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HAMILTON CLUB OF CHICAGO
5?    ~SERIAL PUBLICATIONS. Jo. 13.'
SOME ASPECTS
OF THE
PHILIPPINE QUESTION
BY
PROFESSOR DEAN C. WORCESTER
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, AND MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION
AN ADDRESS DELIVERED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
CLUB, AT CENTRAL MUSIC HALL, CHICAGO,
NOVEMBER Iq, I899
ISSUED BY
THE LIBRARY AND PUBLICATION COMMITTEE
JANUARY, 19oo
COPYRIGHT 1900 BY DEAN C. WORCESTER
THE UNIVEH bi'i U Ai- uinlliAN4 LUtiARi'LS




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HAMILTON CLUB OF CHICAGO.
SERIAL PUBLICATIONS.
NUMBER 13.
SOME ASPECTS OF THE PHILIPPINE
QUESTION.
BY DEAN C.SWORCESTER.
Delivered under the auspices of the Club, November 15, 1899.
It would be presumptuous for any man to attempt a comprehensive discussion of the Philippine question within the limits of a
single address, and I shall not undertake anything so ambitious
to-night-but I am very glad to have this opportunity to address the
Hamilton Club and its friends on certain phases of the great problem
which to-day confronts us, and in which the American public takes so
keen an interest.
It is not, I think, too much to say that the issues which it raises,
directly and indirectly, are more important, more far-reaching in
their consequences, than any our nation has been called upon to
meet since its birth. In what sort of a spirit, then, are we to face
them?
There are those who are willing to make mere party politics out
of questions which involve the present well-being, no less than the
future destiny, of millions of their fellow creatures. Too mean and?mall to take a broad view of any subject, they are incapable of
ascribing to others motives higher than those by which they are
themselves actuated. To such as these I have nothing to say,
to-night or at any other time. I am glad to believe that they constitute the small minority of our citizens, and that the rest of us are
honestly striving to get at the truth. We realize that the Philippine question is in no sense a party question. If ever we were called
upon to face a problem of national and international importance it is
now, and that problem must be settled on its merits. A settlement
on any other basis can result only in national disaster.
Those of us who approach the Philippine question in this spirit
may differ honestly, and very widely, as to the ends which are
desirable, and the means best calculated to promote their attainment,
but we can always find common ground because, each in his own
way, we are seeking the same general results.
In our calmer moments, at least, we recognize the fact that there
is nothing to gain by calling each other hard names, or casting
reflections on each other's motives. In general, we admit that two
things are essential to the intelligent and sane discussion of any


7 'el 1111, S"', F7,41
1.1    &" -       "      I.
--     -I- _"     _/J  _L-_




issue. One is a knowledge of the facts involved; the other, the
disposition and ability to interpret those facts correctly.
In the present instance these two essentials are not altogether
easy of attainment. Our great distance from the Philippine archipelago, and the unreliable character of much that finds its way into
our local press concerning conditions there, make facts hard to
obtain, while differences of race, training, and temperament between
the Filipinos and ourselves make it difficult, if not impossible, for
many of us to put ourselves in their place. Those who reason that
under given circumstances these children of the tropics would feel
as we do, will sooner or later fall into grievous error.
While looking over newspaper comments on the preliminary
report submitted to the President of the United States by the Commission of which I have the honor to be a member, I noted with
interest a suggestion, evidently made in all sincerity, that if the Commissioners would only read the newspapers they would learn much
that was new to them about the situation in the Philippines.
Now I must admit that for many months I have been in a country where I could not readily avail myself of that wonderful institution, the great American daily; still I trust that my sojourn in the
Philippine Islands has not been altogether without its compensating advantages. I notice that a professor at your great university
here is reported to have said that the Commissioners might just as
well have written their report before visiting the archipelago. Now,
that professor is mistaken. He might have done so, but I, at least,
really could not, for I had much to learn, and not a little to unlearn;
and not being gifted with second-sight, I was driven to the necessity
of gaining a knowledge of conditions in the Philippines by observation, and of ascertaining the feelings and aspirations of the people by
daily conversations with them.
Since my return to America, however, I have acted on the suggestion of the editor above mentioned, and have read the newspapers.
The result has been, as predicted, that I have learned much that I
did not even suspect before, as to the events leading up to the war
in which we are at present engaged; much concerning the feelings
and aspirations of the Filipinos, which I can safely say would greatly
surprise the Filipinos themselves were it to be communicated to
them.
If we are compelled to admit the truth of all the accusations
brought by those who declaim against our so-called "crime in the
Philippines" we have indeed committed a great transgression against
the people of those Islands. With your permission I propose to take
up some of the alleged facts cited in support of these serious charges
and scrutinize them somewhat closely. I shall try to make my
examination wholly dispassionate. Nothing is further from my
intention or desire than to become involved in any controversy.
Should I fall into error, I shall be very glad to be set right, and I
assume that the authors of any statements which I may find it necessary to criticise will meet me in the same friendly spirit which I per

2




p


sonally feel toward all who take an honest interest in our great
Philippine problem.
The statements which I desire to discuss are so numerous, so disconnected, and in not a few cases so contradictory, that I find some
difficulty in putting them into logical order. In general, it would
seem that those who deal in them had experienced the same trouble.
There has recently been a noteworthy exception, however, in the
case of a gentleman who addressed an audience from the rostrum on
which I stand, and in taking up my points, it will be convenient for
me to roughly follow the order which he adopted, and in some
instances to quote his statements of propositions which I examine.
First, then.-It has been persistently stated that either before or
soon after his arrival at Manila, Aguinaldo was definitely promised
independence for his people by one American official or another, and
many who do not make this claim maintain that he was promised it by
implication, if not in so many words. Consul Pratt and Admiral
Dewey have often been named as the guilty men. What are the
facts?
There is nothing in the official report to show that Admiral
Dewey ever made any such promise, either directly or indirectly,
and whatever political tricksters may think, or say, concerning his
recent personal statement in regard to the matter, I know I am safe
in believing that the American people will accept it as final.
Aguinaldo ought to know as much about this matter as anyone, so
we will let him speak for himself.
On May 24, I898, in his first proclamation, he says:
"FILIPINOS:
"The great nation, North America, cradle of true liberty, and
friendly on that account to the liberty of our people, oppressed and
subjugated by the tyranny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here a protection* which is
decisive as well as disinterested toward us, considering us endowed
with sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy
land." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 431.)
It will be seen that the implication here as to the granting of
independence is of a very mild description, and there is nothing said
of promises.
On June ioth Aguinaldo addressed a letter to President McKinley, called forth by a statement in the London Times, that the United
States might sell the Philippine Islands to some European power
after taking them from the Spaniards. In this letter he says:
"I close by protesting once and a thousand times, in the name of
this people, which knows how to fight for its honor by means of its
improvised warriors and artillery men, against the statement published by the Times, mainly for the purpose of casting a blot in history
upon its glorious name; a people which trusts blindly in you not to
abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, biut to leave it free and independent, even if you make peace with Spain, and I offer fervent
prayers for the ever-increasing prosperity of your powerful nation,
* All italics are the speaker's.




