INTUITIONS OF THE MIND
INDUCTIVELY INVESTIGATED.
BY THE
REV. JAMES M'COSH, LL.D.,
PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN QUEEN'S COLLEGE, BELFAST,
AUTHOR OF'TEE METELOD OF TIE DIVINE GOVERNMENT PEYSICAL AND MORAL,' AND
JOINT AUTHOR OF'TYPICAL FORMS AND SPECIAL ENDS IN CREATION.
NEW YORK:
ROBERT CARTER AND BROTIIERS,
530, BROADWAY.
1860.
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CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
Page
AIM OF TiHE WOK ANI) METIODI) OF INQUIRY...... i1
tart firot.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE INTUITIVE
CCNVICTIONS OF THE MIND.
BOOK I.
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS REGARDING INTUITIONS.
CHAPTER I.
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS.
Sect. I. No Innate Mental Images or Representations....
Sect. II. No Innate, Abstract, or General Notions.....
Sect. III. No A Priori Forms imposed by the Mind on Objects
Sect. IV. The Intuitions are not immediately before Conscious  ness as Laws or Principles...............
CHAPTER II.
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS.
Sect. I. There are Intuitive Principles operating in the M~ind.
Sect. II. The Native Convictions of the Mind are of the Nature
of Perceptions or Intuitions................
Sect. III. Intuitive Convictions rise on the Contemplation of Ob  jects presented or represented to the Mlind.......
4.
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16
1.9
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29
30 
CONTENTS.
Page
Sect. IV. The Intuitions of the Mind are primarily directed to
Individual Objects................... 
Sect. V. The Individual Intuitive Convictions can be generalized
into Maxims, and these are entitled to be represented as Phi  losophic Principles....................
BOOK II.
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS AND METHOD OF
. EMPLOYING THEM.
CIIAPTER I.
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES OF INTUITIONS.
Sect. I. Tests.......................
Sect. II. Different Aspects of Intuitions, and their Theoretical
Characters......................
Sect. III. Certain Misapprehensions in regard to the Character
of Intuitive Convictions.................
Sect. IV. Certain Practical Characteristics.........
CHAPTER II.
METHIIOD OF EMPLOYING INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES.
Sect. I. The Spontaneous and Reflex Use of Intuitive Principles
Sect. II. Sources of Error in Metaphysical Speculation..,
Sect. III. Conditions of the Legitimacy of the Appeal to Intuitive
Principles........................
Sect. IV. Method of Investigating and Interpreting our Intui  tions...........................
Sect. V. What Explanation can be given of the Intuitions of the
Mind.........................
CHAPTER III.
(SUPPLEME[NTARY.) BRIEF (CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPI NIONS IN REGARD TO INTUITIVE TRUTHS.....
iv
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33
37
41
55
59
62
69
76
85
92
98 
CONTENTS.
Part   $ccot.
PARTICULAR EXAMINATION OF THE INTUITIONS.
BOOK I.
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
CHAPTER I.
BODY AND SPIRIT.
Page
119
122
Sect. I. The Mind begins its Intelligent Acts with Knowledge.
The Simple Cognitive Powers..............
Sect. II. Our Intuitive Cognitions of Body.........
Sect. III. Some Distinctions to be attended to in regard to our
Cognition of Body...................
Sect. IV. The Qualities of Matter known by Intuition...
Sect. V. Our Intuitive Cognition of Self or of Spirit.....
CHiAPTER II.
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
Sect. I. (Prelimninary.) On the Nature of Abstractioni and Gene  ralization........................................ 157
Sect. II. On Being.......................     161
Sect. III. On Substance..............164
Sect. IV. On Mode, Quality, Property, Essence........             173
Sect. V. On Personality..............   180
Sect. VI. On Extension..............                   183
Sect. VII. On Number..............                     184
Sect. VIII. On Motion..............                     185
Sect. IX. On Power...............                     187
Sect. X. (Supplementary.) Tle Va)-iots Kinds of Power knowi by
-ExIerience.................                                   187
BOOK II.
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
CHAPTER I.
THEIR GENER-AL NATURE...................196
v
133
145
148 
CONTENTS.
Page
CHAPTER II.
TIME AND SPACE................ 202
CHAPTER III.
THE INFINITE................
CHAPTER IV.
THIE EXTENT, TESTS, AND POWER OF OUR NATIVE BELIEFS. 231
BOOK III.
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
CHAPTER I.
THEIR GENERAL NATURE, AND A CLASSIFICATION OF THEM. 236
CHAPTER II.
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERV
Sect. I. Relation of Identity....
Sect. II. Relation of Whole and Parts.
Sect. III. Relations of Space......
Sect. IV. The Relations of Time...
Sect. V. The Relations of Quantity..
Sect. VI. The Relations of Resemblance.
Sect. VII. Relations of Active Property.
Sect. VIII. Relation of Cause and Effect
BOOK IV.
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
CHAPTER I.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS.
Sect. I. The Appetencies, the Will, and the Conscience... 279
Sect. II. (Supplementary.) On the Beautiful.......    288
CHAPTER II.
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISES OF CONSCIENCE.
Sect. I. Convictions as to the Nature of Moral Good.... 290
Sect. II. On Sin and Error.............                 297
Sect. III. Relation of Moral Good and Happiness........   302
vi
214
BY THE MIND.
242
247
250
252
252
255
257
258
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CONTENTS.
Page
CIIAPTER III.
THiE FREEDOM OF THE WILL............                    308
Wart Stairb
INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES AND THE VARIOUS SCIENCES.
BOOK I.
METAPHYSICS.
CHAPTER I.
MIETAPIiYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY...
. CHAPTER II.
GNOSIOLOGY.
Sect. I. On Knowledge..................
Sect. II. On the Origin of our Knowledge and Ideas....
Sect. III. Limits to our Knowledge, Ideas, and Beliefs....
Sect. IV. Relation of Intuition and Experience......
Sect. V. On the Necessity attached to our Primary Convictions.
Sect. VI. (Supplementar.y.) On the D)istin)ctions between the Un   derstanzding and the Reason; between a priori and a posteriori
Principles; between Formn and lfatter; between Subjective and
Objective; between the Loyical and Chronoloyical Order of
Ideas; between the Cause and Occasion of Innate Ideas..
CHAPTER III.
ONTOLOGY.
Sect. I. On Knowing and Being............
Sect. II. On Idealism....................
Sect. III. On Scepticism...................
Sect. IV. On the Conditioned and the Unconditioned....
Sect. V. (Supplementary.)  The Antinomies of Kant......
Sect. VI. (Supplementary.) Examination of icr. J. S. JIill's Mc   taplhysical System...................
Vil
315
322
326
33,-l
340
345
351
358
362
374
385
388
390 
CONTENTS.
BOOK II.
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE SCIENCES.
CHAPTER I.
Page
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEMONSTRATIVE OR FORMAL AND
THE MATERIAL OR INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.......  395
CHAPTER II.
THE MENTAL SCIENCES.
Sect.'I. Classification of the Mental Sciences..
Sect. II. Logic............
Sect. III. Ethics............
CHAPTER III.
MATHEMATICS..................                                  409
CHAPTER IV.
INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES  415
CHAPTER V.
APPLICATION TO THEOLOGY.
Sect. I. Faith and Reason..........
Sect. II. Natural Theology.  The Theistic Argument
Sect. III. On the Immortality of the Soul....
Sect. IV. Pantheism...............
Sect. V. Christian Divinity.........
Sect. VI. Man as a Religious Being......
Sect. VII. Rational Theology........
Sect. VIII. Intuitional Theology.......
ERRATA.
Page 166, line 5 from foot, for "Abrici" read "Ulrici."
Page 246, line 7 from head,for "A is not A" read "A is not Not-A."
viii
..... 400
..... 402
..... 406
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427
441
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461
476
480
482 
INTUITIONS OF THE MIND.
INTRODUCTION.
AIM OF THE WORK AND METHOD OF INQUIRY.
ACCORDING to one class of speculators, the mind derives
all its knowledge, judgments, maxims, from observation
and experience. According to another class of thinkers,
there are ideas, truths, principles, which originate in the
native power, and are seen in the inward light of the
mind. These last have been called by a great number
of names, such as innate ideas, intuitions, necessary
judgments, fundamental laws of belief, principles of
common sense, first or primitive truths; and diverse
have been the accounts given of them, and the uses to
which they have been turned. This is a controversy
which has been from the beginning, and which is ever
being renewed in one form or other. It appears to me
that this contest is now, and has ever been, characterized
by ai immense complication of confusion; and confusion,
as Bacon has remarked, is more difficult to rectify than
open error. I am not, in this treatise, to plunge at once
into a thicket, in which so many have lost themselves
as they sought to find or cut a way through it. But
my aim throughout is to ascertain what are the actual
laws or principles in the mind denoted by these various
B 
INTRODUCTION.
phrases, what is their mode of operation, what the rule
which they follow, and the purpose which they are competent to serve.
As the result, it will appear that there are in the
mind such existences and powers as primary perceptions
and fundamental laws of belief, but that they are very
different in their nature from the account which is often
given of them, and that they are by no means fitted to
accomplish the ends to which they have been turned in
metaphysical and theological speculation. I would as
soon believe that there are no such agents as heat, chemical affinity, and electricity in physical nature, as that
there are no immediate perceptions and native-born convictions in this mind of ours. I look indeed on the one
kind of agents, like the other, to be among the deepest
and most potent at work in this world, mental and material; and yet the one class, like the other, while operating every instant on soul or body, are apt to hide
themselves from the view. Indeed they discover themselves only by their effects, and their law can be detected only by a careful observation of its actings; and
it should be added, that both are capable of evil as well
as good, and are to be carefully watched and guarded in
the use which is made of them.
The prejudice against native and necessary principles
has arisen to a great extent from the extravagant account
which has been rendered of them, and from the vain, the
ambitious, and often pernicious purposes which they have
been made to serve. It is to be hoped, that by a clear
determination of their exact nature, and of the rules of
their operation, and by a judicious exposition of the method by which alone they can be discovered, and of the
restrictions which should be laid on their employment,
the feeling against them on the part of so many, philosophers and non-philosophers, may be dispelled; while
2 
INTRODUCTION.
at the same time rash speculators are prevented from employing them for the furthering of pretentious ends to
which they have no legitimate reference.
In inquiring into the evidence of their existence, into
the place which they hold in the constitution of the mind,
the laws by which they are guided, and the way in which
they manifest themselves, I am to proceed throughout
in the Method of Induction.   I profess to prosecute the
investigation in the way of the observation of facts-with
an accompanying analysis and co-ordination, but still of
facts, which have been carefully observed. It has often
been shown that the method of induction admits, rutatis
wutandis, of an application to the study of the human
mind, as well as to that of the material universe. The
difference in the application lies mainly in this, that in
the one case we use self-consciousness, or the internal
sense, whereas in the other we employ the external sense
as the organ or instrument. I certainly do not propose
to find out the intuitions of the mind by the bodily eye,
aided or unaided by the microscope, nor discover their
mode of operation by the blowpipe. They are in their
nature spiritual, and so sense cannot touch them, nor see
them, nor hear them, nor can the telescope in its widest
range detect them.   Still they are there in our mental
nature; there is an eye of wider sweep than the telescope,
and more searching than the microscope, ready to be
directed towards them. By introspection we may look
on them in operation; by abstraction or analysis we may
separate the essential peculiarity from the rough concrete
presentations; and by generalization, rise to the law which
they follow.
But let me not be misunderstood. The method pursued, as it is not on the one hand to be confounded with
an ambitious transcendentalism which declines to ask
help from observation, so it is as little on the other hand
B2
3 
INTRODUCTION.
to be identified with a miserable sensational empiricism.
I do not expect to discover what are the native principles of the mind by a priori speculation, but neither do
I profess by observation to lay or construct a foundation
on which to rear fundamental truth. I am not, therefore, to be lightly charged with a contradiction, as if I
resorted to experience for a basis or ground of principles
which I represent as original and independent. I employ induction simply as a mnean or mnethod of finding
laws which are prior to induction, otherwise induction
could not find them. Experience is not supposed by me
to furnish the ground of necessary truth; all that it can
do is to supply the facts which enable us to discover the
truth, and that the truth is necessary.   I allude to this
objection, not with the view of formally meeting it here,
but in order to show that it has not been overlooked, and
then adjourn the discussion of it to its appropriate place.
It will come out, in the course of our survey, that while
there are regulative principles in the mind, operating altogether independently of any reflex notice we may take
of them, and not depending for their authority on our
induction of them, it is at the same time true that they
can become known to us as general principles only by
inward observation, and can be legitimately employed in
philosophic speculation only on the condition of being
rigidly inducted. By observation we may rise to the
discovery of mental principles which do not in themselves
depend on observation, but which have a place in our
constitution anterior to our observation of them, and are
there, as observation discovers, native, necessary, and universal.
In some respects, it is an unfortunate time for giving
forth such a work to the world. Every age, like the seed,
is at one and the same time the product of combined influences in the past, arid the germ of life for the future.
4 
INTRODUCTION.
In this present age, two manner of principles, each of the
character of a different parent, are struggling for the
mastery; the one earth-born, sensational, empirical, utilitarian, deriving all ideas from the senses, and all knowable truth friom man's limited experience, and holding
that man can be swayed by no motives of a higher order
than the wish to secure pleasure or avoid pain; the other,
if not heaven-born, at least cloud-born, being ideal, transcendental, pantheistic, attributing man's loftiest ideas
to an inward light, appealing to principles which are discovered without the trouble of observation, and issuing in
a belief in the good, instead of a belief in God. Each
of these views has its keen partisans, either violently attacking one another, or regarding each other with silent
contempt, while the great body of reading men are professedly indifferent,-those who claim to be neutral, how.
ever, being all the while unconsciously in the service
either of the one or other, commonly of the lower or
earthly, just as those who profess to belong neither to
God nor Mammon, do in fact belong to Mammon.
What then can be expected of the reception of such a
work in such an age? A large body, even of the thinking portion of the community, are prejudiced against
all such discussions, as fruitless of good in every circumstance, and in some forms productive of mischief. I
suspect the great mass of those who call themselves practical men, and the majority of those addicted to the,study
of the physical sciences, will be further prepossessed
against this treatise as defending a doctrine which they
thought had been long ago and for ever exploded by
Locke. On the other hand, those most inclined to favour
such pursuits are, for the most part, committed and
pledged to extreme views, and can scarcely be expected
to look with a favourable eye on a work which, professedly built on pure observation, declines to follow any
5 
INTRODUCTION.
school,-indeed, proclaims that as schools and sects, with
their separate standpoints and watchwords, have long
ago ceased in physical science, so it is time they should
disappear in the field of mental science likewise; that
those who prosecute the study, calling no man master,
may look, without prepossession, into the volume spread
out before them in their own soul, and read it with the
eye of consciousness. Nearly all confessed metaphysicians will assert that I am degrading high philosophy in
making it submit to the method of induction, and that
the restrictions which I would lay upon speculation must
deprive it of its most fascinating charms; while hundreds
of eager youths, walking hopefully on the high a' priori
road, and expecting that the next turn-which they already see not far in front-must open on the great ocean
of absolute truth, will feel as if they were unmercifully
stopped and turned back at the very time when the long
looked-for scene was about to burst gloriously on their
view.
But regarded under some other aspects, this is an age
ill which such a work (I would on this account as well as
many others it were only worthy of its subject) is especially needed. Every nation awakened to intelligence
must have a philosophy of some description. Whatever
men may profess or affect, they cannot in fact do without
it; and if any age or nation, arrived at civilization, will
not form or adopt a high and elevating philosophy, it will
assuredly fall under the power of a low and a debasing
one. It oftens happens that a profession of contempt
for all metaphysics as being futile and unintelligible, is
often an introduction to a discussion which is metaphysical without the parties knowing it (as the person in
the French play had spoken prose all his life without
being aware of it); and of such metaphysics it will coinmmonly be found that they are futile and unintelligible
6 
INTRODUCTION.
enough. Often is Aristotle denounced in language borrowed from himself, and the Schoolmen are disparaged by
those who are all the while using distinctions which they
have cut with sharp chisel in the rock, never to be effaced.
There are persons speaking with contempt of Plato, Descartes, Locke, and all the metaphysicians who are taking
advantage of the great truths which they have discovered.
I could easily show that in our very sermons from the
pulpit, and orations in the senate, and pleadings at the
bar, principles are ever and anon appealed to which have
come from the heads of our deepest thinkers, in ages long
gone by, and who may now be forgotten by all but a few
antiquarians in philosophy.  Natural science itself is, in
the hands of its most advanced votaries, ever touching on
the borders of metaphysics, and compelling our physicists
to rest on certain fundamental convictions as to extension and force. The truth is, in very proportion as material science advances, do thinking minds feel the need
of something to go down deeper and mount up higher
than the senses can do-of some means of settling those
anxious questions which the mind is ever putting in regard to the soul, and the relation of the universe to God,
and of a foundation on which the understanding can
ultimately and confidently repose. Whatever the superficial may think, philosophy is an underlying power, of
vast importance because of mighty influence. It is because it is fundamental and radical, that it is unseen by
the vulgar, who notice only what is above the surface.
Let us see that the foundation be well laid, that the root
be properly planted. That foundation must be secure
which is founded in our mental constitution; that is the
proper root which is planted by our Maker.
In determining the precise nature of the mental intuitions, we may hope to be able to settle what they can do,
and, as no less important, what they cannot do. Thus do
7 
INTRODUCTION.
I hope to contribute my little aid in elevating the low,
and in bringing down the presumptuous tendencies of the
age; thus would I raise the downward, and at the same
time lower the proud look; thus would I keep men from
poring ever on the dust of the earth on the one hand,
and on the other hand from attempting, Icarus-like, to
mount in a flight which must issue in a lamentable fall.
Thus would I seek to raise the view-position of some
reckoned by themselves and others the wiser and more
sober, who are digging for ever in the mere clay of material existence, and who, believing in nothing but what
can be seen and touched, never rise to the contemplation
of moral and spiritual, of immutable and eternal truth;
and thus too would I save the more promising of-our
intellectual youths from falling under the power of a
boasting a priori intuitionalism, which is alluring them
on by gilded clouds, which will turn out to be damp and
chill after they have taken infinite pains to climb to
them and to enter them.
In Germany, in Britain, in the United States of America,-alas! France, with its finest minds ground down
by a military despotism necessitated by an unprincipled
democracy, has ceased to be a country of independent
thought, and so cannot be named in such a connection,
-thought is in a transition, and therefore a very restless
state. In Germany, the high transcendental, intuitional,
or dialectic method, has wrought itself out-has cropped
out to the surface in thinness and brittleness; and in the
reaction, eminent professors are lecturing to half-empty
benches; and books which if published twenty years ago
would have moved thought to its greatest depths, can now
find little sale, few readers, and scarcely any believers;
while in the absence of a judicious philosophy, accepted
and influential, a plausible materialism, acknowledging
no existence but matter and force, is making consider
8 
INTRODUCTION.
able progress on the pretence of furnishing what the old
metaphysics never yielded, something tangible and therefore solid. In the English-speaking nations there coexists
with the old experiential spirit engendered by Locke,
and the sensational spirit imported from France, a determined recoil, especially among certain musing and impulsive youths, against Lockism, and sensationalism, and the
bony and haggard forms of physicism, which have become denuded of all truth, intellectual, moral, and religious, transcending sense andexperience; and there is strong
tendency towards an idealism, which, all decked and radiant, is seeking to win them to its embrace. It is surely
possible that there may be some disturbed by the din of
these controversies, and shunning both extremes, who may
be prepared to welcome an attempt to discover-not,
certainly, all truth (which is precluded to the human
mind), but, by a sure method-that of observation and
facts-a sure foundation, laid by God himself, and on
which other truths may be laid, and on which they may
firmly rest.
I would not have taken such pains (as I can say conscientiously I have done) with this treatise, had I not
been persuaded that it embodies important truth. At
the same time I feel that in discussing so many and such
abstruse topics, confusion and error may have crept in.
My conviction indeed is very strong as to the accuracy
of the general views unfolded in the First and Third of
the three Parts into which the work is divided. There
is more room for doubt and hesitation as to the discussions on the more particular topics in the Second Part.
In regard to these, I would not only give-what indeed I
know I cannot withhold-full freedom to others to differ
from me, but I reserve to myself the right to improve,
to modify, to correct, if need be, the views here set forth,
should I receive new light on further reading and reflec
9 
INTRODUCTION.
tion. I make this admission and claim this prerogative
the more readily, as in doing so I may be in the better
position to maintain that oversights and errors in these
details will not be found after all to affect the general
principles expounded in this volume, and their application to every form of speculation, philosophic and religious.
Note.-In thinking out this Work, I have made free
but not unacknowledged use of the works of the great
thinkers, both of ancient and modern times, both of the
Continent and of Britain, who have pondered on these
topics. Among later metaphysicians I have specially to
acknowledge my obligations to the erudition, the unsurpassed logical power, and the profound observation, of
the late Sir William Hamilton. I have also derived advantage, in the discussion of certain points, from the writings of living authors, British and Continental, who will
be quoted or referred to at the proper places. In making this acknowledgment, I do not profess to belong
to the school of any eminent man of the past or present,
nor to any school, except the one which will attend to
nothing but facts. I claim to have so far caught the
spirit of those who have gone before, as to be resolute
to maintain my independence, and I have not scrupled
to state wherein I differ from those whose writings have
yielded me the most valuable thoughts and suggestions.
I have so constructed the work as to put incidental
discussions and criticisms in Chapters and Sections, Preliminary and Supplemental, printed in smaller type.
10 
PART FIRtST.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE
INTUITIVE CONVICTIONS OF THE MIND.  
13
BOOK I.
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS REGARDING
INTUITIONS.
CHAPTER I.
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS.
SECT. I. No INNATE MENTAL IMAGES OR REPRESNTATIONS.
THE mind of man has the power of imaging or representing, in old forms by the memory, or in new forms by
the imagination, whatever it has at any time known or
experienced. To this mental property the Aristotelian
phrase'phantasy,' in use till last century, and revived of
late by Sir William Hamilton,* might be appropriately ap.
plied, and then we should have the old term'phantasm'
(not' phantom,' which might continue to denote the spectre) ready to designate the mental result, or the idea in
consciousness. Having seen a given mountain, I can recall
it at ally time. Not only so, but I can put what I have
experienced in an indefinite number of new shapes and
colours. Having seen Mont Blanc, I can, when it pleases
me, bring it up before me in all its bulk, supported by
its snow-capped buttresses and flanked by its glancing
glaciers; but I can do more, I can picture a mountain
covered, not with ice, but with silver, or a mountain
* See his edition of Reid's Works, p. 291. 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
reaching up to the moon. I can reproduce in like mode
whatever has been brought under my notice by any of
the other senses.  I can recall and reconstruct the bodily
sensations,-the sounds, the colours, the tastes,-which I
have at any time experienced. Milton, when he wrote
' Paradise Lost,' had lost the power of beholding colours,
but he had still the capacity of imaging them to hiumself, or delineating them to others, as he did iit his picture of the garden of Eden. A late distinguished poet
never had the sense of smell, except for one brief but
enjoyable space, when it awoke as he stood in a garden
with flowers; but he must have been able ever after to
realize what odoutrs meant. It is to be carefully noted
that this reproductive power reaches not only over all
that has been acquired by the bodily senses, but over
all that has been obtained by consciousness or the. inward sense. I can recall the joys, the hopes, the sorrows,
the fears, which at some former time may have moved
my bosom. I can do more: I can picture myself, or picture
others, in new and unheard-of scenes of gladness or of
grief. Not only can I represent to myself the countenance of my friend, I can have an idea of his character
and dispositions. I can form a mental picture of the outward scenes in which Shakspeare or Walter Scott place
their heroes or heroines; but I can also enter into their
thoughts and feelings.
But all these ideas, in the sense of phantasms, are reproductions of past experience in old forms or new dispositions.   He who has had the use of his eyes at any
time, can ever after understand what is meant by the
colour of scarlet, but the person born blind has not the
most distant idea of it in the sense of image, and if
pressed for an answer to the question what he supposes
it to be, he can come no nearer the reality than the man
mentioned by Locke, who likened it to the sound of a
14 
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS.
trumpet; or than the blind boy of whom I have heard,
who when asked whether he would prefer a lilac-coloured
or a brown-coloured book, offered as a prize, decided for
the lilac, as he supposed it must resemble the lilac-bush,
whose odour had been so agreeable to him. Having
experience of cogitations and sentiments of our own, we
apprehend and appreciate those of others. Having a
spiritual nature ourselves, we can form some idea of that
Great Spirit in whose image we can claim to have been
fashioned.   But there may be attributes possessed by
God of which we can form as little idea as the deaf man
can of sounds, or the man without smell can of odours;
they may be attributes to which we possess nothing like,
and which we may be incapable of representing even in
imagination. Niebuhr, the traveller, had often brought
before him in his old-age the scenes of Eastern lands,
but it was because he had witnessed them in his youth;
and even we who have never been in those countries can
so far understand the descriptions in his travels, because
we have had the elements of them in our own experience;
but there may be scenes in heaven which it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive, inasmuch as nothing similar has passed under his notice in this lower
world.
Now the proposition advanced in this Section is that
the soul is not born unto this world with a stock of such
phantasms, ready to come out on occasions presented. I
rather think that this is the sense in which the phrase
is understood by those who give Locke the credit of
exploding  the doctrine of "innate ideas" for ever.
Taking' idea' in the sense of'image,' they say, what can
be so unreasonable as to suppose that the mind comnes
into the world with such impressions ready to start
forth, like writing with invisible ink, or like sun-pictures
when exposed to certain chemical agencies.  Locke, who
15 
GENERAL PROPOSIrTIONS.
I suspect took'idea' very much in the sense of mental
image, or representation, may very possibly claim to have
for ever set aside this view. But his credit in this respect
is not very great after all. For I rather think no philosopher of influence ever propounded such a doctrine, formally or explicitly. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that
Plato might have consistently held some such doctrine.
le might have maintained that the soul did come into
the world with such ideas; but then he would have ascribed them to experience acquired in a previous state of
existence. But Plato's doctrine of ideas, while I believe
it, in many aspects of it, to be as true as it is sublime,
is apt to run into myths and fancies in the expression,
so that it is difficult to give a thoroughly consistent exposition of it. By'idea' he meant a pattern in or before
the Divine Mind from all eternity; and he supposes a
course of philosophic abstraction to be quite as necessary as reminiscence to call up such ideas into consciousness. But whether the view which I am opposing has or
has not been entertained by men of eminence, it is expedient to notice it, in order at the very commencement to
remove it out of the way as an encumbrance.
SECT. II. No INNATE ABSTRACT OR GENERAL NOTIONS.
This proposition is not the same as that illustrated in
last Section. A mental picture of a mountain is one
thing, and a general notion of the class mountain is a
very different thing. All our cognitions by the senses or
the consciousness, and all our subsequent images of them
in memory or imagination, are singular and concrete; that
is, they are of individual things, and of things with an
aggregate of qualities.  I can see or picture to myself
an individual man of a certain form or character, but I
cannot perceive nor adequately represent in the phantasy
the class man. I can see or imagine a piece of magne
16 
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS.
tized iron, but I cannot see or imagine the polarity of the
iron apart from the iron.
Still the mind has the high capacity of forming abstract and general notions.  Out of the concrete it can
form the abstract notion. I can see or image a lily only
as with both a shape and colour, but I can in thought
contemplate its whiteness apart from its form. Having
seen a number of beasts with four limbs, I can think
about a class of animals agreeing in this, that they are all
quadrupeds. It appears then that the mental image and
the abstract or general notion are not the same. The
former is an exercise of the reproductive powers, recalling the old or putting the old in new collocations.  The
other is the result of an exercise of thought, separating
the part from the whole, or contemplating an indefinite
number of objects as possessing common qualities.  If
the one may be called the phantasm; the other, in contradistinction, may be denominated the notion or concept;
or, to designate it more unequivocally, the logical notion
or concept.
But it is quite as true of the abstract and general notions, as of the mental representations of the individual,
that they are not in the soul when it comes into the
world. It has been the avowed doctrine of the great
body of philosophers, that the mind starts with the singular and the concrete.  All our abstract notions are the
result of a process in which we separate in thought the
part from the whole; say the quality, from the substance
presenting itself with its qualities,-say transparency, contemplated apart from the transparent ice or glass. All
our general notions are the product of a process in which
we contemplate objects as possessing common attributes,
-say philosophers, as men agreeing in this, that they are
seekers of wisdom.
It is, as I reckon it, the true merit of Locke that, in
C
17 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
the second book of his Essay on the Human Understanding, he shows how in the ideas we form of such objects as space, time, substance, cause, and infinity, and in
the general maxims employed in speculation, such as that
"it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be
at the same time," there is involved a process of the understanding founded on a previous experience.*  It will
be acknowledged that the soul is not born into the world
with such abstract ideas as those of hardness, or organic
action, or life, nor such general notions as those of mineral, plant, animal. This is admitted by all. But it is
equally true that the soul of the infant has not yet ill an
abstract or general form those ideas which certain meta
* Wherein lie the defects of Locke will come out as we advance (see
more especially Part I. Book II. Chap. III., and Part III. Book I.
Chap II., sect. ii.); but I think he is invincible when he shows that children do not start with general maxims consciously before them, and that
savages are not in possession of them. Thus, speaking of the maxim, "It
is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," he says, "A great
part of illiterate people and savages pass many years of their rational age
without ever thinking on this and the like general propositions" (Essay,
bk. i. ch. xi. s. 12). "There is no knowledge of these general and self.
evident maxims in the mind till it comes to the exercise of reason" (ib.,
s. 14).  Speaking of more particular self-evident propositions, which
are assented to at first hearing, as that one and two are equal to three,
he says, "They are known and assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of these more general maxims, and so being earlier in the mind
than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the
assent wherewith they are received at first hearing" (s. 20). "For though
a child quickly assents to this proposition, that an apple is not fire,
when hlie has got the ideas of these two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learned that the names apple and fire
stand for them, yet it will be some years after, before the same child
will assent to this proposition, that it is impossible for the same thing
to be and not to be" (s. 23).  "He  that will say children join these
general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps with justice be thought to have more passion and
zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that
age" (s. 25).  "Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians; much less are they found in the thoughts
of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals"
(s. 27).
is 
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS.
physicians describe as innate, as those of the ego and the
non-ego, extension and potency, mind and matter, cause
and effect, infinity and moral good. We reach the abstract idea of hardness by specially fixing the attention
on one of the qualities of body. In like manner it is necessary, in order to attain the idea of space, to separate
in thought the space from body known as occupying
space. We get the idea of bodily substance by considering the permanent being apart from that which changes
in the bodies falling under our notice.   It is one of
the aims of this treatise to specify the way in which the
mind gets these ideas in the concrete and singular. But
for the present I am seeking to have rubbish removed,
that there may be free space whereon to lay a foundation.
And I think it of vast moment to have it admitted that
every abstract notion implies a process of separation, that
every general notion implies a process of comparison,
and that both one and other proceed on a previous knowledge which has come within the range of our consciousness.
SECT. III. No A PRIOBI FORMS IMPOSED BY THE MIND  ON
OBJECTS.
This proposition is laid down in opposition to a view
which has been extensively and resolutely entertained of
late years. Traces of it in a looser form may be detected
at a much earlier date, but it may be regarded as formally introduced into philosophy by Kant, in his great
work on the Kritick of Pure Reason. Suppose that the
eyes, in every exercise of vision, were to start with a lens
of a particular shape and colour, every object seen would
take a predetermined form, and appear in a special hue.
It is thus, according to Kant, that the mind sets out
with certain forms which it imposes on phenomena,-that
is, on appearances presenting themselves.   In every prig
c2
19 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
mary cognition the mind imposes two Forms, one of Space
and another of Time, on the phenomena presented emnpirically or a posteriori.  Again, in comparing its cognitions, it sets them in a number of frameworks, called
Categories, such as that of Quantity, Quality, Relation
(including Substance and Accident, Causality and Dependence), and Modality, which have a reality not objectively
in things but subjectively in the mind.  A yet higher formative power brings these categories into unity in three
Ideas of Pure Reason, those of Substance, Interdependence of Phenomena, and God, in which all objective reality has disappeared.  These forms of the senses, categories of the understanding, and ideas of pure reason,
constitute the a priori as distinguished from the a posteriori elements in the mental exercises.
It would carry us prematurely into very deep topics,
with very ramified connections, were I at this early stage
to criticize this doctrine in all its extent and bearings.
It must suffice for the present to affirm that so far as it
declares that the mind in cognition gives to the object
what is not in the object, it is an unnatural doctrine, and
is fraught with far-reaching consequences of a perilous
character. The doctrine which I hope to establish is
that the intuitive or cognitive powers do not impose
forms on the objects, but are simply the agents or instruments by which we are enabled to discover what is in
the objects. The mind, in looking at a material object,
does not superinduce extension on it, but it observes that
it is in space and must be in space. It does not carry
within it a chain wherewith to connect events by a law
of causation, but it has a capacity to discover that events
are so connected and must be so connected. The capacity of cognition in the mind is not that of the bent
mirror, to reflect the object under modified forms, but of
the plane mirror, to reflect it as it is in its proper shape
20 
NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS.
and colour.  The truth is perceived by the mind, not
formed; it is cognized, and not created. There must of
course be a correspondence between the subject, mind,
and the object, material or mental, contemplated; but
it is a correspondence whereby the one knows and the
other is known. This seems to me to be our natural,
intuitive, and necessary conviction, and he who departs
from it is landed in thickening difficulties on every side,
and in particular cannot possibly defend himself from
the assaults of scepticism; for if the mind can in respect
of what it apprehends in the object create so much, why
not suppose that it creates all?  If it can create the space
in which the object is perceived, why not suppose that
it can create the object itself? This was the conclusion
drawn by Fichte, who, carrying out the principles of Kant
a step further, made the whole supposed external object
a mere projection of the mind. There is no satisfactory
or consistent way of avoiding this consequence but by
adhering to the natural doctrine, and holding that the
mind is so constituted as to know the object as it is, under the aspects'in which it is presented to it.
SECT. IV. THE INTUITIONS ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY BEFORE
CONSCIOUSNESS AS LAWS OR PRINCIPLES.
I am to labour to show, in coming Sections, that there
are intuitive principles in the mind regulating cognitions,
beliefs, and judgments, whether intellectual or moral. My
present position is, that operating in the mind as native
laws or rules, they are not, as such, before the consciousness.
Everv one speaks of there being in the mind capacities,
powers, or faculties, such as the memory, or the imagination, or the reason, yet no one is immediately conscious of
these mental powers.  We are conscious of remembering
a given event, of imagining a given scene, of discovering
21 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
a given relation, but not of the mental power from which
the acts proceed. Such considerations show that there
may be operating in the mind faculties which do not fall
directly under the internal eye.  What is true of the faculties is true of the intuitive potencies of the mind. Indeed the intuitive principles of the mind are very closely
related to the faculties. I have seldom however seen the
precise relation between  them distinctly pointed out.
One class of investigators, such as Locke, treat of the
faculties; another class, such as the German metaphysicians who have ramified from Kant, of a vriori principles
in the mind; while a third class, such as the Scottish
school which has sprung from Reid, admit both into their
system, but without explaining their connection. To me
it appears that the intuitive or necessary principles of
the mind are just the fundamental principles or regulative laws of the faculties.  But without dwelling on this
at present, it is enough to announce that the necessary
principles, like the faculties of the mind, do not come
immediately under the cognizance of consciousness. The
individual actings do indeed fall directly under reflection
or the internal sense. Thus we are conscious that the
mind, on discovering a given effect, judges and decides
that it must have a cause, and looks for a cause; but
it has not meanwhile before it the general principle that
every effect has a cause, or the principle of causation
expressly formalized.   Being convinced that we exist,
we cannot be made to believe that we do not exist; but
this is not because we have consciously before us the
principle of contradiction,'that it is impossible for the
same thing to be and not to be at the same time.' It will
be shown forthwith that we arrive reflexly at a knowledge of the intuitive principle, which operates spontaneously, by the observation and generalization of its individual acts or energies. My present purpose is gained
22 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS.
if it is shown  that  such  metaphysical principles as
causation and contradiction are not directly before consciousness as rules, laws, or principles.
CHAPTER II.
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS.
SECT. I. THERE ARE INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES OPERATING IN
THE MIND.
I Do not propose to bring a full or satisfactory proof of
this assertion in this short Section; the evidence will be
found in the Second Part, in which our intuitive convictions are unfolded and discussed in detail. All that I
profess to do at this stage is, to announce and explain certain positions which I hope to establish as we proceed, and
answer some preliminary objections which are likely to
occur to the English reader. To illustrate my meaning
I must refer to certain convictions which I suppose to be
intuitive, such as those regarding Space and Time, Substance, Quality, Cause and Effect, and Moral Good; all
of these will be treated in detail in subsequent parts of the
vollme.
(1.) The first position I would lay down is that the
mind must have something native or innate. The word
innate is apt to be obnoxious to English ears; it is associated with views which Locke is supposed to have
set aside for ever; and the revival of it will appear to
some like the raising of a carcase from the grave to which
it had been happily consigned. I have no10 partiality for a
23 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
phrase which has been employed to set forth doctrines
which it will be one object of this Work to undermine.
To the phrase'innate ideas' I take strong objections,
which will come out as we advance. To the term'innate,'
if it were employed to qualify the proper noun, I see no
objections; but if any are offended with it, the word
'native' will serve our purpose as well.  All that either
phrase denotes is, that there is something-at present I
do not say what-in man's soul at the time it is born.
In this respect it is like the bodily substances which
fall under our notice. These bodies are something and
have something. This piece of iron which I hold in my
hand is not a nonentity; it is an existence; it occupies
space; it resists pressure; it has a colour. The soul of
man is also an existence; it knows; it understands; it
grieves; it rejoices. The capacity which it has of doing
so may be described as native and original.
In this respect it is like the bodily frame when it
comes forth from the womb. That body is not all which
it is afterwards to become. Yet it is not, even at this
early stage, a nonentity; it is not a nothing about to
grow into something. Already that frame has a structure, a form, and most wondrous properties. And just
as little is the soul, when it awakes to consciousness, a
nonentity; even at this point, it is an existence, a something, and is possessed of something which niaytbe called
innate or connate.
Even on the supposition that it is like a surface of wax
or a sheet of white paper, ready to receive whatever is irn
pressed or written on it, it must have something inborn.
If the mind have but a power of impressibility, it has in
this something innate. The very wax and paper, in the
inadequate i]lustration referred to, have capabilities, the
capacity of taking something on them, and retaining it.
But such comparisons have all a misleading tendency.
24 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS.
Surely the mind has something more than a mere receptivity! It is not a mere surface, on which matter may
reflect itself as on a mirror: our consciousness testifies
that, in comparison with matter, it is active; that it has
an original, and an originating potency.
(2.) A second position may be maintained; that this
something has rules, laws, or properties. Matter, with all
its endowments, inorganic and organic, is regulated by
laws which it is the office of physical and physiological
science to discover. All the powers or properties of mnaterial substance have rules of action; for example, gravitation and chemical affinity have regulations which can
be expressed in quantitative proportions. That mind also
has properties, is shown by its action; and surely these:
properties do not act capriciously or lawlessly. There are
rules involved in the very constitution of the active properties, and these rules are not beyond the possibility of
being discovered and expressed. The senses indeed can.
not detect them, but they may be found out by internal
observation. Nor does it appear that this law can be
discovered immediately by consciousness, any more than
the law of gravitation can be perceived by the eye. But
the operations of the mental properties are under the eye
of consciousness just as those of gravitation are under
the senses; and by careful observation, analysis, and generalization, we may from the acts reach the laws of the
acts. He who has reached the exact expression of our
mental properties, is in possession of a law which is native
or innate.
(3.) As a third position, it is capable of being established that the mind has original perceptions, which original perceptions may be described as intuitive. Every
one will acknowledge that the mind has perceptions
through the senses, and I shall endeavour to show, as we
advance, that it has perceptions of the understanding
25 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
and of the moral faculty: some of these perceptions are,
no doubt, secondary and derivative, but the secondary
imply primary perceptions, and the derivative original
ones. Thus perception of distance by the eye may be derivative: but it implies an original perception, by the eye,
of a surface. It is by a process of reasoning that I know
that the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the square of the other two sides: but
this reasoning proceeds on certain axiomatic truths whose
certainty is seen at once, as that "if equals be added to
equals, the wholes are equal." Let it be observed that
we are now in a region in which are loftier properties than
those possessed by inert matter; still these higher have
rules as well as the lower or material properties. The
original perceptions by sense, or reason, or moral power,
have all their laws, which it should be the business of
psychology or of metaphysics to discover and determine.
These original perceptions may be represented as intuitions inasmuch as they look immediately on the object
or truth. The rules or laws which they obey may be described as intuitive principles; it is the office of mental
science to discover them by a process of introspection,
abstraction, and comparison.
(4.) It is possible to defend a fourth position, that the
mind can discover necessary and universal truth. Not
that I propose to substantiate this statement at this stage
of our inquiries, still I may announce it, and show how
it is not impossible to establish it. The mind declares
that these two straight lines before it do not enclose a
space.   It does more: it declares of every other  two
straight  lines conceived,  that  they cannot  enclose  a
space.   It says of these two straight lines, that if they
proceed an inch without being nearer each other, that
they will proceed an ell, a mile, or a myriad of miles,
without being nearer; nay, it declares of all such parallel
2(; 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
lines, that they may be prolonged for ever without meeting. These are specimens of a large class of truths,
which the mind perceives to be true, and necessarily
true. There are logical truths-such as that whatever is
predicated of a class may be predicated of all the members of the class, and moral truths-such as that sin is
deserving of reprobation, which are also necessary and
universal.  But if the mind may-as I maintain that it
can and does-rise to the discovery of such truths, it must
be by native laws, the expression of which will give us
metaphysical science, just as the expression of the laws
which material phenomena obey gives us physical science.
But it will be said that we discover all this by experience. We are not at this stage of inquiry in circumstances to have the relation between intuition and experience definitively pointed out. But
(5.) It may be stated, as a fifth position, that the very
acquisition of experience implies native laws or principles.
So far from experience being able to account for innate
principles, innate principles are required to account for
the treasures of experience. For how is it that man is
enabled to gather experience? How is he different in
this respect from the stock or the stone, from the vege table or the brute, which can acquire no experience, at
least no such experience? Plainly because he is endowed
with capacities for this end; and these faculties must
have some law or principle on which they proceed. Ex perience, in the narrow sense, must mean, what we have
personally noticed. Even in noticing this, there must be
faculties, with principles involved in them, at work. But
a personal experience would of itself be valueless to man;
it would not and could not enable him to rise from the
known to the unknown, to argue from the past to the
future. But man can from the known discover the un known, from the past he can anticipate the future; and
27 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
when he does so, he must proceed on some principle
which is capable of exposition, and ought to be expressed. And if man be capable, as I maintain he is, of
reaching necessary and universal truth, he must proceed
on principles which can never be derived from experience.
Twenty times have we tried, and found that two straight
lines do not enclose a space: this does not authorize us
to affirm that they never can enclose a space, otherwise
we might argue that, because we had seen a judge and
his wig twenty times together, they must therefore be
together through all eternity. A hundred times have I
seen a spark kindle gunpowder: this does not entitle me
to declare that it will do so the thousandth or the millionth time, or wherever the spark and the gunpowder
are found.   The gathered knowledge and wisdom of
man, and his power of prediction, thus imply more than
experience: they presuppose faculties to enable him to
gather experience, and in some cases involve necessary
principles which enable him, and justify him, as he acts
on his ability, to rise from a limited experience to an
unlimited and necessary law.
But it may be urged that we reach these results by
reasoning. I reply that
(6.) A sixth position may be established, that reasoning
proceeds on principles which cannot be proved by reasoning, but must be assumed, and assumed as seen intuitively to be true. In all ratiocination there must be something from which we argue. That from which we argue
is the premiss,-in the Aristotelian analysis of argument,
it is the two premnisses. But as we go back and back,
we must at length come to something which cannot be
proven. That which cannot be proven must be assumed,
but surely ilot assumed capriciously; if assumed capri.
ciously, it can yield no proper foundation, and if not
assumed arbitrarily, it must be according to some rule
o28 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS.
or principle which should be expounded and stated by
the metaphysician. How can we reason but from what
we know? and in going back we come to truths which
we know directly, that is, by intuition, and the law of
this intuition should be evolved. It might further be
shown that there must be a mental principle involvedit is the Dictum in the Aristotelian account of reasoning
-in the process by which we connect the conclusion
with the premisses; for were there no such principle,
the ratiocination would be arbitrary, and it would be vain
for any man to endeavour to convince his neighbour, or
even to try to keep himself consistent.  Such considerations as these show that at the foundation of argument,
and at every stage of the superstructure, there are mental
principles involved which are either intuitive or depend
on principles which are intuitive.
SECT. II. THE NATIVE CONVICTIONS OF THE MIND ARE OF
THE NATURE OF PERCEPTIONS OR INTUITIONS.
In some cases there are external objects presented;
the mind looks upon them, and the conviction at once
springs up. Thus it is that it knows immediately this
particular body, this paper or table, as occupying space.
In other cases it is something within the mind that is
contemplated; it is self in some particular exercise, -Say
thinking or feeling.   In many instances the object presented in the mind is the result of a prior mental process.
Thus, having at a former time seen two straight lines, we
now, in our thinking moods, image or represent them;
and the mind, on the contemplation, proclaims at once
that they cannot enclose a space. Or we have occasion
to consider some particular voluntary sentiment of a fellow-mnan,-say his cherishing malice against another man,
and we proclaim it to be evil, condemnable. In this last
instance the act contemplated is not, properly speaking,
29 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
under our immediate view, for it is in the breast of a
neighbour, but it is represented to us in our minds, and
looking on this representation the mind pronounces a
decision. In every case these convictions seem to be of
the nature of perceptions, that is, something is presented
to us, and the cognition, belief, or judgment is formed.
It is on this account that I have, in the title of this Treatise, chosen to call them Intuitions. As we advance, we
shall find other distinctive characters, the expression of
which yields other epithets; but the term Intuitions, that
is, perceptions formed by looking in upon objects, seems
to bring out the original quality of the native convictions
of the mind.
SECT. III. INTUITIVE CONVICTIONS RISE ON THE CONTEM  PLATION OF OBJECTS PRESENTED OR REPRESENTED TO THE
MIND.
Metaphysicians have often given such an account of
them as to leave the impression that the mind creates
them independent of objects, or that, at the utmost, experience furnishes merely the occasion, on the occurrence
of which the mind fashions them by its own inherent
power. I shall have occasion to show that the relation
between the intuitive powers and objects is of a much
closer and more dependent character than this account
would lead us to suppose. In intuition we look into the
object, we discover something in it, or belonging to it,
or we discover a relation between it and some other object. Were the object taken away, the perception would
be meaningless, indeed it would altogether cease. Intuition is a perception of an object, and of something in
it or pertaining to it. Perception, without something
looked into, would be as contradictory as vision without
an object seen, or touch without an object felt. In our
cognitions we know objects, or qualities of objects, we
30 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS. 
know self as thinking, or body as extended.   In belief
we entertain a trust regarding certain objects that they
are so and so,-of time, for example, that it can conime to
no end. In judgment we discover certain relations between two or more objects, as that a mode implies a
substance.   Our intuitive convictions are thus not ideas,
notions, judgments, formed apart from objects, but are
in fact discoveries of something in objects, or relating to
them.*
SECT. IV. THE INTUITIONS OF THE MIND ARE PRIMARILY
DIRECTED TO INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS.
I shall have occasion to show, when I come to distinguish and classify the intuitions, that some are of the
nature of cognitions and beliefs, while others are of the
nature of judgments.   But whatever be their distinctive
nature, they always, as intuitions, primarily contemplate
objects as individuals. If I know, or believe in anything,
it is an existing thing, that is, as singular. If I form an
intuitive judgment, that is, make a comparison, it is still
in regard to two or more objects considered as singulars;
and so far as we pass beyond this, there is always, as I
shall endeavour to show, a discursive process involved.
A very different account is often given, if not formally,
at least implicitly, of intuition or of intuitive reason.
Man is represented as gazing immediately on the true,
the beautiful, the good, meaning in the abstract, or in the
general.  It is admitted that there must be some sort of
experience, some individual object presented as the occasion, but the fiiiid, being thus roused into activity, is represented as contemplating, by direct vision, such things
as space and time, substance and quality, cause and
effect, the infinite, and moral good. I hope to be able to
* Locke laid strong hold of the features specified in this Section and
the last; see iafra, Part I. Book II. Chap. III.
31 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
show that this theory is altogether mistaken.   Our appeal on this subject must be to the consciousness and
the memory, and these give a very different account of
the process which passes through the mind when it is
employed about such objects. Intuitively the mind contemplates a particular body as occupying space and being in space, and it is by a subsequent intellectual process, in which abstraction acts an important part, that
the idea of space is formed.  Intuitively the mind  contemplates an event as happening in time, and then by a
further process arrives at the notion of time.  The mind
has not intuitively an idea of cause or causation in the
abstract, but discovering a given effect, it looks for a specific cause.  It does not form some sort of vague notion
of a general infinite, but fixing its attention on some individual thing,-such as space, or time, or God,-it is
constrained to believe it to be infinite. The child has
not formed to itself a refined idea of moral good, but
contemplating a given action it proclaims it to be good
or evil. The same remark holds good of the intuitive
judgments of the mind, that is, when it compares two or
more things, and proclaims them at once to agree or disagree. I do not, without a process of discursive thought,
pronounce, or even understand, the general maxim that
things which are equal to the same things are equal to
one another, but on discovering that first one bush and
then another bush are of the same height as my staff, I
decide that the two bushes are equal to one another.
It will be shown in next Section that the mind has the
power of generalizing the individual cognitions or judgments of the intuitions, and in doing so it may arrive at
most important truth. It will come out, too, that intuition may fasten on the general proposition and pronounce
decisions in which it is involved.   But in the formation
of the general maxim, there is a process of logical thought
-32 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS.
involved for which the intuition is not responsible. It
is only in the form of convictions regarding individuals
presenting themselves that our intuitions manifest themselves in all men-in children and savages for instance.
The boy decides that the ball which he holds in his hand
cannot be at the same time in the hand of some other boy
who may pretend to have it; but he has not meanwhile
consciously before him the formula that it is impossible
for the same body to be in two places at the same time.
The individual conviction is in all men when the objects
are pressed on their attention, the general maxim is the
result of thought and especially of abstraction and generalization. By drawing this distinction we are able
to maintain that these intuitions are native and in all
minds, and yet save ourselves from the absurdity ill
which so many metaphysicians land themselves when
they speak of children or infants as employed in contemplating the e,o and the non.-ego, personality, externality,
subject, and object. The particular conviction is formed
by all in a concrete form when the appropriate objects
present themselves; but the abstract formula is fashioned
by those addicted to reflection, and is not even understood except by those whose minds are matured and cultivated.
SECT. V. THE INDIVIDUAL INTUITIVE CONVICTIONS CAN BE
GENERALIZED INTO MAXIMS, AND THESE ARE ENTITLED TO
BE REPRESENTED'AS PHILOSOPHIC PRINCIPLES.
The native principles in the soul are analogous to the
physical laws operating in external nature. Both one
and other act at all times, on the necessary. conditions
being supplied. Like the physiological processes of re.
spiration and the circulation of the blood, the intuitions
do not depend for their operation on any voluntary determination of the human mind, and they act whether
D
33 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
we observe them or no; indeed they often act best when
we are taking no notice of them. We cannot command
their exercise on the one hand, nor prohibit it on the
other. A greater or less number of them are working
in the soul at every waking moment of our existence.
It is always to be remembered indeed that they are
mental and not material laws; but, making allowance
for this, they may be regarded as operating very much
like the great physical or physiological laws of chemical
affinity, or of nervous irritability, or of the reflex nervous
system. As they act in an analogous manner, so they
may be discovered in much the same way as the laws of
the material universe, that is, by the method of induction.
The laws of matter are discovered by the observation
and generalization of their individual operations. With
the exception of a few metaphysicians of the schools of
Schelling or Hegel, no one now maintains that these
laws can be discovered by a priori speculation. Nor cau
they be detected by mere sense,-by eye, or touch, or
ear; no man ever yet saw, or touched, or heard, a law of
nature. All that falls under the perception of the senses
are individual facts, and those generally concrete or complex; that is, the object is presented as exhibiting more
than one quality at the same time, or the effect is the
result of a variety of causes.   In order to reach the law
by an observation of the facts, there is need first of all of
a judicious analysis, or, as Bacon calls it, the necessary
"rejections and exclusions," or the separation and setting aside of the extraneous matter of the mixed phenomenon; that is, the matter which does not belong to
the law or agent we are seeking to discover. Having
made these appropriate rejections, we now generalize the
facts-that is, find out where they agree-and thus arrive
at the discovery of the physical law.
34 
POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS.
It is in much the same way, mutatis mutandi8, that
we discover the laws of our original and native convictions.  I boldly affirm that it is as impossible to determine them as it is to settle the laws of the external universe by a priori cogitation or logical division and dissection. As they cannot be elaborated by speculation on
the one hand, so neither do they fall under the immediate
cognizance of consciousness on the other. All that comes
under the consciousness is individual: it is an object
now present; it is the mind in some state or mode. But
our modifications of mind at any given moment  are
always more or less complex; that is, there is more than
one property in exercise, though of course combined in
the unity of the mind. But, by a sharp analysis, it is
always possible to separate the different elements, and
fix the attention exclusively on that which alone pertains
to the law or property we are seeking to evolve. Examining carefully the nature of the acts which seem to flow
from the same principle, we generalize them; and, if we
do so accurately, we obtain the exact niature of the prin.
ciple, and can embody it in a verbal expression.
The principle thus discovered and enunciated is properly a metaphysical one; it is a truth above sense, a
truth of mind, a truth of reason. It is different in its
origin and authority from the general rules reached by
experience, such as the law of gravitation, or the law of
chemical affinity, or the law of the distribution of animals
over the earth's surface.  These latter are the mere generalizations of an experience necessarily limited; they
hold good merely in the measure of our experience, and
as experience can never reach all possible cases, so the
rule can never be absolute; we call never say that there
may not be exceptions.  Laws of the former kind are of
a higher or deeper nature, they are the generalization of
convictions carrying necessity with them, and a consequent
D2
85 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
universality in their very nature. They are entitled to
be regarded as in an especial sense philosophic principles, being the ground to which we come when we follow
any system of truth sufficiently far down, and competent
to act as a basis on which to erect a superstructure of
science. They are truths of our original constitution,
having the sanction of Him who hath given us our constitution, and graven them there with His own finger.
It is ever to be borne in mind, however, that the detection and exact expression of these intuitive principles
is always a delicate and is often a most difficult operation. Did they fall immediately under the eye of consciousness, the work would be a comparatively easy one;
we should only have to look within in order to see them.
But all that consciousness can notice are their individual exercises mixed up one with another and with all
other actings of the mind. It requires a microscopic
eye, and much analytic skill, to detect the various fibres
in the complex structure, and to follow each through its
various windings an& entanglements to its source.
36 
37
BOOK II.
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS, AND METHOD
OF EMPLOYING THEM.
CHAPTER I.
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES OF INTUITION.
SECT. I. TESTS.
BUT how are we to distinguish a primitive conviction
which does not need probation, and which we may not
even doubt, from propositions which we are not required
to believe till evidence is produced? Are we entitled to
appeal, when we please and as we please, to supposed
first truths?  Have we the privilege, when we wish to
adhere to a favourite opinion, to declare that we see it
to be true intuitively, and thus at once get rid of all
objections, and of the necessity for even instituting an
examination? May we, when hard pressed, or defeated
in argument, resort, as it suits us, to an original principle which we assume without evidence, and declare to
be beyond the reach of refutation? It is one of the
aims of this treatise to limit the confidence we put in
our supposed intuitions, and lay a stringent restraint
on the appeal to truths which are represented as above
probation. There can be tests propounded sufficient to
determine with precision what convictions are, and what 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
convictions are not, entitled to be regarded as intuitive,
and these tests are such that they admit of an easy
application, requiring only a moderate degree of careful
consideration of the maxim proffered as claiming our
assent.
1. The primary mark of intuitive truth is self evidence.
It must be evident, and it must have its evidence in the
object. The mind, on the bare contemplation of the object, must see it to be so and so, must see it to be so at
once, without requiring any foreign evidence or mediate
proof. That the planet Mars is inhabited, or that it is
not inhabited, is not a first truth, for it is not evident
on the bare contemplation of the object. That the isle of
Madagascar is inhabited, even this is not a primary conviction; we believe it because of secondary testimony.
Nay, that the three angles of a triangle are together
equal to two right-angles, is not a primitive judgment,
for it needs other truths coming between to carry our
conviction. But that there is an extended object before
me when I look at a table or a wall, that I who look at
these objects exist, and that two marbles added to two
marbles here will be equal to two marbles added to two
marbles there,-these are truths that are evident on the
bare contemplation of the objects, and need no foreign
facts, or considerations derived from any other quarter,
to establish them.
But it may be asked, can we certainly know what
truths are self-evident? Are we not liable to be deceived, especially by education and prepossessions? Have
not some declared propositions to be self-evident, which
have afterwards been positively disproved? The reply
is, that if we devote our minds earnestly to the object,
we cannot readily go astray. No doubt, it is possible to
fall into error in the application of this test, as in the
application of any other; but this can take place only
38 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
by negligence, by refusing to go round the object to
which the conviction refers, and to look upon it as it is
in itself, and in all its aspects.   In specifying this test
as the fundamental one, I do not mean that it can be
applied without much and careful inspection.  It is fortunate that we have a secondary test to determine the
presence of the primary characteristic.
2  Aece88ssity is a secondary mark of intuitive truti.  I
am not inclined to fix on this as the original or essential characteristic. I shrink from maintaining that a proposition is true because we must believe it. A proposition is true as being true, and certain propositions are
seen by us to be self-evidently true. I would not ground
the evidence on the necessity of belief, but I- would ascribe the irresistible nature of the conviction to the selfevidence. As the necessity flows from the self-evidence,
so it may become a test of it, and a test not difficult of
application.
When an object or truth is self-evident, necessity
always attaches to our convictions regarding it. And
according to the nature of the conviction, so is- the necessity attached.   We  shall see that some of the convictions are of the nature of knowledge, others of the nature of belief, a third class of the nature of judgments,
in which we compare objects known or believed in. In
the first our cognition is necessary, in the second our
belief is necessary, in the third our judgment is necessary.  I know self as an existing thing: this is a necessary cognition; I must entertain it, and never can be
driven from it. That space exceeds my widest imagination of space: this is a necessary belief, I must believe it.
That every effect has a cause: this is a necessary judgment; I must decide in this way. Wherever there is
such a conviction, it is a sign of an intuitive perception.
Necessity too may be employed in a negative form, and
39 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
this is often the most decisive form. If I know immediately that there is an extended object before me in the
book which I read, I cannot be made to know that there
is not an extended object before me. If I must believe
that time had no beginning, I cannot be made to believe
that it has had a beginning. Necessitated as I am to
decide that two parallel lines cannot meet, I cannot be
made to decide that they can meet. Necessity as a test
may thus assume two forms, and we may take the one
best suited to our purpose at the time. In the use of a
very little care and discernment, this test will settle for
us as to any given truth, whether it is or is not selfevident.
3. Catholicity may be employed as a tertiary test.  By
catholicity is meant that the conviction is entertained
by all men, or at least by all men possessed of intelligence, when the objects are presented.   I am  not inclined to use this as a primary test. For in the first
place it is not easy to ascertain, or at least to settle absoluttely, what truths may claim this common consent of
humanity; and even though this were determined, still it
might be urged in the second place that this does not
prove that it is necessary or original, but simply that it
is a native property,-like the appetite for food among
all men,-and would still leave it possible for opponents
to maintain that there may be intelligent beings in other
worlds who accord no such assent, just as we can conceive
beings in the other parts of the universe who have no
craving for meat or drink. But while not inclined to
use catholicity as a primary test, I think it may come in
at times as an auxiliary one. For what is in all men,
may most probably come from what is not only native,
but necessary; and must also in all probability be selfevident, or at least follow very directly from what is selfevident. Catholicity, when conjoined with necessity, may
40 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
determine very readily and precisely whether a conviction
is intuitive.
Important purposes are served by the combination of
these two tests: that is, necessity and catholicity. By
the first we have a personal assurance which can never
be shaken, and of which no one can deprive us. Though
the whole world were to declare that we do not exist,
or that a cruel action is good, we would not give up
our own personal conviction in favour of their declaration.   By the other principle we have confidence in
addressing our fellow-men, for we know that there are
grounds of thought common to them and to us, and to.
these we can appeal in reasoning with them. By the
one I am enabled, yea, compelled, to hold by my per.
sonality, and maintain my independence; by the other I
am made to feel that I am one of a large family, every
member of which has the same principles of belief as I
myself have.  The one gives me the argument from private judgment, the other the argument from common or
catholic consent. The concurrence of the two should
suffice to protect me from scepticism of every kind, whether it relate to the world within or the world without,
whether to physical or moral truths.
These marks are as clear and as easily applied, and
are quite as decisive for testing reason in its primary
or intuitive exercise, as the syllogism is in testing reason
in its secondary or derivative operation; that is, as infer ence or reasoning.
SECT. II. DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF INTUITIONS, AND THEIR
THEORETICAL CHARACTERS.
Hitherto we have been approaching our subject by a
somewhat winding path, catching glimpses of the position of the building, and of some of its principal turrets.
We may now walk up directly to it, and take a survey
41 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
of its general form, and ascertain the mode of entering
it, with the view of afterwards exploring its apartments
one by one. It will be found to present three sides,
sides of one fabric, but each with its peculiarities.
The intuitions may be considered first as laws, rules,
principles regulating the original action and the primi tive perceptions of the mind.   Or secondly, they may be
regarded as individual perceptions, or convictions manifesting themselves in consciousness. Or thirdly, they
may be contemplated as abstract notions, or general rules
elaborated out of the individual exercises. We cannot
have a distinct or adequate view of our intuitions un less we carefully distinguish these the one from the
other. The whole of the confusion, and the greater part
of the errors, which have appeared in the discussions
about innate ideas and a priori principles, have sprung
from neglecting these distinctions, or from not carrying
them out consistently. In each of these sides the in tuitions present distinct characters, and  many affirma tions may be properly made of the original principles of
the mind under one of these aspects, which would by no
means hold good of the others.
I. They may be contemplated as LAWS, RULES, OR
PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE MIND.  Hence they have been
called Kotwa( 7rpoXr*ets, lKotai em, otat, orphTan" evvota, forms
and regulative principles. Under this aspect
(1.) They are native. Hence they have been called natural, innate, connate, implanted, constitutional. All these
phrases point to the circumstance that they are not acquired by practice, nor the result of experience, but are
in the mind naturally, as constituents of its very being,
and involved in its higher exercises.   In this  respect
-they are analogous to universal gravitation and chemical affinity, which are not produced in bodies as they
-operate, but are in the very nature of bodies, and the
42 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES'.
springs of their action. It is thus-that is, by an original
property of his being-that man is led to look on body
as occupying space, on any given effect as having a cause,
and on certain actions as being morally good or evil.
(2.) They are regultaive.* They rule the mind in its
original and primitive energies, both of thought and belief. They lead the mind, for example, on discovering a
quality, to connect it with substance; on contemplating
time, to declare that it cannot have had a beginning; and
on having a vicious action brought before it, to decide
that it is deserving of punishment.   This characteristic
is brought before us by the phrases so often applied to
them,-forms, laws, rules, canons, and principles. They
lead and guide the deeper mental action, just as the
chemical and vital properties conduct and control the
composition of bodies and the organization of plants.  It
is to be carefully noticed that, as regulative principles,
they are not dependent, in themselves or in their action, on our observation of them; indeed they must be
guiding the mind before we can observe them; still less
are they dependent on the will of the possessor, which
has merely an indirect control over them, and this only
by bringing before the cognitive or representative powers
of the mind the objects which evoke them.
(3.) They are catholic, or common.   That is, they are
* The phrase Regulative has been used by Kant in Kr. d. r. Ver.
transcen. Doc. der Urtheilskraft, ch. iii., where he speaks of certain
principles as being constitutive and others regulative. The distinction
proceeds on certain Kantian views, and cannot be admitted by any
natural realist. Sir W. Hamilton has adopted the phrase Regulative
(' Metaphysics,' Lect. 38), and agrees so far with Kant that he reckons
many of the regulative principles of the mind, such as those about
space and time and cause, as guaranteeing no objective reality. The
phrase is a good one, but in adopting it, care must be taken to dissociate
it from all the peculiarities of the Kantian and Hamiltonian philosophy.
The regulative"principles guide the mind so as that it discovers what
is in things, whereas, according to Kant, they guarantee nothing as to
things.
43 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
in every human mind. Not that they are in all men as
formalized principles; under this aspect, as we shall see
forthwith, they come before the minds of comparatively
few. Some of them are perhaps not even manifested in
all minds; certainly some of them are not manifested,
in their higher forms, in the souls of all. In infants some
of them have not yet mnade their appearance, and among
persons low in the scale of intelligence, they do not come
out in their loftier exercises; just as the plant does not
come all at once into full fiower,-just as the plant, in
unfavourable circumstances, may never come into seed
at all. Still the capacity is there, needing only favourable
circumstances-that is, the appropriate objects pressed on
the attention-to foster it into developed forms.   Under
this aspect, the epithets common, catholic, have been applied to them; they have been represented as the universal attributes of humanity, and as belonging to man as
man.
But it is to be specially noticed that in this whole general view of them, they are not before consciousness
as principles. They do indeed come out into consciousness, not however as laws, but as individual convictions.
This negative characteristic has been often referred to
when they have been spoken of as latent, occult, hiding
themselves, as roots covered up in the substance of the
soul, as foundations beneath the ground, as faculties requiring to be developed, and as evoked into exercise only
on the occasion of experience.
II. They may be contemplated as CONVICTIONS MANIFESTED IN CONSCIOUSNESS.   Hence they are called especially intuitions, spontaneous or natural convictions, innate ideas, and primitive beliefs and judgments. It is
only under this aspect that we can directly apply to them
the tests of intuition specified in last Section.   Under
what restriction they apply to our intuitions as regulative
44 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
or as generalized principles may be afterwards pointed
out. We have already in our survey gathered what are
some of the characteristics of these our conscious convictions; still, what we before enounced will require to be
formally stated in its proper place alongside of some
other theoretical characteristics, to be now unfolded.
(1.) Ttey areperceptions. This feature was caught and
has been expressed by those who speak of them as perceptions, apperceptions, senses, apprehensions, and who represent them as seeing, looking, regarding, contemplating.
(2.) They look at objects.  Hence they have been represented as comprising knowledge, cognition, and discernment. It is of the greater moment to bring out
this characteristic, from the circumstance that they have
often been too much dissociated from objects. In reading some of the exaggerated accounts of them, the impression is apt to be left that they are formed by the
native power of the mind, independent of objects altogether; and even in more guarded statements, the presentation of objects is spoken of as merely the occasion on
which they spring up.*   In opposition to all this, I
maintain that they are perceptions of objects, of objects
themselves or something in objects. Sometimes the objects are external to the mind, as when I intuitively look
on body as extended or on space as having no limits.
In other cases the objects are within the mind, as when
I look on self, and discover that it has being and per sonality, or on a certain representation in the mind, say
of a benevolent action, which I discern to be good. Or the
intuition may manifest itself in the form of judgments
or comparisons; but even in such, it is a perception of
objects as having points of relation.   It is the very
nature of the regulative principles of the mind that they
* This view is examined infra, Part III. Book I. Chap. II. sect. v.,
Supplementary.
45 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
lead us to look at objects, and to discover what is in
them.
(3.) TJey look at objects as singulars.   In this re spect they are analogous to the senses and consciousness,
and have often been characterized as senses and as consciousnesses. This peculiarity has already been explained
in a general way.
(4.) They are immediate. That is, our minds, in intuition, gaze directly on the object. Hence they have
been called feelings,-language which may be allowed if
meant merely to express that they are analogous to feeling or touch as it feels or handles an object, but which
is of a most misleading character if intended to signify
that they are of the nature of emotions.   Under this
aspect they have been called visions, inspirations, revelations. Hence too the special name Intuitions applied to
them, to denote that they see the object as it were face
to face, and with nothing coming between to aid the
view on the one hand, or obstruct it on the other. This
character it is which affords what I have described as
the primary test, that is, self-evidence.
In the case of many objects, we cannot look on them
directly. Thus we who live in the nineteenth century
cannot be spectators of the events which happened in the
first century. When dwelling in these islands, we cannot
gaze on the Himalayas or Andes; we can contemplate
such objects only indirectly, and through something else
as a medium. But in every intuition we look at once on
the corresponding object: it is thus we are conscious
immediately of self in action; thus that we gaze on body
as occupying space; thus that we regard space as unbounded; thus that we regard a certain disposition as
good or as evil.
But to prevent misapprehension it is necessary here
to offer an explanation. When I say that the object
46 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
is present, I do not mean by this that the object must
be a bodily one, or one external to the mind. The object may quite as frequently be a mental as a material
one. The object may even be represented, in a loose and
inaccurate sense, as an absent one.  Thus I may pronounce of an event which happened far away, in India,
that it must have had a cause, and of a deed of self-sacrifice, done a thousand years ago, that it must have been
good. But then it is not, properly speaking, to the distant event that the intuition looks, but to the representation of it in the mind. It is only mediately, through the
representation, that the intuition can refer to the actual
occurrence, and this on the supposition that the representation is correct; and if the representation be erroneous, or even mutilated, or imperfect, it cannot be legitimately applied to the event. Correctly speaking, the
object is always present when the intuition gazes on it;
it is either a bodily object immediately before the mind,
or it is a presentation or representation within the mind
itself.
(5.) There is a conviction of necessity attached to every
one of them. Hence they have been described as irresistible, unavoidable, compelling belief, and not admitting of
doubt or dispute. We have already had this character
under our notice, and it may yet come before us in its
applications, and in regard to the supposed diversity in
the necessity as attached to different convictions, and
it is not needful to enter more minutely into its nature
in this general survey. It should be carefully noticed
that the necessity attaches itself directly only to our individual perceptions. The general formula carries with
it no such conviction till it is shown that it has been
correctly formed. There may be legitimate doubts and
disputes as to many proposed philosophic maxims, as to
whether they are or are not correct. Still, as will be
47 
CHIIARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
shown, the necessity being in the singulars, goes up into
the universals on the condition of the universal being properly formed.
(6.) They are original and independent.  Hence they
have been called first, primary, or primitive truths, and
been described as origins, a'pxal, or original principles,
seeds, roots, and starting-points, and characterized as underived, independent, self-sufficient.   The mind spontaneously*starts with such, it sets out from them, and in
doing so, feels that it has need of no probation or foreign
support of any kind.
A large body of our convictions, even of the surest, are
derived; they are dependent on something else. Thus
we are dependent for our historical information on the
testimony of our fellow-men; for our belief in the great
mysteries opened in the Bible, on the testimony of God;
for our conviction of the propositions in the Sixth Book
of Euclid, on the prefixed axioms, and on the propositions
in the other five books, and generally for the last conclusion of a chain of reasoning, on all the links which have
preceded. But in intuition, or, as it may be called, intuitive reason, our conviction hangs on nothing else. That
the whole, orange or earth, is equal to the sum of its
several parts, is a truth which depends on no other.
There may be many asseverations to which we do not
give our assent till evidence of some kind is furnished.
There may be true propositions from which we withhold
our concurrence till they are proven.  Very possibly there
may be inhabitants on that other side of the moon
which no human eye has seen, but I wait for evidence
before I give a decision one way or another. It seems
very certain that there have been volcanoes in the moon,
but men did not give their credence till traces of eruptive
formations were discovered by the telescope. But there
are propositions which do not require proof, even as they
48 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
do not admit of proof, and yet our conviction of them,
to say the least of it, is as strong as of the truths most
firmly established by probation. There are some apprehensions, some propositions, in regard to which the
mnind sees that it needs mediate proof in order to convince it that they imply a reality or a truth; but there
are others, in regard to which it sees that they have in
themselves all that is needful to gain our assent. There
are some truths for which reason demands support before
it will give its adhesion to them; there are others, in
regard to which reason says, that they do not require to
be borne up by any external evidence. It is not because
of any defect in the veracity of intuitive truths, that
they do not admit of probation; it is rather because of
the fullness and strength of their veracity.   It is, in a
sense, owing to a deficiency in certain truths, or rather, a
deficiency in our minds with respect to them, that they
require something to lean on. Thus it is because of some
defect or perplexity in the truth (to us), that mathematicians cannot solve, except approximately, the problem of
three bodies attracting each other.  It is because of the
self-sufficiency of certain truths, such as that the thinking  ne exists, and that extended bodies exist, and that
gratitude is a virtue, it is because our minds are so constituted as to see them at once, that they require no
proof; we need no  other light in which to see them,
they shine in their own light.
But let us properly understand and limit this account
given of them;. when they are said to be independent, it
does not mean that they are independent of objects: we
have before seen that our intuitions are perceptions of
or regarding objects.
(6.) Some of them are catiolic,-that is, in all men.
hence they have been described as common ideas and
notions. We have seen that as regulative powers they
E
49 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
are in all men, without exception. But all of them do
not, therefore, come forth in actual energies; many of
them in their developed and manifested form are the result of growth, and some of them seem to lie dormant
in many minds from the want of proper fostering circumstances.  Still, there are some of them, such as the intuition of self and the intuition of body in space, which
are formed by all men in their individual and concrete
form.
III. They may be contemplated as NOTIONS OR PRINCIPLES FORMED BY ABSTRACTION AND GENERALIZA.TION.
Under this aspect they are 7rp&a vo7'4laTa, natmriejmdicia,
a priori notions, definitions, maxims, and axioms.
Thus considered they cannot be represented as common or universal in the sense of being in all men. If
we look to the hundreds of millions of human beings on
the face of the earth, including infants, children, savages
and the unreflecting masses, there is but a very small
minority of the family of man who have ever had such
notions or maxims before them. Every human being, if
he sees an object before him, will refuse to give his assent to the assertion that this object does not exist; but
how few beyond the limited circle of professed metaphysicians have ever had consciously before them the principle that it is impossible for the same thing to be and
not to be at the same time. Millions of men, women,
and children are'every hour acting on the intuition of
causation-are taking food, for example, in the belief that
it will nourish them, though they never have had the
principle consciously before them, and know not so much
as that there is a principle of causation. But under this
view,
(1.) The General Maxim, is Necessary, on the condition
of the generalization out of the individual convictions being
properlyformed.  It is to be constantly kept in mind, that
50 
MARKS AND PECULIIARITIES.
the necessity attaches in the first instance to the singular
conviction looking to its objects. But the necessity being
in the individuals, may be made to go up into the general,
provided the general has been legitimately drawn from
the individuals.   With this proviso, a very important
one however, the maxim is not only true, it is necessarily
true, it cannot be otherwise. If any one were to lay
down the principle that "everything must have a cause,"
he would not be announcing a necessary truth; for while
there is a necessary conviction in every exercise of mind
regarding causation, he has not seized it properly, nor
expressed it correctly. But if the maxim that "everything which begins to be must have a cause" be, as I
maintain it is, the proper generalization of the peculiarity
of the individual conviction, it may be regarded as a nlecessary one.   In this respect it differs from the general
laws of nature reached by observation; as for example,
that hydrogen chemically combines with oxygen in the
proportion of one to eight. We cannot, from the bare
contemplation of hydrogen and oxygen, say that they
must unite in any particular proportion, or that they
shall unite at all. The law is reached by the pure observation of particular cases, and these, however many, are
still limited in number; for all the particular cases, that
is, of the mutual action of hydrogen and oxygen in the
universe, never can fall under our notice. The law may,
after all, be a mere modification of a higher and wider law;
there may be exceptions to it in other worlds; it is in no
sense absolutely or universally certain. But on the bare
contemplation of two given straight lines, I perceive,
without any succession of trials, that they cannot enclose
a space.  I perceive that this would be true of any
other two straight lines that could fall under my notice,
and thus I reach the general maxim that no two straight
lines can enclose a space, a maxim admitting of excep                                            E 2
51 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
tions at no time and at no place.  In regard to the one
class of general truths, I have formed a law from a necessarily limited, out of an indefinite number of cases.  In
regard to the other, our generalizations are of convictions
in our own mind, each of which carries necessity in it. In
order to the formation of the latter, we have not to go out
in search of external instances in the mental or material
world, nor to number and to weigh such; we have all the
elements in each of our convictions; and if we generalize
properly, by what in some cases is an easy, but in others
a somewhat difficult process, we reach general truths,
which have the same necessity as the individual convic
tions.
(2.) Thley are Universal, Immutable, Eternal: only
however on the same condition as they are necessary, that
is, on the understanding that the general maxim is duly
fashioned out of the individual convictions.   But here it
will be necessary to distinguish between two applications
of the word'universal' which have often been confounded.
Sometimes a principle is called universal because it is in
all men or avowed by all men. I have in this treatise
adopted the word'catholic,' or'common,' to express
this property of intuition. But when we say a truth is
universal, we may mean that it is universally true, that
is, admits of no exceptions, and it is in this latter application I use the word'universal.' Universality in this
sense follows from necessity; the maxim which is necessarily, must be universally, true.* It is only in this
* That a truth is accepted by common or catholic consent, and that it
is without exception, are not the same, though they have often been
confounded under the one epithet'universal.'  Sir W. Hamilton says
(Note A. p. 754, Reid's Works), "Necessity and universality may be regarded as coincident; for when a belief is necessary, it is, eo ipso, universal; and that a belief is universal is a certain index that it must be necessary (see Leibnitz,'Nouveaux Essais,' lib. i. s. 4)." Hamilton means
by universality, universality of belief; which also Leibnitz means in the
passage referred to-the language he uses is,. " consentement universel."
52 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
meaning that the term can be applied to the maxims
which express in a general form the law of our intuitive
convictions. Such maxims admrit of exceptions at no
time and in no place. They are true in our own land,
but they are true also in other lands; true in our world,
they are true in all other worlds; true ill all ages of time,
they are equally true through all eternity. Hence they
have been called expressively unchangeable, imperishable,
and eternal truths.
(3.) They are fandamiental. Hence they have been
described as radical, as grounds or foundations, and called
fundamental laws of thought and belief. They are the
truths we come to, when we analyze a discussion into
its elements.   We may even set out with them in argument or in speculation, provided we have adequately
generalized them. All demonstrated and derived truths
will be found, if we pursue them sufficiently far down,
to be resting on such fundamental truths.  In controver.
sies on profound topics, especially in theology and meta.
physics, those who engage in them feel themselves ever
coming down to a ground beneath which they cannot
get. In searching into the structure of argument, we find,
But it is surely conceivable (I do not say, actual), that a conviction might
be necessary to one man and not to all men; and there are in fact beliefs
in man, which are universal, such as that the sun will rise tomorrow, which
are not necessary. Kant used'universal' in the sense of'true without
exception,' and very properly remarks, that the necessity and universality
belong inseparably to each other, but that sometimes the one and sometimes the other test admits of the easier or more effective application.
" Nothwendigkeit und strenge Allgemeinheit sind also sichere Kennzeichen einer Erkenntniss a priori, und gehoren auch unzertrennlich zu
einander. Weil es aber im Gebrauche derselben bisweilen leichter ist,
die empirische Beschraiinktheit derselben, als die Zufalligkeit in den Urtheilen, oder es auch mannigmal einleuchtender ist, die unbeschrainkte
Allgemeinheit, die wir einem Urtheile beilegen, als die Nothwendigkeit
desselben zu zeigen, so ist rathsam, sich gedachter beider Kriterien,
deren jedes fiir sich unfehlbar ist, abgesondert zu bedienen" (K. d. r.
V., Einleit. Auf. 2. Werke, bd. ii. p. 697: Rosenkranz).
53 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
as we follow it from conclusion to premiss, hanging on
a premiss which is self-supporting. The sceptic is ever
compelling the philosopher to go down to these depths.
The dogmatist, in building his structure, is entitled to
start with them as assumptions,-he must be -the more
careful that what he builds on be really the rock. On
them other truths may rest, but they themselves rest on
none. There may ever be an appeal to them, but there
can.never be an appeal from them.
Now in order to avoid confusion, and the error which
springs from confusion, it is essential that we go round
these three sides of this shield of trtith, that we read
what is on each, and carefully distinguish the inscriptions.
If any one having occasion to employ intuition neglect
to do this, he will ever be liable to affirm of the intuition
under one aspect, what is true of it only in another, or
to turn the wrong side towards the weapons of the assailant while he keeps the wrong side towards himself.
When we are required to speak of them distinctively, our
intuitions under the first aspect may be called native
laws or regulative principles; under the second aspect,
native, spontaneous, or necessary convictions; under the
third aspect, universal truths or formalized maxims.
As Innate or Regulative Principles they are in all men
at all ages; but it is wrong to represent them as being
before the consciousness, as being immediately under our
notice, as capable of being discovered without abstraction or generalization, or observation, or trouble of any
kind. It is wrong to represent them as ideas in the
Lockian sense of the term, that is, as apprehensions before consciousness.
As Spontaneous Convictions they are immediately
under the eye of consciousness, but there they are not
in the form of philosophic principles, nor can we say of
54 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
every one of them they appear in all men, and from
their earliest infancy.
As Universal Truths or General Maxims they are in
an especial sense philosophic principles, but then as such
they are known only to comparatively few; they can be
appealed to in argument only on the condition that their
law has been gathered by induction, and carefully expressed, and while there can be no dispute as to the
spontaneous convictions, there may be disputes as to
whether they have been properly generalized.*
At the same time these are after all only the diverse aspects of one great general fact, and they have
relations all to each, and each to all. There is first a
mind with its native capacities, each with its rule of action. In due time these come out into action, some of
them at an earlier, and some of them at a later date, on
the appropriate objects being presented, and the actions
are before consciousness.  As.being before consciousness
we can observe them by reflection, and discover the nature of the law which has all along been in the mind, and
in its very constitution.
SECT. III. CERTAIN MISAPPREHENSIONS IN REGARD TO THE
CHARACTER OF INTUITIVE CONVICTIONS.
Looking on the above as the properties and marks of
the intuitive convictions of the mind, we see that a wrong
account is often given of them.
1. It is wrong to represent them as unaccountable
feelings, as blind instincts, as unreasonable impulses.
They have nothing whatever of the nature of those feelings or emotions which raise up excitement within us,
and attach us to certain objects, and draw us away from
* In writing this Section, I have kept before me throughout Hamil.
ton's famous Note A, and have freely borrowed from it. But Hamilton
has not distinguished between these Three Aspects of Common Sense.
55 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
Others. Nor should they be put under the same head
as the instincts which prompt us to crave for food when
we are hungry, or which lead the dog to follow his master. In such cases the parties obey an impulse, which
is not accompanied with knowledge or judgment of any
kind, whereas in the perceptions of intuition there is
always knowledge involved, and this the most certain of
all, immediate knowledge, and in many of them there
is judgment looking directly on the objects compared.
So far from being unreasonable, they involve a primary
exercise of reason superior to all secondary or derivative
processes, which ever depend on the primary, and are
often inferior in certainty, and can, in no circumstances,
rise higher than the fountain from which they have
flowed.
2. It is wrong to represent man, so far as he yields
to these convictions, as being under some sort of stern
and relentless fatality which compels him to go, without
yielding him light of any kind. No doubt they constrain him to acknowledge the existence of certain objects, and the certainty of special truths; but this, not
by denying him light, but by affording himr the fullest
conceivable light, such light that he cannot possibly
mistake the object or wander from the path.  No doubt
he cannot have mediate proof, but it is because he has
what the faculties which judge of proof declare to be
vastly higher, immediate evidence, or self-evidence.  We
need no secondary proof, for we have primary, to convince us that two parallel lines can never meet. Our
intuitions do not compel us against the reason, but they
convince us in the highest exercise of reason, and they
lead us not against, but by the assent of our clearest
and profoundest intelligence.  No mani is ever, even in
his most wayward moods, spontaneously tempted to
complain because bound to yield to these convictions.
56 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
Wheni he reflects on their nature, he should rejoice because such is his constitution that he is led to follow and
obey them.
3. It is wrong to represent these self-evident truths as
being truths merely to the individual, or truths merely to
mnan, or beings constituted like man.. There are some
who speak and write as if what is truth to one marn
might not be truth to another man; as if what is truth
to mankind might not be truth to other intelligent
beings.* This account might be correct if the convictions were borne in upon the mind by a blind natural
impulse. But what we perceive by an original intuition
* It is not easy to determine the precise philosophy of the Sophists,
if indeed they had a philosophy. The doctrine of fleraclitus was that
all is and is not; that while it does come into being, it forthwith ceases
to be.  Protagoras, proceeding on this doctrine, declared, (D- yap Wrov
7ravTrov xpr7,a-rcov iuErpov apOpooirov EtLVaL, rcv Re'v Ovrcov, v  TrrL, r&v 8 Pi
ovrWv, Co ObK Eo,rtLv. This Socrates expounds as meaning w. owa iev fKarTa
iaOl ~aLvEraL, roLaura ttev a-rLtv fEOL, oLa 8E aof (Plato, Theetetus, 24:
Bekker). Aristotle represents Protagoras as maintaining that ra& /oKOv-Ta 7ravra E(rrLv lXrlO7 Ka' ra' PaLv4,uEva (Metaph. lib. iii. c. 5: Bonitz).
Again, lib. x. c. 6, this Kal yap &EKEZVOS gpr1 Trdavra v Xp?7acTiZov eLvat terpov
aOp(,pa-ov, OV''' ETEpov XEytov' To6 OKOoV LK rco'ro70 KaL aLvat 7raytoo.
It will be observed that in these accounts there is an interpretation
put on the language of Protagoras. But there can be no doubt that
Plato, and Aristotle too, laboured each in his own way to show, in opposition to these views, that there was a reality and a truth independent of the individual and of appearance. (See infi'a, Chap. III.) It is
an instructive circumstance that the Sensationalist School has reached
in our day the very position of the Sophists, and regard it as impossible
to reach independent and necessary truth, if indeed any such truth
exists. We might expect that such men would seek to justify the
Sophists, and disparage the high arguments of Plato. Cudworth, speaking of the theoretical universal propositions in geometry and metaphysics, has finely remarked that it is true of every one of them whenever "it is rightly understood by any particular mind, whatsoever and
wheresoever it be: the truth of it is no private thing, nor relative to
that particular mind only, but is aXr/OiE KaOOXLKO'V,'a catholic and uni.
versal truth,' as the Stoics speak, throughout the whole world; nay, it
would not fail to be a truth throughout infinite worlds, if there were so
many, to all such minds as would rightly understand it" (Immutable
Morality, bk. iv. c. v.).
57 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
is a reality or is a truth; we know it to be so, we judge
it to be so. And it is a reality, a truth, whether others
know and acknowledge it or no. It is a truth, not merely
to me or you, but to all men; not only to all men, but
to all intelligences capable of discovering truths of that
particular nature.   That  two  lines cannot enclose  a
space, is a truth everywhere, in the planet Mars as well
as in the planet Earth. That ingratitude is morally evil,
must hold good in all other worlds, as well as in this
world of ours, where sin so much abounds. Another
misapprehension, of a different character, must also be
rectified.
4. It is wrong to represent all our intuitive convictions as being formed within us from our birth. The
account given of them by some would leave the impression on the mind that they must all appear in infancy.
This is commonly the view taken by those who throw
ridicule upon them. What can be so preposterous, they
say, as to suppose that babies are meditating on the infinite from the time they escape from the womb, and
distinguishing between good and evil before they know
the right hand from th3 left? The account which has
been given, in these chapters, of our original convictions,
shows how they may not all appear from our earliest
years. They are formed, we have seen, on the contemplation of objects presenting themselves from without
or from within. Some of these objects press themselves,
I believe, on the notice from the very first action of the
soul, and the intuitions directed to these are exercised
with the very first exercises of intelligence. From the
very dawn of existence the infant must envisage self,
and body acting on self. But there are other convictions which cannot be formed till a later date, bemcause
the objects to which they relate cannot be presented till
the intelligence is advanced.   Thus I believe that the
5S 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
conviction of moral good and evil arises on the presentation of voluntary actions done by intelligent beings,
and the mind must have made progress before it can
form such a notion, and look into it to see what is involved in it. The intuition in regard to the infinite is
called forth only when we contemplate such objects as
space and time, or God, and the comprehension of these
implies a considerable maturity of intelligence. We thus
see that though all our intuitive convictions are native,
yet some of them are the result of growth. Some of them
do not appear in infancy; some of them appear in children, and among persons low in the scale of understanding, such as savages, only in a very low and rudimentary form. All of them are capable of growing with the
growth of our intelligence, and even with the growth of
our voluntary and emotional nature. Some of them are
at one and the same time natural, and the issue of a
long development-like the flower and the fruit, which
are in the plant from its embryo, but may not be actually formed till there has been a stalk and branches, and
leaves and buds.
SECT. IV. CERTAIN PRACTICAL CHARACTERISTICS.
From the theoretical characters there flow some others
of a more practical nature.
1. All men who have had their attention addressed
to the objects, are in fact led by spontaneous conviction,
and this, whatever be their professed speculative opinions. This follows from the circumstance that they are
self-evident, and that men, all men, must give their assent to them. The regulative principles being essential
parts of manl's nature, we find all men under the influence of them Being irresistible, no man can deliver himself from them. They are ever operating spontaneously,
and that whether men do or do not acknowledge them
59 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
refiexly. In this respect the philosopher and the peasant,
the dogmatist and the sceptic are at one. The metaphy sician who has detected and formalized the principle, is
not in a better position than the mechanic who acts on
the principle without knowing that there is a principle.
The sceptic who denies the principle is notwithstanding
convinced of the individual truth when it is pressed upon
his notice, quite as implicitly as the philosopher who is
strenuously defending it.
2. These self-evident truths cannot be set aside by
any other truth, real or pretended. They could be overthrown only by some truth higher in itself, or carrying
with it greater weight. But there is no such truth, there
can be no such truth. There are indeed co-ordinate principles,-all self-evident truths are in respect of veracity
of equal rank,-but not even on the supposition that
the one contradicted the other, could we set aside either.
The result in which such a contradiction should land us,
is not a selection of one or other, but absolute scepticism, always along with implicit spontaneous faith in both
principles. I shall have occasion to show that we are
not landed in any such lamentable issue, and that all
attempts to prove that intuitive truths contradict each
other have lamentably failed.
It follows that when an apparent contradiction arises
between what seems a self-evident truth and any other
supposed truth, we are to examine the evidence which
we have for both.  It is thus that the mathematician
acts when his demonstrations seem to be contradictory.
He does not allow himself to imagine that truth can be
inconsistent; he goes over his demonstrations to find out
what error he has himself committed.   If one filndamiental principle seems to be inconsistent with another
fundamental principle, we are to examine whether both
are certainly fundamental, and can be shoiwn to be so
60 
MARKS AND PECULIARITIES.
by the proper tests, and in particular whether they have
been properly generalized and expressed. In all such
cases it will be found either that one at least of the
principles is not intuitively certain-indeed  neither.of
them may be so; or, as is more common, we may not
have properly stated the primitive principle, and the
seeming inconsistency lies not in the principles themselves, but in our expression of them.
Or, again, the apparent contradiction may lie between
a primitive principle and a derivative one.  In such a
case it is certain that if what seems a primitive principle
be truly so, and if we have put it in the proper form, it
can never be displaced or overthrown by any secondary
one. For if we follow that derivative principle to its
foundation, we shall find that it cannot be resting on
any truth more authoritative than the fundamental one
which it is now being employed to undermine, while in
the derivation of it, a number of doubtful elements may
have entered which must render it by more or fewer degrees less certain than the intuitive truth against which
it is set. In all such cases we must examine the supposed first principle, to see that it is a first principle,
and that it is properly inducted, and review the derivative principle in order to determine the nature of the
evidence by which it is supported. By such a sifting
process the seeming contradiction will in all probability
disappear; but if it still continue, we are of course shut
up to the alternative of adhering to the fundamental
truth, and laying aside the derivative one, as being inferior in authority and certainty.
61 
62
CHAPTER II.
METHOD OF EMPLOYING INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES.
SECT. I. THE SPONTANEOUS AND REFLEX USE OF INTUITIVE
PRINCIPLES.
FROM the account which has been given of the Intuitions,
it appears that they may operate-indeed they are ever
operating-of their own accord, and without our prompting them into exercise by any voluntary act; and it appears, too, that we may generalize the individual actings,
discover the rule of their operation, and then proceed to
use them in deduction and in speculation. The former
of these may be called the Spontaneous Action, and the
latter the Reflex Application of the Intuitions. In their
spontaneous exercise they are regulating principles, regulating thought and belief, and operating whether we observe them or no. But in this operation our convictions
all relate to singulars, and so cannot be directly used in
philosophic speculation. In order to their scientific application, there is need of careful reflex observation and
generalization. In order to their spontaneous perception
it is not requisite that their nature should be determined,
they act best when we look simply at the object and take
no introspection of them. But to a legitimate application of them in philosophy, it is essential that their exact
nature, and precise law and rule, be carefully determined.
It is all-important, in treating of our intuitions, to draw
such a distinction, for much which may be affirmed of
them under one of these aspects cannot be affirmed of
them in the other.*
* "La raison se developpe de deux manieres, spontaneite et rE 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
1. The spontaneous must always precede the reflex
form. We have already noticed the circumstance that
in the case of some of them the spontaneous perception
begins with the earliest exercise of the intelligence, while
in the case of others, though a preparation is made for
them from the beginning-just as all the organs of the
animal may be said to be in the embryo-it is long before
they come out in open manifestation, and in unfavourable circumstances they may never appear in a fully developed form, or in vigorous life. But at whatever time
they appear spontaneously, the generalized expression
of them must always be later. We cannot generalize
them till we have observed them, and we cannot observe them till they are in exercise. The reflex use of
them is a scientific process, and cannot begin in the individual or in a nation, till the scientific spirit has been
engendered. Even in their native form, some of them
appear only in the mature man and in the fully developed
mind; in their reflex shape they are found only in individuals and in ages and countries addicted to reflection
or inward observation. Indeed, as the discovery, or even
the comprehension, of the reflex law implies a special
bending back of the eye, from which most men shrink,
the process is one which the great mass of mankind
never engage in, and which the majority of those who
engage in it never follow, except for the sustaining of
some favourite dogma, or the repelling of some proffered
objection.  It must be late in the history of inquiry and
flexion."-" La raison debute par une synthese riche et feconde, mais
obscure: vient apres l'analyse qui eclaircit tout en divisant tout, et qui
aspire elle-m6me ak une synthese supericure, aussi comprehensive que la
premiere et plus lumineuse.  La spontaneite4 donne la vdrite; la reflexion produit la science; l'une fournit une base large et solide aux
developpements de l'humanite4; l'autre imprime a ces developpements
leur forme la plus parfaite."-" L'erreur vient de la refiexion." (Cousin,
Cours de l'Hist. Phil. ie serie, t. i. leg. vi. vii.)
63
a 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
speculation before we can expect to have an expression
of the laws of the intuitions expounded simply for its
scientific value, or as a body of scientific truth.
2. The intuition, in its reflex, abstract, or general form,
is derived from, and is best tested by, the concrete spon-,
taneous conviction. In order to the formation of the
definition, maxim, or axiom, we must have objects or
cases before us, and we must be careful to observe them,
and note what is involved in them.
It is a matter of fact that geometry arose out of mensuration. Men began by measuring fields and heights,
and thence proceeded to construct a scientific mode of
accomplishing what had been done by practical rules,
and I suspect that the enunciation of axioms and some
of the more elementary demonstrations, came at a later
date than practical rules, or even than certain of the more
advanced propositions. We find, in like manner, that a
systematized and connected Ethics, proceeding from original principles, and going on to applications, came later
in the history of moral philosophy than the practical injunctions of parents, or the moral codes of legislators
and the laws of religion. Thlere was reasoning, and even
rules of reasoning, before a regular Logic appeared. Metaphysics has arisen out of the contests of opposing sects,
or has been interposed as a breakwater against a tide of
scepticism.
In all times and circumstances, the most effectual
means of testing logical, ethical, and metaphysical principle, is by the application of it to actual cases, which
should be as numerous and varied as possible. It is
when actual examples are before it that the mind is able
to appreciate the meaning of the general formulae. It is
only when it has considered them in their application to
a number of diversified instances that the mind is in
circumstances to pronounce them to be probably, or
64
a 
METIIOD OF APPLICATION.
approximately, or altogether correct.*   Without such
observational testing, definition, division, arrangement,
and deduction may have rather a tempting and misleading influence. A power of dissection and inference can
do as little in metaphysical as in physical investigation,
that is, it is of no value at all, or may be positively injurious unless it proceed on a previous collation of facts.
Minds of great logical and critical discernment are apt
to go further wrong than others who are no philosophers
at all, by seizing on some mutilated or imperfectly expressed principle, and carrying it out fearlessly, according
to the rules of a rigid deduction. Of all men, those who
live in the region of high abstractions, which they never
bring down to realities, are most apt to go astray as in
snow-drift; and when they do wander, they go faster and
further wrong than other meln.
At the same time, it is to be observed that the abstraction, or generalization, is not got from an outward
object or event which may fall under ocular inspection
or instrumental experiment, but from the operations of a
mental law, which may be altogether missed by those
who are exclusively engrossed with the object at which
the mind is looking when the regulative principle is
working.   Of all men, the ardent sense-observer, or the
* Kant has laid down a very different maxim, declaring that examples only injure the understanding in respect of the correctness and
precision of the apprehension.   Speaking of examples: "Denn was die
Richtigkeit und Prijcision der Verstandeseinsicht betrifft, so thun sie
derselben vielmehr gemeiniglich einigen Abbruch, weil sie nur selten
die Bedingung der Regel adaiquat erfi'llen (als casuts in terminis), und
jiberdies diejenige Anstrengung des Verstandes oftmals schwiichen,
Regeln im Allgemeinen, und unabhaingig von den besonderen Umstiinden der Erfahrung, nach ihrer Zulanglichkeit, einzusehen, und sie daher
zuletzt mehr wie Formeln, als Grundsiitze, zu gebrauchen angewohnen"
(K. d. r. Vern. Trans. Log., p. 119: Rosen.). This shows that Kant
had no correct idea of the way in which the general rule is reached.
The same view is evidently taken by many of the formal logicians of
our day.
F
C 5 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
lhvely picturer of external images, is the most inclined to
shrink from reflex inspection, and is the worst fitted to
propound or to judge of abstract mental principles.
