
 Lincoln in his study and stated that I called especially to ask 
 him whom he desired put on the ticket with him as Vice-Presi- 
 dent. He leaned forward and in a low but distinct tone of voice 
 said, " Governor Johnson of Tennessee." 
 
 In March, 1889, I spent an hour with Mr. Hamlin in Washing 
 ton at the house of a friend with whom he was stopping while 
 attending the inauguration of President Harrison in March of 
 that year. 
 
 Among other matters I casually mentioned the expression of 
 Mr. Lincoln the morning of the meeting of the Baltimore Con 
 vention in 1864, not supposing for a moment that it was any 
 thing that would surprise him. You can imagine my annoyance 
 at the remark that it called out from Mr. Hamlin, which was: 
 "Judge Pettis, I am sorry you told me that." I regretted having 
 made the statement, but I could not recall it. 
 
 Later in the year I noticed a published interview had with you 
 in which you had made substantially the same statement from 
 Mr. Lincoln to you very shortly before the meeting of the con 
 vention, which I clipped and with satisfaction enclosed to Mr. 
 Hamlin in verification of mine to Mr. H., stating that your state 
 ment to the same effect as mine made to him in the March before 
 had relieved me from fear that he, Mr. Hamlin, might have some 
 times questioned the accuracy of my memory, and the letter I 
 now send you was Mr. Hamlin s reply. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 S. NEWTON PETTIS. 
 
 HAMLIN S LETTER TO PETTIS. 
 
 THE following is Mr. Hamlin s letter to Judge Pettis, the orig 
 inal of which is now in our possession : 
 
 BANGOR, September 13, 1889. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: Have been from home for several days, and did 
 not get your letter and newspaper slip until last evening. Hence 
 the delay in my reply. 
 
47 2 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 When I met and conferred with you in Washington, and yon 
 told me of your interview with Mr. L. (Lincoln), I had not the 
 vSlightest doubt of your correctness. The remark that I made 
 was caused wholly because you made certain statements of Mr. 
 L. which I had seen, but which I did not believe until made posi 
 tive by you. I was really sorry to be disabused. Hence I was 
 truly sorry at what you said and the information 3-011 gave me. 
 
 Mr. L. (Lincoln) evidently became some alarmed about his re 
 election and changed his position. That is all I care to say. If 
 we ever shall meet again, I may say something more to you. I 
 will write no more. Yours very truly, 
 
 H. HAMUN. 
 
 HON. S. N. PETTIS, Meadville, Pa. 
 
 LINCOLN, CAMERON, AND BUTLER. 
 
 THE following letter from General Butler, and the added ex 
 tract from his magazine article on the same subject, explain 
 themselves: 
 
 BOSTON, July 14, 1891. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: A few years ago I w r as asked to write, as my 
 memory serves me, for the North American Review, while under 
 the editorial management of Mr. Allen Thorndike Rice, my 
 reminiscences of the facts in relation to the interview between 
 Mr. Cameron and myself which took place at Fort Monroe some 
 time in March, 1864, as I remember. It might have been a little 
 later, but it must have been before the 4th day of May, 1864, be 
 cause I went into the field on that date, and did not see Mr. 
 Cameron during the campaign. My recollection is that the arti 
 cle was entitled "Vice-Presidential Politics in 1864." I should 
 say that the article was written five or six years ago. 
 
 I cannot now add anything that I know of to what I said then. 
 I meant to tell it just as it lay in my memory, and certainly did 
 so, wholly without any relation to Mr. Hamlin, because I under 
 stood it had been determined on by Mr. Lincoln and his friends 
 that somebody else, if it were possible, should be nominated in 
 stead of Mr. Hamlin. Of the reasons of that determination I 
 made no inquiry, because the whole matter was one in which I 
 had no intention to take any part. Yours truly, 
 
 BENJ. F. BUTLER. 
 
 A. K. McCLURE, Esq. 
 
APPENDIX. 473 
 
 GENERAL BUTLER S STATEMENT IN MAGAZINE. 
 [From the North American Review for October, 1885.] 
 
 "Within three weeks afterward a gentleman (Cameron) who 
 stood very high in Mr. Lincoln s confidence came to me at Fort 
 Monroe. This was after I had heard that Grant had allotted to 
 me a not unimportant part in the coming campaign around Rich 
 mond, of the results of which I had the highest hope, and for 
 which I had been laboring, and the story of which has not yet 
 been told, but may be hereafter. 
 
 " The gentleman informed me that he came from Mr. Lincoln; 
 this was said with directness, because the messenger and myself 
 had been for a considerable time in quite warm friendly relations, 
 and I owed much to him, which I can never repay save with 
 gratitude. 
 
 " He said: The President, as you know, intends to be a candi 
 date for re-election, and as his friends indicate that Mr. Hamlin 
 is no longer to be a candidate for Vice-President, and as he is 
 from New England, the President thinks that his place should be 
 filled by some one from that section; and aside from reasons of 
 personal friendship which would make it pleasant to have you 
 with him, he believes that being the first prominent Democrat 
 who volunteered for the war, your candidature would add strength 
 to the ticket, especially with the War Democrats, and he hopes 
 that you will allow your friends to co-operate with his to place 
 you in that position. 
 
 "I answered: Please say to Mr. Lincoln that while I appre 
 ciate with the fullest sensibility this act of friendship and the 
 compliment he pays me, yet I must decline- Tell him, I said 
 laughingly, with the prospects of the campaign, I would not 
 quit the field to be Vice-President, even with himself as Presi 
 dent, unless he will give me bond, with sureties, in the full sum 
 of his four years salary, that he will die or resign within three 
 months after his inauguration. " 
 
 CAMERON S DECLARATIONS. 
 
 THE following is an extract from an interview with General 
 Cameron taken by James R. Young, now Executive Clerk of the 
 Senate, in 1873, revised by Cameron himself and published in the 
 New York Herald in the summer of that year: 
 
474 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 " Lincoln and Stanton thought highly of Butler, and I will 
 now tell you of another fact that is not generally known, and 
 which will show you how near Butler came to being President 
 instead of Andrew Johnson. In the spring of 1864, when it was 
 determined to run Mr. Lincoln for a second term, it was the de 
 sire of Lincoln, and also that of Stauton, who was the one man 
 of the Cabinet upon whom Lincoln thoroughly depended, that 
 Butler should run on the ticket with him as the candidate for 
 Vice-President. I was called into consultation and heartily en 
 dorsed the scheme. Accordingly Lincoln sent me on a mission 
 to Fort Monroe to see General Butler, and to say to him that it 
 was his (Lincoln s) request that he (General Butler) should allow 
 himself to be run as second on the ticket. 
 
 " I, accompanied by William H. Armstrong, afterward a mem 
 ber of Congress from the Williamsport district, did visit General 
 Butler and made the tender according to instructions. To our 
 astonishment, Butler refused to agree to the proposition. He 
 said there was nothing in the Vice-Presidency, and he preferred 
 remaining in command of his army, where he thought he would 
 be of more service to his country. 
 
 A LATER CAMERON INTERVIEW. 
 
 THE following interview with General Cameron, taken by 
 Colonel Burr a few years before his death, was carefully revised 
 by Cameron himself. It is not only a repetition of General But 
 ler s statement, but it tells how, after Butler declined the Vice- 
 Presidency, Lincoln carefully considered other prominent War 
 Democrats, and finally agreed w r ith Cameron to nominate John 
 son: 
 
 "I had been summoned from Harrisburg by the President to 
 consult with him in relation to the approaching campaign," said 
 General Cameron. " He was holding a reception when I arrived, 
 but after it was over we had a long and earnest conversation. Mr. 
 Lincoln had been much distressed at the intrigues in and out of 
 his Cabinet to defeat his renomination; but that was now assured, 
 and the question of a man for the second place on the ticket was 
 freely and earnestly discussed. Mr. Lincoln thought, and so did 
 I, that Mr. Hamlin s position during the four \ ears of his admin 
 istration made it advisable to have a new name substituted. Sev 
 eral men were freely talked of, but without conclusion as to any 
 
APPENDIX. 475 
 
 particular person. Not long after that I was requested to come 
 to the White House again. I went and the subject was again 
 brought up by the President ; and the result of our conversation 
 was that Mr. Lincoln asked me to go to Fortress Monroe and ask 
 General Butler if he would be willing to run, and, if not, to con 
 fer with him upon the subject. 
 
 "General Butler positively declined to consider the subject, 
 saying that he preferred to remain in the military service, and he 
 thought a man could not justify himself in leaving the army in 
 the time of war to run for a political office. The general and 
 myself then talked the matter over freely, and it is my opinion 
 at this distance from the event that he suggested that a Southern 
 man should be given the place. After completing the duty as 
 signed by the President, I returned to Washington and reported 
 the result to Mr. Lincoln. He seemed to regret General Butler s 
 decision, and afterward the name of Andrew Johnson was sug 
 gested and accepted. In my judgment, Mr. Hamlin never had a 
 serious chance to become the Vice-Presidential candidate after 
 Mr. Lincoln s renomination was assured." 
 
 JOHNSON S SECRETARY SPEAKS. 
 
 MAJOR BENJAMIN C. TRUMAN, a well-known Eastern journalist, 
 and now manager of the California exhibit for the coming Chicago 
 Fair, testifies in the following conclusive manner on the subject: 
 
 CHICAGO, July 25. 
 MY DEAR MR. McCLURE: 
 
 We met in New Orleans the year of the fair, as you may re 
 member. I am the man recently quoted in the Tribune in rela 
 tion to the Lincoln-Hamlin controversy, but I did not wish to 
 volunteer conspicuously in the dispute. I was private secretary 
 of Andrew Johnson in Nashville in 1864. I saw and handled all 
 his correspondence during that time, and I know it to be a fact 
 that Mr. Lincoln desired the nomination of Johnson for Vice- 
 President, and that Brownlow and Maynard went to Baltimore at 
 request of Lincoln and Johnson to promote the nomination. 
 
