o i,. It 7' 8. SP E E C H OF H-ON. WIL.'M JI SAS. ON TIlE NECESSITY OF IMMEDIATE CONSTITUTIONAL DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF CALIFORiNIA, FEB. 7, 1856 S A C R A M E N T O: PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE JOURNAL. 1856 -I* -.,.'' M7t wX Z \,,y foriniig a Constitution to apply only to t}Je two col,I ties iinamed1 anid exeltidinr tie remaiider of thlie State, as it would by fbiming a Constitutioiin to al,py oiily to those two arid the initervwl,iiig counties, or to ai y otheir f'1ation o01 part of the State orIl. A State is not a 1,'it't of a Slite. Any portion of Califorinia would not be Califor'nia. Aud it is iirratioaiil to suppose that our i)eople would elect naeni to revise aind r'e fori-ii their -Constitution, wio wo uld not eonifinie tiheisclves to tihe business w-itli which the people ihave eatr,"sted theni. 1'tin not discus siug what men could d(o in such a ceolvention. They would not be the officers of any govern ment, nor responsible to any government. Of course they couild do whiatever they peleased. They could provide that all our inhaibltants should reside in our town, or leave the coon triV, or cut each other's throats. But peop)le who reason about what men rot,ld do, or suffer themselves to be governed by such considera tiolls, are certainly riot governed by reason, but only by their fears. Wlieti the liuits of a State or nation like California, arc once fixed byv nudislputed all thority, tiley renmain thereafter as though they had been settled and established for all time. They are not afterward to be affected by any change or reform of its goverinmeilt. They have nothing whatever to do with the subject of revising arid chiangirng its Constitutions. They need never again be mentioned or alluded to in its Coustitutions, or' its laws. They have been fixed and arc presumed to lie k::own and recognized by all inailkiild. All stiates, nati(ens arid governiments, in bein', see irid know them, and must forever aciknow,ledge and respect them. They are serious. And it would be a gross assumlptionI of ilover, a thing tunheard of; aind withon[ aliiy 3'istific'i. tio:: or excuse, for a Conlvcniioil Cele't,; tos reAd ite od abead or chanige the Cof:stitiri (If our Btate, to attemnIt to do smthing else, and chance the State itself iristrad of its ConstitU tili'i only.,Sir, io 1111'ti,,,I of ouni ter'ritorv, not aIll inchl (of the soil of our State, can ever heic after be sex ered,r ltaken fi'oiii us, unider the exi~stia, order of' thilljs, except by the force of somie Siiiertpior iower', or by corilItact between thils and sonie otlier State or States, approved of by the Congress of the United States. Arid the rmode of dolurg that is llrecscribed by the fu,dainental law of the ULlion, and that mode is bv our iLeqislat,tre, riot by our votes for or against at Constitution, nor by ally conduct of a constitutional convention. Indeed, a con ventioll woulil not, ll'operiy, have anythlirig at all to do with that questiol, nor wouil,l they have ally right wliateveir to rueddle withi it. It could never piropierly come before them, nor be eoCii)ir'ehieiided in any branch or 1)ilrt of their busginess. There would be no niore pro 1p/ietty ill their atteimiiptirig to exclude ally Ior fioni of the territory of their' State, than there would be in their attempting to alinex new territory to it. Arid instead of attempting to make two or raor-e States by cutting up our own, they would be eugaged in a business not tit all more for'(iigil frlini their iiroper duties, by insanely atterllpting to annex riegoii and Utah. But in the next place even if a new State or a new territory were actually formed out. of a p)oI-tloll of our Statte, it could not be inflicted witil slivery, becauise there is not tile least question Or LiloLibt in the niiiids of any body, that aii ov erwhelmirig majority of our people in either' section of the State are sincerely arid ui ncorllprorllisiilgly opposed to its introduction. Arid whoever lives iii this State-arid thiuks our people are either indifferent or inattentive to that subject, niust be ignoranit indeed. if it were otherwise, i frankly adiait, I would not urge the passage of this bill. For God knows, I would not be iustrurotrital in adding any new public evils to those which already ilearly overwcelmti us. ]But I feel pe:feetly satisfied that no one can now show any solid grounds for the slightest appIrehieisiorIs oil this subject. The exir(mrue cautioli which has been hitherto exercised was wise, tierhas; it all events, it hlas been courpletely successful ill removing all lurther danger of slavery in California. And now, if we are to wait liily longer for fear of the trifling influence of some few per-solis, who are not yet convinced that slavery would do more harm than good here, then hIow long are we to wait IMirst be until the next year? It will take longer tliaii that now' Indeed, witl the utmost disilatch we can reasonably exercise, it will take a length of time equal to one third of the whilole period of our' existence, ,As a State, before we can1 possibly g:,t a new Constitutil, e ven, if we pIass the bill irnmediaitel IUder the aiitiquited IpIrovisions of our (, oiitittiLioit oil the subject of its revision and cliang' e,to year' arde I cituisite to aecoirplisi' tiiat: ot~1ect. And if tie new colistitutloioll amendmlient be adopte~d3, which provides for 9 biennial sessions of the Legislature, it mnay then take us yet four or five years to accom plishl so desirable an object, unless we pass this bill during the presert session. Tllerefo,e, it seems to nie, tlhat an) longer delay would be ac'ual injustice to t'ie c )untrv. For if the welfare of our people really requires a revision and chalge of our Constitution, there ceitainly outiht to be no further unneceseary delyt in aecompl.sli.ig the first steps to that end, that is, to ieceive the advice and ascertain the wishes of the people, as to whether they desire such revision and change or not. I now b(g leave to return to the argument, and en deavor to show that the welfare of this State absolutely demands, that such revision and change be made. Objections to the Cotistltutlon.-Those of Omission. A distinguished English statesman wrote, many years ago, "It is an undertaking of some delicacy to examine into the cause of public disorders. If a man happens not to succeed in such an inrquiry, he w ill be thought weak and visionary; if he touches the true grIi'v anice, there is danger that he may come near to persons of weight and consequence, who will rather b exasperated at the discovery of their error., than thankfll for the opportunity of correct;.ing them. If lie should(l be oblliged( to blame the ftavorites of the people, he will },e conisidered as the tool of power; if he cen scures those in po wer he will be looked upon as ,t;l i istraemeut or faction. But in all exertions o)t luty,. something is to be hazarded. I am iit,t one of tihou who think that the people are reier in the W-ron(. They have been so fre luently, both in other cotuntries and in this. i,utt l io sav, that in all disputes, between thliii and their rulers, the presumption is, at l,,itst upon a part, in favor of the people. Wlrhere popular discontents have been very prevalent it riiUiy /'ell be aiqreted and -supported, that there Iass beeni, genurally, somiething found amiss in th CONS.TITtTrION, o r in the conduct of GoovER, MENr. The people have no interest in disorderi. When they do wrong,. it is their error, not their crime. Bat with the governing part Alt the State it is far otherwise. T'hey may c("rtaiinly act ill by design, as well as by mis S'r. if scLh views were correct in a monarcliial counitry, they will certainly not be disputed in tis. The reason why California requires a constitution of her own, and cannot prosper under the constitution of Iowa, or any other remote country, ought. perhaps to be sufficiently apparent in th] very nature of things. The hlal)its of our people, their main business punisuits. their ifrequent want of permanency in p articular neiglihborhoods, and their prevailing teniperaini'ults and passions for the Halargest lib)erty.,' and for arriving straight at justice, retnders the very organization of society here rqiiie different from that of either, or any of 2 the other States. And it must be recollected that free governments are not able to rule the p ople, tbut only to govern them, as they con sent to be goy-erned. And just so far as a free coIstitiitioI disregards their necessities, just s9) fa.r it will I)e wronig. and prove more injur ioIns than li)eneiicial. Tlhe location or position o!o.U State is also very materially different from every other in the Union. We are en tirely isolated and almost completelyremoved beyond the influence of all the other States. Practically and in effect, we are more com pletely removed fi'om all intercourse with the other States of the Union, than though we were situated' upon the continent of Europe. And our State itselfis not more completely dtffereut from France, Prussia, or Turkey, than it is from any of the ordinary agricultu ral States on the eastern slope of this couti n alt. In fact. in consequence of the almost crimi nal conduct of Congress, in neglecting to estab lish an overland military railroad, we are still left here more completely and effectually cut off tfrom all intercourse with the other States of our cotrttry, than though we inhabited the territory of France or of Norway. And so far from our being an inland and merely agricul tural State, like Iowa, we actually occupy a new world in the commercial history of man kilnd. We first discover. then, that there is a gen eral and sweeping objection to our Constitu tion, which is a radical defect, but not peculiar to any one part of it. It consists in its serious want of adaptation to the actual condition of our' p,eople. Inii its being narrow and merely im tative, and not reach'ngr out to meet the new and extraordinary state of things which exists here. In its imposing no greater re staaints upon officials than though all our citi. zeus had been borni upon this sail, were at tacked to no other State or cqtuntry, and could not possibly be found here in great numbers perfectly regardless of the welfare of the State, and desiring and intending no other objects by their visits, than such as tako English men into India. However proper our constitutional organization of offices and qualifica tions for fillsng them, may have been in 1849, experience has taught us that they ought, to be changed and made more stringent; that they ought, in fact, to be surrounded by constitutional checks, which would be unusual, and, perhaps. unnecessary in the eaitern States. In the next place, to go into particular objections, the constitution it is actually dumb on the all.important subject of finance. There are properly no financial regulations at all in this whole constitution. The regulation of funds, the borrowing from one fund and squandering in another; in one word, the entire financial system in the State is left to be regulated as each session of the Legislature may see fit, or to be managed without any obligatory regulations at all. The importance of proer constitutionalt regulations upon this subject :.1,...,' 10 tre almost incalculable. They are self evident no every one. They would prevent the Leg,islature froiom doing what it pleases with the public mn.oney and resources. How so important a subljeet come to be so entirely neglected by the convention of 1849, it is actuallv difficult to account for in anv other way, tlhan by refereuce the constitution of Iowa, where precisely the same defect is disclosed. The importance of constitutional regulations upon this subject are so great, that their proper establishment alonie would more than compensate the country for all the cxieiises of a constitutional convention. In the next plane, tlhe constitution imposes no limit whatever, to the sums of money wkhichl the Legislature may allow to its own members, to its officers and clerks, and to any and all officials under the goveirnmenlt. In re gard to the Legislative expenses alone, there is at least more than $100,0(00 annually expended without any nlecessity therefor. There was expended last year in oine item alone, (that of cleiks and officers of the two Houses) mole than $7t),00)(0 uselesslv. And there are other leakages which are reallv enormous, and completely useless. And a still greater abuse has been permitted under this defect tlhrlough the local, city, and county officers through the State. Under the guise of fees for services, permissionr has been given by law in inulmerious instances, to extort cuormious sums of moonev for the mnere perfor mance of the mnost simple and ordinary official duties. And thus the very laws have enticed ien into idleness, and induced tlhemn to seek fortunes or support by office, and not by hon est indutiry, And have excited and cicour aged men to hazard their whole fortunes upon elections, audc to detgrade and polute, as far as the po)wei of money can do so, the very ilters of the governinent. And all this, not that the count ry might receive somne advanta:c, but merely that the successful individuals ul-ay eil joy tlke priv ilege of enforcing the most ulngod lV extortions fr om the people. Sir, under the theory of a fr'ee government, office is desig,)ed to be the performance of a public obligation, imposed by duty and patri otism. But in Calitornia, the laws have ren dered the pursuit of office a branch of business; men live by it, and speculate upon it, make its chances of success the rule of their party fi delity, and sometimes encourage the most dan gerous and infamous outrages upnii the rights of the entire country, in order to secure it. This is not the fault of the people, but of the government which permits such pernicious inducements to be offered for the political cor ruption of society. and holds out no induce ments whatever, to patriotism and political fidelity, but basely and injuriously offers all the rewards of the country to those only who are successful in merely gaining some office, rendering the very servants of the government gr'eater than its masters. In thle next place, the constitution does not restrain tlie Legislature firom disposing of the entire public domain and property of the State, ait suchl time and in such way and mainer as it sees fit, without requiring the plirevious consultation, advice or consent of the people, to whom it belongs. Nor does it expressly prohibit the Legislature fronm funding or otherwise forcing the people to pay d.,imands or claims against the State and its lesser communities, illegally or unconstitutionally contracted; thus opening the door to the most momentous fieauds. and ititroduciig a general feeling of trifling and mere gambling with the rights and property of the people. In the next place, it does not prevent nor even restrain the passsage of laws of a purely private and local, or individual character. Wherebv, probably more than one half of the time and expense of the sessions of the Legislatuie, have been usually consiumed wvith the affairs ofsomnie few meie private individiiuals. This is against the economy, dignity, and ob ects, of a great national government, such as we here requiire; and is also wholly unnecessary, because such affairs could be transacted in other ways with equal juistice to individual rights, a1d(1 greater advantage to the true interests of all local communities. in the next place, it makes no provision for separate Senatorial and Asseml)ly districts; iwhereby every memnber of the LeLislatuire would be miade the irimmediate, and special agent of somie one particular locality lvreiy neighborhood containing a certain niumber of inhlabitants, would be directly and specifically rclresented. And every locality in the State would be more directly present;.i the Legisl.a tluire, tliough an ageit in-nmediately and solely responsible to Ini particular district, and nioree likely to be p(rsoiiall-y well-knowni to its elec tots, and directly ideitified withll th)eir interests. At present, tlhe members from the more popu 1ious counties. control the action of the Legisla lure, -whilst they are elected frorio whole couln ties at large, and there is no exclusive lidivid tal responrsibility amongst any of them. They urenot separately, but only collectively, the representatives of tlheir counties. Owing to their numbers and general election, they rep resent no place nlor interest paiticulaly, but their whole county or district in a lump. A majority of all the members of this Senate are elected in only six districts. It is not in hu man nature to feel under such circumstances,. the samie individual responsibility which would otherwise result. And besides, all portions of counties and districts are equally ecntitled to, and ought always to be allowed the equal privilege of their one representation. Indeed, the election of members of thle Legislature from the State at large, could be maintained by about the same course of reasoning, and with about the same justice, as their electiozi at large in the few enormous counities, ald districts of the State.'The most direct, per II sonial responditibility of political agents, like anv other aisets, is undoubtedly the best "cav to insure tliir fidelitv to those wlho pp)oi,[t theni. Ainid it seems to me that the plan stuggested, which has worked to admiration in so,ie of the other states, ought especially to be adopted in tiis. But under this Iowa Coinstitution, the Legislature is expressly prolibite,i firo estabiish ing any Seniatorial or AscieiilIy districts of less d(imenisionis than a whole county, no matter how vaist or populous the county ilimav be.' And seveial of our coonties are hnrger than whole States on the Atlan tic Coast. In the next place our constitution, still closely I'llowing its remote original., prohibits our Legislature f'romn ever being composed of more thian eighty m iinbers in the Ass~mtbly, und half that iumber in thli Senate. Th,i linitation in Iowa is actuailly very nearly as large. Me aie foreveri pohibited by this constitution. i,rei having upwards of twelve more menal)era in our whiolre t tlli is tllowedI in Iowa. The policy of allowing a large representation in th e -, gilative bodies of free ,Stattes, i1 aL nitLt ter which has given ris' to so ny-ILlv vaaLiotns (oI)ions, that I will not ICIc discLss it, lest [ merely excite tim oppositLoni of membirs. lBtt it does seem to mu. no one can reasoeal,I douibt, that our representation in Calilornia cannut long remain constitutionally limited to so sinli a numheir withliont actual injustice The other house of the Leg-~istature is ahlceadv full. Not o(ine addllitioim-It imiemubeLr caii ew.'r he allowed thenre unti l tills conistitutioni is changed,-. And whl11ole conuties h'lriy(lv exist here w' ithout even one representative in the Assembily. The proper rule of representa tion is, not the dispatch of business, bnut t,ihave the whole people and every plirtioll of tihe country, iuill and fiairly represented The dispatch Of business is important, but it is iniinitely more imiportanit to have a full and fair representatioii ot' the people. than to merely atford fiteilities for the dispatch of business at their expense. And instead of the number beiug as small as practicable, it seems to me, it ought to be as large as practicable. Certain it is. that the greater the number, the greater the s cnrity against bad, hasty, and unpopular uleasures of In(rlati.ll. In a word. sir, 1 do no~it unde~rsnlandn why California, with its armies of' speculators, its immense resources, its vast limits. and the newness and stranigeness of its general population. should be limited relativuly to tile smallest and most insignificant relni'centatiori of any State in the Union. Political hypocrites and unthinking men, might possioly ir iate al)out the expense. were it not for the well known fact, that our entire repre' sentatlien could be actually doubled to-day, without tile least necessity