to which and to you I shall show unbounded gratitude, and shall
repay with interest that great obligation."
If anyone had promised Aguinaldo independence it would have
been only natural for him to mention the fact in his letter to the
President. In his proclamation of June i8th he is much more
explicit as to his desires, saying:
"I have proclaimed in the face of the whole world that the aspiration of my whole life, the final object of all my efforts and strength,
is nothing else but your independence, for I am firmly convinced that
that constitutes your constant desire, and that independence signifies for us redemption from slavery and tyranny, regaining our
liberty and entrance into the concert of civilized nations." (Sen.
Doc. 62, p. 432.)
It will be noted, however, that there is no claim here as to
promises made. In a letter dated Bacoor, July 24th, and addressed
to General Anderson, he says:
"I came from Hong Kong to prevent my countrymen from
making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans,
pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not allow any internal
discord, because, being a judge of their desires, I had the strong
convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a government according to their desires.
"Thus it is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship,
and afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated
themselves from Spanish domination, I established a Revolutionary
Government. * * * It is true that my government has not been
acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the
great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now
actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon
it with greater benevolence than any other nation." (Sen. Doc. 62,
P. 394-)
Note well that five weeks after proclaiming independence to his
people, he makes no claim that it was promised him, but says that
he came from Hong Kong to prevent his people from aiding the Spaniards against us.
In a letter to Mr. Williams, the United States Consul at Manila,
under date of August Ist, Aguinaldo by implication flatly contradicts
his original statement in the following words:
"They assert, besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was
brought from Hong Kong to assure those [i. e., the American] forces
by my presence that the Filipinos would not make common cause
with the Spaniards, and that they had delivered to the Filipinos the
arms abandoned by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save
themselves much labor, fatigue, blood and treasure that a war with
Spain would cost. But I do not believe these unworthy suspicions."
(Sen. Doc. 62, 398.)
On August 6th he calls on foreign governments to recognize
"the belligerency of the revolution and the independence of the Phil

4




ippines" (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 438), but he says nothing about promises.
In a proclamation published as a supplement to "The Herald of
the Revolution," January 5, i899, four weeks before the outbreak of
hostilities, we notice a radical change in tone, and here, at last, he
makes a definite charge in the following words:
"In conclusion, I protest against such an unexpected act which
treats of American sovereignty in these Islands in the face of all the
antecedents which I have in my possession, referring to my relations
with the American authorities, which are unequivocal testimony that
the United States did not take me out of Hong Kong to make war
against Spain for their own benefit, but for the benefit of our liberty
and independence; TO WHICH END SAID AUTHORITIES VERBALLY PROMISED ME THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT AND EFFICACIOUS CO-OPERATION."
Why, it may well be asked, was this important statement so long
delayed, if true? Why did he not strengthen his position by declaring in his very first proclamation that the Americans had promised
their support and co-operation in the attempt to win independence?
Thus far I have confined myself strictly to the official record. I
wish now to add that members of Aguinaldo's own cabinet testified
before the Commission to the fact that even after his proclamation
of June i8th, he freely admitted that no American had ever promised
him independence.
In view of this admission, it is perhaps unnecessary to pursue the
question further; nevertheless, I shall do so. It has been often stated
that our Consul at Singapore, Mr. Spencer Pratt, exceeded his
authority and made the promise in question, if not directly, at least
indirectly. I am indebted to Admiral Dewey for the statement that
Mr. Pratt is ready to take oath to never having made any such promise. The following is his official statement in regard to the matter:
"I beg to repeat * * that I declined even to discuss with Gen.
Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with
regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any
kind, committed the Government in no way whatever, and, in the
course of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the
Government would co-operate with him (General Aguinaldo) for
the furtherance of any plan of his own, nor that, in accepting his said
co-operation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 358.)
I may add that legal proceedings, brought by Mr. Pratt against
John Foreman, for publishing this and other charges in his book
on the Philippine Islands, resulted successfully, Mr. Foreman being
compelled to remove the offending page and insert an apology. It
is only fair to suppose that had there been any proof of this statement
he would have brought it forward.
Now a word as to implied promises in general. It has been said
that our officials throughout the far East, by failing to immediately
inform Aguinaldo and his supporters that independence would not
be granted to them by the United States, as soon as they mentioned
their aspirations for it, and by seeking their aid in our war against
5




Spain, promised them by implication that their desires would be
granted, and it has been further maintained that they were left in this
delusion until after the fall of Manila, when we no longer had need
of their services.
It is, I believe, admitted, that the question of whether or not independence shall be granted to the Filipinos rests with the Congress
of the United States. How anyone could possibly have answered it
before the conclusion of the treaty of peace at Paris determined
whether or not we had any. status in the matter, does not annear;
much less is it evident how this could have been done before the fall
of Manila, or even before an American soldier had set foot on Luzon.
It is hardly to be wondered at, therefore, Shat our officials in the
far East did not avail themselves of the first opportunity to attempt
to settle finally a question which lay entirely beyond their jurisdiction!
But is it true that we let our unsuspecting allies go on without
a hint as to the uncertainty of their position?
On July 17th, Major Jones, acting under authority of General
Anderson, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:
"Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here
to expel the Spaniards, and to give a good government to the whole
people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight." (Sen.
Doc. 62, p. 391.)
"To give a good government to the whole people!" Is there any
implied promise of independence here?
On July 22nd General Anderson wrote further, as follows:
"I observe that your excellency has announced yourself as a
dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I
have no orders from my government on the subject; and so far as
I can ascertain your independent status has not been recognized by
any foreign power. * * * I cannot, without orders, recognize
your civil authority." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 394.)
Finally, on August 24th, General Merritt wrote:
"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event
of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain is
concerned, it is utterly impossible for me, as the military representative only of the United States, to make any promises such as you
request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon
the good will of Americans out here, and the Government of which
you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the
future."  (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 402.)
In view of the facts above cited, what must we think as to the
accuracy, not to say the disingenuousness, of the following statement?
"It was weeks after various proclamations and other public utterances of Aguinaldo to that effect, that the correspondence between
him and General Anderson that I have quoted, took place, and that
the useful services of the Filipinos as our practical allies were accepted. It is further an undisputed fact that during this period our
6