3. The expression of the abstract or general truth is
more or less easy, and is likely to be more or less correct,
according to the simplicity of the objects to which the
spontaneous conviction is directed. It is evident that
some of the intuitive principles of the mind are more
difficult to detect and formalize than others.   Those
which are directed to sensible objects, and simple objects, will be found out more easily, and at an earlier
date, than those which look to more complex or spiritual
objects. Thus the intuitions regarding space-seen by
the eye, and readily pictured in the imagination-were
abstracted, and generalized into geometrical definitions
and axioms, at an early stage of intellectual culture. It
is a vastly more difficult task to express accurately, and
in their ultimate form, the intuitive convictions regarding such objects as substance, and quality, and the laws
involved in' thought and moral perception. Still the war
of contending sects, and the assaults of the sceptic, and
the insidious underminings of the sophist, would compel
men, at an early date, to evolve some sort of logic, and
we have the nature of genera and species and definition,
chalked out by Socrates, the principle of contradiction
employed by Plato, and the formula of reasoning determined, at least approximately, by Aristotle, and, in a
looser form, even in India, more than two thousand years
ago.* The practical interest collecting round moral questions would also lead to an early enunciation of ethical
principle, which, however, owing to the innumerable relations involved in the discharge of duty, would not, at
an early stage, take a thoroughly fundamental or rigidly
* See Paper on Indian Logic, by Professor Max Miiller, in Appendix to Thompson's'Outline of the Laws of Thought.'
66 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
exact form.  The crude nature of the classification embodied in the cardinal virtues, is a proof of the difficulty
of expressing the ultimate laws of morality, or the supreme rule of right and wrong. A similar complexity
presents itself in all inquiries in which substance and
force enter as elements, and hence, while attempts will
be made from the commencement of speculation to express first principles in regard to such objects, the rule
announced will in general combine a mixture of intuitive
and experiential elements, will be able to serve only a
provisional purpose, will seldom be more than approximately correct, and will require to be rectified by much
subsequent examination and comparison with concrete
cases.
4. In their spontaneous action the intuitions never err,
properly speaking; but there may be manifold errors
lurking in their reflex form and application. I have used
the qualified language that properly speaking they do
not err in their original impulses; for even here they may
carry error with them. They look to a representation
given them, and this representation may be erroneous,
and this error will appear in the result. The mind intuitively declares that on a real quality presenting itself, it
must imply a substance; but what is not truly a quality
may be represented as a quality, and then it is declared
that this quality implies a substance. Thus Sir Isaac
Newton and Dr. S. Clarke represented time and space as
qualities, (which I regard as a mistake,) and then represented reason as guaranteeing that these qualities implied
a substance in which they inhere, which is God. But
the error in such cases cannot legitimately be charged on
the intuition, which is exercised simply in regard to the
presentation or representation made to it.
But there is room for innumerable errors creeping into
the abstract or general enunciation and the scientific ap                                            F 2
67 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
plication of it. For we may have made a most defective,
or exaggerated, or totally inaccurate abstraction or generalization of the formula out of the individual exercises, or
we may apply it to cases to which it has no legitimate
reference. From such causes as these have sprung those
oversights, exaggerations, and not unfrequently flagrant
and pernicious errors, which have appeared in every form
of metaphysical speculation. This is a topic which will
fall to be resumed in next Section.
5. The tests of intuitive convictions admit of an application to the abstract and general principle, only so
far as the abstraction and generalization have been properly performed. It is only as applied to singulars, that
our perceptions can be regarded as intuitive. The tests
of intuitions, viz. self-evidence, necessity, and catholicity,
apply directly only to individual convictions. To the
formalized expression of them, the tests apply only mediately, and on the supposition and condition that the
formula are the proper expression of the spontaneous
convictions.
It is always possible that the abstraction and the
generalization have not been correctly executed.   In
some cases, this is no more than barely possible. Whenever the object is a very simple one, presenting itself very
much apart from all other circumstances, there is scarcely
the possibility of error creeping in. Hence the assurance which the mind feels in regard to mathematical
axioms, and the propositions founded on them by steps
every one of which is intuitive. Even in regard to mathematics there may be doubts and contests, but it is only
in more recondite topics, such for instance as those into
which the idea of infinity enters. But in regard to intuitions which refer to objects which are more complicated,
that is, which are mixed up with divers other matters
in our comnprehension, there may be difficulties in exactly
68 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
seizing-and expressing the principle, and there may therefore be doubts and disputes as to whether any given account of them is correct and adequate. It is self-evident as to this particular quality, that it implies a substance, but there is much obscurity about the general
relation of substance and quality. The mind at once
declares of this given effect that it must have a cause,
but there may be doubts and difficulties as to the proper
form in which to put the law of causation. Every man
is convinced that he is the same person today as he was
yesterday, but how few have had consciously before them
the general principle of self and of personality!
SECT. II. SOURCES OF ERROR IN METAPHYSICAL
SPECULATION.
All proposed metaphysical principles are attempted
expressions of the intuitions in the form of a general
law. Now error may at times spring from the assumption of a principle which has no existence whatever in
the human mind.   I am persuaded however that the
errors thus originated are comparatively few, and are
seldom followed by serious consequences. In regard to
the assumption of totally imaginary principles, I am coinvinced that there have been fewer mistakes in metaphysical than in physical science. As the intuitions of the
mind are working in every man's bosom, it will seldom
happen that the speculator can set out with a principle
which has no existence whatever; and should he so venture, he would certainly meet with little response. It is
possible also for error to arise from a chain of erroneous
deduction from principles which are genuine in thenmselves and soundly interpreted. The mistakes springing
from this quarter are likewise, I believe, few and trifling,
the more so that those who draw such inferences are
generally men of powerful logical mind, and not likely
69 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
to commit errors in reasoning; and if they did, those who
have ability to follow them would be sure to detect them.
By far the most copious source of error in philosophic
speculation is to be found in the imperfect, or exaggerated, or mutilated expression of principles which really
have a place in our constitution. In such cases the presence of the real metal gives currency to the dross which
is mixed with it.
In regard to many of our intuitions, the gathering of
the common quality out of the concrete and individual
manifestations is about as subtle a work as the human
understanding can engage in. This arises from the recondite, the complicated, and fugitive nature of the mental
states, from which they must be drawn. But from the
very commencement of speculation and the breaking out
of discussion, attempts have been made to give a body
and a form to the native convictions. It is seldom that
the account is altogether illusory; most commonly there
is a basis of fact to set off the fiction.  But the principle is seen and represented only under one aspect, while
others are left out of sight. It oftels happens that he
whose intuitions are the strongest and the liveliest is of all
men the least qualified to examine and generalize them,
and should he be tempted to embody them in propositions, they will be sure to take distorted, perhaps erroneous forms.   In all departments of speculation, metaphysical, ethical, and theological, we meet with persons whose
faith is strong, whose sentiments are fervent, and whose
very reason is far-seeing, but whose creed-that is, formalized doctrine-is extravagant, or even perilously wrong.
In other cases the conviction, genuine in itself, is put
forth in a mutilated shape by prejudiced men to support
a favourite doctrine, or by party men to get rid of a formidable objection.
The human mind is impelled by an intellectual craving,
70 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
and by the circumstances in which it is placed, to be ever
generalizing, and this in respect both of material and
mental phenomena. But its earliest classes and systems,
even those of them made for scientific purposes, are conmmionly of a very crude character. Still, even such generalizations, though at the best mere approximations, at tirmes
serve valuable ends in the absence of better and until
better appear. Such laws as these have been laid down,
"Nature abhors a vacuum;" "Some bodies are naturally
light, and others heavy;" "Combustible bodies are chemically composed of a base with phlogiston combined
with it;" "The organs of the flower are transformed
leaves."   These were the best general statements which
scientific inquirers could give at the time of their observations. They served to express, if not to explain, certain phenomena. Nature's horror of a vacuum showed
how water rose in a pump. The doctrine of the natural heaviness and lightness of bodies seemed to explain
how stones fell to the earth, while smoke rose in the
atmosphere. The burning of brimstone was thought to
be satisfactorily accounted for, when it was said that
brimstone being composed of sulphurous acid and phlogiston, the combustion consisted in giving out phlogiston
The undoubted correspondence between the leaf and the
stamen suggested the idea that the leaf had been transformed into a stamen. But modern science, advancing
in the inductive method, has shown that none of these
were correct expressions of the real laws of nature. It
cannot be because of its aversion to a vacuum, that
water rises in a pump, for if the vacuum extends higher
than a certain number of feet, the water allows it to
exist in its emptiness. Smoke rises from the earth, not
because of its natural levity, but because it is buoyed up
by the atmosphere. It unfortunately happens tlat lead,
after it is burned,-that is, after it has given off, accord
71 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
ing to the phlogiston theory, one of its ingredients,-is
found to be heavier than before. Stamens and pistils have
never been leaves, they are merely after the same model.
These are examples from physical science. Metaphysical
science, from the subtle and intertwined nature of the phenomena, can furnish far more numerous instances. In tihe
mental sciences the general statements have commonly a
genuine fact, but mixed with this there is often an alloy.
The error may not influence the spontaneous action of the
primitive principle, but it may tell terribly in the reflex
application. It may not even exercise any prejudicial
influence in certain departments of investigation, but in
other walks it may work endless confusion, or land in
consequences fitted to sap the very foundations of morality
and religion. Take the distinction drawn, in some form, by
most civilized languages, between the head and the heart.
The distinction embodies a great truth, and when used in
conversation or popular discourse it can conduct to no evil.
But it cannot be carried out psychologically. For in each
a number of very distinct faculties are included.  Under
the phrase'heart,' in particular, are covered powers with
wide diversities of function, such as the conscience, the
emotions, and the will. The question agitated in this
celntury, whether religion be an affair of the head or the
heart, has come to be a hopelessly perplexed one, because
the offices of the powers embraced under each are diverse, and run into each other; and certain of the positions taken up are, to say the least of it, perilous: as when
it is said that religion resides exclusively in the heart,
and persons understand that it is a matter of mere emnotion, omitting understanding, will, and conscience, which
have equally a part to play.  Of the same description is
the distinction between the reason and the understanding. It points to a reality. There is a distinction between
reason in its primary, and reason in its secondary or
72 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
logical exercises, and the mind can rise, always however
by a process in which the logical understanding is employed, to the discovery of universal and necessary truth.
But each of the divisions, the reason and the understanding, comprises powers which run into each other. This
distinction is at the best confusing,* and it is often so
stated as to imply that the reason, without the use of the
understanding processes of abstraction and generalization, can rise to the contemplation of the true, the beautiful, and the good.
It can be shown that some of the ancient philosophers,
and Kepler in modern times, had glimpses of a law of
universal gravitation before the days of Newton, but none
of these had been able to determine its exact nature
and rule. Suppose that while science was at this stage,
some person had affirmed that there was a power of attraction among all bodies, varying inversely not according
to the square of the distance, but according to the distance:
he would no doubt have had a truth, and a very important
one; but the law thus stated, while it explained in a general way a number of the phenomena, would, when deductions were drawn from it, have issued in ever accumulating errors, and this not because no such law existed,
but because its rule had been improperly apprehended and
enunciated. Almost all metaphysical errors spring from
this source, from the improper formalization of principles
which are real laws of our constitution. When presented
in this mutilated shape, even truth may lead to hideous
consequences. It will be shown as we advance that there
is an intuitive law of cause and effect, but this law has
not always been correctly enunciated.   Suppose it be
put in this formi, that "Everything niust have a cause."
it will issue logically and necessarily in the result that the
* This distinction is examined, Part III. Book I. Chap. II. sect. v.,
Supplementary.
73 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
Intelligent Cause of this world must Himself have had
a cause. This consequence can at once be avoided by a
proper enunciation of the law of causation.
We may now see how it is that metaphysicians, when
they go wrong, go further wrong than others. This
proceeds from the fundamental nature of metaphysical
principles: every error here, like a mistake in taking
down the datum of an arithmetical or mathematical question, must issue in fearfully magnified error in the results
reached. This weakness in the foundation must make
the structure insecure to its topmost pinnacle.   The
tainting of the fountain will go with the stream in all its
length. Suppose that we set out in ethical discussion,
with the assumption that virtue is just a far-sighted love
of pleasure; or in theology, with the dogma that justice
is a modification of benevolence: it will turn out that
these principles (which I believe to be wrong) will affect
the whole superstructure of speculation, and lead those
who adopt them to take very inadequate views of sin on
the one hand, and the justice of God on the other. It
should be added, that an error in the starting principle
comes out in more exaggerated errors in the issue, in
very proportion to the rigid consecutiveness of the deduction, and the extent to which it is carried.   A
mistake in the first steps of an arithmetical question,
may be lessened by some counterbalancing blunder in
the further calculations.   It has often happened that
philosophers have shrunk from following out their principles to their consequences. Locke in particular has
often been saved from extreme opinions to which his
theory led, but from which his sagacity and honesty recoiled, by falling into inconsequences and inconsistencies.
Powerful logical minds, like Spinoza and Hegel, have, on
the other hand, boldly avowed the most extravagant doctrines, as being the legitimate result of their gratuitous
assumptions.
74 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
There is another circumstance to be taken into account by those who would unfold the theory of the metaphysician's extravagancies; he is not restrained as the
physical investigator is by stubborn facts, nor checked
as the commercial man is by stern realities, which he
dare not despise. He has only to mount into a region
of pure (or rather, I should say, cloudy), speculation to
find himself in circumstances to cleave his way without meeting with any felt barrier. At the same time
one might have reasonably expected, that when such
speculators as Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, felt
themselves rushing headlong against all acknowledged
truth, they would have suspected that there was something wrong in their assumptions, or in their method.
Whenever the results reached contradict the senses or
the established doctrines of physical science, whenever
they lead to the denial of the distinction between good
and evil, or the personality of the soul, or of the existence, the personality, and continual providence of God,
it is time to review the process by which they have been
gained, for they are running counter to truths which
have too deep a foundation to be moved by doubtful
speculations. The remark of Bacon as to physical, may
be applied to metaphysical speculation, that doctrine is
to be tried by fruits. "Of all signs there is none more
certain or worthy than that of the fruits produced; for the
fruits and effects are sureties and vouchers, as it were,
for philosophy." "In the same manner as we are cautioned by religion to show our faith by our works, we
may freely apply the principle to philosophy, and judge
of it by its works, accounting that to be futile which is
unproductive, and still more, if instead of grapes and
olives it yield but.the thistles and thorns of dispute and
contention."
75 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
SECT. III. CONDITIONS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE APPEAL
TO INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES.
There is scarcely occasion to lay down any rules as
to the spontaneous use of the regulative principles of
the mind.   It is of their nature to act, and, like the
physiological processes of seeing and breathing, they act
all the better when no notice is taken of them. All that
is necessary to call them forth is to present the appropriate objects;-in mnathematics, for example, to present
geometrical figures and quantities, and in moral subjects to present models and ideals of excellence. Thus
are they evoked in the first instance, and thus are our
intellectual and moral intuitions refined, elevated, and
strengthened. Any other rules fitted to promote their
right action are of a moral, rather than a speculative
character. If the motive power of the mind be right,
if the man be impelled by a love of truth, and swayed
by a spirit of candour, then the regulative principles, if
occupied about the proper objects, will of themselves
perform their proper function.  There is truth in the
common observation that a mind sophisticated by logic
and confused by metaphysics will often fall into errors
from which others who follow only good sense and good
feeling are happily delivered.
But if persons wish at any time to review their opinions, or answer objections, or convince others by argument, they must employ principles of some kind, and
these, in the last resort, must conduct to first principles.
I suppose that if man's moral nature had been pure, he
would never have fallen into error; there would have
been no difference among mankind in regard to questions of vital moment, and controversy would have been
unknown. In such a happy condition, I believe that
first principles would have been contemplated simply as
76 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
a matter of intellectual curiosity, and as illustrative of
the Divine wisdom. It is not necessary to prove that
man is not placed in such a blessed state of things. It
is scarcely possible to find three men met together whose
opinions are at one, even on essential points; to err is
an inherent weakness of humanity, and some have fallen
into most pernicious mistakes.   Every man needs, in
consequence, to examine the apprehensions he has formed,
and the convictions which he has been led to entertain;
he has to defend what he believes to be truth when it
is assailed, and he has, in a spirit of love, to endeavour
to convince others of their errors when these relate to
matters of great moment for this life or the life to come.
In this world of ours, the review of impressions and
opinions, and discussion, are matters of absolute neces..
sity: but this implies the use of proofs, premisses, tests;
and if we pursue these sufficiently far (as we must at
times be constrained to do), we go beyond derivative to
original principles. But are we allowed to call in a
supposed fundamental principle when it suits us, or use
it in the form we please, to justify an opinion to which
we are determined to adhere at all hazards, or to crush
our opponent? As there are logical rules to guard against
abuse in derivative argument, so there may also be logical
rules laid down to restrain the appeal to assumable pre
misses.
1. Those who appeal to first truths must be prepared
to show that they are first truths. In most investigations it is not necessary ever to be going down to the
foundation. In ordinary physical inquiry, for example,
we may assume such laws as gravitation and chemical
affinity, without being required to prove them once and
and again. But in certain discussions, theological and
philosophical, more especially when the controversy is
with the doubter or the sceptic, it may be needful to rest
77 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
our first stones on the foundation, -in all such cases we
must be sure that we have gone down to the rock. We
must hold ourselves ready to prove, not indeed the truth
of the first principle,-for this is impossible in the nature
of things,-but that it is a first principle.  We are required to show that it is self-evident; and if this be denied, we may show that we are constrained to believe
it, and cannot be made to judge or decide the contradictory of it to be true; and we may confirm all this by
showing that all men adhere to it. We should not stop
short of this in the argument which we construct for our
own conviction. An opponent has a right to insist on
this in arguing with us on questions which go down to
the bottom; and we have a right, in arguing with one
who makes any appeal to primary principles, to demand
of him to prove that what he is calling in be in fact a
self-evident and necessary conviction.
2. Those who employ intuitive principles in demonstration, speculation, or discussion of any kind, must see
that they accurately express them. This is done in the
science of geometry, which owes much of its certainty,
and the satisfaction which the mind feels in contemplating its truths, to the circumstance that it begins with
announcing, in the rigid form of axioms, or postulates,
all that it assumes. We should insist that the same
be done in all other branches which employ first principles. The canon is, not only that they be enunciated,
but that their precise rule be enunciated. It often happens that in the popular expression of material facts, a
law is put in a form which gives some information, but
which may not after all be absolutely correct. People
often say that mountains draw the clouds, and thus foster
rain, and this gives a sort of statement of certain facts;
but the true account is that the cold mountain condenses
the moisture in the current of air sweeping over it. It
78 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
is quite right to say that the tides are produced by the
attraction of the moon, and this explains some of the
facts; but then it cannot show how there is full tide
not only on the side of the earth next the moon, but on
the opposite side. In the expression of the phenomena
of the mind, there are still more frequent instances of
statements which are only approximately correct. Thus
substance has been explained as that which subsists of
itself, or needs nothing else in order to its existence.
This account contains a truth, but is expressed in too
unrestricted a form. Spinoza, proceeding on such a definition, which had been supplied him by the school of
Descartes, goes on with a bristling array of forms, and
much word.quibbling, to demonstrate, that there can
be only one substance, of which all other things are the
attributes or modes. We are at once saved from this
pantheistic consequence by putting the proper limitation
on the definition. It is quite true that in all discussion,
theological and moral, philosophic principles are often appealed to, and may serve a proper purpose, even when
not very formally or accurately expressed. This they do
because the truth contained in the principle happens to
be applicable. But it might have happened to be otherwise.  "Every event has a cause:" this is a maxim
which we are applying in our every-day reasonings and
observations.  But has it no limits? or is causation of
the same character in regard to every event?  In particular, does causation reign in the will, as it reigns in
the material universe? or if it does, is causation in the
will the same in kind as causation in external nature,
or as causation in the intelligence? He who uses the
principle of causation indiscriminately, may, before he is
aware of it, land himself ill the conclusion that man is
as much the slave of circumstances as every spoke in the
wheel, or as every link in a chain, which a strong force
79 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
is dragging along. We can save ourselves from such
consequences only by limiting, modifying, or explaining
the doctrine of causation. We have already seen that
our intuition regarding causality may be so stated as to
land us in an infinite series of causes; we now see that
it may be so enounced as to undermine the great moral
doctrine of the essential freedom of the will. We see how
important it must be to have the nature and the precise
range of the law clearly and definitely settled.
The two rules now laid down may seem to some to be
very hard ones; but they are very necessary ones to
arrest those confused and confusing controversies which
abound to such an extent in philosophy, in theology, and
in other departments of investigation as well.  It is always indeed to be allowed that our inquiries on most
subjects may be conducted and terminated satisfactorily
without our being required to go down to metaphysical
principles. The farmer, the merchant, the politician,
and even the physical investigator in most of his walks,
may come to the right conclusion in regard to the topics
which they wish to settle, without its being necessary for
them to determine the nature of mathematical axioms
or the law of cause and effect; on which, notwithstanding, some of these calculations regarding the seasons or
the tides or the movements of the heavenly bodies, or the
probal)e actings of men, may after all depend-only,
however, in the sense of a deep foundation which it is
not necessary for these parties to examine.   But if any
one will enter on speculations involving radical truth, he
must be prepared to submit to the conditions on which
they can be properly conducted. No manl is bound to
be a metaphysician unless he chooses, but if he insist on
beconming one, he must attend to the rules of the office
which he takes on himself. Every man is not under a
moral obligation to throw aside other useful pursuits, and
80 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
devote himself to answering such speculations as those
of Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, Fichte, or Hegel; but if he
ventures into the arena, he must conform to its rules.
Every friend of religion is not obliged to write a philosophic defence of it, and some who have ventured upon
such a work might have been more profitably employed
in some less ambitious undertaking, as in defending some
of the outworks of religion, or illustrating its power by
their lives; but those who claim to be philosophers must
comport themselves as philosophers. It is to be regretted
that multitudes dabble in metaphysics who have no capacity for grappling with its subtle truths; but the only
effective mode of curbing this incompetency and quackery, is by insisting on all those who would enter the
trade undergoing some sort of scientific apprenticeship
or process of training. Nor are these restrictions the
less necessary from the circumstance that not a few of
those who possess the greatest aversion to metaphysics
are all the while deep in metaphysics without their knowing it, and certainly without their being prepared to avow
it, and it is necessary to lay an arrest on such by showing what the science is, and compelling them if they enter the country to conform to its laws.
There are persons who are constrained by the circum.
stances in which they are placed, or by what they believe
to be the voice of duty, to discuss fundamental questions.
There have been persons, even in the lowest walks of
life, troubled, owing to a peculiar intellectual temperament (commonly not of a very healthy character), with
speculative doubts, which are only to be removed by
speculative arguments; but, if convinced, it must surely
be by arguments built on a sure foundation. Some are
placed in a position in which they are assailed by the infidel, and feel that they must meet him in the cause of
truth and religion.  Some, as knowing that they possess
G'
81 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
peculiar gifts, feel themselves called on to defend the
very citadel of morals or of religion, or to rear a fabric
of truth compacted from the very base. But if these
men are not to waste their strength in a war of subtleties, they must be careful how they begin to build, lest
what they rear turn out to be crazy and unstable, and a
source of weakness rather than of strength. Paying attention to certain restrictions and precautions themselves,
they will be in a position to insist on wild speculators,
or the sceptics whom they oppose, conforming themselves
to these canons of the logic of metaphysical speculation.
These then I reckon as the conditions of all argument
which appeals formally to primary truth, to necessary
conviction, or common sense. Persons not pretending
to be philosophers, and discussing none of those topics
which philosophers alone can discuss, may claim the privilege, when a sceptical objection comes in their way, or
an altogether unbelievable dogma is asserted, of rejecting it at once, on the ground of spontaneous conviction,
and troubling themselves no more about it. They must
take care, however, in all such cases, that what they suppose to be a native conviction be not a mere prepossession of education, or prejudice of temper, and if there be
ground for doubt, there is no help for it but in an appeal
to the tests of intuitions, and the canons of their legitimate
use. And as to those who profess to proceed philosophically, it is incumbent on them that they prove that
what they assume is an original conviction, and that they
generalize the spontaneous exercises, and express them in
rigid formulae.  But when it is thus conducted, the argument from intuition or common sense is not an arga~nentum ad _opulum, and least of all an argument addressed to vulgar prejudice.  It presupposes a rigid scientific process, and should not be attempted by any except those who possess the requisite retrospective powers
82 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
of observation, and have disciplined themselves to the
rules of the logic of first principles. When conformed
to the right conditions, it is an argument strictly scientific, eminently satisfactory within its proper domain, and
is in an especial sense the philosophical argument.
Such restrictions as these would, I know full well, lay
an arrest at once on more than one-half of the metaphysics of this age, and of every age. This would be felt
to be a discouragement by certain eager youths, full of
expectations of the results to be reached by philosophic
speculation, and by certain older, but not wiser men,
who have mapped out the whole intellectual globe, and
would feel troubled at the idea of their distribution being disturbed: but in the end there would be no loss;
for the part remaining after the refining process, would
be of vastly more worth, and would soon be acknowledged to be so.
When speculative philosophy is pursued in the usual
unrestrained manner, the results reached are of the most
unsatisfactory character, and at times are felt to be so.
How often do ardent youths rush into the country opened
to them, as keenly as the adventurers in the sixteenth
century set out in search of E1 Dorado, and after spending        years, and wasting the strength of manhood, they
come back with a sense of emptiness and a feeling of
disappointment! Even those who refuse to abandon the
hope, and who cling most resolutely to the idea that they
have discovered genuine gold, are now and again all but
overwhelmed with a feeling of prostration and bitterness,
and  break out, as the Doctor in'Faust,'        "I feel it, I have heaped upon my brain
The gathered treasure of man's thought in vain."
In such there is a weariness, an aching, an ennui of the
head, which is felt to be as deep, if not so keen, as the
aching, the ennui of the heart ever is; and yet there may
G2
83 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
coexist with this a determination to continue the fruitless pursuit. Others have had a confession wrung from
them like that of Jacobi: "In my younger years it stood
thus with me in regard to philosophy: I seemed to myself
to be heir to innumerable riches, and only some unimportant lawsuits and some unmeaning formalities seemed
to hinder me from taking full possession of my inheritance. The suits, while pending, grew to be important.
At last it appeared that I had inherited nothing but
lawsuits, and that the whole bequest was in insolvent
hands."
Happy are those who advance, or who can return, as
fresh in spirit and as innocent as when they entered.
Some, feeling as if no certainty could be reached, or as
if, after unwinding the folds of the mystery, nothing
wonderful or worthy has been discovered, have come to
the settled conclusion that it is vain for them ever after
to expect to find certainty, to reach felt assurance, or even
to look for anything worth seeing, and so give themselves up to listlessness and apathy. Wandering till they
have become bewildered, as if in a deep and gloomy forest, they sit down with the intention of never rising;
or, like persons wearied and worn out in snowdrift, they
lie down to become benumbed, and are ready to perish
in cold. Still worse consequences have followed. How
often does the eager youth rush on till he falls into the
abyss!
" He eagerly pursues,
Beyond the realms of dreams, that fleeting shade;
IHe overleaps the bounds!"
Entering into the labyrinth, to survey its wonders, he
is lost in its numberless passages and its endless windings, without being ever able to find his way back to
the open light and air; nay, how often has it happened
that the builder of such intricacies has himself been
84 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
imprisoned and entombed within them. Or, rushing
eagerly to solve the sphinx riddles which Nature is propounding, and unable to find the solution, he must pay
the awful penalty to that terrible Power, which insists on
a reply, and crushes those who try and do not succeed! Some have entered, with lively anticipations, this
temple of mystery, only to come out oppressed with
doubt, or with the language of scorn and scepticism on
their lips; they have seen all, they say, been in the very
Holy of Holies, and found it empty, with no God dwelling between the Cherubim or uttering his voice in the
Shechinah.
"He dropped his plummet down the broad
Deep universe, and said,' No God,'
Finding no bottom."
SECT. IV. METHOD OF INVESTIGATING AND INTERPRETING
OUR INTUITIONS.
Two questions require to be answered in all metaphysical investigation. The one is, What is the nature
of the intuition itself? and the other, What is the nature
of the object at which it looks, and for which it is the
guarantee? These two inquiries are to be prosecuted
in one and the same way,-that is, in the method of induction; not with sense, but consciousness, as our informant. There is really no other manner of determining
the nature of the intuitional power, its law, rule, and
manner of operation; nor any other mode of ascertaining what is the kind of object or truth revealed by that
power. I know of no shorthand or summary way, by
logic or cogitation, of settling these two essential questions in philosophy.   It might have been different if
man had been conscious of the intuition as an intuition.
In this case it would only have been needful to look
within by the internal sense in order to find its nature.
85 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
But just as the law of gravitation is not written on the
face of the sky so that the eye can see it, so neither is
the law of causation printed on the soul so that consciousness can read off the inscription. The one law,
like the other, is to be ascertained by an investigation
of its individual acts, and this in a state of things in
which the action of one property is closely interblended
with that of another property; necessitating not only
an observation of facts, but a very patient and discerning
induction, so that we may catch the rule of the distinct
agencies.
The task, so far as the second question is concerned,
might have been easier if all our intuitions had been constructed so as to discover one and the same kind of truth.
But as each of the senses is organized to discover its own
kind of material qualities, so each of the internal perceptions reveals its peculiar object or truth, and in its own
peculiar manner. As inductive inquiry into the nature
of perception through the eye will not settle for us what
is the nature of perception through the touch, so neither
can an investigation of any one intuition settle for us the
nature of the apprehension which the others, or any of
the others, are fitted to furnish. The metaphysician, in
conducting his delicate inquiries, must go over the in tuitions one by one, asking of each what it has to say of
itself, and what is the vision which it has to disclose; in
this respect acting like the divine who has the proper
respect for revelation, and who does not determine be forehand what the inspired record should say, but reve rently asks, What  saith the Scripture?   A  thousand
errors have arisen in philosophy from omitting to look at
our intuitions one by one, and from affirming of all what
may be true only of some.
It is the special office of the metaphysician to go to
our intuitions one by one, and ask, What does it say of
S6 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
itself? what does it profess to look at and discover? This
latter is the inquiry which we should make when our aim
is to discover whether the conviction testifies to the existence of an object or truth external to, or independent of,
the mind perceiving it.  To give some examples.  What,
we mayask, is the object attested by the mind when it is
perceiving through the senses? The answer seems to
be, an object external to self, extended and movable. In
this exercise, and in every other intelligent exercise, consciousness testifies to the existence of a self in intelligent
exercise. There are other operations in which the mind
is simply imagining: even in such cases it has a knowledge; but it has no knowledge of, or belief in, an object
external to the mind. If I am picturing a griffin, I am
conscious of self thus engaged, but I have no intuitive
conviction of the existence of a griffin, independent of
my thinking of it, as I have of the existence of a pen or
table when I press my hand upon it. In the interpretation of the intuition, it is essential to inquire what, if any,
is the sort of object to the existence of which it testifies.
These two are different from yet another, and a third inquiry: Does, or does not, the intuition speak the truth?
Is it not possible that it may deceive us? I am anxious
to avoid this question for the present, and defer it till we
have got an answer to the two prior ones,-What is the
nature of the intuitions?. and what the precise object
looked at?-questions which will be settled as we examine
the intuitions in order. The question as to what saith
the intuition, is not the same as the question as to whether
the intuition should be trusted. It is expedient to determine precisely what the witness says, before we inquire
whether he does or does not speak the truth; and so we
adjourn this last question to the close of our survey.
In questioning the witness, it will be necessary, when
a testimony is given in favour of a reality independent
87 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
of the contemplative mind, to determine very precisely
what is the sort of reality. In particular the question
should be put, Is the attestation in behalf of an independent thing, or merely of the quality of a thing, or of
the relation between one thing and another, or what else?
For example, self-consciousness seems to testify in behalf
of self as an individual existence, and sense-perception
seems to assert of bodily objects that they have a separate being; but when the mind contemplates thinking,
or solidity, or potency, though it undoubtedly affirms of
them that they are real, it does not look on them as separate entities, as this paper or as this book is. The
mind declares that moral excellence is a reality, and not
a figment; but it does not attribute the same sort of
reality to it as it does to the man who possesses moral
excellence. The mind seems to me to declare that there
is a reality in space and time, but we may land ourselves
in innumerable difficulties if we make rash assertions as
to the kind of reality we give them. Unless we draw
such distinctions, we may altogether misunderstand the
testimony given, and then be tempted to charge the
blunders, which our own hastiness has committed, onl our
mental constitution. And yet these are distinctions which
are altogether lost sight of by those who juggle with the
phrases'objective' and'subjective.' Even in our most subjective exercises, as when the mind is thinking of one of
its own states, there is always an object known, namely,
self; and when we say that such a thing has an objective existence, we may mean a great many different things
which should be carefully distinguished.*
The meaning and importance of these cautions may
best be comprehended by giving examples of the evil
which has arisen from neglecting them. Kanlt laboured
* On Subjective and Objective, see Part III. Book I. Chap. II.
sect. v., Supplementary.
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METHOD OF APPLICATION.
to determine more critically than had been done before,
the nature of the mind's convictions regarding space,
time, and causation, and he stood up resolutely for their
reality; but then it was a merely subjective reality-a
reality in the mind. Time and space are represented
by him as forms under which we cognize all phenomena
presented to the senses, and cause and effect is a category under which events are arranged by the understanding. Now, in examining this theory, I start with
inquiring, What do our native convictions say in regard
to these subjects? Are they satisfied when it is said
that time and space and causation have no existence
out of the mind? They seem to me, on the contrary,
to declare that time and space have a reality out of the
mind, and independent of the mind, quite as much as
the phenomena which we discover in space and time,
and that cause and effect have an existence quite as much
as the events which they connect.   No doubt I may
deny the trustworthiness of my intuitive convictions as
attesting. the existence of external being, but immediately after, some one, proceeding a step further in the
same direction, will deny the trustworthiness of all their
other testimonies, till we are landed in a scepticism
which sets aside the reality, subjective as well as objective.
This is an illustration of evil arising from a refusal to
listen to our convictions. Mistakes have also arisen from
neglecting the distinctions between the kinds of testimony. M. Cousin finds fault, very properly, with Kant,
for not allowing an objective existence to substance and
causation, and other truths attested by reason. But then
he does not institute a patient inquiry into the nature of
the reality which the mind gives to such things as sub stance and cause and moral good; and he argues as if
these must have the same sort of reality as the individual
89 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
soul has, or as an individual acting causally has, or as
a good man has; and he has thus been led to argue
at once, from our idea of objective substance to God as
absolute substance, from creature effect to God as the
Supreme Cause, and from the idea of moral good to the
existence of a good God,-a mode of argument which I
cannot but regard as inconclusive and highly unsatisfactory, the more so as it operates, with other considerations, to lead him to represent God as a cause which
must create.*
By steadily adhering to this method of induction, and
attending to such cautions, we may surely hope to be
able to ascertain something as to the original principles
of the mind, and determine likewise what are the truths
guaranteed by them: and this, I apprehend, is the main
work which metaphysics should attempt.
In regard to systems not built upon inductive psychological proof, I confess that to me they are all very much
alike; they differ only in respect of the intellectual temperament of the individual constructing them, or the
influences under which he has been nurtured. The man
of genius, like Schelling, will create an ingenious theory,
beautiful as the golden locks of the setting sun; the man
of vigorous intellect, like Hegel, will erect a fabric which
looks as coherent as a palace of ice: but until they can
* See a summary of his admirable review of Kant, Prem. S4r. tom. v.
leq. viii. In Prem. Ser. tom. ii. leg. vii., viii., xiv., xxii., he labours to
show that the ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, imply the
existence of a God who is the true, the beautiful, the good; and in
Deux. Ser. tom. i. leg. iv., v., that the finite implies the infinite, that the
effect implies a cause, and the cause an effect.  In these last lectures
he had spoken of God as necessarily creating. In Fragments Philosophiques, Aver. de la trois. ed., he withdraws the language'necessity of
creation,' as not sufficiently reverent towards the Creator; but he adheres to the meaning, "Or en Dieu surtout la force est adequate a la
substance, et la force divine est toujours en acte; Dieu est done essentiellement actif et createur."
90 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
be shown to be founded on the inherent principles of
the mind, or to be built up of materials thence derived,
I wrap myself up in philosophic doubt, as not being sure
whether they may disappear while I am gazing on them.
Nor am I to be seduced into an admiration of such
imposing systems by the plea often urged in their behalf,
that they fuirnish a gymnasium for the exercise of the
intellect. I acknowledge that one of the very highest advanltages of study of every description is to be found in
the vigour imparted to the mind which pursues it. But
whatever may have been the difficulty in the days of the
schoolmen, it is not necessary now to resort to fruitless
a priori speculation, in order to find an arena in which
to exercise the intellect. Nay, I am convinced that when
the research conducts to no solid results, it will weary
the mind without strengthening it; the effort will be like
that of one who beateth the air, and activity will always
be followed by exhaustion, by dissatisfaction, and an un willingness to make further exertion. Labour, it is true,
is its own reward; but if there be no other reward, there
will be the want of the needful incentive. The vigour im parted is only one of the incidental effects which follow
when labour is undertaken in the hope of securing substan tial fruits. Nor is it to be forgotten that these speculations,
though fruitless of good, are not fruitless of evil. In the
struggles thus engendered there are other powers of the
mind tried as well as the understanding; there are often
sad agonizings of the feelings, of the faith, and indeed of
the whole soul, which feels as if the foundation on which
it previously stood had been removed and none other
supplied, and as if it had in consequence to sink for
ever; or as if it were doomed to move for ever onward
without reaching a termination, while all retreat has been
cut off behind.   In these wrestlings I fear that many
wounds are inflicted, which continue long to rankle and
91 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
often terminate in something worse than the dissolution
of the bodily organism, for they end in the loss of faith
and of peace, in cases in which they do not issue in immorality, in scepticism, or in blasphemy. Any sentiment
of admiration which might be excited by the display of
mental power and learning on the part of the speculators,
is counteracted in my mind by more painful associations
than the Quaker poet connected with the sound of the
drum.
"I hate that drum's discordant sound,
Parading round and round and round;
To me it talks of ravaged plains,
And burning towns and ruined swains,
And mangled limbs and dying groans,
And widows' tears and orphans' moans,
And all that Misery's hand bestows
To fill the catalogue of human woes."
These exercises, I suspect, resemble not so much those
of the gymnasium, as of the ancient gladiatorial shows,
in which no doubt there were many brilliant feats performed, but in which also members were mutilated, and
the heart's-blood of many a brave man shed. I fear that
ill not a few cases generous and courageous youths have
entered the lists, to lose in the contest all creed, all religious, and in some cases, all moral principle, and with
these all peace and all stability.
"I see before me the gladiator lie,
He leans upon his hand-his manly brow
Consents to death, but conquers agony;
And his drooped head sinks gradually low:
And through his side the last drops ebbing slow
From the big gash, fall heavy one by one,
Like the first of a thunder-shower. And now
The arena swims around him —he is gone."
SECT. V. WHAT EXPLANATION CAN BE GIVEN OF THE
INTUITIONS OF THE MIND?
As we arc about forthwith to ask the Intuitions to
92 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
give an account of themselves, it may be as well to have
it settled what sort of information we may expect to
draw from them.
Our intuitions are at once the clearest and the darkest objects which the mind can contemplate; constituting
the intellectual sense by which we get all our original
knowledge, it is found to be a painful and arduous work
to turn back the eye upon itself. Truths seen by intuition shine in their own light, like the luminary of day,
and any attempt to make them clearer is like "going out
with a taper to see the sun," and yet when  we would
look steadily on them our eye is apt to be blenched. In
another respect too they are like the sun-they shine the
brightest when we get the first glance at them, and if we
continue to gaze, they appear dim and dark to our oppressed vision. And yet it is only by reflexly looking on
them as they shine, that we can expect to be able to determine their form and dimensions.
There are senses in which they cannot, there are senses
in which they can be explained.
I. 1. They cannot be explained in the sense of being
rendered intelligible to any one naturally without them.
He who is born blind cannot be made to see colours by
help of a microscope or telescope, nor could the most
vivid description give him any idea of them. In like
manner, if there were a human being without the intuitions, he could not be made to understand the objects
which they reveal: he who does not see them when he
opens his eyes, will never be enabled to behold them by
any logical process of explanation or definition. If men
were without the native capacity of perceiving extension,
or power of discerning moral good, it would be impossible by any description or argument to convey the dimmest idea of them. This is one reason why the subject
of our original perceptions has been felt to be so very
93 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
mysterious. It is seen that human discussion can do
nothing in clearing them up, and that if it attempt to
do so, it is only "darkening counsel by words without
knowledge." But all this dazzling of our eye arises not
from any darkness enveloping them, but from the very
brightness of the light in which they shine.
2. They cannot be explained in the sense of being resolved into simpler elements. In physical science we
can gain important information regarding many objects,
by resolving them into their constituents; even there
however we come to simple substances which cannot be
decomposed. In mental science we can explain many
phenomena by explicating the processes involved in the
formation of them; thus, in regard to the perception of
distance by the eye, we can show what are the original
endowments of the sense of sight, and what are the acquisitions of experience; and in regard to, reasoning, we
can point out the relation of premisses and conclusion.
But in the process of decomposition we must come to
simple properties which admit of no analysis. The intuitive principles of the mind are the simple powers to
which we owe all our original cognitions: he who would
attempt to cut these atoms will find the edge of his analysis bent back and blunted, as the razor is when it is
applied to the rock.
3. They cannot be explained in the sense of being referred to higher principles from which they derive their
authority. Some phenomena, both material and mental,
can be thus shown to hang on higher truths: the movements of the planets and of the moon up in the sky, are
dependent on the law of gravitation, and on the collocation of the several bodies. We may lawfully and profitably seek out for the authority on which certain of our
apprehensions or cognitions rest: we may trace the steps,
for example, by which we are led to believe that Julius
94 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
Cesar lived, or that Jesus Christ died and rose again, or
those by which we come to be assured that the square of
the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the
square of the other two sides.  But in all such regressions we must at last come back to something original,
and having its authority in itself.
For some things we must have a foundation, but we
do not seek for a foundation for everything. It was the
idea that everything must lean on something else, which
led the Indians to place the earth on the back of an elephant, and to make the elephant stand on a tortoise.
I use this as a mere illustration.  It is quite true that
most truths known to us stand on other truths. But
we come at last to truths which stand on nothing else.
The mind does not feel on this account that the truths
are less stable: it is convinced as to certain truths that
they need something else to lean on; but of certain truths
it sees that they bear up other truths and yet themselves
need no support beyond or beneath them; and it sees
that these are the truths which are the firmest and the
most secure. He who would go beyond them is going
further back than the beginning; he who would go further down is trying to get beneath the foundation.
II. But there are senses in which an account or an
explanation can be given of them.
1. Negative definitions may be given of them. The
knowledge which we have of the objects being in its very
nature the simplest of all knowledge, we cannot make it
simpler.   But  if any one mistakes in regard to the
objects, and says that they possess qualities which we
know do not belong them, then we can correct him. We
can by reason of our intimate knowledge of the objects
make an indefinite number of negative assertions regarding them. Thus, we can affirm of self perceiving that it
is different from the body perceived, of extension that it
95 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
is not the same as consciousness or intelligence, of space
and time that they can have no bounds, of moral excellence that it is not the same as the pleasurable, and of
vice that it is not the same as the painful. These negative propositions may be made to face error from whatever quarter it makes its hostile assaults.
2. Their peculiarity may be brought out by abstraction. Not that their nature may be explained to one who
is not already cognizant of them. But the native cognizance which the mind has of them is concrete, is mixed.
Several intuitions are mingled in one act, or our intuitive perceptions are bound up with our derivative or experiential exercises. As long as our reflex knowledge
is of this character, it is indistinct and confused, and we
are ever liable to fall into error when we make affirmations regarding it; for what we assert of the whole, or of
every one of the parts, may be true only of some or
of one of the parts. But by analysis we can make the
given intuitions stand forth separately to the view, just
as by experiment in physical science we can separate
the agencies of nature which usually work in combination,-separate, for example, in the exhausted receiver of
an air-pumup, the power which draws a body to the earth
from the resistance given to it in ordinary circumstances
by the atmosphere. Looking at it thus, we can distinguish and express its peculiarity.   Not that this expression could convey any meaning to one without the intuition, but to one with the intuition the meaning flashes
immediately on the vision. Naturally, there is never a
knowledge of not-self without a co-existing knowledge
of self, but by abstraction we can separate the two and
look at each by itself; and when we describe the notself as extended or in motion, or the self as conscious
and intelligent, an apprehension at once starts up in the
mind corresponding to the object.
96 
METHOD OF APPLICATION.
3. The nature of the object intuitively known can be
specified.   Not indeed that it could be apprehended by
one without the proper perception, but to one with the
corresponding intuition its nature can be distinctly stated.
Thus we can, in intelligent language, describe the extension of body as its being contained in space and occupying space, and virtue as the approvable quality of
voluntary actions of intelligent beings, and the mind at
once understands what is meant to be affirmed of the
objects.
4. We may generalize or classify the intuitions of
the mind.* Fixing by abstraction on certain common
qualities, we may then, by generalization, place all those
possessing them into one class. We may fix on the
more marked and decided points of resemblance, with
their implied differences, and this will give us the Grand
Divisions. We may then divide and subdivide, according to other, and minor, but still important points of
resemblance and difference, in due ordination and subordination.   In this Treatise we classify the intuitions according to what they look at and discover, as
II. THE GOOD.
I. THE TRUE.
1. Primitive Cognitions. 2. Primitive Beliefs. 3. Primitive Judgments.
The justification of this arrangement can be found
only in its embracing all the phenomena, and of this the
reader must judge as we proceed with the exposition.
I speak of our intuitions as looking to the true and
the good, and the true and the good thus perceived have
a reality, but this is not to be understood as a reality of
the same sort as is possessed by individual things, which
* Locke says truly, that if we include all self-evident propositions,
_principles will be almost infinite (Essay, book ii. ch. vii. s. 10). Hence
the need of generalizing them.
H
97
I. THE Tpu.B. 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
may be true or good. They have a reality, not as individual entities, but as common qualities, which should
be expressed by a common epithet. But the qualities
always imply individual objects, in which they inhere.
And wherever the qualities of knowledge and moral
excellence are to be found in the creature they are but
emanations from the Creator. The streams, if we follow
them, will lead us up to the Fountain. It will be seen
that our intuitive convictions, whether they relate to the
true or the good, all conduct us to Him who is emphatically the True and the Good.
CHAPTER III.
(sUPPLEMENTARY.)
BRIEF CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS IN REGARD
TO INTUITIVE TRUTHS.
I. THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS OF GREECE.-The Greek philosophers who flourished in the sixth and fifth centuries before
Christ, if they did not exactly discuss, did, at least, start the question of man's native power of intuition. The Ionian School, founded
by Thales, and continued by Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and others, dwelling among material elements, found only the
mutable and the fleeting; till at length it was laid down systematically by Heraclitus, that all things were in a state of perpetual
flux, under the power of an ever-kindling and ever-extinguishing
fire. Running to the opposite extreme, the Eleatic School, of
which Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno were the most illustrious masters, appealed altogether from sense (ar~O(r;t) and
opinion (8o'a) to reason (Xo'yo7); fixed its attention on the abiding
nature of things beneath all mutation; dived into profound, but
over-subtle, and often confused and quibbling disquisitions regarding Being; and ended by making all things so fixed that
change and motion became impossible.  It was in the very midst
of the collision of these sects that Socrates was reared. Professing to have only a practical aim in view, he yet, in putting,
95 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS.
down the opposition to that end, indulged in all the subtlety of a
Greek intellect, and thus stimulated the dialectic spirit of his
pupil Plato, who sought to harmonize the fleeting and the fixed.
II. PLATO.-It would be altogether a mistake to suppose, as
some have done, that Plato is for ever inquiring into the origin of
ideas in the mind, like the metaphysicians who came after Descartes and Locke. His aim was of a character loftier and wider,
but more unattainable by the cogitation of one thinker, or indeed
by cogitation at all. Nor was it his object to discover the absolute, as if he had been reared in the schools of Schelling or Hegel.
His grand aim was to discover the real (To ov) and the abiding,
amidst the illusions of sense and the mutations of things. And in
following this end he sought prematurely to determine questions
which can be settled only by a long course of patient induction,
carried on by a succession of observers of the world without and
the world within. But in the search he started many deep views
of God, of man, and of the world, which have been established by
the Bible, and by inductive mental and physical science.  1. He
everywhere proceeds on the doctrine that man is possessed of a
power of reason (Ao'yo, or vovs, or vo-rt) above sense, or faith,
or understanding (8tavota). 2. This reason contemplates ideas
('8E'at, or Et8,) suprasensible, immutable, eternal, which ideas are
realities. 3. He sees that there is need of a process of thought,
specially of abstraction, in order to the mind rising to these ideas.
4. The discovery of these ideas should be the especial aim of the
philosopher, and the gazing on them the highest exercise of wisdom. But Plato moves above our earth like the sun, with so
dazzling a light that we feel unable, or unwilling, to look too niarrowly into the exact body of truth which sheds such a lustre.
1. He has given a wrong account of the reality in these eternal
ideas, making them the only realities; denying reality to the objects of sense, except in so far as they partake of them, and seeming to make them independent even of the Divine Mind.  2. Under
the one phase,'idea,' he gathers an aggregate of things which
require to be distinguished,-such as the true, the beautiful, the
good, unity and being, natural law and moral law, the forms of
objects, and even the universals fashioned arbitrarily by the mind.
By heaping together and confounding all these things which
should be carefully distinguished, he has given a grandeur to his
views, but at the expense of clearness and accuracy. 3. He does
not see that ideas exist naturally in the mind merely in the form
of laws or rules. To account for them he is obliged to suppose
that the soul pre-existed, and that the calling up of the ideas is a
H2
99 
CHIARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
sort of reminiscence.  4. lie does not see how the mind reaches
them in their abstract, general, or philosophic form.  He  did not
observe that the mind begins with the knowledge of particular
objects, and must thence rise by induction to generals.  He thus
laid himself open to the assaults, always acute, often just, at
times captious, of Aristotle, who saw that the general existed in
the individuals, and that it was from the singulars that man rose
to the universals (see Metaph. i. 12.)   5. He attaches an ex travagant value to the contemplation of these ideas in their abstract
and general form. Overlooking the other purposes served by
ideas, and their indissoluble connection with singulars,-forgetting
that philosophy consists in viewing law in relation to its objects, he represents the mind as in its highest exercise when it is gazing
upon them in their essence, formless and colourless:'H yap aH p /-a,TO 7E Ka't    u'TTo  Kat avafr,g ort'a o'vrw ova v         KVopV
1tov(o 0EaTn-  vwZ XprTa~  7rEp't'V To' Tq! Xa-Oovs ECrtO-T-qI.L- yEVo0  TOVTOV
EXeL rTOV T07roV (Phedrus, 58).  He thus prepared the way for the
extravagancies of the Neoplatonist School of Plotinus and Proclus,
who reckoned the mind as in its loftiest state when under an
intuition or ecstasy, which looks on the One and the Good, and
who found, I believe, the gazing idle and unprofitable enough.
III. ARISTOTLE.-Hiis views, if not so grand as those of Plato,
are much more sober and definite. Hle has specified most of the
separate characteristics of intuition, but I have not been able to
find how he reconciles his several statements. 1. He has a power,
or faculty, called Novs, which he represents as concerned with the
principles of thought and being:'O voes acr'T  repL Tasg px&al TROv
VO-QTV Ka't Tv OvrTov (Mag. Mor. i. 35).  Elsewhere he shows that
it cannot be pov-qsrtg, nor coL'a, nor E7rrrjt,u, but vos, which has
to do with the principles of science: AE7rETat  vovv Etvat TYV apXv
(Eth. Nic. vi. 6: ed. Michelet). 2. He fixes on self-evidence
and independence as tests of what he calls first truths and principles. First truths are those whose credit is not through others,
but of themselves.  DEcrT 8' Eo  0 Rev Ka& 7rpra Ta cd 8'   Eu'pIIv
aXXa 8't avC)1v eXov/ta T'V 7rtcrTtv or 8et ya'p EV Taetg E7rtcrTTOVtKaZs
&pxets 47rtnetOat  t'o T8a 7, ad   CKaD V TWv a!pX(Zv  avZrv KaO'
Eavv  vELVat 7tv (Top. i. 1: ed. Waitz).  3.JIe fixes on necessity
as a test, and represents the truths as eternal. Thus he speaks
of necessary principles, and of their being inherent in things:
Et' O" EoTLV v!7rO8ctKTtK' ETty I - E$ vaKayat'wv apxov (o ytap E't'(TaTat,
ov 8vvaTov aL XX(o; EXEtv), Ta 8E Kaf ALVTA v7rC!pXovT7a!VayKaeta TOZS
irply/ixatv,V K.T.X. (Anal. Post. i. 6). TA Ee a'vays ovTra aCAXs a''8ta,
-ravta Ta 8''m'8ta ay4vrlra Ka't a~0apTa (Eth. Nic. vi. 3).  4. It is a
C -e         -
I,.
100 
CRITIC;AL ITEVIEW OF OPINIONS.
favourite maxim with him that everything cannot be proven.  He
says that all science is not demonstrative, that the science of
things immediate is undemonstrable; for as all demonstration is
from things prior, we must, at last, arrive at things immediate
which are not demonstrable:'HE8E'sSa,Ev oVae, 7radav E 7rt    /v
a7rooELKTtKrv E'LvaL, aA'a 7iv TO-V a'E'o(~v ava7ro'SEKToV KaL' TOg'O'Tt avayKa,ov, SavEpov' e' yap ava'yK7 /lE'v 7lro'(rTao'Oa TA' rrpO'TEpa Ka,t e W via7rdo~'tet'LoraTaL 8' 7rOTE Ta' a-ea, Tar' ava'7roEtKTa ava'yK- E'IaL (Anal.
Post. i. 3); see also i. 22, where he says there must be principles
of demonstration, rTv a7ro8E'eEoV O'Tt ava'yK- apXa' ELvat. Ile speaks
of science and demonstration carrying us to intuition, vozs (i. 23).
5. le draws the distinction between two classes of truths. We
believe all things, either through syllogism or from induction,
aravra yap 7rToaVo/xEV v 8La oTVXXoy~'/Aov v' e'raTy-ws  (Anal.
Prior. ii. 23). To nature, the syllogism is the prior and the
more known; but to us, that which is through induction is the
more palpable: NvoEt Rev o'V 7rpO'TepoS KaY, -yV(oplArepos 0 8tLa ToU
ItEO'ov ovXXo,tcy,o's, itav 8 EVapyE'ETEpOs 6 8ta a ~rs f;rayo)s; (ib.).
In explaining this, he says that he calls'things prior and more
knowable to us' those which are nearer to sense, and'things
prior and more knowable simply' those which are more remote;
but those things which are universal, belong to the most remote, and those which are singular, to the nearest: AE'o) 8e 7rpo's
Aquas rev 7rpo'TEpa Kal YtVppL,w'TEpa Ta' EyV'TEpOV Ais ato'Oeo'E()s, a7rXs
e' 7rpoTEpa Kat' yvopt(TEpa Ta 7rOpp(oTEpov. E('Tt 8E  rOppWTaTW IREV
Ta KaOo'Xov /uAo(Ta, E'yyvrTaT  8E' Ta KaO' C'Kao'Ta"  (Anal. Post. i.
2). But the question is started, Hiow does the human mind,
which must begin with the singulars, as better known to it,
reach the universal?   Hle seems to say, in the following passage, we reach universal truth through induction: MavOavo,rEv
y foray,q "     a7ro8,EtEt. E(TTL'' tkEV a7r'8,eEtR EK T'V KaOo'XOV, i 8iera     Ey K TWV KaTa'po  a18vaTov oE Ta Ka8o' ov Oc(p)'aL Ad 8L E/r a
-o~~ ~v, &-&                 EL,,a  d  )L(T' E'r'ET,V,',,o1 oV7
7rOlELV, OTl V7rapXEL E'KAOT(O ev  EVta KatE1t'I yR,          lt
EKaTzoo. E&aXqVal 8, H  EXovTag atoC-Oqolv (oV1VaTOV. TV ya'p Ka'
EKacrTov v ato- 6Lq   ou -yap Ev8E'XETLaL  \apE(v aLv'T(-A)V T7'7V C'7Lrt7/V.
OVTE yap EK T3V KaOo'XV ave,E 4I7raywLy7, OVTE -t' swayewrs  a'vv rs  at(O0~oE(wS (ib. i. 18; cf. Eth. Nic. vi. 3). All these are important
principles. But how does he reconcile them?  I-low in particular
does he reconcile his doctrine, that universals are gained by induction, with his statement as to the mind having a vozs which looks
at principles? There are passages in his Metaphysics which show
that such questions had been before his mind.   The  question is
101 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
put whether first principles are universal, or are as singulars of
things; and the further and most important question, whether
they subsist in capacity or in energy, that is, whether they exist virtually or in act: IIorepov at apxa'L KaOo'Aov dE'LV 7 S'a KaO''Ka "a
TC)v 7rpayUa'Twv, KaL 8vva'EL v EvEpyeT'a (Metaph. ii. 2.10: ed. Bonitz).
In another passage he seems to answer, that those things which
are predicated of individuals are first principles rather than the
genera, but adds that it would not be easy to express how one
should conceive these first principles:'EK REV OV'V TOVT(oV /a3toV
atL'vETaC'ra c'a  7rL T(V ~'aot'ov KaM/opov/'Eva apXal'Etvat TOV Y7EV()v.
a'Xtv 8E 7r&s av' 8E  avTras adpXas v7roXafetv o, pa8Ltov ETrELV. For
this statement he gives reasons, which lead him to the conclusion
that the universals which are predicated of individuals are principles in the ratio of their universality, and that the very highest
generalizations must be emphatically principles: T/v R/Ev yap appxv
8EZ Ka'  v aLttav  E'vaL 7rapa Ta 7rpa'y~aTa WV'p, KaL 87va(OaL'vaL
GL~~ ~ ~ ~ 4-/-TaGI'vGL  Ep', Kt8vao-t     &ta
X,pLoEv-qv AVTOV' TOLOUTO  TLpaE T' KOLE~(7'TOV ('Lya  LaV
Xtopgozt-t,uv a&&v'  SrozoiroV 8E Tt 7rap&a T'o Ka0'     at 8' a dt{
av tgs ZVwoka'pot, X7rkv O'T& KaOo' v Ka+yopECTat KatL KaTa' avTTOv;
aWa tL7V, EL' 8taL TOZTO, Ta' 1axov KaOoOv UAXOV OETE'OV apXaa'.
o-TE adpxa't Ta'rpoi-' av E'(o'av y'  (ii. 3.15). There are points
of connection not brought out in this statement.  But we are
not rashly to charge Aristotle with an inconsistency. I believe
that his statement as to first truths and syllogism, and his statement as to the universality of induction, are both true. But he
has not drawn the distinction between first principles as forms in
the mind, and as individual convictions, and as laws got by induction; nor has he seen how the self-evidence and necessity, being
in the singulars, goes up into the universals when (but only when)
the induction is properly formed.
IV. DEscARTEs seized on a large body of important truth in
regard to innate ideas. 1. He saw that they were of the nature
of powers or faculties ready to operate, but needing to be called
forth. "Lorsque je dis que quelque idee est nee avec nous, ou
qu'elle est naturellement empreinte en nos ames, je n'entends pas
qu'elle se presente toujours a notre pens6e, car ainsi il n'y en
aurait aucune; mais j'entends seulement que nous avons en nousme6mes la faculte6 de la produire" (Trois Objec. Rep. Obj. 10). See
other passages to the same effect, quoted by Mr. Veitch, Trans. of
Med., etc., pp. 207-208. 2. He had a glimpse, but confused, of
the test of self-evidence, which he unhappily represents as clearness.  "Toutes les choses que nous concevons clairement et distinctement sont vraies de la faqon dont nous les concevons" (Med.
Abrege6). IHe thus explains clearness and distinctness: "J'ap
102 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS.
pelle claire celle qui est presente et manifeste a un esprit attentif;
de meme que nous disons voir clairement les objets, lorsqu'e6tant
presents a nos yeux ils agissent assez fort sur eux, et qu'ils sont
dispos6s a les regarder; et distincte, celle qui est tellement precise
et differente de toutes les autres, qu'elle ne comprend en soi que
ce qui parolt manifestement a celui qui la considere comme il
faut" (Prin. Phil. i. 45).  3. He sees that they assume the shape
of common notions. 4. These are represented as eternal truths
of intelligence. "Lorsque nous pensons qu'on ne sauroit faire
quelque chose de rien, nous ne croyons point que cette proposition
soit une chose qui existe ou la proprie6t6 de quelque chose, mais
nous la prenons pour une certaine verite6 6ternelle qui a son sie6ge
en notre pens6e, et que l'on nomme une notion commune ou une
maxime; tout de meme quand on dit qu'il est impossible qu'une
meme chose soit et ne soit pas en meme temps, que ce qui a et6
fait ne peut n'etre pas fait, que celui qui pense ne peut manquer
d'etre ou d'exister pendant qu'il pense, et quantite6 d'autres semblables, ce sont seulement des ve6rite6s, et non pas des choses qui
soient hors de notre pensee, et il y en a un si grand nombre de telles
qu'il seroit malaise6 de les d6nombrer" (Prin. Phil. i. 49). 5. He
discovers that they come forth into consciousness; hence he calls
them innate ideas, and defines idea: "Cette forme de chacune de
nos penses par la perception immediate de laquelle nous avons
connaissance de ces memes pens6es" (R6p. aux Deux Object.).
But there is confusion throughout, in the view which he takes and
in his mode of expression. 1. He gives no account of the relation
between the faculty on the one hand, and the idea or common
notion on the other. He does not see that abstraction and generalization are necessary in order to reach the abstract and general
idea. 2. The test of self-evidence is not well expressed; in this
respect he is inferior to Locke. The clearness and distinctness of
an idea is, to say the least of it, a very ambiguous phrase, for in
some senses of the word we may have a very clear idea of an imaginary object, or a distinct idea of a falsehood. 3. That there is
confusion in his view is evident from the circumstance that he
often states that these truths are not equally admitted by all, because they are opposed to the prejudices of some. He speaks of
persons "qui ont imprim6 de longue main des opinions en leur
cr6ance, qui etaient contraires a quelqules-unes de ces ve6rits s"
(Prin. i. 50). 4. He expects far too much from a bare contem plation of the principles or causes of things. "Mais l'ordre que
j'ai tenu en ceci a et6 tel: premierement, j'ai tache6 de trouver en
g6n6ral les principes ou premieres causes de tout ce qui est ou
103 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
qui peut etre dans le monde, sans rien considerer pour cet effet
que Dieu seul qui l'a cr6e, ni les tirer d'ailleurs que de certaines
semences de verite6s qui sont naturellement en nos ames. Apres
cela, j'ai examine quels etaient les premiers et les plus ordinaires
effets qu'on pouvait deduire de ces causes; et il me semble que par
la j'ai trouv6 des cieux, des astres, une terre, et meme sur la terre
de l'eau, de l'air, etc." (M6th. P. vi.).
V. LocKE has, in his account of the Human Understanding, both
a sensational or rather an experiential element, and a rational
element.  Eagerly bent on establishing his favourite position that
all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection, he has not
blended these elements very successfully, nor been at much pains
to show their consistency. In France they took the sensational
element, and overlooked the other. The Arians and Socinians of
Britain seized eagerly on the rational element. In his unmeasured
condemnation of innate ideas in the First Book of his Essay, he
seems to deny truths which he openly defends or incidentally
allows in other parts of the work. 1. He gives a high place to
reason. Thus, in replying to Stillingfleet, he says:-" Reason, as
standing for true and clear principles, and also as standing for
clear and fair deductions from those principles, I have not wholly
omitted; as is manifest from what I have said of self-evident propositions, intuitive knowledge, and demonstration, in other parts
of my Essay."  Speaking of self-evident propositions:-" Whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later, this is true
of them, that they are all known by their native evidence, are
wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof
one from another" (see Rogers's Essays, Locke, p. 47). 2. He
gives an important place to intuition. 3. He fixes on self-evidence as the mark of intuition. "Sometimes the mind perceives
the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this I think we
may call intuitive knowledge.  From this the mind is at no pains
of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth
light, only by being directed towards it." "This kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable
of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine,
forces itself immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the mind
turns its view that way, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt,
or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear
light of it."  "He that demands a greater certainty than this,
demands he knows not what, and shows only that he has a mind
to be a sceptic without being able to be so" (Essay, bk. iv. ch.
104 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS.
ii. sect. 1; see also book iv. chap. xvii. sect. 4). Among truths
known intuitively, "we have an intuitive knowledge of our own
existence" (bk. iv. ch. iii. sect. 21);  and "man knows by an
intuitive certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any
real Being than it can be equal to two right-angles" (bk. iv. ch.
x. sect. 3). 4. He is obliged at times to appeal to necessity of
conception. Thus, in arguing with Stillingfleet:-" The idea of
beginning to be, is necessarily connected with the idea of some
operation; and the idea of operation with the idea of something
operating, which we call a cause." "The idea of a right-angled
triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two
right ones; nor can we conceive this relation, this connection of
these two ideas, to be possibly mutable" (Essay, bk. iv. ch. iii.
sect. 29). He speaks of certain and universal knowledge as having
"necessary connection," "necessary co-existence,"' necessary dependence" (see Webb on the Intellectualism of Locke, P. iii.)
5. He sees that intuitive general maxims are all derived from
particulars. This follows from his general maxim that the mind
begins with particulars. "The ideas first in the mind,'tis evident,
are those of particular things, from which by slow degrees the
understanding proceeds to some few general ones" (bk. iv. ch. vii.
sect. 9). "In particulars our knowledge begins, and so spreads
itself by degrees to generals" (bk. iv. ch. vii. sect. 11). Following out this view, he speaks of the general propositions being
"not innate but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These when observing men have
made them, unobserving men when they are proposed to them
cannot refuse their assent to" (bk. i. ch. ii. sect. 21). 6. He
saw clearly-what Kant never saw-that the mind rises to universal propositions by looking at things, and the nature of things.
" Had they examined the ways whereby men come to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to
result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves
when duly considered, and that they were discovered by the appli cation of those faculties which were fitted by nature to receive and
judge of them when duly employed about them (bk. i. ch. iv.
sect. 25).
But, on the other hand, Locke has omitted or controverted cer tain great truths. 1. He imagines that when he has disproved
innate ideas in the sense of phantasms, and general notions, he has
therefore disproved them in every sense, 2. He does not see that
the intuition which he acknowledges, must have a rule, law, or
principle, which may be described as innate, inasmuch as it is in
105 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
the mind prior to all experience. 3. Misled by his theory of the
mind looking at ideas and not at things, he represents intuition as concerned solely with the comparison of ideas.  This
was noticed by the Bishop of -, in a letter dated Johnstoun, October 26, 1697, to Locke's friend, Mr. MIolyneux:-" To
me it seems that, according to Mr. Locke, I cannot be said to
know anything except there be two ideas in my mind, and all
the knowledge I have must be concerning the relation these two
ideas have to one another, and that I can be certain of nothing
else, which in my opinion excludes all certainty of sense and of
single ideas, all certainty of consciousness, such as willing, conceiving, believing, knowing, etc., and, as he confesses, all certainty
of faith, and, lastly, all certainty of remembrance of which I have
formerly demonstrated as soon as I have forgot or do not actually
think of the demonstration" (Letters between Locke and Molyneux). Reid refers to Locke's notion that belief or knowledge
consists in a perception of the agreement or disagreement of
ideas, and characterizes it "as one of the main pillars of modern
scepticism."  "I say a sensation exists, and I think I understand clearly what I mean. But you want to make the thing
clearer, and for that end tell me that there is an agreement between the idea of that sensation and the idea of existence. To
speak freely, this conveys to me no light, but darkness. I can
conceive no otherwise of it than as an odd and obscure circumlocution. I conclude then that the belief which accompanies sensation and memory is a simple act of the mind which cannot be
defined" (Works, p. 107). 4. HIe does not see the peculiar nature
of intuitive maxims. He perceives that they are got by generalization-the great truth overlooked by the special supporters of
innate ideas; but he fails to observe that they are the generalization of primitive cognitions and truths, which carry with them
self-evidence and necessity.
VI. LEIBNITZ had profound but, in some respects, extravagant
views of necessary truths. 1. He sees that they have a place in
the mind, as habitudes, dispositions, aptitudes, faculties.  "Les
connaissances ou les v6rites, en tant qu'elles sont en nous, quand
m6me on n'y pense point, sont des habitudes ou des dispositions"
(Nouv. Essais, Opera, p. 213: ed. Erdmann). At the same place
he calls them'aptitudes.'  "Lorsqu'on dit que les notions innees
sont implicitement dans l'esprit, cela doit signifier seulement,
qu'il a la faculte de les connaltre" (p. 212).  2. "Leibnitz has
the honour of first explicitly enouncing the criterion of necessity,
and Kant of first fully applying it to the phenomena. In nothing
106 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS.
has Kant been more successful than in this under consideration."
So says Hamilton (Reid's Works, p. 323). The remark seems correct; but it should be added that Aristotle, as has been shown, expressly fixed on necessity, while others appealed to it; even Locke
speaks of knowledge as "irresistible," and of "necessary relations."
Leibnitz draws more decidedly than had been done before, the
distinction between necessary and eternal truths and truths of
experience (p. 209). 3. Because of the natural faculty and "preformation," the ideas tend to come into consciousness in a special
form.  "I1 y a toujours une disposition particuliere a l'action, et
a' une action plut6t qu'a l'autre" (p. 223). He illustrates this by
supposing that in the marble there might be veins which marked
out a particular figure, say that of Hercules preferably to others.
"Mais s'il y avoit des veines dans la pierre, qui marquassent la figure
d'Hercule pr6ferablement a d'autres figures, cette pierre y seroit
plus determinee, et Hercule y seroit comme inne6 en quelque
favon" (p. 196). 4. He represents the intellect itself as a source
of ideas. To the maxim " Vihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit
in sensu," he adds, "nisi ipse intellectus."  The expression is not
very explicit.  He explains it:-" Or l'ame renferme l'6tre, la substance, l'un, le meme, la cause, la perception, le raisonnement, et
quantite6 d'autres notions." But he is surely wrong in identifying
these with Locke's ideas of reflection (p. 223). 5. He sees that
there is need of more than spontaneity, that there is need of
some intellectual process, in order to discover the general truth.
"Les maximes inn6es ne paroissent que par l'attention qu'on leur
donne" (p. 213). But,-1. He separates necessary truth from
things, and making them altogether mental, he led the way to
that subjective tendency which was carried so far by Kant. 2. He
does not distinguish between the necessary principle as a disposition unconsciously in the mind, and a general maxim discovered by
a process.  3. He does not see that the general maxim is reached
by generalizing the individual necessary truths.
VII. BUrFIER'S principal treatise is on'Premieres V6rit6s.'
He saw:-1. That there was in the mind an original law, which
he characterizes as a'disposition.' 2. He speaks of it as coming
forth in common and uniform judgments among all men or the
greater part. 3. He sees that it does not thus come forth till
mature age, and till men come to the use of reason. These three
points are all brought out in the following sentence. "J'entends
ici par le SENS CommuN, la disposition que la nature a mise dans
tous les hommes, ou manifestement dans la plupart d'entre eux,
pour leur faire porter, quand ils ont atteint l'usage de la raison,
107
I 
CHARACTER OFi INTUITIONS.
un jugement commun et uniforme sur des objets differents du sentiment intime de leur propre perception: jugement qui n'est point
la cons6quence d'aucun principe ant6rieur" (p. i. c. v.).  4. He
specifies several important practical characteristics of first truths.
"(1.) Le premier de ces caracteres est qu'elles soient si claires, que
quand on entreprend de les prouver ou de les attaquer, on ne le
puisse faire que par des propositions qui manifestement ne sont ni
plus claires ni plus certaines. (2.) D'etre si universellement reVues parmi les hommles en tout temps, en tous lieux, et par toutes
sortes d'esprits, que ceux qui les attaquent se trouvent, dans le
genre humain, etre manifestement moins d'un contre cent, ou
me6me contre mille. (3.) D'6tre si fortement imprim6es dans nous,
que nous y conformions notre conduite, malgr6 les raffinements de
ceux qui imaginent des opinions contraires, et qui eux-meames
agissent conform6ment, non a leurs opinions imaginees, mais aux
premieres v6rites universellement revues" (p. i. c. vii.).  It does
not appear however that (1) he fixed explicitly on their deeper
qualities of self-evidence and necessity, nor (2) showed the relation between their individual and general form.
VII. REID)'s great merit lies in establishing certain principles
of Common Sense, such as those of substance and quality, cause
and effect, and moral good, as against the scepticism of Hume.
He does not profess to give an exhaustive account of these principles, nor to enter minutely into their distinctive character and
mode of operation, but in conducting his proper work, he has
mentioned nearly all their distinctive qualities. 1. He represents
them as being in the nature of man: thus he speaks of" an original principle of our constitution" (p. 121), and calls them "original
and natural judgments," as "part of that furniture which Nature
hath given to the human understanding," as "the inspiration of
the Almighty" and "a part of our constitution " (p. 209, Works:
Hamilton's edition).   2. He represents the mind as having a
sense or perception of them; and on the one hand avoids the
error of Locke, who regards intuition as concerned solely with a
comparison of ideas, and he does not on the other hand fall into
that of Kant, who looks on them as mere forms in the mind.  3.
He follows Locke in fixing on self-evidence as a decisive test.
" WVe ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is
to judge of things self-evident; the second, to draw conclusions
that are not self-evident from those that are.  The first of these
is the province, and the sole province, of common sense, and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason " (p. 425: see
108 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS.
also p. 422).  4. He specifies necessity as a mark.  "Bythecon
stitution of our nature we are under a necessity of assent to
them" (p. 130).  He speaks of a certain truth "being a necessary
truth, and therefore no object of sense."  "It is not that things
which begin tQ exist commonly have a cause, or even that they always in fact have a cause, but that they must have a cause and
cannot begin to exist without a cause" (p. 455: see also pp. 521,
456). Yet he has not a steady apprehension of necessity as a
test, for he says:-" I resolve for my own part always to pay a great
regard to the dictates of common sense, and not to depart from
them without absolute necessity" (p. 113), as if necessity did not
preclude our departing from them. 5. He characterizes them as
universal; thus he appeals to the "universal consent of mankind;
not of philosophers only, but of the rude and unlearned vulgar"
(p. 456).
His positive errors on this subject are not many, but he has
not seen the full truth, and he has fallen into several oversights.
1. By neglecting a rigid use of tests, he has described some truths
as first principles, into which there enters an experiential element.
Thus, for example, "that there is life and intelligence in our fellowmen," "that certain features of the countenance, sounds of the
voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind" (p. 448), and that "there is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion" (450); and "that in the
phenomena of Nature, what is to be will probably be like to what
has been in similar circumstances" (45]1).  A rigid application of
the tests of self-evidence and necessity, would have shown that
these were not first principles. 2. He is not careful to distinguish between the Spontaneous and Reflex use of common sense.
He uses legitimately the argument from common sense against
Hume, but in philosophy we must use the reflex principle carefully expressed, whereas Reid often appeals in a loose way to the
spontaneous conviction. And here I may take the opportunity of
stating my conviction (and this notwithstanding Sir W. Hamilton's
defence of it in Note A) that the phrase'common-sense' is an
unfortunate, because a loose and ambiguous one. Common sense
(besides its use by Aristotle, see Hamilton's Note A)  has two
meanings in ordinary discourse. It may signify, first, that unacquired, unbought, untaught sagacity, which certain men have by
nature, and which other men never could acquire, even though
they were subjected to the process mentioned by Solomon (Prov.
xxvii. 22), and brayed in a mortar. Or it may signify the commu
109 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
nis senses, or the perceptions and judgments which are common
to all men. It is only in this latter sense that the argument from
common sense is a philosophic one; that is, only on the condition
that the appeal be to convictions which are in all men; and fur ther, that there has been a systematic exposition of them. Reid
did make a most legitimate use of the argument from common
sense, appealing to convictions in all men, and bringing out to view,
and expressing with greater or less accuracy, the principles involved in these convictions. But then he has also taken advantage
of the first meaning of the phrase; he represents the strength of
these original judgments as good sense (p. 209): he appeals from
philosophy to common sense; and in order to counteract the impression left by the high intellectual abilities of Hume, he showed
that those who opposed Hume were not such fools after all, but
had the good sense and shrewdness of mankind on their side
(see p. 127, etc., with foot-notes of Hamilton).   This has led
many to suppose that the argument of Reid and Beattie is altogether an address to the vulgar. In this way, what seemed at the
time a very dexterous use of a two-edged sword, has turned
against those who employed it, and injustice has been done to the
Scottish School of philosophers, who do make a proper use of the
argument from common sense. 3. He does not see how to reconcile the doctrine (of Locke) that all maxims appear in consciousness as particulars, with his own doctrine of there being principles
in the constitution of the mind, and there coming forth in general
propositions.
IX. KANT has, next to Locke, exercised the greatest influence
on modern speculation. As a general rule, the one dwells upon
and magnifies the truths which the other overlooks.  Kant is a
reaction against Locke. He carries out, in his own logical way,
certain principles which had grown up in the schools of Descartes,
Leibnitz, and Wolf.  1. He sees more clearly, and explains more
fully than ever had been done before, that the a priori principles
are in the mind in the character of forms, or rules, prior to their
being called forth or exercised. Thus, speaking of our intuition
of space, he says it must be ready a priori in the mind, that is,
before any perception of objects. "Die Form derselben muss
zu ihnen insgesammt im Gemiithe a priori bereit liegen und
daher abgesondert von aller Empfindung k6nnen betrachtet werden" (Werke, bd. ii. p. 32: ed. Rosenkranz). The mind has not
only Intuitions of Space and Time to impose on phenomena or
presentations, it has Categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation,
Modality, to impose on its cognitions; and Ideas of Substance,
110 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS.
Totality of Phenomena, and Deity, to impose on the judgments
reached by the Categories. 2. He maintains that the forms of
the sensibility, and the categories of the understanding, have all a
reference to objects of experience, real or possible; this, in fact,
is their use; without this they would be meaningless. The ideas
of pure reason do, however, refer to the comparisons of the understanding, and not to objects, and fruitless speculation arises from
supposing that they refer to objects; and there may, also, be an
undue use of the forms of sense and the categories of the understanding, but in themselves they refer to objects of possible experience (Kr. d. r. Vern., Trans. Dial.).  3. He proposes in his
great work, the Kritik of Pure Reason, to give an inventory, in
systematic order, of the a priori principles in the mind. "Denn
es ist nichts als das Inventarium aller unserer Besitze durch
reine Vernunft, systematisch geordnet" (Vorrede zu erst. Auf.).
He seeks for an organon, which would be a compendium of the
principles according to which a priori cognitions would be obtained.  "Ein Organon der reinen Vernunft wiirde ein Inbegriff
derjenigen Principien seyn, nach denen alle reine Erkentnisse a
priori kdnnen erworben und wirklich zu Stande gebracht werden"
(Einleit.). 4. He uses systematically the tests of Necessity and
Universality, meaning by Universality the Universality of the
Truth (see supra, p. 43, foot-note).
But, on the other hand, he has fallen into the grossest misapprehensions regarding the nature of the a priori principles of
reason. 1. He maintains that the mind can have no intuition of
things. All that it can know are mere presentations or phenomena. It is all true that the Forms of Sense and the Categories
relate to objects of possible experience, but then experience does
not give us a knowledge of things. "Es sind demnach die Gegenstande der Erfahrung niemals an sich selbst." Speaking even of
self-consciousness he says, it does not know self as it exists: "Und
selbst ist die innere und sinnliche Anschauung unseres Gemilths
(als Gegenstandes des Bewusstseyns)... auch nicht das eigentliche
Selbst, so wie es an sich existirt" (Bd. ii. p. 389). He thus separates
the intuitions of the mind altogether from things. 2. He makes our
a priori Intuitions impose on phenomenathe forms of Space and
Time, which have no existence out of the mind. The categories are
frameworks for binding conceptions into judgments. The ideas
of pure reason reduce the judgments to unity, but have no reference to objects; and if we suppose them to have, we are landed
in illusion and contradictions. By this system he makes much
ideal which we are naturally led to regard as real, and thus pre,
III 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
pared the way for Fichte, who made the whole ideal. 3. His
Mlethod of discovering the a priori principles of the mind is not
the Inductive, but the Critical. Reason is called to undertake
the task of self-examination, which may secure its righteous claims,
not in an arbitrary way, but according to its own eternal and
unchangeable laws. "Eine Aufforderung an die Vernunft, das
beschwerlichste a]ler ihrer Geschaifte, namlich das der Se]bsterkenntniss aufs Neue zu jibernehmen und einen Gerichtshof
einzusetzen, der sie bei ihren gerechten Anspriiuchen sichere, dagegen aber alle grundloseAnmaassungen nicht durchMachtspruiche
sondern nach ihren ewigen und unwandelbaren Gesetzen" (Vor. z.
erst. Auf.). Reason was thus set on criticizing itself according to
laws of its own, and a succession of speculators set out each with
what he alleged to be the laws of reason, but no two of them
agreed as to what the laws of reason were, or what the standard
by which to test them, and conclusions were reached which were
evidently most irrational.
X. DUGALD STEWART delighted to look on our intuitions
under the aspect of "Fundamental Laws of Human  Belief"
(Elem. vol. ii. ch. i.). ]. He sees that they are of the nature
of laws in the mind.  2. He sees that they are natural, original,
and fundamental. 3. He sees that they are involved in the faculties. Hence he calls them ",elements of reason" (Elem. vol. ii.
p. 49: Ham. edit.); he would identify them with the exercise of
our reasoning powers, and speaks of them as component elements,
without which the faculty of reasoning is inconceivable and impossible (p. 39). It may be added that while he never formally
appeals to necessity, he is obliged to use it incidentally. Thus
"every man is impressed with an irresistible conviction that all
his sensations, thoughts, and volitions belong to one and the same
being" (Elem. vol. i. p. 47);  and "we are impressed with an
irresistible conviction of our personal identity" (Essays, p. 59).
Speaking of causes, in the metaphysical meaning of the word, he
says, the "word cause expresses something which is supposed to
be necessarily connected with the change" (Elem. vol. i. p. 97).
In looking on them as "fundamental laws," and in avoiding the
ambiguity of the phrase "common sense," he has gone beyond
Reid, but otherwise he has not thrown much light on them. He
is in great confusion from not discovering how it is that "the
elements of reason" may become general maxims, axioms, or principles.
XI. DR. THOMAS BROwN has demonstrated, with great ingenuity, that our belief in the invariableness of cause and effect
112 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS.
cannot be had from experience (Cause and Effect, part iii. sect. 3).
He has also shown that the belief in our personal identity is intuitive (Lect. 13). When he comes to our intuitions, he speaks
of them as "principles of thought;" as "primary universal intuitions of direct belief;" as "being felt intuitively, universally, immediately, irresistibly;" as "an internal, never-ceasing voice from the
Creator and Preserver of our being;" as "omnipotent, like their
Author;" and "such that it is impossible for us to doubt them"
(Lect. 13).- These are fine expressions, but his view of them is
meagre after all, and a retrogression from the Scottish School.
He makes no inquiry into their nature, laws, or tests.
XII. M. CousiN has given throughout all his philosophical
works, clear and beautiful expositions of the elements of reason.
1. It is a favourite doctrine that reason looks at truths, eternal,
universal, and absolute; truths, not to the individual or the race,
but to all intelligences. 2. He uses, most successfully, the tests
of necessity and universality, in order to distinguish the truths of
reason from other truths. 3. He has distinguished between the
spontaneous and reflective form of the truths of reasons (see supra,
p. 62).  4. He has shown that primitive truths are all at first individual.  "C'est un fait qu'il ne faut pas oublier, et qu'on oublie
beaucoup trop souvent, que nos jugements sont d'abord des jugements particuliers et d6termines, et que c'est sous cette forme d'un
jugement particulier et determine que font leur premiere apparition
toutes les verites universelles et necessaires" (ser. ii. t. iii. leg. 19;
see also ser. i. t. i. progr.; t. ii. progr. leg. ii.-iv., xi.). But on the
other hand, he has given an exaggerated account of the power of
human reason, and has not seen that induction is necessary in
order to the discovery of necessary truth in its general form. 1.
He uses unhappy and unguarded language in speaking of reason.
His favourite epithet as applied to it is'impersonal;' language
which has a correct meaning inasmuch as the truth is not to the
person but to all intelligences, but is often so employed as, without his intending it, to come very close to those pantheistic
systems which identify the Divine and human reason (see ser.
ii. leg. v.). 2. His reduction of the ideas of reason to three is
full of confusion. The first idea is supposed to be unity, substance, cause, perfect, infinite, eternal; the second, multiple, quality, effect, imperfect, finite, bounded; and the third, the relation
of the other two. It is to confound the things which manifestly
differ, to make unity, cause, good, infinite indentical. The business
of the metaphysician should be to observe each of these carefully,
and bring out their peculiarities and their differences. 3. He
I
113 
CHARACTER OF INTUITIONS.
does not see how it is that the general maxim is formed out of
the particulars.  He says that abstraction, "saisit immediatement
ce que le premier objet soumis a son observation renferme de
general" (ser. i. t. i. leg. xi.). He does not see that in order
to the formation of the general law there is need of a process,
often delicate and laborious, of observation, abstraction, and generalization.
XIII. SIR WILLIAM IIAMILTON'S Note A, appended to his
edition of Reid's Works, is the most important contribution made
in this century to the science of first truths.  1. He has there
specified nearly every important character of our intuitive con victions, and attached to them an appropriate nomenclature. 2.
He  has shown that the argument from common sense is one
strictly scientific and eminently philosophic. 3. He has with
unsurpassed erudition brought testimonies in behalf of the principles of common sense from the writings of the eminent thinkers
of all ages and countries.  But on the other hand:-1. He fails
to draw the distinction between common sense as an aggregate of
laws in the mind, as convictions in consciousness, and as generalized maxims.  Thus the confusion of the spontaneous cognition
and its generalized form appears in such passages as the following:-" The primitive cognitions seem to leap ready from the
womb of reason, like Pallas from the head of Jupiter; sometimes the mind places them at the commencement of its operations in order to have a point of support and a fixed basis
without which the operations would be impossible; sometimes
they form in a certain sort the crowning, the consummation
of all the intellectual operations" (Metaphysics, Lect. 38). 2.
He does not properly appreciate the circumstance that intuitive
convictions all look to singulars, and that there is need of induction to reach the general truth. He supposes that the general
truth is revealed at once to consciousness. "Philosophy is the
development and application of the constitutive and normal truths
which consciousness immediately reveals." "Philosophy is thus
wholly dependent on consciousness" (Reid's Works, p. 746). It
is true that philosophy is dependent on consciousness, but it is
dependent also on abstraction and generalization. He calls ultimate, primary, and universal principles, facts of consciousness
(Metaphysics, Lect. 15). 3. His method is not the Inductive,
but that of Critical Analysis introduced by Kant (Met. Lect. 29).
4. He fails to observe that the mind in intuition looks at objects.  He makes the mind's conviction in regard to such objects
as space, substance, cause, and infinity, to be impotencies, and
114 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF OPINIONS.
their laws to be laws of thought and not of things (Append. to
Discussions on Phil.). The error of such views will come out as
we advance. I have endeavoured to expose it in the appendix
to'Method of Divine Government,' in an article in the'North
British Review,' for August, 1857, and an article in the' Dublin
University Magazine,' for August, 1859.
XIV. DR. WHEWELL has done great service at once to the physical sciences and to metaphysics, by showing, in his'Philosophy of
the Inductive Sciences,'-l. That the former proceed upon and imply principles not got from experience; that geometry and aritlihmetic depend on first truths regarding space, time, and number;
and mechanical science on intuitions regarding force, matter, etc.
2. He has exhibited these principles in instructive forms, announcing them in their deeper and wider character under the
designation of fundamental ideas, and then presenting them under
the name of conceptions in the more specific shapes in which they
become available in the particular sciences: thus, in mechanical
science the fundamental idea of cause becomes the conception of
force.   But then he has injured his great work:-1. By following the Kantian doctrine of forms, and supposing that the
mental ideas "impose" and "superinduce" on the objects something not in the objects, whereas they merely enable us to arrive
at what is in the objects. 2. He also fails to show that the
ideas or maxims in the general form in which alone they are
available in science, are got by induction. 3. The phraseology
which he employs is unfortunate, it is'fundamental ideas' and
' conceptions.' The word'idea' has been used in so many different
senses by different writers, by Plato, Descartes, Locke, Kant, and
Hegel, that it is perhaps expedient to abandon it altogether in
strict philosophic writing; it is certainly not expedient to use it,
as Whewell does, in a new application. The word' conception'
stands in classical English both for the phantasm, or image, and
the logical notion-certain later metaphysicians would restrict it
to the logical notion; and there is no propriety in using it to
signify an a priori law. 4. He has damaged the general acceptance of his principles, which seem to me to be as true as they are
often profound, by making a number of truths a priori which are
evidently got from experience: thus he makes the law of action
and reaction, and the laws of motion generally, self-evident and
necessary.
I 2
115  
PART SECOND.
PARTICULAR EXAMINATION OF THE INTUITIONS. 
I 
119
BOOK I.
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
CHAPTER I.
BODY AND SPIRIT.
SECT. I. THE MIND BEGINS ITS INTELLIGENT ACTS WITH
KNOWLEDGE. THE SIMPLE COGNITIVE POWERS.
IT is a favourite position in the views expounded in this
treatise, that the mind begins its acts of intelligence with
knowledge.   This is not the common representation.
According to a very ancient doctrine, the mind has, prior
to the acquisition of knowledge, a stock of ideas out of
itself, or in itself, at which it looks, and its primary exercises consist in contemplating or in forming these ideas.
This view, with no pretensions to precision in the statement of it, was a prevalent one in ancient Greece, ill the
scholastic ages, and in the earlier stages of modern philosophy.  It seems to me to be the view which was habitually entertained by Descartes and Locke. In later
times, the mind was supposed to commence with impressions of some kind. This view may be regarded as introduced formally into philosophy by Hume, who opens
his'Treatise on Human Nature' by declaring that all the
perceptions of the mind are impressions and ideas; that
impressions come first, and that ideas are the faint images
of them. This view has evidently a materialistic ten 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
dency. Literally, an impression can be produced only
on a material substance, and it is not easy to determine
precisely what is meant by the phrase when it is used
metaphorically.   This  impression  theory is the one
adopted by the French Sensational School, and by the
physiologists of this country. In Germany the influence
exercised by Kant's Kritik of Pure Reason has made the
general account to be that the mind starts with presentations, and not with things, with phenomena in the
sense of appearances, which'phenomena' are but modifications of Hume's'impressions,' and of the'ideas' of the
ancients. Now it appears to me that all these accounts,
consciousness being witness, are imperfect, and by their
defects erroneous. The mind is not conscious of these
impressions preceding the knowledge which it has immediately of self, and the objects falling under the notice
of the senses. Nor can it be legitimately shown how the
mind can ever rise from ideas, impressions, phenomena,
to the knowledge of things.   The followers of Locke
have always felt the difficulty of showing how the mind
from mere ideas could reach external realities. Hume
designedly represented the original exercises of the mind
as being mere impressions, in order to undermine the
very foundations of knowledge. Though Kant acknowledged a reality beneath the presentations, beyond the
phenomena, those who followed out his views found the
reality disappearing more and more, till at length it vanished altogether, leaving only a concatenated series of
mental forms.
There is no effectual or consistent way of avoiding
these consequences but by falling back on the natural
system, and maintaining that the mind in its intelligent
acts starts with knowledge. But let not the statement
be misunderstood.   I do not mean that the mind commences with abstract knowledge, or general knowledge,
120 
BODY AND SPIRIT.
or indeed with systematized knowledge of any description. It acquires first a knowledge of individual things
as they are presented to it and to its knowing faculties,
and it is out of this that all its arranged knowledge is
formed by a subsequent exercise of the understanding.
From the concrete the mind fashions the abstract, by
separating in thought a part from the whole, a quality
from the object.  Starting with the particular, the mind
reaches the general by observing the points of agreement.   From  premisses involving knowledge,  it can
arrive at other propositions also containing knowledge.
It seems clear to me, that if the mind had not knowledge in the foundation, it never could have knowledge
in the superstructure reared; but finding knowledge in
its first intelligent exercises, it can thence, by the processes of abstraction, generalization, and reasoning, reach
further and higher knowledge.
The mind is endowed with at least two simple cognitive powers,-sense-perception and self-consciousness.
Both are cognitive in their nature, and look on and reveal to us existing things; the one, material objects presented to us through the bodily senses, and the other,
self in a particular state or exercise.  It is altogether
inadequate language to represent these faculties as giving
us an idea, or an impression, or an apprehension, or a
notion, or a conception, or looking on unknown appearances, they give us knowledge of objects under aspects
presented to us. No other language is equal to express
the full mental action of which we are conscious.
In this Book it is my aim to seek out, to analyze, and
expose to the view the convictions that are involved in
the exercise of these two powers.   I shall begin with
our cognitions in their more concrete form, and then
dwell more specially on the cognitions discovered by abstraction to be involved in these.
121 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
SECT. II. OUR INTUITIVE COGNITIONS OF BODY.
We are following the plainest dictates of consciousness, we avoid a thousand difficulties, and we get a solid
ground on which to rest and to build, when we maintain
that the mind in its first exercises acquires knowledge;
not indeed scientific or arranged, not of qualities of objects and classes of objects, but still knowledge-the
knowledge of things presenting themselves, and as they
present themselves; which knowledge, individual and
concrete, is the foundation of all other knowledge, abstract, general, and deductive. In particular, the mind is
so constituted as to attain a knowledge of body, or of
material objects.
It is through the bodily organism that the intelligence
of man attains its knowledge of all material objects beyond. This is true of the infant mind; it is true also of
the mature mind. We may assert something more than
this regarding the organism. It is not only the medium
through which we know all bodily objects beyond itself,
it is itself an object primarily known; nay, I am inclined
to think that, along with the objects immediately affecting it, it is the only object originally known. Intuitively
man seems to know nothing beyond his own organism,
and objects immediately affecting it; in all further knowledge there is a process of inference proceeding on a gathered experience.  This theory seems to me to explain
all the facts, and it delivers us from many perplexities.
Let us go over the senses one by one, with a view of
determining what seems to be the original information
supplied by each. In the sense of smell, the objects
immediately perceived are the nostrils as affected; it is
only by experience that we know that there is an object
beyond, from which the smell proceeds, and it is only
by science that we know that odorous particles have pro
122 
BODY.
ceeded from that object. In hearing, our primary perceptions seem to be of the ear as affected; that there
is a sounding body we learn by further observation, and
that there are vibrations between it and the ear we are
told by scientific research.   In taste, it is originally the
palate as affected by what we feel by another sense to be
a tangible body, which body science tells us must be in
a liquid state. In touch proper, there is a sensation of a
particular part of the frame as affected by we know not
what, but which we may discover by experiential observation. It is the same with all the impressions we have
by the sense of temperature, the sense of titillation, the
sense of shuddering, the sense of the creeping of the flesh,
the sense of lightness or of weight, and the like organic
affections, usually but improperly attributed to touch. In
regard to all these senses, it seems highly probable that
our original and primitive perceptions are simply of the
organism as affected by something unknown, so far as
intuition is concerned.   But there are other two senses
which furnish, I am inclined to think, a new and further
kind of information.   The sense of touch, when  the
phrase is used in a loose sense, is a complex one, embracing a considerable number and variety of senses,
which have not been scientifically classified, and which,
perhaps, cannot be so till we have a more  thorough
physiology of the nerves.  Certain it is that there is a
locomotive energy and a muscular sense entirely different
from feeling, or such affections as those of heat and cold.
The soul of man instinctively wills to move the arm; an
action is produced in a motor nerve, which sets in
motion a muscle, with probably an attached set of bones,
and the intimation of such a movement having taken place
is conveyed to the brain by a sensor nerve. As the result
of this complex physiological process, we come to know
that there is something beyond our organism; we know
an object out of our organism hindering the movement
123 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
of the organ and resisting our energy.*  It is more dif
ficult to determine what is the original perception by
sight. It must certainly be of a coloured surface affecting
the felt organism. The boy born blind, when his sight
was restored by an operation by Cheselden, felt as if
every object "touched his eyes, as what he felt did his
skin." I think it probable that the coloured surface perceived as affecting the living organism, is seen as in the
direction of the felt and localized sentient organ, neither
behind it, nor at the side, but at what distance we know
not till other senses and a gathered experience come to
our aid. Such seems to be our original knowledge, received through the various senses as inlets.
But we are not to understand that the mind receives
sensations and information only from one sense at a time.
In order to have a full view of the actual state of things,
we must remember that man, at every instant of his
waking existence, is getting organic feelings and perceptions from a number of these sources; say at one and the
same time from the sense of heat, from the sense of taste in
* The following is the account given by Miiller (trans. by Baly,
p. 1080):-" First, the child governs the movements of its limbs, and
thus perceives that they are instruments subject to the use and government of its internal'self,' while the resistance which it meets with
around is not subject to its will, and therefore gives it the idea of an
absolute exterior. Secondly, the child will perceive a difference in the
sensations produced according as two parts of its own body touch each
other, or as one part of its body only meets with resistance from without. In the first instance, where one arm, for example, touches the
other, the resistance is offered by a part of the child's own body, and
the limb thus giving the resistance becomes the subject of sensation as
well as the other. The two limbs are in this case external objects of
perception, and percipient at the same time. In the second instance,
the resisting body will be represented to the mind as something external and foreign to the living body, and not subject to the internal
self. Thus will arise in the mind of the child the idea of a resistance
which one part of its own body can offer to other parts of its body,
and at the same time the idea of a resistance offered to its body by an
absolute exterior. In this way is gained the idea of an external world
as the cause of sensations."
