THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS.
PART I.
THE THEORY OF HUMAN PROGRESSION.








THE THEORY
OF
HUMAN PROGRESSION,
AND
NATURAL PROBABILITY
OF A
REIGN OF JUSTICE.
"The charm that exercises the most powerful influence on the mind is derived
Dss from a knowledge of that which is than from a perception of that which oill be,
ven though the latter be nothing more than a new condition of a known existence."
-HUMBOLDT' CosmOS.
BOSTON:
SANBORN, CARTER AND BAZIN.
PORTLAND:
SANBORN & CARTER.
1856.




STEREOTYPED AT TIIE
BOSTON STEREOTYPE FOUNDRY.




DEDICATION.
TO
MONSIt:UR VICTOIR COUSIN,
PROFESSOR OP PHILOSOPHY AT PARIS.
SIR:-To you I beg leave to dedicate the following Essay
on Humria  Progression, with those- sentiments of esteem  and
admiration which I share in common with so many of my countrymen.
The truth I' endeavor to inculcate is-' That credence rules the
world -that credence determines the condition and fixes the
destiny of nations -that true credence must ever entail with it
a correct and beneficial system of society, while false credence
must ever be accompanied by despotism, anarchy, and wrongthat before a' nation can' change its condition, it must change its
credence; that change of crede'nce will of necessity be accompanied sooner or later'by change of condition: and consequently,
that true credence, or in other wtords knowledge, is the only
means by which man can workl out his w'ell: being and ameliorate
his condition on the globe.
To no one could I dedicate a work intended to elucidate these
principles so appropriately as to yourself —to you, Sir, who
have labored so earnestly and so well to give to your countrymen a correct system of Ethical Philosophy, and, through them,
to communicate to Europe a scheme of natural morals which
must ere long bear a rich and most beneficial harvest.
1*




6                     DEDICATION.
The question is often asked, What is the use of philosophy?
-nor is the answer difficult.  Next to religion, philosophy is,
of all known causes, the element that most powerfully tends to
determine the condition of a country. It is a power-a power
so vast that we are scarcely likely to over-estimate its effects;
and, though it must ever be unable to solve the great questions
in which our race is involved, it may, by uprooting political
superstitions and false religions, exercise an influence that no
calculation can compute. The theories of one generation become
the habitual credence of the next; and that habitual credence,
transformed into a rule of action, is ere long realized as a palpable fact in the outward condition of society. And thus it may
be truly said-As the philosophy of a country is, so its condition
will be.
In aiding so powerfully as you have done to substitute a
rational philosophy for the sensationalism  that previously prevailed, you have conferred a boon on France and on the world;
and your eloquent appeals for the principles of natural duty will,
no doubt, find a response in the hearts of your countrymen, that
must carry them onward to even a higher and more stable glory
than they have ever yet attained.
France has yet to read her great lesson of new philosophy
to the continent of Europe; and every student of the world's
thoughts and the world's actions must rejoice that you, Sir, have
been her instructor, and that you have laid on her those moral
obligations, of which to propagate the principles must open up
to her a new and glorious career.
Accept, Sir, the dedication of this work as a tribute of respect
from your sincere admirer,
THE AUTHOR.




CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION  OF THE NATURE  OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE......             15
CHAPTER I.
ON THE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN PROGRESSION.
SECTION L
Remarks on the Matters involved in Political Science,          31
Liberty and Property,.....                            33
SECTION II.
On the Mode in which Men have made Laws,..       37
Liberty of thought, speech, publication, and action,..  37
Restrictive laws,.......    41
The game laws, &c.,...              42
The excise laws,...       48
Taxation of labor,......        50
Indirect taxation,...62
Customs and excise,....  53
Unlimited legislation,.....    65
Its gradual limitation,....66
Legislation for thought,......    66
Sectarian legislation,  7. 67
Immutability of justice,......  68
Legislation beyond its province,......69
Change of laws- result,.......      60
Freedom of expression,..62




8                           CONTENTS.
The censorship,...  *  63
Despotic power-its means,..  64
Combinations,..... 66
Religious liberty,....  67
Reaction under pressure,..   69
The people and the rulers,....       70
Despotism and superstition;.                         ~.       71
Change of conditions,..  73
Free intercourse,... 74
Retrogression of Spain,   ~....  75
SECTION II.
The Combination of Knonwedge and Reason,.... 76
The Bible,..........77
Causes,.....    80
Demonology,.........            82
Popish miracles -Popery,.....    84
Persecution of witches,....                          86
Patriotism,.........86
Mercenaries,.                 ~...   87
The turning-point of modern times,......               88
Inductive reasonings,..90
Mental philosophy, ~~~.                                        92
Ethics,.......93
Revelation,......                          94
Correct credence,.....      95
The Bible......96
Natural phenomena-social laws,...97
Induction,.....   100
Dogmatism and scepticism,.....       102
Philosophy,...               106
The method:of Bacon,..... 107
Gradual circumscription of philosophy,...109
Common credence -primary knowledge,,..      110
Science and philosophy......                    112
Ontology,.......113
Criticism of knowledge,.... 114
Form and matter of knowledge,......116
Evolution of freedom,.... 119




CONTENTS.                              9
Conditions of freedom,.....  122
Credence,.........        124
SECTION IV.
The Use and Operation of the Combination of Knowledge and Reason,  125
Man's moral imperfection,..126
Evils of injustice,......127
Political association,...... 128
The progress of society,....   129
Use of combination,.                  130
Change of credence,........ 131
Negro slavery,...... 132
Emancipation of the Negroes,..133
Anti-slavery combination,...                      135
Predicted evils,.......   136
True character of Negro emancipation,..    137
The tax of the twenty millions,....   139
The corn laws,..... 139
Repeal of the corn laws,.....  147
The slave and corn laws,..  149
The argument of justice,......   153
The argument of benefit,.... 165
Moral force,.....                           156
The end of progression,.. 157
The origin of progress,.....   158
Means of progress,.....  159
Propositions on the operation of knowledge,...   160
~CHAPTEiR  II.
ON THE THEORY OF MAN'S INTELLECTUAL PRO4IESSION.
SECTION I.
The Order of the Sciences,.....       168
The sciences,......    170
The categories,......171
The modes,.......172




10                         CONTENTS.
Nature, knowledge, language,.......    172
The forms of reasoning,....                 174
The growth of the sciences,.......    178
The process of science,.......      184
Man science,........193
A millennium,......   198
Order of the sciences,.                   ~....   201
Dependence of the sciences,.....               203
Evolution of the sciences,..... 204
The marks of a science,........    205
Present position of the sciences,... 206
SECTION II.
Deerminaton of the Character, Poetion, and Boundaries of Political
Sciece,......   220
I. General observations,...   220
Political science,......   221
p II. The province and position of political econqy,.          229
Its position,...... 234
Its object,......   23
The welfare of man,....... 238
Growth of economy,.                                     239
A natural system of political economy,,..            240
Laws of nature deranged by man,....   243
The ultimatum of political economy,....244
III. The province and position of politics proper,.   246
Truth progressive,..... 247
Politics proper-its position,....                249
Socialism and communism,..250
Character of political relations,.....   252
Justice the foundation of political society,....24
Essential character of political society,.. 257
Posterior limit of political science,...259
Position of politics proper,.....                   262




CONTENTS.                          11
CHAPTER III.
ON THE THEORY OF MAN'S PRACTICAL PROGRESSION.
SECTION L
Outline of the Argument, that there is a natural probability in favor of
the Reign of Justice,.........263
A reign of justice, or political millennium,...   264
Order of knowledge,.                                     266
Correct knowledge produces correct action,....   268
Correct action produces the beneficial condition,..    270
Anticipation of a political millennium,.  272
Influence of Christianity,...... 276
The millennium of Scripture,.                            278
The millennium of nature,.... 280
The revelation through nature,.                          282
Natural truth-divine,....283
SECtION II.
Te Influence of Science on Man's Terrestrial Condition,..   284
Sensation and reason,...285
Reason posits power,....   286
Astronomy, geography, navigation,... 288
Measurement of time,....                              289
Application of mathematics,... 290
Mechanics and locomotion,...291
Machinery, chemistry, and electricity,.                   293
The soil and its productions,...                    295
Tenure of land,......  296
Drainage,......            298
Improvement of domestic animals,...... 299
Empirical and scientific physiology,...   301
Extension of human life,... 305
SECTION II.
Application of the Theory of Progression to Man's Political Condition, 306
Pauperism,...........307
Condition of Britain,...                          310




12                         CONTENTS.
Origin of pauperism,.....     313
The radical evil,.......                             315
The two parties,....   316
The two questions -liberty and property,...   317
Right of representation,....   319
Social science,... 320
Method of science,....   321
Arbitrary determination of crime,...... 326
What is a crime........         327
Crime and property,  ~....                               328
Property and land......   335
Major and minor of political science,... 338
Law measured by justice,....340
Supremacy of justice,..... 343
Law versus legislation,.....   344
Universality of justice,.....  345
Definition of crime,..... 347
Serfdom and aristocracy,...... 348
Deterioration of man......   355
Liberty.and property,.... 355
The lord and the serf,...357
Equality in the eye of the law, and in the scheme of the state,. 359
Perpetual supremacy of justice,.....   369
Disposition of the soil,...370
Equality in the eye of the law, and in the scheme of the state,   372
Property in the soil,..                 378
The feudal system,.                                        384
Conversion of arable into pasture,.398
Enclosure of commons,....400
The politics of landed property,.. 401
The gradual evolution of truth,..... 412
A theoretic ultimatum,...                 413
The classes of society,...... 414
The practical man'and the theorist,....      41
Final propositions on the end of progression,... 419




CONTENTS.                          13
CHAPTER IV.
BRIEF OUTLINE OF AN HISTORICAL SKETCH, BEING AN ATTEMPT TO
APPREHEND THE SENTIMENTS OF THE HUMAN MIND WHICH HAVE
RULED SOCIETY, AND TO APPRECIATE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MAN THROUGH HISTORIC MANIFESTATIONS,. 421
Theories,..... 422
The papacy and the feudal system,..   423
War feudalism,........424
The feudal constitution of society,..                424
The equitable constitution of society,..                 426
Causes of war,........   427
The.trader,......                               428
War feudalism and parchment feudalism,....   429
The trader and the feudal system,.... 433
The feudal lords,.....434
War, pleasure, and policy,...                     438
Trade,..........   440
The period of barbarous war,... 441
The period of knightly war,....   442
The period of court pleasures,.                        443
The period of court policy,....   444
The occupations of the ruling classes,.. 451
War, pleasure and policy,...                              451
The policy system,.....454
Political economy,........   455
The equity system,...   458
Historic summary,....                        459
Historic development of man in the state,....        460
CONCLUSION.
Ultimate knowledge-unity of credence,.            462
A valid natural theology,......   464
Growth of theology,.......                               471
Substance, infinity, and power,...   473
2




14                        CONTENTS.
Design,.....474
Intelligence, intelligent design,..                   476
Possibility of moral theology,...478
Gradual evolution of a genuine natural theology,. 482
Man's fallen nature,.....485
Revelation,....     487
Theology, strictly scientific,.......   488
Present position of natural theology,....            491
Dependence of natural theology on natural science,.   494
Ultimate effects of scientific knowledge,.... 496
Christianity the main cause of human civilization,..  497
Truth restored to man,..... 499
APPENDIX.
0tn the Classzaation ofthe Science,..... 601




THE
THEORY OF HUMAN PROGRESSION.
INTRODUCTION.
PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OF THE NATURE OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE.
BEFORE attempting to exhibit an argument to establish the possibility of a science of politics, and to
prove also the probability that such a science may
reasonably be expected to evolve at this period of
man's progressive acquisition of knowledge, it is necessary to define exactly what we mean by a science
of politics.
Science is nature seen by the reason, and not merely
by the senses. Science exists in the mind, and in the
mind alone. Wherever the substantives of a science
may be derived from, or whatever may be their character, they form portions of a science only as they are
made to function logically in the human reason. Unless they are connected by the law of reason and consequent, so that one proposition is capable of being
correctly evolved fro  two or more other propositions,




16          PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OF
called the premises, the science as yet has no existence,
and has still to be discovered.  Logic, therefore, is the
universal form of all science.  It is science with blank
categories, and when these blank categories are filled
up, either with numbers, quantities, and spaces, as in
the mathematical sciences, or with the qualities and
powers of matter, as in the physical sciences, mathematics and physics take their scientific origin, and
assume an ordination which is not arbitrary.  Science,
then, wherever it is developed, is the same for the
human intellect wherever that intellect can comprehend it. It abolishes diversity of credence, and reestablishes unity of credence.
We have then to ask, " Vhat is the matter of political science?"  Of what does it treat?  What are its
substantives?  What is the general character of the
truths it professes to develop?
1. It'treats exclusively of men.
2. It treats exclusively of the relations between man
and man.
3. It treats exclusively of the relations of men in
equity.
Equity or justice is the object-noun of the science
of politics, as number is the object-noun of arithmetic;
quantity, of algebra; space, of geometry; or value of
political economy.*
- It must be observed that equity or justice is not itself capable
of definition. If it were so, it could not be the object-noun of a
science, as no science ever defines its object-noun. For instance,
unity, quantity, space, force, matter, value, are all incapable of definition; butforhs of unity,forms of quantity,forms of space,forms
of force, forms of-matter,forms of value, are capable of definition.




THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,              17
Politics, then, is' the science of EQUITY, and treats
of the relations of MEN in equity.
The fundamental fact from  which its propositions
derive a practical importance, is the following:" Men are capable of acting equitably or unequitably towards each other."
To' obliterate all unequitable (or unjust) action of
one maan towards another, or of one body of men
towards another body of men, is therefore the practical
ultimatum of the science of politics.
Politics, then, professes to develop the laws by
which human actions ought to be regulated, in so far
as men interfere with each other.
Human actions may be viewed under various distinct aspects:1. In their physiological aspect.  In this aspect, to
kill a man is to inflict' such an injury on his bodily
frame as causes the cessation of his functions.
2. In their economical aspect.  In this aspect, to kill
a man is to destroy a mechanism which possessed so
much value; and, consequently, to inflict a greater or
less injury to society, according to the value of the
person; killed.  Men cost a considerable expense to
On this subject we havesome observations to offer hereafter; but
if the reader should suppose that a science ought to define its
object-noun, he has only to refer to the mathematical sciences, not
one of which ever attempts to offer a definition of its noun-substantive major. Were a geometrician to offer the smallest speculation as to what space is, he would have departed altogether from
the province of geometric science. Spurious definitions of value
are occasionally set forth; that is, we are told-not what value is,
but what it does, a mode of definition altogether-illicit.
2*




18         PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OF
rear, and the destruction of the object reared is, or
may be, the loss of the cost and profit.
3. In their political aspect. In this aspect, to kill a
man may be a crime, or a duty, or neither, (an accident,
for instance.)  If by accident, the physiological fact is
the same, the economical fact the same, but the political fact is essentially different from intentional killing.
4. In their religious aspect. In this aspect, to kill a
man may be either a sin or a righteous act; and in
this aspect the killing involves all the three previous
modes, as intention is taken for granted.
Politics then, in its position, is posterior to political
economy, and anterior to religion. It superadds a new
concept to economics, and religion again superadds a
new concept to politics. Political economy in no respect can be allowed to discourse of duty, nor can politics be allowed to discourse of sin. Economy superadds the concept value to physiology, and the physiologist has exactly the same case to deny the value of
the economist that the economist has to deny the
equity of the politician, or the politician to deny the
religious quality of actions posited by the divine.
The four regions are perfectly distinct; distinct in
their noun-substantive major, distinct in the end of
their inquiries, distinct in their method, and distinct in
their practical signification and importance, although
all meeting in the organized, intellectual, moral, and
religious being, MAN.
Into politics, therefore, no action can be allowed to
enter which is not at the same time intentional, and
the action of one man, or one body of men, on another man, or body of men.




THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.         19
The substantives, then, that enter the science of
politics, are
Man,         Will,       Action;
and the general problem is to discover the laws which
should regulate the voluntary actions of men towards
each other, and thereby to determine what the order
of society in its practical construction and arrangement ought to be.  Men have social rules of action;
and, from the condition of men on the surface of the
globe, men must have social rules of action, whether
those rules are right or wrong. A practical necessity
exists for some kind of determination; but it is plain
from history, that in many cases the practical rules
have been altogether erroneous and criminal.  It is
therefore necessary to discover what the rules ought to
be; for the rules determine the political condition of
society.
In politics, as in every other science, it is necessary
to classify the forms of the matter with which we
reason; thus geometry classifies the forms of space
into lines, angles, and figures.
Actions, then, are classified into duties and crimes.
But as duty and crime are thus viewed subjectively, it
is necessary to determine the objective characteristics
of a duty and a crime, so as to be able to determine
the character of the action itself, without inquiring
into its motives. The only requisite would then be to
ascertain whether it was or was not intentional, for
this intentionality can never be laid aside.
Again, it is not only necessary to take into consideration  man, the subject, with whom  lies the
whole question of human liberty, but the earth, the




20         PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OP
object, with which lies the whole question: of human
property.
The same division that enabled us to classify human actions, will enable us to exhibit the aspects in
which the earth is considered.
1. The earth may be viewed as involved in physical
science. In this aspect, it is involved in astronomy,
mechanics, chemistry, &c.
2. The earth may beviewed as involved in economical science. In this aspect, it is a power of production -a power capable of producing wealth.
3. The earth may be viewed as involved in political
science. In this aspect, the power of production has
superadded to it the concept, property. Economy can
no more discourse of property than it can discourse of
duty or crime. -Property is a quality altogether incapable of being apprehended in the object itself by
means of sensational observation, exactly as the criminality of an action can never be apprehended in the
physiological characteristics of an action.
4. The earth may be viewed as involved in religion.
"The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof."
The difference between the political and the religious
mode of viewing the earth as property, is this: In
politics, the power of production is viewed as property;
in religion, the substance is viewed as property. Politics in-no respect treat: of the substance, although the
feudal systemr —according to which the king derived
his rights from God- assumed the proprietorship of
the substance, exactly as the- correlative system, the
papacy, claimed for its head the spiritual vicegerency
of God, and: assumed the" power of forgiving sin.




THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.       21
The feudal systenm has transmitted, on this subject of
property, a superstition strictly analogous to that of
slavery. The slave was an object, not an agent,- a
thing, not a being; he was property, and could not
possess property. In course of time, however, he
passed from the objective and superstitious mode of
estimation, and became transformed into a political
agent and power. The earth has not yet been transformed into a power; but the whole analogy of nientific progress would, e think,, lead to the belief that it
will come, ere long, to be viewed in this light.
It is quite evident that the earth cainnot function in
political'economy until it is transformed into a power
of production having a value. And, to carry it forward into the science of politics, all that is requisite is
to apply the axiom, "an object is the property of its
creator;" so that when political economy has determined, by a scientific method which is not arbitrary,
what value is created and who creates this value, politics takes up the question:where political economy
had left it, and determines, according to a method
which is not arbitrary,to whom the created value should
be allocated..We have thus the substaintives man, will,  action,
du, t crime, property; but as action of one man upon
another pecessarily implies an agent and an object, a
doer and a sufferer, the same action may be regarded
in its relation to the agent and in its relation to the
object. Thus the action which is called a crime in
the.gent, is caeled a wrongin respect to the person
against whom. the crime is cmmited; and again,
whatever duty lie upon one man, gives birth to,a coex



22         PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OF
tensive and correlative right in all other men. If one
man is bound not to murder or to defraud, another
man has a coextensive and correlative righlt to be unmurdered and undefrauded; and herein lies the whole
theory of human rights.  Thus the terms present
themselves in the following manner: —.gent or Person acting.      Person acted upon.
A duty.                    A right.
A crime.                   A wrong.
Finally, then, the principal substantives of the science of politics are-man, will, action, duty, crime,
rights, wrongs, and property. And equity or justice is
the object-noun of the science in which the relations
have to be determined.
From the previous considerations it is evident that
political science, if it can be exhibited as really and
truly a branch of knowledge, must assume to determine, not merely the laws that should regulate an
individual, but any number of individuals associated
together.  If an action be criminal for an individual,
it is no less criminal for ten individuals, or a hundred,
or a thousand, or a million. If it be a crime for one
man to seize another man and reduce him to slavery,
the criminality of the action is in no respect diminished if a whole nation should commit the action with
all imaginable formalities.  If it be a crime for one
man who is more powerful than another to deprive
that other of property without his consent the action
is no less criminal if a thousand or a million deprive
another thousand or million of their property without
their consent.  Science can acknowledge none of
these arbitrary distinctions.  If there be a rule at all)




THE, NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.       23
it must be general; and therefore political science
must assume to determine the principles upon which
political societies ought to be constructed, and also to
determine the principles on which human laws ought
to be made.
And as there cannot be the slightest doubt that God
has made truth the fountain of good, it may perhaps
be fairly expected, that if ever political science is fairly
evolved and really reduced to practice, it will confer a
greater benefit on mankind, and prevent a greater
amount of evil, than all the other sciences...
Political science is peculiarly man-science; and
though, as yet, the subject is little or no better than
a practical superstition, we propose, in the present
volume, to exhibit an argument, affording, we think,
sufficient ground for believing that it will, at no distant period, be reduced to the same form and ordination as the other sciences.
Of course, any thing like a unity of credence is at
present altogether out of -the question.  Such a unity
is neither possible nor desirable. It could only be a
superstition -that is, a credence without evidence.
To produce conviction, therefore, is not so much our
hope, as to endeavor to open up the questions that
really require solution.  And here we must be allowed
a remark on the subject of politics, taking the term in
its general signification. Perhaps no subject, except
religion, absorbs so large a-share of the attention of
Britain, and perhaps no subject has so small a portion
of English literature devoted to its exposition. At
the utmost, there are only a very few works which can
be called dissertations on the principles of political




24         PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OF
ethics. This paucity of special works is certainly one
of the most curious facts in the history of literature.
The word politics is in almost every man's mouth; the
subject involves interests of the utmost magnitude;
questions of politics are continually in debate; the
greatest assembly in the kingdom assembles yearly to
discuss practical measures, which are necessarily
founded on some theoretic principles, (right or wrong;)
and yet, perhaps, no subect of ordinary interest could
be named that has so small a   quantity of literature
devoted to the exposition of its more general truths.
The current literature of politics is one of the wonders of the world, but the book literature is of the
scantiest character. Some -of it is said to be antiquated, (Milton and Locke, for instance - a very great
mistake, as we propose to:show hereafter,) and some
of it never even approaches the main questions. Under these circumstances, therefore, perhaps no apology
is requisite for an endeavor to systematize the subject.
The first questioin every branch of knowledge
is its method. So long as the method is in dispute,
the whole subject is necessarily involved, not only in
obscurity, but in doubt. Without method there can
be no standard of appeal, no process of proof, no
means of determining  otherwise than by opinion,
whether a proposition is true or false. But even if
opinion were the rule, this could not exclude the
necessity for theoretic principles.  Whose opinion is
to be taken as the rule?  Is it the opinion of the
emperor, as in Russia?  or the opinion of the free
population, as in the United States? or the opinion
of the whole male population, as in France? or the




THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.       20
opinion of a small portion of the population, as in
Britain? Whatever system may be practically adopted, that system  necessarily involves a theory; and
the question is, "Is there any possibility of discovering or evolving a natural theory which is not arbitrary?"  Is there, in the question of man's political
relation to man, a truth and a falsity as independent
of man's opinion as are the truths of geometry or
astronomy? A truth there must be somewhere, and
in the present volume we attempt to exhibit the
probability of its evolution.
Our argument is based on the theory of progress,
or the fact of progress  for it is a fact as well as a
theory; and the theory of progress is based on the
principle, that there is an order in which man not
only does evolve the various branches of knowledge,
but an order in which man must necessarily evolve
the various branches of knowledge. And this necessity is based on the principle, that every science when
undergoing its process of discovery is objective, that
is, the object of contemplation; but when discovered
and reduced to ordination it becomes subjective, that
is, a means of operation for the discovery and evolution of the science that lies logically beyond it, and
next to it in logical proximity.
If this logical dependance of one science on another'could be clearly made out for the whole realm  of
knowledge, it would give the outline, not only of the
classification of the sciences, but of man's intellectual
hisory- of man's intellectual development  where
the word development means, not the alteration of
man's nature, but the extension of his knowledge, and
3




26         PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OF
the consequent improvement of his mode of action,
entailing with it the improvement of his condition.
And if the law of this intellectual development can
be made out for the branches of knowledge which
have already been reduced to ordination, it may be
carried into the future, and the future progress of mankind may be seen to evolve logically out of the past
progress.
Let us then consider the aspects in which a science
of politics may be viewed.
1. In the probability of its evolution, based on the
logical determination of its position in a scheme of
classification.'
2. In its constituent propositions, and the method
it employs for their substantiation.
3. In tfie history of its doctrine (not the history of
its books) —in the history of the past reduction of its
theoretic principles to practice, and in the application
of its principles to the present condition of society;
thereby attempting to estimate what changes ought
-to be made, and what, in fact, ought to be the one
definite form of political society.
The present volume professes to treat of the first
of these divisions.
In attempting to classify the sciences' and to show
that they evolve logically out of each other, we do not
profess, in the slightest degree, to discourse on the
matter of the sciences themselves, further than their
primary propositions are concerned; but on their form,
their position, their actual development, (as commonly
acknowledged,) and on the lesson which, as a whole,
they must'ultimately teach.




THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.       27
With regard to the classification of the mathematical sciences, we have not the slightest misgivings.
We believe that the order in which they are presented
will be found-correct; and as logic has not usually
been considered as the first and simplest of the mathematical sciences, we have said rather ifore on logic
than might otherwise have been necessary.
With regard to the inorganic physical sciences, the
mode of classification is by no:means so evident.
The method according to which they must be classed,if
we knew their characteristics, is apparent enough; but
that difficulties attend the application of the method,
so as to locate the various suites of phenomena in
an unobjectionable scheme, m-ust certainly be admitted.  The difficulties will no doubt be ultimately
removed; but they must, in the first place, be removed
by the acquiescence of men of science before the mere
logician can profess to arrange the materials, and to
schelmatize the branches of knowledge according to
their essential characteristics.
Thus it belongs to the physicist t6 determine
whether there is, or is not, a material substance called
light; but it does not belong to the physicist to determine whether the mechanical phenomena of light are,
or are not, to be confounded withits ichemical phenomena. Let light be what it may, the mechanical
(including the geometric) phenomena of light fall
necessarily before the chemical phenomena. Again,
it belongs to the physicist to determine what sound is;
but the mechanics of sound (vibration) must be logically separated from the music of-souid, (tone, &c.,)
inasmuch as the music might be studiedwithout even




28        PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OF
the knowledge that the sound was accompanied by,
or produced by, vibration; and, on the other hand, the
vibrations might be observed and measured by a deaf
person, who could have no knowledge of tone, and to
whom the vibrations would be only motions.
Chemistry, again, treats of the qualitative characteristics of matter, and it may be viewed in one sense
as a science complete in itself. But if such a major
power could be discovered as would produce the phenomena logically in the observed conditions, then
chemistry, from being a science in itself, would become
only the classification of a science, and the power,
whatever name it might receive, would assume the
precedence, because the qualitative relations would be
made to function under the influence of the power.
Every function, of whatever character, or wherever
found, we assume to present itself under the form of
An Agent,     An Object,     A Product;
and this division belongs, in no respect, to any one
particular science, but to all, -that is, it is a necessary
form' of thought, and being so, it belongs to the metaphysician. Now, if a science be viewed as a complete
function, it must range all its substantives under one
of these heads. Every thing of which science treats
must be ranked either as agent, object, or phenomenon; and no science can be considered as completed,
even in part, until it has made such a logical ordination:as will make the phenomnenon to result logically
from the operation of the agent on the object. But
<while a science is undergoing its process of discovery,
this logical ordinalion of its parts is illegitimate, and
cannot be made on sufficient grounds; so that the




TIE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.        29
development of the constituent propositions of a science is necessary before its various portions cal be
classified in such a manner as to satisfy the requirements of the reason.
Under these circumstances, we have given only a
general estimate, sufficient to direct the line of argument without trespassing on special departments, or
intruding opinions on subjects that' lie beyond our
province. To construct an argument that should be
in the main correct, is all we could hope to achieve.
3*








CHAPTER  I.
ON THE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN PROGRESSION
SECTION I. — REMARKS ON TItE MATTERS INVOLVED IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE.
A DISTINCTION must necessarily be drawn between
the science of politics itself, and its application to
Marn.
The science is purely abstract and theoretic. It
professes only to determine the trueness or falsity of
certain propositions which are apprehended by the
reason; and the reason may take into consideration
this trueness or falsity, without dwelling on the fact
that man is a moral being, who ought to act in accordance with such principles as are legitimately substantiated. In this sense the science of politics is as
purely abstract as geometry, which determines the
general relations of figures, without in the slightest
degree attempting to pronounce whether there are any
real material objects to which its truths can be applied.
But when we have admitted the fact, that man is a
moral being, the theoretic dogma becomes transformed




32     REMARKS ON THE4 MATTERS INVOLVED
into a practical rule of action, which lays an imperative obligation on man to act in a particular manner,
and to refrain from acting in another manner. The
theoretic truth determines the relations of moral beings, and consequently determines what ought to be
their conditions with regard to each other; the practical rule determines what man may, or may not, do
justly, and consequently what the political construction of civil society ought to be.
The science of politics then treats of equity, and of
the relations of men in equity. And the general questions which the science has to solve are, -
1. What are those actions which men may do
equitably?
2. What are those actions which men are by equity
bound to do?
3. What are those actions which men cannot do
equitably? that is, what are those actions which,
though they may.actually'be done, are not, and never
can be, equitable?
Political science, therefore, discourses of human
actions; and these actions classified with regard to the
agent, are divided into duties, crimes, and negative
actions. But when the moral motives of the agent
are left out of account, the actions themselves are investigated as to their characteristics, and they may
then be treated of in their relation to the two great
categories of political science, liberty and property.
Under the heads of liberty and property all questions of politics may be discussed, bearing in mind
always that political science treats exclusively of the
relations of men. The questions then assume the
form of,



IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.           33
1. What are the equitable relations of men in the
matter of liberty?
2. What are the equitable relations of men in the
matter of property?
Both of these- objects, liberty and property, may be
treated of under the head of human action, (the moral
laws of property being nothing more than rules which
prescribe or -prohibit certain modes of human action,)
but the division conveniently expresses a distinction
of the objects upon which action may be exercised.
Thus, an exposition of the laws of liberty should determine the moral rules that preside over the actions
of men in the matter of mutual interference; while
an exposition of the laws of property should determine the moral rules that preside over men in their
possession of the earth.
But politics, taking into consideration only the relations of men, cannot take::cognizance of any duty
which would still be a duty if only one man were in
existence.  The duties of religion thati relate to the
Creator are beyond and above the sphere of politics;
and so also are the duties of benevolence, which belong to: another category than equity.
It is only as men may act towards each other equitably or unequitably that we consider their relations.
An act of benevolence is not, strictly speaking, either
equitable or unequitable. The recipient has no equitable claim to the bounty; and what the dohor gives,
he gives not to satisfy the- law of equity, but a higher
law, which applies to him as an individual, but which
it is impossible to apply (by law and force) to a society. The relations of men. in society must first be




34      REMARKS ON THE MATTERS INVOLVED
constructed on the principle of equity, and then each
individual may exercise his benevolence as occasion
may require.  Were there no equity, there could be no
benevolence, because no man could know what was
his own, or what he had a right to give.*
Liberty, like  slavery, poverty, depravity,. purity,
beauty, &c., is one of those concepts that men have
idealized, and made into nouns-substantive, for the
purpose of using: them  with greater facility in language.  As such, it is incapable of definition, not
being composed of any more simple concepts.  In
this sense it is an object, and maybe reasoned with
like any other noun. But it also signifies a condition,
namely, the condition in which a man uses his powers
without the interference of another man.  It differs
from freedom  in the circumstance of amount.  Freedom appears to signify the absolute condition in which
interference by human will is altogether removed; in
which case there would be a perfect equality of political rights, and the law would recognize no difference
whatever between the individuals of whom  a state
was composed.  Liberty, on  the contrary, appears
capable of indefinite variation, from'the smallest
amount that the most oppressed slave has, to the utmost and most perfect amount, which then becomes
freedomt
For instance, the kings of England gave lands (which belonged to the crown, that is, to the nation) to private individuals.
The question then is, Had the incumbent monarch a right to
alienate those lands in perpetuity from the nation?
f Such, at all events, would seem to be the sense usually affixed
to the two tterms. But, in that case, the word freedom would ad



IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.               35
Licentiousness is compatible with liberty, but not
with freedom. For instance, a slaveholder has far too
much liberty- that is, he is at liberty to perform acts
of licentiousness; but where there is freedom, there
can be no surplus liberty; for the moment the equilibrium of equity is disturbed by the licentious exercise
of power, that moment freedom has vanished, and liberty becomes relative.  One man then comes to have
too much liberty, and another man too little.
The powers of man involved in the general term
liberty, are the powers of feeling, thinking, speaking,
writing and publishing, and acting. The sum total of'
these is implicated in the fact of life; so that, if the
life be taken away, the whole of the powers are taken
away.  Politically speaking, therefore, to take away
life is to take away the sum  total of liberty, and to
destroy or obliterate;a free agent.
Liberty, in its most extensive signification,involves
the whole powers or conditions of men which can be
affected by the agency of other men;- but liberty has
also a more restricted signification, which confines it
to liberty -of thought, speech, publication, and action.
In the former sense, life is involved in liberty; in the
latter sense, life assumes a separate standing, and becomes a category by itself.  And again, the moral
feelings may be interfered with by slander or defamation; and this gives rise to another category of politics' namely, reputation.
vantageously supplant liberty in several passages of the New Testament, such as Rom. viii. 21; 2 Cor. iii. 17; Gal. ii. 4; v. 1,
13, &c.,-where absolute freedom, or emancipation, seems to be
spoken of.




36   MATTERS INVOLVED- IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.
Life, libert, property, and  reputation, are then
viewed as the possessions of men; and the laws which
should regulate men in their mutual action on each
other, with regard to life, liberty, property, and reputation, have to be determined by political science.
With regard to life, we do not believe that any
principle whatever can be found in natural knowledge
that would justify the taking away of life, save in
defence of self or others. For life, therefore, there can
only be a negative theory of very limited extent.  All
that can be said on the subject must necessarily resolve itself into one or two propositions. Laws may
take lives, but laws cannot create axioms of the reason; and without these there can be no principle to
determine otherwise than superstitiously when a life
ought to be taken. That the laws by which lives have
been, taken away have been only formal superstitions,
is plainly evident from  the changes which the laws
have undergone. The lawshave no -other basis than
vague opinion, directed by human passion; and the
day appears to be not far distant when capital punishment will be either abolished altogether, or confined to
the case -of the murderer, if it be determined that
Scripture commands or implies the execution of him
who has taken away the life of his fellow.
The genuine essence of all liberty is non-interference,
and to-secure universal non-interference is the first and
most essential end of all political association.
But interference may be from the government and
law, quite as much as from the individual, and interference by law is incomparably more prejudicial to a




ON THE MODE IN WHICH MEN HAVE MADE LAWS. 37
community than any amount of casual interference
that would be likely to take place in a civilized
country.
SECTION II. — ON THE MODE IN WHICH MEN HAVE
MADE LAWS.
LIBERTY presents itself under the form of liberty of
thought, liberty of speech, liberty of publication, and
liberty of action; and political liberty evolves chronologically in the order of thought, speech, publication,
and action. To secure this liberty by law, and to
make it exactly equal for all- individuals in the eye of
the law, is the great end of political civilization.
Thought is now (in Britain) almost emancipated
from  state interference, although the time was, and
not so very long since, when men attempted to control each other in their thoughts. Religious superstition has ever played the most prominent part in this
species of interference, and the priest of by-gone days
was the licentious tyrant of the mind, who would
have forced uncredited conviction by the fagot and the
flame. Not only was freedom of speech controlled,
and punished by the rack, the dungeon, and the lingering death of infamy, but the very thoughts were scrutinized; and unless a man renounced his creed, he was
tortured by the ruthless arm Of power, and carried to
the stake as the living offering of bigotry to the demon
of superstition.
Feeling is not under man's control, and therefore
4




38                FREEDOM OF SPEECH.
they have allowed each other to escape from profession
upon that subject, at the same time taking advantage
of the nerves for the infliction of as' much pain as
man  could reasonably  devise.  What is technically
called torture (in the art of inflicting pain) is also
abolished, and some obscure principle of retribution is
now substituted, which sometimes shuts a man up in
a prison, sometimes transports him to the southern
hemisphere, sometimes fines him  a sum  of money,
and sometimes allows him  to escape altogether, because the legal punishment is felt to be disproportioned
to the crime.*
Speech is still, and properly enough, made a matter
of superintendence.  A  man may injure another by
his speech, and consequently speech does come within
the limits of politics.  Immense changes, however,
have taken place in the laws that relate to the expression of thought, more especially on political subjects.
Freedom  of speech, and of public speech, and in any
number of speakers or auditors, is one of the first
essentials of true liberty. Wherever it is not enjoyed,
liberty  is  a  shadow  and  tyranny  is a substance.
France has yet to learn this essential lesson of liberty,
* "In France, the average values have been from 0'477 to 0'665
for the six years previous to 1831. Thus the chances are only 477
to 1000 that the individual will be condemned when accused of
crime against persons; 665 when the crime is one against property.
The principal cause of this inequality appears to be, as has been
frequently remarked, that we are averse to apply punishment when
it has a certain degree of severity, or appears severe in proportion
to the crime; this is especially the case with crimes against persons." - QUETELET^S Treatise on Man, Book IV. Chap. ii.




FREEDOM OF SPEECH.             39
and until the French either obtain or take the freedom
of speech that they have riot now, and never have had,
they must be in a state of political subserviency to the
executive power, that should make a nation blush
with shame, where so many cultivated men have
turned their attention to the public affairs of the state.
That France should submit to restriction on public
discussion, is one of the best evidences that something
more than revolution is required to make a people
free.
Freedom of discussion is the grea.t turning-point of
liberty, the first great field of battle between the nation and the rulers. If the nation gain the day, its
progress is onward towards freedom; but if the rulers
gain the day, the nation must submit to tyranny, and
must groan under the licentious hand of a self-constituted government.- So soon as freedom of speech is
prevented, no other resource than revolution can possibly remain, and the men who might not speak with
tongues must have recourse to weapons of more
powerful argument. Where there is freedom of discussion, there is always hope for the nation. The
government may enforce its privileges for a time; but
so certainly as freedom of discussionis preserved, so
certainly must those privileges be curtailed, one after
another, and freedom of action must eventually complete the evolution.
Writing and publication are as essential as speech.
The censorship is an abomination altogether incompatible with freedom, and every country that tolerates
it must lay its account, not for the reformation of
reason, but for the revolution of violence —not for




40           CRIMES AND FALSE CRIMES.
change effected by the intellect of the country, but for
change effected by the explosion of pent-up passions
seeking to destroy rather than to reconstruct.
England has almost achieved her emancipation in
the matter of thought, speech, ar4 writing; but very
considerable changes still remain, to be effected before
liberty of action can be said to be achieved.  There
are actions which are naturally crimes, and which
never can be any thing else than crimes    robbery and
murder, for instance.  Such actions are criminal anterior to all legislation, and independently of any human
enactment whatever.  They are unjust from  their
nature, and we can predicate, a priori, that they are
unjust, as well as prove, a posteriori, by their effects,
that they are eminently prejudicial.
Such actions, and such actions alone, is the government of a country competent to prohibit, and to class
as crimes. But let us observe what takes place in
actual legislation. No action can be less criminal
than the purchase of the productions of one country,
and the transport of those productions to another
country, for the legitimate profit of the trader and the
convenience of the inhabitants.  The government,
however, passes a law that such transport shall not be
allowed, and that- the man who still persists in it shall
be called a criminal, and treated as such. The government thus creates a new crime, and establishes an
artificial standard of morality, one of the most pernicious things for a community that can possibly exist,
as it leadsqmen to conclude that acts are'wrong only
because they are forbidden, and also enlists in favor of
the offender those feelings -which ought ever to be
retained in favor of the law.




RESTRICTIVE'LAWS.             41
The restriction would be a crime if it were only a
restriction, and prevented the international exchange
of produce. But what are its effects?  It calls into
existence a set of men who devote themselves by profession to infringe the law. The act of transport is
perfectly innocent and highly beneficial; but so soon
as it is prohibited by law, the man who engages in it
is obliged to use the arts of deception and concealment, and from one step of small depravity to another,
sinks lower and lower, until he at last employs violence, and does not hesitate to murder. The act of
transport in which the smuggler is engaged is one of
the most iagitimate modes of exercising the human
powers. Everykind of advantage attends it. First, it
is profitable to the foreign seller. Second, it is profitable to the merchant. Third, it is profitable to the
carrier. Fourth, it is profitable to the home consumer;
for if the goods were not more highly esteemed by him
than the money, he would not purchase them  at the
price. And fifth, it is injurious to no one. The first
three profits are money profits; the fourth, the profit of
convenience and gratification. But the moral effects
are no less beneficial. First, the man who is engaged
in'awful trading is well employed, and likely to be a
peaceful and good citizen. Second, the fact of pur-'chasing from a foreigner gives the trader an interest in
that foreigner, and eminently tends to break'down
those national antipathies which have descended from
the darker ages. The buyer and the seller are a step
further from  war every bargain they conclude in
honest dealing; and the iniquitous doctrine, that a
" Frenchman is the natural enemy of an Englishman,"
4*




42               THE GAME LAWS.
must every (lay find its practical refutation in the substantial benefits of trade. First,then, the prohibitory
law sacrifices all these benefits, and the law of restriction diminishes them  to the full extent of its restriction. But what takes place?  The contraband trader
is created by the prospect of gain arising from  the
increase of price. This increase of price, instead of
being a benefit to the legal trader, is his curse. It is
neither more nor less than a premium  held out to the
smuggler to evade the custom  and to undersell the
legal trader, thereby tending constantly to reduce his
profit, as well as to diminish his sale. But this is not
all. It is a premium to the reckless to break the law;
and the man who lives in the habitual breach of the
law  soon becomes a ruined character and a ruined
MAN.
There are, perhaps, few courses of life that end so
certainly in ruin as the smuggler's and the poacher's;
and yet, barring the law, the acts in which they are
engaged are perfectly innocent and perfectly legitimate.  The man who takes to smuggling or to poaching as the means of gaining his,bread, is almost as
certainly beyond recovery as the drunkard or the thief.
It has been our lot to see some of these characters,
and to observe the influence of their pursuits, and we
can say no otherwise than that we have been shocked
to see men of energy and great natural endowment
destroyed by the temptations which the law had so
superfluously placed in their way. When once the
habit of breaking the law is established, the distinction
is overlooked that would not otherwise have been forgotten, namely, that there is a right and a wrong




THE GAME LAWS.                43
independently of the law; and the man who commenced by shooting a hare in his cabbage-plot finishes
by shooting a keeper, and expiating the offence on the
gallows.
We do not mean that a man has a right to shoot
every where and any where, but we mean that the act
of shooting the game-the legal crime- is not a
crime, and never can be such; and that the consequences are in a great measure the fruits- of the law,
and must be charged against it.*
Let us take another case. The Creator,. in his
bounty, has distributed rivers over our country; and
the rivers of Scotland, at a certain season, teem (or
did teem  till the sea nets were established) with
abundance of food in the shape of salmon, which are
thus brought, as it were, to the very door of the inhabitants. The uncultivated moors of the same district
abound with.wild birds, to an extent perhaps unequalled in the world. It might be supposed reasonable
that these gifts of Providence should be of some service to the stated inhabitants who labor; and as corn
land is not so plentiful in the north as in the south,
Providence appears to have thrown the salmon and
the grouse into the scale to furnish the necessary food
for man. But what has the law done?  To stoot a
grouse is not merely a trespass on the occupier of the
land, but a crime, a criminal act, a thing that must be
punished, a deed for which the half-starved Highlander
* Since the above was written, some partial changes have been
made with regard to hares, preparatory, we hope, to the total abolition of all game laws whatever.




44              THE GAME LAWS.
can be hailed to prison, and shut up as an offender
against the laws of his country, when that country
had reduced him to the verge of starvation. And to
spear a salmon, a fish from the sea that no man may
ever have seen, and cannot possibly recognize, is also
attended with pains and penalties for killing the fish
that Heaven had sent for food.
Let us consider that Providence -has made some
animals susceptible of domestication. A man takes
the trouble of rearing a lamb or a bullock; and by
every principle of equity they are his - at least he
has the claim of preference, which no other man has
a right to invade. Were any man to take this sheep
or ox for his own use, we see at once the impropriety
of the action. First, it is an interference with another
man without a justifying reason; and second, were
such interference allowed generally, the domestication
of animals would cease, and food would become so
much the less abundant.
In this case, there is a breach of equity involved,
and the taking is a crime. But, on the other hand,
Providence has made other animals incapable of domestication, and distributed them over the country,
apparently for the very purpose of affording food, and
this irthe very districts that are not so highly favored
with the cereal productions of the soil. Such, in
Scotland, are the salmon and the grouse; and these,
at one period, were so abundant as to afford a staple
article of food, and even now are sufficiently numerous
to feed a large portion of the population  from August
to December. And what has the law done'with regard
to these bountiful gifts of Providence? The law has




THE GAME LAWS.               45
made it a crime for the poor man to touch them. The
poor man now can never legally have either a salmon
or a grouse; and in the very parishes where those animals are sufficiently numerous to feed the whole resident pauper population, the poor may take their
choice between starvation and expatriation.
Now, in the case of the animals that are not-capable
of domestication, there is an important distinction to
be observed. To shoot one of these animals is not a
breach of equity —that is, the wild one is no man's
property, while the domesticated one must practically
be regarded as such; and therefore, as the wild animals could not be regarded as property —for property
must be recognizable-the law has made it a crime
for the poor man to take them for his use. And the
privileged classes, not content with all the land, and
neatly all the offices of the state, have usurped the
fowls of the air, and the fish of the sea, that never
owned a master save the Lord of heaven and earth.
It may be considered that the question is of no
great importance; neither perhaps is it, compared
with the weightier question of the land; but we have
taken it as an illustration (the first that happened to
occur) of the principle of legislation as regards action.
As regards action, England is not a free country, and
the, sooner the nation is convinced of the fact, the
better for the community. And by free country, we
mean a country in which every man has a legal right
to do every thing that is not naturally a crime.  Where
a man can do what is a crime, freedom is no more.
But the law may be the criminal as well as the nation;
and injustice from the law is quite as unjust, and ten




46               THE G(AME LAWS.
times more detrimental, than injustice from the individual.
With regard to the crime, the real criminality of the
action,.measured either by reason or by Scripture, and
with regard to the detriment, measured by the consequences, let us ask the following question, and let any
man answer it on his conscience: Here are animals
provided by nature in abundance - they cannot follow
even the laws of property established in all analogous
cases, inasmuch as they are not recognizable, and cannot be claimed'as ever having been in possession.
These animals are distributed widely, and spread
throughout the country in a manner to afford a convenient supply to the various districts. The -fish arrive
from the sea in their highest condition, and afford good
and wholesome food. The birds are of the poultry
kind, distinguished for the quality and quantity of
their flesh, and for their powers of reproduction,characters that have always drawn a line of demarcation between them-and the birds of prey, and pointed
them out for food. These animals are distributed by
nature throughout the habitable districts where cultivation must be limited, and where animal food must
be required, both:fromn the scarcity of corn and from
the nature of the climate. Such, at least, is the judgment of Providence, as manifested in the works of
creation, and in the harmony which is every where
perceptible between the productions of a region and
their suitability to-man. These districts (from  the
monopoly of the land) are ow inhabited by a race
reduced to the — lowest state of poverty, and in many
cases to a degradation that would class them with the




THE GAME LAWS.                      47
savages.  Let us ask, which is the crime?  That these
people should take the animals which nature has provided; or 4that the privileged classes of the country
should pass a law  to prevent their touching a single
one of them under the pain of fine and imprisonment?
And be it remarked, these animals are not property,
even by the wording of the enactment, which does not
punish for interference with property, but for interference with animals, which the privileged classes wish
to monopolize for other purposes.  Hundreds of tons
of-fish, and thousands of boxes of birds, are annually
-taken away for sale from  these districts, and yet not
one of the poor of the inhabitants may touch a feather,
nor finger a scale, without being guilty of a crime; and
from- one year's end to the other, the mass of the population have not the legal right to take one single meal
from a bird without danger of imprisonment, nor from
a fish without danger of a fine.  Is it-a crime, or is it
not, that the privileged classes should pass such a law?
And is it a crime, or is it not, that the nation should
allow such laws, and such privileged classes, to continue?*
"We are inclined to believe that the real value of game in
this country is not in general fully understood. It is usually looked
upon as kept chiefly for amusement, and its commercial importance
is little thought of. Yet its direct value as a marketable commodityis very considerable; and its indirect value, as enhancing landed
propey,: is so great that it is not easy to form an estimate of it.
The -rie      r of ordinary game are pretty well known in Scotland.
In'Englandl H.ey are still higher, and there is always a ready demand. The ynue of a brace of grouse is, on an average, 6s. in
England; pheasits, 6s.; partridges, 3s.; hares, 2s. each; woodcQcks from 6s.!to  fi- a pair. The average value of a Highland




48                 THE EXCISE LAWS.
Again, the manufacturers of certain articles, who
are certainly  not guilty  of crime, or even  of the
shadow  of offence, are not allowed to carry on the
necessary operations except under the lock and key
of the state officials; and the regulations are of so
stringent a character, that if they were not partially
relaxed by the exciseman, the business could scarcely
be carried on without incurring penalties from the law.
The soap manufacturer is certainly engaged in the
red deer is not less than ~5. So much for the direct value of
game; and when we consider its importance indirectly, we are first
led to think of the Highland moors which it has rendered so profitable. For the following facts on this portion of the subject, we
are indebted to an able letter on the Game Laws by Lord Malmesbury. A vast number of moors are now let for ~460 or ~500 a year,
which formerly brought nothing to the proprietor, as they-are unfit
even for sheep. Large tracts, which formerly let- as sheep farms,
are now converted into deer forests, and pay at least one third, and
even one half, more than they did formerly. Five hundred deer
may be kept on a space of ground that will feed twelve hundred
sheep. Taking the sheep at the average price of 18s. each, these
would be worth ~1080; but the deer would realize nearly double
that sum- namely, ~2000; for the average price of stags in summer, and hinds in winter, is fully ~4. From a long standing
knowledge of the Highland moors, Lord Malmesbury is of opinion
that they are yearly advancing in price, and becoming a more important kind of property. He saw a list last year of one hundred
and six moors let for shootings, the rent of which could not be
averaged at less than ~300, which makes a total of ~31,800.
There were twice 1s many more let at an average of ~100, and a
third portion unlet, whose value may be fairly stated at ~1,000;
the whole making together a rental of ~70,000 on the Highland
shootings. He adds, that this may be looked upon as a clear gain
as far as respects the grouse moors, and an increase of two fifths
on deer ground called "forest" - Journal of J.griculture.




THE EXCISE LA-WS.                   49
production of an article that- benefits the community;
and even the distiller (for whom  as much cannot be
said) is entitled to carry on his business on the same
footing as every other man.  The legislators make a
pretext of revenue; and revenue of course is necessary, although not to the extent to which revenue is
raised in Britain.  But when the %necessity of revenue
is granted, is it at all necessary that the man who is
engaged in the lawful manufacture of an article required by the community, should be obliged to give
notice to a state official that he is about to perform
this, that, and the other process of his manufacture,
and be esteemed a criminal worthy'of punishment if
that notice is forgotten or neglected? *
All these restrictions are the remnants of the more
exclusive privileges claimed and enforced by the privileged classes of other times, and the remnants of that
political superstition which, next to religious superstition, every man ought to lend his aid to destroy.
The pretext that revenue is necessary, is one that
would scarcelybe entitled to attention, were it not accompanied by the injustice and detriment that follow
in its train.  Revenue, so far as necessary for the ac* "The duty on paper is levied with a multiplicity of detail
known only in the department of the excise. The duty is taken
upon every single ream; and every single ream has to be weighed,
and stamped, and cut, and made up, and labelled, and endorsed,
and certified, and entered in a particular and special manner; and
if there is the slightest infraction of the excise regulations, the
board is immediately down upon the manufacturer for a penalty."
Tax on soap, 1848,                     -.~795,981
Tax on paper,     --                 -     578,704
5




50               LAND AND LAPOR.
tual requirements of a state, need form a very trifling
portion of a nation's expenditure. The whole cost of
the administration of justice, and of every other valuable service that the state really requires, is a mere
trifle in comparison to the actual revenue, and to the
still greater cost occasioned by the enactments of the
legislature. But as revenue may be derived from two
sources, the privileged classes have taken care that it
shall be derived from that source in which they are not
so immediately interested.
We have spoken of the liberty of human action;
and one of the forms of that action is labor.  The
material objects of the creation possess a value of
exchange; that is, people are willing to pay for them.
But- labor also possesses a value of exchange, and
people are willing to pay for it as well as for the material objects that constitute the globe and its inhabitants. Let it be observed that labor is essentially
private property. It has a value, and the land has no
more than a value.
Let it also be observed that the land is not essentially private property, and that naturally one man has
as much right to the land as another.
Labor on the one hand, and land on the other, are
susceptible of taxation.
The privileged classes, in the earlier stages of society, had all tfie land and all the labor. The lord was
the lord not only of the land, but of the labor of those
who were engaged in the useful arts of industry.  In
the course of time the serfs obtained a small portion
of their rights, and towns were formed where the citizens could carry on their labor with a certain degree




LAND AND LABOR.                51
of advantage to themselves, and with a certain degree
of emancipation from the licentious will of,h-e lord.
Taxation could consequently be on the land of:the
lord, or on the labor of the townsman, for all the
townsman's capital was originally the produce of his
labor.*
If we consider the various states of Europe, from
Russia to England, -we shall find the lord and the
laborer to occupy varigus stages of the political scale
of evolution, by which the laborer at last succeeds in
withdrawing his industry from- the interference of the
lord, and from the taxation of the state.
Let it be observed, that when the land is taxed, no
man is taxed; for the land produces, according to the
law of the Creator, more than the value of the labor
expended on it, and on tifis account men are willing
to pay a rent for land. But when the privileged
classes had monopolized the land, they called it theirs
in the same sense in which labor is supposed to belong
to fthe laborer; and, although the absurdity of the
proposition is sufficiently apparent, the laborer was
glad enough to escape with even a small portion of
his liberty, and to rejoice that he could call his life and
his family his own.
But then the lords of the land were the rulers and
the makers of the laws, and the imposers of taxation,
and it was not reasonable to suppose that they should
tax the land.  The king required money, and various
persons about kings in all ages require money, and of
Probate and-legacy duties, 1843:Legacies,      -   -   -:-   ~1,223,342
Probates and administrations,    -  922,839
Taxes on the inheritance of land, -     0




52                 INDIRECT TAXATION.
course the only choice in-the matter of taxation is
between.labor and the land.
To tax labor, then, becomes a matter of the most
palpable necessity, and those who have been divested
of almost every single particle of earth or sea that
could be of any benefit to them, must also be made to
bear the burdens of the state, and to pay for the support of a government that was of little use to the
community, and that only existed by the right of the
strongest, or the consent of superstition.*
The principle of taxing labor is only a remnant of
the serfdom of the darker ages, and it has been continued in this country by the ingenious device of what
are termed  indirect taxes, by which labor is taxed,
although the laborer is only made acquainted with the
fact by the distress that periodically oppresses him.
* Immediately a bad government is of no use to the community,
but mediately andprospectively the most stringent despotism in the
world is of the highest importance and of the greatest value.
Man must apparently progress through centralization; and a bad
government, provided it centralizes, is the foundation of after
changes most beneficial to mankind. The good part of the Russian government is its centralization; and, notwithstanding the
antipathy manifested against that government, we have little hesitation in maintaining, that on the whole it is doing good to the population under its rule. It is gradually subjecting savage tribes to
the ordinary course of homogeneous law; and, though the laws
are bad, and the administration worse, the phase is one-which the
nomadic tribes and the semi-barbarous population must pass
through before they arrive at political freedom. In the general
history of man it seems requisite that central monarchy should
destroy the privileges of multiple aristocracy; and Russia is gradually effecting this great change.  The. sympatfy manifested
towards the Poles is questionable, inasmuch as the great majority
of Poles were ruled by individual aristocrats instead of by laws.




CUSTOMS AND EXCISE.                  53
The man who is poisoned without his knowledge
does not die the less certainly for his ignorance, and
the people who are taxed do not suffer the less because
the taxes happen to be imposed in such a manner that
the unthinking-and the ignorant do not perceive those
taxes in the price they pay for almost every article of
consumption. All the real harm. is doneto a country
as effectually by indirect taxation, as if every penny
were paid out of the day's wages to the tax-gatherer
of the state.  But the rulers know full well that if the
tax-gatherer were to present himself at the pay-table
of the laborer, at the counter of the shopman, at the
office of the merchant, and at the ship of the seafaring
carrier, the doom  of labor taxation would be sealed,
and the country would not tolerate so glaring an injustice.  And the indirect system of taxation is employed, not that it.prevents the community from  suffering, but that it prevents the community from dwelling on the cause of their suffering, and thereby retards
a revolution against the privileged classes.
Such are the circumstances that led to the establishment of customs and excise;: and the total and complete abolition of those two branches of interference
is one of the necessary changes that must take place
before this country can be free, and before this country
can enjoy that commercial liberty, without which a
periodical crisis must necessarily be the lot of the
laborer, the merchant, and the manufacturer.*  It is
* "Simultaneously with the relaxation of the restrictive policy,of the United States, Great Britain, from whose example we derive
the system, has relaxed hers. She has modified her corn laws, and
reduced many other duties to moderate revenue rates. After ages
F5*




54                 CUSTOMS AND EXCISE.
true that the total abolition of the customs appears
chimerical at present; yet, if we consider the history
of the changes that have  already taken  place, and
seize their abstract form, (theonly form  that contains
real instruction,) we have sufficient ground to hope,
not only for the abolition of every species of tax upon
labor, but for the recovery of each man's natural property.  So certainly as this country continues to progress, so  certainly must every restraint be removed
from  every action that is not a crime; and the customs- laws can no more be perpetuated, if the present
liberty of discussion coitinues, than  restraints upon
discussion could be perpetuated after men had learnt
to think for themselves, and to form  their convictions
according to the evidence before them.
of experience, the statesmen of that country have been constrained
by stern necessity, and by a public opinion having its deep foundation in the sufferings and wants of impoverished millions, to abandon a system, the effect of which was to build up immense fortunes
in the hands of the few, and to reduce the laboring millions to
pauperism and misery. Nearly ip the same ratio that labor was
depressed, capital was increased and concentrated by the British
protection policy.
"The evils of the system in Great Britain were at length rendered intolerable, and it has been abandoned, but not without a
severe struggle on the part of the protected and favored classes to
retain the unjust advantages which they have so long enjoyed. It
was by-the same classes. in the United States, whenever an attempt
was made to modify or abolish the same unjust system here. The
protective policy had been in operation in the United States for a
much shorter period, and itW pernicious effects were therefore not
so clearly perceived and felt. Enough, however, was known of
these effects to induce its repeal."-President's Message, 1846,
(United States.)




UNLIMITED LEGISLATION.            55
The great source of the evil that weighs so heavily
on the unprivileged classes of society is to be found
in the doctrine, "that rulers are competent to legislate
for every thing and for any thing."
This doctrine appears to be universally adopted in
states that are just beginning to emerge from a condition of barbarism.  Thoughts, words, and actions are
all legislated for, without even an inquiry into the
right of the ruler to promulgate a law upon the subject of his enactment.  The right is assumed, and the
ruler has the power to enforce the law. The multitude,
who are obliged to devote their attention to the means
of their livelihood, offer a passive acquiescence, and
endeavor to carry on as well as they can, until they
find the operation of the law so prejudicial that they'can bear it no longer, and then a struggle ensues, by
which liberty is advanced a step; and the multitude
return to their toils. In course of time, however, it is
found that the remaining laws are as prejudicial to the
advanced stage of society as those which were abolished were prejudicial to its earlier stage. A new
struggle ensues, and liberty is advanced another step.
Knowledge increases, and trade increases, and still it
is found that the laws are so prejudicial that they must
be abolished. This process goes on for centuries; and
law after law is repealed, because the actual conditions
of the people can permit their existence no longer.
In this process of evolution, we perceive laws going
one after the other, in proportion as knowledge increases; but it is quite evident that such process cannot continue indefinitely; and it becomes an interesting question to inquire, how it happens that such a




56          LEGISLATION FOR THOUGHT.
process should be necessary, and what is its natural
termination.
The process is necessary, because legislators had
overstepped the boundaries of legislation, and interfered with matters beyond their province. Instead of
confining themselves to the prohibition (or rather to
the proclamation of the prohibition) of every action by
which one man injured another man, they legislated
for men's thoughts, and enacted laws about religion,
and persecuted by law those who differed from  the
sect that happened to be in power.
This persecution, a few centuries since in England,
and not a century since in Spain, was at its utmost
possible extreme; that is, men inflicted all the possible
pain that they could on their fellow-creatures of a different creed, and finished by committing them to the
flames.
In course of time, however, knowledge increased,
and men thought it scarcely right to proceed to the
utmost possible extreme; and a modification of the
auto da fe was introduced in the shape of imprisonment, fine, banishment, &c., &c.
The Protestant creed introduced a very important
change in the credence of the country in this matter
of religion. 
The Romanists always professed to slaughter men
to the glory of God; and so long as the theological
propriety of immolation was current in -the minds of
men, there was little chance of their seeing the character of their actions. The Protestants, on the contrary, abandoned the high ground of sacrifice to the
Deity, and substituted the more rational idea of sacri



SECTARIAN LEGISLATION.            57
lice to the king. The unfortunate Covenanter, who
was shot or decapitated, was not an offering to the
Deity, but an offering to the king; and the difference
was of immense importance to the country, although
of no particular consequence to the Covenanter.  So
soon as persecution (legislation for men's thoughts)
was conceived to be for man, and not for God, men
began to inquire whether, after all, the king had really
the right to legislate to such an extent. And as
knowledge increased, they began to relax their principles a little, and to think that the deprivation of civil
privileges would be punishment sufficient for the offence of thinking differently from the sect in power.
The modification still goes on, and measure after
measure is abolished, until at last the professors of
differeit creeds almost begin to think that they can
inhabit the same country without persecuting each
other on account of their religion.
Catholic emancipation was one of the insignificant
measures that concluded the evolution with regard to
that sect.  The repeal of the Test and Corporation
Act was another insignificant measure that brought
up the rear of a system of persecution that had been
waxing weaker and weaker for a century or two.
Both of these measures were hailed as the glorious
evidences of Britain's impartiality, and certainly the
measures were necessary, (if freedom be necessary-;)
but, after all, they were no more in comparison to the
measures that had preceded them than the nursery
tales and the popular superstitions are to the gorgeous
pagan credences from which they had their birth.
The last remnant of this religious superstition that




58           IMSMUTABILITY OF JUSTIGC,.
once played so prominent a part in Britain, is now to
be found in the taxation of nonconformists; and the
church-rates, and the official distinction between the
various sects, are the last representatives of that
system  of legislation that lit the fires of Smithfield,
and sent Claverhouse and his dragoons to murder the
hill-side peasant, and to torture the differently thinking
Presbyterian.
But what, after all, is the principle that has so modified the laws of Britain? Whence comes it that men
should have so singularly changed their opinions in
the course of a century or two?
It is perfectly evident that justice does not vary from
age to age. Justice is the same from the beginning
of the world to the time that man shall change his
constitution.  An act of justice can no more alter its
character (without a revelation) than the diameter of
the circle can alter its relation to the circumference.
What was just yesterday is just to-day, was just a
thousand years ago, and will be just a thousand years
to come.
IHow then does it happen that so strange a modification should have come over the credence of our
race, and how does it happen that men should legislate so differently?
The credence has changed with the acquisition of
knowledge, and the legislation has changed with the
credence.
Menhave discovered that legislators have no right
"to legislate for credences, and thus the' last remnants
of such legislation are obliged to appear under another
name, and to assume a false guise, that they may be
allowed to continue a few years longer.




LEGISLATION BEYOND ITS PROVINCE.       59
Legislation, with regard to thought, never was just,
and never can be just:; and the abstract form of the
change is nothing more than that the legislators have
so far been driven off a ground that they never had a
right to occupy.
For the man animal, food is the first necessity; but
for the man mental, credence according to evidence is
the first correct law of his intellectual nature. Food
is one of the conditions of existence; and, until it can
be procured in tolerable quantity, and with some degree of certainty, a community cares little about the
mind, and allows the question of free thought to remain in abeyance.
When a community begins to emerge from barbarism, and legislation assumes a definite form, every
thing is legislated for. Food, thought, speech, action,
property, and in all their various forms, are all made
subjects of enactment; and men thus endeavor to
improve the world that Godmrade, by passing laws to
amend the order of nature. The first necessity for the
community is to have some small opportunity of procuring food, and when the- necessary conditions are
obtained, (which involve some degree of liberty,) men
turn their attention to other subjects, according to the
character of their theological belief. The religious
impulses of our nature require satisfaction, perhaps,
before any other portion of the mental constitution;
and as men must have some kind of theological credence, right or wrong, they believe any thing rather
than remain in doubt. And as, where there is no evidence, there can be no truth and no error, but mere
arbitrary -superstition, the state has generally estab



60                   CHANGE 01'O  LAWS.
lished some form  of credence by law, and committed
the care of the supersitition to the priest.  But there
does happen to be a true religion as well as an indefinite number of superstitions; and, after the revival of
learning, when  the truth begaM  to  break  on  men's
minds, that religion was not a matter of mere arbitrary church authority, but a real matter of truth and
falsehood, in which life and death were involved, the
Christianity of the Bible came into collision with the
established superstitions of the papal priesthood, and
a struggle was commenced, which began by the maximum   of persecution, and  ended, in  this country  at
least in the maximum of liberty of thought.*
* "But we shall next consider the state of religion in England.
From the days of Wickliffe there were many that differed from the
doctrines commonly received. He wrote many books that gave
great offence to the clergy, yet being powerfully supported by the
duke of Lancaster, they could not have their revenge during his
life; but he was, after his death, condemned, and his body was
raised and burnt. The Bible, which he translated into English,
with the preface which he set before it, produced the greatest
cffects. In it he reflected on the lives of the clergy, and condemned the' worship of saints and images, and the corporeal presence of Christ in the sacraments; but the most criminal part was
the exhorting all people to read the Scriptures; when the testimonies against those corruptions were such, that there was no way to
deal with them but to silence them. His followers were not men
of letters, but being wrought on by the easy conviction of plain
sense, were -by them determined in their persuasions. They did
not form themselvbs into a body, but were contented to hold their
opinions secretly, and did not spread them but to their particular
confidents. The clergy sought thlem out every where, and did
deliver them, after conviction, to the secular arm, that is,,to the
fire." — BURNET'S I1story of the Reformation, abridged, p. 14.




RESULT.                    61
But it is not one single shade more right now than
it was two or five hundre. years since, that men
should think and believe for themselves without the
interference of the legislator.  The legislator never had
a particle of right to interfere in matters of faith,
which right he does not possess to the full extent in
the present day. And the real essence of the change
is to be found, not in the alteration or improvement
of the laws, but in the total exclusion of legislation
from  the province of thought.  The legislator was
altogether out of his sphere; and every law was necessarily unjust, whether mild, moderate, or severe. No
matter what the character of the enactment happened
to be, it was an injustice and a licentious invasion of
the natural rights of man; and as such, the only question that could:legitimately be taken into consideration
respecting it was its abolition.
It must not be-supposed, however, that a country is
in the same circumstances before a law has been called
into existence, and after its abolition. Before the law
is enacted men are naturally free, but when the law
has been abolished, men are legally free. A country,
arrived at complete freedom  after the various transformations of superstition and injustice, is a very different thing from a country where legislation has only
commenced.  The actual laws that exist in both cases
might perhaps be the same; but in the one case they
are the stepping stones to an indefinite series of legislative acts, and in the other case they are the permanent records of a nation's final judgment. England,
before men legislated for thoughts, and England after
men have legislated for thoughts, and abolished such
6




62           FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.
legislation, is in very different circumstances; inasmuch as it may now be-reckoned a matter of ascertained truth, that legislation for matters of belief is
preeminently prejudicial, as well as unjust. And the
probability of new  legislation on the subject can
scarcely be contemplated, unless some very unexpected
change take place, altogether out of the order of the
scheme of progress that may naturally be anticipated.
But if legislation can be out of its sphere in the
matter of thought, it can also be out of its sphere in
the matters of speech, action, and property.
Next to liberty of thought comes liberty of speech,
writing, and publication.
Speech and publication are very extensively legislated for, and the countries of continental Europe appear
all, or nearly all, to admit the unlimited  ight of the
legislator to interfere as much as he pleases with the
natural rights of the community in the sphere of the
expression of thought.
Where rulers govern by power, and not by the enlightened choice of the nation, they are a party opposed
to the nation. On the one hand is the nation and the
national interest; and on the other hand is the government and the interest of the individuals connected with
it. The more power the rulers have, the less liberty
the people have; and the more land and privilege the
rulers have, the less wealth have the population. Now
wealth and power are exactly what men are desirous
of possessing; and as rulers are men, it is not to be
wondered at that they dip their fingers into every
man's dish, equitably or unequitably, and monopolize
the best things that happen to be going. The land,




THE CENSORSHIP.                63
of course, either in kind or in some other-form, falls to
the lot of the rulers and their coadjutors-the nobles
and the priests.  The cultivation of the land, (the labor,) instead of also falling to the lot of the privileged
classes, becomes the portion of the people.
But excessive privileges are much easier maintained
against a weak people than against a strong one; and
as the people can only be strong by khowledge, virtue,
and combination-knowledge, virtue, and combination are in little favor.with despotic governments.
Political knowledge (that is, the knowledge of their
rights and interests) is carefully excluded from  the
mass of the population; jand as political knowledge
grows out of discussion about social welfare, as well
as out of the thoughtful toil of the author, both discussion and authorship are subjected to partial or total
prohibition. The most frantic blasphemies will find a
readier license for publication than a sober treatise on
the public welfare; and a philosophical denial of all
right. and wrong whatever will be more tolerable than
an inquiry into the foundations of the. rulers' privileges. The most infamously immoral production is
less likely to be scrutinized than a dissertation on
political economy; and an association for murdering,
torturing, and expatriating the population,* would be
more readily authorized than an association Tor.forwarding the rights of the people.
Any thing in the shape of superstition (that is,
uninquiring credence) is esteemed proper enough; but
the moment men begin to inquire and to seek for
* An inquisition, for instance.




64                   THE CENSORSHIP.
reasons, that moment is the government alarmed, and
that moment must means be put in operation to stop
the course of knowledge.*  Governments, like those
of Russia, Austria, and Italy, can only exist by means
of superstition; and the question with them  is, not as
to the propriety of allowing men to obtain knowledge
and to express their thoughts, but as to the propriety
of the existence of the government; and every restrictive measure that affects the free expression of' opinion,
is only an act of self-defence against the nation.  The
government must either give up its privileges, or keep
the people in slavery with  regard to expression  of
opinion; and the stringent laws of'the  continental
powers, relative to every kind of political meeting, are
no more than measures of precaution, analogous to
those practised by the pirate who  scuttles his prize
(with its crew) as a measure conducing to his safety.t
* "Thus the universities governed by ecclesiastics persuaded
the poor bigot Philip III. to pass a law prohibiting the study of any
new system of medicine, and requiring Galen, Hippocrates, and
Avicenna; they scouted the exact sciences and experimental philosophy, which said they made every medical man a Tiberius; and
so they scared the timid Ferdinand VII. in 1830, by telling him
that the schools of medicine created materialists, heretics, and revolutionists; thereupon the beloved monarch shut up the lecture
rooms forthwith." - FORD'S Spain.
f The pirate is rationally correct- that is, his act does conduce
to his immediate safety, for dead men tell no tales, and sunk ships
cannot appear in evidence. And despotic governors are also rationally correct; that is, an ignorant and superstitious population
has less power and less desire for liberty than a population that
thinks for itself, and has free opportunity of expression. The remote consequences, however, are sometimes overlooked. When the
truth is discovered, the pirate is hanged, and the ruler guillotined.




DESPOTIC POWER -ITS MEANS.          65
The objects of a despotic government must necessarily be distinguished from its means. The objects are
WEALTH AND POWER; the means, TYRANNY AND SUPERSTITION. Tyranny is power without right, and superstition is credence without evidence. The means of
a despotic government, therefore, are power without
rightand credence without evidence. The governor
of a country, in the earlier stage of legislation, is the
strongest man in the country; and, by conversion, the
strongest man in the country is the governor. Now,
one strongest man, who has the opportunity of taking
a thousand weaker men in detail, is stronger than the
whole thousand if he can prevent them from combining.
This is the concise explanation of the theory of a despotic government. A noble, a chief, even a bishop,
may become a sovereign, and remain so as long as he
has power or dexterity to prevent the people from
combining. As soon as they combine, he is no longer
the strongest, and his wealth as well as his power is in
a fair way to depart. It therefore becomes a matter
of serious consideration for him to discover and put in
practice those means that tendto secure his power, and
prevent'his enemies (his subjects) from combining.
In the first place, he must have more wealth; and,
as he cannot have it by his own honest industry, he
must have it by the industry of others, or by the monopoly of those natural objects which other men must
possess as the conditions of their existence.
Land is the great source of wealth; forests and fisheries are also tolerable; mines and minerals are capable of yielding a revenue; and, in addition to these,
comes the taxation of labor.
6*




66               COMBINATIONS.
These sources of wealth, therefore, must be turned
to account, and the governor, of course, does not neglect them. Wealth is power for the ruler, as knowledge is power for the people; and the more wealth the
ruler has, the more power has he for taking advantage
of his subjects. Wealth, therefore, is both a means
and an end- a means of getting more wealth and of
getting more power. Wealth gives birth to a standing
army, and a- standing army gives birth to more power,
as it enables the ruler. to apply his principles more
extensively and with greater security.
But if a people were to combine against any standing army that is likely to exist, the ruler would no
longer be a ruler, and the army would no longer be an
army.  It therefore becomes a matter of serious
thought for the ruler to obviate the tendencies towards
combination.
There are two or three kinds of combination.
1st. The combination of national antipathy. This
combination may exist where there is abundance of
ignorance. The Indians might combine against the
whites on the continent of America, and, though the
combinations were partial, they did a great deal of
mischief in by-gone times. The Tyrolese might combine on the same principle, and so might the Poles,
the Swiss, the Greeks, &c. It must not be supposed
that these are contests for freedom. On the contrary,
they are contests against a foreign tyranny in favor of
a domestic one. Such combinations are interesting
as matters of history, but of very little importance to
the progress of real freedom.
2d. Religious combination. This also is a matter




RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.                   67
of sentiment, and by no means advances freedom  as
a matter of necessity.  The crusades were singular
exhibitions of this kind of combination carried out
on a large scale.  The wars of the Ligue also exhibit
a double combination of ruffians on both sides, who
perpetrated astonishing crimes for the advancement
of their religious party.*
The Presbyterians of Scotland, and the Puritans of
England, HAD HOLD OF THE TRUTH; and, though they
had scarcely yet learnt to view it in its true light, they
progressed  immensely  towards freedom.  They  did
confound civil nd religious liberty; but. notwithstanding, it is to them, under God, that we owe the preservation of the cause of liberty in this country, when
the continent, and  especially  France, either extinguished the little liberty that had begun to illuminate
the people, or so impeded its progress that they have
still their convulsions before them.  The extinction of
Protestantism  in  France  rendered  a physical force
convulsion necessary before the obstacles to the prog* Absurd as the crusades were in themselves, they were of the
highest value to Europe; in fact, it seems that whatever the temporary evils attendant on any one part of human condition, or ot
human manifestation, that condition was a phase of progress, calculated to leave society in a better state than it found it. This
principle is applicable also to the first French revolution. It was a
fearful scene when,yiewed individually. But if we look to the condition of France before the revolution, and again after the revolution, we cannot deny that its effects were of the greatest value-to
the country. Those who attend merely to the revolution and its
horrors, are like those who go to see a criminal executed without
asking the reason of his execution, or inquiring into the reasonableness of the laws which demand his execution. The French revolution was produced by the lawsof nature. Who made those laws?




68                 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.
ress of society could be removed; and if full liberty
of thought had been accorded, instead of the revocation of the edict of Nantes, in all probability the progression of society would have taken place by the
gradual removal of abuses, instead of being arrested
until the bulwarks of despotism were no longer strong
enough to retain the expansive energies of the population.  To suppose that the French revolution could
have been prevented by any of the individuals who
happened to figure in it, is to suppose that causes are
no causes, and effects no effects.  But France has still
her work to do; and, although none of4he past frenzy
can be again anticipated, as-the causes do not exist to
produce it,* France has yet to  shake off despotism,
* The atrocities of the first French revolution were French; the
atrocities of the last were Parisian. In the former case there was
not only insurrection in the towns, but there was the most fearful
of all convulsions-a rural insurrection. The atrocities of the
last revolution, &c., were very partial. They were confined to a
few of the lowost population in Paris; and, no doubt, there are in
Paris, at the bottom of society, persons who would do any thing.
There is no possibility, however, of instituting a comparison between the frenzy of the late revolution and that of the former. It
is perfectly absurd, and only shows how panic and party feeling
will blind the judgment and make the tongue rave nonsense.
To those who speak so loudly and so long of the horrors of
insurrection, We propound a question: "Which is the worst, the
most atrocious, the most base, and the greatest reproach to a nation,
" 1st. The atrocities that accompany a political insurrection? or,
"  2d. Women poisoning people by scores for the sake of obtaining burial fees?"  In the paper, yesterday, we read an account of
a woman thus disposingof eight of her offspring.
The first is French.
The latter- is English.
The demoralization going on in Britain is such, that if ever there




REACTION UNDER PRESSURE.              69
and-to form  a government- that shall rule otherwise
than by a standing army and. a system of officials.
In the convulsions of..France we have a third kind
of combination; namely, combination to overthrow
an evil that pres-s on the feelings, thoughts, and interests of men.  The population suffered from a common evil; and when that evil was exposed, they combined to overthrow  it.  The combination, however,
was not of a high character. It was a mere reaction
under pressure.  To get rid of the pressure was nearly
the sum and substance of the combination; and disunion and licentiousness followed when the pressure
was removed. 
But there is another kind of combination, and a far
more important one for the welfare of the world - the
combination of knowledge and reason.  Knowledge is
credence based on sufficient evidence; and reason is
the power of perceiving consequences, and of inferring
antecedents.  Without reason man would only be a
higher kind of ape; as it is, he is a spirit and an
immortal.
Man has an intellect, as well as a bodily frame, and
this intellect has its laws and its requirements. Observation is its food, reason is its process of digestion,
and truth is its circulating fluid, without which it degenerates and dies.  Truth makes the mind strong,
ignorance makes it weak, and error infects it with
were any thing like an insurrection, it is impossible to predict the
extent-to which frenzy might be carried. The demoralization of
the population is England's greatest'danger; and, if not*met in'time by means of moral and intellectual training, it may produce
the direst evils, and make England a manufacturing hell.




70          THE PEOPLE AND THE RULERS.
disease. Knowledge is not only power - it is strength
-strength of the mind, health, and life, and strength.
To obliterate this strength, therefore, is the object of
the despotic ruler.  If the people are strong, the despot
Must be weak; but the legitimate rJer is so much the
stronger as the people are stronger.  When the rulers
and the nation are in opposite scales, the less weight
the people have, the more easily are they outweighed;
but when both are in the same scales, the heavier they
both are the better for both, and the worse for those
who are opposed to them.  In a free country, where
law was absolutely supreme and really equitable, every
man would feel the ruler to be a portion of himself,
and would lend his arm or his aid to further the ends
of justice.  The ruler of a free country should be the
pure administrator of the law-the first magistrate
of equity, to whom every man was bound by the righteous bonds of justice, and by the sentiments of reverence implanted in our nature to elevate our race above
the creatures that surround us.
In a despotism, superstition takes the place of
knowledge, and the fear of suffering helps to procure
an unwilling obedience.
The ruler's the wolf, the people are the flock, and
the lawyers* and priests t are the foxes who prepare
the flock for slaughter.
* England, happy in the integrity and mildness of her judges in
the 18th century, and in our own times  during the Stuart reigns,
was cursed by a succession of ruffians in ermine, who, for the sake
of court favor, violated the principles of law, the precepts of religion, and the dictates of humanity."  CAMPBELL'S Lives of the
Chancellors. 
t In speaking lightly of the priests, we do not speak lightly of




ESPOTISM AND SUPERSTITION.                 71
When the priesthood lose their influence, an army
must be resorted to, and physical tyranny and centralization  must do  the work  of superstition.  At all
hazards, the people must be kept down, or the game
of despotism is lost.
The simplest plan of a despotism  is to make the
people believe that the ruler is a distant relation to
some of the deities of the country.  A greater or less
degree of this method appears to be common in infant
stages of society, but a small advance of knowledge
suffices to disturb so convenient a doctrine; and this
is partly the reason why so dire an antipathy should
be manifested by the rulers of various countries to the
introduction of the gospel as contained in revelation.
Russia, Austria, and Italy are little better than pagan
countries, and  the rulers are partially or altogether
believed  to  have some special connection with the
object of worship, and to rule by right divine.*  The
men holding a sacred office. The priest —that is, the sacrificer
and the mediator — does not hold a sacred office. Every human
priest is an antichrist. In the Christian religion there is but one
Priest, and his sacrifice is offered, so that there remains no more
offering for sin. "It is finished!"
The only real Priest has ascended into heaven, and to those who
wait for him he will come a second time unto salvation../11 other
priests are antichrists.
The present priests, including the Roman sacrificers and mediators, must be classed with alchemists, astrologers, and necromancers,
partly deceived, and partly deceivers. Next to that of becoming
the object of worship, (like the Grand Llama,) the office of priest is
the most wicked that it is possible for man to fill.
"*  Emperors, kings, and other superiors have their power from
God, because they are the substitutes of God on earth."




72              CHANGE OF CONDITIONS.
pope, of course, is a kind of partial divinity, from
being the high priest of the Roman superstitions; and,
in Russia, "God and the emperor" are much on the
same footing as God and the pope.  Both the pope
and the emperor are blasphemously associated with
the divine Majesty, and the authority of Heaven is
supposed in some obscure way or other to attach to
the persons of those worthies.  France has passed the
theological view of government, and the priest is no
longer a jackall to the king. Superstition has lost its
hold; and though the women must still have some
kind of religion, the men have got beyond the point
of believing  merely on authority; and  as, unfortunately, they have been denied the truth, they have sunk
into passive infidelity.  Superstition and the ruler are
no longer allied in their thoughts, and an innumerable
multitude of officials must be called into existence to
lep them  from indulging in political disturbances.
Mere superstition, however, is insufficient to enslave
a people that has commercial intercourse with other
Ques.- "How must subjects behave towards their sovereign?
-/ns. —"Subjects must behave towards their sovereign like
faithful slaves towards their master.
Ques.  "Why must subjects behave like slaves?
Zlns.   "Because their sovereign is their master, and has power
over their property as well as over their life.
Ques.- "Are subjects bound to obey also bad sovereigns?
JIns.- "Yes, subjects are bound to obey not only good, but also
bad sovereigns." -The Duty of Subjects towards their Sovereign,
for Instruction in Reading, in the Second Class of Elementary
Schools. Milan: 1824.
Such are the deliberate blasphemies inculcated by order of the
Austrian government.




