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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANOARDS - 1963
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3
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ORNL. P, 2408
CONF-661001-21..
CONTAINENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN THE TRANSURANIUM PROCESSING PLANT *
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: L. J. King and J. L. Matherne
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Oak. Ridge, Tennessee
SH PRICES
MBA 1.003 MN 50
SUMMARY
The Transuranium Processing Plant (TRU) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
is operated in conjunction with the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) to pro-
vide grem quantities of many of the transuranium elements and milligram
quantities of some of the transcalifornium isotopes for use in research. .
Many of the design features of the facility are governed by the special
problems associated with the containment of the high-specific-activity actinide
elements.
These elements are primarily alpha emitters; in addition, some undergo
spontaneous fissioning. High dose rates of penetrating radiation, including the :
fast neutrons from spontaneous fission, necessitate thick shielding (54 in. of
high-density concrete) and require all maintenance to be done remotely. This
paper describes the special containment features of this plant.
Facilities for handling radioactive materiais consist of nine heavily
shielded cells that are equipped with master-slave mani.pulators and windows,
and eight laboratories. Within each cell, process equipment is enclosed in
Research sponsored by the U. &. Atomic Energy Commission under contract
with the Union Carbide Corporation.
LEGAL NOTICE
ORNI - Afr-nerICIAL
This report was prepared us an account of Government sponsored work. Neither the Vallad
Statou, por the Commission, dor hay person acting on bebill of the Commission:
A. Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, wild respect to the accu.
racy, compleaness, or unchaldous of the informatiua contained in this report, or that the wo
of way information, apparatus, method, or process dixiosed to this report may not infringe
prinately owed rights; or
B. Asrumos kay Habilites with respect to the use of, or for damages runding from the
un of way taformation, appundus, method, or proceu discloved in this report
As used in the above, "persoa acting on behalf of tbe Commiussoo" locladus say one
ployee or coatructor of the Commission, or employte of much contractor, to the autoat that
Jucá employne or coatractor of the Commission, or employee of such contractor propers,
diseminates, or provides access to, nay laformation purrunat to do employment or coainct
with the Commission, or wo employment with such contractor.
ORNL - AEC - OFFICIAL

RELEASED FOR ANNOUNCEMENT
IN NUCLEAR SCIENCE ABSTRACTS
TO
2
a cell cubicle.
Four of the cell cubicles contain chemical processing Equip-
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ment; three are used for remote fabrication of recycle targets for further
3.-*
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irradiation in the HFIR; and two are used for remote analytical chemistry wurk.
Behind and below each cubicle and shielded from it by a concrete wall is a
tank pit for housing waste collection equipment and process and storage tanks.
The usual containment practice of providing multiple, enclosed ventilation
.
systems is used. Process equipment is enclosed in sealed cubicles within the
primary cells, which are in turn enclosed by the ouilding shell. Each enclosure.
is separately ventilated with differential pressures, maintained automatically, .
50 that each enclosure is at a lower pressure than its immediate envelope.
Portals between building areas and from the building are equipped with air
locks. The building shell is maintained continuously at a vacuum of 0.3-1n.
HaÒ gage to ensure absolute containment of all activity within the building.
This compares with the standard practice at ORNL of bringing a building vacuum
to 0.3-18. H20 gage within 20 sec in case of emergency, while normally maintaining
the facility at atmospheric pressure. The glove-box ventilation system, the cell
cubicle ventilation system, and the processing-cell ventilation system are ;
designed so that all glove boxes, cells, and cubicles are e. bausted to common
.
headers (one for each system) that have automatic instrumentation to control
.
pressures.
The flow rate of purge air is controlled by throttling the inlet. .
.
Thus, the glove boxes, cubicles, and cells "float" on the respective headers,
.
which provide extra ventilation capacity to prevent pressure buildup. The
headers are capable of exhausting at least one-tenth volume per minute from
the attached enclosed processing box, cell, or cubicle.
