ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
BY
JAMES MILL
INTRODUCTION BY
THEODORE SCHROEDER
Price 15 Cents

THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
ON
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
“THE LAST RIGHT VVE SHALL MEN.
TION, REGARDS THE FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS. THE IMPORTANCE OF
THIS CONSISTS, BESIDES THE ADVAN.
CEMENT OF TRUTH, SCIENCE, MOR-
ALITY AND ARTS IN GENERAL, IN ITS
DIFFUSION OF LIBERAL SENTIMENTS
ON THE ADNMINISTRATION OF GOV.
ERNMENT, ITS READY COMMUNI.
CATION OF THOUGHTS BETVVEEN
SUBJECTS, AND ITS CONSEQUENTIAL
PROMOTION OF UNION ANMONG
THEM, VHEREBY OPPRESSIVE OFFL
CERS ARE SHAMED OR INTIMIDATED
INTO NMORE HONOURABLE AND JUST
NMODES OF CONDUCTING AFFAIRS.”
Address to the Inhabitants of Ouebec, Oct. 28, 1774, Journal
of the Continental Congress, Vol. One, Page 108, Edition of 1904
-226-e-Aza Cº44. A. * Jº-
6+. 0.2a-c_* C-4 1-0 ºvº- *
173,9-4- Ava.l…v., 4814
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO
GOVERNMENT
BEING PART OF AN ESSAY WRITTEN
FOR THE
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA.
SIXTH EDITION, 1821
EY
JAMES MILL
INTRODUCTION BY
THEODORE SCHROEDER
FREE SPEECH LEAGUE
56 EAST 59th STREET
NEW YORK CITY
1913 .

THE FREE SPEECH LEAGUE
At Albany, New York, on April 7, 1911, the
Free Speech League was incorporated. The incor-
porators are: President, Leonard D. Abbott, associate
editor of Current Literature, Vice-president, Brand
Whitlock, mayor of Toledo, Ohio; Lincoln Steffens,
leading progressive economist, Bolton Hall, author and
lawyer; Gilbert E. Roe, law-writer; Treasurer, Dr.
E. B. Foote, author of medical books; Secretary,
Theodore Schroeder, author and lawyer. In the
articles of incorporation the purposes of the Free
Speech League are declared to be :
“The principal objects for which said corporation
is formed are as follows, viz: By all lawful means to
promote such judicial construction of the Constitution
of the United States, and of the several states, and of
the statutes passed in conformity therewith, as will
secure to every person the greatest liberty consistent
with the equal liberty of all others, and especially to
preclude the punishment of any mere psychological
offense; and, to that end, by all lawful means to op-
pose every form of governmental censorship over any
method for the expression, communication or trans
mission of ideas, whether by use of previous inhibition
or subsequent punishment; and to promote such legis-
lative enactments and constitutional amendments, state
and national, as will secure these ends.” The officers
are all unsalaried. If you are interested send a con-
tribution to
THE FREE SPEECH LEAGUE,
56 East 59th St., New York City
INTRODUCTION
A “good” slave always opposes the liberation of
other slaves or the abolition of the slave-caste.
Although he himself might like to get beyond it, yet,
because he has been taught to feel so, he “knows”
that other slaves have no capacity for development
under freedom. The highest degree of slave-virtue
is reached when the slave resents his own emancipa-
tion and personally punishes the would-be emanci-
pator of himself or of his fellow-slave. In the
United States of America we have very generally
legalized these slave-virtues and have penalized the
provocateur of slave-revolt, and all this has been done
with the theoretical consent of the slave-voters of
these states, which slave-voters are the successors of
the Continental Congress and of the signers of the
Declaration of Independence.
From such motives, operating unconsciously be-
cause disguised by such words as law and order,
peace and patriotism, we have long since abolished
liberty of conscience and of speech for all men of the
present generation who are of the same general char-
acter as those who made this “republic” possible. As
good slaves should do, we all affirm that the would-be
emancipators are the enemies of “society,” that is
exploiters.
The international etiquette which prevails among
the tyrannous officials of national importance has ac-
quired the force of international law and so in another
way we have superseded the constitutional guarantees
enacted by our rebellious predecessors. Just as one
“gentleman” despot would not offend a friendly fel-
low-tyrant, so all must support each other's system.
In the international fellowship for the suppression
of freedom and for the perpetuation of established
wrongs no one would allow any slave within his do-




, 3
INTRODUCTION
main to promote an uprising among the slaves of an-
other friendly slaves-driving power. Each tyrannous
power teaches and imposes a like “duty” upon those
whom it dominates. Formerly the victims of slav-
ishness mobbed and imprisoned the abolitionist of
chattle-slavery. Now we send to jail all those who
conspire here for the overthrow of slave-exploitation
abroad by any method unapproved by the political
machine of the beneficiaries of vested iniquities.
Pursuant to this inter-tyrant etiquette ratified by
our courts, men are now serving jail sentences for
dispatching seditious ideas from the United States
into Mexico to the annoyance of an official barbarian
who was in friendly relation with the chiefs of our
own beaurocracy. In like perpetuation of legalized
injustice we deport men for subjection to the tender
mercies of a “Bloody Tzar,” because it is pretended
that all dislike those ideas of the immigrant which
he naturally derived from seeing and feeling the
operations of that government. This is the new
international fugitive-slave-law, In some Ameri-
can states a citizen, even, may be fined and impris-
oned for five years merely for here advocating the
overthrow of Russia's savage autocrat by the only
method that is possible yet is unlawful. So the
inter-tyrant etiquette reduces the most free govern-
ment to the standard of the most barbarous.
It is many such facts as these which make it de-
sirable to republish part of a once famous but now
forgotten defense of free speech for revolutionists.
#; to James Mill's essay on “Liberty of the
ress.”
James Mill (1775-1836) had the misfortune to
be the parent of John Stuart Mill, whose greate,
fame has almost eclipsed the father's reputation a
economist and philosopher. Bentham said: “I was th
spiritual father of [James] Mill, and Mill the spir
itual father of Ricardo. It was by Mill's encouragé
ment that Ricardo was induced to publish Political
4.
sº
INTRODUCTION
Economy’ and to enter Parliament.” Lewes records
to James Mill’s credit, also this: “The first person
who saw his [Hobbs'] importance as a political
thinker and had the courage to proclaim it was, I
believe, James Mill.” Upon its appearance, in
1818, his “History of India” at once put Mill in the
first rank among the authors of his time. This is a
“standard work” upon that subject. After this
Mill became a political reformer. He was the warm-
est disciple of Jeremy Bentham, as well as
his close friend, neighbor and all but constant
companion. When old age disqualified Bentham
from active management of the reform campaign to
..which he had given such conspicuous impetus, James
Mill became the recognized leader of the Benthamite
party. Among his warm friends he numbered such
men as Lords Brougham and Langdale, also George
Grote, John and Charles Austin, William Ellis,
Walter Coulson and John Black. During the
crisis of the Reform Bill, Mill was much sought and
consulted.
