wº TiE Tºº - { &NSS3 W HAT | IS PROPERTYP BY - § § § s § - - - º º | 3. N PART IV T NEW YORK | THE HUMBOLDIPElºi (COMPANY | § 19 ASTCR PLACE § ººzºº 222222222° º ºz - - * Zhe Greatest Book of the Century. Thousands of cº { . . . ordered every W.eek. | { EVERY ONE SHOULD READ a.º. LOOKING BACKWARD. By EDWARD BELLAMY. In paper covers 50 cents; in cloth covers. $1. * Bellamy's wonderful book.”—EDwARD EveRETT HALE. “It is a revelation and an evangel.”— FRANCEs E. WILLARD. “A romance of surpassing merit and noble purpose.”—EDGAR FAwCETT. “The vital, inspiring, convincing power of this book.”— Ziterary World. “Intensely interesting, and more than interesting.”— Golden Rule, Boston. “That remarkable and fascinating novel which so many are now reading.”—E. C. STEDMAN, in * 27, e Critic. “A marvelous story, combined with social philosophy and a forecast of the millennium.”—Portland Transcript. “That astonishing book, “Looking Backward, how it haunts one, like a grown-up “Alice in Wonder- land.’ The mind follows entranced.”— Gazette, Boston. “It has made a deeper and more lasting impression than any other book of the year, not even except- ing the two great theological novels.”—Boston Herald. “‘Looking Backward” is the “Uncle Tom's Cabin’ of the industrial slavery of to-day—a noble dream admirably wrought out.”—JAMEs JEFFREY ROCHE. “The extraordinary effect which Mr. Bellamy's romance has had with the public; . . . one cannot deny the charms of the author's art; . . . his alluring allegory.”— W. D. HoweLLs. “The most wonderful book of the nineteenth century. This is the best of the many good ones writ- ten to make the people think. But ‘Looking Backward” inspires hope as well as thought.”— Zhe Æxaminer. “Its satire, and its intense feeling for the wronged and suffering of the present day, make the reader.” think seriously. The appeal is always made to a man's reason, and to his noblest sentiments—nevelº to his selfishness.”— Boston Post. --> “It is a thought-breeding book, and all who are studying the problems of the age, all who believe in > progress, all who are free to receive new light upon the capacities and possibilities of the race, will find ºf in Mr. Bellamy's exceedingly clever book satisfaction and inspiration.”— Mew York Zribune. “‘Looking Backward” is a well-made book, but it is more—a glowing prophecy and a gospel of { beace. He who reads it expecting merely to be entertained, must, we should think, find himself unex- | pectedly haunted by visions of a golden age wherein all the world unites to do the world’s work like ..members of one family, where labor and living are provided for each man, where toil and leisure alter- nate in happy proportions, where want and therefore greed and jealousy are unknown, where the pleas- ures of this world are free to all, to cheer but not enslave.”— The Nation, Wew York. We will mail this book to any Post Office address in the world at above prices. Address: THE HUMBOLDT, PUBE iSHING CO. / R | SECOND MEMOIR. 343 tury, the wealthy families had incomes of no less than two millions: some possessed as many as twenty thousand slaves. All the authors who have written upon the causes of the fall of the Roman republic concur. M. Giraud of Aix quotes the testimony of Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Olympiodorus, and Photius. Under Vespasian and Titus, Pliny, the naturalist, exclaimed: “Large estates have ruined Italy, and are ruining the provinces.” But it never has been understood that the extension of property was effected then, as it is to-day, under the aegis of the law, and by virtue of the constitution. When the Senate sold captured lands at auction, it was in the interest of the treasury and of public welfare. When the patricians bought up possessions and property, they realized the purpose of the Senate's decrees; when they lent at high rates of in- terest, they took advantage of a legal privilege. “Property,” said the lender, “is the right to enjoy even to the extent of abuse, jus utendi et abutendi; that is, the right to lend at interest, — to lease, to acquire, and then to lease and lend again.” But property is also the right to exchange, to trans- fer, and to sell. If, then, the social condition is such that the proprietor, ruined by usury, may be compelled to sell his pos- session, the means of his subsistence, he will sell it; and, thanks to the law, accumulated property—devouring and anthropophagous property — will be established.” * “Inquiries concerning Property among the Romans.” * “Its acquisitive nature works rapidly in the sleep of the law. It is ready, at the word, to absorb every thing. Witness the famous equivocation about the ox-hide which, when cut up into thongs, was large enough to enclose the site of Carthage. . . The legend has reappeared several times since Dido. . . Such is the love of man for the land. Limited by tombs, measured by the members of the human body, by the thumb, the foot, and the arm, it harmonizes, as far as possible, with the very proportions of man. Nor is he satisfied yet : he * = - > 344 WHAT IS PROPERTY 2 The immediate and secondary cause of the decline of the Romans was, then, the internaf dissensions between the two orders of the republic, -- the patricians and the plebeians, – dissensions which gave rise to civil wars, proscriptions, and loss of liberty, and finally led to the empire; but the primary and mediate cause of their decline was the establishment by Numa of the institution of property. I end with an extract from a work which I have quoted several times already, and which has recently received a prize from the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences: — “The concentration of property,’” says M. Laboulaye, “while causing extreme poverty, forced the emperors to feed and amuse the people, that they might forget their misery. Panem et circenses: that was the Roman law in regard to the poor; a dire and perhaps a necessary evil wherever a landed aristocracy exists. e * “To feed these hungry mouths, grain was brought from Africa and the provinces, and distributed gratuitously among the needy. In the time of Caesar, three hundred and twenty thousand people were thus fed. Augustus saw that such a measure led directly to the destruction of hus- bandry; but to abolish these distributions was to put a weapon within the reach of the first aspirant for power. The emperor shrank at the thought. “While grain was gratuitous, agriculture was impossible. Tillage gave way to pasturage, another cause of depopulation, even among slaves. “Finally, luxury, carried further and further every day, covered the soil of Italy with elegant villas, which occupied whole cantons. Gardens and groves replaced the fields, and the free population fled to the towns. Husbandry disappeared almost entirely, and with husbandry the husband- man. Africa furnished the wheat, and Greece the wine. Tiberius com- plained bitterly of this evil, which placed the lives of the Roman people at the mercy of the winds and waves: that was his anxiety. One day calls Heaven to witness that it is his ; he tries to orient his land, to give it the form ºf heaven. . . . In his titanic intoxication, he describes property in the very terms which he employs in describing the Almighty — fundus optimus maximus. . . . He shall make it his couch, and they shall be separated no more, – Kat eatyvvvro fixotmri.” — Michelet: Origin of French Zaw. SECOND MEMOIR. 345 later, and three hundred thousand starving men walked the streets of Rome : that was a revolution. “This decline of Italy and the provinces did not stop After the reign of Nero, depopulation commenced in towns as noted as Antium and Tarentum. Under the reign of Perºnax, there was so much desert land that the emperor abandoned it, even that which belonged to the treasury, to whoever would cultivate it, besides exempting the farmers from taxation for a period of ten years. Senators were compelled to invest one-third of their fortunes in real estate in Italy; but this measure served only to increase the evil which they wished to cure. To force the rich to possess in Italy was to increase the large estates which had ruined the country. And must I say, finally, that Aurelian wished to send the -captives into the desert lands of Etruria, and that Valentinian was forced to settle the Alamanni on the fertile banks of the Po P’’ If the reader, in running through this book, should com- plain of meeting with nothing but quotations from other works, extracts from journals and public lectures, comments upon laws, and interpretations of them, I would remind him that the very object of this memoir is to establish the con- formity of my opinion concerning property with that univer- sally held; that, far from aiming at a paradox, it has been my main study to follow the advice of the world; and, finally, that my sole pretension is to clearly formulate the general belief. I cannot repeat it too often, – and I confess it with pride, – I teach absolutely nothing that is new ; and I should regard the doctrine which I advocate as radically erroneous, if a single witness should testify against it. Let us now trace the revolutions in property among the Barbarians. As long as the German tribes dwelt in their forests, it did not occur to them to divide and appropriate the soil. The land was held in common : each individual could plow, sow, and reap. But, when the empire was once invaded, they be- thought themselves of sharing the land, just as they shared 346 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 spoils after a victory. “Hence,” says M. Laboulaye, “the ex- pressions sortes Burgundiorum Gothorum and k\mpot Ovavöt- Xov ; hence the German words allod, allodium, and loos, lot. which are used in all modern languages to designate the gifts of chance.” Allodial property, at least with the mass of coparceners, was originally held, then, in equal shares; for all of the prizes were equal, or, at least, equivalent. This property, like that of the Romans, was wholly individual, independent, exclusive, . transferable, and consequently susceptible of accumulation and invasion. But, instead of its being, as was the case among the Romans, the large estate which, through increase and usury, subordinated and absorbed the small one, among the Barbarians—fonder of war than of wealth, more eager to dispose of persons than to appropriate things — it was the warrior who, through superiority of arms, enslaved his adver- sary. The Roman wanted matter ; the Barbarian wanted man. Consequently, in the feudal ages, rents were almost nothing, — simply a hare, a partridge, a pie, a few pints of wine brought by a little girl, or a Maypole set up within the suzerain's reach. In return, the vassal or incumbent had to follow the seignior to battle (a thing which happened almost every day), and equip and feed himself at his own expense. “This spirit of the German tribes—this spirit of companion- ship and association — governed the territory as it governed. individuals. The lands, like the men, were secured to a chief or seignior by a bond of mutual protection and fidelity. This subjection was the labor of the German epoch which gave birth to feudalism. By fair means or foul, every proprietor who could not be a chief was forced to be a vassal.”. (Labou- Jaye: History of Property.) By fair means or foul, every mechanic who cannot be a SECOND MEMOIR. 347 master has to be a journeyman; every proprietor who is not an invader will be invaded ; every producer who cannot, by the exploitation of other men, furnish products at less than their proper value, will lose his labor. Corporations and masterships, which are hated so bitterly, but which will re- appear if we are not careful, are the necessary results of the principle of competition which is inherent in property; their organization was patterned formerly after that of the feudal Hierarchy, which was the result of the subordination of men and possessions. The times which paved the way for the advent of feudal- ism and the reappearance of large proprietors were times of carnage and the most frightful anarchy. Never before had murder and violence made such havoc with the human race. The tenth century, among others, if my memory serves me rightly, was called the century of iron. His property, his life, and the honor of his wife and children always in danger, the small proprietor made haste to do homage to his seignior, and to bestow something on the church of his freehold, that he might receive protection and security. “Both facts and laws bear witness that from the sixth to the tenth century the proprietors of small freeholds were gradually plundered, or reduced by the encroachments of large proprietors and counts to the condition of either vassals or tributaries. The Capitularies are full of repressive provisions; but the incessant reiteration of these threats only shows the perseverance of the evil and the impotency of the government. Oppression, moreover, varies but little in its methods. The complaints of the free proprietors, and the groans of the plebeians at the time of the Gracchi, were one and the same. It is said that, whenever a poor man refused to give his estate to the bishop, the curate, the count, the judge, or the centurion, these immediately sought an opportunity to ruin him. They made him serve in the army until, completely ruined, he was in- duced, by fair means or foul, to give up his freehold.”— Laboulaye: His- Atory of Property. 348 whAT IS PROPERTY How many small proprietors and manufacturers have not been ruined by large ones through chicanery, law-suits, and competition ? Strategy, violence, and usury, — such are the proprietor's methods of plundering the laborer. Thus we see property, at all ages and in all its forms, oscillating by virtue of its principle between two opposite terms, – extreme division and extreme accumulation. Property, at its first term, is almost null. Reduced to per- sonal exploitation, it is property only potentially. At its second term, it exists in its perfection; then it is truly property. When property is widely distributed, society thrives, pro- gresses, grows, and rises quickly to the zenith of its power. Thus, the Jews, after leaving Babylon with Esdras and Nehe- miah, soon became richer and more powerful than they had been under their kings. Sparta was in a strong and pros- perous condition during the two or three centuries which followed the death of Lycurgus. The best days of Athens were those of the Persian war; Rome, whose inhabitants. were divided from the beginning into two classes, –the ex- ploiters and the exploited,—knew no such thing as peace. When property is concentrated, society, abusing itself, polluted, so to speak, grows corrupt, wears itself out—how shall I express this horrible idea 2–plunges into long-con- tinued and fatal luxury. When feudalism was established, society had to die of the same disease which killed it under the Caesars, – I mean accumulated property. But humanity, created for an immor- tal destiny, is deathless; the revolutions which disturb it are purifying crises, invariably followed by more vigorous health. In the fifth century, the invasion of the Barbarians partially restored the world to a state of natural equality. In the SECOND MEMOIR. 349 twelfth century, a new spirit pervading all society gave the slave his rights, and through justice breathed new life into the heart of nations. It has been said, and often repeated, that Christianity regenerated the world. That is true; but it seems to me that there is a mistake in the date. Chris- tianity had no influence upon Roman society; when the Barbarians came, that society had disappeared. For such is God's curse upon property; every political organization based upon the exploitation of man shall perish : slave-labor is death to the race of tyrants. The patrician families became extinct, as the feudal families did, and as all aristocracies must. It was in the middle ages, when a reactionary movement was beginning to secretly undermine accumulated property, that the influence of Christianity was first exercised to its full extent. The destruction of feudalism, the conversion of the serf into the commoner, the emancipation of the com- munes, and the admission of the Third Estate to political power, were deeds accomplished by Christianity exclusively. I say Christianity, not ecclesiasticism ; for the priests and bishops were themselves large proprietors, and as such often persecuted the villeins. Without the Christianity of the middle ages, the existence of modern society could not be explained, and would not be possible. The truth of this assertion is shown by the very facts which M. Laboulaye quotes, although this author inclines to the opposite opinion.” 1 M. Guizot denies that Christianity alone is entitled to the glory of the abolition of slavery. “To this end,” he says, “many causes were necessary, - the evolution of other ideas and other principles of civilization.” So general an assertion cannot be refuted. Some of these ideas and causes should have been pointed out, that we might judge whether their source was not wholly Christian, or whether at least the Christian spirit had not penetrated and thus 350 WHAT IS PROPERTY 2 1. Slavery among the Romans. – “The Roman slave was, in the eyes of the law, only a thing, —no more than an ox or a horse. He had meither property, family, nor personality; he was defenceless against his master's cruelty, folly, or cupidity. ‘Sell your oxen that are past use,’ said Cato, ‘sell your calves, your lambs, your wool, your hides, your old ploughs, your old iron, your old slave, and your sick slave, and all that is of no use to you.’ When no market could be found for the slaves that were worn out by sickness or old age, they were abandoned to starvation. Claudius was the first defender of this shameful practice.” “Discharge your old workman,” says the economist of the proprietary school; “turn off that sick domestic, that tooth- less and worn-out servant. Put away the unserviceable beauty; to the hospital with the useless mouths' " “The condition of these wretched beings improved but little under the emperors; and the best that can be said of the goodness of Anto ninus is that he prohibited intolerable cruelty, as an abuse of property. Axpedit enim reißublicae me gui's re sua male utatur, says Gaius. “As soon as the Church met in council, it launched an anathema against the masters who had exercised over their slaves this terrible right of life and death. Were not the slaves, thanks to the right of sanctuary and to their poverty, the dearest protégés of religion ? Con- stantine, who embodied in the laws the grand ideas of Christianity, valued the life of a slave as highly as that of a freeman, and declared the master, who had intentionally brought death upon his slave, guilty of murder. Between this law and that of Antoninus there is a complete revolution in moral ideas: the slave was a thing; religion has made him a man.” Note the last words: “Between the law of the Gospel and that of Antoninus there is a complete revolution in moral ideas: the slave was a thing; religion has made him a man.” The moral revolution which transformed the slave into a fructified them. Most of the emancipation charters begin with these words s “For the love of God and the salvation of my soul.” Now, we did not com- mence to love God and to think of our salvation until after the promulgation of the Gospel. SECOND MEMOIR. 35 ſ citizen was effected, then, by Christianity before the Bar- barians set foot upon the soil of the empire. We have only to trace the progress of this moral revolution in the personnel of society. “But,” M. Laboulaye rightly says, “it did not change the condition of men in a moment, any more than that of things; between slavery and liberty there was an abyss which could not be filled in a day; the transitional step was servitude.” Now, what was servitude 2 In what did it differ from Roman slavery, and whence came this difference 2 Let the same author answer. 2. Of Servitude. —“I see, in the lord's manor, slaves charged with domestic duties. Some are employed in the personal service of the master; others are charged with household cares. The women spin the wool; the men grind the grain, make the bread, or practise, in the inter- est of the seignior, what little they know of the industrial arts. The master punishes them when he chooses, kills them with impunity, and sells them and theirs like so many cattle. The slave has no personality, and consequently no wehrgeld” peculiar to himself: he is a thing. The wehrgeld belongs to the master as a compensation for the loss of his property. Whether the slave is killed or stolen, the indemnity does not change, for the injury is the same ; but the indemnity increases or dimin- ishes according to the value of the serf. In all these particulars Ger- manic slavery and Roman servitude are alike.” This similarity is worthy of notice. Slavery is always the same, whether in a Roman villa or on a Barbarian farm. The man, like the ox and the ass, is a part of the live-stock; a price is set upon his head; he is a tool without a conscience, a chattel without personality, an impeccable, irresponsible being, who has neither rights nor duties. 1 Weregild, – the fine paid for the murder of a man. So much for a count, so much for a baron, so much for a freeman, so much for a priest; for a slave, nothing. His value was restored to the proprietor. 