for any increase at ,lI in the public expenses. In 1he niext place our constitution makes no prov ision for the certain and prompt punishnient, of official bad conduct, in judicial arid othler Sta~te officers~. No candid person will deny that all attempts here to punish officials by impeaclimeut. as required by this constitution, are mor'ally certain to interrupt and retard the public business, cnd to greatly increase the public expenses, without being at all well calculated to accomplisli the purposes intended. It may be possible that I ani in error in relation to this objeetion; but I aiii wholly unable to discover either tlec necessity or justice of releasing all the officers nameed iii the coustitu tioii, froum punishment for oflicia,tl misconduct, except by themonarchica, aristocratie and exp)ciisive iiiode ot iiiipeachiinent. Why shouldl so niucli aiiti-republieaii ceremony be gone through with in order to punish a general State Attorney, or Surveyor, or a District Judge?Theierc are other olhecies in the coiuntiry of eq1al digenity and greater respoinsibility, whose occupants are allowed, by the saume coilstitiitioni, to "be tried for misdemeanor in otlitce, in such maniier ls the Iecislrture niav provide." "'Tlhe ftet that they arc State officers, or n(,tliinallv so, does 0ot by any meittis prove that Itmore 0011 cnvenient, etlicient, and satisfiaetory mode could be idoptedi. for inquirin:, into, aiind if necessary Iiunishiiiig teirii, for their bad behavior in office. Besides it is unieqIiual and unjust. It favors the office of a Judge more tlan that of it legisla.tor. Tile office of a Judge is iii no sense sio important and responsible as the office of at legislator. The latter i'x authorized to make the Il,.w, wlilst the former caii onily apply the law, as lie finds it, to given cases. And whenever lie does otherwise, except when the law is uincionatitutioiial, 1)rovisioni ought to be made f'i,r his irminiedicte trial, arId if iiecessai-v, promipilt rei,i~ival froni office. The decision of a Judge tirll, a law is uncoustittutioial, oughit not to 0(e coieitisive upon the people iii till cases, 1ircause it amoutts to nothiniig more than deciiing or explre(ssing the opinion of a few persons, authoritatively, that a law passed by tile representatives of the peoplie, is in conflict with a law plassed by tce people themselves. ,Now, under a wise provision of the conistitutioii, nearly all members iof the Legislature, at least all of one branch of it, and one halt' ot the other, are virtually tried for their official conduct, once every year. But Judges, although inferior officers in point of fact, are treated as superiors. And, by vicious custoni and erroneous habits of thinking, we maintain a state of things which associates with nieri. Judges, and actually almost completely surreiiders into their hands, the very rights of Justice itself, of which they are properly, the mere servants, the absolute slaves. We have just had occasion to observe that the only way to insure, or reasonably anticipate, good conduct in alny mere officials, is to bring them into an immediate, quick, and sure responsibility, some where, for every official act which they perform. And'10 one who will exercise his reason, will require an argiment to pr,ive, that official responsibility ought 12 to be complete arid expeditious in respl)eet t) par-tmeu t authorized to i-dminister the laws, judges as any other officer's. in the State. The thie poeir to chiange thetm vith practical in] mode of doing this need not be to tile public punirity? We all know that our judzes,ar at large, but there need be no difllculltv in de- practically exempt fi'om punishm(ient. Scarce vising a plan more satisfactory than thie pres ly anv of"ence short of crinie itself. would i)e eat, which practically exemiI)ts juidges fioni sLfficient to insure tleir condemnation n(d re nearly all responsibility whatever. The cloth — minoval from ollice. A m.i,joitv ot this Senate, aing of judges with an official inmportance be- acting in concurrence with the Assetmbly, pos yond other mortals, has certain)ly no sound( sess vast poweri in other rep,pect,, )ILt when it arguments to support, it, and it may be qres- comes to try somne mere individual iwho has tioned wnetihei it does not leaid to thle vei got elected to the office of Judge, a State At abuses which it is designed, if tlhere b. any (de- torney, or Surveyor, we are not to) be trlusted sign in it,, to prevent. to the same extent as thotugh we "-ore conuring AVWy should we continue under a Constittri- in a law inflicting a death penalty If.~oni( tion which permits Judges to act without any mere official is to be tried we are to be distrus direct and imminent responsibility. Iln ages ted and suspected, and not less than two-thirds past the Judgts of England exercised the pow- must agree upon the punishmeit or none can ers now b)eing boldly exercised by the judicial be lflicted. In the Sipreme Court two beifited. upn th urm e tr power of California. They malde laws upon men being a lare majority of tlre(, mnv the bench whenever, in their opifiont, it was condemn a man to death. or deprive him of his best so to do. But all the n glish sJudges com- property, or his liberty. but here in this nume bined, coud not decide cases without the right rous body ot'fiore than ten times the number, of appeal firom their decisions, to the ulper a majorit is not to be trust(,d when acting as branch of the legislative power, the House (of a court, Indeed, the cumbersome and anti-re publican mode of impeachment, as it now con Lords. And besides, the monarchial and aris- p ulican mode of impeachment, as it now con tocratic government under which they hel stitutioually exists, atlords oadequate and ef power, the confused and uncertain state of fi'ieit redress for this State against judicial the laws, the want of judicial decisions to abuses guide them, anid the profound gnorance and It may work well enough for the aristocra political vassalage of the LEnglish people, at ey in the monarch of Englad, where it oi'igi the time, afforded some excuse, and rendered nated. But I know of no reason or necessit,, such practices tolerable, if riot advantageous. for its continuance, (at leastinits pi'esent forii) B]3ut what excuse is there for continuing a sys- in tlre constitution of California. Its a(lr ptiorr tem which, if it does not elicouarge, at least in thle constitution of the United States nearly permits the safhe thing to be done here, at thi, seventy y'enrs ago, and in other coiistittitiot;i age of the world, in this free and universally since, gives it Weight, h)ut does not prove coil enlightened country? lf the admiuistratiotl elusively that it cain never be improved upon, of justice was lame. blind, uncertain, whilst in its application to ofeicials in C.ilifornia. suchjudicial acts were requiired or tolerate(, BIt, sir, wliv Should Icontinue to detain the in Eilgland. w*hat reason, i-h,t proprietv, wha t Senate by p(inting out defects in o ut' constitu justice, what necessity, is there, for tIre sanae tion whih l sorud thtiikers whether offiils blind, lame, and uncertain administration of or their superiors, must al mit to be ftill of dejustice at this timle ana ial thi~s free State': No justice at th.s time aud iii thls free State" NiO fects? All those to which direct allusion has such practices are any longer toclei,it,id c-d enei alr eady been made. r'e, with a single ex. in Eilgland, aud besides these there is thle ri-lt to n y e o ghte o e, ig in Englappe Are we to progress3 in e er~ otler ception, only a few of the defects of omission, of appeal. Are we to progress in every othier o lwhich would r'ead-lily occur' to airy one. An branch of government arid remain stationary tt y.tterjpt to recite all the defects; of eoriission, or go backwards, in the modes of adminitr- t t to reie nl the dfet f iiitSl-o lag justice? Of what are our courts coirstitir- nlltire errors actallyecontained iiy the corlti hti to such immense titon, would niot tre iieeessar'y to niy purpose, ted. that they are entitled to such immen, and would occupy inJore of the tune of the privileges, without any direct practical respoin Seniate thian there'is oc~()cas-ion for,. All I desiie sibility to any one, or any aplpeal friom their.ena oe toa tie re is fctisol fof All I desii e vacillating decisions? Who are our Judges is, to poe to the saisfcti f menes, tht - eisio,i( clitipof povei coitoitheststiolJ o ie~tes,h,t that they alone know justice, —that they alot is a revision andtit if wge of rer cons,tituion are wiser than all other courts, and all other necesar d tt if we ealy care at for- the welfarie of this counntry, we will ni( individuals? What would they be were they f the lte of tis cotr, e i off the bench? What were they previous to as- pilelt off' the bench? WVhat were they prep roo8 to a_ longer delay the first step necebsary to its a,'cending it, but inferiors to hufidreds of youir complislmert. citizens? Has the bench changed them9 The measures whicli a constituttional conve,i Do cushioned chairs, and scarlet curtains so tion ought to pas;, and the kirnd of corlstiluchange the character of the poor lhumanity, tion which wcould be bhst suited to the coliiwhich they support and shelteir? Are we lfools, try, aire niatters, wrhichl do riot really b)elong to that we should give up to names what belongs us to deter-ine, ard wich do riot requile sl to things; and take that for wiseoom arid learn- expiession on orll aI-t iii or(1 to silport ann ing which may be only the sublimity of ni psi- ass the lill under consideration. I dot ty' Are we rational freemen. and still willing therteore pi'oposehereto dlssor eve II to continue a constitution which gies the tde ludle to them, unless in a few instances and in general ternms. Sir, perhaps no really intelligent man, anid not even the urenibers of the constitutiotriil c-,,rvention of 1849, so fir as i,am informed, pretend that experience has not discovered maiiv vital defects in our constitution, Inde ed two-thirds of the memahberis of the last session of this body admitted such defects, arid at termpted to provide a renredy for a few of tlihei bv the slow, expensive, rind most urisatisficto rV riyode of p)iceneal amendm ents. And 'here I beg leave to Iigress a i,.,rert, in o'rer to point out a few of the object ions to such a mlode of amending a constitutioon, which con tairis ei-rors thiroughIouit the whole of it, arid i11 llr'lii'ly eve ry ry tic.1. In faict the err-ors ill the constitution itself, Iot refeir'ing to its omiris sioi nl'sv,,perhiaps, be j, stly aid faii'ly i,idica ted as-,i llows: IIn the first article, two sec tions erroneous; in the second article, one sec tion erroneous; in the third ar-ticle, containing but one section, even that erroneous, in aill it ting of a false irterpretation; in the fourth ar ticle, twelve sections erronenon; iiin the fifth article, two se-tio)nis erroneous; in the sixth ar ticle, eleven out of the ei,hteen sectioris, err(, neous. The seventh article is cemcere ing the aiulitia; the eiglithi conicerning State deits; and tlih ninth concerning educrition, arid they coi rain buti eigit se*tions altogether. The tenth is one-half erroneous; in tile eleventh r'ticlc, five' sections erroneous; tile twe'iftl ar t,ie consists of bhlt onie section estabiisliuig the State bouirdarv: thie last article,. ol selieri ale, certain.; sixteen s(eelions, of whiic.ii thui teen arie [low obsolete, (beir)g merely teiip,r'i I'y provis,ioiis for' the iadopI)tioni of tiei coirstitu tionj, &.,) arid one of thie remainder eriine o1.1 I do riot pr'ceteid to say tlia,t all will agree to this enirmei'ati(oIn, (I iretely ive iiiy own opinion, as to that.) B3uit I I}elieve any candid man, wiro is competent to jud'ge, ad lis crirefrilly examriried the constitution, will lidrit that therc re irelativel y, ot lea t as many oi,b ectioirs to it as ale ind1icated]. Now, ill tlre lii-st ol tce oil therscore of en om, (whi cli at. best, is no ar-gutiri et in fivor of leoisl'ltrve,'ralerd,icts, but ( ln3 ra s a question of liey,) it wvouldl actually e'r~st t lie jt,t o,'e to imke the required anildimenrits by ii eee-:i,ei, through tthe 1 egiature than by calling a c(rirstit,ittio:Aal convention and hiavialg done w i it it on e, T ite mcmbeirs of a eonEtitu tio lc()i%ention ought not to receive over tiri-ec or' I'(tir dollars at dav. And the expenises of a coiive,,itiorr need riot exceed onehalf ori one-third the cost of eriel session of the I. egislatri ae. Indeed, in riry ol)iliiori,.$'60,ooo oulit to cover the whiolc expense. Arr, by IL,r,Iper eco.o:r,titiitionail rfi'm, at lcast tliir'ce timues the necessaryv cost of at coriveitio,'r could be saved evei'y year, estiniating the cos~t lit ~100o,0orr. ~'l'ie tirst constitiorial amedniments wihlih have ever v'et beern gotten thrtoughI the Legislasture, and w hiFc ar,:.till prendinig in this, its sevent}t session, ri,d iii rist be au'iit pa:ssedi hiii'e be'forte t}e i e', (I I i-ru etrustedr to the w',tcs orf tile preol,lec,!;tve 1)i'obatll air-end errst tire St, ate riot le'ss t1111a,s'$18, tilt Ii'82, O)00 fri tie ilCi'e tillettisirig atonce which tie corisittitii.)in in seicii cses rcqui'e. And coni sidetiri~gtietime in of tile le,,gislre occrpied ill teireir 1,as e, aid the I)ilrl tirne whiicli miiust be agailii conisumriedi a,!,id'i for', in get ting theni Ipassecd at this Session, tir actu,'l p)blic co-st, epill sp, be f.iily e,,tirirratedI witlh eei'tta.iity -it less tlian i'225,00() or'-$3,r}01), or' atborit (oire half (,f tile whole nreces,ary expense of a conistitritioririil coriveir tion. Anid all this delay las elpsed rind this aolior,rirl of publir' lioiev ieeir a'iready expeiil. e,i for wlo att W 1v, sii-, f,r', liir'ce proinilient aiiueridleitts to the coiristitftioni. T1ie first ir'roviding that ieisors elete- el 1i the Li egisla turite shall liold tlleli' offices fi'r Ijst double tile tiiiie,it 1piesenit allowed bh. w. lrThe secreiid Contains an aritiquateil aid olrjectioti,ible fea-ituire' in 1)rovid-ing for' tli(' revision of tliro coirst itittirir. A'ird the th irdil priovides thr,ittthiic o(ittith of' otlice sli'il re('l l i-c tIre (oflieet to uiiake oath that i,.i lis irit f,iirghlt ii rItei. ~Now, ex ceptt th e sio s sec rord amenidmneiit, uili ring evey cnsrtituit~iiiil coivention to stiliubit tite tr,,,s titrtion it,r.' a(d()it lo the I)eople for' t!eir r'atrtieatioil, (wiiliir'li luay tie a wise lirovisioi, siice tiliiie riie rirariy who s(oer to ul ir,k it, iecessary ) but, exceplt this, whait iridinvidrial c-rii fail to riegarrid tI~ies anle, ents ais aniorig tlre insi'rgiificanit,,iiit riurt riii,rtig tile asrit iieKess,ia? For onie, I eaiiriot dliscovr%'e thirat thcy ate at all weI c alcrl ater, (ir eveii designred. to telieve tlie puiblic grievances, or aceotiil)iils any actua l -iii veiiit in our goiverri,ricii t. ir;ererisirig tile tiune of State res idlenice firioii onre 1-o t\iwo yeai's all ill loislt less ailp)rove, but I allrule only to' thie other featuiiies of the amnidineits. s for tire first of tliese proposed aniecidrneirts, osteirsiily pro vidiaigi foi, biennial sessiois of tlie Iegisllttli'i. it riuglit bc a wise provision in ail old country wheie its legislitioii had lung been catefril, and all its laiws rieduiced to ai sy-stein, and all its eourits cirriterit to toilow in tlie beaiten rath s of juriiislii'iiderce w,or)ii by the steady eroirse of justlice foi' ages past. Or' it uigIrt be wise arr,nig the- liloiest rird gool hearl peii~le of iiirla-)d and agricriltiriril ~tates. ]-ut i,a couritrv sitirated is this is,it the 1r eselt tiure, witi It coinstitntiori not otlier-wise a da pted to, niov' lii-riron izi,ig withI suchli I. itt,(el-1olritioir ill its lirovisi,ris, it is ei-t,iily q ue s tionab le wivirtirer these p rov isirs f1)or lielni l sessions of our ].egi,,i i'trit i riot ractuailly well cilcril,aited to) do miiore( lia-rni tli:r gorid. I ri,I'iit thliat tire irighit of t,lie Asseiir.lly to iirl:.ch, arid of the Searate to r'y. tire iunlI~iiaihni('iit ol' Starte offlieers, ilirder' it, vo-t, hil-I r'ulc, is lii'rict ically cit 11o gr'ort efteelt. Burt I (10 arrt see rr'ily eveil 13 14 tilis,iight cheek agains-t off~icial badl cot, duct Isoul d be entirelyv ireioved, which will cert aiiily lie the ease,, 11) all illte-ts and pIrIiposes, i f t tliIs aIIen dllnelr t lte 1lollted ii its prlselt foli l,, and be strictlv observed. It does scenm t o m e thlat at t'i he selnbIlanee of so011e 1)t11ishtneut foir Ibal coniduct in,iState oflicer's hIould b e r eserveii, unitil some {,ther way can be provizled for the pul~ishlment of official o'tfell,SoS. Oul r existilg governmient is not so1 planaed th at t}le Legislature has no duty Io l)erf,orm bu t the pas~sage of lavws. The ~,)listitu1ion 1 eex p lresl,v iii,poses other duties 11uI)IOl t, he ]-e~islaiture, some of which in - ren der it actually nivise to poTsti)olle its meetlLts to ()Illy ,lice In two years, withoit aly provisioii avin,g been 10a le fli1' the I)erformnauce of such duties in:otliei' wvay- except tlhroti,Ih botlI }louses of t iie Le(islature. The Coistitutioin is founded I1)o1) the tlheory that the Assembly wheleverl' -eesv will ilnlite iint,, the coieduet of the State otncevs, and ifjustiee seeIlis to requiire it w ill i:Idiet them, or any of theni, for o aficial ca conduct, and that',e Ielate will then peiforiii tie hieh judicial duty of tit')itll and p)assing jut(l,ment up1)onI such inidlictelieits. The whole b1o0(1 of out- Stite judicial a!ud executive otuccis and l,ltte other State oeliccir, call nevec be tried inl aill other niainner whateve.'- foi- any official negligence I,I' bad conduct they may chose to b guilty of. ludeed, one of the very reasons why the sessions of tile LegislateIr.