CHANGE OF CONDITIONS.                   73
nations.  So long as the country can be surrounded
with  a barrier, and  free communication  prevented,
superstition may do its work tolerably well, and a nation may remain in much the same state for an indefinite period.*  When, for a thousand years, the sun
* We have only to look at Spain to see how effectually superstition eradicates even an aspiration after freedom. Let it be remembered that, a few centuries since, Spain was second to no
country in Europe in the extent of herpolitcal power. What is
sie now, and what has superstition made her  "The masses care
no more for a constitution than the Berber or Oriental; with them
this thing of parchment is no reality, but a mere abstraction, which
they neither understand nor estimate. The people do not want
their laws to be 6hanged, but to have them fairly administered;
the laws are good in theory, but worm-eaten in practice, by bribery
and corruption. Confer a spick-and-span patent Benthamite constitution on Spaniards, and they will take it without thanks; annul
it, and they will respond. by a patient shrug. Their only idea of
government is despotism."  FORD'S Spain, p. 862.
Mr. Ford addc, that though despotism may be odious in theory, it
never pressed harshly on the nation in practice. This is rather a
singular way of reading Spanish history; and we would ask, if
despotism have not pressed hard, what is it that has pressed so
hard? If despotism has not pressed hard on Spain, what was it
that burnt 30,000 of her inhabitants, and imprisoned and expatriated
an immense multitude of her industrious population?  Of course
the Roman superstitions were at the bottom of the persecutions,
but the despotism was the efficient agent in carrying out the diabolical instigations of the monks and priests. Where there is not
a despotism, the power of the priest is annulled. He can no longer
proscure the death or the exile of those who differ in belief. And
wherever the priest is found, there will be found an ally and a
supporter of despotic power. Superstition ruined the credence of
Spain, and despotism ruined the country. The two walk hand in
hand, like the invisible pestilence and the loathsome disease that
shows that pestilence to the world.
7




7 4             FREE INTERCOURSE.
rises every day upon similar conditions, it is by no
means wonderful that change should not take place.
In the political, as well as the physical world, the conditions must be changed before we can look for a
change in the phenomena.  Change the conditions,
and some change or other will be exhibited in the consequent results. For those who have the: land and the
privilege, every change is dangerous; and the invariable tendency of the privileged classes to oppose change
is only a prudefe exercise of foresight..
One of the most important changes in the condition
of a people is free intercourse with strangers. Interchange of thought and opinion takes place, information is given and received, new arts are learnt and
communicated, and something analogous to a chemical effervescence takes place between the two people,
who are thus mutually excited to a state of social ferment. But not only are nations stimulated by intercourse with others; it appears to be a -kw of animal
development, that the mixture of races produces a
higher and better type than either of the originals, and
the finest races are those in whose elements the original types have almost disappeared. Races of men
may, at the same time, be so mingled as to produce a
lower type, and this law also extends to the lower ani
mals; but while two races, already low, may be inju.
diciously crossed, to the detriment of the progeny,
there seems little reason for doubt that the intermixture of national blood, where the races are of a higher
character, is conducive to the physical perfection of
mankind. The races of western Europe, that now take
the preeminence in the world, are complex, and the




RETROGRESSION OF SPAIN.                 75
result of many amalgamations. The south of Britain,
especially, which produces men probably inferior to
none oilhe whole surface of the globe, is peopled by
a race resulting from  many tribes who successively
invaded the shores, and left a greater or less impress
on the character of the, inhabitants.*  The Spaniard
and  the  Frenchman  are also the results of mixed
blood; and, though the kingdom of Spain has sunk to
insignificance from the effects of superstition and tyranny, the Spaniard is a high type of the human species, and only wants truth and freedom  to enable him
to play a distinguished part in the.destinies of the
world.  When England and France were.as.superstitious and as enslaved as Spain, Spain was perhaps the
most powerful kingdom  in Europe; but since Spain
did not progress in freedom, she has naturally sunk
into -every kind of licentiousness; and the Spanish
race, with all its immorality and recklessness of blood* "The Saxons and Normans having sprung from the same
Teutonic stock, the mixture of races, aided by the common services and sympathies of religion, became a matter of much greater
facility than the same process.in other countries. And this mixture
we know has ever given the most powerful impetus to the progress
of civilization. Perhaps no race of men ever'ceased to be barbarous
4nd stationary without mingling blood with another race. On the
other hand, such interfusion has rarely if ever occurred, without
imparting benefit to both sides —energy, knowledge, enterprise,
and advancement in the arts of life. These causes combined, as
well as others that might be mentioned, gradually gave prevalence
to the Saxon language, and ultimately produced the'Commons of
England,' before whose ascendancy Norman feudalism must'hide
its diminished head;  while the' Englishry, whom it so long trampled down and spurned, are now the most illustrious and the might
iest nation on the globe.' -NVorth BritishReview.




76   COMBINATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND REASON.
shed, is a living evidence of what kings and priests
can do with a nation, when the nation does not destroy their influence in time. Had Spain dtablished
freedom of thought, instead of torturing and expatriating her industrious inhabitants, she might now have
been a second England, with wealth and power beyond any other continental country. Freedom  of
thought is now evolving in Spain; andif a moderate
tyranny could be established, to consolidate the disjointed elements of the country, Spain might still
progress. But freedom of thought is now necessary;
and if any attempt be made to curtail it, the progress
of revolution may go on for years and years, until
worn out by anarchy, and the credences of the rising
generation running counter to the old superstitions,
some bold adventurer may seize the reins of government, and exhibit Spain in an entirely new aspect.
That the present rulers will continue is almost an
impossibility.
SECTION III. -THE COMBINATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND
REASON.
[Knowledge is Credence based on sufficient Evidence, and Reason
is the Power of perceiving Consequences, and of infenring  i ntecedents.]
THE combination ofknowledge and reason is the
great moving power destined to emancipate the world.
It is the only ground of hope for the unprivileged




THE BIBLE.                       77
classes, but, at the same time, it is,a sure ground of
hope, and the more rapidly knowledge increases, the
more rapidly will its all-powerful influence be made
apparent to the world.
The first great condition of true knowledge is the
Bible.  Without this, man knows nothing.  He neither knows what he is, nor what is his destiny; and
though he may guess at some of the important truths
in which the race is involved, he gropes in obscurity
as to the most essential.  Without the Bible, superstition and infidelity reign universally.*  But God never
made man to be either superstitious or an infidel; and
* "It will be better to avoid all religious discussions whatever,
on which the natives are very sensitive. There is too wide a gulf
between, ever to be passed. Spaniards, who, like the Moslems,
allow themselves great latitude in laughing at monks, priests, and
professors of religion, are very touchy as regards the articles of
their creed; on these, therefore, beware of sportive criticism. The
whole nation in religious matters is divided into only two classesbigoted Romanists or infidels; there is no via media. The very
existence of the Bible is unknown to the vast majority, who, when
convinced of the cheats put forth as religion, have nothing better
to fall back on but infidelity. They have no means of knowing
the truth, and even the better classes have not the moral courage to
seek it; they are afraid to examine the subject; they anticipate an
unsatisfactory result, and therefore leave it alone in dangerous
indifferentism. And even with the most liberal, with those who
believe every thing except the Bible, the term hereje, heretic, still
conveys an undefined feeling of horror and disgust, which we tolerant Protestants cannot understand. A Lutheran they scarcely
believe to haee a soul, and almost think has a tail.
One thing is quite clear; that however serious and discouraging
the blows recently dealt to the pope, the cause of infidelity, and
not of Protestantism, has hitherto been the sole gainer." FORD'S
Hand-book for Spain, p. 168. It would say very little for Protes7*




78                     THE BIBLE.
as soon as either qf these forms is stamped upon a
nation, every kind of error is let loose, and the erroneous credence in the matter of religion extends to the
temporal affairs of the state. There is but one truth;
and if men go wrong in the most important item, we
cannot wonder that they should err as to the moral
principles by which they should be guided in their
actions towards each other.  If they know  not their
duties to their Creator, how can it be expected that
they should fulfil their duties to their fellows? *
Independent of all considerations of a hereafter, the
tantism if it did gain where there is no evidence. The process by
which Romanists. pass to infidelity is very easily explained.
Popery is a positive credence; that is, it maintains a great many
positive propositions. When these are examined, the evidence on
which they ought to be based is found wanting, and the inquirer
properly abandons them, thereby sinking into a negative state. He
should, however, return to the God of nature until he finds evidence
for a positive creed.
"From the state of matters in this country, it will not be long in
all probability before the fruit ofthis religious toleration begins to
appear. There is already much secret infidelity, and that will now
no longer be concealed, so that we shall have an infidel party.
There will also be a considerable body who hold pertinaciously by
the forms, ceremonies,- miracles, and worship of Rome, whom.you
may call the Romanist party.; and there will be a third, which I
trust by God's blessing may be, a rapidly increasing party. Though
small in its beginnings, you may call it the evangelical party."
-Letterfrom Italy, Witness, March 8, 1848.
* In saying that without the Bible mian knows nothing, we do
not mean that science or philosophy are to be learned from the
Bible. All natural knowledge may be learned without the Bible;
but suppose a nation were possessed of all natural knowledge, and
yet had not the Bible, what doubts and mysteries would remain to
overwhelm the inquirer?  Besides, man, as man, is a worshipping




THE BIBLE.                      79
Bible has an eminent effect in regulating the conditions of men in this world.  Religious superstition is
essentially tyrannical.  It interferes with men's thoughts
and actions in almost every country of the globe, and
freedom  appears to be scarcely possible wherever it
has a decided hold on the community.- Superstition
is the basis of bigotry, and bigotry is the basis of persecution.  Destroy the superstition, and both bigotry
and persecution will soon fall to the ground.
The Bible strikes at the root of persecution, by removing the false credence on which it is based; and
wherever the Bible gains an ascendency over the priestcraft of a superstition, we may be certain that, sooner
or later, all persecution will disappear, and liberty of
creature, and all history informs us that where the revelation of
TRUTH was unknown, men plunged madly into superstition. The
Bible saves from this great whirlpool of destruction; and by enlightening man on his nature and destiny, and by revealing more
clearly and specifically the wonderful benevolence of the Creator,
and the constant interest taken by the Divine Being in the affairs
of this world, the Bible enables man to settle his credence, and to
classify his knowledge upon a system unknown to those who have
not the truth. When, above all our philosophy, there remains an
infinite void or an infinite unknown, we doubt, and speculate, and
wander in obscurity. But when revelation opens up the highest
truths that involve our race, and teaches what we must do to be
saved, all other knowledge ranges itself lower down in the scale,
and assumes a definite position, instead of floating loosely amidst
the vague mysteries of the imagination. Philosophy, however
clear, is but the deceitful moonlight that mocks with its illusions;
and though much may be seen and known eveln by the moonlight,
the calm and steady rays 6f day are requisite before the spell of
the fancy is dissolved, and before the form and color of creation
can be seen in their reality.




80                   CAUSES.
thought be established. The Bible sanctions no persecution, but teaches men that they are made of one
flesh, and that they are personally responsible to their
Creator.
Next to the Bible is the knowledge of material nature. An endless variety of phenomena are constantly
occurring around us, and these, by a law of our mental constitution, are referred to causes.
These causes have ever played a most prominent
part in the history of mankind, and the fancy has ever
thrown around them that mysterious mantle of the
imagination by which they were clothed with personality. From necessary forms of rational thought, they
became transfigured, each and all of them, into conscious existences,that willed and acted for themselves,
and produced the multifarious phenomena of nature.
The child asks us, not "What?" but "Why?  * And
infant nations, who never belie the great principles of
our nature, whether moral, intellectual, or sensual,
whether good or evil, rushed from the exhibition of
the phenomenon to the cause creator that produced it
-endowed that cause with all the attributes of mind,
and filled the world with half material spirits, demons
and demigods, and all the vague mythologies of mysterious influences that spring from  the unhallowed
heart of man, which, naked and shamed, has soughtrefuge in the dark caverns of superstition. As man
was, so were the causes: fierce warrior deities with
the warlike nations - emblems of thought, " sitting on
* A child never thinks of measuring a phenomenon, but asks,;' What produced it? " "Why did it take place?"




CAUSES.                  81
a lotus leaf, immersed in the contemplation of their
own divinity," among the mystic speculators of the
sunlit lands. —demons of carnage, figured in the tiger
fetish off the oppressed progeny of Ham- Molochs,
Baals, or Saturns-fates, furies, or destinies; while
the classic poesy of Greece and Rome deified the sentiments of the human mind, and pictured them as
beings presiding over nature, though steeped in all the
vices of mankind.
Still, wherever there was intellect there was beauty.
False as were the credences, we cannot now turn to
them without recognizing the glorious attributes of
reason with which mankind has been endowed. Nor
can we wonder at the spell of fascination, when we
find the mere abstractions of our thought presented in
the form of a Hebe, a Venus, or Minerva. Dark as
were the times of ancient paganism, there was 4
beauty of imagination that speaks home to the intellect: of man, and leaves a sad regret.- Let us not forget, however, that we behold, not as actors in the
scene, but- as the spectators at those gladiatorial shows,
where the contest of man with death was the absorbing drama for the onlooker, while the victims in the
arena poured forth their blood and perished.
It was reserved for the corruption of Christianity to
throw the darkest shade. It is said that "the shadow
is nowhere so dark as immediately under the lamp;"
and the true light of Heaven was converted, not into
the lamp that lightens, but into the lamp that casts a
shade. Piety died away, and theology took her place.
Creeds and confessions were substituted for living virtue. Christians forgot to fix their eyes on Heaven,
and deified the symbols of religion.




82                    DEMONOLOGY.
The wisdom that is from above is not a creel, but a
principle of life imbued with truth; and when  the
church forgot the life, the truth vanished from the
symbol, and  left the dead  remains of unspiritual
knowledge.  The shadows were dark before, but now
night shrouded in a veil.
Now was the night of degradation.  Now was man
seen, not in the energies of his pride, not in the brilliant colors of his fancy, not in the heroism of a noble
heart, that'had framed its country for its God, and
rushed to death self-sacrificed-but in the drivelling
wretchedness of priestcraft, and in the sensuality of
worse than pagan Rome.  Now indeed was darkness.
Truth had few worshippers -  tradition had her hosts.
Virtue was gone, and man was content with ceremony.  Causes  were no longer deities; and all that
had remained of beauty was drowned in the senseless
legend of the monkish tale.
Causes now were demons and demi-demons.  The
atmosphere of earth was filled with spirits of malignity.  Demons and devils stared from out the ordinary
phenomena of nature.*   Tempests had their witches,
winds had their wizards, and saints were prayed to for
* " Such were the words which Paracelsus addressed to his contemporaries, who were as yet incapable. of appreciating doctrines
of this sort; for the'belief in enchantment still remained every
where unshaken, and faith in the world of spirits.still held men's
minds in so close a bondage, that thousands were, according "to
their own conviction, given up as a prey to the devil; while, at the
command of religion as well as of law, countless piles were
lighted, by the flames of which human society was to be purified."
— ecker's Epidemics of the JMiddle.Iges, p. 100.




POPISH MIRACLES.              83
protection. Now was death triumphant. Death of all
that was noble, death of all that was true, death of all
that was brave.  Now was the reign of ignorance, and
now was-the priest man's deity. Now was "the heel
bruised," and now was truth transformed into a LIE.
Lies in the life, lies in the heart, lies on the tongue,
lies in the creed, lies in the ceremony, lies in the vow,
lies in the church, lies at the altar, and lies to the lips
of the last expiring agonies of man. O, mystery of
iniquity!
But the causes did not fall alone. As the causes
fell, so fell man. Man and his deities are linked by a
chain that nothing severs but death; for as the object
of our worship is, so shall we be, more and more nearly.
While we look to the night of intellect and virtue
that followed the teaching of the priest, let us also
look to one incident that shows the depth of human
degradation. Man had anciently deified the cause, and
created, according to a necessary law of our nature, a
something that should afford an explanation of phenomena. The priest now creates not a cause, but a
phenomenon.
So long-as man takes the fact in nature, and seeks
to assign a cause, he follows the true path; and that
path is abstractly correct, however absurd may be the
fancied explanation. The priest, however, who turned
every thing into a lie, forsook even this great principle
of our intellect, and took a cause and worked a miracle.
He sought no longer to personify, but to simulate.
And the vulgar miracles of the papal heresy were simulated facts, wrought for the purposes of deception.
His bleeding idols and moving pictures, and all the




POPISH MIRACLES.
Ather stock-in-trade of lying priestcraft, were imitations
of phenomena; while wooden virgin Marys and human saints were supposed to preside over the operations of the elements.
To suppose that any thing else than vice, abomination, and tyranny could exist with such a system, is
out-of the question.  All the history of man teaches
us, that:where there is a-corrupt priesthood, there is a
corrupt people.  And if the people are corrupt  if
from the king-on the throne to the peasant who tills
the field, lies and superstition form the sum and substance of theological credence, where in all the world
can liberty be expected to come from?  Does liberty
grow out of lies? orout of truth?  Out of ignorance
and vice? or out of knowledge and virtue?  And if
itdoes grow out of truth, there is but ONE TRUTH; and
that truth is the condition of man's welfare, and the
only price at which true freedom can be purchased.. It may be supposed that we dwell too strongly and
too long on the superstitions of the Roman heresy.
Not so.  These superstitions have more political influence for the destruction of freedom, than all the other
causes that act on the states of central and southern
Europe. Read the history of any country where Romanism has been the prevailing superstition; read the
best accounts of the presen condition of any Roman
Catholic countries — and then say if you can find any
thing whatever that can be called even an approach to
liberty-to an equitable condition of society.  Take
France before the revolution, (and even forget the
ameliorating influence of time in softening down the
asperities —an influence that makes us look with




POPERY.                  85
almost calm indifference at deeds however dark, provided they are far enough removed,) and ask what
Romanism had done for France? See brute carnality
pursued intentionally, see despotism not even arrested
at the oubliettes, see a peasantry taught lies by the
priest, while the farmers of the taxes ground them into
madness and desperation, the state corrupt in every
function, the best and the most industrious part of the
population expatriated or destroyed, and liberty of
thought uprooted by the sabres of the soldiery. When
at last (without the aid of what is called Protestantisin) the very people, who from  infancy had been
taught to reverence the priest and his mysteries, could
no longer believe his lies, what could be expected?
When every thing had been so corrupted that France
was rotten to the core, and there remained no single
bond that could keep the nation together as a society;
and when the very light of reason, that professed to
teach nothing, destroyed the superstitions of the priest,
and unhinged the credence of the nation; when the
priest was found a deceiyer and the ruler a despot,
and men's reason told them that it was so, even without the Bible; -and when all religious credence was
swept away in the reaction of the poisoned intellect
— what could we expect?  And can it be supposed
that Russia and Austria have nothing of the kind
in store?  Will ignorance remain there forever, and
teach men that, though they have a reason, they must
not exercise it, but be, like the beasts of the field, subject to their master?  Some may:think that "to-morrow shall be as to-day, and much more abundant."
" God forbid! " must be the prayer of every freeman.
8




86                 PATRIOTISM.
The degradation of the causes of natural phenomena entailed some of the most horrid cruelties that
have stained the history of the world. GoD was dethroned from the realm of nature, as well as from the
realm of religion; and when virgins, saints, old bones,
and bits of wood became the objects of men's worship,
witches and sorcerers were the minor deities of nature,
and the. causes of phenomena. The priest, however,
had the power, and, as he dealt in miracles himself, the.witches trenched too closely on his domain, and he
removed them by a process more frantically cruel than
that by which he himself was afterwards removed by
the few insane atheists of France. The terrible crimes
that were committed, under the pretext of punishing
witchcraft, show us that nature as well as religion was
provided with an inquisition by the priest; and the
multitudes of sorcerers who were immolated in the
middle ages, were as much the victims of nature misinterpreted, as the martyr Christians were the victims
of a false theology. Truth, in either case, would have
prevented the commission of the crimes.
Not only, however, does popery destroy the elements,bf freedom; it uproots that most pure and most holy
of all man's natural sentiments - patriotism. Some
have come to speculate about the country that produces most food, most population, most machinery,
and most, &c., &c., as if that were necessarily the best
country. Granted, if man were to live forever. But
as threescore years and ten are the time of man's days
upon earth, hewho has a country has but one. All
trade, all fairness, all peace, all good will to all the
nations in the world; but yet there is a country for




MERCENARIES.                 87
which something else is reserved. It is not merely the
country of our birth; that is an accident that goes for
nothing in the case of birth abroad. It is theJand of
our fathers, the land of our hopes, the land of our language, the land-of our affections, and the land of our
heart. It is the land that we should stand with or fall
with.  Were there ten thousand Tamrierlanes ravaging
the earth, we might look on as spectators; it might, or
it might not, be our duty to interfere..But our land is
the land of our sanctuary, on which foeman's foot is
the impress of pollution; and, so long as there beats a
patriot's heart, there will be found the patriot's sword.
Nothing in the history of the world ever struck patriotism dead, save the blasphemous doctrines of Rome.
Search all history for a thousand years, read tales and
legends, and records of all that has come down of
papal Roman history, and say if you can find one
single Roman patriot;  Ask if there be one man in all
that city, and that state, whose heart has beat for Rome,
and whose hand grasped a patriot's brand on the
threshold of his fathers.  Saxons and Franks, Northmen, Genoese, Pisans, Venetians, Sicilians, Burgundians, Flemings, Spaniards, Moors, Normans, Europeans, Africans, and Asiatics, all the races that ran to
seek a country, or staid to defend one, have left a
name in the annals of the age. And where amidst
them all is the Roman?  Rome fought, but not with
Romans.  She who buys and sells souls, and purgatorial fires, and redemption with a bloodless sacrifice,
bought and sold men, and hired the arms of hirelings.
Rome taught men that they might fight here-to-day,
there to-morrow, and sell their swords for gold. Men




88     THE TURNING-POINT OF MODERN TIMES.
fought because it was their trade, and worked for the
employer that gave most wages -wretches without a
country, fit emblems of their instructor. Patriotism
was disbanded, save with the peasant cultivators of
the soil, who still could fight for their homes, like the
tiger for his lair.
Whatever may be said of the material benefits of
countries, one thing is certain - a country where there
is no patriotism ienot safe for a day. Patriotism is a
country's true strength; for where there is no patriotism there is no bond of union. When France was
patriotic, and trusted her frontier to her peasantry, all
the armies of Europe could set no foot upon her soil.
But when men fought for the emperor, and not for
their country, France was humbled in the dust. Ten
grains of true patriotism  would have saved Spain,
Italy, and Germany from Napoleon; but, alas! "they
had them not," and, what is more, never will have, and
never can have, till Roman priestcraft is destroyed.
But' time rolled on, and night was drawing to a
close.  Broken gleams of light flickered here and
there, to give warning of the coming day. Day broke
at last, and nature was emancipated from the mystic
folds of superstition. The great turning-point of
modern times was, when the doctrine of constant repetition of similar-phenomena in similar conditions was
substituted for the dread of unseen, and too often
malevolent, agency.
Man learned at last to bend his eye on the phenomenon, accurately to observe the conditions, and accurately to measure the change. Physical truth was the
result of this operation, so simple, now we know it,




INDUCTIVE REASONINGS.           89
yet of such vast importance to the welfare of the
world. Superstition here received its blow of death;
and, just in proportion as the inductive philosophy (in
physical science) was received and cultivated; so was
man emancipated from the terrors -of unseen agency,
and the phenomena of nature were fixed on a stable
basis, that invited man constantly to further inquiry.
But what had become of the causes? The immense
revolution that had taken place in man's view of nature, was accompanied by another revolution that
went far to destroy the priestcraft of Rome, and to
bring man back to the spiritual worship of his Creator.
The Bible had been resuscitated, and some at all
events had learned to love the pure beauty of religion
as taught by God, and to forsake  the doctrines of
devils as taught by man. Instead of stocks, and
stones, and graven images, and the remnants of the
human frame, men learned to bow the knee to Him
who sitteth on the throne of righteousness, and to confide in the God of heaven, who had sent his Son for
the redemption of the world.
The causes were now no longer beings, but the laws
by which the one God carries on the governmertt of the
material world. No wonder that Rome will have no
science.
~But has this view of nature a direct bearing on the
political condition of mankind?  No doubt of it
whatever. Those who have advocated the utilitarian
theory are true obenefactors to their country; and,
though we may take occasion to advert to the cases
in which that theory has been carried altogether out
of its legitimate province, we of course accept it to its
8*




90            INDUCTIVE REASONINGS.
utmost efte'nt in those matters that come within its
range. But what is the utilitarian theory, and what is
its connection with inductive philosophy?
Let us suppose men legislating on a theological
principle, (nio- matter what,) and carrying out their
laws by force. Let us suppose an inductive philosopher beginning at the effects of these laws, carefully
collecting the statistics of the things he can observe,
and arranging them into an exhibition of facts.  Let
us suppose that these facts (as it is most likely they
would) show the results of the legislation to have been
eminently detrimental to the great body of the population. Suppose he publishes these details. Of course
those who legislate on a theological principle care
nothing about consequences; for if the principle be
correct, the legislation is a duty at all hazards. Now,
what is-to be done?  Of course, if the populace are
not quite so certain about the principle as the legislators are, they might begin to suspect a mistake in the
rulers' method of proceeding, and perhaps they might
weigh the statistics against the theology, and give the
preference to the former. This is very likely. Now,
what course have the rulers? Either to abandon their
legislation, or to expel the philosopher, and prevent all
further inquiries of the'kind. But suppose the inductive mode of judging of legislative acts should happen
to procure free course, it is quite impossible that facts,
merefacts, should not tell on the country in the long
run, and that reasonings upon those facts should not
spring up in every man's mind, and cause him to throw
all his weight into every change in which he could see
his own, and the interest of his fellows, involved.




INDUCTIVE REASONINGS.          91
But suppose a new light were to break upon the
nation. Suppose men should happen to reflect that
facts come from the operations of the laws of God,
and suppose the thought should strike them that God
is a benevolent and a just God -that he made a good
world, gave it good laws, and that social evils sliing
from man's.-injustice to his fellow, and from the wrong
way in which things have been divided. Suppose the
idea should go abroad that God is no respecter of persons, but that perhaps the welfare of a peasant is of
as much value in the eyes of Him who doeth all things
well, as the welfare of a king. Now, suppose to these
reflections were joined another or two, that God made
man's reason, and made man to hate pain and flee
from it; and also that man's nature obliges him to live
in society, and that societies may make mistakes, as
the child does who puts his finger into the flanle, and
that the pain is to teach- him to beware in future.
Were such notions to go abroad, it is perfectly evident
that the inductive philosophy, when it found out evils
and suffering attending legislative acts, would come,
backed with the authority of Him who made the laws
of nature, and it would lead to the belief that the
welfare of the gret masses of the population was
never sacrificed to procure the wealth of the few, without God's displeasure being always made manifest in
the spffering that ensued. Not that this suffering was
a miraftlous interference, but the result of the ordinary
laws which God has made for the government of the
world.
Suppose, however, one more principle should be
admitted, namely, that " that which is just is beneficial,




92            MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
and for the good of the greatest number." Suppose
men should reflect that induction requires time -and
knowledge before it can be brought to perfection, and
that God endowed man with an,a priori principle of
justice, to enable him to steer clear of injuring his fellow, w/en where the inductive evidence should not be
at hand. Suppose the results of this justice and of
this induction should happen to turn out always and
invariably coincident, and although pursuing different
paths to reach the same end, yet the end arrived at
never was different.
Were all this admitted, (and though it takes many
words to tell it, perhaps it might be seen all at one
view,) it is plain that the inductive method of examining the condition of the country would have the most
direct and the most powerful influence on the legislation of the country. Where suffering was considered
not the mere accident of chance, nor the work of a
malevolent spirit, but the voice of a just and benevolent God, telling mento amend the order of society,
and to return to those elementary principles of justice
that he had implanted in their mind —surely we can
see that the progress of this nation must be very different from the progress of that tiation from which
inductive philosophy was banished, and where men
legislated for themselves and pretended to be legislating
for God.
Next to a rational view of nature comes a true philosophy of the mind and of the mental operations. It
might be supposed that this could have little influence
on the political condition of a nation; and if all the
great truths relating to man were not so inseparably




ETHICS.                      93
linked together, that error in the one usually involves
or implies error in the other, perhaps, taken alone, it
might be of no great importance.  But from  some
cause or other, speculative errors about ma1 have usually involved speculative errors about God, and speculative errors about God have usually unhinged the
whole framework of human duty, and obscured the
distinction between right and wrong.  This subject
the reader will find discussed in the first volume of M.
Cousin's "History of the Moral Philosophy of the
Eighteenth Century," where he traces, with a grace
peculiar to himself, the doctrine of "no causes but
physical causes" to the "sensation " school of mental
philosophy.*
Of M. Cousin's work, it.is perhaps impossible to
speak too highly, and we rejoice to see so eminent a
man, and so candid a reasoner, speaking out for the
natural principles of duty, declaring his honest conviction, that, as a philosopher, he finds a law of justice
written in the constitution of man. At the same time,
we cannot but hope that those who adopt that philosophy will not confine themselves to the general idea
of a just and righteous God made manifest through
the glorious works of nature and of mind, but continue in the onward path of truth, and really investigate with the same candor the authenticity of the
* The doctrine of no causes but physical causes, is said to have
produced, perhaps, the most frightful exclamation that ever crossed
the lips of man, - " Nous pouvons faire ce que nous voulons, il n'y-a
pas de Dieu!" said to have been uttered by the rabble at Arras,
as the executioner's cart tracked its way with blood. Fit doctrine
to fit deed.




94                 REVELATION.
BIBLE. For ourselves we cannot speak as if the
Bible were not a revelation, or even as if it were a
collection of doubtful documents; and therefore we
cannot speculate as if there were a question as to
whether God has revealed himself directly, as well as
by necessary inference from his works.  Christianity is
never to be found in nature, although religion is; and
THE CHRIST, the Son of the living God, equal
and one with the Father, forms as necessary a part of
all true acceptance with God, and of all present religion, (now since the fall,) as the most clear acknowledgment of the Creator. When we confine ourselves
purely to philosophy, and ask what may be learnt by
the unaided exercise of the reason, we do well, so long
as we do not advance oqr results to the exclusion of
revelation; but when we form a system of philosophy
from nature, however perfect that system may be, we
suggest that it is not logical to predicate any thing
whatever about the reality or unreality of a revelation,
with only that philosophy for the premises. Nothing
whatever is capable of being the premises of the question of revelation, except the evidence on which any
particular revelation is stated to be founded. And
although the attributes of the Deity are made evident
through nature, we must never from that leap to the
conclusion, that God has not made known his particular acts, which could never be inferred, as we can infer
his attributes. "God that made the world and all
things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and
earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands;
neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he
needed any thing, seeing he giveth to all life, and




CORRECT CREDENCE.                 95
breath, and all things; and hath made of one bloocd
all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the
earth, and hath determined the times before appointed,
and the bounds of their habitation; that they should
seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and
find him, though he be not far from every one of us.
For in him we live, and move, and have our being;
as certain also of your own poets have said, For we
are also his offspring. Forasmuch then as we are the
offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art
and man's device.  And the times of this ignorance
God winked at; but now commandeth all men every
where to repent: because he hath appointed a day, in
the which he will judge the world in righteousness by
that Man whom  he hath ordained; whereof he hath
given assurance unto all men in that he hath raised
him from the dead." -  PAUL's Address to the Athenians.
But what, after all, is the sum and substance of our
argument concerning the combination of knowledge
and reason? Merely this, that correct credence is absolutely essential to the human race, before that race
can know and work out its own well being.
The elements of this correct credence are, 1st. The
Bible. 2d. A correct view of the phenomena of material nature. 3d. A correct philosophy of the mental
operations.*
* We do not, in this place, enter on the subject of moral science,
ihaving to treat it more specially hereafter. A correct philosophy,of the mental operations would of course include the science of
equity, but a science of equity there cannot possibly be, so long as
there is a sensational philosophy; and therefore we have affirmed.




96                    THE BIBLE.
1st. The Bible. Thereis but one truth, and, if the
Bible system be true, every other system must be erroneous, and must lead to a course of action prejudicial
to mankind.  The question is not as to the necessity
of all men becoming, what is sometimes termed religious, but as to the general acceptance or rejection of
that system of revealed knowledge which is contained
in the Bible alone; and, when we consider how vast an
amount of information is there afforded us respecting
man, man's nature, and man's destiny, we see at once,
that if all that information be correct and be rejected,
men shut themselves out from  the light, and plunge
wilfully into vague and hopeless darkness.  So far
from the Bible being in opposition to the reason of
mankind, the Bible is the great emancipator of the
reason; the first great influence that delivers man from
the empire of passion and superstition, and leaves him
free to exercise those faculties with which the Creator
has endowed his intellect.  Sceptics may frame their
sophisms, and point incredulous to its insoluble mysteries; but HIsToRY dashes their sophisms into the dust,
and shows us the great evolution of freedom and civilization taking place under the shadow of revealed
truth, while the mass of the earth's inhabitants struggle
helplessly onward in a vain endeavor to deliver themthat a correct mental philosophy is essential to human welfare. At
the conclusion of the volume, we shall endeavor to show how a
genuine philosophy may become possible, and possible in such a
manner as to cast aside dispute. Philosophy, strictly speaking, can
never assume a satisfactory form until the whole of the direct sciences are completed, and then philosophy will become purely
critical.




NATURAL PHENOMENA.                       97
selves from the evils that inseparably accompany
superstition. No truth can be more certain, than that
the welfare of the human race is wrapped up in the
universal acceptance of the Bible as the Word of God,
and the only true source from which man must draw
the first great facts in which all the children of men
are irrevocably implicated.
2d. A correct view  of natural phenomena.  In this,
two things are implied: 1st. A knowledge of natural
phenomena, (science;)  and, 2d. The attribution  of
those phenomena to their true cause. If God be the
Creator of the universe, God is also the physical Governor of the universe; and as such we must regard the
occurrences of nature as the results of the laws established by him. And when once men shall really awake
to the conviction, that the social evils of the community (poverty and want,* with the accompaniments of
* That poverty and want have a direct tendency to produce
crime, is a fact which may be ascertained inductively in the same
manner as any general fact or principle is ascertained and established in the physical sciences. If prevention be better than cure,
it is most certainly better than punishment, which has proved itself,
in the general history of the world, to be the clumsiest and most
inefficient means of preventing crime that has ever been employed
towards a population. Theie is a vast difference between the man
who is by habit and repute a criminal, and the man who is led to
commit crime under certain circumstances of social distress. Almost every man in the world is of such a nature that he would
commit crime in certain circumstances; and this very fact should
point out the necessity of reforming the circumstances, as well as
endeavoring to restrain the offenders by threats of consequent infliction. So intimately is crime connected with the physical condition of the population, that it may almost be said to fluctuate with
9




98                      SOCIAL L'-AWS.
crime, ignorance, and disease) arise from  an infringement of certain invariable laws, no more uncertain in
their nature than those which regulate the fall of a
stone or the motion of a planet, we may reasonably
the price of provisions and the demand for labor; and the only sure
mode of reducing it to a minimum, is to remove those political obstacles which prevent the cultivator and the laborer from reaping
their natural reward, or which prevent them from employing their
labor on the earth, which God has given as a storehouse for food,
but which the laws of men reduce to sterility by the common system of landed property. How many thousands of criminal Irishmen might be made useful members of society, by allowing them
to cultivate the land, according to the law of God's word and of
God's nature, for their own profit! Let any one compare the following statement of Irish crime with the price of provisions in
Ireland at the respective periods, and deny, if he can, the same inductive relation of cause and effect which forms the essence of all
physical science: -
"OUTRAGES.- Ireland, October, 1847.- Returns have just been
issued (pursuant to an order of the House of Lords, dated June 28)
stating the number and kind of outrages reported by the constabulary in Ireland, from the month of June, 1845, to the month of May,
1847, inclusive. This return is intended as a continuation of the
sessional paper, No. 279 of 1845. The results of this latest document show a fearful and extraordinary increase of crime in Ireland.
Thus the total number of outrages specially reported to the constabulary force in Ireland, during the month of July, 1844, was 552.
In June, 1845, the number was 896, and in July, 1845, it was 708.
In September of the same year it was 552; in August, 1846, it was
478; while in the following month it had increased to 829. In
October, the number of offences again increased to 1482- (nearly
three times as many as during the corresponding period of the preceding year;) in November last it was 1761; and in the concluding
month of the year, no less a number than 2666 - (upwards of four
times as many as in December, 1845,) Of that number, 1389 were
cases of cattle stealing; 14 homicides, (in poe not th;).22  ases of




INDUCTION.                     99
expect that men will bend their eye on the phenomenon; endeavor to ascertain* the conditions and forces
that result in good or evil, and thus to discover a natural science of society that may open a new era in the
history of civilization.  Induction is no less applicable
to the phenomena of men than it is to the phenomena
of matter; and, although there are disturbing causes
that render the study more complex and more difficult,
we can have no reason for supposing that the same
stability that prevails in the inorganic world, does not
also prevail in the social world of men, and entail
many effects which are too often attributed to the voluntary volitions of the mind.  Not that there are no
phenomena in the social world which cannot be accounted for by physical laws - for this would obliterate man's moral nature; but that certain social conditions are for the most part accompanied by certain
social phenomena, which may be studied in the same
manner as the facts of any other science, and made
the basis of social action and of human legislation.
firing at the person; 25 aggravated assaults, &c. Thirty-five of
the offences were of an agrarian character. In the first month of
the present year, (1847,) the number of offences reported by the
constabulary in Ireland was still further augmented, for it amounted
to 2885 -(1276 in Munster alone.) In May it was 2647, of which
number 1446 were cases of cattle stealing; while in the May preceding there were only 69 of these offences reported. The return
from which these results are extracted does not come lower than
the month of May. During the two years included in the account,
(June, 1845, to May, 1847, both inclusive,) the total number of outrages reported by the constabulary in Ireland amounted to no fewer
than 29,302, or at the rate of more than 40 outrages every day in
the year."- Witness, October 30, 1847.




1.00               INDUCTION.
Thus every religion and every political system may
be judged of inductively (by an examination of the
condition of the people where it prevails) as well as
dogmatically, by an inquiry into its own inherent nature; and we may, as politicians, pronounce the utter
condemnation of idolatry, on account of its fruits of
ignorance, vice, crime, and detriment to the social. condition of mankind; while, as theologians, we exhibit
its falsity and error, and condemn it because its credence is unsupported, and therefore superstitious. It
is true that this view may, by certain classes, be esteemed a low one; but all truth is worthy of attention, much more especially that which affects the social
condition of men, because these effects, that may be
observed by the natural exercise of our faculties, must
be considered as the results of God's laws operating
in the world. It is no mean advantage to truth, that
she has always the benefit (the common worldly benefit) on her side; neither is it a small argument against
any erroneous system, that we may point to its deadly
fruits, and show  the demoralizing influence of its
operation.
But if idolatry may be judged of by its fruits, so
may despotism, so may slavery, so may restrictive laws,
and so may all those inventions of worldly legislation,
by which a small benefit is conferred on the few at the
expense of the mass of the population.  And these
effects, whatever their kind, belong to a natural and
inductive science of society, the great principles of
which remain the same in all ages and in all conditions, however much, or however little advantage
may have been derived by a nation from their contemplation.




INDUCTION.                      101
3d. A correct philosophy of the mental operations.
Whenever we approach what is termed metaphysical
philosophy, we feel that we approach a quagmire, over
which a dense mist seems to hold its perpetual habitation.* The footing is all unsound, or at least suspicious, and the little light there is, is only sufficient to
confuse and perplex us.  If we attempt to advance,
two ultimate and hitherto impassable objects present
themselves to view. On the one hand is the bottomless pit of scepticism, and on the other is the commanding  but inaccessible height of absolute truth.
Some, wearied with vain endeavors to scale the precipice, have at last, as if despairingly, advanced beyond
the brink, and sunk into the unfathomable void; while
* In speaking thus of metaphysical philosophy, we do not speak
of that genuine philosophy which consists in the enumeration and
discussion of the primary elements and propositions of human credence, but of that spurious speculation that endeavors, by a subtle
use of language, and of half-formed thought, to uproot the foundations of truth. Let us suppose that every man in the world immediately gives his assent to the necessary and universal truth of an
axiom, (no matter what.) Some philosophers say, " But your axiom
is only a subjective conviction; now prove to me its objective
truth." The most definite reply to this objection, and one which
the sceptic may fail to get over with all his ingenuity, is this, " Give
me a definition of objective truth." Axioms are, it is true, incapable of proof; but why? because they are the standards of all other
propositional truth whatever. The idealist, on the other hand, accepts truth, but confuses the question of reality. The fact we
believe to be, that if truth and reality were fairly defined, and not
jumbled together in a kind of mysterious way, both the sceptic and
the idealist (the Berkleyian) would at once be convicted of introducing a new term into their conclusion, and making a palpable
logical fallacy.
9*




102         PHILOSOPHY AND SCEPTICISM.
others, startled at the plunge, have flattered themselves
that, by some, mighty effort of their own faith or imagination, they could compensate for the reality, that
could only be obtained by setting the foot on the summit and casting the eye over universal nature.
Between scepticism on the one hand, and the dogmatism of unsupported faith on the other, philosophy
has slowly swayed backwards and forwards, leaving
man as little farther advanced in ontology as he was
five hundred, or a thousand, or two thousand years.
since.
To suppose, however, that philosophy is the useless
jargon that some writers appear desirous of representing, because it has failed to solve the great problem,
namely, "How  can objective existence be rationally
substantiated? " is surely to look at history with only
one eye. Philosophy has failed; that is, the human
intellect has failed; that is, man as man has failed;
that is, in fact, that after all the mental toil of the
greatest, the problem appears insoluble, and seems to.
teach us that humanity cannot arrive at objective
truth by its own unaided efforts; neither, we candidly
confess, does it appear to us to be of the slightest importance whether it.can or cannot.
Grant that scepticism in philosophy is the ultimate
result of all investigation; let us only be consistent,
and make that scepticism universal, and the bugbear
of scepticism disappears forever.  Let us write a plus
or a minus, a sign positive or a sign negative, before
all our knowledge, and what difference can it possibly
make?  Knowledge remains the same in all its relative proportions; and all that man has really ascer



SCEPTICISM.                    103
tained to be true, remains as permanently stable, and
as really capable of application, as if ten thousand
syllogisms had proven that knowledge was truth, and
that the axiomatic credence of mankind was really
veracious.  Scepticism, whatever be its dangers, is
only dangerous when partially applied, and when we
apparently undermine  one branch of knowledge by
insisting on rational proof, while at the same time we
admit as much, and perhaps infinitely more, without
any process of proof whatever, but merely because we
are constrained to believe. When one man shall have
demonstrated to another man his own existence, (and
the most sceptical of the sceptics admits the existence
of the me,) it will then be time to substantiate objective existence, by a process of proof that can have no
difficulties, when once the proof of the one me is furnished to the other. If we will be sceptics, let us be
consistent; and let us write our sign negative, not
merely before objective knowledge, but before the existence of that me, whose existence is absolutely as
incapable of every approach to rational proof as is the
existence of an external world.*
It is commonly supposed, that philosophic scepticism has some
mysterious power to unhinge the very framework of morals. Now
suppose that, after all, the whole of man's knowledge should be
proven subjective, what difference can it make? Suppose a subjective man is arrested by a subjective policeman, tried by a subjective jury, and condemned to subjective imprisonment-is the
pain the less real because it is subjective?  Or, to extend the
argument, suppose the whole system of morals should be subjective, and that there shall be a subjective day of judgment, and a
subjective eternity. What difference could tie mere mode of ex



104                    SCEPTICISM.
When, however, we take the existence of the me for
granted, and then insist that other objective'existence
should produce a proof of which it is incapable, our
scepticism  is not only dangerous but fatal, and the
tangled web of sophistry is made to envelop certain
subjects, as if they, and they only, were shrouded in
obscurity. To proceed in this manner is no more rational than it would be to take objective existence for
granted, and then to reflect on the me, and imperatively
to demand its rational proof.  Rational proof there is
none, either in the one case or the other; for the me is
as really objective to all our consciousness, as is matter
or universal mind.  We are conscious of mental phenomena alone; and the me is as far removed from
immediate appreciation, as is any other substantive
existence that our race admits with persevering universality.  Let us only make scepticism  (philosophic
scepticism) absolutely universal, and the foundations
of real knowledge are laid anew, and the glorious edifice of science acquires its fair proportions, and becomes the settled home of man's intellect, where he
may dwell in peace and safety, having buried scepticism in a grave of. its own digging.*
pression make? If scepticism were practical, it would save from
terrestrial consequences and terrestrial pain; and, if it cannot do
so, it makes the most groundless assumption when it proposes to
abolish future punishment. Even if matter were only an idea, it is
plain thatpain is to be avoided, even if it were only subjective;
and consequently if criminality of action brings pain, it is plain
that the most certain of all knowledge is morals. The moral law is
abiding, whatever view may be taken of matter.
* There is one argument which appears to us valid against all




SCErTICISM.                     105
For ourselves, we believe that scepticism  may be
fairly met, and fairly vanquished by the most strict
rules of logic.  Its stronghold is in the ambiguity of
terms, and in the use of terms which it has no logical
right to use.  Let us, however, without descending
into abstract disputations, take it up on the fact.
philosophers who admit the me, and require rational proof of the
existence of the not me. Let us grant that all the external material world may come to be viewed by that philosopher as an assemblage of the sensations or phenomena of the me. This may, perhaps, be possible; but these philosophers use arguments and write
books. Now, for what purpose are these books written?  Surely
not to convince the me, for the me is supposed convinced already,
but to convince some other me, that is, some objective mental existence which can never, even by the utmost stretch of scepticism, be
confounded with the me personal. An argument is to convince a
mind; and assuredly that mind never made a sensual impression on
the sceptic. Nothing in the shape of a sensual impression, nothing
in the shape of observation, nothing in the shape of phenomenal
affection, could ever be experienced by the sceptic of that mind,
whose existence he takes for granted when he endeavors to convince it. Every philosopher who writes a book or uses an argument, appears to us to admit objective existence in a manner that is
not liable to the reply usually given to his admission of the material world. That, we have granted, may be phenomenal; but when
he acts for the conviction of a judgment by publishing an argu
ment, will it, or can it, be advanced that that judgment is phenom
enal?  Is it not absolutely and essentially another me, perfectly
distinct and perfectly distinguished from every thing that the me
who writes can possibly predicate of itself? We can easily imagine
a sceptic viewing men's bodies as phenomena, and classing them
among the modifications of himself; but when he endeavors to
convince their judgments, he thereby substantiates external existence objective to himself, and utterly incapable of ever being
reduced to that modification of the ME, that forms the essential
groundwork of the sceptical philosophy.




106                r ILOSOPIoHY.
Scepticism says, " You have no proof for the objective truth of your subjective convictions."  We deny
the fact, and allege that an argument based on the
calculation of probabilities would establish, beyond
the smallest possibility of doubt, the objective veracity
of the subjective laws of reason. The mathematical
sciences are, every one of them,-namely, arithmetic,
algebra, geometry, and statics,-purely subjective;
every one of their primary propositions is an axiomatic
truth taken for granted, self-evident, incapable of question, purely abstract, and that does not pronounce on
the real existence of any concrete reality whatever.
Now how comes it, that when these subjective sciences are applied to matter, an entity with which they
have nothing to do, they are invariably as correct as
when merely contemplated by the reason?  How, if
the subjective convictions and subjective processes of
the reason are not correct, can an astronomer predict
the return of a comet? —and the comet does return,
to other men's perceptions, years after he is dead.
Scepticism is the greatest imposition that ever fooled
man's reason, yet it must be fairly met.
Never, perhaps, was the absence of a definition
productive of so much fruitless toil, as when men set
to work on philosophy. It had been well if philosophers had definitely laid before them the object they
were about to pursue, and satisfied themselves that the
means of arriving at their end were really within their
reach. WVhat is the object of philosophy?  What is
philosophy?  What does a man propose to expound
when he teaches philosophy?  These are questions
usually evaded by some oblique dissertation on the




THE METHOD OF BACON.            107
general form of knowledge, the nature of things, &c.,
&c., and the definite object to be pursued is never ascertained. For a long period philosophy was ontology;
that is, the knowledge of being, entirely and exclusively objective in its character, entirely and exclusively
subjective in its means of operation. That is, men
endeavored to substantiate both the reality and the
form of the universe in their own minds, without the
connecting link - evidence - that renders one form of
thought knowledge. There was no evidence, therefore
there was no knowledge. With such a system  the
abstract sciences alone are possible, as in them the
evidence is subjective, and supplied by the rational
constitution of the mind.
The Baconian philosophy broke up ontology, by
supplying the connecting link that must unite the
object and the subject. That link was evidence, and
that evidence was only possible by means of observation. Philosophy now separated into two parts - one
of which was metaphysics, the representative of the
ancient philosophy; and science, the new philosophy
that arose from the new method of founding knowledge on evidence.
The new philosophy has advanced with wonderful
strides, enlightening man's intellect, and dispersing
innumerable benefits, which reproduce themselves in
an infinity of forms, and hold out hopes of great and
permanent advantage to our race. The old philosophy
remains much where it was, as regards its nature, but
in a very different position as to the extent of the
ground it occupies.
At one period the ontological method of making




108  GRADUAL CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF PHILOSOPHY.
science (that is, the method of making sciehce  without
evidence) was universal. It was applied to physics as
well as to metaphysics, and its domain was supposed
to extend over every thing that could become the subject of human knowledge. Not only was there a
scholastic theology, but a scholastic series of assertions
with regard to the essence of matter, all explanatory
of observed phenomena.  Alchemy, astrology, &c.,
completed the circle, and reduced to art the principles
of dogmatic assertion. During the reign of this system, it is worthy of remark that diversity of credence
and contradiction of statement were just as prevalent
in matters of physical science, as they now are in
matters of politics and philosophy.
When, however, a new  method was discovered,
diversity of credence and the ontological system retired from all those regions where real knowledge was
acquired; and, as the new philosophy extended its
domain, the old philosophy was curtailed in its sphere
of operation, and restricted to those subjects that have
not yet been reduced to scientific ordination. Thus
the region of conflicting belief was one of indefinite
boundary, or rather one whose boundary was constantly fluctuating and retiring before the advance
of real knowledge. The history of real or positive
knowledge might almost be termed the history of the
retrogression of philosophy; and just as the new
method was enabled to substantiate its propositions in
such a manner, that all who investigated the evidence
arrived at the same unity of credence, was philosophy
constrained to abandon its ground, and to retire to
those heights where it now enjoys but a precarious
authority.




GRADUAL CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF PHILOSOPHY. 109
Let us now firmly lay hold of the fact, that philosophy at one period pretended to explain the phenomena of the external world, and that philosophy has
now been driven from every part of that region that
has been occupied by positive science.
Can nothing be learned from this fact?  We think
that something can, and it is this: That philosophy,
after retrograding from every region of thought to
which man may apply his attention, shall at last resolve itself into the science of human thought, and
pronounce nothing whatever on any subject that is not
merely and exclusively human thought.  If we consider knowledge, we shall find that it implies three
things; the object, (that is, the universe;) the subject,
(that is, the human mind;) and the connecting link
between them, that is, evidence.  Now, if we consider
that philosophy has abandoned one portion after another of the object, just in proportion as positive science has occupied that portion, we can see that, if the
process continues, the whole of the object must ultimately be abandoned, and the subject alone become the
object of contemplation. And if so, then will philosophy teach only psychology,* that is, the science of
mental phenomena, which we can have no reason to
* Psychology, taking that term extensively to signify mental
science. Of course, mental science has its divisions. First, there
is inductive psychology, the observational part of mental science;
and, second, there is the science proper of thought. The latter
alone is entitled to the name of philosophy; the former is the natural history of mind. All the direct sciences must be evolved before
there can be a science proper of thought. On this subject, however, we shall remark towards the close of the volume.
10




110            COMMON CREDENCE.
doubt may assume somewhat of the same ordination
that prevails in those sciences that have the material
world for their foundation.
Let us now for a moment reflect upon our argument, and endeavor to seize the point at which philosophy broke away from the path of legitimate inquiry, and lost itself amid the shifting quicksands of
doubt, denial, and contradiction.
Let us place both the vulgar multitude and the
philosophers before us, and examine their various occupations.
The multitude, in all ages and in all places, have
admitted the existence of the mind, the existence of
the external world, and the existence of Deity. These
appear to be the common facts which those who
do not enter on philosophic inquiry admit and -act
upon as matters requiring neither proof nor specific
investigation. They are the common and general
groundwork of human credence and of human action;
and their certitude is never shaken in the popular mind
until some philosopher shall have promulgated some
abstract speculations as to the evidence on which
those propositions are received. The multitude, then,
believed and acted on their belief, taking the three
great facts we have mentioned as the most common
and ordinary truths, without which the whole economy of thought must be overturned, and laid in inextricable confusion.
The philosophers, however, were desirous of rendering some intelligible account of the phenomenon presented by the multitude, and clearing their minds of
mere ordinary belief, endeavored to give a rational




PRIMARY KNOWLEDGE.               1ll
explanation of the theory of human credence.  Their
object was not to accept these great facts, and thence
to proceed to specific knowledge, but to lay anew the
rational evidence on which these facts themselves were
to be admitted.
This intention appears at first sight to be praiseworthy, and the process may seem  not altogether
illegitimate.
Let us however posit the universal fact, that before
man can reason, three substantives must be given or
taken for granted, and that two propositions must also
be given, involving those three substantives as the
terms, before man can by any possibility arrive at a
proposition established by rational, that is, by logical,
proof.  Let men'therefore pursue their inquiry as far
back as the most subtle intellect can possibly reach,
there must necessarily be found at the bottom  of all
real or of all hypothetical reasoning, three substantives
and two propositions, which, if accepted, may lead to
real knowledge, and, if rejected, must land us without
further difficulty in scepticism, absolutely universal,
obliterating all truth, all possibility of knowledge, and
all existence of whatever kind or character, subjective
or objective.
Such being the case, we may unhesitatingly assert,
that, at the bottom of all knowledge whatever, there
must be found some substantive existences absolutely
incapable of rational substantiation, and some propositions absolutely incapable of rational demonstration.
Without these it is impossible for man to reason.
Any man, therefore, who admits any rational knowledge whatever, does thereby necessarily admit certain




112          SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY,
undemonstrable propositions, and the existence of certain substantives which he has necessarily taken for
granted.
The specific difference, then, between real knowledge and philosophy appears to be this: Real knowledge, or positive science, accepts the ordinary belief of
the multitude, and, pursuing it forwards, endeavors to
determine its limitations, becoming at every step less
and less general. Philosophy, on the contrary, commencing at the ordinary belief of the multitude, pursues its course backwards, endeavoring at every step
to become more and more general.  The ultimate
termination of this course must ever necessarily be,
either to accept some propositions as primary and unproven, or to maintain a consistent. scepticism, which
absolutely obliterates the possibility of rational knowledge. To show how this difference is manifested, we
have only to inquire upon what terms the primary
substantives of the sciences are accepted by science
and philosophy.
The geometrician, for instance, accepts space, without the smallest inquiry into its nature. His object is
to limit, define, and exhibit the relations of spaces.
Philosophy, on the contrary, going backwards, might
discourse forever on the nature of space, without eliciting one truth that should be of the smallest importance to mankind.. The sister substantive of space,
namely, time, is also accepted by the man of science,
whose only object is to measure it accurately; that is,
definitely to determine the limitations of its portions.
The physical sciences, again, accept matter; and without the smallest speculation as to what matter really




ONTOLOGYo                  113
is, they each, in their several branches, endeavor to determine definitely its various forms, and accurately to
specify its manifestations. Philosophy, on the contrary, endeavors to go backwards from the ordinary cre-'dence, and to furnish some explanation as to what
matter is or is not, for some have attempted to obliterate it altogether.
The two substantives, space and mratter, are sufficient for our purpose.  Positive science, accepting
space, and-pursuing the inquiry forwards - investigating first the forms of spaces, and then the necessary
relations that exist between those forms  furnishes
us with geometry. While by accepting matter, and inquiring only into the forms of its manifestation, and
the relations that are observed to exist between those
forms, we are, by the exercise of the human reason,
at last presented with the sciences of astronomy, mechanics, chemistry, physiology, &c.; where we know
not whether most to admire the power and wisdom of
God as displayed in the objects themselves, or his
goodness in endowing man with an intellect to comprehend them.
Against this, what has philosophy to place in the
opposite scale?  Starting from the very same point,
only pursuing her fancied investigation backwards,
what are the treasures she has amassed on her way,
and what the results she has pfsented to mankind?
A thousand years of speculation as to whether matter
be a substance or a shadow, an existence real or ideal;
and, notwithstanding that the most acute minds have
devoted no small time to the speculations, not one
single hair's breadth of progress has ever been made
10*




114         CRITICISM OF KNOWLEDGE.
towards the determination. Every discussion as to
the nature of matter or of space, may be raised to-day
as well as two thousand years ago; and, for all that
we can possibly have reason for anticipating, may be
raised at any future period of man's existence on the
earth, with just as much and just as little probability
of ever terminating in any other proposition than
" space is space, and matter is matter."
We conceive, then, that the moment at which philosophy wandered and went astray was, when it attempted to discuss the objective -truth or falsehood of
the primary credences or convictions of mankind.
These primary convictions, in their general form, are
at the bottom  of all human knowledge; but whether
human knowledge have or have not an external, real,
and objective counterpart, which would remain if man
and man's intellect were annihilated, neither philosophy nor any other natural method can possibly determine. Whether knowledge be truth is (to philosophy) an insoluble mystery; neither has any reason
ever been exhibited to the world for supposing that the
means of solution are at all within the reach of man.
But if it be impossible for philosophy to solve the
question of objective existence, and if all the various
sciences accept, without inquiry, the primary substantives of which they respectively treat, what conclusion
must we come to a  to the character of knowledge?
and what object must we allocate to philosophy to
constitute it a possible branch of knowledge?
First. All human knowledge, obtained by the natural exercise of the faculties, is real only in so far as
it is phenomenal. That is, knowledge, being only a




CRITICISMI OF KNOWLEDGE.               115
form of thought, exists in the mind, and it is beyond the
reach  of the human  faculties to ascertain certainly
whether the  mental propositions  which  constitute
knowledge coincide with actual and external realities.
]That they do so, is a matter, not of knowledge, which
can be rationally substantiated, but of primary, unproven, and unprovable credence.*
Second. If every portion of what is commonly understood by the objective universe be made the subject of some one particular science, (which always accepts its primary substantives, and inquires only into the
modes of their manifestation,) and if ontological or
metaphysical philosophy be rejected from  every portion  of that object which positive science comes to
occupy, then can philosophy no longer attempt to pronounce a priori upon what is, or what is not, but must
confine itself exclusively to thought, and to thought
alone; thereby changing its character from metaphysics to a proper science of thought.   This, then, we
believe to be the true province of philosophy, not to
inquire into the truth or falsehood of the primary convictions of the intellect, but to observe and record what
those primary convictions are, to enumerate them, to
* The fallacy of philosophic scepticism is, not in viewing knowledge from the subjective point of view, which is in fact a legitimate process, but in supposing that this mode of viewing knowledge entails any consequences whatever affecting morals. Crime
may be viewed by the philosopher in its subjective aspect-that
is, in the mind; and the punishment that follows crime may also be
viewed in its subjective aspect-that is, in the pain experienced
by the criminal. But is the pain one single atom less an evil because it happens to be viewed subjectively?




116     FORM AND MATTER OF KNOWLEDGE.
determine the fQrms of their manifestations, and to
pursue with regard to human thought the same kind
of inquiry that the mathematical sciences pursue with
regard to numbers, quantities, and spaces, and more
nearly still, the same kind of inquiry that the physical
sciences pursue with regard to matter and its manifestations.
One of the most valuable distinctions that has ever
been made in philosophy, and one that we believe will
ultimately incline mankind to clearer views of the true
province of philosophy, is the distinction between
the matter of knowledge and the form of knowledge.
This distinction will, we have no doubt, ultimately
strike at the root of metaphysical speculation. For
what, after all, is ontology? An attempt to construct
the universe out of the general convictions of the uiderstanding. Now, let us suppose that the human
mind, so far from being an unwritten tablet, formed
merely for the reception of impressions, is, as it were,
organized up to the highest possible point, so that it
universally and invariably stamps a form on those impressions, which form is in nowise dependent on the
external objects, but due to the constitution of the
mind itself. This form will every where be present in
every portion of knowledge.  What then?  Shall we
thence conclude that we may, by some more than usually subtle process of mental analysis, reconstruct a mental universe harmonious with that without us, merely
by excogitation? Shall we not rather still adhere to
the belief that, be the mind as complex as it may, it
could of itself originate not one single iota of knowledge, unless the substantive groundwork of that knowl



OBSERVATION.                      117
edge were furnished to it from without? *  Observation,
psychological or sensational, can alone furnish us with
a fact, and a fact in one form or other must lie at the
bottom  of every chain of reasoning not purely hypothetical.  Let us grant to the utmost possible extent
that the form of knowledge is determined by the constitution of the intellect itself; yet the substantive and
concrete element, the primary matter of knowledge,
whether relating to the me or the not me, must be derived exclusively from observation, and never can by
any possibility be more than guessed at by the mere
metaphysician.  Ontology, however, has  always aspired to determine the matter as well as the form of
* In affirming that observation is the origin of all knowledge, we
mean the chronological origin, not the logical origin. The doctrine
that makes all knowledge to consist of transformed sensation — in
other words, the sensationalist doctrine-is perfectly untenable.
It cannot be consistently maintained, even in a conversation that
lasts but a few minutes. The sensationalist, whatever he may argue, is under the constant necessity of using terms to which he
can assign no physical correlative. He argues as a sensationalist,
and in so doing exhibits himself an intellectualist. He cannot help
it-no man ever could. Sensation, however, is necessary to call
the mind into activity; and thus all knowledge may be said to originate, not in sensation, but through the sensations. Were there no
sensation, there is no reason to suppose there would be knowledge;
but when once there is sensation, the mind, from its internal constitution, posits things altogether and essentially distinct from sensation, or from any possible transformation of sensation. It is very
singular that sensationalism, which is commonly supposed to lead
to absolute materialism, does actually lead to absolute idealism.
Instead of substantiating matter, it obliterates it, and leaves nothing
but the phenomenon; the substances, mind and matter, being both
extinguished. - See Morell's Hist. of Philosophy.




118              MATTER OF KNOWLEDGE.
knowledge, and never till it abandons the vain attempt,
can we hope to see philosophy regenerated, and reconstructed, as it may be, into perhaps the most interest.
ing of all human  sciences.  The form  of knowledge,
and not the matter, is the true object of philosophy.*
* In saying that philosophy should confine itself to psychology,
we do not mean that it should confine itself to the mere record of
what takes place in the mind. This is the natural history of
thought, and the natural history is only the basis of the science.
Every branch of knowledge has a natural history as well as a science; and if we confound the two, as the Scotch psychologists did,
we must either leave a large number of questions unexplained, or
dogmatize through thick and thin, and attempt to suffocate the questions instead of answering them. All knowledge is necessarily
divided into real-ology and thought-ology, (if the expressions may
pass,) and we maintain that the knowledge of reals is not the
knowledge of thought, and that the knowledge of thought is not
the knowledge of reals. Now, philosophy may take its choice,
either to discourse on reals - God, Nature, Man - or to discourse
on thought-perceptions, abstractions, relations; but it cannot be
allowed under the same name to discourse on both, unless that name
be coextensive with knowledge, and embrace all that can be known.
If philosophy be a peculiarl branch of knowledge, it must, like
every other branch, select its object, and to that object it must be
confined. It is perfectly illegitimate for any science to pretend to
discourse on the subjective intellect that is in operation. If this
be allowed, truth and falsehood are immediately overthrown and
blended in one mass of inextricable confusion. Who would allow
a geometrician, as such, to discourse on the trueness or falsity of
the primary axioms of geometry?  The only circumstance that
renders geometry possible, is the subjective truth (necessary and
universal) of those axioms, and the circumstance that they are incapable of such questioning, and are the essence, the most abstract
form, and the universal standard of all geometric truth. If we
pretend to make the axiom objective, and to inquire into its truth,
we may be philosophers, or any thing else, but most certainly we




EVOLUTION  OF FREEDOM.                  119
We conclude, then, our argument with regard to the
combination  of knowledge and  reason.  We mean
not that men  must combine knowledge and reason,
but that the great masses of the unprivileged classes
must combine together on the same knowledge, and
on the same principles, that they have rationally deduced from  that knowledge.  It has been said, that
"for men to be free, it is sufficient that they will it:"
never was there a greater mistake, or one so utterly at
variance with the great facts of history. Perhaps no
sentiment is stronger in the human breast than the
are no longer geometricians. And s~o it is with all other sciences
whatever, even those that relate to thought. If we make thought
objective for the purpose of studying it, and we can only study it by
making it objective, we must speak of thought, the product, analyze
it, classify its forms, and exhibit their relations; but most certainly
we have nothing whatever to do with the intellect that is thinking
about thought. If we turn from thought, the product, to the intellect that thinks, and wish to know the intellect, then we must make
intellect objective, analyze it, classify its faculties, and exhibit their
relations; but here again, as every where else, we must not confound the object that is thought about with the subject that thinks.
The subjective intellect can never.legitimately be taken into consideration. Philosophy appears to us to wander about without a resting-place for the sole of,her foot: first, she speaks of the absolute
reality, and then of the absolute idea, and changes backwards and
forwards in such a way, that really it requires no ghost to tell us,
that questions investigated upon such a methodless principle must
ever remain insoluble. If philosophy be as extensive as knowledge,
then knowledge is composed of the various scientific and historical
branches, with their relations, and there is no peculiarity about philosophy. But if, as we imagine, philosophy is a peculiar branch of
knowledge, it must necessarily select its object, like all other sciences, and if it assume to be the scientia scientiarum, then its object is knowldge and not reality.' If its object be knowledge, then




120             EVOLUTION  OF FREEDOM.
love of liberty.  For this men have panted, prayed,
fought, struggled, rebelled, and endured every kind of
hardship, and every kind of cruelty. And yet they are
not free.  To be free, it is first necessary that men
should know wherein true freedom  consists; namely,
in the absolute supremacy of equal and impartial law,
made without respect of persons or classes, and administered with  uprightness and regularity.  Nor is
this all. True freedom is the very highest point of
political civilization; and to  suppose that mere will
can ever lead to that point, is to suppose that men may
to knowledge it must confine its discourse, every speculation about
reality being altogether illicit. Thus, if philosophy profess to treat
of God, it is theology, and must never attempt to discourse on the
idea of God. All speculations about absolute ideas are (however interesting, and however useful) illegitimate; they have no more business there than speculations on the idea of substance have in treatises on mechanics. And if philosophy select the idea, and not the
reality, as its object, it may discourse on absolute.ideas, but must
refrain from discoursing on theology. This mode of distinctive
investigation is the great first principle of method, and the great
means of the progression of knowledge; and when the day comes
that the separate branches have been completely investigated on a
principle of independent inquiry, and the sensationalist has exhausted the world without, and the philosopher the world within,
and the Christian doctor has attained to a' perfect knowledge of
Scripture, the three regions may again blend into one, and show
the wondrous harmony of the universe —of that creation which
came spotless from the hand of the Lord, but has so long exhibited
the discord and diversity of sin. Whether that day may come ere
the new heavens and the new earth shall be the place of man's
abode, we know not, nor have the means of ascertaining; but that
the constant progress of man's intellectual perception is towards
that final unity, we can learn, as certainly as we can learn that the
political progress of men is towards a condition of equality.




FREEDOM.                 121
overleap the conditions of their nature, and reach the
goal without the struggles of the race. True freedom,
however simple in its theory, is the highest, and probably the most complex, form of combined society. It
is the whole body of society acting on the principles
of knowledge, and carrying truth into practical operation. Will can never achieve this.
True freedom supposes a condition of society which
is incompatible with ignorance and error - a condition
negative in its principles, positive in its institution and
establishment-a condition that has never yet been
attained, even in a tolerable degree, by any nation
under the dominion of superstition, and never yet completely attained even by the most enlightened states,
-a condition to be attained not by one great tumult,
but gradually evolved and perfected with the lapse of
years. It is the result and ultimate end of a great
progress, which makes its way with knowledge, sometimes advancing with peaceful steps, sometimes overturning the barriers that stand in the way amid the
din of revolution. It is the condition of society where
will is excluded, and law is made on an objective reason, which convinces man's judgment that it is equitable. It is a condition first to be defined in its abstract form by the man of thought, and then to be
striven for by the mass of the population; a condition that supposes great advancement and infinite
benefit to mankind, but a condition that must be purchased, and purchased only on those terms which are
prescribed by the laws of man's constitution.
The political history of our race teaches us that
1I




122           CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM.
there are three conditions of society involving a cause
on the one hand, and an effect on the other.
The causes are Knowledge, Superstition, Infidelity.
The effects, Freedom, Despotism, Anarchy.
Knowledge and Freedom.
Superstition and Despotism.
Infidelity and Anarchy.
Such are the conditions of our nature. Man may
make his election of the cause, but God has determined the character of the consequent.
No fact stands out more prominently from the condition of the various nations, or from their history,
than that those conditions, and the great actions of
men in the figure of society, depend upon their credences; that is, on the convictions of their intellect;
that is, on the propositions they hold to be true.
What makes one nation press ardently forward in the
pursuit of liberty, while another sits dead and stupid
under the iron rule of the despot?  Thought, mere
thought, impalpable and invisible thought, a something
which can neither be seen, felt, nor handled;.but which
fixes man's destiny, raising him  if correct to the dignity and energy of freeman, dooming him if erroneous
to vice, degradation, and slavery. The history of the
world has to be re-written on a new principle, and this
unseen element has to be exhibited as the cause of
the condition of the nations.  Climate, circumstance,
and race may all go for something or for much; but,
far more influential than either, is credence    What
* Mr. John Macgregor (who, by the way, takes upon him to call
a far greater man than himself a canting hypocrite - Oliver Crorm




CREDENCE.                      123
makes Africa slumber on in her barbarous dream  of
semi-brutality, as if her sons were forever doomed to
claim kindred with the beasts of the field?  Her credence, her bloody superstitions, her errors of thought.
And what makes Asia the perpetual home of despotism, of cruel exaction and licentious tyranny, of fabled
wealth to the ruler, and grinding poverty to the cultiwell, to wit) begins his dissertation on the "Natural Resources,
&c., of the Nations of Europe," with the following passage:
" The geographical position of a country has always been admitted
as of the first importance in regard to its prosperity and power."
Mr. Macgregor also informs us, "that the science of statistics is
that of truth; " -but we will undertake to affirm, that the science of
statistics never did, and never can, lead to such a doctrine as Mr.
Macgregor's. Will any man in the world rank the geographical
position of England as so. very superior to that of Turkey? or that
of North America to that of South America? or that of Prussia
and Holland to that of Spain and Portugal?  Yet Turkey, South
America, and Spain, are going to wreck and ruin; although Turkey
was very powerful at one period, and Spain was the first kingdom
in Europe. And is the geographical position of Switzerland, without even a seaport, so very superior to that of Ireland? Yet Dr.
Bowring's report on Switzerland would lead to the conclusion that
the country was prosperous, and not desolated by hunger fever.
Mr. Macgregor himself states, "with, however, nearly every natural element of power and advantage for commerce, there is scarcely
any country in Europe or Asia so ill cultivated as, or where industry is farther in arrear than in, Asiatic Turkey."
The prosperity of a country does not depend on its position, but
on the character of its inhabitants, on their credence, their knowledge, their institutions, and the freedom of their government. The
geographical position of the United States has not altered since
1776, yet since that time the country has made a progress unequalled in history. Suppose North and South America were to
change inhabitants, would the position be of any imaginable consequence? Position, indeed!




124                 CREDENCE.
vator of the soil? Asiatic superstition; that is, the
common and every-day thought of the millions who
inhabit Asia. And what has fixed the destiny and
determined the present position of the countries of
Europe?  Credence. Why is Spain in a constant
struggle between despotism and anarchy?  Because
the mind of Spain is struggling between superstition
and infidelity. Why is Italy worn out? and why is
she the home of all that is little and despicable in
the eyes of Englishmen?  Because her credence has
ruined the mind of the population. And why, with
every advantage of earth, ocean, and sky, are the fairest portions of the earth, the shores and islands of the
eastern Mediterranean, inhabited by degenerate races,
who dare not strike one blow for liberty, but lie grovelling in vice, without a thought for the regeneration of
their country? Because their credence has degraded
them. And why is Russia a vast conglomeration of
slave plantations, with one great slave owner for a
master? Because the minds of Russians are enslaved
by the greater despot - superstition. And why is
England the mightiest of nations, with a power and
an influence that are felt in every quarter of the globe?
Because the mind of England is the most enlightened, and because knowledge has made her powerful. What makes Turkey's weakness and England's
strength? Not climate, not geographical position, not
any physical advantage to which so much of the difference is usually attributed   but credence; the credence of England is correct, and the credence of Turkey is erroneous. Sooner or later men must learn the
great fact, that the social and political condition of a




USE AND OPERATION OF COMBINATION.   125
nation is absolutely dependent- on that nation's credence. Correct credence is knowledge, and knowledge
alone is capable of regenerating the political condition
of mankind. Change the credence of a nation, and
you change the whole current of its future progress.
Let the most darkened and benighted spot on earth,
the far-away South Sea island, where the fierce idolater could feast on his captive victim, and the unhappy
mother could think it no crime to destroy her newborn offspring; where man was, if we may so speak, a
demon worse than a beast of prey; let that spot be
but visited by the knowledge of the true God, the first
great element of truth - let the truth be but received
-let the idolater change his credence, and you have
changed the whole order of society. Even let the
truths of the gospel descend savingly but into the
hearts of a few, if the truth obtain an intellectual
assent with the population, instead of a perpetual
record of crime and abomination, we shall see man's
reason emancipated, and the whole figure of society
transformed, as it were, beneath the miracle-working
hland of the Most High.
SECTION IV. —THE USE AND OPERATION OF THE COMBINATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND REASON.
WE now turn to the use of combination. Why
should men combine, and for what object should they
combine?
11




126            MAN!S MORAL IMPERFECTION.
First. There are certain  evils which belong to the
race of mankind, and which afflict humanity more or
less in every quarter of the globe.  Some of these evils
are of such a nature as to appear under circumstances
of extreme aggravation in certain conditions of society; while, in other and better conditions, they are
kept under some beneficial restraint by the direct intention and continued effort of society. In the existence of these evils is to be found the reason of combination; and the object of combination is to remove as
much as possible, or at all events to diminish, such of
these evils as affect the political condition of men, or
the condition of men in society.
The first great master evil, and the one to which
most others may be traced, directly or indirectly, is the
innate corruption and depravity of man, which makes
him  prefer falsehood to truth,* vice -to virtue, and the
* In saying that man prefers falsehood to truth, we do not mean
that man's intellect prefers falsehood. The intellect, were it not
impelled in a wrong direction by the sentiments, would naturally
seek truth, and truth only; and, were it left unbiased by the will,
would form  its propositions regardless of all save the evidence
before it. From  the complex nature of man, however, and from
the corruption of the moral portion of the mind, it happens that
propositions altogether unfounded are received as true, apparently
for the purpose of filling up the general scheme or chart of knowledge, which must be filled up either with truth or falsehood, but, at
all events, filled up. Hence all nations, at one period or other, have
had a false religion, and a false scheme of ethics. Whatever metaphysic difficulties assail the question, it is an historical fact, that the
human race has preferred, and still does, throughout the greater
part of the globe, prefer, falsehood to truth on the subject of religion and morality; and a false religion is the source from which




E:VILS o0' INJUSTICE:.           127
gratification of passion to the enlightened and rational exercise of his natural faculties.  Whatever view
may be taken of the theological question of natural depravity, we hold it an historical fact of the very first
magnitude, and of the most indubitable veracity, that
the human race, as stlch, has always, and in every
known region of the earth, " done the things which it
ought not to have done, and left undone the things
which it ought to have done."  With regard to man's
nature, we shall enter into no disputation; but, with iegard to men's actions, we view them through the common medium of history, and We hesitate not to see the
practice of injustice more or less prevalent in every
country of the earth, and, at the same time, to accept
that explanation of the fact which is furnished in such
plain terms by the words of divine revelation. History informs us that the actions of men are wicked; and
surely there can be no absurdity in giving credence to
Scripture, when it informs us that their hearts are so
likewise.  With the depravity of the heart, politics
has no concern; but so soon as that depravity comes
to manifest itself in action, and to appear in the form
of fraud or violence, the necessity of a system of politics is immediately substantiated. Men are wicked,
and therefore inclined to do wrong; but they are also
rational, and may combine systematically to prevent
the wrong from being done.
Among the evils that prey upon humanity, there are
some which men inflict upon each other.  These may
error on almost all other subjects flows as naturally as water from a
fountain. There cannot possibly be any hope of political regeneration so long as a nation adheres to a false religion.




128            EVILS OF INJUSTICE.
generally be reduced to the class of violence or of
fraud; and the prevention of violence and fraud is the
first great end of political association. The possibility of violence and fraud naturally originates some
kind of government, the character of which appears to
be determined much more by the condition of the population as regards knowledge, than by any direct intention on the part of the rulers, or of any body of
men whatever.'The evils that would arise from  the unrestrained
passions of mankind form the general groundwork or
reason for the establishment of some rule, order, or
government, which the mass of the population, for the
most part, acquiesce in, whatever be its character.
When a government is established, we have the more
or less perfect formation of a state; that is, of an association of individuals supposed to be acting together
for their common advantage. [It will be altogether
unnecessary for us to go back to the formation of governments amongst nations scarcely emerging from
barbarism. The character of such governments is a
matter of little or no importance, neither would any
change merely in the form of government be attended
with any particular advantage. The first great necessity for such nations is the acquisition of knowledge.
Give knowledge, and civilization will follow of its own
accord, just in proportion as that knowledge is more
or less complete, and more or less generally disseminated. We confine our remarks to those nations that
have undergone some considerable process of consolidation, and arrived at some definite form of constitution. such as the nations of modern Europe; in each




THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY.           129
of which we have a government varying in character,
according to the moral and intellectual condition of
the population.]
The ostensible reason for the existence of a government, we suppose -to be "the necessity of preventing.
individual fraud or violence."  Were there no tendency
in the individual to fraud and violence, the first great
end of political association would cease to exist.
If; then, the government be established for the prevention of fraud and violence, —that is, for the prevention of injustice, -what is the use of that other
combination of which we have spoken, namely, the
combination of knowledge and reason?
1st. The progress of mankind is a progress from
ignorance, error, and superstition, towards knowledge.
2d. Governments being established in the earlier
stages of society, -that is, during the reign of ignorance, error, and superstition,-have always, and in
every known case, been more or less despotic; that is,
have systematically assumed powers to which they
were not justly entitled.
3d. The progress of political society is a progress in
which these unjust powers have been gradually curtailed and abolished, in proportion as the nation has
progressed from ignorance and superstition, and advanced towards knowledge.
The use, then, of the combination of knowledge and
reason is (not to combine against individual injustice,
this being the province of the government, but) to reduce the powers of the government and the laws of
the country within those bounds of justice beyond
which they cannot be other than despotic.




130            USE OF COMBINATION.
The first great fact that we learn from history with
regard to governments is; that they are all (whatever
be their form) despotic in their character during the
earlier periods of society, and that they lose their despotic character only when the nation progresses in
knowledge, and combines for the advancement of its
liberties.
In all the countries of Europe we may observe the
powers of the government undergoing a gradual but
sure process of curtailment; while, on the other hand,
the liberties of the people are expanding in a corresponding ratio, and becoming systematically established by law. In Russia, the process exhibits only
the first faint symptoms of commencement; while in
England the process is tolerably complete, (as regards
personal liberty;) the interval between these two being
filled up by the other European countries. The progress of liberty, then, is an internal progress, by which
the internal constitution of the country is altered and
amended.
What, then, is the combination of which we have
spoken, as if it were capable of working out the great
evolution of liberty and justice?
It is the combination of the nation, or of the enlightened portion of the nation, against the laws of the
nation, and against the unjust powers of the rulers.
Liberty is advanced not by the warfare of one nation against another nation, but by the warfare (physical or moral) of the unprivileged classes against the
unjust laws, and against the unjust privileges that prevail within the nation itself; and this warfare can only
be carried on efficiently by the mass of the population




CHANGE OF CREDENCE.            131
combining to extort those measures that have been
theoretically shown to be right, or those measures that
on good grounds are presumed to be beneficial.
The common notion almost universally adopted in
the earlier stages of society, and still prevalent in some
of the countries of Europe, is, that the ruler rules by
his own will, as if he were the lord or supreme director
of the nation. Instead of laws being made on an
objective reason that establishes their equity, they are
the expressions of the will of those who happen to be
in power; and the gradual destruction of this doctrine,
with its evil consequences, is the result of knowledge
disseminated throughout the population.
When we look back on the history of England, or
of any other country that has made considerable progress, we see that all the great changes that have taken
place in the political condition of the population have
been preceded by changes in the theoretic credence of
the population, and that the amended order of society
has resulted directly from a new and more correct order of thought. And we may also see that these beneficial changes have seldom, if ever, originated with
the rulers themselves, but have been extorted from
them, sometimes by force, and sometimes by the moral
influence that the man in the right has over the man
in the wrong.
Without alluding to the explosion of the " divine
right of kings," &c., (which enabled the rulers to practise flagrant iniquities without being brought to judicial trial,) we may refer to two modern instances of
the combination of knowledge and reason, by which
the people of Britain obtained changes of vast ex



132               NEGRO SLAVERY.
tent, by a moral power which overcame the will of the
rulers and of the privileged orders, who were linked to
support the abuses.  We refer to the emancipation of
the negroes, and to the repeal of the corn laws.
We have selected these two instances because they
represent two great classes- of evils on the one hand,
and of argument on the other.
The laws of Great Britain declared that it was lawful for one man to possess another man as his property; and this principle was carried into practical operation by the seizure and reduction to slavery of vast
numbers of Africans, who were thenceforward viewed
as mere laboring animals, denied deducation, denied
religion, and denied those rights of family which Nature has established as the first of her social laws.
In this negro slavery we have a vast system of fraud
and violence, established and continued by authority
of the British government; that is, we have the power
which had been conferred on the government for the
purpose of preventing violence and fraud, turned altogether away from  its legitimate exercise, and made
the instrument of supporting a system  of glaring injustice and flagrant iniquity.  We have that greatest
of all political evils, injustice, established and maintained by law; that is, in fact, the despotism  of
false law.
Here, instead of the government and the law being
the means of protection, they give systematic countenance to the injustice; and, by legalizing crime, they
deprive the man who is oppressed (the negro) from
endeavoring to recover by his own effort the natural
rights with which the Almighty had endowed him.




EMANCIPATION OF THE NEGROES.        133
And how was slavery abolished? What were the
efficient means that led first to the abolition of the
traffic, and afterwards to the authoritative declaration,
that slavery should no longer be countenarled by law;
that is, that the system itself must cease in the British
dominions?  Was it by the natural mode? by the
method which Nature teaches, when she tells us to
resist every attack upon our liberty? Alas! the negro
knew little about liberty, and his ignorance was, perhaps, as much the true cause of his slavery as was the
color of his skin. What was it that abolished negro
slavery?  It was the moral influence of knowledge,
reason, and religion. The trade had been sanctioned
by long use; the interests of the wealthy and powerful
were linked to maintain it; the laws of the empire had
declared it legitimate, and the government was opposed to its abolition. More than this, not one single
man who had the means and the opportunity to make
himself heard on behalf of the negro, had one farthing
of pecuniary interest in procuring the negro's emancipation. Those who argued had no suffering to impel
them, save the suffering of just and generous hearts;
no interest to lead them on, save the interests of humanity and the good of the oppressed.
What, then, were the motives  and the means that
led to so great a~political change as the emancipation
of a race from slavery?
First. Certain individuals learnt to think aright on
the subject, and to give utterance to their thoughts.
The battle was then commenced.  On the one hand
was reason, involving the principles of natural equity;
and on the other was the despotism of the law, the
11




134         EMANCIPATION OF THE NEGROES,
power of the government, and the pecuniary interests
of the wealthy and influential.
Sooner or later, correct thought makes its way, and
the more ltpidly and surely, the more a nation has
abandoned superstition.
The theoretic argument or credence adopted by the
advocates of liberty was, " That man is made free by
God, and  can  never be made rightfully a slave by
man."   The argument in its most essential character
was one of mere justice, not of economical benefit or
prejudice, profit or loss. A moral agitation was commenced, the few were, transformed into the many, and
the progress of opinion (of credence) was such, that
every possible argument that could be adduced on the
opposite side was brought forth from the lying chambers of selfishness. Every thing in the shape of an
argument —every thing that could be made to pass
for one, though halt, lame, or blind, was pressed into
the service of casuistry, for the purpose of perpetuating
injustice.*
* "The question now is only the continuance of this abominable
traffic, which even its friends think so. intolerable that it ought to
be crushed. Jamaica has imported 150,000 negroes in the course
of twenty years, and this is admitted to be only one tenth of
the trade. Was there ever, can there be, any thing beyond the
enormity of this infamous traffic? The verythought of it is beyond human endurance. It is allowed, however, that the trade is
infamous, but the abolition of it is resolvable to a question of expediency; and then, when the trade is argued as a commercial case,
its advocates, in order to continue it, desert even the principles of
commerce; so that a traffic in the liberty, the blood, the life of human
beings, is not to have even the advantages of the common rules of
arithmetic which govern all other commercial dealings." — Pitt's
Speech, April, 1792.