Government did not inform the Filipinos that their fond expectations
as to our recognition of their independence were mistaken. Our
Secretary of State did, indeed, on June i6th, write to Mr. Pratt, our
Consul-General at Singapore, that our Government knew the insurgents * * * merely as 'discontented and rebellious subjects of
Spain,' who if we occupied their country in consequence of war
would have to yield us due 'obedience,' and other officers of our government were instructed not to make any promises to the Filipinos
as to the future, but the Filipinos themselves were not so informed.
THEY WERE LEFT TO BELIEVE THAT WHILE FIGHTING IN CO-OPERATION
WITH THE AMERICAN FORCES, THEY WERE FIGHTING FOR THEIR OWN
INDEPENDENCE."
It is at least not too much to say that in quoting the correspondence between General Anderson and Aguinaldo, the author of this
statement overlooked several important passages.
Let us take up another contention which has been persistently
reiterated; namely, that when our forces arrived at Manila, the Filipinos were struggling to throw off the yoke of Spain. It is urged
that "the Filipinos, constituting the strongest and foremost tribe of
the population of the archipelago, had long been fighting for freedom
and independence."
The Tagalogs are of course referred to. Now the Visavans are
the equals, if not the superiors, of the Tagalogs, in advancement,
and exceed them in numbers as well as in extent of territory occupied,
while in the matter of strength, none of the numerous Philippine
peoples have been able in the past to hold their own unaided against
the Moros, and I doubt if any one of them could do it to-day. These
questions aside, however, were the Tagalogs really fighting the
Spaniards when Admiral Dewey arrived in Manila Bay, and if so,
for what, and with what chance of success? To answer this question
we must go back a little. From i872 to i896 peace reigned in the
Philippine Archipelago. In the latter year a bloody revolution broke
out, but it is a matter of simple history that this movement had for
its object the attainment of certain definite and specific reforms, the
nature of which was clearly and publicly set forth by the revolutionary
leaders, who had no thought or expectation of shaking off the sovereignty of Spain.
This revolution was brought to an end on December I4th, i897,
by the famous treaty of Biac-na-bato, the Spanish Governor-General,
Primo de Rivera, having promised certain of the reforms sought,
and having further undertaken to place at the disposal of one Pedro
Paterno, who served as a go-between, a large sum of money to be
distributed among the prominent insurgent officials, on condition
that they would surrender the arms of their troops, and would themselves leave the country. Of this transaction it has been said:
"The old slander that Aguinaldo had sold out the revolutionary
movement for a bribe of $400,000 has been so thoroughly exploded
by the best authorities, that it requires uncommon audacity to repeat it," and the doubter is referred for corroboration of this statement to Senate Document 62, page 421.
7




To Senate Document 62, let us accordingly go. On page 421 I
find the following:
"In August, I896, an insurrection broke out in Cavite and soon
spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued
* * until December, I897, when the Governor-General, Primo
de Rivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo, the substance of the document which is in possession of Sefior Felipe Agoncillo * * * * being attached hereto. In brief, it required that
Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders should leave the country,
the Government agreeing to pay them $8o0,000 in silver and promising to introduce numerous reforms. * * * Aguinaldo and his
associates went to Hong Kong and Singapore. A portion of the
money, $400,ooo (Mexican), was deposited in banks at Hong Kong,
and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs, named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the
very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a
division of the money among the insurgents according to rank.
Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to
remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would
carry out their promised reforms, and if they failed to do so, it was
to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit
was settled out of court by paying Artacho $5,ooo (Mexican)."
It cannot be denied that the position taken by Aguinaldo as to
the use of this fund was honorable if he was sincere in it, but even
among his own countrymen there have been those who doubted his
sincerity, saying that, having deposited the entire sum in his own
name, he resisted a division of it because he desired to use it for his
private ends. As a matter of fact it was used, in part at least, to
further the new revolutionary movement; but it should not be forgotten that this movement promptly resulted in a dictatorship for
Aguinaldo himself. Finally, it is not altogether evident that a man's
announcing his intention of putting certain cash to honest uses
"explodes" the theory that he was bought with it.
Now it happens that Senate Document 62 is not the only source
of information on this subject. Numerous witnesses, conversant with
the facts, testified before the Commission, and some new information was obtained. We inquired what became of the $400,000 (Mexican) which was not paid to Aguinaldo and his followers. It seems
that Primo de Rivera claims this amount was given to Pedro Paterno
with which to "pacify" the leaders who remained in Luzon. Paterno
insists that it was duly distributed, while the leaders in question
maintain that they never received a penny of it; and as one of our
Filipino witnesses remarked, "It has never been definitely ascertained
who forgot that he had this sum in his pocket."
Highly interesting, also, in this connection, is a letter from
Paterno himself, under date of February 23, I898. This letter was
addressed to a well-known Spanish official, and was read in a public
session of Congress at Madrid on June i6th, of the same year. It
begins:
"My Esteemed Friend: As it appears that at last one is thinking
8




of giving me something for the services rendered by me, and as,
according to you, the recompense is going to be a title of Castile, I
wish to speak frankly in secret on the subject."
Speaking further of his desires, he says:
"In the fourth place it must be valued in dollars, so that the
reward may not be held in contempt by the public, who know my
liberality when I pay with splendid generosity sea voyages, river and
land journeys, for myself and for my emissaries; or when I distribute
with abundant profusion pecuniary and material recompenses TO
BUY OVER THE WILLS OF, AND UNITE ALL THE INSURGENT CHIEFS TO
BRING THEM TO SURRENDER TO SPAIN. * * * To conclude, I
want a title of Castile, that of Prince or Duke, if possible, and to be
a Grandee of the first class, free of nobility patent fees, and the sum
of $...... once for all."
Paterno's innate modesty evidently prevents him from naming
the exact sum in the body of the letter, but under the letters "N. B."
at the end of it, he adds:
"Verbally, I mentioned one million of dollars, and that Parliament
should meet sometimes for the Philippines, and for extraordinary
reasons. Take note that out of the 25,000 men sent here by Spain on
account of the insurrection, statistics show 6,ooo struck off the effective list in the first six months, and many millions of dollars
expenses. THE LITTLE PRESENT, OR THE CHRISTMAS BOX, MY
AGUINALDO, IS OF NO MEAN WORTH.'
Evidently Paterno thought he had bought someone. Paterno
ought to know.
Now as to the co-operation alleged to have taken place between
the Filipino forces and our own. It is not to be denied that General
Anderson asked for such co-operation and that Aguinaldo promised
it, but it will be readily admitted that it is one thing to ask and
another to receive; one thing to promise and another to fulfill one's
promises. Did Aguinaldo live up to his agreement? There are those
who unhesitatingly reply to this question in the affirmative, saying
~    that, "his force did faithfully and effectively co-operate with ours,"
that he responded cordially to General Anderson's invitation and "an
extended correspondence followed, special services being asked for
by the party of the first part, being rendered by the party of the
second part, and duly acknowledged by the first." All of this went
'     on pleasantly until the capture of Manila, "in which Aguinaldo's forces
effectively co-operated." This is important if true, but is it true?
'l   Let us examine this correspondence and see. It is found in Senate
Document No. 62, and a comparison of the letters with Mr. Schurz''    shall we say condensation of them, illustrates admirably the way in
l,    which that valuable document is frequently used:
"July 6, I898.
"Sefior Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy,
"Commanding Philippine Forces.
"General:-I am encouraged by the friendly sentiments expressed
by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant,
~.




