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RECEIVED BY DTIE AUG 29 1967 CONH-6.7/10 2-3.
MASTER
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,"Safety Review Procedures for Hot Cell
Radiochemical Processing Facilities at ORNL"*
CESTI PRICES
by
1.C.103.00MN_65
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anagement documents in the son milion
:.
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W. D. Burch
T. A. Arehart
recomaneno mention to determined that it means in M
c
de camiones relation time and garmin was born to the maintenance wwwcom.mi
eine neden ominai ir montant
This paper is to be submitted for the
Winter ANS Meeting, Remote Systems Technology
Division. A round table discussion, based on a
group of papers with the same general subject
from 6 or 8 laboratories around the country, will
constitute one session at the meeting.
consider is cominchin den
themes and the
bietender in die marine
TEGAL NOTICE
The report was prepared as an account of Goverament sponsored work. Neither the United
States, por the Commission, nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission:
A. Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, with respect to the accu-
racy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in thio report, or that the use
of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this roport may not infringe
privately owned rights; or
B. Assumos any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the
non hadermation, oppurtu, method, or proceto disclosed the sport,
Au tend to the above, "person acties om beral of the Couniustom" taluded my
ploys or contractor of the Commission, or employbe of each contractor, to the extent that
auch employs or contractor of the Commission, or etaployee of mucha contrroter preparo,
dovoninatos, or prorides access to, ar taformation parmant to do employment of contract
wa the Commission, or Wu employant with enot contractor.
'n
Research sponsored by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission under
contract with the Union Carbide Corporation.
mination in
DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENI LS UNLIMLIED
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PTNT 1 TH
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THCS
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, "Safety Review Procedures for Hot Cell and
Radiochemical Processing facilities at ORNL"
T
W. D. Burch
T. A. Arenart
he wi
.
Oak Ridge Natioral Laboratory
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Abstract
Responsibility for radiation safety of all hot cell and radio-
chemical processing facilities at ORNL is under the Director of
Radiation Safety and Control, who has established uniform policies
:
throughout the laburatory. Working with a full-time staff of three
and with the help of standing review and advisory committees,
adequate safety practices have been maintained such that no inci-
dents of any consequence have occurred within the past seven years
since the regulations were implemented.
This paper describes the
organization and some of the established standards.
.
Introduction
At Oak Ridge National Laboratory there are now about fifteen
e are now
en
major hot cell and/or chemical processing facilities engaged in many
ce
varied programs.
In recent years a system of uniform standards has been
established to ensure that these facilities are constructed to adequate
standards and are operated in a manner to minimize the possibilities
.
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2
of radiation incidents.
These regulations apply from the first
conceptual design of a new facility on througli delailed design,
construction, operation, and any subsequent changes in the general
scope of the facility.
These present procedures were established
after a complete review of several radiation incidents cight year:
ago. One of the key concepts in these regulations is that any
accident must be contained within the confines of the facility
involved.
This is very essential at ORNL because of the concentra-
tion of facilities within a limited geographical arca.
This paper describes the essential elements in the radiation
safety program at ORNL which include:
(1) An organization for coping with radiation problems with
specific responsibilities assigned to various laboratory
groups.
(2) Specific standards for maintaining each facility in a
safe condition.
(3) Adequate procedures for safe operation.
(4) Adequate personnel training.
(5)
A system for the review and analysis of minor incidents.
(6) A plan for handling major emergencies.
Organization
All responsibility for radiation safety is placed under the
Director of Safety and Radiation Control 2) who is on the top
ma
management level at the Laboratory. ile is assisted loy it still of
three senior employees who work full-time will ilee: problem!:: Ol
radiation Sirfety.
In fig. I are shown the rou;'s involved in
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2:
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Laboraćory Director
n.o...
i'r'.
mio
Director of Safety
and Radiation Control
(Staff of 3)
win
ain't
Division Directors
him. Lai
her
Hot Cell, Radiochemical Pro-
cessing Plants & Criticality
Review Committees
Radiation Control
Officers .
with
.
det
tiin ihtigt
Applied Health Physics Group
Operating
Facility
orimo otvori
| Advisory Committees
..
TE:
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Fig. 1

radiation salily and the general relationship between blesse groups.
1
Three review committees are charged with the task of determining
that facilities can be operated safely, that the provisions for
ca
containmenį are adequate, that operating procedures are in order,
and that the general requirements of the Laboratory are incl. The
two primary review committees are the Hot Cell and the Radiochemical
Processing Plants Committees. Depending on the activities in a
facility, one of these committees will be assigned by the Director
of Safety and Radiation Control to review that facility.