-e are relli'e1l by the Constitution, to be helh'isiiually, i in (,der that it may sit at least as ofte{, as once a year, as a sort of gi-aid inquest u101 the co(duet of tli,i other departments of t!lie goverin meut, as well as fo)r the passag,e and amendiiiecit of Tlew s Tlese aInendIOenits whieh are now prolose,t. providle for the election of the meiiibeirs Iof the Legislature on the first Wednesday of Sel~teinber, l8o7, the Assemblymen for two, anid Seiiators foi' four yeurs. T'his will bring their sessions, only at such times as the new Governor and all the executive oileers of the governiment receive power and enter upoil the duties of tihei' office. ConeIuentlet, whatever itilscliiefs they iiiighit ever be disIposed to commit, would not be ireaiched even with ati imupeaehment, until after the tel ni of tlieii- offices had ai-tually expired. And the condition of the country could iemain wholly unknown iit the interim' for ev-eIl the Govel-nor is not required to cominniuciate the condition of the State, exceplt to the Legislature, in sessioit. And the subordinate executive officers, or any of them, could, witli impunity, refuse to repor to the Governor, welin there would be no redress except I)y cailling an extra session. I do not desire to dlsc~s~ this question here, because I am miei-ely doiiing so fir a different pnrl ose than to op~pose bleeial sessions of the Legislature. I do act op,i10se them upoil principle, but I am endeavoriiig to prove that we niust have a genieral r.efci'to. befi)re their introductioni will cer tliuly or neee -,;al-ilv afford us -ny relief what vIr, oI, be ecitai not to adc tully prove iliju'ios ins~teadl ~of beneii,.i l. W as there no occasionl fiol the i,leetiul of tiis 1)rcsent session of the LegislatlIri-e There was a sessiou ol lia,t year, and has beeni one e vc yar. What good are we certain to aeCIomifiih, and what evil mav we p,ssibly c om mit, by sim!)ly postp)oililg the sessions of the Legisiattire, without mackiug such other refoirnis adti chal ges iu the (' tslu'itotin -is are requiied, if you It,rol,OSe to iiitroduce bieiiiiial sessions of tili, legisluture i Our piublic condition is generally thouight bad enou-li now to last fiooiiie vear- to nriotliel-. Arie we eertaill, that it will beeomiie morde toleral!le, 1y proloigiug the tilties (of its eii dti:'anee. or illerely at,temptiuc to lenrtlieli the I,)ei-'ods ietween its i,i(.timls Indeed, tli i adloption of the amilendiiieilt, as it now stands, would afford no security against annual sesslion. fTitere is li,t!lilin to prIevelit the Legislittore from cContinuing in s-essitIn as long as they please (luriig 011e vealr, and adjourniig their se-aion over to the iiext veal'. Jtudgingir fi'olii ou,' past expierience, there'would be but little diffleolty it leavilg our public affairs ill such a state,,s to irequil'e 11i011l s,essions of the Legislature as now. Aniid thie -same exp,i-ieiee ought, pel-li )s, to teacli us that such a ,-esilt may be actually anticipated. it has proved to be the case in some of the otlieri -states where bienjial sessions of the Legitatii-'e have been attteiipted, atid I know (,f II(, good 1 reasoli fil' S0i)posii,g it may not be doiue here. And if this sho(.)uld prove to be the cace, the only effect of titis amendmeut would be to double the termn of office of evely nieinber of the Legislature to twice its present length. Ail, sir, if ibieninial session,s could be wiselv inter1)ola0 ed into the p resent Constitution at all, viwhait was the actual iiecessity of requilring members to hold their offices for two anid fouti yeal's? Would it not have been better to have provided for the election of -ll of then) evely two years? Does true wisdom)ni dictate or lIublic policy require, that lec-islators must hold their offices and remain independent of the peolple, for such a greatly iiicreased length of tiae, in Calitoriiia. But, sil', [ see no evidence of statesmanship, or even of good judlgnienit, inl supposing that our difficulties nust aecessarily be lessened, in proportion to the length of time which shrll intervene betweea the sessions of our Legislature. If I did I would certainly be ill favor of tlieiri meeting ouly once iii a centui-y. It eeritainlv seenis to me moi-e ratioiial, to conclude that it is the systelim itself, which ouglit to be amended, and the power to do evil at all, which ought to be removed or lessened, and not the mere tilaes of legislative sittitigs, which require to be regulated. ITlicie is aniothiei' objection to it, which shows how little caie has been bestowed upon so great a subjecot as anmeading the Constitution. 15 Thllat there was alny design iI it. I cannot and do not believe. Iut it is morallv certain that if this provision for biennial sessions should pass at this se sioli of the Legislature, and be ratified by the people, the result will be, not bieninial sessions of the Legislature, but sirmply and only a doublin, of the length of time for its menibers to hold office. The aiiiendmient req1uires the Legislature to hold a session in 1 S57, and biennially thereafter, "unless the Governor of the State shall. in the in-terim, convene the Le,cislaturie by pr?oclramation." Now, ill S1857, the Constitution requiles a Gov ernor to be elected. The returns of the election of Governor in that year arc exl)ressly reqtiired by the (Conrstitution, "to be sealed up sold1 transmitted to the seat of government, directed to the Speaker of the Assembly, who shall, during the first week of the session, open and pulblislh them in the presence of both iHouses of the Legislature." And in case there should chailce to be a tie vote between two candidates for that office having the highest number of votes, it would then be the duty of the Legislature to elect a Governor.'hlis would rienderi it unquestionably the duty of the Governor, to convene the Legislature in 18o8, and again each alternate two years; and this proposed amendment introducing biennial ses~mois would compel it to meet each of the other alternate years. tHencie annual sessioiis will be as ilecessarv under the Constitution, after the adoption of this amendment, as they are n)ow. So much for constitutional "4 reforms" by the Legislature. Now, sir, those who really think that our public evils aile owingt to the fact that the Legislature meets once a year, instead of once ill t 0o vealrs, asid that the offices of its nmembers oughlt to be iii duration to two and four years, ought to be required to prove the correctness of their ideas, by good argument and sound reasons, before they ask the people to adopt what is. to all appearance, a mere innovation uponl the existing Constitution, and well calculated to increase, rather than diminish, its powers for evil. The second leadiug amendment proposed by the Legislature seems only intended to require a Constitutional Convention to submit the constitution it might agree upon, to the people for their adoption or rejection, and not at once proclaim it to be the Constitution, without submlitting it to the people at all. The amiendment so far as that object is concerned, can do no harm; although it can only be deemed necessary by those who can bring their minds to believe that any such monstrous usurpation would be attempted by any constitutional convention, composed of American citizens. But the objection to it to which I wish to call the attention of the Senate is this, that it proposes to continue the antiquated and anti-re~)ublican principle of requiring a vote of two-thirds of the members of each House, before a law can be passed allowing the people even the right to vote upoln the question, as to whether they wish a constitutional convention or not. For my part I do not understand how we can be sincere in our attachment to democratic principles, and at the same time deem it necessary to repose so little confidence in the people. I can discover no objections to permitting our citizens to vote for or against calling a constitutional convention, whenever a majority, of the members of each HIouse of the Legislature, slhould think it necessary to submit such a question to their consideration.Iii this particular our constitution has strangely departed fLom that of Iowa, and manv it not all, the recent constitutions in the Eastern States. In fo)rirer times, when legislators and other like office holders, were really apt to be more intelligent than the general run of people, tlieii assumed superiority was rnot without some show of reason. But now, when the weight of worth and intelligence is always out of office and not in it, I see no necessity for so providin g agai ist constitutional reforms, that al)outit one third of the members, il either HIouse, can forever prevent them. The third and last amendment proposed by the Legislatutre, after four years since tlihev first begari to give their attention lo the subtject, is the provision makirng officials swear they have not fought a duel. It is a thing well enough in itself, but how is it cal( ulated to relieve us fi'om bad government? Of course we all know, it has nothing wlate-er to do with the governirielit. It is a amere provision for the more elfectual stup)pression of a certain crime, which has been rendered faslhionalile. Now ought we to requi're aiiny further attempts it constitutioI nmkuiniti, by the l,egislaturte, before we will even consent to "think" that a convention is necessary for that purpose? But in additioii to the experience lvliicli this exanmple affords us of this systerm of constitution-nraking by the Legislature, there are other and perhaps moroe weighty and conclusive objections, to our assuming the task of a constitutional convention. The legitimate duties of the members of the Legislattiue will not adnit of sufficient time or preparation, fbr the proper discussion and consideration of numerous constitutiotial amendments. No legislators, however able, can possibly bring their minds to the subject, with the same capacity and success, as though they had no other business to engage their attention.Men whose minds are occupied with the thousand al I one matters which constantly engage the attenti;.on of legislators, cannot be reasonably expected to discharge the duties of a constitutional convention, with justice to themselves, or to a subject of such profound importance to the whole people of the country. Arid besides this, they are not elected for any such purpose, nor are they authorized or even permitted by the constitution, to as 16 s,iiie alln' such unidertukingt, It would be, iinqLuestio'uably, against the spirit, and, in my opinion, against the exlpress lanuage of tlhe co.lstittition. It is ele;irly inconsistent with orclir art hiuman conilduet, to expect any one branch or departiteritof a govetrnment, to be thle best calculated to wisely arid thoroughly reform itself, a.id all the other departmtnents of the same government. Undoubtedly ou' con stitution never intended to imrpose stuch a iduty iu,ori the Legislature. The provision fol' Unending the constitution thbi o h legislative recommendation, app)lies orily to azendinents, and cannot by any fiir or just construction be made to apply to any general change or amendment of the entire constitution, but only such armeridnierits as a e casual. lWhenever the mellibers of the Legislature, or the rieqiui site mnajority of themr, "think," that a revision and change of the whole constitution is reqlli. red, the constitution expressly diriects tlhat it be dolne by a convention, arnd declares that they s,hall subtiit the question of calling a con veritio)n, to the electors at the next succeeding general election, And wlhen we do thlinkl tlhai such a revision and change is necessary, 1 (lo not understand. how we can be expected to disregar,t our oaths, arid lttempt the task oursalves. i'or my part I conscientiously anid sincerely "think it is necessary- to revise and change tle entire constitution," arid thcerefoie neitli er the advise of friends, nor aniy otlher conrsilertations whatever, ought to or shall, deter nie fi,rli tthe hearty support of the nmeasure now before the SenaLte. And I sincerely trust that riot even one ri-ari wi ll )be found in eitlher brancli of the Legislatlure, who does not al.so tin/, tlint such a revisian a,id chat'e ouhft to be made. For I amn well ware, that there is riot one to be fotiil(, wiwo is any lees aixioris thanr I ami, to p rf(rm his duties faitlifallv, to this aoultrlv.Ail(i it is mIy firlli,ltlli sintcerle e,uvietion, tli.it, there is ino one act so necessary to its elf,tr, as an inmmediate arid tiiorouglhI constitutional reform. I will now'renew the airgiru-enit arid endeavor to siiow still other and rirore eoneliisive reasons, why every mant in these halls, oulght to feel the samie conviction of its niecessity. Allusior has already been made to a few entirely new provisions, some of which all will admlnit, the coristituttionl oghit to contain. Alany other new provisions might be suggested, soime of which might be thought more imnportantit than aily which have beenl mentioned. But it would perhaps be iecessary to discuss them at lengtlh, in order to renrder their necessity ap)parentt, and I shall therefore riot referi to ther-i but proceed at once to suggest some of the im portarit defects which the constitution now contaiuns. And I will endeavor to confine my allusions to those only, which have been fonud objectionable by actual experience, and those w hich I hope all will admit to be so, without any serious differeriies of opinion). For I am only anxious to make suceh suggestiois as have, undoubtedly, occurred to every meiniber of this body. God knows, that I have no feeliing in this matter except to do my duty, and no wishles in regard to it, except such' as every sincere man, and true Californian, must cer tainly entertain. And I desire the respect and confidence of this body, too profondil(ly and sincerely, to knowingly give utterance to any views, concerning so sacred a subject as the constitution of our country, which would be offensive or even objectionable to a single member of the Senate, marny of whomr if not every one one of them, I amr not ashamned to acknowledge as my superiors. Indeed had almost any other n-iember of this body, devo ted all the care, study, anid labor to this sub ject, which I have bestow\ved upon it, I ani confident he would convince every one of us, that the welfare of this country niot only de manols, that a constitutional convention should be called, but that it should be called in the quickest possible tinie. The first ol)jection to the Constitution. which apperiars iii the ord(et of its provisionis,and ther(e fore the one plirhapls to be first inotice(l, is the '(d section of the 1st Article, — concerning tlre right of trial by jury. The Cornstitution says ir tolerably distinct terms, the right of trial byjury shall remnaininviolate forever, and thait it shall be secured to all; I)ttt that in all civil cases. Inot in all of any particular class or kind of civil cases, but iii all civi caces whatisover, tihe right of trial by jury may be w aiv7ed, "iii tlfe nmainer to be prescribed by law.h 7 The law has prescribed the manner ii wnhich this nmay be done, and exl)I'essly provide(d that in all cases where issues ol' tict are to be tr ied. they shall be tried by a jury'unless a jtury trial be wvlived by the partics. This has been( tie statlnte law on the subject ol'juliy trials ever since Our State has existed(l. It hiis never been clihriiged by legislativ-e actioi. it has twsice passed the legislatiire. It is certail'ly supported by no forced or ullftir' COIlSti'Cti-I of tOe Constitution. It is btiv oid all reaisoniabl) doubt, what the constitutionail coni ncitioni intended. many of whorm ere inii tlhe irst session of the Legislatur wtIen the law was fir-.t passed. It is unquestio-rably not necessarily an infringement upon the Constitution Arid, in my humble opinion, it is 1no more ftairly and necessarily in violation of the Constitution iii any respect, than every other law in the Statute books of this State. But, sir, the law on this sul)bjet has beon abrogated by arnother power in tlis Goiverinment, knownil by thc na enic of the Supreme Court of Califoiria. Thait Gonirt, although practically constitiuted of only tw.o men, his discovered within the past er, that ill the rein who li'te been in oUI' lerislaturires during the F'ast six years, and all (or at least all;o far as I have ever heard,) of the lawyers in this State, have been 17 disgracefully ignorant in relation to the right of trial by jury, and in relation to the new and purely judicial diwcovery, that we have Chancellors and Chancery Courts in California. That Court hasdecided that the people of this State do not enjoy the right of trial by jury in all civil cases, even thoug they should demand it. That Court has daide {, and deciared it to be law, that in what it has chosen to call Chancery cases, the parties, and I now quote its own language, "the parties are not enittled to trial by jury," (see case of Walker vs. Sedgwiok.) Of course we are all aware that the laws of this State, like the laws of many of the other States, do not recognize nor admit of any distinction between cases in Equity or Chancery, and cases in law. All such distinctions in the trial of causes. (which are only injurious where the two systems of law and equity are combined iqto one,) are now, and always have been, entirely abolished by our laws. No court of Chancery, as distinguished from a court of law, has ever at any time existed under the laws of this State. We all know this to be strictly true. No distinctions in the trial of causes, as to the mode of ascertaining the facts in issue, has ever been tolerated here between equity cases and law cases. In enforcing the equity jurisdiction confered by the Constitution upon our Distrct Courts, the Legislature has provided, as it unquestionably may do, that as to all matters of fact arising in such cases, they shall be disposed of by juries, and not by a single man on the bench; or in other words, that they shall be assed upon by twelve men, not by one man. But our Supreme Court having become fond of power, and grown bold in its usurpations, has changed the law, and made it wholly different from what the Legiglaiure has thought best to adopt It has decided that in chancery Ae, District Judges shall be chancellors, and try cases as chancellors, and that in such cases, "the parties are not entitled to trial by jury." If there were any chancery cases here, legally speaking, they wotld probably include at least one fourth of all the civil cases in our Courts.Chancellors, as we all know, sit without juries; they alone constitute both the Court and the jury, and perform the functions of both. Thus, solely by- the edict of a Court, oar District Judges are made Chancellors, are authorized to open Courts of Ehncery, and are. directed to try cases as Chancellors, in direct opposition to the laws of all our successive Legisla tures, which have never recognized nor established any such tribunals, and without their having been created, or even named in the Constitution itself. It is true, some of our Districtand other'inferior Courts, find it impracticable to pay much attention to this and other vagaries of the Supreme Conrt, and therefore follow the law made by the Legisla — ture, and not the law Wade by that Cout, in relation to the right of jury toi' out zi, 3 since our Court of last resort has deemed it fit and proper to decide thlt onur Constitution does not secure the right of trial by jury in all dases, and'sice our Constitution aords us to certain redress against such decigous, except by changing the Constitution, all will dmit that it ought to be changed. and its language rendered so plain that no court wtllventure to disre_grd it. I do not mean to say that.all would be in favor of continuing jury trials as juries have been heretofore conducted, and are in the contemplation of the Constitution organized, but I do mean to be understood as saying, that every man in his senses, will prefer jury trials under a reformed jury system, to being left in this country at the absolute mercy of only one single individual. The next objection to the constitution, which I will allude to, perhaps only requires to be mentioned, in ordertobe amitted. It id the provision which 4eclares, that "all the laws of a general nature shall have a uniform opera. tion." How such a,provision came to be inserteI the Constitution of Catifornia, some of whos counties are as different in their wants, and actually as far removed from each other, as counties in the States of South Carolina, and Massachusetts, it is difficult to determine, except upon the supposition, that in copying the coinstitution of Iowa, this provision was incUded among the rest. I have not been' able to discover any such provision in the constitution of the United States, nor of any of the greater States in the Union, where it is often found ntecessary to give laws of a general nature, a differeut operation, according to the' different Wants of the country. Such a provision, in the constitution of our State, is not only unnecessary, but exceedingly mischevious. It interferes with our gIving to laws of a general nature, such different operation, as the best interests of the whole country may actually quire. Adopting the loose, and merely arbi. trary construction which has been sometimes given to other parts of the constitutioin, by the courts, members have been found in the Leg lature, who were willing to attempt to construe away the effect of this section altogether. But it still stands there in the constitution, occupying a whole section by itself, and its full weight, and evident meaning must be given to it. Men of easy conscience, may give it such a construction, as to make it meanjust nothing at all, and be willing to pass laws of a general nature, without heeding it But even if it were not wicked, it would certainly be ijrious, for men holding office under a constitution, not to be humbly, and truly obedient, to every provision, which it contains. I certain. ly, most heartily, recommend the doctrine of strict, and faithful obedience to every sylable of the constitution. The next objection to the constitution is, the provision, giving to each' house of the Legisa~thre, -rightto "ledge ofLe q~livo, electlons, and returns, of its own members,. without qualifying such right, so as to prohibit its ever being exercised, for merely partizan, or personal purpose& That this aouse as Mr. Burke once said to the English House of Commome, "that this House should have no power.of expulsion, is aun hard saying, that this House should have a general'discretionary power ofXsqualilcatiou is a dangerous saying. That the. people should not choose their own representative, is a saying which shakes the constitution. That this House, should name the representative, is saying which, followed by practice, subverts the constitution." The'next objection I will allude to, is the mode provided for punishing official miscon conductL I have before alluded to this matter and endeavored to show, that the expensive and monarchial ceremony of impeachment, is treating any mere official with more atten tion than he is apt to deserve, and less punish mt than he is apt to merit. Besides what has already been stated, it is not well design ed to effect the objects intended in another re ptL The officers of government who are only liable to impeachment for. official bad conduct, are always likely to belong to a pol tical party of very great if not controlling inlueie in the Legislature and country. And whenever anything is said against the officer or the management of his office, or any demonstratioaa are made against him in the Legis lature, his paty, and his political friends are apt to conclude that they w.ill be injred by any attempt at punishment, or ruined by the isclosures which it would occasion. And the officer, although guilty, mayenjoy the protection of a powerful minority, or the complete security of a mvority, for the sake of the party to which he belongs, and thus instances my readily occur, in which the oficer may go free from punislmeat although richly deserv g it. he next objection which I will suggest, is the section which provides that "Every law enacted by the Legislature, shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title; anad no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the Act revised, or section amended, shall be reenacted and published at length." The Constitution of Iowa is not responsible for the whole of. thi section; and in what other Con:-, st-itution in the Union, if any, it may be found, I do not know. It was however, ac&oring to the -published report of its proceeding adopted by the Convention of'49, "withouti debate." Under it no law can be constitutiQnally revsed, without the old law, as IWell v the new, being repassed through both houses of'the Legislature and re-signed by the Gvevor, aad then republished at full lenh. ThBre is Do iult to be found with the ploba-. ble y o a ev roknyo,whichi was " parently to avoid any coiff~ison E' the'laws; and also to prevent amendments being passed without their effect being'rendered palpable to all, and -perhaps, rto ender it certain that when- one saw. e law last. made there wonkld be no 0ousionu to examiine its previous prov tons. But public laws are alwatys pre sumed to be read by all and their ontents re nembere4. Such,a presumption must always be acted upon aan cestalhshed fit. It can never he disputed nor eVen doubted,, -in en forcing the laws. Such is not however the ease with private or local laws, which affect only the few; and the Iegislature ought to have no power to insert in such laws, any laws of a general nature. And totprevent this, sowe Constitutions contain the first clause of the section quoted, andiapply it to private and local' laws, but no others. The Constitu tion of Iowa however, contains much of the section precisely as it stands in our Constitu tion, Und I am inclined to think the balance of the section is an original composition of thb Convention of 1849.'But be that as it inay, all will certainly agree, that It is only ren dered'woise by the addition. We have learn ed by actual experience, that it. hasproved to be of no such public advantage as was tn doubt dly anticipated,.whilst it has greatly increased the public expenses for the cost of printing and pubishing. Indeed it would be very difftult to show that the State. has ever been as much benefited by it, as the State Printer. The provision of the Constitution.whliieh au. thorizes the Governor, without any qualifivation or restraint, to grant reprieves and- pardons, after a legal conviction has been had, is another?of the ear marle of anti-republicanism, unnecessary, and, perhaps, inconsistent in a country, whose people is its king. This power to pardon criminals, -was, at least at one time, believed to be greatly abused im this country. And among the first exhibitions of Lynch Law, it was not uncommon to hear tloe who favored such proceedings, attribute their action to their belief, that the criminals would be certain to be pardoned by the Governor, even if convicted -by the courts. That the power will never again be abused, if allowed to continne as at present, without any limitatio to its exercise, none of us can affirm. And since its existence in its present form is unnecessary, it' is difficult to discover the wisdom of its contihiusance. With as much certainty as water se6eks its level,' crime increases as t-he chances of punhioment are removed and the prospects of escape are increased. To repose in a king tli right to pardon his subjects whenever he should deem it pro,per, Was probably as much th,' dictate of policy at of justice. But the reions which defend this right in the King of Englai'd, do not, perhaps, justify it in the Governior of California, Yet in England this power ha hewen gr'atty eceumserlbed by: actIc 9f Parli':it, and Fly imprlemOu fis, that, hot by t's 19 compulsion but by the free act and desire of the crown, its exercise is now extremely rare, in fact, that it is now never exercised except with the approbation of the judges. Atall events, whenever it is exercised in England (from whence we derive the idea) the privilege is bestowed upon the king, the head of tihe na tion,,and not, as with us, upon a mere execu tive officer, who, in other respyes, o(upies no similar position in the governmieit,As X matter of precaution, lesc the due course of law should possibly at'some time become un merciful, the power to pardon ought, perhaps, to be somewhere reposed. But even the thought of its forming any part or approachi-.' ble linlk, in proceedings in criminal punishments, ought never to be encouraged. And, it seems' to me, no such unqualified power ought to be reposed in any one man in a free State, and to' repose it in'the Governor is only reposing it in a single citizen. Our California experience corroborates what reason ought to teach us, that office makes a man no better than a citizen. Whiat he was, before he goes down into an office, he still remains whilst he continues there. That his position is either higher or nobler, does not depend upon reason, nor is it founded upon fact; it is merely the argument of self-prile, and the conclusion unavoidable to human vanity. Truth and reaaon teach us, that poor human nature remains essen'atially the samue, whether the shapes it moves in, pass by the names of Governors and Presidents, or men and citizens Therefore, in a government of men, all Mere individuals in office ought to be reuiembered as mere individual citizens not their superiors, and no unqualified powers ought, it seems to me, to be left to the were direction of one officer, without any qualification or responsibility or its exercise, which could not be reposed with equal Safety in one good citizen out of office, It must be remembered that the officer in whom this power is now reposed, is in no manner controllable or responisible for its exertcise, however improperly bestowed. In the provisions of the Constitutipn concerfning eduication, seems to be a verbal blunder.ilt is contaiLed in the copies as published in the Debates in the Convention, and also as officially published in the first volume of our Stvtutei I allude to it not with a disposition to find fault with it, because by reference to the Iowa Constitution, and very likely by reference to the original on file in the office ofi the Secretary of State, the omitted word cn be discovered and the sense restored, but it affords an excuse for alluding to the haste with which the Constitution was prepared. After the several parts of the Constitution had been separateiy agreed upon by the Convention, they actuarly read and rushed through the entire Constite tion, article after article, in one: single night the night of the 10th of Oetober, 1849. afte 7i o'elW~ in the etei+. And it is pS tt4 for it is expressly stated in- the report of the ro.eedings, from whici I quote, bat on that very riight, when the whole'Constitution wa rushed through the Convention,' "verbal er rora" were eorrected in the Article coticerning the iDeclaration of Rights," and several er rors in the -phrasesology corrected" i the Arti cle on the "'Legilative Department," and "two verbal errors corrected," in the Article on the " Executive Department." This, how ever, is no ground for indignation or surprise, for having tie Iowa C6ustitution before them, their main duty was, perhaps, not extremely arduous They had little more'to do, than -to see to it, that the Clerk had copied correctly. But, sir, it ought to be sufficienly humillating to Cahfornians, not to have a Constitution of their own, without being required to suffer the additional humiliation of its not having beer even copied without mistakes But what is more important to be consider ed in this connection, 19 the provision made for the, election and support of a State officer, and the maintenance of a separate bureau, which has not been found necessary. The provisions on the subject of education are en tirely inadequate to the requirement of an in dependenut State officer. The objection is not to the creation of the office, but to the neglect to do anything to render it necessary. It aeems to have been supposed that the creation of an officer for the ex'cluive purpose of superintending public instruction, was making lib eral provisions for the education of the children of the people, an object, in my judgment, of actually greater importance thanany or even all, the other provisions of a free governe nt put togrther. The universal' education,nd moral training of the people is of more importance in endeavors to secure their general happiness, than any formn of governmedt which a few human minds can possibly invent. A- tiation un-educeated and immor4al niver ha, and undoubtedly never can, enjoy the true and pure blessiugo of freedom, whatever be the mnere form of government under which they exist Andin a country like ours, all other objects and p'urposes sink into'isasignifieancq wlfen compared to the proper edueation ofevery child who is, likely, at sore period, to arrive at the greatest office in his co'untry. ado not iment Some mere offic, of servitude, but the truly great offe of an Americlan Citizen. Therefore, not the secondary hut the first oject of a free government ought to'be, not o,ly the voluntary, but, if necessary, the compulsory education, of every child and youth in tihe State. The stuch lauded ad boasted provisions on the subject,'oonain'ed in our cpni'tution, undotletdly pompare faorably with soaes of the con-stitutions of t he other't'.tX and esiecilly tat'f Iowa bshould ho be'o 'o'en, forn w,or& Ihe,' 1 airr. word fo~r *word, c thiey4 p $. 20 Verbatim copy of the Iowa constitution, that they did not even change the length of time during which the Superintendent of Public Instruction should hold his offi(e. And the term of that officer now, is actually one year longer than that of our Governor, without any appar. ent reason for it whatever, except that it was so in the copy from which the original was made. They changed the term of the office of Governor, from four to two year*; but it is really probable that they forgot, at all events it is certain that they neglected, to make a corresponding change in the term of office of the Superintendent, and the consequence is, that the Superintendent of Public Instruction, with. out the least reason for it, holds his office one year longer than either or any of the other public officers, except Judicial. The provision of the constitution which prohibits any diminution of Judicial salaries during the whole term for which a Judge may be elected, and the other provisions generally on the subject of salaries, in my judgment, impose in the one case an unnecessary restriction, and in the other, leave too much'pover with the Legislature. Whilst an American people never yet refused to pay cheerfullv towards the necessary expenses of a good government, they cannot endure with patience, nor tolerate without every possible resistance, the idea Qf contributing money for public purposes which would not be necessary if the government were prudently and economically administered. And that they are perfectly right in this, is proved by reason and experience. Aside from merely prudential considerations, the healthfulness and well-being of the government itself, demands economy and prudence in every department, An individual is not more certain to be ruined by prodigality, than is a government bv extravagance. And all sums paid by government for things which are not really necessary for its efficient administration, are purely extravagances. They probably ought to be prohibited, as far as possible, by constitutional provisions. Perhaps sums ought to be fixed by the constitution as the maximum of all official salaries and compensation, which could never be exceeded by fees or otherwise, in favor of &y office whatsoever. At all events, offices should not be allowed to exist which oppress the people to enrich the occupants. Under the present government the rule of official compensation is grossly unequal and almost universaly exorbitant. The general organization of public offices is without any fixed system, and completely profligate. 0off ces requiring the least ability, ~nd those whose duties can all be performed by deputies; are often paid more than thoe. which require the greatest efforts of mind, and the most constant application to their duties, and must rest with their whole weight upon toi9 officers themeselv In my judgment the' tepi of ofices ought to be short, in order'that none need be required to serve in them longer than they can afford to. And the profits ofoffiee should be absolutely trifling. in order that it may never be thought of as a means of Iiveli hood. The mode of making public contiracts requires constitutional guards ip order that all indirect speculations upon the courtty nmay be cut off. All that portion of population which looks to office, and not to pseful industry for a livelihood, should be rendered incapable of obtaining a finer living by their indolence, than industry can afford to enjoy, by constant toil. As long as a people reward their oflicelrs only with money, they need never hope to have servants who love them, but only such as would use them. High salaries excite the cupidity of the selfish, low salaries, awaken the patriotism of the good. High salaries causle all the crowds of men to rush for office; low salaries cause "the office to seek the man." Publiec gratitude goes further with all true men, than merely their wages. When men receive no other reward than the payment of their necessary expenses, the people discover that they are willing to serve their country for its own sake, and cannot avoid feeling a greater respect and'affection for their public men. And the affections of the people are surer to command devotion to their services. than their mere pay with their abuse, however well laid on. The former satisfies good men, the latter'is only agreeable to the bad. Sir, our own experience should teach us8 that high salaries are not only against public economy, but also impolitic in other respect& No other government in the Union exceptthis, has ever paid such enormous sums to its officials; and their services in this State seem to have been rendered, generally, for no other 'parent object than t secure their pay, They have engendered no love for the country but only a love for its offices. They have driven off patriotism and public spirit, and supplied their places with'official gambling, and parti. san immoralities. Aside from the offieials connected with the revenue, the United States has always been handsonmely served in this State, Side by side with our own officers arid under the same expenses, for about one half the compensation paid by us. In my opinion, taking all the State, county and local public officers together, a proper constitutional reform of this government could save for the people, not less than one million dollars annually, and the public interests would, at the sa,ue time, be better attended to. If I, am not mistakes in this (and if time would permit its discussion at length, I think I could show that I am not,) this consideration alone ought to be sufficient to warrant us in at least permitting the people to express their wishes, as to whether they desire a constitutional confentiop or not The p.' vision of the constitution tiat "all laws,' decree, regulations'and provisions, which from their nature require publication, shall be published in Enlish and Spanish,* is undoubtedly objectionable as a constitutional regulation. I believeno similar provision exists in the constitution of any other American St te except Louisiana. But even there it does not go to any such extent It provides for publishing the constitution and laws in another language; but nothing more. By fixing such a regulation in the constitution, the Le gislature is compelled to obey it to the fullest extent, and, in many instances, when no por tion ofout citizens are benefitted in eomparison to the expense which it entails upon all of them. It therefore often becomtnes unjust to comply with it, whilst a refusal to do so, would b a disobedience to its express commands. All the public laws could be published in Spanish, but probably our fellew citizens who are natives of this country, do not themselves consider it necessary, that every private law, and every official document requiring pnblication should be published in both Spanish and English. I do not think the constitutional convention of 1849 deserve the slightest censure for having adopted this provision at that time, lout experience has proved that it is calculated to do more harm to all, than good to any body. The provisions of the Constitution on the subject of taxation, which affects directly the interests and prosperity of every inhabitant of the State, are extremely meagre, and but little better than no regulations at all, on this all important subject. They actually do not occupy four lines of the whole Constitution, and those simply declare that taxation shall be equal and uniform, without making tlle least provisionto insure so just a result. They add, thatall property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, but they affix no limit to the arepunt of tax which may be imposed. These two brief declarations contain all the provis tons of the Constitution regulating thee imposition of taxes We have learned by the most trying and severe experience that the Legis lature of California ought not to be -allowed the power to impose taxes when, how, and in what amounts they please, without the slightest constitutional restriction, or regulation. The amount and system of taxation. which has hitherto prevailed in this State, is not merely unequal and unjust, it ig vicious and unmitigated oppression; it is complete and absolute tyrany; inflicted from year to year, and every year becoming more terrible and wholly insupportable. This Lgislature inay do what they please, but the next will think themselves capable of making improvements, and as long as the Constitution leaves this subject entirely with the Legislature, no settled rules, no fair, equal, just and established system of taxation can ever reasonably be hoped for. This portion of our Coastitiunoa is also of such immense importance to this country, that no unnecessary delay ogh t to be endured in accomplishing its co nlete and radical amendment. It would be needless to Comment upon this subject, for every permanent citizen, and almost every inhabitant, who has remained twelve months in this State, has no doubt discovered that its mode and plan of taxation is completely infaimouns. It has actu ally driven hundreds, and possibly tlousands, of active, busine&ss men out of the State altogether; and continually causes the miost intense dissatisfaction. The,provisions of theConstitution concerning its general amendlent or'revision and change,' is not taken from the Constitution of Iowa, which is more just. Indeed, justice to the Constitution of Iowa, would perhaps require the acknowledgment. that had the Convention 1849 adopted it entire, with the additional section which provides for "a system of county and town governments," it would have been all the better for this country; because, it must be confessed, that the few alterations which have been made, have not, taking them all together. amounted to the least improve ment, and in aome important respects, they are worse than.the, original. Among these last, I allude particularly to theialterations in the judiciary, and the one now under consideration. The Constitution of Iowa does not re. quire the consent of two-thirds of the members of each house of the Legislature before the people can be allowed to vote for or against a Convention to amend their own Consttution. Constitutions are simply laws passed by the supreme Legislature of the Sta4, its citizens themselves, in their originaland supreme capacity. Upon what Principle any small number of people or any.particular set.of offlcisals, are to be authorized and justified in preventing the people from the exercise of this right, at this age, and in this period of political pro. gres, I do not understand. At this age the whole people are supposed to possess more intelligenc, than any mere assemblages sent out from their midst. Why should not they be consulted before the adoption of any law, of vital and permanent interest to the people oft the whole State? The laws that they will themselves approve they will never permit to be disobeyed. Certainly nothing can be more unjust, unreasonable, and inconsistent,' than to hold the people responsible for good government, and at the same time refuse to entrust them with every proper facility fbr amending its Constitution, and being themselves consulted with, as to its laws. To suppose that the few of us now assembled, or who may hereafter be assembled in these Halls are either more intelligent, or more anxious for the happiness of the people. than the people themselves whom we but represent, is absurd. Every one of us have left men amongst our constituents who are our superiors in all respects. 