He was instrumental in starting the Edinburgh
Review, and frequently wrote for its pages. He also
contributed articles to the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
One of these on “Government” forcefully and con-
cisely stated the progressive creed of the time, ac-
cording to Benthamite principles. This became a
“text-book for the young men of the Union at Cam-
bridge,” and was deemed worthy of a reply from
Macauley.
Another of these essays written for the Encyclo-
paedia was upon “The Liberty of the Press.” From
that article the following pages are extracted. As
we read their unanswered logic, and remember that
Mill was conservative enough to be a Monarchist,
we are made to feel that our American progressives
and reformers must belong to the “libertarians” of
the tenth century. THEODORE SchROEDER.
New York City, May, 1913.

- 5
On Seditious Opinions
By
REv. Rob ERT HALL
Öº law hath amply provided
against overt acts of sedition
and disorder, and to suppress mere
opinions by any other method than
reasoning and argument is the height
of tyranny. Freedom of thought be-
ing intimately connected with the
happiness and dignity of man in every
stage of his being, is of so much
more importance than the preservation
of any Constitution, that to infringe
the former under pretense of supporting
the latter, is to sacrifice the means to
the end.
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO
GOVERNMENT
BY JAMES MILL
- (Extracts from an article in the supplement to the Sixth Edition of
the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1821)
XHORTATIONS TO RESIST ALL POW-
ERS OF GOVERNMENT AT ONCE,
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED OF-
FENSES. Unless a door is left open to resistance
of government, in the largest sense of the word, the
doctrine of passive obedience is adopted; and the
consequence is, the universal prevalence of misgov-
ernment ensnaring the misery and degradation of
the people. On the other hand, unless the operations
of government, instituted for the protection of rights,
are secured from obstruction the security of rights,
and all the advantages dependent upon the exist-
ence of government, are at an end. Between these
two securities, both necessary to obtain the benefits
of good government, there appears to be such a con-
trariety that the one can only be obtained by the sac-
rifice of the other. * * *
The application of physical force which is treated
as an evil is clearly distinguishable from that re-
sistance of government which is the last security
of the many against the misconduct of the few. * *
It is resistance to all the powers of government at
sº-
7
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
once, either to withdraw them from the hands in
which they have hitherto been deposited, or greatly
to modify the terms upon which they are held. * *
We think it may be satisfactorily shown, that no
operation of the press, however directly eahorting to
this species of resistance ought to be treated as an
offense. * ,
The reason is, that no such exhortation can have
any immediate or formidable effect; can indeed, have
any effect at all, except through such a medium
as ought to be, at all times perfectly free. Suppose
that a work is published, exhorting the people in gen-
eral to take arms against the government, for the
purpose of altering it against the consent of its rulers.
The people cannot take arms against the Govern-
ment without the certainty of being immediately
crushed, unless there has been already created a gen-
eral consent. If this consent exists in such perfec-
tion as to want nothing to begin action but an ex-
hortation, nothing can prevent the exhortation, and
forbidding it is useless. If the consent does not ex-
ist in nearly the last degree of perfection, a mere
exhortation, read in print, can have no effect which
is worth regarding. In all circumstances, there-
fore it is useless and consequently absurd, to treat
this species of exhortation as an offense. If on the
other hand it were clearly recognized, that every man
had a license to exhort the people to a general re-“
sistance of government, all such exhortations would
become ridiculous, unless on those rare and extreme
occasions on which no prohibitions, and no penalties
can or ought to prevent them. * * $:
We think it will appear, with sufficient evidence,
that in the way of indirect exhortations to resistance
that is, in laying the grounds of dissatisfaction with
the government, there is no medium between allowing
everything, and allowing nothing; that the end, in
short, which is sought to be gained, by allowing any-
thing to be published in censure of the government,
8
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
cannot be obtained, without leaving it perfectly free
to publish everything.
The end which is sought to be obtained, by allow-
ing anything to be said in censure of the government,
is, to ensure the goodness of the government; the
most important of all the objects, to the attainment
of which, the wisdom of man can be applied. If
the goodness of government could be ensured by any
preferable means, it is evident that all censure of the
government ought to be prohibited. All discontent
with the government is only good, in so far as it is a
means of removing real cause of discontent. If
there is no cause, or if there is better means of re-
moving the cause, the discontent is, of course, an evil
and that which produces it an evil. '
So true it is, however, that the discontent of the
people is the only means of removing the defects of
vicious governments, that the freedom of the press,
the main instrument of creating discontent, is, in all
civilized countries, among all but the advocates of
misgovernment, regarded as an indispensable secu-
rity, and the greatest safeguard of the interests of
mankind.
For what is meant by a vicious government? or
wherein do the defects of government consist? Most
assuredly they all consist in sacrificing the interests.
of the many to the interests of the few. The small
number, in whose hands the powers of government
are, in part directly, in part indirectly, placed, can-
not fail, like other men, to have a greater regard for
what is advantageous to themselves, than what is
advantageous to other men. They pursue, there-
fore, their own advantage, in preference to that of
the rest of the community. That is enough. Where
there is nothing to check that propensity, all the evils
of misgovernment, that is, in one word, the worst
evils by which human nature is afflicted, are the in-
evitable consequence. (See the article Gover N-
MENT.)

9
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
There can be no adequate check without the free-
dom of the press. The evidence of this is irresistible.
In all countries, the people either have a power
legally and peaceably of removing their governors,
or they have not that power. If they have not that
power, they can only obtain very considerable ame-
liorations of their governments by resistance, by ap-
plying physical force to their rulers, or, at least, by
threats so likely to be followed by performance, as
may frighten their rulers into compliance. But re-
sistance, to have this effect, must be general. To be
general, it must spring from a general conformity of
opinion, and a general knowledge of that conformity.
How is this effect to be produced, but by some means,
fully enjoyed by the people, of communicating their
sentiments to one another? Unless where the people
can all meet in general assembly, there is no other
means, known to the world, of attaining this object,
to be compared with the freedom of the press.
It is, no doubt, true, that in countries where the
liberty of the press is unknown, evil governments are
frequently overthrown. This is almost always ac-
complished by the military force, revenging some
grievance of their own, or falling in with some heat
and animosity of the people. But does it ever enable
them to make a new government, in which any
greater security is provided for their interests than
there was before? In such cases, the people get rid
of one set of rulers, whom they hate, only to ob-
tain another set, with equal powers of doing them
In Jury.
There are, however, we believe, some people who
say, that though the liberty of the press is a necessary
instrument to attain good government, yet, if it is'
fairly attained, and if legal and peaceable means are
in the hands of the people of removing their govern-
ors for misconduct;-if the people of England, for
example, really chose the members of the House of
Commons, and renewed their choice so frequently,

10
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
as to have the power of removal after a short ex-
perience of misconduct, the freedom of the press
would be unnecessary.