124 
BODY AND SPIRIT.
the mouth, from the sense of hearing, the sense of sightsuppose of a portion of our own body and of the walls of
the apartment in which we sit, and from the muscular sense
-say of the chair on which we sit, or the floor on which
we stand. Our whole conscious state at any given time
is thus a very complex, or rather, a concrete one. There
is in it at all times a sense of the living body as extended,
and, I may add, as ours. This is a sense which human
beings, infant and mature, carry with them every instant
of their waking existence, perhaps in a low state even in
their times of sleep.  "This consciousness of our own
corporeal existence is the standard by which we estimate
in our sense of touch the extension of all resisting bodies."* Along with this there will always be in our
waking moments a sense of something extra-organic but
affecting the organism, such as the surface before the
eye, or the object which supports us. But the vividness
of the impression made, or some decisive act of the will
in order to accomplish a desired end, will at times centre
the mind's regards in a special manner on some one of
the objects made known by the senses. Thus, a violent
pain in an organ will absorb the whole attention on itself; or a vivid colour will draw out the mind towards the
coloured object. By these concentrations of intelligence
we obtain a more special acquaintance with the nature of
the objects presenting themselves.   It is thus only that
the special senses fulfil their full function, and impart
information abiding with us beyond the moment when
the action takes place.
Such seems to be our original stock of knowledge acquired by sense. It is as yet within very narrow limits,
within our frames, and a sphere immediately in contact.t
* Mi'ller's Physiology, translated by Baly, p. 1081.
t "We perceive and can perceive nothing but what is relative to
the organ." (Hamilton, foot-note to Reid, p. 247).
125 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
We reach a wider knowledge by remembering what we
have thus obtained, by subjecting it to processes of abstraction and generalization, and drawing inferences from
it. Our information is especially enlarged and consolidated, by combining the information got from several of
the senses, which are all intended to assist each other.
In particular, the two intellectual senses par excellence,
sight and the muscular sense, are fitted to aid each other
and all the other senses. By sight we know merely a coloured surface; by the muscular sense we may come to
know that the object with a superficies has three dimensions and is impenetrable,-we may know the object to
be the same by our seeing upon it the hand which feels
the pressure. By sight we know not how far the coloured surface is from our organism; by inferences founded
on gathered information from the muscular sense, we
come to know how far it is from us, whether an inch or
many feet or yards. By the muscular sense we know
solid objects only as pressing themselves immediately on
our organism; by sight we see objects-which sight does
not declare to be solid but which a combined experience
declares must be solid-thousands or millions of miles
away.   By inferences from various senses united, we
know that this taste is from a certain kind of food, that
this smell is from a rose or lily, that this sound is from
a human voice or a musical instrument.   Thus our
knowledge, commencing with the organism and objects
affecting it, may extend to objects at a great distance,
and clothe them with qualities which are not perceived
as immediately belonging to them. We know that this
blue surface seen indistinctly is a bay of the ocean fifty
miles off, and that this brilliant spark up in the blue
concave, is a solid body, radiating light hundreds of millions of miles away.
Let us analyse what is involved in this intuitive knowledge.
126 
BODY.
I. We know the object as existing or having being. This is a necessary conviction, attached to, or rather,
composing an essential part of our concrete cognition of
every material object presented to us, be it our own
frame, or of things external to our frame; whether this
hard table or stone, or this yielding water, or even this
vapoury mist, or this fleeting cloud. We look on each of
the objects thus presented to us, in our organism or beyond it, as having an existence, a being, a reality. Every
one understands these phrases; they cannot be made
simpler or more intelligible by an explanation. We understand them because they express a mental fact which
every one has experienced. We may talk of what we
contemplate in sense-perception being nothing but an
impression, an appearance, an idea, but we can never be
made to give our assent to any such statements. However
ingenious the arguments which may be adduced in favour
of the objects of our sense-perceptions being mere illusions,
we find that after listening to them, and allowing to them
all the weight that is possible, we still look upon bodies
as realities next time they present themselves.   The reason, is we know them to be realities, by a native cognition which can never be overcome.
II. In our primitive cognitions, we know objects as
having an existence independent of the contemplative
mind. We know the object as separate from ourselves.
We do not create it when we perceive it, nor does it
cease to exist because- we have ceased to contemplate it.
All this is involved in our very cognition of the object,
and he who would deny this is setting aside our very
primitive knowledge, and he who would argue against
this, will never be able to convince us in fact, because he
is opposing a fundamental conviction which will work
whenever the object is presented. *
* Tlhe convictions referred to in these paragraphs, set aside at once
127 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
III. We know the object as having an abiding existence.   This is a truth which requires to be stated with
not a few explanations and cautions. I can merely give
a hint of what is meant, and reserve the fuller discussion
of it till I come to speak of substance, in the next chapter.  I have already affirmed that every material object
has an existence abiding, in this sense, that our contemplation did not create it, nor will it cease to exist because
our attention is not directed towards it. But this is not
all: we apprehend that this thing has an abiding being
in itself. Our intuition indeed does not say, as to this
being, how or when it came to be there, nor whether nor
in what circumstances it may cease; for information on
such topics we must go to other quarters. But when
the question is started, we must decide that this thing
had a being prior to our perceiving it, unless indeed it so
happened that it was produced by a power capable of
doing so at the very time our senses alighted on it, and
that it will continue to exist after we have ceased to regard it, unless indeed something interpose to destroy it.
But enough for the present of this somewhat difficult
discussion.
IV. In our primitive cognition of body there is involved a knowledge of outness or externality.* We
the doctrine of Kaut, that the mind in the intuition of sense, takes
cognizance of phenomena in the sense of appearances. They should
also modify the doctrine of Hamilton. "Our knowledge of qualities
or phenomena is necessarily relative, for these exist only as they exist
in relation to our faculties." (Foot-note to Reid, p. 323.) It is a truism that we can know objects merely as our faculties enable us to know
them; but the question is, What is the nature and extent of the knowledge which our faculties furnish P I admit that whatever external objects we know, we know in a relation to us.  But I hold that man and
his faculties are so constituted as to know things (with being) exercising qualities, and to know qualities as existing separate from and independent of our cognition of them.
* "Perception involves in every instance the notion of externality,
or outness" (D. Stewart, Essays, p. 419).
128 
BODY.
know the object perceived, be it the organism or the
object affecting the organism, as not in the mind, as out
of the mind. In regard to some of the objects perceived
by us we may be in doubt as to whether they are in the
organism or beyond it, but we are always sure that they
are extra-mental. This is a conviction from which we
can never be driven by any power of will or force of circumstances.  It is at the foundation of the judgments
to be afterwards specified as to tile distinctions between
the self and the nlot-self, the ego and the non-ego.*
V. In all our knowledge through the senses we know
the object as extended.   I am inclined to think that this
knowledge in the concrete is involved even in such perceptions as those of smell, taste, hearing, and feeling, and
the allied affections of temperature and titillation. In all
these we intuitively know the organism as out of the mind,
as extended, and as localized. At every waking moment
we have sensations from more than one sense, and we
must know the organs affected as out of each other and
in different places.t It is acknowledged that the primitive
* The convictions spoken of in these paragraphs set aside all forms
of idealism in sense-perception. Berkeley says that, so far as matter
is concerned, "esse est percipi."  I hold, that according to our intuitive
conviction, the thing which we perceive must exist before we can perceive it, and that we perceive it as an extended thling independent
and out of the contemplative mind. Fichte represents the external
thing as a creation or projection of the perceiving mind. But the
mind in knowing the self as perceiving, knows that it is an external
thing that is perceived, and cannot be made to think otherwise. Professor Ferrier bases his fabric of demonstrated idealism on the proposition, the object of knowledge " always is, and must be, the object
with the addition of oneself,-object plus subject,-thing, or thought,
mnecum" (Inst. of Metaph. prop. ii.). If this proposition professes to
be a statement of fact, I deny that the fact of consciousness is properly
stated. If it professes to be a first truth, I deny that it ought to be
assumed in this particular form. No doubt we always know self at
the same time that we know an external object by sense-perception,
but we know the external object as separate from and independent of
self. We might as well deny that we know the object at all, as deny
that we know it to have an existence distinct from self.
t Hamilton says, "An extension is apprehended in the apprehension
K
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PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
knowledge got in this way is very bare and limited, and
without those perceived relationships and distinctions
which become associated with it in our future life. But
imperfect though it be, it must ever involve the occupation of space. The other two senses furnish more express
information, the eye giving a coloured surface of a defined form, and the muscular sense extension in three
dimensions. It should be noticed that in our knowledge
of extra-organic objects, whether by the eye or the muscular sense, we know them as situated in a certain place
in reference to our organism, which we have already so far
localized and distributed in space, and which henceforth
we use as a centre for direction and distance.
VI. We know the objects as affecting us. I have already said that we know them as independent of us.
This is an important truth. But it is equally true and
equally important that these objects are made known
to us as somehow having an influence on us. The organic object is capable of affecting our minds, and the
extra-organic object affects the organism which affects the
mind.  Upon this cognition are founded certain judgments as to the relations of the object known to the
knowing mind. In particular,
VII. In certain, if not in all, of our original cognitions
through the senses we know the objects as exercising
potency or property. This is denied in theory by many
who are yet found to admit it inadvertently when they
tell us that we can know matter only by its properties:
for what, I ask, are properties but powers to act in a
certain way? But still it is dogmatically asserted, that
whatever we may know about material objects, we can
of the reciprocal externality of all sensations" (Appendix to Reid,
p. 885). Again, "In the consciousness of sensations relatively localized
and reciprocally external, we have a veritable apprehension and consequently an immediate perception of the affected organism, as extenllded,
divided, figured, etc." (ib. p. 884).
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BODY.
never know that they have power; we cannot see power,
they say, nor hear power, nor touch power. In opposition to these confident assertions, I lay down the very
opposite dogma, that we cannot see body, or touch, or
even hear, or taste, or smell body, except as affecting
us, that is, having a power in reference to us. When an
extra-organic body resists our muscular energy,* what is
it doing but affecting our organism in a certain way?
The very coloured surface revealed through sight, is
known to us as affecting, that is, having an influence
over, our organism. But there is more than this,-the
organism is known as having power to affect the cognitive self. The muscular effort resisted, the visual organs impressed by the coloured surface, are known as producing an effect on the mind.   The organs affected in
smell, in taste, in temperature, in hearing, in feeling, are
all known as rousing the miind into cognitive activity.
It might be further maintained, even in regard to those
senses which do not immediately reveal anything extraorganic, that they seem to point to some unknown cause
of the affection known; but it is better to postpone the
discussion of this question till it can be discussed fully.
But in regard to the two senses which reveal objects beyond the bodily frame, and in regard to all the senses
so far as they make known our frame to us, there is an
intuitive conviction of potency wrapped up in all our cognitions.
But it will be vehemently urged that it is most pre
* Locke says that impenetrability, or, as he prefers calling it, as
having less of a negative meaning, solidity, seems the "idea most intimately connected with and essential to body, so as nowhere else to be
found or imagined, but only in matter;" and he adds, we "find it inseparably inherent in body wherever or however modified;" and in
explaining this, he says of bodies, that "they do by an unsurmountable
force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them"
(Essay, ii. iv. 1).
131
K'2 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
posterous to assert that we know all this by tAe senses.
Upon this I remark that the phrase by tle senses is ambiguous. If by senses be meant the mere bodily organism,-the eye, the ears, the nerves, and the brain,
I affirm that we know, and can know, nothing by this
mere bodily part; that so far from knowing potency or
extension, we do not know even colour, or taste, or
smell.  But if by the senses be meant the mind exercised
in senlse-perception, summoned into activity by the organism, and contemplating cognitively the external world,
then I maintain that we do know, and this intuitively,
external objects as influencing us-that is, exercising
powers in reference to us.   I ask those who  would
doubt of this doctrine, of what it is that they suppose
the mind to be cognizant in sense-perception.   If they
say, a mere sensation or impression in the mind, I reply
that this is not consistent with the revelation of consciousness, which announces plainly that what we know
is something extra-mental. If they say, with Kant, a
mere phenomenon in the sense of appearance, then I
reply that this too is inconsistent with consciousness,
which declares that we know the thing. But if we know
the thing, we must know something about it. If they
say they know it as having extension and form, I grasp
at the admission, and ask thenm to consider how high
the knowledge thus allowed, involving at one and the
same time space, and an object occupying space, and so
much of space. Surely those who acknowledge this much
may be prepared to confess further that the mind which
in perception is capable of knowing an object as occupying space, is also capable of knowing the same object
as exercising power in regard to us.* We have only to
* "C'est la raison, et la raison seule, qui connait, et connait le monde;
et elle ne le connait d'abord qu'a titre de cause; il n'est d'abord pour
nous que la cause des phenomenes sensitifs que nous ne pouvons
notls rapporter h nous-m6mes; et nous ne rechercherions pas cette
132 - 
BODY.
examine the state of mind involved in all our cognitions
of matter, to discover that there is involved in it a know
ledge both of extension and of property.
Such seemn to be some of the principal of our cognitions through the senses; and I have sought to evolve
them by an analysis proceeding on a careful observation
of their nature.
SECT. III. SOME DISTINCTIONS TO BE ATTENDED TO IN
REGARD TO OUR COGNITION OF BODY.
It is a fundamniental position with the author of this
treatise that we ought to look on all our primitive cogniitions as guaranteeing a reality. In particular we are
to look on each of our sense-perceptions as pointing to a
corresponding extra-mtental object.  But in order to be
able to mnaintain this doctrine with even the appearance
of plausibility, it is necessary to attend to certain dis
tinctions.
cause, par consequent nous ne la trouverions pas, si notre raison n'gtait
pourvue du prineipe de causalit6, si nous pouvions supposer quL'un phenomone peut commencer a apparaitre sur le th6atre de la conscience,
du temps ou de l'espace, sans qu'il ait une cause. Done le prineipe de
causalite, je ne erains pas de le dire, est le pore du monde extdrieur,
loin qu'il soit possible de l'en tirer, et de le faire venir de la sensation."
So says M. Cousin in criticizing Locke (Deux. Ser. tom. iii. lee. 19).
This is not far from the truth. There is reason or intelligence involved
in our knowledge of the external world, and there is causality in this
knowledge.  The mind knows the external thing as a cause-it must
know it in other characters as well, in particular it must know it as
extended-still, it knows it as a cause. But except in the mode of
development, this doctrine does not differ so much from that of Locke
as Cousin imagines. Locke derives the materials of all our ideas from
sensation and experience. He derives our idea of cause from both these
sources. But then the mind, in the formation of its ideas, proceeds intelligently, reasonably. There is intelligence, according to Locke, in sensation, and in comparing certain ideas the mind perceives their agreement immediately by intuition. Locke's account of the full phenomenon does not seem to me satisfactory, or very congruously wrought
out; but it is quite as near the truth as that of Cousin, who calls sensation the chronological condition, and reason the logical principle
(See this distinction examined, infra, Part III. Bk. I. Ch. II. sect. v.).
133 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
I. There is thie DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR ORIGINAL
AND ACQUIRED PERCEPTIONS.  In standing up for the
trustworthiness of our perceptions, I always mean our
original perceptions, proceeding from the primitive principles of the mind, and having the sanction of Him who
gave us our constitution. The perceptions acquired by
inference, or other intellectual processes grounded on
experience, will have a corresponding reality only when
these processes have been validly conducted.
I have endeavoured in last Section to give an approximately correct account of what seem to be our original
perceptions through  the various senses.   But  to our
primitive stock we add others, and in doing so we enmploy rules derived from the generalizations of experience,
and deductive reasoning in applying them to given cases.
It has been all but universally acknowledged, since the
days of Berkeley, that the perception of distance is not
an original endowment of the sense of sight in human
beings, but that we come to determine it by a gathered
observation. As the result of experience, we lay down
such rules as these: that all object with whose form we
are familiar,-such as a watch,-if seen with a faint colour
and outline, and with a smaller disc in comparison with
other known objects in the field of view, must be more
distant than when seen with a better defined figure and
a more vivid colour and a fuller form. We lay it down
as another rule, that when a number of objects intervene between us and a scene on which we are looking,say a mountain,-it must be at a considerable distance.
Such rules formed by us are found approximately correct, and useful in ordinary cases, and at every instant at
which our eyes are open they conduct us to a knowledge
which carries us far beyond our primitive perceptions.
But then it is to be noticed that error may creep into
our acquired perceptions.  We  may reckon a rule as
134 
BODY.
universal which has many exceptions, and may make an
application of it to a wrong case. It will not be difficult
to show that all the supposed deception of the senses is
to be traced to the wrong inferences which we draw in
our acquired perceptions.
Almost all forms of idealism-the system which supposes certain of our supposed cognitions to be creations of
the mind, and all forms of scepticism-the system which
would set aside all our cognitions, plead the deceitfulness of the senses.  Our senses are not to be trusted in
some things, says the idealist, and we are to determine
by reason when they are to be trusted. Our senses delude us in some things, says the sceptic, and we may
therefore distrust them in all.  It is of vast moment to
stop these errors at the point at which they flow out, by
showing that the senses, meaning our original perceptions through the senses, can all be trusted in regard to
the special testimony which they furnish.
But how, it is asked, does the stick in the water, felt
to be straight by the sense of touch, seem crooked to the
sense of sight? The answer is, that the knowledge of
the shape of an object does not primarily fall under
the sense of sight, and that when we determine whether
a stick is or is not straight, by the sense of sight, it is by
a process of inference in which we have laid down the
rule that objects that give a certain figure before the eye
are crooked, a rule correct enough for common cases, but
not applicable to cases in which the rays of light are refracted in passing from one medium to another. Why
does a boy seem a man, and a man a giant in a mist,
whereas if you clear away the mist, both are instantly reduced to their proper dimensions? An answer can easily be given. We have laid down the rule that an object
seen so dimly must be distant; but an object appearing
of such dimensions at a distance must be large: and the
135 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
phenomenon is felt to be a deception only by those who
are not accustomed to move in the mist. Why does a
mnountain, viewed across an arm of the sea, seem near,
while the same mountain, seen at an equal distance beyond an undulated country studded with houses and
trees, will seem very remote?  The answer is not that
the eye has deceived us, but that we have made a mistaken application of a rule usually correct, that an object
must be near when few objects intervene between us and
it; and it is to be noticed that those who are accustomed to look across sheets of water, commit no such
mistakes, for they have acquired other means of measuring distance. Again, we have found it true in cases so
many, that we cannot number them, that when we are
at rest and the image of an object, say a carriage, passes
across the vision, the object must be in motion.  That
rule is accurate in all cases similar to those firom which
it was derived; but it fails the landsinan when, feeling as
if he were at rest in the ship, he infers that the shore is
mioving, away from the vessel.  In all such cases we see
that it is not the senses, that is, the natural and original
perceptions of the senses having the authority of God,
which deceive us, but rules formed by ourselves, and illegitimately applied.  It may be observed that the same
experience which enables us to gather the rules, may
enable us to ascertain the limits of the rules, and the exceptions.  It is only the landsminan who is deceived into
the thought that the shore is moving; the seaman has
modified the rule, or rather, he realizes the idea that he
himself is moving, and he is not deceived for one instant.
Supposing this to be the correct account, we may stand
up for the trustworthiness of all our intuitive perceptions,
at least when the organism and the mind are in a healthy
state. Even in cases in which the organismin is diseased,
the error lies commonly, perhaps always, iin a wrong ill
136
I.
I.:.. 
BODY.
ference.* When our visual organs are distempered, we
may seem to see a solid figure before us which touch tells
us has no reality; but  the fact is, all that we intuitively
see is a colouiired surface, whether in or out of the organismn, whether solid or aerial, we know not intuitively. We
hear a sound which we interpret as coming from a voice
where no living being can be, but the interpretation is
our own: all that our nature declares is, that there is an
affection of our auditory organs. The visions, the imaginary sounds, touches, and smells, felt by persons whose
organs are diseased, or excited by strong mental fancy
within-just as they would be by an object without, are,
after all, inferences fromn what are in themselves mere organic affections. In the greater number of such cases,
there is a means of detecting the error occasioned by disease in one of the organs, by other organs not distempered.  At the same time I am  not inclined to deny that
there may be cases in which the brain is so disorganized, and the mind so deranged, that the person is given
up for life to hopeless delusion. We are now within the
* Aristotle had an apprehension of what I am convinced will turn out
to be the true account of these seeming errors of the senses. (See his
Treatise on the Soul, b. iii., c. i., iii., vi.) Hie says the perception,
by a sense, of things peculiar to that sense, is true, or involves the smallest amount of error. But when such objects are perceived in their accidents (that is, as to things not falling peculiarly under that sense),
there is room for falsehood; when, for instance, something is said to be
white there is no falsehood, but when the object is said to be this or
that (if the white thing is said to be Cleon), (of. iii., i. 7), there may be
falsehood.'H a'oOlortL r3'v pe'v LLV aL,'E 0'7 t o  o'Xt LXroV EXovra
,rO *eU8ov. 8evrepov 8;E' roU o'viue,7KEvat'aura' KaL EvravOa #a'7 EvaEXErat
8tLa+ev8erEOatL oa RLv yyap XEVKOV, ov' *eV8eat, EL 8E troz T ro ro' \EVKO,'  a'XXo 7L
+Ev,8'Erat (iii., iii., 12: ed. Trendelenburg).'AX,X''arEp Tro' 6pav rov LLOv
alheO[', L 8' av'plaO  ro T'  VKOw&?,, OVK aXies aLE (ib. vi. 7). Aristotle
saw that the difficulties might be cleared up, by attending to what each
sense testifies, and separating the associated imaginations and opinions or judgments. The full explanation, however, could not be given
till Berkeley led men to distinguish between the original and acquired
perceptions of the senses, by showing that the knowledge of distance by
the eye, is an acquisition.
137 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
range of phenomena which carry us into the deepest
mysteries of our world, and have a conniection with man's
liability to disease, and the existence of sin.
II. There is the DISTINCTION BETWEEN  SENSATION
AND PERCEPTION.  It may be laid down as a general
fact, that every given state of man's mind is concrete;
that is, in the one act there are elements which may be
separated at other times, or which may be separated by
analysis. Thus in purely mental action, there may at one
and the same moment be an exercise of the intelligence,
of feeling, and of will; in one act we may comprehend
that our friend is in distress, may feel grieved in consequence, and resolve to take steps to relieve him. In like
manner all the mental affections excited by the action of
the bodily senses are concrete. What is thus mixed up in
one concrete act, can be separated by analysis, and ought
for important ends to be so separated: indeed the separation is often made for us naturally, for we have now
one portion, and now another of the combined state. In
particular, it is of great moment in philosophy to distin
guish between the sensations and perceptions which are
always mixed up together.
Perception is the knowledge of the object presenting
itself to the senses, whether in the organism or beyond
it. Sensation is the feeling associated,-the feeling of
the organism.   These two always coexist.*  There is
never the knowledge without an organic feeling, never
a feeling of the organism without a cognitive apprehension of it. These sensations differ widely fromn each
other, as our consciousness testifies; some of them being
pleasant, some painful; others indifferent as to pleasure
* Reid represents the sensation being "followed by a perception of
the object;" on which Hamilton remarks, "that sensation proper precedes perception proper is a false assumption; they are simultaneous
elements of the same indivisible energy" (Reid's Works, p. 186: see
also p. 853).
138 
BODY.
and pain, but still with a feeling. Some we call exciting, others dull; some we designate as warm, others
as cold; and for most of them we have no name whatever,-indeed they so run into each other that it would
be difficult to discriminate them by a specific nomenclature. The perceptions, again, are as numerous and
varied as the knowledge we have by all the senses. Now
these two ever mix themselves up with each other. The
sensation of the odour mingles with the apprehension of
the nostrils; the flavour of the food is joined with the
recognition of the palate; the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the sound comes in with the knowledge. of
the ear as affected; and the organ which we know as
feeling has an associated sensation. There is an organic
sensation conjoined even with the knowledge we have
of the extra-organic object affecting our muscular sense
or our visual organism. This sensation may be little
noticed because the attention is fixed on the object;
still it is always there, as we may discover by a careful
introspection of the combined mental affection.
But this leads me to notice that in the concrete mental state sometimes the perception or the knowledge is
the more prominent, whereas at other times the sensation is the predominant. There is a difference indeed
of the senses in this respect. Thus in the senses of
taste, smell, touch proper, and the allied senses of temperature, titillation, shuddering, and flesh-creeping, the
sensation is the prevailing element.   These  mtay be
regarded as the lower and the more animal senses, in
which the attention is largely absorbed in self. In hearing, so far as the original perceptions are concerned, the
sensation is still the predominant affection; but as we
come to know the sounding bodies, our attention is often
directed almost exclusively to the object. Thus as we
are listening to a person speaking we lose sight of the
139 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
hearing ear, and think only of what is said. Still, when
the sounds are unpleasant, or when they are peculiarly
pleasant, as in music, it is the sensation that absorbs the
attention. In the muscular sense it is the resisting ob ject that is most noticed. Ini sight the colour is largely
(but not exclusively, as will be shown forthwith) a sen sational, whereas the spread-out surface is the perceptive
element. In many of our acts of vision there is a nice
balancing of the two, the colour and the form being alike
noticed; in others the colour, by its gorgeousness, ab sorbs the whole mental energy; while in a third class
the colour-sensation is lost sight of, and we are conscious
of scarcely anything more than the form. And here I
am tempted to remark that in the lower forms, both of
nature and of the fine arts, it is the colour which is the
more striking characteristic; and children, and persons
low in the scale of intelligence, feel a peculiar delight in
such objects. As we rise, in nature to the common herbaceous plants, and in art to flower-painting, there is
often a union of the beauty, both of colour and of form.
When we mount to the highest plants, as to the trees
of the forest, and to the animal creation and the human
form, and in art to historical painting, varied colouring
disappears, that higher minds may gaze with undivided
attention on objective forms characterized by high proportions, or full of life or suggestive of character.
It should not be omitted that the mind can at any
time fix its attention more specially on one of these, and
then the other will very much disappear from the field
of view.  Sometimes this is done for us spontaneously,
by the vividness of the sensation on the one hand, or by
the interest which collects around the external object on
the other.  Sometimes the concentration is effected by
a strong act of will, fixing the mind's regards on one
or other in order to gain a special end.  Thus we niay
140 
BODY.
yield ourselves entirely to a luscious strain of music, or
we may be absorbed in thought about some object, so as
scarcely to notice the sounds. Under ear-ache we may
have the whole energy of the mind concentred on the
pain, and be able to attend to nothing else; or we may
be so interested in a discourse or a topic of thought as
scarcely to feel the torture.
But while the two ever coexist,- sometimes with the
one prevailing and sometimes with the other predomiiant, and sometimes with the two nicely balanced, it is
of importance to distinguish them. Every man of sense
draws the distinction between the music and the musical instrument, between the ear-ache and his ear. The
metaphysician should also draw the distinction,-indeed
it is essential that he do so. The two were given for
different ends.  Our perceptions are the main means of
supplying us with knowledge, whereas our sensations
are meant to increase our enjoyment, to stimulate to exertion, to give warning, or perhaps to inflict penalties.
We must beware, both philosophically and practically,
of confounding our sensations and our perceptions, our
feelings and our cognitions. In the confounding of the
two  we  have another  circumstance  leading men  to
charge their senses with deception.  T'his will appear
more fully when we come to notice another set of distinctions.
III. There are DISTINCTIONS  BETWEEN THE OBJECTS
KNOWN. There is the distinction between the organic
object and the object beyond the organism. There is
the more delicate distinction between the objects immediately known as extra-organic and objects inferred as
affecting the organism but themselves unknown. Let
me explain these distinctions.
We have seen that in some of the senses the proper
object of perception is the organism itself. In two others
141 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
it is beyond the organism. Let us consider these two
classes in order.
In the first class all that we know immediately is the
organism as affected. But if affected, it must be affected
by something. It is in one state this instant, and it
will be in another state the next. The intuitive conviction of causation-to be afterwards discussed-constrains us to look for an agent to produce the effect.
And where is this agent to be found? In the organism,
or beyond the organism? I am certain, in regard to
some of our organic affections, that intuition says nothing
on this special point. This is the case with our sense of
smell, our taste and touch, and sense of temperature,and I think also, though with some hesitation, of the
sense of hearing. The intuitive conviction of cause and
effect does indeed intimate that there must be a cause,
but as to where that cause is to be found we must trust
to experience, which tells us that the cause is in some
cases to be found in the organism itself, and in other
cases in an agent beyond,-such as odorous particles,
sapid bodies, heat, undulations from a sounding body,
or a solid object applied to our nerves of touch. In all
cases the affection of sense and the conviction of cause
combined are sufficient to prompt us to look round for
an agent. The senses act as monitors, and most important monitors they are, of powers working in our
bodily frames, and in the physical universe around us.
I believe that every one of our senses gives us intimation
of powers,-such as floating particles, light, and heat,
which are among the most powerful agencies conducting
the processes of the material world. Still these are unknown to our senses, and we become aware of their existence merely as causes of known effects. As to what
odours, sounds, flavours, heat, and, we may add, light
and colours are, our intuitions are silent, and their na
1-42 
BODY.
ture is to be determined by observation,-indeed can
be determined only by elaborate scientific research. It
should be added, that while science has ascertained much
about them, it has not, in its latest advances, been able
to settle what is the exact nature of such agents as heat,
light, and colour.
Let us turn now to the other class of senses, which
give us a knowledge of extra-organic objects. By the
muscular sense we know an object as extended in three
dimensions, and as resisting our effort. We have thus
a knowledge of objects extended, and exercising dynamic energy beyond the little world of self.
The sense of sight presents peculiar difficulties in this
connection. It seems to me clearly to look at an extended
surface, not part of our organism, but affecting it. But
what are we to make of colour? It is the greatest difficulty which the metaphysician meets with in the investigationl of the senses. The mind knows the perceived
object to be in its nature extended; but do we also
know it as in its very nature coloured? If so, is there
colour in the object as there is extension?   The following is the solution which I am inclined to offer of this
difficult subject. The sense of colour may be regarded
as intermediate between those senses in which we perceive an extra-organic object, and those other senses
which reveal merely the organism as affected, but whether
by agents within or beyond the organism we know not.
In the sense of colour, we primarily know only the organism as affected, but we are intuitively led, at the
same time, to look on what thus affects our organism
as not in the organism, but as in the extended surface
in which it is seen. But beyond this, that is beyond
colour being an extra-organic cause of an organic affection, we know nothing of its nature by intuition. If
this account be correct, we see that our sense of co
143 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
lour is different, on the one hand, from our knowledge of our sensations of heat, or smell, or taste, for we
do not know whether these are within or beyond the
frame, while we do know that colour is out of ourselves
in a surface; and different, too, on the other hand, from
the knowledge of the extended surface and the impenetrability which are revealed directly by the sight and
muscular sense, whereas we do not know what colour is.
Hence arises, if I do not mistake, that peculiar conviction
regarding colour which has so puzzled metaphysicians.
The sense of colour combines, in closest union, the sensation and the perception, the organic affection and the
extra-organic. I confess I have always fondly clung to
the idea that, sooner or later, colour will be found by
physical investigation to have a reality, I do not say of
what kind, in every material object.*
By help of such distinctions as these, we may defend
the validity of all our native convictions through the
senses. In doing so, it will be observed that we stand
up for the trustworthiness of our original, but not necessarily of our acquired perceptions; that we stand up
for a reality corresponding to our perceptions proper,
but not therefore to our associated sensations; and that
we stand up for a reality, be it organic, or extra-organic,
or both, corresponding to each particular sense as for
itself, but not a reality for any one sense of precisely the
same kind as the reality for the others. The senses can
be supposed to deceive us, when the organism and mind
are in a sound state, only when we overlook one or other
or all of these distinctions.
* I have, in'Typical Forms  and Special Ends,' by J. M'Cosh and
Geo. Dickie (p. 165, 2nd ed.), pointed to a number of phenomena, which
seem to show that colour is a reality in the object, which reality is made
known to us by means of the reflection of the beam by the colour.
When the undivided beam falls on the green leaves of a plant, the green
beam is reflected and reaches our eye, and the red is absorbed, not to
be lost, but to come out in russet bark, or red flower, or berry.
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BODY.
SECT. IV. THE QUALITIES OF MATTER KNOWN BY INTUITION.
The distinctions unfolded in last Section seem to be
the all —important ones, in order to enable us to defend
the trustworthiness of our sense-perceptions. I have not,
in that Section, made mention of the famous distinction
between the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter,
because, so far as it is fitted to clear up and establish the
validity of the senses, it is embraced in those which we
have drawn, and which are fitted, in my opinion, to bring
out the whole truth in a fuller and more distinct manner.
But it will be necessary, for other philosophic ends, to
draw a distinction between the qualities of matter which
are primitively known, and others which may become
known by induction or scientific research. The qualities
of matter known to intuition may be divided into three
classes:-those which relate to space; those which one
body exercises in reference to another; those which body
exercises in reference to the sensitive and perceiving
mind. Let it be observed, in regard to all of these, that
the quality in the body always relates to something else,
so passive and dependent is body on something out of
itself.
I. There are the Qualities of Matter by which it occupies Space and is contained in Space, that is, Extension.
We have this knowledge, I believe, through each of our
senses; for in each of our senses we know the corresponding organs as extended and out of each other, and
through two of the senses we know objects beyond our
b o d i l y    frame as extended.  Hamilton represents extension as a necessary constituent of our notion of Matter,
a       n        d         evolves it from "two catholic  conditions of matter;
(I.) the occupying space, and (II.) the being contained in
space. Of these, the former affords (A) Trinal Extension, explicated again into (I.) Divisibility, (ii.) Size, con
L
145 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
taining under it Density or Rarity, (III.) Figure, and (B)
Ultimate Incompressibility; while the latter gives (A)
Mobility, and (B) Situation. Neglecting subordination,
we have thus eight proximate attributes; 1, Extension;
2, Divisibility; 3, Size; 4, Density or Rarity; 5, Figure; 6,
Incompressibility absolute; 7, Mobility; 8, Situation."*
II. The Qualities which one body exercises in reference
to another; in other words, the Properties or Forces of
matter. I have expended much labour in vain if I have
not shown, in previous Sections, that here we have a
necessary conviction.   In  the visual and locomotive
senses, we know an extra-organic object as affecting us
and our organism.  All this seems to be involved in our
perception, and to be a native conviction of the mind, to
which it is ever prompted, and from which it can never
be delivered. Not only so, we are ever led to look for
a producing cause, even of our purely organic affections
in the ear and palate and nostrils.   A  knowledge of
power, and a conviction of power being in exercise, is
thus involved in our very perceptions through the senses.
Adhering to these views, we must set aside at once
two opposite doctrines which have had the support each
of a number of eminent metaphysicians or metaphysical
speculators. The one is that matter is known as possessing no other quality than extension. This error originated with Descartes,t and has prevailed extensively
among those metaphysicians who have felt his influence.
But the view is opposed to that intuition which represents all matter as having and exercising energy. On
the other side, there are speculators who maintain that
all the phenomena of matter can be explained by suppo
* Hamilton's Reid, Note D, p. 848.
t "L'espace ou le lieu interieur et le corps qui est compris en cet
espace, ne sont differents aussi que par notre pensde. Car, en effet la
meme etendue en longueur, largeur et profondeur qui constitue l'espace
constitue le corps" (Des. Med. p. ii. 10).
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BODY.
sing it to possess potency. This mistake sprang from
Leibnitz, who supposed that the universe of matter (and
of mind) was composed of monads having power, and to
which the mind imparted the relation of space.* But
the dynamical theory of body, so far as it denies the existence of space, and body as occupying space, is utterly inconsistent with that fundamental conviction, of
which the mind can never be shorn, which declares that
the matter which has force must be extended, and that
the force exercised is a force in a body in one part of
space, over another body in a different part of space.
III. There is the influence, that is, power, which the
bodily organs have over the mind. I feel that I must
speak with great caution on this topic. Neither physiology nor psychology has been able to throw any light on
the particular way in which body affects mind. The
theories which have been introduced,-such as that of
Occasional Causes by the disciples of Descartes, and of
Pre-established Harmony by Leibnitz, and of impressions
by modern physiologists,-have only increased, instead of
removing the difficulties. We cannot say whether the
organism affects the knowing mind immediately or mediately. We cannot say whether it has power in itself,
or whether the power may not lie in some other agent
working in the organ.  We cannot say whether the power
lies exclusively in the organ, or, as is more probable, in
the organ and mind combined. Scientific research has
thrown no light on these mysteries, and intuition should
not pretend to settle these questions.   Still intuition
seems to me to say, that connected with the organism
* Leibnitz held that bodies are endowed with some sort of active
force. "Les corps sont dou4s de quelque force active." This force may
be called life. "C'est une realite immaterielle, indivisible et indestructible: il en met partout dans le corps croyant qu'il n'y a point de partie
de la masse oui il n'y ait un corps organise, doue de quelque perception
ou d'une manicre d'ame (Op. p. 694: ed. Erdmann). That he looked
upon space as a relation will come out below.
L2
147 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
there is power of some kind to call forth mental ac
tion.
Such seem to be the qualities of matter which we
know by intuition. But even in regard to these, experience is ever adding to our knowledge, which we arrange
and systematize by induction and science. Whatever
other qualities of matter-if there be such-may become
known to us, are discovered by experience. I have put
the qualification if tle)-e be smce, because in fact we do
not know whether all the other qualities of body be not
modifications of those we have named. We are made
aware of such agents as heat, light, electricity, magnetism,
but it is an unsettled question whether they are bodies or
(as is more probable) affections of body, implying forces
of a peculiar character. These are questions which can
be determined only by physical science, proceeding in
the method of induction.
SECT. V. OUR INTUITIVE COGNITION OF SELF OR OF SPIRIT.
It is very probable (though it can never be positively
proven) that the first knowledge acquired by the mind is
of our own bodily frame, through the sensitive organism
-a view which does not imply that, apart altogether
from such perceptions, the spirit would not have operated. But whatever may be the theory formed on this
speculative subject, it is certain that whenever or however the mind is aroused into an act of intelligence,
there is always involved in the exercise a knowledge of
self. Coexisting with every intelligent act of mind there
is always a self-consciousness. But let it be carefully
observed that this knowledge is not of an abstract being
or substance, or of an ego, or of an essence, but of the
concrete self in the particular state in which it may be,
with the particular thoughts, sensations, or purposes,
which it may be entertaining at the time. Let us ob
148 
SPIRIT.
serve, and seek to evolve, what is involved in the cognition
of self.
I. We know self as having being, existence.  The
knowledge we have ill self-consciousness, which is associated with every intelligent act, is not of an impression,
as Hume would say, nor of a mere quality or attribute,
as certain of the Scottish metaphysicians* would affirm,
nor of a phenomenon, in the sense of appearance, as Kantt
supposes, but of a thing or reality. In affirming this, we
are bringing out and expressing what is embraced in our
primitive cognition. No account which falls short of this
can be regarded as a full exhibition of the facts falling
under our eye when we look within. If any man main
* The Scottish School generally maintains that we do not know mind
and body, but only the qualities of them. Reid indeed says,'" Every
man is conscious of a thinking principle, or mind, in himself" (Works,
p. 217). Campbell, in his'Philosophy of Rhetorice,' speaks of consciousness being concerned with "the existence of mind itself, and
its actual feelings, etc." (b. i. c. v. p. ii.). But this language is not
free from ambiguity. Reid says that "sensation suggests to us both
a faculty and a mind, and not only suggests the notion of them, but
creates a belief of their existence;" and he defends the use of the word
' suggest,' which I reckon a very unfortunate one in such an application (Works, pp. 110-111). This view is carried out and elaborated by
D. Stewart: "It is not matter or body which I perceive by my senses,
but only extension, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which
the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is
extended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with
respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence,
but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition, operations
which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills"
(Elem. vol. i. p. 46). See also vol. ii. p. 41, and Phil. Essays, p. 58.
t Kant holds that the inner sense gives no intuition of the soul as
an object.   "Der innere Sinn, vermittelst dessen das Gemiith sich
selbst, oder seinen inneren Zustand anschaut,  giebt zwar keine Anschliauung von der Seele selbst, als einem Object" (Kr. d. r. V. p. 34). He
speaks of the subject envisaging itself, not as it is, but as it appears: "Da
es denn sich selbst anschaut, nicht wie es sich unmittelbar selbstthaitig vorstellen wiirde, sondern nach der Art wie es von innem afficirt
wird, folglich wie es sich erscheint, nicht wie es ist" (Zw. Aufg. p. 718).
He says that by the inner sense we know the subject self as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself: "Was die innere Anschauung betrifft,
149 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
tains that all that we can discover is a mere idea, impression, phenomenon, or quality of an unknown thing, I ask
him for his evidence, and he must, in replying, call in the
internal sense, and I can then show him that this sense,
or cognitive power (for it is not a sense except in an
abusive application of the term), declares that we know
a something, or thing with a positive existence.
This is a knowledge which cannot be explained, nor
defined in the sense of being resolved into anything
simpler or founded on anything deeper. It is a simple
element implied in every intelligent act, and not derived
from any other act or exercise. It is a basis on which
other knowledge may be reared, and not a superstructure
standing on another foundation.
As it is a primitive, so it is a necessary conviction.
We cannot by any other supposed knowledge undermine
or set aside this fundamental knowledge. We cannot be
made by any process of speculation or ratiocination to
believe that we have not being. The process of reasoning which would set aside this cognition can plead no
principle stronger than the conviction which we have in
favour of the reality of self.
In saying that we know self as possessed of being, we
do not mean to affirm that we know all about self, or
about our spiritual nature. There are mysteries about
self, and about everything else we know, sufficient to awe
every truly wise man into humility. All that is meant
is, that, whatever may be unknown, we always know
unser eigenes Subject nur als Erscheinung, nicht aber nach dem, was es
an sich selbst ist, erkennen" (ib. p. 850). Mr. Mansel has done great
service to philosophy by maintaining so clearly and resolutely, in his
'Prolegomena Logica,' and the article on'Metaphysics' in the' Encyclopedia Britannica,' that we intuitively know self. "I am immediately conscious of myself seeing and hearing, willing and thinking"
(Prol. Log. p. 129). Hamilton speaks of our being conscious every
moment of our existence, and of the eyo as a "self.-subsistent entity"
(Metaph. Lect. 19).
150 
SPIRIT.
being whenever we know any of the objects presented
to us from within or from without. This subject will be
resumed in a more special manner in next Chapter.
II. We know self as not depending for its existence
on our observation of it. Of course we can know self
only when we know self; our knowledge of self exists
not till we have the knowledge, and it exists only so long
as we have the knowledge. But when we come to know
self, we know it as already existing, and we do not look
on its continued existence as depending on our recognition of it.
III. We know self as being in itself an abiding existence.  Not that we are to stretch this conviction so far
as to believe in the self-existence of mind, or in its eternal existence. We believe certainly in the permanence
of mind independent of our cognition of it, and amidst
all the shiftings and variations of its states. Yet this
does not imply that there never was a time when self was
non-existing. For aught this conviction says, there may
have been a time when self came into existence-another
conviction assures us that when it did, it must have had
a cause. It must be added that this conviction does not
go the length of assuring us that mind must exist for
ever, or that it must exist after the dissolution of the
body. It does indeed seem to say that, if it shall cease
to exist, it must be in virtue of some cause adequate to
destroy it; and it helps to produce and strengthen the
feeling which the dying man cherishes when he looks on
the soul as likely to abide when the body is dead. But
as to whether the dissolution of the bodily frame is a
sufficient cause of the decease of the soul,-as to whether
it may abide when the bodily frame is disorganized,-this
is a question to be settled not altogether by intuition, but
by a number of other considerations, and more particularly by the conviction that God will call us into judg
151 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
ment at last, and is most definitely settled, after all, by the
inspired declarations of the Word of God. But it' is
pleasant to observe that there is an original conviction
altogether in unison with this derivative belief, a conviction leading us to look on self as permanent unless there
be a cause working adequate to its dissolution.
According to the views presented under these heads,
the existence of self is a position to be assumed, and not
to be proven.  It does not need proof, and no proof
should be offered; no mediate evidence could possibly be
clearer than the truth which it is brought to support. It
has been keenly disputed how we are to understand the
Cogito, ergo sum," of Descartes.   Are we to regard it
as a process of reasoning?  If it be so, it is either a pe5tio principii, or its conclusiveness may be doubted. If
the cogito be understood as embracing ego, that is, be
understood as ego coyito, then the ego is evidently involved in it, is in fact assumed.  If it means anything
short of this, then it might be difficult to establish the
accuracy of the inference; thus, if the cogito does not
embrace the ego, it is not clear that the conclusion follows.*  Or are we to regard the statement as a sort of
primitive judgment, not implying mediate reasoning or a
middle termn?t Taken in this sense, I would reckon
that the connection between thought and existence is involved in our knowledge of self as existing, rather than
that the knowledge of self issues from the perception of
the connection between thought and personal existence.
Or are we to look on the expression as simply a mode of
* Kant has a powerful criticism of the "Cogito, ergo sum," considered
as an argument, in his Paralogismen d. r. Vern. in the Kritik.
t In answering the objections of Gassendi, Descartes says: "Cum
advertimus nos esse res cogitantes, prima quedam notio est quse et
nullo syllogismo concluditur; neque etiam quis dicit'Ego cogito, ergo
sum, sive existo,' existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit, sed
tanquam rem per se notam simplici mentis intuitu agnoscit."  See the
subject discussed by Cousin, Prem. Ser. tom. i. leg. vi.
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SPIRIT.
stating an assumption? In this case the word ergo, the
usual symbol of reasoning, comes in awkwardly; and
besides, the truth to be assumed is not the complex
judgment, coqito, ergo sm, but the fact revealed at once
to consciousness of ego coqitans.*  This primitive cognition may be the ground of a number of judgments, but
it is to reverse the order of things entirely to make any
one of these judgments the ground of the cognitions.
The cognitions which have been unfolded in this Chapter, form, when memory begins to be exercised, the ground
of our recognition of our personal identity, and lead us
to believe in a self which abideth amid all changes of
thought and mood and feeling. This subject will be
resumed by us under the head of Primitive Judgments.
IV. We know self as exercising potency. We have
seen that we know it as having being; we know it
further as having active being.   We  know it as acting,
we know it as being acted on, we know it as the source
of action.t   Even  in sense. perception we know  it as
being acted on from without,-nay, we know it as itself
acting in producing the result. So far as we know objects acting on it, we know it as capable of being influenced,-in other words, as having a capacity of a
particular description. So far as we know it acting in
producing changes in itself or other things, we know it
* "C'est par une meme perception de notre ame que nous eprouvons
le sentiment intime et de notre pens6e et de notre existence" (Buffier,
Prem. Ver. p. i. c. i.).
t Sir W. Hamilton admits all I am pleading for. "I know myself
as a force in energy, the not-self as a counter-force in energy" (Note
D, p. 666, of Ap. to Reid). And again: " We have a perception proper,
of the secundo-primary quality, of resistance in an extra-organic force
as an immediate cognition" (p. 883). Is this statement an essential
part of his doctrine, or an incidental admission? If part of his system,
it should modify the view he has given elsewhere of our conviction of
power as being a mere impotency (see Appendix to Discuss.). If it be
inadvertent, it is a proof that truth will come out of honest men, in
spite of the errors of their system.
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PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
as a potency, as having power. When we recollect,
when we fondly dwell on a particular scene, when we fix
the thoughts on a particular object, we are exercising
power, and by consciousness we know that we are doing
so. When in consequence of coming to know of events
bearing upon us personally,-say of some blessing about
to descend, or calamity about to befall, —-we rejoice or
grieve, we experience an effect. This conscious potency
is especially felt in all exercises of the will, whether it be
directed to the mental action which we wish to stay or
quicken, or the bodily organism which we purpose to
move. I demur, indeed, to the view maintained by
some philosophers of eminence, that our idea of power
is obtained exclusively from the consciousness of the
power of will over the muscles. But I am persuaded
that our most vivid conviction of power is derived from
the influence of the will both on bodily and mental action,* and that the influence of the will on the organism
is what enables us to connect mental with bodily action.
But here it will be necessary to offer an explanation to
save ourselves from obvious difficulties, which many have
not seen their way to overcome. We shall find, under
another head, that while we believe intuitively that every
effect has a cause, we do not know by intuition what the
cause is apart from experience; and that while we are
convinced that the cause produces the effect, it is only
by experience we know what the effect is. It follows
that we do not know intuitively what or how many
* This is substantially the view of Locke, who says, " Bodies by our
senses do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power as
we have from reflection on the operations of our own mind." In deriving our idea of Power from Sensation and Reflection, he supposes the
mind to be actively and intelligently exercised. "Whatever change is
observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere to make that
change" (Essay, ii. xxi. 4). But Locke has omitted to inquire what
it is in the mind which insists that it must collect a cause wherever
there is a chkange.
154 
SPIRIT.
powers must concur to produce a given effect. This
qualification will be found to have a great significance
imparted to it by the circumstance to be afterwards
noticed, that in order to most creature effects there is
need of a concurrence of causes, or of a concause. When
I will to move my arm, I know that the will is one of the
elements in producing the effect, but I do not know, till
physiology tells me, how many others must co-operate.
It follows that one of the elements of a complex cause
may act and no effect follow, because one part of the concause is absent. I may will to take a cheerful view of everything, and yet not be able owing to the rise of gloomy
thoughts. I may will to move my arm and yet the arm
may not move, because paralysis has cut off the concurrence of the organism. This subject will again come
before us under various aspects.
V. We know the knowing mind to be different from
the material object known, whether this be the organism
as affected or the object affecting it. Not that we know
by intuition wherein the difference lies; not that we
are in a position to say whether they may not, after all,
have points of resemblance, and a mutual dependence,
and a reciprocal influence,-on these points our only
guide is a gathered experience. But in every act in
which we know a bodily object, we know it to be dif ferent from self, and self to be different from it. This is
a conviction which we can never lose, and of which no
sophistry can deprive us. We carry it with us at all
times, and wherever we go. It makes it impossible for
any man to confound himself with the universe, or the
universe with him. Man may mistake one external ob ject for another, but it is not possible that he should
mistake an external object for himsqlf, or identify-himself
with any other object. This conviction is thus a means,
as shall be shown later in the treatise, of delivering us
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PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
from the more common forms of idealism, and from
every form of pantheism.
VI. We know self in every one of its states, as these
pass before self-consciousness. And herein lies an im portant difference between the knowledge we have of
mind and the greater portion of the knowledge we have
acquired of the material universe. The knowledge which
we  have of matter by intuition is extremely limited.
What we thus know, indeed, is supremely valuable, as
the ground on which we erect all our other information;
still it is in itself very narrow, being confined to an ac quaintance with our organism as extended and as ex ercising an influence on the mind, and to objects imme diately in contact with it. Most even of the knowledge
which we have of our organism, and of objects in contact
with it, is derivative; and there is a process of inference
in all that we know of objects at a distance,-of sun,
moon, stars, of hills, rivers, valleys,-and of the persons
and countenances and conversations of our friends. But
in regard to our own mninds, we know all the individual
facts directly and intuitively. We gaze at once on the
mind thinking, imagining, feeling, resolving.   In this
view it may be safely said that we know more of certain
of the states and of the action of mind than we know of
the whole material universe, even in this age of advanced
science. It should be added, in order to save the remark
from appearing to some incredibly extravagant, that while
we thus know spontaneously so much about the workings
of the mind, the majority of men think far more about
their objective  than  their subjective knowledge.    It
should be further added, that while we are ever growing,
more than people who have not thought on the subject
imag,ine, in the knowledge of our mental affections, yet
there are greater difficulties in adding to our original
stock in the mental than in the material world.
156 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
It is the office of psychology, as a science, to observe
wherein the states of mind which fall under consciousness agree and wherein they differ, and to endeavour to
arrange and classify them. In conducting this its work,
all the facts are discovered by consciousness as an intuitive
faculty.  Our sensations, our perceptions, our elaborated
thoughts, our moral cognitions, our emotions, our wishes,
our volitions, and all our necessary convictions, are under
our immediate view.   But it is to be carefully observed
that the classification is a work of discursive, and not of
intuitive thought. We know our thoughts and feelings,
but not as thoughts or feelings. As to how we are to
arrange them, and as to what is the best classification of
our mental states, this is a question not for intuition, but
for mental science, looking to the facts which consciousness makes known. WTe are conscious, not of faculties,
but merely of individual energies, which we compare and
arrange under certain heads as faculties.  It is important to state here once more that we are conscious of
the intuitions of the mind as individual energies, and not
as abstract forms or general laws.
CHAPTER II.
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
SEcT. I. (Preliminary.) ON TiE NATURE oF ABSTRAcTION
AND GENERALIZATION.
As abstraction and generalization perform so important a part
in the formation of the a priori notions and maxims out of the
concrete and individual convictions, it will be necessary to explain
the nature of these processes, the more so as a defective account
has often been given of them.
157 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
It is very generally acknowledged that man's mind begins with
the concrete, and thence reaches the abstract, that is, that it first
knows or contemplates an object with the qualities presenting
themselves, and that it afterwards learns to consider the object
apart from any particular quality, or the quality apart from the
object. The statement now made, does not imply that man's primary knowledge is complex. The complex is not the same as the
concrete. In complex knowledge man has mingled several cognitions which are simple; but to man the concrete is the simple.
His primary knowledge is of objects with certain qualities which
he may subsequently be able to separate and distinguish. Thus
by the eye he gets a knowledge of the bodies before him as at one
and the same time extended and coloured. By the muscular sense,
or locomotive energy, he knows objects as extended, movable, and
resisting energy. It is a curious circumstance that when the memory recalls an object, it always presents it in the concrete, that
is, with qualities which can be separated. We cannot even imagine an object except in the concrete; we cannot picture to ourselves an extended surface without giving it colour of some kind,
and we cannot imagine a colour except on an extended surface.
With this primary knowledge and these representations in possession, the mind proceeds to abstract, and is urged to do so by a
native intellectual impulse. It can separate in thought the qualities from the object, or one quality from another, say the colotir
from the form.
Abstraction may be considered in a wider or in a narrower
sense. It may be regarded, in an extended sense, as that operation of mind, in which, to use the language of Whately, "we draw
off and contemplate separately any part of an object presented to
the mind, disregarding the rest" (Logic Anal. Out.).   In this
more general sense the parts may exist separately as well as the
whole; thus, having seen a judge with his wig, we can not only
separate in thought the wig from the judge, but the wig can in
fact be separated from the wearer. In a narrower sense, abstraction is that operation of mind in which we contemplate the quality
of an object separately from the object. "An abstract name," says
Mr. Mill (Logic, b. i. c. ii.), "is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing." In this sense the part separated in thought cannot be separated from the object in fact. Colour may be thought
of (not seen or imagined) apart from an extended body, but cannot
exist apart from a coloured object.
It is a very common impression that our abstractions are in no
sense realities. I wish at this early stage of the investigations to
158 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   159
be prosecuted in this treatise, to set myself against this view,
which has sometimes been positively expressed, but is far more frequently underlying and implied in statements and arguments
without being formally announced. I lay down a very different
position, that if the concrete be real, and the abstraction be properly made, the abstract thing, that is, the thing contemplated in
the abstraction, will also be real. I may never have seen a bird
without wings, but I can consider the wings apart from the bird,
and I am sure that the wings have as real an existence as the bird
itself.  This will be admitted at once in regard to all such cases
as this, in which I can in fact separate the pinions from the body of
the fowl. But I go a step further, and maintain, that even in cases
in which the part abstracted cannot be separated in reality from
the whole, still it is to be considered as real. It may not have, or
be capable of having, an independent reality, but still it has a reality. I can think of gravitation apart from a given body, or from
the chemical affinity of that body; and in doing so I do not suppose that it can exist apart from body; still the gravitation has an
existence just as much as the body has, it has not a reality independent of the body, but it has a reality in the body, as a quality
of it. The same remark might be applied to, and will hold good of,
any other abstraction. No doubt if the original concrete object be
imaginary, the abstraction formed from it may be the same; I can
separate in thought the beauty of Venus from Venus herself; and
of course, as Venus is ideal, so also is her beauty. But when the
object is real, and I abstract or separately contemplate what has
been known in the real, then, as the concrete object is real, so is
also the part or quality abstracted real; not that it may be a reality capable of subsisting in itself, but still a reality in the object
as a quality of it.
I reckon it of the utmost moment to make this remark. The
view here presented saves us on the one hand from an extreme
Realism, which would attribute an independent reality to every
quality abstracted, which would for example represent beauty as a
separate thing, like a beautiful scene in nature, and on the other
hand, from what is more important in our present inquiry, from
regarding it as a nonentity, or at the utmost as a mere form or creation of the mind.* We are ever hearing the phrase repeated a
* "Concreta vere res tint, abstracta non sunt res sed rerum modi;
modi autem nihil aliud sunt quam relationes rei ad intellectum seu apparendi facultates" (Leibnitz de Stilo Philos.: Nizolii Op. p. 63). In
this as in other matters, Leibnitz introduced a subjective tendency,which
came forth in full manifestation only in a later age. 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
"mere abstraction;" and the language is applied to such objects as
space, time, beauty, and even truth and moral good. In opposition to such views, I maintain that abstraction is not necessarily
concerned about fictions or illusions.   Abstractions are not, as
they have often been represented, the attenuated ghosts of departed quantities; they may rather be represented as the very
skeleton of the body, not capable of action alone, but still an important existence in the body, acting with its covering of flesh and
skin. Abstraction is not only a lofty intellectual exercise, it is in
a sense a cognitive act, and when the concrete object looked at is
real, it will give us, if properly conducted, a reality in the part separated. As to whether this part is or is not capable of a separate existence, this depends on the nature of the original concrete
cognition.
Generalization is dependent on abstraction, and arises out of it.
In generalization we contemplate an indefinite number of objects
as possessing a common attribute or attributes. A general notion
is a notion of these objects. This expressed in language is a common term, which therefore stands for an indefinite number of objects, for all that possess the common quality or qualities.
As abstractions are formed out of concretes, so generalizations
are formed out of individuals or singulars.   It has been  very
generally allowed by philosophers that the mind begins with the
knowledge of individual objects or scenes presentedto it. Among
these objects it may, by its comparative faculty, discover resemblances. In some cases the comparison is preceded by an abstraction of the qualities in respect of which the objects are alike;
in other cases it may be perceived at once that there is a resemblance, and the abstraction of the points of resemblance may
follow. In all cases, both the discovery of resemblance and abstraction are needful to generalization, in which we put in a class,
and usually call by a common name, the objects thought to resemble each other in certain respects, and so far as they resemble
each other.
I am prepared to lay down in regard to generalization a proposition similar to that which I am inclined to enforce in regard
to abstraction. When the individuals are real, the generalization has also a reality; that is, there' is a reality in the class.
True, I may constitute a class from imaginary individuals,-say a
class of griffins, or a class of mermaids, or a class of ghosts. In
such a case the general is as unreal as the singular.   But if my
generalization is from real objects; if it is a generalization made
of objects in nature, say of marbles, or reptiles, or cruciferous
160 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   161
plants, or even of objects of human workmanship, such as chairs,
or houses, or churches, then the intellectual product has also a
reality involved.  I do not mean to say that the general exists, or
can exist, as an individual thing, like the singulars which it embraces,-that the class crocodile has the same sort of existence as
the individual crocodile,-but I maintain that it has a reality in
the common attributes possessed by the objects.
In abstraction, thle reality may be simply that of an attribute in
an individual object. In' generalization, it is the possession of a
common attribute by an indefinite number of objects. The composition of marble is a fact quite as much, though not exactly of
the same sort, as the limestone itself.   The possession of cold
blood, and of the three heart-compartments, is a reality quite as
much as the individual crocodile is. The possession of four cross
petals is a real thing, just as a particular wild mustard-plant is.
The structure and adaptation to a practical use of chair, house,
and church, are not fictitious any more than this chair, or this
house, or this church is. This account preserves us on the one hand
from an extravagant realism, which would give to the universal
the same sort of reality as the singular; and on the other, from
an extreme conceptualism or nominalism, which would place the
reality solely in the conception of the mind, or in the name. The
class has a reality, but it is simply in the possession of common
qualities by an indefinite number of objects.
According to this view, abstraction and generalization are processes of a very high order; they are, in fact, essential to philosophy, quite as much so, indeed, as Plato and the Schoolmen supposed;
without them we can never reach the truths on which the higher
forms of wisdom gaze. They always pre-suppose, indeed, that
something has been given them; but, acting upon this, they turn
it to most important purposes, and if they start with realities and
are properly conducted, they are ever in the region of realities,
and of realities of the highest kind. We shall see as we advance
that all philosophic notions and maxims are the results of these
processes, some of them being abstractions, and others being also
of the nature of generalizations.
SECT. II. ON BEING.
But what can be said of Being? Verily, little can be
said of it.  The mistake of metaphysicians lies in their
saying too much; and they have made assertions which
have, and can have, no meaning, and landed themselves
M 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
in self-created mysteries or in contradictions.  So little
can be affirmed of Being, not because of the complexity
of the idea, but because of its simplicity; we can find
nothing simpler into which to resolve it.   We  have
come to ultimate truth, and there is really no deeper
foundation on which to rest it. There is no light behind
in which to show it in vivid outline.
Ill the concrete every one has the cognition of Being,
just as every man has a skeleton in his frame.  But
the common mind is apt to turn away from the abstract
idea, as it does from an anatomical preparation; or rather, it feels as if such attenuated notions belong to the
regions of ghosts, where
" Entity and quiddity,
The ghosts of defunct bodies, fly."
All that the metaphysician can do is to appeal to the
perception which all men form, to separate this from the
others with which it is joined, and make it stand out
singly and simply, that it may shine and be seen in its
own light, and with this the mind will be satisfied:
"Who thinks of asking if the sun is light,
Observing that it lightens?"
Those who attempt anything more, and to peer into the
object, will find that the light darkens as they gaze
upon it. "When I burned in desire to question them
further, they made themselves-air, into which they vanished."
I allow that the abstract notion of Being is one which
the mind is not inclined spontaneously to fashion. As
to many other abstractions, it is led naturally to form
them; they are framed for it, or it is compelled by the
circumstances in which it is placed to frame them. Thus
I see a man with a black coat one day, and with a grey
coat the next, and I cannot but separate the colour from
162 
ANAILYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
the object. But in such high abstractions as Being, that
which we contemplate is liever, in fact, separated from
any one thing. Still Being is an abstraction which we
are constrained to make for philosophic purposes, and it
was, in fact, formed so early as the age of the speculators of the Eleatic School.   It is the one thing to
be found objectively in all our knowledge.   Hence in
all our abstractions it is that which remains; in the
ascending process of generalization it is the summmum
genus.  This does not prove that Being can exist apart
from a special mode of existence, or the exercise of some
quality. Nor does it prove that we can know Being separate from a concrete existence.  I hold the one as well
as the other of these to be impossible.  But in all know
ledge we know what we know as having existence, which
is Being.
I cannot give my adhesion to the opinion of those who
speak so strongly of man being incapacitated to know
Being. I have already intimated my dissent from the
Kantian doctrine that we do not know things, but appearances; and even froin the theory of those Scottish
metaphysicians who affirm that we do not know things,
but qualities. What we know is the thing manifesting
itself to iis,-is the thing exercising particular qualities.
But then it is confidently asserted that we do not know
the "thing in itself." The language, I rather think, is
unmeaning; but if it has a meaning, it is incorrect.   I
do not believe that there is any such thing in existence
as Being in itself, or that man can even so much as
imagine it: and if this be so, it is clear that we cannot
know it, and desirable that we should not suppose that
we know it. Of this I am sure, that those Neo-Platonists who professed to be able to rise to the discovery
of Being in itself (which could only be the abstract idea
of Being), and to be employed in gazing on it, had
m 2
163 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
miserably bare and most unprofitable matter of meditation, whether for intellectual, or moral, or religious
ends.   But if any mean to deny that we can know
Being as it is, I maintain in opposition to them, and I
appeal to consciousness to confirm me when I say, that
we immediately know Being in every act of cognition.
But then we are told that we cannot know the mystery
of Being.*  I am under a strong impression that speculators have attached a much greater amount of mystery
to this simple subject than really belongs to it.  Of this
I am sure, that much of the obscurity which has collected around it has sprung from the confused discussions of metaphysicians, who  have laboured to explain
what needs no explanation to our intelligence, or to get
a basis on which to build what stands securely on its
own foundation.   I do indeed most fully admit that
there may be much about Being which we do not know;
much about Being generally, much  about every individual Being, unknown to us and unknowable in this
world.   Still I do affirm that we know  so much of
Being, and that any further knowledge conveyed to us
would not set aside our present knowledge, but would
simply enlarge it.
SECT. III. ON SUBSTANCE.
All that the metaphysician can do in regard to sub  * Kant everywhere speaks of our not knowing the "Ding an sich."
See in the Kritik of Pure Reason (Antin. d. r. V. Abs. vi.). M. Cousin
allows to Kant that we have not a consciousness of our proper nature,
otherwise, he says, that the abysses and mysteries of existence would
all be known; but to save himself from the Kantian consequences, he
calls in reason to give us a conviction of self and personal identity: —
" Nul de nous n'a conscience de sa propre nature, sans quoi les abimes
de l'existence seraient faciles a sonder, les mystbres de l'ame nous
seraient parfaitement connus."  "L'identite  personnelle est une conviction de la raison" (ser. ii. leg. xviii.). It were surely both simpler
and wiser to suppose that there is intelligence in consciousness, and
that this intelligent consciousness knows self.
164 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   165
stance is to show that our cognition of it is original and
fundamental,  and to evolve what is contained in the
cognition. He should not attempt to prove how it is so
and so (the 8o'T of Aristotle), but he may show that it
is so and so (the OTt of Aristotle). He could not give the
dimmest idea of it to one who had not already the knowledge, but he may separate it by analysis from the other
cognitions with which it is combined, and make it stand
out fully to the view.  He may so weigh and measure it
as to show its extent and boundary, and deliver it from
those crudities in which speculators have incrusted it.
The following is the best analysis I am able to furnish.
I. In all knowledge of substance there is involved
BEING or EXISTENCE, not of being in the abstract, but of
something in being.  This we have seen is an essential
element in our cognition, both of mind and body. The
mind starts with knowledge, and with the knowledge of
things as having being. This is the foundation, the niecessary foundation, of all other exercises.  If the mind
did not begin with knowledge, it could not end with
knowledge. In particular, if it had not knowledge in the
concrete, it never could get knowledge in the abstract.
If there were not a knowledge of things in the premisses
with which we set out, there never could be such a knowledge in the conclusion. But having knowledge, obtained
by intuition, to set out with, we find that when we proceed
legitimately-that is, according to the laws of thought —
in our discursive exercises, we have always reality in the
conclusion.
II. In all knowledge of substance there is involved
AcTIVE POWER. We cannot know self, or the mind that
knows, except as active, that is, exerting power, or as
being affected. Nor can we know material objects except
as exercising or suffering aii influence-that is a certain
kind of power. They become known to us as having a 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
power either upon ourselves or upon other objects, and
we express this when we say that we know matter by
its properties.
This is a doctrine which has been opposed by a large
school of metaphysicians that have felt directly or indirectly the influence of Descartes, who represented extension as the essence of matter. This oversight has marred
their whole speculations, and landed them in innumerable difficulties. For not finding power in our original
cognitions, they have either with the sceptic Hlume denied
that we have any such cognition, or they have with Kant
made it a form which the mind imposes on objects. Still
a large amount of authority can be pleaded in behalf of
the doctrine, that power is involved in our idea of substance.  It is the expressed view of Locke.   It is imaintained by Leibnitz with all the ingenuity of his speculative genius. Even Kant acknowledges (though froui the
subjective character which he ascribes to our intuitive
convictions, he can turn it to no profitable account) that
cause is involved in our idea of substance.* It has been
incidentally admitted by many who have theoretically denied it.
III. There is involved in our knowledge of substance
a conviction of its having A PER,MANE,NCE.t This proposition must be very guardedly stated. By being loosely and
inaccurately announced, it has led to very erroneous and
* Locke says that "powers make a great part of our complex ideas
of substances" (Essay ii. xxiii. 7-10).  Leibnitz says, "Jusqu'ici rien
n'a mieux marqu6 la substance que la puissance d'agir" (Op. p. 460).
The language of Kant is, "Diese Causalitait fiihrt auf den Begriff der
Handlung, diese auf den Begriff der Kraft und dadurclh auf den Begriff
der Substanz."  "Wo Handlung mithin Thaitigkeit und Kraft ist, da
ist auch Substanz" (Werke, pp. 172, 173). "Die Substanz in Raume
kennen wir nur dlurch Krafte" (p. 218). See also Abrici System der
Logik, Th. i. 5, where are some profound views of power.
t Speaking of such qualities as hardness, Reid says:-" They were
real qualities before they were perceived by touch, and continue to be
so when they are not perceived; for if any man will affirm that dia
166 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   167
dangerous doctrines. But there is a truth here, if we could
only properly apprehend and express it. A substance is
not a spectre which appeared when we began to see it,
and which may cease to exist when we have ceased to
view it. This conviction is at the basis of the belief in
the abiding nature of every existing thing, amid all the
changes which it may undergo. However a piece of matter may be beat or cut mechanically, we do not believe it
to be destroyed. However it may be evaporated or decomposed by heat or chemical processes, we are not convinced that it is annihilated. When the moisture on the
earth disappears, we do not therefore conclude that it has
vanished into nothing; we look for it in a new form, and
our expectation is gratified when we discover it in the
vapour of the atmosphere or the cloud. When fuel is
put on the fire it gradually disappears from the view, but
we inquire for it elsewhere, and find it in the ashes and
in the smoke. Our conviction of the abiding nature of
self is still more deeply rooted and fixed. We believe in
its continuance amid all the changes of thought and sensation, mood and feeling, lethargy and activity.
But while there is all this in our apprehension of substance, there is not more than this, and the errors have
arisen from supposing that there is more.  In particular,
our conviction does not require us to believe either
in the necessary existence of every substance or in its
indestructibility. Our intuition does not say whether
it has or has not been created, whether it does or does
monds were not hard till they were handled, who would reason with
him?"  "Our sensations suggest to us a sentient being or mind to
which they belong, a sentient being which hath a permanent existence, although the sensations are transient and of short duration, a
being which is still the same while its sensations and other operations are varied ten thousand ways" (Reid's Works, pp. 120, 122).
The word suggest, taken from Berkeley and from Locke, was appropriate
enough as used by idealists, but comes awkwardly from Reid. The word
should have been know. 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
not need the Divine power to maintain and uphold it,
whether it may or may not be destroyed.  It does not
entitle us to affirm that matter must ever have existed,
or must, if formed, have been fashioned out of pre-existing
materials. Nor does it say how long it has existed, or
how long it will exist. An analogous intuitive conviction-that of cause-says that if produced, it must have
been produced by a cause; that if destroyed, it must be
by a power independent of itself.   Hence we cannot
assert positively, when we see a substance, say a piece of
burned coal, disappearing from our view, that it must still
exist, for in the operation of combustion there may have
been a power to destroy it; all that we can affirmt is, that
the substance did not vanish of itself.  All that our intuition guarantees is, that in itself substance has permanence, and that if destroyed, it must be by something ab
extra.
By this limitation we are saved at once from certain
pernicious consequences which were drawn from the doctrine of Descartes.  According to him, a substance is that
which subsists of itself, which has no need of anything
from without in order to' its existence.* Proceeding on
this definition, Spinoza laboured to show that there was
and could be only one substance, of which everything is
an attribute or a mode. The school of Descartes sought
to save themselves from this pantheistic consequence by
various devices.  It is not to our present purpose to inquire whether these were or were not successful, as in
accordance with the principles of Descartes.   To me it
appears that we must amend the definition of Descartes,
* "Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quse
ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum. Et quidem substantia quae nulla plane re indigeat, unica tantum potest intellige, nempe
Deus. Alias vero omnes non nisi ope concursus Dei existere posse
percipimus" (Prin. Phil., p. i. 51). Hle speaks of created substances
"quod sint res que solo Dei concursu egent ad existendum"  (ib. 52).
168 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMTIVE COGrNITIONS.   169
and reject the definition of Spinoza, and then all the conclusions founded on them must fall to the ground.
"I understand," says Spinoza, "by substance, that
which is in itself, and conceived by itself; that is to say,
that of which the concept can be formed without having need of the concept of any other.thing."*  There is
a whole aggregate of things jumbled in this definition.
That which is in itself is one thing, that which is conceived by itself is another thing, which is not even necessarily the same as that which is given as an explanation,
viz. that of which a concept can be formed without
having need of the concept of any other thing.   I object
to our conviction in regard to substance being called a
concept, a phrase denoting an abstract or general notion
formed by a discursive process of the understanding; the
conviction is an intuition.  The intuition says of every
substance that it is a thing or reality, but it does not say
whence the reality proceeded. It says that substance has
power, but it does not say whence that power. No doubt
a substance is a thing known (not merely conceived) in
itself, but the same may be said of space and time, and
everything apprehended intuitively.   Having removed
this definition out of the way, as not the expression of our
intuitive knowledge, we leave the whole pantheism of Spinoza without a foundation. I am certain that our native
conviction as to substance gives no countenance to pantheism of any kind.   Our intuition says that substance
has being, but it does not say whether it is dependent or
independent being. It says that it has power, but it does
not say that it is underived, or whence it is derived. It
says that it has permanence, but does not say that it has
not been created, and that it cannot be destroyed.
* "Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur;
hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo
formari debeat" (Ethices p. i. def. 3: ed. Bruder). 
PRIMITIVE COGNITI-,NS.
According to the account now given, self or spirit must
be a substance. We know it as having being, we know
it as having power and permanence. While it has all
these, it is to be studiously noticed that we do not know
it to have all, or indeed any, of these independently. For
aught our intuition says, it may be dependent for all of
these on the creative power or concurrent power of God.
Not only so, it may, for anything our intuition intimates,
be dependent for some of these on its association with
the bodily organism in this present state of things.   If
we wish to settle these questions, we must look to other
circumstances and considerations.
Many metaphysicians have felt greater difficulty in allowing that matter is a substance. But explaining substance as has been done in this Section, it is entitled to
be so regarded. It too has being, power, and endurance.
We can deny this only by refusing to follow our native
convictions. But in standing up for the substantial nature of body, it is still more necessary than in the case of
spirit, to bear in mind the qualifications under which we
make the statement.   We cannot affirm of matter that
it has derived its characteristics from no source independent of itself. Nor can we declare of it that it can subsist of itself, and independent of the co-operating power
of mind, that is, the Divine Mind. We are stretching
intuition altogether beyond its province, if we make it
pronounce oracular decisions on any such questions.
But are mind and matter different substances? I
reply that there are certain positions on this subject
which can be defended against all opposition. First, in the
cognition of the knowing mind, which ever co-exists with
our cognition of matter, we always know the two to be
different. When we look at these hills we have ever an
accompanying cognition of self as looking at the hills,
and we know the hills to be different from self, and self
170 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   171
to be different from the hills. Secondly, we know that
the very things by which substance is characterized —existence, potency, and permanence-are not the same in
the case of mind and body. Thus the being of mind is
not the same with that of matter, nor are the powers of
mind the same with those of matter, nor does the permanence of body depend on human beings observing it,
nor can it be shown that the permanence of mind depends on the permanence of the bodily friame. With
these proofs or presumptions in our favour, we may surely
throw the ofzms proahandi of proving that they are the
same substance on our opponents.   But, thirdly, all attempts to resolve mind into matter, or matter into mind,
have utterly failed. If we deny that matter has an existence independent of the contemplative mind, we are
trampling on one of the intuitions of our nature.  Those
who resolve mind into matter always overlook the very
essential qualities of the knowing, the conscious, the
thinking, the moral, the responsible soul. We are thus
entitled, from all we can know of substance, to declare
them to be different substances. As to whether they
may not, after all, have some unity in the view of higher
intelligences, who take a deeper view of substance, this is
a question which we need not start, for we cannot settle
it, and the unity is one which we can never discover nor
comprehend.   It is enough for us that they are different
substances in all the characteristics of substance known
to us.
Sir W. Hamilton* remarks that the word'substance'
(s8bstantia) may be " viewed as derived froni smbsistendo,
and as meaning ens per se subsistens (ov'ca, in Greek);
or it may be viewed as the basis of attributes, in which
sense it may be regarded as derived from substando, and
id quod substat accidenlibus8; like the Greek, V7rogTa(t,
* Metaph., Lect. 8., where are admirable definitions of terms. 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
v7rOcKEtlEVov. In either case it will, however, signify the
same thing, viewed in a different aspect." With this latter
statement I cannot concur.   In the first of these senses
there is such a thing as a substance, and its characteristics can be specified.  But I can see no evidence whatever for the existence of any such thing as a substance
in the other sense, that is, as a sabstratlm lying in and
beyond, or standing under, all that comies under our immediate knowledge.* There is no topic on which there
has been a greater amount of unintelligible language employed than on this. We know, it is said, only qualities,
* "If any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure
substance in general, he will find that he has no other idea of it at all,
but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities
which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are
commonly called accidents" (Locke, Essay ii. xxiii. 23). His view is thus
fully expounded in his'Letter to Stillingfleet:'-" Your Lordship well
expresses it,- We find that we can have no true conception of any modes
or accide~Is, but we must conceive a substratum or subject wherein they
are; i.e. that they cannot exist or subsist of themselves. Hence the
mind perceives their necessary connection with inherence or being supported; which being a relative idea, superadded to the red colour in a
cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea
of a support. For I never denied that the mind could frame to itself
ideas of relation, but have showed the quite contrary in my chapters
about relation. But because a relation cannot be founded on nothing,
or be the relation of nothing, and the thing here related as a supporter
or support is not represented to the mind by any clear and distinct
idea, therefore the obscure, indistinct, vague idea of thing or something
is all that is left to be the positive idea which has the relation of a support or substratum to modes or accidents; and that general undetermined idea of something is by the abstraction of the mind derived'also
from the simple ideas of Sensation and Reflection; and thus the mind,
from the positive simple ideas got by sensation or reflection, comes
to the general relative idea of substance; which without these positive simple ideas it could never have." I have quoted this passage
because it lets us see fully what Locke's precise theory is, and what
are its defects. The mind gets all its ideas from sensation and reflection, but in comparing ideas it discovers necessary relations. Among
these is substance, of which the idea is very obscure. Still the mind is
led to suppose that there is such a thing acting as a support or substratum.
172 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   173
but we are constrained by reason, or by common sense,
to believe in a something in which they inhere. Or
qualities, it is said, fall under sense, while substance is
known by r,ov, or reason.   Others, proceeding on these
admissions, mainiltain that qualities alone being known,
we may doubt whether there is such a thing as substance, and may certainly affirm that we can never know
it. Now in opposition to all this style of thinking, and
writing, which has prevailed to so great an extent since
the days of Locke, I maintain that we never know qualities without  also knowing  substance.   Qualities, as
qualities distinct from substances, are as much unknown
to us as substance distinct from qualities.   We  shall
show in next Section that we know both in one concrete
act.  We know qualities as qualities of a real thing, having being and power and permanence.
SECT. IV. ON MODE, QUALITY, PROPERTY, ESSENCE.
Two great truths press themselves on the reflecting
mind when it contemplates this world of ours.  One of
these, the more obvious, is the mutability of all mundane
objects.  Nothing seems to be enduring, all appears to
be fluctuating.  This has been a favourite view of poets,
to whom it has furnished a succession of kaleidoscope
pictures; moralists and divines have dwelt upon it, in
order to allure us to seek for something more stable than
this world can furnish; and even libertines have turned it
to their own use, and exhorted us to catch the enjoyment
while it passes, to shoot the bird on the wing: "Let
us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Philosophies
have been built on this doctrine of the fluctuation of all
things. Heraclitus of Ephesus taught that all things
are in a perpetual flux; that we cannot enter the same
stream twice; whereon Cratylus rebuked him, and showed
that we cannot do so once.*   But there is another truth
* Aristotle, lIet. iii. v. 6. 
PRIMIITIVE COGNITIONS.
which has a no less important, indeed a deeper place
in the nature of things.  In  the midst of all these
mutations objects have, after all, a permanence.  Ever
changing, they are yet all the while ever the same. Persons of deeper thought, or at least more addicted to abstraction, looking beneath the changing surface, dwell on
this permanence, which they discover to be like the fixed
mountain-while the changes are merely like the colours
that pass over its surface; and some have so magnified
it as to make it set aside the mutability.   The Eleatics
carried their doctrine so far as to maintain the oneness
and unchangeableness of all being. The founder of the
school, Xenophanes, identified this immutable oneness
with the Divine Being. His disciple, Parmenides, degenerating in religious faith, though superior to the master
ill logical power, narrowed this unity into metaphysical being. Zeno, who followed, showed his subtlety by
pointing out the difficulties in which they are involved
who maintain the existence of multiplicity and motion.
The expansive mind of Plato wrestled with both these
extremes, and sought by his doctrine of supra-sensible
ideas, and an exuberance of subtleties, to establish a
doctrine of being not inconsistent with multiplicity and
change.  In modern times Descartes and Spinoza have
magnified the importance of Substance quite as much as
the Eleatics did Being, while the great mass of physicists,
and all the speculators of the Sensational School never get
deeper than the fleeting and the phenomenal.
The wise, and the only proper course, is to assume
both, to assume both as first truths. No attempt should
be made to support either by mediate proof; each carries with it its own evidence.  Neither can be set aside
by any sophistical reasoning founded on the other.  It
is the business of philosophy not to attempt to discard
either, but rather to give the proper account of each,
when they will be seen not to be inconsistent.  The doe
174 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   175
trine of the permanence of objects is founded on being
and substance. We must take a view of the other truth
in this Section.
Every substance, we have seen, is known as having
being, power, and endurance. But every terrestrial substance is at the same time known as changing. Self
changes as we look in upon it; the material world
changes as we look out upon it. No attempt should be
made to explain how the two can co-exist, the permanent
and the changeable. For mind and body are known at one
and the same time as both. The one is quite as much
known, and therefore quite as conceivable ever afterwards, as the other; and there can be no difficulty (whatever metaphysicians may ingeniously urge in opposition)
in conceiving of their compatibility, since they were ever
known to exist together. It is one of the permanent
characters, both of mind and body, that they are ever
known as changing. Their liability to change is an element in their very nature. Now the appropriate term
to express the given state of any one substance is MODE;
or if we wish a convenient change of phraseology, Y~odification, State, or Condition.
From this account we see in what sense it is that
substance implies mode, and mode implies substance.
Mode implies substance, not only inasmuch as a state
must be the state of something, but inasmuch as mode
is the state of a substance liable to change, and so capable of manifesting itself in more than one phase.
Substance implies mode, inasmuch as it must always
be in a certain state, and is liable to be in different
states. The maxim is more than a verbal one, more
than a truism, more than an identical (analytic) judgment involved ill the terms; it is a judgment affirming
a truth intuitively discovered by the mind when looking
at the things (a synthetic judgment a vriori.) 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
Every object is known not only as having being, but
is known as having a certain being or nature. That
which is thus manifested to us may be something common to this one thing with other things, or it may be
something peculiar to the thing itself. Every particular
substance known, is known as at least having being and
potency and an abiding nature, and is known also as
possessing peculiar or distinguishing attributes.  That
by which the object is thus known to us as in itself, or
as acting, may be called a quality of the substance.   Sir
W. Hamilton speaks of the qualities of substance as "its
aptitudes and manners of existence and of action."*
But let us properly understand the relation of the two,
substance and quality. The two are ever known in one
concrete act. Thus when at a given moment we know
self as rejoicing, we do not know the self as separate,
or the rejoicing as separate, but we grasp the self and
the rejoicing at once.   But then it is necessary for mrany
purposes to distinguish between them, and we do so by
analysis; indeed, thie analysis is in a sense done for us
naturally.   For while self is rejoicing to-day, it may be
grieving to-morrow. To express the distinction it is needful to have a nomenclature, and so we distinguish between the substance and the quality.  Not that the substance can ever exist without the quality, or the quality
without the substance.   On  the contrary, the one  implies the other. The substance must always have at least
the qualities by which all substance is characterized, and
it may have many others. The qualities must always be
qualities of a thing having these characteristics.   The
maxim that the substance implies the quality, is thus a
proposition of the same character as that the substance
implies the mode.
The word'substance' may be used either as an abstract
* Metaph., Lect. viii.
I76 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNIT.'ONS.   177
or a general term. As an abstract term it designates the
thing as having the characteristics of substance, which
I believe to be existence, potency, and continuance. As
a general term it denotes all those things which have
the characteristics of substance.   Quality, too, may  be
employed as an abstract or a general term. As an abstract term it denotes that in any given substance by
which it acts or manifests itself.  As a general term it
denotes all the manifestations or actions of a substance.
Some of these qualities are found in all substance: such
are the characteristics of substance of which I have so
often spoken.   Others are peculiar to certain substances,
or manifest themselves in certain substances at certain
times. Particular qualities are known by us intuitively
to be in mind or matter.   Thus we know consciousness,
personality, thought, and will, as in mind; while we
know extension and incompressibility as being in matter;
these may appropriately be styled Essential Qualities of
sp;rit and body. Other qualities are discovered by experience. Both mind and body may have qualities which
can never be known by us. As to the qualities which
become known to us by experience, and the qualities
concealed from us, we can never know whether any of
them are, or are not, essential either to body or mind.
If this view be correct, we see that a wrong account is
often given of substance and qualities, and the relation between them. Thus it is very commnon to say that substance
is a thing behind the qualities or underneath them, acting as a substratum, basis, ground, or support. All such
language is in its very nature metaphorical; the analogy
is of the most distant kind, and may have a misleading
character.   The substance is the very thing itself, considered in a certain aspect, and the qualities are its action
or manifestation. Again, it is frequently said that qualities are known, whereas substance cannot be known, or
N 
PRIMITIVE COGNITfIONS.
if known, known only by some deeper or more transcendental principle of the mind.  Now I hold that we never
know quality except as the quality of a substance, and
that we  know both equally in one undivided act.  This a
solmewhat less mystical or nimysterious account than that
commonly given by mnetaphysicians, but is, as it appears
to mie, in strict accordance with the revelations of consciousness.
I have said that the term'quality' expresses all in the
substance by which it acts or manifests itself.  That in
substance which acts, is power, and in all substance (we
have seen) is power. The term PROPERTY, which signifies peculiar quality, might, I think, in accordance with
a usage to which it has of late been approximating more
and more, be appropriated to express the powers of any
given substance, as the power of thinking or feeling in
mind, or of gravity or chemical affinity in body.  To vary
the phraseology, the word Faculty -miay be employed when
we speak of mental powers, and fEorce when we speak
of material powers.   It is the business of science to determine by observation and generalization, the powers or
properties of minid and body.
Another phrase with the ideas involved in it requires
to be explained here, and that is EssENCE.  It is a very
mystical word, and a whole aggregate of foolish speculation has clustered round it.  Still it may have a meaning. As applied logically to classes of objects, it has a si,g nification which can be precisely fixed; it denotes the
commlon quality or qualities which are found in all the
members of the class. Thus the possession of four limbs
is the essence of the class quadruped.   It is to be remeaibered that when the class is one of what some logi cians call Kinds, it is impossible to specify all the comimonr qualities which go to constitute it.  Thus we cannot
tell all the attributes vwhich go to make lup such natural
17S 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   179
classes as those of metal, dog, or rose. All that we can do is
to specify some of the more marked, which are signs of
others. But for such logical purposes the phrase'common attribute' or'differentia'is the better, and is more
frequently employed. It is in metaphysics that the word
'essence' is supposed to have a place. Thus the question
is often put, What is the essence of mind? or What is the
essence of body? or What is the essence of this individual
mind, or of this piece of clay or chalk? Now we can
answer such a question as this, only when we are allowed
to draw distinctions and offer explanations. First, we may
allowably conceive that every one object, and every class
of objects, has an aggregate of things which go to constitute it, and we may with perfect propriety refer to
such an essence as possibly or probably existing,* but
always on the distinct condition forthwith to be specified
more formally, that we do not speak of the essence as
something which can be known by us in all its totality.
Secondly, there are some things which we know to belong to the essence of certain objects;  thus we know
that being, power, and permanence, are essential to all
substance, and that certain qualities belong to mind,
and certain qualities, such as extension and incoinpressibility, to body. But we must ever guard against tlhe
idea that there may not be other qualities also essential
to these objects.  For, Tlirdly, lthe essence of a thing, at
least in its totality, must always. be unknown to man.
How many things are united in body or mind, or in any
individual mind or material object, this can never be
ascertained by human observation or ingenuity. In this
sense it is proper in us to speak of the essence of things
* Locke,'Letter to Stillingfleet,' takes Essences "to be in everything
that internal constitution, or frame, or modification of the Substance,
which God, in his wisdom and good pleasure, thinks fit to give to every
particular creature when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant
there are in all things that exist."
N2 
PRIMiITIVE COGNITIONS.
as being unknown to man; meaning thereby, not that
we cannot know the substance, which I maintain we do
know, or that we cannot know some of the qualities which
go to make up the essence, but merely that we cannot
know what precisely constitutes the essence in its entireness.  But, Fourtily, wae are not warranted to maintain
that there must be something lyiiing further in than the
qualities we know, and that this one thing is entitled to
be regarded as the essence of the object. We have no
ground whatever for believing that there must be, or that
there is, something more internal or central than the substanice and quality which we know. r'ue, there are probably occult qualities, even in those objects withi which
we are most intimately acquainted, but we are not therefore warranted to conclude that what is concealed must
differ in nature or in kind fromn what is revealed, or that
it is in any way more necessary to the existence or the
continuance of the object.   I have a shrewd suspicion
that there is a vast amount of unmeaning talk in the
language which is employed on this special subject by
mnetaphysicians, who would see something which the vulgar cannot discern, whereas they should be contented
with pointing to what all men perceive.  It is quite conceivable, and perfectly possible, that though we should
know all about any given terrestrial or material object,
we should after all not fall in with anything more mysterious or deep than those wonders which comte every
day under our notice in the world without, or the world
within us.
SECT. V. ON PERSONALITY.
Our perception of personality is closely connected with
our knowledge of being, but there is more in personality
than in being. We know material objects as having
existence, but we have a special apprehension in regard
ISO 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   181
to self beyond what we have in regard to material objects.*   Like every other simple perception, it cannot be
defined, but it may be brought out to separate view by
abstraction;  and consciousness (with memnory) will recognize it as one of the cognitions which it had seen
before in company with others. We express this conviction when we say we are persons. The abstract idea
is one not likely to be  spontaneously formed.   The
infant, the child, the savage, are not in the habit of
making any such analysis of consciousness, nor are the
great body of mankind at the trouble of asserting their
own existence.   Such a proposition, with its subject and
predicate, will be formed only after philosophy has taken
a shape,-probably only after sophistry and scepticism
have been attacking our original convictions.   It is only
the metaphysician who will ever take the trouble of affirming that hlie exists, and the wise metaphysician will
refrain from going further and trying to prove that lihe
exists.
Yet it is a conviction which the mind ever carries with
it; it is one of the high characteristics of humanity.  Inanimate matter is without it. The brute shows that hle is
tending towards it, yet can have it only in an incipient
degree. It is the very essence of the man's individuality,
* "This self-personality, like all other simple and immediate presentations, is indefinable; but it is so, because it is superior to definition.
It can be analyzed into no simpler elements, for it is itself the simplest
of all; it can be made no clearer by description or comparison, for it
is revealed to us in all the clearness of an original intuition, of which
description and comparison can furnish only faint and partial resemblances" (Mansel,'Prolegomena Logica,' p. 129; see also Art. Met. in
Encyc. Brit. p. 618, 619, etc.). It was the greatest of all the oversights
of Kant that he did not give personality a place among the intuitions
of the mind, to which it was entitled quite as much as space and time.
Hield in by no primary belief in personality, those who came after, such
as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, wandered out into a wide waste of
Pantheism. Taking with them no belief in the personality of self, they
never could reach personality in God. 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
and is one of the main elements in his sense of independence, in his sense of freedom, in his sense of responsibility. As possessing it, man feels that he is independent of physical nature; independent of all creature
intelligences; independent, in a sense, of God, against
whom, alas! he may rebel, and to whom he must for
certain give an account.  It is a conviction to be used
and not abused. It would certainly be abused were it
to seduce man to isolate himself from the objects around
him, to try to become independent of the provisions
miade to aid his weakness in physical nature, or to separate himself from his brothers or sisters of humanity;
and still more were it to tempt him to rebel against
God. It is properly used when, under the guidance of
moral law, it is leading him, not to be ever floating on
with the stream, but at times to be standing up in the
midst of it and acting as a rampart in its current, or as a
martyr seeking to stem the tide of corruption, or Prometheus-like, rising up, not against the true God, but
against the false gods who rule in Olympus. Powers
hostile to the progress of humanity have sought to subdue this principle.   Absolutism would  crush it, and
make man live for some dominant end, political or ecclesiastical. Pantheism would dissipate it till man became relaxed and lost all individuality, as he moves
listlessly in a hot and hazy atmosphere.   It is this conviction which makes man feel that he is not a mere
bubble on the surface of being, blown up in one chance
agitation, and about to be absorbed in another.   It
keeps man from being lost,-lost in physical nature, lost
in the crowd of human beings, or lost in the ocean of
being; he is, after and amidst all, a person. As such
he has a part to perform, an end to serve, a work to
do, a destiny to work out, and an account to render.
182 
ANALI,YSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
SECT. VI.  ON  EXTENSION.
The knowledge of extension is involved in every exercise of sense-perception, even as the knowledge of personality is implied in every exercise of self-consciousness.
We certainly cannot exercise the senses of sight and
muscular energy,-we cannot, I believe, perceive through
any of the senses,-withiout knowing the object, be it the
organism or something affecting the organism, as p)ossessing extensionsalways  along with  other qualities.
This, then, is historically the origin of our idea of extension or space,-that is, we have a perception of it in
every cognition of body.   But in this primitive klnowiledge we do not apprehend it as distinct from body.   It
is an extended and a coloured surface, which we know
through the eye;  it is an extended body capable of
resisting 1us, which we know through the muscular sense
and locomotive energy; it is a set of organs localized
and out of each other, that we know by the other senses.
But by an easy intellectual act we can separate the
extension from the impenetrability and the associated
sensations.   We are greatly aided in our apprehensions
of empty space by certain exercises of sense-perception.
For we have experience ever presenting itself of two
bodies seen or felt, with nothing between obvious to the
senses.  True, scientific research shows that the interval
is not a pure vacuum, that there is air, or ether, between
the bodies; still it is in our apprehension a void,-that
is, a space, with no perceived body to fill it.  We  are
thus led to an apprehension of space as different from
body occupying space.  We are not to look on the extension thus reached as an illusion,- a nonentity, or as
nothing. If we know, as I maintain we do, body in
space, the space must have an existence (I do not say
what sort of existence), just as much as the bod(y hlas.
183 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
But when we separately contemplate the extension, we
are contemplating a reality just as verily as when we
perceive the body. It will not do to dismiss space summarily by describing it as a mere abstraction; in order
to our apprehension of it there is need of abstraction,
but it is an abstraction of a real part from a real whole.
To this cognition of space, and to every apprehension
of it, there is attached a number of intuitive beliefs.  It
is the business of the metaphysician to unfold these in
an inductive mannier, and point out and determine their
nature and laws as precisely as possible.  This falls to be
done in another Book of this Treatise, to which therefore
I adjourn the further discussion of space, as it embraces
a larger faith than it does of a cognitive element in our
apprehension of it.
SECT. VII. ON NUMBER.
We seem to derive our knowledge of number from our
cognition of being, and especially from our cognition of
self as a person. We know self as one object; we also
know other and external objects as singulars. Already
then have we number in the concrete, involved in this
our primary knowledge.* Every object known, and especially self, is known as one. Every other object known,
is known as another one. If we know self as one, then
the external object which is known as different from self,
is known as a second one. The mind can now think of
one object, and of one object + another object, or of
two, and of one object +  another object +  another ob  * Aristotle places number among the sensibles perceived by the common sense (De An. ii. 6; iii. 1). He says each sense perceives unity:
[Kao7rrr7 -yap ev al'O,7'at. a(-o-tvrr  (iii. 1. 5: ed. Trend.). Descartes makes
number perceived by us in all perceptions of body (Prin. p. i. 69).
Locke says of Unity or One, "Every object our senses are employed
about, every idea in our understandings, every thought of our minds,
brings this idea along with it" (Essay ii. xvi. 1). Buffer says that the
knowledge that I exist, I am, I think, is in a sense the same as, or at
least includes this, I am one (Prem. V6r. p. ii. 10).
184 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITl'IONS.  l1 85
ject, or of three. It can then, by a process of abstraction, separate the numbers from the objects, in order to
their separate consideration.   Not that it supposes for
one instant that numbers can exist apart from objects,
but it can separately contemplate them.   One cannot
exist apart from one object, or two from two objects, but
the mind can think about the one or the two apart from
the peculiarity of the objects.  Its judgments  and its
conclusions in all such cases, if conducted according to
the laws of thought, will apply to objects; that is, all its
judgments regarding one, two, or a thousand, will apply
to a corresponding number of objects. Having obtained
in this way a knowledge of numbers in the concrete, and
numbers in the abstract, the mind is prepared to discover
relations among numbers in a manner to be afterwards
specified in the book on Primitive Judgments.
But before leaving our present topic, it may be proper
to state that the mind has no such conviction of the existence of numbers separate from the objects numbered,
as it has of space, distinct from the objects in space, or
as it has of time, distinct from the events which happen in
time; nor has it any intuitive belief as to the necessary
infinity of objects or of numbers.   True, it can set no
limit to the number of objects, but it is not compelled to
believe that there can be no limits, as it is constrained to
believe that there can be no bounds to space or to time.
SECT. VIII. ON MOTION.
Our perception of motion is, as it appears to me, intuitive. But it supposes more than sense, or sense-perception, in the narrow sense of the termn.  It is probable
that we have an apprehension of change of place, from
the movement of our intuitively localized organs,-say
from a member of the body being moved by the locomotive energy, as when I lift my arm; this perception will be 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
especially apt to arise when we move the hand along organs to which a place has been given.   Or we nay apprehend an extra-organic body by the touch or muscular
sense, and by the same sense feel our hand or some other
extra-organic body passing over it. We maty also get the
perception by the sense of sight.  The child touching
another part of the body by its hand, will see the image
of its hand moving to perform the act.  Besides, the
"image of our own body occupies, in nearly all pictures
on our retina, regularly some determinate space in the
upper, middle, or lower part of the field of vision;" it remains constant while the other images are seen moving.*
There is more here however than immediate cognition.
There is a brief exercise of memory; we must, at the
same time that we perceive the body as now in one place,
remember that it was formerly in another place. There
is an exercise too of comparison in noticing the relation
between the object in respect of the place in which it has
been, and the place in which it now is.  And upon our
discovering change of any kind in the motion, the intuition of cause comes in to declare that there must have
been active power at work. This is one of those cases
which will come before us more and more frequently
as we advance, in which cognitions, beliefs, and judgments mingle together; and yet the act can scarcely be
described as complex, except in this sense, that on other
occasions some of the parts can exist separately or in
other combinations. The circumstance that these other
elements conjoin in our conviction as to motionr, will
bring the subject before us in other parts of the Treatise.