In addition,
the Criticality Review Committee will independently review any
criticality problems. These committees normally review a new
facility in at least two stages, first, when the conceptual desiyn
is well organized, and secondly, when construction is complete, but
prior to operation.
These review committees report their findings
directly to the Laboratory Director, who, in turn, through the
Director of Safety and Radiation Control and his staff implements
actions recommended by the committee.
Major responsibilities are still placed, of course, on the par-
ticular research division which operates a facility. Within each
division a Radiation Control Officer has been appointed with major
responsibility for radiation, as well as other safety practices
within the division. The Radiation Control Officers riport dually,
first, the their division director and also ts the Director of Safety
and Radiation Control. They meet frequently with the Director of
Safety and Riadiation Control and his staff to review specific laboris-
tory problems, thus keeping a continual flow of in! 08192 iull within
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all the divisions concerning the radiation problems of the Liborilory.
The Radiation Control Officer must keep abreast of all activities
within his division. Hinor policy changes are reviewed and approved
by the Radiation Control (fficer, or he may decide that a particular
matter should be reviewed by Safety and Radiation Control.
If the
changes are major a full review before the review commictee may also
be carried out. It is the responsibility of the divisions to either
stay within the context of previous reviews or request follow-up
reviews by Safety and Radiation Control.
The Health Physics organization at ORNL has a dual function of
research and applied activities. The Applied Health Physics group,
with responsibilities for routine surveillance, personnel monitoring,
etc., report to Laboratory management through the Director of Safety
mar
and Radiation Control. Members of this organization are assigned to
the facilities to work as a part of the group and are responsible for
the day-to-day health physics practices within the facility.
In addition to the review committees, several advisory committees
exist as a support to the staff functions of the Director of Safety
and Radiation Control. As one example, these committees recomend the
number and type of personnel monitoring instruments, both fixed und
portable, to be used in a particular facility. The Laboratory has a
completely standardized list of personnel monitoring instruments used,
where required, by all groups.
The above groups working in close cooperation with the various
Laboratory Divisions assure a sound radiation Safety program without
imposing unnecessary restrictions which would compromise the firborilory':;
prizry mission or research and development.
Preoperational Reviews
S
In recognition of the importance of safe facilities for the
handling and processing of liazardous radioactive or fissile materials,
the Laboratory's radiation safety policy requires that all nuclear or
230
radiochemical operations involving 1 gram or more of 239Pu, or material.
of equivalent hazard, be formally reviewed by the appropriate Labora-
tory Director's review committee.Reviews of operations with less
activity may be made at the discretion of the Director of Safety and
Radiation Control.
Reviews progress in three stages. At the conceptual design stage
the designer and operator of a proposed facility are aided by a
criteria review group composed of a member from Safety and Radiation
Control and an Applied Health Physics member in the formulation of
preliminary design criteria based on materials to be handled and the
operational concepts. When the design criteria and operational pro-
cedures are firmed, normally at the Title I design stage, the operating;
division requests a preliminary review by the appropriate Laboratory
Director's review committee to determine if all of the Laboratory's
requirements are met. Finally, a formal preoperational review is
conducted after construction is completed but prior to operation.
Before this review a safety analysis of the facility, operating
procedures, and emergency plans are submitted to the review conmittec.
Based on these documents, formal discussions with the designer
and operator, and tour of the facility, the review committee makes
formal recomnendations regarding the operation of the facility to the
Liborilory liririlor, will copies: 1o ill cognizant poczciple. Approval].
ilmal : l'oppo non rretillics ille 19:!il! on Ur. liseli niso:
lloc nomi II 1.si.
102 cddition to the Laboratory's review, just recently ORO-ARC
working; Lirouge tile ottice of Silfety and Radiation Contril began con-
Jucting independent operational reviews. Their findings and
recommendations are transmitted formally to the Laboratory Director.
feriodic Operitional Checks
In general, it is ORNL policy to review the radiation safety
wil..
jer izcilities once per verir.
Normally, this review is ciung
Diformully by embers of tire stail of Safety and Radiation Control.
The purpose of this review is to delermine that the procedures and
policies estalilished in the past were still being followed explicitly,
Were
irid child 170 180k safety problems have been introduced into the opera-
ting
cility.
Daar tied a significantly news process is to be
installed, or
charide is operating procedures is planned, a complete
revien
y crie appropriate committee would be made. The staff members
o Sately wid Kädiücion Control wouli decide when such a review is
in orier.