So far is this from being true, that it is doubtful
whether a power in the people of choosing their own
rulers, without the liberty of the press, would be an
advantage.
Freedom of Censure on the Conduct of their Rulers,
is necessary for the good of the People
It is perfectly clear, that all chance of advantage
to the people, from having the choice of their rulers,
depends upon their making a good choice. If they
make a bad choice—if they elect people either inca-
pable, or disinclined, to use well the power entrusted
to them, they incur the same evils to which they are
doomed when they are deprived of the due control
over those by whom their affairs are administered:
We may then ask, if there are any possible means
by which the people can make a good choice, besides
the liberty of the press? The very foundation of a
good choice is knowledge. The fuller and more per-
fect the knowledge, the better the chance, where all
sinister interest is absent, of a good choice. How
can the people receive the most perfect knowledge
relative to the characters of those who present them-
selves to their choice, but by information conveyed
freely, and without reserve, from one to another?
There is another use of the freedom of the press,
no less deserving the most profound attention, that
of making known the conduct of the individuals who
have been chosen. This latter service is of so much
importance, that upon it the whole value of the for-
mer depends.
This is capable of being rigidly demonstrated. No
benefit is obtained by making choice of a man who
is well qualified to serve the people, and also well
inclined to serve them, if you place him in a situa-
tion in which he will have preponderant motives to
serve himself at their expence.
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
If any set of men are chosen to wield the powers
of government, while the people have not the means
of knowing in what manner they discharge their
duties, they will have the means of serving themselves
at the expence of the people; and all the miseries of
evil government are the certain consequence.
Suppose the people to choose the members of the
Legislative Assembly, with power of rechoosing,
or dismissing them, at short intervals: To what de-
sirable end could these powers be exercised, without
the liberty of the press? Suppose that any one of
those whom they have chosen has misconducted him-
self, or promoted, as far as depended upon him, the
ends of misgovernment; how are the people to know
that the powers with which they had entrusted him
had been treacherously employed?
If they do not know, they will rechoose him, and
that as cordially as the man who has served them with
the greatest fidelity. This they are under a deplor-
able necessity of doing, even to be just; for, as they
know no difference between him and the best, it would
be on their part iniquity to make any. The conse-
quences would be fatal. If one man saw that he
might promote misrule for his own advantage, so
would another; so, of course, would they all. In
these circumstances, we see laid the foundation on
which, in every country, bad government is reared.
On this foundation it is impossible that it should not
be reared. When the causes are the same, who can
expect that the effects will be different? It is un-
necessary to dwell upon these fundamental truths,
because they have already been developed in the
article GovKRNMENT.,
Without the knowledge, then, of what is done by
their representatives, in the use of the powers en-
trusted to them, the people cannot profit by the
power of choosing them, and the advantages of good
government are unattainable. It will not surely
cost many words to satisfy all classes of readers


12
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
that, without the free and unrestrained use of the
press, the requisite knowledge cannot be obtained.
That an accurate report of what is done by each
of the representatives, a transcript of his speeches,
and a statement of his propositions and votes, is
necessary to be laid before the people, to enable
them to judge of his conduct, nobody, we presume,
will deny. This requires the use of the cheapest
means of communication, and, we add, the free use
of those means. Unless every man has the liberty of
publishing the proceedings of the Legislative As-
sembly, the people can have no security that they are
fairly published. If it is in the power of their rulers
to permit one person, and forbid another, the people
may be sure that a false report, a report calculated
to make them believe that they are well governed
when they are ill governed, will be often presented to
them.
One thing more is necessary, and so necessary, that,
if it is wanting, the other might as well be wanting
also. The publication of the proceedings tells what
is done. This, however, is useless, unless a correct
judgment is passed upon what is done.
We have brought this inquiry, then, to an im-
portant point. In the article Gover NMENT, we have
seen that, unless the people hold in their own hands
an effectual power of control on the acts of their
government, the government will be inevitably vic-
ious: We have now seen, that they cannot exercise
this -control to any beneficial purpose without the
means of forming a correct judgment upon the con-
duct of their representatives: We have likewise seen,
that one of the means necessary to enable them to
judge correctly of the conduct of their representa-
tives, is the liberty to every body of publishing re-
ports of what they do. It remains to inquire, by what
other acts the press can be made to contribute to
the same desirable end.
What is wanted is, that all the people, or as many

13
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
of them as possible, should estimate correctly the
consequences of the acts proposed or done by their
representatives, and also that they should know what
acts might have been proposed, if the best were not
proposed, from which better consequences would
have followed. This end would be accomplished most
effectually, if those who are sufficiently enlightened
would point out to those who are in danger of mis-
takes, the true conclusions; and showing the weight
of evidence to be in their favour, should obtain for
them the universal assent.
How is this to be accomplished? In what manner
are those wise men to be chosen? And who are to
be the choosers? Directly the object cannot be at-
tained. There are no distinct and indubitable marks
by which wisdom, and less by which integrity, is to
be known. And who is to be trusted with the priv-
ilege of pointing them out? They whose judgment
requires to be directed are not well qualified to de-
termine who shall direct them. And if the rulers are
to choose, they will employ none but those who will
act in conformity to their views, and enable them
to benefit themselves by the pillage and oppression
of the people.
As there is no possible organ of choice, no choice
whatever ought to be made. If no choice is to be
made, every man that pleases ought to be allowed.
All this is indubitable. The consequences of deny-
ing any part of it are so obvious, that hardly any
man, we suppose, will risk the imputations to which
such a denial would justly expose him.
They who say that no choice ought to be made,
say, in effect, that no limit whatsoever ought to be
imposed upon the liberty of the press. The one of
these propositions is involved in the other. To im-
pose any restraint upon the liberty of the press, is
undoubtedly to make a choice. If the restraint is
imposed by the government, it is the government
that chooses the directors of the public mind:#If
14
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
any government chooses the directors of the public
mind, that government is despotic.
Suppose that, by the restraint imposed upon the
liberty of the press, all censure of the government is
forbidden, here is undoubtedly a choice. The gov-
ernment, in this case, virtually says, The people who
might attempt the task of directing the public mind
are of two sorts; one that of those who would cen-
sure; another that of those who would not censure;
I choose the latter.
Suppose that not every censure, but only such and
such kinds of censure, are forbidden; here, again, is
still a choice, while confessedly there is no party to
- whom the power of choosing for the rest can with
safety be given. #.
If not every censure, but only some censures, are
to be forbidden, what are those to which the pro-
hibition should extend? The answer to this question
will elucidate nearly all that yet remains in any
degree obscure, of the doctrine of the liberty of the
press.