* (Mfiller's Physiology: trans. by Baly, p. 1083.) Aristotle places
motion, like number, among the common sensibles, Descartes among the
properties perceived in every perception of body (see places in last
note), and Locke among the primary qualities of bodies, which are always in them (ii. viii. 22). See some profound observations on motion
in' Logische Untersuchungen v. Trendelenburg,' b. i. iv.
186 
ANALYSIS OF OTJR PRIIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   187
SECT. IX. ON POWER.
I have been labouring to show, in the last Chapter and
in this, that power is involved in our knowledge of substance. We can never know either self, or bodies beyond
self, except as exercising influence or potency. Not that
we are to suppose that we have thus by intuition an abstract or a general idea of power: all that we have is a
knowledge of a given substance acting. This seems the
only doctrine in accordance with the revelations of consciousness.  It is involved in the common statement that
we cannot know substance except by its properties; for
what are properties but powers acting when the needful
conditions are supplied? I reckon it as an oversight in a
great body of metaphysicians that they have been afraid
to ascribe our apprehension of power to intuition.  In
consequence of this neglect, some never get the idea of
power, but merely of succession, within the bare limits of
experience, which can never entitle us to argue that the
world must have proceeded from Divine Power; others
have been obliged to find cause, not in any perception of
the mind as it looks on things, but in some form imposed by the mind on objects; while a considerable
number hesitate and vacillate in their account, representing it now as an original conviction, and now as an
acquisition of experience.
Wherever there is power in act, there is an effect. But
the discovery of the relation between cause and effect
cannot be discovered, except by an exercise of judgment.
The discussion of the nature of our conviction of Power
will be resumed under the head of Primitive Judgments.
SECT. X. (Suvplementary.)  THE VARIOUTS KINDs OF POWER
KNOWN BY ExPERIENCE.
We are led by the cognitive nature of the mind to look on substance as necessarily possessing potency, but it is after all by ex 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
perience that we have to determine the nature of the power exer cised by any particular substance.  Experience shows us that all
potency is not of the same description. The precise nature of the
power residing in any one substance is to be ascertained by a
generalization of its individual operations. Though it does not
fall within our precise province, yet it may help to clear up some
important metaphysical questions, if we particularize some of the
kinds of potency made known by experience.
I. FORcE IN INANIMATE OBJECTS.-In order to the exercise
of this potency there is need of two or more bodies in a particular
relation to each other. A simple body existing alone in the universe, and in a state of isolation, that is, in no relation to any
other body, could exercise no active power whatever. Indeed,
the power of a body seems to be a power to influence some other
body, or some other substance.  It seems also to be a law of the
action of bodies that when any one body acts on another, that
other acts on it.  In all bodily causation there is thus mutual
action; and experience seems to show that the action of each of
the bodies is equal to that of the other.  It is the aim of the plysical sciences to determine the nature and measure of this reciprocal operation.
According to this account there is need, in order to material
action, of two or more bodies. When these bodies are in such a
relation as suits their several properties, action takes place, and
an effect is produced. It follows that cause-meaning by cause
the invariable and unconditional cause, that which of itself will
produce the effect, and ever produce the effect-must always be
more or less complex; it always implies two or more bodies in
a particular relation to each other. The effect will always be
found to be of the same complex character, will always be found
to consist of the bodies which acted as a cause, being in some way
changed. To illustrate what I mean:- Let us suppose that we
have two material substances to experiment with, salt and water.
Place the two out of relation to each other, and no effect will be
produced. Bring them into contact, and action will commenee.
The salt acts on the water, and the water on the salt. The cause,
properly speaking, of this action is not the salt alone, or the water
alone, but the salt and water in a particular relation. This is the
true cause, productive and necessary; the cause which, wherever
it exists, will tend to produce the same effect, and in fact produce
it, except when counteracted by other forces. The effect is also
dual, and it is to be found in the very substances which acted as
the cause; it is not to be found in the salt, or in the water, or in
188 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   1S9
a third substance, but in the salt and water in a new and different
state. This is the invariable effect which will be for ever produced by the same cause.
Such seems to be the nature of material causation and effectuation. In all cases the cause is dual, or plural, as is also the effect;
and the bodies which acted as the cause are the bodies acted on in
the effect. I am persuaded that the well-known law of action and
reaction proceeds on this circumstance, which is also intimately
connected with the polar action of substances. In the common
statements as to cause and effect there is only one of the elements
of the comnplex cause or complex effect mentioned, the other being
omitted because it does not seem needful to express it. Thus we
speak of the salt as the cause, making the water of a particular
taste as the effect. But there is an omission in all such statements, which require to be completed by calling in the missing
part, when we profess to give a thoroughly accurate and philosophie account of the process. There are cases in which the complexity of the cause or of the effect is not so evident as in the
example I have given.  Thus, if a picture were to fall upon a table
and break it, we would say in loose language that the fall of the
picture was the cause of the breaking of the table. But when the
full cause is spread out, it is seen to be the picture falling with a particular force, and striking the table in a particular direction, while
the effect consists not in the breaking of the table merely, but also
in the picture losing a portion of its momentum. We have but to
reflect for a very little to see and be prepared to acknowledge
that in all gravitating action, in all chemical, in all magnetic and
electric, there is the co-operation of two or more bodies, and that
the cause consists of the bodies in one state and the effects of the
same bodies in a different state.*
II. VITAL POWER.-The attempts which have been made to
determine wherein life consists cannot be said to have as yet been
crowned with anything like success. There is every reason to
think that there is a vital power so far different from the mechanical or chemical, but science has not yet ascertained its nature
and its laws.  So far as we have glimpses of its mode of operation, it seems to involve a complexity of agents. One part of the
cell acts on another, or one cell acts on another, or it acts on external matter, and whatever acts is being acted on.
A curious question is here started, What is the nature of the
power involved in vegetable and animal reproduction? This
* This subject is illustrated,'Method of Divine Government,' b. ii. c. i. 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
is a subject still involved in great mystery, but there are ob vious and well-ascertained facts which go to establish a general
doctrine.
First, there is a duality in all vital reproduction.  In certain
portions of the vegetable kingdom, the reproductive powers are in
different organs, in others they are on different plants. In the
animal creation the reproductive organs are commonly in different
individuals, which must therefore pair in order to the production
of young. This is an example in a higher scale, and in a more
patent form, of that duality in causation which we traced already in
inanimate creation, and which makes all physical creation so depen dent on arrangements which have been made by the Creator of all
things.
Secondly, there is a positive and adequate power in the dual
parentage to produce the offspring as an effect. No living creature can proceed except from a parent of its own kind, no vegetable or animal can spring from a vegetable or animal inferior to
itself in the order of beings. This is one of the best established
generalizations of natural history, and it has not been shaken by
any of the attempts which have been made to find exceptions to it,
certainly not by the analogies which have been urged against it,
derived from objects totally different. The whole of the true
analogies of Nature, that is, those derived from objects really correlated, show that every substance or aggregate of substances
producing an effect, as it must have power to produce the
effect, so it must have power to produce an effect of that particular kind; indeed we cannot conceive that a cause should produce an effect of a higher nature than itself. The parents seem
to be endowed with a power to produce an offspring "after their
kind," that is, of the same species and no other. There is no power
onl the part of anl inferior plant to produce a higher, on the part of
a vegetable to produce an animal, or on the part of an inferior
animal to produce a higher. In particular, human beings with intelligences, and such only,-certainly not apes or monkeys,-can
have an offspring possessed of reasonable and responsible souls.
This doctrine brings reproduction under laws analogous to those
laws of causation which reign in other departments of Nature. The
particular mode of the operation of the power has not been and
may never be fully determined, but that there is power required,
special in kind and adequate in amount, seems to be established on
amply sufficient evidence. This doctrine opens to us a glimpse of
the deep foundation which the law that the offspring must be
of the same species as the parent, has in the very constitution
190 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   19l
of things, and in the nature of the power that operates in the universe.
III. RECIPROCALI ACTION OF MIND AND BODY.-That the two
have been so constituted as that the bodily organism acts on mind,
while mind is also capable of operating on the organism, this seems
to me to be the most satisfactory as it is certainly the simplest account which can be given of the connection.   But let us properly
understand what, on such a supposition, is the precise cause. It is
a complex one in every case; it is the mind and the body in a particular relation to each other.  The coexistence of the two is necessary to any effect being produced, and the effect is the result of
the two operating and co-operating. Thus in all perception through
the senses there is a cerebral power and there is mental power, and
without both there will be no result, no object perceived. There
seems also to be a duality in the effect: there is certainly a mental
effect, for the mind now perceives; and the cerebral mass, in the
very act of producing mental action, may undergo a change; thus
there seems to be a fatigue and exhaustion produced in the organism by the very act of perceiving an immense number of objects
within a brief time, as' when we travel a great distance by railway,
and this can be accounted for by supposing that the organism is affected by the action which has taken place.
There is a similar duality of power in all those cases in which
the action begins firom the mind, as when we will to move the
arm, and the arm  moves.  Hlere the concurrence of two factors
is necessary in order to the result: there is a volition, and a
nicely adjusted organism in ahealthy state; and if either were
wanting, the effect would not follow. Possibly, as there is a duality in the cause, there may also' be a duality in the effect, and the
next mental state may be so far modified by the joint bodily and
mental exertion; but I have to add, that it is just as possible
that we may have here come into the region of pure mental causation, in which, as we shall see forthwith, there is no such complexity.
In a vast amount of the results of which we are conscious, the
concurrence and co-operation both of mental and cerebral potency
are required in order to action. Thus it has been proven that a
healthy state of the brain is requisite in order to our remember ing or even imagining sensible objects; for in certain derange ments of the brain the person cannot image an object with a
figure.   In all such cases the main cause is to be found in the
mind; still the body has a part to play, and if it does not co-ope rate, the effect is not produced. In all those actions in wMhichl there 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
is the active operation of the bodily organism, in order to a men tal effect, it seems probable that the mental act, or rather the
joint act, produces also an effect on the bodily organism which has
been in action. In all mental emotion there seems to be involved
the active co-operation of a bodily organism, and there is always a
reaction on the organism, often in wearying and deranging it, at
least when the feeling, say fear or sorrow, is excited bythe con templation of evil.  Even in the exercises of the intellect there
seems to be a concurrence of organic agency necessary, and there
is always a lassitude following long and continuous intellectual
efforts. I have sometimes thought that a certain organic state is
necessary in order to our very volitions; and hence our incapacity
to form a fixed purpose in certain states of the body, and the
weariness which follows a long stretch of attention, even when
this has been accompanied with no bodily exertions.
I am aware that the account now given of the reciprocal action
of mind and body, is exposed to a great amount of questioning.
Thus, it will be asked, How does mind act on body, and body on
mind?  To this I reply by a counter-question, What is meant by
'How'?  If nothing more be meant than simply the occurrence
of the facts, then I answer that psychological and physiological research has discovered some of the facts, and may possibly detect
more, and may very probably never be able to discover the whole.
If something more than this be intended, then I ask, What is intended? If it be expected that we fild out some mysterious
bond between mind and body, I answer that there is no reason to
think that there is any such bond, and that if there did exist such
a bond, and we could discover it, it would only increase instead of
lessening the mystery. The most reasonable and the most simple
view is that spirit and body have been so constituted, that is, have
had such a nature imparted to them, that they mutually influence
each other, and co-operate to produce a joint result.
IV. \{ENTAL AcTION.-We  are not to suppose that purely
mental is in every respect the same as material action. There is a
sense in which every given body is inert and passive, it is active
only so far as it is acted on. In this respect there is a wide difference between material and mental power. Material causation
implies the presence of two or more bodies, whereas mental causation requires the presence of only one-the self-acting mind. I
can think, feel, will, without requiring any external object (always
perhaps excepting the organism, in the subordinate sense already
referred to) to co-operate with me. The oldest definition of mind
handed down to us, embodies a great truth when it describes it as
192 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.   193
that which moves itself. It can set a train of thought a-going, and
modify an existing train by a power within itself. This is one of
the prerogatives of mind, eminently characterizing it, and at once
distinguishing it from sluggish and passive matter.
But while there is self-acting power within the mind itself,
there is a sort of duality or plurality even in mental action. What
is the cause of any given state, say of the grief I may be feeling at
this present time? I have just heard of the death of a particular
individual known to me, and the intelligence apprehended is, no
doubt, part of the cause; but it is not the whole of it, for the same
news may have been comprehended by another person without
producing any such effect. In the unconditional cause there must
be included not only the immediate intelligence as apprehended
by me, but the affection which I acquired in former years for the
individual, and even my original susceptibility of friendship and of
grief; the concurrence of all these is necessary in order to this
particular state under which I am now labouring. Even here, too,
we may discover a kind of duality in the effect, for the result of
my cherishing grief at this time is to deepen my affection for my
friend, and even to increase nay original capacity for afifection and
sorrow.
V. CAIUSATION IN THE WILL.-We have seen that mental action differs widely from material. And we are not to suppose that
every mental action is the same in kind as every other.  Every faculty of the mind indeed has its own rule and mode of operation,
which it is the office of psychological science to ascertain. In
particular, causation in the will may differ from causation in other
mental action.
I am prepared indeed to maintain that our volitions are not absolutely beyond the law of causation.   If I rightly interpret my
intuition on the subject of causation, it leads me to look for a
cause of our very volitions as well as of our intellectual acts. Besides, as a matter of fact, there have been predictions of voluntary
acts, say of crimes, as accurate as of physical events, such as births
or deaths. On such grounds as these I am inclined to say that
causation must have some sort of place in the will as in all other
creature-action. But causation in regard to the will may be of a
totally different character from causation in acts of intelligence
or feeling.
While our intuition seems to me to say that causation has a
place even in voluntary acts, it does not say what is the nature of
that causation; this is to be determined by an inductive inquiry
into the operations of our voluntary acts.  And here we are
0 
PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
once met by the fact that man has free will. This fact cannot set
aside the other fact that our volitions are caused; but as both are
facts, the one must be so stated as to be seen not to be inconsistent with the other. And when we contemplate our volitions
by the light of consciousness, we discover at once that causation
does not operate in the will as it does in the material universe, or
even in our intellectual and emotional actions. iHere, I believe,
lies the key which is to explain the enigma of the consistency of
man's free will and the Divine Sovereignty. We may not be able
to find the key, but we can tell the place where it lies.
VI. DIvINE CAI-sATION.-I shrink from entering minutely into
the consideration of the action of causation within the Divine Mind.
It is evidently a subject which stretches far beyond human discussion or comprehension. But it appears very evident that we are
led to look on God as a Substance, having power in himself and
the cause of effects produced. Indeed it is from the effects in the
universe, and proceeding on an intuitive principle, that we argue
that there is a cause above the world. The nature of the causation is in every case to be determined by an inductive investigation
of facts, and not by a priori speculation.  Such an inquiry will
soon convince us that causation in the acts of God is not of the
same kind as causation in the operations of created objects. In
particular there is no need, as in physical nature, of any co-operation in order to the Divine workmanship.  "Hle spake, and it was
done: he commanded, and it stood fast."  "Hle said, Let there be
light: and there was light." Not only so, but in the original operation of God in the universe, there must have been the exercise of a
power, to which we see nothing similar in the actions of any created
object. Man cannot create anything absolutely new; he cannot
create a new power or property: he can merely modify the old
powers; and even this, so far as the external world is concerned,
he can do simply by using the power laid up for him in the
brain; and all the changes which take place, fall out according to
the agencies of Nature. But it is different with God, who must at
first have created all things out of nothing; that is, there was a
power to create in him, and this power he chose in his infinite
wisdom and goodness to exert.
Metaphysicians have often used very absurd language about
man's incapacity so much as to conceive of creation.  It is quite
true that imaii himself can perform nothing similar to creation, but
still he can conceive of it.  lie cau suppose that there was a time
when there was no created object, and he can then conceive a
world springing into being. He cannot indeed believe that this
194 
ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS.
world started into being without a producing cause, but he is not
compelled to believe that it was effected in the same manner as we
form a new object, that is, out of pre-existing matter. When I am
led, as I am led on good evidence, to look on this world as being
produced by God, I can conceive it caused by an immediate exercise of his power. I am not necessarily led to believe that it must
have been formed out of Himself or out of any pre-existing substance; it may have been made not out of Himself, but by Himself, by the power that is in Him. Nor am I led to look upon the
forces now in the world as existing in some other form in God: to
suppose this is to forget that the mode of the operation of causation varies in the case of every order of beings, and to insist that
the power exercised by God must be exerted in the same way as
creature potency. The mode of the operation of causation when
God creates, is quite as accordant with our intuitive belief as the
manner in which the forces operate in the mental or material
world.
And here I take occasion to remark that the pantheistic doctrine which maintains that the world must have been drawn out
of the Divine Substance, of which therefore it participates, receives no sanction whatever from the primary beliefs of the mind.
It is simply a rash and unfounded inference from certain experiential facts which are true of the creature, but may have no
application to the Creator. Whatever evidence it may profess to
advance, it cannot plead intuition; and I may have occasion to show
elsewhere that there are intuitions directly opposed to it, especially that intuition which I have of self as a separate intelligence.
There is another and a kindred topic which here opens to the
view, but from the minute discussion of which I draw back. I
am led to believe that God is a substance, and an unchanging substance, unchanging in the character of His voluntary acts. We
have proot that He is a Being of essential holiness, benevolence,
and truth, and we further believe that He never will or can do
an unrighteous act. On what ground do we cling to this belief?
It seems to be founded on the conviction that there may be, that
there is, an unchanging substance possessed of moral excellence
which never can and never will be defiled by sin, and are we
not thus, and this lawfully and properly, carrying up the law of
substance and cause to the Divine Being, and making it guarantee
for us the eternal ri(ghteousness of God?
195
o.2 
196
BOOK II.
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
CHAPTER I.
THEIR GENERAL NATURE.
OUR primary cognitions and beliefs are very intimately
connected, and they run almost insensibly into each
other. Yet they may be distinguished. The word'cognition,' when we find it needful to separate it from faith,
might be confined in strictness to those mental energies
in which the mind looks on an object now present,-say
on a body perceived by the senses, or on self in a particular state, or on a representation in the mind; and
then'faith' would be applied to all those exercises in
which we believe-we can only use a synonymous word
when we describe a simple mode of mind-in the existence of an object not now before us, and under immediate inspection.
Philosophers have drawn the distinction between Presentative and Representative Knowledge.  In the former
the object is present at the time,-we perceive it, we
feel it, we are conscious of it as now and here and
under  our inspection.  In Representative Knowledge
there is an object now present, representing an absent
object.   Thus I may have an image or conception of
Venice, with its decaying beauty, and this is now pre 
GENERAL NATURE OF PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 197
sent, and under the eye of consciousness; but it represents something absent and distant, of the existence of
which I am at the same time convinced. When I was actually in Venice, and gazed on its churches and palaces
rising out of the waters, there would be no propriety in
saying that I believed in the existence of the city,- the
correct phrase is that I knew it to exist. I know, too,
that I have at this moment an idea of Venice; but as
Venice itself is not before me, the proper expression
of my conviction is that I believe in its existence.   I
maintain that whenever we have passed beyond  Presentative Knowledge, and are assured of the reality of
an absent object, there faith-it may be in a very simple
form, but still real faith-has entered as an element.
So far as I amn conscious of an imaging of the past, or
a judging of it, or a reasoning about it, my mental state
is cognition; but so far as I am convinced of the existence of the absent object, my state of mind is belief.*
* The distinction between Presentative and Representative Knowledge is drawn by Hamilton in his edition of Reid, Note B. The view
given by me in the text seems to be in accordance with such language
as the following, used by him in Metaph. Lect. 12: "Properly speaking, we know only the actual and the present, and all real knowledge
is an immediate knowledge. What is said to be mediately known is in
truth not known to be, but only believed to be." Speaking of memory,
he says: "It is not a knowledge of the past at all, but a knowledge of
the present and a belief of the past." Consistently or inconsistently, he
says that "belief always precedes knowledge" (Lect. 3). Speaking of
the external world, he says: "We believe it to exist, only because we
are immediately cognizant of it as existing" (Reid, p. 750). With this I
concur.  But I cannot agree with what follows, where he seems to
found our knowledge on a belief, and represents our knowing that we
know as founded on a belief prior to or deeper than, knowledge.  "If
asked indeed, Hlow do we know that we know it?... how do we
know that this object is not a mere mode of mind illusively presented
to us as a mode of matter? then indeed we must reply that we do not (P)
in propriety know that what we are compelled to perceive as not-self is
not a perception of self, and that we can only on reflection believe such
to be the case, in reliance on the original necessity of so believing imposed on us by our nature." 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS:
In such examples the faith is of a low order, and need
not be distinguished from knowledge, except for the
purposes of rigid science; but still faith is there, and
there ill its essential character; and he who would know
what faith is, must view it in these lower formis, " which
exist more simple in their elements," as well as in the
highler, just as he who would know the nature of the
plant or animal must study it in the lichen or zoophyte.
These are the incipient movements of a mental power
which is capable of rising to the greatest  heights of
earth, and looking up to the heaven above, which can
call before it all time, and go forth even into the eternity beyond. Already do we see how it joins on to
cognition, and mingles with it.  Faith, as the telescope,
shows objects which unaided sense cannot discern, but
still there is personal knowledge, an eye to guarantee
the accuracy of the vision.  We  have immediate knowledge always with us, we have self in a particular state
or exercise; but rising from this, we believe in ain object
which is absent,-in the loftier energies of faith we believe in objects which we have never seen, and which we
never can see in this world.
According to this account we are said to know ourselves, and the objects presented to the senses and the
representations (always however as presentations) in the
[nind, but to believe in objects which we have seen in
time past, but which are not now present, and in objects
which we have never seen, and very specially in objects
which we can never fully know, such as an Infinite God.
The mind seems to begin not with faith, but with cognition. It sets out with the knowledge of an external
object presented to it, and with a knowledge of self
contemplating that object.  I cannot, then, agree with
those who maintain that faith-I mean natural faithmust precede knowledge.   I hold that knowledge, psy
19S 
THEIR GENERAL NATURE.
chologically colIsidered, appears first, and then faith. But
around our original cognition there grows and clusters
a body of primitive beliefs whichl go out far beyond our
personal knowledge.   Knowledge is, after all, the root;
but from this stable and more earthly ground there
spring beliefs which mount in living power and in lovely
form and colour toward the sky.
The two differ psychlologically, and there are important philosophic ends to be served by distinguishlling between them;  but after all it is more important to fix our
attention on their points of agreement and coincidence.
'The belief has a basis of cognition, the cognition has a
superstructure of beliefs.   In a sense we know space,
for it is present to us; certainly body occupying space
is ever before the senses, but when we look on space as
having no bounds, we are beyond  the territory of cognition, we are in the region of faith.  The one conviction, equally with the other, carries within itself its authority and validity.   No  man is entitled to restrict himself to cognitions, and refuse to attend or to yield to
the beliefs which he is also led to entertain by the very
constitution of his mind.   No  man can do so, in fact.
Every man must act upon his native beliefs as well as
upon his cognitions.   He requires no external consideration to lead him to trust in the one any more than
in the other, for each has its sufficiency in itself. He
* There were profound discussions in the scholastic ages as to the
separate provinces of faith and knowledge or reason, but it was in
regard to matters of religion, and specially of revelation, including
Church authority. Anselm gave the first, or deeper place, to faith, and
Abelard to knowledge.  But there was confusion in the controversy,
owing to its not being determined psychologically what is the precise
difference of knowledge and faith, and of reason and faith.  In every
exercise of mind about the great objects and truths of'religion, there
must be both cognitive and faith (psychological) elements embraced,
and reason always comprises faith when it refers to the existence of
objects. The relation of faith and reason will fall to be discussed in the
last Chapter of this Volume.
199 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS:
who would weakly give up his native faiths because assaults are made on them, and doggedly resolve to yield
to nothing but immediate cognitions, will find that the
sceptic who has driven him from the beliefs will go on
to attack the cognitions likewise, and that he can defend the cognitions only on grounds which might have
enabled him to stand by his credences likewise. On the
other hand, I grieve over the attempts, for the last age
or two, of a school of thinkers who labour to prove that
the understanding or the speculative reason leads to scepticism and nihilism, and then appeal to faith to save us
from the abyss before us. I have no toleration for those
who tell us with a sigh, too often of affectation, that they
are very sorry that knowledge or reason leads to contradictions and insoluble doubts, from which they are longings to be delivered by some mysterious faith. It is time
to put an end to this worse than civil strife, to this setting of one part of the soul against another. I do not believe that the understanding, or the reason, or any other
power of the mind, lands us in scepticism.  Each cognitive faculty conducts in its own way to its own truths.
The intelligence and the faith are not conflicting, but
conspiring elements. I am sure that the criticism which
has attacked the knowledge, would, if followed out, be no
less formidable in its assaults on the belief.   In these
pages I am endeavouring to show how they concur and
co-operate, being almost always associated in one concrete act, which we analyze merely for scientific ends.*
* Kant laboured to demonstrate that the Speculative Reason lands
us in contradictions, and was not given us in order to reach objective
truth; but then he called in a Practical Reason, which guaranteed a
moral law, a God, and immortality. See the'Methodenlehre' in the
' Kritik.' Jacobi admitted, far too readily, to Kant and Fichte, that
speculation and philosophy led to scepticism, but he fell back on Faith
(Glaube) or Sentiment (Gefiihl), which he represented as a Revelation
(Offenbarung).  See his'David Hiume: Ueber den Glauben,' and'Jacobi an Fichlte.' He has given views of intuition and of faith as true
200 
T'HEIR GENEItAIl, NATURE.
But while we must yield to our intuitive beliefs as
well as perceptions, we are not therefore to suppose that
our faiths are beyond inspection and above examination.
They are liable to be tried, and should at times be tried,
by the very same tests as our cognitions.   We  are not
to allow ourselves, without examination and without review, to yield to whatever may suggest itself to our own
minds, or be recommended to us by others, as a primitive belief. We must try the spirits, whether they are
of God. In nothing is man so apt to run into excess and
extravagance, into folly and error, as yielding to plausible
beliefs. The tendency of faith is upwards, but it needs
weights and plummets to hold it down, lest it mount
into a region of thin air, and there burst and dissolve.
Fortunately we have a ready means at hand of trying
our constitutional beliefs, and determining for us when
as they are beautiful; but he has not unfolded the precise nature of
faith, nor seen its relation to the understanding. Even Fichte, after
trying to show that knowledge (WMssen) leads to an absolute idealism,
in which we know not whether our very thought may not be a dream,
resorts to Faith (Glaube), and allows an appeal to the Heart (Herz)
(Bestimmung des Menschen, Buch iii. Glaube). Sir W. Hamilton maintains that " all that we know is phenomenal of the unknown" (Discuss.
p. 644, 2nd ed.), and that "the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or
result of all true philosophy" (p. 609), but delights to recognize a faith
which looks beyond; of which faith, however, he gives no account.
"We are warned," he says, "from recognizing the domain of our
knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith."
And he adds, "And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very
consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and
finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned, beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality" (p. 15). Ever
since the days of Schleiermnacher, there has been a body of theologians
who in the very same spirit admit that the existence of God cannot be
established by human intelligence, and who call in a God-consciousness,
or a faith, to reveal God to us. I admit that intuition and faith have
their part to act, but so also has the understanding. (See infra,
Part III. Book II. Chap. V.) For an account of the German systems,
see Michelet,'Entwickelungsgeschichte;' Chalybaius, Hist. Entwick.
d. Specul. Philos. von Kant bis Hegel; Willm, Hist. Phil. Allemande,
and Morell's limpidly clear'History of Speculative Philosophy.'
201 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
they should be disallowed, and when they should be allowed to flow out freely.  Are they self-evident?  Are
they necessary, so necessary that we cannot believe the
opposite?  Are they universal?  These three questions,
searchingly asked and honestly answered, will settle for
us whether we ought or whether we ought not to follow
a belief proffered to our acceptance.   We are at liberty
to employ a belief in argument, appeal, and speculation,
only under the same conditions as a cognition; that is,
having shown that it is a constitutional one, we must
further determine more accurately its nature and law,
its extent and limits.  Thus, and thus only, can we hope
on the one hand to be kept from  mistaking our own
fancies, misapprehensions, wishes, or prejudices, for primitive and heaven-born beliefs, and on the other hand
be justified in appealing to- the faiths which have the
sanction of our constitution, and the God who gave us
our constitution, and in using them as a basis on which
to rear a fabric of philosophical, or ethical, or theological
truths.
CHAPTER II.
TIME AND SPACE.
OF space in the concrete we have an immediate knowledge; that is, by the senses, certainly by some of them,
such as the touch and the sight, most probably by all
of them, we know bodies, say our own bodily organism
as extended, that is, as occupying space. By abstraction
we can fix our attention on the space as distinct from
associated qualities, and by inward reflection we can
gather what are the convictions attached.   These con
202 
TIMIE AND SPACE.
victions pass beyond knowledge proper, and become beliefs, that is, convictions in regard to something which
we do not immediately know, nay, which we may never
be able to know.
With time, also, we have an immediate acquaintance.
In sense-perception and self-consciousness we know a
particular object or mental state as now present.   Our
consciousness is continuous; speedily does immediate
consciousness slide into memory; the present becomes
past, and is remembered as past. The child's organism
is now in a state of pain; immediately after the pain is
gone, but the pain of the past is remembered, and rei-lembered as being past.  Already, then, there is the
idea of time always in the concrete. We remember something as having been under our consciousness in the past.
By abstraction we can then think of the time as different
from the event remembered in time; and by introspection we can ascertain the nature of the attached convictions. Many of these are of the nature of faiths going
far beyond what is, or ever can be, immediately known.
Space and time mingle with all our perceptions. Yet
after all we can say little about them; all that we can
do as metaphysicians is to analyze and express our original convictions. It belongs to the mathematician to
evolve deductively what is involved in certain of them.
In unfolding the necessary convictions we may make the
following affirmations.
I. Time and space have a reality independent of the
percipient mind, and out of the percipient mind. The
intelligence does not create them, it discovers them, and
it discovers them as having an existence independent of
the mind contemplating them, as having this existence
whether the mind contemplates them or no, and an existence out of and beyond the mind as it thinks of them.
He who denies this is in the very act setting aside one
203 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
of the clearest of native principles, and has left himself
no stand-point from which he can repel any proposal
suggested to himself or offered by another, to set aside
any other conviction, or all other convictions.  If some one
affirm that space has no objective existence, he leaves it
competent for any other coming after him, to maintain
that the objects perceived in space have no reality.  He
who allows that time may have no reality except in the
contemplative mind, will find himself greatly troubled to
answer the sceptic, when he insists that the events in time
are quite as unreal as the time is in which they are per ceived as having occurred. There is only one sure and
consistent mode of avoiding these troublesome and dan gerous consequences, and that is by standing up for the
veracity of all our fundamental perceptions, and, among
others, of our convictions regarding the reality of space
and time.
According to Kant, space and time are the forms given
by the mind to the phenomena which are presented
through the senses, and are not to be considered as
having anything more than a subjective existence.  It is
one of the most fatal heresies-that is, dogmas opposed
to the revelations of consciousness-ever introduced into
philosophy, and it lies at the basis of all the aberrations
in the school of speculation which followed. For those
who were taught that the mind could create the space
and time, soon learned to suppose that the mind could
also create the objects and events cognized as in space
and time, till the whole external universe became ideal,
and all reality was supposed to lie in a series of connected mental forms. He who would arrest the stream,
must seek to stop it at the place whence it flowed out;
otherwise all his efforts will be ineffectual.*
* Dr. Thomas Brown, in an article on Villers,':Philosophie de
Kant,' in No. 2 (1803) of the'Edinburgh Review,' dwells on this.
204 
TIME AND SPACE.
II. Space and time are continuous, that is, they extend out, flow on, without break, separation, or interruption. In this respect they are different from matter or
body, which may be broken into parts, and the parts
separated from each other. But there can be no gaps
in space, no cessation in time.
This is one of several circumstances which has made
space and time to be classed together. Yet while they
may be grouped under one head, they are not identical,
and they have their points of difference.  In particular,
space has three dimensions,-length, breadth, and depth;
"The truth of space and of the world being to our reasoning scepticism the same, we cannot deny space and admit the reality of sensible
objects." D. Stewart, after affirming that the idea of space "is manifestly accompanied with an irresistible conviction that space is necessarily existent, and that its annihilation is impossible," adds, "to call
this proposition in question, is to open a door to universal scepticism" (Disser. p. 597). In our day we find the greatest opponent of
the Dialectic of Hegelwho has appeared, taking the same view. " Hiernach sind Raum und Zeit etwas Subjectives und zwar naeh Kant
etwas nur Subjectives. Wenn dies folgt, so verfliichtet sich damit die
ganze Weltanlsicht in Erscheinung, und Erschcinung ist vom Scheine
nicht weit entfernt. Wenn Raum und Zeit nur und ausschliessend
Subjectives sind, so draingt sich allenthalben diese Zuthat ein. Wie
die Luftschicht zwischen dem Auge und dem Gegenstande, wirft sie
auf alles eine fremde Triibung; denn alles erscheint in Raum und
Zeit, die nur aus uns geboren sind. Wir erkennen nun nichts an sich;
denn die Verstandesbegriffe haben (nach Kant) nur Anwendung durch
diese Formen der Anschauung und die Vernunftbegriffe suehen wieder
nur eine Einheit fuir die Verstandeserkenntniss. Wie wollen wir uns von
dem Zauberkreise 15sen, da er vielmehr unser eigenstes Wesen est?"
(Trendelenburg,' Logische Untersuchungen,' b. i. v.). Sir W. Hamilton
agrees with Kant as to the a priori idea of space, and to avoid the
difficulties calls in an a posteriori notion:-" We have a twofold cognition of space; (a) an a priori or native imagination of it in general, as
a necessary condition of the possibility of thought; and (b) under that
an a posteriori or adventitious percept of it, in particular as contingently
apprehended in this or that complexus of sensations" (Reid's Works,
p. 882). "In this I venture a step beyond Reid and Stewart, no less
than beyond Kant" (p. 126). A simpler and a more natural account of
the relations between a priori and a posteriori would bring these two
notions to a unity.
205 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
that is, we may contemplate it as extending along any
given line, as spreading out in a surface, or as going out
in all directions. Time again has only succession, or
priority and posteriority.   We often apply to time  language derived from space, and we represent time as a
line, and speak of it as being only in one direction. But
it is to be remembered that such language is used metaphorically, and has no literal meaning as applied to
time.  Still it points to a truth, and specifies a difference
between space and time.* But in regard to their extension or flow, both are continuous, and spread out or
run on without a possible division.
But it will be urged, that the question is often discussed
as to whether space and time are infinitely divisible,
and that certain mathematicians maintain that they have
demonstrated the infinite divisibility of space. In looking at this question, it is desirable first of all to have it
settled in what sense extension is capable of division.
We cannot divide space in the sense in which we divide
matter. In dividing body we separate one part of it
from another, so as to leave a space between. We can
thus divide an apple, and keep one part of it in our
hand, and put the other in our mouth. But we cannot
thus separate or isolate space apart from space.   In the
sense of separation, we cannot with propriety speak of the
infinite divisibility of space, for it is not divisible at all,
* It has been asked why the mind gives three dimensions to space
and only one to time. Those who regard space and time as the creation of the mind, may amuse themselves with answering this question.
There is profound sense in the following remarks of Sir J. Herschel,
in his'Review of Whewell' (Essays, p. 2()2):-" The reason, we conceive, why we apprehend things without us, is that they are without
us. We take it for granted that they exist in space, because they do
so exist, and because such their existence is a matter of direct perception, which can neither be explained in words nor contravened in
imagination; because, in short, space is a reality." "That which has
parts, proportions, and susceptibilities of exact measurement. must be
a'thing."'
206 
TIME AND SPACE.
either finitely or infinitely.   The same remark  holds
good of time. The mind declares that the separation of
space from space, or of time from time, is impossible in
the nature of things.*
There may however be relations discovered both in
space and time. We can conceive of less or more of extension, and of proportions between the less and the more;
the one may be twice or ten times as much as the other.
All this we are allowed, nay necessitated, to think. The
science which treats of quantity, that is, mathematics, has
specially to do with their relations. There may be little or
no impropriety in calling these proportions parts, provided
we do not misunderstand the language we employ, or
understand it as implying that between two spaces there
can be an interval in which there is no space. What is
meant by the infinite division of space seems to be, that
fixing our thoughts on any given section or proportion of
space, say the thousandth part of an inch, we are at liberty
to conceive of the half of it, and again of the half of the
quotient, and so on indefinitely as far as may serve our
purpose or we may choose. Some of these subjects will
be resumed when we come to consider those primitive
judgments which relate to quantity.
But before leaving the subject immediately before us,
it is of importance to have it noticed that our convictions
say nothing whatever on (what is a very different matter
from the divisibility of space, though the two have often
been confounded) the infinite divisibility of matter. This
latter is a question which can be settled by nothing but
experience; experience at this present stage of science
says nothing whatever on the subject, and I suspect will
never be able to settle it on one side or other.  There
might be limits to man's capacity of dividing body which
* This view is developed with great acuteness in Gillespie's' Necessa.rv Existence of Deity' (Exam. Antith. Refut. p. iii.).
207 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
would not be limits to other beings, and whether there
could be any limits to a Being of Infinite Power is a
question which it transcends our faculties to answer, and
which therefore we should not attempt to answer.
But the difficulty has been started, are space and time
made up of parts? and if so, are infinite time and space
made up of parts? To this I reply, first and decisively,
that we cannot conceive them as made up of partitions, or
separable parts, as an apple or an orange is, or as the earth
is, or the sun is. But then, secondly, we can conceive
proportion in space and time, and if we take any of these
proportional sections, and divide it into two, thought will
compel us to say that the two must make up the whole.
In this sense the parts make up the whole, that is, the
subsections make up the section. If the question be extended beyond this, and it be asked, Is infinite space
made up of parts? I answer, that as we can have no adequate notion of infinite space, so we cannot be expected
to answer all the questions which may be put regarding
it. It is certain that neither infinite space nor finite
space is made up of separable parts. We can speak intelligibly of proportions in finite space, and determine
their relations to each other and the whole.   I tremble
to speak of the proportions of infinite space, lest I be
using language which has or can have no proper meaning, and the signification attached to which by me or
others might be altogether inapplicable to such a subject.
Still there are propositions which we might intelligibly
use.  It is self-evident that any proportion of space must
be less than infinite space.   Anid if infinite space can be
conceived as having proportions, and we could conceive
all these proportions, then these proportions would be
equal to the whole. But as we cannot adequately conceive the whole, so neither can we conceive of the proportions of the whole. We are in a region dark and path
208 
TIME AND SPACE.
less and directionless, and we may as well draw back at
once, for nothing is to be gained by advancing.* We
are onl the verge of another subject, to which we must
turn.
III. Space and time have and can have no limits. Nor
is this a mere negative proposition, as some have declared
it to be; it is a positive affirmation that to whatever point
we go, in reality or in imagination, there must be a space
and time beyond. Nor is it, as it has been represented,
an impotency of mind. It is not a mere incapacity to
conceive that when we go a certain length back or forward ill time, or out into space, there time and space
should cease.  It is a conviction of a positive kind, that
beyond these points, or beyond any other space conceivable, there must still be time and space. This, as will be
shown more fully forthwith, is a truth self-evident, necessary, universal.  If we were carried out to the utmost
point to which the furthest-seeing telescope can reach, or
beyond this as far as imagination can range, we should
confidently stretch forth our hand into an outer region,
believing that there must be space into which it might
enter, and that if it were hindered, it must be by body
occupying space.
There is more than this embraced in our native conviction. We are constrained to believe, as to the space
and time which we know in part, and which we are constrained to regard as beyond our power of imagination,
that they are such that no addition could be made to them.
This is a further and a most important element in our
conviction. We intuitively know space and time: with
this we start.   Looking to the space and time which we
* "'Non igitur respondere curabimus iis, qui quserunt an si daretur
linea infinita, ejus media pars esset etiam infinita; vel an numerus infinitus sit par anve impar; et talia; quia de iis nulli videntur debere
cogitare nisi qui mentem suam infinitam esse arbitrantur " (Descartes,
Prin. p. i. 26).
P
209 
'PRINMITIVE BEIEFS.
thus know, we are constrained to regard them as ever going beyond our image of them. But we do more, we are
convinced that they are such in their very nature, that
no further space and time could be added to them. Join
these elements together, and so far as I can discover by
reflection on the operations of my own mind, we have
the conception and belief which the mind of man is able
to attain as to the infinity of space and time.
But we are already in the heart of the subject of the infinite, to which a separate Section must be allotted. In
this  Section we have yet to take up certain difficulties
which press on us when we contemplate space and time.
We may have occasion to show, at a later part of this work,
that our very cognitions often land us in mysteries, that
is, in propositions to which we must assent, but which
have bearings which we cannot comprehend. To a still
greater extent is it of the nature of faith ever to be going
out into darkness. For the truths believed in may not
be fully comprehended in themselves, and their relations
may be altogether beyond our ken. It should be'frankly
acknowledged that we are landed in mysteries which the
human intellect cannot explicate, whenever we inquire
beyond the narrow limits within which our convictions
restrain us. But it is of all courses the most foolish and
suicidal to urge the difficulties connected with space and
time as a reason for setting aside our intuitive convictions respecting them, say in regard to their reality.
Doubtless we are landed in some perplexities by allowing that they are real, but we are landed in more hopeless difficulties and in far more serious consequences, when
we deny their reality; and there is this important difference between the cases, that in the one the difficulties
arise from the nature of the subject, whereas in the other
they are created by our own unwarranted affirmations
and speculations.
12 10 
TIME AND SPACE.
But what are space and time? is the question that will
be pressed on us. To this I reply, that it is true of them,
as of the objects of every other intuitive conviction, that
we cannot explain them except by referring to our original perception.   All that has been attempted in this
Section is to bring out clearly what is involved in the
perception.
But it will be asked, Are they substances, are they
modes, or are they relations? To this I reply, that these
questions relate not so much to the nature of space or
time as the classification of them, and that they are
not to be classified with substances, modes, or relations.* We cannot call them substances, for we do not
know that they have power or action. Nor can we call
them modes, for we have no intuitive knowledge of any
substance in which they inhere. And they are certainly
more than relations of one thing to another, for we know
no two or more things which by their relation could yield
space and time. They are not then to be arranged with
such cognitions as these. They seem indeed to be entitled to be put in a class by themselves, and resemble
substances, modes, relations, only in that they are existences, entities, realities.
Certain mystical divines and philosophers are accustomed to speak of space and time as having no reality to
* Leibnitz held space and time to be relations given to objects by the
mind. "Je tenois l'Espace pour quelque de PUREMENT RELATIr, comme
le Temps; pour un ORDRE DE COEXISTENCES, comme le Temps est un
ORDRE DE SUccEssiONs" (Op. p. 752. See also pp. 756, 769, 461). He
speaks of space and time as being "rapports," and as "ideal."  Leibnitz thus prepared the way for the more systematic doctrine of Kant.
Samuel Clarke argues powerfully that space and time are realities, but
makes them attributes, properties, or modes, of an eternal substance
(see his Letters to Leibnitz). D. Stewart, with his usual wisdom, says
that "space is neither a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation;" adding, "But it does not follow from this that it is nothing objective"
(Dissert. p. 596).
211
P 2 
PRI'1.MIT'IVE  BELIEFS.
the Divine mind.  It follows, I think, that if they have
no reality to the God who knows all truth, they can, properly speaking, have no reality at all.  If our convictions
testify (as I have endeavoured to show) that they have
a reality, it follows, I think, that they have a reality to
the Divine mind. Again, there are some who talk of anl
Eternal Now:
" Nothing is there to come, and nothing past,
But an Eternal Now does ever last."
These verses of Cowley embody, as definitely as can be
clone, a view which has often been floating in the stateinents of divines in speaking of God and Eternity and
rTime.  But the language has either no meaning, or if it
has, it lands us in hopeless contradictions.
It would have been very different if divines had contented themselves with stating that they do not know
how space and time stand related to the Divine mind.
We are here in the midst of a mystery, which we have
no faculties to clear up. We know that space and time
exist; we know on sufficient evidence that God exists:
but we have no means of knowing how space and time
stand related to God. The view taken by Sir Isaac
Newton,-" Deus durat semper et'adest ubique, et, existendo semiper et ubique, durationem et spatiurn ccnstituit,"*-is certainly a grand one, but  I doubt  much
whether human intelligence can dictatorially affirm that
it is as true as it is sublime.
It is by placing the subject beyond the human faculties that we are able to meet an objection urged with
great logical power by Kant, and usually thought to be
insuperable.t   If space and time be real and infinite,
then we have two infinites; and if God be also infinite,
ouir difficulties are increased.  For it is absurd, if not
* Scholium at close of Phil. Nat. Prin. Math.
t Kr. d. r. Vern., Die transcen. Aesthet.
12 
TIME AND SPACF.
contradictory, to suppose that there call be two infinite
things-that God can be infinite while space and time
are also infinites.  Now to this I might without the possibility of a positive refutation, urge that there may, for
auight we know, be nothing inconsistent in supposing
that there are two things, as space and time, the one
unbounded and the other without beginning or end, and
that there can even be nothing contradictory in supposing that space and time on the one hand, and God
on the other, may have infinite attributes. They could be
held as contradictory only in the supposition that the existence of unbounded space and unending time were, in
the nature of things, inconsistent with the existence of
an infinite God;  which it may safely be said can never
be proven. As to how they could subsist together, is a
question we are not obliged to answer, for we must believe many separate truths, each on its evidence, without
being able to trace a connection, or being able so much
as to say that there is a how between them.   But I plant
myself on far firmier ground, when I maintain, secondly,
that while I believe that space and time are infinite, and
that God is infinite, I am not necessarily obliged to hold
that the infinity of space and time is independent of the
infinity of God.  Who will venture to affirm that the
statement we have quoted from the great Newton may
not be true?  Who will venture to affirm that space and
time, being dependent on God, may not stand in a relation to God, which is altogether indefinable and utterly
inconceivable by us? True we are constrained to believe
that space and time have an existence independent of us,
but we are not compelled to believe that they have an
existence independent of everything else, and least of all
independent of God. In such a subject, where we have
no light from intulition or from experience to guide us,
true wisdom shows itself in refusing to assert or dclogma
213 
THE INFINITE.
tize, or even to speculate; and when it has observed this
rule for itself, it is the better able to rebuke doubt and
scepticism, when they would bring forth their difficulties
from regions which are beyond the reach of human
knowledge.
CHAPTER III.
THE INFINITE.
THEF subject now opening before us is a profound one
in itself, and has exercised the profoundest minds ever
since thought began the attempt to solve the problems
of the universe. All that I profess to do is to endeavour
to discover by induction what is the mind's conviction in
regard to infinity.   4 priori cogitation is not to be tolerated in its proffered determinations of what our idea of
Infinity should be or must be. Logical dissection and
division, instead of aiding, may only lead us into hopeless
difficulties. Lofty generalizations embracing all other objects, may have no application to an object which from
its very nature must be sUi generis.
This belief, like every other, will be found to grow out
of a cognition, and to have an apprehension or conception as a body round which it gathers. Yet it should be
admitted as
PRELIMINARY, that we cannot form an adefuate idea
or conception of an infnite object.* It is a favourite position of certain British philosophers, that the mind of
man can form no conception of the infinite, or that the
* I regard this truth as established by Locke (Essay ii. xvii). Sir W.
Hamilton has overthrown those gigantic systems which proceed on an
opposite view (see his'Philosophy of the Unconditioned').  At the
214 
THE INFINITE.
conception is at best negative. There is a great truth,
but we shall show that there is also a fatal oversight, in
this statement.
First, it may be admitted that the mind can form no
apprehension of the infinite, in the sense of image or
phantasm. In saying so, I do not mean merely that we
cannot construct a mental picture of the infinite as an attribute. Of no quality can the mind fashion a picture;
it cannot have a mental representation of transparency,
apart from a transparent substance, and just as little can
it picture to itself infinity apart from an infinite duration,
or infinite extension, or an infinite God. But it is not
ill this sense simply that the mind cannot apprehend the
infinite, it cannot have before it an apprehension of an
infinite object, say of an infinite space, or all infinite
God. For to image a thing in our mind is to give it an
extent and a boundary. When we would image unlimited space, we swell out an immense volume, but it has
after all a boundary, commonly a spherical one. When
we would picture unlimited time, we let out an immense
line behind and before, but the rope is after all cut at
both ends. When we would represent to ourselves almighty power, we call up some given act of God, say
creating or annihilating the universe; but after all, the
work has a measure, and may be finished. In the sense
of image, then, the mind cannot have any proper apprehension of infinity as an attribute, or of an infinite object.
But apprehension may be considered as an act of the
understanding as well as a mere act of the phantasy.
We can conceive, we can think about much, which we
cannot image.   We can meditate and reason about such
same time I do not think that either Locke or Hamilton has given a
full exposition of the mind's intuitive conviction respecting infinity.
Mr. Calderwood opposes the views of Hamilton, but is obliged to admit
that we have not an adequate conception of the infinite (see' Philosophy of the Infinite').
215 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
things as law, government, duty, religion, while yet we
can form no mental picture of them.  The grand question in this discussion is, Can we form an intellectual
notion of an infinite object, say of an infinite God? And
I feel constrained to admnit and maintain that human intelligence can form no proper or adequate conception of
an infinite existence. By what process can it be supposed to construct such a conception? Certainly not by
abstraction, for abstraction separates, takes away, diminishes.  It is just as certain that it cannot compass this
end by generalization, for generalization merely groups
objects by attributes known, and unless we have infinity first in the individual, we cannot have it in the general. Nor can we reach it by addition, multiplication,
composition; these will give the enlarged, but not the
unlimited: a distance of a quintillion of quintillions of
years, or ages, has as distinct a boundary as an ell or an
inch.   Nor can the understanding attain it by a process of ratiocination, for unless the infinite were in the
premiss, no canon of reasoning would justify its having a
place in the conclusion. If the intelligence does not find
the infinite in the perception with which it sets out, it
never could fashion it by cutting or carving, by construc
tion or supraposition.
But it may be said that we have an apprehension, or
conception, or perception of the infinite by intuition.   I
am about to show that we have a conviction in regard to
infinity of a very deep and positive character.   But I
am at present arguing that this does not take the shape
of an adequate mental representation or logical notion.
What is its nature is to be determined solely by a process of inward observation, and this I am now endeavouring to conduct.
I. We have an intuitive belief in regard to the infinity
of certain objects.   Let me endeavour to unfold it.  I
216 
THE INFINITE.
have allowed that we cannot have an idea of infinite
space or time, in the sense of imaging, picturing, or representing them.   Stretch itself as it may, the imaging
power of the mind can never go beyond an expansion,
with a boundary, commonly a globe or sphere of which
self is the centre, and duration stretching along like a
line, but with a beginning and an end.   In respect then
of the mental picture or representation, the apprehension
is merely of the very large or the very long, but still of
the finite, of what might be called the indefinite, but not
the infinite. But any account of our conviction as to infinity which goes no further, leaves out the main, the
peculiar element. The sailor is not led by any native
instinct to believe that the ocean has no bottom, simply
because in letting down the soundinlg-line he has not
reached the ground. When the astronomer has gauged
space as far as his telescope can penetrate, he finds that
there are still stars and clusters of stars, but lie is not
necessitated to believe that there must be star after star
on and for ever. The geologist in going down from
layer to layer still finds signs of the existence of a previous earth, but he is not obliged to conclude that there
must have been stratum before stratum from all eternity.
But man is constrained to believe that whatever be the
point of space or time to which his eye or his thoughts
may reach, there must be a space and time beyond.
Whence this belief of the mind on space and time being
presented to it? Whence this necessity of thought or
belief? This is the very phenomenon to be accounted
for; and yet the British school of mnetaphysicians can
scarcely be said to have contemplated it seriously or
steadfastly with the view of unfolding the depth of meaning embraced in it.*  It implies that to whatever point
* Locke was prevented by the defects of his theory and his antipathy
to innate ideas from developing all that is in our conviction of infi
217 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
of space or time we might go in our persons or in our
fancy, there would still be a space and a time beyond.
I can easily, in imagination, go out as far as the rim of
the earth, or as the moon, or as the sun, or as the nearest star, or as the furthest star seen by the eye, or as the
remotest star discovered as a speck in a nebulous cloud
of light by the telescope, but when there, I must believe that space still goes on, and that if I were carried
ten thousand million times further there would still be
space.   I can represent to myself the instant of time
when man was created, and beyond this the time when
the lion or the worm, or the palm or the lichen, were
created, or when the earth or the angels were created;
but though this period were multiplied by itself millions
nity. Yet, while he maintains that our idea of the infinite is negative, he
admits "that it has something of positive in all those things we apply
to it, inasmuch as the mind comprehends so much of the object"
(Essay ii. xvii. 15). He even admits, though rather incidentally, that
the mind has a necessary conviction as to the existence of an infinite.
Thus, speaking of space, he says the mind "must necessarily conclude
it, by the very Nature and Idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite" (4). Again, "I think it unavoidable for every considering rational creature that will but examine his own, or any other existence,
to have the notion of an eternal wise Being who had no beginning; and
such an Idea of infinite duration I am sure I have" (17). It is to be
regretted that Locke never unfolded all that is contained in these "necessary" and "unavoidable" mental processes.  Hamilton represents
the notion of infinity as an "impotency" of the mind, an impotency to
conceive that space and time should have bounds. I am endeavouring
to show in these paragraphs that there is more than this. Hamilton
admits that we have a belief in the infinite. "The sphere of our belief
is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge; and therefore when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from
denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. This I have
indeed anxiously evinced both by reason and authority" (Metaph.
vol. ii. App. p. 530). Handing us over in this way to belief, he has nowhere explained the psychological nature of this belief, or of belief in
general. Must not a belief in a thing of which we have no conception
be a belief in zero? He maintains that our conceptions as to the infinite land us in contradictions. "We are altogether unable to conceive
space as bounded, as finite; that is, as a whole beyond which there
218 
THE INFINITE.
of billions of trillions of times, I not only cannot believe that duration did then begin, I am constrained to
believe that it did not and could not then commence.
This intuitive belief, accompanied as it is with a stringent necessity of feeling, is the very peculiarity of the
mind's conviction in regard to infinity, as it is one of the
grandest characteristics of human intelligence. It should
be added that it is a power which ever impresses man with
his powerlessness.
This conviction has the characters and can bear the
tests of intuition.  It is self-evident.  Indeed, if it did
not shine in its own light, it could never be seen in any
other which we might hold up to it. It can stand the
test of necessity.  It is necessary, we must believe it
is no further space." "On the other hand, we are equally powerless
to realize in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory. We
cannot conceive space infinite, or without bound" (Metaph. Lect. 38).
I may be permitted to quote the criticism I have offered on this seeming contradiction in a review of Hamilton in Dub. Univ. Mag., Aug.
1859. "The seeming contradiction here arises from the double sense
in which the word'conceive' is used. In the second of these counterpropositions the word is used in the sense of imaging, or representing
in consciousness, as when the mind's eye pictures a fish or a mermaid.
In this signification we cannot have an idea or notion of the infinite.
But the thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as
the imaging power. The mind can think of the class fish, or even of
the imaginary class mermaid, while it cannot picture the class. Now,
in the first of the opposed propositions, the word'conceive' is taken in
the sense of thinking, deciding, being convinced. We picture space
as bounded, but we cannot think, judge, or believe it to be bounded.
When thus explained, all appearance of contradiction disappears; indeed, all the contradictions which the Kantians, Hegelians, and Iamiltonians are so fond of discovering between our intuitive convictions
will vanish, if we but carefully inquire into the nature of the convictions. Both propositions, when rightly understood, are true, and there
is no contradiction.  They stand thus:-' We cannot image space as
without bounds;''we cannot think that it has bounds, or believe that
it has no bounds.' The former may well be represented as a creature
impotency; the latter is most assuredly a creature potency, is one of
the most elevated and elevating convictions of which the mind is possessed, and is a conviction of which it can never be shorn."
219 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
when our intelligence is directed towards it. We cannot be made to believe otherwise, or that there is a limit
to immensity and duration. It is, when properly understood, universal. The image, it is true, of space or time,
formed by the boy or savage, may be very contracted.
The widest space of which he has had any experience
may be the glorious dome spread over his head in the
sky, and his imagination may be able to go very little
beyond the visible heavens or the distant hills which
bound his view, still he is sure that beyond there must
be something, an "outer infinite," and perhaps he will
be eager to know what is beyond his horizon. His idea
of time, as a positive picture, may extend no further than
the date of the oldest story which his grandfather has
told him; but he is sure that at that point duration did
not begin, and he may be interested to know what happened before.
" Heaven lies about us in our infancy.
~..    *. o  
Hence in a season of calm weather,
Though inland far we be,
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
Which brought us hither,
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore."
But this is not all that is contained in our conviction.
We are constrained to believe, in regard to the objects
which we look upon as infinite, that they are incapable
of augmentation. Here, as in every apprehension which
wve have of infinity, the imaging power of the mind fails
and must fail; still we have an image and an intellectual
conception —say, an image with a notion of extension, or
duration, or Deity. Or we represent to ourselves the
Divine Being, with certain attributes,-say, as wise or as
good,-and our belief as to Him and these attributes
220 
THE  INFINITE.
is, that he cannot be wiser or better.  This aspect may
be appropriately designated as the Perfect. This is the
conviction of the Perfect, of which many profound philosophers make so much, but not more, as I think, than
they are entitled to do; though they have not, as it appears to me, always given the correct account of the nature and of the genesis of the notion.* We think of
God as having all his attributes such that no addition
could be made to them: and we call such attributes His
perfections. In regard, indeed, to the moral perfections
of Deity, it is this expressive word Perfect, rather than
infinite, which expresses the conviction which we are led
to entertain in regard, for example, to the wisdom, or
benevolence, or righteousness of God.
This, too, seems a native conviction of the mind.    It
needs, indeed, a certain matter provided for it, and to
which it may adhere.   In a positive shape it springs up
late, and grows slowly in all minds to which it is not externally given by education, out of the Bible or otherwise. Still it is there in the mind as a tendency, placing
* In musing on divine things, the thought occurred to Anselm that
it might be possible to find a single argument which would of itself
prove that there is a God, and that he is the Supreme Good. Man,
he says, is able to form a conception of something than which nothing
greater can be conceived; and this conception, he argues, implies the
existence of a corresponding being (Proslogion). A similar argument
occurred to Descartes. He found in himself the idea of a Perfect being;
and he argues that in this idea the existence of the Being is comprised,
as the equality of the three angles to two right-angles is comprised in
the idea of a triangle (Meth. p. 4, etc.). Leibnitz acknowledges that the
argument is valid, provided he is allowed to supply a missing link, and
to show that it is possible that God should exist (Op. p. 273). It may
be doubted whether these arguments for the Divine existence, derived
from the mere idea of the Perfect, are valid, independent of external
facts. But these eminent men are right in saying that the mind has
some conception and conviction as to the perfect; and these combine,
with the observation of traces of design, to enable us to construct an
argument for the Divine existence. In our day, M. Cousin maintains
that the mind has the idea of the perfect, which he employs in his
theistic argument, Ser. ii. t. ii.
221 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
before every man some sort of "Idea" in the Platonic
sense; a model, or beau ideal, which he is ever prompted
to strive after, while he is made to feel that he has not
reached it. It is this impulse, I apprehend, which makes
even the heathens speak of their gods, or at least their
supreme God, as ineffably good and immortal;-their
actual conceptions of his excellence and duration may be
extremely inadequate, still they will not allow that there
could be any increase made to his attributes; and, under
fostering circumstances, the conviction will come out in
a more decided form. When the object is brought under
our notice we see that it is perfect, that it must be perfect, and that it cannot be otherwise. The faith is universal, but the conception takes the form which may be.
given it by the education or the intellectual strength and
growth of the individual.
But it will be urged that these two views or sides of
infinity are inconsistent. According to the one, infinity
is something to which something can be ever added;
whereas, according to the other, it is something to which
nothing can be added. But in this, as in every other
case of apparent or alleged contradiction among our original perceptions, the inconsistency vanishes on a careful
inspection of the precise nature of the convictions. The
infinite is something beyond oar image or notion; but it
is not something beyond the infinite itself. It is some.
thing which admits of no increase, but that something is
not the imperfect notion we form, and which we know
to be imperfect. The two are not contradictory, but the
one is supplementary to the other. They cannot however be represented as the complement the one of the
other; for while they make up such an apprehension as
the finite mind of man can form, they do not make up
the infinite itself, which is confessedly far beyond. The
first of these views tends to humble us, as showing how
222 
THE  INFINITE.
far our creature impotency is below Creator Power. The
other has rather a tendency to elevate us, by showing a
perfect exemplar, which is indeed far above us, but to
which we may ever look up. The Perfect shines above
us like the sunl in the heavens, distant and unapproachable, dazzling and blinding as we would gaze on it, but
still our eye is ever turned up towards it, and we feel that
it is a blessed thing that there is such a light, and that
we are permitted to walk in it and rejoice in it.
II. We believe in infinite space and time, and in the
possibility of infinite substance or being. After what
has been already said of space and time we need not
dwell on the first of these positions. But in believing in
the infinity of extension and duration, we believe that
there may possibly be infinite substance dwelling in
them. I am not satisfied that our intuitive convictions
go beyond this, or that they of themselves, apart from
auxiliary considerations, guarantee the existence of infinite substance. I am sure they do not give any authority to the doctrine held by so many of the ancient
Greek philosophers, that material substance is eternal:
we can easily believe matter to have been brought into
existence at some point in time by a power adequate
to produce it. It does not appear to me that we are
constrained by our convictions on this special subject,
taken apart from all other evidence, to believe in the
existence of an eternal or omnipresent  God.   Herein
I have always thought that the argument a priori, or
intuitive, in behalf of the Divine existence fails. There
is a link wanting which shows that the proof is not
apodictic or demonstrative, that it is not founded on
truths which are self-evident throughout, as is, for example, the proposition that the opposite angles made by
the intersection of two straight lines are equal. We
have, and can have, no demonstrative evidence of other
223 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
truths to which the mind cleaves most resolutely,-as,
for example, that we ever had a sister, or brother, or
friend, or that we were ever favoured to sit under the
shelter of a father's wisdom, or the dews of a mother's
tenderness. There is need of other considerations, and
particularly of an experiential element, in the form of
certain obvious facts, to prove the existence of a Being
dwelling in infinite time and space, and possessed of
infinite power and goodness. I may have occasion to
show that when the patent facts and the native convictions are brought together, the certainty is of the very
highest order short of demonstration, which it falls beneath only so far as not absolutely to preclude the possibility of doubt when the fool is determined to say in
his heart, "There is no God." It would be premature
and out of place to bring forward in array these combiniied considerations at this stage of our inquiries, and
to show how the order and adaptation in nature are
evidence of a designing and planning mind,-how these
effects in nature evoke the intuition which demands that
there be a cause,-'how our convictions of moral obligation imply a law, the embodiment of the nature of
a lawgiver,-and how  all these unite to establish the
existence of a living Being intelligent and holy. But it
is to our present purpose to show how these individually,
and in their union and co-operation, fall in with, and
exactly suit, our intuition regarding time and space.
For I think it may be admitted that there is all
emptiness, if I may so speak, about pure space and
time. We know not, in fact, of a space or time without
a substantial existence iu them.  I do indeed maintain,
on the ground of irradicable conviction, that we must
believe them to be independent of ourselves contemplating them, or of material objects placed in them.
But the mind has a difficulty in conceiving of them as
224 
THE INFINITE.
altogether separate and independent entities.  It is from
this cause, I am convinced, that so many philosophers
represent them as mere relations of things rather than
things, or as forms given to objects by the mind, or as
mere conditions of existence.  These are very incorrect
representations; still the very fact that they have been
advanced is an evidence of the difficulty which the nmind
experiences in grasping the realities of empty space and
time, which do look as if they were voids to be filled up.
Independent of us, they scarcely look as if they were
independent of a substantial existence.   I am not pre.
pared to affirm with S. Clarke, that they are modes of
substance, but I have little to say against another statement of the same author, that "they are immediate and
necessary consequences of the existence of God, and that
without them his Eternity and Ubiquity would be taken
away;" or the statement of Newton, that "God constitutes time and space." The mind feels as if there were
something a-wanting, till it learns of ONE to occupy the
vacuum; but it is met and gratified in every one of its
intellectual and moral intuitions when it is brought to
know Him who inhabiteth eternity and immensity, and
filleth them with living and life-giving fulness.
III. We look on infinity as an attribute of some object supposed to exist.  Infinity is not to be regarded
as a substance, or a distinct entity; we do not reckon it
as an independent something, but we attribute it to
something which has existence.  It is the more necessary to make this remark fronm the circumstance that
metaphysicians are very much tempted to give an independent being to abstractions, and often write about the
infinite in such a way as to make their readers look
upon them as separate entities.  I stand up for the reality of infinity, but I claim for it a reality simply as an
attribute.  It is regarded intuitively as an attribute of
q4
225 
PRIMITIVE BELIIEFS.
expansion and duration. But the mind is not satisfied
that it has got the whole truth till it looks on it as an
attribute of God, and of his glorious perfections.
IV. We have a conception of the objects which we
believe to be infinite. I have admitted that this notion
is not adequate; in short, it is not a notion of infinity.
Still the mind has a notion in regard to the infinite.
On this, as a basis, the belief stands; round this, as a
body, the belief gathers, as the atmosphere does round
the earth. First, there must always be a notion of an
existing thing, say space or time; or, as far more conceivable, a living and an intelligent God. The mind
labours to heighten, deepen, widen, this notion on every
side. Still it is within limits: but it can inquire what
is beyond. It can do more: it can look out on what is
beyond. It can do yet more: it knows that there is
something beyond, and perceives somewhat of it. It
perceives, for example, that far as it has gone in space,
there is a space beyond; far as it has gone in time, there
is a time beyond; much as it has conceived of God,
there is, after all, more of the Divine perfections. There
is thus a clear conception of an object; there is thus,
too, a conception of this same object being beyond, and
still further. The belief attaches to this conception, and
declares that this thing conceived, this thing conceived as
still beyond, is a reality, and that it is such that it cannot be increased. My readers must consult their own
consciousness as to whether the account now given of
the nature and genesis of our conviction is the correct one.
This notion, with its adhering belief, is a mental phe nomenon which we have a word to express.  We  can
subject it to logical processes; it comes in, like all our
perceptions, in the concrete,-it is something, say space,
time, or Deity, we apprehend as infinite; but we can ab stract the infinite from the object regarded as infinite,
226 
THE  INFINITE.
and form the abstract idea of infinity. We can generalize it, and use it as a predicate; thus we can talk of
space and time and God as being infinite.  We can utter judgments regarding it, as that the infinite God is in
every given place; there is no place of which we may
not say, "Surely the Lord is in this place." We can even
reason about it; thus we can infer that this puny effort
of man, set against the recorded will of God, shall most
certainly be frustrated by His infinite power. Keeping
within the limits prescribed by the nature of the convictions, man can speak about the infinite and be intelligible, he call legitimately employ it in argument, and lihe
can muse upon it and find it to be among the most ennobling and precious of themes.*
* It should be carefully observed that according to this account, infinite is not a separate or an independently existing thing, but the attribute of a thing,-very possibly an attribute of an attribute of an
existing thing. It is of something, say of space, or of the attribute of
something, say of the power of God, that we predicate that they are infinite. This certainly implies that no space can be added to infinite
space, but does not imply that space, because it is infinite, must contain
all existence, must comprise, say wisdom and goodness. It implies that
God cannot be more righteous than he is, but does not involve that his
righteousness or even that his being must embrace all being. Mr.
Mansel, in the'Limits of Religious Thought Examined,' 3rd ed. p. 46,
q    u     o    t     e     s the language of Hegel: "What k ind of an Absolute Being is
that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included? " and refers to Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Parker, as holding similar views. I am sure that the mind is not shut up into any
such doctrine by its native convictions. Against such a view the artillery of Hamilton and Mansel tells with irresistible power. They have
shown most conclusively that such a notion involves inextricable confus       i       o       n        and hopeless contradictions.  I  freely abandon such a conception
to them, to tear it to pieces with their remorseless logic. But I decidedly
d     e      m      u      r to the statement of Mr. Mansel,  "that which is conceived as
absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the
sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being." I have
n o t h i n g                      here to say as to the absolute, but I  do affirm that we have a
conception as to the infinite, the perfect-I do not say of the infinite, the
perfect-which does not imply this consequence, and that we can both
think and speak of infinity without falling into contradictions. But
M         r. Mansel says (p. 335) that my view (a    s        partially expounded in Ap
Q 
227 
PRIMITIVE BELI,IEFS.
And yet it is true all the while that the notion is
engulfed in mystery; it is but a small lamp of light
hanging in (to us) circumambient darkness.  It is of all
things the most preposterous in certain speculators to
set out with the idea of the infinite without a previous
induction of its nature, and thence proceed, consecutively
or deductively, to draw out a body of philosophy or theology. Such men have lost themselves in attempting to
voyage an "unreal, vast, unbounded deep of horrible confusion;" and yet they would seek to pilot others, only to
conduct them into darker gloom and nmore inextricable
straits, and, in the end, bottomless abysses. The account
we have given of the conception and belief, shows how
narrow the limits within which man can make intelligible
assertions; how strait the road in which he must walk, if
he would not lose himself in wilderness and bog. He
who passes these bounds is talking without a meaning;
he who would start with the notion of the absolute, and
thence construct a system embracing God, the world, and
man, will without fail land himself in helpless and hope
pendix to' Method of Divine Government,' and in an Article on "Intuitionalism and the Limits to Religious Thought" in the' North British
Review' for February, 1859), differs from that of Sir W. Hamilton rather in language than in substance, and that it is not opposed to any
principle of the'Philosophy of the Conditioned.' I rejoice to believe
this, as I would rather agree with Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel
than with any metaphysicians of the past or present age. But whether
I agree with them or not, I must hold it to be quite possible to muse
and reason about the attribute'infinite,' as it is in fact conceived and believed in by the mind, without falling into the difficulties in which the
German supporters of the absolute have involved themselves, and that
we can think of God and write about God as infinite, without being
compelled by any logical necessity to look upon Him as embracing all
existence, or to reckon it impossible or inconceivable that He should
create a world and living agents different from Himself. We cannot
conceive that God's power should be increased, but we can conceive it
exercised in creating beings possessed of power. We cannot conceive
His goodness to be enlarged, but we can, without a contradiction, conceive Him creating other beings also good.  Nor are we by this con
228 
THE  INF1INITE.
less contradictions-the necessary consequent, and the
appropriate punishment, of his folly and presumption.*
The nature of man's conviction in regard to infinity, is
fitted to impress us, at one and the same time, with the
strength and the weakness of human intelligence, which
is powerful in that it can apprehend so much, but feeble in that it can apprehend no more. The idea entertained is felt to be inadequate, but this is one of its excellencies, that it is felt to be inadequate; for it would
indeed be lamentably deficient if it did not acknowledge
of itself that it falls infinitely beneath the magnitude of
the object. The mind is led by an inward tendency to
stretch its ideas wider and wider, but is made to know
at the most extreme point which it has reached that there
is something further on.  It is thus impelled to be ever
striving after something which it has not yet reached,
and to look beyond the limits of time into eternity beyond, in which there is the prospect of a noble occupation in beholding, through ages which can come to no
end, and a space which has no bounds, the manifestations of a might and an excellence of which we can never
know all, but of which we may ever know more.  It is
an idea which would ever allure us up towards a God of
ception shut up to the conclusion that the creature-power or creatureexcellence might be added to the Divine power and goodness, and thus
make it greater. To all quibbles proceeding in this line, I say that for
aught I know it may not be possible they should be added, or that
if added they should increase the Divine perfections; and no reply
could be given, drawn either from intuition or experience, the only
lights to which I can allow an appeal.
* It is at this point that Sir W. Hamilton has done such unspeakable
service to Philosophy in his'Philosophy of the Unconditioned,' and
Mr. Mansel to Theology, in his'Limits of Religious Thought,' by dispeling and scattering for ever the Philosophy of the Absolute, and the
Theology which issued from that dark thunder-cloud, bulking so large
to the eye, and sending forth terrific lightnings. with bellowing sounds
and dreadful tempests, which brooded so long over Germany, and has
been hovering on our shores and those of the United States of America.
229 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
infinite perfection, and yet make us feel more and more
impressively the higher we ascend, that we are, after all,
infinitely beneath Him. Man's capacity to form such an
idea is a proof that he was formed by an infinite God,
and in the image of an infinite God; his incapacity in
spite of all his efforts to form a higher idea, is fitted to
show us how wide the space and how impassable the
gulf which separates man as finite from God the infinite.
They are in error who conclude that they cannot know
an Infinite God, but they are equally in error who suppose that they can reach a perfect knowledge of Him.
There is a sense in which he may be described as the
unknown God, for no human intellect can come to know
all the attributes of God, or even know all about any one
of his perfections; but there is a sense in which he is
emphatically the known God, inasmuch as he has been
pleased to manifest and reveal himself, and every human
being is required to attain a clear and positive, though at
the same time a necessarily inadequate knowledge of him.
It is true, on the one hand, that the invisible things of
God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being
understood from the things which are made, even his
eternal power and Godhead; but it is equally true, on
the other, that we cannot by searching find out God, that
we cannot find out the Almighty unto perfection. The
wide finite, with its horizon ever widening as we ascend,
should call forth our admiration, our adoration, and our
love; the wider infinite, which is round about, and into
which we can only gaze as we often gaze into the deep
sky, should impress us with a feeling of awe in reference
to Himn who fills it all, and a feeling of humility in reference to ourselves who can know so little.
He who dwells in infinity is at once a God who reveals and a God who conceals himself. We can know,
but we can know only in part. The knowledge which
230 
THE INFINITE.
we can attain is the clearest, and yet the obscurest of all
our knowledge. A child, a savage, can acquire a certain
acquaintance with Him, while neither sage nor angel can
rise to a full comprehension of Him. God may be truly
described as the Being of whom we know the most, inasmuch as His works are ever pressing themselves upon
our attention, and we behold more of His ways than of
the ways of any other; and yet He is the Being of whom
we know the least, inasmuch as we know comparatively
less of His whole nature than we do of ourselves, or of
our fellow-men, or of any object falling under our senses.
They who know the least of Him have in this the most
valuable of all knowledge; they who know the most, know
but little after all of His glorious perfections. Let us prize
what knowledge we have, but feel meanwhile that our
knowledge is comparative ignorance. They who know
little of Him may feel as if they knew much; they who
know much will always feel that they know little. The
most limited knowledge of Him should be felt to be precious, but this mainly as an encouragement to seek knowledge higher and yet higher, without limit and without
end. They who in earth or heaven know the most, know
that they know little after all; but they know that they
may know more and more of Him throughout eternal ages.
CHAPTER IV.
TiE EXTENT, TESTS, AND POWER OF OUR NATIVE
BELIEFS.
THE, above are some of the principal-I will not venture to say that they are the whole-of our native beliefs. As they grow upon our native convictions, so they
11
231 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.
attach themselves to our primitive judgments, in mnost of
which there is more or less of the faith-element, that is,
belief in the existence of an object not directly known.
There is belief, for instance, involved in the judgment
that this effect has a cause, which cause may be unknown. There is belief, too, exercised in certain of our
moral judgments, as when we believe in the integrity of
a good man, or trust in the Word of God, even when
His Providence seems in opposition. But these are
topics which will fall to be discussed specially in subsequent Books.
It is scarcely necessary to remark that faith is an affection of mind, not limited to our primary convictions.
Faith collects round our observational knowledge and
even around the conclusions reached by inference.   We
believe-the course of Nature being unchanged by its
Author-that the seed cast into the ground in spring
will yield a return in autumn, that the sun will rise tomorrow as lie has done to-day, and that the planet Saturn
a year hence will be found in the very place calculated for
us by the astronomer. We exercise faith, every one of us,
in listening to the testimony of credible witnesses, and
faith is in one of its liveliest forms when it becomes trust
in the ability, the excellence, and the love of a fellow-creature. Our highest faiths are those in which there is a mixture of the observational and intuitional elements, the
observational supplying the object, and the intuitional
imparting to them a profundity and a power as resting on
an immovable foundation and going out into the vast
and unbounded.   In particular, when God has been revealed, faith ever clusters round Him as its appropriate
object.,
There are canons whereby to try the trustworthiness of
our belief. First, so far as our intuitive beliefs are concerned, these are the general tests of intuition. Take our
232 
THEIR EXTENT AND TESTS.
belief in the infinite.  We  have to ask, Is the truth believed in self-evident, or does it lean on something else?
Is it necessary? Can we believe that space and time and
the Being dwelling in them have limits? Is it universal,
that is, do men ever practically believe that they can come
to the verge of time and space? Such queries as these
wvill settle for us at once what beliefs are original and
fundamental. We should put these questions to every
belief that may suggest itself to our own minds.   We
are entitled to put them to every belief which may be
pressed on us by others. Then, secondly, as to our derivative or observational beliefs, there are the ordinary rules
of evidence as enunciated in works of special or applied
logic, or as stated in books on the particular departments
of knowledge, or, more frequently, as caught up by common experience, and incorporated into the good sense of
mankind. In no such case are we to believe without
proof being supplied, and we are entitled and required
to examine the evidence. Thirdly, as to mixed cases in
which our faith proceeds partly on intuition, and partly
on observation; our business is carefully to separate the
two, and to judge each by its appropriate tests.  In the
use of such rules as these, while led to yield to the faith
sanctioned by our rational nature, we shall at the same
time be saved from those extravagant credences which
are recommended to us by unauthorized authority, by
mysticism which has confused itself, by superstition, by
bigotry, by fanaticism, by pride, or by passion.
Looked at under one aspect, faith might be considered
as so far a weakness cleaving to man, for where he has
faith, other and higher beings may have immediate knowledge. But when contemplated under other aspects, it
is an element of vast strength. In heaven, much of what
is faith here, will be brightened into sight, but even in
heaven faith abideth. Our faiths widen indefinitely the
233 
PRIMITIVE BEIIEFS,.
sphere of our convictions, they surround our solid cognitions with an atmosphere in which it is bracing and exhilarating to walk, which no doubt has its mists and clouds,
but has also a kindling and irradiating capacity, and may
be warmed into the fervour, and reflect the very light
of heaven in a thousand varied colours. He who would
tear off from the mind its proper beliefs, would in the very
act be shearing it of one of its principal glories.
What a power even in our earthly faiths, as when men
sow in the assurance that they will reap after a long season, and labour in the confidence of a reward at a far
distance! What an efficacy in the trust which the child
reposes in the parent, which the scholar puts in his master, which the soldier places in his General, and which
the lover commits to the person beloved!  These  are
among the chief potencies which have been moving mankind to good, or, alas! to evil. By the sharpness of its
vision it discovers an outlet where sense thought that the
way was shut in and closed. Difficulties give way as it advances, and impossibilities to prudence speedily become
accomplishments before the might and energy of faith.
To it we owe the greatest achievements which mankind
have effected in art, in travel, in conquest; setting out in
search of the unseen, they have made it seen and palpable. It was thus that Columbus persevered till the
long hoped-for country burst on his view; it is always
thus that men discover new lands and new worlds outside
those previously known.
But faith has ever a tendency to go out with strong
pinions into infinity,which it feels to be its proper element.
It has a telescopic power, whereby it looks on vast and
remote objects, and beholds them as near and at hand.
There is a constancy in its course and a steadiness in its
progress, because its eye is fixed on a pole-star far above
our earth. How lofty its mien as it moves on, looking
234 
THEIR POWER.
upward and onward, and not downward and backward,
with an eye kindled by the brilliancy of the object at
which it looks! Henc~ its power, a power drawn from
the attraction of the world above. No element in all
nature so potent. The lightning cannot move with the
same velocity; light does not travel so quick from the
sun to the earth, as faith does from earth to heaven.   It
heaves up, as by an irresistible hydrostatic pressure, the
load which would press on the bosom. It glows like the
heat, it burns like the fire, and obstacles are consumed
before its devouring progress. Persecution coming like
the wind to extinguish it, only fans it into a brighter
flame.
The proper object of faith is, after all, the Divine Being.
Time and space and infinity seem empty and dead and
cold, till faith fills them with the Divine presence, quickens them with the Divine life, and warms them with the
Divine love. When thus grounded, how stable! firmer
than sense can ever be, for the objects at which it looks
are more abiding.  "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are unseen are eternal."
When thus fixed, the soul is at rest, as secure in Him
to whom it adheres. When thus directed, all its acts,
even the meanest, become noble, being sanctified by the
Divine end which they contemplate. All doubts are now
decided on the right side by eternity being cast into the
scale. When thus associated, its might is irresistible. It
carries with it, and this according to the measure of it,
the power of God. It is, no doubt, weak in that it leans,
but it is strong in that it leans on the arm of the Omnipotent. It is a creature impotency which makes us lay
hold of the Creator's power.
235 
236
BOOK III.
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
CHAPTER I.
THEIR GENERAL NATURE, AND A CLASSIFICATION
OF THEM.
THE mind of man has a set of Simple Cognitive-called
by Sir William Hamilton Presentative-Powers, such as
Sense-Perception and Self-Consciousness, by which it
knows objects before it. From these we obtain our Primitive Cognitions. It has also a set of Reproductive
Powers, such as the Memory and the Imagination, by
which it recalls the past in old forms or in new dispositions. Out of them arise many of our Faiths, as in the
existence of objects which fell under our notice in time
past, and in an infinity surpassing our utmost powers
of imagination. But the mind has also a Power of Comparison, by which it perceives Relations and forms Judgments.
Our Primitive Judgments are formed from our Primitive Cognitions and Primitive Beliefs. On comparing
two or more objects known or believed in,* we discover
* A judgment is usually defined as a comparison of two notions.
Upon which Mr. J. S. Mill remarks, that "propositions (except where
the mind itself is the subject treated of) are not assertions respecting
our ideas of things, but assertions respecting things themselves," adding, "My belief has not reference to the ideas, it has reference to the 
GENERAL NATURE OF PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. 237
that they bear a necessary relation to each other. The
necessity of the relation arises from the nature of the
things. We discover that objects have a certain relation because of the nature of the objects, as these become known to us, or as we have been led to believe
them to be; and whenever we are led to discover a necessary relation, it is because we have such an acquaintance as to observe that there is a relation implied in
their very nature. It should be added, that because of
our limited and imperfect acquaintance with things, there
may be many necessary relations which are altogether
unknown to us, even among objects which are so far
known.
In accepting this account, we are saved from the extravagant positions taken up by many metaphysicians as
to the a priori judgments of the mind, which they represent as fashioned by a power of reason independent
of things, whereas they are formed on the contemplation
of things, and of the nature of things so far as apprehended. Such questions as the following are often put
by ingenious minds:-How is it that two straight lines
cannot enclose a space? How is it that time appears like a
line stretching behind and before, whereas the analogous
thing, space, extends in three dimensions? The proper
reply is, that all this follows from the very nature of
space and time. And if the question be put, How do we
know that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and
things" (Logic, i. v. 1). There is force in the criticism, yet it does not
give the exact truth. In propositions about extra-mental objects, we
are not comparing the two notions as states of mind; so far as logicians have proceeded on this view, they have fallen into confusion
and error. But still, while it is true that our predications are made,
not in regard to our notions, but of things, it is in regard to things
apprehended, or of which we have a notion, as Mr. Mill admits: "In
order to believe that gold is yellow, I must indeed have the idea of
gold and the idea of yellow, and something having reference to those
ideas must take place in my mind." 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMIENTS:
that time has length without breadth? the answer is, that
all this is involved in our primary knowledge of space and
time. No other answer can be given; no other answer
should be attempted.   Our primitive judgments proceed on our primitive cognitions and beliefs, which again
are founded on the nature of things, as we are constituted to discover it.
It will be necessary at this place to examine a very
common representation that the mind begins with judgments, rather than tile knowledge of individual tilings,
and that there is judgment or comparison in all knowledge. According to Locke, knowledge is nothing but
the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any two ideas. Sir W.
Hamilton and Mr. Mansel maintain that in every cognitive act there is judgment.   In opposition to Locke,
I hold that the mind does not commence with ideas
and the comparison of ideas, but with the knowledge of
things, of which it can ever after form ideas, and which
it is able to compare.  I reckon it impossible for the
mind, from mere ideas not comprising knowledge, or
from the comparison of such ideas, ever to rise to knowledge, to the knowledge of things. The system of Locke
is at this point involved in difficulties from which it cannot be delivered by those who hold, as he did, that man
can reach a knowledge of objects.  The only consistent
issue of such a doctrine is all idealism which maintains
that the mind can never get beyond its own circle or
globe, and is there engaged for ever in the contemplation
and comparison of its own ideas, in regard to which it
never can be certain whether they have any external reality corresponding to them. If the view of Hamilton
and Mansel were slightly modified, or were otherwise expressed, I am not sure that I should widely dissent from
it.  I acknowledge that every intuitive cognitioli may
238 
THEIR GENERAL NATURE.
furnish the matter and supply the ground for a judgment. Thus, out of the knowledge of a stone as before
me, I can form the judgment "This stone is now present," by an analysis of the concrete cognition. The
knowledge of self as thinking enables me, as I distinguish between the eyo and the particular thought, and
observe the relation of the two, to affirm, "I think."
Nay, I believe that every primary cognition may entitle
me, by an easy abstraction and comparison, to frame a
number of primary judgments. Thus, the cognition of
the stone enables me to say, "This stone exists;" "This
stone is here;" and if the perception be by the eye,
"This stone is extended;" and if it be by the muscular
sense, " This stone resists pressure;" while the cognition
of self as perceiving the stone, enables me to affirm, "I
perceive the stone;" "I exist;" " I perceive." The two,
indeed-our primary cognitions and beliefs on the one
hand, and our primary judgments on the other-are intimately connected. Every cognition furnishes the materials of a judgment; and a judgment possible, I do not
say actual, is involved in every cognition. As the relation is implied in the nature of the individual objects,
and the judgment proceeds on the knowledge of the nature of the objects, so the two, in fact, may be all but
simultaneous, and it may scarcely be necessary to distinguish them, except for rigidly exact philosophic purposes.* Still it is the cognition which comes first, and
* According to Locke, "Perception is the first operation of all our
intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds"
(Essay, ii. x. 15). According to the view I take, perception is knowledge. According to Locke, " Knowledge is nothing but the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our ideas" (iv. i. 1). Hamilton says,-" Consciousness
is primarily a judgment or affirmation of existence. Again, consciousness is not merely the affirmation of naked existence, but the affirmation of a certain qualified or determinate existence" (Metaph. Lect. 24.
See also Notes to Reid's Works, pp. 243, 275).  Mr. Mansel says,
239 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
forms the basis on which the judgments are founded; in
the case of the primitive judgments, directly founded. It
should be frankly admitted that what is given in primary
cognition, is in itself of the vaguest and most valueless
character till abstraction and comparison are brought to
bear upon it. Still our cognitions and beliefs furnish the
materials of all that the discursive understanding weaves
into such rich and often complicated forms.
It is to be carefully observed that our primitive cognitions and beliefs being of realities, all the intellectual processes properly founded onil them must relate to realities
also. If what we proceed on be unreal, that which we reach
by a logical process may also be unreal. If space and time,
for example, have, as somlne suppose, no reality independent
of the contemplative mind, then all the relations of space
and time as unfolded in mathematical demonstrations,
must also be regarded as unreal in the same sense. On
the other hand, if space and time have (as I maintain) an
existence irrespective of the mind thinking about them,
then all the necessary relations drawn from our knowledge
may also be regarded as having a reality independent of
the mind reflecting on them. Not that they are to be
supposed to have an existence as individuals, or independent of the things related: they have precisely such a reality as we are intuitively led to believe them to have; that
is, they exist as necessary relations of the separate things.
"It may be laid down as a general Canon of Psychology, that every act
of consciousness, intuitive or discursive, is comprised in a eonviction
of the presence of its object, either internally in the mind, or externally
in space. The result of every such act may thus be generally stated
in the proposition,'This is here."'  To this statement I have scarcely
any objection to take, the more especially as he goes on to distinguish
between such a psychological judgment and a logical one. "The former
is the judgment of a relation between the conscious subject and the immediate object of consciousness. The latter is the judgment of a relation which two objects of thought bear to each other" (Proleg. Logica, ch. ii.). I prefer saying that what he calls a psychological judgment is a cognition, which may be explicated into a judgment, which
judgment will be a logical one.
240 
THEIR GENERAL NATURE.
It may be as well to announce here generally, what
will be shown specially at every stage as we adyance, that
all the primitive judgments of the mind are individual.
The mind does not in its spontaneous operations declare
that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to
be, but upon being satisfied that a certain thing exists,
it at once sets aside the thought or assertion that it does
not exist. It does not affirm in a general proposition
that no two lines can enclose a space; but it says, these
two lines cannot enclose a space: and it would say the same
of every other two lines. It does not metaphysically announce that every quality implies a substance, that every
effect must have a cause, but it declares of this property
contemplated that it implies a substance, and of this
given effect that it must have had a cause. It is out of
these individual judgments that the general maxim is obtained by a process of generalization. But then it is to
be observed that it is not a generalization of an outward
experience,-which must always be limited, and never can
furnish ground for a necessary and universal proposition,
but of inward and immediate judgments of the mind,
which carry in them the conviction of necessity, which
necessity therefore will attach itself to the general maxim,
on the condition of our having properly performed the
process of generalization.
It is necessary for our purposes to classify the primary judgments pronounced by the mind; but this is by
no means an easy task.  An arrangement may however
serve very important ends, even though it be not
thoroughly exhaustive, and altogether unobjectionable.
The following is to be regarded simply as the best which
I have been able to draw out, and may be accepted as a
provisional one till a better be furnished.* The mind
* Locke speaks of relations as being infinite, and mentions only a few.
He specifies Cause and Effect, Time, Place, Identity and Diversity, Pro
R
241 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
seems capable of noticing intuitively at least the following
relations:
Those of (I.) Identity and Difference; (II.) Whole and
Parts; (III.) Space; (IV.) Time; (V.) Quantity; (VI.) Resemblance; (VII.) Active Property; (VIII.) Cause and
Effect.
CHAPTER II.
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED BY THE MIND.
SECT. I. RELATION OF IDENTITY.
WE have seen that every object known by us is known
as having being; I do not say an independent being, but
a separate and individual being. This being continuing
in the object constitutes its identity. This identity every
object has as long as it exists, and this whether the
identity does or does not become known to us or to any
other created being. An object has identity not because
the identity is known to us; but an object having continued being, and therefore identity, intelligent beings
may come to discover it. We are so constituted as to
be able to know being,-that is, that the object known to
us possesses being, —and we look on the object as retaining that being as long as it exists. We are prepared to
portion, and Moral Relations (Essay, ii. xxviii.).  Hume mentions Resemblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degree, Contrariety,
Cause and Effect. Kant's Categories are:-(I.) Quantity; containing
Unity, Plurality, Totality; (II.) Quality; containing Reality, Negation,
Limitation; (III.) Relation; comprising Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and Dependence, Community of Agent and Patient; (IV.) Modality; under which are Possibility and Impossibility, Existence and
Non-Existence, Necessity and Contingence. Dr. Brown arranges them
as those of-(I.) Co-existence; embracing Position, Resemblance or Difference, Proportion, Degree, Comprehension; (II.) Succession; containing Causal and Casual Priority.
242. 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
decide then that if we ever fall in with this object again,
it will have retained its identity. We may fall in with
the same object again without discovering it to be the
same, because of a defect of memory, or because the object was disguised in a crowd. But in regard to certain
objects, we cannot avoid observing the sameness, and
cannot be deceived in pronouncing them the same.
So far as self is concerned, we discover the identity
intuitively as we look on the objects presented in selfconsciousness and memory.   We  have an immediate
knowledge of self in every exercise of consciousness. We
have a recollection of self in some particular state in
every exercise of memory. The mind has thus before
it, at every waking moment, a knowledge of a present
self; and in every exercise of memory it has a past self;
and in looking at and comparing the two, it at once
proclaimsthe identity.  It will be observed that here,
as in every other case, the judgment throws us back on
cognition and belief; the necessary facts on which the
mind pronounces the necessary judgment, are furnished
in the exercise of consciousness and memory.
In regard to objects external to the mind we have no
such intuitive means of discovering an identity.  Our
original perceptions do not extend even to the identity
of our bodily frame. Every particle of matter in the
body may be changed in seven years, as physiologists
tell us, in perfect accordance with our intuitive perceptions.  We may be without a body in the state between
death and the resurrection, and may receive an entirely
new and spiritual body in heaven, and yet retain all the
while our identity and feeling of identity.. And in the
case of extra-organic objects there is always a possibility
of doubt as to whether what we perceive now is the
same object as fell under our notice at some previous
time.   The infant, prompted by his instinct as to the
R2
243 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
continuance of being, and making a wrong application
of it, will often be inclined to discover identity where
there is only resemblance, and will be apt, for example,
to look on every man he meets with as his father. As
he advances in life he will be led to pay more regard to
differences. As to when there is a sufficient amount of
resemblance to denote a sameness, this is to be determnined solely by the laws of experiential evidence. In
some cases, as when we recognize our friends and familiar objects, there is moral certainty; in other cases
there is probability, less or greater, according to the
proof which is perceived or can be adduced.*
The intuitive judgments are always individual, and
are pronounced on the objects being presented. When
generalized, they take the form of such metaphysical
maxims as these:-" It is impossible for the same thing
to be and not to be at the same time."  "Everything
preserves its identity as long as it exists."  "We  are
sure that we are the same beings as we were since consciousness began, and must continue the same as long
as consciousness exists."
The above are judgments pronounced on individual
* These views determine the light in which we should look on as
'pretty' a controversy as ever raged in metaphysics or out of it, as to
whether two things in every respect alike-say two drops of waterwould or would not be identical. Leibnitz held that each thing differed
from every other by an internal principle of distinction, and that no
individuals could be alike in every respect; and that if they were, they
could have no principle of individuation (Op. p. 277). Kant criticized
this view, and urged that even though they were in every respect alike,
they would differ as being in different parts of space (Werke, Bd. ii.
p. 217). The common representation was that they would differ numerically. I am not sure that any of these accounts is correct. It is
quite conceivable that there might be two things in every respect alike,
except in their individual being. It is not their existence in different
parts of space which constitutes their diffrence, but as different in
their being they exist in different parts of space. They have a distinct being, not because they are numerically different, but they are numerically distinct because they have a distinct being.
244 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
objects contemplated.  Under the same head there fall
to be placed predications which the mind makes at
once and intuitively in regard to relations which have
been previously perceived and sanctioned by the mind.
Suppose that, on the ground of experience, we become
convinced that no reptile is warm-blooded; the mind, on
the bare contemplation of the notions, will at once and
intuitively declare that no warm-blooded animal can be
a reptile. In all such cases it is presupposed that there
is a previously discovered relation.  It is possible that
the mind may have been deceived, and that the relation
does not exist in fact; and in this case the judgment
pronounced according to the law of identity would also
be wrong as a matter of fact.  Thus if a proposition
were given that'no mammal is warm-blooded,'  the
mind would pronounce that no'warm-blooded animal
can be a mammal.' The error, however, would lie not
in the law of thought, but in the original proposition
furnished.
This is the proper place to explain the famous distinction drawn by Kant between Analytic and Synthetic
Judgments.   Analytic Judgments are those in which
the predicate is involved in the very notion which constitutes the subject; as when we say that'an island is
surrounded with water,''a king has authority to rule,'
'the moral law should be obeyed.' All such judgments
are said, in the nomenclature of the Kantian school, to
be apriori. We have come to entertain certain apprehensions in regard to island, king, and moral law, and
now we pronounce a set of judgments on the bare contemplation of these, and involved in them by the law of
identity. The judgments involved in the general law
of identity, the analytic judgments of Kant, are represented by Sir W. Hamilton as capable of being resolved
into three specific laws. " 1. The Law, Principle, or Axiom
245 
PRIMITIVFE  JUDGMIENTS.
of Identity, which, in regard to the same thing, immediately or directly enjoins the affirmation of it with itself, and mediately or indirectly prohibits its negation:
(A is A).  2. The Law, etc., of Contradiction (properly
Non-Contradiction), which in regard to contradictories
explicitly enjoining their reciprocal negation, implicitly
prohibits their reciprocal affirmation: (A is not A). In
other words, contradictories are thought as existences
incompatible at the same time, as at once mutually
exclusive.  3. The Law, etc., of  xlcheded Middle or
Third, which declares that whilst contradictories are
only two, everything, if explicitly thought, must be
thought as of these, either the one or the other: (A is
either B or not B).  In different terms:-Affirmation
and Negation of the same thing, in the same respect,
have no conceivable medium; whilst anything actually
may, and virtually must, be either affirmed or denied
of anything. In other words:-Every predicate is true
or false of every subject; or contradictories are thought
as impossible, but at the same time one or other as
necessary."* These laws have a great importance in
Formrnal Logic. Being carried out and applied in special
forms, they show what may be drawn from any proposition or set of propositions given, and they keep thought
consistent with itself.
Synthetic (as distinguished from Analytic) Judgments
are those in which the predicate affirms or denies something more than is embraced in the subject: as when
we say'gold is yellow,''body gravitates,'' sin will be
punished.' Some of these judgments are a posteriori;
that is, we reach them by experience. Others of them
are said to be a priori; that is, the mind, on the bare
contemplation of the notions, at once pronounces the
agreement or disagreement. As examples, there are the
* Metaph. vol. ii. append. ii.
246 
RELATIONS INTfiTIVELY OBSERVED.
mathematical axioms, such as that two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and metaphysical principles, such
as that every effect must have a cause. In this Section,
I have given Sir W.  Hamilton's analysis of Identical
or Analytic Judgments. In the remaining Sections, I
am to endeavour to unfold the Synthetic Judgments
a priori.
SECT. II. RELATION OF WHOLE AND PARTS.
It is a fundamental principle of this treatise that the
mind begins with the concrete,- a truth which should
always go along with the other, which has, however,
been more frequently noticed, that it begins with the
individual. Being thus furnished with the concrete in
its primary knowledge and beliefs,-and we may add,
imaginations,-the mind can consider a part of the concrete whole separate from the other parts. In doing so,
it is much aided by the circumstance that the concrete
whole seldom comes round in all its entireness. The
child sees a man with a hat to-day and without his hat
to-morrow, and is thus the better enabled to form a notion of the hat apart from the man that wore it.