354 WHAT IS PROPERTYP Way did his condition improve 2 “In good season . . .” [when PJ “the serf began to be regarded as a man; and, as such, the law of the Visigoths, under the influence of Christian ideas, punished with fine or banishment any one who maimed or killed him.” Always Christianity, always religion, though we should like to speak of the laws only. Did the philanthropy of the Visigoths make its first appearance before or after the preach- ing of the Gospel This point must be cleared up. “After the conquest, the serfs were scattered over the large estates of the Barbarians, each having his house, his lot, and his peculium, in return for which he paid rent and performed service. They were rarely sepa- rated from their homes when their land was sold; they and all that they had became the property of the purchaser. The law favored this reali-. zation of the serf, in not allowing him to be sold out of the country.” What inspired this law, destructive not only of slavery, but of property itself? For, if the master cannot drive from his, domain the slave whom he has once established there, it fol- lows that the slave is proprietor, as well as the master. “The Barbarians,” again says M. Laboulaye, “were the first to recog- nize the slave's rights of family and property, —two rights which are: incompatible with slavery.” JBut was this recognition the necessary result of the mode- of servitude in vogue among the Germanic nations previous to their conversion to Christianity, or was it the immediate effect of that spirit of justice infused with religion, by which the seignior was forced to respect in the serf a soul equal to his own, a brother in Jesus Christ, purified by the same bap- tism, and redeemed by the same sacrifice of the Son of God in the form of man 2 For we must not close our eyes to the fact that, though the Barbarian morals and the ignorance SECS)ND MEMOIR, 353. and carelessness of the seigniors, who busied themselves mainly with wars and battles, paying little or no attention to agriculture, may have been great aids in the emancipation of the serfs, still the vital principle of this emancipation was essentially Christian. Suppose that the Barbarians had re- inained Pagans in the midst of a Pagan world. As they did not change the Gospel, so they would not have changed the polytheistic customs; slavery would have remained what it was ; they would have continued to kill the slaves who were desirous of liberty, family, and property; whole nations would have been reduced to the condition of Helots; nothing would have changed upon the terrestrial stage, except the actors. The Barbarians were less selfish, less imperious, less dissolute, and less cruel than the Romans. Such was the nature upon which, after the fall of the empire and the reno- vation of society, Christianity was to act. But this nature, grounded as in former times upon slavery and war, would, by its own energy, have produced nothing but war and slavery. “Gradually, the serfs obtained the privilege of being judged by the same standard as their masters. . . .” When, how, and by what title did they obtain this priv- ilege 2 g” “Gradually, their duties were regulated.” Whence came the regulations 2 Who had the authority to introduce them 2 “The master took a part of the labor of the serf, -three days, for instance, — and left the rest to him. As for Sunday, that belonged to God.” And what established Sunday, if not religion ? Whence I infer, that the same power which took it upon itself to sus- pend hostilities and to lighten the duties of the serf was also 354 WHAT IS PROPERTY 2 that which regulated the judiciary and created a sort of law for the slave. But this law itself, on what did it bear 2—what was its prin- ciple 2–what was the philosophy of the councils and popes with reference to this matter? The reply to all these ques- tions, coming from me alone, would be distrusted. The au thority of M. Laboulaye shall give credence to my words This holy philosophy, to which the slaves were indebted for every thing, this invocation of the Gospel, was an anathema. against property. The proprietors of small freeholds, that is, the freemen of the middle class, had fallen, in consequence of the tyranny of the nobles, into a worse condition than that of the tenants and serfs. “The expenses of war weighed less heavily upon the serf than upon the freeman ; and, as for legal protection, the seigniorial court, where the serf was judged by his peers, was far preferable to the cantonal assembly. It was better to have a noble for a seignior than for a judge.” So it is better to-day to have a man of large capital for an associate than for a rival. The honest tenant—the laborer who earns weekly a moderate but constant salary—is more to be envied than the independent but small farmer, or the poor licensed mechanic. At that time, all were either seigniors or serfs, oppressors or oppressed. “Then, under the protection of convents, or of the seigniorial turret, new societies were formed, which silently spread over the soil made fertile by their hands, and which derived their power from the annihilation of the free classes whom they enlisted in their behalf. As tenants, these men acquired, from generation to generation, sacred rights over the soil which they cultivated in the interest of lazy and pillaging masters. As fast as the social tempest abated, it SECOND MEMOIR. 355 ** became necessary to respect the union and heritage of these villeins, who by their labor had truly prescribed the soil for their own profit.” I ask how prescription could take effect where a contrary title and possession already existed 2 M. Laboulaye is a law- yer. Where, then, did he ever see the labor of the slave and the cultivation by the tenant prescribe the soil for their own profit, to the detriment of a recognized master daily acting as a proprietor 2 Let us not disguise matters. As fast as the tenants and the serfs grew rich, they wished to be indepen- dent and free ; they commenced to associate, unfurl their municipal banners, raise belfries, fortify their towns, and refuse to pay their seigniorial dues. In doing these things they were perfectly right; for, in fact, their condition was intolerable. But in law — I mean in Roman and Napoleonic law — their refusal to obey and pay tribute to their masters was illegitimate. - Now, this imperceptible usurpation of proper , by the com- monalty was inspired by religion. The seignior had attached the serf to the soil; religion granted the serf rights over the soil. The seigntor imposed duties upon the serf; religion fixed their limits. The seignior could kill the serf with impunity, could deprive him of his wife, violate his daughter, pillage his house, and rob him of his savings ; religion checked his invasions: it excommuni- cated the seignior. Religion was the real cause of the ruin of feudal property. Why should it not be bold enough to-day to resolutely condemn capitalistic property 2 Since the middle ages, there has been no change in social economy except in its forms; its relations remain unaltered. The only result of the emancipation of the serfs was that property changed hands; or, rather, that new proprietors were 356 WHAT IS PROPER:#y f created. Sooner or later the extension of privilege, far front curing the evil, was to operate to the disadvantage of the plebeians. Nevertheless, the new social organization did not meet with the same end in all places. In Lombardy, for example, where the people rapidly growing rich through commerce and industry soon conquered the authorities, even to the exclusion of the nobles, – first, the nobility became poor and degraded, and were forced, in order to live and maintain their credit, to gain admission to the guilds; then, the ordi- mary subalternization of property leading to inequality of for- tunes, to wealth and poverty, to jealousies and hatreds, the cities passed rapidly from the rankest democracy under the yoke of a few ambitious leaders. Such was the fate of most of the Lombardic cities, – Genoa, Florence, Bologna, Milan, Pisa, &c., - which afterwards changed rulers frequently, but which have never since risen in favor of liberty. The people can easily escape from the tyranny of despots, but they do not know how to throw off the effects of their own despotism; just as we avoid the assassin's steel, while we succumb to a constitutional malady. As soon as a nation becomes pro- prietor, either it must perish, or a foreign invasion must force it again to begin its evolutionary round." * 1 The spirit of despotism and monopoly which animated the communes has not escaped the attention of historians. “The formation of the commoners’ associations,” says Meyer, “did not spring from the true spirit of liberty, but from the desire for exemption from the charges of the seigniors, from individual interests, and jealousy of the welfare of others. . . . Each commune or cor- poration opposed the creation of every other; and this spirit increased to such an extent that the King of England, Henry V., having established a university at Caen, in 1432, the city and university of Paris opposed the registration of the edict. “The communes once organized, the kings treated them as superior vassals. TNow, just as the under vassal had no communication with the king except SEcond MEMOIR. 357 In France, the Revolution was much more gradual. The communes, in taking refuge under the protection of the kings, had found them masters rather than protectors. Their liberty had long since been lost, or, rather, their emancipation had been suspended, when feudalism received its death-blow at the hand of Richelieu. Then liberty halted; the prince of the feudatories held sole and undivided sway. The nobles, the clergy, the commoners, the parliaments, every thing in short except a few seeming privileges, were controlled by the king; who, like his early predecessors, consumed regularly, and nearly always in advance, the revenues of his domain, – and that domain was France. Finally, '89 arrived; liberty re- sumed its march ; a century and a half had been required to wear out the last form of feudal property, -monarchy. The French Revolution may be defined as the substitution of real right for personal right; that is to say, in the days of feudalism, the value of property depended upon the standing of the proprietor, while, after the Revolution, he regard for the man was proportional to his property. Now, we have seen from what has been said in the preceding pages, that this recognition of the right of laborers had been the constant aim of the serfs and communes, the secret motive of their through the direct vassal, so also the commoners could enter no complaints -except through the commune. “Like causes produce like effects. Each commune became a small and separate State, governed by a few citizens, who sought to extend their authority over the others; who, in their turn, revenged themselves upon the unfortunate inhabitants who had not the right of citizenship. Feudalism in unemancipated countries, and oligarchy in the communes, made nearly the same ravages. There were sub-associations, fraternities, tradesmen’s associations in the com- munes, and colleges in the universities. The oppression was so great, that it was no rare thing to see the inhabitants of a commune demanding its suppres- ision. . . .”— Mayºr: Žudicial Institutions of Europe. 358 whAT IS PROPERTY P efforts. The movement of '89 was only the last stage of that long insurrection. But it seems to me that we have not paid sufficient attention to the fact that the Revolution of 1789, instigated by the same causes, animated by the same spirit, triumphing by the same struggles, was consummated in Italy four centuries ago. Italy was the first to sound the signal of war against feudalism ; France has followed; Spain and Eng- land are beginning to move; the rest still sleep. If a grand example should be given to the world, the day of trial would be much abridged. Note the following summary of the revolutions of property, from the days of the Roman Empire down to the present time : — 1. Fifth Century. — Barbarian invasions; division of the lands of the empire into independent portions or freeholds. 2. From the fifth to the eighth Century. — Gradual concentra- tion of freeholds, or transformation of the small freeholds into fiefs, feuds, tenures, &c. Large properties, small possessions. Charlemagne (771–814) decrees that all freeholds are dependent upon the king of France. 3. From the eighth to the tenth Century. — The relation between the crown and the superior dependents is broken ; the latter becoming freeholders, while the smaller dependents cease to recognize the king, and adhere to the nearest suzerain. Feudal system. 4. Twelfth Century. — Movement of the serfs towards liberty; emancipation of the communes. 5. Thirteenth Century. — Abolition of personal right, and of the feudal system in Italy. Italian Republics. 6. Seventeenth Century. — Abolition of feudalism in France during Richelieu’s ministry. Despotism. SECOND MEMOIR. 359 7. 1789. — Abolition of all privileges of birth, caste, prov- inces, and corporations ; equality of persons and of rights. French democracy. 8. 1830. — The principle of concentration inherent in indi- vidual property is remarked. Development of the idea of association. - The more we reflect upon this series of transformations and changes, the more clearly we see that they were neces- sary in their principle, in their manifestations, and in their result. It was necessary that inexperienced conquerors, eager for liberty, should divide the Roman Empire into a multitude of estates, as free and independent as themselves. It was necessary that these men, who liked war even better than liberty, should submit to their leaders; and, as the free- hold represented the man, that property should violate prop- erty. It was necessary that, under the rule of a nobility always idle when not fighting, there should grow up a body of laborers, who, by the power of production, and by the division and circulation of wealth, would gradually gain control over commerce, industry, and a portion of the land, and who, having become rich, would aspire to power and authority also. It was necessary, finally, that liberty and equality of rights having been achieved, and individual property still existing, attended by robbery, poverty, social inequality, and oppres- sion, there should be an inquiry into the cause of this evil, and an idea of universal association formed, whereby, on con- dition of labor, all interests should be protected and consoli- dated. 26 36O WHAT IS PROPERTY 2 “Evil, when carried too far,” says a learned jurist, “cures itself; and the political innovation which aims to increase the power of the State, finally succumbs to the effects of its own work. The Germans, to secure their independence, chose chi fs; and soon they were oppressed by their kings and noblemen. The monarchs surrounded themselves with volun- teers, in order to control the freemen; and they found themselves de- pendent upon their proud vassais. The missi dominici were sent into the provinces to maintain the power of the emperors, and to protect the people from the oppressions of the noblemen; and not only did they usurp the imperial power to a great extent, but they dealt more severely with the inhabitants. The freemen became vassals, in order to get rid of military service and court duty; and they were immediately involved in all the personal quarrels of their seigniors, and compelled to do jury duty in their courts. . . . The kings protected the cities and the communes, in the hope of freeing them from the yoke of the grand vassals, and of rendering their own power more absolute; and those same communes have, in several European countries, procured the establishment of a constitutional power, are "now holding royalty in check, and are giving rise to a universal desire for political reform.”— Meyer: }udicial Insti futions of Europe. In recapitulation. What was feudalism 2 A confederation of the grand seign iors against the villeins, and against the king." What is constitutional government P A confederation of the bour geoisie against the laborers, and against the king.” 1 Feudalism was, in spirit and in its providential destiny, a long protest of the human personality against the monkish communism with which Europe, in the middle ages, was overrun. After the orgies of Pagan selfishness, society —carried to the opposite extreme by the Christian religion—risked its life by unlimited self-denial and absolute indifference to the pleasures of the world Feudalism was the balance-weight which saved Europe from the combined influence of the religious communities and the Manichean sects which had sprung up since the fourth century under different names and in different countries. Modern civilization is indebted to feudalism for the definitive establishment of the person, of marriage, of the family, and of country. (See, on this subject, Guizot, “History of Civilization in Europe.”) 2 This was made evident in July, 1830, and the years which followed it, when the electoral bourgeoisie effected a revolution in order to get control over SECOND MEMOIR. 36 I How did feudalism end ? In the union of the communes and the royal authority. How will the bourgeoise aristocracy end ? In the union of the proletariat and the sovereign power. What was the immediate result of the struggle of the com- munes and the king against the seigniors 2 The monarchical unity of Louis XIV. What will be the result of the struggle of the proletariat and the sovereign power combined against the bourgeoisie 2 The absolute unity of the nation and the government. It remains to be seen whether the nation, one and supreme, will be represented in its executive and central power by ane, by five, by one hundred, or one thousand; that is, it re- mains to be seen, whether the royalty of the barricades intends to maintain itself by the people, or without the people, and whether Louis Philippe wishes his reign to be the most famous in all history. T have made this statement as brief, but at the same time —r- the king, and suppressed the émeutes in order to restrain the people. The bour- geoisie, through the jury, the magistracy, its position in the army, and its mu- nicipal despotism, governs both royalty and the people. It is the bourgeoisie which, more than any other class, is conservative and retrogressive. It is the bourgeoisie which makes and unmakes ministries. It is the bourgeoisie which has destroyed the influence of the Upper Chamber, and which will dethrone the King whenever he shall become unsatisfactory to it. It is to please the bour- geoisie that royalty makes itself unpopular. It is the bourgeoisie which is troubled at the hopes of the people, and which hinders reform. The jour- nals of the bourgeoisie are the ones which preach morality and religion to us, while reserving scepticism and indifference for themselves; which attack per- sonal government, and favor the denial of the electoral privilege to those who have no property. The bourgeoisie will accept any thing rather than the eman- cipation of the proletariat. As soon as it thinks its privileges threatened, it will unite with royalty; and who does not know that at this very moment these two antagonists have suspended their quarrels . . . It has been a question of property. 362 WHAT IS PROPERTY P. as accurate as I could, neglecting facts and details, that I" might give the more attention to the economical relations of society. For the study of history is like the study of the human organism ; just as the latter has its system, its organs, and its functions, which can be treated separately, so the former has its ensemble, its instruments, and its causes. Of course I do not pretend that the principle of property is a complete résumé of all the social forces; but, as in that won- derful machine which we call our body, the harmony of the whole allows us to draw a general conclusion from the con- sideration of a single function or organ, so, in discussing his- torical causes, I have been able to reason with absolute accuracy from a single order of facts, certain as I was of the perfect correlation which exists between this special order and universal history. As is the property of a nation, so is . its family, its marriage, its religion, its civil and military organization, and its legislative and judicial institutions. JHistory, viewed from this standpoint, is a grand and sublime psychological study. Well, sir, in writing against property, have I done more than quote the language of history I have said to modern society, — the daughter and heiress of all preceding societies,— Age quod agis: complete the task which for six thousand years you have been executing under the inspiration and by the command of God; hasten to finish your journey; turn neither to the right nor the left, but follow the road which lies before you. You seek reason, law, unity, and discipline ; but hereafter you can find them only by stripping off the veils of your infancy, and ceasing to follow instinct as a guide. Awaken your sleeping conscience; open your eyes to the pure light of reflection and science; behold the phantom which troubled your dreams, and so long kept you in a state- SECOND MEMOIR. 363 of unutterable anguish. Know thyself, O long-deluded so- ciety! know thy enemy . . . And I have denounced prop- erty. We often hear the defenders of the right of domain quote in defence of their views the testimony of nations and ages. We can judge, from what has just been said, how far this his- torical argument conforms to the real facts and the conclu- sions of science. º To complete this apology, I must examine the various theories. Neither politics, nor legislation, nor history, can be ex- plained and understood, without a positive theory which defines their elements, and discovers their laws; in short, without a philosophy. Now, the two principal schools, which to this day divide the attention of the world, do not satisfy this condition. The first, essentially practical in its character, confined to a statement of facts, and buried in learning, cares very little by what laws humanity develops itself. To it these laws are the secret of the Almighty, which no one can fathom without a commission from on high. In applying the facts of history to government, this school does not reason ; it does not antic. ipate; it makes no comparison of the past with the present, in order to predict the future. In its opinion, the lessons of experience teach us only to repeat old errors, and its whole philosophy consists in perpetually retracing the tracks of antiquity, instead of going straight ahead forever in the direc- tion in which they point. The second school may be called either fatalistic or pan- theistic. To it the movements of empires and the revolutions of humanity are the manifestations, the incarnations, of the Almighty. The human race, identified with the divine 364 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 essence, wheels in a circle of appearances, informations, and destructions, which necessarily excludes the idea of absolute truth, and destroys providence and liberty. Corresponding to these two schools of history, there are two schools of jurisprudence, similarly opposed, and pos- sessed of the same peculiarities. 1. The practical and conventional school, to which the law” is always a creation of the legislator, an expression of his will. a privilege which he condescends to grant, — in short, a gra- tuitous affirmation to be regarded as judicious and legitimate, no matter what it declares. 