It will not be said that any censure which is just
should be forbidden; because that would undoubt-
edly be to detract from the means of enabling the
people to form correct judgments; and we have, we
trust, rendered it indisputable that no source of ben-
efit to society is at all to be compared with that of
correct judgments, on their government and its func-
tionaries, formed by the people, and determining
their actions. *
But what censures are just and what are unjust;
in other words, what are the conclusions which ought
to be formed respecting the properties and the acts of
the government, is exactly the point to be deter-
mined. If you say that no man is to pass an unjust
censure upon the government, who is to judge? It
is surely unnecessary to repeat the proof of the
proposition, that there is nobody who can safely be
permitted to judge. The path of practical wisdom
15
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
is as clear as day: All censures must be permitted,
equally; just, and unjust.
Where various conclusions are formed among a
number of men, upon a subject on which it would
be unsafe, and therefore improper, to give any minor
portion of them a power of determining for the rest,
only one expedient remains. Fortunately, that is
an expedient, the operation of which is powerful, and
its effects beneficial in the highest degree. All the
conclusions which have formed themselves in the
minds of different individuals, should be openly ad-
duced; and the power of comparison and choice
should be granted to all. Where there is no motive
to attach a man to error, it is natural to him to em-
brace the truth; especially if pains are taken to adapt
the explanation to his capacity. Every man, pos-
sessed of reason, is accustomed to weigh evidence,
and to be guided and determined by its preponder-
ance. When various conclusions are, with their evi-
dence, presented with equal care and with equal skill,
there is a moral certainty, though some few may be
misguided, that the greater number will judge aright,
and that the greatest force of evidence, wherever it
is, will produce the greatest impression.
As this is a proposition upon which every thing
depends, it is happy that the evidence of it should be
so very clear and striking. There is, indeed, hardly
any law of human nature more generally recognized,
wherever there is not a motive to deny its existence.
“To the position of Tully, that if Virtue could be
seen, she must be loved, may be added,” says Dr.
Johnson, “that if Truth could be heard, she must be
obeyed.” (Rambler, No. 87)—“Je vous plains, mes
Pères,” says Mons. Pascal to the Jesuits, “d’avoir
recours à de tels remèdes. Vous croyez avoir la force
et l'impunité: mais je crois avoir la verité, et l'inno-
cence, C'est une etrange et longue guerre que celle,
ou la violence essaie d’opprimer la verité. Tous
les efforts de la violence ne peuvent affoiblir la verité,

16
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
et. ne servent qu'à la relever davantage: toutes les
lumières de la verité ne peuvent rien pour arrêter la
violence, et ne font que l’irriter encore plus. Quand
la force combat la force, la plus puissante detruit la
moindre: quand l’on expose les discours aux discours,
ceux qui sont veritables et convainquants confondent
et dissipent ceux qui n'ont que la vanité et le men-
songe.” (Lett. Provinc. 12.)—“Reason,” says Burke,
“clearly and manfully delivered, has in itself a mighty
force; but reason, in the mouth of legal authority, is,
one may fairly say, irresistible.” (Lett. on Regicide
Peace.)
It is of importance to show how many of the great-
est men, of all ages and countries, have borne testi-
mony to the prevalence of true over false conclusions,
when both are fairly offered to the human mind.
“Truth,” says Mr. Locke, “certainly would do well
enough, if she were once left to shift for herself. She
seldom has received, and I fear never will receive,
much assistance from the power of great men, to
whom she is but rarely known, and more rarely wel-
come. She is not taught by law nor has she any
need of force to procure her entrance into the minds
of men.” (Letter on Toleration.) The following is
the emphatical language of Montesquieu: “La raison
a un empire naturel; elle a même un empire tyranni-
que: on lui resiste, mais cette resistance est son
triomphe, encore un peu de temps, et l’on sera forcé
de revenir à elle.” (Esp. de Loia, l. 28, ch. 38. —“It
is noted out of Cicero, by Machiavel, that the people,
though they are not so prone to find out truth of
themselves, as to follow custom, or run into error;
yet if they be shown truth, they not only acknowl-
edge and embrace it very suddenly, but are the most
constant and faithful guardians and conservators of
it.” (Harrington.)—“The labour of a confutation,”
says Chillingworth, “I have not in any place found
such labour or difficulty, but that it was under-
takeable by a man of very mean abilities; and the


17
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
reason is, because it is Truth I plead for; which is so
strong an argument for itself, that it needs only light
to discover it.” (Religion of Protestants.)—“About
things on which the public thinks long,” says Dr.
Johnson, “it commonly attains to think right” (Life
of Addison.)—“The adversary,” says Dr. Campbell,
“is both subtile and powerful. With such an adver-
sary, I should on very unequal terms enter the lists,
had I not the advantage of being on the side of
truth. And an eminent advantage this doubtless is.
It requires but moderate abilities to speak in defence
of a good cause. A good cause demands but a dis-
tinct exposition, and a fair hearing; and we may say,
with great propriety, it will speak for itself.”
(Campbell on Miracles, Introd.) *
We have then arrived at the following important
conclusions,—that there is no safety to the people in
allowing anybody to choose opinions for them;
that there are no marks by which it can be decided
beforehand, what opinions are true and what are
false; that there must, therefore, be equal freedom
of declaring all opinions, both true and false; and
that, when all opinions, true and false, are equally de-
clared, the assent of the greater number, when their
interests are not opposed to them, may always be ex-
pected to be given to the true. These principles,
the foundation of which appears to be impregnable,
suffice for the speedy determination of every prac-
tical question.
All censure thrown upon the government, all cen-
sure thrown either upon the institutions of the gov-
ernment, or upon the conduct of any, of the func-
tionaries of government, supreme or subordinate,
has a tendency to produce resistance to the goyern-
ment. -
Of the censures thrown upon government, some
may have a tendency to produce resistance to the
operations of government in detail; others that gen:
18 -
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
eral resistance which has in view some great altera-
tion in the government.
Of the first sort would be any such accusation of
the conduct and disposition of a judge, as might
excite the people, whose sympathies were roused in
favour of the individual against whom his sentence
was to operate, to rescue him from the officers of
-justice. We have already shown that such a rescue
ought to be punished, and any direct exhortation to
it ought to be punished. It will now be evident, we
trust, that no censure on the judge, though capable
of being treated as an indirect exhortation, ought to
be punished.
The reason is conclusive. The people ought to
know, if possible, the real qualities of the actions of
those who are entrusted with any share in the man-
agement of their affairs. This they have no chance
of knowing, without the unlimited power of censure
upon those actions, both in gross and detail. To see
the full force of these propositions, it is only neces-
sary to apply the principles which have been already
established.
If the people have not the means of knowing the
actions of all public functionaries, they have no se-
curity for the good conduct even of their represen-
tatives. Suppose it is the duty of their representatives
to watch the conduct of the judges, and secure the
perfection of judicature, the people cannot know
whether their representatives perform this duty, un-
less they know what the conduct of the judges is.