In all abstraction there is judgment or comparison;
that is, we discover a relation between two objects contemplated. We contemplate a concrete whole, and we
contemplate a part, and observe a relation of the part as
a part of the whole. It should be admitted that, without any exercise of comparison, we are capable of imaging
a part of a whole, in cases where the part can be separated; thus, having seen a man on horseback, I can
easily picture to myself the man separately or the horse
separately, without thinking of any relation between
them; but in such processes there is no exercise of abstraction.  Abstraction is eminently an intellectual operation. In it we contemplate a part as part of a whole,
247 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
say a quality as a quality of a substance; for example,
transparency as a quality of ice, or of some other sub stance.  In all such exercises there is involved a Cor relative Power.   This power may be called Compre hension, inasmuch as it contemplates the whole in its
relation to the parts; or Abstraction, inasmuch as it con templates the part as part of a whole; and the Faculty
of Analysis and Synthesis, inasmuch as it contemplates
the two in correlation,-the parts and the whole. There
is, if I do not mistake, intuition involved in every exer cise of this power. The operations of the intuition are
always singular, but they may be generalized, and being
so, they will give us the following as involved in Ab straction.
1. The Abstract implies the Concrete. This arises
from the very nature of abstraction. When an object
is before it in the concrete, the mind can separate a
quality from the object, and one quality from another.
It can distinguish, for example, between a man taken as
a whole, and any one quality of his, such as bodily
strength; and distinguish between any one quality and
another, as between his bodily strength and intellectual
power, between his intellectual faculties and his feelings,
and between any one feeling, such as joy, and any other
feeling, such as sorrow. But we are not to suppose
that, while we can thus distinguish between a whole and
its parts, between an object and its qualities, between
one quality and another, therefore the part can exist
independent of the whole, or the quality of its object.
'Every abstracted quality implies some concrete object
from which it has been separated in thought.
2. When the Concrete is Real, the Abstract is also
Real. In this respect there is a truth in the now exploded doctrine of realism. Abstraction, if it proceeds
on a reality and is properly conducted, ever conducts to
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RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
realities. It is thus a most important intellectual exercise for the discovery of truth, enabling us to discover
the permanent amidst the fleeting, the real amidst the
phenomenal. As I look on a piece of magnetized iron,
I know it to be a real existence, and I think of it as
having a certain form, and of its attracting certain objects, and I must believe that this figure is a reality quite
as much as the iron which has the form, and that the attractive power is not a mere fiction, any more than the
iron of which it is a property. But it is to be carefully
observed that this abstract thing, while it has an existence, has not necessarily an independent existence. We
have already seen that when it is a quality it must always
be the quality of a substance. Beauty is certainly reality, but it has no existence apart from a beautiful person
or scene, of whom or of which it is an attribute.
A philosopher, says Kant, was asked, What is the weight
of smoke? and he answered,-Substract the weight of
the ashes from the weight of the fuel burned, and we
have the weight of smoke. At the basis of this judgment is the intuitive maxim that the whole is equal to
the sum of its parts. The individual intuitive judgments
which the mind pronounces on looking at whole and
parts may perhaps be all generalized into two principles.
(1.) The parts make up the whole. (2.) The whole is
equal to the sum of its parts. From the first of these we
may derive the rules, that the abstract part is involved in
the concrete whole, and that the abstract, as part of a real
concrete thing, is also a real. From the first we have the
rule that the parts are less than the whole, and from the
second the maxim that the whole is greater than the
parts. It is of importance to have such maxims as these
accurately enunciated in mathematical demonstration and
logical and metaphysical science. Spontaneously, however, the mind does not form any such maxims, which are
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PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
merely the generalized expression of its individual judgments.
Still the maxim is underlying many of our thoughts
in all departments of investigation.   Thus, in Natural
History it urges us to seek for a classification in which
all the members of any subdivision will make up the
whole. It impels the chemist to look out for all the elements which go to constitute the compound substance.
In psychology and metaphysics it prompts us to analyze
a concrete mental state into parts, and insists that in the
synthesis the parts be equal to the whole. In logic it
demands, as a rule of division, that the members make up
the class, and is involved in all those processes in which
we infer (in subalternation) that what is true of all must
be true of some; or (in disjunctive division) that what is
true of one of two alternatives (A and B), and is not true
of one (A), must be true of the other (B). In most of
such cases the more prominent elements are got from experience; in some of them, other intuitions act the more
important part; but in all of them there are intuitions
of whole and parts underlying the mental processes,unconsciously and covertly, no doubt, but still capable of
being brought out to view for scientific purposes.
SECT. III. RELATIONS OF SPACE.
I have endeavoured to show that the mind in senseperception has a knowledge of objects as occupying space,
and that round these original cognitions there gather
certain native beliefs.  Upon the contemplation of the
objects thus apprehended, the mind is led at once and
necessarily to pronounce certain judgments. They may
be arranged as follows:
1. There are all the mathematical axioms which relate
to limited extension, such as, "The shortest distance between any two points is a straight line;" "Two straight
250 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
lines cannot enclose a space;"  "Two straight lines which
when produced the shortest possible distance are not
nearer each other, will not, if produced ever so far, approach nearer each other;" "All right-angles are equal
to one another." Under the same head are to be placed
the postulates involved ill the definitions and in the propositions founded on them, such as the following, put in
the form of maxims:-" A straight line may be drawn
from any one point to any other point;" "A straight line
may be produced to any length in a straight line;" "There
may be such a figure as a circle, that is, a plane figure
such that all straight lines drawn from a certain point
within the figure are equal to one another;" and that "A
circle may be described from any centre at any distance
fromn that centre." I shall have occasion, in speaking of
tile application of the principles laid down in this treatise
to mathemlatics, to return to axioms, and shall then show
that the intuitive judgments pronounced by the mind in
regard to the relations of space are all individual, and
that the form assumed by them in the axioms of geometry is the result of the generalization, not indeed of an
outward experience, but of the individual decisions of the
mind.
2. There are certain axioms in regard to motion, such
as that "All motion is in space;" "All motion is from
one part of space to another;" "All motion is by an object in space;" "A body in passing from one part of
space to another must pass through the whole intermediate space."
3. There are the primitive truths which arise from the
relation of objects to space, such as "That body occupies
space;" "That bodv is contained in space;" "That body
occupies a certain portion of space;" and thus "That
body has a defined figure." But what, it may be asked,
do our intuitive convictions say as to the relation of mind
251 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
and space? I am inclined to think that our intuition
declares of spirit, that it must be in space.  It is clear,
too, that so far as mind acts on body, it must act on body
as in space, say in making that body move in space. But
beyond this, I am persuaded that we have no means of
knowing the relations which mind and space bear to each
other. As to whether spirit does or does not occupy
space, this is a subject on which intuition seems to say
nothing, and I suspect that experience says as little.
4. There are certain metaphysical judgments as to
space, such as "Space is continuous;" "Space cannot
be divided in the sense of its parts being separated;" and
all those derived from the infinity of space, such as that
"Space has no limits;" "Any line may be infinitely pro
longed in space."
SECT. IV. THE RELATIONS OF TIME.
The apprehension of time is given in every exercise of
memory; we remember the event as having happened in
time past. Rounid this primary conviction there collect
a number of beliefs. When time thus apprehended is
contemplated by us, we are led, from the very nature of
the object, to make certain affirmations and denials. It
declares that "Time is continuous;" that "Time cannot
be divided into separable parts;" and that "Time  has
no limits." The mind also declares of every event that
it happens in time.
SECT. V. THE RELATIONS OF QUANTITY.
These are equivalent to the relations of proportion referred to by Locke, and the relations of proportion and
degree mentioned by Brown; they are the relations of
less and more. The mind, in discovering them, proceeds
upon the knowledge previously acquired of objects as
being singulars, that is, units; it is upon a succession
252 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
of units coming before it that the judgment  is pronounced.   It also very frequently proceeds on other relations which have been previously discovered; on perceiving, for instance, that objects resemble each other
in respect of space, time, and property, we may notice
that they have less or more of the common thing in respect of which they agree.
It is to this intuition I refer the power which the
mind has of discovering the relation of simple numbers.
A very high authority on this subject has given a somewhat different account. Dr. Whewell refers our conception of number to the sense of successiveness, or, as I
would render it, the faculty which discovers the relations
of Time. "'The conception of number appears to require the exercise of the sense of succession.  At first
sight indeed we seem to apprehend number without
any act of memory, or any reference to time; for example, we look at a horse, and see that his legs are four,
and this we seem to do at once without reckoning them.
But it is not difficult to see that this seeming instantaneousness of the perception of small numbers is an illusion. This resembles the many other cases in which we
perform short and easy acts so rapidly and familiarly that
we are unconscious of them, as in the acts of seeing, and
articulating our words. And this is the more manifest
since we begin our acquaintance with number by counting even the smallest numbers. Children, and very rude
savages, must use an effort to reckon even their five fingers, and find a difficulty in going further. And persons
have been known who were able by habit, or by peculiar
natural aptitude, to count by dozens as rapidly as common persons can by units.  We  may conclude therefore
that when we appear to catch a small number by a single
glance of the eye, we do, in fact, count the units of it in a
regular though very brief succession. To count requires
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PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
an act of memory; of this we are sensible when we
count very slowly, as when we reckon the strokes of a
church clock, for in such a case we may forget in the in tervals of the strokes, and miscount. Now it will not be
doubted that the nature of the process in counting is thesame, whether we count fast or slow. There is no definite speed of reckoning at which the faculties which it
requires are changed, and therefore memory, which is requisite in some cases, must be so in all." I entirely concur with this statement.   I am convinced that the perception of the relations of time, is presupposed in our
discerning the relations of number. But there may be
more required.  Dr. Whewell appends a foot-note, "If any
one holds number to be apprehended by a direct act of
intuition, as space and time are, this view will not disturb
the other doctrines delivered in the text."* I believe that
one, or unity, is involved in our primary cognition of objects. Not that I think it necessary to call in a special
intuition in order to our being able to count or number;
but I believe that, besides the exercise of memory, and
the discovery of the relations of the succession in time,
there must be the general power of discovering the relations of quantity: we must be able, not only to go over
the units, but further, to discover the relations of the
units and of their combinations.
To this faculty I refer all those operations in which
we discover equality, or difference, or proportions of any
kind, in numbers. The mental capacity is greatly aided,
and its intuitive perceptions are put in a position to act
more readily and extensively, through the divisions and
notations by tens in our modern arithmetic; every ten,
every hundred, every thousand, and so oD, comes to be
regarded as a unit, and the judgments in regard to units
are made to reach numbers indefinitely large. These
*'Philosophy of Inductive Sciences,' II. ix. 4.
'-) 5 4 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
numerical judgments admit of an application to extension in space.  Fixing on a certain length, superficies
or solid, as a unit, we form judgments which embrace
lines or surfaces or solids never actually measured.  I
am persuaded that, even in its common and practical
operations,-as, for example, in the measurement of distance by the eye,-the mind fixes on some known and
familiar length as its standard, and estimates larger space
by this. Ever since Descartes conceived the method of
expressing curve lines and surfaces by means of equations,
mathematics may be said to be concerned with quantity
as their sicmmmvz genus. The judgments as intuitive are
all individual, but they can be generalized, when they.will
assume such forms as the "Common Notions," so far as
they relate to quantity, prefixed by Euclid to his Elements.
"Things which are equal to the same are equal to one
another." "If equals be added to equals, the wholes are
equal." "If equals be taken from equals, the remainders are equal."  "If equals be added to unequals, the
wholes are unequal." "If equals be taken from unequals,
the remainders are unequal." "Things which are double
the same thing are equal to one another." "Things
which are half the same thing are equal to one another."
SECT. VI. THE RELATIONS OF RESEMBLANCE.
It has been generally acknowledged that man's primary knowledge is of individual objects: not that he as
yet knows them to be individual; it is only after he has
been able to form general notions that he draws the distinction, and finds that what he first knew was singular.
What is meant is, that the boy does not begin with a notion of man, or woman, or humanity in general, but with
a knowledge of a particular man, say his father, or a particular woman, say his mother; and it is only as other
men and other women come under his notice, and lie
'l 5 5 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
observes their points of agreement, that he is able to rise
to the general notion of man, or woman, or humankind.
In the mental processes involved in generalization, the
most important part is the observational one. When we
discover, for example, the resemblances of plants, and
proceed to group them into species, genera, and orders,
the operation is one of induction and comparison. There
is no necessity of thought involved in the law that roses
have five petals, or that fishes are cold-blooded, or indeed
in any of the laws of natural history.   Still there are
laws of thought which have a place in the generalizing
process.
1. The universal implies the singular. The mind pronounces this judgment when it looks at the nature of the
individuals and the generals. The universal is not something independent of the singulars, prior to the singulars, or above the singulars. A general notion is the
notion of an indefinite number of objects possessing a
common attribute or attributes.   It is clear, therefore,
that the general proceeds on and presupposes individuals. If there were no individuals, there would be no
general; and if the individuals were to cease, the general
would likewise cease. If there were no individual roses,
there would be no such thing as a class of plants oalled
roses.
2. When the singulars are real, the universal is also
real; always, of course, on the supposition that the generalization has been properly made. There exists, we
shall suppose, in nature, a number of objects possessing
common attributes, we have observed their points of resemblance, and put them in a class: has, or has not, the
class an existence? In reply, I say that the genus has an
existence and a reality as well as the individual objects.
An indefinite number of animals chew the cud, and are
called ruminant; the class ruminant has an existence
256 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
quite as much as the individual animals. But let us observe what sort of reality the class has; it is a reality
merely in the individuals, and in the possession of common qualities by these individuals.
3. Whatever is predicated of a class may be predicated of all the members of the class; and vice versa,,
whatever is predicated of all the members of a class may
be predicated of the class. This is a self-evident and necessary proposition. It is pronounced by the mind in an
individual form whenever it contemplates the relation
of a class and the members of the class; thus, if the general maxim be discovered or allowed, that all reptiles
are cold-blooded, and the further fact be given or ascertained that the crocodile is a reptile, the conclusion is
pronounced that the crocodile is cold-blooded.
We shall discover, when we come to apply these general principles, that the laws mentioned in this Section
play an important part in Logic, and have a place in the
Notion, in the Judgment, and in Reasoning.
SECT. VII. RELATIONS OF ACTIVE PROPERTY.
I have been striving to prove that we cannot know
either self or body acting on self, except as possessing
property.   On looking at the properties of objects, the
mind at once pronounces certain decisions.  These, like
all our other intuitive judgments, have a reference, in
the first instance, to the individual case presented, but
may be made universal by a process of generalization.
Thus, the mind declares, "this property implies a substance," "this substance will exercise a property."  The
abstract truths will seldom  be formally enunciated, but,
as regulative principles, they underlie our common
thoughts, and we proceed on them, even when entirely
unaware of their nature or of their existence. Every action or manifestation we intuitively regard as the action
s
257 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
or exhibition of a something having a substantial being.
On falling in with a new substance, say an aerolite just
dropped from the heavens, we know not indeed what its
properties are, but we are sure that it has properties, and
we make an attempt to discover them.
SECT. VIII. RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.
All our primitive judgments carry us back to primitive
cognitions and beliefs, that is, they are pronounced by
the mind as it looks to objects intuitively known or necessarily believed in. The judgment which affirms that
the cause must produce its effect, and that the effect has
resulted from a cause, proceeds from and is grounded on
a cognition which has already passed under our notice,
the intuitive knowledge of substance exercising power.
It will appear, as we advance, that those who overlook or
deny the mind's primary knowledge of power, can give
no adequate or satisfactory account of the nature or
meaning of the causal judgment.
It will be needful to show here, first of all, that the
judgment is not derived from the generalizations of outward experience. As we do so, it will be necessary to
state, though it will not be necessary to dwell on it after
the enunciations which have been so often repeated, that
our conviction is not of a general truth, but relates solely
to individual facts presented to or contemplated by the
mind.   Our original judgment is not that every cause
has an effect, and that every effect has a cause, propositions which will not be admitted and cannot be understood till the words'cause' and'effect,' terms very abstract
and general, be explained,-but it is that this thing
having power, may produce an effect, and that this thing
apprehended as a new thing or as having been changed
must have had a cause.
In proceeding to prove that the mental conviction, thus
258 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
understood, is not derived from experience, I am disposed to admit at once that observation might, without
any original intuition, lead to a loose general belief in
cause and effect.   On  seeing  two events in frequent
juxtaposition, we might be disposed when we see the one
to think of the other by the ordinary law of association,
and when we see the one to expect the other, as the result of a process of generalization. This I freelv admit;
but I maintain, at the same time, that the intuitive conviction is, in fact, one powerful means of making us associate cause and effect so naturally in our minds, and to
generalize our experience of causation. Any experiential
conviction would necessarily want certain essential elements ever found in our conviction regarding causation.
First, it would not, as being the result of generalization, operate at so early a period of life as our belief in
cause and effect evidently does. The causal belief is as
strong in infancy as in mature life or in old-age, is as
strong among savages as in civilized countries in which
scientific observation has made the greatest advances.
True, savage nations have not a belief in the uniformity
of nature, which is a result (as shall be shown further on)
of observation; they discover events which are thought
to have no cause in nature, but then they seek for a
cause beyond nature.   Now, if the conviction of causation were like the belief in the uniformity of nature, a
principle derived from induction,-which must necessarily
be a large induction,-it would be difficult to account for
its existence and its invariable operation in the earliest
stages of individual life and of society.   I admit that all
this merely proves that there is a native instinct or inclination prompting us to rise from an effect to a cause,
and by no means justifies us in standing up for a necessary conviction.
Secondly, it would scarcely account for the universality
s 2
259 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
of the belief among men brought up in such various
countries and situations, attached to such different sects
and creeds, and under the influence of all kinds of whini
and caprice. This can be most satisfactorily explained
by supposing that there is a native principle at work, inclining and guiding all men. Such a consideration, I
allow, does not show that the conviction is a fundamental
one, nor would I urge it as in itself a positive proof of
the existence even of a native instinct: still it is a strong
presumption. Indeed the theory which supposes that
there is some original impulse or inclination, is the only
one which can give a full explanation of all the beliefs
which man cherishes, and the judgments which he ever
pronounces.
Thtirdly, it would not account for the fundamental and
necessary character of the judgment.  This is the conclusive circumstance, of which the others are to be regarded as merely corroborations. No possible length or
uniformity could or should give this necessity of conviction to the judgment.   We might have seen A and B,
this stone and that stone, this star and that star, this
man and that man together, a thousand, or a million, or
a billion of times, and without our ever having seen theni
separate, but this would not and ought not to necessitate
us to believe that they have been for ever together, and
shall be for ever together, and must be for ever together.
No doubt, it would lead us, when we fell in with the one
to look for the other, and we would wonder if the one
presented itself without the other; still, it is possible for
us'to conceive, and, on evidence being produced, to believe, that there may be the one without the other. It
was long supposed that all metals are comparatively
heavy, but while every one was astonished at the fact,
no one was prepared to deny it, when it was shown by
Davy that potassium floated on water. Down to a very
260 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
recent date civilized men had never seen a black swan, yet
no naturalist was ever so presumptuous as to affirm that
there never could be such an animal; and when black
swans were discovered in Australia, scientific men, no
doubt, wondered, but never went so far as to deny the
fact. A very wide and uniform experience would justify
a general expectation, but not a necessary conviction;
and this experience is liable to be disturbed at any time
by a new occurrence inconsistent with what has been
previously known to us. But the belief in the connection between cause and effect is of a totally different
character. We can believe that two things which have
been united since creation began, may never be united
again while creation lasts; but we never can be made to
believe, or rather, think, judge, or decide (for this is the
right expression) that a change can take place without a
cause.  We can believe that night and day might henceforth be disconnected, and that from and after this day
or some other day there would only be perpetual day or
perpetual night on the earth; but we could never be
made to decide that, the causes which produced day and
night being the same, there ever could be any other
effect than day or night. We could believe, on sufficient evidence, that the sun might not rise on our earth
to-morrow, but we never could be made to judge that,
the sun and earth and all other things necessary to
the sun rising on our earth abiding as they are, the lu..
minary of day should not run his round as usual.. We
see at once that there is a difference between the judgment of the mind in the two cases; in the case in which
we have before us a mere conjunction sanctioned by a
wide and invariable induction, and that in which we
have an effect, and connect it with its cause. The one
belief can be overcome, and should be overcome at any
time by a new and inconsistent fact coming under our
261 
PRIMITIVE JUL GMENTS.
observation; whereas, in regard to the other, we are confident that it never can be modified or set aside, and we
feel that it ought not to be overborne.
It is to be carefully noticed that while we have a native and necessary conviction, it does not announce what
effect any given cause must produce, or what is the cause
of any given effect. On an effect presenting itself to our
notice, we believe that it must have a cause, but what
the cause is, is to be determined, after all, by observation. On discovering a new substance, say a metal, we
anticipate that it will act in some particular way on the
needful conditions being supplied; but how it will act,
chemically or magnetically, or in reference to any other
agent, we cannot predict beforehand. It is of the utmost
moment that we ever take this view of the intuitive principle when we would use it in speculation, and that we
should distinctly know what it cannot do, as well as what
it can do. It is meant to be a regulative principle underlying and guiding our inquiries, but it is not intended
to supersede experience. On the contrary, it is when an
effect or a cause is presented, that the intuitive principle
begins to operate, and constrains us to look for a cause
or an effect. And as to what the precise cause or effect
may be, even this is not announced by the conviction,
but is to be discovered by experience; that is, having
discovered that a substance has operated in a certain
way in time past, we are sure that it will so operate
again; and having found that a particular effect has proceeded from a certain cause, we are sure, on the same
effect presenting itself, that it must have come from the
same cause.  It thus appears that intuition and experience combine, each meanwhile having its own province,
in all the judgments which we pronounce as to the mode
of the operation of any given cause, or the cause of any
given effect. It is our special business, in what remains
262 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
of this Section, to determine in an inductive manner
what is involved in our conviction of cause and effect,
and the relation between them.
I. Cause implies a Substance with Potency. This
doctrine was explicitly stated and defended by Leibnitz,
and has been incidentally admitted by many who have
not been prepared to adhere to the general view.* We
never know of a causal influence being exercised, except
by an object having being and substantial existence. We
decide, and must decide, that every effect proceeds from
one or more substances having potency. If a tree is felled
to the ground, if the salt we saw dry a minute ago is
now melted, if a limb of man or animal is broken, we
not only look for a cause, but we look for a cause in
something that had being and property, say in the wind
blowing on the tree, or in water mingling with the salt,
or in a blow being inflicted by a stick, or other hard
substance, on the limb. When we discover effects produced by light, heat, electricity, or similar agents, whose
precise nature has not been discovered, we regard them
either as separate substances, or if this seems (as it does)
highly improbable, we regard them as properties or affections of substances. If this world be an effect, we look
for its cause in a Being possessed of power.
And this, I may remark in passing, seems to be the
reason why we do not place Tiale and Space under the
law of causation. Causes operate and effects take place
in time and space, but we are not led to look on duration and place producing effects, or being themselves
affected by any agents.   We talk, indeed, of time effecting mighty changes, say in elevating or abrading the
earth's surface, or in revolutionizing society, and changing men's opinions and sentiments; but the language is
elliptical, and it means, when  the steps are fully un                  * See supra, pp. 147, 166.
263 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
folded, that powers residing in substances produce effects
when time is allowed them. So far as we know, or can
know, of time or space, we look on them as unchanged
and unchangeable, though it would be presumptuous in
us to affirm that they can in no way be affected or in fluenced by the Divine Power.
II. Power residing in substance is exercised when the
needful conditions are supplied. All creature power is
conditioned and limited: it is a power to produce a cer tain particular effect. Commonly, if not invariably, there
is need, as has been shown in treating of Power, of the
concurrence of two or more agencies in order to action,
and there will be operation only when there is co-opera tion. The very power of God is in a sense qualified, it is
guided by that which should ever direct it, by His Will,
which is holy and benevolent.  But confining our attention to creature power, mental or material, it has always
a rule, or defined mode of action, and can act only in
a particular way, and to a certain extent. That which
is necessary to the exercise of power in a substance may
be called the conditions, and it is only on the conditions
being supplied that power is exercised. A magnet has
a power of attracting iron, but it is only when iron is
within reach that the property is active.
There is a sense, and an important sense, in which
power may be said to be in the substance, to be inherent in the substance, to constitute, indeed, an element
in the nature of the substance.  In this sense the power
of the substance is always the same; that is, the same
substance will always act in the same way on the conditions being supplied. Allotropismn  may seem an exception,
but it is so only in appearance; for when phosphorus produces one effect in one state, and another effect in another
state, it is because of some change produced by heat, or
electricity, or some other agent; and that the power
264 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
continues the same, is evident from the circumstance that
when the substance is brought back from its allotropic
state, it exercises the same power as it did at first, a clear
proof that in the allotropic state it was simply put under
new conditions.  It appears from these statements that
there may be perfect propriety in speaking of latent power,
that is, of a power not in action because the conditions
needful to its operation are not supplied. Nay, it is possible, I do not say probable, that there are properties
both of mind and matter which are usually occult, and
only appear in action on rare occasions. Nay, some have
supposed that the soul has capacities which are altogether
dormant here (like the capacity of the dumb to learn languages if only they had hearing), and are to be awakened
into life only on the conditions needful to their exercise
being presented in the world to come.
III. There must be an adequacy or sufficiency of
power to produce the effect. We not only look for a
cause, but for a competent cause. Experience, it is true,
and experience alone, can tell us what is a sufficient
cause, as it alone can inform us what is the cause.  Still
there seems to be an inherent conviction of the mind
which leads us, in looking for a cause, to make the cause
equal to the work which it accomplishes. Powers differ
in kind, and they differ in degree. There is need, for
instance, of more than human  power to create a substance out of nothing.   There is need of more than the
power residing in material substance to produce thought
and emotion and will. The ant which carries a seed of
grain, is not competent, like man, to carry a sack of
corn; and the strength of man is inadequate to raise a
weight which can be lifted with ease by a steam-engine.
The lily can reproduce a lily after its kind, but can)not
produce a pine or an oak. These facts, I am aware, can be
known only by observation. But underneath all our ex
265 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
periential knowledge there is a necessary principle which
constrains us, when we discover an effect, to look not
only for a cause, but a cause with the kind of power
which is fitted to produce the kind of effect, and to proportion the extent of the power to the extent of the effect.
This original principle is the source of a number of most
important derivative ones; as, when we have found a
substance exercising a certain sort of power, we anticipate that it will always exercise the same sort of power,
and when we have found it exercising a certain amount
of force, we expect that it will always be fit for the same,
-of course, always on the necessary conditions being
furnished. Thus, having found that our minds can follow a train of reasoning, we are sure that they will always be able to do so,-of course, on the supposition that
the bodily organism needful to mental operation in man
is not in a state of derangement. The amount of force
which drives a ball a certain distance to-day, we are sure
will drive it to the same distance to-morrow. If a definite weight of oxygen has been ascertained chemically
to unite with a certain definite weight of hydrogen, we
are sure it will ever do so; and if we find the very same
amount of oxygen not drawing to it the same amount of
hydrogen, we argue that there must have been some
change in the conditions of the oxygen. It is acknowledged that in such judgments there is and must be
an experiential element, which in spontaneous thought
is ever the more prominent,-it is ever the one about
which the mind is most anxious, as being the only doubtful one; still there is also a necessary principle, which
is overlooked only because it is indisputable and invariable. Rising from earthly to heavenly things, we look
on God, who has produced works in which are traces
of such large power and admirable wisdom, as a Being
possessed of power and wisdom corresponding to the
2-6 
RELATIONS INTUITIVEILY OBSERVED.
effects we discover, and as capable, whenever he may see
fit, of producing works distinguished by the same lofty
characteristics.
IV. There is a necessary relation between the cause
and the effect, arising from the necessity of the cause to
produce the effect when the conditions are furnished.
The principles laid down in preceding Sections seem to
me to establish this truth, and so to clear up the subject
round which the discussions regarding causation have
chiefly turned since the days of Hume. Perverting and
turning to his own purposes the views regarding sensation which had been maintained by Locke and other
metaphysicians, the great sceptic represents the mind as
starting with impressions; and it seems to me certain
that, were there nothing beyond this in the original intuitions of the mind, it would be impossible to show how
it could ever reach the knowledge of realities. Many of
the opponents of Hume have not seen, or, at least, have
not adopted the proper method of meeting him. Kant
supposes the mind to start with phenomena, and not
with things; and when he subsequently calls in a category of cause and effect, it is avowed that it cannot apply to things, but simply to phenomena. Dr. Thomas
Brown saw clearly that our belief in cause and effect
is intuitive, and so far his views are sound, and most
eloquently and forcibly illustrated; but, supposing the
mind to start with mere sensations, and not with the
knowledge of things, and things possessing power, he
never reached adequate views of the relation between the
cause and the effect. Differing widely from Hume as to
the nature of the mental principle which leads us to be lieve in the connection between cause and effect, he re gards the objective connection as merely invariable ante cedence and consequence. In sustaining this tenet he
wastes an immense amount of ingenuity in showing that
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PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
there is nothing, no link of any kind, between the cause
and the effect.  True I say, and I maintain that, except
in the way of loose metaphor, no one ever asserted that
there was. But in all this argument he blinks the main
question,-and yet it is ever, as appears from chance ex pressions, pressing itself on him,-which is not as to what
is between the cause and effect, but what is there in the
cause to produce the effect. If he had supposed the mind
to begin with the cognition of self and of body exercising
power, he would have found more in the relation than
the mere invariability of the succession: he would have
discovered a power in the substance or substances act ing as the cause, and that the invariableness, so far from
being the primary circumstance, was a necessary conse quence of this.
The invariability then carries us back to a more im portant circumstance, to the power which is intuitively
known to be in substance. When the substances have
the conditions furnished, they act, and effects must
follow. The acting substances in the relation needful to their action is thus the true cause, the unconditional cause (to use a phrase of Mr. J. S. Mill's), the invariable cause ever followed by its proper and peculiar
effects. This view however lends no sanction whatever
to the rash statements of M. Cousin, who speaks about
its being necessary for God to create.  True, creation
must follow if he put forth the volition, but then he has
a will to exert or withhold the creating act. Creation
must spring into being if he will it, but to will it is an
element (always along with power) in that cause of which
a created object is the effect. The same remark holds
good, within certain limitations, of the acts of man: when
he wills it, certain effects follow, as when he wills to
lift the arm, the arm must move if the organs be in
a healthy condition; but in this and all similar cases,
268 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
while the effect is necessary, it is on the presupposition
of a cause in which will and free will is an essential
element.   In other cases the effects follow from a power
in substance, acting, so far as man can know, without
any exercise of will.  When I hear of the death of a
friend, and a torrent of grief flows into my bosom, or
when a spark falls on gunpowder, and an explosion follows, there is no exercise of creature will, (though there
may possibly be a concurrence of the Divine Will necessary to all creature action); but whether there be or be
not room for free will in the cause or substances acting,
there is a necessary connection between these substances
acting (with or without free will) and their proper effect.
The mind, in contemplating the relation between cause
and effect, declares the relation to be necessary, and cannot be made to believe otherwise, and decides that it is
a necessity arising from the power intuitively known as
in the substance.  It is to reverse the proper order of
things to resolve the necessity into the invariableness:
the invariableness is the result of a necessity arising from
the potency of substance.
V. An effect is known as either a new substance, or
as a change in a previously existing substance.   The
production of a new substance, or even of a new power,
property, or capacity in an old substance, is altogether
beyond human power; it is probably beyond all creature
power. It seems to be the special prerogative of God to
create out of nothing. A large induction seems to inform
us that, in creating substances, he imparted to them all
their qualities and properties; and man can as little add
to the powers in the substances, as he can add to the
substances in the universe. Another kind of effect, and
the one which alone falls under our common observation,
consists in a previously existing substance being put in a
new state: this is the only effect which can be produced
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PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
by any modification of physical action, as by mechanical
or chemical action; nay, it is the only effect which can
be produced by mental action or human action of any
description. Taking advantage of natural powers, we
may find a body in one condition and put it in another;
or, accommodating ourselves to mental laws, we may produce changes in our own state of mind: but here our
power terminates. We are informed of all this by an
enlarged experience rather than by intuition; but our
primary conviction seems to say, that as every cause is
found in a substance, so every effect is also in a substance,
which may, as induction shows, be either a totally new
substance, or a substance undergoing some modification.
From this doctrine of causation, there follow several
corollaries of no little consequence in the settlement of
speculative questions.
1. When the effect is real, that is, a real thing or
substance, the cause must also be real, that is, a real thing
or substance produced or changed. No doubt, it is quite
possible for man, endowed as he is with the power of
imagination as well as cognition, to conjure up a fancifil
effect, say to fancy that some mysterious power is exercising a malign influence upon him, and in such a case
the cause must be as imaginary as the effect (though
even here the intuitive law of causation will constrain him
to seek for producing power in some human or angelic
being, in some star or animal); but if the effect be a
thing in actual existence, the cause must also be in actual
existence. Taking this view with us, we see how those
metaphysicians who suppose that the mind primitively
knows only phenomena, can never satisfactorily go beyond a phenomnenology, or reach a God who has any
other sort of existence than the phenomena, and the
mental laws which bind them.   But if the world be a
reality, if mind be a real thing, and body a real thing, and
270 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
the heavens and earth be real things, and if they be
effects of power which must of necessity be supra-mundane, then the constitutional laws of the mind insist that
the cause must also be real, and is to be found in a Being
possessed of the adequate and competent power.
2. The mind is not necessitated to seek for an endless
series of causes. As the doctrine of causation is sometimes stated, it might appear as if we were required, in
following the chain of cause and effect, to go back ad infinitum. It is said, in a loose way, that every object
must have a cause; and then, as this cause must also
have a cause, it might seem as if we were compelled to
go on for ever from one link to another. In particular,
it might appear as if we could never legitimately argue
from the law of causation in favour of this world being
caused; for, if the law of cause and effect be universal,
then we must seek for a cause, not only of the world, but
of the Being who made the world; and if it be not universal, then it is conceivable that this world may be one
of the things which are not caused. This is al objection
urged with great confidence by Kant; and a large school
of metaphysicians seem to think that it is fatal to any
argument in favour of the Divine existence derived from
human intelligence, as in every such argument the law
of causation must enter as an element. Kant endeavours
to escape from the dismal consequences in which he felt
himself being engulfed, by declaring that the law of
cause and effect, which thus required an infinite regressos,
was a law of thought and not of things, and by calling
in a moral argument (which argument has again been
assailed by the very objections which Kant directed
against the speculative argument-for if our intelligence
be a delusion, why may not our moral convictions also
be so?); while a large body of thinkers have appealed to
some sort of mysterious faith which will not submit to
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PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
be examined or even expressed. But, with all deference
to these bold asseverations, I maintain that if only this
Cosmos can be shown to bear marks of being an effect,
the argument from causation can carry us up to a supramundane cause, while it does not require us to go back
to a cause of that cause.   All inquiry into causation
conducts us to substance; but it does not compel Ius to
go on further, or to go on for ever.  The law of causality
does insist that the world, as an effect, must have a cause
in a Being possessing power; and if, in inquiring into the
nature of that Being, we find reason to believe that He or
it must be an effect, it would insist on us going on to look
out for a further cause. But if, on the other hand, we
find no signs of that Being who made the world being an
effect, our intuition regarding causation would be entirely
satisfied in looking on that Being as uncaused, as selfexistent, as having power in Himself.   It thus appears
that this difficulty, which has puzzled so many, has arisen
entirely from a misapprehension and perversion of the
law of causation, commencing with Hume, and presented
in a new form by Kant.   It is removed at once by an
inductive investigation of our cognition of power, and of
our judgment regarding causation.*
* It is a circumstance worthy of being noted that the powerful mind
of Kant, in his chase after an Unconditioned, represented by him as
ideal, finds a progressus or a regressus of some kind or other in time,
in space, in matter, in cause, in the possible or actual, but admits
fully and explicitly that in regard to substance the reason has no
ground to proceed regressively with conditions. In regard to causality
we have a series of causes which go back unendingly, the unconditioned
being the absolute totality of the series. But in substance there is no
such regressus. "Was die Kategorien des realen Verhailtnisses unter
den Erscheinungen anlangt, so schickt sich die Kategorie der Substanz
mit ihren Accidenzen nicht zu einer transscendentalen Idee, d. i. die
Vernunft hat keinen Grund, in Ansehung ihrer, regressiv auf Bedingungen zu gehen." (Kr. d. r. Vern., p. 328.) We have only to connect this doctrine of substance, not necessarily calling, according to the
principles of reason, for a regressus, with his admission that substance
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PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
3. By observing and classifying the effects, we may
obtain a knowledge of the substances from which the
effects proceed. Powers residing ill substances differ in
kind and in degree in different substances. The power
of creation differs from the power of simply producing
changes in what already exists. Power in spiritual beings
differs from power in inanimate creation.   Even when
the power is the same in kind, it may differ in degree in
different individuals. Now it is by a careful observation
and generalization of its actings, and of the effects that
follow, that we are enabled to gather our chief knowledge
of substance.   In conducting such an investigation in
a scientific manner, we put in one class, and usually designate by a common name, the acts which are alike in
their main features, and argue legitimately that there is
a faculty in the substance to produce these effects. It is
thus from a classinfication of the actings of natural substances that we seek to rise to a knowledge of the properties general and specific of body.   It is thus that we
observe and generalize the acts of the mind, and so endeavour to ascertain its faculties.  It is thus, that from
a careful generalization of the acts of God, the theologian attempts to give something like-he should profess to do no mnore-a systematic account of his Attributes.   All this does not imply, though some are ever
telling us that it does, that we are dividing the unity of
the soul, or the unity of God. In proceeding in this
inductive manner we are taking the only plan available
to us of becoming acquainted with those powers or attributes which constitute an essential element in the human
soul and in the Divine Mind.
involves power (see supra, p. 166 foot-note) to be able to maintain, and
this without falling into any contradiction, that the effects seen in
nature of a power above nature, argue a substance having power, for
whi(ch we are not required to seek for a cause.
273
T 
PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
4. By combined intuition and experience we may
often be enabled to argue that effects of a particular
description imply causes of a particular kind and degree.
Intuition insists that not only there be a cause of the
effect, but that  the cause be sufficient.   Experience
then comes in to give us information as to certain effects
coming from certain causes or substances, and not
coming from certain others. We do not expect inanimate objects to produce the effects that flow from the
plant, nor the plant to accomplish what is done by the
animal, nor body to effect what can be done by mind.
A very wide induction informs us that order and adaptation come from a being capable of contemplating means
and end, and are not to be looked for from material
forces operating blindly and unintelligently.   All this
may not, it is true, be intuitive or apodictic, but it is
the result of a large and uniform observation, and it
connects itself with a primary conviction which demands
an adequacy in the cause, and is satisfied when it is
directed to a Supreme Intelligence, the source of all the
system and utility to be found in the universe.
5. The intuitive conviction gives no sanction whatever
to the maxims that like can only act on like, or like only
proceed from like, or that the effect must resemble the
cause. All these proceed from narrow views of cause,
making that universal which holds good only in certain
cases. Like things do influence each other, but unlike
things also exercise a mutual affection, as when acid
acts on an alkali.  The offspring of plants and animals
do resemble their parents; but there are effects which
are in no way like their cause, as when the sun's heat
makes the ice to melt. By laying down such maxims,
philosophers landed themselves in innumerable difficulties; they could not allow that body could influence
mind, or mind body, or conceive how it was possible for
274 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
the physical universe to proceed from a spiritual God;
and they helped, with other Cartesian principles, to shut
up Spinoza into a pantheism which would admit of only
one substance. But such maxims have no foundation in
intuition, and they are contradicted by experience. The
maxim is not, the cause and effect must be alike, but
that the cause must be competent to produce the effect.
6. It is not a sufficiently accurate expression of the
principle of causation when it is said that like causes in
like circumstances will produce like effects. When the
law is announced in this vague form, we lose ourselves
in determining what amount of resemblance there must
be in the causes and in the effects, and in estimating
the relative importance of the causes and of the circumstances.   A philosophical account of the cause  must
specify the likeness necessary, and embrace the circumstances. We must therefore bring in substance and the
power in substance acting according to a rule. Every
created substance is endowed with power of a certain
kind and amount, which will act, on the needful conditions being supplied; and the correct statement is, that
the same substances, acting in the same relation, will
always produce the same effects.
7. Our intuitive conviction is not of the uniformity or
continuance of the course of nature. This is the vague
shape in which the principle appears in the works of
Reid and Stewart.  " God," says the former, "hath implanted in human minds an original principle, by which
we believe and expect the continuance of the course of
nature, and the continuance of those connections which
we have observed in time past" (Works, p. 198). "We
attend to every conjunction of things which presents
itself, and expect the continuance of that conjunction."
This is far too loose a form in which to present the
maxim; indeed it is altogether incorrect, and may land
T2
275 
PRIMITIVE; JUDGMENTS.
us, if logically followed out, in very serious consequences.
Instead of having a belief in the permanence or continuance of the course of tilings, the great body of mankind- nearly all in the earlier and simpler ages of
society, and almost all who live beyond the pale of the
countries in which physical science is cultivated-look
upon this world as liable to constant interferences on
the part of supernatural agencies, in cases in which they
do not regard events as being produced by chance or
caprice.  It is vain, therefore, to speak of the belief in
the uniformity of nature as a self-evident, a necessary,
or a universal principle.*
Besides, if we have an intuitive belief in the permanence of nature, it will be impossible to prove that nature
was created, or that there can be any miracles or interference with the agencies of nature by a supernatural
power; for no evidence adduced in behalf of creation or
divine interposition could ever be so strong as the necessary belief in direct opposition to it.  But the fact is,
that all such maxims as that the course of things is uni
* Mr. J. S. Mill is successful in showing (Logic, bk. iii. ch. xvi.) that
man's belief in the uniformity of nature is the result of experience, that
it is entertained only by the educated and civilized few, and that even
among such it has been of slow growth. But Mr. Mill has fallen into
a glaring'fallacy of confusion' in confounding our belief in causation
with our belief in the uniformity of nature. The distinction was before
him, at least for an instant, when, speaking of the irregularities of
nature, he says: "Such phenomena were commonly, in that early
stage of human knowledge, ascribed to the direct intervention of the
will of some supernatural being, and therefore still to a cause. This
shows the strong tendency of the human mind to ascribe every phenomenon to some cause or other." It is of this tendency that I affirm that
it is native, and irresistible.   He tells us that one "accustomed to
abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the
purpose, will, when his imagination has once learned to entertain the
notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance, of
the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the
universe, events may succeed one another at random, without any fixed
law; nor can anything in our experience, or in our mental nature,
constitute a sufficient or indeed any reason for believing that this is
276 
RELATIONS INTUITIVELY OBSERVED.
form, and that like may be expected in like circumstances,
are the result, not of any fundamental principle of in telligence, but of experience; and the same experience
which determines how far they are true must determine
also how they are to be understood, how they are mo dified, and what are the exceptions  to them.   Natural
science proves that while the usual rule is that all plants
and animals proceed from parents of the same kind, there
must yet have been a time or times when new species
appeared on the earth by a supernatural power, or at
least a power not at work in the present processes of
nature.'The world as a whole bears marks of being an
effect, and there must have been a time when it was produced by a power above itself. In the inspired writings
we have evidence of works being done by Moses and
the Prophets, by Jesus and the Apostles, surpassing the
power of man or of physical nature. All this is inconsistent with a belief in the absolute uniformity of the
course of nature, but it is quite in harmony with the intuitive conviction. If the world be an effect, we seek for
nowhere the case." I have remarked on this elsewhere (Method of
Divinc Government, p. 528). "This statement about fixed laws is
ambiguous. If by fixed law be meant simply order and uniformity
among physical events, the statement is true. But if meant to signify
an event without a cause, material or mental, the statement is contradicted by our'mental nature,' which impels us to seek for a cause of
every event. Hie is right in affirming that' experience' cannot authorize such a belief; but it is just as certain that our'mental nature'
constrains us to entertain it: and surely if there be laws in physical
nature, there may also be trustworthy laws in our mental nature."
There is the same confusion of two different things in the following
passage. "The uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise called
the law of causation, must be received not as the law of the universe,
but of that portion of it only which is within the range of our means
of sure observation, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent
cases." I freely admit all this in regard to the order observable everywhere in our Cosmos; there may or may not be a similar uniformity in
the regions of space beyond. But our mental nature will not allow us
to think, judge, or believe (these, and not'conceive,' which is ambiguous, are the proper phrases), that in this our world, or in any other
world, there can be an event without a cause.
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PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS.
a cause above the world; if the new species of animtnated
beings cannot have been produced by natural agencies,
we call in a supernatural cause; if the miracles of Scripture cannot be accounted for by humnan power, we call in
Divine Power; and we feel, meanwhile, that so far from
our native convictions being violated, they are gratified
to the full when they learn of the events, otherwise inexplicable, being referred to causes adequate to produce
them. It thus appears that those difficulties which have
been propounded so pompously about the impossibility
of proving that there can have been a cause above nature producing the effects in nature, or of establishing
a miraculous interposition with the course of things, all
proceed on defective and erroneous views of causation,
and at once disappear when the nature of our conviction
is inductively investigated and correctly expressed.*
* It is not to my present purpose to enter on the subject of miracles,
but it does fall in with the topics discussed in the text to remark, that
there is nothing in a miracle opposed to any intuition of the mind,certainly nothing opposed to our intuition as to cause. Hume, the
sceptic, takes all sorts of objections to miracles, and the evidence by
which they are supported, but he does not maintain that a miracle is
impossible.  It is "experience," according to him, "which assures us
of the laws of nature" (Essay on Miracles); and I hold that the same
experience shows us effects in nature which constrain us, according to
the intuitive law of causation, to argue a Power above nature, which
Power is an adequate cause of any miracle which may be attested by
proper evidence. Dr. Thomas Brown has shown very satisfactorily
that a miracle, with the Divine Power as its cause, is not inconsistent with our intuitive belief in causation (Cause and Effect,
note E). Ever since Fichte published his' Versuch einer Kritik aller
Offenbarung,' there have been persons in Germany who represent it as
impossible for God to perform a miracle. This may be a necessary
consequence of those false assumptions regarding our knowing only
self, which landed Fichte in an incongruous pantheism, in which he at
one time represents the Ego as the All-including God, as the "moral
order;" and at another time represents God as the All, and absorbing
the Ego. But it can plead in its behalf no principle in the constitution
of man's mind,-no principle either natural or necessary.  The result
at which we have arrived is, that the question of the occurrence of
miracles is to be determined by the ordinary laws of evidence.
,78 
279
BOOK IV.
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
CHAPTER I.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE MOTIVE AND MORAL
POWERS.
SECT. I. THE APPETENCIES, THE WILL, AND THE CON                    SCIENCE.
THE relation between the innate principles, or the fundamental laws of the mind, on the one hand, and the faculties of the mind on the other, has seldom been properly
understood. The former seem to me to be the rules of
the operation of the latter.  I have in the first three
Books enldeavoured to unfold the main primary principles
regulating those faculties which have been called the
Understanding, or the Intellectual or Gnostic or Cognitive Powers; or, better still, the Cognitive and Contemplative, so as to embrace the Imagination, which can
scarcely be called a Cognitive but is certainly a Contemplative Power. But in all classifications of the powers
of the mind which have the least pretensions to completeness, there has been a recognition of another class,
under the name of the Will, or the Feelings, or the
Erective or Motive Powers; they may perhaps be best
designated as the Motive and Moral Powers, so as to
embrace unequivocally the functions of the conscience. 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
I am in this Chapter to take a glance at this class of
powers, and afterwards seek to ascertain the fundamental
principles involved in them. They are at least three in
number, the Appetencies,-including the Emotions,-tlie
Will, and the Conscience.
I. There are the native APPETENCIES OF THE, MIND
LEAD)ING TO EMOTIONS.  Man is so constituted that he is
capable of being swayed in will, and so in action, by cer tain motives, that is, by the contemplation of certain objects or ends, while others do not influence him.  It
would serve many important ends to have a classification of these, that is, of the springs of human will and
action. To endeavour to give a complete and exhaustive
list of these, that is, of the categories of man's moral
nature, would, I am aware, be quite as bold an effort as
that so often made to determine the categories of the
understanding.   Such a classification would at the best
be very imperfect in the first instance. But, even though
only provisionally correct, it might accomplish some useful purposes.   In the absence of any arrangement sanctioned by metaphysicians generally, it must suffice to
mention here some of the principal motives which very
obviously sway the will and impel to action.
1. Mankind are evidently inclined, involuntarily and
voluntarily, to exercise every native power,-the senses,
the memory, the imagination, the power of language, the
various rational powers, such as abstraction, comparison,
causality, the emotional, voluntary, and moral capacities.
A vast portion of human activity proceeds from no higher
and from no lower source than this. As the lamb frisks,
and the colt gambols, and as the child is in perpetual
rotation, so man's internal powers are for ever impelling him to exertion, independent altogether of any external object, or even of any further internal ends to be
gained.
280 
MOTIVE AND MIORAL POWERS.
2. Whatever is contemplated as capable of securing
pleasure is felt to be desirable, and whatever is apprehended as likely to inflict pain is avoided. This is so
very obvious a swaying power with human beings that it
has been noticed, and commonly greatly exaggerated, in
every account which has been given of man's active and
moral nature. The mistake of the vulgar, and especially
of the sensational systems, is that they have represented
pleasure and pain as the sole contemplated ends by which
man is or can be swayed. It is our object in these paragraphs to show that man can be influenced by other
motives better and worse.
3. There are certain appetencies in man, bodily and
mrental, which crave for gratification, and this independent of the pleasure to be secured by their indulgence.
Of this description are the appetites of hunger, thirst, and
sex, and the mental tendencies to seek for knowledge, esteem, society, power, property. These appetencies may
connect themselves with the other two classes already
specified, but still they are different. They will tend to
act as natural inclinations, but still they look towards
particular external objects.   We may come  to gratify
them for the sake of the pleasure, but in the first instance
we seek the objects for their own sakes, and it is in seeking the objects we obtain gratification. Thev operate to
some extent in the breasts of all, and they come to exercise a fearfully controlling and grasping power over the
minds of multitudes.
4. Man is impelled by ani inward principle, more or
less powerful in the case of different individuals, and
varying widely in the objects desired, to seek for the
beautiful in inanimate or in animate objects, in grand or
lovely scenes in nature, in statues, paintings, buildings,
fine composition in prose or poetry, and in the countenances or forms of man or woman.
281 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
5. It is not to be omitted that the moral power in
man is not only (as I hope to show) a knowing and judg ing faculty, it has a prompting energy, and leads us,
when a corrupt will does not interfere, to such acts as
the worship of God and beneficence to man, done be cause they are right.
6. Whatever is felt to be appetible for ourselves we
may wish that others should enjoy, while we may desire
that they should be preserved from all that is unappeti ble, such as restraint and pain and sin. Man is so constituted as to be stirred to desire and prompted to action by the contemplation of other beings to whom he is
related, such as God when he knows Him, and his fellow-men, more especially certain of his fellow-men, such
as his countrymen and kindred, and those who have bestowed favours upon him. I must ever set myself against
the miserably degrading doctrine of those who represent man as utterly selfish in his constitution, and capable
of being swayed by no other considerations than those
which promise pleasurable gratifications to be realized by
himself. He may, by a hardening process of sin, make
himself thus selfish, but in his original nature he is capable of being swayed by a great number and variety
of other motives, and among others by attachments to
man as man, or to particular men or women, and by sympathy for persons in trouble.
In whatever way we may classify them, these, or such
as these, are the motives by which man is naturally
swayed. Upon these native and primary principles of
action, others, acquired and  secondary,  come  to  be
grafted. Thus money, not originally desired for its own
sake, may come to be coveted as fitted to gratify the love
of property, the love of power, or the love of pleasure.
Or a particular fellow-man, at first indifferent, comes to
be avoided, because he seems inclined to thwart us in
282 
MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS.
some of our favourite ends, such as the acquisition of
wealth or of fame. It is a peculiarity of our nature that
these secondary principles may become primary ones, and
prompt us to seek, for their own sakes, objects which were
at first coveted solely because they tended to promote
further ends.
The appetencies, native and acquired, stir up Emotion,
which is called forth by an apprehension of objects as
fitted to gratify or to disappoint these appetencies. Let us
call whatever accords with them the Appetible, and whatever runs counter to them the Inappetible; then the law
is that the appetible, when in prospect, calls forth hope,
and when realized, joy; whereas the inappetible, when in
prospect, excites fear, and when realized, sorrow. It is
always to be taken into account that the emotive susceptibility is naturally stronger in some minds than in others,
is stronger at one period of life, or even one day or hour,
than another; but making due allowance for this variable element, the intensity of feeling is determined by
the strength of the motive principle, its native strength
or its acquired strength, and by the extent of the appetible or inappetible embraced within the mental apprehension of the object or end fitted to gratify or disappoint the appetency. There are thus three elements
determining the emotion, and these varying in the case
of different individuals, and of the same individual at
different times. There is the emotional susceptibility,
depending largely on the state of the brain or particular
organs of it. There is the mental appetency, natural or
acquired. There is the mental apprehension of an object
or event as tending to content or gratify the appetence.
By these elements we can explain all the feelings and
much of the activity of humanity. We have here the key
to unlock a door through which we may see what rules
the passions of men and women, often so very capricious,
~253 
28~~~~      MNORALJ CONVICTIONS.
and apparently contradictory. This deep affection, long
cherished, or this burst of sudden anger or joy or grief,
reveals to the observant eye the deep moving principle of
the inner soul.
It should be observed that while the mind is impelled
by such appetencies towards certain objects, it has not
necessarily before it the general principle by which it is
actuated, nor indeed a general idea of any description.
It contemplates an individual object as about to give it
pleasure, or about to add to its power or famue, and it at
once longs for it without generalizing its aim. Here, as
in other cases which have passed under our notice, the
mind is actuated by principles which are not before the
consciousness as princiles.
The emotions stirred up by these appetencies are characterized by two marked features; one is a drawing towards the object that is appetible, and a drawing away
from what is inappetible; and the other is a lively excitement-whence the namne emotions. Thus, in fear we
have an apprehension of some evil as about to befall us
or those in whomu we feel an interest, and wre shrink from
the object; whereas, in hope, we have an idea of an
event as about to bring good, and we, as it were, reach
toward it. While thus longing or shrinking, the mlind
is all the whie in a quickened and movred state.
II. There is the WILL. The powers I have been speaking of rush on to their ends instinctively and blindly.
The native power goes on to action, the appetite claims
indulgence, the dominant passion embraces its object,
each according to its nature. But these activities ande
propensities are often inconsistent the one with the other.
The intellect would set out on high pursuits, but is opposed by some grovelhing appetite, or the mnan would wish
to acquire famle, but, ill doing so, finds that he cannot
accumulate property as he rmight otherwise do. Is man
28$ 
MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS.
condemned to be the slave of these appetencies? yielding
to the one which happens to assail him, or obeying the
strongest when they are competing or clashing.  It is
probable that this is the condition of the brute creatures,
and would be the state of man did he not possesss a higher
power. That power is the Will.
Properly speaking, the will does not furnish incitements,
inducement, or motives; these come from the appetencies
which we have just been considering. It is the province
of the Will, seated above them, to sanction or restrain
them when they present themselves, and to decide among
them when they are comnpeting with each other for the
mastery.  We have seen that the characteristic property
of emotion is attachment or repugnance, with associated
excitenment. The distinguishing quality of will is choice
or rejection.  Inducements being held out, the mind, in
the exercise of will, sanctions or refuses; it assumes a
number of forms, in all of which there is the element of
choice.  If the object is present, we positively choose it
or adopt it; if the object is-absent, we wish for it; if it is
to be obtained by some exertion on our part, we form a
resolution to take the steps necessary to procure it.
III. There is the CONSCIENCE. It is the special function of this power to say when a particular appetency
should lJc allowed aid when it shlould be restrained; in
doing so, it addresses itself to the will. The conscience
thus claims to be above, not only our natural appetencies,
but above the will, which ought to yield as sooni as the
decision of conscience is given; not that it can set itself
altogether above nature, not that it should set itself above
nature; it is its office to sit in judgment on appetencies
which are natural or may  be acquired, and it works
thlrough free will as an essential element of our nature.
But, as Bishop Butler has shown, it is of the nature of
our constitution that it pronounces judgLoecnts for the will
285 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
and upon the appetencies. Let us endeavour to unfold
the nature of this moral power. It will be seen that,
though not identical with, it is so far analogous to the
intellectual powers.
1. The conscience is of the nature of a cognitive power.
It is analogous in this respect to the faculties of sense
and self-consciousness. Not that it makes known any
individual object, as the senses do when they show this
table or that chair, or as self-consciousness does, when
it discloses self in a particular state, say as musing or as
hoping: it reveals to us merely certain qualities of objects
otherwise known, that is, known by perception and selfconsciousness; it lets us know, for example, of certain
voluntary states of ourselves or of others, that they are
good or that they are evil. Making known no new substance or independent existence, it does reveal to us a
quality of all souls possessed of intelligence and free will;
it was this property of the conscience that was seized by
Shaftesbury and by Francis Hutcheson, when they called
this power the moral sense. The phrase was adopted by
them, I suspect, to make their system tally with that of
Locke, who admitted an external and internal sense, to
which they now added a moral sense. It was, in some
respects, an unfortunate phrase, as it seemed to degrade
the moral power in man to the rank of a bodily faculty,
or to make it dependent on bodily organization. But it is
fitted to bring out one feature of man's nature, that by
which he is able to detect a certain quality in the acts of
all intelligent beings.*
2. There are beliefs involved in the exercise of the
moral power. These beliefs are very closely connected
* See some valuable remarks in note F, appended to Mansel's' Prolegomena Logica.' "It appears that a power of discerning right and
wrong in individual acts must be allowed as the presentative basis,
without which no system of Moral Philosophy is possible." See also
Art. Metaph. in Encyc. Brit.
286 
MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS.
with the cognitions, from which indeed it is scarcely necessary to distinguish them, except for certain purposes
of philosophic accuracy. The phrase moral cognitions
might be confined to those mental exercises in which the
action which we pronounce good or bad is our own, falling immediately under consciousness, and we pronounce
it to be good or bad, whereas our moral beliefs extend
much further, and refer to acts not immediately under
the introspective power, as when we believe that benevolence is good everywhere, and that God is good and has
been good and shall be good to all eternity. I am inclined to regard our moral cognitions as the basis of our
moral beliefs. We seem first to have a necessary conviction in regard to the moral nature of our own actions,
and thence we arise to convictions which look to moral
qualities, which, being apprehended by us, we declare
to be good or evil, wherever they are to be found, and
whoever may be the possessor.
3. Judgments are involved in the exercise of this
moral power. These proceed on our original cognitions
and beliefs. Discerning in certain agents moral qualities,
we can discover relations involved in the comparison of
these qualities one with another, and with other objects
and qualities. Our moral,. like our intellectual cognitions
and beliefs, furnish matter for innumerable judgments.
Thus, in looking at the relation in which man stands to
God, we affirm that we ought to obey the Divine commands. Or, looking to a certain deed and to the painful
consequences to which it has led, we say the sin merits
the suffering.  It is the special office of ethical science
to generalize and express the cognitions, beliefs, and
judgments of the moral power, and to derive rules from
them by which to judge of actions.
4. Our apprehension of moral good and evil is accompanied with appetency and emotion. The conscience, in
287 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
fact, partakes of the nature both of a cognitive and a
motive power; it knows certain qualities in objects, and,
as it recognizes them, it looks on them as appetible or
inappetible, and is moved towards them or away from
them.   Hence the conscience is not only a judge, it is a
spring of action, and prompts us, if we would but obey
it, to seek certain ends, and carefully to avoid others.
SECT. II. (Supplementary.)  ON THE BEAUTIFUL.
A reference is here made to this subject mainly with the view
of showing that, while the appreciation of beauty is a native feeling, it is not to be regarded as a necessary principle. We are certainly led by strong natural inclination to contemplate certain objects with special feelings of attachment and admiration.  The
science which seeks to catch and formalize these feelings, and to
judge by the rules thence drawn of objects in nature and in art,
has been called Esthetics, but might perhaps be more appropriately termed Kalology, or Kallisophy, that is, the science of the
Fair or Lovely. It may be doubted however whether we have
any such necessary convictions in regard to beauty as we have in
regard to certain fundamental intellectual truths and moral qualities. Our knowledge and belief regarding objects presented to
sense and consciousness amount to this, that they have an existence independent of the mind contemplating them, and that they
would and must have the same existence to all minds endowed
with the capacity of becoming acquainted with them. Again, in
pronouncing certain judgments, the mind declares not only that
there is a relation, but that the relation is necessary. But, in
looking on an attractive object, while led to delight in it as lovely,
we are not constrained to believe that it must be beautiful, independent of our feeling regarding it, and that it must appear beautiful to all beings.  I must believe that the sun exists as an extended body, independent of the structure of my eye or mind, and
that it would be apprehended as an extended body by any inhabitant of Mlars or Jupiter endowed with the capacity to perceive
the object I must believe that ingratitude is a sin, not oily on
the earth, but everywhere, in the planet Saturn or the star Sirius,
in heaven or in hell, and that all beings endowed with moral capacity must see it in the same light; but I am not necessitated to
believe that the objects which appear beautiful to me, or to all
men, have a beauty independent of the mind that contemplates
288 
MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS.
them, and that all other minds, or even that all minds endowed
with the sense of beauty, must view them in precisely the same
light. We find, in fact, that the music which is felt by some to
be so pleasant and exciting, has no charms whatever to others.
We could easily enough believe, if evidence were furnished to us,
that the colours which appear so lovely to our eyes, have no attraction whatever to the inhabitants of another planet. Not only
so, we can conceive that the very order and proportions which
awaken so deep an interest in our minds, might be contemplated
with no feeling of admiration by beings endowed with a different
mental constitution.
At the same time it should be acknowledged that there seem to
be qualities which must have an excellence altogether independent
of the mind which views them. It is an opinion which goes as far
back as the time of Plato, and has ever since been widely entertained, that beauty of forms consists in some sort of proportion
or harmony,* which may admit of a mathematical expression; and
later and more scientific research is altogether in its favour. It
is now established that complementary colours, that is, colours
which when combined make up the full beam, are felt to be beautiful when seen simultaneously; that is, the mind is made to dclight in the unities of nature. At the basis of music there are
certain fixed ratios; and in poetry of every description there are
measures and correspondencies. Pythagoras has often been ridiculed for his doctrine of the music of the spheres; and probably
his views were sufficiently mystical and fanciful, but the latest
science shows that there is a harmony in all nature,-in its forms,
its forces, and its motions. The higher unorganized, and all organized objects, take definite forms which are often regulated by
mathematical laws.  The forces of nature can be estimated in
numbers, and light and heat seem to go in undulations, or at least
by intervals, while the movements of the great bodics in nature
are periodical.t Such facts as these seem to show that, at the
basis of beauty, there may very probably be principles which are
necessary, eternal, and altogether independent of the individual
mind, or even of the general mind of humanity. But over them
all the mind seems to spread a colour and a lustre which we can
* See fine Platonic speculations in M'Vicar,'On  the Beautiful,
the Picturesque, the Sublime,' and the'Philosophy of the Beautiful;'
and in Blackie's'Beauty, with Plato's Doctrine of the Beautiful;' as
well as in Ruskin's'Modern Painters,' vol. ii.
t The harmonies in nature, in respect of Colour, Number, Form, etc.,
are illustrated in'Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation.'
U
I-) 8 9 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
not regard as necessary, and which may not be universal; or which,
if universal, can have become so only by the appointment of the one
God, who Himself delights, and would also lead us to delight in the
unity and harmony which run through all his works. It is quite
possible that, so far as there are eternal principles lying at the
basis of certain forms of beauty, they may only be modifications of
the eternal principles of truth.
Other kinds of beauty ally themselves more closely with the
morally good. There is a beauty in all truly virtuous and beneficent actions of the creature, and, above all, of the Great Creator.
Whatever seems to proceed from love or from kindness, such as
peace and plenty and diffused happiness, is apt to collect a feeling
of loveliness around it. The question is started, May not the
principles which underlie these forms of beauty be modifications of
the eternal principles of right and wrong?
In the pages of all writers who have meditated profoundly on
this subject, will be found such utterances as these:-" The beautiful is always true;" "The beautiful is ever good." Alas! the only
exception to this last maxim is to be found in certain human
beings, in which guilt has destroyed the holy, but left as yet, and
for a time, the lovely, which however will in due time lose its
lustre. But there is truth involved in these maximns, and I have
sometimes thought that it lies in this, that at the basis of beauty
there are'eternal principles, modifications of the true and the good,
over which the mind casts a colour and a clothing. The God who
made us hath given us a nature which throws a halo and a radiance
round certain kinds of everlasting verities and moral qualities, with
the view of rendering them attractive, and gathering our affections
about them.
CHIIAPTER II.
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISES OF
CONSCIENCE.
SECT. I. CONVICTIONS AS TO THE NATURE OF MORAL GOOD.
STILL deeper interests are involved in our being able to
show that there is an immutable and eternal morality
than even in our proving that there is immutable and
290 
CONVICTIONS INVOI,VED IN CONSCIENCE. 
eternal truth. But after having laboured at such length
to demonstrate that there are native and necessary principles involved in the intellectual exercises of the mind, it
will not be needful to take such pains to show that there
are similar convictions of a moral character. The mind
is led by its very nature and constitution to perceive that
there is an indelible distinction between good and evil,
just as there is an indelible distinction between truth and
falsehood. It finds that every substance has potency;
that the species implies the individual; but it also declares that to give every one his due is good, and must
be good, and that it is wrong in children to neglect their
parents, and in God's creatures to forget their Creator.
Let me endeavour to bring out and express some of the
principal moral convictions of the mind.
I. The moral quality is not given to the action by the
mind contemplating it. It is not a colour thrown over
the object by the mental eye which perceives it, but is a
real quality of the object, is there prior to its being perceived, and is in the object whether it is perceived or
not. It is not our perception and approbation that render
a benevolent action good; but we perceive its excellence
and approve of it because it is good. It follows that
II. Moral good is moral good to all intelligences so
high in the scale of being as to be able to discern it.
I lay down this position in order to guard against the
idea that moral excellence is something depending on
the peculiar constitution of man, and that it is allowable
to suppose that there may be intelligent beings in other
worlds to whom virtue does not appear as virtue. Such
a view seems altogether inconsistent with our intuitive
convictions, and would effectually undermine the foundations of morality.  It is allowable to suppose that there
may be beings in other worlds who see no beauty in the
colours or in the shapes and proportions which we so
u 2
291 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
much admire; but I cannot admit that there are any intelligent and responsible beings who look on malevolence
as a virtue or justice as a sin.*
1II. Moral good lays an obligation on us to attend to
it. This sense, or rather, conviction of obligation, is one
of the peculiarities, is indeed the chief peculiarity, of our
moral perceptions.   Herein do our moral convictions,
whether of the nature of cognitions, beliefs, or judgments,
differ from the intellectual convictions which have passed
under our notice in the previous parts of this treatise.
That a straight line is the shortest between two points,
this I am constrained to decide when my attention is
called to the subject, but I know of no duty thence arising,
no affection which I should thereon cherish, no action
which I ought to do. But when I am led to believe that
there is a good God who made me and upholds me, the
mind declares that it is and must be good to love and
obey that Being, and that there is an obligation lying on
me to do so.  This is expressed by such phrases as Be'ov,
duty, riqht, omtyht, obliacttiozi, the convictions embodied in
which cannot be accounted for on any utilitarian hypothesis. It is shown that a particular action readily within
our power will tend to promote the happiness of an individual or of society.  The mindi's apprehension of this
is one thing, and the conviction that we ought to do it is
an entirely different thing, and the two should never be
confounded.
But the conscience is not only a cognitive, it is a motive power. This conviction of obligation distinguishes
* The systems which represent man's moral faculty as a mere feeling
or sentiment, such as the systems of Adam Smith, of Thomas Brown,
of Sir James Mackintosh, are chargeable with two defects:-First,
the theory does not come up to the full mental facts, which embrace
perception, or knowledge, and judgment, as well as emotion; and, as a
consequence, secondly, they make it appear as if virtue might arise from
the peculiar constitution or temperament of the race.
292 
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE.
it at once from the other motive as it does firom the other
cognitive powers.   The inducements addressed to man's
sense of duty are altogether different from those addressed
to the other appetencies of the mind. The love of pleasure, of fame, and of activity, do all hold out allurements
to man, but none of them carries with it a binding obligation. When we follow them we have no sense of merit;
when we decline them we have nonsense of guilt. It is
different when our moral convictions say that a particular
line of conduct should be pursued. We feel now not
only that we may do it, but that we should do it, and
that if we neglect to do it, we are guilty of sin. Hence
arises the great ethical doctrine, expounded in so masterly a manner by Bishop Butler, that the conscience is
supreme; that is, supreme among the other moving
powers.   Just as appetite craves for food, and the love
of society for social intercourse, so the conscience directs
to certain conduct, but with this difference, that it declares itself superior to the others.  It carries with it its
authority, and asserts its claims, and is prepared to denounce its if we disregard them.
IV. The conscience points to an authority above itself.
It is supreme as within the mind, but it is not absolutely
supreme.   It claims to be superior to all other motives,
such as the love of pleasure, and even to such motives as
intellectual improvement; but it seems to point to a
power above the mind altogether. At the same time it
does not seem to announce what is the nature of the object which it would prompt us to seek after.  In this respect it is like some of our intellectual intuitions, which
impel us to look round for something which they do not
themselves reveal. Thus, intuitive causality constrains us
when we discover an effect to look for a cause, but does
not specify what the cause is. In like manner our moral
faculty seems to me to point to some power, principle,
o93 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
or being, it says not what, above itself. It does not claim
for itself that it is infallible, that it is sufficient, that it is
independent. It bows to something which has authority;
it acknowledges a standard which is and must be right;
it looks up for sanction and guidance.   It says that it
ought to yield to no earthly power; but it does not
affirm of itself that it can never mistake, and that there
is no authority to which it should submit. On the contrary, it often finds itself in difficulty and perplexity, and
feels that it should look round and up for a light, and it is
sure that there is such a light.   What is thus unknown
to the intuition itself, but which, notwithstanding, it is
ever seeking, is revealed by other processes.
V. This obligation, when we are led to believe in a
Supreme Being, takes the form of law; and we believe
that we are under law to God.   Our moral convictions
do not, so it seems to me, of themselves compel us to
believe in the existence of God. I am persuaded, however, that like most of our deeper intuitions (as I hope
subsequently to show) they do point upwards to God.
And whenever we do, by combined intuition and the obvious facts of experience, reach God, the God who gave
us all our endowments, and therefore our moral constitution, the mind traces up the obligation under which it
lies to Him.   The expression of this inward conviction
now is not that we are under obligation to an unknown
power, but under law, and under law to God. It is thus
indeed we get the peculiar idea of moral government and
moral law, not from sense, nor from pleasure, nor from
utility, but from conscience constraining us to feel obligation, and combined intuition and experience leading us
to trace up that law to God as the Being who sanctions
it. Till this object is reached, our moral intuition is felt
to be vague, indefinite; it is craving for something which
it feels to be wanting; but when God is foltnd, as li.,
294 
CONVICTIONS INVOILVED IN CONSCIENCE.
cannot fail to be found when we are in search of Him,
then the intuition is satisfied, and ever after connects the
law with the lawgiver.
VI. Moral good is perceived as having desert, as approvable and rewardable. This, too, is a peculiar idea,
derived from the moral power in man, and cannot have
been derived from, as it cannot be resolved into, any
modification of pleasure, or pain, or sensation of any
kind. We are convinced in regard to every good action
that it is meritorious; we give to it our approbation,
and we look for encouragement and reward. This conviction operates with other considerations in leading us
to look to God as the Governor of this World, and as
ready to uphold and defend the right. There are times
when our expectations on this subject are disappointed,
and when we see deeds of moral heroism only landing
him who performs them in opprobrium  and suffering.
Still, even in such cases, our instincts keep firm, in spite
of all appearances to the contrary; and we believe that,
sooner or later, in this world or the world to come, the
deeds will meet with their appropriate reward.
VII. Moral good lies in the region of the will. By
this I mean that every truly virtuous act must be a
voluntary one. In saying so, I do not mean to assert
that every morally good act must be a volition contemplatinlg or performing some outward deed. The will of
man exists in other forms than in a resolution to act.
Wherever there is choice, I hold that there is will.
Whenever I adopt any particular object presented, or
prefer any one object to another, there is choice.  There
is also the exercise of choice, and therefore of will, in
all cases in which we deliberately reject any object or
proposal made to us. I hold then that there is choice
-not only in volition, or resolution, or the final determination to act,-there is choice in wish or in voluntary
295 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
aversion.   When we wish that God's name may be hal lowed, that our friends may prosper and be in health,
there is will. These wishes and volitions and rejections
may unite themselves with any one of our feelings, and
even with our intellectual exercises. Using will in this
wide sense, I say that it is the region, and the exclusive
region, of moral good. It is in voluntary acts that the
conscience discerns a moral quality, and it is upon such
acts, and no others, that it pronounces its decisions. We
shall see forthwith that the will, in all its proper acts,
is free; and it is upon acts which we were free to perform, but from which also we were free to abstain, that
all the judgments of conscience are declared.
VIII. Moral Good is a quality of certain actions proceeding from Free Will. I have been urging that moral
good is not a creation of the mind when contemplating
actions or affections, but that it has an actual existence.
But let us understand what is the precise nature of the
reality. In order to express the reality, some are in the
habit of saying that morality has an objective and not a
mnere subjective existence.   But this language is not
fitted to bring out the full truth, and may leave an erroneous impression, as if moral excellence had an existence
as a separate object, like a stone or a mountain. It has
an existence, but merely as a quality of free acts of intelligent beings.
IX. The moral quality of action cannot be resolved
into anything simpler. The miind discerns it at once, as
the eye sees a surface and the muscular sense feels pressure. If any man asks us, What is extension? we bid
him exercise his bodily senses. If any man asks us,
What is virtue? I bid himn exercise his conscience in
looking at a good action.   No attempt should be made
to give a positive definition of virtue. Any pIroffered
definition will either be erroneous, or it will be a mere
296 
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE.
identical proposition.  If we say that virtue consists in
happiness, or in utility, or in beneficial tendency, all
such accounts are utterly wrong, for they leave out the
mrain  elements,  the obligation,  the  imperativeness of
moral law, the desert, the approvableness, the rewardableness. If we introduce such phrases as the following,
and say that virtue is binding, that it is right, good;
we are, after all, only saying that virtue is virtue. All
that can be done by moral science on this particular
point is, to exhibit fully the distinctive features, so that
the conscience may recognize them, to bring out the law
or principle, and embody it in suitable expressions.
SECT. II. ON SIN AND ERROR.
I have been arguing that our intellectual and moral
intuitions are all necessary and universal. This doctrine
however must not be so stated as to imply that it is
impossible for man to fall into error, or for the conscience to come to a false decision, or for human beings
to commit sin.
That men do, in fact, fall into error is evident from
this single circumstance, that scarcely two persons can
be brought to accord in opinion, even on points of importance.   In regard, indeed, to necessary truths, there
are certain restrictions laid on the mind. No man who
considers the subject can be made to believe that two
straight lines will enclose a space.  Still, even in regard
to such truths, the mind has a capacity of ignorance and
of error; it may refuse to consider them, and, mistaking
their nature, it may make statements inconsistent with
them without knowing it. Those who have gone through
the demonstrations of Euclid are constrained to believe
the truth of every proposition, but the truths have never
so much as been presented to the minds of the great
In(jority of mankind, and many persons might easily be
297 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
persuaded that the angles of certain triangles are equal
to less or to more than two right-angles.   But whatever
the restrictions laid on our liability to error in necessary
truth, there seem to be no limits to man's exposure to
mistakes in other matters. There is boundless room for
them in all conclusions which are dependent on expe riential evidence, especially when that evidence is of a
cumulative character. In all such matters the mind may
refuse to look at the evidence, or it may take only what
is favourable to one side, and may arrive at most er roneous and preposterous results. This liability to error
is apt to appear in all affairs in which we are under the
influence of pride or party spirit, or a prejudiced and
biassed disposition; in short, wherever there is moral
evil swaying the will, and leading it to look on evidence
in a partial spirit.  If I were immediately cognizant of
tlle heart of a good man, and could see the springs that
move him to benevolence and self-sacrifice, I should be
constrained to approve of him; but I may be prejudiced
against him, and I shall twist and torture facts till I
bring myself to believe that he is doing all this from a
deep designing selfishness.   The topic does not come
within my proper scope, but I cannot keep from giving
it as nmy decided conviction, that while ignorance may
arise from the limited nature of our faculties and from a
limited means of knowledge, positive error does in every
case proceed directly or indirectly from a corrupted will,
leading us to pronounce a hasty judgment without evidence, or to seek partial evidence on the side to which
our inclinations lean. A thoroughly pure and candid
will would, in my opinion, preserve man, even with his
present limited faculties, not indeed froln ignorance on
many points, but from all possibility of positive mistakes.
But the question may be asked, How is the existence
()f sill, and of wrong decisions of the colnscience, consistcllt
2 98 
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE.
with the necessity which attaches to our moral convictions? The difficulty can easily be removed so far as the
existence of sin is concerned; for sin must ever proceed
from the region of the will, which is free to do good,
but also free to do evil.  It may be necessary for the
conscience to decide in a certain manner, but it is not
necessary that the will should do what the conscience
commands. And it is to the influence exercised by a disobedient will upon the conscience that I attribute all the
errors in its decisions. In whatever way we may reconcile them, these two facts can each be established on
abundant evidence: the one, that in the primitive exercises Of conscience there is a conviction of necessity; the
other is, that the conscience is liable to manifold perversions.  Care must be taken not to state the two so as to
make the one appear to be inconsistent with the other;
both can be so enunciated as to make all seeming contradiction vanish.  As to the exact nature of the necessity of conviction, and the ground which it covers, this is
to be determined, like its existence, by an observation of
the conviction itself. If we look directly and fairly at
moral excellence, the mind must declare it to be good.
But then first the mind may refuse to look at it at all,
and secondly, it may not regard it in the right light. If
we look upon the living and the true God in the proper
aspect, we must acknowledge that we owe Him love an(l
obedience; but then we may refuse to look upon Him,
we may contrive to live without God, and God may not
be in all our thoughts; or we may fashion to ourselves a
Deity with a degraded nature, making Him one altoge ther like unto ourselves, and then the proper awe and af fection will no longer rise in our bosoms.
It is to be taken into account that, while our decisions
upon the acts presented may be intuitively certain, yet
that the acts arc not intuitively presented, and  may be
299 
0MORAL CONVICTIONS.
very inaccurately presented.   The conscience, it is to be
remembered, is a reflex faculty, judging of objects pre  sented to it by the other powers, and the representation
given it umay be incorrect.   The liability to deception
and perversion is increased by the circumstance that the
states of mind with which our voluntary acts are mixed
upl) are of a very complicated character. There is room
in this way for giving a wrong account of our actual state
of mind at any given moment.   I contribute a sum of
money to relieve a person in distress; I may do so from
a variety of motives; but I am naturally led by self-love
to look on the motive as good, and then I cherish a feel ing of self-approbation, in which I should by no means
have been justified had I taken a searching view of the
whole mental state.  Again, I find a neighbour doing
the very same act, and I am led by jealousy to attribute
selfish motives to him, and I condemn him in a judgment
in which I may be equally unwarranted.   By such se ductions as these the mind may become utterly perverted
in the representations which it gives, and in the consequent moral judgments which it pronounces. In the
case of these perversions of the conscience, as ill the case
of the errors of the understanding (as we have previously
seen), the evil is to be traced to the will refusing to give
obedience to its proper law, and conjuring up a series of
deceptions to excuse and defend itself. The intuition is
after all there, but it is difficult in a mind perverted by a
corrupt and prejudiced will to put it in a position to act
aright.  In order to this, it may be needful to have a
DI)ivine Law revealed, and this applied by a teaching and
quickening Spirit from above.
We are already in the heart of the subject of Sin, a
topic which academic moralists studiously avoid,  but
which must be carefully looked at by those who would
give a correct account of our moral constitution.   In re
300 
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE.
ferring to it here, I do not profess to be able to give an
explanation of the origin of sin under the government of
God, whose power is Almighty, and who shows that he
hates sin. This seems to be a mystery which human
reason cannot clear up.  The topic certainly does not fall
within the scope of our present investigation. I have
here simply to consider sin in its reference to our moral
convictions.
I. The conscience declares that sin is a reality.  It is
a reality of the very same description as moral good. It
is not a separate entity, like a plant or an animal, but it
is a quality of certain voluntary acts.   I lay down this
position in opposition to those who would represent sin
as a mere privation or a negation. I never can bring
myself to believe that deceit and envy and malice and
ungodliness and lust, are merely the absence of certain
qualities; they imply the presence Qf real qualities in the
will of those who cherish the affections and cowmmit the
deeds.
II. Sin is a quality of voluntary acts. It always resides in some mental affection or act in which there is the
exercise of free will.  The guilt of the sin thus always
lies with him who commits it. He cannot throw the
blame on any other, for he has himself given his consent
to it.  Others may have seduced him into it, and in that
case the criminality of having tempted him lies with
them; but then the sin of having yielded to the temptation and having done the wicked deed lies with himself,
he can devolve it onil no other.
III. Our moral convictions declare that sin- is of evil
desert, condemnable, punishable. This conviction is of
precisely an opposite character to that which we entertain in regard to good affection and action. We declare
the sin to have in itself evil desert; we condemn it in
conse.quence, and we say of it, that it should be dis
301 
MORALI, CONVICTIONS.
couraged, nay, punished. The very ideas, so full of
meaning, involved in these mental convictions, are native,
original, and necessary. We cannot get them from mere
sensations of pleasure or pain, or from any intellectual
operation whatever; and yet we are constrained to take
this view of sin wherever it is pressed fairly upon our
notice. It is this conviction that stirs up and keeps alive
a sense of guilt and apprehension of punishment in the
breast of every sinner. It is found even among children, and among the rudest and most ignorant savages,
who are urged thereby to try somle means of avoiding or
averting the wrath of God, and who are prepared in consequence to listen to the parent, or teacher, or missionary, when he speaks of the desert of sin, and points to a
Saviour who suffered in our room and stead, and so made
reconciliation for transgressors.
SECT. III. RELATION OF MORAL GOOD AND HAPPINESS.
These two have a number of points of connection and
correspondence. Much of moral good consists in the
voluntary promotion of happiness, and the diminution of
pain in a world in which there is such a liability to suffering. A very large number of human virtues, and of
vices too, take their origin from mnan's capacity of pleasure and pain; and in a state of things in which there
was no possibility of increasing felicity, or removing
misery, many of this world's virtues would altogether
disappear. Still the two, while they have many interesting points of affinity, are not to be identified. In particular, we are not to resolve virtue into a mere tendency
to promote the pleasure of the individual or happiness of
the race. There seems to me to be certain great truths
which the mind perceives at once, in regard to the connection of the two.
I. The good is good altogether independent of the
302 
CONVIICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE.
pleasure it may bring. There is a good which does not
immediately contemplate the production of happiness.
Such, for example, are love to God, the glorifying of
God, and the hallowing of His name: these have no respect, in our entertaining and cherishing them, to an augmentation of the Divine felicity. No doubt such an act
or spirit may, by reflection of light, tend to brighten our
own felicity; but this is an indirect effect, which follows
only where we cherish the temper and perform the corresponding work in the idea that it is right. We do
deeds of justice to the distant, to the departed, and the
dead, who never may be conscious of what we have performed. Even in regard to services done with the view
of promoting the happiness of the individual, or of the
community, we are made to feel that, if happiness be
good, the benevolence which leads us to seek the happiness of others is still better, is alone morally good.   In
all cases the conscience constrains us to decide that virtue is good, whether it does or does not contemplate the
production of pleasure.
II. Our moral constitution declares that we ought to
promote the happiness of all who are susceptible of happiness. The only plausible form of the utilitarian theory
of morals is that elaborated by Bentham, who says that
we ought to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But why ought we to do so? Whence gel
we the should, the obligation, the duty? Why should I
seek the happiness of any other being than myself? why
the happiness of a great number, or of the greatest number? why the happiness even of any one individual beyond the unit of self? If the advocates of the "greatest
happiness" principle will only answer this question thoroughly, they must call in a moral principle, or take refuige in a system against which our whole nature rebels,
in a theory which says that we are not required to do
303 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
more than look after our own gratifications. The very advocates of the greatest happiness theory are thus constrained, if they will only adhere to their view, to call in
an ethical principle, and this will be found, if they examine it, to require more from man than that he should
further the felicity of others.* But while it covers vastly
more ground, it certainly includes this, that we are
bound, as much as in us lies, to promote the welfare of
* Mfr. J. S. Mill gives up Paley as an expounder of utilitarianism
(Dissertations, vol. ii. p. 460), and allows, as to Bentham, "that there
were large deficiencies and hiatuses in his scheme of human nature" (p.
462). To whom then are we to look, if we would examine a system
which assumes such different shapes; which now takes the form of a
selfish system whose principle is that every man should seek his own
happiness, now the form of a benevolent system, which says that a man
should promote the happiness of the greatest number? In the first of
these forms it is at once set aside by an appeal to our nature, and to
feelings which Mr. Mill admits to be in our nature. In the second of
these forms, that taken by Bentham and Mill, there is a principle of intuitive morals surreptitiously admitted, that we should look to the happiness of others as well as our own. Mr. Mill says, "The matter in debate is what is right,-not whether what is right ought to be done" (p.
460). This is not a full or accurate account of the matter in debate. One
question in debate is, Can the utilitarian theory account for our conviction as to right and wrong, merit and guilt? I hold that it cannot.
The higher class of utilitarians seem to trace these convictions to the
association of ideas proceeding on our feelings of pleasure and pain.
Thus Mr. Mill says (vol. i. p. 137), "The idea of the pain of another
is naturally painful; the idea of the pleasure of another is naturally
pleasurable. From this fact in our natural constitution, all our affections, both of love and aversion, towards human beings, in so far as they
are different from those we entertain towards mere inanimate objects
which are pleasant or disagreeable to us, are held by the best teachers
of the theory of utility to originate. In this, the unselfish part of our
nature, lies a foundation, even independently of inculcation from without, for the generation of moral feelings." Let it be observed that this
makes the very unselfish part of our nature stand on a selfish basis.
"The idea of the pleasure of another is naturally pleasurable," that is, to
ourselves. I hold that we are led to love our fellow-creatures independently of its being pleasant to ourselves; and that it is when we love
them that the affection is found to be pleasant, by the appointment of
the Author of our constitution, who thus prompts us to benevolence,
and rewards us for cherishing it. The theory does not account for our
benevolent feelings, and it fails still more when it would account for our
304 
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE.
all who are capable of having their misery alleviated or
their felicity enhanced.
III. Our moral convictions affirm that moral good
should meet with happiness. They seetn to declare that
this is in itself appropriate and good; and when we are
led to believe in the existence of a good God, we are sure
that He will seek to secure this end.   Experience, no
doubt, shows many things in seeming opposition to this,
moral convictions. I admit that it might give some explanation of certain accompaniments, but it can give no account of the conviction of
"ought," " obligation," " duty," " merit," " desert," " guilt." A second
question in debate is, Can the utilitarian show that anything is "right"?
that there is truly anything such that it "ought to be done " P Suppose
some sensationalist or sceptic were to maintain, as against the utilitarian, that he was not bound to promote this happiness of the greatest
number, how would the advocate of the greatest happiness principle reply to him? Consistently, he could appeal only to these personal feelings of pleasure and pain; and if he appealed to anything deeper, it
must be to the very moral principle whose existence he denies. There
is a third question in debate, which will be more easily determined
after we have settled the other two. For when it is shown that man
has convictions as to moral good and evil, and that these require
him to do certain acts and abstain from others, we may be the better
prepared to admit, as to certain of these acts, that they do not contemplate the promotion of happiness. Thus, to love God is good, and to refuse to any one his due affection and gratitude for favours seems to be
evil, independently of the happiness of the creature or Creator being
thereby augmented or diminished. A fourth question is, Does utility
afford a good test and measure of virtue and vice P It is foreign to the
scope of this treatise to enter on this question, but I may remark that
the ultimate appeal to "ought" and "duty" being taken away, and
the appeal, in the last resource, being to pleasure and pain, utilitarianism will not train men to deeds of self-sacrifice, and those who have
embraced it will ever be tempted to give way on great emergencies, and
to yield and equivocate when they should at all hazards resist the evil.
And it has been shown again and again, that it is beyond the capacity of man to foresee the results of acts, or even to discern the tendency of certain acts done in complicated circumstances. But, omitting this, it is to my present purpose to call on my readers to notice
that the theory of an independent morality, and of moral conviction,
admits and embraces all that is true in utilitarianism. It affirms that
we ought to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and
in regard to all questions bearing on happiness, the conscience requires
us to weigh consequences and to look to long issues and results.
x
305 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
shows many crushed with misfortune and wrung with
agony, who are far more virtuous than those who are in
the enjoyment of health and prosperity. But our inward
convictions guide us to the right conclusions in spite of
these apparently contradictory results of outward observation. They lead us to believe that they who are thus
afflicted are after all suffering no injustice, inasmuch as
they have sinned against heaven, and to expect that the
wicked will not be allowed to pass unpunished. And
since we do not discover a full retribution in this world,
they lead us to look forward to a day of judgment, in
which all the inequalities and seeming incongruities of
this present dispensation will be rectified in appearance
as well as in reality, and the justice of God's moral government fully vindicated.
IV. Our moral convictions declare that sill merits pain
as a punishment. There is as close a connection between
sin and pain as there is between virtue and happiness.
There may indeed be happiness, and there may be suffering, where there is neither virtue nor the opposite, as, for
example, among the brute creation; but wherever there is
virtue, we decide that it merits happiness, and wherever
there is sin, that it deserves suffering, and we are led to
anticipate that the proper consequences will follow under
the government of a good and a holy God. But as the
intellectual intuition of causation, while it constrains us
to look for a cause, does not make known the precise
cause, so our moral conviction of merit, while it leads us
to look for the punishment of sin, does not specify where,
or when, or how the penalty is to be inflicted: all that it
intimates is that it should and shall come.  This convic
tion keeps alive in the breasts of the wicked at least an
occasional fear of punishment, even in the midst of the
greatest outward prosperity, and points very emphatically,
if not very distinctly, to a day of judgment and of righ
306 
CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN CONSCIENCE.
teous retribution. But as this instinct does not supply
the object, it is quite possible that a wrong one may
be presented by the baser fears of the heart, or by a
degraded superstition, and the final judgment may be
thought of as a petty assize, and the judge be regarded
as gratifying a personal revenge, and heaven be contemplated as an elysium of sensual joys, and hell as a place
of vulgar torture. Still the conviction does demand its
object, and when the moral sense is refined, it feels that
the account given in Scripture of a judgment day, and of
a heaven of light, and a hell of darkness, is in thorough
correspondence with the intuition which God has planted
in our mental constitution.
But in contemplating and in harmonizing such truths
as these, Natural Ethics finds itself in difficulties: it starts
questions which it cannot answer; it raises doubts which
it cannot dispel. We see on the one hand that God will
be led to punish sin, that he "will by no means clear
the guilty."  But we have evidence, on the other hand,
that he delights supremely in the happiness of his creatures. How then can God be just and yet the justifier
of the ungodly? Intuitive Ethics conducts us to a yawning chasm, but shows no bridge across; while we are led
most anxiously to long for one, and almost to expect that
one will appear. It leads us to a place where we have
no light, but where we are led to cry out for a light because of the very thickness of the darkness. How grateful should we be when a light is vouchsafed fromn heaven
to show us that the gulf is spanned, and to disclose the
way by which it may be crossed!
x 2
307 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
CHAPTER III.
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
WE have seen that conscience pronounces its decisions
on acts of the will.  NTot only so, its judgments proceed
on the supposition that the will is in the proper exercise
of its full functions; in other words, that the will is free.
In every act of will there is an essential freedom, of which
the mind is conscious.  The possession of a free will is
thus one of the elements which go to constitute man a
moral and responsible agent.
The will is free. In saying so, I mean to assert, not merely that it is free to act as it pleases,-indeed it may often
be hindered from action, as when I will to move my arm,
and it refuses to obey because of paralysis.   I claim for
it an anterior and a higher power, a power in the mind
to choose, and, when it chooses, a consciousness that it
might choose otherwise.
This truth is revealed to us by immediate consciousness, and is not to be set aside by any other truth whatever.  It is a first truth equal to the highest, to no one
of which will it ever yield.  It cannot be set aside by
any other truth whatever, nor even by any other first
truth, and certainly by no derived truth. Whatever other
proposition is true, this is true also, that man's will is
free. If there be any other truth apparently inconsistent
with it, care must be taken so to express it that it may
not be truly contradictory.
It is a truth which may be expressed in words. It
is so expressed when we say the mind has in itself tile
power of choice. But it cannot be drawn from any deeper
fact, or resolved into any anterior principle.  Any attempts to reduce it to simpler elenments, will only perplex
and confuse the whole subject. Thus, that which is free,
308 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
is often supposed to be uncaused; whereas the uncaused
for aught I know, might, if there could be such a thing
in creation, not be free.  It is from the exercise of will
that we get our very idea of freedom. As we survey the
external world, including even our own bodily frame, we
find it bound in the chain of physical causation, in which
every movement of an object is determined from without.  Even our very intellectual and emotive states are
under laws of association and potencies which control
them. It is in the sanctuary of the will that freedom alone
is to be found.
So much is clear, so very clear that any attempts to
make it clearer will only darken it. The difficulties which
encompass this subject do not arise fromn free will itself,
but from its connection with other truths. First, there is
the Divine Foreknowledge and the Divine Sovereignty,
doctrines which recommend themselves to high reason,
and which are found in the Word of God. Secondly,
there is the appearance of causation in the mind, even
in its voluntary acts. The attempt to reconcile these with
creature freedom has engaged the subtlest and perplexed
the clearest minds since men began to ask the how, the
why, and the wherefore. It is my humble but decided
opinion that the human understanding cannot thoroughly
clear up the subject. I certainly do not profess to be able
to throw light upon it. I must content myself with remarking on some of the more prevalent theories, and expounding the view which seems to me to be upon the
whole the most satisfactory.
Among the speculative thinkers of the present day
there are two favourite modes by which they try to extricate themselves from the difficulties which beset the
subject. One was introduced by Kant, who has been
followed by a long train of theologians and metaphysicians. According to this view, the mind knows only
309 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
phenomena, and not things, and the law of cause and
effect is a mental framework giving a form to our knowledge of phenomena. It applies therefore to phenomena,
and not to things, which, for aught we know, or can
know in this world, may or may not obey the law of
causation. Kant acknowledges that we are led by the
speculative principles of the mind to look on even the
will as under the dominion of cause, but then it is
quite conceivable that the thing itself may after all be
free, and we are led to believe it to be free by the Practical Reason. Now I have to remark, first of all, on this
theory, that it must be taken in its entirety. We are not
at liberty (as some would do) to adopt it so far merely as
it may suit our purpose, and refuse the very foundation
on which it is built. We must, in particular, admit as a
fundamental principle that we can never know things,
and that causation has no respect whatever to things, but
is a mere subjective principle of the mind. But I have
failed in one of the main ends of this treatise if I have
not succeeded in showing that the mind has knowledge
of things in its primary exercises, that we know objects
as having potency, and that the law of cause and effect
refers to such objects. If we deny this, we are denying
certain of the intuitions of the mind in certain of their
clearest enunciations; and if we deny them in one of their
declarations, why not in others? and if we deny one set,
why not every other set? till at last we know not what
to believe and what to disbelieve. Those who believe
that the mind can come to the knowledge of things, and
that they discover power in things, cannot resort to this
theory.
A more prevalent doctrine among those who hold firmly
by the freedom of the will, is that causation does not extend to the production of volitions. Thus, M. Cousin
maintains that we obtain our very idea of causes from
310 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
the exercise of will, which may be a cause, but cannot
be an effect. The difficulties in the way of this theory
arise, first, from the nature of our intuition in regard to
cause, and, secondly, from certain facts which seem to
show that there is causation in the will.  The question
is, first, whether causation reaches over our volitions, as
it does over our other mental acts.  A man does a malevolent or a benevolent deed: when this fact is presented,
the question is, Do we, or do we not, look for a cause in
the previous character and disposition of the individual,
combined possibly with the circumstances in which he
was placed? Do we not anticipate of the man thoroughly
just, that he will ever do just acts? We are sure in regard to the good God that He will, and ever must be,
good. To confirm all this we have, secondly, facts, statistical facts. Knowing that if causes keep the same, the
same effects will follow, men draw out statistics of voluntary acts, which turn out to be quite as correct as statistics of the weather, or of the mortality of man. The
number of thefts and murders that will be committed in
a country next year, and the number of letters which will
be posted, can be determined as accurately as the number of births or deaths. The facts cannot be denied, and
they proceed on the principles of a sameness of causes
producing a sameness of effects, which causes embrace
voluntary acts.
To avoid these difficulties, I am inclined to admit that
antecedent circumstances do act causally on the will. But
at the same time I maintain that cause operates in a very
different way upon the will from that in which it acts in
other departments of nature.   The mind has and must
have the power of free choice: so says consciousness. But
consciousness does not say, and cannot say, what antecedent circumstances of an internal character have swayed
the will. These causes certainly do not operate as causes
311 
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
operate in physical nature, or as causes operate in our
intellectual being. I have shown that cause in the mind
is not of the same character as cause in physical nature.
I believe that cause as operating on the will is of a different character from cause as acting in the intellectual
or emotive parts of our nature. It is here, I believe,-that
is, in the peculiar nature of cause as operating on the will,
- that the means of clearing up this subject, and effecting a reconciliation between the seeming incongruities,
are to be found.*  But I do not say that man can find
them, for I am convinced he cannot penetrate this region
and determine the nature and mode of operation of the
power which sways the will.  We can point to the place
where must lie the means of clearing up the mystery,
but then we cannot reach that place. It is the region
where operate the agencies which come between God and
the will of his rational and responsible creatures. Well
may we pause here, and lay our hands on our mouths,
as we say in our hearts, "Once have I spoken, but I will
not answer; yea, twice, but I will proceed no further."
* Some of my critics, most respected by me, such as the late Sir W.
Hamilton, Dr. Fitzgerald, Bishop of Cork, Dr. Ulrici, of Halle, and
Mr. Mansel, have publicly or privately taken exception to the doctrine
maintained in the'Method of Divine Government' as to there being
both freedom and a peculiar sort of causation in the will. I have in
that work, and now more fully in this, given the view which seems
sanctioned by our constitution. But I do shrink, on so tangled a subject, from controversy, believing that I can throw no new light on it. I
must ever hold most resolutely to the fundamental doctrine of the
freedom of the will. But I will listen most willingly to any one who
can give a better account-that is, more in accordance with our constitution-of the expectation that the thoroughly good being will continue good, and of the possibility of giving statistics in anticipation of
voluntary actions.