21. 22 General. Remarks. Oreelo-Idlers. There are, nowadays, not merely hundreds but thousands of men always remaining in the ranks of the people, who are superior to those who attempt to direct and command them, There are not merely hundreds but thousands of men to be found here in the secluded walks of cities, and upon the plains, and in thIe val leys,'and amongst the hills and mountains, who have never been in office, and yet whose learning, ability, native greatness of soul, and pure sympathy for their fellow-countrymen in this remote State, weild put us all to the blush. The greatest loss that can occur to us, is the continual loss of the advice and direction of such men, merelyi because they hold no office For my part, I believe sincerely that our government would be far more just, noble, powerful, successful and permanent, if it were far more democratic. I know of no reason whatever for distrusting the action of the people upon any measures of great public moment. Certainly, if they cannot all be trusted, the few who come out from amongst them, Must be still less worthy of confidence. In a nation offreemen, so brave and generous and universally. intelligent as the Californians, I am confident that it is only necessary to appeal directly to their patriotism and good sense, in order to insure a most just, powerful and glorious government. The idea that such a people ought to be governed entirely by laws made without any cotsultation with them, and without their previous knowledge of what they are to contain, but sprung upon them suddenly or in haste and by a few persons (as is the custom'in aristoc-ati'c and despotic governments), is certainly anti democratic, and I cannot see why it is not actually unwise. At all events, the idea that the citizens of California, ever can, or ever will, be so governed, fur.eers ly, is, in my judgment, wholly im probable. The Califoritanis are not "Old Fogies," they believe that we can and ought to peogress in the principles and science of governumenlt. They want 1o officials to set themselves up to govern themt, and they will never submit to it. They want to govern thenmselves through their officials, and ro make a convenience of the men they'place in office, not to be male a eouven ence olf by them They want to use their officials themnselves, they do not want to be used by them. Tlrey want a governiment which will afford citizens the opporturiity to become as much renowned in the government, without oilice, as with it. Ther want to abate the terrible and destructive nulsauces (,f office and office-seeking. The ermine no longer conceals firom them that merely one or two ordinary individuals sit within, And Law has rio longer such senseless terror as to deprive them of their reason, or prevent them fromn discovering the present false and absurd cystenro for making it. They will respect pro perty, maintai order, and insist upon exat Justice between man and m'an. But they want nothing else, and they will never be brought to submit to anything les, not even to save the nerves of those who thiink tit lawyers and lawyers' courts are indispeasabl necsa: ry, in order to alminister justice. hey will not respect nor cheerfully afford anv, asistance to a mere government for the support of offi ciels and-the encouragement of idlers. I verily believe a majority of our people would almost as soon vote for the law of Draco, which made idleness a crime punishable with death, as to continue under the existing plague, the prevailing epidemic, the sweeping, increasilig and destructive mania, for office. Indeed, it might actually be more to their advantage to pay for the support of a standing army, with long muskets, and keep) it well fed and under good discipline, than attempt to maintain a standing aimv of idlers, witll merely long fingers, and voracious appetites, and under no discipline at all. Sir, it is an actual fact, that the whole political duty and power of our people, under the existing government, coisists of nothing but the mere election of men into office. Tle whole vitality of this Constitution is but little more than a series of regulations for thie We]f tion and support of officials, who are to pet pretty much as they please; with but few re, striaints upon their conduct,, and no sensible or certain means of punishinug them for bad behavior in office. The idea seems to have been that the people would not elect men to oilce who would not well govern them. The idea ought to have been, that the esole object of electing any persons at all to office, is merely to provide facilities for the people to govern themselves. Indeed, this whole Constitution is inters)mesed with a weight,f fogyista. The people are no where,-in its at,tive, living L.,ovisions,-no where left free from the pest of olice. They are distrusted. They are treated as inferiors. They are left to li moved and swayed by one of the most insidious and terrible curses of free government, I mean oFrrlIAL INLLUENOL Resume. Mr. President-an humble, but honest and sincere, effort has been made to point out only a portion of the defects il our Constitution, a majority of which we will, undoubtedly, all adimit to be serious objeetion& I now beg leave to merely recapitulate them, with brevi. ty, in order that they may be brought agnia firesh to our recollection. They are these: lat. Thlat our Constitution was adopted before the loeal condition and wants of the country had been fully developed and made known, and ctnequently must, from the very natttife of things, be less complete and beneficial thain one which eould be prepared with our present experen V 23 ,2d. That it imposes no hebecks upon the enormous sums which the Xegislature can al low its favorites, under the guise of official services; whereby public ofes are made the objects of speculation or profit, rather than the mere performance of public duties. 3d. That it does not restrain a few citizens ii the Legislature from selling, or otherwise disposing of, any or all of the public domain and property of the State, at such time, and upon sueh terms, as they may see fit to adopt, without being required, in aty case whatever, to previously advise the people of their inten. tions, or to give them an opportunity to ex press their wishes with regard to the disposi tion of their properlty. 4th. That it enables the Legislature to cre ate whole counties without allowing them one Representative in the Assembly; and limits the entire legislative representation of the State to a small number of individuals, not ex ceeding, perhaps, one half of the number which the public interests and security de mand, at the present time, and being compara tively much less than is allowed in every other State ini the Union; whilst the gross sum now paid to the members of the Legislature need not be at all increased by doubling their num bers - 5th. That it allows officers to be appointed by the Executive who ought to be elected by the people; and allows the Legislature, by a mere majority vote, to create new offices (however unnecessary) and fix the conipensation of the incumbents. 6th. That it allows the Legislature to ix the pay of its own inember& 7th. That it allows the Legistature to continue in session for such length of time less than a year, as it sees fit, and at the same compensation during the whole period; 8th. That it allows the Legislature at each session to employ as many officers, elerks, attaches and servants as it chooses, and to fix their compensation; whereby such numbers have been employed, and at such rates, as to annually cause an expense nearly equaling the whole sum paid to the members of both houses of the Legislature. 9th, That. it imposes no checks-whatever upon the sums which the Legislature may expend and order to be expended, under the head of contingencies; Whereby through this and the other powers referred to, the expenses of the Goverunment are at least three times greater than there is any actual necessity for,, 10th. That it leaves the entire Finances of the state under the complete control of the the Legislature, without any constitutional check, system, or regulation whatever, leaving all the different funds to be thrown into Qonfusion; the ronies ia one fund (however a: cred ~,e trust,) to be borrowed and expended throtgh anoher nd; A-nd.approriaoa of property to one fund for some specific object, to be taken by some other find,at i suh price and upon sucteh terms as the maj'ority of- a few persons. being the members of the Legislaturei mlay see fit to direct And in this and other ways, leaving the whole fillances of the State continually upon a hazard. 11lth. That it does not restrain the Legila.' tare friom passing purely local and private bills, of no general public utility or advantage, whereby its sessions have been uselessly r pto longed, the public expenses unnecessarily inm creased, and the doors of the Legislature thrown open to invite partial,'personal and corrupt legislation. 12. That it does not create a direct respon sibility between each individual legislator,- and those whom he undertakes to represent; ma king no provision for as many Senatorial and Assemtbly districts, as there are memers of each in the Legislature, whereby each neigh borhood or certain number of citizens could have their own separate represenatives, being singly and directly responsible to them for his official conduct, and more likely to be well known to them, and better acquainted i.th their situation and their wants. 13. That its plan for punishing official mi$, conduct in District Judges and other inferior State officers, only by indictment in the As, sembly, and a judgment agreed to by'two thirds of the memibers of the Senate, is con trary to Democratic principles, enormously ex pensive, wholly unnecessary, and against pub lie policy. 14th. That its provisions concerning the sa" cred rights of the people to have all their cases tried by juries, have proved to be defective; and, in consequeoce, the Supremnie Court has annulled a long established law of this State, and decided that the people "are not entitled to trial by jury" in a very latge el s of civil cases which it calls chancery cases:, and that all such cases are to be tried only before one man, who is to act as both judge and jury; whereby not only is the right of trial by jury invaded to an extect that is dangerous in this country, but the.Supreme Court itself usurps a new power,.nd assumes the right to pass upon thte facts as well as the law, in any ches which it shall please to designate by a partieu lar name. 15t14 That its provisions requiring that "all laws of a general nature shball have a iinifo' operatieon., is not merely useless, but seriqsy injurious, interfering as it does with the ps. sage of laws of a general lature, to operate differently in different eounties, according to their several different wants and neessities 16th. That it permits each House f' the Legislature to determine the elections of its own members, without any quolifieation of such right; whereby the people can be defeatld' their own ehoiee of a representative, agd',,il spits of their Aln isd, ted in his plaee, whenever a msgorty of the House to which he is elected may see fig upon partizan, or any other grounds,. to.exercise this power. 17th. That it prohibits any revision or amendment of a law, without re-passing and reprinting the whole of the revi.sed law or section amended, whereby the public expenses are greatly increased without any necessity, or actual public advantage. 18th. That it bestows upon only one man, and without any restraint or qualification, the monarchical power. (more absolutely than is at present vested in the English Crown) of granting reprieves and pardons to criminals, after they have been duly and lawfully convicted by thc unanimous approval of eourts and juriea. 19th. That it creates a Bureau of Education to be presided over by an independent officer, without making any provisions (in relation to that grandest object of human polities) rendering such an officer necessary; and without limiting the termn of his office within reasonable and consistent bounds. 20th. Thlat it reu.ires "all laws, decrees, regulations and provisions which from their nature require publication," to be published in the Spanish language; whereby a great expense is unnecessarily entailed upon the equntiy, without the power of diminishing it, so as only to comply with what our Spanisk population really require in relation to this subject. 21st. That it does not effectually prohibit the Legislature from contracting civil debts orliabilitiea without the previous consent of the people, who pay them; nor restrain its vile powers of funding liabilities illegally and unjus tifiably contracted, and thus forcing debts upon the people which they never assented to, nor were benefitted by, nor were under any obligations to pay-either legal or moral. 22d. That it throws difficulties in the way of revising and changing the Constitution, which are unnecessary, impolitic and inconsistent with the principles upon which the gov. ernment is founded. Sir, can any candid and intelligent man be found, in the Legislature, or out of it, who will not admit that at least a majority of these objections to the constitution, are valid and important, as such? The peop'e of other States have deemed it necessary to call conventions, and revise and change their constitutions, whennuot one quarter o~ the objections could be fairly stated against them, which all must admit to exist against ours. I have not stated numerous objections, which I believe radical and important, and doubtless some of those, which 1 have deemed to be objections, others may be ready to defend. But it does seem to me, wholly impossible for any one to honestly, candidly, and thoroughly, investigate the subject, without being forced to admit, that there ra'great Sumbers inirtat defect, in - sious parts of the constitution, which require change and amendment. And that the least thing we can do, as legislators, if we' care one straw about the views of the people, or the interests of this country, will be to submit the question to the people, for their superior advice and discretion Object o the. BPl. Tnue- efma ]wood . Blly le hotped fr latht bway.... The bill under consideration, asks for nothing more than the consent of the Leislatif, to a mere recommendation of thil subject to the people, which it seems to me no one ought to be willing to refuse, but only anxious to concede We know, of a certainty, that the people will never blame us for voting for such a recommendation, but they may well blame us for such conduct, as would, itnder existing circumstances, be the clearest evidence of our want of confidence in them. If the bill which I have introduced, requires alterations or amendments, in any respect, I will, for one heartily support them. NWhose bill, or what bill is passed, is a matter of no moment to the public, provided it will properly accomplish the object intended. All that is required in the premises, because all that the existing constitution authorizes, or requires, is, "to recommend to the electors, at the next election for members of' the Legielature, to vote for, or against a convention." If a-majority of the electors, vtipg at such election, shall vote in favor of calling a conconvention, it will then become the duty of the Legislature at its next session, to'provide by law for calling a convention, to be holden within six months after the passage of such law." Now, sir, after the lapse of more than i years, under this constitution, the first that was adopted in this country and which we have tound, by experience, to be full of defects, it eems to me it is high time for us to at. tempt its necessary amendment, in order that our people may enjoy the advantagesqf a government adapted to their real condition. Sir, I do not believe there is. one respectable citizen of California, here, or elsewhere,. who does not sincerely desire a thorough, and complete ref6rmation in our public alirs. But what cause, what propriety, what reason, is tere for attempting a reformation, without commencing at thevery place from whence nearly-ill our public evils flow? For my pt T have long and earnestly devoted myself to this subject with all the feeble powers which I possess, and with an earnest wish to hit upon some expedient for reforming our errors and removing our grievances, without any revision, or change of the constitution, except such as the Legislature ought to attempt. Blut, sir it is in vain. The necessities of this country absolutely demand an entire revision and Change of this constitution. And I coftidentIyv toe, that it is idl e & w w1 i, to, pe, 24 25 for the infinite blessings of a good government in this State, until a new oonstitution shall be adopted. Certainly reasons enough have been already stated, to convince any candid and unprejudiced member, that such revision and change, is at least sufficieutly necessary, to render it his duty to submit the question of a convention to the people. If not, then, in the name of Heaven, what does he expect, in order