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Primary cell contaiment 18 maintalued during all material transfer .
operations into or out of the cell bank and during all maintenance operations
that are performed on equipment within the cell bank. Everything that enters
a cubicle from outside the cell bank or leaves a cubicle, to be removed from
the cell bank, 18 handled with either the completely sealed and contained
transfer case or the intercell conveyor. For both transfer methods, the
cubi-le seal 18 maintained by the double-door technique in which a door on
the cubicle and a door on the transfer device are locked together when the
transfer device is sealed to the cubicle. Thus, the interiors of the device
and the cubicle are joined while each of the doors prevents the exterior
surface of the other door from being contaminated. Maintenance of equipment
located in the tank pits is accomplished by using a special maintenance shield
provided with windows and bagged tool and equipment ports. This shield 18
.
installed temporarily in place of the concrete shielding blocks in the top of
the cell during maintenance operations.
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CONTA INMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN TES TRANSURANIUM PROCESSING PLANT
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L. J. King and J. L. Matherne. .'
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Oak Ridge, Tennessee .
ABSTRACT
Containment of radionuclides in the Traneuranium Processing Plant 18
complicated because many of the 1sotope 3 of the transuranium elements bave
high specific toxicity and because the plant and equipment must be capable
of accommodating extensive changes. Cell process equipment is enclosed in
sealed processing cubicles. These cubicles are enclosed in the primary cells,
which in turn are enclosed by the building shell. Each enclosure is separately
ventilated with differential pressures, maintained automatically, so that each
enclosure is at a lower pressure than its immediate envelope. Various devices,
all modifications of bagging techniques, are used to transfer materials and
to perform maintenance through the containment barriers.
Research sponsored by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission under contract
with the Union Carbide Corporation.
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INTRODUCTION
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The Transuranium Processing Plant (TRU) at Oak Ridge National laboratory
18 operated in conjunction with the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) to pro-
vide gran quantities of many othe transuroniun elements and milligram
quantities of some of the transcalifornium isotopes, for use in research
work by laboratories throughout the country. The conceptual design and the
early development of equipment and facilities are well documented in the
literature. 1,2
The alpha-emitting, spontaneously fissioning actinide elements in the
transuranium group have created problems that are novel in radiochemical plant
design.
The fast-neutron flux, together with penetrating garmas from fission
products and spontaneous fission, requires shielding considerations normaliy
associated with reactor shields. Uncertainties in the chemistry of the actinides
and the corrosiveness of the chemicals required for the processes necessitate
provisions for complete and relatively simple replacement of process equipment.
The presence of large amounts of radioactivity requires maintenance and equip-
ment replacement to be done remotely. Two other papers presented at this
conference describe equipment for processing and maintenance.*
The total amount of radioactivity present ia TRU in terms of the number
of body burdens 18 not much different from that in plants that process radio-
isotopes or fuel materials. However, the high specific activity of the
actinides causes complication in containment of radionuclides in a flexible
facility like TRU. For example, the biological hazard of 25?CP. 18 37,000 times
that of the same mass of 299pu.
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T
.LU
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The purpose of this paper 18 to describe the provisions for containing
and for preventing the release of hazardous quantities of radionuclides from
the Transuranium Proceöbing Plant.
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PROCESS MATERIAIS
About 600 g of 242 Pu and 500 g of higher actinides, 243am and 244cm, bave
been produced for the feed materials of the program by irradiation in the '
Savannah River reactors of 10 kg batches of " Pu. A portion of the <*Pu has
been fabricated into target rods that are now being irradiated in the HFIR..
The remainder was irradiated in a Savannah River reactor for about one year to
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produce small quantities of the heavy actinides.
This material is now being
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processed in TRU. After 12 to 18 months irradiation in HFIR the plutonium rods
will be processed in TRIJ for recovery of the higher actinides that will be
formed 1
transmutation.
In general, the <*Pu, ?Ani, and curium isotopes
will be incorporated into new targets and recycled to the HFIR. The trans-
curium elements (be'rkelium, californium, einsteinium, and fermium) will be
puritied and held for distribution to other investigators. The procedure of
recycling the plutonium, americium, and curium isotopes and separating various
product streams and special isotopes will continue indefinitely. The 500 g of
2243 Am and 244cm will be fabricated into targets that will be included in the
irradiation-processing cycles.
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1
Among the isotopes of these elements are alpha-emitters with the highest
known specific activities. For example, cf has a specific activity of .
645 curies/s, which 18 10,000 times as high as the specific activity of 239 Pu.