312 
PART THIRD.
INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES AND THE VARIOUS
SCIENCES.  
315
BOOK I.
METAPHYSICS.
CHAPTER I.
METAPHYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY.
THE, phrase Metaphysics is believed to have taken its
rise from the title given to one of the treatises of Aristotle. There is no reason to think that the name was
given to the work referred to by the author. It does not
even appear that it was meant to denote the nature of
the contents. Andronicus, it is said, inscribed on the
manuscripts, Ta  eTa''a Pvo'tca, to intimate that these
books were to follow the physical treatises.* In the
writings of Aristotle this department is called, not Metaphysics, but the First Philosophy.
Metaphysical speculation is usually supposed, and, I believe, correctly, to have originated with the Eleatics, who
flourished 450 or 500 years before our era. Separating
from the physiologists, that is, physical speculators, of the
Ionian School, they directed their attention to the dicta of
inward reason. Going far below what they represented
as the illusions of the senses, they sought to penetrate
* On the title, see Bonitz,' Commentarius' appended to his edition
of the Metaphysics.   See also M'Mahon's translation of the Metaphysics, p. 1., where Clemens Alexandrinus and Philoponus are quoted
as giving a different view from the common one. 
METAPHIYSICS.
the mystery of being.  With themn all things were one,
and this incapable of motion or of change.
Metaphysics are treated, along with all other topics,
by Plato, under the somewhat unfortunate name of Dia lectics, which has nearly the same meaning as Speculative
Philosophy has in modern times, only the former meant
discussion in conversation, the latter discussion in the
head or in books. According to Plato, it was the science
which treated of the one Real Being (T'o o'v) and the Real
Good. This one Real Being was not with him, as with
the Eleatics, inconsistent with the existence of the many.
It embraced the inquiry into the nature of the Good
and the Beautiful, and expounded the Eternal Ideas
which had been in or before the Divine Mind from all
eternity, to the contemplation of which man's soul could
rise by cogitation, because it had been formed in the
Divine image, and in which the sensible universe participated, thereby having a stability in the midst of its mutability.*
According to Aristotle, the First Philosophy treats of
entity so far forth as it is entity, and of quiddity or the
nature of a thing, and of that which is universally inherent, so far as it is in entity.   He  argues  that if
there were not some substance (ov'-a) other than those
that exist in nature, then physics would be the first
science, but if there be an eternal and unmovable substance, then there must be a prior science to treat of it,
and this is to be honoured as the first and highest philosophy. But the inquiry into entity is in fact an inquiry
into causes, or what makes a thing to be what it is; and
he shows that such an investigation conducts to four
causes: (1) the Formal (7v ovv't'av Kan'6 rV r as); (2)
the Material (Trev {xV  s, can To v7rO,KEEVOv); (3) the Effi
* It is scarcely necessary to refer to Archer Butler's account of
Plato, in Hist. of Anc. Phil., as the finest in our language.
316 
METAPHYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY. 317
cient (OGCv 4 apXl, T   icv7eos,); (4) the Final (so oV
6eVEKPV Kaa To ayaaoo').
From the bent of his genius, Bacon was no way addicted to metaphysics, but he allots it a separate and a
most important place. He says that Physics regards
what is wholly immersed in matter and movable, supposing only existence and natural necessity, whereas Metaphysics regards what is more abstracted and fixed,
and supposes also mind and idea. To be more particular, he represents physics as inquiring into the efficient
and material cause, and metaphysics into the formal and
final.t
The two largest metaphysical treatises of Descartes
are entitled'Meditations on the First Philosophy' and
'Principles of Philosophy.' He says that the first part
of philosophy is "Metaphysics, in which are contained
the principles of knowledge, among which are found the
explication of the principal attributes of God, of the immateriality of the soul, and of all the clear and simple
notions that are in us." He represents Philosophy as a
tree, of which Metaphysics is the root, Physics the trunk,
and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of
this trunk.++
In the Wolfian School which proposed to systematize
the scattered philosophy of Leibnitz, Metaphysics was
asked to deal with three grand topics,-God, the World,
and the Soul,-and should aim to construct a Rational
Theology, a Rational Physics, and a Rational Psychology.
Kant takes up this view of Metaphysics, but labours to
show that the speculative reason cannot construct any
one of these three sciences. The only available metaphysics, according to him, is a Criticism of the Reason,
unfolding its a priori elements. He arrives at the con   Metaph. i. 3, 1, compared with iii. 1, v. 1, 3.
t De Augmentis, iii. 4.       + Prin. Phil. Epis. Auth. 
METAPHYSICS.
clusion that all the operations of the Speculative Reason
are mere subjective exercises, which imply no objective
reality, and admit of no application to things; and he
saves himself from scepticism by a criticism of the Practical Reason, which guarantees the existence of God,
Freedom, and Immortality.*
In the schools which ramified from Kant, Metaphysics
is represented as being a systematic search after the Absolute,-after Absolute Being, its nature and its method
of development.
And what are we to make of Metaphysics in our own
country? It is clear that she has lost, and, I suspect, for
ever, the position once allowed her, when she stood at the
head of all secular knowledge, and claimed to be equal, or
all but equal, in rank, to theology itself.  "Time was,"
says Kant,t "when she was the queen of all the sciences;
and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-mnatter, this title of honour.   Now it is the fashion
to heap contempt and scorn upon her, and the matron
mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba." Some seem
inclined to treat her very much as they treat those dejure
sovereigns wandering over Europe, whom no country will
take as de facto sovereigns, that is, they give her all outward honour, but no authority.  Others are prepared to
set aside her claimns very summarily. The multitudes
who set value on nothing but what can be counted in
money, never allow themselves to speak of metaphysics
except with a sneer.   The ever-increasing number of
persons who read but who are indisposed to think, complain that philosophy is not so interesting as the new
novel, or the pictorial history, which is quite as exciting
and quite as untrue as the novel. The physicist who has
* See Methodenlehre, in Kr. d. r. Vern.
t Kritik, translated by Meiklejohn, p. xvii.
318 
METAPHYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY.  319
kept a register of the heat of the atmosphere at nine
o'clock in the morning for the last five years, and the naturalist who has discovered a plant or insect distinguished
from all hitherto known species by an additional spot,
cannot conceal their contempt for a department of in
quiry which deals with objects which cannot be seen nor
handled, weighed nor measured.
In the face of all this scorn I boldly affirm that Metaphysics are not exploded, and that they never will be exploded. But if they are to keep or regain a place in this
country, they must submit to lower their pretensions, and
secure that the performance be in some measure equal to
the profession made. In particular, they must confine
themselves to a field which is open to human investigation, and which can be overtaken. Looking to the philosophies to which I have just been referring, we see that
some have ascribed to it far too wide a province, allotting
to it inquiries which in modern times have been happily
distributed, owing to the advance in the division of labour, to a great number of sciences. The nature of things
without and within us, their causes and properties and
modes of operation, these are to be determined only by
a great number and variety of inductive sciences, each
prosecuted in its own way. Others again have allotted
to it investigations which must ever be futile, either because they are meaningless, or because they are beyond
the human faculties. Thus it is vain for man to seek after
Being in itself, or the One in itself, because there is no
such thing anywhere but in the brain of the metaphysician, who does not comprehend what sort of realities abstractions have; and as to the Absolute, if it has a signification at all, it is an object beyond the grasp of man's reason. But is there no field of inquiry left open to Metaphy
sics? I believe that there is, and that in this field those who
are competent for the arduous work of digging in it may 
METAPHYSICS.
find treasures of the highest value. Dugald Stewart has
noticed "the extraordinary change which has gradually
and insensibly taken place, since the publication of Locke's
Essay, in the meaning of the word Metaphysics, a word
formerly appropriated to the ontology and pneumatology
of the schools, but now understood as equally applicable
to all those inquiries which have for their object to trace
the various branches of human knowledge to the first
principles in the constitution of our nature." * This
is an approximation to a proper account of the science.
I am inclined to define Metaphysics as THE ScIENCE
WHICH INQUIRES INTO THE ORIGINAL OR INTUITIVE CONVICTIONS OF THE MIND, WITH A VIEW OF GENERALIZING
AND  EXPRESSING  THEM,  AND ALSO  OF DETERMINING
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTS REVEALED BY THEM.  In prosecuting the investigation, it must first be the aim of the
inquirer to observe the phenomena, primarily and mainly
by direct consciousness or immediate introspection, but
secondarily, and often as satisfactorily, by examining the
expression of the inward convictions in the conversation
and writings of mankind. As he observes, he must be careful by analysis to separate the intuitions from the associated mental states, and to distinguish between one kind
of intuition and another; and he must also endeavour to
classify them, and to put them in rigidly exact formulae.
What he thus reaches, if the process has been properly
conducted, he is entitled to regard as first, or fundamental,
or philosophic principles. In this investigation he will
sometimes have to look more to the subjective, and at other
times more to the objective side; or, in other words,
sometimes more to the knowing powers, and at other
times more to the objects known.  So far as the science
looks at the first, it may be called Gnosiology; t so far
* Dissertation, p. 475.
t Hamilton speaks of some older treatises, which afford a name not
320 
METAPHYSICS, GNOSIOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY.  321
as it looks to the second, it may be called Ontology;
which two may be regarded as subordinate departments
of Metaphysics. This treatise professes to be one on
Metaphysics throughout. In the Chapters which follow
this, I am to single out Knowing and Being for more
special consideration.
The province thus allotted to Metaphysics is quite a
defined one.  It is not the science of all truth, but it is
the science of an important department,-it is the science
of fundamental truth  It should not venture to ascertain
the nature of all knowledge, Divine and human; it should
be satisfied if it can find what are the original knowing
powers of man. It should not pretend to settle the nature of all being, or the whole nature of any one being;
but it would try to find what we can know of certain
kinds of being by intuition. It should not presume to
discover all causes,-which are to be discovered only partially by all the sciences,-but it should expound the nature of our original conviction regarding causation.   It
should not start with the Absolute, and thence derive all
dependent existence; but, as I will show, it is competent
to prove that our convictions, aided by obvious facts, lead
us to believe in an Infinite Being. It has a field in which
it is perfectly competent to discover truth. The body of
truth thus reached constitutes, in a special sense, philosophy; and'philosophical' is an epithet which may be
applied to every inquiry which reaches it in the last resort, or which begins with it and uses it. It is to be
valued, like all other truth, for its own sake, and because
truth is the nutriment of the intellect, for which it craves,
and by which, as it feeds on it, it is strengthened. The
principles at which it looks are involved, as I am to show
in next Book, in all the deeper sciences, in all mental
unsuitable for a nomology of cognitions, viz. Gnosiology, or Gnostologia (Met. Lect. 7).
Y 
METAPHYSICS.
sciences, in mathematics, and even in certain departments
of physical science; and it is desirable, not only for the
sake of metaphysics itself, but for their sakes, to have
these principles accurately expounded, in order that other
departments of knowledge may be delivered from discussions which are to them encumbrances, and have their
foundations distinctly laid and firmly settled. It is a
science in which progress may be made from age to age
by the united action of successive labourers observing,
distinguishing, arranging, and devising an appropriate
nomenclature. Like every other science which has to do
with facts, it must be conducted in the Inductive Method,* in which observation is the first process, and the
last process, and the main process throughout; the process with which we start, and the process by which we
advance all along, and at the close test all that is done;
but in which, at the same time, analysis and generalization are employed as instruments, always working, however, on facts observed. It is true that metaphysics reach
truth which is independent of any observation of ours,
but it is truth which we can discover only by induction.
CHAPTER II.
GNOSIOLOGY.
SECT. I. ON KNOWLEDGE.
WHAT is Science ('Et.,Uv7v)? is the question put by
Socrates in Plato's subtle dialogue of Thextetus. But
* "If ever our philosophy concerning the human mind is carried so
far as to deserve the name of science, which ought never to be despaired
of, it must be by observing facts, reducing them to general rules, and
drawing just conclusions from them." (Reid's Works, p. 122.)
322 
GNOSIOLOGY.
the word'science' has two meanings.  In one sense it
can be defined. It is knowledge arranged, correlated, or
systematized. In this sense we speak of astronomy, ge..
ology, logic, and other sciences. But the word had, at
least in Greek, another signification, and meant simply
knowledge; and we may suppose the question to be put,
What is Knowledge? To this the reply must be, that we
cannot positively define knowledge so as to make it intelligible to one who did not know it otherwise. Still we
can, by analysis, separate it from other things with which
it is associated,-such as sensations, emotions, and fancies,-and make it stand out distinctly to the view of
those who are already conscious of it. The science which
thus unfolds the nature of knowledge may be called Gnosiology, or Gnosilogy (from yvPoCt and Xoyos).  I prefer
this to Epistemology, which would signify the science of
arranged knowledge.
This science should be prosecuted in the same method
as every other which has to do with facts, that is, in the
Inductive. Its main office is to inquire into the nature
of the knowing powers, to determine the mode of the
operation of each, and the amount, and what is equally
important, the kind, of knowledge which each is fitted to
impart. This is what I have been doing all throughout
this treatise. I am not to recapitulate the processes here.
Yet it will be necessary to show, in a few sentences, how
the method followed and the results reached have a bearing on Gnosiology. Commencing with sense-perception,
I drew the distinction between our original and acquired
perceptions, and endeavoured to ascertain what are our
primary perceptions through the various senses, and also
pointed out the difference between sensation and perception. Proceeding to self-consciousness, I sought to estimate the primary knowledge which we have of self as
acting or exercising some property. Comining to the re                                           Y 2
323 
METAPHYSICS.
productive powers, I showed that here the faith element
appears, and I pointed out the relation in which faith and
cognition stand to each other, and unfolded the convictions which we have in regard to space, time, and the infinite. Looking to the objects thus made known or believed in, the mind pronounces a set of judgments, and I
drew out a classification of these, and sought to unfold
their nature. But the mind has not only the capacity
of discovering the true, it has a power of discovering the
good; and I was at pains to show wherein our moral
convictions are analogous to our intellectual convictions,
and wherein they differ from them.
From this statement it appears that the metaphysician,
in prosecuting his pursuits, should be able to distinguish
(f) between our cognitions and certain associated states;
(2) between one kind of conviction and another; and
(3) between our original and acquired convictions. Almost all errors, excesses, and defects in philosophy have
proceeded from overlooking or mistaking these all-essential differences. Thus some confound their sensations, or
their feelings, or their inferences, or even their fancies,
with their primary knowledge. Some imagine that our
primitive convictions must all be alike in every respect,
and that what is affirmed legitimately of one may be affirmed of any other, or of all; that, for example, our primitive cognitions and moral convictions, all disclose the
same sort of reality as is to be found in the perceptions
of sense. Again, it is by failing to distinguish between
the convictions guaranteed by our constitution and those
reached by experience, that persons have been led to suppose that their senses or faculties deceive them.
In Plato's dialogue, Socrates is represented as exposing all the answers given by Theetetus, but without
explicitly furnishing one of his own. He shows first, that
science is niot sense-perception (at'~a"Oqo). It'is true that
324 
GNOSIOLOGY.
all knowledge is not derived from this source; but a certain portion is,-though in order to estimate it exactly,
we must be careful to separate from it associated sensa.
tions, and stand up only for the positive veracity of constitutional convictions. He shows, secondly, that science
is not opinion or judgment (8o',a a,X,Or,).  Yet, by judgment on materials supplied, we can and do reach truth,
and have criteria-as will be shown in next paragraphby which to test it.  He then shows that science cannot
consist in judgment with a rational process (erT&a Xo'7ov)
accompanying it. It is admitted that no rational process
can add to the force of truth, but analysis and explication
can settle for us wherein lies the force of truth.
But the question is here started, Can there be a criterion of truth? The inquiry has comnionly been made
by those who seek for an absolute law, or for one short,
and easy rule, which may at once determine for us as to
every given or supposable asseveration, whether it is or
is not true. Now it may be confidently asserted that
such a criterion is not discoverable by man, nor can he
so much as know whether it is possible ill the nature
of things, or available to any other intelligences. But I
have laboured to show that there are tests of primitive
truth not very difficult of application; these tests are
self-evidence and necessity, and, as auxiliary to these,
catlho]icity. Again, of that portion of fundamental truth
which may be ranked under the head of Analytic Judgments a priori, there are very stringent tests in the Laws
of Identity, Non-Contradiction, and Excluded Middle.
Some very definite rules for testing Synthetic Judgments
a priori may be found in the maxims which have been
enunciated in treating of the various classes of Primitive Judgments. As to experiential truth, there are in
many departments tests quite sufficient for all practical
purposes, but these are so many that they cannot be
325 
METAPHYSICS.
numbered. Each advanced science* and art has its own
rules of evidence, quite competent to determine for it
what is truth in its own department and within fields
open to man's observation. But there can be no rule
found by the physicist, or devised by the inetaphysicist,
to determine all questions, or questions beyond the
range of man's observation,-as, for example, whether
the Dog-star is or is not inhabited, or as to whether
there are other substances in the universe besides mind
and mnatter.
SECT. II. ON THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.
We  must now enter upon the inquiries in which
Locke and five or six friends who met in his chamber
in Oxford found themselves involved, and which issued
twenty years afterwards in the famous'Essay on the
Human Understanding.'   Starting with a far different
topic, they found themselves quickly at a stand, and it
came into the thoughts of Locke that before entering
"upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with." It
follows from the account given in the preceding pages
that man's knowledge is derived from Four Sources.
FIRsT, we obtain knowledge from sensation, or rather,
sense-perception. Such is the knowledge we have of
body, and of body extended and resisting pressure, and
of our organism as affcting us, or as being affected with
smells, tastes, sounds, and colours.
SECONDLY, we obtain knowledge from self-consciousness. Such is the knowledge we have of self, and of its
* It is scarcely necessary to say, that we have admirable rules and
tests, in regard to the Inductive Sciences, in Mill's'Logic,' and in
regard to the Social Sciences, in Sir G. C. Lewis's'Treatise on the
Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics.'
326 
GNOSIOLOGY.
modes, actions, and affections,-say, as thinking, feeling,
resolving.
I amn convinced that from these two sources we obtain
not all our knowledge, but all the knowledge we have of
separately existing objects. We do not know, and we
cannot, as will be shown forthwith, so much as conceive
of a distinctly existing thing, excepting in so far as we
have become acquainted with it by means of sensation
and reflection, or of materials thus derived. Here Locke
held by a great truth, though he did not see how to
limit it on the one hand, nor what truths required to be
added to it on the other. For man has other sources of
knowledge.
THIRDLY, by a further Cognitive or Faith exercise
we discover Qualities and Relations in objects which have
become known by the senses external and internal. Of
this description are the ideas which the mind forms of
such objects as space, time, the infinite, the relation
between cause and effect, and moral good. There is a
wide difference between this Third Class and the Second,
though the two have often been confounded. In selfconsciousness we look simply at what is passing within,
and as it passes within. But the mind has a capacity
of discovering further qualities and relations amnong the
objects which have been revealed to it by sensation and
consciousness. This third kind of knowledge seems to
be what is referred to by those who represent the mind
or intellect itself as a source of ideas. But this account
can be admitted only on its being understood that the
mind notices these qualities and relations as in objects
which have been made known by sensation and reflection.
FOURTHLY, the mind can reach truth necessary and
universal, that is, universally true. This may be regarded
as knowledge, and it is knowledge which goes far beyond
that derived from the other sources. We are sure that
327 
METAPHYSICS.
these two straight lines which go parallel for the smallest
possible space, may be extended infinitely, without being
ever nearer each other. We are certain that gratitude
and holy love, which are good here, must be good all
through the wide universe. But this fourth kind of cognition is not independent of the other three kinds. All
the necessary truth we can reach bears a reference to
objects which have become known directly, or by a discursive process through perception and consciousness,
either to these objects, as primarily known, or to the
qualities and relations in them discovered by a further
cognitive or faith process. The knowledge attained from
the first three sources is, as I have repeatedly had occasion to remark, all concrete and individual. But we
discern a necessity in certain portions of the individual
knowledge or convictions, and we can proceed to generalize these; and so far as we abstract and generalize
properly, we are sure that what is true of the singular is
true also of the universal; that what is true of these two
lines is true of every set of lines exactly like them which
we could contemplate; that what is true of this effect,
namely, that it must have a cause, is true of every other,
that is, if we have accurately determined it to be an
effect. By this process we reach universal truth, of which
we know that it must hold good in all times and at all
places.
Such seem to be the sources of human knowledge.
We can add to the original stock got from all these quarters. Thus, we can add to what we have through the
senses by observing other and new objects. We can
know more of our minds by carefully noting their actions. The mind, too, can rise to clearer and nobler
views of intellectual and moral qualities by meditating
on the proper objects and themes.   We can widen and
consolidate our acquaintance with necessary and univer
328 
GNOSIOLOGY.
sal truth by a careful inspection and generalization of our
individual convictions.
The question of the origin of our ideas is substantially
the same with that of the sources of our knowledge; but
in discussing this second question, it is of all things essential to have it fixed what is meant by' idea.' Plato,
with whom  the term  originated as a philosophic one,
meant those eternal patterns which have been in or before the Divine mind from all eternity, which the works
of nature participate in to some extent, and to the contemplation of which the mind of man can rise by abstraction and philosophic meditation. Descartes meant by it
whatever is before the mind in every sort of mental apprehension. Locke tells us that he denotes by the phrase
all that the schoolmen designated both by the phantasm
and the universal notion. Kant applied the phrase to
the ideas of substance, totality of phenomena, and God,
reached by the reason as a regulative faculty going out
beyond the province of experience and objective reality.
Hegel is for ever dwelling on an absolute idea, which he
identifies with God, and represents as ever unfolding itself out of nothing into being, subjective and objective.
Using the phrase in the Platonic sense, it is scarcely relevant to inquire into the origin of our ideas; it is clear
however that Plato represented our recognition of eternal ideas as a high intellectual exercise, originating in
the inborn power of the mind, and awakened by inward
cogitation and reminiscence. In the Kantian and Hegelian systems the idea is supposed to be discerned by
reason; Kant giving it no existence except in the mind,
and Hegel giving it an existence both objective and subjective, but identifying the reason with the idea, and the
objective with the subjective. Using the phrase in the
Cartesian and Lockian sense, we can inquire into the
origin of our ideas.
329 
METAPHYSICS.
In accordance with modern usage in the English
tongue, it might be as well perhaps to employ the word
'idea' to denote the reproduced image or representation
in the mind, and the abstract and general notion. Thus
explained, it would exclude our original cognitions on the
one hand, and also the regulative principles of the mind
on the other. An idea, in this sense, would always be
a reproduction in an old form, or more commonly in a
new forn], of what has first been known.   We first
know objects, external or internal; and then we may
have them called up in whole or in part, magnified or
diminished, or mixed and compounded in an infinite va riety of ways; or, by an intellectual process, we may
contemplate one of their attributes separately, or group
them into classes.   Our ideas, in this sense, are ever
dependent on our cognitions; we cannot have an idea,
either as an image or a notion, of which the materials
have not been furnished by the various cognitive powers,
primary and secondary. It is always to be remembered
that by increase and decrease, by intellectual abstraction
and generalization, our ideas may go far beyond our
knowledge; still, as our ideas in the last resort depend
on our knowledge, they must be drawn from the same
quarters. When the question is put then as to the
origin of our ideas, we are thrown back on the Four
Sources from which all our knowledge is derived. So far
as our ideas of distinctly existing objects are concerned,
they are all got ultimately from the outward and inward
senses: to this extent the doctrine of Locke is unassailable. We cannot imagine or think of any other kind of
existence than matter and mind, with space and time,
though, for aught we know, there may be other substances and beings in the universe with a far different
nature. But then we are led by our cognitive and faith
powers, intellectual and moral, to clothe the objects, thus
330 
GNOSIOLOGY.
known, with qualities and relations which cannot be perceived either by sensation or reflection.  It is not by
one or other of these, or by both combined, that I come
to believe that space and time are infinite, that this effect
must proceed from a cause, that this benevolent action is
good, and that this falsehood is a sin; nor is it by either
or by both that I can rise to the conviction that the effect
is for ever tied to its cause, and that lying must be a sin
in all time and in all eternity.
The principle "Nihil est in intellects fquod non prius
fuerit in sensu" has been ascribed to Aristotle, but most
certainly without foundation, as the great Peripatetic
everywhere calls in intuition in the last resort, and is ever
coming to truth which he represents as self-evident and
necessary. The maxim has been fathered, I do not know
on what authority, on the Stoics. It is assuredly not the
principle adopted by Locke, who is so often represented
as favouring it; for the great English philosopher ever
traces our ideas, not to one, but to two sources, and delights to derive many of our ideas from reflection. It
is however the fundamental principle of that school in
France and in Britain which has been called Sensational.
There are three very flagrant oversights in the theory of
those who derive all our ideas from sensation. First,
there is an omission of all such ideas as we have of spirit
and of the qualities of spirit, such as rationality, free will,
personality.   Secondly, there is a neglect or a wrong ac count of all the further cognitive exercises of the mind
by which it comes to apprehend such objects as infinite time, moral good, merit, and responsibility. Thirdly,
there is a denial, or at least oversight, of the mind's deep
convictions as to necessary and universal truth.   Sensa tionalism, followed out logically to its consequences, would
represent the mind as incapable of conceiving of a spi ritual God, or of being convinced of the indelible dis
331 
METAPHYSICS.
tinction between good and evil; and make it illegitimate
to argue from the effects in the world in favour of the
existence of a First Cause.
Locke is ever to be distinguished from those who de rive all our ideas from the senses. He takes great pains
to show that a vast number of the most important ideas
which the mind of man can form, are got from reflec tion on the operations of our own minds. His precise
doctrine is that the materials of the ideas which man can
entertain, come in by two inlets, sensation and reflection; that they are first perceived by the mind, and then
retained; and that they are subsequently turned into
a great variety of new shapes by the faculties of discernment, comparison, abstraction, composition, and the
power of discovering moral relations. The ideas being
thus obtained, he supposes that the mind can perceive
agreemenits and disagreements among them. In particular, it is endowed with a power of intuition, by which
it at once perceives the agreement and disagreement of
certain ideas, discovers these to be in the very nature of
ideas, and necessary. Such being the views of Locke,
they are as different from those of the Sensationalists
on the one hand, as they are from those of Descartes,
Leibnitz, and Kant on the other.   Indeed the most
careless reader cannot go through the'Essay on the
Human Understanding' without discovering that, if
Locke has a strong sensational, he has also a rational
side. He will allow no ideas to be in the mind except
those which can be shown to spring from onie or other
of the inlets, and yet he resolutely maintains that, with
these ideas before it, the mind may perceive truth at
once; he thinks that morality is capable of demonstration, and in religion he is decidedly rationalistic. So far,
it appears to me, we can easily ascertain the views of
Locke. It is more difficult to determine how far he sup
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GNOSIOLOGY.
posed the mind to be capable of modifying or adding
to the materials derived from the outward and inward
senses.  It is quite clear that he represents the mind as
having the power to perceive and compound and divide
these ideas, and discover resemblances and other relations; but there are passages in which, consistently or
inconsistently, he speaks of the mind having something
more suggested to it, or superinducing something higher.*
Confining our attention to the points which are clear,
I think we may discover-not certainly such grave errors
as in the doctrines of the sensationalists, but still —several
oversights. First, he overlooks the cognitions and beliefs involved in the exercises with which the mind starts.
This has arisen, to a great extent, from his attaching
himself to the theory that the mind begins not with
knowledge, but with ideas, which are first perceived by
the mind, and then compared, upon which comparison it
is that the mind reaches knowledge. He has never set
himself to inquire what is involved in the sensation and
reflection which give us our ideas. Hie takes no notice
of intuition enabling us to look directly at the very thing,
and of our intuition of extension, and of a cognitive selfconsciousness, and of the beliefs gathering round space
and time and the infinite. Secondly, he has not given
a distinct place and a sufficient prominence to the ideas
got from the mind observing certain qualities and relations in objects made known by sensation and reflection.
The defects of his system, in not giving an adequate account of our idea of moral good, which he gets from our
* Locke speaks of certain ideas being' suggested' to the mind by the
senses (a phraseology adopted by Reid and Stewart),'Essay,' ii. vii. 9;
and of'relation' as "not contained in the real existence of things, but
extraneous and superinduced," ii. xxv. 8. (See Webb on' Intellectualism of Locke,' v.) He maintains that morality is capable of demonstration, iii. ii. 16, etc. For other passages illustrative of Locke's precise
views supra, pp. 18, 31,104-106, 133, 154, 166,172 (especially), 218,239.
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METAPHYSICS.
sensations of pleasure and pain, with a law of God superinduced, without so much as his trying to prove
how we are hound, on his system, to obey that law, was
perceived at an early date by British writers, who adhered to him as closely as possible; and Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson called in a Moral Sense (as an addition
to Locke's outward and inward sense); while Bishop
Butler called in conscience, which he characterized as a
"principle of reflection."  Thirdly, he has not inquired
what are the laws involved in the Intuition to which he
appeals in the fourth book of his Essay as giving us the
most certain of all our knowledge.   Had he developed
the nature of intuition, and the principles involved, with
the same care as he has expounded the experiential element, his system would have been at once and effectually
saved from the fearful results in which it issued in France,
where his name was used to support doctrines which he
would have repudiated with deep indignation. He is
right in saying that the mind has not consciously before
it in spontaneous action such speculative principles as
that "Whatever is is," or moral maxims in a formalized
shape; but he has failed to perceive that such principles
as these are the rules of our intuitions, and that they can
be discovered by a reflex process of generalization.  It
is but justice to Locke to say that he acknowledges necessary truth, but it does not form a part of his general
theory: his professed followers have abandoned it; and
sceptics have shown that he cannot reach it in consistency
with his system.
SECT. III. LIMITS TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, IDEAS, AND
BELIEFS.
It is instructive to find that niiot a few of the most profound philosophers with which our world has been honoured, have been prone to dwell on the limits to man's
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GNOSIOLOGY.
capacity. The truth is, it is always the smallest minds
which are most apt to be swollen with the wind engendered by their own vanity. The intellects which have
gone out with greatest power to the furthest limits, are
those which feel most keenly the barriers by which human thought is bounded. The minds which have set
out on the widest excursions, and which have taken the
boldest flights, are those that know best that there is a
wider region lying beyond, which is altogether inaccessible
to man. It was the peculiarly wise man of the Hebrews
who said, " No man can find out the work that God
maketh from the beginning to the end." The Greek
sage by emphasis declared that, if he excelled others, it
was only in this, that he knew nothing. It was the
avowed object of the sagacious Locke to teach man the
length of his tether, which, we may remark, those feel
most who attempt to get away from it. Reid laboured
to restrain the pride of philosophy, and to bring men
back to a common sense, in respect of which the peasant
and philosopher are alike. It was the design of Kant's
great work to show how little speculative reason can accomplish. In our own day we have had Sir W. Hamilton
showing, with unsurpassed logical power, within what
narrow bounds the thought of man is restrained.
We have already in our survey gathered the materials
for enabling us to settle the general question, in which
however are several special questions which should be
carefully separated.
1. What are the limits to man's power of acquiring
knowledge? The answer is, that he cannot know, at
least in this world, any substance or separate existence
other than those revealed by sense and consciousness.
There may be, very probably there are, in the universe,
other substances besides matter and spirit, other existences which are not substances, as well as space and time,
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METAPHYSICS.
but these must ever remain unknown to us in this world.
Again, he can never know any qualities or relations
among the objects thus revealed to the outward and inward sense, except in so far as we have special faculties
of knowledge; and the number and the nature of these
are to be ascertained by a process of induction, and by
no other process either easier or more difficult. This is
what has been attempted in this treatise, it may be supposed with only partial success in the execution, but, it is
confidently believed, in the right method. A more difficult process need not be resorted to, and would conduct
us only into ever-thickening intricacies; and an easier
method is not available in the investigation of the facts
of nature, in this, nor, indeed, in any other department.
After unfolding what seems to be in our primitive cognitions, I gave some account of the primitive faiths which
gather round them, and classified the relations which the
mind can discover, and unfolded the moral convictions
which we are led to form. Such are the limits to man's
original capacity, of which there are decisive tests in selfevidence, necessity, and catholicity.
Within these limits man has a wide field in which to
expatiate; a field, indeed, which he can never thoroughly
explore, but in which he may discover more and more.
What he may discover, and what he may never be able
to discover, are to be determined by the separate sciences,
each in its own department. Thus, what he can find out
of mind, of its various powers and original convictions,
is to be determined by the various branches of mental
science. What he can ascertain by the senses, aided by
instruments, must be settled by the physical sciences.
2. The limits to man's capacity of knowledge being ascertained, it is easy to determine the limits to his power
of formiing ideas.   The materials must all be got from
the four sources of knowledge which have been pointed
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GNOSIOLOGY.
out.   There are two classes of powers employed in enlarging and modifying these. The one is the imagination,
which can decrease, as when on seeing a man it can form
the idea of a dwarf; and increase, as when it can form
the idea of a giant; or divide, as when it sees a man it
can form an image of his head; or compound, as when it
puts a hundred hands on man, and forms the idea of a
Briareus. The mind can further discover a number of
relations among the objects primitively known. These I
have endeavoured to classify. In particular, the mind
can out of the concrete form innumerable abstracts, and
from the singulars construct an indefinite number of universals. It should be observed that man's power of imagination and correlation extends over his moral convictions as well as his intellectual cognitions. Thus, he can
clothe the hero of a romance in various kinds of moral
excellence of which we have discovered the rudiments in
ourselves or others, and perceive relations among the moral properties which have fallen under his notice. These
are the limits to man's capacity of forming ideas, determined first by his powers of cognition and secondly by
his powers of belief and correlation.
3. Our beliefs, it is evident, may go beyond our cognitions. Nay, there is a sense in which they go beyond
our very phantasms or notions.  Still there are stringent
limits set to them in our very nature and constitution.
Thus, we can never believe anything in opposition to selfevident and necessary truths. In regard to at least some
of these truths, we cannot so much as imagine them
to be false. Thus, we cannot conceive that we ourselves
while we exist should at the same time not exist. There
are beliefs which are in our very mental make and frame,
and which are altogether beyond our voluntary power.
If we except these, however, our power of possible belief
is wide as our capacity of forming ideas.  If it is asked
z
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METAPHYSICS.
what we should believe within these limits? the answer
is, only what has evidence to plead in its behalf, what
has self-evidence or mediate evidence. Metaphysics, with
its tests, can determine what truths are to be received
on their own authority; as to the kind and amount of
evidence required in derivative truth, this can be settled
only by the canons of the special departments of investigation, historical or physical.
But do our beliefs ever go beyond our ideas?   This
is a very curious question, and different persons will be
disposed to give different answers to it. It is quite clear
that we can, and do, believe in much of which we can
form no adequate conception in the sense of mental
image; thus, we believe in the existence of an infinite
God, who is not picturable in the imagination. But the
more difficult question is, Can or should we believe in
aught of which we have no apprehension of any kind?
I am inclined to think that there is always a conception
of some sort at the basis of every belief; and that when
there is no positive conception, then faith ought to cease,
and must cease.  But this doctrine is liable to misapprehension unless certain very important modifications and
explanations be conjoined.
It seems clear to me that every belief must be a belief in
something of which we have some sort of conception. A
belief in nothing would not deserve to be called a belief,
and a belief in something of which we have no apprehension would be equivalent to a belief in nothing. But it
will be urged that every man must believe in certain
great truths regarding eternity, of which he has no conception, and that the Christian in particular has such a
truth in which he firmly believes, in the doctrine of the
Trinity.  Still, I maintain that even in such a case there
is an apprehension or conception. Thus, in regard to infinity, we apprehend space or time, or God, who inhabits
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GNOSIOLOGY.
all space and time, stretching away further and further;
but far as we go, we apprehend and believe that there is
and must be a space, a time, a living Being beyond. Or
we apprehend a spiritual God, with attributes, say of
power and love; and we strive to conceive of Him, and of
these perfections; and we believe of Him and His power
and goodness that they transcend all our feeble attempts
at comprehension. In every supposable case of belief
we have an apprehension of some kind. A traveller tells
us that he saw in Africa some strange monster which he
cannot describe so as to enable us to comprehend it; we
understand this man's language, and if we have reason
to look upon him as trustworthy, we believe his statement; but still our belief goes upon our apprehension.
An inspired writer tells us something about there being
three persons in one God; and, having evidence of his
inspiration, we believe him: but even here there is an
apprehension; there is a conception of the God of truth
as revealing the truth. There is more: this revelation is
contained in words of which we form some sort of apprehension. Thus, we are told that Jesus Christ is God;
that he became man; and yet we discover that he is
somehow or other different from God the Father. Thus
in all our beliefs there seems to be a conception of something, and of something real and existing; but still it
may be of something conceived by us as having qualities
which pass beyond our comprehension, or qualities of
which we have no comprehension.
Some of these conceptions, with their attached beliefs,
are those which raise up within us the feeling of the
sublime, and are, of all others, the most fitted to elevate
the soul of man. Need I add that it is possible for us
to believe in truths which we cannot reconcile with other
t r uths  of sense or understanding. It            is wrong in us,
indeed, to believe in a proposition unsupported by evi
z2
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METAPHYSICS.
dence; but when it is thus sustained, and when especially
it is seen to have the sanction of God, then the mind asserts its prerogative of belief, even when the truth transcends all sense, all personal, all human experience, nay,
even when it is encompassed with darkness and difficulties on every side.  Faith feels that it is in its highest
exercise, when founding oni the authority of God, it believes not indeed in contradictions (which it can never do),
but in truths which it cannot reconcile with the appearances of things, or with other truths which the reason
sanctions.
SECT. IV. REiLATION OF INTUITION AND EXPERIENCE.
We must now dive into the subject whose depths the
great Teutonic metaphysician sought to sound; not that
Kant spoke much of it in the intercourse with his friends,
but he was for ever pondering on it as he sat in his bachelor domicile, as he paced forward and backward in his
favourite walk in the suburbs of Ko6nigsberg, as he lectured to his class, or elaborated his published writings.
The general question embraces several special ones, which
must be carefully distinguished.   In seeking to settle
these, we must always have it fixed in our minds in what
sense we employ the word'experience;' for the phrase
may be understood in narrower or in wider significations.
It may be confined to the outward fact known or apprehended, or it may also embrace the inward consciousness.
It may mean mere personal experience, or it may contain
the whole gathered experience of mankind. It has been
employed to stand for the experience of sense, and it has
been so enlarged as to comprise all that we can know or
feel by any or all of our cognitive powers, such as consciousness and conscience.  In this Section I use it to
express all that comes into consciousness; for, properly
speaking, there is no experience till the fact is appre
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GNOSIOLOGY.
hended within. Taken in this sense, it would be nearer
the truth, that is, would embrace a larger portion of
truth, were we to say that our knowledge and ideas are
drawn from the experience of consciousness, rather than
from the experience of sense. We cannot reproduce
things in idea, we cannot generalize any conglomerate of
facts till they have been in consciousness, into which
however they must have come by a cognitive power,
which is therefore the true source of knowledge. When
I limit the phrase'experience' to a particular class of apprehended facts, I will give notice by an epithet or explanatory clause. If it be needful to fix steadily in how
wide a sense we use'experience,' it is still more essential
to determine under what particular aspect we view inltuition, when we would consider its relations to experience.
We have seen, in an earlier part of this Treatise (Part I.
Bk. II. Ch. I. s. ii.), that Intuition may be contemplated
under three general aspects,- as a body of regulative
principles, as spontaneous convictions, and as generalized
maxims. Under each of these, Experience stands in a
different relation to Intuition.
I. Let us consider the relation of Experience to Intuition, considered as a body of Regulative Principles. In
this sense intuition, being native and original, is prior to
experience of every kind, personal or general.  So far
from depending oln what we have passed through, our intuitions are a powerful means of prompting to the acquisition of experience; for, being in the mind as natural
inclinations and aptitudes, they are ever instigating to
action. All of them seek for objects, and are gratified
when the proper objects are presented. Just as the eye
was given us to see, and light is felt to be pleasant to
the eyes, so the cognitive powers were given us in order
to lead us to the acquisition of knowledge, and they are
pleased when knowledge is furnished. Our belief as to
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METAPHYSICS.
the boundlessness of space is ever alluring us to explore
it in earth and sea, and in the deep expanse of heaven;
and our belief in time without beginning and without
end, is ever tempting us to go back through all the years
which human history opens to us, and, beyond these,
through all the ages which geology discloses, and to look
forward, as far as human foresight and Bible prophecy
may enable us, into the dim events of the future. Thus
too our minds delight to discover substances acting ac cording to their properties, and plants and animals
developing according to the life that is in them, to find
species and genera in the whole organic kingdoms, to
trace mathematical relations corresponding to our higher
intellectual cravings among all the objects presenting
themselves on the earth and in the starry heavens, and to
rise from near effects to remote causes in space and time.
Nor is it to be omitted that our moral convictions prompt
us to look for, and when we have found him, to look up
to a Moral Governor of the universe, and to anticipate of
him that he will be ready to support the innocent sufferer,
and to punish the wicked. It should be added, that in
experience we are ever finding a gratifying exemplifica tion of our native tendencies, and a satisfying corrobo ration of our intuitive expectations. We expect a cause
to turn up for this mysterious occurrence; we are disappointed at first, but in due time it appears. We anticipate that this secret deed of villany will be detected and
exposed; and so we are amazed for a season when we hear
of the perpetrator flattered by the world, and seemingly
* favoured in the providence of God; but our moral convictions are vindicated when the wicked man is at last caught
in the net which had all along been weaving for him, and
all his ill-gotten spoils are made to add to the weight of
his ignominy, and to embitter his disgrace.
II. Let us consider the relation of Experience to our
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GNOSIOLOGY.
Intuitive Convictions as these are manifested in Consciousness. We have now a more complicated series of circutmstances to look at and to weigh. Under this head
we cannot speak of intuition and experience as being opposed; every conviction, be it of sense or consciousness,
of the understanding or of conscience, is an experience.
It is in itself an experience, and it is an experience which
can be generalized.
So far, all is clear enough. The difficulty and the confusion arise when we contemplate the relation of experience to the forthcoming of the regulative principle into
action, and into consciousness. There is a sense in which
experience is required in order to such manifestation.
Thus, in some cases the mental intuition is called forth
by an external stimulus; it is thus that our knowledge
of body is evoked by an action of the bodily senses. It
is to be observed however, in regard to all such cases,
that it is scarcely correct to represent the intuition as depending on experience; it depends, no doubt, on an outward stimulus as an essential part of the concause, but
the action can scarcely be called experience, for there is
nothing in consciousness till the intuition is in energy.
The proper statement is that there must be the concurrence of an outward action, in order to the rise of the inward conviction. Again, it is a fact that all our intuitions relate, directly or indirectly, to objects which have
become known by sensation and reflection, in the sense
explained in the two preceding Sections. But in estimating this circumstance, it is to be remembered that
sensation and reflection are themselves intuitions, and
comprise very deep convictions. Once more, there are
cases in which the intuition is called into exercise by
the representations or apprehensions that have risen up
in the mind. This is the case with all our primitive beliefs, judgments, and moral convictions: they all depend
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METAPHYSICS.
on previous cognitions, and our judgments may further
depend on beliefs. Thus it is when we contemplate an
object as extended, and an event as happening in time,
that our intuitive convictions as to space and time spring
up; it is when we consider two straight lines, that we
proclaim that they cannot enclose a space.   Thus it is
when we look to objects grouped into classes, that we
declare that whatever is predicated of the class may be
predicated of all the members  of the class.  Thus it
is when we look to certain voluntary acts of intelligent
beings, that we regard them as good or evil, rewardable
or punishable.   In regard then to all intellectual beliefs
and judgments, and to all moral cognitions, beliefs, and
judgments, there must always be an experience on which
they proceed. But, in making this statement, let it be ob served first, that the experience may not be one of sense.
Thus, our moral convictions proceed, not on an outward
sensation, but on a voluntary action being presented to
the moral power.   It is to be further taken into account
that the beliefs and judgments may often proceed on an
experience which is itself intuitive.  I proceed upon an
intuitive conviction regarding time when I declare it to
be infinite, and on an intuitive knowledge of extension,
when I affirm that the shortest distance between two points
is a straight line. It thus appears, in regard to our spontaneous convictions, that there is no proper opposition between experience and intuition; that we must beware of
making sweeping declarations in the idea that they will
apply to all instances; that in most cases there is a complex co-operation of the two; and that we must consider
each class of cases separately, in order to determine what
is the precise nature of the relation.
III. Let us consider the relation of Experience to
ourSGeneralized Intuitions. To reach these, experience is
always necessary, is indeed an indispensable condition.
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GNOSIOLOGY.
The maxim is just the generalization of the experiences.
But let us keep a steady apprehension of the distinction
between the generalizations fashioned from two different
sorts of experience. One kind of general maxim is obtained from facts external and internal which may have
fallen under our notice, no matter how, through our own
experience or the experience or authority of others. Thus,
we have discovered that the positive poles of magnets repel each other; that dicotyledonous plants are exogenous;
and that ideas which have at any time co-existed tend to
recall each other. But the mind can reach a higher order
of maxims; I may give as examples, that two parallel
lines cannot meet; that every quality implies a substance,
and that sin is of evil desert. This second class of axioms
implies a generalization equally with the other, but it is
from a very different sort of singulars. Of the first class
of maxims we may be able to say that they seem to be
true within the cosmos open to our observation; but whether they hold good in all parts of the universe, we cannot
dogmatically affirm. Thus, there may be metals in other
worlds which follow very different magnetic laws, and
there may be intelligent beings in them whose ideas follow a different order of association from those with which
we are acquainted on earth; but it is as certain in those
other worlds as in this, that the whole is equal to the sum
of its parts, and that ungodliness is a sin.
SECT. V. ON THE NECESSITY ATTACHED TO OUR PRIMARY
CONVICTIONS.
We have seen throughout the whole of this Treatise
that a conviction of necessity attaches to all our original
cognitions, beliefs, and judgments, both intellectual and
moral. But we may find ourselves in hopeless perplexities, or even in a network of contradictions, unless we
determine precisely to what it is that the necessity ad
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METAPHYSICS.
heres. The proper account is, that the necessity covers
the ground which the conviction occupies,-neither less
nor more. We may err, either by contracting it within
a narrower, or stretching it over a wider surface. It follows that if we would determine how far the necessity
extends, we must carefully and exactly ascertain what is
the nature of the native conviction, and what are the objects at which it looks.
Beginning with our Cognitions, the conviction is that
the object exists at the time we perceive it, and has the
qualities we discover in it. This implies, according to
the law of identity (in the form of non-contradiction), that
it is not possible that it should not be existing, and not
in possession of these qualities at the time it falls under
our notice. But it does not imply that the object has a
necessary or an eternal existence. It does not imply that
the object must have existed in all other, or in any other,
circumstances. For aught our conviction says, the object in other positions, or with a different set of preexisting causes, might not have existed at all, or might
have had a different set of qualities. But while the necessity does not reach further, it always extends as far as
the perception: thus it demands that body be regarded
by us as extended and as resisting pressure, that self be
looked on as capable of such qualities as thought and feeling, and that the properties of body and mind are not
produced by our contemplation of them.
Coming now to our original Beliefs and Judgments, it
has been shown, as to the Beliefs, that while they proceed on our Cognitions, they go beyond them, go beyond
the now and the present,-declaring,  for instance, of
time and space, that they must transcend our widest phantasms or conceptions of them, and that they are such that
no space or time could be added to them. And as far as
the conviction goes, so far does the necessity extend.
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GNOSIOLOGY.
The necessity attached to our Judgments is in like manner exactly coincident with them. These imply objects
on which they are pronounced. At the same time the
judgment, with its adhering necessity, has a regard not
to the objects directly, but to the relation of the objects.
These objects may be real or they may be imaginary.
I may pronounce Chimborazo to be higher than Mont
Blanc, but I may also affirm of a mountain 100,000
feet high that it is higher than one 50,000 feet high.
As to whether the objects are or are not real, this is a
question to be settled by our cognitions and beliefs, original and acquired, and by inferences from them. But
it is to be carefully observed, that even when the object
is imaginary, the judgment proceeds on a cognition of
the elements of the objects. Thus, having knowni what
is the size of a man, we affirm of a giant, who is greater
than a common man, that he is greater than a dwarf,
who is smaller than ordinary humanity. Still, the necessity in the judgment does not of itself imply the existence
of the objects, still less any necessary existence; all that
it proclaims is, that the objects might exist out of materials which have fallen under our notice, and that the
objects, being so and so, must have such a relation. In
a sense, then, our judgments are hypothetical; the objects being so, must have a particular connection. There
may be, or there may never have been, two exactly pa rallel lines: what our intuitive judgment declares is,
that if there be such, they can never meet. A similar
remark may be made of every other class of primitive
judgments. There may or there may not be a sea in the
moon; but if there be, its waters must be extended, and
call resist pressure. There may or there may not be in habitants in the planet Jupiter; but if there be, they must
have been created by a power competent to the opera tion. It is on this account, I suppose, that such truths
347 
METAPHYSICS.
have been called abstract or hypothetical, inasmuch as
they deal with abstract relations, not implying the exist ence of the things. But it is to be borne in mind, that
when the objects exist, the judgments, with their accom panying necessity, apply to them.
It holds good also of our Moral Perceptions, that the
necessity is as wide as our conviction, but no wider. It
implies that the good or evil is a real quality of certain
voluntary acts of ours, and this whether we view it or not,
and independent of the view we take of it. It involves that
certain actions are good or evil, whenever or wherever they
are performed, in this land or other lands, in this world or
other worlds. Rising beyond cognitions and beliefs, the
mind can pronounce moral judgments on certain acts ap prehended by it. These judgments do not imply the ex istence of the objects; but the decision will apply to the
realities, if there be such. Thus, there may or may not
be ungodliness or ingratitude in the planet Saturn; but
if there be such a thing, we declare that it must be evil
and condemnable. It is to be noted that our moral convictions do not imply that we shall certainly practise the
good, or that all must be. morally good which men declare
to be so.
As soon as our original cognition or belief assures us
of the existence of an object with certain qualities, or as
a judgment affirms a necessary relation, the law of identity comes into operation, and insists on our keeping truth
consistent with itself; and in particular, the law of noncontradiction restricts us from thinking or believing the
opposite of the truth apprehended. When we know that
self exists, we cannot be made to think that self does not
exist. Constrained to look on time as without limits, we
at once deny that it can have limits. Deciding that every
effect has a cause, we cannot be made to believe that it
has not had a cause. We have a conviction that murder
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GNOSlOLOGY.
is a crime, and cannot be made to decide that it is not.
We have this necessity in two forms as a test of fundamental truth; in its original or positive, and also in a negative form, founded on the law of non-contradiction. In
no case can the conviction be wrought in us that what we
intuitively know or believe to exist does not exist, or that
the contradictory of a primitive judgment can possibly
be true.
A different impression might be left by an account
often given. A distinction has been drawn between selfevident truths which relate to matters of fact, such as that
body exists and that self exists, and necessary truths, such
as that a quality implies a substance, and that the whole is
equal to the sum of its parts. Of the latter it is supposed
that we cannot conceive or think the opposite, whereas it
is supposed that we can of the former. But there is confusion in this representation. Thus, it is said that we can
easily conceive that the self of which we are conscious
might never have existed.  The statement is correct, but
it does not go to establish the general doctrine. For our
intuition is not that self must have existed in all possible
circumstances, but it is that it exists with certain qualities
at the time we contemplate it.  We  may think a great
many things about it, but the exact opposite we cannot
be made to think or believe; in this respect our cognitions are on the same footing as our judgments, and all
our intuitions are alike.
And this leads me to specify with precision what it
is that we cannot do in regard to necessary truth. A
common account is that we cannot conceive the contradictory of such a truth. But the word'conceive' is ambiguous, and in itself means nothing more than'apprehend,' or even than'imagine;' and it is not mere apprehension or imagination that we use as a test. The
exact account is that we cannot realize in consciousness
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METAPHYSICS.
the exact opposite of the intuitive conviction, whatever
that be; that whatever we know intuitively as existing,
we cannot be made not to know as existing; whatever we
intuitively believe, we cannot be made not to believe; and
when we discover an agreement, we cannot be made to
judge that there is not an agreement.* The test of necessity thus employed admits of an application at once easy
and certain.
It should be noticed that the conviction of necessity
follows conviction wherever it is found. In what is technically called demonstrative or apodictic reasoning, all
the new steps are seen to be true intuitively, and the
necessity goes through the whole process step by step.
Thus the necessity adheres not only to the axioms of Euclid, but goes on to the last proposition of the last book.
It is the same in all other sciences which are demonstrative, as Ethics and Logic are to a limited extent; the necessity adheres to whatever is drawn from first truths by
intuitive principles. It is needful to add, that in mixed
processes, in which there is both intuition and experience
in the results reached, the necessity sticks merely to the intuitive part, and does not guarantee the whole. I suppose
there is no doubt of the accuracy of the mathematical
demonstrations employed by Fourier in his disquisitions
about heat, but there are disputes as to some of the assumptions on which his calculations proceed. We have
here a source of errors. In processes into which intuition
enters, but is only one of the elements, persons allot to
the whole a certainty which can be claimed only in behalf
of one of the parts.
* There are acute and profound remarks on the various kinds of necessity of thought in Mansel's Proleg. Log.
350 
GNOSIOLI,OGY.
SECT. VI. (Supplementary.) ON THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
THE UNDERSTANDING AND THE REASON; BETWEEN A PRIORI
AND A POSTERIORI PRINCIPLES; BETWEEN FORM AND MAT  TER; BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE; BETWEEN
THE LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IDEAS; BE  TWEEN THE CAUSE AND OCCASION OF INNATE IDEAS.
We are now in circumstances to examine certain distinctions
which have been drawn by the supporters of innate ideas, or intuitive reason, mainly in order to reconcile their views with the
claims of experience.
I. THERE IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNDERSTANDING
AND THE REASON.-Milton draws the distinction between reason
'intuitive' and'discursive.'  Beattie and Reid represent Reason
as having two degrees: in the former, reason sees the truth at once;
in the other, it reaches it by a process. There is evidently ground
for these distinctions. But the distinction I am now to examine
was first drawn in a formal manner by Kant, and has since assumed
divers shapes in Germany and in this country. According to Kant,
the mind has three general intellectual powers, the Sense, the Understanding (Verstand), and the Reason (Verninft); the Sense
giving us presentations, or phenomena; the Understanding binding these by categories; and the Reason bringing the judgments of
the Understanding to unity by three Ideas-of Substance, Totality
of Phenomena, and Deity-which are especially the Ideas of Reason.
The distinction was introduced among the English-speaking nations
by Coleridge, who however modified it.  "Reason," says he, "is
the power of universal and necessary convictions, the source and
substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in
themselves. Its presence is always marked by the necessity of the
positions affirmed" (Aids to Reflection, i. 168). It has become an
accepted distinction among a certain class of metaphysicians and
divines all over Europe and the English-speaking people of the
great American continent.   These parties commonly illustrate
their views in some such way as the following. The mind, they
say, must have some power by which it gazes immediately on the
true and the good. But sense, which looks only to the phenomenal and fluctuating, cannot enable us to do so. As little can the
logical understanding, whose province it is to generalize the phenomena of sense, mount into so high a sphere. We must therefore bring in a transcendental power-call it Reason, or Intellectual
Intuition, or Faith, or Feeling-to account for the mind's capacity
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METAPHYSICS.
of discovering the universal and the necessary, and of gazing at
once on eternal Truth and Goodness, on the Infinite and the Ab solute.
Now there is great and important truth aimed at and meant to
be set forth in this language. The speculators of France, who de rive all our notions from sense, and those of Britain, who draw
all our maxims from experience, are overlooking the most won drous properties of the soul, which has principles at once deeper
and higher than sense, and the faculty which compounds and com pares the material supplied by sense. And if by Reason is meant
the aggregate of Regulative Principles, I have no objections to
the phrase, and to certain important applications of it, but then we
must keep carefully in view the mode in which these principles
operate.
We may mark the following errors, or oversights, in the school
referred to. (1.) Intuitive Reason is not, properly speaking, opposed to Sense, but is involved in certain exercises of sense. There
is knowledge, and this intuitive, in all sense-perception. It may
be proper indeed to draw the distinction between the two elements
which are indissolubly wrapt up in the one concrete act. Kant
endeavoured to do so, but gave a perversely erroneous account
when he represented intuition as giving to objects the forms of
space and time; whereas intuition simply enables us to discover
that bodies are in space, and events in time. There is certainly a
high intuitional capacity involved in every exercise of mind which
takes in extension or regards objects as exercising property. And
then it is altogether wrong to represent sense as the one original
source of experiential knowledge, which is derived from consciousness as well as from perception through the senses. (2.) It is
wrong to represent Intuitive Reason as opposed to the Understanding.   There is intuitive reason involved in certain exercises
of the understanding, as when we infer that what is true of a given
class must be true of each of the members of the class. Nor is it
to be forgotten that the understanding can abstract and generalize
upon a great deal more than the objects of sense; it can do so
upon the materials supplied by consciousness, and by all the further convictions of the mind, such as the conscience.   (3.) It is
wrong to represent the mind as gazing immediately and intuitively
on the true or the good, upon the necessary or the universal. It
can indeed rise to the conception of these, but, in order to its
doing so, it has to engage in abstraction and generalization, which
makes the truth gained no longer a truth of pure reason, but of
reason and understanding combined. It is not consistent with the
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GNOSIOLOGY.
natural history of the mind to represent it as at once rising to the
contemplation of some ideal of the fair and good, which it is able
to look at when the spirit is not agitated by passion or bedimmed
by earthliness. We are undoubtedly led by native taste to admire
the beautiful, but it is when embodied in a lovely object. We are
constrained, in spite of a rebellious will, to approve of the good,
but it is when a good action, or rather, a good being performing a
good action, is presented to the mind. The general ideas of the
true, the fair, and the good, do not spring up intuitively in the
mind, but are fashioned out of intuitive elements by those addicted
to reflection. (4.) It is preposterously wrong to suppose that the
mind can employ intuitive convictions in philosophic or religious
speculations without any associated exercise of the logical understanding. Not being immediately conscious of the Regulative Principles of the mind, we cannot employ them in discussion till we
have first inquired into their nature by induction, and embodied
their rule in a clear definition or a precise axiom.
II. DISTINCTION  BETWEEN'A PRIORI' AND'A POSTERIORI'
PRINCIPLES.-Prior to the time of David Hume, the phrase apriori
was applied to the procedure from principle to consequent, and from
cause to effect, using the word cause in a wider and looser sense
than in these times; while the word a posteriori was employed to
characterize the procedure from consequent to antecedent, or from
effect to cause.* Since the publication of Hiume's philosophic works,
and more especially since the'Kritik of Pure Reason' came to have
such extensive influence, apriori denotes whatever is supposed to be
in the mind prior to experience; and a posteriori whatever has been
acquired by experience. The distinction thus indicated and designated may be admitted without allowing that it probes the subject to
its depths;and certainly without admitting all theviews usually associated with it. Even in regard to knowledge acquired by experience,
I maintain that, prior to its acquisition, the mind has the power of
acquiring it. The bodily frame has certainly the organs of sense
prior to seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, or smelling. The mind
has certainly the capacity of perception before it actually observes
any external object, and the power of comparison before it can notice relations. Ald, in acknowledging the distinction, we must
ever protest against the idea that any universal or necessary truth
can be discerned by the mind without a process of a posteriori in  * Cudworth's language is, "The abstract universal rationes,'reasons,'
are that higher station of the mind, from whence, looking down upon
individual things, it hath a commanding view of them, and, as it were,
a priori comprehends or knows them" (Immut. Mor. i. iii. 2).
A
353 
METAPHYSICS.
duction and arrangement. So far as the phrase is applied to general maxims, it should be on the understanding that they have
been drawn by a logical process out of the individual apriori convictions.
Closely allied to the question of a priori truth is the question,
Can there be an a priori science? This is a topic which will come
more fully before us in certain of the Chapters of the next Book.
There is a sense in which certain sciences are a priori, that is, the
principles of them are in the constitution of the mind, and are
ready to manifest themselves in individual acts. In another sense
there can be no a priori science, for science employs general principles, and there are no such principles known a priori. But there
are sciences, the ground-principles of which are not the generalizations of a gathered experience, but of the necessary decisions of the
mind, and these sciences may be called a priori with perfect propriety, provided always that it be understood, that while the general law is in the mind prior to its manifestation, it is discovered by
us only through the generalization of its individual exercises.
III. DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORM AND MATTER.-This phraseology was introduced by Aristotle, who represented everything as
having in itself both matter (vak) and form (E'os).  It had a new
signification given to it by Kant, who supposes that the mind supplies from its own furniture a form to impose on the matter presented from without. The form thus corresponds to the apriori element, and the matter to the a posteriori.  But the view thus given
of the relation in which the knowing mind stands to the known
object is altogether a mistaken one. It supposes that the mind in
cognition adds an element from its own resources, whereas it is
simply so constituted as to know what is in the object. This doctrine needs only to be carried out consequentially to sap the foundations of all knowledge,-for if the mind may contribute from its
own stores one element, why not another? why not all the elements? In fact, Kant did, by this distinction, open the way to all
those later speculations which represent the whole universe of being as an ideal construction. There can, I think, be no impropriety
in speaking of the original principles of the mind as forms or rules,
but they are forms merely as are the rules of granmmar, which do
not add anything to correct speaking and writing, but are merely
the expression of the laws which they follow. As to the word
' matter,' it has either no meaning in such an application, or a meaning of a misleading character.
IV. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE AND OnJECTIVE. —The
word' subject' has a diversity of meaning in the Englishl language.
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GNOSlOLOGY.
In logic it denotes the term of which predication is made; in common
discourse, it means the topic about which affirmations are made;
and in metaphysics, the mind contemplating an object. The term
'object'too is not without its ambiguity. Sometimes it stands fbr
a thing contemplated by the mind, and sometimes for a thing considered in itself, and often it denotes the aim or end which the mind
has in any of its pursuits. I am afraid it will be impossible, in
common discourse, to deprive the phrases of any one of these various significations.   The adjectives'subjective' and'objective'
have not had such a variety of meaning, and the nouns'subject'
and'object,' when used together, in philosophic discussion, should
be limited so as to be exactly coincident with them. They should,
in my opinion, never be used except as correlative phrases; the
terms'subject' and'subjective' being employed to designate, not
the mind in itself, but the mind as contemplating a thing; and
the terms'object' and'objective' to denote, not a thing in itself,
but a thing as contemplated by the mind. It is clear that if the
phrases were employed in this sense when used at the same time,
we should be saved an immense amount of word-warfare, in which
subject and object, subjective and objective act so prominent a part.
We should be prevented from speaking, as is so often done, of the
mind as subject or subjective, except when it is looking at something, or of the thing as an object or objective, except when it is
contemplated by a thinking mind. We would also know at once
what is meant when it is said that the subject implies the object,
and the object the subject. It does not mean that the existence
of mind implies an external thing to contemplate it, or that a thing,
as such, implies a mind to consider it; it signifies simply that the
one implies the other, as the husband implies the wife and the wife
a husband, from which we cannot argue that every man must have
a wife and every woman a husband, but merely that when the man
is a husband, he must have a wife, and when the woman is a wife,
she must have a husband. The subjective implies the objective
merely in the sense that when the mind is contemplating a thing,
it must be contemplating it, and that when a thing is contemplated,
it must be contemplated by a contemplative mind.
With a large school of metaphysicians and divines the words
subjective and objective are used in a Kantian sense, and are made,
without the persons employing them being aware of it, to bring in
the whole peculiarities of the critical philosophy. In the philosophy
which has germinated from Kant, the subject mind is supposed to
have a formative power, and the object thing is supposed to be a
thing, or phenomenon, plus a shape or a colour given it by the
2 A 2
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METAPHYSICS.
mind. Proceeding on this view, the phrase'subjective' comes to
express that which is contributed by the mind in cognition. Thus
by a juggling use of these phrases, persons are being involved,
without their having the least suspicion of it, in a philosophy
which makes it impossible for us ever to know things except under aspects twisted and distorted no man can tell how far from
the reality. We can be saved from this only by using them as
correlatives, and insisting when we do so that the subjective mind
is so constituted as to know the object as it is under the aspects
presented.
V. LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF II)EAS.-Sir W.
Hamilton quotes a saying of Patricius, "Cognitio omnis a mnente
primam originem, a sensibus exordium habet primum."  The distinction is deep in Kant, and has been fully and skilfully elaborated by M. Cousin.  It is said that there are ever two factors in
the formation of our a priori ideas, reason and experience; and
that logically reason is first, whereas chronologically experience
comes first. The distinction is not clearly nor happily drawn by
such phraseology. For it is difficult to understand what is meant
by' origin' as distinguished from' beginning;' and what is meant by
'logical' in such an application; it cannot mean, according to the
rules of formal logic, it must mean, according to reason; and then
comes in the important fact that reason and experience are not,
properly speaking, opposed. The distinction, however, points to
a truth, inasmuch as our intuitions, as mental faculties, laws, or
tendencies, are in the mind prior to the exercise of them. There
is a difficulty, however, in apprehending what is meant by the
logical or reason element being first, but not chronologically. The
intuition as a law is in the mind prior, chronologically, to the experience of it. The individual exhibition of the conviction and the
experience of it come chronologically together. It is true, however, in the fullest sense, that an experience is necessary in order
to our being able to present the necessary conviction in the form
of an abstract definition or general maxim. This distinction connects itself with another, which I am now to examine.
VI. DISTINCTION BETWEEN REASON AS THE CAUSE, AND SENSE
AND EXPERIENCE AS THE OccASION.*-It is allowed that, apart
* Cudworth refers to ideas of a high kind, which he admits are "most
commonly excited and awakened occasionally from the appulse of outward objects knocking at the doors of the senses," and complains of
men not distinguishing " betwixt the outward occasion, or invitation, of
these cogitations, and the immediate active or productive cause of
them" (Immut. Mor. iv. ii. 2).
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GNOSIOLOGY.
from sense and experience, the mind cannot have any ideas; still,
it is not experience which produces our necessary ideas, it is merely
the occasion of them, the true cause being the reason. Thus, with out an exercise of sense, there could be no idea of space in the
mind; but then the operation is merely the occasion on which the
idea of space is produced by an inherent mental energy. Aloof
from a special event, there could be no idea of time; but then it is
affirmed that upon an event becoming apprehended, the idea of
time, already potentially in the mind, is ready to spring up. Without the observation of contiguous concurrences, there could be no
idea of cause; but on such being presented, the mind is found to
be already in possession of an idea of cause by which to bind
them in a necessary connection. Till some human action is presented, there could be no idea of moral good; but on a benevolent
action being apprehended, the idea of moral good is ready to
spring up.
There is important truth which this account is intended to ex press, but it es no t bring it out accurately. It is not so easy
to settle precisely the difference between cause and occasion: the
occasion is, in fact, one of the elements of unconditional cause,
or rather, concause, which produces the effect. In regard to the
original faculty or law of the mind, it is undoubtedly the main
element of the complex cause which issues in a spontaneous intuitive conviction. But there is need of a concurrence of circumstances in order to this faculty operating.  But instead of confusedly binding all these up in the one expression'occasion,' it is
better to spread them out individually, when it will be found that
each acts in its own way. Thus we should show that an action of
the organism is needful to call our intuition of sense-perception
into exercise. We should show, too, that an apprehension of an
object or objects is needed, in order to-call into action our intuitions as to the infinity of time, and eternal relations, and moral
good; and then we may see that this apprehension may not have
been got from sense, and that in our primary cognition of the
.object there may have been intuition,-thus, it is because we intuitively know every object as having being, that we declare its
identity of being at different times. Again, in respect to the generalized maxim, or notion, the account is fitted to leave a very
erroneous impression, for it makes it appear as if it were upon the
occasion of the presentation of a material object, that there springs
up the abstract idea of space, and of an event becoming known,
that there arises the idea of time, or of a succession of events being
apprehended, that the mind forms an idea of cause.  It is all true
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METAPHYSICS.
that there must be experience in order to the construction of the
abstract or general notion, but the notion is fornmed, after all, by
the ordinary process of abstraction and generalization.
CHAPTER III.
ONTOLOGY.
SECT. I. ON KNOWING AND BEING.
THEsE, are topics which the subtle Greek mind delighted to discuss from the time that reflective thought was
first awakened within it,-that is, from at least five hundred years before the Christian era. I confess I should
like to have been present when they were handled on that
morning when Socrates, as yet little more than a boy,
met the aged Parmenides, so venerable with his noble
aspect and hoary locks, and Zeno, tall and elegant, and
in the vigour of his strength, in the house of Pythodorus,
in the Cerameicus, beyond the walls at Athens.*  At the
same time I fear that, after all, I could have got little
more than a glimpse of the meaning of the interlocutors.
It is clear that even Socrates himself is not sure whether
he is listening to solid argument, or losing himself among
verbal disquisitions and dialectic sophistries. And who
will venture to make intelligible to a modern mind-even
to a Teutonic mind-the arguments by which Parmenides and Zeno prove that Being is One, and the impossibility of Non-Being; or translate with a meaning, into
any other tongue, the subtleties of those Dialogues, such
as Parmenides and the Sophist, in which Plato makes
his speakers discourse of the One and of the Existing?
The grand error of all these disputations arises fromn
* See the opening of the Parmenides of Plato.
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ONTOLOGY.
those who conduct them imagining that truth lies at the
bottom of the well, whereas it is at the surface; and in
going past the pure waters at the top, they have only
gone down into mud and mire. We are knowing, and
knowing ieing, at every waking hour of our existence,
and all that the philosopher can do is to observe them,
to separate each from the other, and from all with which
it is associated, and to give it a right expression.  But
the ancient Greeks, followed by modern metaphysicians,
imagined that they could do more, and so have done infinitely less. They have tried to get a more solid founldation for what rests on itself, and so have made that insecure which is felt to be stable. They have laboured to
make that clearer which is already clear, and have thus
darkened the subject by assertions which have no meaning. They have explained what might be used to explain other truths, but which itself neither requires nor
admits of explanation, and so have only landed and lost
themselves in distinctions which proceed on no differences
in the nature of things, and in mysteries of their own
creation.
Knowing, in the concrete, is a perpetual mental exercise, ever under the eye of consciousness; and we can
l)y an intellectual act separate it from its object, and
contemplate it in the abstract. In all acts of knowledge
we know Being in the concrete; that is, we know things
as existing, and we can separate in thought the thing
from our knowledge of it, and the thing as existing from
all else which we may know about the thing. The sci ence which treats of Being, or Existence, is Ontology.
In a loose sense, every real science,-that is, every science
which treats of existing objects,-might be called an on tological science. But every one sees that it would be
preposterous to represent astronomy and geology and
agriculture as departments of ontolo,gy, for these sciences
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METAPHYSICS.
treat not so much of the mere being of objects gene  rally, as of certain qualities and laws of special classes
of objects. We must therefore confine the science within
more stringent limits.   If we define Ontology as the
science of what we know of things intuitively, we are
giving it a precise field, which cali be taken in from the
waste, and cultivated. Gnosiology and Ontology may be
treated to a great extent together in a Metaphysics which
unfolds, as has been attempted in this treatise, the ori  ginal convictions of the mind. Still they can be distin  guished, and the distinction between them should be
steadily kept in view. The one seeks to find what are our
original powers, the other to determine what we know of
things by these powers.
In order to reach this second end, we must go over, one
by one, the various classes of objects known by our in tuitive powers; but this not, as in Gnosiology, to deter mine what the power is, but what is the object which it
looks at. I have been seeking to accomplish the one as
well as the other of these all throughout this treatise.
By simple cognitive, or presentative powers (as Hamilton
calls them), we know objects in the singular and in the
concrete: by consciousness we know self as having being,
and capable of thought and feeling; by perception we
know body as extended and resisting pressure; and by
both we know self and not-self as having an existence
independent of the contemplative mind. By the reproductive powers we are led to believe in the past event
recalled by memory as real, that is, as having occurred
in time past; and round space, known in the concrete in
perception, and time, known with the event in remniniscence, there gather a number of beliefs which can be ascertained and expressed. Among the objects thus known
or believed in,-and it should be added, imagined out of
the materials supplied by the cognitive and reproduc
3C)O 
ONTOI,OGY.
tive powers,-the mind can discern necessary relations,
that is, arising from the very nature of the objects. The
mind, too, is led to know and believe in a moral excellence ill the voluntary acts of intelligent beings, and to
discover the bearings and relations of moral good and
evil.
Such a survey as this enables us to determine what are
the kinds of reality which the mind is able to discover.
In sense-perception and consciousness it is a real thing,
known as having certain qualities. In our beliefs, too,
we look to a real thing having attributes. We believe,
we must believe, space and time to have an existence, not
as mere forms of thought, but altogether independent of
the contemplative mind. Our judgments may or may
not look to a reality, for we may discover relations among
imaginary as well as among actual objects. But when
the objects are real the relations discovered are also real,
-not indeed independent realities, but real relations in
the actual objects. The reality discovered by the moral
power lies in a quality of certain voluntary acts performed
by persons possessed of conscience and free will. We
thus see how such an inspection settles for us not only
that there is a reality, but what is the sort of reality;
whether a present or an absent reality, whether an independent reality or a reality in objects. Thus we maintain
that abstract and general notions have a reality when the
objects from which they are drawn are real; but we are
not to understand, as Plato's language would lead us to
believe, that they have a reality independent in some intelligible world. The relations of quantity treated of in
mathematics have a reality, but it is only in space and
time, and in bodies as occupying space and existing in
time.  Cause and effect have a reality independent of the
mind which observes them; but this is, after all, in the
substances which act and are acted on.  Moral good and
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METAPHYSICS.
sin are certainly both real, but their actuality is in the
dispositions of responsible beings.
But it will be urged that all this proceeds on the idea
that our original convictions can be trusted.   I might
maintain, in reply, that whether our convictions can be
confided in or not, it is at least a matter of speculative
interest to determine what our convictions say. But I
do hold that our original convictions must be held as a
sufficient guarantee of the truths for which they vouch.
The objections which may be advanced against this view
will be answered in the Sections that follow, on Idealism
and Scepticism. It will be seen that, so far as they have
any plausibility, they are all removed when we take along
wAith us accurate conceptions of what it is that our ori
ginal convictions depone to.
SECT. II. ON IDEALISM.
Two questions here press themselves on us, and seem
to raise up clouds in which dimly-seen objects look like
spectres.
I. Does the subject never add to the object something
not in the object? Does the eye, in looking at a scene,
never impart a colour to it, a glow or a gloom? The
mirth is not in the merry peal, nor the melancholy in the
funereal toll of the bell, nor is the music in the flute or
organ, but in the soul which rings and breathes and beats
in harmony with the external movements. The view differs according to the point from which men take it, according to men's natural or acquired temperaments, tastes,
and characters, and according to the circumstances in
which they are placed. How different the estimate which
is formed of a neighbour's character, according as he who
judges is swayed by kindness or malignity, by charity or
suspicion.! The scene varies according to the humour
in which we happen to be, quite as much as it changes
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ONTOLOGY.
according to the light or atmosphere in which we survey
it. Hope gladdens everything as if it were seen under
an Italian sky, whereas disappointment wraps it in mist
and cloud. Joy steeps all the landscape in its own rich
colours, whereas sorrow wraps it as in the sable dress of
mourning. Do not such facts, known to all observers of
human nature, and dwelt on by poets as being largely
their stock-in-trade, prove that in all our ideas, views, notions, opinions, there is a subjective element no less potent than the objective? And if there be, what limits are
we to set it?   Is our metaphysical philosophy agreed
with itself on this subject? Or, with all its refinements,
can it draw a decided line which will for ever separate the
one from the other?
1. All knowledge through the senses is accompanied
with an organic feeling, that is, a sensation.  Our immediate acquaintance with the external world is always
through the organism, and is therefore associated and
combined with organic affections pleasing or displeasing.
Certain sounds are felt to be harsh or grating, others are
relished as being sweet or melodious or harmonious. Some
colours, in themselves or in their associations, are felt to be
glaring or discordant, while others are enjoyed as being
agreeable or exciting. In short, every sense-perception is
accompanied with a sensation, the perception being the
knowledge, and the sensation the organic affection felt by
the conscious mind as present in the organism. He who
is no philosopher, finds little difficulty in distinguishing
the two in practice; and it ought not to be difficult for the
man who is a philosopher to distinguish the two in theory.
Every man can distinguish the sugar in itself from the
sweet flavour which we have in our mouth when we taste it,
or the tooth and gum from the toothache which is wrench ing them; and the metaphysician is only giving a philo sophic expression to a natural difference when he distin guishes between sensation and perception.
363 
METAPHYSICS.
2. Certain mental representations are accompanied with
emotion. Thus the apprehension of evil as about to come
on us or those whom we love, raises up fear; the contemplation of good, on the other hand, as likely to accrue to
us or those in whom we feel an interest, excites hope.
This is only one example of the kind of emotions which
attach themselves to all mental pictures of objects, as having brought, or as now bringing, or as likely to bring
pleasure or pain, or any other sort of good or evil, and
which steep the objects in their own waters, and impart
to them their peculiar hue. Hence the gloom cast over
scenes fair enough in themrnselves-as by a dark shadow
the effect of the interposition of a gloomy self obstructing
the light; hence the splendour poured over perhaps the
very same scenes at other times-as by light streaming
through our feelings, as through stained glass or irradiated clouds.   Hence the pleasure we feel in certain contemplations, and the pain called forth by others. Hence
the fear that depresses, that arrests all energy, and at last
sinks its victim; hence the hope which buoys up, which
cheers and leads to deeds of daring and of heroism. But
while the two are blended in one mental affection in the
mind, it is not difficult, after all, to distinguish between the
object known, and the accompanying emotion; between
the trumpet sounding, and the martial spirit excited by
it; between the canvas and oil of Titian, and the feeling
which his ascending Mary raises within us, glowing and
attractive as the splendours of the dying day; between
our friend as he is in himself, and the deep and tender
regard which we must entertain towards him.
3. Certain ideas are associated with other ideas which
raise emotions.  It does not concern us at present to explain the nature of the laws which govern the succession
of our ideas. It is certain that ideas which have at any
time been together in our mind, either simultaneously
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'ONTOLOGY.
or successively, in a concrete or complex state, will tend
to produce the one the other or the others; and an idea
which has no emotion attached, may come notwithstanding to raise up feeling through the idea with which it is
associated, and which never can come without sentiment.
Thermopylae, Bannockburn, and Waterloo, look uninteresting enough places to the eye, and to those who may
be ignorant of the scenes transacted there, but the spots
and the very names stir up feeling like a war-trumpet in
the breasts of all who know that freedom was there delivered from menacing tyranny. Thus it is that the buds
and blossoms of spring, and the prattle of boys and girls,
call forth a hope as fresh and lively as they themselves
are. Thus it is that the leaves of autumn-gorgeous
though they be in colouring, and the graveyard where our
forefathers sleep-clothed though it be all overwith green
grass, incline to musing and to sadness. But neither is
it very difficult to distinguish between an apprehension
or representation and its associated feeling, to separate
between the primrose and the buoyant emotion which
bursts forth on the contemplation of it, between the grave
of a sister and the sorrowful tenderness which it evokes.
4. The mind of the mature man cannot look oil any
one object without viewing it in a number of relations.
A house presented to an infant may be nothing but a
coloured surface with a certain outline; to the mature man
it is known as a house possibly, with a loved dweller within. An apple falling to the ground is known intuitively
simply as an object in motion; but by the educated mali
it is known as a vegetable fruit falling to the ground in
obedience to what seems a universal law of matter. Does
not the mind, in such cases, add to the object relations
imposed by itself? To this I answer, that all that the
mind does, is to add to its original a further knowledge
of relations discovered in the objects themselves. -The
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METAPHYSICS.
object before us is not merely a coloured shape, it is a
house, and as a house we are entitled to regard it. The
apple falling to the ground is in fact a fruit obeying a
power of gravitation. The letters of a book are to tile
infant mere black strokes; to the child learning to read
they are figures, signs of sound; to the grown man or
woman they are signs of thoughts or feelings, addressed
by a writer to a reader: but the truth is, the letters are
real things under all these aspects, real strokes, real signs
of sound and sense.   So far as we proceed accurately,
according to the laws of thought using experience, and
are employed in discovering the actual relations of things,
the conceptions reached imply a reality quite as much 1as
the intuitions with which the mind starts.
I am not prepared to say that these are all, but they
are the more important of the natural influences which
operate to colour or enlarge our knowledge. The Author
of our nature certainly means us to add to our knowledge
by observation, and to graft the acquired on the original
stock; and he has superinduced these attached sensations,
and made the very laws of our nature to call in associated
thoughts and feelings in order to intensify and elevate
our enjoyment, and in some cases to be a prognostic of
evil, which should ever be associated with offence and disgust.  So far as music gives us more pleasure than wire
vibrations; —so far as a Swiss valley, guarded by Mont
Blanc, or Mont Cervin, or the Jungfrau, is finer than an
accumulation of grass, trees, stones, and snow;-so far
as the spot where a great and a good man was born, is
more stimulating than would be the uninteresting hut,
which is all the bodily sense perceives,-we owe it to the
beneficence of God, who has made us sensitive as well
as cognitive beings. So far as we are led to shrink from
baser scenes, it is by a provision which is intended to
keep us back from what might issue in pain or in sin. It
366 
ONTOLOGY.
should be added that while this is no doubt the original
intent of these peculiarities of our constitution, they may,
in the voluntary and sinful abuse of them, become a seduction to evil, and a scourge to inflict the keenest misery.
They may lead mnan, through a misgoverned imagination, to paint in glowing colours a fictitious object, and
then pursue it, when he
"Sees full before him, gliding without tread,
An image with a glory round its head;
This shade he worships for its golden hues,
And makes (not knowing) that which he pursues."
Thus it is that the mind irradiates with a romantic tinge
objects unworthy in themselves, and then goes on to love
them and delight in them. Man may thus come, too, to
be haunted by spectres of his own creation, to be mocked
by his own shadow seen across some of the deeper gorges
of the earth, and striding opposite as he himself moves.
Thus it is that there are to us, for our gratification, glowing colours, burnishing what are in themselves only mists
and damps, and spanning the heavens above us with a
bow of hope, assuring us that these waters which threaten
will not overwhelm us; thus it is, too, that there are
hideous mock suns personating the very brightest light
which God has planted in these heavens.  Still the man
of good sense and of simple honesty will find no difficulty
in distinguishing practically between things which I have
been seeking to separate theoretically in this Section.
II. But is not anl imperfect knowledge an erroneous,
a delusive knowledge?   A rock seen in outline between
us and the sky, seems like a man's face; as we approach
it, the features, chin, nose, and brow vanish, and we discover it to be an unshapely mass.  To the common ap.
prehension the sky looks concave, with a sprinkling of
stars sparkling at night like diamonds on its surface, and
it is only further consideration which brings us to regard
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METAPHYSICS.
it as a vast expanse, in which great luminaries are moving.   The boy feels as if he might mount to the moon,
and bring it down; and as if he could hold the sun in
his hands like an orange, provided it did not burn him.
In such instances our further experience on earth sets
aside our first beliefs; and is it not possible that many
of the favourite opinions entertained by all men on earth
may be set aside by the wider and ever widening experience of heaven? Is it not conceivable that the very
strongest and most universal convictions of humankind
may seem altogether erroneous to beings in a different
constitution of things, and with other principles of knowledge and belief?
1. I answer that many of the inferences we draw fromn
our original and acquired knowledge, and the applications
we make of it, are erroneous.   It is ascertained, for instance, that absolute size, distance, and direction, are not
original endowments of the sense of sight; all that we
intuitively perceive by the eye is a coloured surface.  It
follows that when we are judging of the magnitude or
locality of objects, we are drawing inferences from our
original perceptions. We found these conclusions on
rules which are correct enough for ordinary cases, or
cases similar to those from which they were derived, but
which may be altogether wrong or deceptive when applied to other or peculiar cases. We are not warranted
to allege that our intuitive perceptions through the senses
deceive us: we have been led astray by rules laid down
by ourselves; and further knowledge enables us to correct them, or rather, to show under what restrictions they
hold good. But the increase of knowledge does not set
aside the primary knowledge; on the contrary, it might
be shown that it proceeds on the original stock.
I am inclined to think that all the errors into which
we fall are of a similar character. We draw rash in
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ONTOLOGY.
ferences from our real knowledge, original or acquired, and
then charge our errors on our constitutions.  Still more
frequently we illegitimately extend rules correct enough
in themselves to cases to which they do not apply. In
some of these instances the generalizations we form, or
the conclusions we draw, may serve sonme good end, even
though they-cannot be regarded as positively true.  Thus
we suppose the sky to be a concave sphere; thus, too,
scientific men of the most rigidly positive class are obliged,
when referring to the last resources of decomposition, to
call in indivisible particles, molecules, monads, or atoms.
But these are mere suppositions to aid our conceptive
power, and enable us to think or talk intelligibly of objects of which we have no intuitive, and, in the latter
case, no certain knowledge whatsoever. These convictions
cannot be described as primary or fundamental, and we
can easily deliver ourselves from both the one and the
other. In such cases, increase of knowledge constrains us
to modify or correct some of the conclusions illegitimately
drawn from data which are sound.
2. I answer, that further knowledge is ever adding
to our original or acquired stock, but does not set it
aside. Were we to look upon our knowledge as being
absolute and perfect, we should, in the very act, be falling
into error; we should be drawing a conclusion uilwarranted by facts.  I am convinced that much of the supposed illusion into which we fall arises from this cause.
We suppose that we know all about an object, whereas
we may know it, after all, only under one aspect, or in the
exercise of but a very few of its many and varied properties; but, imagining we know its whole nature, we
set about constructing theories regarding it, and pointing
out its relation to all other objects.  I acknowledge that
such speculations may be set aside by further knowledge,
even as they would be seen all along to be erroneous by
2 B
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METAPHYSICS.
persons of higher intelligence. Those who imagine that
they have cleared up all the mysteries of the Divine nature and decrees, of the soul of man and the nature of
spirit or of body, may be astonished and humbled to find,
when they reach the land of brighter light, how crude
their theories have been. But their nmistakes have arisen,
not from their constitutions or their experience deceiving them, but from the unwarrantable additions made by
their own ingenuity. But so far as our knowledge proceeds from intuition, and is guaranteed by our nature and
constitution, it will be found that further knowledge, natural or supernatural, imparted in this life or the life to
come, serves only to enlarge our original stock, and make
it more solid and congruous. The new aspects now presented will not be inconsistent with the old, but will
rather enable us to make a more extended use of them.
Here we see as in a glass darkly; still, what we see is a
correct representation, so far as it goes; and what we are
to discover in a clearer light, may often be the full lineamrents and features of what we saw here so very obscurely.
All existing objects may be represented as polygons,some perhaps with a hundred sides, some with a thousand,
and the Supreme Being with an infinite number; and of
these man may see only a few, perhaps half-a-dozen or a
dozen; still, what he sees is real. The knowledge may not
be sufficient to enable him to construct the mathematics
of the figure, or to discover all the relations of side to
side and side to centre  still, what he sees are real sides
of the very thing; and if we could see other sides, or all
the sides, it would not even modify this first knowledge,
it would simply enlarge it.
Conceive a savage, just taught to read simple words of
one or two syllables, poring over the pages of a full Bible,
which a missionary has presented to him. A few chapters in Genesis or John is all he has read or can yet read.
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ONTOLOGY.
What he has thus learned is truth, and if he keep to
what he has read and understood, he has committed no
error.   But mingled with this there may be suppositions, guesses, conclusions, expectations, as to the general
contents of the book, and associated with the whole, superinduced feelings of wonder or awe, and these, were
he to open them up, would in all probability appear
sufficiently ludicrous to one who has perused the whole
volume. It appears to me that the wisest man in this
world stands in relation to the whole body of truth in
very much the same relation as the savage does to the
truth in the Bible.   Let this wise man, if he would deserve the name, keep to what he does know, and he is on
safe ground; but if he begins to speculate beyond, his
conjectures will in all probability appear most] preposterous to higher intelligences, and his most confident assertions may turn out to be contradictions. Still, when
he keeps within the precincts of knowledge given in intuition or acquired by experience, what is revealed to him
is as certain as it is valuable, valuable in itself, and valuable as the foundation on which further acquisitions
may be built, without limits and without end.   I do
believe that in the region, wherever it be, to which man is
carried after death, new objects will be disclosed to him
which he could not so much as conceive on earth; and
the very objects which he knew before, divine or created,
will be seen clothed with new qualities, as different from
any which have come under his notice when on earth, as
colours are to the man born blind but whose eyes are
opened, or as musical sounds are to the man whose ears
have been unstopped, and that these new kinds of knowledge will open new sources of enjoyment, ever-during
and ever-increasing, but all this without any of our genuine earthly knowledge or experience being nullified or
cancelled.
2 B 2
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METAPHYSICS.
We are now in circumstances to judge of idealism
But let us first speak of the ideal spirit.  It is truly an
elevated and an elevating one, if at all restrained within
proper limits. There are elements in human nature fitted
and intended to produce and foster it. It is meant that
sensations should warm our knowledge into a glow, that
feelings should buoy up our intellectual notions into a
higher region than they themselves can reach, and
that our colder apprehensions should be linked to others
which are more fervent.  The glory thus cast around objects, commonplace enough it may be in themselves, relnders them more lovable and beloved. The melody which
the ear gives to the sound, increases our interest in the
thought or sentiment uttered, and turns, if I may so
speak, prose into poetry. The ideal spirit may be an incentive to glorious enterprise; it steeps the country before us-mountain, vale, sea, and island-in sunlight,
and thus allures us to explore it  It is especially elevating when it takes a moral direction, when it places before us a high mnodel to which we ever look, and to which
we would become assimilated; and sets us forth amidst
sacrifices made, to accomplish some high end reaching
forth far in time or into eternity. Still, it is of the utmost
moment that the person steadily draw the distinction
between our knowledge of the object and the light in
which we view it. Without this, the unrestrained spirit
will be apt to break forth into extravagance, which will
end in a collapse and a reaction; foolish hopes will be excited which can never be gratified, and when this comes
to be realized, the issue is the blackest disappointment,
not unfrequently ennui, apathy, and chagrin,-at times,
sourness, bitterness, or despair.
While we can with truth say so much of the ideal
spirit, I can bestow no such commendation on idealism
as a philosophic system, that is, the system which would
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ONTOLOGY.
raise our associated sentiments to the rank of cognitions.
I allow that it is vastly superior to sensationalism, which
acknowledges only the visible and the tangible; but, in
making this allowance, it is proper to add that, on the
principle that extremes meet, it sometimes happens that
there are persons atone and the same time sensationalists and idealists, believing only in the physical, and yet
not believing the physical to be real.* But, speaking of
idealism in itself, it is an unphilosophic system, and, in
the end, has a dangerous tendency. Its radical vice lies in
maintaining that certain things, which we intuitively know
or believe to be real, are not real. I say, certain things;
for were it to deny that all things are real, it would be
scepticism.  Idealism draws back from such an issue with
shuddering.  But, affirming the reality of certain objects,
with palpable inconsistency it will not admit the existence
of other objects equally guaranteed by our constitution.
This inconsistency will pursue the system remorselessly
as an avenger.  Idealism commonly begins by declaring
that external objects have no such reality as we suppose
them to have, and then it is driven or led in the next age
or in the pages of the next speculator to avow that they
have no reality at all. At this stage it will still make
lofty pretensions to a realism founded, not on the exteirnal phenomenon, but on the internal idea. But the logical necessity speedily chases the system from this refuge,
and constrains the succeeding speculator to admit that
self is not as it seems, or that it exists only as it is felt, or
when it is felt; and the terrible consequence cannot be
avoided, that we cannot know whether there be objects
before us or no, or whether there be an eye or a mind to
perceive them.  There is no way of avoiding this black
and blank scepticism but by standing up for the trustworthiness of all our original intuitions, and formally
* See a review of Mir. Nlill, infra, Sect. VI.
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METAPHYSICS.
maintaining that there is a reality wherever our intuitions
declare that there is.
The idealist has indeed a truth, which he weaves into
the body of his system, but that truth is misapprehended
and perverted. There are impressions and inferences
ever mingling, naturally or inadvertently, lawfully or unlawfully, with our knowledge; and he confounds these,
when it is his business, as a professed philosopher, to distinguish them in theory, as men of common sense ever
distinguish them in practice. His system is not clearness,
but confusion. He has dived below the surface, but has
not, after all, gone down to the bottom so as to see all,
and his view of the deep is more obscure than if he had
remained above. Amazed or enraptured with the discovery of certain facts immediately below that which is
patent to the vulgar eye, he looks on them as the main
or sole facts, and henceforth overlooks all the superficial
ones, forgetting that it is true in philosophy, as in geology, that the rock strata which jut out into the most
prominent peaks are those which, if we follow them, dive
down the deepest. He has sought to attain a higher
position, but has stopped halfway, and his views, after
all, are not so clear as those obtained further down, and
they are certainly much more confusing than those which
he might have had, had he reached the clear height above
all dimming influence; they are at best like those which
the traveller gets on cloudy days when he has climbed a
certain elevation up the Alps, and, in the midway mists,
catches occasional glimpses of the green valleys below him,
and of the imposing mountain-tops and sky yet far above
him.
SECT. III. ON SCEPTICISM.
Scepticism may assume a variety of forms, which however differ only in some being more thorough-going than
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ONTOLOGY.
others, some denying the veracity of certain of our cognitions, others denying the trustworthiness of all. Like most
kinds of folly, it commonly does not reach its last stage
at once, but advances step by step. Some philosopher of
eminence sets aside one of our intuitions, and then an
advancing thinker, impelled by logical consistency, or by
the sharpness of his mind, or by levity, or wantonness,
or by the love of paradox or of notoriety, shows how
on the same ground we may deny them all.  It was thus
that Berkeley, in denying the substantial existence of
body, prepared the way for Hume, who denied the substantial existence of spirit; and thus that Kant, in affirming that space and time had no existence out of the
mind, opened a path for Fichte when he declared that the
external object in space might also be the creation of
the mind; and for Schelling and Hegel when they made
mind and matter, creator and creature, all and alike
ideal.* I have already discussed scepticism disguised as
idealism; I am now to offer a few remarks on an avowed
scepticism.
Let us understand precisely how far a sceptic may go.
In doing so it is essential to remember the distinction
between the spontaneous and reflex use of our intuitions.
Under the first of these aspects they not only claim authority, they secure concurrence and obedience. Every
man knows that he has a bodily frame, and'believes that
it exists in space, and that if he would go in the nearest
way to a given point, he must walk in a straight line.
Doubt and denial are possible only in regard to the reflex statement of intuitive principles. Every manl is in
* It is thus that the speculations of Professor Ferrier as to our cognition of the external world being the cognition of the object plus self,
is holding out a great temptation to some vain and conceited youth to
go a little further in the same direction, and maintain that all truth, all
reasoning, that our very belief in God, are mixed up with some subjective element, are, in short, object or truth mecum.
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METAPHIIYSICS.
fact convinced that he has a solid bodily frame, and that
the nearest way to a particular place is a straight line;
but it is possible for him, if he chooses, to deny the propositions in which these truths are conveyed; it is quite
competent for him speculatively to assert that he has not
a body, and that the shortest road to a given point is a
crooked line.
And this leads me to point out in what respects scepticism may be allowable, and wherein it may even be beneficial. The dogmatist often lays down and employs for
purposes lawful and unlawful, principles represented as
indisputable, which have not the sanction of our constitution, or which may be expressed in a form only partially
or approximately correct.   Great interests may often be
involved in having these principles doubted or disputed.
Without this we may find, before we are aware of it,
great moral or religious truths assaulted or undermined;
or we may set up for defence of the citadel of truth a
crazy and insecure turret, which is a positive weakness,
and which, as it falls, may give an easier inlet to the
enemy.   This then is the special mission of the sceptic:
it is to lay a restraint on the dogmatist; at times, if need
be, to assail or to lash him. It would be wrong to affirm
that the scepticism of Hume has not cleared the philosophic atmosphere of many weakening and deleterious
influences which had been gathering for centuries. The
great sin of scepticism lies in this, that it attacks indiscriminately the good and the evil, and would destroy
both as by a consuming fire.  But surely there may be
a means of securing all the good ends which scepticism
has produced, without the accompanying destruction of
the good.   Socrates seems to me to have succeeded in
this, when he attacked the pretentious systems of his
age, at the same time that he held resolutely by every
great moral and spiritual truth.  Let it be admitted that
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our spontaneous convictions guarantee a truth, but let it
be avowed at the same time that any given philosophic
expression of them is fallible, and may be doubted,
disputed, and denied. Let it be understood, as to every
philosophic principle proffered, that we are entitled, nay,
in duty bound, to examine it before we assent to it, and
that the burden of establishing that it is a thorough transcript of the law in the mind lies on him who employs
it. By this simple rule, rigidly enforced and scrupulously
followed, we might have all the benefits which have arisen
from the siftings of scepticism, without its fearful throes,
and its destructions-terrible as those of a battle-fieldof noble credences and inspiring hopes.
But what are we to do with the sceptic, that is, with
one who speculatively denies intuitive truth?
1. There are some things which we ou qt not to do
with him. We should not waste our precious feeling
in professing to sympathize with him, as if he were
practically troubled with doubts as to the existence of
himself, or his friends, or his enemies, or his food, or his
money, or his earthly interests; for in respect of all these
he is quite as firm a believer as the man who comes
to convince him with an apparatus of argument. Nor
need we be at the trouble of appointing a guard to
watch him lest he run against a carriage, or step into a
river, or fall over a precipice. For whatever he may profess to us or to himself, he believes in the existence of
the carriage, the river, and the precipice, and has a salutary awe of their perilous power. Nor would there be
any propriety in declaring him mad, and sending him to
Bedlam, for he only pretends to have lost his senses, or
rather, never to have had them, and in his simulation has
over-acted his part, and gone beyond the madman, who
never sets himself against intuitive trutlh.*
*- I. Morel was asked to examine a prisoner who pretended to be
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METAPHYSICS.
2. There are some things which we cannot do with
the sceptic, and therefore should not attempt to do. We
cannot answer him by argument, that is, mediate proof;
for this, if followed sufficiently far back, will conduct us
to a principle which cannot be proven, and which therefore the sceptic will deny. It can scarcely be regarded
as a complete refutation to demonstrate that his sceptical
denials are inconsistent with certain affirmations made
by him; for he may admit the inconsistencies, and then
found his argument against the possibility of discovering
truth on the circumstance that he and every other must
inevitably fall into contradictions.  It is not even a confutation when it is shown that his scepticism is suicidal,
or violates the law of contradiction, for he may find no
position so suited to him as that which maintains that all
knowledge is contradictory.