 Forney wrote to Johnson saying that General Sickles would be 
 in Tennessee to canvass John son s availability, and that Lincoln, 
 on the whole, preferred Johnson first and Holt next. I do not 
 know that General Sickles conferred w r ith Johnson on the sub 
 ject, and it is possible that General Sickles was not advised by 
 
47 6 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 Lincoln at the time he sent him on the secret mission what he 
 had in view, for Lincoln may at that time have been undecided 
 in his own mind. It is certain, however, that after General 
 Sickles returned and reported to Lincoln, Lincoln decided to 
 favor the nomination of Johnson. 
 
 I went out to Tennessee with Johnson in March, 1862, and had 
 charge of his official and private correspondence for four years. 
 I wrote at his dictation many letters to Mr. Lincoln, and was 
 cognizant of all Mr. Lincoln s communications to him. 
 
 When he was made Military Governor and Brigadier-General, 
 I was appointed on his staff along with William A. Browning of 
 Baltimore, who died in 66. It was Colonel Forney who obtained 
 the position for me, and he was in close confidential relations 
 with Johnson during the entire period I speak of. 
 
 Very truly, 
 BEN C. TRUMAN. 
 
 JONES SPEAKS FOR RAYMOND. 
 
 HENRY J. RAYMOND was editor of the New York Times in 
 1864, of which George Jones was then, as now, the chief owner, 
 and their relations were of the most confidential character. Ray 
 mond was the Lincoln leader and the master-spirit of the Balti 
 more Convention of 1864. He framed and reported the platform; 
 he was made chairman of the National Committee; he wrote the 
 Life of Lincoln for the campaign ; and it was his leadership that 
 carried a majority of the New York delegation for Johnson even 
 against Dickinson, from Raymond s own State, because he was 
 in the confidence of and acting in accord with the wishes of Lin 
 coln. Raymond has long since joined the great majority beyond, 
 but Jones thus incisively speaks for him: 
 
 SOUTH POLAND, ME., July 17, 1891. 
 
 MY DEAR COLONEL McCLURE: Your letter has been forwarded 
 to me here. I have read the contention about the Vice-Presi 
 dency, and do not hesitate to say that you are absolutely in the 
 right in your statement of the facts. 
 
 I had many talks with Raymond on the subject. Dickinson s 
 friends never forgave him, although he made Dickinson U. S. 
 District Attorney afterward to compensate him for the loss of the 
 Vice-Presidency. Seward and Weed were also with Raymond in 
 that fight. Faithfully yours, 
 
 GEORGE JONES. 
 
APPENDIX. 477 
 
 MARSHAL LAMON S LETTER. 
 
 CARLSBAD, BOHEMIA, August 16, 1891. 
 HON. A. K. McCivURE: 
 
 DEAR SIR: The question of preference of President Lincoln in 
 1864 as to who ought to be placed on the national ticket with 
 himself is one of doubt, I observe from reading- the American 
 newspapers, and one which has, since the death of Ex-Vice-Presi- 
 dent Ham! in, given rise to much controversy. At this distance 
 of time from the exciting events of that period I had thought 
 that no fact was better established than Mr. Lincoln s politic 
 preference as a strategic skirmish from the beaten path to give 
 strength to the party and discouragement to the South. He was 
 decidedly in favor of a Southern man for Vice-President. And 
 of all men South, his preference, as he expressed himself to pru 
 dent friends, was for Andrew Johnson. This he could not con 
 sistently make public, for he occupied a delicate position before 
 the people, and was apprehensive of giving offense to Hamlin s 
 united New England constituency. 
 
 To discreet and trusted friends with w r hom he deemed it pru 
 dent to confer he urged that such a nomination would disarm our 
 enemies of the Union abroad, and be a check to the recognition 
 of the Confederacy by England and France to a greater extent 
 than anything in our power to do at that time, and if judiciously 
 and quietly effected would, in his opinion, in no wise jeopardize 
 the success of the party. 
 
 He believed that the election of one of the candidates on the 
 national ticket from an insurgent State, from the heart of the 
 Confederacy, that had been restored to the Union and had re 
 pented of the sin of rebellion, would not only be wise, but expe 
 dient; and Johnson being a lifelong representative Southern man, 
 who had been Governor, a member of Congress, a United States 
 Senator, and was then Military Governor of the State of Tennes 
 see, it was fitting, and would have more influence in proving the 
 success of the Union arms against the Confederate rebellion than 
 anything that had been accomplished. 
 
 I recall to mind the fact that Mr. Lincoln sent for you, Mr. 
 Editor, the day before the National Convention was to meet, for 
 consultation on this veritable subject. To the best of my recol 
 lection, you were not in sympathy with the scheme; that you 
 opposed it and declared yourself in favor of the old ticket of 
 1860; and I am confident that at first you were opposed to the 
 
47 8 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 nomination of Johnson. But after some discussion and hearing 
 Mr. Lincoln s earnest reasoning in favor of his position, you 
 yielded your prejudices and seemed convinced that there was 
 philosophy and, perhaps, sound politics in the proposition. The 
 late lamented Leonard Swett of Illinois was also sent for and 
 consulted before the convention met; Mr. Lincoln always had 
 great faith and confidence in Mr. Swett s political wisdom. The 
 proposition took Swett b\- surprise. He had made up his mind 
 that the old ticket of Lincoln and Hamlin would be again renomi- 
 nated as a matter of course. Swett said to him: " Lincoln, if it 
 were known in New England that you are in favor of leaving 
 Hamlin off the ticket it would raise the devil among the Yankees 
 (Mr. Swett was born in Maine), and it would raise a bumble-bee s 
 nest about your ears that would appall the country." Swett con 
 tinued about in this strain: " However popular you are with the 
 masses over the country, you are not so with the New England 
 politicians, because of your tardiness in issuing your Emancipa 
 tion Proclamation and your liberal reconstruction policy. You 
 must know that you have not recovered from what these people 
 think two great blunders of your administration. In view of 
 these facts I think it a dangerous experiment." 
 
 Lincoln was serious, earnest, and resolute. He produced argu 
 ments so convincing to Swett that he shortly became a con 
 vert to the proposed new departure, and in deference to Mr. 
 Lincoln s wishes he went to the convention as a delegate from 
 Illinois, and joined Cameron, yourself, and others in supporting 
 Johnson. 
 
 I recollect that Swett asked Mr. Lincoln, as he was leaving "he 
 White House, whether he was authorized to use his name in tins 
 behalf before the convention. The reply was, " No; I will address 
 a letter to Lamon here embodying my views, which you, McClure, 
 and other friends may use if it be found absolutely necessary. 
 Otherwise, it may be better that I should not appear actively on 
 the stage of this theatre." The letter was written, and I took it 
 to the convention with me. It was not used, as there was no 
 occasion for its use, and it was afterward returned to Mr. Lin 
 coln, at his request. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln was beset before the convention by the friends of 
 the Hamlin interest for his opinion and preference for Vice-Presi- 
 dent. To such he invariably dodged the question, sometimes 
 saying: "It perhaps would not become me to interfere with the 
 will of the people," always evading a direct answer. 
 
APPENDIX. 479 
 
 However this conduct may subject him to the charge by some 
 persons of the want of open candor, the success of the party and 
 the safety of the Union were the paramount objects that moved 
 him. He did not, by suppressing the truth to those whom he 
 thought had no right to cross-question him, purpose conveying 
 a false impression. If this is to be construed as duplicity, be it 
 so; he was still " Honest old Abe," and he thought the end justi 
 fied the means. 
 
 About this time, and for a short time before this convention 
 was held, Mr. Lincoln was exceedingly anxious to bring Ten 
 nessee under a regular State government, and he argued that by 
 emphasizing it by the election of Johnson to the Vice-Presidency 
 (not that he had any prejudice against Mr. Hamlin) in no way 
 could such rapid strides be made toward the restoration of the 
 Union. 
 
 If the nomination of Johnson was a mistake, a misdemeanor, 
 or a crime, the responsibility of it should rest where it belongs. 
 Mr. Lincoln was undoubtedly blamable for the blunder. It may 
 be that more calamitous mistakes happened in the lives of very 
 many eminent and good men during those troublous times of our 
 country s history. 
 
 With all my affection, admiration, love, and veneration for Mr. 
 Lincoln, I have never been one of those who believed him im 
 maculate and incapable of making mistakes. He was human 
 and in the nature of things was liable to err, yet he erred less 
 often than other men. He had amiable weaknesses, some of 
 which only the more ennobled him. 
 
 It s no compliment to his memory to smother from the closest 
 scrutiny any of the acts of his life and transfigure him by full- 
 some deification, so that his most intimate friends cannot recog 
 nize the Abraham Lincoln of other days. The truth of history 
 requires that he should be placed on the record, now that he is 
 dead, as he stood before the people while living. Whatever mis 
 takes he made were made through the purest of motives. All his 
 fruits, all his amiable weaknesses, and all his virtues should be 
 written on the same pages, so that the world may know the true 
 man as his friends knew him. With all the truth told of him he 
 will appear a purer and better man than any other man living or 
 any man that ever did live. 
 
 With all that can truthfully be said of him, Abraham Lincoln 
 has reached that stage of moral elevation where his name alone 
 will be more beneficial to humanity at large than the personal 
 
480 LINCOLN AND MEN OF WAR-TIMES. 
 
 services of any other man to the people of any country as their 
 Chief Magistrate. Respectfully, 
 
 WARD H. LAMON. 
 
 A CABINET MINISTER TESTIFIES. 
 [Gideon Welles, in the Galaxy, Nov., 1877.] 
 