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Some of these isotopes fission spontaneously, releasing fast neutrons and
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gamma radiation directly from the fissions and from 1188ion products. In
early cycles, gamma rays will be the dominant source of penetrating radiation,
but neutrons will become the dominant source in later cycles.
In Table 1 the biological hazard of 1997u 18 compared with the hazards
of some of the isotopes that will be present in THU in significant amounts.
Although not all-inclusive, listed isotopes are those that are significant
to the production scheme.
The total biological hazard presented by the transuranium elements in
TRU 18 equivalent to the hazard presented by a few hundred kilograms of
.
Pu.
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+
1
+
+
+
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Table 1. Hazards of Some Transuranium Isotopes Compared with the Hazard of
Pu
Specific
Activity
(curies/8)
Maximum Per-
missible Body
Burden for
Critical Orgon
Amount
Per Body
Burden
(ug)
239 Pu to Give
Same Hazard as
lg of Isotope
Approx. Amount
of 259 Pu to Give
Equivalent Hazard
(kg)
Amount
In TRU
(8)
Isotope
Suc)
239pu
0.0613
0.04
.
0.6
.
242.qu
0.00389
0.05
13
0.05
0.05
200
2010
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هم داج
0.184
0.05
0.27
2.2
250
244cm
8.3
0.1
1.2 x 103
· 500
250
249 BIS
186)
0.04
252c2
045
0.01
3.9 x 10-4 ...
1.6 x 10-5
8.15 x 10-8.
1540
37500
7.36 x 106
5
2x 10-3
9200 :
254cf
0.00075
15
Maximum amount of each isotope expected at some time. These amounts will not all be
presented simultaneously.
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PHYSICAL PLANT
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The facilities for handling radioactive materials consist of nine
heavily shielded cel.ls served by master-sleve manipulators, and eight
laboratories, four on each of two floors. The first floor plan of the
shop are single-story additiona. One "cold" laboratory for the preparation
of "cold" reagents and assembly of equipment is located between two alpha
laboratories, and the fourth laboratory on each floor contains analytical
equipment. One of the alpha laboratories on the first floor contains a
shielded cave facility for laboratory development work, where a small amount
of shielding 18 required and somewhat better containment is needed than 18
provided by a glove box. The laboratory area contains supporting rooms for
the handling and storing of process reagents anà for the storing of glove boxes
under off-gas vacuum, ani check and holdup areas for maintaining containment
air pressures while moving things in and out of the building.
TRU Processing Area
The nine shielded process cells are arranged in line.
The top and back
of the cell line is enclosed by a high-bay area (the "limited access area")
that is equipped with a bridge crane. Removable top plugs provide access to
:
the cells. The front face of the cell line, which 18 provided with windows
and master-slave manipulators, makes up one wall of the operating area.
Essentially all process and building service instrumentation 18 located in
the operating area. The second floor immediately over the operating area 18
rcdiodujo : iriu
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a chemical makeup area for process-reagent head tanks, nonradicactive pumps,
etc. Transmitters for process and service instrumentation are located there.
: ORNL - AEC - OFFICIAL
of the nine cells, which are shielded by 54 in. of high-density concrete
or an equivalent, four contain chemical processing equipment for dissolution,
solvent extraction, and precipitation processes; three contain equipment for
preparation and inspection of recycle targets; and two cells are used for
remote analytical operations.
Within the shielded cells, process equipment is enclosed in a cell
cubicle formed on the front end sides by the cell walls, and o? epoxy resin-
coated stainless steel plate on the rear wall and top; the bottom 16 of
Hastelloy C to withstand the corrosion of accidentally spilled chloride
solutions. Behind and below each cell cubicle and shielded from it by a
coacrete wall is a tank pit for housing waste collection equipment and process
and storage tanks.
Service lines enter through removable plugs in the back and top of the
cell. Shielded pits in the floor behind the cells house off-gas filters and
a pipe tunnel for process lines.
CONTAINMENT
The TRU facility has special provisions to prevent the escape of processi
materials to the environment. Building ventilation systems and gaseous, liquid, ..
and solid waste systems are all involved in the containment of radioactive
materials.