2. The fatalistic and pantheistic school, sometimes called the historical school, which opposes the despotism of the first, and maintains that law, like literature and religion, is always. the expression of society, - its manifestation, its form, the external realization of its mobile spirit and its ever-changing inspirations. Each of these schools, denying the absolute, rejects thereby all positive and a priori philosophy. Now, it is evident that the theories of these two schools, whatever view we take of them, are utterly unsatisfactory: for, opposed, they form no dilemma, – that is, if one is false, it does not follow that the other is true; and, united, they do. not constitute the truth, since they disregard the absolute, without which there is no truth. They are respectively a £hesis and an antithesis. There remains to be found, then, a synthesis, which, predicating the absolute, justifies the will of the legislator, explains the variations of the law, annihilates. the theory of the circular movement of humanity, and demon- strates its progress. The legists, by the very nature of their studies and in spite of their obstinate prejudices, have been led irresistibly to sus- SE, COND MEMOIR. 365 pect that the absolute in the science of law is not as chimeri- cal as is commonly supposed ; and this suspicion arose from their comparison of the various relations which legislators have been called upon to regulate. M. Laboulaye, the laureate of the Institute, begins his “History of Property” with these words: — • “While the law of contract, which regulates only the mutual inter- ests of men, has not varied for centuries (except in certain forms which relate more to the proof than to the character of the obligation), the civil law of property, which regulates the mutual relations of citizens, has undergone several radical changes, and has kept pace in its variations with all the vicissitudes of society. The law of contract, which holds essentially to those principles of eternal justice which are engraven upon the depths of the human heart, is the immutable element of jurispru- dence, and, in a certain sense, its philosophy. Property, on the contrary, is the variable element of jurisprudence, its history, its policy.” Marvellous ! There is in law, and consequently in politics, something variable and something invariable. The invariable element is obligation, the bond of justice, duty; the varia- ble element is property, - that is, the external form of law, the subject-matter of the contract. Whence it follows that the law can modify, change, reform, and judge property. Reconcile that, if you can, with the idea of an eternal, ab- solute, permanent, and indefectible right. However, M. Laboulaye is in perfect accord with himself when he adds, “Possession of the soil rests solely upon force until society takes it in hand, and espouses the cause of the possessor;”* and, a little farther, “The right of property is 1 The same opinion was recently expressed from the tribune by one of our most honorable Deputies, M. Gauguier. “Nature,” said he, “has not en- dowed man with landed property.” Changing the adjective landed, which designates only a species, into capitalistic, which denotes the genus, - M. Gauguier made an égaſſitaire profession of faith. 366 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 not natural, but social. The laws not only protect property: they give it birth,” &c. Now, that which the law has made the law can unmake; especially since, according to M. La- boulaye, – an avowed partisan of the historical or pantheistic school, - the law is not absolute, is not an idea, but a form. But why is it that property is variable, and, unlike obliga- tion, incapable of definition and settlement Before affirm- ing, somewhat boldly without doubt, that in right there are no absolute principles (the most dangerous, most immoral, most tyrannical — in a word, most anti-social — assertion imaginable), it was proper that the right of property should be subjected to a thorough examination, in order to put in evidence its variable, arbitrary, and contingent elements, and those which are eternal, legitimate, and absolute ; then, this operation performed, it became easy to account for the laws, and to correct all the codes. Now, this examination of property I claim to have made, and in the fullest detail; but, either from the public's lack of interest in an unrecommended and unattractive pamphlet, or —which is more probable — from the weakness of exposition and want of genius which characterize the work, the First Memoir on Property passed unnoticed; scarcely would a few communists, having turned its leaves, deign to brand it with their disapprobation. You alone, sir, in spite of the disfavor which I showed for your economical predecessors in too se- vere a criticism of them,-you alone have judged me justly; and although I cannot accept, at least literally, your first judg- ment, yet it is to you alone that I appeal from a decision too equivocal to be regarded as final. It not being my intention to enter at present into a discus- sion of principles, I shall content myself with estimating, from the point of view of this simple and intelligible abso- SECOND MEMOIR. 367 lute, the theories of property which our generation has pro- duced. The most exact idea of property is given us by the Roman law, faithfully followed in this particular by the ancient le- gists. It is the absolute, exclusive, autocratic domain of a man over a thing, -a domain which begins by usucaption, is maintained by possession, and finally, by the aid of prescrip- tion, finds its sanction in the civil law; a domain which so identifies the man with the thing, that the proprietor can say, “He who uses my field, virtually compels me to labor for him ; therefore he owes me compensation.” I pass in silence the secondary modes by which property can be acquired, – tradition, sale, exchange, inheritance, &c., — which have nothing in common with the origin of prop- erty. Accordingly, Pothier said the domain of property, and not simply property. And the most learned writers on jurispru- dence—in imitation of the Roman praetor who recognized a right of property and a right of possession—have carefully distinguished between the domain and the right of usufruct, ause, and habitation, which, reduced to its natural limits, is the very expression of justice; and which is, in my opinion, to supplant domanial property, and finally form the basis of all jurisprudence. But, sir, admire the clumsiness of systems, or rather the fatality of logic | While the Roman law and all the savants inspired by it teach that property in its origin is the right of first occupancy sanctioned by law, the modern legists, dis- satisfied with this brutal definition, claim that property is based upon labor. Immediately they infer that he who no longer labors, but makes another labor in his stead, loses his right to the earnings of the latter. It is by virtue of this 368 WHAT IS PROPERTY 2 principle that the serfs of the middle ages claimed a legal right to property, and consequently to the enjoyment of polit- ical rights; that the clergy were despoiled in '89 of their immense estates, and were granted a pension in exchange; that at the restoration the liberal deputies opposed the in- demnity of one billion francs. “The nation,” said they, “has acquired by twenty-five years of labor and possession the property which the emigrants forfeited by abandonment and long idleness: why should the nobles be treated with more favor than the priests * * * All usurpations, not born of war, have been caused and supported by labor. All modern history proves this, from the end of the Roman empire down to the present day. And as if to give a sort of legal sanction to these usurpations, the doctrine of labor, subversive of property, is professed at great length in the Roman law under the name of pre- scription. The man who cultivates, it has been said, makes the land his own ; consequently, no more property. This was clearly seen by the old jurists, who have not failed to denounce this novelty; while on the other hand the young school hoots at the absurdity of the first-occupant theory. Others have pre- 1 A professor of comparative legislation, M. Lerminier, has gone still far- ther. He has dared to say that the nation took from the clergy all their pos- sessions, not because of idleness, but because of unworthiness. “You have civilized the world,” cries this apostle of equality, speaking to the priests; “and for that reason your possessions were given you. In your hands they were at once an instrument and a reward. But you do not now deserve them, for you long since ceased to civilize any thing whatever. . . .” This position is quite in harmony with my principles, and I heartily applaud the indignation of M. Lerminier; but I do not know that a proprietor was ever deprived of his property because unworthy; and as reasonable, social, and even useful as the thing may seem, it is quite contrary to the uses and customs. of property. SECOND MEMOIR. 369 sented themselves, pretending to reconcile the two opinions. by uniting them. They have failed, like all the juste-milieur of the world, and are laughed at for their eclecticism. At present, the alarm is in the ‘camp of the old doctrine; from all sides pour in defences of property, studies regarding prop- erty, theories of property, each one of which, giving the lie to the rest, inflicts a fresh wound upon property. Consider, indeed, the inextricable embarrassments, the con- tradictions, the absurdities, the incredible nonsense, in which the bold defenders of property so lightly involve themselves. I choose the eclectics, because, those killed, the others cannot survive. M. Troplong, jurist, passes for a philosopher in the eyes of the editors of “Le Drøſt.” I tell the gentlemen of “Le Droit” that, in the judgment of philosophers, M. Troplong is only an advocate; and I prove my assertion. M. Troplong is a defender of progress. “The words of the code,” says he, “are fruitful sap with which the classic works of the eighteenth century overflow: To wish to sup- press them . . . is to violate the law of progress, and to forget that a science which moves is a science which grows.” " Now, the only mutable and progressive portion of law, as we have already seen, is that which concerns property. If, then, you ask what reforms are to be introduced into the right of property? M. Troplong makes no reply; what progress is to be hoped for 2 no reply; what is to be the destiny of prop- erty in case of universal association ? no reply; what is the absolute and what the contingent, what the true and what the false, in property no reply. M. Troplong favors quies- ! “Treatise on Prescription. ' 37O whAT IS PROPERTY 2 cence and in statu quo in regard to property. What could be more unphilosophical in a progressive philosopher ? Nevertheless, M. Troplong has thought about these things. “There are,” he says, “many weak points and antiquated ideas in the doctrines of modern authors concerning prop- erty: witness the works of MM. Toullier and Duranton.” The doctrine of M. Troplong promises, then, strong points, advanced and progressive ideas. Let us see ; let us ex- amine : — “Man, placed in the presence of matter, is conscious of a power over it, which has been given, to him to satisfy the needs of his being. King of inanimate or unintelligent nature, he feels that he has a right to modify it, govern it, and fit it for his use. There it is, the subject of property, which is legitimate only when exercised over things, never when over persons.” M. Troplong is so little of a philosopher, that he does not even know the import of the philosophical terms which he makes a show of using. He says of matter that it is the subject of property; he should have said the object. M. Trop- long uses the language of the anatomists, who apply the term subject to the human matter used in their experiments. This error of our author is repeated farther on : “Liberty, which overcomes matter, the subject of property, &c.” The subject of property is man; its object is matter. But even this is but a slight mortification; directly we shall have some crucifixions. Thus, according to the passage just quoted, it is in the con- science and personality of man that the principle of property must be sought. Is there any thing new in this doctrine * Apparently it never has occurred to those who, since the days of Cicero and Aristotle, and earlier, have maintained £hat things belong to the first occupant, that occupation may be SECOND MEMOIR, 37 I exercised by beings devoid of conscience and personality. The human personality, though it may be the principle or the subject of property, as matter is the object, is not the condi- tion. Now, it is this condition which we most need to know. So far, M. Troplong tells us no more than his masters, and the figures with which he adorns his style add nothing to the old idea. Property, then, implies three terms: The subject, the object, and the condition. There is no difficulty in regard to the first two terms. As to the third, the condition of property down to this day, for the Greek as for the Barbarian, has been that of first occupancy. What now would you have it, progressive doctor 2 “When man lays hands for the first time upon an object without a master, he performs an act which, among individuals, is of the greatest importance. The thing thus seized and occupied participates, so to speak, in the personality of him who holds it. It becomes sacred, like himself. It is impossible to take it without doing violence to his liberty, or to remove it without rashly invading his person. Diogenes did but express this truth of intuition, when he said: ‘Stand out of my light !’” Very good but would the prince of cynics, the very per- sonal and very haughty Diogenes, have had the right to charge another cynic, as rent for this same place in the sun- shine, a bone for twenty-four hours of possession ? It is that which constitutes the proprietor; it is that which you fail to justify. In reasoning from the human personality and indi- viduality to the right of property, you unconsciously construct a syllogism in which the conclusion includes more than the premises, contrary to the rules laid down by Aristotle. The individuality of the human person proves individual posses- sion, originally called proprietas, in opposition to collective: possession, communio. It gives birth to the distinction 372 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 between thine and mine, true signs of equality, not, by any means, of subordination. “From equivocation to equivoca- tion,” says M. Michelet,” “property would crawl to the end of the world ; man could not limit it, were not he himself its limit. Where they clash, there will be its frontier.” In short, individuality of being destroys the hypothesis of com- munism, but it does not for that reason give birth to domain, — that domain by virtue of which the holder of a thing exerci- ses over the person who takes his place a right of prestation and suzerainty, that has always been identified with prop- erty itself. Further, that he whose legitimately acquired possession injures nobody cannot be nonsuited without flagrant injus- tice, is a truth, not of intuition, as M. Troplong says, but of inward sensation,” which has nothing to do with property. M. Troplong admits, then, occupancy as a condition of property. In that, he is in accord with the Roman law, in accord with MM. Toullier and Duranton; but in his opinion this condition is not the only one, and it is in this particular that his doctrine goes beyond theirs. “But, however exclusive the right arising from sole occupancy, does it not become still more so, when man has moulded matter by his labor; when he has deposited in it a portion of himself, re-creating it by his industry, and setting upon it the seal of his intelligence and activity? Of all conquests, that is the most legitimate, for it is the price of labor. 1 “Origin of French Law.” * To honor one's parents, to be grateful to one's benefactors, to neither kill nor steal,-truths of inward sensation. To obey God rather than men, to render to each that which is his ; the whole is greater than a part, a straight line is the shortest road from one point to another, — truths of intuition. All are a priori: but the first are felt by the conscience, and imply only a simple act of the soul; the second are perceived by the reason, and imply comparison and relation. In short, the former are sentiments, the latter are ideas. SECOND MEMOIR. 373 º He who should deprive a man of the thing thus remodelled, thus human- ized, would invade the man himself, and would inflict the deepest wounds upon his liberty.” *: I pass over the very beautiful explanations in which M. . Troplong, discussing labor and industry, displays the whole wealth of his eloquence. M. Troplong is not only a philoso- pher, he is an orator, an artist. He abounds with appeals to the conscience and the passions. I might make sad work of his rhetoric, should I undertake to dissect it; but I confine myself for the present to his philosophy. If M. Troplong had only known how to think and reflect, before abandoning the original fact of occupancy and plung- ing into the theory of labor, he would have asked himself: “What is it to occupy 2” And he would have discovered that occupancy is only a generic term by which all modes of possession are expressed, – seizure, station, immanence, habi- tation, cultivation, use, consumption, &c.; that labor, conse- quently, is but one of a thousand forms of occupancy. He would have understood, finally, that the right of possession which is born of labor is governed by the same general laws as that which results from the simple seizure of things. What kind of a legist is he who declaims when he ought to reason, who continually mistakes his metaphors for legal axioms, and who does not so much as know how to obtain a universal by induction, and form a category 2 If labor is identical with occupancy, the only benefit which it secures to the laborer is the right of individual possession of the object of his labor; if it differs from occupancy, it gives birth to a right equal only to itself, - that is, a right which begins, continues, and ends, with the labor of the occupant. It is for this reason, in the words of the law, that one cannot acquire a just title to a thing by labor alone. He must also 374 whAT IS PROPERTY P hold it for a year and a day, in order to be regarded as its possessor; and possess it twenty or thirty years, in order to become its proprietor. - These preliminaries established, M. Troplong's whole struct- ure falls of its own weight, and the inferences, which he at- tempts to draw, vanish. “Property once acquired by occupation and labor, it natu- rally preserves itself, not only by the same means, but also by the refusal of the holder to abdicate; for from the very fact that it has risen to the height of a right, it is its nature to perpetuate itself and to last for an indefinite period. . . . Rights, considered from an ideal point of view, are imperish- able and eternal; and time, which affects only the contin- gent, can no more disturb them than it can injure God himself.” It is astonishing that our author, in speaking of the ideal, time, and etermity, did not work into his sentence- the divine wings of Plato, - so fashionable to-day in philo- sophical works. With the exception of falsehood, I hate nonsense more than any thing else in the world. Property once acquired / Good, if it is acquired; but, as it is not acquired, it cannot be preserved. Rights are eternal / Yes, in the sight of God, like the archetypal ideas of the Platonists. But, on the earth, rights exist only in the presence of a subject, an object, and a condition. Take away one of these three things, and rights no longer exist. Thus, individual possession ceases at the death of the subject, upon the destruction of the object, or in case of exchange or abandonment. Let us admit, however, with M. Troplong, that property is an absolute and eternal right, which cannot be destroyed save by the deed and at the will of the proprietor. What are the consequences which immediately follow from this. position ? SECOND MEMOIR. 375 To show the justice and utility of prescription, M. Trop- long supposes the case of a bona fide possessor whom a pro- prietor, long since forgotten or even unknown, is attempting to eject from his possession. Jº At the start, the error of the possessor was excusable but 'not irreparable. Pursuing its course and growing old by degrees, it has so completely clothed itself in the colors of truth, it has spoken so loudly the language of right, it has involved so many confiding in- terests, that it fairly may be asked whether it would not cause greater confusion to go back to the reality than to sanction the fictions which it (an error, without doubt) has sown on its way? Well, yes; it must be confessed, without hesita- tion, that the remedy would prove worse than the disease, and that its application would lead to the most outrageous injustice.” How long since utility became a principle of law When the Athenians, by the advice of Aristides, rejected a propo- sition eminently advantageous to their republic, but also ut- terly unjust, they showed finer moral perception and greater clearness of intellect than M. Troplong. Property is an eternal right, independent of time, indestructible except by the act and at the will of the proprietor; and here this right is taken from the proprietor, and on what ground 2 Good God 1 on the ground of absence / Is it not true that legists are governed by caprice in giving and taking away rights 2 When it pleases these gentlemen, idleness, unworthiness, or absence can invalidate a right which, under quite similar circumstances, labor, residence, and virtue are inadequate to obtain. Do not be astonished that legists reject the ab- solute. Their good pleasure is law, and their disordered imaginations are the real cause of the evolutions in juris- prudence. 