 MR. HAMLIN, who was elected with Lincoln in 1860, had not 
 displayed the breadth of view and enlightened statesmanship 
 which was expected, and consequently lost confidence with the 
 country during his term. Yet there was no concentration or 
 unity on any one to fill his place. His friends and supporters, 
 while conscious that he brought no strength to the ticket, 
 claimed, but with no zeal or earnestness, that as Mr. Lincoln 
 was renominated, it would be invidious not to nominate Hamlin 
 also. 
 
 The question of substituting another for Vice-President had 
 been discussed in political circles prior to the meeting of the con 
 vention, without any marked personal preference, but with a 
 manifest desire that there should be a change. Mr. Lincoln felt 
 the delicacy of his position, and was therefore careful to avoid the 
 expression of any opinion; but it was known to those who en 
 joyed his confidence that he appreciated the honesty, integrity, 
 and self-sacrificing patriotism of Andrew 7 Johnson of Tennessee. 
 
 GENERAL SICKLES STATEMENT. 
 [General Sickles Interview in New York Times.] 
 
 " WHEN I went South to visit Governor Johnson this sentiment 
 was in the air," continued General Sickles. " I knew of it, but 
 I considered from my past position that it would be indelicate for 
 me to invite the President s confidence on purely political mat 
 ters. It was not my mission to undertake to bring about changes 
 in Mr. Johnson s methods of administration which should affect 
 his standing before the Baltimore Convention. The result of my 
 visit may have had some such effect: I do not say that it did not. 
 I reported to Mr. Lincoln and to Mr. Seward. 
 
 Now, what was the situation at Baltimore ? Mr. Leonard 
 Swett was President Lincoln s shadow. Whatever Mr. Swett did 
 represented and reflected Mr. Lincoln s views. In the Baltimore 
 
APPENDIX. 481 
 
 Convention Mr. Swett at once came out for Judge Holt, a Border- 
 State man. Mr. Nicolay sent word to Mr. Hay, who had been 
 left to keep house, asking if the President approved of this. 
 Now note Mr. Lincoln s reply: 
 
 <l Swett is unquestionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man, 
 but I had not thought of him for Vice-President. Wish not to 
 interfere. 
 
 "That tells the whole story. Mr. Lincoln knew that Mr. Swett, 
 in bringing out a Border-State man, was doing precisely right. 
 The indorsement on that note was for Mr. Nicolay s eye. He was 
 not one of the President s close advisers. He was but a clerk. 
 He was not the man whom President Lincoln would send to Bal 
 timore to take a hand in shaping the convention. A tyro in poli 
 tics would see that if the President wanted a thing done, his own 
 .secretary would have been the last messenger sent to do it. It 
 would have revealed the President s hand if Mr. Nicolay had 
 been given a mission in the convention. 
 
 " Colonel McClure, Governor Andrew G. Curtin, Simon Came 
 ron, and others of that stamp were the men whom Mr. Lincoln 
 relied on. So that while the indorsement on the note gives Mr. 
 Nicolay documentary evidence for his position, that very remark, 
 Swett is all right, gives Colonel McClure good ground for his 
 position if there were nothing else. 
 
 " Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton were close advisers of Mr. Lin 
 coln. They spoke their sentiments in favor of a Border-State 
 man. That they advised the choice of Mr. Johnson I do not 
 know, or that the President had chosen Mr. Johnson I do not 
 know, but the one expression, Swett is all right, is the key that 
 unlocks all the mystery there is in this present controversy." 
 
 3* 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Adams, Charles Francis Eulogy 
 of Seward, 60; as a candidate 
 for President, 1872, 326. 
 
 Altoona Conference Meeting of, 
 269, 270; Curtin s letter con 
 cerning, note, 270, 272. 
 
 Anderson, Robert Relieved from 
 command by Sherman, 230. 
 
 Andrew, John A. Changes vote 
 of Mass, to Lincoln, 39; sec 
 onds Evarts motion, 39; joins 
 Altoona Conference, 269. 
 
 Armstrong, William H. Visits 
 Butler with Cameron, 118. 
 
 Army of the Potomac Vicissi 
 tudes of, 356. 
 
 Arnold, Isaac N. On Lincoln 
 and emancipation, 101; Lin 
 coln s confidence in, 126. 
 
 Ashley, James M. Saves consti 
 tutional amendment abolishing 
 slavery from defeat, 109. 
 
 Banks, Nathaniel P. Vote for 
 Vice-President in Chicago Con 
 vention, 41; retreat across the 
 Potomac, 1862, 394. 
 
 Bannan, Benjamin Draft Com 
 missioner in Schuylkill county. 
 82, 83. 
 
 Bartlett, W. O. Knowledge of 
 the Lincoln-Bennett letter, 92. 
 
 Bates, Edward Greeley s sup 
 port of, 30, 315; votes received 
 in Chicago Convention, 39; in 
 Lincoln s Cabinet, 60. 
 
 Bayard, George A. Given com 
 mand of brigade Pa. Reserves, 
 428. 
 
 Beauregard, P. G. T. Threatens 
 Washington, 67. 
 
 Bennett, James Gordon Offered 
 French mission, 90; supports 
 Lincoln s re-election, 91; tati- 
 tude toward Lincoln, 92. 
 
 Biddle, Col. Charles J. Goes to 
 relief of Col. Wallace, 256. 
 
 Biddle, Craig On Gov. Curtin s 
 staff, 256. 
 
 Black, Jeremiah S. Becomes Bu 
 chanan s Secretary of State, 172, 
 300; grieved by Buchanan s pol 
 icy toward S. C., 301, 302; writes 
 Buchanan s answer, 302. 
 
 Blaine, James G. Opinion of 111. 
 Republican Convention, 1860, 
 29; support of Lincoln, 62. 
 
 Blair, Frank P. Supports Bates 
 at Chicago, 1860, 37; offers Gen. 
 Sherman a Missouri brigadier- 
 ship, 228; secures Greeley s 
 nomination for President, 327. 
 
 Blair, Montgomery Supports 
 Bates at Chicago, 1860, 37; of 
 fers Gen. Sherman a War-De 
 partment clerkship, 228. 
 
 Boyd, William H. His home at 
 Chambersburg saved, 420, 421. 
 
 Brown, B. Gratz Nominated for 
 Vice-President, 327. 
 
 Brown, John In Chambersburg 
 in 1859, 334, 335, 390. 
 
 Buchanan, James Stanton and 
 Black in Cabinet of, 172; mis 
 conceptions regarding his ad 
 ministration, 297, 298; estimate 
 of, 298, 299; change of policy, 
 300; policy toward S. C., 301, 
 302; reinforcement of Southern 
 forts, 302, 303; impossibility of 
 reinforcement, 304; proofs of 
 loyalty of, 304; patriotic letters 
 of, 305-310; justice to, 310, 311. 
 
 Buckalew, Charles A. Elected 
 to the United States Senate, 
 152. 
 
 Buell, Don Carlos An unre 
 warded hero, 355; military ca 
 reer of, 381-383; campaign 
 against Chattanooga, 383, 384; 
 
 (483) 
 
4 8 4 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 plan of campaign overruled, 
 but censured by the War De 
 partment, 384; his removal ! 
 asked, 385; relieved, 386; asks 
 for investigation, 387; myste 
 rious disappearance of the rec 
 ord, 387, 388. 
 
 Burnside, Ambrose E. What it 
 would cost to capture Manas- 
 sas, 70. 
 
 Butler, Benjamin F. Lincoln s 
 first selection for Vice-Presi- 
 dent in 1864, 118; Cameron s 
 mission to, 118; nomination de- j 
 clined, 119; Cameron s instruc- 
 tions to, regarding slaves, 161. 
 
 Cameron, Simon Candidate for 
 President, 1860, 35, 36; opposed 
 for Secretary of War, 48; re 
 garded war as inevitable, 60; 
 David Davis Cabinet promise, 
 89; advised arming the slaves, 
 103, 161; mission to Gen. But 
 ler, 1864, 118; consents to John 
 son s nomination, 119; relations 
 to Lincoln in 1864,121, 123, 124; 
 estimate of, 147; beginning of 
 feud with Curtin, 149; defeats 
 Forney for the Senat-, 150, 151; 
 defeated by Buckalew, 151; 
 Presidential aspirations, 1860, 
 152; the War Secretaryship, 
 403; Lincoln s hesitation and 
 letters, 155-157; subsequent ne 
 gotiations and appointment, 
 157-160; administration of the 
 War Department, 160, 161; offi 
 cial recommendation regarding 
 slavery, 161 - 163; retirement 
 from Cabinet, 164; feels ag 
 grieved, 164, 165; subsequent 
 relations to Lincoln, 166; esti 
 mate of, 166-168; conducts 
 campaign in Pa. in 1864, 199- 
 201; conference with Sherman 
 at Louisville, 231; refuses to ac 
 cept Pa. Reserves, 254; unites 
 with McClure and Forney to 
 ask foreign mission for Curtin, 
 263. 
 
 Carter, Colonel Story of his 
 burial at Chambersburg, 416, 
 417. 
 
 Cass, Lewis Resignation from 
 Buchanan s Cabinet, 172, 300. 
 
 Chambersburg Why destroyed, 
 258, 259; description of, 334, 
 390; John Brown in, 335, 390; 
 anti-slavery sentiment in, 338; 
 Capt. Cook in, 343; the town 
 in war times, 392; Patterson s 
 command at, 393; alarm at, 
 1862, 394; Stuart s capture of, 
 1862, 399; flag of truce demand 
 ing surrender of, 401; surren 
 dered to Gen. Hampton, 402; 
 Gen. Jenkins in, 1864, 407; Gen. 
 Lee in, 408; Lee s council in 
 public square, 400; Christian 
 burial refused to a Confederate 
 officer in, 416, 417; Gen. Mc- 
 Causland s approach rumored, 
 418; captured and burned, 419; 
 " Remember Chambersburg! " 
 421; no reimbursement, 421, 
 422; after the burning, 422. 
 