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Cell process equipoient 16 enclosed in sealed process cubicles, which
in turn are enclosed in the primary cell, which in turn are enclosed by the
building shell. Each enclosure 18 separately ventilated with differential
pressures, maintained automatically, such that each enclosure 18 at a lower.
pressure than its immediate envelope. The proce88 equipment 18 operated at
-10-1n. A20 gage, the sealed cubicle at -1.7-in. H20 gage, the cell at -1.4-in.
H20 gage, the "limited access aren" at -0.4-in. H2O gage, the laboratory part
of the building at -0.35-1n. H20 gage, and the operating area and chemical
makeup area at -0.3-in. H20 gage. All purge air flows from one containment
envelope to the next through filters or backflow preventers.
Primary Containment in Laboratories
Containment in the laboratories 18 similar to that existing in other
high-alpha-level laboratories. Small quantities of radioactive materials are
handled in the analytical laboratories in chemical fume boods or in open-port
glove boxes in which inflowing air 18 used to prevent the release of radio- .
active materials. Chemical development work involving the actinide elements :
and higher-level analytical work is conducted in glove boxes operated under
a -0.3-in. H2O gage pressure with respect to the room ventilation system. This
ensures that any leakage will be into the box and aids in preventing escape of.
contamination from the boxe Air flow through the standard 3-10 glove box 18
about 0.5 cfm unless larger quantities are required for heat dissipation. All
in-flow air 18 prefiltered into the box through absolute filters. The box 18.
exhausted through a roughing and absolute filter to the ventilation : system for
the TRU processing cells. The purge rate 18 controlled by varying the surface
area of the inlet filters. The boxes are allowed to "float" on a common header:
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and up to 10 cfm of extra ventilation capacity 16 always available to prevent
pressure buildup in the glove box. All transfers into and out of glove boxes
are made through transfer ports using a plastic-bag transfer technique.
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The primary containment of the shielded cave 18 provided by an internal
alpha box, which has many features identical to the alpha glove boxes. However,
it is surrounded by a 2-ft concrete shield, and operations are performed with
manipulators. A glove box attached through a labyrinth transfer chute pro-
vides a means of getting materials in and out of the alpha box by hagging :
techniques, and high-level activity can be removed via a sealed container and
a side-loading carrier.
Ventilation for this primary containment 18 provided from the vessel
off-gas system. Pressure within the alpha box 18 maintained at -0.7-in.
Fleo gage with respect to the laboratory, and the cave itself 18 kept at a
pressuré midway between the alpha box and the laboratory.
Primary containment in the Processing Area
The containment envelope, which satisfies the ORNL criteria for primary
containment, 18 the heavily shielded bank of process cells. As an added
precaution against the release of any of the actinides, those process operations
that are likely to result in release of red loactivity from process lines and .
vessels are performed in sealed process cubicles located within the cells.
The cubicles contain all sampling stations and all process equipment that might
require frequent maintenance or miglit be expected to require replacement. Except
for a few large equipment items, only tanks and piping are located in the cel
bank outside the cubicles.
MA
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Each process cubicle is located inside a separate processing cell. The
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cubicles are isolated from each other and from their respective cells, and
the cells are isolated from each other except for interconnection via the cell
exhaust duct.
This 180lation minimizes the spread of contamination from one
cell area to another.
Cubicle Ventilation. - In each cubicle, air 18 circulated within the
cubicle through absolute filters, past cooling coils, and then back into the
cubicle at a rate bigb enough to remove the heat produced by the process or
by cell lighting. From 5 to 50 cfm of purge air enters each cubicle from
the cell in which the cubicle 18 contained through an absolute filter, and
18 exhausted into a common header serving all cubicles. Purge rate 18 set
from inside the cubicle by a manual damper in the inlet. Thus the entire
exhaust capacity of 50 cím 18 always available in case the cubicle pressure .
starts to increase. The purge capacity of 50 cfm 18 more than one-tenth of
a cubicle volume per minute: A pressure control station maintains a pressure
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of 0.3-in. H20 gage vacuum on the cubicle exhaust header with respect to the ::
cell ventilation system. Cubicle vent gases are treated in a caustic scrubber
and discharged through one roughing filter and two absolute filters to a 250-
ft-bigb stack.