Ignorance of this would of itself suffice to vitiate the
government. A door would be left open, through
which the rulers might benefit themselves at the ex-
pence of the people. All the profit to be made by
an abuse of the power of justice, would thus become
the profit of the representatives, by whom it would
be allowed, and encouraged, as far as the knowledge
which they could not withhold from the people, would
permit.
19
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
That the people ought, therefore, to know the con-
duct of their judges, and when we say judges we
mean every other functionary, and the more perfect-
ly the better, may be laid down as indubitable. They
are deprived of all trustworthy means of knowing, if
any limit whatsoever is placed to the power of cen-
Sure,
All censure consists in the delivery of an unfavor-
able opinion, with or without the grounds of it. This
is the essence of censure. But if the conduct of the
judge deserves that an unfavorable opinion should be
entertained of it, the more perfectly that is known
to the people, the better. *
The conduct of the judge, on this occasion, says a
defender, does not deserve an unfavourable opinion:
A public expression of such an opinion ought, there-
fore, to be prohibited. But there are occasions on
which the conduct of judges deserves an unfavour-
able opinion. When it is deserved, there is no se-
curity for good government, unless it is allowed to
be made known. How can you allow an unfavour-
able opinion to be delivered in the one case, and not
delivered in the other? To have the benefit of it in
the one case, you must submit to the evil of it in
the other.
In matters of Government, undeserved Praise as
mischievous as undeserved Blame.
As the real point of importance is, to establish
correct opinions in the minds of the people, it is as
mischievous to inculcate a favourable opinion, when
an unfavourable is deserved, as an unfavourable
when a favourable is deserved; and, in the eye of
reason, it is incontrovertible, that, if the one deserves
to be prevented by punishment, so does the other.
But, if an unfavourable opinion is pronounced
of any public functionary; of a judge, for example,
would you have it left uncontradicted? Would you
20
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
&
not grant the liberty of calling in question the truth
of the allegations, and of supporting a different
opinion? If not, the character of no public func-

tionary would be safe, and any man, however de-
serving, might be made to appear the proper object
of the most unfavourable sentiments. Why should
not the two cases be treated equally? Why should
not the favourable, as well as the unfavourable
opinion be open to contradiction?
It is perfectly certain, that it is not in the power
of law to mark out, by antecedent definition, any
sort of men, of whom it can say, all opinions favour-
able to such men shall be punished. It can never
be affirmed of any men beforehand that they will
certainly perform such and such injurious actions.
If they do perform them, all declarations conform-
able with the matter of fact are good. But the
question is, whether they have performed them?
One man, affirms that they have. Is that to be taken
for granted? And is no man to be allowed to affirm
the contrary, and to sift the grounds upon which
the allegations of the other man are supported? It
is by weighing well the evidence on both sides, that
a well-founded opinion is capable of being formed.
And it is certain, that the best security for having
the evidence on both sides fully adduced, and the
strength and weakness of it perfectly disclosed, is
by permitting all those who are attached to differ-
ent opinions to do what they can for the support of
them.
If it is evident that it ought not to be permitted to
speak evil of public functionaries without limit,
while any limit is put to the power of speaking well
of them; it is equally evident that, for the purpose
of forming a correct opinion of their conduct, it
ought not to be permitted to speak well of them,
and oppose any limit whatsoever to the power of
speaking ill of them. dºt
It ought not to be permitted to speak evil of
21
on Liberty of THE PRESS
them without an equal liberty of speaking well; be-
cause, in that case, the evidence against them might
be made to appear much stronger than it was. It
ought not to be permitted to speak well of them
without an equal liberty of speaking ill; because, in
that case, the evidence in favour of them might be
made to appear much greater than it really was. In
either case, the people would be misguided, and de-
frauded of that moral knowledge of the conduct of
their rulers, the paramount importance of which has
so fully appeared.
It may be said (as by the short-sighted, if we did
not anticipate them, it would be said), that if, by
limiting the power of censure, the people are made
to judge more favourably of their rulers than they
deserve, the evil is small; but if they are permitted
to form a very unfavourable opinion, the conse-
quences are alarming.
We believe it may be rigidly demonstrated, that
no evils are greater than those which result from a
more favourable opinion of their rulers, on the part
of the people, than their rulers deserve; because just
as far as that undue favour extends, bad govern-
ment is secured. By an opinion of their rulers more
favourable than they deserve, is implied an igno-
rance on the part of the people of certain acts of
their rulers by which the people suffer. All acts by
which the rulers have any motive to make the people
suffer, are acts by which the rulers profit. When
the ignorance of the people extends to material
points, all the evils of bad government are secured.
These are the greatest of all possible evils. To this
it will not be said that the ignorance of the people
ought to extend. On all material points, it is ad-
mitted, then, that the freedom of censure ought to
be complete. But if it is to be allowed on great
points, on those where it is calculated to excite the
greatest disapprobation; what can be thought of
their consistency, who would restrain it on those
22
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
where it is only calculated to excite a small? If it
is proper to protect the people from great injuries
at the hands of their rulers, by exciting a strong, it
is good to protect them against small injuries, by
exciting a weak disapprobation.
To public functionaries may be imputed either
acts which they have not performed, or a want of
certain qualifications, moral or intellectual, which
they possess.
With respect to acts, and even dispositions, which
do not, either directly or indirectly, concern their
public function, the same protection may be safely
extended to them as to private men.
Acts in their public capacity which they have not
performed, may be imputed to them either by mere
forgery, and without any appearance of ground, or
they may be imputed with some appearance of
ground. From permitting the former, no good can
be derived. They ought, therefore, to be prevented,
in the same way as false imputations, injurious to
individuals in their private capacity. That there
should be no restraint in imputing actions to any
public functionary which he may appear to have
done, flows immediately from the principles already
established, and requires not that any thing should
here be added to its proof. Any appearance
sufficient to lay the foundation of the slightest
suspicion, renders it useful to call the attention of
the public to the suspected part, which can only be
done by making the suspicion known. A man may
indeed, publish, as a matter of fact, what is support-
ed by appearances which would only justify the
slightest suspicion. In that case, he is sure of in-
curring the disgrace of temerity, if not of malignity;
and this is all the penalty which needs or can safely
be inflicted upon him.
In imputing inaptitude to a public functionary,
on the score either of intellectual or moral qualities,
scarcely any limitation would be safe. Every man
23
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
ought to have liberty to declare upon this subject
any opinion which he pleases, and support it by any
evidence which he may think adapted to the end.
If, in supporting his opinion of the inaptitude of
any public functionary, he imputes to him actions
which there is not even an appearance of his having
performed, that limited prohibition, the propriety
of which we have just recognized, will strictly apply.
With this exception, freedom should be unimpaired.