ANTI-SLAVERY COMBINATION.              130
The theoretic credence, however, gained ground, and
was powerfully aided by a more accurate knowledge
of the enormities that Britons practised on Africans
under shelter of British law.  Authentic information
was obtained and disseminated, and at last a great
combination of knowledge and reason was brought to
bear against the iniquity. Political justice, however,
is a plant of slow growth; and years of debate, of
contest between truth and falsehood, were necessary,
before even the trading in human blood, the buying
and selling of man, who was made in the image of
the Creator, ceased to receive the sanction of the most
enlightened and freest state in the world. And here
we cannot fail to remark one circumstance that has
almost invariably accompanied every political change
which had for its object the destructior of an injustice.
We mean the ohtcry about the evils that would follow
No sooner has any one, more enlightened or more impartial than his neighbors, insisted on an act of justice,
(which, after all, let it never be forgotten, is only the
refraining from injustice,) than all the evils in the category are immediately prognosticated, as if the doing
of God's will were to  let loose hell to ravage the
earth.*
* To Mr. Alderman Watson belongs the unenviable honor of
having presented this kind of argument in a form that may serve as
a model for those who seek to prevent change, and as a type of the
argument by which economists have so often endeavored to evade
justice, by advancing the most glaring absurdities and the most
unblushing lies. "Mr. Alderman Watson said, that the natives
were taken from a worse state of slavery in their own country to
one more mild. The abolition of the trade would ruin the West




136                PREDICTED EVILS.
When the emancipation of the African was spoken
of, and when the nation of Britain appeared to be
taking into serious consideration the rightfulness of
abolishing slavery, what tremendous evils were to follow!  Trade was to be ruined, commerce was almost
to cease, and  manufacturers were to be bankrupts.
WVorse than all, private property was to be invaded,
(property in human flesh,) the rights of planters sacrificed to the speculative notions of fanatics, and the
British government was to commit an act that would
forever deprive it of the confidence of British subjects.
These evils at home were, of course, to be accompanied by others abroad much more tremendous.  The
West India islands were, of course, to be ruined past
all possible hope of recovery; the blacks were to insurge and to destroy the white population; a moral
hurricane, ten times more dreadful than the winds of
heaven, was  to sweep across the  Caribbean  Sea;
blood was to flow like water; the emancipated slave
was to celebrate the first moment of his liberty with
rape, rapine, and murder; evils unheard of and inconceivable were to astonish the earth; the very heavens
were to  fall.  And why?  Because British subjects
Indies, destroy our Newfoundland fishery, which the slaves of the
West Indies supported, by consuming that part of the fish which
was fit for no other consumption (!); and consequently, by cutting
off the great source of seamen, annihilate our marine." - Debate,
H. C., 1791. Such were the arguments used, and successfully
used, in the British House of Commons, for perpetuating a system,
the cruelties of which have probably never been surpassed, whether
we consider their severity, their extent, or the length of their
duration.




TRUE CHARACTER OF NEGRO EMANCIPATION.  137
were no longer to be permitted by British law to hold
their fellow-men in slavery on British ground.*
With regard to the emancipation of the negroes, we
have two remarks to offer.
First. The legalizing of slavery was positive, the
emancipation negative.
This distinction we hold to be of importance, as it
helps to point out how far legislation is legitimate.
To emancipate a slave is merely to refrain from exercising that power which keeps him in bondage; and
when the question of emancipation arises, the question
* To show how correct credence progresses, even where we least
suspect it, we have only to turn to Fox's speech, April, 1791. After
a noble appeal for the suppression of the trade, and a full declaration of the natural rights of man —after citing the doctrine of
Christianity, that "high and low, rich and poor, are equal in the
sight of God," and the fact that slavery has ever disappeared before
the progress of Christ's religion -after bursts of noble and generous eloquence on behalf of the negro —he concludes by falling
into the common snare, and stumbles at the evils that would follow
the emancipation. The trade he would suppress; and so far his
credence was correct; but he had not progressed so far in correct
credence (although necessarily flowing from his own principles) as
to advocate the suppression of slavery in the West India islands.
Mr. Fox s;d, " that if it were asked whether they meant also to
abolish slavery in the West Indies, he would candidly say he was
sorry he could not go so far. It was possible for men to be slaves
so long as to ihake it dangerous all at once to give them liberty,"
&c.- that is, dangerous to refrain from oppressing them by force;
for the moment the positive and forcible oppression is withdrawn,
the man becomes free. What Fox, however, could not see to be
correct, the religious community of England saw more clearly; and
for half a century a great combination of knowledge, reason, and
religion maintained a contest that finally resulted in the purchase
of the emancipation at the expense of ~20,000,000.
11i




138  TRUE CHARACTER OF NEGRO EMANCIPATION.
is not one of performing a positive act, but of refrainingc from performing a series of positive acts, by which
another is deprived of his natural liberty.
Every moment that a negro is kept a slave, he was
so kept by the positive power of the British law, backed
by the British arms; for had the negro said, (as he had
an undoubted right to say,) " You wish to oppress me,
therefore I stand on my defence," the strong arm of
the law would immediately have appeared against
him, and reduced him again to slavery.
The law  was a positive enactment armed with
power, and the moment the law ceased to exist, the
negro was emancipated, not by the law, but by nature.
The law may make a slave; but it is beyond the power
of the law to make a freeman.  These laws were of
course made by human legislators, and the question
arises, " Has any human legislator, or body of legislators a right to reduce any individual whatever to slavery?"  " Clearly not," is the answer now given by
Britons; and if so, then could there never be justly a
question of gradual abolition, for gradual abolition
only means, "Shall we continue positively to exercise
our power for so many years to come for the purpose
of keeping men in slavery?"  The only question that
can ever be legitimately taken into consideration, with
regard to slavery, is immediate and total abolition, and
so of all similar cases where injustice is established or
systematically perpetuated by law.
Second. The people of Great Britain were taxed by
force for the purpose of paying the planters for their
slaves. Theoretically, the Commons imposed the taxation on themselves; but nine tenths of the population




THE TAX- O.F THE TWENTY MILLIONS.    139
have nothing to do with the election of members of
Parliament, and, so.far as they were concerned, the
taxation was ab extra - forced on them  by a government which they had no voice in  electing.  We
maintain that this act was one of-downright injustice and oppression, whatever may be said of its
magnanimity.
The planters knew perfectly well that they never
had a moral right to the slaves, and consequently they
could have no moral claim to compensation.  Now,
the slave laws were not enacted by this generation,
and it is admitted that those who enacted them had
no possible right to do so. The payment of the
twenty millions, therefore, resolves itself into this,
" The law of Britain will not cease to lend its aid and
its arm  to perpetuate slavery, unless the people of
Britain pay an immense sum to the planters."  The
only course that was really legitimate was for the government of Britain to declare that it had no possible
right to make or keep men slaves, and at once to expunge the statutes, letting the planters take their
chance, at the same time protecting the negroes, as
British subjects, born on British ground. A few years
ago, the French law  authorized  gambling houses.
Now, will it be maintained that the keepers of those
"hells" had any just claim for compensation against
the laboring population of France? (Or the keepers
of those other houses which the law still sanctions?)
It was a just, and, as the world goes, a glorious thing
for Britain to abolish slavery as it did; but most certainly the laboring man of England, who pays five per




140              THE CORN LAWS.,
cent. on his tea, sugar, and tobacco, to pay the planters,
is as surely oppressed and defrauded as was the negro,
although not to the same extent. No man in the
world, and no association in the world, could ever have
an equitable right to tax a laborer for the purpose of
remunerating a man-robber; and, although the measure is now passed and done with, we very much question whether some analogous cases will not be cleared
up by the mass of the nation ere many years pass over
the heads of Englishmen. When the question of
landed property comes to a definite discussion, there
may be little thought of compensation.
The other instance of a great and successful combination, in which knowledge and reason triumphed over
the law, the government, and the privileged classes of
the country, was recently. exhibited in the repeal of
the corn laws.
The case of the corn laws appears to have been this.
The seller of the raw material being the official governor of the country, enacted a statute to enhance the
price of the manufactured product, thereby obtaining
for himself, in his private capacity, a higher price from
the manufacturer for his raw material.*
The seller of the raw material was the land owner,
and the raw material sold (or rented for a longer or
shorter period) was the productive power of the land.
The manufacturer and retail merchant was the
farmer, the article manufactured and sold was corn,
and the consumer was the mass of the population.
The farmer, in taking a farm, has three great sub* See note A, Appendix.




THE CORN LAWS.                   141
jects to consider: 1st. The quantity of produce. 2d.
The probable price of produce. 3d. Amount of rent.'
The first question which the would-be farmer has to
answer is, " Can he make a profit by taking land from
the land owner, and selling corn to the consumer?"
This question he has to answer by a comparison of
the whole expense with the whole value of produce.
And first, in current agriculture, (that is, agriculture
divested of the extraneous expense of draining, building, &c., which come under the head of improvement
of the farm, and not mere cultivation,) a given farm is
estimated to produce a certain average quantity of
grain. This quantity is the first item to be considered,
as it is the basis of all future calculation. A certain
portion of this quantity is requisite for consumption,
and the remainder is marketable. The marketable portion, being the real merchandise which the farmer buys
and retails again, must always be assumed at a certain value in the terms of the price paid for it.  Whatever price the farmer pays for his marketable corn, he
must expect, on the first principle of commerce, to
receive a larger price (in the same terms) from the
consumer.  This larger price is the whole ultimate
* The expense of producing (exclusive of rent) we do not take
into consideration, as that on any given farm is not subject to such
fluctuation as either to " make or break " the farmer. Experimental
farmers may, of course, ruin themselves by a bad investment in
labor, &c.; but the expense of improvement should be distinguished
from the expense of current cultivation; and we believe that the
latter expense may, in the matter of the corn laws, be assumed as
a fixed quantity, although, in reality, varying with the value of
money where money wages are paid, and with the value of produce
where the laborers are fed.




142              THE CORN LAWS.
object of.the farmer, and, provided it is sufficient, he
is satisfied. To him it makes no possible difference
what the real price paid or obtained is, provided the
proportion between them be such as to leave a sufficient balance in his favor. What he wants is profit,
and, provided he makes a sufficient profit, it matters
little to him how that profit comes.
Our object in making these remarks is to show that
the absolute amount of rent paid by the farmer is
really a matter of indifference to him. If all the rents
in the country were suddenly to be doubled, or increased tenfold, it would not injure the farmer, provided the price of his marketable grain were to increase
in such a proportion as to leave him the same real
profit. His condition would be exactly the same as at
present; he would be neither richer nor poorer, nor
would he know the difference, except in the nominal
value of his rent and produce.
The fluctuating quantities on which the farmer depends are price of grain and rent. Assuming that he
has calculated or estimated the average marketable
quantity of corn for the currency of his lease, he then
depends on the relation between his rent and the price
of grain. If the price of grain be high, his rent may
be high; if low, his rent must be low, to leave him a
sufficient profit, which is all he has to contend for.
This, then, appears to have been the essence of the
corn laws. At the price at which corn would be sold
in the English market, provided that market were open
to all the world, the farmer could only pay a certain
-rent for land; but, provided all foreign competition
was excluded up to a given point, the farmer could




THE CORN LAWS.               143
afford to pay a much higher rent for land, and yet derive the same real profit.
To a country, however, that produces quite sufficient corn for the consumption of its inhabitants, a
tax on foreign corn is of little moment; and it is only
when the home produce is insufficient, or barely sufficient for the demand, that the influence of the tax is
felt, and then its operation is neither more nor less
than starving the inhabitants into paying a higher
price than Nature would have supplied them at.
When, however, we turn to the class by whom the
corn tax was imposed, and find that, so far from being
disinterested legislators, they were in reality the land
owners    the wholesale merchants of the raw material
the tax assumes another form, and becomes, in fact,
a tax to produce more rent through the pressure of
starvation. Not that people would in reality starve,
but that they would escape the pressure of starvation
by giving nmore for food, which more would pass
through the pocket of the farmer into that of the land
owner.
The ostensible reason advanced (and perhaps sincerely by some) for the imposition of the corn laws,
was the encouragement of agriculture; that is, the
putting money into the pockets of agriculturists. But
the laws were found at last to be eminently detrimental to the farmer, (on account of the fluctuations of
price,) as well as ruinous to another class of which we
have not spoken; namely, the  manufacturers and
manufacturing artisans of the country, who now form
the largest portion of the population. The farmer was
deluded into the idea of obtaining a high price for




144              THE CORN LAWS.
corn, and naturally gave, or stipulated to give, a high
price for land. The evil was unseen in its real malignity, until it pleased God, in the bounty of his providence, to send such abundant harvests, (1835, 1836,)
that the corn tax was defeated.  The farmers were
then reduced to sell at a natural price, while they had
to pay a taxation rent, and of course they felt the
weight of that system of legislation which attempted
to amend the order of Providence, and on which, with
all its nice adjustments, the landed'legislators had descanted so wisely.
The low price of corn at that period let the manufacturers into a secret; they obtained great sums of
money, and with the money obtained what was of
more value to the country - they obtained knowledge.
They were taught that their commercial prosperity
depended, in a great measure, on the low price of corn
in Britain; and a very cursory consideration may explain how this happens.  Let us suppose that there
are five millions of the laboring population, who have
a gross income of from 10s. or 12s. to 30s. or 40s. per
week. The laborer, out of his income, has to provide
the three great requisites- food, shelter, and raiment;
and, even at the best and most prosperous of times,
his earnings are not much more than sufficient to procure these in decent abundance. Now, let any supposition whatever be made with regard to the rise or fall
of wages, and the rise or fall of the price of corn, it is
evident that the manufacturers of Great Britain must
be injured by a high price of corn. For, first, let it be
granted that wages rise with the price of corn, (which
is certainly not the case,) then the expense of manu



THE CORN LAWS.               145
facturing increases on account of the increase of
wages, and the foreign market is supplied with dear
goods -that is, (for in commerce it is much the same
thing,) the foreign sales must decrease on account of
the rise in price. The difference of a few pence may
stop the sale of a certain description of goods; and
stopping the sale stops the manufacture, the manufacturer's profit, and the employment of the artisans.
But, second, let us ask how the home market is affected by a great rise or fall in the price of corn, while
wages remain nearly the same, as in reality they do,
with the majority of the laboring population. Let us
suppose that wheat is at 40s. per quarter, and that a
laborer's family consumes 4s. worth of bread per week.
He then has the remainder of his week's income to
dispose of in the purchase of his other requisites.
But let wheat rise to 80s. per quarter, and he must
then expend 8s. per week for the same quantity of
bread that he previously purchased for 4s. We have
here a difference of 4s. per week; and the question is,
What does the laborer do with those 4s. when bread
is cheap?  The answer is very simple - he spends it
with the maznufacturer. He wants a coat, and a hat,
and shoes, and hose, and shirts; and his wife wants a
gown and a bonnet; and the children want frocks and
pinafores; and the bed would be the better for an extra blanket or two, and some sheets.  Nor is this all:
the little furniture of his home wants replenishing;
the knives and forks are too few, and the children
exceed the spoons. The plates and dishes which were
broken in the dear tiraes could not then be replaced;
but now, whe, e  corn is cheap, visions of a new set flit
Il8:




146               TIE CORN LAWS.
before the imagination of the thrifty housewife.  Perhaps even a clock is purchased, and it is most likely
that some addition will be made to the little stock of
books. The laborer is at ease in his circumstances,
because he has this little revenue of 4s. a week to
come and go on. It is true, he must lay it out carefully; but then how different to have it to think about,
instead of having it screwed out of him by a crying
pressure for food! When he has it, he feels himself a
free man; he has a new social and domestic existence;
he is a buyer from choice, not from necessity; and the
family deliberations as to how it shall be spent, give a
new interest to the hours he spends at home. All goes
on merrily, and old England is worth all the countries
under the sun.
Let us take even a moderate estimate of this 4s. a
week, and we shall see how vast a sum it amounts to
in the course of a year. Suppose that five millions
have it to spend, and that those five millions spend ~10
with the manufacturers.  Fifty millions sterling arising
from the difference in the price of corn! Had the corn
laws operated according to the intentions of land proprietors, and kept wheat at 80s. in the year 1836, there
can be no doubt whatever that they would have deprived the laboring population of fifty millions' worth
of goods, and the manufacturers of fifty millions' worth
of sales, as directly as if those fifty millions had been
wrested by violence from the laborer; but this is one
of the facts which the indirect system of taxation is
employed to conceal."
~ Since writing the above, we have seen the following notipe of




REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS.                  147
The repeal of the corn laws was effected by a great
combination of knowledge and reason - such, perhaps,
as we might look for in vain in the history of any other
European  country.  Certain  individuals found  that
their lawful interests were seriously injured by the interference of the  enactments, and  they resolved to
make an efiort for the abolition of those enactments.
Of themselves they  were utterly  powerless, and all
their individual exertions would have been ineffectual
to achieve their end.  They had, however, knowledge
and reason on their side; that is, they were in possession of certain facts, which led by necessary inference
to the conclusion, that the corn laws were eminently
prejudicial in their operation, and that, therefore, the
corn laws should no longer be allowed to exist.  Conthe "prosperous state of the kingdom," A. D. 1836, in Wade's excellent " British History, chronologically arranged:" -
"At the close of the past, and commencement of the present
year, the United Kingdom exhibited unusual signs of internal contentment and general prosperity. With the exception of partial
depression of agriculture, all the great branches of national industry were unusually prosperous. In the great clothing districts of
Yorkshire and Lancashire, the times were never known to be more
favorable. In spite of the great development of the cotton trade,
it still continued to expand, and its utmost bounds seemed illimitable. It was the same with the woollen manufacturers of Leeds and
Huddersfield, the'stuff manufacture of Bradford and Halifax, the
linen manufacture of Barnsley and Knaresborough, the blanket and
flannel manufactures of Dewsbury and Rochdale; they were all
thriving. Even in the silk trade of Macclesfield, Coventry, and
Spitalfield there were no complaints, no more than in the lace
trades of Nottingham, Derby, and Leicester. The potteries of
Staffordshire continued prosperous, and the iron trade in all its
branches was unusually flourishing."




148        REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS.
scious that they had truth on their side, they came
fearlessly before the nation, and staked their cause on
the power of truth to convince the mass of the population. They lectured, and published, and spoke, and
argued, all for one specific end; namely, to communicate knowledge to the nation, and thereby to make the
nation change its credence on the subject of the corn
laws. The truth gradually prevailed; that is, was generally disseminated; that is, the same knowledge was
received by a larger number of individuals, who naturally drew the same necessary inference.  A great
combination was formed, such as must ever remain
one of the.historic glories of Britain and of Britons.
It was essentially a combination of knowledge and
reason; and well-grounded argument was the only
weapon with which it maintained the contest. Far
more was involved than a mere change in the economical laws of the kingdom; it was a contest between
the two great classes of British society -the unprivileged laborers and the privileged land owners. The
privileged classes, almost to a man, were against the
change; and they also, on their side, endeavored to
establish a combination - a combination of class interest, in which the only available argument was the
pecuniary interest of the order. The exertions made
by the anti-corn-law party to convince the judgment
of the nation were prodigious; and never had any
political agitation so much the appearance of instructing, and so little the appearance of exciting the passions. Instead of the vague harangues of noisy and
designing demagogues, there was the sober communication of information which would have been interest



THE SLAVE LAWS AND THE CORN LAWS.  149
ing and instructive, even had it been altogether unconnected with the great practical consequence. The
nation was convinced at last; and notwithstanding all
the influence of the aristocracy, and all the unwillingness of the government, the laws were repealed, and
as there is every reason to suppose, abolished forever.
In these two cases (the abolition of negro slavery
and the repeal of the corn laws) we have an illustration of some of the great principles which are called
into operation, whenever the social condition of the
community is ameliorated and rendered more consistent with the dictates of reason and religion.
1st. The only action that is a political crime, is a
forcible, fraudulent, or licentious interference of one
man with another.  Such actions, and such actions
alone, is it competent for any legislature to prohibit,
unless with the free consent of all who are to be affected by the law. Where there is no interference
there is no political crime, and consequently nothing
which the legislature can justly prohibit.
2d. Both the slave laws and the corn laws were
a priori enactments, to prevent men from doing actions
which were in nowise criminal.  They were positive
enactments to restrain and diminish the natural liberty
of men who had infringed no law of equity, and who
had in no respect injured their fellow-men by force,
fraud, or licentiousness.
3d. The legislators of the country were, in their private capacity, extensively interested in the maintenance of the unjust laws; and thus, in opposing their
repeal, were using their official influence for their own
personal advantage, to the eminent detriment of their
13*




150   THE SIAVE LAWS AND TIHE CORN LAWS.
fellow-subjects. Those, therefore, who were interested,
either as slave owners or landed proprietors, were
(according to the principle that a man ought not to
be judge in his own cause) incompetent to sit in deliberation on their repeal.
4th. The institutes of nature, as established by
God's providence in the world, teach us that a man
should labor for the advantage of himself and of his
family; but all slave laws are attempts to controvert
this principle, and blasphemoasly to overrule the order
of nature, as established by the divine Being.  All
slave laws make freedom  criminal, and thus establish
an artificial rule of morality, which gives entrance to
every kind of political error, and consequently to every
kind of political licentiousness.
5th. To transfer corn from one part of the world to
another, according to the necessities of the inhabitants,
so far from being an act which requires restriction or
prohibition, is an act which every man has a natural
right to perform  for his own commercial advantage,
and which no legislature is competent to restrict or
prohibit, unless it be admitted that the legislature,
stands in the place of the divine Being, and that all
the ordinary acts of life are to be performed only on
its supreme permission.
6th. Both the slave and corn laws were enactments
to restrict or prohibit men from  performing actions
which were naturally proper, profitable, and legitimate;
that is, to prevent the negro fiom laboring for his own
advantage, and the trader from engaging in legitimate
commerce; the repeal of those laws, therefore, did not
consist of any positive enactment, but of the removal




THE SLAVE LAWS AND TH-E CORN LAWS.   151
of legislative interference from actions which in themselves were naturally legitimate.  The abolition of
those laws, therefore, iwas o;nly to allow thing's to remnain
as they were established by nature; and when the world
discovers that God has constituted nature aright, men
will have arrived at the first and greatest principle of
social science.
7th. The abolition of the slave and corn laws was
only attained after a long'and arduous struggle; and
though horrible iniquities were committed under the
sanction of the former, and great national detriment
was produced by the latter; and though the nation
was long convinced of the propriety of repealing the
unjust and injurious enactments, the country was for
years compelled to bear the sin of the injustice, and to
suffer the national detriment, because the legislators
refused to remove restrictions whose nature was infamous, and whose fruits were evil continually.
8th. The legislature of Great Britain, so far from
taking the initiative in the repeal of the slave and
corn laws, offered every possible opposition to the
wishes of the nation; and it was only when the pressure from without became so imperative th,at further
resistance might have been dangerous, that the deliberative assembly of the freest state in the world
declared that it was not a crime for a man with a
dark skin to enjoy natural freedom, or for a trader
to import corn without being subject to a tax so
enormous, that it usually operated as a prohibition.
9th. The slave and corn laws were at last repealed,
by a, process which, we doubt not, will ultimately
achieve the repeal of every law  which restricts or




152         THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTICE.
prohibits actions not naturally criminal - the wiser and
better part of the nation combined against the legislature; on the one hand were knowledge, reason, and
religion; on the other, prescriptive privilege and the
will of the legislator.
10th. The two cases which we have adduced represent two great classes of cases, against each of which
a particular argument is employed.  The abolition
of slavery was a question of justice, (equity;) the
abolition of the corn laws a question  of benefit,
(economy.)
The argument of justice, however it may be extended and illustrated, may always be summed up in
this, "Refrain from interfering by fraud or force with
another;" and, although no precept can be more in
harmony with the dictates of natural reason and
with the injunctions of divine revelation, it must be
confessed that this argument is among the least
powerful to influence men, or to induce them  to
form their conduct aright.  History teaches us, that
it is not sufficient for men to know that an action or
an enactment is unjust to induce them to abandon
the action, or to abolish the enactment; for this they
seldom do until the evidence of the evil fruits of the
injustice are so superabundant, that no mere sophism
can be longer held as an excuse. The argument of
justice, instead of being the most practically influential, as it is the most morally valid, is seldom of
avail until backed by a knowledge of the economical
evils that never in any one case fail to accompany
injustice; and though the voice of God and the voice
of universal reason may ever be heard proclaiming,.




TIHE ARGUMENT OF JUSTICE.         153
"'Do not unto others as ye would not that others
should do unto you," it is not until some summation
of evil consequences has convinced men of their error,
that they abandon their course of lawless selfishness,
and allow the constitution of society to remain on
the natural footing established by the Creator. And
in this we may see the reason -why the political progress of mankind has been so slow, and why an extensive knowledge of facts must accompany  an
admission of principles, before society awakes to the
necessity of remodelling their constitution, and returning from  the systems established in barbarous
ages, to the more simple and equitable system which
the eye of reason may read in the constitution of
harmonious nature. It is ever immutably and irrevocably wrong, that any man, or any body of men
whatever, should constrain another man, not a criminal, to labor for the advantage of any save himself
and his kindred; yet half a century of agitation was
necessary before England withdrew  her oppressing
arm fiom nthe negro; and then the negro was only
emancipated by wresting his price from the population of Britain.
The argument of justice may thus be pure or
mixed; pure, when it confines itself to the dogma,
"Refrain from  interference," — mixed, when it collects and exhibits the evil consequences of interference.
For the operation of the pure argument, all that is
necessary is, to ascertain, on good evidence, that
there is interference (constraint, restraint, compulsion,
or evasion) by force or fraud, and the dogma is in
itself, taken alone, a good and valid reason for the




1.54        THE ARGUIMENT OF JUSTICE.
cessation of the injustice; for no man, and no majority of men, can possibly, under any circumstances
whatever, have a right to interfere by force or fraud
with another.  But though the pure argument is
morally valid, it is seldom or never effectual; knowledge as- well as reason must be brought to bear on
society, and the practical consequences of injustice
must be made apparent, before the mass of men are
stimulated to clamor for change. Thus, though the
reduction of man to slavery, next to judicial murder,
be the highest political crime, the population of
Britain —perhaps the most religious, the most humane, and the most just population ever assembled
together-could not be brought to emancipate the
negro, until the horrors of West Indian iniquity had
been portrayed in all their blackness, and until the
detestable nature of the system had been so exhibited
that men's feelings of humanity revolted, and the
abolition became a matter of moral necessity to the
nation. The argument of benefit is of another kind.
The argument of justice proceeds upon the principle
that certain actions may not be done, whatever be
their consequences.  Grant that slavery was beneficial, in a commercial sense, to Great Britain; that
the negroes were better fed and better clothed, &c., in
their state of slavery than in their state of freedom, (if
such a state be entitled to that name;) grant that all
the physical advantages were in favor of slavery; yet
can slavery never be otherwise than contrary to the
law of God, a system  of injustice detestable to all
good men. Let the consequences be what they may,
no man can justly make or keep another man a slave;




THE ARGUMENT OF BENEFIT.           155
neither would any consequences whatever justify the
deprivation of that natural liberty with which the
Creator endows all men alike.  The argument of
benefit, however, assumes that the action itself is indifferent; that is, that it has not in itself any such
moral character as will enable us to pronounce at
once whether it ought or ought not to be done. Let
us grant that a tax upon the importation of corn were
beneficial to Great Britain, and that all the inhabitants
freely consented to the imposition of the tax, there is
nothing in the tax itself to prevent such imposition,
(morally,) but it must stand or fall entirely and exclusively according to the consequences that are found
to follow in its train.
The main argument advanced against slavery was,
that it was unjust; and this argument was impressed
on the population by a relation of the many abominations that accompanied the system.  The main
argument against the corn laws was, that they were
prejudicial to the country. They had been established
ostensibly for the benefit of the agriculturists; and it
was proven, by a superabundance of facts, that they
were in no wise beneficial to the cultivators of the
soil, while they were notoriously prejudicial to all
the rest of the population, except the thirty or forty
thousand individuals who hold the nation's land. As
a measure of national economy, they had wrought
only mischief; they had embarrassed trade, impeded
manufacture, repressed industry, and made the laborer
pay dear for his food. while they operated at the same
time to diminish his employment.  In every respect
they were bad; and because the nation was convinced




156               nMORAL FORCE.
they were bad, the legislators, who are ever the last
to promote beneficial changes, were ultimately obliged
to abolish them, and to leave the supply of the national food to that natural course which is ever found
the most beneficial in the end.
Such were two modern instances of the combination of knowledge  and reason - spirit-stirring exhibitions of the energies of a noble people warring for
the abolition of injustice, and for the emancipation of
legitimate industry. Nor, however invidious& may be
deemed the comparison, can we refrain from asking,
what form these agitations would have assumed in
any other European country?  What country in
Europe could have presented the spectacle of a calm
and resolute combination of a large portion of the
inhabitants against the laws of the land?  What
country in Europe could have carried on so much
agitation without a breach of the public peace, or
without riot and confusion?  In France, there might
have been a revolution; in Italy, a secret combination,
bound with oaths on death's-heads and cross-bones;
in Russia, an assassination of the autocrat; in Spain,
an insurrection only more wicked than contemptible;
but in no country, except Great Britain, could such
great changes in the law be procured, by the mass of
the population first ascertaining what was correct,
and then patiently waiting till the power of truth had
convinced the legislators that the desired change was
good, and for the benefit of mankind. France, notwithstanding all her revolutions, has yet to learn the
practical operation of a moral poweri; and until she
masters this most essential element of peaceable




THE END OF PROGRESSION.           157
progression, the sword must be the umpire between
the rulers and the ruled.
Notwithstanding the length of our argument concerning the combination of knowledge and reason, we
shall not consider it too lengthened, if it in any wise
contributes to elucidate those means that must be put
in operation for advancing the political progress of
mankind.  It is the greatest possible absurdity to suppose that all the changes that take place in the political condition of societies are only portions of a routine which, when fulfilled, is to commence again, and
again to present the same phases, and the same or
analogous phenomena. No; the political progress of
mankind is a passage to one definite end, to an ultimatum, to a condition that requires no further change,
to a stable system of law that does not demand perpetual deliberation, but only perpetual administration;
and the great question for the political world is, " What
is that end?  What is that system?  What is that
ultimatum?"  WVhat, in fact, is the political condition
of society that controverts no principle of reason, and
sins against no precept of religion? for this, we may
rest assured, is the ultimate end towards which all civilized societies must progress.
No man for a moment can hesitate to pronounce, or
to prophesy with unlimited assurance, that the negroes
in the slave states of America will ultimately obtain
their freedom, and that the serfs of Russia will ultimately be emancipated. The future history of Russia
may be read in the present history of France and England; and this, not on account of the propagation of
14




158            ORIGIN OF PROGRESS.
French or English ideas, but because the substantive
element- man -is the same in both cases, and his
progress in every country in the world must be characterized by the same abstract phenomena, whatever
may be the concrete or real occurrences under which
the abstract principles happen to be developed.
The progress of the European nations is a progress
from serfdom and lordship towards freedom; that is,
a progress from  inequality towards equality. And
although some of the newer states appear to overleap
many of the intermediate steps through which the
older societies have passed, it must not be forgotten
that the newer states have merely borrowed from the
older, and adopted such, improvements as the new
foundation of a state rendered possible under the
given circumstances. Thus the North Americans did
not, by their declaration of independence, advance
themselves from a condition of semi-barbarism to a
highly equitable system of political rule; but having
to found a new state, they adopted the best principles
which had been gradually, and during the course of
many centuries, developing in Europe; at the same
time making such further progress towards equality as
the occasion of commencing a state naturally afforded
opportunity for.
The real history of political progress commences
only at that period where the maximum of disparity
between the various orders or classes begins to be systematically diminished. From  this point (which is
chronologically different in the various countries) there
is a natural course of progress, different in the out



MEANS OF PROGRESS.              159
ward circumstances of its manifestation, but essentially the same in its abstract characters, in every
country that achieves civilization. The essence of this
progress is the gradual emancipation of the rights of
the serf or unprivileged laborer, and the corresponding
diminution of the privileges of the lord. Now it may
be observed, that the great revolutions which take
place in the earlier portions of this progress are physical force revolutions;- changes brought about by the
sword, because there are no other means sufficiently
powerful to effect them. Nor is it difficult to see why
this must be the case. In the earlier stages of society,
force and privilege rule - not reason and equity; and
as those who have the privileges will not abandon
them, those who suffer the oppression must resort to
the only influence whose authority is acknowledged.
Were the privileged classes to admit reason as the
umpire, there would be no necessity for force revolutions; but as the changes come to be necessary, they
must be achieved by such means as will affect them,
however undesirable it may be that such means should
be necessary.  We can have little hesitation in asserting, that the changes brought about in the political
condition of the people of France by the first French
revolution, were imperatively necessary; that is, that
the condition of France was such that those changes
must take place, independently of the mere will of any
individual, because such changes were the necessary
consequences of such a condition.  The means, to a
certain extent, might be within the control of the actors; but the end- the change in the political condition of the people -must have followed from  the




160              PROPOSITIONS ON
operation of those general laws that regulate the political progress of mankind.*
When, however, a nation has made some political
progress, and its despotism has become relaxed; or, in
other words, when some degree of liberty has been
attained by the mass of the population - a revolution
by physical force (which is always attended with lamentable evils) may be obviated or rendered unnecessary. Where liberty has made a real progress, knowledge must have made a real progress; and where
knowledge has progressed, reason becomes as powerful
an agent as force, and one which ought ever to be
chosen, if the alternative be in our choice.
To conclude our argument with regard to the combination of knowledge and reason, we lay down the
following propositions: —
1st. On the sure word of divine prophecy, we anticipate a reign of justice on the earth.
2d. That a reign of justice necessarily implies that
every man in the world shall, at some future time, be
put in possession of all his rights.
3d. That the history of civilized communities shows
us, that the progression of mankind in a political aspect is, from a diversity of privileges towards an equality of rights.
4th. That one man can have a privilege only by
depriving another man, or many other men, of a portion of their rights. Consequently, that a reign of
justice will consist in the destruction of every privilege, and in the restitution of every right.
* See note B, Appendix.




THE OPERATION OF KNOWLEDGE.         161
5th. That, under the supreme direction of divine
Providence, man is the agent employed in working out
his own political well-being.
6th. That man cannot work out his political wellbeing unless he knows wherein  that well-being
consists.
Knowledge, therefore, is necessary to enable man to
work out his political well-being.
7th. That men must know correctly before they can
act correctly.
8th. That the political well-being of mankind involves two things-correct knowledge and correct
action. Correct action is knowledge carried into practical operation.
9th. That the political regeneration of mankind is
dependent on the acquisition and promulgation of
political knowledge.
10th. That in the laws which should regulate man's
political action, there is a truth and a falsehood, as
nuch as there is a truth and a falsehood in matters of
geometric or astronomic science.
11th. That the political condition of men can never
be what it ought to be, until men have.acquired the
requisite knowledge; that is, until they have perfected
political science, and reduced it to the same form and
ordination as any of the other sciences.
12th. That, with the perfection of political science,
there will necessarily follow an amended order of political action, and consequently an amended condition
of society.
13th. That political knowledge is divided into two
distinct branches. First. A sensational branch which
14*




162               PROPOSITIONS ON
furnishes us with the facts of man's condition, and the
actual results of -human action.  Second. A rational
branch, which furnishes us with the principles that
ought to regulate human action.
The first is political economy; the second is politics,
or the science of equity.
14th. That the actual political condition of no
country in the world is the practical illustration of tile
propositions of political truth.  Consequently, that the
actual political condition of every country in the world
requires to be revised and amended.
15th. That improvements in the political condition
of a country are made exactly in proportion as the
truths of political economy and political science are
reduced to practice.
16th. That in every country there are privileged
classes who have more power or more property than
they are justly entitled to, and unprivileged classes
who have less power or less property than they are
justly entitled to.  That the difference between these
two classes has been undergoing a gradual but sure
process of diminution.  This fact we learn from
history.
17th. That the further progress of the diminution in
the difference between the privileged and unprivileged
classes, may be surely anticipated as the continuation
of a process that has already been going on for
centuries.
18th. That the absolute equality, of men in all political rights is the ultimate end of political progression. That so long as there is not absolute equality
of political rights, there is the constant element of




THE OPERATION OF KNOWLEDGE.            163
further change, and consequently good reason for anticipating further change.
19th. That while a single individual may or may
not determine his actions according to his knowledge,
(for man is erring,) the constitution of humanity ibb
the mass necessarily determines, that wherever knowledge is obtained, systematically ordinated, and generally diffised, an amended order of action will invariably result.
20th. That the theory of political progress is,1. The present condition is felt to be grievous, and
seen by the intellect to be partial and unjust.
2. The present condition, when translated into language, furnishes a proposition which will not bear the
investigation of the reason, and which is consequently
rejected as superstitious or erroneous.
3. With the condemnation of the proposition,. of
which the present condition of society (at any given
period) is only a real exemplification, there necessarily
follows the condemnation of that condition, and a
desire for change is necessarily generated.
4. But, in course of time, a new proposition is discovered or suggested, and this proposition, if it will
stand the investigation of the reason, is posited as true,
that is, classed as a portion of knowledge.
5. The proposition which is true, is thenr translated
into a practical rule of action, and from this practical
rule of action there would necessarily result a certain
condition of society different from that condition which
had been condemned as erroneous.
6. The new condition of society is then posited as
an end to be attained, as a thing to be striven for, in a
free country by the power of well-grounded argument




164                  PROPOSITIONS ON
and social combination, and under a despotism by the
power of the sword and the convulsion of revolution.
7. But as the old condition necessarily involves the
interests  of some parties, (placemen, slave  owners,
land owners, for instance,) the transition from the old
condition, which  was  erroneous, to  the  new  and
amended  condition, is always the cause of a social
struggle between the partisans of the old condition
and the partisans of the new.
8. This social struggle may assume two forms, according to the nature of the question in dispute, and
according to the character of the political institutions
of the country where it takes place. (1.) If change
be sought in a country where there are no legal and
constitutional means whereby the masses of the population may obtain that change, the sword must necessarily be resorted to, and a physical force revolution,
so far from  being a crime, is one of the highest political duties of man.* (2.) If, on the contrary, the change
* We must distinctly reiterate that we speak only of political
duty, whose only rule is the law of justice, as developed in the
propositions of political science. Man's religious duty we do not
profess to teach. Politics has this world, and this world alone, for
its sphere of action; and the sword (that is, compulsion) is the instrument whereby all should be compelled to adhere to the strictest
rules of equal and even-handed justice. Justice neither gives nor
forgives, bears nor forbears. Religion, on the contrary, introduces
a higher and a divine principle of action, which may enjoin a man
to refrain from the forcible assertion of his rights, and rather to
bear an ill than to redress it by the sword. Man, as man, is universally bound by the laws of justice, and may universally carry
those laws into operation; but man, as a Christian, is bound by the
laws of Scripture, and must regulate his conduct by the precepts
of divine revelation,




THE OPERATION OF KNOWLEDGE.         165
be sought in a country that has attained to liberty of
discussion, a free press, a tolerably extensive representation, &c., (that is, where deliberative judgment and
not mere will rules,) the sword (always an evil, though
sometimes necessary) may be superseded by the moral
force of truth. Knowledge disseminated will convince
the masses, and when the masses are convinced, they
will combine, and when they combine, the change,
sooner or later, will follow as a necessary consequence.
9. We have said, however, that the nature of the
question, as well as the character of the political institutions, may determine the character of the social struggle. A country may be possessed of much freedom,
and yet ther may remain, some questions which moral
force is incapable of deciding. The interests involved
may be of such magnitude, or the questions may entail such radical changes in the very constitution of
the state, that no legal means whatever may exist for
bringing about the change. When, therefore, the mass
of the population have resolved that the change shall
take place, and there exist no legal means for effecting
it, or when those in official authority positively refuse
to make the change, even when its necessity is apparent to the nation, the sword must be the umpire as
between two parties who have severed all political
connection, and are openly at war.
10. But even where a temporary appeal to the sword
may be requisite, because there are no other means
capable of removing the barriers that stand in the way
of political progress, the sword is the mere instrument
employed to effect a change which could not be
effected without its aid. Where knowledge has ex




166              PROPOSITIONS ON
hibited the malignant character of the present condition, and reason has shown how that condition may
be amended, the change must come as a necessary
consequence of man's constitution. It is not in the
power of man to prevent it; for he is as much bound
by the laws which regulate his intellect and his actions as he is by the laws which regulate the condition
of his bodily frame. Knowledge does necessarily produce change, as much as heat necessarily produces
change; and where knowledge becomes more and
more accurate, more and more extensive, and more
and more generally diffused, change must necessarily
take place in the same ratio, and entail with it a new
order of society, and an amended condition of man
upon the globe. Wherever, then, the unjust interests
of the ruling classes are required to give way before
the progress of knowledge, and those ruling classes
peremptorily refuse to allow the condition of society to
be amended, the sword is the instrument which knowledge and reason may be compelled to use; for it is
not possible, it is not within the limits of man's choice,
that the progress of society can be permanently arrested when the intellect of the masses has advanced
in knowledge beyond those propositions, of which the
present condition is only the realization.
21st. We posit, finally, that the acquisition, scientific ordination, and general diffusion of knowledge,
will necessarily obliterate error and superstition, and
continually amend the condition of man upon the
globe, until his ultimate condition shall be the best the
circumstances of the earth permit of. On this ground
we take up (what might in other and abler hands be




THE OPERATION OF KNOWLEDGE.         167
an argument of no small interest, namely) the natural
probability of a millennium, based on the classification
of the sciences, on the past progress of mankind, and
on the computed evolution of man's future progress.
The outline alone of this argument we shall indicate;
and we have no hesitation in believing, that every one
who sees it in its true light will at once see how the
combination of knowledge and reason must regenerate
the earth, and evolve a period of universal prosperity,
which the divine Creator has graciously promised, and
whose natural probability we maintain to be within
the calculation of the human reason.




CHAPTER  II.
ON THE THEORY OF MAN'S INTELLECTUAL
PROGRESSION.
SECTION I. —THE ORDER OF THE SCIENCES.
1st. THE sum of all things which man can know is
circumscribed in quality, although in each quality there
may be combinations of indefinite extent.  That is,
there are only so many possible sciences, although each
science, in its own department, may be pursued indefinitely.
2d. The sciences are capable of being classed on a
system which is not arbitrary.
3d. The discovery of the sciences as an historical fact
is correlative with the scheme of classification.  The
classification is a mere process of the intellect, whereby
the sciences are arranged in a certain order, according
to a principle.  The discovery of the sciences is an
historical fact, extending over many centuries.  We
assert that the order of discovery has been correlative
with the order of classification.
4th. In the order of discovery, we are at a certain




THE SCIENCES.                 169
point, or at a certain number in the series, according
to the scheme of classification.
5th. There is, therefore, the strongest ground for
believing that the future sciences will be discovered
and reduced to ordination in the same order that they
stand in the scheme of classification.
6th. Correlative with the sciences are the arts.
The science% are knowledge, the arts are action.
7th. With the discovery of the sciences, there follows invariably a new and amended order of action;
that is, the arts, or the products of human activity, continually improve with the progression of the sciences.
[The word art we use not in its restricted and partial
sense, as applying more particularly to the fine arts,
but in its general sense, as signifying the systematic
products of human activity.  The fine arts are, to a
great extent, the gift of the individual, and consequently are so far independent of science.]
8th. The sciences are classed on their complexity.
To determine the position of a science in the scheme
of classification, we have only to ask how many substantive concepts does it necessarily involve; that is,
with how many nouns-substantive can it be made and
expressed..9th. The order of the sciences is as follows:1. The mathematical sciences.
2. The force sciences.
3. The inorganic physical sciences.
4. The sciences that treat of vegetable organization.
5. The sciences that treat of animal organization.
6. The sciences that treat of man and his functions.
Let it be remembered that science is not a reality,
15




170                TIHE CATEGORIES.
but only a form  of thought.  Science exists in the
mind, and in the mind alone; it is the mind's mode
of viewing reality.
The realities are matter and mind.
Let any portion of matter be subjected to our investigation, and the mind, from the necessary laws of
its constitution, abstracts the qualities if that portion
of matter, the one from the other, and then investigates the laws of those abstractions.
The laws of those abstractions constitute the mathematical sciences.
These abstractions  form  the  much-decried  (and
much less understood) categories, under which all
scientific knowledge must range itself.
These categories are for the mathematical sciences1. Identity.  What is A?
2. Equality. What is A part off
3. Number.  How many parts?
4. Quantity.  How much is each part?
5. Space, (position, extent, direction.).6. Force, (classed especially hereafter.)
And each of these primary and undefinable abstractions, or substantive concepts, furnish us with a distinct science.
The rational process of thought'in every science is
subjective, and does not require to be taken into consideration. The abstract sciences arise from the application of the rational process of thought (subjective)
to the above concepts, which are the objects of the
sciences.'
* Anterior to all reasoning whatever, there is the ontological
necessity, or necessary form of thought, which precedes all science,




THE MODES.                       171
Every object in every department of human thought
may and must be considered under three aspects.
1st. Existence.  2d. Relation.  3d. Function.
All that man  can  know  of any thing  whatever
comes under one of these heads.
1st. The thing; 2d, its condition; 3d, its function;
and to these three answer the three processes of the
mind.
1st. Apprehension.   2d. Classification.   3d. Reasoning.
When, therefore, the categorical concepts are apprehended by abstraction, the second process is the classification of the forms of the concept, and the third process is reasoning.   In  every  science, therefore, we
have classification and reasoning; and we have only
The most universalform of science is logic, or syllogistic, in which
we have the blank form into which the mathematical sciences place
numbers, quantities, and spaces. Logic is the first form of reasoning; which reasoning in the mathematical sciences is called
calculating. But anterior to reasoning, there is the mode of the
substantive terms, and the mode of the propositions which are to
enter into reasoning; and these modes are determined by ontology
or metaphysic, which furnishes the axioms or self-evident truths.
These axioms are taken as subjectively true in the sciences, but
ontology considers them first as objective.  Thus ontology pronounces nothing whatever on the reality of being, but on the
mode of being in thought. Ontology, then, divides substantive
thought into substance, attribute, cause, effect, necessary existence,
contingent existence, power, function, &c.; and when the mode
of these has been determined, these substantives are transformed
from objective consideration into subjective use. Science exists
in the mind, and thus when forces, for instance, function in the
mind, they function through the laws of ontological classification:
without ontology there could be no science whatever.




172       NATURE, KNOWLEDGE, LANGUAGE.
to ask what do we classify, and with what do we reason, to determine the name and the nature of the
science.  The most ultimate abstraction which the
human intellect can form, is the noun-substantive in
its generic character without attribute.  It therefore
is the primary and fundamental element of science,
which, by the addition of attributes or predicates,
shall become the substantive element of any science
whatever.  We assert, then, that the first possible
predicate that we can attach to the noun-substantive,
in its generic character, is Identity; the second, Equality; the third, Number; and so on.
Correlative with the course of nature and of thought
(or knowledge) is the course of language; and here
we have the same exhaustive triplicity, beyond which
it is impossible for us to go.
Apprehension-furnishes us with the name, classification with the proposition, and reasoning with the syllogism. The name, the proposition, and the syllogism
include every thing that can be expressed as science.
We have, then,The course of nature.
1st. The thing. 2d. Its condition. 3d. Its function.
The course of knowledge.
1st. The concept. 2d. Its classification. 3d. Reasoning.
The course of language.
1st. The name.  2d. The proposition.  3d. The
syllogism.
The concept is the thing (ens) apprehended by the
intellect.
The name is the expression, in language, of the
concept, and consequently of the thing.




THE FORMS OF REASONING.            173
Classification is the apprehension of the condition
of the thing, in which are included all its quiescent
relations; and the proposition is the expression, in
language, of that classification.
Reasoning is subsequent to propositional knowledge, and is the process whereby a new proposition is
made to evolve from two anterior propositions.
The syllogism is the complete expression, in language, of reasoning; and both are correlative with all
the active functions of real nature.
Were man incapable of reasoning, he might apprehend all the realities of nature, and classify all on the
most perfect system of ordination; but never, by any
possibility, could he explain and calculate the functions
of realities.  Every function is active, and every action
involves an agent, (or cause;) and were man not
endowed with the intuitive principle of causation,
all motions, combinations, functions, in a word, all
changes, would immediately become inexplicable, and
the universe would forever remain a vast enigma.
The actual constitution of the human intellect is as
absolutely necessary to all science, as is the existence
of the realities of which the sciences respectively treat.
Such, then, are the general characteristics of all the
sciences, that is, of all the true sciences that involve
functions and reasoning; for the so-called sciences
that do not involve functions and reasoning (descriptive botany, zoology, &c.) are mere classification, and
not sciences.  The general form of scientific knowledge, then, is A, -the name, the concept, the thing.
A is B, —the proposition, the classification, condition, or relation of A.
15*




174          THE FORMS OF REASONING.
B is C, —the classification, condition, or relation
of B.
Ergo, A is C, -the consequent of the two anterior
propositions. The whole forms the syllogism or reasoning, which is the expression of the function of
realities.
Let us now turn to the formation and growth of
the abstract sciences.
Let A, B, and C be called terms; and, as nomenclature is at first purely arbitrary, these terms may be
made to stand for any thing we please.
The first, most simple, and'most elementary form
of reasoning, is reasoning in identity, or with terms
of which identity (or its opposite, non-identity) is
predicated.
A is B; B is C; ergo, A is C.
A is B; B is not C; ergo, A is not C;
where the terms are singular, is the very simplest
form of all reasoning, and consequently the most general and least specific form of all science whatever.
The second' form  of reasoning is reasoning in
equality, or with terms declared to be equal (or its
opposite, unequal) to each other.
When we reasoned in identity, the terms were incapable of division; but when we reason in equality,
the most general form of division is introduced, and
our terms are now divided into whole or parts.  We
have therefore become more specific, and can say, the
whole of A, part of A; the whole of B, part of
B; e.g.,The whole of A is equal to part of B.
The whole of B is equal to part of C; ergo, the
whole of A is equal to part of C.




THEI FOR'IS OF':REASOXNING.          4175
The third form of reasoning is reasoning in number,
or reasoning with terms, which are not merely divided
generally into whole or parts, but into parts that have
been specifically numbered.  A  is now  divided, not
merely into whole or parts, but into 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
&c., parts.
Reasoning in identity  and in equality is what is
termed logic, although in logic there are two sciences;
the one the science of identity, the other the science
of equality.  The science of number is called arithmetic, and is nothing more than logic with the terms
divided into numbers.
The fourth form of reasoning is reasoning in quantity, or reasoning with terms which are not only numbered, but which have a quantity attached to each of
their parts.  In arithmetic, all the units are supposed
to be absolutely equal to each other; in algebra, on
the contrary, the units are capable of various magnitudes.*
Our terms are now  divided into numbered parts,
which have quantity attached to them; let us now
add a new predicate to the quantities, and a new science arises.
The fifth form of reasoning is reasoning in space* Quantity and number are frequently confounded with each
other, and algebra has been termed universal arithmetic. They are
essentially distinct, inasmuch as arithmetic starts from the unit,
which is indivisible, and the number continually increases with the
repetition of the unit. Quantity, on the contrary, starts from infinity, which is divisible ad inqfnitum, the quantity diminishing continually as we increase the number of the parts. Number and quantity are in the inverse ratio of each other.




176          THE FORMS OF REASONING.
geometry.  What were before only quantities, have
now become quantities of space; and the laws of
position, direction, and extent constitute  the fifth
science.
The sixth form  of reasoning is reasoning in force;
and our terms, becoming more and more specific with
the addition of each new concept, have now become
forces.
Such is the necessary order of the mathematical
sciences.
1st. Logic; which really includes two sciences.
3d. Arithmetic; that is, logic applied to units or
number.
4th. Algebra; that is, arithmetic applied to quantities.
5th. Geometry; that is, algebra applied to space.
6th. Statics; that is, geometry applied to force.
In this order, the mathematical sciences must necessarily be classed, and in this order the mathematical
sciences must necessarily be discovered. Ten thousand men originating the mathematical sciences by a
process of independent investigation, would necessarily discover them in this order; and were ten thousand worlds, peopled with human beings, to go through
the process of making anew the mathematical sciences,
every one of those human races would pass through
the same intellectual course, and evolve the abstract
sciences exactly in the same necessary order.  The
constitution of human reason forbids that it should be
otherwise; one science being impossible until its antecedent is so well known as to be capable of subjective
operation.  Thus, unless the laws of identity are




THE GROWTH OF THE SCIENCES.          177
known, there can be no investigation of the laws of
equality; and until the laws of equality are known,
there can be no investigation of the laws of number;
and until arithmetic is known, there can be no investigation of the laws of quantity; and until the laws of
quantity are known, there can be no investigation into
the relations of spaces; and until geometry is known,
there can be no statics.
But the mathematical sciences are abstract, a priori,
and deductive; their principles are not principles of
observed truth, but of rational necessity; they emanate, in their scientific character, not from the operations of nature, but from  the operations of mind;
sense, at the utmost, furnishes only the subject matter
from which the intellect derives the element, - the one
noun-substantive, of the science; while all the propositions, and all the reasonings, and all the far-off conclusions, are furnished by man's rational mind, as
exclusively as if matter had no existence. And these
mathematical sciences form the abstract preparation
of man for the acquisition of real or physical knowledge. Without the mathematical sciences, there can
be no physical science —there may be classifications,
facts, propositions innumerable; but science, which
involves the syllogism, there never can be till the
abstract sciences are so far advanced as to be capable
of subjective application to the real facts of nature.
Let us now make an observation on the method by
which one science grows out of another, by the introduction of only one single new concept or substantive idea.
For want of better names, (at present,) we shall




178        THE GROWVTH OF THE SCIENCES.
call the sciences of identity and equality simple and
compound logic.
In simple logic the rational process of the intellect
is subjective, and the terms (of which nothing is predicated except identity; for instance, A is B, B is C) are
objective.
In compound logic the terms have a new predicate;
they are no longer identicals, but equivalents, and simple logic is now subjective, (that is, in operation,) while
the equivalents are objective, that is, operated upon.
Logic being the first, most general, and most abs
stract of all the sciences, is universally applicable; it
may be applied to every subject of human thought.
Logic is the universal form of all science; it is the
general formula or expression of science.  The mathematical sciences are only logic, with numbers, quantities, spaces, or forces for the terms; and the physical
sciences are only logic, with physical realities for the
terms. The Jfrm  remains universally the same; and
the progression of the sciences, or the advance from one
science to another, consists in adding predicate after
predicate to the terms, and thereby rendering them continually more complex.  The form remains exactly the
same; but in the mathematical sciences we commence
with the major and minor propositions, and thence
deduce the consequent.  In the physical sciences, we
first commence with the consequent and minor proposition, and thence infer the mcjor.  When the major
is inferred, we can then reason deductively, as in the
mathematical sciences.
Let us therefore apply logic to numbers; that is,
instead of our terms being merely equivalents, let us




THE GROWTH OF THE SCIENCES.          179
make them  numbers, and every proposition that was
true in logic is now true with regard to numbers; that
is, we create arithmetic, which is nothing more than
logic applied to numbers, and in which logic is subjective, and number objective. Having made arithmetic, let us apply it to quantities, and we have algebra where arithmetic is subjective, and quantities are
objective; arithmetic being the process of operation,
and quantities being the substantives operated upon.
Let us now apply algebra to space, that is, to positions,
directions, extents, and geometry is originated.  In
geometry, algebra is subjective, and the forms of space
are objective.
Let us now apply geometry to force, and statics is
originated where geometry is subjective, and forces are
objective.
In the above sciences, not one single idea has been
introduced that requires sensual observation, and all
the operations have been operations of the mind.
Let us now apply the above sciences to the substantives and operations of real nature, and the physical sciences arise one after another in a similar order
of complexity.
In statics, the whole question was, whether the
forces did or did not neutralize each other at a given
point; but nothing was said as to the consequences if
they did not neutralize each other.
Let a new substantive concept be introduced, and
let the consequence of force, which has not been neutralized, be motion.
Let us remember, that in every department of
knowledge we have to consider, 1st. The thing. 2d.
Its condition and relations. 3d. Its function.




180        TIE GROWTH OF THE SCIENCES.
The six sciences of which we liave spoken, treat
only of quiescent conditions and relations; and iThen
applied to the realities of nature, they apply only to
the quiescent conditions and relations of those realities.  But the realities of nature have functions, and
those functions form  the groundwork of the physical
sciences.
In the transition from  the abstract sciences to the
physical sciences, it is usually supposed that we overstep a broad line of demarcation, about which there
can be no possible mistake.  It is usually advanced,
that in the one class. of sciences we have nothing but
abstractions and their necessary relations; while in the
other class we have tangible or visible realities - good
solid matter.
Such a mode of viewing the sciences is as clumsy
as it is empirical, and calculated only to satisfy those
who (however deeply versed in the specialities of any
one particular science) have never turned their attention to the relations of the sciences among themselves.
The transition from  the abstract sciences to the
physical sciences is not the abrupt leap so commonly
supposed; it is a gradual transition, that is, a transition step by step, in which the step that lands us on
the real universe is neither greater nor less than any
of the previous steps that had conducted us from one
science to another; or if, indeed, it can be called
greater, it is only greater in a gradual ratio of increase,
which might be already observed to pervade the abstract sciences.  The difference between the sciences
may be viewed. as  gradually increasing; but we
maintain that, if this view  be taken, the increase of




THE GROWTH OF TIHE SCIENCES.         181
the difference is in a progressive ratio, and that there
is no such thing as stepping out of one region (the
region of the mathematical sciences) into another
region, (the region of the physical sciences,) by a
passage that brings us into a sphere altogether dissimilar.  So long as mere classifications are called
sciences, there can be no just views of science, and
consequently no just views of the relations of the
sciences to each other.  Classification, wherever it
may be found, and to whatever it may refer, is only
one of the preliminaries of science; and it is only
when we can reason, that is, deduce a new proposition  from  propositions  already ascertained, that
science has properly commenced.
Let us, then, inquire what is the step by which we
pass from the mathematical sciences to the physical
sciences.  Our terms from  equivalents become numbers, and from numbers become quantities, and from
quantities become spaces, and from  spaces become
forces. Force involves space, quantity, number, equality, and identity; but it does not involve matter.
As a real fact, we may have no force without matter;
but in logical analysis force may be considered, and
may be reasoned with quite independently of matter.
In statics, then, our terms were forces, and the question was, Do the forces neutralize each other, or do
they not?
Now, every portion of matter must be considered,
like every thing else, under the three phases. 1st.
Existence; 2d. Condition and relation; 3d. Function.  And the physical sciences, properly so called,
treat of the functions of matter.
16




182       THE GROWTH OF THE SCIENCES.
What, then, is the simplest and most universal
function of matter? for this is the criterion by which
we recognize the first physical science.
The simplest and most universal function of matter
is motion; the science of motion, therefore, is the first,
the simplest, ancd the least specific of all the physical
sciences.
Let us now examine the step that leads fromforce
to motion.
It is evident that all the physical sciences must be
based on the observation of the existence, condition,
and function of the real matter with which man is
acquainted; and that every real motion must be the
motion of some one particular portion of matter.
But every portion of matter has a certain number of
accidents attached to it; that is, has a number of
predicates, which are quite superfluous in treating of
motion, and which, consequently, must be abstracted.
Color, density, chemical composition, &c., &c., must
all be reserved for future consideration, until the most
general laws of motion are discovered.
In statics our terms were forces, and the question
was, Did or did not the forces neutralize each other?
Let us consider the simplest form of motion; and
as a physical body would involve a number of predicates, let us take only the essential one, namely, the
one that is absolutely necessary to the formation of a
new science. In statics we had no motion; and as
every motion requires a something that shall move,
let that something be (not a planet nor a portion of
real matter, both of which are as yet much too complex) but a point, with no other physical predicate
than that it is movable.




THE GROWTH OF THE SCIENCES.          183
Our term  has now become a movable point, and
the forces which in the previous science were objective, now become subjective; that is, the laws of
force which were to be discovered in the previous
science, are now to be called into actual operation
for the purpose of evolving a new science, which, in its
turn, will again be called into subjective operation for
the purpose of evolving another new science, and so on
till the whole series of the real sciences is completed.
With forces acting on a movable point, all that
we can treat of is the direction and extent of the
motion, with the position of departure, the positions
of transit, and the position of arrival; that is, the
three substantives of geometry, position, direction, and
extent, exhaust all that can be discovered until a new
concept is introduced.
Hitherto the concept time has not been taken into
consideration.  As space is the necessary condition
of the existence of matter, so is time the necessary
condition of the functions of matter.  Space is the
necessary condition of statical science; time is the
necessary condition of dynamical science.
Let us, therefore, add time to the motions whose
directions and extent have been previously treated
of, and we immediately add the laws of velocity;
that is, the relation between time and space.
The science of motion (dynamics) brings us to the
verge of the physical sciences.
We have said that the functions of realities constitute the bases of the physical sciences. Let us,
then, ask, What is involved in afunction?
We hold the principle to be absolutely universal,




184          THE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.
that,   wherever man observes a change, there he
infers a cause."  A function, then, is necessarily composed of three items. 1st. A cause; 2d. An object;
3d. An operation, or phenomenon. The cause is the
agent, the object is the thing operated upon, and the
phenomenon is the change in the condition or relation
of the object.
But we have stated that reasoning is correlative
with function, and reasoning is expressed in language
by the syllogism. In the syllogism, therefore, we must
find a correlative triplicity answering to the component
items of the function.
The function gives us the cause, the object, and the
phenomenon; and, answering to these, the syllogism
gives us,1st. The major premiss; 2d. The minor premiss;
and, 3d. The conclusion, or consequent.
In the mathematical sciences we have, given the
major and minor premises to find the conclusion; in
the physical sciences (while they are in process of discovery) we have, given the minor premiss and conclusion to find the major premiss. But when a physical
science is discovered, that is, when its facts have
been generalized in such a mode as to cast aside dispute, we are then enabled to reason deductively, in the
same manner as in the mathematical sciences; and so
long as a science is incapable of this deductive reasoning, it is only undergoing the process of discovery.
In the physical sciences, all that we can observe is,
1st. The condition of the object; and, 2d. The phenomenon.  The cause is forever hidden from sensual
observation, and is only apprehended by the reason.




THE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.             185
The condition of the object, when expressed in language, furnishes us with a proposition; and the phenomenon, when expressed in language, furnishes us
with another proposition relating to the same object.
Now, let any two propositions of a complete syllogism be given, the third can be inferred; and in the
physical sciences, observation gives us the condition of
the object (namely, the minor premiss) and the phenomenon (namely, the conclusion) to find the major
premiss.  But, although the cause in a function is hidden from our senses, it is absolutely required by our
reason; and every observed phenomenon  is considered by the human mind as the effect of some unseen
agent or cause.t
We have already stated that science is only a form
of thought; the physical sciences may be termed, nature seen by the reason, and not merely by the senses.
We must consider, then, how  the facts of sensational observation are transformed into the propositions
of rational science. ~ For this purpose, let us consider
what is furnished by observation and what by reason.
Observation gives us, 1st. The condition  of the
object; and, 2d. The phenomenon.  And reason, under all circumstances, views a function as composed
of, 1st. The cause; 2d. The occasion; 3d. The effect.
The condition of the object given by observation, is
what the reason terms the occasion; and the phenom* We apply the term phenomenon exclusively to the action or
operation, not to the object.
t We are aware that the sensationalists deny this; but until they
have abolishedforce, the cause of motion, and demolished dynamics,
they can advance nothing on this subject worthy of attention.
16*




186          THE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.
enon given by observation, is what the reason terms
the effect; and these in the syllogism  are represented
by the minor premiss and the conclusion. Consequently the problem of the physical sciences is, to infer such a major premiss as would make the observed
phenomenon (when stated in language) follow syllogistically from that major, and from  the observed condition of the object, when stated in language.
To express this technically, let A be the object, and
A is B, its condition; and let A is C be the expression, in language, of the phenomenon.
Observation then gives us, -
A is B, and A is C.
But (A is C,) being the phenomenon, is regarded
by the reason as an effect, and is consequently the conchlsion of a syllogism, one of whose premises is wanting. The problem  then is, to supply the wanting
proposition of the syllogism; that is, such a proposition as shall make the conclusion follow from  the tswo
premises, according to the laws of logic. The required
proposition is, B is C.  [B being of course distributed
when we reason with whole and parts.]
Such is the general problem of the physical sciences
expressed in the most abstract form; but when we
turn to realities, our terms, A, B, C, must be written
out; that is, instead of abstract terms, they must be
descriptions of the physical realities and phenomena,
and, instead of presenting themselves under the form
of alphabetic letters, as they do in logic, they present
themselves under the form  of propositions, (perhaps
very numerous and very extensive,) containing a mass
of real observation.  Every single term  may be a




TIlE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.           187
proposition, or a series of propositions, or even a syllogism; but the final result in every case is, that the
whole are at last assembled into one syllogism, however extensive, and however complex may be the
character of the premises.
Those who are familiar with logic, (and every one
ought to be so,) will at once observe that B is the middle term of the syllogism; and consequently the problem of the physical sciences is to discover the nature
of that middle term that will connect the condition of
matter, or the circumstances of matter, with the phenomena manifested i; those circumstances.
Now, it will be observed, that in nature we find no
proportions, ratios, squares, roots, forces, &c., &c.;
these are all mental abstractions; yet these We the
great middle terms of the physical sciences that enable men to reason of the effects of new combinations.
No man, for instance, ever observes " the inverse ratio
of the square of the distance;" all that he can possibly observe is actual distance - so many inches, feet,
miles; but the ratio he discovers by his reason, generalizing from particular facts to the general expression
of those facts.  And when he has discovered such a
ratio as shall coincide with all his observed measurements, he is then enabled to reason deductively, having found the middle term  of his syllogism.  This
middle term may be a generalized fact or general proposition, or it may be a force or cause; and the difference between these is, that the general fact or proposition produces the logical consequent, and the force is
conceived as external to the mind, existing in real
nature, and producing the real consequent, or effect, or




188          THE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.
phenomenon. In the physical sciences, therefore, two
distinct classes of problems present themselves, -the
problems of inference, and the problems of deduction,
expressed logically as, -
1st. Given the minor premiss and consequent, to
find the major premiss.
2d. Given the major and minor premises, to find the
consequent.
In the process of discovering the physical sciences
we have the first problem; namely, given the observed
conditions of matter, and the observed phenomena, to
infer the force, or forces, that in those conditions would
produce those phenomena. And when such forces
have been suggested as would, by acting regularly,
produce the phenomena in the given conditions, the
facts are said to be explained, and a vast power of
future calculation (reasoning) is immediately acquired
by man. For immediately the middle term has been
discovered, we are enabled to reason deductively, that
is, from the two premises to the consequent; and this
middle term being a constant, we have only to ascertain any new conditions to enable us to predict future
phenomena. If the real phenomena coincide with the
predicted phenomena, (that is, if the effect in nature
coincide with the consequent of the syllogism,) a verification is afforded that the inferred major premiss was
correct; but if they do not coincide, we are immediately led to the conclusion, either that the inferred
major was erroneous, or that in the minor some condition had been overlooked, which has tended to alter
the character of the phenomena.
Between the syllogism, the intellectual reason of




THE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.          189
mankind, and the operations of external nature, there
is the most perfect parallelism; and this parallelism
affords a most undoubted proof of the objective veracity of the subjective convictions of the human mind.
Were the general convictions of the human reason
(its axioms) not true objectively, as well as necessarily
true subjectively, the prediction of physical phenomena
would be absolutely impossible.  And although the
philosophic sceptic may by ingenious ambiguities involve that question in doubts and sophisms, surely we
may rest satisfied that the same hand that made the
heavens and the earth in so wonderful a harmony of
order, has not made the human reason only a mockery
and a delusion.
Having indicated the general process by which the
sciences evolve one after the other, thereby giving a
necessary order of classification, and a necessary ordei
of chronological discovery, we shall not attempt the
particular classification of the physical sciences, but
confine ourselves to a few remarks bearing on the definite meaning of our argument.
In dynamics, as an abstract science, our term was a
movable point.  Let that point be endowed with
physical characteristics one after another, and the
physical sciences arise. From a point let it be transformed into a body possessing weight, or resistance,
and we have general mechanics-a science partly
physical, partly mathematical.
But here we must guard against being imposed on
by a system, however simple that system may appear.
In the mathematical sciences we found that there
was but one series, and that all were coordinated upon




190          THE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.
one single line. We must not thence infer that we
shall find exactly the same simplicity in the physical
sciences. Man has only one reason, but he has several
senses; and those senses may furnish us with elements
independent of each other, althoudgh in the order of the
sciences depending both on the mathematical sciences,
and both requisite before we can proceed to other and
more complex sciences.
Such we presume light, sound, and heat to be.
Now, although we can have no hesitation in. affirming
that optics is impossible until the mathematical sciences have been evolved and are capable of application, and although we must necessarily have optics
before we can possibly have the physiology of the eye;
yet there may be no such mutual dependence between
optics and acoustics, and we may therefore be obliged
to group these together as holding the same rank in
the classification, and consequently as likely to be discovered about the same time.
And here another question is necessary, of considerable importance to the true understanding of the
character of science. " How far are the real physical
sciences (astronomy, for instance) to be considered as
true sciences? "
All the phenomena of. nature  are operations —
things done. Now, science consists of knowledge, and
knowledge exists in the mind. How, then, are we to
view the real operations of nature, considered as external to the mind?
The real operations of nature are to be viewed as
arts — as divine arts - and their comprehension alone
can be called science. The universe is God's great




THE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.           191
workshop, and man is the rational spectator, whose
office it is to comprehend the processes that are there
carried on. The motions of the planets do not constitute science; it is the rational apprehension of those
motions in the human mind that constitutes science.
But the principles of mechanics are far more general
than all the facts of astronomy; they apply not only
tO the real sun and the real planets, but to all possible
suns, and to all possible matter constituted in a manner similar to the matter with which we are acquainted.
Consequently astronomy, vast as it is, must be
viewed only as a real illustration of the principles of
mechanics, as an exemplification of dynamics; which
exemplification in every real item might have been
totally different, and yet have exhibited the very same
principles.  The heavenly bodies might have been
twice as numerous or twice as few, and yet have exhibited exactly the same principles of construction; in
which case the science of mechanics would have remained exactly as it is, while actual astronomy would
have been totally dissimilar.
From the more simple motions of matter we turn
naturally to those that are more complex; that is, from
those that are more general to those that are more
specific. WVhen the mere motion of a body is considered, it is evident that this motion is subject to the
same laws, whether the body be a stone, an apple, or
an animal. But when matter is subdivided and classified, it is found that some motions and some phenomena are altogether distinct from the general motions of matter.  The phenomena of magnetism,
electricity, and chemistry, therefore, take their rank




192          THE PROCESS OF SCIENCE.
after mechanics, and these in their turn are the nece.ssary preparations for a new order of sciences.
WTe have said that the classification of the sciences,
and their chronological discovery, (or reduction to ordination,) must follow the order of their complexity.
From the more simple we pass to the more complex;
from the more general to the more specific.
Let us then ask, What is necessary to the complete
understanding of a single portion of inorganic matter
-a pint of water, for instance?  (Speculations on
things which cannot be known respecting matter, of
course we altogether exclude.)  This matter may present itself in three forms; vapor, liquid, and solid —
the phenomena of heat, therefore, are involved.  It
may be decomposed; chemistry, therefore, is involved;
Electricity may be generated in its passage from  a
liquid to a vapor; electricity, therefore, is involved; it
may move as a solid, or as a liquid, or as a gas; the
motions of solids, liquids, and gases, therefore, fall
under separate consideration. It may sound - acoustics; may transmit or reflect light - optics; it may
appear in the form of rain, hail, or snow; as a solid,
its sides may be numbered, their angles and their area
measured; and that measurement involves the theory
of quantities; and finally, without logic, we could not
reason about it at all. It will be found, on close examination, that the complete understanding of this pint
of water involves all the physical and all the niathematical sciences. But this pint of water does not as
yet involve organization. Let it, however, be presented
as a constituent part of a plant, and a new series of
phenomena immediately present themselves; and, for




MAN SCIENCE.                193
the understanding of these new phenomena, every one
of the previous sciences is absolutely requisite. After
the inorganic sciences, therefore, come the sciences of
organization, of vegetable and  animal physiology,
showing a continual increase of complexity until we
arrive at man, the most complex and most highly organized of all the earth's inhabitants.
To consider man, however, merely in his physiology,
is to regard him only as an animal made up of certain
organs, each of which has its function. Physiology
teaches us of what the human body is composed, and
how the mechanism of life is carried on. It teaches
us what man is in his bodily frame, and it endeavors
to give us a rational view of the functions and uses
of his parts. It points out the relation of those parts
to the whole, and it shows us how the living man —
the active, thinking, and sentient agent-is a compound of wondrous and varied mechanisms.  But
still, though physiology be the highest and most complex of all the physical sciences, there is something
beyond it, something that comes after it in the logical
order of classification. Man himself has his functions;
and when we have considered what man is, we may
turn to what man does.
Man is by nature a social being, made to live in
society, and his social acts have their laws, which,
when understood, give us a new order of knowledge,
altogether distinct from the knowledge contained in
the previous sciences.
Men must buy and sell, cultivate and navigate,
trade and manufacture; in a word, men must act;
and, as there is no necessary power determining them
17




194                MAN SCIENCE.
to act in any one particular direction, there is ever
before them a right course and a wrong course; the
one tending to a good and beneficial condition of
society, the other to a bad and detrimental condition
of society.  And again, men may trespass on each
other; may inflict pain on each other; may do evil
to each other.  Mel, therefore, must legislate.
And here an evident distinction  presents itself,
which enables us to classify human action. We may
ask, " What means will lead to a certain end? " and
" What is the end that ought to be produced? "
We have here two social sciences, in each of which
there is the same stable truth that prevails in all the
other sciences, if man can only discover it and reduce
it to scientific ordination.  It must be within the reach
of man, or else we must admit that all rules of social
action are purely arbitrary; that is, in fact, that there
are no rules.  Such a supposition, however, is perfectly
absurd, and can never be consistently maintained.
On the above distinction is grounded the division
of social science into non-moral and moral; the one
treating exclusively on the relation of means to an
end, and the other exclusively on the' end that ought
to be the object of pursuit.
In these new sciences, human action is the element
with which we have to reason; and the conditions of
men are the phenomena that result directly from that
action. We have, therefore, 
1st. An inductive science of human action, which
presents itself in the following form: 
1. Given the actual actions of men in their social
capacity, This is the minor proposition of the syllogism,




MAN SCIENCE.                     195
2. Given the actual conditions of men.
This is the consequent or conclusion of the syllogism, the conditions of men being the effects of their
actions.*
And the problem  is to find " the general expression
of the relation between the actions of men and their
social condition."   When this general expression  is
found, it supplies the major proposition of the syllogism; and the criterion of this major being correct, is,
that the observed phenomena contained in the consequent of the syllogism  would follow  logically from
the major and minor premises. If such a major cannot be found as would logically produce all the observed phenomena from  all the observed conditions,
we must seek  further until a satisfactory major is
discovered.
2d. A deductive science of human action.t
It is evident that, anterior to all induction whatever, there are certain acts which ought not to be
done.  The first man who committed murder was as
* The conditions of men here spoken of must not be confounded
with the conditions of the syllogism. The syllogistic conditions
are the conditions of the subject with which we reason, and here
we reason with human actions.  Were we, however, to reason
inversely from the conditions of men to the probable actions of
men in those conditions or circumstances, (quite a legitimate and a
most important syllogism,) then those conditions would really become the logical conditions, or minor proposition; whereas, here
they are the consequent, or conclusion.
f This science is perfectly distinct from any deductions that
might be made in the previous science when the major proposition
was discovered. And yet there cannot be the slightest doubt that
the two sciences, perfectly understood, would lead to the same
identical conclusion.




196                MAN SCIENCE.
guilty of committing a crime as the last man who
shall raise the unhappy hand of violence against his
brother.  He could, however, have no inductive evidence of the effects of his action; and the same holds
true of robbery, fraud, and every other crime. Consequently we may inquire, What was it that made
the first murder a crime, and how could man know
that such an act ought not to be performed?
The mind of man views actions not merely in their
physical characteristics, but as being equitable or unequitable, just or unjust; and this equity gives an a
priori boundary to action, and lays a moral restriction
on man, which will prevent him  from  injuring his
fellow, even where he has no inductive  evidence
whatever.
The principles of this equity are abstract and universal convictions of the reason, and the problem
presents itself in the following manner: —
1st. Given the general axioms of equity. (This is
the major proposition;) and, —
2d. Given the physical or non-moral characteristics
of an action. (This is the minor proposition of the
syllogism.)
To find the moral character of that action, namely,
whether it be a duty or a crime.  (This is the conclusion of the syllogism.)
The first of these sciences is political economy,
which is purely inductive, and treats of the physical
effects of human action so far as those effects are to
be discovered in the condition of societies.  The second is politics, the science of equity which is purely
abstract, and treats of the universal principles that




MAN SCIENCE.                 197
ought to regulate human action, so far as men can
affect each other by their actions.
The  fundamental  noun-substantive  of political
economy is utility, of which value is the measure.*
The fundamental noun-substantive of politics is equity, which, having its abstract laws in the very constitution of the human mind, gives us the moral measure
of human action.
We now turn to the practical bearing of our argument, for which the rough sketch we have given of
the classification of the sciences was only the requisite preliminary.
\Ve maintain, then,First. That the sciences, classed on their complexity, must be classed in the following order:1st. The mathematical and force sciences.
2d. The  inorganic  physical sciences, beginning
with the most general, and  terminating with  the
most specific.
3d. The organic physical sciences, composed of
vegetable and animal physiology.
4th. The sciences that relate exclusively to man,
and that treat of human action.  These are, (1) nonmoral, political economy, which treats of the beneficial
or prejudicial effects of human action; (2) moral,
politics, which treats of the moral character of human
action, whether that action be the action of a single
individual towards another individual, or whether it' And value (the abstraction) is itself measured by the outward
fact of exchangeability, and exchangeability is again measured
by the middle term money; in Britain, for instance, by gold.
which is called the standard.
17*




198                MILLENNIUM.
be the action of a whole society, or portion of a society, with all the formality of legislation, &c. Politics
is, in fact, nothing more than the moral law which
ought to regulate the actions of the individual, extended to the actions of men when associated as a
political society, the same moral law being obligatory
on multitudes that is obligatory on the individual.
Our argument then is, that "there is a natural
probability in favor of a millennium;" and this natural probability is based,
1st. On the division and classification of human
knowledge.
2d. On the fact that the chronological order of the
discovery of the sciences is the same as the order of
classification.
3d. On the power of correct credence (knowledge)
to produce correct action.
Let us, in the first place, endeavor to settle definitely what we mean by a millennium.
1st. We do not mean any particular portion of time.
2d. We do not mean a miraculous condition of
society, produced by the power of Almighty God
working supernatural changes in the nature of man.
It pay be true that God, in his infinite goodness, shall,
ere the world's end, so enlighten mankind by the
divine spirit of grace and wisdom, that it may almost
be no metaphor to say that man has become a new
creature.  This may be true; but this is not what we
refer to.
3d. We do not mean a personal reign of the Son
of God, the Savior of the world. On this subject we
can offer no possible opinion. That the Lord Jesus




A MILLENNIUM.                199
Christ shall reign in power, and that his will shall be
done on earth ere the earth's history closes, we believe
with the most undoubted assurance.  But that the
Redeemer of mankind shall again appear in person
before he cometh to judge the world, this is a question
which we must leave unanswered.
4th. By a millennium we mean a period of universal peace and prosperity -a reign of knowledge, justice, and benevolence-a period when the condition
of man upon the globe shall be the best the circumstances of the earth permit of —when the systematic
arrangements of society shall be in perfect accordance
with the dictates of man's reason -and when societies shall act correctly, and thereby evolve the maximum of happiness possible on earth.
A- millennium, therefore, is for us a period when
truth shall be discovered and carried into practical
operation.  This is the essence of human welfare,truth discovered and carried into practical operation.
Let it be remembered that the progress of mankind,
in the evolution of civilization, is a progress from  superstition and error towards knowledge.  Superstition
and error present themselves under the form of diversity of credence; knowledge presents itself under the
form of unity of credence. Wherever there is knowledge, that knowledge is the same in all parts of the
earth, and the same in substance whatever language
it may use as the instrument of expression.  The
progress of mankind, therefore, is a progress from diversity of credence towards unity of credence. There
is but one truth, one scheme of knowledge; and consequently, wherever knowledge is really attained, di



200                A MILLENNIUM.
versity of credence is impossible.  Where men differ
in credence, they differ because one or all have not
knowledge.
We have, then, to ask, " Into what branches is
knowledge divided?" " What is the logical order of
those branches in a scheme of classification?"   In
what clhronological order have the various branches
been reduced to scientific ordination?"  "At which
branch are the most advanced nations now in the nineteenth century?" and, "What are the branches that
yet remain to be reduced to scientific ordination, and
in what order may we-expect those future branches to
be reduced to the form of science, which excludes diversity of credence? "      "A
The natural probability of a future reign of justice
is based on the answers to these questions.  If there
be a scheme of knowledge, and if the past history of
science proves that the sciences have been evolved one
after the other in accordance with that scheme, we assert that there is nothing unreasonable in anticipating
that the future progress of discovery will continue to
go on in the same direction.  On the contrary, we
maintain that such anticipation is a fair, legitimate,
and impartial inference from the facts before us.  We
are w-ell aware of the ridicule which practical politicians endeavor to throw  on the anticipation of a
political millennium, and too often with a levity which
we cannot esteem other than unbecoming, when we
know that the Creator of mankind has distinctly promised a period of peace and prosperity to our race. It
may not be given to man to know the times and the
seasons, but most certainly it is given to man to know




ORDER OF THE SCIENCES.           201
the fact; and surely it would be as wise to speak of
that fact with modest reverence, instead of associating
it, or even a wrong anticipation of it, with the scoff,
and the jeer, and the gibe of ridicule.
To the above questions, then, we give the following
answers: 
ist. Into what branches is knowledge divided? Into
the factso f sensational and psychological observation,
rational science, and history. Savage nations may
see the sun rise and set, and the moon wax and wane,
and they may see for centuries these and the other
phenomena of nature without advancing in intelligence. The son, like the father, may live and die a
savage. It is not till man begins to reason — that is,
to make rational science-that the foundation of
natural civilization is laid, and the first step taken in
that course which continually tends to distinguish,
man more and more from the animals, and to make
the intellectual portion of his nature predominate
over the instincts of his bodily frame.
History, again, is a branch of knowledge common to
every reality with which we are acquainted.  In it,
therefore, we must not look for the great element of
human progression. That element is found in rational
science, and rational science is divided into the following branches:1. The mathematical and force sciences, beginning
at logic, and ending with dynamics.
2. The inorganic physical sciences, beginning with
the most general, and ending with the most specific.
These we have attempted to arrange generally in
the table in the Appendix.*  What are called the




202           ORDER OF THE SCIENCES.
mixed sciences are only general physical sciences;
and these, of course, would come first, while chemistry
and galvanism  probably would occupy the most advanced station in the series.
3. The organic physical sciences, including (1)
vegetable physiology, and (2) animal physiology.
Anatomy is not a science, it is a mere classification
forming a portion of physiology. Physiology is the
architecture, (anatomy,) dynamics, and chemistry of
organized bodies; that is, architecture, dynamics, and
chemistry applied to the functions of vitality.
4. MAN SCIENCE.
The sciences of human action are, —
(1.) A sensational and inductive science, called political economy.
(2.) A moral and deductive science, which we call
politics.
The order in which we have given the sciences
answers the second question, namely, " What is the
logical order of the branches of knowledge in" a
scheme of classification? "
The third question is, " In  That chronological order
have the various branches been reduced to scientific
ordination?"  The chronological order in which the
sciences have been discovered, or reduced to ordination, is correlative with the logical scheme of classification. As a history of the actual evolution of the
sciences would be out of place in the present volume,
we must be content with stating the fact, that the
mathematical sciences were first evolved, then the
more simple of the physical sciences; and that the
progress of discovery, since the time of Newton down




DEPENDENCE OF THE SCIENCES.          203
to the present day, has been, as nearly as we could
possibly expect, on the very same principle of complexity that forms the ground of classification. And
it would not be difficult, we think, to prove not only
that it has been so, but that it could not possibly have
been otherwise.  Without geometry, statics and dynamics are impossible; without statics and dynamics,
hydrostatics and hydrodynamics are impossible; and
without hydrostatics and hydrodynamics, that portion
of physiology which treats of the phenomena of vegetable and animal circulation is also impossible. Here
the one science must precede the other in chronological discovery, because it is requisite to render that
other science discoverable.  The one is the means
whereby we attain to the other, just as, in a single
science, one problem must be solved before we can, by
any possibility, attain to the solution of another problem.  And the law of this dependence of one science
on another is, that the truths of the antecedent science,
which are the objects of research when we study that
science, become subjective -that is, means of operation-when we study the consequent science.
It is impossible, therefore, that the sciences should
be discovered in any other than a certain order; that
is, man must acquire knowledge on a scheme which
has laws as fixed and definite as the very laws of the
sciences themselves.
We may remark, however, in the evolution of the
sciences, that it is not necessary that the whole (all
that can be known) of an antecedent science should
be evolved before the elementary portion of the consequent science is commenced.  WVhen geometry has




204         EVOLUTION OF THE SCIENCES.
made a certain progress, statics may be commenced;
and thus the earlier portion of statics may be evolved
coincidently with the more advanced portion of geometry.  Again, when inorganic chemistry has made
a certain progress, organic chemistry may be commenced; and its more elementary truths will be undergoing a process of evolution coincidently with the
more advanced truths of inorganic chemistry.
Thus, although the sciences are necessarily antecedent anal consequent to each other, they interweave or
overlap each other in their chronological evolution;
just as father and son may be alive at the same time,
yet the father is necessarily older than the son. And
in the evolution of the sciences we may have several
generations on foot at a given period; we may have
three, four, five, or six sciences all undergoing the
process of evolution, but all at different stages of
progress.  The first may be tolerably complete; the
second less so; the third still less so; the fourth may
be but beginning to assume the form of a teachable
branch of knowledge; the fifth only settling its nomenclature and classification; while the sixth only
shows symptoms of commencement, attracting perhaps a large share of attention, but being replete with
arbitrary opinion, superstitious credence, and general
diversity of statement.  When geometry was a science, astronomy was a superstition; and when mechanics and astronomy were sciences, chemistry was
a superstition; and when chemistry had assumed the
form of science, political economy was a superstition;
and now  that political economy begins- to assume
somewhat of scientific ordination, politics is little better than a suplerstition.