27 376 WHAT IS PROPERTY 2 “If the nominal proprietor should plead ignorance, his claim would be none the more valid. Indeed, his ignorance might arise from inexcus- able carelessness, etc.” What I in order to legitimate dispossession through pre- scription, you suppose faults in the proprietor | You blame his absence, — which may have been involuntary ; his neg- lect, — not knowing what caused it; his carelessness, – a gra- tuitous supposition of your own It is absurd. One very simple observation suffices to annihilate this theory. Soci- ety, which, they tell us, makes an exception in the interest of order in favor of the possessor as against the old proprietor, owes the latter an indemnity; since the privilege of prescrip- tion is nothing but expropriation for the sake of public utility. But here is something stronger: — “In society a place cannot remain vacant with impunity. A new man arises in place of the old one who disappears or goes away; he brings here his existence, becomes entirely absorbed, and devotes himself to this post which he finds abandoned. Shall the deserter, then, dispute the honor of the victory with the soldier who fights with the sweat stand- ing on his brow, and bears the burden of the day, in behalf of a cause which he deems just 2' When the tongue of an advocate once gets in motion, who can tell where it will stop 2 M. Troplong admits and justifies usurpation in case of the absence of the proprietor, and on a mere presumption of his carelessness. But when the neglect is authenticated ; when the abandonment is solemnly and voluntarily set forth in a contract in the presence of a magis- trate; when the proprietor dares to say, “I cease to labor, but I still claim a share of the product,” — then the absentee's right of property is protected ; the usurpation of the possessor would be criminal ; farm-rent is the reward of idleness. SECOND MEMOIR. 377 "Where is, I do not say the consistency, but, the honesty of this law Prescription is a result of the civil law, a creation of the legislator. Why has not the legislator fixed the conditions differently — why, instead of twenty and thirty years, is not a single year sufficient to prescribe 2–why are not voluntary absence and confessed idleness as good grounds for dispos- session as involuntary absence, ignorance, or apathy But in vain should we ask M. Troplong, the philosopher, to tell us the ground of prescription. Concerning the code, M. Troplong does not reason. “The interpreter,” he says, “must take things as they are, Society as it exists, laws as they are made: that is the only sensible starting-point.” Well, then, write no more books; cease to reproach your predecessors— who, like you, have aimed only at interpretation of the law — ? for having remained in the rear; talk no more of philosophy and progress, for the lie sticks in your throat. - M. Troplong denies the reality of the right of possession; He denies that possession has ever existed as a principle of society; and he quotes M. de Savigny, who holds precisely the opposite position, and whom he is content to leave unan- swered. At one time, M. Troplong asserts that possession and property are contemporaneous, and that they exist at the same time, which implies that the right of property is based on the fact of possession, — a conclusion which is evidently absurd ; at another, he denies that possession had any histori- cal eristence prior to property, — an assertion which is contra- dicted by the customs of many nations which cultivate the land without appropriating it; by the Roman law, which dis- tinguished so clearly between possession and property; and by our code itself, which makes possession for twenty or thirty years the condition of property. Finally, M. Troplong 378 WHA r is PROPERTYP goes so far as to maintain that the Roman maxim, Nihil com-- mune habet proprietas cum possessione— which contains so striking an allusion to the possession of the ager publicus, and which, sooner or later, will be again accepted without qualification — expresses in French law only a judicial axiom, a simple rule forbidding the union of an action possessoire with an action petitoire, — an opinion as retrogressive as it is unphilosophical. In treating of actions possessoires, M. Troplong is so unfor- tunate or awkward that he mutilates economy through failure : to grasp its meaning. “Just as property,” he writes, “gave rise to the action for revendication, so possession — the fus' possessionis — was the cause of possessory interdicts. . . . . There were two kinds of interdicts, – the interdict recuper- andae possessionis, and the interdict refinema'a possessionis, – which correspond to our complainte en cas de saisine et nouvel- leté. There is also a third, – adipiscendae possessionis, – of which the Roman law-books speak in connection with the two others. But, in reality, this interdict is not possessory: for he who wishes to acquire possession by this means does not possess, and has not possessed; and yet acquired posses- sion is the condition of possessory interdicts.” Why is not an action to acquire possession equally conceivable with an action to be reinstated in possession ? When the Roman plebeians demanded a division of the conquered territory; when the proletaires of Lyons took for their motto, Vivre en- travaillant, ou mourir en combattant (to live working, or die fighting); when the most enlightened of the modern econo- mists claim for every man the right to labor and to live, – they only propose this interdict, adipiscenda possessionis, which embarrasses M. Troplong so seriously. And what is my ob-- ject in pleading against property, if not to obtain possession ? SECOND MEMOIR. 379 How is it that M. Troplong—the legist, the orator, the phi- losopher — does not see that logically this interdict must be admitted, since it is the necessary complement of the two others, and the three united form an indivisible trinity, - to recover, to maintain, to acquire 2 To break this series is to create a blank, destroy the natural synthesis of things, and follow the example of the geometrician who tried to conceive of a solid with only two dimensions. But it is not astonishing that M. Troplong rejects the third class of actions possessoires, when we consider that he rejects possession itself. He is so completely controlled by his prejudices in this respect, that he is unconsciously led, not to unite (that would be horrible in His eyes), but to identify the action possessoire with the action petitoire. This could be easily proved, were it not too tedious to plunge into these metaphysical obscurities. As an interpreter of the law, M. Troplong is no more suc- ‘cessful than as a philosopher. One specimen of his skill in this direction, and I am done with him : — Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 23: “Actions possessoires are allowable only when commenced within the year of trouble by those who have held possession for at least a year by an irrevocable title.” M. Troplong's comments:— “Ought we to maintain—as Duparc, Poullain, and Lanjuínais would have us — the rule spoliatus ante omnia restituendus, when an individual, who is neither proprietor nor annual possessor, is expelled by a third party, who has no right to the estate 2 I think not. Art. 23 of the Code is general: it absolutely requires that the plaintiff in actions possessoires shall have been in peaceable possession for a year at least. That is the invariable principle: it can in no case be modified. And why should it be set aside 2 The plaintiff had no seisin; he had no privileged posses- sion; he had only a temporary occupancy, insufficient to warrant in his favor the presumption of property, which renders the annual possession so valuable. Well! this de facto occupancy he has lost; another is in- 38o whAT IS PROPERTY P vested with it: possession is in the hands of this new-comer. Now, is not this a case for the application of the principle, In pari causa posses- sor potior habetur? Should not the actual possessor be preferred to the evicted possessor P Can he not meet the complaint of his adversary by saying to him : ‘Prove that you were an annual possessor before me, for you are the plaintiff. As far as I am concerned, it is not for me to tell you how I possess, nor how long I have possessed. Possideo quia £os- sideo. I have no other reply, no other defence. When you have shown that your action is admissible, then we will see whether you are entitled to lift the veil which hides the origin of my possession.’” And this is what is honored with the name of jurisprudence and philosophy, - the restoration of force. What! when I have “moulded matter by my labor” [I quote M. Troplong]; when I have “deposited in it a portion of myself” [M. Trop- long] ; when I have “re-created it by my industry, and set upon it the seal of my intelligence” [M. Troplong], - on the ground that I have not possessed it for a year, a stranger may dispossess me, and the law offers me no protection | And if M. Troplong is my judge, M. Troplong will condemn me! And if I resist my adversary, - if, for this bit of mud which I may call my field, and of which they wish to rob me, a war breaks out between the two competitors, – the legislator will gravely wait until the stronger, having killed the other, has had possession for a year! No, no, Monsieur Troplong you do not understand the words of the law; for I prefer to call in question your intelligence rather than the justice of the legislator. You are mistaken in your application of the prin- ciple, In pari causa possessor potior habetur: the actuality of possession here refers to him who possessed at the time when the difficulty arose, not to him who possesses at the time of the complaint. And when the code prohibits the reception of actions possessoires, in cases where the possession is not of a year's duration, it simply means that if, before a year has SECOND MEMOIR. 381 elapsed, the holder relinquishes possession, and ceases act- ually to occupy in propria persona, he cannot avail himself of an action possessoire against his successor. In a word, the code treats possession of less than a year as it ought to treat all possession, however long it has existed, - that is, the con- dition of property ought to be, not merely seisin for a year, but perpetual seisin. I will not pursue this analysis farther. When an author bases two volumes of quibbles on foundations so uncertain, it may be boldly declared that his work, whatever the amount of learning displayed in it, is a mess of nonsense unworthy a critic's attention. At this point, sir, I seem to hear you reproaching me for this conceited dogmatism, this lawless arrogance, which re- spects nothing, claims a monopoly of justice and good sense, and assumes to put in the pillory any one who dares to main- tain an opinion contrary to its own. This fault, they tell me, more odious than any other in an author, was too prominent a characteristic of my First Memoir, and I should do well to correct it. It is important to the success of my defence, that I should vindicate myself from this reproach ; and since, while per- seiving in myself other faults of a different character, I still adhere in this particular to my disputatious style, it is right :hat I should give my reasons for my conduct. I act, not from inclination, but from necessity. I say, then, that I treat my authors as I do for two reasons: a reason of right, and a reason of intention ; both peremptory. 1. Reason of right. When I preach equality of fortunes, I do not advance an opinion more or less probable, a utopia more or less ingenious, an idea conceived within my brain by means of imagination only. I lay down an absolute truth, 382 WHAT IS PROPERTY concerning which hesitation is impossible, modesty super- fluous, and doubt ridiculous. But, do you ask, what assures me that that which I utter is true 2 What assures me, sir? The logical and metaphysical processes which I use, the correctness of which I have demon- strated by & priori reasoning ; the fact that I possess an infallible method of investigation and verification with which my authors are unacquainted ; and finally, the fact that for all matters relating to property and justice I have found a formula which explains all legislative variations, and furnishes a key for all problems. Now, is there so much as a shadow of method in M. Toullier, M. Troplong, and this swarm of insipid commentators, almost as devoid of reason and moral sense as the code itself 2 Do you give the name of method to an alphabetical, chronological, analogical, or merely nominal classification of subjects Do you give the name of method to these lists of paragraphs gathered under an arbitrary head, these sophistical vagaries, this mass of contradictory quota- tions and opinions, this nauseous style, this spasmodic rhetoric, models of which are so common at the bar, though seldom found elsewhere 2 Do you take for philosophy this twaddle, this intolerable pettifoggery adorned with a few scholastic trimmings 2 No, no a writer who respects himself, never will consent to enter the balance with these manipulators of law, misnamed jurists; and for my part I object to a comparison. 2. Reason of intention. As far as I am permitted to divulge this secret, I am a conspirator in an immense revolution, ter. rible to charlatans and despots, to all exploiters of the poor and credulous, to all salaried idlers, dealers in political pana- ceas and parables, tyrants in a word of thought and of opinion. I labor to stir up the reason of individuals to insurrection against the reason of authorities. SECOND MEMOIR. 383 According to the laws of the society of which I am a mem- ber, all the evils which afflict humanity arise from faith in external teachings and submission to authority. And not to go outside of our own century, is it not true, for instance, that France is plundered, scoffed at, and tyrannized over, because she speaks in masses, and not by heads 2 The French people are penned up in three or four flocks, receiv- ing their signal from a chief, responding to the voice of a leader, and thinking just as he says. A certain journal, it is said, has fifty thousand subscribers; assuming six readers to every subscriber, we have three hundred thousand sheep browsing and bleating at the same cratch. Apply this calcu- lation to the whole periodical press, and you find that, in our free and intelligent France, there are two millions of creatures receiving every morning from the journals spiritual pasturage. Two millions ! In other words, the entire nation allows a score of little fellows to lead it by the nose. By no means, sir, do I deny to journalists talent, science, love of truth, patriotism, and what you please. They are very worthy and intelligent people, whom I undoubtedly should wish to resemble, had I the honor to know them. That of which I complain, and that which has made me a conspirator, is that, instead of enlightening us, these gentlemen command us, impose upon us articles of faith, and that without demon- stration or verification. When, for example, I ask why these fortifications of Paris, which, in former times, under the influ- ence of certain prejudices, and by means of a concurrence of extraordinary circumstances supposed for the sake of the argu- ment to have existed, may perhaps have served to protect us, but which it is doubtful whether our descendants will ever use,—when I ask, I say, on what grounds they assimilate the future to a hypothetical past, they reply that M. Thiers, who 384 , whAT IS PROPERTY P has a great mind, has written upon this subject a report of admirable elegance and marvellous clearness. At this I be- come angry, and reply that M. Thiers does not know what he is talking about. Why, having wanted no detached forts seven years ago, do we want them to-day ? “Oh damn it,” they say, “the difference is great; the first forts were too near to us; with these we cannot be bom- barded.” You cannot be bombarded; but you can be block- aded, and will be, if you stir. What! to obtain blockade forts from the Parisians, it has sufficed to prejudice them against bombardment forts | And they thought to outwit the govern- ment Oh, the sovereignty of the people ! . . . “Damn it ! M. Thiers, who is wiser than you, says that it: would be absurd to suppose a government making war upon citizens, and maintaining itself by force and in spite of the: will of the people. That would be absurd ' " Perhaps so: such a thing has happened more than once, and may happen again. Besides, when despotism is strong, it appears almost legitimate. However that may be, they lied in 1833, and; they lie again in 1841, - those who threaten us with the bomb-shell. And then, if M. Thiers is so well assured of the intentions of the government, why does he not wish the forts to be built before the circuit is extended ? Why this air of suspicion of the government, unless an intrigue has, been planned between the government and M. Thiers ? “Damn it! we do not wish to be again invaded. If Paris. had been fortified in 1815, Napoleon would not have been conquered l’ But I tell you that Napoleon was not con- quered, but sold; and that if, in 1815, Paris had had fortifi- cations, it would have been with them as with the thirty thcusand men of Grouchy, who were misled during the battle. It is still easier to surrender forts than to lead soldiers. SECOND MEMOIR. 385 Would the selfish and the cowardly ever lack reasons for yielding to the enemy? “But do you not see that the absolutist courts are provoked at our fortifications?—a proof that they do not think as you do.” You believe that; and, for my part, I believe that in reality they are quite at ease about the matter; and, if they appear to tease our ministers, they do so only to give the latter an opportunity to decline. The absolutist courts are always on better terms with our constitutional monarchy, than our monarchy with us. Does not M. Guizot say that France needs to be defended within as well as without * Within against whom Against France. O Parisians l it is but six months since you demanded war, and now you want only barricades. Why should the allies fear your doc- trines, when you cannot even control yourselves 2 . . . How could you sustain a siege, when you weep over the absence of an actress 2 “But, finally, do you not understand that, by the rules of modern warfare, the capital of a country is always the objec- tive point of its assailants Suppose our army defeated on the Rhine, France invaded, and defenceless Paris falling into. the hands of the enemy. It would be the death of the ad- ministrative power; without a head it could not live. The capital taken, the nation must submit. What do you say to that * * The reply is very simple. Why is society constituted in. such a way that the destiny of the country depends upon the safety of the capital * Why, in case our territory be invaded and Paris besieged, cannot the legislative, executive, and mili- tary powers act outside of Paris Why this localization of all the vital forces of France 2 . . . Do not cry out upon de- centralization. This hackneyed reproach would discredit only 386 WHAT IS PROPERTY P your own intelligence and sincerity. It is not a question of decentralization ; it is your political fetichism which I attack. Why should the national unity be attached to a certain place, to certain functionaries, to certain bayonets 2 Why should the Place Maubert and the Palace of the Tuileries be the pal- ladium of France 2 Now let me make an hypothesis. Suppose it were written in the charter, “In case the coun- try be again invaded, and Paris forced to surrender, the government being annihilated and the national assembly dis- solved, the electoral colleges shall reassemble spontaneously and without other official notice, for the purpose of appoint- ing new deputies, who shall organize a provisional govern- ment at Orleans. If Orleans succumbs, the government shall reconstruct itself in the same way at Lyons ; then at Bordeaux, then at Bayonne, until all France be captured or the enemy driven from the land. For the government may perish, but the nation never dies. The king, the peers, and the deputies massacred, Vive la France /’’ Do you not think that such an addition to the charter would be a better safeguard for the liberty and integrity of the country than walls and bastions around Paris 2 Well, then I do henceforth for administration, industry, science, lit- erature, and art that which the charter ought to prescribe for the central government and common defence. Instead of endeavoring to render Paris impregnable, try rather to render the loss of Paris an insignificant matter. Instead of accu- mulating about one point academies, faculties, schools, and political, administrative, and judicial centres; instead of ar- resting intellectual development and weakening public spirit in the provinces by this fatal agglomeration, — can you not, without destroying unity, distribute social functions among SECOND MEMOIR. 387: places as well as among persons Such a system—in allow- ing each province to participate in political power and action, and in balancing industry, intelligence, and strength in all parts of the country— would equally secure, against enemies at home and enemies abroad, the liberty of the people and the stability of the government. - Discriminate, then, between the centralization of functions and the concentration of organs; between political unity and its material symbol. “Oh that is plausible; but it is impossible !” — which means that the city of Paris does not intend to surrender its. privileges, and that there it is still a question of property. Idle talk | The country, in a state of panic which has been cleverly worked upon, has asked for fortifications. I dare to affirm that it has abdicated its sovereignty. All parties are to blame for this suicide, – the conservatives, by their acqui- escence in the plans of the government; the friends of the dynasty, because they wish no opposition to that which pleases them, and because a popular revolution would anni- hilate them; the democrats, because they hope to rule in their turn.” That which all rejoice at having obtained is a means * Armand Carrel would have favored the fortification of the capital, “Le National” has said, again and again, placing the name of its old editor by the side of the names of Napoleon and Vauban. What signifies this exhumation of an anti-popular politician P. It signifies that Armand Carrel wished to make government an individual and irremovable, but elective, property, and that he wished this property to be elected, not by the people, but by the army. The political system of Carrel was simply a reorganization of the praetorian guards. Carrel also hated the péquins. That which he deplored in the revolution of July was not, they say, the insurrection of the people, but the victory of the people over the soldiers. That is the reason why Carrel, after 1830, would never support the patriots. “Do you answer me with a few regiments?” he asked. Armand Carrel regarded the army—the military power—as the basis of law and government. This man undoubtedly had a moral sense within him, 388 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 of future repression. As for the defence of the country, they are not troubled about that. The idea of tyranny dwells in the minds of all, and brings together into one conspiracy all forms of selfishness. We wish the regeneration of society, but we subordinate this desire to our ideas and convenience. That our approaching marriage may take place, that our busi- ness may succeed, that our opinions may triumph, we post- pone reform. Intolerance and selfishness lead us to put fetters upon liberty; and, because we cannot wish all that God wishes, we would, if it rested with us, stay the course of destiny rather than sacrifice our own interests and self-love. Is not this an instance where the words of Solomon apply, - “L’iniquité a menti d elle-même”f For this reason, sir, I have enlisted in a desperate war against every form of authority over the multitude. Advance sentinel of the proletariat, I cross bayonets with the celebri- ties of the day, as well as with spies and charlatans. Well, when I am fighting with an illustrious adversary, must I stop at the end of every phrase, like an orator in the tribune, to say “the learned author,” “the eloquent writer,” “the pro- found publicist,” and a hundred other platitudes with which it is fashionable to mock people 2 These civilities seem to me no less insulting to the man attacked than dishonorable but he surely had no sense of justice. Were he still in this world, I declare it boldly, liberty would have no greater enemy than Carrel. It is said that on this question of the fortification of Paris the staff of “Le National" are not agreed. This would prove, if proof were needed, that a journal may blunder and falsify, without entitling any one to accuse its editors. A journal is a metaphysical being, for which no one is really responsible, and which owes its existence solely to mutual concessions. This idea ought to frighten those worthy citizens who, because they borrow their opinions from a journal, imagine that they belong to a political party, and who have not the faintest suspicion that they are really without a head. SECOND MEMOIR. 