 Chandler, Zach. Distrust of Lin 
 coln, 62. 
 
 Chase, Salmon P. Votes re 
 ceived in Chicago Convention, 
 39; believes in peaceable dis 
 union, 60; nomination as Chief 
 Justice, 77; attitude toward Lin 
 coln, 1861-64, 132,133; Lincoln 
 proposed to "decline," 135, 136; 
 strained relations with Lin 
 coln, 137; resigns from Cabinet, 
 138; in retirement, 139; visits 
 Lincoln in 1864, 140; appointed 
 Chief Justice, 141; Lincoln s 
 magnanimity toward, 143, 144; 
 legal attainments of, note, 144; 
 subsequent career of, 144-146; 
 bearer of Lincoln s letter re 
 moving Cameron from War 
 Department, 164; Stevens on 
 impeachment rulings of, 285. 
 
 Childs, George W. At luncheon 
 with Grant, 205. 
 
 Clay, Cassius M. Vote for Pres 
 ident in Chicago Convention, 
 39; for Vice-President, 40. 
 
 Cobb, Howell Leaves Buchan 
 an s Cabinet, 300; his division 
 at Hagerstown, 1862, 395. 
 
 Coffroth, Alexander H. Gives 
 first Democratic vote in favor 
 
INDEX. 
 
 485 
 
 of constitutional amendment 
 abolishing slavery, no. 
 
 Collamer, Jacob Votes received 
 in Chicago Convention, 39; let 
 ter on Sherman s terms to 
 Johnston, 244. 
 
 Columbia, S. C. The cry of re 
 taliation for Chambersburg,42i. 
 
 Congress Acts prohibiting sla 
 very, 103; constitutional amend 
 ment abolishing slavery in, 109, 
 no. 
 
 Convention, Democratic National, 
 1864 Declares the war a fail 
 ure, 225; anti-war platform, 324. 
 
 Convention, Republican National, 
 1856 Character of, 27. 
 
 Convention, Republican National, 
 1860 Character of, 27; Seward 
 demonstration, 37, 38; ballots 
 for President, 38, 39. 
 
 Convention, Republican National, 
 1864 Representation of insur 
 gent States in, 120. 
 
 Cook, John E. Hazlitt mistaken 
 f r , 337; romance of the cap 
 ture of, 338; reward for, 339; 
 characteristics of, 340, 347-349; 
 capture by Logan anc Fitz- 
 hugh, 342, 343; taken to Cham- 
 bersburg, 343; negotiations 
 with Dan Logan, 344, 345; be 
 fore Justice Reisher, 345; sent 
 to jail, 346; plans for escape, 
 346-350; the romance of the 
 requisition, 351; surrender, 
 trial, and execution, 351, 352. 
 
 Couch, Darius N. In command 
 at Harrisburg, 1863, 412; has no 
 force to meet McCausland, I 
 1864, 418; retires to Harrisburg, I 
 419. 
 
 Crawford, Samuel W. Given 
 command of Pa. Reserves, 443; 
 asks that his division rejoin the 
 army, 444; at Gettysburg, 445; 
 with his division in Va., 447- 
 453; farewell to Pa. Reserves, 
 
 453, 454- 
 
 Cummings, Alexander Repre 
 sented Cameron at Chicago, 
 1860, 153- 
 
 Curtin, Andrew G. Supports 
 Lincoln at Chicago, 1860, 30, 31; 
 
 candidate for Governor of Pa., 
 32, 33; reasons for opposing 
 Seward, 33-35; reasons for sup 
 porting Lincoln, 35, 36; calls on 
 Weed in Chicago, 41; cam 
 paign of 1860, 42; elected Gov 
 ernor, 43, 47; conference at the 
 White House, 65, 66; not a 
 party to Cabinet pledges, 89; 
 gubernatorial -declination, 1863, 
 89, 90; re-election, 90; begin 
 ning of feud with Cameron, 149; 
 appeals to Stanton for Jere Mc- 
 Kibben, 177; offers McClellan 
 cor mand of Pa. troops, 211; 
 brilliant services of, 248; inau 
 gural address, 249; as a popular 
 leader, 249, 250; early relations 
 with Lincoln, 251; Pa. Reserves, 
 the Governor s call, 252, 253; 
 refused by the government, 
 254; order recalled, but the 
 corps authorized by the Legis 
 lature, 255; appeals to, by War 
 Department, 256, 257; in Lin 
 coln s councils, 258; responsi 
 bilities and achievements, 258, 
 259; relations to Stanton, 259; 
 asks for exchange of prisoners, 
 259, 260; Stanton s support of, 
 for re-election, 260, 261; sug 
 gests Gen. W. B. Franklin for 
 Governor, 261; willing to re 
 tire, 261-265; offered first-class 
 foreign mission, 263; renomina- 
 tion and re-election, 265; de 
 votion to the soldiers, 265; 
 266; care of soldiers or 
 phans, conception of scheme, 
 266, 267; appeals to the 
 Legislature, 268; suggests con 
 ference of War Governors, 268, 
 269; letter concerning the Al- 
 toona Conference, note, 270, 
 272; resolution of thanks, 273; 
 President Grant thanked for 
 nomination of, as minister to 
 Russia, 274; minister to Russia 
 and subsequent services, 275; 
 complimentary vote in Cincin 
 nati Convention, 327; orders 
 Capt. Palmer s company to act 
 as scouts, 395; advised of Lee s 
 movement against Gettysburg, 
 
486 
 
 IXDEX. 
 
 409, 410; a mysterious dispatch 
 to, 410, 412; identity of the 
 sender, 412, 413 ; receives Meade s 
 report of Pickett s repulse, 416; 
 care for the Pa. Reserves, 427. 
 
 Davis, David Supports Lincoln 
 at Chicago, 1860, 37; visits Pa. 
 Republican headquarters, 46; 
 on Lincoln s reticence, 74, 75; 
 a Lincoln organizer, 88; Cabi 
 net places promised by, 89; ne 
 gotiations with Sanderson and 
 Cummings, 153; the Cameron 
 bargain, 159; as a candidate for 
 President, 1872, 326; not nomi 
 nated, 327. 
 
 Davis, Henry Winter Vote for 
 Vice-President in Chicago Con 
 vention, 41 ; distrusts Lincoln, 
 62; in opposition to Lincoln, 
 1864, 117, 139, 322, 323. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson Instructions for 
 Hampton Roads Conference, 
 106; Lincoln s wish for his es 
 cape, 242. 
 
 Dawes, Henry L. Investigates 
 the War Department under 
 Cameron, 160. 
 
 Dayton, William L. Votes re 
 ceived in Chicago Convention, 
 39- 
 
 Defrees, John S. With Lane at 
 Chicago, 1860, 33; at Cincin 
 nati Convention, 1872, 327. 
 
 Democratic Party Strength of, 
 in Pa., 1857-60, 32; anti-war 
 platform of, 324. 
 
 Dennison, William Political mis 
 sion to Pa., 1864, 201; offers 
 McClellan command of Ohio 
 volunteers, 212. 
 
 Dickinson, Daniel S. War Den^- 
 ocrat, 118, 119, 121, 122. 
 
 District of Columbia Slavery 
 abolished in, 103, 280. 
 
 Dix, John A. War Democrat, 
 118, 119, 300. 
 
 Doubleday, Abner At the begin 
 ning of the war, 369, 370. 
 
 Douglas, Stephen A. Sustains 
 Lincoln s administration, 62. 
 
 Drexel, Anthony J. Sympathizes 
 
 with Republican cause, 1860, 42; 
 at luncheon with Grant, 205. 
 
 Early, Jubal A. Orders burning 
 of Chambersburg, 421. 
 
 Easton, Captain His battery at 
 the Chickahominy, 431. 
 
 Ellsworth, Col. E. E. Death of, 
 /o. 
 
 Emancipation Proclamation 
 Preliminary proclamation, 100; 
 States and districts not in 
 cluded in, 107; as a war meas 
 ure, 108; talks with Lincoln on, 
 as a political measure, 111-113; 
 effects of, in State elections, 
 in; compensation for slaves, 
 241. 
 
 Emergency-Men Reynolds sent 
 to Pa. to organize, 396 never 
 serviceable, 407. 
 
 Evarts, William M. Nor --es 
 Seward at Chicago, 1860, 37; 
 moves to make Lincoln s nom 
 ination unanimous, 39; attitude 
 on nomination for Vice-Presi 
 dent, 40. 
 
 Ewell, Richard S. Drives Banks 
 across the Potomac, 394. 
 
 Fenton, Reuben E. At Cincin 
 nati Convention, 1872, 327. 
 
 Fitzhugh, Cleggett Assists in 
 the capture of Cook, 342. 
 
 Floyd, John B. In Buchanan s 
 Cabinet, 297, 300. 
 
 Forney, John W. Defeated for 
 United States Senator, 150, 151; 
 asked to promote Curtin s re 
 tirement, 262, 263. 
 
 Franklin, William B. Suggested 
 by Curtin for Governor of Pa., 
 261. 
 
 Fremont, John C. Nominated 
 for President, 27, 28; vote for, 
 in Chicago Convention, 39; 
 candidature in 1863, 91; procla 
 mation regarding slaves, 161. 
 