THJ  MARKS OF A SCIENCE.                 205
We may, therefore, have several sciences on foot at
the same period, yet all at different stages of progress.
And this brings us to the next question," At which  branch  or branches of knowledge are
the  most advanced  nations now  in  the  nineteenth
century?"
There are several tests which we may apply to a
branch of knowledge to ascertain whether it is or is
not a science; that is, whether it is as yet reduced to
scientific ordination.
1st. It must have a definite province, so that we
distinctly understand what we are reasoning about.*
* The great error of philosophy has been the want of a definition.
Philosophers have forgotten to tell us what it really was that they
were going to treat of. It is quite evident that thought, and the
laws of thought, are perfectly distinct from realities, and the laws of
realities; and no science under the same name can be allowed to
treat of both. Philosophers have jumbled the two together in a
most illegitimate manner; and the consequence was, that when
they encountered something connected with thought which they
could not explain, they astounded the world with inconceivable
assertions with regard to realities.  Some, by this rather curious
process, discovered that there was no matter; others, that there was
no mind; and some, though we almost hesitate to affirm it, dared
to call in question the existence of our divine Maker, and to dethrone the Lord of heaven and earth.
If philosophy will treat of thought, let it confine itself to thought;
and if it will treat of realities, let it confine itself to realities, and
become theology, or any other branch of knowledge; but we maintain that it is quite illegitimate for philosophy to jump backwards
and forwards, from thought to reality, and from reality to thought.
Such a method necessarily produces inextricable confusion, and the
very foundations of human credence become shaken in the minds
of those whose intellectual constitution enables them to see only
as far as the difficulty without seeing through it. Hume, perhaps,
18




206      PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.
2d. It must be teachable as a branch of knowledge.
For this purpose, its propositions must be coordinated, so that we can know whether we are at the commencement, or how  far we have progressed beyond
the commencement.  Philosophy, as yet, has scarcely
a commencement, middle, or end; although symptoms
are beginning to show  themselves that, ere long, we
may expect something very much more satisfactory.
3d. It must be capable of subjective application.
This we consider to be the proper criterion  of the
state of a science.  If it is incapable of application, it is
only undergoing the process of discovery; if it is capable of application, it is so far complete. It is then the
same for all men alike, (there is but one truth,) and it
becomes a means of operation whereby things are
done which could not otherwise have been done.
We- ask, then, at what sciences are the most advanced nations now in the nineteenth century?
It is evident that the mathematical sciences, and
the more general physical sciences, fulfil the above
only intended to puzzle people; and his amazing acuteness enabled
him to baffle and to mystify many an honest head. But it was a
fearful amusement: it might be a mere game, but it was a fiend's
game; and although we cannot but admire the clearness and purity
of Hume's intellect, we have often thought -and not without regret.-how much greater and how much better a man he would
have been, had he endeavored, in honest sincerity of heart, to solve
the difficulties as well as to propound them. We have no doubt
whatever that Hume knew that his sophisms were sophisms, and in
his own mind saw much farther through them than he liked to
acknowledge. Had Hume not been a sceptic, he might probably
have been at the head of all modern writers on philosophy; for he
undoubtedly possessed that exquisitely subtile intellect, without
which a, man - however great his other acquirements -can never
be more than a second-rate philosopher.




PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.    207
conditions. The question, then, is with the advanced
physical sciences, and with those that follow them in
the scheme of classification.
Let us take chemistry as the most advanced inorganic physical science, and classify the sciences that
follow chemistry in the natural scheme of classification. We have then
Chemistry.
Vegetable physiology.
Animal physiology.
Man science.
The new term acquired in the passage from the inorganic to the organic sciences, is vitality -life.
Vegetable physiology presents itself under two "aspects, which give us two sciences; the one treating of
the structure and functions of the organs of plants, the
other of the structure and functions of the whole vegetable kingdom, considered as one of the great organs
of the terrestrial economy.
A science, we have said, contains, —
1st. A  nomenclature.  2d. A  classification.  3d.
Reasoning.
And the correlatives of these in nature are, —
1st. The objects.  2d. Their conditions.  3d. Their
functions.
Vegetable physiology, then, has two forms; that
which relates to the life, growth, and propagation of a
single plant, composed  of many organs, and that
which relates to the vegetable kingdom, composed of
many species of plants.
Let us designate these as internal and external physiology, and we shall then be able to classify the various
branches of botany.




208        PRESENT  POSITION  OF THE  SCIENCES.
A SCIENCE IN GENERAL.
1. NOMENCLATURE.   2. CLASSIFICATION.          3. REASONING.
The objects described Statement of the con- Syllogistic scheme of
and named.            ditions and relations   the functions of the
of the objects.       objects.
GENERAL FORMULA APPLIED TO,
1st. Internal Physiology.
Nomenclature of the Classification of those Function   of  those
various parts, or or-   parts,    including   parts in the  phegans, of the single   their    mechanical   nomena   of  life,
plants. Description   and chemical adap-   growth, and propaof the organs.        tation.                gation..
2d. External Physiology.
Comparative  nomen- Classification of those Function of plants in
clature of the vari-   plants,  and  their  the terrestrial econous plants that in-   arrangement.           omy.
habit  the   globe.
Comparative  anatomy.
The support of the  animal kingdom   is the great
practical function of the vegetable kingdom.
The same  principles  of classification  apply to  animal physiology, where we have, -
First.
Nomenclature and de- Classification; that is, Function   of  those
scription of organs.  the organs assem-   parts in the pheDescriptive   anat-   bled into apparatus   nonena of animal
omy.                  -e. g., digestive ap-   life.
paratus, respiratory
apparatus, &c.
Second.
Comparative  nomen- Classification of those Function of the aniclature of the vari-   animals, and their rmal kingdom in the
ous  animals  that   arrangement   into   terrestrial economy.
inhabit the  globe.   groups.
Comparative  anatomy, and  description.




PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.    209
The individual nomenclature of the various plants
and animals is in the first place arbitrary, and subject
-to no rules; conmparison, however, introduces the element of coordination, and a systematic nomenclature
is adopted, constituting the scheme of species, genera,
classes, &c.
It will be observed that chefistry, hydrodynamics,
&c., are absolutely requisite before internal vegetable
physiology can make a scientific progress. The functions of the organs of plants. are explicable only in
and through the perfection of the inorganic sciences,
and the latter must necessarily be so far advanced as
to be capable of subjective application before the former can by any possibility be explained.
But if the immediate use of plants in the physical
economy of the earth be the maintenance of animal
life, external vegetable physiology, which treats of the
functions of the vegetable kingdom, is the necessary
preparation for internal animal physiology; no theory
of the nutrition of animals being possible without first
of all arriving at a knowledge of the nutriment.
Hence, also, the chemistry of inorganic matter, and
the chemistry of vegetable substances and products,
must be evolved before there can be a theory of vegetable nutrition.
The maintenance of animal life is the physical ultimatum  of the earth —the last final function of mat-'ter. When we proceed beyond this, we arrive at a
region where the functions are no longer purely physical; for although man in his political economy may
partly be viewed as a higher kind of animal, yet his
functions, even in that region, are essentially distin18*




210      PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.
guished from those of animals by the introduction of
inrtellectual computation.  The physical world may, it
is true, sustain mankind -may feedclothe, and shelter man's animal frame; but in the production of food,
and in its distribution, there is a function of intelligence which prevents the maintenance of man from
being classed as a mel physical phenomenon.
When, therefore, we turn to the sustentation of men
associated together in society, we have passed from
the region of mere organization, and have entered the
sphere of rational intelligence.
The science that treats of the production and distribution of food, and the other physical requirements of
man, is termed political economy; and the ultimatumr
of that science is,"  How  may the greatest physical
good be procured for the greatest number?"'
This ultimatum  is not arbitrary, as some would
almost have us suppose; it is the necessary end of the
science, if that science have any existence. Just as
we are necessarily led to view the surface of the earth
in its function of sustaining vegetable life, and the
vegetable kingdom  in its function of sustaining animal life; so are we led by the very laws of our intelligence to posit the physical benefit of mankind as the
* It is usual in Britain to confine the province of political economy to the production of wealth; and this view is correct and convenient, if the name POLITICAL ECONOIMY be reserved for the first
and simplest embranchment of social science. But awthe distribution must have its laws, as well as the production, those laws require
investigation, and a special name must be accorded to this portion
of social science, which is, in fact, of greater practical importance
than the other.




PRESENT POSI.TION OF THE SCIENCES.    211
ultimatum  to which  all. economical arrangements
should tend, if they do not depart from the very intention which is the ground and origin of their existence.
But political economy is a mere computation of
antecedences and sequences: it tells what results follow  certain conditions; and, generalizing its facts, it
at last arrives at the laws which regulate the physical
condition of man, so far as that condition is the consequence of human action. The utmost that it can
tell is, " what means lead to a certain end;" but being
based purely on observation, it can never lay on us a
duty, nor deter us from a crime. Even in its ultimatum, it can only say that, if men do not pursue their
advantage, they act irrationally, but never can it say
that they act crimrinally. It computes the mechanism
of human action, but iever can determine the end of
human action. Duty and crime are terms with which
it has no concern, and to which it can attach no meaning. It is merely observational, and must confine itself as a science to the generalization of facts, while,
when taken as a practical rule of action, its sphere
extends no further than the physical well-being. of
mankind; and the " benefit of the greatest number" is
fixed on, not from any idea of moral duty, but merely
because that ultimatum exhibits the greatest quantity.
In no sense is this science one iota more moral than
astronomy, which furnishes the practical rule of navigation; or geometry, which furnishes the practical rule
of mensuration.  To confound it with duty, is essentially to destroy its character as an inductive science.
In answer to the question, then, " At what sciences
are the most advanced nations now in the nineteenth
century?" we reply,



212     PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.
The marks by which we recognize the condition of
a science, and its relative perfection, are, -
1st. It must have a definite province.
2d. It must be teachable as a system.
3d. It must be capable of subjective application.
And a science consists of a nomenclature, classification, and reasoning. The genuine criterion of the
perfection of a science is, that it is capable of subjective application, and only in so far as it is thus capable
can it be considered perfect.
A slight attention to the recent labors of scientific
men will convince us that chemistry fulfils the above
conditions; that not only have its nomenclature and
classification been tolerably well perfected, but that its
reasoning is so far advanced as to render it capable of
application to the regions that lie beyond it. Here it
is only necessary to refer to the researches of Liebig
and his fellow-laborers in the region of chemicophysiology.
Vegetable physiology is, and must ever be, consequent on chemistry and electricity; and, being logically
consequent, must also be chronologically subsequent
in the order of its discovery; that is, of its reduction
to scientific ordination. If chemistry, therefore, have
only been recentiy rendered capable of subjective application, we must naturally expect that vegetable
physiology shall present a less degree of perfection;
and that, at all events, some years must elapse before
it shall be so completely developed as to change from
an object of study to an instrument of operation.
But vegetable physiology, although necessarily posterior to chemistry, and in the  present day only




PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.    213
undergoing its process of evolution, is already further
advanced than chemistry was one hundred years since.
As the various sciences are necessarily antecedent and
subsequent to each other, so are the various parts of the
same science necessarily antecedent and subsequent;
and when We analyze vegetable physiology into its
various parts, we find that the earlier portions have
already assumed the form of scientific ordination.
Vegetable physiology consists of mechanics, (including architecture, statics, dynamics,) chemistry,
and electricity, applied to the objects endowed with
vegetable life; and the ultimate object of research is,
the explanation of the process by which the functions
of life, growth, and propagation are carried on. In the
architecture we have the enumeration, nomenclature,
and description of the organs; in the mechanics we
have their adaptation for the performance of certain
functions; and in the chemistry and electricity we
have a physical explanation of certain phenomena
which take place under the influence of life, but by
means of the laws which regulate the world of inorganic matter.
In determining, therefore, the position occupied by
vegetable physiology at the present time, we must
bear in mind that the portions of that science stand
logically in the following order:Nomenclature of organs.
Description of organs.
Mechanical functions.
Chemical and Electrical functions.
Of these, the first three are so far advanced, that
although formal improvements may be expected, yet




214    PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.
the knowledge may, for the most part, be said to be
obtained; and the question that remains is, rather
how that knowledge should be reduced to the most
simple and most convenient expression. The fourth
is now  occupying the attention of many eminent
men, and thie progress already made is sufficient to
assure us, not only that the right track has been discovered, but that ere long the chemistry of vegetation
will be so far advanced as to form the instrument of
investigation into the chemistry of animal organization. In fact, very considerable progress has already
been made in the latter direction.
External vegetable physiology consists of comparative nomenclature of all known plants.
Classification of plants.
Function of plants in the terrestrial economy.
The two former of these are achieved, although
probably susceptible of formal improvement.  The
latter is undergoing a process of evolution.
As we have only proposed to ourselves to indicate
the outline of an argument without insisting on its
details, we need scarcely advert to the prodigious
labor expended on a knowledge of the structure of
animal bodies, or to the astonishing accuracy with
which some men have made themselves acquainted
with anatomy, both human and comparative. Anatomy, as we have already said, is not a science; it is
merely the nomenclature and classification of the science of physiology; and as such it would probably
have been considered, had it not received an accidental character from its connection with the medical
art. Had anatomy been studied for purely scientific




PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.    215
purposes, (and not, as now, for the purpose of alleviating human suffering, or preventing human dissolution,)
its entire subserviency to what is termed physiology
would probably have been  acknowledged, and it
would no more have been called a science than the
description of the lines and figures of geometry. It is
merely the description of the substantives whose
functions form the subject of future investigation.
At what point, then, is the present generation in
its knowledge of animal physiology?
The distinction we have drawn between internal
and external physiology, will enable us to allocate
the various portions of zoology. Internal physiology
discourses of,1st. The constituent organs of animal bodies.
2d. The conditions of those organs.
3d. Their function.
And the science presents these under the form of,1st. Nomenclature and description of the organs.
2d. Classification of the organs.
3d. Reasoning. That is, the syllogistic statement of
a scheme whereby the actually observed phenomena
would, when stated in language, follow logically from
the premises. One premiss being the expression of a
cause, force, or generalized fact;. and the other, the
expression of the conditions of the organs functioning.
It might, perhaps, be too much to assert that the
nomenclature, description, and classification of the
organs of animal bodies had arrived at a state of
perfection; but these branches have undoubtedly arrived at a state of ordination which is likely to remain
permanent, unless, indeed, a general revolution of
scientific nomenclature should at some future period




216     PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.
be agreed upon.  The knowledge is obtained; and
when we consider the manner in which a nomenclature necessarily grows out of a mass of the most heterogeneous materials, derived, perhaps, from a multitude of languages, it may fairly be asserted that that
knowledge is presented in as perfect a form as could
reasonably have been expected.
When we turn to the functions of the organs of
animal bodies, we find that the principle of progressive
complexity, which we have assumed as the basis of our
argument, still aids us in allocating the various portions of the same science, and enables us to understand how  one portion of physiology happens to
evolve chronologically before another. Thus geometry
is necessarily anterior to optics, and optics necessarily
anterior to the physiology of the eye, both logically
and chronologically. Again, the general principles of
mechanics must first be ascertained before an explanation can be given of the action of the muscles on the
bones, and of the motions that result from that action.
But optics can explain only a portion of the functions of the eye. The eye contains solid and liquid
parts, which not only refract light, but which have a
chemical composition.  And mechanics can explain
only a portion of the phenomena of muscular action.
And thus, although the geometry of vision may be
tolerably perfect, and a satisfactory explanation is
given of the result of muscular action, there is a
course of inquiry that lies beyond both optics and
mechanics, in which those sciences can afford no information.  When the muscular force is generated,
and acts in a particular direction, its results may be
explicable on the same principles that apply to non



PRESENT POSITION  OF THE SCIENCES.               217
vital forces acting on non-organic portions of matter.
But according to what laws is the muscular force itself
generated?  And, when generated, does it act in any
such  similar manner to voltaic  electricity, as would
enable us to conclude that the motion resulted fiom  a
galvanic power acting on nervous cords and muscular
fibres, as they are shown to be disposed by the scalpel
and the microscope?
As we do not pretend, in the slightest degree whatever, to discourse upon science, but only on the principles  that must pervade  the  classification  of' the
sciences, and the theory  of the order in which they
must chronologically evolve, we need only refer to the
fact, that within these few years the dynamics of the
blood and the chemistry of the blood have been made
subjects of special research, and that they are now
undergoing their process of evolution and reduction
to scientific ordination.*
* Among other labors, we may refer to those of Magendie on
the dynamics of the blood, and to those of Andral and Gavarret T
on its chemistry. But, in addition to these, we have only to turn
over the advertising pages of the medical journals to be convinced
that physiology is, as it were, laboring to assume a more definite
and more satisfactory form. As straws are said to indicate the direction of the current, so we may infer some notion of the direction
in which physiological science is piogressing, from the titles of the
works that daily issue from the press. Works are now produced
whose very titles would have been unintelligible half a century
since. Such titles as "Electro-Biology" are at all events indications; they show us, however insignificant might be their real merits, that the human mind is directing its eforts towards a region
altogether unknown to our ancestors.
"t J. L. Gavarret, author of the " General Principles of Medical Statistics."
19




218     PRESENT POSITION 01 TrHE SCIENCES.
The general principle which we conceive to pervade
the evolution of the various portions of physiology is
this: " In the same order that the non-organic sciences
have themselves been reduced to ordination, will they
be applied to the phenomena of animal life."
And in endeavoring to determine the present position of animal physiology, we shall, perhaps, not be
far from the truth if we reckon the nomenclature of
the organs and the description of the organs to be
tolerably complete, the explanation of the mechanical
functions to have made very considerable progress, and
the chemical and electrical functions to be now attracting a large share of the attention of scientific men.
We now turn for a moment to what we have termed
external animal physiology, which consists of
Comparative nomenclature of all known animals.
Comparative description and classification of animals.
Function of animals in the terrestrial economy.
And here, perhaps, it would be unsafe to assert that
more has been achieved than the nomenclature; foralthough there is no doubt a classification, that classification is open to such serious objections, that naturalists
themselves are beginning to acknowledge the necessity
of revising it, and constructing it on principles more
sound, because more in accordance with the great
analogies of nature.
To take one instance, which will suffiee for o-i
purpose.
If, among the birds, the first rank be accorded to the
birds of prey, (the eagles, vultures, hawks, &c.,) and
not to those birds in which the nervous system is most




PRESENT POSITION OF THE SCIENCES.    21.9
highly developed, and the manifestation of intelligence
most apparent, (the parrots, &c.,) why, on the same
principle of classification, is not the first rank among
the mammifers accorded to the beasts of prey, (the
lions, tigers, wolves, &c.,) which, among quadrupeds,
are the undoubted representatives or correlatives of the
eagles and vultures?
If the relative development of the nervous system
determine the rank among the mammifers, no good
reason can be alleged why it should not also do so
among the birds; and there can be little doubt that the
anomaly that now prevails must give way to a more
consistent system, which shall take the analogies of
nature as its basis, instead of any fanciful notions
about the nobility of the eagle.
Were we to hazard an opinion on this head, which
we can only do as looking at these subjects from a
distance, we might express a conviction that the principles of classification proposed by that amiable and
accomplished naturalist, Dr. Kaup of Darmstadt, are
those which must ultimately prevail.
Human physiology is the last, the highest, and the
most complex of all the physical sciences. It is the
termination of man's intellectual labors, so far as
regards the universe of matter. It is the ultimatum
of material manifestation, the final type of complex
arrangement, the summit beyond which we leave the
material world, and enter into a new region of thought.
Nor is it merely a metaphor to say, that " man is the
epitome of the world."  Every science that precedes
human physiology is necessary to the complete understanding of the human frame. That frame has parts




220             POLITICAL SCIENCE.
— number is involved; those parts have quantity and
extent - algebra and geometry are involved; the body
may move or be at rest —dynamics and statics are
involved; the motions of solids, liquids, and aeriform
fluids are involved; optics, acoustics, chemistry, electricity, and galvanism all play their parts in elucidating the phenomena of the wondrous' mechanism. But,
granting that human physiology is the last and most
complex of all the physical sciences, has man no further region into which he may push his inquiries, and
extend the field of intellectual research?
Man has his functions - What are their laws?
SECTION II. — DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER, POSITION, AND BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
~ I.  General  Observations. -The most simple
functions of man, and those which naturally fall to
be considered first, are those in which he acts on the
external world.
First. Man may act on the physical world that surrounds him.  These actions, when systematized, constitute the mechanical arts, chemical arts, &c. Under
this head are assembled agriculture, navigation, manufactures, trade, commerce, systems of locomotion,
fisheries, mines, &c.; in fact, all those occupations in
which man is employed for the purpose of extracting
from the earth the objects he requires, or of distributing or transforming them for his legitimate remuneration.




POLITICAL SCIENCE.             221
[Some of the French writers have most appositely
termed this "l'exploitation de la terre par l'industrie,"
in  opposition  to  "l'exploitation  de l'homme  par
l'homme."  When such expressions come to be placed
in opposition to each other, it needs no prophet to tell
us that the present social systems must soon undergo
a radical revision.]
Second. Man may act on man.
This he may do either mediately or immediately.
Mediately, when, at the same time that he is engaged
in the above occupations, he reacts on his fellow-men
through those occupations, either to their benefit or
prejudice. Imzmediately, when he acts on his fellowmen  by constraint, restraint, compulsion, violence,
fraud, or defamation.
The principles involved in man's action on man are
included under the term social science or politics, when
those terms are takel in a general signification.
Social science is divided into two embranchments;
namely, political economy, the object-noun of which
is social utility; and politics proper, the object-noun
of which is equity.
The problem of political economy is to discover the
laws (generalized facts) which preside over human
actions, where there is no direct interference between
man and man.
The problem  of politics is to discover the laws
(principles of the reason) which ought to preside over
human actions in the matter of interference.
In both sciences, human actions are the substantives with which we reason. In endeavoring to determine the present position of man in his knowledge of
19*




222              POLITICAL SCIENCE.
political economy and politics, we must premise that
we here approach the region where szperstition, and
not science, prevails.
Knowledge is credence based on sufficient evidence,
and superstition is credence without sufficient evidence.
No truth can be more satisfactorily established by
history than that man is gradually emerging froml
superstition -gradually emancipating himself from
those unfounded credences which have, in every department of science, enslaved his intellect and misdirected his actions. It is,too much the practice, however, of this age to indulge in self-adulation, and to
imagine fondly, that the light which has begun to
dawn has dispelled all the darkness from the atmosphere of knowledge. Men seem to think that, because
they can now look rationally at the phenomena of
nature, they have read the whole riddle of the universe; that they are the wise men; that superstition
no longer enfolds them; and that, from  their high
monument of wisdom, they can look back on their
credulous fathers, and smile complacently in the vastness of their own superiority.
Great, no doubt, has been the emancipation of mind
from religious and natural superstition; but we should,
indeed, be sitting down in contented ignorance, were
we to imagine that superstition does not now enslave
us ifi the same manner that it enslaved our forefathers,
except that her domain has been removed a little farther onward. Superstition has retired just as the sciences have been reduced to ordination -just as they
have emerged from the chaos, and been moulded into
form by the intellect of man. In the very same order,




POLI'ICAL SCIENCE.              223
and to the very same extent, and at the same chronological period that the sciences have appeared, has
superstition gradually retired, and taken her new stand
in those fields of thought where the reason of mankind had not yet beheld the divine light of truth.
"When the mathematical sciences had made some good
progress, the physical sciences were yet in the womb
of futurity, and their place was occupied by a series
of superstitions.  These superstitions retired, but retired only gradually as science lit her peaceful lamp in
the various chambers of nature. And now is it at all
difficult to find superstition? to point out the region
she still occupies? to show where vast systems of credence are as baseless as the credence of the alchemist,
and vast systems of action are founded on the baseless credence?
The whole realm of political science is as yet little
better than a superstition; and though humanity is
perpetually mraking convulsive throes to escape from
the evils entailed by the erroneous credence, we may
rest surely convinced that those evils will never be
obliterated until the human intellect has fairly mastered
the theory of man's political relations, and reduced that
theory to universal application.
Nor do we here refer to any theory which we ourselves may advance.  Our views may be true, or they
may be false. We, of course, believe them true; but,
he they true or false, we lay down the proposition in
the most general signification, that the evils that
afflict the large masses of the population never can be
obliterated until man's reason has mastered the theory
of man's relation to man, and until he has reduced




224               POLITICAL SCIENCE.
the principles of political science to practical realization in the constitution of society.
To observe the manner in which men legislate,and legislators, be they who they may, are only men,
— we should naturally be led to the conclusion, that
there was no truth and no falsehood in political science.
How otherwise can we explain the circumstance, that
laws are perpetually undergoing a process of change?
A law enacted only a few years since, is now found
to be incorrect - so bad, in fact, that it must be abolished.  In that law, perhaps, the interests of millions
were involved; yet, notwithstanding, legislators are
allowed to mnake these vast experiments with the
property and the liberties of their fellow-men on no
surer ground than opinion, which, in the great majority
of cases, is mere presumptuous superstition.
Truth, in fact, has almost as little to do with legislation as it had with alchemy or astrology; and this
is the case, whatever may be the real matter of truth.
According to law.in England, the Episcopalian church
is the true church; truth, according to law, is in the
Thirty-nine Articles; the bishop is not only a churchman, but a legislator -a member of the supreme Parliament, and a ruler of the state.  But in another part
of Britain the church of England is not the true
church, it is a scandalous hierarchy, because in the
northern part of Britain the Presbyterian church is the
true church; truth, according to law, is in the Confession of Faith;. and the bishop, so far from  even
* Since the beginning of the present century, there have been
passed between five and six thousand public acts of Parliament.




POLITICAL SCIENCE.                 225
being entitled to reverence, is a vile intruder on the
equal rights of his brethren.  Ie would not be allowed to address his fellow-Christians from the legal
pulpits of the legal church; he is a "dumbe dogge,"
a small pope, a hireling shepherd; he is, in fact, that
incarnation of Presbyterian abhorrence - a prelate.
In Ireland, again, (unfortunate Ireland!) Poperywhich is, root and branch, totally false in England
and Scotland —is partially legally true; and perhaps,
by and by, it is going to be more true.  Not that
it can be true in England, because the law  cannot
allow  that; but that it may be true in Ireland —or
true enough, at all events, for Ireland-as any thing
does for Ireland.'
Now, is it any thing else than  mere superstition
that allows any legislature whatever to establish systems of propositions which are legally true in one part
of the kingdom, legally false in another?  Whatever
is true, it is quite evident that truth did not preside at
the legislation-that truth was not the basis, the
ground, the reason of the legislation.  But if truth'did not preside at the legislation, what did preside?
Superstition.
Again: God gave the earth to the children of men.
Now, is it true that the gift of a king (a man, with a
different name) is a good title to as much land as
would support a thousand families; that the legisla* " The quantity of specie coined in the reign of James I. was
about ~5,4' 2,000; of which ~3,666,000 was in gold, and ~1,765,000
in-silver. It still continued the practice to issue some base money for
the use of Ireland."-WADE, p 173. Yes, truly; and it has long
continued the practice to issue base money for the use of Ireland,




226              POLITICAL SCIENCE.
ture (other men) should enact a law to secure that
land in perpetuity to the descendants of the person
who received the gift; that this person and his heirs
should be called proprietors of that land, and should,
by the law, be treated as such; that from that portion
of the earth's surface all other persons are excluded by
the law, save only those who have the permission of
the proprietor; that this proprietor may be always
absent from that land, and yet that he is to receive
from the cultivators of the land the rent - that is, the
profit that God has graciously been pleased to accord to human industry employed in the cultivation
of the soil?  Is this true, or is it only a mere groundless szperstition' that lies at the bottom of nine tenths
of the evils of society?  It cannot be rigiht, unless
there is a principle of truth on which the system  is
based; yet where, either in the study of external nature, or of man, or of revelation, can we find true
propositions on which to base so iniquitous a system?
Again: Is it true that a deliberative  assembly,
chosen by a small part of the population, has a riight
-in morals, or religion, or any other measure of right
and wrong-to determine that the legislators of the
country shall be chosen by certain individuals, whose
number, at the utmost, does not amount to more than
one fourth of the adult male population of the country?  Is it true that this deliberative assembly has an
equitable right to pr~event the other three fourths of the
adult male population from having any voice in the
election of those who are to tax their labor?  Is it
true that those three fourths of the adult male population are, i.) any way whatever, morally bound to obey




POLITICAL SCIENCE.            227
a deliberative assembly chosen and elected in this
manner?  Is this true, or is it only a portion of that
more general superstition which once pervaded all the
physical sciences, but which has now been driven before the advance of knowledge, and obliged to take
refuge in the regions of politics and religion?
Again: the present age is one in which we hear
much of a "surplus population," a "redundant population," &c., while it seems to be forgotten that the
man who can earn his daily bread can never be redundant, while the man who consumes vast revenues,
without working for them, must necessarily be so.
This redundant population, finding the difficulties and
miseries of a residence in their native country more
painful than even expatriation and removal to another
hemisphere, begin to emigrate to Australia. A Solon
of a political economist, theorizing on the terms labor,
capital, supply, demand, &c., arrives at the conclusion
that one square mile of the earth's surface is the exact
quantity that should be sold to the emigrant, and that
the best of all possible prices for that land is exactly
one pound sterling per English statute acre.  The
governors of this country, convinced of their own
ignorance, and happy to listen to a man who can discourse fluently on such mysterious matters as labor
and capital, determine to apply the magic formula;
and thenceforth no man who cannot purchase one
square mile of land, at one pound per English statute acre, is allowed to settle down and earn his livelihood in one vast district of the southern hemisphere.
Is it true, or is it false, that a few men in England
have the right to impose such a restriction on the




228              POIITICAL SCIENrCE.
liberties of mankind?  Is any other evidence required
than that furnished by the cWakefield system, that political economy, in its practical application, is at present
only a superstition —a mere tissue of the most arbitrary and groundless propositions, not one iota better
than the propositions of judicial astrology?
Again: the legislators of Britain  (who at that
period represented a very small fragment of the population) enacted laws against the supply of food from
foreign countries.  Millions of pounds sterling were
involved in the operation of the laws, and millions
of persons were affected in the price of their daily
food. Some years later, the population discovered the
effect of the enactments, and the governors were
obliged to abolish them, because the masses would no
longer tolerate their existence.  Now, is it true, or
false, that any men, call them  what you will, have
the right to make these vast experiments?  Are not
these cases, and rimany others, exactly similar to the
cases in which rulers have attempted to make a true
or a false theology,-a true or a false system  of
astronomy,- or a true or a false system  of nature,
when they persecuted sorcerers, and devoted the victim to the fagot and the flames?
Again: What is the whole system of criminal legislation now carried into force in Great Britain? What
is it but a great superstition, an arbitrary superstition,
where there is no regulative principle for the intellect
to rest upon?  Why should one criminal be fined,
another impqrisoned, another transported, and another
hancgecl?  Is there any connection, either inductive or
deductive, between the crimes and the punishments?




POLITICAL ECONOMY.              229
Is the allocation of the punishment based upon any
principle that connects just such a lind, and such a
quantity, with the ofTence?  Is not the selection of
the punishment arbitrary; that is, dependent not on
any principle discoverable in nature, but dependent on
vague and groundless opinion - that is, superstition?
Crimes are the maladies of society, and punishments are the medicines which laws administer for
their correction. Now, are the recipes at present in
use in politics one atom less arbitrary, less superstitious, or less absurd, than were the recipes of medicine
two hundred years since?  Could we see things present in the same light that we see things past, we
should regard the affected wisdom of legislators and
lawyers with the same ridicule and contempt so lavishly bestowed on the quacks, diviners, and necromancers of a former age.  Where there is no truth to
rest upon, there can only be error or superstition.
~ II. The Province and Position of Political Economy. - Enterijlg our protest, therefore, that the regions
of political economy and politics are at present pervaded by endless superstitions, we shall endeavor to
point out the position of the present generation in its
attempts to evolve those sciences.
First. The object-noun of political economy has
been ascertained, and definitions have been attempted
of the substantives of the science; that is, attempts
have been made to describe and classify the objects
with which men must reason. when they reason in
political economy.
Second. Large masses of facts have been collected
20




230              POLITICAL ECONOMY.
relating to a variety of subjects. These have been
collected with more or less accuracy, and arranged
with more or less judgment. In some cases, tabulated
forms have been produced which leave little or nothing to be desired on the score of accuracy, purity,* and
facility of manipulation.  In other cases, immense
records of facts have been accumulated, of so heterogeneous a character, or involving so many separate
considerations, that conclusions altogether incompatible with each other are drawn from them  to serve the
purposes of the political reasoners.
Third. In some cases, the aid of mathematics has
been called in to methodize the facts, and to determine
the general value of the inferences that we are entitled
to draw fiom them.
1st. Of the object-noun of political economy.
Every proper science has an object-noun, and the
exclusive end and intention of the science is to discover and reduce to logical order the relations that
exist between the substantives of the science in that
object-noun.  Thus, arithmetic treats of relations in
number; geometry, of relations in space, (position,
direction, and  extent;) dynamics, of relations in
force, &c.
Political economy then treats of relations in social
utility, and we ask, " WVhat are the relations of this,
that, and the other action, or system of action, in social utility?"  The answer to this question belongs
exclusively to the science of political economy. [The
A By purity, we mean that the facts are strictly comparable; that
improper facts have been left out.




POLITICAL ECONOMY.                    231
same  action  may be judged  in  social utility, or in
equity; in  the former case we are engaged with a
question of political economy; in the latter, with a
question of politics.  Endless ambiguities and discussions arise  from  confounding  the one  science with
the other.]
2d. We  now  ask, "WVith  what  do  we reason?
WVhat are the substantives of the science? "
Political economy is entirely and exclusively conversant with human actions.
We reason with  human  actions in  social utility.
Social utility is the object-noun of the science, and the
forms of human  action  are the subject-nouns, which
are to be named, classed, and reasoned with.*
Wherever human action is not involved, there is no
* Thus, the cultivation of the earth is a form of human action;
trading is a form of human action; restrictive laws and prohibitory
laws, when carried into execution, are forms of human action.
These forms have to be classified; and science is achieved when
the classified forms are made to function in a rational schemethat is, when the premises expressed in language will produce,
logically, such consequents as are actually observed to take place
in the real world.
In the external world we observe antecedence, coincidence, and
subsequence, (or antecedent events, coincident events, and subsequent events;) but the mind alone furnishes the idea of consequence,
(causation,) and, as the stream  of time rolls on, with the whole
functions of nature going on coincidently, we require to observe
what antecedents are invariably followed (and in all circumstances)
by certain subsequents, and thus to arrive at particular causes and
particular effects. For this, the classification of events is requisite,
and when they are arranged into species and genera, they become
capable of functioning in a logical scheme, which scheme constitutes science.




232             POLITICAL ECONOMY.
political economy. WiTatever results from the general
action of the laws of the non-human universe, does
not belong to political economy.  The goodness or
badness of a climate, the fertility or non-fertility of the
soil, the existence of coal, iron, or other minerals —
these in no respect whatever enter the science of political economy, except just in so far as they are affected
by human action. The fertility of the soil produced by
humzan industry, the production of iron, the cultivation,
manufacture, and  commerce  of cotton, wheat, tea,
sugar, sheep, cattle, wool, &c., &c., —all these enter
into political economy, because they represent certain
forms of human action, which have an appreciable
value in social utility.
The destruction of all the sheep, for instance, and
all the people in a highland district, by a storm or by
a dreadful convulsion of the elements, would in no
respect enter into the science of political economy.
But the abolition of the sheep, and the abolition of
the population, by the so-called proprietor, under the
sanction of British law, and the conversion of the district into a game desert, does enter into political economy; and when we ask the questions, "Is this act
socially beneficial or prejudicial? " and,. " Are the laws
that grant a legal power to perform such acts by force
socially beneficial or prejudicial? " we reason in political economy.
These same acts and laws may also be judged of
in equity; but in that case we have passed from political economy to true politics.
Political economy, then, is the science that treats of
human function.  Where human function is not in.




POLITICAL ECONOMY.              233
volved, we are not engaged with political economy.'But then there is a limitation on the other hand.
Political economy is a non-moral science, and in no
case can be allowed to pronounce a moral judgment.
All that it can ever tell us is, whether certain actions
or systems of action are beneficial, indifferent, or prejudicial; and when the terms right and wrong, (adjectives,) ought, &c., are employed, they are used to indicate correctness or incorrectness in social utility.
Acts of interference, whether by law, or merely by
the individual, belong properly to the science of politics, but they may also be legitimately judged of
through the medium of political economy. In the one
mode, however, we reason synthetically, as in geometry; in the other mode we reason empirically, as if we
were to infer the general properties of figures from an
induction of the actual properties presented by an indefinite multitude of individual figures. The practical
difference is this. By treating a question of interference by the rules of'equity, we arrive at once at a
conclusion; whereas, when itr is treated by the rules
of utility, it may require many years, many observations, and many disputations as to facts, before a conclusion can be drawn.  The equity of the slave trade
is a question so simple, that few intelligent men could
fail to settle it satisfactorily in a few minutes; but the
economy of the trade would require, and did require,
many years to settle it; and even now there are not
wanting hundreds who, on economical principles, would
defend both the trade and the condition of slavery.
Although perfect knowledge in both sciences would,
no doubt, lead to exactly the same practical conclu20*




234      POLITICAL ECONOMY -  ITS POSITION.
sion, the argumenlt of economy is sometimes set up
against the (argument of equity.  The concise reply to'
such a mode of proceeding is this, " If equity have any
existence at'all, its rules are necessarily iimperative."
Deny'the im'pe?,ra'tive nature of equity, and you obliterate all morals.'
Now, where there is no interference between man
and man, no judgment in equity can possibly be pronounced.  WVhere there is no interfer'ence, (and nothing
that'enters religion,) economy gives the tanon; she
holds the balance, and pronounces judgment, because
the question belongs to the jurisdiction of her court.
But where there is interoference, we can have a judgment in equity; and where we can have a judgment
in equity, no economical considerations whatever (even
if it were not true that the just coincides with the beneficial) can ever relieve man from  the imperative obligation. The moment it was admitted that economical
considerations should outweigh the judgment in equity,
that moment is man's moral nature obliterated, and he
becomes an animal a,little' superior to the orangoutang.
We now turn to the mode in which political economy is usually presented.  Utility is, no doubt, the
object of investigation; but what is its rmeasure, what
is its criterion, what are the marks by which we know
an action to be beneficial or prejudicial?
* It is true, however, that the argument of economy has a far
more powerful influence on the world than the argument of equity.
Men are not satisfied with the logical determination of right and
wrong; they must have a picture as well as a specification; they
must have the evils portrayed in all their malignity before they resolutely determine to amend them.




POLITICAL ECONOMY -ITS OBJECT.         235
According to some writers, we should imagine that
utility was measured according to the wedlth prodcucecl.
Vcalue) labor, capital e, es, profit, rent, &c., are the
substantives of their science; and' the production of
vwealth appears to be the end, the sum  and substance,
the object of their desires.
WVe deny, from beginning to end, this view of political economy.  It has some truth in it-the beginnings of truth; but such, in the general, is no more
the end of political economy, than the determination
of the chances in gambling was the end of the calculation Of probabilities.
We assert- and we have no doubt whatever that
this view will ultimately obtain the suffrages of all -
that the welfare of man is the end of political economy.
To this it may be replied, that the production of
wealth is the means; and that all economists intend
to include the welfare of man as a matter of course.
We deny the whole theory from beginning to end.
We assent that the production of man, and man in
a continually higher condition, is the object, the end,
the ultimatum of the science.
Let us suppose that one thousand families were
employed in the cultivation of one hundred thousand
acres of land; that they lived, maintained themselves
in decent plenty, reared their families in health, industry, honesty, and those manly qualities which, among
the agricultural population of Great Britain, have
assumed a higher character than in any other portion
of the earth's inhabitants. Suppose that this population produce only as much as suffices for the plentiful
support of all the individuals. Good. There is not,




236        POLITICAL ECONOMY —ITS OBJECT.
on the average of twenty years, any superabundance
that cal be called accumulated profit.
This population, according to some political economists, would be a most unproductive, most useless
portion of society.''  "In 1709, an application was made to Parliament for an act
to divide and enclose the common fields and wastes belonging to
the parish of Ropley.  This served as an encouragement and
example; and applications of the same kind became annually more
frequent. It appears that, since that period, very nearly four thousand bills of enclosure have been passed; and it is also well known
that, in numerous instances, the same end has been reached without
legislative interference, by private agreement among the parties
interested. In a word, we have scarcely a doubt that about five
thousand parishes (a moiety of the whole territory of England) have
been subjected to the operation of these measures in the space of
about one hundred and twenty years; and as little (however beneficial the division and consequent improvement of this vast territory
may have proved to the owners, and to some other classes) that the
Vhange has been a woful one for our peasantry. We believe that
the final extinction of the class of small occupiers and crofters has,
in almost every instance, followed the division of common-field
parishes. Several small farms have been consolidated into one;
and the little farmer has been either metamorphosed into a cotton
spinner, or, continuing perhaps to occupy his old farm-house without any land attached to it, lingers as a day laborer on the soil
which he once rented. Similar in character has been the effect of
this change upon the condition of the cottager. Before the division
and enclosure of the district, every cottager possessed a common
right of some extent —a right, for instance, to turn out a cow, a.
pig, a few sheep and geese, upon the wastes of the parish: most
of them were in possession of sinall crofts, which supplied the cow
with winter fodder; where this did not happen to be the case, the
cottager either purchased hay for her keep, or paid for her run in
the straw yard of some neighboring farmer. Hence it is clear that,
under the above system, not only the little farmer, but also the




POLITICAL ECONOMY -  ITS OBJECT.             237
We deny the fact.  This population has reared and
produced men.
Suppose, again, the great body of this population
should be set to spin cotton, smelt iron, grind cutlery,
and weave stockings; that at these occupations, by
incessant toil, they should produce not only as much
as support them, but one half more;  according to
political economists, these occupations would be incomparably more profitable than the agricultural occupations, and consequently much better for society.
We deny the fact, and scout the inference.  The
production of man, and of man in his best condition,
is the physical ultimatum of the earth; and any system  whatever that sacrifices  the workman  to  the
work-the  man  who  produces the wealth  to  the
wealth  produced-is a monstrous system  of misdirected  intention, based on  a  blasphemy  against
man's spiritual nature.
The whole system  of modern manufacture, with
its factory slavery; its gaunt and sallow faces; its
humblest cottager, drew a very considerable portion of his subsistence directly from the land. His cow furnished him with what
is invaluable to a laborer-a store of milk in the summer months;
his pig, fattened upon the common and with the refuse vegetables
of his garden, supplied him with bacon for his winter consumption;
and there were poultry besides. It has been very much the fashion
to decry the advantages which accrued from the enjoyment of
common rights; but to him who has, and who fortunately wants,
but little, a trifle is of importance. This trifle amounted, probably
to half the subsistence of the man's family.'And buirdly chields and clever hizzies
Were bred in sic a way as this is.' 
Quart. Rev. July, 1829.




238             THE WELFARE OF MAN.
half-clad hunger; its female degradation; its abortions and rickety children; its dens of pestilence and
abominatipn; its ignorance, brutality, and drunkenness; its vice, in all the hideous forms of infidelity,
hopeless poverty, and mad despair, - these, and, if it
were possible, worse than these, are the sure fruits of
makling man the workman of mammon, instead of
making wealth the servant of humanity for the relief
of man's estate.
The day is not far distant when the labor of
England will hold her court of justice; let those who
may await the sentence of the tribunal.
That system  of political economy which makes
wealtht, and not man, the ultimatum, is based on a
monstrous fallacy - on a fallacy so slavish and so detestable, that the wonder is, how accomplished and
personally amiable men can be found as its abettors.
The fallacy is, in  taking  the rents of the landlords, and the profits of the capitalists, as the measures of good and evil, instead of taking the condition
of the cultivators, and the condition of the laborers,
(the many,) as the sure index of the character of a
system.
Whatever tends to debase man, to make him physically, intellectually, or morally a lower being, is bad,
however much or however little the wealth produced
may be.'  The wealth is not the stable element; it
* The distribution of wealth is a question of incomparably more
importance than even its production.  This appears a paradox.
It is not so, however. Place man on the earth, and it is his nature
to produce wealth. Hunger and want will impel him; and as his
intellect becomes more and more enlightened, and his ingenuity




GROWTI OF ECONOMY.                      239
is an accidental, and by no means the most important,
adjunct.  Man is the stable element.  His condition
is the standard; his improvement is a good; his deterioration is an evil.  And this, independently of all
other considerations.   All other considerations  are
secondary, dependent, subsidiary to the great intention.
Man is not useful as he produces wealth, but wealth
is useful as it sustains man, ameliorates his condition,
impro-ves his capacities, gives opportunities for his
further cultivation, and aids his progress in the great
scheme of-human regeneration.
Such  views, then, of political economy  as  make
wealth the ultimatum, (and this wealth, be it always
remembered, is the wealth of the land owner, the mill
owner, the iron master, &c., and not the wealth of the
becomes greater under the influence of the enlightened intellect,
his arrangements will be more complex, more far-sighted, more independent of any sudden shocks or derangements that might accrue
from accident. Great advantage, of course, attends the study of
the best mode of producing wealth. In the distribution, however,
another circumstance has to be taken into consideration. All history proves man to be afallen creature. No theory of human nature
can stand for a moment, that does not admit man's fallen condition.
Such theories invariably lead to endless contradictions, because
they cannot explain the facts and phases of human manifestation.
Now man as afallen creature, though necessarily impelled to produce wealth, more or less, is also tempted to commit injustice. The
strong individual appropriates more than his equitable share at the
expense of the weak individual; and all privileged classes are
rmerely classes of individuals who have obtained more land, or more
power, or more license than equitably could have been assigned to
them. The laws of distribution are of incomparably more practical
importance than the laws of production, and the public mind will
not allow many years to elapse without bringing them to vehement
discussionL




240 A NATURAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.
multitude of human laborers,) are merely the beginnings of the science of political economy.  This science, like every other, must pass through its stages;
it must have its errors, its superstitions, its partial
truths, its truths misunderstood, before it comes forth
as a system over which man has no power of control,
but which he must contemplate as a system of truth
designed by the Creator of the world for the instruction of his intellect, and the improvement of his
condition.
Political economy is now struggling to assume a
position among the sciences. It is daily growing,
daily assuming a more definite form, and daily shaking
off those questions that do not belong to it, although
so intimately allied with it that they are sure to occur,
over and over again, to its cultivators.
That it is a science in the same sense in which
chemistry is a science, no person can for a moment
maintain. But so much has already been done, that
any day might see it transformed by the hand of
some master, and presented to the world in the aspect
of a teachable branch of knowledge, capable of application to the great problems of legislation.
At the same time we must remark, that the natural
science of political economy has labored under the
immense disadvantage of collecting facts which were
not the result of nature's operations, but which were,
in a great measure, the result of human legislation,
which varied from time to time, and from country to
country. The statistics of the corn trade, for instance,
and consequently the statistics of the price of corn
throughout Britain, were encumbered with sliding




A NATURAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. 241
scales, fixed duties, and all the other concomitants
which the aristocratic rulers of the country have invented for the purpose of taxing labor instead of land.
Now, nature has no sliding scales to-day, and fixed
duties to-morrow.  She acts harmoniously; and the
study of her facts is not disturbed by the consideration of causes which may vary indefinitely.  Had
matter gravitated  towards matter according  to a
sliding scale at one period, and according to a fixed
scale at another, and according to no scale at all at a
third, it is at all events questionable whether even
Newton would have been able to unravel the intricacy
of her laws.  Consequently we must regard the labors
of political economists with lenity, nor must we demand from  them  the same unity of credence which
we expect from  the chemist, the anatomist, or the
physiologist, because a disturbing force of variable
character has interfered with the objects of their investigation.  At a future period, there can be no doubt
that political economy will assume exactly the same
form  and ordination as the other sciences, and that
the economist will, to a great extent, drive from the
field both the demagogue and the legislator who
makes laws on opinion.
Before leaving the subject of political economy,
however, we have one remark to offer.  God has
given to man, and to the world, a certain constitution.
By the laws which God has established for the government of the world, certain consequences follow
certain antecedents. All human laws whatever are
attempts to alter the natural arrangement, and to substitute some other consequent, which, according to
21




242  A NATURAL' SY.AI OF POLITIC\I ECONOMY.
the ordinary course of nature, would not have followed.
It is therefore evident that man, in making laws, mnest
have the most clear and perfectly justifying reason for
so doing; or otherwise lhe is attempting to controvert
the arrangements of the Almighty, and to substitute
hutnan arrangements for those that are divine.  Many
of the evils of society are mainly to be traced to the
disturbing influence which human laws have exercised
on the natural arrangements of Providence.
On the conveyance of the productions of one country to another, for instance, God has placed certain
restrictions. Distance must be overcome, storms must
be encountered, and risks of various kinds must be
incurred.  Suppose that the whole of the natural risks
amount to one fifth of the cost price of the articles.
[God, in giving man ingenuity, has given him a power,
not 6f diminishing distance or abolishing storms, but
of continually improving the means of transport, and
thereby diminishing the natural risk. But let us suppose that, at a given period, the risk did amount to a
fifth of the cost price of the article.]
Now, what has man done?  Has he accepted the
conditions under which God allowed him  to exercise
his ingenuity?  Has he thankfully taken the good,
and endeavored to diminish its cost as much as the
circumstances of the earth allow? Or has he, on the
contrary, taken the conditions such as they were presented in nature, and vastly increased that part of the
liability which it was man's constant interest to diminish?  According to the laws of nature, (or of God, the
author of nature,) the condition annexed to the supply
of the foreign goods was the payment of one. fifth of




LAWS OF NATURE DERANGED BY MAN.                243
the cost; but man, by restrictive laws, customs, duties,
&c., increases the cost of supply to two fifths, or a
half, or a whole, or perhaps double, the cost price of
the articles.*
We are fully  aware that, to'many, this mode of
viewing restrictive laws will appear, at all events, irrelevant; at the same time, there can be little doubt that,
so long as restrictive laws of this character are allowed
to exist, man must suffer.  We do not say that the
persons who make the laws will suffer, that they will
be poorer, or that they will reap the inconvenience of
the arrangements.   Their pecuniary interests are often
diametrically opposed to the welfare of the great body
of the population.  But so long  as any legislators
whatever are  allowed  to  originate  restrictions, and
thereby vastly to increase the cost of those natural
productions which the population requires, the great
body of the inhabitants of a country must be in a
* The mode in which the taxation of articles of consumption
operates, is thus set forth by the Liverpool Financial Reform
Association: -
s. d.
Cost of tea, per pound,  - -                1  0
Add profit, 25 per cent.,  -    -      -   0  3
Duty, per pound,                       -   2  24
Add profit on the duty,      -              0  64
Price to consumer, instead of Is. 3d., -    4  0
Those who are interested in the facts of politics (and who is not?)
will find the best account of the present political condition of Britain. in Wade's "Unreformed Abuses in Church and State."  London: E. Wilson. Price 2s. 6d. This is, perhaps, the best exposition of the fruits of aristocratic government that has issued from
the press.




244    LAWS OF NATURE DERANGED BY MAN.
worse condition than Providence intended, in a worse
condition than they would have been had there been
no such laws, and in a worse condition than they
would have been had the arrangements of nature been
left to themselves, and not interfered with by the enactments of the legislators.
There is the greatest possible difference between
taking advantage of the laws of nature, and originating laws. It is not man's office to originate laws.
God has made the laws, and given man an intellect to
discover and apply them. As well may man make
laws in the physical sciences, or in theology, as in political economy. It is true he may make laws and
enforce them; but what he never can do is, to make
the operation of those laws beneficial to the world.
This is beyond his power; and, though the laws may
be for the pecuniary advantage of the privileged classes
of a country, they are necessarily followed by a concomitant series of evils, which bear on the masses of
the population.
The great truth which political economy will ultimately teach is this: " That God has constituted nature aright; that it is man's interest to take advantage
of the arrangements of nature according to the laws
which God has established in the world; that all human laws originating in man are prejudicial arrangements, which interfere with the course of nature; that
all such laws ought universally to be abolished, so that
man may have free scope to extract the maximum of
benefit from the earth."  Social arrangements for the
benefit of all are not laws - they are adaptations of
the lawys of nature. These are requisite for society;




THE ULTIMATUM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.  245
and to these arrangements, legislation, in its economical aspect, ought to be exclusively confined. When
men persecute each other on account of their religious
tenets, (either by positive infliction or by exclusion
from civil rights,) they make laws —they originate
laws; when they make it a crime to kill a wild animal,
they originate laws; when they tax the population for
the support of a national creed and national ceremonial, they originate laws; when they allow the king to
grant fifty or a hundred thousand acres of the nation's
land to an individual, they originate laws. There are
no such laws as these in nature; no such laws in reason; no such laws in Scripture. They are mere human inventions, having no truth to rest upon; they
are the productions of man during the era of superstition.
But, on the'contrary, when men make light-houses
for the protection of maritime commerce -public harbors for the safety of ships, seamen, and cargoeswhen they make a police to watch -when they pave,
light, and clean towns-when they make roads and
arrangements for communication - when they support
such national defences as are judged requisite at any
given time - when they support judges and other ofiicers to administer the laws of justice -when they do
these, and many other similar acts, at the common
expense, and enforce the payment, they do not make
laws. They make only such arrangements, based on
the laws of nature or equity, as are deemed fitting at
a given period; they take advantage of the world,
such as they find it, and endeavor to evolve from it a
greater amount of good than they could do individu21*




246               POLITICS PROPER.
ally, were there no such social arrangements.  Mlen
may make laws, if they will; but what they cannot do
is, to make good to follow them.
~ III. Thle Province and Position of Politics Proper.
- From political economy we turn to politics. HTere
we approach the argument that a millennium, or reign
of justice on the earth, is a natzril event; that it belongs to the course of human evolution; that it is conmputcable on the very same principles that men employ
to compute other events; that it may be inferred from
the past history of human progression, which gives us
the actual line of progress, and from the logzical ordination of the sciences, which gives us the abstract line
of progress.
First, then, we have to determine the position of
politics in the scheme of classification. Before doing
so, however, we must remark that no science of politics, whatever be its form, or whatever be its matter,
can hope to meet with impartial investigation. WVhatever may be the real system of truth, (and a truth
there must be somewhere,) that system cannot fail to
controvert the opinions of multitudes, and to be favorable or unfavorable to the pecuniary interests of multitudes.  A few there may be who are able to look
calmly; but the minds of the vast majority are occupied by habitual prepossessions, which, in spite of
every effort of the will, prevent the intellect from shaking off its fetters. What they have been accustomed
to, or one short step beyond what they have been accustomed to, is the extent of their intellectual horizon.
All beyond is a fabulous region of mysterious portent -




T RUTH PIROGRESSIV I,.              247
an  UUltima Thule,) wlhose thick waters are unnavigable -a land of darkness, which perhaps some of our
far-off' descendants may possibly visit, but which we
can never hope to explore.
Admit the fact of human progression, however, (nor
can it reasonably be denied,*) and all the objections,
and all the difficulties connected with the habitual credence of a present generation, vanish into air.  Let
political truth be what it may, it cannot receive general
adoption at any period.  It must grow; it must be
suggested, misunderstood, denied, discussed, adopted
in part, rejected in part, re-discussed, further adopted,
and so on.  Were any generation of men (constituted
as men now are, and manifesting similar tendencies to
what may every where be observed) to continue to live
on instead of being replaced by successive generations,
it appears highly probable that the progression of man
would be for the most part arrested, or, at all events, it
would be much less rapid than at present.  In general,
men form their opinions young, and adhere to them  for
the remainder of their lives.  New intellect must be
brought forward, with  its elasticity, its inquisitive
scepticism, and its ardent desire to form a system
* It may be necessary distinctly to reiterate, that by human progression we do not mean the progression of man's nature, but the
progression of man's knowledge, and the progression of his systematic arrangements. We are well aware that there is a doctrine
which teaches the progressive improvement of human nature. And
even this latter doctrine appears to be so far correct, that the higher
sentiments of human nature come more and more into general
action the more men depart from barbarism. But that any amount
of natural improvement will make man other than a fallen creature,
is out of the question.




248                 TRUTH PROGRESSIVE.
satisfactory to  itself.  It also, in time, fixes its credence, and a new  generation is required to continue
the onward progress, and to pioneer the way into new
regions of thought.  Truths, which the last generation
regarded  as wild romances, or as destructive instigations of the devil, are by the next adopted in sober
earnest, and beheld as links in the vast chain of natural revelation,* which, century  after century, goes on
unfolding itself.
Doubts, disputes, denials, and diversity of opinion,
therefore, are of little importance.  They are natural;
they must come.  They are the modes in which man
* We use the term natural revelation intentionally, not for the
purpose of putting science on an equality with Scripture revelation,
but for the purpose of redeeming it from sensational degradationThe grand question of philosophy is, whether the material world
furnishes only a summation of sensual impressions, or whether it
is really and truly a revelation. That is, can we, or can we not,
see through material phenomena into a region which is not appreciable by sense?  If we say no, we are sceptics; if yes, we are
idealists, or (a much better name) intellectualists.  To put the question in a clear light, we ask, "Is the material world a final object,
which conveys only sensual impression?" or, "Is the material
world a book, that affords sensual impression, (the letters, figures,
pages, &c.,) and which, over and above the sensual impression, conveys an intellectual meaning intended by the Author."  A dog,
Looking at a book, sees the same that a man sees; but he understands not the iutellectual meaning intended to be conveyed to the
reader by the aid of the symbols. Now, is the universe an object
final, or a book    This is the great question of philosophy. If we
idmit it to be a book, as St. Paul does, (Rom. i. 20,) we thereby
idmit science to be truly a revelation. Even if the question were
Doubtful, which we do not believe, we esteem St. Paul's declaration
i settlement of it, as here St. Paul has pronounced divine judgment
3n a question of philosophy.




POLITICS PROPER —ITS POSITION.             249
expresses his ignorance, alnd  frequently the means
he uses to acquire knowledge and determine truth.
Where there is diversity of opinion, there must be
ignorance on one side or on both; and bold would be
the man who, in politics, should assert that he had so
completely mastered  all truth, that all other men
ought to come over to his side.  And yet there must
be a truth somewhere; and, as knowledge does not
admit of diversity of opinion, if ever man can have a
system of politics other than empirical, other than superstitious, diversity of opinion must disappear from
politics, just as it has disappeared from the sciences
which man has already mastered.
First, of the position of politics as a science.
1st. Man may act on the external world of matter,
and we may consider the laws of such actions
without taking into consideration the reflex eftiet
on man.
2d. We take into consideration the reflex effects on
man, and in them  we find the laws of political
economy.*
3d. Man may act on man directly, by interference.
The laws which prohibit, limit, or regulate these
actions of intererrence, constitute the science of
politics.' Political economy may have a restricted or an extended signification.'It may mean an exposition of the laws according to
which man creates or produces wealth. In this sense it is the
science of value. Or it may mean an exposition of the laws which
regulate social welfare, including the distribution of wealth, the
public health, the public-education, &c. In this sense it is the
science of social utility, of which the production of wealth is only




250          SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM.
WVe here proceed according to a regular progression,
beginning at the most simple forms of human action,
and passing to those which are more and more complex.
Politics has to do exclusively with the relations
between men, and to determine the principles that
should regulate their actions towanrds each  other.
NWV here initcference is not concerned, there is no question in politics.  This, then, is the anterior limitation
of the science-that where there is no interference
between man and man, there is no question of politics.
We have, then, to determine the posterior bounday — that which separates it from  any science that
might lie beyond it.
This posterior limit is likely, from  the prevalence
of socialist and communist doctrines, to become the
great desideratum  of political theory.  Those doctrines, whatever may be the contempt heaped on them
in England, are far more generally diffused than most
Englishmen  are aware of.  They are now  revolutionizing Europe; and no one can predict the extent
of the changes that must follow them, if once they
gain the complete mastery of the public mind.  Instead of railing at them, however, it is much more
profitable to endeavor to understand them, and to
seize the fallacy on which they are based.  Those
doctrines contain a profound truth; and more than
this, they are the convulsive cries of man's spiritual
the first and simplest embranchment. The economists of England
have strenuously adhered to the first meaning; but their place
must soon be taken by men of a different stamp, who take a wider
range of investiflgtion.




SOCIALISMl AND COMMUNISM.           251
nature, seeking after a better and a holier world than
is found in the present condition of society.  It is true
that men are brethren — the children of one Father;
it is true that universal benevolence is a virtue; it is
true that man ought not to seek his own advantage at
the expense of his fellow; it is true that in the present
system of society there are stupendous abuses which
cannot be justified; and it is also true that socialism
and communism  are based on fallacies, although the
above truths are ostensibly at the bottom  of those
systems.
There is a true communism  and a false communism.  Christianity itself teaches us that men are
brethren; and no dogmas that have ever been uttered
are more communist than some precepts of the New
Testament.  It is a fact, also, be it explained as it
may, that the early Christians were de facto communists, -that they held all things in comrhon, and that
no man called any thing his own.  These very doctrines have revived in our day, and they are now playing havoc with the institutions of Europe. They are
revived in the world of politics, however, and not in the
world of religion; and, as a phenomenon in the history of man, this circumstance is well worthy of
attention.
All that we have here to do with communism  is to
point out the fallacy on which it rests, when advanced,
as it is, into the region of politics.* This fallacy will
* Of course, we speak here only of that communism that would
obliterate private property altogether. The abolition of private
property in land, and the restitution of the soil to the state, is an




252      CHARACTER OF POLITICAL REA'rlTIONS.
be found the moment we can determine the posterior
limitation of the science of politics.  And if that posterior limitation cannot be determined, if it cannot be
settled satisfactorily by the fairest principles of reason,
then no man is entitled to say that communism  may
not, after all, be the correct theory of politics; and
though he may asseverate as he will, or rail, or abuse,
he has no right to do so till he can point out the line
of demarcation that separates political questions from
those that lie altogether beyond the sphere of politics.
Nor would any thing that could be said be of much
avail to stem  the torrent of credence that has set in.
Stem  it we cannot; but it may be possible to give it
a right direction.
Political relations are not relations of fraternity.
Love, charity, benevolence, and generosity have nothing whatever to do with politics.  These substantives,
and the principles of action to which they give rise,
lie beyond the region of politics.  This they do necessarily —just as necessarily as light and sound, optics
and  acoustics, lie necessarily beyond the region of
geometry.  Unless this truth is fairly apprehended,
and unless the line of demarcation between politics
and the regions that lie beyond it is logically determined and clearly perceived, there is a continual danger of slidilng imperceptibly into socialism. Whatever
may be true, or whatever may be false, in socialism,
(using that term  in the most unobjectionable senseentirely difit'rent question. Every political state is a communist
association; and its conmmon property, the taxation, must be taken
either from land or lablor. In Britain, the common property, the
revenue, already exceeds the rental of the soil.




CHARACTER OF POLITICAL RELATIONS.    253
Christian socialism, for instance,) the principles of
equity must first be taken into consideration before we
can, by any possibility, proceed to the consideration
of those higher principles of action which may come
into play, when once the principles of justice are
acknowledged and carried into general operation.
This question is, perhaps practically, the most important in modern politics.  Insurged millions let
loose on the world, with vague ideas of fraternity in
their heads, with the courage of enthusiasm in their
hearts, and with bayonets in their hands, are, at all
events, formidable expositors of doctrine. Their energy is exactly what the continent of Europe has so
long required; but their ignorance may transform what
would otherwise have been a most useful reformation
into a terrible hurricane of vengeance, and a blind
exercise of destructive power.  Now that the theorist
and the orator can raise armed millions, the game of
politics has assumed a new character. Theories are
no longer barren speculations, nor is oratory mere
declamation. It is, therefore, of the first importance
that the most careful, impartial, and honest endeavor
should be made to perfect the theory of politics -to
base first on the immutable foundations of justiceto satisfy the reason before setting the passions in a
flame - to evolve principles which can be calmly and
soberly maintained by the intellect, before they are
given as rules of action to enthusiastic populations,
ready to march in any diriection that is plausibly
pointed out as the right one.
WVe have no intention, however, to attempt the
correction of wrong theories. Wrong theories may
22




254             JUSTICE THE FOUNDATION
be supplanted, but it is questionable whether they are
ever corrected.  The development of the right theory
is the great object.  It will do the work if once it can
be finally cleared of logical objection. Men want political truth, and they are making desperate efforts to
obtain it; and obtain it they will, ultimately, there can'
be no possible doubt.
Political relations, so far from being relations of
fraternity, or of love, or of any of those sentiments
that teach us to bear or to forbear, or to give or to
forgive, are relations of equity.  They  are relations
of justice, which gives nothing, and forgives nothing.
They are jural relations, and  political society is a
jural society.*
The moment this truth  is forgotten, the door is
opened  for  the  wildest  and  most  impracticable
schemes.  We have, in fact, broken down the barriers
of reason, and admitted a flood of wild imagination.
While, on the other hand, we repudiate every thing
that assumes the form  of authority, (as dispensing
with reason;) so, on the other hand, must we as carefully. deny admission  to  anl   propositions whatever
* This truth has been clearly apprehended, and very distinctly
announced, by Francis Lieber, in his able "Manual of Political
Ethics."  [London: William Smith, Fleet Street.] That work is
well worthy the perusal of those who take an interest in political
science. It is far from being a formal treatise, but a most admirable preparation for the gradual introduction of scientific form. " The
state, I said, is founded on the relations of right; it is ajural society, as a church is a religious society, or an assurance company a
financial association. The idea of the just, and the action founded
on this idea, called justice, is the broad foundation and great object
of the state."-P. 160O




OF POLITICAL SOCIETY.             255
which cannot show  a rational foundation, because
they pretend to derive from  the higher and more
expansive sentiments of the heart. Nothing can be
more  delusive, nothing  more  certainly dangerous.
Justice is stable, permanent, and strictly regulative.
Its rules must determine the form of society, a form
which may at all times be enforced.  Arid if, as is the.
case in all known countries, that form shall have been
departed from, then force may be legitimately used
for its restoration.
The moment, however, that we attempt to substitute the relations of benevolence for those of justice,
both the scales and the sword fall from the hands of
the image.  Benevolence can regulate nothing, and
enforce nothing.  First let me know what is mine, and
then inculcate the duties and the pleasures of benevolence.  But if nothing is mine, then is there not only
no justice, but no possibility of benevolence; and those
who advocate the absolute  abolition of property,
would do well to consider that the moment property
is abolished, that moment is'the practice of benevolence (such, at all events, as involves the objects of
property) abolished also. The foundation, therefore,
of political society on benevolence is suicidal; the
only possibility of benevolence being the admission
that something is mine (service or property) which I
may lawfully give, lawfully withhold, but which I
may choose to give if I please, when actuated by
benevolence.*: The question, whether there ought to be any property at all,
is essentially distinguished from the question, What otught to be
property, and whose property ought it to be? The abolition of




256              JUSTICE THE FOUNDATION,
Love, benevolence, charity, fraternity, therefore, cannot enter a  system  of politics.  No human society
could be founded on them  that attempts to regulate
the distribution of natural property, and the allocation
of that increased value which is created by the labor
of individuals.  Love may, to a certain extent, reign
in a family; but in a state composed of a multitude
of independent (although social) individuals, each producing  according  to  his  skill, energy, perseverance,
and accidental opportunities, justice must be the regulative principle, without which the society falls either
under the h*nd of tyranny, or falls into  the equally
destructive condition of anarchy and confusion.
slavery is a question of the destruction of property. Destroy the
property, and the slave is a freeman. This circumstance shows
that there is nothing so very alarming in the terrible phrase, " destruction of property."  It is one question, whether there ought to
be property in the abstract; and another and a very different question, whether the present distribution, enforced by law, is the correct one. For instance, Does the county of Sutherland Ilelons  to
one man, and can he exclude all the rest of the inhabitants, except
from the sea-beach and the king's highway?  The- law says so.
Now, suppose the nation were to revise these laws, and to affirm
that the cultivators, from time immemorial, had quite as good a right
to cultivate, by prescription, as the landlord to receive rent for
which he does not, and never did, labor.  Suppose the nation were
to go further in their revision, and to say, The king's grants of
former times, or any arrangements of former times, do not deprive
us of our right to our native soil. Suppose questions of this kind
to occur. These are all questions of the " destruction of property!" but yet they are essentially different from the abolition of
property. The abolition of property is a chimera; but the revision,
and, to a very large extent, the destruction -that is, the transference- is a tolerable certainty.  [Some, perhaps, might prefer the
term intolerable.]




OF POLITICAL SOCIETY.            257
We posit, therefore, that political society is a society whose essence, end, and intention is to exhibit, in
realization, the principles of equity or justice. And
that'benevolence has nothing whatever to do with
political society, as such, may be proven by the following consideration:We can conceive that intellect should exist, separated from sentiment or passion.  Let us suppose a
nation of intellectual beings, of pure intelligences. It
is evident that these might contemplate and reason,
and that they might attain to truth, but that action
is impossible for them, further than the mere action
of the intellect.  Let us now endow them with the
power of action, with will, passions, and with the
sentiment of justice, but without the sentiment of love
or benevolence. It is evident that they would be able
to perceive, and to carry into practice, the rules of
equity for the regulation of their conduct.  They
would be able to determine that one member had
infringed the rights of another; they would be able to
enforce restitution where an injustice had been committed; but they would be unable even to comprehend what benevolence was, and the giving of property would be absolutely unknown and unintelligible.
This society, nevertheless, would be a political society,
fully and completely. Without even the thought of
benevolence, they could carry justice into universal
operation, and weigh acts with the utmost impartiality; and also they could carry out the laws of justice
with the most scrupulous exactne'ss, neither abating
an atom nor superadding an atom.  Political society,
therefore, could exist, and be regulated by the most
22*




258     C}IARACTER OF PIOITI'JCAL SOCIETY.
strict rules of justice, even where there was not tle
idea or the sentirent of benevolence; and consequently benevolence is not the basis of political society, and ought not to be taken into consideration
whenl we profess, to reason in politics.  It lies beylond
politics, and falls to be considered when the laws of
justice have been fully and completely determined.
Although, however, benevolence has nothing to do
with politics, it has much to do with man. And as it
does lie beyond politics, its laws, whatever they are,
or wherever they may be derived from, will fall to be
considered at some period or other.  Towards them
the world is progressing, and after a reign of justice
there will fall, in necessary order, a reign of benevolence.  T~his is logically necessary.  TV/.hen such a
happy period may come, or whether it may come in
this world, is another question.  But that it follows
as logically as animal physiology follows vegetable
physiology, we believe to be perfectly clear. In former
ages, when love and war were esteemed the highest
pursuits of man by the ignorant and semi-arbrarous,
an age of political economy, like the present, would
have been looked upon with the most unmeasured
contempt as to its character, and the most unmeasured scepticism as to the probability of its occurrence.
From a reign of political economy, however, to a reign
of justice, there is incomparably less distance than
from a reign of barbarous power to a reign of political
economy.  May we not learn from this fact to expand
our minds, and to anticipate, with bright hope, that
the  phases of human  evolution, passing upwards
through the sentiments of man, and exhibiting those




PO.STrJlOn  LIM.AIT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.  259
sentiments one after another as they are of a higher
and a higher character, shall at last present man as
realizing th:e Ihi-hest principles of his nature, and exhibiting in the outward figure of society the manifestation
of those inward principles which mrke man a denizen
of a spiritual world, and link him with the unseen
region of light, and love, and immortality?
But if politics be the science of justice, and justice
does not admit the idea of benevolence, that idea
being necessarily posterior to justice, what is the radical distinction between justice and benevolence, and
where is the line of demarcation that separates them?
That line of demarcation is found in the distinction
between the negative and the positive. All the rules
of justice are radically negative or restrictive, and present themselves in the form, " Thou shalt not do."  All
the rules of benevolence are positive or expansive, and
present themselves under the form, " Thou shalt do, or
thou oughtest to do."
Certain difficulties of language here present themselves, as they do wherever the theory of positive and
negative is involved. A negative proposition may
present itself with the same valid signification under
the form of a positive proposition, and a positive proposition may present itself under the form of a negative
proposition. This is universal. It applies'no more to
politics than it does to logic or mathematics; and
though in those sciences it may cause little practical
difficulty, in politics it may be made the basis of much
unnecessary misunderstanding.
A very simple consideration, however, will place in
a clear enough light the difference between the nega



260   POSTERIOR LIMIT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
tive character of justice, and the positive character of
benevolence.
If all men were socially passive, and did not in any
wise inltefere with each other, there would be the perfection of justices while there might be the total absence
of benevolence.
No rule of justice can ever originate an interference.
All interference based on justice is consequential; that
is, the consequence of a prior act of interference, which
requires to be corrected.  All primary interference,
contrary to the will of the person interfered with, (he
being of sound mind, sober, &c.,) is an injustice; and
though injustice is usually made to imply also some
matter of detriment, pain, or loss, yet this detriment is
not its essential character.  The essential character of
injustice consists in the forcible interference of one
man with another; nor is any man justified in constraining another to receive even a benefit (or what
nine hundred and ninety men out of a thousand would
pronounce a benefit) against his will.  The essential
character of injustice is, the overbearing of one man's
will by another man's force or fraud.  And no rule or
principle of equity  can ever originate such an interference.
The whole scheme of justice, therefore, is essentially
and radically restrictive, and all its positive rules, or
rules which justify or command interference, will be
found to consist of those which justify the restoration
of thinsfrs to that condition in which they would have
been, had there een no interference. That is, whenever
the negative state of non-interference has been departed from, and the equilibrium of equity destroyed,




POSTERIOR LIMIT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.  261
justice furnishes rules for positive interference, whereby
the negative state may be restored, and the equilibrium
of equity reestablished. But this in no wise affects
the assertion, that the principles of justice, and the
scheme of the science, are entirely restrictive; because,
let all society be in the negative state of non-interference, and it would remain so forever, were the rules
of justice attended to.
Benevolence, on the contrary, supposes that men
shall be socially active; not that they shall interfere
with each other without consent, but that they shall
take a constant interest in each other's welfare, and be
ready to offer the helping hand off sympathy when sorrows fall upon their brethren.  Benevolence cannot
infringe justice; it only superadds more than justice
could require.
Such a condition of society, then, as would be compatible with the perfection of justice, might exclude
benevolence altogether.  Consequently, justice and
benevolence  are  radically distinguished from  each
other; and politics, which is the science of justice, is
independent of benevolence.
Here, then, we learn the posterior limit of the science of politics.
Where there is no question of interference between
man and man, there is no question of politics. This
is the anterior limit - that which separates it from all
that comes before it; from  political economy, the
physical sciences, and the mathematical sciences.
And the posterior limit is found in the fact, that the
science is confined exclusively to the exhibition of the
laws relating to such interference as is consequent on




262        POSITION OF POLITICS PROPER.
a departure from the state of non-interference,:lnd to
the exhibition of the laws (intuitions of the reason)
which prohibit all primary interference.  [The latter,
of course, come logically first in the exposition of the
science.]
Having, then, determined the limits of the science
of politics, we affirm (from  the preceding data) that
its position is immediately after the science of political
economy, and that it is followed by the laws of benevolence, wherever these may be derived from.




CHAPTER  III.
ON TH THE THEORY OF MAN'S PRACTICAL
PROGRESSION.
SECTION I. —— OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT, THAT THERE
IS A NATURAL PROBABILITY IN FAVOR OF THE REIGN
OF JUSTICE.
[THIS argument, the outline of which is given in
the present section, is continued to the end of the volurne. It is based upon, -
1. The analysis of the forms of scientific truth, and
the order of the evolution of the sciences.
2. On the abstract forms of man's historic manifestations.
3. On the general arrangement of the component
faculties of man, and the order in which these
come into exercise.]
We have now to make good our argument, that
there is a natural probability in favor of a millennium,
or reign of justice. We assume from  Scripture the
fact that there shall be a millennium; and all we have




264            A REIGN OF JUSTICE,
to do is to point out the natural probability of its occurrence, and the probable mechanism by which that
condition is to be brought about. We treat, therefore,
not of a theological millennium, which may involve
spiritual elements only to be known by the light of
holy Scripture, but of the second causes which, operating in the world, shall at last bring man into the state
most favorable for the operation of Scripture truth. A
scriptural millennium is much more than a mere reign
of justice, although that is a main element; but here
we touch only on that part of the scriptural millennium which involves the improvement of the human
race in those qualities and conditions with which we
are naturally cognizant.
And we affirm that, beyond a doubt, a reign of justice is to be anticipated on the fairest principles of
computation; and that the argument by which it is
established will bear the closest scrutiny of' the impartial reason.  Setting aside Scripture altogether, (if the
expression may be allowed,) we maintain that man
has, within the range of his natural knowledge, sufficient means for determining, that if the course of
human history continue ordinated on the same principles that may be inferred from a consideration of the
past and present, then in the future there must come a
time when justice shall be the regulative principle of
the earth, and man shall carry it into systematic and
universal operation.
And though we advance this argument for political
purposes alone, we esteem it no mean thing that'the
good times of prosperity, graciously revealed in Scripture, are actually borne out to the natural reason of




OR POLITICAL MILLENNIUM.           265
mankind. After all that has been said of the millennium, we cannot help thinking that there is a peculiar
satisfaction in finding that nature, history, and reason
contribute to authenticate the promise. That the more
closely the intellect shall search, and the more widely
it shall extend its views, it shall yet learn more and
more to bow in simple faith before the divine Word,
which, with all its mysteries, does continue to justify
itself in each new view we gain of nature, and to unfold perpetual witness of its own divinity.  Amid the
wreck of empires, the turmoils of society, and the dark
labyrinths of deceiving doctrines, it is pleasant to lay
hold on a clew of hope which leads to better and happier times, and ends at last in a kingdom of righteousness, where they " shall sit under their own vine and
their own fig-tree, none making them afraid."
Let us now endeavor to condense the argument, and
to place it fairly before the understanding.  We believe it valid, and do not fear to present it in its most
naked form.
1st. The progression of humanity is in proportion
to the acquisition of rational knowledge, and the reduction of that knowledge to practical operation.
2d. Rational knowledge is divided into the various
sciences.
3d. A science is composed of nomenclature, (the
name,) description and classification, (the proposition,)
and reasoning, (the syllogism.)
4th. The sciences have among themselves a necessary co6rdination.
5th. The measure of this co6rdination is the relative
23




266               onmDE   OF KNOWLETDG.E.
simplicity or complexity of the objects involved in the
science.
6th. In  classifying  the  sciences, the  most simple
sciences are necessarily placed first, then those that are
more complex, and so forth.
7th. The sciences have a necessary order of chronological discovery.
8th. The order of chronological discovery is coincident with the order of logical classification.
9th. Consequently, if the  logical classification be
satisfactorily achieved, and the whole of the sciences
are not yet evolved, we can predict what the  future
order of discovery will be.
10th. The general groundwork of the classification
of the sciences is as follows  -
I. The abstract sciences, which give the universal
forms  of  rational necessity.  These  are  called  the
mathematical sciences, and they occur necessarily in
the following order:
1.  Logic.'   The  universal form  of  all  science
whatever.
* Logic and statics may or may not be considered as mathematical
sciences, according to the signification given to that term. But this
is a mere question of the use of a name. Logic is purely abstract,
and being the most general form of science, is necessarily anterior
to arithmetic; so that, if the term mathematic be applied to all the
sciences involved in the rational investigation of numbers, quantities, and spaces, logic (or syllogistic) is a mathematical science.
Again, statics superadds to space the concept force, and there are
d priori propositions with regard to force, of a character exactly
similar to the axioms of mathematics; e. g., two equal forces acting




ORDER OF KNOWLEDGE.                     267
2. Arithmetic. Logic applied to numbers.
3. Algebra. Arithmetic applied to quantities.
4. Geometry.  Algebra applied to the forms of space.
5. Statics. Geometry applied to forces.
Internmediate Science.
Dynamics.  Subject, force.  Product, motion.
II. The inorganic physical sciences.
Mechanics.  Phenomena, equilibrium, motion.
The phenomena of solids.'"       "        "~  liquids.
4r"      "'"  gaseous fluids.
44    C4       "4 imponderable fluids.
Magnetism, chemistry, and electricity.  Phenomena,
motion, polarization, formation, combination, and decomposition, &c.
III. The organic sciences.
1st. Botany.  Phenomena,  life, growth, propaga2d. Zo6ology.* J                 tion, &c.
in the same straight line, but in opposite directions, will neutralize
each other. Thus, statics may be considered as that portion of the
general doctrine of force which has an intimate connection with the
sciences of space and quantity; while dynamics may be considered
as more nearly related to the matter sciences. Or a genus may be
made for statics and dynamics, as in the table in the Appendix.
To this genus there can be no objection, when we remember that
science reads nature backwards, and takes the fundamental categories in an inverted order, so that force may be abstracted in thought
from matter.' These we have previously termed vegetable and animal physiology, for the purpose of insisting on the fact, that descriptive botany, descriptive zoology, anatomy, &c., are not sciences. They are
mere classifications and descriptions of objects whosefunctions must
be studied before we have science, properly so called.




268             CORRECT KNO0WLEDGE
IV. Mall science.
Functions.  Action on the external worll.
Action on man, without interference.
Action on man by interference.
Actions towards the divine Being.
The principles of correct action, for the first class of
these functions, are derived from the sciences that precede man science.
The second class of functions gives rise to political
economy, which furnishes the rule of correct action.
The third class to politics.
The fourth class to religion, the scientific groundwork of which is theology.
We posit, then, that human progression is from
logic and the mathematical sciences, through the physical sciences, and up to man science.
In estimating human progression as a fact, we can
only study it as it has manifested itself since the
schoolmen, by the adoption of a rational organon,
began to lay anew the foundation principles of human
credence, and to develop  the general doctrine of
method.  The schoolmen (notwithstanding the contempt so superfluously heaped on their memory) are
undoubtedly the genuine founders of modern science;
and Aristotle is the grand master of that association,
whose object is to achieve a scheme of rational truth
which shall be the same  for all human intellect,
wherever that intellect can comprehend it. Ontology
and logic are necessarily anterior to the sciences of
number, quantity, and space; and though the schoolmen attempted to carry their method into regions




PRODUCES CORRECT ACTION.         269
where it was not applicable, they went no farther
astray in so doing than the sensationalists, who apply
the method of matter to the phenomena of mind, and
thereby attempt to obliterate all morals.
WVe ask, then, in what way knowledge tends to
improve the condition of man upon the globe?
Correct knowledge is the only means whereby correct action can be performed. In advancing, therefore,
the probability of a millennium in politics, we must,
of course, imply that a millennium  in other departments has actually taken place, or is now taking place.
And this we do. The definition of a millennium is,
for us, not any period of time, but a period of truth
discovered and reduced to practice. And consequently,
when we speak of a political millennium, we speak of
a period when political truth shall be discovered" and
be reduced to practice; and such a period we maintain to be within the bounds of rational anticipation.
Let us reflect that the constitution -of man, and the
earth on which he is placed, permits of possible conditions. Some conditions are bad, some better, and
some are the best that can exist with such an earth
and such inhabitants. No person can, for a moment,
maintain that man has achieved the best conditions of
which the terrestrial economy (including the inhabitants of the globe) is capable. No cotuntry, no tribe,
no nation, can lay claim to the honor of having placed
itself in the best conditions which Providence had
allowed it to enjoy. Now, in speaking of a millennium, we pronounce nothing whatever on the absolute
amount of evil that is or is not inseparable from man.
All we contend for is, that man is continually pro.
23*




270                 CORRECT ACTION
gressing towards the best conditions that the terrestrial
economy renders possible, and that the day will come
when his political condition shall be perfected, on the
same principles that he perfects his other conditions.
Knowledge is the only means given to man to evolve
correct action, and correct action is the only means
whereby the best condition can be attained.  And this
principle is common to every branch of knowledge.
Let a political millennium then mean, the best political condition to which man can attain.  A political
millennium cannot mean more than this.
A political millennium, then, will take place whenever political truth is discovered and reduced to practice.  We do not say what is political truth, or what
is not political truth; but merely determine the general
conditions of what we mean by a political millennium.
And we affirri that, according to the past progression of mankind in other departments of knowledge
and of action, there are good grounds for believing that
political truth shall be discovered and reduced to practice.  In so doing, we treat political science, not as a
mystery which refuses to be reduced to system, and
which would thereby justify those who appeal to necessity, (whatever course they take,*) but as one of the
* When an action is so utterly defenceless that no reason can be
alleged in its favor, its abettors usually fall back on necessity. "It
is true the thing might not be quite right; but, after all, you must
allow it to have been necessary." Such is a concise summary of the
political reasonings of a class. As if any thing could be necessary
whereby we interfered with others, unless it were based on the most
clear and indisputable rational truth. As an instance, we give the
following paragraph: -




PRODUCES THE BE;NEFICIAL CONDITION.    271
sciences which it behoves mani to study, exactly in the
same manner that he would study dynamics, or any
other branch of knowledge.
Whatever may be the mat/l r of political truth, and
whatever may  be the condition  of society  that expresses that truth in outward manifestation, we have
only to consider the sphere of political truth to determine that it is as much within man's reach as truth in
any other department.
What, in fact, is the problem  of politics?   To discover the  laws which  should  regulate  men  in  the
matter of interference.  When those laws are discovered, political truth  is  discovered.   Now, notwithstanding  the perpetual misconception  of the nature
of political science, arising from the fact that it is
almost invariably  confounded  with  government, the
right to govern, the king's zmcjesty, the authority of the
sovereign, and  the  other superstitious  devices  by
"'The Solas RemoveIis. -It was previously stated that Lord
Macdonald had desired the removal of his smaller tenantry from
the Solas district.  WTe have since learned that the people are to
remain over the winter, on condition of emigrating in the spring
of next year. They have given up their stock, and Lord Macdonald allows them to remain in their houses, retaining also their
grain and potato crops, a cow to supply milk, and a garron or horse
to convey their winter peats. The destitute are to be supplied
with meal and clothes, and all arrears of rent are abandoned.
We have no wish in any way to encourage wholesale clearances,
and sincerely regret that Lord Mwacdonald should find it necessary
to remove large bodies of an attached tenantry; but where the
means of emigration are provided for a depressed, poverty-stricken,
and almost starving community, the true philanthropist will not
be in haste to censure.  This is the case in Solas."  Inverness
Courier.