Still there are some things which we can do for or with
the sceptic.
I. We may make use of any admissions avowed by him
or incidentally made, in order to shut him up into truths
which he denies. Sometimes we may be able to show
that the truth which he allows implies the truth which
he disallows.   In other cases we can ask him on what
principle or ground he assents to certain truths; and when
we have his answer, we may be able to show how, on the
same grounds, he must admit other propositions.   Thus
we ask the Berkeleian on what ground he admits the existence of the subject mind; and, whatever it be, we may
show that the same ground supports the doctrine of the
deranged, and asked him how old he was; to which the prisoner replied, "245 francs, 35 centimes, 124 carriages," etc. To the same question, more distinctly asked, he replied, "5 metres, 75 centimetres."
When asked how long he had been deranged, he answered, "Cats,
always cats." M. Morel at once proclaimed his madness to be simulated, and states,-" In their extreme aberrations, in their most furious
delirium, madmen do not confound what it is impossible for the most extravagant logic to confound." (See'Physiological Journal,' Oct. 1857.)
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ONTOLOGY.
existence of the object matter.   Thus too we mnay ask
how it is that Kant admits the existence of a thing behind
the phenomenon, and by help of this process prove that
the phenomenon is the thing. If Fichte admit an ego,
or a self, or a belief, it is competent to proceed thereon to show that we are thereby constrained to believe in
the existence of objects out of self and independent of
our belief.*   This argumeitum ad Itominem is perfectly
allowable. We can say to him, If you admit this, you
must also admit that. If he is so guarded and stinted in
his admissions as to say that he allows tAis merely practically and not theoretically or absolutely, we are entitled
to demand of him that he believe tlat practically. Thus,
if he admit practically that he has at any time had (what
Hume allows at the outset) an impression, or idea, we may
show him that he should also admit practically that he
has an abiding and an identical self, and that he conltemplates objects out of him, and independent of him, and,
as more important, that he should admit practically that
he is a responsible being, and must give account of himself. Should he try to save himself, by declaring that he
believes the first, or second, or third of those truths,
only because obliged to do so, we may show that there
is a similar necessity requiring him to believe the rest.
This is a telling argument, which has  been used with
great skill and power by many of the opponents of scepticism in all ages.  It is emphatically an argurnentlm ad
hoyiinem, for it is one which may be used not merely
against a particular individual, but with men as men,
with every man. No man but admits something, and
* It is thus that when Professor Ferrier declares that we know the
object mecur, we can show that on the same ground, whatever it be,
he should admit an object independent of the me. He says (Scottish
Philosophy, pp. 19, 20) that "no man in his senses could require a proof
that it [that is, real existence] is." I am glad of this appeal. A man's
senses tell us that the stone before us has an existence independent of
the contemplative mind.
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METAPHYSICS.
that something may be employed to make him  admit
something else.  It can be shown that he who doubts
believes, that he who denies affirms, and that he who
doubts or denies that he doubts or denies, is in the very
act making an affirmation.  Such a process goes at least
to shut the mouth of the sceptic, for if he open his mouth,
it is to let out a weapon which you can turn against him.
His only refuge is in a thorough-going scepticism, which
affirms that man's supposed knowledge is contradictory,
and that all argument is delusive. You can at least insist on this scepticism that it remain silent, and not advance arguments which are inconsistent with that judgment or belief to which it would appeal.
II. We can carefully explain the nature of a primitive
conviction.  The method referred to under last head is
one which we may quite legitimately employ in dealing
with the sophist or the caviller, we may always kill him
with his own weapons. But we have a more satisfactory
mode of dealing with the truth-seeking and the truthloving.   We can ask them to examine the nature of the
convictions to which we invite them to yield.
1. It can be shown that the mind declares of itself
that its primitive perceptions contain knowledge. I do
not urge this as a mediate proof, or a new and independent proof, it is simply the statement of a fact, that the
mind, in contemplating its original convictions, affirms
that there is knowledge in them. As to some of its
states, it finds that they contain sensations, sentiments,
imaginations, but in every one of them, at the same time,
a cognition of self, and in certain of them a cognition of
an object or truth external to self and independent of
it. It is to these that we ask consent without the aid of
flirther evidence.
2. It may be shown that the intuitive principles of the
mind are native, catholic, necessary. It is not truth merely
380 
ONTOLOGY.
to the individual man, but to all men; not merely to all
men, but to all intelligent beings. It is certain not only
to me but to all beings throughout the universe who have
capacity to understand it, that if two straight lines proceed an inch without coming nearer, they will proceed a
million of miles without coming nearer, and not only is
the wilful infliction of pain a sin on earth, it is a sin in
every other part of the universe.
3. The mind declares of certain truths that they need
no other truth to support them. There are cases in which
it feels that it needs evidence in order to gain its assent.
It does not allow that there was such a man as David,
king of Israel, or Philip, king of Macedon, till proof is
brought forward. It may remain in doubt as to what
truth there is in the poetical accounts of the siege of
Troy, because no valid evidence is produced. But it
draws a distinction between these cases and others in
which it needs no evidence. When it is asserted that
the moon is inhabited, the mind asks proof, but it asks
none when it is affirmed that I am the same person yesterday as I was to-day.  It is conceivable that the first
of these assertions might be substantiated by evidence
which would command our assent, but it would not, after
all, be a more rational assent than that which we give at
once to the other.
4. The mind knows self-evident truth to be the most
certain of all truths. What is it that the sceptic demands? It is all-important to put this question, and to
fix him down to a specific answer. Does he demand
proof or argument? Then it implies that he would be
satisfied with argument. But it can be shown him that
in argument there is a first principle involved, the dependence of conclusion on premisses, and in the last resort
we come to a premiss not admitting of probation. But
surely he who admits argument must admit all that is in
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METAPHYSICS.
argument; but as to the premiss with which we set out,
it is not less evident, it is mnore evident than the conclu sion. It is so far a weakness in a proposition, or rather,
of our mind in reference to it, that we do not see it to
be true or false immediately. The mind declares that the
most certain of all truths are those which are seen to be
true at once and in themselves.
III. It can be shown that there is a congruity and
consistency among the original and derivative convictions
of the mind. This is not urged as if it were an independent and unassailable demonstration. It is conceivable that the power from which human power derives its
power might have made all men liable to a deception,
incapable of being ever detected, in consequence of its
being carefully provided that no inconsistencies should
creep in. This is certainly possible, though it is by no
means probable, according at least to our laws of judgment. For, if this power be a Being possessed of goodness and truth, it is not conceivable that he should form
any creature liable to be deceived: and, if it be a capricious or malignant power, it is by no means probable
that all the deceptions would turn out to be congruous:
here or there would come out an original conviction in
manifest contradiction to another original conviction, or a
derivative principle openly inconsistent with both. The
consistency of the parts is thus a sort of corroboration of
the truth of each part and of the whole. To give only
two examples. It is by intuition I have endeavoured to
show that the intellect, on discovering an effect, looks for
cause, and it always finds, in fact, that for every effect
there is a cause; and as it finds this again and again, in
an extended and invariable experience, it has in this, not
a primary proof, but a secondary confirmation of its intuition. Again, we expect that sin will not go unpunished;
from time to time we find it punished in this life, and are
382 
ONTOLOGY.
thus strengthened in our convictions that it will all be
punished at last. All the intuitions have such corroborations in the daily experience of every man, and these
are felt to give a satisfaction to the mind.*
IV. When we reach the great truth, that there is a
righteous God, we can plead the Divine veracity in favour
of the trustworthiness of the intuitive convictions planted
by Him in our constitution. Not that even this consideration can be adduced as a primary or an absolute
proof; for it is only on the supposition that a God exists
that it can be legitimately employed, and our conviction
of the Divine existence presupposes a confidence in the
veracity of our intuitions and arguments founded on them.
But this truth, being once admitted, becomes henceforth
the keystone which keeps all the separate and independent parts of our constitution in one compact and stable
whole, which can never be broken down, but will be felt
to be the stronger the greater the weight that is laid
upon it.
V. No truths, recognized by the mind as such, can be
shown to be contradictory. In this line of thought a
sound metaphysics may accomplish some good ends. Scep
* Speaking of primary convictions of the mind, Hamilton says: "They
are many, they are in authority co-ordinate, and their testimony is clear
and precise. It is therefore competent for us to view them in correlation; to compare their declarations; and to consider whether they contradict, and, by contradicting, invalidate each other. This mutual contradiction is possible in two ways.  1st, It may be that the primary data
themselves are directly or immediately contradictory of each other. 2nd,
It may be that they are mediately or indirectly contradictory, inasmuch
as the consequences to which they necessarily lead, and for the truth and
falsehood of which they are therefore responsible, are mutually repugnant. By evincing either of these, the veracity of consciousness will be
disproved; for, in either case, consciousness is shown to be inconsistent
with itself, and consequently inconsistent with the unity of truth. But
by no other process of demonstration, is this possible." He adds, "No attempt to show that the data of consciousness are (either in themselves
or in their necessary consequences) mutually contradictory has yet succeeded"' (Reid's Works, pp. 745, 746).
383 
METAPHYSICS.
tics have laboured-and others not sceptics have done
their best to aid them-to prove that certain proposi tions approved of by the mind are contradictory. But
in this attempt they have failed, as can be shown, I be lieve, of every case in which they have tried.* It can be
proved, in regard to the opposed propositions, that, in
some cases, they have no meaning; that, in other cases,
the mind pronounces in favour of neither the one nor the
other; that, in several cases, the propositions seem to be
contradictory only because improperly stated, and when
they are properly enunciated, the difficulty disappears;
and that, in the remaining cases, there is merely a difficulty in proposing a positive reconciliation of the propositions, but no real inconsistency.
There is little risk of scepticism producing any injurious influence in the common business of life. The reason
is, that circumstances ever pressing on the attention constrain men to proceed on their spontaneous principles,
which are sound, even when the speculative principles are
altogether infidel. He who is hungry will partake of food,
he who sees an offensive weapon about to strike him will
avoid it, even though he be not prepared to avow, as a
philosopher, that there are any such gross things as bread
or iron in the universe, or though he may doubt, as a
metaphysician, whether food be fitted to nourish, or a
sword to kill him.  It is not in such urgent matters of
animal comfort and temporal interest that scepticism. is
wont to manifest itself, but in far different subjects, and
especially in leading persons to doubt of the great truths
of morality and religion, the practical action in which is
more under the control of the will. Even here there will
be times when the spontaneous belief or impulse will
overmaster the speculative unbelief, as when moral indignation, implying a belief in the reality of sin, is excited
* See an examination of Kant's attempt, infra, Sect. V.
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ONTOLOGY.
by a mean or dishonest action, or when disease has seized
us, and death seems in hard pursuit, and threatens to
hurry us to the judgment-seat. Such circumstances as
these will call forth the action of conscience, in spite of
all efforts to repress it. But when there is nothing of
this description to arouse the native feeling, unbelief may
succeed in keeping us very much out of the way of all
that would call the internal sentiment into activity, and
for days, or weeks, or months together it may seldom
arise to utter a protest or create a disturbance of any description; and, even when the deeper moral or religious
powers come forth to assert their authority, there may,
be a vigorous, and, so far, a successful warfare waged
with them; that is, they may be so far repressed as not
to command the will, or lead to any practical operation.
Hence the evil of scepticism, in chilling the ardour of
youth, and confirming the hardness of age, in repressing
every noble aspiration and every high effort, while it
leaves the soul the servant or slave of the lower, the sensual, the ambitious, the proud, or the selfish impulses of
the heart.
SECT. IV. ON TIHE CONDITIONED AND THE UNCONDITIONED.
Leibnitz complained of the Electress of Brandenburg
that she asked the why of the why. There are some truths
in regard to which we are not warranted to ask the why.
They shine in their own light; and we feel that we need
no light, and we ask no light, wherewith to see them,
and any light we might seek to aid us would be felt only
as an encumbrance. In all such cases the mind asks no
why, and is amazed when the why is asked; and feels
that it can give no answer, and ought not to attempt an
answer. Other truths can be known only mediately, or
by means of some other truth coming between as evidence. I need no mediate proof to convince me that I
2c
385 
METrAPHYSICS.
exist, or that I hold an object in my hand which I call a
pen; but I need evidence to convince me that there are
inhabitants in India, or that there is a cycle of spots presented in the sun's rotation.  In regard to this class of
truths I am entitled —nay, required-to ask the wly. Not
only so; if the truth urged as evidence is not self-evident,
I may ask the W/ly of the why, and the why of that why,
on and on, till we come to a self-evident truth, when the
wly becomes unintelligible.   Now we may say of the
one class of truths that they depend (to us) on no condition, and call them Unconditioned; whereas we must
call the other Conditioned, for we require another truth
as a condition of our assenting to them.
But this is not precisely what is meant, or all that is
meant, by conditioned and unconditioned in philosophic
nomenclature. We find that not only does one truth depend on another as evidence to our minds, but one thing
as an existence depends on another. Everything falling
under our notice on earth is dependent on some other
thing as its cause. All physical events proceed from a
concurrence of previous circumstances.   All animated
beings come from a parentage. But is everything that
exists thus a dependent link in a chain which hangs on
nothing? There are intellectual instincts which recoil
from such a thought. There are intuitions which, proceeding on facts ever pressing themselves on the attention, lead to a very different result. By our intuitive
conviction in regard to substance we are introduced to
that which has power of itself. True, we discover that
all mundane substances, spiritual and material, have in
fact been originated, and have proceeded from something
anterior to them. But then our intuition presses us on,
and we seek for a cause of that cause which is farthest
removed from our view. Pursuing various lines, external
and internal, we arrive at a substance which has no mark
386 
ONTOLOGY.
of being an effect; to a substance who is the cause, and,
as such, the intelligent cause, of all the order and adaptation of one thing to another in the universe; who is the
founder of the moral power within us, and the sanctioner
of the moral law to which it looks, and who seems to be
that Infinite Existence to which our faith in infinity is
ever pointing; and now the mind in all its intuitions is
satisfied. The intuitive belief as to power in substance
is satisfied; the intuitive belief in the adequacy of the
cause to produce its effects is satisfied; the native moral
conviction is satisfied; and the belief in infinity is satisfied. True, every step in this process is not intuitive or
demonstrative; there may be more than one experiential
link in the chain; but the intuitive convictions enter
very largely, and when experience has furnished its quota,
they are gratified, and feel as if they had nothing to demand beyond this One Substance possessed of all power
and of all perfection.
If we would avoid the utmost possible confusion of
thought, we must distinguish between these two kinds of
conditioned and unconditioned; the one referring to human knowledge, and the discussion of it falling properly
under Gnosiology; the other to existence, and so falling
under Ontology. The conditional, in respect of knowledge, does, if we pursue the conditioned sufficiently far,
conduct at last to primary truths, which are to us unconditioned. These are the first truths which we have been
seeking to seize and express in this treatise. We cannot
be made to think or believe that these primary truths
should not be positive truths, and regarded as truths by
all other beings capable of comprehending them as well
as ourselves. But it is to be carefully remarked, and
ever allowed, that some of those truths which are original and independent to us, may be seen by higher intelligences to be dependent on, or to be necessarily inter                                           2c2
387 
METAPHYSICS.
linked with, other truths. We may by patient induction
ascertain what are to us unconditioned truths; but it
would be presumptuous in us to pretend to determine
what truths are so in themselves, and are seen to be such
by the omniscient God.  Again, as to conditioned and
unconditioned existence, it is quite clear that nothing falls
uinder our notice in this world which is absolutely unconditioned. But the intuitive convictions of the mind, proceeding on a few obvious facts, lead us by an easy process to an unconditioned Being,-that is, whose existence
depends on no other.
But the question is started, Can we conceive of the
Unconditioned?  Of truth unconditioned to us we can
conceive: it is the generalization of those truths on which
we are ever falling back-in the last resort. But can we
conceive of unconditioned existence? I find no difficulty
in doing so. My intellectual and moral convictions are
not satisfied till I do so. But is not our conception, after
all, merely negative? I admit that my conception of unconditioned is negative, is a conception merely of the
removing of a restriction; and I am not aware that we
have any intuitive conviction as to unconditioned such
as we have in regard to infinite. But pursuing every one
of our native convictions, cognitive, fiducial, moral, they
conduct us to a positive conception of a Being from
whom all conditions are removed, and whose existence
and perfections are themselves underived, while they are
the source of all power and excellence in the creature.
SECT. V. (Supplementary.) THE ANTINOMIES OF KANT.
Kant tries to show that the speculative reason conducts to propositions which are contradictory of each other (Kritik d. r. Vern.
p. 338). It follows that it cannot be trusted in any of its enunciations. Kant extricates himself from the practical difficulties in
which he was thereby involved by declaring that the speculative
reason was not given to lead us to positive objective truth, and by
388 
ONTOLOGY.
appealing from it to the practical reason. It is however always
competent to the sceptic to maintain that, if the speculative reason
deceive us, so also may the practical reason. The doctrine which
I hold is, that the reason does not lead directly nor consequentially
to any such contradictions. In regard to some of the counter-propositions, Reason seems to me to say nothing on the one side or the
other. In regard to others, there seem to be intuitive convictions
but the contradiction arises from an erroneous exposition or expression of them. It is of course easy, on such abstruse subjects,
to construct a series of propositions which may seem to be contradictory, or in reality be contradictory, if they have a meaning at
all. But these propositions will be found not to be the expression
of the actual decisions of the mind. Let us examine the contradictions which are supposed to be sanctioned by reason. I am to
content myself with looking at the propositions themselves, without entering on the elaborate demonstrations of them by Kant
These demonstrations proceed on the peculiar Kantian principles
in regard to phenomena, space, time, and the nature of the relations
which the mind can discover, and these I have been seeking to
undermine all throughout this treatise. It will be enough here to
show that Reason sanctions no contradictions on the topics to which
Kant refers.
FIRST ANTINOMY.
The world has a beginning in        The world has no beginning in
time, and is limited in regard to  time, and no limits in space, but
space.                              is in regard to both infinite.
Now upon this I have to remark, first, that, as to the'world,'
we have, so far as I can discover, no intuition whatever. We have
merely an intuition as to certain things in the world, or, it may be,
out of the world. Our reason does declare that space and time are
infinite, but it does not declare whether the world is or is not infinite in extent and duration. We shall find under another antinomy what is our conviction as to God. Reason does not declare
that space or time, or the God who inhabits them, must be finite.
SECOND ANTINOMY.
Every composite substance con-       No composite thing can consist
sists of simple parts, and all that   of simple parts, and there cannot
exists must either be simple or   exist in the world any simple subcomposed of simple parts.            stance.
Our reason says nothing as to whether things are or are not
made up of simple substances. Experience cannot settle the ques
389 
METAPHYSICS.
tion started by Kant in one way or other. We find certain things
composite: these we know are made up of parts; but we cannot
say how far the decomposition may extend, or what is the nature
of the furthest elements reached.
THIRD ANTINOMY.
Causality, according to the laws   There is no such thing as freeof nature, is not the only causa-   dom, but everything in the world
lity operating to originate the phe-   happens according to the laws of
nomena of the world; to account   nature.
for the phenomena we must have
a causality of freedom.
Here I think reason does sanction two sets of facts. One is the
existence of freedom; the other is the universal prevalence of some
sort of causation, which may differ however in every different kind
of object. These may be so stated as to be contradictory. But
our convictions in themselves involve no contradiction: it is im.
possible to show that they do by the law of contradiction, which is
that A is not Not-A. "There is some sort of causation even in voluntary acts;" and "the will is free:" no one can show that these
two propositions are contradictory.
FOURTH ANTINOMY.
An absolutely necessary being
does not exist, either in the world
or out of it, as the cause of the
world.
There exists in the world, or in
connection with it, as a part or as
the cause of it, an absolutely necessary being.
Our reason seems to say that time and space must have ever
existed, and must exist. When a God is found, by an easy process
the mind is led by intuition to trace up these effects in nature to
Him as the underived substance. No contradictory proposition
can be established either by reason or experience.
A little patient investigation of our actual intuitions will show
that all these contradictions, of which the Kantians and Hegelians
make so much, are not in our constitutions, but in the ingenious
structures fashioned by metaphysicians to support their theories.
SECT. VI. (Supplementary.) EXAMINATION OF MR. J. S.
MILL'S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM.
By far the ablest opponent of intuitive truth in this country in
our day is Mr. John Stuart Mill.  It will be necessary to examine
his own metaphysical system. I speak thus because he has in fact
390
There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world
happens according to the laws of
nature. 
ONTOLOGY.
a metaphysics underlying his whole logical disquisitions. HIe says,
indeed, in the introduction to his Logic, that "with the original
data or ultimate premisses of our knowledge, with their number or
nature, the mode in which they are obtained, or the tests by which
they may be distinguished, logic in a direct way has, in the sense
in which I conceive the same, nothing to do." Yet Mr. Mill is
ever and anon diving down into these very topics, and uttering
very decided opinions as to our knowledge of mind and body, as
to the foundation of reasoning and demonstrative evidence, and as
to our belief in causation. This I exceedingly regret; the more so
that his logic in topics remote from first principles is distinguished
for masterly exposition, for great clearness, and practical utility.*
If it be answered that a thorough logic cannot be constructed
without building on the foundations which metaphysics supply,
then I have to regret that Mr. Mill's metaphysics should be so
defective.   His philosophy might seem to be that of Locke, but
in fact it omits many truths to which Locke gave prominence, as,
for example, the high function of intuition.  Mr. Mill's metaphysical system is that of the age and circle in which he was trained;
it is derived in part from Dr. Brown, and his own father, Mr.
James Mill, and to a greater extent from M. Comte.
The only satisfactory metaphysical admission of Mr. Mill is,
"Whatever is known to us by consciousness is known beyond the
possibility of question " (4th edit. Logic, Introd. p. 6). What
does this admission amount to? First, as to self, or mind, he says,
"But what this being is, although it is myself, I have no knowledge, other than the series of its states of consciousness." As to
body, he says the reasonable opinion is that it is the "hidden external cause to which we refer our sensations" (Logic, i. iii. 8).
Sensation is our only primary mental operation in regard to an
external world, and perception is discarded "as an obscure word"
(compare Dissertations, vol. i. p. 94).  "There is not the slightest
reason for believing that what we call the sensible qualities of the
object are a type of anything inherent in itself, or bear any affinity
to its own nature."   "Why should matter resemble our sensations P" (Logic, i. iii. 7). Speaking of bodies, and our feelings or
* Mr. Kidd, in his very able work on the'Primary Principles of
Reasoning,' chap. iii., has examined Mr. Mill's Attributive theory of
reasoning, and has shown that when he puts the major premiss in the
form of "Attribute A is a mark of Attribute B," it means that "the
class of things that possess A also possess B," and that we have thus
the Dictam which he so much disparages brought in surreptitiously.
391 
METAPHYSICS.
states of consciousness, he says, 4 The bodies, or external objects
which excite certain of these feelings, together with the powers
or properties whereby they excite them; these being included
rather in compliance with common opinion, and because their ex istence is taken for granted in the common language, from which
I cannot deviate, than because the recognition of such powers or
properties as real existences appears to be warranted by a sound
philosophy." It is curious to see how extremes meet. Mr. Mill
seems in every way the opponent of the Kantian school. Yet he
quotes with approbation and evident delight the words of Sir W.
Hamilton, " All that we know is therefore phenomenal,-pheno menal of the unknown" (i. iii., 5).
I have to ask my readers to compare this philosophic system
with the account I have submitted in this treatise, and judge for
themselves in the light of consciousness. He admits that whatever
is known by consciousness is beyond possibility of question; but
I hold that by consciousness we know much more than he admits.
He allows that we know Feelings-the favourite but most inadequate language of the French Sensationalists, and of Brown. I
maintain that our consciousness is of Self as Feeling, and not of
Feelings separate from Self. If he ask me to define Self, which
I maintain that we thus know, I ask him to define Feeling, which
he acknowledges that we thus know. It will then be seen that
neither can be defined, because both are original perceptions of
consciousness.   He admits  as indisputable only what we are
conscious of. I maintain that we must admit all we intuitively
know, and that we know body immediately. Mr. Mill, following
Brown, maintains that we know body by inference, as the cause
of what we feel. Brown can get the inference; for he holds resolutely by the doctrine that we intuitively believe that every effect
has a cause; and discovering phenomena in us which have no cause
in us, he seeks for a cause without us. This process would, I think,
leave the external world an unknown thing, and could never give
us a knowledge of extension (which not being in the effect we
could not place in the cause;) still we might thus argue that an
external world existed. But how can Mr. Mill, who denies intuitive causation, get the external world at all?' Where, indeed, is he
to get even his causation as an experiential law? For in a mind
shut up darkly from all direct knowledge of anything beyond, the
most common phenomena must be sensations and feelings of which
we can never discover a cause, or know that they have a cause. I
agree with an able critic ('National Review,' Oct. 1859), that the
logical result of such a system is painfully blank. Kant saved
392 
ONTOLOGY.
himself from the consequences of his speculative system by calling
in the Practical Reason, and Hamilton accomplished the same end
by calling in Faith. I think that these great men were entitled
to appeal to our moral convictions and to our necessary faiths.
These I hold to be beyond dispute, no less than our consciousness
or our feelings. But Mr. Mill makes no such appeal to save him
from the void; and he avoids expressing any opinion as to the
great fundamental religious truths which men have in all ages intertwined with their ethical principles, and from which they have
derived their brightest hopes and deepest assurances. He is silent
on these subjects, as if on the one hand unwilling to deny them,
and as if he felt on the other hand that by his miserably defective
philosophic principles he had left himself no ground on which to
build them.
Mr. Mill's derivative logic is admirable; but it is difficult to
find to what the final appeal is to be.  "There is no appeal from
the human faculties generally; but there is an appeal from one
faculty to another, from the judging faculty to those which take
cognizance of fact, the faculties of sense and consciousness" (iii.
xxi. 1). This would seem to make sense and consciousness the
final appeal. But all that sense gives, according to him, is an unknown cause of feelings, and all that consciousness gives is a series
of feelings.   He says, very properly, that we should make "the
opinion agree with the fact;" but he seems to leave us no means
of getting at any other facts than floating feelings.
I have already noticed his defective account of our moral perception (see supra, p. 304), and of our belief in causation (p. 276), and
I may yet have occasion to refer to his theory of mathematical
axioms.   It now only remains at this place to show that he has
given an utterly erroneous account of the tests or criteria of primitive or fundamental truth.  He is obliged, as for himself, to admit some sort of test: we must admit, he says, "all that is known
by consciousness;" and he says there is "no appeal from the human faculties generally." I do regret that he has never patiently
set himself to inquire what is the knowledge given by" consciousness," and in the testimonies of the "faculties generally." This
would have led him to truths which he ignores, or contemptuously
sets aside. He examines the views of the defenders of necessary
truth on the supposition that the test of such truth is that "the
negation of it is not only false but inconceivable" (Logic, ii. v.
6).  He then uses the word "inconceivable" in all its ambiguity
of meaning. By "conceivable" he often means that which we can
apprehend, or of which we may have an idea,in the sense of an image,
393 
METAPHYSICS.
"When we have often seen or thought of two things together, and
have never in any one instance either seen or thought of them
separately, there is, by the primary law of association, an increas ing difficulty, which may in the end become insuperable, of conceiv ing the two things apart." iHe then proceeds to show that what
is inconceivable by one man is conceivable by another; that what
is inconceivable in one age may become conceivable the next.
"There was a time when men of the most cultivated intellects, and
the most emancipated from the dominion of early prejudice, would
not credit the existence of antipodes " (iii. v. 6). I acknowledge
that the tests of intuition have often been loosely stated, and that
they have also been illegitimately applied; just as the laws of de rivative logic have been. But they have seldom or never been put
in the ambiguous form in which Mkr. Mill understands them, and
it is only in such a form that they could ever be supposed to cover
such beliefs as the rejection of the rotundity of the earth. The
tests of intuition can be clearly enunciated, and can be so used as
to settle for us what is intuitive truth. It is not the power of
conception that should be used as a test, but it is self-evidence
with necessity,-the necessity of cognition, if the intuition be a
cognition; the necessity of belief, if it be a belief; the necessity of
judgment, if it be a judgment. There was a time when even educated men felt a difficulty in conceiving the antipodes, because it
seemed contrary, not to intuition, but to their limited experience;
but surely no one knowing anything of philosophy, or of what he
was speaking, would have maintained, at any time, that it was selfevident that the earth could not be round, and that it was impossible, in any circumstances, to believe the opposite. The tests of
intuition, clearly announced and rigidly applied, give their sanction only to such truths as all men have spontaneously assented to
in all ages.
394 
395
BOOK II.
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
THE VARIOUS SCIENCES.
CHAPTER I.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEMONSTRATIVE OR
FORMAL AND THE MATERIAL OR INDUCTIVE SCI ENCES.
THE distinction between them is so obvious that it has
been very generally acknowledged Every one sees the
difference between such sciences as mathematics and the
Aristotelian logic on the one hand, and zoology and
botany on the other. Different accounts however have
been given of the grounds of the distinction. Here, as
in so many of the other topics which have fallen under
our notice, there has been much confusion, issuing in
partial truth and positive error. Thus, it is often said
that the one class has to do exclusively with abstract
truth, and the other with facts which it seeks to classify
and arrange. But there are generalizations, and therefore abstractions, in all science; and if there be any truth
in the account given in this treatise, even the sciences
which proceed on intuition have to commence with facts
which they generalize. Again, the one class is said to be
concerned with a priori and the other with a posteriori
truth. But then truth can be available in such sciences 
396   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
only in a general form, and in order to reach the general'
truth there must be a process of induction.   Still there
is truth in both these statements.   All that is necessary
is to explicate it clearly, and make it stand out separate
from associated errors.
One class of sciences have evidently to do throughout
with facts which they seek to correlate by observing the
relations among them, say of form, of property, or of
cause and effect. When these facts are external, the
sciences are material, such as physiology and chemistry
and geology. If the facts be internal, then we have the
science of psychology, with its several subdivisions. In
these sciences the inquirer always starts with individual
facts, but he aims to discover resemblances or other relations, to abstract the points of correlation, and at last to
arrive at general laws or causes ever rising in generality.
The other class of sciences, if there be any accuracy
in the fundamental principles of this work, must also,
begin with facts, but they are facts of a different order.
The investigator seizes on the original convictions of the
mind on the given set of objects, discovers their rule, or
the principle involved in them, by a process of abstraction
and generalization, and then constructs his science by
combining them, and carrying them out deductively. I
am to show, in the Chapters which follow, that this is
what is done in the science of mathematics, and to some
extent also in logic and ethics.
The distinction between the two is thus sufficiently
marked. Both must start with facts, but the one starts
with the individual convictions, which are native, original,
and necessary-or, to speak more accurately, with the facts
and truths thus revealed,-and formalizing the principles involved in them, it adopts these as its fundamental
maxims, and is now ready to begin its proper work of
combining its truths and deducing consequences. The 
DEMONSTRATIVE AND INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.   397
sciences which use only such principles are very properly
called apodictic, or demonstrative. They may also be
called, in an especial sense, abstract sciences, inasmuch
as they deal with principles in an abstract form. Logic
is frequently called formal, because it proceeds on such
rules; and the appellation might be applied to other sciences, such as ethics, and even mathematics. But it is
not to be forgotten, that, after all, these sciences do start
from facts, though from facts of a particular kind, and if
there be any dispute as to their fundamental principles,
the appeal must be to these facts, that is, to the original
convictions of the mind.   These facts have all a conviction of necessity in them, and on the condition that they
be properly generalized, the necessity goes up with each
case into the general axiom, and all the truths may be
represented as NECESSARY TRUTHS. The maxims with
which these sciences start- are all generalizations of our
primitive cognitions, beliefs, or judgments, and these with
the furthest deductions reached have all a reference to
objects, and these are the particular kind of objects contemplated in the original conviction. The propositions
of geometry have a reference to space. The maxims of
ethics have a reference to voluntary actions. Logical formulae have a reference to the notions of the mind and
the objects apprehended in these notions. We may at
any time apply the abstract deductions of any of these
sciences to cases which fulfil the conditions.   They are
all true, necessarily true, of their corresponding objects.
Thus all the conclusions of mathematics in regard to the
ellipse must hold good of the planets, so far as they move
in an elliptic orbit. The special rules of the syllogism
must hold good of our reasoning about every sort of
things. It is to be remembered, however, that most of
the axioms of the sciences are generalizations, not so much
of our primitive cognitions or beliefs, as of 6ur primitive 
398    METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
judgments, and these, while they have a reference to objects, may have a reference to such merely potentially.
There may be no such thing as a perfectly elliptic curve
in the planetary movements; still, even in such cases, the
abstract truth has a respect to a possible ellipse mathematically correct.
And here the question is started, How can demonstration be carried so far in certain departments, while in
others it can proceed only a very little way? To this it must
be answered, first, in a general way, that demonstration,
as proceeding on intuition, is possible only in those departments in which we have intuition, and in these only
so far as the special intuition will carry us. In mathematics we have the necessary relations of space, time,
number, and quantity to proceed on. The simplicity of
the objects allows of great accuracy of expression, which
again admits, and all but necessitates, great clearness of
notion and comprehension, and thus error is rendered
all but impossible, except from the grossest carelessness.
An encouragement is given to the prosecution of mathematical deduction, by the circumstance that the truths
reached admit of an application to so many departments
of nature which in respect of form, time, and quantity
are constructed on rigidly mathematical principles. In
formal logic too, and in ethics, the laws of thought and
of our moral convictions being detected and rigidly expressed, may be carried out to a considerable length by
rigid deduction. In mechanics and dynamics the intuition of mind regarding force may admit of a very limited
union of demonstration with experiment. But in cases
in which the intuition is of a very bare character, the
number of relations which can be discovered is necessarily
very limited.   Thus the relation of identity can afford
little matter for demonstration. Again, when the intuition mixes itself closely with other mental acts, it is diffi 
DEMONSTRATIVE AND INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.   399
cult to reach its precise rule, or get a rule sufficiently
clear and definite for demonstration. Thus, our intuition
as to cause, the causes being so often dual or plural, does
not admit of so satisfactory deduction as our mathematical intuitions. Yet further, demonstration, however far
it might be carried in an abstract form, admits of few
applications to nature when the circumstances become
very complicated. Mathematics can determine very definitely what will be the path of a body when it is attracted by only one other, but it can settle the problem
of three bodies only approximately.   Formal Logic is
greatly hampered by the complexity of thought and the
variety of the objects of thought, and a demonstrative
ethics becomes valueless in the complicated affairs of human life. By far the greater number of the phenomena
of nature within and without us, are so involved and intricate that the abstract truths of intuition and demonstration admit of no application to them.
In the other class of sciences the inquirer begins with
facts, these not being the necessary convictions of the
mind.   He  has first and mainly to observe them carefully, and, if need be, to work experiments so as to elicit
them fully, and discover the special action of each agent
working in the complex operation; and he aimns by the
"necessary exclusions," and by co-ordination, to reach
a general law or a general cause. This law, however,
has in it no necessity, and no absolute universality, or
universality beyond  the knowable  cosmos.    Having
reached the law, the science is satisfied in regard to that
department of facts. At the same time it may employ
the law as a means to further ends; say, by deduction to
ascertain unknown facts, or to reach some further law.
These deduced particulars, or laws, can of course have
only the certainty of the law from which they are drawn,
and this only on the condition that the derivation is pro 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
perly made. The truths in these departments of knowledge are all EXPERIENTIAL OR CONTINGENT.
It should be noticed that some sciences are of a mixed
character, partaking of the nature of both classes.  Of
this description are mechanics, astronomy, and optics, in
each of which there is a union of the generalization of
outward facts with the generalization of the intuitive
convictions of the mind regarding space, number, and
force. In ethics too there is an observation of the characters and circumstances of men, combined with original
moral principle. Logic, taken in a large sense, may be
considered as not only the science of the generalized operations of thought, but of the laws of thought as applied,
say, to necessary truth in demonstration, and to contingent truth in induction.
Nor should it be omitted that in most sciences there
are metaphysical principles involved, though these are
seldom noticed by physical inquirers. In the Chapters
which immediately follow, I am to refer first to the sciences in which intuition and demonstration are the allimportant instruments, and then to those departments of
knowledge in which intuition enters, often tacit and unseen, as an element.
CHAPTER II.
THE MENTAL SCIENCES.
SECT. I. CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL SCIENCES.
ALREADY five mental sciences have emerged, and these
will come each to be subdivided into special departments
as the study makes progress.
There is Psychology, which inquires into the operations
400 
THE MENTAL SCIENCES.
of the mind of man with the view of discovering its laws
and its faculties.   The founder of this science is undoubtedly Aristotle in ancient times. Locke may be described as its second founder in modern times. It is a
science throughout of facts and the co-ordination of facts.
As a whole, it has made a gradual progress since its origin
in Greece, and its second rise in the seventeenth century.
There is Logic. There were helps and preparations
towards its construction in the discussions of earlier speculators, but Aristotle may be regarded as the founder
of this science also. In modern times it has had a special province allotted to it by Kant, who defined it as the
science of the laws of the understanding and of the
reason. Those who do not acknowledge the distinction,
as drawn by Kant, between the understanding and the
reason, but who adopt Kant's general view of Logic, describe it as the Science of the Laws of Thought. It should
seek first to seize the laws of thought as i) the rIeind of
mlaln, but its main office is to analyze and formalize and
apply them.
There is the science of Ethics.  The founder of it is
undoubtedly Socrates.  It is the science of the laws of
the Morally Good. It should endeavour to seize the laws
of man's moral nature; especially of the conscience, and
thence proceed, as its more particular work, to analyze
them into forms or rules, and apply them to the peculiarities of human character and the specialties of human
life.
There should be a science whose object-matter is the
laws of the feelings.   Already have we  a science for
an important part of this general subject, the science of
AEsthetics, which would determine the laws of the beautiful.  But we should have a science seeking to discover
the laws of the feelings generally, and to trace them in
their influence, as directed to various classes of objects
2D
401 
402   MFTAPHTSICAL PRINCIPLFES INVOLVED IN
within and without us. Plato is entitled to be regarded
as the founder of this science, from his frequent and
often profound inquiries into the nature of the sO IcaxOv,
or'the fair.'  I am inclined to call this scarcely formed
science Kalology, or Kallisophy.
There is the science of Metaphysics.   In some of its
inquiries it appeared earlier than any of the others, going
back to the age of the Eleatics. Yet it will be one of
the latest to come to any degree of perfection, owing to
the subtle and deeply seated nature of the objects at
which it looks. It has generally had far too wide and
ambitious a province allotted to it. I have sought in
this treatise to confine it to a special field, and defined it as
the science of the intuitive convictions of the mind, and
made the science of knowledge and the science of being
as two compartments of it.  Its office is by induction to
determine what are the laws of the intuitions, and to reduce them to general expressions. It cannot attain anything like a scientific form, till psychology has made
some progress, and taught us to distinguish between intuition and associated and allied states of mind.
SECT. II. LoGic.
I -am disposed to define Logic as the Science of the
Laws of Discursive Thought.  It presupposes that certain materials are supplied to the mind, say, by sense and
self-consciousness, and by the reproductive powers bringing them before the mind even when the objects are not
present. Thought works on these materials discursively,
that is, from something given it draws or derives something else. In doing so it follows certain laws. It is the
office of Logic to seize these laws, and to derive rules
from them which may guide and guard thought in its various applications.
Logic is described by those who take much the same 
THE MENTAL SCIENCES.
view of it as I do, as an a priori science. But this account cannot be allowed to pass without an explanation.
It may be called an a priori science, inasmuch as it deals
with laws which are in the mental constitution prior to
all experience. But in another sense it is not an a priori
science, nor can there be an a priori science, for there is
no department in which general laws can be discovered
independent of experience. While the laws of thought
are a priori, we cannot discover them a priori. It is quite
conceivable, indeed, that man might have been so framed
that he could discover the laws of thought by imniediate
consciousness or intuition. His mental constitution might
have been such as to enable him at once to enunciate
the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, and the
Dictuml de omni et nllo. But it is very evident that man
has not been so constituted by his Maker. The only
method available to us of discovering the laws of thought,
is to observe their spontaneous operations, separate by
analysis the invariable from the accidental, and by a
process of induction collect the law from its individual
acts.
Logic thus throws us back on Psychology, and on an
inductive psychology, not indeed to justify the laws, but
to discover them. Not that psychology and logic are identical, or that they should be mixed up with one another.
Psychology, in treating of the operations of the mind generally, will fall in with thought, and will seek by classification to discover the faculties of thought, and these are
specially the comparative or correlative powers. It will
seek even to discover in a general way the laws involved
in thought.                      But when it has gone so far in this directi        o n, it Aill stop. It does not         make a     very minute analysis
of these laiws, it does not seek to present them in all poss    i    b    l     e     forms,  it does not make an application of them to
discursive investigation. It leaves this to logic as its spe                                            2 D 2
403 
404   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
cial province.   Nor should logic enter generally into the
nature of the human mind, its faculties and laws. It
should confine itself to one single department. Nor does
it in this department seek to investigate faculties and
their mode of operation. It looks at the human mind
merely with the view of discovering the laws involved in
the discursive exercises, and when it has detected them, it
puts them in convenient formulae, and applies them to
all various discursive investigations. If psychology were
in a more perfect state, it would save logic from nearly
all psychological inquiry by handing over to it certain
truths which it might at once adopt, and use for its own
special purposes.
Logic has points of relation to metaphysics. Certain
of the fundamental principles of logic are intuitive.
These must fall under the province of metaphysics, which
should generalize them out of their individual operations
and express them, and show what is their precise nature
in the human constitution, and their objective validity,
and the relation in which they stand to the other iniituitive principles, and to the experiential exercises of the
mind. But having finished this work, it hands over
these principles to logic, to make a more specific use of
them by presenting them in divers formulae, and following them out in discursive investigation.   On the other
hand, logic does not consider these intuitive principles
as intuitive.  If they are admitted, it does  not care
whether they are intuitive or experiential; it does not
trouble itself to inquire about their origin, foundation,
or guarantee, or their relation to other exercises of the
mind. But while logic is not to be confounded with
psychology or with metaphysics, yet in all disputes as
to its fundamental principles, it is necessarily thrown
back on both.   In particular the disputes as to the nature of the abstract and general notion, and all the dis 
THE MAENTAL SCIENCES.
cussions in the present day as to whether the predicate
ought or ought not to be qualified, as to whether the
dictum is or is not the ultimate expression of the universal law of reasoning, are to be settled by psychological and metaphysical investigation.
From a very old date, Logic is represented as having
to do with the Notion, with Judgment, and Reasoning.
Its special province is to discover the laws of thought
involved in each of these, to formalize and apply tlhem.
The investigations pursued in this treatise have brought
out a number of truths capable of furnishing principles
in each of these departments.  But it would carry us
into another science altogether, were I to proceed in this
treatise to specify the logical applications of metaphysical truth.
In addition to the Universal Logic discovering and
applying the laws of thought, whatever be the objects,
there may also be a Particular Logic unfolding the laws
of discursive thought as addressed to particular classes
of objects. Under this head such subjects as demonstrative and probable evidence, induction, and analogy would
be discussed.  In this eminently practical department,
metaphysics should be able to show, in every branch of
inquiry, what principles are intuitive,-by the tests which
I have so often specified,-aand, by consequence, what
must be made to rest on experience.*
* I am aware that there are some who deny that there can be such
a department of logic. Logic, they say, has to do with thought, and
not with objects, and can take no cognizance of the difference of objects. I admit that logic has to do with the laws of thought, and not
with the nature of objects. But then thought has always a reference,
avowed or tacit, to objects. There is a subtle error lying here in the
account given of universal logic by Kant, who says that it makes abstraction of all content of the cognition (Kritik, Trans. Logik). It is
all true that logic looks to the thought, but it is also true that thought
has a content. The difference between universal and particular logic
lies in this, that the former looks to thought, whatever be the content,
405 
406   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
SECT. III. ETHICS.
Ethics is in every respect an analogous science to Logic   The difference lies in the difference of the matters
with which they deal, the one aimning to find the laws of
discursive truth, the other the nature of moral good; the
one seeking to attain its end by generalizing tlhe operations of thought, the other by generalizing the exercises
of the motive and moral powers of man.  Ethics, like
Logics, is in a sense an a priori science; it finds and it
employs principles which are valid independent of our
experience.   In another sense, it is a posteriori, inasmuch as these principles and their laws can be discovered
by us only through observation of their individual manifestations; and thus far it is dependent on an inductive
psychology. We must begin with inquiring, Quid est?
and then we find that the thing reached relates to the
Quid oportet?  It is the special office of ethics to ascertain what is involved in the oportet, and apply its formulae to the conduct of responsible beings.
It has to look to three special classes of objects, in
order to discover the laws which it employs. It has to
look to the motives addressed to the mind, with the view
of gaining its consent, and, it may be, of inducing it to
form a determination to act.  It has to look to the will
or the mind deciding upon the motives addressed to it.
Further, and specially, it has to look to the conscience
and the latter to thought, directed to special classes of content. This
leads me to point out another error which has crept into the Kantian
Logic from the Kantian Metaplysics.  It is that the laws of thought
are mere forms in the mind. True, they are rules in the mind, but
they are rules which refer to objects, and they do not give the objects
anything that is not in them. True, all discursive thought implies materials supplied to it. If fable or error be given it, what it reaches may
also be fabulous or erroneous. But on the other hand, if it start with
fact or with truth, and proceed according to logical laws, all that it
reaches will also be real and true. 
THE MENTAL SCIENCES.
intimating to the will when it should yield to motives
addressed to it, and when it should resist. The mind
discerns moral good as a quality of certain voluntary acts,
and it pronounces a number of decisions in regard to
moral good in itself, and these can be abstracted into
definitions or generalized into laws which are the fundamental principles of the science. The mind too has a set
of prinmitive judgments, which it forms in regard to the
connection of moral good and happiness, and these can
also be made to assume a general form.  The general
principles thus obtained can be put, by analysis, into an
immense number of specific forms, to suit special purposes
scientific or practical.   They can be put in the form of
ethical principles, to meet prevalent errors, such as those
of the utilitarian or of the sensationalist. Or, again, they
can take the form of general or specific precepts, such as,
"Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart;" "Thou
shalt not covet anything that is thy neighbour's."  In
regard to the will, our intuitive convictions declare that
in all moral action the deed must be voluntary, and the
will must be free.
But a science of ethics fitted to serve any useful purpose cannot be constructed from the mere native convictions of the mind. We do obtain a few most important
general principles from this source exclusively, and these
underlie the whole science, and bear up every part of it.
But, in order to serve the ends intended by it, ethics must
settle what are the duties of different classes of persons,
according to the relation in which they stand to each
other, such as rulers and subjects, parents and children,
masters and servants; and what the path which individuals should follow in certain circumstances, it may be,
very difficult and perplexing.   In consequence of the affairs of human life being very complicated, demonstration
call be carried but a very little way in ethics.   In order
407 
40S   ME'iAPItYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
to be able to enunciate general principles for our guidance, or to promulgate useful precepts, the ethical inquirer
must condescend to come down from his a priori heights
to the level in which mankind live and walk and work.
Even in the most practical departments of ethical science,
the grand fundamental laws of our moral constitution
must ever be the guiding principles, but we have to consider their application to an almost infinite variety of
earthly positions and human character.
In these investigations metaphysics, were it diligently
to cultivate its own field, and confine itself to it, should
be able greatly to serve the science of ethics.  It should
be in a position to show what is the nature of our intuitions, how these intuitions differ from one another, wherein our intellectual differ frotn our moral intuitions, and
what sort of objective reality each class of our intuitions
guarantees, and it should show how we may draw the
general law out of the individual convictions. But inetaphysics and ethics are not, after all, the same science, nor
should ethics be regarded as a branch of metaphysics,
nor should metaphysics profess to be able to construct
an ethical science.   Some of the fundamental principles
of ethics are certainly metaphysical, but ethics consists
mainly in the construction of a science on these principles
as a basis.
Of all the sciences, ethics is that which comes into
closest relationship with Christianity and the Word of
God. The reason is obvious. It deals with the law
and the very character of God; it deals with man as
under law, and with man as having broken the law.   It
thus prepares us, if it faithfully fulfil its functions, to believe in a religion which shows us how the sinner can be
reconciled to God. When the great doctrine of the Atonement is embraced, a new and most important element is
introduced into ethics.  It should no longer be a science 
MATHEMATICS.
constructed, on the one hand for pure beings, nor on the
other for persons who must ever be kept at a distance
from God.   This new reconciling and gracious element
turns a pagan into a Christian ethics; it turns a cold and
legal, into a warm and evangelical obedience.
CHAPTER III.
MATHEMATICS.
IT has been shown by Kant that the axioms of geometry
are synthetic and not analytic judgments.* Thus, in
the axiom, "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space,"
the predication that "they cannot enclose a space," is not
contained in the bare notion of "two straight lines." Starting with axioms which involve more than analytic judgnients, we are reaching throughout the demonstration
more than identical truth. The propositions in the books
of Euclid are all evolved out of the definitions and axioms,
but are not identical with them, or with one another.
The question is keenly agitated as to axiomns, whether
they are or are not the result of the generalizations of
experience.   It will be found here, as in so many other
questions which have passed under our notice, that there
is truth on both sides, error on both sides, and confusion
i'n the whole controversy, which is to be cleared up by an
exact expression of the mental operation involved in passing the judgment. A mathetnatic axiom, being a general maxim, is the result of a process of generalization. If
we look to what has passed within our minds, we shall
* Kritik d. r. Vern., p. 143.  Mr. Mansel (Proleg. Log., p. 93) maintains that such axioms as that "Things which are equal to the same are
equal to each other" are analytic. But does not this confound equality
with identity?
409 
410   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
find that it has been by the contemplation of individual
instances that the mind has attained to the comprehension
and the conviction of the general proposition, that "If
equals be added, the sums are equal." The boy understands this best when he is in circumstances to use his
marbles, or his apples. The youth who is finding his way
through Euclid does not feel that the axiom adds in the
least to the cogency of the reasoning; on the contrary, it
is rather the case before him that enables hitn to coinprehend the axiom and to acknowledge its truth.
But it does not follow that the axiom is a mere generalization of an ordinary or an outward experience. It is
not by trying two straight rods ten, twenty, or a thousand
times that we arrive at the general proposition that two
straight lines cannot enclose a space, and thence conclude
as to two given lines presented to us that it is impossible
they should enclose a space. It is certainly not by placing
two rods parallel to each other, and lengthening them
more and more, and then measuring their distance to see
if they are approaching that we reach the axiom that two
parallel lines will never meet, and thence be convinced as
to any given set of like lines that they will never come
nearer each other.  Place before us two new substances,
and we cannot tell beforehand whether they will or will
not chemically combine; but on the bare contemplation of two straight lines, we declare they cannot contain a space; and of two parallel lines, that they can
never meet.*
* Mr. Mill maintains (Logic, ii. v. 4, 5) that the proposition, "Two
straight lines cannot enclose a space," is a generalization from observation, "an induction from the evidence of the senses." That observation
is needed I have shown in this treatise; but there is intuition in the
observation. That there is generalization in the general maxim I have
also shown; but it is not a generalization of outward instances. Observation can of itself tell us that these two lines before us do not enclose a space, and that any other couplets of lines examined by us 
MATHEMATICS.
In mathematical truth the mind, upon the objects being presented to its contemplation, at once and intuitively
pronounces the judgmrent.   It conceives two straight
lines, and decides that they cannot be made to enclose a
space.   What is true of this case is seen to be true of
this other case, and of every other, and of all cases. There
is thus generalization in the formation of the axiom, but
it is a generalization of the individual intuitive judgements of the mind.  Hence arises the distinction between
the axioms of mathematics and the general laws reached
by observation. If we have properly generalized the individual conviction, the necessity that is in the individual
twenty, or a hundred, or a thousand, do not enclose a space; but experience can say no more without passing beyond its province. An intellectual generalization of such experience might allow us to affirm that
very probably no two lines enclose a space on the earth, but could never
entitle us to maintain that two lines could not enclose a space in the
constellation Orion.  Mr. Mill, in order to account for the necessity
which attaches to such convictions, refers to the circumstance that geometrical forms admit of being distinctly painted in the imagination, so
that we have "mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and
angles."  We might ask him what he makes of algebraic and analytic
demonstrations of every kind, where there is no such power of imagination and yet the same necessity. But without dwelling on this, I would
have it remarked that in the very theory which he devises to show that
the whole is a process of experience, he is appealing to what no experience can ever compass, "to all possible combinations of lines and
angles."   Intuitive thought, proceeding on intuitive perceptions of
space, may tell us the "possible combinations" of geometrical figures,
but this cannot be done by observation, by sense, or imagination. Supposing, he says, that two straight lines after diverging could again converge, "we can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can
frame a mental image of the appearance which one or both of the lines
must present at that point, which we may rely on as being precisely similar to the reality." Most freely do I admit all this. We may'rely'
on it, but surely it is not experience but thought which tells us what
must be at that point, and that it is a'reality.' The very line of remark
which he is pursuing might have shown him that the discovery of necessaryspatial and quantitative relations is a judgment in which the mind
looks upon objects intuitively known, and now presented, or more frequently represented to the mind.
411 
4 12   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN'
goes up into the general, which embraces all the individuals, and the axiom is necessarily true, and true to all
beings.   But we can never be sure that there may not
somewhere be an exception to experiential laws. We are
sure that two straight lines cannot enclose a space in any
planet, or star, or world, that ever existed or shall exist.
But it is quite possible, that there may be horned animals
which are not ruminant, or white crows in some of the
planets; and that there may come a time when the law
of gravitation shall no longer operate.
In the case of our intuitive convictions regarding space,
number, and quantity, the simplicity of the objects makes
it easy for us to seize the principle, and to put it in proper
formula, which can scarcely fail to be accurately made,
Hence these convictions came to be expressed in general forms, in what were then called Common Notions,
at a very early age of the history of intellectual culture.   The disputes among mathematicians in regard
to axioms, relate not to their certainty and universality,
but to the forms in which they ought to be put, and as
to whether what some regard as first truths may not be
demonstrated from prior truths.   Such, for instance, is
the dispute as to how the axioms and demonstrations as
to parallel lines should be best constructed.   But in regard to our convictions of extension, number, and quantity, it is not difficult to gather the regulating principle
out of the individual judgment, and the expression is
commonly accurate.  It is different with other of our
original convictions, such as those which relate to cause
and effect; the greater complexity of the objects renders
it more difficult to seize on the principle involved, and
there is greater room for dispute as to any given formula
whether it is an exact expression of the facts.
Another interesting and still disputed topic in the
metaphysics of mathematics, relates to the nature and 
MATHEMATICS.
value of Definitions. Mathematical definitions seem to me
to be formalized primitive cognitions or beliefs regarding
space, number, and quantity. In their formation there is
a process of abstraction involved. A point is defined "'position, without magnitude;" there is no such point, there
can be no such point. "A line is length without breadth;"
there was never such a line drawn by pen or diamond
point. But the mind in its analysis is sharper than steel
or diamond. It can contemplate position without taking
extension into view.  It can reason about the length of a
line without regarding the breadth. In all these definitions there is abstraction, but I must ever protest against
the notion that an abstraction is necessarily something
unreal.  If the concrete be real, the part of it separated
by abstraction must likewise be real.  The position of
the point is a reality, and so also is the length of a line;
they are not independent realities, and capable of existing alone and apart, but still they are realities, and when
the mind contemplates them separately, it contemplates
realities. So far as it reasons about them accurately, according to the laws of thought, the conclusions arrived at
will also relate to realities, not independent realities, but
realities of the same nature as those with which we started
in our original definitions. Thus whatever conclusions
are arrived at in regard to lines, or circles, or ellipses, will
apply to all objects, so far as we consider them as having length, or a circular or elliptic form. We find, in fact,
that the conclusions reached in mathematics do hold true
of all bodies in earth or sky, so far as we find them occupying space, or having numerical relations.
If this view be correct, we see how inadequate is the
representation of those who, like D. Stewart and Mr.
J. S. Mill, represent mathematical definitions as merely
hypothetical, and represent the whole consistency'and
necessity as being between a supposition and the conse
413 
414   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
quences drawn from it.* This is to overlook the coin crete cognitions or beliefs from which the definition is
derived.  It is likewise to overlook the fact that these
refer to objects, and the further fact that the abstractions
from the concretes also imply a reality.   This theory
also fails to account for the circumstance that the conclusions reached in mathematics admit of an application
to the settlement of so many questions in astronomny,
and in other departments of natural philosophy. Thus,
what is demonstrated of the conlic sections by Apollonius,
is found true in the orbits of the planets and comets, as
revealed by modern discovery.   All this can at once be
explained if we suppose that the mind starts with cognitions and beliefs, that it abstracts from these, and discovers relations among the things thus abstracted: the
reality that was in the original conviction, goes on to the
furthest conclusion.
I am inclined to look on the primitive cognitions as
constituting, properly speaking, the foundation of matheinatics. The mind, looking at the things under the clear
and distinct aspects in which they are set before it by
abstraction, discovers relations between them, and can
draw deductions from the combination. In this process
the mind proceeds spontaneously, without thinking of
the general principle involved in the reasoning.  It finds
that A is equal to B, and B to C, and it at once conludes that A is equal to C. It does not feel that in order
to reach this conclusion it needs any generalized maxim,
such as that "Things which are equal to the same things
are equal to one another."   The reasopilig appears clear
anterior to the general principle being announced; and
when the principle is announced, it does not seem to
add to the force of the ratiocination. It does not, in fact,
add to the cogency of the argument; it is merely the
* Stewart's Elem. vol. ii. p. 53. Mill's Logic, ii. v. 1. 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES.
expression of the general principle on which it proceeds.
Still, it serves many important scientific purposes, as
Locke and Stewart admit, to have this general principle
expressed in the form of an axioin.* It allows the reflective mind to dwell on the general principle underlying the spontaneous conviction; by its clearness it enables us to test the ratiocination; and it shows what those
must be prepared to disprove who would dispute or deny
the conclusion.  If this view be correct, the abstracted
cognitions or beliefs in the definitions constitute the
proper foundation of mathematical demonstration, while
the axioms being the generalizations of our primitive judgments pronounced on looking at the things defined, are
the links which bind together the parts of the super
structure added.t
CHAPTER IV.
INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THIE PHIIYSICAL
SCIENCES.
THESE sciences must ever be conducted in the mnethod
of induction, with sense and artificial instruments as the
agents of observation. But almost all these sciences do
at times go down to first principles, and the inquirer is
obliged, in the last resort, to appeal to what the mind
* Locke's Essay, iv. vii. 11. Stewart's Elements, vol. ii. p. 25.
t There is truth, then, in a statement of D. Stewart: "The  doctrine which I have been attempting to establish, so far from degrading
axioms from that rank which Dr. Reid would assign them, tends to
identify them still more than he has done, with the exercise of our
reasoning powers; inasmuch as instead of comparing them with the
data, on the accuracy of which that of our conclusion necessarily depends, it considers them as the vincula which give coherence to all the
particular links of the chain; or (to vary the metaphor) as component
elements, without which the faculty of reasoning is inconceivable and
impossible" (Elements, vol. ii. p. 38).
415 
416   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPI,ES INVOLVFED IN
sees to be true. At the same time, it is not the special
business of these sciences to inquire into the nature or
guarantee of ultimate truths; this it leaves very properly
fo metaphysicians, who should be prepared to announce
laws of intuition, which the physicist might profitably employ to suit his purposes. They might be more profitably employed in such a work, which lies exclusively
within their own province, than in pursuing speculative
ends which can never be attained by human reason.
In all the sciences which meet in their researches with
regular forms, and correlated numbers, and constant or
periodical motion,-such as mechanical science, statics
and dynamics, and certain departments of astronomy,
optics, and therinotics, —mathematics have an important
part to act, and they come in with all their intuitive
axioms and demonstrations. On these I need not dwell
further. I leave them, to refer to those sciences in which
intuition enters otherwise than in a mathematical form.
Most, if not all, of our intuitive convictions enter, in
a tacit way, into physical investigation. Thus, the conviction as to tile identity of beiiing leads us to chase the
substance through the various forms it may assume, and
constrains even those who are most opposed to hypotheses,
to speak of ultimate molecules or atomis, which change
not with changing circumstances. The intuition of whole
and parts prompts us to seek for the missing part after
we have found certain parts which have been separated
by analysis, and it constrains us to look on the abstract
as implying the concrete.   Our intuitions as to space
make the physicist certain, when he sees body now in
one place and again in another, that it must have passed
through the whole intermediate space; and it should
prevent him from ever giving in to the theory which represents matter as consisting merely of points of force;
these points cannot, properly speaking, be unextended, 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES.
and there must always be space between. Our conviction as to time assures us that there can be no break
in it, and that when we fall in with the same object at
two different times, it must have existed the whole inter
vening time.   Our intuitions as to quantity, or to number and proportion, enter more or less formally into all
natural investigation.   Our intuition as to generalization
insists that, in division, the subclasses should make up
the class.   Our conviction as to substance and property
prompts us, when we discover a new object, to look out
for the exercise of its properties; and leads the physicist,
when he meets with such agencies as electricity and galvanism, to declare that they must either be separate substances (which is very improbable), or properties or states
of substances. Finally, the fundamental law of causality
directs us to seek for a cause to every effect.  The physical investigator, engrossed with external facts, and
seeking to clear them up, will seldomn so much as observe
these fundamental principles, which are unconscioLusly
guiding himi; and only on rare occasions will he find
it necessary to make a formal appeal to them.   Still,
there will be times when those most prejudiced against
metaphysics will be tempted or compelled to fall back on
them, when going down to the depths of a deep subject,
or when hard pressed by an opponent. It often happens
that, when they do so, their expression of the principle is
sufficiently awkward and blundering; and I think they
have reason to complain of the metaphysician that he has
been wasting his ingenuity in unprofitable and unattainable pursuits, and has done so little to aid physical inves.
tigation in a matter in which he might have lent it effectual aid.
It has been shown by Dr. Whewell, in his great work
on the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, that each
kind of science has its special fundamental idea at its
2 F
417 
418   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
basis, and he classifies the sciences according to the
ideas which regulate them. The phrase "ideas" does not
seem a good one to express the intuitive convictions of
the mind, either in their spontaneous exercises or formal
enunciation, and I think he is altogether wrong in supposing that these ideas "superinduce "oni the facts something not in the facts. But he has in that work developed great truths, which physical investigators were almnost universally overlooking.  I do not mean to follow
him in his elaborate exposition of the ideas and conceptions involved in the various sciences; I must content
myself with showing how certain intuitive principles enter into special sciences.
There is a class of sciences which proceed on our intuition as to the resemblances among objects and classes.
These have been called the classificatory sciences by Whewell; they embrace zoology and botany, and mineralogy
so far as it is not a branch of chemistry, and geology so
far as it deals with organisms. In all these the mind
is guided and guarded by our convictions regarding
individuals, classes, genera, and species.  Another class
of sciences have underlying them our conviction as to
substance and property; of this description is chemistry,
and the sciences which treat of electricity and magnetism
and the cognate agencies. A number of sciences proceed on the conviction as to causation; such are all departments of natural philosophy, as it seeks to determine
the laws which regulate force; and such too is geology,
so far as it strives to find the circumstances and agencies
which have brought the earthl's surface to its present
state. In physiology too there is an inquiry after the
properties, be they mechanical or chemical or vital, which
have brought the organism into the state in which we
find it.
The metaphysician should in no case pretend to be 
THEOLOGY.
able to construct any department of natural science; but,
keeping within his own province, it is competent for himn
to furnish an expression of the fundamental principles of
cognition, belief, and thought, and the physicist might
then be able to use them under the forms which are best
suited to his special purposes.
CHAPTER V.
APPLICATION TO THElOLOGY.
SECT. I. FAITH AND REASON.
THE word Faith is used in various senses, some of them
sufficiently wide and loose, and others extremely narrow
and stringent.   But there is a common mental property
to which the phrase points in all its shades of meaning.
This quality cannot be positively defined; but we may
bring out in clear relief its peculiarity as known to
consciousness, and show what it is not by distinguishing it from other exercises of mind. It is that operation
of soul in which we are convinced of the existence of
what is not before us, of what is not under sense or any
other directly cognitive power. It is a native energy of
the mind, quite as much as knowledge is, or conception
is, or imagination is, or feeling is. Every human being
entertains, and must entertain, faith of some kind.   He
who would insist on always having immediate knowledge,
must needs go out of the world, for he is unfit for this
world, and yet he believes in no other.
It is in consequence of possessing the general capacity
that man is enabled to entertain specific forms of faith.
By a native principle he is led to believe in that of which
he can have no adequate conception,-in the infinity of
2 E 2
419 
420   METAPIIYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
space and time; and, on evidence of His existence being
presented, in the infinity of God. This enables him to
rise to a faith in all those great religious verities which
God has been pleased to reveal.
There is faith, always along with other exercises, involved in nearly every act of human intelligence. There
is faith, I acknowledge of a simple kind, even in the very
acts of memory, for in every exercise of memory we believe in that which is not before us. In many, indeed in
most of our judgments, there is faith implied, as when
on seeing an effect we look for an unseen cause. There
may be faith wrapped up even in the very operations of inference, as when from data before us we infer something
not before us; as when we see the tide ebbing now, and
argue that it will be flowing so many hours after; or,
as when Columbus reasoned himself into the belief that
there was a world lying far to the west of the lands
known to civilized men.
Not in any way psychologically different from these
exercises of faith is that which leads us to believe in the
testimony of others, a kind of belief to which the word
Faith has often been specially appropriated. I am not
inclined, with some, to look on this faith in testimony as
originating in any intuitive or necessary conviction.   I
think it indeed very likely that there is a native tendency
in children to give credit to the narratives told them by
those whom they love or esteem; but this is not of the
nature of a fundamental or irresistible conviction.   Our
common and settled belief in testimony is the result of
observation, induction, and reasoning. We have found
by experience that we can trust our fellow-men, at least
some of our fellow-men.   In all this there is inference
proceeding on an induction, the issue being not a faith in
all men, or in all statements, but a belief in certain men
and in certain narratives. 
THEOLOGY.
When we rise from faith in man to faith-I mean natural faith-in God, there are the same elements with
certain new ones.   The new ones arise from the convictions regarding morality and infinity which attach themselves to the good, the omnipresent, and eternal God. We
believe that this omniscient God must know the truth;
that this infinitely righteous God is incapable of falsehood. At the saute time this faith is not without reason,
for what are our intuitions about infinity and goodness
but primary exercises of reason? This faith is not even
without reasoning, for I am inclined to think that there
is a single link of ratiocination in that mental exercise
by which we rise from the works of God to God the
worker, and there is certainly deduction implied in the
process by which we reach the conclusion that the declarationl of this God of truth must be true.
The word Reason has been employed in as great a
diversity of significations as the term Faith.  Sometimes
it stands for the faculty which reasons or draws inferences.
With other writers, reason, as distinguished from the
understanding, denotes the power which sees necessary
truth at once, without an intermediate process. With
certain English writers it stands for that aggregate of
qualities (unspecified) which distinguishes man from
brutes. Very often it is a general name for intelligence,
or for the cognitive powers of man.  When persons compare or contrast the exercises of reason with those of faith,
they should be careful to understand for themselves, and
to signify to others, the senses in which they employ the
phrase. In the remarks which I have to offer, I use it as
embracing every form of human intelligence, and I attach particular epithets to it when I refer to certain more
special exercises.
It is wrong to represent faith as in itself opposed to
reason in any of its forms.   Faith may go far beyond
421 
42.~   METAPHYSICAL PRlNCIPLES INVOLVED IN
intelligence, but it is not in itself repugnant to it. There
is belief involved in all kinds of intelligence except the
primary ones, those in which we look on the object as
now present; and in all the higher exercises of reason
there is a large faith-element which could be taken out of
reason only with the certain penalty that reason would
be stripped of all its soaring capacities. What could cognition say of duration, expansion, substance, causation,
beauty, nioral good, infinity, God, if faith were denied its
proper scope, and forbidden to take excursions in its native element?
But if reason is not independent of faith, so neither is
faith to proceed without reason.  In particular, it would
be far wrong to insist on any one believing in the existence of any object, or in any truth, without a warrant.
True, the mind is led to believe in much intuitively, but
it is because the objects or verities are self-evident, and
reflexly can stand the tests of intuition. And in all cases
in which we have not this self-evidence, it is entitled to
demand mediate evidence, and should not concede credence till this is furnished.   It is not indeed justified in
insisting that all darkness be dispelled, but it is abandoning its prerogative when it declines to demand that
light be afforded; either direct light, which is the most
satisfactory, or reflected light, where direct light is unavailable, as it is in by far the greater number of instances.
An allowable faith has thus ever the sanction of reason,
and in some cases it is the issue of a consequential reasoning. Faith is thus liable to be tested, even as reason
is; nor are we at liberty to lay reason aside on the pretence of following a faith which will not allow itself to be
examined. Where the truth is alleged to be intuitive, it
must submit to be tried by the marks of original convictions.  Where it professes to be the conclusion of reasoning, the process mnay be subjected to the crucible of the 
THEOLOGY.
logic of inference. Where it claims to be the result of a
gathered experience, it must be prepared to stand an examination by the canons of induction.
It is not good either for reason or faith that it should
"be alone." The former is in itself hard, bony, angular;
and, unmarried to the other, is apt to become opinionative, obstinate, and dogmatic; the latter, without her
partner to lean on, would be facile, weak, and impulsive.
The one is a help-meet provided for the other, and let
there be no divorce of the firmer from the more flexible,
or the more devout and affectionate from the more considerate and resolute.
When faith has evidence, intuitive or derivative, in its
favour, by all means let us follow it, and this however
far on it may lead us, however high it may lift us. As
a general practical rule, we are to yield to what has fair
primia facie evidence in its behalf, without waiting till
every objection is removed. Those who act thus will find
as they advance that difficulties are removed, and further light furnished. This is easily explained. It arises
from the knowledge of the subject and of its relations
which is being acquired, and from the suggestions flowing in upon a mind whose intellectual senses are open to
receive knowledge. Thus children, confiding in the information conveyed by parents whose veracity they have
reason to trust, and pupils believing, on the testimony of
a judicious master, in the utility of branches of knowledge which are at present felt to be irksome, will find as
they make progress that confirmations ever come in to
strengthen their primary trust. In like manner those
who follow such light as they have in religious matters,
will find further light as they grow in an acquaintance,
speculative and practical, with the truths to which they
are thus brought into closer propinquity.   Those who
allow the star set up in the sky to guide them, will fall
423 
4.24    METAPHYSICAL  PRINC('IPLI,S I NVOLVED  IN
in with more formal testimonies to direct them as they
go on, and will at last reach the very spot where truth
-it may be in humble guise-is waiting to gratify their
vision and to receive their homage. On the other hand,
those who refuse or decline to act onl the evidence supplied, may find themselves landed in hopeless darkness.
The rationale of this can also be given. They have refused to follow light, and in the very act they have given
offence to the conscience, which will fill the soul with reproaches whenever the attention is forced upon the object, from which, therefore, the mind will ever be tempted
to turn away as from a personal enemy, whose presence
reminds us of ill usage in the past, and possible mischief for the future. Hence, I suspect, the unwillingness of many to consider even the claims of religion,
whose initiatory evidence they have refused to look at, and
the further evidence of which is therefore denied them.
They have turned away from the object, and to look
upon it produces only irritation, and so they cannot see
it, as they might have done, under its pleasant and its
profitable aspects, and at length it is associated in their
minds with humiliation and bitterness.   There is but
one way of delivering themselves from this unbelief and
its ever widening shadows, and this too many of them are
unwilling to submit to; they niust comne, like the Apostle
Thomas, to the very place of intercourse which they originally avoided, and there a gracious invitation will be
given them to search the object round and round, and
in every part, till, as they find unmistakable marks,
every doubt vanishes, and they exclaim, "My Lord and
my God." We see the difference between the two classes.
The one class, under the influence of pride, have turned
their backs on the light, and they have the shadow caused
by their obstruction of it before them, and they go out
into the darkness and are lost. Whereas the other and 
THE OLOGY.
wiser class keep the light before them, and they leave
their shadow behind them, and they go on towards the
light, and as they approach nearer, the shadow lessens,
till as they stand immediately under it, and look up to
it, all blackness and darkness are dispelled.
But on the other hand, we should not place ourselves
for one hour under the guidance of a faith which has no
evidence to furnish.  There cannot be a more perilous
advice than that which has been given by certain parties
to the doubting and inquiring, when they exhort them
to force themselves to believe, when as yet they feel that
they have no convincing evidence, or to profess a creed
in order to get one as they fall in with evidence in advancing. It will be seen at once wherein this case differs from the other previously put.  In the one we walk
with reason from the beginning, though we do not just
know whither it may lead us; in the other we are without reason from the beginning, and cannot expect reason
to aid us in our difficulties. In the oue we set out with
light, and wait for more; in the other we set out without light, and necessarily at random, and if we fall in
with light, it must be by the purest accident. There
cannot, as it appears to me, be a more likely means of
leading faith into temptation, than by counselling her
to yield to the first party who pays address to her; for
speedily finding herself deceived, she may refuse to put
confidence in any other; or, being seduced pr debauched,
she loses all purity of discernment, and runs from one
lover to another, and the issue is commonly either a scoffing infidelity or a restless flitting from creed to creed,
and from one observance to another, and not unfre quently a ridiculous combination of the two, and the soul
is taking refuge in, and seeking repose under the nearest
and most imposing superstition, in order to avoid a blank
and horrid scepticism.
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426   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
There is indeed a sense in which there may be said to
be an opposition between faith and reason; but it is as
there may be an inconsistency between one dictate of
reason and another. There occur times and circum stances, in the life of every one, when reasons are ad dressed to the intelligence in favour of inconsistent
courses, and when the reasonable man decides, it is in
favour of the one for which the reasons are the strongest.
So there may also be times when man is required to believe, in opposition to many appeals to the sense, and
even to the understanding. But in all such cases reason
in a higher sense comes to the aid of faith, and announces that we ought to believe in spite of the appearances of mere sense, and of a quibbling intellect.
It is further to be taken into account that there are
truths to be believed which are not and cannot be
reached by any native shrewdness of intelligence, or by
the consecutive deductions of reasoning.   Of this description are some of our convictions as to infinity.  Of
a similar character are many of the doctrines which
God has revealed in His Word. In regard to some of
these, not only is a deductive reasoning incapable of demonstrating them, reason in its highest degree is incapable of fully comprehending themi. When it labours to
do so, it is encompassed in darkness, and finds itself
utterly at a loss as it would seek to reconcile them with
other truths sanctioned by reason or experience.  But
still, even here, faith is not without reason; for in regard
to certain of these truths, the intuitive reason which
commands us to believe in them is above all derivative
reason; and in regard to truths revealed to us supernaturally by God, reason calls on us implicitly to submit
to them as to an intelligence which cannot err. Reason
always demands that we should have evidence, irnme.
diate or mediate, in order to believe; but it does not in 
TrHEOLOGY.
sist that the truth be completely within the comprehenrsion of the reason, or unclouded by mystery of any description. Faith has ever the support of reason; yet
it goes far beyond reason, and embraces much which is
far beyond the conceptions of the intellect in its widest
grasp and excursions.  It is because man has a natural
capacity of faith in the unseen and unknown, that he is
able to cherish a faith in the supernatural truths of God's
Word. It is because he has the natural gift of faith,
that he is capable of rising to the supernatural grace.
SECT. II. NATURAL THEOLOGY. THE THEISTIC ARGUMEN'r.
The idea of God, the belief iri God, may be justly
represented as native to lman.  We  are led to it by the
circumstances in which we are placed calling into energy
mental principles which are natural to all. Man does not
require to go in search of it: it comes to him.  He has
only to be waiting for it and disposed to receive it, and
it will be pressed on him from every quarter; it springs
up spontaneously, as the plant or animal does from its
germni; it will well up from the depths of his heart; or it
will shine on him from the works of nature, as light does
from the sun.
But, while the conviction is natural, this does not prove
that it is simple, original, unresolvable, unaccountable.
The knowledge of distance by the eye is undoubtedly
natural to man; there is a provision made in the organism for its attainment, and all who have an eye acquire
it; yet it is not original, but the result of a variety of
processes; physiological and psychological, which can be
pointed out.  Our conviction as to God seems to me to
be of a like nature; it is not a single instinct incapable
of analysis, but is the proper issue of a number of simple
principles, all tending to one point.  Such being its nature, the process admits of explicit statement and satisfactory defence.
427 
428   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
Among metaphysicians of the present day it is a very
common opinion that our belief in God is intuitive.  In
particular this is the view set forth by a school in Germany and in this country, which allows to Kant that the
speculative reason can find or devise no valid argument
in favour of the Divine existence. Left without mediate
proof, they have called in a special cognition, intuition, or
feeling, under the name of'God-consciousness' or'Divine Faith.' If there be any validity in the conditions
laid down in this treatise, as to the logic of intuition,
those who advocate this view may be called on to show
that such an intuition exists; that it is original-that is,
incapable of being resolved into anything else; and fundamental-that is, leaning on nothing else.  It may be
further demanded that they explain the precise law, that
is rule of the intuition's operation. Is it of the nature of
an intellectual cognition, or is it a mere feeling, or is it
a faith? What, in particular, is the precise object which
it perceives and which it reveals, and how much is revealed regarding that object? Is God revealed as a being, or a person, or a substance? Is he revealed as a
power or a cause? or is he revealed simply as a life? Is
he revealed as a living God? or as an infinite God? or
as a holy, that is, sin-hating God? It behoves those who
invoke a separate intuition to reply to such questions as
these, in a way that is at least approximately correct;
and, in giving the answers, it will be needful to reconcile
the replies with the known facts of history, and, in particular, with the degraded views which have been entertained, in most countries, of the Divine Being. If it be a
partial or mutilated God that is revealed,-say, a bare abstraction without qualities, or a brute force, or a vague
life or activity,-we are left, after all, to depend on other
processes when we would clothe him with perfections.
If, on the other hand, it be a full-orbed light, shining in 
THEOLOGY.
all the glory of wisdom and excellence and infinity that
is hung out in the firmament before the mental eye, the
question will have to be answered, How have the great
body of mankind come to see Him in such distorted
shapes and in such dark or hideous colours?
I am not convinced that we are obliged to call in a
separate intuition to discover and guarantee the Divine
existence. I agree, with the majority of philosophers and
divines in all ages, that the common intelligence, cornbined with our moral perceptions and an obvious experience, lead to a belief in God and his chief attributes.
But in the process there may be, and there commonly
is, a variety of elements conspiring.* In particular, there
are both experiential and a priori elements.
I. There are facts involved. These become known to
man in the ordinary exercise of his faculties of knowledge.
In observing them, he discovers phenomena which bear
all the marks of being effects. Everywhere are there
traces of plan and purpose; heterogeneous elements and
diverse agencies conspire to the accomplishment of one
end. They are made, for example, in the organs of
plants and of animals, to take typical forms, which it is
interesting to the eye, or rather, the intellect, to contemplate, and which look as if they were built up by a skilful and tasteful architect. Then every member of the
animal body has a purpose to serve, and is so constructed
as to promote, not merely the being, but the well-being
of the whole. Even in the soul itself there are traces of
structure and design. Man's faculties are suited to one
another, and to the state of things in which he is placed;
the eye seems given him to see, and the memory to re
* The whole theistic argument is expounded with admirable judgment in Buchanan's'Faith in God, etc.' There is vigorous thinking
in Dove's' Logic of the Christian Faith.' It is not necessary to do more
than refer to the Burnett Prize Essays, by Thompson, Tulloch, Orr, etc.
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430   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPI,ES INVOLVED IN
member, and the laws of the association of his ideas are
suited to his position, and his disposition to generalize
and his capacity of grouping enable him to arrange into
classes, in due subordination, the infinite details of na ture. If once it be admitted that these are effects, it will
not be difficult to prove that they do not proceed from
the ordinary powers working in the cosmos. No doubt
there are natural agencies operating in the production of
every natural phenomenon which may be pressed into
the theistic argument; but the agencies are acting only
as they operate in the works of human skill, which are
most unequivocally evidential of design.  In the construction and movements of a chronometer there is nothing, after all, but natural bodies, and the action of
mechanical forces, but there is room for the discovery of
high purpose in the collocation and concurrence of the
various parts to serve an evident end.  It is in the same
way that we are led to see traces of design in the works
of nature; we see physical agents made to combine and
work to accomplish what is obviously an intended effect.
Just as in the construction of a timepiece we discern
traces of an effect not produced by the mere mechanical
laws of the parts, so in the construction of the eye we
find marks of plan and adaptation which do not proceed
from the potency of the coats and humours and muscles
and nerves, but which must come from a power above
them, and using natural agencies merely as a means to
accomplish its end.
Facts illustrative of order and adaptation furnish the
stock of the common treatises of Natural Theology. Most
important ends are served by having them advanced in
great number and variety.  For not only do they give
a religious direction to physical science, not only do they
help the devotion of those who are already believers,
not only do they confirm  the conviction  already pro 
THEOLOGY.
duced,-they tend to produce the conviction.   I am
aware that there are intuitions involved in the process,
and in particular the intuition of causation. But the intuitions are called forth by facts. It is the trace of effects which evokes the intuition of causality. A son of
the desert being asked how he came to believe that a
God existed, replied, that he knew it as he knew from
traces on the sand that a beast or a man had passed.
By all means then let works unfolding marks of design
in the universe be multiplied, and let each take up its
own department and yield its peculiar contribution. Nor
let it be urged that one case is as good as a thousand
or a million. There are, I admit, single cases which
are decisive,-such, for example, is the construction of
the eye,-but in all these the adaptations are numerous,
and they should be carefully unfolded. It is by the
number and diversity of instances that the possibility of
doubt is precluded. The single trace of a foot in the
desert might scarcely have seemed conclusive to the savage; the presence of many would have settled the question beyond all dispute. It is the multiplicity and variety
of traces that show so clearly and satisfactorily that nature is the effect of construction. It is a happily ordered
circumstance that every man has evidence, and evidence
in proportion to the extent of his knowledge. The common mnan, the peasant, the artisan, is furnished with
abundance of traces in the portions of nature which
fall under his immediate inspection,-in the revolving
seasons, in the grass and grain, in the instincts and
organs of animals, in his own bodily frame, in the provision made for his wants, and the events of an overruling Providence, now encouraging and now punishing
him. The man of science, according as he widens his
sphere, finds further evidences; and in proportion as he
penetrates deeper, he falls in with more recondite proofs.
431 
432   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
I cannot then agree with those metaphysicians who look
on the presentation of instances, or at least the multiplication of them, as useless, and who would have writers
on Natural Theology to he threading their way for ever
among the intricacies of abstract discussion. The fact is,
in order to a spontaneous conviction, we do not require to
have the mental principle enunciated. The unsophisticated mind will have the belief produced more readily
and effectually by reading such a work as that of Paley,
than by the subtlest exposition of the metaphysics of the
argumellt.
Still, there is a metaphysical principle involved, and
this should be brought out in every professedly scientific statement of the complete argument.   The belief
will spring up of its own accord when the facts are presented, and this whether the mental law is or is not
formalized and expressed; but those who would review
the conviction must have the mental principle as well as
the facts unfolded, and it is the office of metaphysics to
furnish it to natural theology.
II. The principle of causation is involved. The object
being offered, the intuition is ready to act. The object
presented is an effect, and the intuition demands a cause.
It may be admitted that there is a possibility of doubt
as to whether the phenomenon is an effect. It is conceivable that the stones, lime, wood, and slates might, without
any power beyond themselves, have met to form the house
in which I dwell; and it is equally conceivable that the
flesh, bones, skin, ligaments of the human frame, might
also have congregated into my bodily frame without any
higher power contriving their harmony. This link of
the argument is not intuitive.  The evidence is just so
much short of demonstration as to allow the possibility
of doubt. But it is a probability, a moral certainty of
the highest order.  It is quite as certain that the eye is 
THEOLOGY.
a construction, as that a watch is so, or a house is so, or
a steamn-engine is so. This being admitted, the phenomenon  comes under the mental law, and we are necessitated to believe, that this, being an effect, must have a
cause.
It may be demlanded of those who profess to expound
the whole argument, and who appeal to the principle of
causation, that they should specify the nature of the principle and show wherein lies its validity. If they derive
it from an extended experience, it will always be competent for the sceptic to urge that the widest experience of
human science and of history cannot justify the universality of the law. True, in this world every effect seems
to have a cause, but our experience in the cosmos does
not entitle us to go beyond.it, as we must do, when we
seek a cause of the cosmos. Hence the importance, if
we would bind firmly the ligaments of the theistic argument together, of showing that the principle of causation is a primary one, prior to experience and above it.
It may be further required of those who appeal to the
principle, that they unfold its precise nature. In doing
so they will find that every joint of the reasoning is firm,
and capable of repelling all the weapons which have been
directed against it.
It is an essential part of the internal law that it requires the cause to be adequate to produce the effect; it
must be a power to produce the effect, the given effect.*
Here again an experiential element must, I should suppose, enter. Experience must tell us what the precise
effect is. Experience, too, must tell us that there is no
power in the common agencies of nature, without an arrangement made for them, to run into these typical forms
and beneficent collocations. The intuition, meanwhile,
* I have endeavoured to establish the positions here used, P. II.
B. III. C. II. s. 8.
2 F
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434   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
insists not only on a cause, but a competent cause for
this effect, and for every separate effect, and for the whole
effect in its beautiful co-ordination and harmonious adjustment. Our idea of the cause thus grows and accumnulates with our idea of the extent of the effect, till at
last it is felt to be far beyond human comprehension.
It is an essential element of the law of causation that
if the effect be a real thing, the cause must also be real
quite as much so as the effect.   Hence the importance
of adhering to the doctrine of natural realism as opposed
to idealism. For when the effect is supposed to be in
part or altogether a creation of the contemplative mind,
the cause is apt to be regarded in the same ideal light.
It is of the nature of the law of causation that it looks
for the cause in a substance, in an existing thing having
power and capable of action. The intuition does not say
what the nature of the substance must be: it says, however, that it must be a substance with a power commensurate with the effect.  And what is the effect? It is an
harmonious adjustment, a union of agency, a combination of effort far beyond our power of comprehension, and
the cause, whatever it be, must reside in an existence coitpetent for all this.  So far the mental principle, proceeding on very obvious facts, can carry us. Perhaps it can
conduct us no further without the aid of other intuitions
employing other facts.   But in guiding us so far it has
fulfilled its function and discharged an important office in
God's service.
It will be observed that the principle of causation, while
it constrains us to seek for a power in a substance, does
not, when properly interpreted, necessitate us to look for
an infinite series of causes.  The intuition is satisfied
when it reaches a Being with power adequate to the whole
effect; and if, on the contemplation of the nature of that
Being, we find no marks of IHis being all effect, the intui 
TIEOLOGY.
tion makes no call on us to go further.  It feels restless
indeed till it attains this point.  As long as it is mounting the chain, it is compelled to go on; it feels that it cannot stop, and yet is confidently looking for a termination;
but when it reaches the All-Powerful Being, it stays in
comfort, as feeling that it has reached an unmovable resting-place.
III. Other intuitions take hold of other facts, and
confirm the argument, and clothe the Divine Being with
a variety of perfections.   The argument is a cumulative
one.   It gets materials from a great number and diversity of quarters, indeed from every quarter.   It is the
business of natural theology as a science to spread out
these, and of metaphysics to give an exact expression to
the intuitive elements.
(1.) There is the conviction which we have of self as a
being, intelligent, thinking, lovinig, willing. It is the knowledge which we have of ourselves as spiritual beings which
suggests the idea of God who is a spirit. Those who,
like IHlobbes, or like the French Sensationalists, make sensation the only inlet of knowledge and ideas, can never
consistently reach a spiritual God.   Thle possession of a
soul by us justifies us in regarding God as a being with
intelligence and personality. We are constrained to look
for an adequate cause of the marks of design in the universe, and we cannot rest till we call in a Designing Mind.
Besides, this self is an important part of the effect, and
we look for intelligence as alone capable of producing intelligence. Our idea of the Great Original Cause of all
things is thus at one and the same time enlarged and
rendered more definite.
(2.) I have shown that man has a very peculiar class
of intuitive convictions bearing on the subject of moral
good.   In particular, every one has a conscience, which
declares that there is an indelible distinction between
2 F 2
435 
436   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
good and evil. Surely the God who implanted that conscience must himself love the good which it would lead
us to love, and hate the evil which it would impel us to
hate. This moral power in man manifests itself in leading us to cherish a conviction of obligation to a law above
itself, independent of itself and of the mind which looks
to it, and having authority or right to enjoin and forbid.
I shall not go the length of positively affirming that this
binding law of itself implies a lawgiver, but I do maintain that the mind feels something wanting till it hears of
a Moral Governor who is ever ruling, and is ready to reward and punish.
(3.) The mind has a strong conviction that there is an
infinite existence. Space and time are conceived by themselves as unbounded, and wherever they are, there may be
substance dwelling in them.   But infinite extension and
duration, and our belief regarding them, are felt to be
void and empty till we are able to place in them infinite
substance with infinite attributes; but when it has done
so, the mind feels that it has found the wanting truth, and
is satisfied supremely and to the full.
Thus it is that I would build up the cumulative idea.
But I would have it remarked that what I have sought
to construct so systematically, is spontaneously reared
in a much more irregular or piecemeal manner; that
which I have placed first comning last; or, in too many
cases, very important elements, such as the recognition of
the high spirituality and holiness, or even the unity of
the Divine plan and personality, being altogether omitted,
so as to exhibit a partial, or broken, or distorted image;
or the whole may happily be reared at once by the strong
intuitive energy, evoked and trained by a Christian education.
Several advantages arise from giving this account of
the genesis of the conviction. The argument thus built 
THEOLOGY.
postulates no new or peculiar intuitions other than those
which guide us in all thought of a lofty or a profound
character.   Our appeal is to the universal principles of
humanity, on which all men act in other matters, and
which they are not at liberty summarily to discard when
it would constrain them to believe in a Great and Good
Being, the Author of their own being and of the universe.
It embraces the same mixture of elements, experiential
and intuitive, as is found in the arguments which carry
conviction in the more important transactions of life. It
carries with it the sanction of our constitution, and yet
allows observation to contribute out of its ever.accumulating stores. When ingenious men make the inference
demonstrative, it holds out incitements to other ingenious
men to detect weaknesses and breaks in the links of the
chain. When there is a loose appeal to consciousness
or faith, there is always a possibility of persons urging in
reply,'You may have such a sentiment, and I allow you
freely to indulge it, but do not impose it on me;' or more
frequently this vague feeling may be satisfied with a God
as vague and empty as itself. If the account given above
be correct, then the grounds of our belief can be spread
out, and the argument defended, the experiential elements by the logic of induction, and the mental elements
by the logic of intuition; and the whole pressed home,
in an appeal which no one is at liberty to decline to look
at or to accept.
The account given shows how the argument may be
resisted. The conviction springs up naturally, but not
necessarily. Men may overcome it, being led into a labyrinth of sophistry from which they discover no outlet,
or, more frequently, being hardened by an encouraged
pride, or sensualized by a course of vice.   An atheist is
a phenomenon which rarely presents itself; and when it
does, it is to be viewed with a feeling of humiliation and
43 7 
438   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPI,FS INVOLVED IN
compassion. It may be allowed, I think, that there have
been persons who have strived hard to persuade themselves that there is no God, and have so far succeeded
that they are troubled with the conviction only at some
of the more lucid or awful moments of their lives.
VVe see how iuaii is responsible for his belief in God.
Were the argumient altogether apodictic, there would be
no possibility of doubt, and therefore no room for the
consent or dissent of the will. But the argument being
moral, and not demonstrative, there is room for the exercise of an evil heart in rejecting it, and therefore of a
candid spirit in falling in cheerfully with it.
The account given shows not only how we can build
up on defensible grounds the argument for the Divine
existence, but also how we can construct a defence of His
more peculiar perfections, such as His goodness, justice,
and infinity. Those who describe the whole process as one
of feeling, are apt to take a very light and loose view of
the Divine Being; they talk of Him as mere power, or
mere activity, or mere life.   But when we give a wiser
and juster view of the conviction, we see that the same
considerations which lead us to believe in his existence
also constrain us to believe in his unbending righteousness and his spotless holiness.
Following out the theory, we can account for the low,
the unworthy, the perverted representations taken and
given of the Divine character. When the higher intuitions of the mind are not called into exercise by proper
training and the appropriate objects, they lie, to a great
extent, dormant, and so God, or the gods, come to be
largely stripped of spiritual or moral qualities. As men's
minds became barbarized and narrowed, their attention
was confined to a very limited class of objects as being
the proper effects of the Divine power.   God came to
be contemplated not as the author of creation, or as the 
THEOLOGY.
actor in it throughout, but as an agent merely in certain
portions of it, which were contemplated with peculiar
wonder or fear; and as these portions were viewed as
inconsistent with each other, there arose gods many and
lords many. The doctrine of the unity of God, and of
the spirituality of God, being lost sight of, the gods came
to be multiplied indefinitely, according as it suited the
impulses, the fears, the superstitions of the votaries, or
the interests of the priests and their temple.   The distinction between God and His works being lost sight of,
distorted traditions, and baseless fables and myths, the
natural expression of human wants and wishes, clustered
in ever-increasing intensity round the gods, and their
places of worship, and certain awful spots in nature, or
mysterious agents operating in it; and these were handed
down from mother to son, ever growing in waywardness
and strength.   In the history of religion we have two
classes of phenomena to be accounted for by those who
would give an explanation of the nature and genesis of
the religious conviction.   We have an all but universal
belief in a God, or in gods, with nearly as universal a
degradation of the character of Deity. The double phenomenon can be explained only by supposing that there
are native religious tendencies in the mind, ever working
but ever liable to be abused and perverted, and requiring
to be called forth into healthy exercise by the presentation of suitable objects, and indeed to be guided and directed by a standard revelation.
We see how the conviction is to be called out, strengthened and refined.  It is by the presentation of objects
fitted to awaken the intuitions into energy and to keep
them in proper exercise. The idea of a moral and spiritual God is to be aroused and kept alive by the attention being directed to moral and spiritual truths.   This
is what is done, in the best of all modes-in the concrete
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440   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
mode, in the Word of God-which ought therefore to be
thrown open to children at an early age.   This is what
is done in a religious training, conducted according to
the Word of God. A God who is at once Light and
Love is set before us, and he is represented as revealed
to fallen man in the face of his Son; holy precepts are
enjoined by Him as the guardian of duty; and thus is
generation after generation reared, the child being trained
by the parent, and the child becoming the parent in order
to train the child. Natural Theology is also fitted to confirm and widen this conception among the comparatively
few who may be expected to study it. According as men
are taught to look on their own nature as spiritual, so will
they be disposed to look on God as a Spirit; and according as they are educated to look on the conscience as an
undefeasible property of humanity, so will they be led to
look on God as essentially holy. Still it is only, I believe,
by an abiding written revelation that the truth call be
made patent to the great mass of mankind, or saved
from perversion by the fancies, the foolish speculations,
and the infidelity of the educated. Only thus can we
get light admitted into the dwelling of the poor man, and
into the heart of the busy man of the world, and only
thus get it handed down from age to age.   I am aware
that even though the Bible were withdrawn, the religious
conceptions would go down, in lands which had once
enjoyed its light, to the next age in comparative purity.
But as generations succeeded which had not been trained
in its lessons, I am convinced that the great mass of the
people would speedily lapse into some degraded worship,
probably of the Mormon type, and that the philosophers,
pursuing their own favourite ideas, would exercise little
influence, certainly little influence for good, and care little
to put forth what little they have over an unthinking multitude, who would appreciate their distant and refined 
THEOLOGY.
speculations only by evincing at times their shrewd sense
of their practical absurdity. It is by a permanent Luminary being kept up in the sky that we expect light to be
so diffused over our world that all men may behold it,
and walk in it, and see objects in it.
SECT. III. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
The doctrine of the soul's immortality cannot be esta.
blished by rigid demonstration any more than that of
the Divine existence. But in the one as in the other
there are necessary principles involved, which look to
obvious facts, and issue in a conviction which may be described as natural. The expounded argument is the expression of processes which are spontaneous.   It draws
materials from a variety of quarters and admits of accumulation.   No one of the elements is in itself conclusive,
but ill the whole there is a high probability quite entitled
to demand belief and practical action.   There are three
intuitive elements involved.
I. There is the intuition of self as a being, a substance,
a spiritual substance. Every one is immediately conscious
of a self different from the material objects which press
themselves on his notice, and of the action of mental attributes in no way resembling the properties of matter,
of lofty thoughts and far-ranging imaginations and high
moral sentiments, of lively and fervent emotions and of
a power of choice and fixed resolution. The circumstance
that the bodily organism is dissolved at death is no proof
that these qualities or the existence in which they inhere
shall perish. We see the body die, but we never see the
spirit die. We know that the soul has existed; we have
no evidence that it ceases to exist.  The burden of proof
may legitimately be laid on those who maintain that it
does. The soul exists as a substance, and will continue
to exist unless destroyed by a power from without capable
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442   METAPHYSiCAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
of producing this special effect.  I doubt whether the
argument can be stretched further. It is possible to con ceive that the dissolution of the body may be an adequate
cause of the destruction of the soul, and the idea could
not be repelled by any positive demonstration. It could
only be urged in reply that there is no necessary connec tion between the breaking-up of the bodily organism and
the death of the soul, and that the soul is convinced that
it may look on in the midst of the struggles of the ma terial dissolution and survive when they are ended.
And here it is worthy of being noticed that we have
no experience of any one thing being absolutely annihilated.  Man knows no such thing even among material
objects. He casts wood into the fire, and the existing
combination of its elements is destroyed, but the elements
themselves are not lost; one part has gone down into the
ashes, another has gone up into the air, and not one
particle has perished. What is true of material particles
is no less true of physical forces.  Man cannot create a
physical force, and as little call he destroy it; if it be in a
statical state, he may bring it forth into a dynamical one;
if it be in activity, he may contrive to counteract it; but
he cannot create it on the one hand, not put it out of existence on the other. The force which came from the sun
to the plants in the form of heat in the geological age of
the coal-formation is not lost; it was received by the vegetable organisms, it was laid up in the strata of the earth,
and is ready to burst forth, on the needful conditions being supplied, in fire and flame, and be a source of mechanical force in steam. And if no material particle is ever
lost, and no physical force lost, is it consistent with the
analogy of nature to suppose that mental force is lost?
If mind is extinguished on the dissolution of the body, it
is the only force known to us as being absolutely annihilated, and yet it looks and feels as if it were the most
imperishable of them all. 