that it shall ever become his duty to do so? Does he expect to wait until the people shall have learned to live in a state of anarchy, or shall have repudiated the government altogether? Or does he merely require still further reasons, in order to induce him to "think," that a revision and change of the entire constitution is necessary? If he only require the latter, then I ask him, as a man, as a Californian, as an Ainerican, to turn his earnest attention to the Judicial Department, created and upheld by this constitution. The Judiciary. With regard to some of the other and multifarious objections, which have already been mentioned, I haye spoken with diffidence of opinion, but with regard to the judicial system which this constitution inflicts upon us, I confess that any indication of doubt, or reserve on my part, would be but affectation, and any diffidence of opinion, but hypocracy. Ihave had occasion to watch the effects of this branch of the government more closely than either of the others, and ever since the adoption of the constitution. I have never yet met a man of sense in California, who did not think our judicial system grossly defective. It isnotmerely erronious, and dangerous to individual and public rights, but it is an insult to the intelligence of the country. It is a disgrace, which Californians ought to be no longer required to endure. Even the Judges on the bench, who are men of candor, are forced to admit that it ought to be completely reformed. Indeed, it has already caused a general feeling of disres pect for our courts, and all connected with them. And to me, it is amazing, that good men, who have been so long in office, have neglected to remove an evil of such sweeping power and destructive influence, as the existingjudicial organization of this State. Such terrible and public denunciations asCalifornia courts receive from the people, ought never to be indulged, or tolerated, unless they be deserved. But if one half, or one tenth part of what is said against them be deserved, then what language can express the odium which should attach to that man, whose duty it has become to provide redress, but who shall refuse to give his cheerful aid in that behalf. It is undoubtedly the duty of the statesman to be attentive to the actions and complaints of the people, for in no other way can the disorders of the State be asceirtained or remedied. But. silr, we must not look among the people for the location of the disorders which are to 4 be remedied, because in the government itself, and not in the people, all chronic political diseases have their seat. If we, find our people repeatedly guilty of" mob law," we must not neglect to observe, that the courts of the State have not remained obedient to the laws of the country. If we find our people sometimes suddenly making laws upon the spot, to suit their own notions of punishment for certain offenses, we ought also to observe that their Courts are addicted to the same thing, and sometimes make laws upon the bench to suit their own notions in certain cases. if we find our peopie sometimes denying criminals their legal right to trial by indictnient, we ought also to observe that our Courts are sometimes denying good and honest citizeus their legal right to trial by jury. If we sometimes find our people treating the lawr with contempt and deciding. a case in haste, we ought also to observe that our Supreme Court has sometimes treated laws with contempt and disobedience, which have been passed to regulate the mode of their decisions., If the people have sometimes denied men the right to appeal from their hasty judgments to the courts of law, we ought also to observe that our Supreme Court has denied us all the right of appeal from its hastyjudgments to the Supreme Court of the United States, even in such few cases as are expressly authorized by the constitutional and well settled laws of our country, and by the universal custom of our people ever since the existence of our nation. Sir, if there be danger to liberty, and property, whilst the people are addicted to disregarding the laws, what shall be said when the Courts themselves are treating them with disobedience? If hundreds, and sometimes thousands of people are to be censured and condemned for mob law, what are we to say of a constitution which cannot prevent only two men from executing mob law in our very Court of last resort? If there be other offenses of which our people are guilty, and to which no allusion has been made; so are there other acts ofjudicial despotism, perpetrated by the Supreme Court of California, under the protection of this constitution, upon which I will not dwell. I will not dwell upon the written laws consulted upon and passed by the two or three men in that Court, prior to the last election, (for I nowhere allude to the Judge recently elected,) which laws are to be found, to-dty, in its 45th, 46th, and 47th rules;. and which literally and undisguisedly make a law on the important subject of appeals differing in very serious respects, fronm the constitutional laws of this State, duly passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor, upon the very same subject' 1 will not dwell dpon the daring decision made by that Court upon the very eve of the last general election, which was calculated to disfranchise at least five thousand of the ele I 26 tors of this State; and although, of course, not at all designed or intended to affect the election, still most singularly and excellently well designed to continue the ol( duality, the oli two J dlges,' of.hat Court in powel. I allude to the decision, or exl ression (,f opinioii in a niadie up case, juist previ,i)us to the last elc tion, at wli(:h two of the Ju ritices who made it weie not ol-posing candidates, though oln o1)posing tickets, wherein that tribunal modestly and fioom a pure and virtuous sense ol'duty, decided, or rather expressed the opinlion, not only tllat no Courts in this State except the District CouLits could naturialize, but also that the Courts of the United States hlave no suchl right. An opinion never'before avowed by a Court which acknowledged the sligrhtest obedience to the laws or constitution ()f the Union. An op)inion which never can be adopted without utterly repudiating the express laws of our country; which are unquestionablv constitutional, and have been steadily bfollowed and obeyed t)v all the States from the foundation of our national government down to the preept time. Sir, the spectacle presented by such exlibitions as these, of the conduct of the higlhest constitutional coutrt, the tribunal of last resort, in a great State, is, to me, far more terr ible and alairming, than all the worst demnonstrations of popular fury, which the people of this State have ever in any place, or at aily time, exhibit ed. I manke these alusions in 0sorrow, and with sincere grief, to think tha' such things dare to be already so boldly attempted, in an American State. God knows, I make no allsions to that Court or its con,duct, from any personal feelings against the in(dividuals who have presided in it for the past four years, or who still preside there. I carn cauid:dly and truthfully declare, and I do therefore here avow, that I am not actuated by the slightest or most remote personal feelin-g in this matter. Indeed, as to the mere ind ividuals composing the Court, I do not see that they have anything to do with the delects in the constitution. And I allude only to the Court and its Judges otficially. I do not attack them, but their office. I dlo not allutde to-their actions, but to the actions of their Court. Sir, we all know that no Court has any right whatever to governi us, nor make any laws for us, nor decide for us what is right and necessary. The whole duty of our Courts eonsists in only declaring and ap)lVing the law, as they find it. Any other rule is most dangerois to the rights and liberty of every inhabitant of thle country. They have legally no discretion whatever, not one particle.They have no authlority to valy the law, even one lhair's breadth. But the Supreme Court of this State seenms not to be content, with performing only the inferior and obedient duties of a Court. It has aspired, it seeks to be something greater than a Court. It has grown ambitious, not to do merely what other courts have done, but to do what other courts have never dared to do. "Its appetite has grown by what it has fed uponi," until w liat wa,s but recently two (%rdinary attoinies at law, have, sutddenly,, ithont gi("it apl)lication and wit hout gieat legal learlniiLi, grown greaser and wiser than all the other courts and lawyers of this age, and of all the foirmer ages of our country. It has proved by asiguments, satisfactory to itself only, that it is gieater, wiser, and more learned, thaitn the Courts of the United States, and of all the other States. It has struck out new pathls in judicial duty,, hitherto uiknown and supil,osed to have no existence. It has made new discoveiies in judicial powers, which have hitherto been sur)posed dangerous to liberty, and strictlv pro,ibited firom Courts. It has not been satisfied to nmerely aid us in the admiuistration of our laws; it has also beconme the champion of politicatl heresies. Uinder the guise of jndicial decisions, it takes occasion to disseminate political doctrines, which are odious and thateful to the peop)le of this State, aid deserve the severest. ie'pro)bationi of every true Anie'ieaii citizeni. ULider the pretence of maintaini)g the rihits of our State, it seems willing to take away, some of the mnost importauit rights which we eljoy. Infaituated with its capacity to elevatelour State, it has actually deoiaded us below our real position, and has mnide decisions to prove that we do not enjoy the samie rights which are fireely conceded to the people of the other States. Attempting to elevhte our State sovereignty, it places our State in a false, if not a dangerous attitude, which we never ought, and God grant, that we nlever may, mainitain. Because it strikes at the very foundations of the Union. By the theories of all other American constitutions, as well as our ow-v,anri also by the theory of the Eiglisli Constitutions, which all our AmerIicani constitutions have imitated but repub icanizedl, and therefore, by the fixed laws under ~which, aud with reference to which, the ditffereit departments of this govermnment Went into,peration, its judicial departtiieit, as is well known, is itiferior in the exterat of its powers to either of tile othlieris. It is not inferior in place or degree, for it is coorhii-tte witli the others. Nor can it be in. terfeed wvithl bv eitlher of the others, as long as it coufiles itself to its own sphiere of hlunible but highly responsible duties. Where it does not do so, however, its occupants can be punJished by the others. But, sir, (so true it is, that in all human governments unguarded authoriity will only beget an appetite for. p)ower,) we find that our Supreme Coult, although piractically constituted of oily two ineil, has not remained contented even with the great l)owers which tile Constitutioni has uiiguarded ly bestowed upoOn it. It has not remained satisied lwith the excessive powers which ought not to have been entrusted with such a Court, but has been for the last four years continual 27 ly grasping after still more power. Not con-' tenlt with thle great and reslposible di.ties of a co-ordinate department, it lias boldly leaped(l allthe judicial restraints whi-cli surroun(d oth er courts, ard stands today not in the niere attitude of the Supremne Court. but actually il] attitude of the Sul)p-eme Plower, inll this government. Sir, such a position ought to excite universal alarm and condemnnation, in any gov erirnient and utnder aniiy Court, however care fully organized. But, when it is assumed by only two corimon attorneys, and in a mere trio coert like thalt which now constitutes the Sup)remie Court of California, it ought to be niet by other feelings than those indicated by eitlher srieers, smiles, or laughter. It mray be tllhat we ought not merely to lnau,h nor ridicule nor trifle with miatters of fis nature, nor with efforts to do away with such' public wronIgs. Our peol)le and our press, miay be wirong, in generally treating sulch official inpu dence arid asstml)tion, with iere indi(,erence ad coriteiil)t. For it assuines tle vevry powers wlich are oinly exerciseed,v tvraiir;' itself; ani-d if maint,aire(l, it at oniice redics this governimer.t in substan ce arid ii fact, irito a iiost contemptible olig.rchy. Sir, it is aiazinlg lIow re.(ly we all are to believe in the rioss govorumnelital alimises alid outragies which exist in other countlries, whilst we do nort seem to discover tllhose which niay be even niore oppressive and disigraeeful, in our own. Sir, olly two men at tlhe otlihecr ed of this street, ca'n twist all 0ot' lai'ws a'dotit thleir fingers. Tlley can set tlhemrnselves ip to control aIdl, whllenev er tlley l)lase, to defeat, thle htlll(dreds of lefislIators who annually visit tli,se II(ills, freslh fiomi the peol-le, and anxious to secure for' them, somie imeasures of relief.Arid, sir, whilst we who are sent here to rmake the laws, are busily arid studiously accused before tile people, of being the direct cause of all tile evils ol- the couitry, our laws are handled like way, and our statutes like douglh, in the jutdicial fingers of the Courts. Thley cannot be enrjoyed and admini istered as the wlrole (,f us in b)oth these halls, or as we aid( our successors, miay constitutionally determine to be best for the couiitry-, un)less it- shall lplca-e the Court to concede to us that privilege. Under tlie insidious pretence that we have nIo right to interfere with their "department of the Government," they hold us actually in sult,jection to their own wills, arid judicial pleasure. Arid we see that two Ineh, two ordinary lawyeris, can sit demurely, at the otllher end of this city, and nullify, with omlplete pr'actii'l imipunity, tihe (constitutional riLtts arid liws of th-e'peole as often as it suiets theiri pleasure, aiid they acquiire or make thle ol)l)ortniiity, so to do. Arid yet we sc-e no very gretit evils; we see no great necessity for immediate constitutional reforms, arid we seemi to think it strange, that order is not maintained; that our laws are not well administered' that. our courts are not respected; and that our people have been so fir'equently guilty of taking the laws into their own hands, withlout respect, and in open definrice of legally constituted Courts and Jtirlges. Sir, iii what foi,in is actual tyranny to come amongst us, in order that we may be ceritaiririffits li)ecseiee? Mulst it come withl armines and banniers? Can it never be ve.n until it comes with a crov n upon its head and a septie in its hand I Our fitliers sceented tyranny in the very air that pass ed away fi'om official wrongs. Are we alr-eady growlg dull and inattentive to its approachles? Or do we suppose tlat it actually cannrot exist amongt! nieri who are in the acknowledged eirjoymnent of liberty? iS ir, we cannot be so ig norant as to believe that tyranny is conltied to acttlirl despiotisIms, or restrained withlin the jurisdictions of Kinigs and l,umpolis. We know that it iiay exist wherever mankind is to be foun(l. Thiat its existence in Republics can only be repressed by "eternal vigilance."thiat it is not a tliring wiis(h can ever be extintguislied by any one ecifort of a people. It inil.y be cut dowin anid every vestige of it be destroyed, by a revoliition,but it cannot be annilijiated. It will gr,w agnin. It will take ro;,t fr og nothing. Its seeds -ire scattered inmore widely and dangerously3 among freemien, tlain asnrr slave(s, f)or its seat is ii the humarn miiiid, and it liv es; lherever selfish ambition attainis to power Perha,ps no mnan, not truly great, and sliblimely christian, has ever been entrusted with suprenie powers in a government arid left comiparatively firee from responsibility, who has not felt hIis power, and grown into tihe p)iactices of tyranniiy. It is but the liistaIry of mankind in every country, and at every age. AAnd I cannot understand why we should conclude, that at this tine, and here in Catlfoi-nia, no such practices can, or do, actually exist. Tlhere canl be inodangerous tyranny in our Legisl.iture for it is anniualtly dissolved and refortmed agairi firom tjie peopIe. Nor can there well be tyranny under the Executive deparitmincit of this Government, forits offices are of slhort dur ation, arld numerously constituted, and thleir duties merely exeeutie, not creative, nor undefiled. But, Sir', the head of the Judiital departmnent of this Goverinient has becomue, in ilily judgment, a tyranny. And if we really v ishli to learri what tyraniny is, and wheat petty tyraLnts can do, and dare do, in a Republiiw, we riecd only watch attentively their so callcd judicial career. Sir, no tyranny can be so dangerous to freetmen, as that which conceals its intentions belsind tIre sacred ermine of their courts. Indeed, of all tyr'airnies none could possibly be better calculated to deprive freenlull of their riglt, tlhan that which steals upon them in the very garb ofjustice. Courts oft'jistice can s)iii their strong anid insidious w,-bs in seerqt, and roll mau up, and bind them hand arid foot, in the strong arid irextlicable ineshes of their judieial orders and decrees, whilst the people cannot perceive the wrong, and the injured can only buzz, and struggle, I., — 7 28 and wonder how suchl things can be And thus, in their own courts, and here in this State, the people and their laws are continually caught in the mischievous and unseen cobwebs of judicial law, sptun by the one or two judicial spiders who watch within; and who sitthere, not as if for the plain straight-forward purpose of administering simnple justice, but rather as if aiding a surrounding family in securing the means of a fine support. Mr. Justice Blackstone. the renowned English Jurist, and "the father of our common law." declares in his commentaries, which must be familliar to you all, that "To set the judicial power above that of the legislative, would be subvelrsive of all government." And certainly, no proposition can be more self evident, to reflecting men. Chief Justice Marshall, perhaps the greatest Judge, and most profound reasoner. on the constitutional powers of our courts. who ever sat upon a bench in America; himself the head of the highest judicial department in the United States, and, of course, unwilling to stirrender any of the powers or -rights properly belonging to his court, has expressed his views upon this subject, and the views which have always been maintained by the great court over which he so long presided, in these remarkable words: The Judicial Department, (he said in delivering the opinion ot his court,) is the instrument employed by the government, in administering the laws, The jtudicial department of the government hasa no will in any case. Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, HAS NO EXIS'rENCE. Courts are mere instruments of the law, and CAN WII.L NOTHrINa. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; but always for the purpose qf giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.