 Gettysburg Lee s movement 
 against, 408; Benjamin S. Hu- 
 ber sent to inform Gov. Curtin, 
 409: information from John A. 
 Seiders, 410; story of an un- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 487 
 
 signed message, 410, 412; Lee s 
 
 retreat from, 416; Pa. Reserves 
 
 at, 445, 446. 
 Gilmore, Harry Refrains from 
 
 burning Colonel Boyd s home, 
 
 420, 421. 
 Gorham, George C. Letter on 
 
 Sherman s terms of surrender, 
 
 245- 
 
 Grant, Ulysses S. Virginia cam 
 paign, 1864, 124; magnanimous 
 treatment of Admiral Porter, 
 143; Stanton s relations to, 170; 
 early life, 189, 191; colonel of 
 the Twenty-first 111. V-ls., 191; 
 service in Kentucky and Ten 
 nessee, 192; antagonized by 
 Halleck and McClellan, 192; at 
 Shiloh, 193; inflamed public 
 sentiment against, 193, 194; 
 saved by Lincoln, 196-198; first 
 acquaintance with Lincoln, 198, 
 199; Lincoln doubtful of his po 
 litical sympathies in 1864, 202; 
 fidelity to Lincoln, 204; frank 
 explanation, 205; as a conver 
 sationalist, 206; in war and 
 peace, 206, 207; contrasted with 
 McClellan, 217; thanked by Pa. 
 Legislature for nomination of 
 Curtin as minister to Russia, 
 274; indifference toward Gree- 
 ley, 325; Meade contrasted with, 
 358; injustice to Meade, 361; 
 orders Thomas to attack Hood, 
 365; requests relief of Thomas, 
 366; congratulates Thomas on 
 victory at Nashville, 368; treat- I 
 ment of Fitz John Porter, 374, 
 376; appreciation of Buell, 383; 
 asks for Buell s restoration, 387; 
 
 Greeley, Horace Opposed to 
 Seward in 1860, 30-40; supports 
 Bates, 30; chairman Oregon 
 delegation, Chicago, 1860, 37; ; 
 offers Gov. Morgan nomination 
 for Vice-President, 40; not in 
 accord with Lincoln, 91 ; Lin 
 coln s letter to, on emancipa- j 
 tion, 100; early hostility to Lin- j 
 coin, 312; revolt against Sew 
 ard, 314; support of Lincoln, 
 315; subsequent estrangement, 
 315, 316; in favor of peaceable 
 
 secession, 316; "On to Rich 
 mond!" cry, 318; characteristics 
 of, 319; differences with Lin 
 coln, 319, 320; attitude toward 
 slavery and emancipation, 320, 
 321; opposes Lincoln s renomi- 
 nation, 321; supports Wade and 
 Davis arraignment of Lincoln, 
 322; part in the Jewett-Sanders 
 negotiations, 322, 323; later re 
 lations to Lincoln, 324; in po 
 litical revolt, 325; Grant s indif- 
 | ference, 325; choice of candi 
 dates at Cincinnati in 1872, 326; 
 how nominated, 327, 328; the 
 Democratic endorsement of, 
 329; defeat and death, 331, 332. 
 
 Halleck, Henry W. Made gen- 
 eral-in-chief, [ y 4; antagonizes 
 Grant, but reverses his judg 
 ment, 192; ordered to the field 
 by the President, 107; ordered 
 to Washington as commander- 
 in-chief, 198; belief in Gen. 
 Sherman s imbecility, 231; as 
 sents to relief of Thomas at 
 Nashville, 366; injustice to 
 Buell, Chattanooga campaign, 
 384; explains why Buell could 
 not be restored, 359. 
 Hamlin, Hannibal Vote for 
 Vice-President in Chicago Con 
 vention, 40; Lincoln unfavora 
 ble to re-election of, 115; why 
 nominated in 1860, 117; forces 
 demoralized, 122; Lincoln s feel 
 ings toward, 128; no deceit to 
 ward, 129; knowledge of Lin 
 coln s wishes, letter to Judge 
 Pettis, 129, 130. 
 
 Hampton, Wade Receives sur 
 render of Chambersburg, 402. 
 Hatch, O. M. A Lincoln organ 
 izer, 88. 
 
 Hazlehurst, Isaac American can 
 didate for Governor of Pa., 32. 
 Hazlitt, Albert Arrested in the 
 Cumberland Valley, 337; the 
 romance of the requisition, 351. 
 Herndon, William H. On Lin 
 coln s confidences, 74, 76. 
 Hickman, John Vote for Vice- 
 
488 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 President in Chicago Conven 
 tion, 40. 
 
 Holt, Joseph War Democrat, 
 118; receives Lincoln s ostensi 
 ble support for Vice-President, 
 1864, 122; in Buchanan s Cabi 
 net, 300. 
 
 Hooker, Joseph Urges a dicta 
 torship on McClellan, 223. 
 
 Huber, Benjamin S. Carries 
 news of Lee s movement against 
 Gettysburg to Governor Cur 
 tin 409. 
 
 Hunter, David Vandalism of, 
 258, 259. 
 
 Indiana Doubtful in 1864, 120. 
 
 Jenkins Captures Chambers- 
 burg, 1863, 407, 408. 
 
 Jewett, William Cornell As a 
 peacemaker, 322. 
 
 Johnson, Albert E. H. Letter 
 on Stanton, note, 176. 
 
 Johnson, Andrew Lincoln fa 
 vors, for Vice-President, 1864, 
 115; Gen. Sickles mission to, 
 119; nomination accomplished, 
 122; Lincoln s reasons for his 
 nomination, 128, 129; Stanton s 
 hostility to, 187; admonished by 
 Grant, 206; repudiates Stanton s 
 violent treatment of Gen. Sher 
 man, 240; Stevens dislike of, 
 281, 282; hostility of Stevens, 
 285, 286; attempt to supersede 
 Grant, 370. 
 
 Johnston, Joseph E. Surrenders 
 to Sherman, 234, 235; terms ac 
 corded by Sherman, 236. 
 
 Jones, Lieutenant Reached 
 Chambersburg from Harper s 
 Ferry, 392. 
 
 Judd, Norman B. Supports Lin 
 coln at Chicago, 1860, 37; at 
 tends Mrs. Lincoln at Harris- 
 burg, 52; a Lincoln organizer, 
 88. 
 
 Kagi,John Henry With Meriam 
 in Chambersburg, 335, 336; 
 killed at Harper s Ferry, 336. 
 
 Kimmell, Francis M. Method of 
 
 sending news of Lee s invasion,. 
 410. 
 
 Lamon, Ward H. Dines with 
 Lincoln and Curtin at Harris- 
 burg, 51; accompanies Lincoln 
 to Washington, 53; on Lin 
 coln s character, 76; Lincoln s 
 letter to, at Baltimore Conven 
 tion, 122. 
 
 Lane, Henry S. Supports Lin 
 coln at Chicago, 1860, 30, 31; 
 candidate for Governor of Ind., 
 32, 33; reasons for opposing 
 Seward, 33-35; reasons for sup 
 porting Lincoln, 35, 36; elected 
 Governor of Ind., 43; not a 
 party to Cabinet pledges, 89. 
 
 Lane, Mrs. Henry S. Letter 
 from, note, 30, 31. 
 
 Lee, Robert E. Criticism of his 
 campaigns, 217; Maryland cam 
 paign in 1862, 394, 395; invasion 
 of Pa. in 1863, 407, 408; council 
 in public square in Chambers- 
 burg, 409; retreat from Gettys 
 burg, 416. 
 
 Lewis, Joseph J. Protests against 
 Chase for Chief Justice, 141, 142. 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham His nomina 
 tion unexpected, 27; character 
 of his support, 27-29; support 
 of Curtin and Lane, 30; attitude 
 toward slavery, 34; Pennsylva 
 nia s attitude toward, 36; en 
 thusiasm for, 36, 37; nominated, 
 38; McClure s first visit to, 44; 
 sends Davis and Swett to Pa., 
 46; letters to McClure destroy 
 ed, 48; invites McClure to 
 Springfield, 48; the interview, 
 49; Curtin s guest on his way 
 to Washington, 50; fears of as 
 sassination, 50, 51; reception 
 and dinner, 51; arrangements 
 for the journey, 51-53; the jour 
 ney, 54, 55; his regrets, 55; sen 
 sational stories, 56; arrival in 
 Washington, 57; distrust of his 
 ability, 59; his fitness for the 
 Presidency, 60, 61; difficulty of 
 formulating a policy, 63; epi 
 gram on the spoilsmen, 64; con 
 ference with Curtin and Me- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 489 
 
 Clure touching defence of Pa., 
 65, 66; characteristics, 72; his 
 confidence, how far given, 74; 
 his reticence, 77; intellectual or 
 ganization, 78; a man of the 
 people, 80; his political sagac 
 ity, 81; averts a draft riot, 82, 
 83; in politics, 85; Presidential 
 aspirations, 87; no knowledge 
 of Cabinet promises, 89; offers 
 French mission to J. G. Ben 
 nett, 90; letter to General Sher 
 man, 93; solution of mustering- 
 in difficulty in Pa., 94, 95; views 
 of slavery, 98; Emancipation 
 Proclamation, 100; nswer to 
 Chicago clerical delegation, 101; 
 waiting for victory, 102; plan 
 of compensated emancipation, 
 103, 104; Hunter s order re 
 voked, 104; compensated eman 
 cipation at Hampton Roads 
 Conference, 106; congratulated 
 on achievement of emancipa 
 tion, no; Johnson for Vice- 
 President, 1864, 115; leaders in 
 opposition to, 117; wants a War 
 Democrat on ticket, 118; elec 
 toral purposes of, 119, 120; 
 manipulation of Cameron, 121; 
 interview with Lamon and 
 Swett, 122; relations to Mc- 
 Clure and Cameron, 123, 124; 
 fears defeat, 125, 126; reasons 
 for Johnson s nomination, 128, , 
 129; no deceit toward Hamlin, 
 129; Chase s attitude toward, 
 132-134; proposes to "decline" 
 Chase, anecdote, 135; desire for 
 renomination, 136; doubts, 137; 
 strained relations with Chase, 
 137-139; discusses Stanton as a 
 possible Chief Justice, 142; mag 
 nanimity toward Chase, 143, 
 144; relations toward Cameron, i 
 147; the War Secretaryship, 
 154; letters to Cameron, 155- 
 157; subsequent action, 157-160; 
 exculpation of Cameron, 161; 
 relieves Fremont, and recalls 
 Cameron s report touching sla 
 very, 161-163; letter removing 
 Cameron from War Depart 
 ment, 164, 165; letter recalled, 
 