to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will
be advantageous to both.
"Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must
be apparent to you as a military officer, that we will require much
more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and
co-operation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this
country." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 39I.)
Apparently, however, there was some difficulty about co-operation, when it became necessary for Aguinaldo to do anything, for
under date of July I7th, we read:
"General Emilio Aguinaldo,
"Sir:-Gen. Anderson wishes me to say that the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Parafiaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and
shelter it, will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this
neighborhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this
we are willing to pay a fair price but no more. WE FIND SO FAR THAT
THE NATIVE POPULATION ARE NOT WILLING TO GIVE US THIS ASSISTANCE AS PROMPTLY AS REQUIRED. But we must have it, and, if it
becomes necessary, we will be compelled to send out parties to seize
what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we
are here to befriend the Filipinos." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 391.)
"At 3:30 p. m., July I7th, General Aguinaldo and secretary called
to say that two Americans, assuming to be officers, had called and
presented a letter as to which he requested a statement whether it
was authorized."  (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 392.)
General Anderson endorsed the letter as follows:
"The request herein made by Major Jones, chief quartermaster,
was made by my direction." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 392.)
It will be observed that things were fairly bristling with "smoothness" at this time.  On the following day Aguinaldo replied to
General Anderson, promising to furnish the assistance wanted.
Nevertheless, on July 23d we find the following from General Anderson to him:
"General:-When I came here three weeks ago I requested your
excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of
transportation for the American army, as it was to fight in the cause
of your people. So far we have received no response.
"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make
requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts.
"If you cannot secure these, I will have to pass you and make
requisition directly on the people.
"I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience."
(Sen. Doc. 62, p. 394.)
This peremptory communication had the desired effect. Aguinaldo replied with excuses and regrets, and furnished a part of the
assistance asked for. In a letter written July 24th, acknowledging
A.,nte:... ' *  *  *  @ *10




'      the receipt of his communication, General Anderson adds the following significant statement:
"The people to whom we applied even for the hiring of caramates,
etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except
by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 396.)
As to the relations between Aguinaldo and General Anderson
at this time, we further find the following over the name of General
F. V. Greene:
"The only general officer who saw him [Aguinaldo] or had any
communication with him was General Anderson. He did much to
thwart this officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise
providing for his troops, and he went so far in a letter of July 23d
as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent, a notice which it is hardly necessary to
say was ignored." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 423.)
Now every one of these statements appears in Senate Document
Number 62, but they seem to have been overlooked by the gentleman
who said, "all of this went on pleasantly until the capture of Manila."
This is not all.  Witnesses testified before the Commission that
Aguinaldo positively forbade his people to assist General Anderson,
and that on the occasion of the landing of our forces at Parafiaque
he seriously considered the advisability of attacking them. This idea
he eventually gave up, thinking it would be better to enter Manila
with our troops, and procure, if possible, the arms and ammunition
surrendered by the Spanish soldiers. It has further been said:
"Whether there was or not any form of compact or alliance signed
and sealed, no candid man who has studied the official documents will
deny that in point of fact the Filipinos having been desired and invited
to do so, were, before the capture of Manila, acting and were PRAcTICALLY RECOGNIZED as our allies, and that as such they did effective
service which we accepted and profited by. This is an indisputable
fact, proved by the record."
Let us therefore again go to the record. In his letter of August
ist, to Consul Williams, Aguinaldo said:
0 "Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with
the Filipino generals, and, uniting the forces, render the end more
decisive? * * It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots
the favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up
to the present, the American forces have not shown an active, only
a passive, co-operation, from which they suppose that the intention
of these forces is not for the best." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 398.)
As to co-operation in the attack on Manila, General Greene makes
I      the following statement:
*       "The day before the attack on Manila he [Aguinaldo] sent staff
officers to the same general, asking for our plans of attack, so that
their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had previously been made to me by one of his brigade commanders, to which
I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desired."
(Sen. Doc. 62, p. 423.)
I I




It would therefore appear that we were not accepting the "serv-  I
ices" offered at this time.
On the I3th of August Aguinaldo addressed the following communication to General Anderson:
"My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have
always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know
and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many
sacrifices made of money and lives, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT PRUDENT TO,ISSUE ORDERS TO THE CONTRARY, AS THEY MIGHT BE DISOBEYED
AGAINST MY AUTHORITY. * * Nevertheless, if it seems best to
you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding
and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards,
I will commission Don Filipe Buencamino and others, who will
to-day go out from our lines to hold a conference with you, and
[trust?] that they will be safe during the conference." (Sen. Doc.
62, p. 399.)
Not only does this communication badly shake the "co-operation" theory, but we see that on the very day the city fell Aguinaldo
admitted that he doubted his ability to control his own troops, and
indulged in a not very deeply veiled threat to attack us if we did not
allow his undisciplined followers to enter Manila.
Finally, I have Aguinaldo's own statement to submit as to this
whole matter. It occurs in a proclamation issued by him at Malolos, January 5, 1899:
"The Americans, seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino
people, disembarked forces at the town of Parafiaque and took up
positions all along the line occupied by my troops, as far as Maytubig, taking possession of many trenches constructed by my
own people by the employment of astuteness not unaccompanied by
violence. They forced a capitulation on the garrison of Manila,
which, inasmuch as it was invested by my troops, was compelled to
surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part,
although I was not notified."
Now, what part did the insurgents take? Some interesting facts
were testified to before the Commission. It is believed that our
troops were wounded and killed by fire from the insurgents during
the attack, and an officer was sent to warn the latter that they were
firing into our men. After the flag of truce had been displayed on
the battlements of the city, an insurgent force fired on Spanish soldiers who were standing exposed' on the walls, provoking a return
fire which killed one of our men and wounded three. It cannot be
denied that the insurgents had been promised the loot of Manila.
They attempted to enter the city and refused to retire when ordered
to do so. It became necessary to drive them back practically at  1
the bayonet point. So general was the idea that Manila would be
looted that men, women and children streamed toward the city all
day on August I3th, coming from the neighboring towns, with sacks
which they expected to fill with plunder.
Remembering that Aguinaldo himself doubted his ability to
restrain his troops before we entered Manila, and was apparently
12




unable to do so, how would it have been if they had once got
inside? As a matter of fact, they constituted a menace rather than
a help, and, as the official record states: "The world knows that the
attack [on Manila] was only delayed to protect the city and its
Spanish inhabitants from the dreaded vengeance of the insurgents."
(Sen. Doc. 62, p. I5I.)
Manila lay completely at the mercy of Dewey's guns. The
fighting of August I3th was perfunctory, and designed only to save
the honor of the Spanish troops. Land forces were needed only for
garrison duty.
After the fall of the city Aguinaldo modestly demanded the
Royal Palace for himself, and in addition the principal churches, a
share in the public funds, and, most important of all, the arms and
ammunition surrendered by the Spanish troops, of which he had long
planned to possess himself. It is needless to add that his requests
were refused.
I believe I have said enough to show that there was no true
co-operation between our land forces and the Filipinos. We fought
a common foe, each in his own way, and that was all.
After the fall of Manila the feeling between Americans and
insurgents grew rapidly worse. The latter were at first allowed to
occupy some of the suburbs of the city, but they committed intolerable abuses, and the police, being outnumbered, were unable to
restrain them. It therefore became necessary to order them back,
and this angered them still more. Meanwhile, the anti-American
feeling was steadily, although secretly, nourished by the insurgent
leaders. So-called "popular clubs" were organized among the
natives with the sole object of stirring up ill-feeling between the
opposing forces. From their membership was recruited, later, a
numerous local militia, which was to attack us from within when
the regular insurgent troops attacked from without. The Filipino
Congress passed a decree imposing military service on every male
citizen over eighteen years of age. Aguinaldo pigeon-holed a message which was sanctioned by Congress and his Cabinet, requesting
the President of the United States not to abandon the Philippine
Islands, but to establish a protectorate over them. He further
attempted to get the war-making power transferred from Congress
to himself, and urged a heavy bond issue to secure a million dollars
for the purchase of arms and ammunition.
At last came the day when he ordered his friends to leave Manila.
The feeling was general that an attack would soon follow. Meanwhile our soldiers were subjected to constant insults, and persistent
attempts were made to provoke them to fire. The patience which
they displayed under these trying circumstances was misunderstood. The Filipinos believed it to be due to cowardice and boasted
openly that when they attacked they would drive us into the sea
within three hours. As I shall show later, there is reason to believe
that Aguinaldo at this time received a cable message from his agents
at Washington, urging him to attack at once. At all events the signals for an attack were agreed upon.
'3