389 to the aggressor. But when, rebuking an author, I say to him, “Citizen, your doctrine is absurd, and, if to prove my assertion is an offence against you, I am guilty of it,” imme- -diately the listener opens his ears; he is all attention; and, if I do not succeed in convincing him, at least I give his thought an impulse, and set him the wholesome example of doubt and 'free examination. Then do not think, sir, that, in tripping up the philosophy of your very learned and very estimable confrère, M. Trop- dong, I fail to appreciate his talent as a writer (in my opinion, he has too much for a jurist); nor his knowledge, though it is too closely confined to the letter of the law, and the reading •of old books. In these particulars, M. Troplong offends on the side of excess rather than deficiency. Further, do not ‘believe that I am actuated by any personal animosity towards him, or that I have the slightest desire to wound his self-love. I know M. Troplong only by his “Treatise on Prescription,” which I wish he had not written; and as for my critics, nei- ther M. Troplong, nor any of those whose opinion I value, will ever read me. Once more, my only object is to prove, as far as I am able, to this unhappy French nation, that those : who make the laws, as well as those who interpret them, are not infallible organs of general, impersonal, and absolute I CalSOIl. I had resolved to submit to a systematic criticism the semi- official defence of the right of property recently put forth by M. Wolowski, your colleague at the Conservatory. With this view, I had commenced to collect the documents necessary for each of his lectures; but, soon perceiving that the ideas of the professor were incoherent, that his arguments contra- dicted each other, that one affirmation was sure to be over- thrown by another, and that in M. Wolowski's lucubrations 390 WHAT IS PROPERTY 2 the good was always mingled with the bad, and being by: nature a little suspicious, it suddenly occurred to me that M. Wolowski was an advocate of equality in disguise, thrown in spite of himself into the position in which the patriarch Jacob pictures one of his sons, – inter duas clitellas, between two stools, as the proverb says. In more parliamentary lan- guage, I saw clearly that M. Wolowski was placed between his profound convictions on the one hand and his official duties on the other, and that, in order to maintain his posi- tion, he had to assume a certain slant. Then I experienced. great pain at seeing the reserve, the circumlocution, the fig- ures, and the irony to which a professor of legislation, whose duty it is to teach dogmas with clearness and precision, was forced to resort; and I fell to cursing the society in which an honest man is not allowed to say frankly what he thinks. Never, sir, have you conceived of such torture: I seemed to be witnessing the martyrdom of a mind. I am going to give you an idea of these astonishing meetings, or rather of these: scenes of sorrow. Monday, Nov. 20, 1840. — The professor declares, in brief, — I. That the right of property is not founded upon occupa- tion, but upon the impress of man; 2. That every man has a natural and inalienable right to the use of matter. Now, if matter can be appropriated, and if, notwithstanding, all men retain an inalienable right to the use of this matter, what is property – and if matter can be appropriated only by labor, how long is this appropriation to continue – ques tions that will confuse and confound all jurists whatsoever. Then M. Wolowski cites his authorities. Great God what. witnesses he brings forward | First, M. Troplong, the great metaphysician, whom we have discussed ; then, M. Louis, Blanc, editor of the “Revue du Progrès,” who came near SECOND MEMOIR. 39 I being tried by jury for publishing his “Organization of Labor,” and who escaped from the clutches of the public prosecutor only by a juggler's trick; 1 Corinne,— I mean Madame de Stael,-who, in an ode, making a poetical com- parison of the land with the waves, of the furrow of a plough with the wake of a vessel, says “that property exists only where man has left his trace,” which makes property dependent upon the solidity of the elements; Rousseau, the apostle of liberty and equality, but who, according to M. Wolowski, attacked property only as a joke, and in order to point a paradox; Robespierre, who prohibited a division of the land, because he regarded such a measure as a rejuvenes- cence of property, and who, while awaiting the definitive or- ganization of the republic, placed all property in the c ire of the people, – that is, transferred the right of eminent domain from the individual to society; Babeuf, who wanted prop- erty for the nation, and communism for the citizens; M. Con- sidérant, who favors a division of landed property into shares, —that is, who wishes to render property nominal and ficti- tious: the whole being intermingled with jokes and witticisms (intended undoubtedly to lead people away from the hornets' nests) at the expense of the adversaries of the right of prop- erty Mozemāer 26. — M. Wolowski supposes this objection: Land, like water, air, and light, is necessary to life, there- fore it cannot be appropriated; and he replies: The impor- 1 In a very short article, which was read by M. Wolowski, M. Louis Blanc declares, in substance, that he is not a communist (which I easily believe); that one must be a fool to attack property (but he does not say why); and that it is very necessary to guard against confounding property with its abuses. When Voltaire overthrew Christianity, he repeatedly avowed that he had no spite against religion, but only against its abuses. 28 392 whAT IS PROPERTY F tance of landed property diminishes as the power of industry increases. Good! this importance diminishes, but it does not disappear; and this, of itself, shows landed property to be illegitimate. Here M. Wolowski pretends to think that the opponents of property refer only to property in land, while they merely take it as a term of comparison; and, in showing with won- derful clearness the absurdity of the position in which he places them, he finds a way of drawing the attention of his hearers to another subject without being false to the truth which it is his office to contradict. “Property,” says M. Wolowski, “is that which distin- guishes man from the animals.” That may be ; but are we to regard this as a compliment or a satire 2 “Mahomet,” says M. Wolowski, “decreed property.” And so did Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane, and all the ravagers of nations. What sort of legislators were they “Property has been in existence ever since the origin of the human race.” Yes, and so has slavery, and despotism also ; and likewise polygamy and idolatry. But what does this antiquity show The members of the Council of the State — M. Portalis at their head—did not raise, in their discussion of the Code, the , question of the legitimacy of property. “Their silence,” says M. Wolowski, “is a precedent in favor of this right.” I may regard this reply as personally addressed to me, since the observation belongs to me. I reply, “As long as an opinion is universally admitted, the universality of belief serves of itself as argument and proof. When this same opinion is attacked, the former faith proves nothing; we must resort to reason. Ignorance, however old and pardonable it may be, never outweighs reason.” SECOND MEMOIR. 393 Property has its abuses, M. Wolowski confesses. “But,” The says, “these abuses gradually disappear. To-day their cause is known. They all arise from a false theory of prop- erty. In principle, property is inviolable, but it can and must be checked and disciplined.” Such are the conclusions of the professor. - When one thus remains in the clouds, he need not fear to equivocate. Nevertheless, I would like him to define these abuses of property, to show their cause, to explain this true theory from which no abuse is to spring; in short, to tell me how, without destroying property, it can be governed for the greatest good of all. “Our civil code,” says M. Wolowski, in speaking of this subject, “leaves much to be desired.” I think it leaves every thing undone. Finally, M. Wolowski opposes, on the one hand, the con- centration of capital, and the absorption which results there- from ; and, on the other, he objects to the extreme division of the land. Now I think that I have demonstrated in my First Memoir, that large accumulation and minute division are the first two terms of an economical trinity, -a thesis and an antithesis. But, while M. Wolowski says nothing of the third term, the synthesis, and thus leaves the inference in sus- pense, I have shown that this third term is Association, which is the annihilation of property. Movember 30. — LITERARY PROPERTY. M. Wolowski grants that it is just to recognize the rights of talent (which is not in the least hostile to equality); but he seriously objects to perpetual and absolute property in the works of genius, to the profit of the authors' heirs. His main argument is, that society has a right of collective production over every crea- tion of the mind. Now, it is precisely this principle of col- lective power that I developed in my “Inquiries into Property 394 whAT IS PROPERTY P and Government,” and on which I have established the com— plete edifice of a new social organization. M. Wolowski is, as far as I know, the first jurist who has made a legislative application of this economical law. Only, while I have ex- tended the principle of collective power to every sort of product, M. Wolowski, more prudent than it is my nature to be, confines it to neutral ground. So, that that which I am bold enough to say of the whole, he is contented to affirm of a part, leaving the intelligent hearer to fill up the void for himself. However, his arguments are keen and close. One feels that the professor, finding himself more at ease with one aspect of property, has given the rein to his intellect, and, is rushing on towards liberty. 1. Absolute literary property would hinder the activity of other men, and obstruct the development of humanity. It. would be the death of progress; it would be suicide. What. would have happened if the first inventions, – the plough,. the level, the saw, &c., - had been appropriated 2 Such is the first proposition of M. Wolówski. I reply: Absolute property in land and tools hinders human activity, and obstructs progress and the free development of man. What happened in Rome, and in all the ancient na-. tions 2 What occurred in the middle ages 2 What do we see to-day in England, in consequence of absolute property in the sources of production ? The suicide of humanity. 2. Real and personal property is in harmony with the social. interest. In consequence of literary property, social and indi-- vidual interests are perpetually in conflict. The statement of this proposition contains a rhetorical. figure, common with those who do not enjoy full and com- plete liberty of speech. This figure is the anti-phrasis or contre-verité. It consists, according to Dumarsais and the: SECOND MEMOIR. 395 'best humanists, in saying one thing while meaning another. M. Wolowski's proposition, naturally expressed, would read as follows: “Just as real and personal property is essentially hostile to society, so, in consequence of literary property, social and individual interests are perpetually in conflict.” 3. M. de Montalembert, in the Chamber of Peers, vehe- mently protested against the assimilation of authors to inven- tors of machinery; an assimilation which he claimed to be injurious to the former. M. Wolowski replies, that the rights of authors, without machinery, would be nil; that, without paper-mills, type foundries, and printing-offices, there could be no sale of verse and prose; that many a mechanical invention, — the compass, for instance, the telescope, or the steam-engine, – is quite as valuable as a book. Prior to M. Montalembert, M. Charles Comte had laughed at the inference in favor of mechanical inventions, which logical minds never fail to draw from the privileges granted to authors. “He,” says M. Comte, “who first conceived and executed the idea of transforming a piece of wood into a pair of sabots, or an animal's hide into a pair of sandals, would thereby have acquired an exclusive right to make shoes for the human race l’” Undoubtedly, under the system of prop- erty. For, in fact, this pair of sabots, over which you make so merry, is the creation of the shoemaker, the work of his genius, the expression of his thought; to him it is his poem, quite as much as “Le Roi s'amuse,” is M. Victor Hugo's drama. Justice for all alike. If you refuse a patent to a per- fecter of boots, refuse also a privilege to a maker of rhymes. 4. That which gives importance to a book is a fact ex- ternal to the author and his work. Without the intelligence of society, without its development, and a certain community of ideas, passions, and interests between it and the authors, 396 whAT IS PROPERTY the works of the latter would be worth nothing. The ex- changeable value of a book is due even more to the social" condition than to the talent displayed in it. * Indeed, it seems as if I were copying my own words. This proposition of M. Wolowski contains a special expression of a general and absolute idea, one of the strongest and most con- clusive against the right of property. Why do artists, like mechanics, find the means to live 2 Because society has made the fine arts, like the rudest industries, objects of con- sumption and exchange, governed consequently by all the laws of commerce and political economy. Now, the first of these laws is the equipoise of functions; that is, the equality of associates. 5. M. Wolowski indulges in sarcasm against the petitioners. for literary property. “There are authors,” he says, “who crave the privileges of authors, and who for that purpose point out the power of the melodrama. They speak of the niece of Corneille, begging at the door of a theatre which the works. of her uncle had enriched. . . . To satisfy the avarice of literary people, it would be necessary to create literary majo- rats, and make a whole code of exceptions.” I like this virtuous irony. But M. Wolowski has by no. means exhausted the difficulties which the question involves. And first, is it just that MM. Cousin, Guizot, Villemain, Damiron, and company, paid by the State for delivering lect- ures, should be paid a second time through the booksellers ?— that I, who have the right to report their lectures, should not have the right to print them 2 Is it just that MM. Noel and Chapsal, overseers of the University, should use their influence in selling their selections from literature to the youth whose studies they are instructed to superintend in consideration of a salary 2 And, if that is not just, is it not SECOND MEMOIR. 397 proper to refuse literary property to every author holding public offices, and receiving pensions or sinecures 2 Again, shall the privilege of the author extend to irreligious and immoral works, calculated only to corrupt the heart, and obscure the understanding 2 To grant this privilege is to sanction immorality by law; to refuse it is to censure the author. And since it is impossible, in the present imperfect state of society, to prevent all violations of the moral law, it will be necessary to open a license-office for books as well as morals. But, then, three-fourths of our literary people will be obliged to register; and, recognized thenceforth on their own declaration as prostitutes, they will necessarily belong to the public. We pay toll to the prostitute ; we do not endow her. Finally, shall plagiarism be classed with forgery If you reply “Yes,” you appropriate in advance all the subjects of which books treat; if you say “No,” you leave the whole matter to the decision of the judge. Except in the case of a clandestine reprint, how will he distinguish forgery from quotation, imitation, plagiarism, or even coincidence 2 A savant spends two years in calculating a table of logarithms to nine or ten decimals. He prints it. A fortnight after his book is selling at half-price; it is impossible to tell whether this result is due to forgery or competition. What shall the court do In case of doubt, shall it award the property to the first occupant As well decide the question by lot. These, however, are trifling considerations; but do we see that, in granting a perpetual privilege to authors and their heirs, we really strike a fatal blow at their interests We think to make booksellers dependent upon authors, – a delu- sion. The booksellers will unite against works, and their proprietors. Against works, by refusing to push their sale, by replacing them with poor imitations, by reproducing them 398 whAT IS PROPERTY 3 in a hundred indirect ways; and no one knows how far the science of plagiarism, and skilful imitation may be carried. Against proprietors. Are we ignorant of the fact, that a demand for a dozen copies enables a bookseller to sell a thou- sand; that with an edition of five hundred he can supply a kingdom for thirty years 2 What will the poor authors do in the presence of this omnipotent union of booksellers ? I will tell them what they will do. They will enter the employ of those whom they now treat as pirates ; and, to secure an advantage, they will become wage laborers. A fit reward for ignoble avarice, and insatiable pride." 1 The property fever is at its height among writers and artists, and it is curious to see the complacency with which our legislators and men of letters cherish this devouring passion. An artist sells a picture, and then, the mer- chandise delivered, assumes to prevent the purchaser from selling engravings, under the pretext that he, the painter, in selling the original, has not sold his design. A dispute arises between the amateur and the artist in regard to both the fact and the law. M. Villemain, the Minister of Public Instruction, being consulted as to this particular case, finds that the painter is right; only the property in the design should have been specially reserved in the contract: sc that, in reality, M. Villemain recognizes in the artist a power to surrender his work and prevent its communication; thus contradicting the legal axiom, One cannot give and keep at the same time. A strange reasoner is M. Villemain An ambiguous principle leads to a false conclusion. Instead of rejecting the prin- ciple, M. Villemain hastens to admit the conclusion. With him the reductio aa absurdum is a convincing argument. Thus he is made official defender of liter- ary property, sure of being understood and sustained by a set of loafers, the disgrace of literature and the plague of public morals. Why, then, does M. Villemain feel so strong an interest in setting himself up as the chief of the literary classes, in playing for their benefit the rôle of Zrissotin in the councils of the State, and in becoming the accomplice and associate of a band of profli- gates, – soi-disant men of letters, – who for more than ten years have labored with such deplorable success to ruin public spirit, and corrupt the heart by warping the mind? Contradictions of contradictions ! “Genius is the great leveller of the world,” cries M. de Lamartine; “then genius should be a proprietor. Liter- ary property is the fortune of democracy.” This unfortunate poet thinks him- self profound when he is only puffed up. His eloquence consists solely in SECOND MEMOIR. 399 6. Objection.