 165; appointment of Stanton, 
 165, 166; Stanton s attitude to 
 ward, 171-173; attitude toward 
 Stanton, 173; treatment of the 
 McKibben case, 178-181; for 
 bearance shown McClellan, 182, 
 183; visit to Gen. Scott at West 
 Point, 183; gives McClellan 
 command of the defences of 
 Washington, 184; compels Stan- 
 ton s obedience, 185; never con 
 templated removing Stanton, 
 186; pressure on, for Grant s re 
 moval, 193-196; his method to 
 save Grant, 196-198; asks Mc- 
 Clure and MacVeagh to co-op 
 erate with Republican State 
 Committee in Pa. in 1864, 200; 
 solicitude in regard to result in 
 Nov., 201, 202; McClure s in 
 terview with, regarding the sol 
 dier vote, 202,203; Grant s fidel 
 ity to, 204, 205; relations to Mc 
 Clellan, 208, 210; McClellan s 
 accusations, 215, 216; trust in 
 McClellan, 218; McClellan s po 
 litical and military protests to, 
 219, 220; magnanimity toward 
 Hooker, 223; fears success of 
 McClellan s Presidential candi 
 dature, 224; views of the conse 
 quences, 225; first meeting with 
 Gen. Sherman, 227; early esti 
 mate of Sherman, 230; later 
 confidence in Sherman, 234; 
 views of reconstruction, 236, 
 240, 241 ; instructions to Sher 
 man, 236, 237; message to Gov. 
 Vance, 237; compensation for 
 slavery, 241 ; wish for Jefferson 
 Davis escape, 242; fears re 
 garding the South, 242, 243; in 
 structions to Gen. Weitzel, 243, 
 244; relations with Curtin, 251; 
 Curtin in councils of, 258; Cur- 
 tin appeals to, for exchange of 
 prisoners, 260; offers first-class 
 foreign mission to Curtin, 263; 
 approved Altoona Conference, 
 note, 272; contrasted with Ste 
 vens, 277; methods in contrast 
 with Stevens , 279, 280, 284, 285; 
 early policy identical with Bu 
 chanan s, 297, 304, 310; early 
 
490 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 hostility of Greeley to, 312; 
 Greeley s support of, 315; sub 
 sequent estrangement of Gree 
 dy* 3i5 3i6; embarrassed by 
 Greeley, 316, 317; Greeley op 
 poses renomination of, 321; 
 Wade and Davis arraignment 
 of, 322; share in Greeley -Jewett 
 negotiations, 323; Greeley s 
 later relations to, 324; dissatis 
 fied with Meade after Gettys 
 burg, 359, 360. 
 
 Lincoln, Mrs. Disinclined to the 
 secret journey of the President 
 elect, 52; passes through Balti 
 more, 55. 
 
 Logan, Daniel Account of, 341; 
 capture of Cook, 342; to allow 
 Cook to escape, 344-346. 
 
 Logan, Hugh Account of, 341; 
 in Chambersburg with Stuart s 
 cavalry, 402; makes a bold 
 promise, 406. 
 
 Logan, John A. Political ser 
 vices in 1864, 93; sent to relieve 
 Thomas at Nashville, 367. 
 
 McCall, George A. Given com 
 mand of Pa. Reserves, 425; or 
 dered to hold Fredericksburg, 
 1862, 428; skillful conduct at 
 Games Mills, 430; at Savage 
 Station, 433, 434; captured, 434; 
 exchanged and resigns, 436. 
 
 McCandless, William Wounded 
 at the Wilderness, 450. 
 
 McCausland, General Threatens 
 Chambersburg, 418; seizes and 
 burns the town, 419, 420. 
 
 McClellan, George B. Called to 
 the command, 69, 212; Burn- 
 side on his tardiness, 70; can 
 didature in 1864, 91; could have 
 defeated Lincoln, 124; Stanton s 
 relations to, as Secretary of 
 War, 165, 166; Stanton s rela 
 tions to, 170-182; petulant mes 
 sage to Stanton, 183; in com 
 mand of the defences of Wash 
 ington, 184, 185, 220; antago 
 nizes Grant, 192; as a military 
 commander, 208; explanations 
 of failure, 210, 211; offered com 
 mand of Pa, troops, 211, 425; 
 
 accepts command of Ohio vol 
 unteers, 212; believes himself 
 victim of a conspiracy, 213-215; 
 compared with Lee and Grant, 
 217; affection of his soldiers for, 
 218; Lincoln s trust in, 218, 219; 
 caustic political criticism, 2jp; 
 personal feeling toward "Gn- 
 coln, 219, 220; Lincoln s treat 
 ment of, 220, 221; contemplates 
 a dictatorship, 222-224; candi 
 date for President, 224, 225; 
 Lincoln s view of consequences 
 of election of, 225; Stevens ha 
 tred of, 282; information of 
 Lee s movements before Antie- 
 tam, 395; orders McClure to 
 obstruct Lee s advance, 396; 
 after Antietam, 441; Fredericks- 
 burg report, 432. 
 
 McClure, Alexander K. With 
 Curtin at Chicago, 1860, 33; 
 calls on Weed in Chicago, 41; 
 discouragements in Pa. cam 
 paign in 1860, 41, 42; calls on 
 Seward, 42; first visit to Lin 
 coln, 44; meets Da^as and 
 Swett at Republican head 
 quarters, 46; visits Lincoln at 
 Springfield, 1861, 48; the inter 
 view, 49, 154, 155; meeting at 
 Harrisburg, 50; conference at 
 the White House, 65, 66; on 
 Lincoln s characteristics, 76,77; 
 orgaj izes draft in Pa., 80; ef 
 forts to muster conscripts, 94; 
 interview with Lincoln, 94, 95; 
 Lincoln s solution, 95, 96; talks 
 with Lincoln on Emancipation 
 Proclamation, 111-113; instruc 
 tions for, in letter to Lamon, 
 122; delegate-at-large from Pa., 
 123; interview with Lincoln 
 political prospects, 1864, 125, 
 126; Johnson s nomination, in 
 terview with Lincoln, 127, 128; 
 Chase s candidature, Lincoln 
 on, 134-136; Lincoln s letter re 
 moving Cameron from War 
 Department shown to, 164; es 
 timate of Cameron, 166-168; 
 appeals to Lincoln on behalf of 
 Jere McKibben, 178-181; inter 
 view with Stanton, 179-181; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 491 
 
 finds Stanton gracious, 181,182; 
 belief in Grant s failure at Shi- 
 loh, 194, 195; asked by Lincoln 
 to co-operate with Republican 
 State Committee in Pa. in 1864, 
 200; interview with Lincoln re 
 garding the soldier vote in 
 1864, 202, 203; testifies to 
 Grant s fidelity to Lincoln, 204; 
 meeting with Grant in Phila., 
 205; anecdote of Lincoln and 
 Sherman, 235; tribute to Cur- 
 tin, 248; seeks to promote Cur- 
 tin s retirement, 262, 263; rela 
 tions to Stevens, 292; in Cin 
 cinnati Convention, 1872, 325; 
 attitude in regard to Greeley s 
 nomination, 325, 326; supports 
 Charles Francis Adams, 326; 
 disappointed with Greeley s 
 nomination, 329; Greeley s 
 last letter to, 331; draws 
 Meriam s will, 335, 336; counsel 
 for Captain Cook, 3^8, 345; 
 meeting with Cook, 345, 346; 
 interviews in the jail, 346-349; 
 first meeting with Gen. Meade, 
 359 J witli Gen. Thomas, 369; as 
 a military commander, 1862, 
 395, 396; ordered by McClellan 
 to obstruct Lee s advance, 396; 
 warns Capt. Palmer at An- 
 tietam, 397; plan to prevent 
 Palmer s identification, 398; 
 hears of Stuart s intended raid, 
 399; surrender of Chambers- 
 burg demanded of, 402; meets 
 Gen. Hampton, 402; meets 
 Hugh Logan, 402; arrest by 
 otu-irt ordered, 402, 403; experi 
 ence with a detachment of Stu 
 art s cavalry, 403-405; identity 
 of his Confederate guests, 405, 
 406; how advised of Lee s inva 
 sion, 1863, 407; arrest of, again 
 ordered, 408; fails to obtain 
 Christian burial for a Confed 
 erate officer, 416, 417; house at 
 Chambersburg burned by Mc- 
 Causland s cavalry, 419. 
 
 McDowell, Irwin Pa. Reserves 
 in corps of, 427, 428. 
 
 McKibben, Jere Stanton s treat 
 ment of, 177-181. 
 
 McLean, John Votes received in 
 Chicago Convention, 39; rea 
 sons for Stevens support of, 
 281. 
 
 MacVeagh, Wayne Assists Re 
 publican State Committee in 
 Pa. in 1864, 200; bears Meade s 
 report of Pickett s repulse to 
 Gov. Curtin, 416. 
 