On the night of February 4th, at 8:45, occurred the incident
which gave the insurgents the excuse for which they had been waiting. An insurgent officer attempted to pass our guard at the San
Juan Bridge with a detail of men. He was driven back. A little
later a large body of insurgent troops made an advance on the
South Dakota outposts, which fell back rather than fire. At about
the same time an insurgent lieutenant with a detail of six men again
attempted to cross the San Juan bridge, where Private Grayson of
Company "D", First Nebraska Volunteers, was on guard. After
warning them three times to halt without effect, he fired, killing the
lieutenant, whose men returned the fire and retreated. Signal
rockets were promptly sent up by the Filipinos, and they soon
opened a vigorous general attack on our lines, which, as all the
world knows, was splendidly repulsed.
Now I ask you to compare this simple statement of well ascertained facts with the following account:
"One evening, early in February last, some Filipino soldiers
entered the American lines without, however, attacking anybody.
An American sentry fired, killing one of the Filipinos. Then a
desultory firing began at the outposts. It spread until it assumed
the proportions of an extensive engagement, in which a large number
of Filipinos were killed. It is a well-established fact that-this engagement could not have been a premeditated affair on the part of the
Filipinos, as many of their officers, including Aguinaldo's private
secretary, were at the time at the theaters and cafes of Manila."
As Aguinaldo had some ten thousand armed men inside Manila,
it would seem by no means certain that many of his officers would
not have remained there, even had they definitely planned an attack
for the night of February 4th, but I do not raise this question.
What I do say is, that the killing of a native soldier by one of our
men in the discharge of his duty afforded rno excuse for a general
conflict. It is idle to argue that the soldier was the aggressor.
The aggressors were the men who attempted to force the line he
had been ordered to hold. Only a sense of duty could have
prompted his action. One man seldom fires on seven, at short
range, for the amusement of the thing.
This was not the first time that a sentry had killed Filipinos,
and the incident would not have led to the result which followed
had the insurgents not been ready and anxious to attack.
The account of the outbreak of hostilities, given by the Commission, has been criticised on the ground that it does not agree in
all details with the account of General MacArthur. I have to say
in reply that if any one will take the pains to compare the official
accounts of General MacArthur, General Otis, and Admiral Dewey,
he will find that no one of them agrees in all of its details with either
of the others. This does not, however, prove that all of these gentlemen are liars. The account given by the Commission was based
on information obtained from eye witnesses, and I have no apology
to make for it. For purposes of comparison, however, I quote General Otis' account:
I4




"MANILA, February 5, I899.
"Insurgents in large force opened attack on our outer line at
8:45 last evening. Renewed attack several times during the night.
At 4 o'clock this morning entire line engaged. All attacks repulsed.
At daybreak advanced against insurgents, and had driven them
beyond the line they had formerly occupied."
It has been stated further that General Otis himself did not believe the insurgent commanders meditated an attack at this time.
This is true, for under date of February 7th he cabled as follows:
"Positive insurgent attack not ordered by insurgent government, which has shown inability to control army concentrated
around Manila."
This despatch is persistently quoted by a certain section of our
press, but for some mysterious reason there seems to be no inclination in that quarter to quote General Otis' later message, under date
of February 12th, which I submit for your consideration:
"Reported that insurgent representative at Washington telegraphed Aguinaldo to drive out Americans before arrival of reinforcements. The despatch received Hong Kong, and mailed to
Malolos, which decided on attack to be made about 7th instant.
Eagerness of the insurgent troops to engage precipitated battle."
This matter aside, the Commission is in possession of abundant
proof that the insurgent leaders had planned a general attack to be
made at a date not definitely fixed, but in the near future. Signals
by means of colored rockets had been agreed upon. Various Filipinos informed us that these signals were promptly shown after the
firing began on the night of February 4th, and Admiral Dewey himself saw them from the bay.
I am often asked the question, might not all this have been
avoided, even after the fall of Manila, if attempts had been made to
reach an understanding with the insurgents. I am glad to be able
to say to you that such attempts were made.
General Otis, who did not believe that the insurgent leaders were
really plotting trouble, had repeated friendly interviews with one
and another of them. Aguinaldo was invited to come to Manila
and visit him, and was promised that General Otis would return the
visit at Malolos, but he declined the invitation. On January 9th
General Otis addressed a long communication to him, in the hope
that this, together with a formal conference of Commissioners for
which he had provided, Would bring about an understanding. In
this communication he says:
"Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Philippine people and the
representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope
that our Commissioners, by thorough discussion, may be able to
dispel. I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and
yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The
Filipinos appear to think that we meditate an attack, WHILE I AM
UNDER THE STRICTEST ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
IS5




STATES TO AVOID A CONFLICT IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE. My troops,
witnessing the earnestness and the comparatively disturbed and
unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops, and many of the
citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension
of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Philippine people depend upon the friendly protection of
the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has
acknowledged before the world that all her claimed rights in this
country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification
by the Senate of the United States, and the action of its Congress
must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can
proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of
the people of the United States, expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait,
at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people, and
shall continue to labor with that end in view. THERE SHALL BE NO
CONFLICT OF FORCES IF I AM ABLE TO AVOID IT, AND STILL I SHALL
ENDEAVOR TO MAINTAIN A POSITION TO MEET ALL EMERGENCIES."
General Otis named three able officers as a Commission, specifying that they were "to meet a Committee appointed by General
Aguinaldo, to confer with regard to the situation of affairs, and to
arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aims and
desires of the Philippine people and the people of the United
States." Six sessions were held, the last occurring on the 29th of
January, only six days before the outbreak of hostilities. Our purposes and intentions were fully explained to the Filipino Commissioners, and, after all attempts to arrive at an understanding had
proved fruitless, they were handed a communication from General
Otis closing with the words: "I AM OBLIGED TO HOLD MANILA AND
ITS DEFENSES, BUT NO HOSTILE ACT WILL BE INAUGURATED BY THE
UNITED STATES TROOPS." The prime cause of the failure of these
final negotiations lay in the fact that the Filipino Commissioners
were unable to formulate any definite statement of their own desires.
They did say that they desired independence under United States
protection, but, in discussion, made it evident, first: that they did
not themselves know what they meant by these words; and second,
that they were not agreed among themselves even on the general
proposition.
It is charged that we did not conquer the Philippines, but
bought sovereignty over them from Spain, and that sovereignty has
been likened to "a soup made by boiling the shadow of the breastbone of a pigeon that had been starved to death." The objector
continues: "Now look at the circumstances under which that session
was made. Spain had lost the country except a few isolated and
helpless little garrisons, most of which were effectively blockaded by
the Filipinos. The American forces occupied Cavite and the harbor
and city of Manila, and nothing more. The bulk of the country
i6