We have now, therefore, explained, we hope suffi-
ciently, in what manner the principles which we have
established require, that.the use of the press should
be regulated in speaking of the action of
functionaries, and of their fitness for the duties
which they are appointed to discharge, whether those
functionaries are the immediate representatives of
the people, or others whom it is the business of those
representatives to control.
Freedom of Censure on the Institutions of Govern-
"ment is necessary for the good of the People.
We have next to inquire in what manner those
principles require that the use of the press should
be regulated in speaking of the institutions of
government. The illustrations already adduced will
supersede the use of many words upon this part of
the subject.
Institutions of government are good in propor-
tion as they save the people from evil, whether it be
evil created by the government, or evil not prevented
by the government. Institutions of government are
bad in proportion as they are the cause of evil to the
people, either by what they create, or what they fail
in preventing.
According to this statement, which it is impossible
to controvert, institutions of government may, in
strict propriety of speech, be said to be the cause of
all the evil which they do not save the people from,
and from which the people would be saved by any
other institutions.
24
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
It is therefore of the highest importance that the
people should know what are the institutions which
save from the greatest quantity of evil, and how
much their own institutions want of being those best
institutions.
Institutions of government are bad, either because
those in whose hands the powers of government are
placed do not know that they are bad, and though
willing, cannot improve them; or they are bad, be-
cause those who have in their hands the powers of
government do not wish that they should be im-
proved.
Where the rulers are willing, but do not know
how to improve the institutions of government;
everything which leads to a knowledge of their de-
fects is desirable to both rulers and people. That
which most certainly leads to such knowledge is,
that every man who thinks he understands any thing
of the subject, should produce his opinions, with the
evidence on which they are supported, and that every
man who disapproves of these opinions should state
his objections. All the knowledge which all the in-
dividuals in the society possess upon the subject is
thus brought, as it were, to a common stock or
treasury; while every thing which has the appear-
ance of being knowledge, but is only a counterfeit
of knowledge, is assayed and rejected. Every sub-
ject has the best chance of becoming thoroughly
understood, when, by the delivery of all opinions, it
is presented in all points of view, when all the evi-
"dence upon both sides is brought forward, and all
, those who are most interested in showing the weak-
ness of what is weak in it, and the strength of what
is strong, are, by the freedom of the press, permit-
ted, and by the warmth of discussion, excited, to de-
vote to it the keenest application of their faculties.
False opinions will then be delivered. True; but
when are we most secure against the influence of
false opinions? Most assuredly when the grounds
25
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
of these opinions are the most thoroughly searched.
When are the grounds of opinion most thoroughly
searched? When discussion upon the subject is the
most general and the most intense; when the great-
est number of qualified persons engage in the dis-
cussion, and are excited by all the warmth of com-
petition, and all the interest of important conse-
quences, to study the subject with the deepest at-
tention. To give a body of rulers, or any other body
of men, a power of choosing, for the rest, opinions
upon government, without discussion, we have al-
ready seen, upon good evidence, is the way to se-
cure the prevalence of the most destructive errors.
When institutions are bad, and the rulers would
gladly change them if they knew they were bad,
discussion, it will not be disputed, would be good
for both parties, both rulers and ruled. There is,
however, another case, and that by far the most
common, where the rulers are attached to the bad
institutions, and are disposed to do all in their power
to prevent any alteration. This is the case with all
institutions which leave it in the power of the men
who are entrusted with the powers Óf government,
to make use of them for their own advantage, to the
detriment of the people; in other words, which en-
able them to do injury to the people, or prevent
the people from good. This is the case with by far
the greater number of those institutions by which
the people suffer. They are institutions contrived
for benefiting the few at the cost of the many.
With respect, therefore, to the greater number of
defective institutions, it is the interest of the rulers
that true opinions should not prevail. But with re-
spect to these institutions, it is of still greater im-
portance to the people that discussion should be
free. Such institutions as the rulers would improve,
if they knew that they were defective, will be im-
proved as the rulers themselves become sensible of
their defects. Such defective institutions as the
26
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
rulers would not wish to see improved, will never
be improved, unless the knowledge of these defects
is diffused among the people, and excites among
them a disapprobation which the rulers do not think
it prudent to disregard. º
That the prevalence of true opinions among the
people, relative to those defects in their political in-
stitutions, by which the rulers profit at their ex-
pence, is of the utmost importance to the people,
is therefore a proposition, which no improbity will
dare openly to controvert. That freedom of dis-
cussion is the only security which the people can
have for the prevalence of true opinions has already
been proved. It is therefore proved, that freedom
of discussion, in its utmost perfection, they ought
to enjoy.
What is included in the term freedom of discus-
sion, is evident from what has already been said.
Freedom of discussion means the power of pre-
senting all opinions equally, relative to the subject
of discussion; and of recommending them by any
medium of persuasion which the author may think
proper to employ. If any obstruction is given to
the delivering of one sort of opinions, not given to
the delivering of another; if any advantage is at-
tached to the delivering of one sort of opinions,
not attached to the delivery of another; so far
equality of treatment is destroyed, and so far the
freedom of discussion is infringed; so far truth is
not left to the support of her own evidence; and so
far, if the advantages are attached to the side of
error, truth is deprived of her chance of prevailing.
To attach advantage to the delivering of one set
of opinions, disadvantage to the delivering of an-
other, is to make a choice. But we have already
seen, that it is not safe for the people to let any
body choose opinions for them. If it be said, that
the people themselves might be the authors of this
preference, what is this but to say, that the people

27
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
can choose better before discussion than after; be-
fore they have obtained information than after it?
No, if the people choose before discussion, before
information, they cannot choose for themselves.
They must follow blindly the impulse of certain in-
dividuals, who, therefore, choose for them. This
is, therefore, a pretence, for the purpose of disguis-
ing the truth, and cheating the people of that choice,
upon which all their security for good government
depends.
If these deductions are as clear and incontrover-
tible as to us they appear to be, the inquiry respect-
ing the principles which ought to regulate the use
of the press is drawn pretty nearly to its close. We
have shown, that as far as regards the violation of
the rights of individuals, in respect to both persons
and things, no definition on account of the press is
required. We have shown in what manner the
rights of individuals, in regard to reputation, should
be defined by the civil code, and the violation of
them prevented by the penal. We next proceeded
to what may be considered as the main branch of
the inquiry, namely, the use of the press in speak-
ing of the institutions and functionaries of govern-
ment. We have found, that in this respect the free-
dom of the press is of such importance, that there
is no security for good government without it. We
have also found, that the use of it, in respect to
these subjects, admits but of two useful restrictions;
—that of a direct exhortation to obstruct any of the
operations of government in detail, and that of im-
puting to a functionary of government a criminal
act, which there was no ground, nor even any ap-
pearance of ground, to impute to him. These re-
strictions, of course, it would be very easy to define
in the criminal code, and to find appropriate motives
to sanction. In all other respects, we have seen that
the press ought to be free; that if there is any limit
to the power of delivering unfavourable opinions,
28
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
respecting either the functionaries, or the institu-
tions of government, and of recommending those
opinions by any media, with the single exception of
false facts, under the circumstances mentioned
above, the benefits which may be derived from the
freedom of the press are so greatly infringed that
hardly any security for good government can re-
Iſla IIl.