272 ANTICIPATION OF A POLITICAL MILLENNIUM.
which men impose on themselves from the force of
habit, what reason can possibly be alleged for asserting that the laws which should regulate men in the
matter of interference, are not as much within the
reach of the human intellect as the laws which should
regulate the merchant in carrying on his commercial
transactions?
But while we anticipate that the day will come
when political truth shall be discovered, and be as
generally acknowledged as truth in any other science,
it is important to apprehend the reason why political
truth has not yet assumed a systematic form.
If man progress in knowledge from the more simple
to the more complex,-and there can be no doubt
that he does progress according to this law,-it is
plainly evident that man, being the most complex of
all the objects that inhabit the earth, must be the last
whose phenomena are subjected to analysis.  Let the
sciences be classed as they may, man, cand manz's functions, must always be placed at the extreme end of the
scale of natural knowedge; and, consequently, it is no
wonder that man science is not completed, when men
are only approaching the completion of matter science.
Man first evolves logic and the mathematical sciences, then the inorganic physical sciences, then the
organic physical sciences, and, last of all, he makes
man his intellectual object, and endeavors to discover
the laws of his functions. No matter how long or
how short a time may be employed in the evolution,
this is the necessary order in which the discovery of
science must take place. And it would be quite as absurd for us now to affirm that politics cannot assume




ANTICIPATION OF A POLITICAL MILLENNIUM. 273
exactly the same form  and certainty as the other
sciences, as it would have been for men to affirm that
chemistry could not reach its present perfection when
their attention was devoted to mechanics, and the
"region  of chemistry was occupied  by  groundless
superstition.
But while we affirm  that political science cannot
fail to be reduced to such an unobjectionable system
as shall command the assent of the unprejudiced
intellect, we have yet to look back on the operation
of scientific truth, and to observe how the mere dogma
becomes transformed into an external reality - how
the mere proposition, which the intellect apprehends,
becomes the means of vast achievement, and of vast
benefit to the race of man.
It has been well said that "error is the cause of
human misery;" and as surely may it be said that
knowledge is the antidote of error, and the means of
man's redemption from  misery.  And though it is
true that religion is the cause of individual regeneration, and the true and main cause of man's progression towards good, we must not, on that account,
neglect the study of the mechanism of progression, or
fail to note the route by which man must pass in his
upward and onward progress.  It is true that the
Christian religion is what makes men progress; it
gives the impulse, but it does not describe the various
steps of the course which the human race must take
in its passage to an equitable condition of society.
The steps of that course, so far as the race is concerned, must be looked for in the evolution of the
sciences one after another.  And each new science is




274  ANTICIPATION  OI A POLITICAL MIILLENNIUM.
not only a revelation to the intellect, but a new  power
for performing things which could not otherwise have
been done; in fact, a new  sceptre for man to rule the
world, and to bend its elements in obedience to his
will.*
* "It is never expected, and indeed it is not possible, that the
mass of mankind should be acquainted with the process by which
any kind of investigation whatever is carried on. The search after
truth - even the truths of the phenomenal world -is a process to
them  completely enveloped in darkness; all they have to do is to
reap the practical fruits of any discovery when it is made, without
casting one single thought upon the steps by which others have
arrived at it. If we look for a moment at the law by which thought
is propagated, we find that it always descends from the highest
order of thinkers to those who are one degree below them. From
these, again, it descends another degree, losing, at each step of the
descent, something more of the scientific form, until it reaches the
mass in the shape of some admitted fact, of which they feel there
is not a shadow of doubt; — a fact which rests on the authority of
what all the world above them  says, and which, therefore, they
receive, totally regardless of the method of its elucidation. Take,
for example, any great fact, or law of nature, ascertained by means
of physical science.  Such a fact is, first of all, perchance, wrung
from the most close and laborious mathematical analysis. A few,
perhaps, may take the trouble to follow every step of this process;
but the mass, even of natural philosophers themselves, are content
to see what is the method of investigation, to copy the formulas in
which it results, and then put it down as so much further accession
to their physical science. The mass of intelligent, educated minds,
again, with a general idea only of mathematical analysis, accept
the fact or law we are now supposing, as one of the many beautiful
results of investigations which they acknowledge to be far beyond
the reach of their own powers; and from them, lastly, it descends
to the rest of the conmmuityv as a bare fiact, which they appropriate
to their own use, simply as being a universally acknowledged
truth." -MoRl,'s lHist. JMod. Philosophy — introduction.




INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.          275
Let us again repeat, that knowledge is the only
means given to man to evolve correct action; and
that correct action is the only means whereby man
can evolve a correct, and consequently beneficial, condition.  Let us also note well, that knowledge does
not admit of diversity of opinion; that where knowledge is really attained and properly substantiated,
uniformity of credence is its constant and necessary
result; and, consequently, wherever we find diversity
of opinion, we have a region where knowledge is not
yet attained, or where it has not yet met with general
acceptance.
Let us now ask, What is the essence of that ultimate condition of man, expressed for brevity's sake by
the word millennium?  A period when truth is discovered, acknowlecdged, and carried into practical operation.
In so far as the millennium is a religious millennium,
it is a period when religious truth? shall be discovered,
acknowledged, and carried into practical operation.
And in so far as it is a political millennium, it is
a period when political truth shall be discovered, acknowledged, and carried into practical operation. And
so forth for every other branch of knowledge that is
capable of being reduced to practice.
The Sacred Scriptures, it is well known, do not
teach man science, nor do they even advert to some
of the very greatest earthly consequences that flow
from  their acceptance.  The Scriptures, in a most
remarkable manner, confine themselves to religion.
Their tendency is moral, not intellecttual.  As much as
is required to convey the moral teaching is explicitly
declared; but the most remarkable silence is pre



276         INFLUENCE OF ClJRTSTIANITY.
served on many questions of the most intense interest,
apparently for the very purpose of never allowing
man's attention to be diverted, even for a moment,
from  the mighty purpose for which they were sent.
Their province is eternity; and the things of time are
apparently referred to only as they stand connected
with man's eternal welfare.  Let us take two circumstances alone to illustrate our position.  In every
region of the earth where Christianity has not prevailed, woman has more or less been looked upon as
inferior to man, and in some regions has been reduced
to absolute degradation. Christianity has everywhere
restored woman to her moral equality with man; and
it is questionable whether man has not been even the
greatest gainer by the change.  Again: slavery-or
the subjugation of man to man, and the transformation of man fiom  a being~ into a thing —has been
almost universal.  WVherever Christianity has prevailed, slavery has gradually disappeared; and there
cannot be the slightest doubt that the prevalence of
Bible religion will ultimately obliterate every remnant
of slavery from  the face of the earth. Enough has
been already done to assure us of this unmistakable
tendency of Jible religion; and though a corrupted
Christianity may yet tolerate the abomination, there
need be no hesitation in regarding the freedom of man
and the emancipation of the slave as the necessary
attendants which, sooner or later, will every where
follow the accep-tance of the gospel.'
For a chnimacter of s.l.vcholldinlo religion, s0;  "The Life of
Frederick Douglass," written by himself.




THE MILLENNIUM OF SCRIPTURE.        277
And if we calmly consider the magnitude of these
two social changes, can we estimate their importance,
or match them by any other two changes which have
taken place in the condition of mankind? Take the
first alone-the emancipation of woman, and her
restoration to that place Xwhich the divine Being designed her to occupy as tfi companion and helpmeet
for man. And all this man owes to Christianity.
It was not vman's doing. It was God's Word that
wrought the change. And yet, where in the whole
record of revelation can we point to a single passage
that affirms that such a change would follow the acceptance of the gospel?  It is, in fact, the greatest
change that has ever taken place in man's domestic
condition. If it were possible to allow nman to remain
as he is, and to return woman to her inferiority and
degradation, how long could society remain? Virtue
would forsake mankind, and Heaven would hide its
face and its favor from the injustice. The good elements of society would at once disappear, and the
corrupted mass, putrefying, would return to its base
and earthly elements.  And yet, if we search Scripture, we shall find only the principles of the great
change, and not one single prediction of its occurrence.
And so with slavery.  So little does the letter of
Scripture pronounce judgment on the iniquity, that
churches have not been wanting which dared to advance Scripture arguments for its justification.'  And
yet who can doubt that the spirit of Chritt's holy
religion is certain, wherever it prevails, to emancipate
* See " Chambers's Tract on Slavery." Edinburgh.
24




278        THE MILLENNIUM OF SCRIPTURE.
the slave, and to reinstate him  in all those natural
rights which, as a moral, intellectual, and religious
being, are his birthrights, necessary to be preserved to
enable him to fulfil the destiny of responsibility?
And so with the millennium.  Scripture holds out
the promise of a religious millennium; but can we
suppose that the period of bessedness will not involve
much more than is apparent on the page of Holy
Writ?  Is it at all illegitimate to infer, that natural
truth shall have received a vast expansion; that there
shall be a' millennium of the intellect —a completion
of the process of continual discovery; and, instead,
only a process of continual adaptation? Is the field
of intellectual research a field where continual warfare
must be waged, where conquest after conquest leaves
yet as much to conquer?  Or is the march of human
knowledge not rather the journey from  the land of
darkness?  Is not this the time of the exodus? and
may we not surely look forward to the period when
the intellect, entering into the promised land of truth,
shall journey no longer forward, but rest in the rich
enjoyment of her sanctuary?
Such we maintain to be the case (not from Scripture, for Scripture is silent on these points, but) from
the past progress of nankind, and from  the present
elements at work in a direction that cannot be mistaken.  Scripture posits a religious millennium  as a
fact, and in Scripture that period appears isolated,
if we may so speak.  It appears separated from the
anterior periods of history. It does not seem to follow
as a natural consequence from  the times which precede it.  Its preparation is, at best, but slightly alluded




THE MIILLENNIUMI OF SCRIPTURE.        279
to; and, though we are told that knowledge shall be
increased, we are by no means explicitly informed
what kind of knowledge that is, or what are to be its
effects.  And why, we may ask, does Scripture confine itself to such narrow bounds?  Can we not see
the very same principle pervading this portion of
Scripture that pervades so many others; namely, that
Scripture confines its declarations to the religious part
of the predicted period, leaving it to man to discover
for himself all the other concomitants, all the natural
accessories, which are within the range of reason, and
which man may estimate with some good degree of
probability?
On this ground we maintain, that although the
millennium  in one sense may be an isolated period,
essentially different from all we know of the earth's
past history; yet, in another sense, it is t period for
which preparations are continually going on; and if
we conceive it to include the discovery and reduction
to practice of natural knowledge, as well as of religious
knowledge, then the natural portion of the millennium
has already commenced, and we may expect it to grow
more and more apparent at every future period of
the earth's history. In fact, the religious millennium
would in that case be only the completion of a series,
the perfection of an evolution that had been going on
for centuries, the final addition of the spiritual element
over and above all that man could achieve for himself
by the exercise of his unaided powers.*  And when
Of course we speak here, not of the nature of the religious
millennium, not of its internal qualities, but of its external characteristic; that it is a period of the reign of religion, following the




280           THE MILLENNIUM  OF NATURE.
we reflect that Scripture confines itself to that spiritual
element alone, we need not be surprised that the millennium, as there presented, should appear much more
isolated than it could possibly be in reality from all
those  improvements  in  man's  terrestrial  condition,
which could not fail to accompany the universal prevalence of Christian piety.
A  millennium, then, is a  condition  of society in
which man shall evolve the maximum  of good by acting correctly. And man can act correctly only where he
has acquired knowledge.  If, then, wye have a scheme,
according to which knowledge must' be acquired, we
have the means of estimating the order in which the
natural portions of the millennium  must be successively unfolded.
" Knowledge is power," power to turn the earth to
better and better account; and thereby continually
to improve the condition of man upon the globe.  The
development of natural truth. In its internal details, it may be a
period when man shall act on religious motive to an extent altogether inconceivable in the present day. But in its character, as a
fact, it appears to be the last final termination of the progress that
man can make on earth. It is, in fact, the completion of human
evolution. And the completion of human evolution takes place
logically, whenever the human race acts systematically under the
influence of the highest sentiments of human nature. Whenever
the highest sentiments of human nature are systematically the
springs of human action, man has completed his possible progress,
he has fulfilled his destiny, (we do not say his diuty,) he can rise no
higher, he can do no more, until the Creator, renewing man's
spiritual nature, and abolishing the evil character of the desires,
shall emancipate the soul from sin, and restore the fieedom that
was lost by man's transgression, and repurchased by the merits of
the divine Redeemer.




THE MILLENNIUM OF NATURE.         281
moment, then, we ascertain the order in which knowledge must be acquired, we learn the scheme of human
improvement, and ascertain the general outline of his
course, in his passage from ignorance, poverty, and,depravity, towards knowledge, prosperity, and virtuous
action.
All that we have professed to do, was to point out
the probability of a political millennium; that is, we
have endeavored to show, that if man progress in
future, according to the scheme that has regulated his
past progress, there will come a time when political
truth shall be discovered, acknowledged, and reduced
to practical operation.
But to confine ourselves to this view alone, would
be to take a very limited survey of the course and
mechanism of human improvement.
A political millennium will come, but it will come
only because it forms a portion of the still greater
scheme of human improvement -of the more general
millennium, that involves all human knowledge and
all human operation.
The natural millennium, whose probability we
maintain to be within the reach of human computation, although more especially to be desired in the
region of politics, extends equally to all the sciences,
and to every department of man's systematic action.
Nor could a political millennium take place without
being preceded by certain knowledge and certain
conditions, independent, it is true, of political science,
but necessarily anterior and preparatory to the complete evolution of a reign of justice.
When we reflect that the essence of a millennium
24 




282      TI-E REVELATION THIOUGI  NATURE.
is, " truth discovered and carried into practical operation," we have generalized a term applied in Scripture
to a period w-hen reliTiogus truth shouldc be discovered,
acknowledged, and reduced to practical operation.
Consequently, wherever we  lhave tru'Zth discozered
and ccar',ied into practical operation, we have a millennium in thiat department of knowledoge.
Therefore, the past history of human progress must
supply us with the begiinins of the natural millenniumz; and these beginnings we must look fbr int the
sciences that have been already discovered and redaced
to practice.
Let it never be forgotten that there is but one truth,
and all truth is the expression of the divine wisdom,
and the revelation of the divine character and will. All
truth is in fact divine.  There is not one Deity of Scripture, and another Deity of Nature.  Nor can we for a
moment coincide with that kind of separation, which
some appear anxious to establish, between the revelation in words and the revelation in realities.  Both are
expressions of the divine intentions, both are revelations
of our Creator, both are intended for our guidance and
instruction, and both are capable of enlightening man,
although not in the same department, nor to the same
extent.  Admitting  all that scriptural theology can
teach, there is still a revelation through nature, which
we may neglect, it is true, but which we can only
neglect to our own detriment, as it is the expression
of divine wisdom  manifesting itself through actual
works, and displaying before our eyes the reitl exemplification of the abstract principles which, by the same
hand, had been impressed upon our reason.




NATURAL'TRUTH, DIVINE EFFECTS OF SCIENCE. 283
All science, therefore, is divine, and divine, not in
the sense of pantheism, but in the sense of its being
the correlative object created in harmony with the human reason.  Science is the object of reason, and,reality is the object of science; and both reason and
reality are the productions of the divine Creator.
Error and superstition are human; they belong to
fallen humanity; they are not divine; they form  no
part of the-original constitution of the earth; they are
darkness, not light. But true knowledge is God's intention; for that purpose the intellect of man was
made.  Reason, on the one hand, and reality on the
other, are the correlatives of creation, and science is
the middle term  that unites them; reality giving the
matter of science, and reason giving the form.  Knowledge, therefore, is the divine intention; and all the
sciences may be viewed, not as human acquisitions,
but as fulfilments of the divine purpose in creating an
intellect to comprehend, and an object to be comprehended. Religion in the individual may exist without
a particle of science; but can it be maintained, for a
moment, that the race of man can reach its highest
condition, and achieve its highest destiny, without becoming acquainted with those natural truths in which
practical cornsequences of the most important kind are
necessarily implicated?
Let us, then, conclude that all scientific truth is divine, (or, if that term appear too strong, let us say that
all scientific truth is the natural intention of the Creator of our system,) that it is the intellect of the creature apprehending correctly the divine arrangements
of the created. Natural science is the apprehension




284           INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE.
of the divine wisdom and power, as St. Paul himself
teaches us, -" For the invisible things of him from
the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal
power and Godhead; so that they are without ex'cuse:
because that, when they knew God, they glorified him
not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in
their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened." - Epistle to Romans, 1st chapter.
Immediately, then, that we admit science to be not
merely human, science acquires a new character. It
becomes the exponent of humanity, and points out the
order of human progression. We have here a sure
basis of operation, a foundation on which the reason
may at last rest in constructing its philosophy of man.
Science is stable. It shifts not with opinion, and
changes not with lapse of ages. Were all knowledge
obliterated, and man to begin to-morrow a new course
of research, he could come only to the same truths and
to the same sciences; and those sciences would evolve
in a similar order, were the experiment to take place a
hundred or a thousand times.
SECTION II.-THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE ON MAN'S
TERRESTRIAL CONDITION.
ADMITTING, then, the divinity of science, in so far as
science has been really ascertained, we revert to its
connection with man's practical function, and inquire




SENSATION AND REASON.           285
how the dogma of knowledge is efficient to produce
an amended condition of man upon the globe.
Every science has a millennium; that is, a period
when its truths are discovered, acknowledged, and carried into practical operation.
First coine the mathematical sciences. These, as
mere exercises of the intellect, are by no means of a
high character. They are little more, in fact, than
mechanical reasonings, mere methods of computation
performed by the aid of signs. The discovery of the
methods has, no doubt, called forth some of the highest exercises of human genius; but genius looks beyond the mere computation of numbers, quantities,
and spaces.
When we turn, however, to the application of the
mathematical sciences, their influence in enlightening
mankind is of the very highest order. Identity, equality, number, quantity, space, and force, mere abstractions of the reason, become fundamental elements of
knowledge, by which the observed realities of nature
are made to function in man's intelligent apprehension.
Sensational observation furnishes only the very smallest part even of physical science. Strictly speaking,
observation furnishes only a momentary image or
impression, or a succession of momentary images or
impressions. No man ever observed motion. He observes successively in time material substantives in successive positions in space; but the motion he never did
observe, and never can observe. Let materialists or
sensationalists reason as they may, they cannot tell
what physical properties motion has. It has no color,
no taste, no smell, no sound; it cannot be felt or




286             REASON POSITS POWER.
appreciated by the senses, and to the sensationalist it
has no existence.  It is a word he has no right to use;
but use it he must, and in so doing he borrows it from
the intellectualist.*  And so with force.  Force is inappreciable by sense.  Sense never saw  force, never
felt it, and never can assign one single tensational
property to it.  It is posited by the reason; and the
moment we become sensationalists, we should drop
the word and the concept as chimeras of human invention.  And, in so doing, we must drop the science of
dynamics.  No greater absurdity was ever imposed on
man, nothing  was ever more frantically  credulous,
nothing that the wildest superstition ever raved in its
most intense moments of insane imagination, was
more utterly contrary to man's universal experience,
and man's universal reason, than the attribution of all
man's knowledge to sense.  Nor can we approve of
those arguments which  drag the question into the
region of theology.  That is not its region.  The
battle cannot be fought there till won in another field.
It must be fought as a question of philosophy in the
region of dynamics; for if once we substantiate power,
and can show a science of force, and perform  with
that science of force rational operations whose conclusions are verified in nature, and predict by its aid
- It is one of the changes which the reason includes in the general lvw, (necessary form of thought,) "Every change must have a
cause."  This is the condition under which man thinks. He may
deny the proposition, or mystify it, from his inability to appreciate
mental phenomena; but it is as much a condition of his thought
while engaged in the denial, as it is while engaged in its admission
In mechanics, the change is motion, the cause is force.




ASTRONOMY,  GEOGRAPHY, NAVIGATION.        287
far-off truths only to occur in reality years after the
rational calculation has been made, we have grounded
the validity of the reason, and proven beyond dispute
its undoubted right to substantiate things hidden from,sense, and forever beyond the reach of sensational
apprehension.*
But if sense furnish so little in a science, mind, must
furnish' all that is not mere momentary impression;
and the rational operations of mind, applied to the
material realities of nature, are expressed in the mathematical sciences when they are brought to bear on
physical nature, and to lend the aid of their computing
power to systematize the impressions of the senses.
Number, quantity, space, and force, (essentially nonphysical concepts,) are absolutely necessary for the
formation of physical science; and all the observations
that man could make would be forever dog's views
of nature, were it not for the introduction of those
rational elements which tear the veil from  the world
of matter, and lay bare the mysteries of its divine
arrangement.
When man has evolved the mathematical sciences
and dynamics, he has acquired a vast power over the
world of matter; not merely a power of intellectual
apprehension, but, over and above, a power of action
-a power to perform  things which react intensely
on his own social condition, and place him  on an entirely different footing as regards his relations to the
* " The most certain method that can guide us in the research
of truth consists in rising, by induction, from phenomena to laws,
and from laws to forces." — LAPLACE, Essai Philosophique sur les
Probabilitds.




288     ASTRONOMY) GEOGRAPHY, NAVIGATION.
material universe.. His observations, without the mathematical sciences, go for little or nothing. He can
neither number, nor measure, nor compute; and without measurement, his observations are mere sensations.
We shall remark only one or two of the effects of
the mathematical sciences.  The first great achievement, and one whose importance to the world is beyond all human calculation, is "the determination of
the physical character of man's hbme or residence in
space."  Astronomy and general geography are the
results. Now, passing over all that could be called
mere knowledge, let us look to two practical effects,
which forever place the practical influence of the mathematical sciences on man's condition, altogether beyond the power of question -~navigation  and the
measurement of time. Navigation is possible without
astronomical observation, or tt least with the very
rudest elements of observation.  The Northmen were
no doubt in the habit of sailing to America (Vinland)
five hundred years before Columbus; and that they
navigated all the European seas, from Iceland to Italy,
is proven by abundant evidence. But what comparison can be established between such navigation, and
that which now is one of the most powerful of all
agents for the civilization of the earth?  Such navigation was an adventure, not an occupation. And the
wonder is, how even the boldest, hardiest, and most
daring of all races should have undertaken such enterprises. No one can for a moment believe that such
navigation as now takes place could possibly have
arisen without a knowledge of astronomy and geography, or could possibly be continued were the astro



MEASUREMENT OF TIME.            289
nomical elements to be dropped. The navigation of
the Northmen was an adventure, and it ceased because
it was an adventure. It had no systematic knowledge
at the bottom of it, showing how the thing that had
been done once could be done again. It passed away,
and even the discovery of the western continent, with
which they had traded, was all but forgotten. But
can any one suppose, that so long as the present
knowledge remains, navigation could again cease, or
be confined to coasting expeditions?  ~Were all the
ships in the world destroyed, a few years only could
elapse before the ensign of England would wave in
the breeze of every navigable latitude; and the speedy
reparation of the great catastrophe would only show
the power that man has acquired from knowledge.
Between the navigation of former times and the navigation of the present day, there is much the same difference that there is between Alexander's expedition to
India and the unromantic overland journey, reduced to
a monthly question of pounds, shillings, and pence.
Closely connected with navigation, and extending
its influence throughout all civilized society, is the
measurement of time. The measurement of time is in
fact the measurement of the motions of the heavenly
bodies. The firmament in one sense is a great clock,
with a very singular dial, and a very curious method
of notation. Let it stop, and all means of measuring
time accurately, and of being sure that our measurements are correct, fade away forever. And who can
estimate the practical influence on the world of the
measurement of time?
Geography, astronomy, the measurement of time,
25




290        APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS.
and systematic navigation, laid the foundation for the
general civilization of the world. And one circumstance we may remark connected with ocean locomotion-the most advanced nations in the world will
always be those who navigate the most; and, consequently, advancement, improvement, civilization,
knowledge, and  art, will always be disseminated
through navigation.- No instance can be adduced of
barbarous nations navigating to a great extent, while
at the same time more advanced nations did not
navigate.  Those who have navigated, in all ages,
have been those who were full of life, energy, resolution, and progress.  The advanced nations are the
goers, the less advanced nations are the stayers at
home.  Sloth and barbarism are essentially stationary;
energy and civilization are essentially expansive, cosmopolitan, and progressive.  One circumstance alone
shows us that navigation is essential to the regeneration of the earth.  The one true religion never could
be propagcated throughout the world, as there is no doubt
it will be at some fJture period, without navigation.
But to what does man owe geography, astronomy,
the measurement of time, and systematic navigation?
To the application of the mathematical sciences to the
observed conditions of material nature.
Now, although the term may be new, and by some
may be considered objectionable, we do not hesitate
to speak of a mathematical millennium.   A mathematical millennium takes place when mathematical truth
is discovered, and reduced to practical operation.
Mathematical science is the foundation of man's intellectual and practical progress, and the region of




MECIANICS AND LOCOMOTION.        291
mathematics is the first region in which a natural
millennium takes place.  Without mathematics we
have no astronomy, no geography, no measurement
of time, and no systematic navigation, worthy of the
name. That is, we have in those departments ignorance or superstition, instead of knowledge.
Next to a mathematical millennium is a mechanical
millennium. And here we leave the knowledge, and
turn only to the action, and to the consequent condition of man. The mathernatical sciences are absolutely essential to the evolution of mechanics, and
mechanical knowledge is absolutely necessary to enable man to turn the earth to the best account. One
of the first great spheres of mechanical operation
is "locomotion."  The mathematical sciences teach
men how to navigate, in what direction to go, how
to make maps and charts, how to determine the
locality of towns, capes, reefs, ships, &c., &c.  But
the mathematical sciences do not teach how to make
ships. They help, but they do not complete. The
properties of matter are involved, and these must be
ascertained by observation.
The improvement of locomotion is one of the first
essentials in the progression of mankind, and we
might almost measure the relative advancement of
nations by the condition of their means of locomotion.
Advantages of the highest importance to man's intellectual and moral welfare are involved in facilitating
locomotion; and every obstacle placed by governments
in the way of perfectly free locomotion, is a barrier
erected to defer the advance of civilization. It is a
clog placed by ignorant despotism on the emancipa



292           MECHANICS AND LOCOMOTION.
tion of mankind, not merely from  political thraldom,
but also from  natural ignorance and natural degradation. It is a crime, not merely against the individual,
but against humanity itself.   And whoever has the
power, has the most undoubted right to break down
every such barrier as a duty to his race.  Political
freedom, in this respect, however, is not the only essential; we must also have the mechanical facility.*
Let us consider that the earth, as constituted, permits only of locomotionmunder certain conditions.   It
is possible for man to have a maximum  of locomotive
facility. A certain speed will be found beyond which
we lose in safety, and below which we lose in celerity
* While mentioning locomotion, it is, perhaps, impossible to refrain from remembering the late Mr. Waghorn, (with whose name
the title of lieutenant appears like that of exciseman in connection
with the name of one Robert Burns,) as brave a heart and as true
a genius as England has seen for many a long day. Mr. Waghorn
was the Napoleon of communication; and when those who did not
reward him have been long forgotten, his name will appear as one
of those heroes to whom the world owes its progress. It is sickening to think that Waghorn should have died as he did, overborne
by the material cares of this life; but when prime ministers, and
first lords of the admiralty, and chartered East India companies,
shall be mere matters of history, the name of Waghorn will appear
with those of Eric the Red, and Marco Paolo, and Christopher Columbus, and Richard Chancellor, and La Salle, and Brindley, and
Watt, and Telford, and those other heroes who have bequeathed
the world's good, by stamping the impress of their genius on the
destinies of humanity. To think that the wealth of England should
have bowed before a Hudson, and brought rich offerings to the shrine
of pampered sycophancy, and yet should have seen a brave man
end as did Waghorn, when a few thousands might have gladdened
the last days of the intrepid Englishman!  But enough — he will
not be forgotten.




MACHINERY.                   293
without gaining in safety.  And this applies to all
systems of locomotion. The problem, then, is to discover the best system; that which combines the maximum of celerity with the minimum of danger.  And
when we have made as near an approach to this as
the circumstances of the earth permit of, we have a
locomotive millennium.'
All engineering is nothing more than the application of mathematics and mechanics to the world of
matter. Roads, bridges, canals, ships, harbors, docks,
railroads, tunnels, steam engines, steam vessels, steam
locomotives, &c. &c., are the products of mathematics
and mechanics.  Man, with these, is man armed with
the powers of nature.  He has vanquished his opponent, and enlisted her forces in his service.  Matter is
no longer the object that opposes him, but the arsenal
from  which he draws his weapons and his stores.
Coal and water become concentrated forces, whose
powers he may develop and control for the extension
of his dominion over nature, and for the improvement
of his terrestrial condition.  One single steam engine
constructed by mankind is of more real importance
than all the powers of Rome, and one single printing
press than all the arts of Greece. They are powers,
prodigious powers, placed at man's disposal. They
are products of the reason; and just as reason learns
to see farther and farther into the processes of nature,
Letters, newspapers, &c., are entirely dependent on the means
of locomotion; and who can possibly estimate the influence of
postal communications on the civilization and advancement of
mankind? But even the prodigies of steam have been eclipsed by
the electric telegraph.
25*




294           CHEMISTRY AND ELECTRICITY.
so does man acquire new power for extracting welfare
from  the earth.
Again: man makes a few observations oil the phenomena of light; these he geometrizes.  He makes a
few observations on the power of various substances
to modify the phenomena;  and what is the result?
He produces the telescope, which extends his vision
to a distance altogether inconceivable; and the microscope, which reveals the minute operations of organic
nature.*
And if we  turn  to  chemistry, shall we find  the
practical effects of science one atom less important, or
one atom  less remarkable?  What are the metals, and
where do they come from?  WVhat is gas? that great
moralizer of modern  cities, more powerful than  all
police could be.  Mechanics and chemistry furnish us
with an endless variety of substances, and an endless
variety of productions, all tending to give man more
power, more leisure, more comfort; to make him  in
fact more free, and  to elevate  his position  on the
* "In order to enumerate only a few of the instruments whose
invention characterizes great epochs in the history of civilization,
I would name the telescope, and its too long-delayed connection
with instruments of measurement; the compound microscope, which
furnishes us with the means of tracing the conditions of the process
of development of organs, which Aristotle gracefully designates as'the formative activity of the source of being;' the compass, and
the different contrivances invented for measuring terrestrial magnetism; the use of the pendulum as a measure of time; the barometer; the thermometer; hygrometric and electrometric apparatuses;
and the polariscope, in its application to the phenomena of colored
polarization in the light of the stars, or in luminous regions of the
atmosphere." - HUMBOLDT'S Cosmos, p. 473.




THE SOII AND ITS PRODUCTIONS.        295
globe. Instead of being the slave of physical nature,
science wsill make man its master, as the Creator
intended him  to be when he gave him  an earthly
dominion.
Electricity, again, has already achieved its wonders; and though we may expect many more practical
effects, we have enough to prove that this science,
which some years since was a plaything, is a mighty
agent that endows man with power which, even a
century since, would have been regarded as indubitably magical.  The very circumstance that man can
now communicate with man almost instantaneously,
although separated by the breadth' of a kingdom,
ought to teach us that time and space, the former
tyrants of mankind, may be overcome by means
whose simplicity is, at least, as extraordinary as their
power.
Nor, if we turn to vegetable physiology, are the
practical effects that the advance of knowledge entails
for man's benefit one hair's breadth less extraordinary.
A few observations are made on the growth of plants,
on the disposition of the soils, on the effect of moisture, and on the relation of surface water to the
productions of the agriculturist.  Certain reasonings
are made, and certain experiments, to prove whether
the reasonings are correct.  The practical result, at
last, is a general system of drainage, whiclh transforms
wretched pastures into fertile cornfields, and in many
cases doubles, trebles, and quadruples the value of the
produce. To countries like England, Scotland, and
Ireland, thi  practical importance of this draining
system  is immense.  These countries have, within




296              TENURE OF LAND.
themselves, an almost indefinite power of creating
agricultural wealth; and, so far from being in danger
of a superabundant population, they could, in ten
years, with a tenth part of the annual expenditure of
the kingdom on unnecessary armaments, so outrun the
increase of the population, that it would be unnecessary to import one single grain of corn. Far more
than this is within the limit of possibility, and it is
only necessary to ascertain the progress made by
Scotland within the memory of the present generatiWn
of agriculturists, to be convinced that the natural
capabilities of the soil of Britain are abundantly sufficient for all its inhabitants; and that the true reason
why the population increases more rapidly than the
food is to be found, not in the laws of God, but in the
political laws which have made such a disposition of
the soil as absolutely prevents it from being turned
to account.  Under the present system of land occupancy, combined with labor taxation, want and starvation are the natural consequences.  They may
excite compassion, but they need excite no wonder.
And until the present systeW  is broken up, root and
branch, and buried in oblivion, the laboring population of Britain and Ireland must reap the fruits of a
system that first allocates all the soil to thirty or forty
thousand proprietors, and then places the heaviest
taxation in the world on the mass of the inhabitants.
Let any man inquire of the Scottish agriculturists —
the greatest landlord worshippers in Europe -what is
the reason that the improvement of the soil does not
go on more rapidly and more generally.  The answer,
we have invariably found, attributes the evil to the




TENURE OF LAND.               297
political tenure of land. The agriculturists could produce more corn.* Every one of them, except in a few
small districts where the land is up to its pitch of production, will attest to this fact.  They could make
more food —more wheat, more oats, more turnips,
heavier sheep, more and better wool, &c., &c. And
they would do so,-both for their own profit, and from
a spirit of emulation generated by the rapid improvements already achieved,- but they cannot do so; and
the country, which allowed the crown to alienate the
soil, must be content to see it half cultivated, and to
depend for supplies on distant lands.  They cannot
improve, because, although the improvements would
pay, and pay abundantly, in the first place they have
not the capital to execute the improvements at the
commencement of their lease; and, in the second, it is
absurd for them  to make permanent improvements
during the currency of a lease, the only effect of which
would be, -and, as a fact, often is, -that, at the end
of the lease, the legal landlord would let the land, with
its improvements, by auction.  Their improvements
would be put up to auction, the only difference being
that the biddings are written instead of spoken; and,
unless they will give more rent for their own improvements than any other person will give, they are turned
out of the land, and, in many instances, carry their
skill and capital to far distant countries. The difficulties are neither with the soil, nor the climate, nor the
price of produce; they all hinge on the political ar.
rangement that the law has made with regard to the
soil and its tenure; and until this arrangement is
* See Mr. Caird's Pamphlet on " High Farming"




298                      DRAINAGE.
destroyed, the soil never can produce its maximum.
The evil is immensely aggravated, it is true, by the
system   of entail; but the  radical evil, the  grand
masterpiece of mischief, that requires to be corrected,
is the alienation of the soil from the nation, and the
taxation of the labor of the country.
With regard to draining the soil, however, a new
scheme has recently been carried into execution. The
government taxes the population, and lends the money
to the landlords to drain the soil. The landlords are
to pay a certain interest and quit capital, which discharges  the  debt in  twenty-two  years.   This per
centage  the farmer finds to be less than  the profit
lively to accrue from  the improvement of the land,
and he agrees to pay it to the landlord.  The consequence is, that the country has been taxed for the
purpose of presenting  the  landlords with  the clear
amount of improvement at the end  of twenty-two
vears.*  Such  is the wisdom  and  equity of British
(landlord) legislation.
Notwithstanding  the political arrangements, however, the advantages of draining are of the highest
character.  The soil improves, the climate improvesf
* Since the drainage money was advanced by the government,
advertisements have appeared in the " North British Advertiser,"
in which the landlord offers to drain the lands on the payment of
ten peracent. per annum by the tenant.
f " Comment en serait-il autrement quand les belles recherches
publices par M. Arago dans l'annuaire, ont demontre que les
defrichements et les grands travaux agricoles suffisaient pour diminuer les chaleurs de l'et6 et les rigueurs de lhiver, et peut 6tre
m6me influer sur la temperature moyenne de tout un royaume." ~
GAVARRET, Pricipes Generauxr de Statistique Medicale, p. 182.




IMPROVEMENT OF DOMESTIC ANIMALS.                299
the character and condition of the agriculturists improve, and the  amount of food is vastly  increased.
And to what do we owe draining, with all its sterling
advantages?   To nothing more than the application
of hydrodynamics to vegetable physiology.  This is
its scientific character —its character as a product
of human ingenuity, exercising itself on the physical
world.*
It will scarcely be necessary to remark the power
of man to modify the animal kingdom, and thereby
to produce those animals that serve him better, and
make his position more advantageous.  The horses,
* Were the governors of England open to any scheme that
would permanently improve the country, without being made a
job, a very simple means is at their disposal. Take one million
a year from the army and navy. This might be done without
impairing the real security of the country. Let this money be
expended on drainage and permanent improvements.  Let it be
lent to no person in the first place.  But, wherever tenants in
occupancy were willing to pay the interest of the money, let them
be judges under inspection what drains are requisite, and whether
they are properly executed.  No person is so competent as the
tenant to see that the work is well done, where his interest is so
much involved. When the drains are specified, let their execution be done by contract. The tenant and inspector giving their
certificate that the land is properly drained according to bargain,
the contractor receives his money. The difference between the
common interest of money, say three and a half per cent., and the
quit per centage, say six and a half per cent., to be paid by the
landlord, who receives the permanent benefit. The land itself to
be accountable for all the liabilities.  This scheme would prodigiously increase the produce of the country; and, as the land is
so little taxed, the landlords would have no right to complain. With
a landlord legislature, however, we fear there is but little chance
for schemes of this nature.




300    IMPROVEMENT OF DOMESTIC ANIMALS.
cattle, sheep, &c., of Britain, are even now almost
artificial races.  The difference between those animals
as they are, and animals of the same species as they
would have been in a state of nature, is the product
of human ingenuity.  The Durham ox, or the Leicester sheep, is, in one sense, a machine- a machine for
the manufacture of beef, mutton, fat, and wool, out
of grass, turnips, and oil cakes. The improvement of
the breed is exactly a similar occupation to the improvement of a cotton mill, or the improvement of the
soil.  If man wants more corn than will grow naturally on the soil, he must improve the soil, drain it,
manure it, lime it, irrigate it, &c. It is no longer the
same soil; it is the same species, but a different variety fromr  what it was originally.  Even let it alone,
and it will bear a different series of plants.  The original plants die out, and their place is taken by others
more useful to man.  And when man sows seed of a
certain requisite character, he reaps a much better and
more abundant crop.  And so it is with a sheep, or a
bullock, or a fowl.  Naturally he grows wild, rough,
hardy, and takes far too much exercise to fatten.  He
is developed in those parts that man esteems the least,
-that do not pay. He is unmanageable, has his own
way, runs, jumps, tears, flies, and does many things
that no doubt amuse himself, but that do not recommend him  as an investment.  The improved animal,
on the contrary, is quiet, solemn, fattens well, appears
to understand the end of his existence, and takes to it
kindly; bears beef and fat, or mutton and wool, to
the very best of his power, and seems pleased with his
prosperity.  Ile even learns to look down onL his less




EMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PHYSIOLOGY.  301
cultivated companions, and seems thoroughly imbued
with a quiet sense of his own superiority.   He does
as he is bid, and in all respects is a man server. He
does his work, and receives his wages.
The improvements that have hitherto taken place
in agriculture, in horticulture, and in the races of
horses, cattle, sheep, and the other domestic animals,
are the direct results of empirical physiology, which
observes and records the resulting fact, without inquiring into the various steps of the process by which the
fact is eventually produced. The empirical physiologist inquires, "Does the earth become more productive by the application of certain substances, (called,
generically, manures,) and if so, What are the relative advantages of these substances, compared among
themselves?"   The scientific  physiologist, on  the
contrary, inquires, "In what manner does the earth
become more productive by the application of these
substances?"  The one fixes his attention on the
improvement of his art; the other, on the improvement of his knowledge.  The one endeavors to read
aright the laws of the practical world, and to apply
them to his use; the other endeavors to read aright
the construction of the material world, and the laws
by which nature carries on her operations.  The empiric is satisfied when he has learned the mode by
which he can make his bullocks fatten in the shortest
time and at the least expense; the scientific physiologist, on the contrary, is never satisfied till he has
traced the particles of food from their primary prehension, through the process of their assimilation, to their
ultimate deposition in the tissues.  The one manipu26




302    EMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PHYSIOLOGY.
lates a mass, and endeavors to induce certain final
consequences; the other attempts to seize a primary
atom, and to determine the laws which regulate its
evolution.
Empirical physiology and scientific physiology represent two great methods, whose tendency is to approach nearer and nearer to each other, and finally to
unite in their results.  The former commences with
perhaps a great rude fact, plain and obvious, and as
far as possible removed from any thing that would be
called science. This fact, perhaps, might be merely
the division of the year into its two great seasons -
summer and winter; and the observation that domestic cattle thrive better if housed in winter, than if left
exposed to the inclemency of the season.  This, in
many cases, is the first great practical step, or first
great division, which is gradually to undergo innumerable subdivisions; and these subdivisions affecting
many kinds of food, and many breeds of animals, at
last evolve a complete art, whose principles are tolerably well ascertained.  Scientific physiology, on the
contrary, commences with a fact as far distant on the
opposite side from its ultimate application. It begins
with the analysis of the atmosphere, with the mysteries of oxygen and carbon, with theories of combustion, with what the air does in the fire, and what
becomes of the smoke. And while engaged in these
investigations, it knows no more of the process by
which bullocks are fattened than the bullocks know of
phlogiston.  In course of time, however, it improves
both its knowledge and its method; it attacks the fat
itself, and begins to discourse of stearine, oleine, &c.;




EMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC  PHYSIOLOGY.    303
and also begins a series of investigations on the process of respiration, on the possible modes by which
animal tissues may be consumed, and on the conditions
that accelerate or retard the consumption. This is the
first fibre of communication shot across the interval
which separates empirical from  scientific physiology;
and though only a fibre, it is like the ice shooting from
opposite sides of the stream, the first frail forerunner
of a solid communication.  Step by step the two processes go on, the one descending into details more and
more artistically minute; the other departing more
and more from  its elementary compounds, until it succeeds at last in constructing a scheme of knowledge
which shall not only explain the results, but serve as a
guide for the evolution of a correct systematic practice.
* The difference between the empirical and the scientific method
is expressed with logical accuracy, as follows: -
1. The empirical method manipulates those substantives (in
any particular course of inquiry) which present the greatest comprehension.
2. The scientific method manipulates those substances which
present the greatest extension.
Thus an animal frame comprehends the processes of combination,
decomposition, respiration, the development of heat, &c., &c.;
while the natural history of oxygen or carbon extends to all the
objects in which oxygen and carbon are comprehended, although
that natural history in reality comprehends nothing but its own
series of phenomena.
The antagonism usually set forth as existing between the inductive and the deductive process of reasoning, is not only based on
a misunderstanding of the methods of pure syllogistic, but absolutely opposed to the methods which are pursued in matters of
induction. There is really only one process of reasoning, although
this may be read in different manners. What is called the induc



304     EMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC  PHYSIOLOGY.
And when once the two methods have come to an
identity of result, (as they  have in  some of the mechanical arts, and as they may soon in some, branches
of physiology, (a system of truth is developed for the
world, for the human race, for humanity; not merely
for the discoverers and improvers, but for man as man,
for the human being tenanting  the world, and gradually learning to read aright the universe, or cosmos, in
which he finds himself placed.  Man has made a new
acquisition, and  this new  acquisition  remains a permanent, stable, and lasting addition to the wealth of
humanity.
But empirical physiology does not apply merely to
tive process of reasoning is only the inductive process of observing;
and when the observations are made, the reasonings are all made
by the same process.
Let the logician apply to any man in the practical departments of
life, and he will find him reasoning from a major premiss; which
will be found to consist of two propositions, and not, as the Baconians affirm, of one, which has been inferred from many observations.
For instance: —
Major. - In every case that I have given this food to my cattle,
they have thriven well.
Minor. -This is a new case, in which I give the same food to
my cattle.
Consequent.-Therefore they will thrive well, (the probability
being greater or less according to circumstances.)
The Baconians divide the major premiss and call it a reasoning,
whereas it is no more than an observation.
The essential difference, however, between the empirical and the
scientific methods is this -the one classifies events, the other
classifies substances. The empiric endeavors to find the law of the
events; the man of science, the law of the substances; and in this
light both pursue exactly the same method.




EXTENSION OF HUMAN LIFE.                  305
the organized or animated objects that man finds surrounding him.  It applies to himself, and to the material conditions of his bodily frame.  Of all animals,
man is the most subject to disease, the most liable to
be cut off from  existence before his body has passed
through its natural transformations, and at last sinks
exhausted from  the influence of age.  History, however, proves that an immense amelioration has taken
place even in this respect - that man has extended the
limits of his life - that he has intelligently constructed
circumstances less fatal' to his organism -that he has
diminished, and vastly diminished, his liability to dissolution —in fact, that he  has to  a  certain extent
beaten the evils of the physiological world, exactly as
he has vanquished the difficulties of the mechanical
world.*
* M. Moreau de Jonnes, in a notice on the mortality of Europe,
has given the following table, which tends equally to prove the influence of civilization on the number of deaths --
One                   One
Countries.     Years.    death out   Years.   death out
of                   of
Sweden,        1754 to 17(8    34    1821 to 1825   45
Denmark,  1751 to 1754    32             1819        45
Germany,           1788        32        1825        45
Prussia,           1717        30    1821 to 1824    39
Austria,           1822        40    1825 to 1830    43
Holland,           1800        26        1824        40
England,           1690        33        1821        58
Great Britain,  1785 to 1789    43    1800 to 1804    47
France,            1776       25-5  1825 to 1827   39-5
Roman States,      1767       21-5       1829        28
Scotland,          1801        44        1821        50
— QUETELET'S Calculation of Probabilities. Notes by Mr. Beamish. See the whole note, (v.) p. 114.
26*




306          EXTENSION OF HUMAN LIFE.
This improvement man owes to empirical physiology, partly intentional and partly unintentionalpartly to the exercise of a direct'effort, and partly to
the general amelioration of circumstances produced by
the advance of civilization.  Better clothing and better food- btter dwellings and a better system  of
drainage- cleanliness, ventilation, and a more abundant supply of water-prompt treatment under acute
disease, inoculation and vaccination-the improvement of jails, workhouses, and all other prisons and
similar abominations    a more simple and natural
mode of rearing children -in fact, a better and more
rational system of treating the human frame both individual and collective, and placing it in circumstances
more conducive to its healthy function, has at last
evolved a longer life, and secured to the general man
a longer tenancy of terrestrial existence.
SECTION II.-APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF PROGRESSION TO MAN S POLITICAL CONDITION.
WE have said enough, however, to show the direct
bearing of science on the improvement of man's condition on the globe.  Knowledge is obtained, an improved system of action is consequently generated,
and from that improved system of action an improved
condition arises as the necessary result.
But, then, how comes it that, notwithstanding man's
vast achievements, his wonderful efforts of mechanical




PAUPERISM.                307
ingenuity, and the amazing productions of his skill,
his own condition in a social capacity should not have
improved in the same ratio as the improvement of his
condition with regard to the material world? In Britain, man has to a great extent beaten the material
world. He has vanquished it, overpowered it; he can
make it serve him;. he can use not merely his muscles,
but the very powers of nature, to affect his purposes;
his reason has triumphed over matter; and matter's
tendencies and powers are to a great extent subject to
his will. And, notwithstanding this, a large portion
of the population is reduced to pauperism, to that fearful state of dependence in which man finds himself a
blot on the universe of God -a wretch thrown up by
the waves of time, without a use and without an end,
homeless in the presence of the firmament, and helpless in the face of the creation. Was it for this that
the Almighty made man in his own image, and gave
him the earth for an inheritance? Was it for this that
he sent his Son into the world to proclaim the divine
benevolence, to preach the doctrine of human brotherhood, and to lay the foundation of a kingdom  that
should endure forever and ever?  We do not believe
it; neither do we believe that pauperism comes from
God.  It is man's doing, and man's doing alone.
God has abundantly supplied man with all the requisite means of support; and where he cannot find support, we must look, not to the arrangements of the
Almighty, but to the arrangements of men, and to the
mode in which they have portioned out the earth. To
charge the poverty of man on God, is to blaspheme
the Creator instead of bowing in reverent thankfulness




308                  PAUPERISM.
for the profusion of his goodness.  He has given
enough, abundance, more than sufficient; and if man
has not enough, we must look to the mode in which
God's gifts have been distributed. There is enough,
enough for all, abundantly enough; and all that is
requisite is freedom to labor on the soil, and to extract from it the produce that God intended for man's
support.
But what is the cause of British pauperism?  Why
are there periodical starvations in Ireland and the
Highlands?  Why is there a crisis every few years
in England, when able-bodied men, willing to work,
can find no employment?  Why are Britons obliged
to be shipped off to other countries? Is' it because
the natural capabilities of the soil have been wrought
up to the highest pitch, and yet there remains a surplus population that the soil will neither employ nor
feed?  Is it because manufacturing has been carried
to its utmost extent, and there really is no further
room for the employment of a larger population? Is
it, in fact, because man has done his best with Britain,
made the most of it, got out of it all the food and all
the wealth that it is capable of producing, and yet it
will not keep its own inhabitants, either by the food it
produces, or by articles of exchange that it might
give to other countries for food?  Is it a matter of necessity that there shall be paupers (that vile word) in
the richest country in. the world?  Is it true that England can no longer support Englishmen; nor Ireland,
Irishmen; nor Scotland, Scotchmen?  Have we, in
fact, arrived at the last term of population, and must
all, over and above, expatriate or starve? Is this true,




PAUPERISM.                309
or is it false?  It is false -false from beginning to
end..
And what is the cause of human pauperism and
human degradation? for the two go hand in hand.
It is because the social arrangements of men have
been made by superstition, and not by knowledge. The
sciences, we have shown, lead to an amended order of
action, and an amended order of action leads to an
amended and improved condition. But we must have
knowledge in the department in which we require the
condition to be amended. That is, mechanical knowledge improves man's mechanical condition, as regards
his power over external nature; agricultural knowledge,
his agricultural condition; chemical knowledge, his
chemical condition, and so forth. But social knowledge - that  is, social science - is absolutely requisite
before we can labor intelligently to improve man's
social condition. These are the conditions under which
man tenants the globe. Every department of nature,
and of man's phenomenology, has its laws; and if
those laws are infringed, evil is the immediate, invariable, and necessary result. And if man's social condition is evil; if we find at one end of society a few
thousands of individuals with enormous wealth, for
which they work not, and never have worked, and at
the other end of society millions belonging to the same
country, and born on the same soil, with barely the
necessaries of life, and too often in abject destitution
— there is no other conclusion possible than that this
poverty arises from man's social arrangements, and
that poor the mass of the population must remain
until those arrangements are rectified by knowledge.




310           CONDITION OF BRITAINe
Does any man suppose that the nation will much
longer believe " that Britain cannot support its inhabitants?"  Does any man believe that the men who
can make steam engines, and cotton mills, and railroads, and ships, and the largest commerce in the
world, and spinning jennies, and steam printing machines, and Skerryvore light-houses, and electric telegraphs, and a thousand other wonders, could not make
such a distribution of Britain as should enable every
man in it, and many more, to earn an abundant livelihood by their labor?  Does any man believe this?
And if he does not believe it, does he suppose that any
superstitious notions about the king's right to grant
the soil to individuals will long stand in the way of
their doing it?  If Englishmen discover that pauperism  and wretchedness are unnecessary; that the
divine Being never intended such things.; that the degradation of the laboring population, their moral degradation consequent on poverty, is the curse of the
laws and not of nature, -does any man suppose that
Englishmen would not be justified in abolishing such
laws, or that they will not abolish them?  Can we
believe for a moment, that if any arrangement would
enable the population to find plenty, that such an arrangement will not be made? If any man believe this,
he is at all events willing to be credulous.  For ourselves, we believe it not.
There are hundreds of thousands of persons in this
country who cannot earn above from 7s. to 10s. per
week, even when they have constant employment.
The wages of the Scottish agricultural laborer- certainly as respectable a man as is found in the whole




CONDITION OF BRITAIN.                  311
world in a similar situation, although unfortunately
undergoing  the same process of degradation  that is
undermining society in the towns — do not average
~26 per annum.  This, in  fact, is a high estimate;'but, to place the question altogether beyond the reach o~
minute wrangling, let it even be called ~30 per annum,
and here we are quite sure that we exceed the highest
remuneration that the best, steadiest, most sober and
most skilful laborer —the man who works a pair of
horses - can obtain from the ordinary farmer. With
this  sum   he  brings up a family and  educates  his.
children.  His life is a life of stern economy and he
faces it like a man.  He respects himself, and feels
that he has a right to be respected. He does manage
to live like a moral being, and sometimes escapes the
degradation of the poor roll in his old age.' This is
the best position of the laborer, the maximum  that the
present condition of Scotland can afford to the highest class of her laboring children - milk, porridge, and
potatoes, and with these he goes through his life of
honest lndependence.
* "The class, perhaps, which suffers most in agricultural districts is that of single women; whose wages, when employed as
out-workers in the vigor of life, are not more than sufficient to
furnish them, in the scantiest measure and humblest style, with the
necessaries of life; and who thus, in the absence of any of those
resources, such as spinning and knitting, to which in old age females had recourse in former times, have no prospect before them,
if they remain unmarried, but that of living in their latter days supported by parochial aid." - Report on Increase of Pauperism. Edinburgh: A. & C. Black.
Such is the prospect which Britain holds out to her laboring
children- a life of semi-starvation, and an old age of pauperism.
The American republic is, at all events, clear of this evil.




312              CONDITION OF BRITAIN.
But what is the minimzum, what is the condition of
the shoals of Irish peasantry who invade the west
coast, and the tribes of Highlanders who have little or
nothing' to do?  What can they earn?  WVhat food
do they habitually use, and what is their moral existence?   Let any one visit the Western Islands, and
inquire into the social condition of the inhabitants,
and the arrangements that mnen have made for the
destruction of the population.   See scores of men,
women, and children gathering shellfish on the shore
as almost their only food, while the reift of the island
is all abstracted, and spent in London or elsewhere;
and then say if it be possible that, with such arrangement, any soil, or any climate, or any profusion of
natural advantages, would have compensated for the
evil arrangements that men have made.*  Does any
one suppose that those same Highlanders, who find a
wretched  sustenance  on  the  shore, could  not, and
would not, extract an abundant existence out of the
soil of their native island?   The law  forbids them;
that is, men have made such arrangements witit regard
to God's earth, that the stable population  must be
* In some of the Western Islands the people are little or no better than bondsmen or serfs. In one island (and perhaps the practice
is common, but on this we cannot speak) it is said that the tenants
are not allowed to sell their grain except to the landlord. What is
this but serfdom? It was, of course, proper to introduce law into
the Highlands; but no principle, either of natural right, or religion,
or social economy, could ever justify the law in giving the property
of the clan to the head of the house, to be used by him as private
property. This is the origin of all the Highland distress.  No
economical improvements are worth a farthing until this radical
evil is corrected.




ORIGIN OF PAUPERISM.                313
reduced to destitution, for the purpose of having one
man endowed with a wealth which he, perhaps, knows
not how to use, nor even to retain.*
But what, after all, is the practical conclusion  to,which we come? What system  is it that would obliterate pauperism?  On this we do not intend to enter
in  the  present volume.  We must first show  tile
probability  (a  probability  which, taken  altogether,
amounts to a reasonable expectation) that man, placed
as he is on the globe, is not necessarily condemned to
pauperism  and  degradation; but that a period will
come, ere long, when the natural laws which govern
society shall be discovered, and, being discovered,
shall lead to a condition of prosperity altogether inconceivable at the present time.  Two systems are
open to us:Either pauperism  and  degradation  are  the work
of the Creator of our -system, the  ALLPOWERFUL, who has placed  present man
in  circumstances where the  natural capabilities of the earth are insufficient for his
support; 
Or,  pauperism and degradation are the work of
fallen man, who through ignorance has based
* A fact. The greater part of an island, the rental of which
part was about ~20,000 a year, has recently been found insufficient
to support a family. The capital was spent, and the estate is for
sale. On that same island we have seen the native population in
numbers gathering their daily food on the shore. This island, in
miniature, is a very exact representation of the social condition of
Great Britain. It may take a little time for the mass of the population to see exactly how things really do stand; but they will discover the truth at last.
27




314           ()RIGIN OF PAUPERISM.
his arrangements of' the earth on superstitious propositions, and thereby necessarily has rendered it impossible that, the
amount, of good intended by the Creator can
be extracted from the earth.
Of these two schemes we may take our choice.
We may blasphemously rush to the conclusion, that
the earth is for man a terrible prison, with necessary
horrors, from  which, do what we will, we cannot
escape.  Or we may believe, with humble reverence,
that, notwithstanding man's transgression, the Almighty God has yet, in the abundance of his compassion, plentifully provided him with the means of
terrestrial existence. That man's doings are the cause
of man's distress; that man's ignorance, and man's
error, and man's injustice, and man's wrong arrangement of the world, is the true and only cause why
man is afflicted Faith poverty, and thereby placed in
circumstances almost incompatible with his proper
existence as a moral agent and an accountable creature.  And if we admit that moral degradation does,
for the most part, accompany physical degradation,
then must we admit, that if any new arrangement of
the natural world, which man did not create, would
have the effect of obliterating poverty, and, consequently, of obliterating the necessary evils of poverty,
that new arrangement is right, just, and good, and
ought to be carried into execution, whatever the present arrangements, inherited from  past generations,
may actually be.
And we affirm, without the slightest hesitation,
that the very same kind of improvements that have




THE RADICAL EVIL.             315
followed the mathematical and physical sciences, will
follow social science, and achieve in the world of man
far greater wonders than have yet been achieved in
the world of matter. It is not trade Britain wants,
enor more railroads, nor larger orders for cotton, nor
new schemes for alimenting the poor, nor loans to
landlords, nor any other mercantile or economical
change. It is social change. New  social arrangements, made on the principles.of natural equity.  No
economical measure whatever is capable of reaching
the depths of the social evils. Ameliorations may, no
doubt, be made for a time; but the radical evil remains, still generating the poison that corrupts society.
The evil is expressed in a few words; and, sooner
or later, the nation will appreciate it and rectify it.
It is " the alienation of the soil from the state, and the
consequent taxation of the industry of the country."
Britain may go on producing with wonderful energy,
and may accomplish far more than she has yet accomplished.  She may struggle as Britain only can
struggle.  She may present to the world peace at
home, when the nations of Europe are filled with insurrection. She may lead foremost in the march of
civilization, and be first among the kingdoms of the
earth. All this she may do, and more. But as certainly as Britain continues her present social arrangements, so certainly will there come a time when - the
other questions being cleared on this side and on that
side, and the main question brought into the arena —
the labor of Britain will emancipate itself from thraldom. Gradually and surely has the separation been
taking place between the privileged land owner and




316                THE TWO PARTIES.
the unprivileged laborer.  And the time will come at
last that there shall be but two parties looking each
other in the face, and knowing that the destruction
of one is an  event of necessary occurrence.  That
event must come.  Nor is it in man to stay it or to
produce it.  It will come as the result of the laws
that govern nature and that govern man.  As in the
island we have spoken of, the population must be destroyed or the land must be open to their cultivation,
and not accorded to the landlord. Of the two parties,
one must give way.  One must sink to rise no more;
one must disappear from  the earth.  Their continued
existence is incompatible.   Nature cannot support
both.  Nature cannot afford to support the population
in plenty, and  over and above to pay, on a small
island, ~20,000 a year to the proprietor.  Such things
cannot be.  We may as well attempt mechanical impossibilities as political impossibilities; and, notwithstanding the almost universal prevalence of the current
superstition about the rights of landed property, we
have no hesitation in affirming that a very few years
will show that superstition destroyed, and the main
question of England's welfare brought to a serious
and definite discussion.*
* The theory of Highland pauperization is one of the simplest
things imaginable. Nature has only so many sources of wealth;
and if these are taken away, by the laws, from the inhabitants of
a district, it stands to reason that the inhabitants must be poor.
Were the wealth produced in the Highlands to remain in the Highlands, the inhabitants would be rich; but the annual profits, for the
most part, go away and never return. There is a perpetual drain
outwards - an export without a corresponding import, either of
money or goods. If the money produced by the sheep, cattle,




THE TWVO QUESTIONS.                    317
In politics, there are only two main questions-  first,
personal liberty; second, natural property.  England
has been at work for centuries in the endeavor to
settle the first, and when that is definitively settled,,she will give her undivided attention to the second.
grouse, -and salmon, actually returned in any form to the districts
producing them, the inhabitants would receive the remuneration
intended by nature. As it is, pauperism is the natural and necessary result.
" Since the period that the Highlands were brought under the
dominion of the law, the inhabitants have been found by all who
have visited them from other quarters of the country to be a people
annually on the brink of starvation, and annually, to a greater or
less degree, feeding on shellfish or seaware. Their indolence and
their dirtiness have also been observed by all observers during this
whole period. Their ignorance of the arts of bettering their condition, and of the comforts enjoyed in other quarters of the kingdom,
have also been uniformly taken notice of. Their destitution was an
annual thing; but the usual and ordinary distress was every now
and then aggravated by, a recurrence of a bad season for the' crops
on which they principally lived. They were cheerful in the years
when they could get any thing like a fair supply of the coarsest
and meanest food, but they never labored for any thing more; and
hence an unfavorable season, when it came, found them with nothing, and reduced them to starvation. When the season was what
might be called good, they never taxed their industry to devise
measures for warding off the fatal effects of the bad' season which
might be close at hand. Such a season was that of 1836, in which,
if the potatoes were not a total failure, there was a more general
failure of crops in the country. It was followed by the destitution
of 1836-7, which called forth the bounty of the other parts of the
kingdom, and directed much attention to the state of the Highlands.
When I ask the people here, whether the present destitution of
1847 or that of 1837 was the worst, they all declare that the present is far'the worst; but when I inquire how those people lived in
1837, I find good reason to believe that it was about as bad as
1847."- Scotsman, February 17, 1847.
27*




818           LIBERTY AND PROPERTY.
Before the discussion of the question of property,
(natural property, the object,) there is, however, a main
and principal question of liberty. Englishmen have
achieved their liberty in one sense; that is, they are
equal in the eye of the criminal law, (nearly so,) have
a right to be tried by their peers according to law, and
cannot on any occasion be subjected to punishment
by the rulers, as such.  So far the progress of England has been satisfactory; and, above every country
in the world, she has been distinguished for her race
of independent judges, whose conduct for many years
past has been one of the greatest moral wonders of
the world. In the whole history of the administration
of justice, there is nothing to compare with the quiet
grandeur with which the judges of England  have
unostentatiously performed their duties.  Apart from
religion, this has been England's truest greatness, her
most solid claim  to the admiration of all mankind.
The deeds of her greatest commanders are as dust in
the balance, compared with the deeds of her judges.
These have been truly great; and England owes to
them  that moral supremacy of the law, which is the
surest basis of civil society, and the grandest natural
phenomenon that comes within the limits of man's
cognizance. Long may. Heaven continue to favor
England with upright judges, and long may Englishmen continue to regard them with the highest honor.
But, in another sense, Englishmen have not achieved
their liberty, and a main question remains to be decided. Its ultimate decision is by no means a matter
of doubt, but it may be years before.it comes to definite issue. This question is, " the right of the deliber



RIGHT 0'F JEPRESENTATION.          319
ative assembly to make laws for, and impose taxation
on, that portion of the population who have no voice
in the election of thle represenntatives; " in other words,
the question of universal suffrage.  It is plainly evi-,dent, that those who have no power to elect are not
citizens of the skate.  They are an inferior class, ruled
byforce; and the emancipation of this class, and their
equalization in the eye of the law, is the first great
question that will agitate the kingdom.  Economical
questions as to whether there shall be three soldiers
-or half a dozen, or whether a certain duty shall be
ten per cent. or twenty, or whether the government
should give more or less aid to emigration, all these
are quite unimportant compared with the main question, of whether two or three millions of men are
morally bound to obey and acknowledge a government that excll es them from representation.  Let this
question be treated as it may, of one thing we are
quite convinced; namely, that the non-electing population will either obtain the right by the consent of
the present rulers, or ultimately they will take it by
force.  The change must come as it lies in the order
of human progression; but what the means of effecting the change shall be, remains to be determined.
In all probability, when once the question is thoroughly a national one, the present rulers will admit the
necessity of the change, and place the whole population on an equality as regards their political functions.  And when once this last great question of
liberty has been disposed of, the country cannot fail to
commence another evolution, and to enter on a line
of progress that shall ultimately place men on the




320                   SOCIAL SCIENCE.
same equality with regard to natural property that will
then prevail with regard to political liberty.'
But let the mechanism of the changes be what they
miay, let our views be right or wrong with regard to
the process of improvement, we yet maintain that our
major proposition is fully borne out.  We allege, as
the most general proposition, that the improvement of
social science will improve man's social action, and
that the improvement of man's social action will improve man's social condition; in  fact, that the acquisition of social science will ultimately produce a social
millennium.  There is a science of man, and of man's
action, if we can only discover it; and the discovery
of that, science will produce effects analogous to the
effects produced by any other science.  Let us, then,
* We hope, at some future time, to be able to lay before the
public some remarks on the equalization of actual property. An
absolute equality of actual property is neither possible, nor desirable, norjast. We do not believe that there'is an insuperable difficulty in showing how a system, perfectly just in theory, can be
carried into practice, and yet preserve to every man the absolute
control of the fruits of his personal skill, labor, and industry. The
great question of modern times is, "What is the theory of a perfect political state? " Admitting man's fallen nature, and all the
elements that might be supposed to interfere with the realization of
a perfect state, what is its theory?  There must be a theory, be
what it may. That theory is the great desideratum of modern
times. It settles definitely and forever what must be the end of
man's political progress. For ourselves, we believe assuredly that
God has made man's logical reason to harmonize with man's condition; and thus, whatever the reason can ascertain to be true, must,
when reduced to practice, produce good, and not evil. The more
men advance, the more will they perceive that truth, the intellectual
proposition, is the foundation of good, the outward condition.




METHOD OF SCIENCE.                      321
endeavor to  estimate, for a  moment, some  of the
effects that may reasonably be anticipated  from  the
discovery, acknowledgment, and reduction  to  ordination, of social science.'
But, in the first place, let us observe that the natural
history of a science always begins at the wrong end,
We do not mean that it ought not to  do so; on the
contrary, it ought to do so, and must do so, because it
cannot do otherwise.  Nature furnishes us with wholes,
and these must first be manipulated as whole individuals.  These are named, described, and  classed  after
a fashion.  Neither the  nomenclature, however, nor
the classification, are destined to remain.  They serve
a temporary purpose;, and are of use to facilitate communication.  Thus chemistry cannot commence with
* The term  discovery is perhaps liable to be misunderstood, or
perhaps rather to be objected to. We do not mean that any object
called a science is to be discovered like a fossil or a new planet.
Science exists in the mind, not in external nature; and the discovery of science is the discovery of the truths of a science, and of
the process by which those truths are substantiated. Thus, Aristotle discovered logic when he laid bare the process of reasoning,
and exhibited the necessary forms under which man's intellect
works. Aristotle did not discover that man could reason; neither
did he discover a new object; but he discovered a science, a mode
of knowledge. Newton did not discover the sun, nor the moon, nor
the earth; but he discovered the mode of their operations. The
sun, the moon, and the earth remained unaffected by the discovery;
they performed their functions as usual, without the slightest attention to the great philosopher. The change was in the credence of
mankind. And so it is with all science. The change is in the credence of mankind. Now, intellect (taken as intellect, without regarding the moral influences that may bias its judgments) is of that
nature that it is convinced by evidence. All human intellect is




322                 METHOD OF SCIENCE.
oxygen, hydrogen, calcium, and potassium, &c.  These
are the logical primaries, or simples, of chemistry; but
they  are  by  no  means  the  chronological primaries.
Neither does anatomy begin with fibrine, albumen, nor
globules, but with a whole animal, and with a head, a
thorax, an abdomen, thoracic members, and abdominal
members.  Neither does zoology begin with organic
substance, its arrangement into the organs of nutrition,
locomotion, s         in, sesation  reproduction, &c.; but with a
great number of different animals, presenting different
outward appearances.  This principle is universal in
science, that the chronological commencement is with
a zwhole, a complex mass; while the logical commencement of the science, properly so ealled, is with a simradically the same, only variable in quantity.  And scientific discovery is the discovery of that mode of presenting propositions
which necessarily leads intellect, or any number of unbiased intellects, to the same identical conclusions. There is but one truth,
and consequently there is but one scheme of knowledge; and the
great final result of scientific discovery, is the restoration of the
eify of human credence. Men may differ in taste, in likings, and
in disliking's; but their intellect cannot differ in judgment, except
through superstition or error.  The discovery of science, therefore,
is the discovery of the knowledge itself, and of that mode of presenting it that shall convince intellect as intellect.  On this account
it has been said, that " he discovers who proves."  As science advances, diversity of opinion dies away, and unity of knowledge
takes its place. To produce this unity of knowledge for the whole
race of man, is the magnificent destiny of science; and the humblest cultivator of natural knowledge is, like the coral insect, helping to rear an edifice, lwhich, emerging from the vexed ocean of
conflicting credence, shall be first stable and secure, and, at last,
shall cover itself with verdure, flowers, and fruits, and bloom beautiful in the face of heaven.




METHOD OF SCIENCE.                    323
pie primary, from which we start to build up the complex mass.'
To express this in logical formula, let us say that
the chronological commencement is with an individual
presenting  the greatest comprehension and the least
extension, and that the logical commencement is with
an individual presenting the greatest extension and the
least comprehensionf.
The process of science, therefore, is in the first place
analytic, and when the analysis has been carried down
to the last elements, the process is reversed, and it then
becomes synthetic.  And  this is true of the mathematical sciences as well as of the physical sciences,
although  the  mathematical sciences are  invariably
presented in  the synthetic form.  In them  we have
the first and most simple appearance of analysis, and
the greatest preponderance of synthesis. In the ad* "All, or almost all, the substances found on the globe of the
earth have been subjected to chemical investigation. The result
has been, that all the animal and vegetable substances, without
exception, and by far the greatest number of mineral bodies, are
compounds."
t To Sir William Hamilton, of the University of Edinburgh, the
logical world is indebted for an exposition of the theory of comprehension and extension.
Among the individual objects of natural science, man is the one
that presents the greatest comprehension; but the name, man, extends only to himself. The name animal, on the contrary, extends
to an immense variety of organized beings, but comprehends only a
sensitive organized individual. A blood globule, as a matter of
real science, has a great extension, but comprehends only a very
simple form of organization. The word being (noun substantive) is




324                 METIOD OF SCIENCE.:
vanced physical sciences, on the'contrary, we have the
greatest amount of analysis; so great, in fact, that the
analytic portion  of the science  has frequently  been
mistaken  for the whole science.  The whole science,
however, is not completed until both the analytic portion and the synthetic portion are achieved.  Geometry has its preparatory  analysis,,exactly as chemistry
has its analysis; and though  no mention  is made of
this in geometrical treatises, the fact cannot be overlooked when we take a  survey  of the  philosophy of
science.  Nature does not furnish us with  points having no extent, with  straight lines having  no breadth,
with  perfect circles, squares, and  triangles, &e.  On
the  contrary, nature furnishes us with forms very imperfect for the most part, and very complex for the
most part, and these we analyze into the elementary
forms of position, (the point,) and  direction  and  exthat which presents the greatest possible extension and least possible
comprehension.  WVhat is called the universe, on the contrary, presents the greatest possible comprehension, and the least possible
extension.  There can only be one universe; but there may be an
infinity of beings, or rather an indejinity.  Extension appears to
represent number, where we begin with unity, and repeat indefinitely; and comprehension appears to represent quantity, where we
begin with infinity, and subdivide indefinitely.  The difference
between number and quantity has been far too much overlooked,
apparently from the circumstance that unity is (absurdly) allowed
to be divisible. That is, we divide one unit into two units. Now,
the fact is, we have doubled the number and halved the quantity.
Unity in pure arithmetic is absolutely indivisible until we assign it
a value, or quantity, and then it may represent any number; but in
pure arithmetic, unity is the one simple.




METTOD OF SCIENCE.                    325
tent, (the line,) and with these we proceed to construct
extent in two  directions, (the superficies,) and extent
in three directions, (the solid.*)
In politics, therefore, as in every other science, the
natural history comes first, and then the science. The
most obvious divisions of things as they are, are the
first clumsy attempts at analysis; and laws begin, not
by constructing the state as it ought to be constructed,
but by attempting to remedy the most obvious evils.
This is the case even where laws have been made in a
good intention.  We do not refer to  those bad, and
unjust, and despotic laws which have prevailed in all
European states, but to the best portion of the laws
viewed in their best light; and these we maintain to
have begun at the latter end of the question, and not
at its beginning.
o Space, as an unlimited solid, we take to be, not simple, as usually represented, but as compound. The concept space is composite, and may be analyzed into position, direction, and extent.
These three concepts are simple, cannot be defined, and form the
elementary substantives of geometry. Direction and extent give
rise to two different methods. For instance, by measuring the distances (extent) between all the points of a country, (suppose by
chain,) we may construct a map, and the map shall have a scale;
but we shall not be able to tell, in the least, how to place the map
-that is, we know nothing about the direction. And if we measure only the direction (suppose by compass) of the various points,
we shall also have a map, and this map we shall place correctly, but
it will not have a scale -that is, we know nothing about the extent. To have both the direction and the extent, we must combine
both methods; and on this account a survey by triangulation requires a measured base line, the only use of which, however, is to
give the scale, theform -being determined by the direction of the
points.
28




326    ARBITRARY DETERMINATION OF CRIME.
The first and most obvious requirement in a country is some degree of security for life, liberty, and
property.  This gives birth to criminal law, the great
end of which is ostensibly to prevent crimes. Now
here we have the whole evidence of history that law
began at the wrong end.  Law  ought to emanate
from  ethics, and the very first and most important
question to determine is, " What is a crime, and what
is not a crime? "  Instead of ascertaining what was a
crime, men assumzed the crime, and then proceeded to
enact laws for its punishment.  They made a synthesis before making an analysis, and made that synthesis the basis of political enactment, and committed
murder and robbery, and every other crime, under th6
shelter of their legislation. So far as the science of
politics was concerned, *ey were in much the same
position as those who made astronomy without observation; that is, they were wholly and totally basing
on arbitrary assumption.  But wrong proceedings in
politics are far more serious than wrong proceedings
in other departments, inasmuch as man and man's
welfare are concerned; and the laws of former times,
and to a large extent of the present time, being based
on superstition, necessarily produced, and continue
to produce, effects the most detrimental to society.
Even admitting the major proposition of the law, that
"crime ought to be punished," the minor, "this act
and that act are crimes," was purely arbitrary; it was
determined on no principle of stability, was variable,
contradictory, often absurd, and very generally unjust.
Thus, at one period it was a crime for a man to be
free, (as it still is in Russia and the southern states




WHAT IS A CRIME.?              327
of America;) at another period it was a crime to have
a slave.  At one period it was a crime to go to
church; at another, to refrain from  going to church.
At one period it was a crime to shoot a deer; at
another, no crime. At one period it was a crime to
be a witch.; tt another period it was admitted that
there were no witches.  Now  all this diversity is
exactly similar to the diversity that prevailed in the
physical sciences before Bacon's time.  The major
principles of investigation were not in dispute; but
Bacon, with a grasp of magnificent genius, laid hold
of the minors of the sciences, and told men that they
must first ascertain them before they could arrive at
knowledge. 
And so it is in law, the exponent of men's views of
political science.  The minor proposition, "What is
a crime?" requires to be determined on exactly the
same principles as we determine " What is a square?"
or, " What is the orbit of the earth?"  Without this
determination, made on principles which are not arbitrary but scientific, law is despotism; and no man
in the world is morally bound to obey it, except as
Scripture may enjoin him to obey even unjust laws.
If legislatures will make arbitrary crimes,-that is,
make actions legally criminal which are not naturally
criminal,-no population is bound to obey them.
On the contrary, it becomes one of the highest duties
of man to resist such laws —to use every effort to
procure their abolition; and, if he cannot do so by
reason, then to do so by force.  The welfare of humanity demands this at the hand of every man; and
the base and slavish doctrine of non-resistance is fit,




328            CRIME AND PROPERTY.
not for men who study truth in God's universe, but
for hireling sycophants, who care not what man may
suffer so that their vile carcasses are clothed and
fed.  The liberties we have in England are mainly
owing to the fact, tLat England would not tolerate
the determination of crime by the executive rulers, but
reserved this for the deliberative assembly; and, in so
doing, England has undoubtedly made a declaration
-not so explicit as it would be now —that she reserves the right to try the issue by force of arms with
any government that should make artificial crimes, or
punish the population for actions which were neither
contrary to the laws of God, of reason, or of nature..1he power of the ruler to determine "what is a
crime," is the origin and sole basis of the political
degradation of the continent of Europe.  Abstract
this determination from the power of the rulers, -let
it be made on a principle of independent investigation,
and let the rulers be the executors of the laws,-and
we have the first great practical reform that envelops
the germ of all others, and that cannot fail ultimately
to entail the best blessings of liberty and security.
All the revolutions of the continent, from the day of
the Jen de Paurne down to the year 1849, have originated in nothing else than the false determination of
crime by the law, and the power of the ruler not
merely to execute laws, but to make, alter, and originate them.
But intimately connected with the theory of crime
(much more so than is usually imagined) is the
theory of natural property.  The law assumed crime
arbitrarily, and proceeded to punish it; it assumed




CRIME AND PROPERTY.                   329
property arbitrarily, and proceeded to protect it.  The
king, who had the power to make or unmake crimes,
had the power to dispose of the land that belonged to
the state.*  He sold or gifted it, and thus in the long
run the whole'of the lands of England, with  some
trifling exceptions, have been alienated from  the nation, and the burden of taxation has been placed upon
the  people.f  Superstition —that is, unfounded  cre* James I. considered that, "as it is atheism and blasphemy
in a creature to dispute what the Deity may do, so it is presumption
and sedition in a subject to dispute what the king may do in the
height of his power. Good Christians will be content with God's
will revealed in his Word; and good subjects will rest in the king's
will, revealed in his law." - (forks, 557-531.) This profane comparison was familiar to the servile lawyers of the day. (See Finch,
Law. 81. 3.) —Euc. Met.
t As an instance of the manner in which the lands of England
have been disposed of, and consequently the taxation placed on
the industrious classes, we give the following from the Biographia.Britannica: 
"In the year 1695, King Williamn made this nobleman [Lord
Portland] a grant of the lordships of Denbigh, Bromfield, Yale,
and other lands, containing many thousand acres, in the principality of Wales; which, being part of the demesne thereof, the
grant was opposed, and the House of Commons addressed the king
to put a stop to the passing it, which his majesty accordingly complied with, and recalled the grant, promising, however, to find some
other way of showing his favor to Lord Portland, who, he said, had
deserved it by long and faithful services; and this promise the
king after made good.....  It was not long after King William recalled these grants, before his majesty found means to make
Lord Portland others in recompense for the revenues of the principality of Wales, namely, a grant of certain buildings in Whitehall,
for forty-five years, at the rent of six shillings and eight pence; a
grant of the manor of Grantham, in the county of Lincoln; Honor
of Penrith, in the county of Cumberland; manor of Dracklaw and
28*




330               CRIME AND PROPERTY.
dece -  was at the bottom  of the king's right in both
cases; and  the  present inhabitants  of the British
islands are bound to observe the laws made i'n former
times, concerning crimes and property, just in so fkr
as those laws are now  equlitable, or wioutld now  be eeenacted  we   tere ere   o lawzs on  /tose suzjects.  The
present possessor of a portion of land derives not one
iota of present right from the former gift of a defunct
monarch; and  his right, to be now  valid, must be
such, that, were all his titles destroyed, the nation
would proceed to place him  in possession of the lands,
because he, as an individual man, had an equitable
claim  to them.  Just as, if all the laws and statutes
of England were destroyed, the nation would proceed
as usual to the arrest and punishment of the murderer
or robber   those persons being punished, not because
there are laws for their punishment, but because it is
just that they should be punished, and just that there
should be laws to punish.  The justice of the punishment does in no case derive from  the law, but the
Rudneth, in Cheshire; manor of Torrington, in Norfolk; manors
of Partington, Bristol, Garth, Hornsey, Thwing, Burnisley, and
Leven, in the county of York- all parcel of the ancient revenue
of the crown of England; the manor of Pevensey, in the county of
Sussex, parcel of the duchy of Lancaster; and all the lands and
tenements, &c., thereunto belonging, to hold to his lordship and his
heirs; and also his majesty's manor of East Greenwich, in the
county of Kent, under the rent of ~4 13s. 4d. a year."
The present effect of these grants is exactly equivalent to the
addition of the present annual value of these lands to the present
taxation of the community of Britain. Had the lands of England
not been alienated from the state, there need not have been one
penny of taxation on the industrious classes.




C-RIME AND PROPERTY.             t31.
whole force and validity of the law derives from  tle
justice of the punishment; and where the punishment
is not just, that punishment is a crime, whatever the
law may be, or whatever it may declare.
One striking fa.ct is apparent in considering the
past history of'-aws with regard to crimes and property.  The laws with regard to crimes have been
considered alterable; the laws with regard to property
have been considered unalterable. One generation of
legislators and rulers made an action a legal crime;
but the next generation did not, on that account,
consider itself bound forever so to esteem it.  Ol the
contrary, every generation of legislators has considered itself at full liberty to alter, revise, amend, and
abolish such laws, according to its own judgment.
But with regard fo the king's gift of lands it has been
quite otherwise.  The deeds of past rulers have been
supposed to extend to all future generations; and the
doctrine now prevalent is, that the lands, once alienated by the king's gift, could not be reassumed by the
nation without a breach of equity — without, in fact,
committing that crime abhorrent in the eyes of aristocracy -" attacking the rights of property."  This
discrepancy is at once explained, when we reflect that
the legislators of Britain have been for the most part
the landlords themselves, or those so immediately connected with their interests, that the government was,
to all intents and purposes, a landlordocracy. But the
question still occurs, and must occur again and again,
"If the acts of past rulers were not morally permanent with regard to crime, how can they possibly be
so with regard to property? and if they are morally




332            CRIME AND PROPERTY.
permanent with regard to property, how can they be
otherwise with regard to crime? "
We have now to show that crime and property are
ilot distinct; in fact, that, so far as regards legislation,
they are identical; and that the laws (or king's grants,
which are, in fact, nothing else than laws, although
this fact is overlooked) regarding  landed property
are- neither more nor less than laws regarding crime.
Property is usually regarded as an object —as something essentially distinguished from  action.  Yet we
shall undertake to show that action alone is concerned,
and Jhat all laws regarding property are merely laws
regarding action.  And if we succeed in doing this,
we have unhinged the superstition that prevails on the
subject of landed property -  we have loosened the
fabric of aristocracy, and laid open& a question that
for many years to come will occupy the attention of
Great Britain. There is already in the public minds
a very extensive suspicion that the present distribution
of the land is the true and main cause of England's
distress and Ireland's wretchedness; but the supposed
difficulty of presenting a scheme which should be
perfectly just in theory, and practicable and beneficial
if carried into effect, appears to have deterred many
from openly attacking the question, and from subjecting it to the same kind of calm and rational investigation so lavishly accorded to other questions of incomparably less importance. The apparent hopelessness,
also, of affecting any radical change in the present
system, and the fear of advocating " wild" doctrines,
have both exerted an influence in repressing investigation.  This apathy, however, cannot continue long.