was occupied and possessed by the people thereof, over whom Spain
had, in point of fact, ceased to exercise any authority, the Spanish
power having been driven out or destroyed by the Filipino insurrection."
The figure of speech is certainly very pretty, and the statements
which follow it are very plausible, but suppose we examine the facts.
Had the Filipinos really accomplished all this at the time indicated?
Did they ever at any subsequent time accomplish it? On August
30th General F. V. Greene gives the following account of the existing
state of affairs:
"It is a fact that the Visayas have taken no active part in the
present insurrection, nor in that of I896; that the Spanish Government is still in full control at Cebu and Iloilo and in the Visayas'
Islands, and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no effort to attack
them. The Visayas number nearly two million, or about as many
as the population of all the Tagalo provinces which Aguinaldo
claims to have captured. There is no evidence to show that they
will support his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that, on
account of racial prejudices and jealousies, and other causes, they
will oppose him."  (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 425.)
It would appear, then, that at this time the Filipino insurrection
had by no means "driven out or destroyed the Spanish power."
Now, as a matter of fact, what had it done? General Greene states,
under the same date as above:
"Such a force can hardly be called an army, and yet the service
which it has rendered should not be underestimated. Between two
thousand and three thousand Spanish native troops surrendered to
it during the months of June and July; it constantly annoyed and
harassed the Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up at night,
and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila early in
July so completely that all supplies were cut off and the inhabitants,
as well as the Spanish troops, were forced to live on horse and
buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs. It captured the waterworks of Manila, and cut off the water supply, and
if it had been in the dry season, would have inflicted great suffering
on the inhabitants for lack of water." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 420.)
What did Aguinaldo himself claim for his forces? We will let
him answer. In his proclamation to foreign governments, issued
August 6th, he made the following statement:
"The said revolution now rules in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Union, Infanta and
Zambales, and it holds beseiged the capital of Manila." (Sen. Doc.
62, p. 438.)
In other words, he claimed to control the Tagalog provinces and
practically nothing more.
Several weeks after the capitulation of Manila he sent a number
of small vessels to the Island of Panay carrying Tagalog soldiers,
who landed in the province of Antique. The Spanish troops met
and promptly defeated them. Other forces were sent, however, and
I7




by the middle of November they controlled practically the whole
island except Iloilo and its immediate vicinity.
On the 5th of September the Spanish Government applied to
Washington, through the French Ambassador, for permission to
reinforce its garrisons in the Central and Southern Islands, but this
permission was not granted.
On October 3ISt the American Peace Commissioners demanded
the cession of the Philippines, and on November 28th Spain acceded
to this demand. During the first week of December the Madrid
Government ordered General Rios to suspend hostilities in the
Visayan Islands and retire with his troops to Mindanao, pending arrangements for their return to Spain. This order was issued because
of the evident uselessness of shedding Spanish blood in the defense
of territory which was soon to pass from the hands of Spain forever.
Before Rios could leave Iloilo the insurgents attacked him. He
promptly administered a severe defeat to them, and then evacuated
the town, the insurgents at once taking possession. On the 23d
of December Spanish control came to an end in the Visayan Islands,
although it continued long afterward in Mindanao and the islands
of the Sulu archipelago. The Visayans themselves were in utter
discord. They broke up into rival factions, each of which wished to
set up a government of its own. It should be clearly borne in mind,
then, that the Spaniards retired from the Visayan Islands on account
of the action of the United States Commissioners at Paris, and not
because compelled to do so by natives of the Tagalog or any other
tribe.
Now let us look a little further. On the ist of May, i898,
Admiral Dewey sent the flower of the Spanish fleet in Philippine
waters to the bottom. There still remained fourteen gunboats in
the archipelago. One of these entered Manila Bay and was captured. The others prudently kept away. Had the Spanish fleet
been cruising through the waters of the group at will, would
Aguinaldo and his followers have attempted to return to the islands?
Had they succeeded in doing so could they have raised an army
within a few miles of Manila without molestation? Had they raised
such an army where would they have obtained rifles and ammunition for it? Would thev have had such an easy time with the garrisons in the interior had the soldiers held in Manila by the presence
of our blockading fleet been free to go to their rescue? Could they
have successfully invested the city by land had we not cut off all
aid by sea? If so, why did they not do it in the rebellion of i896?
Does any sane man believe that with the Spanish fleet afloat they
could have despatched armed expeditions to attack the Spanish garrison and the peaceable natives in other islands? Can it be believed
that Spain would have failed to reinforce her Philippine garrison
had she been allowed to do so? And who stood in the wvay?
In view of the facts cited I have no hesitation in saying that the
United States did infinitely more than Aguinaldo's army toward
driving out and destroying Spanish power in the Philippine Islands.
If our claim to sovereignty was shadowy, what shall we say as to
i8




the claim of a tribe representing less than one-sixth of the population of the archipelago and exercising jurisdiction over but a small
part of the total territory? When Spain ceded to us her sovereignty
in the Philippines she had already lost through us, directly or indirectly, practically all that she no longer possessed herself.
It is said that the so-called peace treaty was no peace treaty at
all, but was "an open and brutal declaration of war against our
allies, the Filipinos, who struggled for freedom and independence
from foreign rule." It is said, further, that this treaty was made
behind doors "which were tightly closed to the people of the Philippines." Neither statement is true. The doors at Paris were not
closed to the people of the Philippines, and at least one well-known
Filipino appeared before the American Commissioners and strongly
urged them to insist on the cession of the islands. Leading Filipinos at Malolos eventually became alarmed lest the United States
should abandon them, and it was decided that a message should be
sent to President McKinley asking him "what desires he had about
the country, and what form of government he wished to establish,"
at the same time urging him not to abandon the Filipinos, but to
establish a protectorate over them. Definite action was secured,
authorizing the sending of such a message but Aguinaldo personally
prevented it.
The Filipinos were united in their desire that we should expel
Spain and the majority of them were anxious that we should not
even then abandon them. It is difficult to see how under these circumstances a treaty which provided for cession of sovereignty to
the United States, and left the future relationship between the Filipinos and the American Government to be determined constituted
"a declaration of war."
The President's order of December 2ISt, providing for the extension of military rule throughout the archipelago, has been similarly
characterized. The critics are not wholly consistent; they first
blame the Government for not informing the Filipinos that they will
not be granted immediate independence; then, when such an
announcement is made, they call it a brutal declaration of war.
Let us examine for a moment the circumstances under which this
order was issued. Spain's withdrawal of her troops from the
Visayan Islands placed us in a most embarrassing position. Chaos
followed the event. The Tagalogs in Panay were sufficiently
numerous to dominate the Visayans who populate that island,
yet they set up a new "republic" with a president of its own. The
foreign residents of Iloilo, the principal city of the island, asked for
American troops. The people of Negros wisely kept out Tagalog
adventurers, and established a government of their own, almost
immediately sending word that they wished to accept American
sovereignty. Cebu was less fortunate. Tagalogs landed there in
considerable numbers, and after enlisting the services of the lawless
element in the island, attempted to compel the peaceable natives
to join them, killing many of those who refused. A small Tagalog
force entered the islands of Samar and Leyte, oppressing and malI9