Limitations to Freedom of Discussion, which in-
volve its destruction.
In the administration of English law, or rather
of what is called law, upon this subject, without be-
ing any thing better than the arbitrary will of the
judges, it is said, that though discusssion should be
free, it should be “decent;” and that all “indecency”
in discussion should be punished as a libel. It is
not our object in this discourse to give an exposi-
tion of the manifold deformities of the English law
of libel. If we have been successful in developing
the true principles which ought to regulate the free-
dom of the press, every reader may, by an applica-
tion of those principles, determine what he ought to
think of the several particulars which there may at-
tract his attention. We shall confine ourselves to
to a short notice of those dicta, or doctrines, which
seem most likely to be pleaded in opposition to the
principles which we have endeavoured to establish.
The question is, whether indecent discussion
should be prohibited? To answer this question, we
must, of course, inquire what is meant by indecent.
In English libel law, where this term holds so
distinguished a place, is it not defined?
English legislators have not hitherto been good
at defining; and English lawyers have always
vehemently condemned, and grossly abused it. The
word “indecent,” therefore, has always been a term
under which it was not difficult, on each occasion,

29
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
for the judge to include whatever he did not like.
“Decent,” and “what the judge likes,” have been
pretty nearly synonymous.
Indecency of discussion cannot mean the delivery
either of true or of false opinions, because discussion
implies both. In all discussion there is supposed at
least two parties, one who affirms and one who
denies. One of them must be in the wrong.
The delivery, though not of all true opinions, yet
of some, may be said to be indecent. All opinions
are either favourable or unfavourable. True opin-
ions that are favourable to government and its func-
tionaries will not be said to be indecent; nor will
all opinions that are true and unfavourable be
marked out for prohibition under that name.
Opinions unfavourable may either be greatly un-
favourable or slightly unfavourable. If any un-
favourable opinions are exempted from the charge
of indecency, it must be those which are slightly so.
But observe what would be the consequence of pro-
hibiting, as indecent, those which are greatly un-
favourable. A true opinion, greatly unfavourable
to a functionary, or institution of government, is
an opinion that the functionary, or institution, is
greatly hurtful to the people. You would permit
the slight evil to be spoken of, and hence removed;
you would not permit the great evil to be spoken
of.
If no true opinion can be regarded as indecent,
meaning by indecent, requiring punishment, we
must inquire if any false opinion on matters of
government ought to be treated as such. If all false
opinions are indecent, all discussion is indecent. All
false opinions, therefore, are not indecent. The
English libel law does not treat any favourable
opinions, how much soever false, as indecent. If all
opinions that are false and unfavourable are said
to be indecent, who is to judge if they are false? It
has been already proved, that the people can confide
30
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
the power of determining what opinions are true,
what are false to none but themselves. Nothing
can resist the following argument. Either the
people do know, or they do not know, that an opin-
ion is false: if they do not know, they can permit
nobody to judge for them, and must leave discus-
sion its free course: if they do know, all infliction
of evil for the delivery of an opinion, which then
can do no harm, would be purely mischievous and
utterly absurd.
If all opinions, true and false, must be allowed to
be delivered, so must all the media of proof. We
need not examine minutely the truth of this infer-
ence, because it will probably be allowed. It will
be said, however, that though all opinions may be
delivered, and the grounds of them stated, it must
be done in calm and gentle language. Vehement
expressions, all words and phrases calculated to in-
flame, may justly be regarded as indecent, because
they have a tendency rather to pervert than rectify
the judgment.
To examine this proposition, it must be taken out
of that state of vagueness in which so many things
are left by the English law, and made, if possible,
to speak a language, the meaning of which may be
ascertained. *
We have just decided, and as it appeared, on very
substantial grounds, that the statement of no
opinion, favourable or unfavourable, true or false,
with its media of proof, ought to be forbidden. No
language, necessary for that purpose, can be inde-
cent, meaning here, as before, nothing by that term,
as nothing can be meant, but simply punishable, or ,
proper for punishment.
But the only difference between delivering an
opinion one way and another way is, that in the one
case it is simply delivered, in the other it is delivered
with indications of passion. The meaning of the
31
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
phrase in question then must be, that an opinion
must not be delivered with indications of passion.
What! not even a favourable one?
“Oh, yes! a favourable one. Merited praise
ought to be delivered with warmth.”
Here, then, is inequality, and therefore mischief,
at once. An opinion, meaning here a true opinion,
if it is favourable, you allow—if unfavourable, you
do not allow—to be delivered in a certain way.
Why? Because in that way, you say, it is calculated
to make an undue impression. Opinions favourable,
then, you wish to make an undue impression, and
by that confess the wickedness of your intention.
You desire that the people should think better of
the institutions and functionaries of their govern-
ment than they deserve; in other words, you wish
the government to be bad.
If opinions, to what degree soever unfavourable,
may be freely and fully delivered, there are two con-
clusive reasons why the terms in which they are de-
livered should not be liable to punishment. In the
first place, the difference between one mode of de-
livery and another is of little consequence. In the
second place, you cannot forbid the delivery in one
set of terms, without giving a power of preventing
it in almost all. *
First, the difference is of little consequence. If
I say barely that such a functionary of government,
or such an institution of government, is the cause
of great injury and suffering to the people, all that
I can do more by any language is, to give intima-
tion, that the conduct of such functionary, or the ex-
istence of such institution, excites in me great con-
tempt, or great anger, or great hatred, and ought
to excite them in others. But if I put this in the
way of a direct proposition, I may do so, because
then it will be a naked statement with regard to a
matter of fact, and cannot be forbidden, without
*
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FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
overthrowing the whole of the doctrine which we
have already established.
If, then, I give indication of certain sentiments of
mine, and of my opinion of what ought to be the
sentiments of others earplicitly, I ought, you say,
to be held innocent; if implicitly, guilty. Implicity,
or explicity, that is the difference, and the whole
of the difference. If I say, that such a judge, on
such an occasion, took a bribe, and pronounced an
unjust decision, which ruined a meritorious man and
his family, this is a simple declaration of opinion,
and ought not, according to the doctrine already
established, to meet with the smallest obstruction.