CRIME AND PROPERTY,            333
Whatever may be the result, the investigation cannot
fail to be made; and even if it only terminated in
substantiating the validity of the " rights " of the landlords, it would be satisfactory to the country to know
that there was truth and not superstition at the bottom
of the arrangements.  But that such would be the
result is, at qll events, doubtful; and when the country
is thoroughly convinced of the futility of the ecoonomical schemes that appear one after another, - and it is
fast approaching that conviction, - it will allow the
administrators of the government to pursue their course
unheeded, while it fixes its own attention on prospective changes far more extensive than ever could
emanate from a government constituted like that of
Britain.
We now undertake to show that the gift of land by
the king is nothing.more than a law affecting action;
and, consequently, is of the same character as a law
relating to crime. And if so, it must follow the general course of the laws relating to crime; and if those
laws are not morally permanent, neither is the king's
gift of land morally permanent, but may be revised,
amended, or abolished, exactly in the same manner as
a law affecting crime. And over and above, we maintain, that neither the one nor the other is one atom
more valid, or more binding, on account of legislation,
but that they are right now, or wrong now, wholly and
solely according to their own merits; that the law cannot make a crime, although the law may call an action
by this name, and treat it as such; and. that the law
cannot make a portion of land property, although it
may call it property. Both crime and property are




334            CRIME AND PROPERTY.
anterior to law, and superior to it; and it was not to
make either the one or the other, but to prevent the
one and protect the other, that legislative law was
called into existence.  Law is not the moral measure
of right and wrong; but the rule of practice for the
policeman, constable, jailer, judge, sheriff, and hangman; and until law is absolutely perfect, there is a
canon higher than the canon of law, one more valid
and iMore stable - the canon of reason - to which law
itself must be subject.
A law  against crime is a public declaration that
certain acts ought not to be performed; and that he
who performs them  shall be visited with certain
specified penalties. This, we maintain, is exactly the
essence of the king's grant of landed property. Because, -
1st. The king's grant of land is an authorization to
use the land in favor of the grantee.  And, -
2d. The king's grant is a prohibition to all other persons to u.se the land.  And, -
3d. The law  declares that if any persons use the
land without permission of the grantee, they shall be
punished.
Now the essential part of this political arrangement
is this:  "All persons in the nation are forbidden,
under pains and penalties, to use a certain portion of
land, with the exception of the grantee, or by his permission."  This, then, is essentially a law  against
action —a law  declaring that to use a certain portion of land is a crime for the vast majority of the
population.
Now, if we turn to the effects of this arrangement,




PROPERTY IN LAND.                  335
we find that the grantee is in no respect bound to
make the land produce.  He may utterly neglect it;
nay, he may, as has actually been done recently in
the Highlands of Scotland (and as the king himself
did ages ago at the New Forest) - he may drive off
the population, drive off the sheep, (the food of
man,) and convert the district into a game desert
for his own amusement - he having plenty of wealth,
derived perhaps from  other lands, wherewith to support these costly  pleasures -  at the expense of ^he
nation.*
Such, on the side of the grantee, is the limit of
liberty.   Let us now  ask, what the limit is on the
part of the nation.   No  matter what may be the
state of the land -  even if it is lying waste, and producing nothing for man's support, as is actually the
case in many  parts of the kingdom — no  man in
Britain may put into it a spade or a potato, to save
his family  from  starvation, without incurring  the
penalties of the law.  He would be a criminal, (the
law would call him  so,) and he would be treated as
such.
This state of affairs represents the extremes; and
* "The Marquis of Breadalbane's forest of Corrichebach, or the
Black Mount, in Glenorchy, was restored at great cost(having been
previously converted into sheep walks) in 1820; it covers 35,000
acres." - Quarterly Review.
That is, if we understand the passage aright, these 35,000 acres
were formerly wild, and without sheep. Afterwards, sheep were
introduced, and consequently so much more food was produced.
And in 1820 the sheep were driven off, and the land again made a
game desert for the amusement of a single individual. Rights of
property!




336                PROPERTY IN LAND.
all that is better than the extremes is due, not to the
law, but to  the laws of nature.  Now, the law  has
done this grievous injury; it has deprived  the poor
of the natural remedy whereby they would have corrected so enormous an abuse.  Let us suppose that
there was no law, and that one  man  claimed thirty
thousand  acres  (see  last note) for  his amusement.
Other  persons  require  the  land  for their support.
They begin to  occupy it, and he endeavors to repel
them.  Now, what would be the natural consequence?
What ought the cultivators to do? Should they retire
and starve? or expatriate themselves?  They would
resist the aggression by force, and in  so doing they
would only do their duty.*  But the law will not allow
them  to resist.  The law  has first deprived them  of
the land, and then enlisted a standing army to prevent
them  from using the natural means of recovering it.t
But independently of the specific character of the
actual laws and  arrangements prevalent in Britain,
we take the question up on the most general ground,
* This principle, however startling in words, is universally acknowledged and acted on by civilized communities. When they
form colonies in lands inhabited by tribes which do not cultivate
the soil, but occupy it as a hunting-ground, the cultivating colonists
always repel.the aggression of the hunters.
t Exactly as the laws of Britain did, and the laws of the southern States do, first deprive a man of his natural liberty, and then
use the power of the state to prevent his recovering it by force.
One of the most curious superstitions in the world is the belief
that we may lawfully go to war with foreign men for a very slight
cause; and that we must not go to war with what people call our
own countrymen, even when they wrong us ten times more than the
foreigners..




PROPERTY INX LAND.             337
and we affirm, as a universal proposition, that where
there is not a question of action, there is no question
of morals. And, consequently, if any object be treated
of independently of human action, it does not come
within the limits of morals, and can give rise neither
to crime nor to duty. And, consequently, if the land
be separated from  the. question of hunnza action, it is
no longer property, but a mere physical object that
enters the physical sciences.  And, consequently, the
moment we endeavor to establish a distinction between
laws relating to property and laws relating to action,
we have obliterated property, and left only land in its
physical character, and not in its moral character. It
is the theory of human action alone that can make
land, or any thing else, property.  The very moment
we have used the word property in its moral sense, as
giving rise to duties and crimes, (or, rather, becoming
the object of duties and crimes,) that moment have we
involved it in the theory of human action, from which
it can never be separated until we return it to its physical signification.  And, when so returned, it can
neither be the object of a duty nor of a crime. In its
physical sense, land can give rise to no crimes, nor can
it ever be property until we consider it as involved in
the doctrine of human action.
And this being the case, the laws and arrangements
of past rulers relating to property are in no possible
respect more binding than their laws and arrangements
relating to crime, property being only a concise expression of a proposition that prohibits actions of a certain
character.  Drop the prohibition of the action, and
the property has altogether disappeared.  And, conse29




338             PROPERTY IN LAND.
quently, all past arrangements with regard to land are
as open to be revised, amended, or abolished, as past
arrangements with regard to actions called crimes,
and, consequently, there is no such thing as "the
rights of landed property" separated from  the mere
dictum of the law, which the nation has an undoubted
right to alter or abolish whenever it shall see fit to do
so. And if the nation were to resolve to resume and
take back all lands which had been granted by the
crown, (with considerations affecting those individuals
who had purchased,) the nation would not be guilty
of any crime, or wrong, or impropriety, but would be
exactly in the same position as it is when it abolishes
laws against witchcraft, or laws in favor of the slave
trade, or laws which make it a legal crime to be a
Jew or a Catholic.
Superstition, on this point, may endure for a few
years longer; but no truth can be more certain than
that God gave the land for the benefit of all; and if
any arrangement interfere with or diminish that benefit, then has man, as man, as the recipient of God's
bounty, an undoubted right to alter or abolish that
arrangement, exactly as he alters his arrangements
in agriculture, in medicine, in mechanics, or in navigation. No more crime, and no more wrong, attaches
to his alterations in the one case than in the other.
We have now, therefore, opened up the way for a
consideration of some of the effects that may reasonably be expected to follow the discovery of political
science.
1st. The major proposition, " Crime ought to be
prevented; and there ought to be laws, and an execu



MAJOR AND MINOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.  339
tive administration of those laws, for the prevention
of crime."  This major proposition is not ii dispute;
and the progression of man in his political aspect does
not consist in any alteration to be made in the major
proposition.
2d. The minor proposition, "What is a crime?
This and that action are crimes."  In this minor lies
the whole essence of political progression and political
amelioration. Political improvement takes place exactly as men discover and definitely determine the
true nature of crime; and exactly as they confine their
laws to the prohibition of those actions which are
crimes, and to the non-prohibition of those actions
which are not crimes. The laws of man cannot make
a crime, neither can they unmake a crime. Crime is
logically anterior to human legislation; and the very
end and intent of legislation, in its first and most
essential capacity, is to prevent crime.
All nations with which we are acquainted have
punished, as crimes, actions which were not crimes;
and the gradual improvement of the laws of man in
this respect is one of the great phenomena that we
learn from history. On the gradual alteration of the
laws (of Britain, for instance) may be based a most
conclusive argument, that political science is undergoing a gradual process of discovery, those laws being
altered invariably in accordance with a change of credence, gradually gaining ground with the population.
But while we have a positive major proposition, we
have also a negative major proposition, which is,"No action that is not a crime ought to be prevented by the law."




340           LAW  MEASURED BY JUSTICE.
Now, as legislators and rulers are only men, (there
is no divine wisdom  nor divine sacredness * about
them,) they may be the criminals as well as any of
the population; and if they assume powers and enforce laws which emanate from  their will, (and not
from  an impartial judgment,) they are exactly in the
case of an individual who commits crime by resorting
to violence.
It is quite easy for the generality of writers on
these subjects to treat of crime as committed by the
population.  They see so far, and  sometimes their
views are valuable and correct. But they have first
perched the government on a great height, which they
do not intend to survey, and then confine their observations to  the subject population.   To  include
both at one view appears a stretch beyond their power,
and hence their admirable dissertations are unsatisfactory; and by unsatisfactory, we do not mean that
they are not distinguished by talent of the highest
order, and by upright sincerity; but that they treat
* "James I. was so accustomed to regard himself, and to be
addressed by his flatterers as'the Lord's anointed,''the vicegerent of God upon earth,' in fact, a kind of deputed deity, that he
was constantly tempted to accuse his subjects of blasphemy and
irreligion when they presumed to oppose his will, or to call in question his lawless assumptions of authority; at the same time, there
was no form of impiety, from the light and irreverent mention of
the sacred name in familiar speech, to profane cursing and swearing, and to the blasphemous and audacious assumption of a kind
of parity with the Supreme Being, by which the lips and mind of
the prince himself were undefiled..... James was the first of
England to whom the unappropriate title of sacred majesty was
applied." - Miss AIRIN'S Mem. Court, James I.




LAW MEASURED BY JUSTICE.            341
only one portion of the phenomenon, and omit its correlative. Exactly as if one were to write an able dissertation on the earth's motion, furnishing us with a
perfect diagram and specification of the orbit, and an
exact determination of the velocity, and yet should
altogether omit to mention the sun. Such a dissertation, let its details be as perfect as they may, wouild
be altogether unsatisfactory; because the correlative,
the sun, has not been exhibited in its relations to the
earth.
And so it is with crime.  He who studies crime as
a portion of man.science, (and not merely as accidentally treated of in this system of law that happens
to be in force in Britain, or that system  of law that
happens to be in force in another country,) must include in his view the whole phenomzenon, and must
inquire what does man do, as man.  And when we
turn to Britain with this principle, we must regard
the whole population, king, lorls, commons, soldiers,
judges, laborers, paupers, in fact, the whole mass of
society, as merely men.  And when we define crime,
and find that actions coinciding with that definition
are performed by any of these parties, by whatever
name they may be called, or under whatever pretences
they may appear, we must not hesitate to call the
action by the name of crime, and to say, This is a
crime committed by men. Reverence for law, as law,
as a human rule of action de facto enacted by legislators, is mere debasing superstition; nor, however
venerable law may be in some men's estimation, do
we consider either their law or their worship of it at
29 *




342              SUPREAIACY  OF JUSTICE.
all entitled to respect.*   Men venerate law  and care
nothing  for justice, just as they venerate the  priest
and forget the Deity.  And if any legislature, or any
king, commit an act, which act would not be equitable between two individuals, we no more hesitate to
call it a crime in the one case as well as in the other.
And when legislators, taking advantage of the superstitious. veneration  which  men  still have for power
and  human  authority, proceed  to  prohibit actions
* As an instance of the manner in which lawyers regard the
social institutions of men, we may give the following quotation
from Crabb's " History of English Law," p. 7: -
"It is worthy of observation, that all the Saxon lawgivers showed
great wisdom in the business of legislation, by admitting no laws
into their selections but what were adapted to the temper and
manners of their subjects, being for the most part taken fromn
people that were nearly allied to themselves."
On the very next page, we have an illustration of the great
wisdom of the Saxon lawgivers. " The Saxon people were divided
into freemen and slaves.",
Slavery, servitude, villenage, and every one of its modifications,
is a political institution, though this fact is apt to be overlooked
when the slave comes to be viewed as the property of another Jnan.
But what is politics? The system of rules which ought to prevail
between man and man; and law ought to consist of those rules
reduced to human enactment.  Individual injustice may make a
man a slave, and the action is a crime; but the criminality does not
in the slightest degree diminish when the action is authorized by
human laws. Now, in a country that has assumed the form of
a state, slavery could not exist unless it were authorized by the lawv:
and the evil influence of human law has been, that it sanctioned
this, and many other abominations, using the armed force of the
state for their continuance, and transmitting them to posterity as
institutions under which men were born, and which, to a certain
degree, were to them natural, or, rather, habitual.




SUPREMIACY OF JUSTICE.              343
which are not crimes, and to burden the population
with unequal taxation, and to exclude large portions
of the population from equal rights in the eye of the
law and in the scheme of the state, we do not hesitate
to affirm  that such legislation  should be regarded
exactly in the same light that individual violence or
restraint would be regarded.  MIen are the agents, the
actors, in the one case as well as in the other; and
the action which is wrong for individuals without titles,
is equally wrong for individuals called by any names
that the imagination could devise.  Man, as man, is
bound by the moral laws of justice, and no arrangements which the -human race could make can ever
emancipate any portion of that race from  the same
rules and requirements that are binding on individuals.
The whole idea of a ruler, of a man, or body of men,
who may interfere with others on, principles different
from those that regulate individual or private interference, is a mere idolatrous superstition, debasing in its
influence, and disastrous in its effects.  The almighty
Maker and Ruler of mankind will have men subject to
justice, and not to men; and the very moment the
rules of justice, which vary not, nor can vary, are departed from, that moment is man relieved from  his
allegiance to the ruler; and if the population have the
power, they may arrest the rulers, and bring them  to
the same judicial trial that would be reserved for the
individual.*
* This principle, although frequently represented as seditious, is
not only clearly acknowledged, but reduced to specific law in Magna Charta. The principle is acknowledged, although the application of it is restricted to twenty-five barons, chosen by the whole




344            LAW  VERSUS LEGISLATION.
And hence the necessity for a " science of justice,"
that men   definitely ascertaining, on principles which
are not arbitrary, the real actions which are criminal —
may appoint a first magistrate to carry into execution
the laws of justice.  And this first magistrate-king,
president, or any thing else,-is not to govern men,
but to regulate them  according to the laws of equity;
and, in performing this function, he occupies the highest position to which man may attain, and, performing
his duties with impartial sincerity, he merits the constant respect, aid, and support of every person in the
land.  This portion of the British  constitution, the
first magistrate king, the independent judges, and the
jury  from  the locality, is unsurpassed, if not unequalled, by any thing in the whole history of man.
In  England, we have in this portion of our political
mechanism the most profound reason for thankfulness
to God.  And we do not hesitate to make a curious
assertion -that if our political rulers (those who tax
and restrict us) were brought into the courts of law as
individuals peiforming  certain  specified acts towards
other individuals, the ordinary process of criminal trial
of the barons; and a reservation is made in favor of the persons of
the king, queen, and royal children. Chapter xxxviii. specifies the
manner in which four barons, chosen out of the twenty-five, shall
notify any grievance, and petition to have it redressed without
delay: " And if it is not redressed by us, (the king,) or if we
should chance to be out of the realm, if it is not redressed by our.justiciary within forty days, &c., the four barons aforesaid shall lay
the cause before the rest of the twenty-five barons, and the said
twenty-five barons, together with the community of the whole kingdom; shall distrain and distress us all the ways possible; namely, by
seizing our castles, lands, possessions," &c.




UNIVERSALITY OF JUSTICE.           345
by jury, and jiudge, and law, would at once rectify
nearly every political evil in the country.  I-lad the
slave owner been tried, he could not have been convicted because of the law; but had the legislature been
tried for making laws to allow slavery, and for Musing'
the British arms to support it, there can be no question
that, if the ordinary decisions were adhered to, the
jury would have found the legislature guilty, and England may proudly say that her judges would not have
hesitated to pronounce the condemnation.
Only let the taxer, and the taxee, who is excluded
from a voice in the representation, be viewed as two
men, or two bodies of men; let them  enter the present
courts of law, and let the case be tried irrespective of
political considerations, and there can be no doubt that
the taxee would establish his right to dispose of his
property without the interference of the taxer. They
are only men, neighbors; and what is not just between
two men, never can be just, however great the number
of individuals, or however euphonious the names that
may be applied to them.
This principle of allowing no man whatever, and
no body of men whatever, to emancipate themselves
from the strict requirements of justice, but in all their
corporate actions to be subject to the same principles
of equity that are binding on the individual —this
principle is the great end of political amelioration. In
advocating it, we teach doctrines, it is true, which are
little less than revolutionary; and revolutions, either
moral or physical, there must be until the ultimate
term of man's political progression is evolved, and the
course of transition from the rule of power to the rule




346           UNIVERSALITY OF JUSTICE.
of reason is complete.  Ve advocate, not a breach of
justice, but its univiersal extension; its extension to all
the acts of man, as mvan, whether he appear under the
form of an isolated individual, or under the more imposing aspect of a deliberative assembly and executive
government, ruling the millions of a state.  All we
ask is, that the same principles that regulate the laws
as they affect individuals, should be extended to the
political actions of the rulers; and if once this principle were realized, all partiality, class legislation, privilege, colnmercial restriction, customs laws, game laws,
&c., would immediately disappear. These things have
no foundation except in the will of the rulers; and
mall, as man, is neither bound to obey or acknowledge
as a dispenser of justice that government that persists
in imposing on the population its own superstitious
and destructive devices, instead of the impartial laws
of equity, made equally for all men and equally administered.
Under these circumstances, it may be affirmed that
the first great effect that will follow the discovery of
political science, is the definite and non-arbitrary determination of the great minor, "What is a crime?"
And this being determined according to a scientific
method which shall command the assent of the human
intellect, the practical consequence will be, that every
restriction will be removed from  every action that is
not a crime.  And consequently there will be perfect
freedom for every man to exercise his talents and his
industry without state interference, or restriction, or
taxation of any kind whatever, so long as he shall continue to refrain from those actions which, according to




DEFINITION OF CRIME.                 347
the science of equity, are demonstrated to be crimes.
Progression -  that is, change -  must be anticipated
as natural and necessary, until the political aspect of
mankind  shall present a realization of this condition.
Definitely to determine what is a crime, and what is
not a crime, is one of the first great problems of political science.'We define crime to be, " a breach of
equity;"* and consequently we maintain that whatever is not a breach of equity is not a crime, and
under no circumstances whatever ought to be prohibited or restricted by the laws. Absolute freedom, then,
to perform every action that is not a breach of equity,
constitutes the great final termination of man's political progress, so far as liberty is concerned.
But what is man's final termination with regard to
the other great substantive of politics, property?
Here we approach a subject that, in the course of a
few years, (in all probability,) will be the great element
of strife and contention.  Here is the rock on which
England's  famous  constitution  of king, lords, and
commons will suffer its final shipwreck.   Such  an
assertion is, of course, at present a mere opinion; but
if the scheme we have  advanced be in  the main: It may, perhaps, be necessary to add,  or of decency."  The
repression of offences against decency forms, however, a very small
portion of man's political action. With the exception of these, and
the observance of the Sabbath, we believe our definition to be general. It is the true political definition; but the political definition
does not exactly include every thing that men in society have to
take into consideration. Political science is abstract; but the real
substantive, man, is concrete; and his condltlions must be considered in applying the science to his circumstances.




348           SERFDOM A NT ARTSTOCRACY.
correct, then we do not hesitate to affirm, that if we continue that scheme into the future, we may see that the
question of landed property will be the cause of a stupendous struggle between  the  aristocracy  and  the
laborocracy of Britain, and that its final settlement
will entail the destruction  of the constitution.  And
the question lies in narrow bounds, all that is required
being an answer to a question virtually the following: "Is the population to be starved, pauperized, and
expatriated, or is the aristocracy to be destroyed?"*
For ourselves, we have not the slightest hesitation in
predicting  the final result; but what may  be the
mechanism  of the changes requires altogether a different course of investigation.  On the mode of change
we pronounce no opinion; but on the matter of change
we no more hesitate to prognosticate than we do to
predict that, ere a few  years longer, the millions of
Russian serfs will have gained their emancipation;
and surely serfdom is as ancient and venerable an institution as aristocracy.
Serfdom  and aristocracy are, in fact, the correlatives
of each. other.  Wherever there are serfs, there there
are aristocrats; and  wherever there are aristocrats,
there there are serfs; and though the laborers of England are not serfs in one sense, inasmuch as they may
emigrate if they can find the means, they are, to all intents and lurposes, serfs so long as they remain in
* By the destructionof the aristocracy, we do not mean the destruction of the aristocrats, any more than by the destruction of pauperism, we should mean the destruction of the persons of the paupers. It is to the system that we refer exclusively, and only as
either system has been created by the arrang'ements of men.




SERFDOM AND ARISTOCRACY.          349
England.  It is a mere fallacy to suppose that serfdom
has been abolished in England. It has not been abolished, it has only been generalized. And here we must
have recourse to an illustration to show that serfdom,
or even slavery, may be abolished in appearance, and
yet retained in reality, the means of compulsion being
changed with the advance of society, which would
no longer tolerate the open employment of individual
force.
Let us suppose an island divided into thirty estates.
These estates belong to thirty proprietors, and are
cultivated  by slaves, by genuine out-and-out salable
negroes. These slaves are the property (!) of the
white proprietors, each of whom  has a stock of one
hundred.  There are then thirty proprietors, and three
thousand laboring slaves, supported by the island —
the slaves having sustenance and the labor, the proprietors having indolence and the luxury. As the slaves
belong to the proprietors, they are individual slaves,
confined to the cultivation of their respective estates.
Let us now suppose that the proprietors made a new
arrangement of their affairs; that, instead of possessing each a hundred slaves, they thought it would be
more convenient to establish a system by which those
proprietors who wanted the labor of more at any
particular time should be able to have it, and those
who at any particular time had not work for a hundred, should relieve themselves of the expense of their
keep. To effect this, and to throw the trouble of the
new system  on the slaves, they abandon the system  of individual slavery, and generalize it. Each
proprietor gives up his right to his negroes; but
30




3-50         SERFDOM AND ARISTOCRACY.
the negroes are still to do the work of the island, and
the proprietors are still to have the profit. Nor is it
difficult to effect this arrangement without compulsion
- all that is necessary being to establish the rule, that
the negroes shall be fed by those for whom they work,
and that their wages shall be their sustenance. All the
land being in the hands of the proprietors, the negroes
can obtain support only by laboring for the proprietors.  But it is found that the new arrangement has
still its inconveniences.  At certain seasons of the
year there is not work for the whole three thousand
laborers; and as they can only obtain support from
the proprietors, the latter establish a general or corporate fund for the sustenance of those who happen to
be out of employ. This is a poor-law.
But still the system is capable of improvement;
that is, more of the trouble may be allotted to the negroes, without the profits of the proprietors being interfered with. The proprietors under.the present system
are obliged to provide the aliments of the laborers, and
this of course is not only troublesome, but the regulation of the quantity is attended with inconveniences.
The proprietors, therefore, knowing that they have all
the land, and that the laborers cannot find support
except by laboring for them, establish an intermediate
class, (of shopkeepers,) who receive the provisions from
the proprietors and dispense them to the laborers. The
shopkeepers are only transformed laborers, employed
in a particular department of the economy of the
island.
This new system, however, requires a means of exchange to enable the proprietors to be certain that none




SERFDOM AND ARISTOCRACY.            351
of the laborers obtain food without doing the necessary work, and labor must therefore have a representative, which shall enable the laborer to obtain his day's
food when he has done his day's work. This representative is money. The laborer does a day's work,
and receives a coin, a shell, a token, or a piece of
paper, the essential character of which is -that it is
"an order for a day's food."
But the shopkeeper being, a laborer, must receive
his own food, and this he does by receiving for the tokens which represent labor a larger quantity from the
proprietors than the quantity he gives to the laborers.
The figure might be extended, and the system of
modern society might be made to growlout of the two
primary elements, the proprietor and the slave.
But what we ask is this, Are the laborers, when their
slavery has been generalized, and money has been introduced, are they not still the serfs of the proprietors?
True, the proprietors have no longer individual slaves,
and cannot inflict individual punishments; but the
whole body of the laborers still belong to the whole
body of the proprietors, inasmuch as the land belongs
to the latter, and the laborers cannot obtain their sustenance without laboring for them.
Now, suppose the accumulated profits of the proprietors were sufficient to enable them to live for a certain
number of years without the cultivation of their lands,
and they should by any mad freak resolve to do so,
and not to employ the laborers; the latter would, of
course, be reduced to destitution and starvation; so
that, although the individual life of a laborer is not in
the hands of an individual proprietor, the lives of the




352             SERFDOM  AND ARISTOCRACY.
whole class of laborers would be in the hands of the
class of the proprietors. And if a large proportion of
the latter were to absent themselves from the island,
and not to cause the lands to be cultivated, of course
a large portion of the laborers would be reduced to
want, or perhaps to hunger-fever and  death.   And
this is what takes place in Ireland.*
Now, are not the laborers serfs under these circumstances?  We maintain that they  are, and that the
laborers t of England, Ireland, and Scotland are serfs;
though the name is a disagreeable one, and the fact of
their serfdom  is concealed by the economical arrangements by which  the internal business of the country
is carried on.  The laborers are the serfs, and the proprietors are the aristocracy; and  it makes little or no
difference whether we have an imaginary island with
thirty proprietors and three thousand laboring serfs, or
* General statement in acres of the cultivated, uncultivated, and
unprofitable land of the United Kingdom. - (Mront the Third Report of the Emigration Committee.)
Uncultivated
Cultivated. wastes capable           Total.
of improve-  Unprofitable.
ime t.
England..... 25,632;000   3,454,000 13,256,400  32,342,400
Wales....   3,117,000     530,000   1,105,000   4,752,000
Scotland....  5,265,000   5,950,000  8,523,930  19,738,930
Ireland.....  12,125,280   4,900,000  2,416,664  19,441,944
British Islands.    383,690   166,000    569,469   1,119,159
46,522,970  15,000,000 15,871,463  77,394,433
f By laborers, of course, we mean all who labor for their bread,
whether merchants, manufacturers, professional men, artisans
farmers, agricultural laborers, operatives, &c.




SERFDOM AND ARISTOCRACY.                  353
a real island with thirty thousand proprietors and five
or six millions of laboring serfs.   Let the political arrangements be what they may, let there be universal or
any other suffrage, so long as the aristocracy have all
the land, and derive the rent of it, the laborer is only a
serf, and a serf he will remain until he has uprooted
the rights of private landed property.  The land is for
the nation, and not for the aristocracy.
We affirm, then, that serfdom  has not been abolished, but only generalized, in England, Ireland, and
Scotland; and this generalization appears to be the
step of transition through which society must pass, in
its progress from the condition of individual lord and
individual serf, to the condition of equitable equality,
in which there shall be no lord and no serf, but only
freemen without privileges and without oppressions.*
But it is necessary to understand what we mean by
a lord and a serf.
A  serf is a  man who, by  the  arrangements of
* "These villeins, belonging principally to lords of manors,
were either villeins regardant, — that is, annexed to the manor or
land, -or else they were in gross, or at large; that is, annexed to
the person of the lord, and transferable by deed from one owner
to another. They could not leave their lord without his permission, but, if they ran away or were purloined from him, might
be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts or other chattels.
They held, indeed, small portions of land, by way of sustaining
themselves and families, but it was at the mere will of the lord,
who might dispossess them whenever he pleased; and it was upon
villein services, that is, to carry out dung, to hedge and ditch the
lord's demesnes, and any other the meanest offices; and their
services were not only base, but uncertain, both as to their time
and quantity. A villein, in short, was in much the same state
30*




354            SERFDOM AND ARISTOCRACY.
mankind, is deprived of the object on which he might
expend his labor, or of the natural profit that results
from  his labor, and, consequently, is under the necessity of supporting himself and his family by his labor
alone.  And a lord, or an aristocrat, is a man who, by
the arrangements of' mankind, is made to possess the
object, and who, consequently, can support himself
and his family without labor, on the profits created by
the labor of others.  This is the essential distinction
between the lord and the serf; and we maintain that
the constitution of the world forbids that any arrangement of this kind should result in any other than an
evil condition of society, which must necessarily condemn a large part of the population to physical degradation; and  if to  physical  degradation, to  moral
degradation.  No instance can be adduced of a population reduced to extreme poverty - as must ever be
the case where the land, the great source of wealth, is
allotted to a few who labor not —where that populawith us as Lord Molesworth describes to be that of the boors in
Denmark, and which Stiernhoak attributes also to the traals or
slaves in Sweden, which confirms the probability of their being, in
some degree, monuments of the Danish tyranny. A villein could
acquire no property either in lands or goods; but, if he purchased
either, the lord might enter upon them, oust the villein, and seize
them to his own use, unless he contrived to dispose of them again
before the lord had seized them, for the lord had then lost his
opportunity.
"In many places, also, a fine was payable to the lord if the viliein presumed to marry his daughter to any one without leave from
the lord; and, by the common law, the lord might also bring an
action against the husband for damages in thus purloining his property." - BLACKSTONE'S Commentaries, book ii. chap. 6.




DETERIORATION OF MAN.'      355
tion has not been also and in consequence reduced to
moral'and  intellectual degradation, and  where the
spirit of man has not been depraved and borne down
by the circumstances in which man, and not God, has
placed him.'
In endeavoring to estimate what rmust be the ultimate condition  of mankind with  regard to  natural
property, we  have  two  methods  of determination:
first, that of political science; second, that of analogy,
based on the actual history of the past evolution of
mankind  with  regard  to natural liberty.  We  have
already stated that the too great substantives of politics are liberty and property.  Each of these gives rise
* Poverty and want are evils, inasmuch as they produce human
suffering; but they are far greater evils, as they tend to produce
the deterioration oji man. And when this deterioration is produced
by the political arrangements of a country, with regard to the land
and the other natural sources of wealth, the alteration of those
arrangements becomes a moral duty of the very highest character.
As an illustration of this deterioration of man, we quote the following passage from the Edinburgh Review, October, 1848, where the
writer is treating of man scientifically, and without reference to
politics. Let the reader contrast this passage with a political article in the same number of the Edinburgh Review, where the writer
appears to assert, that " of a hundred honest, industrious, and
upright men, the vast majority are certain to do well." According
to theslaws of nature they would do well, but according to the laws
of Ireland no personal qualifications would relieve the masses from
hopeless poverty so long as the present politcal arrangements are
allowed to remain. In Ireland, the object of labor (the land) has
been taken from the inhabitants, and vast districts are lying unimproved and uncultivated in the face of a population willing to work
for the lowest wages. On the one hand is the land lying idle, and
on the other is the labor lying idle; and the landlordocracy is the
obstacle that prevents the two from being brought into contact, and




356              LIBERTY AND PROPERTY.
to a course of evolution, and the two courses of evolution  are analogous; that is, the process is similar,
while  the  substantives involved  in the process are
diverse. Thus the lord and the serf present the farthest possible remove from  equity, both  as regards
liberty and as regards property; and the process by
which  the  serf gradually  emancipates  his personal
actions from the power of the lord, may be taken as
an indication  of the process by which he will ultimately succeed in depriving the lord of his exclusive
possession of the earth, and thereby emancipating his
own labor from the burdens that oppress it, and from
the depreciation of value which it must necessarily
thereby securing an abundant provision for the population.  So
long as the land is unimproved and uncultivated, it is nonsense to
assert that Ireland is over-populous, or that she.could not support a
much larger population. It is the law, and not nature, that reduces
Ireland to starvation.
"Races which have advanced the farthest in civilization, and
attained the greatest perfection of physical form, produce also
examples of physical inferiority in individuals or families. Among
other consequences of long-continued want and ignorance, the
conformation of the cranium appears to have been affected. The
Sanatory Commission would arrive at this conclusion, we believe,
were it to examine the worst part of the population of our great
towns; the most convincing proof, however, is unfortunately furnished by the lowest classes of the Irish population." Thee are
certain districts in Leitrim, Sligo, and Mayo, (as pointed out by an
intelligent writer in the Dublin University /Magazine, No. 48,)
chiefly inhabited by the descendants of the native Irish, driven
by the British from Armagh and the south of Down, about two
centuries ago. These people, whose ancestors were well grown,
able bodied, and comely, are now reduced to an average stature of
five feet, two inches, are pot-bellied, bow legged, and abortively
featured, and are especially remarkable for "open, projecting




THE LORD AND THE SERF.                   357
experience, so long as the great body of the population
are merely laborers for the lords.  And laborers for
the lords the great body of the population must be,
so long as the soil, the mines, the fisheries, &c., are
accorded to a small number of individual proprietors.
As regards personal liberty, the lord and the serf
present the  greatest possible  diversity.   They  are
the  antipodes, the  positive  and  negative  poles, of
man's possible condition.  The  antagonism   cannot
be greater; it is absolute, ultimate, final. Man cannot make the disparity more perfect; it is the absolute dominion of strength, and the absolute subjection
of weakness. The lord is the possessor, the serf is the
mouths, with prominent teeth and exposed gums, their advancing
cheek bones and depressed noses bearing barbarism on their very
front." In other words, within so short a period they seem to have
acquired a prognathous type of skull, [" the third type of configuration of the skull has been very happily named by Dr. Prichard
prognathous, to express its most distinctive character, namely, the
forward prominence of the jaws,"] like the savages of Australia,'6 thus giving an example of deterioration from known causes, as
almost compensates by its value to future ages for the suffering
and debasement which past generations have endured in perfecting
its appalling lesson."  "The hordes of wretched Irish, whom
famine has driven to seek subsistence in the seaports and manufacturing towns of Great Britain, must have enabled many of our
readers to make this observation for themselves: every gradation
being perceptible, from the really noble type of countenance and
figure seen in some of them, to that utterly debased aspect which
can be looked at only with disgust....... In both cases (the
Irish and the Australians) the same cause- a long-continued
deficiency of food and social degradation (where a sufficient elevation to resist these depressing agencies had not been previously
attained)- has terminated in the same results."-Edinburgh Review, October, 1848, p. 443.




358            rNTE LORD AND THE SEIRF.
possessed; the one is a being who commands, the
other a thing who obeys.  The one has the profit
without the labor, the other the labor without the
profit.
Such a condition -contrary as it is to every principle of reason, of equity, and of religion -is not only
established by licentious power, but authorized and
perpetuated by human law.  And thus the iniquity
was made to receive a sanction, which, although based
on the darkest superstition, yet lent a kind of moral
authorization to the system, and enabled the lords to
speak of their rights; while the serfs, on the other
hand, were impressed with a kind of fear that they
might be doing wrong when they resorted to force to
rid themselves of the oppression.
And the history of the acquisition of liberty (in
Britain, for instance) is only the history of the gradual
destruction of the privileges of the lord, and of the
legal title which the serf has from  time to time succeeded in establishing to those natural rights of which
he had been deprived. The vast transformations that
have taken place in the social conditions of Englishmen may be concisely expressed in the proposition,
that " they have gradually, and through the course of
many centuries, been progressing from the extreme of
antagonism  and disparity towards absolute equality
in the eye of the law, so far as the matter of liberty'
is concerned."*  It is true that this process is not
t " The rest of their slaves have not, like ours, particular employments allotted to them. Each is the master of a habitation
and household of his own. The lord requires from him a certain
quantity of grain, cattle, or cloth, as from a tenant; and so far only




EQUALITY IN THE EYE OF THE LAW.                359
yet complete, and  that considerable  changes must
yet take place before the government of the country
becomes the impartial administrator of equal law, made
the same for every inhabitant of the country, without
the slightest distinction of individuals or of classes,
except in  so far as individuals may be made to fill
offices; which offices may have peculiar duties, peculiar responsibilities, and peculiar remunerations attached"to them.  But this question of official disparity
is a mere question of executive administration, similar
to the appointment of directors or managers in a corporate concern, where some are appointed to act for
all; without, however, establishing any disparity of
rights, but only such a disparity of functions as the
common judgment of the society may find advisable
for the success of its operations.
If, then, the progress of modern society has been a
gradual but sure progress from  the extreme of disparity towards absolute parity in the eye of the law,
so far as personal liberty is concerned, we have only
to identify the laws of property with the laws of libthe subjection of the slave extends. His domestic offices are performed by his own wife and children. It is unusual to scourge a
slave, or punish him with chains or hard labor. They are sometimes killed by their masters; not through severity of chastisement,
but in the heat of passion, like an enemy, with this difference, that
it is done with impunity. Freedmen (manumitted slaves) are little
superior to slaves, seldom filling any important office in the family;
never in the state, except in those tribes which are under regal
government. There they rise above the freeborn, and even the
nobles; in the rest, the subordinate condition of the freedmen is a
proof of freedom."-TACITUS, Manners of the Germans, xxv
(Aiken's Translation.)




360    EQUALITY IN THE EYE OF THE LAWV,
erty to arrive at a firm conviction, that the progress
will continue in the same direction until parity in the
eye of the law shall be evolved, so far as natural property is concerned. If we were to view the laws relating to natural property (the earth) as distinct from
the laws relating to personal liberty, then we should
base an argument on analogy, and we should maintain that the evolution that has taken place in the
matter of liberty would also take place in the matter
of natural property. And this argument would be
valid, and would afford a high probability that the
equalization of natural property was to be anticipated as the conclusion of human evolution in that
department.
But if property be considered as one of the substantives of moral dynamics, and if we reason the question on the scheme of human action-inquiring not
into the laws that have reference to the object, but
into the laws that have reference to man and man's
actions —we thereby identify the laws of liberty and
the laws of property, and come to view both as the
laws that should preside over human function; because, to allocate a certain portion of the earth to one
individual, is only to prohibit all other individuals
from using that portion, and the question, viewed in
this light, can only be argued as a branch of the more
general question, "How can one man justly lay restrictions on another man?"  And when the question
is viewed in this light, it is plainly evident that there
is no such thing as a law of property, distinct and
separate from a law of liberty, but that the theory of
liberty must include the theory of property; and if




AND IN THE SCHEME OF THE STATE.    361
the time should come when the law shall be impartial
with regard to human action, then of necessity must
the law be impartial with regard to natural property;
in fact, with regard to every thing thact is not crecated by
the skill and labor of the individutal
Let us consider that the very essence of just law
is, that it is "no respecter of persons," and that
a priori it acknowledges no difference and no distinction between the individuals who are to be regulated
by-its enactments.  Law, to be just, must be the same
for all the individuals who are to be subject to it;
and if law be made in such a manner that it imposes
on one man a restriction which it does not impose on
another, then is that.law not just, nor is man morally
bound to acknowledge it or obey it.  The validity of
law depends exclusively on its equity and impartiality;
and wherever the law  starts by acknowledging or
establishing diversities of privileges, there is the law
unjust, partial, and wicked; and it is the duty of man,
as man, to destroy that law, and to reestablish the
equilibrium of equity, whici ought never to have been
disturbed.  The very end and intention of impartial
law is the prevention of the disturbance of the equilibrium  of equity; and where the law, instead of
preventing this disturbance, originates, defends, and
perpetuates it, that law has altogether departed from
the true intention of law, and its abolition is absolutely
necessary before man can attain to the best condition
possible for him on earth.
We are fully aware that there exists in the minds
of many persons a vague apprehension, that if the
present laws relating to landed property were to be
31




362     EQUAtLI'TY IN THE EYE OF TIHE LAW 
disturbed, evils of the most malignant character would
invade the society of Britain.  Nothing can be more
absurd, more puerile, more dastardly. The very same
fears have prevailed with regard to every other change
that has taken place; and, down to the last change
that man shall make in his political arrangements, we
may rest satisfied that the craven, the placeman, and
the aristocrat will not fail to vent loud lamentations
on the evils which, in their estimation, are sure to follow.  The oft-repeated quotation from the great bard,
"'Tis better to bear the ills we have, than fly to others
that we know not of," is dragged in to give the sanction of that proud name to fears which he would have
regarded with scorn, and to interested representations
which he would have rejected with detestation. True,
in Shakspeare's sense, it is better to bear the ills of
human life than to rush with the red hand into the
presence of the almighty Giver of life. True, this is
true. And even in our own lot it may be better to
bear one worldly evil than to make a change which
might entail other worldly evils which we know not
of. This also is true. But surely none can be so besotted as not to perceive that the question comes in
another form, and that a new reading must be adopted
before we can have an applicable sentiment.  The
question, wlherever tlhere is izjustice, is not, whether it
is better to bear the ills we have; but, whether it is
better to make others bear the ills we inflict upon
them; and, whether it is better for them to bear the
ills which mnen inflict, than fly to changes which deliver
the oppressed from  the pain, and the oppressor from
the sin, of the injustice,




AND IN THE SCHEME OF THE STATE.    363
But while we maintain that the continual progress
of mankind is towards equality in the eye of the lcaw,
and that as men were once at the utmost extreme of
inequality, and have been gradually and surely decreasing that inequality; and consequently that we
have the evidence of past history to give us the line
of progress, and the evidence of reason that, if that
line continue, it must terminate in the total abolition
of privilege and the establishment of absolute equality; we have also the dogma of political science,
which proves equality to be righlt, and evidence from
the other sciences to prove that what is right ultimately comes to be adopted in practice.
This portion of the argument presents itself in the
following aspect:1st. There is no possibility of establishing a diversity of rights between the various individuals of which
the human race is composed, in so far as those individuals enter into relation with each other for the formation of a state or community, acting for -the common
advantage.
In saying that there is no possibility of establishing
such a diversity of rights, we mean, that there is no
natural source of knowledge whatever from  which
such a diversity could possibly flow. There may be a
diversity of strength, or of intellect, or of skill, or of
cunning; but the very moment we admit an abstract
or general moral law, we absolutely obliterate the possibility of a diversity of rights. Men find themselves
on the surface of the globe, and find themselves also
possessed of a reason which furnishes general propositions applicable to the race:; and there exists no




364     EQUALITY IN TIIE EYE OF THE LAW,
natural means whatever of determining what individual men should possess more rights than their fellows,
or what individual men should possess fewer rights than
their fellows. The only possible means by which such
a diversity could be established, would be. a revelation
from the Creator of mankind; and except in the one
case, of the Hebrew nation, we have no evidence that
the Creator has ever pointed out any individuals, or
any families, who were to enjoy specified rights, in
contradistinction to the general rights which men derive from the intuitions of the reason.
2d. Men having fallen from the first estate in which
they were created, have in their moral actions and political arrangements followed, not the dictates of their
impartial reason, but the dictates of their selfish passions; and thus those in power have not only acted
wrongfully, but have enacted wrong, bad, and wicked
laws, thereby perpetuating the injustice under the formal sanction of legislation.
3d. On this account, human laws and human
arrangements, instead of being impartial and for the
benefit of human society at large, have originated and
perpetuated systems of partiality, whereby power and
privilege were accorded to certain individuals, families,
classes, castes, &c., at the expense of the other members of the race; who, of necessity, were restricted in
their rights in the same ratio that the privileged classes
were endowed with privileges.
4th. Human society, therefore, instead of presenting
an ethically homogeneous aspect, resulting from the
universal prevalence of impartial law, (which laid on
all exactly the same moral restrictions, and which




AND IN THE SCHEME OF THE STATE.    365
accorded to all exactly the same liberty for the development of individual labor, skill, industry, and enterprise,)
has exhibited the human race as divided into classes
endowed with diverse privileges; and has figured forth,the antagonism of the oppressor and the oppressed,
instead of the harmony of equal freemen, each developing his own fortunes within those moral restrictions
which are immutable.
5th. But the arrangements of mankind have not
only established diversities of rights affecting mere
action, (in Britain, for instance, we have a franchised
class and an unfranchised class; that is, a freed class,
or class of freed serfs, and an unfreed class, or class of
laboring serfs not yet freed,) but they have established
diversities of rights affecting the possession of the
earth, which the Creator intended for the race; and
thus one man was endowed with vast extents of territory, while, on the other hand, multitudes were thereby
necessarily deprived of every thing except their labor.
So singular a system could only originate in the reigrn
of power, and could only be perpetuated through the
ignorance of the masses of the population. But the
arrangements of mankind with regard to the earth did
not stop here. One generation was not content with
making arrangements which were to be in force for
that generation alone; but laws were enacted, and
customs were acknowledged, whereby the arranges
ments of one generation were to descend to future
generations, and to be imposed on men not yet born,
who were to be born into a world already portioned
out, and, consequently, to which they had no title.
Those, therefore, who were born into the world in a
31*




366       EQUALITY  IN THE EYE OF ~TIE LAW,
country where the land had been  accorded to individual proprietors, could obtain  their livelihood only by
laboring  for other men; and  as those to whom  the
land had been  accorded could not cultivate it themselves, and as the land was required for the support of
the population, the laborers were under the necessity
of paying a rent to those who thus procured a vast
revenue without labor.  This system  of diversity of
rights to the natural earth, which God intended for the
race, being perpetuated from  generation to generation,
entails with it, as its necessary attendant, that baneful
condition  of society, in which we have  a few  aristocrats endowed with vast wealth without labor, and a
multitude of laborers reduced to poverty,* destitution,
and sometimes to actual starvation.t
* "La condition des paysans est des plus malheureuses. Les
fortunes sont tellement disproportionn6es, qu'on ne voit que des
riches et des pauvres, les petits proprietaires sont fort rares. 11 en
resulte un manque d'emulation et de courage pour fonder des etablissements d'industrie et pour ameliorer l'agriculture." - Dit. Gcog.
Univ., AJrt. Calabre.
t One would scarcely imagine that in London, the wealthiest city
in the world, people could be starved to death. We mention an
incident that came within our own experience. Some years ago we
were present at a dispensary, one of those admirable and unostentatious institutions established to afford medical relief to the poor in
London, and supported principally by the efforts of the medical officers. A widow appeared as a patient. She stated that she had six
children to support, and that her whole earnings amounted to 7s. a
week. We saw the medical officer shake his head, doubting that
the case was beyond the reach of medicine. The surgeon was a
humane man, and he did what he could for her. Some months
after, we saw him  again, and inquired for the widow. She had
died. We asked the nature of her disease; and the reply was,




AN.D IN Tii' SCHEME OF  THE STATE.              367
6th. The whole- idea of a diversit;y of riglhts and
privileges originates in t'he corrupted heart of mankind,
and in the darkenled intellect ithat has allowed snperstir
tion to dictate its credence, instead of lbasing its propositions on the axioms of the reason.
" She died of starvation!"  With the hand of deatlr upon her, she
had labored for her children, and at last she died for want of food.
Such is London.
Does the reader suppose such things do not occur? Let us take
a sketch by the great depictor of modern manners, Mr. Charles
Dickens:
"'Ah!' said the man, bursting into tears, and sinking on his
knees at the feet of the dead woman,' Kneel down, kneel down
kneel round her every one of you, and mark my words. I say she
starved to death. I never knew how bad she was till the fever
came upon her, and then her bones were starting through the skin.
There was neither fire nor candle; she died in the dark-in the
dark! She couldn't even see her children's faces, though we heard
her gasping out their names. I begged for her in the streets, and
they sent me to prison. When I came back, she was dying; and
all the blood in my heart was dried up, for they starved her to
death. I swear it before the God that saw it —they starved her!
lie twined his hands in his hair, and with a loud scream rolled
grovelling upon the floor, his eyes fixed, and the foam gushing from
his lips." -  Oliver Twist.
Fain would we express a hope that Mr. Dickens, to whom God
has given so admirable a genius, might one day turn his attention
to the condition of the laboring classes in the manufacturing towns
of England. He might then become indeed a benefactor to his
country; and, as no pen can command a more powerful interest
than his own, he might reap the noble satisfaction of alleviating
those dreadful evils that prey on the population. The warning voice
might, it is true, be heard in vain; but so certainly as those evils
are not removed by better social conditions, accompanied by moral
and intellectual education, so certainly will they one day produce
their natural fruits of frantic revolte




368     EQUALITY IN THE EYE OF THE LXW.
However long men may be in coming to the conelusion, they must ultimately accord that there are no
natural means known by which a diversity of rights
could possibly be established.  A diversity of rights
implies, that some individuals are to be endowed with
certain privileges not common to the race. And these
individuals would require to be recognizable. Now,
no natural means whatever, no methods of appreciation known to man, ever did, or ever could, enable the
human race to say, a priori, " This individual is entitled to more rights than that individual."  Nothing
but a revelation from the Creator could ever establish
such a distinction; and consequently all diversities in
the human race must be diversities of office, and diversities of condition, produced by the more or less successful result of individual labor, enterprise, or skill. Every
other diversity is contrary to reason; and when established by human law, such law is bad, wrong, and
wicked, and ought to be abolished.
7th. The whole history of man informs us that the
human race is gradually emerging from  superstition,
gradually acquiring knowledge, and gradually applying
that knowledge to rectify the arrangements which
were made in times of superstition. And history also
informs us, that wherever truth is substantiated, it
does, sooner or later, receive the assent of the human
intellect; and though the progress has been partial,
both as regards the quantity of truth received, and the
extent to which it has been received by the nations of
the earth, the advances already made leave no possible
doubt as to the system, process, or scheme, according
to which man abandons superstition, and adheres at




PERPETUAL SUPREMIACY OF JUSTICE.       369
last to those propositions which are properly substantiated.  In every department of human action, we
may in the present day observe the gradual, substitution of scientific method for enmpirical lmethod, or for the
fictions of superstition; and as no doubt can possibly
be entertained that men are now approaching man
science, we may rest satisfied that the political relations of man will, ere long, be treated according to a
scientific method —- that fictions will be abandoned,
and that arrangements will be made in accordance
with the dictates of the reason, instead of emanating
from the right of the strongest, confirmed by legislation.
8th. The great theoretic change that must take
place in Britain, is the abolition of the belief that one
generation of men can be bound by'the arrangements
of past generations; and, instead of that belief, the
substitution of a belief that men in every age must be
governed by reason; that, rwhatever the arrangements
or laws of past generations may have been, those arrangements or laws are binding now only in so far as
they are now right, quite independently of any sanction they may have received from  legislation. The
acts of past men are no more binding on present men
in matters of politics than they are in matters of astronomy or theology; and when we find the soil of
Britain disposed of, not according to any scheme that
pretends to be now right, but according to the arrangements of men long since dead, who enacted the perpetuity of their arrangements, we may rest satisfied that
the nation must ere long turn its attention to the revision of those arrangements, and inquire6 " What




370           DISPOSITION OF THE; SOIL.
oubght to be the present disposition of the soil, supposing,
no arrangements tIwhatever hlad been inherited from past
generations."
No political truth requires to be more strenuously
impressed upon the world, than that the men of every
succeeding generation have the same right to make
their own arrangements, unburdened with any responsibilities, restrictions, diversities of rights and privileges, other than those, restrictions imposed by the
general laws of equity, or those diversities of office
which they may agree to make for their general advantage.  Nothing can be more absurd than to suppose
that a past generation can make arrangements to
deprive the present generation (at any given time) of
its full right to dispose of the earth in the mode that
is best for the present generation; and though the
laws of Britain are utterly contrary to reason, in this
respect, inasmuch as lands are entailed in particular
families, to whom  other Britons must pay a rent for
the use of the soil, we need not hesitate to affirm, that
the moment a scientific method (whether inductive and
economical, or deductive and moral) comes to be applied to the question, "WVhose is the soil, and how
should it be distributed? " that moment will the fabric
of English aristocracy be undermined, and the social
laws of Britain will undergo a'thorough regeneration.
Superstition on this point may endure for a few years
longer; but so certainly as men achieve equality in the
eye of the law with regard to natural liberty, so certainly must they ultimately achieve equality with
regard to natural property.  And so certainly as men
reduce to practice the propositions of knowledge in the




DISPOSITION OF THE SOIL.          371
other sciences, so certainly will they ultima-tely reduce
to practice the propositions of political science; and
instead of being the slaves of superstition, held in awe
by the bugbears of hereditary rights, the authority of
(wrong) laws, and the impositions of legal fictions, they
will make reason the ruler, moral science the expositor
of reason, and subject themselves to the laws of
justice, and no longer to the laws of men.
If, then, we admit that every generation of men has
the same free right to make its own arrangements, and
to carry into effect the principles it knows or believes
to be true, quite independently of the arrangements
that have been made by any anterior generations, we
must also of necessity admit, that the earth and all it
contains belong, for the time being, to every existing
generation, and that the disposition of the earth (as the
great storehouse from which man must derive his support and sustenance) is not to be determined by the
laws, customs, arrangements, king's gifts, or prescriptive rights of any past generation of men, but by the
judgment and reason of the existing  generation,
ordering all arrangements according to the rules of
equity, which are always valid and always binding,
and which at every given moment of time are the
rules which ought to determine human action.  Consequently the question at every period is, "What is
the equitable disposition of the earth?"  Is it equitable that any arrangements of past generations should
cause one man now to be born heir to a county, or
half a county, or quarter of a county, while the other
inhabitants of that county are thereby deprived of all
right to the soil, and must consequently pay a rent io




372     EQUALITY IN TILE EYEE OF THIE tAW,
the one individual who naturally has not one particle
of right to the earth more than they have themselves?
And if such an arrangement be not now equitable,
most undoubtedly it ought not to be allowed to continue; and if any government (instead of adlinnistrating the laws of equity) use the armed power of the
nation for the purpose of enforcing such arrangements,
such government has departed from its proper intention, and is not entitled to obedience.
If, then, we admit that every generation of men has
exactly the same free right to the earth, unencumbered
by any arrangements of past ages, the great problem
is to discover  "such a system as shall secure to every
man his exact share of the naturcal advantages which the
Creator has provided for the race; while, at the same
time, he has full opportunity, without let or hIinderance,
to exercise his labor, industry, and skill, for his own
advantage."   Until this problem  is solved, both in
theory and in practice, political change must continually go on.
The great practical termination, therefore, towards
which modern societies are continually progressing, is
equalization in the eye of the law, both with regard to
natural liberty and natural property.  Andc if we view
property (natural property - that is, that which is not
created by human labor, industry, or skill) as entering
the theory of morals - and we must view it in this
light when we view  it by the aid of a scientific
method -Twe include natural property in the theory of
human finction, and posit, finally that the progression
of mankind is towards that political condition in which
the law shall be exactly one and the same for all men,




AND IN THE SCHEME OF THE STATE.           373
without diversities of rights or privileges, and without
diversities of condition other than diversities of office,
and diversities of condition produced by the more or less
successful result of individual labor, skill, or enterprise,
And the ground, on which we identify* the laws of
property and the laws of liberty is this: When human2
laws accord to one man a portion of the earth as prop.
erty, the essential character of such an arrangemeent is,
that all other men are prohibited or restricted from using
that portion of the earth; and consequently this law is
merely a law restricting action, inasmuch as the prohibition is specific, whereas there is no injulnction on the
proprietor to cultivate the land, or make it produce its
maxcimum for the increase of humaln welfare.
Absolute equalization in the eye of the law with
regard to natural rights, *is the final termination of
man's political progress, the last term  in that grand
series of changes that commenced with the two opposite elements -the lord and the serf; and which will
terminate with the one element —the freenman without privileges and without oppressions.
There cannot be the slightest question that the
progression of modern states is towards universal
suffrage; that is, towards absolute equalization of
the political function of the individuals of whom the
state is composed.  The necessary attendant of'universal suffrage must be, "the equal eligibility of every
member of the state to fill any office in the state."
When a state arrives at this ultimatum with regard
* Identify —to make one; or to establish an identity betw.een
two things that appear under different names or different aspects.
32




374     EQUALITY IN THE EYE OF THE LAW,
to the political function of each individual, the question of natural property must fall to be discussed;
and as no possible reason can be alleged why one
individual should, acpriori, be endowed with more of
the earth (which God, the Creator and Father of mankind, has given to the human race) than any other individual; and as every generation of existing men must
have exactly the same title to afree earth, unencumbered with any arrangements of past generations, we
may rest satisfied that, through whatever transformations men may pass, the ultimate point at which they
must necessarily arrive is absolute equality with regard
to natural property.  And if so, the intention of Providence will then be realized, that the industrious man
shall be rich, and the man who labors not shall be
poor.  Such is the intention of nature, and such is
the intention of the almighty Maker of mankind.
The great social problem, then, that cannot fail
ere long to appear in the arena of European discussion
is, " to discover such a system as shall secure to every
man his exact share of the natural advantages which
the Creator has provided for the race; while, at the
same time, he has full opportunity, without let or hinderance, to exercise his skill, industry, and perseverance
for his ozwn advantage."
Of this problem, we maintain that there can be but
one general solution possible; and the whole analogy
of scientific discovery assures us that, sooner or later,
the problem will be solved, that the solution will be
acknowledged, and that it will be transformed from
an intellectual dogma into a practical rule of action,
thereby presenting a realization, in outward condition,




AND IN THE SCHEME OF THE STATE.    375
of those propositions which the reason has seen to
be correct.
The solution we propound (and which we hope to
defend more at large at some future period) is the
following, although, of course, there is no supposition
that any general solution can be immediately applicable to the circumstances of this or any other country.
[For convenience' sake, we neglect all speculations
as to what may or may not be the geographical
arrangements of states at a future period. We shall
speak of England alone, and consider the state of
England as composed of an indefinite number of
members, all equal in the eye of the law, all on a
parity with regard to primary political function, and
all equally eligible to fill any office to which they may
be elected by the suffrages of the majority.  All
authority of man is of course excluded, and the CANON
OF RIGHT is the SCIENCE OF EQUITY; that is, the rules
of divine and immutable justice, as capable of being
apprehended by the human reason.]
1st. Reason can  acknowledge no difference of
original rights between the individuals of which the
human race is composed.
2d. Equality of rights cannot be sacrificed by any
arrangements which one generation of men make for
succeeding generations; but eqAality of rights is per.
petual, inasmuch as that equality derives from the
human reason, which varies not from age to age.
Even if it were true that there ought to be an inequality of rights among the individuals of the human
race, it would be absolutely impossible to determine
which individuals of the race should be born to more




376      EQUALITY IN THE EYE OF THE LAW~
rights, and which individuals to fewer rights, than their
fellows.   An inequality of rights can only be based
on superstition, and the very moment reason is substituted for superstition in political science, (as it has
been  in the  physical sciences,) that moment must
men  admit that no  possible means are known  by
which an inequality of rights'could possibly be substantiated.  Even if it were true, for instance, that
there should be an  aristocracy and a serfdom, there
are no possible means of determining which individuals
should be the aristocrats, and which, individuals the sesfs.
3d. The state of England, then, would  present a
soil (including  the  soil proper, the  mines, forests,
*" Whilst we maintain the unity of the human species, we at the
same time repel the depressing assumption of superior and inferior
races of men."  ['The very cheerless, and, in recent times, too
often discussed doctrine of the unequal rights of men to freedom,
and of slavery as an institution in conformity with nature, is unhappily found most systematically developed in Aristotle's Politica, i.
3, 56.']    There are nations more susceptible of cultivation, more
highly civilized, r*ore ennobled by mental cultivation, than others,
but none in themselves nobler than others. All are in like degree
designed for freedom —a freedom which, in the ruder conditions
of society, belongs only to the individual, but which, in social
states, enjoying political institutions, appertains as a right to the
whole body of the community."  If we would indicate an idea
which, throughout the whole course of history, has ever more
and more widely extended its empire, or which, more than any
other, testifies to the much contested, and still more decidedly misunderstood perfectibility of the whole human race, it is that of
establishing our common humanity-of striving to remove the
barriers which prejudice and limited views of every kind have
erected amongst men - and to teach all mankind, without reference
to religion, nation, or color, as one fraternity, one great community,
fitted for the attainment of one object, the unrestrained develop



AND IN THE SCHEME OF THE STATE.                 377
fisheries, &c., in fact, that portion of the natural earth
called England) which was permanent, and a population that was not permanent, but renewed by successive generations.
4th. The  question, then, is, "What system  will
secure to every individual of these successive generations his portion of the natural advantages of England?"   Of this problem, we maintain that there is
but one solution possible.
5th. No truth  can be more absolutely certain, as
an intuitive proposition of the reason, than that "an
object is the property of its creator;" and we maintain that creation* is the only means by which  an
ment of the psychical powers. This is the ultimate and highest
aim of society, identical with the direction implanted by nature in
the mind of man towards the indefinite extension of his existence.
He regards the earth in all its limits, and the heavens as far as
his eye can scan their bright and starry depths, as inwardly his
own, given to him as the objects of his contemplation, and as a
field for the development of his energies. Even the child longs to
pass the hills, or the seas, which enclose his manor house; yet,
when his eager steps have borne him beyond those limits, he pines
like the plant for his native soil; and it is by this touching and
beautiful attribute of man, this longing for that which is unknown,
and this fond remembrance of that which is lost, that he is spared
from an exclusive attachment to the present. Thus deeply rooted
in the innermost nature of man, and even enjoined upon him by his
highest tendencies, the recognition of the bond of humanity becomes one of the noblest leading principles in the history of man
kind." - HUMBOLDT'S Cosmos, vol. i. p. 368; Bohn's edition.
* In the arts-man createsform; in political economy he creates
value; and in politics he creates property. And as the evolution
is in this order- -1st, the Arts; 2d, Political Economy; 3d, Politics;
the laws of political economy must be discovered before there can be
a system ofproperty rational in its theory and scientific in its form.
32*




378            PROPERTY IN THE SOlL,
individual right to property can be generated.  Consequently, as no individual and no generation is the
creator of' the substantive, earth, it belongs equally to
all the existing inhabitants; that is, no individual has
a special claim to more than another.
6th. But while on the one hand we take into consideration the object, -that is, the earth,- we must
also take into consideration the subject; that is, man,
and man's labor.
7th. The object is the common property of all, no
individual being able to exhibit a title to any particular portion of it.  And individual or private property
is, the increased value produced by individual labor.
Again: in the earth must be distinguished the permanent earth and its temporary or perishable productions.  The former,- that is, the permanent earth,we maintain, never can be private property; and every
system  that treats it as such must necessarily be unjust.  No rational basis has ever been exhibited to the
world on which.private right to any particular portion
of the earth c0ould possibly be founded.
8th. But though the permanent earth never can be
private property, - although the laws may call it so,
and may treat it as such,-it must be possessed by
individuals for the purpose of cultivation, and for the
purpose of extracting from it all those natural objects
which man requires.
9th. The question, then, is, Upon what terms, or
according to what system, must the earth be possessed
by the successive generations that succeed each other
on the surface of the globe?  The conditions given
are —First. That the earth is the common property




PROPERTY IN THE SOIL.            879
of the race; Second,.'lThat whatever an individual produces by his own labor —Vwhether it be a new object,
made out of many materials, or a new vcalue given by
labor to an object whose forift, locality, &c., may be
changed  is the private property of that individual,
and he may dispose of it as he pleases, provided he
does not interfere with his fellows; Th/ird. The earth
is the perpetual common property of the race, and
each succeeding generation has a full title to a free
earth. One generation cannot encumber a succeeding
generation.
And the condition required is, such a system  as
shall secure to the successive individuals of the race
their share of the common property, and the opportunity, wthout interference, of making as much private. property as their skill, industry, and enterprise
would enable them to make.
The scheme that appears to present itself most
naturally is, the general division of the soil, portioning
it out to the inhabitants according to their number.
Such appears to be the only system  that suggests
itself to most minds, if we may judge from the objections brought forward  against an  equalization of
property. All these objections are against the actual
division of the soil; and certainly such a division is
theoretically erroneous, especially when the fractional
parts are made the property of the possessors.  But
independently of this, the profits arising from trade,
&c., would induce many individuals to forsake agriculture, and to abandon their portion to those who
preferred the cultivation of the soil to any other
pursuit. A purely agricultural population is almost




380           PROPERTY IN THE SOIL.
impossible at any period; but when men have made
considerable advances in the arts, &c., a general return
to agricultural pursuits is a mere chimera, a phantom.
Men must go forward, never backward. To speak of
a division of lands in England is absurd.  Such a
division would be as useless as it is improbable. But
it is more than useless; it is unjust: and unjust, not
to the present so called proprietors, but to the human
beings who are continually being born into the world,
and who have exactly the same natural right to a
portion that their predecessors have.  For instance,
let us suppose a hundred thousand acres divided into
a thousand portions, and accorded as property to a
thousand persons. This appears, at first sight, to be
an equitable arrangement; and if the persons were
immortal, and begot no children, the arrangement
might be unobjectionable. But if the soil were made
property, it would be alienable, and one of the thousand persons might alienate his hundred acres to
another proprietor, who would then come to have two 
hundred acres.  This might be perfectly equitable
between the two parties themselves; but there are
others interested in the transaction, and their rights
must not be overlooked.  Let us suppose that, in
a few years, the adult population had increased to
one thousand and fifty. The fifty new men haye
exactly the same right to a fractional share that the
original one thousand had-mere priority of time
making no possible difference in the right of men to
the natural globe. What, then, would require to be
done? It would be necessary, either, 1st, to preserve
the original proprietors in their so called properties,




PROPERTY IN THE SOIL.             381
thereby depriving the fifty new men of all share of the
globe; or, 2d, to make a new division of the whole
lands, dividing them  into  one thousand and fifty
portions. This, of course, would destroy the proprietorship of the first occupants, and, in the practical
division of the lands, would involve the recasting
of the whole thousand farms or holdings.  Every
one would require to shift its boundaries every time
that an increase of the population rendered a new
division requisite. Such a system would be destructive to the cultivation of the soil; and though perhaps possible, it would be attended with inconveniences which render its reduction to practice out
of the question.
The actual division of the soil need never be anticipated, nor would such a division be just, if the divided
portions were made the property (legally, for they
could never be so morally) of individuals.
If, then, successive generations of men cannot have
their fractional share of the actual soil, (including
mines, &c.,) how can the division of the advantages
of the natural earth be effected?
By the division of its annual value or rent; that is,
by making the rent of the soil the common property of
the nation. That is, (as the taxation is the common
property of the state,) by taking the whole of the taxes
out of the rents of the soil, and thereby abolishing all
other kinds of taxation whatever.  And thus all industry would be absolutely emancipated from  every
burden, and  every man would reap such natural
reward as his skill, industry, or enterprise rendered
legitimately his, according to the natural law of free




382             PROPERTY IN THE SOIL.
competition.*  This we maintain to be the only theory
that will satisfy the requirements of the problem  of
natural property.  And the question now is, How can
the division of the rent be effected? An actual division
of the rent —that is, the payment of so much money
to each individual -  would be attended with, perhaps,
insuperable inconveniences; neither is such an actual
division requisite, every requirement being capable of
fulfilment without it.
We now apply this solution to England.  England
forms a state; that is, a community acting through
public servants for the administration of justice, &c.
In the actual condition of England, many things are
at present unjust; and the right of the government
to  tax and make laws for those who  are excluded
from   representation  is, at all events, questionable.
However, we shall make a few  remarks on England
as she is, and on England as she ought to be; that is,
as she would be, were the rules of equity reduced to
practical operation.
1st. The state has alienated the lands to private
individuals called proprietors, and the vast majority of
Englishmen are born to their labor minus their share
of the taxation.
2d. This taxation of labor has introduced vast systems of restriction  on trades and industry.  Instead
W*   e have no hesitation whatever in predicting, that all civilized
communities must ultimately abolish all revenue restrictions on industry, and draw the whole taxation from the rents of the soil. And
this because (as we shall endeavor to show in a future portion of
the subject) the rents of the soil are the common produce of the
whole labor of a community.




PROPERTY IN THE SOIL.             383
of a perfectly free trade with all the world, England
has adopted a revenue system that most materially
diminishes both the amount of trade and its profit.
And, instead of a perfectly free internal industry, England has adopted an excise that is as vexatious in its
operation as can well be conceived. Both the customs
and excise laws, and every other tax on industry, have
arisen from the alienation of the soil from the stae;
and had the soil not been alienated, no tax whatever
would have been requisite; and were the soil resumed,
(as it undoubtedly ought to be,) every tax of every
kind and character, save the common rent of the soil,
might at once be abolished, with the whole army of
collectors, revenue officers, cruisers, coast guards, excisemen, &c., &c.
3d. Taxation can only be on land or labor.  [By
land we mean the natural earth, not merely the agricultural soil.]  These are the two radical elements
that can be subjected to taxation, capital being originally derived from  one or the other.  Capital is only
hoarded labor or hoarded rent; and as all capital must
be derived from the one source or the other, all taxation
of capital is only taxation of land or of labor. Consequently all taxation of whatever kind is, 1st, taxation of labor, that is, a deduction from the natural
remuneration which God intended the laborer to derive
from his exertions; or, 2d, taxation of land;,that is, the
appropriation of the current value of the natural earth
to the expenses of the state.
Now, labor is essentially private property, and land
is not essentially private property, but on the contrary
is the common inheritance of every generation of




384              THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.
mankind.  Where the land is taxed, no man is taxed,
nor does the taxation of land interfere in any "way
whatever with the progress of human industry.  On
the contrary, the taxation of land, rightly directed,
might be made to advance the condition of the country
to a high degree of prosperity.
4th. For the expenses of a state there must be a
revenue, and this revenue must be derived from  the
taxation of labor, or from the rent of the lands. There
is no other alternative; either the rents of the soil must
be devoted to the common expenses of the state, or
the labor of individuals must be interfered with; and
restrictions, supervisions,- prohibitions, &c., must be
called into existence, to facilitate the collection of the
revenue.
5th. In  England, exactly the same injustice was
practised with  regard to  natural property that was
practised with regard to natural liberty; and though
the laws and customs that took away the natural liberty of the laboring serf have been for the most part
abolished, the laws and customs that make the land
the exclusive property of the aristocracy remain almost
intact, and have yet to undergo their progress of abolition.  Let us first look at the circumstances of the
case.  And here we shall make a few quotations from
the impartial Blackstone.*
Every Englishman should diligently peruse the first few chapters of the second book of Blackstone's Commentaries, " Of the
Rights of Things," and, in addition to these, an article in the Quarterly Review for July, 1829, on the condition of the English peasantry. From these, and a history of the resumption andl subsequent
alienation of the church lands, he will gather a tolerable idea of




THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.                    385
" The constitution of feuds had its original from  the
military policy of the northern, or Celtic nations —
the Goths, the Huns, the Franks, &c...... It was
brought by them  from  their own countries, and continued in their respective colonies as the most likely
means to  secure their new  acquisitions; and to that
end large districts, or parcels of land, were allotted by
the conquering general to the superior officers of the
army, and by them dealt out again in smaller parcels
or allotments to the inferior officers and most deserving  soldiers.   These  allotments were called feoda,
feud, fiefs, or fees; which last appellation, in the northern languages, signifies a conditional stipend or reward.
Rewards, or stipends, they evidently were; and  the
condition  annexed  to  them  was, that the possessor
should do service faithfully, both  at home and in the
wars,.to him  by whom  they were given; for which
purpose he took the jurarmentum fidelitatis, or oath of
fealty; and in case of the breach of this condition and
the circumstances that have led to the present condition of England. The lands of England have been disposed of according to
two laws - the law of the strongest and the law of the most cunning;
hence England's pauperism  and England's moral degradation.
There yet remains another law, and its reduction to practice will,
one day or other, regenerate the social condition of the population
-the law of equity.
The article on the " condition of the English peasantry " is well
worthy of republication in a separate form. Its appearance in that
periodical prevents all suspicion of its having been written for the
purpose of exciting discontent; and yet we do not hesitate to affirm,
that if once the laboring classes were seriously to take up the questions on which it treats, they would resolve never to rest satisfied
till they had abolished the landed aristocracy of England, and
emancipated their own labor from the burdens that have been imposed upon them from the allocation of the land to the aristocracy,
and of the taxation to the laborers of the country.
33




386            THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.
oath, by not performing the stipulated service, or by
deserting the lord in battle, the lands were again to
revert to him who granted them."
This explains the mechanism  by which the lands
were allocated; but the right to allocate was the right
of the sword, or right of the strongest; and consequently any future person who should prove strong
enough to overcome the occupiers, would have exactly
the same right to allocate them to other individuals.
The whole of the feudal system  was based on the
right of the strongest; and if the unfortunate Irish
were strong enough to reconquer the lands of Ireland,
they would have exactly the same right that was reduced to practice by the feudal laws.
" But this feudal polity, which was thus, by degrees
established over all the continent of Europe, seems not
to have been received in this part of our island —-at
least not universally, and as a part of the national
constitution, till the reign of WVilliam  the Norman..... From the prodigious slaughter of the English
nobility at the battle of Hastings, and the fruitless
insurrections of those who survived, such numerous
forfeitures had accrued, that he was able to reward his
Norman followers with very large and extensive possessions.....  The king held a great council to inquire into the state of the nation; the immediate
consequence of which was the compiling of the great
survey called Domesday-book, which was finished in
the next year; and in the latter end of that very year,
the king was attended by all his nobility at Sarum,
where all the principal landholders submitted their
lands to the yoke of military tenure, became the king's




THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.                  387
vassals, and did honor and fealty to his person.' This
may possibly have been the era of formally introducing
the feudal tenures by law; and perhaps the very law
thus made at the Council of Sarum  is that which is
still extant..... This new  polity, therefore, seems
not to have been imposed by the Conqueror, but nationally and freely adopted by the general assembly of
the whole realm, in the same manner as other nations
of Europe had before adopted it, upon the same principle of self-security. And, in particular, they had the
recent example of the French nation before their eyes,
which had gradually surrendered up all its allodial or
free lands into the king's hands, who restored them to
the owners as a beneftcium or feud, to be held by them
and such of their heirs as they previously nominated
to the king; and thus by degrees all the allodial estates
in France were converted into feuds, and the freemen
became the vassals of the crown. The only difference
between this change of tenures in Fiance and that in
England was, that the former was effected gradually
by the consent of private persons; the latter was done
at once all over England by the common consent of
the nation......  The grand and fundamental maxim of all feudal tenure is this: That all lands were
originally granted out by the sovereign, and are therefore holden either mediately or immediately of the: This, in fact, was the formation of the state of England, after
its conquest by the Normans. But it was the construction of the
state on false principles. This formation, so far as the landlords
were concerned, was legally dissolved in the reign of Charles II.,
when the lands became the property (in law) of the aristocracy.
The state is now beginning to be re-formed on true principles; and
it appears probable that its ultimate form will be that of a republic
with universal suffrage, with all the lands rented from the state, and
consequently without any other taxation of any kind or character
whatever




388            THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.
crown. The grantor was called the proprietor or lord,
being he who retained the dominion or ultimate property of the feud or fee; and the grantee, who had only
the use and possession, according to the terms of the
grant was styled the feudatory or vassal, which was
only another name for the tenant or holder of the
lands....   Besides an oath of fealty, the vassal
did usually homage to his lord; professing that he became his man from that day forth, of life, and limb,
and earthly honor. When the tenant had thus professed himself to be the man of his superior or lord,
the next consideration was concerning the service
which, as such, he was bound to render in recompense
for the land that he held. This, in pure, proper, and
original feuds, was only twofold - to follow or do suit
to the lord in his courts in time of peace, and in his
armies or warlike retinue when necessity called him to
the field.  The military branch of service consisted in
attending the lord to the wars, if called upon, with
such a retinue, and for such a number of days, as were
stipulated at the first; donation in proportion to the
quantity of the land......At the first introduction
of feuds, as they were gratuitous so also they were
precarious, and held at the will of the lord, who was
then the sole judge whether his vassal performed his
services faithfully. Then they became certain for one
or more years,.....  In process of time, feuds came
by degrees to be universally extended beyond the life
of the first vassal to his sons, or perhaps to such one
of them as the lord should name; and, in this case,
the form of the donation was strictly observed; for if
a feud was given to a man and his sons, all his sons
succeeded him  in equal portions; and, as they died
off, their shares reverted to the lord, and did not descend to their children, or even to their surviving
brothers, as not being specified in the donation. But
when such a feud was given to a man and his heirs




THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.              389
ill general terms, then a more extended rule of succession took place; and, when the feudatory died, his
male descendants in infinitum were admitted to the
succession.
" These were the principal and very simple qualities
of the genuine or original feuds, which were all of a
military nature, and in the hands of military persons;
though the feudatories, being under frequent incapacities of cultivating and manuring their own lands, soon
found it necessary to commit part of them to inferior
tenants, obliging them to such returns in service, corn,
cattle, or money, as might enable the chief feudatories
to attend their military duties without distraction;
which returns, or reditus, were the original of rents.
" In this chapter (chap. vi.) we shall take a short
view of the ancient tenures of our English'estates, or
the manner in which lands, tenements, and hereditaments might have been holden, as the same stood in
force till the middle of the last century; in which we
shall easily perceive that all the particularities, all the
seeming and real hardships, that attended those tenures, were to be accounted for upon feudal principles,
and no other; being fruits of, and deduced fromr, the
feudal policy.' Almost all the real property of this kingdom is, by
the policy of our laws,; supposed to be granted by, dependent upon, and holden of, some superior lord, by
and in consideration of certain services to be rendered
to the lord by the tenant or possessor of this property.
The thing holden is therefore styled a tenement, the
possessors thereof tenants, and the manner of their
possession a tenure. Thus all the land in the kingdom
is supposed to be holden, mediately or immediately, of
the king, who is styled lord paramount, or above all.
Such tenants as held under the king immediately,
when they granted out portions of their lands to inferior persons, became also lords with respect to those
33 *




390            TIlE FEUDAL SYSTEM.
inferior persons, as they were still tenants with respect
to the king; and thus, partaking of a middle nature,
were called mesne, or middle lords.' So that it the
king granted a manor to A, and he granted a portion
of the land to B, now B was said to hold of A, and
A of the king; or, in other words, B held his lands
immediately of A, but mediately of the king.  The
king, therefore, was styled lord paramount; A was
both tenant and lord, or was a mesne lord; and B
was called tenant paravail, or the lowest tenant, being
he who was supposed to make a vail, or profit, of
the land. In this manner are all the lands of the king-'dom holden which are in the hands of subjects; for,
according to Sir Edward Coke, in the law of England
we have not properly allodium; which, we have seen,
is the name by which the feudists abroad distinguish
such estates of the subject as are not holden of any
superior.  So that at the first glance we may observe,
that our lands are either plainly feuds, or partake very
strongly of the feudal nature.
" All tenures being thus derived, or supposed to be
derived, from the king, those that held immediately
under him  in right of his crown and dignity were
called tenants in capite, or in chief; which was the most
honorable species of tenure; but, at the same time,
subjected the tenants to greater and more burdensome
services than inferior tenures did. This distinction
ran through all the different sorts of tenure, of which
I now proceed to give an account.
" There seem to have subsisted among our ancestors
four principal species of lay tenures, to which all others may be reduced; the grand criteria of which were
the natures of the several services, or renders, that
were due to the lords from  their tenants.  The services, in respect of their quality, were either free or
base services; in respect of their quantity, and the
time of exacting them, were either certain or uncer



'THE FEUDA-i SYSTEMr.           391
tain.  Free services were such as were not unbecoming the character of a soldier or a freeman to perform;
as to serve under his lord in the wars, to pay a sum
of money,, and the like.  Base services were such as
"were fit only for'peasants, or persons of a servile rank;
as to plough the lord's land, to make his hedges, to
carry out his dung, or other mean employments... 
" The first, most universal, and esteemed the most
honorable species of tenure, was that by knightservice, called in Latin servitium militare, and in law
French chivalry, or service de chivaler, answering to
the fief d'haubert of the Normans.  This differed in
very few points from a pure and proper feud, being
entirely military, and the general effect of the feudal
establishment in England.  To make a tenure by
kniglt-service, a determinate quantity of land was
necessary, which was called a knight's fee, feodlum
militare; the measure of which in 3 Edward I. was
estimated at twelve ploughlands, and its value (though
it varied with the times) in the reigns of Edward I.
and Edward II. was stated at ~20 per annum.  And
he who held this proportion of land (or a whole fee)
by knight-service, was bound to attend his lord to the
wars for forty days in everyyear if called upon; which
attendance was his reditus, or return, his rent or service for the land he claimed to hold. If he held only
half a knight's fee, he was only bound to attend twenty
days, and so in proportion.....
" The personal attendaace in knight-service growing
troublesome and inconvenient in many respects, the
tenants found means of compounding for it, by first
sending others in their stead, and in process of time
making a pecuniary satisfaction to the lords in lieu of
it. This pecuniary satisfaction at last came to be levied by assessments at so much for every knight's fee;
and therefore this kind of tenure was called scutagium
in Latin, or servitium scuti - scutum being then a well



392               THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.
known denomination for money; and in like manner
it was called in our Norman-French  escuage, being
indeed a pecuniary instead of a military service. The
first time this appears to have been taken was in the
5 Henry II., on account of his expedition to Toulouse;
but it soon came to be so universal that personal attendance fell quite into disuse.  Hence we find in our
ancient histories, that from this period, when our kings
went to war, they levied scutages on their tenants, that
is, on all the land holders of the kingdom, to defray
their expenses and to hire troops; and these assessments in the time of Henry II. seem  to  have been
made arbitrarily, and at the king's pleasure; which
prerogative being greatly abused by his successors, it
became matter of national clamor, and King John was
obliged to consent by his Mclagna Cliarta,' that noscu* Villeins were not protected by JMagna Charta; nullus liber
homo capiatur vel imprisonetur, &c., was cautiously expressed to
exclude the poor villein; for, as Lord Coke tells us, "the lord may
beat his villein, and if it be without cause he cannot have any remedy." - Jote in Christian's Blackstone.
"He that holds in pure villenage shall do whatsoever is commanded him, and always be bound to an uncertain service."
The villein was originally a serf or slave, whose political condition gradually underwent improvement with the progress of society.
The villeins of England have attained to personal liberty; that is,
the present laborers who do the work of England- who create its.wealth -are no longer subject to the personal tyranny of either
lord or king. But from the generalization of serfdom they are compelled by natural causes, starvation, hunger, &c., to do the workfor
a bare subsistence, in contradistinction to the law of nature and the
law of God, that he who does the work shall reap the profit which
the Almighty has annexed to labor expended on the natural earth.
Aristocracy, like serfdom, has also been generalized; that is, instead of individual aristocrats ruling individual serfs, a general
court or assembly of aristocrats now rules the whole mass of labor



THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.                     393
tage should be imposed without, consent of Parliament.
But this clause was omitted in  his sol Henry III.'s
charter, where we only find that scutages or escuage
should be taken as they were used to be taken in the
time of Henry II.; that is, in a reasonable and moderate manner.  Yet afterwards, by statute 25 Edw. I.
c. 5 and 6, and many subsequent statutes, it was again
provided that the king should take no aids or tasks by
his common assent of the realm: hence it was held in
our old books that escuage or scutage could not be
levied  but by consent of Parliament; such  scutages
being indeed the groundwork of all succeeding subsidies, and the land tax of later times.
" Since, therefore, escuage  differed  from   knighters, and taxes their labor to an extent equal to the whole rental of
the country.
"Under the Saxon government there were, as Sir William Temple speaks, a sort of people in a condition of downright servitude,
used and employed in the most servile works, and belonging, both
they, their children, and effects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest
of the cattle or stock upon it. These seem to have been those who
held the folk-land, from which they were removable at the lord's
pleasure. On the arrival of the Normans here, it seems not improbable that they, who were strangers to any other than a feudal
state, might give some sparks of enfranchisement to such wretched
persons as fell to their share, by admitting them, as well as others,
to the oath of fealty; which conferred a right of protection, and
raised the tenant to a kind of estate superior to downright slavery,
but inferior to every other condition. This they called villenage,
and the tenants villeins, either from the word viles, or else, as Edward Coke tells us, a villa; because they lived chiefly in villages,
and were employed in rustic works of the most sordid kind, resembling the Spartan helots, to whom  alone the culture of the lands
was consigned, their rugged masters, like our northern ancestors
esteeming war the only honorable employment of manhood."
-   lackstone, book ii. chap. 60




394             THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.
service in nothing but as a compensation differs from
actual service, knight-service is frequently confounded
with it. And thus Littleton must be understood when
he tells us that tenant by homage, fealty, and escuage,
was tenant by knight-service; that is, that this tenure
(being subservient to the military policy of the nation)
was respected as a tenure in chivalry.  But as the actual service was uncertain, and depended upon emergencies, so it was necessary that this peculiar compensation should be equally uncertain, and depend on the
assessments of the legislature, suited to these emergencies. For had the escuage been a settled invariable
sum, payable at certain times, it had been neither more
nor less than a mere pecuniary rent; and the tenure,
instead of knight-service, would have then been of
another kind, called socage; of which we shall speak
in the next chapter.' For the present I have only to observe, that by the
degenerating of knight-service, or personal military
duty, into escuage or pecuniary assessments, all the
advantages (either promised or real) of the feudal constitution were destroyed, and nothing but the hardships
renained.  Instead  of forming  a national militia,
composed of barons, knights, and gentlemen, bound
by their interest, their honor, and their oaths, to defend:their king and country, the whole of this system of
tenure now  tended to nothing else but a wretched
means of raising money to pay an army of occasional
mercenaries.  In the mean time the families of all our
nobility and gentry groaned under the intolerable burdens which (in consequence of the fiction adopted
after the Conquest) were introduced and laid upon
them by the subtlety and finesse of the Norman lawyers.  For, besides the scutages, to which they were
liable in defect of personal attendance - which, however, were assessed by themselves in Parliamentthey might be called upon by the king or lord para



THIE FEUDAL SYSTEM.            395
mount for aids, whenever his eldest son was to be
knighted, or his eldest daughter married, not to forget
the ransom of his own person. The heir, on the death
of his ancestor, if of full age, was plundered of the first
emoluments arising from his inheritance, by way of
relief and primer seisin; and if under age, of the
whole of his estate during infancy. And then, as Sir
Thomas Smith very feelingly complains,'When he
came to his own after he was out of wardship, his
woods decayed, houses fallen down, stock wasted and
gone, lands let forth and ploughed to be barren;' to
reduce him still further, he was yet to pay half a year's
profits as a fine for suing out his livery, and also the
price or value of his marriage, if he refused such wife
as his lord and guardian had bartered for and imposed
upon him; or twice that value' if he married another
woman.  Add to this the untimely and expensive
honor of knighthood, to make his poverty more completely splendid. And when, by these deductions, his
fortune was so shattered and ruined that perhaps he
was obliged to sell his patrimony, he had not even
that poor privilege allowed him without paying an
exorbitant fine for a license of alienation.
" A slavery so complicated and so extensive as this
called aloud for a remedy, in a nation that boasted
of its freedom. Palliatives were, from time to time,
applied by successive acts of Parliament, which assuaged some temporary grievances, till at length the
humanity of King James I. consented, in consideration
of a proper equivalent, to abolish them all, though the
plan proceeded not to effect: in like manner as he
had formed a scheme, and began to put it in execution, for removing the feudal grievance of heritable
jurisdictions in Scotland, which has since been pursued and effected by the statute 20 Geo. II. c. 43.
King James's plan for exchanging our military tenures seems to have been nearly the same as that




396             THE FEUDAL SYSTEMS
which has since been pursued, only with this difference, that, by way of compensation for the loss which
the crown and other lords would sustain, an annual
fee-farm rent was to have been settled, and insepara-"
bly annexed to the crown, and assured to the inferior
lords, payable out of every knight's fee within their
respective seigniories -an expedient seemingly much
better than the hereditary excise, which was afterwards
made the principal equivalent of these concessions.
For at length the military tenures, with all their heavy
appendages, (having during the usurpation been discontinued,) were destroyed at one blow by the statute
12 Car. II. c. 24, which enacts'that the court of
wards and liveries, and all wardships, liveries, primer
seizins, and ousterlemains, values and forfeitures of
marriages, by reason of any tenure of the king or
others, be totally taken away; and that all fines for
alienations, tenures by homage, knight's service, and
escuage, and also aids for marrying the daughter or
knighting the son, and all tenures of the king in cCapitc,
be likewise taken away; and that all sorts of tenures,
held of the king or others, be turned into free and common socage, save only tenures in frankalmoign, copyholds, and the honorary services (without the slavish
part) of grand serjeantry;' -a statute which was a
greater acquisition to the civil property of this kingdom
than even Mlagna CGharta itself; since that only pruned
the luxuriances that had grown out of the military
tenures, and thereby preserved them in vigor, but the
statute of King Charles extirpated the whole, and
demolished both root and branches." —Blackstone,
book ii. chap. 4.
"The abolition  of military tenures, which was
effected by statute, was one of the most acceptable
measures that have been adopted.... The principal and original purpose of these tenures was to
secure an efficient military force for the protection of
the realmt.... 




THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.              397
"To supply the deficiency in the king's revenue,
which the subtraction of the feudal profits and the
successive grants of the crown had occasioned, was of
course the next subject of consideration for the legislature. King James conceived the plan of securing an
equivalent for the feudal profits by an annual fee-farm
rent, which was to have been settled and inseparably
annexed to the crown, and assured to the inferior
lords, payable out of every knight's fee within their
respective seigniories.  This plan appears to have
been pursued in regard to inferior lords; but in respect
to the king, the principal equivalent for these concessions was the excise.
" The excise was a novel mode of taxing commodities, either immediately on their consumption, or more
frequently on their retail sale.  It is said to have been
first devised in the reign of Charles I., and was given
to the crown by act of Parliament as an equivalent
for the profits of the feudal tenures; and although a
very unpopular tax, it has been imposed on fresh comzmodities in every subsequent reign..    i. In consequence of the abolition of the feudal tenures, a
permanent kind of military force was now  raised,
called a standing arimy, of which it appears that this
king, Charles II., had not more than the number of
5000."-C Crabb's Hist. English Law.
"The origin.of a permanently embodied military
force may be dated from the commencement of this
reign..... These formed at first a force of about
5000 men; but in the latter part of the next reign
this force was augmented to 30,000.  Parliament,
however, never sanctioned the enrolment of this large
army, nor did it vote the money required for their
maintenance.  They were embodied by the authority
of the crown only, and were paid for either out of the
civil list, or by diverting money voted for other purposes.  It was on this unconstitutional force that
34




398            ARABLE AND PASTURE.
James II. mistakenly depended for the success of
his anti-Protestant and arbitrary schemes."- Wade's
British Chronology.
Such is the most concise history that we could lay
before the reader, in quotations, of the politics of English landed property. We shall show, presently,, what
a momentous change is recorded in this little history;
but, before proceeding to any remarks of our own, we
must advert to another change in the disposition of a
large portion of the soil of England.
" In the course of the fourteenth century, the demand for wool to supply not only the markets of the
Netherlands, but also the infant manufacturers of our
own country, rapidly increased.  This circumstance
brought about an important change in the distribution of the population.  The owners of land, finding sheep-feeding more profitable than husbandry,
commenced the same system which we have all witnessed in full operation in the Highlands of Scotland.
The peasantry, previously employed in tillage, were
turned adrift upon the world; the allotments of arable
land, which had afforded them and their families the
means of subsistence, were enclosed, consolidated, and
converted into sheep-walks; and the policy of Henry
VII. greatly accelerated a social revolution which had
commenced before his accession. The misery and
suffering which this change of system inflicted upon
the ejected peasantry, have been depicted in beautiful
and glowing language by Sir Thomas More, in his
Utopia.
"' Your sheep,' says he,' which were wont to be so
meek and tame, and so small eaters, now become so
great devourers, and so wild, that they eat up and
swallow down the very men themselves. They con



ARABLE AND PASTURE.            399
sume, destroy, and devour whole fields, houses, and
cities; for, look in what part of the realm doth grow
the finest, and therefore dearest wool; there, noblemen
and gentlemen- yea, and certain abbots, holy men,
God wot!- not contenting themselves with the
yearly revenues and profits that were wont to grow
to their forefathers and predecessors of their' lands,
nor being content that they live in rest and pleasure,
nothing profiting, yea, much annoying, the weal public, leave no ground for tillage. They enclose all into
pastures, they throw down houses, they pluck d'own
towns, and leave nothing standing  but only the
church, to be made a sheep-house. And, as though
you lost no small quantity of ground by forests,
chases, lands, and parks, those good, holy men, turn
all dwelling-places and all glebe lands into desolation
and wilderness,
"' Therefore, that one covetous, and unsatiable cormorant and very plague of his native country may
compass about and enclose many thousand acres of
ground together within one pale or hedge, the husbandmen be thrust out of their own, or else, either by
cozen and fraud, or by violent oppression, they be put
beside it, or by wrongs and injuries they be so wearied
that they be compelled to sell all, By one means,
therefore, or other, -either by hook or by crook,they must needs depart away, poor, silly, wretched
souls! - men, women, husbands, wives, fatherless
children, widows, woful mothers with their young
babes and their whole household, small in substance
and much in number, as husbandry requireth many
hands; for one shepherd or herdsman is enough to
eat up that ground with cattle, to the occupying
whereof about husbandry many hands were requisite.
After that so much ground was enclosed for pasture,
an infinite multitude of sheep died of the rot; such
vengeance God took of their inordinate, unsatiable




400          ENCLOSURE OF COMMONS.
covetousness -sending among the sheep that pestiferous murrain, which much more justly should have
fallen on the chief masters' own heads......
" A very considerable portion of the discarded occupiers were thus absorbed; but the remainder, amounting, as it appears from all the records of the period, to
no inconsiderable number, either unable to find a small
spot of land to rent and occupy, or unwilling to submit
to the confinemeht of towns and manufactories, became
wandering beggars, infesting the roads and villages of
the country.  Hence the English poor-laws.  During
this memorable period in the history of our peasantry,
various laws were enacted for the suppression of vagrancy, and these were finally amended and consolidate
ed in the celebrated act of 43 Elizabeth.....  But
another revolution was now approaching, and one
which has affected their (the peasantry,) welfare more
extensively, as well as more intensely, than even the
momentous change wrought under the dominion of
the Tudors. The numerous small farms which had
escaped consolidation, and consequently supplied an
asylum  for the peasantry discarded fromr the larger
estates, were now doomed to undergo a similar revolution.  Through the operation of too obvious causes,
several of the smaller farms in each parish had come
to be the property of one landlord. It was then discovered that the divtsion and enclosure of the common
fields and wastes of the parish would render this property more profitable, by facilitating the introduction of
an improved system of tillage. In 1709, an application was made to Parliament for. an act to divide and
enclose the common fields and wastes belonging to
the parish of Ropley. This served as an encouragement and example, and applications of the same kind
became annually more frequent. It appears that, since
that period, very nearly 4000 bills of enclosure have
been passed; and it is also well known that, in numer



LANDED PROPERTY.              401
ous instances, the same end has been reached without
legislative interference, by private agreement among
the parties interested. In a word, we have scarcely a
doubt that about 5000 parishes (a, moiety of the whole,territory of England) have been subjected to the operation of these measures in the space of about one
hundred and twenty years; and as little (howeverFbeneficial the division and consequent improvement of
this vast territory may have proved to the owners, and
to some other classes) that the" change has been a woful one for our peasantry.  We believe that the final
extinction of the class of small occupiers and crofters
has, in almost every instance, followed the division of
common field parishes." —Quarterly Review, July, 1829.
The political history of landed property in England,
therefore, appears to have been as follows:1st. The lands were accorded by the king to persons
who were to undertake the military service of the
kingdom.
2d. The performance of this military service was
the condition on which individuals held the national
land.
3d. The lands were at first held for life, and afterwards were made hereditary.
4th. The military service was abolished by the law,
and a standing, army introduced.
5th. This standing army was paid by the king.
6th. The king, havTng abolished the military services
of the individuals who held the national land, resorted
to the taxation of articles of consumption for the payment of the army.
The lands of England, therefore, instead of being
held on condition of performing the military service
34*




402                  THE POLITICS OF
of the kingdom, became the property of the  individuals who held them, and thus the state of England
lost the lands of England.  And the military service
of the kingdom, instead of being performed by those
individuals who held  the national land, was  henceforth  (after the reign  of Charles II.) to be paid for
by the  general taxation  of the  inhabitants  of the
country.
Therefore the present' system  of taxation, and the
national debt, the interest of which is procured by the
forcible taxation of the general inhabitants of England, are both due to the alienation of the lands fromn
the state, inasmuch  as the national debt (incurred for
war expenses) would have been a debt upon the lands,
and  not a debt upon  the people  of England.*   If,
* Total Expense of the AJrmy, NJavy, and Ordnance, from 1790 to
1815, inclusive, inmillions sterling, (round numbers.)
Years.  Millions.   Years.  Millions.   Years.   Millions.
1791        4       1800        29       1808        39
1792        8       1801        26       1809        42
1793       13       1802        23       1810        43
1794       20       1803        21       1811        47
1795       28       1804        30       1812        49
1796       30       1805        36       1813        54
1797       27       1806        37       1814        60
1798       25       1807        36       1815        43
1799       27                                       _ 
To this it may be added, that the war charges of the kingdom,
from the year 1815 to 1848, amounted to 484 millions sterling; and
the advantage to the country of an aristocratic House of Commons,
having an unlimited power to tax the labors of the community, may
be inferred from the fact, that from 1835 to 1847, (inclusive,) the
expenses of the war establishments increased rather more than a




LAND'ED PROPERTY.                 403
therefore, the legislature had a right to abolish the military services of those who held the national land, and
thereby to impose on the general community all the
liabilities of the military service of the kingdom, the
legislature has the same right to abolish the general
taxation of the community, and to allocate to those
who hold the land all the expenses that have been
incurred, and are still incurred, for the war charges of
the kingdom.
The alienation of the land from  the state, and its
conversion into private property, was the first grand
step that laid the foundation of the modern system  of
society in England -  a system  that presents enormous wealth in the hands of a few  aristocrats, who
neither labor, nor even pay taxes in proportion to those
waho do labor, (land pays no legacy duty on being transmitted;) and a vast population  laboring for a bare
subsistence, or reduced sometimes by millions to the
condition of pauperism.
So long as this system  is allowed to continue, it
appears (from the constitution of the earth, and of
man's power to extract from it a maintenance) an absolute impossibility that pauperism  should be obliterated; inasmuch as the burden of taxation necessarily
falls on labor, and more especially as the value of labor
million every two years. Nothing less that miracles could save the
country from pauperization under such a system of government.
No reformation of the public expenditure, however, can possibly
be anticipated until men of an entirely different class form the majority of the House of Commons; and this change can only be secured by a total revision of the whole system of representation.




404                   THE POLITICS OF
is necessarily diminished wherever there is a soil allocated to an aristocracy.+
The abolition of the military tenures, however, did
not complete the great evolution by which the lands
of England have been transformed  into the property
of a few  thousand  aristocrats,   That evolution consisted of three great facts, -
1st. The allocation of the church lands to individual proprietors.
2d. The abolition of military tenure, and the substitution of the taxation of articles of consumption;
in other words, of the taxation of labor.
3d. The  enclosure  of the  common  lands, whereby
vast numbers of the peasantry were ruined, deprived
of their legal rights, which were quite as valid as the
entails of the aristocracy, and, being separated from
the land, were sent to  propagate  pauperism  in  the
* Political economists have insisted much on the small matters
that affect the value of labor. By far the most important is, the
mode in which the land is distributed.  Wherever there is a free
soil, labor naintains its value. Wherever the soil is in the hands
of a few proprietors, or tied up by entails, labor necessarily undergoes depreciation. In fact, it is the disposition of the land that determines the value of labor. If men could get the land to labor on,
they would manufacture only for a remuneration that afforded more
profit than God has attached to the cultivation of the earth. Where
they cannot get the land to labor on, they are starved into working
for a bare subsistence. There is only one reason why the labor of
England, Ireland, and Scotland is of so little marketable value, and
that reason is, the present disposition of the soil. Were the soil disposed of according to the laws of equity, there cannot be the least
doubt that the labor of the laboring classes would at once rise to at
least double its present value.




LANDED PROPERTY.             405
towns and villages. Such were the great political
events that terminated in the separation of the people
of England from the soil of England, and such was
the price paid for that personal freedom and personal
independence which has been gradually evolving from
the time of the Norman formation of the state of
England, and which will come to a natural termination the moment men are equalized in their political
functions. The moment the law becomes impartial,
and recognizes no a priori difference between the individuals of whom the state is composed, that moment
has the grand evolution of liberty come to a conclusion,
and the evolution of natural property will then enter
on its course.
On the three events which have at last left the lands
of England in the hands of a small number of aristocrats, we shall make only one or two observations.
Every one of these events, has a right side as well
as a wrong side; and unless we learn to estimate
impartially the value of the changes, we are in danger
of taking a distorted view of the morals as well as of
the matter of the changes.
1st. It was right to abolish the monasteries.
2d. It was right to abolish the military tenures.
3d. It was right to enclose the common lands.
And it was wrong,- 
1st. To allocate the church lands to individuals.
2d. To allow the lands to remain as the property
of those who neither cultivated them, nor were liable
for the performance of the military service of the
kingdom.
3d. To make such a disposition of the common




406              TIE POLITICS OF
lands as disinherited the peasantry, and at last left
the common lands in the hands of the aristocracy as
property.
So soon as the Roman religion was supplanted in
England, there can be no question that it was right
to abolish the monasteries; and though many hardships were no doubt inflicted on some excellent men
and women, (for the church in England contained
both,) the system had grown old. It had outlived its
time, and the day of its departure had arrived. Man
was to take a new expansion; to enter on a course
of thought; to begin to exercise his reason, and no
longer to believe on mere authority. And the removal
of the Papal church of England was the first great requirement for the commencement of a course that
must terminate at last in absolute liberty of thought,
and absolute non-interference of the legislature with
the credence of any individual. But the iniquity of the
mode in which the monasteries were suppressed was
in the fact, that the lands were transformed into the
property of the aristocracy. If the king resumed them
in his official character of head of the state of England,
he could not justly transform them into his own private property, nor could he justly transform them into
the private property of any individual members of the
state. Such a transaction is utterly beyond the intention of civil government, and its toleration could not
take place in a community governed by reason. And
when we take into consideration that there are but
two objects of taxation, namely, individual labor or
the natural earth, the allocation of these lands as private property was only tantamount to the prospective




LANDED PROPERTY.              407
abstraction of the value of the lands from the future
laborers of the country.  Were there no such thing as
taxation, the gift of lands would be comparatively a
matter of indifference, (provided there was no restriction whatever on its sale and purchase;) but so long
as taxation on labor exists, the gift of lanAs is exactly
equivalent to the present abstraction of the present
annual value of those lands from the present laborers
of England.  And herein lies the injustice and evil
of the king's gift of the abbey lands.
Again: the abolition of military tenures was right,
because that system had also grown old. It was inefficient; useless for the military service of the kingdom; it did not work; its evil remained without its
good. But the transformation of the lands into the
property of the aristocracy, and the establishment of a
system of taxation that has entailed the heaviest debt
and the heaviest'taxation in the world on the laborers
of England - these were the evils that entailed England's pauperism.  Had the lands of England been
liable (as most justly they should have been liable)
for their own defence, there can be little or no doubt
that the national debt (at all events, the 600 millions
incurred in attempting to arrest the progress of Europe) would not have been incurred at all. Had the
land been liable, the aristocracy, who held the land,
would never have plunged into a war, the principal
effects of which appear to have been the deferring of
the requisite changes on the continent of Europe, and
the infliction of a debt on England which will ultimately effect the destruction of the aristocracy. The
king never could justly, as the head of the state, abolish




408              THE POLITICS OF
the liability of the land to defray the war charges of
the state, by attaching those liabilities to the individual laborers, while the land holders were allowed to
carry off a free land. This, in fact, is the greatest
political change that has taken place in Englandof infinitely more importance to the present generation than the revolution that expelled the Stuarts.
The prerogatives of the crown could not have failed
to undergo changes in the natural order of evolution.
As knowledge progressed, the king, from a ruler, must
have become an administrator. But the legal establishment of labor taxation, and the accordance of the
land as the property of the aristocracy, fixed upon
the country a system that had the appearance of
right, and that brought with it the impress of imperial
legislation; while it originated in the darkest ignorance or the most licentious overstretch of power, and
could not fail to produce ultimately the most pernicious results. The tax-payers of England can never
be sufficiently reminded, that there need have been no
taxes had it not been for the alienation of the land
from the state.
The enclosure of the common lands, again, was a
proper measure, inasmuch as the lands were producing
little; and every measure that caused the lands to produce more for the consumption of the country was so
far beneficial. It would have been quite absurd to
leave the common lands in pasture, while their enclosure would produce for the service of the country a
much larger quantity of food.  And the same argument that took away the lands of the peasantry, would
now take away the lands of those proprietors who
allow their lands to lie uncultivated.




LANDED PROPERTY.              409
On the effects of the enclosure of the common lands,
we quote another passage frqm the same article in the
Quarterly Review, July, 1829:
" Here, no doubt, it will be observed, that in every
einstance an allotment of land was, on the division of the waste, assigned to the owners of common
rights," (incumbents, rather than owners;) " and that an
allotment in severalty, if properly attended to and cultivated, must have proved much more valuable to the
cottager than what he had lost. If such had been the
case, we readily admit that the division could not have
proved detrimental to him; but, unfortunately, this
very rarely happened. These allotments were assigned,
under enclosure acts, not to the occupier, but the owner
of the cottage. Few cottages were in the occupation
of their owners; they generally, indeed, we may say
universally, belonged to the proprietors of the neighboring farms; and the allotments granted in lieu of the
extinguished common rights were generally added to
the large farms, and seldom attached to the cottages.
The cottages which were occupied by their owners
had, of course, allotments attached to them; but these
have by degrees passed by sale into the hands of some
large proprietor in the neighborhood. De facto, in
ninety-nine cases out of the hundred, the allotment
has been detached from the cottage, and thrown into
the occupation of some adjoining farmer.
" That such a change should have been attended
with most important consequences, can excite no surprise in any reflecting mind.  So far as it goes, a complete severance has been effected between the E]nglisl
peasantry and the English soil.  The little farmers and
cottiers of the country have been converted into day
laborers, depending entirely upon daily earnings, which
may, and frequently in point of fact do, fail them.
They have now no land, upon the produce of which
35




410              THE POLITICS OF
they can fall as a reserve whenever the demand for labor happens to be slack.. This revolution is unquestionably the true cause of the heavy and increasing
burdens now pressing upon parishes in the form of
poor-rates.  Independently of all reasoning founded
upon general principles, this is a truth capable of being
substantiated by a mass of evidence, so clear and so
well authenticated as to leave no room for doubt. In
almost every instance the increase of poor-rates has
kept pace visibly with the progress of enclosures."
The passage we have underlined-" a complete
severance has been effected between the English peasantry and the English soil " —points out the great
economical cause of England's periodical distress; a
distress which, were it not for the poor-laws, would
occasionally manifest itself (as it did in 1830-31) in
tumultuous assemblages and breaches of the law.
And assuredly that severance between the subjective
labor and the objective soil will yet rectify itself. No
class of society can be visited with long-continued
evils, without entailing evil on the other classes. And
though the manufactures of England, taking an expansion altogether unprecedented in the history of the
world, were able to consume the redundant population,
the time must come when the rate of increase will diminish, when the population shall find no maintenance
either in the towns or in the country, and social
changes, attended with a more equitable distribution
of the sources of wealth, will result in spite of all
that men can do to prevent them.
While the increase of the poor rates in England
reached to such an extent, that in not a few cases the




LANDED PROPERTY.              411
half of the rental, and in the case of the parish of
Cholesbury the whole of the rental, was absorbed; and
while new legislative enactments were absolutely necessary to prevent the ruin of the land holders —it is
singular to observe how little inquiry was made into
the radical cause of England's pauperism. Rates and
paupers are correlatives, and the rates increase because
the paupers have increased. No remedial measure
that attempts only to supply the wants of those who
are paupers will ever reach the depths of pauperism;
and while there is of course an imperative necessity to
relieve a famished population, there is quite as great a
necessity to inquire, " Why does it happen, that in the
richest country in the world a large portion of the population should be reduced to pauperism?" Until the
causes of pauperism are satisfactorily ascertained, and
until the remedy is applied to the cause, no remedial
measure can do more than alleviate the evil. Apply
the remedy to the cause, and the evil is eradicated.
The cause, or at least one of the great causes, is that
expressed in the words of the reviewer, " the severance
between the English peasantry and the English soil;"
and until the peasantry recover that soil, the inhabitants of England may rest satisfied that the curse of
pauperism  will pursue them; and if the remedy be
not applied in time, that the vengeance of Heaven
will be manifested against a nation —with so many
privileges -that allows her children to be condemned
to want, and ignorance, and moral degradation.
Although we have presented the reader with this
sketch of the historical politics of landed property, we
attach little br no importance to it.  No historical




412    THE GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF TRUTH.
argument is ever capable of deciding a present question
of equity.  Men must go forward, never backward.
History may enlighten, may instruct, may teach us
what has been, and may afford us the groundwork of
an argument for anticipating what shall be in future;
but history will not supply the motive for action, nor
can it ever furnish the rule of action. For these we
must look to the present times: the motive must be a
living one, not a dead one; and the rule must be
a rule that depends, not on one age rather than another, but a rule that always was valid had man been
able to see it, that is valid now, and that will be valid
when we shall have passed away, and our places are
supplied by the generations that come after us. In
the past we see the concrete manifestations of man's
phenomena, we see the phases through which he has
passed, and we may learn to extract or evolve the law
of the direction in which he is progressing. In man's
actual history, all variable as it is, like the outward appearances of nature, we behold a stupendous series of
real phenomena, in which men and nations are the
actors. The rulers and the ruled, the monarch, the
aristocrat, and the serf, the priest, the artist, the merchant, and the soldier, all play their respective parts in
man's political drama. Events roll on, and history
records the scenes.
But beneath the outward variety of man's historic
representations, can we not plunge below the surface
and seize some stable element, some scheme, some
law, some generalized fact, some plan or principle on
which the drama has been constructed, some permanent truth that evolves amid all the apparent diversity




A THEORETIC ULTIMATUM.            413
of images?  Can we not transform  the real elements
as they appear into some abstract form that enables us
to state them  in a rational equation?  Can we not
apprehend the essential character of the changes, as,well as their empirical character, and derive instruction
for the reason, as well as materials for the memory
and the understanding?
No truth appears to be more satisfactorily and more
generally borne out by the history of modern Europe,
than that the progression of men in the matter of liberty "is from  a diversity of privileges towards an
equality of rights;" that is, that the past progress has
been all in this direction since the maximum of diversity prevailed in the aspect of individual lord and individual serf. And if this be the case, it cannot be an
unreasonable conclusion, that if sufficient time be
allowed for the evolution, the progress of change will
continue to go on till some ultimate condition is evolved.
And that ultimate condition can only be at the point
where diversity of privilege disappears, and every individual in the state is legally entitled to identically
the same political functions.  Diversities of office
there may be, and there must be, but diversity of
rights there cannot be without injustice.
Such, then, is the theoretic ultimatum  that satisfies
the reason with regard to its equity, and such is the
historic ultimatum that the reason infers from the past
history of mankind. Such, then, is the point towards
which societies are progressing; and when that point
is reached, the ultimatum  of equity is achieved, and
the present course of historical evolution is complete.
35*




414          THE CLASSES OF SOCIETY.
But while on the one hand we cast our eyes on the
ultimate object to be obtained - on that which is theoretically right —it should never be forgotten that two
other questions nearer at hand claim as urgent an attention -the questions, " Where are we at present in
the line of progress?" and " What are the next steps
that require to be taken to lead society towards its
final destination? " These are questions for the practical statesman and for the present generation, who
require to deliver themselves from the evils that have
grown to a height, and whose real character has been
apprehended by the nation. On these questions we
shall only make a passing remark.
Diversity of opinion may arise between two men
who are both apparently in the right, if the attention
of the one be directed to what is theoretically right,
and the attention of the other to what is practically
expedient as the next step which the present balance
of powers in the state renders possible. At every period there are some men in advance of their age, some
suited to the practical requirements of their age, and
others behind their age - the gepide or loiterers, who
remain in the rear. The latter class, for the most part,
are composed of those whose interests are implicated
in the present disposition of affairs, and who dread
change of every description, perhaps from a vague
apprehension that they may lose their present powers,
while the increase of those powers is an event not to
be anticipated. This class is gradually losing its influence, gradually receding from the direction of the
state, and submitting to a current that it can no longer




THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE THEORIST.  410
control, but which it may to a certain extent impede.
The other two classes are the real laborers; with them
lies the motive of progression, and the judgment to
determine in what particular direction change ought
to be efficted.  For the loiterers, every change is bad;
and the whole of their practical function is to retard,
to contrive.obstacles, to find impediments, and if possible to prevent investigation. But for the other two
classes, not only is the impulse necessary, but on them
lies the burden of devising new conditions, which shall
be more beneficial than the present conditions, of exploring, pioneering, preparing the way, and finally of
dragging onward the cumbrous car of state., held back
as it is by those who inherit from  darker ages the
power of retardation.  Between the first two classes,
however, there must ever be diversity of opinion, so
long as the one class is bent on what is theoretically
right, and the other on what it deems to be practicnlly
expedient. The first regards the measures of the second as unsatisfactory, as half measures, as mere sops
to allay the Cerberus of popular discontent. The
second, on the contrary, regard the measures of the
first as impracticable schemes, as theoretic measures,
good enough perhaps in the abstract, (that is, measures that satisfy the reason,) but which, from  some
peculiarity in present circumstances, are quite incapable of application.  The one professedly takes reason
for his criterion, and rejects every measure that falls
short of its requirements; the other extends his view
no farther than to the single point that enables him to
take one step in advance.  The one takes the unchangeable and imperishable element of man, the




416    THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE THEORIST.
objective reason,* crowns it with imperial authority,
and demands that all should at once acknowledge its
supremacy.  The other takes the variable element of
man -  his subjective condition -  and, rejecting every
dogma that claims to be absolute, discourses only on
the proximate possibility of improving that condition.
The one sees the transparent image of truth divested
of the garb of humanity; the other sees the outward
raiment in its frailty and imperfection, and heeds not
to draw aside the drap'ery that conceals the divinity
of reason.
Between these two parties, therefore, there is not so
much a perpetual warfare as a perpetual misunderstanding.  Their point of view  is different.   They
stand on different elevations, and have quite a different range of horizon.   Granting that some of both
parties (and who can doubt it?) have the honest and
sincere desire to advance society in the right direction,
there is between them an incompatibility both of conviction and of feeling, which forbids that they should
cooperate as laborers in the same field, and for the
same ultimate object. The one views society as in a
* Axiomatic truth is subjective when in spontaneous operation,
but it is objective when reduced to language, and expressed in propositions. This fact is altogether overlooked by those who descant
on the subjectivity of axiomatic truth. On the very same principle,
heat, color, sound, &c., &c., matter, mind, and every thing else, are
subjective according to these philosophers, so that there really is
nothing -in fact, it is quite a mistake to suppose that there can be
any thing -the universe being only a great delusion. If the simplicity of a philosophical system be the criterion of its perfection,
this system can scarcely be excelled.




THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE THEORIST.  417
state of transition, and presses forward towards an
ultimatum. The other views society as engaged in
its ordinary labor, believes in no ultimatum, but acknowledges that certain changes are rendered necessary by a change of circumstances. The one views
the revival of learning as the passage out of Egypt,
and the present time as the journeying through the
wilderness towards the promised land of rest. The
other believes in no Egypt and no promised land, but
feels that the daily labor must be done in the world
of politics as well as in the world of matter. The
one stands on the top of Pisgah, and beholds afar off
the Canaan of his hopes, the land of long expectation,
and the land for which the past journeyings of the
race have been but the necessary preparations. The
other, like Lot, beholds the plain of Jordan that it is
well watered every where, and journeys eastward that
he may find sustenance for his flock. The one is
an intellectualist, who believes in the supremacy of
reason, and attributes the systematic errors of society
to erroneous propositions. The other is an empiric,
who admits no absolute criterion, but admits that the
conditions of mankind may be gradually improved.
The one fixes his eye on truth, and forgets the intermediate distance that separates man from its realization. The other fixes his eye on man as he appears
at present, forgetting alike the history of his transformation and the probable goal that must form his
destination.
To a certain extent, both are necessary; both are
workers in the great field of human improvement
and of man's amelioration. Incomprehensible as they




418   THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE THEORIST.
must ever be to each other, (till the last final item of
change shall bring both to an identity of purpose,) they
are fellow-laborers in the scheme of human evolution.
The one devises afar off the general scheme of progress; the other carries the proximate measures of that
scheme into practical operation. The one is the hydrographer who constructs the chart; the other, the
mariner who navigates the ship, ignorant, perhaps,
what may be its final destination.
Between the man of theory and the man of practice,
therefore, there is (at present) a perpetual though
fluctuating difference.  Seldcm is it given to man in
this world to understand aright his own position; and
though he may labor, and labor well, it is rare that he
can appreciate correctly the true position of his labors.
And thus in the field of politics, the theorist and the
man of practice appear to misunderstand the bearings
of their respective occupations.  The theorist, too
often trusting to his individual perceptions, forgets
that propositions which appear to him of absolute
certitude can never be accepted by the world until
they have received a far wider authentication than
any one man could possibly bestow upon them. And
though perchance he might evolve some propositions
which should ultimately be able to stand their ground,
experience will prove that the diffusion of truth is no
less necessary than its discovery. Truth, like leaven,
must pervade the mass before the requisite transformation is effected.  On the other hand, the man of practice moves, for the most part, as he is impelled by the
convictions of the multitude, and his object is not to
theorize but to design the requisite.changes, and to




THE END OF PROGRESSION.          419
carry them into execution. The theories of to-day he
regards with indifference or aversion; they are of no
practical avail; he is pressed with the necessity of
action, and act he must, or his place must be ceded
to another. But he also forgets. He forgets that the
very measures which he now  reduces to practical
operation were the theories of the past generation, and
that he is only carrying into execution the schemes
which the practical men of other times regarded in the
same light as he regards the theories of to-day; and
the very theories (some of them at all events) which
he regards with aversion, are destined to become the
measures of some future man of practice, who bestows
on the theories of his day the same characteristic abhorrence. He forgets that he moves in action because
the multitude have moved in mind; and that the
multitude moved in mind because they had imbibed
the theories of former speculators, and changed their
credence under the influence of conviction. He forgets
that change of action comes from change of credence,
and that change of credence comes from  theoretic
speculation. He forgets that if there were no theories
there would be no change, and if no change, no necessity for him to execute it.
In assigning, then, a theoretic ultimatum to man's
political progress, we posit, -
1st. That this ultimatum is the only one that satisfies the reason.
2d. That its probability is borne out by the history
of the past changes that have taken place in the relative conditions of the various political classes of,which
society has hitherto been composed.




420          THE END OF PROGRESSION.
3d. That if society continue to progress on the
same scheme or plan that may be inferred from  an
observation of its past progress, and if sufficient time
be allowed for the completion of the evolution, there
must come a period when the equilibrium  of equity
shall be restored, and every individual in the state
shall be exactly equal in his primary political function.
4th. That all diversities of rights and privileges,
being contrary to the theoretic reason of mankind,
shall altogether disappear; and the law, which is (in
its proper sense) the expression of the theoretic reason, shall acknowledge no political difference whatever
between the individuals who form  the state, except
such diversities of office as may be found advisable
for conducting the business of the body politic. And
this diversity of office to be determined exclusively by
the free election of the whole associated individuals
who form the state.
5th. That law derives from the general or abstract
reason of the human race, and therefore it can never
acknowledge a political difference between the individuals of the race without being guilty of partiality and
injustice.
6th. Absolute equality in the eye of the law, without the slightest distinction of individuals or classes,
is, therefore, the ultimatum  of political progression;
and this ultimatum is the only condition that satisfies
the requirements of the reason, and the only condition
that presents a rational termination to those changes
which, according to history, have been gradually taking
place fpr cent ries.




CHAPTER  IV.
BRIEF OUTLINE OF AN HISTOInICAL SKETCH, BEING
AN ATTEMPT TO APPREHEND  THE SENTIM'ENTS
OF THE HUMAN MIND WHICH HAVE RULED SOCIETY, AND TO APPRECIATE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF MAN THROUGH HIS HISTORIC
MANIFESTATIONS.
BUT, while an equality of political rights may be
posited as a logical ultimatum that satisfies the reason, and therefore as an ultimatum  that may surely
be expected to evolve in one nation after another, as
knowledge progresses and the arrangements of superstition are broken down before the advance of truth, it
must be remembered that the organization of society is
the end to be achieved; and the practical ultimatum
is the organization of society on true principles instead
of on false principles.
To suppose that theoretic principles are incapable
of being reduced to practice because they are theoretic,
is not only an assumption that God has created man's
reason in opposition to the requirements of his terrestrial condition, but it is also a palpable inconsistency
utterly untenable. All arrangements are necessarily
based on theoretic principles of some kind or other;
nor call man, by any possibility, make any construction of society which is not de facto the actual reali36




422                  THEORIES.
zation of a theory. It is exactly the same with philosophy. Every man might reject, in words, the claims
of philosophic theories; yet no sooner does he proceed
to act than he immediately gives his unconditional
assent to some philosophical theory, and declares, in
the most explicit and intelligible of all modes, his unreserved belief in phiTosophic propositions which involve the highest abstractions of the reason. Let the
whole phenomenon of his action be translated into
language, and at the bottom will necessarily be found
a philosophic theory.  Incapable as he may be of
reflection, or of reducing his credence to its ultimate
form, he has by the very fact of action pronounced
judgment on the great questions of philosophy. No
intelligent act can be performed without also involving, as an absolute necessity, a theory; and therefore
the question lies, not between the acceptance or the
rejection of theories, but between  the acceptance
of a true or a false theory, for one must necessarily
be chosen.
Every form  of society, every form  of government,
every system of association, every actually existing
form of civil polity, is the realization of speculative
propositions.  Every government necessarily has its
theory, of which that government is only the practical
realization. Every system established by man, either
in church or state, has been only the outward expression of an inward credence, which credence involved
a theory; and this theory is true or false.
In the past arrangements of society, therefore, it is
possible to detect the theories on which those arrangements have been based, to inquire whether they were




THE PAPACY AND THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.   423
true or false, and to trace them  in their evolution as
they changed from one to the other, under the influence of new circumstances and newly developed truthe
In Britain, the constitution of civil society, like that
of ecclesiastical society, has only once been subjected
to systematic arrangement; once only has the state
been formed in such a manner that each individual
has-had his civil position allocated to him by law,
while, at the same time, he was directly connected
with the other individuals, forming together one political- association.
The church, as one association, presented itself under the form of the papacy; the state, as one association, presented itself under the form of the feudal
system.  The papacy was the complete organization
of the church on false principles; the feudal system
was the complete organization of the state on false
principles; and the history of modern society is the
history of the gradual destruction of those two great
systems - of the de-organization of the papal church
- of the de-organization of the feudal state -of the
reduction of both to unassociated elements; and of
the gradual growth of those new principles, which
shall ultimately rearrange those elements into a new
form, and present once more a united church, constructed upon two principles; and an organized state,
or real political association, completely organized on
those principles of political truth which took their birth
in the reformation of religion, and since that period
have been undergoing development, becoming more
powerful, more generally received, and more and more
extensively applied.




424              WAR - FEUDALISM.
The political construction of society, under the
feudal system, was essentially based on the assumption of a diversity of orders, or classes, or castes. In
its origin, the feudal system had been a genuine and
true expression of man's requirements. Superiority of
position was acquired by superiority of skill, courage,
or enterprise; and so long as it was a war system,
and the lands were accorded to the warriors, the feudal
system  was correct in principle, and efficient in its
operation. But when the system had grown, and had
become not an accidental form produced by circumstances, but an intentional form confirmed by parch.
ment laws, —when the settled warrior became a
here'ditary noble, and society presented no longer a
genuine war construction, but a civil construction,
which was the parchment representation of the genuine feudalism,-the superiority of merit disappeared,
and its place was taken by a superiority of rank. The
war feudalism was a spontaneous allocation of offices
to individuals according to their capacities; but the
parchment feudalism  was the construction of civil
society on the principle of hereditary rank, hereditary
jurisdiction, hereditary legislation, and hereditary
landed property. This system was the construction
of civil society on false principles; and modern society is gradually growing out of this form of construction to assume another form  of organization,
based on the principle of equality.
Let us, then, ask, What was the essential form of
society in its feudal construction?
A, B, C, D, and E will represent individuals, to
whom  the feudal system  allocated the following
positions --




THE FEUDAL CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY.  425
A is a king by right.
B is a great landlord by right, vassal of A and
lord of C.
C is a vassal, holding land from  11 by military
service.
D  is a sub-feudatory, holding land from  C for
services not immediately military.
E is a serf belonging to A, B, C, or D, without
political rights. He is property, not a person.
Such wouldbe the feudal constitution of society.
Of course the word right is employed, in its customary false sense, to indicate what is received by law, or
custom, not in its moral sense.
According to the feudal theory, A was supposed to
derive his rights from God, and to be subject to God
alone; and this doctrine was asserted in France down
to a short period before the revolution. In England,
it was considered to be abolished by the revolution
of 1688.
B was subject to A, and derived his rights from A,
whose vassal he was. These rights, however, became
hereditary, and, when sanctioned by custom, B maintained them as inherent. B's son was born a lord.
C was subject to B, and subject also to A; so that
B was subject to A, and lord of C.
D was subject to C, and was proprietor of E.
E was pioperty of D. He was master of nobody,
not even of himself.  All that he had belonged to his
owner.
In this scheme of political society, A legislates for
B, tries B in his great court, and punishes him on.occasion. B, however, has a jurisdiction of his own,
36*




426  THE EQUITABLE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY.
and tries C in his little or baronial court, and punishes
hiim on occasion.  C has a minor jurisdiction over D.
And D, beng proprietor of E, legislates for him, and
punishes him as he thinks proper.
Such was the feudal arrangement of society with
regard to political rights.  And this was the system
effectually uprooted and destroyed by the French
revolution-the system  that has been, and still is,
gradually undergoing a process of destruction  in
Britain. Feudalism has not been destroyed in Britain;
it has only been generalized and modified.  Vast
changes have yet to take place before it finally disappears.
Let us now turn to the aspect of this society, when
the doctrine of equality has been applied to it so far
as liberty is concerned.
A is no longer a king, but a freeman.
B is no longer a lord, but a freeman.
C is no longer a military vassal, but a freeman.
D is no longer a socman, but a freeman.
E is no longer a serf, but a freeman.
And these freemen, being equal in rights, proceed
to form a state, and elect a government for the regulation of the whole.
In the former case we have the rule of superstition
and prescription; in the latter, the rule of reason and
equal justice to all.  In the former case wLv have privileges accorded to a few, at the expense of the rights
(the moral rights) of the many; in the latter case we
have no privileges, no hereditary distinctions, and no
diversity of conditions, except those of office, or those
produced by the more or less successful result of




CAUSES OF WAR.                427
industry, skill, or elterprise.  In the former case we
have a system that contains within itself the destruction of justice;. in the latter a system  that contains
within itself the construction of a jural society. In
the former case we have a system  that contains
necessarily, 
1. A cause of war of B  against A, (the barons
bridle the king.)
2. A cause of war of C against B.
3. A cause of war of D against C.
4. A cause of war of E against A B C and DbecauseA B C and D had deprived him of his rights as
a man - as a moral being accountable to God.
In the latter case we have the obliteration of all just
cause of war.  Where none has a legal right which is
not accorded to another in the scheme of the state, the
cause of internal strife is obliterated; and though governments go to war on very insufficient pretexts, populations seldom or never do so without a just cause.
The obliteration of the cause, therefore, may fairly be
expected to obliterate the fact.
The feudal system, with all its modifications past
and present, however mild or constitutional, is nothing
more than systematized slavery.  At the bottom of
society there must always be found the great masses
in a worse condition than nature intended.  And
wherever the feudal system exists, or any remnant of
it, that system, or its remnant, creates a cause of war
among the classes of society; which cause of war
creates perpetual uneasiness, frequent agitations, and
occasional revolutions.
It must be observed that the feudal system  had no




428                     THE TRADER.
place for the trader.  The trader is a non-feudal element in society, and belongs to a different system  of
organization.  His day is fast approaching, and he
will ultimately push out hereditary feudalism from the
direction  of the  state.  He began without a  place,
without a rank, and almost without ordinary protection. As a Jew he was persecuted and cruelly wronged,
barbarously treated because he had no brute force to
repel aggression.* As a foreigner he was taxed and
* "Another considerable article of the crown revenue was the
profits arising from the Jews. Our histories are every where full
of the great and extraordinary taxes and impositions laid on' them;
they were a constant fund for a necessitous court. Mr. Maddox
has produced a multitude of the exchequer records to evince this
truth; but as he has not given any reason for the exercise of this
arbitrary power, but only taken notice of the fact that they were so
taxed; and as this conduct of our ancient kings seems to have perplexed.Lord Coke in some parts of his works, - we shall beg leave
to inquire into the grounds and reason of this behavior; because
such arbitrary and extraordinary methods are contrary to the
analogy of our constitution in other respects.
"Some think our kings had a right to use the Jews in what manner they pleased, and that their fortunes and estate were absolutely
at the king's disposal, and this by a grant from the legislature.:or
it appears by the twenty-ninth law of the Confessor, that the Jews
were the absolute property of the king. The words are, Judai et
omnia sua sunt regis; quod si quispiam detinuerit eos, vel pecuniam
eorum, perquirat rex si vult, tanquam  suum proprium: and the
reader may see this law enforced among the ordinances of Henry II.
and Richard I., concerning the Jews. He may likewise find a very
memorable record in the first volume of Rymer's Collections, where
Henry III. mortgages for ~5000 to his brother, the Earl of Cornwall, omnis JudQeos regni /ngliae, with a power of distraining the
bodies of all or any of them, if the money was not paid at the times
prefixed." - History of Taxes from William the Conqueror to A. D.
1761.




WAR FEUDALISM AND PARCHMENT FEUDALISM. 429
tolerated, and as a native he was a base trader
engaged in ignoble pursuits.
The feudal system was organization on false principles, but it was organization; and so long as the organization was genuine and spontaneous, the feudal
system was the true and living expression of man's
necessities. The leader was a leader, a lion heart who
could dare and do. He led because he could lead, and
was followed from instinct, which knows its leader and
follows him. But when the feudal system was transplanted from the field to the court, -when the pen
of the lawyer supplanted the sword of the knight, and
the banrer of parchment was more powerful than the
pennon, - the life of feudalism was gone, and a clattering skeleton remained with its dead formalities.
War feudalism was a good, and genuine, and true
man; but parchment feudalism was a mock man, 
the one was the organization of force, - the other the
law copy of that organization, and the attempts to fix
in perpetuity the form without the elements. In the
one, power was the essential, and form the accidental;
in the other, form was the essential, and power was
the accidental. The one had a leader who did govern;
the other, a king who was supposed to govern. The
one had an aristocracy of talent; the other an aristocracy of sheepskin. The one gave lands because he
first conquered them; the other gave lands because
they fell into his hands. The one gave lands to men
of the sword who could defend them; the other to
fools and favorites. The one was a real lion who
showed himself; the other was a stuffed lion with a
fox for a showman.




430  WAR FEUDALISM AND PARCIMENT FEUDALISMI.
Every human system  grows, expands, arrives at
maturity, decays, and dies. The system dies, but man
does not die. Man goes on to new systems, which
grow, expand, and die also; and again to new systems,
which also die. But beneath the surface of the human
systems there is a reality which does not die-a reality which evolves. One system teaches one truth, and
another system another truth, and the truth remains
when the system has disappeared.  All attempts to fix
systems in perpetuity are unnatural. The vital element is fled, and the body must perish, or if preserved
is a mummy.  And all systems preserved by law
beyond their natural existence are mummnfnsystems.
And it would be no less absurd to allocate a maintenance to a mummy than to a system. If the man is
alive, he must support himself; if dead, he needs no
maintenance. And if the system is alive, it will make
its maintenance because men require it; and if men
require it not, it is a mummy system, and should have
no maintenance.
All human systems, intentionally established, or
reduced to legal institutions, originate in the credences
of man; and so long as the credences last, the systems
are natural, and do not decay. But when the credence
advances, the system is no longer the expression of
man's requirements; and the system if preserved can
do evil, and only evil. With the advance of credence
the system ought to advance also; for man, in perpetuating systems, perpetuates only the expression of his
former ignorance. The feudal system was the organization of power, because man believed war to be the
noblest occupation. It was power organized; and if




WAR FEUDALISM AND PARCHMENT FEUDALISM. 431
it had been true that war was man's real occupation,
the feudal system  was the true system of organization.  But another element than force began to
divide men's credence - law. And the form of the
feudal system  was transformed from  the right of
the sword to the right of the sheepskin. The sword
was bad, but the system was efficient so long as
it was spontaneous.  The sheepskin was an improvement on the sword; and had the system  of
the sheepskin gone back to the genuine origin of
the system of the sword, it would have resulted in
the same efficiency that characterized the power of
feudalism. The sword has a right use and a wrong
use  it may be in the hand of justice, or it may be
in the hand of will. And the sheepskin also has a
right use and a wrong use -it may be the expression
of justice, or it may be the expression of will. The
sword is force, the sheepskin is law; and when men
advance from the organization of force to the organization of law, the parchment supersedes the sword,
and injustice may be done by the one exactly as it
was done by the other.  It is a higher and more
systematic kind of injustice, and so far it is a progress, as fine and imprisonment is an advance upon the
torture wheel. The feudal system grew spontaneously, and the elements of its power were in the form of
its spontaneous construction. But the form of its
construction was not preserved, and feudalism decayed
from the very attempt to perpetuate it.
Feudalism became hereditary; but neither courage
nor skill are hereditary, and hereditary warriors are
mummies. The hereditary system  transformed the




432  WAR FEUDALISM  AND PARCHMENT FEUDALISM.
whole genius of feudal society, and the feudal system,
as a war organization, had lost its power. The principle of feudalism, as a war system, was to allocate
the.lands to him who was the warrior; the principle
of feudalism, as a parchment system, was to consider
him  warrior who  held the lands.i And when the
force organization of society gave way to the law
organization of society, the hereditary principle was
transplanted into the legislature, and men became
hereditary legislators.  But wisdom  is no more hereditary than courage and skill; and the hereditary
system  of legislation-the parchment feudalismbecame as inefficient as the hereditary  system  of
defence-the pennon  feudalism.   A  new  element
was required, and a new element appeared, to dispute
the claims of hereditary force or hereditary law.
The pennon feudalism  had a pursuit —war; and
the parchment feudalism  had a pursuit —pleasure.
First, Mars, then Bacchus and Venus, has been the
course of semi-barbarous man in all ages. But neither
war nor pleasure will satisfy mankind; and man must
progress beyond his mere animal desires.  A  new
pursuit began to grow amid the wars and pleasures
* "The companion requires from the liberality of his chief the
warlike steed, the bloody and conquering spear, and in place of
pay he expects to be supplied with a table, homely indeed, but
plentiful.".Note by M3. Brotier. - "From hence, Montesquieu (Esprit des
Lois, xxx. 3) justly derives the origin of-vassalage. At first the
prince gives to his nobles arms and provisions; as avarice advanced, money; and then lands were required, which from benefices became at length hereditary possessions, and were called fiefs.
Hence the establishment of the feudal system."  AIKEN's Tacitus.
Manners of Germans.




THE TRADER AND THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.   433
of feudalism - trade. This new pursuit was a new
advance of society, and it introduced a new element
in the shape of wealth. It was not merely trade, but
trade beginning to be organized and systematized.
Trade, like war or pleasure, had always formed part
of the occupation of mankind. But feudalism, not
content with organizing an army, had organized civil
society on the war principle; and parchment feudalism organized society on the principle that the aristocrats were for pleasure, and the rest of the people for
labor to supply their pleasures. "Priests are set apart
for prayer, but it is fit that noble chevaliers should enjoy
all ease and taste all pleasures; while the laborer toils
in order that they may be nourished in abundance -
they and their horses and their dogs." Trade, however, crept in; and society began to admit a portion
of the trade principle. And this, like every thing
else, began on false grounds; with privileges, charters,
restrictions, exemptions, local boundaries, and a hundred other interruptions to the laws of nature. Trade,
however, asserted its claims, and advanced a new
element into the constitution of government. The
burgesses were tolerated, because they had money
and could pay taxes; and gradually the traders have
pushed their way against the parchment lords, as the
parchment lords pushed theirs against the pennon
lords. The commons are partly knights who represent
proprietors of land, and partly " citizens and burgesses, chosen by the mercantile or supposed trading
interest of the nation."  And though the commons
have never in reality represented the people of Britain,
but at the most the wealthier txaders, the direction of
37




434             TIHE FEUDAL LORDS.
society may be inferred from the relative position of
the commons now, and the commons two or three
centuries ago. Henry VIII. was a parchment king,
whose will was law. The war lords had fought themselves out in the wars of the Roses, and as war lords
appeared no more. The commons were a few cringing
burgesses, without power. The king was the state,
and, to all intents and purposes, the only real power
in the state. He did what it has been the lot of few
to do -he changed the religion of the nation and
confiscated the lands of the church, and, in so doing,
laid the foundation of the parchment power of the
lords. A few reigns, and the commonwealth passed
over; and the lords had found that law, and not the
sword, was the genuine source of power. The lords
were now the state, and admitted William of Orange
to be the organ of aristocratic domination.  This
scheme has extended down to the present day; but
another change has been going on, showing plainly
that the power of the lords is no more permanent than
the power of the king. The commons have taken up
the power. It is now customarily admitted that the
government cannot function without a majority of
the commons; in fact, that the king reigns, but does
not govern, and that a majority in the commons is
the necessary element for carrying on the operations
of the state. The lords have retired in solemn decency, and the knights and burgesses direct the affairs
of Britain.
To suppose, however, that this change is ultimate,
would be contrary to all the teaching of history.
Parchment lordship is contrary to the credence of




THE FEUDAL LORDS.              435
modern times.  Men are. beginning to believe that he
who does not work ought not to be supported, as those
who do work support the whole. The war lord worked,
and worked hard. He fought, or was ready to fight,
and his life was at stake for his wages. He deserved
his reward. He was a man who led men, and so
long as he was a real war lord, and war was the real
pursuit, he was a genuine man, and filled an office for
which men were willing to accord him wages. When
he became a parchment lord, he still worked. He
made laws, and ruled the country. He was to a certain extent necessary, like the bishop, who once worked
also, and ruled the church. And in former days, the
rule of the church was no more a jest than the rule of
the state. It was a real office — a thing not of silks
and drawing-rooms; but of the translation of the
Word of God, and appearance at the martyr's stake
when requisite. The bishop was a pastor, a real genuine pastor, who had a flock, and cared for it; and even
now, if it were possible to reanimate the bishop, and
make him again a leader, a genuine leader of men,
there is no man in the country who could count followers with him. But both have outlived their time.
The commons are said to rule, and the bishop's voice
is heard only in the minor wranglings of sectarianism.
True, there are good and pious bishops and archbishops, and their writings, as cultivated men and ministers,
are excellent. But as bishops, they are almost unknown.*  The office is no longer requisite. And the
* For an account of the revenues of the church of England,
incomes of the bishoprics, &c., see Wade's " Unreformed Abuses




436                THE FEUDAL LORDS.
parchment lord is also antiquated, because he does. not
work.  There is no work for parchment lords, no demand in the market, nothing for them to'do. Formerly, if there had been no lords, they would have
been originated.  Society required them, and would
pay for them; and, if there had been none, society
would have made them, and did make them.  There
in Church and State." Some curious facts are there stated regarding the expense at which England supports her ecclesiastical ministrations. It seems that there are 32 cathedral and collegiate
churches in England and Wales, with 261 members, (deans, canons,
prebendaries, &c.,) and a revenue of ~184,123 per annum. For
this sum a week-day service is maintained, (in addition to the Sabbath services,) and the congregations are stated to amount to nearly
the same number as the officials. Thus:Cathedrals.       Officials Present.  Congregations.
Durham,      1             32              18.
Peterborough, 1            12               7
Wells,       1             19              22
Carlisle,    1             17               9
Rochester,   1             22              14
Oxford, (!)   1            15              18
Lincoln,     1             24               8
7             141    Persons, 96
The seven bishoprics bearing the above names had the following
incomes in 1843:Durham, -   -   -~22,416
Peterborough, -. 4,060
Bath and Wells,        -                4,567
Carlisle, -                             2,476
Rochester,   -   -          -           1,102
Oxford,           -   -                 2,506
Lincoln, -        -       -             5,610
Total,   -   ~42,737




THE FEUDAL LORDS.               437
was an office which men required to fill; an office that
had its labors, its responsibilities, its dangers, and consequently its rewards. But if lords no longer lead,
and no longer govern in reality; or if they govern not
as lords, but as wealthy members of the state, influencing the election of the commons who do govern
— their office is gone; like the war lords, who were
useless when made hereditary, and settled on their
estates. The war lords disappeared, and an enlisted
army of real soldiers took their place. Men who were
not born soldiers by caste, but who became soldiers by
profession, have been universally substituted for the
feudal soldiers. The feudal soldiers were inefficient;
their office was take rup by men who could do the
duty better, and against whom the feudal soldiers did
not dare to appear.  And so with the parchment
lords.  Their office was to make laws, to govern the
country, to rule the state. And if they no longer rule
the state, but have disappeared from the work before
the enlisted legislators who were not born legislators,
but became so, their office has vanished; and, if history
tell true tales of the past, we may rest assured that
time will ultimately accord the office to those who do
the work in reality. Pleasure lords are too contrary to
the spirit of labor which an age of trade requires, to
be allowed long to occupy the first position. The
work of parchment aristocracies is gone from their
hands, and commons govern; and though titles are
harmless in the present day compared to what they
were once, there is maintenance in luxury without labor,
which, in an age of trade, is certain at last to reduce
the question to a calculation of profit and loss, meas37 




438             THE FEUDAL LORDS.
ured by money, and to make trading rulers act on the
result of the balance sheet.
In estimating, however, the historic probabilities of
Britain, various considerations must be taken into
account. It seems quite certain that the pleasure
lords cannot continue to occupy the first position,
merely because they have a sheepskin with a few
black marks upon it. But who is to take their place?
The trading community are fast, very fast, pushing
out the parchment holders.  Land tenures are undergoing alterations. Old families are failing, not from
the want of parchments, but from the want of wealth.
Merchants are now the notables, the men of note who
express the requirements of the country. But the pursuit of money is no more the ulmmate pursuit of man
than the pursuit of war or pleasure. The trader, in
his turn, must cede the first place to those who express
man's higher requirements.  Money is a means, not
an end; and when those who represent the means
have played their part, those who represent something
beyond the means will assert their claims, and push
the trader from the direction of the state. Man is a
rational and a moral being, and his rational and moral
nature must ultimately prevail'to determine the arrangements of society.
Let us then look at the principles that have determined the past construction of British society. What
have been the occupations of the governing class?
What in fact has been, in the estimation of society,
the highest pursuit of the civil and secular man?
1st. WAR. Society was constructed on the war
principle. War manifested itself first in the form of




W1AR, PLEAlSURE, AND POLICY.       439
barbarous war; second, knightly war; and third, national war; and then the war construction of society
was finished. The war was then performed, not by
the rulers in person, but by a service; that is, by men
who fought because they were paid for it. The army
was not the state, but the servant.
2d. PLEASURE. As one system arrives at its height,
and begins, although imperceptibly, to decay, another
system, which is destined to supersede it, already has
begun to take root and to grow up under the shelter
of the old system. The war system gave birth to the
political system, and the war leader was the origin of
the political ruler. National war gave birth to the
national court, and the national court gave birth to
courtly pleasures, and the knights who had been field
knights gradually became transformed into  court
knights. As the war system decayed, the court knights
superseded the war knights, the accomplishments of
the court were held in higher estimation than the accomplishments of the field, till at last the fop was the
genuine ruler, and society was constructed on the
pleasure principle. Barbarous pleasures grew  first,
then refined pleasures, till at last the very corruption
of manners necessitated a change.
3d. POLICY. Out of the courtly pleasures grew
courtly policies. The ambition was now, not to be a
warrior, nor a mere court gallant, but a statesman.
An age of policy occurred, in which the destinies of
nations, and the welfare of whole populations, were
sacrificed to the crotchets of statesmen who made
great experiments for their amusement. The population, who did the work and got the food out of the




440                   TRADE.
earth, had first been sacrificed for the war rulers, then
for the pleasure rulers, and now they were sacrificed
for the policy rulers. The balance of power was one
of their crotchets, the integrity of the empire another,
the balance of trade another, and the protection of trade
and agriculture another. To these gentlemen Britain
owes the American war, the French war, the national
debt, the corn laws, the customs, excise, (in their present extent of evil,) and a great many other things not
less destructive to the laboring community than was
the reign of war or pleasure. War killed a man, and
to a genuine man there is pleasure in war, —in fighting, contending, striving, and battling,- although at
the last he is killed. It was a rude and fierce pleasure, and very destructive to society; but still a man
had a chance of fighting, and that was something.
But policy kills a man without even the chance of the
fight, taxes him to expatriation, hunger-fevers him to
death with thoughts of murder in his head, and intentions of murder in his heart if he recovers. The reign
of policy was, and is, no less destructive to society
than the reign of war, and it also must pass away,
and is passing away fast. The policy statesman is
making way for the trader; and the trader, who also
is only a step in advance, and not a finality, is already
sheltering the man who will supersede him-the
political economist.  The trader's day is now, and
every day will see the policy and pleasure laws clearing away, because they interfere with trade. Trade is
now the genuine pursuit of Britain, as war was once;
and as the feudal laws grew and decayed, and have
been undergoing a process of abolition, which will not




THE PERIOD OF BARBAROUS WAR.         441
stop till every vestige of them is utterly obliterated
both from the the statute book and from the institutions of British society, the trading laws, which are at
this moment pauperizing the population, must give
way one after another till men discover that God has
constituted nature aright, and that the only protection
trade requires is protection from violence, and fraud,
and state interference.
In endeavoring to fix the periods of war, pleasure,
and policy, of course no exact boundaries can be
assigned. The one system grew out of the other, and
one was developing while the other was decaying.
At the same time, it is easy to point out the period
when each system was in operation, just as*it is easy
to perceive the colors in the rainbow, although we'cannot exactly determine where the one color ends
and the other begins.
The Roman period of British history belongs to
the ancient world. It has little or nothing to do with
modern development.  It was the realization of a
different system of credence from that which was to
take possession of the world. The credence was false,
and the system  had worn out. The middle of the
fifth century, then, was the period when the modern
history of Britain commences.
The first period was expressed in barbarous war.
From  the shores of the Baltic, and from  the neighboring countries, hordes of barbarous warriors poured
forth under the names of Saxons, Danes, or Northmen.  They were pirates by profession, pagans in
religion, and men of the most dauntless courage, combined with the direst ferocity. Their trade was war,
which they carried on relentlessly.




442       TIHE PERIOD OF KNIGHTLY WAR.
The Saxons settled in Britain, and laid the rude
foundations of a civil state. Christianity began to
exert its influence; and though the Saxon leaders or
kings were for the most part warriors, the people
would probably have settled down to peaceable agriculture had it not been for the arrival of new hordes
of Northmen, who from the latter part of the eighth
century invaded England, and continued the barbarous system of war down to the Norman conquest.
By barbarous war must be understood war which
is not conducted according to rules which bind both
parties; and this system  may be said to have prevailed fiom the departure of the Romans to the arrival
of the Normans.
The Normans introduced knightly war. A knight
was not a barbarian. He had his laws of chivalry —
rude at first, but gradually becoming more precise,
more merciful, more fair, and more punctilious of
honor.  Villiam  was a knightly leader; neither a
barbarian nor a king, but a war chief whose title
was the sword, but still the sword of a regulator or
systematizer.
From 1066 to 1485 was the period of knightly war,
and Richard III. was the last of the knight warriors.
His successor, Henry VII., was a king   a law or
parchment king -a politic prince, who did his best to
destroy the war retinues of the barons who had so
long distracted the country with their minor dissensions.  During this period we have two types of
leaders, —one at the end of the twelfth century, the
other at the beginning of the fifteenth, —namely,
Richard I, who w as more a knight than a king, and




THE PERIOD OF COURT PLEASURES.     443
Henry V., who was a knight fast verging towards a
king. Both were warriors, both performed prodigies
in the field; but Richard was a knight leader, Henry
a king leader. This was the period of warlike pleasures, jousts, and tournaments, which prepared the
nobles for the court pleasures that superseded them
in. after times.
The wars now became national, and the individuals
who performed the service had little or no connection
with the cause of the wars. From this period down
to James II., the king ruled; and he ruled not in the
field, but in the cabinet.
This was the period of courtly pleasures; at first
rude, coarse, and sensual, but gradually becoming
more refined. The nobles became court gallants, and
the warlike pastimes gradually died away. The court
of Elizabeth was the type of the transition, and the
court of Charles II. was the full-developed type of
pleasure. Here were courtiers and courtesans in their
glory; the first without courage, the latter without
modesty, but very elegant and agreeable gentlemen
and ladies, there can be no doubt.
England had never been so great as under the dominion of Oliver Cromwell, and Cromwell permitted
no court gallants. And had England and Scotland
understood their interests, there would have been no
Charles II. and no James II. on this side of the Straits
of Dover. Twice England has missed her destiny,
and suffered for it; once when Wickliffe taught religion, while Wat Tyler demanded the abolition of
slavery and the destruction of the feudal system.
These were voices which England would not hear;




444       THE PERIOD OF COURT POLICY.
and England had a Henry VIII. and a Charles II. to
do the work. And once when Cromwell would have
organized the state if men would have let him. But
they chose rather a king than a republic, and Charles
II. abolished the feudal tenures, allowing the lands to
escape; and George III., in consequence of that
alienation, fixed the national debt on the laborers of
the country. The third time that England's opportunity occurs, it is to be hoped that sure work will be
made of the evils that remain; and probably that opportunity is not quite so far distant as many imagine.
From the reign of William III. down to the reign
of George IV. was the age of policy.  Whigs and
tories now began to rule. They were no longer war
lords nor pleasure lords, but policy lords. Every thing
now  became a mysterious matter of policy. The
most vague and ridiculous notions were esteemed
profound truths, to which as much importance was
attached by the nobles of this period, as had been
attached to the shape of a frill by the court gallants
of the former period, or to the punctilios of knightly
war in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
The court women also, like the men, had progressed
beyond the mere elegancies of the courtesan, and
had become politicians or tools for political purposes.
War was now not the pursuit but the engine of the
politician; and. national wars were engaged in at the
expense of the people as matters of policy.  The
court of Anne represented the earlier form of this
period; and in it we recognize pursuits essentially
different from those of former courts. William had
been half a king, half a tool in the hands of the policy




THE PERIOD OF COURT POLICY.         445
aristocracy.  The religion of the people had by no
means been the great motive that led to the introduction of his Protestant majesty, but the protestantizing of the state, for the purpose of destroying the
despotism of the crown. The monarch now ruled no
more, but the ministers and the parties; and the monarchl*as the legal instrument in the hands of the
parties; in fact, the effigy shown to the people to
give validity to the arrangements of legislators and
schemers. During William's reign, the policy system
acquired its strength, and in Anne's reign it took the
direction of the national affairs. Her court, consequently, became the scene of political intrigues, in
which she was the puppet, the politicians the showmen, and the people the spectators who paid for the
show. " The queen loved her own way, and, with
the ordinary infirmity of conscious incapacity, was
extremely jealous of any semblance of interference
with the exercise of her authority; yet she was the
constant slave of favorites, who in their turn were the
tools of intriguing politicians. Though her preferences
and dislikes had often no better foundations than the
predilections of the toilet, it was upon them that the
policy of her administration and the destinies of Europe depended. By a chambermaid's intrigue Bolingbroke triumphed over his rival, the earl of Oxford. It
was because the queen fondly doated on the Duchess
of Marlborough, that her reign was'adorned by the
glories of Blenheim  and Ramillies;' it was because
Mrs. Abigail Masham  artfully supplanted her benefactress in royal favor, that a stop was put to the war
which ravaged the continent; it was in great part owing
38




446       THE PERIOD OF COURT POLICY.
to the influence of the duchess of Somerset, another
favorite lady, that the queen did not attempt to recall
her brother, the Chevalier St. George. Thus, probably,
a feeble-minded princess, influenced only by her waiting-women, determined that the Pretender should be
excluded from  England, a tory and high church
ministry formed, and a Bourbon seated beyondAthe
Pyrenees.  Of the twelve years of her majesty's
reign, ten were years of fierce warfare, that laid waste
the finest countries in Europe.  The point at issue
between France and the confederate powers was the
succession to the Spanish monarchy; whether Philip
of Anjou, a grandson of Louis XIV., or Charles Archduke of Austria, the second son of Leopold, emperor
of Germany, should inherit the crown of Spain.
England exerted her utmost force in this contest, both
in men and money, though it was nearly indifferent
to her interests whether Austria or France were aggrandized by the acquisition of Spain and America."
" But the splendid triumphs of Marlborough and Prince
Eugene were an inadequate compensation for the
decay of trade and rapid increase of the piublic debt
and taxes."  This, however, was only the commencement of the policy system, which came to its full completion in the reign of George III., who was to policy
exactly what Charles II. had been to pleasure; namely, the complete and full-grown type, who carried the
system to its maximum, and indicated to a certainty
that a change of system would take place ere long.
The whigs and tories, or policy lords, have governed England from the revolution of 1688 down to
the present time; but a new system is in preparation,




THE PERIOD OF COURT POLICY.        447
and must soon undergo its development.  The policy
lords are abandoning the direction of state affairs to
men of facts and figures; and these facts and figures
are certain in the long run to obliterate the policy
system, and to establish the government of political
economy.
During this period (from the end of the seventeenth
century to the present time, nearly) church and state
was the watchword of internal politics. The altar and
the throne were the effigies, church and state was the
war-cry, and the clergy and nobles were the priests of
the superstition. Every thing was squared upon the
plan of church and state policy. Scotland, which had
withstood the arms of England, was overcome by
state policy, and united legislatively and executively
to the state. "This important measure was more
popular in England than Scotland, where it was
stoutly opposed by Fletcher of Saltoun, the earl of
Belhaven, and the dukes of Athol and Hamilton,
though the quiet acquiescence of the last with a majority of the Scots Parliament was procured by a judicious distribution of honors and bribes towards the
close of the negotiations."  This xas another step
towards the generalization of government, which has
been going on since the barons were denied the right
of private war, and which process of generalization
is as apparent in the history of France as in that of
Britain.
Another and very important step was the suppression or suspension of the convocation of the church
of England; a step which in fact destroyed the ecclesiastical liberties of that church, and made it a branch




448        THE PERIOD OF COURT POLICY.
of the service, like the army. As soon as the convocation revives, a new era will commence for England.
The great reign of policy, however, was the reign
of George III., which exhibited the system in full perfection. The policy of this reign appears now to be
remarkable; but to the actors themselves appeared no
doubt very wise and clever, and quite as indubitably
right as war or pleasure had appeared to Richard I. Lr
Charles II. The first great exhibition was the attempt
to coerce the American colonies, "the deluded and
unhappy multitude," as the inhabitants of America
were termed in the king's speech of 1777. This was
a policy war; and it cost Britain about one hundred
and thirty millions sterling, the interest of which is
now taken from  the profits of the present laborers.
And the policy of the war may be inferred from the
fact, that the advantages derived by Britain from a
trade with free America increased continually from
the moment the transatlantic Britons were allowed to
make their own political arrangements.  The next
piece'of policy was the great French war, or series
of wars, which was at first a war against popular
democracy, and latterly a war against imperial despotism. The policy rulers of Britain carried on this war
at an expense of about six hundred millions sterling;
and, to defray the charge, the revenues of this and
future generations were sold in perpetuity to Jews and
money dealers.
Another piece of policy was the union with Ireland
without Catholic emancipation, and the union of the
Protestant Episcopal church of that country with the
church of England.  The reign of policy, however,




THE PERIOD OF COURT POLICY.        449
has culminated, and a new system may reasonably be
expected to supplant it.  Catholic emancipation, the
reform bill, the emancipation of the negroes, and the
repeal of the corn laws, are certain evidences that the
reign of mere policy is dying away. Changes of this
character, however, do not take place at once; but as
new generations grow up in different circumstances,
and with different associations, new credences supplant the old, and those new credences grow gradually into realization. The policy system is not dead,
only dying. It still retains its power with regard to
Russia, the great bugbear of the policy gentry, as if
God intended the nations of the earth to progress only
as the rulers of Britain would allow them. The Russians are the progressors, the centralizers, the generalizers, the reducers to rule and system; and the Russians are doing that greatest of all state servicesdestroying the power of the nobles, and subjecting
men to the laws of the state. Of course, Russia is a
despotism, and cannot be otherwise without falling
into confusion. There is a period in the history of
civilization when the ruler is necessarily despotic, as
there are evils which can give way only before the
influence and beneath the hand of despotism. Despotism  alone, whether democratic or autocratic, appears capable of destroying the superstitious ecclesiastical institutions which have descended from darker
ages. Henry VIII. was a despot, and, had he not
been a despot, he could not have uprooted the papal
church and taken away its lands. The French democrats were despots, and they also uprooted the state
superstition, and took away its lands.  And who
38*




450        THE PERIOD OF COURT POLICY.
knows how soon a Russian despot may destroy the
Greek church, and emancipate'tie whole of the serfs?
Organization by all means, and at all hazards, appears
the only mode by which barbarous nations can be civilized; and the real evil lies not in despotic power, but
in the legal or parchment perpetuation of that power
beyond the circumstances that make it arise spontaneously.
And yet of this progressing Russia, (which has already collected the laws of the empire, thereby laying
the foundation of the ultimate supremacy of law, and
not of man,) the policy rulers of Britain consider themselves bound by policy to entertain vague apprehensions, and in consequence to prop up the Mahomedan
despotism, which does not progress. It would have
been much more rational if England and France had
driven the Turks out of Europe altogether. To allow
the first geographical position in eastern Europe to
remain in the hands of Mahomedans, is perfectly
absurd; and if Russia can take possession of it, surely
England, with Gibraltar, Malta, the Cape, &c., &c.,
can have no just ground of interference, except to
make sure that the seas are kept open for her merchants.  The seas are " the highways of the world,"
and every nation has a right to require that they shall
never be obstructed. Britain has already had two lessons in policy wars, and these might suffice to show
their total inefficiency to produce even the end required, setting aside the question whether the end was
desirable.  Notwithstanding  the efforts of Britain,
America did become independent; and all that Britain
obtained was her debt. And, notwithstanding all the




OCCUPATIONS OF TIHE RULING CLASS.     451
efforts of Britain, France rejected the Bourbons, old
and young; and all that Britain obtained was a much
larger debt. And if the latter effort, which cannot
reasonably be expected to be surpassed on any future
occasion, was so utterly powerless to arrest the progress
of advancing credence, surely the policy system may
be laid aside as a mere superstition, destructive to
those who act upon its dictates, and proven beyond
dispute to be not the rule that should guide statesmen
in their labors.
But the reign of policy is fast drawing to a close;
and we must endeavor to estimate its logical successor. Looking to the past, what may we expect the
future to be? This is the question for which we have
endeavored to exhibit the principles of the past; and
out of those principles we think there flows a future
scheme of progress.
TVhat have been the occupations of the ruling classes
of Britain?
1st. War, which was barbarous war so long as the
Northmen were afloat.
Knightly war, consequent on the Norman conquest.
William was partly a barbarous leader, partly a great
baron with his retainers, and partly a knight; or a war
leader beginning gradually to grow  into a knight.
Richard I. was a knight, Henry V. was still a knight
with a considerable degree of the court, and Richard
III., the last warrior, was more of the courtier than
the knight.  These are the types or representatives of
the war period of society. The nobles, or ruling
classes, followed the same kind of development; first,
barbarous warriors, then knightly warriors, then barons




452          WAR, PLEASURE, AND POLICY.
with  retinues, who  fought for causes, and  then
courtiers.
2d. Pleasure.* The nobles, from knightly war progressed to knightly courtesy in the former period, and
the warlike pastimes at which ladies were present,
prepared them for the court pleasures. Queen Elizabeth was a court lady, (still, however, with a smattering of the war system,) and in her court the nobles
exhibit the feeble remains of knighthood, and the
rapid growth of courtiership.   In Charles II.'s time
the war knight had become supplanted entirely by the
court knight.  Court pleasures were the summit of
human aspiration for the rulers of the state.
3d. Policy.  The introduction  of a foreign ruler
necessarily introduced foreign politics, and the courtiers naturally became schemers and intriguers. The
court of Anne presents the pleasure courtier defunct,
and the policy courtier assuming the first rmportance.
In George  III.'s reign, the  policy system  had arrived at full perfection; and, if it could have been
carried on without costing money, might have gone
on perhaps much longer.
Between war, knightly war, courtly pleasures, and
courtly policy, there is a natural connection.  The one
grows out of the other. Their order is not accidental.
Courtly pleasures could never have succeeded imme* The question is, What pursuit was esteemed as the highest
pursuit in which men could engage? and though pleasure expresses
imperfectly the meaning, there can be no doubt that during this
period court pleasure held the very first rank, as war had previously
done, and policy did at a later period.




WAR, PLEASURE, AND  POLICY.              453
diately on barbarous war; nor could  courtly policy
have  succeeded  immediately on  knightly war.  We
have here a growth, or expansion, or development, of
the pursuits of the ruling  classes; and, singularly
enough, the connection of one system with another is
still preserved in language. The ambiguities of words
sometimes involve curious truths; and several words
now in use in English are applicable to two of these
systems.  The word gallantry may mean gallantry in
thefield or in the court; in the former it belongs to the
war system, in the latter to the pleasure system; and
when court gallantry from ceremonious'devotion became transformed into the Charles the Second system,
the word intrigue expresses the action, and this is also applicable to the policy pursuits which followed. Thus:Knightly war,     Gallantry    Court pleasures,  Intrigues.
Court pleasures,        e  Policy,
But the policy system is drawing to a close. The
balance, of power is an exploded  superstition; the
balance of trade is nearly exploded; the integrity of
the empire is now  a matter of little moment; and
Canada or the West Indies might govern themselves
without costing Britain another one hundred and thirty
millions to prevent them; and the protection of trade
* The ambiguous word that connects the policy system with the
political economy system is perhaps measures. Thus: -
Knightly war,    Cntry  ourt pleasures, Intrigues Policy,  Measures.
Court pleasures, allantry. Policy,.       economy,  e
Where the word measures means in the first sense actions, and in
the second sense measurements- that is, the measurements that
determine whether the actions are or are not correct. The word is
actually used in these two senses.




454             THE POLICY SYSTEM.
and agriculture are very generally regarded as fallacious
impostures, meaning monopoly, labor taxation, and
increase of the landlords' rents.
But.what system follows policy in the natural order
of development?
Policy is a very vague word as used by politicians.
It had a definite meaning in the abstract, but in the
concrete meant any thing that any party chose to advocate.  In the abstract, it meant that certain measures,
or certain modes of operation, would be advantageous
to the country. But in the concrete, it meant a war
with America, or a war with France, or the exclusion
of foreign goods, or the deprivation of civil rights
because a man held certain religious tenets, or the
employment of spies, or the retention of the negro in
slavery, or a host of other measures, all advocated by
the ruling classes of Britain as matters of excellent
policy. But while the policy superstition was in the
ascendant, a vast trade was growing up in Britain,
and traders have an unfortunate habit of regarding
profit and loss as measured by money. And though
traders are nearly as backward in ascertaining their
real interests as agriculturists in abandoning their
clumsy implements and adopting an improved system
of cultivation, trade, with free discussion, gradually
op*ens its eyes, and discovers that, alas! all this admirable policy has been only a delusion, a creditor by
blood, glory, and pauperism, and a debtor to vast sums
of gold.
Trade, then, imperceptibly, and  almost unconsciously, begins to influence policy, not by denying
that policy ought to rule, but by discovering and




THE POLICY SYSTEM.            455
making manifest that certain acts which were assumed
to be politic are actually disadvantageous; that they
involve loss and not profit, and, consequently, that
they ought not to be done. Knowledge reduces policy
from its flights of eloquence to the investigation of
facts and figures, -from  its vague and mysterious
superstitions to its plain and' palpable truths, far less
grand, of course, but still truths; and truths are powerful when profit and loss are concerned. And thus
the dispute between policy and trade is not whether
policy ought to direct the affairs of the state, but
whether an act propounded as an act of policy really
is so or not. Is it really advantageous?  The policy
gentlemen may enlarge on the glory of the British
arms, the necessity of preserving the constitution, &c.;
but Trade replies, " Exactly. But does what you are
pleased to term the glory of the British arms really
conduce to the welfare of the country?  Does your
mode of understanding the constitution really conduce to the welfare of the country?  Does your
mode of imposing and spending the taxes really conduce to the welfare of the country? for in this case
alone can your measures be looked upon as acts of
policy."
And thus the moment acts of policy come to be
accurately measured, instead of having their value
assumed, - and this measurement follows quite naturally in the order of progress,-the policy system is
defunct, and political economy, which has grown out
of it by the mere measurement of the acts of so-called
policy, supersedes it. Policy was a major without a
minor, or rather with any minor which the statesmen




456             POLITICAL ECONOMY.
chose to put into the syllogism; but political economy undertakes to furnish the true minor, —not
arbitrary, but scientific, —and a consequent rule of
political economy takes place by a natural order of
development.
And as this method appears so plain and natural,
it would seem a fair inference that Britain is now
about to see the policys system interred, and to see the
political economists take the direction of the country.
And that they will ere long take tke direction of the
state, appears beyond a doubt. But how far the government of Britain, upon the principles of political
economy, is compatible with the preservation of an
aristocracy and a labor taxation, of course remains to
be proved. The economists have not yet the power,
nor can they have it till a modification takes place in
the representation; but when that modification takes
place, —and perhaps few men would give odds that it
does not take place in less than fifteen years, —the
rule of the policy lords and parchment aristocracy is
done.  The moment a new change makes the representation more liberal than the present system, and
really adapts it to the requirements of the country,
that moment does a new era of government open up
to Britain, and that moment do the economists naturally enter on the functions of state direction, provided
no great accidents happen in the interval.
But neither is political economy the ultimate. It is
a step beyond policy, as the reign of court policy was
a step beyond the reign of court pleasure. But it is
logically insufficient. There are questions which it
cannot answer, or dare not answer. It must take the




POLITICAL ECONOMY.            457
money management of the state, and determine the
mode in which taxes should be levied, as well as the
amount of taxes; and, in determining the mode in
which taxes ought to be levied, it must come between
two parties —the laborers who' create the wealth of
the country, and the landlords who consume the rents.
This position will bring political economy to a stand.
The difficulty is insoluble to political economy, and
a new system must grow, develop, and assume the
direction of the country.
Political economy professes to teach how value
grows, increases, accumulates, and who makes it.
The latter question, solved by a fair exposition of
ascertained facts, first systematized, and then reduced
to a law, lands society on the grand question, " To
whom does it belong?"  With this question political
economy, as such, has no concern. It is beyond political economy, higher than political economy, and is
what political economy is not —it is final in theory.
Let political economy be as perfect as any science
can possibly be, beyond it there lies the question, To
whom — to what persons — does the created value
belong?  And first and foremost must come the question of the land.  Suppose, for instance, it should
be clearly proven, according to the science of facts,
(as some have termed economy,) that it would be
more beneficial to the whole associated community of
Britain to abolish all customs and excises, and all
taxes whatever except a land tax, which could be collected for nothing, or next to nothing, what would
political economy say in that case? Would it abolish
39




458            THE EQUITY SYSTEM.
all the taxes that interfere with trade, and thereby
absorb the rents of the lands, or would it determine
that a man with a parchment, who does not labor, is
to be preferred to a man without a parchment, who
does?  From this dilemma political economy cannot
escape. There must be another system-one that
can solve these questions by rule - not arbitrarily, but
scientifically —by a rule that is general, and applicable to all parties.
And this new system  is necessarily politics, or the
science of equity.
Political economy, in fact, is the natural preparative
for a science of equity. All its questions solved, (and
solved in such a manner that the solutions are incapable of dispute, and come to be taught as ordinary
matters of ascertained truth,) there yet remains the
question, "Who is the proprietor of the created value? "
And this question arises necessarily so soon as political
economy has discovered who creates the value. And
thus politics, or the science of equity, springs necessarily in chronological order out of political economy;
and when economists have directed the state affairs up
to those questions which they cannot answer, they
must cede the first place to the true politicians, or
themselves become true politicians. And when that
period arrives, the political evolution is complete, and
there is the reign of equity or justice.
To sum up the historic probabilities, then, we may
present the following table. The producers of food
and of articles to exchange against food are the ruled;
and the rulers appear under the respective forms of




HISTORIC SUMMARY.                   459
THE RULERSo                    THE RULED.
Warriors.
War on barbarous principles,     The Cultivators, Traders,
from the departure of the Ro-    Manufacturers, &c., &c.
mans to the Conquest.
Knight Warriors.
From the Conquest to death of
Richard III.
King and Courtiers.
From  Henry VII. to revolution of 1688.
Church and State Policy Rulers.
From  1688 to George IV. or
William IV.
Political Economy Rulers.
Beginning to assume direction
of the state in the reign of Queen
Victoria.
And the order of the systems that have hitherto
been pursued by the ruling classes, and of the systems
which may be expected in future, is as follows: —
Manifestation.
1. The Barbarous War System.
2. The Knightly War System.
3. The Court Gallant System.
4. The Court Policy System.
5. The Political Economy System.
6. The Science of Equity System.
7. Finally, the Supremacy of Christianity.