USNE. Baciation Safety Standards
vitrious i t ing to be ::11 .crusive, te jey saiety standards
establistiei di che lavoratory te desobei here. The springent
0)
USL ridiniti s
orpolistruires hat all onerations Marcin
'
misatile
sens
se hai Surrounded in two times
tid..
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PIRTIS: design intiin tieu
crijiri: sotsi
second to prevent significant inclivity relcasc !o the environment.
Secondary containment may be a hermetically sealed shell around
the primary container; it may be an outer building shell or controlled
enclosed areas of a specified Jeak-liitoss around a hio1 cell or it
complex system of air locks, alarms, exhausts, filters, scrubbers,
and other devices which by the maintenance of negative pressure and
the retention of hazardous materials permits no significant release
through the waste effluent systems. The gaseous and liquid effluent
systems themselves may be accepted as a whole or a part of secondary
containment.
In some cases administrative corcrols may be substituted
in lieu of the second line of defense, but secondary containment
usually involves building construction and the devices mentioned
above.
The following criteria are used at ORNL in the design of radio-
chemical plants, hot cells, laboratories, and the buildings containing
them:
1. Hot Cells
(a) Vacuum equal to, or greater than, one inch* water must
be maintained at all times. This minimum cell vacuum
S
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1m
vacuull
is established to assure a positive flow of air from
secondary containment into the cell.
(b)
The cell exhaust capacity must be at least 0..1.* cell
volume per minute. This rate minimizes explosion
hazards due to volatile solvents and also assures that,
in the event of cell pressurization clue to an explosion,
the cell will be returned to the negative 1 inch of
water in a short time.
(c) Permissible leak rate is 0.01* cell volume per minute at
2 in. water sp. This specification assures that contami-
nation escape from the cell is minimized in the event of
cell pressurization.
(d)
Seals must withstand 10 in. of water pressure to assure
integrity of all cell closures and penetrations.
(e)
The cell must withstand the pressure produced by the
maximum credible accident.
es
Glove Boxes
(a) Vacuum must be equal to or greater than 0.3 in. water.
cuum
Water
(b) Exhaust rate is not specified, but must be adequate
for heat load and dilution requirements.
(c) Capacity of the exhaust system must be sufficient to
provide 5 cfm for each glove box and maintain a face
velocity of 100 fpm through one open glove port on
every five glove boxes.
The latter is based on the
assumption that ruptured gloves can occur in glove
box facilities.
3. Containment Building
(a) The building is designed to prevent the dispersal of
ev
activity to the environment in the event or an iceicent.
(b) Under emergency conditions the building must be main-
tained at a vacuum of 0.3 in. of water or greater. for
siriplicity some buildings are held at this pressure
*These viilues may be relaxed based on the requirements of the
operating conditions and maxinuir credible accident.
continuously. Where this is not the case, the venti-
lation system must be capable of reducing the building
pressure to 0.3 in. in 20 seconds or loss. All air
must be exhausted through absolute filters.
(c)
The flow of air within the building is always from an.
area of low contamination potential into an area of
greater contamination potential. .
Recirculation of air within one area or room is permiīted,
but recirculation through a central air conditioning
This prevents the spread of activity via the ventilation
Ve
system.
4. Air Handling
(a) Ventilation and off-gas systems must be backed up by
2
SMUS
: ke,
i
4.
emergency systems to maintain containment conditions in
the event of fan breakdown or power outage.
(5)
Air discharged from contained systems must be filtered
through roughing and HEPA (absolute) filters. Contami-
nated air from work cells, vessel and glove box off-gas
requires two testable systems in series. Air which is
normally clean but has the potential of becoming Con-
taminated in the event of an accident (secondary
containment shells), or from only mildly contaminated
areas (chemical hoods, process cells) requires only
one Cestable system.
1) Contaminants capable of damaging the filter med ind must
be removed prior to discharge to the filter syslem.
Dt
.
(d) Absolute filter systems inust be tested in place
prescribed frequencies (generally twice yearly) and
have an efficiency of - 99.95% for > 0.3 micron
Te
C
particles.
e)
A release of a maximum of one curie of radioactive
iodine (LBAI) per week on an average basis for the
combined ORNL facilities is considered a tolerable
level. Each facility is limited to a maximum of 0.3
curie per week, and a long term average of 0.1.
curie/week.
(f) Each facility or experiment having the potential of
releasing greater than 0.2 curie per week, in the
event of a failure, must have its adsorber system
tested in situ.
5. Fire Protection
(a) All buildings at ORNL are protected by fire extinguishing
systems; sprinkler, deluge, or carbon dioxide, whichever
is applicable.