-(Osborne, v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat, 866. Sir, I would be the last to deprive our courts of any of their proper, legitimate and constitutional powers. But it is as impolitic to uphold a constitution which lends them facilities for assuming and exercising new powers, as it would be to attempt to deprive them of any part of the legitimate power which they already properly, and legitimately possess. But it seems to me, that no proposition can be more true than that the courts of this State have no authority, to upset any of the old and settled laws of the country, which have been established by unvarying custom, and affirmed by competent authority; nor to make laws in opposition to, or differing in the least, from the constitutional laws passed by the Legislature; nor in any manner, nor under any pretence, to disregard, evade, or misconstrue any law what ever, passed by. the Legislature, unless it be clearly, and beyond all reasonable question, contrary to the constitution of the United States, or of this State. Any other doctrine makes the mere judge a legislator. and introduces at once a contusion of laws, aqd the reign of that most plain and palpable tyranny, which we, here, in California, so patiently endure. I mean the tyranny of being subjected to laws, whilst it is not in our power to know what they are, or how, or in what manner, or to what extent, they will be applied and canforced. Sir, I feel confident that no intelligent and thinking man can tread the soil of California to-day, without the feeling that it is oppressed. ArLd thai justice, as adninisterel in all the other States of our country, is not administered here. But, sir, let us cease attending to the dangerous conduct of our Supreme Court, and asertain if the cause of such conduct, be not fairlyv and clearly attributable to its dangerous and trifling organization. Because, if the Court is so organized that such conduct would not be likely to be repeated at any future time by a change of its officers, then all the abuses to which we have alluded would not be owing to the constitutional organization of the Court, but only to the people themselves, for electing unsuitable men to perform its great office. Sir, the Constitution of the United States does not necessarily form a wise and complete model to be followed by the individual States, in the formation of their Constitutions; because, the chief objects sought to be attained by that instrument, the individual States have no control over. They have surrendered them up to the Union. But still the division of powers, in the national Constitution, anid thie manner in which that division is made, and the theory which forms a part of each, and is briefly outlined in them; all must admit to be, perhaps, the acme of political wisdom. The theory upon which such division is based, (lid not originate with the framers of our national Constitution. Angels from hleaven, could not give sudden birth to so much political wisdom. It was the result of seven hundred years of English progress and English experience But, neither by the English, nor the American Constitution, is the number of judges to compose the Supreme or inferior Courts, limited aind confined to such trifling numbers as with us, nor to any particulatr number. The legislative department is so organized as to reflect fairly and fully the public receesities, and to that department is left the power of increasing the nunmber from time to time, as the public interests, aud security against judicial usurpations, might require. The English Government, bowever, secures itself against judicial usurpations by never allowing its courts to question the seacts of the legislative branch of the Government, fur any purpose or under any pretense, and by retaining the supreme head of the judioial power, in the upper branch of its legislature. 29 We shall notice presently, how carefully tlie government of the United States has secured: itself against judicial usurpation. The American Constitution does not contain any clause or Article, declaring the government divided into three separat departtments, neither of which shall interfere with the duties properly belonging to the otlier, as is contained in the Colistitution of Iowa and tlhis, and some of the other States, a provision which is unnecessary, and (as we have learned by our California experience.,) is liable to be completely misapprehended and dangerously construed. But it contents itself by simply establishing separately, the three pow ers ill the government which nactutll experience lias proved to be necessary in all firee constituions. Because, we see plainlv', that if one body of the government were allowed to make laws, and then to cionstrue and execute them, there would Inot exist the necessary checks or restraints to prevent such body from governiling thte country as it saw fit. And that when once entrusted with such power there would be no leqal mode of getting rid of it, (except by constitutional change) however oppressive or obnoxious it might become. It is also equal ly apparent, that if either two of the three apparently natural divisions of government, were entrusted to one body, it would l)ecome almost equally objectionable, because, if one body were allowed to make the laws and execute them, or to make and construe them, (as onU' Supreme Court has doue,)in either case the power would almost inevitably lead to gross abuses. Therefore it has been found the acme of political wisdom to create the powers separately, and endow the first with authority to nmake the laws, the second with authority to execute them, and the third with authority simply to declare tlhenm, and announce what they truly are, whenever questiolns arise, in the transactions of life, as to their real meaning, or as to their having been properly passed, or properly obeyed, or properly executedl. In all this I amn only restating what is perfectly fanmiliar to Senatars. But it will serve to recall to their reccollectioil the necessity there is, for so constituting tliese several del)artments, as to irender it absolutley certain that each one of thenm will contain as manry checks upont its action, as will be at all consistent withl its efficiency. For a eonstitutional governmenut, it will be remembered, is a government of checks aid directions, fiom beginningto end. And in prop,,rtion as these checks are removed from any of its departinents, and the mere individuals wivo must be placed in them, are allowed to exercise thieir own judzinent and discretion, jlest s(, fai noss your Government depart firom the g:.i,nd object sought for in constitutions, that is, e government of laws, aind not of mere individuals or individual notions or opinions, however conspicuously obtruded, or plausibly argued. But altlhough nll these three separate and distinct departments seem to be indispet,sably necessary in a good constutitionral govetrnnreit, yet it is by no means to be understood or even imragined, that they are each of the same, or equal, weight acd power in the government. ln England the legislative departulent is absolutely sipremne over toth (and each) of the others. And yet, theoretically and in practical effect, each one of them, the Judlicial, the Executive, or Sovereign as it is there called, and the I'arliatnent, are co-ordinate del)partments of the same Government. The Anierican constitution differs essentially in its organization of these two departments. but (what I am only now trying to illustrate,) the sanie, or corn paratively the same, relative power is still carefully preserved in each, under the Ameican constitution, as exists under the English constitution. The Judicial power is the last named, and is desigae(d to be as colmpletely subjected to the legislative power as is possible without enldangering its dignity, its jlust independence and its efficiency. All its judg es firom the highest to thle lowest, are appointed by the Executiv e, with the consent of thle Senate, and aie niensuireably under the control of the legislative power.''The Congress of the United States, whenever it chooses to exercise the power, can ditminish or increase the number of Judges, arid can impeach and remove them from office. next, in an increasing scale of these powers, comnes the Executive P'ower, which is greater that th,le Judicial. UInder the government of the Uiiite( States, we find one manrn etitrustd for. brief period, with greater actual eower, than all its Courts and Judges together. The President can apploinrt, (with tlhe consent of the Senate,) the Chiefs of all the 3Bureaus in the vwhole Executive deI)artihert of the Gov. ernnent, and remnove thctn at pleasure. And the same is true of all the Consuls, Foreign Mlinisters, and Anibsssadors of the nation. And we also rerneniber tlllt hle appoints all the Judges arnd Justices of the Judicial department, and all the Marslhals, who are to carry their decrees into effect, and removes the latter at pleasurie. Andl in thlesnrie way he can make treaties. He can veto laws patssed by Congress; and is thIe Comnmander in-Chief of the Army and Navy of tihe United States, and cornmissions their ofli(&ers. Indeed, in time of peace, the President of the United States possesses more actual power than has been exercised by the head of the Eng,lish monarchy in twenty years; ard in war, lie is not only Commander.iin-Ch-ief of all the military power of the Union, but also of all tlre congregated nations of which the Unionr is composed, whenever their forces are called into its service. But the other of these powers is the one which is first in importance, andl is the one first namned in the Constitution of the United States, and of this and all the other States. 30 In' all free, or even partially free, Constitutions, the legislative department is'the highest and most grand of all. In our country it is not itself the Supreme power'. (for that is left,'where it actually i-s ill every country, with the people themnselves,) but it is ti:e direct and immediate representative of the Supreme Power in the goverilment. It is the only department which, (freely speaking,) is not controlled by law. It itself makes law. It is amiientble to no punishment It is answerable to no power on earth, except the people. It is sworn to support the Constitution, but even if it violates it, or neglects any other official duitv, it cannot be punished, by any other tribunal which exists. It is responsible iii ino way to either (,f the othier departmuents. It ia~,iot be ca.lled in questioii for anything, Ly either of the otlher departmteuts, or both of them together. But it can call in question'their couduct. And it can, whenever it'1cemit proper, or necessary, impeach an)y or all of tiheir officers, aud remove aniiv or ill of them fromu their offices, whilst it it-elf remains undisturfbed, and is as iniriiove-al'bi in its powers as the greiter power which stands behiiiid it, and aninally raises it into bIeiiin. And eveii to tilat gire-at,er power its ineiiim)eois are not aienable,',,lr theyv are but the emboilitents of that very power itself; and even the people cannot puinish us ini the o.iDces which we iiow hold, illyv -mnore than thiey can puiiisli themselves. For in the eyes of the goverunienit we are' the people thenisel ves, assemhled i in maungeable nuimbrs anilI controlled by a Constitutioni. Aud our duty consists mainlv, in,tupurvising t ll t}io other dellartments of the goverilmeiit, pioviding mealns for their support, and remedies for their ibuses,aiid p'.ese'ibiug authoritative rules to guide and govern the business ani,t intercourse of human life, so as to iisure the great*st amount of liunian happiness. Such, as you all k ow, is the theory upon wliiel: the three sepjairate delpa,'tii-ents of our Amiericaii governments are founded; and such are the relative powers, not usefulness but powers, of the several del)artments. And such ttlen is the relative power of the three depart inelits under this constitution; the liuiiiblest of which, as we have alreadiy seen, is, for sonie cause, aspiriug to make itself gieater than either of the others. When the J,,dicial -)epartaeret of a ftee government is so happily oirgainized and constituted, as to insure its liuinb)le and conscientious obedience to the laws, aned a dischiarge of its unceasing and nierc'iful duties, wvith iiitegrity and probity, and without any reference to the inportanee of the,.ndividuals or tlie view s of the i:,dividuials, who preside in its courts, it then becomes, perhaps, relatively speaking, the miost useful of a!l the departmeiits of goverili-ielit. But now let us go on aud ascertlai what has heeii done by this constitution, to secure this iiiiible hut truly great and even god-like branch of tlte government, against judicial corruption and usur pation., The beat, because the quickest and most convincing way, in which we can do this, is to conipare the constitutional checks an(i guards which have been thrown arouniiid that dejpartinent. with those which surround the two other departments, under this same constitutioii. By examining the State constitutions of former years, and those of recent'adoption, it will be found that far greater checks are now thrown around the iilecutive Department, than was formerly customary. The example of the United States-constitution is no longer followed in this respect, by the States. Fortuiictelv for us the constitution of Iowa had adop)ted the progressive policy on this subject, and we find it ii outr owvu. Tiie Governor lis no louger allh)wed to control the Executive D)epartmiiet. In time of peace lie is stripped of nearly all his great powers. The veto power, and the pariloiiiiig power, are about,tlie only positive pioweis whici are still left to him.lIe is the ChielfiMa'gistrate of the State, and as such is the ad of the Executive Departimleint. All othieir eoiif f that depaiitineut are subordinate to him. They are -oiimissioiied by il, and their annual reports must be. made to Iii-ii. IuLit noie of tteni are subjected to his ilterference in their duties. Except the Secretay'3' of State (who, in my opinion, ought aiso to be elected) lie does lot apiniioiiit ay of th,in. knot are thiev responsible to liii; ilor soliject to be reiiioved by him. But they ire elected by the p)cople, like Iiimself, aid at the sanme times aud ior the saioe terms. Aud like himself tliov also aire respionsible to the LIegislature foi their official conduct Tlius we see, at.a glance, how conil)letely that depiartmetint is surrounded with checks. We see that the chief of that dep)artnieilt and of' the State itself, could not do mlic iiar, even if lie should grow ambitious, aind allow niere vaniity and self-haiortaiiee, to take the place Of usefuluess witli reflectiorn. We see that he of hiisulsf, could not draw a warraut, nor settle aii account, nor piay out, nor hold, a dollasr of the public money; without the consent of the other iiid)eoeudent bureaus of his depiartiuent. And tliat they all are,' check upoii each otheir. So also we discover in the organization of the legialutive department. that it is surrounded wiub mlaly constitutional checks. Reason would seeni to teach us, that if so much puwer should be entrusted to any body of men less thiai a majolity of the electoral citizenship of the State, such body ought to be comipiosedi of more thai two or three persons, and ought to have g eat checks throwi around its actioii. Aud we fi,id sucih to be the case. Ini the first place it is designed to contain great ninbers: at preseut, thl(,uglh its rejirescntation is veiy small. it is coimposed of oiie huiidred and tlir. teeii men elected f~oim diriereut parts of the state. Iu the next place, its existence is as hirief as possibile, in order to allow it to accomplish anything at all, Every few months it is 31 completely dissolved, and carried lbnck again into its original element (the people), from whence it was taken. lii tile next place, it is completely split in two, and eacll part is set up to cleeck or op pose the otlier, just as far as it lIleases. These two parts are separate and distinct boilis, un equal iii numnibeis, and each cornm)letely iide pendent of tlle other, except thlat tlhey slihall both stay together as long, within thle electoral year, as either ore ilnSSts3 upon it. Both of them are equal in pow-er, dintity, and respon sibility; the only material difference being that but one half of tile members of oie b dy, are elected annually, and for a little longer period than those of tlie othter. li the fourth place neither one of these bodies can )pass aiiy law. A i ajority of thle one may agree to and pass any bill or diaft for that purpose, but every word and sinteclee must be agreed to, and be also passed with due formality by the other, before it can become a law under anv circum stances. In the fifth )ilace, when a nmajority of both thesex bodies are brought to a i)er feet agreeluelit, they cannot even then pass a law. Thle bill being passed by both of themn must then be submtitted to tile ch:ef of thle Ex ecutive Del)attientu If he vetoes, or sends it back refusing to agree to it, his reasons for so doing mlust be stated and recorded. Anid it must then be reconsidered and passed over again by two-tlirds of'the nmembers in each body formally agreeinlg to it, and recording thleir- individlual names in favor of it, or it cannot becolme a law at all. All these things are perfectly familiar to us, but the recital of themn brings freshly to our minds, the great checks which ave firiily and immovably thrown arounil the legislative departinetit, and the executive departmiient, of the goverlimuent; imitating in this respect. the constitution of the Uniion, and of nearly all the republics of which itis composed. We find that with each of these departinents every reasonable precaution is takei, to be relieved against the almost unavoidable abuses, and usulrp)ationis, which have never failedl to tempt pIoor human nature, whenever it is clothed with extraordinarv powers; and especially when it is prione to that tiiflinig amnbition which seeks mere personal fame, instead of thatgreat ambition which is evei ready to loose anld bury thle individual, in the famne and glory of his country alone. But now let us turn our minds upon the conistitutional oirganization of the Judicial Departmenrt, which, in our State government, way, perhaps, be fairly and justly ranked as only second to the whole legislative departmeut itself. What checks do we find thrown around the action of this department? WhI)at immovable barriers do we see, calculated to prevent or even iritended to hinder it from usurpations?W5hat guards do we see there, to prevent it from doing whatever its mere judges, shall please todo? What provisions do we discove r to secure it against mistakesn What plans do we detect, to giiard it ngainst wilful errorq What arrangerrents can we poiiit out, to pre veut or hinder its actual corruptions; or to re lieve the wNroru,ed ag,ainist its eorrul)t or iwill ful decisions? Sir, none. Practically, and therefo)re properli, speaking, none whateverlI Here the comparison of our constitution with that of the Uniion is totally at an end. Here, even its resemblance to the constitutions of any, of the States which are the most renowil ed in their jutdicial history, can no lornger even be traced. Why is this? What is the reason fc-r thrust ing asidc all the land marks, which experience has erected for our guide. anrd foisting into be ing this tremendous powder, unguarded, un changeable, except by chlangoing the constitu tion, and practically' irresponsible? Is it be cause it was tlhoughlt safe, since this branch of the government, as to be intrutsted to the lawyers? The time Nas, when real lawyers, as a body, arnd almnost as individuals, were great men.'tld just men. The time was when lawyers. from thi(ir constant devotion to the study of the principles and arguments of jus tice, learned well its quiet ways, and walk(d in them, with great thoughts, and honest, and upright minlds. The time was when lawyers were an ornament to their country, because they wcrq an aristocracy of intellect, learn ing, honesty, and morality. But that time has passed away. Arnd now, it caln neither be proved, niior sately aflirmed, that. as a body, they are either models of virtue or paragons of' iitelligence. The time was, when lawyers were not made in one day, nor by paying for anl entertainment. The tinme w-as, when, in portions of our own country, seven years preparatory study, and arl actual, not an imaginary, but ait actual good moral character, were necessary to make an attorney; and three years longer was necessary at the bar, belore the attorney could assume the responsible position ot a couusellor at law. And in Eingland, whose laws and jurisprudence are still the basis of