460             HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT
Faculties of Mind.
1. Combativeness and Lower Passions - Manual Arts developing.
9. Combativeness and Sentiments - Fine Arts developing.
3. Voluptuousness, with the Mechanical Arts developing.
4. Cunning, with the Understanding developing.
5. Benefit, or Utility, with the Practical Reason.
6. Justice, with the Theoretic Reason.
7. Benevolence, with the Mind developed.
If this scheme be correct, the civilization of man
under the influence of Christianity - such as it was
after its corruption, and such as it was when reformed
by the resuscitation of the Bible —would  manifest
itself in the state in the predominance of
Starting point. - The Lower Passions.
The Lower Sentiments.
The Non-Moral Reason.
The Moral Reason.
Termination. -   The Higher Sentiments.
[By non-moral reason, we mean the intellect applied
to external nature, or to such of the human phenomena
as neither involve man's relation to man, nor the laws
that should regulate the interference of one man with
another.  By moral reason, we mean the intellect applied to the relations of men in the matter of interference, and to the discovery of the laws which should
regulate that interference, and also the intellect applied
to the relations of man to the divine Being.]
And this scheme, (imperfectly and crudely as we have
advanced it,) we maintain, is borne out, first, by the




OF MAN IN THE STATE.           461
analytic reason analyzing the forms of scientific truth
and the order of scientific development; second, by
the analysis of the components of man's nature; and
third, by the abstract form of history, so far as it has
extended. And on these three grounds, if they coincide and mutually support each other, may be projected the natural probability of a period yet to
come, when justice shall be realized on earth, to be
followed by a period when Christianity shall reign supreme, and call into real and systematic action the
higher and nobler sentiments of man.
39*




CONCLUSION.
WE have now to offer a few observations on the
knowledge that is logically subsequent to the science
of equity, and which, therefore, may be expected to
evolve chronologically at some future period. The
whole of our argument is based on the consideration,
that there is a logical connection between the sciences,
and that, therefore, there is a necessary order in which
they must evolve chronologically; and, consequently,
that the logical classification of the sciences does
actually scheme out in its abstract form the intellectual development of the human race.  If, then, we
can class the knowledge not yet reduced to scientific
ordination, we can project according to a plan (which
is not arbitrary) the future phase of man's intellectual credence, and consequently form within certain limits an estimation of man's future destiny
on earth.
Science exists in the mind, and in the mind alone.
And a branch of knowledge has become a science
when its substantive elements are made to function in
the blank or abstract categories of the reason, which
are identically the same in all human intellect. And




UNITY OF CREDENCE.               463
on this account it is that science abolishes diversity
and restores unity of credence.  And as there is but
one universe for man to know, and but one type of
intellect  to apprehend that universe, it follows as a
natural necessity, that if man be allowed sufficient
time to reduce to scientific ordination all the cognizable substantives that exist within the range of intellection, a universal unity of credence will evolve. And
this is the magnificent destiny of science. 2Esthetic
differences there will always be, so long as individuals
present a variety of constitution; but differences of
intellection there can only be from ignorance, superstition, or error; and science is the obliterator of ignorance, superstition, and error.
The unquestionably tendency of science is to improve the condition of mankind on the surface of the
habitable globe; but the past period of scientific evolution has been necessarily employed more in the evolution of true intellection than in the transformation
of the correct credence into a concrete rule of action,
which should bear its legitimate fruits and exhibit the
human race in an aspect as yet unknown, and as yet
almost universally discredited, notwithstanding the
cheering and unmistakable promises of divine revelation.  The light of science has arisen, and the
morning of man's welfare is at hand; but the light is
as yet only cold and gray, and the genial rays of
warmth that shall bring into life the good are only
beginning to manifest their power, and to bring into
* The same in essential quality, though not the same in relative
quantity.




464        A VALID NATURAL THEOLOGY.
active being those germs of bounty which God has
never withdrawn from the world, but which man has
hitherto, in the darkness of his fallen nature, turned to
so little avail. Science has as yet only been undergoing its process of discovery; but the period of its
application must ere long arrive, and a new world of
human benefit, as different from all that man has yet
experienced, must open to the race a world of GOOD, as
vast and wonderful as the realm of TRUTH which has
opened its portals to the inquiring reason of modern
humanity; revealing matter not as a brute material,
but as the home of varied forces with which the Creator has endowed it, to work out before the eyes of his
creature the operations of created nature. Science is
truth, and truth is the fountain of good. The age of
truth is now, and the age of goofl cannot fail to appear.
"Knowledge is not a couch whereon to rest a
searching and restless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a
fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to
raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for
strife and contention; or a shop for profit or sale; but
a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator, and the
relief of man's estate.'
If science were merely the reflection in the human
intellect of the order of nature's operations, science
would make man knowing without making him wise;
and if science were only calculated to improve man's
terrestrial condition, and to make man rich, science
would only make man rich as the brutes are rich.
Beneath the outward formula of science there lies the
everlasting TRUTH, as beneath the outward forms of




A VALID NATURAL THEOLOGY.            465
nature there lies the everlasting POWER. Science has
a higher and a nobler destiny than the mere illumination of the intellect, or the mere increase of man's terrestrial advantages. " The heavens declare the glory
of GOD, and the firmament showeth his handiwork."
And the summation of all that science can teach, and
of all that man's reason can abstract from  the sensational apprehension of material nature, is the knowledge of that divine Creator, "who hath measured the
waters in the hollow  of his hand, and meted out
heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of
the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in
scales, and the hills in a balance."' Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath
created these things,* that bringeth out their host by
number; he calleth them all by names, by the greatness of his might, for that he is strong in power, not
one faileth."
Posterior to the science of equity in the logical order
of classification comes theology; and consequently, if
the sciences evolve in the order of their logical ordination, a period must come when theology —-natural
theology- shall be evolved, and men shall come to a
systematic unity of credence on the great question of
" Who hath created these things?"
We have, therefore, to inquire what kind of theology can be taught by reason, and how the scientific
* This most natural reply to the mere logic of scepticism is said
to have been used by Napoleon- in Egypt, if we remember rightly
-when the savans around him were developing their infidel reasonings. " All very true, gentlemen," he said, pointing to the starry
firmament, " but who made all these?"




466                NATURAL THEOLOGY.
determination  of the Creator grows gradually more
and more precise with the discovery and reduction to
ordination of the various sciences.*
In the first place, we may assume that natural theology is impossible, in its complete form, until men
have arrived at a knowledge of the natural universe.
If the God of nature be inferred from  the works of
nature, it is plainly evident that a knowledge of those
works is antecedently requisite before the attributes of
God are placed on a sure and scientific basis that commands universal assent.t  And if the various sciences
* In taking this view of natural theology, we must remind the
reader that we treat only of the manner in which theology grows
and expands in the reflective reason of mankind, and thereby becomes capable of being taught as a branch of knowledge. The
question of individual responsibility is much more implicated in the
moral character of the dispositions than in the greater or less perspicuity of the intellectual perceptions; so much so, in fact, that
each individual would have been morally responsible, even although
no man had ever mentioned the name of the divine Creator to his
fellow-man. Responsibility is a primary fact belonging to man's
nature, but theology is susceptible of a greater or less degree of
perfection, as it becomes capable of being systematically exhibited
in a series of propositions logically substantiated.
f By natural theology we do not mean that which is accepted by
the church, which, neither in its origin nor its method, is natural
theology, but rather the corroboration of the general truths of
Scripture from the works of nature; but we mean such a natural
theology as shall convince intellect as intellect, and thereby produce a unity of credence for the whole race of man. The question
is a very simple one. There either is, or there is not, within the
range of natural cognition, the proof, perfectly valid, clear, and
satisfactory, of the moral existence of the Creator. If there is, (as
can scarcely be doubted, save by those who have entangled themselves in spurious reasonings, which do not go deep enough,) the




NATURAL THEOLOGY.                   467
are only openings up to the intellect of humanity of
the various portions of the natural universe, it is also
plainly evident that the sciences have, each one in particular, some light to throw on the great question of
the character of the Creator, and that the, whole mass
of the natural sciences must give, as the grand result,
a purely scientific natural theology, beyond which man
can go no farther without a supernatural revelation;
and therefore, although revelation be given to guide
man byfaith, and especially to make known to man
those manifestations of divine goodness which could
not possibly be learned through natural theology, it
appears evident that the natural knowledge of God
will grow and expand under the development of science, until in the end natural theology comes to the
very verge of revelation, and proves beyond a doubt
that revelation is exactly what man required to complete his range of knowledge. It might, however, be
reasonably advanced, that revelation is not an accidental
source of knowledge, existing only because man is a
proof must ultimately enlighten the whole world, exactly on the
same principle as science enlightens the world. But for this, time
is requisite. Nor need we be surprised that time should be requisite, when we reflect that even physical truth is slowly accepted
by the world. The Newtonian philosophy is, as yet, only accepted
by a portion of the world; and even it was met by refutations,
"proving it to be false and absurd, both by mathematical and physical demonstration."  And if physical truth of this kind expands so
slowly, and takes so long a time to overrun the earth, no natural
theology could expect to meet with a more cordial reception, but
gradually to fight its way with the superstitions, false religions,
scepticisms, and mysticisms which enslave the larger portion of
mankind.




468            NATURAL THEOLOGY.
fallen creature, but that a revelation from the Creator
is as really a natural source of knowledge, belonging to
this earth and to the human race, as is the world of
material phenomena, or the world of mental phenomena. The fall of man did not entail revelation. Revelation was anterior to the fall, and was a portion of
man's terrestrial lot. It was a thing not miraculous,
but common; and it would appear that the revelation
we now have is the substitute for the ordinary communication that would have taken place between the
Creator and the intelligent beings he had called into
existence. That there was a direct communication
between God and his human creatures, is plainly
affirmed in Scripture. Revelation, therefore, (that is,
communication from the world of spirit,) is not to be
regarded as accidental to the world, but as part of
man's lot on earth, quite as much one of man's original sources of knowledge as sensation or intellection.
But setting aside this view, and adhering only to
the traditional element, we may ask, What became of
man's knowledge of God?  It has been, of course,
preserved in the books of Scripture, and in the minds
of a small portion of the human race; but with regard
to the great mass of mankind, those not specially
enlightened by supernatural means, what became of
man's knowledge of God?  In every country of the
world it has presented itself in a corrupted form. False
gods, and false views of God, have universally prevailed.  Superstition (credence without evidence) has
universally destroyed some of the attributes of the
true God, and substituted for them some invention of
man's imagination. And not only has theology in its




NATURAL THEOLOGY.               469
general form been corrupted in the intellectual apprehension; but in the  practical acknowledgment of
God in worship, men have introduced superstitious
and erroneous ceremonies, symbols, and offices, which
were also corrupt, and, in many cases, absolute abominations.
Against the traditions of false gods and erroneous
worship, science enters the lists.  Science assumes
as its first proposition to base credence on evidence,
and thereby to evolve truth instead of error or superstition.
Consequently science, taking its birth, will invariably manifest itself in scepticism. And this scepticism,
much as it has been abused, is really and truly a valid
process when brought to bear on a superstition; and
the Christian religion is now valid, because it has stood
before every attempt of scepticism, and fairly triumphed over every effort that man has made to impugn the divinity of its origin.  In every country,
therefore, that has a traditional worship, it is a natural
consequence that that worship should be tested by
scepticism, whenever it happens that men resolutely
apply a scientific method, and proceed to posit truth
only when it is substantiated by evidence. Scepticism
in its legitimate form is doubt, and doubt is one of the
great elements of humanity absolutely requisite to
place knowledge on a secure basis.
Let us grant then that a scientific method, originating in a country, will naturally come. into contact
with the traditional elements already prevalent in that
country; and also, that it is the property of a scientific method to destroy superstition, and to substan40




470                NATURAL THEOLOGY.
tiate truth -  first, in its most general form, and then
gradually to enter more and more specially on the accurate survey of the universe with which man is acquainted.  Truth can have nothing to fear, but every
thing to hope, from the most accurate survey that man
can possibly take of the region open to cognition.
As an historical fact, the cultivation of science in
Britain and France was accompanied by scepticism,
far less terrible in the former country it is true, but not
the less arising from the prevalence of a scientific
mode of grounding credence on evidence.
Let us, then, endeavor to  ascertain  how  a  true
knowledge of God must naturally grow.
1st. Scepticism enters into a contest with traditionalism, and as in every country there has been either a
false or a corrupted religion, scepticism (setting aside
scriptural reformation, which is not, properly speaking, scientific*) has  to  achieve  the  destruction  of
* As Mr. Morell has well observed, philosophy reasons, but does
not preach. Thus the advancement of natural theology consists in
developing its propositions, and substantiating their trueness. A
scriptural reformation, on the contrary, consists not merely in the
substantiation of propositions, but in the circumstance that men
accept the propositions of Scripture as rules of life. But although
philosophy, in one sense, is purely speculative, we must not overlook the fact, that ethics, while inquiring what is true, has for its
question, " What ought to be done? "  And if, from the natural relations of man to man, there arises a system of human ethics, (or
rules of action,) so, if the existence of God be established by a
purely scientific method, must there necessarily rise a system of
theological ethics, establishing in general terms what ought to be
the conduct of the human creature in reference to the divine Creator. This branch, which the great Dr. Chalmers expounded under
the name of " ethics of theology," we have termed Dikaistic, (see




NATURAL THEOLOGY.                 471
superstition; but in place of superstition it has nothing
to substitute.
2d. That man should permanently refrain from  a
theological credence is out of the question. There is
either nothing whatever, or there is some permanently
enduring something that was anterior to man, that
underlies all the operations of nature, and that constructed, and continues to construct, all the varied
mechanisms, physical and mental, with which man is
acquainted; and this permanent element which man
posits, in accordance with the laws of his reason, is
what is meant by God.  God, therefore, has a necessary existence to the human mind; and the main
question is not, Whether there is an eternal and allpervading power; for man cannot conceive that there
is not; but, What is the character of that immortal
Power that sustains the universe? what, in fact, are
the attributes of God?
And in the growth of these attributes, that is, in
the addition of predicate -after predicate to the substantive idea, lies the process by which a natural
theology, purely scientific, must ultimately be developed, and actually command the human credence
in the same manner as any other truth.
JThe first positing of the theological idea is, logically,
universal existence in space and immortal existence
in time. This is the first step towards a scientific
table in the Appendix,) from Jlxatog, righteous; and it should answer the question, " How ought man to act, rightly or righteously? "
It is plain, however, that from the fall of man, dikaistic cannot
satisfy, but only direct, in general terms, to the fountain of divine
satisfaction. It is a perfectly valid branch of knowledge, but
altogether inadequate for man's fallen necessities.




472               GROWTH  OF THEOLOGY.
theology purely rational and objective; and it is absolutely necessary that it should be objective, otherwise
we abandon  the scientific method, and launch into
mysticism. An infinite and immortal substance may
be termed that portion of natural theology which is
furnished by the mathematical contemplation of the
universe.*
* Historically, the celebrated argument of Samuel Clarke comes
under this head. Another, and well-constructed argument, is that
of Moses Lowman. Neither of these arguments is pure; both
authors attempting to prove more than can be proven by their
method. An d priori argument cannot prove afact, only a rational
necessity. Geometry does not prove that there is space; it only
proves what the relations between the forms of space must be.
And so an d priori argument in reference to theology cannot prove
that there is existence, but only what the rational necessities of the
forms of existence must be in the human apprehension. The form
of this argument may be concisely expressed as follows: —
1. Major. If there be existence actual, there must be existence necessary.
2. Minor. There is existence actual.
3. Conclusion. There is existence necessary.
The major proposition is an abstract conviction of the human
reason, and is d priori; and, in fact, all a priori propositions should
be announced in the hypothetical form.
The minor is derived from  experience, and consequently the
argument is not d priori.
To extend the argument, it is necessary to discover what the characteristics of the existence actual really are, and thereby to infer,
by a reflex process, the attributes of the existence necessary. The
growth of the theological argument depends on the qualification
and quantification of the actual existence known to man; and, therefore the scheme of natural theology depends on the extension of the
sciences. But then again, experience cannot discourse of infinite
attributes, and reason must, d priori, determine the infinity of the
attributes, although reason could not possibly determine the existence of the attributes without experience. And thus reason and




SUBSTANCE, INFINITY, AND POWER.         473
The universality in space and the immortality in
time being posited, the general groundwork is laid for
the addition of predicates; and these must be derived
from  the world of material function.  The physical
sciences must contribute to transform  the abstraction
into something farther removed from negation.
The next attribute is power.  And this addition of
power very possibly produces pantheism.  The idea
has now  become an infinite and immortal power.
And further than this, no physical or metaphysical
argument can legitimately extend.  Another region
must be surveyed before science posits indubitably
other attributes which shall transform the power into
intelligence; and thus the theology of nature will receive a new  extension.  Physical science, as such,
can afford nothing but an all-pervading power; and
if man were never to go beyond the physical sciences,
the scientific world would remain (that is, without
revelation) at the natural theology of pantheism; and,
historically, pantheism  is now  succeeding the continental scepticism.
It has usually been supposed that the contemplation of what is called design in the works of creation
proves the existence of an intelligent designer. This
argument has been so commonly advanced, and is
supposed to be so perfectly valid, that it appears
almost a philosophical heresy to call it in question.
experience gradually and systematically construct an argument;
reason furnishing the metaphysic of necessity, and experience the
concrete of reality.  Reason is the operation of weaving, and
experience the material woven; both are necessary to produce the
fabric.
40*




474                   DESIGN.
Let us examine, therefore, whether this argument, as
hitherto advanced, is really conclusive. It may, perhaps, be necessary to observe the fact, that this argument has not convinced a large portion of the scientific world; and, if there be nothing more conclusive,
it is evident that such natural theology, taken alone,
has failed.
We must remind the reader that we are by no
means engaged in an attempt to prove the existence of
God; but only to trace the mode in which the idea of
God arises necessarily in the human reason as actually
involved in the spectacle of nature, thoroughly understood; and, therefore, we only endeavor to estimate
hozo much is really and truly furnished by one method,
and how much is furnished by another method.  And
we affirm  that neither the mathematical nor the
physical contemplation of the universe can legitimately
introduce any term into the conclusion which is not
a term  of mathematics or a term ofphysics, except
those general terms of metaphysic which are anterior
to both. And by general terms of metaphysic we
mean those which express abstractions and relations,
without in the least affirming whether there are or are
not any realities which coincide with the abstract
terms.  The office of metaphysic is to furnish abstract
categories (substantial and propositional) into which
experience must locate realities; and if we introduce
terms which are neither abstract nor yet furnished by
physical (sensational) experience, we have an illicit
process, and, consequently, an inconclusive argument.
And though the argument of design is satisfactory
to those who are already believers, (as illustrative of the




DESIGN.                  475
divine wisdom,) we must remember that a great
difference exists between an exposition of God's wisdom and a proof of God's existence, so conclusive in
itself that it commands the assent of intellect, as
intellect.
That there is a proof of God's existence, and of his
power and wisdom, so perfectly conclusive that it
shall command the assent of the reason of mankind,
wet have no possible doubt; but that such an argument can be drawn from physical science (farther than
power is concerned) we by no means admit; inasmuch
as the term intelligence, necessary to substantiate the
personality of God, belongs neither to metaphysics,
nor to mathematics, nor to physics.
All metaphysical dogmas must confine' themselves
to abstract terms, abstract divisions, and abstract relations.  Such are the following:- 
Existence, non-existence, necessity, contingency, creation, created, substance, attribute, cause, effect, condition, change, &c. And whenever these termS are used
concretely, and not abstractly, we have left the realm
of metaphysic. This metaphysic underlies all human
knowledge whatever, and is in reality nothing more
than the necessary form of thought. Into this necessary form of thought, the mathematical substantives
-identity, equality, number, quantity, space, and force
— are located, and the mathematical sciences arise.
And again, into the blank categories of the mathematical propositions the facts of sensation are located, and
the physical sciences arise. But Vs the physical sciences do not involve objective intelligence, but only
the objective conditions and functions of matter, it is




476    INTELLIGENCE - INTELLIGENT DESIGN.
plainly evident that a conclusion which involves intelligence can never be drawn from the bare contemplation of matter; and that, therefore, there must first be
the contemplation of mind, and the discovery of the
laws of mind, before we can posit legitimately the
intelligence of that power which pantheistic physics
posits as universal.
The argument that there is design in the works of
nature is, properly speaking, not physical, but physicopsychological; and the bridge that connects the allpervading power with mind is as follows: 
In the works of nature, and the operations of nature, man intuitively perceives by his reason a power
or force; and the primordial force, if we make nothing
objective but matter, necessarily lands us in pantheism,
which is at present the theological credence of a large
portion of the sciqtific men on the continent. And
out of this pantheism there is no scientific exit until
mind is made objective, and the facts of mind are
brought ti bear on the facts of physics; so that what
was before only a primordial force becomes an intelligent agent, of whom power is the attribute.
In the world of matter, two phenomena are apparent. First. The performance of a function. This supplies the material from which man intuitively posits
power or force.  Second. The adaptation of the physical conditions of matter for the achievement of certain
ends. This is the portion that has been called design;
but as design implies a designer, the term is illegitimate
until it has been determined what a designer is, and
what the term  design is really employed to signify.
If we assume a designer because there is design, we




INTELLIGENCE -INTELLIGENT DESIGN.   477
have assumed only a truism; but we have forgotten
to establish the most essential proposition, namely,
that the adaptation of means to an end is design.
Every merely physical argument to prove the intelligence of the primordial forcewill split on this rock;
and it is absolutely necessary, therefore, for man to
progress beyond matter science before natural theology
cal be other than pantheism. Pantheism is the theology of physical science; and if there were no other
science beyond physical science, pantheism would be
the last final form of scientific credence.
Let us, however, still bearing in mind the division
of the sciences into
The mathematical sciences, (or notion sciences,)
The matter sciences,
The man sciences,
-Let us ask how the primordial force of pantheism
is legitimately transformed into an attribute of an
intelligence.
Let a designer stand for an intelligence who is possessed of power, and who intentionally adapts means
to an end. Design, therefore, will stand for intentional
adaptation; and from the contemplation of man we
are enabled to make the above definitions without
transcending the realm of experience. When we have
made man objective, we can affirm, " man can design;"
and when we contemplate the product of man's design, we find it expressed in the terms, " adaptation of
means to an end," where neither of the terms are psychological, but such as are used legitimately in physical science. And when, on the other hand, we find in
nature the adaptation of means to an end, we infer




478         POSSIBILITY  OF MORAL THEOLOGY.
design and a designer, because the only circumstances
within our experience in which we can trace the origination of adaptation  are those in which human mind
is implicated.*
And thus what was aifirst an omnipresent and immortal substance, and afterwards an omnipresent and
immortal power, becomes transformed into an omnipresent and immortal intelligence.  And this growth
of the theological idea is borne out by the chronological fact, first, Spinoza, Clarke, Lowman, &c., then
Paley, Chalmers, and the Bridgewater Treatises.
But an intelligent and all-pervading mind, although
possessed of even infinite power and infinite wisdom,
is still insufficient.   There are facts in nature which
* The word design, like hundreds of other words, is subject to
an ambiguity of so common a character, that it is apt to be overlooked. In one sense it is used subjectively, in another sense it is
used objectively. In its subjective sense it means a mode of action,
in its objective sense it means a product of action; and when man
observes the character of the product resulting from his own mode
of action, and recognizes in the objective universe products of an
analogous character, he transforms the objective idea of those products into a subjective form. And this transformation of the objective into the subjective, is in fact the whole secret of the progression of science. When the mathematical sciences are studied,
they are objective; but when they are used, they are transformed
into the subjective form, and become powers of operation. Every
science, when its laws are discovered, becomes thus transformed
into a subjective power of operation - that is, into an art; exactly
as a proposition in any one science is first considered objectively as
to its truth or falsity, and afterwards used subjectively for the purpose of determining the truth or falsity of a subsequent proposition.
This metamorphosis is one of the most beautiful considerations in
the whole realm of reasoning.




POSSIBILITY OF MORAL THEOLOGY.        479
power taken as power, and wisdom taken as wisdom,
will not account for. Not only is man, when made
objective, found to be possessed of an intellectual
capacity which enables him to design, and of a power
which enables him to execute, but also of a moral
nature which lays on him the imperative obligation
of designing certain ends, and of refraining from designing certain other ends. And as man is as much
a portion of nature as is matter, we must have a productive power of such a character as would account
for this moral nature of man, and to have this we
must have the transformation of mere natural theology into moral theology.  And although this moral
theology is not yet universally admitted by men of
science, it follows so plainly and evidently from the
preceding method that it cannot fail to evolve.
Let us then reinvestigate the process according to
which a purely scientific natural theology must grow.
Natural theology is strictly a science; and this science
must be classed as the last and highest of the direct
sciences. In so far as it is an intellectual dogmia, only
discoursing of truth, it is a direct science, quite as
much so as dynamics, which treats of the laws of
force, except only that dynamics treats of the laws of
mechanical force, and thereby explains logically (that
is, in three propositions, one of which follows as the
conclusion of the other two) the mechanical functions
of matter; while theology must furnish such a major
power as shall account for all the cognizable phenomena within the reach of human cognition.  And thus
exactly as man's knowledge of the universe, both material and mental, grows and expands in the form of




480      POSSIBILITY OF MORAL THEOLOGYo
science, so must the idea of God grow and expand
also, until the whole of the possible sciences are completed, and man comes to the universal application of
truth.
We have then to glance once more at the order of
human knowledge, and here we must remark on the
groundwork of the mathematical sciences.
In the mathematical sciences the object-noun is
an abstraction.  Number, quantity, and space are
abstractions.
These abstractions are divided into forms or partial
numbers, partial quantities, and partial spaces.
And these forms are made to function by the application of the subjective axioms of the reason. These
subjective axioms are taken for granted as true, anteriorly to any consideration of the actual matter of the
mathematical sciences.
But these subjective axioms, or universal and purely
abstract propositions, when considered as objective,
belong to the region of metaphysic, and, therefore,
metaphysic is the groundwork of all scientific knowledge. And metaphysic furnishes to mathematic the
synthetic propositions purely a priori, and perfectly
abstract, which enable the substantives of mathematic
to function. That is, in fact, the substantives of mathematic are located in the blank propositions of metaphysic, and the mathematical sciences are produced;
in' the same manner as the facts of sensational observation are afterwards located in the propositions of
mathematic, (that is, of number, quantity, space, and
force,) and the physical sciences, properly so called,
are produced.




POSSIBILITY  OF MORAL THEOLOGY.              481
The order of human  knowledge, therefore, is, logically, -
Metaphysics, which furnishes the abstraction and the
axiom  to mathematics.
Mathematics, which  furnishes the computing power
to physics.
Physics, which furnishes the correct rule of the arts to
political economy.
Political economy, which furnishes the correct mode
of action to politics.
Politics, which furnishes the correct mode of action to
theology.* [Politics, the science of equity, determines what is just; and theology brings the
just into operation.]
Theology, which furnishes the ultimate rule of action
for mankind, and leads his hopes towards immortality.
* It must be remembered that theology would not be of practical
avail unless man were a moral being-that is, an accountable
being. The existence of a great First Cause might be substantiated by valid evidence; but to make man accountable to the First
Cause requires a separate process of proof, and this proof is found
in the moral nature of man; and the moral nature of man is indubitably substantiated the moment moral science is achieved. So
that moral science furnishes to speculative theology its moral element; and though politics confines itself to the minor question of
man's accountability to man, it transmits to speculative theology
the incomparably greater proposition, that man must also be accountable to God, which proposition a merely speculative theology could
not prove, as it confines itself to the question of God's existence.
The divine attributes could not be proven in their moral form, unless man be first admitted to be a moral being. Hence the advantage of a system of natural morals, which, if once substantiated,
must forever uproot the argumentations of the sceptic.
41




482             NATURAL THEOLOGY.
These are the direct sciences which are objective;
and this is not only the order in which they must be
classed, but the order in which they must necessarily
be evolved in the history of human evolution.
If we take the sciences in this order, it is plain that
science reads the universe backwards, beginning at the
most ultimate abstractions, and gradually becoming
more and more real, more and more directly applicable to the great requirements of the moral man.
And if we consider science to be " the universe seen
by the reason, and not merely by the senses," we see
that this inverse order is absolutely necessary, because
the reason must master the most universal forms first,
and afterwards those that are more special in their
order. But while metaphysic, and next to it mathematic, is the-genus of science which presents the greatest possible extension, it is that which presents the
least possible comprehension; and on the contrary,
natural theology, considered as a mode of thought, presents the greatest possible comprehension, really involving all the other sciences whatever.
And this being the case, natural theology grows
(in the mind of man) exactly as the anterior sciences
are perfected; and thus the final ultimatum  of all
scientific cognition, when perfected in its whole sphere,
is the teaching of natural theology. And on this
account it is, that the prevalent natural theology,
wherever it is scientific, will always assume the form
of those sciences which have been last laid open to
the intellect. So that it need excite no surprise, that
at one period of man's evolution we should see the
metaphysical attributes developed; at a subsequent




NATURAL THEOLOGY.             483
period, the mathematical attributes; at a subsequent
period, the physical attributes, (power, &c.;) at a still
later period, the intellectual attributes; and finally, the
moral attributes. But this progressive development
is nothing more than the progressive development of
man's knowledge, the Divine Reality remaining always the same, however darkened or however enlightened man may be; so that at the last, natural
reason, by a purely scientific process, will have seen
in the universe, not an aggregate of functioning matter,
nor a pantheistic power, nor a mere intelligence possessed of power, but an INFINITE CREATOR, infinite in
his moral attributes; that is, infinitely holy; to whom
the whole human  race is accountable for every
thought, and every word, and every action.
And thus natural theology, opening up to the reason
of mankind, one after another, the attributes of God,
will at last land the race on the very threshold of
divine revelation, which alone can solve the moral
difficulty of a reason, which points infallibly in one
direction, and afallen nature, which tends infallibly in
another. When political economy shall have done
her work on earth, and taught men how to evolve the
maximum of material good, and when equity shall have
taught men to construct society in accordance with
the principles of justice, the reason of mankind will
still go onward, and the higher and nobler good, the
aspiration after immortality, will still beckon on hufhanity; and earth, transformed by truth, harmoniously
reverberating from nature to reason, and from reason
to revelation, shall at last rejoice in the universal
knowledge of Him whose kingdom is everlasting.




484         GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF A
Let us then concisely review the growth of the
theological idea, and examine how much each genus
of science contributes.
All science is the knowledge of BEING, and each
particular science discourses of the mode of being, or
of the manifestation of being.
1. Metaphysic. Posits the universal mode in which
the human mind views being. Its
contribution to theology is the division of being into necessary and contingent, substance and attribute, cause
and effect, &c.
2. Mathematic. Introduces space and quantity. The
idea now becomes a substance having no limits in space. (Infinity.)
3. Dynamic.   Introduces power. And as space is
the static condition of the universe,
so time is the dynamic condition.
The idea becomes non-limited in
time, (immortal;) and the substance
is a power without limits in time or
space.
4. Physic.     Introduces construction, or the adaptation of condition to the achievement of an end. The power now
becomes an infinite constructive power. (Pantheism.)
5. Economic.  Introduces intentional design in construction. The idea now  becomes
an intelligence infinitely powerful and
infinitely wise.
6. Politic.    Introduces justice. That is, treats,




GENUINE NATURAL THEOLOGY.          485
not of the mode of producing an end, but of the end
that ought to be produced.  The intelligence now
becomes a God of infinite justice.
Such is the direct mode in which natural theology
is produced; but it is plainly evident that if man were
to stay here, he has nothing whereon to ground his
hopes. A God of infinite justice, no man who ever
lived on earth would or could desire to stand before.
Justice is exactly that attribute which, while it clothes
God with righteous majesty, fills man with reasonable
terror. Man is not only an intelligence who comprehends, but a voluntary agent who acts; and no
man who ever lived would desire that his actions
should be weighed in the balances of justice, and that
he himself should abide by the award. Between the
dictates of man's reason and the history of his actions
there is a discrepancy. Man, in fact, is afallen being;
and science, while it enlightens him, cannot obliterate
his crimes. Natural theology, then, while it solves
the mystery of the natural universe, can never solve
the mystery of the moral universe. It may establish
man's responsibility, but in so doing it as indubitably
establishes his criminality; and thus when natural
theology shall have achieved its highest point, and
blazoned forth the moral attributes of God, it will, at
the same time, have heralded man's condemnation,
and pronounced irrevocable judgment on the race.
And thus the final destiny of natural theology
(which really comprehends all science *) is only to
* Man, in evolving the sciences, reads the universe backwards,
and terminates at natural theology. Thus natural theology is, in
41*




486           A MILLENNIUM ANTICIPATED.
lead man at last to the divine message of mercyto the glad tidings of forgiveness and reconciliation.
And thus, also, as the sciences evolve chronologically
in the same order that they are logically classified,
the ultimate end of human study, and of all man's
intellectual achievements, is only at last to prove
beyond a doubt the' absolute necessity both of a revelation and of a means of redemption, of which God
is the author.  And therefore, as we have pursued
exactly the same method in evolving the sciences to
come which explains the evolution of those already
ordinated, there is a'natural ground for anticipating
not only a millennium of justice, in which all man's
political arrangements shall be made in accordance
with the dictates of enlightened equity, but beyond
that period a millennium  of Christianity,'when the
burdened heart of humanity shall return to the true
waters of life, and drink from  the immortal streams
of Truth.
Having thus endeavored, in a concise manner, to
exhibit the mode in which natural theology must necessarily be evolved, both logically in the reason and
chronologically in the history of mankind, we may
the first place, or in the process of its formation, an inference. But
when the sciences are completed, and man reverses the order of
knowledge to make it correlative with the order of reality, all the
operations of nature, instead of being viewed as the proofs of God's
existence, are viewed as the operations of the Divine power and
wisdom.  And thus, though all knowledge may be viewed as
leading to God, all reality (save the moral determinations of voluntary agents) must be viewed as flowing from God; so that a
knowledge of God and of the divine operations would really comprehend all science whatever.




REVELATION.                 487
attempt to estimate the present position of natural
theology, and to account for its present unsatisfactory
character.
1st. Revelation is given to guide man correctly, under
all circumstances of his scientific knowledge. If man
be ignorant of science, revelation is in itself the divine
record of that truth which it behoves man the most to
know.  Revelation solves the moral mystery of the
universe, and points out to man the one thing needful
-namely, how man can attain to an immortality of
purified soul and blissful existence.  And let science
progress as it may - let man's knowledge become as
extensive and as accurate as it ever could by any possibility - revelation is still and always supreme, always
infinitely greater than any possible increment of natural knowledge. Revelatidn has an absolute and infinite truth for the most ignorant, and it has also an
absolute and infinite truth for the most enlightened.
2d. Between natural theology, which is purely scientific, (that is, such as would have arisen had there
never been a revelation, and consequently no traditional idea of Deity,) and such natural theology as
first takes its major propositions from Scripture, and
then proceeds to illustrate them from nature, there is
of course a difference so great, that the two, although
passing under the same name, are not even comparable. Natural theology is as different in its method from
scriptural physics, or scriptural metaphysics, or scriptural morals, as is geology from the scriptural account
of the creation.  The two can never be legitimately
compared until the natural science is completed, exactly as geology can never be legitimately compared




488      THEOLOGY - STRICTLY SCIENTIFIC.
with Scripture until men of science have agreed what
geology actually does teach.'
3d. Natural theology, purely scientific, is an attempt
to solve the mystery of the universe by the natural
powers of the human intellect.  It is, therefore, an
attempt to posit such a major as should account to the
reason for the whole facts of cognition. And consequently every realm, and every branch of cognition,
does necessarily bring its contribution to natural theology. It is true that any branch of cognition imay be
considered in its separate Isolation, and investigated in
its internal detail alone; but as all branches of cognition actually do meet in the one universe with which
man is acquainted, " What is the one major substance
of that universe that makes matter to be; and the one
major power of that universe that makes matter to
function; and the one major intelligence that. makes
mind to be; and the one major moral Ruler, who
makes mind to function towards a definite end?"
Had the universe been a blank space, and man only
a disembodied reason capable of contemplating that
space, but incapable of making himself and his own
mental operations objective, he would only have posited
an infinite and invisible space. Had he been presented
with such a physical universe as really exists only at
rest, but still been disembodied and capable only of
contemplating the material world existing in space, he
would have posited substance, quality, and condition,
* At the same time, an objection from one science may be fairly
met and triumphantly overthrown byan argument from the same
science.




THEOLOGY - STRICTLY SCIENTIFIC.        489
and drawn the line of distinction between the infinite
substance and the finite manifestation.
Had the physical universe begun to function, (move,)
he would have posited power; and had the functions
been regular, or apparently in accordance with the
relative conditions of the various portions of matter,
he would have posited constructivity as well as productivity.
And if he were then endowed with a body, and with
the power of reflection on his own existence and his
own operations, he would have posited a mental power
and mental construction. And if he found within his
intellectual nature a reason for acting in one direction
rather than another, and a conscience which laid on
him the duty of obeying his reason rather than his
passions, he would posit a moral intelligence with all
the preceding attributes. But then it must be remembered, that if in his ignorance he failed at first to apprehend the unity of design presented by the actual
construction of the physical universe, he would posit
as man! different powers as there appeared to be different qualities of forces, and would endeavor to unite
these secondary powers in some higher unity, so as
still to make the facts of experience coincide with the
dogmas of his reason.  And thus, though he would
posit power in the general, he would require to elaborate the sciences of the powers of nature before he
was in a condition to speak of the character of the
major power.*  And so with morals.  Man may, it is
* "A considerable portion of the qualitative properties of matter
-or, to speak more in accordance with the language of natural




490        THEOLOGY-  STRICTLY SCIENTIFIC.
true, posit a moral deity in the general, and  speak
of punishments and rewards, instead of mere occurrences; but what he never can determine, until he has
admitted the first propositions of moral science, is the
character of the moral Ruler of the universe.'  This
character may be taken from  revelation, or it hay be
assumed; but proven, in  the same  manner as any
other portion of science, it never can be, till moral
science is actually achieved and taught as a branch
of knowledge.   If, then, moral science has not yet
been  evolved, but is only in  course of preparation
through  the  evolution  of  political economy, it is
plainly evident that all speculations as to the moral
character of the Deity are not to be ranked as natural
theology.t
philosophy, of the qualitative expression of forces-is doubtless
still unknown to us; and the attempt perfectly to represent unity in
diversity must, therefore, necessarily prove unsuccessful." - HUMBOLDT'S Cosmos, chap. i. 63.
* It must be distinctly remembered, throughout this argument,
that those who do admit man to be a moral being have all the
elements of a genuine natural theology, and are imperatively
bound by its conclusions.
t We speak, of course, not of such natural theology as is elaborated by the Christian, who has the problem  of the universe
solved for him by revelation, but of such natural theology as should
convince the world in the same manner as a correct system of
astronomy convinces the world. When the fact of God's moral
existence is made perfectly indubitable to the Christian through
revelation, he can easily corroborate his belief by perceiving the
marks of the divine hand in all the works of nature. But it must
be remembeied that the very question of natural theology is this
very fact; and if the fact is really involved in the phenomena of
nature, (as no doubt it is,) the scientific world may ultimately find




PRESENT POSITION  OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 491
If natural theology be an inference from the whole
realm of knovwedge, it is plain that if a portion of
that realm, and this the most important portion, has
not yet been  accurately surveyed, natural theology
must necessarily be incomplete; and as it is plainly
apparent that moral science has not yet been reduced
to ordination, nor can be so reduced till political economy is developed as a teachable branch of knowledge,
it is also plain that moral theology, which depends on
moral science, is still incapable of assuming a scientific form.
And this we imagine to be the present position of
science and natural theology.  Natural theology, at
present, is little more than constructive pantheism -
the universal prevalence of a power that constructs
itself absolutely obliged to admit the fact, and the sceptic will be
regarded in much the same light as one who should deny the
Newtonian theory of planetary arrangement. But for this natural
theology, moral science is absolutely requisite. The French philosophers of the last century denied that man was a moral being,
and the English sensationalists of the present day maintain the
same proposition. And if the proposition were true, moral theology
would be not only impossible, but absolutely unintelligible.
But if moral science were once made, (and it can be made if
man be a moral being,) such a proposition would be universally
rejected as untenable; and it would become a matter of indubitable truth, not only that man was an accountable being, but that
there must necessarily be a great moral Being to whom humanity
is to render account.  And as this truth is involved in man's
rational contemplation of the universe, the whole world, if it
continue to progress in knowledge, must necessarily come to it at
some period or other. But this natural theology cannot evolve for
the world, until moral science has been so perfected as to be
beyond the reach of question.




492  PRESENT POSITION OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.
and operates being, in fact, the theology of the scientific world. Nor, unless the scientificwvorld accepts
revelation, can  natural theology assume  a higher
character until moral science be achieved, and then
moral theology must follow.  If it still be a matter
of dispute among men of science, whether man be a
moral being, or only a politico-economical being, it is
perfectly evident that science has no groundwork for
the establishment'of a moral universe; and if the
universe within the range of cognition be assumed
non-moral, there can be no reason for substantiating
a moral cause as the originator and director of the
universe.  Nor are we to admit mere assumptions,
and presumptions, and speculations, as science in the
world of morals any more than in the world of matter.
Either it is true that a definite rule of moral action
can be discovered by the reason, or it follows of
course that rules of action are not naturally imperative; and if they be not naturally imperative, it cal
only be a superstition to consider them as obligatory.
So that the possibility of moral science must be
granted, or else we must grant the non-imperative
nature of all moral rules whatever; for certainly the
logical destruction of natural morals would entail the
destruction, not only of all actual revelation, but of all
possible revelation.  If there be no natural reason
which lays on man an imperative obligation to act
rightly, there can be no reason for acting in accordance
with a divine rule which specifies the items of which
that rightly consists; and as revelation does not reveal
man's moral nature, but only his moral condition, and
Lhe mode by which that condition can be amended, it




PRESENT POSITION OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 493
is plain that if man's moral nature be rejected, (as it
really is by the sensationalist,) the revelation is incapable of reaching him, and must ever remain unintelligible to him.
But then, on the other hand, sensationalism is only
a partial view of the phenomenon.  Sensationalism
considers not man, but the product of man's action;
it treats not of mind, but of the conditions of matter;
and as the universal consciousness of humanity is
against a mere material contemplation of the universe,
inasmuch as each man finds himself capable of acting,
and of understanding reasons for acting in one mode
rather than another, sensationalism must be viewed
only as the philosophy of the world physical. And as
the world physical is only the unintelligent object,
sensationalism is only the philosophy of the unintelligent object; whereas the intelligent subject (man)
offers an entirely new region of investigation, and
superadds various qualitative predicates, which extend
knowledge into an entirely different sphere, and consequently transform sensationalism first into intellectualism, and ultimately into moralism.
The physical world, when considered objectively
and exclusively, (as it is in physical science,) does not
present within the field of contemplation the operation
of mind. For this we must turn to man, and, having
evolved the laws of physical operation, the laws of
man's operation fall next to be considered.  And
human action falls to be considered logically in the
following order: —
1. Action upon the material world, for the direct
purpose of producing an effect upon the material
42




494     DEPENDENCE OF NATURAL THEOLOGY
world. This involves the laws of the arts, which laws
are drawn from the physical sciences.
2. Action upon the material world, for the purpose
of producing an effect on man. This involves the laws
of political economy, which laws are drawn from an
induction of observed facts, as to what effects have
been ascertained to follow certain modes of action.
3. Action upon man without forcible interference,
for the purpose of producing an effect on man. This
involves the laws of social action, but only such social
action as does not involve constraint or interference
against the will of the party operated upon.
4. Action upon man by interference or forcible control.  This involves the laws of justice.,
Such are the modes of human action, and the laws
of these modes must be evolved in this order. First,
the arts, (mechanical, chemical, agricultural, &c.;) then
political economy, which treats of the production of
wealth; then social science, which treats of the distribution of wealth, the public health, the public education,
the public recreation, &c.; and, last of all, politics,
which treats of the laws which should regulate interference, (legislation, government, &c.)
The two last of these divisions alone are entitled to
the name of moral science, which lays down the laws
of human duty.  Anteriorly to- the consideration of
man's action on man, the concept of duty does not
arise. Justice is the rule regulative between man and
man; and the consideration of man's relations to man
is the first period at which moral science makes its
appearance. In chronological evolution, the scientific
world is only attempting to complete the second
division, (political economy,) and to break up the




ON NATURAL SCIENCE.              495
ground of the third division, (social science.)  The
fourth division is, as yet, almost unattacked, and in
practice is a.mere superstition.
Now, natural theology can never legitimately go
beyond those branches of science which have been
evolved and reduced to scientific ordination.  And
every attempt to make a more complete theology than
science really warrants, only produces scepticism  on
the part of those who find an inconclusive argument
advanced as a demonstration. Moral theology, strictly
and purely scientific, is at present impossible, ( that is,
impossible for the world;) and impossible, because
moral science has not yet made its appearance, and
because moral theology depends on moral science, and
is an inference from it. In Britain, of course, Scripture is the source of theology, and moral theology is
derived from the written revelation.  But, on the continent, philosophy is the theology of the great mass of
thinking men; and their theology, derived from  the
revelation of nature, does actually follow the development of science.  And as scepticism was first posited
with its negation, and then pantheism with its most
general affirmation, and now, instead of a mere power,
an intelligent power is beginning to be seen as absolutely necessary to explain the phenomena of nature,
we may rest assured that, with the development of
social and moral science, (which cannot fail to undergo
their evolution in their order,) there will arise necessarily a moral theology, and the world will be indoctrinated with the theory of a moral Deity.*
* "Now, this moral theology has h peculiar advantage. over the
speculative, that it leads infallibily to the conception of a single all




496 ULTIMATE EFFECTS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE.
Now, this consummation  of science, although of
course still insufficient, is most earnestly to be desired,
not because natural theology can ever be a substitute
for the written Word, but because a true natural theology may  be the great preparative for the universal
acceptance of the written Word.  Eighteen  hundred
years have elapsed since the Creator of mankind appeared on earth to proclaim the doctrine of human
restoration; and yet three fourths of the world are
unacquainted with the truth. Even in those countries
where the  Christian religion  has been  accepted, no
such improvement of man's condition has followed as
would at all justify the supposition that the gospel
most perfect and reasonable First Being, whereunto speculative theology never directs us from  objective grounds, and much less
could be able to convince us of the same. For we do not find
either in transcendental or natural theology, howsoever far reason
therein may lead us, any sufficient ground for admitting a single
Being only, which we presuppose for all natural causes, and upon
which we had, at the same time, sufficient cause for making these
in all respects dependent. On the contrary, if we consider from
the point of view of moral unity, as a necessary law of the world,
the cause which alone can give to this the adequate effect, and consequently, as to ourselves, obligatory force, it must then be a single
supreme will that comprehends within itself all these laws. For
how would we find, under different wills, perfect unity of ends?
This will must be omnipotent; so that all nature, and its reference
to morality in the world, may be subjected to it - omniscient, so
that it may cognize the internal of sentiments, and their moral
worth — omnipresent, so that it may be ready immediately for all
the necessities which highest optimism demands - eternal, so that
at no time this harmony of nature and liberty be wanting."
KANT'S Critic of Pure Reason. 
See, also, some noble passages in Samuel Clarke's "Evidences,"
appended to his " Demonstration."




CHRISTIANITY THE MAIN CAUSE          497
has ever yet borne its legitimate fruits. The truth
has been preserved; but most assuredly it has yet to
achievetar more for the whole race of man than it has
ever yet achieved for any one community.  And,
again, when Luther's repetition of. the fundamental
truth of Christianity (justification by faith) held out a
promise of good, the good was gradually sacrificed to
political superstitions; and the reformation failed to
achieve more than a partial, and very partial, benefit
to the world. In Germany, the church became rationalistic; in England, Erastian, sectarian, schismatic,
rationalistic; and, lastly, teire has come a sickly tendency to Roman paganism and idolatry. In Scotland,
moderatism assailed the church; and for a long period
the majority of the ministers were rather moralists
than Christians. And this rationalistic, moralist, or
moderate exhibition of Christianity is only a national
diversity of the samie fundamental reality - namely, a
return to an imperfect theology of nature. In fact,
the history of the reformation is rather the history of
the dissolution of the papacy, which constructed the
church on false principles, than the history of the restoration of the church constructed on true principles.
And it would seem almost an inference from the past
history of ecclesiastical Christianity, (we speak in no
respect of spiritual religion,) that the Christian church,
as one association, offers little prospect of being reunited until civil society has discovered the true principles
of civil association, and founded the social institutions
of mankind on the demonstrative principles of equity.
But while the written Word has not hitherto achieved
a condition of society such as its principles would
42*




498           OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION.
dictate, and such as, without doubt, it will one day
achieve for man, we must not overlook what it has
achieved. It has not yet achieved the Christianzation
of mankind; but it, and it as the major cause, has
achieved the civilization of mankind. And this civilization has been the slow and gradual acquisition of
natural truth, and the reduction of that truth to practical operation.
Now, if it be true that all human science ends in
morals, and that natural theology follows the development of science, (and it ca  never legitimately be in
advance of science,) then natural theology will come
ultimately to be a purely scientific moral theology, and
will thus be brought to the point where man identifies
the God of nature with the God of Scripture. And
thus the long-lost unity will be once more restored, and
the enlightened reason of mankind, reading aright the
revelation of the true God in the cosmos of creation,
will see -not in doubt nor in darkness, but in the full
daylight splendor of its own inherent majesty- the
divinity of that gospel which opens up the heaven of
the moral universe, and spreads before the full-grown
intellect of man the eternal joys of a purchased immortality.
" Truth, indeed, once came into the world with her
divine Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious
to look on; but when he ascended, and his apostles
after him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked
race of deceivers, who, as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how they dealt with
the good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely
form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the




TRTTH RESTORED TO MAN.           499
four winds. From that time, ever since, the sad friends
of Truth - such as durst appear- imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of
Osiris, went up and down, gathering up limb by limb
still as they could find them. We have not yet found
them all, lords and commons, nor ever shall do till her
Master's second coming.  He shall bring together
every joint and member, and shall mould them into an
immortal feature of loveliness and perfection."








APPENDIX.
THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.
HAVING assumed, as the basil of our argument for
the progression of humanity, the consecutive evolution
of the sciences, and their logical dependence on each
other, we have endeavored to present the sciences in a
tabulated form, which, if correct, should present the
logical order in which they must be classified, and the
chronological order in which they must be evolved by
the human race. To have exhibited the chronological
evolution of the sciences, would have required a separate dissertation, for which we have not space in. the
present volume; but if the reader will consider the
progress of science from theWdays of the schoolmen
down to the present day, he will find that the following
table, which is merely logical, might be exhibited, in
fact, as chronological. For that purpose, however,
each'science would have required to be divided into
its separate portions. Thus, acoustics would require
to be divided into its mechanics, or the doctrine of its
motions or vibrations, and its music, or the doctrine of
its tones. And, again, optics would require to be divided into its geometry, or the doctrine of its reflection, refraction, &e., (in which it is unnecessary to con



502                 APPENDIX.
sider the motion of a distinct fluid;) into its mechanics,
or the doctrine of its motion; and into its chemistry,
or the doctrine of its agency on other substances.
These various portions are perfectly distinct, (as distinct as the mechanics of solid matter from the chemistry of solid matter;) and consequently, in the history
of evolution, it is to be expected that the one portion
will evolve before the other, although all may be assembled under the same name.
Again, this mode of viewing the progressive evolution of the sciences explains at once the controversy
between the Baconians and the Aristotelians. Many
tirades have been levied against Aristotle and his followers, by those who appear altogether incapable of
comprehending his method. Aristotle's method was
absolutely necessary, (meaning thereby the deductive
method of reasoning;) and it was perfect, so far as
the mathematical sciences extended. Without Aristotle, there could have been no Bacon. Both were
requisite.  The first developed the general form of all
reasoning, and the second applied the form to the phenomena of matter. B4t the deductive mode is only
one of the phases of reasoning; and the Baconians,
overlooking the fact that the deductive mode was the
only mode applicable to mathematics, imagined that
they had invented a new method, when they had only
inverted the method which Aristotle had bequeathed
to them. For, in fact, between the deductive method
and the inductive method there is only this difference,
that in the former we begin with the major and minor
premises, and deduce the consequent; whereas, iri the
inductive method, we begin with the minor premiss,




THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.   503
(the observed conditions,) and the consequent, (the
attendant phenomena,) and from these infer the major
premiss; that is, the law or generalized fact. Aristotle
was as necessary as Bacon; and though the Baconians of the present day do not perceive it, they are
exactly in the same position with regard to moral science that the Aristotelians were in with regard to
matter science.  The sensationalist Baconians, who
endeavor to make moral science by a mere induction
of facts, are as much out of their province as the metaphysicians, who endeavored to make physical theories
by ratiocination.  A third method is now  requisite,
and then the scheme of knowledge will be completed.
Aristotle, Bacon, and the man to come,* will have
exhausted the whole doctrine of method. But each is
necessary in his place; Aristotle to give the method
of the mathematical sciences, (and also, let it not be
forgotten, the method of the physical sciences when
once they are discovered;) Bacon, to give the method
of the physical sciences, (in the process of discovery;)
and the man to come to give the method of the man
sciences. But even in the man sciences there can be
nothing to transcend the method of Aristotle, as there
really was nothing in the Baconian method to transcend the method of Aristotle.  Aristotle gave the
* To Kant this position may perhaps be ultimately assigned, but
even in that case he would be the man to come, as he has not yet
been acknowledged as the autho; of the terminal method, which
must exhaust the realm of cognition. It is questionable whether
any future writer will ever be able to transcend Kant; but at the
same time it is also questionable whether the critical method can
be fully achieved before the whole of the sciences are evolved.




504                 APPENDIX.
blank forms of reasoning, and Bacon pointed out the
mode of putting real facts into the minor propositions
of the syllogisms. And whenever man science is fully
made, it also will be only a filling in of real truth into
the blank formulae of Aristotle, who, although for a
time degraded from his high position, will again hereafter be esteemed as the genuine founder of scientific
method. When physical science, passing through the
phase of induction, which is the process of discovery,
shall have fairly established the great major propositions of the physical world, the method of Aristotle
will once more be applicable, and his name will again
be revered as second to none in the grand phenomenon of man's intellectual development.
If, again, it be true that man evolves the sciences
in a certain chronological order, we learn to appreciate
more correctly the various labors of those great men
whose names symbol the respective eras of development.  Thus Aristotle might lay bare the universal
doctrine of method, and after-ages might have little to
improve upon his labors. His logic might be exhaustive, and no future writer might be able to say that he
had seen more completely than Aristotle into the universal form of science. But if (as we affirm) logic is
the first and most general of all the sciences, the genuine origin of all systematic reasoning, then logic necessarily falls to be classed first, and Aristotle might develop logic, while his opinions on all other branches
of knowledge were empirical, incomplete, superstitious,
or erroneous. His logic might be perfect while his politics would be little else than a tissue of assumptions.
But the most important consideratidn connected




THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.   505
with the following scheme of classification is the
logical dependence of one science on its antecedent
science. And this dependence manifests itself in the
fact, that the one science applied to the forms of the
next fundamental noun-substantive, actually becomes
the next science. Thus, logic applied to number becomes arithmetic; arithmetic applied to quantities,
becomes algebra; algebra applied to spaces becomes
geometry; and geometry applied to force becomes
statics.
This process cannot possibly be reversed. It is not
arbitrary, but necessary. It belongs not to a mode of
classification which might serve a temporary purpose,
but to a general mode of classification which would
always impel man as man to arrange the sciences in
this order, and in no other, because no other is permanently possible. Not that we have succeeded in arranging the physical sciences in an order altogether unobjectionable, but that we have exposed the principles
of classification which must ultimately prevail wTlen
the doubts and difficulties now connected with the. physical sciences shall have been cleared away, and the
relations between electricity, chemistry, and magnetism been so simplified, as to enable lines of demarcation to be drawn with a precision which the mere
logician would not now be justified in attempting.
Those who are familiar with logic'(and happily that
science is gradually regaining its position) will perceive that the fundamental nouns-substantive of the
sciences are classed on their extension and comprehension, the extension diminishing exactly as the comprehension includes more and more qualities or predicates.
43




506                 APPENDIX.
And this circumstance affords a high presumption
that the order is not arbitrary, but the genuine order
of nature.
Science, in every case, involves reasoning, and where
there is not reasoning (as in the descriptive sciences)
there is only classification, which is the preliminary of
science. But, anterior to reasoning, there are the
fundamental and universal propositions of human
credence, which belong to ontology or metaphysic.
And ontology furnishes the axioms to the mathematical sciences, which axioms render deductive reasoning
possible.
Ontology posits what Kant has accurately termed
a synthetic proposition; and this synthetic proposition,
next to the abstraction, is the very foundation of all
science whatever. True, the sensationalists have endeavored to obliterate this synthetic proposition; but
the current of human credence is rapidly returning
to a more genuine estimation of the-real character of
the phenomena of thought, and the fundamentals of
belief (never capable of being rejected in fact) may
ere long be expected to undergo an examination which
shall place them beyond dispute.
But another consideration may be made with regard
to thought.  Two methods of studying thought are
open to mankind: first, the psychological; and, second,
the critical.  The psychological assumes the power
of man to make thought itself objective, to study
it, classify it, and reason with it; the ultimate appeal
being to the human consciousness.  This method
is ever open to objection.  The intellectualist may
posit substance, and cause, and power, and appeal for




THE CLASSIFICATON OF THE SCIENCES.   507
the confirmation of his doctrine to the consciousness
of mankind.  The sceptic at once asserts the subjectivity of the concepts, and uproots the very possibility
of proof. True, he says, there is a substance, but that
substance is in thought; and a cause, but the cause is
in thought; and a power, but the power is in thought.
And thus the intellectualist is reduced to the mere
reiteration of his dogma- a dogma which, so long as
he confines himself to the criterion of consciousness, is
no more than an assertion of his own mental experience or conviction.
Far otherwise with the critic. The critic takes his
stand on the immovable basis of science, and, leaving
all questions of consciousness or of mental operation,
he makes the whole range of the sciences objective,
and asks what thoughts they have posited, and what
methods they have pursued.  He leaves it to every
science in particular to determine what is true and
what is false in each region of inquiry; and, when
science has achieved her office, he culls the first and
fundamental truths of each science, and says, " These
are indisputable; and, if you question them, you must
fight your battle with the world of science, which
has established and authenticated these propositions."
And thus when he speaks of power, he appeals not to
consciousness, but to the science of dynamics, which
treats especially of power, and performs with that
substantive operations which could not be performed
without it.
The sciences are all direct and spontaneous, and
their office is to determine what is true. In geometry,
for instance, the axioms are spontaneously true; and




508                 APPENDIX.
geometry never does, and never can, inquire into the
objectivity or subjectivity of her fundamental propositions. They are true necessarily, because no effort
of man can conceive them  otherwise. And when
they -have been accepted on these terms by geometry,
they are handed over to the critic; whose office is not
to determine what axioms are true, but to examine
what they consist of, what is their form, their meaning,
and their function.
And as the sciences, when completed, will involve
every substantive that can enter philosophy, and every
proposition that could give rise to a question on the
reality of knowledge, critical philosophy will thus become the genuine doctrine of thought; not inquiring
into the truth of the thought, for that is the office of
science, but into its form and mechanism. And thus
philosophy would be at once the genuine scientia scientiarum, and the genuine exposition of the laws of
human thought, based on the whole range of science,
and appealing to ascertained knowledge for the substantiation of her fundamental truths.
If psychology have any truths to advance, they
must be advanced as scientific, and not philosophic
truths.  Philosophy cannot acknowledge them  till
they have been already established beyond dispute;
and then philosophy uses them for a purpose altogether distinct from the purpose of science. Science,
making its realm of investigation objective, inquires
what is true in the object, and this object may be man
as well as matter. But when science has made her
truth, and achieved her independent inquiry, philosophy accepts the truth, and endeavors, with the whole




THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.   509
mass received from the whole category of the sciences,
to read aright the phenomenon of knowledge; and,
linking the object with the subject, to complete the
circle of cognition, and, it may be, to project some
reasonable anticipation of the future destiny of humanity.
The last of the direct sciences is theology.  Theology completes the range of spontaneous science, and
closes the book of science, properly so called. But
beyond theology lies critical philosophy, which reflects
on the whole course of knowledge, and examines the
method that has been pursued. And this critical philosophy can never be achieved till the whole of the
sciences are complete-complete, not in having made
manifest every truth which they quantitatively contain, but complete in having posited their fundamental
propositions, and acknowledged the method by which
they evolve truths of a certain specific quality. And
if this be the case, it is plainly evident that critical
philosophy has yet to undergo a new expansion; in
fact,that so long as there remains one qualitative science to be reduced to ordination, critical philosophy is
only partially possible.  Moral science and natural
theology must be truths for the world, before critical
philosophy can sum up the whole facts of cognition,
and pronounce judgment on the cosmos of man's
knowledge.
But what is the lesson that philosophy can teach -
the last problem of man's inquiries upon earth?
In this philosophy there may lie involved the stupendous fact of a mystery insoluble to the reason — a
mystery that has borne down humanity, and baffled
43*




510                 APPENDIX.
the mightiest efforts of the intellect. Ever and ever
there comes back the appalling consciousness of "a
reason that points infallibly in one direction, and a
fallen nature that tends infallibly in another." Science
is here utterly helpless to inform; and philosophy,
while recording the fact, weeps over the hopeless mystery. 41an cannot solve the mystery. And thus philosophy, reading the whole realm of knowledge, and
beholding all that the intellect can teach, lands at last
on the shore of that ocean where a higher than man
must guide -where the horizon is infinity, and where
she might gaze forever on the lost regions of illimitable space. That ocean philosophy cannot traverse.
Reason cannot survey the infinite. Time, and earth,
and man's knowledge are all behind; and before is
the infinite ocean of immortality. And here philosophy must end with a pathless ocean and an insoluble
mystery. Her work is over-finished. She has no
compass to guide on the trackless waters -no beacon
to direct her. The loadstar of heaven must appear,
and Faith, giving the hand to reason, may lead by the
records of eternal Truth.
Nor is this faith itself unreasonable. It is not mysticism nor superstition, but credence of a matter beyond the realm of reason, by means of an evidence
within the bounds of reason; reason being judge of the
evidence which authenticates the matter.
And thus the last final lesson that philosophy can
teach, and which one day it will teach the world, is,
that there is an insoluble mystery within the region of
cognition; and that, consequently, the only hope of
knowledge is in a revelation from that divine Creator
and Preserver whose moral existence has been proven




THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.   511
by natural theology. And this indeed is the true province of philosophy, her great work, her terrible achievement, save that there is hope from on high. She lands,
indeed, at last on the shore of a boundless ocean; but
in so doing she bequeaths to man the last record of her
teaching —that in revelation alone can be found the
truth that humanity requires.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.
All science presents itself under the following aspect:1. The substantive.
2. The relation between two substantives.
This is called the proposition.
Two propositions must in every case be given before
there can be reasoning.
3. The evolution of a new relation from two propositions given. This in its complete form is called the
syllogism.
This is the universal form of science, and it first
appears in logic, which is the most abstract form of all
science.
The evolved relation is always a new relation, being
the relation between one of the substantives of one of
the given propositions, and one of the substantives of
the other proposition.
A perfect syllogism presents itself under the following general form:Major Premiss.  The whole of B is C.
Minor Premiss. The whole of A is B.
Consequent.    The whole of A is C.
In the deductive sciences, *(the mathematical sciences always, and the physical sciences when their




512                      APPENDIX.
laws are discovered,) the evolved relation is the conclusion or consequent of the syllogism.
In the inductive sciences, while undergoing their
process of discovery, the evolved relation is the major
premiss, which then becomes sufficient for deductive
reasoning in new cases.
Every single science consists of a nomenclature, a
classification, and a system  of syllogisms; that is, of a
system of propositions connected together by the law
of reason and consequent.
A classification is improperly termed a science; it is
only a portion of a science, the propositions which are
isolated in a classification requiring to be connected
by the law of reason and consequent, before science
properly so called is achieved.
In the physical sciences, matter invariably appears
as a power, or force, or agent, or as acted on by a
power, or force, or agent; whereas in the mere classification it is a substance.*
In mechanics, matter is viewed as a power capable
of acting on other matter, without producing a change
in the qualitative powers of the portions of the matter
operated upon.
* Unless matter be conceived as a power, (a power located or
conditioned,) there cannot be science. There might be a knowledge
of facts, but the facts must be connected by the law of reason and
consequent, before the facts will function in science; and they can
only be connected by the law of reason and consequent by making
matter an agent, or power. But though some matter is always
present as a power, there may also, in the same syllogism, be matter present as a substance- that is, as an object acted on by the
agent; while for the moment;ie reaction of the object on the agent
is not taken into consideration.
As every major premiss represents a power, every minor premiss




TIlE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES,   513
In chemistry, matter is viewed as a power capable
of producing a change in the qualitative powers of
every portion of the matter operated upon.
In political economy, matter is viewed as a power,
(called value;) which power is the power of exchanging against other articles, or against services: or it is
viewed as a power capable of producing articles of
value. In political economy, man himself is viewed
as a power capable of producing value, or consuming it.
In politics, man is viewed as a conscious power,
capable of acting equitably or unequitably towards
his fellow-men.
Power, and not substance, is the essence of all physical science; and the object of research is the discovery of the exact specification of the powers of nature
in their most general form, so that those powers shall
function in the syllogism, and produce logical consequents which shall coincide with the observed consequents wherever the verification can be made.
All science exists in the mind, and it is only as the
substantives of the sciences are made to function logically in human thought that science is really achieved.
Science, then, is a form  of thought, and when evolved
a clcssification, and every consequent a produced phenomenon, matter may appear in the major as a power, and in the minor as a
substance, thus:Major.      Matter acting, (a power.)
Minor.      Matter acted upon, (a substance.)
Consequent. Produced phenbmenon.
Dr. Thomas Brown, in advocating the substantial claims of matter against the potential, appears to have overlooked the fact, that
we know as little of substance as of power. Both are relative terms;
and if the one be obliterated, the other, by a parity of reasoning,
ought also to disappear.




514                  APPENDIX.
it is the same for all human intellect; so that it involves in itself the unity of human credence, in opposition to the diversity of error, superstition, or mere
opinion.
FIRST.
The foundation of human knowledge is Ontology.
Ontology furnishes —st. The abstraction or substantive of the science; and, 2d. The axiomatic proposition, or necessary relation which renders reasoning
possible. Ontology is not a science, but is the necessary preparation for all the sciences. The mathematical sciences derive their axioms from ontology. Ontology presents itself in the form -
A. The abstraction or substantive posited.
A is B. The relation or proposition. The synthetic
proposition of Kant, which becomes the axiom
in mathematics.
Science.
Science originates when we apply a rational method
to the object of intellectual perception, rejecting all
human authority and all human superstition.
The universal form of science is Logic. Logic furnishes the laws of identity and equality, and its process is called reasoning.  Logic presents itself in the
form -
A is B; B is C; ergo, A is C: the law of identity.
A is part of B; the whole of B is part of C; errgo
A is part of C: the law of equality.
The doctrine of identity and equality is therefore
the first science, and the sciences range themselves in
the order given in the accompanying table:



THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.    515
THE REGION  OF KNOWLEDGE.                          REALITY.
METAPHYSIC; OR, FORMAL INTUITION.
The necessary and uni-.   I Ontology.or Metaphysic in
versal forms of thought, i "e.  spontaneous operation.
SCIENCE; OR, FORMAL APPREHENSION.*
I. FORMAL SCIENCE.
THE CATEGORIES.               THE SCIENCES.
Identity                     I Logi^, or
Equality                       Syllogistic.
The firmament of
It. THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES., the knowlee
SPACE, the knowledge
Number                         Arithmetic,      of which involves geQuantity                      Algebra.          ometry and the anterior
Space                         Geometry.         sciences.
III. THE FORCE SCIENCES                                  The HEAVENLY BDIES, the knowledge of
Forces, neutralizino each other   Statics,      which involves the force
Forces, producing-motion      Dynamics.         sciences and all the anIV. THE MATTER SCIENCES, or powers conditioned.          or ciences.
I INORGANIC. 
Force, conditioned in  Solids           Mechanics.
Liquids             Hydrodynamics.
Aeriform fluids     Pneumatics.
Sound                           Acoustics.        The EARTH  and its
Light      Imponderables.       Optics.         Atmosphere, the knowlHeat )     Impone.      Thermology.    edge of which involves
Magnetic Force                  Magnetism.      the inorganic sciences
Affinity                        Chemistry.      and those which precede
of Solids ) according to              them.
Liquids  their chemical
Gases ) classification
Light
Heat
Electric Force                  Electricity.
l ORGANIC. I
Life or Vital Force        Vegetable Physiology. The Vegetable Kingdom.:Animal Physiology.  The Animal Kingdom.
V. THE MAN SCIENCES, OR MIND SCIENCES.                  TheHUMAN RACE, the
complete knowledge of
Utility                    Political Economy,   which would involve all
Equity                     Politics,            the sciences, without
Accountability             Theology (natural.)  exception.
PHILOSOPHY; OR, FORMAL REFLECTION.
critical Philosophy            Critic                 The CREATOR, posited
Ethics of Theology             Dikaistic.              the reason in natural
Expectation of a Future Life   Elpistic.            theology.
The DIvINE CREATOR,
REIVELATIOP N.                       made known by personal communication
* GEiERAL FORM.                         t GENERAL FORM.
Major.... The General Propbsition.   Major.   Agent.  The Qualitative Power.
Minor... The Specified Condition.   Minor.. Object.. The Classified Matter.
Consequent.. The Resulting Proposition.  Consequent  Phenomenon The Resulting Function.




516                    APPENDIX.'A more uniform nomenclature might, however, be
attempted in the following manner:-e
1st. Primary Knowledge, necessary and universal.
Ontologic.
2d. Science.
Logic or Syllogistic.
Mathematic.
Dynamic.
Physic. (A term absurdly applied in Britain to drugs
and drugging.)
Mtl^echanic       1   Of all the various forms or
Mechanic          I
Magnetic         manifestations of matter with
Chemic             which  man  is  acquainted,
Electro-Galvanic  classified  specially  in  each
3 science.
Organic, -
Botanic.
Zo6logic, (including man as an animal.)
Anthropologic, or Man science.
Artistic, (Arts and manufactures, &c.)! Economic. (Production of wealth.)
Socialistic. (Distribution  of wealth and
welfare of the community.)
Politic.* (The laws of equity.)
* The term ethic is objectionable, ethos meaning a manner or
custom. On the contrary, if it be true that man ought t@ be a citizen or member of a state, and not an isolated individual, the term
politic may properly apply to the rules that should regulate men as
citizens; that is, in their actions towards each other, and to the sys



THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.    517
Theologic.* (The divine Creator of man and the
universe.)
3d. Philosophy.
Critic.    What have I known?          See Kant, CanDikaistic. What ought I to do?      on of Pure ReaElpistic.  What may I hope?             son.  Sect. 2.
Seeing that man is a fallen creature, and that there
is an insoluble mystery within the region of cognition,
the two latter questions can never receive a satisfactory
answer from  natural knowledge.   Revelation  alone
can answer them.
If we view knowledge as necessarily evolving, both
logically and chronologically, in the above order, the
scheme ought to explain the generation of science;
that is, the mode in which one science grows out of,
and is produced by, another.  And to effect this explanation, we have only to arrange the sciences as consecutive, so that one science applied to the classification
(or classified substantives) of the next science should
produce the next science; remembering always that
tem of truth on which those rules are founded. It must be remembered that man is by nature either a politic being or not a politic
being; and very important consequences follow in either case.
* In the previous table we viewed theology from the point of
view of man's accountability; but when that view has been taken,
theology must, of course, be erected into a genus by itself, and as
comprehending all the other sciences. In looking upwards from
man, the divine Judge is alone apparent; but in tracing the universe from God, the whole universe appears as his handiwork.
Both of these modes are legitimate, but each gives rise to a separate
series of considerations.
44




518                 APPENDIX.
each science introduces a new concept, a new nomenclature, and a new series of classified substantives,
which are made to function in the mind by the laws
of the previous science.
Thus, ontology gives the laws to logic, while logic
gives the laws to arithmetic, arithmetic to algebra, and
so on.
Abstraction gives the substantives to ontology, and
ontology gives the universal forms of rational thought,
(or of knowledge;) and these, applied to the classified
terms of logic, evolve the process of reasoning; and
the process of reasoning applied to classified numbers
gives arithmetic; and so forth. Thus:-.
Ontology.
Ontology, Logic.
Ontology, Logic, Arithmetic.
Ontology, Logic, Arithmetic, Algebra.
Ontology, Logic, Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry.
Ontology, Logic, Arithmetic,Algebra,Geometry, Statics.
This table would extend as far as the mechanics of
sound, light, and heat; and if electricity (or any
power by whatever name known) should come to be
viewed as the cause of magnetic, chemic, and electric
phenomena, the table would then extend to physiology, the last of the purely physical sciences, after
which intelligence appears.  A new region is then
entered on.
On analyzing a science into its general elements, a
correlation is observed to exist between the operations
of nature and the operations of the human reason.




THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.   519
Every function in nature is conceived under the conditions ofAn agent,    an object,    a phenomenon;
or concretely -
Force,        matter,        motion;
whereas the function, when transformed into language,
presents itself in the formA major,      a minor,       a consequent;
the syllogism in the reason being the representative of
the function in external nature. But as it is the rational apprehension of the function, and not the function itself, which constitutes science, every individual
science will present itself as ordinated on the plan of
major, minor, and consequent.  And as each science
may be viewed in its general or speculative truth and in
its practical application, each science may present itself
as a series of double syllogisms, where the consequent
of the speculative portion becomes the major premiss
of the practical portion.  The following scheme will
be sufficient to illustrate this point, taking one example
from the mathematical sciences, one from the physical
sciences, and one from  moral science. In a special
treatise the subject might be pursued to a much greater
length.
SPECULATIVE GEOMETRY.
Major.   The axioms.
Minor.        The specification of spaces, (definitions.)
Consequent.         The function of lines, &c.




520                       APPENDIX.
applied Geometry.
Major.    The function of fines, &c.
Minor.           The specification of concrete conditions.
Consequent.             Concrete determination of spaces.
In commerce again, this consequent becomes the major premiss
of a new syllogism, e. g.:Major.  Concrete determination of spaces, (so many acres of land.)
Minor.           Rate of value,          (so much per acre.)
Consequent.            Concrete determination of value.
This is the process that connects the very highest
and most ultimate abstractions with the most immediate and concrete matters of practical life. It is also
the process which constitutes the chain of proof in any
particular science, the proven conclusion being transformed into an admitted  major, for the purpose of
evolving a new consequent.
Speculative Mechanics.
Major.    General laws of force.
Minor.           Specification of particular forces.
Consequent.            Action of particular forces.
Real Mechanics, (Astronomy, for instance.)
Major.    Action of particular forces.
Minor.           Specification of the conditions of matter.
Consequent.            Action of matter.
Reading this last syllogism from the bottom upwards, it becomes an  inductive syllogism, the forces
being inferred from the actions of matter and the
conditions of matter. The consequent, again, might




THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.            521
become a major in another syllogism; for instance, in
the determination of a ship's latitude, e. g. --
Major.   Action of matter, (motions of the heavenly bodies.)
Minor.          Observed conditions, (sun's apparent altitude.)
Consequent.          Latitude of observer.
This syllogism, of course, involves numerous details
and special considerations.  Its consequent, again, becomes available in a new reasoning, either by itself, (as
in running down a port or island in the same latitude
-a common practice among elementary navigators,)
or combined with the determination of the longitude.
Thus, (the mariner knowing himself to be east or west
of his port,) -
Major.   Latitude of observer.
Minor.          Latitude of desired port.
Consequent.           Course to be steered.
So that a few general syllogisms, with their propositions properly filled with the specific details, lead from
celestial mechanics to practical navigation.
Speculative Politics.
Major.   The axioms or general laws of equity.
Minor.          Specification of particular actions.
Consequent.          Moral value of actions.
Politics applied as a Rule of iction.
Major.   Moral value of actions.
Minor.          Specification of the conditions of men.
Consequent.           Concrete actions that ought to result,
44*




522                      APPENDIX.
Politics realized in Legislation.
Major.      Concrete actions that ought to result.
Minor.          Concrete actions that do or may result.
Consequent.         Legal prohibition, restriction, &c.
In the foregoing table of the sciences, neither astronomy nor geology appears.  Astronomy is not in
itself a science, but a real illustration or example of
the science of mechanics.'
The qualitative forces of all real matter have to be
inferred, (and herein lies the method of induction;)
but when  inferred, the  substantives are viewed  as
functioning  under the influence of laws which  are
more general than any real or concrete manifestation
with which man is acquainted.
* When, however, knowledge is classified on its objective elements, (which exhibit the real operations,) the realm of nature may
be divided into its physiologies, and these are viewed as existing
in time and space. The division would then be into1. Astronomy, or the physiology of the siderial universe..2. Geology, (in its most extensive signification,) or the physiology
of the terrestrial world.
3. The vegetable world.
4. The animal world.
5. The human worlds
But, as astronomy and geology present certain concrete condiitons, concrete arrangements, and concrete functions, it seems more
simple to reserve the term science for a knowledge of the principles
according to which the functions are supposed to take place, and
according to which other concrete functions would have taken
place, had the conditions been other than they are. By this arrangement, the sciences would form the major premiss of a great
syllogism; the conditions of the various substantives of nature, the
minor premiss; and the history of real events or functions, the
consequent.




TIlE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.   523
Science is an attempt to make the conceived substantives of nature function in the human mind correlatively with their real functions; so that from the
observed conditions of to-day, the reason may predict
what the conditions of to-morrow will be- nature
performing the real operations, and reason performing
the rational computation. And if the rational operation be correct,-that is, coincident with the real
operation,-the sensations of to-morrow will confirm
the method, and authenticate the rational process of
the thought.
But if astronomy be viewed as only a stupendous
art, or real operation done, it follows, according to the
same mode of viewing, that the qualitative characteristics of matter revealed by chemistry must also be
assembled in a classification, and be viewed as functioning unmer the influence of a general power; and
if magnetism, chemistry, and electricity could be
absolutely identified,- on which, of course, we can
offer no opinion, having only to do with the method
of classification, -then chemistry would recede from
its position as a science, and take up its position as
the classification of the science of electricity.  But
these points must all, in the first place, be satisfactorily determined by the men of science, from whom
the logician receives the materials that require to be
schematized.
When the whole of the sciences are evolved, critical
philosophy becomes possible in its complete form,
being always possible so far as science has actually
extended, and no farther. Critical philosophy is the
final termination of man's intellectual labors on earth.




524                 APPENDIX.
It consists in the reflex consideration of the scheme
of science, and critically examines the mode in which
human intellect, constituted as it is, has been able to
evolve and develop the sciences. Critical philosophy
pronounces nothing on the truth or falsehood of the
sciences, but on their form, their order, their relations,
their classification, and their functions.  The whole
scheme of natural knowledge being completed, the
last inference that can be drawn from the consideration of the whole, is the prospective destiny of man;
and the scheme of natural knowledge will thus be
brought to the verge of that region where revelation
alone can speak authoritatively, and solve those questions which are insoluble by the unaided reason.




NOTES.                 525
NOTE A.-p p 140.
IN political economy, land, labor, money, &c., may
all be reckoned as raw material, out of which the ultimate value is produced. The agriculturist inquires
how corn is manufactured, but the economist inquires
how value is manufactured.
NOTE B. —p. 160.
While we hear so much of the horrors of the
French revolution, it is singular that we hear so little
of the horrors that caused it. The most infamous
injustice, systematically established by law, seems to
excite little or no indignation; while the popular reaction consequent on that injustice —although only a
consequence flowing from the laws of human nature
-is branded with every epithet that language can
supply. Surely, this is a most unphilosophical method
of studying history. The condition of France after
the revolution was incomparably better than its condition previous to that great outbreak; and though
the passage was a stormy one, (from the total absence
of religion among the people,) France gained as much
in thirty years as it would have taken centuries to
achieve had the sword not been appealed to. The
condition of the law in France before the revolution,
as contrasted with its present condition, is exhibited
in the following quotations: —




526                       APPENDIX.
" The ancient laws of France were a mixture of the civil, feudal,
and canon law. Partly they were the doctrines of the authorities
on the civil law, and partly they were the ordinances issued by the
various monarchs. By far the greatest portion, however, in bulk,
consisted of the peculiar feudal customs of the various provinces.
In these the feudal system  was sometimes retained in so high
a state of purity, that the collectors of provincial customs are
esteemed excellent authorities on the subject.  But it was not
merely in each province that there was a local custom. The
power of the crown, or any other paramount legislature, was so
feeble, that wherever an assembly of men were held together by
one common tie, as where they were co-vassals of one lord or
members of the same civic community, they had, in some measure,
a code of laws of their own. The royal codes, which existed on a
large scale, are estimated at about 300; but of the number of
inferior local customs it would be impossible to make an estimate.
Voltaire observes, that a man travelling through his country has to
change laws as often as he has to change horses, and that the most
learned barrister in one village will be a complete ignoramus a few
miles off. The seignorial courts were divided' into three grades,
according to the extent of the penal authority exercised by them.
The principal courts of law were the parliaments of the respective
provinces. Seats in them  were generally held by purchase, or
were in the hereditary succession of great families, who thus constituted a species of professional nobility. The decrees of these
bodies were often baffled or reversed by the royal authority, exercised in the well-known form of lettres de cachet. These alterations
of the decisions of the courts, however, were performed not as a
judicial revision, but by the simple authority of the king; and thus
the parliaments, being subject to no judicial control or responsibility, adhered but slightly to fixed rules of law, and often acted
according to their own will and discretion. The jury, even so
much of it as may have existed under the old feudal form, had
entirely disappeared, and proceedings were conducted in secret.
Criminal investigations, instead of terminating in a conclusive trial,
as in England, were protracted through a lingering succession of
written pleadings and secret investigations, from which the accused
could never calculate on being free. The torture was extensively




NOTES.                       527
employed, but in the general case only when there was as much
circumstantial evidence as would justify a conviction in this
country.
"The whole of this system was swept suddenly away before the
tide of the revolution."
PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW.
"To an unlearned person in this country it is a much easier
thing to know the law of France, on any particular point, than the
law he is living under. If an English lawyer is asked a question,
his answer involves references to commentaries, decisions, and
statutes innumerable; but, in the general case, the answer of a
French lawyer bears simple reference to such a paragraph of such
a code." - Chambers's Information for the People, No. 44, JNew
Series.
France, by  her revolution, achieved  two  of the
greatest reformations that could possibly have been
devised for the welfare of the country -two vast and
permanent social changes, which continue to diffuse
benefits of the best and most important character.
The first was the revision  and codification of her
laws; the second, the emancipation and re-distribution
of her soil. The change in the laws was a change
from  darkness to light-from  death to life-from
corruption and impurity to comparative spotlessness
and  impartiality.  In  this change the France  that
survived the revolution reaped a rich inheritance of
good —an  inheritance  which  no  mere  change  of
dynasty  could  permanently deprive her of; and  it
would have been well for England if she also had
framed a homogeneous system  of codified laws, with
provisions at once equitable and intelligible. It is, of
course, true that no mere code of laws can entail the




528                 APPENDIX.
good that depends on the moral and intellectual improvement of the population; but it is also true that
many disadvantages necessarily arise where the civil
arrangements of a community are regulated by an
indefinite multitude of statutes, and an antiquated
system of administration. In England, the improvement of the laws has been sacrificed to the interests
of the lawyers.