Cell Ventilation. - Air for ventilating each cell is drawn from the
high-bay area through a roughing filter and backflow preventer located in
a duct at the rear of each cell. : A manually set damper in the inlet duct
to each cell is used to regulate air flow. Inlet ducts and filters are
large enough to provide 1000 cfm of ventilation air to each cell, and this
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quantity 18 provided to remove the 6-kw process heat load from each of cells
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4 through 7. The remaining cells are supplied 370 cfm of ventilating air,
which 18 more than the one-tenth of a cell volume per minute required.
.
Alpha-Seal Windows. • The front face of each .cubicle contains a viewing:
window consisting of an alpha-beal window and a bulk shielding window. The
alpha-seal windows are designed to withstand a pressure of 900 10/ft? without
losing the seal, and they can be replaced from the operating area without
..
allowing a break in cubicle containment.
Manipulators. - Process cells are equipped with heavy-duty, master-slave.
manipulators sealed with double boots. The pressure in the space between the
boots 18 monitored for leakage on either boot.
...
Process Safeguards. - A number of safeguards are provided to prevent
radioactive solutions or gases from escaping the process cells. Remote
transmitters located in the chemical makeup area are used to transmit signals
.
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to the panel board in the operating area. No process lines directly connect
.
from the cells to the operating area, and the transmitters are at least 8 ft
above all proces8 vessels.
Where solution transfers are made by steam jet, protection against backing
the solution up into the steam line 18 provided by a continuous air purge at ::
about 150 cc/min. When the jet 18 turned off, the air purges all steam from
the line, ensuring that condensation cannot pull process solutions back up
the line.
Protection has been incorporated into the equipment to ensure that pro-
ce88 solutions are not backed up into the various utility systems.
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Process radiation monitors, equipped with alarms and in some cases
automatic Interlocks, act to prevent the escape of radioactive materials
from the celi bank.
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Secondary Containment
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The shell of the laboratory and processing parts of the building con-
stitutes the secondary container for TRU. The office annex 18 operated at
atmospheric pressure and 18 heated and ventilated by a separate system. Thus,
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1t 18 not involved in containment.
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The building contains a number of air conditioning and heating systems
and exhaust systems that are operated to provide the pressure differences
:
required for secondary containment. Normally-occupied personnel areas are
supplied with a cnce-through air flow system from which the air 18 exhausted
through roughing and absolute filters' on the roof. The normal ventilation
for those areas maintains a vacuum of between 0.3 and 0.4-in. Hao gage with
respect to outdoors. Thus, the building 18 always under the vacuum required
for containment under emergency conditions.
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Building Pressure Control. - The building area outside the cells 18
divided into six zones that are provided with differential-pressure controls
and differential-pressure dampers in the air streams from the supply systems.
The differential-pressure controllers (static pressure sensing pickups) act
in conjunction with the constant-volume filtered exhaust systems to maintain
the required negative pressure. The six zones that are independently con-
4
2
trolled are (1) first-floor labs, offices, and corridors, (2) second-floor
labs, offices, and corridors, (3) operating area, (4) makeup area, (5) decon-
tamination and transfer areas, and (6) high-bay area.
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Alpha Laboratories. • The laboratory portion of th: building constitutes
the secondary container for the experiments done in the glove boxes and the
shielded cave. The pormal ventilation for this area 18 designed to maintain
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a vacuum of 0.35-1n. H20 with respect to outdoors.
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The laboratory rooms themselves provide an additional intermediate barrier
to the release of radioactive niaterials to the environment within the lab wing
secondary containment system even though the rooms are not sealed. Building,
ventilation air norua.'ly flows into the laboratories from the corridors and
then to the building exhaust system. Thus, any radioactive materials released
to the laboratory room from a glove box would very likely be retained within
the room or be collected on the building exhaust system filters.
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Portals. - Vestibule air locks are provided at all portals through which
parts of the building are connected and through which the building 18 connected'
to outdoors. Normal passage to and from the processing and laboratory erea 18
through a personnel monitoring station connecting with the office annex.
The
other portals are used only as emergency exits or, under controlled conditions,
for transferring materials into or out of the building.
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Ventilation System Safeguards. - Airborne contamination 18 intended to
be localized by ensuring that flow of ventilation air, and flow of air that
might leak between areas, 18 always in the direction or increased contamination
potential. Normally this 18 monitored by instruments, including automatic
alarms, that will indicate improper balance in building air pressures. All
ventilation machinery has install.eå spares, and duplicates are supplied emer- :,
gency power from separate emergency power sources. Special switching 18 provided
:
It
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to automatically start standby equipment 18 an item of operating equipment ..