 Meade, George G. Furloughs 
 Pa. soldiers in 1864, 203; an un 
 rewarded hero, 355; military 
 career of, 356; Gettysburg 
 campaign, 356-358; contrasted 
 with Grant, 358; characteristics 
 of, 359; less of the Lieutenant- 
 Generalship, 359, 360; confi 
 dence and disappointment, 361, 
 362; contrasted with Thomas, 
 362; given command of bri 
 gade, Pa. Reserves, 425; at 
 Dranesville, 426; wounded 
 at Savage Station, 434; in com 
 mand of Pa. Reserves, 438; 
 with the Reserves at South 
 Mountain, 439; at Antietam, 
 439, 440; back to his division, 
 441 ; in command of Fifth corps, 
 442, 443; sword presented by 
 Pa. Reserves, 447. 
 
 Medill, Joseph A Lincoln or 
 ganizer, 88. 
 
 Meredith, William M. Presses 
 for exchange of prisoners, 260. 
 
 Meriam, Francis J. Makes his 
 will, 335, 336; escapes, 337. 
 
 Milroy, Gen. Stampede into Pa., 
 407. 
 
 Morgan, Edwin D. Supports 
 Seward at Chicago, 1860, 37: of 
 fered nomination for Vice- 
 President, 40; remains at head 
 of National Committee, 41; de 
 clined to join Altoona Confer 
 ence, note, 272. 
 
 Morton, Oliver P. Elected Gov 
 ernor of Ind., 93; hostility to 
 Buell, 385. 
 
 New York Herald Supports 
 Lincoln s re-election, 91. 
 
 New York Tribune Influence of, 
 in 1860, 29; not in accord with 
 Lincoln, 91 ; in campaign of 
 
492 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 1860, 314, 315; favors peace 
 able secession, 316. 
 Niccolls, Samuel J. At the 
 the burning of Mr. McClure s 
 house, 419, 420. 
 
 Ord, E. O. C. Given command 
 brigade Pa. Reserves, 425; at 
 Dranesville, 426; ordered to the 
 Shenandoah Valley, 428. 
 
 O Rourke, Captain Testimonial 
 of Pa. Reserves to, 442. 
 
 Packer, William F. Elected Gov 
 ernor of Pa., 1857, 32. 
 
 Palmer, Capt. W. J. Serves as 
 a scout in Maryland in 1862, 
 395; continues to enter Lee s 
 lines in Va., 397; arrested, but 
 escapes identification, 397, 398. 
 
 Parker, John B. On Gov. Cur- 
 tin s staff, 256. 
 
 Patterso i, Robert Asks for more 
 soldiers, note, 253; his army at 
 Chambersburg, 393. 
 
 Pennsylvania Campaign of 1860, 
 42-47; defence of, 65, 66; draft 
 in, 80; opposition in Schuylkill 
 county, 81, 82; Lincoln on poli 
 tics in, 85, 87; State draft of 
 1862, 93, 94; doubtful in, 1864, 
 126; law regulating elections in 
 the army, 177; Republican party 
 beaten in October elections, 
 1864, 199; Lincoln s solicitude 
 in regard to the result in, in 
 Nov., 201, 202; the soldier 
 vote, 202, 203. 
 
 Pennsylvania Reserves Gov. 
 Curtin s call, 252; Gen. Patter 
 son s letter, note, 253; their ac 
 ceptance refused, 254; the com 
 mand authorized, 255; begin 
 active service, 256, 257; organ 
 ization of, 42?; command given 
 to Gen. McCall, 425; at Dranes 
 ville, 426; with McDowell s 
 corps, 426; on the right of Mc- 
 Clellan s army, 429; in the bat 
 tle of Games Mills, 429-431 ; 
 at Savage Station, 432; in the 
 battle, 433-435; losses before 
 Richmond, 435; Reynolds suc 
 ceeds McCall, 436; join Pope at 
 
 Warrenton Junction, 436, 437; 
 at the second battle of Man- 
 assas, 437, 438; Meade in com 
 mand, 438; at the battle of 
 South Mountain, 439; at An- 
 tietam, 439, 440; at Fredericks- 
 burg, 441, 442; effort to with 
 draw for reorganization, 443; 
 Gen. Crawford in command of, 
 443, 444; march into Md. and 
 Pa., 444,445; at Gettysburg, 445; 
 446; again in Va., 447; brisk 
 action at Bristoe Station, 448; 
 at the battle of the Wilderness, 
 449, 450; continued fighting, 
 451-453; services ended, 453; 
 Gen. Crawford s farewell, 453, 
 454; their return home, 454; 
 tribute to, 455, 456. 
 Pinkerton, Allan Convinced of 
 
 Lincoln s danger, 50. 
 Pomeroy, Stephen W. Sender of 
 the mysterious Kimmell mes 
 sage, 412; letter telling the his 
 tory of, 413-415. 
 
 Pope, John Given command of 
 Army of Virginia, 184; military 
 incompetency of, 373; prefers 
 charges against Fitz John Por 
 ter, 374; falls back from the 
 Rapidan, 437. 
 
 Porter, David D. Grant s mag 
 nanimity toward, 143; testi 
 mony to Lincoln s instructions 
 to Sherman, 240. 
 
 Porter, Fitz John Lincoln and 
 Stanton on judgment against, 
 186; an unrewarded hero, 355; 
 military injustice to, 371, 372; 
 antebellum and early war rec 
 ord, 372, 373; alleged dis 
 obedience of Pope s orders, 373; 
 services at Antietam, 373, 374; 
 Pope s charges, 374; fruitless 
 efforts to obtain justice, 374, 
 375; censure removed, 375; 
 Gen. Terry s generous con 
 duct toward, 376; career since 
 the war, 376, 377. 
 
 Potts, Joseph E. On Gov. Cur- 
 tin s staff, 256. 
 
 Raymond, Henry J. In Lin 
 coln s confidence in 1864, 121 
 
INDEX. 
 
 493 
 
 Read, John M. Vote received in* 1 
 Chicago Convention, 39. 
 
 Reader, Andrew H. For Cam- ! 
 eron for President, 1860, 35; 
 vote received for Vice-Presi 
 dent in Chicago Convention, 39. 
 
 Republican Party Formation of, 
 27, 28; in Pa. in 1860, 31, 32; 
 in Ind., 1860, 32; campaign in 
 Pa., 1860, 42; discord in, 60; 
 leaders distracted in 1864, 117. 
 
 Reynolds, John F. Sent to or- j 
 ganize emergency men, 1862, 
 396; at Gettysburg, 415; given 
 command of brigade Pa. Re 
 serves, 425; at Dranesville, 426; 
 captured, 431; exchanged and j 
 in command of Pa. Reserves, 
 436; at the second battle of 
 Manassas, 437, 438; relieved 
 and ordered to Harrisburg, 
 438; with First army corps, 441. 
 
 Rice, Perry A. One of Stuart s \ 
 Pa. prisoners, 402; death in 
 Libby Prison, 406. 
 
 Roberts, R. Biddle On Gov. 
 Curtin s staff, 256, 441. 
 
 Rosecrans, William S. Succeeds 
 Buell in Tennessee, 386. 
 
 Sanders, George N. As a peace 
 maker, 322. 
 
 Sanderson, John P. Represented 
 Cameron at Chicago, 1860, 153; 
 confers with Lincoln at Spring 
 field, 157, 158. 
 
 Schofield, John M. Joins 
 Thomas at Nashville, 365; 
 order to relieve Thomas, 366; 
 reviews judgment against Fitz 
 John Porter, 375. 
 
 Scott, Thomas A. Dines with 
 Lincoln, 51; arranges for Lin 
 coln s journey to Washington, 
 52, 53; Lincoln s letter remov 
 ing Cameron from War De 
 partment shown to, 164; be 
 lieved Gen. Sherman a lunatic, 
 230; on Gov. Curtin s staff, 
 256. 
 
 Scott, Winfield Warns Lincoln, 
 50; estimate of, in 1861, 65, 66; 
 on the military situation, 67, 68; 
 in his dotage, 69; Lincoln s visit 
 
 to, at West Point, 183 ; urges 
 Buchanan to reinforce South 
 ern forts, 302, 303. 
 
 Seiders, John A. Reports 
 Rhodes movement from Car 
 lisle toward Gettysburg, 410. 
 
 Seward, William H. Before Chi 
 cago, 1860, 28; why opposed by 
 Curtin and Lane, 33, 34; 
 earnestness of the contest, 37; 
 indifference of, in campaign of 
 1860, 41; warns Lincoln, 50; 
 meets the President-elect, 57; 
 accepts and then declines office 
 under Lincoln, 59, 60; disbelief 
 in civil war, 60; favors a foreign 
 war, 61; favors Johnson for 
 Vice-President, 1864, 121; favors 
 Cameron for War portfolio, 
 159; Greeley s revolt against, 
 
 3i4- 
 
 Seymour, Horatio Nominated 
 for President, 1868, 145. 
 
 Seymour, Truman At Savage 
 Station, 435; at South Moun 
 tain, 439; at Antietam, 440. 
 
 Sheridan, Philip H. Victories in 
 1864, 124; furloughs Pa. sol 
 diers in 1864, 203; appointment 
 as Lieutenant-General 359-361; 
 accusations against Warren at 
 Five Forks, 379; persistent in 
 justice to Warren, 380, 381. 
 Sherman, John Support of Lin 
 coln, 62; visits Lincoln with 
 Capt. Sherman, note, 237; on 
 Lincoln s views of the restora 
 tion of State governments in 
 the South, note, 238; urges ac 
 ceptance of Pa. Reserves, 254. 
 