treating their Visayan inhabitants. It must have been evident to
anyone in the least familiar with conditions in the Philippines that
such results would inevitably follow the withdrawal of the Spanish
troops. The only possible way of preventing bloody disorder, ending eventually in utter anarchy, was to extend our military government to the ceded territory. Yet because the President issued an
order providing for this step he is accused of having declared war
against the Filipinos. Many of the peaceable Visayans certainly
did not look upon the matter in this light. On the contrary, I have
repeatedly heard our administration bitterly criticised by leading
men from the Central Islands because this order was not put into
immediate effect. Could this have been done it would have saved
great loss of property, and, what is far more important, untold suffering. To have unnecessarily delayed action, under the circumstances, would have been little short of criminal, and my only regret
is that circumstances prevented the immediate execution of a plan
which was demanded by the existing conditions-and would have been
beneficent in its results.
Much has been said and written in praise of Aguinaldo's government. As a matter of fact, what sort of a government did he
set up?  Its general features are well known. At its head was a
self-established dictator. He was aided by a congress composed of
members nominally elected, but really, with few exceptions, named
by himself. The vice-president of this congress informed me that
it was composed exclusively of Tagalogs and that Aguinaldo could,
and did, remove those who displeased him. It included among its
members many men of marked ability, who had accepted office in
the hope of bringing about conservative action, and with the promise
that nothing should be done to antagonize the Americans. They
promptly resigned when they saw that the task they had undertaken
was a hopeless one. Aguinaldo's first cabinet included several
very able Filipinos, who had joined it under similar conditions and
who left it for the same cause.
Whatever may be said of its ability, the Malolos congress was
never, in any sense of the word, representative of anything but the
Tagalog tribe. Its strongest members deserted Aguinaldo and
came over to us when he decided on war.
The Central government aside, what did the Tagalogs accomplish in an administrative way, in their own provinces, and what in
those they succeeded in dominating? In this connection it has
been said:
".The ghastliest argument of all in the defense of the President's
course is that he had to extend American sovereignty over the whole
archipelago, even before the ratification of the treaty, and that he
was, and is now, obliged to shoot down the Filipinos to the end of
restoring order and preventing anarchy on the islands."
The author of the above statement adds:
"I challenge the Imperialists to show me any instance of bloody
disturbances or other savagery among themselves sufficient to cre

20




ate any necessity of our, armed interference to restore order, or to
save them from anarchy."
Now, while I do not desire to lay claim to the title "Imperialist,"
I will accept that challenge.
At the time I left Manila, the province of Batangas was overrun
with thieves and murderers. No attempt was being made to enforce
law and order. The public schools were abandoned. Forced contributions had been wrung from the people at the bayonet point
until many of them were ruined. Unwilling contributors had been
punished by having their hands hacked off, and even by being buried
alive. The individual houses in such important towns as Tail were
intrenched in order that the inhabitants might defend themselves
against their very neighbors. The military governor of the province,
although a Tagalog and an insurgent, had characterized the condition existing as "complete anarchy," and had repeatedly sent in
secret to Manila asking for aid to restore order, and promising to
surrender with his troops if we would only dispatch a small force and
make a show of attacking him.
It cannot be claimed that conditions in Batangas were due to outside interference. Except for a couple of prisoners no American
soldier had ever set foot there and the people had enjoyed a full
measure of "independence" for more than a year. In Cavite province, just south of Manila, the insurgent troops had robbed the
inhabitants of the principal towns, and had committed very numerous assaults on women. One of their generals had established a
regular seraglio and had flatly refused to obey the orders of his superior officer. The natives of the province were calling the insurgent
troops by the name commonly applied to the mythical being popularly supposed to breed the cholera. Men were constantly coming
in from the important towns begging us to advance our lines, drive
out the insurgents, and give them protection.
I have chosen these two provinces because I personally received
almost daily reports of conditions there and know whereof I speak.
They were by no means exceptional.
In southern Luzon the Bicols had risen against the Tagalogs at
several points and were asking us for help. The Tagalog general,
Lucban, had extorted some $200,000 from the inhabitants of Samar
and Leyte and had put it in his pocket. The people of Bohol were
calling for aid. The Moros and the insurgents had fallen to fighting
each other in Mindanao where we had not landed a man. Tomas
Aguinaldo, an insurgent official, and a cousin of the dictator, had
gone to Manburao on the west coast of Mindoro and had there
organized a genuine piratical expedition with the avowed object of
plundering the peaceable inhabitants of the Calamianes Islands,
Palawan, Masbate, Sibuyan and Romblon. This plan had been
carried out and he had returned to Manburao heavily laden with
plunder, thereby so disgusting Angel Fabie, the insurgent captain
of the port at that place, that he had voluntarily come to Manila,
given himself up, and begun to work heartily for the American
cause. From all sides came accounts of the intolerable abuses prac21




ticed by the insurgent troops, and by bands of robbers made up of
deserting soldiers, who had escaped with their arms, and who
promptly began to rob and kill their own people. I could go on
indefinitely with illustrations but I believe that those given will
suffice. The simple fact of the case is that the insurgent government had signally failed to maintain law and order, punish
crime, provide for public education or perform any of the essential
functions of good government, if we except the collection of taxes,
in which it had displayed an ability unequaled even under the Spanish
regime.
Now a fexw words as to the feeling of the people toward Americans. Mr. Schurz tells us that "we have managed to turn virtually
the whole population, who at first greeted us with childlike trust, as
their beloved deliverers, into deadly enemies, for it is a notorious
fact that those whom we regard as 'amigos' to-day will to-morrow
stand in the ranks of our foes. We have not a true friend left
among the Islanders, unless it is some speculators and the Sultan of
Sulu," and that "it is useless to say that the subjugated Philippine
Islanders will become our friends if we give them good government.
However good that government may be, it will to them be foreign
rule, and foreign rule especially hateful when begun by broken faith,
cemented by streams of innocent blood, and erected upon the ruins
of devastated homes. The American is, and will remain to them,
more a foreigner, an unsympathetic foreigner, than the Spaniard ever
was."
If these statements are true, then I know absolutely nothing of
the conditions which exist in the Philippine Islands. I denounce
them as utterly false. We have many a good and true friend to-day
among the leading Filipinos of Manila. Even in the provinces
which have been laid waste by war the better element, which has all
along been secretly in sympathy with us, is coming out and declaring openly for us. The people in our newly organized towns never
wearied of talking to me about the wonderful difference between the
Spaniards and the Americans. We are more popular in the great
island of Negros to-day than the Spaniards ever were, and we have
done in the Sulu Islands what the Spaniards failed to do in more
than three centuries. Wherever our troops have remained for a
time in contact with the natives, public sentiment has gradually but
steadily changed. When we first marched through the province of
Bulacan the inhabitants burned their houses and fled before our
advancing columns. To-day those same natives have rebuilt their
homes, have planted their fields, and are living quietly and contentedly under the protection of our troops, in the enjoyment of a larger
measure of local self-government than they ever had before.
Be it remembered that we have accomplished all this in the face
of almost insurmountable obstacles. The Spanish authorities, both
civil and religious, poisoned the minds of the natives with venomous
tales concerning us before our arrival. The Spanish prisoners of
war worked against us with might and main as long as they remained
in the country. The insurgent press has never ceased to publish
22