— Property in occupied land passes to the heirs of the occupant. “Why,” say the authors, “should not the work of genius pass in like manner to the heirs of the man of genius 2" M. Wolowski's reply: “Because the labor of the first occupant is continued by his heirs, while the heirs of an author neither change nor add to his works. In landed property, the continuance of labor explains the continuatice of the right.” - Yes, when the labor is continued ; but if the labor is not continued, the right ceases. Thus is the right of possession, founded on personal labor, recognized by M. Wolowski. M. Wolowski decides in favor of granting to authors prop- erty in their works for a certain number of years, dating from the day of their first publication. The succeeding lectures on patents on inventions were no less instructive, although intermingled with shocking contra- dictions inserted with a view to make the useful truths more palatable. The necessity for brevity compels me to terminate this examination here, not without regret. Thus, of two eclectic jurists, who attempt a defence of coupling ideas which clash with each other: round square, dark sun, fallen angel, friest and love, thought and poetry, genius and fortune, levelling and property. Let us tell him, in reply, that his mind is a dark luminary; that each of his dis- courses is a disordered harmony; and that all his successes, whether in verse or prose, are due to the use of the extraordinary in the treatment of the most ordinary subjects. “Le National,” in reply to the report of M. Lamartine, endeavors to prove that literary property is of quite a different nature from landed property; as if the nature of the right of property depended on the object to which it is ap- plied, and not on the mode of its exercise and the condition of its existence. , But the main object of “Le National" is to please a class of proprietors whom an extension of the right of property vexes: that is why “Le National’’ opposes literary property. Will it tell us, once for all, whether it is for equality , or against it? 4OO whAT IS PROPERTY P property, one is entangled in a set of dogmas without prin– ciple or method, and is constantly talking nonsense; and the other designedly abandons the cause of property, in order to: present under the same name the theory of individual posses- sion. Was I wrong in claiming that confusion reigned among legists, and ought I to be legally prosecuted for having said that their science henceforth stood convicted of falsehood, its glory eclipsed ? The ordinary resources of the law no longer sufficing, phi- losophy, political economy, and the framers of systems have been consulted. All the oracles appealed to have been dis- couraging. The philosophers are no clearer to-day than at the time of the eclectic efflorescence; nevertheless, through their mysti- cal apothegms, we can distinguish the words progress, unity, association, solidarity, fraternity, which are certainly not reas- suring to proprietors. One of these philosophers, M. Pierre Leroux, has written two large books, in which he claims to show by all religious, legislative, and philosophical systems that, since men are responsible to each other, equality of con- ditions is the final law of society. It is true that this philoso- pher admits a kind of property; but as he leaves us to imagine what property would become in presence of equality, , we may boldly class him with the opponents of the right of increase. I must here declare freely—in order that I may not be: suspected of secret connivance, which is foreign to my na- ture—that M. Leroux has my full sympathy. Not that I, am a believer in his quasi-Pythagorean philosophy (upon this- subject I should have more than one observation to submit to him, provided a veteran covered with stripes would not despise the remarks of a conscript); not that I feel bound tor SECOND MEMOIR. 4OI: this author by any special consideration for his opposition to property. In my opinion, M. Leroux could, and even ought to, state his position more explicitly and logically. But I like, I admire, in M. Leroux, the antagonist of our philo- sophical demigods, the demolisher of usurped reputations, the pitiless critic of every thing that is respected because of its antiquity. Such is the reason for my high esteem of M. Leroux; such would be the principle of the only literary asso- ciation which, in this century of coteries, I should care to form. We need men who, like M. Leroux, call in question social principles, – not to diffuse doubt concerning them, but to make them doubly sure; men who excite the mind by bold negations, and make the conscience tremble by doctrines of annihilation. Where is the man who does not shudder on hearing M. Leroux exclaim, “There is neither a paradise nor a hell; the wicked will not be punished, nor the good re- warded. Mortals | cease to hope and fear; you revolve in a circle of appearances; humanity is an immortal tree, whose branches, withering one after another, feed with their débris the root which is always young !” Where is the man who, on hearing this desolate confession of faith, does not demand with terror, “Is it then true that I am only an aggregate of elements organized by an unknown force, an idea realized for a few moments, a form which passes and disappears 2 Is it true that my mind is only a harmony, and my soul a vortex? What is the ego Ż what is God? what is the sanc- tion of society 2" In former times, M. Leroux would have been regarded as a great culprit, worthy only (like Vanini) of death and universal execration. To-day, M. Leroux is fulfilling a mission of salva- tion, for which, whatever he may say, he will be rewarded. Like those gloomy invalids who are always talking of their 4O2 WHAT IS PROPERTY f approaching death, and who faint when the doctor's opinion confirms their pretence, our materialistic society is agitated and loses countenance while listening to this startling decree of the philosopher, “Thou shalt die ' " Honor then to M. Leroux, who has revealed to us the cowardice of the Epicu- reans; to M. Leroux, who renders new philosophical solu- tions necessary | Honor to the anti-eclectic, to the apostle of equality In his work on “Humanity,” M. Leroux commences by positing the necessity of property: “You wish to abolish property; but do you not see that thereby you would annihi- late man and even the name of man 2 ... You wish to abolish property; but could you live without a body ? I will not tell you that it is necessary to support this body; . . . I will tell you that this body is itself a species of property.” In order clearly to understand the doctrine of M. Leroux, it must be borne in mind that there are three necessary and primitive forms of society, - communism, property, and that which to-day we properly call association. M. Leroux rejects in the first place communism, and combats it with all his might. Man is a personal and free being, and therefore needs a sphere of independence and individual activity. M. Letoux emphasizes this in adding: “You wish neither family, nor country, nor property; therefore no more fathers, no more sons, no more brothers. Here you are, related to no. being in time, and therefore without a name; here you are, alone in the midst of a billion of men who to-day inhabit the earth. How do you expect me to distinguish you in space in the midst of this multitude 2 ” If man is indistinguishable, he is nothing. Now, he can be distinguished, individualized, only through a devotion of cer- tain things to his use, — such as his body, his faculties, and SECOND MF MOIR. 4O3. the tools which he uses. “Hence,” says M. Leroux, “the y necessity of appropriation ;” in short, property. But property on what condition ? Here M. Leroux, after having condemned communism, denounces in its turn the right of domain. His whole doctrine can be summed up in this single proposition, — Man may be made by property a slave or a despot by turns. - That posited, if we ask M. Leroux to tell us under what system of property man will be neither a slave nor a despot, but free, just, and a citizen, M. Leroux replies in the third. volume of his work on “Humanity: ” — ſº “There are three ways of destroying man's communion with his fel- lows and with the universe: . . . I. By separating man in time; 2. by separating him in space; 3. by dividing the land, or, in general terms, the instruments of production; by attaching men to things, by subordi- nating man to property, by making man a proprietor.” This language, it must be confessed, savors a little too. strongly of the metaphysical heights which the author fre- quents, and of the school of M. Cousin. Nevertheless, it can be seen, clearly enough it seems to me, that M. Leroux opposes the exclusive appropriation of the instruments of pro- duction ; only he calls this non-appropriation of the instru- ments of production a new method of establishing property, while I, in accordance with all precedent, call it a destruc- tion of property. In fact, without the appropriation of instru- ments, property is nothing. “Hitherto, we have confined ourselves to pointing out and combating the despotic features of property, by considering property alone. We have failed to see that the despotism of property is a correlative of the division of the human race; . . . that property, instead of being organ- 1zed in such a way as to facilitate the unlimited communion of man with his fellows and with the universe, has been, on the contrary, turned against this communion.” 4O4 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 Let us translate this into commercial phraseology. In order to destroy despotism and the inequality of conditions, men must cease from competition and must associate their interests. Let employer and employed (now enemies and rivals) become associates. Now, ask any manufacturer, merchant, or capitalist, whether he would conside; himself a proprietor if he were to share his revenue and profits with this mass of wage-laborers whom it is proposed to make his associates. “Family, property, and country are finite things, which ought to be organized with a view to the infinite. For man is a finite being, who aspires to the infinite. To him, absolute finiteness is evil. The infinite is his aim, the indefinite his right.” \ e Few of my readers would understand these hierophantic words, were I to leave them unexplained. M. Leroux means, by this magnificent formula, that humanity is a single im- mense society, which, in its collective unity, represents the infinite ; that every nation, every tribe, every commune, and every citizen are, in different degrees, fragments or finite members of the infinite society, the evil in which results solely from individualism and privilege, – in other words, from the subordination of the infinite to the finite; finally, that, to attain humanity's end and aim, each part has a right to an indefinitely progressive development. º “All the evils which afflict the human race arise from caste. The family is a blessing; the family caste (the nobility) is an evil. Country is a blessing; the country caste (supreme, domineering, conquering) is an evil; property (individual possession) is a blessing; the prop- erty caste (the domain of property of Pothier, Toullier, Troplong, &c.) is an evil.” Thus, according to M. Leroux, there is property and prop- - erty, — the one good, the other bad. Now, as it is proper to SECOND MEMOIR. 4O5 call different things by different names, if we keep the name “property” for the former, we must call the latter robbery, rapine, brigandage. If, on the contrary, we reserve the name “property” for the latter, we must designate the former by :the term possession, or some other equivalent; otherwise we should be troubled with an unpleasant synonymy. What a blessing it would be if philosophers, daring for once to say all that they think, would speak the language of ordinary mortals | Nations and rulers would derive much greater profit from their lectures, and, applying the same names to the same ideas, would come, perhaps, to understand each other. I boldly declare that, in regard to property, I hold no other opinion than that of M. Leroux; but, if I should adopt the style of the philosopher, and repeat after him, “Property is a blessing, but the property caste — the statu quo of property—is an evil,” I should be extolled as a genius by all the bachelors who write for the reviews. If, on the contrary, I prefer the classic language of Rome and the civil code, and say accordingly, “Possession is a blessing, but 1 M. Leroux has been highly praised in a review for having defended prop- erty. I do not know whether the industrious encyclopedist is pleased with the praise, but I know very well that in his place I should mourn for reason and for truth. “Le National,” on the other hand, has laughed at M. Leroux and his ideas on property, charging him with tautology and childishness. “Le National” does not wish to understand. Is it necessary to remind this journal that it has no right to deride a dogmatic philosopher, because it is without a doctrine itself? From its foundation, “Le National " has been a nursery of intriguers and rene- gades. From time to time it takes care to warn its readers. Instead of lament- ing over all its defections, the democratic sheet would do better to lay the blame on itself, and confess the shallowness of its theories. When will this organ of popular interests and the electoral reform cease to hire sceptics and spread doubt? I will wager, without going further, that M. Léon Durocher, the critic of M. Leroux, is an anonymous or pseudonymous editor of some bourgeois, or even aristocratic, journal. 4O6 WHAT IS PROPERTY property is robbery,” immediately the aforesaid bachelors. raise a hue and cry against the monster, and the judge: threatens me. Oh, the power of language The economists, questioned in their turn, propose to asso- ciate capital and labor. You know, sir, what that means. If we follow out the doctrine, we soon find that it ends in an absorption of property, not by the community, but by a gen- eral and indissoluble commandite, so that the condition of the proprietor would differ from that of the workingman only in receiving larger wages. This system, with some peculiar additions and embellishments, is the idea of the phalanstery. But it is clear that, if inequality of conditions is one of the attributes of property, it is not the whole of property. That which makes property a delightful thing, as some philosopher (I know not who) has said, is the power to dispose at will, not only of one's own goods, but of their specific nature; to use: them at pleasure; to confine and enclose them ; to excommu- nicate mankind, as M. Pierre Leroux says; in short, to make such use of them as passion, interest, or even caprice, may suggest. What is the possession of money, a. share in an agricultural or industrial enterprise, or a government-bond coupon, in comparison with the infinite charm of being mas- ter of one's house and grounds, under one's vine and fig-tree ? “Beati possidentes / " says an author quoted by M. Troplong. Seriously, can that be applied to a man of income, who has no other possession under the sun than the market, and in his pocket his money : As well maintain that a trough is a cow- yard. A nice method of reform They never cease to con- demn the thirst for gold, and the growing individualism of the century; and yet, most inconceivable of contradictions, they prepare to turn all kinds of property into one, – prop- erty in coin. SECOND MEMOIR. 4O7 I must say something further of a theory of property lately put forth with some ado: I mean the theory of M. Considé- rant. The Fourierists are not men who examine a doctrine in order to ascertain whether it conflicts with their system. On the contrary, it is their custom to exult and sing songs of triumph whenever an adversary passes without perceiving or noticing them. These gentlemen want direct refutations, in order that, if they are beaten, they may have, at least, the selfish consolation of having been spoken of. Well, let their wish be gratified. M. Considérant makes the most lofty pretensions to logic. His method of procedure is always that of major, minor, and conclusion. He would willingly write upon his hat, “Argu- mentator in barbara.” But M. Considérant is too intelligent and quick-witted to be a good logician, as is proved by the fact that he appears to have taken the syllogism for logic. The syllogism, as everybody knows who is interested in philosophical curiosities, is the first and perpetual sophism of the human mind, – the favorite tool of falsehood, the stumbling-block of science, the advocate of crime. The syl- logism has produced all the evils which the fabulist so elo- quently condemned, and has done nothing good or useful: it is as devoid of truth as of justice. We might apply to it these words of Scripture: “Celui qui met en lui sa confiance, périra.” Consequently, the best philosophers long since con- demned it; so that now none but the enemies of reason wish to make the syllogism its weapon. M. Considérant, then, has built his theory of property upon a syllogism. Would he be disposed to stake the system of Fourier upon his arguments, as I am ready to risk the whole doctrine of equality upon my refutation of that system 2 20 408 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 Such a duel would be quite in keeping with the warlike and chivalric tastes of M. Considérant, and the public would profit by it; for, one of the two adversaries falling, no more would be said about him, and there would be one grumbler less in the world. The theory of M. Considérant has this remarkable feature, that, in attempting to satisfy at the same time the claims of both laborers and proprietors, it infringes alike upon the rights of the former and the privileges of the latter. In the first place, the author lays it down as a principle : “I. That the use of the land belongs to each member of the race; that it is a natural and imprescriptible right, similar in all respects to the right to the air and the sunshine. 2. That the right to labor is equally fundamental, natural, and imprescriptible.” I have shown that the recognition of this double right would be the death of property. I denounce M. Considérant to the proprietors But M. Considérant maintains that the right to labor creates the right of property, and this is the way he reasons : — Major Premise. —“Every man legitimately possesses the thing which his labor, his skill,—or, in more general terms, his action, — has created.” To which M. Considérant adds, by way of comment: “In- deed, the land not having been created by man, it follows from the fundamental principle of property, that the land, being given to the race in common, can in no wise be the exclusive and legitimate property of such and such indi- viduals, who were not the creators of this value.” If I am not mistaken, there is no one to whom this propo- sition, at first sight and in its entirety, does not seem utterly irrefutable. Reader, distrust the syllogism. First, I observe that the words legitimately possesses signify SECOND MEMOIR. 4O9 to the author's mind is legitimate proprietor; otherwise the argument, being intended to prove the legitimacy of property, would have no meaning. I might here raise the question of the difference between property and possession, and call upon M. Considérant, before going further, to define the one and the other; but I pass on. - This first proposition is doubly false. I. In that it asserts the act of creation to be the only basis of property. 2. In that it regards this act as sufficient in all cases to authorize the right of property. And, in the first place, if man may be proprietor of the game which he does not create, but which he kills; of the fruits which he does not create, but which he gathers; of the vegetables which he does not create, but which he plants; of the animals which he does not create, but which he rears, —it is conceivable that men may in like manner become pro- prietors of the land which they do not create, but which they clear and fertilize. The act of creation, then, is not necessary to the acquisition of the right of property. I say further, that this act alone is not always sufficient, and I prove it by the second premise of M. Considérant : — Minor Premise. — “Suppose that on an isolated island, on the soil of a nation, or over the whole face of the earth (the extent of the scene of action does not affect our judgment of the facts), a generation of human beings devotes itself for the first time to industry, agriculture, manufact- ures, &c. This generation, by its labor, intelligence, and activity, creates products, develops values which did not exist on the uncultivated land. Is it not perfectly clear that the property of this industrious generation will stand on a basis of right, if the value or wealth produced by the activity of all be distributed among the producers, according to each one's assistance in the creation of the general wealth 2 That is unques- tionable.” That is quite questionable. For this value or wealth, pro- 4 IO whAT IS PROPERTY 2 duced by the activity of all, is by the very fact of its creation: collective wealth, the use of which, like that of the land, may be divided, but which as property remains undivided. And why this undivided ownership 2 Because the society which creates is itself indivisible, – a permanent unit, incapable of reduction to fractions. And it is this unity of society which makes the land common property, and which, as M. Considérant says, renders its use imprescriptible in the case of every individual. Suppose, indeed, that at a given time the soil should be equally divided ; the very next moment this division, if it allowed the right of property, would become illegitimate. Should there be the slightest irregularity in the method of transfer, men, members of society, imprescriptible possessors of the land, might be deprived at one blow of prop- erty, possession, and the means of production. In short, property in capital is indivisible, and consequently inalien- able, not necessarily when the capital is uncreated, but when it is common or collective. I confirm this theory against M. Considérant, by the third term of his syllogism:— Conclusion. —“The results of the labor performed by this generation are divisible into two classes, between which it is important clearly to distinguish. The first class includes the products of the soil which belong to this first generation in its usufructuary capacity, augmented, improved, and refined by its labor and industry. These products consist either of objects of consumption or instruments of labor. It is clear that these products are the legitimate property of those who have created them by their activity. . . . Second class. – Not only has this generation created the products just mentioned (objects of consumption and instru- ments of labor), but it has also added to the original value of the soil by cultivation, by the erection of buildings, by all the labor producing per- manent results, which it has performed. This additional value evidently constitutes a product—a value created by the activity of the first gener- ation; and if, by any means whatever, the ownership of this value be: SECOND MEMOIR. 