If I also state the matter of fact with regard to my-
self, that this action has excited in me great com-
passion for the injured family, and great anger and
hatred against the author of their wrongs, this must
be fully allowed. I must further be allowed to ex-
press freely my opinion, that this action ought to
excite similar sentiments in other members of the
community, and that the judge ought to receive an
appropriate punishment. Much of all this, however,
I may say in another manner. I may say it much
more shortly by implication.—Here, I may cry, is
an act for the indignation of mankind! Here is a
villain, who, invested with the most sacred of trusts,
has prostituted it to the vilest of purposes! Why is
he not an object of public execration? Why are
not the vials of wrath already poured forth upon his
odious head?—All this means nothing, but that he
has committed the act; that I hate him for it, and
commiserate the sufferers; that I think he ought to
be punished; and that other people ought to feel as
I do. It cannot be pretended, that between these
two modes of expression, the difference, in point of
real and ultimate effect, can be considerable. For a
momentary warmth, the passionate language may
have considerable power. The permanent opinion
formed of the character of the man, as well as the
33
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
punishment, which, under a tolerable administration
of law, he can sustain, must depend wholly upon the
real state of the facts; any peculiarity in the
language in which the facts may have been origi-
nally announced soon loses its effect. If that
language has expressed no more indignation than
what was really due, it has done nothing more than
what the knowledge of the facts themselves would
have done. If it has expressed more indignation
than what was due, the knowledge of the facts oper-
ates immediately to extinguish it, and, what is more,
to excite an unfavourable opinion of him who had
thus displayed his intemperance. No evil then is
produced; or none but what is very slight and mo–
mentary. If there should be a short-lived excess
of unfavourable feeling, we have next to consider
what is the proper remedy. Punishment should
never be applied, where the end can be attained by
more desirable means. To destroy any excess of
unfavourable feeling, all that is necessary is, to show
the precise state of the facts, and the real amount of
the evil which they import. All excess of feeling
arises from imputing to the facts a greater efficacy
in the way of evil than belongs to them. Correct
this opinion, and the remedy is complete.
Secondly, you cannot forbid the use of passionate
language, without giving a power of obstructing
the use of censorial language altogether. The rea-
son exists in the very nature of language. You
cannot speak of moral acts in language which does
not imply approbation and disapprobation. All
such language may be termed passionate language.
How can you point out a line where passionate
language begins, dispassionate ends? The effect of
words upon the mind depends upon the associations
which we have with them. But no two men have
the same associations with the same words. A word
which may excite strains of emotion in one breast,
will excite none in another. A word may appear
34
FOR ADVOCATING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT
to one man a passionate word, which does not ap-
pear so to another. Suppose the legislature were
to say, that all censure, conveyed in passionate
language, shall be punished, hardly could the vices
of either the functionaries or the institutions of
government be spoken of in any language which
the judges might not condemn as passionate
language, and which they would not have an inter-
est, in league with other functionaries, to prohibit
by their condemnation. The evil, therefore, which
must of necessity be incurred by a power to punish
language to which the name of passionate could be
applied, would be immense. The evil which is in-
curred by leaving it exempt from punishment is too
insignificant to allow that almost anything should
be risked for preventing it.
Religion, in some of its shapes, has, in most
countries, been placed on the footing of an institu-
tion of the state. Ought the freedom of the press
to be as complete, in regard to this, as we have seen
that it ought to be, in regard to all other institutions
of the state? If any one says that it ought not, it
, is incumbent upon him to show wherein the prin-
ciples, which are applicable to the other institutions,
fail in their application to this.
We have seen, that, in regard to all other insti-
tutions, it is unsafe for the people to permit any but
themselves to choose opinions for them. Nothing
can be more certain, than that it is unsafe for them
to permit any but themselves to choose for them in
religion.
If they part with the power of choosing their own
religious opinions, they part with every power. It
is well known with what ease religious opinions can
be made to embrace everything upon which the un-
limited power of rulers, and the utmost degradation
of the people, depend. The doctrine of passive obe-
dience and non-resistance was a religious doctrine.
Permit any man, or any set of men, to say what

35
ON LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
3'- *- : *...
shall, and what shall not, be religious opinions, you
make them despotic immediately.
This is so obvious, that it requires neither illustra-
tion nor proof.
But if the people here, too, must choose opinions
for themselves, discussion must have its course; the
same propositions which we have proved to be true
in regard to other institutions, are true in regard
to this; and no opinion ought to be impeded more
than another, by any thing but the adduction of
evidence on the opposite side.
*…*- *...* r * ~f~,
JUDICIAL DEFINITION
OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
“TO SUFFER THE CIVIL NAGISTRATE
TO INTRUDE HIS POVVER INTO THE
FIELD OF OPINION, OR TO RESTRAIN
THE PROFESSION OR PROPAGATION
OF PRINCIPLES, ON SUPPOSITION OF
THEIR ILL TENDENCY, IS A DANGER-
OUS FALLACY, WHICHAT ONCE DE-
STROYS ALL LIBERTY, BECAUSE HE,
BEING OF COURSE JUDGE OF THAT
TENDENCY, VVILLMAKE HIS OPINIONS
THE RULE OF JUDGMENT, AND AP.
PROVE OR, CONDENMN THE SENTL
MENTS OF OTHERS ONLY AS THEY
SHALL SOUARE VVITH OR DIFFER,
FROM HIS OVVN. IT IS TIME ENOUGH
FOR THE RIGHTFUL PURPOSE OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT FOR ITS OFFIC.
ERS TO INTERFERE VVHEN PRINCL
PLES BREAK OUT INTO OVERT ACTS
AGAINST PEACE AND GOOD ORDER,.”
Virginia Legislature. Approved in Reynolds, vs. U. S., 98 U. S. 163.
INTELLECTUAL SLAVERY
BY THEODORE SCHROEDER
To permit the limitation of mental freedom
concedes power to create every other slavery
since only those of high intelligence as to free-
men's rights can know and so love liberty, as to
make possible the overthrow of any tyranny.
Censorship fosters all the horrors of every serf.
dom. It precludes the intelligence necessary to
peaceful revolutions and by the same ignorance
makes revolutions by violence more bloody in
method and less useful in consequences. It is the
surest method of prolonging legalized injustice,
the strongest chain for slaves, the chief support
of a “bloody Tzar” and of the more subtle, in-
direct and therefore more dangerous tyranny of
majorities. It is the slimy ooze in which germi-
nates the prudish purulence of our puritan
“morals” and is the creator of “moralists” for
revenue who easily develop into professional per-
jurers and spy-provocateurs, Tyrant-wrongs and
rebel-vengence will continue their vicious round
until our minds are freed from conventions, tra-
ditions, superstitions and statutes, until we are
permitted to hear all and read all that unrestrain-
ed minds are willing to offer and until we our-
selves are desirous to know all, free to believe all
and encouraged to express all that we believe, or
feel. Liberty by permission is slavery; only tyrants
and slaves live where any sane adult can be
precluded from receiving—even the most odious
opinion—about the most obnoxious subject–
expressed in the most offensive manner—by the
most despised person.