(b) Cells and glove boxes containing amounts of solvents,
reactive or pyrophoric materials which, in the event
of a fire, could breech containment are equipped with
appropriate fire extinguishing systems, Controlled
volume, water fog systems are installed in cells and
glove boxes when the solvent volumes handled ire »5.gal
and >l pint respectively. Dry and/or eutectic powder
systems are used for reactive ind pyrophoric !2terials.
1.2
.
(c) Plastic (Bondstrand) off-gas and ventilation ducts
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are protected by sprinkler systems.
Gaseous Waste
Gaseous wastes discharged from reactors, radiochemical
plants, and laboratories are monitored for radioactive
materials (X, B, Y, and radioiodine) by nieans.of in-
stack sampling and monitoring systems.
In the event of an accidental release the location
and amount of radioactive material disbursed is deter-
mined by 39 monitoring stations. Twenty-two are
located in the plant proper, 9 are located 2 to 8
miles from the plant site and an additional 8 are
located 12 to 75 miles from the plant site. Other
environmental monitoring consists of analyzing milk
and vegetation samples for
sr and 111 pick-up.
Samples are obtained from 12 milk and 8 vegetation
stations which ring the Laboratory at distances of
10 to 50 miles.
Liquid Waste
Two types of radioactive wastes are presently being produced
at ORNL - process or low-level and intermediate-level; facilities
are also available for storage of high-level waste.
(a)
All process waste streains (< 10 uc/gal) from tlic vitrious
radiochemical facilities must pass through continuous
samplers and radiation monitors. Any indication of
excessive amounts of activity would necessitate shuuta
ting down the offending plant.
All "contaminated" process waslost ici autolla Lic:Ily
diverted to and held up in retencion ponds and the
activity reduced to acceptable levels hutore being dis-
charged to the environment. A chrec-million gallon
emergency basin is available in the event the capacities
of the normally used ponds are exceeded.
The intermediate level waste (10 ;C to 10 c/gal)
system is composed of individual facility collector
tanks where the contents are neutralized to a pll of 11
and then pumped to a central surge tank. This waste
is then concentrated by a factor of 20 to 30 and the
concentrate disposed of by the hydrofracturing process
in 80,000 gallon batches.
8. Solid Waste
(a) All solid waste is disposed of by burial. burial
:
trenches are dug no deeper than 12 inches above the
water table.
(b) Description, inventory, and location of each burial
is maintained by an 12% system.
(c)
211 casings are sun?. t
tlie water table in various
locatio:s in the burial area in order that any trans-
area
rans-
port of radioactivity in the water table can be
rt
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detected and mapped.
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llow These Procedures were Applied to the
Transuranium Processing Plant (IKU)
ISUT
Cl!
To conclude this article we have outlined below the various
steps in the safety review procedures is they were applicd to the
Transuranium Processing Plant. Conceptual design of this facility
was started in 1960, and it was placed in operation approximately
18 months ago. It is primarily a hot cell facility with a heavily
shielded cell bank and special ventilation systems designed to
provide positive containment for handling large quantities of the
alpha-emitting actinide elements. In addition, six glove box
laboratories were provided for analytical and low level development
work. Listed in the table below are the significant milestones in
the safety review procedures for this facility.
Table 1. Steps in the Review
Procedures for TRU
December 13, 1961
Review of the conceptual design by the
Radiochemical Processing Plants Review
Committee.
Construction started.
July 1, 1963
May 22, 1965
Construction by the prime contricior
completed.
December 6, 1965
An internal document, "Interim Use of
TRL Alpha Laboratory facilities - Safety
Analysis" was issued so that the liburire
tory facilities could be reviewed inci
placed in operation ilt Chilli i 1.1916.
Approval was granted! by lile still of
WIS
'lable 1 (continues)
Safety and Radiation Control without
full comm'i llac review.
April 15, 1966
IISUT
"Safety Analysis for the Transuranium
Processing l’lant, Building 7920"* was
issued in draſl forin for review by
division management, Safely and Kid iit-
lion Control, and the Radiocliumicill
Processing Plants Review Committee.
May 1, 1966
l'ormal review by the Radiochemical Pro-
cessing Plants Review Committee was
held.
May 10, 1966
A semi-formal safety review was con-
ducted by the safety branch of the
AEC-ORO.
May 26, 1966
Approval for full operation was granted
by AEC-ORO.
June 1, 1966
Full approval for operation was granted
by the Director of Safety and Radiation
Control.
June 1, 1966
Initial radioactive operations were
begun.
*ORNL-3954, edited by l.. J. King.
END

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