4 II distributed among the members of society equitably, - that is, in pro- portion to the labor which each has performed, - each will legitimately possess the portion which he receives. He may then dispose of this legitimate and private property as he sees fit, — exchange it, give it away, or transfer it; and no other individual, or collection of other individuals, —that is, society, —can lay any claim to these values.” Thus, by the distribution of collective capital, to the use of which each associate, either in his own right or in right of his authors, has an imprescriptible and undivided title, there will be in the phalanstery, as in the France of 1841, the poor and the rich; some men who, to live in luxury, have only, as Tigaro says, to take the trouble to be born, and others for whom the fortune of life is but an opportunity for long-con- tinued poverty; idlers with large incomes, and workers whose fortune is always in the future; some privileged by birth and caste, and others pariahs whose sole civil and political rights are the right to labor, and the right to land. For we must not be deceived ; in the phalanstery every thing will be as it is to-day, an object of property, -machines, inventions, thought, books, the products of art, of agriculture, and of industry; animals, houses, fences, vineyards, pastures, forests, fields, — every thing, in short, except the uncultivated land. Now, would you like to know what uncultivated land is worth, according to the advocates of property “A square league 'hardly suffices for the support of a savage,” says M. Charles Comte. Estimating the wretched subsistence of this savage at three hundred francs per year, we find that the square league necessary to his life is, relatively to him, faithfully represented by a rent of fifteen francs. In France there are twenty-eight thousand square leagues, the total rent of which, by this estimate, would be four hundred and twenty thousand francs, which, when divided among nearly thirty-four millions •of people, would give each an income of a centime and a quarter. 4I 2 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 That is the new right which the great genius of Fourier has, invented in behalf of the French people, and with which his first disciple hopes to reform the world. I denounce M. Considérant to the proletariat! If the theory of * Considérant would at least really guar- antee this property which he cherishes so jealously, I might pardon him the flaws in his syllogism, certainly the best one he ever made in his life. But, no : that which M. Considérant takes for property is only a privilege of extra pay. In Fou- rier's system, neither the created capital nor the increased value of the soil are divided and appropriated in any effective manner: the instruments of labor, whether created or not, remain in the hands of the phalanx; the pretended proprietor can touch only the income. He is permitted neither to real- ize his share of the stock, nor to possess it exclusively, nor to administer it, whatever it be. The cashier throws him his dividend; and then, proprietor, eat the whole if you can The system of Fourier would not suit the proprietors, since it takes away the most delightful feature of property, - the free disposition of one's goods. It would please the commu- nists no better, since it involves unequal conditions. It is. repugnant to the friends of free association and equality, in consequence of its tendency to wipe out human character and individuality by suppressing possession, family, and country, the threefold expression of the human personality. Of all our active publicists, none seem to me more fertile in resources, richer in imagination, more luxuriant and varied in style, than M. Considérant. Nevertheless, I doubt if he will undertake to reëstablish his theory of property. If he has this courage, this is what I would say to him: “Before writing your reply, consider well your plan of action; do not scour the country; have recourse to none of your ordinary. SECOND MEMOIR. 4 I 3 expedients; no complaints of civilization ; no sarcasms upon equality; no glorification of the phalanstery. Leave Fourier and the departed in peace, and endeavor only to re-adjust the pieces of your syllogism. To this end, you ought, first, to analyze closely each proposition of your adversary; second, to show the error, either by a direct refutation, or by proving the converse; third, to oppose argument to argument, so that, objection and reply meeting face to face, the stronger may break down the weaker, and shiver it to atoms. By that method only can you boast of having conquered, and compel me to regard you as an honest reasoner, and a good artillery- man.” I should have no excuse for tarrying longer with these phal- ansterian crotchets, if the obligation which I have imposed upon myself of making a clean sweep, and the necessity of vindicating my dignity as a writer, did not prevent me from passing in silence the reproach uttered against me by a cor- respondent of “La Phalange.” “We have seen but lately,” says this journalist,” “that M. Proudhon, enthusiast as he has been for the science created by Fourier, is, or will be, an en- thusiast for any thing else whatsoever.” If ever sectarians had the right to reproach another for changes in his beliefs, this right certainly does not belong to the disciples of Fourier, who are always so eager to adminis- ter the phalansterian baptism to the deserters of all parties. But why regard it as a crime, if they are sincere? Of what consequence is the constancy or inconstancy of an individual to the truth which is always the same 2 It is better to en- lighten men's minds than to teach them to be obstinate in their prejudices. Do we not know that man is frail and 1 “Impartial,” of Besançon. 4. I4. whAT IS PROPERTY 2 fickle, that his heart is full of delusions, and that his lips are a distillery of falsehood 2 Omnis homo mendar. Whether we will or no, we all serve for a time as instruments of this truth, whose kingdom comes every day. God alone is immu- table, because he is eternal. That is the reply which, as a general rule, an honest man is entitled always to make, and which I ought perhaps to be content to offer as an excuse; for I am no better than my fathers. But, in a century of doubt and apostasy like ours, when it is of importance to set the small and the weak an example of strength and honesty of utterance, I must not suffer my character as a public assailant of property to be dishonored. I must render an account of my old opinions. Examining myself, therefore, upon this charge of Fourier- ism, and endeavoring to refresh my memory, I find that, having been connected with the Fourierists in my studies and my friendships, it is possible that, without knowing it, I have been one of Fourier's partisans. Jérôme Lalande placed Napoleon and Jesus Christ in his catalogue of atheists. The Fourierists resemble this astronomer: if a man happens to find fault with the existing civilization, and to admit the truth of a few of their criticisms, they straightway enlist him, willy- nilly, in their school. Nevertheless, I do not deny that I have been a Fourierist; for, since they say it, of course it may be so. But, sir, that of which my ex-associates are igno- rant, and which doubtless will astonish you, is that I have been many other things, – in religion, by turns a Protestant, a Papist, an Arian and Semi-Arian, a Manichean, a Gnostic, an Adamite even and a Pre-Adamite, a Sceptic, a Pelagian, a Socinian, an Anti-Trinitarian, and a Neo-Christian;" in phi- * The Arians deny the divinity of Christ. The Semi-Arians differ from the Arians only by a few subtle distinctions. M. Pierre Leroux, who regards Jesus SECOND MEMOIR. 4 I 5 losophy and politics, an Idealist, a Pantheist, a Platonist, a Cartesian, an Eclectic (that is, a sort of juste-milieu), a Mon- archist, an Aristocrat, a Constitutionalist, a follower of Ba- beuf, and a Communist. I have wandered through a whole encyclopaedia of systems. Do you think it surprising, sir, that, among them all, I was for a short time a Fourierist 2 as a man, but claims that the Spirit of God was infused into him, is a true Semi-Arian. The Manicheans admit two co-existent and eternal principles, – God and matter, spirit and flesh, light and darkness, good and evil; but, unlike the Phalansterians, who pretend to reconcile the two, the Manicheans make war upon matter, and labor with all their might for the destruction of the flesh, by condemning marriage and forbidding reproduction, — which does not prevent them, however, from indulging in all the carnal pleasures which the intensest lust can conceive of. In this last particular, the tendency of the Fourieristic morality is quite Manichean. The Gnostics do not differ from the early Christians. As their name indi- cates, they regarded themselves as inspired. Fourier, who held peculiar ideas concerning the visions of somnambulists, and who believed in the possibility of developing the magnetic power to such an extent as to enable us to commune with invisible beings, might, if he were living, pass also for a Gnostic. The Adamites attend mass entirely naked, from motives of chastity. Jean Jacques Rousseau, who took the sleep of the senses for chastity, and who saw in modesty only a refinement of pleasure, inclined towards Adamism. I know such a sect, whose members usually celebrate their mysteries in the costume of Venus coming from the bath. The Pre-Adamites believe that men existed before the first man. I once met a Pre-Adamite. True, he was deaf and a Fourierist. The Pelagians deny grace, and attribute all the merit of good works to lib- erty. The Fourierists, who teach that man's nature and passions are good, are reversed Pelagians; they give all to grace, and nothing to liberty. The Socinians, deists in all other respects, admit an original revelation. Many people are Socinians to-day, who do not suspect it, and who regard their opinions as new. The Neo-Christians are those simpletons who admire Christianity because it has produced bells and cathedrals. Base in soul, corrupt in heart, dissolute in mind and senses, the Neo-Christians seek especially after the external form, and admire religion, as they love women, for its physical beauty. They believe in a coming revelation, as well as a transfiguration of Catholicism. They will sing masses at the grand spectacle in the phalanstery 416 whAT IS PROPERTY P For my part, I am not at all surprised, although at present IT have no recollection of it. One thing is sure, — that my superstition and credulity reached their height at the very period of my life which my critics reproachfully assign as the date of my Fourieristic beliefs. Now I hold quite other views. My mind no longer admits that which is demon- strated by syllogisms, analogies, or metaphors, which are the methods of the phalanstery, but demands a process of gener- alization ind induction which excludes error. Of my past opinions, I retain absolutely none. I have acquired some Ánowledge. I no longer believe. I either know, or am igno- rant. In a word, in seeking for the reason of things, I saw that I was a rationalist. Undoubtedly, it would have been simpler to begin where I have ended. But then, if such is the law of the human mind;. if all society, for six thousand years, has done nothing but fall into error; if all mankind are still buried in the darkness. of faith, deceived by their prejudices and passions, guided only by the instinct of their leaders; if my accusers, them- selves, are not free from sectarianism (for they call themselves. Fourierists), — am I alone inexcusable for having, in my inner self, at the secret tribunal of my conscience, begun anew the journey of our poor humanity ? I would by no means, then, deny my errors; but, sir, that which distinguishes me from those who rush into print is the fact that, though my thoughts have varied much, my writings do not vary. To-day, even, and on a multitude of questions, . I am beset by a thousand extravagant and contradictory opin- ions; but my opinions I do not print, for the public has noth- ing to do with them. Before addressing my fellow-men, I wait until light breaks in upon the chaos of my ideas, in order that what I may say may be, not the whole truth (no man can. know that), but nothing but the truth. & SECOND MEMOIR. 4 I 7 This singular disposition of my mind to first identify itself with a system in order to better understand it, and then to reflect upon it in order to test its legitimacy, is the very thing which disgusted me with Fourier, and ruined in my esteem the societary school.' To be a faithful Fourierist, in fact, one must abandon his reason and accept every thing from a mas- ter, doctrine, interpretation, and application. M. Consid- érant, whose excessive intolerance anathematizes all who do not abide by his sovereign decisions, has no other concep- tion of Fourierism. Has he not been appointed Fourier's vicar on earth and pope of a Church which, unfortunately for its apostles, will never be of this world 2 Passive belief is the theological virtue of all sectarians, especially of the Fourierists. Now, this is what happened to me. While trying to demon- strate by argument the religion of which I had become a fol- lower in studying Fourier, I suddenly perceived that by reasoning I was becoming incredulous; that on each article of the creed my reason and my faith were at variance, and that my six weeks' labor was wholly lost. I saw that the Fourierists—in spite of their inexhaustible gabble, and their extravagant pretension to decide in all things — were neither savants, nor logicians, nor even believers; that they were scientific quacks, who were led more by their self-love than their conscience to labor for the triumph of their sect, and to whom all means were good that would reach that end. I then understood why to the Epicureans they promised women, wine, music, and a sea of luxury ; to the rigorists, mainten- ance of marriage, purity of morals, and temperance; to labor- ers, high wages; to proprietors, large incomes; to philosophers, solutions the secret of which Fourier alone possessed; to priests, a costly religion and magnificent festivals; to savants, 4.18 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 knowledge of an unimaginable nature; to each, indeed, that which he most desired. In the beginning, this seemed to me droll; in the end, I regarded it as the height of impudence. No, sir; no one yet knows of the foolishness and infamy which the phalansterian system contains. That is a subject which I mean to treat as soon as I have balanced my accounts with property." It is rumored that the Fourierists think of leaving France and going to the new world to found a phalanstery. When a house threatens to fall, the rats scamper away; that is because they are rats. Men do better; they rebuild it. Not long since, the St. Simonians, despairing of their country which paid no heed to them, proudly shook the dust from their feet, and started for the Orient to fight the battle of free woman. Pride, wilfulness, mad selfishness! True charity, like true faith, does not worry, never despairs; it seeks neither its own glory, nor its interest, nor empire; it does every thing for all, speaks with indulgence to the reason and the will, and de- sires to conquer only by persuasion and sacrifice. Remain in France, Fourierists, if the progress of humanity is the only thing which you have at heart! There is more to do here than in the new world. Otherwise, go! you are nothing but liars and hypocrites The foregoing statement by no means embraces all the political elements, all the opinions and tendencies, which threaten the future of property; but it ought to satisfy any 1. It should be understood that the above refers only to the moral and politi- cal doctrines of Fourier, —doctrines which, like all philosophical and religious systems, have their root and raison d'existence in society itself, and for this reason deserve to be examined. The peculiar speculations of Fourier and his sect concerning cosmogony, geology, natural history, physiology, and psychol- ogy, I leave to the attention of those who would think it their duty to seriously refute the fables of Blue Beard and the Ass's Skin. SECOND MEMOIR. 4 IQ one who knows how to classify facts, and to deduce their law or the idea which governs them. Existing society seems abandoned to the demon of falsehood and discord; and it is this sad sight which grieves so deeply many distinguished minds who lived too long in a former age to be able to under- stand ours. Now, while the short-sighted spectator begins to despair of humanity, and, distracted and cursing that of which he is ignorant, plunges into scepticism and fatalism, the true observer, certain of the spirit which governs the world, seeks to comprehend and fathom Providence. The memoir on “Property,” published last year by the pensioner of the Acad- emy of Besançon, is simply a study of this nature. The time has come for me to relate the history of this un- lucky treatise, which has already caused me so much chagrin, and made me so unpopular; but which was on my part so involuntary and unpremeditated, that I would dare to affirm that there is not an economist, not a philosopher, not a jurist, who is not a hundred times guiltier than I. There is some- thing so singular in the way in which I was led to attack property, that if, on hearing my sad story, you persist, sir, in your blame, I hope at least you will be forced to pity me. I never have pretended to be a great politician ; far from that, I always have felt for controversies of a political nature the greatest aversion ; and if, in my “Essay on Property,” I have sometimes ridiculed our politicians, believe, sir, that I was governed much less by my pride in the little that I know, than by my vivid consciousness of their ignorance and exces- sive vanity. Relying more on Providence than on men; not suspecting at first that politics, like every other science, con- tained an absolute truth ; agreeing equally well with Bossuet and Jean Jacques, – I accepted with resignation my share of Human misery, and contented myself with praying to God for 42O whAT IS PROPERTY good deputies, upright ministers, and an honest king. By taste as well as by discretion and lack of confidence in my powers, I was slowly pursuing some commonplace studies in philology, mingled with a little metaphysics, when I suddenly fell upon the greatest problem that ever has occupied philo- sophical minds: I mean the criterion of certainty. Those of my readers who are unacquainted with the philo- sophical terminology will be glad to be told in a few words what this criterion is, which plays so great a part in my work. The criterion of certainty, according to the philosophers, will be, when discovered, an infallible method of establishing the truth of an opinion, a judgment, a theory, or a system, in nearly the same way as gold is recognized by the touchstone, as iron approaches the magnet, or, better still, as we verify a mathematical operation by applying the proof. Time has hitherto served as a sort of criterion for society. Thus, the primitive men —having observed that they were not all equal in strength, beauty, and labor— judged, and rightly, that cer- tain ones among them were called by nature to the perform- ance of simple and common functions; but they concluded, and this is where their error lay, that these same individuals of duller intellect, more restricted genius, and weaker person- ality, were predestined to serve the others; that is, to labor while the latter rested, and to have no other will than theirs: and from this idea of a natural subordination among men sprang domesticity, which, voluntarily accepted at first, was imperceptibly converted into horrible slavery. Time, making this error more palpable, has brought about justice. Nations have learned at their own cost that the subjection of man to man is a false idea, an erroneous theory, pernicious alike to master and to slave. And yet such a social system has stood SECOND MEMOIR. 42 I several thousand years, and has been defended by celebrated philosophers; even to-day, under somewhat mitigated forms, sophists of every description uphold and extol it. But experi- ence is bringing it to an end. Time, then, is the criterion of societies ; thus looked at, history is the demonstration of the errors of humanity by the argument reductio ad absurdum. Now, the criterion sought for by metaphysicians would have the advantage of discriminating at once between the true and the false in every opinion; so that in politics, religion, and morals, for example, the true and the useful being imme- diately recognized, we should no longer need to await the sorrowful experience of time. Evidently such a secret would be death to the sophists, – that cursed brood, who, under differ- ent names, excite the curiosity of nations, and, owing to the difficulty of separating the truth from the error in their artis- tically woven theories, lead them into fatal ventures, disturb their peace, and fill them with such extraordinary prejudice. Up to this day, the criterion of certainty remains a mystery; this is owing to the multitude of criteria that have been successively proposed. Some have taken for an absolute and definite criterion the testimony of the senses; others intui- tion; these evidence; those argument. M. Lamennais affirms that there is no other criterion than universal reason. Before him, M. de Bonald thought he had discovered it in language. Quite recently, M. Buchez has proposed morality; and, to har- monize them all, the eclectics have said that it was absurd to seek for an absolute criterion, since there were as many crite- ria as special orders of knowledge. Of all these hypotheses it may be observed, That the testi- mony of the senses is not a criterion, because the senses, Jrelating us only to phenomena, furnish us with no ideas; that 422 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 intuition needs external confirmation or objective certainty; that evidence requires proof, and argument verification ; that universal reason has been wrong many a time; that language serves equally well to express the true or the false; that moral- ity, like all the rest, needs demonstration and rule; and finally, that the eclectic idea is the least reasonable of all, since it is of no use to say that there are several criteria if we cannot point out one. I very much fear that it will be with the cri- terion as with the philosopher's stone; that it will finally be abandoned, not only as insolvable, but as chimerical. Conse- quently, I entertain no hopes of having found it; nevertheless, I am not sure that some one more skilful will not discover it. Be it as it may with regard to a criterion or criteria, there are methods of demonstration which, when applied to certain subjects, may lead to the discovery of unknown truths, bring to light relations hitherto unsuspected, and lift a paradox to the highest degree of certainty. In such a case, it is not by its novelty, nor even by its content, that a system should be judged, but by its method. The critic, then, should follow the example of the Supreme Court, which, in the cases which come before it, never examines the facts, but only the form of procedure. Now, what is the form of procedure ? A method. I then looked to see what philosophy, in the absence of a criterion, had accomplished by the aid of special methods, and I must say that I could not discover — in spite of the loudly-proclaimed pretensions of some—that it had produced any thing of real value; and, at last, wearied with the philo- sophical twaddle, I resolved to make a new search for the criterion. I confess it, to my shame, this folly lasted for two years, and I am not yet entirely rid of it. It was like seeking a needle in a haystack. I might have learned Chi-- SECOND MEMOIR. 