incredible lies about us. We have been hampered by the difference
in language, and finally, we have been compelled to fight with one
hand and organize and protect with the other.
When I look back over the past nine months, I wonder that we
have made so much progress in gaining the good will of the people.
How have we done it? By treating our prisoners most humanely;
by tenderly caring for the insurgent wounded; by granting protection to the wives and children of those who were fighting against
us; by dealing out even-handed justice to those who were wronged.
The Filipinos never saw the like before, and it has touched their
hearts. In a hundred ways they show that they have begun to
trust us. I say to you that if we give them good government the
day will soon come when they will fight to the death for us. Nay,
more, I say to you that native volunteers are fighting to the death
for us to-day against their Tagalog foes.
But, the objectors say, if only a small fraction of the Philippine
population is in arms against us, and if the large majority of the
people are ready to accept American sovereignty, why is it that we
are compelled to send a great army to the islands? I answer first,
because we are waging the most humane war in history. If it were
simply a matter of killing, we should not need so large an army.
Two regiments of troops could go where they choose in the island
of Luzon to-day and kill to their heart's content without serious risk.
It is because we are attempting to protect the peaceable inhabitants
from the depredations of the lawless that we require so large a force.
With the evil element once in the ascendant among ten millions of
people, the task of restoring order and affording protection to the
law-abiding and the peaceable is far from small. There are whole
provinces, yes, whole islands, ready to declare for us, as soon as we
can send troops to defend their inhabitants against the Tagalogs and
against their own lawless citizens.
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the persistent activity of those Americans who have favored the insurgent cause has
given hope to our enemies and caused alarm to our Filipino friends,
who know full well that were our troops to be withdrawn their
tenure of life would be more than uncertain. The mere fact that a
heavy force is being sent to the Philippines will give courage to
those who are friendly to us and will show our enemies that we mean
business. It will go far toward ending the war.
Finally, a word as to the way out. Is it conceivable that we
should withdraw our troops, abandoning our friends to the certain
vengeance of our enemy and the people at large to civil war and
utter anarchy? There can be but one answer to this question. For
the present our soldiers must stay. Little by little native troops can
be substituted for them.
And what as to the future government of the archipelago?
Should the Filipinos be given a free hand from the start? Most certainly not. \Tery few of them really want it, and in any event the
result of such experiments in government as have already been made
is conclusive. They cannot yet walk alone. Shall we, then, leave
23




them to crawl? The academician may say "Yes," but the practical
man will answer with an emphatic "No!"
How far can they be intrusted with the affairs of government?
The only safe basis for a reply to this question is experience. Probably few people know how much has already been done toward solving the problem by actual experiment. The municipal and provincial governments which have been, and are being, set up will in due
time furnish a safe foundation for congressional action. For the
rest, I believe that the American people can be depended on to see
that the Filipinos are allowed to share in their own government so
fast and so far as they shall show themselves able and fit to do so.
It is certain that we shall never make enemies by giving more, but we
shall inevitably do so if we take away what we have once given.
We should, therefore, begin carefully, increasing the rights and
privileges of our wards as rapidly as safety will permit.
I have purposely refrained from saying anything as to the
importance of the Philippines from a commercial standpoint. The
opponents of our present policy seem peculiarly sensitive in regard
to this matter. They feel themselves free to insist that the islands
are nearly or quite worthless; that all commercial advantages which
would result from their retention can be obtained in other ways, and
that white men can not live there anyhow; and if one attempts to
discuss these statements he is at once called a mercenary brute.
Now I believe that in considering any important question full
consideration should be given to every argument for and against it,
but I have too much consideration for my audience to begin the discussion of the present and prospective wealth of the Philippines at
this late hour, and in any event I do not think it necessary to base
an argument for their retention on such grounds.
I believe that the war we are waging to deliver the Filipino people
from their Tagalog masters is just as truly a war in the interests of
humanity as was-the one which drove the Spaniards out of Cuba,
but our work will only have begun when it is over. If we are to succeed in the task which we have undertaken, we must exercise the
greatest care in the selection of our administrative officials. There
will be much for them to learn, and those who show willingness and
ability to learn it, and who demonstrate their worth, should be kept
in office during good behavior. In short, we must adopt the same
sound principles that would guide the sensible manager of any great
business enterprise in the selection, the retention, and the promotion of his employees.
In closing, let me say that there does not live an "Anti-imperialist" who has a more sincere regard for the people of the Philippine
Islands, or a keener interest in their welfare, than myself. I believe
that under our guidance they will make rapid progress in civilize
tion, and will eventually be able to take an important share in the
government of their country, but I know that if the full weight of
that burden were thrown upon them to-day they would inevitably
sink under it.
Those who affect to believe that we are creating bloody disorder
24




by our presence in the Philippine Islands; that the natives would continue to hate us, even if we gave them good government; that they
would be better off under a very bad government entirely their own
than under a very good one administered in part by others, and
that the only logical and honorable course open to us is to withdraw
our forces, and leave the peaceable and law-abiding natives at the
mercy of Emilio Aguinaldo and his army, may be sincere in their
convictions, but by freely giving voice to them they are encouraging
the ambitious Tagalog leader to prolong a struggle which, even if
successful, would only bring years full of trouble and disorder to his
people. The prolongation of this struggle is costing us millions of
dollars, and what is far worse, good, red, American blood. History
will fix the responsibility for it.
Those of us who believe that the flag should stay in the East, and
that under its shadow we should patiently teach to our new wards the
lessons they must learn ere they can hope to take their place in the
great family of nations a free and united people, should let the world
know where we stand, and we should stand shoulder to shoulder.
Let those scoff who will. There is work for us to do. The future
of ten millions of human beings, no less than the honor of a great
nation, are in our keeping. The eyes of the world are upon us.
" Take up the White Man's burdenYe dare not stoop to lessNor call too loud on freedom
To cloke your weariness.
By all ye will or whisper,
By all ye leave or do,
The silent sullen peoples
Shall weigh your God and you.
" Take up the White Man's burden!
Have done with childish daysThe lightly-proffered laurel,
The easy ungrudged praise:
Comes now, to search your manhood
Through all the thankless years,
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers."


25




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