TIIEOLOGY.
II. There is the conviction of moral obligation and responsibility pointing to a judgment day and a state of
righteous retribution. The argument built on this ground
is felt by many strong minds to be the strongest of all.
Kant, so severe in his criticism of the psychological argument, yields to the moral one. Chalmers fondly dwells
on it as the one which actually carries weight with mankind.  It proceeds on the existence of a moral faculty;
but its validity does not depend on any peculiar view
which may be taken by us of the moral powers in man.
It is enough that man be acknowledged to be under moral obligation-under moral law: that law is imperative
it commands and it forbids: it is a supreme law-claiming authority over all faculties and affections, over in
particular all voluntary desires and acts.   This law in
the heart points to a lawgiver who hath planted it in our
constitution, and who sanctions and upholds it. Upon
our recognizing God as lawgiver, the conscience announces that we are accountable to him; "so then every
one of us shall give account of himself to God." But if
we are to give account to God, there must be a day of
reckoning to arrive-in this life, or, if not in this life, in
the life to come. He who hath appointed the law must
needs be judge; He who has appointed it so authoritatively, and proclaimed it so publicly, must needs inquire
whether it has or has not been obeyed. But this judicial
work is not fully discharged in this present state of things,
and therefore we look for another. There are times when
God seems to set up a throne of judgment on the earth,
and call men before it. There are ever and anon instructive examples of studiously concealed wickedness being
brought to light and exposed; of the arm of violence be in g arrested, when the blow was about to descend; and
of the deceitful man being caught in the net which he
laid for others. These cases however are not uniform, or
without palpable exceptions; they are corroborations of
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444   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
our moral decisions, but they do not come fully up to
the demands of our constitution, which is thereby only
strengthened in the conviction and expectation that what
is only partial here will, at last, be universal.
Our moral nature, giving these general intimations as
to the world at large, seems to carry a more special mes sage to every man,-that he must submit to the judge.
This is a feeling which may lie very much dormant in
many states of the existence of man; as when he is en grossed with business, or absorbed in schemes of earthly
ambition; but it seizes many a quiet moment to insinuate the truth committed to it; it awakes with terrible
power in the state of relaxation which succeeds the
fever heat of the evil propensities; it issues its lightning
flashes in the dark hour of disappointment; it raises its
sharp voice in the stillness of the sick chamber; and gives
forth foreboding utterances, which few dare despise when
they realize the thought that the time of their departure
is at hand. I am not seeking to disturb men by dreams
in the night, which have no corresponding realities in the
day; I am not raising up ghosts in the darkness to
frighten men, as if they were children, into a salutary
fear; I am asking them to read what is graven, as by a
chisel on a rock, on the constitution and heart of all men.
The conscience in this life is the anticipation of the arch..
angel's trumpet summoning all men to the judgment, and
in the other world may become the worm that never dies,
and the fire that is not quenched.
III. There is the intuition of personality guaranteeing
that the self that lives and sins and the self to be judged
is the same being. I am not advancing this as a primary
proof that this self must abide after death; I urge it
simply to prove that, if the soul outlives the body, it must
carry with it its essential personality. The soul which lives
after death is the same as lived before.
I have previously noticed the circumstance that there 
THEOI,OGY.
is nothing lost in this world.   In particular, the soul
carries with it the conviction that it should abide. This
feeling being perverted has led to a doctrine which has
been widely entertained in various ages and nations, that
the spirit passes from body to body. But in this doctrine
of transmigration there is a serious mistake, arising from
materialistic ideas, that is, from attaching to the soul ideas
which have a meaning only when applied to bodily force.
It is easy to conceive of physical force migrating from body
to body, losing meanwhile none of its essential qualities.
But in supposing that mind thus travels we are obliged
to strip it of one of its essential attributes: we suppose
that it has a different consciousness in its different habitations, and thus deprive it of an abiding personality. It
is curious to notice that a similar error has made its appearance of late among a class of thinkers who profess to
be looking into great depths, but in so doing have overlooked a truth near at hand. According to the pantheistic doctrine of these times, the soul at the separation
from the body goes out as it were into a great ocean of
spiritual existence.  This doctrine is also materialistic.
We can conceive of air thus rushing into air, and of a
bucketful of water losing itself in a river; and why? because neither air nor water ever had a separate and conscious personality. The soul as long as it exists must
retain its personality as an essential property, and must
carry it along with it wherever it goes. The moral conviction clusters round this personal self. The being who
is judged, and saved or condemned, is tile same who
sinned and continued in his sin, or who believed and was
justified when on earth.
Upon these arguments others grow which have more or
less of force. There is, for example, the shrinking frown
annihilation, the longing for immortality,-a feeling which
seems to guarantee the veracity of the expectation che
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446   METAPItYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
rished. Then there are affections, pure and holy, springing up on earth but not allowed to be gratified on earth,
but we may hope to have satisfied to the full in heaven.
There are attachments and profitable friendships firmly
clenched only to be violently snapped asunder by the
stroke of death, but which we expect to have renewed in
a place where there are no breaches. Do not those swelling feelings which agitate the bosoms of friends when one
of them is summoned away seem to show that these divided waters are yet to meet?  Then we see from time
to time intellectual powers cultivated to the utmost, but
blasted in the flower when they seemed to promise a large
fruit. May we not believe that in a universe in which
nothing is made in vain, and nothing of God's workmanship lost, these powers have been nurtured to serve some
great and good end in a future state of existence? These
facts combined seem to show that there are means instituted in this world which have their full consummation
in the world to come.
SEcT. IV. PANTHEISM.
Pantheism has some qualities to recommend it to our
favourable regard, especially when it is viewed at a distance. To be able to reduce the multiplicity in the universe to unity may seem to be about the highest achievement of human ingenuity, and the end to which every
separate science points.   To  represent every existing
thing as a modification of the one God seems to account
on the one hand for the variety which we find in nature,
and on the other hand for the wonderful mutual connection and dependence of all the parts. The system fosters
the admiration which the enlightened mind feels in the
contemplation of the beauties of nature and art, and thus
falls in readily with those aesthetic feelings which become
stronger in every nation as it advances in refinemenit and 
THEOLOGY.
civilization.  It allows too of the outpouring of some of
the devout sentiments of our nature. It leads us to connect God with his works, and makes us feel as if our admiration of beauty were an act of devotion paid to God,
of whom this beauty, whether it proceed from the forces
of nature or the ingenuity of man, is an exhibition. If it
does not compel us to fall on our knees in prayer, it at least
encourages praise, for what is all this admiration, whether
merely heaving in the breast or expressed in glowing language, of the loveliness and grace of the objects around
and above us, and of the order and harmony of the powers
in nature, but just a hymn of praise to Him who lives and
acts in them and indeed constitutes them? Pantheism
calls forth and fosters these feelings because of the truth
which it has retained,-truth often left out or rejected in
certain mechanical systems of nature, in which, to use the
strong language of Thomas Carlyle, God is represented as
" sitting as it were apart, and guiding it, and seeing it
go." As embracing these truths it can use, though often
in a hypocritical sense, the profoundest phraseology of the
Bible, and speak of God as incarnate in his works and
especially in man.
But it must be added, that there are other considerations
which recommend pantheism to not a few. Under some of
its forms it fosters the deepest pride; as, for instance, in
the system of Spinoza, where man is represented as a mode
of Deity, and in that of Hegel, where human intelligence
is represented as identical with the Divine. Under every
form it delivers mankind from a sense of personal responsibility to God, who may call his intelligent creatures to account; and from all sense of guilt and fear-of punishment
in a futu,:e life. Being a modification of Deity, we are not
called to cherish any deep sense of dependence on Him,
and we have no motive to pray to Him; more especially
as His whole procedure is an eternal flow in a predeter
44A 
448   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
mined channel beyond the control of our prayers. No
doubt we are liable, even according to this system, to be,
not exactly punished, but exposed to suffering if we pursue certain courses; but all this does not imply that we
have given offence to a living being, that we have raised
up by our conduct a holy indignation in the breast of any
one, or that we shall have to appear at last at a throne of
judgment. What we have to bear (this is the sort of spirit
which Carlyle has caught from feeding on the German
pantheists), let us bear in a spirit of manly pride, as knowing that we cannot by any entreaties influence a power
whose movements are fixed from eternity. And as to the
world to come, doubtless there is such a world, but there
God is as unpersonal as He is here, and we become like
Him by casting off our supposed personality, and, like
the burst bubble, become swallowed up and lost in the
awful ocean of Being,, out of which we were blown to
float for one brief hour as a spectacle on the surface.
These are the considerations which have recommended
it to some of the best and some of the worst principles
of our nature.  It is needful to examine it, and yet it is
difficult to do so, for, Proteus-like, it takes a new shape
as we seize it, cloud-like it eludes us as we would grasp
it. Few of those attached to it have ever attempted to give
it a defined shape, and most of those who have attacked
it have had no fixed or conceded points from which to
assail it, and the weapons that they shoot neither wound
nor slay. "They fight in vain; the shadows which they
destroy spring up again in a moment, like the heroes in
Valhalla, again to be able to amuse themselves in bloodless conflicts."
There have been very exaggerated statements made as
to the extent of the prevalence of pantheism, and this
both by its foes and its friends.  Some, in a sensitive
apprehension of it, have discovered it in systenms which 
THEOI,OGY.
have not avowed it, and in whiqh there is an open acknowledgmuent of the existence of a personal God. The
historians of philosophy of the school of Hegel discover
pantheism, even in the Hegelian form, in almost every
systemn of philosophy, Asiatic or Grecian. I grant that in
the great majority of the popular superstitions and( pagan
philosophies there has been no sharp line of demarcation
drawn between God and his works, and in most of them
there is supposed to be some matter coeval with God,
and independent of hinm.  This arises certainly not from
an elevating, but from a degrading tendency in the
human mind, which has a difficulty in conceiving of a
spiritual God, the creator of all things. Acknowledging
that this confounding of God and his works is nearly
universal in all systems of religion or philosophy not
derived directly or indirectly from revelation, I am persuaded that comparatively few have allowed themselves
to sink so far ill the bogs of metaphysics as not to look
on God as a person, or to believe that God is in no way
distinct from his works. The number of avowed pan.
theists must ever be very few, fewer than belong to Buddhism, Brahminism, Mahometanism, or even Mormonisnm,
and they are to be found exclusively in the narrow circle
of the refined and the idle. The creed is of far too subtle
and cobweb a texture to stand the rude jerks and the
storms of common life.
It has assumiied an immense number of shapes, if shape
it can be said to have, whose very nature is to be shapeless. The following seem to be the more decided.
1. There is Material Pantheism. According to this,
it is the mere matter of the universe, with its forces, its
life, its thought, as the result of organism, which constitutes the One All, that may be called God. This is the
lowest sort of pantheism, indeed it scarcely deserves the
name, for it has no proper unity amidst the diversity. Yet
2 G
449 
450   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
I suspect it is, after all, the most prevalent among those
who are inclined to pantheism in this country or in France,
and in the extreme left of the school of Hegel,-and this
has as many supporters in Germany as the higher forms
have.  It has something to recommend it to vulgar minds,
which dislike a living God, and yet are not prepared to
give up all belief in Deity.   It admits nothing but what
can be made patent to sense, and yet it has a way of
deceiving itself, by speaking of the aggregate of material
existences as if they were one existence, capable of something like order and intelligence.
2. There is Organic or Vital Pantheism. The difficulty which we have in defining life, or in apprehending
it, holds out a temptation to many to explain all things
by it, which, in fact, is to explain the i7notmmper ignotims.
All nature, they say, is full of life; and this statement is
doubtless true, if by life is meant simply activity.  The
old Cartesian doctrine, according to which matter is mere
extension, and is in itself utterly sluggish and inert, cannot stand in the midst of the discoveries of modern science,
which show us the chemical, electric, and calorific forces
all characterized by incessant activity. But while matter
is active in a sense, this does not show that any one particle of it, or that the material world as a whole, has life,
meaning organic life. The mystical view that nature is
a plant, an animal, or an organism, appeared in various
forms of Platonism; the equally unintelligible idea that
all nature has life, comes out in the writings of certain
physical speculators of the school of Schelling, and has
passed over into the poetry and the poetical prose of this
country, and in all cases tends to substitute some sort of
impersonal power for a personal God.
3. There is the One Substance Pantheism. Persons
begin first by declaring that the material universe is the
body, and God the soul. This is an error, for God acts 
THEOLOGY.
independent of the universe, which is his creation. It is
not, however, pantheism; for persons may hold this view,
and yet maintain that the two are distinct. It however
prepares the way for pantheism, which maintains that
there is a spiritual power acting in the material form,
the two being all the while one substance. We owe the
introduction of this system, as a system, to Spinoza, who
tried to found on certain views of Descartes as to the
nature of substance. According to this shy, thoughtbewildered man, there is but one substance, which substance has attributes which the mind can conceive as its
essence and modes, being the affections of the substance.
This substance is infinite, a part of it is substance finite,
and man is such a part of the Divine Substance. This
system has been set forth in his Ethics in a terrible array
of confused and confusing definitions, axiomis, and deinonstrations, in which things that should  be  distinguished are confounded, and propositions that should
be proven are unconsciously assumed. Perhaps no one,
except Spinoza, ever held his precise doctrine; but it
was eagerly grasped at by those who, towards the end of
last century, were seeking to introduce pantheism in a
more shadowy form. It might be shown, in opposition
to it, that whatever considerations are urged to prove
that there is one substance, may be employed to prove
that there must be two.
4. There is Ideal Pantheism. It is the issue reached
in the course of ages by a process of philosophical speculation, starting with improper assumptions, and conducted in a wrong method by persons of consecutive and
systematic minds, who will follow out their favourite
notions, however preposterous the conclusions to which
they lead.   Kant began with making tinme and space
subjective forms, and Fichte went on to make matter and
God himself a subjective creation of the mindi.  Schelliug
2-G(2
451 
452   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED 1iN
sought to enlarge the system by making mind and matter,
God and the universe, at one and the same time ideal
and real,-ideal on the one side, and real on the other;
and Hegel came forward with an artificial dialectic, to
show how nothing could become something, and how God
becomes conscious in humanity. These systems differ
widely; indeed some of them are absolutely inconsistent
with the others.   In particular, an ideal pantheism is
incompatible with a materialistic, organic, or substantial
pantheism. Yet among those who are inclined to these
views there is a constant propensity, when attacked, to
flee from the one to the other. When we prove that there
is a material world, they assert that this external world
intellectualized is God; and again, when we prove that
there are laws, typical forms, ideas, above the mechanism
of nature, they solemnly announce that these objectified
constitute the universe.   But we cannot allow the system
thus to transmigrate from body to body; I insist on its
abiding in some one of its shapes while we subject it to
examination.   In the course of our extensive survey we
have attained principles quite sufficient to exorcize it,
whatever be the form which it assumes.  It will be instructive to find that the intuitions of the mind, while
they conduct, with the aid of obvious facts, to a belief in the
Divine existence, are utterly inconsistent with pantheism.
1. Pantheism is inconsistent with the intuitive knowledge which we have both of mind and matter.   The
universe cannot all be matter, for we are conscious of
ourselves possessing thought and intelligence, and of
planning, designing, and executing in the exercise of
free will. It cannot be a mere organism, for we see
material objects which are beneath the organic state, and
we are conscious of souls which are above it.  It cannot
be one substance, for we are as sure that there are two
substances as that there is one. It cannot be all idea, or 
THEOLIOGY.
mere idea, for we are cognizant of the object as well as
of the thought; and ordinary experience, with the laws
of thought building on it, carries us from object to object,
from quality to substance, and from effect to cause, the
one being real as much as the other.
2. Pantheism is inconsistent with the consciousness of
self, with the belief in our personality. It may seem a
doctrine at once simple and sublime to represent the universe as "Ev,cat 7rav, but it is inconsistent with one of the
earliest and most irradicable of our primary convictions.
If it can be shown that there are two or more persons, it
follows that all is not one, that all is not God. According to every scheme of pantheism, I, as a part of the
universe, am part of God, part of the whole which constitutes God. In all consciousness of self we know ourselves as persons; in all knowledge of other objects we
know them as different from ourselves, and ourselves as
different from them. Every man is convinced of this;
no man can be made to think otherwise. If there be a
God, then, as all His works proclaim, He must be different from at least one part of His works, He must be
different from me. In the construction of his artificial
system of apriori forms, Kant most unfortunately omitted
the knowledge of a personal self, and thus speculation,
in the hands of his successors, was allowed to flow out
into a dreary waste of pantheism. When we restore the
conviction of the separate existence of self, and the belief
in our continued personality to its proper place, we are
rearing an effective barrier in the way of the possible introduction of any system in which man can be identified
with God or with anything else.
3. Pantheism is inconsistent with man's possession of
a will, and a free will. It is the circumstance that man
is possessed of a distinct will which suggests the idea
that God is not a mere law or principle, but a person
453 
454   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
with a power of voluntary determination.   It is in consequence of his possessing an inherent and positive freedomt that mnan is led to look upon God as also free, and
this in a higher and more absolute sense, inasmuch as
there can be nothing to lay restraint upon His. liberty.
May we not go a step further, and maintain that the possession of voluntary power and freedom on the part of man,
is not only fitted to suggest, but is a proof, that the God
from whom they proceeded has a will, and that this will is
free? It is not easy to determine, as to certain forms of
pantheism, whether they attribute free will to God, or in
what sense they affirm or deny it. The doctrine of Hegel,
that God awoke to consciousness, and acquired a will ill
the consciousness and will of man, seems to me to be utterly inconsistent with the essential principles of reason,
which requires that the cause be adequate to produce the
effect. But what adequacy can there be in a power without will to produce will? All forms of pantheism which
do not ascribe a separate will to God are liable to the
objection that they suppose God to produce in man a
free will not possessed by Himself from eternity.  If the
other alternative be taken, and will be ascribed to Deity,
then have we two wills in the universe, the will of God
and the will of man, and it follows that all is not one in
any intelligible sense, for we have now two distinct wills,
which may run counter to each other. Whatever be the
philosophic system adopted, we have, as matter of fact,
the hundred of millions of distinct wills possessed by
human beings. These separate wills show by one process that God must have a distinct will, and by another
process that there must be more than one will in the
universe, and both conclusions are inconsistent with a
system which says all is one.
4. Our sense of accountability to God as Judge is inconsistent with pantheism. There is in man, we have 
THEOLOGY.
seen, a native principle, which leads him to distinguish
between good and evil, which indicates not unobscurely
that the evil will be punished, and points to One ready to
inflict the penalty.  Natural religion, it is true, can say
little as to the time and manner of the judgment, but it
does announce that the sustainer of the moral law must,
among other offices, exercise that of Judge. But the
feeling with which we look at the judgment plainly intimates that we must submit to the trial in our individual
capacity. It is utterly inconsistent with the sentiment to
suppose that, prior to the final judgment, man is to be
absorbed into Deity. God, as Judge, must be distinct
from the persons judged, and we who are judged must
be the same as those who committed the deeds.   In
particular, they who sinned, and they only, are liable to
punishment. We have only to follow out the doctrine of
personal responsibility to find it setting aside every form
of pantheism.
Having thus inquired into the truth of pantheism, we
are now at liberty to look at its consequences.* And
this, it may be remarked, seems to me to be the proper
order in which to proceed in all investigation. The argument from consequences may very properly make us
suspicious of a doctrine, but cannot absolutely disprove
it. It may be one of the very objects of those who propound an erroneous dogma, to deliver us from the fear
of God and the obligations of morality, and they are to
be met by proving, not that their opinions are injurious,
but that they are unsound. But when we have first
shown that a doctrine is untrue, we may then point out
the evil consequences which flow from it. It' will be
found, in fact, that the true always leads to beneficent,
and the false to pernicious results. This does not seem
* There are fine remarks on the Pantheistic spirit in the First Essay
of Bayne's' Christian Life.'
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45()  METAPHYSI]CAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
to arise, as some have supposed, from the true and the
good, from the false and the wicked, being identical, but
rather from the pre-ordained connection instituted be tween themi by Him who hath marked His approbation
of the true and the good by making them yield happy
fruits, and hath branded the false with His disapproba tion by causing it to be followed by a train of disastrous
consequences.
In weighing the results to which the system leads, I
would not wish to be indiscriminate in the censure be stowed; I by no means charge it with leading to every
sort of evil.  As containing some important elements of
truth, it mlay, under some aspects, have rather an elevat ing tendency, more especially when compared with those
systems in which God is separated altogether from the
universe, and made an idle spectator of its mechanism,
or those other and superstitious systems in which he is
pictured as guilty of favouritism and caprice.  But ill
comparing it with an enlightened theism, in comparing
it with revelation, which it would set aside, it is chargeable with certain very grave consequences.
It is supposed to be one of the special advantages of
the system that, teaching us to discover God ill all his
works, it leads us to cherish a perpetual affection towards
Him.  But in this representation there is as grievous a
misunderstanding of the character of man as there is of
the character of God. It proceeds on a mistaken view
of emotion, and of the objects which call it forth. The
sentiment raised by inanimate beauty is a mere esthetic
feeling, and has nothing in it of love, in the adequate
sense of the term. The feeling with which we contemplate a lovely natural scene, such as Loch Lomond or the
Trossachs, or a great monument, such as that of Rauch
at Berlin, or that of Canova at Vienna, or of Tlihorwaldsen
at Lucerne, is not that required of us when we contem 
THEOLOGY.
plate the Divine Being.  Then it may be doubted whether any abstract truth or general principle is fitted to
kindle emotion. Analysis and classification are intended
to deepeil and amplify our intellectual conceptions, but
are by no  means fitted to rouse feeling.  It is not by
dwelling on the grand ideas of the lovely and the good
that sentiment is evoked, but by the contemplation of
a lovely object or a good individual. These ideas may
serve to widen our views and raise our minds above a
weak superstition, but they are not fitted nor intended,
by Him who hath given us the capacity to form them, to
create and cherish affection in our bosoms. It is when
a lovely object, a fine statue or painting, is presented, that
feelings of admiration are called forth; and in like manher, it is when a person supposed to be possessed of good
or amiable qualities is brought under our notice that we
are led to love him. It follows that in very proportion
as we take away the individuality of God, we make it
more and more difficult for man to love him; and if we
strip Him of personality altogether, we make it impossible
for the human  heart to cherish any affection towards
Him.  Hence we find that the pantheist, when he would
create a passing feeling of gratitude or affection towards
the God of his system, is obliged to personify him. Were
he to look upon God as a mere principle of law or order,
as a procession of processes, he would find his heart continuing cold and blank as he contemplated Him, and so
he uses a species of deception, or yields to a delusion,
and represents Him as having consciousness and life,
nay, as the only consciousness and the absolute life.  In
this way he may succeed in exciting a sort of mystic feeling, radiant as the evening sky; but as the body of the
luminary, which alone can keep up the glow, is gone, it
Soon sinks into darkness. Even when the feeling is warmest, there is an idea ever pressing itself on the mind, that
457 
458   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
the whole representation is fictitious, and hence the glow
produced has as little of permanence, and exercises as
little control over the practice, as that called forth by a
theatrical show or the scenes of a novel.
Failing as it does in this its supposed advantage, the
system is chargeable with stripping religion of all those
severe truths and elevating sentiments which practically
influence the minds of men for good. The feeling of
personality having been destroyed so far as it is possible
for an artificial system to destroy it, he who has imbibed
the spirit of pantheism will not be distinguished by much
determination, activity, or practical philanthropy.  The
energetic and devoted character of Fichte may seem to
be an example to the contrary; but, as Archdeacon Hare
remarks, "To form a correct judgment  concerning the
tendency of any doctrine, we should rather look at the
fruit it bears in the disciples than in the teacher. For
he only made it, they are made by it." We see the
true influence of pantheism in the indolent and dreamy
character of the Brahmins and Buddhists of the East.
It is scarcely conceivable that there should arise among
pantheists a great reformer, an energetic philanthropist,
a self-devoted martyr.   Along with personality there
must depart all feelings of responsibility, all sense of
obligation, all consciousness of guilt, all apprehension of
a judgment-day; and when these are gone, there can remain no very acute perception of the distinction between
right and wrong, between good and evil.  This feeling
is promoted by the representations given of the eternal
ideas, processes, and laws, which are supposed to move
on in one everlasting stream, raising up, bearing along
with them, and turning to their own use, every event, the
important and the unimportant, the evil and the good.
Viewed in this light, evil comes to be esteemed the lesser
good, or rather, as merely the lesser good for the pre 
TI EOLOG Y.
sent; for in the end it may come to be the greater,
or the very greatest good.  It is a necessary tenet of
this system that the evil equally with the good is a
part of God, —some one speaks of the " good as God's
right hand, and the evil as the left."   It is vain to
suppose that under such a system God can seriously
purpose to punish the sin, or that he can so much as
condemn it. Those who are thoroughly imbued with
the spirit of the system, will be led first of all to excuse
evil in themselves, and then they will be led to palliate
it in others.   One of the issues will be very perverted
views of contemporaneous society and of past history.
The responsibility of the individual will be lost sight of
in the contemplation of the vast processes and sweeping
cycles which move like gigantic wheels, apparently as
well without as with individual effort; and crime, especially brilliant and successful crime, will be spoken of
with little or no condemnation, because regarded as a
step necessary to great and good results.  Nor is it to
be forgotten that pantheism, in nearly all its forms (if
not in all), rejects the doctrine of the immortality of the
soul, at least of a personal immortality.  Our personality
in this life is an illusion, or rather, a delusion, and at
death the deception ceases, and the reality commences
in the soul being swallowed up in the all-absorbing One,
and lost in its individuality, as the river is when it flows
into the ocean. It should be the grand aim and the
holy office of religion to raise the downward tendencies
and to lay a restraint on the evil propensities of humanity; and this it can do only by the holy truths which
it proclaims, and the self-sacrificing sentiments which it
calls forth. But so far from providing or fostering these,
pantheism seems rather to remove them out of the way,
or destroy their force; and instead of stemming the
stream of evil, it rather sails along with it, and helps to
swell its waters.
459 
460   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPI,l'S INVOLVED IN
Such, if I do not mistake, is the influence of pan theism on the individuals who are under its sway.
Equally pernicious would be its influence upon any coun try in which it might prevail to any great extent. It is
foolish indeed to expect or to fear that the majority of
any people will ever attach themselves to so mystical,
and yet, withal, so artificial a system. The great body
of mankind  must-happily or unhappily-be far too
much engrossed with realities, will be far too eagerly
bent on seeking calculable gains, and exposed to far too
many real sorrows, to allow of their wandering into this
land of dreams and shadows. But if ever pantheism
should come to be favourably received or extensively
adopted among those addicted to reflection, or possessed
of abundant leisure, in any modern nation, the effect on
the character of the people would be most pernicious.
It would necessitate an immediate revival of the old
distinction, done away with by Christianity, of an esoteric doctrine for the thinking few, and an exoteric doctrine for the unthinking many. The inner doctrine of
the select class would be an airy pantheism scarcely
differing from a blank atheism, and the outer doctrine
of the multitude would be a hero-worship, a natureworship, or an idol-worship; in short, some description
of creature-worship, with all its degrading tendencies.
All this would take place without any attempt on the
part ef the learned to restrain the evil; nay, the learned
wo,;id join in the evil and encourage it; and this wors'lip would be defended by them as a homage paid to
the part of the One All as representative of the whole.
They would acknowledge that the mass of the people
are incapable of seeing any such meaning; but then, it
is by this very circumstance that they themselves are
separated from the vulgar, who must necessarily be
doomed to act without knowing the significance of their 
THEOLOGY.
acts.  "Posterity," says Jacobi, "will not wonder, if
in the desert of unbelief, men raise serpents and pray
to golden calves once more, and if in this serpent and
calf service philosophers tend the altars." In such a
state of things it is evident we should have the idle
and the educated classes proud, haughty, self-righteous,
mostly pleasure-loving and dissolute, and the great
body of the people abandoned-without any serious
attempt being made to elevate them-to the grossest
darkness and the most grovelling superstition, relieved
only by a love of imposing spectacles which impress the
senses or excite the imagination; while now and then,
and here and there, we should have some earnest or
malicious sceptic attacking the hypocrisy of the one
class an('[ the ignorance of the other, and troubling
both, without being able to improve either by supplying anything more solid or satisfying. So far as I can
see, the more advanced nations of modern Europe are
to be saved from such an issue only by the active and
earnest propagation of Scriptural light.
SECT. V. CHRISTIAN DIVINITY.
It has been found in all ages, that there are intimate
points of affinity between Metaphysics, that is, our generalized intuitions, and Theology, that is, the systematized
expression of the concrete and scattered truths of revelation. In the first speculations of mankind theology
and philosophy are indissolubly intertwined in what has
been called Theosophy. At a very early age of the
Church of Christ, the Eastern theosophies and certain
forms of Platonism became associated with Bible doctrine.  This arose partly from the circumstance that a
number of eminent Christian Fathers had, prior to their
conversion to Christianity, been attached to philosophy,
Asiatic or Grecian; and partly, I am convinced, by the
461 
46:2  METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
fact that there had been wrought, even into the paga,i
philosophic systems, a large body of truth, either springing from the native convictions systematized by the
inherent sagacity of the mind, or derived from a tradition which had kept afloat a remnant of primitive truth.
Platonism, in particular, had many interesting points of
correspondence with Christianity.  The lofty genius of
Plato, nurtured in Eastern as well as Western learning,
and drinking deeply of the moral spirit of Socrates, had
succeeded in seizing on some of those great natural
truths which come closest to Inspired Revelation.  In
the scholastic ages the logical forms of Aristotle were
employed to mould into a certain shape every known
truth of religion (as well as of secular knowledge), and
may be traced at this day in not a few distinctions
and technical phrases of theology. In modern times
famous divines and schools of divinity have delighted to
couch their expositions of doctrine, and their defences
of Christianity, in accordance with the favourite principles and often in the very nomenclature of particular
philosophers of eminence.   The influence of Descartes
is visible in the rigid, dogmatic, and deductive method
of not a few theological treatises of the second half of
the seventeenth century. Even the philosophy of Locke,
though possessing little affinity to the profounder truths
of Christianity or sympathy with them, may be detected
as regulating the defences of religion, and the manner in
which it was recommended during last century,-as when
it is shown us that experience, external or internal, is in
favour of Christianity, and that piety promotes the happiness of the possessor. The speech of those who talk
much of a moral sense "bewrayeth" theem, and shows
that they have taken their views directly or indirectly
from Shaftesbury or Hutcheson. In the United States
of America the metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards were 
THEOLOGY.
incorporated for two or three ages with New England
theology. The formidable nomenclature and the bristling distinctions of Kant, as also the subtle and glowing
intuitionalism of Sclileierinacher (the two being often
mixed incongruously together) may be traced in almost
every theological work published in Germany for the
last half-century, and come out in the writings of not a
few British and American divines who have felt the impulse of the great Teutonic invasion of thought. The
airy spirit of Coleridge has been caught by a considerable body of English divines of high literary reputation.
It may be doubted whether religion has not, on the
whole, been injured to a greater extent than it has been
benefited by its close association with philosophy.   The
gnosticism of the East introduced the earliest formidable heresies into thile Christian Church, and drew many
away from the simplicity of the truth into mystic speculations.  In the writings of Origen, and others of a kindred spirit, the statements of the Word were thought to
be of little value in their literal interpretation, and are
sublimated into gorgeous theories, constructed in a region
of gilded clouds.   No doubt many of those who thus introduced the gentile philosophy into the religion of Jesus,
imagined that they might thereby benefit Christianity,
but in fact they corrupted it,-quite as much as those who
with like intentions introduced pagan rites into Christian
worship, and pagan statues into Christian temples. In
the medieval ages the scholastic bandages, when they
did not positively strangle the vital truths, did yet set them
in so rigid a shape as to injure the life, and made them repulsive to many souls which might have been attracted by
the same truths presented in a so much more rounded and
flexible and altogether natural form in the pages of the
living Word. The professed demonstrations and deductions, conducted in the mathematical mode of Descartes
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464   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
and Samuel Clarke, were guilty of many a paralogisin,
and this often tempted shrewd men to doubt of the whole
system which had been supported by such brittle buttresses. The philosophies of Locke and of Hlutcheson
could not appreciate one-half of the great soul of Christianity; the sanctifying truths of revelation assumed a
clipped, a bare, and a dry appearance in the pages of those
whose appeal was to sense, and in whose view happiness
is the greatest good. Edwards had undoubtedly a spirit
of angelic brightness and depth of penetration, yet it
may be doubted whether certain profound and mysterious
doctrines of Christianity are most expediently defended
by being identified with his speculations as to necessity
and original sin. The theologies which have ramified
from the trunk of Kant, or sprouted from the germ of
Schleiermachler have laboured to move Christianity from
the old foundation of faith in the testimony of God, on
to a new ground in the Practical Reason, or a God-consciousness; and the issue is that those who have felt their
influence have been seeking to construct each one a religion for himself, retaining only so much of revealed truth
as may please his heart and fancy or suit his purpose.
The school of Coleridge has experienced how difficult it
is to serve two such masters as religion and literature,
and in its airy excursions has had a tendency to fly off
from some of those truths-such as the Inspiration of
Scripture and the Atonement of Christ-to which unsophisticated minds have ever clung most resolutely as feeling that their soul's peace is involved in them.
Can no method be devised of making philosophy and
theology co-operate without their being confounded? In
particular, is there no way by which religion may call in
philosophy to her aid in fighting her battles against error,
and yet prevent the powerful and ambitious ally from settling in her country and lording it over it? The following 
THEOLOGY.
rules might at once guide and guard religio-philosophic
speculation.
I. Metaphysics have important negative purposes to
serve in theology.
1. Sound metaphysics may be employed to meet unsound metaphysics. When Scriptural truths are assailed
on professedly philosophic grounds, by philosophy may
these foundations be examined.  Thus some object to the
Scriptures that they represent God as cherishing moral
indignation against sin; their views may be counteracted
by showing that, if we are entitled to argue from our
mental nature that God is a good God, we are authorized
on the same ground to look upon him as hating iniquity.
If it be maintained that the Scripture doctrines are not
to be believed because they land us in speculative difficulties, and cannot be fully comprehended, philosophy is
at hand to show that the truths which are most fully believed by us, such as those relating to being, cause, infinity, to the growth of the plant and of the animal, and
even to such agents as heat, light, and electricity, all go
out into mystery.*
But in performing this office of expulsion, philosophy
should not be allowed to take the place which had been
usurped by the power which it has driven out. What I
mean may be illustrated thus. Certain doctrines regarding
necessity and free will have found their way into theology,
and wrought not a little mischief. Some have given such
an account of man's freedom as to make him independent of God, and to set aside the Scripture doctrine of
his being enslaved by the influence of sin. At-the opposite extreme some have gone so far as to deny to man
all proper freedom of will, and some have identified their
doctrine of an iron necessity with the Bible doctrine of
the Divine.Sovereignty. Both of these extreme errors may
* See' CGlauiben und Wissen,' von Dr. H. Ulrici.
2 H
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466   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
be removed, as I think, by a judicious exposition of the
true facts of human nature, by proving on the one hand
that there is a causation siqeneris in the human will, and
by showing on the other hand that consciousness testifies to an essential freedom in every genuine exercise of
the voluntary power in man. But when this end-has been
accomplished, let metaphysics henceforth retire into its
own territory, and let not the peculiar views which we
may entertain in regard to the will, or the precise psychological nature of freedom, be allowed to rule ip Divinity
proper, and to overawe the honest interpretation of Scripture, according to exegetical principles.
2. Metaphysics may be pre-eminently useful in keeping
metaphysics in their own place. For it is the tendency
of metaphysics to be ever pressing beyond their own domain, and encroaching on their neighbour's territory,sometimes avowedly and as claiming a right, more frequently in a covert manner, denying that they are metaphysics, to which they may even profess an antipathy;but under whatever pretext they come, if they propose to
settle in theology, they must be driven out as intruders.
Metaphysics have a veryimportant province-not alltruths,
but first truths-and to that province they must be confined. No one will now tolerate for a moment any claims
which they nmay put forth to construct a natural philoso.phy, a botany, or a chemistry. A primary philosophy may
do some little in the way of setting fast the foundations
of these sciences, but they must be built up by materials
got from other quarters.  And just as little is it capable
of rearing a theology, and determining every question
which may be started as to God and man and nature,
and their reticulated mutual relations. History, the history of all ages and countries, gives a testimony as decided as it is uniform, that human reason is incapable of
forming a religion which can stand the tests of reason 
THEOLOGY.
and meet the felt wants of man. He who would construct a physical science must go to the volume of nature;
he who would construct a theology must go to the volume
of revelation. It is no disparagement to metaphysical
science that it cannot do what it is the province of other
sciences to accomplish. It is no disparagement to geometry that it cannot draw out a system of anatomy, nor
in any way to the discredit of chemistry that it cannot
build up a science of geology. Nor is it any degradation to speculative philosophy that it cannot rear a science of Divinity. Each science, like a planet, has its own
orbit, and when it keeps to this it has good purposes to
serve; but if it passes beyond, it will fail to accomplish its
proper ends, and may come into destructive collision with
other powers.   "We do not enlarge the sciences," says
Kant, "but disfigure them, when we suffer their boundaries to run into one another." He who would seek for a
quickening religion among the maxims of philosophy, is,
as Bacon says, seeking the living among the dead, and
must ever come back with an aching heart and a feeling
of disappointment.  A wise metaphysics, which knows its
own place, which is the place of principles, will find it to
be for its interest-indeed absolutely essential to the preservation of its influence, and the protection of its own
territory, in the present day, when it has so many enemies
-to rebuke every attempt which may be made by its less
prudent but more ardent supporters to make it intrude
into the province of other sciences.
II. Metaphysics, without entering Theology, may lend
it some aid.
1. It may show that the difficulties and mysteries
which meet us in theology are the same as those which
come up in metaphysics, being those which arise from
the limitation of our faculties, and the imperfection of
our knowledge.  "No difficulty," says Sir W. Hamilton,
2  2
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468   METAPIHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
"emerges in theology, which has not previously enmerged in
philosophy." The difficulties of Revealed Religion chiefly
congregate round the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Decrees of God, and Original Sin. The difficulties of the
first arise simply from the mystery which attaches to this,
but also to every other doctrine regarding the Divine Nature; we can understand so much, but learn of vastly more,
beyond our comprehension. Those who would doubt of
the triune nature of God because they cannot fully conmpass it, will find themselves landed in precisely the same
difficulties when they would fathom the infinity, or indeed any of the perfections of God. The difficulties which
may spring from the doctrine of the Divine Sovereignty
are no other than the old ones which philosophers have
met with from the beginning, as they sought to reconcile
freedom with causation.   The doctrine of Original Sin
does raise up difficulties, and may seem to bear hard
against the character of the Creator; but an analogous
insoluble problem presents itself in Natural Religion.
How has sin been permitte(dl under the government of
a God at once Omnipotent and Good P  Nay, it is the
very same difficulty which presses on us when we ask
the question, How does it happen that all human beings,
left though they be to the fireedom of their own will,
do in fact begin to sin as they begin to act for themselves? He who would answer this question and not
avoid it, must come to an original sin, encompassed with
all the difficulties of the Bible doctrine; but if lie discard Christianity, he has no relief from the evil, he has
no light to set over against the darkness.   Metaphysics
are competent to demonstrate that no man can deliver
himself from these difficulties by fleeing fromt Christianity
to what may be represented as a Rational Theism.
2. Metaphysics may furnish not a few evidences in
favour of Christianity. Thus it supplies the main ele 
THEOLOGY.
menits ill the proof of those great doctrines which the
Word of God presupposes, such as the existence of the
infinity and unity of God, and the immortality of the
soul, and a judgment-day,-truths very much lost sight
of in heathenism, and the prominence given to which
in the Jewish Scriptures is a proof of their being divinely inspired. All works of Natural Theology properly constructed have a tendency to strengthen the
foundations of Christianity.  In particular, the inductive
investigation of the moral faculty in man may yield a
number of evidences in favour of the Divine origin of
our religion.  The conscience declares that there is an
indelible distinction between good and evil, and conducts
by an easy process to the conviction, that God approves
the good and hates the evil. The moral power points to
a law, holy, just, and good, a law which all men have
broken, and which no nation shut out from supernatural
li,ght, and no pagan philosophy, has ever exhibited in its
purity.  When that law shines forth in the Word, and
when, in particular, it is manifested in the character of
the God-Man, the conclusion is forced on us that those
who make it thus shine upon us in its brightness, must
have had an express vision from heaven.   The conscience, rightly interpreted, declares that all men have
sinned, and so given offence to God. The same moral
power indicates, not obscurely, that sin deserves to be
punished, and points to God as ready to inflict the penalty.  Great service, as it appears to me, is rendered to
Christianity, when it is shown, by means 6f an inquiry
into the nature of conscience, that these are truths of
natural religion.  For being once established on an independent basis, they prepare us to welcome the grand
doctrine of Revealed Religion, that the Word has become flesh, and tabernacled on the earth, suffering in
the sinner's room and stead, and thus opening a way by
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470   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOILVED IN
which sinful man may be restored to the favour and
image of a sin-hating God. Verily those rationalists or
intuitionalists who would set aside or explain away the
doctrine of the sinner being reconciled by the blood of
Jesus, are overlooking what is about the deepest and
strongest conviction of moral reason or intuition in the
breast of man. In these, and in a variety of other ways,
illustrated by such writers as Pascal, Butler, and Chalmers,* a sound philosophy may show us light shining
through chinks upon us in the darkness, to allure us to
look out for the great luminary which God has made to
shine upon our world.
3. Metaphysics can give a philosophic method and
manner to the treatment of theological topics.  It may
do so without intruding beyond its province, or introducing any of its peculiarities. It may appear in its mode
and in the results, without troubling us with all the
processes. How often does it happen, in theological discussions, that there are laboured attempts to prove what
need not and cannot be proven, while other propositions,
which ought to be demonstrated, are left unsupported!
How often are derivative propositions left without a support, while primary principles are made to lean on secondary ones!  A mind trained to philosophy will avoid
these errors; as knowing what propositions require not
probation, and how to make such shine in their own light,
and generally, how to build up an argument of original
and derived truth consecutively from the foundation.
But are metaphysics to be absolutely precluded from
entering the domain of divinity proper? If a philoso
* The intimations of conscience were long neglected in the philosophies and speculative theologies of Germany, which in this respect
were behind those of Britain. A better tone was commenced by Julius
Mfiller, in his great work on'Sin;' and of late we have, in'Die Christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens, von Dr. Schenkel,' an
admirable account of the relation of the conscience to God. 
THEOLOGY.
phic thought occur to a youth in the freshness of his
observation, or to an old man in the ripeness of his wisdom, is he not to be allowed to bring it into the temple,
and lay it on the altar, because these are too sacred? In
reply, I observe that,
III. Metaphysics are to be allowed to enter theology
only under certain conditions.
1. The metaphysical principle advanced must be shown
to be sanctioned by the very constitution of the mind,
and by Him who has granted it to us. It is thus only
that we can lay an arrest on fancy, conceit, and prejudice, and prevent persons, when pushed hard for a defence, from taking refuge in a principle which they declare to be above argument. There are truths above probation, but there are no truths above examination, and
the truths above proof are those which bear inspection
the best. If persons appeal to first principles, avowedly
or unavowedly, the burden lies on them of showing that
the principles they employ are first truths. Those who
adopt this rule for themselves are entitled to insist that
those who oppose them, or oppose religion, should sub mit to the same restrictions.  It may certainly be de mianded of those who set themselves against Christianity,
or any of its peculiar doctrines, on professedly philoso phic grounds, that they show that their objections are
founded on principles which are fundamental, and not
drawn from the prejudices of the heart or the pet opi nions of some small knot of thinkers.
2. The precise nature of the fundamental principle
employed must be  specified, so far at least as it is
brought to bear on the topic discussed. For it is quite
possible that the principle, though in itself a legitimate
one, may be illegitimately employed, and how can this be
ascertained except by a precise enunciation of its rule?
Thus, I believe that there is a principle of causation ope
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472   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
rating in all creature-action, even, I believe, in acts of
the will; but then it would be wrong to infer from this
that the mode of causal action is the same in our voluntary as in physical, or even as in our intellectual nature.
Yet, again and again have writers maintained that man
must be a machine, because the principle of causation is
universally operative, even in the will, as is shown by
predictions founded on statistics which can be given
forth as to crimnes and other voluntary acts.   The fallacy
at once appears when we properly interpret the principle
of causation, which announces indeed that every event
has a cause, but leaves the nature of that cause to be
determined by experience, which shows that causation
in the will is entirely different from causation in other
action.  Some go to the other extreme, and insist that
the possession of freedom by man is inconsistent with
the universal reign of causation.  This misapprehension
may be removed by a correct exposition of the intuitive
principle of freedom, which affirms indeed of every action
of the will that it is free, but says nothing, and caii say
nothing, as to whether it is or is not caused.   These are
illustrations of the way in which a philosophic principle,
sound in itself, may issue in illegitimate consequences
because its rule has not been ascertained.
I have so far limited the rule as to say that the intui.
tive principle employed must be precisely enunciated, so
far at least as it is brought to bear on the topic we are
discussing.  This is all that can be legitimately insisted
on. Every time that we argue that an effect has a cause,
or that a quality implies a substance, we mnay not be
bound rigidly to announce the formula.   But in all perplexing questions and doubtful references, the law must
be given in express terms, for it is quite possible that it
may not admit of a legitimate application to the case
before us.  Fortunately the questions in which  such 
TIIEOLOGY.
rigid accuracy requires to be insisted on are comparatively few.   Unfortunately for the theologian it so happens that almong these are the very questions which fall
to be discussed in deeper divinity. The rule is that the
principle must be correctly expressed so far as it relates
to the topic to which it is applied, and if it is possible
that an  expression in part may be an inaccurate one,
there is no help for it, the law must be fully and rigidly
unfolded.
But it will be urged that such a caution must often
necessitate the inappropriate discussion of a metaphysical question in the midst of a theological exposition.  I
admit that this shows that the introduction of metaphy sics into theology has its difficulties and inconveniences.
Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the practice by
many theologians of laying hold, without examination, of
a supposed philosophic principle which serves their'end,
using it to help their immediate purpose, and then passing on to another topic, which is treated in the same
manner. All ingenuous minds feel this method to be
most confusing and uncomfortable; even the professed
metaphysician will often be stirred up to oppose it, as
the metaphysics may not be his own. If metaphysics
are to venture into the theological field, let them come
in openly and not furtively, and let them conform to the
rules of the logic of intuition.  And if the investigations
thus necessitated cannot come in gracefully in the heart
of a Scriptural exposition, let them be handed over to anl
appendix, or appear in a separate treatise, the merits of
which will be more readily ascertained fromni the circum stance that the philosophical stands out separate from the
religious element.  This leads to another rule.
3. There must be a careful separation of the Scriptural
truth from the supposed metaphysical principle employed
to illustrate or defend it.  The great body of practical
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474   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
thinkers, especially in England, have ever entertained, and
this not without grounds to go on, a suspicion of metaphysical theology. In the exposition of the doctrines of
the Bible, not only in sermons, but in practical divinity,
the introduction of metaphysical discussions may be declinled with great wisdom, except when the metaphysical
objections of opponents necessitate it.  The great body,
even of thinking men, will be vastly more pleased, and
in a still higher degree more profited, by clear statement
and spontaneous reasoning, than by abstruse discussions.
A calm reverence for Scripture, a careful collation of passages, an enlarged acquaintance with the whole volume,
sound sense, clear statement, direct argument, in which
there is but a link or two between the first premiss and
the final conclusion, a knowledge of human character in its
practical operations, and, above all, genuine faith, an attachment to the truth, and a love to God and man, will do vastly
more than metaphysical subtlety or lengthened deduction,
in explaining, enforcing, and defending Divine truth.
But are metaphysics therefore to be absolutely banished
from theology? I lay down no such stringent rule; the
very objections of the heretic and the rationalist, and the
cavils of the infidel and the scoffer, compel divines, whether they will or no, to enter the regions of metaphysics.
Tile God who gives to all men their gifts, is to be praised
because he has raised up from time to time persons of great
intellectual stature, who have defended the grand essential doctrines of Christianity in learned and elaborate philosophical treatises. Philosophy should acknowledge that
some of the works of which she has most cause to be
proud were constructed with the avowed design of defending the foundations or strengthening the fortresses of
religion.
But in professedly theological works there should be
a studious distinction drawn between the philosophy and 
THEOLOGY.
the religion. This is needful, in order that we may satisfactorily examine both, and be able on the one hand to
determine whether the author has laid hold of a correct
metaphysical principle, and been legitimately applying it;
and, on the other hand, to view the religious doctrine
apart from the philosophic speculation. The caution now
enforced will not forbid philosophy from attempting to
aid religion, to furnish to it evidences, to confirm its doctrines, and systematize its scattered truths; but it will
secure that the two be not confounded; in particular, that
philosophy do not represent itself as religion but as metaphysics; that it do not claim for its speculations the
authority of the Bible or of God, or advance them as an
essential part of religion, or place them on the same level
as the truths of the Divine Word; and, above all, that it
do not make religion lean upon them, so that if they
should break down religion would be supposed to have
suffered a defeat.
The rule laid down demands that the two be seen to
be different. Not that it should insist that they be discussed in separate treatises, or each in separate chapters
of one treatise; this night look too like that formal accuracy of demeanour and character which often conceals
the worst inaccuracies. But it rigidly exacts that the two
be distinguished in the mind of the writer, and that the
discussion be conducted so that the difference cannot be
lost sight of by the most careless reader; so that the
philosophy may be recognized simply as philosophy, and
the religion be seen to be independent of the philosophy;
and so that, should the philosophy be set aside by new
systems, the religion may remain entire and uninjured.
Bishop Butler, I may remark, has set a noble example
in this respect both in his'Analogy' and in his'Ser mons:' his philosophy, whether employed in illustration
or defence, is always so brought forward that it can never
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476   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPI,ES INVOLVED IN
be confounded with the religious truth, which it is meant
to aid, and never to injure. As neighbours, the two may
have much pleasant and profitable communion, and many
interchanges of good offices; but still, they should keep
their separate domiciles; without this there will sooner
or later be misunderstandings, jarring, and disputes, and
in the end suspicions and cruel separations.
These restrictions, I am aware, lay the axe to the root
of many a tree which those who planted it will be unwilling to see cut down; but they are necessary to the
clearing of a dreadfully intertangled forest, and to allow
the trees which are entitled to remain to have free breathing-space, and thus attain their full growth, and stand out
in their proper form.
SECT. VI.  MAN AS A RELIGIOUS  BEING.
There is a sense in which man is certainly not a religious being.   He is inclined to avoid God, and to live
unmindful of Him; and when constrained to look at His
purity, his eyes are so dazzled that he pays Him a blinded
and superstitious prostration. When left to himself, he
has ever been degrading the Divine nature and character,
and whether blessed or not with a supernatural revelation,
he has ever been breaking the coiolmandliients of God.
But there is a sense in which irian is a religious being.
All nations have had a religion of some kind, and the
number of professed atheists is so small that some have
doubted whether there has ever been such a monster as
a sincere atheist.   The Psalmist seems to give the true
account when he describes the fool as saying in his heart
there is no God.   There  are intuitions, processes of
thought, natural observations, and deep feelings, which
all tend, even when restrained and degraded, towards a
conviction of the existence of a Supernatural Being, to a
faith in Him or a fear of Him, to adoration, and a sense 
THEOLOGY.
of responsibility.   Every deeper intuition of the soul
goes out towards God. Created being, as we follow it
down, is felt to be fixed and permanent only in uncreated
being.   The objects around us are felt to be so fleeting
that our conviction of reality is satisfied only when we
reach self-existent substance.   Our conviction of substance is not content till it comes to One who has all
power in himself. Infinite time and space are felt, after
all, to be only infinite emptiness till we fill them up with
a living and loving Being. All the beautiful relationships
in nature, all the order in respect of form, time, and
quantity, all the adaptations of means to end, seem but
the scattered rays from an original and central wisdom.
The impulse whichl prompts us to search after causes will
not cease its cravings till it carries us up to a first cause
in a self-acting substance.   Earthly beauty is so evanescent that we rejoice to learn that there is a Divine beauty
of which the other is but a flickering reflection.  Our
moral convictions especially mount towards God as their
proper sphere, their source, and their honme.   Our sense
of obligation connects us by stronger than physical bonds
with Him who is the author of our moral nature, the
sanctioner of the moral law, and who is at last to be our
judge. I do not go so far as to say that any one of these
does of itself prove the Divine existence.   I do not even
affirm that all of them together would enable us to construct a logical argument in behalf of the being of God.
These intuitions are expected to look to certain very obvious facts pressing themselves on the attention of all;
but I maintain that, being thus stimulated and supported,
they do lead to certain deep feelings and impressions ill
the minds of all, and to a most reasonable belief in God.
Every one of them, like the plant, is sending down roots
towards this ground, is shooting out points towards this
light.  We feel that this world has no stability till we
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478   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
make it rest on God. In particular, we feel as to ourselves that we are in a state of dependence; as having
derived our being from another; as needing a supply for
our ever-craving wants; as having our destiny swayed
by events arranged without consulting us; as being ever
under an eye that inspects us; and as having at last to
appear at a judgment-seat; and we cannot be satisfied
till we learn that we hang on a Great Central Power and
Light, round which we should revolve, as the earth does
round the sun.
These convictions, and the feelings growing on them,
are deep down in the bosoms of all; and like waters
which have descended from the heavens and penetrated
into the hills, they will ever tend to burst out, and if restrained in their legitimate channels, they will find vent in
others. Ever craving for something, they will be in pain
and uneasiness till the appropriate object is presented.
Their cry indeed will often be like the infant's cry in the
night, a cry in the darkness for something unknown.
And as the appetite of hunger in its eagerness may lead
us to grasp at a sad mixture of food and earth, nay, of
food and poison when it is presented, so our natural
religious faith may often be taken in with a sad medley
of truth and error, of earnest godliness, and debasing superstition. Still, while they eagerly devour such, they will
not be satisfied therewith, but, feeling restless and troubled, they will still crave for something, they know not
what, and look for a remedy to their experienced ills.
It follows from this account that these instincts and
feelings may be perverted and abused. Man is allured,
not compelled, to be religious.  True piety is always a
holy act, to which there is the consent of the will. Man,
if he is bent upon it, may become unbelieving or superstitious. As having committed sin, he will ever be
prompted, like Cain, to go out from the presence of the 
THEOLOGY.
Lord, and to strain after a forgetfulness of Him. Or, as
oppressed with a secret consciousness of sin, and as unable to look on the holiness of God, he will ever be
tempted to form a god to his own taste, and who may
not dazzle and blind him by the brightness of his purity.
The majority of mankind flit between these two states;
between a stubborn forgetfulness of God and desire to
be independent of Him, and a superstitious prostration
before a god, or more frequently gods, fashioned by them
according to the crude cravings and cherished wishes of
their hearts.
But in this state of half-conscious sin there is a powerful intuition awakened, and though to a large extent
blind, and to some extent incapable of hearing, it will at
times cry terribly for its object.  There will rise up a
conscience of guilt and an apprehension of an unknown
danger, like the sullen roar of ocean waves evidently at
hand, but not seen in a murky and stormy night; and
this will be followed by an anxious though possibly very
ignorant and perplexed looking round for a way of
escape. While men are engrossed with the cares and
climbings and fears and gratifications of this world,
these apprehensions may to a large extent be suppressed;
still they are there deep down in the heart, and at times
they will breathe out in yearnings after some help, to
come we know not whence, or burst forth in dreadful
cries and alarms; or if these natural outlets be closed
by a cherished unbelief, it will only be to make the restrained feelings spread like a disease and burn like an
internal fire. It is this sentiment which keeps alive a
sense of sin and a fear of God and of a judgment-day
among all nations, and which so far prepares the heathen
to listen to the tidings of a provided Saviour. But this
instinct may likewise be misled, because of its blindness,
and may be directed to objects which seem fitted to
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480   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
gratify it, but which in the end disappoint it.  It may
tempt the man who is moved by it to picture God as a
vindictive being, or it may prompt to acts of laceration,
supposed to be fitted to appease the anger of God. Still,
the anxious spirit, even after the most horrid and excruciating acts have been performed, will not be satisfied,
for it will still be in doubt whether, after all, thlat terrible
God be pacified. These sentiments and cravings will
always feel that there is nothing to meet them in a deistic or rationalistic creed, and that there is nothing to
give them peace in pagan ritual and sacrifices.  I believe
they can be met, and gratified, and brought to composure only by the view, presented in the Word, of God
reconciling man to Himself by the blood of Hiis Son.
SECT. VII. RATIONAL THEOLOGY.
Attempts have often been made, by persons professing
a great respect for Christianity, to construct a religious
creed by human reason; sometimes using'reason' in the
larger and looser sense, to stand for all the intellectual
powers, together with the moral faculty, and sometimes
confining it to the mnere logical understanding. It is not
proposed to discard the Bible, but to found the doctrines
believed in on a rational basis; and most commonly all
tenets are rejected, or at least omitted, which cannot be
thus supported.   In this country this theology usually
borrowed largely from Locke, and appealed much to experience and man's desire to secure happiness.   In Germany it proceeded on the fundamental principles of the
critical philosophy of Kant, and especially on certain a
priori notions of the sufficiency of virtue.  Its oversights
are many and glaring.
1. While professing to appeal to human nature, it has
commonly overlooked some of the very deepest intuitions
and the mlost characteristic feelings of the soul, such as 
THEOLOGY.
the sense of sin and the terror of a sin-hating and sinpunishing God. These have been studiously omitted,
because they are palpably and uncompromisingly opposed
to the self-righteous, self-sufficient spirit which the builders
of the system wish to be allowed to cherish.
2. There have been not a few gaps and flaws in the
structures reared.  These have proceeded from the deternined purpose of the builders to erect a system of theology without accepting aid from Divine authority. They
have been triumphantly pointed out with a sneer by the
sceptic, who shows that objections can be taken to many
of the pretended demonstrations of religious truths, as, for
example, to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body,
and all that depends on that doctrine in regard to the
world to come. By all means let the analogies and illustrations which may be drawn from nature in favour of
such doctrines be urged, but the truths rest, after all,
most securely on the authority of God. The rational theology, which would move them from this foundation, is in
every respect most irrational.
3. It errs most egregiously in casting aside the truths
of the Word, which are most suited to the deeper wants of
man, such as those which tell us of reconciliation through
the Son of God, of the work of converting grace, and of
restoration to communion with God. These doctrines
cannot be discovered by human reason in its highest or
deepest researches, yet they are the truths which when
revealed commend themselves most forcibly to the heart
of man.
4. It has been powerless in calling forth deep feeling,
in rousing the soul to enthusiasm and devotedness, or in
urging it on to deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice. The
heart of man, especially at those times when it is awed
by a sense of the Divine majesty and purity, or struck
with a sense of its own sinfulness, or elevated by aspira                                            2I
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482   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
tions after a holier state, has ever turned away from it
with abhorrence and scorn.
SECT. VIII. INTUITIONAL THEOLOGY.
The icy and rigid rationalism of last age has dissolved
in the heat of a warmer season, and of late we have had
a time of wading deep in melted matter; and now we
are in an atmosphere of sultriness and dimness, of haziness and dreaminess. It is universally acknowledged
that the logical processes of definition and reasoning can
do little in religion; and those who, in days bygone,
would have appealed to such forms, are in these times
betaking themselves to something livelier,-to Feeling,
Belief, Inspiration,-or, in one word, to Intuition, which
looks at the truth or object at once, and through no interfering process or dimming medium.   In last age, certaim  of our " excelsior" youths were like to be starved in
cold; in-this age, they are in greater danger of having
the seeds of a wasting disease fostered by lukewarm damps
and gilded vapours.
The clearest views they show are those which we obtain by gazing immediately on the object. Have not,
they ask, the seers and sages of our world, poetic and
philosophic, seen further than other men by direct, and
not by reflected or introspective vision? Does not our
own consciousness witness that we get the furthest-reachimg glimpses when we are wholly engrossed in looking
out at things, without being at the trouble to analyze
our thoughts? There are moments when all thinkers, or
certain thinkers, have seen further than in their usual
moods; and this by overlooking all interposing objects,
and gazing full on the truth. Some seem to have experienced ecstatic states, in which, being lifted above themselves and the earth, and carried-whether in the body
or out of the body they know not-into the third heavens, 
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they behold things which it is not possible for man to
utter. An entranced minute of such bursting revelation
is worth, they say, hours or years of your logically concatenated thought. The soul is then carried as to a
great height, above the clouds that rise from the damps
of earth, like unto Mount Teneriffe, from which ardent
gazers thought they saw land lying to the far west ages
before the practical Columbus actually set foot on America. As there are sounds, such as the sighings of the
stream, heard in the stillness of evening, which are not
audible in the bustle of the day, so there are voices heard
in certain quieter moods of the mind which cannot be
discerned when the soul is being agitated by discussion
and ratiocination. As there are states of our atmosphere
in which remote objects seem near, as there are days in
which we can look far down into the ocean and behold
its treasures, as the night shows us heavenly lights which
are invisible in the glare of common day, so there are
day moods and night moods in which we look into great
depths, and see the dirrm as distinct, and behold truths
glittering like gems, and brilliant as constellations. At
these times it looks as if a veil or cloud were removed,
and we see, as it were by polarized light, the inward
constitution of things which usually expose but their
tame outside; and we gaze on naked truth without the
robe which it commonly wears, but which conceals what
is infinitely more lovely than itself. Our eye can then
look on pure light without being blinded by it; and we
stand face to face with truth and beauty and goodness,
and, in a sense, with God Himself.
This is a view very often presented in the present day;
and it should be admitted at once that it is by spontaneous, and not by reflective thought, that the mind attains its clearest and most penetrating visions of things.
Our mental powers operate spontaneously, and act most
2 i 2
483 
4S4   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPI,ES INVOLVED IN
faithfully when we are taking no notice of them, but are
influenced by a simple desire to discover the truth; when
the mind is in its best exercises, the interposition of metaphysical introspection and syllogistic forniulae would
tend only to dim the clearness of the view. It may be
allowed farther, that there are times in every man's
thinking when great truths come suddenly upon him;
times when he feels as if he were emerging at once from
a ttunnel into the light of day.   These are states to be
cherished, and not curbed. But it is of vast moment that
we understand their precise nature, and the value to be
attached to them, and the restrictions to be laid upon the
confidence we put in them.
I. In these visions, clear or profound, there are coinmmonly other processes besides simple intuition. Almost
always there is involved in them the gathered wisdom
of long and varied and ripened experience; very often
there are analyses more or less refined(, generalizations of
a narrower or wider scope; and not unfrequently ratiocinations, passing so rapidly, that the processes are not
only not analyzed, they are not even observed. When
Archimedes broke out into such ecstasy on discovering
a law of hydrostatics; when the thought flashed on the
mind of Newton that the power which draws an apple to
the ground is that which holds the muoon in her sphere;
when Franklin identified the sparks produced by rubbing
certain substances on the earth with the lightning of
heaven; when it occurred to Watt that the steam which
moved the lid of a kettle might be turned to a great
mechanical purpose; when the Abbe' Haiiy, in gathering
up the fragments of a crystal which had accidentally
fallen from his hands, surmised that all crystals were derived from a few primitive forms; when Oken, on looking
at the bleached skull of a deer in the Hartz Forest, exclaimed, "This is a vertebrate column!" every one ac 
THEOLOGY.
knowledges that there was vastly more than intuitional
power involved: there were presupposed large original
talents of a peculiar kind in each case, habits of scientific
research, and long courses of systematic training and observation; while at the instant there were the highest
powers of comparison and computation in exercise. It
will be readily allowed that there was a similar combination of native gift, of accumulated experience, and connected ratiocination, implied in the discoveries made by
Adam Smith and others in political and social science.
But I go a step further, and maintain that the grand
views of moral and religious truth which burst on the
vision of our greatest philosophers were the result of rays
coming from a thousand scattered points. When Socrates
unfolded to an age and nation deprived of the light of
revelation such elevated doctrines regarding a superintending Providence, and the intimate relation between
virtue and happiness; when Plato showed that man participated in the Divine intelligence, and that the forms
of nature partook of the ideas or patterns which had been
in or before the Divine Mind from all eternity; when
Leibnitz developed his grand theory of a pre-established
harmony running through the mental and material universe,-there were in active exercise profound reflection,
long observation of human nature and of the ways of
God, searching analyses, and a cultivated moral vision.
I am sure that there is a similar union involved in those
far-reaching glimpses which more obscure men have had,
at their better moments, of great moral or spiritual verities regarding the nature of man, and the character and
dealings of God.
The leap of waters at the cataract of Niagara is on the
instant, yet it is not, after all, a simple process: antecedent to it there have been rains falling from heaven, and
these gathered into a river, and acquiring momentum as
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486   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
they move on, and a precipitous cliff formed for their descent; and in the fall, water, rock, and atmosphere mingle
their separate influences. The flash of lightning across
the sky is instantaneous, yet it is the produce of long
meteorological operations, in which probably air, moisture, sunlight, electricity, and an attracting object, have
each had its part; and it is only on the whole gathering
to an overflow that the convulsive effect is produced.
There must have been a similar collection of strength,
and combination of scattered influences, in those sudden
leaps which certainii minds have taken; as when Augustine abandoned paganism, and Luther left ritualism; and
there are the same in those movements of the spirit of
man in which it penetrates to immense distances without
our being able to follow it through all the intermediate
space, and illumines as it passes the densest masses of
darkness.   It is the business of physical science to explain the one set of processes, and it shows that they are
the result of a,conspiracyof agencies.  It is the office of
psychological science to explain the other set of operations, and it can show that there is involved in them a
variety of original and acquired endowments. A number
of different rays have met in the production of this pure
white light.  The views are so wide-ranging, because all
the inlets of the mind are open to receive impressions.
II. In all these higher visions there is apt to be a nixture of error.   Thle glittering lustre in which the objects
are seen is apt to dazzle the eye, and prevent it from
taking too narrow an inspection. The rapidity of the
mental process is favourable to the concealment of hasti ness of inference, to which we are led by the influence
of inferior motives, acting like concealed iron upon the
ship's compass.   With the desire to discover the truth
there may be united the personal vanity or the idiosyn crasies of the individual, or the prejudices of the pledged 
THEOLOGY.
partisan, or *the proud and self-righteous temper, or a
spirit of contradiction. How often does it happen, in
such cases, that the conceits of the fancy or the wishes
of the heart are attributed to the reason, that high feeling
is mistaken for high wisdom, that what is dark is supposed to be deep, that what is lovely is supposed to be
holy! In the region to which they have betaken themselves, objects seem gigantic because perceived in the
list, as they look through the openings in which persons
mistake gilded clouds for sunlit islands, or for mountains based on the earth and piercing the sky.
Besides the error which may be in the original vision,
there are apt to be additional mistakes when the individual would unfold it and put it into language. As
Aurora Leigh says:
"It may be, perhaps,
Such have not settled long and deep enough
In trance, to attain to clairvoyance; and still
The memory mixes with the vision, spoils
And works it turbid."
The intuitionalist often has a genuine feeling; and when
hle confines himself to a simple description, his statement,
if not altogether free from error, may be a correct transcript of what has passed in his own mind, and may have
as vivifying an influence upon others as it has had upon
himtnself. The glow which radiates from such men as Cole
ridge, when tracing the correspondences between subject
and object, or Wordsworth, as he sketches the feelings
awakened by the forms and aspects of nature, or Ruskin,
as we gaze with him on the higher works of art, steeps all
attendant minds in its own splendours,-as the gorgeous
evening sun burnishes all objects, clouds as well as landscapes, in its own rich hues. The intuitionalist ever succeeds best in poetry, or in prose which is of the character
of poetry, and might, if the father of it chose, be wedded
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488   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
to immortal verse. But when he attempts, as he often
does, a systematic exposition, scientific, or logical, or philosophical, or theological, of his sentiments, there may
now, with the errors of the original writing, be mingled
the mistakes that arise from an unfaithful transcription.
Every one knows that to feel and to analyze the feeling
are two very different exercises; and it often happens that
those who feel the most intensely, and even those who
think the most profoundly, are the least capacitated for
unfolding the process to others. In attempting to do so,
they often mix it up with other elements, and the product
is a conglomerate, in which truth and error are banded
together without the possibility of separating them.   In
unwinding the threads, they have tangled them; and
they become the more hopelessly entangled the greater
the strength which they exert in unravelling them. The
pool may, or quite as possibly may not, have been originally pure; it has certainly been rendered altogether
turbid by the mud stirred up in the attempt to explore
it. As the author of'Hours with the Mystics' says,
"This intuitional metal, in its native state, is mere fluent,
formless quicksilver; to make it definite and serviceable,
you must fix it by an alloy: but then, alas! it is paure
Reason no longer; and, so far from being universal truth,
receives a countless variety of shapes, according to the
temperament, culture, or philosophic party of the individual thinker."
These visions, raptures, and ecstasies are most apt to
appear in philosophy and theology; and it is there they
work most mischief.   The intuitionalist is ever placing
things in their wrong category, dividing the things which
should be joined, or mixing the things which should be
separated. His analogies overlook differences; his distinctions set aside resemblances.  His limitations are like
the mad attempts of Xerxes to chain the ocean.   His 
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definitions are like the boundings of a cloud-while he is
pointing to them they are changed; indeed his whole
method is like a project to make roads and run fences in
cloudland.   In metaphysics, he represents as essences
what are in fact nothing but attenuated ghosts, created
by his own oppressed vision as it looks into darkness.
The Neo-Platonists pretended to see the One and the
Good by ecstasy; what they saw was merely an abstract
quality separated from the concrete object. They tried
to raise up emotion by the contemplation of the skeleton
attribute, but in this they did and could not succeed; for
it is not by abstraction that feeling is excited, but by the
presentation of an individual and living reality. The attempt in the present age, by certain metaphysical speculators, to call forth feeling by the presentation of the
True, the Beautiful, the Good, must terminate in a similar failure. It is not by the contemplation of truth, but
of the God of truth; not by the contemplation of loveliness, but of the God of loveliness; not by the contemplation of the good, but of the good God, that feelings
of adoration and love are called forth and gratified.
There are still greater perils attending the indulgence
of these inspirations in matters of religion. The intuitionalist is tempted to ascribe to some higher influence
the idea which arises simply from the law of association
or organic impulse; to attribute to intuition what is mere
floating sentiment; to pure reason what is the product
of habit or of passion; nay, to God Himself what springs
from the fallible human heart. The height to which the
soul is carried in these elevations is apt to have a dizzying
influence; and not a few have fallen when they seemed
to themselves to be standing most secure.  Some, pretending to a heavenly mission, have yielded at once to the
temptation which the true Messenger withstood; and,
without a promise of one to bear them up in their pre
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4)0   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
sumption, have cast themselves down from the pinnacle
to which they were elevated, and been lost amidst the
laughter of men.   Some have claimed for their own conceits the inspiration of Heaven; and have come to deify
their own imaginations, and to sanctify their schemes of
ambition, by representing them as formed under the
sanction of God.
III. The error is to be detected by a careful reflex examination of the spontaneous process of intuition, or,
what is more frequent, of the intuition with certain conjoined elements. That error may creep into these visions
and raptures, is evident from the circumstance, that
scarcely any two inspirationalists agree even when pretending to have revelations on the same point; and when
they do concur, it is evidently because of the dominant
authority of some great master.   How, then, are we  to
decide among the claims of the rival sages, or seers, or
doctors, or schools? Plainly by inquiring which of them,
if any, are in fact under the influence of a native intuition; and this is to be done by an inductive inquiry into
the nature of our intuitions, and by trying the proposed
dogma or feeling by the tests, thus discovered, of intuition.
In no other department of human investigation, except
speculative philosophy and theology, will an indiscriminate
appeal to intuition or feeling be allowed in the present
day.   Mathematics admit of no such loose methods of
procedure.   The fundamental principles of that science
are, no doubt, founded on intuition; but then it is on
intuitions carefully enunciated and formalized, and the
whole superstructure is banded by rigid logical deduction.
Physical science will not tolerate any such anticipations,
except at times in the way of suggesting hypotheses, to
be immediately tried by a rigid induction of facts, and
accepted or rejected only as they can stand the test.  In
political science there is a necessity for the weighing of 
THIEOLOGY.
conflicting principles, and room for clearness of head and
far-seeing sagacity; but in these operations mere intuition
has a small share, and is not allowed to pass till it is
carefully sifted. It is surely high time that intuition were
prevented from careering without restraint in the fields of
philosophy and theology, and that rules were laid down,
not for absolutely restraining it, but'for confining it within
its legitimate province.
The sole corrective of the evil, the only means of separating the error from the truth, is to be found in a cool
reflex examination of the spontaneous process. This is
needed, even when the idea is one which has occurred to
our own minds; to protect them from the self-deception
to which all are liable, to provide them with a safety-lamp
when they would enter dark subterranean passages; or
with a chart when they would venture on a sea of speculation; or with a compass to tell the direction when they
would go out beyond the measured and fenced ground of
thlougtht into a waste, above which clouds for ever hover,
and where are precipices over which multitudes are for
ever falling. Needed to guard us even in our personal
musiongs, it will surely be acknowledged that it is still
more necessary when others demand our assent to their
proffered vision, lest what we pick up be
"Like cast-off nosegays picked up on the road,
The worse for being warm."
Not that this review of the spontaneous thought should
set out with the fixed purpose of rejecting all that has
been suggested; on the contrary, it should retain and
carefully cherish all that may be good, and cast away
only what cannot stand a sifting inspection. But the test ing, in order to accomplish these ends, must proceed on
certain principles.   So far as the spontaneous exercise
professes to be guided by an induction of facts, it must
be tried by the canons of the logic of induction.   So far
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492   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
as it involves ratiocination, the approved rules of reason ing must determine its validity.  So far as it claims to
be intuitional, metaphysical science is entitled to demand
that the principle involved be shown to be in the very
constitution of the mind, self-evident, necessary, univer sal; and further, that its determinate rule be specified
and formalized, so that we may see whether it covers the
case in hand.
In moral subjects, first thouygts are often the best, because formed prior to the calcurations of selfishness.
They may not, however, always be the best; for they
may proceed from passion, which in fallen man is as
spontaneous and quite as quick as any moral impulse. As
a general rule, neither the first nor the second thoughts
are the best; but the last thoughts of a studious course
of reflection, in which both first and second thoughts are
reviewed, that which is good in each being preserved, and
that which is evil rejected. The same remark holds good
of the exercises of the intellect. The first views of the
truth are frequently the freshest and the justest.  It has
been remarked, that the first view of the new-born infant
discloses a resemblance to father or mother which the
subsequent growth of the child effaces; and there is often
a similar power of penetration in the first glance of the
intellectual eye, directed towards a truth presented for the
first time: the prominent features are then caught on the
instant, and coTrrespondences are detected which disappear
on a more familialr acquaintance, being lost sight of among
other qualities. But while these original glimpses are
often very precious, and are to be carefully noted and
registered, it is equally true that first impressions often
contain large mixture of error. At these times of intense
rapture and ardent longing, the mind seizes eagerly on
what presents itself, and is incapable of drawing distinctions, and may utterly neglect other aspects, which are 
THEOLOGY.
only to be detected by longer and more familiar acquaintance.  Hence the need of cool reflection to come after,
and retain only what can be justified by the rules of logic.
As the first looks of the infant reveal features which are
subsequently lost sight of, so the last look of the dying
will call up once more likenesses which had escaped our
notice in the interval. Let there be a similar holding of all
the true analogies-caught in the first look-in those last
looks, which, after many a survey, we cherish and retain
for ever of the objects which excite our interests and claim
our regards.
IV. In order to give the intuitions in the disordered
soul of man a religious direction, there is need of a very
special OBJECT to evoke, to harmonize, and centre them.
Had man's nature been limpidly pure, I suppose he
would have risen at once and spontaneously to the contemplation of God, and that his soul would have reposed
with satisfaction on Him. But mnan ever feels, when he
would thus mount, that there is a downward drag, when
he would draw nigh to God that there is a repulsion, and
he knows not what to do in order to reconciliation, and he
either betakes himself to various sorts of supposed pacifications, but is left in painful uncertainty as to whether
they can accomplish his ends, or he allows himself to
sink into a godless indifference. In order to the restoration of peace, and to his heart being drawn forth towards God, there is need of some Reconciler being disclosed to the view; and this is what is so aptly provided
in the Eternal Logos becoming flesh and working out a
salvation. But in order that this Object be recognized,
he must come before us with the authority of God; and
in order to our being able to look to him, he must be
set before us in such a way that we can readily and
clearly see Him. It is thus that Jesus Christ comes before us, attested by prophecy and by miracle, thus that he
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494   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN
is presented to us in the Word as in a glass. We have
now the Object fitted to call forth the deeper moral intuitions into play, and to gratify them each and all to the
full. We can now look to God, revealed in the face of
his Son, without being scared or prostrated; and as we
gaze, the pent-up and imprisoned religious affections are
set free. The sense of sin, which before so bound the
heart in icy hardness, is melted as by genial heat, and
repentance bursts forth in copious streams to relieve the
soul. Faith feels that it can repose on a pacified God,
and love clasps and embraces Him who is now seen to
be chiefest amonog ten thousand, and altogether lovely.
Need I add, that in order that the Object presented
accomplish those ends he must be a real object. Were
he a mere picture, or a fable, or a myth, the soul would
be driven back by the idea ever pressed on it, that this
is, after all, an illusion. The understanding would rebel
against the imposture which had been tried upon it; and
the faith would veer round by a polar reaction to a hardened scepticism; and the intuitions would refuse to
appear on the idle summons given them; and the soul
would in sulkiness, as it were, retreat into a dim cavern
where it has only a flickering light, but from which it is
morbidly indisposed to pass into the sunshine without.
It is, as I reckon it, a happy result of the development
of principles in this treatise, that it shows how we must
still go to the Word of God for our religion. All attempts hitherto made to construct a religion independent of Scripture have turned out acknowledged failures:
the systems reared cannot stand a sifting examination by
reason, and have been utterly powerless on human character. There was an expectation, long cherished by
many, that something better than the old Christianity of
the Bible, literally interpreted, might come out of the
great German philosophic systems of Kanit and Fichte, 
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Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher; but these hopes
have been doomed to acknowledged disappointment. The
idea was fondly cherished by some that certain men of
literary genius, who had caught more or less of the spirit
of the German Metaphysics, such as Coleridge, and
Goethe, and Carlyle, must have something new and profound to satisfy the soul in its deeper cravings, could
they only be induced to utter it. Coleridge has played
out his tune, sweet and irregular as the harp of /Eolus,
and all men perceive that he never had anything to meet
the deeper wants of humanity, except what he got from
the songs of Zion. It has long been clear, in regard to
Goethe, and is now being seen in regard to Carlyle, that
neither of them ever had anything positive to furnish in
religion, and that all they had to utter was blankly negative, and I rather think that the last hope of drawing
anything soul-satisfying from these quarters has vanished
from the minds of those who have been most impressed
by their genius. I freely acknowledge, as to some of the
eminent men I have referred to, that they have given
profound expositions of some of the deeper principles
and feelings of the soul, and have thus furnished a contribution to philosophy and incidentally benefited theology.  In particular, it may be admitted of a school of
intuitionalist divines who have felt the influence of the
Teutonic speculations, that they have called attention to
foundations and impulses in our nature, which a narrow
artificial theology-made up of coagulated abstracts of the
supposed Christian system-had overlooked; but which
as these men have shown, had not been lost sight of in
actual and living Christianity. The school has erred not
in tihe positive views which the members of it have unfolded, but in what they have omitted and scornfully
denied. In particular, they have lost sight of one of the
deepest and most ineradicable of all our intuitions; they
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496   METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVi,D IN
have taken no notice of that sense of sill and apprehension of God and of a judgment-day which make men feel
dissatisfied with every form of natural religion, and bring
them in helplessness to the Crucified Saviour and the
written Word.* Intuitionalism has had its trial in the
age now passing away as rationalism lad in the previous
one, and both have been found utterly insufficient. Rationalism reared a structure with regular walls and wellfitted gates, but the soul has ever felt it to be desolate
as a prison. Intuitionalism has raised up a showy summer palace, but it is utterly and manifestly unfitted to
withstand the winds and colds of winter.
There are some who imagine that we may now discard
the Bible, and yet retain all the light and assurance and
comfort which it has diffused. There were persons in
the last century who thought they could dispense with
the Scriptures, and yet retain among the people their
high morality. The generation which had been piously
educated did in many cases keep up to the high standard
of morality; but the generation which succeeded, educated in mere morality, thought they had outgrown the
rigid morality of their fathers, as these fathers had outlived the rigid orthodoxy of their fathers; and the race
which was reared to be moral, turned out fearfully immoral. Men had cut down the tree on which the flowers
grew, expecting they would still flourish, and were astonished when they faded. In the day which has now
reached its noon, the corresponding class of thinkers are
under a deep impression that there is need of feeling in
order to incite to a living morality, and so must have
* In particular, Mr. Maurice, drawing from the schools in Germany
which flourished prior to the later inquiries into Sin and Conscience,
has, while developing some of the airier of our mental aspirations, overlooked the deeper convictions of the moral power, and thus been led to
discard the Scripture doctrine of Atonement. There are important remarks in Rigg's' Anglican Theology.' 
THEOLOGY.
sentiment, by all means and above all things a warm
and glowing sentiment. But still they would rise above
the inspired Word, and leave it behind, foolishly imagining that they may have a continuance of the diffused
fervour, without the body from which the heat radiates.
The issue of such an experiment is certain, and is already
beginning to show itself. The race reared under such
influences will go a step further in the direction in which
they have been led, and will have no difficulty in discarding the feelings which are left without a basis, till we
have a generation without creed, and without any senmblance of piety, real or pretended. The evening sky, immediately after the sun has sunk, may be as lovely and
gorgeous as when he was above the horizon; but it is
only the child who will cherish the imagination, that
after the illuminating body has gone the glow will not
soon fade into gloom.
V. A theology which looks merely to that portion of
Divine truth which is addressed to our intuitions must
be very vague, loose, and unsatisfactory. If compelled
to decide between a rationalistic and intuitional religion,
I would infinitely prefer the latter, just as I would choose
an idealistic view of nature rather than a materialistic or
sensational or mechanical.  But I am not bound to make
a selection. It is all true that a logical divinity has ever
been felt to be harsh and crabbed, and that there has
been nothing in it to gain our deeper convictions or win
our regards. But it is as true that intuitional theology
gives mere cloudland, in which all is vapoury and hazy
at the best, and in which we are at last apt to be drenched
in rain and tempest. If the one looks so unattractive, as
dyked so rigidly into rectilinear and rectangular figures,
disregardful of all natural height and hollow, the other
is a territory in an unmeasured and unenclosed waste.
In religion, in all its beneficent forms, especially in re                                            2K
497 
498S   METAFHYSICAL PRINCIPT,ES INVOI,VED IN
ligion as set forth in the Bible, all the deeper principles
and higher faculties of the soul are addressed, and, being
combined, they keep each other in their proper position,
while each fulfils its function the better by having the
co-operation of the others.  True religion certainly calls
forth the intuitional power in its highest intensity, but it
gives exercise to other powers of the soul.  If there be
need of an immediate reason to gaze on higher truth, and
appreciate it, there is also a use for the logical understanding in examining and weighing the evidence, in distinguishling one truth from another, and in keeping truth
consistent with itself; and there is a place for the affections as they collect an interest around it.  Nor is it to
be forgotten that the will, or the choosing and resolving
faculty, has a very special work to do in following out the
obligations lying on us in the discharge of duties, which
are an essential part of religion, and.react upon our whole
intellectual and moral nature; "by works faith is made
perfect."  It is all true that a performance of dtity without respect to God and godliness, will become empty formalism or self-righteous phariseeisnm, but it is just as
certain that a mere gazing intuitionalisin will end in idle
musing, wasting itself and so dying out.
It was never meant that any one of the members of
our psychical frame should act apart from the others in
religious exercises, just as it is not intended that one
limb of the body should act without the others, or that
the eye should act without the ear, or the taste without
the touch. In a sound piety the various powers act in
combination, like the various elements-heat, colour, and'
chemical-of the sunbeam, and they are to be separated
only for scientific ends by a scientific process.  True,
there mray, even in natural operations, be a preponderance of one of the elements above the others, for the accomp)lislhient of special ends; still, they are never alto 
Tl EOl,OGY.
gether separated; and if studiously kept apart, or if certain of themn be allowed to gather to excess, their action
may become deleterious, or they may burst out in a destructive discharge. In particular, the contemplative elemnent, if unduly fostered (like a plant in a stove), and dissevered from rigid thought and a resolute will, must issue
in a mvstic creed and a life of day-drelmns.  Revelation
calls forth all the powers of the soul.   The light of the
Word, like the light of the sun, is one, but it has, after
all, a number of elements, such as narrative, example, description, type, argument, appeal, exhortation, warning,
precept, promise, presentations, and representations, in
prose and poetry, each fitted to evoke a corresponding
power in our souls, and to draw it forth in a proper direction, and give it the proper hue; and piety is in the
healthiest and loveliest state when every essential prilnciple of our constitution is exercised ill due measure and
proper proportion.
VI. In a living piety the intuitions have a very important place, being always associated with other mental
exercises.   All the deeper convictions of our nature rest
onl the objects which are presented in a living religion;
indeed they can be satisfied with nothing else. The selfexistent being, the self-subsistent substance, the inherent
power, the loveliness, the love, the righteousness, the
truthfulness of God, these, not in their abstract forms
(which are far too like skeletons to delight the eye), but
as embodied in full form in a Living Beilig, are objects
on which the soul would gaze with rapture in its pure
and unclouded moments; it would turn towards them as
towards an attractive liglit; it reposes upon them as upon
a mountain whose foundations can never be moved; an(l
it expands towards them  as towards  the expanse  ()f
heaven, with its still stars away in the depths.  We have
never reached the proper objects of religion, nor even the
499 
INTUITIONAL THEOLOGY.
region in which they dwell, if intuition has not been bearing up the soul. In our highest exercises of rapt devotion, other operations, though still present in their results,
iay disappear in their processes, to allow the soul to
gaze without distraction, immediately, and, as it were,
face to face, on GoD WHO IS A SPIRIT, on GOD WHO IS
LIGHT, on GOD WHO IS LOVE.
V
500 
INDEX.
Abelard, 199.
Abstraction and Abstract Notion,
16-19,  50-55, 68, 96, 103,
114, 157-161, 247-250, 413.
,Esthetics, 401, 446.
Analysis, 248.
Analytic  Judgments,  245-247,
325, 409.
Anselm, 199, 221.
Antinomies of Kant, 388-390.
Appetencies, 279-284, 287, 406.
Apriori,19-21, 34-35, 111, 115,
317, 353-354, 395, 403, 406,
428-429, 453.
Aristotle, 13, 57, 66, 100-102,
137, 184, 186, 316-317, 331,
354, 401, 462.
Atonement, 307, 408, 464, 466,
480, 481, 493, 496.
Axioms,  Mathematical,  50, 64,
68, 247, 249, 250-251, 255,
409-415.
Catholicity as a Test of Truth,
40, 41, 43, 49, 52-53, 107,
109, 220, 380.
Cause and Causation, 20, 23, 73,
79, 89-90,  109, 112, 113,
187-195, 258-278, 310-311,
316-317, 342, 353, 356-357,
390 2,  392, 417-418, 433-435,
471-472, 477.
Chalmers, 443, 470.
Classification, 418  (see Generali  zatiorn).
Clarke, Samuel, 67,211, 225,464.
Coleridge,  351-35, 31  463-464,
487,495.
Colour, 124, 140, 143, 144.
Comm on Sen se, 55,  109-110,
112, 114.
Conscience, 285-288, 3801-302,
385, 4 06-407, 435,436,443  444, 470, 496.
Consciousness, 21-23, 42, 44-50,
85-86, 88, 114, 121, 148  157, 340-341, 3, 360, 392-393,
452-453.
Contradiction, Principle of, 66,
246, 325,346, 348-350.
Contradictions, supposed, in Hu  man Reason, 60-61, 200, 212  213, 218-219, 222-223, 227,
271-273, 382-384, 388-390.
Cousin, 62-63, 89-90, 113-114,
132-133, 164, 221, 268, 310  311.
Criterion of Truth, 325-326.
Cudworth, 57, 353, 356.
Bacon, 1, 75, 317, 467.
Beattie, 110, 351.
Beauty, 288-290, 456, 477.
Being, 121, 149, 161-164, 165,
477.
Berkeley, 81, 129, 167, 375.
Body, 126-133, 170, 441-442,
452.
Brown, Thomas, 112-113, 204,
242, 252, 278, 292.
Buffier, 107-108, 153, 184.
Butler, 285, 293, 470, 475.
Calderwood, 215.
Campbell, 149.
Carlyle, 447, 448, 495.
Categories of Kant, 20, 110-1 1 2,
242.
Definitions, 50, 66, 93-97, 412
415.
Demonstration,  350,  395-400,
438.
501 
INDEX.
Descartes, 7, 79, 99,  102-104,
115, 119, 146, 152, 166, 168,
174, 184, 186, 209, 221, 317,
329, 450, 451, 462.
Design in Nature, 429-432, 435,
477.
43, 52-53, 55, 106-107, 109,
114-115, 125, 127-128, 129  130, 138,145-146, 153, 171  173, 197, 201, 205, 214, 217  219, 227-229, 238-240, 245  247, 312, 320-321, 356, 360,
383, 467.
Hegel, 75, 81, 115,  181, 227,
329, 375, 447, 449, 450, 452,
495.
Heraclitus, 57, 98, 173.
Herschel, Sir J., 206.
Hobbes, 435.
Hume, 81, 1]08-110, 119, 149,
166, 242, 272, 278, 353, 375,
376.
Edwards,  Jonathan,  462-463,
464.
Eleatic School, 98, 163, 174, 315   316, 358, 402.
Emotions,  283-284,  364-365,
456-457, 498.
Essence, 178-180.
Ethics, 64, 66-67, 70, 74, 279  307, 350, 400, 406-409.
Excluded Middle, Law of, 246,
325.
Experience, 4, 27-28, 104, 232,
258-262, 274, 305-306, 325  326, 340-345, 353-354, 356  358, 396-400, 410-412, 429  433, 437, 477.
Externality, 128.
Faculties of the Mind, 21-23, 72  73, 236, 279-288, 351, 360.
Faith, 196-202, 286-287, 327,
337-340,341-342, 346, 348  350, 361-362, 393, 419-427,
428.
Ferrier, Professor, 129, 375, 379.
Fichte, 21, 75, 81, 112, 129,
181, 201, 278, 375, 379, 451,
458, 494.
Forms given by the Mind, 19-21,
110-112, 354, 453.
Fundamental Principles, 38, 53,
112, 115.
Idea,  1, 13, 15, 99,  115, 119,
329-340, 418.
Idealism,  5, 9, 129, 135, 363  375, 451-452.
Identity, 242-247, 325, 416.
Immortality of the Soul 441-446.
Individuals, 29-36, 45-46, 68,
105, 110, 113, 114, 240-241,
244, 248.
Induction, 3-4, 101-102,  112;
114, 322-324, 423, 491.
Infinite, 32, 59, 113, 114, 208  210, 214-231, 436, 477.
Innate Idleas, 1, 15, 23-29, 42,
54, 103, 329-337.
Intuition, 29-36, 42, 44-50, 85  87, 104, 340-345, 351-353,
437, 439, 482-500.
Intuitional Theology, 470, 482  500.
Ionian School, 98.
Jacobi, 84, 200-201, 461.
Judgments, Pritmitive, 236-24.2,
287, 346-350.
Generalization and General No  tion, 16-19,  32-36,  50-55,
62-71, 97, 103, 114, 157-161,
255-257, 258-259, 409-412.
Gillespie, 207.
Gnosticism, 463.
Gnosiology,  320-362,  387 (see
Knowledge).
Goethe, 495.
Hamilton, Sir William, 10, 13,
Kalology, 4      01-402.
Kant, 19-21, 22, 43, 52-53, 65,
88-90, 105, 106-107, 108,
110-112, 115, 127, 128, 149,
152, 164, 166, 181, 204-205,
212, 242, 214, 245, 271-273,
309-310, 317, 329, 351, 353,
502 
INDEX.
327-328, 345-350, 353, 380,
390, 394, 397.
Neo-Platonists, 100, 163, 489.
Newton, Sir Isaac, 67, 212, 213,
225.
Notion (see Abstraction and Gene  ralization).
Number, 115,184-185,253-254.
354-356, 375, 379, 388-390,
401, 405-406, 409, 443, 451,
453, 463, 464,467, 480, 494.
Kidd, Mr., 391.
Kniowledge, 38, 106, 119-122,
126-133, 148-157,  196-200,
322-336,346,358-362,362  374,387.
Leibnitz, 52, 106, 107, 147, 159,
166, 211, 221, 244, 385,485.
Locke, 7, 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22,
23, 31, 97, 99, 107, 115, 120  121, 131, 132-133, 154, 167,
172-173, 179, 184, 186, 214,
217-218,238-240, 241, 252,
329-335, 40l, 415, 462, 464,
480.
Loic, 64, 66, 82, 250, 257,351,
390-393, 400, 401, 402-405,
422-423,437,497-498.
Obligation, Moral, 292-295, 404  305, 443-444, 454-455, 459,
476-480.
Ontology, 315-316, 321, 358  388.
Original Principles, 48, 58, 63.
Original Sense-perceptions,  122  126, 134-138.
Pantheism, 166-169, 275, 446  461.
Pain, 306-307.
Perfect., 220-221.
Permanence of Substance, 128,
151, 166-169, 442-455.
Personality and Personal Identity,
112, 113, 180-182, 444-445,
448, 453, 457.
Phantasm and Phantasy, 13, 105,
115, 215.
Phenomenal Theory of Knowledge,
19-20,  127-128,  163,  204,
270.
Philosophy, 6-7, 33-36, 82, 316   319, 464-476.
Plato, 7, 16, 57, 66, 99-100, 115,
174, 289, 310, 324-325, 329,
358, 361, 450, 460-461, 485.
Physical Sciences, 250, 415-419.
Power, 130-133, 146-148, 153   155, 165-166, 178, 187-195,
257-258,263-265 (see Caifse).
Properties, 178, 257-258, 417   418.
Psycholog,y, 400-404.
Mackintosh, Sir James, 292.
Mathematics, 64, 68, 74, 255,
396-398, 409-415.
Mlansel, My., 149-150, 181, 227  229, 238-240, 286, 409.
Maurice, Mr., 496.
Maxims, 18, 32-36, 50-55, 64  66, 106, 114, 344-345, 409 -
415.
Metaphysics, 6-7, 64-97, 315  394, 402, 404, 40, 418, 461  476.
Mill, Mr.       J. S., 158, 236-237,
268, 276-277, 304-305, 326,
373, 390-394, 410-411, 413.
MIiracles, 276-278, 493.
Mode, 173-175.
Mloral Good, 23, 32, 58, 59, 66   67, 88,290-297,302-307,342,
348, 357, 361, 393,407, 435   438, 439, 443-444, 458-459,
477.
Mootion, 185-186, 251.
Quality, 20, 23, 113, 145-148,
175-178.
Quantity, 20, 66, 252-255, 417.
Necessary Truth,4, 26,39-40,47,
50-53, 56 1, 59, 100, 105, 107,
109, 111, 112, 113, 219-220,
260-262, 267-268, 298-299,
Rationalism, 468, 470, 480-482.
503 
INDEX.
Reason, 20, 56, 72, 73, 104, 108,
110-112, 113, 199, 351, 353,
419-427, 498.
Reasoning, 28-29, 66, 405, 492.
Reflex use of Intuition, 62-69,
109, 113, 490-492.
Regulative Principles, 25, 33, 34,
42-43, 54, 59, 341-342.
Reid, 22, 108-110, 138, 149, 166,
167, 275, 322, 351.
Relations, 250-278, 365-366.
Resemblance, 255-257 (see Gene  ralization).
Responsibility (see Obligation).
Revelation, 439, 440, 461-476,
482-498.
Spinoza, 74, 79, 81, 168-169,
174, 447, 451.
Spirit, 148-157, 170-171, 251  252, 435, 441-446, 452-453.
Spontaneous Convictions, 44-50,
54, 56, 59, 62-69, 82, 109,
113, 114, 342-344, 357, 490.
Stewart, D., 112, 128, 149, 205  211, 275, 320, 413, 415.
SubjectiveandObjective,354-356.
Substance0,20, 623, 66-67, 89-90,
110, 113, 164-180, 263, 268,
416-418, 450-451, 477.
Synthesis, 248.
Synthetic Judgments, 245-247,
325, 409.
Superstition, 438, 457, 461, 478  480.
Scepticism, 135-137,  374-385.
Schelling, 75, 181,375,451-452,
495.
Schenkel, 470.
Schleiermacher, 201, 227, 463,
464, 495.
Schoolmen, 7, 462-463.
Self, Knowledge of, 58, 148-157,
243, 435, 441-442, 452-453.
Self-Evidence,  38,  56, 59-60,
100, 102, 103, 104, 108, 219,
381.
Sensation,  138-141,  324-325,
363.
Sensationalism, 5, 9, 57, 120,
331-332, 435.
Senses, 86-87,  122-144,  353,
35'7.
Sense-Perception,  86-87,  121,
134-145, 324, 325, 326, 353,
363.
Shaftesbury, 286, 462.
Sin,  297-302,  360-361,  470,
478-482, 496.
Singulars (see Individuals).
Socrates, 57, 66, 324-325, 358,
401, 462, 485.
Sophists, 57, 66.
Space, 20, 23, 32, 67, 88-89, 114,
115, 202-214, 21 5-223, 250  252, 262, 357, 360-361, 389,
416.
Testimony, 420.
Tests of Intuition, 37-41, 68,
109, 113, 231-233, 325, 326,
393, 394,      422, 492.
Theistic Argument, 271-273,388,
427-441.
Theology, 70, 74, 383, 461-476,
482-498.
Timiie, 20, 23, 32, 67, 88, 89, 114,
115, 200-214, 222-225, 252,
263, 357, 360, 361, 389, 417.
Trendelenburg, 186, 205.
Ulrici, 166, 465.
Unconditioned, 272, 385-388.
Understanding, 72-73, 351-353.
Uniformity of Nature, 259, 275  278.
Unity, 113.
Universal Truth, 26-27, 52-53,
50-55, 57,1l1],113,291,321  328, 353, 380-381.
Utilitarianism, 303-305.
Wlhately, 158.
Whewell, Dr., 115, 253-254,417  418.
Whole and Parts, 247, 416.
Will, 284-285, 295-296,  308  312, 390, 406, 453-454, 465,
471-472.
504