Palle. Therefore, the likelihood of disrupting containment ventilation 18
remote. However, instrumentation 18 provided that will shut down the building,
exhaust fans if the glove-box vacuum, with respect to the laboratories, becomes :
too low, or 1f the pressure in the processing cells approaches the building.
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pressure.
Material Transfer and Maintenance
Containment is maintained during all material transfer operations into
:
or out of the cell bank and during all maintenance operations that are per-
formed on equipment within the cell bank. Complete descriptions of transfer
and maintenance equipment are given by Bottenfield et al.".
:
Everything that enters a cubicle from outside the cell bank or that
leaves a cubicle to be removed from the cell bank 18 handled either with the
equipment transfer case or with the intercell conveyor. Both paths provide
for maintaining the cubicle alpha seal. The double-door technique 18 used in
which a door on the cubicle and a door on the transfer device are locked to-
gether when the transfer device 18 sealed to the cubicle. Thus, the interiors
of the device and cubicle are joined while each of the doors prevents the
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exterior surface of the other door from becoming contaminated..
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Maintenance of equipment located in the tank pits is accomplished using
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the tank pit maintenance shield that is installed temporarily in place of the
concrete cell shielding blocks.
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YOGY.INXO
Remote Transfer System. - The remote transfer system, which includes an
intercell conveyor, a transfer cubicle, and a shielded carrier, may be used
while the processing plant 18 in hul operation. Small tools, parts, chemicals,
waste materials, and samples may be transported in the 8-in.-diam by 8-18.- .
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ORN! - ASC-NEFICIA!
high conveyor canister.
::
The conveyor drive mechanism, track and chain supports, chain adjuster,
chain idlers, canister dolly, and canister are enclosed in a sealed bousing
(approximately 95 feet long) located beneath the cubicles. Openings in the
top of the housing coincide with transfer ports in the nine cell cubicles
and the transfer cubicles.
Transfers between the canister and a cubicle are
effected by positioning the canister at the cubicle by using a control box
•
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and position indicator located in the operating area. The canister 18 elevated
by the dolly mechanism and 18 sealed to the bottom of the cubicle transfer i
port. An air-actuated mechanism inside the cubicle unlocks the canister cover
from the canister, locks and seals it to the cubicle door, and opens the port.
Material transfer is then accomplished using the master-slave manipulators.
A system of interlocks prevents (1) movement of the conveyor: dolly when
the cubicle and canister doors are not properly closed, (2) opening a cubicle
door unless the canister cover is locked to it, and (3) lateral movement of
the dolly when the canister 18 in the raised position.
Materials that are to be transferred into or out of the cell cubicles
via the transfer system must pass through the transfer cubicle. A glove box :
accessible through a rotary transfer port (a lazy Susan) provides for transfer :
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of uncontaminated or low-activity itens. Ordinary bagging techniques are used
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for containment. A door in the transfer cubicle shield accommodates a shielded.
:
carrier that uses the double-cover technique for transfer of highly active
materials. Covered plastic containers are used to maintain containment when
the carrier 18 used. The plastic cover and container are heat sealed before
the container 18 drawn into the carrier for removal.
Equipment Transfer Case. - The equipment transfer case functions with
all cell cubicles and other components located in the limited access area
Incidental to the maintenance of the large process equipment located in the
cubicles. All process equipment in the cubicles 18 designed so that the
cubicles can be completely stripped by using the transfer case. Thus, process
equipment can be changed completely without loss of containment. It 18 .
necessary to remove a small cell shielding block in order to place the trans-
fer case on top of the cubicle.
Therefore, processing operations must be
curtailed somewhat.
When the transfer case 18 placed on top of a cubicle, it compresses the
gasket located on the bottom of the transfer case and effects a seal to the
top of the cubicle. A manual drive simultaneously unlocks the cubicle and
transfer case doors and seals the two doors to each other. A second manual
drive elevates the interlocked doors into the transfer case for storage while
equipment 18 being transferred by the 1000-1b-capacity electric hoist located
inside the case.