our own, I believe ten years of study and practice is still necessary, to attain a legal position, which I have seen repeatedly reached in California, in much less time thin ten days. The time was when neither dishonest meni, nor immoral men, nor triclksters, nor legal snobs, could hold high heads in courts of justice, or gain the highest positions, upon the very benches, where justice itself is supposed to sit enlthroned. Then, the laws were read as a system, and their principles were taught witli the certainty of a science, and never were these prilnciples neglected or overlooked by courts, througli igrnorance, nor corruption, nor policy.'I'he, a knoweledge of the laws, and their principles, was what gave strength and pri-.emirlncac to the lawyer; now, political ijflucnce, or an iltimacy with the Judges, is said to bc frequeiitly of more weight, than legal learning or ability. Then, ' i i....l,4 I' 1 c.a - 32 lawyers went into the trial of causes. with an where they do not enjoy our liberty, but are accurate knowledge of the issues to be tried, ruled by an aristocracy, and treated as the and with the consciousness that the law, and subjects of an hereditary sovereign. no such not the opinion of the Judge,. was to be ad- imprudent and reckless trust of the judicial ministered; new, the trial of causes is not power, is allowed, or tolerated(l. Thewhole merely an honest contest for justice, and the House of Lordsitself, all the peersoftherealm, triumph of legal principles, but rather the the whole body ol the iiobility ofthat vast nastruggles of Xsmartness," trickery, and con- tion, are alone entrusted with the great powers cealment. Then, councellors, who were not which we here actually repose in two Calitorlearned in the law, did not dare to go upon nia attornies at law! And yet we boast of the bench; now, those in this State, who are making our government to suit ourselves, and the best qualified for the bench, stand no pride ourselves upon having it as it ought to chance whatoever, to be elevated to its humble be. Why should we be so infatuated with but grand and sacred duties. Then, there might names, and so forgetful of things? Why should have been some show of reason and policy, in we endure such self-inflicted tyranny? Why entrusting the administration of justice on the should we longer sustain a judicial system, bench, to the hands of a few lawyers, whose which is only tendi'ng to bring the very name great learning, retnoowned int(egrity. and pro- of courts and lawyers into just contempt? found obedience to the religion wh;.cli origin- It is idle to talk of the individuals who now ated the noblest precepts of our common lan, chance to preside in that court. No human might have enal)led them, with the assistance'bein)gs are entitled to any such powers, in any of the still greater learning which then sur- country which pretends to freedom, or to the rounded them at the bar, toadminister justice, least possible intelligence. And few human without varialjleness; or shadow of turnilig. beings can possibly be found, who would not But even conceding that the legal promes abuse it. The very men who are loudest in sioti was, at this day, and in this State, com denouncing the individuals who have been posed of all the learning ability, and hirh inoo- presiding there, would be themselves, herhaps, rality, which ever characterized it, either in still more unfit for the same position But no England, or America; still, did any one, even mere individuals are worth talkinig about. or durinu the primuest days of the legal profession, thinking about, in considering sutch a subject. ever he r of the Supreme Judicial power of a Indivitiuals are but the objects and instrugreat commer, ial State, being left in the inents of government.' And in the light of' hands olf two lawyers. And not only that, but the principles upon which it is founded, they left to their discretion. without any constitu- are but atoms of animated dust, who move and tional guards against their conduct. And not act to-day, and to-forrow are silent forever. only that. but also without any appeal from None of the errors of this constitution are to their decisions, in any case, however moment- be accounted for, and explained, by the mere ous the niecessity, or however apparent their abuse of individuals. It ought not to be so error? exposed to abuses, To censure ind'.viduals, is Sir. such a judicial department, even in an old to censure the people who have placed them State, whose policy had been long settled, and in power. The people Phave done no wrong; whose laws had become nearly all pc.sed upon in theory, they never can do wrong; and whatand reduced lo a system, would be dangerous ever they do alwaysemust be right. They and unwise, in the extreme. But. for this new have done the best they could; and in my opinand immense empire of California, it is not ion they have had some as good and true merely an error, it is an enormity. It is inot friends in this government, for the past four merely impolitic, it is outrageous. Two law- years. as they have to-day. Indeed, perhaps, yers, it may be, unread, utnlearned, vain, and the majority of those who are now in office, cotilident, but inexperienced, atrid without any have aided the people to elect the very men knowledge, or even belief ini law, as a science; to power, who have hitherto struggled, but two men, who, it may be, would never be spo- struggled in vain, to secure a good and pros ken of, nor thou,ght of, as even men of good perous government, under a bad and vicious habits, or men whom you could saft'ely appoint constitution. your private agents, and entrust even with But, sir, I beg to state still other objections your own individual prope(rty; two men. it to the organization of our judicial department. may be, of gross sensuality, of uncontrolable It is not only limited by the constitution to vices, and of dangerous profligacy; may by three men, anv two of whom can control $$ the mere blunder, or accident, or thoughtless- action, in its supreme court, but these the ness, of a partizan nomination, and a partizan men are not el,en allowed to be elected in suct support, become the supreme masters ot all a manner as to insure their beiig at all fit for our courts, the interpreters of all our laws, the the office. They cannot even be elected at a supreme arbiters of justice, between all -his tlme when their ovun mierits, and not the power vast people; and the very depositors and guar-'of their party, would carry them into office.dians of all our rights to property, and even They must be elected at the general election. to liberty itself. Thuts, the Legislature is not only deprived of' Sir, in the very monarchy of England, where the power of inereasing their number, but. althe people do not govern themselves at all, so, prohibited from providing for their election -~~~ ~~ a,', 0- -. - < > 0, >To..X 0'' D c~ @gX W~it5! a SSSX tS4; W;@02 t S~1 - - 0 ~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~7 ~~ 0 -r- -~~~~~ -7 0 -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C -cl- * E:,C)0 34 impossible that giving du. weight to all its advantages as well as disadvantages, it will trov7e thaIt it hqs lost more thanti it lihis reained, tile experiieint. At prisciit its Sup-ehiuc Appellate Couot, call,d the Court of Appeals, conisists of eight Judges, four of whloin are elected by tile State at large, aild fotur are a ken, at stated periods, fi-om the Justices of its Sulpremne Court, wvlo have served in that sub. ordin ite cap)acity for the longest peri(le. Its Supreme Court, whiell is oiilv iii iiifc,rior coul't, can never be held bh les tliai th,'ce but miaV c,iisist of mlore, of the District Judges. It is, the refore, -equired to be m11r- ( lnerohs ly coiuposed than our Silipreme Court, although it is not tlieir couIrt of last resorl. Our Conlsti tution authorizes two Jtidzes to hol,l our0 tt l or 0 -Couiti id i-e~V requir1,-s lorec than two to decidle atly case whIttver,'d fi'ot their decision tlleI-e i- io apeal Tthe,,Iges iu e w Yo,'k are t b elected Ibv the ptolde' but at sucll times as tli Legi,i-htttire iiltl see tit t,, pre-s ribe It is'woirtliy of Itaiticullikr attetitioi,i ti at not one of the o lierStates whose couuittflast reort - is comullosed of but three iiichI, has p)ermitted either oftlie thil-ee to be elected it ageptl'o011 ti'- election, whilst uitder til Csi thait pi)Ihil)ite-l elcol, is the vrvery, oIle hilhl i3 fixcd uljloni. Ii low a, the uel of tile,[ -Il'ecIie (2oiI-t al-ce l eted by t~ie joit(t vote of the two houses of the GeIieil Aiss-iibly Atd the Distirict Judzes av-c &-lC~-tca tile et'd ai electioiis. lihld at n dilffecloCit t ilie fi'oni the gelierlal Ilee-ioIs. Illinois, tle Judlg-es are elected by tile ieo,)1e, but a di fferent time froln the gelier-al election, i- fixedI y the Coiisti tlitiou for that esplecial plu,rpose. In M[isu,1 the Judges of the S.-3t. eme Court are,l~poit ed by the Goveriioi-, by and with the dvico and consent of the Seiate.,'i(I the Ciculit Judges are elected by the 1)eople but a special judicial electioii is there al so required by the Constitutiou' which exemtl)ts thieo as far as is possible fromt iee partisln control. in Aikanisas they aire elected bty tile joint v ote of both houses of the Legislatire. And iii Texas, the only other State in the Union whio1e judiciary is constitutionally organized with such a trifling number of men ii their courts of lest resoit (exc ept Mississippi and Telilnessee, where they eachl have a different judicial systeim and a s,-parale Court of C hancerv) in Texas, the Juddges ale ali app)oiitedl by tie Governor, by aaid with tile idvice and cousent of two th~irds of the Seniate. I get thils Inifor-latiuii fh'oin the Cono. itutiLoiii of all the Si-'es wllich I have niamed, as published witl'.iii tile last three years; anid I presumne I have stated it correctly. Besides tIle difreileiit 1mod(es5 of electinlg t[heir Judges (which alolle is of so much moment tbat our judicial system is no longer fit to be eoiapai-red with theius), the Oonstitutions of each of those States differ in other, and somaetirnes impor tant respects, i re lation to the,r judiciary. They generally inipose particular qualifications which their J udles must pIossess; and take precautions against tthe three men who are to control their judicial power, being elected wholly firom aay o01e,,v two p,,i-tioiis of the State; and contain other importan Irecautionary meas ui-es. But our Constitution riot only has none of the precautions wli,i-h the others contaiin, but has none whaitever, of any kind. Indeed, whilst of all the States in the Union, iiot one has such a ligiatory and unsettled popula tiori, or call possibly requiree such extreme caultioi inl the selection of its Judges as our own, yet the JIrovisions of our Coustitution eom01lei us to eidui-e a systeml which is, in this i'es}eet also, coImIlfetely destitute of any pre 1-.1,1ti,1s, aud is (.obei'ly aid truly) absolutely reckl ess. ll,,w aiiy man of sense can expect, or what reai-)1i lie c0 l ave to siplplose, that justice will ever 1)e well a'rid (-e)ll v, l r eveoii tolei — ibly vad4:11inistc'ere in this copiltiy,3 u'itil tliere is a clialigo of tlie Conistituti(Il, it is iip)ossible for 111e to conlceive. Ou- ent1 ire judiciai sfstemi is wrong'. Tlie whole organizalion of our C,)t,'ts, Conlity, i)isti-iet an(: upi erne, is grossly,efoctive liid the lattev' is iiudei'ihbly,, a,id, I thi ik, nlost disgracefully lid. oi my part, 1 have never vet heard a lain wyer, oi 1 any one else, speak well of it,l atliout'li I have 1)een1 oe'e ever 1i0ee it was 1111ft1'telv anid witholit Ice-sity, a1(1 I thiuIk, witlhout excuse, foistedl ill),o oil' Staite by 1a vote,,f prou),ibly iin,t o;~e-fi:'th of the olect,rs then ill tlhe country. A~ii(l I confess, if I ever sliliu,l tiudcI au-in to speak well of our pi-eselit judicial s stel, I woulIl be fi)rced to colue10l(10, inl spite of all eliai-ity, either that he was a Jud,ge whose term of olibce has y-et long to run, or thiat lie spoke without candor and fi-om ijterested iimotives, o0r else that lie was destitute of the nost ordinary i-ittelligence. Conclusion, Si]-, men may well ask how we could have gone o)1 at all witlih our State (,(over,iiiiieit eveII as fir as we liave. if this Cons-titttiion be really as grossly defective, as I have i-epi-e eit*-'l it to be. But, sit, we have not gonie 4)11. IVe ha.tve gone just whlieie we iiiiglit hliove beeit expected to go. We~ liave gone bickwards. C eii goilig backwards now. Our puiulic reveniue, insteaid of 1iei-eeasilig, is beceiniiigh coili -imrtivel.? less aid less. Aud this goveriihett is pei'l:-ps i~iipoiceiitihly, liii iti rait, v si;~k~~iuq' owr n lower inl ~tren~gthl,,efiqciei-ic'y ao,d usefuilness,. Aid I eotilildcniliy bolieve, that Ino iiia i lives'lwio will evecr sce tS a:cseil atd -ittaii out, liee pos'tiun, ai~d lle gi-eat 1)1p0rper-ity anld hiail-)inei s which this couniti-r is so well calculated to affoi-d us, until lie sees this Constitutlou totally and thoroughly reformed. Sir, the workings of this judicial syst em 35 have now been tried here for six years; and years ago, its failure was discovered and a,l initte, and measures were attempted for the Legislaitre to affoird relief. But year after year and year after year. have men assemn )le0l ii these halls, and heard the concealed eSo )laiuts. then the stiflee exe:.ratiois, and theai t}ie universal wvhisperiitgs of the Ipeople of tlie whole State atgaiiist their Courts of Justice, rand the mockery with which they gelierally pei'f,,)ri their- otfices' until these comnl~lairits arid execrations have become -s lonil arid tlireatening(, and irrepressible, as the tlhioiders of aa outraged firmamnnt, a-ld have broken and bl:rst asunder the withs and bands of law, in a thousand localities of the State. And if we ever intend to do any-thing at all for the relief of the conntr:,', it seems to nle it is our duty' to do so iiimediately. Sir, in order to deteirmIne what course we oti,.1it to pursuie npoii this subject, let us look back, for an instant, to the conduLict of our al cestors. L,-t us cill tup in our minIs, the me mofle-i of asliingtor, A,lm Jeff4rson and F''rikIri' and hosts of rnen of tieir tunes, of equal houesty, p i'obity, ability and patriotism. /low would su.-Ii enia act unider the same (.ii ceuianstaicees whicl rno s drrou:dus,; H,,w wouldl they conduct themselves under such politiealcurss, as we, thieir descendants aud couriti-y'm -n, are enduring- a,-rd prmittil, here, ill this;Aei'icar Sta te? Would they iave pei-nitted tlihemselve(s to be thus long and ba1'iselv abused by agoveraiiit so eltir-el rinsri~ced to their cond-ition an situaitioni? 5Vould thev live under an equally defetive cnu-stitutiori, arid ue,(orlra,e nio refoirms s Would the), rein-tia indif feren t uider such abuses, or tiri-i ti-aitor,s to every p)rinciple of true lihoiior and patriotismr Wvonld t,hey reinain indiffer etit to oilicial dep ravity, and tae incre'1sing, spirit of puibl)lic iminoraslityA, Wonld they be guilty of the disgr':,'etul coutluet, of remainirig iriattritive to the welfaiie of' any of the great States of t,}ti eot,,itrjt of which tiiey were eitizelis? W iere thli(y the kind of imenr to deter nii,e to flee f so.,ii srcii (,,nut"y as tiis, as .i0n as thIe e(, l fil tc ti',l its gelierons ai 1rlfestore's, the,- rneca,,s of siill)oi-t? W~ou [(I l ever ces-e to hie eri ai s i n any p)e t 0io: of Auierila'i?W,,id they be gultt' of seeing a i'erit, Amr —ilean State sinkingigiuto dis. grI.e,t I wtitotot maki Ingi an effort to reileci it? i,iiee,I is SiltIi conduct I)ecornirie to citur-tiz s I,t' I,,,.'!, tl~,,~:::[,,:s'it.1c. tioas wor-tliv of(ifthU ':, o',v,,'", of;i; -l::l'ie't!L v Si-swht is there iil r'ti:iis ~ lntrv, v,'II c,! ( I. (,an c iiue,: oii l,i -i to } 1"2,,: Il.,r -if, 1 kiiowv of notlting, Nh:,"t ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.' -yl 1lO t' - I O' ~ O S i.3 l l e 1 -ec'r even'l toi fi-: lfit l; wit, exIi cp0't its st,i'CvtOii lit. Il every oilrei i'pect, it i s ~iot iirely ri,istiiipassed, but wholly uiicqlualled by any otheri State'vhatever I,ide-ed s1i', whe,'e else in all this Union, where else an all this continent, lb there a State so ma'niceent? And yet the teiderness an(r danger's of its iifirit years, ai'e leieili passed' ~ tmidst the gireatest politicatl ir~d'f' ren-e and aluses, w qiIth aly AImer-ican St,Lte hias ever befoei e ndired, fi'om those wio cla iiin to be its own citizens. Iideed it is Ilss ed by naiture, anid cursedi by n,othling liutlt wliit Ie owl es, can iremove. Is it not o0-ui Stat5 e; is it iro our countryi If not, thlien wire-a is o01,' State,. where is our conritity'? lPirodlibly ii,,11e of us will ever rigtin live peim.tTrently in any- other.. And ii itself, certainly no State, eitlihr in his toi'y or ill set,, ever had so wonlderiful. a beginning, or' (witl the blessing of God) so, noble a cai-eer to l)ut'sce. W~ith resources moire i'xtensive and~ exhaust less than greatt irations and kingdoms p,ossess' witli a sea coast standiari for a tlou:_iand miles up1)onl the v ery ceari, w'v,ise comiiirnorce ]as ex c ited the e l'iitv of,ll tiiurope, fir a I'ast, anid is the co)ve,tecd boon tliat hias ait leiig'th em brIoiled its gicreates-t ni-ations inl nl-ie war:. 1111l1 w'tli a s,,il'rtid cli irate more blessed thlai Italy; wlhat sin lt State in all the limits of ouir eoulltr-, is so ht1;1i1i11 ly 1)rte e by natue, to sustai.~ a grt-ett a happy' nation. And w lint: Stateo ng 1111)0 all our tlie~ulies, is mol-e wN'oirtliy to excite o(101 pride, our p1ttiiiotisrri, and oat entire arid absolute love ansd devaot ion? -No State e0ver- be-for-e has been, or' pri-obably' ever aga,iin call beco,rie, a part of I lie Ainericaia Union, wlii'.h is so ricli, so vast, so in giufi o-ent, sio lovely Iindeed California to America, is trul,' moar'e thal Itily to ll'tro,l1e. it is true we harve no nreoit ct ure, no sculp tri-e, no prirtitn rgs, no a nl,.cielit rri,)rinuirents, iio ".,oble 1recordis Ofea h'eroic race' " sill, Itaily was withoit thet n oiice;arii(l we lir,,ve, in vcry truth, all t'hce beauties of her skyv, all the deli ciouisn1es;s otf liti- elihate, all th,e p)leas,ri-e of hi(r lastintg summers, and rnote of lher fevers, 11oneo of lir manlaia, none af liei'1roecos, n1or) heri Pont,'I i! t' lirive'Iwel aln Etna noai it Vesuvius hobt of w}vat use ari-e they', unli0ess to destroy still mi-o1e o.-ias, or to 1110]oatlic li ouis of a1 flew P'eOillieli'! She criririot ateahthie y-ieldI of oill orchariids,, ii,irotir ri fie, ci —t eit lierei01nt 0ier1 olivetrecs, 11 oer cOl'iagleS, O'f hiri- gral)ers, y ield rnol'e r,iliriidailly thairi our olwni, altliorih she be hIlssedi ill son;g as lte derir lail,(if the oli'e aid the viie." Nor, inileed, hiie we a I',, i: But-Iltrily liad] no R,oim-e onic(.'.rcl A%ow ~ 1'(, "I, ('o3011', We ar'e ne, ie have buit juis,t Inlid ti' sI elv,,lt r's breast. ~11A(1d 1c)(ili,l 0Iow. tI-( 1 vcie ra[ dr iffusi a''io,~ Iof k'wdre, tlre wII' rler-i~tl'ic-lii-ve n.ielits of Iirt, anial te i li e: i,s of sciec-rce, iiih t, I ira~;2ciedoi (,t 1)11 c~,i,t~e,ria'eirriirtt-thelri i'cili(}lllbcl' ]1lr'S s: lidtlteuc wai -it, ill fLir'Iy-, yet six t.lt idi's,i l,,111htoi-y be w Fi'tt, F w1 s I1 ),'tll. Ii i I.I iIV,. glorions for tlhose wilo now live au 1)11leedshave not ali'eaidy been achfieved, and "growv, 36 dim-with age;" our monuments have not already been erected, and "fallen to decay;" bnt all, with ns, is still in the future; our history is to be, written; our moinuments are to be, er,cte,. Sir, of all who corn ose her citizenship, today, of all who boast of thle niame of Amiericanus, let nut one of us imiagine, that we are either fit to enjoy, or worthy even to inhabit a country, so lovely in itself, and so glorious in its destiny; if we remain any longer indif feient to the wicked deeds which have defiled her Coirts; and the wretched laws and govelllrnieit, whlich are but strangling and corrilpting her body, in the very infancy of its being.