423 nese or Arabic in the time that I have lost in considering and reconsidering syllogisms, in rising to the summit of an induc- tion as to the top of a ladder, in inserting a proposition be- tween the horns of a dilemma, in decomposing, distinguishing, separating, denying, affirming, admitting, as if I could pass abstractions through a sieve. I selected justice as the subject-matter of my experiments. Finally, after a thousand decompositions, recompositions, and double compositions, I found at the bottom of my analytical crucible, not the criterion of certainty, but a metaphysico- economico-political treatise, whose conclusions were such that I did not care to present them in a more artistic or, if you will, more intelligible form. The effect which this work pro- duced upon all classes of minds gave me an idea of the spirit of our age, and did not cause me to regret the prudent and scientific obscurity of my style. How happens it that to-day I am obliged to defend my intentions, when my conduct bears the evident impress of such lofty morality ? You have read my work, sir, and you know the gist of my tedious and scholastic lucubrations. Considering the revolu- tions of humanity, the vicissitudes of empires, the transfor- mations of property, and the innumerable forms of justice and of right, I asked, “Are the evils which afflict us inherent in our condition as men, or do they arise only from an error? This inequality of fortunes which all admit to be the cause of society's embarrassments, is it, as some assert, the effect of Nature ; or, in the division of the products of labor and the soil, may there not have been some error in calculation? Does each laborer receive all that is due him, and only that which is due him In short, in the present conditions of labor, wages, and exchange, is no one wronged 2–are the accounts well kept 2—is the social balance accurate ’’’ 424 whAT IS PROPERTY 2 Then I commenced a most laborious investigation. It was necessary to arrange informal notes, to discuss contradictory titles, to reply to captious allegations, to refute absurd preten- sions, and to describe fictitious debts, dishonest transactions, and fraudulent accounts. In order to triumph over quibblers, I had to deny the authority of custom, to examine the argu- ments of legislators, and to oppose science with science itself. Finally, all these operations completed, I had to give a judi- 'cial decision. I therefore declared, my hand upon my heart, before God and men, that the causes of social inequality are three in number: I. Gratuitous appropriation of collective wealth : 2. Inequality in exchange; 3. The right of profit or increase. And since this threefold method of extortion is the very essence of the domain of property, I denied the legitimacy of property, and proclaimed its identity with robbery. That is my only offence. I have reasoned upon property; I have searched for the criterion of justice; I have demon- strated, not the possibility, but the necessity, of equality of fortunes; I have allowed myself no attack upon persons, no assault upon the government, of which I, more than any one else, am a provisional adherent. If I have sometimes used the word proprietor, I have used it as the abstract name of a metaphysical being, whose reality breathes in every individ- ual, - not alone in a privileged few. Nevertheless, I acknowledge—for I wish my confession to be sincere—that the general tone of my book has been bit- terly censured. They complain of an atmosphere of passion and invective unworthy of an honest man, and quite out of place in the treatment of so grave a subject. If this reproach is well founded (which it is impossible for me either to deny or admit, because in my own cause I can- SECOND MEMOIR. 4.25 not be judge), – if, I say, I deserve this charge, I can only humble myself and acknowledge myself guilty of an invol- untary wrong; the only excuse that I could offer being of such a nature that it ought not to be communicated to the public. All that I can say is, that I understand better than any one how the anger which injustice causes may render an author harsh and violent in his criticisms. When, after twenty years of labor, a man still finds himself on the brink of starvation, and then suddenly discovers in an equivoca- tion, an error in calculation, the cause of the evil which tor- ments him in common with so many millions of his fellows, he can scarcely restrain a cry of sorrow and dismay. But, sir, though pride be offended by my rudeness, it is not to pride that I apologize, but to the proletaires, to the simple- minded, whom I perhaps have scandalized. My angry dia- lectics may have produced a bad effect on some peaceable minds. Some poor workingman — more affected by my sar- casm than by the strength of my arguments — may, perhaps, have concluded that property is the result of a perpetual Machiavelianism on the part of the governors against the gov- erned,—a deplorable error of which my book itself is the best refutation. I devoted two chapters to showing how property springs from human personality and the comparison of indi. viduals. Then I explained its perpetual limitation ; and, following out the same idea, I predicted its approaching disappearance. How, then, could the editors of the “Revue Démocratique,” after having borrowed from me nearly the whole substance of their economical articles, dare to say: “The holders of the soil, and other productive capital, are more or less wilful accomplices in a vast robbery, they being ...the exclusive receivers and sharers of the stolen goods”? The proprietors wilfully guilty of the crime of robbery! 426 WHAT IS I ROPERTY Never did that homicidal phrase escape my pen; never did. my heart conceive the frightful thought. Thank Heaven I know not how to calumniate my kind; and I have too strong a desire to seek for the reason of things to be willing to be- lieve in criminal conspiracies. The millionnaire is no more tainted by property than the journeyman who works for thirty sous per day. On both sides the error is equal, as well as the intention. The effect is also the same, though positive in the former, and negative in the latter. I accused property; I did not denounce the proprietors, which would have been absurd.: and I am sorry that there are among us wills so per- verse and minds so shattered that they care for only so much of the truth as will aid them in their evil designs. Such is the only regret which I feel on account of my indignation, which, though expressed perhaps too bitterly, was at least honest, and legitimate in its source. However, what did I do in this essay which I voluntarily submitted to the Academy of Moral Sciences 2 Seeking a fixed axiom amid social uncertainties, I traced back to one fundamental question all the secondary questions over which, at present, so keen and diversified a conflict is raging. This . question was the right of property. Then, comparing all existing theories with each other, and extracting from them that which is common to them all, I endeavored to discover that element in the idea of property which is necessary, im-- mutable, and absolute; and asserted, after authentic verifica- tion, that this idea is reducible to that of individual and transmissible possession ; susceptible of exchange, but not of alienation ; founded on labor, and not on fictitious occupancy, . or idle caprice. I said, further, that this idea was the result. of our revolutionary movements, – the culminating point to- wards which all opinions, gradually divesting themselves oft SECOND MEMOIR. 427 their contradictory elements, converge. And I tried to dem- onstrate this by the spirit of the laws, by political economy, by psychology and history. A Father of the Church, finishing a learned exposition of the Catholic doctrine, cried, in the enthusiasm of his faith, “Domine, si error est, a te decepti sumus (if my religion is false, God is to blame).” I, as well as this theologian, can say, “If equality is a fable, God, through whom we act and think and are ; God, who governs society by eternal laws, who rewards just nations, and punishes proprietors, – God alone is the author of evil: God has lied. The fault lies not with me.” But, if I am mistaken in my inferences, I should be shown my error, and led out of it. It is surely worth the trouble, and I think I deserve this honor. There is no ground for proscription. For, in the words of that member of the Con- vention who did not like the guillotine, to kill is not to reply. TJntil then, I persist in regarding my work as useful, social, full of instruction for public officials, — worthy, in short, of reward and encouragement. For there is one truth of which I am profoundly convinced, — nations live by absolute ideas, not by approximate and par- tial conceptions; therefore, men are needed who define prin- ciples, or at least test them in the fire of controversy. Such is the law, - the idea first, the pure idea, the understanding of the laws of God, the theory: practice follows with slow steps, cautious, attentive to the succession of events; sure to seize, towards this eternal meridian, the indications of supreme reason. The co-operation of theory and practice produces in humanity the realization of order, — the absolute truth." 1 A writer for the radical press, M. Louis Raybaud, said, in the preface to lis “Studies of Contemporary Reformers: ” “Who does not know that mo- 428 whAT IS PROPERTY P All of us, as long as we live, are called, each in proportion to his strength, to this sublime work. The only duty which it imposes upon us is to refrain from appropriating the truth to ourselves, either by concealing it, or by accommodating it to the temper of the century, or by using it for our own interests. This principle of conscience, so grand and so simple, has always been present in my thought. Consider, in fact, sir, that which I might have done, but did not wish to do. I reason on the most honorable hypothe- sis. What hindered me from concealing, for some years to come, the abstract theory of the equality of fortunes, and, at the same time, from criticising constitutions and codes; from showing the absolute and the contingent, the immutable and the ephemeral, the eternal and the transitory, in laws present and past; from constructing a new system of legislation, and establishing on a solid foundation this social edifice, ever de- stroyed and as often rebuilt? Might I not, taking up the definitions of casuists, have clearly shown the cause of their contradictions and uncertainties, and supplied, at the same time, the inadequacies of their conclusions 2 Might I not rality is relative Aside from a few grand sentiments which are strikingly instinctive, the measure of human acts varies with nations and climates, and only civilization—the progressive education of the race—can lead to a uni- versal morality. . . . The absolute escapes our contingent and finite nature; the absolute is the secret of God.” God keep from evil M. Louis Raybaud I But I cannot help remarking that all political apostates begin by the negation of the absolute, which is really the negation of truth. What can a writer, who, professes scepticism, have in common with radical views 7 What has he to say to his readers ? What judgment is he entitled to pass upon contemporary reformers ? M. Raybaud thought it would seem wise to repeat an old imperti- nence of the legist, and that may serve him for an excuse. We all have these: weaknesses. But I am surprised that a man of so much intelligence as M. Ray- baud, who studies systems, fails to see the very thing he ought first to recognize,. — namely, that systems are the progress of the mind towards the absolute. SECOND MEMOIR. 429 have confirmed this labor by a vast historical exposition, in which the principle of exclusion, and of the accumulation of property, the appropriation of collective wealth, and the radi- cal vice in exchanges, would have figured as the constant causes of tyranny, war, and revolution ? “It should have been done,” you say. Do not doubt, sir, that such a task would have required more patience than genius. With the principles of social economy which I have analyzed, I would have had only to break the ground, and fol- low the furrow. The critic of laws finds nothing more diffi- cult than to determine justice: the labor alone would have been longer. Oh, if I had pursued this glittering prospect, and, like the man of the burning bush, with inspired counte- nance and deep and solemn voice, had presented myself some day with new tables, there would have been found fools to admire, boobies to applaud, and cowards to offer me the dic- tatorship; for, in the way of popular infatuations, nothing is impossible. But, sir, after this monument of insolence and pride, what should I have deserved in your opinion, at the tribunal of God, and in the judgment of free men 2 Death, sir, and eternal reprobation I therefore spoke the truth as soon as I saw it, waiting only long enough to give it proper expression. I pointed out error in order that each might reform himself, and render his labors more useful. I announced the existence of a new polit- ical element, in order that my associates in reform, develop- ing it in concert, might arrive more promptly at that unity of principles which alone can assure to society a better day. I expected to receive, if not for my book, at least for my com- mendable conduct, a small republican ovation. And, behold ! journalists denounce me, academicians curse me, political 43O whAT IS PROPERTY 2 adventurers (great God 1) think to niake themselves tolerable by protesting that they are not ilke me ! I give the formula by which the whole social edifice i,\ay be scientifically recon- structed, and the strongest minds repreach. ºne for being able only to destroy. The rest despise me, because I an: unknown When the “Essay on Property” fell into the reformatory camp, some asked: “Who has spoken 2 Is it Arago 2 Is it Lamennais ? Michel de Bourges or Garnier-Pages 2 " An. when they heard the name of a new man : “We do not know. him,” they would reply. Thus, the monopoly of thei-ght, property in reason, oppresses the proletariat as well as tº:* Bourgeoisie. The worship of the infamous prevails even on the steps of the tabernacle. But what am I saying 2 May evil befall me, if I blame the poor creatures | Oh ! let us not despise those generous souls, who in the excitement of their patriotism are always prompt to identify the voice of their chiefs with the truth. Let us encourage rather their simple credulity, enlighten com- placently and tenderly their precious sincerity, and reserve our shafts for those vain-glorious spirits who are always ad- miring their genius, and, in different tongues, caressing the people in order to govern them. These considerations alone oblige me to reply to the strange and superficial conclusions of the “Journal du Peuple” (issue of Oct. II, 1840), on the question of property. I leave, there- fore, the journalist to address myself only to his readers. I hope that the self-love of the writer will not be offended, if, in the presence of the masses, I ignore an individual. You say, proletaires of the “Peuple,” “For the very reason that men and things exist, there always will be men who will possess things; nothing, therefore, can destroy property.” In speaking thus, you unconsciously argue exactly after the SECOND MEMOIR. 43 I manner of M. Cousin, who always reasons from possession to froperty. This coincidence, however, does not surprise me. M. Cousin is a philosopher of much mind, and you, prole- taires, have still more. Certainly it is honorable, even for a philosopher, to be your companion in error. Originally, the word property was synonymous with proper or individual possession. It designated each individual's special right to the use of a thing. But when this right of use, inert (if I may say so) as it was with regard to the other usufructuaries, became active and paramount, — that is, when the usufructuary converted his right to personally use the thing into the right to use it by his neighbor's labor, — then property changed its nature, and its idea became complex. The legists knew this very well, but instead of opposing, as they ought, this accumulation of profits, they accepted and sanctioned the whole. And as the right of farm-rent necesa- rily implies the right of use, – in other words, as the right to cultivate land by the labor of a slave supposes one's power to cultivate it himself, according to the principle that the greater includes the less, – the name property was reserved to desig- nate this double right, and that of possession was adopted to designate the right of use. Whence property came to be called the perfect right, the right of domain, the eminent right, the heroic or quiritaire right, — in Latin, jus perfectum, fus optimum, jus quiritarium, jus dominii, - while possession be- came assimilated to farm-rent. Now, that individual possession exists of right, or, better, from natural necessity, all philosophers admit, and can easily be demonstrated ; but when, in imitation of M. Cousin, we assume it to be the basis of the domain of property, we fall into the sophism called sophisma amphiboliae vel ambiguitatis, which consists in changing the meaning by a verbal equivo- cation. 4.32 whAT IS PROPERTY P People often think themselves very profound, because, by the aid of expressions of extreme generality, they appear to rise to the height of absolute ideas, and thus deceive inexpe- rienced minds; and, what is worse, this is commonly called examining abstractions. But the abstraction formed by the comparison of identical facts is one thing, while that which is deduced from different acceptations of the same term is quite another. The first gives the universal idea, the axiom, the law ; the second indicates the order of generation of ideas. All our errors arise from the constant confusion of these two kinds of abstractions. In this particular, languages and phi- losophies are alike deficient. The less common an idiom is, and the more obscure its terms, the more prolific is it as a source of error: a philosopher is sophistical in proportion to his ignorance of any method of neutralizing this imperfection in language. If the art of correcting the errors of speech by scientific methods is ever discovered, then philosophy will have found its criterion of certainty. Now, then, the difference between property and possession being well established, and it being settled that the former, for the reasons which I have just given, must necessarily dis- appear, is it best, for the slight advantage of restoring an ety- mology, to retain the word property? My opinion is that it would be very unwise to do so, and I will tell why. I quote from the “Journal du Peuple:” — “To the legislative power belongs the right to regulate property, to prescribe the conditions of acquiring, possessing, and transmitting it. . . It cannot be denied that inheritance, assessment, commerce, industry, g labor, and wages require the most important modifications.” You wish, proletaires, to regulate property; that is, you wish to destroy it and reduce it to the right of possession. For to regulate property without the consent of the proprie- SECOND MEMOIR, 433. tors is to deny the right of domain ; to associate employees. with proprietors is to destroy the eminent right; to suppress or even reduce farm-rent, house-rent, revenue, and increase generally, is to annihilate perfect property. Why, then, while laboring with such laudable enthusiasm for the establish- ment of equality, should you retain an expression whose equivocal meaning will always be an obstacle in the way of your success 2 There you have the first reason — a wholly philosophical one—for rejecting not only the thing, but the name, prop- erty. Here now is the political, the highest reason. Every social revolution — M. Cousin will tell you — is effected only by the realization of an idea, either political, moral, or religious. When Alexander conquered Asia, his idea was to avenge Greek liberty against the insults of Ori- ental despotism ; when Marius and Caesar overthrew the Roman patricians, their idea was to give bread to the people; when Christianity revolutionized the world, its idea was to emancipate mankind, and to substitute the worship of one God for the deities of Epicurus and Homer; when France rose in '89, her idea was liberty and equality before the law. There has been no true revolution, says M. Cousin, with- out its idea ; so that where an idea does not exist, or even fails of a formal expression, revolution is impossible. There are mobs, conspirators, rioters, regicides. There are no revo- lutionists. Society, devoid of ideas, twists and tosses about, and dies in the midst of its fruitless labor. Nevertheless, you all feel that a revolution is to come, and that you alone can accomplish it. What, then, is the idea which governs you, proletaires of the nineteenth century 2– for really I cannot call you revolutionists. What do you -bink 2–what do you believe – what do you want 2 Be 434 what Is PROPERTY guarded in your reply. I have read faithfully your favorite journals, your most esteemed authors. I find everywhere only vain and puerile entités; nowhere do I discover an idea. g I will explain the meaning of this word entité, -new, with- out doubt, to most of you. By entité is generally understood a substance which the imagination grasps, but which is incognizable by the senses and the reason. Thus the soporific power of opium, of which Sganarelle speaks, and the peccant humors of ancient medi- cine, are entités. The entité is the support of those who do not wish to confess their ignorance. It is incomprehensible; or, as St. Paul says, the argumentum non apparentium. In philosophy, the entité is often only a repetition of words which add nothing to the thought. For example, when M. Pierre Leroux—who says so many excellent things, but who is too fond, in my opinion, of his Platonic formulas —assures us that the evils of humanity are due to our ignorance of life, M. Pierre Leroux utters an entité; for it is evident that if we are evil it is because we do not know how to live; but the knowledge of this fact is of no value to us. When M. Edgar Quinet declares that France suffers and declines because there is an antagonism of men and of inter-