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Maintenance in Cell Tank Pit. - • Maintenance of equipment located in the
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tank pits will be accomplished using a tank pit maintenance shield, which
will be installed in the top of the cell in place of a concrete shielding plug.
Plastic bagging techniques and tools provided with plastic boots will be used,
and the maintenance shield will be sealed with tape to the al joining concrete .
...
crete shield plug is being removed and the maintenance shield 18 being installed,
additional air flow will be provided to maintain a minimm of 100-1pm face .
velocity across the roof plug opening.
Intermediate Level Waste
.
Radiochemical wastes are handled in a system of headers and collection
tanks that is totally within the cell bank. Solutions in the TRU collection ::
tank may be transferred by steam jet to the ORNL intermediate-level waste .
system or may be recycled to the proce: 38 vessels.
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The processing cubicles and cells contain sumps to collect spilled liquids.
Alarms at the control panel are actuated when a sump becomes full, and the
liquid may eicher be jetted to the waste collection system or, as would be
desirable if valuable material had been collected in a cuticle sump, collected
from within the cubicle.
Zoning
Zoning, which is the application of certain radiation safety regulations
to various parts of the building, 18 important in preventing the spread of
radioactive contamination and in limiting personnel radiation exposures. In
the Transuranluu Processing Plant the entire building, except the office annex,
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18 designated a "regulated zone." Only authorized personnel are permitted,
and normal entrance and exit are through a single vestibule ajr lock. Per-
sons leaving the regulated zone (the entire building) are required to monitor
themselves for radioactive contamination. No eating or drinking, except from
approved fountains, 18 permitted. Some type of personnel radiation monitor,
ekis
r
is
s
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in addition to a film badge, must be worn at all times.
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.
Within the regulated zone, certain laboratory and maintenance rooms are
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designated "contamination zones."
The operations performed in these areas
.
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are such that radioactive contamination of personnel and equipment 18 more
.-_
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probable that it is in other areas. Regulations here are more restrictive.
Smoking 18 prohibited, and protective clothing must be worn. Personnel and
all objects leaving a contamination zone must be monitored and be free from
contamination. Monitoring must be repeated at the building portal even 1f
this is only a few steps from where contamination-zone monitoring was done.
Contamination zones are not allowed to remain contaminated. If contamina-
tion is discovered anywhere outside the primary containment barrier, It must
be cleaned up as soon as possible.
Zoning and monitoring are effective in detecting radioactive contamina-
tion at its source and preventing it from being tracked or carried to the
rest of the building or from the building:
IVIJIJJU-JIV - INOU
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K
o ncicom.
.
REFERENCES
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4
. 1.
-
W. E. Unger et al., "Transuranium Processing Facility Design," Nuclear
Science and Engineering 17, 479-85 (1963).
S
.+-
0. 0. Yarbro et al., "Process Equipment Design and Development for
Transuranium Processing Plant," Nuclear Science and Engineering 17,
492-97 (1963).
.1
.
-
-
-
-
3.
F. L. Peishel et al., "Philosophy of Chemical Processing Equipment
Design and Installation in the Transuranium Processing ilant," this
journal.
4.
B. F. Bottenfield et al., "Remote Maintenance Systems in the Transuranium
Processing Plant," this journal. :
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IVIDIO-
Y- INTO
TV1D1310-)3V - INDO
ORML CWG 66-6143
126'
OFFICE
Normal
Entrance
Normal Entronce
to Regulated Zone
ANNEX
Instrument
Shop
Men
Chonge Room
von ATM are
Cold Check and
Receiving
Elevator
Monitoring
Portal/
Corridor
Solid
Waste
W
w
Equipment
Mechanical
Equipment
Analytical Lab
pical Lob
Abho Lab
apho Las
Cold Lot
Cold Loo
Shielded
Cove Area
Air Lock
Shift
Supervisor
.
TRU Operations Control Poom
.
Transfer
Area
Processing Cells
Conveyor
Maint.
Analytical Cells
Transfer
Cubicle
DOLCİDD
Tank Pits
Muintenance
Shop
W
Air Lock
Change
"Limited Access" Areo
Room
L
3
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int
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'
16
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LV
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bus
midi . i .
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END
TY
DATE FILMED
10/21 / 66








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