 Sherman, William T. Furloughs 
 soldiers to vote, 1864, 93; cap 
 tures Atlanta, 124; first meeting 
 with Lincoln, 227; declines 
 clerkship in War Department 
 and a Missouri brigadiership, 
 228; appointed colonel Thir 
 teenth regiment U. S. A., 229; 
 character of, 229, 230; Lincoln s 
 early estimate of, 230; regarded 
 as a lunatic, 230, 231; reasons 
 for the assumption, 231, 252; 
 conference with Cameron, 231, 
 2-?2; military services of, 232- 
 
494 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 234; Lincoln s later confidence 
 in, 234; Johnston s surrender 
 to, 234, 235; terms of, 236; Lin 
 coln s views and instructions, 
 236, 237; John Sherman s let 
 ter, note, 238; assassination of 
 Lincoln, 239; Stanton s violent 
 rejection of Sherman s terms, 
 240; Gorham s letter, note, 245. 
 
 Sickles, Daniel E. Mission to 
 Tennessee, 1864, 119. 
 
 Simmons, Col. Goes to relief of 
 Col. Wallace, 256. 
 
 Slavery Lincoln s early attitude j 
 toward, 34; position toward, as j 
 President, 98; Emancipation, 
 preliminary proclamation and 
 letter to Greeley, 100; destruc 
 tion by Congressional action, 
 103; in the Border States, 103; 
 104; constitutional emancipa 
 tion, 109; constitutional amend- \ 
 ment abolishing, 109, no; Dem 
 ocratic votes for amendment, 
 no; amendment ratified, in; 
 compensation for emancipation, 
 126, 127; Lincoln s attitude on 
 Cameron s and Fremont s 
 actions, 161-163; compensated 
 emancipation, 241. 
 
 Smith, C. R Named by Mc- 
 Clellan to succeed Grant, 102. 
 
 Smith, Caleb B. In Lincoln s 
 Cabinet, 60. 
 
 Smith, Captain Burns Mr. Mc- 
 Clure s house at Chambers- 
 burg, 419. 
 
 South Carolina President Bu 
 chanan s policy, 301, 302. 
 
 Stanton, Edwin M. Nomination 
 as Secretary of War, 77; orders 
 the military to Schuylkill 
 county, 81; orders superseded, 
 83; supports Chase for chief- 
 justice, 141; considered by Lin 
 coln for chief-justice, 142; rea 
 sons for appointment to War 
 Department, 165, 166; character 
 of, 170, 171; attitude toward 
 Lincoln, 171-183, 214, 215; ser 
 vices in Buchanan s Cabinet, 
 171, 172; virulent letters to Bu 
 chanan, 172. 173; change of 
 tone, 174; as Secretary of War, 
 
 174-177; telegraphic facilities, 
 note, 176; hatreds, 177; treat 
 ment of Jere McKibben, 177- 
 181; hatred of McClellan, 182; 
 hostility to McClellan s rein 
 statement, 184, 185; disobe 
 dience to Lincoln, 185; more 
 resentments, 185, 186; conflict 
 with President Johnson, 187; 
 in retirement, 187, 188; Mc 
 Clellan s accusations, 214, 215; 
 on dictatorship, 223; violent re 
 jection of Sherman s terms to 
 Johnston, 240; Curtin s rela 
 tions to, 259; supports Gov. 
 Curtin for re-election, 260; 
 subsequent unfriendliness, 260, 
 261; influence in Buchanan s 
 Cabinet, 300; dissatisfaction 
 with Thomas, 365; hatred of 
 Buell, 383, 387, 388. 
 
 States Rights Question of, 62. 
 
 Stephens, Alex. H. Demands 
 recognition of the Confederacy 
 at Hampton Roads Conference, 
 1 06. 
 
 Stev.ns, Thaddeus Supports 
 McLean for President, 1860, 35; 
 closes debate on constitutional 
 amendment abolishing slavery, 
 no; attitude toward Lincoln, 
 1864, 126; contrasted with Lin 
 coln, 277; courageous for jus 
 tice, 278; as the Commoner of 
 the republic, 278, 279; methods 
 in contrast with Lincoln s, 279; 
 280; abolition of slavery in 
 District of Columbia, 280, 281; 
 reasons for sunporting Mc 
 Lean in 1860, 281; reluctant 
 vote for Johnston for Vice- 
 President at Baltimore, 281, 
 282; eagerness of, to enter Lin 
 coln s Cabinet, 282, 283; pro 
 tests against Cameron s ap 
 pointment, 283; previous Cab 
 inet disappointment, 283; con 
 flicts with Lincoln, 284; hostile 
 attitude toward Johnson, 285, 
 286; his disappointment over 
 his own career, 286; love for 
 his mother, 287; the measures 
 formulated by, 287, 288; recon 
 struction policy, 288-292; as a 
 
INDEX. J 
 
 495 
 
 lawyer, 293; death, 294, 295; 
 estimate of two commanders, 
 396, 397- 
 
 Stuart, J. E. B. Raid into the 
 Cumberland Valley, 399; arrest 
 of civilians in Pa., 1862, 402. 
 
 Sumner, Charles Vote for in 
 Chicago Convention, 39; dis 
 trusts Lincoln, 62; supports ! 
 Chase for chief-justice, 140, , 
 141; tribute to Stevens, 295. 
 
 Sumner, Col. Disappointment 
 over Lincoln s departure from 
 Harrisburg to Washington, 53. 
 
 Swett, Leonard Letter to Mr. 
 Drummond, 29; supports Lin 
 coln at Chicago, 1860, 37; visits 
 Pa. Republican headquarters, 
 46; on Lincoln s characteristics, 
 75; a Lincoln organizer, 88; 
 reluctant support of Johnson at 
 Baltimore, 1864, 122; at Cincin 
 nati Convention, 1872, 327. 
 
 Taney, Roger B. Death of, 140. 
 
 Taylor, Col. Killed at Gettys 
 burg, 445, 446. 
 
 Tennessee Represented in Re 
 publican National Convention, 
 1864, 1 20. 
 
 Terry, A. H. Reviews judgment 
 in case of Fitz John Porter, 
 375; generous conduct toward 
 Porter, 376. 
 
 Thomas, George H. An unre 
 warded hero, 355; contrasted 
 with Meade, 362; military rec 
 ord of, 363, 364; his position at 
 Nashville and impending re 
 moval, 337-367; Gen. Logan s 
 mission, 367; battle of Nash 
 ville, 367, 368; vindicated by the 
 result, 368, 369; characteristics 
 of, 369. 370; refuses nomination 
 as General by brevet, 372; 
 career after the war, 372, 373; 
 requests recall of order reliev 
 ing Buell, 385, 386. 
 
 Thomas, Philip Succeeds Cobb 
 in Buchanan s Cabinet, 300. 
 
 Thomson, John Edgar Soldiers 
 orphans schools, 267. 
 
 Tilden, Samuel J. Controls Dem 
 
 ocratic National Convention, 
 1868, 145. 
 
 Townsend, Assistant Adjutant- 
 General Mission to Harris- 
 burg, 82. 
 
 Trumbull, Lyman -Distrust of 
 Lincoln, 62; reports constitu 
 tional amendment abolishing 
 slavery, 109. 
 
 Virginia Lincoln s instructions 
 to Weitzel, 243; order revoked, 
 244. 
 
 Voorhees, Daniel W. Defends 
 Captain Cook, 352. 
 
 Wade, Benjamin F. Votes re 
 ceived in Chicago Convention, 
 39; distrusts Lincoln, 62; in op 
 position to Lincoln, 1864, 117, 
 139, 322, 324- 
 
 War for the Union In 1864, 117; 
 military and political situation, 
 124; declared a failure by Dem 
 ocratic National Convention, 
 225; Greeley s war issues, 318, 
 
 319- 
 
 Warren, G. K. An unrewarded 
 hero, 355; military career of, 
 377-379; Sheridan s allegations 
 at Five Forks, 379; ineffectual 
 efforts I secure justice, 380, 
 381; death, 381. 
 
 Washburne, Elihu B. Meets 
 Lincoln on his arrival in Wash 
 ington, 57; justifies Grant s 
 conduct at Shiloh, 194. 
 ; Washington Threatened, 67; 
 McClellan in command of de 
 fences of, 184, 185. 
 
 Weed, Thurlow Greeley s rela 
 tions toward 1860, 30; seeks to 
 control Lane, note, 31; Seward 
 leader at Chicago, 37; displeas 
 ure over Lincoln s nomination, 
 40-42; favors Johnson for Vice- 
 President, 1864, 121; favors 
 Cameron for War portfolio, 
 159; relations to Seward and 
 Greeley, 315. 
 
 Welles, Gideon In Lincoln s 
 Cabinet, 60; on Lincoln s pol 
 icy of reconstruction, 242-244. 
 
 Weitzel, Godfrey Lincoln s or 
 der regarding Virginia Legis- 
 
496 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 lature, 243; order revoked, 244. 
 
 Whitehead, Thomas W. Mr. 
 McClure s two meetings with, 
 406. 
 
 Willard, Governor Captain 
 Cook s brother-in-law. 344; ef 
 forts in Cook s behalf, 352. 
 
 Wilmot, David Republican can 
 didate for Governor of Pa., 32; 
 supports Lincoln at Chicago, 
 1860, 35- 
 
 Wilson, James F. Offers amend 
 ment to the constitution abol 
 ishing slavery, 109. 
 
 Wilson, William W. Services as 
 a military telegrapher, 395. 
 
 Wise, Henry A. Offers reward 
 for Cook s arrest, 339; insists 
 on Cook s execution, 352. 
 
 Wood, General Incredulity re 
 garding Stuart s raid, 1862, 
 399, 401. 
 
 Woodward, George W. Opposes 
 Curtin for Governor of Pa, 
 1863, 90. 
 
 Wright, John A. On Gov. Cur- 
 tin s staff, 256. 
 
 Yates, Richard Appoints Grant 
 colonel Twenty-first Illinois 
 Volunteers, 191; he tility to 
 Buell, 385- 
 
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